Clans, Authoritarian Rulers, and Parliaments in Central Asia

Clans, Authoritarian Rulers, and Parliaments in Central Asia S. Frederick Starr

SILK ROAD PAPER June 2006

Clans, Authoritarian Rulers, and Parliaments in Central Asia

S. Frederick Starr

© Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program – A Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, 1619 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036 Uppsala University, Box 514, 75120 Uppsala, Sweden www.silkroadstudies.org

“Clans, Authoritarian Rulers, and Parliaments in Central Asia” is a Silk Road Paper produced by the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. The Silk Road Papers series is the Occasional Papers series of the Joint Center, published jointly on topical and timely subjects. It is edited by Svante E. Cornell, Research and Publications Director of the Joint Center. The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program is a joint transatlantic independent and privately funded research and policy center. The Joint Center has offices in Washington and Uppsala, and is affiliated with the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University and the Department of Eurasian Studies of Uppsala University. The Joint Center is the first of its kind and is today firmly established as a leading focus of research and policy worldwide, serving a large and diverse community of analysts, scholars, policy-watchers, business leaders and journalists. The Joint Center aims to be at the forefront of research on issues of conflict, security and development in the region; and to function as a focal point for academic, policy, and public discussion of the region through its applied research, its publications, teaching, research cooperation, public lectures and seminars.

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Table of Contents

Summary and Recommendations ..................................................................... 4 1. Central Asia’s Dual Political Systems........................................................... 6 2. Family Networks, Regional Power Centers, and Economic Barons............7 3. How the Soviet System Dealt with the Power Brokers or “Clans” ........... 8 4. Politics A, Politics B, and the “Authoritarian” Rulers ............................... 10 5. Presidential Power, Parliaments, and Politics B .......................................... 11 6. A Further Paradox: The Deficit of Government Under Authoritarian Rule...12 7. Why “Civil Society” May Not be an Effective Agent of Change ........... 14 8. Why Presidential Elections Are Weak Agents of Reform ........................ 16 9. Parliamentary Elections as a More Promising Arena of Change .............. 17 10. The Role of Parliamentary Practice........................................................... 19 11. The Role of Political Parties ........................................................................21 12. Concluding Note: the EU and Domestic Politics in Central Asia ........... 25

Summary and Recommendations

This Silk Road Paper was written by S. Frederick Starr at the request of the Policy Panning Unit of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was commissioned after a joint seminar s conducted in Helsinki in January 2006, focusing on priorities toward the Caucasus and Central Asia for the Finnish EU Presidency in the second half of 2006. The writer is grateful to the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for this initiative and for its support for this research. The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union, the Finnish government, or the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ●

Clans, regional elites, and financial magnates are a formidable presence in the politics of all Central Asian countries. Working behind the scenes, they have placed leaders in power for over forty years and define the nature of politics today.

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The fundamental political dynamic in each country is between the president and these power brokers, not between president and parliament, as is often assumed in the West. Any effort to advance democratic norms must be built on the recognition of this reality.

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Because of their lack of resources and personnel and their dependence on largely invisible power brokers, “authoritarian” rulers view themselves as weak. The countries they rule are in fact not over-governed but “under-governed.”

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The presidents’ desire to emancipate themselves from control by the power brokers who put them in office and thus strengthen their rule can lead them to look favorably on parliaments and parliamentary elections, albeit for their own purposes. This is true even though parliaments may ultimately challenge the rulers’ authority.

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Day-to-day parliamentary practice helps create a political class and concept of citizenship that is independent both of the authoritarian

rulers and of the clans, magnates, and regional power brokers who put the parliamentarians in office. ●

Recognizing the above, Europe, in its efforts to advance democratization, should: 1. Focus more on parliamentary elections than on presidential elections, as these have the greatest potential for advancing the concept of citizenship with the least threat to overall stability. 2. Focus more on parliamentary practice and on political parties through exchanges and support, rather than on the development of NGOs. The day-to–day practice of parliaments and parties develops a political class that in turn reshapes government at both the local and national levels. NGOs, by contrast, are generally viewed as the creations of external interests and not part of the normal political process. 3. Pressure to remove authoritarian rulers is likely to lead either to the indefinite prolongation of their rule or to a descent into crises. The most likely outcome of crises in Central Asia is either the reaffirmation of the former inter-clan pacts, with dire consequences for the losing factions, or the creation of new pacts, leading to the repression of all those regions, clans, families and magnates who formerly held sway. Either outcome would be gravely destabilizing for each country and for the region as a whole.

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Europe will be in a position to influence the evolution of political life in Central Asia only to the extent that it also makes a commitment to the region’s security and to its economic development. As noted above, national leaders feel themselves to be weak and beholden to clans, regional power brokers and magnates, as well as to external powers (mainly Russia) with whom the latter are often aligned. To the extent that Europe responds to the leaders’ security concerns and need for investment it will have a voice in how political life in the region evolves.

1. Central Asia’s Dual Political Systems

Politics in Central Asia, as well as in Azerbaijan, puzzle and frustrate western observers. To varying degrees. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have all been dismissed as authoritarian systems, hostile to democracy and the rights of citizens. Similar concerns have been voiced for Georgia and Armenia. Yet the prescriptions favored by the EU and USA for addressing these supposed pathologies have had little positive effect and may be making matters worse. Given the growing importance of these states, a better understanding of their politics is past due. Immediately after these countries gained independence in 1992, western countries focused their assistance on developing new parliaments, parties, laws, and courts. Gradually, however, it became clear that the “presidential” (as opposed to parliamentary) systems adopted everywhere had opened the door for powerful individuals to rise to the fore and claim authoritarian powers. Notwithstanding the fact that they came from substantially different cultures (Turkic versus Persian; nomadic versus oasis versus mountain), presidents Akaev, Aliyev, Karimov, Nazarbayev, Niyazov, and Rokhmonov all consolidated their grip in very similar ways, and to the detriment of political parties and parliaments. Western critics viewed these presidential systems as a long step backwards, notwithstanding that they trace their genealogy through Yeltsin’s Russia back to the France of de Gaulle. Accordingly, western governments have supported NGOs that work outside the systems rather than political forces that work within them. Naively convinced that matters could not get worse, the westerners’ policies towards all six countries at times border on calls for regime change. It should be stressed that the “problem” of Central Asian politics is not simply one of presidential might versus feckless parliaments—a relationship which we might call “Politics A.” Indeed, that relationship is something of a sideshow to what is occurring on the main political stage, which is dominated by great power brokers and the networks they control. On that

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main stage, presidents and parties, as well as parliaments, are engaged in a constant struggle with these power brokers and networks, which western analysts misleadingly refer to as “clans.” It is convenient to refer to this second pair of contests as “Politics B.” Because the key factors in Politics B are virtually invisible to outsiders, they have proven frustratingly elusive.

2. Family Networks, Regional Power Centers, and Economic Barons The so-called “clans” that dominate the invisible politics (Politics B) of Greater Central Asia (including Azerbaijan and Afghanistan) can be divided into three groups. First, the formerly nomadic peoples, the Kyrgyz Kazakhs, and Turkmens, are comprised of large kinship systems that are in turn subdivided into lower units culminating in individual families. The three Kazakh “hordes” or zhuses extend deep into Xinjiang and embrace all people calling themselves Kazakh. Analogous groupings divide northern and southern Kyrgyz. The next lowest level in both peoples can fairly be called a “tribe” or “clan.” For both the Kyrgyz and the Turkmen these remain an important source of identity, as they were formerly among the longer-settled Uzbeks. These family groups have long memories. The present president of the Kyrgyz Republic, Kurmanbek Bakiev, is described in the West as a “southerner.” Yet among the Kyrgyz it is know that back in the 1880s his tribe or clan broke ranks with the other southern tribes and cooperated with the hated Uzbeks of Kokand. Thus, some of his most bitter foes are fellow southerners. Second, are the regional networks that exist in every country. Based on close economic and political ties and accent (in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan also on language) these regional networks are extremely powerful, reflecting the diverse emirates and local power centers of earlier centuries. The largest of these, acting alone (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan) or in alliance with another regional power center (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan), have long dominated the politics of each country. Control of the territory of present-day Uzbekistan long fell to local elites from the two largest cities, Tashkent and Samarkand. Gorbachev’s effort to dethrone this alliance and replace it with one based on Ferghana and

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Khorezm failed dismally. In Tajikistan, the transfer of power from north (Khojent) to south (Kulyab) led to civil war, while Kyrgyzstan’s 2005 “Tulip” revolution’s shifted political power from north to south, which gravely destabilized that country. No wonder that Niyazov in Turkmenistan presents himself as above tribal and regional groupings and stresses (to the point of absurdity) a general Turkmen nationality. The third source of Politics B power in Central Asia derives from control of resources. In pre-Soviet times this meant the emirs’ control of irrigation systems. Today it means control of whole sectors of the economy, whether cotton, power, mineral extraction, construction, or transport. The authority of these magnates often dates to Soviet times, and is therefore deeper than that of Russia’s recently minted oligarchs. The influence of some of these magnates or barons often overlaps or merges with regional power centers or even kinship groups. In the case of a number of individuals, their influence is reinforced by illegal activity. The renowned “Gafur” in Tashkent may resemble a mafia don but his power extends deep into the central government.

3. How the Soviet System Dealt with the Power Brokers or “Clans” A paradoxical result of the Soviet colonial system is that it transformed local power brokers and clan leaders into civic and even national leaders. They may have been in conflict with one another locally, but they had a common interest in protecting their republics from Moscow. During the 1920s and 1930s Moscow tried to suppress such locally-based political networks in the region. Later, during the less repressive era following Stalin’s death, Moscow allowed them free rein so long as they delivered the production and social control that the Communist Party demanded of all republics. Clan and local interests differ sharply within each country. Under Soviet rule the task of balancing these divergent interests fell to the Politbureaus, meeting behind closed doors. To achieve this they backed strong local leaders like Rashidov in Uzbekistan, Usubaliev in Kyrgyzstan, Kunaev in Kazakhstan, Aliyev in Azerbaijan, Gapurov in Turkmenistan, and Rasulov in Tajikistan. These men gained legitimacy because the local power brokers supported them. The resulting authoritarian systems of rule flourished under both Khrushchev and Brezhnev, and lasted for thirty years.

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The rise of Gorbachev in the 1980s brought a decisive end to these arrangements. In the name of anti-corruption and the restoration of “Soviet norms,” Gorbachev effected a revolution.1 Between 1982 and 1986 all five Central Asian leaders disappeared from the scene, whether through death, retirement, or firing. In their places Gorbachev named reliable servants of Moscow, all of whom quickly proved themselves incapable of maintaining the old balances, of protecting the interests of the titular nationality against Russia, and of maintaining the local economy. Local dissatisfaction spread, and burst out in violence in the first major antiSoviet revolt of the era of glasnost’, in Almaty in 1986. Even where there was no violence, the power brokers, clan leaders, and magnates who had heretofore controlled local affairs began to regroup. With the first elections in 1989 they re-imposed the balances that had worked for thirty years, and then lent their backing to new, younger leaders who could serve in their behalf. Thus, it is the power brokers, clan leaders, and magnates who launched presidents Akaev, Nazarbayev, and Karimov, rather than vice versa. In Tajikistan their failure in this effort led directly to the civil war of 1993-97. Only in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan did the new leaders arise with a broader and more personal mandate. Everywhere, however, the new leaders were confirmed by election during the last year of Soviet rule, and then reconfirmed by subsequent votes immediately after independence.2 This was the case also in Azerbaijan where Ayaz Mutalibov had himself elected in late 1991, but was unseated by a popular revolt linked to his poor performance in the Karabakh war. Thus, independence in four of the five Central Asian republics and in Azerbaijan was, in political terms, less a revolution than a restoration. People in all five new countries believed they had reversed the revolution that Gorbachev had attempted to impose on them. In doing so, they expected that the relative prosperity of the 1970s would soon return, and that their lives would continue as formerly, but with the added benefit of full national sovereignty.

1

James Critchlow, Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic’s Road to Sovereignty, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford, 1991, Ch. 3, esp. p.43. 2 A good study of the phenomenon of “deals” between clans and the post-Soviet leaders is Kathleen Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories,” World Politics, vol. 56 no. 2, January 2004, pp.224-61.

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4. Politics A, Politics B, and the “Authoritarian” Rulers Many dismiss the professed interest of Central Asian leaders in national elections and even parliaments as mere cynicism. After all, if they were to apply systematically the principle of “one person one vote” they would upset delicate regional and other balances and risk throwing their country into chaos. But their involvement with elective politics is not mere cynicism. For no sooner were the new leaders in office than they began working to emancipate themselves from the control of the power brokers, clan leaders, and magnates. The presidents appreciated that carefully controlled national elections could strengthen their own hand without upsetting any of the internal balances on which their rule depended. Of course, it was out of the question that any of the presidents would follow Yeltsin and allow the local election of governors or hakims. This would have allowed local magnates to create what in effect would have become states within states. This happened in Russia under Yeltsin, and Vladimir Putin made apriority of reversing this once in power. The presidents of Central Asian states all opposed this on the same grounds that the French have always done. For the same reason the presidents embraced the notion of carefully controlled national parliaments. True, in every country local magnates worked hard to shape the electoral processes, as had occurred in the early history of all the western democracies. From the presidents’ standpoint, the goal was to use parliaments to dilute the magnates’ control locally. It did not hurt that election to parliament brought more than a few of these magnates to the capitals, where they were under the presidents’ constant watch and control. The only president who doubted his ability to control the situation was Niyazov, who therefore established a council of clan elders that worked in parallel with the parliament and could be invoked as a brake on parliamentary restiveness. Bicameral legislatures in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan also served as effective brakes on parliamentary caprice, since the upper houses invariably included local officials who had been appointed by the president. Karimov, who initially thought he could prevail with a unicameral legislature, shifted in 2004 to a bicameral system, with the upper house dominated by officials and other presidential appointees.

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From the rulers’ perspective, this was a completely logical step. Periodic national and parliamentary elections could serve a useful purpose to the extent they would engage the populace with the president’s programs and ratify the presidents’ general course. What was not acceptable was to turn over the great question of balancing regional, clan, and family interests to the principle of “one person one vote.” Instead, legislatures dominated by an unofficial “presidential bloc,” provided solid assurance that the elective principle would not undermine the fragile presidencies or, equally important, tamper with the political balances or “deals” on which those presidencies depended.

5. Presidential Power, Parliaments, and Politics B Authoritarianism requires an authoritarian ruler. It is tempting to explain the appearance of such rulers in terms of their personalities. But in Central Asia the individuals in question, Presidents Akaev, Karimov, Nazarbayev, Niyazov, Rokhmonov, and also Aliyev differ, so sharply in background and outlook as to question whether they share any “authoritarian profile”. Alternatively, one could explain such rulers in terms of culture. In Central Asia, this usually means defining these five states as uniformly “oriental” and therefore inclined to oriental forms of despotism. Yet the diverse cultural heritages of the countries in question --Turkic versus Persian, formerly nomadic versus formerly oasis dwellers-- throws this hypothesis into question. Or, finally, one could blame authoritarianism in the region on acculturation gained through years of Soviet rule. This thesis has some merit, but it, too, must be qualified. While it is true that most former Soviet states followed Russia in endowing their presidencies with “Gaullist” powers, the Baltic republics chose a very different path and others may yet do so. Why, then, did the others opt for authoritarian rule? Because it promised to resolve a genuine problem in the polity that might otherwise have posed dangers to the state’s very existence. This common problem, evident across Central Asia, is posed by the continued existence of powerful sub-national local networks, clans, families, and wealthy magnates—in short, Politics “B.” This explains why Central Asian presidents view elections more as a means than an end. The end is to emancipate themselves from control by the local networks, clans, and magnates who put them in office, but without at the same time making themselves subservient to parliaments which those same

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power brokers could control. Presidential elections serve this end well, for they enable the president to say he is beholden only to the “people.” Parliamentary elections pose greater problems, however, because they can be controlled by the very networks, clans, and magnates from whom the presidents are trying to free themselves. In the history of democratization, there is nothing unusual in rulers viewing the vote as a means of strengthening their control rather than an end in itself. But any attempt to use democracy in this way entails great risk. Karimov in Uzbekistan tried to do this when he embraced an alliance with the U.S. It was the hope of his key advisors that the “democracy promotion” clauses that they inserted prominently in the Strategic Partnership agreement signed after 9:11 could be used to exert pressure on the main power base of the regional networks and magnates, namely, the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, the U.S., preoccupied with the operations in Afghanistan, did not exert the pressure that the reformers around Karimov (Safayev, Gulyamov, etc.) had hoped it would. This undercut the reformers and forced Karimov himself back into the hands of the power brokers. As this happened, Uzbekistan again embraced the Russian/Chinese authoritarian model, which posed no danger to the country’s traditional power brokers.

6. A Further Paradox: The Deficit of Government Under Authoritarian Rule The notion of independence as a restoration of the status quo ante in Central Asia helps explain a peculiarity of the dilemma in which the new leaders found themselves. For in spite of the public’s expectations of a smooth return to prosperity enhanced by independence, the new states faced a formidable challenge. For independence destroyed the capacity of the state to collect taxes and in turn use them to pay civil servants who would deliver needed services. At the same time, it generated an urgent need to create new and costly institutions like armies and ministries. It fell to the new presidents to meet these demands. Both the international and national communities expected them to do so, while grossly underestimating the complexity of the task and their lack of human and financial resources. The international community may have been impressed by the presidents’ exceptional powers de jure, but the presidents themselves

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were overwhelmed by the acute awareness of their actual weakness. This gave the presidents an interest in strengthening the de facto powers and resources of their office, an interest that set them at odds with the regional elites and clans that had installed them in power and upon whom they depended. Anyone watching from this perspective would have sensed how privatization, demanded by international donors and financial institutions, revealed the presidents’ power or lack of it. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the presidents embraced privatization. While the resulting process created many instant millionaires, presidents Nazarbayev and Akaev were nonetheless able to maintain control and balance in the polity. In Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan the presidents encouraged the establishment of small and medium businesses but shied away from privatizing larger firms as this would inevitably have upset the fragile political balances in the country. Paradoxically, it is precisely those presidents whom the outer world judged as most authoritarian who were least able to use their supposedly limitless powers to privatize in such a way that it would strengthen, rather than undermine, the prevailing balances. In long refusing to privatize larger firms, presidents Rokhmonov, Niyazov, and Karimov acknowledged the severe limits of their power vis-à-vis local elites and clans. The weaker they felt themselves to be, the more they tried to exploit national symbols to generate centripetal force. Meanwhile, regional elites and clans controlled whole sectors of the economy by their domination of state industries. To elevate the voice of the capital and their own authority, the presidents all promoted nationalism (Rokhmonov’s cult of the Samanids, Karimov’s cult of Timur, and Niyazov’s cult of himself, not to mention Akaev’s cult of Manas, and Nazarbayev’s new capital at Astana) and undertook populist policies that reached over the main power blocs directly to the people. The supposedly “authoritarian” rulers of Central Asia have all been functioning under conditions of actual under-government, which they lack the resources to correct. In the absence of such resources, they resort to bluster and bombast, and to direct appeals to the public at large. This explains Niyazov’s decision to subsidize cooking oil and electricity and Karimov’s decision to increase expenditure on health and education, even after the economy began to falter after 1998. It also explains Nazarbayev’s successful effort to renationalize part of the Kazkah oil industry, and Akaev’s wife’s

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attempt to create a national foundation under her exclusive control that would promote Kyrgyz welfare. Above all, it helps explain the presidents’ efforts to enrich themselves or, in Karimov’s case, seize control over the use of assets. Venality doubtless played a role in this, but it was also driven by the authoritarian rulers’ perceived need to redress their actual weakness. Indeed, control over financial resources – whether personal or through the states – became equated with control over the political system.

7. Why “Civil Society” May Not be an Effective Agent of Change This, then, is the peculiar nature of “authoritarianism” in post-independence Central Asia. While many politicians and journalists who have come afoul of the prevailing system have good grounds for complaining about the presidents’ seemingly unlimited powers, the reality is different. The countries all suffer not from too much but from too little government. They suffer from high officials who lack the resources to provide the basics of normal governance and welfare, and from lower civil servants who are both grossly under-qualified and under-paid. Above all, they suffer from presidents who are beholden to ironclad understandings with powerful but largely invisible regional, clan, and economic power brokers. Even if they wanted to do so, the presidents cannot escape from these arrangements and embrace fully democratic forms of legitimacy. To do so would, in their view, threaten the stability of the state. How, then, can more open and participatory systems come into being? What forces, if any, will soften the prevailing presidentialism and bring about a greater degree of civic participation? Is it possible for this to occur through a process of evolution? Or will such changes come about only through crisis? For a dozen years after independence western countries all assumed that the systems would quickly evolve in the way they desired. To hasten the process they lent support to what they called “civil society,” groups and forces outside the government that could be provided with training and financial support from abroad in the expectation that they would gradually take root at home and spearhead greater openness.

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The evidence to date suggests this tactic has not worked. On the one hand, few members of the broader public in the region consider such “civil society organizations” to be truly indigenous, as they depend almost entirely on foreign funding and foreign-educated locals drawn mainly from the elite of the capitals. On the other hand, members of the governments, especially officials at the local level, see these foreign-sponsored groups as undermining their own authority. Such organizations rarely work through or with local officials, whom they (correctly) judge to be largely unreformed holdovers from the Soviet era. Being comparatively well-funded, they daily remind the governments of their own lack of resources, incompetence, ineffectiveness, and overall fragility, but without providing those same governments and the bureaucrats who comprise them with the means of improving the situation from within. No wonder the bureaucrats view the foreign-sponsored “civil society” organizations as elements of instability. The West’s strategy for introducing greater openness into the governance of Central Asian states has led on both sides to an unproductive confrontation. During 2005-6 this blossomed into full-blown conflict between the governments and civil society organizations in the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan. Earlier, Turkmenistan had severely restricted such organizations. By late 2005 Kazakhstan began to move in the same direction. Many NGOs are choosing to leave the region, if they are not meanwhile expelled. As a result, many international groups have abandoned the hope of a peaceful transition and are looking instead to regime change as a precondition to progress. Yet Kyrgyzstan’s experience since March 2005 gives cause for concern as to the viability of this option. And so we return again to the question: are there any evolutionary processes that might in time bring about change in the direction of more open and participatory systems? NGOs may not be a very effective tool for achieving this but there is mounting evidence that specific aspects of the electoral process and associated activities are. However, not all elections and activities are equally efficacious in this regard. It is therefore worth examining in turn presidential elections, parliamentary elections, parliamentary practice, and the life of political parties in order to pinpoint which have of these are most likely to foster democratization.

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8. Why Presidential Elections Are Weak Agents of Reform Presidential elections garner national and international attention like no others and become a litmus test for the state of democracy in a given country. This is unrealistic. Not only are the stakes highest in these elections but they most directly affect those with the greatest capacity to influence improperly the outcome, i.e., the presidents. The simplest means of shaping the outcome of a presidential election is to eliminate potential opponents. Long before Putin jailed potential rival Mikhail Khodorkovskii, Presidents Nazarbayev and Karimov had driven their rivals Akezhan Kazhegeldin (Kazakhstan) and Abdurrahim Pulatov and Muhammad Solikh (Uzbekistan) from the country, and Presidents Akaev and Niyazov had their rivals Feliks Kulov and Boris Shikhmuradov jailed. President Rokhmonov neutralized his Islamist rival Akbar Turajonzodah through jobs and money but made sure his other rival, Abdumalik Abdulajanov, would be arrested if he reentered the country. In all these instances we see authoritarianism in its most ruthless form. More sophisticated measures for controlling presidential elections are also readily at hand, as President Akaev demonstrated when he introduced a Kyrgyz language test into the election law and then used it effectively against his rival, Kulov. The president needs do nothing. The entire bureaucracy, including those charged with managing elections locally, are beholden for their positions solely to the president. Under such conditions, an official in charge of any region that votes less than overwhelmingly for the incumbent can reasonably fear for his job. In the rare case that an authoritarian leader warns local bureaucrats not to interfere, as occurred in Azerbaijan in the 2003 presidential elections, local administrators still have good reason to stuff the ballot boxes. These and countless further examples show that presidential elections, because they often reinforce the worst tendencies in a polity, are the least likely agents of positive evolutionary change. Indeed, they can even make authoritarian regimes more durable. Acknowledging this, the ability of authoritarian presidents to manipulate presidential votes is subject to more constraints than a generation ago. The new states all turned over the management of elections over to electoral commissions, which operate according to written rules and procedures and

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whose members and heads, unlike the presidents, cannot hide from international evaluators and critics. The recently introduced practice of international ballot watchers has also introduced new elements of transparency. It is unlikely that many American or European elections in the nineteenth century would have passed the kind of scrutiny that is now normal for elections in developing countries.

9. Parliamentary Elections as a More Promising Arena of Change In most countries democratization began when elites sought to curtail the absolute authority of the throne. They acted through and in the name of parliaments, which began as the institutional channel for the assembled elite to parlez collectively with the monarch. Over time these bodies claimed the right to offer their collective views on such matters as the levying of taxes and the waging of war. This did not come about smoothly: in England in required the multiple crises that led to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and in Sweden soon afterwards it entailed the mass execution of the challenging elites. But if relations between parliaments and thrones often descended into armed conflict (France in 17889 and Russia in 1907-17) the process of selecting assembly members has been regularized and gained acceptance through multiple smaller confrontations. Thus, regularized electoral processes can serve as a stepping stone along a path leading out of authoritarianism.3 Corrupt parliamentary elections can trigger regime-change,4 which occurred in the Kyrgyz Republic with the “Tulip Revolution” of 24 March 2005. But parliamentary elections in Central Asia have more often been a source of steady, evolutionary progress. This is what occurred in the November 2004 parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan, and the December 2004 elections in Uzbekistan.5 As the OSCE and other observers noted, these were both flawed elections, yet they were 3

Axel Hadenius, Jan Teorell, “Authoritarian Regimes 1972-2003: Patterns of Stability and Change”, paper presented at a conference on democratization in the Middle East and Central Asia, Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, May 2005. 4 “Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, OSCE/ODIHR, 28 February, 2005, available at http://www.osce.org/item/13831.html. 5 M.K. Dior, “Parliamentary Elections in Uzbekistan, 2004,” Himalayan and Central Asian Studies,, vol. 9, 1-2, January-June, 2005, pp.34-40.

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both significantly less flawed than previous parliamentary elections in those countries. The fact that the party led by President Nazarbayev did poorly at the polls and the heretofore marginal White Path (Ak Zhol) party did relatively well attests to the fact that in both cases the electoral principle actually worked. Ak Zhol’s scathing retrospective critique of the elections was quite justified, but does not refute this conclusion. Similarly, many international observers did not even bother to monitor the 2004 parliamentary elections in Uzbekistan, yet those elections featured included such improvements as published statements by all parties and televised debates among candidates. Even when votes are obviously falsified, as occurred in the February, 2005, Tajik parliamentary election, the resulting crises are commonly handled through negotiation. In the end, the Tajik president rejected the opposition’s demand that the vote be nullified, but had to accept the vote’s unexpected conclusion, which advanced the Islamic Renaissance Party to the second spot in the Parliament.6 Situations such as occurred in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan have increased both national and international expectations regarding the conduct of parliamentary elections in Central Asia. For this reason the 2005 parliamentary elections in both the Kyrgyz Republic and Azerbaijan were looked to with great anticipation. In the former case, the reality fell short of expectations, giving rise to the Tulip Revolution. In the latter case President Aliev spent most of 2005 taking substantive measures to assure that the vote would strengthen rather than undermine his own legitimacy, both at home and abroad. Both cases testify to the possibility that rising expectations regarding the conduct of parliamentary elections can be agents for positive change. One may conclude from this that even in Central Asia parliamentary elections serve as a kind of school that spreads understanding of the elective principle among the public. Because battles over the conduct of parliamentary elections are fought at both the national and local levels, they actively engage local clan heads, power brokers, and economic elites, even in cases like Tajikistan in 2005, where the broader public remained passive. Even at their worst, then, parliamentary elections are a source of ongoing civic education, which continues even in the face of occasional steps 6

Rashid Abdullo, “Tajikistan:The 2005 Elections and the Future of Statehood,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, 3(33),2005, p. 133.

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backwards. Most important, they are the best means available for diverting the energies of local clans, magnates, and power brokers into constructive channels.

10. The Role of Parliamentary Practice No institution in authoritarian states is the object of more withering criticism and outright cynicism than “pocket parliaments.” Whether in Egypt, Nigeria, Russia, or any of the states of Central Asia they are seen as the willing tools of the national leader and hence ineffective. Yet across Central Asia the daily practice of parliamentary bodies has become a powerful if largely unacknowledged force for evolutionary change. However limited their mandate, even quasi-parliamentary bodies introduce thousands of members of the political class and even larger numbers of ordinary citizens to the idea that government should be responsive and responsible to the people. The fate of President Akaev’s budgets in the Kyrgyz parliament typifies the manner in which parliamentary processes can become powerful educational tools. Most members of the Jogorku Kenesh down to April 2005 were Akaev loyalists, local cl;an heads, power brokers and other notables who, we now know, received bribes (called stipends) from the president. The Kyrgyz constitution at the time gave delegates the right to debate the budget but not to change it. Notwithstanding this, by 1998 President Akaev was exposed to astonishingly blunt criticism every time he presented his budgets to parliament. Even nominally loyal delegates vied with one another to demonstrate their independence and their command of budgetary matters, conspicuously parading their oratorical skills before a packed visitors’ gallery. Akaev had no choice but to listen patiently and respond in detail.7 The slightest sign of condescension on the President’s part was met with a barrage of scorn, which forced the president and delegates to interact, if not as equals, at least as citizens. It might be objected that Central Asian parliaments are packed with notables from the regional groupings and clans, and with people representing the magnates who control both publicly and privately owned enterprises. But how different is this from the eighteenth-century Virginia House of Burgesses, or from the British parliament prior to the First Reform Bill of

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1832, let alone from the French parlements on the eve of the Revolution, or the nineteenth-century Prussian Landtag, which represented not the interests of individuals but of estates (Staende)? Yet each of these bodies played significant roles in the development of representative government in their country. The fact is that normal parliamentary processes sets in motion developments that more often than not favor democratization. Interviews with parliamentary delegates in all five Central Asian parliaments confirm this truth. A delegate may have been designated to stand by local clans, magnates, or power brokers. Or he or she may have been nominated “from above” and selected through a dubious election. Yet when that person acquires an office, a government telephone, a visiting card identifying him as a member of parliament, and a conspicuous badge for his lapel, he comes to view himself differently. Visits from foreign parliamentarians, participation in national and international conferences, and appearances on local television all serve to reinforce the delegate’s view of himself as a significant element in the national political process, no longer a mere subject but a true public citizen. These processes have been going forward steadily even in Uzbekistan. Annual meetings with key delegates to the Oily Majlis over three years between 2001 and 2004 produced clear evidence that they were being steadily acculturated to parliamentary life. All had used the time to study the practices of parliaments abroad. All had had contact with foreign parliamentarians and all had grown more astute in their analyses of the good and bad features of each. Nor should this be surprising. As noted above, President Karimov understood that parliament could provide a counterbalance to the unlimited aspirations of clans, families, and magnates. This has actually strengthened the parliament. But Karimov evidently considers this a small price to pay if it increases his own freedom of action vis-à-vis the all-powerful clans and families that put him in power. Tajikistan’s bicameral Majlisi Oli lags far behind its counterparts elsewhere, thanks to President Rokhmonov’s ability to control its members financially. Yet even there the daily processes of parliamentary life have fostered a growing independence among members of the Majlisi Oli, with consequences that have yet to be seen. In Kyrgyzstan as in Armenia, the liberalization of central control over parliamentary elections led to the elections becoming a marketplace pure and

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simple rather than a marketplace of ideas. Businessmen, many of which involved in organized crime, secured a place in parliament, immunity, and influence over the legislative system. Finally, what about Turkmenistan, where President Niyazov enjoys Khanlike powers and has reduced the Mejlis to a meaningless status? In contrast to Karimov, Niyazov so fully accepted his partnership with the major Turkmen tribes that he for years vetted his major policy initiatives with their collective council of elders, the Khalk Maslakhaty or People’s Council, rather than the parliament. Yet the Mejlis has continued to meet, and its handpicked members are being steadily acculturated to the possibilities of parliamentary life, even as they are daily reminded of their own total subordination. At some point President Niyazov’s rule will end. Parliament is one of the more likely settings from which Niyazov’s successor might emerge, and definitely the place where many future alignments and interests are already being quietly defined and shaped.

11. The Role of Political Parties Formal political parties developed late in the West, and in many countries they were greeted as an unhealthy pathology.8 All the Central Asian states have taken great pains to assure that political parties not become the institutional expression of regional or ethnic divisions.9 All but Tajikistan rule out parties based on religion. This means that one of the main functions remaining for political parties in Central Asia might be to serve as the organizational base for dominant or rival elites. But even this is severely constrained. Following Yeltsin in Russia, all the regional presidents long resisted calls for them to organize their own party. Only Niyazov embraced the idea of a presidential party from the start. By the end of the first decade of independence, however, all had come to understand that they, too, needed solid party backing. Nazarbayev and Akaev tried to achieve this by getting their daughters to organize pro-government parties. Karimov, who had begun his presidency by 8

Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist Papers, Baltimore, 1981, pp. 16-23. 9 On parties and ethnicity in Kazakhstan see Valentina Kurganskaia, “The Party System in Kazakhstan and Ethnic Issues, Central Asia and the Caucasus, No., 2(32), 2005, pp. 67-74. For an overview of parties in the region see Mira Karybaeva, “Development of a Multiparty System in Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No.2(32) 2005, pp. 41-60.

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de-legitimizing religious and nationalist parties on the right and social democratic parties on the left, eventually formed four (later five) legal parties of the center, all of them avowedly pro-government. By the 2004 parliamentary elections he went further, and began stating his preferences among them. Rokhmonov, faced with the entry of the Islamic party into parliament, immediately set up his own pro-governmental group, the Peoples’ Democratic Party.10 This process demonstrates the gradual, if reluctant, acceptance of political parties by authoritarian rulers across Central Asia. Their early reluctance was due to the potential of parties to effect changes in the fundamental balances among regional networks, clans, magnates, and families upon which the presidents’ personal power rested. From the presidents’ perspective, parties, like parliaments, were fine so long as they constrained these forces, but would pose a threat as soon as they aspired to change fundamentally the relations among them. President Bakiev has already sought radical redress for the North’s long-term dominance of Kyrgyz politics, and the consequences may prove destabilizing. 11 In the long run parties may bring about a fairer balance of power in each country, but the authoritarian rulers rightly judge that in the process this could undercut their own power base. Uncontrolled parties, even more than the principle of “one person one vote,” could unleash uncontrollable forces within these new yet deeply conservative states. This realization has led to the non-registration or banning of parties in every country in the region. This runs the danger of moving powerful forces outside the system, where they can pose a yet greater danger. A more effective method, practiced in all states except Uzbekistan, allow candidates to run as individuals, unaffiliated with any party. This retards the growth of parties, but at the potential price of elevating the status of rivals to the president. Detailed laws on everything from party finances to the maintenance of membership lists by region can also be used effectively to curtail party activity. In Tajikistan the election law requires parties to publish their platforms in full; when a party competing in the 2005 parliamentary elections failed to do so it was banned.12 A simpler and more effective method by

10

Parviz Mullojanov, “Party Building in Tajikistan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3(33), 2005, pp,. 88-87, 11 “Kyrgyzstan After the Revolution,” Crisis Group Asia Report No. 97, 4 May 2005, pp. 4-8. 12 Abdullo, p.132-133.

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which governments can keep parties in check is through cooptation. This can mean giving key party figures or their supporters remunerative administrative posts or handing them outright payments, as Akaev earlier, and, more recently, Rokhmonov and Niyazov, have done. This cursory account of the techniques by which authoritarian rulers can control the work of political parties might suggest that it is a one-sided battle, with all the most effective weapons in the hands of the state. If this were so, one would have to conclude that political parties, like presidential votes, offer few prospects for evolution towards more open systems. Yet the picture is more complex and, in the end, more positive. Take, for example, the decision by all Central Asian leaders to champion a “presidential” party. As of this writing, only Niyazov has accomplished this without serious problems. In Tajikistan, Rokhmonov’s People’s Democratic Party received all possible support from the president prior to the 2005 parliamentary elections, yet it placed a weak third in the balloting.13 Presidential parties in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic fared no better. In Kazakhstan’s November 2004 parliamentary vote Dariga Nazarbayeva’s Azhar Party received substantial subsidies, not to mention unlimited access to the national television station run by Ms. Nazarbayeva herself. Yet Kazakhs gave more votes to the heretofore marginal Ak Zhol Party. The differential might have been yet greater had not many local officials illegally promoted Azhar. Similarly, Bermet Akaeva’s presidential party failed to shine even in the grossly corrupt first parliamentary election of March, 2005, and fared still worse in the revote that followed. Even though she had disingenuously tried to distance herself from her father, Akaeva herself lost the election in her Bishkek constituency. Nor has Karimov succeeded in his efforts to champion one of Uzbekistan’s five pro-government parties over the others. Initially, he lent his support to the Fidokorlar or “Self-Sacrificers” Party, a grouping of younger professionals who favor a market economy and more open society, as opposed to the more popular Halq Demokratik Partiyasi, or People’s Democratic Party, made up mainly of older former Communists. No sooner had he accepted the nomination of this group than the Liberal Democratic Party began to advance rapidly. Appealing to young entrepreneurs, this group presented itself as the outspoken champions of economic reform. Following the voters’

13

Ibid., p. 130.

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shifting loyalties, Karimov changed horses, and by the December 2005 parliamentary elections was actively signaling his support for the LDP. The consistent picture in all Central Asian countries except Turkmenistan is for the legal parties to develop slowly and steadily, for them to use all legal tools at their disposal to challenge dubious restrictions imposed by the government, and, when improprieties occur, to turn for help to the international monitoring organizations and both national and international media in order to advance their claims against the government. In every instance enumerated here the supposedly authoritarian ruler either failed to manipulate the parties as he wished, failed in his effort to elicit from voters the preferred outcome, or was forced to follow rather than lead the electoral process. All this is possible due to the experience that parties have gained through day-to-day practice. This can be observed in every country but emerges with particular clarity in the country where political parties would seem to be at a particular disadvantage, Uzbekistan. The four (later five) legal parties were all creations of the state, and are by definition pro-government. Yet over the three years in which the author met with their heads, a steady evolution was evident. Viewed retrospectively, the process seems to have been all but inevitable. Created “from above,” each party nonetheless had to define its program and hence its constituents. The Democratic National Rebirth Party opted for a nationalistic path, championing national unity and appealing to government officials, older civic leaders, and the moderate Sunni Muslim majority. Fidorkorlar (also known as the National Democratic Party) presented itself as the party of the progressive intelligentsia, supporting openness and free markets. The People’s Democratic Party found a niche for itself as the defender of social welfare programs, and therefore appealed to poorer farmers, the urban lower middle class, retirees, and former Communists. The Adolat or Justice Party staked out similar territory but proposed more moderate left-centrist solutions, even rebranding itself as the Social Democratic Party. And the Liberal Democrats took up the cause of young business people in the major urban centers. As they groped to translate these programmatic and social foci into practical actions, all five parties benefited from contacts with like-minded parties abroad. The Russian Communists lent support to the PDP while the German Social Democrats shared their experience with the Fidorkolar. Other

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European parties sought out what they considered their counterpart parties in Uzbekistan and rendered them assistance. Meanwhile, a host of international organizations, including the US National Democratic Institute and National Republican Institute, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, the Freidrich Ebert Stifftung, and many others provided nonpartisan training in the conduct of elections and in practical aspects of party organization. Similar activities occurred in all the other countries of the region, with the exception of Turkmenistan. Even there, however, the voice of international organizations was audible, and, according to Turkmen parliamentarians, have given rise to the hope of more “normal” party activity in the future.14

12. Concluding Note: the EU and Domestic Politics in Central Asia The preceding discussion can have one of two purposes. First, it can simply inform the EU presidency on some of the realities of domestic politics across the region. By identifying some of the potential pitfalls of domestic politics it can help European statesmen avoid them. At the same time, because it treats these realities as normal aspects of the development of new states and their evolution towards more democratic systems, it can put some of the current problems in a broader and more positive perspective. Second, it can provide the context for more active EU programs and activities designed to foster the gradual evolution of these polities in directions compatible with European practice. If the arguments presented herein are correct, they suggest that progress towards democratization can be achieved by 1) fostering party-to-party contacts between legal political parties from Central Asian countries and counterparts in Europe 2) promoting direct parliament-to-parliament contacts between Central Asia and European countries, and 3) concentrating on election practices, especially parliamentary elections. The great potential of such activity is gradually to loosen the grip on the region’s political life now exercised by clans, regional elites, and economic

14

Interviews by the author with Turkmen parliamentarians, October, 2002.

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power brokers. and by the nominally “authoritarian” rulers through whom they work but with whom they are in very unstable alliance. This can be achieved only by working through the governments and legally recognized parties and not around them. Yet this cannot be done in isolation. With the exception of Kazakhstan, all the national leaders are beset by a sense of their own weakness and of their government’s lack of resources. Only if the EU shows itself willing to engage with these issues can it expect cooperation from the Central Asian side on political reform. This means taking measures that will help address the real security concerns of these new states and it means investing in their economies and infrastructures to promote economic growth. It is entirely possible for the EU to advance the cause of political evolution in Central Asia, but only if it is prepared also to take an active role in the region’s security and economic development.

Autonomy and Conflict Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus – Cases in Georgia

Svante E. Cornell

Uppsala 2002

Aey Charkhe Falak Kharabi Az Keena-e- Tu Ast Bedadgari Shiva-e Dereena Tu Ast Aey Khak Agar Seena-e Tu Bishi-kafand Bass Gohar-e Qeemati Ka Dar Seena-e Tu Ast

Circling heaven, this decay is your ill-will Cruelty, your attribute so perennial O earth! If they cleave your chest In your bosom you hide a precious jewel! Ruba’iyat of Omar Khayyam (ca. 1048-1131) Translation by Dr. Imtiaz Kazi, 2000

Dissertation for the Degree of Doctor in Philosophy in Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University in 2002 ABSTRACT Cornell, Svante E.: Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus – Cases in Georgia. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Report No. 61. 258 pp. Uppsala. ISBN 91-506-1600-5. Providing minority populations with autonomy is gaining appreciation as a method of solving, managing, and even pre-empting ethnic conflict. However, in spite of the enthusiasm for autonomy solutions among academics and practitioners alike, there is reason to argue that the provision of autonomy for a minority may under certain circumstances increase rather than decrease the likelihood of conflict. In certain political conditions, autonomy strengthens the separate identity of a minority; it thereby increases its incentives to collective action against the state; and most of all its capacity to seek separation from the central state, through the state-like institutions that autonomy entails. The objective of this dissertation is to investigate whether territorial autonomy was a contributing factor to the violent ethnic conflicts that have erupted in the South Caucasus since the late 1980s. It presents a theoretical argument to explain which qualities of autonomy solutions increase the likelihood of conflict; and then seeks to outline possible rival explanations derived from the theoretical literature. The dissertation then examines the explanatory value of autonomy as compared to nine other possible causal factors in a study of nine minorities in the South Caucasus. Finding that autonomy has the highest explanatory value of any of the factors under study, it then moves on to study in depth the five minorities existing on the territory of the republic of Georgia. Three of them, Abkhazia, Ajaria, and South Ossetia, were autonomous, whereas two (the Armenians and Azeris in Southern Georgia) had no autonomous status. The dissertation shows how the institution of autonomy, by promoting an ethnic elite in control of state-like institutions, and by enhancing factors such as leadership, economic viability, and external support, played a crucial together with these factors in the escalation to conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whereas the absence of autonomy mitigated conflict in Javaheti’s Armenian and Kvemo Kartli’s Azeri populations. Keywords: Autonomy, Caucasus, Ethnopolitical Conflict, Georgia (Republic), Ethnic Relations, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Javakheti, Ajaria, Kvemo Kartli Svante E. Cornell, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Box 514, SE75120 Uppsala, Sweden © Svante E. Cornell 2002 ISSN 0566-8808 ISBN 91-506-1600-5 Printed in Sweden by Elanders Gotab, Stockholm 2002 Distributed by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Box 514, SE-75120 Uppsala, Sweden Phone +46 18 471 00 00 Fax. + 46 18 69 51 02 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.pcr.uu.se

Autonomy and Conflict Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus – Cases in Georgia Contents Acknowledgments......................................................................................... vii Maps............................................................................................................... ix The Role of Autonomy for Violent Conflict .....................................................1 1.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 2 1.2. Autonomy: General Perceptions............................................................................................ 5 1.3. Theoretical Aspects on Autonomy ........................................................................................ 8 1.4. Autonomy and Secessionism ................................................................................................ 15 1.5. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 19

The Roots of Ethnopolitical Conflict ............................................................. 21 2.1. General Research on Ethnopolitical Conflict .................................................................... 22 2.2. The Categories of Factors: Underlying Factors versus Catalyzers .................................. 25 2.3. Background Factors or Permissive Conditions of Ethnic Conflict................................. 27 2.4. Catalyzing Factors or ‘Triggers’ of Ethnic Conflict........................................................... 52 2.5. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 58

Communism and Nationalism: Ethnicity in the Soviet Context .................. 61 3.1. The National Question in Marxist Writing......................................................................... 62 3.2. Leninist Nationality Theory: Reconciling Communism with Nationalism .................... 64 3.3. Leninism in Practice: Korenizatsiia......................................................................................... 68 3.4. Stalinism and the National Question................................................................................... 77 3.5. The National Question after Stalin ...................................................................................... 83 3.6. The Last Years: from Andropov to Gorbachev ................................................................ 88 3.7. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 89

Research Design ............................................................................................ 91

4.1. Definitions............................................................................................................................... 92 4.2. Causal Effect and Causal Mechanism.................................................................................. 93 4.3. The “Degrees of Freedom” Problem .................................................................................. 95 4.4. Mill’s Method of Difference and Multiple Causality ......................................................... 96 4.5. Process Tracing....................................................................................................................... 99 4.6. Case Selection ......................................................................................................................... 99 4.7. Sources ...................................................................................................................................100

Factors in Ethnopolitical Conflict in the South Caucasus.......................... 103 5.1. Ethnic Groups in the South Caucasus ..............................................................................103 5.2. Factors in Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus .........................................................110 5.3. Summary of the Findings ....................................................................................................124 5.4. Conclusions ...........................................................................................................................127

Political Development in Georgia ................................................................ 129 6.1. Georgian Identity and History............................................................................................129 6.2. The First World War and the Russian Revolution ..........................................................136 6.3. The Rise and Fall of the First Georgian Republic ...........................................................139 6.4. Soviet Georgia.......................................................................................................................142 6.5. The Georgian National Revival..........................................................................................149 6.6. Independence and Civil War...............................................................................................163 6.7. Picking Up the Pieces ..........................................................................................................170

Explaining Ethnopolitical Conflict.............................................................. 173 7.1. Abkhazia: the Impossible Happening................................................................................173 7.2. South Ossetia: the Power of a Parliament ........................................................................186 7.3. Javakheti Armenians: A Narrow Escape? .........................................................................196 7.4.Azeris of Kvemo Kartli: the Silent Mass............................................................................209 7.5. Ajaria: Regionalism Enforced .............................................................................................214

Conclusions .................................................................................................. 225 References .................................................................................................... 237

Acknowledgments This dissertation began as a quest to understand the causes of the ethnopolitical conflicts that have ravaged the Caucasus since the late Soviet era. It is the product of a fruitful combination of theoretical perspectives gained in an academic environment, but also of impressions, experiences, and understanding gained from conversations with experts in and on the region, the reading of historical documents, books and articles by experts, and news reports pertaining to the societies and polities of the Caucasus, and not least travels in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The number of individuals that contributed to this research in one or another manner is extensive. I benefited from the intellectual environment of four institutions during the research for this dissertation. First of all, I am indebted to the colleagues and friends at the department of Peace and Conflict Research of Uppsala University. My deepest gratitude goes to my supervisor Peter Wallensteen, whose guidance, support and encouragement was of the greatest importance to the completion of this work, and to Kjell-Åke Nordquist for his valuable comments. The participants in the research seminar at the department all read various parts of this research and contributed important perspectives and remarks. I would like especially to acknowledge the comments and suggestions made over several years by Magnus Öberg, Erik Melander, and Mary-Jane Fox. Two flights of stairs higher up in the same building, the department of East European Studies has been a constant source of intellectual stimulation, be it through conversations with faculty members or through interaction with the students that I had the privilege to share my limited experience with in the last four years. I am especially grateful to Kristian Gerner, whose constant encouragement, appreciation and guidance has been of crucial importance from the beginning of this study until its completion. Anna Jonsson, Claes Levinsson, Örjan Sturesjö, and Ingvar Svanberg have all been especially close friends and critical commentators. The third institution in which this dissertation was shaped is the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C. I am especially grateful to S. Frederick Starr for the confidence and trust he has vested in me, and for his enthusiastic encouragement of my research. I am also indebted to Charles H. Fairbanks for sharing his deep knowledge and understanding of the Caucasus with me over many long discussions. Finally, much of the research in Georgia would not have been possible without the help of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies in Tbilisi. My most sincere gratitude and appreciation is to Alexander Rondeli, the gray eminence of the Caucasus, whose experience and clear vision is rivaled by none, as is his generosity and hospitality.

Over countless trips to the Caucasus, the hospitality and generosity I encountered from friends, colleagues, acquaintances, and complete strangers from ministers to refugees alike, has been one of the most rewarding experiences of this research. I am particularly grateful to old and new friends such as Irakli Alasania, Ruslan Ali-Zade, Ashot Galoian, Haroutioun Kojoyan, Niyazi Mehdi, Irakli Machavariani, Nasib Nassibli, Erdal Otuzbir, Khatuna Salukvadze, David Soumbadze, Elin Suleymanov, Chingiz Sultansoy, Georgi Tcheishvili, Mamuka Tsereteli, and Temuri Yakobashvili. Further away from the Caucasus, a number of people sharing a fascination for or a dedication to this wider region of the world have constituted a network of like-minded souls, including Thomas Goltz, Asad Hayauddin, Patrik Jotun, Aftab Kazi, Marcela Londoño, Andrea Persip, Regine Spector, Maria Sultan, and Niklas Swanström. More than anyone else, my parents Gudrun and Erik were sources of encouragement and support. I am also grateful to Imtiaz Kazi for kindly allowing me to reprint a verse, epitomizing the contradictions of a mesmerizing yet tormented part of the world, from his fascinating translation of Omar Khayyam’s Rubai’yat, before his work was actually published by the Economic Cooperation Organization in Tehran. Research for this work was supported by a generous research grant from the Swedish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences and funding from the department of East European Studies at Uppsala University. The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also provided financial support. While all individuals mentioned above, and people whose names cannot be mentioned here, contributed to this effort in some way, any errors that remain are my own.

Washington, D.C., April 16, 2002 Svante Cornell

Political Map of the Caucasus

Maps

Georgia with Autonomous Units, 1989

The Javakheti Area (Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda) of Samtskhe-Javakheti

The Dmanisi, Bolnisi, Marneuli, and Gardabani Areas of Kvemo Kartli

1 The Role of Autonomy for Violent Conflict

Territorial autonomy is often considered a mechanism of conflict resolution, a compromise between a minority aiming at self-determination and a state protecting its territorial integrity. Territorial autonomy is increasingly advocated as a solution to ethnic conflicts, but the institution of autonomous regions for minorities is also gaining salience as a mechanism to prevent the eruption of violent conflict. While being a solution to many conflicts, there is reason to suspect that autonomy can under certain circumstances act as a catalyst of conflict. This is most clear in the successor states of the former Soviet Union, where ethnic conflicts have typically taken the shape of a conflict between an autonomous region or republic and its central government. In fact, the successor states of the former Soviet Union constitute a unique environment to trace this phenomenon. Despite its ideological aims to unify people of different ethnic origins, the Soviet state was in fact built on a system of hierarchical ethnic federalism. Below the 15 union republics that the union consisted of, there were over thirty autonomous republics and regions with lower degrees of self-rule. However, all minorities were not covered by this systemsome, for a variety of reasons, never held autonomous status, mainly if the ethnic group in question was the holder of union or autonomous republic elsewhere. Hence groups such as Russians in Kazakhstan, Tajiks in Uzbekistan, and countless others became so-called ‘non-status’ minorities despite their large numbers. In a situation where certain minorities are endowed with territorial autonomy and others devoid of such status, one could à priori expect the non-autonomous minorities, especially in a time of political transition or crisis, to press for the elevation to an autonomous status or independence, or to demand to redraw the new international borders (where applicable) to be included in their ‘mother’ state; on the other hand, minorities already holding autonomous regions would, given that they already enjoy self-rule, have less of a reason to do so. Yet during the transition period that began in the mid-1980s and until the late 1990s, only one case of a non-autonomous minority voicing a credible and sustained struggle for selfdetermination occurred, that of the Gagauz in Moldova, which was solved by an autonomy arrangement in 1994. On the other hand, a host of secessionist or irredentist struggles1 took place between autonomous regions and their central governments: some

1 Here separatism is defined as the struggle of an ethnic group for an independent state, whereas irredentism is taken to mean an attempt by a portion of an ethnic group in one state to unite with ethnic kin in another.

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2

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became violent and led to wars in Mountainous Karabakh (Azerbaijan), South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Georgia) and Chechnya (Russian Federation), whereas secessionism emerged, without leading to large-scale violence, in other cases such as Crimea (Ukraine), GornoBadakhshan (Tajikistan), Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Russian Federation). Other autonomous regions voiced their claims to higher levels of self-rule more or less calmly, without questioning the integrity of their state of belonging, and obtained concessions through negotiations with the center; prominent examples are Ajaria (Georgia), SakhaYakutia (Russia). Still other autonomous regions never even voiced any such claims, including Karakalpakistan in Uzbekistan, and Mordovia, Udmurtia, and Karelia in Russia. Yet it remains the case that among the numerous minorities in the South Caucasus, the only ones that ended up in secessionist armed conflicts with their central governments were the autonomous ones.

1.1. Introduction The purpose of this study is to investigate whether territorial autonomy was a contributing factor to the violent ethnic conflicts that have erupted in the South Caucasus since the late 1980s. The three states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are particularly well suited to a study of the role of autonomy for violent ethnic conflict since they form a limited geographical area where nine compactly settled minorities were present before the onset of conflict in the late 1980s. Four of these were autonomous: the Armenians of Mountainous Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and the Abkhaz, Ajars, and South Ossetians in Georgia. Meanwhile, five minorities of comparable size lacked autonomy: the Armenians of Javakheti in Georgia, the Azeris in Georgia, the Azeris in Armenia, and the Talysh and Lezgins of Azerbaijan. While the relations between the various minorities and their central governments have ranged from calm to occasionally high levels of tensions in all cases, only in three cases did these tensions deteriorate into armed conflict: in Mountainous Karabakh, South Ossetia, and in Abkhazia, incidentally three of the four areas that held territorial autonomy. As these three cases were all autonomous regions or republics in the Soviet period, the question that comes to mind is whether autonomy played any role in the escalation to armed conflict. Was autonomy a factor generating conflict, or did conflict emerge in these specific regions for other and different reasons? Already at this point, it is necessary to note that no attempt is made to portray autonomy as the sole responsible factor for these conflicts. Indeed, autonomy can be construed neither as a sufficient nor as a necessary condition for conflict. Of 20 autonomous regions in the Russian Federation, armed conflict had emerged only in one case by early 2002: Chechnya. Likewise, ethnopolitical conflicts have emerged in various regions of the world without the presence of autonomy for the minority in question. Nevertheless, the question is whether autonomy contributed to the emergence of conflict; and if so, in which way, to what extent, and in relation to

The Role of Autonomy for Violent Conflict

which other factors? As will be shown below, there are a number of facets of the institution of territorial autonomy that may be conceived of as contributing to conflict, rather than decreasing the risk of violence. It is nevertheless necessary to account for the role played by other factors which have been listed and discussed at length in the plentiful theoretical literature on ethnic conflict, or arrived to in empirical studies of instances of the same phenomenon. An important question is the specific character of the Soviet autonomous structure, which is explained in detail in chapter three. A number of analysts dismiss the relevance of Soviet autonomies, with the argument that they were simply not autonomous. For example, Dörge denied that Soviet ‘entities’ enjoyed genuine autonomy;2 Lapidoth, in the same vein, dismisses them by arguing that ‘Soviet autonomy has always been of a merely administrative and cultural nature’, and that by the 1930s, the ‘limited administrative autonomy that had existed became an almost-empty shell’.3 Certainly, it is correct that the Soviet Union was a strong authoritarian state, where the Communist party leadership was responsible for all important decisions. However, as the discussion in chapter three will show, the Soviet autonomies did over time develop indigenous elites, indigenous institutions, and actually in certain times such as the 1920s and since the 1970s, did carry with them a significant self-rule by local elites, shielding them from the center’s policies. The issue also relates more broadly to the relationship between autonomy and democracy. Can a meaningful autonomy exist in a non-democratic state? Many writers would argue that the devolution of power is not possible in an authoritarian state, and that as a result, real autonomy would not be possible. Yet even in authoritarian societies, autonomy may exist in the sense of creating territories whose existence is legitimized through ethnicity, with governmental institutions manned by native elites, defined borders, and significant power in cultural, educational, and sometimes even economic and political matters that help shape the consciousness of the inhabitants of these autonomous regions. Soviet autonomies are examples thereof, and this issue is treated at further length below. The argument presented in this study has not been systematically treated in the theoretical literature on ethnopolitical conflict. Various researchers have alluded to the role of autonomous institutions in conjunction with ethnic conflict, but this author is unaware of any systematic inquiry into the role of autonomy as a factor in the emergence of ethnopolitical conflict. The lack of existing theory rules out a purely deductive approach as such an approach is normally used either to test an existing theory, a part of Heinrich Dörge, Der Autonome Verband im Geltenden Staats-und Völkersrecht, Vienna: Brämüller, 1931, p. 18, quoted in Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflict (Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 1996), p. 30. 3 Lapidoth, Autonomy, p. 91. 2

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an existing theory, or a novel deductive theoretical construct. As one researcher notes, ‘it is commonly held that that deductive approaches should be chosen whenever possible, but that recommendation offers limited guidance if there is no identifiable theory to test’.4 Indeed, there is a need to build theory in this field, hence a theory-building approach will be adopted. Relevant academic literature drawn from various fields will be used in chapter two to set up a number of working proposition on factors plausibly leading to conflict between a government and a minority population, whether autonomous or not. Relevant literature includes, as will be discussed below, literature on conflict between nations as well as literature on nationalism and ethnic conflict. To determine if autonomy indeed played a role in the emergence of ethnopolitical conflict in the South Caucasus, it must be contrasted with the role played by a host of other factors. This chapter will present the logical case for the argument that territorial autonomy is conducive not to peace and cooperation, but to ethnic mobilization and, indeed, to conflict. In chapter two, a theoretical discussion on the roots of ethnopolitical conflict is undertaken, with the aim of providing the alternative or contributing explanations that may help in accounting for the emergence of conflict in the region. Several working propositions are extracted from this chapter. Having formed the theoretical setting of the discussion, a historical overview of Soviet nationality policy is necessary before moving to the actual investigation of the conflicts of the late 1980s and 1990s. Chapter three will set the scene of the study by examining in further detail the Soviet Union’s policies toward nationality and ethnicity, based on Marxism-Leninism – policies that were of great importance to this study as it was Soviet nationality policy that drew the borders of the South Caucasus and determined the minorities that were granted autonomy. The map of the South Caucasus, and the societies that existed in the region in the late 1980s, cannot be dissociated from the Soviet Union’s singular approach toward minority issues. Being equipped with a theoretical framework and a historical background to ethnic relations and ethnic policies in the former Soviet Union, chapter four will outline the methodology to be used to investigate the empirical reality and contrast it with the theoretical elements outlined in chapters one and two. After having provided a brief empirical background to the region and specifically to the nine minorities that form the universe of cases in this study, chapter five will carry out a factor-based study of the nine cases, drawing on the working propositions emanating from chapters one and two. This chapter will provide an indication of the role of different factors in explaining the emergence of ethnopolitical conflict. While providing an indication of causal effect, that

Thomas Ohlson, Power Politics and Peace Policies. Intra-State Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa, Report No. 50, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 1998.

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is, establishing a link between an explanatory factor and the outcome of conflict, it does not provide an increased understanding of the causal mechanism – i.e., how and through which human mechanism that particular explanatory factor is related to ethnopolitical conflict. In order to achieve such an understanding, a smaller number of cases will be singled out for further examination. Five cases in the Republic of Georgia, exhibiting the full variation in outcome among the cases under study while sharing a similar political context, are then examined in further detail. Chapter six will provide a comprehensive background to the political development of Georgia with specific attention to minority issues. Against this background, chapter seven will examine each of the five selected cases, with a view to explain which factors, in which way, and in what relation to one another, contributed to the emergence of conflict or the lack thereof. Finally, after a brief comparative discussion of the cases, chapter eight will conclude the study.

1.2. Autonomy: General Perceptions Since the 1950s, ethnopolitical conflict has grown as a source of concern in the international arena. It culminated after the cold war with the eruption of conflict in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. A number of conflicts also broke out between ethnically defined social groups in Africa and south Asia, in the post-communist states of Eastern Europe and Eurasia, as well as in Western Europe.5 The reigning assumption that ethnic conflict was a vestige of the primitive past was revised and eventually abandoned, particularly in view of the spread of ethnic conflict to less developed regions. This led to increased media coverage and public awareness of ethnic issues; more importantly, academic research on ethnic conflict and its resolution mushroomed.6 Ethnic mobilization among minority populations in multiethnic states has often led to demands for self-rule (territorial autonomy) or to demands for outright secession.7 Especially in defined geographical areas where minorities are compactly settled, the creation of a separate state is a feasible goal and territorial control becomes a chief issue of conflict. In situations in which ethnic groups live in overlapping settlement patterns, such demands are less feasible and are made more infrequently, making control over or 5

Ted Robert Gurr, “Ethnic Warfare on the Wane,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, May–June 2000, p. 53.

6

Significant works on nationalism and ethnic conflict include Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 2d ed., London: Verso, 1991; Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Blackwell, 1988; Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986; Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985; Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970; Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict, Washington, DC: USIP Press, 1993; Gurr, Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century, Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 2000). 7

In other instances, however, ethnic demands are not for ‘exit’—autonomy or secession—but for greater participation in the government of the central state, particularly when settlement patterns overlap.

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influence in the central government the most contentious issue.8 Indeed, Fearon and Laitin find “regional concentration of minority group (a) powerful and robust factor. . . far more likely to see large-scale ethnic violence than urban or widely dispersed minorities.”9 Many theorists have found that solutions involving regional autonomy are effective in dealing with ethnic conflict. Ted Gurr, for example, has argued that “negotiated regional autonomy has proved to be an effective antidote for ethnopolitical wars of secession in Western and Third World States.”10 Likewise, Kjell-Åke Nordquist has observed that creating an autonomy—“a self-governing intra-state region—as a conflict-solving mechanism in an internal armed conflict is both a theoretical and, very often, a practical option for the parties in such conflicts.”11 Regional autonomy implies the introduction of ethnoterritoriality—territorial control linked to ethnicity. It occurs either when a region is explicitly created as a homeland for an ethnic group or when a minority group constitutes a large majority of the population of an autonomous state structure and perceives it as its own. Central governments are nevertheless almost universally reluctant to accede to demands for autonomy for several reasons. First and foremost, they fear that granting territorial autonomy to a minority group would be merely the first step toward the eventual secession of the region. Second, granting autonomy to one region may be perceived as

8

It must be noted, however, that ethnic conflict in such situations is possible, and when it does occur, it is likely to be significantly more severe than in cases of less intermingled settlement patterns. Conflict in intermingled states would tend not to be over a part of the state’s territory and its affiliation but over the control of the state apparatus, that is, the entire territory of the state. The emergence of violent conflict in such situations would be significantly more likely to lead to large-scale ethnic cleansing and/or genocide: a geographic partition line being much more difficult to draw, the conflict is likely to take place not on a warfront between two organized military formations but in civilianinhabited areas over a much larger tract of territory. Moreover, the knowledge that a clean territorial break is impossible or very difficult encourages the urge to displace or eliminate members of the other group and even the perception that it is necessary. A political solution would also imply that one would continue to live intermingled with members of the other group. This is in turn interpreted as a security threat to the own group and again increases the urge to expel or eliminate the other group, actions that are even conceptualized as defensive and indispensable for the own group’s well-being. This situation is referred to as the security dilemma. See, for example, Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival 35, no. 1 (1993). Also Erik Melander, Anarchy Within: The Security Dilemma between Ethnic Groups in Emerging Anarchy, Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1999.

9

James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Weak States, Rough Terrain, and Large-Scale Ethnic Violence since 1945” (Paper presented at the 1999 annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, September 2–5, 1999), 16, emphasis in original.

10

Ted Robert Gurr, “Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 38, Fall 1994, p. 366. 11

Kjell-Åke Nordquist, “Autonomy as a Conflict-Solving Mechanism: An Overview,” in Markku Suksi, ed., Autonomy: Applications and Implications, The Hague: Kluwer, 1998, p. 59.

The Role of Autonomy for Violent Conflict

discrimination against other inhabitants or groups.12 Third, autonomy increases the risk of intervention by a foreign state affiliated with the specific minority population.13 In spite of such reservations, however, an increasing number of ethnopolitical conflicts over territory have been settled by compromises involving regional autonomy, such as the provision of autonomy to the Nagas in India in 1972, the Miskitos of Nicaragua in 1987, or the Gagauz of Moldova in 1994. The popularity of autonomy as a solution undoubtedly stems from its being one of the few conceivable compromise solutions in conflicts over the administrative control of a specific territory. Indeed, as will be discussed further, autonomy represents a compromise on the issue of state sovereignty itself. Advocates of autonomy solutions or of ethnofederalism in general14 argue that autonomy solutions are effective conflict-resolving mechanisms and that further federalization of multiethnic states along ethnic lines will help prevent ethnic conflict. In some of the literature, ethnofederalism has been characterized as what David Meyer terms a “cure-all prescription” for ethnic tensions.15 There is, however, considerable reason to argue that the institution of territorial autonomy may be conducive not to interethnic peace and cooperation but rather may foster ethnic mobilization, increased secessionism, and even armed conflict. Whereas the merits of federalism were widely lauded in the literature from the 1960s to 1990, developments since then have generated doubt that ethnofederal solutions can effectively prevent ethnic conflict. Several researchers have noted—usually in passing—how federal structures may be counterproductive under certain circumstances.16 Yet no systematic inquiry has been made into how and why federal structures, designed to mitigate centrifugal forces, instead may end up strengthening them. 12

Interestingly, in certain instances the central government, in particular in states trying to build a civic national identity, argues that granting autonomy to a minority population would be tantamount to defining that population as second-class citizens. The Turkish government, for example, sticks to its refusal for special rights to citizens of Kurdish origin, on the grounds that they are already enjoying all existing rights as first-class citizens of the Turkish republic; any special rights would imply their segregation from the rest of the population and by extension their diminishment to second-class status.

13

See Lapidoth, Autonomy, p. 203. By the same token it can be argued that the refusal to grant autonomy could be an even stronger incentive for a state affiliated with the minority to intervene. 14 Ethnofederalism is taken to mean the devolution of power within states to ethnically defined and territorially defined areas, either symmetrically or asymmetrically. 15

David J. Meyer, “A Place of Our Own: Does the Ethnicization of Territorial Control Create Incentives for Elites to Conduct Ethno-Political Mobilization? Cases from the Caucasus in Comparative Perspective”, Paper presented at the Fifth Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, New York, April 2000. See, for example, Daniel J. Elazar, Federalism and the Way to Peace, Kingston: Queens University, 1994; also Lapidoth, Autonomy.. 16

See, for example, Henry Hale, “Ethnofederalism and Theories of Secession: Getting More from the Soviet Cases” (Paper Presented at the annual meeting of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, New York, April 1999); Robert Dorff, “Federalism in Eastern Europe: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 24 (Spring 1994).

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1.3. Theoretical Aspects on Autonomy The term ‘autonomy’ is derived from the Greek words auto (self) and nomos (law), meaning the right to make one’s own laws. The term is used with differing meanings in philosophy, the natural sciences, and in international law and international relations. Autonomy is a term that applies in a variety of social and legal contexts. As Lapidoth notes, it is used ‘fairly loosely to describe the quality of having the right to decide or act at one’s own discretion in certain matters’.17 As used in international relations, the term was originally derived from sociology, but in a political and legal sense it ‘is part of the self-government of certain public corporations and institutions. It includes the power to … regulate their own affairs by enacting legal rules’. In international law, autonomy is taken to mean ‘that parts of the state’s territory are authorized to govern themselves in certain matters by enacting laws and statutes, but without constituting a state of their own’.18 This definition obviously refers to territorial autonomy, which is nevertheless not the only possible political understanding of the term. In particular, another type is cultural autonomy— whereby specific rights and duties are conferred on individuals belonging to a specific group, whether ethnically or religiously based. Autonomy in this study will, unless otherwise specified, refer to territorial autonomy. Crawford defined it as follows: ‘autonomous areas are regions of a State, usually possessing some ethnic or cultural distinctiveness, which have been granted separate powers of internal administration, to whatever degree, without being detached from the State of which they are part’.19 Lapidoth argues that ‘a territorial political autonomy is an arrangement aimed at granting to a group that differs from the majority of the population in the state, but that constitutes the majority in a specific region, a means by which it can express its distinct identity’.20 The latter part of this definition would certainly apply to the Soviet autonomies, although as viewed below, Lapidoth is dismissive of them. Whatever limitations there were on the exercise of political authority, the Soviet autonomies certainly helped promote the distinct identity of the groups that were granted autonomy, as will be viewed in greater detail in chapter three. However, there is not necessarily a requirement that the ethnic group granted autonomy form a majority of the population in a given region. Autonomy may be granted on a demographic basis, but also on the basis of an acknowledgment of the ethnic group’s indigenous nature on a specific territory irrespective of population figures, i.e. an acknowledgment of a certain group’s right to exercise authority over a certain territory. Hence in this study, the term autonomy will, unless otherwise specified, be understood as ‘a defined territory that has been legally

Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts, Washington: USIP Press, 1996, p. 29. 18 Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘On the Legal Understanding of Autonomy’, in Suksi, ed., Autonomy: Applications and Implications, p. 7. 19 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 211. 20 Lapidoth, Autonomy, p. 33. 17

The Role of Autonomy for Violent Conflict

granted a special status and rights and institutions of self-government by a state, by virtue of a titular ethnic group’s ascribed differences from the majority population of that state, without being detached from the state’.

1.3.1. Autonomy: Definitions and Relation to Human Rights The concept of autonomy can according to Steiner be divided into three schemes. The first is a power-sharing regime (or a form of consociational democracy), which ‘assures one or several ethnic groups of a particular form of participation in governance or economic opportunities’, such as ethnic quotas in parliament and government or veto rights.21 The second type is a regime of cultural autonomy, whereby members of particular ethnic communities are endowed with specific rights and duties in relation to the government, occasionally being bound by different laws.22 This is often the case for religious groups, as is the case in Israel for Muslims and Christians, or in India for Hindus and Muslims. Members of particular groups may also be given special rights to preserve their culture and language, through the institution of native language schools for minorities for example. Most important with cultural autonomy is that it is not territorially based; it may still, nevertheless, be either individually or group based and either voluntary or compulsory. The third type in Steiner’s analysis is that which gives an ethnic group selfrule, that is political authority over a certain territory, in order to govern its internal affairs to a determined extent. These regimes must naturally be based in the legal system of the particular country, and as such form a part of that state’s system of government.23 It must nevertheless be questioned whether the first regime or consociational democracy can qualify within anything but a very broad concept of autonomy; the concept of powersharing is in essence different from that of autonomy, being based on participation in power rather than devolution of power. The principle of autonomy can be defined as ‘the granting of internal self-government to a region or group of persons, thus recognizing a partial independence from the influence of the national or central government’, which can be determined ‘by the degree of actual as well as formal independence enjoyed by the autonomous entity in its political decision-making process’.24 This definition would include the concept of cultural autonomy, where a ‘group of persons’ is given ‘a partial independence from the influence of the government’; such schemes are useful for minorities scattered on the territory of a state, where no autonomous region covering that population can for practical reasons be Henry J. Steiner, ‘Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle over Autonomy Regimes for Minorities’, in The Notre Dame Law Review, vol. 66, 1991, pp. 1539-1560, here at p. 1542. 22 John Coakley, ‘Approaches to the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: The Strategy of Non-Territorial Autonomy’, International Political Science Review, vol. 15 no. 3, 1994, pp. 297-314. 23 Steiner, ‘Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle over Autonomy Regimes for Minorities’, p. 1542. 24 Heintze, ‘On the Legal Understanding of Autonomy’, in Suksi, ed., Autonomy: Applications and Implications, p. 7. 21

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created. The bulk of this definition is nevertheless intended for territorial autonomy, usually considered synonymous with that of ‘self-government’. It is established that the ‘right to self-determination’ included in the UN charter referred not to sovereignty or independence but to ‘self-government’; it was repeatedly noted that the principle of selfdetermination conformed to the principles of the charter only insofar as it implied the right of self-government of peoples, not the right to secession.25 In the framework of international law, the discussion on autonomy regimes comes within reach of the discussion on human rights and group rights. According to Heintze, ‘the subject of autonomy is always a group … the prerequisites of autonomy are recognition as a minority or group on the one hand and the acceptance of collective rights [that is, group rights] on the other’.26 Group rights and their relation to human rights are subject to debate. They can be construed as either collective or corporate rights. Without going to deep into the details of the theoretical discussion on individual human rights and group rights, a short overview of the topic is necessary to place the concept of autonomy in clearer context. Some authors argue that human rights are by nature individual rights borne by each person—i.e., universal human rights. Hence there is a difference between human rights and group rights: rights held by a group are by nature dissimilar to those held by individuals. Others insist that human rights can take collective as well as individual forms. Accordingly, much of what is important to Humans relates to things people experience collectively rather than individually.27 The relationship between group rights and human rights, can hence be seen either as antagonistic or complimentary. Some argue that group rights are complements to human rights; the reasons why we ascribe rights to individuals are also reasons why rights should be recognized for groups; the same underlying values and concerns apply. Additionally, group rights in this perspective as seen as actually strengthening or guaranteeing individual human rights. Another view is that group rights are potentially a threat to individual rights: the rights of groups are often claimed over or against individuals. Moreover, a major purpose of human rights doctrine has been to protect individuals from the power of groups. As such, it is argued that including group rights into human rights defeats the very purpose of human rights. It is interesting to note

Documents of the UN Conference on International Organization, vol. 6, New York: UN Information Organization, 1945, p. 296, cited by Heintze, ‘On the Legal Understanding of Autonomy’, in Suksi, ed., Autonomy: Applications and Implications, p. 9. 26 Heintze, ‘On the Legal Understanding of Autonomy’, in Suksi, ed., Autonomy: Applications and Implications, p. 15. 27 J. Herman Burgers, ‘The Function of Human Rights as Individual and Collective Rights’, in Jan Berting et al. (eds.) Human Rights in a Pluralist World: Individuals and Collectivities, London: Meckler, 1990, p. 63; Yoram Dinstein, ‘Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly vol. 25 , 1976, p. 102. See Peter Jones, ‘Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples’ Rights’, in Human Rights Quarterly vol. 21 no. 1, 1999, pp. 80-107. 25

The Role of Autonomy for Violent Conflict

that there is a trend toward the acceptance and widespread use of the concept of group rights (or collective human rights) in international law. The decisive issue at stake, as shown below, is whether one ascribes to a collective or corporate conception of group rights. The question is whether group rights are vested in the ethnic group or in the individual. 28 The ‘collective’ conception, as typified by Joseph Raz, subscribes to an interest theory of rights.29 X has a right if and only if X is entitled to have rights, and if an aspect of X’s well-being is a sufficient reason for holding other person(s) to be under a duty to respect that right. An interest becomes a right only if it is an interest of sufficient moment to justify imposing a duty on another. Hence a right is also conceptually tied to a duty. Group rights arise when the joint interest of a number of people provides sufficient justification for imposing duties upon others (such as positive discrimination/assertive action from the state), whereas the single interest of only one individual would not provide the necessary justification. In this sense, a group right is held jointly by those who make up the group; the group has no existence or interest other than that of its members. This conception can be applied to groups that have strong ascribed identities. For a cultural minority, its culture may be central to the lives of its members. In that case, the minority has a right, as a group, that the majority society shall take steps to accommodate and protect the minority’s culture. The costs and inconveniences of actively safeguarding a minority culture is justified by the interests of the combined interests of all of the members of the minority, not the interests of any single member of the minority. Whereas the collective conception ascribes moral standing to the individuals that jointly make up the group, the corporate conception ascribes a moral standing to the group as such. The question is if groups can be said to have the same irreducible moral standing entitling them with rights as individuals? If so, what criteria would a group have to meet in order to hold rights? In any case, the number of groups holding rights by the corporate conception will be smaller in number than that by the collective conception, since the group needs to have a certain moral standing and not only interests. A group must possess a morally significant identity such that it qualifies for a moral standing separately from its individual members. Generally groups such as ‘nations’ or ‘peoples’ are attributed such standing and are seen as having rights that may be conceived of in corporate terms.

See discussion in Jones, ‘Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples’ Rights’. For background, see eg. Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights, Individual Rights and Collective Rights’, in Berting et al. (eds.) Human Rights in a Pluralist World: Individuals and Collectivities, p. 39; James A. Graff, ‘Human Rights, Peoples, and the Right to Self-Determination’, in Judith Baker (ed.) Group Rights, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994, p. 186. 29 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, especially pp. 207-209. 28

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Some scholars claim that group rights conceived of as corporate rights can not be considered human rights, because they are held by corporate entities and not human beings. They are grounded in whatever gives these corporate entities their special moral status, unlike human rights that are based on humanity and personhood.30 A corporate right can be a universal right: For example the right to national self-determination can be asserted in a way making it universal to all nations. Also it is held by the nation and not the persons making up the nation, and the moral standing allowing the nation to hold the right is not humanity but nationhood. However, if this right is seen as a collective right, then it is held not by the nation as such but jointly by the people making up the nation, but based on the interest that those individuals share in living in a self-determined fashion. The collective rights of a group of individuals will fail if the duties imposed on other individuals to accord them that right are unduly harsh. Hence the collective rights of a group are seen in relation to the individual rights and duties of others. But this is not the case for corporate rights. Corporate rights accord groups a right that is ultimate and not derived from individual rights. Hence if moral standing is given to the group, a potential for rivalry between the group rights and individual rights exists, and may be seen as fundamental and inherent to the concept. For example, ascribing a moral standing to the group will be problematic in the case of people within the group trying to break free (i.e. live in a different way than dictated by tradition.) If rights are ascribed to the group’s members individually, then they are free to do as they wish. But if the right is ascribed to the group as such, then this may not be the case, and group and individual rights may conflict. Questions of territory will also be salient. If a nation asserts its corporate right to a territory, it may justify a policy of ethnic cleansing to purge elements whom it deems not to be part of itself and which are therefore not deemed to have a right to live on that territory, again to the detriment of the individual rights of others. To solve such conceptual problems, it is argued that individual human rights must always have a priority over corporate rights. This would prevent the possibility of a corporate right challenging the rights of individuals. Autonomy regimes are often advocated as a consequence of the right to selfdetermination of peoples and as such within the conception of corporate group rights. In fact, there are movements to make autonomy a principle of international law. In the draft declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, it is stated that ‘indigenous peoples have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs’. As the declaration has not been ratified, such formulations do not yet have any

30

Jones, ‘Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples’ Rights’, pp. 88-92.

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legal status; in fact the declaration would be the first legal text in which a group is expressly considered as the holder of a right to autonomy.31

1.3.2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Autonomy Regimes in the Literature The advantages of autonomy regimes are relatively well known. Given the multitude of ethnic groups in the world, advocates of autonomy argue that group rights need to be realized below the state level, so as to avoid the transformation of the international system into one containing hundreds of states. The traditional structure of the international system is already threatened by the relative reduction of the role of states in international affairs by the increasing importance of sub-state entities such as ‘groups’, be they ethnic, national or religious, and supra-state entities such as regional and international organizations. Autonomy is basically the only possible compromise between the interests of the group and those of the state; moreover the flexibility that is inherent in the concept of autonomy, tailored as it may be to each particular situation, increases its usefulness in the context of ever-increasing ethnic tensions. Autonomy may hence work both to prevent and to resolve ethnic conflict. Autonomy regimes, by protecting diversity, by necessity rest in the assumption that differences enrich more than endanger the world. According to Steiner, ‘autonomy regimes of ethnic minorities defend cultural survival rights in counteracting [the trend toward homogenization that has accompanied Western development]’.32 Indeed, the present international system seems to be moving toward a system of international norms that protects difference by pressuring states to create autonomy regimes for minorities, and such norms raise obvious and serious issues: ‘the ideal in the human rights movement of preserving difference cannot so readily be bent to support the creation of autonomy regimes’. Whereas such regimes are based on the norm of equal protection, autonomy and power-sharing imply forms of institutionalized separateness which according to Steiner violate the very norm of equal protection: they ‘explicitly discriminate among groups on grounds of religion, language, race, or national origin ... [and thereby] drive home the lesson that socioeconomic life and career turn on ethnic bonds.’ Moreover, autonomy regimes not only preserve but lock into place historical differences among groups. According to Steiner, ‘a state composed of segregated autonomy regimes would resemble more a museum of social and cultural antiquities than any human rights ideal’.33 In practice, other authors have argued that autonomy, implying the differential treatment of a certain group may result in protests by other groups, and thus lead to

Heintze, ‘On the Legal Understanding of Autonomy’, in Suksi, ed., Autonomy: Applications and Implications, p. 14. 32 Steiner, ‘Ideals and Counter-Ideals…’, p. 1550. 33 Steiner, ‘Ideals and Counter-Ideals…’, p. 1552. 31

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rather than prevent conflict.34 By contrast, a unitary statethrough integration and the denial of collective group rights (though not therefore limiting individual rights)provides equal opportunities and rules for all citizens of the state, irrespective of color, ethnicity or religion, and thereby prevents the polarization around such issues that would characterize solutions such as autonomy or federalism. Autonomy may in fact isolate the minority and prevent its members from political or economic participation in the larger sphere of the state. Accordingly, it makes dialogue between groups within the society difficult, alienate its component groups from each other, and lead to segregation.35 Lyck has taken the example of the Faroe islands’ autonomy to prove the negative effects of autonomy, arguing that autonomy led the state to feel less responsible for the development of the region.36 The general thrust of the current debate is nevertheless that the advantages of autonomy supersede the possible drawbacks. However, this is the case if and only if the autonomy is designed, created, and maintained in a proper way, with the necessary safeguards providing mechanisms for the regulation of possible future conflicts and perhaps also for eventual alterations of the autonomy’s status. Autonomy is not in and by itself automatically a recipe for success; quite to the contrary, it is a solution with a number of dangers and risks, which yields its intended positive results only if properly designed.

1.3.3. Autonomy and Sovereignty The very nature of autonomous regions from the outset entails the existence of certain assets which are conducive to secessionism. The relationship between the central government of a state and an autonomous region within that same state resembles neither the horizontal relation between sovereign states nor the vertical relationship between a state and its citizens, whether or not they be organized politically along ethnic, religious, or ideological lines. With the institution of an autonomous status for a given region, the central government of a state acknowledges the devolution of a certain portion of its sovereignty to the representatives of the population of that region. In fact, the central government concedes that it does not have unlimited jurisdiction over the territory in question—herein lies the essence of autonomy. But at the same time, the central government insists on emphasizing the subordination of the autonomous region to itself and that the existence of the latter in no way contradicts its territorial integrity. Hence the

See Douglas Sanders, ‘Collective Rights’ in Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 13 no. 3, 1991, pp. 368-386. 35 See M. Brems, Die Politische Integration Etnischer Minderheiten, Frankfurt Am Main: Lang, 1995, p. 142, cited in Heintze, ‘On the Legal Understanding of Autonomy’, in Suksi, ed., Autonomy: Applications and Implications, p. 12. 36 L. Lyck, ‘Lessons to be Learned on Autonomy from the Faeroese Situation Since 1992’, in Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 64 no. 3, 1995, pp. 481-487. 34

The Role of Autonomy for Violent Conflict

relations between the two units can be described as diagonal; in fact an autonomous region can be conceived of as a state within a state, whether or not this circumstance be officially recognized by either party. Autonomous regions typically share some or most of attributes of states, given that they possess executive, legislative and judiciary bodies; they often have state-like symbols like flags, coats of arms, etc., and often have other state-like institutions like parliaments, ministries, and even presidencies. In fact, autonomies may share most attributes of a state but never, by definition, the main onethat of being completely sovereign, not having any judicial authority above itself. An autonomous region may claim elements of sovereignty, but it is by definition a part of a sovereign state. The sovereignty of the autonomy can never be more than partial or delimited to certain determined spheres such as culture, economy, etc. But by the same token, the institution of an autonomous region implies that the state itself is no longer completely sovereign: it has agreed to share its sovereignty with the autonomy, albeit on an unequal basis, the devolution of sovereignty concerning only a part of the country and being limited to certain spheres. An extreme example, the Republic of Bashkortostan is defined as ‘a sovereign state within the Russian Federation’ — a definition which may seem a contradiction in terms, but which does add fuel to the debate on various regimes of statehood and sovereignty.37 There is no accepted pattern for the conduct of relations between an autonomous region and its central governmenta fact which corresponds very well to the usefulness of autonomy as a mechanism of conflict resolution or prevention: its very flexibility and ability to be adapted to the specific grievances of a specific minority. Within the ‘society’ of independent and sovereign states, relations between all members are based on certain generally accepted principles, such as the equality of states, non-interference, inviolability of borders etc. Likewise but in a less generally accepted manner, there are principles that govern the relationship between a state and its citizens. The relationship between a central government and its autonomous region(s) does not, however, fit into either of these, sharing elements of both.

1.4. Autonomy and Secessionism There are two ways in which the institution of autonomous regions could be conceived of as conducive to secessionism: first of all by institutionalizing and promoting the separate identity of its titular group, thereby increasing group cohesion and the incentives of the

Ildus G. Ilishev, ‘Russian Federalism: Political, Legal and Ethnolingual Aspects  A View from the Republic of Bashkortostan’, in Nationalities Papers, vol. 26 no. 4, 1998, pp. 724-759. Reproduced as an appendix to the article is the Treaty on the Mutual Derogation of Powers between the State Organs of the Russian Federation and the State Organs of the Republic of Bashkortostan, in Stanovlenie Dogovornykh Otnosheniy Respubliku Bashkortostan i Rossiyskoy Federatsii (1990-1996 gg., Sbornik Dokumentov), Ufa, 1997.

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group to act; and secondly by its political institutions that increase the capacity of the group to act.

1.4.1. Borders One integral characteristic of autonomous regions is established, recognized, and clearly delimited borders—which in the Soviet case appeared on most maps of the union. The importance of borders has been emphasized among other by Benedict Anderson in his classic work Imagined Communities. As Anderson quotes a Thai author referring to southeast Asia and in particular Siam, ‘a map anticipated spatial reality, not vice versa. In other words, a map was a model for, rather than a model of, what it purported to represent … it had become a real instrument to concretize projections on the earth’s surface. A map was now necessary for the new administration to back up their claims…’.38 Anderson points to the special importance of what he terms the ‘map-as-logo’, whereby in the depiction of a territory, lines of longitude and latitude, place names, rivers, mountains and neighbors all disappear and only the contoursthat is, the bordersof the territory in question remain. The map is hence ‘pure sign, no longer compass to the world’. As Anderson shows, the map in this format can then be used for ‘transfer to posters, official seals, letterheads, magazine and textbook covers … instantly recognizable, everywhere visible, the logo-map penetrated deep into the popular imagination, forming a powerful emblem for the anticolonial nationalisms being born’.39 The same process can be said to have been at work in the former Soviet Union with respect to its component entities. The maps, that is the borders and shapes of the union republics, autonomous republics and autonomous regions were well in existence by the 1980s and had been so for as long as most inhabitants could remember. Much as in the example cited by Anderson, these maps and borders antedated spatial realities in the sense that internal borders of the Soviet Union carried little historical and practical importance.40 However, to autonomous minorities, the symbol of the republic or region’s shape, map, or borders was present, for most of the population, from birth. With the break-up of the Soviet Union, this symbol became an important rallying cry and an important tool in the hands of ‘political entrepreneurs’. Practically, the task of delimiting the borders of the imagined new state was already completed, an obvious advantage compared to non-autonomous minorities. Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of Siam, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994. 39 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso, 1991, p. 175. 40 Lezgins, for example, have for centuries lived on both banks of the Samur river. When this river became the border between the Dagestan ASSR and the Azerbaijan SSR in the 1920s, this did not affect the Lezgins much; they were still able to carry on with their lives, with kinship ties across the administrative border. When in 1992 the Samur became the border between two independent states, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan, the division suddenly became a bitter reality to the Lezgins. 38

The Role of Autonomy for Violent Conflict

1.4.2. Group identity Several researchers have noted the importance of autonomous entities for sustaining, promoting and enhancing group identity and cohesion. Gurr, for example, notes that ‘the capacity for collective action is relatively high [in the case of] groups that control an autonomous regional government’.41 The primary instrument for the promotion of ethnic identity is the education system. Arguing for the usefulness of an institutionalist explanation to explain the salience of nationalism in Russia’s republics, Gorenburg notes that: Instilling a strong sense of ethnic community in individuals requires them to be exposed early and frequently to information about their ethnic identity. In the context of Soviet nationalities policy, this exposure came primarily through the education system. By establishing separate systems of native language education for most of the minority ethnic groups that had their own ethno-territorial administrative units, the Soviet government in effect created an institution dedicated to instilling a common and separate identity among the students … the identity was further reinforced in the classroom, where titular students were taught the culture and history of their ancestors, who were portrayed as having a direct genetic link with the members of the modern ethnic group.42

Hence it is reasonable to argue that the institution of autonomous regions inherently increase the group identity and cohesion of the region’s titular group, not only through the existence of borders but also due to the separate educational system autonomy often entails.

1.4.3. State Institutions Another aspect of autonomous regions is the fact that they typically possess state-like institutions that can have a crucial effect in a process of ethnic mobilization, and that can be used by nationalist leaders to pursue a challenge to the central state’s integrity. Unlike the case of non-autonomous minorities, autonomous regions in many parts of the world have governments and parliaments that act as legitimate representatives of their ethnic constituencies and constitute recognized decision-making bodies. Parliaments can be used to pass language laws, to refuse to accept legislation from the central government, to issue declarations of sovereignty and independence, etc. A minority equipped with an autonomous status hence has institutions through which to challenge state authorities in general and the specific policies and actions of the central government in particular. The crucial factor is that autonomy creates institutions with some legitimacy to take this kind of actions. By contrast, a minority without such institutions would find it more complicated to challenge the state. Popular movements, petitions, demonstrations etc. may in certain contexts be effective methods to influence state policy; however even the See Gurr, Peoples Versus States. Dmitry Gorenburg, “Nationalism for the Masses: Popular Support for Nationalism in Russia’s Ethnic Republics,” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 53 no. 1, January 2001, p. 74.

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organization of such shows of dismay are considerably easier given the existence of autonomous structures. Beyond increasing the sense of legitimacy of the actions taken by the minority, it effectively creates decision-making structures that are crucial in any attempt to bring ethnopolitical demands from the level of quiet dissatisfaction to that of direct action. As Meyer notes, autonomy ‘institutes a stratification of authority, subordinating administrative personnel into a defined hierarchy’; moreover, autonomy ‘establishes standard operating procedures and positive sanctions for the execution of its bureaucratic roles, and negative sanctions for poor performance, however that is defined by the AS [Autonomous Structure] leadership’.43 In other words, given the existence of a nationalist leadership in the autonomous structure, the entirety of the bureaucracy is enticed to follow suit and adopt a more nationalist profile.

1.4.4. Leadership The very fact that autonomous regions have governments moreover means that they have leadersa crucial factor in any process of mobilization. The position of the leadership of an autonomous region is institutionalized in a manner that the leadership of a regular popular national movement can never be, meaning that leaders of autonomous structures have a relatively solid base to stand on. As Meyer notes, autonomy gives ‘a stamp of legitimacy to its executives and to the rule of the titular ethnic group’, and ‘facilitates improved cohesion of various ethno-politically mobilizing nationalists by providing a single institution around which they can unite’.44 Beyond lending legitimacy to the leadership, its institutionalization also entails that routines for succession exist. The ‘national struggle’ could continue even through a change in leadership. The existence of an autonomous structure, especially where the titular ethnic group is in demographic majority position, also increases the risk of politicians resorting to ethnic mobilization for career purposes. The institution of autonomy being the source of power for leading élites, the leadership has a vested interest in increasing the level of self-government of the region in question. Elite power is simply positively correlated to the level of autonomy. Consequently, the élite has a vested interest in keeping nationalist sentiment among the population at a high level, which will ensure a pressure from below to sustain or enhance the level of autonomy.

1.4.5. Financial Resources Autonomous structures also often carry with them access to financial resources that can be used to fund nationalist movements, and lessen the leadership’s dependence on the

43 David J. Meyer, A Place of Our Own: Does the Ethnicization of Territorial Control Create Incentives for Elites to Conduct Ethno-Political Mobilization? Cases from the Caucasus in Comparative Perspective, Paper presented at the 5th Annual Convention of the ASN, New York, NY, April 2000, p. 2. 44 Meyer, A Place of Our Own, p. 2.

The Role of Autonomy for Violent Conflict

central government for finances. Some autonomy schemes include delegation of taxation to the levels of the autonomy, giving the autonomous government direct access to funds, as is the case in Tatarstan or Bashkortostan. Access to funds provides a basis for a movement to emerge without having to find funds from abroad or through donations from supporters, hence greatly increasing the financial independence of the secessionist movement. Moreover, funds can be used to distribute patronage, but also to buy weapons and other equipment.

1.4.6. Mass Media Autonomous regions also often enjoy the privilege of having mass media under the control of its governmental authorities, including television, radio stations, as well as newspapers. In other words, beyond the ability to influence the attitudes of the population in the long term through the education system, autonomous regions possess every available means to directly influence the population through news coverage and depiction of events in media—or in clear terms, propaganda—and speed up the process of ethnic mobilization.

1.4.6. External Support Yet another factor is external support. Very much due to its institutions, but also to the above-mentioned fact that their very institution of autonomy entails the recognition by the state of the devolution of its sovereignty, the international political (and perhaps also legal) standing of an autonomous region is not comparable to that of a non-autonomous minority. Practically, this entails that external support for an autonomous region is more likely to be forthcoming than for non-autonomous minorities.

1.5. Conclusions The conclusion of the discussion above is that ceteris paribus, secessionism is likely to be significantly higher for minorities equipped with an autonomous region, compared to non-autonomous minorities. In the Soviet context, the fact that autonomous regions were sometimes tightly controlled by the center during the Soviet era was no impediment to their use for political purposes during the transition period. First of all, the identityshaping characteristics were present all throughout the Soviet era; secondly, the autonomous structures could be filled with increased content and more actual political significance in the late 1980s. Whereas the ASSR or AO Supreme Soviets had often been rubber-stamp institutions during the Soviet era (though this was not always the case, as Abkhazia and Tatarstan among others repeatedly sought a change in status aginst the wishes of Soviet authorities), the political liberalization of the late 1980s meant that the powers given to these parliaments by the (on paper) highly liberal Brezhnevian

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constitution could actually be used. This chapter generates one working proposition for the study: Proposition: In combination with other factors, the existence of territorial autonomy increases the risk of conflict.

2 The Roots of Ethnopolitical Conflict

Chapter one set forth the thesis that autonomy has certain facets that may contribute to ethnic mobilization and hence to conflict. However, an ever-growing body of literature has identified a large number of different factors at the root of ethnopolitical conflict. In order to investigate the relationship between autonomy and conflict, it is hence necessary to contrast the salience of autonomy with the salience of other factors. It shall be recalled that chapter one noted that autonomy is regarded neither as a sufficient nor as a necessary condition for ethnopolitical conflict. In other words, certain autonomous territories do not come in a situation of conflict with their central government; moreover, ethnopolitical conflict takes place in the absence of autonomous structures. Hence the challenge is to investigate whether autonomy has indeed been a factor contributing to the emergence of conflict in the South Caucasus. Chapter four will deal with the methodology of the study in further detail; nevertheless, it should be clear already at this stage that autonomy will need to be contrasted with other factors that have been at work in the process leading to conflict in the South Caucasus. This chapter envisages to examine the discussion on ethnopolitical conflict in the literature, extract the central arguments produced by scholarship to explain the emergence of this type of conflict, and finally to construct working propositions based on this literature, that would have an explanatory value for the occurrence of conflict. For this purpose, a discussion surveying general research on the subject is undertaken in order to arrive at a categorization of factors deemed responsible for the phenomenon of ethnopolitical conflict. The discussion takes its base in the traditional dichotomy between primordial and instrumental views of ethnic conflict, and then emphasizes three central categories of factors: incentives or willingness to rebel, capacity to act, and political opportunity to act. Moreover, the dichotomy between background factors and catalyzing factors behind ethnic conflict is emphasized and the factors to be elaborated are discussed under these sub-headings. Two issues are paid special attention to in the selection whenever applicable: the specific case of autonomous regions, and the geographic territory of the former Soviet Union. Hence, factors that may be important for ethnopolitical conflict generally but superfluous in the context of the former Soviet Union, where all nine cases to be discussed are confined, are not dwelled on. For example, the proposition that transition from authoritarianism to democracy increases the risks of conflict is important for the general body of theory on ethnopolitical conflict; however all

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cases in this study would fall under the same conditions of political transition, and therefore this explanatory factor would have no ability to explain a variance in the occurrence of conflict.

2.1. General Research on Ethnopolitical Conflict The literature on the phenomena of ethnicity and nationalism is relatively plentiful. A number of classic works on the development of nationalism exist, such as Anderson’s Imagined Communities or Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism. Meanwhile, there is an entire body of literature that has tried to map the reasons or causes of inter-state conflict. However, as noted by Gurr and Harff, ‘there is no comprehensive and widely accepted theory of the causes and consequences of ethnopolitical conflict’.1 Likewise van Evera states that ‘scholars have written widely on the causes of nationalism but said little about its effects … most strikingly, the impact on nationalism on the risk of war has barely been explored’.2 One would agree with Charles Tilly that ‘if the Nobel Academy [sic] awarded a prize in political science, surely it would give high priority to anyone who would provide a convincing answer to a simple question: under what conditions do ethnically identified populations make sustained, effective claims to control their own separate state?’ In the same mood, Horowitz notes that there are ‘formidable obstacles’ to the construction of a theory of ethnic conflict.3 Moreover, the element of autonomy is largely ignored. In fact, in much of the literature on ethnic relations the assumption is of relations between an ethnic group, which may be politically organized in a variety of more or less cohesive ways, and a government that often is seen as representing a particular ethnic group. The case of politically autonomous ethnic groups (usually treated at par with non-autonomous groups in the literature) differs from this standard pattern of ethnic relations in one important respect: both ethnic groups in question, at the center and at the periphery, possess sovereignty, albeit at different degrees. Both are organized into a territorial entity with political institutions that represent their populations. Of course, one of these entities is within and hierarchically subordinated to the other; but the minority group is nonetheless in a qualitatively different position compared to ethnic groups not vested with an autonomous status.

Ted R. Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994, pp. 7778. 2 Stephen van Evera, ‘Hypotheses on Nationalism and War’, originally published in International Security, vol. 18 no. 4, 1994, pp. 5-39; page numbers here refer to the article republished in Michael E. Brown (ed.), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: An International Security Reader, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997 3 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985, p. 95. 1

The Roots of Ethnopolitical Conflict

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Although few consistent theories of ethnic conflict as such exist, most attempts to treat the issue find their roots in theories of ethnicity and nationalism. There is a traditional dichotomy on the issue of the roots of ethnic tensions. One is the primordialist view which, very simplified, argues that ethnic identities are given, and beyond that that the process of modernization was perceived as a threat to minority cultures and ways of life, hence prompting rebellion on the part of minorities. Deutsch, for example, argued that social mobilization was related to ethnic conflict, and this argument has been developed by other authors.4 According to this view, ethnic competition is likely to occur in the ‘modern’ sphere of life as it is people newly having severed ties with their familiar, traditional environment to move to a ‘modern’ living environment, (typically leaving agriculture on the countryside for industrial or service work in an urban environment) that are most subjected to insecurity and seek the shelter of their tribal or communal identity. As such, ethnic conflict is seen not (as had been the case earlier) as a primitive relic of the past, but related to the very process of transition from the ‘primitive’ past to modernity. Another view, defended by among other Charles Tilly, argues that ethnic identities are social constructs, and that the main aim of groups is material and political gains; hence political entrepreneurs make use of economic differences and promote ethnic solidarity as a means to achieve economic and political aims.5 Tilly argues that leaders and members of ethnically defined populations make strong claims for control over autonomous states or subdivisions of states under two conditions: when competitors begin to make claims for statehood that would exclude or subordinate the ethnic group in question; and when the agents of a state to which the population is already subordinated begins to threaten a) the group’s ethnic identity or b) its shared access to advantageous niches.6 According to this line of thought, political entrepreneurs seek to raise the level of group consciousness and group cohesion among their target population. Where one school of thought emphasizes the defense of ethnic identity, the other stresses the pursuit of group interests. What can be inferred from these two lines of thought is on the one hand an emphasis on grievances and defense of ethnic identity: that is, the perception of an ethnic group (typically a minority population) that it is discriminated against by another group (normally the majority population of a state). Such perceived disadvantages create a willingness or incentive on the part of members of the ethnic group to mobilize politically. The other line of thought would then argue that the main driving force is the pursuit of

Karl W. Deutsch, ‘Social Mobilization and Political Development’, in American Political Science Review, vol. 55, 1961, pp. 493-514; Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, ‘Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective’, in American Political Science Review, vol. 64, 1970, pp. 111230. 5 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978. 6 Charles Tilly, ‘Ethnic Conflict in the Soviet Union’, in Theory and Society, vol. 20 no. 5, October 1991, p. 575. 4

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group interests, that is political capacity and opportunity  that leaders see a chance of achieving certain political or economic goals by ethnic mobilization. Naturally, these two lines of thought are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed, a number of studies have argued that the amalgamation of these two views would be the best basis for the construction of a theory of ethnic conflict. Ted Gurr has noted that ‘ethnopolitical activism is motivated by peoples’ deep-seated grievances about their collective status in combination with the situationally determined pursuit of political interests, as articulated by group leaders and political entrepreneurs’.7 It seems reasonable to argue, as do Gurr and Harff, that ethnic conflict is most likely to occur when both conditions are fulfilled: that is, when there is a strong sense among a minority of imposed group disadvantages, and where the ethnic group is characterized by a strong group cohesion and represented by leaders with a political agenda.8 Naturally, these factors are linked; in particular the notions of perceived discrimination and political leadership are linked by group cohesion. A commonly felt notion of discrimination or suppression among members of a group under certain circumstances – such as the group inhabiting a defined territory and not living dispersed throughout the territory of the state, for example – increases the feeling of common belonging to the group, and hence strengthens group cohesion.9 Group cohesion is also a sine qua non for the emergence of credible political leaders. Without group cohesion, there would be no strongly knit community on which the leaders could base their position; any political movements would be abortive or unsuccessful even in the absence of – or perhaps, especially in the case of – state suppression of such movement. Moreover, absence of group cohesion would significantly lower the likelihood of political movements forming at all, since the formation of massgrounded movements depends on a reasonably strong basis that only a cohesive and selfaware group can provide. Group cohesion carries with it the emergence of grass-root cultural or other informal or formal associations and groupings from which a political movement can emerge. The key word in knitting together these concepts seems to be capacity. Both willingness to act and political opportunity in the shape of political leaders are important because they increase the capacity of the group to act. Indeed, in a recent study, Gurr views ‘group capacity for collective action’ as a function of the salience of group identity and cohesion, shared incentives (that is, willingness), and the existence of legitimate leaders (in Gurr’s

Ted R. Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict, Washington, DC: USIP Press, 1993, p. 123. 8 Ted R. Gurr and Barabara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994. 9 Naturally, a group can possess a strong level of group cohesion even in the absence of discrimination; especially if there are significant cultural, linguistic, or religious differences between a group and its neighbors, group cohesion can survive and even strengthen for centuries even in a nonhostile environment. 7

The Roots of Ethnopolitical Conflict

25

model defined as ‘coalitions among diverse segments and contending leaders’ and ‘authenticity of leadership’).10 Basically, the crucial notions just noted of perceived discrimination, group cohesion, and political leadership can be approximated into the three more abstract notions of incentives, capacity, and opportunity. Perceived discrimination, or in the words of Gurr and Harff ‘imposed group disadvantages’, is instrumental in increasing frustration and resentment among members of a group against authorities and/or other groups, thereby creating an incentive or willingness to change the disadvantageous situation by taking action. Strong levels of group identity—which translates into higher group cohesion— fueled by incentives to act lead to a greater willingness for collective action. Both these factors increase the likelihood of the emergence of a political leadership, an element that implies an increased capacity for action on the part of the group. Capacity to act is also strongly affected by opportunity structures, often elements external to the group – whether domestic to the state (such as regime transitions, economic crises) or related to the international environment (such as outside intervention and regional crises). It is reasonable to conclude that the presence of incentives, capacity and opportunity for political action all significantly increase the likelihood of conflict, at least insofar as the demands of a group are resisted by authorities and/or other groups – a conflict can not take place unless the minority group’s challenge leads to a negative reaction fro the part of the state, or other groups. However, states very seldom allow minority challenges on sovereignty to proceed unchecked. All in all, conflict is likely only when the three elements are all present, where a willingness and capacity to act as well as political opportunity exists.

2.2. The Categories of Factors: Underlying Factors versus Catalyzers An increasing number of authors have emphasized the existence of various qualitative categories of factors leading to conflict. Van Evera argues that ‘causes of war or peace can be classified as proximate (causes that directly affect the odds of war) or remote (causes of these proximate causes, or background conditions necessary for their activation.)’.11 In a similar manner, Harff denotes enduring (background) conditions, as well as ‘triggers’ and ‘accelerators’, the latter being the essential and necessary factors that ‘move conflicts to the next stage of escalation or, for that matter, that trigger de-escalation’;12 likewise, Brown divides factors leading to internal conflict into ‘underlying factors or permissive

Ted R. Gurr, Peoples Versus States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and Accommodation at the End of the 20th Century, Washington: USIP Press, 2000, chapter 3. 11 Van Evera, ‘Hypotheses on Nationalism and War’, p. 7. 12 Barbara Harff, ‘Early Warning of Humanitarian Crises: Sequential Models and the Role of Accelerators’, in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems, Lanham, ML: Rownam & Littlefield Publishers inc., 1998, p. 72. 10

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conditions’, and ‘catalytic factors or proximate causes’.13 Brown, Van Evera, Gurr and Harff all strive to build hypotheses on the emergence of ethnic conflict, and all at the outset divide the factors or variables they present into a ‘background’ set of factors and a set of ‘triggers’ or proximate causes. The case for making this distinction is the following: there are factors that are required for a conflict to occur, but that in themselves do not trigger the eruption of conflict, or in other words ‘activate’ it. For example, historic conflict or the ‘age-old animosities’ between peoples, often mentioned in media, is a factor in most ethnic conflicts in the sense that such conflicts seldom break out without the existence of animosities between the peoples or ethnic groups involved. However, this is not a triggering factor of conflict, for several reasons. One major point is that the presence of this factor does not explain why conflict erupts at a specific point in time; background factors are often time-resistant – they are present over a long period of time, without conflict necessarily occurring. Moreover, empirical evidence shows that such factors are typically present in numerous situations, but that even in case of the presence of a combination of background factors in a multitude of cases, only a limited number of potential conflicts actually turn into large-scale violence. In this sense, the background factors are ‘permissive conditions’, as Brown puts it: they are ‘necessary’ for the occurrence of conflict but do not in and by themselves trigger conflict. Naturally, the presence of a multitude of background factors certainly makes the eruption of conflict more likely. However, there is necessarily something that triggers the conflict, a certain change that takes place, which escalates the conflict from potential to actual. Indeed, there are numerous instances of ethnic groups living with strong mutual animosities for extended periods of time without clashing violently on a large scale. Whether they are persons or ethnic groups, neighbors may despise each other but there is a need for a specific contentious issue or a triggering event or development for actual confrontation to take place. Background factors are then factors that are either constant or develop during an extended period of time, and that are hence less resistant to sudden change. In the categorization of factors above, background factors, as will be seen below, typically fall under the headings ‘incentives’ and ‘capacity’, but seldom under ‘opportunity’. Those factors that spur a willingness to act among ethnic groups are typically time-resistant as they are mainly to do with group identities or perceptions of group relations and of history that do not change rapidly. Factors related with capacity are more diverse, some, mainly political factors, being malleable to change but others, such as demographic and geographic factors, being more resistant to time. Secondly, there is a set of ‘catalyzing’ factors that directly trigger conflict. The scholarly research on nationalism and conflict, as Brown puts it, ‘does a commendable job of surveying the underlying factors or permissive conditions that make some situations

Michael E. Brown, ‘The Causes of Internal Conflict’, in Brown (ed.), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: An International Security Reader, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997, pp. 3-25, here at p. 4.

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27

particularly prone to violence, but it is weak when it comes to identifying the catalytic factorsthe triggers or proximate causesof internal conflicts’.14 These factors are events or circumstances that directly increase the risk of conflict, or escalate it, in a given context. The catalyzing factors are by nature situational and fluctuating, and more difficult to assess and predict than the background factors. An example of a typical proximate cause is a coup d’état bringing a nationalist leader to power; given the presence of several background factors, such an event would have the potential to radicalize an already wary minority, leading it to decide to secede, hence triggering a violent conflict if the state reacts to the secession. Catalyzing factors are often related to developments that provide a political opportunity; events that significantly and rapidly increase either the capacity or the willingness of a group to act. Obviously, one corollary of the dichotomy between background and catalyzing factors is that background factors are considerably more easy to identify and analyzemore timeresistant and accessible as they arethan catalyzers, which range from geopolitical changes to internal events that may be difficult to predict or in which a substantial element of chance and timing may play an important role. However the dichotomy is important in several ways: with relevance to the present work, it helps in understanding the eruption of conflict at a specific point in time: with an analysis based on background variables only, one may do a great deal to identify the areas where a potential for conflict exists, but not much to predict when and howthat is under which circumstancesthis could happen. Although outside the scope of this study, it is important to note that the importance is even more conspicuous for conflict prevention: background factors, as just mentioned, identify potential conflict situations. Their understanding is necessary as preventive measures must include efforts to offset these factors. However, understanding what actually triggers a conflict is equally or more important in the short term as preventive measures must focus on preventing the catalyzing factors or circumstances from emerging.

2.3. Background Factors or Permissive Conditions of Ethnic Conflict The underlying factors behind ethnic conflict can be divided into several sub-categories of factors. Hence, factors may be related either to group cohesion and willingness, to capacity for action, or to opportunity. As noted above, background factors can by nature not be related to opportunity, whereas catalyzing factors typically fall under this heading. Background factors are then classified under two headings: group cohesion and incentives, and capacity for action.

14

Brown, ‘The Causes of Internal Conflict’, p. 13.

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2.3.1. Group Cohesion and Incentives 2.3.1.1. Group Identity and Group Cohesion Ethnic mobilization, a sine qua non of ethnic conflict, is dependent upon individual members of the group actually identifying the ethnic group as their primary allegiance and primary identity. In fact, ethnic identity is but one of several allegiances individuals may have. Other, competing, allegiances may be related to class, tribe, region, religion, or a civic national identity of a state. That ethnic conflict did not break out in any significant scale in the Soviet Union before its dissolution is often explained by the monocausal explanation of effective state repression. Another significant factor seldom acknowledged is that a great part of the citizens of the Soviet Union did identify themselves, at least in part, exactly as such. The civic identity (and to a lower degree a ‘proletariat’ class identity) of being a Soviet citizen, coupled with official rhetoric of the brotherhood of nations, was in fact at least partially adopted by a significant number of people—while the structure of the union, as discussed in chapter three, simultaneously entrenched the separate ethnic identity of the minority populations. With the dissolution of the union, not only did central repression fade, but the Soviet, all-encompassing identity was no more, and individuals were forced to reorient their identities—in practice leading to an increased identification with the ethnic group.15 This process took place in former Yugoslavia as well. This serves to highlight the fact that ethnic identities are not given, instead being highly situational and carrying different importance under different circumstances. For example, in a society that is deeply characterized by social (class) cleavages, ethnic identity may fall in the background and cease to be a major determinant. Ethnic identity may also be diluted by a civic conception of a nation that assimilates or integrates individuals into itself. The case of Turkey is a case in point, where the ‘Turkish’ identity, a creation of the twentieth century, has succeeded in gaining the status of primary identity for a large majority of the population, despite its ethnically highly mixed character. Even a substantial number of Kurds, the largest and most cohesive minority in Turkey, identify themselves at least partially as ‘Turk’a predominantly civic identity.16 The comparison between the Turkish and Soviet approaches to the issue of ethnicity is particularly interesting. The Soviet approach was to acknowledge and entertain ethnic identities while trying to build a common, new identity over the ethnic identities. The Turkish approach (modeled on France) was also to create a new civic conception of the nation, however here the approach was integrative: previous ethnic identities were discouraged, often harshly, and full focus was given on promoting the common civic See Svante E. Cornell, ‘Conflicting Identities in the Caucasus’, in Peace Reviewa Transnational Quarterly, vol. 9 no. 4, December 1997. 16 See chapter 7 in Hugh Pope, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic, London: Hurst, 1997. Also Svante E. Cornell, ‘The Kurdish Question and Turkish Politics’, in Orbis, vol. 45 no. 1, 2001. 15

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identity. In retrospect, both approaches have encountered severe problems. Of course, other factors and circumstances have influenced the outcome of the respective ‘experiments’; whereas this debate deserves to be the subject of a study in its own right, suffice it to say that the utter collapse of the Soviet system and the plethora of ethnic tensions in the former Soviet Union does put the consociational approach into question. The issue of group identity is crucial to the study of ethnic conflict. Gurr and Harff express the issue with the following hypothesis: ‘the more strongly a person identifies with an ethnic group that is subject to discrimination, the more likely he or she is to be motivated into action’. Gurr has argued that several external conditions contribute to the salience of group identity: the extent of cultural differences between the group and other groups with which it interacts; the severity of the group’s disadvantages in relation to other groups; and the intensity of conflict with other groups and the state.17 Cultural differences and discrimination are discussed in detail below. However, the issue of conflict presents the danger of a circular argument: conflict increases group identity, which in turn increases willingness to act, which increase the risk of conflict, etc. If the present aim is to explain what leads to conflict, it is hard to argue that conflict itself is a reason for it. With regard to group identity in the former Soviet Union, it should be noted that all titular nationalities of autonomous regions and republics had institutions to promote their separate culture and identity. The degrees of cultural rights varied between autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts; nevertheless, the pattern was roughly similar although the emphasis given to promotion of cultural rights differed over time. Most notably, from the 1960s to the 1980s, titular language instruction decreased steadily. Yet, this differed little among groups. State policy in the cultural field is susceptible to have a very limited explanatory value for group cohesion and willingness to act on the part of ethnic groups. 2.3.1.2. Cultural Differences The rather commonsensical argument that cultural differences are necessary for ethnic conflict is a starting point for this argument. Without significant cultural differences, conflicts may arise but they would then not be ethnopolitical conflicts as the background of the conflict does not have any relation with communal identity. The extent of these differences is nevertheless likely to have an influence on the potential for violence. In the Minorities at Risk project, Gurr denotes six ‘cultural traits’ to measure differentials: ethnicity/nationality, language, religion, social customs, historical origin, and urban/rural residence. Whereas this categorization is very neat, the first variable, ethnicity, is somewhat confusing as it seems to be comparable with the category, cultural differences, and therefore measurable with the five remaining variables. In any case, ethnicity as such is a term subject to an amount of discussion and debate so great that it can hardly be 17

Gurr, Minorities at Risk, p. 126.

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easily measured or coded without severe theoretical problems. What is to have different ethnicity? To look different, to be seen differently by other groups or simply to have a different national identity than other groups? In principle, cultural differences can take the shape of differences in language, religion, physical appearance, customs and traditions. It can be argued that the risks of conflict increase with the number of factors separating two groups. If groups speak different languages, the chances of information failure, and therefore misunderstanding and subsequent conflict, increase; if they share different religions, one important conflict-preventing factor in the spiritual realm is absentin many religions there are strong prohibitions against violence toward members of the same religion; moreover difference in religion increases the ‘otherness’ of the other group, thereby deepening alienation and prejudice. Differences in physical appearance (be it physiognomy or dress) contributes to visually isolating the other group from one’s own, thereby giving rise to added prejudice and stereotyping, as well as easy identification of members of a group. The difference is readily observable without interaction, which is not the case with religion or language. Less pronounced factors such as different traditions, customs or habits related to food, drinking, or social behaviors are additional factors. The levels of cultural differences between minorities and the titular nationalities of the central state vary greatly. For instance, cultural differences between Russians and Ukrainians are relatively low; by contrast, those between Chechens and Russians are highly significant in all categories discussed above. Likewise, Talysh and Azeris have lesser cultural differences than Armenians and Azeris. À priori it could be assumed that the likelihood of conflict would increase with the level of cultural differences. However, researchers have pointed out that distinct but very closely related ethnic groups may not automatically have harmonious relations. The smaller among the two groups may feel threatened of absorption by the larger group, and lead to a perceived need for self-assertion. Examples are Bashkirs and Tatars, Ukrainians and Russians, or Norwegians and Swedes. In general, though, greater cultural differences carry greater risks of friction, tensions, and conflict. Moreover, the previously examined issue of group cohesion can be incorporated: cultural differences will matter immensely more if group identity is strong and the groups, or at least one of them, are cohesive. In particular, the cohesion of the minority is important. If the state’s titular nationality is cohesive, this is conducive to conflict only if it is revisionist and seeks conflict with the minority, as happened in Georgia in the late 1980s. But normally, being the holder of a sovereign state, the majority population is more likely to be satisfied with its status and therefore may not seek to challenge the autonomy. On the other hand, cohesion among the minority group is likely to contribute to the likelihood of conflict in case it is dissatisfied (which it at the outset has a higher incentive to be, not being the holder of a sovereign state), if it perceives relative group disadvantages. In particular, the level to which the minority has been assimilated into the culture of the titular nationality of the state is important. Many minorities in the Russian Federation, for example, are strongly culturally and linguistically Russified, and their group cohesion is relatively low. Extreme nationalists are however likely to be especially active if they

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perceive a danger of total assimilation; their possibility to gain popular support will in all likelihood be low. The discussion can be summarized in the following proposition: Proposition 1: The deeper the cultural differences between two groups, and the stronger group identities and cohesion, the higher the risk of conflict. 2.3.1.3. Political Discrimination The perhaps most well-known and obvious political factor increasing the likelihood of ethnic conflict is discrimination. As discussed above, perceived ‘group disadvantages’ imposed by another group in control of the central government is a factor almost certain to lead to an increasing frustration among members of an ethnic group, and as a result, an increasing willingness for political action that may in turn translate into demands for secession. Discrimination can be political or economic in character, and the two are often interlinked. Political discrimination, in Gurr’s definition, implies that ‘group members are or have been systematically limited in their enjoyment of political rights or access to political position by comparison with other groups in their society’.18 In general, it is clear that political discrimination is a potent factor increasing the likelihood of conflict. Van Evera hypothesizes that ‘the more severely nationalities oppress minorities now living in their states, the greater the risk of war’.19 Likewise, Brown argues that authoritarian systems are likely to generate resentment over time, especially if ‘the interests of some ethnic groups are served while others are trampled’, and that ‘conflict is especially likely where ‘oppression and violence are commonly employed by the state’.20 In the case of the former Soviet Union, however, the relevance of political discrimination as a factor in explaining why conflict erupted in certain areas and not others is not evident. This is the case because it is highly difficult, if not impossible, to measure the levels of discrimination in each autonomous unit. Moreover, if discrimination was taking place, who would be to blamethe Republican leadership or the central Soviet State? Nationalism or Communism? In fact, laying the blame squarely on the republican government would be somewhat illogical since the Soviet Union was a totalitarian state where the republican governments were not autonomous in reality although being so on paper. To take a concrete example, the Abkhaz accuse the Georgian republican leadership of having tried to obliterate the national identity of the Abkhaz through a process of linguistic and cultural ‘Georgianization’. The Georgians retaliate that compared to the North Caucasian nationalities (ethnically related to the Abkhaz) that had autonomous entities within the Russian Federation, the cultural identity of the Abkhaz were considerably more protected; accordingly, whereas North Caucasian nationalities were

Gurr, Minorities at Risk, p. 46. Van Evera, ‘Hypotheses on Nationalism and War’, p. 30. 20 Brown, ‘The Causes of Internal Conflict’, p.8. 18 19

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subjected to linguistic and cultural Russification, Abkhazia’s belonging to Georgia protected it from such policies and enabled the Abkhaz, despite their demographic weakness, to survive as a distinct nation. In such a situation, discrimination is largely a matter of perception. In the end, it is irrelevant in judging the likelihood of conflict whether or not discrimination has actually taken place; what is important is if a group feels discriminated, whether there is a perception of discrimination. (Perceptual factors are discussed below.) Political discrimination against minorities is often said to have been the rule, not the exception in the Soviet Union: non-Russians were allegedly systematically disfavored while seeking career opportunities at the union level, most blatantly in the military.21 A counter-claim is that autonomous minorities were subjected to a similar level of discrimination as were citizens in general, irrespective of origin—ethnic Russians fared as bad as did others. Moreover, autonomous regions were areas were the titular nationality was positively discriminated. For example, despite being less than a fifth of the population of their ASSR, the Abkhaz controlled almost half of the seats of the local parliament and were highly over-represented in the governing of the ASSR. Given this unclear picture of discrimination, it is arguably meaningless to seek to explain the variance in conflict through variance in political discrimination. Keeping this problem in mind, it is possible to argue that among minorities subjected to a higher degree of discrimination or harassment compared to other groups, the likelihood of conflict is higher. With reference to the discussion above regarding the ‘even distribution’ of discrimination in the former Soviet Union, two specific cases of noticeably higher levels of discrimination can be noted. The first is the case of national groups that were subjected to deportation during the second world war. The deported nationalities (including the Chechens, Ingush, Karachai and Balkar) were even after their ‘rehabilitation’ from deportation in the 1950s treated as second class citizens and their possibilities of political participation were highly restricted. For example, Jokhar Dudayev, the leader of the Chechen struggle for independence between 1990 and his death in 1996, was able to enter the military academy by posing as an individual of Ossetian nationality. The deported nationalities were clearly discriminated in terms of education and training as well as in their careers. Hence it is certain that the deported nationalities (that are all part of the Russian Federation) have a higher level of frustration and resentment toward the central government in Moscow than do other autonomous minorities. National groups that have been the subject of systematic harassment such as deportation or attempted genocide are

21 However, especially in the military, a clear bias toward certain nationalities could be seen. In particular, Muslim citizens composed the bulk of the supply and logistics forces, but seldom the actual fighting forces and never the elite forces. Muslims were at clear disadvantage while seeking to become officers, something that can be said about Baltic peoples as well; by contrast, more trusted nations such as the Armenians were comparatively favored.

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more likely to have a willingness to secede from the political entity that they associate with the injustices committed against them. Secondly, non-Christian peoples were subjected to higher levels of discrimination for their religious beliefs and simply for their origin than Christian peoples. This regards especially Muslim peoples, given that the Soviet Union was especially hostile to Islam, seeing Islamic Fundamentalism as a potential security threat, but also to Buddhist minorities. Hence it can be expected that the frustration against the central government be higher among Muslims and Buddhists. Islamic peoples in particular were subjected to a higher level of discrimination in many spheres of Soviet life than other citizens. The restrictions on expressions of religion were harsher concerning Islam than other religions, in particular Orthodox Christianity. Muslims were systematically disfavored in the military service, were normally confined to non-fighting and therefore less prestigious positions in the military. At several occasions during the period of Soviet rule, Soviet Atheism assaulted Islam in the Union. Muslims were distrusted, and few Muslims made officer rank, whereas other minority nationalities, such as Armenians or Georgians, fared considerably better.22 Again, the problem of identifying the ‘culprit’ arises. In the nonRussian republics especially, discrimination could be identified either with the titular nationality of the republic or with the central authorities. Interestingly, there were few autonomous regions in non-Russian republics granted to Muslim populations: Ajaria is the only case. Karakalpakistan, Nakhchivan and Gorno-Badakhshan were all Muslim autonomies within Muslim republics. With respect to the Russian Federation, then, a plausible argument could be made that Muslim autonomies would have a greater incentive to seek separate statehood, due to a likely higher perception of imposed group disadvantages than other groups, an argument true also for Buddhists, in all likelihood at a lower intensity. However, it must be noted that this very much approximates the variable on cultural differences: claiming that Muslims and Buddhists have a higher willingness to act is in practice the same as saying that peoples with high cultural differences have a higher willingness to act. Besides these exceptions, political discrimination is not a variable that is either possible to measure or which would be likely to have a bearing on the likelihood of conflict, given the relatively even level of suppression, assault on civil society and lack of democracy that was characteristic of communism in its Soviet shape. 2.3.1.4. Type of National Conception: Civic or Ethnic? Nationalism is often treated as a coherent concept needing no further definition. But in connection with the discussion above regarding identities, it was noted that civic 22 See Yaacov Ro’i, Islam in the Soviet Union, London: Hurst, 1999; Hélène Carrère D’Encausse, Islam and the Russian Empire: Reform and Revolution in Central Asia, London: I.B. Tauris, 1987; Amir Taheri, Crescent in a Red Sky: The Future of Islam in the Soviet Union, New York, 1989.

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conceptions of nationhood exist, such as the French, Turkish or formerly Soviet and Yugoslav kinds. In fact, this conception is predominant in many states where political and communal borders are least compatible. Conceptions such as ‘Ghanaian’ or ‘Nigerian’ have little or no ethnic connotation but designate the citizenship of a political entity, the nation-state or occasionally the state-nation. Despite being a more abstract conception, civic nationalism can be a very strong identity as exemplified by the Turkish or French case. And the difference between the two conceptions of nationalism is significant enough to deserve further treatment. As Anthony Smith has noted, ‘nationalism-in-general is merely a lazy historian’s escape from the arduous task of explaining the influence of this or that particular nationalist idea, argument or sentiment in its highly specific context’.23 Smith points to the difference between a civic-territorial and an ethnic-genealogic model of the nation. According to Smith, the civic model of the nation is a predominantly spatial or territorial conception, with the nation and the land it inhabits belonging to each other; secondly there is ‘a community of laws and institutions with a single political will’, implying common regulating institutions, whether the state be organized as a unitary state such as France or Turkey or unions of separate territorial entities such as the United States. There is a deep sense of a legal and political community whose members are equal before the law of that community; and moreover, a measure of ‘common culture and a civic ideology’ that bind the population together. Opposed to this stands the ‘ethnicgenealogic’ conception of the nation, whose emphasis lies on a community of birth and native culture. An ethnic nation is before anything a community of common descent. Whereas in the civic model an individual can choose which nation to belong to or become integrated into the nation of his choice, there is no such possibility in an ethnic model of a nation. There is what Smith terms ‘a fictive super-family’, with myths of common ancestry tying together the members of a nationtherefore the use of the term ‘genealogic’.24 Naturally, few nationalisms are purely civic or ethnic, and most share elements of both. But, as Smith puts it, the conceptual distinction has important consequences: Civic and territorial models of the nation tend to produce certain kinds of nationalist movement: ‘anti-colonial’ movements before independence and ‘integration’ movements after independence. Ethnic and genealogical models of the nation, on the other hand, tend to give rise to secessionist or diaspora movements before independence and irredentist or ‘pan’ movements thereafter.25

Hence territorial, civic nationalism typically concentrates on bringing together and integrating the population residing within its boundaries, giving them equal standing before the law and often abandoning plans to ‘rescue’ ethnic kin in neighboring states. Ethnic nationalist movements, on the other hand, are intent on making the political and Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, London: Penguin Books, 1991, p. 79. Smith, National Identity, pp. 8-15. 25 Smith, National Identity, p. 82. 23 24

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ethnic boundaries coterminous with each other; this implies that ethnic nationalism is more likely to be aggressive towards other ethnic groups on the territory of ‘their’ state and towards neighboring states containing ethnic kin to the group.26 Conceptions of nation based on civic nationalism are then inherently more peaceful and non-aggressive than ethnic ones. As Brown notes, ‘conflict is more likely when ethnic conceptions of nationalism predominate’.27 However, it should be noted that models of nations based on civic nationalism vary greatly with regard to their treatment of divergent identities on their territory, and that the dominance of civic nationalism does not preclude conflict, as displayed both by Indonesia and Turkey. Whereas in especially immigrant nations like the US, for example, all ‘previous’ identities are accepted and tolerated but expected to be secondary to the American identity, other states such as France or Turkey see competing identities as threats to the entire national project and therefore deny or suppress them. For example, Atatürk’s dictum was generous in that it allowed everyone who desired so to become a Turkish citizen; but it didn’t provide a solution for those who were not prepared to abandon their previous identities in order to embrace the new national idea. This, in a nutshell, was the problem of a significant portion of the Kurdish population who differed from the rest of the population not only by language but also by its clan-based feudal social structure, the dissolution of which the regime never succeeded in inspiring. Minorities, in order to be minorities, are nevertheless generally ethnically defined. Should they be predominantly civic, that would contradict the concept of minority, which implies a distinction of some sort from the rest of the population. However, this is not necessarily true for autonomous regions. In the example of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation, the leadership speaks of a Tatarstani nation composed of the citizens of Tatarstan, as opposed to the Tatar ethnic group. But only minorities endowed with a strong autonomy can reason in terms of citizenship, which is almost always a prerogative of the state. As concerns the subject of this study, the very existence of autonomous regions within a state is likely to affect the national conception. In rigid integrationist civic systems, autonomy as such would be seen as a consociational model of handling minority issues that would go against the very conception of the state. But in the Soviet Union, autonomies were inherited and few governments (Georgia being a partial exception) were intent on abolishing them. The character of the national identities of the autonomous Smith, National Identity, pp. 82-83. The Turkish republic is an example of a civic state: Atatürk’s dictum defining the Turkish nation (Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyene) determines as a citizen everyone who calls him or herself a Turk as opposed to whoever is a Turk. Every person living within the borders of the republic and accepting its basic principles was welcome to be its citizen irrespective of ethnic origin. Hence, people of Caucasian or Slavic origin having migrated to Anatolia, or indigenous populations of Kurdish or Arabic origin became Turks in their own right, whereas Turkish minorities elsewhere, in the Middle East or in the Balkans, did not enjoy substantial privileges for obtaining citizenship in the republic, and were mostly ignored unless they sought refuge in Turkey. 27 Brown, ‘The Causes of Internal Conflict’, p.8. 26

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titular nationality and that of the state titular nationality are nevertheless crucial to the relations between center and autonomy. If the state’s titular nationality is dominated by an ethnic conception of the nation, the chances that the autonomous minority will desire to dissociate itself by secession are higher; similarly, if the autonomous nationality defines itself predominantly ethnically, its own desire for separate statehood is likely to be more pronounced, and the likelihood of conflict increases. On the other hand, civic conceptions of nation in both autonomy and central state will have a dampening effect on conflict. It is then possible to formulate the following proposition: Proposition 2: The more the national conception of either the minority or the state’s titular nation approximate an ethnic conception of the nation, the higher the likelihood of conflict. 2.3.1.5. Loss of Political Autonomy Gurr notes a ‘history of lost political autonomy’ as a major ‘risk factor’ in his model of ethnopolitical rebellion. According to Gurr, it is ‘an historical fact around which myths and grievances are formed. Appeals to those myths and grievances are a potent source of mobilization for future political action’.28 In this assessment, Gurr touches on a point related with the discussion regarding autonomy made in chapter 2. Indeed, the loss of autonomy, with the symbolism it carries, is a potent factor in increasing resentment and thereby willingness to take political action. The most obvious examples are Kosovo, which lost its real autonomy in 1989 and where the cycle of violence in Yugoslavia subsequently started; and South Ossetia in Georgia, where the threat of losing autonomy was a precipitating factor to the conflict. But as these two examples show, the loss of political autonomy may be both a background factor and a catalyzer of conflict. If political autonomy has been lost but a somewhat stable situation has been created in spite of this, as in Kosovo, the loss of autonomy serves as an additional factor increasing incentives on the part of the minority to act. But if a situation is already tense, as will be discussed below, the removal of political autonomy can serve as a direct catalyzing factor precipitating violent conflict. This factor can explain the reasons for conflict only in cases of autonomous minorities. Among the cases in this study, only Ajaria was faced with a distinct political threat from the Georgian national movement to lift Ajaria’s autonomy, whereas Zviad Gamsakhurdia, even before coming to power, pledged to safeguard Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s autonomy. South Ossetia’s autonomy was eventually lifted, but only after South Ossetia took a decision to secede from Georgia. In no case in this study can the actual loss of political autonomy be seen as a cause for conflict. The fear of losing autonomy may have been a factor, and as such will be discussed in the case studies.

Ted R. Gurr, ‘A Risk Assessment Model of Ethnopolitical Rebellion’, in Davies and Gurr, (eds.), Preventive Measures, p. 18.

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2.3.1.6. The Security Dilemma The processes whereby groups feel the need to provide for their own security and ponder whether other groups are a threat to them lead to specific situation that has recently been given much attention by conflict theory: that of the Security Dilemma. The essence of the security dilemma concept is that ‘vulnerable and fearful actors through efforts to enhance their own security undermine the security of others’.29 By acting to defend themselves, groups unintentionally threaten the security of other groups; the emergence of a selfdefense militia movement in one ethnic group may easily be seen as a potential or real threat by a neighboring group which will then move to take similar action, in the worst case leading to mutual escalating counter-measures and eventually the unleashing of offensive military action for defensive purpose – a kind of deterrence failure.30 The increased understanding of such mechanisms has done a great deal to improve the understanding of how and why ethnic civil wars break out in transition periods after the fall of authoritarian rule, what rational choice theorists call ‘emerging anarchy’. The security dilemma nevertheless presupposes that emerging anarchy is a cause of ethnic tensions. This view is problematic as in many cases it is the very ethnic tensions that lead to the emerging anarchy. For example, there were few signs of emerging anarchy when the Mountainous Karabakh conflict emerged in 1988, or when the riots in Abkhazia took place in 1989. These conflicts contributed significantly to creating the anarchy that emerged in the Soviet Union and led to its dissolution. In other words, the security dilemma may have the causal chain backwards in some cases.31 A security dilemma certainly existed in between Armenia and Azerbaijan by 1991 – but how did it emerge? Moreover, the conditions of ‘emerging anarchy’ or state weakness were similar throughout the Caucasus region in the period under study. Why did conflict emerge among certain groups rather than others? Clearly, even if a security dilemma developed between some of the groups, such as the Georgians and Abkhaz or the Armenians and Azeris, there must have been some reason why this dynamic occurred among those groups and not between Armenians and Georgians or Azeris and Georgians. 2.3.1.7. Past Conflict and Myths A number of authors have argued that the perception held by members of groups against other groups is a major cause of conflict. Brown argues that ‘groups tend to whitewash and glorify their own histories, and often demonize their neighbors, rivals and

See Erik Melander, Anarchy Within: The Security Dilemma between Ethnic Groups in Emerging Anarchy, Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1999, p. i. 30 See eg. Barry Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict, in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 103-124. 31 See Stuart Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001, pp. 20-21. 29

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adversaries’, and that history often becomes distorted and exaggerated. The creation of ‘ethnic mythologies’, in his view, increase the risk of conflict, especially if two groups have mutually exclusive and mirroring perceptions of each other.32 By the same token, Van Evera argues that nations can co-exist most easily when their self-images and images of their neighbors converge, but that relations ‘are worst if images diverge in self-justifying directions’.33 As both authors show, mythmaking is especially dangerous if related to past conflicts and crimes that have transpired in the relations between two groups. A particular factor affecting group relations is the collective memory, which strongly influences the perception of other groups. A key factor affecting such perceptions is the history of relations between ethnic groups. As Van Evera has argued, ‘the degree of harmony or conflict between intermingled nationalities depends partly on the size of the crimes committed by each against the other in the past; the greater these crimes, the greater the current conflict’.34 More importantly, the memory of past crimes will determine the relations between the groups. A strong level of remembrance will strengthen the perception that it is impossible to continue living with the other group, and that members of the own group living in the midst of the other group need to be rescued. Hence, remembrance of past crimes is conducive to what Van Evera terms a diaspora-annexing as opposed to a diaspora-accepting attitude. Of course, past conflict need not lead to renewed conflict, as the current European integration project and especially FrancoGerman relations exemplify. In fact, the salience of past conflict and past crimes is related to several factors: first, the degree to which they are remembered and nurtured, or transformed into national myths; second, the degree to which the perpetrator of the crimes is still present and can be held responsible, and whether individuals or an entire group is held responsible. This factor is in turn dependent upon how the perceived perpetrator interprets the past, if the crimes are admitted and repented, or if the two groups’ interpretation of the past are compatible. Kaufman has pointed to the importance of symbolic politics. Symbolic politics theory holds that ‘people make political choices based on emotion and in response to symbols’, giving great importance to the psychological environment in which conflicts emerge.35 By suggesting that people often make decisions on the basis of emotions and symbols rather than rational, cost- or benefit-calculations, symbolic politics helps explaining how the ethnic bond can be mobilized upon. As Kaufman notes, On the individual level, appeals to emotionally laden ethnic symbols are what motivate people to participate in ethnic movements, and appeals to myths blaming other groups are Brown, ‘The Causes of Internal Conflict’, p. 13. 33 Van Evera, ‘Hypotheses on Nationalism and War’, p. 47. 34 Van Evera, ‘Hypotheses on Nationalism and War’, p. 44. 35 Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, p. 29. 32

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what make people feel aggressive and motivate them to fight in ethnic wars. Those emotional appeals short-circuit the complicated problem of making tradeoff decisions because they encourage people to put ethnic issues ahead of other concerns.36

It is uncontroversial to argue that the existence of past conflict between two groups, especially if this conflict is well-remembered and/or has been mythified, increases the likelihood of mutual suspicion, tensions, and conflict. Proposition 3: The greater the intensity of past conflict and the myths surrounding it, the greater the risk of conflict.

2.3.2. Capacity for Action 2.3.2.1. Rough Terrain The connection between ‘rough terrain’ and conflict has been noted by military experts, most notably by students of guerrilla warfare.37 It is commonly accepted that a ‘rough’ physical geography—mountains or heavy forests—is conducive to guerrilla warfare. In such terrain, defenders with local knowledge have the upper hand against traditional military forces and counterinsurgency strategies. The examples of Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Chechnya speak for themselves: motivated guerrilla fighters aided by rough terrain are able to deny numerically far larger armies control of territory indefinitely. Technologically superior enemy forces are unable to utilize their numerical, organizational and technological advantages against the defenders, hence making the cost of war for the occupying forces prohibitively high. Of course, rough terrain is by itself not a factor leading to conflict. Most importantly, defending forces need the support of the civilian population for their war effort to be successful. Supplies of food, treatment of wounded fighters, etc. all depend on the relationship between the civilian population and the fighters. This said, studying 37 ‘rural base minorities’ in Eastern Europe, Fearon and Laitin find that ‘mountain groups were six times more likely to see large-scale fighting with the state following the Soviet collapse’. As they note, rough terrain is a useful tool to explain how minorities with small numbers can ‘sustain significant guerrilla conflicts with the state’.38 However, there may be reason for caution. In the context of the study of secessionist conflict in the former Soviet Union, almost all ethnic conflict has taken place in the Caucasus. The ‘rough terrain’ variable would seem to be highly applicable here. But

Ibid., p. 30. 37 See Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1997. 38 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Weak States, Rough Terrain, and Large-Scale Ethnic Violence since 1945’, Paper presented at the 1999 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, 2-5 September 1999, Atlanta, GA, pp. 18-20. 36

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a region such as the Caucasus may share other particularities than rough terrain, whether cultural, demographic, historic, or geopolitical. Hence the ‘rough terrain’ variable may be difficult to isolate. On a different note, certain authors have tried to connect topography with psychology, arguing that ‘mountain peoples’ typically are more warlike, for example, than peoples inhabiting lowlands. The historian of civilizations, Fernand Braudel, for instance, famously stated that ‘In the mountains, then, civilization is never very stable.’ Furthermore, he argued that: The mountains are as a rule a world apart from civilizations, which are an urban and lowland achievement. Their history is to have none, to remain always on the fringes of the great waves of civilization, even the longest and most persistent, which may spread over great distances in the horizontal plane but are powerless to move vertically when faced with an obstacle of several hundred meters.39

This discussion, as epitomized by Braudel, has tendencies to make sweeping generalizations on entire peoples because of the typography of their habitat. However, it should be noted that mountains, especially, have a function of providing a certain degree of isolation for their inhabitants, and progress and development generally reaches mountain areas in a very delayed and incomplete manner.40 The very ethnic geography of the Caucasus, especially the north Caucasus, illustrates this. In the mountains of Dagestan, a plethora of ethnolinguistic groups exist, some with fewer than a thousand members, which have been able to safeguard their distinctive identity throughout centuries of war, conquest, and collectivization. As such, it is no exaggeration to argue that terrain does have an impact, in the longer term, on the identity of the people. This is primarily true for mountains, but the dense jungles of the Amazon have provided similar, perhaps even stronger shelter for indigenous peoples there. In a sense, then, rough terrain can be said to have an influence both on the strength of ethnic identity and on the capacity for rebellion. However, its effects on identity can be internalized in the factors dealing with identity without necessarily invoking terrain; for practical purposes it matters little what caused cultural differences, whether historical or topographic factors. For the purposes of this study, rough terrain will be dealt with in the manner in which it may directly influence political decisions, that is through its effect on a minority’s expected capacity to act and to sustain itself. Proposition 4: Rough terrain, in particular mountains or heavy forests, increases the risk of conflict.

François Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, New York, 1972, Vol. 1, p. 33. 40 S. Frederick Starr, ‘Altitude Sickness’, The National Interest¸ Spring 2001. 39

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2.3.2.2. Ethnic Geography and Demography Another important factor that has been stressed in the literature is ethnic geography. The settlement patterns of ethnic groups in a state are likely to have an impact on conflict potential: first of all, if ethnic groups live dispersed on the territory of a state and not physically tied to one particular geographic region, secessionist demands are less likely to emerge, since the creation of a separate state or the delimitation of its boundaries would be difficult or impossible. In such cases, minorities are likely to press for cultural rights and a commensurate share in the government and political life of the state they inhabit. However, it must be noted that the ethnic conflict in such situations is possible; moreover it is likely to be significantly more severe than in cases of less intermingled settlement patterns. Conflict in intermingled states would tend not to be over a part of the state’s territory and its affiliation but over the control of the state apparatus, that is, the entire territory of the state. The emergence of violent conflict in such situations would be significantly more likely to lead to large-scale ethnic cleansing and/or genocide, for several reasons. Firstly, a geographic partition line is much more difficult to draw, and the conflict is likely to take place not on a warfront between two organized armies but to a larger extent in civilian-inhabited areas over a much larger tract of territory. Secondly, the knowledge that a clean territorial break is impossible or very difficultand costly for the own group in terms of having to carry out population exchanges, as has been done in certain casesentails that the urge to forcibly displace or physically eliminate members of the other group become more pronounced, and even perceived as necessary. Third, the security dilemma would apply to a larger extent in such cases: a future compromise would imply that one would continue to live intermingled with members of the other group. This is in turn interpreted as a security threat to the own group, and again increases the urge to expel or eliminate the other group, actions that are even conceptualized as defensive and indispensable for the own group’s survival and well being. If, by contrast, ethnic groups are settled in clearly defined territorial areas, the risk of a secessionist conflict is significantly larger; the separation from the ‘mother’ state then becomes attainable and imaginable for the group in question. The link between people and territory is typically greater, implying a sense of group ownership of the land. While the likelihood of the rise of secessionist demands is higher in states where groups are settled along regional lines, conflict if it erupts is unlikely to lead to large-scale systematic killings or genocide. Warfare is, as Brown puts it, likely to be ‘more conventional in character’.41 The discrepancy in outcome between the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Mountainous Karabakh illustrates this phenomenon. Bosnia-Herzegovina presents a clear case of the first kind of situation, whereas Mountainous Karabakh is a relatively good case of a conflict over a slice of land, and mass killings and genocide took place in the former

41

Brown, ‘The Causes of Internal Conflict’, p. 7.

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case but not in the latter unless one uses a highly diluted definition of the term.42 The possibility for the state to accept the secession of a region is furthermore significantly higher if that region is well-defined, homogeneously populated by the minority group in question, geographically advantageously located (that is, either at the border areas of the state or at the seaside but not located like an ‘island’ within the state), and of minor strategic importance. In the case of autonomous regions, the issue above does not arise, since there is by definition a well-defined geographic area allocated to a specific ethnic group. Even then, both geography and demography may nevertheless still matter, and matter a lot. As concerns geography, the location of the region, either autonomous or non-autonomous—is crucial. Although minority populationsand thereby autonomous regionsare usually located at the periphery of states, this is not always the case, as the cases of Tatarstan or Bashkortostan in Russia illustrate. Moreover, the neighborhood in which the minority is located carries great importance. If it is isolated from the rest of the world, the likelihood of secessionism and especially conflict is low; economically, the new state would not be able to conduct relations, and politically it would be significantly more dependent on the former state it belonged to, with which it is unlikely to have a friendly relationship after secession. Isolation can take three forms: Firstly, a region is isolated if it does not share a border with any other state or has an outlet to the sea, that is if it is encircled by the state it belongs to. Second, a region may be isolated even if it does have an outlet to the outside world but this outlet is not conducive to be used since it has a hostile relationship with the neighboring state in question, or if it is physically inaccessible, like the Sakha republic’s arctic coast. Thirdly, the region is isolated if the outletneighbor or waterwayis in a state of turmoil. Basically, then, a proposition can be formulated as follows: The greater the geographic proximity and access to the outside world, the higher the likelihood of secessionism and conflict. In the context of the present study, all minority-populated regions are contiguous to the outside world. The only exception, technically, is Mountainous Karabakh, separated from Armenia by a corridor which, at its thinnest, is ca. 12 km wide. For practical purposes, this did not mean Mountainous Karabakh could not be connected to Armenia; given the short distance between the borders of the enclave and of Armenia, it was practically contiguous to the outside world. Given that all cases fall into the ‘yes’ category, this proposition will not be used in the study.

42 Both Armenians and Azerbaijanis accuse each other of genocide. Armenians mention the massacre of Armenians in Sumgait (February 1988) as an instance of genocide. According to official figures, 26 people died; the real figure is undoubtedly higher, but nevertheless does not qualify for the term genocide neither regarding the numbers involved nor the imperative of premeditation. The Azeris accuse Armenians of the killing of over a thousand civilians during the Armenian capture of the Azeri village of Khojaly in February 1992, while the killing of over 700 civilians has been proven. Whereas this action represents the largest event of its kind in the war’s history, it does not either qualify for the term genocide.

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Concerning demography, the demographic strength of the group in question is particularly important. Two points deserve to be made. First, for a credible secessionist struggle to emerge, it is reasonable to think that the secessionist group needs a certain demographic weight compared to the population of the rest of the country. A group that composes only a fraction of a state’s population will have several incentives not to secede. One incentive is that the imagined new state would not be economically or politically viable. Another, more powerful, that a struggle for independence against the vastly more numerous majority population would be unlikely to succeed. Importantly, as will be discussed below, this factor can be offset by external support either of ethnic kin or politically motivated third states. Also, in case of a political transition in the ‘mother’ state with its political scene looking inward, there may be a window of opportunity for even a small minority to secede. A proposition is hence that ‘the larger the demographic strength of the minority in relation to the population of the state, the greater the risk of conflict.’ However, all minorities in the South Caucasus compose less than 5% of their respective states’ population and would hence score low on this variable.43 This proposition is hence discarded for the purposes of this study. The second point is the internal demographic structure of the region inhabited by the minority. It can be assumed that the titular nationality needs to have a strong relative demographic position in the autonomous region in order to wage a credible struggle for independence. Demographic plurality make it easier for a group to control the local administration of a minority area, something which would be difficult if not impossible if other groups are demographically larger. Moreover, in the absence of demographic plurality of one titular group, a mass-level political movement is unlikely to emerge. In any case, the political ambitions of different groups and especially their leaders are normally hard to reconcile. In a case of two or more minority groups coexisting in a region, the prospect of secession has the potential to evolve into a security dilemma between the groups. This is the case, as the new environment resulting from secession would increase A state is generally termed homogeneous if minorities amount to less than 5% of the population. The same figure, although arbitrary, will be applied here. One would assume that a group numbering less than 5% of the population of the state—that is twenty times smaller—would have a low capacity to act. Using this figure, no group in this study can be termed ‘large enough’, if defined as the population inhabiting a plausibly secessionist region. Armenians form close to 9% of Georgia’s population, but reside in three different locations clearly separated from one another geographically and socio-economically. Secessionist moves would hence require a significant population in each of the three regions; demographic numbers can hence not be measured in lump. Likewise, the secessionist move in Mountainous Karabakh was a phenomenon completely separate from the much larger Armenian community in Baku, estimated at close to half a million people. Technically, this proposition would show a positive correlation in six cases; however, the three cases of conflict would naturally all be in the ‘wrong’ square. Moreover, Abkhaz and South Ossetians are by far the smallest minorities in the study, numbering less than 100,000 each and far smaller than the Armenians in Javakheti and Azeris in Kvemo Kartli, who number between 150,000 and 300,000 each, depending on estimates. Moreover, in Azerbaijan the Mountainous Karabakh Armenians are smaller in number both to the Lezgins and the Talysh.

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the importance of the demographic, economic, and political relations between the groups. Concretely, both groups would wonder how the inter-group relationship would crystallize after secession. Question such as the following will arise: Will the other group attempt to monopolize power? Would it have an interest in eliminating political participation of the other group? What weaponry does it have access to? Does the other group have external support? Do we need to take precautions for our security? The conclusion is that ceteris paribus, the likelihood of a secessionist movement decreases the lower the demographic portion of the autonomy belongs to the titular nations. Proposition 5: The greater the demographic dominance of the minority in the region it inhabits, the greater the risk of conflict. 2.3.2.3. Weak State Structures One main structural factor noted by Brown is the problem of weak state structures, which can be applied both to the case of newly formed states and to existing states in a time of political and/or economic transition. Many post-colonial states on different continents have suffered from being artificial constructs, with borders drawn at worst arbitrarily and in any case often belying logic, and without political institutions ‘capable of exercising meaningful control over the territory placed under their nominal supervision’.44 The states emanating from the dissolved socialist multi-ethnic federations (that is, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) share these problems to varying degrees. In this sense, a large number of states have come into existence in a situation requiring a cumbersome and among tracts of the population unpopular process of nation-building. One major weakness of a state is hence if the political boundaries correspond poorly to communal boundaries. Of course, this is not necessarily a weakening factor. Few states are ethnically homogeneous and strong states can and do exist in multiethnic environments. The United States and France are examples of highly multiethnic states that have been largely successful in building a strong civic national identity. However, there are fewer examples of states born in the twentieth century, particularly in its latter half, that have been equally successful in this endeavor. Turkey managed to create a strong civic ‘Turkish’ identity out of a highly heterogeneous population—only one group, the Kurds, has evaded, and then only partly, integration into the Turkish civic identity.45 Nevertheless, in most cases of especially postcolonial states, the disparity between ethnic settlement patterns and state boundaries has been a major problem. The general global revival of ethnicity as a political concept has complicated or in some cases made impossible nation-building processes in many states. Whether ethnicity has been treated in a consociational or integrative manner, results have

Brown, ‘The Causes of Internal Conflict’, p. 5. 45 Hugh Poulton, Top hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic, London: Hurst, 1997; Erik Cornell, Turkey in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges, Opportunities, Threats, Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000. 44

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varied greatly. With reference to intra-state ethnic conflict, it is a triviality, but a significant one, to note that conflict can take place only if more than one ethnic group inhabit the territory of a state. Basically, the academic treatment of the phenomenon of ethnic conflict is restricted to multi-ethnic states, albeit in the broadest definition of the concept. Naturally, inter-state conflicts can also be described as ethnic, though this necessitates a geographical proximity between the two belligerents. Two of the hypotheses in Van Evera’s typology of causes for conflict follow from this point. The first is that ‘stateless nationalisms pose a greater risk of war if they have the strength to plausibly reach for freedom, and the central state has the will to resist their attempt’.46 This entails that nationalism in an ethnic group that is not the holder of a nation-state poses a greater risk to peace than nationalism in a group that already has a state. In other words, nationalism among stateless ethnic groups entails dissatisfaction with present status and a quest to improve this status, ultimately by seeking the creation of a nation-state. Van Evera’s argument can be taken one step further and applied to the case of ethnic groups holding a state within a state, that is, a territorial autonomy. Would nationalism among autonomous groups be more or less dangerous than among groups with no political status? The argument here, as advanced in chapter one, is that if the group is revisionistthat is, dissatisfied with its autonomous status or seeking to revise it, then its opportunity of acting on the dissatisfaction is greater. The other hypothesis related to this issue in Van Evera’s typology is that ‘the greater the defensibility and legitimacy of borders, and the greater the correspondence between these political borders and communal boundaries, the smaller the risk of war.’ A sub-hypothesis of this is that ‘the more closely the boundaries of emerging nation-states follow ethnic boundaries, the smaller the risk of war.’47 This issue is less than controversial, mainly stating that ethnic conflict is likely to take place in states where more than one ethnic group lives. States, even if not ‘born weak’ are subject to being weakened by other factors, be they external or internal. Reductions in aid or fluctuations in commodity prices (especially for rentier states48) have the potential of severely weakening certain states. Nevertheless such events must be considered as catalyzing rather than background factors, given their fluctuating character. ‘Root’ factors weakening a state are mainly internal; endemic corruption, administrative incompetence, economic mismanagement, and a failure to uphold law and order are typical indicators of the weakness of states. As Brown notes, When state structures weaken, violent conflict often follows. Power struggles between and among politicians and would-be leaders intensify. Regional leaders become increasingly independent, and should they consolidate control over military assets, become virtual warlords. Ethnic groups which had been oppressed by the center are more able to assert Van Evera, ‘Hypotheses on Nationalism and War’, p. 29. 47 Van Evera, ‘Hypotheses on Nationalism and War’, p. 29. 48 See eg. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, eds., The Rentier State (vol. 2 of Nation, State and Integration in the Arab World), London: Croom Helm, 1987. 46

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themselves politically, perhaps in the form of developing more administrative autonomy or their own states … criminal organizations become more powerful and pervasive … borders are controlled less effectively … when states are weak, individual groups within these states feel compelled to provide for their own defense; they have to worry about whether other groups pose security threats … the incentives for groups to make independent military preparations grow.49

These processes are exacerbated in the face of state collapse, as in the case of Somalia, or in a power vacuum following the dissolution of a multiethnic state held together by authoritarianism, coercion and a failed ideologyas in the cases of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. As discussed in chapter 2, the existence of statehood on various levels in these states poses an additional problem as these quasi-state entities suddenly came into juridical existence, whereas practically they had only existed on paper. The specific issue of political transition is discussed in section 2.4.1. In general, the argument is that the more state power is based on coercion, the higher the likelihood of conflict once state structures weaken, whatever the reason for the weakening. However, all cases in this study were components of one state; they were all affected to comparable degrees by the weakening of state structures at the center, yet conflict erupted in some regions but not in others. Obviously, the explanation is to be found elsewhere. 2.3.2.4. Regional Constellation of Power A last structural factor is in the external realm, and concerns the regional constellation of power surrounding the state in question. This issue has several dimensions. One issue of major importance with regard to ethnic relations is whether minority groups in a given state have ethnic kin in neighboring states, and especially if this ethnic kin constitute a majority population of a nation-state. A second, equally important issue lies in the relative power of the two states: whether the kin state has a power (demographic, economic, political and/or military) comparable to or greater than the state where the minority lives. Van Evera posits that ‘the risks … are larger if the rescue of diasporas is difficult but possible; smaller if rescue is either impossible or easy’.50 The argument needs elucidation; it is fairly straightforward that risks of violent conflict are low if ‘rescue’that is the intervention of ethnic kin on behalf of a group in another stateis impossible either for geographic of power-related reasons, such as the impossibility of Israel coming to the rescue of Soviet Jews. However, the argument of risks being lower when ‘rescue is easy’ is counter-intuitive. According to Van Evera, the threat of intervention by a strong power may be enough to ensure better treatment of the minority in question and is in most cases an important factor in the formulation of policy in a state. Hence it is ‘in-between situationsthose where rescue is possible, but only under optimal conditionsthat are

49 50

Brown, ‘The Causes of Internal Conflict’, p. 7. Van Evera, ‘Hypotheses on Nationalism and War’, p. 29.

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most dangerous’. Whereas in both ‘easy’ and ‘impossible’ conditions the behavior of external powers are predictable and therefore secure, the in-between situation is unpredictable as the potential intervening state may await a window of opportunity, fearing it may not come back.51 A proposition drawn from this discussion is: Proposition 6: If a minority has ethnic kin in another country, the likelihood of conflict increases. 2.3.2.5. Economic Factors Economic factors are complicated in the typology used here since they are, dependent on their character, possible to categorize both as incentives and capacity. Economic hardships fuel incentives to act; economic strength increases capacity to act. A short overview of the treatment of economic factors in the literature is helpful. Brown outlines three major factors in the economic and social realm: general economic problems, discriminatory economic systems, and problems related with economic development and ‘modernization’.52 Most analyses of economic factors behind ethnic conflict are based on studies of the third world, or occasionally the developed world. The situation of post-Soviet economies is substantially different. Whereas developing countries or the ‘third world’ are considered to be on a path toward ‘modernization’, the former socialist countries of the ‘second world’ were significantly ‘modernized’ in several ways. This is characterized by the generally high level of education of the population, (for example, the literacy rate in Tajikistan is 98,9% whereas it is 31% in neighboring Afghanistan); the relatively well-built infrastructure, the high level of urbanization, the comparably good position of women in society, the secularization of society, etc. Hence the significant economic disorders and poverty in ‘second world’ countries are dissimilar to those in the third world as it is the case of a radical worsening of economic conditions for people that have experienced better times. The radical social changes brought forward by modernization were hence already long present in these states, making them qualitatively different from the third world. Naturally, this was true to different extents in different regions of the union: in particular, the ‘southern’ regions of the Caucasus and especially Central Asia were primarily considered as raw material-producers in the Soviet command economy and less permeated by the processes of industrialization and urbanization. Likewise, southern Central Asia (Uzbekistan, southern Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) in particular was less secularized than the rest of the union; in general, the social structure there survived the onslaught on traditional society better than other parts of the union. Yet, these nations were arguably more similar economically and socially to other northern and western, more developed, communist-ruled nations than to the non-Soviet societies 51 52

Van Evera; also Barry Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, pp. 32-38. Brown, ‘The Causes of Internal Conflict’, p. 10.

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to their south such as Afghanistan or Iran, with the possible exception of the most rural and far-away areas. Under the reigning conditions, one could expect people in the post-communist countries affected by poverty to react stronger to their economic situation than people in countries that have not experienced better times. This has not been the case, however, mostly due to the widespread social apathy that is another characteristic of post-Soviet societies. Generally, of course, it is possible to assume that general economic problems increase the risk of conflict. As Van Evera notes, economic problems increase the tendency to seek for scapegoats. Moreover, economic difficulties may spur leaders to play the ethnic card to cement their position in power, which may otherwise be threatened by their economic record. Generally speaking, the incentives to act are higher in situations of economic hardship. In the context of the former Soviet Union, however, the decade after 1985 was characterized by a general economic collapse. In the second half of the 1990s, the economic situation in post-Soviet states have developed rather differently, but until 1995 the economic difficulties were arguably equally disastrous in all successor states. The economic difficulties can hence not significantly explain the variance in the dependent variable in this study. The relationship between economy and ethnic conflict is a complicated matter. Horowitz makes two basic distinctions, that between backward and advanced regions, and that between backward and advanced groups.53 Regions are characterized as advanced or backward according to their relative economic position in the state, measured (whenever possible given the difficulty of acquiring data) by regional income. Groups are characterized as advanced if they have benefited from opportunities in education and nonagricultural employment; represented over the mean in number of secondary school and university graduates, in bureaucratic and professional employment; and in per capita income. Backward groups are ‘less favorably situated on the average in terms of educational attainment, high-salaried employment, and per capita income’; moreover, backward groups are often stereotyped as ‘indolent, ignorant, and not disposed to achievement’. Horowitz then finds four categories: advanced groups in advanced regions, advanced groups in backward regions, backward groups in advanced regions; and backward groups in backward regions. All, according to Horowitz’ model, have different propensities for secessionism. Horowitz observes that ‘the vast majority of secessionist regions is economically backward. Advanced regions are far less inclined to separatism’. When advanced groups in advanced regions move toward secessionism, the rationale is a feeling of subsidizing poorer regions which in turn leads to frustration, and a belief that secession would be economically beneficial. However, secession would carry with it important economic drawbacks, such as the loss of a larger inner market and possible Donald L. Horowitz, ‘Patterns to Ethnic Separatism’, in Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 23 no. 2, 1981; also Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict.

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destruction through warfare of the economic potential. Hence, advanced groups in advanced regions are likely to settle for a compromise through negotiation. According to Horowitz, advanced groups, either in advanced or backward regions, in general choose to secede only if economic costs are low.54 Backward groups in backward regions are according to Horowitz by far the most frequent secessionists; moreover, they are early secessionists. Horowitz’ argues that despite the economic weakness of the region, backward groups in backward regions often choose the path of secession despite the economic costs it would entail: The frequency, enthusiasm, and violence of separatist movements among backward groups in backward regions can scarcely be put down to selfish elite motives alone. It is true that, whereas secession enables leaders to eliminate the interethnic competition they previously faced, many other people may be adversely affected by the end of revenue subsidies and the severance of the backward economy from the state. Yet the formal divergence of interest is just that; by the time the movement gets underway, calculations of sacrifice and opportunity are invariably overwhelmed by an avalanche of ethnic sentiment that the undivided state is intolerable.55

With respect to the Soviet Union, it is instructive to note that the regions that according to Horowitz’ model would be most prone to ethnic conflict would be Central Asia and not more ‘advanced’ regions such as the Baltic republics. In any case, according to Horowitz’ model, Baltic republics would be late seceders, whereas Central Asian republics would be early seceders. Hence following this model, the regions of the USSR most likely to secede in the time of transition that eventually led to the dissolution of the union were the Central Asian ones. Indeed, Horowitz made this point in 1991: The situation of the Central Asian ethnic groups strikes me as quite different [compared to the Baltic] and potentially of far greater consequence for ethnic relations in the long term … Russians and Kazakhs confront each other as ethnic strangers … and a juxtaposition of ‘backward’ but indigenous Kazakhs with ‘advanced’ but immigrant Russians is surely present. Where such juxtapositions emerge, so-called backward-indigenous groups typically make strong claims to priority in the territory and to homogenization as the ultimate objective. Such claims are often reinforced by intergroup violence, and secessionist movements are common. … Backward groups in backward regions (such as Central Asia) typically have fewer inhibitions on separatism and more incentives to secede than do advanced groups in advanced regions.56

In all fairness, Horowitz issued a disclaimer, and noted that ‘the eruption of conflict is not inevitable. By accident or by design, regimes may take measures that mitigate severe ethnic conflict’. However, with the benefit and comfort of hindsight, it is safe to say that

Horowitz, ‘Patterns to Ethnic Separatism’, p. 193. 55 Horowitz, ‘Patterns to Ethnic Separatism’, p. 174. 56 Donald Horowitz, ‘How to Begin Thinking Comparatively about Soviet Ethnic Problems’, in Alexander J. Motyl, (ed.), Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1992, pp. 16-17. 54

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Horowitz’ model is relatively unhelpful for understanding and explaining the break-up of the Soviet Union. Indeed, Central Asia was a ‘dog that didn’t bark’ during the turbulent years between 1988 and 1991. In fact, Kazakhstan in particular was the most reluctant republic to proclaim its independence, doing so in fact after the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union and later than any other republic.57 Kazakhstan has been the most integrationist country of the CIS besides Russia, pushing ardently for a creation of some form of Eurasian Union. Generally speaking, Central Asia was spared ethnic unrest, save certain riots and events prior to the dissolution of the union. Between 1986 and 1990, most republics in Central Asia experienced a flare-up in low-intensity ethnic tensions, not typically directed at Russians but at other immigrant nationalities, including Armenians, Lezgins, or Meskhetian Turks. The only large-scale ethnic hostilities in Central Asia since 1986 took place between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan in 1990.58 The most important point made by Horowitz is nevertheless his pointing out that secessionism exists in different guises, and that the type of secessionism at work has a great impact on the likelihood of conflict and compromise, respectively. Indeed, using Horowitz’ typology, advanced groups in advanced regions are perhaps as likely as other groups, especially if well organized and provided with a leadership as autonomous group almost automatically are, to press for secession with peaceful means. The threat of secessionism could be an important tool for such groups in bargaining with the central state; such groups would, in the absence of large-scale repression, be driven more by pragmatic rather than emotional rationales. As such, if confronted with a harsh response from the state and a threat of military intervention, advanced groups in advanced regions would see the costs of secession rising sharply and overshadowing the benefits. They would hence be likely to settle for a compromise whereby they would gain certain levels of self-determination in especially the economic realm but remain politically within the state. On the other hand, backward groups in backward regions would be less likely to press for secession unless a large set of other background factors were present. But once they do, they would arguably be less likely to settle for a compromise and more likely to take up arms. Connecting to the typology used in this study, advanced groups in advanced regions have a higher capacity to act, given that their territory has a certain economic viability. Their willingness to secede may differ according to other factors, but it can be assumed that their willingness to fight is lower, given that they have more to lose than other groups. By contrast, backward groups in backward regions have a distinctively lower capacity to act, having little economic viability; however, their incentives to act may be 57 In the words of one analyst, ‘the collapse of the USSR left the republic with little choice but to take formal independence’. Martha Brill Olcott, ‘Kazakhstan: Pushing for Eurasia’, in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (eds.), New States, New PoliticsBuilding the Post-Soviet States, Cambridge University press, 1997, p. 547. 58 Yalman Onaran, ‘Economics and nationalism: the case of Muslim Central Asia’, in Central Asian Survey, vol. 13 no. 4, 1994.

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higher since they identify their status as imposed disadvantages and have little to lose economically. Taking into account the above discussion, it can be assumed that ethnic leaders’ strategies are likely to be significantly influenced by the economic condition of their region. This is true in particular for autonomous regions; their leaders are practically concerned with the financial and economic duties of government in the region, unlike nationalist leaders in non-autonomous regions that are often primarily concerned with political and cultural issues rather than with the macro-economic realities of their region. In the political calculation that inevitably transpires among the leadership regarding the desirability of a secessionist struggle, it is likely that the economic viability of the region, should it succeed to become independent, would affect these calculations. If leaders have reason to anticipate that after independence the prospective state will be worse off economically than the existing situation, this is likely to have a curbing effect on secessionist aspirations. Practically, there is reason to think that ceteris paribus, leaders of an impoverished region with little industry and few natural resources would be less inclined to embark on a struggle for independent statehood than leaders of a region endowed either with abundant natural resources or a strong industry. However, as Horowitz points out, a strong economy may also be an impediment to secessionism. Secession may carry with it economic disadvantages insofar as the region would no longer have unimpeded access to the larger market of the state it belongs to; this is an impediment only if the region does not have the possibility to market its goods elsewhere. Here, the geographic location of the region (as viewed earlier) is crucial. Moreover, it can be argued that economic wealth impedes secessionism simply as the population would be less likely to be dissatisfied with their economic condition and therefore less likely to support a secessionist struggle that would carry the risk of armed conflict and thereby also endanger the very economic wealth of the people. To quote Armenian President Robert Kocharian, the rich man is unlikely to be more willing to fight than the poor man.59 If the population is economically deprived, however, it would have significantly less to lose by a secessionist struggle. If, on the other hand, an economic potential for welfare existstypically through natural resources but possibly also through industrybut which has not benefited the local people (for example if income from the region has gone directly to the central state budget and not returned in other forms to the region of origin) the risk of conflict would increase, since the locals are likely to be frustrated over what would be perceived as the ‘theft’ of ‘their’ resources. Summing up the discussion, the following proposition can be deduced:

When asked by a journalist if Azerbaijan’s oil resources would not give Azerbaijan the possibility of acquiring weapons through its new wealth and conquer Mountainous Karabakh with military means, Kocharian asked the reporter ‘Are you sure the rich man fights better?’. See RFE/RL Caucasus Report, vol. 1 no. 29, 15 September 1998; The New York Times, 14 September 1998.

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Proposition 7: Economic viability increases the likelihood of conflictespecially where the indigenous people have not hitherto benefited from it.

2.4. Catalyzing Factors or ‘Triggers’ of Ethnic Conflict Catalyzing factors of ethnic conflict are generally factors related to political opportunity. This means relatively rapid political or economic changes or events that create a new situation, where typically the capacity of a group to act is boosted. The willingness of a group to act is less likely to change in a short period of time than its capacity to act. Naturally, it is possible to conceive of events that would radically change a group’s willingness to act: a sudden change of leadership in the central government in a radical direction is an example that comes to mind. Mostly, however, capacities are changed by political opportunity. Indeed, the most widely noted catalyzing factor of ethnic conflict is regime transition and suddenly weakening state structures—whether internally or externally conditioned—which increases the security concerns of groups while simultaneously providing opportunities for political action. Indeed, in explaining any of the conflicts that erupted in the former Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, this factor is of paramount importance. However, as mentioned above, this factor is less helpful in explaining why certain areas in these collapsed states were the scene of conflict and others not. Clearly, since conflict did not erupt everywhere at the same time, other factors must have been at work. Moreover, even in cases where a great number of background factors were present, such as Chechnya, or in the case of Kosovo, armed conflict did erupt but significantly laterin 1994 and 1998, respectively, despite the fact that these areas were known as high-risk situations long before that. Some catalyzing factor must hence have been at work. In this discussion, attention will be given to three main catalyzing factors. The role of leadership; external support; and the availability of arms.

2.4.1. Political Transition It is generally accepted that conflict is more likely to emerge in times of political transition, especially in authoritarian political systems.60 This is the case for several reasons: first of all, political transition, especially in the shape of processes of democratization, is likely to carry with it the decline of state repression as well as increased opportunities for political action on the part of social groups, including ethnic groups. Hence, suppressed desires for secession are likely to be rejuvenated and to come to the open in times of political transition. Moreover, such times of flux provide opportunities for new political leaders to emerge and seek power; and a very powerful base for a political leader to appeal to is the ethnic group, especially if popular resentment against the state and/or other groups is strong. Gurr lists this among ‘group opportunities for

60

Brown, ‘The Causes of Internal Conflict’, p. 8.

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collective action’, terming it ‘recency of major change in structure of the political regime’. Whereas Gurr’s contention that ‘major, abrupt regime changes provide a window of opportunity for ethnic contenders to press their claims’ is fundamentally correct, Gurr’s interpretation does not account for the fact that this political opportunity may exist prior to regime change. In fact, regime change itself, even if abrupt and major, is not always unanticipated. Rather, certain factors such as changes in the external environment, attempts to political reform, or changes in practices of state suppression are instrumental in creating the atmosphere of flux which is understood as the time of transition. Basically, it is not necessarily the case that regime change precedes or causes ethnic tension; often, the same factors that eventually lead to regime change are also conducive to ethnic violence. Sometimes, as in the case of the Soviet Union, ethnic tensions precede and contribute to abrupt regime change. In this sense, it seems more correct to argue that periods of political transition (the time preceding and succeeding actual regime change), albeit difficult to define with exactitude, are particularly conducive to ethnic conflict. In general, one could hypothesize that times of political flux and transition increase the likelihood of ethnic conflict. For the purpose of this study, all ethnic conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union took place in the time of transition that began in 1987 and in some ways still continues. Indeed, the most direct origin of almost all conflicts were concentrated to the years immediately preceding or following the break-up of the union. This factor is however a constant in this study, given that the political transition was present in all the cases covered. Since all cases were part of the Soviet Union and more or less equally affected by the changes at the center, a variance in this variable is not to be expected. In fact, all nine cases went through similar political flux.

2.4.2. Availability of Arms It is a superfluity to claim that armed conflict is impossible without arms. But the availability of arms is an important factor in the risk of armed conflict in given area. This factor is naturally related to other factors such as geography and external support, which make the appropriation of arms more or less difficult—or weakening state structures that enable nationalist groups to acquire weapons from within the country. However, this factor needs to be handled with caution, given that increasing tensions between an autonomous region and its central government may breed an arms race. In other words, it may be difficult to determine whether the conflict attracted arms to the region or whether the existence of arms were a factor in leading to conflict. The case of the Soviet Union includes certain peculiarities that are likely to have had, and continue to have, an impact in this field. First of all, the Soviet Union was a military superpower, implying that it had large arsenals of all types of weaponry. As a result, weapons were present within the country, and prospective leaders of armed violence needed not import them from outside in case they could obtain them from local military installations. It is a fact that basically all armed violence on the former Soviet Union’s territory has been perpetrated with weapons

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emanating from the Soviet army’s depots. The use of military materiel by non-state actors has in turn been made possible by the remarkable level of corruption among union military and later the successor states’ military forces, itself a product of the financial debacle and political dissolution of the union. The financial debacle increased incentives for corruption as the wage arrears of the officer corps grew, making it increasingly hard for officers and their families to make a decent living. Meanwhile, the political dissolution of the union also carried with it a destruction of discipline in the ranks—the chance of getting away was significantly higher than just a few years earlier. Given the appalling condition of the Soviet military, and the ease with which military arsenals were ‘burglarized’, ‘broken into’, or simply reported ‘stolen’, it is plausible that the risk of conflict be higher in areas with a high concentration of military installations. Such areas are reasonably easy to determine: the periphery of the union. Areas such as Tatarstan or Yakutia, geographically located inside the union and far from its outer borders, had few or no military installations. These installations were located on the rim of the union, especially on the borders with Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey, but also to a lesser extent on the borders with Eastern Europe (lesser, because Soviet military installations existed in Warsaw pact states, and the western republics were hence not front-line areas). In other words, southern Central Asia and the Caucasus, and to a lesser degree the westernmost parts of the union such as Moldova, western Ukraine and Belarus were areas with especially high concentrations of arms. Naturally, Tatar or Yakut extremists could presumably acquire weapons from other parts of the union. However, the access to these weapons would be significantly more difficult and risky for groups far from military installations. In areas such as Tajikistan or the Caucasus, for example, the opportunity of acquiring weapons was significantly higher. A general proposition would be that areas with high concentrations of military installations have a significantly higher risk of conflict. However, given the saturation of the Caucasus with arms, and the comparatively short distances in the region, the availability of weapons was high for all minorities under study. As such, the proposition is not used in the study.

2.4.3. The Issue of Leadership: Power Grab or Ethnic Mobilization? The issue of leadership and its effects on ethnic relations is central to the debate on the causes of ethnic conflict, and the core of the instrumentalist argument. In the context of the former Soviet Union, a number of authors have dismissed the ethnic factor behind separatism in especially the Russian Federation, arguing instead that the demands for independence or higher levels of self-rule on the part of ‘the republics’ has been conditioned basically by their leaders’ attempts to stay in power and to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the center. Philip Roeder, for instance, argues that the sovereignty drive among autonomous republics in the Russian Federation was orchestrated primarily to preserve the communist-era élite’s control over their regions and to increase their relative

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power vis-à-vis the central authorities.61 Likewise, Daniel Treisman argues that ‘rather than primordial cultural aspirations, [separatist threats] may constitute weapons in a competitive struggle to extract a larger share of centrally bestowed benefits’.62 Hence these authors have argued that ethnic leaders in the Russian Federation have concentrated on economic issues, while using ethnicity as a smokescreen for their activities. And indeed, it is difficult to refute the argument that leaders have a vested interest in preserving and expanding the autonomy of their region solely for political purposes, even solely for career purposes. However, this assumption may not hold up to closer scrutiny. First of all, even if it would be logical to assume that leaders would promote secessionism only for political purposes, it would be illogical to argue that they would go as far as causing ethnic conflict for their political purposes. Career-minded political leaders are unlikely to reject a compromise with the central state for the highly dangerous prospect of waging a war for independent statehood. Secondly, leaders cannot create grass-roots secessionism where there is no ethnic tension. Without the presence of several background factors, leaders would have a hard time finding popular support for secessionism. And thirdly, empirical studies show that the argument may be empirically wrong. Gorenburg studied the public statements of leaders in four ethnic republics (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Khakassia and Chuvashia) and contrasted them with the actual laws and political programs adopted by the same leaders. If the argument of political ambition determining secessionism is true, we would expect to find a verbal insistence on cultural issues but less practical commitment to it. The results are the opposite. Leaders spoke little of ethnic and cultural issues such as the promotion of the titular group’s culture and language, but enacted significant legislation designed to promote the titular group culturallythis despite the fact that the titular nationality constitutes a majority population only in one of the studied republics, Chuvashia. Hence promotion of the titular group at the expense of other groups implied a significant political risk since it carried the danger of alienating non-titulars, especially Russians. Although these élites wanted to promote ethnic revival in order to ensure the cultural and political survival of their ethnic group, they did not want to alienate Russian inhabitants of their region and the central government in Moscow. For this reason, they argued that their fight for sovereignty was aimed at increasing local self-government and economic wellbeing, which would benefit all inhabitants of their region, regardless of ethnicity. As a result, in most republics ethnic revival was implemented but was not discussed in the speeches and interviews given by local leaders.63

See Philip Roeder, ‘Post-Soviet Institutions and Ethnopolitics’, Paper presented at the 1994 meeting of the American Political Science Association. 62 Daniel Treisman, ‘The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet Russia, in British Journal of Political Science, vol. 26 no. 2, 1996, p. 327. 63 Dmitry Gorenburg, ‘Regional Separatism in Russia: Ethnic Mobilisation or Power Grab?’, in EuropeAsia Studies, vol. 51 no. 2, 1999, p. 269. 61

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The results of Gorenburg’s investigation enable us to at least moderate the claim made regarding political ambition being the monocausal explanation of secessionism in autonomous republics in the former Soviet Union. Certainly, political ambition plays a role: this is displayed most clearly by the fact that even ethnic republics controlled politically by ethnic Russians have promoted autonomy from the center. However, as noted, the pursuit of ethnically and culturally motivated aims is not to be ignored. This said, the effects of leadership, and in particular leadership change, on the prospects of conflict, are significant. Most notably, the advent to power, through democratic means or by illegitimate ways, of radical nationalist leaders is likely to be a major factor precipitating conflict. This is true both for the central government and the minority leadership. Radical nationalist leadership in the minority would have a potential to act on the existing frustration, promote ethnic mobilization, and thereby escalate tension with the central government. In the case of autonomous regions, a radical nationalist autonomous leadership would not be unlikely to take the unilateral decision of secession, whereas a less radical government would be unlikely to take that decision unless provoked. By the same token, the advent to power of a radical nationalist regime in the central government of a state would carry the risk of alienating the autonomous region, which would then feel a need to reconsider its further remaining within the state. This is the case for several reasons. First of all, a radical nationalist government would be more likely to be negatively inclined to the very existence of autonomies on its territory; moreover, it would be more likely to pursue policies promoting the titular group of the state, detrimental to minorities, including autonomous ones. Basically, the autonomous minority would be likely to reconsider its wish to coexist within a single (albeit not unitary) state with such a government. As argued in chapter one, it would be in a more advantageous position than non-autonomous minorities to do so, given that it controls a quasi-state structure with an institutionalized decision-making mechanism, state-like institutions and symbols, as well as fixed borders. It deserves to be stressed that the leadership change factor is a catalyzing factor, implying that its significance would be depending on the presence of background factors in the concerned areas. For example, a radical nationalist regime emerging in Moscow would not automatically lead to attempts to secession by all autonomous regions in the Russian Federation; however, the risk of secessionist activity in areas with high scores on background variables would increase. It should also be noted that stark policy shifts by an incumbent government in either camp could have much the same effect as leadership change. Proposition 8: the emergence of a radical leadership in either the minority population or the central government significantly increases the risk of conflict.

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2.4.4. Contagion, Diffusion and Spill-over: The Importance of the International Environment The discussion above has concentrated on domestic factors including the structure of the state, inter-group relations, economic issues, and cultural differences. Nevertheless, ethnic relations are strongly influenced also by external factors. Primary among these are external support for a party to a conflict and the regional political environment. 2.4.4.1. External Support As Ted Gurr notes, ‘foreign sympathizers can contribute substantially to a cultural group’s cohesion and political mobilization by providing material, political and moral support’.64 Foreign support can take the shape of either state or non-state actors supporting secessionist aspirations, and can take various shapes. The most outright type of support is military intervention in a conflict, which is powerful but risky on the part of the intervening state or group. More common are economic and financial support, provision of training facilities, diplomatic actions in support of a group and political pressure on the state. Such support may be given for a variety of purposes, most often ethnic or religious solidarity with the insurgent group or political enmity with the central state in question, or a combination of these factors. This factor may serve both as a background factor and as a catalyzer. As noted above, the risk of conflict increases if the titular group of an autonomy has ethnic kin abroad. Foreign support may also be a catalyst, if during an escalation of tensions the autonomy’s leadership secures the active support of a state. This factor could be pivotal in determining the leadership’s decision whether or not to take up arms. Given clear signals that a friendly state will not intervene would significantly lower the likelihood of war since autonomous regions are typically smaller in size and number, and possess less military resources and training than the central state organsthe risk of defeat is normally large. On the other hand, a promise of support would have the opposite effect and tilt the balance toward a decision to move forward with secession, even at the price of war. In whatever shape, foreign support plays a crucial role in the likelihood of conflict. It is clearly a catalyzing factor since it is amenable to great variance in a short period of time. A foreign government, for instance, may suddenly alter a prior decision of non-involvement, thereby rapidly changing the situation in a stand-off between a minority and a central government. It must however be noted that it is sometimes difficult to determine whether the conflict brought foreign support or if foreign support led to conflict in a given case. However, external support prior to the outbreak of hostilities can without difficulty be seen as a catalyzing factor of conflict.

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Gurr, Peoples Versus States.

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Proposition 9: External political, financial and/or military support for a minority significantly increase the risk of conflict. 2.4.4.2. Contagion In addition to external support, the occurrence of separatist struggles in nearby minority regions, whether in the same state or neighboring states, is likely to have an impact on the likelihood of conflict. A successful secession in a neighboring state may set a precedent and in fact add to the determination of a group’s leadership to follow suit. Moreover, it is likely that the effect of ‘contagion’ be higher the closer the proximity of the contagious case. This argument is nevertheless complicated in the case of the Caucasus. The emergence of the Mountainous Karabakh conflict in early 1988 is often claimed to have had a catalyzing impact on the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But likewise, bloodshed in a nearby conflict may also calm tensions, setting an example of horror for the concerned populations and decrease the following of nationalist groups. Separatism in Chechnya, for example, can be claimed to have had a deterring impact on other minorities in the North Caucasus. The war sent a signal that separatism is likely to be followed by death and destruction—not likely a factor leading to contagion. In any case, this argument fails to explain why the Mountainous Karabakh conflict, if it affected the situation in South Ossetia or Abkhazia, did not lead to the radicalization of the situations among any of the other minorities. Especially Javakheti, populated by Armenians just like Mountainous Karabakh, would have been a clear candidate for contagion, or for that matter other minorities in Azerbaijan such as the Talysh or Lezgins.

2.5. Conclusions In the discussion above, an overview of the background and catalyzing factors existing in the theoretical literature on ethnopolitical conflict has been undertaken and adapted to the present research, that is adapted to the specific conditions of the former Soviet Union as well as the specific conditions of autonomous regions. The propositions summarized in table 2.1 will provide a basis for an empirical investigation of the roots of conflict between autonomous regions and central governments in the former Soviet Union. After a review of nationality policy in the Soviet Union in the next chapter, chapter four will deal with the methodology to be adopted to confront these propositions with the empirical record.

The Roots of Ethnopolitical Conflict

Table 2.1: A Summary of Working Propositions

Group Cohesion & Willingness

Prop. 1: The deeper the cultural differences between two groups, and the stronger group identities and cohesion, particularly in the autonomous minority, the higher the risk of conflict. Prop. 2: The more the national conception of either the minority or the state’s titular nation approximate an ethnic conception of the nation, the higher the likelihood of conflict Prop. 3: The greater the intensity of past conflict and the myths surrounding it, the greater the risk of conflict.

Capacity for Action

Prop. 4 : Rough terrain, in particular mountains or heavy forests, increases the risk of conflict. Prop. 5: The greater the demographic dominance of the minority in the region it inhabits, the greater the risk of conflict. Prop. 6: If a minority has ethnic kin in another country, the likelihood of conflict increases.

Catalyzing Factors

Prop. 7: Economic viability increases the likelihood of conflict especially where the indigenous people have not hitherto benefited from it. Prop. 8: the emergence of a radical leadership in either minority population or the central state significantly increases the risk of conflict. Prop. 9: External political, financial and/or military support for a minority significantly increase the risk of conflict.

Autonomy

Prop. 10: The existence of territorial autonomy significantly increases the risk of conflict.

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3 Communism and Nationalism: Ethnicity in the Soviet Context

The particularity of governance and of the view of ethnicity in the former Soviet Union is a factor in any study of ethnic relations and policies in the former Soviet space. In fact, the Soviet experience of creating and governing a multi-ethnic state with a disparate population is the tale of a constant conflict between pragmatic interests of the state and ideology, stemming from the philosophical incompatibility of Communism and Nationalism. The two ideologies have in common the focus on the community, not the individual; the individual human being is seen as a member of a collectivity.1 However, the analogy ends there: where Nationalism sees the nation as the main determinant of individual and collective identity, Communism sees social class as the main determinant. But both ideological and practical considerations, perhaps with an emphasis on the latter, led the architects of the Soviet Union to give notable concessions to nationalism. To reestablish control of a multi-ethnic empire in which many of the minority peoples had been given a taste of independence, the emerging Soviet state, weak after revolution and civil war, was not in a position to recentralize the periphery solely with military force. Having to provide an incentive for the minorities to join the revamped Russian state, the Bolsheviks guaranteed political autonomy to all minorities that joined the Soviet Union. Lenin, specifically, was a firm believer in the self-determination of peoples as a sine qua non for the development of a socialist state. However, the task of reconciling a state aiming to build a communist ideal where all ethnic and cultural differences would dissolve with a state grounded in the principle of ethno-federalism was ideologically doubtful. How did the communist leaders of the early twentieth century settle for a program based so heavily on the national self-determination, that eventually led all multi-ethnic communist states in Europe (the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia) to emerge and continue to develop as ethnic-based federations? This question is important since it lies at the basis for the Soviet nationality policies that governed the relations between Moscow and the ethnic units of the union for seventy years. These policies, in turn, shaped the sometimes dramatic, and occasionally less dramatic, developments in

Ian Bremmer, ‘Reassessing Soviet Nationalities Theory’, in Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 7. 1

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inter-ethnic relations that developed once the Soviet system collapsed. This chapter will trace the ideological and practical relationship between Communism and Nationalism from the writings of Marx to the policies of Gorbachev.

3.1. The National Question in Marxist Writing In the prolific writing of Marx and Engels, the mention of the phenomenon of nationalism is, in the words of Connor, ‘irregularly strewn throughout a number of their treatises and even their personal correspondence, for neither man attempted a detailed exposition of the topic’.2 This very fact betrays the secondary role assigned to nationalism and the nation in Marxian thinking. Marx’s entire body of thought was predicated on a belief that the fundamental societal divisions were class distinctions that ignore ethnic or national boundaries. The idea that such divisions would hold a primary role in social and political life was therefore quite naturally alien to Marxian thinking. Marx’s view of the world was determined by his focus on economic determinants of political development, and the category of the nation played little role in this view. Flowing from this neglect of the national question, Marx and Engels also never developed a clear terminology, instead confusing the terms state, nation and nationality in their writings. However, the surge of nationalism that occurred in Central Europe during the lives of Marx and Engels gradually forced them to give larger consideration to the power of nationalism. But in his Communist Manifesto published the same year as the national revolutions of 1848, Marx stated that ‘national differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing… the supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster.’3 In other words, Marx and Engels believed that the collapse of capitalism would necessarily bring with it the dissolution of the national differences. Yet, they also saw the development of nations as a corollary of the development of capitalism. Having no esteem for nationalism as an ideology, Marx nevertheless viewed it in relations with the level of development of a society. Nationalism could be progressive in less developed societies in that it would help developing capitalism, hence moving the society further toward socialism; By contrast, in an advanced capitalist society, nationalism would be a reactionary force, since it would tie together national communities against each other, hence obscuring the common objectives of workers across borders and prevent their unification against the bourgeoisie. As Connor summarizes Marx’s position, nationalism is seen as a ‘bourgeois ideology pressed into service by that class in order to divert the proletariat from realizing its own class consciousness and interests’.4 Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 6. 3 Marx, the Communist Manifesto, quoted in Connor, The National Question, p. 8. 4 Connor, The National Question, p. 10. 2

Communism and Nationalism

While the category of the nation and nationalism were neglected in the early writings of Marx and Engels, they came to occupy a more important role after the wave of national revolutions throughout Europe in 1848. Whereas they came to realize the importance of the nation, this realization, especially in Engels’ writings, took a rather bizarre turn. In fact, Engels could not conceal a thinly veiled racism in the ‘scientific socialism’ that dominated his writings. Remarkably, after 1848, Engels began to appropriate class roles to entire nations. Hence the Germans, Italians, Hungarians and Poles came to represent progress, and the numerous smaller, especially south Slavic nations came to represent backwardness and reaction. While he and Marx had long agreed that reactionary classes would be exterminated after a class war, Engels also considered that this ‘progress’ would include the ‘disappearance from the face of the earth … of entire reactionary peoples’. His feelings about Slavic peoples were especially notable, as he expected Germans and Hungarians to ‘wipe out these petty hidebound nations’,5 whose ‘chief mission … is to perish in the revolutionary holocaust’.6 Hence the concepts of nation and class were muddled, and apparently it was possible that nations and not classes would fight the progressive, revolutionary wars. Marx was less prone to sweeping generalizations and the careless and bigoted language of Engels, and did not abandon his focus on class as the main category in social conflict. Yet it is clear that Marx in principle had few objections Engels’ views on this issue, and that he, too, after 1848 was forced to consider the enduring force of national allegiances even as compared to class allegiances. More profoundly, the developments during his lifetime forced Marx to change his views on the manner in which the dialectics of history worked. In his early writings, including the Communist Manifesto, Marx had seen the forces of history working across national boundaries. By the time the first volume of Capital was published shortly before Germany’s unification in 1871, Marx saw capitalism affect each country in a separate process. He no longer believed a socialist revolution would immediately follow the capitalist revolution in Germany, as he had earlier, but now believed capitalism would be victorious and establish itself before a socialist revolution would occur. As Szporluk notes, Marx ‘unknowingly adopted the view that nations (countries, peoples) had a history which existed above and beyond history understood as the history of class struggles’.7 This is important, because the Marxian thought that spread to Russia and contributed to the ideology of Lenin was the one of Marx after the publication of Capital, in which national divisions were acknowledged.

Ian Cummins, Marx, Engels, and National Movements, London: Croom Helm, 1980, pp. 39-41. Roman Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 171 6 Connor, The National Question, p. 15 7 Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism, p. 177. Emphasis in original. 5

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The last decade of the 19th century saw a surge of nationalist activity in the empires of eastern Europe, which was influenced by the nationalist movements that had recently achieved the unification of Germany and Italy. This phenomenon, which Marx and Engels had dealt with rather summarily, was taken up by a group of thinkers that have come to be known as the ‘Austro-Marxists’. Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, in particular, tried to understand the development of nationalism and its relationship with the economically-based social classes of Marxism.8 This brought them to accept the ‘nation’ as a historical phenomenon in its own right, and therefore the need to foresee its role in a socialist world or state. The ‘Austro-Marxists’, writing in the early twentieth century, were concerned with the national question in the Austro-Hungarian empire, and developed the idea of National-Cultural Autonomy. Whereas the Austrian Social-Democratic Party at its 1899 Congress proposed to divide the Empire into ethnically defined provinces, i.e. restructuring the state according to territorial autonomy, Bauer and others disagreed, instead proposing the concept of non-territorial, cultural autonomy. Eventually, the party settled for a compromise solution. In later years, Bauer and Renner developed their scheme of extraterritorial autonomy, which was based on the individual rather than on the collective. Membership in a national group was to be completely voluntary, which normall is not the case with territorial autonomy. National minorities would be given autonomy to conduct their internal affairs, but not through territorial division of the state into national provinces; instead, autonomous communities were to be organized as sovereign collectives, irrespective of their territorial locations within the state. Hence ethnic identity is not linked to territorial control; national communities are given significant self-rule without dividing the state territorially according to ethnicity.9 Bauer also contributed significantly to the development of the constructivist theory of the nation. He recognized the cultural and historical origins of the ethnic group, while emphasizing the element of social construction in its creation and political existence. This sociological theory of the nation and a political program to deal with it provided an important alternative in the creation of socialist states. However, the Soviet Union adopted the diametrically opposed principle of territorial autonomy. Lenin, in particular, chastised the ideas of AustroMarxism as a bourgeois deception.

3.2. Leninist Nationality Theory: Reconciling Communism with Nationalism The issue of nationality, though neglected on the whole by Marx and Engels, became a major contentious issue in the development of socialism. Many prominent thinkers, including Rosa Luxemburg, Georgi Plekhanov, and Karl Radek, aligned with classical Tom Bottomore and Patrick Goode ,eds., Austro-Marxism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, p. 11. Otto Bauer, The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy, St. Paul: University of Minnesota Press, 2000. Introduction and translation by Ephraim Nimni.

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Marxian thought in refuting nationalism or any relation with it. On the other hand, Edward Bernstein early on argued for the need to recognize the significance of national diversity.10 Moreover, large sections of Russian socialism were influenced by the ideas of Bauer and Renner. The various groups within the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party divided according to their stance on the national question. Low has identified three main lines of thought, which he calls the Right, the Left, and the Center.11 The ‘Right’ consisted of many of the socialist groupings of national minorities. More dispersed than any other group, the Jewish Worker’s Union Bund enthusiastically adopted the Austro-Marxist line. In addition, the Belorussian, Georgian, and Armenian organizations also espoused this view. The Bund was the first organization to demand the federalization of the Party at its second congress in 1903; the Party’s refusal led the Bund to withdraw from the Party for three years. On the ‘Left’ were the ‘internationalists’ who rejected any concessions to nationalism and the principle of self-determination. Luxemburg and Nikolai Bukharin were two of the most prominent proponents of the ‘Left’. Lenin, however, took a pragmatic position of middle ground, arguing for the necessity to recognize the reality of nationalism.12 More specifically, Lenin adopted what Connor calls ‘strategic Marxism’. He was not ready to distance himself from Marxian thought to the level of Bauer, Renner, or Bernstein by accepting that the nation might become the principal organizational unit of the new order; yet his revolutionary pragmatism led him to develop the idea proposed by Marx that socialists needed to ally themselves with national forces for tactical reasons. Hence the Leninist emphasis on the doctrine of self-determination.13 The First world war had a decisive impact on Lenin’s thought. Lenin and other socialists had not excluded the possibility of such a war breaking out, and even assessed it positively since they thought it would hasten the downfall of capitalism given that it would require the arming of the workers. But the workers did not rebel against their respective bourgeoisies and join forces in an internationalist brotherhood; quite to the contrary, they proved equally if not more appealed by nationalism than their ‘oppressors’. The European socialist parties themselves were no strangers to nationalist appeal. In fact, nation and not class had been the focus of allegiance for the great majority of workers.

3.2.1. Tactical Elements in Lenin’s Nationality Strategy Lenin had neither positive nor negative feelings for the nation as a category or political force. He recognized its power of attraction, though he was convinced that eventually, the socialist revolution would contribute to the disappearance of nations altogether. He believed assimilation a positive, even necessary factor, and hence saw no intrinsic value in Connor, The National Question, pp. 28-29. 11 Alfred D. Low, Lenin on the Question of Nationalities, New York: Bookman, 1958, pp. 24-26. 12 Low, Lenin on the Question of Nationalities, pp. 25-26. 13 Connor, The National Question, p. 30. 10

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safeguarding the identities of various nations. However, given that historical law dictated that national movements would emerge and secede in the Russian and Ottoman Empires, the proletariat’s interests coincided with those of nationalists: the nationalists become a potential ally in imperialist or otherwise oppressive states. Russia had not yet passed through the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, which was a necessary stepping stone on the road to the socialist revolution. However, the revolution of 1905 convinced Lenin that the Russian bourgeoisie was neither able nor willing to carry out this revolution. By a weird leap of logic, it hence became the responsibility of the Proletariat to also undertake the Bourgeois revolution before it carried out the Socialist one. Generally speaking, however, Lenin believed the best practical conditions for the Proletariat to wage its class struggle was democratic bourgeois systems, the most ‘advanced’ form of government under capitalism. Democracy would make it easier for the socialists to agitate and spread their message and eventually grow enough in strength to take over government. Lenin nevertheless had little faith in the capacity of capitalism to develop full democracy; democratic demands could only be met in a distorted and faulty manner under capitalism, whereas full democracy would be possible only under socialism: democracy could not eliminate class oppression. But in the early stages of capitalism, it was necessary for the socialists to support political democracy and forces that advocated political democracy. Again this alliance was tactical, not because of the intrinsic value of democracy but because it would speed up the process of historical evolution. Democracy, in turn, included several elements, an important one of which was the self-determination of nations. Especially in the Russian Empire where non-Russian peoples were in a majority position, Lenin saw the oppression by Czarist Russia of the non-Russian peoples as a specific target. These persecuted and oppressed nations would form an ideal ally of the proletariat. The Russian proletariat, though small in number, would rise as the leader of all democratic forces in Russia, which included prominently the oppressed national groups. The alliance between the proletariat and the oppressed nations implied that the socialists enunciated their full support for the principle of national self-determination.14 The final aim of the socialists remains the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and hence the support for national movements that are non-socialist is temporary in nature. The definition of self-determination espoused by Lenin was unequivocal: it implied the right to secession of oppressed nations. This right to secession was absolute, but did not necessarily mean that all nations would secede from their states. Lenin made the comparison with granting the right to divorce, which did not mean that all women would divorce their husbands. In particular, Lenin believed that economic determinants would dominate the pragmatic thinking of national leaders, and that as a result most national groups would decide not to utilize this right to secession. Even in cases where minorities 14

Low, Lenin on the Question of Nationalities, pp. 37-44.

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used this right to secede, Lenin believed that they would soon return to a federal or other type of union with their former state for mainly economic reasons.

3.2.2. Ideological Elements in Lenin’s Nationality Strategy Lenin noted that nationalism was progressive in the sense of helping to build capitalism, which was a more advanced mode of production than feudalism. The destruction of feudalism was, according to Lenin, deeply intertwined with the emergence and victory of national movements. The creation of the nation-state was a result of the move from feudalism to capitalism, and was carried out by a bourgeoisie that had adopted political democracy – hence the term bourgeois-democratic revolutions. Moreover, Lenin identified the colonial problem as a national one. He famously argued that the most advanced from of Capitalism was Imperialism, which he defined as colonialism overseas. Just as national minorities would revolt in the archaic Ottoman and Czarist Russian Empires, the national groups in the colonies would themselves create national movements and revolutions. This was progressive, and therefore worthy of the support of the Proletariat. In more plainly ideological terms, Lenin defined the right to national self-determination as a genuinely socialist demand, given that socialism was incompatible with the continued oppression of minorities. The doctrine of self-determination was also in conformity with socialism because it underlined the equality of all nations, negating the imperial tendencies of larger nations, including, prominently, the ‘Great Russians’. Moreover, granting the right to self-determination would also reduce tensions between national groups and therefore strengthen proletarian unity after the revolution. The process of reducing suspicion and hatred between ethnic groups is hence of utmost value to the revolution on a global scale, and self-determination is in this context also valuable.15 Yet Lenin ran into problems as he sought to balance this both practical and ideological support for self-determination with the need to ensure that the class consciousness of the proletariat remained its main focus. Hence nationalism could be progressive, but it could not be allowed to obscure the primacy of class as the marker of identity. This is what led Marx to oppose the Austro-Marxists, since their plan of national-cultural autonomy would, according to Lenin, do precisely that – destroy the centralized party structure that was a most important asset in the proletariat’s struggle.16 Another paradox of Leninism was that his emphatic support for self-determination was coupled by an equally enthusiastic endorsement of the assimilation of minorities – which was inherently progressive as it prevented national ossification, and led to the tearing down of national

15 16

Low, Lenin on the Question of Nationalities, pp. 47-48. Low, Lenin on the Question of Nationalities, p. 55.

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differences. But, according to Lenin, self-determination was a necessary precondition for the later assimilation of minorities. With regard to the organization of the states, Lenin’s thoughts on self-determination led many of his colleagues to assume that there was a concomitant right to autonomy or federation. Lenin rejected this idea, since the ‘right’ to federalism implied a ‘right’ to the consent of the other side (Russia) to agree to such a scheme. Lenin considered it absurd to expect a right to the other side’s consent, but equally emphatically concluded that though minorities had no right to autonomy, his plan for the ‘construction of a democratic state’ was autonomy.17 After the proletarian revolution, minorities would be granted autonomy. But since this was not an inherent right but merely a decision from the socialist leadership, it could be revoked at any time. Autonomy, in Lenin’s thought, did not restrict the powers of the central authorities since it was the center that determined the legal framework of autonomy. Autonomy was therefore not in contradiction to democratic centralism. Autonomy would include the setting up of separate educational institutions and encourage the use of local languages, yet it was only a step in the eventual assimilation of the minority. While this appears contradictory, Lenin emphasized the voluntary character of assimilation. He argued that the suspicion and hatred among minority peoples for Russians needed to be done away with before these populations could voluntarily assimilate. For this purpose, a period of full national rights was necessary. While paradoxical, this plan was in conformity with the dialectic character of much of socialist thinking.18 Self-determination was to be ‘no more than a brief moment of independence, leading rapidly to social revolution and, thence, to the reestablishment of a unitary, revolutionary, workers’ state’.19 In retrospect, Lenin underestimated the enduring force of nationalism and the recalcitrance of at least some of the minority peoples in what would be the Soviet Union to voluntarily assimilate. Lenin may have been wrong in assuming that assimilation was necessary and inevitable; the millenarian nature of his ideology was a mental straitjacket. But even so, the insistence on self-determination and on the creation of an autonomy regime did reinforce and lock into place identities that may otherwise not have survived the great forces of modernization and urbanization that would follow. The practical foundation for this undesired outcome was the policy of ‘Korenizatsiia’, or nativization, that was imposed after the great October revolution.

3.3. Leninism in Practice: Korenizatsiia The Bolshevik policy on nationalities, closely following the ideas of Lenin and Stalin, was composed of two rather contradictory principles. As seen above, one main determinant Low, Lenin on the Question of Nationalities, p. 107. 18 Connor, The National Question, pp. 37-38. 19 Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, ’Determinants and Parameters of Soviet Nationality Policy’, in Jeremy R. Azrael, ed., Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices, New York: Praeger Press, 1978, p. 40. 17

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was the conviction that socialism would make nationalism obsolete. The end of class struggle would remove the support base of nationalism in society. In a socialist society, the nations would first grow closer (sblizhenie) in order to eventually merge (slianiie). Given that this was a historically inescapable fact, the ruling socialists could without danger speed up this process by granting all national groups full rights to develop their own culture, language, even ranging to the right of secession. Nationalism was inherently transient, and would not cause a threat to socialism since it was bound to disappear. The more concessions made to national demands, the quicker nationalism itself would vanish.20 Hence a policy was implemented that actively and aggressively ‘nativized’ the minority areas, bringing locals to positions of power and creating actual intellectual elites.

3.3.1. Self-determination and Sovietization: Re-Creating an Empire Immediately upon assuming power on 7 November 1917, the Soviet government reaffirmed its pledge to allow the secession of minorities. And in fact, thirteen new states emerged in what had been the Czarist empire – three of which were Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Soviet Russia indeed accorded initial recognition to them, though practical and power considerations led to the forcible reintegration of areas such as the Caucasus or Ukraine as soon as that became feasible. In fact, the recognition of their independence may have been equally determined by awareness of the weak position of Bolshevik rule in Russia itself, let alone in the peripheries. As would be the case in 19911992 again, Moscow concentrated on maintaining its control over mother Russia herself, allowing temporarily for the secession of numerous territories but aiming at gaining them back as soon as possible. Indeed, the Bolshevik openness and apparent tolerance toward minority peoples was certainly a crucial element in its ability to win the civil war and in relatively painlessly reasserting control of most of Czarist Russia’s territories. In relation to the Great-Russian chauvinism of the white forces, in particular, the policies and promises of the Bolsheviks were important in attracting support from unlikely allies. The Red armies in the North Caucasus found shelter among natives, but after they showed scant respect for local traditions and ways of life, a rebellion broke out in Dagestan in 1920, shortly after Denikin’s armies had been defeated.21 Likewise in Central Asia, the Basmaji Islamic rebels that spread in opposition to the atheist Bolsheviks in the 1920s posed a serious threat to Soviet rule in the area. Stalin, then Commissar for Nationalities, guaranteed both autonomy and respect for Shari’a (Islamic Law) for the concerned

See also Gerhard Simon, Nationalism and Policy toward Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society, (translated by Karen Forster and Oswald Forster) Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991, p. 135. 21 Marie Bennigsen Broxup, ‘The Last Ghazawat: the 1920-21 Uprising’, in Broxup, ed., The North Caucasus Barrier, London: Hurst, 1992. 20

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minorities. This was a crucial step in defeating the rebellion in Dagestan in 1921 and the Basmaji revolt which was practically defeated by 1926.22 In spite of the successful military reconquest of areas that did make use of the right to secession such as the South Caucasus or areas of revolt such as Turkestan or Dagestan, the Soviet state was being built in marking conformity with Lenin’s ideas. Indeed, the Soviet Union developed an ethnic-based territorial structure paralleled by no other state in history, in fact amounting to what Martin has called an ‘affirmative-action empire’. The Soviet state evolved into a hierarchically organized ethnic federation. As Martin puts it, New national elites were trained and promoted to leadership positions in the government, schools, and industrial enterprises of these newly formed territories. In each territory, the national language was declared the official language of government. In dozens of cases, this necessitated the creation of a written language where one did not yet exist.23

The Bolshevik government, immediately after having won the civil war and begun to consolidate its rule in the early 1920s, launched a policy that was termed Korenizatsiia or nativization. The doctrine of self-determination evolved into a concept of nation-building, which in practice implied central support for the consolidation of the various ethnic groups in the Soviet Union. Importantly, all ethnic groups, irrespective of size, level of advancement, or location, were initially considered equal. It became official party policy to help the non-Russian peoples ‘catch up with the better-developed Central Russia … develop a local-language press, schools, theaters, clubs, and cultural and educational facilities altogether; to establish and further a network of courses and schools for … education in local languages’.24 By 1923, there was still a significant debate on the issue, basically along the lines outlined earlier. Representatives of the national minorities demanded guarantees that these promises would be realized and not remain solely on paper, while the left, including especially Russians, still disagreed with the departure from centralism. Yet though Lenin and Stalin disagreed at this point (Lenin supporting the federalization of the union while Stalin preferred that all non-Russian areas should have autonomy under Russia and not be put on an equal level with Russia), Lenin was at this point too ill to enforce all of his views. However, his denunciation of Russian nationalism as the most harmful of all nationalism was still strong and dominated the agenda. To Lenin, the conduct of the Bolshevik party itself after the revolution had not allayed fears of Russian chauvinism remaining strong within the ranks of the party, and he emphasized the need to differentiate between the ‘nationalism of oppressor nations and the

Simon, Nationalism and Policy, pp. 21-22. 23 Terry Martin, ‘An Affirmative Action Empire: the Soviet Union as the Highest Form of Imperialism’, in Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, eds., A State of Nations: Empire and NationMaking in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 67. 24 Simon, Nationalism and Policy, p. 24, quoting KPSSv rezoliutsiiakh I resheniakh sezdov, konferentsii i plenumov CK, vol. 2, Moscow, 1970, p. 252. 22

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nationalism of oppressed nations’, explicitly justifying the latter while condemning the former.25 The problem of Russian nationalism would re-emerge under Stalin and later.26

3.3.2. The Creation of Federalism: the Structure of the Soviet Union Lenin nevertheless managed to force through his position that the Union be composed of equal republics, of which Russia would be one, but not have any hierarchically superior standing. In addition, when naming the Russian Republic, the Soviets used a distinction in language that is lost in English: they employed the term ‘Rossiiski’, denoting not ethnic Russianness but belonging to the territory of Russia and hence including ethnic minorities, and not the exclusive and ethnic term ‘Russki’.27 The Soviet Union then was created from the beginning as a hierarchical federation of ethnically defined territories. Though the number varied until the annexation of new lands in the second world war, it eventually came to constitute over fifty ethnically based territories with governmental structures. It is significant that of over a hundred ethnic groups identified in the USSR, fifty-three at some point held an ethnically determined administrative unit.28 These included first and foremost fifteen union republic or Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR), that were constructed in the manner of independent states that were joined in a federation to form the USSR. Second in the hierarchy were the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR), of which there were over 15; thirdly, there was a lower number of Autonomous Regions or Oblasty and finally a few autonomous areas or Okrugi. These autonomous formations were subjected to the jurisdiction of one of the SSR, not directly to the central authorities. The criteria for establishing these divisions were often arbitrary, however. Especially the distinction between Union Republics (SSR) and Autonomous Republics (ASSR) were less than clear. In institutional terms, the SSR enjoyed a unilateral right to secession in all Soviet constitutions, and the status as component republics of the Soviet Union. The ASSR did not, though like the SSR they had constitutions of their own and most attributes of a state to the same extent as the SSR. A somewhat arbitrary criteria was later advanced by Stalin as the Soviet Union developed in the 1930s: a population of more than one million and an outlet to the outside world. That meant a border to a non-Soviet country, or in the case of the Baltic republics, an international sea border. In 1924, the USSR consisted of six Union Republics (Russia, Transcaucasia, Ukraine, Belorussia, Uzbekistan and Turmenistan), Martin, ‘An Affirmative Action Empire’, p. 70-71. Frederick C. Barghoorn, ‘Russian Nationalism and Soviet Politics: Officials and Unofficial Perspectives’, in Robert Conquest, ed., The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986. 27 Connor, The National Question, p. 221. 28 Bremmer, ‘Reassessing Soviet Nationalities Theory’, p. 5. 25 26

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sixteen autonomous republics, and 17 autonomous regions. By 1936, the union republics had increased to eleven, (Transcaucasia split into the three republics of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, while Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan became union republics) and there were now twenty-two ASSR, nine autonomous regions, and nine autonomous areas.29 The origins of the criteria that were used for determining the status of a region were nevertheless doubtful and arbitrary, as shown by the changes of status of territories in the 1920s and 1930s. They had little ideological or other justification, and the criteria for SSR status seem to have been introduced to counter the demands from the Tatar and Bashkir ASSR to be raised to the status of SSR. Indeed, the Tatars were in 1970 the sixth largest people in the Soviet Union, larger than ten other peoples that did have an SSR of their own. Though most Tatars lived outside the borders of Tatarstan as its borders were drawn by the Soviet leadership, the populations of the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan in 1926 and 1939 were higher than those of several union republics. Stalin, it seems, did not desire to create union republics in the middle of the Russian Federation, only 300 miles from Moscow. As will be viewed below, the very division of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan into separate republics was likely part of Soviet ‘ethnic engineering’. Officially, SSR and ASSR status was to be given to ethnic groups with a developed sense of national consciousness, whereas less ‘advanced’ ethnic groups were to receive the lesser level of self-rule of an autonomous region, which did not have its own constitution and was not intended to have political and economic self-determination to the level enjoyed by the ASSR. Finally, the autonomous areas were mainly restricted to the indigenous peoples of the Far North, such as the Inuits and Chukchi, that received autonomous institutions to be able to exercise and preserve their separate culture. In all levels of the autonomous hierarchy, the local languages and cultures were aggressively promoted throughout the 1920s. In numerous cases, the Soviet authorities created alphabets and written languages for languages that had not used their language in writing. As Simon notes, ‘support for and development of non-Russian languages was one of the most visible signs of the policy of nation-building’. Written languages were developed for 48 ethnic groups, which had until then had no literature in their own spoken language. This meant the introduction of native languages in public life, replacing Russian. This policy was not merely cosmetic; in fact, it formed a most remarkable example of social engineering that benefited the separate identities of the minority groups within the Soviet Union. The Russification of Ukrainians and Belorussians was dramatically turned around, and native language and identity was strengthened in the Ukraine and Belorussia.30

29 30

Simon, Nationalism and Policy, p. 147. Simon, Nationalism and Policy, p. 42.

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Not staying at linking territory with ethnicity, the Soviet leadership adopted a largely primordial conception of ethnicity at an individual level. In 1932, the registration of ethnic origin (nationality or natsional’nost in Soviet terminology) in the internal passports of every citizen was introduced. Very soon after the introduction of this measure, in which individuals had largely been given freedom to indicate their nationality, the possibility to change ethnic affiliation was prohibited, and the nationality of children was now determined solely by that of the parents. This made voluntary assimilation technically impossible. For example, a person whose both parents were Kazakh but was born in Moscow, who did not speak Kazakh and was culturally completely Russified, could not have his or her nationality changed to Russian in official documents. The Soviet Union hence treated ethnicity as ‘an ascriptive characteristic determined by birth’.31 The communist party was at the creation of the Soviet Union in 1922 dominated by Russians and a few other ethnic groups. Russians constituted 72% of the members, while Jews were heavily overrepresented and Poles, Armenians, and Georgians were also well represented. On the other hand, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and especially Central Asians were practically absent from the party. In the higher echelons of the party, this structure was even more pronounced. Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, however, a dramatic shift in the party and state structures developed. In the ten years from 1922 to 1932, the percentage of Ukrainians in the Ukrainian party structures went from 24% to 59%; and in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan from practically zero to 57%. In Armenia, the percentage of Armenians was already high at almost 90% and stayed there, while in Georgia it increased slightly from 62% to 66%. These were the only peoples that were consistently and from the start overrepresented in the party structures compared to their proportion of the population.32 In fact, Georgians and Armenians dominated their respective party structures from the beginning; this, as will be seen in chapter six, is certainly related to the strong socialist movements in these areas even before the arrival of Soviet power. As the Georgian Mensheviks and the Armenian Dashnaktsutiun were the dominant parties in the pre-Soviet era and socialist in nature, these republics were better-prepared for participation in the Soviet Bolshevik administration than other peoples that had had little contact with socialism. In the case of Azerbaijan, this republic had a much higher native participation than any other Muslim republic, though it lagged behind Armenia and Georgia. As a whole, throughout the Soviet Union, party apparatuses on the provincial level in the ethnic republics were aggressively nativized, whereas the process was somewhat slower at the level of the republican apparatuses. Only Central Asia significantly lagged behind in this process, and the Soviet treatment of Turkmenistan was especially harsh: indeed, Turkmenistan seemed to pay the price for its historical

31 Victor Zaslavsky, ‘Success and Collapse: Traditional Soviet Nationality Policy’, in Bremmer and Taras, eds., Nations and Politics, p. 34. 32 Simon, , Nationalism and Policy, pp. 31-34.

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intransigence in being incorporated in the Russian empire. The figures for career advancement of ethnic Turkmens were significantly lower than in neighboring republics like Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan.

3.3.3. The Dubious Background of National Delimitations This generally rosy picture of affirmative action should nevertheless not lead to the conclusion that the Soviet Union’s ethnic engineering project was conducted on exclusively objective or benevolent grounds. There is substantial evidence that the center’s considerations of security or stability were important factors in the national delimitation that took place first in 1924, with important adjustments in the late 1920s and mid 1930s. As Zaslavsky puts it, ‘borders between ethnic territories were drawn arbitrarily, often in accordance with a divide-and-conquer policy in obvious conflict with historical traditions and existing ethnodemographic conditions. In many regions, especially in Central Asia, this policy effectively prevented the emergence of supraethnic groupings and alliances’.33 Three examples are particularly illustrative of this. A first example is the delimitation of the northwestern Caucasus. Two main people inhabit the area, the larger being Circassians (known variously as Cherkess, Adyge, or Kabardins – the latter denoting tribes living predominantly in the East, neighboring Ossetia) living in the foothills of the mountains, and a Turkic people known as the Karachai and Malkarli (Balkar) who traditionally inhabit the highlands. As such, there was a possibility of delimiting the area by creating two relatively homogeneous ethnic unit, a Circassian republic running in an east-west direction to the north of the mountains, and a Turkic republic also running from East to West South of the Circassian republic. However, instead of this rather logical division (if one assumes an objective to create solid ethnic units), the Soviet authorities created two ethnically mixed units, the KabardinBalkar autonomous republic and the Karachai-Cherkess autonomous oblast.34 In retrospect, the decision to divide the North Caucasus in this way seems to have been predicated by concerns regarding the loyalty of these peoples. The Karachai and Balkar were distrusted as a Turkic people that could form a fifth column loyal to Turkey in case of a conflict between the Soviet Union and Turkey. Though republican Turkey’s relations with the USSR were good in the early 1920s, Soviet rulers had not missed the point that the Ottoman Empire fought a war in the Caucasus as late as 1918. Likewise, the Circassian peoples had only by great force been suppressed in 1864, when hundreds of thousand Circassians were forced to flee the Caucasus for the Ottoman Empire. Hence Moscow likely considered them both as unreliable and followed a policy of divide and

Zaslavsky, ‘Success and Collapse’, p. 35. 34 Svante E. Cornell, ‘Ethnic Relations and Democratization in the Northwestern Caucasus’, in Yaacov Ro’i, (ed.), Democracy and Pluralism in Muslim Areas of the Former Soviet Union, London: Frank Cass, forthcoming. 33

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rule, aiming to weaken the capacity of each group to revolt. That Stalin deported the Karachai and Balkar in 1944 strengthens this argument. A second example is the case of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. As alluded to above, the rationale for dividing the Muslim Turkic peoples of the Ural region into two groups was by no means obvious. Quite to the contrary, there was at the time, and still today, no clear borderline between peoples known as Tatars and those known as Bashkirs. Linguistically speaking, there is a flowing linguistic belt of Kipchak Turkic languages and dialects that stretches from western Tatarstan to Kyrgyzstan. A southern Bashkir dialect is not too distant from northern Kazakh, whereas a Bashkir in northern Bashkortostan will understand a southern Tatar dialect better than a southern Bashkir one. This is not to deny the historical differences existing between the much more numerous sedentary Tatars and the predominantly nomadic Bashkirs; however, during the revolutionary period the chief political movement in the Volga region was the aspiration to create a unified ‘Idel-Ural’ republic that would incorporate the lands inhabited by the Tatars and the Bashkirs. Lenin and Stalin co-opted this idea by proposing a Tatar-Bashkir republic in 1918.35 Later, however, they aligned with a group of Bashkir nationalists under Zeki Velidov and in spite of Tatar objections, divided the area into separate republics. Moreover, the borders between the two were drawn such that more Tatars than Bashkirs lived in Bashkortostan, and that Tatar minorities ended up in the neighboring republics. There is little doubt that the Bolshevik leadership explicitly exploited and amplified the Tatar-Bashkir divide in order to prevent the emergence of one strong Turkic Muslim entity in the Volga-Ural region.36 That this was indeed the intention of the Bolsheviks is indicated by the choice of state languages for the Tatars and Bashkirs. A southern Bashkir dialect and a northern Tatar dialect were chosen as the respective official languages of the two republics, thereby selecting languages that were as far from one another as possible. Had a southern Tatar and a northern Bashkir dialect been chosen, the official languages would have been very close to identical. Finally, the example of the Kyrgyz and Kazakhs is analogous. These two peoples are culturally even closer than their Tatar and Bashkir kin are, with the only major difference between them being that the Kazakhs live on the steppes whereas the Kyrgyz live mainly in the mountains to the south. In 1924, the preliminary delimitation of Central Asia was made, in which six peoples (the Karakalpaks, Kyrgyz, Kara-Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Turkmens, and Uzbeks) were identified. Two received SSR status immediately, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, whereas Tajikistan became an ASSR within Uzbekistan, and Kirgizia 35 Daniel E. Schafer, ‘Local Politics and the Birth of the Republic of Bashkortostan, 1919-1920’, in Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry Martin, eds., A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 168. 36 Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986, p. 247-248; Azade-Ayşe Rorlich, The Volga Tatars, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986.

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became an ASSR within the Russian Republic and Kara-Kirgizia an autonomous oblast. Karakalpakistan was first put under the jurisdiction of Russia, then under Kirgizia, until it finally became an ASSR in Uzbekistan. As the reader may note, there is no mention of Kazakhs here: because what is today known as the Kazakhs were called ‘Kyrgyz’; today’s Kyrgyz received the term ‘Kara-Kyrgyz’.37 Then, when the status of the various territories were changed several years later, the Kyrgyz became Kazakhs and the Kara-Kyryz suddenly became Kyrgyz. The fact that two peoples in various times were given the same name is testimony enough to the arbitrary character of Soviet national delimitation. Such ethnic engineering was possible, especially in Central Asia, because of the rather weak character of ethnic identities in the early twentieth century. The primary identification of Central Asians was not ethnic, but rested on sub-state (tribal or regional) or supra-national (Islamic or Turkic) identity. In the South Caucasus, the identities of Armenians, Georgians, Abkhaz, and others were relatively well-established. In Azerbaijan, by contrast, the definition of the Azerbaijani nation was relatively recent and vague. ‘Azerbaijan’ as a territorial denomination is a very old term, but as an ethnic or national marker, the term is a creation of the twentieth century and is defined mainly in negative terms: an Azerbaijani is not a Persian, certainly not a Russian, but not an Anatolian Turk either. The most correct term espoused by many Azerbaijanis themselves is the term ‘Azeri Turk’ denoting their Turkic heritage, but also their distinction from Anatolian Turks through history and religion – the majority of Azeris are Shi’a Muslims whereas Anatolian Turks are overwhelmingly Sunni. In pre-Soviet times, the Azerbaijanis were simply referred to as ‘Tatars’, the common term for Muslim Turks in the Czarist era, or as ‘Muslims’. In Soviet censuses, however, the Azerbaijanis were first identified as ‘Turks’ in 1926, until in 1938 they were re-baptized as ‘Azerbaijani’. Just as in the case of Tatars, Bashkirs, Kyrgyz, and Kazakhs, the Azeris were given little choice to determine their own ethnonym – the decisions were made in Moscow on grounds that were neither obvious nor publicly known. In sum, Leninist nationality policies were definitely characterized by affirmative action. However, these policies were occasionally somewhat exaggeratedly affirmative: they created and amplified distinctions that were not previously significant, without asking the opinion of the ‘affirmed’ peoples. However, Korenizatsiia was not to remain in force for too long. Perhaps because of the deep impact it had on the minority peoples, and because the national distinctions showed no signs of diminishing, far less vanishing as Lenin had predicted, Stalin began to question the virtues of nativization by the late 1920s, and to halt its implementation by the mid-1930s. Within short, the pendulum was reversed, and an aggressive campaign of assimilation was launched by Stalin, himself an assimilated

Kyrgyz comes etymologically from Kyrg – Yz which means forty tribes; Kara means black; and Kazakh means ‘free man’. 37

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Georgian. This reversal of policy, which occurred at the time of the ‘great terror’, would culminate in the genocidal deportations of entire nations in the early 1940s.

3.4. Stalinism and the National Question As noted above, Stalin had not completely shared Lenin’s view of the nationalities question. Stalin was known as the expert on nationalities, writing the first major Bolshevik treatise on the issue in 1913, Marxism and the National Question. Though Stalin deferred to Lenin in 1922 on the structure of the Soviet Union, he clearly had a much more gloomy perspective on the nationalities issue. Perhaps due to his Caucasian origins and his experience from this region, Stalin seemed considerably less convinced than Lenin of the transient nature of nationalism. This perception grew stronger with time, and Stalin ever more departed in his mind from the conviction that class consciousness would necessarily and automatically surpass national consciousness. As Simon notes, Stalin ‘did not share Lenin’s optimism that the revolution had in principle ended nationalism and separatism or that the best way to neutralize these movements would be to make national concessions’.38 Stalin agreed with Lenin that in the time of civil war, national concessions were necessary from a purely pragmatic perspective. While realizing the objective need to grant autonomy to the minorities and espouse the theoretical concept of selfdetermination, Stalin early on favored a granting of equal autonomous rights to all minorities within the Russian state, rather than the gradual, hierarchically different federal status granted to different non-Russian groups.

3.4.1. Centralization and the Concept of ‘Socialist Nations’ Stalin also saw the very concept of nation in a more realistic and less ideologically determined way than most Bolsheviks, including Lenin. He ‘considered relations between nations to be similar to relations between classes, that is, to be determined by force rather than by education or understanding’.39 By the late 1920s, Stalin’s rhetoric had changed with the introduction of the term ‘Socialist Nations’. He argued that the nation-building of the USSR had helped the oppressed nations to blossom, which was a necessary stage in the historical process that would eventually lead to the merger of nations (slianiie). This term of ‘Socialist Nations’ would gain currency after Stalin’s death; yet already then, Stalin argued that the socialist nations were stronger and more tightly knit than ‘bourgeois nations’, because they lacked the internal divisions of ‘irreconcilable class antagonism’ that split the bourgeois nation. As such, the different nations had no contradictions or conflicts with each other, and were therefore in a better position to move closer to one another and eventually merge into a qualitatively new, victorious socialist Soviet nation. This nation would share one language and culture, which, predictably, would be the 38 39

Simon, Nationalism and Policy, p. 22. Carrère d’Encausse, ’Determinants and Parameters’, p. 48.

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Russian one.40 Stalin explicitly referred to this concept as paradoxical and contradictory, but emphasized that this was inherent in the dialectic nature of historical development. Practically, one of the measures strengthened by Stalin during the 1930s and later was the centralized character of Soviet rule. In this respect, it should be recalled that the Soviet Union’s federative structure was not mirrored in the organization of the Communist Party. The Party had always been a highly centralized institution directed by the center in Moscow. This lever was constantly available to regulate the level of actual self-rule by the indigenous elites in the ethnic units of the union. From 1934, Stalin began dismantling the institutions that promoted nativization or the rights of minorities in various cities, autonomous republics and regions. In 1936, he abolished the Presidium of the Council of Nationalities, an organ introduced in the early 1920s as a second chamber of the Central Executive Committee, and had aggressively promoted Korenizatsiia and defended the position and rights of minority populations. In the place of these institutions, and especially in the economic realm, the centralization of the state was accelerated, a process which began with the onslaught of collectivization in 1929, when the administration of agriculture was centralized in Moscow. Economic and political power was concentrated at the SSR level, and increasingly at the level of the Union authorities, which gained the ability to overrule republican decisions in most matters of importance. Hence by the mid1930s, the autonomy granted to the ethnic republics had been halted and was gradually being reduced. This included the sphere of education: in 1934, a uniform school system for the entire country was introduced, and higher education in the country also became centralized in the All-Union Committee for Institutions of Higher Learning. Stalin, however, was careful not to touch the outer symbolic status of the ethnic republics. Centralization did not mean the abolition of autonomous units, far from it: numerous ethnic units had their status raised from autonomous regions to ASSR, and two ASSR (Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) became union republics in 1936. What was taken away in practice was given back in form.41 This incidentally corresponded well to Stalin’s dictum ‘national in form, socialist in content’. Similarly at the center, the Council of Nationalities was expanded in size and standing; however, its Presidium that had been introduced against Stalin’s wishes in 1923 disappeared in the 1936 constitution, which clearly showed the move toward increased centralization.

3.4.2. Russification The centralization of political and economic power launched the period of the ‘great terror’ in the Soviet Union. The great purges that led to the deaths of millions were its most tragic elements. Stalin’s personality cult was an outward show of the increased power that was now vested in his person. Language policy also changed by the late 1930s, 40 41

Simon, Nationalism and Policy, p. 136. See Simon, Nationalism and Policy, pp. 138-147, for a thorough discussion of the centralization efforts.

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and the thrust of the policy turned toward a Russification of the local languages. In fact, Stalin was convinced it was time to move forcibly toward sblizhenie, and in his interpretation, this meant the assimilation of minorities to Russian culture and language. Where Korenizatsiia had introduced the Latin alphabet for the Turkic languages of Central Asia and Azerbaijan, among other, this process was now reversed, and by 1938 these republics were forced to adopt modified versions of the Cyrillic alphabet. This created a large disruption in the republics, as it meant the second change of alphabet in little more than a decade. Before the 1920s, the alphabet used locally had been the Arabic one; the switch to the Latin alphabet had left many people unable to read or write, and this was repeated with the redirection to Cyrillic. Only the Georgians and Armenians with their distinct alphabets, and later the three Baltic republics when they were incorporated into the Soviet Union, were exempted from this switch to Cyrillic. In addition, Russian vocabulary was now inserted into the languages of the minorities. This was particularly notable in less developed languages of smaller minorities, including those in the North Caucasus, which lacked a technical and professional vocabulary in their own language. Though this process is not unique, visible in the French influence on West Africa or the English influence on languages of the Indian subcontinent, its forcible and enthusiastic enforcement by Soviet authorities was remarkable.42 Stalin’s understanding of the power of nationalism, and his likely doubts regarding the mobilizing force of class consciousness, led him to launch a campaign to create Soviet patriotism. This campaign was obvious in the war, when the ‘motherland’ was a powerful rallying cry, but predated the war by several years. Stalin clearly saw the glue of Soviet patriotism in a stronger emphasis on the predominance of the Russian nation. Lenin had from the outset outlined two threats: that of Great-Russian nationalism and that of the nationalism of the minority peoples. While both were considered negative, Lenin considered Great-Russian nationalism the far greater evil and a threat to the Soviet state. Stalin, however, reversed these priorities and downscaled criticism of Russian nationalism while increasing the rhetoric about ‘bourgeois nationalism’ among the minorities.43 From 1937 onwards, the Russian people’s standing departed from that of the other nations: the Russians were now ‘first among equals’, ‘loved by all the other peoples of the union’; the Russian workers were ‘vanguard of Soviet workers’, who selflessly offered their assistance to other nations in overcoming their ‘backwardness’.44 By 1938, decrees were issued that imposed the teaching of the Russian language in all non-Russian schools, and Russian became the sole language used in the military. Rhetoric from the central party authorities now also spoke derogatorily of some policies of Korenizatsiia, which were branded as

Connor, The National Question, p. 272. 43 Hugh Seton-Watson, ‘Russian Nationalism in Historical Perspective’, in Conquest, ed., The Last Empire, p. 25. 44 Simon, Nationalism and Policy, p. 149. 42

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divisive. The emphasis on denouncing nativization especially in the Ukraine is a clear testimony to the increase of Russian nationalism: nothing is more anathema to Russian nationalists than assertion of Ukrainian separate nationhood. As Simon puts it, ‘no longer did one hundred different peoples live in the Soviet Union, but rather one people and ninety-nine others’.45 During the great purges of 1936-38, the ethnic units were heavily targeted. During collectivization almost a decade earlier, the anti-Kulak repression had led to the death of millions of peasants particularly in Kazakhstan and the Ukraine, but this time, it was the Soviet elite itself that was targeted. Most purged officials that were subsequently arrested, taken to labor camps, and usually executed by firing squads were accused of ‘bourgeois nationalism’. Interestingly, the purges found no Russians guilty of great-Russian chauvinism. The purges dealt heavy blows to the national elites in the South Caucasus. On Stalin’s orders, Beria personally killed the head of the Armenian Central Committee and had the Chairman of the Abkhaz party poisoned; but the purges covered the entire Soviet elite, which Stalin did away with. In Chechen-Ingushetia, the purges eliminated 2% of the population; considering that it was the elite strata that was purged, it is clear that the consequences for the societies of the ethnic republics were dire. In the Ukraine, only three of 102 members and candidate members of the Central Committee survived the purges. On the whole, two chief aims of Stalin’s purges can be identified. A general aim was to deflect blame for the failure of all the promises of building socialism and prosperity, and from the excesses of collectivization – Stalin’s person was whitewashed. Secondly, and specifically in the area of nationalities policy, the purges eliminated every person, mainly members of the national minorities, who had opposed Stalin’s policies or advocated greater rights for the non-Russian peoples – and everyone associated with these objectors.46 With the complete and calculated physical elimination of the opponents of his nationality policies, Stalin could now declare that for the first time in history, the national question had been solved. This declaration paved the way for the next stage of Stalin’s excesses, the genocide committed against selected nations when the Second World War would prove Stalin wrong in his assertion that the national question was no more.

3.4.3. War and Genocide The Second World War showed that the national question in the USSR did not belong to the past. The weakening of central power led to unrest in the traditionally troublesome areas, including Ukraine, the Caucasus, and the Baltics.47 In the North Caucasus, the restive areas of Chechnya-Ingushetia again saw a rise in anti-Soviet agitation. This was not new, but had been present during the mid-1930s as well. In 1940, even before the Soviet Simon, Nationalism and Policy, p. 158. Simon, Nationalism and Policy, pp. 160-166. 47 Carrère d’Encausse, ’Determinants and Parameters’, p. 50. 45 46

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Union attacked Germany, a resistance movement had emerged in Chechnya, whose leader, Hasan Izrailov, declared that ‘the Caucasus will be a second Finland’. This revolt, which soon controlled several areas in Chechnya, was inspired by the heroic Finnish resistance to Soviet aggression. But it was also significant as it was the first time that a revolt in the North Caucasus had been launched on a national rather than religious or tribal basis.48 In a sense, the national character of the revolt was a result of Korenizatsiia. The Chechen people, divided into clans, had previously been united only by their joint allegiance to Islam, and organized by Sufi brotherhoods. However, these were not involved in the 1940 revolt. That a national revolt had received significant following showed that a national consciousness was emerging in Chechnya, undoubtedly in great part due to the nativization policies of the Soviet regime. Meanwhile, as the war broke out, Stalin fell back on Russian patriotism. Nation replaced class as the rallying cry for mobilization, and reinforced the position of the Russians as dominant element in society. He launched the concept of ‘fatherland’, a particularly non-socialist concept. This was coupled by an obvious display of discontent in the ethnic peripheries. Large Ukrainian volunteer formations fought against the Soviet forces, and the Caucasus was, as mentioned, in unrest. It became clear that minority nationalism had not been eradicated, strengthening Stalin’s conviction of the strength of national feeling. For the smaller and unreliable nationalities in the Caucasus, as well as for Volga Germans, Koreans, Cossacks, and others, Stalin found that if these peoples could not be pacified, then a more radical solution was needed. The first people to be deported was the Volga Germans, who were removed in July and August 1941, immediately after the German invasion. This was a preventive measure, whereas the deportations that followed after the Germans retreated were punitive. In November 1943, without prior notice, the whole Karachai people was loaded on cattle wagons and transported to Central Asia. In December, the Kalmyks were deported, followed by the Chechens and Ingush in February and March 1944, who were unaware of the fate of the Karachai and the Kalmyks. Finally, in April, the Balkars, and in May, the Crimean Tatars were deported. Deportation was not new in Soviet practice, as it had been widely employed during collectivization. But for the first time, entire peoples were targeted, surgically removed from their places of origin, and maps redrawn as if these people had never existed. These North Caucasian nations were branded as collaborators with Nazi Germany and as traitors to the Soviet Union. At roughly the same time, the Ahiska Turks that lived in the Meskheti area of Georgia were summarily deported to

For more details, see Svante Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Richmond: Curzon, 2000, p. 200; Abdurrahman Avtorkhanov, ‘The Chechens and Ingush during the Soviet Period and its Antecedents’, in Broxup, ed., The North Caucasus Barrier.; John Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya: The Roots of a Separatist Conflict, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

48

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Uzbekistan, though they were not charged with any specific crime.49 The Ahiska, known also as ‘Meskhetian Turks’ after the region in Georgia where they lived, were likely selected because of their ethnic identity as Turks. It is no coincidence that three Turkic peoples, the Meskhetians, Karachai, and Balkar, were deported whereas the Circassian peoples, that had historically been more prone to rebellion, were not. It has by now been proven beyond doubt that the official reason for the deportation had no connection with reality. The German armies never reached Chechnya though they did briefly incorporate the Karachai and Balkar areas. These peoples, as many Chechens and Ingush, fought on the frontlines against German occupation. Even Izrailov’s revolt had no links to Germany, but was purely indigenous.50 In any case, the deportations targeted not individuals guilty of treason but punished entire peoples for the alleged wrongdoings of a few in their midst. The tragedy of the deportations for the peoples involved was immeasurable. The deportations were undertaken during the harsh winter of 1943-44, and the people loaded onto cattle wagons without sanitary arrangements and transported thousand of miles into Central Asia and Siberia, a journey that took over a week, in which most of the deportees were only fed once. A high proportion of the deportees died of cold, starvation or disease during transport; around a quarter of the total number of deportees are estimated to have perished either during transport or within a few weeks after arrival; individual groups lost over half of their members. The demographic consequences of deportation were staggering. The Chechens had grown by 36% during the eleven-year period between 1926 and 1937; their growth rate in 1959-1970 was of 40%. But in the twenty years between 1939 and 1959, the Chechens only grew by 2%, whereas they would almost have doubled in this period in normal conditions.51 Those who survived were confined to a life in an alien land and were not given adequate food rations or shelter. The local population had been told of the alleged treason of the newly settled peoples, or that wild tribesmen, rebels, or cannibals were being resettled there. In spite of this, it was often only because of the help of the local population that the deportees survived. The deportations, administered by Beria in the North Caucasus, had clear orders: no individuals of the punished peoples were to remain. This occasionally met with practical difficulties: one highland areas near the GeorgianChechen border was unreachable by trucks, and the population that could not be transported was burnt alive in a stable.52

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, ‘Punished Peoples’ of the Soviet Union: the Continuing Legacy of Stalin’s Deportations, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991. 50 The authoritative works on the deportations are Robert Conquest, The Nation Killers: the Soviet Deportation of Nationalities London: Macmillan, 1970; Aleksandr Nekrich, The Punished Peoples, New York: Norton, 1978. 51 Conquest, The Nation Killers, p. 160. 52 Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: A Small Victorious War, London: Pan, 1997, pp. 64-67. 49

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This description of the reality of the deportations serves to show the extent to which Soviet nationality policy changed from the 1920s to the early 1940s. From having embarked upon an unprecedented process of nation-building of small and large minorities alike throughout the country, the Stalinist era was a time of repression and disaster that by the onset of collectivization in the late 1920s had begun to affect the minority peoples far worse than the Russian mainland. The famines in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan showed the disastrous effects of these policies. But collectivization was only the beginning; by the late 1930s, Stalinism had turned against its own communist elite, especially in the national minority areas. Since ethnic elites had disagreed with Stalin’s nationality policies, they were particularly targeted and eliminated, and again the case of the Ukraine stands out. Stalin had already launched his very simple yet infamous principle ‘Net chelavek, net problem’ (If there is no person, there is no problem) and applied it in the purges; that he should extend this dictum to entire nations with genocidal results is therefore actually not surprising – in a sense, Stalinism came to its logical conclusion with the deportations.

3.5. The National Question after Stalin After the end of the second world war, Stalin increasingly overtly and explicitly continued his transformation of the Soviet Union from a multinational state where all nations were equal into a Russian-dominated one, justified by the superior culture and civilization of the Russian people. His toast to the Russian people on May 24, 1945, set the trend: ‘I drink to the health of the Russian people because it is the most outstanding of all the Soviet Union’s nations … it has a clear mind, a firm character, and patience.’53 The Zhdanovshchina, the crackdown on intellectuals throughout the union that followed, was particularly severe in the national republics. In a further rebuttal of Korenizatsiia, the historical accounts of the individual nations were questioned and criticized, blamed of ‘bourgeois nationalism’, while the historical relations between these peoples and Russia were altered to portray a historical friendship. Very little about Russian culture was considered reactionary, however. Quite to the contrary, the exploits of Russian history, science, and culture were officially celebrated in the last years of Stalin’s rule.

3.5.1. Khrushchev’s Two-Pronged Destalinization Stalin’s successors saw the need to return some rationality to the functioning of the state, and this did affect nationality policy. Moreover, they were more cognizant of the real threat that had been exposed during the war by the disaffection among national minorities.54 Even more pressingly, the reality that the Soviet Union had a non-Russian majority became especially clear in the power struggle after Stalin’s death. Support of 53 54

Quoted in Simon, Nationalism and Policy, p. 207. Carrère d’Encausse, ’Determinants and Parameters’, p. 51.

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entrenched republican elites became a key issue for the contenders, and the national institutions provided an institutional and territorial base for some of the contenders, like Beria or Khrushchev. Beria, initially, tried to position himself as the champion of the nonRussian peoples, and advocated a return to the policies of Korenizatsiia. Already in June 1953, only weeks after Stalin’s death, the Presidium of the Central Committee instructed the state apparatuses to improve conditions in the national republics, and to promote as many titulars as possible to leading positions. Together with decrees that directed official paperwork to be done in titular languages, the instructions from the center unequivocally indicated a return to Korenizatsiia.55 Suddenly, the party line had changed by 180 degrees. The pro-Russian policies that had been the imperative only months earlier were now branded as ‘deviations’, and a great reshuffle of party cadres in favor of natives was undertaken. This policy concurred with a policy of decentralization that transferred substantial power from the union authorities to the republican institutions. This was especially true in what regarded control over the economy. The emerging Khrushchev regime was seeking to jumpstart the economy by giving larger incentives at the local levels and to eliminate excessive centralization that stifled the economy. In larger republics, these measures were replicated on a lower level, increasing the real power vested in both autonomous and non-autonomous regional institutions.56 Khrushchev in his famous secret speech at the twentieth congress of the CPSU in February 1956 directly attacked Stalinism, specifically targeting its excesses in the nationalities question. Referring to the deportations, Khrushchev stated that ‘no MarxistLeninist and no sensible human being can understand how anyone can hold an entire people … responsible for hostile activities, to inflict mass reprisals on them, and to expose them to hardship and misery for the subversive actions of individuals or small groups’.57 Khrushchev mentioned by name the Karachai, Balkars, Chechens, and Ingush, and the national republics of these peoples and of the Kalmyks were reinstated in January 1957. Yet Crimean Tatars, Germans, and Meskhetian Turks were not mentioned and were not rehabilitated. The Meskhetians and Crimean Tatars would struggle for the next several decades to be granted the right to return, but in vain.58 However, in its familiar way, the pendulum soon swung back beginning in 1959. Khrushchev had by 1957 consolidated his rule, and began to restrict the wide-ranging rights given to national republics, that had occasionally exceeded those of the 1920s. Khrushchev now returned to Lenin’s visions of a socialist state, and announced at the

55 Simon, Nationalism and Policy, p. 228. The resolution has not been published, but is confirmed among other by Khrushchev’s memoirs. 56 Simon, Nationalism and Policy, p. 237. 57 Simon, Nationalism and Policy, p. 241. 58 Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, Punished Peoples of the Soviet Union: the Continuing Legacy of Stalin's Deportations, New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1991.

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twenty-second Party Congress in 1961 that the national groups in the Soviet Union had come to espouse a socialist consciousness, not longer a national one; hence the Soviet Union, having completed the flourishing of nations, had achieved their drawing together, Sblizheniie, and now needed to move on to the final stage in Lenin millenarian vision, the achievement of Slianiie, the merger of nations, where the peoples would rise from a socialist to a communist consciousness.59 This proclamation of, as it turned out, an unrealistic development flowed not from an analysis of reality but was inherently ideological; this increased the confusion in the nationality policy under the late Khrushchev years. The final ‘fusion’ of nations again demanded that the role of a single language and culture be emphasized; the culture was termed Soviet, though the weakness of the conception of a ‘Soviet culture’ forced it to lean on Russian culture, whereas in terms of language, the return to emphasis on Russian was an unavoidable consequence. More than Stalin had, Khrushchev reformed the educational system. He greatly reduced the role of the native languages as media of instruction in the autonomous republics and regions, and to a lesser degree in the union republics; native languages were now relegated to being media of instruction in primary and, to various degrees, secondary schools; it nevertheless remained a subject taught in Russian-language schools in minority areas. This policy may to some extent have been based on objective criteria. Command of Russian was essential for advancement, either economic or political, in the Soviet Union, and hence many parents were not opposed to the concept of having their children receiving education in the Russian language. But Khrushchev also removed the already poorly enforced requirement that ethnic Russians in the national republics learn the local languages, and in practice, ‘native-language education was virtually discontinued’.60 Khrushchev’s about-turn nevertheless betrayed the fact that the Communist party had been unable to reconcile the inherent contradictions of Leninism, and lent towards its ideological conviction that nations were, after all, transient. As Dunlop puts it, ‘despite numerous tactical zigzags, beginning with the NEP, this concept of nations as ultimately ephemeral has never been abandoned by the Soviet leadership’.61 Paradoxically, the Soviet leader who understood the tenacity of national consciousness and realized the limitations of the Soviet state’s capacity to transform societies was Stalin – a conviction that certainly impelled his great purges of national elites and the deportations.

3.5.2. The Brezhnev Era: Reliance on Local Elites The Fall of Khrushchev in 1964 at first accentuated these tendencies. In the late 1960s, his decentralization measures were reversed, and much of the authority delegated to

Carrère d’Encausse, ’Determinants and Parameters’, p. 51. 60 Simon, Nationalism and Policy, p. 269. 61 John Dunlop, ‘Language, Culture, Religion, and National Awareness’, in Conquest, ed., The Last Empire, p. 266. 59

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national republics and lower administrative units were taken back by the center. Yet the Soviet state never regained the power that Stalin had welded. Society was not totally controlled in the way it had been, and grew increasingly diverse. Increasingly, representatives of minority peoples were able to restore some of the deliberate mistakes in Stalin’s history-writing, and to reassert their national cultures and languages without being repressed. Already in the late 1960s, Ukrainian demands resurfaced, especially in the field of culture and education. National demands and denouncements of Russification were now supported by the highest levels of the Ukrainian party hierarchy. This trend was slowed with the removal of Ukrainian party head Shelest in 1972, but was paralleled by developments elsewhere. Even in Central Asia, officially condoned literature now began to amplify the cultural roots of the native population and glorify past heroes.62 The novels of Chingiz Aytmatov, whose themes include the preservation of the memory of the past, were also published during this time. The Uzbek glorification of Amir Timur (Tamerlane), which reached large proportions after independence, took off in the 1970s.63 Moreover, the Islamic revival in Central Asia and the North Caucasus also has its roots in the 1970s, though it would grow significantly due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the opportunity this war provided for Central Asians to establish contacts with kindred peoples in Afghanistan, whose Islamic consciousness was very high. In Georgia, the national movement that had briefly surfaced in 1956 grew strong in the late 1970s. An attempt to reform the Georgian constitution to weaken the status of the Georgian language led to substantial public unrest in Tbilisi in 1978; in 1981, student protests again took place in Tbilisi against the attempts by the center to promote the Russian language in higher education. (see chapter seven) Similar events occurred in the Baltic republics, with public demonstrations against Russification in Estonia in the 1980s. Emigration was another issue that showed that the Soviet Union’s hold on society was withering away. Over two hundred thousand Jews were permitted to emigrate in the 1970s.64 The increase of national dissent may have been related to the foreign policy of détente, which forced Soviet authorities to allow emigration, permit Helsinki watch associations, etc. But even when the late Brezhnev regime tried to backtrack on its concessions in the early 1980s, the pressures from below had grown in size and intensity. Brezhnev’s rule was characterized by less explicit attention to the national question. However, the regime itself grew increasingly reliant on a number of union republics as the source of its power. Azerbaijan under Heydar Aliyev, Uzbekistan under Sharaf Rashidov, Kazakhstan under Dinmuhammad Kunaev, as well as Georgia under Shevardnadze and

Simon, Nationalism and Policy, p. 287. 63 Alexandre Bennigsen, ‘Soviet Minority Nationalism in Historical Perspective’, in Conquest, ed., The Last Empire, p. 143. 64 Simon, Nationalism and Policy, pp. 333-339. 62

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Ukraine after 1972, were republics that formed a loyal power base for Brezhnev.65 In fact, the Soviet Union in the 1970s increasingly came to approximate a network of patronclient relationships, in which Brezhnev granted republican leaders practical independence to run their internal affairs, while these leaders in return provided political stability and support for Brezhnev in Moscow. The republics that formed part of this scheme enjoyed exceptional political stability a the higher echelons during this time. The Aliyev and Shevardnadze regimes in Azerbaijan and Georgia are most well-known, given that these two leaders in the 1990s returned to power in independent Azerbaijan and Georgia. But also in Kyrgyzia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, the local communist party heads held their positions for two decades, mostly in stark contrast to the purges and reshuffles that took place in the Stalin and Khrushchev eras.66 This meant the strengthening of ethnic elites in the peripheries, but also the inclusion of non-Russians and non-Slavs in the power structures at the center. Hence Aliyev and Kunaev both became full members of the Politburo, whereas Sharifov became a candidate member. By contrast, Khrushchev had promoted a large number of Ukrainians, breaking with Stalin’s practices, though nonSlavic minorities were increasingly badly represented at the center – including the formerly influential Georgians and Armenians. A result of the patron-client system used by Brezhnev, the entrenched local elites developed strong networks of their own in their respective republics, with ensuing shadow economies, particularly in Georgia, and corruption. In the case of Azerbaijan, Brezhnev’s brother-in-law Semyen Tsvigun, deputy head of the USSR KGB, had worked with Heydar Aliyev in earlier times and nominated Aliyev first to the post of head of the Azerbaijani KGB in 1966, and then strongly supported his accession to the helm of the republic in 1969. Aliyev soon undertook a major reshuffle of the republican administration that consolidated his power base; he then moved on to gradually become one of the most influential leaders of the entire union, being known as one of Brezhnev’s protégés and as a close associate of his successor Andropov.67 The close patronage networks were no secret to Moscow, and indeed condoned by the Brezhnev regime as a part of an implicit agreement, yet would come back to haunt reformers like Andropov and Gorbachev. The increased leeway accorded to the national republics also meant that the nationalities policy in general was less ideologically motivated than previously. But as Suny has noted, ‘those policies and processes that strengthened the nationalities in their own republic deeply conflicted with contradictory policies and processes that pulled non-Russians toward acculturation, even assimilation,

Mikhail Agursky, ‘The Prospects of National Bolshevism’, in Conquest, ed., The Last Empire, p. 99. 66 Martha Brill Olcott, ‘Central Asia: the Reformers Challenge a Traditional Society’, in Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, eds., The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990, p. 257 67 John P. Willerton, Patronage and Politics in the USSR, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 191-222. 65

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into a general, russified, Soviet culture’.68 Indeed, while elite politics favored the ethnic republics, Russification in the educational system continued. This policy did show some success, especially in Belorussia and the Ukraine, where the number of people stating Russian as their native language increased. Fluency in Russian also increased rapidly in the 1970s, especially in Uzbekistan. In urban areas in the ethnic republics, this process reached noticeable proportions. Cities like Baku, Riga, Tashkent, Bishkek and Almaty were increasingly becoming culturally Russian cities, where the titular population was culturally becoming russified rather rapidly, especially the young generation. The results of this process can be observed still today, although a new Korenizatsiia is developing since independence. In the autonomous republics and regions of the RSFSR, especially in the Volga-Ural region, Russification was even more pronounced. Russian nationalism was also allowed to prosper in the Brezhnev era. Just as he tolerated the building of fiefdoms in the national republics, Brezhnev also tolerated the expression of Russian nationalism, and himself referred to the Russian people as a ‘first among equals’.69

3.6. The Last Years: from Andropov to Gorbachev Andropov, coming to power in 1982, was a believer in both socialism and in the transient character of nationalism, to use Lenin’s terminology. In his first speech, he reiterated the ambition to achieve the fusion of nations, slianiie,70 a term that Brezhnev had avoided but that Khrushchev had employed. A dedicated reformer but also a dedicated communist, Andropov initiated attempts to crack down on corruption, especially in Central Asia, but did not stay in office long enough to implement his vision of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev, who succeeded Andropov in 1985 after the short interlude of Chernenko, found a Soviet Union in deep trouble. The lack of strong power since the late Brezhnev era had allowed for the strengthening of local fiefdoms. Gorbachev set out to uproot them, to reintegrate the peripheries under central control. Between 1985 and 1988, most leaders in the South Caucasus and Central Asia were replaced. These measures often worsened public perceptions of Moscow and occasionally sparked ethnic unrest. When Kunaev was removed in Kazakhstan in 1986 and replaced with an ethnic Russian, large demonstrations ensued, forcing Gorbachev to tread more carefully in his discipline campaigns in the southern peripheries. But Gorbachev’s policies of Glasnost’ and Perestroika also had another consequence: they undermined the role of ideology. In 1989, Alexander Motyl compared ideology to ‘a dog that barked incessantly in the Brezhnev era,

Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993, p. 125. 69 Dina Rome Spechler, ‘Russian Nationalism and Soviet Politics’, in Hajda and Beissinger, eds., The Nationalities Factor, p. 295. 70 Gertrude E. Schroeder, ‘Social and Economic Aspects of the Nationality Problem’, in Conquest, ed, The Last Empire, p. 292. 68

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[and] has literally stopped barking since then’.71 Unlike Brezhnev, who kept the ideological rhetoric at high steam, Gorbachev neglected it. Neglecting ideology meant neglecting the purported glue that held the disparate Soviet Union together; where political openness opened the playing field for the free expression of thoughts, the decrease of ideology created a vacuum that was gradually filled by nationalism. Moreover, openness also meant a reduction of the use of repression.72 As media grew more free and people understood that they could associate and advance political claims without adverse consequences, the central authorities would grow even more dependent on indirect control over the nonRussian peoples through the client governments in the national republics. But Gorbachev, far from trying to use these structures, was trying to dismantle them and exercise more direct control over the periphery. As a result, the central authorities’ instruments for control over non-Russian areas became fewer. Instruments of indirect control were disappearing, leaving Moscow with the option of direct intervention. The use of this instrument in two of the most unruly areas, the Caucasus and the Baltics, shows the desperation of the authorities, but also contributed greatly to speed up the demise of the entire union. The bloody military interventions in Tbilisi in April 1989, in Baku in January 1990, and Vilnius in January 1991, had a profound psychological impact on the affected peoples, and eliminated any legitimacy the Soviet state had left in the eyes of these minorities. Gorbachev’s attempts to salvage the union through a new union treaty in 1991 were largely futile; for all practical purposes, the Baltic states and Georgia and Armenia had seceded at this point, leaving at best a truncated union. The coup against Gorbachev in August 1991 further accelerated and confirmed the unraveling of the union.

3.7. Conclusions Soviet Nationality policy presents a bewildering sequence of nation-building through affirmative action, deportation and genocide, patronage networks, Russification attempts, and pragmatic realpolitik. How does this inform an understanding of the predicament of minorities in the very end of the Soviet era? One primary element is that the frequent pendulum swings created a strong level of distrust for the higher authorities among minorities. Whether union republics for the federal center or autonomous republics and regions for the republican or central authorities, the federal structures and their functioning were subject to change, and with the partial exception of the Brezhnev era, purges from the top were the rule rather than the exception. This naturally created a distrust for federalism as a concept. However, it would be wrong to conclude that the Soviet autonomies were not autonomous. During extended periods of time in the 1920s, partly in the immediate post-Stalin period and certainly in the Brezhnev era, they enjoyed substantial autonomy stretching into the political sphere, beyond the administrative 71 72

Alexander J. Motyl, ‘The End of Ideology?’, in Nationalities Papers, vol. 17, no. 1, 1989, p. 17. Paul Goble, ‘The Rise of Ethnic Politics’, in Nationalities Papers, vol. 17, no. 1, 1989, p. 59.

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autonomy that they always held. And during the entire Soviet period, the autonomous structures of Soviet ethnofederalism actively promoted the distinct separate identity of the minority ethnic groups in the Union. The level to which local elites could promote separateness varied, but basic schooling in the native language existed in practically all republics, autonomous republics, and autonomous oblasts during the entire Soviet era, hence clearly fulfilling Lapidoth’s criteria for defining a territorial autonomy as an ‘arrangement aimed at granting to a group that differs from the majority of the population in the state, but that constitutes the majority in a specific region, a means by which it can express its distinct identity’.73 The Soviet form of autonomy was unique in its historical shape and context; however, its long-term consequences were not as dissimilar from that of the intention of autonomous regions throughout the world that some authors have argued. They effectively cemented the national identity of numerous ethnic groups, in fact building many of these nations, provided ethnic institutions for education, culture, and national development, as well as political institutions, indigenous political elites, and defined borders. The very fact that so many of the Soviet autonomous regions asserted their separate status in some way in the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR testifies to the fact that Soviet autonomy was not an easily dismissible entity. While keeping in mind the differences with autonomy regimes in other parts of the world, the relevance of Soviet autonomy for the study of autonomy worldwide must be stressed.

73

Lapidoth, Autonomy – Felxible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts, Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, p. 33.

4 Research Design

The purpose of this study – to investigate whether territorial autonomy was a contributing factor to the violent ethnic conflicts that erupted in the South Caucasus since the late 1980s – presents a number of methodological challenges. In general, systematic research on the origins of ethnopolitical conflict is relatively scarce—for good reasons. With the abundance of possible explanatory factors discussed in chapter two, researchers have found the task of identifying a clear and consistent pattern of the origins this phenomenon grueling. Moreover, determining the explanatory value of one factor—such as that of autonomy—for the emergence of conflict is a distinct challenge, raising the issues of multiple and conjunctural causation: how to gauge the relative importance of one causal factor and to isolate it from others? As stated earlier, autonomy is neither expected to be a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the emergence of ethnopolitical conflict. Such conflicts do emerge where there is no territorial autonomy for minority groups; moreover, autonomies do not invariably end up in conflict with their central governments. The argument is that autonomy may increase rather than decrease the likelihood of conflict, in contrast with the findings of much of the literature. Hence it becomes crucial to understand in connection to which other factors and through which mechanisms autonomy, if it does, contributes to the likelihood of conflict. Before that, however, two crucial questions at the outset deserve to be addressed. Firstly, if one argues, as many scholars do, that the Soviet Union never introduced true federalism or true autonomy, is the analysis of the role of autonomy in the former Soviet context then misplaced? A credible argument could even be made that for most practical purposes, the Soviet Union differed little from a unitary state, and many researchers indeed do argue that the USSR was in reality not a federation. However, this would miss the point. As seen in chapter one, one of the mechanisms through which autonomy is likely to operate with relation to conflict is in the realms of institutional structure and symbols. Moreover, in certain realms such as education and, equally importantly, the creation of national cadres and elites, federal structure was functional throughout the Soviet era even though real political autonomy was absent. As Leff has argued with reference to the union republic level in the former Yugoslavia and USSR, ethnofederal institutional arrangements during the time of transition took on in practice the role they were earlier accorded on paper: ‘It is in that context that the bargaining environment for ethnonational disputes clearly differs from that of unitary multinational states: in the 91

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course of political opening, federal structures provide republic-level political bases for challenges to the existing political order and offer distinctive opportunities to key actors in the transition.’1 Although written in the context of union republics under a non-territorial federal center, this statement is equally valid for the case of autonomous regions. A second common objection to the argument presented in this study is that the minorities that were initially granted autonomy in the first place were those minorities with greater grievances and in a higher degree of conflict with their central government. After all, autonomy is normally granted in response to ethnic demands; groups that have expressed such demands are arguably more likely to experience renewed secessionism than minorities that have not voiced such claims in the past. However, the more than thirty autonomous regions that were created in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s were not established as a result of ethnic demands. The very structure of the Soviet state was built on ethnic federalism; minority groups were mapped, evaluated, and assigned a certain status, often according to the whims of the highest decision makers, notably Stalin himself. The full explanation as to why certain minorities received autonomy and others did not may never be available; it is relatively safe to argue, however, that the decisions had little to do with actual ethnic demands.

4.1. Definitions The research question in the present study is to explain violent ethnopolitical conflict between an ethnically defined, compactly settled minority population and its central government, and in particular to identify the role of autonomy as an explanatory factor. The criteria for classifying a case as a case of conflict, is the emergence of sustained organized acts of violence by military or paramilitary formations representing on the one hand the minority population and on the other the central government and by extension the majority population. As such, terrorist deeds performed by fringe groups against either military or civilian targets, even if performed in the name of either the minority or the majority population, will not be deemed sufficient. Likewise, unorganized ethnic riots will not satisfy the criteria unless they develop into organized violence. Finally, political confrontation between ethnically based groups not leading to serious acts of violence will not be included. The explanatory factors under study are guided by the working propositions established in chapters one and two. Of specific concern is to assess the role of one specific factor—that of territorial autonomy provided for a minority group—in the emergence of ethnopolitical conflict. As is apparent from the research question and the earlier discussion, the present study has a primarily theory-generating purpose. Given the

Carol Skalnik Leff, “Democratization and Disintegration in Multinational States: The Breakup of the Communist Federations,” World Politics, vol. 51, January 1999, p. 210. 1

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absence of any theoretical framework connecting autonomy and conflict, there is no theory to test; the ambition is to investigate the possible link between autonomy and conflict, which is suggested in chapter one. In this context it is important to note that chapters one and two do not form a rigid theoretical ‘model’ that is to be ‘tested’ in the subsequent chapters. Research on the relationship between autonomy and conflict being practically non-existent, the underlying theory of the study is by necessity underdeveloped. As there is no theory to test, the present study aims to contribute to the building of such theoretical precepts. Whereas this requires a primarily inductive approach, this does not make the study atheoretical, or a purely historical account. The aim is not to write a history of the emergence of conflict in the South Caucasus; nor does it attempt to inductively collect all possible relevant factors affecting the likelihood of conflict. The study is guided by the working propositions, and is as such theoretically grounded and focused on the study of certain specific phenomena.

4.2. Causal Effect and Causal Mechanism This discussion relates intimately with the methodological debate regarding causality. Philosopher David Hume identified three ‘sources of causality’. One of them was ‘constant conjunction’ –- a high degree of covariance between events. This corresponds in modern social science to statistically proven covariation. Hume’s two other items of causality were ‘temporal succession’ and ‘contiguity’. Constant conjunction or covariation can be seen as related to the causal effect tying an independent variable to a dependent variable, whereas temporal succession and contiguity can be said to refer to the causal mechanisms involved. The difference is far more than semantic. Bennett defines the causal effect of an explanatory variable as the ‘change in probability of and/or value of the dependent variable that would have occurred if the explanatory variable had assumed a different value’. By contrast, he defines causal mechanisms as ‘causal processes and intervening variables through which causal or explanatory variables produce causal effects’.2 An illustration is the relationship between smoking and cancer. Scientists have long known that smokers are statistically more likely to fall victim to cancer than nonsmokers. That is, they have established the causal effect that smoking causes cancer. However, it is only recently that the mechanism by which this takes place in the human body has been revealed. Likewise, a major thrust of political science theory in recent decades has been the ‘democratic peace’ paradigm. Statistically, researchers have been able to prove that democracies hardly ever fight each other. This amounts to the discovery of a causal effect. However, the debate on exactly why, or what within the democratic system

Andrew Bennett, ‘Lost in the Translation: Big (N) Misinterpretations of Case Study Research’, paper presented at the 38th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto, March 18-22, 1997.

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makes one democracy reluctant to fight another, is still raging. In other words, the causal mechanism is not known. Especially in social science, however, the value of knowing the causal effect, without comprehending the causal mechanism, is limited. Indeed, if one seeks knowledge in the democratic peace literature that can help in preventing future conflict, very little in terms of policy tools is available. In the context of this study, a hypothetical conclusion based on statistical evidence that autonomy is in fact correlated statistically with conflict to an extent providing a proven causal effect would not necessarily be practically helpful unless one also knows what it is that makes autonomy a cause of conflict. As Andrew Sayer has noted, ‘what we would like . . . is a knowledge of how the process works. Merely knowing that ‘C’ has generally been followed be ‘E’ is not enough; we want to understand the continuous process by which ‘C’ produced ‘E’ ’.3 In both of the cases mentioned above, knowledge of causal effects predated knowledge of causal mechanisms. This was the case because researchers had at their disposal a pool of data large enough to statistically establish causal effects without knowing the causal mechanisms. All spheres of research, however, do not possess such luxury. For example, Homer Dixon et. al. have been trying to show the relationship between environmental scarcity and conflict.4 In so doing, they based their research on numerous single case studies in order to develop an understanding of the causal mechanisms linking environmental scarcity to conflict. This methodology drew heavy criticism from statistically minded researchers for being methodologically unsound and failing to qualify as ‘systematic research’.5 Responding to this criticism, Homer-Dixon et. al. argue convincingly for the need to focus on causal mechanisms when a research program is in its early stages and the underlying theory largely underdeveloped.6 As they argue, estimates of causal effects without understanding of causal mechanisms carries certain pitfalls: ‘First, researchers will not know which potentially confounding variables they should control in their statistical tests; and second, researchers may overlook key processes and causal relationships that are hidden in the data’.7 The qualitative methodology of process tracing, explained in greater detail below, is on the other hand useful in identifying variables or factors particularly important to control; to identify relationships between explanatory factors by treating them qualitatively and not merely as numbers; and to Andrew Sayer, Method in Social Science, London: Routledge, 1992,. pp. 106-107. See also discussion in Bennett, ‘Lost in the Translation’. 4 Thomas Homer-Dixon and Marc Levy, ‘Environment and Security’, International Security, vol. 20 no. 3; Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999. 5 Nils Petter Gleditsch, ‘Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 35 no. 3, May 1998. 6 Thomas Homer-Dixon, Tom Deligiannis, and Daniel M. Schwartz, ‘The Environment and Violent Conflict’, in Paul Diehl and Nils Petter Gleditsch, Environmental Conflict, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001. 7 Ibid., p. 13. 3

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discover causal patterns that may not be found through quantitative analysis. It goes without saying that the establishment of causal mechanisms does not preclude the investigation of causal effect, where the data and the existing theoretical framework make that possible. As Bennett has noted, the establishment of causal inferences should operate, as far as possible, by establishing both causal mechanism and causal effect. The methods do not exclude one another, but are complimentary. The state of research on the topic of this study dictates a qualitative methodology. A main challenge to the present research problem is the large number of possible causal factors, or in statistical terms independent variables. Chapter two identified close to two dozen such factors. The limitation of the study to a distinct geographical area, the South Caucasus, was instrumental in reducing the number of factors to less than a dozen. Yet the number of possible causes of the phenomenon of ethnopolitical conflict remains high, in fact higher than the number of cases under study.

4.3. The “Degrees of Freedom” Problem Qualitative case study methods have been criticized of inherently suffering from a degrees of freedom problem. The number of ‘degrees of freedom’ is obtained by subtracting the number of independent equations linking the unknown quantities from the number of unknown quantities. As a unique solution is desired for each simultaneous equation, the number of unknowns, or cases, needs to be larger than the number of equations, or the risk of spuriousness is inevitable.8 However, by focusing on the arithmetic counting of observations, this criticism fails to account for the qualitative nature of case study methods. As Bennett notes, Statistical researchers tend to aggregate variables together into single indices to get fewer independent variables and more degrees of freedom, but case study researchers do the reverse: they treat variables qualitatively, in all of their relevant dimensions, and they try to distinguish qualitatively different types of each independent and dependent variable. … In addition, within a single case there are many possible process tracing observations along the hypothesized causal paths between independent and dependent variables. A causal path may include many necessary steps, and they may have to occur in a particular order. At each step, the researcher may measure the magnitudes and signs of intervening variables to see if they are as the hypothesis predicts. These many predicted observations may provide sufficient ‘degrees of freedom’, or many more observations than variables, even when the researcher is studying a single case and using several independent variables.9

Especially in the study of complex social situations such as violent conflict, the researcher inevitably faces the problem of the complexity of reality. Some researchers attempt to

See Andrew Bennett, ‘Lost in the Translation: Big (N) Misinterpretations of Case Study Research’, Paper presented at the MacArthur Workshop for Case Study Methods, Harvard University, Oct. 1719, 1997. 9 Ibid, p. 3 8

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simplify reality by claiming that ‘any social system is as complex as the theory developed to study it’10, thereby denying any intrinsic complexity to social phenomena, outside the control of the researcher. As it is likely that events take place whether or not a researcher has designed a model to study it, and indeed that the researcher’s theory may be flawed and unable to grasp the full context of the social phenomenon under study, one is forced to acknowledge that social phenomena have a number of possible causes that interrelate with one another in ways that are extremely difficult to explain or understand in their totality. Estimating the explanatory value of one factor among others is hence, by necessity, a methodologically intricate matter.

4.4. Mill’s Method of Difference and Multiple Causality Case study methods normally find their origin in the methods of agreement and difference established by John Stuart Mill over a century and a half ago. These methods both suffer from intrinsic liabilities, which Mill was himself very aware of. The method of agreement is the most problematic; it assumes that if several cases show a similar outcome on the dependent variable, and if these cases have similar scores on an independent variable, then this is the cause of the outcome. In most social contexts, however, monocausal explanations are unsatisfactory. A specific outcome is seldom generated by one single factor irrespective of others. The method of agreement is incapable of accounting for multiple or conjunctural causality. The method of difference is more developed, being ‘a double application of the method of agreement’.11 The method of difference focuses on different outcomes in the dependent variable among cases, and seeks to find a corresponding variance in an independent variable. The logic is that if two cases have different outcomes on the dependent variable, but identical values on a given independent variable, then that variable cannot be sufficient to cause the outcome. However, as Mill himself noted, this method requires demanding and unrealistic assumptions in order to provide non-spurious inferences.12 Also, as Bennett has noted, in the method of difference, ‘the causal relations being investigated must be deterministic regularities involving conditions that are either necessary or sufficient for a specified outcome.13 Such conditions are not always present; in the case of ethnopolitical conflicts, the multiple

Gleditsch, ‘Armed Conflict and the Environment’, p. 392. See Charles Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies, Berekely: University of California, 1987, p. 39. 12 See Andrew Bennett, ‘Causal Inference in Case Studies: From Mill’s Methods to Causal Mechanisms’ Paper Presented at the American Political Science Association Conference, Atlanta, Georgia, 1999, p. 17. 13 Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George, ‘Process Tracing in Case Study Research’, Paper presented at the MacArthur Workshop for Case Study Methods, Harvard University, Oct. 17-19, 1997, p. 11. 10 11

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causal factors seem individually not to be either sufficient or necessary to produce the outcome of conflict. This raises the issue of multiple and conjunctural causality. Conflicts seldom or never emerge as a result of one single, easily identifiable causal factor. Rather, there is an intricate array of causes lying behind the occurrence of conflict. As has been shown in chapter two, theory assists in the quest to achieve some kind of understanding of the interrelationship between various factors thought to be at the origin of communal conflict. In particular, the differentiation between background and catalyzing factors, and between factors relating either to capacity or incentives, are important in increasing the understanding of the various factors necessary for a conflict to occur. Yet the problem remains how to assess the causal impact of one factor in relation to others. Neither of Mill’s methods provides a solution. Individual case studies involving process tracing (see below) are a possible solution, enabling the detailed study of the causal mechanisms at work in each case. Contrasting case studies, comparing cases with similar characteristics save for differences in one factor under study, are another. But drawing on Mill’s method of agreement, it is also possible to outline a factor-driven or ‘variable-oriented’ study. Mill’s method of difference identifies an independent variable thought to have causal effect on the dependent variable – that is, an explanatory factor thought to have produced a certain outcome. The next step is to identify cases of presence of the outcome (in this case conflict), and match this with concomitant presence of the explanatory factor thought to have caused this effect. Finally, an attempt is made to match an absence of the outcome (i.e. non-conflict) with absence of the explanatory factor in question. In this way, a two-by-two matrix is created where all cases in the ideal case would fit in two cells in order to support the proposition—the absence/absence and the presence/presence cells. This would also correspond to a zero-order correlation in statistical terms.14 In Mill’s method of difference, any deviant case—i.e. falling in one of the two presence/absence cells that do not support the proposition—would be a significant limitation to the study, necessitating explanation for the assumption to hold. However, the problem is that this technique presupposes that explanatory factors are both sufficient and necessary to arrive at the outcome. There are scarcely such factors in the study of communal conflict. In other words, it is more than likely, especially given the multitude of factors studied, that several if not all factors would in certain cases fall in a cell that does not support the assumption; and moreover, that several different explanatory factors will be present in all cases of conflict.

14

See Ragin, The Comparative Method, p. 39.

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Absence of explanatory factor

Presence of explanatory factor

Absence of conflict

Support

Non-Support

Presence of conflict

Non-Support

Support

The presence of a certain explanatory factor in cases of non-conflict should not be taken as evidence that this factor is of no consequence whatsoever in terms of the likelihood of conflict. It may still be a factor increasing the likelihood of conflict; in fact it may theoretically even be a necessary factor for conflict, only not a sufficient one. The absence of a certain explanatory factor in cases of conflict is also possible, but should inspire larger doubt as to its explanatory value. Admittedly, there are different types of conflicts, and the discussion on economic factors in chapter two highlighted that conflicts can occur both in economically viable and non-viable areas. Or, to take another example, conflicts undoubtedly do take place without the presence of external support, as in Chechnya in 1994; this does not mean we should dismiss that factor from the discussion. As a whole, however, in a given universe of cases, one would expect to be able to discriminate between explanatory factors based on their ‘correlation’ with the outcome or lack of outcome, i.e. conflict. The word correlation is deliberately placed between inverted commas, given that a small number of cases would question the statistical significance of the evidence in the study, and hence the basis on which to dismiss or confirm the explanatory power of a given explanatory factor. Still, studying each independent variable’s scores on each case and its relationship with the outcome gives a good indication as to the explanatory value of the given explanatory factor. A series of two-bytwo matrixes, one for each explanatory factor, can hence be constructed; the empirical cases are then placed in any of the four cells of the matrix, giving a very visual illustration of the explanatory factor’s relationship with reality. Such an operation, undertaken in the next chapter, is expected to give valuable hints as to the most important factors leading to ethnopolitical conflict. For the purposes of the present study, the exercise provides an opportunity to judge the explanatory value of autonomy as compared to other factors. This exercise is nevertheless not likely to provide satisfactory results. First of all, while it could be fashioned as a semi-statistical study (in fact corresponding to the Fisher’s Exact Probability Test) and have limited statistical significance, even if it does show a higher ‘correlation’ of some factors as compared to others, it would not explain what causal mechanisms have been active. Just like other statistical methods, it would fail to grasp the human mechanisms by which causal factors

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and the outcome are tied to each other, as well as the relationship between various causal factors.

4.5. Process Tracing In order to deepen the understanding of the empirical processes leading to ethnopolitical conflict, the method chosen is to trace these processes empirically. This tracing process combines induction and deduction. While open to the empirical data at hand, and in principle consisting of an attempt to structure and explain the empirical data, process tracing is not entirely inductive. It is guided by the explanatory factors outlined in chapters one and two, and cognizant of the preliminary findings of chapter five. Yet it also seeks, at every instance of the empirical process, to find both evidence that corroborates the theoretical propositions and evidence that might contradict it. In particular, it seeks to explore, to the extent possible, the interactions between various variables; it explores the particular temporal succession of events in search for links between various factors. Process tracing in this study also has a comparative ambition. It aims at contrasting the cases with divergent outcomes; practically speaking, to explain, to a satisfactory extent, the emergence of conflict in some of the cases but not in others. This necessitates an assessment of the various theoretically derived factors, their specific importance in a given case, and their relationship with other factors. For this purpose, the case studies will need to avoid being comprehensive and holistic studies of a given minority’s political development or relationship with its central government. For all the merits of this type of single, intensive case studies in providing the reader with an increased understanding of and familiarity with the given case, this type of studies are not conducive to orderly, cumulative development of knowledge and theory about the phenomenon in question.15 In other words, the study needs to be structured, i.e. addressing the very same issues in the very same manner in all cases; and focused, that is restricted to the theoretical focus of the study, omitting other perhaps interesting or valuable information not directly related to the aim of the study. A short introduction of each of the nine cases, determining the level of conflict, will precede the factor-based study in chapter five, whereas a detailed overview of Georgia in chapter six will precede the deeper case studies in chapter seven.

4.6. Case Selection An important issue is the number of cases to include in process tracing. This study spans over nine cases, which is a number high enough to raise doubt on whether a structured and focused comparison can be carried out among these cases. All in all, with ten

15 As noted by Andrew Bennett and Alexander George, ‘Research Design Tasks in Case Study Methods’, Paper presented at the MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA), Harvard University, October 17-19, 1997, p. 2.

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different independent variables, there are close to a hundred observations, which cannot realistically be assimilated into the study. It is necessary to reduce the number of cases selected for in-depth study, and ideally cases as similar as possible, with as much variation as possible on the outcome, should be selected. In the context of the present study, one of the three countries under study, Georgia, includes five cases. Of these, two have been cases of violent conflict (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) whereas three were cases of nonconflict. Three of the cases (the aforementioned two and Ajaria) were autonomous regions or republics, whereas the Armenian and Azeri minorities lacked autonomy. In particular, the case of Ajaria, being the only autonomous region not involved in conflict, is significant. These characteristics, with the increased comparability that the inclusion of all cases in one national political sphere provides, speaks for the selection of the cases in Georgia as detailed case studies.

4.7. Sources In the study of ethnic relations in the Caucasus, the selection of empirical sources is a distinct problem. For the Soviet era, few comprehensive English-language studies exist; moreover, Russian-language sources are often doubtful due to the ideological control exercised by Soviet authorities. Be they newspaper reports or academic writings, these works must therefore be treated with caution. Even in the non-Russian language literature on the region, instances of bias in both journalistic and academic writings is plentiful, calling for discretion and repeated control of data. Moreover, direct and intentional disinformation is also present either directly or indirectly in the literature, sowing confusion on certain events, sequences of events, and the like. In the 1990s, an increasingly rich literature has nevertheless developed on the Caucasus region, and then mainly on the overt conflicts taking places there, as well as on the regional politics and the politics of oil and pipelines emanating from the Caspian basin. This literature has been more plentiful on some of the cases in this study than others; for example, the ArmenianAzerbaijani conflict over Mountainous Karabakh has been the subject of most attention, with the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict in second place. Comparatively little has been written on South Ossetia, whereas the minorities having been spared conflict have received very little attention. Given the tense situation and the strategic importance of the region, the Armenians of Javakheti and Ajaria have seen some writings focusing on their situation; likewise, some literature exists on the Lezgins in Azerbaijan. On the other hand, the Talysh of Azerbaijan and the Azeris of Georgia have virtually been left out of the scholarly debate, both in the west and in the region itself. This circumstance complicates the study. For the general background to the region and the overt conflicts, this study relies on earlier empirical research carried out by the author on ethnic relations in the

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Caucasus.16 Moreover, the study uses secondary sources published on the region or presented at conferences by various scholars, and both regional and international primary sources, especially news reports. Interviews with political and academic figures from the region itself have been used wherever this has proven useful or necessary. However, the study does not have a specific interview methodology, and does not base its findings on these interviews.

Svante E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000.

16

5 Factors in Ethnopolitical Conflict in the South Caucasus As was outlined in chapter four, this chapter seeks to examine whether the propositions found in chapters one and two have an explanatory value for the emergence of ethnic conflict in the South Caucasus. For this purpose, each proposition and its outcome in the nine cases is examined and contrasted with the existence of armed secessionist conflict in the nine cases. Before this factor-based study is undertaken, a short overview of the nine cases under study is called for.

5.1. Ethnic Groups in the South Caucasus The Caucasus is known for the diversity of ethnic groups inhabiting the region. This is most pronounced in the northern part of the Caucasus, belonging to the Russian Federation. South of the mountains, three large peoples dominate the demography: the Azerbaijanis, the Georgians and the Armenians. The Azeri Turks are the largest ethnic group in the Caucasus, with close to seven million members—in the Caucasus. Over twenty million reside in Iran, chiefly in its northwestern provinces, separated from their brethren in the Caucasus politically since 1828. Azeris speak a Turkic language closely related to the one spoken in the Turkish republic, and are Muslims, overwhelmingly of the Shi’a denomination. The neighboring Georgians number over four million, speak a South Caucasian language, and are Orthodox Christians. The Armenians number around three million in the Caucasus, but as is the case with Azeris, more Armenians live outside Armenia than in the Caucasus. The Armenians are dispersed in a large Diaspora consisting of close to five million people, mainly in Russia and the United States. They speak an Indo-European language and are Monophysite Christians. These three groups have dominated the South Caucasus politically as well as demographically for the last century. Whereas Georgians and Armenians are old nations with a strong national identity, the Azeris are a by comparison more recent nation, the term Azerbaijani coming to use only in the twentieth century, before which the Azeris were referred to as Turks, Tatars, or Muslims. Nevertheless, these three groups were clearly in presence at the independence of the South Caucasus following the Russian revolution of 1917. In 1918, leaders of the three communities formed an abortive Transcaucasian Federation, before establishing three separate ‘Democratic’ republics with the same names as the three states hold today, but with slightly different borders.1

1

See Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951.

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The present borders between the three states were established by Soviet authorities in the 1920s, in a less than transparent process that left several contentious issues. Minority issues were paramount among these. Two types of minorities existed: the first type were members of these three peoples left within the borders of either of the other two states. Most problematic was the delimitation of borders between areas inhabited by Azeris and Armenians. As both groups inhabited vast areas of the southwestern Caucasus in an overlapping fashion, the creation of clear borders was close to impossible. Three areas in particular were claimed by both: Nakhchivan, Zangezur, and Mountainous Karabakh. In the final delimitation, Zangezur was granted to Armenia, whereas both Nakhchivan and Mountainous Karabakh became parts of Azerbaijan. This effectively separated Azerbaijan into two non-contiguous parts, the mainland and Nakhchivan, encircled by Iran and Armenia but with a 7-km border with Turkey. Nakhchivan was given the status of an Autonomous republic; however, given that it is populated by Azerbaijanis to over 90%, its population was not a minority within Azerbaijan, and is therefore not included in this study. Karabakh, with its Armenian majority population, became an autonomous region within Azerbaijan. Zangezur, home to numerous Azeris as well as Armenians, received no autonomy at all. Hence two of the minorities included in this study were created: the Armenians of Mountainous Karabakh and the Azeris of Armenia. In addition, both Azeris and Armenians were found in compact settlements on Georgia’s territory, especially along the southern borders of Georgia with Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan. A second type of minorities was groups that did not hold a titular soviet republic. These included the Abkhaz, Ossetians, and Ajars in Georgia, and the Talysh and Lezgins in Azerbaijan. The Abkhaz and Ajars were accorded autonomous republic status, whereas Ossetians, deemed to have a homeland in North Ossetia, received the lower status of an autonomous region. Talysh and Lezgins received no autonomy at all. This crystallizes the nine minorities of the South Caucasus that form the empirical universe of this study. The development of these nine cases is detailed below.

5.1.1. Mountainous Karabakh Armenians in Azerbaijan The issue of Mountainous Karabakh was the first ethnic problem to emerge in the South Caucasus in late 1987, with increasing popular Armenian demands for the transfer of the Nagorno (Mountainous) Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) from Azerbaijani to Armenian jurisdiction. Armenians formed over 75% of the NKAO’s population of 180,000 in 1979, the last census before the disturbances began. The area is encircled by Azerbaijan but only 12 km from the Armenian border at the closest point. Ethnic clashes between Armenians and Azeris in the region date back to the so-called Armenian-Tatar war of 1905-6 (as Azeris were generally referred to as Tatars in Czarist Russia), and erupted again in the short era of independence in 1918-20. Mountainous Karabakh has correctly been identified as a conflict where ethnicity and history is pitted against geography and economy. The History of the region, and its population, is hotly debated,

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but the majority Armenians firmly believe they have always been a majority in the region – a claim disputed by Azerbaijani scholars.2 Ethnic mobilization was at full speed in early 1988, with large demonstrations by Armenians in Armenia and Mountainous Karabakh throughout February. The Supreme Soviet of the NKAO petitioned to central authorities for the transfer of the territory to Armenia in February, and after the rejection of its petition, voted for independence in the summer of the same year. Ethnic violence and ethnic cleansing developed rapidly in both republics, leading to the flight of Azeris from Mountainous Karabakh and Armenia, and of Armenians from areas of Azerbaijan other than Mountainous Karabakh. The Armenian Supreme Soviet unilaterally annexed the NKAO to Armenia in December 1989, and in response the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet abolished the NKAO’s autonomy in early 1990. Armed conflict between paramilitary groups emerged and escalated between 1989 and 1991, leading to the gradual Azerbaijani loss of control over the NKAO. Full-scale war ensued in 1992 after the collapse of the USSR, with well-documented instances of direct Armenian involvement. This gives the conflict over the NKAO a clear inter-state dimension in addition to its intra-state dimension. The conflict remains unresolved though a cease-fire ended active hostilities in May 1994. Mountainous Karabakh Armenian forces control Mountainous Karabakh and large tracts of territory outside the former NKAO’s territory connecting it with Armenia and Iran. This is obviously a case of conflict.3

5.1.2. Lezgins in Azerbaijan The Lezgins are a Sunni Muslim people speaking a north Caucasian language, who live in roughly similar numbers on both sides of the border between Azerbaijan and Dagestan. In Azerbaijan, they officially number 200,000, and are compactly settled in northern Azerbaijan. However, the number of Lezgins is probably higher due to intermarriage and widespread registration of Lezgins as Azeri, but the number is unlikely to be as high as Lezgin sources claim (over 600,000). The transformation of the Samur river from having been a relatively meaningless administrative border to a frontier between independent states (Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation) awakened Lezgin ethnic mobilization and political activity in 1992. An organization named Sadval (unity) was formed whose political

Historiographical controversies are summed up in Donald D. Schwartz and Razmik Panossian, eds., Nationalism and History: The Politics of State-Building in Post-Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994. Also George Bournoutian, A History of the Armenian People, Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1993, 2 volumes; Khachig Tololyan, ‘National Self-Determination and the limits of Sovereignty: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Secession on Mountainous Karabakh’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, vol. 1 no. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 86-110. 3 For a detailed study of the conflict, see Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000, pp. 61-141; Cornell, The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Uppsala: Department of East European Studies, 1999; Michael P. Croissant, The ArmenianAzerbaijani Conflict: Causes and Implications, New York: Praeger, 1998. 2

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aims have varied with time, at most demanding the creation of a Lezgin republic under the Russian Federation on areas of Azerbaijan and Dagestan. A great number of Lezgins refused draft into the Azerbaijani army and especially to fight in the Mountainous Karabakh conflict, creating suspicion among Azeris. This was worsened by a 1994 bomb blast killing 12 people in the Baku metro that has been attributed to Sadval. The organization has also been accused of collusion with Armenian security services. The level of actual popular support for Sadval has nevertheless been doubtful. Especially following the political stabilization of Azerbaijan after 1994, coupled with the deterioration of the political situation in Dagestan and in particular the factual collapse of the power-sharing system in that republic to the detriment of the Lezgins, Lezgin political activism has diminished and according to Dagestani sources, Sadval has lost its momentum.4 Moreover, the appointment of General Safar Abiyev, a Lezgin, to the post of defense minister of Azerbaijan calmed tensions in the late 1990s. His appointment is in fact thought to have been intended precisely for that reason.

5.1.3. Talysh in Azerbaijan The Talysh are Shi’a Muslim people speaking a western Iranian language. Their numbers are, like the Lezgins, a matter of debate. The actual number is estimated at 300,000.5 The Talysh, inhabiting the southeastern part of Azerbaijan, are typically bilingual and have seen little ethnic mobilization in the post-Soviet era. One major political event related to the Talysh took place in August 1993, during severe Azerbaijani setbacks in the war with Armenia and less than two months after the June 1993 Coup d’État in Baku. A renegade army commander, Alikram Humbatov, declared the creation of a Talysh-Mugam republic in southeastern Azerbaijan and attempted to delimit and fortify its borders. However, even before government troops intervened, large demonstrations by local citizens spurred a mass desertion among the rebel forces. The leader of the abortive rebellion fled to Iran, spurring speculations on Iranian support for the insurgency, but was later detained and sentenced for treason by Azerbaijani authorities.6 The Talysh have remained calm with virtually no incidents ever since, although Azerbaijani military presence has been negligible. In retrospect, the abortive rebellion seems to have been related more with power politics in Baku than with Talysh ethnic mobilization. In fact, Humbatov was likely

See Cornell, ‘Conflicts in the North Caucasus’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 17 no. 3, 1998, pp. 425-428. Regarding Sadval’s present following, communications from Enver Kisriev, Dagestan Academy of Sciences, October 1999. 5 Official Soviet Census data, though contradictory, helps corroborate the findings of the 1999 Azerbaijani census. In 1926, 77,000 Talysh were registered in the Azerbaijani republic; by the 1959 census this figure had dropped to ninety people, due to registration of almost all Talysh as Azerbaijani. In 1989, the figure had jumped to 21,000. The first census of independent Azerbaijan, carried out in 1999, showed the figure of ca. 300,000. 6 Reports in The Times, 24 August 1993, 25 August 1993. 4

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allied with coup-maker Surat Husseinov in an attempt to weaken the position of President Heydar Aliyev. The Talysh case is a case of non-conflict.

5.1.4. Azeris in Armenia Azeris in Armenia were mainly located in the southern region of Zangezur, but Azeri villages existed in the neighborhood of the whole stretch of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. With the emergence of the Mountainous Karabakh conflict, a mass flow of Azeris from Armenia ensued. Some villages negotiated swaps with Armenian villages in Azerbaijan; others were subjected to more outright ethnic cleansing. By 1989-90, the quasi-totality of Azeris had left Armenia. The Azeris in Armenia were hence involved in ethnic conflict. However, they were not the primary party to a conflict, and their involvement was the result of contagion emanating from the conflict over Mountainous Karabakh. Azeris in Armenia were never involved in an armed secessionist conflict with their central government.

5.1.5. Javakhetia Armenians in Georgia Armenians live in three distinct areas in Georgia: in the capital Tbilisi, in Abkhazia, and in southwestern Georgia on the border with Armenia. The Armenians of Abkhazia to a significant degree took part in the Abkhaz rebellion and will be mentioned in the context of Abkhazia. The main concentration of Armenians is nevertheless found in the districts of Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe in the province of Samtskhe-Javakhetia. Armenians form a compact majority in the Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda raions, and roughly half of the population of Akhaltsikhe. Totally, their numbers are circa 150,000.The area is referred to as Javakhk by Armenians. Javakhetia Armenians were alarmed by the nationalist leadership in Georgia under Zviad Gamsakhurdia, and a political organization named Javakhk has at various times campaigned for Armenian autonomy in Georgia. However, the organization has not managed to gather significant active popular support, and seems to be ridden by internal differences. The Georgian government has been very careful not to provoke the Javakhetia Armenians; meanwhile, the Armenian government, mindful of the importance of its relations with Georgia, has been careful to defuse potential problems in the region, intervening once to talk Javakhk out of plans to hold a referendum on autonomy or secession. However, a Russian military base exists in Akhalkalaki which is composed of local Armenians for the quasi-totality of non-combatants, for over two thirds of its soldiers and non-commanding officers, and a third of its officers. Whereas the situation is tense in Javakhetia, there has so far been no armed secessionist conflict.7 7 See Voitsekh Guretski, ”The Question of Javakheti”, in Caucasian Regional Studies, vol. 3 no. 1, 1998; Ugur Akinci, ”Javakhetia: The Bottle-Neck of the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline”, in Silk Road: A Journal of West Asian Studies, vol. 1 no. 2, December 1997; Igor Rotar, ”Tbilisi Has Only Partial Control Over Georgia's Armenian Regions” Jamestown Prism, vol. 4, no.10, May 15, 1998 Levon Sevunts, ‘Squeeze Play in the Caucasus: Russia Could Tighten its Grip as Georgia, Armenia Break out of Bear Hug’, The Gazette (Montreal), 29 November 1999.

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5.1.6. Azeris in Georgia Azeris reside compactly in the southern and southeastern regions of Georgia, especially in the Marneuli region 40 km south of Tbilisi. Little unrest has been noted among Azeris in Georgia; however in the late 1980s, Georgian extreme nationalists exerted great pressure on Azeris, especially in the Bolnisi region, to leave Georgia. This led to the emigration of up to two thousand families, yet no self-defense organizations emerged among local Azeris, neither did they coalesce politically to demand rights from the Georgian government. In the post-independence era, the close and improving relations between Azerbaijan and Georgia has lowered the risk of conflict further.8

5.1.7. Ajars in Georgia The Ajars are in fact Muslim Georgians, having lived for centuries under the Ottoman Empire. Only in 1878 did present-day Ajaria come under Russian control. Ajaria received the status of an Autonomous Republic in the early 1920s, the only entity to be given autonomous status on religious and not ethnic grounds. Since the 1930s, Ajars were classified as Georgians in official censuses, and for this reason there are no official statistics on the ethnic break-up of Ajaria. Over half of the population is believed to be Muslim (that is, Ajars), and most of the remainder Christian Georgians.9 Ajars feel at the same time a common identity with Georgians and a distinct Ajarian identity based on their Muslim faith and divergence in customs. Tensions emerged during the Gamsakhurdia rule 1990-91 as the Georgian nationalist leadership talked of abolishing Ajaria’s autonomy. However, these tensions were defused as the idea was dropped. With the escalation of conflict between the Georgian central government and South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Ajar leadership has been able to work for an increased autonomy without prompting a reaction from Tbilisi, which was, with an euphemism, busy elsewhere. In 1991, the leadership of the ASSR was assumed by Aslan Abashidze, who has since built a dictatorial regime in the republic. Abashidze has built strong economic relations with Turkey and political and military relations with Russia, including the continued stationing of a Russian military base in Ajaria. This has served as a strong bargaining chip against the central government and a virtual guarantee against Georgian military action. Moreover, Ajaria has benefited from border trade with Turkey, and has withheld payments to the central budget. The economic situation in Ajaria is far better than most other districts of Georgia. A strong autonomist movement has existed in Ajaria, but no armed conflict.

5.1.8. Ossetians in Georgia (South Ossetia) Ossetians are a Christian people speaking a northeastern Iranian language. Ossetians were the titular nationality of the North Ossetian ASSR in the Russian Federation, and the

8 9

Personal interviews, Tbilisi and Marneuli, 1998. See Elizabeth Fuller, ”Georgia’s Adzhar Crisis”, in Report on the USSR, 9 August 1991.

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South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast (SOAO) in Georgia. Ossetians formed just over two thirds of their autonomous region’s population of 98’000 in 1989, the remainder mainly composed of Georgians. Another 100,000 Ossetians also lived scattered in other regions of Georgia. Increasing nationalism in Georgia spurred a reaction in the SOAO, with a popular front, the Ademon Nykhas, emerging in early 1989. In August 1989, steps were taken to make Georgian the sole official language of the republic, prompting Ademon Nykhas to petition to the USSR central government for unification with North Ossetia. A first round of inter-ethnic riots took place in the SOAO in late 1989. In late 1990, after regional parties were banned from contesting Georgian elections, the SOAO Supreme Soviet unilaterally upgraded South Ossetia to an ‘Independent Soviet Democratic Republic’. In December 1990, the Georgian parliament abolished South Ossetia’s autonomy, and the region is since then referred to as ‘Shida Kartli’ or the ‘Tskhinvali and Java’ regions in official Georgian discourse.10 An armed clash was prevented by units of the Soviet Ministry of Interior. By mid-1991, however, the situation deteriorated and South Ossetia’s capital Tskhinvali was under artillery fire. By November, when the Soviet Union was in a state of dissolution, North Caucasian volunteers vowing to support the Ossetian side had gathered in North Ossetia. North Ossetian authorities exerted strong lobbying on Moscow, and the hardliner-dominated Russian Supreme Soviet’s speaker threatened military actions against Georgia. In December, Gamsakhurdia was overthrown in Tbilisi, but the situation again turned explosive after a pause in early 1992. Finally, a cease-fire was signed under Russian President Yeltsin’s auspices in June 1992, and trilateral peace-keeping troops introduced. Georgia with this agreement in practice lost control of South Ossetia, and the conflict remains unresolved. However, peacebuilding at grassroots level has shown limited success, with the return of numerous refugees and the opening of trade and economic links.11

5.1.9. Abkhaz in Georgia Abkhazia was sovietized before Georgia in 1921, with the status of a union republic. However, it was associated with Georgia in 1925 and reduced to an ASSR under Georgia in 1931. Abkhazia has always been multiethnic, but the Abkhaz proportion of the population declined during the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. In 1989 the Abkhaz formed only 17% of the ASSR’s population of half a million, with 45% Georgians, 14% Armenians and 12% Russians. Interethnic tensions had erupted briefly in 1978, and resurfaced in 1988 with 60 leading Abkhaz intellectuals sending a letter detailing 10 President Shevardnadze has nevertheless publicly stated that ‘no one should be afraid of the term South Ossetia’. The Georgian Times, October 1999. 11 See Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, pp. 142-196; Julian Birch, “The Georgian/South Ossetian Territorial and Boundary Dispute”, in Wright et. al. (eds), Trnscaucasian Boundaries, pp. 151- 189; Julian Birch, “Ossetia: A Caucasian Bosnia in Microcosm”, in Central Asian Survey, vol. 14 no. 1, 1995, pp. 4374; Alexei Zverev, “Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus 1988-94”, in Bruno Coppetiers, (ed.), Contested Borders in the Caucasus, Brussels: VUBPress, 1996.

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Abkhaz grievances to the central leadership in Moscow. Demands followed for Abkhazia to be reinstated as a union republic, and in June 1989 ethnic clashes in the capital Sukhumi left a dozen dead and several hundred wounded. Abkhazia was interestingly enough calm during Gamsakhurdia’s rule, whereas all other minorities in Georgia, as viewed above, were uneasy. In retrospect, it seems that Gamsakhurdia had good contacts with the Abkhaz leadership.12 After Gamsakhurdia’s fall from power, tensions began heating up between Tbilisi and Sukhumi in Summer 1992. When Abkhazia reinstated its 1925 constitution, which was perceived as an act of secession in Tbilisi, Georgian paramilitary forces under poor control and discipline attacked Abkhazia in August. The Abkhaz formations were driven up to the northwestern corner of Abkhazia, and Georgian forces occupied the capital. The Abkhaz suddenly counter-attacked in October, with heavy armament, helped by North Caucasian volunteers and air support which came from Russian forces in the Caucasus that obviously also had provided the heavy weaponry to the Abkhaz. The war went from bad to worse for the Georgians during 1993, and Sukhumi was eventually recaptured by Abkhaz forces in September. Virtually all Georgians living on the ASSR’s territory were evicted in a campaign of ethnic cleansing. An unstable cease-fire has reigned since late 1993, with resumption of hostilities in early 1994 and during May 1998.13

5.2. Factors in Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus To actually study the impact of the ten potential explanatory propositions on the nine cases presented above, a simple four-square matrix is employed, where the horizontal axis has two possible outcomes on the proposition under study, and the vertical axis two possible outcomes on the dependent variable. The cases are then ‘placed’ in one of the four squares of the matrix. In this matrix, a perfect covariation between the dependent variable and the proposition in question takes the shape of a diagonal axis where all cases are found in the upper left and lower right squares of the matrix. In other words, cases of no conflict have a low score on the proposition, and cases of conflict have a high score. The aim of this part of the study is to investigate which propositions formulated earlier in the study indeed do seem to have an explanatory value for the level of conflict. If six cases out of nine (that is, two thirds) show a positive correlation between the propositions and

Gamsakhurdia actually staged an attempt to recapture power in Georgia in late 1993. From exile in Chechnia, Gamsakhurdia flew to Abkhazia and from there made his way to his native Mingrelia to the immediate south of Abkhazia. As a result, many of the Georgian forces fighting the Abkhaz at this moment then defected to Gamsakhurdia’s camp, as he tried to gather a military force to March on Tbilisi. As this rebellion failed, Gamsakhurdia escaped to the mountains and apparently took his life around new year’s eve 1994. However, his actions together with Russian support for the Abkhaz had brought Georgia to the brink of disintegration. Although a Georgian nationalist, Gamsakhurdia in this way actually played into the hands of the Abkhaz secessionists and actually sealed the de facto secession of Abkhazia. 13 Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, pp. 142-196. 12

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the outcome, the proposition is deemed interesting and worthy of further investigation. If, however, five or less cases show this correlation, the explanatory value of a proposition is doubtful. For reasons of increasing the readability of the matrixes, a three letter code is given to each case: ABK—Abkhaz in Georgia / Abkhazia; AJA—Ajars in Georgia / Ajaria; ARG—Armenians in Georgia; AZA—Azeris in Armenia; AZG—Azeris in Georgia; LEZ—Lezgins in Azerbaijan; NKA—Armenians in Azerbaijan / NagornoKarabakh; SOS—Ossetians in Georgia / South Ossetia; TAL—Talysh in Azerbaijan.

5.2.1.Cultural Differences Proposition 1: the deeper the cultural differences between two groups, and the stronger group identities and cohesion particularly among the minority population, the higher the risk of conflict’. By virtue of being minorities, all ethnic groups in this study by definition do have cultural differences with the titular populations of the states they inhabit. What is interesting is to determine whether the degree of cultural differences affects the salience of conflict. Indicators used to determine the degree of cultural differences have been limited to the two most marked characteristics: language and religion. Among Caucasian groups, differences in appearance may exist to the trained observer, however, there are no clear delimitations or generally observable characteristics. The Caucasus is a multiethnic though not a multiracial society. Customs do vary among groups, but common Caucasian customs do exist, and 70 years of Soviet rule inculcated many similar customs into the different groups. Most important are therefore the differences in language and religion. Language by itself is not an exclusive category: whereas people can not be both Christian or Muslim, they can speak both Georgian and Abkhaz.14 Yet, language remains perhaps the main marker of ethnic and national identity. The most obvious characteristic of an ethnic group is its separate language. Of course, certain national groups are determined by their religion; the Jews and Sikhs are examples. Yet, in many such cases, a separate language is sought for as an additional marker. The efforts in the 1990s to create separate and distinct languages of Bosnian, Serb and Croatian are an excellent example of this. Likewise, the efforts made to restore the status of Hebrew in Israeli society in that country’s early decades testifies to the importance that language, as a means of communication and symbol of nationhood, represents. Secondly, religion is crucially important as a marker of identity. Religion lies at the ground for virtually all societies’ moral values. Secularized states in the west are no exception, permeated strongly as they are by Christian values. Different religions imply different understandings of the world, different sets of values, different customs and different cultures. For differences among David D. Laitin, Identity in Formation, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. Also discussion in Ted R.Gurr, Peoples Versus States:: Minorities at Risk in the New Century, Washington DC: USIP Press, 2000, p. 67.

14

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two groups to be coded as high, a significant difference in both language and religion between the minority and the titular population of the central state is necessary. Significant implies larger differences than of dialectal character in language – meaning that people of the two groups cannot understand each other if speaking in their native tongues. In terms of religion, larger differences than sectarian are implied. This is not to deny that sectarian conflict, as between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims may exist and be very virulent. Indeed, hatred toward ‘heretics’ is often stronger than that toward ‘infidels’. For example, the militant Sunni Taliban of Afghanistan despise Shi’a Muslims more than Christians, whom they tend to accept as ‘people of the book’. But in the context of the former Soviet Union, religion has so far played a role in communal identities not per se, but as elements of ethnic identity in the relatively strongly secularized states of the region. In relation to this, the importance of sectarian differences have to a large extent been reduced by the impact of Soviet secularization. For example, the Azerbaijani nation is divided into roughly 75% Shi’a and 25% Sunni Muslims, whereas this ratio is reversed among Azeris in Georgia. However, with the exception of fringe radical groups, this distinction is not an important issue in Azerbaijani society. The logic behind the categorization used here, requiring significant differences on both accounts, is that cases scoring high would imply the lack of any common denominator between the two populations. In the former Soviet context, where people already share the common Soviet heritage and normally share a language of communication, Russian, cultural differences can be said to be high only if they share neither strong religious nor linguistic affinities. As a result, only three cases among the nine studied qualify for a ‘high’ score: two cases involving Azeris and Armenians; one involving Azeris and Georgians.15 Among other groups, the Lezgins of Azerbaijan and Armenians in Georgia come closest to a ‘high’ score: Lezgins are Sunni rather than Shi’a and have strong linguistic differences with the Azeris. Armenians are Monophysite rather than Orthodox and have strong linguistic differences with Georgians. The Abkhaz case is more ambiguous, given that they are religiously split, with around two thirds Orthodox Christian and one third Sunni Muslim. They are coded as a case of ‘low’ as a religious split within a group would largely disqualify religion as a reason for rebellion against another group sharing the religion of the majority of the group. It is notable that only one of three cases of conflict have high cultural Armenians are Monophysite Christians speaking an indo-European language. The Azeris differ by being predominantly Shi’a Muslims speaking a Turkic language. Hence (AZA=High differences). In Azerbaijan, Armenians in Mountainous Karabakh differ as above, hence (NKA=High); Talysh are Shi’a Muslims speaking an Indo-European language, hence differing in one category (TAL=Low); Lezgins are Sunni Muslims speaking a North Caucasian language, hence (LEZ=Low). In Georgia, Georgians are Orthodox Christians speaking a South Caucasian language. Minorities differ as follows: Abkhaz are religiously divided, and speak a North Caucasian language (one significant difference, hence coded as ABK=low); Ajars are Sunni Muslims but speak Georgian (AJA=low); Armenians, see above (ARG=Low); Azeris, see above (AZA=High); Ossetians are Orthodox Christians speaking an indo-European language (SOS = Low). 15

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differences. As a whole, only five out of nine cases (the non-shaded cells in the table below) support the proposition relating cultural differences to violent conflict.

Table 5.1: Cultural Differences Low High No Conflict

Conflict

AJA ARG LEZ TAL ABK SOS

AZA AZG NKA

5.2.2. National Conception Proposition 2: The more the national conception of either the minority or the state’s titular nation approximate an ethnic conception, the higher the likelihood of conflict. This proposition is more difficult to define and test, when applied both to the state and the minority. An ethnic minority group in a state can in the traditional definition of the term not have a civic conception of itself, since a civic conception would imply appartenance to the civic nation of the state they live in. However, the ethnic group may be either inclusive or exclusive when it comes to accepting outsiders into its fold through either marriage or what could be termed naturalization – basically to what extent it is possible for outsiders to ‘become’ co-ethnics of the group. To a much clearer degree, an autonomous region can have either a civic or an ethnic conception of the ‘nation’ composing the population this region, as the example of Tatarstani identity cited in chapter two illustrates. Hence one could speak at the outset of a discrepancy between non-autonomous and autonomous cases. In the case of nonautonomous minorities, the national conception of the state is what matters most: whether it tends toward the civic or the ethnic. In autonomous cases, there are four combinations of national conceptions of the state and the autonomous region: ethnic state/ethnic autonomy; ethnic state/civic autonomy; civic state/ethnic autonomy; civic state/civic autonomy. This confusing matrix is attenuated by adding the concept of inclusion. In autonomous cases, the question will be whether the national conceptions of the state and that of the autonomy are exclusive of one another, where a yes answer in one of the two will be sufficient to code the case as ‘yes’; in non-autonomous cases it will be whether the national conception of the state is inclusive or exclusive of the minority in question.

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As is clear from table 2, ethnic and exclusive conceptions dominate in the Caucasus. Given the complexity of coding, a further explanation is warranted. Armenia and Georgia both have a predominantly ethnic conception of the nation, although Georgia may be moving toward a more civic conception.16 The Azerbaijani conception of the nation is mainly civic—although not exclusively—based on the ideology of ‘Azerbaijanism’ that is inclusive of non-Turkic ethnic groups.17 The case of Ajaria are easily coded as ‘No’ given that specific case that the ethnic conception of ‘Georgian’ includes the Ajars, who are considered Georgians; moreover Ajaria has itself a civic conception of ‘Ajarian’ as a citizen of the region. Abkhaz, Ossetians, Azeris and Armenians in Georgia are not included in the conception of ‘Georgian’, thereby making all these cases fall under ‘Yes’. Armenia’s ethnic conception of the nation unquestionably excludes the Azeris, making it a ‘Yes’ case. Azerbaijan’s civic conception is inclusive of the Lezgins and Talysh, making them cases of ‘No’. Mountainous Karabakh Armenians is however a case of ‘Yes’. First of all, it is doubtful whether Armenians would, even before the present conflict, classify under the mainly civic conception of Azerbaijani. The problem is that the Azerbaijani national conception is not completely clear and elaborated and still subject to debate. The most liberal versions would be inclusive of Armenians that paid allegiance to the Azerbaijani state and learnt its official language; most definitions would nevertheless exclude the Armenians on various grounds, including their Christian religion. The coding of this case is nevertheless made easier by the fact that the national conception of the selfproclaimed Republic of Mountainous Karabakh as espoused by its Armenian majority was and remains purely ethnic.18

It is interesting to not that most titular union republics had an ethnic and a civic term defining, respectively, the ethnic titular group and citizenship of the republic. Hence an important difference existed between terms like Russky/Rossiyany, (untranslatable in the English language, the latter meaning a citizen of Russia which includes all ethnic minorities), Kazakh/Kazakhstani, Uzbek/Uzbekistani, etc. Some autonomous republics had the same, such as Tatar/Tatarstani. In the Caucasus, only Azerbaijan has this semantic distinction between the terms Azeri and Azerbaijani. Georgia and Armenia do not, where these identities are predominantly ethnic. Hence a Lezgin or Talysh can identify as a citizen of Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijani (but certainly not as Azeri) whereas this was less possible for citizens of Armenia or Georgia. Though these semantic understandings are difficult to substantiate or explain to readers unfamiliar with the region, there is no contradiction in a person claiming to be simultaneously a Lezgin and an Azerbaijani; however, claiming to be an Armenian and a Georgian simultaneously is less obvious. 17 See Audrey L. Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1992. 18 Even in present negotiations, the Mountainous Karabakh side is highly reluctant to grant Azeris from Mountainous Karabakh the right to return after a settlement. 16

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Table 5.2: Ethnic/Exclusive National Conception No Yes No Conflict Conflict

AJA LEZ TAL

ARG AZA AZG ABK NKA SOS

Six cases support the proposition linking ethnic/exclusive national conception to violent conflict. Importantly, no case of conflict took place in a case where national conceptions were inclusive.

5.2.3. Past Conflict and Myths Proposition 3: The Greater the intensity of past conflict and the myths surrounding it, the greater the risk of conflict. This factor is partially related to perceptions. As such, the coding of the cases requires an understanding of the histories and, moreover, historiographies predominant among the peoples of the Caucasus. The research is complicated by the fact that past conflict has existed to some degree between almost all peoples involved in this study; the Talysh and Lezgins of Azerbaijan being possible exceptions which are straightforwardly coded ‘No’. No mention exist in historical works of the Caucasus of violent conflict between Azeris and Lezgins, or Azeris and Talysh. What is today the southeastern areas of Georgia and northwestern areas of Azerbaijan were claimed by both republics in the 1917-24 period. The Democratic Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan did fight a short war over the area in 1919; isolated radical nationalists on both sides have issued territorial claims in the post-Soviet era, but have found little following. Basically, the Georgian and Azeri communities’ relationship are not significantly marked by this history at present. The case of Azeris in Georgia is hence coded ‘No’. A similar situation exists in Ajaria, where during the First World War a religiously based pro-Turkish movement was strong. However, with the diminishing role of religious identity in the Soviet era, the identification of Ajars with Georgia has increased; past conflict is low and not present in the minds of most Ajars or Georgians; this is also a case of ‘No’. The clearest cases of ‘Yes’ are the Armenians and Azeris (Mountainous Karabakh and Azeris in Armenia). Bloody conflict between the two communities took place in 1905 and 1918-20, and the degree of remembrance is high; moreover the historiographies of the past conflict in the two communities diverge strongly, with obvious tendencies towards whitewashing and glorification. Abkhazia is

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also a case of ‘Yes’, with the Abkhaz strongly remembering the SSR status of the 1920s, blaming the ‘Georgian Stalin’ for Abkhazia’s status under Georgia, and Georgia for attempts to assimilate the Abkhaz. Perceptions of the past are also highly divergent, making Abkhazia a clear ‘Yes’. South Ossetia is a narrower case of ‘Yes’, with a lower level of conflict and divergent perceptions dating back to the Soviet conquest of Georgia in 1921, in which Georgians blame Ossetians for supporting the Bolshevik forces. Still, the creation of an autonomous Ossetian territory in Georgia is resented by many Georgians, who see the Ossetians as a willing bridgehead in Russian attempts to control and sunder Georgia. The Armenians of Georgia are also a case of ‘Yes’. In 1918-19, a bloody war was fought between the Armenian and Georgian Democratic Republics over this area; mutual suspicion has remained high between the two communities, and has actually increased over the latter part of the 1990s.

Table 5.3: Past Conflict No No Conflict

Conflict

AJA AZG LEZ TAL

Yes ARG AZA ABK SOS NKA

As table 3 illustrates, there is a relatively strong support among the nine cases for the proposition that violent conflict at present is related to the occurrence of past conflict and the mythification thereof. Seven of nine cases support the proposition.

5.2.4. Rough Terrain Proposition 4: Rough terrain, in particular mountains or heavy forests, increases the risk of conflict. This indicator is related to the physical geography of the area inhabited by the minority. In a larger study a more precise definition of what constitutes rough terrain is undoubtedly necessary; however, in the present cases the categorization is relatively straightforward: the superimposition of ethnographic and topographic maps gives a relatively clear picture. Azeri-populated areas in Armenia and Georgia, and Talysh-populated areas in Azerbaijan are not predominantly mountainous. Ajaria, Armenian-populated areas in Georgia and

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Lezgin-populated areas in Azerbaijan, by contrast, are. Most significantly, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Mountainous Karabakh are all mountainous. All cases of conflict emerged in a mountainous areas with rough terrain suitable for guerrilla warfare. In total, six cases show a positive correlation. Table 5.4: Rough Terrain No Yes No Conflict

Conflict

AZA AZG TAL

AJA ARG LEZ ABK NKA SOS

5.2.5. Relative Demography Proposition 5: The greater the demographic dominance of the minority in the region it inhabits, the greater the risk of conflict. The proposition suggests that minority groups compactly settled in the area they inhabit pose a larger risk of conflict. This implies not only that the minority is not scattered on the territory of a state, but that within the given ‘homeland’ of the minority, it constitutes a majority of the population. Practically, the difficulty is in determining the area classified as the homeland. For autonomous regions, the borders of the region are given and therefore taken as the norm. For non-autonomous region, the administrative division most commensurate with the minority’s settlement patterns is adopted. Among autonomous regions, Ossetians and Armenians form clear demographic majorities in South Ossetia and Mountainous Karabakh, respectively. Although there are no specific censuses, Ajars are accepted to form a solid majority of Ajaria’s population. These three groups hence form clear cases of ‘Yes’. Only the Abkhaz form a remarkable minority in the Abkhaz ASSR. During the 1970s, Abkhaz were outnumbered not only by Georgians, but also by Armenians in the ASSR. In the 1989 census, however, their position as second largest group was restored, but still form a clear ‘No’. Among nonautonomous groups, of course, it is harder to gauge the demographic situation; there are no clear borders within which to calculate ethnic ratios, though a raion division is used in some cases. As such, any delimitation becomes arbitrary. Armenians and Azeris in Georgia both form relatively strong majorities in the regions they inhabit, most clearly in the case of Armenians. The same can be said for Lezgins and Talysh in Azerbaijan; these are cases of ‘Yes’. Moreover, these populations are not largely spread out beyond their

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core areas. Only the Azeris in Armenia qualify as a case of ‘No’. This proposition is hence supported only by three cases. Table 5.5: Relative Demography/Compact Settlement No Yes No Conflict

AZA

Conflict

ABK

AJA TAL LEZ AZG ARG SOS NKA

5.2.6. Existence of Ethnic Kin Proposition 6: If a minority has ethnic kin in another country, the likelihood of conflict increases. Table 6 shows that most groups under study actually do have ethnic kin abroad, often in positions of titular nationality of either an independent state or an autonomous region. Armenians in Georgia and Mountainous Karabakh have Armenia; Azeris in Armenia and Georgia have Azerbaijan; South Ossetians have North Ossetia; the Abkhaz have Circassian peoples in the North Caucasus; the Lezgins have Lezgins in Dagestan; the Talysh have close ethnic kin in Iran, beyond the fact that they are related to the dominant Farsi culture of Iran. Only the Ajars have no ethnic kin. Hence, only four cases correlate positively with the proposition. However, it is significant that all three cases of conflict do correlate positively with the proposition. Hence, while ethnic kin may theoretically, judging from these results, be a necessary factor, it is obviously not a sufficient one. Table 5.6: Ethnic Kin No No Conflict

Conflict

AJA

Yes ARG AZA AZG LEZ TAL ABK NKA SOS

5.2.7. Economic Viability Proposition 7: Economic viability increases the likelihood of conflict especially where the indigenous people have not hitherto benefited from it.

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Beyond domestic natural resources, this factor is in practice very much related to geographic access to the world, outside support and ethnic kin. However, the factor is here treated in isolation, focusing on domestic economic capacity and resources, and in comparison to the neighboring regions of the respective countries. Javakheti in Georgia, Azeri areas in Armenia, and Lezgin and Talysh areas in Azerbaijan are all poor even compared to the rest of these countries, with few natural resources and basically no industry. Their potential for economic survival in isolation from Georgia or Azerbaijan is dim. They are hence cases of ‘No’. So is South Ossetia if left without economic support from the North. Ajaria, Kvemo Kartli, Abkhazia and Mountainous Karabakh are nevertheless areas that could ‘function’ on their own resources. The case of Mountainous Karabakh is blurred by the fact that it has received substantial support from the Armenian Diaspora, and is in a sense kept alive by Armenians outside Armenia as well as the Armenian state itself. It is hence difficult to determine whether Mountainous Karabakh could survive otherwise. Yet its natural resources, including agriculture, are such that it has a potential for survival on its own devices.

Table 5.7: Economic Viability Low High No Conflict

Conflict

ARG AZA LEZ TAL SOS

AJA AZG ABK NKA

5.2.8. Radical Leadership Proposition 8: the emergence of a radical leadership in either the minority population or the central state significantly increases the risk of conflict. The coding of the cases on this proposition requires elaboration. First of all, the term ‘radical’ needs to be qualified. In this study, a leadership is termed radical if it displays clear tendencies of ethnic nationalism.19 Secondly, ‘leadership’ refers to either the

This can take the shape of rhetoric promoting the ethnic group in question; or, the utilization of historical myths to mobilize population along ethnic lines; or policies of altering political status. In the latter case, ethnic nationalism in the central government could include steps to downgrading the status of autonomous minorities; among the minority group, to improve status. For a non-autonomous

19

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government of an autonomous region, the government of a state, or a radical movement claiming leadership among a non-autonomous minority. As discussed in chapter two, radical leadership in both the state and the minority is likely to have significance for the outcome. As a result, it is logical to assume that the likelihood of conflict is high if at a given point in time, either the minority group or the central government is led by a radical leadership. Naturally, the risk is highest if both ‘sides’ are led by radical forces. In fact, a radical leadership in the central government is unlikely to lead to conflict unless a challenging radical movement emerges among the minority population. Again, the cases of autonomous and non-autonomous minorities differ. A radical or anti-minority change in the leadership of the central government may, if background factors are present (if the situation is ‘ripe’, so to speak) be a spark that triggers the emergence or strengthening of national feelings among the minority. This depends to a large extent on the prior level of organization existing within the minority population. If there is a pre-existing ethnic leadership, the likelihood of increased tension is significant. In the absence of such, however, a radical change in state leadership may not lead to increased tensions. In the case of autonomous minorities, there is by default a pre-existing minority leadership. Of course, this leadership may be co-opted by the central government of otherwise subservient to it; but logically, one would assume that autonomous areas would be more likely to protest radical leadership in the center. This is only natural, given that a radical, ethnic leadership at the central level almost invariably targets devolution of power to minorities and seeks to centralize the power in its own hands; this implies that a radical leadership at the center presents a threat for elites in autonomous regions; and as such, these elites are likely to take counter-steps to safeguard their power. The analysis of the impact of radical leadership is complicated by the fact that all three states at some point in the 1990s had governments that could be described as ‘radical’. The Gamsakhurdia regime in Georgia (October 1990 to December 1991) is only the clearest example of a government coming to power on a nationalist basis, targeting especially Soviet rule but also certain minorities seen as accomplices to the latter. The Georgian experience is discussed in detail in the next chapter. The Armenian government led by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, which was in power between 1991 and 1998, emerged out of the Karabakh movement, the political movement organized for the sole purpose of securing the transfer of Mountainous Karabakh to Armenia. Hence there is no exaggeration in calling that government a nationalist one as well. Of course, the Armenian situation is relevant for this study only as regards 1988-1990: after 1990, the Azeri minority was no longer present in the country. In Azerbaijan, the Popular Front

minority, this could be either demands for autonomy or independence; for an autonomous one, demands for independence.

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government also came to power in the Spring of 1992 on a nationalist undercurrent, very much due what was publicly perceived as the previous, Communist government’s inability to handle the Mountainous Karabakh conflict.20 Moreover, some of the Front’s policies could be interpreted as hostile to minorities. The Mountainous Karabakh conflict was already in a condition of full-scale war at this point, hence the Popular Front’s advent to power cannot be identified as a cause of this conflict’s emergence. No Talysh activity has been noted at this point; the ‘Humbatov affair’ mentioned earlier occurred after the Front government fell from power, in the Fall of 1993. Temporal succession would hence not suggest any link at all in the Talysh case. Only with the case of the Lezgins can a plausible argument be made that the Popular Front’s advent to power in Azerbaijan increased radicalism in Lezgin political circles. Even here, however, Lezgin unrest had been prompted mainly by the transformation of the administrative border on the Samur river into an international border, with the independence of Azerbaijan. Determining whether or not the Popular Front’s rise to power affected the increase of Lezgin radicalism would require a closer analysis of the case. As for Georgia, the five minorities reacted very differently to the rise of the nationalist Gamsakhurdia government, as will be studied in subsequent chapters. Suffice it to note here that whereas the South Ossetian rebellion, only in terms of temporal succession, may be related to the rise of Gamsakhurdia, the Abkhaz rebellion occurred after the arrival of the arguably more moderate Shevardnadze regime. All in all, there seems at first sight to be little correlation between government radicalism and radicalization of minorities and rebellion. Another possibility is analyzing only the minority population and the emergence or not of a radical leadership, as illustrated by table eight. Two cases have clearly seen no radical leadership – in fact no organized leadership at all, during the entire period under study: the Azeris of Armenia and of Georgia. No radical political movement has existed among either these groups, let alone achieved a significant popular support. By contrast, the Talysh of Azerbaijan are coded ‘Yes’. Although the separatist movement that existed for two brief months in 1993 seems to have been totally devoid of popular support, as described in chapter five, it did nevertheless emerge and hence did provide the opportunity of an outlet for any popular feelings that may have been present. The Lezgins of Azerbaijan, as viewed above, have had a radical leadership alluded to above, Sadval. Although its popular support has been doubtful, it is clear that large tracts of the Lezgin population at times had significant sympathies for Sadval, as proven by the following of demonstrations it organized especially between 1992 and 1994.21 By the same token, the Armenians of Georgia are coded ‘Yes’ given the existence of the Javakhk political Thomas Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter’s Adventures in an Oil-Rich, War-Torn, Post-Soviet Republic, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998; Audrey Altstadt, the Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1992. 21 Clem McCarthy, The Lezgins: A Situation Assessment, International Alert Report, May 1997. Also Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, pp. 268-272. 20

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organization, which undoubtedly commands the loyalty of many Javakheti Armenians. Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Mountainous Karabakh are clearly cases of ‘Yes’ given the existence of nationalist and secessionist forces in the government of these Autonomous units, forces that presided over the war efforts to separate these regions from Georgia and Azerbaijan. The case of Ajaria is more complex. Although the Abashidze administration in Ajaria has been highly autonomist, Abashidze himself has especially in the second half of the 1990s profiled himself as a politician on the Georgian political scene, in fact heading the largest opposition bloc to the Shevardnadze regime. A presidential contender in the 2000 elections, Abashidze can hardly be defined as a radical ethnic leader of an ethnic group. Hence Ajaria is coded ‘No’.

Table 5.8: Minority Radical Leadership No Yes No Conflict Conflict

AJA AZA AZG

ARG LEZ TAL ABK NKA SOS

5.2.9. External Support Proposition 9: the emergence of a radical leadership in either the minority population or the central state significantly increases the risk of conflict. External support can take many shapes, ranging from moral and diplomatic support to military intervention. For a case to be coded high on this proposition, political and military support from another state or overt promises of such support is necessary. The Azeris in Armenia, Azeris in Georgia and Talysh of Azerbaijan are all clear cases of ‘No’, never having obtained any political or military support from any state or non-state actor, nor any promises to that effect. Rumors of Iranian or Russian involvement of the Gumbatov affair of 1993 exist, but remain unsubstantiated. Regarding the Lezgins in Azerbaijan, the Russian government has been accused by Azerbaijan to have given birth to Sadval. However, no political or military support for Sadval has been observed. It is hence coded ‘No’. The Armenians in Georgia have not received political or military support from Armenia. This is the case because Armenia, for its own strategic reasons, has exercised a calming influence on Javakheti Armenians. However, the existence of a Russian military base in Akhalkalaki and the fact that local Armenians are heavily enrolled

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there points to a degree of present and potential Russian military support for the Javakheti Armenians. In case of a conflict between the Georgian central government and the Javakheti Armenians, it is highly doubtful whether the Russian military command can abstain from involvement on the side of the insurgents. that the military base in Akhalkalaki will be a source of support for the local Armenians, who form two thirds of the soldiers and NCOs, and a third of the officers of the base. This case is a borderline case given the lack of overt political support from either Russia or Armenia. In Ajaria, the case is similar. The Russian military base is widely known to be tightly linked to the Abashidze regime; moreover, overt Russian support for Ajaria has been voiced at different occasions. For example, former Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev once flew directly to Ajaria’s capital Batumi without passing through Tbilisi or consulting Georgian authorities, in a clear breach of diplomatic code of conduct. Both cases are coded as ‘yes’, with reservations for the nuances discussed n later chapters. The clear Russian military support for the Abkhaz and South Ossetian rebellions is well-established, as seen above and discussed in detail in chapter six. The Armenian political and military support for the secession of Mountainous Karabakh is, if possible, even clearer. Table 9 shows a reasonably clear picture, with a positive correlation in seven cases. The further explanation of border cases, such as Ajaria and Javakheti, remains important. Table 5.9: External Support No Yes No Conflict

Conflict

AZA AZG LEZ TAL

AJA ARG ABK NKA SOS

5.2.10. Autonomous Status Proposition 10: The existence of territorial autonomy significantly increases the risk of conflict. Having examined nine propositions where a variance can be observed among the cases under study, this chapter has tentatively mapped the correspondence between various theoretically derived propositions and the realities on the ground in the South Caucasus. The proposition regarding autonomy is perhaps the easiest to code, given that the existence of autonomous status is easily observable and dichotomous, the answer being either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. There were four autonomous units in the South Caucasus: Ajaria,

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Abkhazia, Mountainous Karabakh, and South Ossetia. Moreover, these four autonomous areas had existed for over half a century without territorial change. The latest change of status was Abkhazia’s downgrading to an autonomous republic under Georgia in 1931. Violent conflict has taken place in three areas: Abkhazia, Mountainous Karabakh, and South Ossetia. No case of violent conflict has occurred in non-autonomous minorities. Ajaria is the only deviant case, being an autonomous region devoid of conflict. This proposition hence shows the highest correlation of all, with eight of nine cases correlating positively with the outcome. Table 5.10: Autonomous Status No Yes No Conflict

Conflict

ARG AZA AZG LEZ TAL

AJA

ABK NKA SOS

5.3. Summary of the Findings This section aims to make an initial screening of the findings of the factor-based study carried out in this chapter. It is important to note that this initial screening is based on numbers and scores of cases on various propositions. As such, it can be termed a quasiquantitative approach, discussing only the observable causal effect; it is not qualitative as it does not explain causal mechanisms, nor does it differentiate between factors or explore their interaction and relationship to one another. Moreover, it is unable to account for the varying degrees of importance the listed factors may carry. However, it does not either aspire to statistical rigor, and can certainly not provide any explanations that are statistically ‘proven’ or correct. The aim of this chapter is to better understand the results of this part of the study and identify the elements requiring further examination. Table 11 summarizes the findings of the proposition-based overview of the cases. The last row of the table shows to what degree the nine propositions are supported by empirical evidence. It should be noted that columns 1 through 7 are background factors, and columns 8 and 9 are catalyzing factors in the typology. Column 10 is autonomy. Taking this into account, the explanatory value of the six background factors are relatively straightforward to interpret. Three of them clearly fall below the arbitrary criterion of a positive correlation in two thirds of the cases. The proposition related to cultural differences is supported only by five cases; moreover, two of the cases of conflict occur in cases of less than deep cultural differences. Hence, it appears that the degree of cultural differences is a poor indicator to the level of conflict, at least as far as these cases are

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concerned. The same is true for relative demography, supported only by three cases; moreover, one case of conflict scores low on this factor. Ethnic kin is supported only by four cases, although all cases of conflict do score high on this factor. But the mere presence of ethnic kin seems to relate poorly to violent conflict. Table 11: Summary of Ten Propositions in Nine Cases 1.

2.

3.

Case

Prop.

CDIF

NATC

PCNF

7.

8.

9.

10.

ECOV

RALD

EXSP

AUTN

ABK

NS

S

S

S

NS

S

S

S

S

S

AJA

S

S

S

NS

NS

S

NS

S

NS

NS

ARG

S

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

S

NS

NS

S

AZA

NS

NS

NS

S

S

NS

S

S

S

S

AZG

NS

NS

S

S

NS

NS

NS

S

S

S

LEZ

S

S

S

NS

NS

NS

S

NS

S

S

NKA

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

S

SOS

NS

S

S

S

S

S

NS

S

S

S

TAL

S

S

S

S

NS

NS

S

NS

S

S

5/9

6/9

7/9

6/9

3/9

4/9

6/9

6/9

7/9

8/9

SUPPORT

4.

5.

6.

ROGT RDEM ETHK

The remaining background factors, (national conception, past conflict, rough terrain, and economic viability) are all supported by six cases or more. Moreover, it is interesting to note that with one exception, no conflict has erupted in cases scoring low on any these four factors. Only the case of South Ossetia, with low economic viability, experienced conflict. Out of twelve observations on these four factors and the three territories involved in conflict, only one diverges from the anticipated outcome. Both catalyzing factors seem to have a significant relationship with the outcome, although both factors undoubtedly require further analysis. Recalling the discussion in chapter three, the lack of a full correlation does not necessarily lower the explanatory value of these propositions. Catalyzing factors do not in and by themselves cause violent conflict; only in the presence of background factors are they susceptible to having an influence on the outcome. Hence any analysis of catalyzing factors needs to be carried out with reference to the scores on background factors in the various cases. To further the analysis, it is interesting to confront the actual outcome on cases to what the theoretical framework would have suggested. Aggregating all 10 propositions and the observations on each of them on each case, a ‘ranking’ can be made of the conflict potential, based on the theoretical framework, of the cases. The propositions were all formulated such that a ‘yes’ score would indicate an increase in the likelihood of conflict. Hence the simple addition of ‘Yes’ scores for a given case provides a ‘ranking’

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where the highest number of ‘Yes’ scores implies the highest conflict potential, and vice versa. Table 12: The Propensity for Conflict Case

CDIF

NATC

PCNF

ROGT RDEM ETHK ECOV

RADL

EXSP

AUTN SUM

NKA

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

10

ABK

N

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

8

SOS

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

8

ARG

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

N

7

AJA

N

N

N

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

Y

5

AZG

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Y

Y

N

N

N

5

AZA

Y

Y

Y

N

N

Y

N

N

N

N

4

LEZ

N

N

N

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

N

4

TAL

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

N

Y

N

N

3

The propensity for conflict that the table purports to indicate corresponds rather well to the degrees of actual tensions and conflict characterizing the nine cases. Mountainous Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia rank first, second and third; the Armenians in Georgia rank fourth. The three cases of conflict are also the first three according to the typology. Finding the Talysh in last place is also no surprise, given that the lowest level of ethnic mobilization among the nine cases is indeed found in that group. Only looking at the numbersthat is, being unable to differentiate between the factorsthe figures in table 12 in fact lead to a relatively straightforward division of the nine cases into two groups. The first group can be called the group of cases with high conflict potential, including Mountainous Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, as well as Javakheti. These cases all have seven indicators or more pointing to a likelihood of conflict. The remaining five cases, constituting the cases with low likelihood of conflict, have from three to five indicators pointing to a likelihood of conflict. There is hence a clearly visible gap between the two sets of cases. This circumstance directs interest to the case of Javakheti Armenians. Its conflict potential is almost as high as two cases of conflict – South Ossetia and Abkhazia – both of which took place in the same political sphere, Georgia. Moreover, a closer look at table 12 indicates that the observations in Javakheti are identical to those in South Ossetia on nine out of ten indicators. Only one factor differs: while the Ossetians had an autonomous status, Javakheti Armenians did not. Of course, this does not prove that autonomy is the ‘cause’ of the difference in outcome of the two cases However, it does imply that Javakheti is a crucial case in this study. Explaining the divergence of outcome in three cases, sharing the same tumultuous political environment of the Georgian republic as well as having a similar conflict potential, must be a priority issue in the forthcoming chapters of this study.

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5.4. Conclusions One of the primary arguments of this study, as outlined in chapter two, was that an autonomous status, by significantly affecting both the willingness and the capacity of a minority to act, constitutes a significant factor in explaining the salience of violent secessionism. This chapter has shown that the indicator of autonomy has the highest positive correlation with violent conflict of the ten indicators examined in this study of nine minorities in the South Caucasus. A whole eight out of nine cases support the relation between autonomy and conflict. The study has recorded no instance of conflict in cases where the factor of autonomy was not present. This is however not an exclusive characteristic of this indicator, as it is shared by six other factors: no conflict has taken place where there has not been an ethnic conception of the nation; significant past conflict; rough terrain; ethnic kin; radical leadership; and external support. Hence whereas the study has shown a significant relationship between autonomy and conflict as far as the South Caucasus is concerned, it has not been able to isolate autonomy as a clearly exceptional factor. In general, the empirical record of armed secessionist conflict in the South Caucasus corresponds reasonably well with the general typology of background and catalyzing factors outlined in section one. One serious challenge is nevertheless to explain which factors, if any, have been of specific importance for the emergence of armed secessionist conflict. This chapter has done limited headway in advancing the understanding of the causal effects linking the indicators advanced in chapters two and three to violent conflict in the Caucasus. Foremost among these tentative causal effects is the autonomy factor, lending a certain credence to the arguments developed in chapter two. However, it remains to be understood in what way, through which causal mechanisms, autonomy affects or influences the outcome of conflict. Needless to say, this is true not only for autonomy but also for the other indicators studied in this chapter. Equally importantly, his chapter has done nothing to advance the understanding of how different factors influence or affect each other. To explore the causal mechanisms and the linkages between various factors influencing secessionism and conflict, the study will now turn to process tracing in the individual cases before contrasting the results and experiences obtained. As was mentioned in chapter four, the number of indicators and cases is high enough to question whether a comparative study of ten indicators (and the relationship between them) in nine cases is feasible. Moreover, the tentative results of this chapter tend to indicate that a detailed study of all cases may not be fruitful. Hence, limiting the case studies to the minorities present on the territory of Georgia will provide several advantages. First of all, the number of cases is reduced to five, making cross-case comparisons more feasible than had nine cases been studies in detail. Secondly, This will also facilitate the study as the very important actor of the central government of the state will be one and the same for all five cases. Tracing the differences among various minorities in response to state behavior will be more feasible. Furthermore, the crucial cases of the study are located in

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Georgia. Georgia possesses two cases of violent conflict (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), a case of an autonomous region not involved in conflict (Ajaria), and a minority with high likelihood of conflict as predicted by the indicators of this study, but which has not seen violent conflict (Javakheti Armenians). In addition, a fifth minority, the Azeris of Georgia, are present, but have had a limited conflict potential and seen very little political activity. Before going into the cases themselves, an overview of Georgian political development in the last decade is undertaken, in order to provide the setting for the five sets of centerperiphery relations that are the actual subject of study.

6 Political Development in Georgia

This chapter aims at setting the scene for the different center-minority relations that developed since the mid-1980s. For this purpose, a brief history of the Georgian state and its relations with neighbors and non-Georgian peoples both within its historical borders and outside of them is of necessity. It should be noted that the Caucasus is a place where history carries greater depth and meaning than in many parts of the world. The importance given to national history and li terature in the Caucasus, and then especially in Georgia and Armenia, is remarkable; school curricula testify to the place history and remembrance of history holds for these nations. The undeniable antiquity of these nations and the richness of their culture have undoubtedly contributed to this situation – but equally importantly, their tumultuous histories and their denial of statehood for centuries at a time have reinforced the role of historical memory in the collective identity of these groups. This is true not least for the Soviet era and the Caucasian nations’ struggle to resist Sovietization and retain their specific national characters. It is noticeable that the Armenian and Georgian languages remained state languages of their respective republics during the Soviet era, whereas in most other areas of the Soviet Union, Russian was imposed as state language.

6.1. Georgian Identity and History To a larger extent than its two neighbors, Georgia is a multiethnic society. Around 70% of the country’s population is composed of Georgians, or ‘Kartvelians’. This figure includes peoples belonging to sub-ethnic groups speaking languages incomprehensible to Georgians from Tbilisi, such as the Mingrelians or Svans, and also encompasses one of the groups included in this study, the Ajars. Georgian, or ‘Kartvelian’ identity is primarily defined in linguistic terms, with religion occupying a secondary position. Georgian or ‘Kartuli’ is the sole literary language of the Kartvelian family of languages, which in and by itself constitutes the separate South Caucasian linguistic group. Other languages or dialects in this group include Svanuri and Zanuri – the latter itself divided into Mingrelian (Megruli) and Laz (Lazuri), spoken mainly in eastern Turkey.1 The literary Georgian language is written with its unique alphabet, created in the fifth century CE (Christian

See Revaz Gachechildze, The New Georgia: Space, Society, Politics, London: University College of London Press, 1995, p. 17.

1

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Era), although evidence of the tribes later coming to constitute the Georgian nation are traceable in the region since the second millennium BCE (Before Christian Era). What could be conceived of as proto-Georgian statehood emerged mainly in the western parts of today’s Georgia, with the kingdom of Colchis (Kolkheti) in the sixth century BCE. In the eastern parts, a Kartli kingdom was formed by the Kartuli-speaking Karti tribes in the end of the fourth century BCE, which came to exert influence on the western, predominantly Zanuri-speaking western areas.

6.1.1. Early History to the Mongol Invasions Since the conversion of the majority of Georgians to Christianity in the third and fourth decades of the 4th century CE, religion held a major role in the formation of the Georgian nation; Christianity was adopted as a state religion in the Kartli kingdom in 331 CE, and rapidly spread westward. It is interesting to note that as opposed to Monophysite (Gregorian) Armenia, Georgia adopted the Chalcedonian (Greek Orthodox) faith in the seventh century. This distinction has remained important, as Kartuli-speaking people professing Monophysite Christianity have continuously been referred to as ‘Somekhi’ – the word denoting a person of Armenian ethnicity in Georgian – literally meaning “those under us”2. As such, the importance of Orthodox Christianity in the formation of the Georgian nation is significant. Indeed, when Georgia as a national and geographic entity was conceptualized in the tenth century, it was as the area in which church service were held in the Georgian/Kartuli language.3 The Church itself had recently been unified, with the Catholicos of Mtskheta (just North of Tbilisi) gaining acceptance in western Georgia.4 Politically, Georgia has throughout its long history been characterized by difficulties in internal cohesion on the one hand, and a hostile international environment on the other; these two elements have at times interacted to complicate matters further. A divide between the western and eastern parts of Georgia has existed since time immemorial, in the past in the form of different kingdoms or principalities, while presently taking the shape of regionalism and individual identity components familiar to most European states. In the west, Colchis and its successors gave way to the Abkhazta Samepo in Georgian, or ‘Abkhazian Kingdom’ in translation, which expanded over western Georgia in the ninth century CE. Though originating in today’s Abkhazia, its language was not the Northwest Caucasian Abkhazian or ‘Apsny’, which remained unwritten until the late nineteenth century, but Kartuli. Some of its inhabitants were clearly Abkhazians, but the language of culture was Kartuli. South of it lay the Kartvelta Samepo, (literally Kartvelian Kingdom) consisting of today’s Ajaria and Samtskhe-Javakheti as well as parts of Guria, Likewise, Armenians refer to Georgia as “Vraci”, i.e. “those above us”. 3 Gachechiladze, pp. 19-20. 4 On the Georgian Church and its role in Georgian History, see Lothar Heiser, Die Georgische Orthodoxe Kirche und Ihr Glaubenszeugnis, Trier: Paulinus Verlag, 1989. 2

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Shida Kartli, Kvemo Kartli, and northeastern Turkey. To the north, the duchies of Shida Kartli retained autonomy, while in the east, the Kakheti principality and the Hereti Kingdom (on present Azerbaijan’s territory) subsisted.5 In 978, for the first time, a state roughly corresponding to today’s Georgia was created through the unification of the Abkhazian and Georgian kingdoms by dynastic succession. In 1010, Kakheti and Hereti were incorporated into the Kingdom. Significantly, the new state’s name was ‘Sakartvelo’, (‘the place of Kartvelis’) which remains the name of the Georgian state today; Georgia was briefly a major power in the region. However, in the middle of the 11th century, the confrontation between the Seljuk empire and Byzantium escalated. The major Byzantine defeat at Mantzikert in 1071, whereby the Byzantine emperor was captured by the Seljuks, left Georgia practically the only Christian kingdom in the East.6 Continued Seljuk incursions briefly incapacitated the Georgian state, and forced Giorgi II to pay an annual tribute to the Seljuk Sultan, Malik Shah. As the state weakened, Giorgi was forced to abdicate in favor of his son David in 1089. David is remembered in Georgian History as Davit Aghmashenebeli or ‘David the re-builder’. As the Seljuk empire was bogged down by a succession struggle, and European crusaders marched on the Holy Land, David reunified Georgia and established royal authority over the church. Georgia expanded southward and eastward, and defeated the Seljuks at a major battle near Didgori in 1121. Tbilisi was captured in 1122, and became Georgia’s capital. This set off a period of further expansion into present Armenia and Azerbaijan, reaching an apex during the reign of the legendary Queen Tamar (1184-1213), and in the early thirteenth century the Georgian state covered roughly the double of its present territory. This expansion was checked and the state itself wrecked by Mongol invasions from the South that begun in 1220. In 1226, the troops of the shah of Khorezm took control over eastern Georgia. The Georgian monarch recognized the overlordship of the Mongols in 1243. As Imeretia broke free from the Mongols in 1260, Georgia was again broken up into western and eastern kingdoms, the latter under Mongol tutelage; moreover, Georgia was further fragmented into various autonomous principalities. During the early fourteenth century, a weakening of the Mongol empire helped Giorgi V (Giorgi the Brilliant) to successfully free Georgia of Mongol influence by 1327. However, the Mongol influence was to return a few decades later. In 1386, Amir Timur (better known in the west as Tamerlane) sacked Tbilisi in one of eight invasions that led to ‘gutted towns, ravaged countryside, and a weakened monarchy’.7 In the early fifteenth century, yet another attempt at unifying Georgia took place under the rule of

For detailed accounts of Georgian ancient history, see David Braund, Georgian in Antiquity. A History of Colchis and Transcaucasian Iberia 550 BC - AD 562, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 6 Suny, p. 34. 7 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994 (rev. ed.), p. 45. 5

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Alexander I (1412-1442) but internal divisions again accentuated the east-west split of the Georgian state. By the end of the fifteenth century, Georgia was divided into three kingdoms (Kakheti, Kartli and Imereti) and a number of principalities. It would remain divided until the Russian annexation in 1801.

6.1.2. Georgia between Shahs, Sultans, and Czars The next centuries saw Georgia sandwiched between two powers that came to dominate its history until the nineteenth century: the increasingly powerful Ottoman and Persian empires. Here, geopolitics intersected with the internal divisions of Georgia, as its western parts came under the influence and rule of the Ottoman empire, whereas Persia extended into eastern Georgia.8 The internal divisions of Georgia meant that local princes often sided with the Turkish or Persian empires for favors; ethnicity or religion were not dominant elements in the politics of the time. In fact, numerous conversions to Islam took place at this time. Moreover, the conflict between Safavid Persia and the Ottomans during the first half of the sixteenth century to a large extent took place in Georgia. The treaty of Amasa between the two great empires in 1555 divided Georgia into two spheres of influence coinciding with the existing east-west divisions within Georgia. However, in 1578 the Ottomans attempted to conquer the entirety of the south Caucasus, and after some resistance by the prince of Kartli, succeeded in controlling the region, and had Iran recognize its suzerainty there. However, Iran’s submission did not last long. Already by 1602, the Caucasus was in flames again, as Shah Abbas I waged war on the Ottomans, and forced the Georgian kings to join the war effort. The seventeenth century was characterized by the arrival on the Georgian scene of the Russian empire. Imperial Russia briefly cultivated the Georgian princes in the hope of gaining a foothold in the Caucasus, and some Georgian kings and princes even swore allegiance to the Czar. This forced Safavid Persia to step carefully, in order to avoid direct Russian involvement. However, Russian promises of support were not kept, and the Persian empire regained its erstwhile position, restoring the border as it had been in 1555. The constant warfare had disastrous consequences for the economy and society of Georgia. Over a hundred thousand Kakhetians had been deported to Iran, slave trade and warfare had impoverished the people, major cities like the Black Sea ports and Kutaisi had populations numbering only in the few thousands. During the late eighteenth century, numerous Kakhetian and Kartlian princes served the Safavid empire, often with distinction, embracing Islam and acting as subservient vassals to their overlords. So did – in appearance – Vakhtang VI, who reluctantly converted to Islam in 1716. Six years later, Isfahan fell to the Afghan Abdali tribes at the battle of Gulnabad. In the same year, 1722, Russia under Peter the Great made its first expedition into the South Caucasus. Relying on Russian support, Vakhtang left the Persian Shah to his destiny. But the Russian forces 8

Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation.

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never reached Georgia, instead withdrawing and leaving the South Caucasus to be conquered by the Ottomans, who controlled the area from 1723 to 1735. Beginning in the seventeenth century, Abkhazian princes began converting to Islam, something that attenuated the high-culture link between the Abkhaz and the Georgians. With the rise of Nadir Shah in Iran, Georgian princes grabbed the opportunity to rid themselves of Ottoman suzerainty, and supported the Iranian reconquest of Kakheti and Kartli. Nadir’s commander of heart was a Georgian, and there was even a Georgian suburb of Isfahan. In 1747, Nadir Shah was murdered, leaving Kartli and Kakheti practically independent. Kartli and Kakheti united in 1762, and its King, Erekle II, reigned until 1798. During his reign, Georgia moved closer into the Russian orbit. Erekle was convinced of the need for a close tie with Russia to ensure Georgia’s survival, and attempted to receive Russian pledges of support in 1773. However, Catherine the Great was more interested in making peace with Turkey, leading to the treaty of KuchukKainarji in 1774 that profoundly neglected Georgia’s interests. But not a decade later, Russian interest had returned, and in 1783 the treaty of Georgievsk was signed, making the Kartli-Kakheti kingdom a Russian protectorate. This increased the fortunes of the Georgian state only in appearance, for when the next Russian-Ottoman war broke out in 1787, Russian troops were removed from Georgia. In 1795, Tbilisi was sacked and burned by the Persians, without any Russia reaction. In spite of this, Kartli-Kakheti was formally annexed to the Russian empire in 1800. Less than a year later, the kingdom itself was abolished.

6.1.3. Georgia Under Russian Rule During the centuries of turmoil that composed Georgia’s history from the twelfth until the early nineteenth centuries, most of the population, notably the ethnic Georgian population, had lived in the countryside. Wars, invasions, and taxation by various rulers had kept cities small and people poor. In this sense, Russian rule was to mean a certain stability. Moreover, Russian rule meant that the Georgian-populated regions were once again unified under a single political roof. Russia conquered Imeretia in 1810, and subsequently Samtskhe, Meskheti, and Javakheti, areas that had long been under Ottoman rule. Numerous Georgian princes accepted Russian suzerainty in exchange for self-rule, but eventually were incorporated directly under Russian rule. Guria lost its autonomy in 1828, after the entire South Caucasus had come under Russian control after the treaty of Turkmanchai with Iran the same year. Samegrelo and Svaneti kept their self-rule until 1857 and 1858, respectively, and Abkhazia until 1864. Finally, in 1878, Ajaria was ceded to Russia by the Ottomans in the treaty of Berlin.9 But these positive consequences of Russian rule were offset by the official negation of a single Georgian nation. In the 1897 census, a total of 11 sub-ethnic Kartvelian groups were listed. Having failed to russianize 9

Gachechiladze, The New Georgia, pp. 26-27.

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Georgia, the Russian rulers resorted to division to secure their rule. This included listing Svans and Mingrels as separate groups, but also fairly abstract constructions such as the ‘Samurzakanians’, denoting the Mingrelians living in contemporary Abkhazia. Abkhazia’s loss of self-rule in 1864, which happened simultaneously with the submission of the Circassian rebellion in the North Caucasus, was accompanied by a forced exile of large numbers of Abkhaz. This mass movement, the Mohajirstvo, irrevocable changed the demographic and religious situation in Abkhazia. The mainly Muslim highland Abkhaz were especially targeted and forced to leave whereas many of the Christian Abkhaz, who mainly lived in the lowlands, had better chances to stay. The number of exiles was so large that Hence the majority of the Abkhaz in Abkhazia now gradually switched from being Muslims to being Christians. More importantly, the numbers of the Abkhaz were decimated, further lowering their demographic position in their ancestral lands. Heavy-handed Russian rule led to uprisings led by elements of the Georgian nobility. In Kakheti in 1802, in Mtiuleti in 1804, again in Kakheti in 1812-13, and in Imereti in 1819, dissatisfied nobles led rebellions or uprisings against the Russian yoke. By the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, a Georgian intelligentsia had formed. In 1829, a secret society was formed with the aim of restoring the Bagratid dynasty, which had ruled Kartli and Kakheti intermittently for almost a thousand years, to power. This society planned to murder all high-ranking Russian officers in Georgia, but was betrayed by one of its members. Although the society was suppressed, the Russian rulers realized a need for concessions to the Georgian nobility to quiet dissent. A last peasant rebellion took place in Guria in 1841. Over the 1860s and 1870s, serfdom was gradually abolished in Georgia although remnants of it existed up until 1912.

6.1.4 The Emergence of a Georgian Nation The first emergence of a national intelligentsia in Georgia can be traced back to the romantic age, the poets and writers of the early nineteenth century that recorded and reassembled Georgia’s cultural heritage. The Georgian national revival was a product of the nobility, for obvious reasons. In fact, the ethnic balance in the Russian-ruled South Caucasus was such that Georgians and Azerbaijani Turks were mainly rural populations, overwhelmingly peasant, with small nobilities. In the Azerbaijani Turks’ case, the nobility was culturally Persianized, as had been the case for parts of the Georgian nobility in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But Azerbaijan was much more intimately tied to Persia than Georgia, sharing Shi’a Islamic culture and religion with the Persians. Georgia, on the other hand, was Christian, a fact that pulled it more naturally, through Russia, into the European cultural orbit, leading to the import of European ideas at a much earlier stage than Azerbaijan. But Georgians remained a mainly rural people. The cities were from an early time onward populated mainly by Armenians, to which Russians were later

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added. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, Tbilisi itself had a majority of Armenians, but all cities in Georgia had comparatively small populations altogether. There being no Georgian bourgeoisie to lead a national movement, this task was taken up by sectors of the nobility. These were led by poets such as Aleksander Chavchavadze, Nikoloz Baratashvili, and Grigol Orbeliani, who awakened the memory of the Georgian golden age of centuries ago. Meanwhile, a small circle of aristocrats began writing scholarly works on the history and geography of Georgia. Subsequently, small numbers of equally aristocratically rooted Georgians traveled to Russia for further education in the 1850s and 1860s. As their contemporary students of Russian or other nationality, they were impressed by the radical movements sweeping through Europe at the time, not least Garibaldi in Italy. At this point, a turn of attention from Russia to Europe among the emerging Georgian intelligentsia can be noted – something that did not happen in Armenia. Indeed, Georgia was since the nineteenth century consistently looking for models in the west, not the north.10 Returning to Georgia, they found increasingly few schools teaching Georgian or other local languages; Russian education was dominant. The group of former students, known as the tergdaleulni11, began publishing journals and periodicals in Georgian, but soon realized the need to effectuate a reform of the Georgian literary language, bringing the written language closer to the vernacular spoken by the people, replacing the archaic church language used hitherto. Undoubtedly, this association with the ‘peasant language’ was related to their exposure to radical, including leftist, ideas. Led by figures such as Ilia Chavchavadze, Akaki Tsereteli and Niko Nikoladze, the tergdaleulni published their own periodicals in vernacular Georgian since 1863, and spread ‘progressive’ ideas in the South Caucasus. Various movements sprang up from this time onwards, and predominantly western ideas ranging from liberalism to anarchism were introduced to the Georgian educated public. But this also gradually led to the fracturing of the Georgian intelligentsia by the mid-1870s. Three chief movements existed, the romantic nationalists, the reformist liberals, and the emerging revolutionary, later Marxist movement that was to grow in strength until the revolution.12 Georgian society differed markedly from Armenian society by its primarily rural character and the size of the nobility. Whereas over 20%of Armenians in the Caucasus were city dwellers, less than 10% of Georgians were; the nobility composed 5% of the Ghia Nodia, ‘The Conflict in Abkhazia: National Projects and Political Circumstances’, in Bruno Coppieters, ed., Georgians and Abkazians: the search for a Settlement, Brussels: Vrije Universiteit Brussels, 1998. 11 Literally, ‘those who drank from the Terek river’, which separated Georgia from Russia, in opposition to the first and older generation of writers that were called the mtkvardaleulni, or ‘those who drank from the Mtkvari (Kura) river’, that flows through Tbilisi. 12 Suny, p. 132. 10

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Georgian population, but only 1% among Armenians.13 As has been seen above, the Georgian national movement’s emergence was heavily tied to the nobility, which did not have a significant level of attachment to the people as a whole. But parallel to the national movement, socialist ideas were on the rise as in many areas of Eastern Europe at the time – in spite of the quasi-absence of a proletariat in Georgia. Whereas a proletariat was beginning to develop in the oil boom of Baku, industry was only nascent in Georgia. Interestingly, as Kazemzadeh notes, class feeling merged with national feeling in Georgia. In the Caucasus of the 19th century, ethnic Armenians heavily dominated the bourgeoisie, specifically the latter, who dominated most of Georgian cities’ commercial life, and gradually acquired land previously belonging to the Georgian nobility. Russians controlled much of the infrastructure and in a sense colonized the country. In 1828-29, numerous Armenians settled in Javakheti and in Abkhazia, while many Muslims were forced out of the western part of the Caucasus. Meanwhile, the Georgian population was chiefly divided into nobility and peasantry; there was practically no Georgian bourgeoisie, whereas the small bourgeois class was dominated by Armenians. This meant that the class lines and ethnic lines ran parallel, that Russians and Armenians came to be seen as alien exploiters earning wealth at the expense of Georgians. By the last decades of the 19th century, the socialist movement, part of the Russian Social-Democratic Worker’s Party, was increasing in strength. Its chief Georgian ideologue was Noi Jordania, who had come into contact with socialist ideas while studying in Warsaw. Jordania, as most other dominant personalities of the Georgian Socialist movement, were Mensheviks. In fact, with the one exception of the large industrial city of Baku, socialism in the entire Caucasus was dominated by the Menshevik faction. Indeed, as Kazemzadeh notes, ‘Elsewhere in Transcaucasia the Soviets found it possible to work in relative harmony with other organizations representing various social and economic classes of the population’.14 It is interesting to note that an ideologically based movement, the Mensheviks, were able to achieve primacy in the Georgian political sphere. In the case of the Azerbaijanis, a national, partly religiously based party, the Müsavat, emerged as the largest political formation. Among the Armenians, the Dashnaktsutiun, an even more strongly nationalist party achieved dominance. In the case of Georgia, nationalist movements remained on the periphery of the political spectrum.

6.2. The First World War and the Russian Revolution A body of large importance in the first-world war Caucasus was the Tiflis Soviet of Worker’s Deputies. The Tiflis Soviet was formed by the regional committee of the Russian Social Democratic worker’s Party on 18 March 1917. The Soviet assumed a 13 Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917-1921, Oxford: George Ronald, 1951, p. 5, quoting V.B. Stankevich, Sud’by Narodov Rossii, Berlin, 1921, pp. 215-216. 14 Kazemzadeh, p. 37.

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position of responsibility over state and society, in fact taking on a quasi-governmental character. The Mensheviks held the majority of the seats of the Tiflis Soviets, as well as other regional Soviets in the rest of Georgia. By contrast, the Bolsheviks were, by their own account, weak in the Caucasus, a fact which allowed the Menshevik and Bolshevik factions to cooperate for a few months during 1917 before splitting again after the Petrograd congress in April. The split was followed by increasing tension between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, and especially by a struggle for influence over the military garrison in Tiflis. The Bolsheviks, though lesser in number, were opposed to the continuation of the war effort, and as a result enjoyed the support of a significant number of the soldiers, who were overwhelmingly ethnic Russians. Yet following the Bolshevik takeover in Petrograd on 25 October, the Georgian Mensheviks disarmed the Bolshevik soldiers and gained control over Georgia and large parts of the South Caucasus. Only Baku was firmly in the hands of the Bolsheviks.15

6.2.1. Ottoman Invasions and Divisions in the Caucasus The Bolshevik takeover affected Georgia deeply, given that it dissolved the link that had existed between Tiflis and Moscow. Indeed, addressing a meeting of all revolutionary organizations a few days after the takeover, Jordania noted that ‘the connection with Russia has been broken and Transcaucasia has been left alone. We have to stand on our own feet and either help ourselves or perish through anarchy’.16 Only days later, a ‘Transcaucasian Commissariat was formed, composed of three Georgians, three Armenians, three Azerbaijanis, and two Russians. Indeed, anarchy dominated among the army, which simply refused to continue the war. Russian soldiers abandoned the Caucasian front, and early in 1918 Ottoman troops started crossing the border, met only by resistance from irregular Armenian formations.17 The Ottoman threat, moreover, divided the peoples of Transcaucasia along ethnic lines. The Georgians and especially the Armenians, generally fearful of the Muslim Turks – this being less than three years after the events of 1915, tried to resist, but the dominant Russian element of the military deserted the battlefield, simply feeling that this was not their war to fight. But the Azerbaijanis, on the other hand, had been feeling subjected to Christian Russian and Armenian domination and exploitation, and were on the whole positively inclined to the Ottoman forces. This was to accentuated following the bloody events of March-April 1918, when civil war raged in Baku, especially between the Armenian Dashnaktsutiun and the Musavat, which spread to general race riots.18 This was nothing new in the Caucasus, given that the first Armenian-Azerbaijani clashes had taken Suny, The Making of Modern Georgia, p. 188-190; Kazemzadeh, pp. 58-59. 16 Noi Jordania, Za Dva Goda, Tiflis 1919, pp. 51-52, quoted by Kazemzadeh, p. 55. 17 Suny, The Making of Modern Georgia, p. 191. 18 Kazemzadeh, p. 73, Audrey Altstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks. 15

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place in 1905-07. These clashes eventually weakened both the Dashanktsutiun and the Musavat, and left the Bolsheviks the dominant force in Baku. Given the increased tension both in the relations between peoples of the region and the external environment of the first world war, as well as the legal vacuum created by the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd and its non-recognition by the Caucasian political formations, the road toward separation from Russia was inevitable. Although Jordania and other Mensheviks, in particular, spoke of the need to stay within ‘democratic Russia’ once re-established, reality was that there was no ‘democratic Russia’ – and most immediately, the local peoples needed to create of self-defense military units. This was in practice done through the three leading political formations, the Mensheviks, Dashnaktsutiun and Musavat – and as such, took place along ethnic lines. The vacuum also led to the necessity of creating governing bodies for Transcaucasia. As a result, a Transcaucasian Commissariat exercising executive authority was created in November 1917, and a legislative body, the Seim, was created on 23 February from the electoral results of the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly that had already been undertaken before the Bolshevik takeover. The Mensheviks and the Musavat got 30 seats each, the Dashnaktsutiun 27, and 10 seats were shared among smaller parties. One of the most immediate issues before the assembly was to consider a Turkish proposal for a separate peace. Given that the Caucasian military formations were highly unqualified to withstand the Turkish army, the Seim on 1 March 1918 adopted a resolution declaring its intention to sue for peace with Turkey.19 Yet the very next day, news reached Tiflis that the Petrograd government had surrendered the Kars, Ardahan and Batumi to the Porte at the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Seim, not recognizing the Bolshevik government, did not recognize the surrender of Caucasian territories. But the confusion in the Caucasus had prevented the creation of a state. Indeed, the politicians in Transcaucasia were unsure whether they formed a part of Russia or an independent state. Transcaucasia had not declared independence, but was building governing structures that amounted to those of an independent state. As a result the legal foundation of Transcaucasia was shaky at best, something the Ottoman delegations could not but take advantage of in negotiations. Meanwhile the Ottoman forces were securing control of Ardahan and Kars, with the active assistance of local Azerbaijanis – leading to increased tension between Azerbaijanis and Armenians.

6.2.2. The Federative Government of Transcaucasia In spite of Turkish ultimatums and against the advice of its chief negotiator, Chkhenkeli, the Mensheviks, Dashnaktsutiun and the Social Revolutionaries decided to proceed with a war they knew was doomed to failure rather than surrender Batumi. By its own account, the Seim chose war over ‘a shameful peace and slavery’, and declared war on the 19

Kazemzadeh, p. 90.

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Ottomans on 14 April. Predictably, Batumi was taken within a day, and apparently, the Ajarian Muslim population of the region had been supporting the Ottoman forces. Faced with the need to adjust its limbo, the Seim after long hours of debate declared independence on 22 April, giving birth to the Independent Federative Republic of Transcaucasia. The only party that ardently supported independence was nevertheless the Musavat, whereas the other parties voting in favor of it had done so reluctantly, seeing no other way out.20 The first step the new government took was to accept the terms of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, and hence surrender the remaining area of contention, Kars. This enabled the Ottoman Empire to recognize Transcaucasia on 28 April. But given the new state’s weakness, the Porte demanded additional territories: the districts of Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki, (basically corresponding to today’s Samtskhe-Javakheti province of Georgia, an area where Meskhetian Turks cohabited with an Armenian population), large parts of the Echmiadzin region, forming the better part of today’s Armenia, and the city of Alexandropol. Again, the divisions between Azerbaijanis on the one hand and the Georgians and Armenians were amplified. The Azerbaijanis had nothing to loose from the Ottoman demands, whereas Georgia and Armenia were vehemently opposed to them. Yet neither the Armenians nor the Georgians could do anything to oppose the Ottoman advances, which occurred very practically on the ground as the Ottoman armies, supported by Azerbaijani formations, marched over present Armenia, headed for Baku.

6.3. The Rise and Fall of the First Georgian Republic At this point, the Georgian leaders seem to have realized the futility of hanging on to a Transcaucasian Federation. Given the Ottoman threat, which was clear and present to Georgia )although the Ottoman armies were mainly passing South of Georgian-inhabited areas), Georgia needed a foreign sponsor to safeguard its security. In order to appeal to a foreign state, Georgia needed to be a subject of international law. With Transcaucasian statehood thoroughly incapacitated by the disagreements among its main component nations, the Seim dissolved itself barely three months after its inception, on 26 May 1918. On the same date and in the same building, Georgia declared independence. This move was undertaken with a mixture of reluctance and enthusiasm, with the former dominating given the dire circumstances of the time. With regard to interethnic relations, it is worth noting that the authors of the declaration had considered the fact that the new state would be a multi-ethnic one: Point no. 6 stated that ‘the Georgian Democratic Republic shall give extensive freedom of development to all the peoples inhabiting her territory.’ As will be seen below, this stated intent did not prevent ethnic issues from gaining salience.

20

Kazemzadeh, pp. 105-107; Suny, p. 191.

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6.3.1. Georgia’s Quest for Recognition and Patrons Before even having proclaimed independence (in fact, probably instead giving additional impetus to the decision to do so), Georgian negotiators had begun to seek a deal with Germany for protection.21 From a Georgian perspective, this made perfect sense: the Brest-Litovsk treaty had freed German soldiers on the eastern front, Germany in the eyes of many looked like a winner in the war although it was destined to collapse only six months later, and Germany was allied to the Ottomans, giving them a certain influence over the actions of the Porte in the Caucasus. But, as Suny argues, the tilt toward Germany was not only expedient, but rooted in a perception of Germany as a center of the European culture toward which Georgia was oriented.22 Within short, German soldiers were deployed on Georgian soil, though not in great numbers, and were generally greeted with enthusiasm by the population. Their correct and disciplined conduct was noted, especially compared with the British forces that followed them. For Germany’s fortunes in the war did not allow it to continue its Caucasian adventure for long. The main document governing Georgian-German relations was signed on 27 August 1918; less than three months later, Germany and the Ottoman empire were clearly losing the war, and taking measures to remove their troops from the Caucasus. In their place, British troops landed in Baku on 17 November, and were to stay in the Caucasus until 1920. Yet British troops presence was never very large; in fact, in spite of the obvious possibility for the entente powers to acquire a foothold in the Caucasus, none of the great powers were seriously interested, neither were they ready to recognize the three Caucasian states as fullfledged members of the international community. This notwithstanding, the latter desperately sought recognition and membership in the League of Nations. Briefly, Italy showed an interest in a mandate over the region, but a change of government in Rome ended Italy’s interest.23 The entente powers eventually recognized the three republics in January 1920, but no troops would be committed to defending them against a Bolshevik invasion, which was not late in coming – Bolshevik forces took over Baku in late April of the same year, and moved westward toward Georgia. At this point, however, the recently constituted Georgian army was able to push back the Red Army, even staging a counteroffensive that temporarily halted Bolshevik designs on Georgia. In fact, Georgian resistance was instrumental in obtaining the signature a treaty on 7 May 1920 between the Georgian Menshevik government and the Russian Bolsheviks. This treaty granted Georgia recognition, and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.24 Yet it was soon clear that the Bolsheviks never intended to let Georgia remain

Kazemzadeh, p. 115, citing G.V. Khachapuridze, Bolsheviki Gruzii v boiakh za pobedu sovetskoi vlasti, Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1947. 22 Suny, p. 193. 23 Kazemzadeh, pp. 227-229. 24 Kazemzadeh, p. 296-299. 21

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independent. Pressure mounted against the Menshevik government to succumb to the Bolshevik forces in Tiflis, to follow the example of Azerbaijan and simply allow the Sovietization of Georgia without a fight. However, the Georgian government refused to give up, in fact putting up stiff resistance when the Red Army eventually attacked Georgia in early 2001. In late February, though, the Bolshevik army broke through the Georgian defenses, and the Menshevik government fled Tiflis for Batumi on 25 February 1921.

6.3.2. Inter-Ethnic Relations in Independent Georgia During its brief tenure, the Menshevik government came across significant problems with ethnic minorities. There were difficulties with regard to the Abkhaz, Ossetian, and Ajarian minorities, and a major conflict with Armenia over Armenian-inhabited territories within Georgian territory.25 Already in the Winter of 1918, an uprising took place in today’s South Ossetia. This uprising was crushed by the Menshevik government’s People’s Guard, generating resentment among Ossetians against the Tiflis government; by the same token, this also open the way for Bolshevik inroads into the Ossetian areas. Again, ideology and ethnicity became linked, Mensheviks being equated with Georgians. In 1920, a much larger Ossetian uprising took place, which was supported by the Bolshevik Regional Committee, which had gathered a military force in Vladikavkaz, today the capital of North Ossetia. As this Ossetian force moved southward, it expelled the Georgian forces and actually integrated Ossetia with Soviet Russia. In Ossetian eyes, this period is recalled as a time of Georgian oppression, and Ossetian historiography cites over 5,000 dead and many more wounded due to Georgian brutality. The Georgians, on the other hand, see the episode in the light of Russia’s first inroads into Georgia, the use of minorities within Georgia as a tool to weaken the country, which is viewed as a recurrent feature of Moscow’s policy against Georgia ever since.26 In the Spring of the same year, a peasant revolt took place in Abkhazia and Mingrelia, which was also suppressed by the People’s Guard. However, subsequent relations between the Menshevik government and Abkhazia are more complex. It should be noted at the outset that the Menshevik government, though intent on creating a unitary Georgian state, did foresee a certain level of self-rule for Abkhazia. Article 107 of the Constitution of the Georgian Republic stated that “Abkhasie (district of Soukhoum), Georgia Musulmane (district of Batum), and Zakhathala (district of Zakhathala), which are integral parts of the Georgian Republic, enjoy an autonomy in the administration of On the economic conditions in Abkhazia both before the revolution and in the early Soviet period, see A. A. Abshilava, Istorii Promyshlennosti Abkhazskoi ASSR, Sukhumi: Abkhazskii institut iazika, literatury i istorii im. D. I. Gulia, 1969. 26 For a Georgian account of the episode, see Avtandil Menteshashvili, ‘An Assessement of the 1920 Uprising in South Ossetia’, in Some National and Ethnic Problems in Georgia, Tbilisi, 1992. A larger work is the same author’s Iz Istorii Vzaimootnosheniy Gruzinskogo, Abkhazskogo i Osetinskogo Narodov (1918-1920 gg.)¸Tbilisi 1990. 25

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their affairs.”27 Whereas no mention was made of Ossetia, the two areas later enjoying the status of Autonomous Republics, Ajaria and Abkhazia, were recognized already by the Menshevik government. Archival material also shows that even as they counteracted protagonists of separatism, especially pro-Turkish landlords and pro-Soviet Bolsheviks in Abkhazia, the Menshevik government consistently viewed Abkhazia as a part of Georgia but enjoying autonomy within it, and did vest powers in Abkhaz representatives – though it picked the ones it viewed are reliable and loyal to Tbilisi.28 Zaqatala, however, became a part of Azerbaijan after the Sovietization of the Caucasus.

6.4. Soviet Georgia The collapse of the first Georgian republic and its integration into the Soviet Union led to the creation of what is usually termed the ‘Second Georgian Republic’, that is, Soviet Georgia, which came into being under tumultuous circumstances, and was central to the conflict between Lenin and Stalin, where the Georgian Stalin found himself on the side of the centralizers that Lenin accused of ‘Great Russian chauvinism’, and Lenin defended the Georgian leaders trying to safeguard Georgia’s sovereignty, who were accused of nationalism. Georgia was from the beginning, and remained, and outlier within the soviet Union. It relatively soon developed one of the highest levels of education, a very large intelligentsia, a high standard of living in the later parts of Soviet rule from widespread poverty in Western Georgia at the time of the revolution, and in many ways refused to submit itself totally to Soviet rule. Georgia was one of the few areas of the union that Moscow never really completely controlled, and was often able to get away with its dodging of Moscow’s rules. From the 1920s through the 1980s, Georgia retained a deep sense of independence from the Soviet leadership, which it was often unable to express. It was hence no coincidence that Georgia, together with the Baltic republics, was where the earliest and the strongest secessionist movements in the union emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. Sovietization, however, changed the elite relationships between the minorities and Georgia. Whereas the Abkhazian nobility had still been somewhat linked to Georgia before the revolution, the new, Communist leadership was linked to Moscow and not to Georgia. In South Ossetia, which hadn’t had any nobility of its own, the Communist elite was, just like in Abkhazia, oriented mainly toward Moscow. This was natural, given the historical link between Ossetia and Russia. Among North Caucasian peoples, the Ossetians were the only Christians, and were consistently an ally of Moscow’s during the entire 19th century. It is not coincidence that the colonization of Georgia in the early 1800s took place via the Ossetian corridor in the central Caucasus. Constantin Kandelaki, The Georgian Question before the Free World (Acts-Documents-Evidence), Paris 1953. Avtandil Menteshashvili, ‘Georgian-Abkhaz Relations in 1918-1921’, in Menteshashvili, Some National and Ethnic Problems in Georgia, Tbilisi, n.d., cites at length material containing Menshevik

27 28

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6.4.1. The Creation of the Soviet Union and the Transcaucasian Federation The integration of Georgia into the emerging Soviet Union began very quickly. A Transcaucasian Federation was imposed from Moscow, against the wishes of many communists from the region itself. In March 1922, a Federal Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of Transcaucasia was formed. As far as Georgia was concerned, three autonomous units were created on its territory. In May 1921, Abkhazia was created as a formally independent Soviet Republic in federation with Georgia, but was formally incorporated into the Georgian Republic in 1931 as an Autonomous Republic. Ajaria was formed as an Autonomous Republic in June 1921, whereas South Ossetia received a status as an Autonomous Oblast much later, in April 1922.29 In the same year, Stalin suggested that the three South Caucasian Republics be joined to the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR) as Autonomous Republics. Whereas Azerbaijani and Armenian Bolsheviks on the whole supported this idea, Georgians leaders were firmly against it. While supporting economic integration, they underlined the need of preserving Georgia’s sovereignty.30 In spite of this, Stalin’s plan would likely have been realized had it not been for the opposition by Lenin. Opposing Stalin’s plan of integrating all areas under Russia, Lenin instead proposed the formation of a union of the then six existing Soviet republics on an equal basis. Georgian leaders wanted to enter the emerging Soviet Union as a signatory in its own right, however the Central Committee in Moscow had decided that Transcaucasia would be a single constituent republic. As the rift between Lenin and Stalin grew, the latter engineered the creation of the Transcaucasian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic (ZSFSR) which joined the Soviet Union in December 1922. Lenin’s illness and Stalin’s ascent toward full power in the party, together with the sidelining of Trotsky throughout 1923, led to the marginalization of the decentralist forces within the Georgian Communist party. In particular, Stalin systematically sought to liquidate Menshevik power. As noted above, the Mensheviks had been the dominant political force in Georgia, and although its leadership was in exile, the Menshevik party still enjoyed large support in Georgia and therefore posed a threat to full Bolshevik control of the Caucasus. In his offensive against the Mensheviks and the autonomist Bolsheviks in Georgia, Stalin among other accused Georgian Communists of a chauvinistic attitude towards minorities, hence turning the argument of a Great Russian chauvinism fielded against him back to the Georgians, and claiming to represent true internationalist values. Georgian ‘moderate’ Bolsheviks like Pilipe Makharadze, on the

discourse on Abkhazia. Conclusions on the intentions and practices of the Mensheviks are those of the author. 29 See V.N. Merkviladze, Sozdanie Ukreplenie Sovetskoi Gosudarstvennosti v Gruzii 1921-1936, Tbilisi 1969. 30 Suny, p. 215.

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other hand, were aware of the widespread opposition in Georgia to the Bolsheviks, and tried to reach out a hand to Mensheviks. By mid-1923, anti-Bolshevik forces had congregated into an underground movement known as the damkom, the secret Committee for the Independence of Georgia (damoukideblobis komiteti). Supported by Jordania in exile, the damkom organized a rebellion in 1924. Although the Mensheviks knew the rebellion could not be successful without support from other Caucasian peoples, a rebellion began in western Georgia on 6 August 1924. The revolt remained localized, did not spread to the large cities, and did not attract large masses. As it collapsed, the repression was of the standard Soviet scale: Four thousand people were killed and countless other sent to labor camps in northern Russia. Soviet government certainly eliminated opposition in the most ruthless ways, but it also brought tangible dividends to Georgia, both economically and politically. As Suny has noted, economic reconstruction of Georgia proceeded relatively quickly, both in agriculture and industry. Georgia benefited from the emphasis on industrialization that the Soviet government implemented. Moreover, in the cultural field, the 1920s were the time of Korenizatsiia, which enabled many Georgians to rise in the Soviet institutions. It helped the Georgians to Georgianize Tbilisi, but also the Ossetians to ‘Ossetianize’ Tskhinvali, which had not been a primarily Ossetians settlement before. By the late 1920s, the Communist party had grown into an institution with a broad social base, extending its legitimacy in society. Georgians could now receive education in their native language to an extent much larger than in Czarist times. Publishing and schooling in Georgian were also greatly promoted, contributing to appeasing popular opposition to the Communist regime. Korenizatsiia affected minority populations as well and not only Georgians. Though Georgians came to hold most important posts in the republic, probably being overrepresented compared to the minorities, the same could be said about the holders of autonomous regions (Abkhaz, Ossetians and Ajars) in their own territories. As far as education was concerned, schools were created for Armenian, Azerbaijani, Abkhaz and Ossetian populations, and of course in Russian. Primary education was made compulsory in 1930, and through the early 1930s the near entirety of the population was made literate. 1929 nevertheless brought the velikii perelom, the height of the forced collectivization of agriculture to the Caucasus and to Georgia, where the rate of collectivization jumped from under 4 percent to over 60 percent in six months. While the adverse effects were by no means as dramatic as in Ukraine or in Kazakhstan, the consequences for peasants arbitrarily qualified as ‘kulaks’ were often severe. The local population’s feeling about collectivization is clear by any analysis of the statistics of the time. The Kakheti region, for example, had only very slowly implemented collectivization. When orders from the Georgian Central Committee criticized this, the rate of collectivization jumped from 12 to 80 percent. When, several months later, peasants were again allowed to leave the Kolkhozes, the rate plummeted instantly to 10 percent. It is important to note that efforts

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at collectivization often proceeded slowly in minority areas.31 Especially Turkic and Armenian-populated areas in the south lagged behind, whereas South Ossetia showed a relatively high level of collectivization (92%). By 1937, at the end of the second five-year plan, Georgia still lagged far behind even Armenia and Azerbaijan in collectivization. Whereas the two neighboring republics had rates of 86-88 percent, Georgia’s was under 77 percent – very much because of Beria’s more lenient treatment of Georgia.

6.4.2. Stalinism in Georgia Throughout the Soviet Union, the 1930s were marked by the bloody purges of the late 1930s. For Georgia, the decade was marked by the ascent of one politician that came to control the republic but also to help it sustain some autonomy from Moscow: Lavrentii Beria became the head of the CPG in 1931, head of the ZSFSR party committee in 1932, and was elevated to head the NKVD, the feared precursor to the KGB, in 1938. Though that meant his moving to Moscow, Beria supervised the South Caucasus even then, and was one of a small number of leading politicians at the central level (his main rivals Zhdanov and Malenkov also did) who maintained a clear territorial power base. Georgia suffered less from the onslaught on the Church, the nobility, and the collectivization, than many areas in the Soviet Union.. Beria’s steep career was made possible to a great extent by his leading role in the Stalinist personality cult. Stalin’s Georgian origins may have made the republic a logical ground for the personality cult compared with any other region of the union, but it was Beria’s well-planned policy of championing the veneration of the leader that brought the cult to new heights in Georgia.32 Coinciding with the onset of the great terror in 1936-38, the adoption of a new constitution of the USSR in 1936 led to the demise of the ZSFSR, whereby the three South Caucasian republics became individual members of the Soviet Union in their own right. This move reduced Beria’s direct control to the Georgian SSR alone, though his dominant influence in the other two republics remained. Beria initially seemed intent on limiting the extent of the great purges in the Caucasus, but his own position was endangered for a short time in 1937, though he managed to reassert his power by purging four thousand people from the party bureaucracy. The entire old Communist elite of Georgia was liquidated, and most leading figures were executed. During the second world war, Georgia suffered greatly. Georgia provided over five hundred thousand soldiers out of a population of roughly 3,5 million. In fact, its

Suny, p. 250. 32 For a further treatment of Beria’s career, see Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., ‘National Cadres as a Force in the Soviet System: The Evidence of Beria’s Career, 1949-53’, in Jeremy Azrael, ed., Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices, New York: Praeger, 1978. For an in-depth treatment, see Amy W. Knight, Beria: Stalin’s First Lieutenant, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. Also, Sergo Beria, Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, London: Duckworth, 2001. 31

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population decreased by over three hundred thousand during the war. This human disaster took over a decade to overcome, much like in other parts of the Soviet Union. However, Beria’s control over Georgia remained until he fell out of favor with Stalin in 1951. Stalin’s direct intervention in Georgian affairs then, including the appointment of a new first secretary, curtailed Beria’s powers. It also led to the demise of many of Beria’s appointees, especially fellow Mingrelians, whereas followers of the new party chief Mgeladze, who had served in Abkhazia prior to his appointment, were favored.33

6.4.3. Destalinization in Georgia Stalin’s death in 1953 led to important changes for Georgia. Khrushchev’s rise and Beria’s subsequent fall opened the way for the destalinization of the union. Whereas this may have been interpreted positively in many areas of the Soviet Union, this was not the case in Georgia. The demise of a Beria and even more so the denigration of Stalin were interpreted by the large majority of Georgians not as a step toward civility in the top hierarchy of the Soviet state, but as an attack on Georgians. Stalin’s crimes were not known to the people, who felt pride – and to a substantial extent still today feel pride – that a Georgian could rise to be the leader of the Communist world, and indeed one of the most powerful men in twentieth century history. In June 1953, Beria was arrested and executed, after which a new first secretary was put in place in the Georgian Communist Party. Vasily Mzhavanadze, a close ally of Krushchev’s, assumed the position in September. This was followed by the replacement of first secretaries in the party organizations of Abkhazia, Ajaria, and Tbilisi itself.34 Krushchev’s secret speech at the twentieth congress of the CPSU in February 1956 was in all likelihood the event that prompted the large anti-Soviet demonstrations in Tbilisi and other Georgian cities in early March 1956. These demonstrations coincided with the commemoration of the third anniversary of Stalin’s death, which the authorities, unlike the two earlier years, had not commemorated. Demonstrators demanded that Stalin be rehabilitated, and specifically asked Molotov to defend Stalin’s name. Barricades were raised, buses and cars overturned, in one of the extremely few instances of civil unrest in the USSR of this time. By March 9, the building of the Communist Party’s central committee in Tbilisi was under siege, and as demonstrators tried to enter government buildings, the army intervened brutally, leading to the killing of hundreds of people.35

Suny, p. 288. Jürgen Gerber, Georgien:: Nationale Opposition und Kommunistische Herrschaft seit 1956, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1997, p. 35; Suny, Georgian Nation, p. 301.

33 34

See Mark Kipnis, ”The Georgian National Movement: Problems and Trends”, in CrossroadsTrends and Issues in Contemporary Society, vol. 1, Autumn 1978, p. 202-203. See also eyewitness account, ‘'We shall not allow criticism of Stalin” available at http://revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv5n2/georgia.htm.

35

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The March massacre widened rifts within the Georgian Communist Party, as several high officials expressed solidarity with the people. But the events also formed evidence of Georgia’s deviance from other parts of the Soviet Union. In the Stalin era and even more so in the aftermath of the 1956 riots, Georgia retained its separate identity, steadfastly refusing at a popular level to integrate with the rest of the union. In many ways, 1956 was a turning point, after which Georgian loyalty to the Soviet Union was gravely compromised. Small nationalist organizations started emerging at that point; most later leaders, including Zviad Gamsakhurdia, were among the activists in the 1956 riots and after. Indeed, Georgia was to a larger extent than other republics, with the possible exception of the Baltics, a reluctant member of the union. And whereas most social indicators in other Soviet Republics showed of increasing integration, the opposite was true in Georgia, where the Georgian nation’s consolidation intensified. A key indicator of this was the extraordinary loyalty to the Georgian language that consecutive censuses showed. From 1956 to 1989, all censuses showed over 98% of Georgians stating Georgian as their mother tongue. By contrast, most other ethnic groups showed a decrease of the titular language and a gradual increase of Russian as mother tongue. The geographic mobility of Georgians was also very low. In 1989, over 95% of Georgians in the USSR lived in their home republic, a figure rivaled by no titular nationality of a union republic. In comparison to other ethnic groups, Georgians also intermarried less, and increasingly less. In 1969, 93,5% of Georgians were married to Georgians, whereas ten years later the figure had increased to 96,3%.36 In terms of political participation, it has often been mentioned that Georgians were over-represented in the party leadership posts, in the administration, and even down to factory and Kolkhoz directors. Whereas Georgians formed less than 70% of the population of the republic, almost 85% of Kolkhoz directors were Georgians in 1984.37 However, the case of Georgia was no exception. Even within the autonomous regions in Georgia, the dominance of the titular nationality could be observed. Hence in 1985, the breakdown of the local secretaries of the South Ossetian obkom of the Communist party showed that 80% of 1st secretaries, 60% of 2nd secretaries, and 75% of ordinary secretaries were Ossetians – although Ossetians formed no more than 65% of the population of the Autonomous region. The Abkhaz were even more over-represented in the local levels of their communist party. Although Abkhaz were no more than 17% of the population of the Abkhaz ASSR, a full 50% of the first secretaries of the local raikom divisions were ethnic Abkhaz. Hence all titular nationalities enjoyed specific privileges in terms of access to education and political office. By contrast, minorities that lacked autonomy fared worse. Armenians, for example, formed almost 10% of the population of Georgia, but only 3,6% of 36 37

Gerber, Georgien, pp. 41-42. Gerber, Georgian, p. 43.

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university students in the 1970s. This can partly be explained by the attraction of studying in Yerevan in Armenian compared to studying in Tbilisi in Georgian or Russian. Likewise the predominantly agrarian Azeri population remained outside the higher educational system and bureaucratic careers in Georgia. The trend was clear: Russians, Armenians or Azeris in Georgia, if interested in higher education and party careers, sought to pursue these aims not in Georgia but in their respective titular republics. It is difficult to determine to what degree this was conditioned by discrimination and denial of opportunities in Georgia, and to what degree it was a result of higher incentives to move to the titular republics of these minority populations. Without taking these incentive structures into account, Suny takes the stand that ‘higher education in Georgia had become the prerogative of Georgians’ and that ‘Georgian control of the local party and republican institutions … resulted … in officially sanctioned discrimination against minorities within the republic’.38 The low figures of minority enrolment in higher education (in 1979, a record 92% of university students were Georgian) should also be seen in the context of two mitigating factors: firstly, language may have played an important role. Whereas most university education took place in Georgian, command of Georgian among minority populations was extremely low. The second language minorities would learn was typically Russian, the language of inter-ethnic communication in the Soviet Union, which meant only the curriculum available in Russian would be truly accessible to the minorities. For minority populations, the first preference would logically be to study in their mother tongue; the second preference to study in Russian, and Georgian would logically be a distant third. For Azeris or Armenians, the vicinity of Baku and Yerevan meant that preferable options of higher education were present, explaining to a certain extent why the minority enrolment figures were so low. That does not prove that there was no discrimination involved, but does point out that discrimination cannot be proven through statistics only. The reforms in the immediate post-Stalin era also brought new efforts led by the center to improve minorities’ conditions. Media broadcasts and newspapers in minority languages were improved, new schools in Armenian, Abkhaz and Ossetian were opened, and a department of Abkhaz language was opened in the Sukhumi branch of the Georgian academy of sciences.39 Mzhavanadze stayed in power until 1972, eight years after Krushchev’s demise. During his 19-year tenure, like in the tenure of Beria before him and long tenures in other republics such as Aliyev’s in Azerbaijan or Rashidov’s in Uzbekistan, strong patronage networks were developed and clientelism prevailed. Officially, Georgia did poorly. Its growth rate was among the lowest in the union. However, the levels of private savings in Georgia were roughly double of the Soviet average; the rates of car and house ownership 38 39

Cf. Suny, Modern Georgia, p. 304. Suny, Modern Georgia, p. 302.

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were also the highest in the union. Effectively, this meant that Georgia was resisting incorporation into the Soviet economic system and preserved a pseudo-capitalist economy to a larger extent than any other Soviet republic.40 This situation attracted increasing attention and criticism from Russia, undermining Mzhavanadze’s power base and eventually leading to his replacement by Eduard Shevardnadze. Shevardnadze had until then been the minister of internal affairs of the Georgian republic, and came to power with a clear mandate from Moscow to fight corruption. Within days of his arrival to power, he showed that he meant business: the first victims of his anti-corruption campaign were arrested, and soon, even the second secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, Churkin, was dismissed on corruption charges. A total of 25.000 people are estimated to have been arrested by 1977. Shevardnadze managed to turn Georgia around, improving the official economic figures considerably, a success which (together with Andropov’s patronage) certainly helped his elevation to candidate membership of the Politburo in 1978, and to full membership and the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in 1985.

6.5. The Georgian National Revival Shevardnadze’s ascent to power also coincided with the formation of the first dissident organizations in Georgia. Actually, fringe nationalist organizations were formed at the time of the 1956 riots, though little is known of their activities. The most well-known is a group called the Gorgasliani, known because two of its members later gained prominence in the national movement. Named after the founder of Tbilisi, king Vakhtang Gorgosali, the Gorgasliani sought to spread accurate information regarding the annexation of 1921 and the repressions of the 1930s. The group included two young men, Merab Kostava and Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the son of Konstantin Gamsakhurdia, one of Georgia’s most renowned literary figures.41 Already in 1957, the KGB broke up the Gorgasliani, though most of them were released within several months due to their young age. It seems that the 1956 riots ended much of the rather particularistic attachment and loyalty to the Communist regime in Georgia, which had mainly been through the persons of Stalin and Beria.

6.5.1. The Emergence of Georgian Nationalist Movements Later, the national movement seems to have re-organized in the 1960s, led by an illegal group of students in the technical university of Tbilisi.42 As this group developed, Gamsakhurdia and his associates reacted to the destruction of Georgian architectural Gregory Grossman, ‘The “Second Economy” of the USSR’, Problems of Communism, vol. 26 no. 5, 1977.

40

41 42

See Gerber, Georgien, pp. 61-62. Interview with Avtandil Imnadze, Tbilisi, October 1998.

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monuments and the theft of religious treasures; the latter case evolved into a scandal which found its way up into the highest offices in Tbilisi. In 1974 Gamsakhurdia and his sympathizers formed a Human Rights protection group, which became a Helsinki Watch group after the signing of the Helsinki accords in 1975.43 Gamsakhurdia took an ‘irreconcilable’ stance, refusing to compromise on Georgia’s independence. He also argued that conflict with minorities needed to be avoided, since such conflict would obstruct the road to independence.44 The emerging Georgian nationalist intelligentsia was heavily anti-Russian, and had a relatively strong religious component. Such organized movements of dissent were rare in the Soviet Union of the time. In early 1977, KGB repression hit most Russian dissident groups and in April the suppression moved to Georgia, with the arrests of Gamsakhurdia and Kostava. Such measures did not succeed in curbing the movement. New figures emerged in support of the two jailed leaders, and several underground (Samizdat) publications were created ,among them the ‘Georgian Chronicle’. In the midst of the changes in the Soviet constitution in the late 1970s, the Georgian Soviet government made public plans to amend the Georgian constitution, in order to remove a clause which defined Georgian as the sole state language, replacing it with a clause giving equal status to Russian and other languages in the republic. This move was highly unpopular.45 In April 1978, during the discussions on reform of the constitution of the republic, an estimated five thousand people, mainly university students, took to the streets. The Shevardnadze government decided to reject any changes to the disputed clause, hence giving in to popular pressure. In Suny’s words, this was a ‘highly unusual concession to an open expression of opposition to state policy, a clear indication of the uneasiness and caution of government policy toward the new nationalism’.46 Shevardnazde managed to comply with popular opinion without being punished or reprimanded by the center, probably due to the economic success of Georgia under his rule: Shevardnadze was awarded the title of ‘hero of socialist labour’ in 1981. The increasing popular base of the student movement may have been caused by an increase in the rural youth with higher education but little connection to the Communist Party or Nomenklatura.47 As Georgia was during this period acquiring the position as the republic with the highest level of per capita higher education, the larger numbers of students formed a fertile ground for anti-Communist feelings. In April 1979, Gamsakhurdia was pardoned after having repented his views, admitting his ‘errors of judgment’ on nation-wide television. Kostava, however, refused to See discussion in Suny, Georgian Nation, p. 309. See Ghia Nodia, ”The Ethnic Policies of Zviad Gamsakhurdia”, in Bruno Coppetiers, (ed.), Contested Borders in the Caucasus, Brussels: VUBPress, 1996, p. 77. 45 On this period, see Kipnis, ‘The Georgian National Movement’, pp. 208-211. 46 Suny, Georgian Nation, pp. 309. 47 I am grateful to Prof. Charles H. Fairbanks for pointing this out to me. 43 44

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surrender, and therefore remained the untarnished leader of Georgian dissidents until his release in 1987 and his death under mysterious circumstances in a car crash in 1989. Gamsakhurdia, on the other hand, had to face an uphill battle to restore his credibility. The national movement nevertheless progressed in spite of all obstacles, and seemed to gather strength every time one of its leaders was arrested. Though the government was paying increasing attention to nationalism among the student population, large anti-Soviet demonstrations took place in 1983 to commemorate the bicentennial of the treaty of Giorgievsk that had formed the first step of Georgia’s annexation to the Russian empire. A number of leaders of the national movement were arrested at this point, including Tamar Chkheidze, Irakli Tsereteli, and Gia Chanturia.48

6.5.2. Minority Issues in the 1970s and 1980s Up to this point, inter-ethnic issues had decidedly remained in the background, and not formed a major contentious issue in Georgian politics or in the rhetoric of the national movement. The soviet leadership had been opposed to all forms of nationalism. At the Union level, this meant opposition both to “Great Russian chauvinism” and minority nationalism; likewise, in Georgia, both Georgian and minority nationalism were attacked by the Communist leadership. In 1977, Shevardnadze stated that ‘The history of our party knows no “good” nationalists. These do not exist by nature. All of them, Georgian as well as Abkhaz, Ossetian, Armenian, and other nationalists are cut from the same wood…’49 Yet at the popular level, tensions existed, and Abkhazia was the main area of contention. Already in 1957, Abkhaz officials made a request for Abkhazia to be transferred to the RSFSR’s control, a demand that was refused by the center. Ten years later, the tensions flared up again, after a Georgian author had resuscitated historiography that argued the Abkhaz were not indigenous to Abkhazia, and the Georgian Communist Party had refused to distance itself from these arguments, which dated back to the Beria years in the 1930s. The 1978 constitutional amendments presented an opportunity for the Abkhaz elite to try to rectify what they saw as a historical injustice committed against them in 1931, when Abkhazia was reduced to the status of an Autonomous Republic within Georgia. The Abkhaz felt their status as a full union republic had been unjustly removed by Stalin, and tended to accuse Stalin of favoring his Georgian co-ethnics in this matter. Furthermore, the Abkhaz complained of ethnic Georgians migrating to Abkhazia, corresponding, in their view, to an artificial alteration of the demographic structure of Abkhazia. In 1886, 42% of the population of Abkhazia (then called the Sukhumi region) was Abkhaz. Still in 1926, Abkhaz were 27%, with almost 56,000 people; Georgians formed 33% with 67,000. Gerber, Georgien, p. 71. Shevardnadze, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party, September 1977. Quoted in Gerber, Georgien, p. 68. 48 49

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The dramatic changes occurred between 1926 and the 1959 census, when the Abkhaz only formed 15% of the population with 62,000 people, whereas Georgians had increased from 67,000 to over 158,000. The influx of other ethnic groups, especially Armenians, also had a strong impact; in 1959, there were more Armenians (64,000) than Abkhaz in Abkhazia, though their number grew at a slower rate in subsequent decades, restoring the Abkhaz to a second place in their own republic. It is interesting to note that the Abkhaz population increased only by 10% in the 33 years between 1926 and 1959, a rate much slower than in the 1959-89 period, when it increased by 52%. These figures are not totally reliable since all over the Soviet Union, censuses were not always carried out in a neutral manner, incorporating political elements in the determination of national belonging and other census questions. However, the data does permit the tentative conclusion that Abkhazia suffered greatly from the times of purges, terror and war that characterized the period between the census of 1926 and that of 1959. According to Abkhaz historywriting, Beria started an anti-Abkhaz drive in 1937, which included the forcible migration of thousands of Mingrelians into Abkhazia’s Gali region;50 the imposition of a Georgianbased alphabet for the Abkhaz language; the closure of Abkhaz-language schools and the opening of numerous Georgian schools; and ethnic Georgians taking over the administration. They further argue that only with the death of Stalin and the fall of Beria was this campaign reversed, a Cyrillic alphabet introduced for the Abkhaz language, power returned to ethnic Abkhaz, and Abkhaz-language schools re-opened. There are no reasons to doubt that these claims have a certain validity. The Stalin era, during which Beria was mostly in full control of the South Caucasus, was a time of brutal and repressive rule by a few individuals that wreaked havoc over the entire Caucasus. The alphabet changes and the transfers of authority are facts that give credence to a certain anti-Abkhaz policy during the Stalin era. However, if an evaluation of the development in Abkhazia alone gives credence to some of the claims voiced by Abkhaz nationalists, a comparison with the ethnic kin of the Abkhaz in the Russian North Caucasus would seem to lend a certain credence to the Georgian claims that Abkhazia suffered less than did North Caucasian minorities under Russian rule. The Georgian claim that Georgia protected the Abkhaz from the excesses of the Soviet government may be somewhat exaggerated, but it is a fact that the Abkhaz were spared from the wholesale deportation of North Caucasian minorities during the second world war. As Gerber notes, compared to the nations of the North Caucasus, whose autonomous status within the RSFSR were of a purely formal nature, the Abkhaz had incomparably larger opportunities to keep their language and culture. The Abkhaz, like the Ossetians, could doubtlessly profit from the well-built educational institutions in Georgia.51

See Darrell Slider, “Crisis and Response in Soviet Nationality Policy: The Case of Abkhazia”, in Central Asian Survey, vol. 4 no. 4, 1985, pp. 51-68, here at p. 52. 50

51

See Gerber, Georgien, p. 128.

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The numbers show that Abkhazia was always multi-ethnic. In fact, only the regions in the north of Abkhazia were homogeneously Abkhaz, whereas the southern Gali region on the border with Georgia proper was heavily Georgian-dominated. It should also be noted that the overwhelming majority of the people listed as Georgians living in Abkhazia were Mingrelians, just like in the neighboring province of Samegrelo. Abortive unrest had emerged in 1957 and 1967, but the constitutional amendments of 1977 led 130 Abkhaz intellectuals to draft a letter to the central authorities that iterated Abkhaz grievances and, among other, asked for Abkhazia to be restored to the status of union republic, and barring that, to be transferred to Russia in the same way that Crimea had been transferred to Ukraine in 1954.52 A commission from Moscow arrived to assess the situation in Abkhazia, and endorsed several of the claims made in the ‘Abkhazian letter’. A university was opened in Sukhumi, and other concessions were made. The Abkhaz still had difficulties competing for academic positions, given the mainly peasant base of Abkhaz society, compared to the somewhat more urban and generally more highly educated Georgians. The ethnic Abkhaz control over the authorities of the Autonomous Republic was strengthened, leading to tensions with the Georgian plurality population, which felt that excessive privileges were being given to the Abkhaz. From this time onward, the Abkhaz established a strong control over the republican administration, controlling over two thirds of government posts and obkom department heads. Hard-line Abkhaz nationalists thought Abkhazia’s autonomy was still largely fictitious, and unrest erupted in Sukhumi in October 1978, that led to martial law and the imposition of troops.53 Nationalist demonstrations in Tbilisi in 1981 among other raised the issue of the rights of Georgians in Abkhazia.54 It is hence clear that tensions between Georgians and Abkhaz had existed in the entire post-Stalin era. With regard to other minorities, however, very little political action was observed. This was true also for South Ossetia, where the first armed conflict would emerge in 1989.

6.5.3. Perestroika and the Growth of Nationalism The succession of Gorbachev to the ailing Andropov and Chernenko, and Shevardnadze’s appointment as foreign minister in Moscow, change the setting in Georgia somewhat. He was succeeded by Jambar Patiashvili, a less than charismatic and relatively insecure leader who failed to follow the reform wind that started blowing in Moscow. As two observers note,

See Stephen Jones, ”Border Disputes and Disputed Borders in the Soviet Federal System”, in Nationalities Papers, vol. 15 no. 1, Spring 1987, p. 56. 53 Ibid, pp. 56-57 54 Gerber, Georgien, pp. 70-71. 52

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Faced with a mushrooming national movement, Patiashvili’s instinctive reaction was to resist its demands as long as he could. But the opening of the political climate at the center could not fail to affect Georgia, and the increasing opportunities to create popular associations that emerged by 1987 were quickly capitalized on by Georgia’s existing political activists. Though many organizations that were formed had an environmental or cultural cover, a great number were clearly nationalist in nature and worked on promoting Georgia’s self-determination and against its links with Moscow. A number of dissident leaders were released from prison in 1987, adding impetus and leadership to the nationalist movement. The popular movement nevertheless grew in strength, and adopted a strongly nationalist character. A startling example occurred when Shevardnadze, still Soviet foreign minister, invited U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to his apartment in Moscow in May 1989. Baker was reportedly astonished to find Shevardnadze’s wife to be a fervent Georgian nationalist, who declared that ‘Georgia must be free’. Admittedly, this took place just after the April 1989 army crackdown in Tbilisi when emotions were running high, but still testifies to the widespread character of the nationalist feeling.56 An initial focus of attention of the emerging national movement was a ‘Caucasian Railway’ project, which attracted heavy opposition because of its environmental consequences as well as the planned destruction of historical monuments on its path. To the demonstrators, the railway also posed a danger of a national character, because it would create a direct rail link to Russia, tying Georgia even further to Russia and possibly leading to immigration of non-Georgians to the republic.57 This project actually resulted in the first media debate in a true sense in Georgia, and hence the first expression of Glasnost.58 As Zurab Zhvania, later the speaker of the Georgian parliament remarked, it was ‘the question which connected the already ripened desire for broad changes.’59 The internal bickering among the nationalists was a major characteristic of the Georgian political sphere and has remained so. Undoubtedly, this has been related to what

Stephen Jones and Robert Parsons, ”Georgia and the Georgians”, in Graham Smith (ed.) The Nationalities Question in the Post-Soviet States, New York: Longman, 1996. 56 See Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the Cold War, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1993, p. 62. 57 See Jonathan Aves, Paths to National Independence in Georgia, 1987-1990, London: School of Slavonic and east European Studies, University of London, 1991, p. 10. 58 See Stephen Jones, ”The Caucasian Mountain Railway Project: A Victory for Glasnost”, Central Asian Survey, vol. 8 no. 2, 1989, pp. 47-59. 59 Jones, ‘The Caucasian Mountain Railway Project…’ quoting Akhalgazrda Iverieli, 26 June 1991. 55

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Ghia Nodia terms ‘the triumph of the radical ethos’ in Georgian politics.60 As Nodia notes, the weakness of moderate groups left the field open to radicals whose main concern was an anti-Soviet feeling that was closely related, in most cases, with an identification of Soviet rule with Russian domination. As time passed, tension in the atmosphere intensified, as two radical groupings diverted from the firs organization formed, the Ilia Chavchavadze Society. One was the National Democratic Party (NDP) led by Gia Chanturia, which had been in clandestine existence since Chanturia’s time in prison in the early 1980s, and connected to the party with the same name that existed during the 1918-21 interlude; and the Society of St. Ilia the Righteous, led by Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Irakli Tsereteli.61 These two movements led the way by their overt commitment to an independent Georgia. The increased popularity of the radical movements became obvious as over 200,000 people demonstrated in Tbilisi in November 1988 against amendments to the USSR’s constitution which would have curtailed Georgia’s internal sovereignty.62 In this time, the Georgian communist party successively lost its legitimacy and authority in Georgian society. Meanwhile, intellectuals were beginning to reassess the ‘official’ history of Georgia and were increasingly critical towards it, publishing articles criticizing and revising the official standpoint. In particular, the issue of the independent Georgian republic of 1918-21 began to be debated. The Communist party tried to counter the radicals by setting up a semi-official movement, the Rustaveli society, which was moderately nationalist and supportive of the reformist policies that the Georgian government was implementing. Yet the government was still keeping its monopoly over politics. At the elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies held in March 1989, a higher proportion of seats compared to other republics were contested by a sole candidate and the voter turnout was publicized at an unlikely but very Soviet.63 This body hence lacked legitimacy. Yet there was still no alternative, the nationalist groups were to internally divided personally and ideologically to form a cohesive movement, and though the Communist government had cause to worry, its power was still relatively intact. Yet the government had by now understood that it needed to move to assuage some of the demands of the nationalists. In November 1988, a law was passed that strengthened the position of the Georgian language in the republic, including in minority areas, at the expense of both minority languages and Russian.64

60

Ghia Nodia, ‘Georgia’s Identity Crisis’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 6 no. 1, 1995, p. 108.

See Suzanne Goldenberg, Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder, London: Zed, 1994, p. 95; Aves, Paths to National Independence in Georgia, p. 12. 62 Aves, Paths to National Independence in Georgia, p. 14. 63 Jones and Parsons, ”Georgia and the Georgians”, p. 300. 64 Elizabeth Fuller, “Draft ‘State Program’ on Georgian Language Published”, Radio Liberty Research Report, 559/88, 12 December 1988. 61

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As the Georgian nationalist movement gathered speed through 1989, the minorities in the republic started to react. In part, they were affected, to various degrees, by the general wind of political freedom and nationalist agitation that swept through the Soviet Union. But some of this reaction was also based on a genuine fear of what the success of Georgian nationalism would mean to the minorities, who were directly threatened by some of the more extreme Georgian nationalist movements. At this time, Georgia’s independence very much seemed utopian, and the collapse of the Soviet Union was foreseen by close to no one. Yet in a process that has been called Matrioshka nationalism, the center-periphery relations at the union level, in this case between Moscow and Tbilisi, were mirrored by new developments between the regional centers and the ethnic minorities in the republics. The Georgian nationalist movement’s ascent to power in Georgia was received with unease by all minorities in the republic, and eventually affected Tbilisi’s relationship with its Abkhaz, Ossetian, Armenian, Azeri, Russian, and even Ajarian minority groups in ways that ranged from quiet discontent to full-scale war and eventually the truncation of Georgian territory. Abkhazia, once again, was the issue that would trigger the beginning of the chaotic developments that led to the independence of Georgia, but also to chaos, defeat, and the dismemberment of the country.

6.5.4. The Trauma of April 9 and the Radicalization of the Population As described in detail in chapter seven, a leading group of Abkhaz intellectuals sent a petition to Moscow that demanded Abkhazia be raised to the status of a Union Republic. As a first overt sign of separatism, the Ossetian national front Ademon Nykhas officially supported Abkhazia’s claim, undoubtedly to be able to follow suit.65 In protest, Georgian radical groups organized demonstrations in Tbilisi that may have been prompted by events in Abkhazia, but soon developed into massive anti-Soviet marches for Georgia’s independence.66 Factories went on strike, and people from all over Georgia poured into the capital. With Shevardnadze and Gorbachev in Great Britain, the Georgian Communist leadership demanded permission from Moscow to use special forces to dissolve the demonstrations.67 On 9 April, airborne and interior troops dissolved the demonstrations, using shovels instead of gunfire in an ultimately futile effort to conceal their carnage. The bloody intervention left 19 dead, 16 of which were women, and dozens more severely wounded. Important nationalist leaders like Chanturia and Gamsakhurdia were arrested. If the intention of the crackdown was to stymie the strengthening nationalist movement, the results were highly counter-productive. The little legitimacy the

Elizabeth Fuller, ‘The South Ossetian Campaign for Unification’, Report on the USSR, 8 December 1989. 66 Vivid accounts of the April 9 events are found in Peter Nasmyth, Georgia: Mountains of Poetry, Richmond: Curzon Press, 1998. 67 Jones and Parsons, ‘Georgia and the Georgians’, p. 300-301. 65

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communist party had left in Georgia suddenly disappeared, and Party head Patiashvili was removed shortly after the events. His successor, Givi Gumbaridze, tried to adapt to the reigning political atmosphere by adopting some of the nationalist rhetoric and moving closer to the position of the oppositional forces. Within a few months, the communist party itself called for national sovereignty, Georgian citizenship, supremacy of Georgian law over union law, and worked for the settlement of Georgians in minority areas as well as the changes of non-Georgian place names into Georgian.68 By early 1990, the Georgian opposition was divided, and some groups participating in the official political sphere after the Party line had moved closer to their demands, showing that the current power-holders could be influenced. However, other, more radical groups refused to do so. Several radical nationalist groups tried to alter the situation by unilaterally holding elections to a ‘National Congress’ that was supposed to lead the country to independence. Yet this body had no legal status, and others, including Gamsakhurdia, instead focused on forcing early elections to the constitutional organ, the republican Supreme Soviet. Well aware that April 9 had ruined the standing of the Party in Georgian society, Party leader Gumbaridze tried to stall by postponing the enacting of a new legal basis for multi-party elections. Yet massive political pressure from the opposition, hunger strikes, and a nation-wide railroad strike forced through an election code that also fulfilled Gamsakhurdia’s aims of prohibiting the participation of regional parties. The elections were held as planned on October 28, in a tense nationalist environment with the most prominent figure, Gamsakhurdia, campaigning with a heavy focus on the defense of Georgians in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Gamsakhurdia’s alliance, the Round Table of National Liberation (Erovnul-Ganmatavisuplebeli Modzraobis Mrgvali Magida) won a landslide election, capturing over 53% of votes and 155 of 250 seats in the parliament, over double that of the Communists’ 61.69 With the exception of the Communist party, all parties now represented in the parliament shared their commitment to market economy, democracy, and rule of law; but also an equally universal commitment to Georgian state independence, strengthening of the Georgian language, and bans on immigration to Georgia. Even the Communist party, remarkably, now adhered to the concept of Georgian independence. Gamsakhurdia was elected Speaker of the Parliament, and the parliament began working on dismantling the Soviet structure of Georgia and carrying it towards independence. The republic was now simply the ‘Republic of Georgia’, omitting all references to ‘socialism’ or ‘Soviet’. The heads of the Republican KGB were fired, and while not immediately antagonizing Moscow by proclaiming independence, Georgia moved rapidly away from Moscow’s orbit. The Soviet military forces in Georgia were

68 69

Jones and Parsons, ”Georgia and the Georgians”, p. 301. Gerber, Georgien, p. 210-211.

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declared to be ‘occupying forces’, and Georgia prohibited its citizens from participating in the March 1991 All-Union referendum on a new Union Treaty proposed by Gorbachev.

6.5.5. ‘Georgia for Georgians’: The Question of Minorities Figures on the ethnic break-up of Georgia are mainly derived from the last Soviet census, which was undertaken in 1989. Since then, however, migration flows and differing growth rates may have altered the demographic reality somewhat. Accordingly, the number of ethnic Russians in Georgia has reduced sharply ever since the anti-Soviet nationalist movement of the late 1980s. Moreover, substantial numbers of Greeks have migrated to Greece. In general, the whole South Caucasus has seen a drastic outflow of residents in the 1990s, given the economic hardships and political conflict of the region. As concerns natural growth rates, only the Azeri population is likely to have grown more rapidly than other groups: Gachechiladze notes that the average household size for ethnic Azeris is 4.9 people, whereas it is 4.1 for Georgians and 3.0 for Slavic households.70 The number of Azeris in Georgia quadrupled between 1926 and 1989, whereas the population of Georgia only doubled. The growth rate of the Azeris is at present three times larger than that of the ethnic Georgians. In parallel to their increase in absolute numbers, the share of Azeri population in the region of Georgia they live in, Kvemo Kartli, is growing rapidly.71

Table 6.1: The Demography of Georgia, 1989 (According to 1989 Census of the USSR)

Ethnic Group Georgians (Kartvelians) Armenians Russians Azeris Ossetians Greeks Abkhaz Ukrainians Others

Percentage of Total Population 70.1 8.1 6.3 5.7 3.0 1.9 1.8 0.9 2.2

As the Gamsakhurdia government came to power, the switch in official nationality policy affected center-periphery relations directly. Resentment grew among Ajars, Armenians, Azeris, and especially Ossetians in South Ossetia, where isolated instances of

70 71

Gachechiladze, The New Georgia, p. 53. Gachechiladze, The New Georgia, p. 92.

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violence had begun to emerge in the spring and Summer of 1989. Language laws instituted by Tbilisi in the Fall of 1989 would make Georgian the sole state language in the republic; the South Ossetian parliament began to vigorously oppose this law. When it failed to achieve a compromise with Tbilisi, the South Ossetian Oblast Soviet adopted a resolution in the end of September 1989 that adopted Ossetian as the state language of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast.72 Inter-ethnic clashes spread in and around South Ossetia that left several dead. To defend the Georgian population there, Gamsakhurdia and his followers, supported by Communist party head Gumbaridze, organized a march on Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, that was joined by over ten thousand people but stopped by Soviet Interior Ministry Forces before it reached the border. Ademon Nykhas then petitioned to Moscow to be joined with North Ossetia. It stated that: It seems to us politically and economically absurd that within the framework of a democratic state the small Ossetian people should be divided into two administrative units; and we demand that the question of the unification of North and South Ossetia be examined at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on nationality questions.73

Low-intensity clashes went on until January 1990, when order was restored, and focus among Georgian nationalists returned to the issue of control over Tbilisi and the Georgian republican institutions. Georgian nationalists also voiced concern of the rapidly increasing numbers of the Muslim population, especially the Azeris. The censuses of 1979 and 1989 showed a rapid increase in the Azeri population of Georgia, and an increasing domination of the Kvemo Kartli district that was by the 1980s becoming solidly Azeri. Some Georgian nationalists voiced fears of the ‘Islamization’ or ‘Tatarization’ of Georgia – using the outdated term ‘Tatar’ for all Muslims of the Caucasus that is seen as derogatory by Azeris – and one intellectual even claimed that by 2050, if current trends continued, Muslims would form half of Georgia’s population.74 Some of the most radical Georgian nationalists in 1989 took action against the Azeri ‘threat’, aiming to force Azeris to leave and return to their ‘homeland’, nearby Azerbaijan. In Bolnisi, some groups tried to prevent the sale of bread to Azeris, whereas Azeri doctors in hospitals in some areas of Marneuli and Bolnisi were sacked from their posts. According to Azeri sources, Georgian nationalists also started detonating small explosions in Azeri settlements to induce fear, again in Bolnisi town. As an answer to these pressures, spontaneously emerged groups coalesced and demanded autonomy in order to protect their rights. In some villages, Azeris created self-defense

72 Elizabeth Fuller, “The South Ossetian Campaign for Unification”, in Report on the USSR, no. 49, 1989, pp. 17-20. 73 Literaturuli Sakartvelo, 20 October 1989; Fuller, “The South Ossetian Campaign for Unification”p. 19. 74 Interview with Süleyman Süleymanov, editor-in-chief of the Gürcüstan newspaper, (published in Azeri language in Tbilisi), February 2002.

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units, basically armed only with hunting rifles. No reaction came from Georgian authorities, and in September and October the largest outflow of Azeris took place, when an estimated 800 families left Bolnisi for Azerbaijan. Azeri sources estimate that a total of two thousand families left Georgia for Azerbaijan in 1989-91. Yet unlike in South Ossetia, the tensions never escalated to armed clashes.75 Even before the election that brought Gamsakhurdia to power, the question of Ajaria’s autonomy had been raised. Gamsakhurdia and his associates suggested that Ajars, being Georgians, had no reason nor a desire for autonomy from Tbilisi and that a referendum on the abolition of Ajaria’s autonomy would be undertaken. In fact, while publicly vowing to respect the autonomy of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Gamsakhurdia advocated the lifting of Ajaria’s autonomy.76 Gamsakhurdia later distanced himself from his earlier position, arguing that the local population’s wishes should determine the region’s status. The electoral results in Ajaria in October 1990, where the Communist party won over 65% of the vote in stark contrast to the rest of Georgia where Gamsakhurdia’s Round Table Alliance was victorious, likely influenced Gamsakhurdia, who never acted on his earlier stated intention of conducting a referendum. Whereas Ajaria has been spared unrest ever since, demonstrations took place in Batumi in April 1991 for the preservation of Ajar autonomy and against the past anti-Islamic practices imposed in the region. Incorrect rumors that Ajaria’s autonomy had been or was being abolished as Georgia declared its independence may have contributed to this.77 The tumultuous developments in Tbilisi that brought Gamsakhurdia to power were arguably indirectly triggered by events in Abkhazia. In fact, the March 1989 demonstrations in Tbilisi that led to the April 9 massacre had begun as an answer to an Abkhaz petition filed to the Soviet leadership in March. And in the aftermath of April 9, the situation in Abkhazia indeed worsened. In June, arguing that the Georgian communist party had distanced itself from Leninist principles and that Menshevik ideology had returned, the Abkhaz Communist Party obkom petitioned to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR to be removed from the ranks of the Georgian Communist Party and become directly submitted to Moscow. For all practical purposes, the Communist party in Abkhazia ceased to function as a division along ethnic lines took place, and the party was incapable of handling any concrete issues.78 Ethnic tensions had spread to the University in Sukhumi (created in 1979), and the leadership in Tbilisi decided to split the university along ethnic lines, by opening a branch of the Tbilisi State

Interview with Süleymanov. Elizabeth Fuller, ”Zviad Gamsakhurdia Proposes Abolition of Adzhar Autonomy”, in Report on the USSR, 30 November 1990. 77 Elizabeth Fuller, ”Georgia’s Adzhar Crisis”, in Report on the USSR, 9 August 1991. 78 See Gerber, Georgien, p. 141, quoting a report by the secretary of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party, Chkheidze, July 1989. 75 76

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University in Sukhumi for the ethnic Georgian students. In spite of loud Abkhaz protests of the illegality of the decision, and objections emanating from as high as the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the opening of the branch was foreseen; this led to riots in Sukhumi that led to the death of 18 people and several hundred wounded, riots that were only suppressed through the imposition of troops.79 Abkhazia was also the seat in August 1989 for the founding conference of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, which would play a crucial role in the 1992-93 war in Abkhazia. This illustrates how Abkhazia played an independent role from Tbilisi already in this period. However, in spite of the bloodshed, the situation calmed down by late 1989, perhaps because the South Ossetian situation was heating up. Other areas were also restive: clashes or unrest with ethnic undertones were reported in Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe among Armenians; and in Marneuli among Azeris during the Summer of 1989.80 When the elections to the Georgian Supreme Soviet were being planned, the inclusion of the provision prohibiting regional parties from participating was heavily criticized.81 Minority groups saw it as a disenfranchisement of their rights, since the major political forces at the center were Georgian nationalists, and even the Communist party was moving closer to the nationalists. In this atmosphere, the Supreme Soviet of the Abkhaz ASSR adopted a resolution unilaterally raising the status of Abkhazia to that of a Union Republic. This resolution, in practice implying secession from Georgia, had a doubtful legality, given that it was unable to muster a quorum in the Soviet. Given that the ethnic Georgian representatives boycotted the session, the resolution failed to gain the support of two thirds of the legislature that were required. Needless to say, the Georgian Supreme Soviet immediately declared the resolution null and void. According to article 78 of the Soviet constitution, the territory and borders of a Union Republic could not be changed without the consent of that Republic’s authorities. Yet forces in Georgia remained preoccupied with the power struggle in Tbilisi, and the de iure secession of Abkhazia did not lead to a Georgian reaction similar to the March on Tskhinvali some months earlier. Instead, focus remained on South Ossetia. Shortly before the October 1990 elections to the Georgian Supreme Soviet, the South Ossetian Oblast Soviet unilaterally upgraded its status to that of an ‘Independent Soviet Democratic Republic’. This decision was heavily influenced by Ademon Nykhas, which had explicitly been prohibited from running in the elections to the Georgian Supreme Soviet. This naturally accentuated the sense of disenfranchisement felt by Ossetians with regard to the recently promulgated Georgian electoral law. As the case had been with Abkhazia a month earlier, the Georgian Supreme Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. 41 no. 29, 1989, pp. 14-16. Gerber, Georgien, p. 142. 81 The law stated that only parties and alliances whose activities extended on the entire territory of the republic of Georgia were allowed to participate in the elections. See Zakon Gruzinskoi Sovetskiy Sotsilisticheskoi Respubliki o Vyborakh Verchovnogo Sovieta Gruzii (Law of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic on Elections to the Supreme Soviet of Georgia), Tbilisi, 1990. 79 80

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Soviet declared the decision null and void, but its preoccupation with the upcoming election distracted Tbilisi from the South Ossetian question. Both South Ossetia and Abkhazia boycotted the elections to the Georgian Supreme Soviet, thereby aggravating the Georgian feeling that the minority populations were in Moscow’s service, trying to undermine Georgia’s sovereignty in every way. The prohibition on Ossetian and Abkhaz political formations from participating in the election may have been a factor in the decision to boycott; however, Aves claims the intention of Ademon Nykhas and Aidgylara had been to boycott from the beginning, in order to stress their distancing from the Georgian political sphere.82 In fact, Gerber notes that the interests of the Abkhaz (and, by the same token, South Ossetian) elite and the Soviet leadership coincided: both saw the independence of Georgia as a direct existential threat to their interests. Moscow saw the independence of any of its component republics as a threat to the Union’s survival; likewise, the Abkhaz and South Ossetians saw the prospect of remaining within an independent, nationalist Georgia as a direct threat to their national rights, both political and cultural. The South Ossetian question grew worse as elections were held on December 9 to the Supreme Soviet of what was now the ‘Independent Soviet Socialist Republic’ of South Ossetia. On December 11, 1990, the newly elected Soviet voted to subordinate itself not to Tbilisi but to Moscow. The same day, the Georgian Parliament abolished the autonomy of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast.83 Gamsakhurdia’s rhetoric now increased, calling Ossetians newcomers to Georgia from their homeland in North Ossetia, and therefore having no right to autonomy in Georgia. He occasionally even talked about the wholesale expulsion of Ossetians from Georgia. A blockade of Tskhinvali was completed by Georgian paramilitary forces, which would last throughout winter. The road connecting South Ossetia to North Ossetia and the rest of Russia was blown up, and electricity and gas supplies were cut. Georgian paramilitary forces were recruited mainly among ethnic Georgian inhabitants of South Ossetia, and were opposed by hastily organized Ossetian ‘self-defense’ forces.84 Soviet troops in Ossetia were deployed to separate the two sides and to broker a cease-fire; however, Soviet troops also took part in the fighting on the side of the Ossetian formations, leading to accusations that Gorbachev was trying to use the Ossetian question as a lever on Georgia to remain within the Union.85 The fighting and economic hardships ensuing from the blockade led to flows of Georgian refugees out of South Ossetia, and of Ossetian refugees, mainly from the rest of

Aves, Paths to National Independence, p. 46. Elizabeth Fuller, ‘Georgian Parliament Votes to Abolish Ossetian Autonomy’, Report on the USSR, 21 December 1990, p. 8. 84 Alexei Zverev, ‘Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus 1988-94’, p. 44. 85 See Stuart Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001, pp. 112-113. 82 83

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Georgia, to North Ossetia.86 The situation grew worse in Spring and Summer 1991, with Georgian paramilitaries shelling Tskhinvali with artillery fire.

6.6. Independence and Civil War Georgia’s transition to independence was catalyzed by the March 1991 All-Union referendum on the preservation of the Soviet Union. The recently elected Gamsakhurdia government in Georgia was one of the six republics to refuse to participate in the referendum.87 However, Abkhazia and South Ossetia both did participate in this referendum. Given the ethnic polarization and the Georgian government’s boycott, the results were predictable: 99% of voters in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia voted in favor of the preservation of the Soviet Union. Gamsakhurdia’s riposte to the all-union referendum was instead to organize a referendum on the restoration of Georgia’s independence, as proclaimed on May 26, 1918. The date set for the referendum was also symptomatic: it was held on April 9, 1991. The referendum was met by a boycott in parts of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, that is, especially the parts where few Georgians lived. But the total number of votes in favor remained massive: 98% of voters expressed themselves in favor of Georgia’s independence.

6.6.1. The Rise and Fall of Gamsakhurdia’s Republic Results in southern Georgia also testify to the fact that the voters in favor of independence were not exclusively ethnic Georgians; 86% of eligible voters in Marneuli, where over 80% of the population is Azerbaijani, voted for independence; in Akhalkalaki, where over 90% of the population is Armenian, 52% voted for independence.88 The Soviet habit of voting in the affirmative to any question put to the people may have influenced this outcome, as well as Gamsakhurdia’s threat that minorities that voted against independence would be deprived on citizenship in independent Georgia.89 Yet it seems that whereas the Azeri community supported Georgia’s independence in spite of Azerbaijan’s continued loyalty to Moscow, the Armenian community was still lukewarm in its attitude to independence although Armenia had also refused to hold the all-union referendum. This clearly points to a higher level of hostility toward Georgian rule among Armenian areas than in Azeri areas. Economic factors may also have contributed to this:

Julian Birch, ‘Ethnic Cleansing in the Caucasus’, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, vol. 1 no. 4, 1995. Between 40,000 and 55,000 Ossetians from Georgia proper are thought to have left for North Ossetia. Moscow News, 19 November 1992. 87 Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova also refused to participate. 88 Gerber, Georgien, p. 215. 89 Elizabeth Fuller, ‘How Wholehearted Is Support in Georgia for Independence’, Report on the USSR, vol. 3 no. 23, 7 June 1991. 86

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whereas both Javakheti Armenians and Azeris are isolated culturally and socially from the Georgian population, the economic isolation of the Javakheti Armenians is in stark contrast to the economic integration of the Azeri population into Georgia, especially in agricultural terms.90 In a bid to assert control over the various provinces of Georgia, Gamsakhurdia introduced a system of centrally appointed Prefects, that would be the arm of the central executive power all over Georgia. This measure was resisted in several minority areas. In South Ossetia, the scheme for obvious reasons could not be properly implemented, whereas in parts of Abkhazia and Javakheti, locals refused to accept the proposed Prefect. In Akhalkalaki, local Armenians staged demonstrations that physically prevented three consecutive centrally appointed Prefects from reaching their office buildings, because they were ethnic Georgians. An Armenian organization called Javakhk had emerged in 1988, and was instrumental in organizing the deployment of a unit of Javakheti Armenians to the conflict in Mountainous Karabakh in Azerbaijan, showing a certain level of ethnic mobilization among Armenians there. Javakhk lobbied for the creation of an Armenian autonomous region within Georgia, and organized the protests against the centrally proposed prefects. It was also instrumental in organizing a ‘Provisional Council of Representatives’ to govern the region in the constitutional vacuum that emerged due to the stand-off with Tbilisi. Elections were held in February 1991 to this Council, which created a Presidium of seven members (one of whom was ethnic Georgian) as a working body. During this time, local Armenians prevented the Georgian National Guard from entering Javakheti. The area remained effectively outside the control of Tbilisi for virtually the entire tenure of Gamsakhurdia. In November 1991, a Prefect proposed by Tbilisi was finally accepted, and the Council dissolved itself.91 While conflict escalated to war in South Ossetia, the situation in Abkhazia was calm but tense; the conflict between Sukhumi and Tbilisi was confined to the political realm. The Abkhaz parliament tried to implement a constitutional reform that would have introduced a parliamentary system of government with two chambers – one with 50 directly elected representatives and a ‘chamber of nationalities’ where Abkhaz, Georgians, Russians, Armenians and Greeks would have been equally represented. This was somewhat surprising since it would have lowered the numerical representation of the Abkhaz, though the Abkhaz nevertheless would retain a veto right in the Chamber of Nationalities. The Georgian parliament refused to accept the draft law, and instead a law was adopted that provided for a unicameral consociational system which gave the Abkhaz a quota of 28, Georgians 26, and ‘others’ 11 seats, and required a two-thirds majority for ‘important’ decisions. That technically gave both Georgians and Abkhaz a veto right in the chamber, but this provision would instead deadlock the Abkhaz parliament soon 90 91

Gachechiladze, The New Georgia, pp. 117-136. See Voitsekh Guretski, ‘The Question of Javakheti’, Caucasian Regional Studies, vol. 3 no. 1, 1998.

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afterwards, as the polarization between the Georgian and Abkhaz components increased. Yet, the Georgian and Abkhaz leaderships managed to keep a working relationship throughout Gamsakhurdia’s rule, during the civil unrest in Georgia at the end of 1991, and up until the arrival of Shevardnadze in March 1992. Shortly after the declaration of independence, Presidential elections were held in May in which Gamsakhurdia was elected over unknown candidates with a landslide of over 86% of votes. Georgia’s independence nevertheless remained unrecognized until mid1992, after Gamsakhurdia’s fall. During Gamsakhurdia’s rule, the erratic character of the leader became an increasing problem. Gamsakhurdia obviously equated Georgia with himself, thereby branding most anyone disagreeing with him as a traitor to the country. Moreover, his controversial statements alienated not only ethnic minorities and political opposition but also foreign states. His criticism of U.S. President Bush’s attempts to prevent the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and his pro-Armenian comments on Mountainous Karabakh alienated the United States and Azerbaijan, the latter a neighbor that provided Georgia with oil. Gamsakhurdia earned the name of a dictator more through his words and his attitude than through deeds. He did ban the Communist Party after August 1991, and he ordered an opposition demonstration to be broken up by police in September. The main problem lay not in Gamsakhurdia’s factual actions but in his erratic mindset that in practice translated into political incompetence. As Stephen Jones has put it, Gamsakhurdia’s other characteristics were a sense of paranoia, a conspiratorial frame of mind, virulent anti-communism, and a tendency to self-glorification. … Gamsakhurdia viewed himself as the last in a long line of Georgian national heroes, all of whom, in his words, have embodied sacrifices on the altar of the fatherland. The struggle for Gamsakhurdia was between ‘good and evil’. … Comparing himself to de Gaulle, Gamsakhurdia argued that a strong presidency corresponded to the ‘historical laws and characteristics’ of the Georgian people.92

After the Moscow coup of August 1991, the polarization between Gamsakhurdia and his opposition deepened. Gamsakhurdia did not immediately condemn the coup, as he apparently tried to negotiate with the coup-makers to avoid a feared Soviet military intervention to assert control over Georgia.93 Gamsakhurdia then decided to dissolve the National Guard, the embryonic army that had been created out of several paramilitary forces, and to integrate it into the Interior Ministry. The Commander of the National Guard, Tengiz Kitovani (incidentally, a former sculptor), condemned the decision and left Tbilisi together with a substantial amount of National Guard troops. The opposition by now included many of Gamsakhurdia’s former associates, such as Kitovani and Tengiz Sigua, the former prime minister, and Gamsakhurdia’s position

92 93

See Jones, ‘Georgia: the Trauma of Statehood’, p. 522. Gerber, Georgien, p. 224.

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became increasingly isolated, which further increased his paranoia. Violent riots broke out between government troops and the armed opposition forces in central Tbilisi on September 2, leading to over twenty wounded. This intra-Georgian feuding and the shedding of blood on the streets of the capital shocked most Georgians deeply. Unfortunately, the situation grew worse, as the political struggle decisively moved into the streets, specifically the Rustaveli boulevard, the main street of Tbilisi. Government supporters gathered on one end, inflated by hundreds of people brought into the city from Gamsakhurdia’s native power base, Mingrelia. The opposition, for its part, had gathered only several hundred meters away. After a brief respite in November, the situation again worsened as no compromise could be struck between the two sides. On December 22, the stalemate was broken by Kitovani’s National Guard forces and a paramilitary group known as the Mkhedrioni (Horsemen) loyal to Jaba Ioseliani, a shady figure and a former bank robber, mafia boss, as well as theater critic. A brief but ugly war erupted in central Tbilisi, until the insurgents controlled most of the city, and Gamsakhurdia was hiding inside the parliament with his most loyal followers. After two weeks, Gamsakhurdia was allowed to flee Tbilisi on January 6, 1992, first by car to Armenia, after which he was granted asylum by the Chechen President Jokhar Dudayev, and lived in Grozny periodically since then until his return to Georgia in 1993.

6.6.2 Shevardnadze’s Republic While Tbilisi was on fire, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, putting the minority peoples of Georgia in state of confusion. There was no USSR, but there was practically no Georgia either. And the kind of Georgia that would emerge from the power struggle in Tbilisi was not known. Georgia was now ruled by a state council led by Sigua, Kitovani, and Ioseliani. In practice, this meant a disastrous breakdown of law and order in Georgia, the utter failure of Georgia’s attempts to liberate itself from Moscow’s rule and create a functioning, independent and democratic state, and the predominance of paramilitary forces that to a large degree consisted of simple criminals prone to looting and pillaging. This state of affairs prevented Georgia from being granted membership in the United Nations together with other former Soviet states, and led to western countries withholding recognition of a government that had military taken over power from an elected President. Ironically, the meltdown of the Georgian government provided an opportunity to restore peace in South Ossetia. Most forces that had been involved in the fighting on the Georgian side had been involved in the fighting in Tbilisi, leading to a de-escalation of tensions. The mess in Tbilisi nevertheless encouraged the Ossetian leadership to hold a referendum on January 19, in which 90% of the population voted to join the Russian Federation. This reiteration of the intention to secede from Georgia did not provoke an immediate reaction, given that the main paramilitary leaders in Tbilisi were in the process of assuming power over the country. Forces loyal to Gamsakhurdia had also retreated to

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their native power base in Mingrelia, concentrating paramilitary activity to the northwest of the country. In order to bolster their credibility, the ruling Military Council renamed itself the State Council, and invited Eduard Shevardnadze to return to Georgia to be its chairman. Shevardnadze’s arrival to power was thought to improve the chances of arriving at a compromise with the minorities and rebuilding the Georgian state. Indeed, initial steps were positive, as Shevardnadze traveled to Tskhinvali and to Vladikavkaz, the capital of North Ossetia. A cease-fire agreement was reached in May, but Shevardnadze’s failure to control the paramilitary forces were already apparent.94 In late April, artillery shelling of Tskhinvali had resumed, and a busload of Ossetian refugees were massacred later in May. The renewed tensions brought the involvement of North Caucasian volunteers that gathered in North Ossetia to support the South Ossetian forces; the central Russian government was also increasingly openly supporting Tskhinvali, threatening Shevardnadze with war; significant amounts of Russian military forces amassed in North Ossetia, where a battalion of volunteers organized by the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus was already present.95 With the threat of an imminent escalation of the conflict with potentially disastrous consequences for Georgia, a final cease-fire agreement was signed in Sochi on June 22 by Shevardnadze and Yeltsin, in the presence of the leaders of North and South Ossetia. This agreement froze the military situation on the ground as it was, with Ossetians and Georgians controlling roughly half of the territory of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast each. Importantly, the Ossetian-controlled areas are not geographically contiguous. Peacekeeping forces led by Russian military but including Georgian and Ossetian elements were introduced on July 14. The conflict in south Ossetia remains unresolved by early 2002, although a certain return of refugees and resumption of economic links has occurred – the latter mainly in the form of smuggling of goods between Georgia and Russia, with South Ossetia functioning as a free economic zone outside any government control. An estimated 700 people died in the conflict.

6.6.3. The War in Abkhazia As mentioned earlier, the Abkhaz and Georgian leadership had managed in late 1991 to agree, though with difficulty, on a consociational scheme for the Abkhaz parliament. And indeed, Abkhazia had been surprisingly calm during the rule of Gamsakhurdia; the fact that the latter, who by late 1991 had shed most the little will to compromise he possessed, agreed to a scheme that granted the Abkhaz heavy over-representation, adds to the peculiarity of the situation. Some observers have drawn the conclusion that there was a shady ‘deal’ between Gamsakhurdia and the Abkhaz leadership; Gamsakhurdia’s Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., ‘The Post-Communist Wars’, Journal of Democracy, October 1995. Julian Birch, ‘Ossetia: A Caucasian Bosnia in Microcosm’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 14 no. 1, 1995, p. 46. On the Confederation, see Dodge Billingsley, ‘Confederates of the Caucasus’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1997.

94 95

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spectacular but ill-fated return to Georgia in 1993 took place through Abkhazia, which has compounded these speculations. Events nevertheless turned for the worse as the Soviet Union collapsed, the Gamsakhurdia government fell, and Abkhazia’s position increasingly fell into a constitutional limbo. The new parliament never got a chance to function properly and was soon deeply divided along ethnic lines. Abkhazia was now led by Vladislav Ardzinba, a historian, former member of the USSR congress of people’s deputies, and member of the right-wing groups in Moscow that were responsible for the August 1991 coup. Having been a close associate of Congress Chairman Lukyanov, Ardzinba had been the polar opposite to Shevardnadze in Union politics. Shevardnadze had been among the most liberal proponents of Perestroika, whereas Ardzinba had been a member of the most reactionary forces in Moscow. Ardzinba soon moved to assert control over Soviet military units in Abkhazia, though Russia in practice retained control over them. Instead, Ardzinba created a National Guard that was mono-ethnically Abkhaz. Further, a practice of replacing ethnic Georgians in leading positions with Abkhaz was initiated. This was partly in response to the practice of ethnic Georgian representatives to consult with Tbilisi, thereby appearing in the Abkhaz eyes to represent not the local Georgian population but the government in Tbilisi.96 But compromise was still being sought, and delegations shuttled between Tbilisi and Sukhumi to try to achieve a compromise on the relationship between Abkhazia and Georgia. Ardzinba proposed a draft treaty in June that would have safeguarded Georgia’s territorial integrity but restructured the relationship in a confederative way. As Georgia’s State Council rejected this proposal and talks led nowhere, tensions increased.97 In July, the Abkhaz parliament, though lacking its ethnic Georgian component, adopted a resolution to restore the rather anachronistic 1925 constitution. This document described the ‘Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic’ as independent but ‘United with the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic on the basis of a special Union Treaty’.98 Meanwhile, Ardzinba’s rhetoric mounted, as he claimed in ate July that ‘Abkhazia is strong enough to fight Georgia’,99 a somewhat absurd statement given the disparity in size and military power between the two. The legality of the resolution adopting the constitution was also highly doubtful, given that the necessary quorum of two thirds was not present in the absence of the ethnic Georgian representatives. Two weeks later, loosely organized Georgian forces under Kitovani entered Abkhazia and drove straight for Sukhumi. The Abkhaz leadership retreated to Gudauta in the North of Abkhazia, where a Russian Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, p. 117. 97 BBC Monitoring Service, 18 June 1992. 98 Gueorgui Otyrba, ‘War in Abkhazia: the Regional Significance of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict’, in Roman Szporluk, ed., The International Relations of Eurasia vol. 1, Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1994. 99 ‘Georgia: Abkhazia “Strong enough to fight Georgia”’, BBC Monitoring Service, 30 July 1992. 96

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military base is located. Kitovani’s forces took Sukhumi on August 18 in a bout of killing and looting characteristic of the undisciplined militias, and then moved north along the Black Sea coast. Shevardnadze seemed to have been caught unaware by Kitovani’s invasion, but failed to force him to withdraw. Meanwhile, the Abkhaz prepared a counter-offensive. As they retreated toward the Russian border, they were met by Chechen and Circassian volunteer units representing the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, whose capital was Sukhumi.100 By late September, their force had further swelled, and when the Abkhaz counter-attacked on October 1, they were equipped with T-72 tanks, Grad rocket launchers, heavy artillery, unidentified naval vessels, and air support, including Sukhoi fighter planes that bombed Sukhumi.101 Evidence of Russian military support for Abkhazia increased after Georgian forces had shelled a Russian military laboratory at Eshera.102 As the Abkhaz counter-offensive gathered strength in spite of several abortive cease-fires, Russian involvement grew as acknowledged by Russian experts: ‘Moscow was clearly held responsible for what was accurately described as a purposeful and purposefully one-sided military intervention on behalf of Abkhazian separation. … Russian planes bombed Sukhumi in February 1993, [and] a Russian army unit participated in an Abkhazian attack on Sukhumi a month later.’103 By July 1993, only Sukhumi and the southwestern part of Abkhazia remained in Georgian hands when a Russian-brokered cease-fire came into effect. The agreement provided for withdrawal of both sides forces from the conflict area. Georgian forces were moved by ship to Poti further South; and the Abkhaz arms were handed over to Russian forces in Abkhazia. At this point, Zviad Gamsakhurdia spectacularly returned from exile to Mingrelia, claiming to be Georgia’s legal President. Over a third of the Georgian forces deserted to support him, and the Abkhaz took this opportunity to resume their offensive. On September 26, Abkhaz-led forces entered Sukhumi, forcing Shevardnadze to flee the city by air, narrowly escaping an Abkhaz missile. The front in Abkhazia collapsed, and Abkhaz forces captured the entire territory of Abkhazia with the exception of parts of the mountainous Kodori gorge in the borderland between Abkhazia and Svaneti. An estimated 200,000 Georgians were evicted from the Gali region and other parts of Abkhazia by the advancing Abkhaz forces. The rebellion in Mingrelia grew, threatening to plunge Georgia into total chaos. Shevardnadze Reuters, 14 August 1992, 18 August 1992, 19 August 1992. For a detailed treatment of the war see Svante Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, pp. 170-174. 102 Viacheslav Chirikba, ‘The Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict and its Aftermath’, in Mehmet Tütüncü, ed., Caucasus: War and Peace, Haarlem: SOTA, 1998. 103 Evgeniy M. Kozhokin, ‘Georgia-Abkhazia’, in Jeremy Azrael and Emil Payin, eds., U.S. and Russian Policy-Making with Respect to the Use of Force, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1996. In March 1993, Georgian artillery shot down a Suhkoi-27 aircraft carrying Soviet Air Force identification marks over the boundary between Abkhazia and Georgia, whose deceased pilot was positively identified as a major on active duty in the Russian Air Force. For a detailed treatment of Russian intervention in the war in Abkhazia, See Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, pp.344-353. 100 101

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acquiesced to Russian demands of joining the Commonwealth of Independent States, and accepted the presence of Russian troops on its territory and to have its border with Turkey patrolled by Russian troops. In exchange, Russian forces now moved to quell the ‘Zviadist’ (as Gamsakhurdia’s forces were called) insurgency in less than two weeks. Gamsakhurdia himself died in mysterious circumstances in a remote area of western Georgia around New Year’s eve. By early 1994, Georgia’s independence had been a complete disaster, with two ethnic wars and two civil wars decimating the country. It had failed to retain its factual independence, and seemed to have returned to Russian domination. It now controlled only half of South Ossetia and had completely lost control over Abkhazia, including over half of the country’s coastline. It had a large refugee population which gradually became a hotbed of nationalism. Shevardnadze was now left with the arduous task of putting Georgia back together.

6.7. Picking Up the Pieces Shevardnadze’s position was highly vulnerable in the aftermath of the war in Abkhazia. Though it was obvious that the defeat had been caused to large extent by external intervention, it remained a fact that Georgia had lost control of two separate parts of its territory under Shevardnadze’s rule. His popularity was extremely low in western Georgia, parts of which were loyal to Gamsakhurdia; he had to handle a Georgia whose international standing had been heavily damaged by Gamsakhurdia’s rule, the military coup of December 1991, and later by the warlords in Shevardnadze’s own government. Georgia’s economy was in shambles, its crucial tourist industry having been decimated by war, and its very independence being threatened by obvious Russian imperial ambitions. However, Shevardnadze moved quickly to consolidate his control of the country and to attract western interests to Georgia. He announced elections for parliament and the presidency, which he subsequently won with ease, had a new constitution adopted, and used his fame in western Europe and the United States to attract desperately needed investments and aid. With increasing attention to Caspian oil resources and the unresolved conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Georgia became the only feasible route for pipelines carrying Azerbaijani oil westward. Shevardnadze capitalized on this, and joined Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev in skillfully promoting the importance of the South Caucasus and their own countries in Eurasian geopolitics. By 1997, Shevardnadze’s government has managed to restore normality to Georgia. Negotiations with the Ossetian and Abkhaz separatists did not approach a solution, but the rest of Georgia stabilized, some economic development occurred, reforms in the political sphere took place, and Georgia became the first Caucasian state to be admitted to the Council of Europe in 1998. Shevardnadze could now focus on undoing the concessions he had been forced to grant Russia in 1993. By 1998, the five-year agreement on border guards

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expired, and in spite of heavy Russian pressure, Shevardnadze refused to renew it. Hence Georgia regained control of its border with Turkey. At the November 1999 Istanbul summit of the OSCE, Georgia gained strong western backing for its demand for Russian forces to be withdrawn, and Moscow had to accept the closure before July 2001 of the military bases in Vaziani (outside Tbilisi) and Gudauta in Abkhazia as well as to start negotiations on the closure of the bases in Akhalkalaki (in Javakheti) and Batumi (in Ajaria). However, Russia is demanding to extend its rights there for 15 years. But the situation again began to deteriorate in the late 1990s. The Russian economic crisis of 1998 affected Georgia deeply, and it was forced to devaluate its currency by over 20%. The economic situation failed to recover after this blow. State finances also failed to improve. Corruption grew into a problem of incalculable proportions, and actually brought down the Georgian government in late 2001. Georgia also failed to improve its energy system, and remained heavily dependent on Russia for gas supplies, used to produce electricity. As a result of the inability of Georgia to pay for the gas, it exposed itself to politically motivated Russian cuts in energy supplies, as occurred in the winter of 2000-2001.104 The security situation also remained fragile. Shevardnadze narrowly escaped two assassination attempts in 1995 and 1998, and security services claim to have thwarted several other attempts on his life. The regional issues also kept a high place on the Georgian state’s agenda. The questions of Ajaria and Javakheti have remained important throughout, whereas the problem on the Pankisi gorge bordering Chechnya gained salience only after the beginning of the second Chechen war in 1999. The Ajar leader Aslan Abashidze staunchly protected the autonomy of Abkhazia, and for many practical purposes kept his enclave separated from Georgia. In part due to the support both of the Russian military base and of Turkey which is its main trading partner, Ajaria has maintained stability and a certain prosperity, though at the expense of political freedoms. The situation in the Pankisi gorge, in the mountains bordering Chechnya, have become a contentious issue in Georgian-Russian relations and yet another destabilizing factor in the country. An exodus of several thousand Chechen refugees to the area took place in late 1999 and early 2000, and the Russian government claims a significant number of Chechen militants (‘terrorists’ in Russian parlance) Georgia denied the allegations, but its control over the gorge rapidly dwindled. Moscow at several occasions has demanded to send Russian troops there, though Georgia refused. Instead, an OSCE observer mission was dispatched to Pankisi, which failed to find any evidence of Russia’s alleged ‘Chechen and Arab militants’. However, a confusing incident took place in the Fall of 2001, when a group of up to 300 Chechens, under the purported leadership of Chechen field commander Ruslan Gelayev, apparently moved from Pankisi to the Kodori gorge in Zeyno Baran, ‘Georgia Under Worst Pressure Since Independence’, Georgia Update, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10 January 2001.

104

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Abkhazia, where it engaged Abkhaz detachments. To the Georgian government’s embarrassment, it seemed to be as genuinely confused as anyone else on what forces had been where and for what reason. The incident nevertheless formed a pretext for Moscow to bomb several villages in the Pankisi and Kodori gorges, on Georgia’s territory, in late 2001. The main minority issue has nevertheless remained the Armenians of Javakheti. Reports of tensions, minor skirmishes, and the like have kept emanating from Javakheti throughout the 1990s. The area is, as mentioned, the home to a Russian military base, which in the lack of any Georgian investments there is the main source of employment for the local Armenians, estimated at 200,000 people. Armenian Diaspora groups in Russia and the United States have recently began raising the question of Javakheti’s status, although no overt support for the demands to grant it autonomy have been voiced by the Armenian government. Georgia’s tumultuous history and especially the painful and bloody events that transpired during the early 1990s raise many questions to the scholar of ethnopolitical conflict. Why is it that ethnic wars erupted in South Ossetia and Abkhazia after gradual escalations of tensions, but not in Javakheti, Ajaria, or the Azeri-populated areas of Kvemo Kartli? How can one explain that seemingly comparable minorities, that to that all drew the attention of the centralizing efforts of the Georgian state, experienced so different outcomes? In order to answer this question, a return to the factors of ethnopolitical conflict employed earlier in this study is called for. In the next chapter, a deeper analysis of how the ten factors viewed in chapter 5 applied to the five cases in Georgia is undertaken.

7 Explaining Ethnopolitical Conflict

Georgia’s five minorities exhibit a wide variance in conflict behavior in the period under study. Armed conflict erupted in two areas, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which were autonomous. Both Javakheti and Ajaria, one autonomous and one non-autonomous area, have experienced relatively high levels of tension with the central government, resisted the sometimes assertive, sometimes timid centralizing efforts of Tbilisi; Ajaria has safeguarded its self-rule, whereas the Javakheti Armenians have made half-hearted and abortive attempts at obtaining self-rule in a climate of muted tensions. Occurrences of communal violence have been scarce in both, although Javakheti Armenians have had repeated standoffs with Georgian military forces. As a contrast to these cases, the heavily Azeri-populated areas of Kvemo Kartli have been mainly silent throughout the period, in spite of relatively strong pressures in the late 1980s. In order to explain these variances in outcome, the ten factors outlined in chapters one and two, and briefly examined in chapter five over the entire South Caucasus, are investigated in further detail here.

7.1. Abkhazia: the Impossible Happening Abkhazia was an unlikely separatist region in the late 1980s – and an even more unlikely candidate to de facto secession. Only 17% of Abkhazia’s population was ethnic Abkhaz (1,8% of Georgia’s population) whereas almost half of the population throughout the post-World War II period was consistently composed of ethnic Georgians. Yet in spite of this demographic situation, Abkhazia became the scene of a grave ethnic conflict that deeply impacted, and to this day still impacts, the building of Georgia’s statehood.

7.1.1. Cultural Differences Georgians and Abkhaz have elements of identity that both unite and divide them. In terms of language, both Georgian and Abkhaz are Caucasian languages. However, Georgian is a South Caucasian language, whereas Abkhaz is Northwest Caucasian, related to Circassian languages (Abaza, Shapsug, Cherkess, Kabardin). The two languages are not mutually understandable, and the language issue formed an important part of the Abkhaz grievances against Georgians: the claim that a ‘georgianization’ of the Abkhaz through imposition of a Georgian-based alphabet for the Abkhaz language and of Georgianlanguage schools took place in the Stalin era. Yet the long coexistence between Abkhaz and Georgians and the common ‘Caucasian’ identity that these indigenous Caucasian 173

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peoples undoubtedly share implies that numerous customs, tales and traditions are common to the two groups. In terms of religion, the picture is also mixed. Whereas the Orthodox church is a strong element of the Georgian identity, religion is a considerably weaker marker of Abkhaz identity. The Abkhaz are in fact religiously divided between Muslims and Christians, a division that dates back to the expulsion of the majority of Muslim Abkhaz together with large numbers of Circassian peoples in 1864. According to estimates, Abkhazia today is approximately 60-70% Christian and 30-40% Muslim. However, much like with the Ossetians, Pagan beliefs that predated Christianity or Islam remain deep-rooted under the veneer of Monotheism – producing what Derluguian calls an ‘easy-going religious syncretism’ in Abkhazia.1 Hence religious differences as such are not a marked issue between Georgians and Abkhaz. Although the Abkhaz and Georgians have distinct and relatively strong ethnic-based identities, cultural differences between the two were not a major factor in the conflict.

7.1.2. National Conception The national conception of both Abkhaz and Georgians are predominantly exclusive and ethnic-based. An Abkhaz can hardly be seen as a Georgian, neither can a Georgian in Abkhazia pass as a member of the Abkhaz community. However, the Georgian government, including all but fringe groups among the nationalist forces, recognized the Abkhaz as indigenous in Abkhazia and most also accept their right to some form of selfrule. Hence within the national conception of Georgia, the concept of Abkhazia’s separate identity is recognized and accepted. Georgian deputy Prime Minister Alexander Kavadze once stated that the Abkhaz, unlike Armenians, Greeks, and Azeris, ‘have no other native land but Abkhazia’, and that Georgia must hence ‘do everything to ensure their rights’.2 This said, the policies of the Georgian government have at times fostered fear among the Abkhaz for their cultural as well as political autonomy, and indeed even for their physical survival. Hence the language laws imposed first at the urge of the nationalist movement in 1988-89 and the stance and the policies of the Gamsakhurdia government itself once elected was not well-received in Abkhazia, with many Abkhaz intellectuals fearing the return of ‘georgianization’ policies. The exclusive character of the national conceptions of the two ethnic groups was a factor increasing the perceived distance between the two communities.

Georgi Derluguian, ‘The Forgotten Abkhazia: Anatomy of Post-Socialist Ethnic War’, PONARS Policy Memo no. 163, November 2000. www.fas.harvard.edu/~ponars/POLICY%20MEMOS/ Derluguian163.html. 2 Moscow News, 13 September 1992. 1

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7.1.3. Past Conflict and Myths Conflict between Abkhaz and Georgians, as seen in chapter seven, is not a phenomenon of the 1990s. Quite to the contrary, the Abkhaz issue was prominent during the First Georgian Republic, when events took place that are understood and portrayed in highly divergent ways by Abkhaz and by Georgians. Georgians see the events in Abkhazia in the light of their attempts, in the hostile and chaotic environment of 1918, to create a democratic state in which minorities would be granted rights and the Abkhaz were already granted autonomy. ‘Ungrateful’ elements among the Abkhaz instead sided with the Bolsheviks, betraying the good faith of the Georgians, and let themselves be manipulated by the Russians. On May 26, 1919, Sakartvelos Respublika wrote that ‘in Abkhazia a group of individuals, driven by their personal considerations and discontent over the basic reforms, turned for help to a foreign country while agitating the people for an uprising’.3 The Menshevik government was accordingly forced to intervene in order to restore order and uphold Georgia’s territorial integrity against Bolshevik encroachments; however, Abkhazia retained its autonomy and was allowed to rule its own affairs even during this time. Predictably, the Abkhaz version of the episode is different: Abkhazia was never legally part of Georgia in the first place, and hence Menshevik Georgia’s claim to Abkhazia was without basis. Yet Georgia intervened brutally and quelled the popular movement in Abkhazia, with a view to install a puppet regime. Similarly, grudges are held among the Abkhaz regarding the submission of Abkhazia to Georgia in 1931. The Abkhaz hold that Abkhazia was constituted as an independent Soviet Socialist Republic in 1921, which was on an equal footing with Georgia, and tied to it in a treaty relationship, and point to the 1925 constitution of Abkhazia as evidence. Only through the intervention of powerful Georgians like Stalin and Beria in the 1930s, they argue, was Abkhazia forced under Georgian rule in 1931, after which Abkhazia was subjected to a forcible policy of ‘georgianization’ that only ended with Stalin’s death and the fall of Beria. Georgians retaliate that Abkhazia may have been formally accorded independent status in 1921 but that this did not imply separation from Georgia. In fact the Soviet leadership in all documentation envisaged three republics in the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, whereas Abkhazia was never mentioned at par with any of these. Likewise, Stalin’s September 1921 assertion that ‘Abkhazia is an autonomous part of independent Georgia’ is brought up by Georgians to show that there was never any intention of putting Abkhazia at par with other Union Republics. Georgians also recall that it was customary during the civil war to form smaller territories as ‘Soviet Socialist Republics’, which were later incorporated into bigger units. For example, Nakhchivan was first declared an SSR, then turned into an autonomous district of Azerbaijan, and finally an ASSR. Other examples include the Kuban Black Sea and Cited in Avtandil Menteshashvili, ‘Georgian-Abkhaz Relations in 1918-1921’, in Some National and Ethnic Problems in Georgia, Tbilisi, 1992. 3

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Stavropol SSRs and several in Central Asia that were subsequently dissolved. As for allegations of ‘georgianization’, Georgians have gone so far as to claim that Abkhazia’s falling under Georgian and not Russian jurisdiction in fact saved Abkhaz culture from annihilation. Though not all Georgians go to such extents, they often do argue that Georgian rule in Abkhazia was incomparably more tolerant than Russian rule in the North Caucasus. As should be clear from the above, the interpretations of past conflict among Abkhaz and Georgians are full of mutual incriminations and suspicion. In the case of the Abkhaz, moreover, the demographic situation and Caucasian history combined created a fear of annihilation that was relatively strong even before the actual ethnic conflict emerged.4 The Abkhaz had been subjected to earlier deportations in 1864 and 1877 by Czarist Russia, contributing to their low numbers. In a Georgia of five million people, the Abkhaz were a very small minority indeed, numbering only 105,000. Moreover, the fate of other related nations, especially the Ubykh, were clearly present in the minds of the Abkhaz.5 The Ubykh, a once-strong Circassian nation closely related to the Abkhaz and inhabiting the areas of the Black Sea coast just northwest of Abkhazia around present-day Sochi, were deported in their totality in the great nineteenth-century deportations that also affected the Abkhaz. Moving to the Ottoman Empire, they were gradually assimilated into a Turkish identity, and the last speaker of the Ubykh language died in 1992. The fate of the Ubykh has intensified Abkhaz fears of physical or cultural annihilation, that were already present in large part due to their weak demography. Indeed, the population of the Abkhaz nation in its entirety is comparable to a small European or American town – creating a fertile ground for a credible threat of actual annihilation of the nation. In sum, the factor of past conflict and especially the mythification of past conflict and the myths and fears arising therefrom, have been significant in the case of Abkhazia. 7.1.4. Rough Terrain Abkhazia is often described as a paradise on earth, very much because of its subtropical climate near the coastline and the presence of high mountains in the northern and eastern parts of Abkhazia. Much of Abkhazia’s territory is covered with thick forests and inaccessible mountains. The roughness of Abkhazia’s terrain was a factor in Russia’s conquest of the South Caucasus in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. While advancing southward, there were three possible routes to cross the majestic Caucasus mountains: the eastern route along the plains of the Caspian sea coast; the central route

4 On the role of psychology in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, see Manana Gabashvili, ‘K Psikologicheskomu Analizu Konflikta Na Primere Vooruzhennogo Konflikta v Abkhazii’, in Georgi Gogsadze et. al., Etnopoliticheskie Konflikty v Zakavkaze: Ikh Istoki I Puti Resheniia¸ College Park, MD: University of Maryland CIDCM, 1997, pp. 146-153. 5

See Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, p. 96 for a discussion of Abkhaz fears.

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from Vladikavkaz across the Daryal gorge (the ‘Georgian Military Highway’) straight down via Shida Kartli to Tbilisi; and the western route through Abkhazia along the Black Sea coast. Because of its inaccessibility, the Russian forces in the early nineteenth century did not employ the route through Abkhazia, focusing on the two other routes. Again in 1921, Bolshevik Russia’s encroachment into Georgia did involve both Abkhazia and Ossetia, but the final Red Army invasion came from the East, advancing toward Georgia only after having subdued Azerbaijan.6 À priori, its geographical and topographical features would make Abkhazia an ideal area for guerrilla warfare, and this reality may indeed have influenced the belief of the Abkhaz leadership in the Summer of 1992 that it was ‘strong enough to fight Georgia’. It is difficult to determine if this was indeed the case, but very little in the prelude to the 1992-93 war suggested that the Abkhaz were reasoning along these lines. Indeed, it seems that the Abkhaz had not taken the possibility of a Georgian invasion into serious consideration. Abkhazian leader Vladislav Ardzinba was reportedly taken by total surprise when informed of Kitovani’s invasion.7 The further development of the Abkhaz war, though not overly relevant to the expectations of the usefulness of guerrilla warfare, would also question the importance of rough terrain. In fact, offensive military operations dominated the fighting, both when Georgian forces pushed North in August 1992 and when the Abkhaz later counter-attacked throughout 1993. It may be said, however, that the military edge between the two parties was dictated by outside factors rather than by either their respective original strengths or their use of terrain. Abkhazia does exhibit rough terrain, but there is no conclusive evidence that terrain played an important part in the political decisions on either side. The Abkhaz did not expect the war; neither were the very disorganized forces under Kitovani repelled by the rough terrain of Abkhazia when they took the decision to invade Abkhazia in August 1992.

7.1.5. Relative Demography As has been noted at several instances in this study, the case of Abkhazia is distinguished by its demographic conditions. As explained in chapter two, the likelihood of conflict is normally thought to be higher in areas where the minority ethnic group predominates demographically. The presence of large communities of other ethnic groups, in particular that of the central state’s majority population, are likely to lower the possibilities for ethnic entrepreneurs among the minority population to revolt. The dangers are higher; the likelihood of opposition from the central government is higher, and the possibilities of achieving independence are compromised in the absence of ethnic cleansing. Should these factors have a direct bearing on ethnopolitical conflict, Abkhazia would have been a See Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (1917-1921), Oxford: George Ronald, 1951, pp. 294-328. 7 Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, p. 120. 6

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textbook case of a minority population without significant risk of conflict. Georgians were over twice as numerous as the Abkhaz in Abkhazia; even Armenians were almost as numerous as the Abkhaz – actually slightly outnumbering the titular nation in 1979. However, it is possible to turn this argument on its head and argue that precisely because of their demographic position, the Abkhaz were predisposed to rebellion. Their demographic situation, and the conviction that Georgia was actively and purposefully trying to alter the demography of the republic, strengthened the fears of annihilation of the Abkhaz and may have deepened their frustration and incentives to change their political situation. If this is the case, it would challenge the theoretical assumption that minorities that predominate demographically in their areas of habitation are the most likely to see ethnopolitical action and conflict. One could actually make a logical case that the high and low ends of demographic domination are likely to see ethnopolitical activism, whereas the middle range, where the minority population neither predominates nor is demographically threatened, are less likely to experience ethnic mobilization and conflict.

7.1.6. Ethnic Kin The Abkhaz demographic weakness was early on offset, at least partly, by the close cooperation that the Abkhaz leadership developed with kin peoples across the Caucasus mountains. In 1989, Sukhumi was the meeting place for the first Congress of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus. Grouping together the Circassian peoples related to the Abkhaz, and the Chechens, Ingush, Ossetians, as well as several Dagestani peoples, the Confederation was a powerful idea in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the fate of the Soviet Union and its successor states was uncertain. The Confederation aimed to restore the North Caucasian ‘Mountain Republic’ that had briefly existed in 1917-1920, and it enjoyed a significant level of support among the local population at this time when national feelings were running high. Sukhumi was declared the capital of the Confederation, and the sense of solidarity felt by activists from the North Caucasus with Abkhazia was remarkable. In this sense, ethnic kin was a potent factor in giving the Abkhaz a sense that they were supported by ethnic kin across the border in the North Caucasus. To a lesser extent and more so during and after the war, the Abkhaz and North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey also proved to be an asset. A number of Turkish citizens of Abkhaz origin came to fight in Abkhazia and yet others came to conduct business after the war, but before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, national kinship sentiments had not awakened in Turkey and hence played no real role in the emergence of the conflict. Ethnic kin in the North Caucasus did, though, as was made abundantly clear by the support that the Abkhaz received from North Caucasian

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volunteers, whose participation in the actual fighting against Georgian forces was of crucial importance to the outcome of the war.8

7.1.7. Economic Viability Both Georgia and Abkhazia were relatively privileged parts of the Soviet Union in economic terms. As described in chapter seven, Georgia had a large shadow economy that grew to impressive proportions in the 1970s, in fact challenging the prevailing Socialist economic order in the republic. Georgia was the republic of the Soviet Union where indicators of wealth such as private savings and automobile ownership were the highest.9 Abkhazia, for its part, was together with Crimea the pearl of the ‘Soviet Rivera’. This meant that industry was weak in Abkhazia compared to the rest of Georgia, with the population mainly employed in agriculture and services. As Kaufman notes, economic considerations played little part in the Abkhaz conflict.10 Yet in terms of economic viability, the Abkhaz government could clearly view Abkhazia as a self-sufficient economic unit outside Georgia. Especially given its tourist industry that mainly attracted Russians – including many high Russian military officers who regularly vacationed in Abkhazia – the republic could expect to survive economically. Even aside from the tourist industry, Abkhazia is basically self-sufficient in food and produces electricity through hydro-electric power plants. Even after the conflict, electricity flow is better in Abkhazia than in many parts of Georgia. Whereas economic viability was present in Abkhazia, it is doubtful whether economic considerations influenced the course of events to any significant extent. As Kaufman notes, both sides were more concerned with ‘symbolic nationalist concerns than economic ones.’11 On the other hand, economic problems or economic dependence on Tbilisi were not present, implying that no economic factors were there to impede the Abkhaz secessionist moves.

7.1.8. Radical Leadership The emergence and strengthening of Abkhaz separatism was led by what can be termed an alliance between intelligentsia groups and the dominant ethnic Abkhaz components of the official structures of the republic. In December 1977, the petition sent to the central government demanding improvements in Abkhazia’s status was drafted by an informal groups of Abkhaz intellectuals. The same letter was submitted to the authorities of the ASSR, where it found support from the ethnic Abkhaz leaders. Moscow’s intervention, though acquiescing to some of the Abkhaz demands, refused to change the status of Abkhazia, but later replaced the incumbent head of the Abkhaz Party Valerian Kobakhia See Dodge Billingsley, ‘Confederates of the Caucasus’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1997. 9 Revaz Gachechiladze, The New Georgia: Space, Society, Politics, pp. 117-136. 10 Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, p. 99. 11 Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, p. 99 8

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through the first deputy chairman of the Council of Minister, Boris Adleiba, a person closer to the separatists. The boost to Abkhaz autonomy in 1978 (discussed in further detail below) greatly contributed to the joint efforts of the official representatives and the intelligentsia, as the Abkhaz were now in a dominant position in the ASSR and may have felt less constrained by Tbilisi, and more supported by Moscow. In apparent collusion between the Abkhaz Nomenklatura and the separatist intelligentsia, a large demonstration was organized in May 1978, something rather unseen in the Brezhnev era – and followed by incidents of unrest and ethnic violence that were not dealt with in the repressive Soviet manner. In November 1988, the Abkhaz nationalist group Aydgylara (Unity) was established under the leadership of the writer Alexei Gogua. Aydgylara based its program on loyalty to Moscow and championing Abkhaz ethnic rights. When Aydgylara organized the demonstration on the sacred field in the village Lykhny in March 198912 (that produced the counter-demonstration in Tbilisi in April that in turn led to the April 9 crackdown), Adleiba rapidly returned from Moscow to take part in the event together with other high Abkhaz officials. The ‘Lykhny declaration’ of March 18 again took up the issue of Abkhazia’s ‘illegal’ incorporation into Georgia and demanded the return to the status of 1921. Adleiba, however, was dismissed and replaced by Vladimir Khishba, formerly Georgian deputy minister of Forestry.13 Vladislav Ardzinba had been the director of the Abkhaz Institute of Language, Literature and History from 1987 until 1989, when he was elected a Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet from Gudauta, one of the most homogeneously Abkhaz areas in Abkhazia . From there, he was involved closely with national issues, including Abkhazia. On December 4, 1990, Ardzinba was elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia. Ardzinba then consolidated his power relatively quickly, and went back on promises of increasing the representation of Georgians he had made before being elected; since then, Ardzinba tried to rule Abkhazia relatively single-handedly while keeping a dialogue with Tbilisi on the reform of the electoral law, which eventually led to the agreement of Summer 1991 of a code that granted the Abkhaz wide over-representation. When the elections to the Supreme Soviet took place, Ardzinba formed a Presidium that consisted of three Abkhaz (including himself), three Georgians, two Russians and one Armenian. As ethnic polarization was intense at this point, the members were forced to take sides: one of the Russian members sided with the Georgians, whereas the other Russian and the Armenian member sided with the Abkhaz. Ardzinba had successfully built a coalition that guaranteed the Abkhaz control over the republic. An ethnic Abkhaz

The field at Lykhny is sacred in pre-monotheistic Abkhaz beliefs, a place where Abkhaz connect spiritually with their ancestors. 13 Vakhtang Kholbaia et. Al., Labyrinth of Abkhazia, (trans. Nana Japaridze-Chkoidze), Tbilisi 1999. 12

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elite that had developed during decades of Soviet rule provided a solid radical leadership for the nationalist movement in the late 1980s.

7.1.9. External Support As the conflict in Abkhazia turned into war with the August 1992 invasion of Kitovani’s forces, the Abkhaz forces received two forms of substantial backing from the North. Direct support came from volunteer units organized by the Abkhaz’ ethnic kin in the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, primarily composed of Chechens and Circassians. This military support was crucial to the war effort, given the numerical inferiority and military inexperience of the Abkhaz forces. Of equal importance was the blatant (though officially denied) military support of Russian military units, which proved decisive as all types of weaponry was provided for the Abkhaz/North Caucasian forces, including air support and naval vessels; detachments of Russian forces very likely also took part in the actual fighting itself.14 Whereas the level of support of Russian military units for the Abkhaz is well established, an important question is whether the Abkhaz anticipated external support in the event of a military conflict with Tbilisi. If external support arrived spontaneously and unexpectedly after Abkhazia was attacked, that would mean that this factor played no part in the political consideration leading to the de facto declaration of independence in 1992. If, however, the Abkhaz were aware that external support would be forthcoming, that may have influenced their decision to bid for independence in mid-1992. Indeed, if the Abkhaz leadership was intent on pursuing separation from Georgia, it had had an excellent opportunity to realize that ambition only six months earlier: when the civil war in Tbilisi between Gamsakhurdia and his opponents flared, Abkhazia could have declared independence, all the more so because the dissolution of the Soviet Union took place at the exact same time. This would have given Abkhazia time to prepare its defenses, and the fact that the Zviadists had a power base in Mingrelia – between Abkhazia in Tbilisi – also meant that the forces loyal to the military council would have had difficulty dealing with an independent Abkhazia. Instead, the Abkhaz leadership waited until the Military Council had consolidated power, the Zviadists reduced to size, and the South Ossetian conflict suspended, freeing Tbilisi’s hands. This, with the benefit of hindsight, was a particularly bad moment to declare independence. Moreover, there was no direct event in Tbilisi or provocation from the Georgian side that could have prompted the decision of the type that had been the case in South Ossetia. As such, the Abkhaz decision remains a mystery. The leadership of Abkhazia, however, had always been well-connected in the Soviet bureaucracy and hierarchy. As the Soviet Union was ruled to a great extent based on See discussion in chapter 6; Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, pp. 347-353; Thomas Goltz, ‘Letter from Eurasia: The Hidden Russian Hand’, Foreign Policy, no. 92, Fall 1993

14

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personal, not institutional ties, and this being particularly true in the Caucasus, the fact that substantial parts of the high echelons of Soviet power vacationed in Abkhazia provided Abkhazia’s ruling circles with a direct connection to the Union-level leadership, similar to the way that Mikhail Gorbachev’s work in the Stavropol region and Mineralnye Vody put him in touch with high visiting officials and served as a springboard for his career. When Stalin tried to curtail Beria’s control over Georgia in 1951 (beginning with the so-called Mingrelian affair), the leadership of the republic was affected by March 1952: Beria’s protégé Charkviani was replaced with the head of the Kutaisi oblast, Akaki Mgeladze, who had only been elected to full membership in the Georgian Communist Party’s Central Committee four months earlier. Before his appointment in Kutaisi, Mgeladze had been first secretary of the Abkhazian Communist Party from 1943 to 1952. While in this position, Mgeladze had had the opportunity to meet Stalin when the dictator was visiting his vacation resort on the Black Sea coast. This personal connection was likely of high importance in Mgeladze’s steep ascent to power in Georgia. It is also known that many high (ethnic Russian) officers in the military were among the Soviet officials that had dachas in Abkhazia; this can explain their attachment to the region and their apprehension for the prospect of Abkhazia belonging to a foreign country, that is, Georgia. Ardzinba had worked for many years under Yevgeniy Primakov, then head of the Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow, and later Russian foreign and Prime Minister. Morevoer, while a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet, Ardzinba was close to Anatoly Lukyanov, the parliamentary chairman who has been called the ideologue of the August 1991 coup.15 This connection proved crucial for the Abkhaz nationalist movement. Much like Georgia in the mid-1990s has benefited from the connection with, and appreciation prevalent in the west for its President, Shevardnadze, Abkhazia in 1991-92 benefited from the close connection that its leadership had with hardliner circles in Moscow, which emboldened it to seek secession from Georgia. A potential challenge to this interpretation is that the hardliner circles lost the power struggle in Moscow after the failure of the August 1991 coup; indeed, Boris Yeltsin’s reformer wing was perhaps the polar opposite of the faction to which Ardzinba had his allegiances. After all, Lukyanov was in prison between late 1991 and 1994. However, a closer look at Russian policy shows the inconsistencies of the actions of different branches of power in Moscow. In fact, it has been observed that Yeltsin at first sought to play the role of an honest broker in the conflict. However, the Russian military, including high-ranking officers in the Ministry of Defense, had a different agenda than the President and actively implemented this agenda. The military sought to restore Moscow’s control over the Caucasus in general and Georgia in particular, especially the strategically located Abkhazia. In late 1992, Yeltsin was still, apparently truthfully, seeking peace, while units of his military forces were

15

The Guardian, 23 August 1991; Moscow Times, 21 August 2001.

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supporting the Abkhaz. The conflicting policies of Russia were obvious in September 1993, when Yeltsin condemned Abkhazia for breaking the cease-fire and occupying Sukhumi – while Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev on the same day claimed that only the ‘immediate withdrawal’ of all Georgian forces from Abkhazia could bring an end to the conflict.16 Indeed, during 1993 the conservative forces’ control over Russian foreign policy grew more assertive.17 What this shows is that although the political leaders of the conservative front in Russia had been sidelined in August 1991, the representatives of similar thinking in the military were very active indeed. The close connections between Ardzinba’s Abkhaz leadership and the rapid Russian response from October 1992 onward form strong circumstantial evidence that Ardzinba had received assurances of military backing for Abkhazian independence. However, Kitovani’s invasion took everyone – including Ardzinba, probably the Russian military leadership, and possibly even Shevardnadze himself – by surprise, explaining why no military support was present to oppose the invasion.18 The presence of such ‘guarantees’ would also shed light on the background to Ardzinba’s July 1992 statement that Abkhazia was ‘strong enough to fight Georgia’; but also his statement on August 14, 2001, the day of Kitovani's invasion where he stated that 'the world knows in which situation Abkhazia has been placed ... we are assured of its moral and material assistance ... in fact I am convinced that we have appropriate support'.19 Viewed in proper context, Ardzinba's confidence at a moment when his disorganized forces were being routed by Kitovani's equally disorganized, but more numerous troops, displayed an awareness that external support was indeed going to be forthcoming. The step is not far to assume that this awareness had been available to Ardzinba only several weeks earlier when the decision to secede was taken. In sum, it is external support played a crucial role in the escalation to conflict in Abkhazia.

7.1.10. The Role of Autonomy Several factors conducive to ethnic conflict existed in Abkhazia, such as a sustained level of tension between the two communities, and mythified and divergent interpretations of history; moreover, their national conceptions were mutually exclusive, and Abkhazia between 1989 and 1992 developed close links to ethnic kin in the North Caucasus and secured external support for its bid for independence from Georgia, under the leadership of a radical nationalist leadership. This reality hence implies that both incentives and 'Russia calls on Georgia not to Fight Abkhazians', International Herald Tribune, 21 September 1993 Mohiaddin Mesbahi, ‘Russian Foreign Policy and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 12 no. 2, 1993, pp. 181-215. 18 Another version often mentioned in Georgia is that the Russians, while supporting the Abkhaz, also instigated Kitovani’s invasion in order to trigger a conflict, by providing weapons, and perhaps promising Kitovani – who was strongly opposed to the bringing in of Shevardnadze five months earlier – support for his leadership in Georgia after a successful operation. 19 Chronicle of and Undeclared War, Moscow 1992, cited in Chervonnaya, Conflict in the Caucasus: Georgia, Abkhazia and the Russian Shadow, Oxford, Gothic Image Publications, 1994, p. 118. 16 17

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capacity for conflict were present in the case of Abkhazia. How did the presence of the institution of territorial autonomy interplay with this? There is little doubt that autonomy helped sustain the separate group identity of the Abkhaz. Especially considering their insignificant numbers, which according to a Russian official in the early twentieth century meant that the ‘Abkhaz language is not written and has no literature, and is destined to extinction. Which language is going to replace it? Obviously, it should be Russian rather than Georgian.’20 Indeed, sandwiched between Georgia and Russia, the Abkhaz people would in the absence of autonomy have been susceptible to linguistic Russification like the North Caucasian peoples to its North, or to ‘georgianization’ like the Mingrelians or Svans to their South and East. Whereas Mingrelians and Svans are linguistically related to Georgians, their languages are not mutually understandable with Georgian. These peoples lacked autonomy, and were gradually georgianized throughout the Soviet period as uniformity of language (based on an eastern Georgian dialect) was stressed through the system of education, print media, and radio and television broadcasts. While these peoples maintain strong regional identities, their integration with mainstream Georgian society has increased. The Abkhaz, on the other hand, were able for most of the Soviet era – depending, as all other parts of the union, on the nationality policy at the center – to preserve the Abkhaz language, and to inculcate through the educational system a national history often highly divergent from that which Georgian schoolchildren were taught. The availability of newspapers and broadcasting in the Abkhaz language, also enhanced through the institution of autonomy, helped sustain the distinct identity of the Abkhaz. Table 7.1. Ethnic Affiliation of raikom Secretaries in the Abkhaz ASSR21 1965

1975

1985

1st Secretaries, Abkhaz %

42,9

50

50

1st Secretaries, Georgian %

57,1

50

37,5

2nd Secretaries, Abkhaz %

28,6

12,5

12,5

2nd Secretaries, Georgian %

57,1

62,5

75

Secretaries, Abkhaz %

28,6

12,5

50

Secretaries, Georgian %

42,9

50

12,5

The significance of the state institutions of the Abkhaz ASSR for the purposes of Abkhaz ethnic mobilization can hardly be overstated. Faced with a daunting demographic inferiority in their homeland, the Abkhaz were throughout the post-Stalin period able to Z. B. Anchabadze, Ocherki etnicheskoi istorii abkhazskogo naroda, Sukhumi 1970, p. 96 Jurgen Gerber, Georgien, Table 15, p. 292. Totals for a given year may not amount to 100 given that members of other nationalities, especially Russians, held office in some areas.

20 21

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increase their already disproportionate representation in the ruling organs of the ASSR. Table 7.1 shows that the Abkhaz, in spite of forming around a sixth of the population of Abkhazia, controlled almost half of the secretarial positions in the raikoms, and significantly, dominated in the positions of first secretary. This is an illustration to the affirmative action policy that the Soviet structure of autonomy implied for small titular populations like the Abkhaz. As the table shows, the Abkhaz were particularly favored after the concessions of 1978, which practically enabled ethnic Abkhaz to secure control over the republican administration and the economic institutions of the ASSR.22 In addition to the raikoms, 67 percent of government ministers and 71% of Obkom department heads were ethnic Abkhaz.23 This control over the institutions of the republic and the affirmative action that strongly favored the Abkhaz and gave them political outlets and career opportunities created an Abkhaz political elite that would have been unlikely to emerge had Abkhazia not enjoyed an autonomous status. Without such leadership, there would not have been any outlet for the grievances of the Abkhaz, grievances that were themselves repeatedly formulated, expressed and entertained by the elite – with the use not least of the media outlets controlled by the Abkhaz government. Autonomy also enabled the Abkhaz elite under Ardzinba to create mono-ethnic defense units and to arm them by appropriating the assets of the Soviet military on the soil of Abkhazia (a decree that was implemented only to a limited extent); and to pass laws concerning the state symbols and status of Abkhazia. Laws on the flag and symbols of Abkhazia were passed in early 1992, and the 1925 constitution was adopted in July, sparking the conflict. The opposition of the ethnic Georgian section of the parliament may have made the decisions legally tenuous or even invalid, but this did not matter in practice: there existed a decision-making body that not only decreed but also implemented the imposition of a state flag, the enactment of a constitution, and the creation of an army. The institutions of the autonomy were also crucial in providing the Abkhaz population with a leadership. At every time since 1978 that the Soviet center replaced a party head, the structure was in place to ensure the survival and often even the strengthening of the separatist movement. In terms of external support, Ardzinba’s position in Moscow may have been strong, but unless he had had the autonomous structures of Abkhazia to return to and lead, he would have faced larger difficulties in creating a nationalist movement with popular support. He could feasibly have gone back to create a national movement at the grassroots level; yet See also Kholbaia et. al., Labyrinth of Abkhazia, chapter one. Darrel Slider, ‘Democratization in Georgia’, in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., Conflict, Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 170. Of 12 ministers and 8 department heads, 13 were Abkhaz and 6 Georgians in the late 1980s. Of regional prosecutors, five were Abkhaz and three Georgian; eight of fifteen deputies from Abkhazia to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were ethnic Abkhaz. See Kholbaia et. Al., Labyrinth of Abkhazia, Chapter one. 22 23

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Abkhazia’s autonomy presented the would-be nationalist leader with an excellent and ready-made power base that included decision-making bodies, links to outside support and to financial resources, as well as to media outlets for propagating the message to the people. Autonomy hence undoubtedly played a crucial role in the development of an assertive Abkhaz nationalist movement that mounted a credible and ultimately successful secessionist challenge to the Georgian central government. The role played by autonomy itself in protecting and promoting the ethnic identity of the Abkhaz, and in providing institutions for a secessionist movement, were important in and by themselves; yet the empirical record also shows how the institution of autonomy was intimately linked with other factors that played an important role in the emergence of conflict, specifically external support and radical leadership.

7.2. South Ossetia: the Power of a Parliament The South Ossetian conflict, perhaps because it was considerably less severe than either the Abkhaz or Mountainous Karabakh conflicts, has been relatively neglected in the literature. However, it remains one of the main impediments to the consolidation of Georgian statehood, while it is geographically considerably closer to Georgia’s heartland than Abkhazia. Like Abkhazia, South Ossetia was an unlikely candidate for secession. Unlike the Abkhaz, the Ossetians were in a majority position in their autonomous region, but their absolute numbers were extremely small, numbering less than 70,000 inside South Ossetia. Yet South Ossetia emerged as the first serious challenger to Georgia’s sovereignty in the Perestroika period. In fact, the situation in Ossetia escalated parallel to, and in direct response to the development of the Georgian national movement – it is in fact arguably the conflict in the Caucasus that most closely approximates the ‘security dilemma’. Georgians and Ossetians perceived each other’s national claims as a direct threat to their own nation. Ossetians saw remaining in Georgia as threatening their survival, whereas Georgians saw Ossetia as a tool of Moscow in undermining Georgian sovereignty and aspirations to independence. This led them both to take actions intended to ‘protect’ their respective interests – that served to escalate the conflict. How did such a severe conflict escalate so quickly in an area that had been quiet and devoid of ethnic tensions in the Soviet era?

7.2.1. Cultural Differences Ossetians claim descent from the Alans, an Iranian people themselves apparently descending from Scythian-Sarmatian tribes that had occupied eastern parts of the Roman empire but settled in the Caucasus in the fifth century, where they created a sizable state in the North Caucasus and present-day Southern Russia. Their language is Iranian, not comprehensible to but related with Farsi. However, unlike most Iranian peoples, Ossetians are predominantly Orthodox Christians. In North Ossetia, a substantial minority (the Digor Ossetians), estimated at 25-30%, is Sunni Muslim; however, the

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Ossetians South of the Great Caucasus range are Orthodox Christians. But similarly to the Abkhaz, the Ossetians retain strong influences from pre-Christian and pre-Islamic religious beliefs.24 South Ossetians hence share the same religion with the Georgians, but belong to a different ethno-linguistic group.

7.2.2. National Conception The Ossetians are like the Abkhaz or Armenians not included in the predominant Georgian national conception. However, especially compared to the Abkhaz, the strength of the ethnic Ossetian identity was relatively weak, and did not find much political expression either in North or South Ossetia during the Soviet times. The rate of intermarriages between between Ossetians and Georgians, especially among Ossetians living outside the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, were relatively high; the most famous alleged child of an Ossetian-Georgian family was Stalin. In spite of this, Georgian views on Ossetian rights in Georgia are considerably more circumscribed than regarding the Abkhaz. While most Georgians see the Abkhaz as an indigenous people and therefore traditionally had a higher degree of toleration or acceptance of Abkhazia’s autonomous status, this is not the case in South Ossetia. It is significant that Ossetia’s autonomy was abolished, while Abkhazia’s never was; many Georgians view Ossetians as recent migrants with a homeland in the North Caucasus, and therefore not entitled to any territorial autonomy in Georgia. Georgian nationalists in the late 1980s very much had Ossetians in mind when defining minorities in Georgia as ‘guests’ on Georgian soil, thereby displaying clearly their conception of Ossetians as being outside the Georgian nation. As for the Ossetians, few inside South Ossetia adopted a Georgian identity, and the overwhelming majority within the autonomous region sustained a distinct Ossetian identity. The proclamation of ‘native’ and ‘non-native’ peoples in Georgia, where Georgians considered themselves and the Abkhaz native, but described the Ossetians as non-native, was particularly alienating for the Ossetians.25

7.2.3. Past Conflict and Myths The level of conflict between Georgians and Ossetians had been low before the first world war and remained low during the Soviet era, especially compared with Abkhazia.26 Historical interpretations nevertheless collide drastically in essential matters, including the Ossetians’ history on present-day Georgia. Georgian sources claim the Ossetians migrated See Sebastian Smith, Allah’s Mountains, I.B. Tauris, pp. 81-82. Albert Kabisov, ‘Konflikt v Iuzhnoi Osetii i tsennost opyta Alanskoi Avtonomii dlia razresheniia konfliktov v Zakavkaze’, in Georgi Gogsadze et. al., Etnopoliticheskie Konflikty v Zakavkaze: Ikh Istoki I Puti Resheniia¸ College Park, MD: University of Maryland CIDCM, 1997, p. 155. 26 For historical overviews of Ossetia during the revolutionary period, see Pavel V. Doguzov, Revolutsionnoe Dvizhenie v Iugo-Osetii, Moscow 1960; Sof’ia Grigor’evna Bekoeva, Iugo-Osetiia v period pervoi Russkoi revoliutsii, Vladikavkaz 1956. 24 25

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to the South of the Caucasus mountains in the 17th or 18th centuries and settling in what Georgians refer to as Shida Kartli;27 Ossetians, on the other hand, claim they have been living on both sides of the mountain range for up to over a thousand years.28 The fact that Shida Kartli is seen as the Heart of Georgian statehood, and that Tskhinvali lies within two hours drive by car from Tbilisi, is seen in Georgia as a Russian-created encroachment on the central territory of the Georgian nation. The establishment of autonomous South Ossetia is seen in this light. Moreover, Georgians claim that during industrialization in Georgia after the establishment of the Soviet Union, numerous Ossetians began migrating southward from the mountains. To support their argument, they cite the fact that Tskhinvali itself had no more than a thousand Ossetians in 1926, whereas this number had increased to 40,000 by 1989.29 Ossetians, naturally, have a different interpretation. They argue that Ossetians, both North and South without any distinction, joined Russia voluntarily in 1774, 27 years before Georgia was annexed in 1801. Hence when Georgia became independent from Russia in 1918, there was accordingly no reason for South Ossetia to be included in Georgia since the Ossetians had joined Russia separately and earlier than Georgia. For Ossetians in Georgia, the separation of Georgia from Russia – either in the shape of Imperial Russia in 1917 or the Soviet Union in 1991 – meant the political division of what they saw as Ossetian lands between two different countries. It is therefore not surprising that the periods of Georgian attempts to secure independence have also been accompanied by Ossetian attempts to secure their connection with their ethnic kin in the North. Ossetia was thus one of the most problematic regions during the First Georgian Republic. Ossetian historiography claims that South Ossetia was annexed by Menshevik Georgia in 1918.30 An uprising took place in the winter of 1918, and a larger rebellion probably instigated by Bolsheviks in 1920. Ossetians tried to establish a Soviet republic in early 1920, but were faced by Georgian troops sent to prevent what would effectively amount to the secession of South Ossetia. Despite assurances of respecting Georgia’s territorial integrity in a May 7, 1920 treaty, Soviet Russia demanded Georgia call back its troops from Ossetia since ‘Ossetia must have that rule which it wished to have’.31 The Avtandil Menteshashvili, Iz Istorii Vzaimootnosheniy Gruzinskogo, Abkhazskogo i Osetinskogo Narodov (1918-1920 gg.)¸Tbilisi 1990.

27

See N.V. Siukayev, Dve Tragedii Yuzhnaya Osetiya, Vladikavkaz, 1994; see also overview in Nikola Cvetkovski, The Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict, Aalborg University, 1999, p. 44. 29 Georgii Gogzadze, ‘Glavnye Asspekty Mezhetnicheskikh Otnoshenii v Gruzii’, in Georgi Gogsadze et. al., Etnopoliticheskie Konflikty v Zakavkaze: Ikh Istoki I Puti Resheniia¸ College Park, MD: University of Maryland CIDCM, 1997, p. 128. 30 See ‘Respublika Iuzhnaia Osetiia – Kratkaia Spravka o Respublike Iuzhnaia Osetiia, Ob Istorii I Kulture eio Naroda’ (http://www.geocities.com/Vienna/Strasse/5262/South.html.) 31 Quote in note by G. Chicherin to the Georgian government, May 17, 1920, in Avtandil Menteshashvili, ‘An Assessment of the 1920 Uprising in South Ossetia’, Some National and Ethnic Problems in Georgia, Tbilisi 1992. (susauri.tripod.com/politic/Ossetia.htm) 28

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Bolshevik forces in South Ossetia then in late May declared having overturned Menshevik rule and appealed for support from the Soviet Russian authorities. However, probably because Soviet Russia was not yet ready for a full-scale conflict with Georgia, instead trying to focus at this point on conquering Baku and Azerbaijan, kept its formal recognition of Georgia’s territorial integrity, and declined to assist the South Ossetian uprising – hence precipitating a Georgian crackdown.32 The level of conflict was hence considerable in the 1918-1920 period. Yet the level of mythification of past conflict and claims based on present grievances remained considerably lower in the Ossetian case compared to the Abkhaz case, where they were constantly on the agenda during much of the Soviet period. Ossetian sources nevertheless claim that Georgia pursued a policy of assimilation in South Ossetia and that its autonomy was illusory. It is reasonably clear from Soviet census data that numerous Ossetians, but then primarily those living outside the South Ossetian autonomous region, adopted Georgian as their native language during the post-war period, and that the level of intermarriage between Georgians and Ossetians was high. This must be seen as a sign that inter-ethnic relations between Georgians and Ossetians were not plagued by high levels of suspicion or conflict. In sum, significant past conflict existed in South Ossetia, which was nevertheless not coupled with high levels of mythification.

7.2.4. Rough Terrain The lands populated by Ossetians lie across the Great Caucasian mountain range, in fact straddling the mountain passes between the western and eastern sections of that range. As such, the southern areas of North Ossetia and the northern areas of South Ossetia are very mountainous and inaccessible. However, the southernmost portion of South Ossetia including its capital Tskhinvali is located in the foothills of the mountains. However, South Ossetia is by any standard a mountainous area. As in the case of Abkhazia, it is difficult to determine whether the rough terrain of South Ossetia actually influenced the calculations of the Ossetian elite. It would in retrospect seem that these considerations played a small part in comparison to the expectation of external support discussed below.

7.2.5. Relative Demography South Ossetia had a very small population in absolute numbers, only passing the 100,000mark by the time of the 1989 census. However, the Ossetians were in a clear demographic majority position of almost 70% of the autonomous Oblast’s population. This implied that unlike the Abkhaz, the Ossetians did not have to resort to strong affirmative action policies in order to control the institutions of South Ossetia. This demographic dominance increased the Ossetians’ prospects of gaining political union with North 32 Menteshashvili, ‘An Assessment of the 1920 Uprising in South Ossetia’, and Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia.

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Ossetia in spite of their low absolute numbers. It also meant that ethnic Ossetians controlled the day-to-day affairs of South Ossetia without resorting to the extreme affirmative action employed in Abkhazia.

7.2.6. Ethnic Kin Ossetian leaders in South Ossetia benefited from their ethnic link to North Ossetia in numerous ways. This closeness increased with the completion of the rail tunnel between North and South Ossetia in 1988. Prior to that, the main road link between North and South Ossetia passed outside South Ossetia’s territory, through Kazbegi and the Daryal Gorge to its immediate East. North Ossetia provided South Ossetia with a valuable ally within the Russian Federation. North Ossetia, and especially its Nomenklatura that was well-connected in Moscow, consistently served as a lobbying factor for Russian support for the South Ossetian cause in its conflict with the Georgian authorities.33 Moreover, the existence of ethnic kin in the North contributed to offsetting the demographic weakness of South Ossetia. This became clear in 1992 when an escalation of the conflict took place, volunteer forces assembled in North Ossetia, composed mainly of ethnic Ossetians from the North and to a lesser extent of other North Caucasian volunteers.34 The promise of support from the North in terms of real fighting personnel was certainly a factor that increased the Ossetian capacity to sustain the conflict with the much more numerous Georgians.

7.2.7. Economic Viability In contrast to Abkhazia, South Ossetia had no tourist attraction, and did not have much economic activity in the Soviet times. It had little industry, some mining activities in the northwest of the autonomous Oblast, but remained a mainly agricultural area even though climatic and topographic conditions made agriculture difficult. Basically, South Ossetia was one of the more disadvantaged areas in Georgia, comparable to mountain regions like Khevsureti or Racha, or for that matter Javakheti. It subsisted through the ‘marginal allocation of industrial resources from Moscow’.35 South Ossetia’s viability was hence low, though it should be noted that South Ossetia strove for unification with economically rather wealthy North Ossetia, and not independence. This factor counterbalanced the lack of economic viability in South Ossetia proper. Of course, the conflict’s development has enabled South Ossetia to function as a major smuggling conduit between Russia and the Julian Birch, ‘Ossetia: A Caucasian Bosnia in Microcosm’, Central Asian Survey, vol. 14 no. 1, 1995. 34 See Dodge Billingsley, ‘Confederates of the Caucasus’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1997. 35 Ketevan Tsikhelashvili, ‘The Case Studies of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’, draft chapter, European Center for Minority Issues, 30 September 2001, p. 38. (http://www.ecmi.de/cps/download/ Abkhazia_SouthOssetia.pdf) 33

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South Caucasus that benefits corrupt Russian, Ossetian, and Georgian customs or law enforcement officials while it leaves the local population with little benefits. This can however hardly be considered a factor of economic viability, especially not in the preconflict period.

7.2.8. Radical Leadership The Ademon Nykhas (Popular Shrine) movement was formed in early 1988, under the leadership of its main ideologue, Alan Chochiev, a hitherto relatively unnoticed lecturer in History at the Tskhinvali Pedagogical Institute. Interestingly, Ademon Nykhas’ first noticeable public appearance was not related directly with the status of South Ossetia, but with Abkhazia: Chochiev addressed an open letter in support of the Abkhaz movement for separation from Georgia in March 1989, following the Lykhny mass meeting. In his letter, reprinted in Literaturuli Sakartvelo on May 5, 1989, Chochiev on behalf of Ademon Nykhas expressed his worries that Abkhazia’s legal demands for sovereignty be ignored, and his hopes that a ‘just solution to the Abkhaz Question will set a precedent for de facto parity between so-called Union and autonomous formations’. He vowed that the entire Ossetian people supported the Abkhaz, including the South Ossetian autonomous oblast’s leadership.36 Clearly, Chochiev envisaged that the Abkhaz case would set a precedent for South Ossetia. However, Chochiev’s views were apparently not shared by all Ossetians at this time. Many Ossetians rushed to stress their loyalty to Georgia and to emphasize the historical friendship of Georgians and Ossetians. Moreover, the South Ossetian Oblast Soviet Plenum unanimously condemned Chochiev’s letter, and the Oblast Procurator even initiated legal action against him.37 The issue was magnified in the Georgian media, and some Georgian observers blame Gamsakhurdia and the Georgian nationalist media for ‘launching’ Chochiev’s career in Ossetia. Indeed, as Chochiev did not enjoy the support of the local Ossetian authorities at this time, his access to the media was certainly limited; hence the claim that most Ossetians learnt about Chochiev and his group from reading the Georgian press may not be unfounded.38 On the other hand, animosities at the grassroots level were emerging. During the celebration of the First Georgian Republic’s independence day on May 18, 1989, a group of Georgians in South Ossetia had their Georgian flags snatched and desecrated. Clashes between bands of ethnic Georgians and Ossetians erupted.39 Other incidents of ethnic violence in South Ossetia were reported in the Summer. However, as Fuller notes, very See Elizabeth Fuller, ‘Georgian Parliament Votes to Abolish Ossetian Autonomy’, Report on the USSR, 21 December 1990; Fuller, ‘The South Ossetian Campaign for Unification’, Report on the USSR, 8 December 1989. 37 Fuller, ‘The South Ossetian Campaign for Unification’, p. 18. 38 Interview with Irakli Machavariani, Special Representative of the President of Georgia to the negotiations in the South Ossetian conflict, Tbilisi, February 2002. 39 Cvetkovski, The Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict, p. 46. 36

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little of this is known as it was not reported in the media.40 Rumors circulated throughout Summer and Fall of 1989 about unrest and about groups of Ossetians traveling to Abkhazia to support the Abkhaz. The Zarya Vostoka newspaper reported a state of ‘psychosis’ in South Ossetia.41 During Summer, Ademon Nykhas begun campaigning for the unification of South Ossetia with North Ossetia, and this reached a point where the official leadership had to respond. In July, Oblast Committee First Secretary Anatolii Chekhoev told a Tskhinvali crowd that ‘Ademon Nykhas' demands for unification of North and South Ossetia [are] groundless’.42 The situation was aggravated in August by the publication of the Georgian language program envisaging the strengthening the position of the Georgian language all over Georgia. This program sparked ethnopolitical mobilization in South Ossetia. Ademon Nykhas now managed to organize strikes in Tskhinvali and in the mines in Kvaisi, showing its increased popular standing.43 Meanwhile, the Oblast Soviet now for the first time leaned toward nationalism. On September 5, its official newspaper Sovetskaia Osetiia published the draft of a law on the Ossetian language that would give equal status to the Ossetian, Georgian, and Russian languages within the Autonomous Oblast. Ademon Nykhas was now consolidating its position in the legislature, attracting an increasing number of members to its radical position. In particular, Chochiev managed to attract the cooperation of Toroz Kolumbekov, a member of the local Soviet.44 In early September, Ademon Nykhas, apparently with the support of some members of the Oblast Soviet, issued an appeal for the unification of North and South Ossetia to the central authorities in Moscow.45 Members of the Oblast Soviet now seriously got involved in the ‘war of laws’ by appealing for the status of South Ossetia to be raised to that of an Autonomous Republic.46 The Georgian Supreme Soviet proclaimed the declaration null and void, and raised the stakes by removing Chekhoev from his position on November 12.47 Two weeks later, Gamsakhurdia, with the obvious support of Communist Party Head Gumbaridze (who supplied transportation) rallied thousands of Georgians into buses to travel to Tskhinvali and hold a rally there.48 The crowd was stopped by armed Ossetians and Ministry of Interior troops, without which the situation may have deteriorated into severe Fuller, ‘The South Ossetian Campaign for Unification’, p. 18. 41 Zarya Vostoka, 23 July 1989. 42 Komunisti, 23 July 1989, quoted in Fuller, ‘The South Ossetian Campaign for Unification’, p. 18. 43 Zarya Vostoka, 29 October 1989; Fuller, ‘The South Ossetian Campaign for Unification’, p. 19. 44 Interview with Machavariani. 45 See chapter six; Fuller, ‘The South Ossetian Campaign for Unification’, p. 18; Cvetkovski, The Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict, p. 46. 46 See ‘Respublika Iuzhnaia Osetiia – Kratkaia Spravka o Respublike Iuzhnaia Osetiia, Ob Istorii I Kulture eio Naroda’. 47 Cvetkovski, The Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict, p. 47. 48 Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, p. 108. Regarding Gumbaridze’s support, Interview with Machavariani. 40

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riots. Several people were wounded in the clashes, and both parties accused each other of atrocities.49 This event radicalized the Ossetian population further, as clashes at a local level between Georgian and Ossetian bands intensified. Though the situation calmed somewhat, political activism in South Ossetia continued. In June, Ademon Nykhas organized a mass meeting in Tskhinvali to force the Oblast Soviet to debate the issue of unification with North Ossetia. The autonomous leadership did not immediately respond; however, in August, the Georgian law prohibiting regional parties from participating in elections was announce, whose consequence was to practically disenfranchise Ademon Nykhas.50 This seems to have gradually tipped the balance finally in favor of the radicals within the Oblast Soviet. On 20 September, it passed a decree on sovereignty, proclaimed South Ossetia an Independent Soviet Democratic Republic, and applied to the USSR Supreme Soviet to be recognized as a subject of the USSR in its own right.51 This, of course, amounted to secession from Georgia. The Georgian Supreme Soviet predictably annulled the declaration as unconstitutional the same day, but did not act on the matter; Tbilisi was focused on the upcoming elections that eventually brought Gamsakhurdia to power on October 28, which were boycotted in South Ossetia. Matters instead heated up when South Ossetia decided to hold parliamentary elections of its own on December 9. These were held in spite of Georgian warnings, and Ossetians claim 72% of the population participated. Interestingly, the new parliament chose Toroz Kulumbekov as its chairman the next day.52 This showed that Ademon Nykhas now controlled the political atmosphere in South Ossetia. In a session of the Georgian parliament on December 11, South Ossetia’s autonomy was abolished and the region is since then in official Georgian parlance referred to as the ‘Tskhinvali and Java regions’. It is clear from the narrative above that radical leadership was present from a very early in South Ossetia. Ademon Nykhas was at first excluded from the ruling institutions of the autonomous region, but constantly tried to gain public support and lobby the Oblast Soviet to follow its radical course of action. Ademon Nykhas specifically made use of Georgian nationalism (which it occasionally provoked, for example by making an incendiary show of support for Abkhazia) and the anti-Ossetian rhetoric of Gamsakhurdia and his likes to increase its stature within the republic. Clearly, the radical leadership provided by Ademon Nykhas was a significant factor in the escalation of conflict in South Ossetia.

Fuller, ‘Georgian Parliament Votes to Abolish Ossetian Autonomy’, p. 8. 50 See Cvetkovski, The Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict, p. 47. 51 Ibid.; Fuller, ‘Georgian Parliament Votes to Abolish Ossetian Autonomy’, p. 9; Gogsadze, p. 130; Zarya Vostoka, 22 September 1990. 52 Birleşik Kafkasya Derneği, Kafkasya Kronolojisi. (http://www.bkd.org.tr/tarih/kronoloji5.htm) 49

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7.2.9. External Support The Ossetian side during various stages of the conflict received support from Moscowfirst in the shape of the Soviet authorities, but later in the shape of the Russian government, especially the hardliner-dominated Russian parliament. The most blatant Russian support for the Ossetian side was during the upsurge in fighting in May-June 1992, when parliamentary chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov and vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi spoke in terms that referred to South Ossetia as a part of Russia. Khasbulatov, referring to South Ossetia, at one occasion stated that ‘Russia is prepared to take urgent measures to defend its citizens from criminal attempts on their lives’ (emphasis added).53 Later, he claimed that Russia might ‘find itself forced to annex South Ossetia’.54 However, earlier stages in the conflict also showed a strong collusion between Ossetian authorities with Moscow. Georgian sources claim that Moscow’s hand was visible behind the Ossetian actions, as Gorbachev is rumored to have told Gamsakhurdia in 1990 that Georgia ‘will have problems with the autonomies’ if it proceeded on its course toward independence, which Georgians view as a thinly veiled threat that Moscow would use the autonomous territories against Georgian aspirations to independence. However, until the conflict broke out seriously in 1991 and escalated in 1992. Although Russian support for South Ossetia under Yeltsin was apparent, it is less clear that promises of support from Soviet authorities existed before Georgia moved toward independence. However, it is reasonably clear that promises of support from Vladikavkaz may have been present. North Ossetian volunteers were important elements in the Ossetian ‘self-defense forces’ since 1990.55 External support clearly contributed to the escalation of the South Ossetian conflict. When Georgia moved toward independence, South Ossetia clearly believed it could stay with, and would be welcomed by, the Soviet Union. Still in April 1991, when Georgia voted for independence, the total dissolution of the USSR was not at all expected. Though little evidence is available, Ossetian actions point to a conviction that the Soviet troops deployed as peacekeepers would protect South Ossetia against Georgian aggression. Only, the collapse of the USSR led to the unexpected withdrawal of these troops in late 1991, triggering a more direct conflict between the parties and removing this protection from the Ossetian side.

7.2.10. The Role of Autonomy As in the case of Abkhazia, South Ossetia displayed several factors conducive to ethnic conflict, including the existence of substantial past conflict, external kin, external support,

International Herald Tribune, 16 June 1992. 54 ‘Shevardnadze Says Russia Aids Rebels’, Washington Post, 20 June 1992. 55 S. Neil MacFarlane et. al., Armed Conflict in Georgia: A Case Study in Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping, Occasional Paper no. 21, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1996, p. 8. 53

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and perhaps most notably radical leadership. However the salience of these factors did not become apparent until the conflict was under way. It emerged not because of a gradual escalation of ethnic tensions at a mass level as in the case of Mountainous Karabakh or even in Abkhazia, where ethnic rioting occurred in 1989, long before the conflict actually broke out. In fact, some of the earliest unrest in South Ossetia took place in 1988 when a typhoid epidemic broke out. The popular protests were addressed not at Tbilisi but at the local South Ossetian Communist authorities.56 The conflict escalated not mainly because of the low-scale ethnic violence in South Ossetia, but much more importantly due to the war of declarations and laws which was waged by the parliaments of Georgia and South Ossetia. The radical leaderships on both sides also played a crucial part in pushing the relationship between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali into a security dilemma. It instructive to assess the strategy of Ademon Nykhas. As the discussion above illustrates, Ademon Nykhas concentrated much of its efforts on influencing the South Ossetian Oblast Soviet in a radical direction. Whereas the Soviet was explicitly opposed to the radical goals of Ademon Nykhas in early 1989, a combination of its lobbying of the Soviet’s deputies, Georgian nationalists’ provocation, and increasing popular support for the radicals gradually changed the policies of the Ossetian parliament. By September 1989, the local parliament was an active participant in the standoff with Tbilisi by unilaterally raising its status to that of an Autonomous Republic. It was not yet on the radical course espoused by Ademon Nykhas, but after Gamsakhurdia’s March on Tskhinvali that was itself sparked by this change in status, the balance tipped in favor of the radicals. The role of the Oblast Soviet in the escalation of the conflict is crucial. It was the existence of state-like institutions like a parliament, but also the presence of statecontrolled media and an entrenched Soviet Nomenklatura and intelligentsia in South Ossetia that made the conflict possible. Chochiev, much like Ardzinba in Abkhazia, was a Historian. His profession was to teach Ossetians about their separate culture and history, thereby entertaining and promoting their sense of separate ethnic identity. Meanwhile, the leadership of the autonomous Oblast that was at first a loyal Soviet bureaucracy was gradually won over to a radical nationalist agenda. As soon as that happened, the radicals possessed institutions with a constitutional base and a certain sense of legitimacy to take and implement their agenda, and tools to propagandize its policy among the population. Once the conflict between Moscow and Tbilisi grew, the existence of autonomous institutions in South Ossetia with radical leaderships were ideal levers for Moscow to undermine the Georgian nationalist movement and its efforts to leave the Soviet Union. With a population base of a small town, South Ossetia gradually came to act like a state. Its institutions provided a self-conscious elite, and a ready-made toolbox under control of ethnic Ossetians to wage a battle of separation from Georgia. Without

56

Nikola Cvetkovski, The Georgian-South Ossetian Conflict, p. 46.

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autonomous institutions, it is extremely unlikely that a credible secessionist movement could have emerged in South Ossetia.

7.3. Javakheti Armenians: A Narrow Escape? On paper, the Armenian community in Javakheti is a clear candidate for ethnopolitical activism given its substantial size, history of uneasy relations with Georgia, and the closeness of ethnic kin. This makes it all the more surprising that it has been ignored in much of the literature. The Minorities at Risk project of the University of Maryland at College Park, for example, does not include the Armenians in Georgia as a minority at risk although it does include the Abkhaz, Ajars, Azeris, Greeks, Ossetians and Russians of Georgia – even mysteriously referring to the occurrence of an ethnic conflict with the Russian minority.57 In his recent seminal work Modern Hatreds, Stuart Kaufman discusses the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts at length, but mentions only Ajars and the Azeris as ‘the wars avoided’.58 Yet the Javakheti issue has during the 1990s clearly been perceived as the most dangerous potential ethnic conflict in Georgia. Most Georgian observers summarily dismiss the risks of ethnic conflict in Ajaria or Kvemo Kartli, but treat the Javakheti issue with caution. As was shown in chapter six, Javakheti’s propensity for conflict according to the indicators used in this study was nearly equivalent to that of Abkhazia or South Ossetia, and far ahead of any other case of non-conflict, including Ajaria and the Azeris of Kvemo Kartli. As was shown in chapter seven, in spite of a fair deal of tension with Tbilisi, a high level of ‘weaponization‘ of the population, and the actual organization of fighting units that served in Karabakh, the Javakheti Armenians did not develop an assertive nationalist movement between 1987 and 2000. How was conflict avoided in Javakheti given the ethnopolitical mobilization of the Javakheti Armenians in a context of tense ethnic relations between the center and minorities all over Georgia?

7.3.1. Cultural Differences Georgians and Armenians speak languages that belong to different language families altogether. This has historically complicated interaction among Georgians and Armenians, who have since the beginning of Russian power in the South Caucasus, but especially during the Soviet era, conducted their contacts in Russian. Whereas this is a factor separating the two, Georgians and Armenians share the Christian faith, forming two relatively significant Christian peoples in an otherwise compactly Muslim part of the world. In fact, the Georgian and Armenian areas are surrounded by Muslims in all directions, something that has had a far larger resonance in Armenia than in Georgia. This said, the Armenian church is Monophysite whereas the Georgian Church has been Orthodox since the seventh century. The theological difference between the two may 57 58

Note. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, p. 123.

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seem cosmetic to a secular observer: the Diophysite or Orthodox, and Monophysite churches split because of a disagreement regarding the identity of Jesus Christ. Whereas Orthodox belief holds that Christ has both a divine and a human personality, Monophysite thought claims Christ’s only identity is the divine one. Yet the difference is as cultural as it is theological, as linguistic differences have on the whole overlapped with religious ones. Hence the terms in Georgian for an Armenian and for a Georgianspeaking Monophysite are the same. The crucial role that the respective churches played in the building and protection of the Armenian and Georgian national identities only strengthened this confluence of ethnicity and religion. Culturally, Georgians and Armenians share elements of Caucasian, Eastern Christian, and lately Soviet culture. Yet differences in identity are marked, with Armenians generally identifying more closely with the Middle East, whereas Georgia sees itself as decidedly European, while sharing more commonalities with the mountain peoples to their North. On the whole, the cultural differences between Armenians and Georgians are not extremely large, though they are not insignificant either.

7.3.2 National Conception The national conception of both Georgians and Armenians are predominantly ethnic. Georgian nationalists view Armenians as ’guests’ in Georgia, a thesis advocated during Gamsakhurdia’s tenure.59 They especially resent the Russian role in the settlement of Armenians (originally from eastern Turkey) to the Javakheti area in 1828-1830.60 Armenians, however, have lived in Georgia for centuries, and historically, relations between the two groups have been cordial, though as mentioned in chapter seven, there has been a certain resentment among Georgians for the industrial and urban qualities of the Armenians while Georgians long remained a peasant nation. Tbilisi Armenians nevertheless form a very different community from Javakheti Armenians. The urban community of Tbilisi Armenians played an important role in the city’s life for centuries, most of them learnt Georgian and some Armenians, though few, even assimilated into a Georgian identity, including the georgianization of their names.61 On the whole, however, the two communities remain segregated even outside Javakheti. As Hin has shown, Georgians and Armenians are doubtful of personal relations with members of the other community.62

David Darchiashvili, ‘Ethnic Relations as a Security Factor in Southern Georgia’, Central Asia and the Caucasus, no. 1, 2000. 60 See eg. Lia Melikishvili, Latent Conflict in Polyethnic Society, Tbilisi: CIPDD, 1999, p. 21 61 Interviews, Tbilisi and Akhaltsikhe, August 2000. 62 Judith Hin, ‘Ethnic and Civic Identity in Georgia: A Comparison between the Main Population Groups: Georgians and Armenians’, Paper Presented at the Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, New York, 15-17 April 1999. Slightly over half of Hin’s Armenian respondents in various ethnically mixed areas in Georgia were positive toward having Georgian 59

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The Javakheti Armenians, on the other hand, form a rural, largely peasant, and settler community. Javakheti Armenians have lived in relative isolation in the mountainous areas of Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda, their integration with Georgia has been to weak to raise the issue of their inclusion into Georgian society. They are recognized as Georgian citizens, but hardly as ‘Georgians’.

7.3.3 Past Conflict and Myths Javakheti first came up as a bone of contention in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, when the independent Georgian and Armenian republics were being created. The declarations of independence of the three South Caucasian states in May 1918 had not been followed by border delimitations, since the abortive Ottoman Caucasian offensive in the early Fall of 1918 forced the governments to postpone such issues. The Ottoman forces evacuated the lands under their control in early December. In late October, however, Georgia had invited the representatives of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Mountain Republic of the North Caucasus to a conference in Tbilisi to solve all border disputes. Faced with the prospect of a multilateral resolution of borders where it feared Georgia and the Muslims republics would form a united front against it, Armenia refused to attend, expressing its wish to resolve its boundary with Georgia in a bilateral way. As the Ottoman forces retreated before any negotiations were even held, Georgian and Armenian forces rushed into areas of Javakheti and Borchalo. Georgian forces were able to occupy several disputed areas before the Armenians, but the Armenian government responded militarily, inciting a rebellion in Borchalo. This brought the two republics to armed clashes in mid-December, as Armenia expected support from Britain and France to which it had shown loyalty during the war, whereas Georgia had been on Germany’s side. However, the British intervention in late December asked Armenia to withdraw its troops from the areas in Borchalo it had occupied. The Armenian and Georgian governments took the case to arbitration at the February 1919 Berne conference of the second international. Arbitrators decided a plebiscite would determine the affiliation of Borchalo and Akhalkalaki, but Armenia refused to accept that unless Georgia withdrew its forces prior to the plebiscite. The issue was never solved and the republics soon perished to Bolshevism, but it gravely damaged Georgian-Armenian relations. Tens of thousands of Armenians were exiled from Georgia after the events. As Kazemzadeh concludes, ’the Armeno-Georgian war inflicted great injury on the cause of the

friends; only a quarter were positive toward having a Georgian partner while 41% explicitly disliked the idea. As for Georgians, 45% were positive toward having Armenian friends, while only 9% supported the idea of having an Armenian partner, and an entire 85% explicitly disliked the idea.

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Transcaucasia republics. The old hostility of the Georgians toward the Armenians flared up and reached an intensity unparalleled before’.63 This said, the Armenian-Georgian conflict of the time must be considered a relatively minor armed conflict in view of the wars that ravaged the Caucasus during this period. The Ottoman invasion had exacted a high human and material toll on the Armenians, and much deeper atrocities were later inflicted on each other by Armenians and Azerbaijanis. As for the Georgians, the Bolshevik invasion was a much greater source of resentment compared to what was perceived as an Armenian aggression. Hence the conflict between Armenians and Georgians of 1918-19 has not been mythified to an extent comparable to the Armenian-Azerbaijani or Georgian-Abkhaz relationship, though the confrontation is by no means forgotten. Georgian suspicion and prejudice toward Armenians may have been nurtured by the conflict, but the occurrence of past conflict was never capitalized upon by nationalist politicians on either side.

7.3.4. Rough terrain Whereas neighboring Meskheti - the western half of the region of Samtskhe-Javakheti - is largely fertile slopes and forest-covered hills, Javakheti is situated on an elevated mountain plateau surrounded by extinct volcanoes. Akhalkalaki, the central city of Javakheti, is at an altitude of 5,000 feet. Several localities in the Ninotsminda district are at over 6,000 feet. The terrain of Javakheti is rough indeed, and few roads and railways connect the region with the rest of Georgia. The main road from Tbilisi to Akhalkalaki goes in a long circle north and west from Tbilisi around Javakheti, passing through Borjomi, before going into the region from the west, whereas the road connecting Akhalkalaki and Tbilisi directly is in such a bad condition that it is trafficable only by four-wheel drive vehicles, and then not during the cold portion of the year, and often gets washed away by torrential rains and landslides. The fact that Javakheti lies close to the border with Turkey and was therefore as restricted zone during the Soviet era has also contributed to the poor quality of infrastructure there. The inaccessibility and isolation of Javakheti has also enabled it to remain isolated economically and socially from Georgia. Even after a decade of Georgian independence, the Georgian currency, the Lari, is only accepted reluctantly here, and the Russian Rouble is de facto the functioning currency in the region. The isolated character of the region also enabled the local Armenians to set up fighting units that participated in the conflict in Mountainous Karabakh as early as in March 1988. The link between Javakheti and Karabakh also brought large number of weapons to the region, and unofficial estimates claim that there are firearms in every house in Javakheti.64 The

Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917-1921, Oxford: George Ronald, 1951, pp. 174183. (This quote at p. 182.) 64 Voitsekh Guretski, ‘The Question of Javakheti’, Caucasian Regional Studies, vol. 3 no. 1, 1998. 63

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isolated character of the region, due to its physical geography, has contributed to these factors that have effectively pulled Javakheti out of Georgia’s orbit.

7.3.5. Relative Demography The population of the Javakheti region is around 110,000 people. In 1989, the Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda regions together had a population of just over 106,000. However, Meskheti (the districts of Akhaltsikhe, Adigeni, Aspindza, and Borjomi) has a population of 120,000, making the population of the province of Samtskhe-Javakheti ca. 220,000250,000 people today, taking into account variations due to possible population growth as well as emigration. Moreover, uncertainty about the accuracy of the Soviet census has led to speculations regarding the real numbers; up to 175,000 Armenians may be living in Samtskhe-Javakheti. Of the two areas, Javakheti is overwhelmingly Armenian, forming the most homogenous minority-populated area in Georgia. At least 90% of the population is Armenian, and according to Armenian sources over 95%. In Meskheti, the situation is different. Though no clear figures exist, very few Armenians live in the Borjomi district, whereas Akhaltsikhe, Adigeni and Aspindza are mixed. A rough estimate would suggest slightly over a third of Meskheti’s population is Armenian, implying that perhaps half of combined Samtskhe-Javakheti’s population is Armenian.65 Javakheti, however, has long been and remains a basically mono-ethnic Armenian society: The similarities to Mountainous Karabakh are striking: a comparable number of Armenians live in mountainous areas just across the border from Armenia and dominate their areas demographically. If anything, Javakheti is more homogeneously Armenian than Karabakh, where Armenians formed ca. 75% of the population; whereas more Armenians lived in Samtskhe-Javakheti as a whole than in Mountainous Karabakh.

7.3.6. Ethnic Kin The issue of ethnic kin in the case of Javakheti is relatively straightforward: Armenia is just across the border, not even separated by a thin stretch of land as were the Armenians of Mountainous Karabakh. Some of Javakheti (Ninotsminda) and all of Meskheti borders Turkey and not Armenia, but the Akhalkalaki region, the largest Armenian concentration, borders Armenia, and is connected by road to Armenia. Most visitors to Javakheti in the 1990s note that the region is economically more closely tied to Armenia than to Georgia, and that a substantial amount of Armenian Drams are in circulation there and in any case universally accepted, whereas the Georgian Lari is clearly not the exclusive legal tender that it is supposed to be on Georgian territory. The Armenian population of Javakheti has also looked South for cultural and educational matters. Many Armenians from Javakheti study in Armenian high schools and universities; and in accordance with an agreement between Georgia and Armenia, the Javakheti Armenian-language schools use textbooks 65

This estimate was widely corroborated by officials and locals in Akhaltsikhe in 2000.

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provided from the republic of Armenia. The Javakheti Armenians’ ties to Armenia are hence strong.

7.3.7. Economic Viability On the economic front, however, Javakheti lacks any major resources and industries. Armenian sources claim it is the least developed part of Georgia, though areas of Guria, Imereti, South Ossetia, and Svaneti could easily compete for that title. Most industries that existed in Javakheti have now been turned into so-called LAOs (Large Abandoned Objects), the conditions of the roads and the infrastructure in Javakheti are disastrous. One of the region’s main industries has been the production of building stone, which is exported through Russia via military convoys.66 Very little of foreign investment in Georgia has gone to Javakheti, instead being focused on larger cities such as Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Rustavi, and parts of Kakheti. In other words, Javakheti’s economic situation is less than favorable. Its separate viability from Georgia may be low; but it must be noted that for economic purposes, its affiliation with Georgia is hardly noticeable, as the central government’s economic influence in Javakheti is close to nil. In sum, Javakheti’s economic viability has been low for a long time and remains so. The poor status of the region’s economy is best illustrated by the fact that one of the most recurrent arguments for opposing the withdrawal of the Russian military base in Akhalkalaki is the crucial role the base plays for the economic and social welfare of Javakheti. The base is the largest employer in the region, as well as the main provider of healthcare services for the local population, though the hospital tied to the base has now been transferred to the Georgian government. The possible withdrawal of the base, it is feared, would lead to the loss of livelihood and social welfare of the population of Akhalkalaki. This has assured a strong sense of attachment between locals and the Russian base, and as a corollary a significantly warmer view of Russia than is the case in other parts of Georgia.

7.3.8. Radical Leadership From early 1988, that is roughly at the time that Ademon Nykhas and Aydgylara emerged, a similar movement emerged in Javakheti, named Javakhk, the Armenian name for the region. Javakhk’s stated goals focused on the preservation of Armenian cultural heritage in local schools, and in political terms, the achievement of autonomy for Javakheti or union with Armenia.67 Javakhk’s leadership is relatively low-key and does not include former Soviet bureaucrats comparable to a Vladislav Ardzinba. The movement emerged among the local Armenian community in Javakheti, and not from a Soviet-bred intelligentsia. Yet in the time of the confrontation between Javakheti Armenians and Tbilisi that developed during the early 1990s, Javakhk took upon itself the role of forging governing mechanisms 66 67

Darchiashvili, ‘Ethnic Relations as a Security Factor’. Guretski, ‘The Question of Javakheti’.

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in the legal vacuum that ensued from the rejection of prefects appointed by Gamsakhurdia. As mentioned in chapter seven, local Armenians repeatedly refused to accept subsequent central nominees for the position of Prefect. This took place through physically preventing the appointee from taking office, involving several instances of violence. The Armenian community demanded that the Prefect be an ethnic Armenian, wary of the power vested in the position of the Prefect and the lack of democratic mechanisms or guarantees.68 The standoff lasted between January and November 1991. To compensate for the lack of authority during this time, Javakhk organized elections for a Council of Representatives of 24 people, and an effective ruling body composed of seven people. This council in effect controlled Javakheti until at last an acceptable candidate for the Prefect position was proposed by Tbilisi. The council then selfdissolved. The apparent ease with which the council dissolved would tend to point to a lack or radicalism within Javakhk. Yet at one point, a vote on declaring independence had emerged in a council meeting, but failed to reach a majority vote. This implies that the body itself was divided on the policy to adopt vis-à-vis Tbilisi – advocates of both compromise and confrontation seem to have been involved. Nevertheless, a paramilitary organization associated with Javakhk called Parvents has been formed, which has access to weapons that were used by Javakheti Armenians that fought in the Karabakh war. The demand for autonomy was raised again in the mid-1990s. In December 1996, Javakhk raised demands for a special administrative status for Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda – in practice, demanding the undoing of the Samtskhe-Javakheti region and regional autonomy for Javakheti.69 In August 1998, Javakhk representative Yervan Sherinian stated that Javakhk’s main goal was to ‘compel the Georgian authorities to create an Armenian autonomous region within Georgia’.70 He charged that unless Georgia agrees to that, Javakheti Armenians may ‘divorce their Georgian brothers in a civilized way’.71 Hence in the mid-1990s, Javakhk activism remained high. Toward the end of the 1990s, however, the Javakhk movement seemed to dissolve, whereas political formations under other names emerged, such as the political party ‘Virk’, that has aggressively demanded autonomy for Javakheti.72 This fluid situation is symptomatic of the divisions existing in Javakheti itself between local ‘clans’.73 These are in turn connected with figures in the wider Georgian political scene. Hence whereas most Armenian political activity has been concentrated in Akhalkalaki, the region of Ninotsminda has remained much Guretski, ‘The Question of Javakheti’. Akhali Toeba, 11 January 1997; Asbarez, 25 February 1997. 70 RFE/RL Newsline, 24 August 1998, quoting Caucasus Press, 22 August 1998. 71 Resonansi, 24 August 1998. 72 Hasan Kanbolat and Nazmi Gul, The Geopolitics and Quest for Autonomy of the Armenians of Javakheti (Georgia) and Kransodar (Russia) in the Caucasus, Ankara: AVSAM, 2000. 73 ‘Inter-Clan War in Akhalkalaki: the Only Idea They Share Is That of Autonomy’, Resonansi, 21 September 1998. 68 69

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calmer.74 Some Georgian observers link this to the relationship between the ‘clan’ led by the Gamgebeli (head of local administration) of Ninotsminda with the informal political grouping around former Georgian parliamentary speaker Zurab Zhvania.75 This is an example of the use of co-optation techniques by the Shevardnadze government to appease some of the radical Armenian leaders in Javakheti. Hence one of the Javakhk leaders was appointed head of the traffic police in the region, a lucrative position as it makes possible the informal ‘taxation’ of traffic through the region to Armenia. Moreover, the Armenian movement in Javakheti is heavily influenced by the Dashnaktsutiun party, which holds a dominant position in the Armenian Diaspora, especially in the United States. The Dashnaktsutiun party’s program mentions the aim of ‘restoring’ Javakheti as a part of Armenia. Importantly, the Javakheti issue gained increasing attention in the Armenian Diaspora since 2000, possibly related to the advent to power in Armenia of Rboert Kocharyan, who entertains good relations with the Dashnaktsutiun whereas his predecessor Levon Ter-Petrosyan banned the party.

7.3.9. External Support Javakheti’s most obvious potential source of external support is Armenia. Moreover, the presence of a large Russian military base has meant that although Javakheti lacks a border with Russia, Russia has had possibilities to provide Javakheti Armenians with external support. Investigating the actual patterns of relationships between Javakheti Armenians on the one hand and Russia and Armenia, respectively, reveals important clues to understanding the peculiar development of Javakheti during the 1990s. Russian policy on an official level has been muted. Little mention has ever been made by Russian officials of Javakheti – except in private to Georgian officials.76 Moscow has not publicly supported the rights of Javakheti Armenians the way it expressed support for Abkhazia or South Ossetia. Russian statements nevertheless often stress the ‘stabilizing role’ that Russia’s military base in Akhalkalaki plays in the region. The base acts in a selfstyled way, ignoring the Georgian legislation when it sees fit. For example, the soldiers in the base are paid in Russian Rubles – which is as major reason that the Ruble is the main currency circulating in Javakheti. This is in contravention of Georgian legislation which stipulates that the Georgian Lari should be the legal tender for all transactions. Normally, goods can not be bought in foreign currency, currency must first be exchanged into Lari, while the government has no significant restrictions on currency exchange. Another crucial matter is the employment structure at the base. Though accurate figures are not Darchiashvili, ‘Ethnic Relations as a Security Factor’. (p. 12/16) 75 Interview with Ghia Nodia, Head of the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Development, and Democracy, Tbilisi, February 2002. To the picture belongs the fact that Zhvania has partly Armenian ancestry. 76 Personal communications, ministry of foreign affairs, Tbilisi 2002. 74

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made public, it is commonly estimated that one third of officers and NCOs, two thirds of soldiers, and the quasi-totality of non-fighting personnel are local ethnic Armenians. This implies that Georgian citizens are enrolled in military duty for another state on Georgian territory, whereas Javakheti Armenians have refused to serve in the Georgian army until 1996, when some Armenians were drafted into the Georgian army. Moreover, Armenians serving in the Russian military are easily granted Russian citizenship. The ‘local’ character of the Russian military base may to a large extent be conditioned by the financial problems of the Russian army: recruiting local Armenians is significantly cheaper than moving Russian personnel to Akhalkalaki. However, in practice, this amounts to the creation by Russia of combat-ready and well-trained formations of local Armenians. The likelihood that these soldiers would be involved in a hypothetical confrontation between Javakheti Armenians and Tbilisi is obvious; likewise, the possibility that the Russian military would be drawn into the conflict as it was in Abkhazia is also significant. Should this seem conspiratorial, one only needs to recall the fate of the 104th airborne brigade located at Ganja, Azerbaijan. The Elçibey government in Baku had negotiated the withdrawal of all Russian troops by the end of 1993; however, the 104th brigade vacated its premises in June 1993 without informing the government of Azerbaijan, leaving behind large parts of its weaponry in the hands of a local warlord, Surat Husseinov, who subsequently marched on Baku, leading to the fall of the government.77 Fears in Georgian leading circles that a similar development may occur if Russia is forced to close the base in Akhalkalaki are substantial.78 External support for Javakheti Armenians has hence been forthcoming from Russia through the activities of the military base in Akhalkalaki. As for Armenia, its position has in great part been dictated by geopolitical realities, forcing Yerevan to exert a moderating influence on the Javakheti Armenians, in stark contrast to its direct interference in the Mountainous Karabakh conflict. In fact, whereas Armenian nationalists put Javakheti only one step below Karabakh on its list of reconquista, the very involvement in Karabakh has been the reason for Armenian moderation in Javakheti.79 The war with Azerbaijan cut off Armenia’s main trade links with the rest of the Soviet Union, which went through Azerbaijan; but also impeded the opening of its border with Turkey, given that Turkey cites an end to Armenian occupation of

See Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, pp. 99-102, for a detailed overview of this episode. Presentation by Defense Minister David Tevzadze at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, April 2001. 79 In fact, Georgian and Azerbaijani observers alike argue that Armenian nationalists were contemplating which of the two regions, Javakheti or Mountainous Karabakh, to annex first. Due to the institution of autonomy in Mountainous Karabakh and the considerably higher levels of hatred among Armenian nationalists for Azerbaijan than for Georgia, the decision was accordingly taken to ‘begin with’ Mountainous Karabakh. Interviews, Baku and Tbilisi, September and November 2000, February 2002. 77 78

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Azerbaijani territories as a prerequisite for the normalization of relations. Landlocked Armenia’s links to the world are hence restricted to either Iran or Georgia, and its nearest seaport is Batumi. This geopolitical reality has put Georgia and Armenia in a curious relationship of mutual dependence. Although Georgia has built a strategic partnership with Armenia’s arch-enemies Turkey and Azerbaijan and has a diametrically different foreign policy orientation (Georgia sees Russia as its main threat but Armenia sees Russia as its chief ally), the two countries have seen the need to keep a working relationship. Consecutive Armenian leaders have been aware that a possible conflict in Javakheti could not fail to involve Armenia and ruin relations with Georgia, thereby in all likelihood cutting Armenia off from the Black Sea and leaving it economically dependent solely on Iran. Moreover, the prospect of a Georgian-Armenian confrontation would also increase the likelihood of Azerbaijani military operations to take back Mountainous Karabakh. Since Armenia simply cannot afford this given its isolation and the already dire conditions of its economy, official Yerevan has been exerting a moderating influence on Javakheti Armenians in order to lower the tensions in the area. In December 1991, during the first winter of the war in Karabakh, an Armenian delegation led by its chief of staff Vazgen Sarkissian (later Prime Minister) reportedly visited Akhalkalaki in order to preserve the stability in the region. Armenian leaders, most notably Sarkissian and former President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, have repeatedly referred to Javakheti as a Georgian internal affair.80 Ter-Petrosyan even closed an Armenian newspaper that argued for the annexation of Javakheti.81 The Dashnaktsutiun party, the largest grouping in the Armenian Diaspora, has also campaigned for the annexation of Javakheti. Whereas the Dashnaktsutiun was outlawed under Ter-Petrosyan, his successor, Robert Kocharyan, legalized the party and appointed one of its leaders as an advisor. While this worried many Georgians, Kocharyan has followed the cautious line of his predecessor on Javakheti. Georgian leaders, meanwhile, have been fully aware of their dependence on Armenia to keep the situation calm in Javakheti, and have been compelled to balance Georgia’s growing relationship with Azerbaijan based on mutual geopolitical interests with a concomitant attention to Armenia. Hence a symbiosis evolved between two governments that often regard each other with significant suspicion. In practice, Armenian leaders intervened in early 1992 when the Gamsakhurdia government had fallen, and Javakhk leaders seemed to consider the option of independence in the opportunity provided by the collapse of Georgian statehood.82 Armenia, at this point basically devoid of electricity and under trade embargo from Turkey and Azerbaijan and in war with the latter, sent an envoy to Akhalkalaki to prevent a deterioration of the situation which could put Armenia in a two-front war. Baku News Summary, 1 September 1998. 81 Igor Rotar, ‘Tbilisi Has Only Partial Control Over Georgia's Armenian Regions’, Prism, vol. 4 no. 10, 15 May 1998. 82 See Levon Sevunts, ‘Squeeze Play in the Caucasus: Russia could tighten its grip as Georgia, Armenia break out of bear hug’, Montreal Gazette, 29 November 1999. 80

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Armenian attention to Javakheti remained strong, as former President Ter-Petrossian met with Georgian President Shevardnadze in Javakheti a few years later. In practice, Georgia’s vulnerability to yet a further ethnic conflict – a scenario that some Georgian and international observers deem would amount to a coup de grace to the struggling Georgian state – has given Armenia a guarantor role over the Armenians of Javakheti, with the reluctant consent of the Georgian government. Georgian observers generally agree that Armenia’s stance is the key to continued peace in Javakheti; in this context, the improved fortunes of the Dashnaktsutiun in Armenia as well as their increased agitation regarding Javakheti has caused considerable worry in Georgia. Armenia’s ‘accord’ with Georgia over Javakheti has also probably influenced Russia’s position. Whereas Moscow has used numerous levers at its disposal to weaken the Georgian government and force it to change its foreign policy orientation, it has never played the card of Javakheti, which it is fully capable of doing. Gas supplies have been cut off at times of political expedience, and a discriminatory visa regime was imposed in late 2000 that forced Georgian citizens except citizens of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to acquire visas before traveling to Russia. This latter measure, of course, is a flagrant infringement of Georgia’s internationally recognized sovereignty over these territories. Moreover, Russian aircraft have bombed areas of Georgia where it arbitrarily considered that Chechen rebels were hiding (the Kodori and Pankisi gorges). But Russia has failed to utilize the Javakheti card, though Georgian officials claim Moscow has often reminded Tbilisi of its possibility to do so. Armenia’s concerns over Javakheti may have conditioned Russia’s policy. Moreover, Russia’s policy in the South Caucasus has sought to achieve a controllable level of instability – and Moscow may have realized that stirring up a conflict in Javakheti could push Georgia over the brink and lead to an uncontrollable situation that could plunge the wider South Caucasus into war. In any case, Javakheti is a case where geopolitics have dictated crucial external support for the prevention of conflict rather than support, as in Abkhazia or South Ossetia, for belligerence among minority leaders. This factor has undoubtedly been a major reason why conflict has been avoided in Javakheti despite a situation containing many elements otherwise conducive to conflict.

7.3.10. The Lack of Autonomy The lack of assertive response by Javakhk to events that could have been served as catalyzing factors of a conflict deserve to be noted. The conflict over Prefects is one example; other serious issues have included the creation of the region of SamtskheJavakheti, and several minor armed confrontations, all of which could have precipitated a major crisis. The first confrontation took place during the unruly days in late December 1991 that ended Gamsakhurdia’s rule. As Gamsakhurdia fled to Armenia, the Military Council’s National Guard tried to enter Javakheti, but was prevented from doing so by the locals; likewise, the unit loyal to Gamsakhurdia that tried to make its way back to

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Georgia from Armenia through Javakheti was disarmed by the local Armenians.83 Another armed incident in August 1998 clearly displays the suspicion and insecurity felt by the Javakheti Armenian community. A Georgian military detachment was approaching Javakheti in order to hold joint exercises with the Russian personnel from the Akhalkalaki base. They were met near the border of Javakheti by an estimated 25 Armenians armed with ‘mortars and other artillery’. When reporting to their superiors on the development, they were ordered to withdraw back into their bases outside Javakheti.84 Policies of the central Georgian government have, as noted above, generally been cautious in relations to Javakheti. Nevertheless, from 1994 a new form of administrative division was created in Georgia: the country was divided into newly created Regions, larger than the Soviet-time regions. Javakheti was merged with Meskheti, creating the region of Samtskhe-Javakheti, with Akhaltsikhe as its capital. Hence Akhalkalaki’s status as a regional center was removed, and more importantly, the almost homogeneously Armenian-populated Javakheti was incorporated with majority-Georgian Meskheti. As Meskheti had a larger population than Javakheti, this diluted the ethnic Armenian component in the new administrative unit. Whereas Armenians formed close to 95% of Javakheti’s population, they now form only roughly half of Samtskhe-Javakheti’s population. An ethnic Georgian, Gigla Baramidze, was appointed head of the region.85 This decision, created by decree no. 237 issued by Shevardnadze, led to increased campaigning for independence among Javakheti Armenians. Over 40,000 signatures were collected in the Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda districts to introduce a legislative initiative (for which 30,000 signatures are needed) to discontinue the creation of the SamtskheJavakheti region, and to grant Javakheti territorial autonomy. However, nothing came out of the initiative as Tbilisi ignored the demands of the Javakheti Armenians. This series of events raises important questions. Several indicators pointed to a high likelihood of conflict in Javakheti. Cultural differences were not great but relatively significant; the national conceptions of Armenians and Georgians are mutually exclusive; a notable level of past conflict existed; Javakheti is an area of very rough terrain, in which significant nationalist groups were active, even briefly instituting de facto self-rule and possessing paramilitary forces, effectively denying the Georgian government control over the territory for most of the 1990s. Several ‘sparks’ occurred that could have ignited a conflict, yet this did not happen. Conflict was avoided for two main reasons. As mentioned earlier, both the Armenian and Georgian governments treated the issue of Javakheti with extreme caution. Yerevan reined in the Javakhk radicals while effectively being granted a guarantor position over Javakheti; Tbilisi refrained from attempting to Guretski, ‘The Question of Javakheti’. 84 ‘Standoff Defused on Georgian-Armenian Border’, RFE/RL Newsline, 17 August 1998. 85 Baramidze was removed from his post in January 2002 after having physically beaten and almost killed the Gamgebeli of Akhaltsikhe with his sidearm. 83

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exert full territorial control over Javakheti, by for example deciding not to move in to dissolve the council of representatives created by Javakhk or to try to disarm the Parvents paramilitaries. Such actions could have directly sparked a conflict, yet unlike in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Tbilisi did not engage in any misadventures in Javakheti. But neither did Javakhk. Developments between 1988 and 2000 in Javakheti point to a lack of means, and to a certain extent also a lack of leadership, to promote a systematic and sustained aggressive nationalist campaign, although Javakheti’s situation was not too different from that of Abkhazia or South Ossetia. A nationalist movement, Javakhk, certainly existed; but it lacked the political skill, finances, and network to establish itself as a vocal voice for Armenian self-determination in Javakheti. It was unable to build a significant movement to revoke the establishment of the Samtskhe-Javakheti region, in spite of an apparently widespread public opposition to it, as proven by the ease with which Javakhk collected over 40,000 signatures in a relatively small and predominantly rural population. Likewise, it has been unable to mount a political campaign to mount a struggle for political autonomy, an idea that seems to enjoy widespread popular support in Javakheti. This was the case largely because Javakheti did not have territorial autonomy. Devoid of autonomy, Javakheti did not produce an ethnic Armenian elite or intelligentsia during the Soviet period. Such an elite, which existed in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and, significantly, in Mountainous Karabakh, would have had much more political skills, experience, and Soviet network to build a strong movement for autonomy or unification with Armenia that would most likely have found a fertile soil given the current Georgian political climate and the specifics of the Javakheti situation. Javakheti lacked a Soviet-style Nomenklatura, but also an ethnic intelligentsia. Its nationalist leadership was mainly composed of petty officials in city councils and of school teachers. Lacking autonomy, the Armenian leadership had no institutions to fall back upon; it did not have a parliament with which to oppose or ‘annul’ the 1994 decision to establish the Samtskhe-Javakheti region, which was perceived by Javakhk leaders as ‘anticonstitutional’ and as designed to ‘counterbalance the Armenian majority in Javakheti’.86 Yet the only manner in which they were able to voice their opposition to the measure was through the collection of signatures that the Georgian government simply ignored. Furthermore, the Javakhk leaders lacked financial resources and foreign contacts that autonomy and links to Moscow had brought South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as illustrated by Ardzinba’s career. Neither did Javakheti have any constitutionally enshrined borders, and Tbilisi succeeded in incorporating it with a largely Georgian region to its west, reasserting somewhat Georgian jurisdiction over Javakheti by ruling the area from Akhaltsikhe and not from Akhalkalaki. Because Javakheti lacked autonomy, Javakhk lacked political institutions, finances, experience, a local intellectual base, as well as political skills and

86

Guretski, ‘The Question of Javakheti’.

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outside contacts, all factors that could all greatly have helped the movement in its efforts to promote a Javakheti Armenian ethnic agenda.

7.4.Azeris of Kvemo Kartli: the Silent Mass The Azerbaijani population of Georgia located in the South and Southeast of the country is one of the country’s most populous minorities at close to 350,000, and by far the fastest-growing one, with the exception of the Kurds.87 The Azeri population is predominantly rural, and dominates demographically in most of the Kvemo (Lower) Kartli province. These areas all lie less than an hour’s drive from Tbilisi. Azeri communities also exist in Tbilisi itself, the city of Rustavi, and the Lagodekhi district of Kakheti, near the border of northeastern Azerbaijan. The non-Azeri population of these regions is mainly composed of Georgians, Russians, and Armenians. The Azeris have been among the least politically active regional groups in Georgia, and certainly the least active minority population. But this generally quiet picture conceals the relatively significant inter-ethnic tensions that existed during the late 1980s between Georgians and Azeris, which culminated in 1989-90.88 The tensions then led to the exile of several hundred Azeri families from Kvemo Kartli.89 Yet these relatively serious ethnic tensions did not lead to large-scale ethnic mobilization among the Azeris, and the situation cooled down. Unlike in Javakheti, the inter-ethnic relations between Azeris and Georgians have improved considerably since then, and previously dominant suspicions have given way to relative harmony.90

7.4.1. Cultural Differences Azeris and Georgians differ considerably in both language, customs, and religion. The Azeri language is a Turkic language closely related to the Turkish of present-day Turkey, hence of a totally different language family than Georgian. Since few Azeris in Georgia speak Georgian, communication between the two groups normally has taken place in Russian. In terms of religion, Azeris in Georgia are divided between a Sunni Muslim majority of ca. 70%, and a Shi’a minority.91 Georgians, of course, are Orthodox Gachechiladze, New Georgia, notes that between 1926 and 1979 Azeris grew double as fast as the rest of Georgia, though recent reports show that emigration of working-age men to find work in Russia and elsewhere has led to a decrease in birth rates. 88 On the tensions in the early 1980s, see Elizabeth Fuller, ‘How Serious Are Inter-Nationality Tensions in Georgia?’, Radio Liberty Report No. 444/83, 25 November 1983. 89 See Konstantin Kokoev and Guram Svanidze, ‘Problems of (Ethnic) Minorities in Georgia’, Central Asia and the Caucasus, no. 1, 2000. 90 Interview with Süleyman Süleymanov, editor-in-chief of the Gürcüstan newspaper, (published in Azeri language in Tbilisi); and Imir Mamedli, official in the State Chancellery of Georgia, Tbilisi, February 2002. 91 Azeri representatives give different figures, with estimations of the Sunni majority ranging from 6080%. Most Azeris downplay the differences between the Sunni and Shi’a population, which seems to 87

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Christians. The only common linkage between Azeris and Georgians is the Caucasian identity, which is relatively strong among both peoples. In particular, Azeris in Georgia have stressed their Caucasian identity over the Turkic identity, probably partly in order to stress their points of commonality with the rest of Georgia.92 This notwithstanding, the cultural differences between Azeris and Georgians are significant.

7.4.2. National Conception The differences in culture are compounded by the exclusive character of national identities. Being an ethnic Azeri makes it near-impossible to be accepted as a ‘Georgian’ in the reigning interpretation of Georgian nationhood. The ethnic identity of the Azeris has not by itself been overly pronounced, but they are well aware of their links with Azerbaijan, Azeris in Iran, and Turkey; moreover, their cultural Muslim identity is also present, though few signals of a politicization of religion is present. Some Middle Eastern Islamic organizations have attempted to build Mosques and Madrassahs in Kvemo Kartli, but have been resisted by the Georgian authorities. Islamic radical groups have had little success here, but their activities have been limited. The Azeri identity’s Turkic and Islamic markers have made it close to diametrically opposed to the Georgian one, which developed in the historical context of opposition to Islamic Empires, among them the Ottoman Turkish one. This makes the Azeris one of the least likely ethnic groups to ever be considered Georgian.

7.4.3. Past Conflict and Myths The historical level of conflict between Azeris and Georgians have been low. A short conflict erupted between the independent republic of Azerbaijan and Georgia in the 19181920 period, but was mainly focused on the northern part of the border between the two, around Lagodekhi (in present-day Georgia) and Zaqatala (in present-day Azerbaijan) which were claimed by both republics. Parts of the Zaqatala area formed part of Georgia in 1918-20, but were subsequently transferred to the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan by Soviet authorities. In the late Soviet period, as in other parts of Georgia, Azeri toponyms were changed into Georgian ones, especially in the Bolnisi district.93 Nevertheless, the level of political activity among Azeris has consistently been low, and the low conflict level was sustained during the tumultuous period leading to Georgia’s independence in 1991. Some Georgian nationalists worried of the demographic increase of Muslim be of relative small importance in Azeri society, though it has been raised by some post-Soviet religious groups, often influenced from abroad. See Imir Mamedli, Iki Prezident Arasynda, Tbilisi: Intellekti Neshriyaty, 2001, pp. 81-82. 92 Shifteh Akbarzadeh, ‘Local Cultures and Global Change: The Case of Marneuli, a Rural Setting of the Azeri Minority in Georgia’, Paper Presented at the Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, New York, N.Y., 13-16 April 2000, p. 6. 93 Interviews, Tbilisi and Marneuli, February 2002.

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peoples, especially Azeris, and as seen in chapter seven, even pressured hundreds of families to leave; nevertheless the political activity among Azeris remained minimal. In 1990, a minor mishap occurred when a false rumor emerged in Tbilisi that Azeris were preparing to secede and join Azerbaijan. Some Georgian nationalists began organizing a march on Marneuli, which could have taken similar forms as the march on Tskhinvali in 1989, but Georgian leaders coordinated with the Azerbaijani Popular Front in Baku, which convinced the Georgians that no such separatist activity was taking place, and the march was aborted.94 In fact, the general picture of the Azeri of Georgia is that of a minority groups that feels politically vulnerable and seeks to avoid conflict by keeping a low-key profile, deferring to the Georgian government, refraining from challenging its conditions, and thereby escaping the wrath of Georgian nationalists.

7.4.4. Rough Terrain As the name of the region suggests, Kvemo Kartli or lower Kartli, is composed mainly of agricultural lowlands, and include some of the least mountainous parts of Georgia. The Mtkvari river runs through Kvemo Kartli, forming the basis of agricultural activity in the province. Around especially the city of Rustavi, large and now partially defunct industries also exist. Though mountainous areas exist closer to Javakheti and to Kakheti, the region is less mountainous than any other region included in this study.

7.4.5. Relative Demography Compactly settled Azeri populations dominate several districts of Kvemo Kartli. Azeris form 80% of the population in the Marneuli district; 74% in Bolnisi; 70% in Dmanisi; and 51% in the Gardabani district. However, some of the Azeri areas are interspersed with Armenian and Georgian settlements, making it less than homogenous. In comparison to other minorities, the Javakheti Armenians are more compactly settled in Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda, but the Azeris have a higher demographic dominance of most areas they inhabit than either the Ossetians or the Abkhaz.

7.4.6. Ethnic Kin The Azeris of Kvemo Kartli live in the vicinity of the border of Georgia with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Contacts between the local Azeris and Azerbaijan are close and multi-faceted. While economically well-integrated in Georgia, the social and educational links of the Azeris are overwhelmingly with Azerbaijan rather than with Tbilisi, despite the geographic closeness of Kvemo Kartli to the Georgian capital. As in the case of Javakheti Armenians, close links between the Azeri community and its ethnic kin across both the Turkish and Azerbaijani border exists. This is compounded by the low level of 94 Interview with Avtandil Imnadze, a leader in the Georgian National Movement in the 1980s, Tbilisi, October 1998.

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knowledge of the Georgian language, especially as the use of Russian is declining in Georgia. The linguistic isolation hence makes the Azeris’ links with Azerbaijan ever closer.

7.4.7. Economic Viability The economic situation in Kvemo Kartli is relatively good. A mainly agricultural area, the local Azeris are involved primarily in vegetable and fruit production, which they market in Tbilisi and other cities in eastern Georgia. Kvemo Kartli is arguably one of the regions of Georgia least affected by the economic downturn with the fall of the Soviet Union. Whereas the agricultural production in Javakheti was geared not to local markets but to the supply of specific products such as some types of dairy products to the entire Soviet market, Kvemo Kartli was basically the breadbasket of eastern Georgia. As such, the dissolution of the USSR affected Kvemo Kartli economically much less than Javakheti.95

7.4.8. Radical Leadership The Azeris are by far the least politically organized minority group in the country. Azeri social and cultural organizations exist, but no dominant politically oriented grouping of Azeris has emerged. An Azeri society was organized in Tbilisi in 1990; the ‘Dayak’ association was formed within the Rustaveli society the same year; the ‘Geyret’ popular movement was formed in Marneuli; the ‘Birlik’ (Unity) movement was formed in Tbilisi in 1992; and the ‘Ümid’ (Hope) society was founded in Gardabani in 1994.96 These movements nevertheless never took on a nationalistic stance even though mass meetings were organized at various times, including a 1990 meeting in Gardabani that allegedly drew 10,000 people. Geyret is seen as having been the most nationalist in its program, though it never found support to voice them actively. Discussions regarding autonomy remained within the community and were not extensively raised publicly.97 However, there were discussions in mid-1989 that Azeris should demand the creation of an autonomous unit with its capital in Rustavi, and Azeri organizations put forward a tenpoint program including demands that ethnic Azeris be appointed to administrative positions in Azeri-populated regions, that Azeri-language education in schools be increased, as well as the creation of an Azeri university or pedagogical institute. Yet these demands came to nothing and remained marginal. Vigilante organizations armed mainly with hunting rifles emerged in areas where Azeris felt threatened in 1989; yet armed clashes never occurred with Georgian nationalist movements. However, armed clashes did take place in June 1989 and again in late 1990 between local Azeris and Svans that had 95 Interview, David Darchiashvili, Researcher at the Georgian Parliament and the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, Tbilisi, February 2002. 96 Interview with Süleyman Süleymanov, editor-in-chief of the Gürcüstan newspaper, (published in Azeri language in Tbilisi); and Inir Mamedli, official in the State Chancellery of Georgia, Tbilisi, February 2002. 97 Mamedli interview.

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been resettled to the Marneuli district in 1987 after their settlements in the mountains of Svaneti had been destroyed by avalanches.98 However, Azeri representatives stress their cooperation in this period with moderate Georgian groups and their loyalty to the Georgian state. Commenting on their lack of response to onslaughts by Georgian nationalists in 1989-90, they argue that Azeris are by nature a peaceful people busy working on the land, that their Islamic identity made them law-abiding citizens, and stress that especially as Azerbaijan was in conflict with Armenia, it was imperative to secure peace and cooperation with Georgia.99 Potential grievances around which a political grouping could conceivably have mobilized were present, given the social isolation, low political representation, and lack of educational opportunities of the Azeri population. Yet no political movement emerged in response to these grievances. Leadership, let alone radical leadership, has been absent among Azeris in Kvemo Kartli.

7.4.9. External Support The obvious candidate for external support to the Azeris in Georgia is the Republic of Azerbaijan. However, the historically good relations between Azerbaijanis and Georgians, and more importantly the development of good and strengthening relations between the political leaderships of the two states at independence have ensured that the Azerbaijani government harbors no aims to produce political tensions regarding the Azeris in Georgia. Quite to the contrary, Azerbaijan and Georgia have formed a strategic partnership during the late 1990s based on their pro-western orientation, their common wish to integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures, and their mutual dependence in energy issues. Azerbaijan is a source of transit fees and energy for Georgia; Georgia is a key transit route for Azerbaijan in its efforts to export its oil and gas resources to western markets. As in the case of Javakheti but in a fundamentally different manner, Azerbaijan has contributed to keeping the Azeri population in Georgia loyal to the government, including efforts by Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev to influence Azeris in Georgia to vote for Eduard Shevardnadze and his Citizen’s Union Party in elections. In Javakheti, Armenia has tried to avoid tensions that could negatively impact on Armenia itself; in the case of Kvemo Kartli, the Azerbaijani government has never had to step in to abate tensions, but has acted as a guarantor of the security of Azeris by the close relations with Tbilisi that Baku entertains. Azeris in Georgia also played an important role in the development of relations between the two countries. This has not prevented some Azerbaijani opposition politicians, most recently Ali Kerimli of the Popular Front Party, of voicing concern about the discrimination of Azeris in Georgia. Such utterances 98 Elizabeth Fuller, ‘Azerbaijani Exodus from Georgia Imminent?’, Report on the USSR, 15 February 1991, p. 17. 99 Mamedli interview.

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nevertheless remain marginal, and are not supported by the rest of the opposition, which supports the Azerbaijani government’s foreign policy in most of its facets.

7.4.10. The Lack of Autonomy The Azeris of Kvemo Kartli have never had any political autonomy, and did not voice any claims to that effect as did representatives of the Armenians of Javakheti. The lack of autonomy in the Soviet period also meant that there existed no local Nomenklatura or intelligentsia; likewise, there was never any political institutions controlled or dominated by the local Azeri population that bred a natural leadership in the region. Together with the close relations between Azerbaijan and Georgia, the lack of autonomy and the rural (and therefore politically less organized) character of the population of the region to a large extent explains the absence of ethnopolitical activity in Kvemo Kartli.

7.5. Ajaria: Regionalism Enforced Ajaria, like Abkhazia, is a Black Sea resort area strategically located between Turkey and Georgia proper and also functioning as Armenia’s main seaport. Ajaria is ethnolinguistically part of Georgia, but was a part of the Ottoman Empire until 1878. Ajaria was incorporated into the Russian empire in the Turkish-Russian war of 1878, but this did not immediately lead to Ajaria’s integration with the rest of Georgia. When the South Caucasus was first delimited in 1918, an idea was briefly floated that Ajaria would form the core of a Muslim Southwest Caucasian republic. Finally, when the Soviet delimitation took place, Ajaria became the only autonomous entity in the Soviet Union that had enjoyed its status because of religious differences from the titular nationality of the republic it belonged to. When Gamsakhurdia came to power in 1990, he had publicly campaigned for the lifting of Ajaria’s autonomy. Given that the threat of lifting autonomy contributed significantly to the conflict in South Ossetia, and that it is deemed in the theoretical literature a highly significant factor in ethnopolitical conflict, a process of escalation could have been expected to take place. Protests took place in Batumi, and Ajaria in 1990 received a strong leadership that was intent on denying Tbilisi control over the autonomous Republic, and Ajaria grew increasingly isolated from the rest of Georgia.100 Yet nothing even approaching ‘ethnic’ mobilization took place in Ajaria, although the republic enjoyed many factors that could have enhanced its capacity to revolt against the center, including external support.

100 O. Zoidze, ‘Postsovietskaia Gruzia: Problemy Natsionalogo Edinstvo I Stanovleniia Gosudarstvennosti’, in Severniy Kavkaz-Zakavkaz’e: Problemy Stabilnosti I Perspektivy Razvitiia – Materialy Mezhdunarodnoy Konferentsii, Moscow: Firedrich Ebert Foundation, 1997, p. 123.

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7.5.1. Cultural Differences Ajaria culturally shares similarities with northeastern Turkey as much as with Georgia. A large Laz population there (linguistically kin to Mingrelians) forms Turkey’s second largest compactly settled minority after the Kurds.101 The Ajars, like the Laz, are Muslim though they are ethnically Georgians – or more specifically, Gurians (speaking a western Georgian dialect). During Ottoman rule, the Ajars were affected by the Millet system of administration in the Empire, which installed religion as the main social identity. This emphasis on religion enforced the separate cultural identity of the Ajars from the Georgians, and moreover, their Georgian language included many Turkish loan words.102 During the pre-Soviet times, the Ajars, like Kurds, Meskhetian Turks, and Azerbaijanis, were simply classified as Muslims, and the South Caucasus was neatly divided culturally into Armenians, Georgians, and Muslims. Yet during the Soviet period, the Ajars were a particular target of atheistic campaign enforced by Moscow, and did not enjoy any protection from Tbilisi given that the authorities in Tbilisi did not feel any particularly strong urge to protect the Islamic identity of a Georgian population. Indeed, to many Georgians, the concept of a Muslim Georgian is a contradiction in terms, given the central role of the Orthodox church in Georgian cultural identity. As the Korenizatsiia policies waned in the 1930s, Ajars were gradually seen simply as Georgians, and a policy of total assimilation was introduced in the 1970s and 1980s. They were only counted as Ajarians in the census of 1926, when they numbered ca. 70,000. Extrapolating these figures would suggest that the Ajar population today is roughly 160,000 to 190,000. As the religious component of their identity was constantly suppressed during the Soviet Union and ethnicity emphasized, Ajaria was secularized, which also meant georgianized, since religion was the only factor separating them from the rest of Georgia. Indeed, analysts note a significant level of assimilation of Ajars during the Soviet era.103 As a result, whereas Ajars retain a feeling of separate cultural identity, they do generally feel Georgian. The level of cultural differences between Ajars and Georgians are hence low.

7.5.2. National Conception The definition of Ajars as Georgians has implied that they are included in most definitions of the Georgian national community. Certainly, the opinion that ‘Georgianness’ and In elections to the 1924 parliament, the Turkish parliament had its only flirtation with autonomy for minorities. Deputies from the predominantly Kurdish southeast were termed ‘Kürdistan Milletvekili, or deputies from Kurdistan. Deputies from the Laz northeast bore the title ‘Lâzistan Milletvekili’ indicating that Kurds and Laz were singled out as minorities to receive special rights. 102 See Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide, London: Hurst, 1985, p. 207. 103 Georgi M. Derluguian, ‘A Tale of Two Resorts: Abkhazia and Ajaria Before and Since the Soviet Collapse’, in Beverly Crawford and Ronnie D. Lipschutz’, The Myth of Ethnic Conflict, Berkeley: University of California, International and Area Studies Research Series, No. 98, 1998. 101

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Christianity are interrelated is strong in Georgia, but importantly, the Ajars themselves have a strong Georgian identity, unlike any other minority in Georgia. Hence on the whole, the Ajars are accepted as members of the national community. As such, they are the only minority population in Georgia to be accepted as ‘Georgians’ in the predominant conception of the Georgian nation. The national conceptions are hence in this case inclusive and not exclusive. However, the radical Georgian nationalists that dominated the late 1980s saw the Ajars as deviant Georgians that basically needed to be converted or at least totally secularized in order to be accepted as ‘proper’ Georgians. In this particular situation, the relationship is in the words of Monica Toft similar to a ‘two-way mirror’, where ‘one group does not think of itself as an “other” but another group does’.104 In other words, even though Georgian nationalists may not have accepted Ajars into their conception of the nation, the Ajars continued to see themselves as Georgians nonetheless. The vague and non-ethnic character of identity in Ajaria has led to some uncertainty. Muslims in Ajaria may hold a Georgian identity in addition to the Ajar one; likewise, Christians in Ajaria may not feel Ajar in the communal sense of the term (the word ethnic is not used since the basis of the separate identity is religion); yet living in Ajaria, they may have a territorial or civic Ajarian identity. In sum, the inclusiveness and compatibility of the two identities blurs the picture.

7.5.3. Past Conflict and Myths Having been reunited with Georgia through annexation by Russia in 1878, Ajaria again fell to the Ottomans on April 15, 1918. As Kazemzadeh notes, ‘it became painfully clear that the population of Ajaria was helping the Turks. The Ajarians tore up railway lines, wrecked trains, and conducted guerrilla operations which increased the disorder in the rear, bringing fear and confusion to the defending army.105 Hence the Ajars’ affinity with Turkey was still strong at this point, which suggests that many Ajars identified themselves primarily through their religious affinity with Turkey and not their linguistic affinity with Georgia. The question of Ajaria again came up several months later when the Ottomans had been defeated. In fact, Ajaria was claimed by four powers: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the abortive ‘Southwestern Caucasian Republic’ (encompassing Ajaria, Kars, Akhaltsikhe, Akhalkalaki and Nakhchivan) all laid claim to the region. Armenia as it demanded access to the sea; Georgia since it considered Ajaria a historic part of Georgia; Azerbaijan since it was Muslim and desired a corridor to Turkey. Azerbaijan later supported the claims of the Southwestern Caucasian republic, which was close to the

104 Monica Duffy Toft, ‘Two-Way Mirror Nationalism: the Case of Ajaria’, in Moshe Gammer, ed., The Politics of the Caspian, London: FrankCass, forthcoming 2002. 105 Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 102.

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defeated Ottoman forces. The British seemed inclined to give Batumi the status of a ‘free city’; however they finally ceded it to Menshevik Georgia in early July 1920.106 Hence a significant level of past conflict existed between Ajaria and Georgia at the time of the first world war. Much like the Ossetians and Abkhaz, Ajaria resisted incorporation into Georgia, instead siding with an external enemy of Georgia’s; the only difference is that it was not Bolshevik Russia but Ottoman Turkey. In spite of this conflict level, however, there has been little mythification of this past, less than in either Abkhazia or Javakheti. As will be seen below, this was the case in great deal because of the assimilation of Ajars in the Soviet period.

7.5.4. Rough Terrain Abkhazia is located in the western plains of Georgia, on the Caspian coast. The western and northern parts of Ajaria are coastal plains, forming a narrow strip of lowlands on the Black Sea coast. However, eastern and southern Ajaria, bordering Samtskhe-Javakheti and Turkey, is composed of rougher terrain: mountains reaching over 2,500 meters in altitude form most of Ajaria’s territory. The two parts of Ajaria have also been politically differentiated, often supporting different families in power struggle for control of the region. The topographic conditions have generated certain problems, for instance a landslide in 1989 that displaced thousands of people.107 Most of Ajaria, almost two thirds of its territory, is covered by forests.108 While highland parts of Ajaria may be inaccessible, a large part of its territory, including the capital and port of Batumi, are easily accessible from Georgia along the Black Sea coast. On the whole, Ajaria’s terrain can be characterized as relatively rough, comparable to Javakheti and South Ossetia.

7.5.5. Relative Demography The relative demographic situation in Ajaria is less well-known that that of other regions of Georgia, given that the Ajars have not been counted as a separate ethnic group since the 1926 census, when they numbered 71,000 (whereas Georgia’s population was 1,8 million), and formed 54% of the population of Ajaria.109 In subsequent censuses, because of the Soviet Union’s campaign against religion that particularly targeted Islam, Ajars (whose separate identity rested on religion and not ethnicity) were counted simply as Georgians. Extrapolating the figures from 1991, the proportion of Ajars in Ajaria is likely to have remained roughly the same; Soviet atheism may have reduced the number of Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, pp. 199-203. See Georgia Country Profile, part. 3, distributed through Turkistan Economy Bulletin, 13 February 2000. 108 David Chantladze, ‘The Adjara Region of the Republic of Georgia’, U.S. Department of Commerece Bisnis, September 1999 (www.bisnis.doc.gov) 109 Elizabeth Fuller, ‘Georgia’s Adzhar Crisis’, Report on the USSR, 9 August 1991, p. 8. 106 107

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people identifying themselves partially by their Muslim religion; on the other hand Muslim peoples, Ajars included, generally have somewhat higher birth rates. Most of all, there is a significant uncertainty given that the Ajar and Georgian identities are not exclusive, as was seen above. Hence there is great uncertainty regarding the number of Ajars in Ajaria. While some observers argue the Ajars are in a minority in Ajaria,110 others estimate that the overwhelming majority of the present population of Ajaria (numbering 393,000 people according to official figures) designated as Georgians is Muslim by culture and hence defined as Ajars. Relatively speaking, the Ajars may not form an overwhelming majority as do the Armenians of Javakheti, but can be thought to form a solid majority of their autonomous region’s population, something which under typical Soviet circumstances would have provided the Ajars with comfortable control of the institutions of the autonomous region. But Ajaria was not typical, as will be seen shortly.

7.5.6. Ethnic Kin Ethnically, Ajaria’s closest kin is in the Georgian province of Guria to its immediate North.111 It is rather distantly linked to the Lazuri-origin people in Northeastern Turkey. After Georgia’s Independence, economic interaction increased between Ajaria and Turkey, but there is no specifically Ajarian common identity among people in northeastern Turkey. The assimilation of the Lazuri population is relatively pronounced in Turkey, and there is hence no significant perceived kinship between Ajars and people across the border.

7.5.7. Economic Viability Especially since independence, Ajaria has developed into one of the wealthiest provinces of Georgia. Its strategic location on the Black Sea coast bordering Turkey has enabled it to profit from most of the border trade between Georgia and Turkey. Ajaria also stayed outside the turmoil of intra-Georgian and Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts, and hence to a large extent escaped the economic downturn of regions like Mingrelia. However, Ajaria’s economic viability was high even before Georgian independence. It was crucial in the early 1900s, because one of the world’s first pipelines carried Baku oil to the Black Sea via Batumi port. With its port, its crucial role in the transportation system of the Caucasus, and its position as the main geographic link between the Caucasus and Turkey, one of Ajaria’s main assets and economic functions is transportation. Moreover, Ajaria is rich in mineral resources and produces subtropical products including tea and tobacco, and has a first-rate tourism industry welcoming thousands of visitors, mainly from the former Soviet Union. Ajaria has an obvious economic viability,

110 111

Toft, ‘Two-Way Mirror Nationalism: the Case of Ajaria’. See Derluguian, ‘A Tale of Two Resorts’, p. 277.

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and has in the post-independence period sought to achieve the status of a free economic zone.

7.5.8. Radical Leadership A most striking factor in Ajaria’s development in the 1990s is the constant adherence of all its main political figures to Georgian patriotism. When accused of Pan-Islamism or Pro-Turkish feelings as happened during Gamsakhurdia’s tenure, or even when Gamsakhurdia before coming to power threatened to abolish Ajaria’s autonomy, Ajarian leaders did not answer by resorting to their separate identity as Ossetians and Abkhaz did. Instead, they constantly emphasized their Georgianness. For example, a letter of nine academics from Batumi State University in 1991 retorted to disparaging remarks by Gamsakhurdia by stating that ‘to level charges of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism against the native-born sons of the Georgian earth was neither historically nor politically justified’ and caused ‘considerable distress’ among an Ajarian population ‘to whom nothing was more galling than aspersions on their Georgianness’.112 Likewise, Ajaria’s present ruler, Aslan Abashidze, refers to himself as a ‘Georgian Patriot’, a radically different way of handling the suspicions of Georgian nationalists compared to the Abkhaz, Ossetians, or Javakheti Armenians; Ajaria in fact presented itself, with reasonable success, as an example for the rest of Georgia. When limited unrest erupted in 1991, as Derluguian puts it, ‘Ajaria never challenged Tbilisi; it was Gamsakhurdia who challenged Ajaria’.113 Though the Ajarian leadership did not answer the challenge, the people did. On April 22, 1991, Ajars poured out on the streets after a rumor, apparently unsubstantiated, had spread that the upcoming elections to the Supreme Soviet would be turned into a referendum on Ajaria’s autonomy, and thereby constitute a step in Gamsakhurdia’s intentions to abolish it, only weeks after Georgia’s declaration of independence. Other grievances voiced included the programs of Christianization of the 1980s, which included old mosques being rebuilt as churches. The demonstrations continued the next day, with demonstrators demanding changes in the leadership of Ajaria, but ended the next day. Shortly before the demonstrations, Gamsakhurdia had in March 1991 forced the Ajarian Supreme Soviet to remove its chairman Tengiz Khakhva, in whose place Aslan Abashidze was elected. Abashidze’s election was dubious, since the Soviet Constitution provided that only a deputy could be elected Chairman of a Supreme Soviet; Abashidze was not.114 Yet from this point onward, Abashidze would increasingly dominate Ajaria, and within a few years achieved full

Fuller, ‘Georgia’s Adzhar Crisis’, p. 10. 113 Derluguian, ‘A Tale of Two Resorts’, p. 281. 114 See Judith Hin, ‘Ajaria: The interest of the Local Potentate in Keeping Violent Conflict at Bay’, Paper Presented at the Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, New York, 13-15 April 2000. 112

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control over the republic. Abashidze comes from a princely family from lower Ajaria whose members ruled Ajaria intermittently before the 1917 revolution. His grandfather Memed Abashidze chaired the first Ajarian parliament in 1918-21. A dynastic trend is visible in Ajaria, as even official information sources from Ajaria now stress that the Abashidze family has ‘been heading Ajaria since 1463’.115 Subsequently, Ajaria developed into an authoritarian fiefdom controlled by Abashidze. Strict rule, violations of Human Rights, and disregard for the central government in Tbilisi have characterized Ajaria. But to an equal extent, a population that were spectators to two civil wars and two ethnic conflicts in Georgia experiences relative wealth, peace, and safety: Abashidze has made a point of cracking down hard on crime, and many observers view Batumi as the safest city in Georgia. With the Georgian government bogged down in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, weakened economically and politically, and fearful of Russian influence (which, as is seen below, was present in Ajaria), Abashidze was in an excellent bargaining position to extract the maximum benefit from Ajaria’s strategic location and Georgia’s general weakness without risking to pay a price for it. Ajaria refused to contribute to the central government budget, was reluctant to allow Georgian border guards to take over control over its border with Turkey from Russian troops in 1998, and Abashidze even keeps a militia along the administrative border between Ajaria and Georgia. Yet while championing the political and economic autonomy of Ajaria, Abashidze has further strengthened his position by assuming a political role beyond Ajaria. He founded the ‘Revival’ faction that gained the second largest number of votes in the parliamentary elections of 1999, and emerged as the main contender to Shevardnadze before the 2000 Presidential elections, from which he withdrew shortly before the elections. Abashidze’s strategy seems clear: to use Ajaria as a power base, work for a nationwide role that he is ready to trade for government acquiescence of his total control over Ajaria. Another example is his suggestion, made in September 1998, that Javakheti should be made a part of the Ajarian republic in order to solve the minority problems there. Much like the case with his national political role, Abashidze makes it clear to the central government that he desires only to control Ajaria, but that he has capacity to create trouble for Shevardnadze’s government should the center try to infringe on his powers in Ajaria. As will be seen below, he is using the presence of a Russian military base as the ultimate safeguard for Ajaria’s autonomy. As should be clear from the above, there is nothing radical in Abashidze’s policies. As Charles H. Fairbanks summarizes the Ajarian situation:

See for example the official homepage of the Republic of Ajaria, at http://www.adjaraar.org/eng/head.shtml.htm. It adds that “Aslan Abashidze possesses an acute sense of justice, political foresight, courage, nobility, persistence, and aristocratic bearing. Abashidze impresses an interlocutor with the sharpness of mind, with extremely logical thinking. As he is always sure of being right, he agrees to meet his opponent halfway very rarely but he never neglects the opinion of the latter. He has immense creative energy and remarkable efficiency”

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The local boss, Aslan Abashidze, has never raised any question of secession from Georgia. He wants simply to do what he wants and to enjoy the profits of vacation hotels, tropical products, and smuggling across the border with Turkey. There seems to be nothing public in Abashidze’s motives; he is operating essentially like a small businessman. The Russian garrison on the border, whose main occupation seems to be smuggling, gives Abashidze the protection to defy the central Georgian government; the Moscow government approves this arrangement because it limits Georgian independence from Russia.116

That is not to say that leadership has not been absent in Ajaria: Quite to the contrary, the pragmatic and business-minded attitude of Abashidze, in opposition to the nationalist and adventurist policies of the Abkhazian, Ossetian, and Gamsakhurdia leaderships, contributed to the stability and peace that has prevailed in Ajaria. Though this came at the price of many political rights and freedoms, most Georgians, burdened by war and economic decay, would probably gladly make that trade, as evidenced by Abashidze’s limited though significant nation-wide appeal.

7.5.9. External Support Abashidze’s political astuteness is proven not only by his reading of the internal Georgian situation and his ability to maximize Ajarian autonomy, but also by his ability to forge external links that have included Turkish business interests, the Russian military, and even relatives of the Clinton administration White House. The latter example may be the geopolitically least important, but the most spectacular.117 Abashidze in 1999 managed to attract the brothers of First Lady Hillary Clinton, Tony and Hugh Rodham, to invest in a $118 million project to export hazelnuts from Ajaria to the west. As Abashidze grew a closer personal relationship to the Rodham brothers (Tony Rodham even became the godfather of his grandson), he soon turned the links to the White House to his advantage, making statements in Georgian politics to the effect that he enjoyed the backing of the Clinton Administration in the forthcoming elections – at a time when relations between Batumi and Tbilisi were sour. As the White House stepped in to rein in the Rodhams, the deal seems to have collapsed. The crucial geographic location of Ajaria quickly became a source of economic input into the Ajarian economy. In fact, most land trade from Turkey to Georgia, Azerbaijan, parts of Russia and even to Armenia passes through the Sarpi border crossing only a few miles from Batumi, and border trade is estimated to have a turnover of close to a hundred Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., “Party, Ideology and the Public World in the Former Soviet Space,” in Arthur M. Meltzer, Jerry Einberger, and M. Richard Zinman, eds., Politics at the End of the Century (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 252. 117 Viveca Novak and Jay Branegan, ‘Are Hillary's Brothers Driving Off Course?’, Time, 1 November 2001; David Ignatius, ‘Rambling Rodhams’, The Washington Post, 16 September 1999; David Ignatius, ‘The Rodhams: Back in Georgia’, The Washington Post, 29 December 1999. 116

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million dollars a month.118 The historical links with Turkey have also given Ajaria a specific place in Turkish policy; in fact, Ajaria received its autonomy in the early 1920s in accordance with the 1921 Treaty of Kars between the Soviet Union and Republican Turkey. Though Turkey unconditionally supports Georgia’s territorial integrity, the Muslim identity of Ajaria and the (by Caucasian standards) relatively recent political links puts it culturally closer to Turkey than most other parts of Georgia, and ensures a level of Turkish attention to any central encroachments on Ajaria. More importantly has been the Russian connection. Abashidze built his power back in 1991-92 on close links with the local Russian military commander, General Gladyshev.119 In an atmosphere where most Georgian politicians, and certainly the Shevardnadze government, have emphatically opposed the stationing of Russian military bases on Georgian territory, Abashidze has explicitly held that their presence in Ajaria form a guarantee of stability. Russian military commanders have also stated their readiness to fight to defend the people of Ajaria.120 At the time of the Abkhaz war, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev after a visit to Sukhumi stopped by in Batumi without informing the government in Tbilisi, met with Abashidze, and publicly stated that Ajaria fell ‘within the Russian sphere of influence’, and noted that if Shevardnadze wanted to see him, he would have to come to Batumi.121 This was interpreted in Tbilisi as a thinly veiled threat to support Ajarian separation from Georgia. In 1998, when the 1993 five-year agreement between Tbilisi and Moscow allowing Russian troops to control Georgia’s borders with Turkey expired, Abashidze refused to allow Georgian border troops to take control over the Ajarian-Turkish border.122 He may have feared that income from smuggling, which both the Ajarian leadership and the Russian military seem to profit from, would be challenged if Tbilisi took control of the border crossing. Though in a less critical way than in Javakheti, the removal of the Russian military base in Batumi could spark unrest and difficulties for the Georgian government. It seems reasonably likely that given the Russian-Georgian relations of the early 1990s and the belligerence of the Russian military against Shevardnadze’s government, a secessionist leader in Ajaria could have played the Russian card offensively as the Ossetians and Abkhaz did. Yet Abashidze’s interests have constantly been primarily economic and pragmatic, rather than nationalistic and idealistic. The achievement of the symbolics of independent statehood never had much appeal to Abashidze, who must also have seen the significant cost in terms of destruction and severed economic linkages incurred on the Abkhaz and South Ossetians in their Derluguian, ‘A Tale of Two Resorts, p. 283, states a figure of US$60-70 million in the mid-1990s, and trade ahs increased considerably since then. 119 Jonathan Aves, Georgia: From Chaos to Stability?, p. 42. 120 Hin, ’Ajaria: The interest of the Local Potentate…’, p. 13. 121 Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, ‘Back in the USSR’, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, 1994, p. 51. 122 Jamestown Monitor, vol. 4, no. 47, 24 march 1998. 118

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secessionist wars. Abashidze was nevertheless content with using his external links to the Russian militarily defensively, fully aware of the deterrent effect it had on any Georgian government attempts to rein in Ajaria’s near-independent status.

7.5.10. The Role of Autonomy The discussion above, like most analyses of Ajaria’s low level of conflict, has stressed the role of Abashidze’s non-radical leadership and the inclusive and compatible Georgian and Ajarian identities as major reasons for the low level of conflict between Ajaria and the Georgian government. An interesting factor in the Ajarian case is that it had a low incentive structure for conflict, whereas capabilities were relatively high. A secession of Ajaria from Georgia would have been fully feasible, with the levels of external support and economic viability that Ajaria enjoys. Moreover, the institutions of autonomy presented the institutional structures that could have made it possible for an Ajarian elite to provide leadership in a secessionist struggle. Indeed, Abashidze managed to secure his position as the undisputed leader of Ajaria by taking control of the reins of the institutions of the Ajarian Autonomous Republic. He was somewhat doubtfully appointed Acting Chairman of the Supreme Soviet; from this position, he managed to cement his control over the structures of the autonomy partly with the help of Gamsakhurdia, who declared null and void the votes obtained by the Communist Party in the elections to the Ajarian Supreme Soviet in June-July 1991, on the basis of a ban on the party.123 This guaranteed a majority support for Abashidze in the legislative body. And whereas Abashidze’s relationship with Gamsakhurdia remained cordial, his relationship with Shevardnadze grew increasingly tense after a period of cooperation in the early 1990s. Abashidze even refused to visit Tbilisi between 1995 and 2000, fearing that an attempt on his life would be made. However, Shevardnadze never managed to curtail Abashidze’s power in Ajaria. Abashidze reigned supreme in Ajaria, but never asserted Ajaria’s independence. Neither was he forced with a strong lobby or intelligentsia-led movements for independence such as existed in South Ossetia (Ademon Nykhas), Abkhazia (Aydgylara), or even Javakheti (the more radical parts of Javakhk). As seen above, autonomous status bred a national intelligentsia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the absence of such an intelligentsia seems to have played an important role in the avoidance of conflict in Javakheti. Why did Ajaria, in spite of its autonomous status, not develop any visible separatist movements, either at the grassroots or at the elite levels? The close ethnic linkages between Ajaria and Georgia, and the authoritarian rule of Abashidze after 1991 may have played a role. But more important was the anomalous character of Ajaria’s autonomy. As noted above, Ajars were not listed separately in Soviet censuses after 1926. In subsequent censuses, they were listed simply as Georgians. Ajaria was already anomalous by being the only Soviet Autonomous region to be based on religious and not ethnic 123

Hin, ’Ajaria: The interest of the Local Potentate…’, pp. 11 & 19.

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basis.124 The abolition of the communal category of Ajars meant that Ajaria became the only autonomous territory in the former Soviet Union not to have a titular nationality. In the words of Derluguian, Ajaria was a ‘land without a people’: there was an Ajaria, but there were no Ajars.125 Had the development of Ajaria resembled that of other entities in the Soviet Union, the 70 years of Soviet rule in Ajaria could have strengthened the separate identity of the Ajars. After all, the difference between Kyrgyz and Kazakh (the two share a common culture and language, the former being highlanders and the latter plains dwellers) was at best an academic one before the national delimitation in 1924 – at first the present-day Kazakhs were even called Kyrgyz, and the Kyrgyz were called the Kara-Kyrgyz. After Soviet ethnic engineering had settled in, separate national identities, though far from cohesive, have taken root. But not only was the ethnonym ‘Ajar’ abolished: the religious identity marker of the Ajars being anathema in the Soviet Union, the area was subjected to an active policy of assimilation into a Georgian identity. As Derluguian notes, Georgian Bolsheviks that generally considered the concept of a Muslim Georgian a contradiction in terms were allowed to unleash their atheistic zeal on Ajaria, where there was no talk of ‘the development of nationalities’ but of struggling against the ‘noxious relics of the past’.126 As a result, there were never any ethnic quota favoring the appointment of Ajars to positions of power, as in Abkhazia or South Ossetia; there were no philological institutes teaching the Ajar culture and history; and no separate, nationally molded Ajar ethnic elite was ever formed. Since the Ajars were officially Georgian, the autonomy of Ajaria did not resemble the autonomy of South Ossetia or Abkhazia: There was no titular nationality to be favored or protected, and therefore Ajaria was in practice not an ethnic autonomy but a region with a higher degree of administrative self-rule than other parts of Georgia. Hence the breeding ground for ethnic mobilization and secessionist aspirations that was provided by autonomy in Abkhazia and South Ossetia simply did not exist.

With the exception of the farce-like creation of a Jewish Autonomous Area, Birobidjan, not far from the North Korean border, in which a total Jewish population of 10,166, or 0,56% of the Soviet Union’s Jewish population, lived at the time of the 1979 census. 125 See Derluguian, ‘A Tale of Two Resorts’, p. 275-76. 126 Ibid., p. 279. 124

8 Conclusions The situation in the South Caucasus in the late 1980s contained a number of elements that contributed to the rise of ethnopolitical conflict. First and foremost was the gradual dissolution of the Soviet Union, which already by 1988 clearly carried with it a partial and later total breakdown of central state authority. The decrease in central power brought with it a concomitant rise in demands for increased power at the republican level of the union. In the union republics, and notably in the Caucasus, the parallel decline of the Communist ideology’s hegemony created an ideological void that was as important as the political void left by the loss of central power. Moreover, the Soviet Union was an authoritarian state where a legal civil society was absent and where the development of a democratic and tolerant political culture was impeded by state authorities. The state, intolerant of dissent, had for decades relied on violence and repression to achieve its domestic goals – something that undoubtedly shaped the political culture of its citizens, and the ease with which violence was resorted to as a political tool. The void created by the collapse of the intolerant communist ideology was filled by equally intolerant ethnic nationalism. This dual collapse of the state’s carrying idea but also of its power in an atmosphere of intolerance makes the Caucasus of the late 1980s highly specific, and arguably highly conflict-prone. Whereas the situation was indeed specific and its peculiarities can explain to a large extent that conflict emerged between ethnic groups, the question remains why some ‘dyads’ of center-minority relations in the South Caucasian republics ended up in conflict with each other while others, actually the majority, did not. As this study has shown, disentangling the factors that have contributed to ethnopolitical conflict in the South Caucasus and attempting to understand the interaction between these various factors is a delicate matter. Yet on the basis of the findings of chapter five and the deeper case studies of chapter seven, a number of conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, a series of permissive conditions or background factors prepared the ground for conflict in certain cases while their absence impeded the rise of conflict in others. Among these, the extent of cultural differences between groups seem to have played a less than central role in the emergence of conflict. Groups that shared various common elements such as the Georgians and Abkhaz, and Georgians and Ossetians, were cases of conflict. Moreover, Azeris in Georgia and Armenia, though subjected both to radical nationalism and having great cultural differences with the majority population, remained silent. The type of national conceptions that dominated in the region seem to have played an important role. The predominance of ethnic and exclusive conceptions of the nation in Georgia, Abkhazia and Ossetia, and the mutually exclusive conceptions of

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the Azeri and Armenian nations did a great deal to prepare the ground for tensions and impede the search for compromise in these areas. The Azerbaijani national conception’s inclusive attitude to at least the Muslim peoples on Azerbaijan’s territory, if not toward the Armenian population, helps explaining the low and manageable level of tensions between the Azerbaijani state and the Talysh and Lezgin minorities. The level of past conflict, divergent interpretation of a conflict-ridden history, of whitewashing the own group and demonizing the other, also seems to have played a great role. The Caucasus is an area where history is entertained and actively and purposefully inculcated by the ethnic elites in the young generation. In this sense, Mountainous Karabakh and Abkhazia had indeed been areas that saw the highest level of conflict in the pre-Soviet era, and where ethnic tensions, moreover, remained important during the entire Soviet era; this prepared the ground for renewed conflict. But Georgia and Armenia fought a war over Javakheti in 1919, an instance that has not been mythified to a great extent; likewise, Georgia and Azerbaijan disagreed on the status of certain territories along their border, but that hatchet has remained buried in the tumultuous last fifteen years. As far as terrain is concerned, it is a fact that all conflict areas were mountainous areas. However, all but one case in the entire study are mountainous, and the empirical record of the conflicts’ development, as seen in chapter seven regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia, provide no conclusive hints to the role of rough terrain in the escalation to war there. In particular, the development of the conflict in Abkhazia, dominated by offensive warfare, seems to cause doubt regarding the connection between terrain and conflict. Another factor, demography, has proven to be a poor explanatory factor of ethnopolitical conflict. The Abkhaz case provides powerful evidence that an ethnic group that is a minority even in the area it inhabits can, if circumstances are right, pose a credible challenge to the authority and integrity of the state. Moreover, a striking element of the conflicts in the Caucasus is the small size of the minorities that fought wars with their central governments. The Armenians of Karabakh, the Abkhaz, and the South Ossetians all had numbers ranging from 65,000 to 120,000 people, whereas the states they challenged had populations of five and eight million, respectively. This unlikely challenge is partly explained by the presence of ethnic kin for all these minorities. They all received state support, as seen below; but they also all had neighboring kin that supported them, and where they found material and political support. Chechens and Circassians in the Abkhaz case, North Ossetia in the South Ossetian case, and Armenians in the case of Mountainous Karabakh all acted as dedicated support bases for their kin across the border. Yet that was not specific to the cases of conflict. In fact, all minorities in the study except the Ajars did have such ethnic kin. Most notably, the Armenians of Georgia and the Lezgins had strong ethnic ties across the border that they occasionally used for political objectives. Finally, the issue of economic viability is unclear. The cases of conflict were not areas that had significant natural resources or an economic incentive to separate; though Karabakh and Abkhazia could survive on their own, there were no economic gains to be made from secession. In any case, the story of ethnopolitical conflict in the

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South Caucasus is not one of decisions taken with regard to economic calculations. These conflicts were not about economy but about identity, about ownership of territory, and about fear. Fear on the part of minorities for what remaining within the state would imply, even raising issues of cultural survival, as in Abkhazia; fear among the majorities that minority populations, especially in Georgia’s case, would serve as a tool of a foreign power to undermine the security and independence of the state.1 Summing up the background factors, it seems that the issue of past conflict played a role – but especially through its remembrance and mythification, and that the exclusivity of national conceptions was a significant part of the problem. In other words, the empirical evidence tends to show that issues related to incentives were important, whereas background factors related to capacity played a more minor role. The factors related to incentives and capacity, if assumed to indicate the conflict potential of a case, provide little assistance in explaining the emergence of conflict in Georgia. In fact, only Ajaria stands out as having a low conflict potential. In particular, Ajaria was the only minority to be included within the Georgian national conception, and had low levels of past conflict, and close to no mythification of whatever past conflict had existed. As such, while Ajaria had some capacity to challenge the government, it scored low on all factors related to incentives to do so. Ajars felt Georgian, were accepted as Georgian, and had little grievances against Georgians. The remaining four cases, however, are more complicated. All of the four (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Javakheti Armenians, and Kvemo Kartli Azeris) have a comparable assortment of background factors. All had various levels of historic conflict with the Georgians; all were excluded from the Georgian national conception; all had ethnic kin abroad; and all except the Azeris of Kvemo Kartli lived in rough terrain. Economic indicators were mixed, as were the salience of cultural differences. The conflict potential of these four cases were then, judging from the background factors, relatively comparable. How does autonomy relate to this? Autonomy, as discussed at length in chapter one, affects background factors mainly in the way that it promotes the separate ethnic identity of the group. As such, autonomy in Abkhazia and South Ossetia served to promote a separate ethnic consciousness among the Abkhaz and Ossetian population of these two regions, something that could not be done in Ajaria since there were officially no Ajars. Through a separate educational system, the Abkhaz and Ossetians were shielded from Georgian cultural influence. Though few Abkhaz lived in Georgia proper, it is instructive to see the differences between the Ossetians living in South Ossetia and those living in the rest of Georgia. In fact, Ossetians were among the minorities in Georgia proper known to assimilate voluntarily without much difficulty in Georgia. They learnt Georgian, often married Georgians, and many of them increasingly came to see themselves as Georgian, in spite of the exclusive character of the Georgian national conception. 1

See Stuart Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, Cornell University Press, 2001.

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Anecdotal evidence confirms this, and numerous persons of Ossetian origin reportedly attempted, often successfully, to have their official ‘nationality’ in their documents changed to identify them as Georgian. Incidentally, the same process occurred among Armenians, especially those that did not live in the compact Armenian settlements in Tbilisi or Javakheti. In South Ossetia, however, the ethnic frontiers seem to have been much more pronounced. The Ossetians there were not at all as willing to give up their Ossetian identity, very much because it was entertained and promoted by the autonomous leadership of South Ossetia. Autonomy also inherently impedes the development of a civic conception of the nation. A civic nation implies that all citizens, by virtue of being citizens, are members of the national community without regard to differences of language, religion, or other ethnicity markers including color or customs. But if minorities are accorded territorial autonomy, that implies that they are singled out as being different, given a special status. The very existence of such special status discourages the development of overlapping and inclusive identities. The concept of all citizens being equal and members of a civic nation is hardly compatible with the singling out of specific groups on the basis of their ethnicity. The very institution of autonomy in this sense implies a rebuttal of the concept of an inclusive and integrated civic nation. The Georgian national conception was already predominantly ethnic; and in this sense, the institution of autonomy was an obstacle to the development of the Georgian national conception in a civic direction. While background factors do not assist significantly in explaining the emergence of conflict, the analysis of catalyzing factors, however, changes the picture somewhat. Radical leadership was present in three of these four cases. In fact, with the exception of the Kvemo Kartli Azeris, the remaining three cases saw a very similar growth of a nationalist movement that claimed to represent the group and voice its grievances. Javakhk, Ademon Nykhas, and Aydgylara all emerged in 1988, at the time that the Georgian national movement gained strength. Among Azeris, various cultural groups did spring up, but none was able to claim a leading role, and no strong nationalist grouping ever emerged that claimed to represent the ethnic group. The responses of the three nationalist movements to the increased strength of the Georgian nationalist movement were also very similar. Aydgylara and Ademon Nykhas began campaigning for stronger links to the rest of the Soviet Union, demanded higher status for their autonomies and eventually demanded independence and attachment to the Russian Federation. Javakhk demanded the institution of an autonomous region for Javakheti, and a strong current existed in the organization for attachment to Armenia. Likewise, during the Gamsakhurdia government’s rule in Tbilisi, all three movements sought to minimize the Georgian government’s authority in their respective regions and to maximize their own control. Hence a dissatisfied and disgruntled elite existed in all three areas that pursued centrifugal tendencies. The main difference between the Javakheti case on the one hand,

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and the South Ossetian and Abkhaz cases on the other, was the institutional base and political skill of the leadership. These two factors are intimately tied to the existence of autonomy in Abkhazia and South Ossetia but its absence in Javakheti. The comparison between South Ossetia and Javakheti is particularly illustrating. These two areas scored equal on all factors save autonomy. Both had low-to-middle cultural differences with Georgians, were excluded from the reigning national conception, had comparable levels of past conflict that lacked substantial mythification, both were poor areas in very rough terrain, both dominated their respective regions demographically, and had ethnic kin across the border with which they had close ties. If anything, the Armenian demographic dominance of Javakheti was considerably larger than that of Ossetians over South Ossetia. Yet the response of these two minority groups to the growth of official Georgian nationalism were very different. Both were apprehensive of the government’s attempts to strengthen the supremacy of the Georgian language over Georgia’s entire territory. Yet Javakheti Armenians had little possibility to resist this, had no instruments either to prevent it or to oppose it. South Ossetia did: the institutions of its autonomous region, and most notably its parliament. As the South Ossetian parliament began waging a war of laws with Tbilisi, the conflict escalated; the lack of such instruments in Javakheti made it more difficult for the Armenians there to challenge the central authorities’ policies. Similarly, the institution of autonomy provided South Ossetia with an institutionalized leadership, in control over a bureaucratic institution with clear decision-making mechanisms and a strong chain of command. The outward unity of the South Ossetian leadership shows to a considerable level of discipline and conformity with authority. This is in stark contrast to the wobbling, indecisive, and inconsistent policies of Javakhk, and to the apparent divisions within the organization. Javakhk had no bureaucratic basis, was a loose association of sub-groups with divergent interests, and lacked a chain of command that ensured that the leadership’s policies were followed or implemented. In this sense, autonomy played an important role in the emergence of a leadership that was not only radical but also cohesive and effective in taking decisions and implementing them. The issue of political experience is also important: Ossetian and Abkhaz leaders were part of the Soviet Nomenklatura, by virtue of their positions in the Soviet bureaucracy. They had political training and experience – in fact, they were mid-to-high level functionaries in the Soviet system. Similarly, the founders of Aydgylara and Ademon Nykhas were part of the official Soviet intelligentsia. Because Javakheti lacked autonomy, Javakhk had neither intelligentsia nor Nomenklatura. It was composed of officials in the Akhalkalaki city council, school teachers, minor businessmen, collective farm directors, etc. The difference in the institutional basis and the political capital in the nationalist movements was hence of crucial importance in the escalation of conflict. Concerning radical leadership, it is also necessary to account for the aggressive attitude of the Georgian nationalist movement toward minorities. As chapter seven showed, the Georgian nationalist forces targeted all minorities in different ways. However, the

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pressures exerted seem to have been particularly strong on two minorities: the Azeris and the South Ossetians. These minorities bore the brunt of the Georgian nationalist fervor to a large extent because of their geographic closeness to Tbilisi. Abkhazia and Ajaria are both far away from Tbilisi in Western Georgia, whereas Javakheti is very inaccessible and geographically isolated from Tbilisi though it is not as far away. The conflict with South Ossetia has gained much more attention than the situation in Kvemo Kartli, where troubles actually preceded the escalation in South Ossetia. As has been seen in chapter six, inter-ethnic clashes erupted in South Ossetia in the summer of 1989, and the ‘March on Tskhinvali’ organized by the Georgian nationalists in Fall 1989 (See page 158) was a significant factor in the escalation of tensions. Yet a similar situation was taking place only a few hundred kilometers to the South. The Georgian nationalist campaign in Kvemo Kartli, and then especially in the Bolnisi area, had all intentions to effectuate an ethnic cleansing of the ‘Tatar’ population. The gravity of the conditions are best testified to by the emigration of several hundred families from the region. This was not dissimilar from the cleansings of Azeris that had taken place in Armenia from late 1987, which was one of the first instances of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, though what happened in Armenia was immensely more systematic and on a much larger scale. Ossetians and Azeris were subjected to very similar nationalist campaigns. Yet in South Ossetia, a nationalist response grew, which contributed to the escalation of the conflict to organized violence and eventually war. But in Kvemo Kartli, the Azeri population that did not leave Georgia appealed to the brotherhood of Georgians and Azeris or simply remained silent. In spite of an environment heavily conducive to ethnic mobilization, given the events in Ossetia, Abkhazia, the conflict in Mountainous Karabakh, etc., such a process did not take place. The Azeris were a rural, peasant population, and as such had little political or social organization; they may even have desired to remain calm for the sake of the conflict in Mountainous Karabakh; but the fact remains that the Azeris were subjected to heavy pressures and did not answer the challenge of the Georgian nationalists. No nationalist movement either in Kvemo Kartli or in Azerbaijan took up the cause of the Azeris in Georgia. This very different development as compared to South Ossetia can be related mainly to two factors, both of which were related to the lack of autonomy in Kvemo Kartli. Firstly, lack of autonomy meant a lack of leadership. In South Ossetia, as viewed above, the local Ossetians had both a Nomenklatura and a local intelligentsia that actively fanned the flames of ethnic nationalism. But in Kvemo Kartli, since there was no autonomy, there was no Nomenklatura; and there was no institute of history or pedagogical institute from which the typical Caucasian nationalist like Alan Chochiev, Vladislav Ardzinba, or even the more moderate Abulfaz Elchibey could emerge. Secondly, the Azeris lacked institutions. Where the Ossetians, in spite of their small numbers, controlled the institutions and media outlets of the South Ossetian autonomous region, the Azeris of Kvemo Kartli in spite of being several times larger did not have the capacity to demand a raise of status, condemn the Georgian nationalists, or

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appeal to help from Moscow or Azerbaijan – because they lacked a parliament. Leadership and institutions were lacking – both of which were provided by autonomy in the South Ossetian case. A major finding of this study has been the role of external support for the minorities that waged secessionist battles in the South Caucasus. Whether in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, or Mountainous Karabakh, the role of external forces, both private in the form of volunteers from the North Caucasus or Armenia, or state support from Russia and Armenia, were crucial in the war efforts. The issue, however, is more complicated than meets the eye at first sight: external support and external encouragement are potentially two different things. In the case of Mountainous Karabakh, there is little doubt that the two were one and the same. The Karabakh movement was in power in Armenia from late 1990, had virtually come to power on one issue – the annexation of Karabakh to Armenia. That the Karabakh authorities could expect support from Armenia and received encouragement from Yerevan is beyond doubt. The situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is less blatantly obvious. South Ossetia is known to have been significantly more nationalistic than North Ossetia; if any Ossetian nationalist leadership existed, that was in the South and not in the North. That doesn’t mean that the North was not a very valuable asset for the Ossetian nationalists in South Ossetia; what it does mean is that encouragement at an early stage was probably not a cause of the conflict. In Abkhazia, the Confederation of Mountain Peoples played a less circumspect role. It had designated Sukhumi as its capital in 1989, and its very creation was to a large extent a display of support for Abkhazia on the part of the Circassian and other North Caucasian peoples. The Confederation and its members can be said to have played a role in encouraging Abkhaz secessionism. But in both cases, Moscow’s role was significantly more powerful. When Georgia moved toward secession from the Soviet Union, it was perfectly feasible both for Moscow and for the Abkhaz and South Ossetian authorities to envisage that these two regions would remain part of the Soviet Union. More blatantly put, Moscow at numerous occasions made it clear to Georgia that should it seek secession from the USSR, it would have problems with its autonomous regions – an understatement, as it happened. There is little doubt that Moscow was consistently entertaining the separatist ambitions of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian elites in the hope of exerting leverage on Georgia. Until the end of 1991, this policy was employed to prevent Georgia from seceding; after independence, it was employed ever more vigorously to keep Georgia within the Russian sphere of influence. With regard to Javakheti, Armenia’s policies of keeping Javakheti calm and influencing the Javakheti Armenians toward compromise have been mentioned. Comparing this situation with Abkhazia, however, it is interesting to note that the brunt of active external support for Abkhazia came after it had declared independence in July 1992, when Kitovani’s paramilitary forces invaded Abkhazia. Javakhk at least one occasion voted on secession from Georgia, but the secessionists could not muster enough votes among the

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leadership of the organization. Supposing that Javakhk had declared the independence of Javakheti and Kitovani, or some Georgian paramilitary leader, had launched a similar attack on Javakheti to the one he launched in August 1992 on Abkhazia, it is very doubtful whether the Armenian would have remained neutral. Given the nationalist sentiment in Armenia at the time, and the dominance of nationalist forces in the country’s politics, Armenia would have been likely to come to the rescue of its ethnic kin in Javakheti. The point here is to distinguish between encouragement before the act of secession, and actual direct support after that act has already been undertaken. What lacked in the case of Javakheti was not the will of Armenia to support Javakheti in an actual situation of need; that support would almost certainly have been forthcoming at some level. What was missing was an encouragement to move toward secession that was completely natural given Armenia’s predicament. Had an actual spark been ignited in Javakheti, however, the Armenian policy could have been a lot different. But the spark never came, because Javakhk was unable to rise above its internal divisions and develop into the cohesive nationalist movement that its founders and leaders intended it to be, or to rally enough support among the population. Javakhk lacked institutions to legitimize its leadership; it lacked outlets to influence the people; and it lacked a bureaucratic organization that provided it with a distinct chain of command and a decision-making mechanism. The Javakhk leaders also lacked the contacts in the Soviet military and party hierarchies that the leaders of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian autonomous regions had. By virtue of their autonomous status, Abkhazia and South Ossetia also had their separate party organizations, which did not exist in Javakheti or Kvemo Kartli. Being party functionaries, the officials in the autonomies had a wide range of direct interaction with union-level authorities and bureaucracy, despite their formal belonging to the Georgian republic. Ardzinba’s case is the most obvious example of how an official from an autonomous region could make use of his contacts in the power ministries in Moscow to attract support for his region’s secessionist ambitions. The Armenians and Azeris in Georgia lacked such conditions, and therefore had no direct link to Moscow. Autonomy is hence intimately related to both the leadership and external support factors. In fact, the large role that autonomy played in the conflicts in the South Caucasus is very much related to the way autonomy interacts with a number of other explanatory factors in this study. Autonomy, at the basis, affects both group incentives and capacity to challenge the government. Though its impact on group identity and group cohesion is significant and an important permissive condition for conflict, autonomy’s impact on group capacity and its interaction with leadership and external support were even more important in transforming these regions from areas of ethnic tension to areas of conflict. In particular, the way in which autonomy positively influences leadership cohesion and provides a radical leadership with a ready-made toolbox for ethnic mobilization is important. With its decision-making structure, its executive and legislative institutions, its

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defined borders, its financial resources, and its control over media outlets, an autonomous structure is a coveted target for ethnic entrepreneurs. In both the cases of South Ossetia and Mountainous Karabakh, the nationalist forces emerged outside the official Nomenklatura, in groups belonging to the local intelligentsia that, of course, had close links with the Nomenklatura. These nationalist groups at first met with resistance from the official leadership of the autonomies, which were wary of challenging the central Soviet authorities, that enforced the status quo. The nationalist forces then concentrated their energy on acquiring control over the autonomous institutions, in fact managing to ‘convert’ many officials to their cause, and eventually replacing those that did not. Once in control of the autonomous structures, the nationalists were able to put the entire autonomous machinery to work to promote their secessionist agenda. This study has aspired to show how the institution of autonomy contributed significantly to the emergence of ethnopolitical conflict in the South Caucasus. Yet having established this linkage raises as many questions as it answers. Two main questions are of particular urgency: first, what are the implications of the results of this study for autonomous regions in areas that do not form part of the former Soviet Union? In other words, what is the validity of this study for a wider sample of cases? And secondly, if autonomy is indeed a factor that contributes to conflict, what practical policy implications does this conclusion carry? The answer to the first question, whether the findings of this study would be replicated in other parts of the world, cannot be securely found without additional research into the specific cases of autonomous regions across the globe. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the Soviet experience, and in particular the Caucasian experience, are unique in many ways. In few other parts of the world will one find autonomous minorities within republics that are in turn part of a larger, federal entity. That factor is relevant especially in terms of the availability of external support; for most autonomous minorities, there is no ‘Moscow’ to which they could turn for help against their republican leadership. Likewise, few ethnic groups will find themselves in multiethnic states that have the paradoxical features of being both governed by a communist ideology and having a highly primordial understanding of ethnicity. In spite of these and other peculiarities of the Soviet Caucasus, however, there are important elements of the role of autonomy there that are likely to operate in the same manner under different political and social conditions. The role that autonomous institutions play in promoting the separate identity of the autonomous ethnic group will almost invariably be a feature of autonomy; in fact, that is precisely why autonomy is demanded and granted. Secondly, the ready-made borders and symbols of the autonomy are also intrinsic to its territorial nature, and serves both to mentally and physically determine the area that is ‘ours’ versus the area that is ‘theirs’, hence increasing separation but also presenting a ready-made delimitation for a secessionist leader. Even more importantly, the role of autonomous institutions as a toolbox for ethnic entrepreneurs is

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also intrinsic to autonomous regions. Most autonomous regions do have, and will have, quasi-state institutions that provide a bureaucratic machine, executive and legislative powers, means to influence the population, and not least a certain popular legitimacy that are extremely valuable assets for a nationalist leader that wishes to pursue a course of separation. That said, the evidence in this study also has the important context of a weakening state. Hence what can be derived from this study is that autonomous institutions are likely to play such a role in case the central institutions of a state weaken either due to internal political or economic problems, as in the case of the Soviet Union or, due to external factors that could include a global or regional economic crisis, or a conflict with a foreign power. Under such conditions of flux and change, autonomous regions could very well pose great challenges to the central authorities in multinational states. Assuming that autonomy does act as a catalyst of conflict under given circumstances, what implication does this finding carry? When confronted with the results of this study, one disheartened practitioner of diplomacy raised the obvious question: if autonomy, bearer of much hope for the management and resolution of ethnopolitical conflicts, is not actually a solution but is rather inherently problematic, what is the way to manage ethnic tensions? The answer does not lie in any general and easily applicable model, and that may itself be one of the most important consequences of realizing the pitfalls of autonomy. Where there has been a tendency to view solutions linking ethnicity and territory, especially territorial autonomy, in one form or another as cure-all prescriptions, this study points to the merits of devising political structures that cut across ethnic and other communal divisions, encourage civic identities, but discourage the use of ethnicity in the political sphere. This study has attempted to show that the advocacy of resolving or preventing ethnic conflict through solutions based on the devolution of power along ethnic lines is at best a questionable and at worst a disastrous enterprise. The little publicized pitfalls of ethnoterritoriality hence need to be kept in mind while formulating policies in and toward multiethnic societies. That does not mean that all autonomy solutions are necessarily destined to collapse or to lead to war. It does mean that whenever the ethnicization of territory can be avoided, it should be avoided. In particular, the difference between pre-conflict and post-conflict situations is important here. In a post-conflict situation where identities have already been polarized; where the connection between territory and ethnicity are already established, it will be extremely difficult to avoid territorial solutions. Hence to assume that Abkhazia could accept to return to Georgian rule in a new Georgia without internal boundaries and a newly created, democratic and all-encompassing civic state is absurd. However, in areas that have not seen ethnic conflict, the connection between territory and ethnicity is to be avoided if at all possible. In the Caucasus, this study would suggest that granting minorities territorial self-rule, as has been suggested, would not ensure peace in the region – if the findings of this study are of any value, there is reason to think that the creation of

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new autonomies would risk destabilize the Caucasus further and impede the building of strong civic and democratic states there. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, increasingly powerful forces are advocating that states should be designed and structured according to political systems that are based on the primordial ethnic identities of its citizens. Creating systems that encourage the formulation of politics on the basis of ethnicity can hardly be equated with progress in a globalized world. Instead of creating systems that resemble a ‘museum of peoples’ and promoting the salience of ethnicity and ascribed identities in socio-economic and political life, the international community is better advised to devise ways in which to downplay the role of ethnicity and encourage cross-cutting identities. This should in no way excuse the suppression of cultural rights of any people; yet it should not seek to institutionalize separeteness. Ethnicity and nationality are not primordial, unchangeable identities but are very much flexible and adaptable. Devising policies that lock such identities into place and seek to preserve them as a value per se is unlikely to bring about a world of understanding and cooperation.

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ПРЕДИСЛОВИЕ После отставки президента Эдуарда Шеварднадзе ситуация вокруг Грузии снова привлекает внимание мировой общественности. Беспокойство вызывает, в частности, судьба Аджарии, которая не совсем подчиняется центральной власти, а также Абхазии и Южной Осетии, которые уже давно фактически отделились от Грузии. Тбилиси пока не достаточно силен, чтобы быстро восстановить свое влияние в этих регионах, но агрессивные высказывания нового президента Грузии Михаила Саакашвили и неопределенное отношение США и России к этим вопросам делают обстановку труднопредсказуемой. Чтобы понять ситуацию вокруг Грузии, нужно знать позиции всех заинтересованных сторон, а также исторические корни проблемы. А это – нелегкая задача. Особенно плохо доходят до внешнего мира голоса представителей регионов и непризнанных государств. В январе–апреле 2004 г. Центру славянских исследований Университета Хоккайдо посчастливилось во второй раз пригласить профессора Станислава Лакоба. Три года назад он опубликовал в Саппоро книгу о грузино-абхазской войне•. В предлагаемой вниманию читателя новой работе этого известного абхазского историка и политического деятеля освещаются различные стороны истории и современного положения Абхазии. Первая глава представляет собой краткий исторический очерк «Абхазия и абхазы». Во второй – «Абхазия и Российская империя»•• освещается деятельность Келешбея и Асланбея Чачба, которые отстаивали независимость Абхазии в начале XIX в. Автор отвергает версию о том, что Асланбей убил своего отца, Келешбея, и доказывает, что Абхазия вошла в состав России отнюдь не добровольно. Зловещей, но в то же время впечатляющей личностью выступает коварная владетельница Мегрелии Нина Дадиани. Она сделала своего зятя формальным владетелем Абхазии и сыграла большую роль в приведении Абхазии в подданство России, но потом потеряла расположение русского царя. •

Лакоба С. Абхазия – де-факто или Грузия – де-юре? (О политике России в Абхазии в постсоветский период. 1991-2000 гг.) Саппоро, 2001. Электронный вариант книги размещен на сайте Центра славянских исследований. •• Эта глава ранее была опубликована в виде отдельной брошюры: Лакоба С. Асланбей: К вопросу о политическом противоборстве в Абхазии в первой трети XIX столетия. Сухум, 1999.

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ГЛАВА I АБХАЗИЯ И АБХАЗЫ. КРАТКИЙ ИСТОРИЧЕСКИЙ ОЧЕРК• Абхазы – один из древнейших коренных этносов Кавказа, язык, культура и традиции которого наиболее близки и родственны северокавказским народам: абазинам, адыгейцам, кабардинцам, черкесам, убыхам. В языковом отношении все они составляют абхазо-адыгскую группу северокавказской семьи языков. Абхазы населяют территорию нынешней Республики Абхазия, которая расположена в северо-западной части Закавказья (территория 8,7 тыс. кв. км) на склонах Большого Кавказа и на Колхидской низменности. Омывается Черным морем. Протяженность побережья Абхазии – более 220 км. Северо-западная граница с Российской Федерацией тянется по реке Псоу, а восточная с Грузией – по реке Ингур. В Абхазии семь административных районов, семь городов (столица Сухум), четыре поселка городского типа. Абхазия небольшая многонациональная страна (около 300 тыс. жителей). Помимо абхазов в ней проживают армяне, грузины, русские, греки, эстонцы, турки, поляки, евреи, немцы, представители других национальностей. Здесь мирно уживаются люди разных конфессий – православные, католики, мусульмане, протестанты, иудеи. По переписи 1989 г. численность абхазов в самой Абхазии составляла 93,2 тыс. человек, а всего в Российской Федерации и странах СНГ их более 150 тыс. Многие абхазы живут в Турции и других странах мира, всего – около 600 тыс. человек. Абхазы исповедуют различные верования: традиционную религию (язычество), православное христианство, суннитский ислам. Первые упоминания об абхазах содержатся в ассирийской надписи ХII в. до н.э. (надпись Тиглатпаласара I) под именем «абешла», в античных греко-римских источниках I-II вв. н.э зафиксированы «апсилы» и «абасги». На их •

Предлагаемый краткий исторический очерк «Абхазия и абхазы» написан автором совместно с известным археологом-кавказоведом, доктором исторических наук, профессором Олегом Бгажба.

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Глава I генетическую связь с абхазским народом указывают этнонимы «апсуа» (самоназвание абхазов), «абаза» (самоназвание абазин, родственных абхазам), «обезы» русских и «абхазы» грузинских летописей. Свою родину абхазы называют «Апсны», т.е. «Страна души». Предки абхазов были одними из создателей мегалитической (дольмены, кромлехи) культуры на Западном Кавказе в III тысячелетии до н.э., а в начале I тысячелетия до н.э. – колхидско-кобанской металлургической провинции. В VIII-VII вв. до н.э. они освоили навыки производства и обработки железа, нашедшие яркое отражение и в героическом нартском эпосе абхазов в образе кузнеца Айнара. В VII-VI вв. до н.э. через территорию Абхазии по меото-колхидской дороге в Переднюю Азию проходили скифы, часть из которых осела и смешалась с местным древнеабхазским населением. Уклад городской жизни (Диоскуриада – современный Сухум; Гюэнос или Гиэнос – совр. Очамчира; Эшерское городище близ Сухума; Питиунт, или Питиус – совр. Пицунда), а вместе с ним и государственность на территорию Абхазии привнесли в первой половине VI в. до н.э. древние греки, связавшие затем местные окрестные общины в единую систему экономических отношений. В первые века н.э. древнеабхазские племена были объединены в раннеклассовые образования (Абасгия, Апсилия, Санигия), которые являлись органической, хотя и периферийной, частью римско-византийского культурного мира. В прибрежных крепостях Питиунта, Себастополиса и Зиганиса стояли римские когорты, а в Египте находилась «Первая когорта абасгов». В VI-VIII вв. н.э. через Абхазию на Северный Кавказ проходили три ответвления «Великого шелкового пути» – дороги через Абасгию, Апсилию и Мисиминию. Во II-VII вв. н.э. древнеабхазские племена создали самобытную «Цебельдинскую культуру». В местных воинских захоронениях найдены самые ранние на территории бывшего СССР мечи III-IV вв. из дамасской стали. По церковному преданию, первую христианскую проповедь предки абхазов услышали из уст апостолов Андрея Первозванного и Симона Кананита. В конце III-IV вв. в Питиунте образовалась первая на Кавказе христианская община, которую епископ Стратофил представлял на первом Вселенском церковном соборе в Никее в 325 г. Официально местное население приняло христианство в VI в. при императоре Юстиниане Великом. Первым пастырем у абасгов был Евфрат, у апсилов – Константин. В Константинополе была основана специальная школа, где обучались дети абасгов. В древнегрузинском источнике «Мученичество Або Тбилели» (VIII в.) прямо говорится о христолюбивой «стране Абхазия». В этот же период происходит и формирование абхазской феодальной народности. В течение VIII-X вв. существовало Абхазское царство, первым царем которого был Леон II, сын дочери могущественного хазарского кагана и двоюродный брат императора Византии (оба они были внуками хазарского кагана, 10

Абхазия и абхазы. Краткий исторический очерк а их матери – родные сестры). Благодаря этому счастливому обстоятельству, Абхазское царство получило тогда «международное признание». Являясь щитом от арабских нашествий, Абхазия возглавила процесс объединения всего Западного Закавказья. Царство достигло своего расцвета в X веке при царе Георгии II, который активно способствовал христианизации Алании (Осетии). В этот период в местной церковной архитектуре выделяется особая абхазо-аланская школа византийского зодчества. Династия абхазских царей пресеклась по мужской линии со смертью бездетного Феодосия Слепого, и власть перешла к его племяннику Баграту III (978-1014), который был картвелом (грузином) по отцу, но абхазский престол унаследовал по материнской линии от династии Леонидов (абхазки по имени Гурандухт, сестры Феодосия). Баграт III составил генеалогическое древо абхазских царей, чтобы подчеркнуть свою связь именно с этой династией. С него началось формирование нового государства – «царства абхазов и картвелов», которое еще несколько столетий продолжало называться «Абхазским». В XIII столетии «царство абхазов и картвелов» распалось. В XIII-XV вв. Абхазия попала в сферу политико-экономического влияния Генуи, которая основала на Черноморском побережье Крыма и Кавказа ряд торговых факторий. Сан-Себастьян (Сухум) стал важным торговоэкономическим центром региона, в котором проживали люди разных народностей и конфессий. В XVI-XVIII вв. Абхазское княжество находилось под протекторатом султанской Турции. В этот период здесь получает распространение ислам суннитского толка. С конца XVIII в., при владетеле Келешбее Чачба (Шервашидзе), Абхазское княжество вновь усилилось и с помощью флота контролировало Черноморское побережье от Анапы до Батума. В мае 1808 г. Келешбей был убит. Владетелем стал его старший сын Асланбей. В июле 1810 г. русский военно-морской десант с боем взял СухумКале. Законный владетельный князь Асланбей Чачба вынужден был оставить крепость. Прибрежная часть Абхазии за исключением значительных территорий вольных горских обществ присоединилась к России. На абхазский престол царские власти возвели своего ставленника Сефербея Чачба, который принял крещение и новое имя Георгий. Одной из отличительных черт Абхазского княжества являлось то, что в отличие от Грузии, с вхождением в Россию оно не утеряло полностью своей государственности. С 1810 по 1864 гг., находясь в составе России, княжество сохраняло автономное управление, которое просуществовало дольше других на Кавказе. В 18641917 гг. Абхазия («Сухумский военный отдел», c 1883 г. «Сухумский округ») была подчинена царской администрации на Кавказе. В XIX столетии Абхазия все еще занимала промежуточное положение между демократическими вольными обществами горцев Северо-Западного

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Глава I Кавказа и феодальной системой Грузии. Однако по духу общественного устройства она была теснее связана с черкесско-убыхским миром. В Абхазии не существовало феодальной собственности на землю, не было крепостного права, все категории крестьян являлись собственниками своей земли, а свободные общинники составляли 3/4 населения страны. В систему «горского феодализма» Абхазии крепко вжились элементы родоплеменного строя и языческих верований. Основой основ общественного устройства Абхазии была сельская община, которая объединяла все слои населения – высшие и низшие сословия – и была пропитана молочным родством («аталычество») феодалов с крестьянами. Тем самым смягчались и некоторые сословные противоречия. В условиях хуторского землевладения пахотные наделы не являлись собственностью всей общины, а находились в посемейной или подворной собственности абхазов. Общими для всех и открытыми для пользования были только пастбища и леса. Хозяйство абхазов носило натуральнопотребительский характер. Они занимались скотоводством, земледелием, виноделием, пчеловодством, обработкой кожи, древесины, гончарным и шорным делом, ткачеством, приготовлением пороха и др. Абхазы традиционно испытывали неприязнь к любым проявлениям товарно-денежных отношений, считая их позорными и унизительными для народа-воина. В результате Кавказской войны и антиколониальных восстаний 1866 и 1877 гг. абхазы пережили этническую катастрофу. Более половины населения вынуждено было покинуть родину и стать беженцами (махаджирами) в Турции. В течение тридцати лет, с 1877 по 1907 гг., абхазы за неоднократные возмущения и бунты считались в царской России «виновным населением». До 1864 г. однородная в этническом отношении страна во второй половине XIX в. подверглась колонизации не только со стороны русских, греческих, армянских, болгарских, немецких, эстонских и других новопоселенцев. Начиная с 70-80-х гг. XIX в., из прилегающих районов Западной Грузии сюда хлынули представители картвельских народов, в основном мегрелы. Тогда же, в 1877 г. в газете Тифлисский вестник появляется программная статья грузинского общественного деятеля Якоба Гогебашвили. В ней, в частности, говорилось, что «мингрельцы должны явиться первыми заместителями выселившихся абхазцев». В результате стремительных процессов перемещения населения этнодемографическая ситуация в стране резко изменилась. Так, если в 1886 г. абхазы составляли 85,7% населения, то в 1897 г. – лишь 55,3%. Картвельская колонизация Абхазии оказалась настолько бурной, что насторожила царские власти. Русские интересы в Абхазии напрямую столкнулись с грузинскими. Представители грузинской церкви, интеллигенции, различных политических партий и течений все отчетливее предъявляли свои притязания на Абхазию. В результате политики «разделяй и властвуй» в 1905 г., в период революционных событий в России, грузино-абхазские

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Абхазия и абхазы. Краткий исторический очерк противоречия до крайности обострились. Абхазы воспринимали все происходящее на их родине как «грузинскую революцию» и выступили на стороне правительства против этих «революционеров». По инициативе председателя правительства России П.А. Столыпина в 1907 г. специальным указом Николая II с абхазов была снята «виновность». После распада Российской империи Абхазия вошла в Союз объединенных горцев Кавказа и Юго-Восточный Союз. 8 ноября 1917 г. на съезде в Сухуме был избран парламент – Абхазский Народный Совет, который принял Конституцию и Декларацию абхазского народа. 11 мая 1918 г. на Батумской международной мирной конференции была провозглашена «Горская республика» (Северо-Кавказская республика). Вместе с Дагестаном, Чечней, Осетией, Кабардой в эту федерацию вошла и Абхазия. Тем самым была восстановлена Абхазская государственность, утерянная в июне 1864 г. Однако в июне 1918 г. в нарушение всех договоренностей войска только что (26 мая 1918 г.) провозглашенной Демократической республики Грузия при прямой военной поддержке императорской Германии оккупировали территорию Абхазии. Правительство Горской республики выразило Германскому правительству и Грузии резкий протест и расценило эти действия как акт агрессии против Абхазии и всего Северо-Кавказского государства. Политика меньшевистского правительства Грузии вызывала крайнее недовольство многонациональной Абхазии, что и облегчило установление здесь советской власти 4 марта 1921 г. Новый режим воспринимался как избавление от репрессий и вооруженного вмешательства Грузинской республики. Сначала большевики предоставили Абхазии свободу политического выбора, который был реализован провозглашением независимой ССР Абхазии (31 марта 1921 – 17 февраля 1922 г.). Уникальность этой ситуации заключалась в том, что Абхазия около года формально была независима как от советской России, так и от советской Грузии. В декабре 1921 г. лидеры Абхазии под сильным нажимом Сталина и Орджоникидзе вынуждены были заключить с Грузией «особый союзный договор», ратифицированный в феврале 1922 г., который зафиксировал равноправие двух республик. 30 декабря 1922 г. полномочный представитель ССР Абхазии Н. Акиртава подписал Договор об образовании СССР. С февраля 1922 г. и вплоть до февраля 1931 г. ССР Абхазия называлась «договорной». Первая советская конституция была принята в Абхазии в апреле 1925 г. III Всеабхазским съездом Советов. В феврале 1931 г. под давлением Сталина договорная ССР Абхазия была преобразована в автономную республику (Абхазская АССР) и включена в состав Грузинской ССР. Этот вопрос был решен в Тбилиси на VI Всегрузинском съезде Советов (19 февраля 1931 г.). Попрание суверенных прав Абхазии, низведение ее статуса до уровня автономии в составе Грузии привело к многодневному общенациональному сходу абхазского народа (18-26 февраля 1931 г.), выразившему недоверие правительству и советской власти. 13

Глава I После смерти 28 декабря 1936 г. председателя правительства Абхазии Нестора Лакоба, который был отравлен в Тбилиси на обеде в доме Л. Берия, начался самый трагичный период новейшей истории Абхазии. На республику обрушился террор, приведший к полному уничтожению политической и интеллектуальной элиты абхазского народа. Усиленными темпами проводилась политика грузинизации: абхазская письменность была переведена с латинской на грузинскую графическую основу, исконные абхазские топонимы заменялись грузинскими, обучение в школах стало вестись на грузинском языке, целенаправленно проводилась ассимиляторская переселенческая политика, направленная на деформацию этнодемографической структуры населения. За период 1937-1953 гг. из внутренних районов Грузии в Абхазию были переселены десятки тысяч грузин, что значительно увеличило их долю в составе населения Абхазии. В завуалированной форме демографическая экспансия грузин продолжалась и в постсталинский период. В результате, если в 1886 г. в Абхазии грузины составляли всего 6% населения, то в 1989 г. их стало уже 45,7%. Массовые митинги и демонстрации с требованием выхода Абхазии из состава Грузии происходили в 1957, 1964, 1967, 1978 и 1989 гг. В 1989-1990 гг. парламент Грузии в одностороннем порядке стал принимать решения, которые игнорировали межгосударственный характер отношений Абхазии и Грузии и по существу вели к упразднению абхазской государственности. Тбилиси признал незаконными и недействительными все государственные структуры советского времени с февраля 1921 г. В ответ Верховный Совет Абхазской АССР 25 августа 1990 г. принял Декларацию о государственном суверенитете Абхазии. Придя к власти в результате вооруженного переворота в Тбилиси, военный совет Грузии в феврале 1992 г. принял решение об отмене Конституции Грузинской ССР 1978 г. и о переходе Республики Грузия к Конституции Демократической Республики Грузия 1921 г., в которой Абхазская АССР как субъект государственно-правовых отношений не значилась. В правовом отношении Грузинская ССР перестала существовать и образовалось новое государство, с которым Абхазская АССР никаких взаимоотношений не имела. В целях преодоления правовой неурегулированности отношений между республиками 23 июля 1992 г. Верховный Совет Абхазии решил восстановить действие Конституции Абхазии 1925 г., а также принял новые Герб и Флаг Республики Абхазия. 14 августа 1992 г. только что вступившая в ООН Грузия развязала войну против Абхазии. Грузинские войска при поддержке боевой авиации, артиллерии, более ста танков, другой бронетехники вторглись в Абхазию и оккупировали часть ее территории. С первого дня агрессии они расстреливали мирных граждан, подвергали их пыткам и насилиям, сжигали дома и села, чинили расправу не только над абхазским, но и над армянским, русским, греческим, еврейским населением. На оккупированной территории производились 14

Абхазия и абхазы. Краткий исторический очерк этнические чистки. Помимо физического истребления проводилась и политика культурного геноцида. Уничтожались памятники истории и культуры абхазского народа, музеи и библиотеки, громились, грабились и сжигались театры, институты, школы, архивы, университет. Погибли ценнейшие фольклорные записи, лингвистические материалы, исторические документы, редчайшие книги и рукописи. Территория Абхазии была освобождена лишь 30 сентября 1993 г., после более чем 13-месячной оккупации. Грузино-абхазские переговоры идут с ноября 1993 г. по настоящее время под эгидой ООН, при посредничестве России и при участии ОБСЕ. Подписан ряд важнейших документов, в частности, «Заявление о мерах по политическому урегулированию от 4 апреля 1994 года». С мая-июня 1994 г., благодаря проводимой под эгидой ООН операции по поддержанию мира (в ней участвуют войска СНГ, в основном России, и военные наблюдатели ООН), прекращен огонь на границе между Абхазией и Грузией. Начался возврат беженцев в пограничный с Грузией Гальский район Абхазии. К настоящему времени практически все довоенное грузинское население вернулось в этот район (всего около 70 тыс. человек). При поддержке России и международных организаций продолжается переговорный процесс. 26 ноября 1994 г. парламент республики принял новую Конституцию суверенного государства. Государственным языком Республики Абхазия признан абхазский, а языком государственных и других учреждений наряду с абхазским является русский. Государственная власть осуществляется на основе разделения на законодательную, исполнительную и судебную ветви. Абхазия – президентская республика. Первым президентом парламент избрал Владислава Ардзинба. С декабря 1994 г. по сентябрь 1999 г. Абхазия и ее народ, как ни одна страна в мире, подверглись жесточайшей политической, экономической и информационной блокаде. После разрушительной грузино-абхазской войны (14 августа 1992 г. – 30 сентября 1993 г.) в стране стали возрождаться культура, наука и образование. Год от года повышается производство чая, табака, оживают курорты в Сухуме, Пицунде, Гагре, тысячи отдыхающих вновь стали посещать Новоафонскую пещеру, монастырь, древнюю столицу Абхазии на Анакопийской горе, озеро Рица. Возобновили свою работу Абхазский государственный университет, Абхазский институт гуманитарных исследований, национальные творческие союзы художников, писателей, журналистов, композиторов, архитекторов. Основана Академия наук Абхазии. В новых условиях функционируют телевидение и радио, Абхазское книжное издательство, журналы, газеты, в том числе независимые. Большой популярностью пользуются народные хореографические коллективы, детские музыкальные ансамбли, постановки Абхазского государственного театра, художественные выставки, молодежные фестивали, конкурсы.

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Глава I В результате проведенного референдума, 12 октября 1999 г. принят Акт о государственной независимости Абхазии. С осени 1999 г. стала меняться к лучшему в отношении многонациональной Абхазии и политика России. Российское правительство, президент В. Путин установили в отношении непризнанной республики безвизовый режим, проводят политику предоставления российского гражданства и т.д. В то же время Грузия неоднократно нарушала договоренности о прекращении огня и в послевоенное время дважды (в мае 1998 г. и октябре 2001 г.) вторгалась в пределы Абхазии, намереваясь взять реванш за свое поражение в 1993 г., впрочем, безуспешно. После свержения Э. Шеварднадзе в результате «революции роз» 23 ноября 2003 г. и прихода к власти М. Саакашвили 25 января 2004 г. грузиноабхазские отношения заметно ухудшились и вновь стали непредсказуемыми.

16

Предисловие

В третьей главе – «После развала Российской империи»• – автор полемизирует с грузинскими учеными (в первую очередь с А. Ментешашвили) об отношениях между Абхазией и Грузией в 1917-1925 гг. (частично здесь затронута и история Абхазии XIX в.) В этой главе раскрываются интересы России, Германии, Великобритании и Турции в регионе и рассматриваются юридические проблемы статуса Абхазии в первые годы после прихода к власти большевиков. Четвертая глава посвящается жизни и деятельности Нестора Лакоба, первого руководителя советской Абхазии, в 1922-1930 гг. председателя Совнаркома, а в 1930-1936 гг. – ЦИКа Абхазии, который приходится автору родственником. Н. Лакоба заботился о населении Абхазии и ограждал республику от разрушительной политики Москвы и Тбилиси. Сталин долгое время поддерживал Лакоба, но как только кремлевский правитель к нему охладел, Берия уничтожил его. Члены его семьи также были репрессированы. Пятая глава включает две части. Первая из них, «Абхазия в условиях передела мира», была написана для международного симпозиума в Центре славянских исследований. В ней анализируется место Грузии и Абхазии в геополитической игре США и России, значение нефте- и газопроводов для Южного Кавказа. Правда, здесь говорится больше о Грузии, чем об Абхазии, но это и понятно, поскольку судьба Абхазии во многом зависит от дальнейшего развития ситуации вокруг Тбилиси. Во второй части, «Кто есть кто в Абхазии», представлены биографические данные 87 представителей общественно-политической, военной и творческой элиты региона. Это ценнейший материал для изучения современной Абхазии. В целом книга вводит в научный оборот множество уникальных источников и предлагает новые трактовки истории и политической жизни Абхазии и Грузии. Можно восхищаться тем, что такой маленький регион, как Абхазия, имеет столь богатую и драматичную историю. Естественно, автор представляет абхазскую, а не грузинскую точку зрения, и в некотором смысле книга носит односторонний характер, который неизбежен для работ региональных ученых Южного Кавказа. Кроме того, читателям может показаться, что автор слишком увлекается анализом геополитики и «большой игры» между державами и недостаточно раскрывает противоречия внутри самой Абхазии. Вместе с тем, можно понять, почему ученые и политики Южного Кавказа проявляют повышенный интерес к геополитике – ведь этот регион слишком часто попадал в зависимое от чужой воли положение... УЯМА Томохико доцент Центра славянских исследований Университета Май 2004 г. Хоккайдо •

Эта глава должна была выйти в журнале Acta Slavica Iaponica в виде статьи под названием «Настоящее, продавленное историческим прошлым, или о новых грузинских разысканиях...», но по некоторым обстоятельствам опубликована так и не была.

5

Если выпало в Империи родиться, лучше жить в глухой провинции у моря. И от Цезаря далеко, и от вьюги, лебезить не нужно, трусить, торопиться. Иосиф Бродский Чем меньше народ, тем длиннее у него кинжал. Кавказская пословица

ВВЕДЕНИЕ Предлагаемая книга очерков посвящена узловым моментам политической истории Абхазии XIX-XXI столетий – времени, в течение которого небольшая причерноморская кавказская страна находилась и все еще находится в орбите российских военно-политических, экономических и культурных отношений. Для абхазского этноса пройденный путь, протяженностью почти в два века, был драматичным. Не раз он оказывался на краю гибели, но вновь возрождался. Так получилось, что в новое и новейшее время начало каждого из столетий – XIX-го, XX-го и XXI-го каким-то мистическим образом формировало вектор будущей политической ориентации Абхазии. Десятилетия российской и советской империй не могли не наложить своего отпечатка на абхазов. Вместе с тем, следует отметить, что само понятие «империя» не несет в себе однозначно негативного смысла, так как в пределах этой формы политического устройства есть и положительные составляющие – стабильность, возможности мирного развития, гуманитарные процессы. Для самосознания такого небольшого народа, как абхазы, эти факторы сыграли свою роль. Достаточно обратиться к другим примерам, когда территория Абхазии привлекала внимание римской, византийской, иранской, арабской, хазарской, грузинской, турецкой империй, либо становилась их частью. Она испытала влияние не только древневосточной культуры, но и средиземноморскоевропейской – античных Греции и Рима, Византии и Генуи. Во времена Византии, например, при Юстиниане I (527-565 гг.) метрополия проводила в Абхазии не только политику «меча», подавляя неоднократные восстания апсилов и абасгов, но и привносила христианские ценности, обучала в константинопольской школе абхазских детей, создавала великолепные памятники местной гражданской и церковной архитектуры. Отличительной чертой Турецкой империи (XVI-XVIII вв.) было фактическое невмешательство во внутренний уклад жизни Абхазии. В то же время многие абхазы стали известными государственными, политическими и военными деятелями этой страны. Российская государственность в Абхазии имела, конечно, свои особенности. Нельзя забывать, что ее утверждение здесь проходило в контексте «покорения Кавказа», которое осуществлялось в крайних, вооруженных 6

Введение формах. Однако если в 1810-1880-х гг. Петербург проводил в Абхазии политику карательных экспедиций, подавления восстаний и мятежей, организации депортаций, объявления непокорных абхазов «виновным населением», то с 90-х гг. XIX в. ситуация кардинальным образом меняется и наступает период бурного культуртрегерства: создается комиссия по переводу богослужебных книг на абхазский язык, зарождается абхазская литература, возрождается христианство, появляются священники, формируется блестящая национальная интеллигенция. Одним словом, политика «кнута» сменяется политикой «пряника», которая была прервана революционными событиями 1917 г. и крушением царской империи. Политика советской империи в Абхазии также имела свои отличительные черты. Утверждение новой власти не сопровождалось здесь кровопролитиями и массовыми репрессиями. Не случайно в 1921-1931 гг. Абхазию сами ее жители называли «счастливой Аркадией», когда она представляла собой маленький цветущий оазис среди огромной страны социальных экспериментов, насилия и нищеты. До 1936 г., когда погиб глава правительства Абхазии Н. Лакоба, это было время политического равновесия, межнационального согласия, экономического бума и культурного взлета. Затем наступил мрачный период откровенной картвельской (грузинской) экспансии (1937-1953 гг.) и подавления абхазов как этнокультурной целостности. Однако эти процессы колонизационного характера уходили своими корнями в 70-80-гг. XIX cтолетия, что еще в 1905 г. привело к первому грузиноабхазскому противостоянию. Смерть «грузинских» вождей советской империи И. Сталина и Л. Берия в 1953 г., приход к власти Н. Хрущева и начавшаяся «оттепель» привели к реабилитации абхазского народа и к возрождению в регионе культуры, науки и образования. Относительно стабильным это время оставалось вплоть до 1989 г. С крушением советской империи, как и после развала царской, вновь до крайности обострились грузино-абхазские противоречия, которые привели к столкновениям (июль 1989 г.), а затем и к кровопролитной войне (1992-1993 гг.). В послевоенный период Абхазия остается непризнанным государством. В силу сформировавшейся традиции последних двух столетий она продолжает быть тесно связана с Россией в политическом, экономическом и культурно-языковом плане, так как русский язык в многонациональной Республике Абхазия выполняет функцию языка межнационального общения. Распад любой империи всегда сопровождается морем крови и больнее всего бьет по малым народам, проживающим в провинциальном приграничье. Переход же от одной империи к другой, пусть даже и «демократической», неизбежно повлечет за собой новые потрясения и создаст дополнительные угрозы для небольших наций, элементарному их существованию. Вот почему абхазы не могут радоваться происходящим болезненным переменам.

7

Введение Так что же будет в Абхазии после двух империй? Вопрос о том, в каком направлении будет дрейфовать страна, во многом зависит от расстановки политических сил великих держав на Южном Кавказе. С той суровой реальностью, что регион Центральная Азия-Кавказ все больше превращается в поле соперничества и борьбы за источники и транзит каспийских энергоносителей, придется считаться всем, особенно малым народам. Хватит ли у России военно-политических сил, а главное – воли, чтобы отстоять свои национальные интересы в ключевом для ее безопасности кавказском регионе, или на смену ей придут Соединенные Штаты? Все отчетливее просматривается, как мощно поднимается Китай, присутствие которого уже сегодня ощущается в каспийско-кавказском направлении. Пока Россия и США уперлись лбами на Кавказе, Китай подкрадывается к нефти и газу Каспия через Казахстан и другие страны Центральной Азии. Существует мнение, что мир все же будет много-, а не однополярным (США) и он сформируется в ближайшие десятилетия. Это будут три силы, три мировые «империи»: США; Россия-ЕС; Китай. Процессы глобализации жестко коснулись кавказского региона, политические лидеры и народы которого должны задуматься, каким здесь будет «пейзаж после битвы». С. Л.

8

... Аслан! Я верю небылице: Отцовской кровью плачет твой кинжал! Виктор Стражев

ГЛАВА II АБХАЗИЯ И РОССИЙСКАЯ ИМПЕРИЯ. АСЛАНБЕЙ: МИФЫ И ФАКТЫ I На протяжении многих десятилетий драматические события абхазской политической жизни первой трети XIX в., вопрос о так называемом присоединении Абхазии к России, о таинственности и противоречивости, безусловно, выдающейся политической фигуры Асланбея Чачба (Шервашидзе), старшего сына Келешбея, о котором К. Кудрявцев заметил: «Арсланбей – злой гений Абхазии начала XIX века»1, – вызывают огромный интерес не только в абхазском обществе. В разное время этот период истории Абхазии привлекал к себе внимание целого ряда ученых и публицистов, среди которых следует особо отметить С. Броневского, Н. Дубровина, В. Потто, К. Мачавариани, А. Фадеева, И. Антелава, Г. Дзидзария и др. Источниковой основой для этих работ послужили «Акты, собранные Кавказскою археографическою комиссиею»2 (далее – АКАК). В этом фундаментальном труде сосредоточены десятки основополагающих документов первой трети XIX в., проливающих свет на далеко неоднозначные события в Абхазии. К таковым, например, относятся материалы, посвященные деятельности абхазского владетеля Келешбея, его старшего сына Асланбея, а также Сефербея. Обращает на себя внимание утвердившееся с начала XIX в. в русской и советской историографии расхожее мнение о том, будто Келешбей стремился в Россию, а его старший сын Асланбей в связи с таким стремлением отца организовал заговор и якобы убил его. Благодаря этим исследованиям, в сознание абхазского народа исключительно через книжную, литературную пропаганду, созвучную официальной имперской доктрине, в течение почти двух столетий внедрялся тезис об «отцеубийце Асланбее», в то время, как в памяти народной Асланбей жил самостоятельной, совершенно иной жизнью народного героя, законного владетеля, боровшегося за свободу Абхазии, что нашло свое отражение и в абхазском фольклоре. Об этом, в частности, свидетельствует В.И. Стражев 17

Глава II (1879-1950) – не только поэт, литератор, но археолог и историк. Он представляет собой редкое исключение в том смысле, что выбивается из общепринятого русскоязычного ряда текстов на тему об Асланбее. Хорошо знавший Абхазию, внимательно изучавший исторические источники, он еще в 1923 г. поставил под сомнение причастность Асланбея к убийству Келешбея. В лирическом стихотворении «Асланбей» есть удивительно проницательные строчки: … Аслан! Я верю небылице: Отцовской кровью плачет твой кинжал! В небольшой исторической справке к этому стихотворению Виктор Стражев пишет об Асланбее: «Его бурная жизнь прошла в упорной и жестокой борьбе с братом (от другой жены Келеш-бея) Сефербеем и племянниками Димитрием и Михаилом, последующими владетелями Абхазии. Ярый противник русских, Аслан воплотил в себе образ героя – борца за независимость и таким остался в памяти своего народа»3. Интересно, что первое известие об убийстве Келешбея было получено генералом Рыкгофом именно от Сефербея – заинтересованного лица. На основании информации Рыкгофа 19 мая 1808 г. граф Гудович направил подробное донесение Александру I4. 8 июня того же года владетельница Мегрелии Нина обращается из Зугдиди с письмом к графу Гудовичу5 и в тот же день пишет прошение русскому императору6. Именно в этих документах изложена официальная версия произошедшего в Абхазии. Интересно, что эта точка зрения без критического анализа источников слово в слово перекочевала в труды русских и советских историков. Поражает и выборочность «нужных» документальных материалов, приводимых в исследованиях. Никто из историков, которые специально разрабатывали тему России и Абхазии начала XIX в., не приводит, например, такое важное свидетельство, как упоминаемые генералом Рыкгофом и обращенные к нему письма самого Асланбея, где тот говорит о своей невиновности и утверждает, что в убийстве его отца замешаны посторонние лица7. Не может не настораживать и другое обстоятельство. Сефербей, претендовавший на абхазский престол, не мог его занять в силу того, что был сыном крестьянки, простолюдинки. Он был законным сыном Келешбея, но по абхазскому праву не мог стать владетелем. Более того, на момент убийства русское военное командование и царская администрация с крайним недоверием относились к Келешбею и его старшему сыну Асланбею – законному наследнику абхазского престола. В политическом плане и в военных вопросах Россия в этом регионе делала ставку только на Мегрелию, а конкретно – на Нину Дадиани, которая не гнушалась ничем, лишь бы удовлетворить аппетиты России и свои собственные амбиции. Естественно, Нина Дадиани не могла влиять на Абхазию при Келешбее или Асланбее, но ее и 18

Абхазия и Российская империя. Асланбей: мифы и факты

Россию вполне устраивал слабохарактерный Сефербей, который являлся зятем владетельницы Мегрелии. Об этом красноречиво говорится в ее упомянутом обращении 1808 г. к Александру I: «Итак, самодержавнейший государь, ныне время удобное принять Сефер-бека под Ваш покров, ибо он есть член (нашего дома) и сосед наш»8. Следует особо отметить и такой факт. В день убийства Келешбея 2 мая 1808 г. Сефербея не было в Сухум-Кале и потому он не мог быть очевидцем случившегося. Между тем, первые сведения, причем подробные, русское военное командование получило именно от Сефербея, который обвинил в гибели Келешбея его сына и своего старшего брата Асланбея. Странно и другое. В тот роковой день Келешбей собрал своих самых доверенных людей9 и обсуждал с ними важные вопросы. Почему среди этих наиболее близких его сторонников не было, например, Сефербея, который в момент убийства пребывал в Никопсии10 или в Лыхны11? По всей видимости, Сефербей в заказном порядке опорочил своего старшего брата Асланбея, законного наследника престола, который никак не устраивал русское командование и Нину Дадиани в этом качестве. И только очернив и оклеветав, можно было найти формальный повод к отлучению его от престолонаследия. Между тем, даже граф Гудович в своем первом сообщении об убийстве Келешбея, ссылаясь на якобы непростые взаимоотношения отца с Асланбеем, в записке царю был вынужден признать, что накануне гибели Келешбея Асланбей сумел вернуть к себе расположение владетеля Абхазии или, дословно, «успел приобрести его доверенность»12. II Как известно, в 80-х гг. XVIII в. к власти в Абхазии пришел владетельный князь Келешбей Чачба (Шервашидзе). В течение трех последующих десятилетий он проводил самостоятельную политику, успешно лавируя между интересами Турции и России. Князь отличался умом, хитростью и его имя было широко известно за пределами Кавказа. Высокого роста, с резкими чертами лица и огненной шевелюрой, он выделялся среди окружающих и приковывал внимание собеседников — военных, дипломатов, путешественников. Келешбей быстро подчинил себе феодальную знать Абхазии, опираясь на мелкое дворянство и «чистых» крестьян-анхаю (анхаю-цкя), каждый из которых был вооружен ружьем, шашкой и пистолетом. Его постоянная стража состояла из 500 ратников. В случае военной угрозы Келешбей в считанные часы мог выставить хорошо вооруженное 25-тысячное войско с артиллерией, конницей и даже флотом. До 600 военных галер владетеля постоянно крейсировали вдоль Черноморского побережья от Батума до Анапы, причем комендантами крепостей Поти и Батум были его племянники-однофамильцы. 19

Глава II На первом этапе своей деятельности Келешбей пользовался военнополитической поддержкой Турции, под протекторатом которой находилась Абхазия. В период расцвета этих отношений владетель построил в Сухуме 70-ти пушечный корабль и подарил его султану. Однако Келешбей, как и его отец владетель Манча (Манучар) Чачба, высланный султаном в середине XVIII в. в Турцию вместе с братьями Ширваном и Зурабом, вынашивал сокровенную мечту о полной свободе и независимости Абхазского государства. Келешбей помнил, как расправились с его семьей. Только его дяде Зурабу удалось вернуться в Абхазию и стать владетелем. Во время пребывания в турецкой ссылке князей Чачба в Абхазии усилились эшерские князья Дзяпш-ипа, занявшие окрестности Сухума. Не имея возможности бороться с этим кланом, Зураб старался сохранить с ним дружественные отношения и даже женил своего племянника Келешбея на княжне Дзяпшипа. Заручившись поддержкой этой влиятельной семьи, в 1771 г. Зураб поднял восстание и изгнал турецкий гарнизон из Сухума. Однако в результате предательства одного из Чачба турки скоро вернули Сухумскую крепость, а затем, устранив Зураба, признали владетелем Абхазии Келешбея. Келешбей внимательно следил за утверждением России в Восточной Грузии, где в 1801 г. было упразднено Картлийско-Кахетинское царство. Владетель надеялся, что военное присутствие царской России в Закавказье (на Южном Кавказе) будет лишь временным, в связи с чем в 1803 г. сделал первый, чисто формальный шаг к сближению с Россией. Однако, как верно заметил по этому поводу историк И.Г. Антелава, «Келешбек не решался, колебался вступить в российское подданство, боясь потерять свою независимость» 13 . Он лишь намеревался с помощью России избавиться от протектората Турции, что и случилось 25 июля 1806 г. после неудачного похода турецкого флота в составе трех военных кораблей и восьми гребных судов к берегам Абхазии. Келешбей успел подготовиться и выставил у Сухумской крепости многотысячную абхазо-адыгскую армию. Турецкий флот развернулся и ушел14. «Это счастливое событие окружило имя Келешбея ореолом героя и еще больше подняло его авторитет, – отмечал в 1940 г. историк Г.А. Дзидзария. – Почти год управлял он независимой Абхазией и заметно охладел к России, вследствие чего царские генералы даже заподозрили его в "измене"»15. В дальнейшем автор только что цитированных строк издал монографию с совершенно иным названием: «Присоединение Абхазии к России и его историческое значение» (Сухуми, 1960), что было продиктовано идеологическими соображениями... В конце XVIII- начале XIX вв. владетель Абхазии неоднократно вторгался в пределы Мегрелии и Имеретии, а его войска доходили до Кутаиси. На левом берегу, в устье Ингура, он закрепил за собой крепость Анаклию. В 1802 г. Келешбей выставил 20-тысячное войско с тремя пушками против владетеля Мегрелии Григория Дадиани и взял в заложники его сына – наследника Левана. Положение Григория Дадиани, бессильного сдержать натиск царя Имеретии 20

Абхазия и Российская империя. Асланбей: мифы и факты

Соломона II, с одной стороны, и абхазского владетеля – с другой, вынудило его первым в Западной Грузии прибегнуть к военной помощи России и вступить под ее покровительство в декабре 1803 г. С этого момента Мегрелия оказывается на острие российской политики в крае. Однако слабовольный Григорий Дадиани не годился на эту роль, и царские власти и российское военное командование все большее внимание обращают на его энергичную и властолюбивую жену Нину, которую Цицианов в письме Литвинову в ноябре 1804 г. лаконично охарактеризовал: «великая интриганка»16. 24 октября 1804 г. Григорий Дадиани неожиданно умер. По свидетельству католического священника Николо, владетель Мегрелии был отравлен жареной курицей, заправленной ядом, а когда почувствовал себя плохо, ему принесли пилюли, наполненные опиумом. Патер Николо сообщает, что все это было подстроено княгиней Ниной17, овдовевшей в 27 лет 18 . Того же мнения придерживался и русский историк Н. Дубровин, назвавший Нину Дадиани «женщиной отважною, хитрою и самолюбивою»19. Патер Николо был личным лекарем Григория Дадиани и, вернувшись в Мегрелию после почти месячной отлучки, застал его уже мертвым. По наведенным справкам патер узнал, что князя лечила лекарка Зева. Николо попросил ее публично рассказать обстоятельства, которые предшествовали его кончине. «После твоего лекарства, – говорила Зева, – Дадиан был истинно здоров, так что оправясь в теле, имел чрезвычайный аппетит. В субботу он приказал жене подать ужин. Изготовя курицу с маслом, княгиня Нина отослала ее мужу. Съевши половину, Дадиан сказал, как невкусна курица, но по тогдашнему его аппетиту съел всю без остатка. В полночь он почувствовал жестокую боль в желудке, спрашивал у жены, с кем она прислала. Дадиан потребовал твоих (ксендза Николо) пилюль, но вместо них были принесены другие, переполненные опиумом. После приема пилюль, в полночь, ему сделалось хуже, и он приказал позвать меня. Я сказала, что не в состоянии его вылечить, потому что, по мнению моему, он должен быть отравлен, и советовала призвать тебя. Услыхав о том, княгиня Нина запретила под страхом наказания говорить об отравлении, присовокупив, что кто может отравить Дадиана? Вслед за тем патер Николо, продолжает Н. Дубровин, вместе с лекаркою отправился к княгине Нине. «Зачем вы дали Дадиану опиум? – спросил Николо. – Я сделала это по ошибке, – ответила Нина, – но что делать!». Патер Николо заплакал. «Не плачьте, – утешала его Нина, – я знаю, что скоро мой сын Леван будет Дадианом, он еще более вас одарит и будет милостивее к вам»20. Тогда же резко осложнились отношения между Россией и Абхазией, так как сын отравленного владетеля Мегрелии находился в заложниках у 21

Глава II Келешбея. Русские военные власти потребовали немедленной выдачи Левана Дадиани и на отказ Келешбея ответили военной акцией: в марте 1805 г. русский генерал Рыкгоф отбил у него крепость Анаклию. В результате долгих переговоров 2 апреля 1805 г. абхазский владетель вернул заложника Левана, ставшего формальным владетелем, в то время, как действительной правительницей Мегрелии вплоть до совершеннолетия Левана оставалась его мать Нина Дадиани. В обмен на Левана абхазский владетель вновь получил крепость Анаклию. Тогда же Келешбей попытался наладить связи с наполеоновской Францией и даже вступил в переписку с ее знаменитым министром иностранных дел Талейраном. В разразившейся русско-турецкой войне 1806-1812 гг. царизм пытался использовать влияние Келешбея в своих интересах тем более, что русские сомневались в искренности и верности Келешбея, когда тот просился под российский «скипетр». Один из влиятельных чиновников в С.Петербурге в июне 1806 г. писал: «Нужно удостовериться, сколь чистосердечна преданность Келеш-бека к России»21. Скоро такой случай представился. В 1807 г. 60-летнему владетелю Абхазии русские власти предложили отбить у турок крепость Поти, но он уклонился от каких-либо военных действий. Командующего войсками России на Кавказе графа Гудовича активно настраивал против Келешбея генерал Рыкгоф, ставший заклятым врагом абхазского владетеля. Так, в рапорте от 8 июня 1807 г. Рыкгоф отмечал: «Келеш-бек только наружно оказывает русским его дружбу»22. В ответ 14 июля 1807 г. граф Гудович обращается к Келешбею с резкими обвинениями: «Не помогали нашим войскам против турок, а еще падает на вас сомнение, что вы под рукою воспособляете туркам»23. Этими важными документами почти на год обрывается всякое упоминание о Келешбее. По всей вероятности, российские власти на Кавказе, подстрекаемые правительницей Мегрелии Ниной Дадиани, решили устранить строптивого Келешбея и, воспользовавшись перемирием с Турцией, поставить во главе абхазского княжества зятя мегрельских владетелей Сефербея Чачба, дискредитировав при этом основного претендента на престол Асланбея, мать которого из княжеской фамилии Дзяпш-ипа была первой женой Келешбея. В этих целях Сефербей при поддержке Нины Дадиани и активном участии русской военной администрации в лице генерала Рыкгофа организовал заговор против Келешбея, в результате которого тот погиб в Сухумской крепости 2 мая 1808 года24. Между прочим, историк А.В. Фадеев в 1931 г. отметил: «Возможно, что и убийство Келеш-бея было организовано Дадианом»25. Через год он добавил: «Это политическое убийство, несомненно, было организовано не без участия Турции и мингрельских владетелей, опасавшихся осуществления абсолютистских замыслов Келешбея»26. Формулировку А.В. Фадеева спустя некоторое время почти буквально повторил Г.А. Дзидзария27.

22

Абхазия и Российская империя. Асланбей: мифы и факты

Интересно, что сразу после убийства Келешбея оценки представителями русской администрации его деятельности резко изменились. Если около года назад граф Гудович обвинял владетеля в протурецкой ориентации, то уже 20 мая 1808 г. он сообщал министру иностранных дел России графу Н.П. Румянцеву о «смерти преданного России абхазского владельца Келеш-бея...»28. С этого момента царские власти начинают преднамеренно формировать миф о якобы преданности Келешбея Чачба российскому престолу, который бытует и по сей день. В официальных российских документах того времени вся вина за убийство Келешбея перекладывается на Асланбея. Как указывалось выше, первые сведения с описанием этого происшествия граф Гудович получил от Сефербея – весьма заинтересованного лица, и генерала Рыкгофа29. В то же время попытки самого Асланбея прояснить ситуацию не принимались во внимание русским командованием. Так, генерал Рыкгоф в рапорте графу Гудовичу сообщал об Асланбее: «В каковом злодеянии он и виновным себя ни под каким предлогом не сознает, отзываясь заговором противу Келешбея посторонних. Я на письма сии ничем и по сие время ему не ответствую...»30. Столь странная реакция генерала говорит лишь о том, что ему и Гудовичу была хорошо известна истинная подоплека событий, если не сказать большего. В их задачу, по-видимому, входило устранение самостоятельного Келешбея и возведение на престол Сефербея. Однако этот план осуществился лишь наполовину. К великому удивлению организаторов заговора (не турок, разумеется) выяснилось, что Сефербей не пользовался никаким авторитетом в абхазском обществе, а все симпатии народа, включая его родственников и близких, оказались на стороне «отцеубийцы» Асланбея, ставшего владетелем Абхазии. Такой поворот событий никак не устраивал Петербург и особенно Нину Дадиани. Так, 8 июня 1808 г. она сообщает Александру I о том, что к ней в Зугдиди явился «зять наш Сефер-бей» (он был женат на Тамаре Дадиани, сестре Григория), который дал в доме Дадиани присягу на верность России и просил помощи и содействия российских войск в борьбе с законным владетелем Абхазии Асланбеем31. Правительница Мегрелии пишет, что в случае признания Сефербея и принятия Абхазии в подданство России, пределы империи расширятся до Крыма, ибо «число абхазцев немалое»32. При этом Нина Дадиани, очевидно, преследовала и личные цели, хорошо понимая стратегическое и торговое значение Абхазии. В начале августа 1808 г. по приказу графа Гудовича генерал Рыкгоф двинул на Сухум объединенные силы правительницы Мегрелии и ее двух зятьев Манучара (из Самурзакана) и Сефербея Чачба. Но на помощь Асланбею в Сухум успел прийти на трех судах с войском его двоюродный брат, комендант крепости Поти Кучукбей Чачба (племянник Келешбея), а по суше прибыли 300 черкесов. В результате военная экспедиция Рыкгофа, заклятого врага Келешбея и Асланбея, провалилась33. Крепость Сухум 23

Глава II так и не была взята, и Сефербей был вынужден вернуться в Мегрелию ни с чем. В результате авторитет Асланбея вырос еще больше. Он пользовался огромной поддержкой народа, высших слоев абхазского общества и многочисленного потомства Келешбея (на его стороне были все братья, от Гасанбея до якобы раненого им Баталбея; Асланбея активно поддерживала и последняя жена Келешбея Ребия-ханум Маршан), что в силу менталитета абхазов было бы невозможно, если бы Асланбей на самом деле убил своего отца. Наконец, Асланбей, женатый на садзской (джигетской) княжне Геч (Гечба), пользовался большим почетом в западноабхазском обществе Садзен, а также среди убыхов и адыгов. Таким образом, официальная точка зрения российских властей, пытавшихся опорочить Асланбея, обвинив его в «отцеубийстве», осталась на бумаге, в российской военноправительственной переписке и не отвернула народ от своего законного владетеля. Необходимо особо отметить, что версия отцеубийства, сфабрикованная российскими военными и администраторами в 1808-1810 гг. в сугубо политических целях, господствовала в историографии на протяжении последних без малого двух веков. В то же время Нину Дадиани, действительно отравившую своего мужа, владетеля Григория Дадиани, царские власти всячески поддерживали и оберегали только потому, что она служила интересам России. Более того, с помощью Нины они активно распространяли слухи об Асланбее, якобы убившем своего отца, и противопоставляли ему Сефербея, которому Келешбей еще при жизни будто бы завещал престол. Но политика дискредитации Асланбея не имела успеха. Он пользовался безусловным авторитетом в стране и потому Сефербей, находившийся, вернее, скрывавшийся большею частью в Мегрелии под защитой русских штыков, постоянно «просил о даче ему войска для взятия Сухума, так как он остается почти совершенно обессиленным и даже изгнанным». Российские же военные просили прислать Черноморскую флотилию «для занятия Сухума, где усиливается отцеубийца Арслан»34. Забегая несколько вперед, следует привести один весьма поучительный факт биографии Нины Дадиани. Дело в том, что отношение к ней русских властей не всегда было благосклонным. Оно круто изменилось, как только ситуация в этой части Кавказа стала иной и Мегрелия сыграла роль проводника русских интересов в Западной Грузии и Абхазии. Так, 18 мая 1820 г. генерал Ермолов очень негативно отзывался о Нине Дадиани, которая со своим младшим сыном Георгием (воспитанником Пажеского корпуса) жила в С.-Петербурге, но затем стала настраивать Георгия против брата Левана, владетеля Мегрелии. Во время волнений в Мегрелии Георгий вместе с бунтовщиками вел себя вызывающе и даже стрелял в русских солдат. Ермолов, зная властолюбивый характер Нины Дадиани, подозревал ее в кознях против сына Левана. Он запретил ей жить при царском дворе в С.-Петербурге и 24

Абхазия и Российская империя. Асланбей: мифы и факты

разрешил пребывать в Москве. Однако император Александр I, разгневанный таким поведением и вероломством Нины Дадиани, в июне 1820 г. сослал ее в Рязань под надзор губернского начальства35. III В обстановке полного безвластия 12 августа 1808 г. Сефербей (после крещения Георгий) направляет императору Александру I свои известные «просительные пункты» о принятии Абхазии в подданство России36, написанные на грузинском языке в Мегрелии под диктовку Нины Дадиани и ее духовника, протоиерея Иоселиани. В порыве откровенности Сефербей сообщает Александру I, что все обращения о принятии Абхазии в состав России писал священник «Иоанн Иоселиани, который искренним сердцем советовал мне предать себя в подданство императорскому престолу» 37 . Основываясь именно на этих незаконных «просительных пунктах», 17 февраля 1810 г. Александр I специальной грамотой признал Георгия (Сефербея) «наследственным князем абхазского владения под верховным покровительством, державою и защитою Российской империи»38. Однако на момент появления этой грамоты и даже значительно позже Сефербей безвыездно жил в русской Мегрелии и не имел никакого влияния в Абхазии, которой уже около двух лет управлял ее законный владетель Асланбей. Но Сефербей через мегрельского священника И. Иоселиани продолжал обращаться в С.-Петербург, нетерпеливо ожидая как «высочайшей грамоты, так и десанта войск из Крыма для покорения Сухум-Кале»39. Но произошло непредвиденное. Когда в июне 1810 г. полковник Симонович в присутствии мегрельской правительницы Нины объявил в Кутаисе Сефербею о присылке грамоты и других высочайших знаков отличия с тем, чтобы «он немедленно отправился в Абхазию для принятия оных с должною церемонией», тот наотрез отказался. Сефербей объяснил Симоновичу, что «весьма для него опасно принять оные в теперешнее время, когда соперник брат его владеет Сухумом и следовательно почти всею Абхазиею и что он, услышав об утверждении его владельцем, будучи сам утвержден от Порты, непременно нападет на него с турецкими войсками, разорит и выгонит из Абхазии». Поэтому Сефербей просил отложить церемонию «до того времени, когда пойдут под Сухум российские войска и тогда при покорении под власть его народа может он принять знаки всемилостивейшего к нему благоволения...»40. Генерал Тормасов, по собственному признанию, «никак не ожидал» такого поворота событий и пришел в ярость. Он не предполагал, чтобы новый владетель всей Абхазии, «был столь бессилен в земле, предоставленной теперь его управлению, что даже опасается принять высочайшую утвердительную грамоту и другие знаки отличия и не смеет ехать в собственный дом в Абхазии, боясь брата своего...». Более того, Сефербей лично 25

Глава II обратился к этому русскому генералу с письмом, в котором просил помочь ему войсками, «без коих он не смеет даже из Мегрелии выехать в свое владение». Русская военная администрация оказалась в трудном положении, но отказаться от покровительства Сефербею уже не могла, т. к. грамота Александром I была уже подписана. Тормасов в своем предписании Симоновичу от 15 июня 1810 г. отмечал, что «не остается теперь другого способа для поддержания его, как покорение крепости Сухума силою оружия и чтобы сим же средством Сефер-Али-бея ввести во владение Абхазией». В этом же послании он интересуется положением в Абхазии и влиянием там Асланбея. «Внушите также правительнице Мегрелии княгине Нине Георгиевне, – писал Тормасов, – что покровительство и милости, оказываемые государем Сефер-Али-бею, последовали во уважение ее с ним родственных связей и по ее предстательству (ходатайству. – С.Л.), а потому и должно ей всеми способами его поддерживать и утвердить его владетелем Абхазии»41. Таким образом, судьба Асланбея и крепости Сухум-Кале была предрешена. По плану русского командования штурм Сухума намечался силами морского десанта и броском со стороны Мегрелии сухопутных войск под командованием генерал-майора Д. Орбелиани, который весной 1809 г. сменил умершего генерала Рыкгофа. К этому времени Россия уже овладела турецкой крепостью Поти. Оставалось взять Сухум, который турки называли Старым Стамбулом42, чтобы господствовать на восточном берегу Черного моря. Еще в марте 1810 г. управляющий военно-морским министерством адмирал маркиз И.И. де-Траверсе отдал приказ о крейсировании русских судов между Анапой и Сухумом, а 10 июня вице-адмирал Языков предписал контр-адмиралу Сарычеву направить из Севастополя в Сухум эскадру в составе 66-пушечного корабля "Варахиил", двух фрегатов "Воин" и "Назарет", одного авиза "Константин" и двух канонерских лодок с батальоном 4-го морского полка в 640 человек под командованием капитан-лейтенанта Додта. В 4 часа дня 8 июля 1810 г. русская эскадра прибыла на Сухумский рейд и по ней из крепости был открыт пушечный и оружейный огонь. На следующий день эскадра подошла ближе к берегу и в 3 часа дня открыла по крепости шквальный артиллерийский огонь. К вечеру почти вся крепостная артиллерия была разбита, а городские строения разрушены. Стоявшие в бухте 7 турецких судов были потоплены. Утром 10 июля 1810 г. Додт высадил на берег батальон морской пехоты с двумя пушками под началом майора Конрадини. Однако выяснилось, что десант не имел штурмовых лестниц. Несмотря на это, после двухчасовой бомбардировки с суши и с моря русские войска заняли крепость.. Со стороны Ингура в город вступила рота Белявского полка с двумя орудиями во главе с генералом Д. Орбелиани и Сефербеем. Асланбей был вынужден бежать к своим родственникам в абхазское общество Садзен. По сообщению Додта, в ходе штурма было убито 300 абхазов и турок, а 78 человек взято в плен. Русский десант потерял 109 26

Абхазия и Российская империя. Асланбей: мифы и факты

офицеров и солдат убитыми и ранеными. Додт захватил 62 пушки, 1080 пудов пороха и много ядер43. В том же году до пяти тысяч абхазов выселилось в Турцию. Это была первая в XIX в. волна абхазского переселения. Как видно, все произошедшее в 1808-1810 гг. никак нельзя назвать добровольным присоединением Абхазии к России. Вместе с тем, эта точка зрения на протяжении многих десятилетий является официальной и единственной. Как показывают документы, события того времени не столь однозначны и заслуживают подробного исследования, включая изучение не только русских текстов, но и турецких, французских, английских источников, в том числе архивных. Захват Сухум-Кале стал лишь первым шагом завоевательной политики царизма в Абхазии. Для закрепления своих позиций России понадобилась еще полувековая война с абхазским народом. Борьба между Сефербеем и Асланбеем была прежде всего борьбой двух влияний – русского и турецкого, а взятие Сухум-Кале являлось победой не Сефербея над Асланбеем, а победой России над Турцией в борьбе за Абхазию44. Сефербей, поддерживаемый русскими штыками, так и не стал уважаем в народе. Он обосновался в Сухумской крепости – единственном месте в Абхазии, где мог чувствовать себя в безопасности. Осенью 1810 г. по приказу Тормасова под охраной более 100 русских солдат и офицеров сюда была доставлена хранившаяся в Поти у полковника Мерлини грамота Александра I и другие знаки отличия. Сефербей принял их в Сухуме «при собрании» и дал «публично перед народом присягу на вечную верность» императору России, утвердив ее «своей подписью и печатью»45. Впрочем, военные власти России прекрасно осознавали, что Сефербей слаб, а «партия его еще не слишком сильна противу его соперника» Асланбея, сторонники которого в декабре 1810 г. продолжали контролировать окрестности Сухума, несмотря на присутствие здесь 1 тыс. русских солдат46. Даже в марте 1811 г. Сефербей все еще имел «самую малую партию», а правительница Нина Дадиани опасалась нападения на Мегрелию со стороны «абхазов и горцев, большею частию приверженных к Арсланбею»47. После взятия Сухума реальная власть оказалась в руках начальника крепости капитана Агаркова, который контролировал действия Сефербея. В своем рапорте начальству в январе 1811 г. он нелестно отзывался о новом владетеле и отмечал, что «дела в Абхазии мало имеют порядка». Сефербей был в страхе и ничего не мог предпринять против сторонников Асланбея. Абхазцы же, продолжал капитан Агарков, до «такой степени смелы, что подъезжают к крепости вооруженные… и стреляют в солдат, так что опасно отойти от оной шагов на 100»48. Вся Абхазия была охвачена народными волнениями. В крайнем раздражении командующий российскими войсками на Кавказе генерал Тормасов писал 15 марта 1811 г. Сефербею, что тот не предпринимает «деятельных мер против партии отцеубийцы... Арслан-бея, которая возрастая 27

Глава II мало-помалу, может взять над вами перевес». Тормасов призывал владетеля: «Прочно утвердите власть свою над абхазским народом». Генерал напоминал Сефербею: «Вы силою оружия и покровительством (императора. – С.Л.) утверждены законным владельцем, восстановлены во всех ваших правах и поддерживаетесь победоносными российскими войсками...»49. В своих записках А.П. Ермолов, признавая Асланбея владетелем Абхазии («некогда также владетель Абхазии»), по поводу Сефербея отметил: «Молодой князь Шервашидзе не имел людей приверженных, которые бы его остерегли, напротив, многие были со стороны убийцы»50. К концу войны турки потеряли все свои опорные пункты на Черноморском побережье Кавказа – Анапу, Суджук-Кале, Сухум-Кале, Анаклию, Поти. Международная обстановка диктовала необходимость скорейшего заключения мира с Турцией. Готовясь к нашествию на Россию, на Висле развертывалась полумиллионная армия Наполеона. В мае 1812 г. был заключен Бухарестский мир, по которому Россия приобретала все побережье Абхазии и Мегрелии. Тем самым надежно обеспечивалось присоединение к России Западной Грузии (Мегрелия, Имеретия, Гурия) и Абхазии и укреплялась безопасность Крыма. Окончание войны с Турцией позволило ускорить завершение войны с Персией (1804-1813 гг.). Россия решила и главную стратегическую задачу: обеспечив мир на своих южных границах, она лишила Наполеона союзника в лице Турции. IV Особо следует остановиться на вопросе о так называемом тайном крещении Сефербея, которое якобы было совершено с благословения Келешбея Чачба еще при его жизни. Необходимо обратить внимание, что впервые эта версия была изложена все той же Ниной Дадиани в письме ее непосредственному начальнику графу Гудовичу 8 июня 1808 г., т.е. сразу после гибели давнего врага дома Дадиани, абхазского владетеля Келешбея. Довольно искусно она излагает приятную для русского уха мегрельскую легенду о «героическом» крещении Сефербея и о принятии им нового имени Георгий. В основе этой манипуляции лежал, прежде всего, военнополитический смысл. «За сего Сефер-бека отец его Келеш-Ахмед-бек, – пишет Нина, – просил в супруги сестру покойного Григория Дадиани, но он ее не выдал, пока не просветил его святым крещением; когда же он просветился чрез священника двора нашего Симеона Асатиани и исповедал нашу веру, то за него была выдана сестра владетелева по бракосочетанию и это оставалось до сего времени в тайне. А ныне, если самодержавнейший государь наш удостоит его чрез вас своим воззрением и примет в рабство, тогда объявит нашу веру не только он, но и вся Абхазия... Прошу твое главное благоуправление поревновать за них (абхазов. – С.Л.) из почтения ко мне, дабы самодержавнейший государь мой уважил 28

Абхазия и Российская империя. Асланбей: мифы и факты

и принял в свое рабство сего зятя моего Сефер-бека, который секретно называется по крещению Георгий, и пожаловал бы ему знак и грамоту, введя также и войска в Абхазию. Если же нам будет не по силам взять кр. Сухум, то всемилостивейший государь наш император да возьмет ее силою своею, окружив ее войском»51. К сожалению, именно эта легенда легла в основу абхазской историографии и, по всей видимости, исключительно по конъюнктурным, политическим соображениям. Между тем анализ документов, опубликованных в актах Кавказской археографической комиссии, указывает на ряд противоречий и даже подтасовок. Так, по тексту письма Нины Дадиани от 8 июня 1808 г. получается, что сам Келешбей еще при жизни Григория Дадиани, скорее всего в 1802-1803 гг., чуть ли не просил мегрельского владетеля отдать его сестру в жены Сефербею. Более того, оказывается, Григорий Дадиани поставил даже условием грозному Келешбею необходимость крещения сына, то есть его перехода из ислама в христианство, что якобы и было сделано Сефербеем «в тайне», с помощью священника мегрельского двора Симеона Асатиани. Но хорошо известно, что в период женитьбы Сефербея именно Григорий Дадиани нуждался в покровительстве абхазского владетеля Келешбея, который и спасал его неоднократно от гнева имеретинского царя Соломона II. Ни при каких обстоятельствах Г. Дадиани и его жена Нина тогда не могли ставить какие-либо условия Келешбею, т.к. были полностью зависимы от него и находились фактически в его власти. Нельзя забывать, что именно в это время малолетний Леван Дадиани, сын Григория и Нины, находился в Абхазии и жил при дворе Келешбея в качестве заложника, «аманата». Не Келешбей, а Григорий Дадиани считал за счастье выдать свою сестру замуж за Сефербея, хотя тот и не обладал правом наследования престола. Вообще, одно из первых, если не первое упоминание об этом браке содержится в описании Литвинова, составленном в октябре 1804 г., в котором, между прочим, сказано: «Соседство, вражда и сила Имеретин противу Дадиани заставили его искать помощи абхазского владельца Келешбека; противность вер не воспрепятствовала им соединить себя родством»52. Это последнее обстоятельство о разности вер, которое не помешало женитьбе Сефербея Чачба и Тамары Дадиани, является важным свидетельством. Мегрельская владетельница Нина в своем спешном письме от 8 июня 1808 г. совершенно запуталась, когда сообщила Гудовичу, что Сефербея-Георгия крестил священник Симеон Асатиани, в то время как его окрестил после гибели Келешбея протоиерей Иоанн Иоселиани, ставший политическим и духовным наставником Сефербея. Выдумки Нины Дадиани первым опроверг в своем рапорте графу Гудовичу генерал Рыкгоф, который, в частности, сообщал 10 июня 1808 г., что Сефербей «охотно приемлет религию греческого (православного. – С.Л.) исповедания со всеми ж его поданными, как он и прежде нетерпели29

Глава II во желал исполнить, но не смел оскорбить тем престарелого его отца»53. Совершенно очевидно, что не без влияния Нины Дадиани и ее священника И. Иоселиани Сефербей в июне 1808 г., когда его отца уже не было в живых и нужно было бороться за абхазский престол с законным наследником старшим братом Асланбеем, решил перейти из мусульманства в христианскую веру. В своем обращении к генералу Рыкгофу, написанном 21 июня 1808 г. явно под диктовку мегрельских владетелей, он сообщал: «Я и до сих пор хотел христианином быть, а теперь так как такое дело случилось, то я хочу свое владение отдать, как Грузия и Одиши государю принадлежать... И я желаю христианином быть и потому расположен усердно к государю... Пособите мне теперь войском, если хотите быть мне вашим»54. Вот с такими посланиями обращался к русскому командованию, с русской территории, из Зугдиди, Сефербей, срочно изъявивший желание переметнуться в православие, т.е. в веру русских и союзных им мегрельцев. Позднее генерал Ермолов писал графу Нессельроде: «Турки не простят ему (Сефербею. – С.Л.) прежнюю перемену закона и вступление под покровительство христианского государя»55. В одном из документов прямо говорится, что возвратившийся из С.Петербурга «протоиерей Иоанн Иоселиани убедил владетеля Абхазии Георгия Шервашидзе вступить в подданство всероссийского престола». Тогда же И. Иоселиани обратил в христианскую веру и самого СефербеяГеоргия56. По этому поводу французский путешественник и ученый Поль Гибаль, побывавший в Абхазии в 1818-1819 гг., особо отметил, что Сефербея «не любили из-за его перехода в христианство»57. Политические события развивались стремительно и, главное, параллельно с вопросом о крещении Сефербея, которого русские власти именовали теперь Георгием. В своем предписании от 14 июля 1808 г. Гудович сообщал Рыкгофу, что Александр I выразил полную поддержку Сефербею и что последний через Рыкгофа должен передать «просительные пункты» императору о принятии в вечное покровительство России58. Вскоре, возвращаясь из Персии, Гудович получил эти пункты от Сефербея, под которыми тот подписался как «Георгий Шарвашидзе». 3 марта 1809 г. Гудович с удовольствием пересказывал Салтыкову легенду Нины Дадиани о тайном крещении Сефербея и сообщил, что министр иностранных дел граф Румянцев объявил Гудовичу волю императора, разрешающую «приступить к принятию абхазского владения в вечное покровительство» России59. V При владетеле Сефербее-Георгии Шервашидзе (1810-1821 гг.) центральная власть в Абхазии совершенно ослабла и старые междоусобицы вспыхнули с прежней силой. Наделенный Россией всеми правами владетельской

30

Абхазия и Российская империя. Асланбей: мифы и факты

власти, Сефербей был формальным правителем Абхазии и не мог существенным образом влиять на политическую обстановку внутри страны. Попрежнему независимыми оставались вольные общества горной Абхазии — Псху, Дал, Аибга, Цабал и др., которые «отказались быть покорными» России и правителю. Владетелем Абхазии народ по-прежнему считал Асланбея. Время от времени он появлялся здесь и поднимал восстания. Так, в июле 1813 г. под его руководством в Абхазии произошло «чрезвычайное волнение» против Георгия Шервашидзе60. На подавление этого выступления были двинуты русские военные силы с двумя орудиями и ополчение владетеля Мегрелии Левана Дадиани. Только таким образом СефербейГеоргий сумел сохранить свою власть. Охраняемый русскими солдатами, он жил либо в Сухумской крепости, либо в Мегрелии, правители которой поддерживали его в борьбе с Асланбеем. Здесь необходимо обратить внимание на следующее важное обстоятельство. Если Асланбей, как утверждали официальные власти России и владетели Мегрелии, был «отцеубийцей», то почему именно его сторону, а не Сефербея-Георгия безоговорочно приняли все ближайшие родственники? Почему на стороне Асланбея неизменно выступали все сыновья Келешбея, его родные братья по отцу: Баталбей, которого он якобы ранил в день убийства Келешбея (со слов Сефербея), а также Гасанбей, Таирбей и Ростомбей? Каким образом последняя жена Келешбея, мать этих сыновей Ребиа-ханум Маршан и мачеха Асланбея, приняла в июле 1813 г. сторону так называемого убийцы своего мужа? 26 июля 1813 г. в своем донесении генерал Ртищев сообщал графу Румянцеву, что Ребиа-ханум Маршан с двумя сыновьями перешла на сторону Асланбея, «под защиту сему извергу, который, впрочем, не родной ее сын» и что это «без сомнения может отклонить от верности Сефер-Али-бею всех подвластных его»61. Приводимые факты могут лишь свидетельствовать о причастности Сефербея, а не Асланбея к убийству отца. В силу абхазских традиций и кровно-родственных отношений семья Келешбея никогда не приняла бы сторону Асланбея, если бы тот на самом деле был «отцеубицей». Между тем, все члены семьи с первого дня после гибели владетеля Абхазии поддерживали Асланбея. Георгий-Сефербей скептически характеризовался даже в официальной переписке русских политиков и военных. Так например, в декабре 1814 г. генерал Симонович сообщал генералу Ртищеву, что Георгий Шервашидзе хотя и предан России, «но не успел еще приобрести полной силы и доверенности в народе Абхазском, по причине коварных происков брата его отцеубийцы Арслан-бея, не оставляющего претензии своей на абхазское владение и домогающегося сей своей цели чрез покровительство турок»62. Не изменилась ситуация в лучшую для Георгия сторону и четыре года спустя. Так, 25 апреля 1818 г. он обращается с письмом на грузинском языке 31

Глава II к генералу Курнатовскому, в котором жалуется, что народ Абхазии не признает его и не повинуется ему. Георгий Шервашидзе пребывал почти в истерическом состоянии: «Прошу дать мне из владения Дадиани войско и также до 300 конных имеретинцев, коих я присоединя к своим верноподданным, под предводительством моим, заставлю оный дикий народ раскаиваться в своем поступке...»63. Тогда же Курнатовский докладывал генералу Сталю, что Г. Шервашидзе известил его о «явном ему неповиновении своего народа». 9 мая 1818 г. Курнатовский раздраженно сообщил: «Абхазский владелец на самом деле еще слабее в управлении своим народом, нежели как сам о себе пишет, так что не смеет почти показаться народу, не хотящему ему повиноваться. Главнейшая причина такового неповиновения есть та, что настоящий владелец утвержден в сем звании без дальнейшего исследования о преданности к нему абхазцев — народа горского, вольного и воинственного и с коими управиться трудно и тому в ком нашлось бы более твердости и благоразумия»64. Это было убийственное заключение о времени правления Г. Шервашидзе, умершем 7 апреля 1821 г. Незадолго до его смерти, 5 февраля 1820 г. генерал Курнатовский делился своими впечатлениями о Георгии Шервашидзе с генералом Вельяминовым. Георгий прибыл в Имеретию и заявил Курнатовскому о «своей непоколебимой преданности российскому престолу». По этому поводу генерал ехидно, но справедливо заметил: «Впрочем, ни измена его (Г. Шервашидзе. – С.Л.) дальнейшего вреда, ни верность значительной пользы не могут нам принести за крайним его в принадлежащем ему владении бессилием»65. После смерти Г. Шервашидзе в Абхазии снова вспыхнули «беспокойства и возмущения». Многие абхазские князья и народ желали видеть владетелем Асланбея или его брата Гасанбея. Но генерал-лейтенант Вельяминов, заменявший выехавшего в Петербург Ермолова, по совету владетеля Мегрелии Левана Дадиани объявил «правительницей Абхазии» вдову Г. Шервашидзе княгиню Тамару Дадиани (тетку Левана). Чтобы обезопасить Тамару, Вельяминов отдал приказ арестовать Гасанбея Чачба и выслать его в Сибирь, где тот и находился вплоть до 1828 г. Абхазы вновь взбунтовались и отказались признать Тамару правительницей Абхазии. 29 мая 1821 г. генерал Ермолов писал графу Нессельроде, что братья Гасанбея – Баталбей, Ростомбей и Таирбей «явно восстают» против Тамары Дадиани. Более того, Таирбей был направлен в Константинополь за помощью для взятия Сухум-Кале и с просьбой возвести в «звание владетеля Абхазии... Арслан-бея»66. Летом 1821 г. Асланбей вернулся на родину. При поддержке своих родственников садзов, убыхов и псхувцев он поднял восстание, «овладел всею Абхазиею» и обложил Сухумскую крепость. В источнике сказано, что после смерти Г. Шервашидзе в 1821 г. «возник мятеж в княжестве, произведенный и поддерживаемый братьями покойного» и направленный против передачи власти сыну Георгия Дмитрию (Омарбею) Шервашидзе67. 32

Абхазия и Российская империя. Асланбей: мифы и факты

VI К 1821 г. относится историческое предание «Из Кисловодской старины. У замка коварства и любви»68, в котором рассказывается о стремительном набеге Асланбея на великосветский курорт с целью устранения претендента на абхазский престол – молодого князя Дмитрия, сына Сефербея. Произошло это в тот момент, когда князь Дмитрий влюбился в Кисловодске в златокудрую княжну Татьяну Голицыну. «Исторические данные указывают, — говорится в этом источнике, — что крепость Кислый подвергалась также нападению и абхазцев. Об этих джигитах никто не помнит в Кисловодске. По крайней мере, в разговорах больше упоминают о кабардинцах и черкесах. Между тем, Абхазия почти вплотную прилегала к Кисловодскому району... Правда, это была горная и теперь недоступная для прохода местность для всех, но не для абхазцев джигитов. Их лошади как кошки царапались по неприступным скалам. Преследовать их было совершенно немыслимо... В числе курсующих в Кисловодске был один из претендентов на княжество Абхазии князь Шервашидзе. Блестящий офицер, воспитанный в Петербурге и уже там известный на балах и великосветских вечерах, принятый при дворе, князь, конечно, очаровал весь курортный бомонд, и многие мамаши мечтали устроить для дочек блестящую карьеру «княгини Абхазии». Если бы они, правда, имели понятие о том, какая жизнь предстоит такой княгине впоследствии, что представляет из себя княжество Абхазия, эта беспрерывная бойня родов, кинжальщина, интриги и разбои, тогда едва ли пожелали бы своим дочкам такую судьбу. Князь Абхазии (Дмитрий. – С.Л.) прибыл в Кисловодск с большим конвоем, со свитой приверженцев, вооруженных с ног до головы. Да иначе и нельзя было. В это время в Абхазии хозяйничал другой претендент на престол из того же рода Аслан-бей, более популярный в народе, но не признанный русским правительством. Два претендента были два кровных врага и встреча их на узкой дорожке окончилась бы гибелью одного из них… А в то время, как официальный владелец Абхазии изнывал в Кисловодске от любви к княжне Татьяне, в самой Абхазии его конкурент усиленно работал, агитируя против русского протеже и обещая старейшинам и «почетным людям» аулов турецкую поддержку… Конечно, прежде всего надо было уничтожить конкурента… Аслан-бей с сильным отрядом направился по горной местности к Кисловодску, предполагая встретить возвращающегося князя Шервашидзе, завлечь его в засаду и уничтожить вместе с конвоем… У Аслан-бея созрела мысль отделаться от конкурента тут же. С отборным отрядом он стал рыскать около курорта, поджидая свою добычу…». Таково историческое предание, сведения о котором были предоставлены мне известным абхазоведом Асланом Гожба.

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Глава II VII Абхазское восстание, которым руководил Асланбей, было разгромлено князем Петром Горчаковым в ноябре 1821 г. Он привез нового владетеля Дмитрия (Омарбея), сына Сефербея. По приказу Горчакова вокруг Сухум-Кале были опустошены и сожжены абхазские села. «Оставив в Соуксу (Лыхны. – С.Л.) две роты Мингрельского полка, – сказано в источнике, – собственно для защиты абхазского владельца, он возвратился с отрядом в Имеретию»69. Находившийся с детства в заложниках в Петербурге, Дмитрий забыл родной язык, обычаи и пользовался еще меньшим авторитетом, чем его отец. Для охраны Дмитрия Горчаков оставил солдат под командованием майора Ракоци. Опасаясь приверженцев Асланбея, Дмитрий около года прожил в Лыхны как пленник. Однако 16 октября 1822 г., по версии его матери Тамары Дадиани, он был отравлен человеком Асланбея Урусом Лакоба (Лаквари)70. По свидетельству же русских офицеров, с которыми Дмитрий постоянно общался, молодой владетель в течение последних трех месяцев болел, страдая лихорадкой, и умер от малярии. Вскоре после смерти Дмитрия, 14 февраля 1823 г. император пожаловал его несовершеннолетнему брату Михаилу (Хамудбею) титул владетеля Абхазии. Тот правил долго (до 1864 г.), но его власть оказалась очень слабой. В 1824 г. под руководством Асланбея вновь вспыхнуло восстание, которое охватило всю Абхазию. Более 12-ти тысяч абхазов заблокировали русские гарнизоны в Сухумской крепости и Лыхненском укреплении. Горчаков отдал приказ Сухумскому коменданту подполковнику Михину навести порядок. В мае 1824 г. с отрядом в 225 штыков тот ночью напал на одно из абхазских сел и сжег его. Возмущенные такой жестокостью, абхазы разгромили отряд, а Михина убили. Восстание вспыхнуло с новой силой. Из Анапы на турецком корабле опять прибыл Асланбей. В течение полутора месяцев русские солдаты обороняли Лыхненское укрепление, в котором находился владетель Михаил. Положение очень тревожило Ермолова. В июне 1824 г. в Абхазию были двинуты крупные военные силы – эскадра Черноморского флота, 2000 русских солдат и 1300 всадников мегрельского ополчения. С моря своей артиллерией их поддерживал фрегат "Спешный". Кроме него в операции были задействованы бриги "Орфей", "Меркурий", "Ганимед", фрегат "Евстафий" и шхуна "Гонец". Карательной экспедицией командовал сам Горчаков, который в августе подавил выступление, потеряв при этом около 800 солдат и офицеров. Асланбей вновь был вынужден эмигрировать в Турцию71. В последний раз Асланбей прибыл в Абхазию в 1830 г. и вновь попытался поднять восстание против своего племянника владетеля Михаила. Но к этому времени присутствие царизма в крае усилилось и Асланбей был вынужден навсегда покинуть свою родину. До самой смерти он жил в

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Абхазия и Российская империя. Асланбей: мифы и факты

Константинополе. Известно также, что во время Крымской войны, в 1855 г., сын Асланбея высадился в Абхазии вместе с турецким десантом Омерпаши и был с почетом принят народом72. Асланбей был действительно законным владетелем Абхазии и после потери престола в результате интервенции 1810 г. в течение 20 лет продолжал борьбу с царизмом. 1

ПРИМЕЧАНИЯ

Кудрявцев К. Сборник материалов по истории Абхазии. Сухум, 1922. С. 155. АКАК. В 12-ти томах. Тифлис, 1866-1904. 3 Стражев В. Горсть. Сухум, 1923. С. 29. 4 АКАК. Т. 3. С. 198-200. 5 Там же. С. 201-204. 6 Там же. С. 201. 7 Там же. С. 205. 8 Там же. С. 201. 9 Там же. С. 198-200. 10 Там же. С. 201. 11 Дзидзария Г.А. Борьба за Абхазию в первом десятилетии ХIХ века. Сухуми, 1940. С. 16. 12 АКАК. Т. 3. С. 198-200. 13 Материалы по истории Абхазии. Сухуми, 1939. С. 107. 14 АКАК. Т. 3. С. 192-193, 519-520; Броневский С. Новейшие географические и исторические известия о Кавказе. Ч. 1. М., 1823. С. 348. 15 Дзидзария Г.А. Борьба за Абхазию. С. 15. 16 Дубровин Н. История войн и владычества русских на Кавказе. Т. 4. СПб., 1886. С. 201. 17 АКАК. Т. 2. С. 481-482, 491, 534-536. 18 Там же. Т. 6. Ч. 1. С. 627. 19 Дубровин Н. История войн. С. 198-199. 20 Там же. С. 197. 21 АКАК. Т. 3. С. 190. 22 Там же. С. 197-198. 23 Там же. С. 198. 24 Дзидзария Г.А. Борьба за Абхазию. С. 16. 25 Фадеев А.В. К вопросу о феодализме в Абхазии. Сухум, 1931. С. 35. 26 Фадеев А.В. Русский царизм и крестьянская реформа в Абхазии. Сухум, 1932. С. 12. 27 Дзидзария Г.А. Борьба за Абхазию. С. 17. 28 АКАК. Т. 3. С. 199-200. 29 Там же. С. 198. 30 Там же. С. 205. 31 Там же. С. 201. 32 Там же. С. 203-204. 33 Там же. С. 207-208. 34 Там же. Т. 4. С. 419-420. 35 Там же. Т. 6. Ч. 1. С. 626-627. 2

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Глава II

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Полный свод законов Российской империи. Т. 40. Приложение. С. 74. № 241289. СПб., 1830. 37 АКАК. Т. 3. С. 209. 38 Материалы и записки по вопросу о владетельских и имущественных правах потомков светлейшего князя Михаила Шервашидзе, последнего владетеля Абхазии. Венден, 1913. С. 5-7; Внешняя политика России ХIХ века и начала ХХ века. Документы. Серия 1. Т. 5. М., 1967. С. 372-373. 39 АКАК. Т. 4. С. 238. 40 Там же. С. 420. 41 Там же. С. 421-422. 42 Вестник Европы. 1867 (сентябрь). Т. III. С. 108. 43 АКАК. Т. 4. С. 422-424. 44 Кудрявцев К. Сборник материалов. С. 158. 45 АКАК. Т. 4. С. 425. 46 Там же. С. 339. 47 Там же. С. 356-357. 48 Там же. С. 426. 49 Там же. С. 428. 50 Ермолов А.П. Записки. М., 1991. С. 375. 51 АКАК. Т. 3. С. 203-204. 52 Там же. Т. 2. С. 410. 53 Там же. Т. 3. С. 205. 54 Там же. 55 Там же. Т. 6. Ч. 1. С. 652-654. 56 Там же. С. 429. 57 Гибаль П. Журнал моего путешествия…1820 г. Рукопись. 58 АКАК. Т. 3. С. 206. 59 Там же. С. 208-209. 60 Там же. Т. 5. С. 499-500. 61 Там же. С. 798. 62 Там же. С. 480-481. 63 Там же. Т. 6. Ч. 1. С. 644. 64 Там же. 65 Там же. С. 575. 66 Там же. С. 656. 67 Там же. 68 Кавказский край (Пятигорск).1912. 27 ноября. № 206. 69 Князь П.Д. Горчаков. Очерк служебной деятельности. СПб., 1862. С. 14-15. 70 АКАК. Т. 6. Ч. 1. С. 663-665. 71 Русский биографический словарь. Т. 23. СПб., 1911. С. 100. 72 Эсадзе С. Историческая записка об управлении Кавказом. Т. 1. Тифлис, 1907. С. 148.

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ÃËÀÂÀ III ÏÎÑËÅ ÐÀÇÂÀËÀ ÐÎÑÑÈÉÑÊÎÉ ÈÌÏÅÐÈÈ: ÀÁÕÀÇÈß Â 1917–1925 ÃÎÄÀÕ. ÏÎËÅÌÈ×ÅÑÊÈÅ ÇÀÌÅÒÊÈ

I  ãîäû ñòàëèíñêèõ ðåïðåññèé àáõàçàì áûëî çàïðåùåíî íàçûâàòüñÿ íàðîäîì. Èìåííî â ýòîò òðàãè÷åñêèé ïåðèîä ïîÿâëÿåòñÿ íà ñâåò «òåîðèÿ» ãðóçèíñêîãî ëèòåðàòóðîâåäà Ï. Èíãîðîêâà. Åå ïîÿâëåíèå ñîâïàëî ïî âðåìåíè ñ 1949–1951 ãã., êîãäà âñëåä çà äåïîðòàöèåé ãðåêîâ è òóðîê èç Àáõàçèè ãîòîâèëîñü âûñåëåíèå è ñàìèõ àáõàçîâ. Èìåííî â ýòè ãîäû áûëè îïóáëèêîâàíû îòäåëüíûå ãëàâû Èíãîðîêâà, âîøåäøèå çàòåì â åãî êíèãó «Ãåîðãèé Ìåð÷óëå – ãðóçèíñêèé ïèñàòåëü X â.» (Òáèëèñè, 1954), ãäå îí âûäâèíóë òåçèñ î òîì, áóäòî àáàñãè-àáõàçû àíòè÷íîñòè è ñðåäíåâåêîâüÿ íå ÿâëÿëèñü ïðåäêàìè ñîâðåìåííîãî àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà, à áûëè ãðóçèíàìè. Íûíåøíèå æå àáõàçû, ïèñàë Èíãîðîêâà, ýòî ïëåìÿ àïñóéöåâ (îò ñàìîíàçâàíèÿ àáõàçî⠖ «àïñóà»), îñåâøåå íà òåððèòîðèè Àáõàçèè ëèøü äâà-òðè ñòîëåòèÿ íàçàä. Òàêèì îáðàçîì, ïîä âîçìîæíîå áóäóùåå âûñåëåíèå àáõàçîâ ïîäâîäèëàñü èäåîëîãè÷åñêàÿ «áàçà», è àáõàçû ïðåäñòàâëÿëèñü êàê «ãîñòè» è âðåìåííûå æèòåëè íà ãðóçèíñêîé çåìëå. Îäíàêî â ñâÿçè ñ óñòðàíåíèåì Ë. Áåðèÿ ïëàíû äåïîðòàöèè àáõàçîâ íå óñïåëè îñóùåñòâèòüñÿ. Ïîñëå âûõîäà â ñâåò êíèãè Èíãîðîêâà â ïå÷àòè ïîÿâèëàñü ñåðèÿ ñòàòåé âèäíûõ ãðóçèíñêèõ è àáõàçñêèõ èñòîðèêîâ è ëèíãâèñòîâ (Ç. Àí÷àáàäçå, Í. Áåðäçåíèøâèëè, Õ. Áãàæáà, Ê. Ëîìòàòèäçå è äð.), êîòîðûå ïîäâåðãëè îáñòîÿòåëüíîé êðèòèêå ýòîò ìèô è óëè÷èëè àâòîðà â ãðóáîì èñêàæåíèè ôàêòîâ. Îäíàêî, ñïóñòÿ äåñÿòèëåòèÿ, ñ êîíöà 1988 ã. ïðîèñõîäèò ðåàíèìàöèÿ «èäåé» Èíãîðîêâà. Ìîëîäîé ãðóçèíñêèé èññëåäîâàòåëü Òîðíèêå Ãîðäàäçå ñëåäóþùèì îáðàçîì îõàðàêòåðèçîâàë ñëîæèâøóþñÿ ñèòóàöèþ: «Ìîæíî ëèøü ñîæàëåòü, ÷òî êíèãà Èíãîðîêâà îáðåëà âòîðóþ æèçíü â 80–90-õ ãîäàõ ñ ëåãêîé ðóêè ãðóçèíñêèõ äèññèäåíòîâ. Òàêàÿ “òåîðèÿ” íåèçáåæíî âûçâàëà ðåçêî îòðèöàòåëüíóþ ðåàêöèþ àáõàçîâ… Â óñëîâèÿõ òîòàëüíîé ýòíèçàöèè ãðóçèíñêîãî îáùåñòâà è ïðè îòñóòñòâèè çðåëîé ãîñóäàðñòâåííîñòè ýòî ïðèâåëî ê íà÷àëó îñòðîé ïîëåìèêè îá èñòîðè÷åñêîé ãåîìèôîëîãèè, ò.å. î òîì, êòî êóäà ïåðâûì ïðèåõàë. Ïðè ýòîì 37

Ãëàâà III

ñîâåðøåííî îøèáî÷íî ïîäðàçóìåâàëîñü, ÷òî ïðèåõàâøèé ïåðâûì èìååò êàêîå-òî îñîáîå ïðàâî íà ýòó çåìëþ. Òàêàÿ æå ãåîìèôîëîãèçàöèÿ ïðèñóùà è äðóãèì êîíôëèêòàì ïîñòêîììóíèñòè÷åñêîãî ìèðà (Êàðàáàõ, Êîñîâî, ðóìûíî-âåíãåðñêèé ñïîð î Òðàíñèëüâàíèè è ò.ä.)»1. Îñíîâûâàÿñü íà ãðóáîé ôàëüñèôèêàöèè Èíãîðîêâà, ëèäåðû òîãäàøíåé Ãðóçèè Ç. Ãàìñàõóðäèà, Ì. Êîñòàâà, À. Áàêðàäçå è äð. íà ìèòèíãàõ â Òáèëèñè, Ñóõóìå, Ãàãðå, â ïåðèîäè÷åñêîé ïå÷àòè ñòàëè îòêðûòî çàÿâëÿòü è âíóøàòü êàðòâåëüñêîìó íàñåëåíèþ, ÷òî Àáõàçèÿ – ýòî ãðóçèíñêàÿ çåìëÿ, à àáõàçû – ýòî ãðóçèíû. Îñîáåííî ñòàðàëèñü îòëè÷èòüñÿ ìíîãî÷èñëåííûå ãðóçèíñêèå ïèñàòåëè. Åæåäíåâíî ïå÷àòü, ðàäèî è òåëåâèäåíèå Ãðóçèè ïðîâîöèðîâàëè àáõàçîâ, çàÿâëÿÿ, ÷òî îíè «ãîñòè» íà ãðóçèíñêîé çåìëå, ÷òî îíè «àïñóéöû» è èõ íóæíî ëèøèòü äàæå «àâòîíîìèè». Ïîñëå ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîãî âîîðóæåííîãî êîíôëèêòà ñèòóàöèÿ â ãðóçèíñêîé èñòîðèîãðàôèè ïî âîïðîñó îá Àáõàçèè åùå áîëåå óõóäøèëàñü2, òàê êàê áîëüøèíñòâî ó÷åíûõ ÿâëÿþòñÿ ñòîðîííèêàìè ìèôîòâîð÷åñòâà Èíãîðîêâà, ñ÷èòàÿ, ÷òî Àáõàçèÿ âñåãäà áûëà íàñåëåíà ãðóçèíàìè. Íåêîòîðûå èç íèõ çàáûëè î ñâîèõ áîëåå ðàííèõ ðàáîòàõ è ñåé÷àñ ïèøóò êàê «íàäî», êàê âñå. Î÷åíü íåìíîãèå èñòîðèêè ïðèäåðæèâàþòñÿ òåîðèè «äâóàáîðèãåííîñòè» Àáõàçèè, è ëèøü îäèí, Ã. Àí÷àáàäçå, ãîâîðèò îá àáõàçàõ êàê àâòîõòîííîì íàñåëåíèè Àáõàçèè ñ äðåâíåéøèõ âðåìåí. Êîíå÷íî, ïîìèìî ãðóçèíñêèõ èñòîðèêîâ è ëèòåðàòîðîâ åñòü èíûå ïðåäñòàâèòåëè ãðóçèíñêîé ýëèòû, åå íîâàÿ âîëíà, êîòîðàÿ ïî-äðóãîìó ðàñöåíèâàåò ìðà÷íóþ ðîëü Èíãîðîêâà â íîâåéøåé èñòîðèè è ñ ïîíèìàíèåì îòíîñèòñÿ ê èñòîðèè àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà è àáõàçñêîé ïðîáëåìå â öåëîì. Çà ñâîþ ãðàæäàíñêóþ ïîçèöèþ îíè ïîäâåðãàþòñÿ íàïàäêàì ñî ñòîðîíû «èìåíèòûõ» ñîîòå÷åñòâåííèêîâ. Òàê, íå óñïåë Äàâèä Áåðäçåíèøâèëè âûñêàçàòü ñâîå ìíåíèå î íåêîòîðûõ ïðîöåññàõ â ãðóçèíñêîì îáùåñòâå è ãîñóäàðñòâå, êàê òóò æå ïîëó÷èë ñóðîâóþ îòïîâåäü ñî ñòðàíèö îôèöèàëüíîé Ñâîáîäíîé Ãðóçèè.  èíòåðâüþ Ðàäèî «Ñâîáîäà» äèðåêòîð Íàöèîíàëüíîé ïàðëàìåíòñêîé áèáëèîòåêè Ãðóçèè Ëåâàí Áåðäçåíèøâèëè î ñîâðåìåííîì ñîñòîÿíèè èñòîðè÷åñêèõ èññëåäîâàíèé ñêàçàë áóêâàëüíî ñëåäóþùåå: «...Ó íàñ íåò èñòîðèè, ó íàñ åñòü Ì. Ëîðäêèïàíèäçå. Îíà õîðîøèé ÷åëîâåê, íî ýòî íå èñòîðèÿ. Ìíåíèå Ëîðäêèïàíèäçå – ýòî ìíåíèå ãðóçèíñêîãî ïðîøëîãî»3. Ìîæíî ñêàçàòü, ÷òî ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêèå îòíîøåíèÿ çàìåòíî óõóäøèëèñü ïîñëå ïóáëèêàöèè êîëëåêòèâíîé ìîíîãðàôèè «Ðàçûñêàíèÿ ïî èñòîðèè Àáõàçèè/Ãðóçèè» (Òáèëèñè, 1999). Êíèãà âûøëà â îòâåò íà «Èñòîðèþ Àáõàçèè» (Ñóõóì, 1991; Ãóäàóòà, 1993), êîòîðàÿ áûëà èçäàíà ïîä ìîåé ðåäàêöèåé. Îòâåò ïðèøåë ñïóñòÿ ïî÷òè 10 ëåò. Ñëåäóåò íàïîìíèòü èñòîðèêàì èç Òáèëèñè, ÷òî, ïîêà îíè ãîòîâèëè ñâîé òðóä, â Ëîíäîíå ïîä ðåäàêöèåé áðèòàíñêîãî àêàäåìèêà êàðòâåëîëîãà Äæîðäæà Õüþèòòà âûøëà íîâàÿ êíèãà «The Abkhazians» («Àáõàçû»)4.  íåé ïîäðîáíî ãîâîðèòñÿ î òåîðèè Èíãîðîêâà è ïðèâîäÿòñÿ òàêèå ñâåäåíèÿ îá àáõàçàõ, ìåãðåëàõ è ãðóçèíàõ äî XVII â., êîòîðûå ìîãóò ïîìî÷ü äîáðîñîâåñòíûì àâòîðàì ðàçîáðàòüñÿ â èñòèíå. Ïðåä38

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

ëàãàþ îçíàêîìèòüñÿ è ñ äðóãèìè ðàáîòàìè ýòîãî àíãëèéñêîãî ó÷åíîãî5, îäíà èç êîòîðûõ, ìåæäó ïðî÷èì, áûëà îïóáëèêîâàíà â 1998 ã. ïîä âåñüìà êðàñíîðå÷èâûì íàçâàíèåì: «Ðîëü ó÷åíûõ â ïîòåðå àáõàçàìè äîâåðèÿ ê ãðóçèíàì, è êàê îçäîðîâèòü ñèòóàöèþ»6. Òàêèì îáðàçîì, îáñòàíîâêà â ñîâðåìåííîé ãðóçèíñêîé èñòîðèîãðàôèè î÷åâèäíî íåáëàãîïðèÿòíà, à âûøåäøèé «àêàäåìè÷åñêèé» òðóä «Ðàçûñêàíèé», çà ðåäêèì èñêëþ÷åíèåì, ïðîíèêíóò äóõîì Èíãîðîêâà. Åãî ìèãðàöèîííàÿ âåðñèÿ â êëàññè÷åñêîì âèäå (XVII â.) èëè â áîëåå ìîäåðíèçèðîâàííîì âàðèàíòå ïðåäñòàâëåíà â ñòàòüÿõ Ì. Áàðàìèäçå, Ä. Ìóñõåëàøâèëè, Ã. Æîðæîëèàíè è äðóãèõ àâòîðîâ. Èçìåíèëàñü è ïîçèöèÿ òàêîãî èçâåñòíîãî èññëåäîâàòåëÿ êàê Î. Äæàïàðèäçå, êîòîðûé êîñíóëñÿ òåìû ýòíîêóëüòóðíîé ñèòóàöèè Ñåâåðî-Çàïàäíîãî Çàêàâêàçüÿ â ýïîõó êàìíÿ è ðàííåãî ìåòàëëà. Íûíå âçãëÿäû ó÷åíîãî «ýâîëþöèîíèðóþò» â ñòîðîíó äâóàáîðèãåííîñòè, è íå èñêëþ÷åíî, ÷òî ýòà ìåòàìîðôîçà ñâÿçàíà ñ îïðåäåëåííûì «ïàòðèîòè÷åñêèì» äàâëåíèåì. Ñèòóàöèÿ, ñëîæèâøàÿñÿ â ãðóçèíñêîé èñòîðèîãðàôèè, íå ìîæåò íå íàñòîðàæèâàòü àáõàçñêîå ñîîáùåñòâî, òàê êàê è ãðóçèíû, è àáõàçû â ñâîåé ìåíòàëüíîñòè î÷åíü áîëåçíåííî ðåàãèðóþò íà ðàçëè÷íûå èçûñêè èñòîðè÷åñêîãî õàðàêòåðà. Ïîëîæåíèå èìåííî â ýòîé îáëàñòè ÿâëÿåòñÿ òî÷íûì áàðîìåòðîì äåéñòâèòåëüíîãî ðàñêëàäà â ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêèõ îòíîøåíèÿõ è ñàìûì ñåðüåçíûì îáðàçîì ïðåïÿòñòâóåò ïîëèòè÷åñêîìó óðåãóëèðîâàíèþ ìåæäó Ãðóçèåé è Àáõàçèåé. Äà è êàê ìîæíî óðåãóëèðîâàòü êîíôëèêò, êîãäà ìåæäó ñòîðîíàìè ñòîèò «òåîðèÿ» Èíãîðîêâà î ïðèøëîñòè àáõàçîâ â Àáõàçèè? Èìåííî ýòî ìíåíèå, ïî ñëîâàì èñòîðèêà Ã. Àí÷àáàäçå, ââèäó ñâîåé íåäâóñìûñëåííîñòè è ëåãêîäîñòóïíîñòè íûíå øèðîêî ðàñïðîñòðàíåíî ñðåäè íàñåëåíèÿ Ãðóçèè7, «ãðóçèíñêîé èíòåëëèãåíöèè, îñîáåííî íåñïåöèàëèñòîâ»8. Òàê, ëèòåðàòóðîâåä Ï. Èíãîðîêâà åùå ïîëâåêà íàçàä ïîëîæèë íà÷àëî «ïîëèòèçèðîâàííûì íàó÷íûì ñïîðàì», è «èñòîðè÷åñêàÿ òåìà â ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêèõ îòíîøåíèÿõ ñòàëà ïðåäìåòîì íàãíåòàíèÿ ñòðàñòåé»9, àêòèâíûì ó÷àñòíèêîì êîòîðûõ â ñâîå âðåìÿ áûë è Ç. Ãàìñàõóðäèà10.  ýòîé ñâÿçè íåîáõîäèìî îòìåòèòü, ÷òî ñòîëêíîâåíèþ 1989 ã. è âîéíå 1992–1993 ãã. ïðåäøåñòâîâàëè êðàéíåå íàïðÿæåíèå â èñòîðèîãðàôèè è äàæå íàñòîÿùàÿ «áèòâà» ìåæäó ãðóçèíñêèìè è àáõàçñêèìè ó÷åíûìè, ïåðåíåñåííàÿ ñî ñòðàíèö íàó÷íûõ èçäàíèé â ñðåäñòâà ìàññîâîé èíôîðìàöèè.

II Íî âåðíåìñÿ ê óïîìÿíóòûì «Ðàçûñêàíèÿì». ×òî êàñàåòñÿ äðåâíåé è ñðåäíåâåêîâîé èñòîðèè, òî, íàäåþñü, ÷òî â áëèæàéøåå âðåìÿ àáõàçñêèå ó÷åíûå äàäóò íåîáõîäèìûå ðàçúÿñíåíèÿ ïî çàòðîíóòûì ïðîáëåìàì. ß æå êîñíóñü íåêîòîðûõ òðàêòîâîê, ôàêòîâ è ïîëîæåíèé, êîòîðûå ëèøü ÷àñòè÷íî çàòðàãèâàþò XIX â., íî îñíîâíîå âíèìàíèå óäåëåíî êëþ÷åâîìó ïåðèîäó èñòîðèè Àáõàçèè XX â. – 1917–1925 ãã. 39

Ãëàâà III

Íîâîé è íîâåéøåé èñòîðèè Àáõàçèè ïîñâÿùåíû, â ÷àñòíîñòè, ñëåäóþùèå ñòàòüè «Ðàçûñêàíèé»: Ã. Ïàé÷àäçå «Àáõàçèÿ â ñîñòàâå Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè (1810–1917 ãã.)»; À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè «Ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêèå îòíîøåíèÿ â ïåðâîé ÷åòâåðòè XX âåêà»; Ë. Òîèäçå «Ê âîïðîñó î ïîëèòè÷åñêîì ñòàòóñå Àáõàçèè (1921–1931 ãã)»; Ã. Æîðæîëèàíè «Èñòîðè÷åñêèå è ïîëèòè÷åñêèå êîðíè êîíôëèêòà â Àáõàçèè/Ãðóçèè». Ìîå âíèìàíèå ãëàâíûì îáðàçîì áóäåò ñîñðåäîòî÷åíî íà ðàáîòå À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè, à òàêæå íà íåêîòîðûõ ïðèíöèïèàëüíî âàæíûõ äîêóìåíòàõ è ïîëîæåíèÿõ, çàòðàãèâàåìûõ äðóãèìè àâòîðàìè. Òàê íàïðèìåð, Ã. Ïàé÷àäçå îïåðèðóåò óñòàðåâøèìè âîççðåíèÿìè íà ïðîöåññ âêëþ÷åíèÿ Àáõàçèè â ñîñòàâ Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè, è ìíîãèå îòâåòû è ðàçúÿñíåíèÿ ïî ýòîìó ïîâîäó ñîäåðæàòñÿ â ìîåé ðàáîòå «Àñëàíáåé»11, â ñâÿçè ñ ÷åì íå áóäó ïîâòîðÿòüñÿ. Íåëüçÿ, îäíàêî, îáîéòè ìîë÷àíèåì òó ÷àñòü ïóáëèêàöèè, â êîòîðîé èññëåäîâàòåëü ñîîáùàåò, ÷òî «èñòîðèê À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè ââåë â íàó÷íûé îáîðîò âåñüìà èíòåðåñíûé àðõèâíûé äîêóìåíò 1870 ã.» – äîêëàäíóþ çàïèñêó äåïóòàòîâ àáõàçñêîãî è ñàìóðçàêàíñêîãî äâîðÿíñòâà íà èìÿ ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Òèôëèññêîãî êîìèòåòà ïî ñîñëîâíî-ïîçåìåëüíûì äåëàì êíÿçÿ Ñâÿòîïîëê-Ìèðñêîãî.  ýòîì äîêóìåíòå, ñîîáùàåò Ïàé÷àäçå, «÷åòêî ãîâîðèòñÿ îá Àáõàçèè êàê ñîñòàâíîé ÷àñòè Ãðóçèè» (Ñ. 233). Íî Ïàé÷àäçå íå îðèãèíàëåí. Åùå íàêàíóíå ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíû ãàçåòà Ñâîáîäíàÿ Ãðóçèÿ îïóáëèêîâàëà ýòó æå äîêëàäíóþ çàïèñêó, êîòîðàÿ, ïî ìíåíèþ ðåäàêöèè, «äàåò âîçìîæíîñòü ëþáîìó ÷èòàòåëþ ðàçîáðàòüñÿ – ÿâëÿåòñÿ ëè Àáõàçèÿ íåîòúåìëåìîé ÷àñòüþ Ãðóçèè»12. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè, âèäèìî, äåéñòâèòåëüíî «îòêðûë» äëÿ ñåáÿ ýòîò äàâíî èçâåñòíûé ñïåöèàëèñòàì äîêóìåíò è, íà÷èíàÿ ñ 1990 ã., íåóñòàííî åãî ïóáëèêóåò è êîììåíòèðóåò, íà ýòîò ðàç – â ñâîåé êíèæêå13. Âîñòîðãàåòñÿ ýòîé çàïèñêîé è Ã. Æîðæîëèàíè (Ñ. 420–421), òàê êàê â íåé, êàê îí ïîëàãàåò, ãîâîðèòñÿ î «ïðèíàäëåæíîñòè Àáõàçèè ê Ãðóçèè». Ñàì Ìåíòåøàøâèëè, ïîëüçóÿñü ñëó÷àåì, â êîòîðûé óæå ðàç öèòèðóåò àáõàçñêèõ è ñàìóðçàêàíñêèõ äåïóòàòîâ Á. Ýìóõâàðè, Ì. Ìàðøàíèÿ, Ò. Ìàðãàíèÿ è Ê. Èíàë-èïà: «Áîëüøàÿ ÷àñòü ìåñòíîñòåé íîñèò ãðóçèíñêèå íàçâàíèÿ; áîëüøàÿ ÷àñòü æèòåëåé ïðèçíàåò ñâîå ìèíãðåëüñêîå èëè ãðóçèíñêîå ïðîèñõîæäåíèå è ñîõðàíèëà äàæå ñâîè ãðóçèíñêèå è ìèíãðåëüñêèå ôàìèëèè. Îäíî òîëüêî ìîæåò äàòü ïîâîä ñ÷èòàòü Àáõàçèþ îòäåëüíîñòüþ îò Ãðóçèè – ýòî ÿçûê; íî è â íåì ìû íàõîäèì íàïîëîâèíó ñëîâ ìèíãðåëüñêèõ è ãðóçèíñêèõ, ïðàâäà, ÷àñòî ñèëüíî èçìåíåííûõ, íî íå ïðåäñòàâëÿþùèõ îñîáîãî çàòðóäíåíèÿ â îòûñêàíèè ïåðâîíà÷àëüíîãî êîðíÿ ìèíãðåëüñêîãî èëè ãðóçèíñêîãî».  çàêëþ÷åíèå, ïðîäîëæàåò Ìåíòåøàøâèëè, àáõàçñêàÿ äåïóòàöèÿ âûðàçèëà íàäåæäó, ÷òî â «ïðèìåíåíèè ê Àáõàçèè è Ñàìóðçàêàíè êðåñòüÿíñêîé ðåôîðìû ìû íå áóäåì èñêëþ÷åíû èç îáùåé ñåìüè ãðóçèíñêèõ íàðîäîâ, ê êîòîðîé èñêîíè ïðèíàäëåæàëè. Ìû ïîçâîëÿåì ñåáå äóìàòü, ÷òî ê íàì âïîëíå ìîãóò áûòü ïðèìåíåíû òå ïîëîæåíèÿ, êîòîðûå ãîñóäàðþ èìïåðàòîðó áëàãîóãîäíî áûëî óñòàíîâèòü äëÿ îñòàëüíûõ ÷àñòåé áûâøåãî Ãðóçèíñêîãî öàð40

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

ñòâà, è ÷òî äëÿ íàñ íå áóäåò ñäåëàíî èñêëþ÷åíèÿ». È, íàêîíåö, ãðóçèíñêèé èñòîðèê ïðèõîäèò ê âûâîäó: «Êàê âèäèì, äåïóòàòû, èçáðàííûå îò âñåõ ñîñëîâèé àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà, ñ÷èòàëè Àáõàçèþ èñòîðè÷åñêè íåðàçðûâíîé ÷àñòüþ Ãðóçèíñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâà» (Ñ. 269–270). Ïðèâåäåííûé âûøå äîêóìåíò öèòèðóåòñÿ òáèëèññêèìè ó÷åíûìè è ïîëèòèêàìè íà ïðîòÿæåíèè ïîñëåäíèõ äåñÿòè ëåò. Ìåæäó òåì ìíå íåîäíîêðàòíî ïðèõîäèëîñü ïðåäîñòåðåãàòü áóäóùèõ ïóáëèêàòîðîâ îò íåêðèòè÷åñêîãî ïîäõîäà ê äàííîìó èñòî÷íèêó, â ñâÿçè ñ ÷åì ïðèäåòñÿ êîñíóòüñÿ ýòîé òåìû åùå ðàç. Äîêëàäíàÿ çàïèñêà ÷åòûðåõ äåïóòàòîâ àáõàçñêîãî è ñàìóðçàêàíñêîãî äâîðÿíñòâà îò 23 ìàðòà 1870 ã. – äàâíî èçâåñòíûé äîêóìåíò. Áóäó÷è äåïóòàòàìè îò êíÿçåé è äâîðÿí Àáõàçèè è Ñàìóðçàêàíè, ò.å. îò âûñøåãî ñîñëîâèÿ, à íå îò âñåãî íàñåëåíèÿ Àáõàçèè, êàê äóìàåò ãðóçèíñêèé èñòîðèê, Á. Ýìóõâàðè, Ì. Ìàðøàíèÿ, Ò. Ìàðãàíèÿ è Ê. Èíàë-èïà ñòðåìèëèñü â õîäå ãîòîâèâøåéñÿ êðåñòüÿíñêîé ðåôîðìû â Àáõàçèè çàïîëó÷èòü òàêèå æå ôèíàíñîâûå è ìàòåðèàëüíûå âûãîäû, êàêèå ïðèîáðåëî ðàíåå âûñøåå äâîðÿíñòâî Ãðóçèè. Äëÿ äîñòèæåíèÿ ýòîé öåëè èì íåîáõîäèìî áûëî óáåäèòü öàðñêèå âëàñòè â òîì, ÷òî Àáõàçèÿ – ýòî ÿêîáû òàêàÿ æå Ãðóçèÿ, à óñëîâèÿ àáõàçñêîé æèçíè íè÷åì íå îòëè÷àþòñÿ îò ãðóçèíñêèõ. Ñóùåñòâóåò ìíîæåñòâî äîêóìåíòàëüíûõ ñâèäåòåëüñòâ XIX â., êîòîðûå îïðîâåðãàþò ýòî êîíúþíêòóðíîå ìíåíèå. Òàê, 10 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1877 ã. ãàçåòà Òèôëèññêèé âåñòíèê ïîñ÷èòàëà íåîáõîäèìûì îòìåòèòü ñëåäóþùåå: «Íå ïîäëåæèò ñîìíåíèþ, ÷òî ýòíîãðàôè÷åñêèé, ñîöèàëüíûé, ïîëèòèêî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêèé áûò è ìèðîâîççðåíèå àáõàçöåâ ðåçêî îòëè÷àþò èõ äàæå îò ñîñåäíèõ íàðîäîâ».  Àáõàçèè, íàïðèìåð, íå ñóùåñòâîâàëî ôåîäàëüíîé ñîáñòâåííîñòè íà çåìëþ, íå áûëî êðåïîñòíîãî ïðàâà, à îñíîâíîå íàñåëåíèå ñîñòàâëÿëè ñâîáîäíûå îáùèííèêè. Çäåñü âñå êàòåãîðèè êðåñòüÿíñòâà ÿâëÿëèñü ñîáñòâåííèêàìè çåìëè.  1869 ã. â «Î÷åðêå óñòðîéñòâà îáùåñòâåííîïîëèòè÷åñêîãî áûòà Àáõàçèè è Ñàìóðçàêàíè» ãîâîðèëîñü: «Â ïîçåìåëüíîì îòíîøåíèè âñå ñîñëîâèÿ ðàâíû». Àáõàçñêàÿ ñåëüñêàÿ îáùèíà áûëà ïðîïèòàíà «ìîëî÷íûì» ðîäñòâîì (àòàëû÷åñòâîì) è îáúåäèíÿëà âñå ñëîè àáõàçñêîãî îáùåñòâà – êàê âûñøèå (êíÿçåé è äâîðÿí), òàê è íèçøèå (êðåñòüÿí). Ôåîäàë íå èìåë ïðàâà îòíÿòü ó êðåñòüÿíèíà çåìëþ, îñêîðáèòü, à òåì áîëåå ïîäíÿòü ðóêó èëè ïðîäàòü åãî. Êîíñòàíòèí Ìà÷àâàðèàíè îòìå÷àë â 1913 ã.: «Òàêîå ïîçåìåëüíîå ïðàâî ñòàâèëî íèçøåå ñîñëîâèå âíå çàâèñèìîñòè îò ïðèâèëåãèðîâàííûõ êëàññîâ».  1866 ã. èç-çà íåïîíèìàíèÿ ìåñòíûõ óñëîâèé öàðñêèìè ÷èíîâíèêàìè â ñåëå Ëûõíû âñïûõíóëî âîññòàíèå. Î÷åâèäåö è àêòèâíûé ó÷àñòíèê òåõ ñîáûòèé, ñûí ïîñëåäíåãî âëàäåòåëÿ Àáõàçèè Ã.Ì. Øåðâàøèäçå ïîçäíåå ïèñàë: «Îáúÿâëåíèå ìàíèôåñòà íàðîäó íà ïî÷âå êðåïîñòíîé çàâèñèìîñòè, íå ñóùåñòâîâàâøåé â ýòîì íàðîäå, ñëåäîâàòåëüíî, íå ïðèìåíèìîé ê íåìó, ÿâëÿëîñü âñåöåëî íåïðîñòèòåëüíîé îøèáêîé ñî ñòîðîíû ÷èíîâ àäìèíèñòðàöèè... Íàðîä íèêàê íå ìîã ïîíÿòü, îò êîãî è îò ÷åãî åãî îñâîáîæäàþò» 41

Ãëàâà III

(Øåðâàøèäçå Ã.Ì. Òàê ïèøåòñÿ èñòîðèÿ // Çàêàâêàçüå. 1910. 6 èþíÿ. ¹ 126). Ñîâåðøåííî èíàÿ ñèòóàöèÿ áûëà â Ðîññèè è â ñîñåäíåé Ìåãðåëèè, ãäå êðåïîñòíè÷åñòâî áûòîâàëî â êðàéíèõ óñëîâèÿõ, à âî âíóòðåííèõ ðàéîíàõ Ãðóçèè îôîðìèëîñü ÷óòü ëè íå â XIV â. 8 íîÿáðÿ 1870 ã. èìïåðàòîð Àëåêñàíäð II, ó÷èòûâàÿ ïðåäûäóùèå îøèáêè àäìèíèñòðàöèè, ïîâëåêøèå çà ñîáîé âîçìóùåíèå àáõàçîâ, óòâåðäèë «Ïîëîæåíèå î ïðåêðàùåíèè ëè÷íîé çàâèñèìîñòè è î ïîçåìåëüíîì óñòðîéñòâå íàñåëåíèÿ â Ñóõóìñêîì îòäåëå».  îòëè÷èå îò äðóãèõ êðåñòüÿíñêèõ ðåôîðì, â êîòîðûõ ïðÿìî ñêàçàíî î «êðåïîñòíîé çàâèñèìîñòè», â àáõàçñêîé ãîâîðèòñÿ ëèøü î «ïðåêðàùåíèè ëè÷íîé çàâèñèìîñòè», ò.å. âíåýêîíîìè÷åñêîé. À òàê êàê âñå àáõàçñêèå êðåñòüÿíå ÿâëÿëèñü ñîáñòâåííèêàìè ñâîåé çåìëè è íå çàâèñåëè îò ôåîäàëîâ ýêîíîìè÷åñêè, òî îíè äîëæíû áûëè çàïëàòèòü âûêóï òîëüêî çà ëè÷íîå îñâîáîæäåíèå.  òî æå âðåìÿ ãðóçèíñêèå è ìåãðåëüñêèå êíÿçüÿ è äâîðÿíå ïîëó÷àëè âûêóïíûå äåíüãè è çà çåìëþ, ÷òî ñòàâèëî èõ â ãîðàçäî áîëåå âûãîäíûå óñëîâèÿ, ÷åì àáõàçñêóþ ïðèâèëåãèðîâàííóþ âåðõóøêó. Öàðñêèå âëàñòè â ñîîòâåòñòâèè ñ ðåàëüíûì ïîëîæåíèåì äåë íå ïðèçíàëè çà àáõàçñêèìè ïîìåùèêàìè ïðàâ íà êðåñòüÿíñêèå íàäåëû. Èìåííî ïîýòîìó è èñêëþ÷èòåëüíî èç ñâîåêîðûñòíûõ, ìåðêàíòèëüíûõ ñîîáðàæåíèé íåñêîëüêî ïðåäñòàâèòåëåé àáõàçñêîé çíàòè ñ ïîìîùüþ ãðóçèíñêèõ äâîðÿí 23 ìàðòà 1870 ã. ñîñòàâèëè ýòó äîêëàäíóþ çàïèñêó, â êîòîðîé ïîïûòàëèñü «ïîäîãíàòü» èñòîðèþ ïîä ñâîè ñèþìèíóòíûå èíòåðåñû.  1975 ã. èçâåñòíûé êàâêàçîâåä Ã. Äçèäçàðèÿ ïîä÷åðêèâàë: «Ýòà òåíäåíöèÿ àáõàçñêîãî äâîðÿíñòâà, ò.å. ñòðåìëåíèå ïðèïèñàòü ñåáÿ ê ãðóçèíñêîìó, íàèáîëåå ÿðêîå è îáîáùåííîå îòðàæåíèå íàøëà â äîêëàäíîé çàïèñêå äåïóòàòîâ êíÿçåé è äâîðÿí Àáõàçèè îò 23 ìàðòà 1870 ãîäà...»14. Óæå â 1872 ã., ò.å. ñïóñòÿ äâà ãîäà ïîñëå åå ïîÿâëåíèÿ, ïî ïîâîäó óïîìÿíóòîé äîêëàäíîé çàïèñêè ãîâîðèëîñü ñëåäóþùåå: «Ñàìè òàâàäû è àìèñòà Àáõàçèè è Ñàìóðçàêàíè äàëåêî íå áûëè òàêîãî âûñîêîãî ïîíÿòèÿ î ñâîåì ïîëîæåíèè, êàêîå èì ïðèäàâàëè ïèñàâøèå îá Àáõàçèè.  îñíîâàíèå äîêàçàòåëüñòâ òîãî âûâîäà, ÷òî ïðàâà èõ íè÷åì íå îòëè÷àëèñü îò ïðàâ òàâàäîâ è àçíàóðîâ Ãðóçèè, ïðèâîäèòñÿ îáûêíîâåííî åùå è ïîíûíå, ÷òî Àáõàçèÿ âõîäèëà â ñîñòàâ Ãðóçèíñêîãî öàðñòâà. Íî ðàçâå ìîæåò ãåãåìîíèÿ îäíîãî ãîñóäàðñòâà íàä äðóãèì ñëóæèòü äîêàçàòåëüñòâîì òîæäåñòâåííîñòè âñåõ ñóùåñòâîâàâøèõ â íèõ ïðàâ è îòíîøåíèé? Åñëè äîêàçûâàòü íåèçáåæíîñòü ýòîãî, òî ïî÷åìó â òàêîì ñëó÷àå ïðàâà è îòíîøåíèÿ àáõàçöåâ è ñàìóðçàêàíöåâ íå ñ÷èòàòü òîæäåñòâåííûìè ñ ïðàâàìè è îòíîøåíèÿìè, ñóùåñòâîâàâøèìè â Òóðöèè, òàê êàê ïîñëåäíèå òðè âåêà îíè íàõîäèëèñü ïîä âëàäû÷åñòâîì ýòîé äåðæàâû. Âñÿ ïðîøåäøàÿ èñòîðèÿ Àáõàçèè ïîêàçûâàåò, íàïðîòèâ, ÷òî îíà áûëà èìåííî â òàêîì ïîëîæåíèè, ïðè êîòîðîì ìîãëà, è äàæå äîëæíà áûëà ñîõðàíèòü îòíîøåíèÿ, âûðàáîòàííûå ñîáñòâåííîé æèçíüþ»15. Êðèòè÷åñêè ê çàïèñêå 1870 ã. îòíåññÿ è èçâåñòíûé èñòîðèê À. Ôàäååâ, êîòîðûé, â ÷àñòíîñòè, îòìå÷àë: «Ïðåäñòàâèòåëè àáõàçñêèõ ôåîäàëîâ ïîäà42

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

ëè ïåòèöèþ, â êîòîðîé îíè ñòàðàëèñü äîêàçàòü, ÷òî îíè íè â ÷åì íå õóæå ðóññêèõ è ãðóçèíñêèõ ïîìåùèêîâ»16. Îäíàêî ýòè ðàçëè÷èÿ, êàê ìû çíàåì, áûëè âåñüìà ñóùåñòâåííû. Îáñòîÿòåëüíîé êðèòèêå çàïèñêó 1870 ã. ïîäâåðã è êðóïíûé ãðóçèíñêèé èñòîðèê äîðåâîëþöèîííîé ïîðû Ñ. Àâàëèàíè – àâòîð ôóíäàìåíòàëüíîãî ïÿòèòîìíîãî òðóäà «Êðåñòüÿíñêèé âîïðîñ â Çàêàâêàçüå». Àíàëèçó îñîáûõ ñîñëîâíûõ è ïîçåìåëüíûõ îòíîøåíèé â Àáõàçèè ýòîò ó÷åíûé ïîñâÿòèë öåëûé ðàçäåë: «Êðåñòüÿíñêàÿ ðåôîðìà â Ñóõóìñêîì îòäåëå»17. Èññëåäîâàòåëü ïèøåò: «Êðåñòüÿíñêàÿ ðåôîðìà â Ñóõóìñêîì îòäåëå èìåëà ñâîè îñîáåííîñòè è ðàçðåøàëàñü ñîîáðàçíî ñ ìåñòíûìè óñëîâèÿìè, íå òàê, êàê â äðóãèõ ÷àñòÿõ Çàêàâêàçüÿ... Îáùåñòâåííîå è ïîëèòè÷åñêîå óñòðîéñòâî Àáõàçèè è Ñàìóðçàêàíè íè÷åì ìåæäó ñîáîé íå ðàçíèëîñü...». Ñ. Àâàëèàíè îòìå÷àåò, ÷òî â 1870 ã. â Òèôëèñ íà çàñåäàíèå êîìèòåòà áûëè ïðèãëàøåíû àáõàçñêèå äåïóòàòû. «Çàÿâëåíèÿ äåïóòàòîâ îò âûñøåãî ñîñëîâèÿ Àáõàçèè è Ñàìóðçàêàíè ïðåäñòàâëÿþòñÿ ÷ðåçâû÷àéíî ëþáîïûòíûìè, – ñîîáùàåò îí äàëåå, – èç ýòèõ çàÿâëåíèé ïðåæäå âñåãî áðîñàåòñÿ â ãëàçà òî îáñòîÿòåëüñòâî, ÷òî äåïóòàòû òàâàäû ñîâåðøåííî èãíîðèðóþò ñîçäàâøèåñÿ â Ñóõóìñêîì îòäåëå âåêîâûå îòíîøåíèÿ. Âñå óñèëèÿ îíè íàïðÿãàþò äëÿ òîãî, ÷òîáû îòíîøåíèÿ çàâèñèìûõ ñîñëîâèé ðàññìàòðèâàòü, êàê òèïè÷íûå êðåïîñòíûå... Òàâàäû Àáõàçèè è Ñàìóðçàêàíè äóìàëè óáåäèòü êîìèòåò â òîì, ÷òî â íàçâàííûõ îáëàñòÿõ ñóùåñòâîâàëî òèïè÷íîå êðåïîñòíîå ïðàâî: åñëè áû â ýòîì èì óäàëîñü óáåäèòü ÷ëåíîâ êîìèòåòà, òî â òàêîì ñëó÷àå òàâàäû èìåëè áû îñíîâàíèå, âî âòîðóþ î÷åðåäü, äîáèâàòüñÿ óòâåðæäåíèÿ çà íèìè ïðàâ ñîáñòâåííîñòè íà çåìëè è âîçíàãðàæäåíèÿ çà ëè÷íóþ ñâîáîäó îòïóñêàåìûõ íà âîëþ...  Àáõàçèè è Ñàìóðçàêàíè çàâèñèìûå ñîñëîâèÿ ñóùåñòâîâàëè, íî çàâèñèìîñòü èõ îòíþäü íåëüçÿ òîëêîâàòü êàê ïîçåìåëüíóþ, ýòî ñêîðåå çàâèñèìîñòü ëè÷íàÿ».  1986 ã. â Òáèëèñè âûøåë ïÿòûé òîì èññëåäîâàíèÿ Ñ. Àâàëèàíè. Âî âñòóïèòåëüíîé ñòàòüå ê ýòîìó èçäàíèþ ïðîôåññîð Ã. Ìàðãèàíè, ãîâîðÿ î ïðîâåäåíèè êðåñòüÿíñêîé ðåôîðìû â Ñóõóìñêîì îòäåëå, êîíñòàòèðîâàë: «Àáõàçñêèå êðåñòüÿíå ê ðàññìàòðèâàåìîìó âðåìåíè óæå âëàäåëè çåìëåé íà ïðàâàõ ñîáñòâåííîñòè.  ñèëó äðåâíèõ îáû÷àåâ îíè ïëàòèëè äâîðÿíàì îïðåäåëåííûå ïîäàòè, íî ïîäàòè ýòè íå îòíîñèëèñü ê ñïåöèôè÷åñêèì ôîðìàì êðåïîñòíîé çàâèñèìîñòè. Ââèäó ýòîãî, ïî ìíåíèþ Ñ. Àâàëèàíè, àáõàçñêèå êðåñòüÿíå íå ÿâëÿëèñü êðåïîñòíûì ñîñëîâèåì». Íåëüçÿ íå êîñíóòüñÿ è òîãî ôàêòà, ÷òî óïîìÿíóòàÿ çàïèñêà îò 23 ìàðòà 1870 ã. ïîÿâèëàñü âî âðåìÿ ïðåáûâàíèÿ àáõàçñêîé äåïóòàöèè â Òèôëèñå. Ê íåé ïðèëîæèëè ðóêó è ïðåäñòàâèòåëè ãðóçèíñêîãî äâîðÿíñòâà – äîêàçûâàåò òîò ôàêò, ÷òî èç ÷åòâåðûõ ïîäïèñàâøèõñÿ äâîå – êíÿçüÿ Áàòà Ýìóõâàðè è Ìñîóñò Ìàðøàíèÿ – áûëè íåãðàìîòíû, è âìåñòî íèõ ðàñïèñàëñÿ íåêòî Èâàí Çåäãåíèäçå... Îñòàåòñÿ òîëüêî ãàäàòü, ïî÷åìó îá ýòèõ ôàêòàõ è ñâåäåíèÿõ, èìåþùèõ ñàìîå ïðÿìîå îòíîøåíèå ê «äîêëàäíîé çàïèñêå» àáõàçñêîãî äâîðÿíñòâà 1870 ã., âñå ýòè ãîäû (ñ 1990 ã.) óìàë÷èâàë òàêîé àâòîðèòåòíûé ãðóçèíñêèé 43

Ãëàâà III

èñòîðèê, êàê À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè? Äóìàåòñÿ, ÷òî íûíåøíÿÿ êàìïàíèÿ âîêðóã ýòîãî äîêóìåíòà äàëåêà îò íàó÷íûõ öåëåé.  ïîñëåäíèå ãîäû èññëåäîâàòåëè, ññûëàÿñü íà ïóáëèêàöèþ â ãðóçèíñêîì æóðíàëå Òåàòðè äà öõîâðåáà çà 1916 (¹ 23), äîâîëüíî ÷àñòî ïðèâîäÿò ñâåäåíèÿ è î äðóãîé àáõàçñêîé äåïóòàöèè, êîòîðàÿ â àïðåëå 1916 ã. áûëà ïðèíÿòà â Òèôëèñå íàìåñòíèêîì íà Êàâêàçå18. Ýòà äåïóòàöèÿ â ñîñòàâå êíÿçåé Ì. Øåðâàøèäçå, Ì. Ýìóõâàðè, À. Èíàë-èïà, Ï. Àí÷àáàäçå è ïðåäñòàâèòåëåé êðåñòüÿíñòâà Á. Ýçóõáàÿ è À. ×óêáàð ïðèáûëà â Òèôëèñ ñ ãëàâíîé öåëüþ – ïîääåðæàòü ãîòîâÿùååñÿ ñ íà÷àëà 1914 ã. ðåøåíèå öàðñêîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà î ïðåîáðàçîâàíèè Ñóõóìñêîãî îêðóãà â ñàìîñòîÿòåëüíóþ Ñóõóìñêóþ ãóáåðíèþ. Îá ýòîì ôàêòå ñîîáùàþò è ãðóçèíñêèå àâòîðû â óïîìÿíóòîé êîëëåêòèâíîé ìîíîãðàôèè (Ã. Ïàé÷àäçå. Ñ. 233; À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè. Ñ. 260–261). Îäíàêî îíè àêöåíòèðóþò âíèìàíèå íà òîì, ÷òî äåïóòàòû ÿêîáû òðåáîâàëè íå îòäåëÿòü Ñóõóìñêóþ åïàðõèþ îò Ãðóçèíñêîãî ýêçàðõàòà, à â ñëó÷àå, åñëè âîïðîñ î Ñóõóìñêîé ãóáåðíèè íå áóäåò ðåøåí ïîëîæèòåëüíî, ïðèñîåäèíèòü îêðóã ê Êóòàèññêîé ãóáåðíèè. Îòâå÷àÿ íà óòâåðæäåíèÿ ïîñëåäíåãî ðîäà, ïî âîçâðàùåíèè â Àáõàçèþ äåïóòàöèÿ âûñòóïèëà ñ îïðîâåðæåíèåì, à ×óêáàð òîãäà æå îïóáëèêîâàë â ïðåññå ñâîé îòâåò ïî ýòîìó ïîâîäó. (Ñì.: ×óêáàð À. Ïèñüìî â ðåäàêöèþ // Ñóõóìñêèé âåñòíèê. 1916. 19 ìàÿ. ¹ 108). Ê êàêîìó æå âûâîäó ïðèõîäÿò ãðóçèíñêèå èñòîðèêè, ñòîëü íàñòîé÷èâî íàïîìèíàÿ î äåïóòàöèÿõ 1870 è 1916 ãã.? Îòêðîâåííåå äðóãèõ ïî ýòîìó ïîâîäó âûñêàçàëñÿ Ã. Æîðæîëèàíè: «Çäåñü, ñîãëàñèâøèñü ñ ìíåíèåì îáåèõ äåïóòàöèé àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà, çàìåòèì, ÷òî ãðóçèí è àáõàçîâ ñâÿçûâàåò íå òîëüêî èçíà÷àëüíàÿ èñòîðèêî-êóëüòóðíàÿ îáùíîñòü, íî è ãåíåòè÷åñêîå ðîäñòâî...», è – äàëåå óêàçûâàåò íà ðåçóëüòàòû àíòðîïîëîãè÷åñêèõ èññëåäîâàíèé, äàííûå àðõåîëîãèè, ôîëüêëîðà è ýòíîãðàôèè (Ñ. 421). Ýòîò àâòîð òî ïðèçûâàåò àáõàçîâ ê äðóæáå è áðàòñòâó ñ ãðóçèíàìè (Ñ. 438–439), òî ãîâîðèò î ïðèíóæäåíèè ê ìèðó íåâîåííûì ïóòåì (Ñ. 437), òî âñëåä çà Èíãîðîêâà ïèøåò î ïðèøëîñòè àáõàçîâ â ïîçäíåñðåäíåâåêîâûé ïåðèîä (Ñ. 414), òî ïîä÷åðêèâàåò, ÷òî ó àáõàçîâ «äðóãîé ðîäèíû íå áûëî è íåò» (Ñ. 438), à âàæíåéøèì ôàêòîðîì â âîññòàíîâëåíèè äîâåðèÿ ìåæäó äâóìÿ íàðîäàìè ñ÷èòàåò íåîáõîäèìîñòü «ïîâûøåíèÿ íàöèîíàëüíîãî ñàìîñîçíàíèÿ àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà» (Ñ. 439), ÷òî ñàìî ïî ñåáå íå ìîæåò íå âûãëÿäåòü äëÿ àáõàçîâ îñêîðáèòåëüíûì. Æîðæîëèàíè îñóæäàåò «êîììóíèñòè÷åñêèé Ñîþç ÑÑл, è ñ íèì çäåñü íåëüçÿ íå ñîãëàñèòüñÿ, íî ýòà òåìà óæå äàâíî íàáèëà îñêîìèíó è óâîäèò â ñòîðîíó îò îáñóæäàåìîé ïðîáëåìû. Êñòàòè, ÷àùå äðóãèõ íà ýòîò ñ÷åò âûñêàçûâàþòñÿ èìåííî áûâøèå ïàðòèéíûå ôóíêöèîíåðû âðîäå ñàìîãî Ã. Æîðæîëèàíè, êîòîðûé â ñîâåòñêîå âðåìÿ ÿâëÿëñÿ ïåðâûì ñåêðåòàðåì Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîðêîìà ïàðòèè. Ýòîìó àâòîðó íå ñëåäóåò ïåðåäåðãèâàòü è ýòíîäåìîãðàôè÷åñêóþ ñòàòèñòèêó XIX–XX ââ., ññûëàÿñü ïðè ýòîì íà Ã.Ï. Ëåæàâà, êîòîðûé «ëþáåçíî ïðåäîñòàâèë» Æîðæîëèàíè «êñåðîêîïèè ïðîöèòèðîâàííûõ äîêóìåíòîâ» (Ñ. 443). Äëÿ ýòîãî äîñòàòî÷íî çàãëÿíóòü â ðàáîòû ñàìîãî Ëåæàâà, 44

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

ãäå ãîâîðèòñÿ î ïðè÷èíàõ, ïðèâåäøèõ ê ñîêðàùåíèþ àáõàçñêîãî íàñåëåíèÿ â ýòîò ïåðèîä, è îá èçìåíåíèè äåìîãðàôè÷åñêîé ñèòóàöèè19. Òàê, ïðèâîäÿ ïîñåìåéíóþ ïåðåïèñü 1886 ã., Ã. Æîðæîëèàíè, Ñ. Ëåêèøâèëè è ìíîãèå äðóãèå àâòîðû ïðè÷èñëÿþò ñàìóðçàêàíöåâ ê ãðóçèíàì, â òî âðåìÿ êàê â èòîãîâîì ðàçäåëå ïåðåïèñè îíè äàíû â ãðàôå «àáõàçû» (85,7%). ×òî êàñàåòñÿ ìåãðåëîâ, ëàçîâ, ñâàíîâ, òî âñå îíè ïðèâîäÿòñÿ ñàìîñòîÿòåëüíî, è èõ áûëî âñåãî 6%. Âîò ïî÷åìó ÷èñëåííîñòü ãðóçèí ðåøèëè óâåëè÷èòü çà ñ÷åò ñàìóðçàêàíöåâ, î êîòîðûõ â 70-õ ãîäàõ XIX â. èçâåñòíûé ãðóçèíñêèé ïóáëèöèñò ßêîá Ãîãåáàøâèëè ïèñàë, ÷òî îíè – «âåòâü àáõàçñêîãî ïëåìåíè»20. Òîãäà æå â àâòîðèòåòíîì «Ñáîðíèêå ñâåäåíèé î Êàâêàçñêèõ ãîðöàõ» ãîâîðèëîñü î òîì, ÷òî Ñàìóðçàêàíü ñîñòàâëÿåò «îäíî öåëîå ñ Àáõàçèåé, ðîäñòâåííîé åé è ïî ïëåìåííîìó ïðîèñõîæäåíèþ, è ïî èñòîðè÷åñêîé ñóäüáå ñâîåé, è ïî õàðàêòåðó âíóòðåííèõ îòíîøåíèé»21. Ïî÷åìó íåêîòîðûå èñòîðèêè ïûòàþòñÿ íàâÿçàòü îáùåñòâåííîìó ìíåíèþ ìèô Èíãîðîêâà î «ïðèøëîñòè» àáõàçîâ â XVII â.? Äà ïîòîìó, ÷òî ñóùåñòâóþò íåîïðîâåðæèìûå äîêóìåíòàëüíûå ñâèäåòåëüñòâà, â ïåðâóþ î÷åðåäü ãðóçèíñêèå, î òî÷íîé äàòå ìàññîâîãî ïåðåñåëåíèÿ ìåãðåëüñêèõ êðåñòüÿí èç Çàïàäíîé Ãðóçèè â Àáõàçèþ. Ýòî ïåðåñåëåíèå ïðîèçîøëî ïîñëå îêîí÷àíèÿ ðóññêî-êàâêàçñêîé âîéíû, óïðàçäíåíèÿ àâòîíîìíîãî Àáõàçñêîãî êíÿæåñòâà (1810–1864 ãã.) è íàñèëüñòâåííîé äåïîðòàöèè àáõàçîâ (ìàõàäæèðñòâî) â Òóðöèþ â ðåçóëüòàòå âîññòàíèé 1866 è 1877 ãã. Îáî âñåì ýòîì ïîäðîáíî ïèøåò âñå òîò æå ß. Ãîãåáàøâèëè â 1877 ã. â ãàçåòå Òèôëèññêèé âåñòíèê â ïðîñòðàííîé ñòàòüå, èçâåñòíîé ïîä íàçâàíèåì «Êåì çàñåëèòü Àáõàçèþ?» (¹ 209, 210, 243–246, 248, 249). Æîðæîëèàíè è äðóãèå íîâåéøèå àâòîðû äåëàþò âèä, ÷òî ýòîò ìàòåðèàë èì íå èçâåñòåí, ìåæäó òåì â íåì äàåòñÿ ðàçâåðíóòûé ïëàí êàðòâåëüñêîé êîëîíèçàöèè Àáõàçèè. Äåìîãðàôè÷åñêîå îñâîåíèå Àáõàçèè ãðóçèíàìè ïðîäîëæàëîñü è â ñîâåòñêîå âðåìÿ, îñîáåííî â 1930– 1950-õ ãã. Äîñòàòî÷íî îçíàêîìèòüñÿ ñ òðóäàìè àáõàçñêèõ ó÷åíûõ íà ýòîò ñ÷åò22. Òàê ÷òî íå ñëåäîâàëî áû óïðåêàòü íàñ â òîì, áóäòî ìû íå «óòðóæäàåì ñåáÿ ññûëêàìè íà äîêóìåíòû, ìàòåðèàëû è èñòî÷íèêè». Ïîäîáíûå óïðåêè òåì áîëåå áåñòàêòíû, ÷òî â îêòÿáðå 1992 ã. ãðóçèíñêèå îêêóïàöèîííûå âëàñòè ñîæãëè â Ñóõóìå Öåíòðàëüíûé ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé àðõèâ Àáõàçèè è Àáõàçñêèé èíñòèòóò ÿçûêà, ëèòåðàòóðû è èñòîðèè.

III Îäíà èç îñíîâíûõ áîëåâûõ òî÷åê â èñòîðèè ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêèõ îòíîøåíèé – ýòî ïåðèîä 1917–1921 ãã., êîòîðîìó ïîñâÿùåíî íåìàëî èññëåäîâàíèé. Íàèáîëåå àêòèâíî ïî ýòîé ïî-ïðåæíåìó îñòðîé ïîëèòè÷åñêîé ïðîáëåìå âûñòóïàåò èñòîðèê À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè. Íåìàëî ðàáîò, ïðàâäà, ðàçíîãî íàó÷íîãî óðîâíÿ îïóáëèêîâàíî ïî äàííîé òåìå è äðóãèìè ãðóçèíñêèìè àâòîðàìè, ñðåäè êîòîðûõ îñîáî ñëåäóåò îòìåòèòü Ó. Ñèäàìîíèäçå è À. Ñóðãóëàäçå, à òàêæå Ë. Òîèäçå, Ä. Ãàìàõàðèÿ è äð. 45

Ãëàâà III

Òàê, íàïðèìåð, â âûøåóïîìÿíóòîé êîëëåêòèâíîé ìîíîãðàôèè À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè è Ë. Òîèäçå ïèøóò, ÷òî Àáõàçèÿ âñåãäà áûëà ÷àñòüþ Ãðóçèè, è 9 ôåâðàëÿ 1918 ã. åé áûëà äàðîâàíà àâòîíîìèÿ â ñîñòàâå Ãðóçèíñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâà. Ïîçäíåå, ïî «äîãîâîðó» îò 8 èþíÿ òîãî æå ãîäà, Àáõàçèÿ áóäòî áû îêîí÷àòåëüíî ñòàëà àâòîíîìíîé ÷àñòüþ Ãðóçèè, è ïîòîìó ââîä ãðóçèíñêèõ âîéñê â ïðåäåëû Àáõàçèè âî âòîðîé ïîëîâèíå èþíÿ 1918 ã. íå ÿâëÿëñÿ àêòîì îêêóïàöèè è àííåêñèè. Ïîäîáíûå äåéñòâèÿ îíè íàçûâàþò çàùèòîé òåððèòîðèàëüíîé öåëîñòíîñòè Ãðóçèè è îáúÿñíÿþò áîðüáîé ñ áîëüøåâèêàìè, ïðîòóðåöêèìè ñèëàìè è äåíèêèíöàìè (Ë. Òîèäçå. Ñ. 292–293; À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè. Ñ. 266). Çäåñü ïðèäåòñÿ ñäåëàòü íåáîëüøîå îòñòóïëåíèå. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè, íàïðèìåð, àáñîëþòíî ñåðüåçíî çàÿâëÿåò, ÷òî âûäåëåíèå â 1904 ã. Ãàãðèíñêîé êëèìàòè÷åñêîé ñòàíöèè ïðèíöà À.Ï. Îëüäåíáóðãñêîãî èç ñîñòàâà Ñóõóìñêîãî îêðóãà è âêëþ÷åíèå ýòîé òåððèòîðèè äî ïðàâîáåðåæüÿ ð. Áçûáü â ñîñòàâ Ñî÷èíñêîãî îêðóãà ×åðíîìîðñêîé ãóáåðíèè «áåñöåðåìîííî íàðóøèëî òåððèòîðèàëüíóþ öåëîñòíîñòü Ãðóçèè, â ÷àñòíîñòè Àáõàçèè» (Ñ. 259). Ýòî óòâåðæäåíèå ñîâåðøåííî àíòèèñòîðè÷íî, òàê êàê â 1904 ã. íà ýòó òåððèòîðèþ ðàñïðîñòðàíÿëàñü þðèñäèêöèÿ òîëüêî îäíîãî ãîñóäàðñòâà – Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè, â ñîñòàâå êîòîðîé íà ïðàâàõ ãóáåðíèé è îêðóãà íàõîäèëèñü è Ãðóçèÿ, óòåðÿâøàÿ â 1801 ã. íå òîëüêî íåçàâèñèìóþ ãîñóäàðñòâåííîñòü, íî è ñîáñòâåííîå íàçâàíèå (è òî è äðóãîå áûëî âîññòàíîâëåíî ëèøü 26 ìàÿ 1918 ã.), è Àáõàçèÿ, ëèøåííàÿ ñâîåé ãîñóäàðñòâåííîñòè ñ 1864 ã. (âîññòàíîâëåíà 11 ìàÿ 1918 ã. â ñîñòàâå ôåäåðàöèè – Ãîðñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè). Òàêèì îáðàçîì, ïèñàòü î íàðóøåíèè òåððèòîðèàëüíîé öåëîñòíîñòè Ãðóçèè â 1904 ã., êîãäà îíà íå áûëà ãîñóäàðñòâîì, ïðîñòî àáñóðäíî. Íå ãîâîðÿ óæå î òîì, ÷òî ðå÷ü èäåò î Ãàãðèíñêîì ðàéîíå ñîâðåìåííîé Àáõàçèè, íå èìåâøåì ê Ãðóçèè íèêàêîãî îòíîøåíèÿ. ×òî æå ïðîèñõîäèëî â Àáõàçèè â 1917–1918 ãã.? Ïîñëå ñîáûòèé ôåâðàëÿ è îêòÿáðÿ 1917 ã., ïîòðÿñøèõ è ðàçâàëèâøèõ Ðîññèþ êàê åäèíîå ãîñóäàðñòâî, Àáõàçèÿ âîøëà â Ñîþç îáúåäèíåííûõ ãîðöåâ Êàâêàçà (ÑÎÃÊ), â ïðàâèòåëüñòâå êîòîðîãî èíòåðåñû Àáõàçèè ïðåäñòàâëÿë ìèíèñòð Ñ. Àøõàöàâà23. 8 íîÿáðÿ 1917 ã. íà ñúåçäå àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà â Ñóõóìå áûë èçáðàí ïàðëàìåíò (ñîçäàííûé, êñòàòè, ðàíüøå ãðóçèíñêîãî) – Àáõàçñêèé íàðîäíûé ñîâåò (ÀÍÑ) – è ïðèíÿòû âàæíåéøèå äîêóìåíòû î ñàìîîïðåäåëåíèè Àáõàçèè: Äåêëàðàöèÿ ñúåçäà àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà è Êîíñòèòóöèÿ ÀÍÑ24. Îãðîìíóþ ðîëü â ïðèíÿòèè ýòèõ äîêóìåíòîâ ñûãðàëè ïðåäñåäàòåëü ñúåçäà è ïåðâûé ïðåäñåäàòåëü ÀÍÑ Ñ. Áàñàðèÿ, îñíîâíîé äîêëàä÷èê À. Øåðèïîâ, êíÿçüÿ À. Øåðâàøèäçå è Ò. Ìàðøàíèÿ, âèäíûå äåÿòåëè àáõàçñêîé èíòåëëèãåíöèè Ì. Öàãóðèÿ, Ä. Àëàíèÿ, Ìèõ. Òàðíàâà è äð.  Äåêëàðàöèè ñúåçäà ïîä÷åðêèâàëîñü, ÷òî «êàæäûé íàðîä äîëæåí ÷åòêî ñëåäèòü çà òåì, ÷òîáû åãî ïðàâà è èíòåðåñû íå ïîñòðàäàëè îò ïîêóøåíèé» íà åãî ñâîáîäó, â ñâÿçè ñ ÷åì «àáõàçñêèé íàðîä óâåðåí â òîì, ÷òî åãî áðàòüÿ – ãîðöû Ñåâåðíîãî Êàâêàçà è Äàãåñòàíà – ïîääåðæàò åãî â òåõ ñëó÷àÿõ, êîãäà îí áóäåò çàùèùàòü ñâîè ïðàâà». 46

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

Èíòåðåñíî, ÷òî ïðåäñòàâèòåëü ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè ÷å÷åíåö Àñëàíáåê Øåðèïîâ âûñòóïàë íà îòêðûòèè ïåðâîãî ãðóçèíñêîãî ïàðëàìåíòà – Íàöèîíàëüíîãî ñîâåòà Ãðóçèè (ÍÑÃ), êîòîðûé îòêðûëñÿ â Òèôëèñå 19 íîÿáðÿ 1917 ã. «ß ñ÷àñòëèâ, – ãîâîðèë îí, – ÷òî íà ìîþ äîëþ âûïàëà âûñîêàÿ ÷åñòü ïåðåäàòü âàì ãîðÿ÷èé ïðèâåò îò èìåíè Àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäíîãî ñîâåòà. Àáõàçñêèé íàðîä, âõîäÿùèé â Ñîþç îáúåäèíåííûõ ãîðöåâ, ïîçäðàâëÿåò ïðåêðàñíóþ Ãðóçèþ ñ ïåðâûìè øàãàìè ïî ïóòè ê íàöèîíàëüíîìó ñàìîîïðåäåëåíèþ. Àáõàçöû, âîøåäøèå â ñîþç ñî ñâîèìè ñåâåðíûìè áðàòüÿìè, óâåðåíû ïîýòîìó è â òîì, ÷òî â ñêîðîì áóäóùåì îíè âñòðåòÿòñÿ ñ áëàãîðîäíûì ãðóçèíñêèì íàðîäîì â îáùåì ñîþçå âñåõ íàðîäîâ Êàâêàçà. È â ýòîì áóäóùåì ñîþçå àáõàçñêèé íàðîä ìûñëèò ñåáÿ êàê ðàâíîïðàâíûé ÷ëåí Ñîþçà îáúåäèíåííûõ ãîðöåâ»25. Êîíòàêòû ìåæäó ïðåäñòàâèòåëÿìè àáõàçñêîãî è ãðóçèíñêîãî ïàðëàìåíòîâ ïðîäîëæàëèñü è â äàëüíåéøåì, â î÷åíü ñëîæíîé âîåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêîé îáñòàíîâêå íà Êàâêàçå â öåëîì è â Àáõàçèè â ÷àñòíîñòè, íàä êîòîðîé íàâèñëà óãðîçà áîëüøåâèñòñêîãî ïåðåâîðîòà. Îäíàêî, íåñìîòðÿ íà âñþ ñëîæíîñòü ñèòóàöèè, ïðåäñòàâèòåëè ÀÍÑ, ïðèáûâøèå íà âñòðå÷ó ñ äåïóòàòàìè Íàöèîíàëüíîãî ñîâåòà Ãðóçèè, çàÿâèëè â Òèôëèñå 9 ôåâðàëÿ 1918 ã., ÷òî îíè ñòðåìÿòñÿ ê ïîëèòè÷åñêîé íåçàâèñèìîñòè Àáõàçèè, «èìåÿ ñ Ãðóçèåé ëèøü äîáðîñîñåäñêèå âçàèìîîòíîøåíèÿ, êàê ñ ðàâíûì ñîñåäîì»26.  ñâÿçè ñ òàêîé ïîñòàíîâêîé âîïðîñà À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè âûíóæäåí ïðèçíàòü, ÷òî äåëåãàöèÿ ÀÍÑ âî ãëàâå ñ À. Øåðâàøèäçå è â ñîñòàâå ïîëêîâíèêà Ð. ×õîòóà, Í. Ìàðãàíèÿ, Á. Öàãóðèÿ, Ì. Ýìóõâàðè â îñíîâíîì ïðèäåðæèâàëàñü «ïðàâûõ íàöèîíàëèñòè÷åñêèõ ïîçèöèé» (Ñ. 262). Ñî ñòîðîíû ÍÑà â ñîâåùàíèè ïðèíÿëè ó÷àñòèå À. ×õåíêåëè, Ê. Ìåñõè, Ã. Ãâàçàâà, Ï. Ñàêâàðåëèäçå, Í. Êàðöèâàäçå, êîòîðûå êàòåãîðè÷åñêè âûñòóïèëè ïðîòèâ âõîæäåíèÿ Àáõàçèè â ñîñòàâ Ñîþçà ãîðöåâ Êàâêàçà. Åùå 8 íîÿáðÿ 1917 ã., â äåíü îòêðûòèÿ ñúåçäà àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà, â Ñóõóì ïðèåõàë áûâøèé äåïóòàò IV Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé äóìû Ðîññèè, ñîöèàë-äåìîêðàò Àêàêèé ×õåíêåëè è äðóãèå ìåíüøåâèñòñêèå äåÿòåëè. «Îíè, – ïèñàë ó÷àñòíèê òåõ ñîáûòèé Ìèõàèë Òàðíàâà, – ïî-âèäèìîìó, áûëè èíôîðìèðîâàíû î ïîäãîòîâëÿåìîì îáúåäèíåíèè Àáõàçèè ñ Ñåâåðî-Êàâêàçñêèì ãîñóäàðñòâîì ãîðöåâ è ïðèåõàëè ñïåöèàëüíî, ÷òîáû ïðåäîòâðàòèòü ýòî îáúåäèíåíèå. ×õåíêåëè, ïî-âèäèìîìó, îñîáåííî ðàññ÷èòûâàë íà óñïåõ ïîòîìó, ÷òî â Àáõàçèè îí áûë ïîïóëÿðíûì êàê åå äåïóòàò â Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé äóìå. Íà ýòîò ñúåçä ïðèáûëè òàêæå è ïðåäñòàâèòåëè Ãîðñêîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà ïîìèìî Øåðèïîâà, êîòîðûé è òàê ïðèíèìàë àêòèâíîå ó÷àñòèå. Ïðèáûë îòòóäà òàêæå è Ñåìåí Ìèõàéëîâè÷ Àøõàöàâà. Íà ñúåçäå ïðîèçíîñèëèñü ãîðÿ÷èå ðå÷è. Âûñòóïàëè äâà ïðîòèâîïîëîæíûõ ëàãåðÿ. Ãðóçèíñêèå äåëåãàòû òÿíóëè Àáõàçèþ â ñòîðîíó Ãðóçèè, à Ñåâåðî-Êàâêàçñêèå – â ñîñòàâ Ñåâåðíîãî Êàâêàçà. Êàê íè ñòàðàëñÿ ×õåíêåëè îòâåðíóòü àáõàçöåâ îò òàêîãî ðåøåíèÿ, åìó òàê è íå óäàëîñü ïðåäîòâðàòèòü ðåøåíèå ñúåçäà î ïðèñîåäèíåíèè Àáõàçèè ê Ñåâåðî-Êàâêàçñêîìó Ãîðñêîìó ãîñóäàðñòâó. Ýòî ðåøåíèå äåéñòâèòåëüíî áûëî 47

Ãëàâà III

ïðèíÿòî áîëüøèíñòâîì ãîëîñîâ, õîòÿ è çäåñü, êàê è ïðè îáñóæäåíèè öåðêîâíîãî âîïðîñà, ãàëüöû òÿíóëè â ñòîðîíó Ãðóçèè è óãðîæàëè âûõîäîì èç Àáõàçèè â ñëó÷àå íåïðèñîåäèíåíèÿ ê Ãðóçèè»27. Ñèòóàöèÿ ñ ãàëüöàìè ïðè îòêðîâåííîé ïîääåðæêå À. ×õåíêåëè, êîòîðûé áûë òåñíî ñâÿçàí ñ Ñàìóðçàêàíüþ, ñóäÿ ïî ñëîâàì À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè, ïî÷òè â òî÷íîñòè ïîâòîðèëàñü íà ñîâåùàíèè â Òèôëèñå 9 ôåâðàëÿ 1918 ã. Ïî ïîâîäó Ñàìóðçàêàíè òîãî âðåìåíè èñòîðèê ëóêàâî ïîÿñíÿåò: «…íûíå Ãàëüñêèé ðàéîí Àáõàçèè, íàñåëåííûé âñåöåëî ãðóçèíàìè» (Ñ. 263). Ñåé÷àñ äà, íî íàñåëåí îí íå ñîáñòâåííî ãðóçèíàìè, à ìåãðåëàìè. ×òî æå êàñàåòñÿ 1918 ã., òî òîãäà â ýòîé ÷àñòè Àáõàçèè ïðîæèâàëî ãëàâíûì îáðàçîì ñìåøàííîå àáõàçî-ìåãðåëüñêîå íàñåëåíèå, ñðåäè êîòîðîãî øåë ïðîöåññ äåýòíèçàöèè àáõàçîâ «çà ñ÷åò ãðóçèíèçàöèè (ìåãðåëèçàöèè)» åå æèòåëåé28. Ïîýòîìó íåò íè÷åãî óäèâèòåëüíîãî â òîì, ÷òî À. ×õåíêåëè, èçâåñòíûé òîãäà ïîëèòè÷åñêèé äåÿòåëü, ïðè ïîääåðæêå òàêèõ ñàìóðçàêàíöåâ, êàê ñîöèàë-äåìîêðàòû êíÿçüÿ Àðçàêàí (Äìèòðèé) Ýìóõâàðè, Ëàäî (Âëàäèìèð) Ýìóõâàðè, Ì. Ýìóõâàðè, êîòîðûå ÿâëÿëèñü àáõàçàìè ëèøü ïî ñâîåìó ïðîèñõîæäåíèþ, ïûòàëñÿ øàíòàæèðîâàòü àáõàçñêóþ äåëåãàöèþ èñêóññòâåííî ðàçäóòîé ïðîáëåìîé Ñàìóðçàêàíè. Îäíàêî íå â ãðóçèíñêèõ èíòåðåñàõ áûëî äî êðàéíîñòè îñëîæíÿòü âîïðîñ, òàê êàê â Ñàìóðçàêàíè â ýòîò ïåðèîä íàèáîëüøèì âëèÿíèåì ïîëüçîâàëèñü íå ìåíüøåâèêè, à áîëüøåâèêè âî ãëàâå ñ Ï. Äçèãóà, ÷òî è ïîäòâåðäèëè äàëüíåéøèå ñîáûòèÿ. Ïîëèòè÷åñêèé øàíòàæ, ïðåäïðèíÿòûé À. ×õåíêåëè, íå óâåí÷àëñÿ óñïåõîì. Äëÿ ýòîãî äîñòàòî÷íî âçãëÿíóòü íà òåêñò çàêëþ÷åííîãî ñîãëàøåíèÿ, êîòîðûé ñàì À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè íåîäíîêðàòíî ïóáëèêîâàë29. ×òîáû óäîñòîâåðèòüñÿ, ïðèâåäó ýòîò äîêóìåíò åùå ðàç öåëèêîì: «1. Âîññîçäàòü åäèíóþ íåðàçäåëüíóþ Àáõàçèþ â ïðåäåëàõ îò ð. Èíãóð äî ð. Ìçûìòà, â ñîñòàâ êîòîðîé âîéäóò ñîáñòâåííî Àáõàçèÿ è Ñàìóðçàêàíü, èëè, ÷òî òî æå, – íûíåøíèé Ñóõóìñêèé îêðóã. 2. Ôîðìà áóäóùåãî ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî óñòðîéñòâà Àáõàçèè äîëæíà áûòü âûðàáîòàíà [â ñîîòâåòñòâèè] ñ ïðèíöèïîì íàöèîíàëüíîãî ñàìîîïðåäåëåíèÿ íà Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíîì ñîáðàíèè Àáõàçèè, ñîçâàííîì íà äåìîêðàòè÷åñêèõ íà÷àëàõ. 3.  ñëó÷àå åñëè Àáõàçèÿ è Ãðóçèÿ ïîæåëàþò âñòóïèòü ñ äðóãèìè íàöèîíàëüíûìè ãîñóäàðñòâàìè â ïîëèòè÷åñêèå äîãîâîðíûå îòíîøåíèÿ, òî âçàèìíî îáÿçûâàþòñÿ èìåòü ïðåäâàðèòåëüíûå ìåæäó ñîáîþ ïî ýòîìó ïîâîäó ïåðåãîâîðû»30. Òàêèì îáðàçîì, â ýòîì äîêóìåíòå ëèøü ñòàâèëñÿ âîïðîñ î çàêëþ÷åíèè ðàâíîïðàâíûõ âçàèìîîòíîøåíèé ìåæäó Àáõàçèåé è Ãðóçèåé, à âî âòîðîì ïóíêòå âîîáùå ãîâîðèòñÿ î «íàöèîíàëüíîì ñàìîîïðåäåëåíèè», ò.å. î ïðàâå àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà íà ñâîþ ãîñóäàðñòâåííîñòü â ïðåäåëàõ Àáõàçèè. Îäíàêî íà îñíîâàíèè ýòîãî äîêóìåíòà ãðóçèíñêèå èñòîðèêè À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè, Ë. Òîèäçå, Ã. Æîðæîëèàíè, Ä. Ãàìàõàðèÿ è äð. ïðèõîäÿò ê âûâîäó î òîì, áóäòî èìåííî ñ ýòîãî âðåìåíè «Àáõàçèè ïðåäîñòàâëÿëàñü øèðîêàÿ àâòîíîìèÿ â 48

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

ñîñòàâå Ãðóçèè». Íî, âî-ïåðâûõ, â ñàìîì äîêóìåíòå íåò è íàìåêà íà àâòîíîìèþ. Âî-âòîðûõ, 9 ôåâðàëÿ 1918 ã. Ãðóçèÿ åùå íå áûëà ïðîâîçãëàøåíà íåçàâèñèìîé ðåñïóáëèêîé è âìåñòå ñ Àðìåíèåé è Àçåðáàéäæàíîì âñå åùå îñòàâàëàñü ÷àñòüþ Ðîññèè. Êàê æå ìîãëà Ãðóçèÿ ïðåäîñòàâèòü àâòîíîìèþ Àáõàçèè, êîãäà åå ñàìîé êàê ãîñóäàðñòâà â òî âðåìÿ åùå íå ñóùåñòâîâàëî, à Àáõàçèÿ ïðîäîëæàëà îñòàâàòüñÿ â ñîñòàâå Ñîþçà ãîðöåâ Êàâêàçà? Íàêîíåö, â òåêñòå ñîãëàøåíèÿ ïðÿìî ãîâîðèòñÿ, ÷òî «ôîðìà áóäóùåãî ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî óñòðîéñòâà åäèíîé Àáõàçèè» äîëæíà áûòü îïðåäåëåíà íà Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíîì ñîáðàíèè Àáõàçèè. Ñîãëàøåíèå 9 ôåâðàëÿ íîñèëî ðàâíîïðàâíûé õàðàêòåð, è ïîòîìó íåïîíÿòíî çàìå÷àíèå À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè â àäðåñ àáõàçñêîé äåëåãàöèè – «äåâàòüñÿ èì áûëî íåêóäà» (Ñ. 263). Îíè íèêóäà è íå äåëèñü. Îòíîñèòåëüíî æå ñëîæíîé îáñòàíîâêè íà òîò ïåðèîä â Àáõàçèè è âîêðóã íåå – ìîæíî ñ óâåðåííîñòü ñêàçàòü, ÷òî â Ãðóçèè â ñâÿçè ñ óãðîçîé òóðåöêîé îêêóïàöèè îíà áûëà íå òîëüêî íå ëó÷øå, íî ïðÿìî-òàêè êàòàñòðîôè÷åñêîé. Ïîýòîìó ïðåäñòàâèòåëè ÍÑà áûëè ñ÷àñòëèâû ïîäïèñàòü ñ ÀÍÑ õîòü êàêîé-íèáóäü äîêóìåíò. «Êàçàëîñü áû, – âîçìóùàåòñÿ äàëåå À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè, – ïîñëå ñîãëàøåíèÿ îò 9 ôåâðàëÿ àáõàçñêèå ëèäåðû òâåðäî ñòàëè ïðèäåðæèâàòüñÿ ïðîãðóçèíñêîé îðèåíòàöèè, îäíàêî... èõ äåéñòâèÿ íà Áàòóìñêîé êîíôåðåíöèè â ìàå 1918 ãîäà ñâèäåòåëüñòâóþò, ÷òî, îïèðàÿñü íà ïðàâÿùèå êðóãè ñóëòàíñêîé Òóðöèè, À. Øåðâàøèäçå ñîâìåñòíî ñ ãîðöàìè Ñåâåðíîãî Êàâêàçà ñòðåìèëñÿ ðåàëèçîâàòü ïðîåêò ñîçäàíèÿ Êàâêàçñêîé êîíôåäåðàöèè, â êîòîðóþ àáõàçû äîëæíû áûëè âîéòè ñàìîñòîÿòåëüíî». Áîëåå òîãî, èì óäàëîñü ýòîãî äîáèòüñÿ, î ÷åì ñâèäåòåëüñòâóåò ñåêðåòíîå ïèñüìî îò 28 ìàÿ 1918 ã. íåìåöêîãî ãåíåðàëà ôîí Ëîññîâà ãðóçèíñêîìó ïðàâèòåëüñòâó (Ñ. 264). Âñå âåðíî, òîëüêî íåïîíÿòíî, ÷åì íåäîâîëåí ãðóçèíñêèé èñòîðèê è ïî÷åìó îí ðåøèë, ÷òî ïîñëå ñîãëàøåíèÿ 9 ôåâðàëÿ àáõàçñêèå ëèäåðû äîëæíû áûëè «ïðèäåðæèâàòüñÿ ïðîãðóçèíñêîé îðèåíòàöèè»? Îíè äåéñòâîâàëè â òî÷íîì ñîîòâåòñòâèè ñ ðåøåíèåì I Ãîðñêîãî ñúåçäà, åùå â ìàå 1917 ã. íàìåòèâøåãî «êîíòóðû íàöèîíàëüíîé èäåîëîãèè», êîòîðàÿ ñïóñòÿ ãîä ïðèâåëà ê ïðîâîçãëàøåíèþ íåçàâèñèìîé ðåñïóáëèêè ãîðöåâ Êàâêàçà (Ãîðñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè). Èç ïðîòîêîëà ïåðâîãî çàñåäàíèÿ Áàòóìñêîé ìåæäóíàðîäíîé ìèðíîé êîíôåðåíöèè (Áàòóì òîãäà âõîäèë â ñîñòàâ Òóðöèè) îò 11 ìàÿ 1918 ã. èçâåñòíî, ÷òî â íåé ïðèíèìàëè ó÷àñòèå äåëåãàöèè Ãåðìàíèè, Òóðöèè, Çàêàâêàçñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè, ãîðöåâ Ñåâåðíîãî Êàâêàçà è Äàãåñòàíà31. Òîãäà æå äåïóòàòû ÀÍÑ À. Øåðâàøèäçå, Ò. Ìàðøàíèÿ, Ñ. Áàñàðèÿ è äðóãèå îáðàòèëèñü ê òóðåöêîìó ïðàâèòåëüñòâó è çàÿâèëè íà Áàòóìñêîé êîíôåðåíöèè, ÷òî «Àáõàçèÿ íå æåëàåò âõîäèòü â ãðóïïó çàêàâêàçñêèõ íàðîäîâ, à îòíîñèò ñåáÿ ê Ñåâåðîêàâêàçñêîìó îáúåäèíåíèþ ãîðöåâ»32. 11 ìàÿ 1918 ã. áûëî îáúÿâëåíî î íåçàâèñèìîñòè Ãîðñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè, â êîòîðóþ íàðÿäó ñ Äàãåñòàíîì, ×å÷íåé, Êàáàðäîé, Àäûãååé è äðóãèìè ñòðàíàìè âîøëà Àáõàçèÿ33. Ïðè ïîääåðæêå Òóðöèè è ó÷àñòèè Ãåðìàíèè è Àâñòðî49

Ãëàâà III

Âåíãðèè ðåñïóáëèêà ãîðöåâ ïîëó÷èëà òîãäà ìåæäóíàðîäíîå ïðèçíàíèå. Ïîñëå îáðàçîâàíèÿ Ãîðñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè Çàêàâêàçñêàÿ ôåäåðàöèÿ (ÇÄÔÐ) ðàñïàëàñü è â òîò æå äåíü, 26 ìàÿ 1918 ã., ïî óëüòèìàòèâíîìó òðåáîâàíèþ Òóðöèè, áûëà ïðîâîçãëàøåíà Äåìîêðàòè÷åñêàÿ ðåñïóáëèêà Ãðóçèÿ, à çàòåì Àçåðáàéäæàíñêàÿ (27 ìàÿ) è Àðìÿíñêàÿ (28 ìàÿ) ðåñïóáëèêè.  èñòîðèè íàðîäîâ Êàâêàçà ýòîò ïåðèîä ïîëó÷èë íàçâàíèå «êàâêàçñêîãî ìàÿ», à â îäíîì èç âîççâàíèé ïî ýòîìó ïîâîäó ãîâîðèëîñü: «Â ìîìåíò êîãäà â Ðîññèè áóøåâàëà àíòèíàöèîíàëüíàÿ ñòèõèÿ áîëüøåâèçìà, íà Êàâêàçå âîñòîðæåñòâîâàëà èäåÿ çäîðîâîé íàöèîíàëüíîé ãîñóäàðñòâåííîñòè»34.  Àêòå î íåçàâèñèìîñòè Ãðóçèè ãîâîðèòñÿ, ÷òî îíà áûëà ïðîâîçãëàøåíà 26 ìàÿ 1918 ã. Ìåæäó òåì â ñàìîì Àêòå íå áûëè îïðåäåëåíû ãðàíèöû Ãðóçèè. Èõ ïðåäâàðèòåëüíûå íàáðîñêè âïåðâûå áûëè ñäåëàíû âåñüìà çàèíòåðåñîâàííûì ëèöîì – íåìåöêèì ãåíåðàëîì ôîí Ëîññîâûì â óïîìÿíóòîì ïèñüìå îò 28 ìàÿ 1918 ã. Ãåíåðàë îáÿçûâàëñÿ ïðèëîæèòü âñå óñèëèÿ ê òîìó, ÷òîáû «Ãåðìàíèÿ îêàçàëà Ãðóçèè ïîìîùü â äåëå îáåñïå÷åíèÿ åå ãðàíèö»35. Ãðóçèíñêèå èñòîðèêè Ë. Òîèäçå (Ñ. 291–292), Ä. Ãàìàõàðèÿ36 è äðóãèå îñîáî îòìå÷àþò, ÷òî Àêò î íåçàâèñèìîñòè Ãðóçèè ïîäïèñàëè òîãäà Â. Øåðâàøèäçå, À. Ýìóõâàðè, Â. Ãóðäæóà, È. Ïàøàëèäè, Ä. Çàõàðîâ. Êàêèì îáðàçîì ýòî ïðîèñõîäèëî? Êàê èçâåñòíî, âåñíîé 1919 ã. âñå íàçâàííûå äåÿòåëè ñòàëè äåïóòàòàìè Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíîãî ñîáðàíèÿ Ãðóçèè ïî ïàðòèéíîìó ñïèñêó ñîöèàë-äåìîêðàòîâ. Íîâûé ïàðëàìåíò Ãðóçèè, ñîáðàâøèéñÿ â Òèôëèñå 12 ìàðòà 1919 ã., ïîäòâåðäèë Àêò î íåçàâèñèìîñòè îò 26 ìàÿ 1918 ã., ïîä êîòîðûì ïîäïèñàëèñü è óïîìÿíóòûå «ïîñëàíöû îò Àáõàçèè». Íî, âî-ïåðâûõ, îíè ïîñòàâèëè ñâîè ïîäïèñè íå 26 ìàÿ 1918 ã., î ÷åì ìíîãèå àâòîðû «ñêðîìíî» óìàë÷èâàþò, à ëèøü 12 ìàðòà 1919 ã., êîãäà Àáõàçèÿ áûëà óæå îêêóïèðîâàíà ãðóçèíñêèìè âîéñêàìè, à ïàðëàìåíò Àáõàçèè äâàæäû ðàçãîíÿëñÿ (â àâãóñòå è îêòÿáðå 1918 ã.). Âî-âòîðûõ, îíè ïîäïèñàëèñü íå êàê ïðåäñòàâèòåëè Àáõàçèè è àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà, êîòîðûé áîéêîòèðîâàë âûáîðû â Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíîå ñîáðàíèå Ãðóçèè, à êàê ÷ëåíû ðåãèîíàëüíîãî îòäåëåíèÿ ïðàâÿùåé ãðóçèíñêîé ìåíüøåâèñòñêîé ïàðòèè. Â-òðåòüèõ, íàëèöî áûëà ïîïûòêà ïîäòàñîâàòü èñòîðè÷åñêèå ôàêòû è ñòðåìëåíèå Òèôëèñà ñ ïîìîùüþ ñâîèõ ìàðèîíåòîê õîòÿ áû çàäíèì ÷èñëîì, 12 ìàðòà 1919 ã., ïðèâÿçàòü Àáõàçèþ ê Ãðóçèè. Â-÷åòâåðòûõ, íà 26 ìàÿ 1918 ã. Àáõàçèÿ íàõîäèëàñü âíå ïðåäåëîâ òåððèòîðèè Ãðóçèíñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè, òàê êàê ñ 11 ìàÿ 1918 ã. ÿâëÿëàñü ÷àñòüþ äðóãîãî ãîñóäàðñòâà – Ãîðñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè, êîòîðàÿ, ê ñîæàëåíèþ, ïðîñóùåñòâîâàëà âñåãî îäèí ãîä. Íà òî ÷òî Àáõàçèÿ íàõîäèëàñü âíå þðèñäèêöèè Ãðóçèè, óêàçûâàåò è ñàì õàðàêòåð äîêóìåíòîâ, ïîäïèñàííûõ ïðåäñòàâèòåëÿìè ýòèõ ñòðàí. Ñîâåðøåííî î÷åâèäíà è ñëåäóþùàÿ âåñüìà ñóùåñòâåííàÿ äåòàëü: åñëè áû Àáõàçèÿ áûëà Ãðóçèåé, òî ïîñëåäíÿÿ íèêîãäà íå ñòðåìèëàñü áû çàêëþ÷àòü ñ íåé «ñîãëàøåíèÿ» è «äîãîâîðû» è âåñòè ïåðåãîâîðû, êàê ñ ñàìîñòîÿòåëüíûì ãîñóäàðñòâîì. Îäíàêî âñå ïåðå÷èñëåííîå èìåëî ìåñòî. 50

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

IV Ïîèñòèíå äðàìàòè÷åñêèå ñîáûòèÿ ðàçûãðàëèñü â îòíîøåíèÿõ ìåæäó Ãðóçèåé è Àáõàçèåé â ïåðèîä ñ 26 ìàÿ ïî 8 èþíÿ 1918 ã.  ýòî âðåìÿ â Àáõàçèè óæå äåéñòâîâàë âòîðîé ÀÍÑ, êîòîðûé ðàçäèðàëè ñåðüåçíûå ïðîòèâîðå÷èÿ, âîçíèêøèå ìåæäó ñòàðûì ñîñòàâîì «ãîðñêîé îðèåíòàöèè» (Ñ. Áàñàðèÿ, À. Øåðâàøèäçå è äð.) è íîâûì âî ãëàâå ñ ìåíüøåâèêîì Âàðëàìîì Øåðâàøèäçå. Ñëîæèâøàÿñÿ ñèòóàöèÿ íàøëà ñâîå îòðàæåíèå è â äâîéñòâåííîì õàðàêòåðå íåêîòîðûõ äîêóìåíòîâ ÀÍÑ, ñ êîòîðûìè àáõàçñêàÿ äåëåãàöèÿ â ñîñòàâå: Ð. Êàêóáà (ãëàâà), Ã. Òóìàíîâ, Â. Ãóðäæóà è Ã. Àäæàìî⠖ ïðèáûëà â Òèôëèñ â íà÷àëå èþíÿ 1918 ã. Êàêàÿ æå ãåîïîëèòè÷åñêàÿ îáñòàíîâêà ñêëàäûâàëàñü ê ýòîìó âðåìåíè â Çàêàâêàçüå âîîáùå è âîêðóã Àáõàçèè â ÷àñòíîñòè? Êàêèå öåëè ïðåñëåäîâàëè çäåñü Òóðöèÿ è Ãåðìàíèÿ? Ñîâåðøåííî î÷åâèäíî, ÷òî îíè ñòðåìèëèñü ïîëó÷èòü äîñòóï ê êàâêàçñêîìó ñûðüþ, è ïðåæäå âñåãî ê áàêèíñêîé íåôòè, ïðè÷åì ñíà÷àëà èõ èíòåðåñû ñîâïàëè. Íî Òóðöèÿ â óùåðá âîåííûì äåéñòâèÿì ïðîòèâ Àíãëèè óâëåêëàñü ïàíèñëàìèçìîì. Ìåæäó «ñîþçíèêàìè» îáîñòðèëèñü ïðîòèâîðå÷èÿ, è Ãåðìàíèÿ ñòàëà «ïðîòèâîäåéñòâîâàòü áûñòðîìó ðàñïðîñòðàíåíèþ òóðîê â Çàêàâêàçüå», ïîíèìàÿ, ÷òî «ñòàðûå õèòðûå äèïëîìàòû îòòîìàíñêîé øêîëû» íà÷èñòî ïåðåèãðàëè íåèñêóñíûõ èãðîêîâ Çàêàâêàçñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè. Ïî ñëîâàì À.È. Äåíèêèíà, ðåøàþùóþ ðîëü â îáðàçîâàíèè ÇÄÔÐ è Ãðóçèíñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè (26 ìàÿ 1918 ã.) ñûãðàë «ñìåðòåëüíûé ñòðàõ ïåðåä òóðåöêèì íàøåñòâèåì». Ê ýòîìó âðåìåíè è ó Ãåðìàíèè îôîðìèëñÿ ñòðàòåãè÷åñêèé âçãëÿä íà Ãðóçèþ. Òàê, íåìåöêèé ãåíåðàë è ïîëèòèê Ëþäåíäîðô îòìå÷àë: «Äëÿ íàñ (ïðîòåêòîðàò íàä Ãðóçèåé) áûë ñðåäñòâîì íåçàâèñèìî îò Òóðöèè ïîëó÷èòü äîñòóï ê êàâêàçñêîìó ñûðüþ è ýêñïëóàòàöèè æåëåçíûõ äîðîã, ïðîõîäÿùèõ ÷åðåç Òèôëèñ. Ìû íå ìîãëè äîâåðèòüñÿ â ýòîì îòíîøåíèè Òóðöèè. Ìû íå ìîãëè ðàññ÷èòûâàòü íà áàêèíñêóþ íåôòü, åñëè íå ïîëó÷èì åå ñàìè»37. Íåôòåïðîãîí Áàêó – Áàòóì, æåëåçíàÿ äîðîãà ÷åðåç Òèôëèñ, áîãàòåéøèå ìàðãàíöåâûå ðóäíèêè, ÷åðíîìîðñêèé ïîðò Ïîòè – âñå ýòî èìåëî îãðîìíîå çíà÷åíèå äëÿ ãåðìàíñêèõ èíòåðåñîâ. Âîò ïî÷åìó Ãåðìàíèÿ îñòàíîâèëà äàëüíåéøåå ïðîäâèæåíèå òóðîê â ïðåäåëû Ãðóçèè íåäàëåêî îò Òèôëèñà. Áîëåå òîãî, Ãåðìàíèÿ ñòàëà óáëàæàòü Ãðóçèþ ïî âîïðîñó îá Àáõàçèè è ïðèëåãàþùèõ ÷åðíîìîðñêèõ òåððèòîðèÿõ.  ñâîå âðåìÿ Ë. Òðîöêèé àáñîëþòíî âåðíî çàìåòèë: «Âàññàëüíûé ñîþç ñ Ãåðìàíèåé äàâàë Ãðóçèè äî ïîðû äî âðåìåíè ñåðüåçíûå ãàðàíòèè íåïðèêîñíîâåííîñòè, òàê êàê Ãåðìàíèÿ ñâÿçûâàëà áðåñòëèòîâñêîé ïåòëåþ Ñîâåòñêóþ Ðîññèþ, êðóøåíèå êîòîðîé ê òîìó æå êàçàëîñü íåèçáåæíûì...»38. Î ïðîâîçãëàøåíèè ãðóçèíñêîé íåçàâèñèìîñòè â Ñóõóìå ñòàëî èçâåñòíî ëèøü 2 èþíÿ.  òîò æå äåíü ÀÍÑ ïðèíÿë çàÿâëåíèå, â êîòîðîì îá Àáõàçèè è Ãðóçèè ãîâîðèëîñü, êàê î ñîñåäíèõ ñòðàíàõ, è äåëàëñÿ àêöåíò íà íåäîïóñòèìîñòè «ïîñÿãàòåëüñòâ íà ñóâåðåííûå ïðàâà íàðîäà ñî ñòîðîíû ñîñåäåé»39. 51

Ãëàâà III

Ñ ýòèì äîêóìåíòîì äåëåãàöèÿ áûëà íàïðàâëåíà â Òèôëèñ.  íåì òàêæå îáúÿâëÿëîñü, ÷òî ïàðëàìåíò Àáõàçèè ïðèíèìàåò íà ñåáÿ âñþ ïîëíîòó âëàñòè, ñ÷èòàÿ Àáõàçèþ è åå íàðîä «ñîâåðøåííî ñàìîñòîÿòåëüíûìè». Îäíàêî íà äåëåãàöèþ îáðóøèëñÿ øêâàë äåçèíôîðìàöèè î ÿêîáû ãîòîâÿùåìñÿ òóðåöêîì âòîðæåíèè â Àáõàçèþ. Íî îòêðûòîãî òóðåöêîãî âìåøàòåëüñòâà íå ìîãëî áûòü, òàê êàê Àáõàçèÿ ê òîìó âðåìåíè áûëà âêëþ÷åíà â ñôåðó âîåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî âëèÿíèÿ Ãåðìàíèè, è â íà÷àëå èþíÿ â Î÷àì÷èðà è Ñóõóìå óæå ñòîÿëè íåáîëüøèå íåìåöêèå îòðÿäû. Ïðàâèòåëüñòâî Ãðóçèè, âèäèìî, íå áåç çàêóëèñíîãî ó÷àñòèÿ À. ×õåíêåëè îêàçûâàëî áåñïðåöåäåíòíîå äàâëåíèå íà ãëàâó äåëåãàöèè Ð. Êàêóáà, äåïóòàòà ÀÍÑ îò Ñàìóðçàêàíè, ñ òåì ÷òîáû ÀÍÑ äàë õîòÿ áû óñòíîå ñîãëàñèå íà çàêëþ÷åíèå äîãîâîðà â «ðàçâèòèå è äîïîëíåíèå ñîãëàøåíèÿ îò 9 ôåâðàëÿ 1918 ãîäà». Çäåñü ñòîèò ïðèâåñòè çàìå÷àíèå Äåíèêèíà îòíîñèòåëüíî äåÿòåëüíîñòè À. ×õåíêåëè íà âûñîêîì ïîñòó â Çàêàâêàçñêîé ðåñïóáëèêå: «Ãðóçèí ×õåíêåëè, – ïèñàë îí, – âîîáùå ïðîÿâëÿâøèé ÷ðåçâû÷àéíóþ óñòóï÷èâîñòü òóðêàì â ÷àñòè, êàñàâøåéñÿ íå-ãðóçèíñêîé òåððèòîðèè, ïðèêàçàë ñäàòü Êàðñ áåç áîÿ»40. Îòíîñèòåëüíî æå Àáõàçèè è åå âõîæäåíèÿ â Ãðóçèþ ýòîò äåÿòåëü çàíèìàë íåïðèìèðèìóþ «ïàòðèîòè÷åñêóþ» ïîçèöèþ... Ïðàâèòåëüñòâåííûå êðóãè Ãðóçèè íå ìîãëî íå âñòðåâîæèòü ïîëîæåíèå èç äîêëàäà Ð. Êàêóáà, â êîòîðîì îí îáúÿâèë, ÷òî ÀÍÑ â «ñêîðîì âðåìåíè ñîçûâàåò Íàðîäíûé ñúåçä ïðåäñòàâèòåëåé âñåõ íàðîäîâ, íàñåëÿþùèõ Àáõàçèþ» (Ìåíòåøàøâèëè À. Ñ. 265), êîòîðûé â ñîîòâåòñòâèè ñ ïóíêòîì 2 ñîãëàøåíèÿ îò 9 ôåâðàëÿ 1918 ã. èìåë ïîëíîå ïðàâî îêîí÷àòåëüíî ðåøèòü âîïðîñ î ãîñóäàðñòâåííîì óñòðîéñòâå Àáõàçèè. Âñå ýòî óñêîðèëî ðàçâÿçêó ñîáûòèé.  ñîçäàâøåéñÿ ñèòóàöèè Ãðóçèÿ ïîòðåáîâàëà îòëîæèòü ìàíäàò äåëåãàöèè â ñòîðîíó è çàêëþ÷èòü íîâûé äîãîâîð. Ñîâåðøåííî çàïóòàâøèéñÿ è ñáèòûé ñ òîëêó òèôëèññêèìè ïîëèòèêàìè, çà ñïèíàìè êîòîðûõ ñòîÿëè íåìåöêèå äèïëîìàòû è âîåííûå, Ð. Êàêóáà ñòàë ïî ïðÿìîìó ïðîâîäó ïåðåäàâàòü â Ñóõóì ïàíè÷åñêèå èçâåñòèÿ è äàæå çàÿâèë î ãîòîâíîñòè äåëåãàöèè áåç ðåøåíèÿ ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè ïîäïèñàòü ïðåäëàãàåìûé «äîãîâîð». ÀÍÑ êàòåãîðè÷åñêè âîçðàæàë ïðîòèâ òàêèõ íàìåðåíèé. Îäíàêî Êàêóáà êàê ãëàâà äåëåãàöèè ïðîäîëæàë íàñòàèâàòü íà ñâîåì.  ñîîáùåíèè â Ñóõóì îò 8 èþíÿ 1918 ã. îí ïðåäëîæèë ñëåäóþùåå: «Èç Òèôëèñà: – Îáðàòèòü âíèìàíèå Ñîâåòà íà òî, ÷òî äîãîâîð èìååò ñèëó äî ñîçûâà Íàöèîíàëüíîãî Ñîáðàíèÿ Àáõàçèè… Åñëè áû ìû íå ïîäíÿëè âîïðîñà î íàøèõ âçàèìîîòíîøåíèÿõ òåïåðü, òî Ãðóç. Ïðàâèòåëüñòâî äîâîëüñòâîâàëîñü áû ñîãëàøåíèåì îò 9 ôåâð.18 ã. âïðåäü äî îêîí÷àòåëüíîãî ðåøåíèÿ âîïðîñà î íàøèõ âçàèìîîòíîøåíèÿõ ñ íàöèîíàëüíûì ñúåçäîì Àáõàçèè, íî êîãäà ìû ñàìè ýòîò âîïðîñ ïîäíÿëè òåïåðü, è ïðè òîì â òàêîì ñìûñëå, êàê áóäòî õîòèì ïðåðâàòü ñ Ãðóçèåé âñÿêóþ ñâÿçü, êàê ýòî, ïîâòîðÿþ, ïîíÿëî Ãðóç. Ïðàâèò-âî íàø ìàíäàò, òî òåïåðü îíî áîèòñÿ îãðàíè÷èòüñÿ ñîãëàøåíèåì îò ôåâðàëÿ è âî èçáåæàíèå âñÿêèõ íåäîðàçóìåíèé íàõîäèò íåîáõîäèìûì íåñêîëüêî ðàçâèòü åãî, îòíþäü íå âûõîäÿ èç ðàìîê ôåâðàëüñ52

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

êîãî ñîãëàøåíèÿ. ×òî êàñàåòñÿ îáùíîñòè èíòåðåñîâ, îá ýòîì äîñòàòî÷íî ñêàçàíî Ãðóç. Ïðàâ., è îíî ñîãëàñíî ñ íàìè, íî îíî óáåæäåíî, ÷òî íåëüçÿ æäàòü ñ âîïðîñîì î âíåøíåé îõðàíå òåððèòîðèè Àáõàçèè äî ñîçûâà Íàö. ñúåçäà Àáõàçèè. Òîëüêî ýòî îáñòîÿòåëüñòâî âûíóæäàåò Ãðóç. Ïðàâ. âîéòè ñ íàìè â ïðåäëàãàåìîå ñîãëàøåíèå, êîòîðîå, êàê ÿ óæå ñêàçàë âûøå, èìååò ñèëó òîëüêî ëèøü äî ñîçûâà Íàö. ñîáðàíèÿ. Äëÿ çàêëþ÷åíèÿ ïîäîáíîãî ñîãëàøåíèÿ, ïî ìíåíèþ Ãð. Ïðàâ., à òàêæå äåëåãàöèè, âîâñå íå òðåáóåòñÿ ñîçûâ êàêèõ-ëèáî ïðåäñòàâèòåëåé Àáõàçèè, à ýòî ñîãëàøåíèå âïîëíå â êîìïåòåíöèè Ïðàâèò-âà Íàðîäíîãî Ñîâ., íûíå ôóíêöèîíèðóþùåãî... Äåëåãàöèÿ ïîëàãàåò, ÷òî â äîãîâîðå íè÷åãî íåïðèåìëåìîãî íåò, ïî÷åìó Íàð. Ñîâåò íå ìîæåò âûñêàçàòüñÿ ïî ñóùåñòâó åãî, äëÿ äåëåãàöèè íåïîíÿòíî. Ñîîáùèòå, êàê áûòü äåëåãàöèè. Îñòàâàòüñÿ çäåñü äàëüøå èëè óåçæàòü â Ñóõóì... ×òî ÿ åùå äîëæåí äîáàâèòü, ÷òî Ãðóç. Ïðàâ. ñîãëàñíî çàêëþ÷èòü ñ íàìè ïðåäëàãàåìîå ñîãëàøåíèå ñëîâåñíî, ò. å. óäîâëåòâîðèòñÿ îíî ñëîâåñíûì çàâåðåíèåì äåëåãàöèè è íå íàñòàèâàåò íà ïîäïèñàíèè äîãîâîðà. Äîáàâëþ åùå, åñëè Íàðîäíûé Ñîâåò áîèòñÿ âçÿòü íà ñåáÿ êàêóþ-íèáóäü îòâåòñòâåííîñòü çà çàêëþ÷åíèå ïðåäëàãàåìîãî ñîãëàøåíèÿ, òî äåëåãàöèÿ íà ñåáÿ ïðèíèìàåò ýòó îòâåòñòâåííîñòü... Èç Ñóõóìà: – Çàâòðà âîïðîñ áóäåò ñíîâà ïîñòàâëåí íà îáñóæäåíèå, è 10-ãî â 6 ÷àñîâ âå÷åðà Âû ïîëó÷èòå ÿñíûé è îïðåäåëåííûé îòâåò. Èç Òèôëèñà: – Íå ïðåäñòàâëÿåòñÿ âîçìîæíûì äî 10. Íåîáõîäèìî ïîëó÷èòü Âàø îòâåò çàâòðà. ×àñ íàçíà÷üòå ñàìè. Èç Ñóõóìà: – Ïî âîçìîæíîñòè ñîîáùèì çàâòðà.  êðàéíåì ñëó÷àå 10-ãî â 6 ÷àñîâ. Èç Òèôëèñà: – Âû ëèøàåòå ïðàâà ãîâîðèòü ñ Ãðóç. Ïðàâ.»41. Íà ñëåäóþùèé äåíü, 9 èþíÿ 1918 ã., èç Ñóõóìà â Òèôëèñ ñîîáùàëîñü: «Ïîëîæåíèå âåùåé â Àáõàçèè ÿâëÿåòñÿ â íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ íàñòîëüêî çàïóòàííûì, ÷òî Àáõ. Íàð. Ñîâåò ëèøåí âîçìîæíîñòè äàòü ïî ñóùåñòâó âàøåãî çàïðîñà îôèöèàëüíî îïðåäåëåííûé îòâåò. Êàêîâ [áû] íè áûë íàø îòâåò, íî ñàì ôàêò çàêëþ÷åíèÿ äîãîâîðà áóäåò èñòîëêîâàí â ñàìîì íåæåëàòåëüíîì ñìûñëå è ìîæåò ïîâëå÷ü çà ñîáîé ïîñëåäñòâèÿ, ãèáåëüíûå ïðåæäå âñåãî äëÿ Àáõàçèè è îïàñíûå òàêæå äëÿ Ãðóçèè... Äî òîãî ìîìåíòà, ïîêà â Îêðóãå íå áóäåò âîäâîðåí ïîðÿäîê, ïîêà íàñåëåíèå íå âåðíåòñÿ ê íîðìàëüíûì îáñòîÿòåëüñòâàì æèçíè, âñÿêîå ñîãëàøåíèå, çàêëþ÷åííîå Àáõ. Íàð. Ñîâ. ñ Ãðóçèåé, è îôîðìëåíèå äîãîâîðà áóäåò íåçàìåäëèòåëüíî èñïîëüçîâàíî â óùåðá èíòåðåñàì ãîñóäàðñòâåííîñòè, è òîãäà óãðîçà âíåøíåãî âìåøàòåëüñòâà, âèñÿùàÿ íàä íàìè, ìîæåò ïðåâðàòèòüñÿ â ôàêò. Àáõ. Íàð. Ñîâ. ïðîñèò Ïðàâ. Ãðóç. ðåñï. íå íàñòàèâàòü íà íåìåäëåííîì îòâåòå è òåì äàòü âîçìîæíîñòü Àáõàçèè â áîëåå ïîäõîäÿùåé îáñòàíîâêå îïðåäåëèòü ñâîþ ñóäüáó»42. Êàê âèäíî èç ýòèõ î÷åíü êðàñíîðå÷èâûõ äîêóìåíòîâ, Ð. Êàêóáà ñàì íàäåëèë ñåáÿ ÷ðåçâû÷àéíûìè ïîëíîìî÷èÿìè è 8 èþíÿ 1918 ã. áåç âåäîìà ÀÍÑ îäîáðèë (âîçìîæíî, è íà ñëîâàõ, òàê êàê ïîäëèííèê çàêëþ÷åííîãî «äîãîâîðà» íåèçâåñòåí) ïðåäëàãàåìûé Ãðóçèåé «äîãîâîð», â òî âðåìÿ êàê ÀÍÑ ïîñëå 53

Ãëàâà III

äîëãîãî è óïîðíîãî ñîïðîòèâëåíèÿ ïðèíÿë ðåøåíèå î çàêëþ÷åíèè äîãîâîðà (íî â äðóãîé ðåäàêöèè!) òîëüêî 10 èþíÿ 1918 ã. Èìåííî ýòîò òåêñò äîêóìåíòà çà ïîäïèñüþ ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ ÀÍÑ Â. Øåðâàøèäçå è äîëæíû áûëè ïðèíÿòü â Òèôëèñå 11 èþíÿ îáå ñòîðîíû. Íî, ïîâòîðÿþ, àáõàçñêàÿ äåëåãàöèÿ âî ãëàâå ñ Ð. Êàêóáà, âîïðåêè òðåáîâàíèþ ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè, ïîøëà íà ñäåëêó ñ ãðóçèíñêèì ïðàâèòåëüñòâîì, ïîäïèñàâ ñ íèì «äîãîâîð» óæå 8 ÷èñëà. Ïîçèöèÿ ñàìîãî Êàêóáà áûëà äàëåêî íå áåñêîðûñòíîé, òàê êàê â Òèôëèñå åìó áûë îáåùàí ïîñò ìèíèñòðà ïî äåëàì Àáõàçèè. Ñèòóàöèÿ îêàçàëàñü íàñòîëüêî çàïóòàííîé è òðàãèêîìè÷íîé, ÷òî äàæå ñåãîäíÿ ÷àñòü ãðóçèíñêèõ èñòîðèêîâ ññûëàåòñÿ íà òåêñò «äîãîâîðà» îò 8 èþíÿ 1918 ã., à äðóãàÿ – íà «äîãîâîð» îò 11 èþíÿ òîãî æå ãîäà. Ìåæäó ïðî÷èì, âåñü ìåõàíèçì ýòîé ïîëèòè÷åñêîé ìàõèíàöèè îñâåùàëñÿ ìíîþ íåîäíîêðàòíî, â òîì ÷èñëå è â «Èñòîðèè Àáõàçèè». Äàæå ñòàâëåííèê Òèôëèñà ïðåäñåäàòåëü ÀÍÑ Â. Øåðâàøèäçå ïîíÿòèÿ íå èìåë îá ýòîé ïîäìåíå äîêóìåíòà è â ñâîåé ïåðåïèñêå ñ ãðóçèíñêèì ïðàâèòåëüñòâîì ññûëàëñÿ íà ïóíêòû íåñóùåñòâóþùåãî «äîãîâîðà» îò 11 èþíÿ43.  ïðèíöèïå, ýòî áûë ãðóáûé ïîëèòè÷åñêèé ïîäëîã, è ñ ïðàâîâîé òî÷êè çðåíèÿ íèêàêîãî äîãîâîðà â äåéñòâèòåëüíîñòè íå ñóùåñòâîâàëî. Âìåñòå ñ òåì íåëüçÿ çàáûâàòü, ÷òî èìåííî ýòà ïîëèòè÷åñêàÿ ôàëüøèâêà ïðèâåëà Àáõàçèþ ê òðàãè÷åñêèì ïîñëåäñòâèÿì è ïîÿâèëàñü íà ñâåò â ñëåäóþùåé ðåäàêöèè: «1. Ïðè ïðàâèòåëüñòâå Äåìîêðàòè÷åñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè Ãðóçèè ñîçäàåòñÿ ïî ïðåäñòàâëåíèþ Àáõàçñêîãî Íàðîäíîãî Ñîâåòà ïîñò ìèíèñòðà ïî äåëàì Àáõàçèè. 2. Âíóòðåííåå óïðàâëåíèå è ñàìîóïðàâëåíèå â Àáõàçèè ïðèíàäëåæèò Àáõàçñêîìó Íàðîäíîìó Ñîâåòó. 3. Êðåäèòû è äåíüãè, íåîáõîäèìûå íà óïðàâëåíèå Àáõàçèåé, îòïóñêàþòñÿ èç ñðåäñòâ Äåìîêðàòè÷åñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè Ãðóçèè è ðàñõîäóþòñÿ íà íóæäû Àáõàçèè Àáõàçñêèì Íàðîäíûì Ñîâåòîì. 4. Äëÿ ñêîðåéøåãî óñòàíîâëåíèÿ ðåâîëþöèîííîãî ïîðÿäêà è îðãàíèçàöèè òâåðäîé âëàñòè â ïîìîùü Àáõàçñêîìó Íàðîäíîìó Ñîâåòó è â åãî ðàñïîðÿæåíèå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî ïîñûëàåò îòðÿä Êðàñíîé ãâàðäèè. 5.  Àáõàçèè îðãàíèçóåòñÿ èíòåðíàöèîíàëüíûé îòðÿä, êîòîðûé íàõîäèòñÿ â ðàñïîðÿæåíèè Àáõàçñêîãî Íàðîäíîãî Ñîâåòà. 6. Ñîöèàëüíûå ðåôîðìû â Àáõàçèè ïðîâîäèò Àáõàçñêèé Íàðîäíûé Ñîâåò íà îñíîâå îáùèõ çàêîíîâ Ãðóçèè ñ ó÷åòîì ìåñòíûõ îñîáåííîñòåé. 7. Ñúåçä íàñåëåíèÿ Àáõàçèè íà äåìîêðàòè÷åñêèõ íà÷àëàõ ñîçûâàåòñÿ ïî âîçìîæíîñòè â ñêîðîì áóäóùåì äëÿ îêîí÷àòåëüíîãî ðåøåíèÿ âîïðîñîâ, ñâÿçàííûõ ñ óñòðîéñòâîì Àáõàçèè»44. Äàííûé òåêñò ñóùåñòâåííî îòëè÷àåòñÿ îò âàðèàíòà äîãîâîðà, ïîäïèñàííîãî 10 èþíÿ Â. Øåðâàøèäçå, è, êàê âèäèì, ñîñòîèò íå èç 8, à èç 7 ïóíêòîâ45. Òàê, â 1-é ñòàòüå äîêóìåíòà ÀÍÑ ñêàçàíî: «Çàêëþ÷àåìûé äîãîâîð ïåðåñìàòðèâàåòñÿ Íàöèîíàëüíûì Ñîáðàíèåì Àáõàçèè, êîòîðîå îêîí÷àòåëüíî 54

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

îïðåäåëÿåò ïîëèòè÷åñêîå óñòðîéñòâî Àáõàçèè, à òàêæå âçàèìîîòíîøåíèÿ ìåæäó Ãðóçèåé è Àáõàçèåé». Èíûìè ñëîâàìè, çàêëþ÷àåìûé äîãîâîð íîñèë âðåìåííûé õàðàêòåð è ïîäëåæàë ïåðåñìîòðó Íàöèîíàëüíûì Ñîáðàíèåì Àáõàçèè íå òîëüêî äëÿ îêîí÷àòåëüíîãî îïðåäåëåíèÿ ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî óñòðîéñòâà Àáõàçèè, íî è äëÿ îêîí÷àòåëüíîãî ðåøåíèÿ âîïðîñà î âçàèìîîòíîøåíèÿõ ìåæäó Ãðóçèåé è Àáõàçèåé.  àíàëîãè÷íîé æå, êàçàëîñü áû, 7-é ñòàòüå «äîãîâîðà» îò 8 èþíÿ ïðåäñòàâëåíà ðàñïëûâ÷àòàÿ ôîðìóëèðîâêà è îïóùåí ðÿä ïðèíöèïèàëüíî âàæíûõ ìîìåíòîâ. Ìîæíî ëè âîîáùå âñåðüåç ãîâîðèòü î òîì, ÷òî óæå òîãäà Àáõàçèÿ ïîëó÷èëà â ñîñòàâå Ãðóçèè ñàìóþ øèðîêóþ àâòîíîìèþ? Âåäü ñîâåðøåííî î÷åâèäíî, ÷òî ï. 2 î âíóòðåííåì óïðàâëåíèè è ñàìîóïðàâëåíèè åùå íå îçíà÷àë ïðåäîñòàâëåíèÿ àâòîíîìèè, òåì áîëåå åñëè â ï. 7 ñêàçàíî îá îêîí÷àòåëüíîì óñòðîéñòâå Àáõàçèè â ñêîðîì áóäóùåì. Òàê, íàïðèìåð, À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè è À. Ñóðãóëàäçå â 1989 ã. ïðèçíàâàëè ôîðìàëüíûé õàðàêòåð ýòîãî äîêóìåíòà, îòìå÷àÿ, ÷òî «äîãîâîðîì» ïðàâèòåëüñòâî Ãðóçèè òîëüêî îáåùàëî «äàòü àâòîíîìèþ Àáõàçèè, îäíàêî ïðàêòè÷åñêîå îñóùåñòâëåíèå åãî çàäåðæàëîñü»46. Íî ïðîøëè ãîäû, è â 1999 ã. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè ïîäïðàâèë ñâîþ ïîçèöèþ: «Ïî äîãîâîðó îò 8 èþíÿ Àáõàçèè áûëà ïðåäîñòàâëåíà øèðîêàÿ àâòîíîìèÿ» (Ñ. 266). Ñïðàøèâàåòñÿ, äëÿ ÷åãî æå â òàêîì ñëó÷àå Ãðóçèè ïîíàäîáèëîñü âîçâðàùàòüñÿ ê ýòîìó âîïðîñó è 20 ìàðòà 1919 ã. âíîâü ïðèíèìàòü «Àêò îá àâòîíîìèè Àáõàçèè»? Ïî ñóòè äåëà, ïðàâèòåëüñòâî Ãðóçèè èíòåðåñîâàë â «äîãîâîðå» 8 èþíÿ ëèøü îäèí ïóíêò – 4-é, äâóñìûñëåííûì ñîäåðæàíèåì êîòîðîãî îíî íå ïðåìèíóëî âîñïîëüçîâàòüñÿ è ââåëî íà òåððèòîðèþ Àáõàçèè íå îáåùàííûé «îòðÿä Êðàñíîé ãâàðäèè», à îêêóïàöèîííûå ìåíüøåâèñòñêèå âîéñêà.  «øèðîêóþ àâòîíîìèþ» íå âåðèë äàæå ïîëèòè÷åñêèé ïðåäñòàâèòåëü Ãðóçèíñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè â Àáõàçèè, ñòàðåéøèé ãðóçèíñêèé ñîöèàë-äåìîêðàò Èñèäîð Ðàìèøâèëè. 19 èþëÿ, ñïóñòÿ ìåñÿö ïîñëå ò.í. äîãîâîðîâ, îí âûñòóïèë â Ñóõóìå íà çàñåäàíèè ÀÍÑ è çàÿâèë î ïðàâîìî÷íîì ñúåçäå íàðîäà, êîòîðûé äîëæåí ðåøèòü äàëüíåéøóþ ñóäüáó Àáõàçèè – ïðèìêíåò ëè îíà «ê Ãðóçèè, Ðîññèè èëè Òóðöèè èëè îáúÿâèò ñàìîñòîÿòåëüíîñòü»47. Ïîñëå âîçâðàùåíèÿ äîìîé àáõàçñêîé äåëåãàöèè, îäîáðèâøåé «äîãîâîð» îò 8 èþíÿ, îòíîøåíèÿ ìåæäó åå ÷ëåíàìè ðåçêî îñëîæíèëèñü, òàê êàê èõ ñòàëè îáâèíÿòü â ïðåäàòåëüñòâå èíòåðåñîâ Àáõàçèè. Îñîáåííî îáîñòðèëîñü ïðîòèâîñòîÿíèå ìåæäó Ð. Êàêóáà, ñ îäíîé ñòîðîíû, è Ã. Òóìàíîâûì è Â. Ãóðäæóà – ñ äðóãîé. Âîëüíî èëè íåâîëüíî, íî Êàêóáà ñ ïîäà÷è ãðóçèíñêîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà ïîñòîÿííî äåçèíôîðìèðîâàë ÀÍÑ è â òàéíå îò àáõàçñêîãî ïàðëàìåíòà 8 èþíÿ ïîøåë íà îòêðîâåííûé ïîëèòè÷åñêèé ïîäëîã. Ïîýòîìó íåóäèâèòåëüíî, ÷òî íà îñíîâàíèè ñòàòüè 1 è â áëàãîäàðíîñòü çà îêàçàííóþ «óñëóãó» èìåííî åãî êàíäèäàòóðà áûëà âûäâèíóòà íà äîëæíîñòü ìèíèñòðà ïî äåëàì Àáõàçèè, è 11 èþëÿ îí áûë íàäåëåí ñîîòâåòñòâóþùèìè ïîëíîìî÷èÿìè. Îäíàêî íà ñëåäóþùèé äåíü, 12 èþëÿ, îãðîìíûé ñõîä íàñåëåíèÿ íà ×åðíîé ðå÷êå áëèç Ãóäàóò ïðè 55

Ãëàâà III

àêòèâíîì ó÷àñòèè Â. Ãóðäæóà è Ã. Òóìàíîâà ïîòðåáîâàë îòñòàâêè Ð. Êàêóáà è âûðàçèë åìó íåäîâåðèå. 17 èþëÿ Êàêóáà çàÿâèë ÀÍÑ î ñëîæåíèè ñ ñåáÿ ïîëíîìî÷èé ìèíèñòðà. Íà ñëåäóþùèé äåíü íà çàñåäàíèè ÀÍÑ âî âçâèí÷åííîì ñîñòîÿíèè â ïðèñóòñòâèè È. Ðàìèøâèëè îí ïðîòåñòîâàë ïðîòèâ âûâîäà ãðóçèíñêèõ âîéñê èç Àáõàçèè, êîòîðûå áûëè ââåäåíû êàê ðàç ïî åãî âèíå. Ñ ðåçêîé ðå÷üþ â ïàðëàìåíòå òîãäà æå âûñòóïèë ïðàâîñëàâíûé àáõàçñêèé ñâÿùåííèê Ã. Òóìàíîâ, ÷ëåí äåëåãàöèè, íàïðàâëåííîé â èþíå â Òèôëèñ, êîòîðûé ïî ïîðó÷åíèþ ñõîäà ãóäàóòñêèõ è ãàãðñêèõ àáõàçîâ ïîòðåáîâàë, ÷òîáû «Àáõàçèÿ áûëà ñàìîñòîÿòåëüíà, à íå áûëà áû ïðîâèíöèåé», – â ïðîòèâíîì ñëó÷àå îíè ãîòîâû «óìåðåòü ñâîáîäíûìè íà ñâîåé çåìëå»48. Ñ îáñòîÿòåëüíîé êðèòèêîé äåÿòåëüíîñòè ÀÍÑ âûñòóïèë è äåïóòàò îò Êîäîðñêîé Àáõàçèè íàðîäíûé ó÷èòåëü À. ×î÷óà49. 19 èþëÿ ÀÍÑ ïðèíÿë îòñòàâêó Ð. Êàêóáà50. Áóêâàëüíî ÷åðåç íåäåëþ, 25 èþëÿ, ïàðëàìåíò èçáðàë ìèíèñòðîì ïî äåëàì Àáõàçèè ïîëêîâíèêà Ð. ×õîòóà, çàâåðèâøåãî ÀÍÑ, ÷òî ãëàâíàÿ åãî öåëü – «çàùèòà èíòåðåñîâ Àáõàçèè»51. Ïîëêîâíèê îñòàëñÿ âåðåí ýòîìó îáåùàíèþ, íî â îêòÿáðå 1918 ã. áûë îáâèíåí â ïîïûòêå ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ïåðåâîðîòà è îòñòðàíåí îò çàíèìàåìîé äîëæíîñòè. Òîãäà æå Òèôëèñ óïðàçäíèë ñàì ýòîò ïîñò è òåì ñàìûì – ñòàòüþ 1 «äîãîâîðà» îò 8 èþíÿ, à ôóíêöèè ìèíèñòðà ïî äåëàì Àáõàçèè âîçëîæèë íà ìèíèñòðà âíóòðåííèõ äåë Ãðóçèè. Íàèáîëåå äàëüíîâèäíûå àáõàçñêèå ïîëèòèêè ïðåäâèäåëè, ÷òî ïîä ïðåäëîãîì áîðüáû ñ áîëüøåâèêàìè è çàùèòû Àáõàçèè îò Òóðöèè Ãðóçèÿ ïîïûòàåòñÿ âîñïîëüçîâàòüñÿ çàêëþ÷åííûì «äîãîâîðîì» è ïðèáðàòü ñòðàíó ê ðóêàì. Îäíèì èç òåõ, êòî ñ êðàéíèì íåäîâåðèåì îòíåññÿ ê äåÿòåëüíîñòè Ð. Êàêóáà, ñòàë áûâøèé ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïåðâîãî ÀÍÑ Ñ.Ï. Áàñàðèÿ, êîòîðûé íà çàñåäàíèè ïàðëàìåíòà 10 èþíÿ 1918 ã. îòêàçàëñÿ ïîäïèñàòü ïîðó÷åíèå äåëåãàöèè î çàêëþ÷åíèè äîãîâîðà ñ Ãðóçèåé è ïèñüìåííî èçëîæèë òîãäà æå ñâîå îñîáîå ìíåíèå ïî ýòîìó âîïðîñó. «Ââèäó òîãî ÷òî, – ãîâîðèëîñü â íåì, – ïðîåêò äîãîâîðà, ïðåäëàãàåìûé Ãðóçèíñêîé Ðåñïóáëèêîé, íîñèò õàðàêòåð óëüòèìàòèâíûé, ëèøàþùèé âîçìîæíîñòè îáäóìàííîãî, ñâîáîäíîãî îáñóæäåíèÿ; ââèäó òîãî ÷òî âàæíûé àêò, êàê ïðåäëàãàåìûé äîãîâîð Àáõàçèè ñ Ãðóçèåé, äåëàåòñÿ íàñïåõ ïðè îãðàíè÷åííîì êîëè÷åñòâå ÷ëåíîâ Àáõàçñêîãî Íàðîäíîãî Ñîâåòà è áåç âåäîìà íàñåëåíèÿ Àáõàçèè, êîòîðîå ìûñëèò ñâîþ ïîëèòè÷åñêóþ ñâîáîäó áåç âñÿêîé îïåêè, ñ ÷üåé áû ñòîðîíû íè áûëî, – ÿ ïðåäëàãàþ Àáõàçñêîìó Íàðîäíîìó Ñîâåòó íà óëüòèìàòóì Ãðóçèè îòâåòèòü ïðîñüáîé äàòü âîçìîæíîñòü íàñåëåíèþ óñòðîèòü Àáõàçñêèé Íàöèîíàëüíûé ñúåçä, ïðàâîìî÷íûé îêîí÷àòåëüíî îïðåäåëèòü ïîëèòè÷åñêîå óñòðîéñòâî Àáõàçèè, çàâåðèâ Ãðóçèíñêóþ Ðåñïóáëèêó, ÷òî Àáõàçèÿ êàê ñàìîñòîÿòåëüíûé íàöèîíàëüíûé îðãàíèçì îáÿçàòåëüíî âñòóïèò â äîáðîñîñåäñêèå äîãîâîðíûå ñîþçû è ñîãëàøåíèÿ ñ Ãðóçèåé. Ïðîøó íàñòîÿùåå îñîáîå ìíåíèå ïåðåäàòü ïî ïðÿìîìó ïðîâîäó àáõàçñêîé äåëåãàöèè»52. 56

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

Îñîáîå ìíåíèå òàêîãî àâòîðèòåòíîãî â íàðîäå ÷åëîâåêà è âëèÿòåëüíîãî äåïóòàòà, èçëîæåííîå 10 èþíÿ, ò.å. êîãäà «äîãîâîð» óæå áûë îäîáðåí â Òèôëèñå, èíòåðåñíî ïî íåñêîëüêèì ïðèíöèïèàëüíûì ïîçèöèÿì. Âî-ïåðâûõ, ïðåäëàãàåìûé «äîãîâî𻠖 ýòî óëüòèìàòóì ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Ãðóçèè. Âî-âòîðûõ, Áàñàðèÿ íå ñîãëàñåí, ÷òîáû òàêîé «âàæíûé àêò» ãîòîâèëñÿ âòàéíå îò íàðîäà Àáõàçèè, ïðè «îãðàíè÷åííîì êîëè÷åñòâå» äåïóòàòîâ ÀÍÑ. Â-òðåòüèõ, îí îñîáî ïîä÷åðêèâàåò, ÷òî «îêîí÷àòåëüíî îïðåäåëèòü ïîëèòè÷åñêîå óñòðîéñòâî Àáõàçèè» ïîëíîìî÷åí òîëüêî «Àáõàçñêèé Íàöèîíàëüíûé ñúåçä». Â-÷åòâåðòûõ, îí ïðåäóïðåæäàåò äåëåãàöèþ âî ãëàâå ñ Êàêóáà îá îòâåòñòâåííîñòè. Ìåæäó ïðî÷èì, äàâàÿ êðàòêóþ õàðàêòåðèñòèêó îêêóïàöèè Àáõàçèè Ãðóçèåé, ãåíåðàë À.È. Äåíèêèí ññûëàåòñÿ íà «äîãîâîð» îò... 11 èþíÿ 1918 ãîäà (!), ò.å. â àáõàçñêîé ðåäàêöèè, à íå â òîé, ÷òî áûëà ïðèíÿòà â Òèôëèñå 8 èþíÿ53. Çíà÷èò, î ïðîèçâåäåííîé ïîäìåíå íå çíàë è âåðõîâíûé ãëàâêîì Äîáðîâîëü÷åñêîé àðìèè.  ïðîäîëæåíèå òåìû î òàê íàçûâàåìîé àâòîíîìèè êîñíóñü óïðåêà, êîòîðûé áðîñèë ìíå óâàæàåìûé À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè (Ñ. 267) ïî ïîâîäó òîãî, ÷òî ÿ â ñâîèõ ðàáîòàõ ÷àñòî öèòèðóþ î÷åðê Ñ. Äàíèëîâà «Òðàãåäèÿ àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà» (Ìþíõåí, 1951), íî ÿêîáû «çàáûâàþ», ÷òî ïèøåò î 1918 ã. ýòîò ëþáèìûé ìíîþ àâòîð, à èìåííî: «Àáõàçèÿ ïîëó÷èëà àâòîíîìèþ» (Ñ. 8). Ïðàâäà, äàëüøå ó÷åíûé íå îñìåëèëñÿ ïðîäîëæèòü öèòèðîâàíèå Ñ. Äàíèëîâà, êîòîðûé, êñòàòè, è áûë ìíîþ âïåðâûå ïåðåèçäàí54. Ãðóçèíñêèé èñòîðèê ëèøü âûõâàòèë òàê íåîáõîäèìîå åìó ñëîâî «àâòîíîìèÿ». Íî âåäü Äàíèëîâ ïèøåò îá ýòîé «àâòîíîìèè» ñ íåñêðûâàåìûì ñàðêàçìîì, è â ýòîì íåòðóäíî óáåäèòüñÿ. Òàê, îí ñîîáùàåò äàëåå, ÷òî ñ ïåðâûõ æå äíåé ÀÍÑ, «ïîæåëàâøèé âçÿòü óïðàâëåíèå ñòðàíîé â ñâîè ðóêè», íàòîëêíóëñÿ íà «ñåðüåçíûå ïðåïÿòñòâèÿ â ñâîèõ íà÷èíàíèÿõ ñî ñòîðîíû ãðóçèíñêèõ âëàñòåé». Ïðåäñòàâèòåëè ìåíüøåâèñòñêîé Ãðóçèè, ïðîäîëæàåò Äàíèëîâ, «ìàëî ñ÷èòàëèñü ñ íàñòðîåíèÿìè è îáû÷àÿìè èíûõ íàðîäîâ», à â Àáõàçèè «ïðîâîäèëè ïîëèòèêó, íå îòâå÷àâøóþ èíòåðåñàì àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà». Ïîëíûì õîäîì øëà ãðóçèíèçàöèÿ, áûëè ãëóáîêèå ðàçíîãëàñèÿ â çåìåëüíîì âîïðîñå. Àíòàãîíèçì ìåæäó íèìè «îáåùàë ïåðåéòè â îòêðûòîå âûñòóïëåíèå ïðîòèâ âëàñòè», è òîãäà àáõàçû ïîñëàëè ñâîèõ ïðåäñòàâèòåëåé ê êîìàíäîâàíèþ Äîáðîâîëü÷åñêîé àðìèè, ÷òîáû ñ èõ ïîìîùüþ «îñâîáîäèòüñÿ îò íîâûõ çàâîåâàòåëåé»55. Òàê ÷òî À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè çðÿ íàâîäèò òåíü íà ïëåòåíü. Âñå, ÷òî ïðèâåäåíî ìíîþ, äàíî ñòðîãî ïî òåêñòó âñëåä çà óïîìèíàíèåì «àâòîíîìèè» íà òîé æå ñòðàíèöå.

V Âîñïîëüçîâàâøèñü òàê íàçûâàåìîé äîãîâîðåííîñòüþ îò 8 èþíÿ 1918 ã., âîéñêà Ãðóçèíñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè ïðè âîåííîé ïîääåðæêå Ãåðìàíèè óæå 17– 19 èþíÿ âûñàäèëèñü â Ñóõóìå è îêêóïèðîâàëè ñòðàíó. Ãåíåðàë À.Ñ. Ëóêîìñêèé ïèñàë ïî ýòîìó ïîâîäó: «Ïîëüçóÿñü ïîääåðæêîþ Ãåðìàíèè, Ãðóçèÿ 57

Ãëàâà III

çàíÿëà ïðîòèâ âîëè íàñåëåíèÿ Àáõàçèþ è Ñî÷èíñêèé îêðóã...»56. Ê òîìó âðåìåíè Àáõàçèÿ îêàçàëàñü â òÿæåëîì ïîëîæåíèè, òàê êàê ëèøèëàñü ðåàëüíîé ïîääåðæêè ñî ñòîðîíû Ãîðñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè â ñâÿçè ñ áóðíûìè âîåííûìè ñîáûòèÿìè íà Ñåâåðíîì Êàâêàçå.  ýòîò ñìóòíûé ïåðèîä êàæäîäíåâíî ìåíÿëèñü ïðèîðèòåòû, ñòàëêèâàëèñü èíòåðåñû ðàçíûõ ãîñóäàðñòâ, çàêðó÷èâàëèñü âñå íîâûå âîäîâîðîòû ïîëèòè÷åñêîé æèçíè, öàðèëè àíàðõèÿ è õàîñ. Àáõàçèÿ îêàçàëàñü îòðåçàííîé îò ñâîèõ åñòåñòâåííûõ ñîþçíèêîâ è, îñòàâøèñü îäèí íà îäèí ñ Ãðóçèåé è Ãåðìàíèåé, íåñìîòðÿ íà ïîïûòêó äèïëîìàòè÷åñêèì ïóòåì ðàçðÿäèòü îáñòàíîâêó, ïîäâåðãëàñü âîåííîé èíòåðâåíöèè. Îäíàêî ïðàâèòåëüñòâî Ãîðñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè íå îñòàëîñü áåçó÷àñòíûì ê ñóäüáå Àáõàçèè è îñóäèëî âòîðæåíèå ãðóçèíñêèõ âîéñê. Òàê, â èþíå 1918 ã. ÌÈÄ Ãîðñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè óñòàìè ìèíèñòðà Ãàéäàðà Áàììàòà çàÿâèë ïðîòåñò ïðàâèòåëüñòâó Ãðóçèè è ãëàâå äèïëîìàòè÷åñêîé ìèññèè ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Ãåðìàíèè íà Êàâêàçå Øóëåíáóðãó ïî ïîâîäó âñòóïëåíèÿ íåìåöêèõ âîéñê â Ñóõóì è «íàõîæäåíèÿ ãðóçèíñêèõ áàíä â Àáõàçèè»57. Äîêóìåíòû Ãîðñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè óáåäèòåëüíî ñâèäåòåëüñòâóþò, ÷òî Àáõàçèÿ ïðîäîëæàëà îñòàâàòüñÿ ÷àñòüþ Ñåâåðîêàâêàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâà, êîòîðîå íå ïðèçíàâàëî ïðèòÿçàíèé Ãðóçèè íà Àáõàçèþ. Âîò ïî÷åìó ñëèøêîì ïîâåðõíîñòíûìè ïðåäñòàâëÿþòñÿ ðàññóæäåíèÿ ãðóçèíñêîãî èñòîðèêà î òîì, ÷òî «Êàâêàçñêàÿ êîíôåäåðàöèÿ íå ñîñòîÿëàñü, è ïîýòîìó âñòóïëåíèå Àáõàçèè â ñîñòàâ Ãðóçèè â èþíå 1918 ã. èìåëî ìåæäóíàðîäíî-ïðàâîâóþ îñíîâó» (Ñ. 264 óïîìÿíóòîé êîëëåêòèâíîé ìîíîãðàôèè). Íî ðàçâå â èþíå 1918 ã. êòî-íèáóäü ìîã ñ óâåðåííîñòüþ ñêàçàòü, ÷òî Êîíôåäåðàöèÿ íå ñîñòîèòñÿ? Äàæå ãåíåðàë ôîí Ëîññîâ íå çíàë îá ýòîì. Ñîâåðøåííî î÷åâèäíî, ÷òî À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè àáñîëþòíî íå çíàêîì ñ äîêóìåíòàìè, ñâèäåòåëüñòâà êîòîðûõ ëèøàþò ýòè åãî óìîçàêëþ÷åíèÿ âñÿêîãî ñìûñëà. Äàæå ñïóñòÿ íåñêîëüêî ìåñÿöåâ ïîñëå îêêóïàöèè Àáõàçèè, â àâãóñòå 1918 ã., ïðåäñåäàòåëü ãîðñêîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Ò. ×åðìîåâ âíîâü çàÿâèë ïðîòåñò Ãåðìàíèè â ñâÿçè ñ âòîðæåíèåì ãðóçèíñêèõ âîéñê â Àáõàçèþ ïðè ïîääåðæêå ðåãóëÿðíûõ ÷àñòåé íåìåöêîé àðìèè.  òî æå âðåìÿ îí ïðåäîñòåðåãàë, ÷òî íàðîäû Ñåâåðíîãî Êàâêàçà, ñâÿçàííûå ñ Ãðóçèåé «åäèíñòâîì ðàñû è äàâíèøíèìè ñèìïàòèÿìè», íå äîëæíû äîïóñêàòü êàêèõ-ëèáî ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ îñëîæíåíèé â ñâîåì ñòðåìëåíèè ê «íàèáîëåå òåñíûì ñîþçíûì ñâÿçÿì äî Êîíôåäåðàöèè (âûäåëåíî ìíîþ. – Ñ.Ë.) âêëþ÷èòåëüíî». Äàëåå â äîêóìåíòå ïîä÷åðêèâàëîñü: «ß îò èìåíè ìîåãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà ñàìûì êàòåãîðè÷íûì îáðàçîì ïðîòåñòóþ ïðîòèâ îáðàçà äåéñòâèé Ãðóçèè â Àáõàçèè, ñîñòàâíîé ÷àñòè ôåäåðàòèâíîé Ðåñïóáëèêè Ñîþçà ãîðöåâ Êàâêàçà (âûäåëåíî ìíîþ. – Ñ.Ë.), è âî èçáåæàíèå òÿæåëûõ îñëîæíåíèé, ìîãóùèõ ïðîèñòå÷ü îò óêàçàííîé ïîëèòèêè ãðóçèíñêîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà, ìîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî ïîëàãàåò íåîáõîäèìûì íåìåäëåííî âûâåñòè èç Àáõàçèè ãðóçèíñêèå âîéñêà, ÷èíîâíèêîâ è ýìèññàðîâ» 58. Èìåííî â ýòîò ïåðèîä, â èþíå – àâãóñòå 1918 ã., Àëåêñàíäð Øåðâàøèäçå, Òàòàø Ìàðøàíèÿ, Ñèìîí Áàñàðèÿ è äðóãèå âëèÿòåëüíûå àáõàçû îáðàùà58

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

ëèñü çà ïîìîùüþ ê àáõàçàì-ìàõàäæèðàì, ïðîæèâàâøèì â Òóðöèè, ïðåäêè êîòîðûõ áûëè âûíóæäåíû ïîêèíóòü ðîäèíó â XIX ñòîëåòèè â ðåçóëüòàòå êàâêàçñêîé âîéíû. Íàðîä è ìíîãèå äåïóòàòû ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè ðàñöåíèëè ñèëîâûå äåéñòâèÿ Ãðóçèè êàê âîîðóæåííîå âòîðæåíèå â ïðåäåëû Ãîðñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâà. Ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Ãðóçèíñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè Íîé Æîðäàíèÿ âñïîìèíàë, êàê ïðåäñòàâèòåëè Ñåâåðíîãî Êàâêàçà ïðåäúÿâèëè òîãäà óëüòèìàòóì: «Àáõàçèÿ íàøà, óõîäèòå îòòóäà!»59. Òóðêè, â ñâîþ î÷åðåäü, òîæå ìå÷òàëè î Ñóõóìè è ïëàíèðîâàëè ñ ïîìîùüþ ÷å÷åíöåâ «çàùèòèòü Àáõàçèþ îò ãðóçèí»60.  íî÷ü íà 27 èþíÿ 1918 ã. àáõàçñêèé (à íå «òóðåöêèé», êàê ïèøåò À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè íà ñ. 267–268) âîîðóæåííûé äåñàíò èç Òóðöèè âûñàäèëñÿ ó ð. Êîäîð. Ýòî áûëà îòâåòíàÿ àêöèÿ, íàïðàâëåííàÿ ïðîòèâ îêêóïàöèè Àáõàçèè Ãðóçèåé è îáúÿâëåíèÿ 23 èþíÿ Ã. Ìàçíèåâà (Ìàçíèàøâèëè) ãåíåðàë-ãóáåðíàòîðîì Àáõàçèè. Îôèöèàëüíî Òóðöèÿ â ýòîò êîíôëèêò íå âìåøèâàëàñü. Äåñàíò æå, ïî ñóòè, áûë âîîðóæåííîé ñèëîé Ãîðñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâà. Êðîìå òîãî, èç ãåðìàíñêèõ èñòî÷íèêîâ èçâåñòíî, ÷òî ãîðñêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî â èþíå – àâãóñòå 1918 ã. ïî-ïðåæíåìó ïðåòåíäîâàëî íà Àáõàçèþ è Ñóõóìñêèé ïîðò. Ïîýòîìó íå ñëó÷àéíî, ÷òî â ýòè æå ìåñÿöû â Àáõàçèè ïðîèñõîäèëè íåîäíîêðàòíûå âûñàäêè ìîðñêèõ äåñàíòîâ àáõàçñêèõ ìàõàäæèðîâ. Îäíàêî òàêèå óñòðåìëåíèÿ ãîðñêîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà ïðîòèâîðå÷èëè èíòåðåñàì ãåðìàíñêîé ïîëèòèêè â ðåãèîíå61. Ïðàâèòåëüñòâî Ãîðñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè ïðîäîëæàëî ñ÷èòàòü Àáõàçèþ ÷àñòüþ ñâîåãî ãîñóäàðñòâà, íåñìîòðÿ íà òî ÷òî îíà áûëà îêêóïèðîâàíà Ãðóçèåé. Òàê, â 1919 ã. ïî çàêàçó Ãîðñêîé äåëåãàöèè â Ëîçàííå ïî-ôðàíöóçñêè áûëà îòïå÷àòàíà öâåòíàÿ ýòíîãðàôè÷åñêàÿ è ïîëèòè÷åñêàÿ êàðòà ðåñïóáëèêè ãîðöåâ Êàâêàçà62, ïðåäíàçíà÷åííàÿ äëÿ Ïàðèæñêîé ìèðíîé êîíôåðåíöèè (â ñîñòàâ Ãîðñêîé äåëåãàöèè áûë âêëþ÷åí è ïðåäñòàâèòåëü Àáõàçèè63). Íà ýòîé êðàñî÷íîé êàðòå íå òîëüêî Àáõàçèÿ, íî è Þæíàÿ Îñåòèÿ óêàçàíû íàõîäÿùèìèñÿ â ïðåäåëàõ Ãîðñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè. Ðàçäðàæàÿñü ïî ïîâîäó ýòèõ è äðóãèõ î÷åâèäíûõ ôàêòîâ, íåêîòîðûå ãðóçèíñêèå ó÷åíûå íåãîäóþò ïî ïîâîäó ïóáëèêàöèé àáõàçñêèõ èñòîðèêîâ. Èì âîîáùå êàæåòñÿ ñòðàííûì, ÷òî èì îòâå÷àþò. È òîãäà îíè íà÷èíàþò ïðèáåãàòü âîò ê òàêèì ïðèåìàì: «Àáõàçñêèå èñòîðèêè ñ÷èòàþò, – ïèøåò À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè, – ÷òî äîãîâîð îò 8 èþíÿ íå ïðåäîñòàâëÿë Àáõàçèè àâòîíîìèè â ñîñòàâå Ãðóçèè. Ýòî óòâåðæäåíèå èì íóæíî äëÿ ïîääåðæêè èçâåñòíîãî òåçèñà èäåîëîãà àáõàçñêèõ ñåïàðàòèñòîâ Ñ. Ëàêîáû î òîì, ÷òî Ãðóçèÿ, îêàçàâ ïîìîùü Àáõàçèè â áîðüáå ïðîòèâ áîëüøåâèñòñêèõ îòðÿäîâ è òóðåöêèõ áàíä, ïûòàâøèõñÿ çàõâàòèòü Ñóõóìè è òåððèòîðèþ Àáõàçèè, ñàìà óñòàíîâèëà íà åå òåððèòîðèè “îêêóïàöèîííûé ðåæèì”... Òàêàÿ ïîçèöèÿ íå ñëó÷àéíà, èáî óïîìèíàíèå îá àâòîíîìèè Àáõàçèè â ñîñòàâå Ãðóçèè äåëàåò àáñóðäíûì óòâåðæäåíèå èäåîëîãîâ ñåïàðàòèñòîâ, ÷òî ãðóçèíñêèå âîéñêà óñòàíîâèëè îêêóïàöèîííûé ðåæèì íà ñâîåé æå òåððèòîðèè» (Ñ. 266). 59

Ãëàâà III

×òî êàñàåòñÿ òåðìèíà «îêêóïàöèÿ» ïðèìåíèòåëüíî ê Àáõàçèè, òî îí âïåðâûå ïðîçâó÷àë â òîì æå 1918 ã., êîãäà ãðóçèíñêèå âîéñêà âòîðãëèñü â Àáõàçèþ, ò.å. çàäîëãî äî ìîåãî ðîæäåíèÿ. Ê ýòîìó âîïðîñó ìû åùå âåðíåìñÿ, õîòÿ ìàòåðèàëîâ íà ýòó òåìó îïóáëèêîâàíî óæå äîñòàòî÷íî. Ãðóçèíñêèé èñòîðèê íàçûâàåò ìåíÿ äàæå çàùèòíèêîì «ñîâåòñêîé èìïåðèè» (Ñ. 267). Íî âåäü èìåííî âî âðåìåíà «ñîâåòñêîé èìïåðèè» À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè èçó÷àë áûò êóðäîâ, ïèñàë îá Îêòÿáðüñêîé ðåâîëþöèè è íàöèîíàëüíîì äâèæåíèè, à çàòåì ïîä âëèÿíèåì Ç. Ãàìñàõóðäèà ïðèíÿëñÿ çà àáõàçîâ è îñåòèí.  ñâÿçè ñ íåêîòîðûìè âûñêàçûâàíèÿìè ýòîãî ó÷åíîãî ïðèâåäó ìíåíèå Êàðëà Ýðèêà Áåõîôôåðà, êîòîðûé ïîáûâàë íà Êàâêàçå â 1919–1920 ãã. «Ñâîáîäíîå è íåçàâèñèìîå ñîöèàë-äåìîêðàòè÷åñêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî ãîñóäàðñòâà Ãðóçèÿ, – îòìå÷àë îí, – íàâñåãäà îñòàíåòñÿ â ìîåé ïàìÿòè êàê êëàññè÷åñêèé ïðèìåð èìïåðèàëèñòè÷åñêîé “ìàëîé íàöèè”. Êàê â âîïðîñå î âíåøíèõ òåððèòîðèàëüíûõ çàõâàòàõ, òàê è â áþðîêðàòè÷åñêîé òèðàíèè âíóòðè ñòðàíû. Øîâèíèçì åå âíå âñÿêèõ ãðàíèö»64. Ãðóçèíñêèå âîéñêà ïîä êîìàíäîâàíèåì ãåíåðàëà Ã. Ìàçíèåâà îêêóïèðîâàëè íå òîëüêî Àáõàçèþ, íî ê 26 èþëÿ 1918 ã. çàõâàòèëè è òåððèòîðèþ ×åðíîìîðñêîãî ïîáåðåæüÿ âïëîòü äî Òóàïñå. Ïðàâäà, î÷åíü ñêîðî ãðóçèíû áûëè âûáèòû îòòóäà Äîáðîâîëü÷åñêîé àðìèåé è îòîøëè ê ð. Áçûáü. Îäíàêî îíè ïîñïåøèëè âêëþ÷èòü â êàðòó «Âåëèêîé Ãðóçèè» âñå çàõâà÷åííûå ñòðàíû è îáëàñòè è ñîáèðàëèñü ïðåäñòàâèòü åå íà Ïàðèæñêîé ìèðíîé êîíôåðåíöèè. Ñâîè äåéñòâèÿ â ×åðíîìîðüå îíè îáúÿñíÿëè áîðüáîé ñ áîëüøåâèêàìè, êîòîðàÿ, ïî ñëîâàì Ãåãå÷êîðè, áûëà âîïðîñîì «íàøåé æèçíè è ñìåðòè». Íî, çàìå÷àåò Äåíèêèí, «êàòåãîðè÷íîñòü ýòîãî çàÿâëåíèÿ áûëà, âïðî÷åì, òîò÷àñ æå îñëàáëåíà ïîÿñíåíèåì», ÷òî çàäà÷à ýòà ñòàâèòñÿ ëèøü íà «×åðíîìîðñêîì ïîáåðåæüå»65. Íà ýòó òåìó î÷åíü ìíîãîå áûëî ñêàçàíî ãåíåðàëàìè Ì. Àëåêñååâûì, À. Äåíèêèíûì, À. Ëóêîìñêèì, ïðåäñòàâèòåëåì êóáàíñêîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Í. Âîðîáüåâûì è äðóãèìè, êîòîðûå â òå÷åíèå 1918–1919 ãã., à çàòåì â ýìèãðàíòñêèõ èçäàíèÿõ íåîäíîêðàòíî îñâåùàëè ñîáûòèÿ â Àáõàçèè è íå ïðèçíàâàëè åå â ñîñòàâå Ãðóçèè. Íå áóäó çäåñü öèòèðîâàòü èõ ñâèäåòåëüñòâà, òàê êàê ìíîãèå èç íèõ îïóáëèêîâàíû, â òîì ÷èñëå Í. Âîðîáüåâà66, è ñèëüíî ðàçäðàæàþò íåêîòîðûõ ãðóçèíñêèõ èñòîðèêîâ. Âîåííûå è ïîëèòèêè òðåáîâàëè òîãäà î÷èñòèòü Àáõàçèþ îò ãðóçèíñêèõ âîéñê è àäìèíèñòðàöèè è ïðåäëàãàëè àíãëè÷àíàì îáúÿâèòü òåððèòîðèþ Àáõàçèè íåéòðàëüíîé67. Î âíåøíèõ çàõâàòàõ Ãðóçèè ïèñàë â ñâîèõ âîñïîìèíàíèÿõ è òàêîé îáúåêòèâíûé ñâèäåòåëü, êàê Á. Áàéêîâ. Îí îòìå÷àë, ÷òî èìïåðèàëèçì «ÿâëÿåòñÿ îòëè÷èòåëüíîé ÷åðòîé âíåøíåé ïîëèòèêè âñåõ ãîñóäàðñòâåííûõ íîâîîáðàçîâàíèé» Çàêàâêàçüÿ, êîòîðûå ñòàëè ïðåäúÿâëÿòü äðóã äðóãó òåððèòîðèàëüíûå ïðåòåíçèè. Èìåííî èìïåðèàëèçì, ïî åãî ñëîâàì, òîëêíóë «Ãðóçèþ íà îâëàäåíèå Ñàìóðçàêàíüþ è Àáõàçèåé»68. 60

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

Âîò òèïè÷íûé ïðèìåð, ñâÿçàííûé ñ Ñàìóðçàêàíüþ. 18 èþíÿ 1918 ã. îäíîâðåìåííî ñ âûñàäêîé ãðóçèíñêèõ âîéñê â Ñóõóìå â ÀÍÑ ïðèøëà òåëåãðàììà èç Òèôëèñà.  íåé ÌÂÄ Ãðóçèè ñîîáùàëî î âðåìåííîì ïîä÷èíåíèè Ñàìóðçàêàíñêîãî ó÷àñòêà Êóòàèññêîìó ãóáåðíñêîìó êîìèññàðó «ïî âîïðîñàì, îòíîñÿùèìñÿ ê îõðàíåíèþ â íåì ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ïîðÿäêà è îáùåñòâåííîé áåçîïàñíîñòè». Òàêèì îáðàçîì, Ñàìóðçàêàíü íàïðÿìóþ âêëþ÷àëàñü â ñîñòàâ Ãðóçèè. Òåì ñàìûì ãðóáî íàðóøàëñÿ ïóíêò 1 ñîãëàøåíèÿ îò 9 ôåâðàëÿ 1918 ã. î «åäèíîé íåðàçäåëüíîé Àáõàçèè â ïðåäåëàõ îò ð. Èíãóð äî ð. Ìçûìòà». È.î. Ñóõóìñêîãî îêðóæíîãî êîìèññàðà Ñ. Áàñàðèÿ, îáåñïîêîåííûé äàííîé òåëåãðàììîé, íàïðàâèë åå, «ââèäó âàæíîñòè èçëîæåííîãî», íà ðàññìîòðåíèå ÀÍÑ69. Îäíàêî, êàê âûÿñíèëîñü, äåïóòàòû ÀÍÑ áûëè âîîáùå íå â êóðñå ïðîèñõîäèâøåãî, à ãðóçèíñêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî äåéñòâîâàëî ÷åðåç ñâîåãî ñòàâëåííèêà Â. Øåðâàøèäçå, êîòîðûé åùå 12 èþíÿ 1918 ã. òàéíî îáðàòèëñÿ â Òèôëèñ ê âîåííîìó ìèíèñòðó ïî ïîâîäó «âîäâîðåíèÿ ïîðÿäêà» â Ñàìóðçàêàíå70. Äåëàòü ïîëèòèêó ÷óæèìè ðóêàìè – ýòî ñòàðûé, èñïûòàííûé ïðèåì... Ïðîøëî åùå íåìíîãî âðåìåíè, è 23 èþíÿ 1918 ã. ãåíåðàë Ìàçíèåâ ñâîèì ïðèêàçîì îáúÿâèë Àáõàçèþ ãåíåðàë-ãóáåðíàòîðñòâîì, à ñåáÿ ãóáåðíàòîðîì. Òàêèå îòêðîâåííûå è áåñöåðåìîííûå äåéñòâèÿ ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Ãðóçèè âûçâàëè âçðûâ íåãîäîâàíèÿ â Àáõàçèè. Òåïåðü âîçìóòèëñÿ äàæå ïðåäñåäàòåëü ÀÍÑ Â. Øåðâàøèäçå, êîòîðûé îòêðûòî ëèøàëñÿ äàæå ôîðìàëüíîé âëàñòè ðóêîâîäèòåëÿ Àáõàçèè. 4 èþëÿ 1918 ã. îò èìåíè ÀÍÑ îí íàïðàâèë ïðàâèòåëüñòâó Ãðóçèè è ïðåäñåäàòåëþ Íàöèîíàëüíîãî Ñîâåòà Ãðóçèè ïðîòåñò.  íåì, â ÷àñòíîñòè, ãîâîðèëîñü: «Â ïîëíîì ñîçíàíèè ñâîåé îòâåòñòâåííîñòè Àáõàçñêèé Íàðîäíûé Ñîâåò âñòóïèë â ïåðåãîâîðû ñ ïðàâèòåëüñòâîì Ãðóçèíñêîé Äåìîêðàòè÷åñêîé Ðåñïóáëèêè ñ öåëüþ óñòàíîâèòü âçàèìíîå ïîíèìàíèå è äðóæåñêóþ ñâÿçü. Ïðàâèòåëüñòâî Ãðóçèè, òàêæå ñîçíàâàÿ âñþ îòâåòñòâåííîñòü ìîìåíòà, ïîäïèñàëî ñ Àáõàçñêèì Íàðîäíûì Ñîâåòîì äîãîâîð 11-ãî èþíÿ ñåãî ãîäà (âûäåëåíî ìíîþ.– Ñ.Ë.); è âî èñïîëíåíèå ïóíêòà 6 äîãîâîðà (âûäåëåíî ìíîþ. – Ñ.Ë.) 11 èþíÿ ïðàâèòåëüñòâî Ãðóçèè ïîñëàëî â Àáõàçèþ âîéñêîâûå ÷àñòè â ïîìîùü Àáõàçñêîìó Íàðîäíîìó Ñîâåòó è â åãî ðàñïîðÿæåíèå ïîä êîìàíäîé ãåíåðàëà Ìàçíèåâà. Ïî ïðèáûòèè â Ñóõóì ãåíåðàë Ìàçíèåâ îïóáëèêîâàë ïðèêàç ïî Ñóõóìñêîìó ãåíåðàë-ãóáåðíàòîðñòâó îò 23-ãî ñåãî èþíÿ ¹1, êîèì Àáõàçèÿ, ñîãëàñíî òåëåãðàììå âîåííîãî ìèíèñòðà, áûëà îáúÿâëåíà Ñóõóìñêèì ãåíåðàë-ãóáåðíàòîðñòâîì, à ãåíåðàë Ìàçíèåâ ãåíåðàë-ãóáåðíàòîðîì.  ïðèêàçå ¹3 ãåíåðàë, óæå âäàâàÿñü â îáëàñòü ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ âçàèìîîòíîøåíèé ìåæäó Ãðóçèåé è Àáõàçèåé, çàÿâëÿåò ñåáÿ ïðåäñòàâèòåëåì ãðóçèíñêîé âëàñòè è òðåáóåò îò íàñåëåíèÿ áåçîãîâîðî÷íîãî ïîä÷èíåíèÿ âñåì çàêîíàì Ãðóçèíñêîé Äåìîêðàòè÷åñêîé Ðåñïóáëèêè, ÷åì íàðóøàåòñÿ ïóíêò 8 äîãîâîðà (âûäåëåíî ìíîþ. – Ñ.Ë.). Àáõàçñêèé Íàðîäíûé Ñîâåò ïðîñèò ðàñïîðÿæåíèÿ îá îòìåíå ïðèêàçà âîåííîãî ìèíèñòðà, êîèì ãåíåðàë Ìàçíèåâ áåç âåäîìà è ñîãëàñèÿ Íàðîäíîãî 61

Ãëàâà III

Ñîâåòà áûë íàçíà÷åí Ñóõóìñêèì ãåíåðàë-ãóáåðíàòîðîì. Ïðè÷åì äîâîæó äî Âàøåãî ñâåäåíèÿ, ÷òî Àáõàçñêèì Íàðîäíûì Ñîâåòîì áûëè äàíû ãåíåðàëó Ìàçíèåâó øèðîêèå ïîëíîìî÷èÿ, âïëîòü äî ïðàâà ââåäåíèÿ îñàäíîãî ïîëîæåíèÿ, íî èñêëþ÷èòåëüíî ïðè âåäåíèè âîåííûõ îïåðàöèé. Ïðîøó óêàçàòü ãåíåðàëó, ÷òî èñòî÷íèêîì âëàñòè è ÷ðåçâû÷àéíûõ ïîëíîìî÷èé íà òåððèòîðèè Àáõàçèè ÿâëÿåòñÿ òîëüêî Àáõàçñêèé Íàðîäíûé Ñîâåò... Óêàçàííûå âûøå äåéñòâèÿ ãåíåðàë-ãóáåðíàòîðà â Àáõàçèè, ïî ñóùåñòâó, ñîçäàþò â ìàññàõ íàñåëåíèÿ Àáõàçèè íåäîâåðèå ïî îòíîøåíèþ Ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Ãðóçèíñêîé Ðåñïóáëèê腻71. Ïðîòåñò Â. Øåðâàøèäçå, òàêèì îáðàçîì, êîíñòàòèðîâàë ñâåðøèâøèéñÿ ôàêò îêêóïàöèè Àáõàçèè ãðóçèíñêèìè âîéñêàìè âñëåä çà îòòîðæåíèåì îò Àáõàçèè Ñàìóðçàêàíè (íûíå Ãàëüñêèé ðàéîí), ÷åãî òàê îïàñàëñÿ Ñèìîí Áàñàðèÿ. Ïî ìåòêîìó âûðàæåíèþ Äåíèêèíà, Ãðóçèÿ çàíÿëàñü «îêðóãëåíèåì ãðàíèö»72. Ïðåäñåäàòåëü ÀÍÑ îêàçûâàåòñÿ ïîíÿòèÿ íå èìåë î ïîäìåíå «äîãîâîðà» è ññûëàëñÿ íà åãî òåêñò îò 11-ãî, à íå 8 èþíÿ 1918 ã., î ÷åì ïîäðîáíî ãîâîðèëîñü âûøå. Îí óïîìèíàë ï. 6 «äîãîâîðà», íà îñíîâå êîòîðîãî áûëè ââåäåíû âîéñêà, à òàêæå ï. 8, ãäå îòìå÷àëîñü, ÷òî ñîöèàëüíûå ðåôîðìû ïðîâîäÿòñÿ â æèçíü àáõàçñêèì ïàðëàìåíòîì «íà îñíîâàíèè îáùèõ çàêîíîâ, èçäàííûõ Çàêàâêàçñêèì Ñåéìîì, íî ïðèìåíèòåëüíî ê ìåñòíûì óñëîâèÿì» (ñðàâíèòå ñ ï. 6 «äîãîâîðà» îò 8 èþíÿ, ãäå ñêàçàíî, ÷òî ñîöèàëüíûå ðåôîðìû â Àáõàçèè ïðîâîäèò ÀÍÑ «íà îñíîâå îáùèõ çàêîíîâ Ãðóçèè ñ ó÷åòîì ìåñòíûõ îñîáåííîñòåé»). Íå çíàë Â. Øåðâàøèäçå è î òîì, ÷òî íàçíà÷åíèå Ìàçíèåâà ãåíåðàë-ãóáåðíàòîðîì Àáõàçèè ñîñòîÿëîñü â Òèôëèñå 18 èþíÿ 1918 ã. ïðèêàçîì âîåííîãî ìèíèñòðà Ãðóçèè. Èíûìè ñëîâàìè, îí ñòàë ôàêòè÷åñêèì ïðàâèòåëåì Àáõàçèè åùå äî ñâîåãî ïîÿâëåíèÿ â Ñóõóìå, êóäà ïðèáûë 19 èþíÿ. Ïîñëå ââåäåíèÿ ãðóçèíñêèõ âîéñê â Àáõàçèþ ïîëîæåíèå ðåçêî îñëîæíèëîñü. Óæå òîãäà, â èþëå 1918 ã., «íàðîä äóìàë, ÷òî ãðóçèíû ïðèøëè îêêóïèðîâàòü Àáõàçèþ»73. Âûñòóïàÿ 18 èþëÿ 1918 ã. íà çàñåäàíèè ÀÍÑ, È. Ðàìèøâèëè âûíóæäåí áûë ïðèçíàòü: «Óìû àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà íàñòðîåíû ïðîòèâ ãðóçèíñêîé äåìîêðàòèè è åå ïðåäñòàâèòåëåé, ïðî êîòîðûõ áûëà ïóùåíà ñïëåòíÿ, ÷òî îíè áóäòî áû íåñóò ðàáñòâî è ïîðàáîùåíèå àáõàçñêîìó íàðîäó... Ïîëîæåíèå ðèñóåòñÿ òàêèì, ÷òî íåñîìíåííî íóæíî îòîçâàòü îòñþäà ãðóçèíñêèå âîéñêà, à ïîòîìó îí åäåò â Òèôëèñ äëÿ äîêëàäà ïî ýòîìó ïîâîäó, òàê êàê ëó÷øå çàáëàãîâðåìåííî îòîçâàòü âîéñêà, ÷åì æäàòü êðîâîïðîëèòèÿ»74. Îäíàêî ïðàâèòåëüñòâî Ãðóçèè íå óäåðæàëîñü îò èìïåðñêèõ àìáèöèé, è âîéñêà íå òîëüêî íå áûëè âûâåäåíû èç Àáõàçèè, íî ïðîäîëæàëè çàíèìàòü âñå íîâûå òåððèòîðèè â íàïðàâëåíèè Òóàïñå. Ïðè÷èíîé ýòîãî ïðîäâèæåíèÿ, ïî ñëîâàì Äåíèêèíà, ïîñëóæèëà ñëàáîñòü ×åðíîìîðüÿ, ïîâîäîì – áîðüáà ñ áîëüøåâèêàìè, ãàðàíòèåé – ñîãëàñèå è ïîääåðæêà íåìöåâ, çàíÿâøèõ è óêðåïèâøèõ Àäëåð.  äàëüíåéøåì ãðóçèíñêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî ïîñòàðàëîñü ñ ïîìîùüþ ó÷åíûõ (â ÷àñòíîñòè, Ï. Èíãîðîêâà75) è ãåíåðàëîâ «îáîñíîâàòü» ñâîè ïðåòåí62

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

çèè íà âíîâü çàíÿòûå ÷åðíîìîðñêèå òåððèòîðèè. Òàê, â äîêóìåíòå, ïðåäñòàâëåííîì 1 ìàÿ 1919 ã. ãåíåðàëîì È. Îäèøåëèäçå íà Ïàðèæñêîé êîíôåðåíöèè, óòâåðæäàëîñü, ÷òî âñÿ ïîëîñà ïîáåðåæüÿ äî Àíàïû è óñòüÿ ð. Êóáàíü ïðèíàäëåæàëà Ãðóçèè óæå â XI–XIII ââ. È óæ ñîâåðøåííî íåëåïî çâó÷àëî çàÿâëåíèå, áóäòî «â ïðîäîëæåíèå XIV ñòîëåòèÿ ãðàíèöû ïîñòåïåííî îòîøëè íàçàä, ê ð. Ìàêîïñå, è ñ XV ñòîëåòèÿ äî XIX â., ò.å. âïëîòü äî ïðèñîåäèíåíèÿ ýòîé ÷àñòè Ãðóçèè ê Ðîññèè, ãðàíèöåé âñåãäà áûëà ð. Ìàêîïñå (þæíåå Òóàïñå)». Âïîëíå ñîëèäàðåí ñ ïîäîáíûìè èçìûøëåíèÿìè è èñòîðèê À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè76.  óïîìÿíóòîé äîêëàäíîé çàïèñêå ãåíåðàëà È. Îäèøåëèäçå äîïóùåíî ñìåøåíèå ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ ãðàíèö Ãðóçèè XI–XIII ââ. (êîòîðàÿ òîãäà ïðåäñòàâëÿëà ñîáîé ôåäåðàòèâíîå ãîñóäàðñòâî) ñ åå ñîáñòâåííî ýòíè÷åñêèìè ãðàíèöàìè.  VIII–Õ ââ. è ïîëèòè÷åñêèå ãðàíèöû Àáõàçñêîãî öàðñòâà ïðîñòèðàëèñü äî Ýðåòè (äî ãðàíèöû ñîâðåìåííîãî Àçåðáàéäæàíà) è áûëè ãîðàçäî øèðå ýòíè÷åñêèõ. Íî íèêòî íà ýòîì îñíîâàíèè íå óòâåðæäàåò, ÷òî, ñêàæåì, Èìåðåòèÿ, Êàõåòèÿ, Êàðòëè áûëè íàñåëåíû â ýòîò ïåðèîä àáõàçàìè è ÷òî ýòî àáõàçñêàÿ çåìëÿ. Õîòÿ, åñëè ñëåäîâàòü ëîãèêå ãðóçèíñêîãî ãåíåðàëà, èìåííî ê òàêîìó âûâîäó ìîæíî ïðèéòè. Ðàçâå ãðóçèíñêîìó ó÷åíîìó íåâåäîìî, ÷òî íà âñåì ïðîñòðàíñòâå îò óñòüÿ Êóáàíè è Àíàïû äî ð. Èíãóð ñ äðåâíåéøèõ âðåìåí ïðîæèâàëè àáõàçî-àäûãñêèå íàðîäû? Ãåíåðàë Îäèøåëèäçå äàæå Ñî÷è îáúÿâèë «÷èñòî ãðóçèíñêèì ãîðîäîì», à âåñü ×åðíîìîðñêèé îêðó㠖 «äðåâíåé ãðóçèíñêîé ïðîâèíöèåé». Îí çàÿâëÿë òàêæå, ÷òî öàðñêèé ìèíèñòð Åðìîëîâ «ðàçäàâàë çåìëþ ãðóçèí ðóññêèì ÷èíîâíèêàì è ãåíåðàëàì»77.  ýòîé ñâÿçè âñïîìèíàåòñÿ, êàê â 1990 ã. èçâåñòíûé àáõàçñêèé äåÿòåëü Çóðàá À÷áà î÷åíü âåðíî ïîäìåòèë: «Íåêîòîðûå ãðóçèíñêèå ó÷åíûå óòâåðæäàþò, ÷òî òåððèòîðèÿ îò ð. Êóáàíü äî ð. Èíãóð – ýòî èõ çåìëÿ. Íî ïóñòü îíè â ïðåäåëàõ äàííîé òåððèòîðèè íàçîâóò õîòÿ áû îäíîãî ãðóçèíñêîãî èëè ìåãðåëüñêîãî êíÿçÿ, äâîðÿíèíà, êîòîðûé âëàäåë áû, â òîì ÷èñëå è â Àáõàçèè, ðîäîâûìè èìåíèÿìè è ñîáñòâåííûìè çåìëÿìè. Òàêèõ ïðîñòî íåò»78. Êàê èçâåñòíî, ×åðíîìîðñêèé êðàé çàíèìàë ïëîùàäü îò Àíàïû äî Ãàãðû è äî 1864 ã. ýòó òåððèòîðèþ ñïëîøü íàñåëÿëè ðîäñòâåííûå íàðîäû – àäûãè (íàòóõàéöû, øàïñóãè, àáàäçåõè è äð.), óáûõè è àáõàçû (ñàäçû, àõ÷èïñó). Ïîñëå îêîí÷àíèÿ êàâêàçñêîé âîéíû â 1864 ã. êîðåííîå íàñåëåíèå êðàÿ âûíóæäåíî áûëî ïåðåñåëèòüñÿ â Òóðöèþ. Ðàéîí Ñî÷è, ãäå æèëè óáûõè, âîîáùå îáåçëþäåë. Íà ïîêèíóòûõ çåìëÿõ ñòàëè ñåëèòüñÿ êîëîíèñòû – ðóññêèå, ïîëÿêè, ýñòîíöû, íåìöû, àðìÿíå, ãðåêè, ìîëäàâàíå. Ïåðâûå ãðóçèíû ïåðåñåëèëèñü â Ñî÷èíñêèé îêðóã èç Êóòàèññêîé ãóáåðíèè â 1881–1882 ãã. è îñåëè â îñíîâíîì â ñåëå Ïëàñòóíñêîå79. Ñ ýòîãî âðåìåíè Ñî÷è è ñòàë, ïî-âèäèìîìó, «ãðóçèíñêèì ãîðîäîì». Åùå â 1991 ã. ïî ïîâîäó òîëüêî ÷òî îïóáëèêîâàííîãî òåíäåíöèîçíîãî èññëåäîâàíèÿ «Èç èñòîðèè âçàèìîîòíîøåíèé ãðóçèíñêîãî, àáõàçñêîãî è îñåòèíñêîãî íàðîäîâ» (Òáèëèñè, 1990) ÿ ïèñàë: «Ýòà ðàáîòà – ïîëèòè÷åñêèé 63

Ãëàâà III

çàêàç è ÿðêîå ïðîÿâëåíèå òåõ èìïåðñêèõ àìáèöèé, êîòîðûå ñåãîäíÿ âíîâü îòêðûòî è àãðåññèâíî âîçîáëàäàëè â Ãðóçèè»80. Íà ñ. 268 «Ðàçûñêàíèé» ãðóçèíñêèé èñòîðèê ïðåäïðèíèìàåò ïîïûòêó äîâåñòè äî íè÷òîæíîé öèôðû è áåç òîãî íåáîëüøîå àáõàçñêîå íàñåëåíèå, ññûëàÿñü ïðè ýòîì íà íåîáúåêòèâíûå è âòîðîñòåïåííûå ãðóçèíñêèå èñòî÷íèêè è ñîâåðøåííî èãíîðèðóÿ äàííûå ïåðâîé âñåðîññèéñêîé (1897 ã.) è ïåðâîé âñåñîþçíîé (1926 ã.) ïåðåïèñåé íàñåëåíèÿ. Òàê, ïðèìåíèòåëüíî ê 1917 ã. îí ïðèâîäèò ñëåäóþùèå ñâåäåíèÿ ïî Àáõàçèè: ãðóçèí – 74 846 ÷åëîâåê (42,1%), àáõàçî⠖ 38 121 (21,4%), ðóññêèõ – 20 893 (11,7%), ãðåêî⠖ 20 673 (11,7%), àðìÿí – 18 219 (10,2%) è äðóãèõ – 5087 (2,9%)81. Ïðè ýòîì íóæíî ó÷èòûâàòü, ÷òî â ÷èñëî «ãðóçèí» âêëþ÷åíû ïîãîëîâíî âñå ñàìóðçàêàíöû è ìåãðåëû. Îäíàêî, ïî ðåçóëüòàòàì ïåðåïèñè 1897 ã., àáõàçîâ áûëî 58 697 (55,3%) ÷åëîâåê, à ãðóçèí (â îñíîâíîì ìåãðåëîâ) – 25 875 (22,4%), è ëèøü ïåðåïèñü 1926 ã. çàôèêñèðîâàëà 67 494 (31,8%) ãðóçèí è 55 918 (26,4%) àáõàçîâ82. Èíòåðåñíî, ÷òî äàæå ãðóçèíñêèé ìèíèñòð âíóòðåííèõ äåë Íîé Ðàìèøâèëè, ñëîâà êîòîðîãî Ìåíòåøàøâèëè ïðèâîäèò83, óêàçûâàåò, ÷òî â 1919 ã. â Àáõàçèè íàñ÷èòûâàëîñü 60 òûñ. ãðóçèí (!). Ìàëîâåðîÿòíî, ÷òîáû îí íå çíàë î ôàíòàñòè÷åñêîé öèôðå ãðóçèí, ïîëó÷åííîé ïî äàííûì ãðóçèíñêîé ñåëüñêîõîçÿéñòâåííîé ïåðåïèñè 1917 ã., è ñïóñòÿ äâà ãîäà, äà åùå íà ïåðåãîâîðàõ ñ àíãëè÷àíàìè, òàê çàíèçèë ÷èñëåííîñòü ñâîèõ ñîïëåìåííèêîâ â Àáõàçèè. Ñêîðåå íàïðîòèâ, Í. Ðàìèøâèëè ñòðåìèëñÿ ìàêñèìàëüíî çàâûñèòü èõ êîëè÷åñòâî. Íî â îòëè÷èå îò Ìåíòåøàøâèëè, îí õîðîøî çíàë äåéñòâèòåëüíîå ïîëîæåíèå âåùåé â Àáõàçèè, ãäå â 1917 ã. 75 òûñ. ãðóçèí íå ìîãëî áûòü – ýòîé äóòîé öèôðå àíãëè÷àíå è ãåíåðàë Äåíèêèí íèêîãäà áû íå ïîâåðèëè. Òåì áîëåå, ÷òî ó Äåíèêèíà áûëè ñîâåðøåííî äðóãèå äàííûå, îòíîñèâøèåñÿ ê 1916 ãîäó: «àáõàçî⠖ 56%, ãðóçèí – 18, ðóññêèõ – 11, àðìÿí – 10, ïðî÷èõ – 5»84. Äàæå â 1926 ã. ãðóçèí, ãëàâíûì îáðàçîì ìåãðåëîâ, áûëî ìåíåå 70 òûñ. Äàëåå Ìåíòåøàøâèëè ïðèâîäèò ñâåäåíèÿ èç äðóãîãî èñòî÷íèêà85, èçäàííîãî â Òèôëèñå â 1927 ã.  íåì óæå çíà÷èòñÿ 36 òûñ. àáõàçîâ. Èíûìè ñëîâàìè, çà äåñÿòü ëåò (ñ 1917 ã.) ÷èñëåííîñòü àáõàçîâ íå âûðîñëà, à, ïî ãðóçèíñêèì äàííûì, ñîêðàòèëàñü áîëåå ÷åì íà äâå òûñÿ÷è ÷åëîâåê. Óäèâèòåëüíî, êàê â ãðóçèíñêîé ñòàòèñòèêå àáõàçû âîîáùå äîæèëè äî ñåãîäíÿøíåãî äíÿ! Åùå 30 ìàðòà 1920 ã. â àáõàçñêîé ãàçåòå Àïñíû ïî ýòîìó ïîâîäó âûñêàçàëñÿ îäèí èç ëó÷øèõ çíàòîêîâ àáõàçñêîé æèçíè Äìèòðèé Ãóëèà.  ñòàòüå «Ïðàâäà îäíîìó â ïîëüçó, à äðóãîìó – âî âðåä» îí îñîáî îòìå÷àë: «Âîò óæå ìíîãî ëåò êðÿäó ïîñòîÿííî íà ìíîãîëþäíûõ ñõîäàõ, “ìèòèíãàõ”, â âûñòóïëåíèÿõ ñëûøèòñÿ, ÷òî â Àáõàçèè ïðîæèâàåò îêîëî 33 òûñ. àáõàçîâ. Êàê ýòî ïîíèìàòü? Ïî äàííûì ýíöèêëîïåäè÷åñêîãî ñëîâàðÿ Ô. Ïàâëåíêîâà, â 1910 ãîäó â Àáõàçèè ïðîæèâàëî 70 òûñ. àáõàçîâ, ïî Ê. Ìà÷àâàðèàíè (1912 ã.) – 82 900, ïî ñòàòèñòèêå 1916 ã. – 91 òûñ.  íàñòîÿùåå æå âðåìÿ èõ îêîëî 100 òûñ. ×òî ýòî çà ëþäè, êîòîðûå íå ìîãóò îòëè÷èòü 100 000 îò 33 000? Åñëè íå çíàþò, ïî÷åìó áû èì íå îáðàòèòüñÿ ê êîìó-ëèáî èç àáõàçîâ èëè â ëèòåðàòóðó çàãëÿíóòü? Ïî÷åìó îíè íå ñòûäÿòñÿ çà óìûøëåííóþ ëîæü?» 86. 64

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

Íåëüçÿ îáîéòè ìîë÷àíèåì è òî, êàêèìè ìåòîäàìè â 1918 ã. äåéñòâîâàëî ïðàâèòåëüñòâî Ãðóçèè, ÷òîáû óòâåðäèòüñÿ íà çàõâà÷åííîé òåððèòîðèè. Ñèìîí Áàñàðèÿ ïî ýòîìó ïîâîäó îñòàâèë î÷åíü âàæíîå è èíòåðåñíîå ñâèäåòåëüñòâî. «Ñëåäóþùèé ÷óäîâèùíûé, íåâåðîÿòíûé ôàêò îêîí÷àòåëüíî ðàñêðûë íàñåëåíèþ, – ïèñàë îí, – ÷òî ãðóçèíñêèå èìïåðèàëèñòû âûòâîðÿþò íå÷òî êîøìàðíîå, îäèíàêîâî ïîçîðíîå êàê äëÿ àáõàçñêîé, òàê è äëÿ ãðóçèíñêîé íàöèè. Èìåííî, ïîòðåáîâàëè îò Àáõàçñêîãî Íàðîäíîãî Ñîâåòà ïèñüìåííûé äîêóìåíò î òîì, ÷òî Òóàïñå åñòü ãðàíèöà Àáõàçèè è ÷òî Àáõàçèÿ èìååò ïðàâî çàíÿòü ×åðíîìîðñêîå ïîáåðåæüå äî Òóàïñå âêëþ÷èòåëüíî. Âñþ ýòó ìàõèíàöèþ èì íóæíî áûëî ïðîäåëàòü â òåõ âèäàõ, ÷òî àðìèÿ Ìàçíèåâà, çàíÿâ Ñî÷è, óæå ïîäõîäèëà ê Òóàïñå, íî ãåíåðàë ôîí Êðåññ, ãåðìàíñêèé ïðîòåêòîð Ãðóçèè, óêàçàë ïðàâèòåëüñòâó ïîñëåäíåé íà íåóäîáñòâî çàíèìàòü ÷óæóþ òåððèòîðèþ. Âîò èì è íóæíî áûëî çàðó÷èòüñÿ äîêóìåíòîì, ïî êîòîðîìó âèäíî áûëî, ÷òî Òóàïñå çàíèìàåòñÿ ïî ïðîñüáå àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà, êîòîðûé, äåñêàòü, èìååò èñòîðè÷åñêîå ïðàâî íà íåãî. ×ëåíû Íàðîäíîãî Ñîâåòà àáõàçû ïðîòåñòîâàëè ïðîòèâ òàêîãî òðåáîâàíèÿ, óêàçàëè íà èìïåðèàëèñòè÷åñêèå çàòåè Ãðóçèè è ò.ä., íî áîëüøèíñòâî Ñîâåòà èç íàçíà÷åíöåâ (îêêóïàöèîííûõ âëàñòåé. – Ñ.Ë.), à òàêæå íîâûé ïðåäñåäàòåëü åãî (Â. Øåðâàøèäçå. – Ñ.Ë.), ðàçäåëÿâøèé ïîëèòèêó íîâûõ âëàñòåé, íàñòîÿë íà ñâîåì. Î÷åâèäíî, êàê ó âñåõ ñîçäàòåëåé èìïåðèé, ïðåä ãðóçèíñêèì ïðàâèòåëüñòâîì âîññòàëî âèäåíèå îãðîìíîãî ãîñóäàðñòâà – ãîñóäàðñòâà âåëè÷èÿ, êàêèì äîëæíà áûëà ñòàòü “äåìîêðàòè÷åñêàÿ ðåñïóáëèêà”»87. Òàêîâû ôàêòû.  ñåðåäèíå ñåíòÿáðÿ 1918 ã. àáõàçñêàÿ äåëåãàöèÿ ïðèáûëà ê ãåíåðàëó Ì.Ñ. Àëåêñååâó88, à 25 ñåíòÿáðÿ â Åêàòåðèíîäàðå (íûíå Êðàñíîäàð) ñîñòîÿëîñü èçâåñòíîå ñîâåùàíèå, íà êîòîðîì ðàññìàòðèâàëñÿ è âîïðîñ îá Àáõàçèè. Îäíàêî ñ ñàìîãî íà÷àëà ãåíåðàëû Äîáðîâîëü÷åñêîé àðìèè íå ñêðûâàëè ñâîèõ ïîäîçðåíèé îòíîñèòåëüíî ñîâìåñòíîãî âòîðæåíèÿ ãðóçèí è íåìöåâ â ×åðíîìîðüå è ñïðàøèâàëè: «Íå ó÷àñòâóåò ëè Ãðóçèÿ â ñîþçå ñ íåìöàìè è áîëüøåâèêàìè â êîìáèíàöèè îêðóæåíèÿ» àðìèè ãåíåðàëà Àëåêñååâà? Ãåãå÷êîðè îòâåðã òàêîå ïðåäïîëîæåíèå89. Èíòåðåñíî, ÷òî îí çàÿâèë òîãäà Àëåêñååâó: «Âîïðîñ î âçàèìîîòíîøåíèÿõ Àáõàçèè, Ãðóçèè è Êóáàíè íóæíî ðåøàòü íå çäåñü, à â äðóãîì ìåñòå»90.  äàííîì ñëó÷àå Ãåãå÷êîðè, õîòÿ è êîñâåííî, íî ïðèçíàë, ÷òî âîïðîñ îá Àáõàçèè åùå íå ðåøåí. Ïî ïîâîäó æå çàíÿòîé Ìàçíèåâûì òåððèòîðèè Ñî÷è – Ãàãðà ãåíåðàë Àëåêñååâ çàÿâèë: «Ìîæíî ëè âîîáùå ãîâîðèòü îá ýòèõ îêðóãàõ, êàê î ãðóçèíñêèõ, êîãäà ìåæäó íèìè è Ãðóçèåé èìååòñÿ åùå öåëûé îêðóã Àáõàçèè?»91. Åùå áîëåå ðåçêî âûñêàçàëñÿ íà ñîâåùàíèè ïðåäñòàâèòåëü êóáàíñêîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Í. Âîðîáüåâ: «Åñëè ãîâîðèòü î ãðàíèöå Ãðóçèè, òî íóæíî óñòàíîâèòü åå òîëüêî âïëîòü äî Àáõàçèè...»92. Äàëåå îí çàìåòèë: «Çà Ãàãðèíñêèì îêðóãîì èìååòñÿ åùå è Àáõàçèÿ, êîòîðóþ îòäàâàòü íà ñúåäåíèå ìû íå ìîæåì. Ãðóçèÿ äîëæíà íà÷èíàòü ñâîè ãðàíèöû çà Àáõàçèåé...»93. 65

Ãëàâà III

Êîíêðåòíóþ îöåíêó äåéñòâèÿì Ãðóçèè è ñèòóàöèè íà ×åðíîìîðüå äàë è ãåíåðàë À. Ëóêîìñêèé: «... ýòîò ïåðèîä ãðóçèíñêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî äîëæíî áûëî äåéñòâîâàòü ïî óêàçêå íåìöåâ è, íàêîíåö, äëÿ Ãðóçèè Ñî÷èíñêèé îêðóã èìåë ãðîìàäíîå çíà÷åíèå â ñìûñëå çîíû, îòäåëÿþùåé îò Äîáðîâîëü÷åñêîé àðìèè Ñóõóìñêèé îêðóã, íàñåëåííûé ñâîáîäîëþáèâûì è âîèíñòâåííûì àáõàçñêèì íàðîäîì, íå æåëàâøèì ïîä÷èíèòüñÿ Ãðóçèè. Ãðóçèíñêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî îïàñàëîñü, ÷òî åñëè Ñî÷èíñêèé îêðóã âîéäåò â ñîñòàâ ×åðíîìîðñêîé ãóáåðíèè, òî íåïîñðåäñòâåííîå ñîñåäñòâî ðàéîíà, ïîä÷èíåííîãî Äîáðîâîëü÷åñêîé àðìèè, ñ Ñóõóìñêèì îêðóãîì ìîæåò ïîâëèÿòü íà îòïàäåíèå Àáõàçèè îò Ãðóçèè è ëèøåíèå ïîñëåäíåé ïîðòîâ íà ×åðíîì ìîðå»94. Íà ñåíòÿáðüñêîì ñîâåùàíèè â Åêàòåðèíîäàðå ãåíåðàë Àëåêñååâ êîíñòàòèðîâàë, ÷òî áóäóùåå ïîëîæåíèå Àáõàçèè âîîáùå íå îïðåäåëåíî95. Î÷åíü èíòåðåñíóþ ïîçèöèþ çàíÿë òîãäà èçâåñòíûé ïîëèòè÷åñêèé äåÿòåëü Ðîññèè Â.Â. Øóëüãèí. Îáðàùàÿñü ê Ãåãå÷êîðè, îí ñïðîñèë: «...Ìû ìîæåì áûòü âïîëíå êîìïåòåíòíû è â ñâîèõ ðåøåíèÿõ ïî âîïðîñó îá Àáõàçèè. Ïî ñò. 13 äîïîëíåíèÿ ê Áðåñòñêîìó äîãîâîðó, Ãðóçèÿ ïðèçíàíà íåçàâèñèìîé, è åñëè áû Àáõàçèÿ çàõîòåëà ýòîãî, ÿ äóìàþ, ïî òåì æå îñíîâàíèÿì, îíà ìîãëà áû äîáèòüñÿ ñàìîñòîÿòåëüíîñòè. Ïðîøó îòâåòèòü, åñëè ïðè çàêëþ÷åíèè Áðåñòñêîãî äîãîâîðà áûëà ðå÷ü î ãðàíèöàõ, òî áûëè ëè óñòàíîâëåíû ãðàíèöû Ãðóçèè?». Âîïðîñ ïðîçâó÷àë íàñòîëüêî íåîæèäàííî äëÿ Ãåãå÷êîðè, ÷òî îí âûíóæäåí áûë ïðèçíàòü: «Íåò, çàôèêñèðîâàíî òî÷íûõ ãðàíèö íå áûëî. Îñîáûì äåêðåòîì áûëî çàÿâëåíî, ÷òî ãðàíèöû óñòàíàâëèâàþòñÿ âðåìåíåì»96. Íî åñëè «Ãðóçèÿ ñ÷èòàåò ñåáÿ íåçàâèñèìîé ðåñïóáëèêîé», âîçðàæàëè ñîáåñåäíèêè òèôëèññêîìó äèïëîìàòó, òî «ïóñòü ïðåäîñòàâèò è Àáõàçèè èìåòü ñóæäåíèå î ñâîåé ñóäüáå»97. Êàê ñâèäåòåëüñòâóåò äîêóìåíò, äàæå íà êîíåö ñåíòÿáðÿ 1918 ã. ó Ãðóçèè åùå íå áûëè óñòàíîâëåíû ãðàíèöû è åå «ãîñóäàðñòâåííîñòü» áûëà ñòîëü çûáêîé, ÷òî åå ïðèòÿçàíèÿ íà Àáõàçèþ âûãëÿäåëè ïðîñòî íåñåðüåçíî. Òåì áîëåå ÷òî ãëàâíûé ñîþçíèê ñîöèàë-äåìîêðàòè÷åñêîé Ãðóçèè, èìïåðàòîðñêàÿ Ãåðìàíèÿ, äîæèâàëà ïîñëåäíèå ìåñÿöû è âìåñòå ñ ñóëòàíñêîé Òóðöèåé îòõîäèëà íà çàäíèé ïëàí. Ñ ðåçêèì îñëàáëåíèåì èõ ìåæäóíàðîäíûõ ïîçèöèé ðóøèëèñü è íàäåæäû ãðóçèíñêîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà. Ãåðìàíèÿ òåðïåëà ñîêðóøèòåëüíîå ïîðàæåíèå â Ïåðâîé ìèðîâîé âîéíå, à «Äåíèêèí è åãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâî íå ïðèçíàâàëè Àáõàçèþ â ñîñòàâå Ãðóçèè» äàæå â 1919 ã., î ÷åì ñâèäåòåëüñòâóåò íîòà Ñàçîíîâà, áûâøåãî ìèíèñòðà èíîñòðàííûõ äåë öàðñêîé Ðîññèè è ïðåäñòàâèòåëÿ Äåíèêèíà íà Ïàðèæñêîé êîíôåðåíöèè, ëîðäó Êåðçîíó (Ñ. 280–281). Ñ ýòèì ñïðàâåäëèâûì çàìå÷àíèåì À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè íåëüçÿ íå ñîãëàñèòüñÿ. Íóæíî ó÷èòûâàòü è òî îáñòîÿòåëüñòâî, ÷òî ñ îñåíè 1918 ã. Äîáðîâîëü÷åñêàÿ àðìèÿ áûëà ãëàâíîé ïîëèòè÷åñêîé ñèëîé, ñ êîòîðîé ñ÷èòàëàñü ïðåæäå âñåãî Àíãëèÿ, à Ãðóçèÿ ïðàêòè÷åñêè íè÷åãî íå ðåøàëà è ôàêòè÷åñêè íå ñóùåñòâîâàëà êàê ãîñóäàðñòâî. Òàê, ïðèâîäÿ ïðîòîêîë ñîâåùàíèÿ îò 23 ìàÿ 66

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

1919 ã., ñîñòîÿâøåãîñÿ ìåæäó ãðóçèíñêîé äåëåãàöèåé (Å. Ãåãå÷êîðè, Í. Ðàìèøâèëè) è ïðåäñòàâèòåëåì Äåíèêèíà ãåíåðàëîì Áðèããñîì, À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè îòìå÷àåò, ÷òî ýòîò äîêóìåíò íàãëÿäíî ñâèäåòåëüñòâóåò î ïëàíàõ çàõâàòà Äåíèêèíûì «âñåé Àáõàçèè è îòòîðæåíèÿ åå îò Ãðóçèè» (Ñ. 273). Çà âûñîêîïàðíûìè ðàññóæäåíèÿìè ãðóçèíñêîé äåëåãàöèè î ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé ãðàíèöå è î òîì, ÷òî «2000 ëåò Ãðóçèÿ ñóùåñòâîâàëà êàê íåçàâèñèìîå ãîñóäàðñòâî» è ò.ï., íåâîçìîæíî ñêðûòü òîò ôàêò, ÷òî ïðàâèòåëüñòâî Ãðóçèè ñòðåìèëîñü îáðåñòè ìåæäóíàðîäíîå ïðèçíàíèå, ÷åìó âñÿ÷åñêè ïðîòèâèëàñü Àíãëèÿ. «Âåäü íàøå ìåæäóíàðîäíîå ïîëîæåíèå åùå íå âûÿñíåíî îêîí÷àòåëüíî, è ìû æäåì ðàçðåøåíèÿ ýòîãî âîïðîñà!» (Ñ. 276) – âîñêëèêíóë â ñåðäöàõ Ãåãå÷êîðè. Øåë ìàé 1919 ãîäà. Ãðóçèþ êàê ñàìîñòîÿòåëüíîå ãîñóäàðñòâî íèêòî íå ïðèçíàâàë. Êàêóþ æå àâòîíîìèþ ìîãëà îíà ïðåäîñòàâèòü Àáõàçèè?

VI Ãðóçèíñêèå îêêóïàöèîííûå âëàñòè ïðîâîäèëè â Àáõàçèè ðåïðåññèâíóþ ïîëèòèêó. Îäíàêî ìíîãèå ãðóçèíñêèå àâòîðû ïûòàþòñÿ ïðåïîäíåñòè ýòè äåéñòâèÿ êàê «ðåäêèå ñëó÷àè ïðåâûøåíèÿ ïîëíîìî÷èé ñî ñòîðîíû ïðàâèòåëüñòâåííûõ âîéñê». ×òî æå íà ñàìîì äåëå ïðîèñõîäèëî â Àáõàçèè ïîñëå âòîðæåíèÿ ãðóçèíñêîé àðìèè?  ñâÿçè ñ íåîäíîêðàòíûìè âûñàäêàìè â èþíå – àâãóñòå 1918 ã. àáõàçñêîãî äåñàíòà ìàõàäæèðîâ èç Òóðöèè âîéñêà Ãðóçèíñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè ïðîâîäèëè â Êîäîðñêîì ó÷àñòêå êàðàòåëüíûå àêöèè. Ïðîòèâ ìèðíîãî êðåñòüÿíñêîãî íàñåëåíèÿ, êîòîðîå íå óñïåëî ñîðãàíèçîâàòüñÿ è ïîääåðæàòü àáõàçîâ-ìàõàäæèðîâ, áûëà ðàçâÿçàíà ñàìàÿ íàñòîÿùàÿ âîéíà. Òèôëèññêèå âëàñòè, ëèöåìåðíî íàçûâàÿ î÷àì÷èðñêèõ àáõàçîâ ëîÿëüíûìè, âîñïîëüçîâàëèñü âûñàäêîé äåñàíòà è ïîä ïðåäëîãîì áîðüáû ñ íèì îãíåì è ìå÷îì ïðîøëèñü ïî êîäîðñêèì ñåëàì. Áûëà áóêâàëüíî ðàçãðîìëåíà Äæãåðäà – ðîäèíà Òàòàøà Ìàðøàíèÿ. Ìåíüøåâèñòñêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî âîçáóäèëî áîëüøîå äåëî «Î ïîâñòàí÷åñêîì äâèæåíèè â Àáõàçèè». Íà÷àëñÿ ðîçûñê ðóêîâîäèòåëåé äâèæåíèÿ – Àëåêñàíäðà Øåðâàøèäçå, Òàòàøà Ìàðøàíèÿ, Ñèìîíà Áàñàðèÿ, Òàêóÿ Öâèæáà, Õàêè Àâèäçáà, Ìåäæèäà Áàãàïø, Êåãâû Êèóò, Õàáèäæà è Êàðàìàíà Àøóáà è äð.  íî÷ü íà 15 àâãóñòà 1918 ã. ó Ìîêâñêîãî ìîíàñòûðÿ ðåãóëÿðíûå ãðóçèíñêèå ÷àñòè ñîâìåñòíî ñ êàçàêàìè ðàçáèëè ìàõàäæèðîâ.  òîò æå äåíü ïðàâèòåëüñòâî Ãðóçèè ïðè àêòèâíîì ó÷àñòèè Âàðëàìà Øåðâàøèäçå ðàçîãíàëî ÀÍÑ, êîòîðûé ñòàë âûõîäèòü èç ïîâèíîâåíèÿ è åùå 8 àâãóñòà 1918 ã. â îòñóòñòâèå Â. Øåðâàøèäçå ïðèíÿë ðåøåíèå î ñîçäàíèè êîìèññèè äëÿ âûáîðîâ â àáõàçñêîå Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíîå ñîáðàíèå98. Òàêîå ðåøåíèå çàêëþ÷àëî äëÿ Ãðóçèè ñåðüåçíóþ óãðîçó, òàê êàê â ñîîòâåòñòâèè ñ «äîãîâîðîì» îò 8 (èëè 11) èþíÿ 1918 ã. Àáõàçèÿ íà ïîäîáíîì Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíîì ñîáðàíèè äîëæíà áûëà îêîí÷àòåëüíî îïðåäåëèòü ñâîå ïîëèòè÷åñêîå óñòðîéñòâî è 67

Ãëàâà III

âçàèìîîòíîøåíèÿ ñ Ãðóçèåé.  ñâÿçè ñ ýòèì ñòðåìëåíèåì Òèôëèñ îáâèíèë äåïóòàòîâ ÀÍÑ â «òóðêîôèëüñòâå».  çàë çàñåäàíèÿ âîðâàëèñü ìåíüøåâèñòñêèå ãâàðäåéöû. ÀÍÑ áûë ðàçãðîìëåí è «ðåîðãàíèçîâàí» ïóòåì çàìåíû íåóãîäíûõ äåïóòàòîâ «ãîðñêîé» îðèåíòàöèè ëþäüìè ãðóçèíñêîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà.  Òèôëèñ ïîëåòåëî ñîîáùåíèå: «Ñåãîäíÿ, 15 àâãóñòà, îïïîçèöèÿ Àáõàçñêîãî Íàðîäíîãî Ñîâåòà ðàçîãíàëà ñòàðûé ñîñòàâ, îðãàíèçóþùèé â òûëó âîññòàíèå òóðêîôèëüñòâóþùåãî õàðàêòåðà»99. Î êàðàòåëüíûõ ìåðîïðèÿòèÿõ îêêóïàöèîííîãî ðåæèìà ìèíèñòð ïî äåëàì Àáõàçèè Ð. ×õîòóà ïîäðîáíî ñîîáùàë èç Òèôëèñà 2 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1918 ã. ïðåäñåäàòåëþ ÀÍÑ Â. Øåðâàøèäçå: «Ðåãóëÿðíûå âîéñêà â òûëó, è â áëèæíåì è â äàëüíåì, íå íàøåäøè âîçìîæíîñòü ñîïðèêîñíîâåíèÿ ñ òóðêàìè, çàíÿëèñü ìàññîâûìè àðåñòàìè ìèðíîãî íàñåëåíèÿ è ïîäæîãàìè.  íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ ñóõóìñêàÿ òþðüìà ïåðåïîëíåíà ìèðíûìè àáõàçöàìè Êîäîðñêîãî ó÷àñòêà, êîòîðûå ÷èñëÿòñÿ â ñïèñêàõ Øòàáà âîåííîïëåííûìè. ×òî êàñàåòñÿ ïîäæîãîâ, òî îíè ïðîäîëæàþòñÿ äî ïîñëåäíåãî âðåìåíè... Âñå ïðîèñõîäÿùåå â ñèëó ñêàçàííîãî âûøå íà÷èíàåò ó÷èòûâàòüñÿ íàðîäíûìè ìàññàìè, êàê àêò âðàæäåáíîãî íàñèëèÿ ñî ñòîðîíû ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Äåìîêðàòè÷åñêîé Ðåñïóáëèêè, íàïðàâëåííûé ê ïîêîðåíèþ Àáõàçèè...»100. Ïîñëå ïåðâîãî ðàçãîíà ÀÍÑ è åãî «ðåîðãàíèçàöèè» îí áûë ïðåâðàùåí â óäîáíóþ øèðìó ïðàâèòåëüñòâà è âîåííûõ êðóãîâ Ãðóçèè. Îò èìåíè ÀÍÑ âëàñòè ïðîâîäèëè â Àáõàçèè ñàìûå áåççàñòåí÷èâûå ìåðîïðèÿòèÿ, âïëîòü äî êàðàòåëüíûõ ðàñïðàâ íàä ìèðíûìè æèòåëÿìè. Ñðåäè íàñåëåíèÿ íàðàñòàëî íåäîâîëüñòâî ïîëèòèêîé ïîäàâëåíèÿ è äåÿòåëüíîñòüþ ÀÍÑ, êîòîðûé âîçãëàâëÿë ïîëèòèê ãðóçèíñêîé îðèåíòàöèè Âàðëàì Øåðâàøèäçå. 20 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1918 ã.101, íàêàíóíå âòîðîãî ðàçãîíà ÀÍÑ, ìèíèñòð ïî äåëàì Àáõàçèè Ð. ×õîòóà íàïðàâèë ïðåäñåäàòåëþ ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Ãðóçèè è Â. Øåðâàøèäçå îòíîøåíèå î íåîáõîäèìîñòè ïåðåñìîòðåòü «äîãîâîð» îò 11 èþíÿ 1918 ã. ìåæäó Àáõàçèåé è Ãðóçèåé íà îñíîâàíèè åãî 1-ãî ïóíêòà (êàê âèäèì, è ìèíèñòð íè÷åãî íå çíàë î «äîãîâîðå» îò 8 èþíÿ!). Ïî ñâèäåòåëüñòâó Ì. Òàðíàâà, îïïîçèöèÿ îñòðî êðèòèêîâàëà ôðàêöèþ ìåíüøåâèñòñêîé ïðàâÿùåé ïàðòèè çà áåçäåéñòâèå â ñâÿçè ñ áåñ÷èíñòâàìè âîåííûõ âëàñòåé. Ê îêòÿáðþ 1918 ã. ñîîòíîøåíèå ñèë â ïàðëàìåíòå ñòàëî óæå ìåíÿòüñÿ â ïîëüçó îïïîçèöèè. Íà áóðíîì çàñåäàíèè ÀÍÑ 9 îêòÿáðÿ 1918 ã. äåïóòàòû ïîñòàâèëè âîïðîñ î âèíîâíèêàõ è ñîó÷àñòíèêàõ ðàçãîíà Ñîâåòà 15 àâãóñòà.  ñâîåì çàÿâëåíèè äåïóòàòû Ä. Àëàíèÿ, Ñ. Àøõàöàâà è äð. ïîòðåáîâàëè «âîññòàíîâèòü â ïðàâàõ íàñèëüñòâåííî ðàñïóùåííûé Íàðîäíûé Ñîâåò, ïîëüçóþùèéñÿ ïîëíûì äîâåðèåì Àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà, ñ åãî çàêîííûì ïðåçèäèóìîì âî ãëàâå». Ñåìåí Àøõàöàâà ïîòðåáîâàë: «Òðóäîâîå íàñåëåíèå Àáõàçèè îïðåäåëåííî ðåøèëî âçÿòü âëàñòü â ñâîè ðóêè, äëÿ ÷åãî ïðèñëàëî ñâîèõ ïðåäñòàâèòåëåé… Íåîáõîäèìî ïåðåèçáðàòü ïðåçèäèóì (ò.å. Â. Øåðâàøèäçå. – Ñ.Ë.). Ëþäè, íå ïîëüçóþùèåñÿ íè äîâåðèåì, íè óâàæåíèåì íàðîäà, íå ìîãóò ïðàâèòü ñòðàíîé»102. Âå÷åðîì 9 îêòÿáðÿ äåïóòàòû ÀÍÑ ïðîãîëîñîâàëè ïðîòèâ ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ñîâåòà Â. Øåðâàøèäçå. Çäàíèå òóò æå îöåïèëè 68

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

ãðóçèíñêèå ãâàðäåéöû, à íà ñëåäóþùèé äåíü, 10 îêòÿáðÿ, âòîðîé ÀÍÑ áûë ðàçîãíàí âîåííîé ñèëîé. Ìåíüøåâèñòñêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî îáúÿâèëî î ðîñïóñêå ÀÍÑ è íàçíà÷åíèè íîâûõ âûáîðîâ. Óòðîì 10 îêòÿáðÿ áûëè àðåñòîâàíû îêðóæíîé êîìèññàð È. Ìàðãàíèÿ âìåñòå ñ Ñ. Àøõàöàâà. Äíåì íà áóëüâàðå ñîáðàëñÿ ìèòèíã, íà êîòîðîì âûñòóïèë Ã. Òóìàíîâ ñ «ðåçêîé îáëè÷èòåëüíîé ðå÷üþ ïðîòèâ ìåíüøåâèñòñêèõ áåçîáðàçèé». Ìèòèíã áûë ðàçîãíàí, à Ã. Òóìàíîâ è Ã. Àäæàìîâ (îáà âõîäèëè â äåëåãàöèþ ïî ïîâîäó «äîãîâîðà» 8 èþíÿ 1918 ã.) àðåñòîâàíû.  ïîñëåäóþùèå äíè âëàñòè âçÿëè ïîä ñòðàæó âèäíûõ àáõàçñêèõ äåïóòàòîâ Ä. Àëàíèÿ, Â. ×à÷áà, Ì. Øëàòòåðà – âñåãî äî 16 ÷åëîâåê. Íåñêîëüêî àáõàçñêèõ ïîëèòèêîâ íî÷üþ îòïðàâèëè íà ïàðîõîäå â Áàòóì, à çàòåì çàêëþ÷èëè â òèôëèññêóþ Ìåòåõñêóþ òþðüìó. Îíè îáâèíÿëèñü â çàãîâîðå ïðîòèâ Ãðóçèíñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè, â ñâÿçÿõ ñ òóðêàìè è Äîáðîâîëü÷åñêîé àðìèåé. Îðãàíèçàòîðàìè ïîïûòêè ïåðåâîðîòà â Àáõàçèè áûëè íàçâàíû ìèíèñòð Ð. ×õîòóà è êîìèññàð È. Ìàðãàíèÿ. 10 îêòÿáðÿ 1918 ã. â Òèôëèñå âûñòóïèë ñ äîêëàäîì ãëàâà ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Í. Æîðäàíèÿ.  ïîñòàíîâëåíèè ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Ãðóçèè ÀÍÑ îáúÿâëÿëñÿ ðàñïóùåííûì, à äîëæíîñòü ìèíèñòðà ïî äåëàì Àáõàçèè óïðàçäíÿëàñü. Òàê, â Àáõàçèè áûëè ëèêâèäèðîâàíû ïîñëåäíèå îñòàòêè ëèïîâîãî «äîãîâîðà» îò 8 èþíÿ è ôèêòèâíîãî ñàìîóïðàâëåíèÿ Àáõàçèè, êîòîðàÿ îêàçàëàñü ïîëíîñòüþ îêêóïèðîâàííîé âîåííîé ñèëîé Ãðóçèíñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè. Ñâîå ïðèñóòñòâèå çäåñü Òèôëèñ îáúÿñíÿë òî áîðüáîé ñ áîëüøåâèêàìè è àíàðõèåé, òî ñ òóðêîôèëüñòâîì è àëåêñååâñêèìè íàñòðîåíèÿìè. 9 îêòÿáðÿ 1918 ã. íà äðàìàòè÷åñêîì çàñåäàíèè ÀÍÑ î÷åíü ìåòêî ïî ýòîìó ïîâîäó âûñêàçàëñÿ Ñ. Àøõàöàâà: «Ñóùåñòâóþùèé ïîðÿäîê íå ìîæåò áîëüøå ïðîäîëæàòüñÿ. Ðàçãîâîð î òóðêîôèëüñòâå – ýòî âçäîð è îáìàí...»103. Ñ ïîäà÷è Â. Øåðâàøèäçå, Ä. Ýìóõâàðè è äð. ìàðèîíåòîê áûë îêîí÷àòåëüíî ðàçîãíàí íåóãîäíûé Òèôëèñó ñîñòàâ âòîðîãî ÀÍÑ. Íàñòóïèë ïåðèîä íåïðèêðûòîé îêêóïàöèè Àáõàçèè.  3-ì ïóíêòå ïîñòàíîâëåíèÿ ãðóçèíñêîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà îò 10 îêòÿáðÿ 1918 ã. ñîîáùàëîñü: «Âðåìåííî, äî èçáðàíèÿ Íàðîäíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçèè (Æîðäàíèÿ óæå è íàçâàíèå ÀÍÑ èçìåíèë. – Ñ.Ë.), íàçíà÷èòü êîìèññàðîì Ñóõóìñêîãî îêðóãà Áåíèþ ×õèêâèøâèëè, â ðóêè êîòîðîãî äîëæíà ïåðåéòè âñÿ ïîëíîòà âëàñòè; äî åãî ïðèåçäà âûñøåé âîåííîé è ãðàæäàíñêîé âëàñòüþ îáëà÷èòü íà÷àëüíèêà øòàáà Ñóõóìñêîãî îòðÿäà Òóõàðåëè». Èç ïðèâåäåííîãî äîêóìåíòà âèäíî, ÷òî ãðóçèíñêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî ñîâåðøèëî äàâíî ïîäãîòîâëÿåìûé ïåðåâîðîò. Ñ îêòÿáðÿ 1918-ãî ïî ìàðò 1919 ã. âñå ãðàæäàíñêîå óïðàâëåíèå Àáõàçèåé îñóùåñòâëÿëîñü ïðÿìûì âìåøàòåëüñòâîì Ãðóçèíñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè. «Äîãîâîð» îò 8 èþíÿ óòðàòèë âñÿêîå çíà÷åíèå. ×ðåçâû÷àéíûé êîìèññàð Á. ×õèêâèøâèëè îïèðàëñÿ íà âîîðóæåííóþ ñèëó Ãðóçèè è íà ïîä÷èíåííûõ åìó êîìèññàðîâ óåçäîâ.  óñëîâèÿõ íåïðèêðûòîé îêêóïàöèè ãðóçèíñêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî ïðèñòóïèëî ê âûáîðàì òðåòüåãî ÀÍÑ íà «äåìîêðàòè÷åñêèõ» íà÷àëàõ. Ïðåäñåäàòåëåì öåíòðàëüíîé èçáèðàòåëüíîé êîìèññèè, êàê è åå ÷ëåíàìè, ñòàë «ñâîé» 69

Ãëàâà III

÷åëîâåê, ìåíüøåâèê Â. Øåðâàøèäçå, îäíàêî âñÿ ðàáîòà êîìèññèè íàïðàâëÿëàñü èç Òèôëèñà ÷åðåç Á. ×õèêâèøâèëè è È. Ðàìèøâèëè. 17 äåêàáðÿ 1918 ã. â ïàðëàìåíòå Ãðóçèè ñ äîêëàäîì î ïîëîæåíèè â Àáõàçèè âûñòóïèë ìèíèñòð âíóòðåííèõ äåë Íîé Ðàìèøâèëè. Ïðèçíàâàÿ, ÷òî â Àáõàçèè äî ñèõ ïîð äåéñòâîâàë «ïðàâèòåëüñòâåííûé ìå÷», îí óòâåðæäàë, ÷òî âîåííûå äåéñòâèÿ âñåãäà ñîïðîâîæäàþòñÿ «ïðèòåñíåíèåì» ìèðíîãî íàñåëåíèÿ, ïî÷åìó òàì è ðàçäàþòñÿ ãîëîñà íåäîâîëüíûõ. Ïðåäëîæèâ íåìåäëåííî ïðèñòóïèòü ê «ïîëîæèòåëüíûì äåéñòâèÿì» è ñðî÷íî ñîçäàòü íîâûé Íàðîäíûé Ñîâåò, ìèíèñòð ïðåäñòàâèë ïðîåêò î âûáîðàõ â ÀÍÑ, êîòîðûé è áûë óòâåðæäåí ïàðëàìåíòîì Ãðóçèè 27 äåêàáðÿ 1918 ã.104 Íîâûé ÀÍÑ äîëæåí áûë èçáèðàòüñÿ âñåìè æèòåëÿìè Àáõàçèè áåç ðàçëè÷èÿ ïîääàíñòâà, â òî âðåìÿ êàê â ñàìîé Ãðóçèè çíà÷èòåëüíàÿ ÷àñòü íàñåëåíèÿ áûëà ëèøåíà èçáèðàòåëüíûõ ïðàâ. Ïîïðàâêè, âíåñåííûå â ïðîåêò î âûáîðàõ è îòíîñèâøèåñÿ ê Àáõàçèè, õàðàêòåðèçîâàëèñü âïîëíå îïðåäåëåííîé íàïðàâëåííîñòüþ. Òàê, îäíà èç íèõ ãëàñèëà: «äåïóòàòàìè ÀÍÑ ìîãóò áûòü èçáðàíû ïîääàííûå Ãðóçèè, íå ïðîæèâàþùèå â Àáõàçèè, è òå, êòî ïîëó÷èë ïðàâî íà æèòåëüñòâî â Àáõàçèè è ïîñëå 19 èþëÿ 1914 ãîäà». Òàêèì îáðàçîì, âñå áûëî ñäåëàíî äëÿ òîãî, ÷òîáû â íîâûé ñîñòàâ ÀÍÑ ïðîøëè òàêèå äåïóòàòû, êàê Èñèäîð Ðàìèøâèëè, Ëåâ Òóìàðêèí, ïðèñòðîèâøèéñÿ íà ñëóæáó ê âëàñòÿì Òèôëèñà, è ìíîãèå äðóãèå, êîòîðûå íèêàê íå áûëè ñâÿçàíû ñ Àáõàçèåé, íî â äàëüíåéøåì ôàêòè÷åñêè óïðàâëÿëè åþ â ðåçóëüòàòå ïðîâåäåíèÿ «äåìîêðàòè÷åñêèõ» âûáîðîâ.  ðåçóëüòàòå íîÿáðüñêîé ðåâîëþöèè 1918 ã. â Ãåðìàíèè Ãðóçèÿ ëèøèëàñü ñâîåãî ãëàâíîãî ñîþçíèêà, è âñå äîãîâîðåííîñòè Òèôëèñà ñ èìïåðàòîðñêîé Ãåðìàíèåé è ñóëòàíñêîé Òóðöèåé êàíóëè â ëåòó. Ñòðàíû-ïîáåäèòåëüíèöû, ïðåæäå âñåãî Àíãëèÿ, íå ïðèçíàâàëè ãðóçèíñêîé ãîñóäàðñòâåííîñòè. Ýòî äåëàëîñü â ñîîòâåòñòâèè ñ ïîæåëàíèÿìè ãåíåðàëà À.È. Äåíèêèíà, áëèæàéøåãî åå ñîþçíèêà. Êàçàëîñü, ðåæèì Í. Æîðäàíèÿ äîæèâàåò ïîñëåäíèå äíè, òàê êàê ïîáåäà Àíòàíòû îçíà÷àëà ïîáåäó Äåíèêèíà è ëèêâèäàöèþ ìåíüøåâèñòñêîé Ãðóçèè.  îòëè÷èå îò íåìöåâ, àíãëè÷àíå íå öåðåìîíèëèñü ñ Òèôëèñîì è ñðàçó æå ïðåäúÿâèëè ïðàâèòåëüñòâó Ãðóçèè æåñòêèå òðåáîâàíèÿ, â òîì ÷èñëå îòíîñèòåëüíî îêêóïèðîâàííîé Àáõàçèè. «Ïåðâûé àíãëè÷àíèí, – âñïîìèíàë Æîðäàíèÿ, – êîòîðûé ÿâèëñÿ êî ìíå îò èìåíè àíãëèéñêîãî êîìàíäîâàíèÿ, áûë ãåíåðàë Áðàéòôîðä. Ãåíåðàë ïðèáûë íà çàñåäàíèå ïðàâèòåëüñòâà. Îí âîøåë ê íàì êàê ôåëüäôåáåëü, ãðóáûé è íåâîñïèòàííûé, ïîÿâèëñÿ êàê âëàñòåëèí. Ìåæäó íàìè ïðîèçîøëà ñòû÷êà. Îí ñ óãðîçîé íàì îáúÿâèë: “Âû çäåñü äîëãî íå áóäåòå ãîñïîäñòâîâàòü!” – è óøåë»105. Èìåííî â òàêîé, ñëîæíåéøåé äëÿ Ãðóçèè ñèòóàöèè åå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî ïðèçíàëî, íàêîíåö, èñòèííûé – êàðàòåëüíûé – õàðàêòåð ñâîèõ äåéñòâèé â Àáõàçèè (Í. Ðàìèøâèëè), â äåêàáðå 1918 ã. âûíåñëî ñïåöèàëüíîå ïîñòàíîâëåíèå î ðàññëåäîâàíèè àêöèé ãðóçèíñêèõ âîéñê è ïîñïåøèëî îáúÿâèòü (â êîòîðûé ðàç!) îá óñòðîéñòâå âíóòðåííåé æèçíè Àáõàçèè íà «àâòîíîìíûõ íà÷àëàõ», ÷òîáû íå ïîòåðÿòü çàõâà÷åííóþ òåððèòîðèþ, à ãëàâíîå – ñîõðàíèòü ñâîå ñóùåñòâîâàíèå. 70

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

Ïîëèòè÷åñêóþ ñèòóàöèþ ýòîãî íåïðîñòîãî ïåðèîäà ïñèõîëîãè÷åñêè âåðíî îáðèñîâàë «âîæäü Êðàñíîé Àðìèè» Ë. Òðîöêèé.  ôåâðàëå 1922 ã. â ðàáîòå «Ìåæäó èìïåðèàëèçìîì è ðåâîëþöèåé. Îñíîâíûå âîïðîñû ðåâîëþöèè íà ÷àñòíîì ïðèìåðå Ãðóçèè» îí ïèñàë: «25 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1918 ã. Æîðäàíèÿ ïèñüìåííî çàâåðÿë ôîí Êðåññà: “Íå â íàøèõ èíòåðåñàõ óìàëÿòü ïðåñòèæ Ãåðìàíèè íà Êàâêàçå”. À ÷åðåç äâà ìåñÿöà ïðèøëîñü óæå îòêðûâàòü âîðîòà âåëèêîáðèòàíñêèì âîéñêàì... Ñëîâîì, ïðè ïåðåìåíå ãåðìàíñêîãî ïîääàíñòâà íà àíòàíòîâñêîå âîæäè ãðóçèíñêîãî ìåíüøåâèçìà ÷ðåçìåðíî ïðåíåáðåãëè äîáðûì ñòàðûì ñîâåòîì ðóññêîãî ïîýòà: “Ëüñòåöû, ëüñòåöû, óìåéòå ñîõðàíèòü è â ñàìîé ïîäëîñòè îòòåíîê áëàãîðîäñòâà”»106. Àáõàçñêèå äåïóòàòû, àðåñòîâàííûå 10 îêòÿáðÿ 1918 ã., íàõîäèëèñü â çàêëþ÷åíèè â òå÷åíèå âñåãî ïåðèîäà âûðàáîòêè ïîëîæåíèÿ î âûáîðàõ â ÀÍÑ, â òî âðåìÿ êàê ïðåäâûáîðíóþ àãèòàöèþ âåëà èñêëþ÷èòåëüíî ïðàâÿùàÿ ñîöèàë-äåìîêðàòè÷åñêàÿ ïàðòèÿ è àãåíòû ãðóçèíñêîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà. Òîëüêî íåçàäîëãî äî âûáîðîâ äåïóòàòû áûëè îñâîáîæäåíû èç Ìåòåõè ïî òðåáîâàíèþ Äåíèêèíà è êîìàíäóþùåãî ñîþçíûìè âîéñêàìè íà Êàâêàçå àíãëèéñêîãî ãåíåðàëà Òîìñîíà, êîòîðûé 5 äåêàáðÿ 1918 ã. îáðàòèëñÿ ê ïðàâèòåëüñòâó Ãðóçèè ïî ïîâîäó àðåñòîâàííûõ àáõàçîâ. Íà ñëåäóþùèé äåíü, 6 äåêàáðÿ, ñîñòîÿëàñü áåñåäà ìåæäó àíãëèéñêèì ïîëêîâíèêîì Ñòîêñîì, ïðåäñòàâèòåëÿìè Ãðóçèè â Áàêó Àëøèáàÿ è ïîëêîâíèêîì Ìàðãàíàäçå. Î÷åíü èíòåðåñíóþ ñòåíîãðàììó ýòîé âñòðå÷è èç àðõèâà Ãàðâàðäñêîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà öèòèðóåò À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè107. Âîîáùå, ñëåäóåò çàìåòèòü, ÷òî ýòîò ó÷åíûé ïîðîé ïðèâîäèò äîêóìåíòû, êîòîðûå ñòàâÿò ïîä ñîìíåíèå íåêîòîðûå åãî âûâîäû. Íàì, «íå äîïóùåííûì» â Ãàðâàðä, îñòàåòñÿ òîëüêî äîãàäûâàòüñÿ, ñêîëüêî åùå èíòåðåñíåéøèõ äîêóìåíòîâ õðàíèòñÿ â òàìîøíåì «Ãðóçèíñêîì àðõèâå», êîòîðûå ÷åì-òî «ñìóùàþò» èñòîðèêîâ èç Òáèëèñè. Ïðèâåäó ëèøü ôðàãìåíò èç áåñåäû Ñòîêñà ñ ãðóçèíñêèìè ïðåäñòàâèòåëÿìè. «Ñòîêñ: – Ãäå îíè ó âàñ íàõîäÿòñÿ? Àëøèáàÿ: –  Òèôëèñå, â Ìåòåõñêîì çàìêå – ýòî òþðüìà äëÿ ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ. Ñòîêñ: – Çà÷åì òàêèå ñóðîâîñòè? Àëøèáàÿ: – Ã-í ïîëêîâíèê, îíè îáâèíÿþòñÿ â ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé èçìåíå. Ïðàâèòåëüñòâî íå ìîãëî íå îòíåñòèñü ê íèì ïî âñåé ñòðîãîñòè çàêîíà. Èç ÷èñëà àðåñòîâàííûõ îäèí áûë ïðè÷àñòåí ê áîëüøåâèñòñêîìó äâèæåíèþ, äðóãîé – èç ÷èñëà òåõ àáõàçöåâ-òóðêîôèëîâ, êîòîðûå ÷åòûðå ìåñÿöà òîìó íàçàä õîòåëè îðãàíèçîâàòü âûñàäêó òóðåöêîãî äåñàíòà â Àáõàçèè. Ñòîêñ: – Âû òîìèòå â òþðüìå àáõàçöåâ, íå ïðåäúÿâëÿÿ îáâèíåíèÿ, ìû ýòîãî äîïóñòèòü íå ìîæåì. Àëøèáàÿ: – Ñ Àáõàçèåé ó íàñ íàèëó÷øèå îòíîøåíèÿ. Âàì ýòî ìîæåò ïîäòâåðäèòü ïîëêîâíèê Ìàðãàíàäçå – íàø âîåííûé ïðåäñòàâèòåëü ïðè äèïëîìàòè÷åñêîì ïðåäñòàâèòåëüñòâå. Ìàðãàíàäçå: – ß àáõàç è ñëóæó ó ãðóçèíñêîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà. ß äîëæåí çàâåðèòü Âàñ, ÷òî ìåæäó íàìè, àáõàçàìè, è Ãðóçèåé íåò íåïðèÿçíåííûõ 71

Ãëàâà III

îòíîøåíèé. Ãðóçèÿ â ñèëó äîãîâîðà ñ Àáõàçèåé ïðåäîñòàâèëà åé ïîëíîå âíóòðåííåå ñàìîóïðàâëåíèå. Àáõàçñêèé Íàðîäíûé Ñîâåò âåäàåò âñåìè âíóòðåííèìè äåëàìè Àáõàçèè. Òîëüêî îòäåëüíûå ëè÷íîñòè ìîãóò èäòè ïðîòèâ ãðóçèíñêîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà, à íå àáõàçñêèé íàðîä. Àëøèáàÿ: – Âû çàñòóïàåòåñü çà ëèö, êîòîðûå íåäîñòîéíû Âàøåãî çàñòóïíè÷åñòâà. Ïîëîæåíèå çàêëþ÷åííûõ àáõàçöåâ äîëæíî âîëíîâàòü Àáõàçñêèé Íàðîäíûé Ñîâåò áîëüøå, ÷åì êîãî áû òî íè áûëî, íî Àáõàçñêèé Íàðîäíûé Ñîâåò íå ñäåëàë íèêàêîãî çàÿâëåíèÿ â çàùèòó àðåñòîâàííûõ – ýòî ïîòîìó, ÷òî îíè íå çàñëóæèëè çàñòóïíè÷åñòâà. Ñòîêñ: – ß íàøåë áû íóæíûì îñâîáîäèòü èõ èç òþðüìû, íî äåðæàòü èõ â Òèôëèñå, ïîêà íàø ïðåäñòàâèòåëü íå ïðèåäåò è íå ðàçáåðåò âîïðîñà». Ñêîðî ïðåäñòàâèòåëü áðèòàíöåâ ïðèåõàë è «ðàçîáðàë âîïðîñ». Ïî ñëîâàì Ë. Òðîöêîãî, «àíãëèéñêèé ïîðó÷èê ñòó÷àë øòûêîì ïî ñòîëó ãðóçèíñêîãî ïðîêóðîðà», òðåáóÿ íåìåäëåííîãî îñâîáîæäåíèÿ àðåñòîâàííûõ108. Ïðèâåäåííàÿ âûøå ñòåíîãðàììà – ïîðàçèòåëüíûé äîêóìåíò êîâàðñòâà è ëèöåìåðèÿ ïðåäñòàâèòåëåé ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Ãðóçèè, êîòîðûå âûäàëè çà àáõàçà ïîëêîâíèêà Ìàðãàíàäçå â íàäåæäå, ÷òî åãî ñëîâà ïðîèçâåäóò íóæíîå âïå÷àòëåíèå íà àíãëèéñêîãî îôèöåðà. Òèôëèññêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî øëî íà ëþáîé ïîäëîã, ëèøü áû óäåðæàòü Àáõàçèþ â ñâîèõ ðóêàõ. Åãî ïîñëàíöû öèíè÷íî çàÿâèëè î òîì, ÷òî ñóäüáà çàêëþ÷åííûõ àáõàçñêèõ äåïóòàòîâ äîëæíà âîëíîâàòü Àáõàçñêèé Íàðîäíûé Ñîâåò, êîòîðûé-äå «íå ñäåëàë íèêàêîãî çàÿâëåíèÿ» â èõ çàùèòó. Òó æå î÷åâèäíóþ ãëóïîñòü â óâåðåííîñòè, ÷òî àíãëè÷àíå íå âëàäåþò âñåé èíôîðìàöèåé, Àëøèáàÿ ïîâòîðèë è â ñâîåì ïèñüìå ãåíåðàëó Òîìñîíó. Êàê æå ÀÍÑ ìîã ÷òî-òî çàÿâèòü, êîãäà îí áûë ðàçîãíàí ãðóçèíñêèìè âëàñòÿìè åùå 10 îêòÿáðÿ 1918 ãîäà? Ìåæäó ïðî÷èì, ñëåäóåò îáðàòèòü îñîáîå âíèìàíèå íà òîò ôàêò, ÷òî â ïîñëåäíåé ñâîåé ïóáëèêàöèè À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè (Ñ. 272–273) âîîáùå èçúÿë ôðàãìåíò ñ óïîìèíàíèåì «àáõàçà Ìàðãàíàäçå», êîòîðûé îí ïðèâîäèë â áîëåå ðàííèõ èçäàíèÿõ109. ×òî ýòî – ïîäòàñîâêà èëè «äðóãàÿ ðåäàêöèÿ»? Èëè òàêèì îáðàçîì ó÷åíûé îòðåàãèðîâàë íà ìîþ êðèòèêó 110 ýòîãî äîêóìåíòà, ïðîçâó÷àâøóþ åùå â 1991 ãîäó?

VII  óñëîâèÿõ íîâîãî ðàñêëàäà ãåîïîëèòè÷åñêèõ ñèë íà Êàâêàçå è ðåçêîãî îñëàáëåíèÿ ïîçèöèé Ãðóçèè, îñòàâøåéñÿ íà ïåðâîì ýòàïå áåç ñîþçíèêîâ è îäèí íà îäèí ñ Äåíèêèíûì, â íà÷àëå 1919 ã. Äîáðîâîëü÷åñêàÿ àðìèÿ ïðåäïðèíÿëà íàñòóïëåíèå â ðàéîíå Ãàãðû ñ öåëüþ îòáðîñèòü ãðóçèíñêèå âîéñêà çà ð. Áçûáü è îáúÿâèòü Àáõàçèþ (Ñóõóìñêèé îêðóã) íåéòðàëüíîé òåððèòîðèåé.  ýòî æå âðåìÿ ñ Äåíèêèíûì íà÷àëè ïåðåãîâîðû ïðåäñòàâèòåëè Àáõàçèè.  1919 ã. â àáõàçñêîé ãàçåòå Àïñíû ñîîáùàëîñü, ÷òî Àëåêñàíäð Øåðâàøèäçå âðó÷èë Äåíèêèíó ïèñüìî, â êîòîðîì ãîâîðèëîñü, ÷òî, «íà÷èíàÿ ñ ÿíâàðÿ ìåñÿöà, àáõàçöû íåñêîëüêî ðàç ïðîñèëè åãî, ÷òîáû îí ïîìîã âûâåñ72

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

òè èç Àáõàçèè ãðóçèíñêèå âîéñêà, êîòîðûå âñÿ÷åñêè ïðèòåñíÿþò àáõàçöåâ».  ïîäîáíîì äóõå áûëî âûäåðæàíî è ïèñüìî èçâåñòíîãî â íàðîäå Àëåêñåÿ Õàñàÿ, êîòîðîå îí òàêæå ëè÷íî âðó÷èë Äåíèêèíó â íàäåæäå íà ïîìîùü – «äëÿ îñâîáîæäåíèÿ íàøåé Àáõàçèè îò çàõâàòèâøèõ åå ÷óæàêîâ». Ïîëîæåíèå â Àáõàçèè îêàçàëîñü â öåíòðå âíèìàíèÿ ñîþçíîãî êîìàíäîâàíèÿ, êîòîðîå ïîòðåáîâàëî îò ãðóçèíñêîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà èçìåíèòü ïîëèòèêó â îòíîøåíèè çàõâà÷åííîãî èì Ñóõóìñêîãî îêðóãà.  ñâîåì ñïåöèàëüíîì ïîñëàíèè ãåíåðàë Äåíèêèí 1 ôåâðàëÿ 1919 ã. ñîîáùàë àíãëèéñêèì ãåíåðàëàì Óîêêåðó è Ìèëüíó, ÷òî ê íåìó îáðàòèëèñü ñ ïèñüìîì «îôèöèàëüíûå ïðåäñòàâèòåëè àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà», êîòîðûå ïîäðîáíî îñâåòèëè òðàãè÷åñêîå ïîëîæåíèå Àáõàçèè ïîñëå åå îêêóïàöèè ãðóçèíñêèìè âîéñêàìè.  ïîñëàíèè îòìå÷àëîñü òàêæå: «Íûíå Ãðóçèÿ îáúÿâëÿåò íîâûå âûáîðû â ñîâåò è ïðîâîäèò èõ ïîä äàâëåíèåì âîîðóæåííîé ñèëû... Ïîýòîìó àáõàçñêèå ïðåäñòàâèòåëè ïðîñÿò ìåíÿ, âî-ïåðâûõ, ïðèîñòàíîâèòü âûáîðû â ñîâåò ïîä âëèÿíèåì ãðóçèíñêèõ âëàñòåé è, âî-âòîðûõ, ïðåäëîæèòü ñîþçíîìó êîìàíäîâàíèþ î íåìåäëåííîì âûâîäå ãðóçèíñêèõ âîéñê èç Àáõàçèè, äàáû èçáàâèòü àáõàçñêèé íàðîä îò íàñèëèé, ìîãóùèõ âûçâàòü êðîâàâóþ ñìóòó...». Ãåíåðàë Äåíèêèí òðåáîâàë: 1) íåìåäëåííî îáúÿâèòü Ñóõóìñêèé îêðóã (Àáõàçèþ) íåéòðàëüíûì; 2) îòâåñòè ãðóçèíñêèå âîéñêà çà ð. Èíãóð; 3) óäàëèòü èç Àáõàçèè ãðóçèíñêóþ àäìèíèñòðàöèþ; 4) «âîçëîæèòü ïîääåðæàíèå ïîðÿäêà íà àáõàçñêèå âëàñòè, ñâîáîäíî èìè ñàìèìè âûáðàííûå»111. Âñëåä çà òåì, 23 ôåâðàëÿ 1919 ã., ó àíãëèéñêîãî ãåíåðàëà Óîêêåðà ñîñòîÿëñÿ æåñòêèé ðàçãîâîð ñ Í. Æîðäàíèÿ, â õîäå êîòîðîãî ïîñëåäíèé ïîîáåùàë ïðåäîñòàâèòü Àáõàçèè øèðîêóþ àâòîíîìèþ112. Ýòî áûë òîò ñàìûé ãåíåðàë Óîêêåð, êîòîðûé, ïî ñëîâàì Ë. Òðîöêîãî, ãðîçèë «ïàëüöåì ïåðåä ñàìûì íîñîì ó ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Íîÿ Æîðäàíèÿ, ïðåäóïðåæäàÿ åãî, ÷òî íåìåäëåííî çàêðîåò öåíòðàëüíûé ìåíüøåâèñòñêèé îðãàí, åñëè òàì ïîÿâèòñÿ ñòàòüÿ, ñïîñîáíàÿ îãîð÷èòü Àíòàíòó». «Êîãäà Äåíèêèí îòáèðàë ó Ãðóçèè Ñóõóìñêèé îêðóã, – ïèñàë îí äàëåå, – ìåíüøåâèêè æàëîâàëèñü íà Äåíèêèíà Óîêêåðó, à íà Óîêêåðà – Ãåíäåðñîíó, – â îáåèõ èíñòàíöèÿõ ñ îäèíàêîâûì óñïåõîì»113. Îïàñàÿñü, ÷òî Äåíèêèí ïðè ïîääåðæêå àíãëè÷àí äîáüåòñÿ íåéòðàëüíîãî ñòàòóñà äëÿ Àáõàçèè, ãðóçèíñêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî ôîðñèðîâàëî âûáîðû â íîâûé, òðåòèé ÀÍÑ. Ïî ïîâîäó ýòèõ «äåìîêðàòè÷åñêèõ» âûáîðîâ â òèôëèññêîé ìåíüøåâèñòñêîé ãàçåòå Ñîöèàë-äåìîêðàò Ìèõàèë Òàðíàâà êîíñòàòèðîâàë: «Ïðåäâûáîðíóþ àãèòàöèþ âåëà òîëüêî ïðàâèòåëüñòâåííàÿ ïàðòèÿ Ãðóçèè... Äðóãèì ïàðòèÿì âñÿ÷åñêè îãðàíè÷èâàëàñü âîçìîæíîñòü àãèòèðîâàíèÿ çà ñâîèõ êàíäèäàòîâ».  ðåçóëüòàòå ôåâðàëüñêèõ âûáîðîâ â íîâîì ÀÍÑ îêàçàëèñü 40 äåïóòàòîâ, èç êîòîðûõ 27 îòêðûòî âûðàæàëè èíòåðåñû ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Ãðóçèè. Ñ 18 ïî 20 ìàðòà 1919 ã. â Ñóõóìå ïðîõîäèëî çàñåäàíèå íîâîãî ÀÍÑ (â ìàå 1919 ã. îí áûë ïåðåèìåíîâàí â ÍÑÀ – Íàðîäíûé Ñîâåò Àáõàçèè). Âñòóïèòåëüíîå ñëîâî íà åãî îòêðûòèè ïðîèçíåñ âñå òîò æå Èñèäîð Ðàìèøâèëè, 73

Ãëàâà III

ïðåäñòàâèòåëü Ãðóçèíñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè â Àáõàçèè: «Ìû íå ïîõîæè íà çàâîåâàòåëåé è íå çåìëÿ çäåøíÿÿ íàì íóæíà, ìû èùåì ñîðàòíèêîâ â áîðüáå, ñ êîòîðûìè ìû ïîéäåì âìåñòå ê ñëàâíîìó âåëèêîìó áóäóùåìó ñîöèàëèçìó»114. Ïðè ýòîì îí îñîáî îòìåòèë: «Ìû çíàåì ñòðåìëåíèå ðåàêöèîííûõ ãðóïï íàðîäà ê “íåçàâèñèìîñòè”, íî äëÿ ýòîãî ìàëåíüêèé íàðîä åùå íå ãîòîâ, è åãî ìîãóò âçÿòü â ðóêè è â ðàáñòâî ïîðàáîòèòåëè, è èç ýòîé ïåòëè ñàì íàðîä íå ñìîæåò îñâîáîäèòüñÿ»115. Íà ñëåäóþùèé äåíü â ãàçåòå Íàøå ñëîâî ýòà ÷àñòü âûñòóïëåíèÿ È. Ðàìèøâèëè áûëà äàíà â ñëåäóþùåé ðåäàêöèè: «Ñòðåìëåíèå àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà ê íåçàâèñèìîìó ñóùåñòâîâàíèþ âïîëíå åñòåñòâåííî. Íî ýòîò ìàëåíüêèé íàðîä åùå äëÿ ýòîãî íå ãîòîâ, è ïîä èìåíåì íåçàâèñèìîñòè ðàçíûå ïîðàáîòèòåëè íà åãî øåþ íàêèíóò òàêóþ ïåòëþ, èç êîòîðîé îñâîáîäèòüñÿ åìó áóäåò ñòîèòü ìíîãèõ óñèëèé. Êîãäà æå Àáõàçèÿ ïî÷óâñòâóåò ñèëó ê ñàìîñòîÿòåëüíîìó ñóùåñòâîâàíèþ, òîãäà íàøà ïîìîùü ê îñóùåñòâëåíèþ ýòîãî øàãà çà íåé îáåñïå÷åíà»116. Íà îòêðûòèè 3-ãî ÀÍÑ îò ðàçëè÷íûõ ôðàêöèé è ãðóïï âûñòóïèëè: Ë.Ì. Òóìàðêèí (ñîöèàë-äåìîêðàò), Ï.Ë. Ãåëîâàíè (ñîöèàëèñò-ôåäåðàëèñò), Ñ.ß. ×àíáà (íåçàâèñèìåö), Ð.È. Êàêóáà (íåçàâèñèìàÿ êðåñòüÿíñêàÿ ãðóïïà), Ì.Ë. Ãðèãîëèÿ (ñîöèàëèñò-ðåâîëþöèîíåð) è Í.Ê. Òàâäãèðèäçå (íàöèîíàë-äåìîêðàò).  ñâîåì âûñòóïëåíèè 18 ìàðòà 1919 ã. Ñàìñîí ×àíáà, â ÷àñòíîñòè, ãîâîðèë: «Ãðóçèíñêèå ñîöèàëèñòû, êîãäà îíè æèëè â Ðîññèè, øëè ïî ïóòè èíòåðíàöèîíàëèçìà, íî, âåðíóâøèñü ê ñåáå, â Ãðóçèþ, ðåøèëè ñîçäàòü ñâîå ãîñóäàðñòâî... Ãîñóäàðñòâî, êàê èçâåñòíî, íå ìîæåò ñóùåñòâîâàòü áåç òåððèòîðèè è ëþäñêèõ ðåñóðñîâ. Ïîýòîìó ãðóçèíû ñòàðàþòñÿ ðàçäâèíóòü, ðàñøèðèòü ãðàíèöû ýòîé ñòðàíû. È ìàëåíüêàÿ Àáõàçèÿ äëÿ ýòîãî ëàêîìûé êóñîê.  íàøå âðåìÿ òðóäíîâàòî ñòàëî çàõâàòèòü êîãî-ëèáî íàñèëüñòâåííûì ïóòåì, åñëè äëÿ ýòîãî íå ïîäûñêàòü ïîâîä, õèòðîñïëåòåííûé ïîäõîä. È âîò ïåðåä íàìè ìàÿ÷èò âûäâèíóòûé âåëèêîé ðåâîëþöèåé âîïðîñ î ñàìîîïðåäåëåíèè íàðîäîâ, íî â ïåðåëèöîâàííîì âèäå. È òåïåðü ìû, íàðîä Àáõàçèè, ñàìîóïðàâëÿåìñÿ. Íî òàê ëè ýòî íà ñàìîì äåëå? Âíåøíå êàê áóäòî òàê, íî, åñëè âãëÿäåòüñÿ ãëóáæå, íàøå ñàìîóïðàâëåíèå íàõîäèòñÿ íå â íàøèõ ðóêàõ, èáî äðóãèå, âûðâàâ åãî èç íàøèõ ðóê, èñïîëüçóþò åãî â ñâîèõ èíòåðåñàõ. Ðàçîãíàâ ñîñòàâ Àáõàçñêîãî Ñîâåòà (â îêòÿáðå 1918 ã. – Ñ.Ë.), îòíÿëè ó íàñ âëàñòü. Çàòåì ïîñëàëè â ðàéîíû Àáõàçèè óéìó àãèòàòîðîâ, ÷òîáû ïîäîáðàòü íóæíûõ, ïîñëóøíûõ èì ëþäåé â Ñîâåò, äàáû èõ óñòàìè ïðîâîçãëàñèòü äàâíî âûíàøèâàåìóþ öåëü – ïðèñîåäèíèòü Àáõàçèþ ê Ãðóçèè. Êàê âîî÷èþ óáåæäàåìñÿ, èì îñòàëîñü íå òàê óæ ìíîãî, ÷òîáû îñóùåñòâèòü ýòó ñâîþ öåëü. Ìû íå ïðîòèâ ñàìîîïðåäåëåíèÿ ãðóçèí è èõ ðåñïóáëèêè, áîëüøå òîãî, ìû ýòî ïðèâåòñòâóåì. À âìåñòå ñ òåì ìû òàêæå óâàæàåì ñåáÿ. Êàêèå áû ñëàäêîçâó÷íûå ñëîâà îíè íè ïðîèçíîñèëè, ñêâîçü íèõ ïðîñâå÷èâàåò èõ çàìûñåë – äåðæàòü Àáõàçèþ íà ïðèöåëå»117. 74

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

Äàâëåíèå Äîáðîâîëü÷åñêîé àðìèè ïî àáõàçñêîìó âîïðîñó, îêàçàííîå ÷åðåç áðèòàíñêîå êîìàíäîâàíèå, áåçóñëîâíî, íàïóãàëî ãðóçèíñêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî è âûíóäèëî ÷åðåç ñâîèõ ñòàâëåííèêîâ â ÀÍÑ 20 ìàðòà 1919 ã. ïðîâåñòè íè ê ÷åìó íå îáÿçûâàþùèé «Àêò îá àâòîíîìèè Àáõàçèè».  ñâÿçè ñ ñî÷èíñêèì êîíôëèêòîì, ïîòåðÿ Ãðóçèåé Àáõàçèè ìîãëà ñòàòü ðåàëüíîñòüþ, ÷òî ïîäòâåðæäàåòñÿ è íà÷àëüíèêîì «Îñîáîãî ñîâåùàíèÿ» ãåíåðàëîì Ëóêîìñêèì: «Ëó÷øèì æå âûõîäîì èç ñîçäàâøåãîñÿ ïîëîæåíèÿ, êàê îá ýòîì è ñîîáùàëîñü àíãëèéñêîìó êîìàíäîâàíèþ, áûëî áû ïðåîáðàçîâàíèå èç Ñóõóìñêîãî îêðóãà, íàñåëåííîãî ãëàâíûì îáðàçîì àáõàçñêèì íàðîäîì è íà âëàäåíèå êîèì Ãðóçèÿ íå èìåëà íèêàêèõ ïðàâ, íåéòðàëüíîé çîíû. Ýòî ðàçðåøèëî áû âñå íåäîðàçóìåíèÿ, à êðèêëèâîå, íî áåññèëüíîå ãðóçèíñêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî, êîíå÷íî, ïîêîðèëîñü áû ýòîìó ðåøåíèþ. Íî ýòîãî íå áûëî ñäåëàíî...»118. Ñàì ïî ñåáå «Àêò îá àâòîíîìèè Àáõàçèè»119 ñîäåðæàë âñåãî äâà ïóíêòà. Ïðèíÿòèå Àêòà òîãäà æå ïðèâåòñòâîâàëîñü ïàðëàìåíòîì Ãðóçèè. Îäíàêî ïî ñóòè ñâîåé îí òàê è îñòàëñÿ íà áóìàãå, à òðè ðàçëè÷íûõ ïðîåêòà Êîíñòèòóöèè Àáõàçèè íå áûëè îäîáðåíû â ñèëó ðàçíîãëàñèé ìåæäó ÀÍÑ, ñ îäíîé ñòîðîíû, è ãðóçèíñêèì ïðàâèòåëüñòâîì è Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíûì ñîáðàíèåì – ñ äðóãîé. Ïðåäñåäàòåëåì 3-ãî ÀÍÑ ñòàë ìåíüøåâèê Àðçàêàí Ýìóõâàðè, à â ìàå Ñîâåò âíîâü âîçãëàâèë Âàðëàì Øåðâàøèäçå. Ýìóõâàðè òîãäà æå ïåðåñåë â êðåñëî ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Àáõàçèè («êîìèññàðèàòà»). Ïîñëå ôîðìàëüíîãî ïðèíÿòèÿ Àêòà ÀÍÑ ñòàë âûïîëíÿòü ôóíêöèè çàêîíîäàòåëüíîãî îðãàíà, à êîìèññàðèàò – èñïîëíèòåëüíîãî. Îäíàêî î÷åíü ñêîðî âñåì ñòàëà î÷åâèäíîé èëëþçîðíîñòü èãðû â àâòîíîìèþ. Òîãäà æå, âåñíîé, ó àíãëè÷àí è ãåíåðàëà Äåíèêèíà âîçíèêëè áîëüøèå ïîäîçðåíèÿ îòíîñèòåëüíî «äåìîêðàòè÷íîñòè» âûáîðîâ â Àáõàçèè. Ýòî íàøëî ñâîå îòðàæåíèå è â ïðîòîêîëå ñîâåùàíèÿ ïðåäñòàâèòåëåé ãðóçèíñêîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà è Äîáðîâîëü÷åñêîé àðìèè ïðè ïîñðåäíè÷åñòâå àíãëèéñêèõ ãåíåðàëîâ Áðèããñà è Áè÷à, êîòîðîå ñîñòîÿëîñü â Òèôëèñå 23–24 ìàÿ 1919 ã. Íîé Ðàìèøâèëè çàÿâèë òîãäà: «Äåìîêðàòè÷åñêèå ïðèíöèïû, î êîòîðûõ Âû ãîâîðèëè, ãåíåðàë, ÿâëÿþòñÿ òîëüêî òåì, ÷åì ðóêîâîäñòâóåòñÿ ãðóçèíñêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî è ÷òî ëåæèò â îñíîâå âî âñåõ åãî äåéñòâèÿõ. Íàøå ïðîäâèæåíèå â Ñóõóìñêîì îêðóãå èìåëî öåëüþ áîðüáó ñ áîëüøåâèçìîì. Íàñåëåíèå ýòîãî îêðóãà ðàâíî 200 òûñÿ÷àì, èç êîèõ áîëüøèíñòâî ñîñòàâëÿþò àáõàçöû è ãðóçèíû (çäåñü Ðàìèøâèëè íå ãîâîðèë, ÷òî ãðóçèí 60 òûñ. ÷åë. – Ñ.Ë.). Ýòî íàñåëåíèå âûÿâèëî ñâîþ âîëþ â âûáîðàõ Íàðîäíîãî Ñîâåòà, äîêàçàâøèõ, ÷òî îíî æåëàåò ïîëó÷èòü àâòîíîìíîå óïðàâëåíèå â ïðåäåëàõ íåçàâèñèìîé Ãðóçèè...». Ãåíåðàë Áðèããñ îòâåòèë: «Ðàç áîëüøèíñòâî íàñåëåíèÿ Ñóõóìñêîãî îêðóãà ñîñòàâëÿþò ãðóçèíû, òî âû íå äîëæíû îïàñàòüñÿ, åñëè Ñîþçíàÿ Êîìèññèÿ ïðîèçâåäåò ðàññëåäîâàíèå. Åñëè Êîìèññèÿ âûÿñíèò, ÷òî íàñåëåíèå áóäåò çà Ãðóçèþ, òî Äåíèêèí íå áóäåò ïðîòèâèòüñÿ ýòîìó...»120. Ãåãå÷êîðè ãåíåðàë Áðèããñ òàêæå çàÿâèë: «Àáõàçöû íåäîâîëüíû 75

Ãëàâà III

ãðóçèíñêèì óïðàâëåíèåì è äàæå çàÿâëÿþò, ÷òî åñëè èì äàäóò îðóæèå, òî îíè ñàìè î÷èñòÿò îêðóã îò ãðóçèíñêèõ âîéñê. Ãðóçèíû ïîñòóïàþò òàì õóæå áîëüøåâèêîâ: îòíèìàþò äîìà, çåìëè, ïðîèçâîäÿò ñîöèàëèçàöèþ è íàöèîíàëèçàöèþ èìóùåñòâà». Äàëåå àíãëèéñêèé ãåíåðàë îòìåòèë: «×òî êàñàåòñÿ Ñóõóìñêîãî îêðóãà, òî èç äðóãèõ èñòî÷íèêîâ ÿ ñëûøàë, ÷òî æåëàíèå âîññîåäèíèòüñÿ ñ Ãðóçèåé íå åñòü âûðàæåíèå âîëè íàñåëåíèÿ. Åñëè àáõàçû íà Ðóññêîì íàðîäíîì ñîáðàíèè çàÿâÿò î ñâîåì æåëàíèè áûòü ñ Ãðóçèåé, òî â íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ òîðæåñòâà äåìîêðàòè÷åñêèõ ïðèíöèïîâ ýòà âîëÿ íàðîäà äîëæíà áûòü óäîâëåòâîðåíà, è Äåíèêèí, íàñòðîåííûé äåìîêðàòè÷åñêè, íå áóäåò ïðîòèâ ýòîãî. Ñåé÷àñ Äåíèêèí õî÷åò îáåñïå÷èòü ñâîé òûë è ñîãëàñåí, ÷òîáû Ñóõóìñêèé îêðóã áûë íåéòðàëüíîé çîíîé, íî îí íå áóäåò ðàçãîâàðèâàòü äî òåõ ïîð, ïîêà ãðóçèíñêèå âîéñêà íå îòîéäóò çà Áçûáü»121.  ñâîþ î÷åðåäü, Ðàìèøâèëè è Ãåãå÷êîðè íàñòàèâàëè íà òîì, ÷òî îêîí÷àòåëüíîå ðåøåíèå äîëæíî áûòü ïðèíÿòî íå íà Ðóññêîì íàðîäíîì ñîáðàíèè, à íà Ïàðèæñêîé êîíôåðåíöèè. Íà ñëåäóþùèé äåíü, 24 ìàÿ 1919 ã., â áåñåäå ñ àíãëèéñêèì ãåíåðàëîì Áè÷åì Íîé Æîðäàíèÿ ñåòîâàë íà ãåíåðàëà Áðèããñà: «Ìíå ïðèõîäèòñÿ âïåðâûå ñëûøàòü ïîäîáíûå ðå÷è îò àíãëèéñêèõ ãåíåðàëîâ».  îòâåò ãåíåðàë Áè÷ íåîæèäàííî çàìåòèë: «Ìû õîòèì èìåòü áðèòàíñêîãî îôèöåðà â Ñóõóìå. Âû íå î÷åíü ïðîòåñòóåòå ïðîòèâ ýòîãî?»122. Ñ îò÷åòîì îá ýòèõ ïåðåãîâîðàõ íà çàñåäàíèè Íàðîäíîãî Ñîâåòà (ÍÑÀ) â Ñóõóìå 6 èþíÿ 1919 ã. âûñòóïèë ïðåäñåäàòåëü êîìèññàðèàòà À. Ýìóõâàðè. Àáõàçñêèé äåïóòàò È. Ìàðãàíèÿ ïî ïîâîäó ñëîæèâøåéñÿ îáñòàíîâêè çàÿâèë òîãäà: «Ìíîãèì èç âàñ èçâåñòíî, ÷òî áûâøèé ×ðåçâû÷àéíûé êîìèññàð ×õèêâèøâèëè ïîñûëàë òåëåãðàììó, ÷òî îí çàñòàë Àáõàçèþ â îáúÿòèÿõ àíàðõèè. ß çàÿâëÿþ, ÷òî ñàìî ãðóçèíñêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî âûçûâàåò óñèëåíèå àíàðõèè è òåïåðü íå òîëüêî ñòðàíà â îáúÿòèÿõ àíàðõèè, íî è ñàìè êîìèññàðû (íàìåê íà À. Ýìóõâàðè. – Ñ.Ë.) â îáúÿòèÿõ àíàðõèè»123. Âñêîðå ïîÿâèëîñü è çàÿâëåíèå 14 äåïóòàòîâ ÍÑÀ (È. Ìàðãàíèÿ, Ä. Àëàíèÿ, Ì. Òàðíàâà, Ì. Öàãóðèÿ è äð.) îò 29 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1919 ã., â êîòîðîì î ñèòóàöèè â Àáõàçèè ãîâîðèëîñü: «Ïî êàêîé-òî çëîé èðîíèè, Âåëèêàÿ Ðóññêàÿ ðåâîëþöèÿ, äàâøàÿ ñâîáîäó è íåçàâèñèìîñòü ïî÷òè âñåì íàðîäíîñòÿì Êàâêàçà, îáîøëà ìàëåíüêóþ Àáõàçèþ, è â íàøåé ñòðàíå âåëèêèå ïðèíöèïû ðåâîëþöèè ñîâåðøåííî çàñëîíèëèñü ïðîèçâîëîì è íàñèëèåì âëàñòåé. È òàê êàê âñå ýòè íàñèëèÿ ïðîèçâîäèëèñü èìåíåì ãðóçèíñêîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà, òî â àáõàçñêîé ìàññå ñëîæèëîñü ïðåäñòàâëåíèå î ãðóçèíàõ êàê î íàñèëüíèêàõ è ïîðàáîòèòåëÿõ... Ïåðåõîäÿ ê äåÿòåëüíîñòè áûâøåãî ×ðåçâû÷àéíîãî êîìèññàðà ãðàæäàíèíà ×õèêâèøâèëè, íàçíà÷åííîãî ãðóçèíñêèì ïðàâèòåëüñòâîì ïîñëå ðàçãîíà Ñîâåòà äëÿ óïðàâëåíèÿ Àáõàçèåé, ìû íå ìîæåì îáîéòè ìîë÷àíèåì ýòîãî çíàìåíàòåëüíîãî ïåðèîäà. Ïîäîáíî ãåíåðàëó Ìàçíèåâó, îí ñîðãàíèçîâàë îòðÿä èç îòáðîñîâ... Óáûòêè, ïðè÷èíåííûå ýòèì îòðÿäîì, âûðàçèëèñü â ìèëëèîíàõ. Ïåðèîä ×ðåçâû÷àéíîãî êîìèññàðà ã. ×õèêâèøâèëè ñîâïàë òàêæå ñ âûáîðàìè â Àáõàçñêèé Íàðîäíûé 76

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

Ñîâåò, è íàäî îòäàòü ñïðàâåäëèâîñòü ã. ×õèêâèøâèëè, ÷òî îí áëåñòÿùå âûïîëíèë ñâîþ çàäà÷ó, ïðîâåäÿ â Ñîâåò ïî ïðåèìóùåñòâó ïðåäñòàâèòåëåé íåàáõàçñêîãî íàñåëåíèÿ, ñîâåðøåííî íå ñâÿçàííûõ íè â êàêîé ñòåïåíè ñ èíòåðåñàìè êðàÿ»124.  ýòîò ïåðèîä â ÍÑÀ óñèëèëàñü áîðüáà è ïðîèçîøëà ïåðåãðóïïèðîâêà ñèë. Äåïóòàòû ðàçáèëèñü íà äâà ëàãåðÿ: â îäíîì ñîáðàëèñü ïî÷òè âñå àáõàçû âî ãëàâå ñ «íåçàâèñèìöàìè», êîòîðûå íàõîäèëèñü â îïïîçèöèè ê ãðóçèíñêîìó ïðàâèòåëüñòâó, â äðóãîì – ñòîðîííèêè Òèôëèñà. Îñåíüþ 1919 ã. ðÿäû ïðàâÿùåé ìåíüøåâèñòñêîé ïàðòèè ïîêèíóëè àáõàçñêèå ñîöèàë-äåìîêðàòû Ì. Òàðíàâà, À. ×óêáàð, Ä. Äçêóÿ, Ê. Áàðöèö, Áàçáà, Êîáàõèÿ, Öâèæáà. Îíè ïðîòåñòîâàëè ïðîòèâ ðàñïðàâ ãðóçèíñêèõ ãâàðäåéöåâ ïîä êîìàíäîâàíèåì ïîëêîâíèêà Òóõàðåëè íàä ìèðíûì êðåñòüÿíñêèì íàñåëåíèåì. Ïî èõ ñëîâàì, ýòè êàðàòåëüíûå äåéñòâèÿ â Áçûáñêîé Àáõàçèè ïðåâçîøëè æåñòîêîñòü öàðñêîãî ãåíåðàëà Àëèõàíîâà-Àâàðñêîãî. «Íà÷àëüíèê ãðóçèíñêîãî îòðÿäà, ïîðó÷èê Êóïóíèÿ, – ïèñàëè îíè, – áûâøèé ïðèñòàâ ã. Ïîòè, èçáèë öåëûé ñõîä â ñåëåíèè Àöû, çàñòàâèâ âñåõ ëå÷ü ïîä ïóëåìåòíûé îãîíü, è ïðîøåëñÿ çàòåì ïî èõ ñïèíàì, íàíîñÿ óäàðû øàøêîé ïëàøìÿ... Îáðàòèâøèåñÿ ê íåìó ñ ïðîòåñòîì ïðîòèâ òàêîãî çâåðñòâà è íàñèëèÿ ÷ëåíû áûâøåãî Àáõàçñêîãî Íàðîäíîãî Ñîâåòà, Àáóõáà è Äçóêóÿ, áûëè àðåñòîâàíû...». Ýòîò øèðîêî èçâåñòíûé äîêóìåíò ïðèâîäèò è Ë. Òðîöêèé125, è ÿ íèñêîëüêî íå óäèâëþñü, åñëè ãðóçèíñêèé èñòîðèê çà öèòèðîâàíèå ýòîãî áîëüøåâèñòñêîãî âîæäÿ íàçîâåò ìåíÿ «òðîöêèñòîì»... Êàðàòåëüíûå ìåðû ïðèìåíÿëèñü íå òîëüêî ïðîòèâ àáõàçîâ, íî è ïðîòèâ þæíûõ îñåòèí. Èõ îñóùåñòâëÿëè «êðàñíîãâàðäåéöû» Äæóãåëè, ïîòîì îòðÿäû «íàðîäíîé ãâàðäèè» Ìàçíèàøâèëè, êîòîðûå îòëè÷àëèñü îò ñîâåòñêîé «êðàñíîé ãâàðäèè» òîëüêî «íàöèîíàëüíûì øîâèíèçìîì». Îíè áûëè õîðîøî âîîðóæåíû, îñîáåííî àðòèëëåðèåé, äîñòàâøåéñÿ îò áûâøåãî Êàâêàçñêîãî ôðîíòà Ðóññêîé àðìèè, ïîëó÷àëè âûñîêîå æàëîâàíüå è, çà ðåäêèì èñêëþ÷åíèåì, âîçãëàâëÿëèñü ëþäüìè ñ òþðåìíûì ïðîøëûì126.  1919–1920 ãã. ïî÷òè íèêòî èç àáõàçîâ (êðîìå À. Ýìóõâàðè, î êîòîðîì Ñ. Áàñàðèÿ ïèñàë: «Íàðîä åãî íå âèäåë è âèäåòü íå õîòåë») íå ñîãëàøàëñÿ ñîòðóäíè÷àòü ñ âëàñòÿìè. Íåñìîòðÿ íà ïðîñüáû è äàæå óãðîçû ìåíüøåâèêîâ, àâòîðèòåòíûé â íàðîäå ó÷èòåëü À. ×î÷óà îòêàçàëñÿ âûäâèíóòü ñâîþ êàíäèäàòóðó â äåïóòàòû Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíîãî ñîáðàíèÿ.  àâãóñòå 1919 ã. â ñâÿçè ñ çàïðîñîì ãðóçèíñêîé íàöèîíàë-äåìîêðàòè÷åñêîé ïàðòèè î ïîëîæåíèè â Àáõàçèè Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíîå ñîáðàíèå áûëî âûíóæäåíî ïðèçíàòü: «Ðåàëüíûå èíòåðåñû ãðóçèí è àáõàçöåâ òðåáóþò íåìåäëåííîé ñìåíû îäíîñòîðîííåé è êðàéíåé ïîëèòèêè íàøåãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà â Àáõàçèè, êîòîðàÿ íåïðèåìëåìà äëÿ áîëüøèíñòâà àáõàçñêîãî íàñåëåíèÿ». Ìåæäó òåì öåíòðàëüíûå âëàñòè èç Òèôëèñà óñèëèâàëè äàâëåíèå íà ÍÑÀ. «Ïðè òàêîì ïîëîæåíèè, – ïèñàë Ì. Òàðíàâà, – ïðîäîëæàëà ôàêòè÷åñêè ñóùåñòâîâàòü ïðåæíÿÿ îêêóïàöèÿ, êîòîðàÿ è áûëà äî 3-ãî Àáõàçñêîãî Íàðîäíîãî Ñîâåòà è Êîìèññàðèàòà Àáõàçèè. Ïîñëåäíèå íóæíû áûëè òîëüêî êàê 77

Ãëàâà III

øèðìà è ôîðìà, ïîä ïðèêðûòèåì êîòîðûõ ïðîâîäèëèñü áû â Àáõàçèè âñå ïðèíöèïû ãðóçèíñêîé ìåíüøåâèñòñêîé ãîñóäàðñòâåííîñòè...»127. Îñåíüþ 1919 ã. â òèôëèññêîé ãàçåòå Ñîöèàë-äåìîêðàò Ìèõàèë Òàðíàâà îòêðûòî çàÿâëÿë, ÷òî Àáõàçèÿ «ëèøåíà âñÿêîé ñàìîñòîÿòåëüíîñòè» è ÿâëÿåòñÿ ñòðàíîé «îêêóïèðîâàííîé»128 . Âîïðåêè ñîîáùåíèþ Ë. Òîèäçå (Ñ. 293), îí äîëãîå âðåìÿ ÿâëÿëñÿ ÷ëåíîì ãðóçèíñêîé ìåíüøåâèñòñêîé ïàðòèè è íå áûë íàñòðîåí áîëüøåâèñòñêè. Îäíàêî âîçìóòèòåëüíûå äåéñòâèÿ ãðóçèíñêîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà ïî îòíîøåíèþ ê Àáõàçèè âûíóæäàëè åå ïîëèòè÷åñêóþ ýëèòó èñêàòü ñîþçíèêîâ òî íà Ñåâåðíîì Êàâêàçå, òî â ëèöå Äåíèêèíà, òî îáðàùàòü âçîðû íà Ñîâåòñêóþ Ðîññèþ, ñ êîòîðîé, êñòàòè, óñèëåííî çàèãðûâàë Æîðäàíèÿ. Íå ñëó÷àéíî, ÷òî åùå â îêòÿáðå 1918 ã. äåïóòàò Ñåìåí Àøõàöàâà ïðåäóïðåæäàë: «Åñëè äàëüøå òàê áóäåò ïðîäîëæàòüñÿ, òî äåéñòâèòåëüíî íàðîä ïðèìåò êàêóþ óãîäíî îðèåíòàöèþ, íå òîëüêî òóðåöêóþ, äàæå äüÿâîëüñêóþ, ëèøü áû èçáàâèòüñÿ îò çàõâàò÷èêîⅻ. Íå çàäíèì ÷èñëîì, à 20 îêòÿáðÿ 1919 ã. Ì. Òàðíàâà âûñêàçàë â òèôëèññêîé ãàçåòå ñâîå ìíåíèå îá îêêóïàöèîííîì ðåæèìå â Àáõàçèè. «Â ãîðîäàõ ñîçäàíû âîåííûå êîìåíäàòóðû, – ñîîáùàë îí, – â öåíòðå – îêðóæíîå âîåííîå óïðàâëåíèå ïîä íàçâàíèåì øòàáà îáîðîíû âî ãëàâå ñ ïîëêîâíèêîì Òóõàðåëè, â óåçäàõ îïåðèðóþò âîéñêîâûå ÷àñòè, ïî ñâîåìó óñìîòðåíèþ çàìåíÿÿ àäìèíèñòðàöèþ, ñëîâîì, âñå âîåííî-àäìèíèñòðàòèâíîå óïðàâëåíèå ñòðàíîé íàõîäèòñÿ â ðóêàõ âîåííûõ àãåíòîâ ãðóçèíñêîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà»129.  ôåâðàëå 1920 ã. â Ñóõóìå íà÷àë ðàáîòó Ñúåçä àáõàçñêîé èíòåëëèãåíöèè, êîòîðûé îòêðûë âñòóïèòåëüíûì ñëîâîì Â.Ò. Àí÷àáàäçå. Íà íåì âûñòóïèëè äåïóòàòû ÍÑÀ Èâàí Ìàðãàíèÿ, Ìèõàèë Òàðíàâà, Äìèòðèé Àëàíèÿ è äðóãèå. «Ñîâåòñêàÿ Ðîññèÿ çàèíòåðåñîâàíà â ñóäüáå Çàêàâêàçñêèõ ðåñïóáëèê, – ãîâîðèë È. Ìàðãàíèÿ, – òàê è Ãðóçèÿ ñòðàñòíî çàèíòåðåñîâàíà â ñóäüáå Àáõàçèè, ÷òî Ãðóçèÿ áåç Àáõàçèè íå ìîæåò ñóùåñòâîâàòü, à àáõàçöû çàèíòåðåñîâàíû â òîì, ÷òîáû îíè áûëè íåçàâèñèìû îò Ãðóçèè, ÷òîáû îíè áûëè áû ñâîáîäíûìè... Íàñ, àáõàçöåâ, ïîäâåðãëè ñàìûì æåñòîêèì ïûòêàì, ÷òî âñå ïîëèòè÷åñêèå ïàðòèè Ãðóçèè ïîäõîäÿò ê Àáõàçèè ñ òîé òî÷êè çðåíèÿ, ÷òî Àáõàçèÿ, êàê è Ìèíãðåëèÿ, Ãóðèÿ è Ñâàíåòèÿ, åñòü ñîñòàâíàÿ è íåîòúåìëåìàÿ ÷àñòü Ãðóçèè, ÷òî è ÿâëÿåòñÿ áîëüøîé îøèáêîé, òàê êàê Àáõàçèþ íàñåëÿþò íàðîäû, ñîâåðøåííî ÷óæäûå ãðóçèíàì ïî ÿçûêó, íðàâàì è îáû÷àÿì, ÷òî îíè, ãðóçèíû, íàñèëüñòâåííî íàñàæäàþò ãðóçèíñêèé ÿçûê â Àáõàçèè... Íàñòîÿùèé ðåæèì äåëàåò ãîðàçäî õóäøåå, ÷åì ñòàðûé... Äåìîêðàòè÷åñêèé ñòðîé îòîøåë îò ñâîèõ çàäà÷... Íèêîãäà òàê öèíè÷íî íå îáìàíûâàëè íàðîä, êàê òåïåðü»130. Âûñòóïëåíèå Ìàðãàíèÿ ïîääåðæàë Ä. Àëàíèÿ: «Îíè (â Òèôëèñå. – Ñ.Ë.) ãîâîðèëè, ÷òî îíè íå èìïåðèàëèñòû, ÷òî èõ íå íóæíî áîÿòüñÿ»131. Íå îñòàëñÿ â ñòîðîíå è Ì. Òàðíàâà: «Àáõàçñêèé Íàðîäíûé Ñîâåò è Êîìèññàðèàò ÿâëÿþòñÿ íå ïðåäñòàâèòåëÿìè íàðîäà, à àãåíòàìè ïðàâèòåëüñòâà. Êîìèññàðèàò áîëüøå ñâÿçàí ñ Òèôëèñîì, ÷åì ñ êðàåì... Ïðÿìîé ïðîâîä èçíîñèëñÿ. Ïðè òàêîì îòíîøåíèè ìîãóò ëè ýòè ó÷ðåæäåíèÿ ñäåëàòü ÷òî-íèáóäü? Îíè äåëà78

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

þò òîëüêî äëÿ íàøèõ ñîñåäåé... Êàê öåíòðàëüíîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî ñìîòðèò íà íàñ? Êîãäà ìû íå áûëè ñ Ãðóçèåé, òîãäà ñ íàìè ñ÷èòàëèñü... Òàêàÿ ïîëèòèêà äîáðà íå ïðèíåñåò. Âñå ýòî îíè îôîðìèëè êàêîé-òî àâòîíîìèåé. Íà ñàìîì äåëå íå÷òî âðîäå îêêóïàöèè... Àáõàçèþ îáðàòèëè â êàêóþ-òî ïðîâèíöèþ Ãðóçèè»132.  1920–1921 ãã. íåäîâîëüñòâî ïî ïîâîäó çàòÿíóâøåãîñÿ ïðèíÿòèÿ Êîíñòèòóöèè «àâòîíîìíîé» Àáõàçèè ñòàëè âûðàæàòü äàæå òàêèå äåÿòåëè, êàê ïðåäñåäàòåëü ÍÑÀ Âàðëàì Øåðâàøèäçå.  íîÿáðå 1920 ã. â îäíîé èç ïîäðîáíûõ «çàïèñîê» íà èìÿ ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Ãðóçèè äåëåãàöèÿ Íàðîäíîãî Ñîâåòà (Â. Øåðâàøèäçå, È. Ïàøàëèäè, Ä. Çàõàðîâ, À. Óáèðèÿ, Â. Ãóðäæóà, Ì. Òàðíàâà, Ì. Áåðóëàâà, Ä. Àëàíèÿ, Ì. Öàãóðèÿ) çàÿâèëà â Òèôëèñå: «Âñå çàÿâëåíèÿ ïðàâèòåëüñòâà î íåçûáëåìîñòè àâòîíîìèè íà ïðàêòèêå äàëåêî ðàñõîäÿòñÿ ñ äåéñòâèòåëüíîñòüþ. Ïî ñóùåñòâó, íà÷èíàÿ ñ 1918 ã., ïðàâèòåëüñòâî ðåñïóáëèêè âñå áîëåå ðàñøèðÿëî îáëàñòü ñâîåãî âòîðæåíèÿ âî âñå ñôåðû æèçíè Àáõàçèè... Îòíîøåíèÿ ìåæäó Ãðóçèåé è Àáõàçèåé äî ñèõ ïîð íå îôîðìëåíû, à ñëåäîâàòåëüíî, þðèäè÷åñêè íå îáÿçàòåëüíû äëÿ îáåèõ ñòîðîí (âûäåëåíî ìíîþ. – Ñ.Ë.)»133. Óïîìÿíóòàÿ äåëåãàöèÿ ÍÑÀ ïðèáûëà â Òèôëèñ 6 íîÿáðÿ 1920 ã. äëÿ ðàññìîòðåíèÿ ïðîåêòà Êîíñòèòóöèè Àáõàçèè â ñìåøàííîé êîìèññèè íà ïàðèòåòíûõ íà÷àëàõ ñîâìåñòíî ñ ïðåäñòàâèòåëÿìè Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíîãî ñîáðàíèÿ Ãðóçèè134. Îäíàêî ïðàâèòåëüñòâî êàòåãîðè÷åñêè îòêàçàëîñü ñîâìåñòíî ñ äåëåãàöèåé Ñîâåòà ðàññìàòðèâàòü è ïðèíèìàòü â Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíîì ñîáðàíèè è ÍÑÀ áóäóùóþ Êîíñòèòóöèþ Àáõàçèè. Òåì ñàìûì áûë ãðóáî íàðóøåí ïóíêò 2-é Àêòà îò 20 ìàðòà 1919 ã.  ñâÿçè ñ òàêèì ïîëîæåíèåì ÷ëåíû êîíñòèòóöèîííîé äåëåãàöèè ÍÑÀ 5 äåêàáðÿ 1920 ã. ñäåëàëè ñâîå ïîñëåäíåå çàÿâëåíèå: «Ââèäó òàêîãî ðàñõîæäåíèÿ âçãëÿäîâ Íàðîäíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçèè è öåíòðàëüíîé âëàñòè ïî âîïðîñó î ïîðÿäêå ðàçðàáîòêè è ïðèíÿòèÿ Êîíñòèòóöèè Àáõàçèè äåëåãàöèÿ âûåçæàåò îáðàòíî»135. Ðÿä ãðóçèíñêèõ èñòîðèêîâ ïðèçíàþò, ÷òî âëàñòè â Òèôëèñå «ÿâíî çàïîçäàëè ñ ïðèíÿòèåì çàêîíà îá àâòîíîìèè Àáõàçèè»136. Îòêðîâåííî øîâèíèñòè÷åñêóþ ïîëèòèêó ìåíüøåâèêè ïðîâîäèëè â îòíîøåíèè íå òîëüêî àáõàçñêîãî, íî è äðóãèõ íàðîäîâ Àáõàçèè. Òûñÿ÷è àðìÿíñêèõ è ãðå÷åñêèõ êðåñòüÿí ïîêèäàëè ñòðàíó. Ìèíóÿ ÍÑÀ, â 1920 ã. âëàñòè ïðèñòóïèëè ê çàñåëåíèþ Ãàãðèíñêîãî è Ãóìèñòèíñêîãî óåçäîâ âûõîäöàìè èç Çàïàäíîé Ãðóçèè137.  îêòÿáðå 1920 ã. ÍÑÀ ðàññìîòðåë íà ñâîåì çàñåäàíèè ýòó «ïðåñòóïíóþ çàêóëèñíóþ ïîëèòèêó, êîòîðàÿ âåäåò ê àííóëèðîâàíèþ àâòîíîìèè Àáõàçèè»138. Áåñöåðåìîííî ïðàâèòåëüñòâî Ãðóçèè âåëî ñåáÿ è â äðóãèõ âîïðîñàõ. Íå ñ÷èòàÿñü ñî ñïåöèôèêîé Àáõàçèè, ãäå ìíîãîíàöèîíàëüíîå íàñåëåíèå îáùàëîñü íà ðóññêîì ÿçûêå, ìåíüøåâèêè â öåëÿõ îñóùåñòâëåíèÿ ïðîãðàììû «íàöèîíàëèçàöèè» (ãðóçèíèçàöèè) êðàÿ íàâÿçûâàëè ñòðàíå ãðóçèíñêèé ÿçûê. Íà çàñåäàíèè ÀÍÑ 25 èþëÿ 1918 ã. áûëî ïðèíÿòî ïîñòàíîâëåíèå: «Ââèäó èíòåðíàöèîíàëüíîñòè íàøåãî êðàÿ îñòàâèòü ãîñóäàðñòâåííûì ÿçûêîì ðóññêèé». 27 èþëÿ Âàðëàì Øåðâàøèäçå âûðàçèë ïðîòåñò â ñâÿçè ñ «ãðóçèíèçàöèåé» ïðàâèòåëüñòâåííûõ 79

Ãëàâà III

ó÷ðåæäåíèé Àáõàçèè è çàìåíîé ðóññêîãî ÿçûêà ãðóçèíñêèì139. Èçó÷åíèå ãðóçèíñêîãî ÿçûêà íàâÿçûâàëîñü øêîëàì140. Ñ êðèòèêîé ïðàâèòåëüñòâà â ýòîì âîïðîñå 2 àâãóñòà 1919 ã. â Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíîì ñîáðàíèè Ãðóçèè âûñòóïèë Ë. Øåíãåëàÿ (ïèñàòåëü Ëåî Êèà÷åëè). Îí íàïîìíèë: «Íåêîòîðûå çàáûâàþò àáõàçñêóþ äåéñòâèòåëüíîñòü, êîòîðàÿ çàêëþ÷àåòñÿ â òîì, ÷òî áîëüøèíñòâî íàñåëåíèÿ Àáõàçèè ãîâîðèò íà ðóññêîì ÿçûêå, è ýòî ïðîèñõîäèò íå òîëüêî â ñàìîé Àáõàçèè, íî è â Ñàìóðçàêàíå, ãäå áîëüøèíñòâî íàñåëåíèÿ ñîñòàâëÿþò ìèíãðåëû. È ïîýòîìó ïðîâåäåíèå íàöèîíàëèçàöèè îäíèì íàñêîêîì íàíåñåò ñåðüåçíûé óùåðá íàì»141. Ñ ÿíâàðÿ 1920 ã. â êðàå áåç âåäîìà ÍÑÀ è Êîìèññàðèàòà ïðÿìûì ðàñïîðÿæåíèåì èç Òèôëèñà áûë ââåäåí «âîåííî-÷ðåçâû÷àéíûé ñóä», êîòîðûé â òå÷åíèå íåñêîëüêèõ ìåñÿöåâ êàçíèë 20 ÷åëîâåê è ïðåäàë ñóäó åùå 129.  ñåíòÿáðå 1920 ã. íà çàñåäàíèè ÍÑÀ Ì. Òàðíàâà îòìåòèë: «Ñóä ââåäåí â Àáõàçèè íå òåìè îðãàíàìè, êîìó ïðèíàäëåæèò ýòî ïðàâî... Çäåñü íàðóøåíû ïðàâà àâòîíîìèè...»142.  ìàå òîãî æå ãîäà ïî ïîâîäó ñëîæèâøåéñÿ ñèòóàöèè äåïóòàòû Áàðöèö è Àëàíèÿ çàÿâèëè: «Àâòîíîìèè íåò, ñàìî ñóùåñòâîâàíèå Ñîâåòà íå èìååò îñíîâàíèÿ...» 143. Íåñìîòðÿ íà ïðîòåñòû ÍÑÀ, ìàëàÿ êîíñòèòóöèîííàÿ êîìèññèÿ Ãðóçèè 29 äåêàáðÿ 1920 ã. ðàññìîòðåëà ïðîåêò «Ïîëîæåíèÿ îá àâòîíîìíîì óïðàâëåíèè Àáõàçèåé» áåç ó÷àñòèÿ ïðåäñòàâèòåëåé Íàðîäíîãî Ñîâåòà. Âìåñòå ñ òåì íà çàñåäàíèè ÍÑÀ, ñîñòîÿâøåìñÿ â Ñóõóìå 4 ÿíâàðÿ 1921 ã. ïîä ïðåäñåäàòåëüñòâîì Â. Øåðâàøèäçå, áûë îäîáðåí äîêëàä êîíñòèòóöèîííîé äåëåãàöèè, êîòîðàÿ âûðàçèëà â Òèôëèñå ïðîòåñò Ïðåçèäèóìó Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíîãî ñîáðàíèÿ â ñâÿçè ñ óùåìëåíèåì çàêîíîäàòåëüíûõ ïðàâ Íàðîäíîãî Ñîâåòà ïðè ðàçðàáîòêå Êîíñòèòóöèè Àáõàçèè. «Äî ñèõ ïîð Íàðîäíûé Ñîâåò âñåìè ìåðàìè ñòàðàëñÿ íå äîïóñòèòü îáîñòðåíèÿ òðåíèé, – çàÿâèë 4 ÿíâàðÿ 1921 ã. Â. Øåðâàøèäçå, – ñ÷èòàÿ ñâîåé îñíîâíîé çàäà÷åé îðãàíèçàöèþ ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé âëàñòè çäåñü, íà ìåñòå. Íî âðåìÿ øëî, óæå òðè äåëåãàöèè êîìàíäèðîâàëèñü Íàðîäíûì Ñîâåòîì ïî äàííîìó âîïðîñó, à àâòîíîìèÿ Àáõàçèè äî ñèõ ïîð íå îôîðìëåíà» 144. Òîëüêî â äíè ñâåðæåíèÿ ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Ãðóçèíñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíîå ñîáðàíèå 21 ôåâðàëÿ 1921 ã. ïðèíÿëî Êîíñòèòóöèþ Ãðóçèè. Îäíàêî ïðèìåíèòåëüíî ê Àáõàçèè îíà íå èìåëà íèêàêîãî çíà÷åíèÿ è íå âñòóïèëà â ñèëó. Êðîìå òîãî, îíà íàðóøèëà ñòàòüþ 2-þ Àêòà îò 20 ìàðòà 1919 ã., ïðèçíàííîãî òîãäà è Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíûì ñîáðàíèåì Ãðóçèè. Êñòàòè, è Ìåíòåøàøâèëè â «Ðàçûñêàíèÿõ» (Ñ. 284) âûíóæäåí ïðèçíàòü: «Ê ñîæàëåíèþ, Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíîå ñîáðàíèå Ãðóçèè ñîâìåñòíî ñ àáõàçñêèìè ïðåäñòàâèòåëÿìè íå ðàçðàáîòàëî (âûäåëåíî ìíîþ. – Ñ.Ë.) Êîíñòèòóöèþ äëÿ àâòîíîìíîé Àáõàçèè». Î ÷åì æå, ñïðàøèâàåòñÿ, òîãäà ðå÷ü? Î÷åíü âàæíûì ÿâëÿåòñÿ è òîò ôàêò, ÷òî àáõàçñêèé íàðîä áîéêîòèðîâàë âûáîðû â ýòî ñàìîå Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíîå ñîáðàíèå, â ñâÿçè ñ ÷åì îíî áûëî ëèøåíî ïðàâîâûõ îñíîâàíèé íà îôîðìëåíèå òàê íàçûâàåìîé àâòîíîìèè Àáõàçèè.  ìàå 1920 ã. â ïðåññå îòìå÷àëîñü: «Ïàðòèéíàÿ (ìåíüøåâèñòñêàÿ. – 80

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

Ñ.Ë.) ñðåäà æèâåò ïîä òÿæåëûì âïå÷àòëåíèåì ðàçîáùåíèÿ ñ àáõàçñêîé èíòåëëèãåíöèåé, ÿâèâøåãîñÿ â ðåçóëüòàòå íåïðèíÿòèÿ àáõàçñêèì íàñåëåíèåì ó÷àñòèÿ â âûáîðàõ â Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíîå ñîáðàíèå»145. Ïîìèìî ñêàçàííîãî, ñòàòüÿ 107-ÿ Êîíñòèòóöèè Ãðóçèè íîñèëà ðàñïëûâ÷àòûé õàðàêòåð, è òðóäíî ïîíÿòü, î êàêîé àâòîíîìèè, êóëüòóðíîé èëè èíîé, øëà ðå÷ü. Ê òîìó æå, êàê ñëåäóåò èç ñòàòüè 108-é, «Ïîëîæåíèå îá àâòîíîìíîì óïðàâëåíèè» âîîáùå íå áûëî âûðàáîòàíî, à áåç íåãî íè î êàêîé «àâòîíîìèè», ïîíÿòíî, è ðå÷è íå ìîãëî áûòü.  ñâÿçè ñ ýòîé «íåóâÿçêîé» À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè, êàê è ðàíåå146, ñèëèòñÿ äîêàçàòü â «Ðàçûñêàíèÿõ» (Ñ. 282–283), ÷òî «Ïîëîæåíèå» ÿêîáû áûëî óòâåðæäåíî âìåñòå ñ Êîíñòèòóöèåé, îäíàêî èç òåêñòà ñàìîé Êîíñòèòóöèè Ãðóçèè 21 ôåâðàëÿ 1921 ã. (ñò. 108) ñëåäóåò, ÷òî îíî íàõîäèëîñü ëèøü â ïðîöåññå ðàçðàáîòêè.

VIII Ñ êîíöà 1919-ãî ïî ôåâðàëü 1921 ã. ðàññòàíîâêà ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ ñèë âîêðóã Ãðóçèè íåñêîëüêî ðàç ïðåòåðïåâàëà ñåðüåçíûå èçìåíåíèÿ.  ïîñëåäíèå ìåñÿöû 1919 ã. âîåííîå ïîëîæåíèå Ñîâåòñêîé Ðîññèè èçìåíèëîñü êàðäèíàëüíî: Þäåíè÷ áûë óíè÷òîæåí, Äåíèêèí îòáðîøåí íà þã è ðàçãðîìëåí. Ñ ëèêâèäàöèåé Äîáðîâîëü÷åñêîé àðìèè, ÿâëÿâøåéñÿ áóôåðîì ìåæäó Ñîâåòàìè è Çàêàâêàçüåì, Ãðóçèÿ îêàçàëàñü íà êðàþ ïðîïàñòè.  ñâîå âðåìÿ ãåíåðàë Äåíèêèí íåîäíîêðàòíî ïðåäóïðåæäàë Òèôëèñ î âîçìîæíîñòè èìåííî òàêèõ âîåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ ïîñëåäñòâèé.  ñîçäàâøåéñÿ íîâîé îáñòàíîâêå ñîâåòñêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî ñòàëî ïðåäëàãàòü íèêåì íå ïðèçíàííîé Ãðóçèè âîåííûé ñîþç äëÿ ëèêâèäàöèè îñòàòêîâ Äîáðîâîëü÷åñêîé àðìèè, îïàñàÿñü, ÷òî îíè ìîãóò ñîðãàíèçîâàòüñÿ è çàêðåïèòüñÿ íà íîâîì ïëàöäàðìå. Îäíàêî Í. Æîðäàíèÿ, íå îñîçíàâàÿ äî êîíöà âñþ ïëà÷åâíîñòü ñâîåãî ïîëîæåíèÿ, 14 ÿíâàðÿ 1920 ã. â Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíîì ñîáðàíèè õâàñòëèâî çàÿâèë: «Âû çíàåòå, ÷òî Ñîâåòñêàÿ Ðîññèÿ íàì ïðåäëîæèëà âîåííûé ñîþç. Ìû åé íàîòðåç îòêàçàëè â ýòîì... Ïóòè Ãðóçèè è Ðîññèè çäåñü ðàçîøëèñü. Íàø ïóòü âåäåò â Åâðîïó, ïóòü Ðîññèè – â Àçèþ... Ïðåäïî÷òó èìïåðèàëèñòîâ Çàïàäà ôàíàòèêàì Âîñòîêà!». Íî ñòðàíû Àíòàíòû, ó÷èòûâàÿ ðåàëüíîå ïîëîæåíèå äåë, íå ñïåøèëè þðèäè÷åñêè ïðèçíàâàòü Ãðóçèþ. Çàïàäíûå äèïëîìàòû ïîñòàðàëèñü îáúÿñíèòü Æîðäàíèÿ, êàêèì ïóòåì ñëåäóåò èäòè ãðóçèíñêîìó ïðàâèòåëüñòâó, ÷òîáû ïîëó÷èòü èõ ïðèçíàíèå. Ýòîò ïóòü ëåæàë ÷åðåç Ìîñêâó, è âûñîêîïàðíûå ñëîâà Æîðäàíèÿ îêàçàëèñü ïðåæäåâðåìåííûìè. Î÷åíü áûñòðî îí çàãîâîðèë äðóãèì ÿçûêîì: «ßñíî áûëî, ÷òî ñ Ðîññèåé, õîòÿ è îñëàáëåííîé, î÷åíü ñ÷èòàëèñü, íå õîòåëè åå ðàñ÷ëåíåíèÿ. ß ðåøèë íà÷àòü ïåðåãîâîðû ñ Ìîñêâîé î ïðèçíàíèè...»147. Ñîâåòñêàÿ Ðîññèÿ ïðèçíàëà Ãðóçèþ äå-þðå, çàêëþ÷èâ ñ íåé 7 ìàÿ 1920 ã. ìèðíûé äîãîâîð â îáìåí íà ëåãàëèçàöèþ ìåñòíûõ áîëüøåâèñòñêèõ îðãàíèçàöèé. Òàêèì îáðàçîì, áûëà ëè Ðîññèÿ «áåëîé» èëè «êðàñíîé» – ñ íåé âûíóæäåíû áûëè ñ÷èòàòüñÿ êàê ñ âåëèêîé äåðæàâîé, íåçàâèñèìî îò ñìåíû 81

Ãëàâà III

åå ïîëèòè÷åñêîé «ðàñöâåòêè». È ÷òî áû òàì íè ãîâîðèëè è íè ïðîâîçãëàøàëè ñåãîäíÿ, îôèöèàëüíî è þðèäè÷åñêè Ãðóçèÿ äî 7 ìàÿ 1920 ã. îñòàâàëàñü â ñôåðå âëèÿíèÿ Ðîññèéñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâà. Òîëüêî ïîñëå îäîáðåíèÿ Êðåìëåì Äåìîêðàòè÷åñêóþ ðåñïóáëèêó Ãðóçèÿ ïðèçíàëè Ãåðìàíèÿ (24 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1920 ã.), Áåëüãèÿ, Ôðàíöèÿ, Àíãëèÿ, Èòàëèÿ, ßïîíèÿ (27 ÿíâàðÿ 1921 ã.), Ïîëüøà (28 ÿíâàðÿ 1921 ã.), Àâñòðèÿ (17 ôåâðàëÿ 1921 ã.), Ðóìûíèÿ (18 ôåâðàëÿ 1921 ã.), Ëþêñåìáóðã (23 ôåâðàëÿ 1921 ã.) è äàæå Ìåêñèêà (14 àïðåëÿ 1921 ã.), â êîòîðîé, âèäèìî, è íå ïîäîçðåâàëè, ÷òî Ãðóçèíñêàÿ ðåñïóáëèêà ïðåêðàòèëà ñâîå ñóùåñòâîâàíèå â ôåâðàëå 1921 ãîäà... Ìíîãèå èñòîðèêè ëþáÿò ïåðå÷èñëÿòü ýòîò ñïèñîê ãîñóäàðñòâ, íî ïðè ýòîì óìàë÷èâàþò îá îäíîì ÷ðåçâû÷àéíî âàæíîì îáñòîÿòåëüñòâå. 9 àïðåëÿ 1991 ã. î íåì (âîçìîæíî, ñ ïîäà÷è ñàìîãî À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè) íà ÷ðåçâû÷àéíîì çàñåäàíèè Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà ðåñïóáëèêè Ãðóçèÿ ãîâîðèë Çâèàä Ãàìñàõóðäèà: «Îäíàêî ðóêîâîäÿùèå êðóãè êðóïíûõ åâðîïåéñêèõ ñòðàí, îñîáåííî Âåëèêîáðèòàíèè, îòäàâàëè ïðåäïî÷òåíèå ïîëèòè÷åñêîìó ñìÿã÷åíèþ îòíîøåíèé ñ óæå ïîáåäèâøåé â Ãðàæäàíñêîé âîéíå Ðîññèåé è ïîýòîìó îôèöèàëüíî ïðèçíàâàëè ïðîáëåìû Ãðóçèíñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè âíóòðåííèì äåëîì Ðîññèè (âûäåëåíî ìíîþ. – Ñ.Ë.)»148. Ðóêîâîäñòâóÿñü èìåííî ýòèì îáñòîÿòåëüñòâîì, Àíãëèÿ è Ôðàíöèÿ ñäåëàëè íåâîçìîæíûì âñòóïëåíèå Ãðóçèè â Ëèãó Íàöèé 16 äåêàáðÿ 1920 ã.149 Ãðóçèÿ óæå òîãäà áûëà îáðå÷åíà, è ñîáûòèÿ â íåé ðàññìàòðèâàëèñü êàê âíóòðåííåå äåëî Ðîññèè. Âîçâðàùàÿñü ê ñîâåòñêî-ãðóçèíñêîìó äîãîâîðó îò 7 ìàÿ 1920 ã., íåîáõîäèìî îòìåòèòü, ÷òî À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè, Ë. Òîèäçå è äðóãèå àâòîðû ïîä÷åðêèâàþò, ÷òî òîãäà ÐÑÔÑÐ þðèäè÷åñêè ïðèçíàëà Ñóõóìñêèé îêðóã «áåçóñëîâíî âõîäÿùèì â ñîñòàâ Ãðóçèíñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâà»150. Íî, âî-ïåðâûõ, äîãîâîð îò 7 ìàÿ íå ìîã áûòü ðàñïðîñòðàíåí íà Àáõàçèþ, òàê êàê ñ èþíÿ 1918 ã., ò.å. çà äâà ãîäà äî ïîäïèñàíèÿ ýòîãî äîêóìåíòà, åå òåððèòîðèÿ áûëà àííåêñèðîâàíà Ãðóçèíñêîé ðåñïóáëèêîé â ðåçóëüòàòå èíòåðâåíöèè. Âî-âòîðûõ, â ýòîì äîãîâîðå íè÷åãî íå ãîâîðèòñÿ îá Àáõàçèè, êàê è åå «àâòîíîìèè» (íàïîìíþ, ÷òî, ïî óòâåðæäåíèþ ãðóçèíñêèõ èñòîðèêîâ, Àáõàçèÿ ñ 1918 ã. áûëà «àâòîíîìèåé»); â íåì ëèøü ñêàçàíî î Ñóõóìñêîì îêðóãå. Ïðàâîâåä À.Ñ. Àâòîíîìîâ â ýòîé ñâÿçè ïèøåò: «...Ýòîò äîãîâîð ëèøü ïðèçíàâàë ôàêò íàõîæäåíèÿ òåððèòîðèè çà ðåêîé Ïñîó ïîä êîíòðîëåì ãðóçèíñêèõ âîéñê, ïðè ýòîì â íåì íè÷åãî íå ãîâîðèëîñü î ñóäüáå Àáõàçèè»151. Èçâåñòíî, êàêóþ íåðàçáåðèõó âûçâàëè ñòàòüè äîãîâîðà î ãðàíèöàõ Ãðóçèè. Ïîñëåäîâàëè ýíåðãè÷íûå ïðîòåñòû ñî ñòîðîíû Àçåðáàéäæàíà ïî Çàêàòàëüñêîìó îêðóãó è Àðìåíèè, êîòîðàÿ îñïàðèâàëà òåððèòîðèè Òèôëèññêîé ãóáåðíèè è Áàòóìñêîé îáëàñòè. Îá Àáõàçèè ãîâîðèòü áûëî íåêîìó, à Ñòàëèí è Îðäæîíèêèäçå íàõîäèëèñü â áëèæàéøåì îêðóæåíèè Ëåíèíà è óæå çàäóìûâàëèñü î áóäóùèõ ãðàíèöàõ ñîâåòñêîé Ãðóçèè, ïðåêðàñíî ïîíèìàÿ, ÷òî çàêëþ÷åííûé äîãîâîð èìååò óñëîâíûé è âðåìåííûé õàðàêòåð. Ïîýòîìó èñêëþ÷èòåëüíî ïî òàêòè÷åñêèì ñîîáðàæåíèÿì âñå òîãäàøíèå òåððèòîðèàëüíûå ïðèòÿçàíèÿ Ãðóçèè áûëè ïîëíîñòüþ ó÷òåíû è óäîâëåòâîðåíû Ëåíèíûì. 82

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

Êàê æå îòíîñèëèñü ê ýòîìó äîãîâîðó è ê ñèòóàöèè âîêðóã íåãî â Ìîñêâå? Âîæäü Êðàñíîé Àðìèè Ë. Òðîöêèé, ïðåêðàñíî âëàäåâøèé îáñòàíîâêîé, ïèñàë: «Ìåíüøåâèñòñêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî ïåðåæèëî âåñíîþ 1920 ã. îñòðûé ïåðèîä ñòðàõà è êàïèòóëèðîâàëî. Êîãäà æå îíî íå áåç èçóìëåíèÿ óáåäèëîñü, ÷òî çàíåñåííûé êóëàê íå îïóñêàåòñÿ íà åãî ãîëîâó, îíî ðåøèëî, ÷òî ïåðåîöåíèëî îïàñíîñòü, è ñòàëî ïî âñåé ëèíèè áèòü îòáîé»152. Ýòà ïåðåîöåíêà áûëà ñâÿçàíà ñ íîâûìè îáñòîÿòåëüñòâàìè – ó ñîâåòñêîé Ðîññèè âîçíèêëè çàòðóäíåíèÿ íà ïîëüñêîì ôðîíòå è ñ Âðàíãåëåì, è Ãðóçèÿ âíîâü ïîâåëà ñåáÿ âûçûâàþùå. Âñå ýòî ó÷èòûâàëîñü Ìîñêâîé, íî, ïî ñëîâàì Òðîöêîãî, òîãäà áîëüøåâèêè «íå âèäåëè ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî èíòåðåñà â ëèêâèäàöèè ìåíüøåâèñòñêîé Ãðóçèè», òàê êàê õîðîøî çíàëè, ÷òî, «åñëè èì íàñòóïèòü íà íîãó», îíè «áóäóò êðè÷àòü íà âñåõ ÿçûêàõ äåìîêðàòè÷åñêîé öèâèëèçàöèè»153. Ìåæäó òåì ñîáûòèÿ â Ãðóçèè ïðèáëèæàëèñü ê ðàçâÿçêå, è íàðîäíûå íàñòðîåíèÿ òàì «íå îòëè÷àëèñü îò îáùåðóññêèõ». Íàñåëåíèå âñå áîëüøå «ñî÷óâñòâîâàëî áîëüøåâèêàì, à... ïðàâèòåëüñòâî íå ìîãëî îðãàíèçîâàòü îáîðîíó»154. Ãðóçèÿ, ïûòàâøàÿñÿ âîññòàíîâèòü ñâîþ ãîñóäàðñòâåííîñòü íà ïðèíöèïàõ «ñàìîîïðåäåëåíèÿ è ìèðà áåç àííåêñèé», â òî æå âðåìÿ îêêóïèðîâàëà Àáõàçèþ, ïîäâåðãëà æåñòî÷àéøèì ðåïðåññèÿì îñåòèí è çàÿâèëà ïðåòåíçèè íà ðóññêèå è àðìÿíñêèå òåððèòîðèè.  ðåçóëüòàòå îíà çàïóòàëàñü â êëóáêå ñîçäàííûõ åþ ñàìîé ïðîòèâîðå÷èé.  ôåâðàëå 1921 ã. ñîâåòñêèé ïåðåâîðîò â Ãðóçèè, ñîâåðøåííûé ïðè àêòèâíîì ó÷àñòèè Êðàñíîé Àðìèè, áûë íåèçáåæåí. Îäíàêî è ñåãîäíÿ åãî ïðåäñòàâëÿþò, ïî ñëîâàì Òðîöêîãî, êàê âíåçàïíûé «íàáåã ñîâåòñêîãî âîëêà íà íåâèííóþ Êðàñíóþ Øàïî÷êó ìåíüøåâèçìà»155. Ïðàâèòåëüñòâî Æîðäàíèÿ íå îêàçàëî ïî÷òè íèêàêîãî ñîïðîòèâëåíèÿ ìàëî÷èñëåííûì ñîâåòñêèì âîéñêàì. Ïî ñâèäåòåëüñòâó ãðóçèíñêîãî ãåíåðàëà Ã. Êâèíèòàäçå156, áîëüøåâèñòñêèé êîìàíäàðì Ãåêêåð ïðîñèë ó Ìîñêâû âñåãî 35 òûñ. ñîëäàò äëÿ çàâîåâàíèÿ Ãðóçèè. Ýìèãðàíòñêèé èñòîðèê Ä. Âà÷íàäçå ïèñàë, ÷òî Ãðóçèÿ äàâàëà â Ðóññêóþ àðìèþ 160 òûñ. âîèíîâ. Ïðîòèâ áîëüøåâèêîâ æå, ñâèäåòåëüñòâîâàë ãåíåðàë È. Îäèøåëèäçå157, ñòðàíà ñìîãëà âûñòàâèòü âñåãî «18 000 øòûêîâ ïðè 46 îðóäèÿõ è øåñòè ýñêàäðîíàõ». Èðîíè÷åñêè îïèñûâàåò îí ñáîð îñîáîãî áàòàëüîíà íàðîäíîé ãâàðäèè, êîòîðûé âìåñòî îáåùàííûõ 1500 ÷åëîâåê «âûøåë èç Òèôëèñà íà òåàòð âîéíû â ñîñòàâå 240 ÷åëîâåê, íî çàòî íà åãî ïðîâîäàõ áûëî ñêàçàíî 240 ðå÷åé»158. 25 ôåâðàëÿ 1921 ã. Êðàñíàÿ Àðìèÿ âîøëà â Òèôëèñ. Ïîëèòèêó Ãðóçèè ýòîãî ïåðèîäà ñïðàâåäëèâî îõàðàêòåðèçîâàë èçâåñòíûé þðèñò-ìåæäóíàðîäíèê, âèäíûé äåÿòåëü Ãðóçèíñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè Ç. Àâàëîâ (Àâàëèøâèëè). «Ïðàâèòåëüñòâî Ãðóçèè ìûñëèëîñü åå âîæäÿìè êàê äåìîêðàòè÷åñêîå – â îòëè÷èå îò ñòðîÿ ñîâåòñêîãî, – ïèñàë îí â ýìèãðàöèè â 1924 ã. – Íà äåëå Ãðóçèÿ, êîíå÷íî, âîâñå åùå íå óäîâëåòâîðÿëà òðåáîâàíèÿì ïðåäñòàâèòåëüíîé äåìîêðàòèè. Âíåøíèå ôîðìû ïîñëåäíåé ïðèêðûâàëè çäåñü äèêòàòóðó ãðóçèíñêîé ñîöèàë-äåìîêðàòè÷åñêîé ïàðòèè...  íà÷àëå 1921 ãîäà Ãðóçèÿ èìåëà â ëèöå ñâîåãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà è â îáðàçå Ó÷ðåäèòåëüíîãî ñîáðàíèÿ ïðîñòóþ êðåàòóðó ïàðòèéíîé îðãàíèçàöèè...  êîíöå ïóòè ïðàâèòåëüñòâî Ãðóçèè 83

Ãëàâà III

î÷óòèëîñü íà ñòîëü óçåíüêîì êàðíèçå, ÷òî ñáðîñèòü åãî âíèç îêàçàëîñü âîçìîæíûì ïðîñòûì ùåë÷êîì... Ãðóçèíñêàÿ äåìîêðàòèÿ 1918–1921 ãã., áûâøàÿ ôîðìîé äèêòàòóðû ñîöèàë-äåìîêðàòèè, ò.å. ìàðêñèçìà ïðàâîãî êðûëà, ÿâëÿëàñü ïåðèîäîì ïîäãîòîâèòåëüíûì ê òîðæåñòâó â Ãðóçèè äèêòàòóðû ñîâåòñêîé. Âñåì ñâîèì ñîäåðæàíèåì ñîöèàëüíîé ïîëèòèêè è äóõîì ñâîèì äåìîêðàòèÿ ýòà... îáðàùåíà áûëà íà äåëå â ñòîðîíó Ìîñêâû, à íå Åâðîïû. È ýòèì ñîçäàâàëîñü êîðåííîå ïðîòèâîðå÷èå ñ òîé åâðîïåéñêîé îðèåíòàöèåé åå âíåøíåé ïîëèòèêè, êîòîðîé Ãðóçèÿ äåðæàëàñü íàñòîé÷èâî äî ëåòà 1920 ã.»159. Ãðàæäàíñêàÿ âîéíà ïîäõîäèëà ê ñâîåìó çàâåðøåíèþ. Ðîññèÿ âîññòàíîâèëà ñâîé êîíòðîëü íàä Çàêàâêàçüåì. Ñòðàíû Àíòàíòû, êîòîðûõ ïðèâëåêàë «çàïàõ áàêèíñêîé íåôòè», ïîñòèãëî ðàçî÷àðîâàíèå. «Ïóòü â Áàêó âåäåò ÷åðåç Áàòóì – Òèôëèñ, – îòìå÷àë Òðîöêèé. – Ýòîò ïîñëåäíèé ïóíêò ÿâëÿåòñÿ ñòðàòåãè÷åñêèì ôîêóñîì Çàêàâêàçüÿ... Áîðüáà èäåò èç-çà íåôòè è ìàðãàíöà. Íåôòåïðîìûøëåííèêàì âñå ðàâíî êàê äîðâàòüñÿ äî íåôòè: ÷åðåç Äåíèêèíà, ÷åðåç ìóñóëüìàíñêóþ ïàðòèþ ìóñàâàò èëè ÷åðåç âîðîòà “íàöèîíàëüíîãî ñàìîîïðåäåëåíèÿ”»160.

IX Ïåðèîä îêêóïàöèè Àáõàçèè Ãðóçèíñêîé ðåñïóáëèêîé çàâåðøèëñÿ â ìàðòå 1921 ã. Î ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ è ýêîíîìè÷åñêèõ ïîñëåäñòâèÿõ ìåíüøåâèñòñêîãî ïðàâëåíèÿ â Àáõàçèè ïèñàòåëü Èñààê Áàáåëü â 1922 ã. ñîîáùàë: «À ìåíüøåâèêè, ýòè ðîêîâûå ìóæ÷èíû, ðàçëîìàëè âñå âäðåáåçãè. Ïîèñòèíå, â ýòîì ôååðè÷åñêîì è ïëîäîðîäÿùåì ñàäó, êîòîðûé íàçûâàåòñÿ Àáõàçèåé, íàó÷àåøüñÿ ñ îñîáîé ñèëîé íåíàâèäåòü ýòó ðàçíîâèäíîñòü âÿëûõ ìîêðèö, êîòîðûå íàñëåäèëè çäåñü âñåìè ïðîÿâëåíèÿìè ñâîåãî òâîð÷åñêîãî ãåíèÿ. Çà äâà ãîäà (çà òðè. – Ñ.Ë.) ñâîåãî âëàäû÷åñòâà îíè óñïåëè ðàçðóøèòü âñå æèçíåííûå ó÷ðåæäåíèÿ ãîðîäà, îòäàëè ëåñíûå áîãàòñòâà íà ðàçãðàáëåíèå èíîñòðàííûì àêóëàì è îáúÿâëåíèåì òàáà÷íîé ìîíîïîëèè äîáèëè âêîíåö íåðâ ñòðàíû»161. Áîðüáó çà ïîëèòè÷åñêóþ ñàìîñòîÿòåëüíîñòü, ãîñóäàðñòâåííóþ íåçàâèñèìîñòü àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà íà÷àëè íå ïðåäñòàâèòåëè áîëüøåâèñòñêîé ïàðòèè, à ñîçäàííûé 8 íîÿáðÿ 1917 ã. Àáõàçñêèé Íàðîäíûé Ñîâåò. Ñîáûòèÿ òîãî âðåìåíè íåîáõîäèìî ðàññìàòðèâàòü â êîíòåêñòå Ãðàæäàíñêîé âîéíû. Åñëè â 1918 ã. èäåÿ ñîâåòñêîé âëàñòè íå ïîëó÷èëà øèðîêîé ïîääåðæêè ó íàðîäîâ Àáõàçèè, òî ê 1921 ã. óñëîâèÿ îáùåñòâåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêîé æèçíè êîðåííûì îáðàçîì èçìåíèëèñü. Èçìåíèëàñü è òàêòèêà áîëüøåâèêîâ â êðàå. Ó÷èòûâàÿ ñåðüåçíûå ïðîìàõè è îøèáêè, äîïóùåííûå â ôåâðàëå è âåñíîé 1918 ã., àáõàçñêèå áîëüøåâèêè ñòàëè ïðèíèìàòü âî âíèìàíèå ìåñòíûå îñîáåííîñòè è ïîçàèìñòâîâàëè ó ðàçãðîìëåííîãî ÀÍÑ èäåþ âîññòàíîâëåíèÿ ñàìîñòîÿòåëüíîé ãîñóäàðñòâåííîñòè. Âñëåä çà óñòàíîâëåíèåì 4 ìàðòà 1921 ã. ñîâåòñêîé âëàñòè, 31 ìàðòà îíè äåêëàðèðîâàëè íåçàâèñèìîñòü àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâà â ôîðìå ÑÑÐ Àáõàçèÿ, ò.å. âîïëîòèëè â æèçíü ñòîëü ïîïóëÿðíûé â íàðîäå òåçèñ î ïîëèòè÷åñêîì ñàìîîïðåäåëåíèè. 84

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

Ñîâåòñêàÿ âëàñòü â êðàå èìåëà ñâîè îñîáåííîñòè è íå ñîïðîâîæäàëàñü ìàññîâûì òåððîðîì. Îíà îêàçàëàñü áîëåå ãèáêîé â ñðàâíåíèè ñ íåäàâíèì ãðóçèíñêèì âëàäû÷åñòâîì. Âî ìíîãîì ýòà íåîáû÷íàÿ äëÿ íîâîé âëàñòè òåíäåíöèÿ îáúÿñíÿåòñÿ òåì, ÷òî åå óòâåðæäåíèå â Àáõàçèè ñîâïàëî ñ ïðîâåäåíèåì â ñîâåòñêîé Ðîññèè íîâîé ýêîíîìè÷åñêîé ïîëèòèêè (ÍÝÏà).  ýòîò ïåðèîä Àáõàçèÿ äåéñòâèòåëüíî áûëà íåáîëüøèì îñòðîâêîì ìèðíîé ðàçìåðåííîé æèçíè. Íî òàê ïðîäîëæàëîñü, ê ñîæàëåíèþ, íåäîëãî162.  ñîâîêóïíîñòè ñ âíóòðåííèìè îáúåêòèâíûìè ïîòðåáíîñòÿìè îáðàçîâàíèþ íåçàâèñèìîé ÑÑÐ Àáõàçèè ñïîñîáñòâîâàë è ìåæäóíàðîäíûé ôàêòîð, à íå ñîìíèòåëüíûé òåçèñ íåêîòîðûõ ãðóçèíñêèõ èñòîðèêîâ î ÿêîáû íàêàçàíèè Ãðóçèè çà ïðîâîçãëàøåíèå íåçàâèñèìîñòè â 1918 ã. Èçâåñòíî, ÷òî åùå ñ îêòÿáðÿ 1920 ã., ïîñëå I ñúåçäà íàðîäîâ Âîñòîêà, áîëüøàÿ ãðóïïà àáõàçñêèõ áîëüøåâèêîâ âî ãëàâå ñ Å. Ýøáà è Í. Ëàêîáà áûëà ïåðåïðàâëåíà â Òóðöèþ163. Âïîñëåäñòâèè Ýøáà îòìå÷àë, ÷òî åçäèë â Òóðöèþ ïî ëè÷íîìó ïîðó÷åíèþ Ëåíèíà äëÿ «âûïîëíåíèÿ î÷åíü îòâåòñòâåííîé çàäà÷è». «ß áûë âî ãëàâå îñîáîé ãðóïïû â ïîåçäêå ïî Àíàòîëèéñêîé Òóðöèè, â Àíãîðå (Àíêàðå. – Ñ.Ë.), ó Êåìàëü-ïàøè», – ïèñàë îí164.  Òðàïåçóíäå (Òðàáçîíå) ñ ïîìîùüþ áàòóìñêèõ àáõàçîâ è ñåìüè Äæèõîãëû Í. Ëàêîáà óñòàíîâèë êîíòàêò ñ âûñøèìè âîåííûìè è ãðàæäàíñêèìè ðóêîâîäèòåëÿìè Òóðöèè. Åãî ãðóïïà îïèðàëàñü íà ìíîãî÷èñëåííóþ àáõàçñêóþ äèàñïîðó Òóðöèè. Êåìàëü-ïàøó îêðóæàëè íåêîòîðûå âëèÿòåëüíûå àáõàçû, è â ïåðâóþ î÷åðåäü áëèæàéøèé òîãäà ñîðàòíèê Àòàòþðêà Ðàóô Îðáàé (àáõàçñêàÿ ôàìèëèÿ Àøõàðóà) – áóäóùèé ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Òóðöèè. Âåðîÿòíåå âñåãî, îñíîâíàÿ çàäà÷à, ïîñòàâëåííàÿ ïåðåä ãðóïïîé, çàêëþ÷àëàñü â òîì, ÷òîáû Òóðöèÿ îòêàçàëàñü îò Áàòóìà è Áàòóìñêîé îáëàñòè, ÷òî âïîëíå âïèñûâàëîñü â êîíòåêñò ïîäãîòîâëÿåìîãî ñîâåòñêî-òóðåöêîãî äîãîâîðà. Èçâåñòíî, íàïðèìåð, ÷òî Ýøáà, Ìèõàèë Ëàêîáà è Êîíñòàíòèí Èíàë-èïà èç Òðàïåçóíäà íàïðàâèëèñü â Ñàìñóí, à çàòåì «âûåõàëè â ðåçèäåíöèþ ê Êåìàëü-ïàøå».  ëè÷íîé àíêåòå Í. Ëàêîáà îò 14 îêòÿáðÿ 1936 ã. óêàçàíî, ÷òî åãî ãðóïïà îñòàâàëàñü â Òóðöèè äî ìàðòà 1921 ã. Ê 4 ìàðòà 1921 ã., äíþ óñòàíîâëåíèÿ ñîâåòñêîé âëàñòè â Ñóõóìå, íè Ýøáà, íè Ëàêîáà åùå íå âåðíóëèñü èç Òóðöèè. Îíè ïðèáûëè ëèøü 6 ìàðòà.  òîò æå äåíü ïðè ó÷àñòèè ïðåäñòàâèòåëåé 9-é Êðàñíîé Àðìèè çäåñü áûë ñôîðìèðîâàí âûñøèé çàêîíîäàòåëüíûé è ðàñïîðÿäèòåëüíûé îðãàí âëàñòè – Ðåâêîì Àáõàçèè â ñîñòàâå Å. Ýøáà (ïðåäñåäàòåëü), Í. Ëàêîáà è Í. Àêèðòàâà. Íà÷àë ôóíêöèîíèðîâàòü è ðóêîâîäÿùèé ïàðòèéíûé öåíòð – Îðãáþðî ÐÊÏ(á) â Àáõàçèè165. Îñíîâû ñîâåòñêî-òóðåöêîãî äîãîâîðà áûëè âûðàáîòàíû óæå â ôåâðàëå 1921 ã. Ëåíèí è Êåìàëü-ïàøà ïðîÿâëÿëè èñêëþ÷èòåëüíóþ çàèíòåðåñîâàííîñòü â äîñòèæåíèè ñîãëàøåíèÿ. Ñïóñòÿ ìåñÿö, 16 ìàðòà 1921 ã., â Ìîñêâå ìåæäó ÐÑÔÑÐ è ïðåäñòàâèòåëÿìè Âåëèêîãî íàöèîíàëüíîãî ñîáðàíèÿ Òóðöèè áûë ïîäïèñàí äîãîâîð î äðóæáå è áðàòñòâå. Òóðöèÿ îáÿçûâàëàñü, â ÷àñòíîñòè, ïðèçíàòü ïðàâî ÑÑÐ Ãðóçèè íà Áàòóì, à ÷åðåç äâà äíÿ ïîñëå 85

Ãëàâà III

ïîäïèñàíèÿ äîãîâîðà, 18 ìàðòà 1921 ã., â Àäæàðèè áûëà óñòàíîâëåíà ñîâåòñêàÿ âëàñòü166. Àáõàçñêàÿ ãðóïïà âî ãëàâå ñ Ýøáà äåéñòâîâàëà ïî ïîðó÷åíèþ Ëåíèíà â íàïðàâëåíèè çàêëþ÷åíèÿ äîãîâîðà ñ Òóðöèåé íà âûãîäíûõ äëÿ ÐÑÔÑÐ óñëîâèÿõ. Íå ñëó÷àéíî ïîýòîìó, ÷òî èõ äåÿòåëüíîñòü «ñîâïàëà» ïî âðåìåíè ñ íàèáîëåå îòâåòñòâåííûì ìîìåíòîì âûðàáîòêè äàííîãî ñîãëàøåíèÿ. È ëèøü â ïåðâûõ ÷èñëàõ ìàðòà 1921 ã., êîãäà ïîñòàâëåííàÿ Ìîñêâîé çàäà÷à áûëà óñïåøíî ðåøåíà, ãðóïïà ïîêèíóëà Òóðöèþ. Êàê òîëüêî Ýøáà è Ëàêîáà ïðèáûëè â Àáõàçèþ, íà ñîâåùàíèÿõ Ðåâêîìà ìãíîâåííî âñòàë âîïðîñ î ïðîâîçãëàøåíèè íåçàâèñèìîé ÑÑÐ Àáõàçèè. 26 ìàðòà 1921 ã. Ðåâêîì Àáõàçèè ñîîáùèë Ëåíèíó îá ýòîì ñâîåì ïîñòàíîâëåíèè167. Îêîí÷àòåëüíîå ðåøåíèå ïî äàííîìó âîïðîñó, êîíå÷íî æå, áûëî ïðèíÿòî â Ìîñêâå íåïîñðåäñòâåííî Ëåíèíûì, ÷òî ïðèçíàþò è ãðóçèíñêèå èñòîðèêè (Ë. Òîèäçå), à Ã. Îðäæîíèêèäçå âûïîëíÿë ëèøü ðîëü èñïîëíèòåëÿ è áûë äàëåêî íå â âîñòîðãå îò ïîäãîòîâëåííîãî àáõàçàìè ïðîåêòà (ñì. ïîëåìèêó Ýøáà è Îðäæîíèêèäçå ïî ïðÿìîìó ïðîâîäó 27 ìàðòà). Ñêîðåå âñåãî ñòîëü ðåøèòåëüíàÿ ïîçèöèÿ Ðåâêîìà Àáõàçèè è åãî ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Å. Ýøáà îñíîâûâàëàñü íà îáåùàíèè Ëåíèíà ïðåäîñòàâèòü «íåçàâèñèìîñòü» Àáõàçèè â ñëó÷àå óñïåøíîãî çàâåðøåíèÿ «àáõàçñêîé ìèññèè» â Òóðöèè. Ïî âñåé âèäèìîñòè, ïîñâÿùåííûå â ñóòü äåëà âëèÿòåëüíûå ïîëèòè÷åñêèå ëèöà àáõàçñêîé äèàñïîðû, è â ïåðâóþ î÷åðåäü Ðàóô Îðáàé, îêàçàëè ñèëüíîå âëèÿíèå íà Êåìàëü-ïàøó ïî âîïðîñó î ïåðåäà÷å Áàòóìà. Äàëåêî íå ñëó÷àåí è òîò ôàêò, ÷òî âîïðîñ î ïðîâîçãëàøåíèè àáõàçñêîé ãîñóäàðñòâåííîñòè ñòàë âïëîòíóþ ðåøàòüñÿ ñðàçó ïîñëå ïîäïèñàíèÿ 16 ìàðòà 1921 ã. äîãîâîðà ìåæäó ÐÑÔÑÐ è Òóðöèåé. Êîñâåííî ýòà ìûñëü ïîäòâåðæäàåòñÿ è ñàìèì «Áàòóìñêèì ñîâåùàíèåì». Ïî÷åìó æå èìåííî Áàòóì, òîëüêî ÷òî áëàãîäàðÿ «àáõàçñêîé ìèññèè» îòîøåäøèé ê Ãðóçèè, ñòàë ìåñòîì ïðîâîçãëàøåíèÿ íåçàâèñèìîé ÑÑÐ Àáõàçèè? 31 ìàðòà 1921 ã. îá èòîãàõ «Áàòóìñêîãî ñîâåùàíèÿ» Ýøáà ïî ïðÿìîìó ïðîâîäó ñîîáùèë Ëåíèíó168, à òî, ÷òî âîæäü áîëüøåâèêîâ îäîáðèë òîãäà ñîçäàíèå íåçàâèñèìîé ÑÑÐ Àáõàçèè, ïîäòâåðæäàþò äîêóìåíò ÖÊ ÐÊÏ(á)169 è äåêëàðàöèÿ Ðåâêîìà Ãðóçèè «Î íåçàâèñèìîñòè ÑÑÐ Àáõàçèè», ïðèíÿòàÿ 21 ìàÿ 1921 ã.  êîíöå êîíöîâ ñàì ôàêò ïóñòü êðàòêîâðåìåííîãî, íî ñóùåñòâîâàíèÿ «íåçàâèñèìîé» ÑÑÐ Àáõàçèè ïðèçíàþò è ãðóçèíñêèå èñòîðèêè. Òàê, Ë. Òîèäçå ïèøåò: «ßñíî, ÷òî îáúÿâëåíèå Àáõàçèè ñîâåòñêîé ñîöèàëèñòè÷åñêîé ðåñïóáëèêîé áûëî ñâÿçàíî íå òîëüêî ñ èìåíåì Â. Ëåíèíà... Åñòåñòâåííî, ê ýòîìó ïðèëîæèë ðóêó è È. Ñòàëèí, õîòÿ îáà ïðåêðàñíî ïîíèìàëè âðåìåííûé è ôîðìàëüíûé õàðàêòåð ýòîé “íåçàâèñèìîñò蔻 (Ñ. 298). Ó÷åíûé ñ÷èòàåò, ÷òî Ñòàëèí âñåãäà ïîääåðæèâàë Àáõàçèþ, è ïðèâîäèò íåñêîëüêî åãî âûñêàçûâàíèé, îòíîñÿùèõñÿ ê ìàþ 1918 ã. è ôåâðàëþ 1921 ã., ò.å. êî âðåìåíè, êîãäà áîëüøåâèêè áîðîëèñü ñ ìåíüøåâèñòñêîé Ãðóçèåé. Íî òîãäà åãî îöåíêè áèëè â îäíó öåëü – ñâàëèòü ïðàâèòåëüñòâî Æîðäàíèÿ, è â óïîìÿíó86

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

òûõ ïóáëèêàöèÿõ Ñòàëèí íèêîãäà íå ãîâîðèë î íåçàâèñèìîì ñóùåñòâîâàíèè Àáõàçèè. Ïîñëå ïîáåäû ñîâåòñêîé âëàñòè â Ãðóçèè Ñòàëèí ïîñòîÿííî ïðåïÿòñòâîâàë êàêîìó-ëèáî íåçàâèñèìîìó ñóùåñòâîâàíèþ Àáõàçèè, î ÷åì ñâèäåòåëüñòâóåò öåëûé ðÿä äîêóìåíòîâ 1921 ã. (ñì. À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè. Ñ. 285). Äàæå ïðè î÷åíü áîëüøîì æåëàíèè Ñòàëèíà òðóäíî çàïîäîçðèòü â ïðîàáõàçñêèõ íàñòðîåíèÿõ. Ñêîðåå íàïðîòèâ. Áóäó÷è íàðêîìîì ïî äåëàì íàöèîíàëüíîñòåé, îí íàáèðàë ñèëó â Êðåìëå, è Ëåíèí íå ìîã íå ó÷èòûâàòü åãî è Îðäæîíèêèäçå íåãàòèâíîãî îòíîøåíèÿ ê àáõàçñêîé íåçàâèñèìîñòè. Äëÿ Ëåíèíà ìíåíèå ýòèõ åãî áëèæàéøèõ ñîðàòíèêîâ, êîíå÷íî æå, «âåñèëî» çíà÷èòåëüíî áîëüøå, ÷åì òî÷êà çðåíèÿ Åôðåìà Ýøáà – ÷åëîâåêà Ë. Òðîöêîãî. Ïîýòîìó íåò íè÷åãî óäèâèòåëüíîãî â òîì, ÷òî â ïèñüìàõ Ëåíèíà 1921 ã., î êîòîðûõ óïîìèíàþò À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè è Ë. Òîèäçå, òåìà Àáõàçèè îòñóòñòâóåò. Ñîâåðøåííî ÿñíî, ÷åì áûëà ïðîäèêòîâàíà òàêàÿ ïîçèöèÿ: Ëåíèí ôàêòè÷åñêè îòäàë àáõàçñêèé âîïðîñ íà îòêóï «ãðóçèíñêèõ òîâàðèùåé». Ñàì Èëüè÷ áûë îäåðæèì èäååé ìèðîâîé ðåâîëþöèè è ìûñëèë ìàñøòàáàìè íå ãðóçèé è àáõàçèé, à êîíòèíåíòîâ è «àçèé». Òîãäà åìó íóæåí áûë äîãîâîð ñ Àòàòþðêîì, è îí îòäàë åìó âñå, êðîìå Áàòóìà. Ïî÷åìó îí ïîøåë íà òàêèå óñòóïêè? Äà ïîòîìó, ÷òî áûë óâåðåí – äîãîâîð êðàòêîâðåìåííûé, è Òóðöèÿ âîò-âîò ñòàíåò åùå îäíîé ñîâåòñêîé ðåñïóáëèêîé. Îäíàêî ýòèì íàäåæäàì íå ñóæäåíî áûëî îïðàâäàòüñÿ. Íåñìîòðÿ íà ìîùíåéøåå ïðîòèâîäåéñòâèå, íåçàâèñèìàÿ ÑÑÐ Àáõàçèÿ ïðîñóùåñòâîâàëà ñ 31 ìàðòà 1921 ã. ïî 17 ôåâðàëÿ 1922 ã., è ýòîò ôàêò îòðèöàòü íåâîçìîæíî.  ôåâðàëå 1922 ã. ñîñòîÿëñÿ I ñúåçä Ñîâåòîâ Àáõàçèè, êîòîðûé ðàòèôèöèðîâàë «îñîáûé ñîþçíûé äîãîâîð» ìåæäó Ãðóçèåé è Àáõàçèåé. Äîãîâîð ÿâèëñÿ ðåçóëüòàòîì ñèëüíåéøåãî äàâëåíèÿ ñî ñòîðîíû Ñòàëèíà – Îðäæîíèêèäçå.  äåêàáðå 1922 ã. ïðåäñòàâèòåëü ÑÑÐ Àáõàçèè Í. Àêèðòàâà ïîñòàâèë ñâîþ ïîäïèñü ïîä Äîãîâîðîì îá îáðàçîâàíèè ÑÑÑÐ. Àáõàçèÿ òîãäà íå âõîäèëà â Ãðóçèþ, à îáúåäèíÿëàñü ñ íåé â êà÷åñòâå äîãîâîðíîé ðåñïóáëèêè. Õàðàêòåð ìåæãîñóäàðñòâåííûõ îòíîøåíèé Àáõàçèè è Ãðóçèè íàøåë ñâîå îòðàæåíèå è â Êîíñòèòóöèÿõ Ãðóçèè 1922 è 1927 ãã.  ïîñëåäíåé, íàïðèìåð, ïîä÷åðêèâàëîñü, ÷òî ÑÑÐ Ãðóçèÿ ÿâëÿåòñÿ ôåäåðàòèâíûì ãîñóäàðñòâîì (ñò. 2).  1924–1925 ãã. áûëè óòâåðæäåíû Ãåðá è Ôëàã ÑÑÐ Àáõàçèè, ïðèíÿòû çàêîíîäàòåëüíûå àêòû êîíñòèòóöèîííîãî õàðàêòåðà, ââåäåíû â äåéñòâèå êîäåêñû: óãîëîâíûé, ãðàæäàíñêèé, óãîëîâíî-ïðîöåññóàëüíûé, çåìåëüíûé, ëåñíîé. Ïåðâàÿ Êîíñòèòóöèÿ ÑÑÐ Àáõàçèè áûëà ïðèíÿòà â àïðåëå 1925 ã. III Âñåàáõàçñêèì ñúåçäîì Ñîâåòîâ. Àáõàçèÿ ïðèíÿëà òîãäà ñâîþ Êîíñòèòóöèþ â êà÷åñòâå «ñîþçíîé» ðåñïóáëèêè, â òî âðåìÿ êàê àâòîíîìèè íå èìåëè ñâîèõ êîíñòèòóöèé.  ýòîò ïåðèîä ÑÑÐ Àáõàçèÿ ïî ñâîåìó ñòàòóñó ÿâëÿëàñü íå àâòîíîìíîé, à ñîþçíîé ðåñïóáëèêîé, èìåâøåé ñòàòóñ ñóâåðåííîãî ãîñóäàðñòâà (ñò. 5 Êîíñòèòóöèè Àáõàçèè 1925 ã.). Ïî ñóòè äåëà, ýòî áûëà ïîñëåäíÿÿ ïîïûòêà ñî ñòîðîíû Ñóõóìà ïåðåñìîòðåòü âçàèìîîòíîøåíèÿ Àáõàçèè ñ Ãðóçèåé. 87

Ãëàâà III

Îá ýòîì ãîâîðèò 5-ÿ ñòàòüÿ Êîíñòèòóöèè: «ÑÑÐ Àáõàçèÿ åñòü ñóâåðåííîå ãîñóäàðñòâî, îñóùåñòâëÿþùåå ãîñóäàðñòâåííóþ âëàñòü íà ñâîåé òåððèòîðèè ñàìîñòîÿòåëüíî è íåçàâèñèìî îò äðóãîé êàêîé-ëèáî âëàñòè. Ñóâåðåíèòåò ÑÑÐ Àáõàçèè, ââèäó äîáðîâîëüíîãî åå âõîæäåíèÿ â ÇÑÔÑÐ è Ñîþç ÑÑÐ, îãðàíè÷åí ëèøü â ïðåäåëàõ è ïî ïðåäìåòàì, óêàçàííûì â Êîíñòèòóöèÿõ ýòèõ Ñîþçîâ... ÑÑÐ. Àáõàçèÿ ñîõðàíÿåò çà ñîáîé ïðàâî ñâîáîäíîãî âûõîäà êàê èç ñîñòàâà ÇÑÔÑÐ, òàê è èç Ñîþçà ÑÑл (öèòèðóþ ïî «Ðàçûñêàíèÿì». Ñ. 304– 305). ßçûêîì ãîñóäàðñòâåííûõ ó÷ðåæäåíèé â Àáõàçèè ïðèçíàâàëñÿ ðóññêèé. Äàííàÿ Êîíñòèòóöèÿ, êîíå÷íî æå, áûëà áåçîãîâîðî÷íî ïðèíÿòà ñúåçäîì. Èíà÷å çà÷åì íàäî áûëî Çàêêðàéêîìó ÐÊÏ(á) âûíîñèòü 6 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1925 ã. ïîñòàíîâëåíèå, â êîòîðîì, â ÷àñòíîñòè, ãîâîðèëîñü: «ïåðåñìîòðåòü Êîíñòèòóöèþ ÑÑÐ Àáõàçèè, ïðèíÿòóþ íà III ñúåçäå Ñîâåòîâ Àáõàçèè»? Îòäåëüíûå ãðóçèíñêèå èñòîðèêè çàÿâëÿþò, ÷òî Êîíñòèòóöèÿ 1925 ã. ÿêîáû ïîäëåæàëà óòâåðæäåíèþ íåêèìè âûøåñòîÿùèìè ñòðóêòóðàìè. Íî âûñøèì îðãàíîì âëàñòè ÿâëÿëñÿ òîãäà Ñúåçä Ñîâåòîâ Àáõàçèè, ðåøåíèå êîòîðîãî ñ÷èòàëîñü îêîí÷àòåëüíûì. Àáõàçñêèìè è ãðóçèíñêèìè ó÷åíûìè ñîâåðøåííî óïóñêàåòñÿ èç âèäó òà òÿæåëàÿ àòìîñôåðà, â êîòîðîé ïðèíèìàëèñü ïîäîáíûå ðåøåíèÿ. Íèêòî èç íèõ íå îáðàòèë âíèìàíèÿ íà òî, ïî÷åìó ñúåçä ñîñòîÿëñÿ ÷óòü ïîçæå íàçíà÷åííîãî âðåìåíè. Íå çíàþò îíè è î òîì, ÷òî ñàìîå íåïîñðåäñòâåííîå ó÷àñòèå â åãî ïîäãîòîâêå ïðèíèìàë Ë. Òðîöêèé, íàõîäèâøèéñÿ òîãäà â Àáõàçèè. «Âåñíîþ 1925 ãîäà ìû æèëè ñ æåíîé íà Êàâêàçå, – âñïîìèíàë îí, – â Ñóõóìå, ïîä ïîêðîâèòåëüñòâîì Íåñòîðà Ëàêîáû, îáùåïðèçíàííîãî ãëàâû Àáõàçñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè»170.  íà÷àëå ìàðòà Òðîöêîãî ïîñåòèëè â Ñóõóìå äðóçüÿ, ïîñîë ÑÑÑÐ âî Ôðàíöèè X. Ðàêîâñêèé è íàðêîì ïî÷ò è òåëåãðàôîâ È. Ñìèðíîâ. Áëèæàéøèé ñïîäâèæíèê Òðîöêîãî Õðèñòèàí Ðàêîâñêèé, âûñòóïàÿ â Ñóõóìå 5 ìàðòà, îòìåòèë: «Â ñâÿçè ñ ñåññèåé Ñîþçíîãî Öåíòðàëüíîãî Èñïîëíèòåëüíîãî Êîìèòåòà, êîòîðàÿ çàñåäàåò â Òèôëèñå, áûëî ïîñòàíîâëåíî, ÷òîáû ÷ëåíû ïðàâèòåëüñòâà ïîñåòèëè ðàçíûå êàâêàçñêèå ðåñïóáëèêè. Íà ìåíÿ âûïàëà äîëÿ, ðàíüøå äðóãèõ, ïðèâåòñòâîâàòü ìîëîäóþ Àáõàçñêóþ Ñîöèàëèñòè÷åñêóþ Ðåñïóáëèêó. Ìû äàåì âñåìó ìèðó ïðèìåð, êàê íóæíî ðåøàòü íàöèîíàëüíûé âîïðîñ»171. Ðàêîâñêèé, áåçóñëîâíî, áûë âïîëíå îñâåäîìëåí îá àáõàçñêèõ ïëàíàõ. Ñòàëèí â ýòî âðåìÿ íà÷èíàë áîðüáó ñ Çèíîâüåâûì è Êàìåíåâûì, à â ðÿäàõ ïàðòèéíîé áþðîêðàòèè âîâñþ øåïòàëèñü î âîçìîæíîì ñîþçå Ñòàëèíà ñ Òðîöêèì. Àâåëü Åíóêèäçå è Íåñòîð Ëàêîáà èñêðåííå íàäåÿëèñü íà ïåðåìåíó êóðñà, è îáà, ïî ñëîâàì Òðîöêîãî, «ïîäíÿëè ãîëîâû»172. Íà ïðåäñòîÿùåì ñúåçäå, êîòîðûé ãîòîâèëñÿ ïðèíÿòü Êîíñòèòóöèþ Àáõàçèè, äîëæíû áûëè ïðèñóòñòâîâàòü Ë. Òðîöêèé, À. Ìÿñíèêîâ, Ñ. Ìîãèëåâñêèé, Ã. Àòàðáåêîâ è äðóãèå âèäíûå äåÿòåëè ïàðòèè. Îäíàêî 22 ìàðòà 1925 ã. «þíêåðñ», íà êîòîðîì âûëåòåëè Ìÿñíèêîâ, Ìîãèëåâñêèé è Àòàðáåêîâ, ïèëîòèðóåìûé ëåò÷èêàìè Øïèëåì è Ñàãàðàäçå, çàãîðåëñÿ â âîçäóõå è ðóõíóë âáëèçè òèôëèññêîãî àýðîäðîìà.  òîò æå äåíü Ëàêîáà âûñòóïèë íà òðàóðíîì çàñåäàíèè 88

Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ

Ñîâíàðêîìà. Áîëüøóþ ðå÷ü ïî ïîâîäó òðàãè÷åñêîé ãèáåëè ñâîèõ äðóçåé ïðîèçíåñ 23 ìàðòà íà ìèòèíãå â Ñóõóìå Òðîöêèé, êîòîðûé ïðîçðà÷íî íàìåêíóë íà óáèéñòâî: «...Êàêàÿ-òî òåõíè÷åñêàÿ ñëó÷àéíîñòü, à ìîæåò áûòü, è íå ñëó÷àéíîñòü, – ìû ïîêà ÷òî ïðè÷èí ýòîé êàòàñòðîôû íå çíàåì – âî âñÿêîì ñëó÷àå, ÷òî-òî ïîñòîðîííåå, ëåæàùåå âíå áîðüáû, âíå îáû÷íîé æèçíè, âíå îðãàíèçìà ýòèõ òîâàðèùåé, ÷òî-òî âíåøíåå ïåðåñåêëî îäíèì óäàðîì èõ æèçíü... Âðÿä ëè ìû äîçíàåìñÿ êîãäà-ëèáî ñ òî÷íîñòüþ î äåéñòâèòåëüíûõ ïðè÷èíàõ ãèáåëè. Âåäü æèâûõ ñâèäåòåëåé òîãî, ÷òî ïðîèçîøëî, íåò!»173. Íàèáîëåå âèäíîé ôèãóðîé ñðåäè ïîãèáøèõ áûë À. Ìÿñíèêîâ, ÷ëåí Ïðåçèäèóìà ÖÈÊ ÑÑÑÐ, ÷ëåí Ðåââîåíñîâåòà ÑÑÑÐ, áûâøèé ñåêðåòàðü Çàêàâêàçñêîãî êðàéêîìà. Êëþ÷åâûå ïîñòû çàíèìàëè Ñ. Ìîãèëåâñêèé, ïðåäñåäàòåëü Çàêàâêàçñêîé ×Ê, è Ã. Àòàðáåêîâ, óïîëíîìî÷åííûé ÑÑÑÐ â ÇÑÔÑÐ. Òðîöêèé òîãäà ãîâîðèë î Ìÿñíèêîâå: «Îí ëåòåë ñþäà, â Àáõàçèþ, íà Ñúåçä Ñîâåòîâ, íî, ê íåñ÷àñòüþ, íå äîëåòåë...»174. Ýòîé àêöèåé Ñòàëèí ðåøàë ñðàçó íåñêîëüêî çàäà÷, è çàìåñòèòåëü Ìîãèëåâñêîãî ïî Çàêàâêàçñêîé ×Ê Ë. Áåðèÿ ïîëó÷èë ñîîòâåòñòâóþùèé ïðèêàç.  ñâîå âðåìÿ êàäðîâûé ÷åêèñò Ñóðåí Ãàçàðÿí çàÿâèë ïî ýòîìó ïîâîäó: «Èñòîðèÿ êîãäà-íèáóäü ïðîëüåò ñâåò íà ýòî äåëî è âûÿâèò çëîâåùóþ ðîëü Áåðèÿ»175. Ïîñëå ãèáåëè ñâîèõ åäèíîìûøëåííèêîâ, êîòîðóþ îí íàçâàë «òðîéíûì óäàðîì», Òðîöêèé ñïåøíî âûåõàë èç Ñóõóìà â Òèôëèñ. Íåñìîòðÿ íà òî ÷òî ïîçèöèè Àáõàçèè îêàçàëèñü ñèëüíî ïîäîðâàííûìè è ñúåçä ëèøèëñÿ ìîùíîé ïîääåðæêè, Í. Ëàêîáà âñå æå ïðîâåë â íà÷àëå àïðåëÿ 1925 ã. III ñúåçä Ñîâåòîâ Àáõàçèè, êîòîðûé è ïðèíÿë Êîíñòèòóöèþ ñóâåðåííîé Àáõàçèè. Ìîæíî ëè íå ó÷èòûâàòü âñå ýòè ñëîæíûå ïîëèòè÷åñêèå îáñòîÿòåëüñòâà, êîãäà èññëåäîâàòåëè êàñàþòñÿ âîïðîñîâ ïðîâåäåíèÿ àáõàçñêîãî ñúåçäà è ïðèíÿòèÿ èì Êîíñòèòóöèè? Òàêèì îáðàçîì, î÷åíü âàæíûé ïðàâîâîé àêò áûë çàôèêñèðîâàí. È ñîâåðøåííî íåâàæíî, î ÷åì ïîòîì, 2 äåêàáðÿ 1925 ã., ãîâîðèë Ëàêîáà â Òèôëèñå íà IV ñúåçäå Êîìïàðòèè Ãðóçèè, – âåäü íàä íèì óæå íàâèñàë «äàìîêëîâ ìå÷». Îí îñòàëñÿ áåç ñîþçíèêîâ, áåç èëëþçèé, à ïîëèòè÷åñêàÿ ñóäüáà Òðîöêîãî áûëà ïðàêòè÷åñêè ïðåäðåøåíà. È â ýòîé íàèñëîæíåéøåé ñèòóàöèè íà÷àëñÿ çàêîíîìåðíûé îòêàò íàçàä íå òîëüêî Ëàêîáà, íî è Àáõàçñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè. Ïî ìåðå óêðåïëåíèÿ âëàñòè Ñòàëèíà ñòàòóñ Àáõàçèè íåóêëîííî ïîíèæàëñÿ, è â ôåâðàëå 1931 ã. äîãîâîðíàÿ ÑÑÐ Àáõàçèÿ áûëà ïðåîáðàçîâàíà â àâòîíîìíóþ ðåñïóáëèêó – Àáõàçñêàÿ ÀÑÑÐ – è âêëþ÷åíà â ñîñòàâ Ãðóçèíñêîé ÑÑÐ, â êîòîðîé è íàõîäèëàñü âïëîòü äî 1991 ã. ÏÐÈÌÅ×ÀÍÈß Ãîðäàäçå Ò. Ìîðàëüíî-èäåîëîãè÷åñêèå ïðåïÿòñòâèÿ ê ðàçðåøåíèþ ãðóçèíîàáõàçñêîãî êîíôëèêòà // Àáõàçèÿ – Ãðóçèÿ. Ïðåïÿòñòâèÿ íà ïóòè ê ìèðó. Ñóõóì, 2000. Ñ. 38–47. 2 Àí÷àáàäçå Ã. Èçó÷åíèå âîïðîñîâ ýòíè÷åñêîé èñòîðèè àáõàçîâ íà ôîíå ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîãî êîíôëèêòà // Àñïåêòû ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîãî êîíôëèêòà. Ìàòåðèàëû ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé êîíôåðåíöèè. Êîíîáååâî (Ìîñêîâñêàÿ îáëàñòü). 1999. Èðâàéí, 2000. Ñ. 20–70. 1

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Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà Ðîññèéñêîé èìïåðèè: Àáõàçèÿ â 1917–1925 ãîäàõ Ñì. ñòàòüè Ãàìàõàðèÿ Ä., Ïàïàñêèðè Ç., ×àíèÿ Â. â Ñàá÷îòà Àïõàçåòè (1990. 3, 4 àâãóñòà) (íà ãðóç. ÿç.). 105 Zhordania N. My life. 106 Òðîöêèé Ë. Ñî÷. Ò. 12. Ñ. 207–208. 107 Ìåíòåøàøâèëè À. Èç èñòîðèè âçàèìîîòíîøåíèé... Ñ. 26–27. 108 Òðîöêèé Ë. Ñî÷. Ò. 12. Ñ. 216. 109 Ñð. ñòàòüþ À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè â «Ðàçûñêàíèÿõ» (Ñ. 272–273) 1999 ã. è åãî ðàáîòó «Èç èñòîðèè âçàèìîîòíîøåíèé» (Ñ. 26–27) 1990 ã. 110 Ñì.: Ëàêîáà Ñ. «È íå çåìëÿ çäåøíÿÿ íàì íóæíà» // Åäèíåíèå. 1991. ¹ 3. Ñ. 8; Èñòîðèÿ Àáõàçèè. Ñóõóì, 1991; Èñòîðèÿ Àáõàçèè. Ãóäàóòà, 1993. Ñ. 309. 111 Äåíèêèí – Þäåíè÷ – Âðàíãåëü. Ñ. 96–97. 112 Ëèòåðàòóðíàÿ Ãðóçèÿ. 1989. ¹ 11. Ñ. 156. 113 Òðîöêèé Ë. Ñî÷. Ò. 12. Ñ. 216–217. 114 Íàøå ñëîâî. 1919. 21 ìàðòà. 115 Òàì æå. 116 Òàì æå. 22 ìàðòà. 117 Ðå÷ü Ñ. ×àíáà áûëà îïóáëèêîâàíà íà àáõàçñêîì ÿçûêå â ãàçåòå Àïñíû 5 àïðåëÿ 1919 ã., äàåòñÿ â ïîäñòðî÷íîì ïåðåâîäå àêàäåìèêà Õ.Ñ. Áãàæáà. Ñì. òàêæå: Èñòîðèÿ Àáõàçèè. 1991; 1993. Ñ. 313–314. 118 Äåíèêèí – Þäåíè÷ – Âðàíãåëü. Ñ. 98. 119 Íàøå ñëîâî. 1919. 21 ìàðòà; Ëèòåðàòóðíàÿ Ãðóçèÿ. 1989. ¹ 11. Ñ. 155–156; Ëàêîáà Ñ. Î÷åðêè ïîëèòè÷åñêîé èñòîðèè Àáõàçèè. Ñ. 74–75; Èñòîðèÿ Àáõàçèè. Ñ. 314–315. 120 Íàøå ñëîâî. 1919. 14 èþíÿ. 121 Ìåíòåøàøâèëè À. Èç èñòîðèè âçàèìîîòíîøåíèé... Ñ. 29–30. 122 Äåìîêðàòè÷åñêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî Ãðóçèè è àíãëèéñêîå êîìàíäîâàíèå. Òèôëèñ, 1928. Ñ. 54–57. 123 Íàøå ñëîâî. 1919. 15 èþíÿ. 124 ÖÃÀÀ. Ô. Ȗ39. Ä. 16. Ë. 1–2; Àáõàçñêèé ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé ìóçåé (äàëåå – ÀÃÌ). Ô. 3. Îï.1. Ä. 39. Ë. 57–58. 125 Òðîöêèé Ë. Ñî÷. Ò. 12. Ñ. 223–224. 126 Äåíèêèí À.È. Î÷åðêè... Ò. 3. Ñ. 48. 127 Òàðíàâà Ìèõ. Âîñïîìèíàíèÿ. 128 Ñîöèàë-äåìîêðàò. 1919. 20 îêòÿáðÿ. ¹ 87. 129 Òàì æå. 130 ÖÃÀÀ. Ô. Ȗ39. Ä. 20à. Ë. 3. 131 Òàì æå. Ë. 3 – 3 îá. 132 Òàì æå. 133 Ðîññèéñêèé ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé àðõèâ ñîöèàëüíî-ïîëèòè÷åñêîé èñòîðèè (äàëåå – ÐÃÀÑÏÈ). Ô. 85. Îï. 15. Ä. 42. Ë. 13–19; ÀÃÌ. Ô. 3. Îï. 1. Ä. 39. Ë. 117–119. 134 Ñëîâî. 1920. 9 íîÿáðÿ. 135 Ëèòåðàòóðíàÿ Ãðóçèÿ. 1989. ¹ 11. Ñ. 157. 136 Ñâîáîäíàÿ Ãðóçèÿ. 1991. 3 ìàÿ. 137 Äçèäçàðèÿ Ã.À. Î÷åðêè èñòîðèè Àáõàçèè (1910–1921 ãã.). Òáèëèñè, 1963. Ñ. 325–326; Ñàãàðèÿ Á.Å. Èñòîðèÿ ïîâòîðÿåòñÿ / Áçûáü. 1989. 30 îêòÿáðÿ. 138 Ñëîâî. 1920. 9 íîÿáðÿ. 139 ÖÃÀÀ. Ô. Ȗ39. Ä. 7. 140 Íàøå ñëîâî. 1919. 20 íîÿáðÿ. 104

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Ãëàâà III Ëèòåðàòóðíàÿ Ãðóçèÿ. 1989. ¹ 11. Ñ. 160. ÖÃÀÀ. Ô. Ȗ39. Ä. 18. Ë. 210, 214. 143 Òàì æå. Ë. 136–138. 144 ÀÃÌ. Ô. 3. Îï. 1. Ä. 54. Ë. 20–27 îá. 145 Íàøå ñëîâî. 1920. 6 ìàÿ. 146 Ñì.: Ëèòåðàòóðíàÿ Ãðóçèÿ. 1989. ¹ 11. 147 Ñì. ñòàòüþ À. Ìåíòåøàøâèëè â æóðíàëå Ëèòåðàòóðíàÿ Ãðóçèÿ (1990. ¹ 2. Ñ. 176–177). 148 Ñâîáîäíàÿ Ãðóçèÿ. 1991. 10 àïðåëÿ 149 Ëèòåðàòóðíàÿ Ãðóçèÿ. 1990. ¹ 2. Ñ. 190–192. 150 Ìåíòåøàøâèëè À. Èç èñòîðèè âçàèìîîòíîøåíèé... Ñ. 56. 151 Àâòîíîìîâ À.Ñ. Î ãîñóäàðñòâåííî-ïðàâîâûõ îòíîøåíèÿõ ìåæäó Ãðóçèåé è Àáõàçèåé â íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ // Íàöèîíàëüíûå èíòåðåñû. Ì., 2000. ¹ 1. Ñ. 33. 152 Òðîöêèé Ë. Ñî÷. Ò. 12. Ñ. 230. 153 Òàì æå. Ñ. 243. 154 Ðóññêèé âðåìåííèê. Ïàðèæ, 1938. ¹ 2. Ñ. 89. 155 Òðîöêèé Ë. Ñî÷. Ò. 12. Ñ. 272, 244. 156 Êàâêàç. 1937. ¹ 6–7. 157 Òàì æå. 1936. ¹ 3. 158 Ðóññêèé âðåìåííèê. 1938. ¹ 2. Ñ.88. 159 Àâàëîâ 3. Íåçàâèñèìîñòü Ãðóçèè... Ñ. Õ, XI, XIV. 160 Òðîöêèé Ë. Ñî÷. Ò. 12. Ñ. 241–242, 277. 161 Ñì.: Çàðÿ Âîñòîêà. 1922. 29 îêòÿáðÿ. ¹ 112. 162 Äàíèëîâ Ñ. Òðàãåäèÿ àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà // Âåñòíèê Èíñòèòóòà ïî èçó÷åíèþ èñòîðèè è êóëüòóðû â ÑÑÑÐ. Ìþíõåí, 1951. ¹ 1. 163 Ïîäðîáíåå ñì.: Ëàêîáà Ñ. Î÷åðêè ïîëèòè÷åñêîé èñòîðèè... Ñ. 79–84. 164 Äçèäçàðèÿ Ã.À. Åôðåì Ýøáà. Ñóõóìè, 1983. Ñ. 64. 165 Ðåâîëþöèîííûå êîìèòåòû Àáõàçèè. Ñá. äîêóìåíòîâ è ìàòåðèàëîâ. Ñóõóìè, 1961. Ñ. 32. 166 Ãðàæäàíñêàÿ âîéíà è âîåííàÿ èíòåðâåíöèÿ â ÑÑÑÐ. Ýíöèêëîïåäèÿ. Ì., 1983. Ñ. 25. 167 Ñàãàðèÿ Á.Å. Íàöèîíàëüíî-ãîñóäàðñòâåííîå ñòðîèòåëüñòâî â Àáõàçèè (1921– 1931 ãã.). Ñóõóìè, 1970. Ñ. 26. 168 Òàì æå. Ñ. 25–27. 169 Îí æå. Îáðàçîâàíèå è óêðåïëåíèå ñîâåòñêîé íàöèîíàëüíîé ãîñóäàðñòâåííîñòè â Àáõàçèè. 1921–1938 ãã. Ñóõóìè, 1981. Ñ. 43. 170 Òðîöêèé Ë. Ïîðòðåòû ðåâîëþöèîíåðîâ / Ñîñò. Þ. Ôåëüøòèíñêèé. Áåíñîí, 1988; Ëàêîáà Ñ. Î÷åðêè ïîëèòè÷åñêîé èñòîðèè... Ñ. 109–110. 171 Òàì æå. Ñ. 108. 172 Òðîöêèé Ë. Ïîðòðåòû ðåâîëþöèîíåðîâ. C. 252. 173 Òðóäîâàÿ Àáõàçèÿ. 1925. 25 ìàðòà 174 Òðîöêèé Ë. Ñî÷. Ò. 8. Ì.; Ë., 1926. Ñ. 267–268; Ïðàâäà. 1925. 31 ìàðòà. ¹ 73. 175 Ñì.: Ñâîáîäíàÿ Ãðóçèÿ. 1998. 3 èþëÿ. ¹ 167. 141

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ÃËÀÂÀ IV ÍÀ ÇÀÐÅ ÑÎÂÅÒÑÊÎÉ ÈÌÏÅÐÈÈ. «ß – ÊÎÁÀ, À ÒÛ – ËÀÊÎÁÀ…»1 Ñìåðòü Ëåíèíà: Ëàêîáà ìåæäó Ñòàëèíûì è Òðîöêèì  ñâÿçè ñ îáðàçîâàíèåì Çàêàâêàçñêîé ôåäåðàöèè âîçíèê «ãðóçèíñêèé âîïðîñ», òàê íàçûâàåìûé èíöèäåíò ìåæäó Ñåðãî Îðäæîíèêèäçå è ãðóïïîé Áóäó Ìäèâàíè. 25 íîÿáðÿ 1922 ã. Ïîëèòáþðî ïðèíÿëî ðåøåíèå íàïðàâèòü â Òèôëèñ êîìèññèþ âî ãëàâå ñ Äçåðæèíñêèì.  òîò æå äåíü îí âûåõàë èç Ñóõóìà, ãäå îòäûõàë ñ îêòÿáðÿ. Èçâåñòíà ôîòîãðàôèÿ, ñíÿòàÿ òîãäà â ñòîëèöå Àáõàçèè: Äçåðæèíñêèé è Ëàêîáà ñèäÿò ðÿäîì, à áëèæå ê öåíòðó – Îðäæîíèêèäçå è Ðûêîâ. Íåäàëåêî îò Ðûêîâà ñòîèò Ãåíðèõ ßãîäà – ïðåäøåñòâåííèê Åæîâà. Ýòîò ñíèìîê ñäåëàí, ïî âñåé âåðîÿòíîñòè, íàêàíóíå èëè â äåíü îòúåçäà êîìèññèè èç Ñóõóìà â Òèôëèñ, ò. å. 25 íîÿáðÿ 1922 ãîäà. ×àñòü ïóòè Äçåðæèíñêîãî è Îðäæîíèêèäçå ñîïðîâîæäàë Íåñòîð. Íà ôîòîãðàôèè, ñíÿòîé óæå â Çóãäèäñêîì áîòàíè÷åñêîì ñàäó, Ëàêîáà ñèäèò â öåíòðå, ìåæäó Äçåðæèíñêèì è ßãîäîé. Ðîâíî çà äâà ìåñÿöà äî ýòîãî, 25 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1922 ã., Íåñòîð ïîëó÷èë ïèñüìî èç Ìîñêâû: «Äîðîãîé ò. Ëàêîáà! Ìîãèëåâñêèé è Àòàðáåêîâ òåáå íàâåðíîå óæå ñîîáùèëè î òîì, ÷òî òò. Äçåðæèíñêèé, ßãîäà è äð. åäóò â ãîñòè ê òåáå íà äâà ìåñÿöà. Íàäî èõ ïîìåñòèòü â ëó÷øåì (â ÷èñòîì, áåç íàñåêîìûõ, ñ îòîïëåíèåì, îñâåùåíèåì è ò. ä.) îñîáíÿêå ó ñàìîãî áåðåãà ìîðÿ. Áûòü âî âñåõ îòíîøåíèÿõ äîñòîéíûì àáõàçöà ãîñòåïðèèìíûì õîçÿèíîì, â ÷åì ó ìåíÿ íåò íè ìàëåéøåãî ñîìíåíèÿ. Ïîäðîáíåå ðàññêàæåò ïîäàòåëü ñåãî. Áóäü çäîðîâ. Êðåïêî æìó òâîþ ðóêó. Òâîé Ñåðãî». Íî âåðíåìñÿ ê íîÿáðüñêîé ïîåçäêå â Òèôëèñ. Ëåíèí îñòàëñÿ êðàéíå íåäîâîëåí ðåçóëüòàòàìè ðàññëåäîâàíèÿ êîìèññèè. Îí òðåáîâàë «ïðèìåðíî íàêàçàòü Îðäæîíèêèäçå», à ïîëèòè÷åñêóþ îòâåòñòâåííîñòü âîçëîæèòü íà Ñòàëèíà è Äçåðæèíñêîãî. Îäíîâðåìåííî â äåêàáðå 1922 ã. Ëåíèí âåäåò 95

Ãëàâà IV

àêòèâíóþ ïåðåïèñêó ñ Òðîöêèì.  ïèñüìå îò 5 ìàðòà 1923 ã. Ëåíèí ïèñàë åìó: «ß ïðîñèë áû Âàñ î÷åíü âçÿòü íà ñåáÿ çàùèòó ãðóçèíñêîãî äåëà íà ÖÊ ïàðòèè. Äåëî ýòî ñåé÷àñ íàõîäèòñÿ ïîä “ïðåñëåäîâàíèåì” Ñòàëèíà è Äçåðæèíñêîãî, è ÿ íå ìîãó ïîëîæèòüñÿ íà èõ áåñïðèñòðàñòèå. Äàæå ñîâñåì íàïðîòèâ. Åñëè áû âû ñîãëàñèëèñü âçÿòü íà ñåáÿ åãî çàùèòó, òî ÿ áû ìîã áûòü ñïîêîéíûì...». Ñîñëàâøèñü íà áîëåçíü, Òðîöêèé íå âçÿëñÿ çà ýòî ùåêîòëèâîå äåëî. Íà ñëåäóþùèé äåíü ïðîèçîøëî ðåçêîå óõóäøåíèå â ñîñòîÿíèè çäîðîâüÿ Ëåíèíà, à 10 ìàðòà ïîñëåäîâàëà ïîòåðÿ ðå÷è. Âî âðåìÿ ýòîé áîëåçíè äî êðàéíîñòè îáîñòðèëèñü îòíîøåíèÿ ìåæäó Òðîöêèì è ñòîðîííèêàìè Ñòàëèíà. Ïîñëåäíèé, ïðè ïîääåðæêå áîëüøèíñòâà ÷ëåíîâ Ïîëèòáþðî, ïîâåë ýíåðãè÷íóþ áîðüáó ïðîòèâ Òðîöêîãî. «...Ñî ñìåðòíîãî îäðà Ëåíèí íàïðàâëÿë ñâîé óäàð ïðîòèâ Ñòàëèíà è åãî ñîþçíèêîâ, Äçåðæèíñêîãî è Îðäæîíèêèäçå, – âñïîìèíàë Òðîöêèé. – Ëåíèí Äçåðæèíñêîãî î÷åíü öåíèë. Îõëàæäåíèå ìåæäó íèìè íà÷àëîñü òîãäà, êîãäà Äçåðæèíñêèé ïîíÿë, ÷òî Ëåíèí íå ñ÷èòàåò åãî ñïîñîáíûì íà ðóêîâîäÿùóþ õîçÿéñòâåííóþ ðàáîòó. Ýòî ñîáñòâåííî è òîëêíóëî Äçåðæèíñêîãî íà ñòîðîíó Ñòàëèíà». Òàêîâà áûëà çàêóëèñíàÿ ðàññòàíîâêà ñèë. Ìåæäó òåì ñ èþëÿ â ñîñòîÿíèè çäîðîâüÿ Ëåíèíà íàñòóïàåò çàìåòíîå óëó÷øåíèå, à 7 ÿíâàðÿ 1924 ã. îí äàæå ïðèñóòñòâóåò íà íîâîãîäíåé åëêå. Ëåíèí â ïðåêðàñíîì íàñòðîåíèè, è íè÷òî íå ïðåäâåùàåò áåäû.  ýòîé ñòàáèëüíîé îáñòàíîâêå Òðîöêèé, ïî íàñòîÿíèþ äîêòîðà Ô.À. Ãåòüå, 16 ÿíâàðÿ âûåçæàåò èç Ìîñêâû íà Êàâêàç. Ïîêà åãî ïîåçä øåë äî Òèôëèñà, â Ñóõóì ïðèøëî íåáîëüøîå ïèñüìî: «Òîâ. Ëàêîáà. Äîðîãîé òîâàðèù! Ïî ñîñòîÿíèþ áîëåçíè ò. Òðîöêîãî âðà÷è ïîñûëàþò â Ñóõóì. Ýòî ñòàëî øèðîêî èçâåñòíî äàæå çà ãðàíèöåé, à ïîòîìó ÿ îïàñàþñü, ÷òîáû ñî ñòîðîíû áåëîãâàðäåéöåâ íå áûëî ïîïûòîê ïîêóøåíèÿ. Ìîÿ ïðîñüáà ê Âàì èìåòü ýòî â âèäó, ò. Òðîöêèé íå áóäåò ïî ñîñòîÿíèþ çäîðîâüÿ, â îáùåì, âûåçæàòü èç äà÷è – à ïîòîìó ãëàâíàÿ çàäà÷à íå äîïóñòèòü òóäà ïîñòîðîííèõ, íåèçâåñòíûõ. Ïðîøó Âàñ ïî âîïðîñó îá îõðàíå ñãîâîðèòüñÿ è ñîãëàñîâàòü ìåðîïðèÿòèÿ ñ ò. Êàóðîâûì. Ñåðäå÷íûé Âàì è àáõàçöàì êîììóíèñòè÷åñêèé ïðèâåò. Âàø Ô. Äçåðæèíñêèé 18.1.24. Ìîñêâà» Â òîò æå äåíü Ëàêîáà áûëî îòïðàâëåíî è äðóãîå ïèñüìî: «Äîðîãîé Íåñòîð! Ê Òåáå íà ëå÷åíèå åäåò ò. Òðîöêèé. Òû, êîíå÷íî, âåëèêîëåïíî ïîíèìàåøü, êàêàÿ îòâåòñòâåííîñòü âîçëàãàåòñÿ íà Òåáÿ è íà âñåõ íàñ åãî ïðåáûâàíèå ó Òåáÿ. Íàäî åãî òàê îáñòàâèòü, ÷òîáû àáñîëþòíî áûëà èñêëþ÷åíà êàêàÿ-íèáóäü ïàêîñòü. Ìû âñå óâåðåíû, ÷òî Òû ñäåëàåøü âñå, ÷òî íåîáõîäèìî. Òàê äåëà çäåñü èäóò çàìå÷àòåëüíî õîðîøî... Öåëóþ òåáÿ, Òâîé Ñåðãî». 96

Íà çàðå ñîâåòñêîé èìïåðèè. «ß – Êîáà, à òû – Ëàêîáà...»

Ýòè âàæíûå äîêóìåíòû, íàïèñàííûå çà òðè äíÿ äî ñìåðòè Ëåíèíà, Ëàêîáà õðàíèë â ñâîåì ëè÷íîì àðõèâå. Îáðàùàåò íà ñåáÿ âíèìàíèå òî, ÷òî Îðäæîíèêèäçå â ñâîåì ïèñüìå ê Íåñòîðó ïðîÿâëÿåò îñîáåííî óâàæèòåëüíûé òîí («ê Òåáå», «ó Òåáÿ»). Î÷åíü ìíîãîå, âèäèìî, áûëî ïîñòàâëåíî íà ýòîò âèçèò Òðîöêîãî â Àáõàçèþ. Âåðíåå, íà åãî âðåìåííóþ èçîëÿöèþ. Çà òðè äíÿ äî êîí÷èíû Ëåíèíà Òðîöêèé ïðîåõàë ÷åðåç Õàðüêîâ.  ïðîäîëæåíèå ïîñëåäíèõ ìåñÿöåâ åãî ïðåñëåäîâàëà òàèíñòâåííàÿ èíôåêöèÿ, êîòîðàÿ ñîïðîâîæäàëàñü ïîñòîÿííî ïîâûøåííîé òåìïåðàòóðîé. «Ïóòåøåñòâèå, – ïèñàëà æåíà Òðîöêîãî Í.È. Ñåäîâà, – äëèííîå ñàìî ïî ñåáå – ÷åðåç Áàêó, Òèôëèñ, Áàòóì, óäëèíÿëîñü åùå ñíåæíûìè çàíîñàìè. Íî äîðîãà äåéñòâîâàëà ñêîðåå óñïîêàèâàþùèì îáðàçîì. Ïî ìåðå òîãî êàê îòúåçæàëè îò Ìîñêâû, ìû îòðûâàëèñü íåñêîëüêî îò òÿæåñòè îáñòàíîâêè åå çà ïîñëåäíåå âðåìÿ. Íî âñå æå ÷óâñòâî ó ìåíÿ áûëî òàêîå, ÷òî âåçó òÿæåëîáîëüíîãî. Òîìèëà íåèçâåñòíîñòü, êàê ñëîæèòñÿ æèçíü â Ñóõóìå, îêðóæàþùèå íàñ òàì áóäóò ëè äðóçüÿ èëè âðàãè?». Èçâåñòèå î ñìåðòè Ëåíèíà çàñòàëî Òðîöêîãî â Òèôëèñå 22 ÿíâàðÿ. Òóò æå, íà âîêçàëå, îí íàïèñàë â 8 ÷àñ. âå÷åðà èçâåñòíóþ òîãäà òåëåãðàììóñòàòüþ î Ëåíèíå. Îá ýòîé ñìåðòè Òðîöêèé óçíàë èç ñîîáùåíèÿ, â êîòîðîì ãîâîðèëîñü: «Ïåðåäàòü ò. Òðîöêîìó. 21 ÿíâàðÿ â 6 ÷àñ. 50 ìèí. (18 ÷àñ. 50 ìèí. – Ñ.Ë.) ñêîðîïîñòèæíî ñêîí÷àëñÿ ò. Ëåíèí. Ñìåðòü ïîñëåäîâàëà îò ïàðàëè÷à äûõàòåëüíîãî öåíòðà. Ïîõîðîíû â ñóááîòó 26 ÿíâàðÿ. Ñòàëèí». Òðîöêèé ñðàçó îòðåàãèðîâàë íà òåëåãðàììó Ñòàëèíà. Ïî ïðÿìîìó ïðîâîäó îí ñîîáùèë â Êðåìëü: «Ñ÷èòàþ íóæíûì âåðíóòüñÿ â Ìîñêâó». Ïðîøëî îêîëî ÷àñà, è ïîñëåäîâàë îòâåò: «Ïîõîðîíû ñîñòîÿòñÿ â ñóááîòó, íå óñïååòå ïðèáûòü âîâðåìÿ. Ïîëèòáþðî ñ÷èòàåò, ÷òî Âàì, ïî ñîñòîÿíèþ çäîðîâüÿ, íåîáõîäèìî åõàòü â Ñóõóì. Ñòàëèí».  ýòè ñæàòûå ñðîêè òÿæåëî áîëüíîé Òðîöêèé íèêàê íå ìîã äîáðàòüñÿ äî Ìîñêâû. Îí âûåõàë â Àáõàçèþ. «Òîëüêî â Ñóõóìå, – ïèñàë Òðîöêèé, – ëåæà ïîä îäåÿëàìè íà âåðàíäå ñàíàòîðèóìà, ÿ óçíàë, ÷òî ïîõîðîíû áûëè ïåðåíåñåíû íà âîñêðåñåíüå». Ñòàëèí, óáåäèâøèñü, ÷òî Òðîöêèé âûåõàë â Ñóõóì, ïåðåíåñ ïîõîðîíû ñ 26-ãî íà 27 ÿíâàðÿ. Èìåííî ýòîò îäèí äåíü äàâàë âîçìîæíîñòü Òðîöêîìó óñïåòü íà ïîõîðîíû. «Êàê ýòî íè êàæåòñÿ íåâåðîÿòíûì, – âñïîìèíàë Òðîöêèé â 1930 ã., – íî ìåíÿ îáìàíóëè íàñ÷åò äíÿ ïîõîðîí. Çàãîâîðùèêè ïî-ñâîåìó ïðàâèëüíî ðàññ÷èòûâàëè, ÷òî ìíå íå ïðèäåò â ãîëîâó ïðîâåðÿòü èõ, à ïîçæå ìîæíî áóäåò âñåãäà ïðèäóìàòü îáúÿñíåíèå. Íàïîìèíàþ, ÷òî î ïåðâîì çàáîëåâàíèè Ëåíèíà ìíå ñîîáùèëè òîëüêî íà òðåòèé äåíü. Ýòî áûë ìåòîä. Öåëü ñîñòîÿëà â òîì, “÷òîáû âûèãðàòü òåì. Îòñóòñòâèå ñîïåðíèêà Ñòàëèíà â Ìîñêâå â äíè âñåíàðîäíîãî ïðîùàíèÿ ñ Ëåíèíûì ïðîèçâåëî òÿæåëîå âïå÷àòëåíèå íà ïàðòèþ è íà áëèæàéøåå îêðóæåíèå Òðîöêîãî. Âëàñòü óñêîëüçàëà èç åãî ðóê.  Àáõàçèè Òðîöêîãî ïðåêðàñíî ïðèíÿë Ëàêîáà. Îí íàäåæíî «îõðàíÿë» âîæäÿ Êðàñíîé Àðìèè, è òîìó ïîíðàâèëîñü â «îáëàñêàííîé ïðèðîäîé ñòðàíå». 97

Ãëàâà IV

Îñòàíîâèëñÿ îí íà ãîñäà÷å, â áûâøåì ïàðêå Ñìåöêîãî. Æåíà Òðîöêîãî âñïîìèíàëà: «Ïðèåõàëè ñîâñåì ðàçáèòûå. Ïåðâûé ðàç âèäåëè Ñóõóì. Öâåëè ìèìîçû – èõ òàì ìíîãî. Âåëèêîëåïíûå ïàëüìû. Êàìåëèè. Áûë ÿíâàðü, â Ìîñêâå ñòîÿëè ëþòûå ìîðîçû. Âñòðåòèëè íàñ àáõàçöû î÷åíü äðóæåñêè.  ñòîëîâîé äîìà îòäûõà âèñåëè ðÿäîì äâà ïîðòðåòà, îäèí â òðàóðå – Âëàäèìèðà Èëüè÷à, äðóãîé – Ë.Ä. Õîòåëîñü ñíÿòü ýòîò ïîñëåäíèé – íî ìû íå ðåøèëèñü, îïàñàÿñü, ÷òî áóäåò ïîõîæå íà äåìîíñòðàöèþ».  ôåâðàëå òåìïåðàòóðà ó Òðîöêîãî íå ïîäíèìàëàñü óæå âûøå 37. Îí ñòàë ñîâåðøàòü íåïðîäîëæèòåëüíûå ïðîãóëêè, ïî-ïðåæíåìó ìíîãî ÷èòàë è ãîòîâèë ê ïå÷àòè î÷åðåäíîé òðóä. Íåñòîðà ïîðàçèëî, êàê Òðîöêèé îäíîâðåìåííî äèêòîâàë ñðàçó äâóì ìàøèíèñòêàì äâå ñîâåðøåííî ðàçíûå ñòàòüè. Îí õîäèë ìåæäó íèìè è ïîî÷åðåäíî çàâàëèâàë ôðàçàìè. Î ñâîèõ çèìíèõ âïå÷àòëåíèÿõ Òðîöêèé ïèñàë: «Â Ñóõóìå ÿ ëåæàë äîëãèìè äíÿìè íà áàëêîíå ëèöîì ê ìîðþ. Íåñìîòðÿ íà ÿíâàðü, ÿðêî è òåïëî ãîðåëî â íåáå ñîëíöå. Ìåæäó áàëêîíîì è ñâåðêàþùèì ìîðåì âûñèëèñü ïàëüìû. Ïîñòîÿííîå îùóùåíèå ïîâûøåííîé òåìïåðàòóðû ñî÷åòàëîñü ñ ãóäÿùåé ìûñëüþ î ñìåðòè Ëåíèíà... ß ãîðàçäî ÿñíåå ïðåäñòàâèë ñåáå òåõ “ó÷åíèêîâ”, êîòîðûå áûâàëè âåðíû ó÷èòåëþ â ìàëîì, íî íå â áîëüøîì. Âìåñòå ñ äûõàíèåì ìîðÿ ÿ âñåì ñóùåñòâîì ñâîèì àññèìèëèðîâàë óâåðåííîñòü â ñâîåé èñòîðè÷åñêîé ïðàâîòå ïðîòèâ ýïèãîíîâ... 27 ÿíâàðÿ 1924 ãîäà. Íàä ïàëüìàìè, íàä ìîðåì öàðèëà ñâåðêàþùàÿ ïîä ãîëóáûì ïîêðîâîì òèøèíà. Âäðóã åå ïåðåðåçàëî çàëïàìè. ×àñòàÿ ñòðåëüáà ïà÷êàìè øëà ãäå-òî âíèçó, ñî ñòîðîíû ìîðÿ. Ýòî áûë ñàëþò Ñóõóìà âîæäþ, êîòîðîãî â ýòîò ÷àñ õîðîíèëè â Ìîñêâå... È ÿ áûë íàñêâîçü ïîòðÿñåí ÷óâñòâîì áëàãîäàðíîñòè, êîãäà íåîæèäàííî ïîëó÷èë ÷åðåç íåñêîëüêî äíåé ïèñüìî îò Íàäåæäû Êîíñòàíòèíîâíû». Ñîëíå÷íûì äíåì 8 àïðåëÿ 1924 ã. íà ïëîùàäè Ñâîáîäû â Ñóõóìå Ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ðåââîåíñîâåòà ÑÑÑÐ, íàðêîìâîåíìîð Ë.Ä. Òðîöêèé âïåðâûå ïîñëå ïðîäîëæèòåëüíîé áîëåçíè ïóáëè÷íî ïðîèçíåñ ðå÷ü â ïàìÿòü î Ëåíèíå. Îí ïðèíèìàë âîåííûé ïàðàä ïðè îãðîìíîì ñòå÷åíèè íàðîäà. Î÷åâèäåö ýòîãî ñîáûòèÿ ñòàðîæèë Ì. Õàõìèãåðè ðàññêàçûâàë, ÷òî ó Òðîöêîãî áûëà èçóìèòåëüíàÿ äèêöèÿ, ïðèÿòíûé ãîëîñ. Âûñòóïàë îí áåç øïàðãàëêè. Îäåò áûë â øèíåëü è â áóäåíîâêó ñî çâåçäîé. Êàæäîå åãî ñëîâî äàëåêî è îò÷åòëèâî áûëî ñëûøíî: «…È íåçàäîëãî äî ñìåðòè Ëåíèí åùå ðàç ñêàçàë íàì âñåì: ïîìíèòå î ñîëèäàðíîñòè òðóäÿùèõñÿ âñåõ íàöèîíàëüíîñòåé, ïîìíèòå îá óâàæåíèè ê ïðàâàì è èíòåðåñàì ñàìîé ìàëåíüêîé íàöèîíàëüíîé ãðóïïû... Ñêàæåì æå ïðåæäå âñåãî íàøå áðàòñêîå ñïàñèáî àáõàçñêîìó ïðàâèòåëüñòâó, Àáõàçñêîé ðåñïóáëèêå, àáõàçñêîìó íàðîäó, óðà!» (Ãîëîñ Òðóäîâîé Àáõàçèè. 1924. 11 àïðåëÿ). Òðîöêèé è Ëàêîáà èñêîëåñèëè âñþ Àáõàçèþ, áûëè ÷àñòûìè ãîñòÿìè êðåñòüÿí, ïîñåùàëè ñåëüñêèå ñõîäû. Íà îäíîì èç íèõ, â ñåëå Ìîêâà, Òðîöêèé ïðîèçíåñ ðå÷ü. Îí íà÷àë åå ïî âñåì ïðàâèëàì àáõàçñêîãî îðàòîðñêîãî èñêóññòâà. Ïåðâîé åãî ôðàçîé áûëî ðèòóàëüíîå îáðàùåíèå, êîòîðîå îí ïðîèç98

Íà çàðå ñîâåòñêîé èìïåðèè. «ß – Êîáà, à òû – Ëàêîáà...»

íåñ ïî-àáõàçñêè: «Íàðîä, âàøè íåâçãîäû ìíå...». Íàðîä àõíóë îò èçóìëåíèÿ. Äëÿ êðåñòüÿí ýòî ñòàëî ãëàâíûì â åãî ðå÷è. Òîãäà æå â ìîñêîâñêîé êíèæêå «Êàâêàç íàøèõ äíåé» (1924 ã.) æóðíàëèñò Çèíàèäà Ðèõòåð ïèñàëà: «Â Ñóõóìå òîëüêî â ïðèåìíîé ïðåäñîâíàðêîìà ìîæíî ïîëó÷èòü ïðåäñòàâëåíèå î êðåñòüÿíñêîé ñàìîáûòíîé Àáõàçèè. Ê ò. Ëàêîáå èëè, êàê åãî ïîïðîñòó êðåñòüÿíå íàçûâàþò â ãëàçà è çà ãëàçà, – ê Íåñòîðó èäóò ñî âñÿêèì äåëîì, ìèíóÿ âñå èíñòàíöèè, â óâåðåííîñòè, ÷òî îí âûñëóøàåò è ðàññóäèò. Ïðåäñîâíàðêîì Àáõàçèè ò. Ëàêîáà ïîëüçóåòñÿ ëþáîâüþ êðåñòüÿí è âñåãî íàñåëåíèÿ. Òîâ. Çèíîâüåâ, êîãäà áûë â Àáõàçèè, ïîøóòèë, ÷òî Àáõàçèþ ñëåäîâàëî áû ïåðåèìåíîâàòü â Ëàêîáèñòàí». Âåñíîé 1924 ã. â Ñóõóì ïðèåçæàëà äåëåãàöèÿ ÖÊ â ñîñòàâå – Òîìñêèé Ôðóíçå, Ïÿòàêîâ è Ãóñåâ, ÷òîáû ñîãëàñîâàòü ñ Òðîöêèì ïåðåìåíû â ëè÷íîì ñîñòàâå âîåííîãî âåäîìñòâà. «Ïî ñóùåñòâó, ýòî áûëà ÷èñòåéøàÿ êîìåäèÿ, – ïèñàë íàðêîìâîåíìîð. – Îáíîâëåíèå ëè÷íîãî ñîñòàâà â âîåííîì âåäîìñòâå äàâíî ñîâåðøàëîñü ïîëíûì õîäîì çà ìîåé ñïèíîé... Âîöàðèëñÿ ðåæèì ÷èñòîé äèêòàòóðû àïïàðàòà íàä ïàðòèåé». Ïåðåä îòúåçäîì Òðîöêîãî ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ñîâíàðêîìà Àáõàçèè Íåñòîð Ëàêîáà â áåñåäå ñ êîððåñïîíäåíòîì ãàçåòû Çàðÿ Âîñòîêà ñêàçàë: «Ñåé÷àñ îí âûãëÿäèò âïîëíå çäîðîâûì, áîäðûì, âåñåëûì. Äâà ñ ïîëîâèíîé ìåñÿöà ò. Òðîöêèé ïðîâåë â àáõàçñêîì “óãîëêå îòäûõà” (ñóáòðîïè÷åñêàÿ ôëîðà) èìåíè Ñåðãî Îðäæîíèêèäçå. Òîâ. Òðîöêèé ÷àñòî âûõîäèë íà îõîòó. Ìåñòíûå êðåñòüÿíå-îõîòíèêè ñðàçó ïðèçíàëè â íåì ñâîåãî êîëëåãó. È, äåéñòâèòåëüíî, Ëåâ Äàâèäîâè÷ îêàçàëñÿ õîðîøèì ñòðåëêîì. Ñ ìîðñêîãî èñòðåáèòåëÿ (âîåííûé êàòåð. – Ñ.Ë.) îí áüåò óòîê íà ëåòó; â îêðåñòíîñòÿõ Ñóõóìà îò åãî ãëàçà íå óñêîëüçíóëè íè îäíî îçåðî èëè áîëîòî, â êîòîðîì áûëà äè÷ü. Âî âðåìÿ îõîòû – òà æå ïðèñóùàÿ åìó ýíåðãèÿ, æåëàíèå âî ÷òî áû òî íè ñòàëî ïîðàçèòü îáúåêò... Íå ìåíüøèé èíòåðåñ âûçâàëè â íåì áûò è íðàâû íàøåé ðåñïóáëèêè, îáû÷àé êðîâàâîé ìåñòè, íàñêîëüêî ýòîò îáû÷àé èçæèò.  îáùåì, íå áûëî ìåëî÷è â æèçíè Àáõàçèè, êîòîðîé îí íè çàòðîíóë áû â äâóõòðåõ ñëîâàõ è îòíîñèòåëüíî êîòîðîé îí íè õîòåë áû ïîëó÷èòü èíôîðìàöèþ... Ìû áûëè äîâîëüíû ñâîèì ãîñòåì è áóäåì óäîâëåòâîðåíû, åñëè îêàæåòñÿ, ÷òî ìû íå çëîóïîòðåáèëè îòäûõîì». Äîâîëüíû áûëè âñå. Îñîáåííî Ñòàëèí. Ëàêîáà îêðóæèë Òðîöêîãî òàêèì âíèìàíèåì è çàáîòîé, ÷òî òîò, ñâåðõ âñåõ îæèäàíèé, âåðíóëñÿ â Ìîñêâó òîëüêî â ñåðåäèíå àïðåëÿ. Ñòàëèí ñèëüíî óêðåïèë ñâîè ïîçèöèè çà âðåìÿ åãî îòñóòñòâèÿ.  12 ÷àñîâ äíÿ 10 àïðåëÿ íà ìèíîíîñöå Òðîöêèé ïîêèíóë Ñóõóì. Ñòîÿâøèé íà ðåéäå ãðå÷åñêèé ïàðîõîä «ßçîí» ñàëþòîâàë åìó ïðè îòõîäå. ×åðåç ïÿòü ÷àñîâ ìèíîíîñåö ïðèáûë â Áàòóì. Èç Áàòóìà ñîîáùàëîñü: «Òîâ. Òðîöêèé ãîðÿ÷î áëàãîäàðèò àáõàçöåâ çà èõ ëþáîâü è âíèìàíèå ê íàõîäÿùèìñÿ â Àáõàçèè ÷àñòÿì Êðàñíîé Àðìèè.  ýòîì âíèìàíèè âîæäü Êðàñíîé Àðìèè âèäèò äóõîâíóþ ñïàéêó àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà è êðàñíûõ âîèíîâ...». 99

Ãëàâà IV

Íà ñëåäóþùèé äåíü íà çàñåäàíèè Òèôëèññêîãî Ñîâåòà Òðîöêèé âûñòóïèë ñ äîêëàäîì «Ìåæäóíàðîäíîå è âíóòðåííåå ïîëîæåíèå ÑÑÑл è îòáûë â Ìîñêâó. «Òåìïåðàòóðà âíîâü âîçîáíîâèëàñü ó ìåíÿ îñåíüþ 1924 ãîäà, – ïèñàë îí. – Ê òîìó âðåìåíè âíîâü ðàçûãðàëàñü äèñêóññèÿ... ß ëåæàë ñ òåìïåðàòóðîé è ìîë÷àë. Ïðåññà è îðàòîðû íè÷åì äðóãèì íå çàíèìàëèñü, êðîìå ðàçîáëà÷åíèÿ òðîöêèçìà». Ðåçóëüòàòîì ýòîé êàìïàíèè ÿâèëîñü òî, ÷òî â ÿíâàðå 1925 ã. Òðîöêèé áûë îñâîáîæäåí îò îáÿçàííîñòåé íàðêîìà ïî âîåííûì äåëàì. Âåñíîé, ïî ñîñòîÿíèþ çäîðîâüÿ, îí âíîâü ïðèåõàë íà ëå÷åíèå â Àáõàçèþ.  íà÷àëå ìàðòà 1925 ã. åãî ïîñåòèëè â Ñóõóìå íåêîòîðûå ñîðàòíèêè. Çà íåñêîëüêî äíåé äî îòêðûòèÿ III ñúåçäà Ñîâåòîâ Àáõàçèè ê Òðîöêîìó äîëæíû áûëè ïðèëåòåòü èç Òèôëèñà À. Ìÿñíèêîâ, Ñ. Ìîãèëåâñêèé è Ã. Àòàðáåêîâ. Îäíàêî, êàê ìû óæå çíàåì, 22 ìàðòà 1925 ã. «þíêåðñ», íà êîòîðîì îíè íàõîäèëèñü, ïîòåðïåë êàòàñòðîôó.  òîò æå äåíü Ëàêîáà âûñòóïèë íà òðàóðíîì çàñåäàíèè Ñîâíàðêîìà. Áîëüøóþ ðå÷ü â èõ ïàìÿòü 23 ìàðòà ïðîèçíåñ â Ñóõóìå Òðîöêèé, êîòîðûé íàçâàë ñëó÷èâøååñÿ óáèéñòâîì. (Òðóäîâàÿ Àáõàçèÿ. 1925. 25 ìàðòà). Âûïîëíÿÿ ïîðó÷åíèÿ Äçåðæèíñêîãî è Îðäæîíèêèäçå, èñõîäèâøèå îò Ñòàëèíà, Ëàêîáà ïðåêðàñíî ñïðàâèëñÿ ñ çàäàíèåì ïî «îïåêå» Òðîöêîãî. Îäíàêî ðîëü Íåñòîðà áûëà íåîäíîçíà÷íîé. Îí îêàçàëñÿ â öåíòðå èíòðèã «äâóõ âûäàþùèõñÿ âîæäåé» (ïî Ëåíèíó), íî, íåñìîòðÿ íà ñëîæíîñòü ñâîåãî ïîëîæåíèÿ, ñóìåë ðàñïîëîæèòü ê ñåáå è Ñòàëèíà, è Òðîöêîãî.  ÿíâàðå 1938 ã. èç äàëåêîé Ìåêñèêè Òðîöêèé îòêëèêíåòñÿ íà ñìåðòü Íåñòîðà ñâîèìè âîñïîìèíàíèÿìè. «Ýòî áûë (îáî âñåõ ïðèõîäèòñÿ ãîâîðèòü “áûë”) ñîâñåì ìèíèàòþðíûé ÷åëîâåê, – ïèñàë îí, – ïðèòîì ïî÷òè ãëóõîé. Íåñìîòðÿ íà îñîáûé çâóêîâîé óñèëèòåëü, êîòîðûé îí íîñèë â êàðìàíå, ðàçãîâàðèâàòü ñ íèì áûëî íåëåãêî. Íî Íåñòîð çíàë ñâîþ Àáõàçèþ, è Àáõàçèÿ çíàëà Íåñòîðà, ãåðîÿ Ãðàæäàíñêîé âîéíû, ÷åëîâåêà áîëüøîãî ìóæåñòâà, áîëüøîé òâåðäîñòè è ïðàêòè÷åñêîãî óìà. Ìèõàèë Ëàêîáà, ìëàäøèé áðàò Íåñòîðà, ñîñòîÿë “ìèíèñòðîì âíóòðåííèõ äåë” (çàìåñòèòåëåì íàðêîìà ïî âíóòðåííèì äåëàì. – Ñ.Ë.) ìàëåíüêîé ðåñïóáëèêè è â òî æå âðåìÿ ìîèì âåðíûì òåëîõðàíèòåëåì âî âðåìÿ îòäûõîâ â Àáõàçèè. Ìèõàèë (òîæå “áûë”) ìîëîäîé, ñêðîìíûé è âåñåëûé àáõàçåö, îäèí èç òåõ, â êîì íåò ëóêàâñòâà. ß íèêîãäà íå âåë ñ áðàòüÿìè ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ áåñåä. Îäèí òîëüêî ðàç Íåñòîð ñêàçàë ìíå: – Íå âèæó â íåì íè÷åãî îñîáåííîãî: íè óìà, íè òàëàíòà. ß ïîíÿë, ÷òî îí ãîâîðèò î Ñòàëèíå, è íå ïîääåðæàë ðàçãîâîðà». Íåñòîðà Ñòàëèí ëè÷íî çíàë åùå ñî âðåìåíè Ãðàæäàíñêîé âîéíû. Ñòàëèí ïîìíèë î ðîëè Ëàêîáà â åãî áîðüáå ñ Òðîöêèì â ïåðâûå ìåñÿöû ïîñëå ñìåðòè Ëåíèíà. Îí ñ÷èòàë, ÷òî Íåñòîð ñîäåéñòâîâàë óêðåïëåíèþ åãî ïîçèöèé â ýòîò ñëîæíûé ïåðåõîäíûé ïåðèîä. Èìåííî â ýòîì êðîåòñÿ çàãàäêà ñòîëü äîëãîé (ïî÷òè äâåíàäöàòèëåòíåé) ðàñïîëîæåííîñòè Ñòàëèíà ê Ëàêîáà. Íà ýòîé îñíîâå âîæäü ïðèáëèçèë ê ñåáå Íåñòîðà è êàê áû íåâçíà÷àé, âî 100

Íà çàðå ñîâåòñêîé èìïåðèè. «ß – Êîáà, à òû – Ëàêîáà...»

âñåóñëûøàíüå ïîøóòèë: «ß – Êîáà, à òû – Ëàêîáà».  øóòêå ïðèñóòñòâîâàëà íåêàÿ ðîäñòâåííàÿ ñîçâó÷íîñòü, êîòîðàÿ êàê íèêîãäà øèðîêî ðàñïàõíóëà ïåðåä Ëàêîáà ñàìûå âûñîêèå äâåðè â Êðåìëå.

Ëàêîáà. Ñòàëèí. Áåðèÿ Ñ ñåðåäèíû 20-õ ãîäîâ Ñòàëèí ñòàë ÷àñòî ïðèåçæàòü â Àáõàçèþ íà îòäûõ. Ýòîò êðàé áûë õîðîøî çíàêîì åìó åùå ïî ñîáûòèÿì ïåðâîé ðåâîëþöèè â Ðîññèè. Òîãäà, â íî÷ü íà 20 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1906 ã., Êîáà ñ ãðóïïîé áîåâèêîâ ñîâåðøèë íàëåò íà ïàðîõîä «Öåñàðåâè÷ Ãåîðãèé» áëèç Ñóõóìà. Áîåâèêè ýêñïðîïðèèðîâàëè äî ïîëóìèëëèîíà ðóáëåé. Ðåâîëþöèîíåðû ñ äåíüãàìè êàê â âîäó êàíóëè. Ñòàëèí ñ äâóìÿ ðóññêèìè áîåâèêàìè íàäåæíî óêðûëñÿ ó àáõàçñêèõ êðåñòüÿí. Ñ òåõ ïîð ýòîò áåðåã ×åðíîãî ìîðÿ ñòàë ñïàñèòåëüíûì äëÿ íåãî. À ïîñëå óäà÷íî ïðîâåäåííîé îïåðàöèè ñ Òðîöêèì â 1924 ã. Ñòàëèí âñå áîëüøå ñòàë æàëîâàòü ðóêîâîäèòåëÿ Àáõàçñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè Í. Ëàêîáà. Êàê óæå ãîâîðèëîñü, â àïðåëå 1924 ã. Òðîöêèé ïîêèíóë Àáõàçèþ è âûåõàë â Ìîñêâó. Âñëåä çà íèì, â ìàå, â ñòîëèöó â êà÷åñòâå äåëåãàòà XIII ñúåçäà ÐÊÏ(á) – ïåðâîãî ñúåçäà ïîñëå ñìåðòè Ëåíèíà – ïðèáûë Ëàêîáà. Çäåñü Íåñòîð ïîïàäàåò â îáúÿòèÿ Ñòàëèíà è Äçåðæèíñêîãî. À óæå â ñëåäóþùåì ãîäó Îðäæîíèêèäçå ïîñ÷èòàë íóæíûì îñîáî îòìåòèòü: «Òîâàðèù Ëàêîáà, êîãäà ìû ñî Ñòàëèíûì áûëè òàì, ïðîèçâåë íà íàñ ñàìûå ëó÷øèå âïå÷àòëåíèÿ èç âñåõ áûâøèõ òàì òîâàðèùåé».  1927 ã. Íåñòîð óæå âûñòóïàë íà XV ñúåçäå ÂÊÏ(á). Ïîä åãî ðóêîâîäñòâîì ðåñïóáëèêà áûñòðî âîçðîæäàëàñü. «Íà ïðèìåðå ìàëåíüêîé Àáõàçèè ìîæíî âèäåòü, – ãîâîðèë àêàäåìèê Í.È. Âàâèëîâ â 1932 ã., – êàê áûñòðî ñîâåòñêàÿ ñòðàíà ñòàíîâèòñÿ âûñîêîêóëüòóðíîé, êàê áûñòðî èçìåíÿåòñÿ ëèê çåìëè. Àáõàçñêîå ïðàâèòåëüñòâî ïîä ïðîñâåùåííûì ðóêîâîäñòâîì óâàæàåìîãî Íåñòîðà Àïîëëîíîâè÷à Ëàêîáà âñåãäà ïðîÿâëÿëî èñêëþ÷èòåëüíîå âíèìàíèå ê íàóêå, âñåìåðíî ïðèâëåêàÿ âñåñîþçíûå íàó÷íûå ó÷ðåæäåíèÿ è ñîçäàâàÿ ñâîè íàó÷íûå èññëåäîâàòåëüñêèå èíñòèòóòû è ñòàíöèè â ñîâåòñêîé Àáõàçèè». Ëàêîáà òâîð÷åñêè ïîäõîäèë ê ðåøåíèþ ïðîáëåì, ïðèíèìàë âî âíèìàíèå ìåñòíûå îñîáåííîñòè. Òàê, íàïðèìåð, â Àáõàçèè êîëëåêòèâèçàöèÿ íå íîñèëà íàñèëüñòâåííûé õàðàêòåð.  îòëè÷èå îò äðóãèõ ðàéîíîâ ñòðàíû çäåñü ýòîò ïðîöåññ çàâåðøèëñÿ ãîðàçäî ïîçæå – ëèøü ïîñëå åãî ãèáåëè. Âûñòóïàÿ â ìàðòå 1935 ã., Ëàêîáà îòìå÷àë: «Íèçîê åùå ïðîöåíò êîëëåêòèâèçàöèè êðåñòüÿíñêèõ õîçÿéñòâ...». Ýòè ñëîâà ïðîçâó÷àëè â äíè, êîãäà Àáõàçèÿ çà âûäàþùèåñÿ óñïåõè â ñåëüñêîì õîçÿéñòâå è ïðîìûøëåííîñòè áûëà óäîñòîåíà îðäåíà Ëåíèíà. Ðåñïóáëèêó, êàê ýòî íè ïàðàäîêñàëüíî, íàãðàäèëè çà óñïåõè â òàáàêîâîäñòâå, êîòîðîå áóðíî ðàçâèâàëîñü íà îñíîâå èíäèâèäóàëüíûõ, à íå êîëëåêòèâíûõ ôîðì õîçÿéñòâîâàíèÿ. Íóæíà áûëà êðàéíÿÿ îñòîðîæíîñòü ïî îòíîøåíèþ ê àáõàçñêîìó êðåñòüÿíñòâó, ÷òîáû íå îòïóãíóòü åãî îò íîâîé âëàñòè. Áëàãîäàðÿ èìåííî 101

Ãëàâà IV

òàêîé òåðïåëèâîé ïîëèòèêå, â Àáõàçèè íå áûëî «ãîëîâîêðóæåíèé îò óñïåõîâ» è ìàññîâîé âûñûëêè â Ñèáèðü. Íåñòîð ñòðîèë «ñîöèàëèçì» îòíîñèòåëüíî ìèðíûì ïóòåì. Îí ïðÿìî ãîâîðèë: «Íå íàæèìàòü íà êîëõîçû». Íåñòîð ñ÷èòàë, ÷òî ñ êîëëåêòèâèçàöèåé â Àáõàçèè íåëüçÿ òîðîïèòüñÿ, èáî «êóëàêà ó íàñ íåò, à ïîòîìó âîïðîñ î ëèêâèäàöèè êóëàêà êàê êëàññà îòïàäàåò». Èìåííî îá ýòîì â ïîýìå «Íåñòîð è Ñàðèÿ» îêîëî ñîðîêà ëåò íàçàä ïèñàë ïîýò Ñåìåí Ëèïêèí: Îí âñå ëþáèë â ñâîåì ðîäíîì íàðîäå: Îáû÷àè, è ýïîñ, è êíÿçåé, Êîòîðûõ îí îñòàâèë íà ñâîáîäå È êàê áû ïðåâðàòèë â æèâîé ìóçåé. Îí âûñåëÿë àáõàçöåâ ñ íåîõîòîé, Êóëàê óíè÷òîæàëñÿ ðàçâå ñîòûé, È òî, êîëü Íåñòîð ê ñòåíêå áûë ïðèïåðò, Îí áûë â ñâîåé ïðèâåðæåííîñòè òâåðä, Àáõàçèÿ áûëà åãî ðàáîòîé…

Òàêàÿ ñâîåîáðàçíàÿ ïîëèòèêà øëà âðàçðåç ñî ñòàëèíñêèì ïëàíîì ïðåîáðàçîâàíèé. Âîñïîëüçîâàâøèñü ýòîé ñèòóàöèåé, ðåñïóáëèêàíñêàÿ ïàðòîðãàíèçàöèÿ âûñòóïèëà ïðîòèâ Íåñòîðà. Îäíàêî íåîæèäàííî äëÿ âñåõ åãî ïîääåðæàëè Ñòàëèí è Îðäæîíèêèäçå. Ñòàëèí 19 îêòÿáðÿ 1929 ã. îáâèíèë Àáõàçñêèé îáêîì â òîì, ÷òî îí «íå ó÷èòûâàåò ñïåöèôè÷åñêèõ îñîáåííîñòåé àáõàçñêîãî óêëàäà, ñáèâàÿñü èíîãäà íà ïîëèòèêó ìåõàíè÷åñêîãî ïåðåíåñåíèÿ ðóññêèõ îáðàçöîâ ñîöèàëèñòè÷åñêîãî ñòðîèòåëüñòâà íà àáõàçñêóþ ïî÷âó». Âçÿâ Ëàêîáà ïîä çàùèòó, Ñòàëèí âìåñòå ñ òåì ïîäâåðã åãî êðèòèêå: «Îøèáêà ò. Ëàêîáà ñîñòîèò â òîì, ÷òî îí à) íåñìîòðÿ íà ñâîé ñòàðûé áîëüøåâèñòñêèé îïûò, ñáèâàåòñÿ èíîãäà â ñâîåé ðàáîòå íà ïîëèòèêó îïîðû íà âñå ñëîè àáõàçñêîãî íàñåëåíèÿ (ýòî íå áîëüøåâèñòñêàÿ ïîëèòèêà) è á) íàõîäèò âîçìîæíûì èíîãäà íå ïîä÷èíÿòüñÿ ðåøåíèÿì îáêîìà (ýòî òîæå íå áîëüøåâèñòñêàÿ ïîëèòèêà). Ôàêòîâ íå ïðèâîæó, òàê êàê îíè îáùåèçâåñòíû. ß äóìàþ, ÷òî ò. Ëàêîáà ìîæåò è äîëæåí îñâîáîäèòüñÿ îò ñâîèõ îøèáîê. ß äóìàþ, ÷òî îáêîì äîëæåí ïîìî÷ü ò. Ëàêîáà â ýòîì äåëå, à ò. Ëàêîáà äîëæåí ïðèçíàòü áåç îãîâîðîê ðóêîâîäÿùóþ ðîëü îáêîìà âî âñåõ äåëàõ àáõàçñêîé æèçíè».  òî âðåìÿ êàê â àïïàðàòàõ óïðàâëåíèÿ ïîâñåìåñòíî âûðàñòàëà ñòåíà, îòäåëÿâøàÿ áþðîêðàòèþ îò íàðîäà, Ëàêîáà ïðîäîëæàë ïðèíèìàòü ëþäåé íå òîëüêî â ïðàâèòåëüñòâå, íî è ïðÿìî íà óëèöå, â êîôåéíå, íà íàáåðåæíîé, ïî äîðîãå äîìîé. Ê íåìó ïðèõîäèëè ñòàðèêè è áåñïðèçîðíèêè, òàáàêîâîäû è áåãëûå àáðåêè. Îí ñâîáîäíî îáùàëñÿ ñ ëþäüìè, îáëàäàë áîëüøèì ÷óâñòâîì þìîðà. Òàê, íà îäíîì èç ñîâåùàíèé Ëàêîáà ãîâîðèë: «Ìû îðãàíèçîâàëè Ñîâíàðõîç. Ê íàì ïðèõîäÿò êðåñòüÿíå è ñïðàøèâàþò: êòî òàêîé Ñîâíàðõîç – àáõàçåö èëè ìèíãðåëåö?». 102

Íà çàðå ñîâåòñêîé èìïåðèè. «ß – Êîáà, à òû – Ëàêîáà...»

Ïðè íåì îòêðûâàëèñü àáõàçñêèå, ðóññêèå, ãðå÷åñêèå, ãðóçèíñêèå, ýñòîíñêèå, àðìÿíñêèå íàöèîíàëüíûå øêîëû, òåõíèêóìû, òåàòðû. Áîëüøóþ ïîìîùü íàðîä Àáõàçèè îêàçàë ãîëîäàþùèì Ïîâîëæüÿ, Êðûìà è Êóáàíè. Òûñÿ÷è áåæåíöåâ, ñîòíè ñèðîò áûëè ñïàñåíû îò ñìåðòè êðåñòüÿíàìè. Íåñòîð ïîìîãàë äàæå ìåñòíûì... êíÿçüÿì è äâîðÿíàì, êîòîðûå îêàçàëèñü â çàòðóäíèòåëüíîì ìàòåðèàëüíîì ïîëîæåíèè. Ýòî âûçûâàëî íåäîóìåíèå. Òàê, áûâøèé ëè÷íûé ñåêðåòàðü Íåñòîðà, À.Ì. Áóëàíîâ, ïîêàçûâàë â 1954 ã.: «...Íå âåëîñü â Àáõàçèè êàêîé-ëèáî áîðüáû ñ àáõàçñêèìè êíÿçüÿìè, êîòîðûå ÷óâñòâîâàëè ñåáÿ ñâîáîäíî, è ýòî áðîñàëîñü â ãëàçà.  1924 ãîäó ÿ íåñêîëüêî ðàç áûë ñâèäåòåëåì òîãî, êàê â Ñîâíàðêîì Àáõàçèè ïðèõîäèë êíÿçü Àëåêñàíäð Øåðâàøèäçå è Íåñòîð Ëàêîáà ïðèíèìàë åãî. Êðîìå íåãî íà ïðèåì ê Íåñòîðó Ëàêîáà ïðèõîäèëè êíÿçüÿ Ýìóõâàðè, Ýøáà, êðóïíàÿ äîìîâëàäåëèöà Äçÿïøèïà. Î ÷åì îíè ãîâîðèëè ñ Íåñòîðîì Ëàêîáà, ÿ íå çíàþ, íî âèäåë, êàê Øåðâàøèäçå, Äçÿïøèïà ïî çàïèñêàì Íåñòîðà Ëàêîáà ïîëó÷àëè äåíüãè â áóõãàëòåðèè Ñîâíàðêîìà.  áóõãàëòåðèè ãîâîðèëîñü, ÷òî èì âûäàâàëè ïîñîáèå...». Ïîçèöèè Íåñòîðà ãîä îò ãîäà óêðåïëÿëèñü. Âîæäü åãî æàëîâàë.  òî æå âðåìÿ Áåðèÿ, îáóðåâàåìûé ñòðàñòÿìè, íèêàê íå ìîã ëè÷íî ïîçíàêîìèòüñÿ ñ Êîáîé. Íåñêîëüêî ðàç íà ñâîé ñòðàõ è ðèñê îí ïûòàëñÿ ïðåäñòàâèòüñÿ Ñòàëèíó, íî âñÿêèé ðàç íåóäà÷íî. Ïîíà÷àëó Ñòàëèíà ðàçäðàæàëà íàçîéëèâîñòü Áåðèÿ. Åãî áåñöåðåìîííîñòü âûçûâàëà â íåì äàæå ãíåâ. Êàê-òî â îäèí èç íåïðîøåíûõ âèçèòîâ Áåðèÿ íà äà÷ó Ñòàëèíà â Àáõàçèè Êîáà ñïðîñèë ñåêðåòàðÿ: – ×òî, îïÿòü ïðèïåðñÿ? – Îïÿòü, Èîñèô Âèññàðèîíîâè÷... – Ïåðåäàé åìó: çäåñü õîçÿèí Ëàêîáà, à íå îí. Áåðèÿ ïîíÿë, ÷òî ïóòü ê Ñòàëèíó ëåæèò ÷åðåç Íåñòîðà. Ëàêîáà ÷óâñòâîâàë ñåáÿ óâåðåííî, íåñìîòðÿ íà íåáîëüøèå íåïðèÿòíîñòè.  îäíîì èç ïèñåì 1929 ã. ñîðàòíèê Íåñòîðà, áóäóùèé ñåêðåòàðü Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè Âëàäèìèð Ëàäàðèÿ ñîîáùàë: «Óâàæàåìûé è äîðîãîé Íåñòîð!.. Áóäó÷è â Ñî÷è, âèäåë Ñòàëèíà â äîìå îòäûõà ÖÈÊà, ðàññïðàøèâàë âñå âðåìÿ, ãäå Âû, ïðèåäåòå ëè, äà çäðàâñòâóåò Àáõàçèÿ, êðè÷àë è ïåë àáõàçñêèå ïåñíè». Òåì âðåìåíåì Áåðèÿ íàñòîé÷èâî îáèâàë ïîðîãè Ëàêîáà. Ëþáîïûòíî â ýòîé ñâÿçè êîðîòêîå ïèñüìî, íàïèñàííîå íà áëàíêå ïîëíîìî÷íîãî ïðåäñòàâèòåëÿ ÎÃÏÓ â ÇÑÔÑÐ: «Äîðîãîé ò. Íåñòîð! Øëþ òåáå ïðèâåò è íàèëó÷øèå ïîæåëàíèÿ. Ñïàñèáî çà ïèñüìî. Î÷åíü õîòåëîñü áû óâèäåòüñÿ ñ ò. Êîáà ïåðåä åãî îòúåçäîì. Ïðè ñëó÷àå áûëî áû õîðîøî, åñëè áû òû åìó íàïîìíèë îá ýòîì. Òîâ. Íîäàðàÿ ïðèêàçàë îòîçâàòü. Âçàìåí ïðèåäåò õîðîøèé ÷åêèñò. Ïðèâåò. Òâîé Ëàâðåíòèé Áåðèÿ. 27.09.31 ã.» Ïåðåä îòúåçäîì èç Àáõàçèè Ñòàëèí, ïî ïðîñüáå Íåñòîðà, ïðèíÿë Áåðèÿ. Ëàêîáà íàìåêíóë, ÷òî ïîðà áû âûäâèíóòü íà ðóêîâîäÿùóþ ïàðòèéíóþ ðàáîòó ýòîãî ìîëîäîãî ýíåðãè÷íîãî ÷åêèñòà. ×åðåç ïîëòîðà ìåñÿöà, 12 íîÿáðÿ 103

Ãëàâà IV

1931 ã., Áåðèÿ ñòàë âòîðûì ñåêðåòàðåì Çàêàâêàçñêîãî êðàéêîìà ÂÊÏ(á) è ïåðâûì ñåêðåòàðåì ÖÊ ÊÏ(á) Ãðóçèè. Êàê ñòàëî èçâåñòíî òåïåðü, âñå íà òîé æå äà÷å â Àáõàçèè ñîñòîÿëñÿ ðàçãîâîð î çàìåíå Ì. Îðàõåëàøâèëè íîâûì ïåðâûì ñåêðåòàðåì Çàêêðàéêîìà (áåñåäà çàïèñàíà ðóêîé Íåñòîðà). Ñòàëèí âäðóã ñïðîñèë: – Áåðèÿ ïîäîéäåò? – Áåðèÿ ïîäîéäåò, – îòâåòèë Ëàêîáà. Ñ íîâîé êàíäèäàòóðîé ñîãëàñèëñÿ òîãäà è Îðäæîíèêèäçå. Î÷åíü ñêîðî Áåðèÿ ïîäíÿëñÿ åùå íà îäíó ñòóïåíüêó. Íà øåñòîì ïëåíóìå 17 îêòÿáðÿ 1932 ã. îí áûë «èçáðàí» ïåðâûì ñåêðåòàðåì Çàêêðàéêîìà ñ îñòàâëåíèåì åãî ïåðâûì ñåêðåòàðåì ÖÊ ÊÏ(á) Ãðóçèè. Íåñòîð íå ñìîã ïðåäóãàäàòü äàëüíåéøåãî ðàçâèòèÿ ñîáûòèé. Îí îïðàâäûâàë ñâîè äåéñòâèÿ òåì, ÷òî Áåðèÿ áûë ðîäîì èç Àáõàçèè, ÷òî îí ìîëîä, ïîñëóøåí åìó (â îòëè÷èå îò ïðåäûäóùèõ ïåðâûõ ñåêðåòàðåé ÖÊ Ãðóçèè, ñ êîòîðûìè îí íå ëàäèë), íå èìååò ñàìîñòîÿòåëüíîãî âûõîäà íà Ñòàëèíà, – òàêîé ÷åëîâåê âî ãëàâå Çàêàâêàçñêîé ïàðòîðãàíèçàöèè áóäåò ïîëåçåí Àáõàçñêîé ðåñïóáëèêå... Ëàêîáà æåñòîêî ïðîñ÷èòàëñÿ.  îäíîé èç åãî çàïèñíûõ êíèæåê åñòü òàêîå èçðå÷åíèå: «×åëîâåêó äàðîâàíû äâà áëàãà: íàäåæäà è íåâåäåíèå áóäóùåãî. Ïîñëåäíåå åùå ëó÷øå ïåðâîãî». Áåðèÿ áûñòðî âîøåë âî âêóñ ñâîåãî íîâîãî ïîëîæåíèÿ è òóò æå «îòáëàãîäàðèë» Íåñòîðà, â äåêàáðå 1932 ã. îáúÿâèâ åìó âûãîâîð. Òîò, â ñâîþ î÷åðåäü, îòìåíÿåò åãî ÷åðåç Ñòàëèíà. Ñ ýòîãî ìîìåíòà Áåðèÿ äåëàåò âñå, ÷òîáû ïîäîðâàòü àâòîðèòåò Íåñòîðà â Çàêàâêàçüå, äèñêðåäèòèðîâàòü åãî â ãëàçàõ Ñòàëèíà. Îá èõ ñëîæíûõ îòíîøåíèÿõ óæå â òî âðåìÿ ñâèäåòåëüñòâóåò, â ÷àñòíîñòè, îäèí èç áëèæàéøèõ ñîòðóäíèêîâ Ñòàëèíà: «Êàê-òî âî âðåìÿ î÷åðåäíîãî ïðèåçäà ê ò. Ñòàëèíó â Ñî÷è Áåðèÿ è Ëàêîáà ïîøëè ïî ðàçíûì äîðîæêàì. Áåðèÿ ïîøåë ïî íàïðàâëåíèþ ê äà÷å ò. Ñòàëèíà, à Ëàêîáà ê ñëóæåáíîìó äîìó. ß îò÷åòëèâî ñëûøàë, êàê Ëàêîáà, ïîäõîäÿ ê ñëóæåáíîìó äîìó, ïðîèçíåñ: “Ìåðçêèé ÷åëîâåê”. Ýòè ñëîâà ìåíÿ ñòðàøíî îçàäà÷àëè... Ýòî áûëî ñêàçàíî ïî àäðåñó Áåðèÿ». Çíà÷èòåëüíûì â èõ áîðüáå ñòàë 1933 ãîä. Áûë ÿñíûé ëåòíèé äåíü. Ê Õîëîäíîðå÷åíñêîé äà÷å áëèç Ãàãð ïîäêàòûâàëè àâòîìîáèëè. Ïðèåõàëè òîâàðèùè èç Ìîñêâû. ßâèëñÿ ñóåòëèâûé Áåðèÿ. Âñå æäàëè Ñòàëèíà íà âåðàíäå, íî îí íåîæèäàííî ïîÿâèëñÿ èç ãëóáèíû ñàäà âìåñòå ñ Ëàêîáà. Ïîñëå êîðîòêîé áåñåäû è ëåãêîãî çàâòðàêà ãîñòè ïîøëè îñìàòðèâàòü ñàä. (Íåñòîð íåîäíîêðàòíî ðàññêàçûâàë ñâîèì áëèçêèì îá ýòîì ýïèçîäå.) «Íó, õâàòèò áåçäåëüíè÷àòü, – ñêàçàë Ñòàëèí. – Ýòîò äèêèé êóñòàðíèê íóæíî âû÷èñòèòü, îí ìåøàåò ñàäó...» Ãîñòè, òàê è íå óñïåâ ïåðåîäåòüñÿ ñ äîðîãè, âçÿëèñü çà ðàáîòó. Êîëþ÷êè âïèâàëèñü â èõ ïàëüöû, öåïëÿëèñü çà áðþêè è ðóêàâà, à Ñòàëèí, äîâîëüíûé, ïîïûõèâàë òðóáêîé. «Ñëýïöè», – äîâåðèòåëüíî ïðîõðèïåë îí Íåñòîðó. Áåðèÿ äîñòàëèñü ãðàáëè. Îíè âûâîäèëè åãî èç ñåáÿ. Åìó òðåáîâàëîñü äðóãîå îðóäèå. Êàêîé-òî ìîñêîâñêèé òîâàðèù íåèñòîâî ëóïèë òîïîðîì ïî ñêîëüç104

Íà çàðå ñîâåòñêîé èìïåðèè. «ß – Êîáà, à òû – Ëàêîáà...»

êîìó êîðíþ êóñòàðíèêà. Óïðóãèé êîðåíü ïîäïðûãèâàë íà ìåñòå è íèêàê íå õîòåë ïîääàâàòüñÿ. Áåðèÿ îòáðîñèë ãðàáëè, ïèõíóë â áîê ìîñêâè÷à è, âûõâàòèâ ó íåãî òîïîð, ãðîìêî, òàê ãðîìêî, ÷òîáû äîëåòåëî äî ñëóõà âîæäÿ, ïðîêðè÷àë: «Ìíå ïîä ñèëó ðóáèòü ïîä êîðåíü ëþáîé êóñòàðíèê, êîòîðûé óêàæåò õîçÿèí ýòîãî ñàäà Èîñèô Âèññàðèîíîâè÷!»  òîò æå äåíü íà Õîëîäíîé ðå÷êå áûëà ñäåëàíà ñèìâîëè÷åñêàÿ ôîòîãðàôèÿ. Íà íåé – Ëàêîáà, Ñòàëèí, Âîðîøèëîâ è Áåðèÿ. Áåðèÿ åùå õóäîùàâ, îáòÿíóò øèðîêèì àðìåéñêèì ðåìíåì, çà êîòîðûì ïî÷òè íà ãðóäè òîð÷èò ëåçâèå îãðîìíîãî òîïîðà. Çàëîæèâ ðóêè çà ñïèíó, îí íàãëîâàòî óñòàâèë êðóãëûå ñòåêëÿøêè ïåíñíå íà Ñòàëèíà.  òîì æå ãîäó â Àáõàçèè áûëî ñôàáðèêîâàíî äåëî î «íàïàäåíèè» íà êàòåð Ñòàëèíà ó ìûñà Ïèöóíäà. Óíèêàëüíûå íàõîäêè áûëè èçâëå÷åíû èç ìîñêîâñêèõ àðõèâîâ, êîòîðûå ïîçâîëÿþò â äåòàëÿõ âîññòàíîâèòü ïðîèñøåäøåå. Òàê, ñòàíîâèòñÿ èçâåñòíî, ÷òî êàòåð «Êðàñíàÿ Çâåçäà» îáñòðåëÿëè 23 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1933 ã. «Êàê î÷åâèäåö äîëæåí ñîîáùèòü ñëåäóþùåå, – ïèñàë 14 îêòÿáðÿ 1953 ã. Í.Ñ. Õðóùåâó ñîòðóäíèê àïïàðàòà ÖÊ ÊÏÑÑ Ñ. ×å÷óëèí. – Êàòåð áûë íåáîëüøîé, ðå÷íîãî òèïà, ñêîðîñòü åãî áûëà ñëàáàÿ. Äî ýòîãî õîäèë ïî ðåêå Íåâå, è ê ýêñïëóàòàöèè íà ×åðíîì ìîðå êàòåð áûë ÿâíî íåïðèãîäåí. Êàòåð èìåë ñòåêëÿííóþ íåáîëüøóþ êðóãëóþ êàáèíêó, ÷åðåç êîòîðóþ ïðîñìàòðèâàëèñü âñå ñòîÿâøèå è ñèäåâøèå â êàòåðå. Âíóòðè êàáèíêè íèêàêîãî óêðûòèÿ íå áûëî...  ìîìåíò îáñòðåëà íà êàòåðå â êàáèíêå ñ ò. Ñòàëèíûì áûë ÿ, à èç îõðàíû Âëàñèê è Áîãäàíîâ. Êðîìå òîãî, äâà-òðè ìîòîðèñòà (ìíå íåçíàêîìûå) íàõîäèëèñü â ìîòîðíîì îòäåëåíèè. Òîâ. Ñòàëèí, êîãäà íà÷àëñÿ îáñòðåë, ñî ñòîðîíû âûñòðåëîâ áûë ïðèêðûò íàìè. Ïðè ýòîì Âëàñèê ïîïðîñèë ðàçðåøåíèÿ ó ò. Ñòàëèíà äàòü îòâåòíûé îãîíü. Ïîëó÷èâ ðàçðåøåíèå, Âëàñèê ïðîèçâåë èç âèí÷åñòåðà íåñêîëüêî âûñòðåëîâ â ñòîðîíó Ïèöóíäñêîé ïðèñòàíè. Êàòåð æå â ýòî âðåìÿ ïåðåñåêàë áóõòó è ïðèáëèæàëñÿ ê çàïàäíîìó áåðåãó áóõòû, ê òîìó ìåñòó, ãäå ñòîèò áåðåãîâîé ìàÿê. ×òîáû êàòåð íå ïîïàäàë ïîä íîâûé îáñòðåë, íî ñ áîëåå áëèçêîãî ðàññòîÿíèÿ, ÿ âûñêî÷èë èç ñòåêëÿííîãî êîëïàêà ê ìîòîðèñòàì è ñêàçàë èì, ÷òîáû êàòåð âåëè òîëüêî ïî ïðÿìîé, â îòêðûòîå ìîðå... Òîâ. Ñòàëèí ñíà÷àëà îáñòðåë êàòåðà ïîñëå áîëåå ÷åì òðåõ÷àñîâîãî ïðåáûâàíèÿ íà áåðåãó â ðàéîíå Ïèöóíäû îòíåñ ê àáõàçñêîìó îáû÷àþ, ñêàçàâ, ÷òî ó àáõàçöåâ ïðèíÿòî ãîñòåé ïðîâîæàòü âûñòðåëàìè. Îäíàêî, êîãäà ðåçêî âûðàçèëèñü âèíòîâî÷íûå âûñòðåëû, ò. Ñòàëèí, âèäèìî, ñâîå ìíåíèå î âûñòðåëàõ èçìåíèë, òàê êàê ïî âîçâðàùåíèè íà Õîëîäíóþ ðå÷êó äëÿ âûÿñíåíèÿ ïðè÷èí îáñòðåëà â ýòîò æå âå÷åð, êàê òîëüêî âûñàäèëèñü, èì áûë ïîñëàí íà Ïèöóíäó Áîãäàíîâ... Äíåé ÷åðåç ïÿòü ïîñëå îáñòðåëà êàòåðà íà èìÿ ò. Ñòàëèíà (íà Õîëîäíóþ ðå÷êó) ïîñòóïèëî ÷àñòíîå ïèñüìî îò îäíîãî ïîãðàíè÷íèêà, ôàìèëèþ íå ïîìíþ.  ýòîì ïèñüìå îí ïðîñèë ò. Ñòàëèíà ïðîñòèòü åãî çà òî, ÷òî îí ñòðåëÿë ïî êàòåðó, à îáúÿñíÿë îí ýòî òåì, ÷òî ïðèíÿë êàòåð çà ÷óæîé (èíîñòðàííûé). Ýòîò êàòåð â ðàéîíå Ïèöóíäû äåéñòâèòåëüíî ïîÿâèëñÿ â ïåðâûé ðàç... Ñîäåðæàíèå ýòîãî ïèñüìà ÿ äîêëàäûâàë ëè÷íî ò. Ñòàëèíó. Îí âûñëóøàë è ïèñüìî ó ìåíÿ âçÿë...» 105

Ãëàâà IV

Âûÿñíèëîñü, ÷òî òðè âûñòðåëà ïðîèçâåë êîìàíäèð îòäåëåíèÿ ïîãðàíïîñòà «Ïèöóíäà» Í.È. Ëàâðîâ. Ïî äðóãîé âåðñèè, îí íàìåðåâàëñÿ îñòàíîâèòü êàòåð è îòïðàâèòü íà íåì â Ãàãðû êðàñíîàðìåéöà ×èãàøåâà ñ ãðÿçíûì áåëüåì, ìèøåíÿìè è ðóæåéíûì ìàñëîì äëÿ Ãàãðèíñêîãî îïåðïîñòà. «Óáåäèâøèñü ëè÷íî â òîì, ÷òî îáñòðåë êàòåðà áûë ñëó÷àéíûì ÿâëåíèåì, – ãîâîðèòñÿ â çàêëþ÷åíèè ïîìîùíèêà Ãëàâíîãî âîåííîãî ïðîêóðîðà ïîäïîëêîâíèêà Çàðóáèíà îò 4 èþëÿ 1955 ã., – È.Â. Ñòàëèí ðàñïîðÿäèëñÿ íàêàçàòü âèíîâíûõ â äèñöèïëèíàðíîì ïîðÿäêå è íàâåñòè óñòàâíîé ïîðÿäîê íà ïîãðàíïîñòó “Ïèöóíäà”. Îäíàêî ïîñòàíîâëåíèåì êîëëåãèè Çàêàâêàçñêîãî ÃÏÓ îò 9 ÿíâàðÿ 1934 ã. áûëè îñóæäåíû Ëàâðîâ è íà÷àëüíèê îïåðïîñòà Ãåòìàíåíêî ê 3 ãîäàì ÈÒË êàæäûé, âðèä êîìåíäàíòà ñóõóìñêîé ïîãðàíêîìåíäàòóðû Áåñåëèÿ – ê 5 ãîäàì ÈÒË, à îïåðóïîëíîìî÷åííûå Ïèëèÿ À. è Åðîôàëî⠖ ê 2 ãîäàì ÈÒË êàæäûé.  1937 ã., êîãäà íà÷àëèñü àðåñòû “ó÷àñòíèêî┠òàê íàçûâàåìîé “ëàêîáîâñêîé îðãàíèçàöèè”, ñëó÷àé îáñòðåëà ïðàâèòåëüñòâåííîãî êàòåðà áûë èñïîëüçîâàí áûâøèìè ðàáîòíèêàìè ÍÊÂÄ Ãðóçèíñêîé ÑÑÐ è ïðèïèñàí Í. Ëàêîáà êàê íåóäàâøèéñÿ òåððîðèñòè÷åñêèé àêò â îòíîøåíèè È.Â. Ñòàëèíà.  ñâÿçè ñ ýòèì 29 èþëÿ 1937 ã. áûë àðåñòîâàí áûâøèé ïðåäñåäàòåëü ÃÏÓ Àáõàçèè Ìèêåëàäçå, à 4 àâãóñòà 1937 ã. îðãàíû ÍÊÂÄ Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ àðåñòîâàëè Ïèëèÿ. Òîëüêî 23 ôåâðàëÿ 1940 ã. áûë ðàçûñêàí è àðåñòîâàí áûâøèé ïîãðàíè÷íèê Ëàâðîâ». Ñðàçó ïîñëå àðåñòà Ëàâðîâà 1-ì ñïåöîòäåëîì ÍÊÂÄ ÑÑÑÐ Áåðèÿ íà ñïåöñîîáùåíèè íàïèñàë: «Êîáóëîâó, Ôåäîðîâó. Ïðîñëåäèòå çà ðàññëåäîâàíèåì. 15.III 1940 ã.».  ðåçóëüòàòå «ðàññëåäîâàíèÿ» 28 èþëÿ 1941 ã. Ëàâðîâ áûë ðàññòðåëÿí, à åùå ðàíüøå, 10 íîÿáðÿ 1937 ã., êàçíåí áûâøèé ïðåäñåäàòåëü Àáõàçñêîãî ÃÏÓ À.Í. Ìèêåëàäçå. Ïî ïîðó÷åíèþ Áåðèÿ ýòèì äåëîì â 1933 ã. çàíèìàëñÿ Ñ.À. Ãîãëèäçå, êîòîðûé ïðîÿâèë îñîáîå ðâåíèå è óæå â 1934 ã. ñòàë íàðêîìîì âíóòðåííèõ äåë Ãðóçèè. Îäíàêî ê âåëèêîìó îãîð÷åíèþ Áåðèÿ «èíöèäåíò» ñ îáñòðåëîì êàòåðà òîãäà íèêàê íå îòðàçèëñÿ íà îòíîøåíèÿõ Êîáû è Íåñòîðà. Íî âðåìÿ íåáûâàëûõ èíòðèã è ïðîâîêàöèé Áåðèÿ ïðîòèâ Ëàêîáà óæå íàñòóïèëî. Îí ïûòàëñÿ ëþáûìè ñðåäñòâàìè âûáèòü åãî èç ñåäëà.  õîä øëè âñåâîçìîæíûå ïðèåìû, âïëîòü äî «çàãîâîðîâ» íà æèçíü âîæäÿ, çàìåøàííûõ íà åãî áîëåçíåííîé ïîäîçðèòåëüíîñòè. Èòàê, Ñòàëèí âñå åùå îòäàâàë ïðåäïî÷òåíèå Ëàêîáà. Åìó íðàâèëîñü, êàê «Ãëóõîé» âèðòóîçíî âëàäåë îðóæèåì, ñíàéïåðñêè ñòðåëÿë, ÷òî îí òîæå ðîñ áåç îòöà è ó÷èëñÿ â òîé æå Òèôëèññêîé äóõîâíîé ñåìèíàðèè. Åìó áûëà áëèçêà äåÿòåëüíîñòü áîåâèêà Ëàêîáà â ãîäû Ãðàæäàíñêîé âîéíû â Áàòóìå è íðàâèëîñü, ÷òî «Ãëóõîé» âñåãäà çíàë, ÷åãî õî÷åò Ñòàëèí. Íåñòîð áûë ïî-ïðåæíåìó íà âîëíå, à Àáõàçñêàÿ àâòîíîìíàÿ ðåñïóáëèêà â ñèëó åãî àâòîðèòåòà è áëèçîñòè ê âîæäþ áûëà ôàêòè÷åñêè íà ïîëîæåíèè ñîþçíîé ðåñïóáëèêè. Òàêàÿ ñàìîñòîÿòåëüíîñòü è íåçàâèñèìîñòü Ëàêîáà, êîòîðîãî Áåðèÿ íàçûâàë çà ãëàçà «ãëóõîé ãîðåö», ïðèâîäèëè Ëàâðåíòèÿ â ÿðîñòü. Îäíàêî è 1934 ã. â 106

Íà çàðå ñîâåòñêîé èìïåðèè. «ß – Êîáà, à òû – Ëàêîáà...»

ýòîì ñîïåðíè÷åñòâå îñòàëñÿ çà Íåñòîðîì – íåñìîòðÿ íà òî, ÷òî èìåííî íà «óáèåííîì» XVII ñúåçäå ÂÊÏ(á) Áåðèÿ ñòàë ÷ëåíîì ÖÊ. Òîãäà æå â Àáõàçèè âûøëà êíèãà «Ñòàëèí è Õàøèì (1901–1902 ãã.)» ñ ïðåäèñëîâèåì Í. Ëàêîáà (áóìàãó íà èçäàíèå âûäåëèë ëè÷íî Ë.Ì. Êàãàíîâè÷).  íåé ðàññêàçûâàëîñü î ðåâîëþöèîííîé ðàáîòå Ñòàëèíà â Áàòóìå è î òîì, êàê åãî ñêðûâàë îò ïîëèöèè â ñâîåì äîìå àáõàçñêèé êðåñòüÿíèí Õàøèì Ñìûðáà. Êíèãà ïîíðàâèëàñü Ñòàëèíó.  ïåðâîì íîìåðå îðãàíà ÖÊ ÂÊÏ(á) æóðíàëà Áîëüøåâèê çà 1935 ã. ïîÿâèëàñü ðåöåíçèÿ íà íåå òîãäà åùå ìîëîäîãî Á. Ïîíîìàðåâà, áóäóùåãî àêàäåìèêà è ñåêðåòàðÿ ÖÊ ÊÏÑÑ. Âñå â òîì æå 1934-ì âûøåë êðàñî÷íî îôîðìëåííûé ñïåöâûïóñê æóðíàëà Îãîíåê ïîä íàçâàíèåì «Ñîâåòñêèå ñóáòðîïèêè».  íåì êðóïíûì ïëàíîì áûëè äàíû ôîòîïîðòðåòû Áåðèÿ è Ëàêîáà, ãîâîðèëîñü î ñîçäàíèè ñîâåòñêîé Ôëîðèäû, ïóáëèêîâàëèñü ïðèçûâû äîãíàòü è ïåðåãíàòü Êàëèôîðíèþ. Ïèñàòåëü Åôèì Çîçóëÿ â íåáîëüøîì î÷åðêå «Ñóáòðîïè÷åñêèå ëþäè» ïèñàë: «Èõ ìíîãî. Îíè ðàçíîîáðàçíû, êàê ïðèðîäà ñóáòðîïèêîâ, è âîâñå íå âñå íàõîäÿòñÿ â ïðåäåëàõ ñóáòðîïè÷åñêèõ ãðàíèö». Ïðÿìî ïðîòèâîïîëîæíûå õàðàêòåðèñòèêè ïèñàòåëü äàåò Ëàêîáà è Áåðèÿ.  Ëàâðåíòèè ïðîãëÿäûâàþò î÷åíü êîíêðåòíûå ÷åðòû: «Ó íåãî òâåðäûå, âîåííûå íàâûêè â ðàáîòå. Îãðîìíûé îïûò.  ëèöå åãî îáðàùàåò íà ñåáÿ âíèìàíèå âûðàæåíèå âîëè, ñîåäèíåííîé ñ îñîáîé îñòðîé âäóì÷èâîñòüþ. Îí ãîâîðèò íàì î ñóáòðîïèêàõ. Ãîâîðèò ñ áîëüøèì âîîäóøåâëåíèåì: “Äà, ýòîò êðàé áóäåò îäíèì èç ëó÷øèõ â ñòðàíå!” È, ãîâîðÿ ýòî, îí êëàäåò íà ñòîë ïåðî, êîòîðîå äåðæàë â ðóêå, è, êàê-òî âûïðÿìèâøèñü, ñ âîñõèùåíèåì ðàññêàçûâàåò, ÷òî î ñóáòðîïèêàõ ãîâîðèë Ñòàëèí: “Òîâ. Ñòàëèí óêàçàë íàì íà íåîáõîäèìîñòü âñåìåðíîãî ðàçâèòèÿ â Çàêàâêàçüå ñóáòðîïè÷åñêèõ êóëüòóð. È ìû ñäåëàåì ýòî”. Íà XVII ñúåçäå ïàðòèè ò. Áåðèÿ çàÿâèë îá ýòîì ñ âûñîêîé òðèáóíû...». Ñîâåðøåííî â äðóãîì ïëàíå äàí Ëàêîáà. Ïèñàòåëü ïèøåò î íåì ïðîñòî: «Ýòî ïåðâîå èìÿ â Àáõàçèè. Íåñòîð Ëàêîáà – ïåðâûé õîçÿéñòâåííèê çàìå÷àòåëüíîé Àáõàçñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè.  ëèöå åãî íàñòîðîæåííîñòü è îçàáî÷åííîñòü: “Ìåòîäû, ìåòîäû íóæíû äðóãèå. Ðàçâå ìîæíî ïîäõîäèòü êî âñåì ÿâëåíèÿì îäèíàêîâî?..” Òîâ. Ëàêîáà áåñïðåðûâíî ðàçúåçæàåò ïî Àáõàçèè, äóìàåò, ðàáîòàåò, èùåò ëþäåé, âû÷èñëÿåò è ïî÷òè íèêîãäà íå áûâàåò äîâîëåí äîñòèãíóòûìè óñïåõàìè».  ñïåöâûïóñêå Îãîíüêà áûëà îïóáëèêîâàíà è ñòàòüÿ Áåðèÿ ïîä öâåòèñòûì, íî íå îðèãèíàëüíûì çàãîëîâêîì: «Äàäèì ëèìîíû, ìàíäàðèíû, àïåëüñèíû – íà ñòîë òðóäÿùåãîñÿ ñîâåòñêîé ñòðàíû».  íåé îáðàùàåò íà ñåáÿ âíèìàíèå îäíà ôðàçà: «Òîâ. Ñòàëèí ïîñòàâèë ïåðåä íàìè çàäà÷ó – äàòü ê 1937 ã. íå ìåíåå ïîëóìèëëèàðäà öèòðóñîâûõ ïëîäîâ». Êàê èçâåñòíî, íà ýòîò ãîä áûëè ïîñòàâëåíû è ñîâñåì èíûå çàäà÷è... Íàñòóïèë 35-é. Îí ïðåêðàñíî ñêëàäûâàëñÿ äëÿ Íåñòîðà è õîðîøî äëÿ Áåðèÿ. Áåðèÿ ïîñòîÿííî æàëîâàëñÿ: «Ëàêîáà çíàåò äîðîãó â Ìîñêâó òîëüêî ÷åðåç Ñî÷è». Êîáà ïîäíà÷èâàë: «Âîò, Ãëóõîé!.. Çíà÷èò îáõîäèò òåáÿ, Ëàâðåíòèé, íå ñ÷èòàåòñÿ...». Î òîì, êàê Áåðèÿ ïîñòîÿííî «ñòó÷àë» Ñòàëèíó íà 107

Ãëàâà IV

Íåñòîðà, ãîâîðèò è ñëåäóþùåå ñâèäåòåëüñòâî. «Áåðèÿ âíåøíå íàõîäèëñÿ â õîðîøèõ îòíîøåíèÿõ ñ Íåñòîðîì Ëàêîáà – ïðåäñåäàòåëåì Ñîâíàðêîìà Àáõàçèè, – ïîêàçûâàë â 1954 ã. åãî ñûí Ñåðãåé Áåðèÿ, – à ôàêòè÷åñêè î÷åíü ïëîõî îòíîñèëñÿ ê Ëàêîáà. Ýòî ÿ çíàþ ïîòîìó, ÷òî åùå ïðè æèçíè Ëàêîáà Áåðèÿ â ìîåì ïðèñóòñòâèè â ðàçãîâîðå ñ È. Â. Ñòàëèíûì ðàññêàçûâàë åìó î Í. Ëàêîáà â ïëîõîì îñâåùåíèè. Áåðèÿ, íàïðèìåð, ãîâîðèë î êàêîì-òî âîññòàíèè àáõàçöåâ (Äóðèïøñêèé ñõîä ôåâðàëÿ 1931 ã. – Ñ.Ë.) è ÷òî âïåðåäè âîîðóæåííûõ àáõàçöåâ øëà ìàòü Í. Ëàêîáà, ÷òîáû â íåå è, ñëåäîâàòåëüíî, â ïîâñòàíöåâ îòðÿäû ÍÊÂÄ íå ñòðåëÿëè, òàê êàê åå çíàëè». Ïîñòàíîâëåíèåì ÖÈÊ ÑÑÑÐ îò 15 ìàðòà 1935 ã. Àáõàçñêàÿ ÀÑÑÐ áûëà íàãðàæäåíà îðäåíîì Ëåíèíà. Òàêîé æå îðäåí ïîëó÷èë è Íåñòîð Ëàêîáà. Ïðàâäà, öåðåìîíèÿ íàãðàæäåíèÿ ñîñòîÿëàñü ñïóñòÿ ãîä, â Ñóõóìå, â äíè ïðàçäíîâàíèÿ 15-ëåòèÿ ñîâåòñêîé Àáõàçèè.  òîì æå ðåøåíèè ÖÈÊ ÑÑÑÐ ãîâîðèëîñü î íàãðàæäåíèè îðäåíîì Ëåíèíà Ãðóçèíñêîé ÑÑÐ è Ë. Áåðèÿ.  ìàðòå â ãàçåòàõ áûëà îïóáëèêîâàíà ôîòîãðàôèÿ: «Áåðèÿ è Ëàêîáà íà çàñåäàíèè VII ñúåçäà Ñîâåòîâ ÑÑÑл. Èõ ñîïåðíè÷åñòâî, ïîäîãðåâàåìîå âîæäåì, ïðîäîëæàëîñü. Ëåòîì Ñòàëèí ïðèåõàë â Àáõàçèþ. Ñîõðàíèëàñü ôîòîãðàôèÿ, ñíÿòàÿ â Íîâîì Àôîíå: Åãîðîâ, Âîðîøèëîâ, Ñòàëèí, Òóõà÷åâñêèé, Ëàêîáà. Ïî âå÷åðàì èãðàëè íà áèëüÿðäå. Ñòàëèí áûë äîâîëåí: Íåñòîð âîâñþ «÷åñàë» êîìàíäàðìîâ. Âîæäü ïîñìåèâàëñÿ: «È èãðàåò ëó÷øå âàñ, è ñòðåëÿåò ëó÷øå». Ïðîèãðûâàë åìó è Ñòàëèí. Êîáà ëèøü ïîõëîïûâàë ïî ïëå÷ó Íåñòîðà è ãîâîðèë: «Çà ÷òî ïðîùàþ, ÷òî ìàëåíüêèé òàêîé». Òåïåðü ñìåÿëèñü êîìàíäàðìû. À Ñòàëèí íà÷èíàë ïîäíà÷èâàòü Ëàâðåíòèÿ: «×òî íå èãðàåøü, çà øàðû äåðæèøüñÿ... Ãëóõîãî áîèøüñÿ?» Áåðèÿ õîðîøî ïîìíèë õîä Íåñòîðà ñ êíèãîé, à ïîòîì åùå ýòà ðåöåíçèÿ â Áîëüøåâèêå. Íóæåí áûë îòâåò, è îí ïîñëåäîâàë.  1935 ã. âûøåë â ñâåò «òðóä» Áåðèÿ (àâòîðîì åãî ñ÷èòàåòñÿ èñòîðèê Áåäèÿ) «Ê âîïðîñó îá èñòîðèè áîëüøåâèñòñêèõ îðãàíèçàöèé â Çàêàâêàçüå», â êîòîðîì ðîëü Ñòàëèíà áûëà ïðåóâåëè÷åíà. Îäíàêî è ýòà êíèãà Êîáå ïðèøëàñü ïî äóøå. Áûëî åùå îäíî îáñòîÿòåëüñòâî, ïîäòîëêíóâøåå Áåðèÿ ê òàêîìó èçäàíèþ. Ê ýòîìó âðåìåíè â ïàðòèéíûõ âåðõàõ ñòàë øèðîêî èçâåñòåí íåîæèäàííî âñïëûâøèé äîêóìåíò î äåÿòåëüíîñòè Áåðèÿ â Áàêó è åãî ïðèãîâîðå ê ðàññòðåëó çà ïîäïèñüþ Êèðîâà â 1920 ã. Íåçàäîëãî äî ãèáåëè Êèðîâà è ïîñëå Îðäæîíèêèäçå íåîäíîêðàòíî ñòàâèë îá ýòîì â èçâåñòíîñòü Ñòàëèíà. Íî Êîáà ëèøü ëóêàâî ïîñìåèâàëñÿ, ëàñêîâî íàçûâàÿ Ëàâðåíòèÿ «ìîøåííèêîì». È ñîâåðøåííî íå ñëó÷àéíî â ãîäîâùèíó óáèéñòâà Êèðîâà â ãàçåòå Ïðàâäà 1 äåêàáðÿ 1935 ã. î íåì ïîÿâëÿåòñÿ îãðîìíàÿ ñòàòüÿ «Ïëàìåííûé áîåö»... çà ïîäïèñüþ Áåðèÿ. Òåì ñàìûì Ñòàëèí áðàë åãî ïîä çàùèòó. Îäíîâðåìåííî Êîáà âûçûâàåò â Ìîñêâó Íåñòîðà. Çäåñü Ëàêîáà îæèäàë ñþðïðèç. Íà çàñåäàíèè ÖÈÊ ÑÑÑÐ îí áûë íàãðàæäåí îðäåíîì Êðàñíîãî Çíàìåíè çà îòëè÷èÿ â ïåðèîä Ãðàæäàíñêîé âîéíû.  îäèí ãîä – ñðàçó äâà âûñøèõ îðäåíà ñòðàíû...  òîò æå äåíü Êîáà èìåë ìíîãî÷àñîâóþ áåñåäó ñ 108

Íà çàðå ñîâåòñêîé èìïåðèè. «ß – Êîáà, à òû – Ëàêîáà...»

Íåñòîðîì â Êðåìëå. Íà ïðîùàíèå âîæäü ïîäàðèë åìó ñâîþ ôîòîãðàôèþ ñ òðóáêîé è êàê íèêîãäà ùåäðî íàäïèñàë: «Òîâàðèùó è äðóãó Ëàêîáå îò È. Ñòàëèíà. 7.XII 35 ã.». Äåêàáðü òðèäöàòü ïÿòîãî îêàçàëñÿ, âîïðåêè îæèäàíèÿì è íàäåæäàì Áåðèÿ, ñàìûì ìðà÷íûì äëÿ íåãî. Ëàêîáà ïî-ïðåæíåìó áûë âïåðåäè, íî èãðà ïðîäîëæàëàñü.  îäèí èç äíåé Áåðèÿ ëåòèò èç Òèôëèñà â Ñóõóì íà ïîêëîí ê «äðóãó». Êàê â ñòàðûå âðåìåíà. Îáúÿñíÿåòñÿ ñ Íåñòîðîì, êàåòñÿ çà ñâîþ íåáëàãîäàðíîñòü. Âäðóã âçðûâàåòñÿ áðàò Íåñòîðà – Ìèõàèë Ëàêîáà è ñî ñëîâàìè: «Àõ òû, çìåÿ, òâîè øòó÷êè â Àáõàçèè íå ïðîéäóò!» ñïóñêàåò Áåðèÿ ñ ëåñòíèöû, âûõâàòèâ «áðàóíèíã». Íåñòîð îñòàíàâëèâàåò áðàòà ñëîâîì «ãîñòü». À Áåðèÿ, êàê íè â ÷åì íå áûâàëî, óæå ïîõëîïûâàåò åãî ïî ïëå÷ó: «Íó, ÷òî òû, Ìèøà, ãîðÿ÷èøüñÿ...»  ýòîò ïåðèîä îòíîøåíèÿ ìåæäó Ñòàëèíûì è Ëàêîáà íîñèëè î÷åíü òåïëûé õàðàêòåð. «Îäíàæäû, îñåíüþ 1935 ã., ÿ ñàì áûë î÷åâèäöåì òàêîãî ôàêòà, – âñïîìèíàë â 1955 ã. Ý.Ì. Àêøáà. – Èäÿ ïî Êîäîðñêîìó øîññåéíîìó ìîñòó, ÿ ñëó÷àéíî âñòðåòèë ïðîãóëèâàâøèõñÿ â ýòîì ðàéîíå Ñòàëèíà È.Â., Ëàêîáà Íåñòîðà, Áåðèÿ è ñîïðîâîæäàâøèõ èõ ëèö. Êîãäà îíè ïðîøëè ìîñò, ïîäîøëè àâòîìàøèíû è Ñòàëèí âìåñòå ñ Ëàêîáà ñåëè â îäèí àâòîìîáèëü, ïðè÷åì Ñòàëèí âçÿë ïîä ðóêó Ëàêîáà, ïîñàäèë åãî íà ñèäåíüå, ñåë ñ íèì ðÿäîì, è îíè óåõàëè, à îñòàëüíûå íà äðóãèõ àâòîìàøèíàõ ïîåõàëè âñëåä çà íèìè. Âî âðåìÿ ïðèåçäîâ È.Â. Ñòàëèíà â Àáõàçèþ Ëàêîáà Í. îðãàíèçîâûâàë åãî îõðàíó è îòäûõ è âìåñòå îíè ïðîâîäèëè î÷åíü ìíîãî âðåìåíè». Ïîäêðàëñÿ 1936-é. Ëàêîáà íåîäíîêðàòíî âûçûâàëè â Êðåìëü. Íà÷èíàÿ ñ 7 äåêàáðÿ 1935 ã. Ñòàëèí âåäåò ñ íèì çàòÿæíûå áåñåäû ïî ïîâîäó ïåðåâîäà â Ìîñêâó. Áåðèÿ óçíàåò îá ýòèõ ïðåäëîæåíèÿõ âîæäÿ. Åìó ïî äóøå, ÷òî Ëàêîáà óêëîíÿåòñÿ îò ïåðåâîäà. Ìåæäó òåì àêöèè Íåñòîðà âñå ðàñòóò. Òàê, îáû÷íî þáèëåþ î÷åðåäíîé ñîþçíîé ðåñïóáëèêè îòâîäèëèñü îäíà-ïîëòîðû ïîëîñû ãàçåòû Ïðàâäà, à àâòîíîìíîé ðåñïóáëèêå è òîãî ìåíüøå. Ïÿòíàäöàòèëåòèþ æå Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ áûëà ïîñâÿùåíà çíà÷èòåëüíàÿ ÷àñòü íîìåðà îò 4 ìàðòà 1936 ã. Íî îñîáî áðîñàåòñÿ â ãëàçà ïåðâàÿ ñòðàíèöà Ïðàâäû. Íà íåé ïîìåùåíà ôîòîãðàôèÿ è òåêñò: «Òîâàðèùè Ñòàëèí, Îðäæîíèêèäçå, Ìèêîÿí è ïðåäñåäàòåëü ÖÈÊ Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ Í. Ëàêîáà (ñïðàâà) â Ñóõóìå. Ñíèìîê ñäåëàí â 1927 ãîäó, ïóáëèêóåòñÿ âïåðâûå». Ôîòîãðàôèþ è òåêñò ê íåé ÷ëåíó ðåäêîëëåãèè Ïðàâäû Ìåõëèñó ïåðåäàë ëè÷íî Ñòàëèí. Ïàðòèéíûå äåÿòåëè òîãî âðåìåíè ÿñíî ïîíèìàëè, ÷òî ïîÿâëåíèå Ëàêîáà íà ïåðâîé ñòðàíèöå ãàçåòû, â îêðóæåíèè ÷ëåíîâ Ïîëèòáþðî, íå ñëó÷àéíî. Âñå ãîâîðèëî çà òî, ÷òî âîïðîñ î ïåðåâîäå Íåñòîðà â Ìîñêâó ðåøåí. À äàòà â òåêñòå ïîä ñíèìêîì, 1927 ã., êàê áû íàïîìèíàëà î äàâíèõ äðóæåñêèõ îòíîøåíèÿõ Ëàêîáà ñî Ñòàëèíûì è äðóãèìè êàâêàçñêèìè ëèäåðàìè ïàðòèè è ãîñóäàðñòâà. Êàêîé æå ïîñò ãîòîâèë Ñòàëèí Íåñòîðó? Âîæäü æåëàë ïîñàäèòü åãî íà ìåñòî... Ãåíðèõà ßãîäû, íàðêîìà âíóòðåííèõ äåë. Ïðèñâàèâàÿ 26 íîÿáðÿ 1935 ã. ñïåöèàëüíî ââåäåííîå äëÿ íåãî «ìàðøàëüñêîå çâàíèå» – ãåíåðàëüíîãî 109

Ãëàâà IV

êîìèññàðà ãîñáåçîïàñíîñòè, Ñòàëèí óæå ïîäûñêèâàë åìó çàìåíó. Îäíàêî åùå 7 äåêàáðÿ 1935 ã. Ëàêîáà â î÷åíü ìÿãêîé ôîðìå, ÷òîáû íå çàäåòü âîæäÿ, óêëîíèëñÿ îò ýòîãî ïðåäëîæåíèÿ. Îí ñëèøêîì õîðîøî çíàë Ñòàëèíà. È ñåáÿ. Îñòåðåãàë åãî îò ýòîãî øàãà è Ñåðãî. È âñå æå âïëîòü äî àâãóñòà 1936 ã. Ñòàëèí âîçëàãàë íàäåæäû íà Ëàêîáà è îäíîâðåìåííî ðàñïðàâëÿëñÿ ùóïàëüöàìè ßãîäû ñ «ãðóïïîé» Êàìåíåâà-Çèíîâüåâà.  äíè ýòîãî ïðîöåññà â ãàçåòå Ïðàâäà 19 àâãóñòà 1936 ã. ïîÿâèëàñü ñòàòüÿ Áåðèÿ «Ðàçâåÿòü â ïðàõ âðàãîâ ñîöèàëèçìà», êîòîðàÿ íà÷èíàëàñü ñëîâàìè: «Íàøà ìîãó÷àÿ ñîâåòñêàÿ ñòðàíà óâåðåííî èäåò âïåðåä ê âåðøèíàì ñ÷àñòëèâîé è ðàäîñòíîé æèçíè». Äî «âåðøèíû» îñòàâàëñÿ ãîä...  ïåðâîé ïîëîâèíå àâãóñòà Ëàêîáà âíîâü áûëî ïðåäëîæåíî ïåðåáðàòüñÿ â Ìîñêâó. Îäíàêî ôàêòè÷åñêèé îòêàç Íåñòîðà íàñòîðîæèë Ñòàëèíà. Ëàêîáà ïîíèìàë, ÷òî ïðåïÿòñòâóåò Áåðèÿ â ïðîâåäåíèè øîâèíèñòè÷åñêîé ïîëèòèêè â Àáõàçèè. Ïåðåâîä Íåñòîðà â Ìîñêâó è óòâåðæäåíèå çäåñü ñòàâëåííèêà Áåðèÿ ðàçâÿçàëè áû ðóêè Ëàâðåíòèþ. È êàê áûë ïðàâ Ñ. Ëèïêèí, êîãäà â ïîýìå «Íåñòîð è Ñàðèÿ» ïèñàë: Îí çíàë, êàêèå õèòðîñòè â öåíå, Ïîðîþ øåë îò ïðàâäû â ñòîðîíå, Ïîðîþ ïî êðèâûì ñòóïàë äîðîãàì. Êîãäà æå ïðåâðàùàëñÿ îí â êðèñòàëë? Êîãäà îí çà Àáõàçèþ ñòîÿë.

Ïåðâûì àêòîì ñâîåîáðàçíîé ìåñòè – íà÷àëîì ñãîâîðà Ñòàëèíà è Áåðèÿ ïðîòèâ Ëàêîáà – ÿâèëîñü, êàê íè ñòðàííî, ïîñòàíîâëåíèå ÖÈÊ ÑÑÑÐ îò 17 àâãóñòà 1936 ã. «Î ïðàâèëüíîì íà÷åðòàíèè íàçâàíèé íàñåëåííûõ ïóíêòîâ», ïî êîòîðîìó ñòîëèöà Àáõàçèè áûëà ïåðåèìåíîâàíà â Ñóõóìè. Âîæäü àêêóðàòíî ïîäñûïàë óïðÿìîìó Íåñòîðó ùåïîòêó ñîëè íà áîëüíóþ ðàíó. Ñ ýòîãî ìîìåíòà ñóäüáà Íåñòîðà áûëà ïðåäîïðåäåëåíà. Îí ÿñíî ñîçíàâàë øàòêîñòü ñâîåãî ïîëîæåíèÿ. Òåì íå ìåíåå âîæäü åùå ïðèíèìàë Íåñòîðà. Ïîñëåäíèå âñòðå÷è ìåæäó íèìè ñîñòîÿëèñü â íîÿáðå è äåêàáðå 1936 ã. Êîáà óæå èãðàë: ãîâîðèë î áóäóùåì, æàëîâàëñÿ íà êîçíè Ëàâðåíòèÿ, îáíàäåæèâàë.  Ìîñêâå Íåñòîð è åãî æåíà Ñàðèÿ, êàê âñåãäà, îñòàíîâèëèñü â ãîñòèíèöå «Ìåòðîïîëü». Øåë ×ðåçâû÷àéíûé VIII Âñåñîþçíûé ñúåçä Ñîâåòîâ (25 íîÿáðÿ – 5 äåêàáðÿ), êîòîðûé ïðèíÿë íîâóþ Êîíñòèòóöèþ ÑÑÑÐ. Ïî âå÷åðàì Ñòàëèí ïðèãëàøàë ê ñåáå íà óæèí, ïðèñûëàë ìàøèíó. Íåñòîð ïîñëå ñúåçäà çàäåðæèâàëñÿ â Ìîñêâå.  òî æå âðåìÿ Áåðèÿ ÷åðåç ñâîèõ ñòàâëåííèêîâ âåäåò àòàêè íà Íåñòîðà, ïîëüçóÿñü åãî îòñóòñòâèåì â Àáõàçèè. Îäèí èç ñîðàòíèêîâ Ëàêîáà Àíàòîëèé Âàðäàíèÿ ñîîáùàë åìó 1 äåêàáðÿ 1936 ã. èç Ñî÷è: «Äîðîãîé Íåñòîð! Õîòÿ óæå ñêîðî ìåñÿö, êàê íå âèäíî ñîëíöà, èäóò äîæäè, Àáõàçèÿ îñòàåòñÿ ñîëíå÷íîé Àáõàçèåé... ß çíàþ ïðåêðàñíî, êàêèå äåëà Âàñ çàäåðæèâàþò è êàêîå îíè èìåþò çíà÷åíèå äëÿ ðåñïóáëèêè, íî äåëî òàêîå, ÷òî ⠓òûëó” íå âñå â ïîðÿäêå...» 110

Íà çàðå ñîâåòñêîé èìïåðèè. «ß – Êîáà, à òû – Ëàêîáà...»

Çäåñü íåîáõîäèìî îñòàíîâèòüñÿ íà ñëåäóþùåì âàæíîì îáñòîÿòåëüñòâå.  1935 è îñîáåííî â 1936 ã. Íåñòîð óïðÿìî ñòàâèë ïåðåä Ñòàëèíûì âîïðîñ î âêëþ÷åíèè Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ â ñîñòàâ ÐÑÔÑÐ, ÷òî î÷åíü ñèëüíî ðàçäðàæàëî Êîáó. Îá ýòîì ãîâîðèò öåëûé ðÿä ñâèäåòåëüñòâ. Âîò îäíî èç íèõ. «Ïîñêîëüêó ÿ íàõîäèëñÿ â òå÷åíèå äëèòåëüíîãî âðåìåíè íà îòâåòñòâåííîé ïàðòèéíîé ðàáîòå, – âñïîìèíàë Ì.X. Ãîíäæóà, – òî ìíå èçâåñòíî, êàê ïðîèñõîäèëà áîðüáà ïðîòèâ Í. Ëàêîáà è åãî ñòîðîííèêîâ. Äîëæåí ïðåæäå âñåãî ñêàçàòü, ÷òî öåíòðàëüíûì âîïðîñîì, âîêðóã êîòîðîãî ïðîèñõîäèëà áîðüáà, – ýòî áûëî îòêðûòî íå âûñêàçûâàåìîå íèãäå ìíåíèå î òîì, ÷òî Àáõàçèÿ äîëæíà âõîäèòü íåïîñðåäñòâåííî â ÐÑÔÑÐ, íå áûòü â ñîñòàâå Ãðóçèíñêîé ÑÑÐ. Ïîýòîìó ïðîøëîå ðóêîâîäñòâî Ãðóçèè, è â ÷àñòíîñòè Áåðèÿ, áîÿëèñü, êàê áû Àáõàçèÿ íå âûøëà èç ñîñòàâà Ãðóçèíñêîé ÑÑÐ. Ïîýòîìó ïðèíèìàëèñü âñå ìåðû ê òîìó, ÷òîáû îïîðî÷èòü Íåñòîðà Ëàêîáà». Òàêàÿ ïîçèöèÿ Íåñòîðà è åãî îêðóæåíèÿ èìåëà ñåðüåçíûå îñíîâàíèÿ. «Ìû ñ÷èòàëè, – ïîêàçûâàë íà äîïðîñå â àâãóñòå 1937 ã. îäèí èç «ëàêîáîâöåâ», Ä.È. Äæåðãåíèÿ, – ÷òî ïîëèòèêà, ïðîâîäèìàÿ ÖÊ Ãðóçèè â Àáõàçèè, åñòü íå ÷òî èíîå, êàê æåëàíèå ÖÊ ÊÏ(á) Ãðóçèè è åãî ðóêîâîäèòåëÿ Áåðèÿ ïðåâðàòèòü Àáõàçèþ â íåîòúåìëåìóþ ÷àñòü Ãðóçèè è çàñåëèòü åå ãðóçèíàìè». Ýòà òåíäåíöèÿ ïðîÿâèëàñü äàæå âî âíåøíèõ, êàçàëîñü áû áåçîáèäíûõ, àêöèÿõ... Îäíàêî îíè ðàñöåíèâàëèñü íàðîäîì àâòîíîìíîé ðåñïóáëèêè êàê ãðóáûå ïîïûòêè âìåøàòåëüñòâà âî âíóòðåííþþ æèçíü Àáõàçèè. Òàê, â ïðîòîêîëå äîïðîñà Ñ.Ñ. Òóðêèÿ îò 21 èþëÿ 1937 ã. ñêàçàíî: «Êàæåòñÿ, â 1935 ã. áûëè ââåäåíû åäèíûå íîìåðíûå çíàêè äëÿ àâòîìàøèí ñ íàäïèñüþ “Ãðóçèÿ” äëÿ Ãðóçèè ñ àâòîíîìíûìè ðåñïóáëèêàìè. Êàê òîëüêî ïîëó÷èëè ýòè çíàêè â Ñóõóìè, Í. Ëàêîáà âîñïðåòèë àâòîèíñïåêöèè èõ ðåàëèçîâûâàòü, à ñàì íà÷àë òåëåãðàôíî ñòàâèòü âîïðîñ ïåðåä Òáèëèñè î ââåäåíèè äëÿ Àáõàçèè îòäåëüíûõ íîìåðíûõ çíàêîâ ñ íàäïèñüþ “Àáõàçèÿ”. Ýòîãî îí äîáèëñÿ». Èçâåñòíî, ÷òî åùå â íîÿáðå, íåçàäîëãî äî îòúåçäà â Ìîñêâó, Áåðèÿ, ïî ñâèäåòåëüñòâó Àäèëå Øàõáàñîâíû Àáàñ-îãëû, ïîáûâàë ó Íåñòîðà íà ñóõóìñêîé êâàðòèðå. Îíè âîçáóæäåííî è äîëãî ðàçãîâàðèâàëè. Ëàêîáà çàìåòèë, ÷òî åãî ñîáåñåäíèê ñòàíîâèòñÿ âñå íàãëåå, óâåðåííåå â ñåáå. Ñïóñòÿ íåñêîëüêî äíåé ïîñëå âîçâðàùåíèÿ èç Ìîñêâû Íåñòîð áûë ñðî÷íî âûçâàí ê Áåðèÿ íà ïàðòàêòèâ. Âå÷åðîì 26 äåêàáðÿ 1936 ã. Ëàêîáà âûåõàë â Òáèëèñè. Îñòàíîâèëñÿ â ãîñòèíèöå «Îðèàíò». Óòðîì áûë ó Áåðèÿ è îáðóãàë åãî ïîñëåäíèìè ñëîâàìè. Äåëî â òîì, ÷òî Íåñòîðó ïîêàçàëè ïëàí ïåðåñåëåíèÿ äåñÿòêîâ òûñÿ÷ ãðóçèí èç ðàéîíîâ Çàïàäíîé Ãðóçèè â Àáõàçèþ. «Òîëüêî ÷åðåç ìîé òðóï», – çàÿâèë Ëàêîáà. Ïðèäÿ â ãîñòèíèöó, ñêàçàë: «Áóäóò çâîíèòü – ìåíÿ íåò». Íî ïîä âå÷åð ïîçâîíèëà ìàòü Áåðèÿ – Ìàðòà Âèññàðèîíîâíà. «Íåñòîð, – ñêàçàëà îíà, – ÿ çíàþ, òû î÷åíü ëþáèøü æàðåíóþ ôîðåëü. Ïðèõîäè, ÿ òåáÿ î÷åíü ïðîøó». Óæèí â äîìå Áåðèÿ ïðîòåêàë âÿëî. Âûïèëè íåñêîëüêî áîêàëîâ âèíà.  âîñåìü âå÷åðà Áåðèÿ ïðåäëîæèë ïîñìîòðåòü íîâûé ñïåêòàêëü.  òåàòð îíè ïðèøëè ñ îïîçäàíèåì. Âñå îáðàòèëè âíèìàíèå íà ëîæó ñëåâà, â êîòîðîé 111

Ãëàâà IV

ñèäåëè Áåðèÿ, åãî æåíà è Íåñòîð. Íàêàíóíå äåêàäû ãðóçèíñêîãî èñêóññòâà â Ìîñêâå çäåñü øëà ïîñòàíîâêà ïåðâîãî ãðóçèíñêîãî áàëåòà «Ìçå÷àáóêè» («Ñîëíöå-þíîøà»). Ïîñëå ïåðâîãî àêòà Íåñòîð óøåë. Åìó áûëî ïëîõî. Åãî òîøíèëî. Ïî äîðîãå â ãîñòèíèöó «Îðèàíò» Íåñòîðà âñòðåòèë óïîëíîìî÷åííûé ïðåäñòàâèòåëüñòâà Àáõàçèè â Ãðóçèè À. Ýíãåëîâ.  ãîñòèíèöå ñòàëî õóæå. Ýíãåëîâ è ìåäñåñòðà íå îòõîäèëè îò Íåñòîðà. Îí ñèäåë ó îòêðûòîãî çèìíåãî îêíà è, çàäûõàÿñü, ïîâòîðÿë: «Óáèë ìåíÿ Ëàâðåíòèé-çìåÿ...» Ãàçåòà Çàðÿ Âîñòîêà â òå äíè îòìå÷àëà: «Ïðåìüåðà ýòîãî ñïåêòàêëÿ â Òáèëèñè ïðîøëà ñ èñêëþ÷èòåëüíûì óñïåõîì...»  ïðàâèòåëüñòâåííîì ñîîáùåíèè ãîâîðèëîñü, ÷òî 28 äåêàáðÿ â 4 ÷àñà 20 ìèíóò óòðà â Òáèëèñè îò ñåðäå÷íîãî ïðèñòóïà ñêîí÷àëñÿ ïðåäñåäàòåëü ÖÈÊ Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ Í.À. Ëàêîáà. Åìó áûëî 43 ãîäà.  òîò æå äåíü, 28 äåêàáðÿ, ãðîá ñ òåëîì Íåñòîðà ïåðåíåñëè èç áîëüíèöû èì. Êàìî è óñòàíîâèëè â Äîìå Êðàñíîé àðìèè. Òûñÿ÷è òáèëèñöåâ ïðèøëè ïðîñòèòüñÿ ñ íèì. Äîøëà äî íàñ è óíèêàëüíàÿ ôîòîãðàôèÿ: ÷åòà Áåðèÿ ó ãðîáà Ëàêîáà. Íà ëèöå Áåðèÿ ïîëóóëûáêà. È âåíîê: «Áëèçêîìó äðóãó – òîâàðèùó Íåñòîðó. Íèíà è Ëàâðåíòèé Áåðèÿ». Âå÷åðîì òåëî Í.À. Ëàêîáà áûëî îòïðàâëåíî ïîåçäîì â Ñóõóìè. Äíåì 29 äåêàáðÿ ñîñòàâ ïðèáûë íà ñòàíöèþ Êåëàñóðè. Øåë ñèëüíûé ñíåã. Íåñòîðà íåñëè íà ðóêàõ äî åãî äîìà. Ñàðèÿ ïîïðîñèëà âñåõ âûéòè èç êîìíàòû. Âûçâàëà Èâàíà Ãðèãîðüåâè÷à Ñåìåðäæèåâà, ëè÷íîãî âðà÷à Ëàêîáà. Ïîñëå òùàòåëüíîãî îñìîòðà îí ñêàçàë: «Íåñòîð îòðàâëåí». Âñå âíóòðåííîñòè, æåëóäîê, ïå÷åíü, ìîçã è äàæå ãîðòàíü áûëè èçúÿòû âðà÷àìè. 29 äåêàáðÿ Ïðàâäà ñîîáùàëà, ÷òî «ñêîðîïîñòèæíî ñêîí÷àëñÿ ñòàðûé, èñïûòàííûé áîëüøåâèê, íåóòîìèìûé ðóêîâîäèòåëü ñîöèàëèñòè÷åñêîãî ñòðîèòåëüñòâà Àáõàçèè òîâàðèù Íåñòîð Àïîëëîíîâè÷ Ëàêîáà».  äåíü ïîõîðîí, 31 äåêàáðÿ, ãàçåòû ïèñàëè î «ñèëüíîì ïîõîëîäàíèè» â Àáõàçèè. Âñå óëèöû áûëè çàïîëíåíû íàðîäîì. Ñ ðå÷üþ î Íåñòîðå íà òðàóðíîì ìèòèíãå âûñòóïèë ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ñîâíàðêîìà Ãðóçèè Ãåðìàí Ìãàëîáëèøâèëè. Áåðèÿ åìó ýòîãî íå ïðîñòèë. Ïîõîðîíèëè Ëàêîáà ñ áîëüøèìè ïî÷åñòÿìè â Áîòàíè÷åñêîì ñàäó â ñïåöèàëüíî îòñòðîåííîì ñêëåïå. Ñî âñåõ êîíöîâ ñòðàíû ëåòåëè òåëåãðàììû. Ñâîå ãëóáîêîå ñîáîëåçíîâàíèå âûðàçèëè àêàäåìèê Í. Âàâèëîâ, Ì. Öõàêàÿ, Ã. Ïåòðîâñêèé, Ñ. Áóäåííûé, àðõèòåêòîðû Â. Ùóêî è Â. Ãåëüôðåéõ. Îòêëèêíóëñÿ ðóêîâîäèòåëü Êîìèíòåðíà Ã. Äèìèòðîâ: «Âìåñòå ñ âàìè ñêîðáèì ïî ïîâîäó óòðàòû çàìå÷àòåëüíîãî áîðöà, íàøåãî äðóãà, ìèëîãî, ñåðäå÷íîãî Íåñòîðà. Êðåïèòåñü â âàøåì âåëèêîì ãîðå, ÿâëÿþùåìñÿ ãîðåì âñåãî àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà». Áåðèÿ íå ïðèåõàë íà ïîõîðîíû. Ñòàëèí, êîòîðûé ðîâíî ãîä íàçàä ñäåëàë òðîãàòåëüíóþ íàäïèñü Íåñòîðó íà ñâîåé ôîòîãðàôèè, äàæå íå ïðèñëàë òåëåãðàììó. Ïîñëå ïîõîðîí Ëàêîáà ïðîøëà íåäåëÿ.  Ìîñêâå îòêðûëàñü äåêàäà ãðóçèíñêîãî èñêóññòâà.  Áîëüøîì òåàòðå øëà ïîñòàíîâêà Òáèëèññêîãî òåàòðà îïåðû è áàëåòà «Äàðåäæàí Öáèåðè» («Êîâàðíàÿ Äàðåäæàí»). «Êîâàðíîé 112

Íà çàðå ñîâåòñêîé èìïåðèè. «ß – Êîáà, à òû – Ëàêîáà...»

Äàðåäæàí» íàñëàæäàëèñü ñèäåâøèå â çàëå Ñòàëèí è Áåðèÿ – ãëàâíûé ðåæèññåð è åãî ïîìîùíèê â óáèéñòâå Ëàêîáà.  êîíöå ÿíâàðÿ ñòàëè ñíèìàòü ïîðòðåòû Íåñòîðà, ïî Àáõàçèè ïîïîëçëè ñëóõè, ÷òî îí «âðàã íàðîäà»...

«Âðàã íàðîä໅ Ïîñëå ïûøíûõ ïîõîðîí Íåñòîðà ïðîøëî ÷óòü áîëüøå ìåñÿöà. Âñå ýòî âðåìÿ ñêëåï, ãäå ïîêîèëîñü çàáàëüçàìèðîâàííîå òåëî Ëàêîáà, îõðàíÿëñÿ ïî÷åòíûì êàðàóëîì ïîãðàíè÷íèêîâ.  ôåâðàëå 1937 ã., ïîä ïîêðîâîì íî÷è, Íåñòîðà ïî ïðèêàçó Áåðèÿ ïåðåíåñëè èç Áîòàíè÷åñêîãî ñàäà è ïåðåçàõîðîíèëè íà Ìèõàéëîâñêîì êëàäáèùå áëèç Ñóõóìà. Çäåñü åãî ìîãèëà çíà÷èëàñü ïîä ¹ 3672. Òåëî îòðàâëåííîãî Ëàêîáà íå äàâàëî ïîêîÿ Áåðèÿ. Íà äîïðîñå 17 íîÿáðÿ 1954 ã. îäèí èç ãëàâíûõ áåðèåâñêèõ ïðåñòóïíèêîâ, ïàëà÷ Ð.À. Ãàíãèÿ, ïîêàçàë: «Ëàêîáà Íåñòîð áûë çàõîðîíåí â Áîòàíè÷åñêîì ñàäó. Ñïóñòÿ ìåñÿö ïðèìåðíî ïîñëå ïîõîðîí... áûëî îáúÿâëåíî, ÷òî îí ÿâëÿåòñÿ âðàãîì íàðîäà. Ïî ïðèêàçàíèþ Ïà÷óëèÿ (íàðêîì âíóòðåííèõ äåë Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ. – Ñ.Ë.) ÿ ëè÷íî ó÷àñòâîâàë â ïåðåíîñå ïðàõà Íåñòîðà Ëàêîáà èç ñêëåïà... Îñòàíêè åãî áûëè ïåðåâåçåíû íà Ìèõàéëîâñêîå êëàäáèùå, à ìîãèëà â Áîòàíè÷åñêîì ñàäó áûëà ñíåñåíà. Äîëæåí ñêàçàòü, ÷òî êîãäà ìû çàêàïûâàëè òðóï Íåñòîðà Ëàêîáà íà Ìèõàéëîâñêîì êëàäáèùå, òî íåîæèäàííî ê ìåñòó íîâîãî çàõîðîíåíèÿ ïðèáûëè æåíà Íåñòîðà Ëàêîáà è åãî ìàòü, à òàêæå æåíà Ìèõàèëà èëè Âàñèëèÿ Ëàêîáà... Êàê îíè ìîãëè óçíàòü î òîì, ÷òî îñòàíêè Íåñòîðà Ëàêîáà ïåðåíîñÿòñÿ, ÿ òî÷íî íå çíàþ». Âñëåä çà ýòîé àêöèåé â Àáõàçèè íà÷àëèñü ìàññîâûå ðåïðåññèè. Îðäåðà íà àðåñòû áëèæàéøèõ ðîäñòâåííèêîâ Íåñòîðà – Ìèõàèëà è Âàñèëèÿ Ëàêîáà, Ìåäæèòà Äæèõ-îãëû áûëè âûäàíû 8 àïðåëÿ 1937 ã. Ñàðèÿ åäåò â Ìîñêâó. Îñòàíàâëèâàåòñÿ ó ñâîåé ïîäðóãè – òåïåðü òîæå âäîâû – Çèíàèäû Îðäæîíèêèäçå.  ëè÷íîì àðõèâå Íåñòîðà îíà îáíàðóæèëà ìàòåðèàëû î «áàêèíñêîì ïåðèîäå» Áåðèÿ, â êîòîðûõ ãîâîðèëîñü, ÷òî ïðèâîäèìûå ôàêòû ìîæåò çàñâèäåòåëüñòâîâàòü òîâàðèù Ñåðãî... Ñòàëèí íå ïðèíÿë Ñàðèþ. Ìîëîòîâ âñòðåòèë åå õîëîäíî. Äîêóìåíò ïðîñìîòðåë, íî íå âçÿë. Ñåêðåòàðü ÖÊ ÂÊÏ(á) Àíäðååâ ïîîáåùàë ïåðåäàòü åãî Ñòàëèíó. Ìåæäó òåì âîëíà àðåñòîâ íàðàñòàåò. Çàáèðàþò áëèæàéøèõ ñîðàòíèêîâ Ëàêîáà. Òàê, 15 èþíÿ 1937 ã. ïðèøëè çà áûâøèì íàðêîìîì çåìëåäåëèÿ Àáõàçèè Ìèõàèëîì ×àëìàç. Òîãäà æå áûë àðåñòîâàí è íàðêîì Êîíñòàíòèí Ñåìåðäæèåâ, à âñëåä çà íèì åãî áðàò äîêòîð Ñåìåðäæèåâ è âðà÷ Â.Ò. Àí÷àáàäçå, êîòîðûå âûíåñëè çàêëþ÷åíèå îá îòðàâëåíèè. Çàáðàëè è ìëàäøåãî áðàòà (ïî ìàòåðè) Íåñòîðà – Èîñèôà Öåéáà. Î÷åíü ñêîðî íàñòóïèë è ÷åðåä æåíùèí. Ïåðâîé, 18 àâãóñòà, áûëà àðåñòîâàíà Øàìèíà Áåíèÿ – æåíà Âàñèëèÿ Ëàêîáà, à 23-ãî – 70-ëåòíÿÿ Øàõóñíà 113

Ãëàâà IV

(ìàòü Íåñòîðà) è Ñàðèÿ. Ïîâîäîì ê ýòèì àðåñòàì ïîñëóæèë ñëóõ î òîì, ÷òî òåëî Ëàêîáà, ÿêîáû, âûêðàëè ñ Ìèõàéëîâñêîãî êëàäáèùà è òàéíî ïåðåçàõîðîíèëè â ðîäîâîì ñåëå Ëûõíû. Îäíàêî äàííîé âåðñèè ïðîòèâîðå÷àò ïîêàçàíèÿ î÷åâèäöà Ð. Ãàíãèÿ: «Î òîì ÷òî ðîäñòâåííèêè Íåñòîðà Ëàêîáà óçíàëè î ìåñòå çàõîðîíåíèÿ òðóïà (íà Ìèõàéëîâêå. – Ñ.Ë.), – ñîîáùàë îí, – ÿ äîëîæèë Ïà÷óëèÿ. Ïîñëå ýòîãî, ñïóñòÿ 8–9 ìåñÿöåâ, êîãäà íàðêîìâíóäåëîì áûë óæå Êàêó÷àÿ, ïîñëåäíèé ìíå ïðåäëîæèë ðàçûñêàòü íà Ìèõàéëîâñêîì êëàäáèùå îñòàíêè Íåñòîðà Ëàêîáà è ïåðåíåñòè èõ â ðàéîí Ìàÿêà. Ýòî ðàñïîðÿæåíèå áûëî âûçâàíî òåì, ÷òî êàê áóäòî áû òðóï Íåñòîðà Ëàêîáà ïîõèòèëè åãî ðîäñòâåííèêè. Íà ñàìîì äåëå òðóï åãî îêàçàëñÿ íà ìåñòå. Ïîä ìîèì ðóêîâîäñòâîì òðóï áûë çàõîðîíåí â ðàéîíå Ìàÿêà. Âî âðåìÿ ýòîé ýêñãóìàöèè ÿ ñíÿë çíà÷îê ÖÈÊà è âçÿë áåëûé íîæèê, êîòîðûé íàõîäèëñÿ â îäåæäå, è ïðåäñòàâèë èõ Êàêó÷àÿ â êà÷åñòâå äîêàçàòåëüñòâà, ÷òî òðóï Íåñòîðà Ëàêîáà áûë ìíîþ îáíàðóæåí».  ñâîèõ ïîêàçàíèÿõ Ãàíãèÿ îáõîäèò âîïðîñ î ñîææåíèè îñòàíêîâ Íåñòîðà â èçâåñòêîâîé ÿìå.  ýòîé ñâÿçè áîëüøîé èíòåðåñ ïðåäñòàâëÿåò ïðîòîêîë äîïðîñà Áåðèÿ îò 28 àâãóñòà 1953 ã., ïðîèçâåäåííîãî Ãåíåðàëüíûì ïðîêóðîðîì ÑÑÑÐ Ð.À. Ðóäåíêî. Îñîáîãî âíèìàíèÿ â íåì çàñëóæèâàþò íå ñòîëüêî óêëîí÷èâûå îòâåòû Áåðèÿ, ñêîëüêî âîïðîñû Ãåíåðàëüíîãî ïðîêóðîðà. «Âîïðîñ: Íåñòîð Ëàêîáà âàì õîðîøî èçâåñòåí? Îòâåò: Õîðîøî èçâåñòåí. Âîïðîñ:  êàêèõ îòíîøåíèÿõ âû íàõîäèëèñü ñ Ëàêîáà? Îòâåò:  áîëåå èëè ìåíåå õîðîøèõ, áûâàëè äðóã ó äðóãà... Âîïðîñ: Ïðè êàêèõ îáñòîÿòåëüñòâàõ ïðîèçîøëà ñìåðòü Ëàêîáà? Îòâåò: Ëàêîáà áûë â Òáèëèñè ïî äåëàì.  äåíü ñìåðòè ïîñëå çàñåäàíèÿ ÖÊ ïàðòèè Ãðóçèè Ëàêîáà âìåñòå ñ äðóãèìè ó ìåíÿ äîìà îáåäàë. Ïîñëå îáåäà ñðàçó ïîøëè â òåàòð è òàì ÷àñà ÷åðåç ïîëòîðà èëè äâà îí óøåë èç òåàòðà ê ñåáå â ãîñòèíèöó è âûçâàë âðà÷à.  òó æå íî÷ü ïîä óòðî îí óìåð. Ñìåðòü åãî íàñòóïèëà, êàê ìíå ïîòîì ñòàëî èçâåñòíî, ïîñëå ñåðäå÷íîãî ïðèñòóïà. Âîïðîñ: Êîìó ïîðó÷åíî áûëî âåñòè ñëåäñòâèå ïî ïîâîäó ñìåðòè Ëàêîáà? Îòâåò: Íå ïîìíþ, ìîæåò áûòü, âåë Ãîãëèäçå. Âîïðîñ: Áûëî ëè ïðîèçâåäåíî õèìè÷åñêîå èññëåäîâàíèå âíóòðåííèõ îðãàíîâ òðóïà Ëàêîáà íà îòñóòñòâèå ÿäà? Îòâåò: Ýòî ìíå íåèçâåñòíî. Èç ñîîáùåíèÿ âðà÷à ìíå èçâåñòíî, ÷òî ó Ëàêîáà äàâíî áûëè ñåðäå÷íûå ïðèïàäêè, àíàòîìè÷åñêîå âñêðûòèå ïîäòâåðäèëî ñêëåðîç ñåðäöà. Âîïðîñ: Êîìó ïðèíàäëåæèò ìûñëü âûðûòü òðóï Ëàêîáà èç çåìëè è ñæå÷ü åãî? Îòâåò: Ýòîãî ÿ íå çíàþ. Âîïðîñ: Ïðèçíàéòåñü, ÷òî âû îòðàâèëè Ëàêîáà, êàê ÷åëîâåêà, êîòîðûé áûë îñâåäîìëåí î âàøåé ïðåñòóïíîé äåÿòåëüíîñòè, ñî ñòîðîíû êîòîðîãî âû ìîãëè îïàñàòüñÿ ðàçîáëà÷åíèÿ? 114

Íà çàðå ñîâåòñêîé èìïåðèè. «ß – Êîáà, à òû – Ëàêîáà...»

Îòâåò: Ýòî ÿ îòðèöàþ. Ïðîòîêîë ìíîþ ïðî÷èòàí, çàïèñàíî ñ ìîèõ ñëîâ âåðíî. Ë. Áåðèÿ». Ðÿäîì ñ Íåñòîðîì â òîò ðîêîâîé âå÷åð 27 äåêàáðÿ 1936 ã. íàõîäèëñÿ óïîëíîìî÷åííûé Àáõàçèè ïðè ÑÍÊ Ãðóçèè Àíàñòàñ Ýíãåëîâ, êîòîðûé áûë óáåæäåí â òîì, ÷òî Ëàêîáà óìåð íå ñâîåé ñìåðòüþ. Ïîäêðåïëÿåò ýòî ìíåíèå è Èâàí Êîðòóà – òîãäàøíèé ðóêîâîäèòåëü àáõàçñêîãî ñòóäåí÷åñêîãî çåìëÿ÷åñòâà â Òáèëèñè. Ïî åãî ñâèäåòåëüñòâó, äíåì 27 äåêàáðÿ Íåñòîð â ïîñòïðåäñòâå Àáõàçèè â ïðèñóòñòâèè Ýíãåëîâà ðàñïîðÿäèëñÿ îêàçàòü ñòóäåíòàì ìàòåðèàëüíóþ ïîääåðæêó. Èõ áåñåäó íåñêîëüêî ðàç ïðåðûâàë òåëåôîí. Ñíà÷àëà çâîíèëà æåíà Áåðèÿ è íàñòîé÷èâî ïðèãëàøàëà Íåñòîðà â ãîñòè, íî òîò âåæëèâî îòêàçûâàëñÿ. Íàêîíåö, ïîçâîíèëà ìàòü Áåðèÿ... Ëàêîáà õîäèë ïî êîìíàòå è ãîâîðèë: «Î÷åíü èíòåðåñíî. ×òî æå îí õî÷åò îò ìåíÿ, Áåðèÿ, âñå âðåìÿ ïðèãëàøàåò?» (Çàïèñàíî ñî ñëîâ áûâøåãî ÷åêèñòà Ì.Ñ. Àõáà). Âñêðûòèå áûëî ïðîâåäåíî â ïðèñóòñòâèè íàðêîìà çäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ Ãðóçèè Ìàìàëàäçå, êîòîðûé íåïîñðåäñòâåííî çàíèìàëñÿ õèìè÷åñêèì èññëåäîâàíèåì âíóòðåííèõ îðãàíîâ è êðîâè. Îäíàêî îí âñêîðå áûë àðåñòîâàí, êàê è Ýíãåëîâ, êîòîðûé òàêæå ïðèñóòñòâîâàë ïðè âñêðûòèè. À âðà÷ Ñóñàííà Âèññàðèîíîâíà Äæàíàøèÿ, ïðîâîäèâøàÿ àíàëèç êðîâè, ñêàçàëà: «Îí æå îòðàâëåí». Ýòîãî áûëî âïîëíå äîñòàòî÷íî, è îíà îêàçàëàñü â Êàðàãàíäèíñêîì ëàãåðå. Ïðîèçâîäèâøèé âñêðûòèå Íåñòîðà ïðîôåññîð Â.Ê. Æãåíòè òàê è íå ñìîã ïîêàçàòü, êåì ñäåëàíà ïðèïèñêà â êîíöå ìåäèöèíñêîãî ïðîòîêîëà: «ßä íå íàéäåí». À õèðóðã Âàðëàì Øåðâàøèäçå ñâèäåòåëüñòâîâàë â 50-å ãîäû: «Êîãäà òåëî Í. Ëàêîáà áûëî äîñòàâëåíî íà êâàðòèðó, â äîìå Ëàêîáà áûëî ïîëíî íàðîäà. Òàêæå íà êâàðòèðå áûë è ÿ. Ñàðèÿ Ëàêîáà îáðàòèëàñü êî ìíå ñ ïðîñüáîé èñïðàâèòü îáåçîáðàæåííîå íåñêîëüêî ëèöî ïîêîéíîãî. Äåéñòâèòåëüíî, ïîñëå ïàòîëîãîàíàòîìè÷åñêîãî âñêðûòèÿ, ïðîèçâåäåííîãî â Òáèëèñè, îïèëåííàÿ ÷åðåïíàÿ êðûøêà ïîä êîæåé ñìåñòèëàñü âïåðåä. Ñàðèÿ Ëàêîáà ïîïðîñèëà âñåõ âûéòè, è ÿ îñòàëñÿ åùå ñ êåì-òî, ìû ïåðåëîæèëè òðóï è ïîñòàâèëè ÷åðåïíóþ êðûøêó íà ìåñòî. Âî âðåìÿ ïåðåêëàäûâàíèÿ òðóïà ÿ óâèäåë, ÷òî âñêðûòèå áûëî ïðîèçâåäåíî âåñüìà ïîäðîáíî, ïîäðîáíåå, ÷åì îáû÷íî ïðîèçâîäèòñÿ âñêðûòèå. Îáû÷íî ïðè âñêðûòèè îãðàíè÷èâàþòñÿ ãðóäíîé, áðþøíîé è ÷åðåïíîé ïîëîñòüþ, à ó íåãî áûëè âñêðûòû è íîãè (áûëè øâû íà ãîëåíÿõ)». Ðàçíûå òîëêè âûçûâàëî è ïîâåäåíèå òáèëèññêèõ âëàñòåé, òàê êàê Ëàêîáà áûë àíàòîìèðîâàí áåç âûçîâà åãî ëå÷àùèõ âðà÷åé èç Ñóõóìà. Êðîìå òîãî, àêò î âñêðûòèè Ëàêîáà íå áûë ïîäïèñàí íàðêîìîì çäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ Àáõàçèè, à åãî ïîäïèñü ïîä äîêóìåíòîì îêàçàëàñü «çàäåëàííîé»... Âñÿ÷åñêîãî âíèìàíèÿ çàñëóæèâàþò ïîêàçàíèÿ Ìàðèè Ñïèðèäîíîâíû Öåêâàâà, îñóæäåííîé â 1937 ã. êàê æåíà «âðàãà íàðîäà» Ìèõàèëà Øëàòòåðà ê 8 ãîäàì ëèøåíèÿ ñâîáîäû, êîòîðûå îíà äàëà â 1954 ã. Ñ 1930 ã. åå ñåìüÿ ïðîæèâàëà â Òáèëèñè. «ß íàõîäèëàñü äîìà, – âñïîìèíàåò îíà, – êîãäà ìîÿ äî÷ü Àäà, âåðíóâøèñü èç òåàòðà îïåðû è áàëåòà, ãäå ñòàâèëàñü ïðåìüåðà, íàñêîëüêî ìíå ïîìíèòñÿ, «Ìçå÷àáóêè», ðàññêàçàëà, ÷òî îíà âèäåëà â ëîæå 115

Ãëàâà IV

Íåñòîðà Ëàêîáà, êîòîðûé ñèäåë âìåñòå ñ Áåðèÿ è åãî æåíîé, è ÷òî â ñåðåäèíå ñïåêòàêëÿ Í. Ëàêîáà ñòàëî ïëîõî è îí èç ëîæè âûøåë... Ðàíî óòðîì êî ìíå ïîçâîíèëà æåíà Ýíãåëîâà è ñîîáùèëà, ÷òî Í. Ëàêîáà ñêîí÷àëñÿ... Ïðîøëî îêîëî ìåñÿöà, íà óëèöå Áåëèíñêîãî â ã. Òáèëèñè ÿ âñòðåòèëà íàøåãî îáùåãî çíàêîìîãî Ýíãåëîâà Àíàñòàñà. Ýíãåëîâ ïîñëå ñìåðòè Í. Ëàêîáà õîäèë ìîðàëüíî óáèòûé è âî âðåìÿ ýòîé âñòðå÷è îí, äåëÿñü ñî ìíîé, ïåðåäàë, ÷òî îí óâåðåí â òîì, ÷òî Í. Ëàêîáà óìåð íå îò ãðóäíîé æàáû, êàê ýòî ãîâîðèëè âðà÷è, ïðèíèìàâøèå ó÷àñòèå âî âñêðûòèè òðóïà, à ÷òî, ìîë, îí áûë îòðàâëåí è ÷òî â ýòîì îí áûë óáåæäåí. Òîãäà æå Ýíãåëîâ ìíå ðàññêàçàë, ÷òî áîëüíîãî Ëàêîáà îí âñòðåòèë âûõîäèâøèì èç òåàòðà è ñîïðîâîæäàë åãî äî ãîñòèíèöû «Îðèàíò».  âåñòèáþëå Ëàêîáà ñòàëî õóæå, è îí ñòàë ïàäàòü. Òîãäà Ýíãåëîâ, ïîääåðæèâàÿ åãî, äîâåë äî åãî íîìåðà.  íîìåðå Í. Ëàêîáà ïîïðîñèë îòêðûòü îêíî, òàê êàê åìó íå õâàòàëî âîçäóõà, ïðè ýòîì îí ïîðûâèñòî äûøàë è ïîâòîðÿë ñëîâà, ÷òî åìó íåõîðîøî, ÷òî åãî îòðàâèëè. Âèäÿ, ÷òî Ëàêîáà ïëîõî, Ýíãåëîâ ïîçâîíèë íà äîì ê âðà÷ó Êèïøèäçå, íî åãî äîìà íå îêàçàëîñü, îí áûë â òåàòðå. Òîãäà Ýíãåëîâ ñàì ïîáåæàë â òåàòð, ðàçûñêàë Êèïøèäçå è ïåðåäàë åìó, ÷òî Íåñòîðó ïëîõî. Òóò æå õî÷ó îòìåòèòü, ÷òî, êîãäà îí ïåðåäàâàë Êèïøèäçå â îòíîøåíèè áîëåçíè Ëàêîáà, ýòè ñëîâà ñëûøàëà ìîÿ äî÷ü Àäà, êîòîðàÿ ñèäåëà â ïàðòåðå ñçàäè Êèïøèäçå. Äàëåå Ýíãåëîâ ìíå ðàññêàçàë, ÷òî, êîãäà â ïðîçåêòóðå Ìèõàéëîâñêîé áîëüíèöû ïðîèçâîäèëè âñêðûòèå òðóïà Ëàêîáà, íåñìîòðÿ íà òî, ÷òî åìó – Ýíãåëîâó íå ðàçðåøàëè ïðèñóòñòâîâàòü ïðè âñêðûòèè, îí âîðâàëñÿ òóäà è ïðèñóòñòâîâàë ïðè âñêðûòèè òðóïà... Ýòî âñå, ÷òî ìíå ðàññêàçàë ïðè ýòîé âñòðå÷å Ýíãåëîâ. Ïîñëå ýòîé âñòðå÷è ÿ óæå Ýíãåëîâà íå âèäåëà». Ýòîò ðàññêàç ñîâïàäàåò ñ ðÿäîì äðóãèõ ïîêàçàíèé è âîñïîìèíàíèé. Ïîñëå ãèáåëè Íåñòîðà íà÷àëñÿ ïðîöåññ îãðóçèíèâàíèÿ Àáõàçèè. Ïðåæäå âñåãî ýòî ñòàëî ïðîÿâëÿòüñÿ â êàäðîâîé ïîëèòèêå. Îäèí èç áëèæàéøèõ áåðèåâñêèõ ñïîäâèæíèêîâ Ñ.Ñ. Ìàìóëîâ ïîçäíåå ñîîáùàë: «ß íàáëþäàë, ÷òî Áåðèÿ è Ëàêîáà âíåøíå ñîáëþäàëè õîðîøèå îòíîøåíèÿ, à ïîñëå ñìåðòè Ëàêîáà Áåðèÿ íà áþðî ÖÊ ñòàë ïðÿìî çàÿâëÿòü, ÷òî â Àáõàçèþ íóæíî áîëüøå ïîñûëàòü ðàáîòíèêîâ ìèíãðåëüöåâ, òàê êàê â Àáõàçèè àáõàçöåâ ìàëî è ÷óòü ëè íå ìåíüøèíñòâî. Ðàíåå ýòîãî Áåðèÿ íå çàÿâëÿë». Ïîäòâåðæäàþò ýòè ñëîâà è ïîêàçàíèÿ À.Ì. Äåäÿíà: «ß õî÷ó îòìåòèòü, ÷òî Í. Ëàêîáà ïðàâèëüíî ïðîâîäèë íàöèîíàëüíóþ ïîëèòèêó â Àáõàçèè.  ïåðèîä åãî äåÿòåëüíîñòè â ÑÍÊ Àáõàçèè åãî çàìåñòèòåëÿìè áûëè ãðåêè, àðìÿíå, ìèíãðåëüöû. Íî ïîñëå «ëàêîáîâñêîãî ïðîöåññà» â 1937 ã. ñòàëà ïðîâîäèòüñÿ ñî ñòîðîíû Áåðèÿ òàêàÿ ïîëèòèêà, ÷òî àðìÿíèí, ðóññêèé, ãðåê íå ìîãëè íàéòè ðàáîòó â Àáõàçèè. Âñå îòâåòñòâåííûå ïîñòû ñòàëè çàíèìàòüñÿ òîëüêî ãðóçèíàìè, ìèíãðåëüöàìè».  íà÷àëå 1937 ã. ïðåäñåäàòåëåì ÖÈÊà Àáõàçèè ñòàë À.Ñ. Àãðáà. Ïðè íåì æå â àâòîíîìíîé ðåñïóáëèêå íà÷àëèñü ìàññîâûå àðåñòû. Äîëãîå âðåìÿ Àãðáà ðàáîòàë â àïïàðàòå Çàêàâêàçñêîé ÷åêà è áûë ïðèáëèæåííûì Áåðèÿ, à ïîñëå íàçíà÷åíèÿ Ëàâðåíòèÿ íà ïîñò ïåðâîãî ñåêðåòàðÿ ÖÊ Ãðóçèè ñòàë ïðåäñåäàòåëåì Çàêàâêàçñêîãî ÃÏÓ. 116

Íà çàðå ñîâåòñêîé èìïåðèè. «ß – Êîáà, à òû – Ëàêîáà...»

Áåðèÿ, ïîñâÿùåííûé âî âñå òàéíû ñëîæíûõ îòíîøåíèé ìåæäó Ëàêîáà è Àãðáà, åùå â 1936 ã. ïîïûòàëñÿ ïîäñèäåòü Íåñòîðà. Îäíàêî ýòà àâàíòþðà åìó ñàìîìó ÷óòü áûëî íå ñòîèëà ãîëîâû. Äåëî îáñòîÿëî òàê.  ÿíâàðå 1936 ã. ñåêðåòàðåì Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè áûë íàçíà÷åí Àëåêñåé Àãðáà. Äî ýòîãî âñå ñîâåùàíèÿ ðóêîâîäñòâà, âñå çàñåäàíèÿ áþðî îáêîìà ïðîõîäèëè â êàáèíåòå Íåñòîðà, â ÖÈÊå. Ñ ïðèõîäîì Àãðáà ïîëîæåíèå èçìåíèëîñü. Îí ñòàë ïðåñëåäîâàòü îêðóæåíèå Ëàêîáà è òðåáîâàë, ÷òîáû Íåñòîð ÿâëÿëñÿ íà ñîâåùàíèÿ â îáêîì ïàðòèè. Ëàêîáà íà÷àë ïîñåùàòü çàñåäàíèÿ, íî ïðè ýòîì íåèçìåííî îïàçäûâàë. Î ïðîèñõîäèâøåé òîãäà áîðüáå â âåðõàõ î÷åíü ïîäðîáíûå ïîêàçàíèÿ äàë â 1955 ã. áûâøèé íà÷àëüíèê õîçóïðàâëåíèÿ Àáõàçèè Ð.Ä. Ýøáà: «Îòíîñèòåëüíî ñíÿòèÿ Àãðáà ñ ïîñòà ñåêðåòàðÿ îáêîìà â 1936 ã. Çàñòóïèâ íà ïîñò ñåêðåòàðÿ, îí ñòàë îáåçëè÷èâàòü è èãíîðèðîâàòü Ëàêîáà. Àãðáà ïðîâåë ðåøåíèåì áþðî îáêîìà çàïðåùåíèå âûåçäà ÷ëåíîâ áþðî è â òîì ÷èñëå Ëàêîáà èç Ñóõóìà áåç ðàçðåøåíèÿ áþðî îáêîìà. Ê òîìó âðåìåíè, ëåòîì 1936 ã., íà îòäûõ â Ìþññåðû ïðèåõàë È.Â. Ñòàëèí. Íå âñòðåòèâ Ëàêîáà, êàê ýòî áûâàëî âñåãäà, È.Â. Ñòàëèí áûë î÷åíü óäèâëåí ýòèì è äàë çàäàíèå âûÿñíèòü, ÷òî ñ íèì (Ëàêîáà) ñëó÷èëîñü. Êîãäà Ëàêîáà ðàçûñêàëè è ïåðåäàëè, ÷òî âîæäü óäèâëåí òåì, ÷òî Ëàêîáà íå âñòðåòèë åãî, Ëàêîáà ïîïðîñèë ïåðåäàòü, ÷òî ïî-ïðåæíåìó ðàä è ñ÷àñòëèâ âñòðåòèòü åãî, íî ÷òî ëèøåí ýòîé âîçìîæíîñòè, òàê êàê, áóäó÷è êîììóíèñòîì äèñöèïëèíèðîâàííûì (âñïîìíèòå ïèñüìî Ñòàëèíà ïî ïîâîäó Íåñòîðà îò 19 îêòÿáðÿ 1929 ã. – Ñ.Ë.), íå ìîæåò íàðóøèòü ïîñòàíîâëåíèå áþðî îáêîìà è âûåõàòü èç Ñóõóìà. Êàê ðàññêàçûâàëè áëèçêèå ðàáîòíèêè Í. Ëàêîáà, îí âñå-òàêè íåìåäëåííî áûë âûçâàí ê âîæäþ. Êîãäà È.Â. Ñòàëèí óçíàë îá ýòîì è ÷òî Àãðáà èãíîðèðóåò åãî, Ëàêîáà, äàë óêàçàíèå Áåðèÿ íåìåäëåííî óáðàòü Àãðáà, è íà ñàìîì äåëå Àãðáà áûë âñêîðå ñìåùåí è îòîçâàí â Òáèëèñè. Ýòîò ôàêò ÿâëÿëñÿ áîëüøèì ïîðàæåíèåì Áåðèÿ». Îäíàêî î÷åíü ñêîðî ïîñëå ñìåðòè Ëàêîáà è Àëåêñåé Àãðáà ñòàë æåðòâîé ðåïðåññèé. 18 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1937 ã. îí áûë àðåñòîâàí, à 21 àïðåëÿ 1938 ã. ðàññòðåëÿí.

Ñàðèÿ Îñåíüþ 1937 ã. â Ñóõóìè ïî ïðèìåðó ìîñêîâñêèõ ïîêàçàòåëüíûõ ïðîøåë îòêðûòûé ñóäåáíûé ïðîöåññ ïî «äåëó 13-òè ëàêîáîâöåâ». Îôèöèàëüíî äåëî íàçûâàëîñü: «Î êîíòððåâîëþöèîííîé, äèâåðñèîííî-âðåäèòåëüñêîé, øïèîíñêîé, òåððîðèñòè÷åñêîé, ïîâñòàí÷åñêîé îðãàíèçàöèè â Àáõàçèè». 30 îêòÿáðÿ – 3 íîÿáðÿ 1937 ã. ïåðåä ñóäåáíûì ñïåêòàêëåì â ãîñòåàòðå Àáõàçèè ïðåäñòàëè: Ì. ×àëìàç, Ì. Ëàêîáà, Ê. Èíàë-èïà, Ä. Äæåðãåíèÿ, Â. Ëàêîáà, Â. Ëàäàðèÿ, À. Ýíãåëîâ, Ñ. Òóðêèÿ, Ï. Ñåéñÿí, Ì. Êèøìàðèÿ, Ñ. Ýáæíîó, X. ×àíáà, Ê. Àõóáà. Ñóõóìñêèé ïðîöåññ ïðîõîäèë ïðè áëèæàéøåì ó÷àñòèè Áåðèÿ. Îí ïîòðåáîâàë çàâåðøèòü åãî äî íîÿáðüñêèõ ïðàçäíèêîâ. Åùå çà íåäåëþ äî íà÷àëà 117

Ãëàâà IV

ïåðâûå äåñÿòü ïîäñóäèìûõ áûëè âûäåëåíû êðàñíûì êàðàíäàøîì. Íàïðîòèâ ñòîÿëà ðåçîëþöèÿ: «Ðàññòðåëÿòü. Ë. Áåðèÿ». Îíè îáâèíÿëèñü â òîì, ÷òî âõîäèëè â «äèâåðñèîííî-òåððîðèñòè÷åñêóþ ãðóïïó îáåð-áàíäèòà Í. Ëàêîáà, ãîòîâèâøåãî ïîêóøåíèå íà âîæäÿ íàðîäîâ Ñòàëèíà». Íàêàíóíå ïðîöåññà â ñëóæåáíîì âàãîíå íà ñòàíöèè Êåëàñóðè Áåðèÿ ïðèíèìàë îòâåòñòâåííûõ çà ïðîâåäåíèå ýòîãî ïîêàçàòåëüíîãî ñóäèëèùà: íàðêîìà âíóòðåííèõ äåë Àáõàçèè Ã. Ïà÷óëèÿ, ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Âåðõîâíîãî ñóäà Ò. Àíòèÿ, ïðîêóðîðà Àáõàçèè Â. Øîíèÿ è îáùåñòâåííîãî îáâèíèòåëÿ Ì. Äåëáà.  äíè ïðîöåññà, 1–2 íîÿáðÿ 1937 ã., â Ñóõóìè ïîä ðóêîâîäñòâîì Áåðèÿ ñîñòîÿëèñü ïëåíóì Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè è ñåññèÿ ÖÈÊ, íà êîòîðûõ áûë ðàññìîòðåí îðãàíèçàöèîííûé âîïðîñ. Ê ðóêîâîäñòâó ðåñïóáëèêîé ïðèøëè øîâèíèñòû. Ïî÷òè âñå àáõàçû áûëè âûâåäåíû èç ñîñòàâà îáêîìà ïàðòèè è ÖÈÊà Àáõàçèè, à çàòåì óíè÷òîæåíû (Ñì.: Ñàãàðèÿ Á.Å. Âîñïèòàíèå èñòîðèåé // Áçûáü. 1988. 23 èþíÿ).  íî÷ü íà 4 íîÿáðÿ 1937 ã. áûëè ðàññòðåëÿíû Â. è Ì. Ëàêîáà, Ì. ×àëìàç, Ï. Ñåéñÿí, À. Ýíãåëîâ, Â. Ëàäàðèÿ, Ñ. Òóðêèÿ, Ä. Äæåðãåíèÿ, Ñ. Ýáæíîó. Òîëüêî â îòíîøåíèè îäíîãî ÷åëîâåêà, Ê. Èíàë-èïà, ïðèãîâîð áûë ïðèâåäåí â èñïîëíåíèå ïîçæå.  äíè «ëàêîáîâñêîãî ïðîöåññà» Áåðèÿ, îêðóæåííûé îõðàíîé, ïðîãóëèâàëñÿ ïî ñóõóìñêîé íàáåðåæíîé. Ýòî áûë åãî ïåðâûé ïðèåçä â Àáõàçèþ ïîñëå ãèáåëè Ëàêîáà. Ïî ñâèäåòåëüñòâó ïðîôåññîðà Çóðàáà Àí÷àáàäçå, åãî äðóã Ðàóô, ñûí Íåñòîðà, ïîäîøåë ê íåìó è ïîïðîñèë ðàçðåøèòü ñâèäàíèå ñ ìàòåðüþ. Áåðèÿ ïîîáåùàë. Íà ñëåäóþùèé äåíü, 31 îêòÿáðÿ, çà Ðàóôîì ïðèøëè. Îí áûë àðåñòîâàí ïåðâûì èç äåòåé, ïÿòíàäöàòè ëåò.  òáèëèññêîé òþðüìå Ðàóô óâèäèò ìàòü... Ñàðèÿ ïîäâåðãàëàñü ñàìûì äèêèì ïûòêàì ñî ñòîðîíû ñëåäîâàòåëåé Êîáóëîâà – Êàäàãèøâèëè, Äàâëèàíèäçå, Ñàâèöêîãî, Õàçàíà, Ãàëàâàíîâà... Íà äîïðîñàõ ïðèñóòñòâîâàë Áåðèÿ, òðåáîâàë ïîêàçàòü, ÷òî Ëàêîáà ãîòîâèë çàãîâîð ïðîòèâ Ñòàëèíà. Åãî èíòåðåñîâàëà è ñóäüáà àðõèâà Íåñòîðà, â êîòîðîì õðàíèëèñü íå òîëüêî ïèñüìà åãî ñàìîãî. Íà ðîçûñêå äîêóìåíòîâ íàñòàèâàë Ñòàëèí. Ñàðèÿ âñå îòðèöàëà, îòêàçûâàëàñü äàâàòü ïîêàçàíèÿ. Òîãäà íà åå ãëàçàõ íà÷àëè ïûòàòü áðàòüå⠖ Ìåäæèòà, Ëþòôè, Àêêè, Õýìäè Äæèõ-îãëû... Îíà ìîë÷àëà. Ïðîáîâàëè è ïî-äðóãîìó. Ñàðèþ ïûòàëè íà ãëàçàõ ó áðàòüåâ. (Ðåïðåññèÿì ïîäâåðãëèñü ïÿòåðî åå áðàòüåâ è ñåñòðà Íàçèÿ.) – È âîò Áåðèÿ ðåøèëñÿ íà î÷íóþ ñòàâêó Ñàðèè ñ Ðàóôîì, – ðàññêàçûâàåò ñàìûé ìëàäøèé, ïÿòûé, áðàò Ìóñòî Àõìåäîâè÷. – Îíà íå äàëà ðåçóëüòàòà. Òîãäà îí çàêðè÷àë: «Áåéòå ýòîãî âûðîäêà! Òîï÷èòå! Äî åå áåññòûæåãî ñëóõà îòëè÷íî äîéäåò âîé ñûíà!» Åãî áèëè ñíîâà è ñíîâà. «Ñïàñè ìåíÿ, ìàìà, – ïðîñèë îí. – Ñêàæè âñå, ÷òî îíè âåëÿò». Íî îíà ëèøü îòâå÷àëà: «Òåðïè, ñûí ìîé, ðàäè îòöà òåðïè!» Âñå, ÷òî ÿ ðàññêàçàë îá ýòîé «âñòðå÷å», ìíå ïåðåäàë Ðàóô àëôàâèòíûì ñòóêîì ïî ïåðåãîðîäêå, êîòîðàÿ ðàçäåëÿëà íàñ âî âíóòðåííåé òþðüìå â Ñóõóìè, êóäà åãî äîñòàâèëè èç Òáèëèñè â 1939 ã. 118

Íà çàðå ñîâåòñêîé èìïåðèè. «ß – Êîáà, à òû – Ëàêîáà...»

Îäíà èç ñîêàìåðíèö Ñàðèè, Ì.Â. Âàñèíà, â ïèñüìå Í.Ñ. Õðóùåâó îò 14 àâãóñòà 1953 ã. ïî ïîâîäó ÷óäîâèùíûõ ïûòîê æåíû Í. Ëàêîáà ñîîáùàëà: «Áðèãàäà ïî ðåïðåññèÿì èç ïÿòè ÷åëîâåê âûìàòûâàëà åæåäíåâíî äóõîâíûå è ôèçè÷åñêèå ñèëû Ñàðèè (âûêðóòèëè ðóêè è âûáèëè ÷åëþñòü, ïîðîëè øîìïîëàìè, ïëåòêàìè òîëùèíîé â ðóêó ñ ïðîâîëî÷íûìè íàêîíå÷íèêàìè, ñàæàëè â êàìåííûé ìåøîê è êàðöåð ñ âîäîé è êðûñàìè, â ñìåðòíóþ è ò. ä.), íà åå ãëàçàõ òàê èçáèâàëè ñûíà øêîëüíèêà, ÷òî èç åãî ðòà, íîñà è óøåé ëèëà êðîâü ðó÷üåì, åå êðèê ïðîíèêàë â ïîäâàëû – â ñåðäöà ñîòåí ìàòåðåé-çàêëþ÷åííûõ è ïî âñåìó çäàíèþ ÍÊÂÄ. Ñàðèÿ íå âèäåëà êîíöà ìó÷åíèÿì è èçäåâàòåëüñòâàì...».  ðàçíîå âðåìÿ âî âíóòðåííåé òþðüìå ÍÊÂÄ â Òáèëèñè âìåñòå ñ Ñàðèåé ñèäåëè Å. Ôåäîðîâà, À. Öàòóðîâà-Àãàáàáîâà, Ë. ×èêîâàíè, À. Êèëàðäæèøâèëè, À. Îðäæîíèêèäçå è ìíîãèå äðóãèå æåíùèíû, êîòîðûå ðàññêàçàëè î ñòîéêîñòè Ñàðèè. Æåíà Íåñòîðà Ëàêîáà ñêîí÷àëàñü â Òáèëèñè â Îðòà÷àëüñêîé òþðåìíîé áîëüíèöå 16 ìàÿ 1939 ã. â òðè ÷àñà äíÿ.  âîçðàñòå òðèäöàòè ÷åòûðåõ ëåò. «Ýòîé æåíùèíå íóæíî âîçäâèãíóòü ïàìÿòíèê!» – ñêàæåò ïîçäíåå î Ñàðèè Ãåíåðàëüíûé ïðîêóðîð ÑÑÑÐ Ð.À. Ðóäåíêî. Î ïîñëåäíèõ äíÿõ Ñàðèè çíàåò è åå íåâåñòêà Àäèëå Øàõáàñîâíà Àáàñîãëû, àðåñòîâàííàÿ âñëåä çà ñâîèì îòöîì è äÿäåé (ïîãèáëè â Ìàãàäàíå) 22 ôåâðàëÿ 1939 ã. êàê ÷ëåí ñåìüè Í. Ëàêîáà, â êâàðòèðå êîòîðîãî îíà æèëà ñ äåêàáðÿ 1935 ïî 1937 ã. Ìíîãèå èç òåõ, êòî áûë ïðè÷àñòåí õîòü êàê-íèáóäü ê «ëàêîáîâöàì», ïîäâåðãàëèñü ðåïðåññèÿì. Íå òîëüêî êîëëåãè ïî ðàáîòå, ðîäñòâåííèêè, øîôåðû, íî è ïðîñòî çíàêîìûå è äàæå ïîâàð ñ êëàäáèùåíñêèì ñòîðîæåì. Ïûòêàì áûëà ïîäâåðãíóòà è ìàòü Íåñòîðà.  êàìåðå Øàõóñíà êðè÷àëà: «Íàñ óíè÷òîæèë Áåðèÿ. Áåðèÿ îòðàâèë ìîåãî ñûíà». Åùå äî ñóäà åå çâåðñêè óáèë ïàëà÷ Ðàæäåí Ãàíãèÿ.

Ðàóô è äåëî àáõàçñêèõ þíîøåé Ñî âñåé áåçæàëîñòíîñòüþ ðåïðåññèè îáðóøèëèñü è íà äåòåé. Âñëåä çà Ðàóôîì áûëè çàêëþ÷åíû ñíà÷àëà â ñïåöèàëüíûå äåòäîìà, à çàòåì ïåðåâåäåíû â òþðüìû äåòè Ìèõàèëà è Âàñèëèÿ Ëàêîáà, Êîíñòàíòèíà Èíàë-èïà. Âìåñòå ñ Ðàóôîì â êàìåðå ¹ 20 Äðàíäñêîé òþðüìû 2 ìåñÿöà è 9 äíåé ñèäåë À. Ìèíîñÿí, êîòîðûé ïîêàçûâàë â 1955 ã., ÷òî ñûí Ëàêîáà ÷èñëèëñÿ ëè÷íî çà Áåðèÿ è òîò òðåáîâàë îò þíîøè óêàçàòü ìåñòîíàõîæäåíèå äâóõ åãî ïèñåì ê Íåñòîðó. «Ñîäåðæàíèå ýòèõ ïèñåì, – ãîâîðèòñÿ â äîêóìåíòå, – êàê ìíå ñòàëî èçâåñòíî ïî ðàññêàçàì Ð. Ëàêîáà, ïðèìåðíî ñëåäóþùåå: Áåðèÿ Ë. ïðîñèë Í. Ëàêîáà ïåðåãîâîðèòü ñ Êîáîé – È. Â. Ñòàëèíûì – ïî ïîâîäó åãî âûäâèæåíèÿ íà ïîñò ïåðâîãî ñåêðåòàðÿ ÖÊ ÊÏ(á) Ãðóçèè. Î ñóùåñòâîâàíèè ïîäëèííèêîâ ýòèõ ïèñåì Ðàóô ìíå ãîâîðèë, ÷òî îíè äîëæíû õðàíèòüñÿ ó Ì. ×àëìàçà... Ïî ðåêîìåíäàöèè Í. Ëàêîáà Áåðèÿ è áûë âûäâèíóò íà ðóêîâîäÿùóþ ðàáîòó â ÖÊ». 119

Ãëàâà IV

Ïîñëå àðåñòà Ðàóôà ïðîøëî äâà ãîäà.  îêòÿáðå 1939 ã. ïîä ñòðàæó áûëè âçÿòû «îïàñíûå òåððîðèñòû»: Ëàêîáà Íèêîëàé (Êóêóøà) Ìèõàéëîâè÷, ó÷åíèê 7 êëàññà, 1922 ã. ðîæäåíèÿ; Ëàêîáà Òåíãèç Âàñèëüåâè÷, ó÷åíèê 6 êëàññà, 1924 ã. ðîæäåíèÿ; Èíàë-èïà Íèêîëàé (Êîêà) Êîíñòàíòèíîâè÷, ó÷åíèê 6 êëàññà, 1923 ã. ðîæäåíèÿ. Âñå îíè îáâèíÿëèñü â òîì, ÷òî ñîâåðøèëè ïîëèòè÷åñêîå ïðåñòóïëåíèå â 1937 ã., òî åñòü êîãäà Í.Ì. Ëàêîáà è Í.Ê. Èíàë-èïà áûëî ïî 14 ëåò, à Ò.Â. Ëàêîáà – 13. Íà ïðîòÿæåíèè äâóõ ëåò ñëåäñòâèå îá ýòèõ àáõàçñêèõ þíîøàõ âåëîñü ÍÊÂÄ Ãðóçèíñêîé ÑÑÐ, à â ìàðòå 1940 ã. ïî ðàñïîðÿæåíèþ íà÷àëüíèêà ÃÝÓ ÍÊÂÄ ÑÑÑÐ Êîáóëîâà âñå ÷åòâåðî áûëè ýòàïèðîâàíû â ðàñïîðÿæåíèå ñëåäñòâåííîé ÷àñòè ÍÊÂÄ ÑÑÑÐ. Âî âíóòðåííþþ òþðüìó ÍÊÂÄ ÑÑÑÐ îíè ïîñòóïèëè 1 àïðåëÿ, ïðè÷åì Ðàóô ñîäåðæàëñÿ â êàìåðå ¹4. Îòñþäà íà èìÿ Áåðèÿ 20 àïðåëÿ 1940 ã. îí íàïðàâèë çàÿâëåíèå, â êîòîðîì ïèñàë: «Àðåñòîâàí ÿ 31 îêòÿáðÿ 1937 ã., ò.å. â âîçðàñòå 15 ëåò, è ïðåäúÿâëåíî ìíå îáâèíåíèå â àíòèñîâåòñêîé àãèòàöèè.  ïåðâîì è âòîðîì ñëåäñòâèè, ïðîèçâåäåííûõ â ÍÊÂÄ Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ, âèíîâíûì ÿ ñåáÿ íå ïðèçíàâàë è ãîâîðèë ïðàâäó... Íî íà ñëåäñòâèè â Ãðóçèíñêîì ÍÊÂÄ â ñåíòÿáðå 1939 ã. ìåíÿ âûíóäèëè (âûäåëåíî Ðàóôîì. – Ñ.Ë.) ïðèçíàòü òàêîâûå îáâèíåíèÿ, îò êîòîðûõ ÿ êàòåãîðè÷åñêè îòêàçûâàþñü, èáî ôàêòû, ìíîþ ïðèçíàííûå, íå ñîîòâåòñòâóþò äåéñòâèòåëüíîñòè, à òàêæå ñ÷èòàþ, ÷òî ñëåäñòâèå Ãðóçèíñêîãî ÍÊÂÄ ïîäîøëî êî ìíå ïðèñòðàñòíî... Ìíå îáèäíî, ãð. Íàðîäíûé Êîìèññàð, ÷òî â ýòî âðåìÿ, êîãäà â ìîè ãîäû íóæíî ó÷èòüñÿ, ïðèîáðåñòè çíàíèÿ, ÿ æå ñêèòàþñü èç òþðüìû â òþðüìó, è íåñó òàêîå òÿæåëîå íàêàçàíèå, ïî ñóùåñòâó, íå ñîâåðøèâ íèêàêîãî ïðåñòóïëåíèÿ». Íà ïåðâîì æå ïî ïðèáûòèè â Ìîñêâó äîïðîñå 23 àïðåëÿ 1940 ã. Ðàóô Ëàêîáà çàÿâèë ñëåäîâàòåëþ Àëüòìàíó, ÷òî îòêàçûâàåòñÿ îò äàííûõ èì íà ñëåäñòâèè â ÍÊÂÄ Ãðóçèè ïîêàçàíèé. Íå ïðèçíàë îí ñåáÿ âèíîâíûì è 29 àïðåëÿ. Ïîñëå ýòîãî Ðàóôà ïîìåùàþò â ñàìóþ ñòðàøíóþ, Ñóõàíîâñêóþ, òþðüìó. Ïîñëå èçíóðèòåëüíîãî äîïðîñà, êîòîðûé ïðîäîëæàëñÿ ñ 11 ïî 12 ìàÿ 1940 ã. (ñ 14.00 äî 3.00 ÷àñîâ), ñëåäîâàòåëè Êóøíåðåâ è Õâàò äîáèëèñü æåëàåìîãî ðåçóëüòàòà. Ðàóô «ïðèçíàë ñåáÿ âèíîâíûì â òîì, ÷òî âîçãëàâèë àíòèñîâåòñêóþ òåððîðèñòè÷åñêóþ ãðóïïèðîâêó â ñóõóìñêîé øêîëå, çàíèìàëñÿ âìåñòå ñ ÷ëåíàìè ýòîé ãðóïïèðîâêè êëåâåòíè÷åñêèìè èçìûøëåíèÿìè è èìåë òåððîðèñòè÷åñêèå íàìåðåíèÿ â îòíîøåíèè Áåðèÿ». Àíàëîãè÷íûõ «ïðèçíàíèé» Êóøíåðåâ äîáèëñÿ îò Í. Ëàêîáà 14 ìàÿ, Ò. Ëàêîáà 21 ìàÿ è Ê. Èíàë-èïà 31 ìàÿ. Äåëî î «òåððîðèñòàõ» áûëî çàñëóøàíî 5 èþëÿ 1941 ã. íà ïîäãîòîâèòåëüíîì çàñåäàíèè Âîåííîé êîëëåãèè Âåðõîâíîãî Ñóäà ÑÑÑÐ ïîä ïðåäñåäàòåëüñòâîì Â.Â. Óëüðèõà. Çàñåäàíèå îïðåäåëèëî: «Äåëî çàñëóøàòü â çàêðûòîì ñóäåáíîì çàñåäàíèè, áåç ó÷àñòèÿ îáâèíåíèÿ è çàùèòû è áåç âûçîâà ñâèäåòåëåé». Íà ñëåäóþùèé äåíü, 6 èþëÿ 1941 ã., ñóä ïðèãîâîðèë àáõàçñêèõ þíî120

Íà çàðå ñîâåòñêîé èìïåðèè. «ß – Êîáà, à òû – Ëàêîáà...»

øåé ê âûñøåé ìåðå íàêàçàíèÿ – ðàññòðåëó.  ñâîåì ïîñëåäíåì ñëîâå Íèêîëàé (Êóêóøà) Ëàêîáà ñêàçàë: «Ìíå ïðîñèòü ó ñóäà íå÷åãî». Ñàìûé ìëàäøèé «òåððîðèñò» Òåíãèç Ëàêîáà 7 èþëÿ â 23 ÷àñà ïåðåäàë ÷åðåç ïîìîùíèêà íà÷àëüíèêà Áóòûðñêîé òþðüìû õîäàòàéñòâî î ïîìèëîâàíèè. Åãî îòêëîíèëè. Ïåðâûì, 27 èþëÿ, áûë ðàññòðåëÿí Êîêà Èíàë-èïà, à íà ñëåäóþùèé äåíü, 28 èþëÿ 1941 ã., – Ðàóô, Íèêîëàé è Òåíãèç Ëàêîáà... Ïîçäíåå, â 1953 ã., áûâøèé ïàëà÷ ÍÊÂÄ À. Õàçàí ñêàæåò: «Ïðîöåññîì î “ëàêîáîâñêîì” çàãîâîðå Áåðèÿ, íåñîìíåííî, ñòðåìèëñÿ çàâîåâàòü åùå áîëüøåå äîâåðèå ê ñåáå. Ïîäîáíî âîñòî÷íîìó ñàòðàïó, Áåðèÿ óíè÷òîæàë ñåìüè îñóæäåííûõ». Þíîøè áûëè ïðèãîâîðåíû ê ðàññòðåëó, íåñìîòðÿ íà òî ÷òî ê ìîìåíòó «ñîâåðøåíèÿ ïðåñòóïëåíèÿ» íèêîìó èç íèõ íå áûëî 18 ëåò, à Òåíãèçó Ëàêîáà êî âðåìåíè âûíåñåíèÿ ïðèãîâîðà èñïîëíèëîñü ëèøü 17.  ðåàáèëèòàöèîííîì çàêëþ÷åíèè Âîåííîé êîëëåãèè Âåðõîâíîãî Ñóäà ÑÑÑÐ îò 3 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1955 ã. ïî äåëó Ëàêîáà Ð.Í, Ëàêîáà Í.Ì., Ëàêîáà Ò.Â., Èíàë-èïà Í.Ê. îñîáî ïîä÷åðêèâàëîñü, ÷òî îíè ïðèçíàëè «âèíó» ïîñëå «ïðåáûâàíèÿ â Ñóõàíîâñêîé òþðüìå ÍÊÂÄ ÑÑÑÐ (ñïóñòÿ äâà ñ ïîëîâèíîé ãîäà ïîñëå àðåñòà)...».  «Îïðåäåëåíèè» ñóäà áûëî ñêàçàíî: «Ïðèíèìàÿ âî âíèìàíèå, ÷òî â ðåçóëüòàòå ôàëüñèôèêàöèè ìàòåðèàëîâ ïðåäâàðèòåëüíîãî ñëåäñòâèÿ íàñòóïèëè òÿæåëûå ïîñëåäñòâèÿ, ÷òî â ðàññëåäîâàíèè äåëà Ëàêîáà Ð.Í. è äð., êðîìå îñóæäåííûõ âðàãîâ íàðîäà Êîáóëîâà è Øâàðöìàíà ïðèíèìàëè ó÷àñòèå Õâàò è äðóãèå ðàáîòíèêè ÍÊÂÄ ÑÑÑÐ, à òàêæå èìåÿ â âèäó, ÷òî Õâàò, êðîìå òîãî, ïðèíèìàë ó÷àñòèå â ðàññëåäîâàíèè äðóãèõ äåë, êîòîðûå âïîñëåäñòâèè ïðåêðàùåíû êàê ñôàëüñèôèöèðîâàííûå íà ïðåäâàðèòåëüíîì ñëåäñòâèè (äåëî ïî îáâèíåíèþ àêàäåìèêà Âàâèëîâà Íèêîëàÿ Èâàíîâè÷à è äð.), Âîåííàÿ êîëëåãèÿ Âåðõîâíîãî Ñóäà ÑÑÑÐ îïðåäåëèëà: Äîâåñòè îá èçëîæåííîì äî ñâåäåíèÿ Ãåíåðàëüíîãî ïðîêóðîðà ÑÑÑÐ íà ïðåäìåò ïðèâëå÷åíèÿ ê îòâåòñòâåííîñòè Õâàòà è äð. ëèö, ïðèíèìàâøèõ ó÷àñòèå â ôàëüñèôèêàöèè äåëà Ëàêîáà Ð.Í., Âàâèëîâà Í.È. è äð. äåë».  æèâûõ îñòàëèñü ëèøü Ñàèäà è Çèíà – äî÷åðè Ìèõàèëà è Âàñèëèÿ Ëàêîáà. Æåíó Âàñèëèÿ ðàññòðåëÿëè. Ñ 1938 ïî 1946 ã. ïî òþðüìàì è ëàãåðÿì ñêèòàëàñü æåíà Ìèõàèëà – Âåðà Ãåîðãèåâíà. Åùå ñåìü ëåò, äî ñàìîé ñìåðòè Ñòàëèíà, îíà íàõîäèëàñü íà ïîñåëåíèè â Êàðàãàíäå. – Ìíå áûëî 12 ëåò, – ðàññêàçûâàåò Ñàèäà Ìèõàéëîâíà Ëàêîáà, – êîãäà àðåñòîâàëè ìàìó â 38-ì. Îíà ïîøëà ïî òþðüìàì, à ÿ ñ áðàòüÿìè Íèêîëàåì (Êóêóøà) è Ñåðãååì (×èâà) – ïî äåòäîìàì. Âñåãäà è îòîâñþäó íàñ çàáèðàëè íî÷üþ è âñåãäà ñ íàìè áûëè äî÷ü íåìåöêîãî êîììóíèñòà Åâà Öèììåðìàí, Ëåíÿ Áîëüøàêîâ, Àéíà è Ýðíà Àíòîíîâû. Ýðíà ñîøëà ñ óìà è âñå ïîâòîðÿëà: «Ëèñòüÿ øóðøàò, ëèñòüÿ øóðøàò... Òèõî, èäóò». Íàêîíåö, ìû ïîïàëè â Âèííèöêóþ îáëàñòü, â ìåñòå÷êî ßíîâî, ãäå ðàñïîëàãàëàñü äåòñêàÿ òðóäîâàÿ êîëîíèÿ ÍÊÂÄ. Âîçãëàâëÿë åå, êñòàòè, çàìå÷àòåëüíûé ÷åëîâåê Áîðèñ Èâàíîâè÷ Ïøåìèíñêèé. Íàñ, äåòåé, òàì áûëî îêîëî øåñòèñîò... Íî÷üþ â 39-ì 121

Ãëàâà IV

èç äåòäîìà ïåðåâåëè ñíà÷àëà â ñóõóìñêóþ, à çàòåì â òáèëèññêóþ òþðüìó ìîåãî ñòàðøåãî áðàòà Êóêóøó (Íèêîëàÿ). Áîëüøå ÿ åãî íèêîãäà íå âèäåëà.  1941 ã. èç äåòäîìà â òþðüìó ïîïàë äðóãîé ìîé áðàò – Ñåðãåé.  ñåðåäèíå 50-õ ãîäîâ ìû ñ ìàìîé, Âåðîé Ãåîðãèåâíîé, óæå çíàëè î ãèáåëè Íèêîëàÿ. Î ñóäüáå æå áðàòà Ñåðãåÿ ÿ óçíàëà ëèøü â 1965 ã. Íà ìîé çàïðîñ èç Ìèíèñòåðñòâà îáîðîíû ÑÑÑÐ 5 ÿíâàðÿ ïðèøåë îòâåò çà ïîäïèñüþ ïîëêîâíèêà Ôåäîðåíêî.  íåì ãîâîðèëîñü: «Ñîîáùàþ, ÷òî ïî èìåþùèìñÿ â Îòäåëå ñâåäåíèÿì Âàø áðàò, ðÿäîâîé 242-é ñòðåëêîâîé äèâèçèè Ëàêîáà Ñåðãåé Ìèõàéëîâè÷, 1924 ã. ðîæäåíèÿ, óðîæåíåö ã. Ñóõóìè, ïðèçâàííûé Òåìèðãîåâñêèì ðàéâîåíêîìàòîì Êðàñíîäàðñêîãî êðàÿ, â áîþ çà Ñîöèàëèñòè÷åñêóþ Ðîäèíó ïîãèá 22 èþíÿ 1943 ã. è ïîõîðîíåí: ñåâåðî-çàïàäíåå 900 ì õ. Ãàïîíîâñêîãî, Êðàñíîäàðñêîãî êðàÿ».  ãðàôå «Àäðåñ ðîäñòâåííèêîâ» óêàçàíî: Òåòÿ, Çîëèíà Íàòàëüÿ Òèõîíîâíà, ïðîæèâàëà: Êðàñíîäàðñêèé êðàé, Êóðãàíñêèé ð-í, Òåìèðãîåâñêèé ñ/ñ, ñò. Òåìèðãîåâñêàÿ». Ïîåõàëà ïî ýòîìó àäðåñó. Çîëèíîé óæå íå áûëî â æèâûõ, íî ÿ çàñòàëà åå äî÷ü. Îíà âñïîìíèëà ìîåãî áðàòà. Îí ïðîâåë â èõ äîìå âñåãî íåñêîëüêî äíåé. Ïåðåä óõîäîì íà ïåðåäîâóþ ðàññêàçàë î ñóäüáå ñâîåé ñåìüè. «Ìû äóìàëè, áðåøåò», – ïîêà÷àëà ãîëîâîé äî÷ü.

Ñòèõîòâîðåíèå Ìàíäåëüøòàìà íà ñìåðòü Íåñòîðà Âåñíîé 1930 ã. Ìàíäåëüøòàìà çàèíòåðåñîâàë íå òîëüêî àáõàçñêèé ÿçûê, íî è àáõàçñêèå ïåñíè.  îäíîé èç çàïèñíûõ êíèæåê ïîýòà ñêàçàíî: «Àáõàçñêèå ïåñíè óäèâèòåëüíî ïåðåäàþò âåðõîâóþ åçäó. Âîò êîïûòèòñÿ âûñîòà; ëåçåò â ãîðó è ïîä ãîðó, èçâîðà÷èâàåòñÿ è ïðÿìèòñÿ áåñêîíå÷íàÿ, êàê äîðîãà, õîðîâàÿ íîòà – êàìåðòîííîå áåññëîâåñíîå äëèííîå à-à-à! È íà ýòîì ðîâíîì ìíîãîêîïûòíîì çâóêå, óñåâøèñü â íåì, êàê â ñåäëå, ïëûâåò ñåáå çàïåâàëà, âûâîäÿ îçîðíóþ èëè ïå÷àëüíî-âîèíñòâåííóþ ìåëîäèþ». Ïðîâîäíèêîì Ìàíäåëüøòàìà â ìèð àáõàçñêîãî ôîëüêëîðà áûë ñîáèðàòåëü íàðîäíûõ ïåñåí Êîíñòàíòèí Êîâà÷. Îíè ïîçíàêîìèëèñü â Ñóõóìå. Ýòî áûëî ïåðåä ïîåçäêîé Ìàíäåëüøòàìà â Àðìåíèþ. Íà îáðàòíîì ïóòè, ïîñëå äîëãîãî ïåðåðûâà ê íåìó âåðíóëèñü ñòèõè. Ïðîéäåò åùå ñåìü ëåò, è ïîýò íàïèøåò ñòèõîòâîðåíèå, ïîñâÿùåííîå Àáõàçèè. Æåíà ïîýòà, Íàäåæäà ßêîâëåâíà, îá ýòîì ïåðèîäå åãî òâîð÷åñòâà âñïîìèíàëà: «Ññûëêà íà ïåñíü ó Î.Ì. ðåäêîñòü.  ïîñëåäíèé ïåðèîä îíà âñòðå÷àåòñÿ êðîìå ÷åðíîâèêî⠓Âîëêà” è “Áóøëàòíèêà” òîëüêî ⠓Àáõàçñêîé ïåñåíêå”: “Ïîþ, êîãäà ãîðòàíü – ñûðà, äóøà – ñóõà, è â ìåðó âëàæåí âçîð, è íå õèòðèò ñîçíàíüå...”. Êàòîðæíûé ôîëüêëîð ó Î.Ì. çàìåòåí ñðàçó – åãî ïîäñêàçàëà æèçíü è îí ëåæèò íà ïîâåðõíîñòè». Áëàãîäàðÿ ýòèì âîñïîìèíàíèÿì è ñòàíîâèòñÿ èçâåñòíîé ñåé÷àñ «Àáõàçñêàÿ ïåñåíêà». Èíòåðåñíî, ÷òî ýòî íàçâàíèå äî ñàìîãî ïîñëåäíåãî âðåìåíè íå áûëî ïðèâåäåíî íè â îäíîì èçäàíèè, íå îòìå÷àëîñü îíî äàæå â ïðèìå÷àíèÿõ. Îíî èçâåñòíî ëèøü ïî ïåðâîé ñòðî÷êå – «Ïîþ, êîãäà 122

Íà çàðå ñîâåòñêîé èìïåðèè. «ß – Êîáà, à òû – Ëàêîáà...»

ãîðòàíü – ñûðà, äóøà – ñóõà...» (Ìàíäåëüøòàì Î. Ñòèõîòâîðåíèÿ. Ë., 1973). ×òî æå ïðîèçîøëî? Ïî÷åìó ñïóñòÿ ñåìü ëåò Ìàíäåëüøòàì ñíîâà âñïîìíèë îá Àáõàçèè? È ïî÷åìó àáõàçñêàÿ ïåñåíêà îêàçàëàñü ðÿäîì ñ ñèáèðñêèìè êàòîðæíûìè? Äåëî â òîì, ÷òî ñòèõîòâîðåíèå ÿâèëîñü ñâîåîáðàçíûì îòêëèêîì íà ãèáåëü Íåñòîðà Ëàêîáà, êîòîðûé, êñòàòè, áûë èíèöèàòîðîì ñáîðà àáõàçñêèõ ïåñåí è ïîêðîâèòåëåì Êîâà÷à. Åùå â 1930 ã. ìåæäó Ëàêîáà è Ìàíäåëüøòàìîì âîçíèêëè äðóæåñêèå îòíîøåíèÿ. «Ýòî Ëàêîáà ïðèãëàñèë íàñ íà ïðàâèòåëüñòâåííóþ äà÷ó», – âñïîìèíàëà Íàäåæäà ßêîâëåâíà. Ñàì Î. Ìàíäåëüøòàì â î÷åðêå «Ñóõóì» ïèñàë òîãäà: «Â ïðèåìíîé Ñîâíàðêîìà ÿ âèäåë æàëîáùèêî⠖ êðåñòüÿí. Ñòàðèêè-òàáàêîâîäû â ÷åðíîé äîìîòêàíîé øåðñòè ïîõîæè íà ôðàíöóçñêèõ êðåñòüÿíâèíîäåëîâ. Ó Íåñòîðà Ëàêîáû – ãëàâû ïðàâèòåëüñòâà – ïîõîäêà ÷åëîâåêà, ñòðåëÿþùåãî èç ëóêà... Ýòî îí ïðèâåç ìåäâåæîíêà íà àâòîìîáèëå, ïîëó÷èë ìåäâåæîíêà â ïîäàðîê îò êðåñòüÿíñêîãî îðàòîðà íà ìèòèíãå â Òêâàð÷åëàõ. Ñëóõîâàÿ òðóáêà ãëóõîãî Ëàêîáû âîñïðèíèìàåòñÿ êàê ñèìâîë âëàñòè». Ïîñëå ñìåðòè Íåñòîðà ïðîøëî ÷óòü áîëüøå ìåñÿöà, è 8 ôåâðàëÿ 1937 ã. Îñèï Ýìèëüåâè÷ ñîçäàë ñòèõîòâîðåíèå-âîñïîìèíàíèå, ñòèõîòâîðåíèå-ïîñâÿùåíèå – «Àáõàçñêóþ ïåñåíêó». Ïîþ, êîãäà ãîðòàíü – ñûðà, äóøà – ñóõà, È â ìåðó âëàæåí âçîð, è íå õèòðèò ñîçíàíüå: Çäîðîâî ëè âèíî? Çäîðîâû ëè ìåõà? Çäîðîâî ëè â êðîâè Êîëõèäû êîëûõàíüå? À ãðóäü ñòåñíÿåòñÿ – áåç ÿçûêà – òèõà: Óæå íå ÿ ïîþ – ïîåò ìîå äûõàíüå – È â ãîðíûõ íîæíàõ ñëóõ, è ãîëîâà ãëóõà… Ïåñíü áåñêîðûñòíàÿ – ñàìà ñåáå õâàëà: Óòåõà äëÿ äðóçåé è äëÿ âðàãî⠖ ñìîëà, Ïåñíü îäíîãëàçàÿ, ðàñòóùàÿ èç ìõà – Îäíîãîëîñûé äàð îõîòíè÷üåãî áûòà, Êîòîðóþ ïîþò âåðõîì è íà âåðõàõ, Äåðæà äûõàíüå âîëüíî è îòêðûòî, Çàáîòÿñü ëèøü î òîì, ÷òîá ÷åñòíî è ñåðäèòî Íà ñâàäüáó ìîëîäûõ äîñòàâèòü áåç ãðåõà.

È åùå îäèí âàæíûé øòðèõ. Ïîñëå ðàáîòû Íåñòîð ÷àñòî íàâåùàë ñâîèõ ãîñòåé íà äà÷å Ñîâíàðêîìà. «Ëàêîáà óìåë ðàçâëå÷ü ëþäåé èíòåðåñíûì ðàññêàçîì», – ïèøåò Íàäåæäà ßêîâëåâíà.  îäèí èç âåñåííèõ âå÷åðîâ 1930 ã. îí ðàññêàçàë î ñâîåì ïðåäêå Óðóñå Ëàêîáà, êîòîðûé â 1822 ã. ÿêîáû îòðàâèë âî âðåìÿ îáåäà âëàäåòåëüíîãî êíÿçÿ Àáõàçèè. «Íà Î.Ì. ðàññêàç Ëàêîáû 123

Ãëàâà IV

ïðîèçâåë áîëüøîå âïå÷àòëåíèå, – âñïîìèíàëà æåíà Ìàíäåëüøòàìà, – åìó ïîñëûøàëñÿ â íåì êàêîé-òî âòîðîé ïëàí. Íàì ãîâîðèëè, ÷òî â 37-ì ãîäó Ëàêîáû óæå íå áûëî â æèâûõ». Íî áûëà è îñòàëàñü «Àáõàçñêàÿ ïåñåíêà». Ïðèñëóøàåìñÿ ê íåé åùå ðàç. Îñîáåííî ê ïåðâîé ÷àñòè. «Çäîðîâî ëè âèíî?» Íåò, âèíî áûëî áîëüíîå. Îòðàâëåííîå. À ãðóäü ñòåñíÿåòñÿ – áåç ÿçûêà – òèõà: Óæå íå ÿ ïîþ – ïîåò ìîå äûõàíüå – È â ãîðíûõ íîæíàõ ñëóõ, è ãîëîâà ãëóõà…

Âèäèìî, Ìàíäåëüøòàìó áûëè õîðîøî èçâåñòíû èñòèííûå îáñòîÿòåëüñòâà ãèáåëè ãëóõîãî Ëàêîáà. È äàæå òî, ÷òî ñìåðòü åãî íàñòóïèëà â çàæàòîì ñî âñåõ ñòîðîí ãîðàìè («â ãîðíûõ íîæíàõ») ãîðîäå Òáèëèñè.  äíè ïîõîðîí ëþäè ãîâîðèëè: «Íåñòîð îòðàâëåí». Ïîâåäàòü îá ýòîì ïîýòó ìîã è Âèêòîð Øêëîâñêèé, òîëüêî ÷òî âåðíóâøèéñÿ èç òðàóðíîãî Ñóõóìè. Ïðåä÷óâñòâèå Ìàíäåëüøòàìîì «âòîðîãî ïëàíà» îêàçàëîñü ïðîðî÷åñêèì. ÏÐÈÌÅ×ÀÍÈß Â äàííîì î÷åðêå î ãëàâå ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Àáõàçèè Íåñòîðå Àïîëëîíîâè÷å Ëàêîáà (1893–1936) èñïîëüçîâàíû ñëåäóþùèå èñòî÷íèêè è ëèòåðàòóðà: – àðõèâ ìåìîðèàëüíîãî ìóçåÿ-êâàðòèðû Í.À. Ëàêîáà; – ëè÷íûé àðõèâ Í.À. Ëàêîáà; – äîêóìåíòû ãîñáåçîïàñíîñòè, êîòîðûå â 1989–1990 ãã. â àðõèâå ÊÃÁ ÑÑÑÐ îáíàðóæèë äîêòîð èñòîðè÷åñêèõ íàóê Â.Ã. Àðäçèíáà (òîãäà äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà ÑÑÑÐ); – âîñïîìèíàíèÿ Ìóñòî Äæèõ-îãëû (ðóêîïèñü); – ãàçåòû 20–30-õ ãîäîâ ÕÕ â.: Ãîëîñ òðóäîâîé Àáõàçèè, Òðóäîâàÿ Àáõàçèÿ, Çàðÿ Âîñòîêà, Ïðàâäà; – Òðîöêèé Ë. Ìîÿ æèçíü. Îïûò àâòîáèîãðàôèè. Ò. II. Áåðëèí, 1930; – Òðîöêèé Ë. Ïîðòðåòû. Áåíñîí, 1984. 1

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ÃËÀÂÀ V ÏÎÑËÅ ÐÀÑÏÀÄÀ ÑÑÑÐ. ÀÁÕÀÇÈß Â ÓÑËÎÂÈßÕ ÏÅÐÅÄÅËÀ ÌÈÐÀ Çà ïîñëåäíåå âðåìÿ â ìèðå ïðîèçîøëè íåîáðàòèìûå ïåðåìåíû. Ïðåæäå âñåãî, ýòî ðàñïàä ÑÑÑÐ, Þãîñëàâèè, ×åõîñëîâàêèè, Ýôèîïèè, îáúåäèíåíèå Ãåðìàíèè, îáðàçîâàíèå öåëîãî ðÿäà òàê íàçûâàåìûõ íåçàâèñèìûõ ãîñóäàðñòâ, ïîëó÷èâøèõ ìåæäóíàðîäíîå ïðèçíàíèå. Äóãà íåñòàáèëüíîñòè, íà ïåðâîì ýòàïå ïðîòÿíóâøàÿñÿ îò Áàëêàí äî Êàâêàçà, íûíå ïðîñòèðàåòñÿ îò Àìåðèêè äî Êîðåè. Ïî èñòå÷åíèè òîëüêî ïîñëåäíèõ äåñÿòè ëåò ìîæíî î÷åðòèòü ïðèìåðíûå êîíòóðû äðàìàòè÷åñêîãî ïåðèîäà ñîâðåìåííîé èñòîðèè, êîòîðûå íåîáõîäèìî ðàññìàòðèâàòü â êîíòåêñòå ñòðåìèòåëüíîãî ïðîöåññà ãëîáàëèçàöèè è ìèðîâûõ ïîòðÿñåíèé. Ïîñëå ðàçâàëà ÑÑÑÐ Àáõàçèÿ ïåðåæèëà íåñêîëüêî ñëîæíåéøèõ ýòàïîâ â óñëîâèÿõ ïåðåäåëà ìèðà: 1-é ýòàï îõâàòûâàåò ïåðèîä ñ äåêàáðÿ 1991 ïî ñåíòÿáðü 1994 ã. è òåñíî ñâÿçàí ñ ïåðâûì ðàçäåëîì ïîñòñîâåòñêîãî ïðîñòðàíñòâà â Çàêàâêàçüå, èëè íà Þæíîì Êàâêàçå, êîòîðûé, â ñâîþ î÷åðåäü, ÿâëÿåòñÿ ÷àñòüþ ìèðîâîãî ïåðåäåëà. Ýòîò ïåðâûé ýòàï âêëþ÷àåò â ñåáÿ ñëåäóþùèå õàðàêòåðèñòèêè: – ìîíîïîëüíîå ãëàâåíñòâî Ðîññèè â Çàêàâêàçüå; – óïðàâëåíèå ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíîé è ìàíèïóëèðîâàíèå åþ â 1992– 1993 ãã.; – ïðàêòè÷åñêîå íåâìåøàòåëüñòâî ÑØÀ è ñòðàí Åâðîïû â ïîëèòèêó Ðîññèè â åå áëèæíåì çàðóáåæüå; – íåäîîöåíêà ãðóçèíñêèì ðóêîâîäñòâîì ãåîïîëèòè÷åñêîãî ôàêòîðà â 1993 ã. è êàê ñëåäñòâèå – âñòóïëåíèå Ãðóçèè â ÑÍà è åå âîçâðàò â ñôåðó âëèÿíèÿ Ðîññèè. 2-é ýòàï íà Þæíîì Êàâêàçå îõâàòûâàåò ïåðèîä ñ ñåíòÿáðÿ 1994 ïî îñåíü 1999 ã. è 11 ñåíòÿáðÿ 2001 ã. è õàðàêòåðèçóåòñÿ îòíîñèòåëüíî ìèðíûì ïåðèîäîì, êîãäà âñå êîíôëèêòû â Çàêàâêàçüå áûëè íà âðåìÿ çàìîðîæåíû.  ñåíòÿáðå 1994 ã. çàïàäíûå íåôòÿíûå êîìïàíèè ïîäïèñàëè ñ ïðàâèòåëüñòâîì Àçåðáàéäæàíà «êîíòðàêò âåêà» î ïîñòàâêàõ êàñïèéñêîé íåôòè â îáõîä 125

Ãëàâà V

Ðîññèè è Èðàíà. Òîãäà æå, â ñåíòÿáðå 1994 ã., ÑØÀ è ñòðàíû Åâðîïû îòêðûòî çàÿâèëè î ñâîèõ ñòðàòåãè÷åñêèõ èíòåðåñàõ â Çàêàâêàçüå â ñâÿçè ñ áîëüøèìè çàïàñàìè ýíåðãîíîñèòåëåé è îòêàçàëèñü ïðèçíàâàòü Þæíûé Êàâêàç èñêëþ÷èòåëüíî ðîññèéñêîé ñôåðîé âëèÿíèÿ. Ê êîíöó 1994 ã. ïîâñåìåñòíî îôîðìèëñÿ è ïðîöåññ ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî óðåãóëèðîâàíèÿ êîíôëèêòîâ â Çàêàâêàçüå.  òî æå âðåìÿ ïðîäîëæàëîñü òàéíîå ñîïåðíè÷åñòâî Ðîññèè è ÑØÀ â ðåãèîíå, îñîáåííî ïî âîïðîñó íåôòåïðîâîäà Áàêó–Òáèëèñè–Äæåéõàí; ïî âîïðîñàì òðàíñïîðòèðîâêè êàñïèéñêîé íåôòè; ïî ïðîáëåìå Åâðàçèéñêîãî òðàíñïîðòíîãî êîðèäîðà ÷åðåç Ãðóçèþ (ÒRÀÑÅÑÀ). Ñ îñåíè 1999 è ñ 11 ñåíòÿáðÿ 2001 ã. â ñîâðåìåííîé ïîëèòè÷åñêîé èñòîðèè Àáõàçèè íàñòóïèë òðåòèé ýòàï, à âìåñòå ñ íèì íà÷àëñÿ âòîðîé ðàçäåë Þæíîãî Êàâêàçà â óñëîâèÿõ ãëîáàëüíîãî ïåðåäåëà ìèðà1 .  1993 ã., ïîñëå îêîí÷àíèÿ ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíû, àäìèíèñòðàöèÿ Á. Åëüöèíà ñ ñåíòÿáðÿ – äåêàáðÿ 1994 ã. è âïëîòü äî îñåíè 1999 ã. âíîâü ñòàëà ïðîâîäèòü â îòíîøåíèè Àáõàçèè ïîëèòèêó «êíóòà», îáúÿâèâ íåçàâèñèìîìó ãîñóäàðñòâó äå-ôàêòî âñåñòîðîííþþ áëîêàäó, âêëþ÷àÿ ôèíàíñîâî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêóþ è èíôîðìàöèîííóþ. Ñ ïðèõîäîì Â. Ïóòèíà ïîëèòèêà «êíóòà», ïðîâîäèìàÿ Åëüöèíûì, ñìåíèëàñü â Àáõàçèè íà ïîëèòèêó «ïðÿíèêà», ÷òî áûëî, áåçóñëîâíî, âûçâàíî àíòèðîññèéñêèì ïîâåäåíèåì Òáèëèñè ïî ðÿäó âîïðîñîâ âîåííî-ñòðàòåãè÷åñêîãî õàðàêòåðà. Îêîí÷àòåëüíûé ïîâîðîò ðîññèéñêîé ïîëèòèêè â ñòîðîíó Àáõàçèè ïðîèçîøåë ïîñëå òðàãåäèè â ÑØÀ 11 ñåíòÿáðÿ 2001 ã. è ïîñëåäîâàâøèìè âñëåä çà íåé Êîäîðñêèìè ñîáûòèÿìè îêòÿáðÿ 2001 ã. Ñëåäóþùèé ýòàï – ýòî ïåðåãîâîðû Ïóòèíà è Áóøà â Ìîñêâå â ìàå 2002 ã., â òîì ÷èñëå ïî âîïðîñó Àáõàçèè. Êîñâåííî îá ýòîì ìîæåò ñâèäåòåëüñòâîâàòü î÷åíü àêòèâíî ïðîøåäøàÿ â Àáõàçèè â èþíå 2002 ã. è ïîääåðæàííàÿ ìíîãîíàöèîíàëüíûì íàñåëåíèåì àêöèÿ ìàññîâîãî ïðèíÿòèÿ ðîññèéñêîãî ãðàæäàíñòâà. Ëåòîì 2002 ã. àêòèâèçàöèÿ ïîëèòèêè Ðîññèè â Àáõàçèè ïðîõîäèëà î÷åíü áóðíî è äåìîíñòðàòèâíî.  àâãóñòå ñþäà ïðèáûëà ïðåäñòàâèòåëüíàÿ ìîñêîâñêî-êðåìëåâñêàÿ äåëåãàöèÿ, êîòîðàÿ îäíèì ñâîèì ïðèñóòñòâèåì îáîçíà÷èëà äàííóþ òåððèòîðèþ êàê ïîäîïå÷íóþ.  íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ ÑØÀ è Ðîññèÿ ÿâëÿþòñÿ «âûíóæäåííûìè» ñîþçíèêàìè. Î÷åâèäíî, ÷òî ÑØÀ íóæäàþòñÿ â ïîääåðæêå Ðîññèè â Àôãàíèñòàíå, Èðàíå, Ñåâåðíîé Êîðåå è, êîíå÷íî æå, ïî ïðîáëåìå Èðàêà. Êàðèêàòóðíîå ïîâåäåíèå Øåâàðäíàäçå íà ýòîì ãåîïîëèòè÷åñêîì ôîíå, åãî ïîïûòêè ñòîëêíóòü, ñòðàâèòü ÑØÀ è Ðîññèþ, à òàêæå åãî äâóðóøíè÷åñòâî áûëè äîïîëíèòåëüíûì ðàçäðàæèòåëåì. Âàøèíãòîí âñå áîëüøå îñîçíàåò, ÷òî åìó íåâîçìîæíî îáîéòèñü áåç ðåãèîíàëüíîé ïîääåðæêè Ðîññèè, ïóñòü è îñëàáëåííîé, íî ñòðåìèòåëüíî íàáèðàþùåé ðàçáåã. Íîâûå ðîññèéñêèå ïðàãìàòèêè, ïîõîæå, îêîí÷àòåëüíî 126

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îïðåäåëèëèñü íå òîëüêî ïî Àáõàçèè. Âñå, ÷òî ïðîèñõîäèò ñåãîäíÿ â ýòîé ÷àñòè ìèðà, íàïîìèíàåò ãðàíäèîçíóþ áèòâó çà Êàâêàç. 11 ñåíòÿáðÿ 2001 ã. íà÷àëñÿ, ïî ñóòè, íîâûé, âòîðîé ýòàï ïåðåäåëà Çàêàâêàçüÿ. Ñòðàòåãè÷åñêàÿ çàäà÷à ÑØÀ è ÅÑ – çàêðåïèòüñÿ â ýòîì ðåãèîíå êàñïèéñêîé íåôòè è îáåñïå÷èòü åå òðàíñïîðòèðîâêó íà Çàïàä; çàäà÷à Ðîññèè – âîññòàíîâèòü ñâîé êîíòðîëü íàä ýòîé æèçíåííî âàæíîé äëÿ áåçîïàñíîñòè þæíîãî ôëàíãà Ðîññèè òåððèòîðèåé äëÿ óìèðîòâîðåíèÿ Ñåâåðíîãî Êàâêàçà. Íàïîìíþ, ÷òî â ïåðèîä 1917–1921 ãã. Ðîññèÿ íà âðåìÿ ïîëíîñòüþ óòåðÿëà êîíòðîëü íàä Çàêàâêàçüåì, ãäå ãîñïîäñòâîâàëè ñíà÷àëà ãåðìàíñêèå è òóðåöêèå âîéñêà, à çàòåì àíãëî-ôðàíöóçñêèå. Òîãäà ñòðàíû Àíòàíòû, êîòîðûõ ïðèâëåêàë âñå òîò æå «çàïàõ áàêèíñêîé íåôòè», ïîñòèãëî ðàçî÷àðîâàíèå. «Ïóòü â Áàêó âåäåò ÷åðåç Áàòóì – Òèôëèñ, – ïèñàë Ë. Òðîöêèé â 20-å ãîäû – Ýòîò ïîñëåäíèé ïóíêò ÿâëÿåòñÿ ñòðàòåãè÷åñêèì ôîêóñîì Çàêàâêàçüÿ… Áîðüáà èäåò èç-çà íåôòè è ìàðãàíöà. Íåôòåïðîìûøëåííèêàì âñå ðàâíî, êàê äîðâàòüñÿ äî íåôòè: ÷åðåç Äåíèêèíà, ÷åðåç ìóñóëüìàíñêóþ ïàðòèþ ìóñàâàò èëè ÷åðåç âîðîòà “íàöèîíàëüíîãî ñàìîîïðåäåëåíèÿ”»2. Ïîõîæå, ÷òî èñòîðèÿ ïîâòîðÿåòñÿ, èëè ïðîèñõîäÿùåå – íîâàÿ èìïðîâèçàöèÿ? Áîëåå ãîäà íàçàä, ò.å. äî ñîáûòèé íîÿáðüñêîé «áàðõàòíîé ðåâîëþöèè» â Òáèëèñè, â Àáõàçèè ïðèøëè ê âûâîäó: «ÑØÀ áóäóò òàêòè÷íî ñäàâàòü Øåâàðäíàäçå, îáíàäåæèâàÿ åãî íà ñëîâàõ, ïîñûëàÿ òåïëûå ïèñüìà…»3. Ñëåäóåò òàêæå îòìåòèòü, ÷òî óæå â òðåòèé ðàç (â ïåðâûé ïîñëå ïîðàæåíèÿ â Àáõàçèè â 1993–1994 ãã., âî âòîðîé ïîñëå ìàéñêèõ ñîáûòèé 1998 ã. â Ãàëå) â Ãðóçèè îáúåêòèâíî ñêëàäûâàåòñÿ ñèòóàöèÿ, êîòîðóþ çàïàäíûå ýêñïåðòû õàðàêòåðèçóþò êàê «íåñîñòîÿâøååñÿ ãîñóäàðñòâî». Ñòàëêèâàÿñü ñî âñå âîçðàñòàþùèìè òðóäíîñòÿìè â ãëîáàëüíûõ âîïðîñàõ, ðàñïûëÿÿ ñâîè âîåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêèå ñèëû è ôèíàíñîâî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêèå ðåñóðñû ïî âñåìó ìèðó, ÑØÀ êàê ñâåðõäåðæàâà ñòàëè èñïûòûâàòü çíà÷èòåëüíûå ñëîæíîñòè. Òàê, íîâàÿ «Áóðÿ â ïóñòûíå» îáåðíóëàñü äëÿ íèõ íàñòîÿùåé «Áóðåé â Åâðîïå», à ñîþçíèêè ïî ÍÀÒÎ Ôðàíöèÿ (Æ. Øèðàê) è Ãåðìàíèÿ (Ã. Øðåäåð) îòêðûòî âûñòóïèëè ïðîòèâ âîéíû â Èðàêå. Ó âåðíîãî ñîþçíèêà Ò. Áëýðà ñåðüåçíûå îñëîæíåíèÿ â áðèòàíñêîì ïàðëàìåíòå, òðóäíîñòè ñ îáùåñòâåííûì ìíåíèåì. Îïåðàöèè â Èðàêå îïàñàåòñÿ Òóðöèÿ, êîòîðóþ âñåðüåç áåñïîêîèò ïðîáëåìà îáúåäèíåííîãî Êóðäèñòàíà, à òàêæå ïëàíû ôåäåðàëèçàöèè Èðàêà ñ ïðåäîñòàâëåíèåì øèðîêîé àâòîíîìèè êóðäàì. Î äåéñòâèòåëüíîé ïîçèöèè ðÿäà âëèÿòåëüíûõ àðàáñêèõ ãîñóäàðñòâ â ñâÿçè ñ âîåííûìè äåéñòâèÿìè Èçðàèëÿ ïðîòèâ ïàëåñòèíöåâ âîîáùå íå ïðèõîäèòñÿ ãîâîðèòü. Îñîáîå áåñïîêîéñòâî âûçûâàþò ìîùü èñëàìñêîãî ôóíäàìåíòàëèçìà è áóðíîå ðàçâèòèå Êèòàÿ. Ïî ýòîìó ïîâîäó ñ îáîñíîâàííîé îçàáî÷åííîñòüþ âûñêàçàëñÿ ×. Êðàóòõàììåð. «Ñóðîâûé ôàêò çàêëþ÷àåòñÿ â òîì, – ïèøåò îí, – ÷òî âîéíà íà ìíîãèõ ôðîíòàõ èñòîùàåò è ñäåðæèâàåò àìåðèêàíñêóþ ìîùü.  òî âðåìÿ êàê àìåðèêàíöû ïðîëèâàþò ñâîþ êðîâü è òðàòÿò 127

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ñâîè ñðåäñòâà â òàêèõ äàëåêèõ ìåñòàõ, êàê Áàãäàä, Êèòàé ñòðîèò ýêîíîìè÷åñêóþ è âîåííóþ ñóïåðäåðæàâó áóäóùåãî» (Time. 2004. 9 ÿíâàðÿ).  ýòîì êîíòåêñòå ãëîáàëüíîé ìèðîâîé ïîëèòèêè Ðîññèÿ èç âûíóæäåííîãî ñîþçíèêà ÑØÀ âñå áîëüøå áóäåò ïðåâðàùàòüñÿ â íåîáõîäèìîãî äëÿ çàïàäíîé öèâèëèçàöèè ñîþçíèêà. Íå ñåêðåò, ÷òî ðîññèéñêèå ãàçî- è íåôòåìàãíàòû ñîâåùàëèñü â 2002 ã. â Òåõàñå, ãäå, â ÷àñòíîñòè, îáñóæäàëñÿ âîïðîñ ñîâðåìåííîé ïîëèòèêè: íå ïåðåêëþ÷èòüñÿ ëè Çàïàäó íà ïîñòàâêè ðîññèéñêîé íåôòè è ãàçà, îòêàçàâøèñü îò óñëóã àðàáñêîãî ìèðà? Âàøèíãòîí îáðàùàåòñÿ ê Ðîññèè çà ïîìîùüþ íå òîëüêî â ñâÿçè ñ ãîðÿùåé ïðîáëåìîé Èðàêà, íî è ñ òðóäíîñòÿìè, ñâÿçàííûìè ñ Àôãàíèñòàíîì, Èðàíîì, ÿäåðíîé Ñåâåðíîé Êîðååé. Âçàèìîäåéñòâèå Ðîññèè è ÑØÀ, èõ êîîðäèíàöèÿ ïðîñìàòðèâàåòñÿ è íà ïðèìåðå çàêàâêàçñêîé ïîëèòèêè. Èçâåñòíî, íàïðèìåð, ÷òî ëåòîì 2003 ã. ÑØÀ è Ðîññèÿ âåëè ñåêðåòíûå êîíñóëüòàöèè î áóäóùåì Çàêàâêàçüÿ, â òîì ÷èñëå è Àáõàçèè, à òàêæå î ðàçãðàíè÷åíèè ñôåð âëèÿíèÿ è ñîòðóäíè÷åñòâå â ýòîì ðåãèîíå. Òàê, íåîæèäàííîñòüþ äëÿ ãðóçèíñêîé îáùåñòâåííîñòè îêàçàëîñü î÷åíü âàæíîå ñîáûòèå íå ñòîëüêî ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî, ñêîëüêî ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî õàðàêòåðà: 31 èþëÿ 2003 ã. áûëè îôîðìëåíû äâà âàæíåéøèõ ñîãëàøåíèÿ. Ðîññèéñêèé «Ãàçïðîì» è ïðàâèòåëüñòâî Ãðóçèè ïîäïèñàëè ñîãëàøåíèå î ñòðàòåãè÷åñêîì ñîòðóäíè÷åñòâå â ãàçîâîé îòðàñëè ñðîêîì íà 25 ëåò, à ïðåçèäåíò àìåðèêàíñêîé êîðïîðàöèè «AES» çàÿâèë, ÷òî ðóêîâîäèìàÿ èì êîðïîðàöèÿ ïðîäàëà ÐÀÎ «ÅÝÑ Ðîññèè» êîíòðîëüíûé ïàêåò (75%) àêöèé òáèëèññêîé ýëåêòðîðàñïðåäåëèòåëüíîé êîìïàíèè «ÒÝËÀÑÈ».  1998 ã., êîãäà àìåðèêàíñêàÿ «AES» âûêóïèëà çà 25 ìëí äîëëàðîâ ïàêåò àêöèé «ÒÝËÀÑÈ», åå ïðèõîä â Ãðóçèþ íàçûâàëè âàæíûì ïîëèòè÷åñêèì ðåøåíèåì è ñòðàòåãè÷åñêèì øàãîì. Íà ñåé ðàç âàæíûå ïîëèòè÷åñêèå øàãè ñäåëàëà Ðîññèÿ. Ôàêòè÷åñêè ÑØÀ óæå òîãäà «ñäàëè» Øåâàðäíàäçå. Ñäåëàíî ýòî áûëî â îäíî÷àñüå, à îïîâåñòèë âñåõ î ïðîèçîøåäøåì ïðèáûâøèé â Òáèëèñè 15 àâãóñòà 2003 ã. âåçäåñóùèé Àíàòîëèé ×óáàéñ. Ðîññèÿ ñòàëà ôàêòè÷åñêèì ìîíîïîëèñòîì â ýíåðãåòè÷åñêîé ñôåðå Ãðóçèè è çàïîëó÷èëà ìàãèñòðàëüíûé ãàçîïðîâîä. Ãëàâíûé ýêñïåðò Èíñòèòóòà ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî ðàçâèòèÿ Ãðóçèè Íèêî Îðâåëàøâèëè êîíñòàòèðîâàë: «Ôàêòè÷åñêè ïðîèçîøåë ïåðåâîðîò.  îáùåì, äåéñòâèòåëüíî, óæå íå íóæíà 11-ÿ ðóññêàÿ àðìèÿ (â 1921 ã. îíà îêêóïèðîâàëà Ãðóçèþ. – Ñ.Ë.), õâàòèò âûäâèæåíèÿ â þæíîì íàïðàâëåíèè ÐÀÎ “ÅÝє è “Ãàçïðîìà”»4 . Ñóäÿ ïî âñåìó, ëåòîì 2003 ã. àìåðèêàíöû îêîí÷àòåëüíî ðåøèëè ñìåíèòü êîððóìïèðîâàííîãî Øåâàðäíàäçå. Îá ýòîì ìîæåò ñâèäåòåëüñòâîâàòü è äâóõäíåâíûé âèçèò â Òáèëèñè â íà÷àëå èþëÿ áûâøåãî ãîññåêðåòàðÿ ÑØÀ Äæåéìñà Áåéêåðà. Îí ïðèâåç íîâóþ ñõåìó ïàðëàìåíòñêèõ âûáîðîâ â Ãðóçèè 2 íîÿáðÿ. Ïðè ýòîì èíòåðåñíî, ÷òî «äðóã» Øåâàðäíàäçå ïîâåë ñåáÿ îòíþäü íå äðóæåñêè, ïðåäëîæèâ íîâûé èçáèðàòåëüíûé êîäåêñ è ôîðìèðîâàíèå èçáèðàòåëüíûõ êîìèññèé âñåõ óðîâíåé. Íîâûé ïðåäñåäàòåëü ÖÈÊ Ãðóçèè âûâîäèëñÿ èç-ïîä âëèÿíèÿ ïðåçèäåíòà Øåâàðäíàäçå, à ïðàâî íàçíà÷åíèÿ íà ýòó 128

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äîëæíîñòü ïîëó÷èëà ÎÁÑÅ. 24 èþëÿ 2003 ã. ïîñëå îæåñòî÷åííûõ äåáàòîâ ïàðëàìåíò Ãðóçèè óòâåðäèë ïðåäñòàâëåííûé èçáèðàòåëüíûé êîäåêñ, ÷òî ÿâèëîñü ñåðüåçíûì ïîðàæåíèåì Øåâàðäíàäçå5 . Âîîáùå äëÿ Çàêàâêàçüÿ â öåëîì îñåíü ñòàëà æàðêîé ïîðîé. Êàê óæå îòìå÷àëîñü, íàðÿäó ñ ñîòðóäíè÷åñòâîì ïðîäîëæàåòñÿ ñêðûòîå, à èíîãäà äåìîíñòðàòèâíîå ñîïåðíè÷åñòâî ìåæäó Ðîññèåé è ÑØÀ. Èç òðåõ ïðèçíàííûõ ñòðàí Çàêàâêàçüÿ òîëüêî Àðìåíèÿ âñå åùå ñìîòðèò â ñòîðîíó Ìîñêâû. Âûáîðû ïðåçèäåíòà â íåé óæå ñîñòîÿëèñü. Ïîõîæå, ÷òî ïî âûáîðàì ïðåçèäåíòà Àçåðáàéäæàíà ÑØÀ è Ðîññèÿ äîãîâîðèëèñü îòíîñèòåëüíî ñûíà Ãåéäàðà Àëèåâà. Ñêîðåå âñåãî, òàêîé æå ðîññèéñêî-àìåðèêàíñêèé êîìïðîìèññíûé âàðèàíò ñóùåñòâîâàë è äëÿ Ãðóçèè, â êîòîðîé ãîòîâèëàñü ñìåíà ðóêîâîäñòâà. Ìåæäó ïðî÷èì, âåñüìà ïîêàçàòåëüíî, ÷òî íàêàíóíå âñòðå÷è ïðåäñòàâèòåëåé ÑØÀ è Ðîññèè â Êýìï-Äýâèäå, ìèíèñòð èíîñòðàííûõ äåë Ðîññèè Èãîðü Èâàíîâ â ñåíòÿáðå 2003 ã. çàáëîêèðîâàë â ßëòå âîïðîñ Ãðóçèè î ðàññìîòðåíèè çàÿâëåíèÿ ïî Àáõàçèè. Øåâàðäíàäçå êàê íèêîãäà áûë ïðèíÿò ðóêîâîäñòâîì Ðîññèè î÷åíü ñóõî. «Âû çíàåòå, êàê ñëîæíî áûëî, – ãîâîðèë îí çàòåì â Òáèëèñè, – ïðèíÿòü çàÿâëåíèå â ßëòå, áûëà ñëîæíàÿ ñèòóàöèÿ»6 . Íà ïðåññ-êîíôåðåíöèè â ßëòå 19 ñåíòÿáðÿ ïðåçèäåíò Â. Ïóòèí íè ñëîâîì íå îáìîëâèëñÿ ïî ïîâîäó òåððèòîðèàëüíîé öåëîñòíîñòè Ãðóçèè. «Íà ïîñòñîâåòñêîì ïðîñòðàíñòâå, – îòâå÷àë îí ãðóçèíñêîìó æóðíàëèñòó, – ê ñîæàëåíèþ, ìíîãî åùå êîíôëèêòíûõ òî÷åê. Îäíà èç íàèáîëåå îñòðûõ – Àáõàçèÿ. È âñå ìû õîòèì, ÷òîáû ýòà è äðóãèå ïðîáëåìû ïîäîáíîãî ðîäà áûëè óðåãóëèðîâàíû ñïðàâåäëèâûì îáðàçîì íà îñíîâå ìåæäóíàðîäíîãî ïðàâà è òåõ ðåàëèé, â êîòîðûõ ìû æèâåì. ×òîáû ýòè ïðîáëåìû áûëè óðåãóëèðîâàíû ñïðàâåäëèâûì îáðàçîì íà áëàãî âñåõ íàðîäîâ, êîòîðûå ïðîæèâàþò íà òåððèòîðèè êîíôëèêòíûõ ðåãèîíîâ»7 . Ïðèíèìàÿ ó÷àñòèå íà óðîâíå ðóêîâîäèòåëåé ñòðàí ÑÍà íà âñòðå÷å â ßëòå, Øåâàðäíàäçå ïîíèìàë, ÷òî îêàçàëñÿ â î÷åíü íåïðîñòîì ïîëîæåíèè, îñîáåííî ïîñëå âèçèòà Áåéêåðà è ýíåðãåòè÷åñêîé êàïèòóëÿöèè ïåðåä ÐÀÎ «ÅÝÑ Ðîññèè» è «Ãàçïðîìîì».  ýòèõ óñëîâèÿõ ïðåçèäåíò Ãðóçèè ðåøèë ñîâåðøèòü åùå îäèí êóëüáèò. Âî âðåìÿ çàñòîëüÿ â ßëòå îí ïðîèçíåñ òîñò â ÷åñòü Ïóòèíà, çà «êîòîðûé åãî çàñòàâèëè îïðàâäûâàòüñÿ â Òáèëèñè». Îí ãîâîðèë, ÷òî â òîñòå íå áûëî ïîäõàëèìñòâà, îäíàêî ðîññèéñêèå è ãðóçèíñêèå ÑÌÈ ñðàâíèëè ýòî åãî âûñòóïëåíèå ñ åãî æå õðåñòîìàòèéíîé ôðàçîé ñîâåòñêèõ âðåìåí: «Ñîëíöå äëÿ Ãðóçèè âñòàåò íà ñåâåðå». Ïðåçèäåíò Ãðóçèè íàçâàë Ïóòèíà «äîñòóïíûì, êîììóíèêàáåëüíûì, äîñòîéíûì, óäèâèòåëüíî ïîíèìàþùèì íþàíñ è ñèòóàöèþ ñåãîäíÿøíåãî äíÿ è áóäóùåãî». Îòìåòèë, ÷òî «ãîðä òåì, ÷òî Ðîññèþ âîçãëàâëÿåò òàêîé ñèëüíûé è îòâåòñòâåííûé ðóêîâîäèòåëü. Ìû âñå äîëæíû áûòü óáåæäåíû â òîì, ÷òî ñ íàìè âåëèêàÿ Ðîññèÿ, ðóññêèé íàðîä»8 . ×óâñòâóÿ, ÷òî Çàïàä ïîâîðà÷èâàåòñÿ ê íåìó ñïèíîé, îí ðåøèë âíîâü íàëàäèòü îòíîøåíèÿ ñ Ìîñêâîé, õîòÿ ñîâñåì íåäàâíî âûñòóïàë ñ îòêðîâåííî 129

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ðóñîôîáñêèìè ðå÷àìè. Ýòèì íå ïðåìèíóëà âîñïîëüçîâàòüñÿ îïïîçèöèÿ. Íàðîä áûë îáåñêóðàæåí òàêîé ìãíîâåííîé ïåðåìåíîé ñâîåãî ïðåçèäåíòà. Íî íà íîñó áûëè âûáîðû â ïàðëàìåíò Ãðóçèè è çèìíèå õîëîäà, òàê ÷òî íè÷åãî äðóãîãî íå îñòàâàëîñü, êàê ñíîâà äðóæèòü ñ Ðîññèåé. Ãðóçèÿ òàê è íå ñìîãëà, íåñìîòðÿ íà îãðîìíûå çàïàäíûå êðåäèòû, ñîçäàòü ñîáñòâåííóþ ýíåðãåòè÷åñêóþ áåçîïàñíîñòü, áåç êîòîðîé âñå ðàçãîâîðû î «íåçàâèñèìîñòè» îñòàâàëèñü ïóñòûì çâóêîì. Íàêàíóíå âûáîðîâ è ïîñîë ÑØÀ Ðè÷àðä Ìàéëç âäðóã çàÿâèë: «Â Ãðóçèè íåáëàãîïðèÿòíàÿ èíâåñòèöèîííàÿ ñðåäà»9 . Âî âñåì ìèðå ðàñïðîñòðàíèëîñü ìíåíèå, ÷òî Ãðóçèÿ – íåíàäåæíûé ïàðòíåð. Âñëåä çà ßëòîé â ñåíòÿáðå 2003 ã. â ÑØÀ ñîñòîÿëèñü ïåðåãîâîðû ïðåçèäåíòîâ Äæ. Áóøà è Â. Ïóòèíà. Âñòðå÷à íà âûñøåì óðîâíå â Êýìï-Äýâèäå ÿâèëàñü, ïî ñëîâàì Øåâàðäíàäçå, ëîãè÷åñêèì ïðîäîëæåíèåì ìîñêîâñêîé âñòðå÷è â ìàå 2002 ã. Îíà äëèëàñü îêîëî äâóõ ÷àñîâ, è íà íåé â îñíîâíîì îáñóæäàëèñü êîíôëèêòû, â òîì ÷èñëå ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêèé, ïðèäíåñòðîâñêèé, êàðàáàõñêèé è äðóãèå. «Ñ÷èòàþ î÷åíü âàæíûì, – îòìåòèë ãëàâà Ãðóçèè, – êîãäà ïðåçèäåíòû äâóõ áîëüøèõ ãîñóäàðñòâ îáñóæäàþò âîïðîñû óðåãóëèðîâàíèÿ êîíôëèêòîâ».  ñâÿçè ñ ýòèì òåëåâåäóùàÿ áðîñèëà ðåïëèêó: «Ïðîòèâîñòîÿíèå èíòåðåñîâ ýòèõ äâóõ ñòðàí ìîæåò ðàçäàâèòü Ãðóçèþ»10 . Ñîáûòèÿ, ïðîèçîøåäøèå âñëåä çà Êýìï-Äýâèäîì, ñâèäåòåëüñòâóþò î òîì, ÷òî ÑØÀ óæåñòî÷èëè ñâîþ ïîçèöèþ â îòíîøåíèè îôèöèàëüíûõ ãðóçèíñêèõ âëàñòåé. Òàê, ïðåäñòàâèòåëü Ãîñäåïàðòàìåíòà ÑØÀ Òîìàñ Àäàìñ, âûéäÿ èç êàáèíåòà Øåâàðäíàäçå, âûñêàçàë íåäîâîëüñòâî îñóùåñòâëÿåìûìè â Ãðóçèè ðåôîðìàìè è ïðåäïîëîæèë, ÷òî «Ãðóçèÿ îñòàíåòñÿ áåç ïîìîùè ÑØÀ»11 . Áåñïîêîéñòâî â ñâÿçè ñ ïðèáëèæàþùèìèñÿ âûáîðàìè ïðîÿâëÿëè ïðèáûâøèå â Ãðóçèþ âèäíûå àìåðèêàíñêèå ïîëèòèêè, âîåííûå, äèïëîìàòû – áûâøèé Ãîññåêðåòàðü Äæåéìñ Áåéêåð, ñåíàòîð Äæîí ÌàêÊåéí, ãåíåðàë Äæîí Øàëèêàøâèëè, áûâøèé çàìåñòèòåëü Ãîññåêðåòàðÿ Ñòðîóá Òýëáîòò, ïðåçèäåíò ïðîåêòà ÍÀÒÎ «Ïåðåõîäíûå äåìîêðàòèè» Áðþñ Äæåêñîí è äðóãèå12.  ñàìûé êàíóí âûáîðîâ òåëåæóðíàëèñò Ëþáà Ýëèàøâèëè ñïðàøèâàëà ïðåçèäåíòà Ãðóçèè î ìíîãî÷èñëåííûõ çàïàäíûõ ïîëèòèêàõ, äèïëîìàòàõ, êîòîðûå «åäèíîäóøíî çàÿâëÿþò, ÷òî ïðîâåäåíèå äåìîêðàòè÷åñêèõ âûáîðîâ ñòàíåò ðåøàþùèì äëÿ ñòðàíû ôàêòîðîì». Ý. Øåâàðäíàäçå íåñêîëüêî ðàñòåðÿííî îòâåòèë: «È ÿ íåðåäêî äóìàþ, ïî÷åìó ïðîÿâëÿþò òàêîé îñîáûé èíòåðåñ ê Ãðóçèè? Âñå ìû ïîìíèì âèçèò Áåéêåðà â Ãðóçèþ è ïðåäëîæåííûé èì ïëàí… Â ñîîòâåòñòâèè ñ ýòèìè ïóíêòàìè äîëæíà ïðîâîäèòüñÿ èçáèðàòåëüíàÿ êàìïàíèÿ. Çàòåì áûëè è äðóãèå». È î÷åíü âÿëî è äàæå ñ îïàñêîé îí îòìåòèë, ÷òî åìó èçâåñòíî, êàê ùåäðî ôèíàíñèðóåòñÿ îïïîçèöèÿ íåêîòîðûìè ñòðàíàìè13 .  ñàìûé êàíóí âûáîðîâ, 31 îêòÿáðÿ 2003 ã., ñïåöèàëüíîå ïîñëàíèå ãëàâå Ãðóçèè íàïðàâèë ïðåçèäåíò ÑØÀ, êîòîðûé íàïîìíèë î äîãîâîðåííîñòÿõ ñ Äæ. Áåéêåðîì ïî âîïðîñó ïðîâåäåíèÿ âûáîðîâ 2 íîÿáðÿ. Êàê îáû÷íî, îí 130

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âûñêàçàëñÿ çà óêðåïëåíèå íåçàâèñèìîñòè è òåððèòîðèàëüíîé öåëîñòíîñòè ñòðàíû è ïðåäëîæèë ðàáîòàòü äëÿ ðåøåíèÿ êîíôëèêòà â «Àáõàçèè èëè äðóãèõ êîíôëèêòîâ â ðåãèîí养14 . Ïîñëå ñâîåãî âûíóæäåííîãî óõîäà Øåâàðäíàäçå äàë ðÿä èíòåðâüþ çàïàäíûì è ðîññèéñêèì ÑÌÈ, â êîòîðûõ îáâèíèë ÑØÀ â ïðè÷àñòíîñòè ê ñâîåé îòñòàâêå. Òàê, êàíàäñêàÿ ãàçåòà Globe and Mail (2003. 27 íîÿáðÿ) ïðèâîäèò ôàêòû ïîääåðæêè ôèíàíñèñòîì-ìèëëèàðäåðîì Äæ. Ñîðîñîì îïïîçèöèîííûõ ñèë, êîòîðûì îí âûäåëÿë çíà÷èòåëüíûå ñóììû. Ñ åãî ïîìîùüþ ëèäåðû «Íàöèîíàëüíîãî äâèæåíèÿ» è ãðóçèíñêèå ñòóäåíòû ïðîøëè ñïåöèàëüíûå êóðñû â Ñåðáèè, ãäå îáó÷àëèñü ïðîâåäåíèþ «áåñêðîâíûõ ðåâîëþöèé». Áðèòàíñêàÿ Daily Telegraph (2003. 27 íîÿáðÿ) ñî ñëîâ ýêñ-ïðåçèäåíòà ñîîáùèëà, ÷òî åãî îòñòàâêà áûëà îðãàíèçîâàíà Çàïàäîì, êîòîðûé Øåâàðäíàäçå îáâèíèë â íåáëàãîäàðíîñòè è ïðåäàòåëüñòâå. Îí íå ñêðûâàë ðàçî÷àðîâàíèÿ ïî ïîâîäó àìåðèêàíñêîãî ïîñëà â Ãðóçèè Ðè÷àðäà Ìàéëçà, ïîääåðæàâøåãî îïïîçèöèþ. «Êîãäà èì íóæíà áûëà ìîÿ ïîääåðæêà ïî Èðàêó, ÿ ïðåäîñòàâèë åå. ×òî æå ñëó÷èëîñü ñåé÷àñ, ÿ îáúÿñíèòü íå ìîãó», – çàìåòèë Øåâàðäíàäçå. Êàê èçâåñòíî, âíåøíÿÿ ïîëèòèêà ìíîãîìåðíà, à îòíîøåíèÿ Ðîññèè è ÑØÀ èçîáèëóþò íåïðåäâèäåííûìè îñëîæíåíèÿìè. Îäèí èç òàêèõ êàìíåé ïðåòêíîâåíèÿ – Ãðóçèÿ. Ñóäÿ ïî âñåìó, äâå äåðæàâû áûëè çàèíòåðåñîâàíû â ñìåíå Ý. Øåâàðäíàäçå, ÷òî è ïðîèçîøëî ïîñëå âûáîðîâ â ðåçóëüòàòå «ðåâîëþöèè ðîç» 23 íîÿáðÿ 2003 ã. Îäíàêî öåëè îíè ïðåñëåäîâàëè ðàçëè÷íûå, ÷òî è ïîäòâåðäèë äàëüíåéøèé õîä ñîáûòèé. Âî ìíîãîì áëàãîäàðÿ êîîðäèíàöèè ñîâìåñòíûõ äåéñòâèé ñîáûòèÿ â Ãðóçèè óäàëîñü óäåðæàòü â îòíîñèòåëüíî áåñêðîâíîì ðóñëå, – õîòÿ ïåðåâîðîò ïðîèçîøåë. Îäíàêî ñ ýòîãî ìîìåíòà è íà÷àëàñü ÷åõàðäà â îòíîøåíèÿõ ìåæäó Ðîññèåé è ÑØÀ. Âîçíèêëè íîâûå îáñòîÿòåëüñòâà, ò.ê. â ðåçóëüòàòå ñìåíû ðóêîâîäñòâà ê âëàñòè ôàêòè÷åñêè ïðèøåë ïðîçàïàäíûé òðèóìâèðàò – Ì. Ñààêàøâèëè, Ç. Æâàíèÿ, Í. Áóðäæàíàäçå. Òàêîé ïîâîðîò ñîáûòèé íèêàê íå óñòðàèâàë Ìîñêâó.  ðåçóëüòàòå â Ãðóçèè ñëîæèëîñü ñâîåîáðàçíîå äâîåâëàñòèå: ÑØÀ, îáðàçíî ãîâîðÿ, îâëàäåëè Òáèëèñè, à Ðîññèÿ ðåãèîíàìè Ãðóçèè, êîòîðàÿ ðàçâàëèëàñü äî îñíîâàíèÿ. Ê íåçàâèñèìûì äå-ôàêòî ðåñïóáëèêàì Àáõàçèè è Þæíîé Îñåòèè ïðèñîåäèíèëàñü Àäæàðèÿ. Åå ëèäåð Àñëàí Àáàøèäçå è ïàðëàìåíò ââåëè â òîò æå äåíü, 23 íîÿáðÿ, ÷ðåçâû÷àéíîå ïîëîæåíèå â Àäæàðèè15 . Âñëåä çà ñîáûòèÿìè â Òáèëèñè Ðîññèÿ äåìîíñòðàòèâíî ïðîâåëà â Ìîñêâå êîíñóëüòàöèè ñ ëèäåðàìè Àäæàðèè, Àáõàçèè è Þæíîé Îñåòèè.  ýòî æå âðåìÿ, âûñòóïàÿ íà çàñåäàíèè Ñîâåòà ìèíèñòðîâ èíîñòðàííûõ äåë ÎÁÑÅ â Ìààñòðèõòå, Í. Áóðäæàíàäçå çàÿâèëà, ÷òî òàêèå äåéñòâèÿ ìîãóò ïðèâåñòè ê óùåðáó â îòíîøåíèÿõ ñ Ìîñêâîé è âûñêàçàëàñü çà âûâîä ñ òåððèòîðèè Ãðóçèè äâóõ îñòàþùèõñÿ ðîññèéñêèõ áàç. Íî, êàê èçâåñòíî, èìåííî îò Ìîñêâû çàâèñèò ñíàáæåíèå Òáèëèñè ýëåêòðîýíåðãèåé è ïðèðîäíûì ãàçîì. Ñòîèò Ðîññèè ïðåêðàòèòü çèìîé ïîñòàâêè, êàê âñÿ ýéôîðèÿ îò ïðèõîäà ê âëàñòè è 131

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ñâåðæåíèÿ «äèêòàòóðû Øåâàðäíàäçå» óëåòó÷èòñÿ óæå ÷åðåç íåñêîëüêî äíåé è òåìíûõ õîëîäíûõ íî÷åé. Ïëàòèòü â ïîëíîì îáúåìå çà ïîñòàâêè ýíåðãèè ñàì Òáèëèñè íå â ñîñòîÿíèè – äîëã íåèçìåííî ðàñòåò 16 . Ôèíàíñîâàÿ îáñòàíîâêà â ñòðàíå ïðîñòî êàòàñòðîôè÷åñêàÿ, äåôèöèò áþäæåòà Ãðóçèè íà 1 äåêàáðÿ 2003 ã. ñîñòàâèë 135 ìëí äîëëàðîâ, à âíåøíèé äîë㠖 ñâûøå 1,5 ìëðä äîëëàðîâ. Íåêîòîðûå âëèÿòåëüíûå çàïàäíûå èçäàíèÿ ñ÷èòàþò, ÷òî ïðîèçîøåäøåå â Ãðóçèè ñòàâèò ðÿä âîïðîñîâ. Òàê, Øåâàðäíàäçå – ýòî âòîðîé ïðåçèäåíò ñòðàíû, êîòîðûé ñìåùåí äî îêîí÷àíèÿ ñðîêà. Íå ñòàíåò ëè ýòî íîðìîé äëÿ Ãðóçèè è âñåãî Êàâêàçà? Ó÷èòûâàÿ ôàêòîðû ýêîíîìè÷åñêèå (ýëåêòðîýíåðãèÿ, ãàç, ñâûøå 1 ìèëëèîíà ãðóçèí, ïðîæèâàþùèõ â Ðîññèè è åæåãîäíî ïåðå÷èñëÿþùèõ ñâîèì ðîäñòâåííèêàì â Ãðóçèè ñâûøå 1 ìëðä äîëëàðîâ), ïîëèòè÷åñêèå (áûâøèå àâòîíîìèè), âîåííûå (ðîññèéñêèå áàçû), âëèÿíèå Ðîññèè íà Ãðóçèþ â ñâåòå ïîñëåäíèõ ñîáûòèé ìîæåò è óñèëèòüñÿ. «Âàøèíãòîí äîëæåí äåéñòâîâàòü áûñòðî, ÷òîáû ïðåäîòâðàòèòü óñèëåíèå âëèÿíèÿ ÐÔ íà Ãðóçèþ»17 , – îòìå÷àåò Wall Street Journal. Ðîññèÿ, ïèøåò Êîììåðñàíò, ãðîçèò íîâûì ãðóçèíñêèì âëàñòÿì óñòàíîâëåíèåì «ïðîòåêòîðàòà» èëè «îïåêè» íàä Àáõàçèåé, Àäæàðèåé è Þæíîé Îñåòèåé, åñëè ñîáûòèÿ áóäóò ðàçâèâàòüñÿ íå ïî ðîññèéñêîìó ñöåíàðèþ. Áûëà ÿêîáû äîñòèãíóòà äîãîâîðåííîñòü î òîì, ÷òî Ðîññèÿ âîçüìåò íà ñåáÿ îáÿçàòåëüñòâà ïî çàùèòå íå òîëüêî íàñåëåíèÿ Àáõàçèè, Þæíîé Îñåòèè è Àäæàðèè (ñðåäè æèòåëåé êîòîðûõ åñòü íåìàëî îáëàäàòåëåé ðîññèéñêèõ ïàñïîðòîâ), íî è èõ òåððèòîðèè18 . Ãëîáàëüíûå âîåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêèå èãðû íà Þæíîì Êàâêàçå, è â ÷àñòíîñòè â Ãðóçèè è Àáõàçèè, ñâÿçàíû ñî ñòðàòåãè÷åñêèì ñîïåðíè÷åñòâîì ÑØÀ è ÅÑ ñ Ðîññèåé ïî ðÿäó âàæíåéøèõ ïîëèòèêî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêèõ íàïðàâëåíèé. Ðîññèÿ êàê ïðàâîïðååìíèöà ÑÑÑÐ íå æåëàåò, ÷òîáû èç-ïîä åå íîñà Çàïàä óâåë çíà÷èòåëüíûå çàïàñû ýíåðãîðåñóðñîâ Êàñïèéñêîãî ðåãèîíà. Òåì áîëåå ÷òî â ïîñòñîâåòñêèé ïåðèîä â ýêîíîìèêå Ðîññèè çàêðåïèëàñü óñòîé÷èâàÿ ñûðüåâàÿ îðèåíòàöèÿ ñ óïîðîì íà íåôòü è ãàç.  ñîâðåìåííîé ñòðóêòóðå ðîññèéñêîãî ýêñïîðòà äîëÿ íåôòè è ãàçà ñîñòàâëÿåò áîëåå 34%. Ðîññèÿ ïåðåêà÷èâàåò öåííîå ñûðüå ñ êàçàõñòàíñêîãî ó÷àñòêà Êàñïèÿ ïî íåôòåïðîâîäó Òåíãèç – Íîâîðîññèéñê. È îíà íå çàèíòåðåñîâàíà â êîíêóðåíöèè, â ñòðîèòåëüñòâå àëüòåðíàòèâíûõ íåôòå- è ãàçîïðîâîäîâ, êîòîðûå ìîãóò ïðîéòè, ìèíóÿ åå òåððèòîðèþ. Èìåííî òàêèì òðàíçèòíûì ýíåðãåòè÷åñêèì êîðèäîðîì Âîñòîê – Çàïàä ïðè ïîääåðæêå ÑØÀ, Òóðöèè è ñòðàí ÅÑ ïûòàåòñÿ ñòàòü Ãðóçèÿ, ÷òî ïðåäñòàâëÿåò ñåðüåçíóþ óãðîçó íàöèîíàëüíîé áåçîïàñíîñòè Ðîññèè. Åå íå ìîæåò íå áåñïîêîèòü: – ñòðîÿùèéñÿ â îáõîä Ðîññèè íåôòåïðîâîä Áàêó – Òáèëèñè – Äæåéõàí; – ïðîåêò Þæíî-Êàâêàçñêîãî ãàçîïðîâîäà Áàêó – Òáèëèñè – Ýðçåðóì (Øàõ-Äåíèç); – ïðîáëåìà Åâðàçèéñêîãî òðàíñïîðòíîãî êîðèäîðà ÷åðåç Ãðóçèþ (TRACECA). 132

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 ñëó÷àå ðåàëèçàöèè ýòèõ ïðîåêòîâ Ðîññèÿ âîîáùå ðèñêóåò ëèøèòüñÿ ýêñïîðòà ãàçà è íåôòè, â ÷àñòíîñòè â ñòðàíû ÅÑ. Âî ìíîãîì ýòèìè ãåîñòðàòåãè÷åñêèìè îáñòîÿòåëüñòâàìè îáúÿñíÿåòñÿ òà âçðûâîîïàñíàÿ îáñòàíîâêà, êîòîðàÿ îõâàòûâàåò íå òîëüêî Ãðóçèþ è Àáõàçèþ, íî è çíà÷èòåëüíóþ ÷àñòü Êàâêàçà, Êàñïèÿ, Ïåðñèäñêîãî Çàëèâà, Èðàêà è ò.ä. Èìåííî ýòîò îáøèðíûé ðåãèîí, ïðîñòèðàþùèéñÿ îò óñòüÿ Âîëãè äî ñóëòàíàòà Îìàí, ïîëó÷èë íàçâàíèå «Êàñïèéñêî-Ïåðñèäñêîãî ýíåðãåòè÷åñêîãî ýëëèïñà»19 . Ñîãëàñíî ñóùåñòâóþùèì îöåíêàì, îí ñîäåðæèò áîëåå 2/3 ðàçâåäàííûõ ìèðîâûõ çàïàñîâ íåôòè è áîëåå 40% ïðèðîäíîãî ãàçà. Ïåðñèäñêèé Çàëè⠖ ýòî áîëåå 600 ìèëëèàðäîâ áàððåëåé íåôòè è 1600 òðèëëèîíîâ êóáè÷åñêèõ ôóòîâ ãàçà. Êàñïèéñêèå çàïàñû íåêîòîðûå èñòî÷íèêè îöåíèâàþò â 200 ìèëëèàðäîâ áàððåëåé íåôòè, õîòÿ ðàáî÷åé öèôðîé ñ÷èòàåòñÿ 90 ìèëëèàðäîâ áàððåëåé. Ýíåðãåòè÷åñêàÿ ïðèâëåêàòåëüíîñòü Ïðèêàñïèéñêîãî ðåãèîíà çàêëþ÷àåòñÿ â òîì, ÷òî îí ïðåäñòàâëÿåò ñîáîé ïðîäîëæåíèå íåôòÿíûõ ìåñòîðîæäåíèé Èðàêà è âñåãî Áëèæíåãî Âîñòîêà20 . Êàñïèé íàçûâàþò ýíåðãåòè÷åñêîé êëàäîâîé ÕÕI âåêà. Îäíàêî ôóíäàìåíòàëüíàÿ ïðîáëåìà Êàñïèÿ – òðàíñïîðòèðîâêà íåôòè íà âíåøíèå ðûíêè. Çäåñü ñðàáàòûâàåò ñòàðûé ãåîïîëèòè÷åñêèé ïðèíöèï: êòî âëàäååò ìàãèñòðàëÿìè, òîò âëàäååò âñåì ñîäåðæàíèåì ïîëèòèêè. Ñåêðåò ãîñïîäñòâà Áðèòàíñêîé èìïåðèè çàêëþ÷àëñÿ â êîíòðîëå íàä êëþ÷åâûìè òðàíçèòíûìè òî÷êàìè ìèðà – Ãèáðàëòàð, Ìàëüòà, Ñóýöêèé êàíàë. Íà ñìåíó äâóì àêòèâíûì èãðîêàì íà Êàñïèè â ÕIX â. – Ðîññèéñêîé è Áðèòàíñêîé èìïåðèÿì – â íîâûõ óñëîâèÿõ èõ ïðèøëî ãîðàçäî áîëüøå. Ãëàâíûé ôîêóñ áîðüáû ìåæäó íèìè – íåôòåãàçîâûå ðåñóðñû. Åñëè â ÕIÕ â. ñ÷èòàëîñü, ÷òî âñå ðåøàåò ñåòü æåëåçíûõ äîðîã â ðåãèîíå, òî ñåãîäíÿ ïåðñïåêòèâû ñòðàòåãè÷åñêîãî äîìèíèðîâàíèÿ â àðåàëå çàâèñÿò îò ñòðîèòåëüñòâà òðóáîïðîâîäîâ, êîòîðûå âûâåäóò íåôòü è ãàç ðåãèîíà íà âíåøíèå ðûíêè. «Ïóòè ïîòåíöèàëüíûõ ýêñïîðòíûõ íåôòåïðîâîäîâ, – îòìå÷àåò À. Ìàãîìåäîâ, – áîëüøå, ÷åì ÷òî-ëèáî äðóãîå, áóäåò îïðåäåëÿòü âûñòðàèâàíèå ëîêàëüíûõ ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ èíòåðåñîâ è íàïðàâëåíèå âíåøíåãî âëèÿíèÿ. Îò òîãî, êóäà ïîéäóò áóäóùèå íåôòåïðîâîäû – íà ñåâåð, þã, âîñòîê èëè çàïàä, – áóäåò îïðåäåëÿòüñÿ òî, êàê ýòî âëèÿíèå ìîæåò ñêàçàòüñÿ â áóäóùåì. Òàêèì îáðàçîì, èìåííî âäîëü íåôòåïðîâîäîâ ìîæíî óâèäåòü, êàê ïðîèñõîäèò âûñòðàèâàíèå áîëüøèõ äåíåã, áîëüøèõ àìáèöèé è áîëüøèõ ýãîèçìîâ êðóïíåéøèõ íåôòÿíûõ êîìïàíèé, ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ ëèäåðîâ è ïðàâÿùèõ ãðóïï»21 . Ñîçäàííûé â 1992 ã. Êàñïèéñêèé òðóáîïðîâîäíûé êîíñîðöèóì (ÊÒÊ) Òåíãèç – Íîâîðîññèéñê (ñ ó÷àñòèåì ïðàâèòåëüñòâ Ðîññèè, Êàçàõñòàíà è Ñóëòàíàòà Îìàí è ïðîòÿæåííîñòüþ 1580 êì) áûë ïðèçâàí óêðåïèòü ðîññèéñêîå äîìèíèðîâàíèå íàä Êàñïèéñêî-×åðíîìîðñêèì ïðîñòðàíñòâîì. ÊÒÊ óäåðæèâàåò Êàçàõñòàí è Ñðåäíþþ Àçèþ â òðàíçèòíûõ òèñêàõ Ðîññèè, âñå åùå ñîõðàíÿþùåé çà ñîáîé ñòàòóñ îñíîâíîãî «êîíòðîëåðà» êàñïèéñêîé íåôòè. Áóêâàëüíî çà íåñêîëüêî äíåé äî ïàðëàìåíòñêèõ âûáîðîâ â Ãðóçèè Ý. Øåâàðäíàäçå êàê áû âñëóõ ðàçìûøëÿë îá ýíåðãåòè÷åñêîé íåçàâèñèìîñòè. 133

Ãëàâà V

«Ìíå êàê ïðåçèäåíòó îñòàëîñü ïîëòîðà ãîäà, – ãîâîðèë îí, – ÷óòü áîëüøå. Õîòåëîñü, ÷òîáû íà ñòðîèòåëüñòâå ãàçîïðîâîäà òàê ïîøëè äåëà, ÷òîáû íàçàä âîçâðàòà íå áûëî. Íè íà Ñåâåð, íè íà Þã, íè â äðóãóþ ñòîðîíó…» 22 . Ðå÷ü øëà î ïðîåêòå ãàçîïðîâîäà Áàêó – Òáèëèñè – Ýðçåðóì (Øàõ-Äåíèç), â ðåçóëüòàòå ðåàëèçàöèè êîòîðîãî Ãðóçèÿ â ëó÷øåì ñëó÷àå ëèøü ê êîíöó 2006 ã. ïîëó÷èò ïðèðîäíûé ãàç. Åãî ñòðîèòåëüñòâî îáîéäåòñÿ â 1 ìëðä äîëëàðîâ. Íî äî ýòîãî âðåìåíè Ãðóçèÿ äîëæíà áóäåò ñóùåñòâîâàòü ëèøü çà ñ÷åò ðîññèéñêîãî ãàçà, ÷òî íå ìîæåò íå âëèÿòü íà åå ïîëèòè÷åñêóþ ñîñòàâëÿþùóþ. Âîîáùå, âîïðîñ îá ýíåðãîíîñèòåëÿõ, èõ ïîñòàâêàõ â Ãðóçèþ, îñîáåííî â åå ñòîëèöó, âûçûâàåò î÷åíü áóðíóþ íåãàòèâíóþ ðåàêöèþ â îáùåñòâå. Îñåíüþ è çèìîé ëþäè ôàêòè÷åñêè ëèøåíû ñâåòà è òåïëà. Íàêàíóíå âûáîðîâ òáèëèññêèé îôèöèîç Ñâîáîäíàÿ Ãðóçèÿ íàèáîëåå àêòèâíî ïðîäâèãàë òåìó áóäóùåé ýíåðãåòè÷åñêîé íåçàâèñèìîñòè ñòðàíû. Òàê, íàïðèìåð, ñîîáùàëîñü, ÷òî ñòðîèòåëüñòâî íåôòåïðîâîäà Áàêó – Òáèëèñè – Äæåéõàí èäåò óñïåøíî, ò.ê. â Ãðóçèþ óæå ïîñòóïèëè 236 êì òðóá (èç 248 êì), èçãîòîâëåííûõ â ßïîíèè23 .  Ðîññèè áûëè äàëåêî íå â âîñòîðãå, êîãäà Øåâàðäíàäçå, îêîí÷àòåëüíî çàïóòàâøèñü â ñâîåé îðèåíòàöèè ìåæäó Êðåìëåì è Áåëûì äîìîì, 30 îêòÿáðÿ 2003 ã. ïðèíÿë ëè÷íîå ó÷àñòèå â ïîäïèñàíèè òáèëèññêîãî ñîãëàøåíèÿ î ïîñòàâêàõ ïðèðîäíîãî ãàçà â Ãðóçèþ ìåæäó ðóêîâîäñòâîì êîìïàíèè ÞæíîÊàâêàçñêèé ãàçîïðîâîä Áàêó – Òáèëèñè – Ýðçåðóì è Ãðóçèíñêîé Ìåæäóíàðîäíîé Íåôòÿíîé Êîðïîðàöèè (ÃÌÍÊ). Ïðîåêò ïðåäóñìàòðèâàåò çàâåðøåíèå ñòðîèòåëüñòâà â 2006 ã. Ïðè ýòîì ñîîáùàëîñü ÷òî: – â êà÷åñòâå òðàíçèòíûõ âûïëàò Ãðóçèÿ áóäåò áåñïëàòíî ïîëó÷àòü 5% îò âñåãî îáúåìà ãàçà – 1,5 ìëðä êóá. ì åæåãîäíî; – â òå÷åíèå 20 ëåò Ãðóçèÿ ñìîæåò çàêóïàòü ó èíâåñòîðîâ 500 ìëí êóá. ì ãàçà â ãîä ïî ôèêñèðîâàííîé öåíå 55 äîëëàðîâ ÑØÀ çà 1000 êóá. ì; – Ãðóçèÿ ïîëó÷èò çà âñå âðåìÿ 7 ìëðä äîëëàðîâ ÑØÀ, à â ñðåäíåì â ãîä – 175 ìëí äîëëàðîâ24 . Òàêèå ïîñòàâêè Êàñïèéñêîãî ïðèðîäíîãî ãàçà ÷åðåç Ãðóçèþ è Òóðöèþ â Åâðîïó íèêàê íå âïèñûâàþòñÿ â ðîññèéñêóþ ïîëèòèêî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêóþ ñòðàòåãèþ. Äóìàåòñÿ, ÷òî ïîäîáíûå ïëàíû íà áóäóùåå óñêîðèëè ðàçâÿçêó ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ ñîáûòèé â Òáèëèñè è ïðèâåëè ê äîñðî÷íîé ñìåíå Ý. Øåâàðäíàäçå. Ýòîé âàæíîé ïðîáëåìå ïîñâÿòèë ñâîè ñòàòüè ãðóçèíñêèé ïóáëèöèñò Ãèÿ Ëîìàäçå. Ïî åãî ñëîâàì, íåêèå ñèëû â Ðîññèè «ïîñòîÿííî äóìàþò î ðåàíèìàöèè ÑÑÑл è ó íèõ ÿêîáû åñòü ïëàí, ïî êîòîðîìó îíè äåéñòâóþò â áûâøèõ ñîâåòñêèõ ðåñïóáëèêàõ. Öåëüþ ýòèõ ñèë ÿâëÿåòñÿ âîññòàíîâëåíèå ñôåðû âëèÿíèÿ Ðîññèè, äëÿ ÷åãî ðîññèéñêîé ïîëèòè÷åñêîé ýëèòîé ñòàë ïðèìåíÿòüñÿ òåðìèí «ëèáåðàëüíûé èìïåðèàëèçì». Àêöåíò äåëàåòñÿ íà ýêîíîìè÷åñêóþ àííåêñèþ. «Âíåøíèå ñèëû, – ïèøåò Ã. Ëîìàäçå, – îñîáåííî àêòèâèçèðîâàëèñü ïðè ââåäåíèè â äåéñòâèå ïðîåêòîâ ìåæäóíàðîäíîãî ìàñøòàáà. Èìåþòñÿ â âèäó «Âåëèêèé øåëêîâûé ïóòü», TRACECA, íåôòåïðîâîä 134

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Áàêó – Òáèëèñè – Äæåéõàí, ãàçîâûå ìàãèñòðàëè. Åñëè Ðîññèÿ îáðåòåò êîíòðîëü íàä ýòèìè ãðàíäèîçíûìè îáúåêòàìè, ó íåå â ðóêàõ îêàæåòñÿ êëþ÷ ê âîðîòàì Åâðîïû è Àçè腻25 . Ñ èñòîðè÷åñêîé òî÷êè çðåíèÿ, ïîäîáíûå âûñêàçûâàíèÿ íå íîâû. Òàê, â ñàìîì íà÷àëå XX âåêà âèäíûé ãðóçèíñêèé þðèñò-ìåæäóíàðîäíèê Ç. Àâàëîâ (Àâàëèøâèëè) îòìå÷àë: «Ïðèñîåäèíåíèå Ãðóçèè ê Ðîññèè áûëî ïîëèòè÷åñêèì ñîáûòèåì ïåðâîñòåïåííîé âàæíîñòè. Èìåííî ñî âðåìåíè ýòîãî ïðèñîåäèíåíèÿ Ðîññèÿ ñòàíîâèòñÿ íà ïóòü, êîòîðûé, ìîæåò áûòü, ïðèâåäåò åå ê áåðåãàì Ïåðñèäñêîãî çàëèâà»26 . Ìåæäó ïðî÷èì, ñëåäóåò îòìåòèòü òîò ôàêò, ÷òî îäèí èç èçâåñòíûõ ïîëèòèêîâ Ãðóçèè, Èðèíà Ñàðèøâèëè-×àíòóðèÿ, â ïåðèîä íàêàëà ïðåäâûáîðíûõ ñòðàñòåé â Òáèëèñè îôèöèàëüíî çàÿâèëà: äåñòàáèëèçàöèÿ íåîáõîäèìà Ðîññèè äëÿ òîãî, ÷òîáû ìàðøðóò ìåæäóíàðîäíûõ íåôòå- è ãàçîïðîâîäîâ áûë èçìåíåí è ïðîëåãàë íå ÷åðåç Ãðóçèþ, à ÷åðåç äðóæåñòâåííóþ Ìîñêâå Àðìåíèþ. È òàêàÿ ñõåìà äëÿ íåêîòîðûõ ãðóçèíñêèõ ïîëèòèêîâ âïîëíå óêëàäûâàåòñÿ â ïîíÿòèå òàê íàçûâàåìîãî ðîññèéñêîãî ëèáåðàëüíîãî èìïåðèàëèçìà. Ïîäîçðåíèÿ Òáèëèñè ïî ýòîìó ïîâîäó ñòàëè îñîáåííî çàìåòíû ïîñëå àâãóñòîâñêîãî âèçèòà À. ×óáàéñà â Ãðóçèþ è ñåíòÿáðüñêîé âñòðå÷è â ßëòå íà óðîâíå ãëàâ ñòðàí ÑÍÃ, íà êîòîðîé áûëî îôîðìëåíî Åäèíîå Ýêîíîìè÷åñêîå Ïðîñòðàíñòâî (ÅÝÏ). Íåêîòîðûå ðàñöåíèëè ÅÝÏ êàê íîâóþ ïîïûòêó Ðîññèè âçÿòü ïîä êîíòðîëü ñèòóàöèþ íà ïîñòñîâåòñêîì ïðîñòðàíñòâå, ÷òîáû èñïîëüçîâàòü âîïðîñû ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî ñîòðóäíè÷åñòâà â ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ öåëÿõ27 . Äëÿ óñïåøíîé ðåàëèçàöèè ïðîåêòà ýíåðãåòè÷åñêîãî êîðèäîðà Âîñòîê – Çàïàä ÷åðåç Ãðóçèþ íåîáõîäèìî ïðåæäå âñåãî óðåãóëèðîâàíèå êîíôëèêòîâ íà Þæíîì Êàâêàçå, â òîì ÷èñëå ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîãî. Ïåðâîñòåïåííîé â ýòîé ñâÿçè ÿâëÿåòñÿ ïðîáëåìà áåçîïàñíîãî ôóíêöèîíèðîâàíèÿ òðóáîïðîâîäîâ. Òàê, íàïðèìåð, ÷òîáû ðåøèòü ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêóþ ïðîáëåìó è óäîâëåòâîðèòü èíòåðåñû Ðîññèè â âîïðîñå áåñïðåïÿòñòâåííîãî ýêñïîðòà íåôòè â Òóðöèþ è äàëåå â Åâðîïó, ìèíóÿ ïðîëèâû Áîñôîð è Äàðäàíåëëû, â 1997 ã. ïðåäëàãàëîñü ñòðîèòåëüñòâî «ñâÿçêè» ìåæäó çàïàäíîé âåòêîé Áàêó – Ñóïñà è èäóùåé â Íîâîðîññèéñê ñåâåðíîé âåòêîé. Ïî îöåíêàì ýêñïåðòîâ, áûâøèé âîåííûé ïîðò Î÷àì÷èðà â Àáõàçèè èìååò è êàê òåðìèíàë ÿâíûå ïðåèìóùåñòâà ïåðåä Ñóïñîé è Íîâîðîññèéñêîì. Îäíèì èç èíèöèàòîðîâ ýòîãî ïëàíà òîãäà âûñòóïèë çàìåñòèòåëü ñåêðåòàðÿ Ñîâåòà áåçîïàñíîñòè Ðîññèè Á. Áåðåçîâñêèé28 . Îäíàêî âñå íàäåæäû â îäíî÷àñüå ðóõíóëè, êîãäà â ïîãðàíè÷íîì ñ Ãðóçèåé Ãàëüñêîì ðàéîíå Àáõàçèè â ìàå 1998 ã. ðàçãîðåëàñü «øåñòèäíåâíàÿ âîéíà». È âîò, íåçàäîëãî äî îñåííèõ 2003 ã. âûáîðîâ â Àçåðáàéäæàíå è Ãðóçèè, òåìà òðóáîïðîâîäà Íîâîðîññèéñê – Ñóïñà (÷åðåç òåððèòîðèþ Àáõàçèè) è äàëåå íà Äæåéõàí áûëà âíîâü îçâó÷åíà. «Ýòî ñàìîñòîÿòåëüíûé òðóáîïðîâîä, – ïðîêîììåíòèðîâàë ñèòóàöèþ ïîñîë Ãðóçèè â Àçåðáàéäæàíå Ç. Ãóìáåðèäçå, – ïî êîòîðîìó íåôòü Ðîññèè è Êàçàõñòàíà ìîãëà áû ýêñïîðòèðîâàòüñÿ 135

Ãëàâà V

èç Íîâîðîññèéñêà â òóðåöêèé ïîðò Äæåéõàí íà Ñðåäèçåìíîì ìîðå, ìèíóÿ ïðîëèâû Áîñôîð è Äàðäàíåëëû»29 . Ïîñîë çàÿâèë, ÷òî âîïðîñ æå î åãî âðåçêå â íåôòåïðîâîä Áàêó – Òáèëèñè – Äæåéõàí ÿêîáû íå îáñóæäàëñÿ Ðîññèåé è Ãðóçèåé. Ìíîãèå ïîëèòèêè â Ãðóçèè è Àáõàçèè îñîçíàëè, ÷òî ïðè÷èíà êîíôëèêòà, åãî ñóòü – â ïåðåðàñïðåäåëåíèè ñôåð âëèÿíèÿ íà Êàâêàçå. «Ýòîò ïðîöåññ åùå íå çàâåðøåí, – çàÿâèë ëèäåð ãðóçèíñêèõ áåæåíöåâ Ò. Íàäàðåéøâèëè, – ïîòîìó-òî ýòè äåñÿòü ëåò ìû íå èìååì íèêàêèõ ðåçóëüòàòîâ. Õîòÿ ñåãîäíÿ óæå ìîæíî ïðåäïîëàãàòü, ÷òî ðàçäåë áëèçîê ê çàâåðøåíèþ, îñòàëñÿ ðàçâå ÷òî Êàâêàçñêèé ðåãèîí. È ñåé÷àñ íàñòóïàåò âòîðîé ýòàï – óðåãóëèðîâàíèå êîíôëèêòîâ. Áëàãîäàðÿ âçàèìíûì êîìïðîìèññàì ìåæäó Ðîññèåé è ÑØÀ ýòè äåðæàâû ìîãóò ïðèéòè ê îïðåäåëåííûì ñîãëàøåíèÿì, êîòîðûå óñòðîÿò îáå ñòîðîíû…»30 . Êàê óæå îòìå÷àëîñü, ñîòðóäíè÷åñòâî îñíîâíûõ èãðîêîâ â ðåãèîíå – ÑØÀ, Ðîññèè è ñòðàí ÅÑ – ñîäåðæèò ýëåìåíòû ñêðûòîãî, à èíîãäà è äåìîíñòðàòèâíîãî ñîïåðíè÷åñòâà. Ýòî õàðàêòåðíî è äëÿ äðóãèõ êîíôëèêòíûõ çîí â ïðåäåëàõ ÑÍÃ, íî îñîáåííî áîëåçíåííî ÑØÀ ðåàãèðóþò íà ïîïûòêè óðåãóëèðîâàíèÿ êîíôëèêòîâ â Ìîëäàâèè – Ïðèäíåñòðîâüå è â Ãðóçèè – Àáõàçèè. Òàê, ïðàêòè÷åñêè ïîäãîòîâëåííûé êîìïðîìèññíûé ïðîåêò óðåãóëèðîâàíèÿ ñ Ïðèäíåñòðîâüåì íà îñíîâå àññèìåòðè÷íîé ôåäåðàöèè Ìîëäîâû áóêâàëüíî ðóõíóë çà äåíü äî ïîäïèñàíèÿ. ÎÁÑÅ è ÑØÀ îòêðîâåííî ïðåñåêëè óðåãóëèðîâàíèå ïî ðîññèéñêîìó ñöåíàðèþ è îòáðîñèëè ðåøåíèå ïðîáëåìû íà ãîäû. Âñå ýòî, êñòàòè, ïðîèñõîäèëî ïàðàëëåëüíî ñî ñìåíîé âëàñòè â Ãðóçèè. È õîòÿ ïåðâûé çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà èíîñòðàííûõ äåë Ðîññèè Â. Òðóáíèêîâ íàêàíóíå àçåðáàéäæàíñêèõ è ãðóçèíñêèõ âûáîðîâ îòìå÷àë óëó÷øåíèå âçàèìîîòíîøåíèé Ðîññèè è ÑØÀ, ÷òî, ïî åãî ñëîâàì, «ïîëîæèòåëüíî ñêàæåòñÿ íà ïîëèòè÷åñêîé ñèòóàöèè íà Þæíîì Êàâêàçå», ïðîáëåì è ïðîòèâîðå÷èé ìåæäó íèìè, îñîáåííî â âîåííîé îáëàñòè, îñòàåòñÿ íåìàëî. Ýòî è ñïîðû ïî ïîâîäó âûïîëíåíèÿ Ðîññèåé îáÿçàòåëüñòâ, âçÿòûõ íà Ñòàìáóëüñêîì ñàììèòå ÎÁÑÅ â 1998 ã. ïî âûâîäó âîåííûõ áàç ñ òåððèòîðèè Ãðóçèè, è ñòðàííàÿ àíòèòåððîðèñòè÷åñêàÿ îïåðàöèÿ â Ïàíêèñè, î êîòîðîé áûëî ïóáëè÷íî çàÿâëåíî çà äâå íåäåëè äî åå ïðîâåäåíèÿ, è îáó÷åíèå àìåðèêàíöàìè äâóõ òûñÿ÷ ãðóçèíñêèõ âîåííûõ ïî ïðîãðàììå «Îáó÷åíèå è îñíàùåíèå». Ðîññèÿ, íàïðèìåð, ñ÷èòàåò, ÷òî âûïîëíèëà ñâîè îáÿçàòåëüñòâà ïî Ñòàìáóëüñêîìó ñîãëàøåíèþ, ðàñôîðìèðîâàâ ñâîè áàçû â Âàçèàíè è Ãóäàóòà. ×òî êàñàåòñÿ áàç â Áàòóìè è Àõàëêàëàêè, òî îíè ìîãóò áûòü âûâåäåíû íå ðàíåå, ÷åì ÷åðåç 9–11 ëåò, õîòÿ ãðóçèíñêàÿ ñòîðîíà íàñòàèâàåò íà ñðîêå â 3 ãîäà. Î ïðîòèâîðå÷èÿõ â ðîññèéñêî-ãðóçèíñêèõ îòíîøåíèÿõ 30 ñåíòÿáðÿ 2003 ã., íàõîäÿñü â Ìîñêâå, ãîâîðèëà ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïàðëàìåíòà Ãðóçèè Íèíî Áóðäæàíàäçå. Îíà îñîáî îòìåòèëà, ÷òî åùå ãîä íàçàä Ðîññèÿ è Ãðóçèÿ ñòîÿëè íà ïîðîãå âîéíû – ñíà÷àëà â ñâÿçè ñ Ïàíêèññêèì óùåëüåì, à çàòåì ñ ñîáûòèÿìè â Àáõàçèè, â Êîäîðñêîì óùåëüå, êîãäà òàì âûñàäèëñÿ ðîññèéñêèé âîçäóøíûé äåñàíò31 . 136

Ïîñëå ðàñïàäà ÑÑÑÐ

Áîëüøîå íåäîâîëüñòâî â Ãðóçèè âûçûâàåò ðîññèéñêîå âëèÿíèå íà ïðîáëåìû Àáõàçèè. Çäåñü è ðàçãîâîðû îá àññîöèèðîâàííûõ îòíîøåíèÿõ Àáõàçèè ñ Ðîññèåé, è ñðî÷íûé ïðèåì äî 80% æèòåëåé ìíîãîíàöèîíàëüíîé íåïðèçíàííîé ðåñïóáëèêè â ðîññèéñêîå ãðàæäàíñòâî (ýòî èíòåðåñíî è â ñâÿçè ñ íåäàâíî çàÿâëåííîé íîâîé âîåííîé äîêòðèíîé Ðîññèè î ïðåâåíòèâíûõ óäàðàõ è çàùèòå ñâîèõ ãðàæäàí), è æåëåçíîäîðîæíîå ñîîáùåíèå Ñî÷è – Ñóõóì, è âîññòàíîâëåíèå Èíãóðñêîãî æåëåçíîäîðîæíîãî ìîñòà, è îòêðûòèå ïåøåõîäíîãî ÷åðåç ïîãðàíè÷íóþ ðåêó Ïñîó, è ìíîãîå äðóãîå. Ãðóçèíñêèõ ïîëèòèêîâ ðàçäðàæàåò, êîãäà Ìîñêâà ãîâîðèò î ñóâåðåíèòåòå è òåððèòîðèàëüíîé öåëîñòíîñòè èõ ñòðàíû è â òî æå âðåìÿ ââîäèò áåçâèçîâûé ðåæèì ñíà÷àëà äëÿ Àáõàçèè è Þæíîé Îñåòèè, à ïîñëå «áàðõàòíîé ðåâîëþöèè» â Òáèëèñè – è äëÿ Àäæàðèè. Òàêèì îáðàçîì, ïðîèñõîäèò ôàêòè÷åñêèé ðàçäåë Ãðóçèè, ïðè÷åì åå äðîáëåíèå ïî ìåðå íåóñòóï÷èâîñòè òáèëèññêèõ «äåìîêðàòîâ» ìîæåò ïðîäîëæèòüñÿ â ëþáîé ìîìåíò.  ïîñëåäíåå âðåìÿ âñå ñèëüíåå çâó÷àò ãîëîñà è î ïðåäîñòàâëåíèè àâòîíîìèè Ñàìöõå-Äæàâàõåòè (Äæàâàõê), ãäå êîìïàêòíî ïðîæèâàþò àðìÿíå (ïîãðàíè÷íûé ðàéîí þæíîé Ãðóçèè ñ Àðìåíèåé). Íåäîâîëüñòâî âûðàæàåò è ìíîãî÷èñëåííàÿ îáùèíà àçåðáàéäæàíöåâ (äî 700 òûñ. ÷åëîâåê), ÷åðåç íàñåëåííûå ïóíêòû êîòîðûõ ïðîëåãàåò ìàðøðóò íåôòåïðîâîäà Áàêó – Äæåéõàí. Äî ïðåäåëà íàêàëåíû îòíîøåíèÿ è ñ Àäæàðèåé. Ïîýòîìó íå ñëó÷àéíî î Ãðóçèè âñå ÷àùå ãîâîðÿò, êàê î Þãîñëàâèè. Ïîñëå òîãî êàê âîåííûå ñïåöèàëèñòû çàïàäíûõ ñòðàí, îñîáåííî ÑØÀ, íà÷àëè îáó÷àòü ïî ïðîãðàììå ÍÀÒÎ íåñêîëüêî ãðóçèíñêèõ áàòàëüîíîâ, Ðîññèÿ ñòàëà áîëüøå âíèìàíèÿ óäåëÿòü Àáõàçèè. Òàê, áûâøèé äèðåêòîð ñëóæáû âíåøíåé ðàçâåäêè, îäèí èç ðóêîâîäèòåëåé ÌÈÄà Ðîññèè Âÿ÷åñëàâ Òðóáíèêîâ, âûñêàçàëñÿ â òîì ñìûñëå, ÷òî ïîäãîòîâëåííûå àìåðèêàíöàìè ãðóçèíñêèå âîåííûå ìîãóò áûòü çàäåéñòâîâàíû â Àáõàçèè. «Âîò ýòî äåéñòâèòåëüíî íàñ áåñïîêîèò, – ïîä÷åðêíóë Â. Òðóáíèêîâ. –  ñëó÷àå ïîäòâåðæäåíèÿ íàøèõ òðåâîã ìû íå áóäåì ïðèâåòñòâîâàòü òàêèå øàãè Ãðóçèè»32 . Ñëåäóåò îñîáî îòìåòèòü íåáûâàëóþ àêòèâíîñòü àäìèíèñòðàöèè ÑØÀ â ðåãèîíå Öåíòðàëüíîé Àçèè, à òàêæå íà Þæíîì Êàâêàçå (Çàêàâêàçüå) ïîñëå ñîáûòèé 11 ñåíòÿáðÿ. Áîðüáà ñ ìåæäóíàðîäíûì òåððîðèçìîì, òàëèáàìè â Àôãàíèñòàíå ïðèâåëà ê òîìó, ÷òî â ðÿäå ñòðàí áûâøåé ñîâåòñêîé Ñðåäíåé Àçèè ÿêîáû íà âðåìåííîé îñíîâå áûëè ðàçìåùåíû àìåðèêàíñêèå âîåííûå áàçû. Ïîäîáíûå ïëàíû Âàøèíãòîí âûíàøèâàåò è â îòíîøåíèè ñòðàí Þæíîãî Êàâêàçà. Íåëüçÿ íåäîîöåíèâàòü è òîãî, ÷òî «àôãàíñêèé ïðåäëîã» äëÿ âíåäðåíèÿ ñâîåãî ïðèñóòñòâèÿ è áàç ìîæåò â äåòàëÿõ ïîâòîðèòüñÿ è çäåñü, íàïðèìåð, â ñëó÷àå êàêîé-íèáóäü íîâîé âîåííîé îïåðàöèè èëè âîåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî äàâëåíèÿ íà Èðàí. ×åì îáúÿñíèòü â ýòîé ñâÿçè ñòîëü ïîâûøåííûé â ïîñëåäíåå âðåìÿ èíòåðåñ Âàøèíãòîíà ê ïðîðîññèéñêîé Àðìåíèè è äëÿ ÷åãî ïîä àìåðèêàíñêîå ïîñîëüñòâî â Åðåâàíå âûäåëåíà îãðîìíàÿ òåððèòîðèÿ â 9 ãà (ýòî ñàìîå áîëüøîå ïðåäñòàâèòåëüñòâî ÑØÀ â ìèðå) è ñ ãàðíèçîíîì â 500 ÷åëîâåê, êîòîðàÿ 137

Ãëàâà V

â ëþáîé ìîìåíò ìîæåò áûòü ïðåâðàùåíà â âîåííóþ áàçó? Íåêîòîðûå ýêñïåðòû â ñâÿçè ñ ýòèì ñ÷èòàþò, ÷òî öåëü àêòèâíîñòè ÑØÀ â Àðìåíèè – ñîñåäíèé Èðàí è ðàñøèðåíèå àðåàëà ñâîèõ èíòåðåñîâ íà Êàâêàçå äî ãðàíèö ñîþçíîé Òóðöèè33. Íå ñëó÷àéíî ïðåìüåð-ìèíèñòð Òóðöèè çàÿâèë â ÿíâàðå òåêóùåãî ãîäà, ÷òî Âàøèíãòîí íàíåñåò â áëèæàéøåå âðåìÿ âîåííûé óäàð ïî Èðàíó è Ñèðèè. Çíà÷èòåëüíîå îæèâëåíèå öàðèò è â Êàñïèéñêîì ðåãèîíå. Àìåðèêàíñêèå âîåííî-ìîðñêèå ñèëû ñîâìåñòíî ñ àçåðáàéäæàíñêèìè îòðàáàòûâàþò ïðèåìû ïî îõðàíå íåôòÿíûõ ïëàòôîðì. Åñòü ñâåäåíèÿ, ÷òî ÑØÀ ñîáèðàþòñÿ ðàçìåñòèòü â Àçåðáàéäæàíå âîåííî-âîçäóøíûå áàçû 34.  ïîñëåäíåå âðåìÿ ñåðüåçíûå ïîïûòêè áûëè ïðåäïðèíÿòû äëÿ òîãî, ÷òîáû çàêðåïèòüñÿ è â Ãðóçèè.  ðåçóëüòàòå íîÿáðüñêîé 2003 ã. «ðåâîëþöèè ðîç» è ïðèõîäà ê âëàñòè Ì. Ñààêàøâèëè, ÑØÀ ïðîÿâèëè ïðÿìóþ çàèíòåðåñîâàííîñòü â ïîääåðæêå íîâîãî ðåæèìà. Òàê, ïîñîë Ð. Ìàéëç îòêðîâåííî çàÿâèë â ÿíâàðå, ÷òî àìåðèêàíñêèå âîåííûå â Ãðóçèè íåîáõîäèìû äëÿ îõðàíû íåôòåïðîâîäà Áàêó – Òáèëèñè – Äæåéõàí35. Ãîññåêðåòàðü Ê. Ïàóýëë îòêðûòî âûñêàçàëñÿ â Òáèëèñè çà âûâîä ðîññèéñêèõ áàç èç Àõàëêàëàêè è Áàòóìè. Ïðàâäà, ïîñëå ìîñêîâñêîé âñòðå÷è ñ ïðåçèäåíòîì Â. Ïóòèíûì ãîññåêðåòàðü ñìÿã÷èë ñâîþ ïîçèöèþ è äàë ñëîâî, ÷òî íèêàêèõ âîåííûõ áàç ÑØÀ â Ãðóçèè íå áóäåò. Îäíàêî âñå ïðåêðàñíî ïîíèìàþò öåíó ñëîâàì – êàê òîëüêî îòêðîþòñÿ «íîâûå îáñòîÿòåëüñòâà», Ðîññèÿ áóäåò ïîñòàâëåíà ïåðåä ñâåðøèâøèìñÿ ôàêòîì. Ìîñêâà î÷åíü áîëåçíåííî âîñïðèíèìàåò âñå, ÷òî ïðîèñõîäèò â åå áëèæíåì çàðóáåæüå, îñîáåííî íà Êàâêàçå, êîòîðûé èçäàâíà ñ÷èòàåò çîíîé ñâîåé íàöèîíàëüíîé áåçîïàñíîñòè. «Íà èãðîâîé äîñêå, êîòîðîé â íàñòîÿùèé ìîìåíò ÿâëÿåòñÿ ýòà çîíà, – ïèøåò èñïàíñêàÿ ãàçåòà, – ñòàëêèâàþòñÿ èíòåðåñû ðàçíûõ äåéñòâóþùèõ ëèö ìåæäóíàðîäíîé àðåíû, íå òîëüêî Ðîññèè è Ãðóçèè. Íî ÑØÀ çàíÿòû Èðàêîì, Áëèæíèì Âîñòîêîì è Àôãàíèñòàíîì, è íè â îäíîé èç ýòèõ çîí íå ìîãóò óñòàíîâèòü ñâîåãî âëèÿíèÿ, è ïîòîìó íå èìåþò âîçìîæíîñòè ïðèëîæèòü äîëæíîå óñèëèå äëÿ ðàçðåøåíèÿ ãðóçèíñêîãî âîïðîñà. Âñå ïðåäïðèíèìàåìûå èìè äåéñòâèÿ áîëüøå íàïîìèíàþò æåëàíèå ñòðàâëèâàòü èíòåðåñû ðàçíûõ ñòîðîí, ÷åì ñòðåìëåíèå íàéòè ðåàëüíîå ðåøåíèå ïðîáëåìû.  äåéñòâèòåëüíîñòè æå êàê åâðîïåéöàì, òàê è àìåðèêàíöàì â íåêîòîðîé ñòåïåíè äàæå âûãîäíî æåëàíèå Ðîññèè ïîääåðæèâàòü ñòàáèëüíîñòü â ïîñòñîâåòñêîì ïðîñòðàíñòâå»36. Îäíàêî Âàøèíãòîí ïûòàåòñÿ âñåìè èìåþùèìèñÿ ñðåäñòâàìè âûòåñíèòü Ðîññèþ èç Çàêàâêàçüÿ. Ãðóçèè â ýòîì ñìûñëå îòâîäèòñÿ ðîëü íåêîåãî «ïàðîâîçà». Íàãíåòàíèå ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ ñòðàñòåé è ÷åðíûé ïèàð âîêðóã Çàêàâêàçüÿ ñîâïàäàþò ñ ïðèáëèæàþùèìèñÿ âûáîðàìè ïðåçèäåíòîâ Ðîññèè (ìàðò 2004 ã.) è ÑØÀ (íîÿáðü 2004 ã.). Ñêîðåå âñåãî, åñòü âëèÿòåëüíûå ñèëû, êîòîðûå õîòÿò ïîäîðâàòü ïîçèöèè Â. Ïóòèíà íàêàíóíå âûáîðîâ è, ñîîòâåòñòâåííî, «óñïåøíûìè» äåéñòâèÿìè íà Êàâêàçå ïðèïîäíÿòü íåñêîëüêî ïîøàòíóâøèéñÿ àâòîðèòåò Äæ. Áóøà. 138

Ïîñëå ðàñïàäà ÑÑÑÐ

Ìåæäó òåì îáàíêðîòèâøàÿñÿ â ïîëèòè÷åñêîì è ýêîíîìè÷åñêîì ñìûñëå Ãðóçèÿ ïðîäîëæàåò ïîëó÷àòü îò çàïàäíûõ ñòðàí áåñïðåöåäåíòíóþ ïîìîùü. Íà èíàóãóðàöèè â Òáèëèñè 25 ÿíâàðÿ 2004 ã. Ê. Ïàóýëë îáúÿâèë, ÷òî ÑØÀ âûäåëèëè Ãðóçèè 166 ìëí äîëëàðîâ. Âñëåä çà ýòèì â ïîðòó Ïîòè ñ àìåðèêàíñêîãî âîåííî-òðàíñïîðòíîãî ñóäíà áûëî âûãðóæåíî 77 åäèíèö òÿæåëîé áðîíåòåõíèêè. Ïðåäóñìîòðåííàÿ ðàíåå äâóõãîäè÷íàÿ ïðîãðàììà ÍÀÒÎ íàøëà ñâîå íîâîå ïðîäîëæåíèå.  Ãðóçèþ ïðèáûëè àìåðèêàíñêèå èíñòðóêòîðû âñåõ ðîäîâ âîéñê. Íà ýòîì ôîíå íîâûå ãðóçèíñêèå ëèäåðû íå ïåðåñòàþò âûñòóïàòü ñ ðåâàíøèñòñêèìè çàÿâëåíèÿìè â àäðåñ Àáõàçèè, Þæíîé Îñåòèè, Àäæàðèè. Î ñâîåé ïîääåðæêå Ì. Ñààêàøâèëè çàÿâèë è êàíöëåð Ãåðìàíèè, êîòîðûé âûäåëèë â âèäå ïîìîùè 12 ìëí åâðî è ïîîáåùàë åùå 26 ìèëëèîíîâ. Ïðè ýòîì Ã. Øðåäåð çàâåðèë Òáèëèñè â ïîääåðæêå ïî âîåííûì âîïðîñàì, îòìåòèâ, ÷òî Ãðóçèÿ âûïîëíÿåò óçëîâóþ ðîëü â êîíôëèêòíîì Êàâêàçñêîì ðåãèîíå, è ïîòîìó Ãåðìàíèÿ ïîääåðæèâàåò ýòó ñòðàíó37. Òàêàÿ çàèíòåðåñîâàííîñòü Ãåðìàíèè ñâÿçàíà, ñóäÿ ïî âñåìó, îïÿòü-òàêè ñ ïîñòàâêàìè íåôòè. Ïðè÷åì ñ íîâûì ìàðøðóòîì íåôòåïðîâîäà ÷åðåç Ãðóçèþ, Óêðàèíó è Ïîëüøó â Ãåðìàíèþ, â îáõîä íå òîëüêî Ðîññèè, íî è Òóðöèè, òàê êàê äðóãîé «ïîëèòèçèðîâàííûé» âàðèàíò – Áàêó – Òáèëèñè – Äæåéõàí âñå åùå îñòàåòñÿ ïîä âîïðîñîì è ïîëíîñòüþ çàâèñèì îò ñòàáèëüíîñòè â ðåãèîíå Öåíòðàëüíàÿ Àçèÿ – Êàâêàç è â Òóðöèè.  íîâîé êîìáèíàöèè ñ íåôòåïðîâîäîì Ãðóçèÿ è Óêðàèíà ïðåòåíäóþò íà êëþ÷åâóþ ðîëü â òðàíñïîðòèðîâêå óãëåâîäîðîäîâ Êàñïèÿ â Åâðîïó. Ïëàíèðóåòñÿ ïåðåêà÷èâàòü ñûðüå ïî âåòêå Áàêó (Àçåðáàéäæàí) – Ñóïñà (Ãðóçèÿ), çàòåì òàíêåðàìè ïî ×åðíîìó ìîðþ äîñòàâëÿòü åãî ê ïîñòðîåííîìó â Îäåññå òåðìèíàëó è ïåðåãîíÿòü ïî òðóáå Îäåññà – Áðîäû (Óêðàèíà) – Ïëîöê (Ïîëüøà) è äàëåå â ñòðàíû ÅÑ. Òàê, â êîíöå ÿíâàðÿ 2004 ã. ïðàâèòåëüñòâó Óêðàèíû àìåðèêàíñêîé êîìïàíèåé Ñhevron Texaco áûëî ïðåäëîæåíî åæåãîäíî ïîäàâàòü â òðóáó íà Áðîäû îêîëî 6 ìëí ò íåôòè â ãîä äëÿ ïðîìûøëåííîñòè Ãåðìàíèè38.  ýòîé ñâÿçè ñèìïòîìàòè÷íî è ïåðâîå ïîñëå «ðåâîëþöèè» íåîôèöèàëüíîå ïîñåùåíèå Ì. Ñààêàøâèëè Óêðàèíû, è ïåðâûé åãî îôèöèàëüíûé âèçèò â êà÷åñòâå ïðåçèäåíòà â Ãåðìàíèþ. Ñîçäàåòñÿ âïå÷àòëåíèå, ÷òî íîâîãî ïðåçèäåíòà Ãðóçèè óñèëåííî íàñòðàèâàþò íà âîåííóþ àâàíòþðó, êîòîðàÿ ìîæåò ïðåâðàòèòü âñþ Ãðóçèþ â àðåíó áîåâûõ äåéñòâèé. Öåëü ýòîé ïðîâîêàöèè – âûíóäèòü Ðîññèþ óéòè ñ Êàâêàçà. Îäíàêî òàêàÿ ïîëèòèêà âûäàâëèâàíèÿ ìîæåò ïðèâåñòè è ê ïðÿìî ïðîòèâîïîëîæíûì ðåçóëüòàòàì. Î÷åâèäíî, ÷òî â òàêîì ñëó÷àå «ïîáåäîíîñíîé ìàëåíüêîé âîéíû» íå ïîëó÷èòñÿ. Ïîäîáíûå äåéñòâèÿ ëèøü îñëîæíÿò ìåæäóíàðîäíóþ îáñòàíîâêó è ÷ðåâàòû ñåðüåçíûìè ïîñëåäñòâèÿìè, è íå òîëüêî ðåãèîíàëüíûìè. Ãåîñòðàòåãè÷åñêèå óñòðåìëåíèÿ Âàøèíãòîíà âïîëíå ïîíÿòíû. Ñóïåðäåðæàâà òîðîïèòñÿ «ïîìåòèòü» ãðàíèöû æèçíåííî âàæíîãî ðåãèîíà ìèðà – «Êàñïèéñêî-Ïåðñèäñêîãî ýíåðãåòè÷åñêîãî ýëëèïñà», îêðóæèâ åãî ñî âñåõ ñòîðîí ñâîèìè âîåííûìè áàçàìè. Çàäà÷à ÑØÀ – îòîäâèíóòü îò íåãî Ðîññèþ 139

Ãëàâà V

è íå äîïóñòèòü â áëèæàéøåì áóäóùåì â Öåíòðàëüíóþ Àçèþ äà è íà Êàâêàç ìîùíî ïîäíèìàþùèéñÿ Êèòàé. Îäíàêî îãðîìíîå ïðîñòðàíñòâî Öåíòðàëüíîé Àçèè Âàøèíãòîí åäâà ëè ñìîæåò êîíòðîëèðîâàòü ñàìîñòîÿòåëüíî, áåç ïîìîùè Ðîññèè. Òàê æå, âïðî÷åì, êàê è Ðîññèÿ áåç ïîääåðæêè ÑØÀ íå ñìîæåò ïî-ïðåæíåìó îñòàâàòüñÿ ãàðàíòîì áåçîïàñíîñòè ýòîé îáøèðíîé òåððèòîðèè. Òîëüêî ñîâìåñòíûìè óñèëèÿìè ñóïåðäåðæàâà è ðåãèîíàëüíàÿ äåðæàâà ñìîãóò â áóäóùåì âûäåðæàòü âñå áîëåå î÷åâèäíûé íàòèñê Êèòàÿ. Íà ñåãîäíÿøíèé äåíü ñóùåñòâóþò 13 ðàçëè÷íûõ ìàðøðóòîâ òðàíñïîðòèðîâêè ýíåðãîíîñèòåëåé Êàñïèÿ. Íå òîëüêî íà Çàïàä, íî è íà Âîñòîê. Ïðè÷åì äâà êðóïíûõ ïðîåêòà ñâÿçàíû ñ Êèòàåì. Ïîêà Ìîñêâà è Âàøèíãòîí æåñòêî ñîïåðíè÷àëè â öåíòðàëüíîàçèàòñêîì è êàâêàçñêîì ðåãèîíå (è ïðîäîëæàþò ýòî äåëàòü), Ïåêèí òèõî ïîäêðàëñÿ è áåç îñîáîãî øóìà ïûòàåòñÿ îñóùåñòâèòü âàæíåéøèå ãåîñòðàòåãè÷åñêèå ïðîåêòû. Ðå÷ü èäåò î íåôòåïðîâîäå Êàçàõñòàí – Êèòàé è ãàçîïðîâîäå Òóðêìåíèñòàí – Óçáåêèñòàí – Êàçàõñòàí – Êèòàé39. Èç 13 ìàðøðóòîâ40 â íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ ôóíêöèîíèðóþò ÷åòûðå: – íåôòåïðîâîä Òåíãèç (Êàçàõñòàí) – Íîâîðîññèéñê (Ðîññèÿ); – íåôòåïðîâîä Áàêó (Àçåðáàéäæàí) – Íîâîðîññèéñê (Ðîññèÿ); – íåôòåïðîâîä Áàêó (Àçåðáàéäæàí) – Ñóïñà (Ãðóçèÿ); – ãàçîïðîâîä Êîðïåäæå (Òóðêìåíèñòàí) – Êóðò-Êóè (Èðàí). Êðîìå òîãî, åñòü è äðóãèå âàðèàíòû, êîòîðûå ìîãóò áûòü ðåàëèçîâàíû â áëèæàéøåå âðåìÿ, íî îíè íàõîäÿòñÿ â ïðÿìîé è æåñòêîé çàâèñèìîñòè îò ðàññòàíîâêè ãåîïîëèòè÷åñêèõ ñèë â ðåãèîíå: – íåôòåïðîâîä Êàçàõñòàí – Òóðêìåíèñòàí – Èðàí; – íåôòåïðîâîä Êàçàõñòàí – Òóðêìåíèñòàí – Àôãàíèñòàí – Ïàêèñòàí; – íåôòåïðîâîä Áàêó (Àçåðáàéäæàí) – Òáèëèñè (Ãðóçèÿ) – Äæåéõàí (Òóðöèÿ); – ãàçîïðîâîä Øàõ-Äåíèç (Àçåðáàéäæàí) – Òáèëèñè (Ãðóçèÿ) – Ýðçåðóì (Òóðöèÿ); – òðàíñêàñïèéñêèé ãàçîïðîâîä Òóðêìåíèñòàí – äíî Êàñïèéñêîãî ìîðÿ – Êàâêàç – Òóðöèÿ; – ãàçîïðîâîä Òóðêìåíèñòàí – Èðàí – Òóðöèÿ; – ãàçîïðîâîä Äîâëåòàáàä (Òóðêìåíèñòàí) – Àôãàíèñòàí – Ïàêèñòàí.  ïðîåêòàõ òðàíñïîðòèðîâêè êàñïèéñêîé íåôòè àêòèâíîå ó÷àñòèå ïðèíèìàåò íå òîëüêî Êèòàé, íî è ßïîíèÿ. ßïîíñêèå ãèãàíòû Itochu è Inpex íàïðÿìóþ çàäåéñòâîâàíû â ôèíàíñèðîâàíèè è ñòðîèòåëüñòâå íåôòåïðîâîäà Áàêó – Òáèëèñè – Äæåéõàí, à ôèðìà-ïðîèçâîäèòåëü Sumitomo óæå ïîñòàâèëà â Ãðóçèþ íåîáõîäèìîå êîëè÷åñòâî ñïåöèàëüíûõ òðóá. Êàê âèäíî, ïðîöåññ ãëîáàëèçàöèè, íîâûé ìèðîïîðÿäîê, îïðåäåëèâøèéñÿ ïîñëå ðàñïàäà ÑÑÑÐ, íå ìîãëè íå îáîñòðèòü âîåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêóþ ñèòóàöèþ â Çàêàâêàçüå (íà Þæíîì Êàâêàçå) â öåëîì è ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêèå îòíîøåíèÿ â ÷àñòíîñòè. Ïîõîæå, ÷òî ïåðèîä äëèòåëüíîãî, ïî÷òè 10-ëåòíåãî (1994–2003) ñîïåðíè÷åñòâà Ðîññèè è ÑØÀ â ýòîì âàæíîì ðåãèîíå ñìåíÿ140

Ïîñëå ðàñïàäà ÑÑÑÐ

åòñÿ ïåðèîäîì «ñîïåðíè÷åñòâà-ñîòðóäíè÷åñòâà» è ïîëíåéøåé íåïðåäñêàçóåìîñòè. Äëÿ áîëüøèõ ãîñóäàðñòâ ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêèé êîíôëèêò, ê ñîæàëåíèþ, íîñèò ñâîåîáðàçíûé ïðèêëàäíîé õàðàêòåð ê òðàíçèòíûì êîðèäîðàì íåôòå- è ãàçîïðîâîäîâ.  ñâÿçè ñ ýòèì åñòåñòâåííî, ÷òî è ñóäüáà êàê Àáõàçèè, òàê è Ãðóçèè îêîí÷àòåëüíî îïðåäåëèòñÿ ïîñëå ÷åòêîãî ðàçãðàíè÷åíèÿ è îïðåäåëåíèÿ ñôåð âëèÿíèÿ Ðîññèè è ÑØÀ â ýòîé ÷àñòè Çàêàâêàçüÿ. Áåç ýòîãî ãëàâíîãî óñëîâèÿ â ïðîäîëæàþùåìñÿ íàòèñêå ãëîáàëèçàöèè è ïðîöåññå ïåðåäåëà ìèðà ïðîáëåìà óðåãóëèðîâàíèÿ ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîãî êîíôëèêòà íå ìîæåò áûòü ðåøåíà, à ïîäõîäû ê íåé îêàæóòñÿ îøèáî÷íûìè. Ñêîðåå âñåãî, îäíà èç ñòîðîí âûíóæäåíà áóäåò (âîçìîæíî, ÷àñòè÷íî) ïîñòóïèòüñÿ ñâîèìè èíòåðåñàìè â ðåãèîíå â ïîëüçó äðóãîé. Íî î÷åâèäíî, ÷òî äëÿ íàöèîíàëüíîé áåçîïàñíîñòè Ðîññèéñêîé Ôåäåðàöèè Ãðóçèÿ è Þæíûé Êàâêàç â çíà÷èòåëüíî áîëüøåé ñòåïåíè ÿâëÿþòñÿ æèçíåííî âàæíûìè, ÷åì äëÿ ÑØÀ. ÏÐÈÌÅ×ÀÍÈß Ëàêîáà Ñ. Àáõàçèÿ – äå-ôàêòî èëè Ãðóçèÿ – äå-þðå? Î ïîëèòèêå Ðîññèè â Àáõàçèè â ïîñòñîâåòñêèé ïåðèîä 1991–2000 ãã. Ñàïïîðî, 2001. 2 Òðîöêèé Ë. Ñî÷. Ò. 12. Ì., [1925]. Ñ. 241–242. 3 Ñáîðíèê ìàòåðèàëîâ ðåñïóáëèêàíñêîé êîíôåðåíöèè, ïîñâÿùåííîé 9-ëåòèþ Ïîáåäû è ïðîâåäåííîé 26 ñåíòÿáðÿ 2002 ã. Ñóõóì, 2002. Ñ. 54–55. 4 Ïàíîðàìà. 2003. ¹6. Àâãóñò. Ñ. 2. 5 Ñîþçíàÿ ãàçåòà. 2003. Ñåíòÿáðü. ¹10. Ñ.10 6 Ñâîáîäíàÿ Ãðóçèÿ. 2003. 23 ñåíòÿáðÿ (äàëåå – ÑÃ). 7 ÑÃ. 2003. 29 ñåíòÿáðÿ. 8 Âåðñèÿ. 2003. ¹37. Ñ. 8. 9 Ñàêàðòâåëîñ Ðåñïóáëèêà. 2003. 30 îêòÿáðÿ. 10 ÑÃ. 2003. 3 îêòÿáðÿ. 11 Òàì æå. 12 Òàì æå. 14 îêòÿáðÿ; Òàì æå. 29 îêòÿáðÿ. 13 Òàì æå. 31 îêòÿáðÿ. 14 Òàì æå. 4 íîÿáðÿ. 15 www.Top rbc.ru/ 2003. 25 íîÿáðÿ. 16 Òàì æå. 1 äåêàáðÿ. 17 Wall Street Journal. 2003. 25 íîÿáðÿ. 18 Êîììåðñàíò. 2003. 29 íîÿáðÿ. 19 Ìàãîìåäîâ À. Êàñïèéñêàÿ íåôòü è ðîññèéñêèå ðåãèîíû: ìåíÿþùàÿñÿ ïðèðîäà ëîêàëüíûõ èíòåðåñîâ âäîëü íåôòåïðîâîäà Òåíãèç – Íîâîðîññèéñê. Ñðàâíèòåëüíûé àíàëèç // Acta Slavica Iaponica. 2002. Vol. 19. P. 21–23 20 Òàì æå. P. 22–23. 21 Òàì æå. P. 24–25. 22 ÑÃ. 2003. 31 îêòÿáðÿ. 23 Òàì æå. 28 îêòÿáðÿ. 24 Òàì æå. 30 îêòÿáðÿ. 1

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Ãëàâà V ÑÃ. 2003. 31 îêòÿáðÿ. Àâàëîâ Ç. Ïðèñîåäèíåíèå Ãðóçèè ê Ðîññèè. ÑÏÁ., 1906. Ñ. 3. 27 ÑÃ. 2003. 24 ñåíòÿáðÿ. 28 Ëàêîáà Ñ. Àáõàçèÿ – äå-ôàêòî èëè Ãðóçèÿ – äå-þðå? Ñ. 98–99. 29 ÑÃ. 2003. 7 îêòÿáðÿ. 30 Òàì æå. 17 îêòÿáðÿ. 31 Òàì æå. 2 îêòÿáðÿ. 32 Òàì æå. 7 îêòÿáðÿ. 33 www.regnum.ru/allnews. 2004. 5 ôåâðàëÿ. 34 The Daily Telegraph. 2004. 9 ÿíâàðÿ. 35 www.abkhazeti.ru/news 2004. 24 ÿíâàðÿ. 36 Rebelion. 2004. 23 ÿíâàðÿ. 37 Äèëèñ ãàçåòè. 2004. 31 ÿíâàðÿ. 38 www.utro.ru – Ñòàòüÿ Èâàíà Òðåãóáîâà. 2004. 9 ôåâðàëÿ 39 Wajima, Miki. Kasupi Kai Shuhen-no Tennen Shigen // Uyama, Tomohiko ed. Chuo Ajia-wo Shiru Tame-no 60 Sho [Ïðèðîäíûå ðåñóðñû Êàñïèéñêîãî ìîðÿ. 60 ãëàâ î Öåíòðàëüíîé Àçèè]. Tokyo, 2003. P. 275. 40 Òàì æå. 25 26

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ÊÒÎ ÅÑÒÜ ÊÒÎ Â ÀÁÕÀÇÈÈ

Îáùåñòâåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêàÿ è âîåííàÿ ýëèòà Àáõàçèè 1991–2004 ãã. Ïåðâîå äåñÿòèëåòèå ïîñëå ðàñïàäà ÑÑÑÐ îçíàìåíîâàëîñü òÿæåëåéøèìè ïîëèòè÷åñêèìè è ñîöèàëüíî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêèìè ïîòðÿñåíèÿìè íà âñåì ïîñòñîâåòñêîì ïðîñòðàíñòâå. Äðàìàòè÷åñêèå ñîáûòèÿ íà îêðàèíàõ ïðèîáðåëè íàèáîëåå îñòðûé õàðàêòåð è âûëèëèñü â ÷åðåäó ìåæíàöèîíàëüíûõ ñòîëêíîâåíèé, ðåâîëþöèé, ïåðåâîðîòîâ, ãðàæäàíñêèõ âîéí. Ýòî îñîáåííî õàðàêòåðíî äëÿ íîâûõ íåçàâèñèìûõ ðåñïóáëèê Çàêàâêàçüÿ (Þæíîãî Êàâêàçà). Âñëåä çà ñîáûòèÿìè â Íàãîðíîì Êàðàáàõå êðîâîïðîëèòèå ïðîèçîøëî â Þæíîé Îñåòèè è Àáõàçèè.  ðåçóëüòàòå ýòíî-ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ âîéí Àçåðáàéäæàí è Ãðóçèÿ, ñîáðàííûå â ñîâåòñêîå âðåìÿ â ñâîåîáðàçíûå ìèíè-èìïåðèè, ðàçâàëèëèñü äî îñíîâàíèÿ. Âîçíèêëè äå-ôàêòî íåçàâèñèìûå ãîñóäàðñòâà – Íàãîðíûé Êàðàáàõ, Þæíàÿ Îñåòèÿ, Àáõàçèÿ. Çíà÷èòåëüíûé èíòåðåñ ïðåäñòàâëÿþò è äåéñòâóþùèå ëèöà ýòîé ïîèñòèíå òðàãè÷åñêîé ýïîõè.  ñèëó èñòîðè÷åñêèõ îáñòîÿòåëüñòâ îíè îêàçàëèñü î÷åâèäöàìè î÷åíü âàæíûõ ïåðåëîìíûõ ñîáûòèé. Íåêîòîðûå èç ýòèõ ëþäåé ðàíåå íå êàñàëèñü ïîëèòèêè, íî îíà êîñíóëàñü èõ. Ïðåäñòàâëÿÿ íåáîëüøóþ ãàëåðåþ áèîãðàôè÷åñêèõ ïîðòðåòîâ íàèáîëåå çíà÷èìûõ ôèãóð îáùåñòâåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêîé æèçíè Àáõàçèè, ãëàâíûì îáðàçîì ïåðèîäà 1991–2001 ãã., ñîñòàâèòåëü ïðåñëåäîâàë îïðåäåëåííóþ öåëü: âûñâåòèòü êàê ìîæíî áîëåå øèðîêèé ñïåêòð ëè÷íîñòåé (ïîëèòèêîâ, ó÷åíûõ, âîåííûõ, äèïëîìàòîâ, ïðåäñòàâèòåëåé òâîð÷åñêîé èíòåëëèãåíöèè è íåïðàâèòåëüñòâåííûõ îðãàíèçàöèé) è ïî âîçìîæíîñòè îïðåäåëèòü èõ êîíêðåòíîå ìåñòî â ïðîèñõîäèâøèõ áóðíûõ ïðîöåññàõ. Òàê, íàïðèìåð, îãðîìíóþ èñòîðè÷åñêóþ ðîëü ñûãðàë äåïóòàòñêèé êîðïóñ àáõàçñêîãî ïàðëàìåíòà, äåÿòåëüíîñòü êîòîðîãî ïðîòåêàëà â ñìóòíûé ïåðèîä 1991–1996 ãã., êîãäà ðåøàëñÿ âîïðîñ: áûòü èëè íå áûòü àáõàçñêîìó ýòíîñó. Íå ñëó÷àéíî, â Àáõàçèè åãî íàçûâàþò «Ïåðâûì ïàðëàìåíòîì». Ïåðâûì ïðåäñåäàòåëåì ýòîãî çàêîíîäàòåëüíîãî îðãàíà ðåñïóáëèêè â 1991–1994 ãã. áûë óæå òîãäà èçâåñòíûé ïîëèòèê Âëàäèñëàâ Àðäçèíáà, 143

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

ñòàâøèé âïîñëåäñòâèè ïðåçèäåíòîì Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ – ñ 1994 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ. Àáõàçñêóþ äåïóòàòñêóþ ôðàêöèþ ñîñòàâèëè íàèáîëåå ÿðêèå ïðåäñòàâèòåëè íàðîäà, ïåðåæèâøèå òÿæåëîå âðåìÿ ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíû (1992–1993) è ïîñëåäóþùóþ ïîëèòèêî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêóþ è èíôîðìàöèîííóþ áëîêàäó. (Ïîäðîáíåå ñì.: Ëàêîáà Ñ. Àáõàçèÿ – äå-ôàêòî èëè Ãðóçèÿ – äå-þðå? Ñàïïîðî, 2001). Ê ñîæàëåíèþ, íå âñå äåïóòàòû çäåñü íàçâàíû. Òî æå ñàìîå ìîæíî ñêàçàòü î íåêîòîðûõ âîåííûõ, ó÷åíûõ, ïðåäñòàâèòåëÿõ âëàñòè, îáùåñòâåííûõ, òâîð÷åñêèõ è íåôîðìàëüíûõ îðãàíèçàöèé. Âìåñòå ñ òåì, äîâîëüíî øèðîêî ïðåäñòàâëåíû íå òîëüêî ïîëèòèêè, íî è âîåííûå, âíåñøèå çíà÷èòåëüíûé âêëàä â ïîáåäó. Ñðåäè íàèáîëåå èçâåñòíûõ ãåíåðàëîâ è îôèöåðî⠖ Ñóëòàí Ñîñíàëèåâ, Ìåðàá Êèøìàðèÿ, Âëàäèìèð Àðøáà, Ñåðãåé Äáàð, Ãèâè Àãðáà, Âèêòîð Êàêàëèÿ, Âëàäèìèð Àíóà, Àëåêñàíäð Âîèíñêèé, Âÿ÷åñëàâ Ýøáà è äðóãèå. Îñîáîå âíèìàíèå óäåëåíî íàðîäíûì ãåðîÿì, àáõàçñêèì ïîëåâûì êîìàíäèðàì, êîòîðûå ïåðâûìè îêàçàëè ñîïðîòèâëåíèå âîéñêàì Ãîññîâåòà Ãðóçèè. Ëó÷øèìè èç ëó÷øèõ áûëè îò÷àÿííûå áðàòüÿ Àñëàí è Çàçà Çàíòàðèÿ, èñòîðèê Âëàäèìèð Àíöóïîâ, àðõåîëîã Ìóøíè Õâàðöêèÿ. Àáõàçèÿ äî âîéíû è ïîñëå íåå áûëà è îñòàåòñÿ ìíîãîíàöèîíàëüíûì ãîñóäàðñòâîì.  ïðåäëàãàåìîé ðàáîòå ïðèâåäåíû áèîãðàôèè íå òîëüêî àáõàçîâ, íî è èçâåñòíûõ ëþäåé äðóãèõ íàöèîíàëüíîñòåé – ðóññêèõ, àðìÿí, ãðóçèí, êàáàðäèíöåâ, îñåòèí, ãðåêîâ.  òðóäíîå âîåííîå âðåìÿ ðÿäîì ñ àáõàçàìè, ñåâåðîêàâêàçñêèìè êîíôåäåðàòàìè, êàçàêàìè ïëå÷îì ê ïëå÷ó ñòàëè ëèäåðû àðìÿíñêîé îáùèíû Àáõàçèè (Àëüáåðò Òîïîëÿí, Ñåðãåé Ìàòîñÿí, Ãàëóñò Òðàïèçîíÿí), êîòîðûå ñôîðìèðîâàëè äâà àðìÿíñêèõ áàòàëüîíà â ñîñòàâå àáõàçñêîé àðìèè è ïðèíèìàëè íåïîñðåäñòâåííîå ó÷àñòèå â áîåâûõ äåéñòâèÿõ.  ðàáîòå íàøëè îòðàæåíèå è èçâåñòíûå â Àáõàçèè ëè÷íîñòè, êîòîðûå íà ïðîòÿæåíèè ìíîãèõ ëåò çàíèìàþòñÿ íå òîëüêî íàó÷íî-èññëåäîâàòåëüñêîé ðàáîòîé, íî è äîñòîéíî ïðåäñòàâëÿþò èíòåðåñû Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ â Ðîññèè, Çàïàäíîé Åâðîïå, Òóðöèè â êà÷åñòâå åå ïîëíîìî÷íûõ ïðåäñòàâèòåëåé. Ýòî âèäíûå ëèíãâèñòû-êàâêàçîâåäû Äæîðäæ Õüþèòò, Âÿ÷åñëàâ ×èðèêáà, èñòîðèê Âëàäèìèð Àâèäçáà, þðèñò Èãîðü Àõáà è äð. Îñîáî ñëåäóåò îòìåòèòü òåõ ÿðêèõ ïîëèòèêîâ, ïðåêðàñíûõ îðàòîðîâ, êîòîðûìè ãîðäèëàñü íå òîëüêî Àáõàçèÿ. Îíè ñûãðàëè áîëüøóþ ðîëü â ñòðîèòåëüñòâå íîâîãî ãîñóäàðñòâà, áóäó÷è äåïóòàòàìè Ïåðâîãî ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè. Ýòî – èçâåñòíûé àðõåîëîã-êàâêàçîâåä Þðèé Âîðîíîâ è þðèñò Çóðàá À÷áà, óáèòûå â Ñóõóìå â 1995 è 2000 ãã. â ðåçóëüòàòå òåððîðèñòè÷åñêèõ àêòîâ. Íåîáõîäèìî ñêàçàòü è î òîì, ÷òî â ñèëó íàðàñòàâøèõ ïðîòèâîðå÷èé ìåæäó äåïóòàòàìè Ïåðâîãî ïàðëàìåíòà è ïðåçèäåíòîì Àáõàçèè, îñîáåííî â 1995– 1996 ãã., ïðàêòè÷åñêè âåñü äåïóòàòñêèé êîðïóñ ñëîæèë ñâîè ïîëíîìî÷èÿ è íå ïðèíÿë ó÷àñòèÿ â âûáîðàõ â íîâûé ïàðëàìåíò. Ýòî áûë ñâîåãî ðîäà ïðî144

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

òåñò ïðîòèâ íàðàñòàâøèõ íåãàòèâíûõ ìåòîäîâ ïðàâëåíèÿ.  òî æå âðåìÿ, ïðîèçîøåäøåå ìîæíî îõàðàêòåðèçîâàòü è êàê ðåä÷àéøèé ñëó÷àé êîëëåêòèâíîãî îòêàçà îò âëàñòè, îò èñïîëíåíèÿ ðîëè øèðìû ïðè íåé.  ýòó ýïîõó íàèáîëåå âûïóêëî ïðîÿâèëñÿ õàðàêòåð è òàëàíò òàêèõ æåíùèí-ïîëèòèêîâ, êàê Íàòåëëà Àêàáà, Èçèäà ×àíèÿ, Íàäåæäà Âåíåäèêòîâà, Ëèàíà Êâàð÷åëèÿ è äð. Çíà÷èòåëüíûì âëèÿíèåì â ïðàâèòåëüñòâå ïîëüçóþòñÿ ìèíèñòðû Ëèëè Áãàíáà è Ëþäìèëà Àâèäçáà.  ñâÿçè ñ òåì ÷òî áèîãðàôè÷åñêèé îáçîð îõâàòûâàåò â îñíîâíîì ïåðèîä äî 2001 ã., ïðåäñòàâëÿåòñÿ âåñüìà æåëàòåëüíûì õîòÿ áû âêðàòöå îñâåòèòü ñèòóàöèþ â Àáõàçèè è îñíîâíûå êàäðîâûå ïåðåñòàíîâêè â ðóêîâîäñòâå ðåñïóáëèêè, êîòîðûå ïðîèçîøëè ïîñëå 2001 ã. Òàê, ê êîíöó 2002 ã. ñ ïîñòà ïðåìüåð-ìèíèñòðà áûë ñìåùåí áëèçêèé ïðåçèäåíòó ïîëèòèê Àíðè Äæåðãåíèÿ. Ñ 1990 ã. îí çàìåòíî âëèÿë íà ïîëèòèêó âûñøåãî ðóêîâîäñòâà è ñ÷èòàëñÿ «ñåðûì êàðäèíàëîì». Âìåñòî íåãî ïðåìüåð-ìèíèñòðîì âíîâü ñòàë õîçÿéñòâåííèê Ãåííàäèé Ãàãóëèÿ, êîòîðûé ìåíåå âñåãî çàíèìàëñÿ ïîëèòèêîé. Îäíàêî íåêîòîðûå íåïîïóëÿðíûå ðåøåíèÿ â îáëàñòè ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî ðåôîðìèðîâàíèÿ, ïðèíèìàâøèåñÿ íà ôîíå âñåîáùåãî íåäîâîëüñòâà è òÿæåëîé êðèìèíîãåííîé îáñòàíîâêè, ïðèâåëè ê íàðîäíîìó íåäîâîëüñòâó, â ðåçóëüòàòå ÷åãî ïðåçèäåíò áûë âûíóæäåí â àïðåëå 2003 ã. îòïðàâèòü â îòñòàâêó Ã. Ãàãóëèÿ è åãî ïåðâîãî çàìåñòèòåëÿ Ðóñëàíà Àðäçèíáà. Íî â äåêàáðå 2003 ã. Ãàãóëèÿ ïîÿâèëñÿ íà ïîëèòè÷åñêîé àâàíñöåíå â êà÷åñòâå ãëàâû àäìèíèñòðàöèè ïðåçèäåíòà ñ øèðîêèìè ïîëíîìî÷èÿìè.  î÷åíü íåïðîñòîé îáùåñòâåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêîé îáñòàíîâêå â àïðåëå 2003 ã. ïðåìüåð-ìèíèñòðîì ñòàíîâèòñÿ Ðàóëü Õàäæèìáà, êîòîðîãî ÷àñòü îêðóæåíèÿ ïðåçèäåíòà ïðî÷èò â åãî ïðååìíèêè. Äðóãèì ïðååìíèêîì ïðîïðåçèäåíòñêèå êðóãè õîòåëè áû âèäåòü ñåêðåòàðÿ Ñîâåòà áåçîïàñíîñòè Àëìàñáåÿ Ê÷à÷, ýêñ-ìèíèñòðà âíóòðåííèõ äåë. Ñîâåðøåííî íåîæèäàííî íà ïîëèòè÷åñêîì íåáîñêëîíå ïîÿâèëñÿ áûâøèé êîìñîìîëüñêèé ôóíêöèîíåð Íóãçàð Àøóáà, â 2002 ã. èçáðàííûé ñïèêåðîì íîâîãî ïàðëàìåíòà. Íå èñêëþ÷åíî, ÷òî âñå ýòè ôèãóðû, âêëþ÷àÿ Ã. Ãàãóëèÿ è ìèíèñòðà èíîñòðàííûõ äåë Ñåðãåÿ Øàìáà, ïðèìóò ó÷àñòèå â ïðåäñòîÿùèõ â 2004 ã. âûáîðàõ ïðåçèäåíòà Àáõàçèè. Ïîìèìî ïðåäñòàâèòåëåé èñïîëíèòåëüíîé è çàêîíîäàòåëüíîé âëàñòè ñðåäè âîçìîæíûõ êàíäèäàòîâ ìîãóò áûòü è òàêèå ïîëèòèêè, êàê Ñåðãåé Áàãàïø, Àíðè Äæåðãåíèÿ, Àëåêñàíäð Àíêâàá, Ëåîíèä Ëàêåðáàÿ, Íîäàð Õàøáà è äðóãèå. Íåêîòîðûå èç íèõ óæå ôàêòè÷åñêè íà÷àëè ïðåäâûáîðíóþ êàìïàíèþ.  ðåçóëüòàòå ïðîèçîøåäøèõ ïåðåñòàíîâîê ñëóæáó ãîñáåçîïàñíîñòè âîçãëàâèë Ãèâè Àãðáà, à ïîñò ìèíèñòðà îáîðîíû ïîëó÷èë áëèçêèé ê ïðåçèäåíòñêîìó îêðóæåíèþ Âÿ÷åñëàâ Ýøáà. Âìåñòî Ãóðàìà Àìêóàá Àáõàçñêóþ òåëåðàäèîêîìïàíèþ âîçãëàâèë áûâøèé äèðåêòîð ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî èíôîðìàöèîííîãî àãåíòñòâà Ðóñëàí Õàøèã, à íà ñìåíó åìó ïðèøëà êîîðäèíàòîð ïðîãðàìì íåïðàâèòåëüñòâåííûõ îðãàíèçàöèé Ìàíàíà Ãóðãóëèÿ. Åùå ðàíüøå ïðîèçîøëà äðóãàÿ âàæíàÿ ðîêèðîâêà – ïðåäñåäàòåëåì Öåíòðàëüíîé 145

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

èçáèðàòåëüíîé êîìèññèè Àáõàçèè âìåñòî çàìåñòèòåëÿ ìèíèñòðà îáîðîíû Ãàððè Êóïàëáà ñòàë áûâøèé ìèíèñòð þñòèöèè Àáõàçèè ãåíåðàë Ñåðãåé Ñìûð, íûíå äåêàí þðèäè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà. Ñðåäè ëþäåé, êîòîðûå ðåøàþò íå òîëüêî êàäðîâûå âîïðîñû, ìîæíî áûëî áû íàçâàòü è ïðåäñòàâèòåëåé òàê íàçûâàåìîãî òåíåâîãî ïðàâèòåëüñòâà. Îäíàêî ïðåäñòàâëÿåòñÿ âïîëíå äîñòàòî÷íûì îçíàêîìèòü ÷èòàòåëÿ ñ òåì êðóãîì ëèö, êîòîðûå äåéñòâèòåëüíî èçâåñòíû â íàðîäå è â îáùåñòâå. Êîíå÷íî, ïðåäëàãàåìûé ïåðå÷åíü èìåí è áèîãðàôèé äàëåêî íå ïîëíûé, íî ïî íåìó âïîëíå ìîæíî ñîñòàâèòü ïðåäñòàâëåíèå îá îáùåñòâåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêîé è âîåííîé ýëèòå Àáõàçèè ïðîøåäøåãî äåñÿòèëåòèÿ, ïåðåæèâøåé âìåñòå ñî âñåé ñòðàíîé êîëîññàëüíûå ïåðåìåíû. Ñàïïîðî, 17 ôåâðàëÿ 2004 ã. ÀÂÈÄÇÁÀ Âëàäèìèð Äæàìàëîâè÷, ïîëíîìî÷íûé ïðåäñòàâèòåëü Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ â Òóðåöêîé ðåñïóáëèêå. Ðîäèëñÿ 25 èþíÿ 1937 ã. â ñ. Âåðõíÿÿ Ýøåðà Ñóõóìñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Íà÷àëüíóþ øêîëó îêîí÷èë â ðîäíîì ñåëå. Ñðåäíåå îáðàçîâàíèå ïîëó÷èë â ã. Ñóõóì. Ñ 1956 ã. àêòåð Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî äðàìàòè÷åñêîãî òåàòðà.  òîì æå ãîäó ïîñòóïèë íà ôèëîëîãè÷åñêèé ôàêóëüòåò Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà. Ïîñëå îêîí÷àíèÿ èíñòèòóòà íàïðàâëåí íà êîìñîìîëüñêóþ ðàáîòó: ñåêðåòàðü Ñóõóìñêîãî ðàéêîìà êîìñîìîëà, Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ïðîìûøëåííîãî êîìèòåòà êîìñîìîëà.  1963–1967 ãã. – àñïèðàíò êàôåäðû èñòîðèè Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà.  1967–1973 ãã. – çàâåäóþùèé îòäåëîì è çàìåñòèòåëü ðåäàêòîðà àáõàçñêîé ãàçåòû Àïñíû êàïø (Êðàñíàÿ Àáõàçèÿ).  1975 ã. ïåðåâåäåí íà ïàðòèéíóþ ðàáîòó â Àáõàçñêèé îáêîì ïàðòèè. Çàíèìàë äîëæíîñòè çàâåäóþùåãî îòäåëîì òîðãîâëè, ïëàíîâûõ è ôèíàíñîâûõ îðãàíîâ, çàòåì çàâåäóþùåãî îòäåëîì ïðîïàãàíäû è àãèòàöèè.  1977 ã. – 1-é ñåêðåòàðü Òêâàð÷åëüñêîãî ãîðêîìà ïàðòèè.  1982–1989 ãã. – çàâåäóþùèé èäåîëîãè÷åñêèì îòäåëîì Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè.  1989 – àâãóñòå 1991 ã. (äî ðîñïóñêà ÊÏÑÑ) – ñåêðåòàðü Àáõàçñêîãî ðåñïóáëèêàíñêîãî êîìèòåòà ïàðòèè. Ñ ôåâðàëü 1994 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ïîëíîìî÷íûé ïðåäñòàâèòåëü Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ â Òóðåöêîé ðåñïóáëèêå. Êàíäèäàò èñòîðè÷åñêèõ íàóê, ÷ëåí Ñîþçà æóðíàëèñòîâ ÑÑÑÐ, èçáèðàëñÿ äåïóòàòîì Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçèè. Æåíàò, èìååò äâîèõ äåòåé. ÀÂÈÄÇÁÀ Ëþäìèëà Áîðèñîâíà, ìèíèñòð çäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ðîäèëàñü 10 èþëÿ 1946 ã. â ã. Íîâûé Àôîí (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàçêà.  1963 ã. îêîí÷èëà íîâîàôîíñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó.  1963–1968 ãã. – ñòóäåíòêà Ìîñêîâñêîãî ìåäèöèíñêîãî ñòîìàòîëîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà.  1968– 146

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

1970 ãã. – âðà÷-ñòîìàòîëîã íîâîàôîíñêîé áîëüíèöû, â 1970–1976 ãã. – çàâåäóþùàÿ ïîëèêëèíè÷åñêèì îòäåëåíèåì Íîâîàôîíñêîãî áîëüíè÷íî-ïîëèêëèíè÷åñêîãî îáúåäèíåíèÿ, â 1976–1992 ãã. – ãëàâíûé âðà÷ Ðåñïóáëèêàíñêîé äåòñêîé ñòîìàòîëîãè÷åñêîé ïîëèêëèíèêè.  1994 – àïðåëå 1997 ã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà çäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ, çàòåì (äî äåêàáðÿ 1999 ã.) âðà÷-ñòîìàòîëîã Ðåñïóáëèêàíñêîé ñòîìàòîëîãè÷åñêîé ïîëèêëèíèêè. Ñ äåêàáðÿ 1999 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ìèíèñòð çäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ Àáõàçèè.  1970, 1972, 1976, 1980 ãã. – êóðñû ñïåöèàëèçàöèè ïî ñòîìàòîëîãèè (Òáèëèñè); â 1981, 1984, 1986 ãã. – êóðñû ïî îðãàíèçàöèè çäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ (Ìîñêâà); â 1991 ã. – Èíñòèòóò óñîâåðøåíñòâîâàíèÿ âðà÷åé (Êàçàíü). Âðà÷-îðãàíèçàòîð çäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ âûñøåé êàòåãîðèè. Íàãðàæäåíà îðäåíîì «Äðóæáû Íàðîäîâ» (1986). Çàìóæåì, äâîå äåòåé. ÀÃÐÁÀ Ãèâè Êàìóãîâè÷, ãåíåðàë-ëåéòåíàíò, ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ñëóæáû ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé áåçîïàñíîñòè Àáõàçèè (ñ 2003 ã.), Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 4 àïðåëÿ 1937 ã. â ñ. Êóëàíóðõâà Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1954 ã. îêîí÷èë ëûõíåíñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó. Ó÷èëñÿ íà ôèëîëîãè÷åñêîì ôàêóëüòåòå Ñóõóìñêîãî ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà.  1958–1960 ãã. – ñòàðøèé ëàáîðàíò êàôåäðû àáõàçñêîãî ÿçûêà èíñòèòóòà, â 1960–1963 ãã. – â ðÿäàõ Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè.  1963–1972 ãã. – ñòàðøèé âîñïèòàòåëü ñóõóìñêîé øêîëûèíòåðíàòà, â 1972–1974 ãã. – ñîòðóäíèê ÌÂÄ Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ.  1974–1979 ãã. – ñîòðóäíèê îòäåëà àäìèíèñòðàòèâíûõ îðãàíîâ Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè, â 1979– 1992 ãã. – íà ðàçíûõ äîëæíîñòÿõ â ÌÂÄ Àáõàçèè.  ÿíâàðå – àâãóñòå 1992 ã. – êîìàíäèð ïîëêà âíóòðåííèõ âîéñê Àáõàçèè (Àáõàçñêîé ãâàðäèè).  ïåðâûé æå äåíü âîéíû, 14 àâãóñòà 1992 ã., âìåñòå ñ Âàõòàíãîì Öóãáà – îäèí èç îðãàíèçàòîðîâ îáîðîíû ïðîòèâ âîéñê Ãîññîâåòà Ãðóçèè â Ñóõóìå, â ðàéîíå 14-é øêîëû è Êðàñíîãî ìîñòà; â ïåðèîä âîéíû îäèí èç ñàìûõ àâòîðèòåòíûõ êîìàíäèðîâ.  1993–1996 ãã. – ìèíèñòð âíóòðåííèõ äåë Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1996– 2002 ãã. – 1-é çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà îáîðîíû Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1996 ã. – ïðèñâîåíî çâàíèå ãåíåðàë-ìàéîð.  1998 ã. – ãåíåðàë-ëåéòåíàíò. Ñ 2003 ã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ñëóæáû ãîñáåçîïàñíîñòè Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Çà ìóæåñòâî è ãåðîèçì, ïðîÿâëåííûå â ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíå 1992– 1993 ãã., ïðèñâîåíî çâàíèå Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Íàãðàæäåí àáõàçñêèì îðäåíîì «Àõüäç-Àïøà». Æåíàò. Òðîå äåòåé. ÀÉÁÀ Àçàðåò Àëåêñååâè÷, ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ôåäåðàöèè íåçàâèñèìûõ ïðîôñîþçîâ Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 25 ìàðòà 1944 ã. â ñ. Îòõàðà Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. 147

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

 1960 ã. îêîí÷èë îòõàðñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó.  1961 ã. ïîñòóïèë â Ðîñòîâñêèé ôèíàíñîâî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêèé èíñòèòóò íà ôèíàíñîâî-êðåäèòíûé ôàêóëüòåò.  1963–1967 ãã. ñëóæèë íà ×åðíîìîðñêîì ôëîòå íà ïîäâîäíîé ëîäêå, à çàòåì íà íàäâîäíîì êðåéñåðå «Äçåðæèíñêèé» áðèãàäû ðàêåòíûõ êîðàáëåé.  1967–1970 ãã. ïðîäîëæèë ó÷åáó â ðîñòîâñêîì èíñòèòóòå.  1970 ã. âåðíóëñÿ â Àáõàçèþ.  1970–1976 ãã. ðàáîòàë êðåäèòíûì èíñïåêòîðîì îòäåëà ôèíàíñèðîâàíèÿ è êðåäèòîâàíèÿ ñåëüñêîãî õîçÿéñòâà, çàìåñòèòåëåì íà÷àëüíèêà ãîðîäñêîãî óïðàâëåíèÿ Àáõàçñêîé ðåñïóáëèêàíñêîé êîíòîðû Ãîñáàíêà.  1976–1986 ãã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ ïðàâëåíèÿ Àáñîþçà ïî ôèíàíñîâî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêèì âîïðîñàì è ñòðîèòåëüñòâó.  1982 ã. îêîí÷èë Áàêèíñêóþ âûñøóþ ïàðòèéíóþ øêîëó.  1986–1989 ãã. – çàìåñòèòåëü äèðåêòîðà Ñóõóìñêîãî ôèçèêî-òåõíè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà. Ñ 1989 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ â ïðîôñîþçàõ Àáõàçèè.  êîíöå 80-õ – íà÷àëå 90-õ ãã. ïðèíèìàë àêòèâíîå ó÷àñòèå â ðàáîòå Íàðîäíîãî ôîðóìà Àáõàçèè «Àèäãûëàðà» («Åäèíåíèå») è ñîçäàíèè Íàðîäíîé ïàðòèè Àáõàçèè.  íà÷àëå 1993 ã. èçáðàí ïðåäñåäàòåëåì ïîëèòñîâåòà Íàðîäíîé ïàðòèè Àáõàçèè. Âî âðåìÿ ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíû â 1993 ã. áûë âåäóùèì âñåíàðîäíîãî àáõàçñêîãî ñõîäà â äðåâíåì ñ. Ëûõíû. Ñ 1994 ã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ôåäåðàöèè íåçàâèñèìûõ ïðîôñîþçîâ Àáõàçèè. Çàêëþ÷åíû ñîãëàøåíèÿ ñ Áåëîðóññèåé è ðåñïóáëèêîé Áàøêîðòîñòàí, à òàêæå ñ 15 êðàÿìè è îáëàñòÿìè, âõîäÿùèìè â Þæíûé Ôåäåðàëüíûé îêðóã ÐÔ. Æåíàò, äâîå ñûíîâåé è äî÷ü. ÀÉÁÀ Ðàóô Òàðõóíîâè÷, ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ñ.-Ïåòåðáóðãñêîãî Àáõàçñêîãî îáùåñòâà «Àïñíû». Ðîäèëñÿ 7 èþëÿ 1935 ã. â ñ. Âåðõíÿÿ Ýøåðà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Îêîí÷èë ñóõóìñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹2. Òðè ãîäà ñëóæèë â Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè.  1959–1961 ãã. – ñòóäåíò Ëåíèíãðàäñêîãî ìàøèíîñòðîèòåëüíîãî òåõíèêóìà. Çàòåì ðàáîòàë íà÷àëüíèêîì öåõà Íåâñêîãî ìàøèíîñòðîèòåëüíîãî çàâîäà «Ýëåêòîðñèëà»; â 1973–1991 ãã. – íà÷àëüíèê öåõà ñòàëåïðîêàòíîãî çàâîäà. Ñ 1991 ã. – ãåíåðàëüíûé äèðåêòîð ÇÀÎ «Íàðò». Ñ 1992–1993 ãã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ñ.-Ïåòåðáóðãñêîãî Àáõàçñêîãî îáùåñòâà «Àïñíû». Æåíàò, èìååò äî÷ü. ÀÊÀÁÀ Íàòåëëà Íóðèåâíà, äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1991–1996), äèðåêòîð ÍÏÎ «Öåíòð ïîääåðæêè äåìîêðàòèè è ïðàâ ÷åëîâåêà», ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïðàâëåíèÿ Àññîöèàöèè æåíùèí Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëàñü 16 ìàðòà 1945 ã. â Ìîñêâå. Àáõàçêà. 148

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Äåä, Õóðøèò Îñìàíîâè÷ Øàìáà, áûë ðåïðåññèðîâàí ïî óêàçàíèþ Áåðèÿ â 1936 ã. Îòåö, Íóðè Ðàäæåáîâè÷ Àêàáà, ñëóæèë âî âðåìÿ Âåëèêîé Îòå÷åñòâåííîé âîéíû (1941–1945) â îðãàíèçàöèè «Ñìåðø» («Ñìåðòü øïèîíàì»), çàòåì ðàáîòàë çàâ. îòäåëîì êàäðîâ Èíñòèòóòà âíåøíåé òîðãîâëè (Ìîñêâà). Ìàòü, Ëèëè Õóðøèòîâíà Øàìáà, áûëà àñïèðàíòêîé Èíñòèòóòà èñòîðèè, íûíå èçâåñòíûé àáõàçñêèé ýòíîãðàô.  1955 ã. ñåìüÿ ïåðååõàëà â ã. Ñóõóì.  1962 ã. îêîí÷èëà ñóõóìñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹10 èì. Í. Ëàêîáà.  1962–1967 ãã. – ñòóäåíòêà èñòîðè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Ìîñêîâñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà (ÌÃÓ), ýòíîãðàô. Ðàáîòàëà ëèòåðàòóðíûì ñîòðóäíèêîì â ðåäàêöèè ãàçåòû Ñîâåòñêàÿ Àáõàçèÿ.  1976 ã. îêîí÷èëà àñïèðàíòóðó Èíñòèòóòà âîñòîêîâåäåíèÿ ÀÍ ÑÑÑÐ (Ìîñêâà). Ïåðååõàëà â Åðåâàí, ñ 1979 ã. – ïðåïîäàâàòåëü èñòîðèè â Åðåâàíñêîì ãîñóäàðñòâåííîì óíèâåðñèòåòå è â Åðåâàíñêîì ïîëèòåõíè÷åñêîì èíñòèòóòå.  1981 ã. çàùèòèëà äèññåðòàöèþ â Èíñòèòóòå âîñòîêîâåäåíèÿ ÀÍ ÑÑÑÐ íà òåìó «Êîëîíèàëüíàÿ ïîëèòèêà àíãëèéñêîãî èìïåðèàëèçìà â Êàòàðå». Ñ 1989 ã. – äîöåíò. Ñ 1989 ã. – â Ñóõóìå, ðàáîòàëà íà êàôåäðå Âñåîáùåé èñòîðèè Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà.  1990 ã. èçáðàíà ÷ëåíîì Ïðåçèäèóìà Íàðîäíîãî ôîðóìà Àáõàçèè «Àèäãûëàðà» («Åäèíåíèå»).  1991–1996 ãã. – äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ, çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Êîìèññèè ïî ïðàâàì ÷åëîâåêà è ìåæíàöèîíàëüíûì îòíîøåíèÿì.  1994–1995 ãã. – ìèíèñòð èíôîðìàöèè è ïå÷àòè.  íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ âîçãëàâëÿåò íåïðàâèòåëüñòâåííóþ îðãàíèçàöèþ (ÍÏÎ) «Öåíòð ïîääåðæêè äåìîêðàòèè è ïðàâ ÷åëîâåêà». Ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïðàâëåíèÿ Àññîöèàöèè æåíùèí Àáõàçèè. Çàìóæåì, äâîå äåòåé. ÀÌÊÓÀÁ (ÌÈÊÂÀÁÈß) Ãóðàì Àðòåìîâè÷, ãåíåðàëüíûé äèðåêòîð Àáõàçñêîé ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé òåëåðàäèîêîìïàíèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 3 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1951 ã. â ã. Ñóõóì (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1968 ã. îêîí÷èë ñóõóìñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹10 èì. Í. Ëàêîáà.  1968–1973 – ãã. ñòóäåíò ôèëîëîãè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Òáèëèññêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà.  1973–1976 ãã. ïðåïîäàâàë ðóññêèé ÿçûê â ñðåäíåé øêîëå ñ. Êèíäãè Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîíà.  1977–1978 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â Ëåíèíãðàäñêîì ãîñóäàðñòâåííîì èíñòèòóòå òåàòðà, ìóçûêè, êèíåìàòîãðàôèè; ðåæèññåð òåëåâèäåíèÿ.  1978–1988 ãã. – ãëàâíûé ðåæèññåð Àáõàçñêîãî òåëåâèäåíèÿ.  1988–1990 ãã. – ñëóøàòåëü Ìîñêîâñêîé Âûñøåé ïîëèòè÷åñêîé øêîëû; ïðåïîäàâàòåëü ïîëèòîëîãèè.  1990–1991 ãã. – àñïèðàíò Àêàäåìèè îáùåñòâåííûõ íàóê ïðè ÖÊ ÊÏÑÑ (Ìîñêâà), â 1991–1992 ãã. ïåðåâåäåí â àñïèðàíòóðó Ðîññèéñêîé àêàäåìèè óïðàâëåíèÿ ïðè Ïðåçèäåíòå ÐÔ (Ìîñêâà). Ñ 1992 ã. – êàíäèäàò èñòîðè÷åñêèõ íàóê. Ñ 1995 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ãåíåðàëüíûé äèðåêòîð Àáõàçñêîé òåëåðàäèîêîìïàíèè. 149

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Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. Àâòîð ïóáëèêàöèé: – ÑÌÈ Àáõàçèè â ïîëèòè÷åñêîé ñèñòåìå îáùåñòâà. Ìîñêâà, 1992. – Àáõàçèÿ: õðîíèêà íåîáúÿâëåííîé âîéíû.  4-õ ò. Ìîñêâà, 1992–1994. ÀÍÊÂÀÁ Àëåêñàíäð Çîëîòèíñêîâè÷, äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1991–1996), ìèíèñòð âíóòðåííèõ äåë Àáõàçèè (1992–1993). Ðîäèëñÿ 26 äåêàáðÿ 1952 ã. â ã. Ñóõóì (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Ïîñëå îêîí÷àíèÿ ñóõóìñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëû ¹16 ðàáîòàë íà Ñóõóìñêîì êîíñåðâíîì çàâîäå (1968–1970).  1970–1974 ãã. – ñòóäåíò þðèäè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Ðîñòîâñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà; þðèñò-ïðàâîâåä.  1975 ã. – ñòàðøèé áóõãàëòåð-ðåâèçîð Ìèíèñòåðñòâà þñòèöèè Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ (Ñóõóì), êîíñóëüòàíò ïî ðàçáîðó æàëîá è çàÿâëåíèé Ìèíþñòà.  1975– 1976 ãã. – èíñòðóêòîð îòäåëà ïðîïàãàíäû è êóëüòìàññîâîé ðàáîòû Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà êîìñîìîëà (Ñóõóì).  1977–1979 ãã. – 1-é ñåêðåòàðü Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéêîìà êîìñîìîëà.  1979–1981 ãã. – íà÷àëüíèê Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîòäåëà âíóòðåííèõ äåë.  1981 ã. – èíñòðóêòîð îòäåëà àäìèíèñòðàòèâíûõ îðãàíîâ ÖÊ ÊÏ Ãðóçèè (Òáèëèñè).  1981–1982 ãã. – çàâåäóþùèé ñåêòîðîì íàóêè è ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî àíàëèçà ñåëüñêîõîçÿéñòâåííîãî îòäåëà ÖÊ ÊÏ Ãðóçèè (Òáèëèñè).  1982–1983 ãã. – çàìåñòèòåëü çàâåäóþùåãî îòäåëîì àäìèíèñòðàòèâíûõ îðãàíîâ ÖÊ ÊÏ Ãðóçèè.  1983 ã. ïðèñâîåíî çâàíèå ïîëêîâíèêà ìèëèöèè.  1983–1990 ãã. – íà÷àëüíèê ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî îòäåëà (íà ïðàâàõ çàìåñòèòåëÿ ìèíèñòðà) ÌÂÄ Ãðóçèíñêîé ÑÑÐ (Òáèëèñè).  1988 ã. îêîí÷èë Àêàäåìèþ îáùåñòâåííûõ íàóê ïðè ÖÊ ÊÏÑÑ (Ìîñêâà).  1991–1996 ãã. – äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1992–1993 ãã. – ìèíèñòð âíóòðåííèõ äåë Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (Ñóõóì). Ñ 1994 ã. æèâåò è ðàáîòàåò â Ìîñêâå. Àêòèâíî çàíèìàåòñÿ êóëüòóðòðåãåðñòâîì, îêàçûâàåò âñåâîçìîæíóþ ïîìîùü ñâîèì çåìëÿêàì, ïîääåðæèâàåò àáõàçñêèõ ó÷åíûõ, ëèòåðàòîðîâ, àðòèñòîâ è äð. Âîçãëàâëÿåò àáõàçñêîå çåìëÿ÷åñòâî â Ìîñêâå. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ÀÍÖÓÏΠÂëàäèìèð Âëàäèìèðîâè÷ (1947–1992), îðãàíèçàòîð ñîïðîòèâëåíèÿ íà Âîñòî÷íîì ôðîíòå, Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 22 íîÿáðÿ 1947 ã. â ã. Ìàðèÿìïîëå Ëèòîâñêîé ÑÑÐ â ñåìüå âîåííîñëóæàùåãî. Ðóññêèé. Îêîí÷èë Ìîñêîâñêîå ñóâîðîâñêîå ó÷èëèùå, ñëóæèë â äåñàíòíûõ âîéñêàõ, ó÷èëñÿ â Ðÿçàíñêîì âûñøåì äåñàíòíîì ó÷èëèùå. Ñ 1968 ã. æèë è ó÷èëñÿ â Àáõàçèè. Ïîñëå çàâåðøåíèÿ ó÷åáû íà èñòîðèêî-ôèëîëîãè÷åñêîì ôàêóëüòåòå Ñóõóìñêîãî ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà ðàáîòàë ïðåïîäàâàòåëåì íà êàôåäðå àðõåîëîãèè, èñòîðèè è ýòíîãðàôèè Àáõàçñêîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà. Çàùèòèë êàíäèäàòñêóþ äèññåðòàöèþ ïî òåìå «Èñòîðèÿ ãîðîäà Ñóõóìè» (íàó÷íûé ðóêîâîäèòåëü èçâåñòíûé àáõàçñêèé èñòîðèê, ïðîôåññîð Ç.Â. Àí÷à150

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áàäçå). Ñåðüåçíî çàíèìàëñÿ ñïîðòîì. Ñíà÷àëà áîêñîì, ïîòîì áîðüáîé. Êàðàòèñò, îáëàäàòåëü ÷åðíîãî ïîÿñà. 24 èþíÿ 1992 ã. âìåñòå ñ îôèöåðàìè Âèêòîðîì Êàêàëèÿ, Ëåîíèäîì Äçàïøáà, áðàòüÿìè Çàíòàðèÿ, Àðäîé Ìèêâàáèÿ è äð. – àêòèâíûé ó÷àñòíèê ìîëíèåíîñíîãî øòóðìà ÌÂÄ Àáõàçèè â Ñóõóìå è âûäâîðåíèÿ îòñòðàíåííîãî îò äîëæíîñòè Ïàðëàìåíòîì Àáõàçèè ìèíèñòðà Ã.Í. Ëîìèíàäçå. Âìåñòå ñ áðàòüÿìè Àñëàíîì è Çàçîé Çàíòàðèÿ áûë îäíèì èç îðãàíèçàòîðîâ âîåíèçèðîâàííîé ãðóïïû «Êàòðàí» è ïàðòèçàíñêîãî äâèæåíèÿ â Î÷àì÷èðñêîì ðàéîíå. Ïîãèá 14 äåêàáðÿ 1992 ã. Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Îñòàëèñü æåíà, äâîå äåòåé. ÀÍ×ÀÁÀÄÇÅ Þðèé Äìèòðèåâè÷, èçâåñòíûé ýòíîãðàô-êàâêàçîâåä, ïðåäñòàâèòåëü ìîñêîâñêîé äèàñïîðû. Ðîäèëñÿ 14 ôåâðàëÿ 1953 ã. â ã. Òêâàð÷åëè (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Îêîí÷èë ñóõóìñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹10 èì. Í. Ëàêîáà è èñòîðèêî-ôèëîëîãè÷åñêèé ôàêóëüòåò Ñóõóìñêîãî ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà â 1975 ã.  1975–1976, 1977–1980 ãã. – àñïèðàíò Èíñòèòóòà ýòíîãðàôèè èì. Í.Í. Ìèêëóõî-Ìàêëàÿ ÀÍ ÑÑÑÐ (Ìîñêâà).  1976–1977 ãã. – ñëóæáà â àðìèè. Ïîñëå àñïèðàíòóðû è çàùèòû êàíäèäàòñêîé äèññåðòàöèè ïðåïîäàâàë â Àáõàçñêîì ãîñóäàðñòâåííîì óíèâåðñèòåòå, ðàáîòàë â Àáõàçñêîì èíñòèòóòå ÿçûêà, ëèòåðàòóðû è èñòîðèè. Ñ 1986 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ æèâåò â Ìîñêâå è ðàáîòàåò â Èíñòèòóòå ýòíîãðàôèè – íûíå Èíñòèòóòå ýòíîëîãèè è àíòðîïîëîãèè Ðîññèéñêîé àêàäåìèè íàóê.  1990 ã. – àêòèâíûé ó÷àñòíèê îáùåñòâåííî-êóëüòóðíîé æèçíè àáõàçñêîé äèàñïîðû â Ìîñêâå, îäèí èç îñíîâàòåëåé Ìîñêîâñêîãî îáùåñòâà àáõàçñêîé êóëüòóðû «Íàðòàà».  1993–1994 ãã. – ãëàâíûé ðåäàêòîð âûõîäèâøåé â Ìîñêâå ãàçåòû Àáõàçñêèé âåñòíèê.  1998 ã. – îäèí èç ñîçäàòåëåé Ìîñêîâñêîãî èññëåäîâàòåëüñêîãî öåíòðà àáõàçîâåäåíèÿ.  2002–2003 ãã. – ãëàâíûé ðåäàêòîð æóðíàëà Ýòíîãðàôè÷åñêîå îáîçðåíèå. Ñ 2003 ã. – âåäóùèé íàó÷íûé ñîòðóäíèê Èíñòèòóòà ýòíîëîãèè è àíòðîïîëîãèè. Îñíîâíûå èññëåäîâàòåëüñêèå èíòåðåñû è îïóáëèêîâàííûå ðàáîòû ïîñâÿùåíû ïðîáëåìàì ýòíè÷åñêîé è ñîöèàëüíîé èñòîðèè íàðîäîâ Êàâêàçà, èñòîðèè è èñòîðèîãðàôèè êàâêàçîâåäåíèÿ, ýòíîïîëèòîëîãèè. Æåíàò, èìååò ñûíà. Î íåì ñì.: Êòî åñòü êòî â èçó÷åíèè íàðîäîâ è íàöèîíàëüíûõ ïðîáëåì Ðîññèè. Ñïðàâî÷íèê. Ì., 1995. ÀÍÓÀ Âëàäèìèð Èâàíîâè÷, çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà îáîðîíû Àáõàçèè, ãåíåðàë-ìàéîð. Ðîäèëñÿ 2 ÿíâàðÿ 1957 ã. â ñ. Òàìûø Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1974 ã. îêîí÷èë òàìûøñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó.  1974–1976 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â À÷èãâàðñêîì ñîâõîçå-òåõíèêóìå.  1977–1979 ãã. – â ðÿäàõ Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè.  1981–1988 ãã. – ñòóäåíò-çàî÷íèê Èíñòèòóòà ñóáòðîïè÷åñêîãî õîçÿéñòâà 151

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(Ñóõóì); àãðîíîì.  1981–1987 ãã. îäíîâðåìåííî ñ ó÷åáîé ðàáîòàë â Òàìûøñêîì ñîâõîçå-çàâîäå.  1987–1992 ãã. – ãëàâà àäìèíèñòðàöèè ñåëà Òàìûø.  1992–1993 ãã., â ïåðèîä ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíû, áûë áîéöîì, íà÷àëüíèêîì øòàáà 1-ãî ïîëêà, êîìàíäèðîì 1-ãî ïîëêà. Ñ 1995 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà îáîðîíû Àáõàçèè, êîìàíäóþùèé Âîñòî÷íîé ãðóïïû âîéñê.  1998 ã. çà óñïåøíûå äåéñòâèÿ â õîäå «øåñòèäíåâíîé» Ãàëüñêîé âîéíû ïðèñâîåíî çâàíèå ãåíåðàë-ìàéîðà. Íàãðàæäåí Îðäåíîì Ëåîíà. ÀÐÄÇÈÍÁÀ Âëàäèñëàâ Ãðèãîðüåâè÷, ïðåçèäåíò Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ðîäèëñÿ 14 ìàÿ 1945 ã. â ñ. Íèæíÿÿ Ýøåðà Ñóõóìñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Îêîí÷èë ñðåäíþþ øêîëó â ñ. Íèæíÿÿ Ýøåðà.  1962–1966 ãã. – ñòóäåíò èñòîðè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà. Àñïèðàíò Èíñòèòóòà âîñòîêîâåäåíèÿ ÀÍ ÑÑÑÐ (Ìîñêâà).  1969–1988 ãã. – íàó÷íûé ñîòðóäíèê Èíñòèòóòà âîñòîêîâåäåíèÿ; èçó÷àë èñòîðèþ, êóëüòóðó, ðåëèãèîçíûå âåðîâàíèÿ äðåâíèõ íàðîäîâ Ìàëîé Àçèè – õàòòîâ è õåòòîâ.  1985 ã. çàùèòèë äîêòîðñêóþ äèññåðòàöèþ.  1987 ã. – çàâåäóþùèé ñåêòîðîì èäåîëîãèè è êóëüòóðû Äðåâíåãî Âîñòîêà Èíñòèòóòà âîñòîêîâåäåíèÿ ÀÍ ÑÑÑÐ. Ñ 1988 ã. â Àáõàçèè, èçáèðàåòñÿ äèðåêòîðîì Àáõàçñêîãî èíñòèòóòà ÿçûêà, ëèòåðàòóðû è èñòîðèè èì. Ä. Ãóëèà. Äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ.  1989 ã. – íàðîäíûé äåïóòàò ÑÑÑÐ, äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà ÑÑÑÐ. Ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïîäêîìèññèè ïî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîìó ñòàòóñó àâòîíîìíûõ îáðàçîâàíèé. ×ëåí Ïðåçèäèóìà Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà ÑÑÑÐ. Âîøåë â áîëüøóþ ïîëèòèêó â îäèí èç ñàìûõ ñëîæíûõ ïåðèîäîâ èñòîðèè Àáõàçèè.  äåêàáðå 1990 ã. èçáðàí Ïðåäñåäàòåëåì Ïðåçèäèóìà Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ. Ïðîâîäèë êóðñ, íàïðàâëåííûé íà ðåàëèçàöèþ íåîòúåìëåìîãî ïðàâà íàðîäà Àáõàçèè íà ñàìîîïðåäåëåíèå.  ïîñëåäíèå ãîäû ñóùåñòâîâàíèÿ ÑÑÑÐ âõîäèë â Ñîâåò Ôåäåðàöèè Ñîþçà ÑÑÐ â êà÷åñòâå Ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçèè.  1991–1994 ãã. – Ïðåäñåäàòåëü Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  àâãóñòå 1992 – ñåíòÿáðå 1993 ã., ñ íà÷àëîì âîîðóæåííîé àãðåññèè Ãðóçèè ïðîòèâ Àáõàçèè, ñòàíîâèòñÿ ïðåäñåäàòåëåì Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî êîìèòåòà îáîðîíû. Ïîä åãî ðóêîâîäñòâîì íàðîä Àáõàçèè îäåðæàë ïîáåäó â âîéíå è èçãíàë âîéñêà Ãîññîâåòà Ãðóçèè ñ òåððèòîðèè Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1994–1995 ãã. – ðóêîâîäèòåëü äåëåãàöèè Àáõàçèè íà ïåðåãîâîðàõ â Æåíåâå, Íüþ-Éîðêå, Ãààãå ïî ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîìó óðåãóëèðîâàíèþ, ïðîõîäèâøèõ ïîä ýãèäîé ÎÎÍ, ïðè ïîñðåäíè÷åñòâå Ðîññèè è ó÷àñòèè ÎÁÑÅ. 26 íîÿáðÿ 1994 ã. èçáðàí ïàðëàìåíòîì ïåðâûì ïðåçèäåíòîì Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. 3 îêòÿáðÿ 1999 ã. â ðåçóëüòàòå âñåîáùèõ âûáîðîâ èçáèðàåòñÿ íà âòîðîé ïðåçèäåíòñêèé ñðîê. 152

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Äîêòîð èñòîðè÷åñêèõ íàóê, ïðîôåññîð, äåéñòâèòåëüíûé ÷ëåí Àêàäåìèè íàóê Àáõàçèè, Àäûãñêîé ìåæäóíàðîäíîé àêàäåìèè íàóê. Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Íàãðàæäåí îðäåíîì «Àõüäç-Àïøà». Æåíàò, èìååò äî÷ü. Îñíîâíûå íàó÷íûå ðàáîòû: – Ðèòóàëû è ìèôû Äðåâíåé Àíàòîëèè. Ì., 1982; – Íåêîòîðûå ñõîäíûå ñòðóêòóðíûå ïðèçíàêè õàòòñêîãî è àáõàçî-àäûãñêèõ ÿçûêîâ // Èñòîðèÿ è ôèëîëîãèÿ ñòðàí Äðåâíåãî Âîñòîêà. Ì., 1979. Ñ. 26–37; – Ê èñòîðèè êóëüòà æåëåçà è êóçíå÷íîãî ðåìåñëà (ïî÷èòàíèå êóçíèöû ó àáõàçîâ) // Äðåâíèé Âîñòîê: ýòíîêóëüòóðíûå ñâÿçè. Ì., 1988. Ñ. 263–306. ÀÐÄÇÈÍÁÀ Ñàëûáåé (Àêà) Çîñèìîâè÷, îäèí èç îñíîâàòåëåé îáùåñòâåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî äâèæåíèÿ «Àìöàõàðà», Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 6 ôåâðàëÿ 1957 ã. â ñ. Äóðèïø Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. 1973 ã. îêîí÷èë äóðèïøñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó. 1975–1978 ãã. ñëóæèë â Âîåííî-Ìîðñêîì Ôëîòå ÑÑÑÐ â Ñåâàñòîïîëå íà ïîäâîäíîé ëîäêå, àêóñòèê. 1978–1992 ãã. çàíèìàëñÿ áèçíåñîì. 1980–1982 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â Áàòóìñêîì òîðãîâîì òåõíèêóìå. 1988–1992 ãã. – àêòèâíûé ó÷àñòíèê Íàðîäíîãî ôîðóìà Àáõàçèè. Ñ íà÷àëîì ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíû 1992–1993 ãã. âìåñòå ñ Ñ. Äáàð, Ì. Õâàðöêèÿ, Ã. Àãðáà ñôîðìèðîâàë Ãóìèñòèíñêèé ôðîíò. ßíâàðü, ìàðò 1993 ã. ó÷àñòâîâàë â íàñòóïàòåëüíûõ îïåðàöèÿõ íà Ñóõóì. Àïðåëü – ñåíòÿáðü 1993 ã. – êîìàíäèð ñâîäíîãî áàòàëüîíà (áîëåå 500 áîéöîâ). Ïîñëå îñâîáîæäåíèÿ ñòîëèöû Àáõàçèè áûë ïåðâûì âîåííûì êîìåíäàíòîì ã. Ñóõóì. Îäèí èç îñíîâàòåëåé ÎÏÄ âåòåðàíîâ âîéíû «Àìöàõàðà». Óáèò â Ìîñêâå 3 ôåâðàëÿ 2003 ã. â ðåçóëüòàòå òåððîðèñòè÷åñêîãî àêòà. Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Îñòàëèñü æåíà, ÷åòâåðî äåòåé. ÀÐØÁÀ Âàëåðèé Øàëâîâè÷, âèöå-ïðåçèäåíò Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ðîäèëñÿ 4 îêòÿáðÿ 1949 ã. â ã. Òêâàð÷åëè (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1956–1967 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â òêâàð÷åëüñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå ¹1.  1967– 1972 ãã. – ñòóäåíò Ìîðäîâñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà; èíæåíåðýêîíîìèñò.  1972–1973 ãã. – èíæåíåð ñòðîéóïðàâëåíèÿ «Òêâàð÷åëäîëîìèòñòðîé».  1973–1974 ãã. ñëóæèë â Ãðóïïå ñîâåòñêèõ âîéñê â ×åõîñëîâàêèè.  1974–1975 ãã. – ýêîíîìèñò ñòðîéóïðàâëåíèÿ «Òêâàð÷åëøàõòîñòðîé».  1975–1977 ãã. – çàâåäóþùèé îòäåëîì ïðîìûøëåííîñòè è 153

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òðàíñïîðòà ðåäàêöèè ãàçåòû Òêâàð÷åëüñêèé ãîðíÿê.  1977–1979 ãã. – íàó÷íûé ñîòðóäíèê îòäåëà ýêîíîìèêè Àáõàçñêîãî èíñòèòóòà ÿçûêà, ëèòåðàòóðû è èñòîðèè.  1979–1985 ãã. – ëåêòîð, èíñòðóêòîð îðãîòäåëà Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîðêîìà ïàðòèè.  1985–1991 ãã. – ëåêòîð, çàâåäóþùèé ëåêòîðñêîé ãðóïïîé Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè.  1991–1992 ãã. – çàâåäóþùèé îòäåëîì ðåäàêöèè ãàçåòû Ðåñïóáëèêà Àáõàçèÿ.  1992–1993 ãã. – áîåö, êîìàíäèð ãðóïïû, âîåííûé êîìåíäàíò, çàìåñòèòåëü íà÷àëüíèêà Ãóäàóòñêîãî âîåííîãî ãàðíèçîíà.  1993–1994 ãã. – ïîëíîìî÷íûé ïðåäñòàâèòåëü Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ â Ðåñïóáëèêå Àäûãåÿ.  1995–1999 ãã. è ñ 1999 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – âèöå-ïðåçèäåíò Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Íàãðàæäåí ìåäàëüþ «Çà îòâàãó». Æåíàò, èìååò ÷åòâåðûõ äåòåé. ÀÐØÁÀ Âëàäèìèð Ãåîðãèåâè÷, 1-é çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà îáîðîíû Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ – íà÷àëüíèê Ãåíåðàëüíîãî øòàáà, ãåíåðàë-ëåéòåíàíò. Ðîäèëñÿ 8 ìàÿ 1959 ã. â ã. Òáèëèñè (Ãðóçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1976 ã. îêîí÷èë òáèëèññêóþ ñðåäíþþ ðóññêóþ øêîëó ¹81.  1976– 1980 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â Òáèëèññêîì âûñøåì àðòèëëåðèéñêîì ó÷èëèùå.  ñåíòÿáðå 1980 – íîÿáðå 1981 ã. â çâàíèè ëåéòåíàíòà ïðîõîäèë ñëóæáó â Ãðóïïå ñîâåòñêèõ âîéñê â Ãåðìàíèè, áûë íà÷àëüíèêîì ðàäèîëîêàöèîííîãî êîìïëåêñà â áàòàðåå çâóêîâîé è ðàäèîëîêàöèîííîé ðàçâåäêè â Øåíâàëüäå (îêîëî Áåðëèíà). Ñ íîÿáðÿ 1981 ã. ïî 1 îêòÿáðÿ 1983 ã. âîåâàë â Àôãàíèñòàíå êîìàíäèðîì âçâîäà îïòè÷åñêîé ðàçâåäêè (ÂÎÐ) â àðòèëëåðèéñêîì ïîëêó, à çàòåì â çâàíèè ñòàðøåãî ëåéòåíàíòà çâóêîâîé è ðàäèîëîêàöèîííîé ðàçâåäêè. Ïðèíèìàë ó÷àñòèå â âîñüìè àðìåéñêèõ îïåðàöèÿõ â ñîñòàâå 108-é ìîòîñòðåëêîâîé äèâèçèè 40-é àðìèè. 22 îêòÿáðÿ 1982 ã. áûë ðàíåí. Âî âðåìÿ ýâàêóàöèè òðàíñïîðò ïîäîðâàëñÿ íà ôóãàñå, â ðåçóëüòàòå ÷åãî ïîëó÷èë âòîðîå òÿæåëîå ðàíåíèå. Ñ îêòÿáðÿ 1983 ã., â Äèëèæàíå (Àðìåíèÿ), â ñîñòàâå 7-é àðìèè, êîìàíäèð àðòèëëåðèéñêîé áàòàðåè óïðàâëåíèÿ.  1985 ã. ïîëó÷èë çâàíèå êàïèòàíà.  1988 ã., ÷åðåç äâà ÷àñà ïîñëå ñèëüíåéøåãî çåìëåòðÿñåíèÿ â Àðìåíèè, ïðèíèìàë àêòèâíîå ó÷àñòèå â ñïàñåíèè ëþäåé, ëèêâèäàöèè ïîñëåäñòâèé ñòèõèéíîãî áåäñòâèÿ â ã. Ñïèòàêå.  1987–1989 ãã. íàõîäèëñÿ â ïîãðàíè÷íîé ìåæäó Àðìåíèåé è Àçåðáàéäæàíîì çîíå ìåæíàöèîíàëüíîãî êîíôëèêòà, áûë çàìåñòèòåëåì âîåííîãî êîìåíäàíòà Èäæåâàíñêîãî ðàéîíà Àðìåíèè, ñ ôåâðàëÿ 1989 ã. – íà÷àëüíèê øòàáà àðòèëëåðèéñêîãî äèâèçèîíà. Ñ 12 èþëÿ 1989 ã. ñëóæèë â Àáõàçèè.  1990 ã. ïðèñâîåíî çâàíèå ìàéîðà. Ñ 1991 ã. – âîåííûé êîìèññàð ã. Òêâàð÷àë, ñ ÿíâàðÿ 1992 ã. – êîìàíäèð Àãóäçåðñêîãî áàòàëüîíà Àáõàçñêîãî ïîëêà («Àáõàçñêîé ãâàðäèè»).  ìàðòå 1992 ã. âìåñòå ñî ñâîèì ïîäðàçäåëåíèåì çàíÿë îáîðîíèòåëüíûå ðóáåæè ó 154

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ð. Èíãóð, íà ãðàíèöå ìåæäó Àáõàçèåé è Ãðóçèåé. Ñ 1989 ïî 1992 ãã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Àññîöèàöèè âîèíîâ-èíòåðíàöèîíàëèñòîâ («àôãàíöåâ») Àáõàçèè. 14 àâãóñòà 1992 ã., â ïåðâûé äåíü âòîðæåíèÿ âîéñê Ãîññîâåòà Ãðóçèè â Àáõàçèþ, âìåñòå ñ ïðèáûâøèìè ðàíåå îôèöåðàìè Âàõòàíãîì Öóãáà è Ãèâè Àãðáà ïðèíèìàë ó÷àñòèå â îðãàíèçàöèè îáîðîíû è âîîðóæåííîì ñîïðîòèâëåíèè â ðàéîíå Êðàñíîãî ìîñòà â Ñóõóìå. 16 àâãóñòà 1992 ã. ïî ëè÷íîìó ïîðó÷åíèþ ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ Â.Ã. Àðäçèíáà íà÷àë ôîðìèðîâàòü áàòàëüîí, îäíàêî 17 àâãóñòà ïîïàë â Ñóõóìå ïîä àâèàíàëåò è ïîëó÷èë êîíòóçèþ.  êîíöå àâãóñòà 1992 ã. íà âåðòîëåòå ïåðåáðîøåí èç Ãóäàóò â Òêâàð÷àë, ãäå äî ñåðåäèíû ñåíòÿáðÿ ôàêòè÷åñêè áûë êîìàíäóþùèì Âîñòî÷íûì ôðîíòîì.  ñåðåäèíå ñåíòÿáðÿ 1992 ã. îòîçâàí â Ãóäàóòó, íàçíà÷åí êîìàíäóþùèì Âîîðóæåííûìè ñèëàìè Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ â çâàíèè ïîëêîâíèêà. Ñ 11 îêòÿáðÿ 1992 ã. – èñïîëíÿþùèé îáÿçàííîñòè ìèíèñòðà îáîðîíû, ñ 26 ìàðòà ïî àâãóñò 1993 ã. – ñîâåòíèê ïî âîåííûì âîïðîñàì ïðè ïðåäñåäàòåëå Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçèè.  îêòÿáðå 1993 ã. ïðèñâîåíî çâàíèå ãåíåðàë-ìàéîðà, âîåííûé êîìèññàð Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ñ èþíÿ 1997 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – 1-é çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà îáîðîíû Àáõàçèè, íà÷àëüíèê Ãåíåðàëüíîãî øòàáà. Ïîñëå ïîáåäíîé «øåñòèäíåâíîé âîéíû» â ìàå 1998 ã. (Ãðóçèÿ ïîïûòàëàñü âçÿòü ðåâàíø çà ñâîå ïîðàæåíèå â âîéíå 1992–1993 ãã., íî áûëà íàãîëîâó ðàçáèòà Àáõàçñêîé àðìèåé) â ïðèãðàíè÷íîì Ãàëüñêîì ðàéîíå Àáõàçèè ïðèñâîåíî çâàíèå ãåíåðàë-ëåéòåíàíòà. Íàãðàæäåí Îðäåíîì Ëåîíà. Æåíàò, èìååò ñûíà. ÀÕÁÀ Èãîðü Ìóðàòîâè÷, ïîëíîìî÷íûé ïðåäñòàâèòåëü Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ â Ðîññèéñêîé Ôåäåðàöèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 5 ôåâðàëÿ 1949 ã. â ã. Ñóõóì (Àáõàçèÿ) â ñåìüå âîåííîñëóæàùåãî. Àáõàç. Îêîí÷èë ñóõóìñêóþ øêîëó ¹10 èì. Í. Ëàêîáà.  1966–1971 ãã. – ñòóäåíò þðèäè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Ìîñêîâñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà èì. Ì.Â. Ëîìîíîñîâà.  1971–1975 ãã. – àñïèðàíò Èíñòèòóòà ãîñóäàðñòâà è ïðàâà ÀÍ ÑÑÑÐ. Þðèñò, ñïåöèàëèñò â îáëàñòè ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî è ìåæäóíàðîäíîãî ïðàâà. Äî 1989 ã. ÿâëÿëñÿ íàó÷íûì ñîòðóäíèêîì Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé áèáëèîòåêè ÑÑÑÐ èì. Â.È. Ëåíèíà (Ìîñêâà). Ñ 1989 ã. ðàáîòàë â Âåðõîâíîì Ñîâåòå ÑÑÑÐ, Âåðõîâíîì Ñîâåòå Àáõàçèè.  1989 ã. ïî èíèöèàòèâå È.Ì. Àõáà âïåðâûå áûëî ñîçäàíî è îôèöèàëüíî çàðåãèñòðèðîâàíî ìîñêîâñêîå îáùåñòâî àáõàçñêîé êóëüòóðû «Íàðòàà». Ïðè àêòèâíîì ó÷àñòèè Â. ×èðèêáà, Ò. Ãóëèà, Þ. Àí÷àáàäçå, È. Áàñàðèÿ è äðóãèõ ñ äåêàáðÿ 1989 ã. â Ìîñêâå âïåðâûå íà÷èíàåò èçäàâàòüñÿ ãàçåòà Àëàøàðà (Ñâåò), à çàòåì Àáõàçñêèé âåñòíèê. Ñ ÿíâàðÿ 1990 ã. ñòàëà ðàáîòàòü âîñêðåñíàÿ àáõàçñêàÿ øêîëà. 155

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Ñ 1 èþíÿ 1992 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ïîëíîìî÷íûé ïðåäñòàâèòåëü Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ â Ðîññèéñêîé Ôåäåðàöèè.  ïåðèîä ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíû 1992–1993 ãã. ñîçäàë è âîçãëàâèë îïåðàòèâíûé øòàá ïî îêàçàíèþ âñåñòîðîííåé ïîìîùè Àáõàçèè, îñíîâíûìè íàïðàâëåíèÿìè ðàáîòû êîòîðîãî áûëè: èíôîðìàöèîííàÿ äåÿòåëüíîñòü, îêàçàíèå ãóìàíèòàðíîé ïîìîùè è ïîääåðæêà áåæåíöåâ è ðàíåíûõ. Øòàá ôóíêöèîíèðîâàë â òå÷åíèå âñåé âîéíû. Óñòàíîâèë è ïîääåðæèâàåò ñâÿçè ñ ðîññèéñêèìè è çàðóáåæíûìè îôèöèàëüíûìè è íåïðàâèòåëüñòâåííûìè îðãàíèçàöèÿìè. Ïîñòîÿííûé ó÷àñòíèê ïåðåãîâîðîâ ïî óðåãóëèðîâàíèþ ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîãî êîíôëèêòà ïðè ïîñðåäíè÷åñòâå Ðîññèè. Ñ 1993 ã. – ÷ëåí Øóðû, Âûñøåãî Ñîâåòà èñëàìñêîãî êóëüòóðíîãî öåíòðà Ðîññèè, êóäà âõîäÿò âèäíûå ãîñóäàðñòâåííûå è îáùåñòâåííûå äåÿòåëè, ïðåäñòàâèòåëè íàóêè è êóëüòóðû Ðîññèè, ïîñëû çàðóáåæíûõ ñòðàí. Æåíàò, èìååò äî÷ü. ÀÕÓÁÀ Äæóìà Âèññàðèîíîâè÷, ïèñàòåëü è ïóáëèöèñò. Ðîäèëñÿ 12 ìàðòà 1937 ã. â ñ. Àòàðà Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  èþíå 1937 ã. åãî îòöà àðåñòîâàëè, îñóäèëè «òðîéêîé» íà 10 ëåò êàê òðîöêèñòà. Íàêàçàíèå îòáûâàë â Àðõàíãåëüñêå è íà ïîëóîñòðîâå Íÿíäîìà. ×åðåç ÷åòûðå ãîäà áûë îñâîáîæäåí, íî åùå â òå÷åíèå ïÿòè ëåò áûë ëèøåí ãðàæäàíñêèõ ïðàâ.  1943 ã. ïîñòóïèë â àáõàçñêóþ øêîëó â ñ. Àòàðà. Âñêîðå áûë èñêëþ÷åí èç øêîëû çà «îñêîðáëåíèå» ó÷èòåëÿ, êîòîðûé íàçâàë ìàëü÷èêà «ñûíîì òðîöêèñòà», à òîò íàçâàë åãî «ôàøèñòîì». Çàòåì ó÷èëñÿ â òêâàð÷àëüñêîé øêîëå.  ÷åòâåðòîì êëàññå åãî îïðåäåëèëè â ãðóçèíñêóþ øêîëó, òàê êàê àáõàçñêèå øêîëû ê òîìó âðåìåíè áûëè çàêðûòû. Äâàæäû âûãîíÿëè èç øêîëû. Ó÷èëñÿ òàêæå â ñóõóìñêîé 1-é, ãðóçèíñêîé, ëûõíåíñêîé è ñóõóìñêîé àáõàçñêèõ øêîëàõ. Ñðåäíåå 8-êëàññíîå îáðàçîâàíèå ïîëó÷èë â 1953 ã. Ïå÷àòàòüñÿ íà÷àë â 1951 ã. Äàëåå ó÷èëñÿ â ñóõóìñêîé 3-é ñðåäíåé øêîëå, â êîòîðîé ó÷èëèñü ïèñàòåëü Ô. Èñêàíäåð è àðõåîëîã Þ. Âîðîíîâ.  1955–1959 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â Ñóõóìñêîì ãîñóäàðñòâåííîì ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîì ó÷èëèùå, êîòîðîå îêîí÷èë ñ îòëè÷èåì.  1959–1960 ãã. – ñòóäåíò ôèëîëîãè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà àáõàçñêîãî ñåêòîðà Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà.  1960–1965 ãã. – ñòóäåíò Ëèòåðàòóðíîãî èíñòèòóòà èì. À.Ì. Ãîðüêîãî (Ìîñêâà). Çàòåì ðàáîòàë êîððåñïîíäåíòîì â ðåäàêöèè ãàçåòû Ñîâåòñêàÿ Àáõàçèÿ.  1967–1969 ãã. – çàâåäóþùèé ëèòåðàòóðíîé ÷àñòüþ Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî äðàìàòè÷åñêîãî òåàòðà èì. Ñ.ß. ×àíáà.  1970–1978 ãã. – ëèòåðàòóðíûé êîíñóëüòàíò Ñîþçà ïèñàòåëåé Àáõàçèè. Ñ 1979 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ãëàâíûé ðåäàêòîð àáõàçñêîãî æóðíàëà Àïñíû àêàçàðà (Èñêóññòâî Àáõàçèè). Ïåðâûå õóäîæåñòâåííûå ïðîèçâåäåíèÿ áûëè íàïå÷àòàíû â àáõàçñêîì æóðíàëå Àëàøàðà (Ñâåò) â 1955–1956 ãã., â ãîäû õðóùåâñêîé «îòòåïåëè». Àâòîð 20 êíè㠖 ðîìàíîâ, ðàññêàçîâ, íîâåëë, ïîâåñòåé, ñòèõîâ, äðàìàòè÷åñ156

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êèõ ïðîèçâåäåíèé. Íàèáîëåå èçâåñòíû ðîìàí «Ïðèñòàíü» (1984), ðàññêàç «Òóãàí» (1964), ïîâåñòü «Áçîó» (1969), «Âîéíû óæå íå áûëî» (1968) è äðóãèå. Ïðîèçâåäåíèÿ ïåðåâåäåíû íà ÿïîíñêèé, àíãëèéñêèé, ïîëüñêèé, ðóññêèé, èñïàíñêèé, ýñòîíñêèé, ëàòûøñêèé, ãðóçèíñêèé ÿçûêè.  60–80-å ãîäû ïðèíèìàë àêòèâíîå ó÷àñòèå â îðãàíèçàöèè âûñòàâîê èçâåñòíîãî õóäîæíèêà Âàðâàðû Äìèòðèåâíû Áóáíîâîé, òåñíûå ñâÿçè ïîääåðæèâàë ñ ÿïîíñêèì ïðîôåññîðîì ðóññêîé ëèòåðàòóðû Ò. Êóðîäà.  1967, 1978, 1989 ãã. èãðàë çàìåòíóþ ðîëü â àáõàçñêîì íàöèîíàëüíîîñâîáîäèòåëüíîì äâèæåíèè, âî âðåìÿ âîéíû 1992–1993 ãã. íåñêîëüêî ìåñÿöåâ íàõîäèëñÿ â ïëåíó.  ïîñëåâîåííîå âðåìÿ îñîáåííî îáðàòèë íà ñåáÿ âíèìàíèå îñòðûìè ïóáëèöèñòè÷åñêèìè ñòàòüÿìè («Îò ðîäíûõ êîðíåé. Èçáðàííàÿ ïóáëèöèñòèêà. Äîêóìåíòû. Êîììåíòàðèè». Ñóõóì, 1997) è êðèòèêîé â àäðåñ îôèöèàëüíûõ âëàñòåé Àáõàçèè (ïóáëèêàöèè â ñóõóìñêîé Íóæíîé ãàçåòå). ×ëåí Ñîþçà ïèñàòåëåé è Ñîþçà æóðíàëèñòîâ, ëàóðåàò Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé ïðåìèè èì. Ä. Ãóëèà. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. À×ÁÀ Çóðàá Êîíñòàíòèíîâè÷ (1950–2000), îáùåñòâåííûé è ïîëèòè÷åñêèé äåÿòåëü Àáõàçèè, äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1991–1996). Ðîäèëñÿ 23 ôåâðàëÿ 1950 ã. â ã. Ñóõóìå (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Îêîí÷èë ñóõóìñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹10 èì. Í. Ëàêîáà.  1967 ã. ïîñòóïèë â Ìîñêîâñêèé ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé óíèâåðñèòåò íà þðèäè÷åñêèé ôàêóëüòåò. Ïîñëå îêîí÷àíèÿ ÌÃÓ ðàáîòàë þðèñêîíñóëüòîì â ðàçëè÷íûõ îðãàíèçàöèÿõ Àáõàçèè. Ñ 1989 ã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Íàðîäíîãî ôîðóìà Àáõàçèè. Áëåñòÿùèé îðàòîð, ïîëåìèñò, àêòèâíûé ñòîðîííèê è ó÷àñòíèê ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîãî äèàëîãà äî âîéíû 1992–1993 ãã.  1991–1996 ãã. – äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ñ 1993 ã. ÷ëåí Ìåæðåñïóáëèêàíñêîé êîëëåãèè àäâîêàòîâ, çàâåäóþùèé þðèäè÷åñêîé êîíñóëüòàöèåé ¹ 24 (Ìîñêâà). 1999 –15 àâãóñòà 2000 ã. êîíñóëüòàíò â Ñóõóìñêîì îôèñå ïî ïðàâàì ÷åëîâåêà ÎÎÍ è ÎÁÑÅ.  ýòîò æå ïåðèîä ïðîÿâèë ñåáÿ êàê ïóáëèöèñò. Ïå÷àòàëñÿ â íåçàâèñèìîé Íóæíîé ãàçåòå (Ñóõóì), âûñòóïàë ñ îñòðûìè êðèòè÷åñêèìè ñòàòüÿìè â àäðåñ îôèöèàëüíûõ âëàñòåé Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Óáèò â Ñóõóìå 15 àâãóñòà 2000 ã. ÁÀÃÀÏØ Ñåðãåé Âàñèëüåâè÷, äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1991–1996), ïðåìüåð-ìèíèñòð Àáõàçèè (1997– 1999). Ðîäèëñÿ 4 ìàðòà 1949 ã. â ã. Ñóõóì (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1956–1966 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â ñóõóìñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå ¹10 èì. Í. Ëàêîáà.  1966–1972 ãã. – ñòóäåíò Ãðóçèíñêîãî èíñòèòóòà ñóáòðîïè÷åñêîãî õîçÿéñòâà (ã. Ñóõóì); àãðîíîì. Ðàáîòàë ðàáî÷èì íà âèíçàâîäå, à çàòåì èíêàññàòîðîì 157

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

â Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîì áàíêå.  1972 ã. – íà÷àëüíèê àãðîîáúåäèíåíèÿ Ìîêâñêîãî ýôèðíîìàñëè÷íîãî ñîâõîçà.  1972–1973 ãã. ñëóæèë â ðÿäàõ Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè.  1973–1974 ãã. – èíñòðóêòîð Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà êîìñîìîëà.  1974–1975 ãã. – çàâåäóþùèé îòäåëîì êîìñîìîëüñêîé îðãàíèçàöèè Ñóõóìñêîãî ðàéêîìà êîìñîìîëà Ãðóçèè.  1975–1977 ãã. – 1-é ñåêðåòàðü Ñóõóìñêîãî ðàéêîìà êîìñîìîëà.  ìàå – ñåíòÿáðå 1977 ã. – çàâåäóþùèé îòäåëîì êîìñîìîëüñêèõ îðãàíèçàöèé Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ËÊÑÌ Ãðóçèè; â ñåíòÿáðå 1977 – ìàðòå 1978 ã. – èíñòðóêòîð ÖÊ êîìñîìîëà Ãðóçèè (Òáèëèñè).  ìàðòå 1978 ã. óòâåðæäåí çàâåäóþùèì ñåêòîðîì èíôîðìàöèè ÖÊ ËÊÑÌ Ãðóçèè (Òáèëèñè).  1978–1979 ãã. – çàâåäóþùèé îòäåëîì ðàáî÷åé è ñåëüñêîé ìîëîäåæè ÖÊ ËÊÑÌ Ãðóçèè (Òáèëèñè).  1979–1980 ãã. – ñåêðåòàðü Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà êîìñîìîëà ïî ïðîïàãàíäå è àãèòàöèè.  1980–1982 ãã. – ïåðâûé ñåêðåòàðü Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ËÊÑÌ Ãðóçèè.  1982 – ñåíòÿáðå 1989 ã. – ïåðâûé ñåêðåòàðü Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ÐÊ ÊÏ Ãðóçèè.  ñåíòÿáðå 1989 –1990 ã. ïåðåâåäåí â ðàñïîðÿæåíèå Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ.  1990–1991 ãã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî àãðîïðîìûøëåííîãî êîìèòåòà Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ.  1991–1992 ãã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîííîãî Ñîâåòà íàðîäíûõ äåïóòàòîâ.  1991–1996 ãã. – äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ñ 1992 ã. – 1-é çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ.  1993– 1995 ãã. – 1-é çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1995–1997 ãã. – 1-é âèöå-ïðåìüåð Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1997– 1999 ãã. – ïðåìüåð-ìèíèñòð Àáõàçèè. Ñ 1999 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ãåíåðàëüíûé äèðåêòîð «×åðíîìîðýíåðãî». Íàãðàæäåí ñîâåòñêèì îðäåíîì «Äðóæáû Íàðîäîâ» (1980). Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ÁÀÐÃÀÍÄÆÈß Äàóð Àíäðååâè÷, äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1991–1996), ìåíåäæåð «Àëüôà-áàíêà» (Ìîñêâà). Ðîäèëñÿ 17 ôåâðàëÿ 1958 ã. â ã. Ñóõóì (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Ïîñëå îêîí÷àíèÿ ñóõóìñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëû â 1975–1980 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â Ìîñêîâñêîì ãîñóäàðñòâåííîì èíñòèòóòå ìåæäóíàðîäíûõ îòíîøåíèé (ÌÃÈÌÎ ÌÈÄ ÑÑÑÐ) íà ôàêóëüòåòå ìåæäóíàðîäíûõ ýêîíîìè÷åñêèõ îòíîøåíèé.  1980–1982 è 1986–1998 ãã. – ïðåïîäàâàòåëü, ñòàðøèé ïðåïîäàâàòåëü, äîöåíò Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà (ã. Ñóõóì).  1982–1986 ãã. – àñïèðàíò ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Ìîñêîâñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà. Ñ 1986 ã. – êàíäèäàò ýêîíîìè÷åñêèõ íàóê.  1990–1991 ãã. ïðîõîäèë â Äàíèè íàó÷íóþ ñòàæèðîâêó íà ýêîíîìè÷åñêîì ôàêóëüòåòå Êîïåíãàãåíñêîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà.  1991–1996 ãã. – äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ, ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïîäêîìèññèè ïî ýêîíîìè÷åñêîé ðåôîðìå.  âîåííûé ïåðèîä (1992–1993) – çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ ïàðëàìåíòñêîé êîìèñ158

Приложение к стр. 158 БАРГАНДЖИЯ, Беслан Андреевич, помощник Председателя Верховного Совета Республики Абхазия, Президента Абхазии (1991-1995 ), руководитель Государственно-правового департамента Министерства по делам федерации, национальностей и миграционной политики Российской Федерации. Родился 26 ноября 1959 г. в г.Сухум (Абхазия). Абхаз. После окончания Сухумской средней школы в 1977-1982 гг. учился в Московском инженерно-строительном институте. 1982 г. – прораб, старший инженер СУ-6 Общестроительного Треста №6 (г.Сухум). 1983-1989 гг. – инструктор, заведующий Кабинетом комсомольской работы Абхазского обкома комсомола (г.Сухум). 1989-1991 гг. – инструктор Сухумского горкома партии. 1991-1995 гг. – помощник и пресс-секретарь Председателя Верховного Совета Республики Абхазия, Президента Абхазии. Август-сентябрь 1992 г. – принимал участие в боевых действиях в составе группы «Гайдар». В сентябре 1992 г. был отозван с фронта Председателем Верховного Совета Абхазии В.Г.Ардзинба. 1995-2001 гг. - главный специалист, консультант, начальник отдела, заместитель руководителя департамента Министерства по делам федерации, национальностей и миграционной политики РФ (г.Москва). С 2001 г. – начальник управления Аппарата Полномочного представителя Президента РФ в Приволжском федеральном округе (у С.В.Кириенко). Принимал непосредственное участие в разработке федеральных законов по установлению порядка разграничения полномочий, по организации деятельности органов власти субъектов Российской Федерации. Неоднократно привлекался к работе Государственной Думы, Совета Федерации, принимал участие в международных и российских конференциях по проблемам федерализма. Инженер-строитель, юрист, кандидат политических наук. Проходил стажировку (по программе «стипендиаты Ельцина») в Великобритании. Эксперт Совета Европы по проблемам демократизации (Программа РУС-1). Женат, трое детей.

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

â Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîì áàíêå.  1972 ã. – íà÷àëüíèê àãðîîáúåäèíåíèÿ Ìîêâñêîãî ýôèðíîìàñëè÷íîãî ñîâõîçà.  1972–1973 ãã. ñëóæèë â ðÿäàõ Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè.  1973–1974 ãã. – èíñòðóêòîð Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà êîìñîìîëà.  1974–1975 ãã. – çàâåäóþùèé îòäåëîì êîìñîìîëüñêîé îðãàíèçàöèè Ñóõóìñêîãî ðàéêîìà êîìñîìîëà Ãðóçèè.  1975–1977 ãã. – 1-é ñåêðåòàðü Ñóõóìñêîãî ðàéêîìà êîìñîìîëà.  ìàå – ñåíòÿáðå 1977 ã. – çàâåäóþùèé îòäåëîì êîìñîìîëüñêèõ îðãàíèçàöèé Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ËÊÑÌ Ãðóçèè; â ñåíòÿáðå 1977 – ìàðòå 1978 ã. – èíñòðóêòîð ÖÊ êîìñîìîëà Ãðóçèè (Òáèëèñè).  ìàðòå 1978 ã. óòâåðæäåí çàâåäóþùèì ñåêòîðîì èíôîðìàöèè ÖÊ ËÊÑÌ Ãðóçèè (Òáèëèñè).  1978–1979 ãã. – çàâåäóþùèé îòäåëîì ðàáî÷åé è ñåëüñêîé ìîëîäåæè ÖÊ ËÊÑÌ Ãðóçèè (Òáèëèñè).  1979–1980 ãã. – ñåêðåòàðü Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà êîìñîìîëà ïî ïðîïàãàíäå è àãèòàöèè.  1980–1982 ãã. – ïåðâûé ñåêðåòàðü Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ËÊÑÌ Ãðóçèè.  1982 – ñåíòÿáðå 1989 ã. – ïåðâûé ñåêðåòàðü Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ÐÊ ÊÏ Ãðóçèè.  ñåíòÿáðå 1989 –1990 ã. ïåðåâåäåí â ðàñïîðÿæåíèå Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ.  1990–1991 ãã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî àãðîïðîìûøëåííîãî êîìèòåòà Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ.  1991–1992 ãã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîííîãî Ñîâåòà íàðîäíûõ äåïóòàòîâ.  1991–1996 ãã. – äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ñ 1992 ã. – 1-é çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ.  1993– 1995 ãã. – 1-é çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1995–1997 ãã. – 1-é âèöå-ïðåìüåð Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1997– 1999 ãã. – ïðåìüåð-ìèíèñòð Àáõàçèè. Ñ 1999 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ãåíåðàëüíûé äèðåêòîð «×åðíîìîðýíåðãî». Íàãðàæäåí ñîâåòñêèì îðäåíîì «Äðóæáû Íàðîäîâ» (1980). Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ÁÀÐÃÀÍÄÆÈß Äàóð Àíäðååâè÷, äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1991–1996), ìåíåäæåð «Àëüôà-áàíêà» (Ìîñêâà). Ðîäèëñÿ 17 ôåâðàëÿ 1958 ã. â ã. Ñóõóì (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Ïîñëå îêîí÷àíèÿ ñóõóìñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëû â 1975–1980 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â Ìîñêîâñêîì ãîñóäàðñòâåííîì èíñòèòóòå ìåæäóíàðîäíûõ îòíîøåíèé (ÌÃÈÌÎ ÌÈÄ ÑÑÑÐ) íà ôàêóëüòåòå ìåæäóíàðîäíûõ ýêîíîìè÷åñêèõ îòíîøåíèé.  1980–1982 è 1986–1998 ãã. – ïðåïîäàâàòåëü, ñòàðøèé ïðåïîäàâàòåëü, äîöåíò Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà (ã. Ñóõóì).  1982–1986 ãã. – àñïèðàíò ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Ìîñêîâñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà. Ñ 1986 ã. – êàíäèäàò ýêîíîìè÷åñêèõ íàóê.  1990–1991 ãã. ïðîõîäèë â Äàíèè íàó÷íóþ ñòàæèðîâêó íà ýêîíîìè÷åñêîì ôàêóëüòåòå Êîïåíãàãåíñêîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà.  1991–1996 ãã. – äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ, ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïîäêîìèññèè ïî ýêîíîìè÷åñêîé ðåôîðìå.  âîåííûé ïåðèîä (1992–1993) – çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ ïàðëàìåíòñêîé êîìèñ158

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

ñèè ïî ýêîíîìè÷åñêèì âîïðîñàì.  íîÿáðå – äåêàáðå 1992 ã. – ðàçðàáîò÷èê çàêîíîïðîåêòà ïî ðåîðãàíèçàöèè ðàáîòû ïàðëàìåíòà è ïðàâèòåëüñòâà, îáðàçîâàíèþ Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî êîìèòåòà îáîðîíû è ÌÈÄà Àáõàçèè. 18–20 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1993 ã. ó÷àñòâîâàë â ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîì ïåðåãîâîðíîì ïðîöåññå ïî ìèðíîìó óðåãóëèðîâàíèþ â Àäëåðå (áëèç Ñî÷è) ïðè ïîñðåäíè÷åñòâå Ðîññèè.  1994–1995 ãã. – ìèíèñòð ýêîíîìèêè Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (ñîâìåùàë ñ ðàáîòîé â ïàðëàìåíòå). 14–15 íîÿáðÿ 1996 ã. – ó÷àñòíèê ïðÿìûõ ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêèõ ïåðåãîâîðîâ â Òáèëèñè ñ Ý. Øåâàðäíàäçå è ìèíèñòðîì èíîñòðàííûõ äåë Ãðóçèè È. Ìåíàãàðèøâèëè.  1996–1998 ãã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Íàöèîíàëüíîãî áàíêà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ñ 1999 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ìåíåäæåð «Àëüôà-áàíêà» (Ìîñêâà). Æåíàò. ÁÃÀÍÁÀ Ëèëè Äóãóæîâíà, ìèíèñòð ôèíàíñîâ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ðîäèëàñü 10 ìàÿ 1937 ã. â ñ. Áçûáü Ãàãðñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàçêà.  1955 ã. îêîí÷èëà áçûáñêóþ àáõàçñêóþ âîñüìèëåòíþþ øêîëó, â 1958 ã. – 11 êëàññîâ îòõàðñêîé àáõàçñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëû Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîíà.  1958– 1962 ãã. – ñòóäåíòêà Ñàðàòîâñêîãî ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà.  1962–1972 ãã. ïî ðàñïðåäåëåíèþ Ãîñïëàíà ÑÑÑÐ íàïðàâëåíà â Àáõàçèþ, ãäå ðàáîòàëà â ñèñòåìå Ðåñïóáëèêàíñêîé êîíòîðû Ãîñáàíêà ÑÑÑÐ íà ðàçëè÷íûõ äîëæíîñòÿõ (îò áóõãàëòåðà äî çàìåñòèòåëÿ óïðàâëÿþùåãî).  íîÿáðå 1972 – ìàå 1992 ã. – ìèíèñòð òîðãîâëè Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ.  1981 ã. çàî÷íî îêîí÷èëà Àêàäåìèþ îáùåñòâåííûõ íàóê ïðè ÖÊ ÊÏÑÑ (Ìîñêâà). Ñ 21 äåêàáðÿ 1993 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ìèíèñòð ôèíàíñîâ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Èçáèðàëàñü äåïóòàòîì Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ. Íàãðàæäåíà îðäåíîì Òðóäîâîãî Êðàñíîãî Çíàìåíè, ìåäàëÿìè, à òàêæå çíà÷êîì «Îòëè÷íèê Ãîñáàíêà ÑÑÑл. ÁÎÖÈÅ Îëåã Èëüè÷, ìèíèñòð òðóäà è ñîöèàëüíîé çàùèòû íàñåëåíèÿ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ðîäèëñÿ 26 ìàðòà 1954 ã. â ã. Òêâàð÷åëè (Àáõàçèÿ). Îñåòèí.  1964 ã. ïåðååõàë â Ñóõóì, ó÷èëñÿ â ñóõóìñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå ¹3.  1971– 1976 ãã. – ñòóäåíò Õàðüêîâñêîãî àâòîäîðîæíîãî èíñòèòóòà.  1976–1979 ãã. – èíæåíåð-ìåõàíèê õàðüêîâñêîãî çàâîäà, â 1979–1984 ãã. – íà÷àëüíèê öåõà Õàðüêîâñêîãî çàâîäà òî÷íîãî ïðèáîðîñòðîåíèÿ.  1984–1989 ãã. – ãëàâíûé èíæåíåð Ñóõóìñêîé àâòîáàçû «Òóðèñò».  1989 – àâãóñòå 1992 ã. – äèðåêòîð àâòîáàçû «Òóðèñò». Âî âðåìÿ âîéíû 1992–1993 ãã. ñëóæèë â Ìèíèñòåðñòâå îáîðîíû Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ, â äîëæíîñòè íà÷àëüíèêà àâòîñëóæáû è ñëóæáû ÃÑÌ; çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà àâòîòðàíñïîðòà Àáõàçèè.  1993–1994 ãã. – íà÷àëüíèê ñëóæáû ÃÑÌ Ìèíèñòåðñòâà îáîðîíû Àáõàçèè.  1995–1999 ãã. – ðåôåðåíò ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî îòäåëà Êàáèíåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. 159

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Ñ äåêàáðÿ 1999 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ìèíèñòð òðóäà è ñîöèàëüíîé çàùèòû íàñåëåíèÿ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Æåíàò, èìååò ñûíà. ÂÅÍÅÄÈÊÒÎÂÀ Íàäåæäà Þðüåâíà, ëèòåðàòîð, ðåäàêòîð íåïðàâèòåëüñòâåííîãî æóðíàëà «Ãðàæäàíñêîå îáùåñòâî». Ðîäèëàñü 29 ôåâðàëÿ 1952 ã. â ã. Íîâãîðîäå (Ðîññèÿ). Ðóññêàÿ. Ñ 1954 ã. æèâåò â Àáõàçèè.  1970 ã. îêîí÷èëà ñóõóìñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹14, â 1976 ã. – Ìîñêîâñêèé ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé èíñòèòóò êóëüòóðû.  1977–1978 ãã. ðàáîòàëà â áèáëèîòåêàõ Ìîñêîâñêîé îáëàñòè.  1979– 1987 ãã. – áèáëèîòåêàðü, ãëàâíûé áèáëèîòåêàðü, çàâåäóþùàÿ ñïðàâî÷íîáèáëèîãðàôè÷åñêèì îòäåëîì Ðåñïóáëèêàíñêîé áèáëèîòåêè Àáõàçèè.  1988–1989 ãã. – êèíîìåõàíèê â Ñóõóìñêîì äîìå êóëüòóðû èì. À.Ì. Ãîðüêîãî.  1990–1992 ãã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ãëàâíîãî ðåäàêòîðà àëüìàíàõà Ëèòåðàòóðíàÿ Àáõàçèÿ.  àâãóñòå 1992 –1993 ã. â ñâÿçè ñ âîåííûìè äåéñòâèÿìè âûíóæäåíà áûëà âûåõàòü èç Ñóõóìà â Êðûì, à çàòåì â Ðîññèþ.  1994–1995 ãã. – íà÷àëüíèê àíàëèòè÷åñêîãî îòäåëà Ìèíèñòåðñòâà èíôîðìàöèè è ïå÷àòè Àáõàçèè.  1996–2000 ãã. ïðèíèìàëà àêòèâíîå ó÷àñòèå â ðàáîòå Êîíãðåññà ðóññêèõ îáùèí Àáõàçèè, ãëàâíûé ðåäàêòîð àëüìàíàõà Ëèòåðàòóðíàÿ Àáõàçèÿ íà ðóññêîì ÿçûêå. Ñ ñåíòÿáðÿ 2000 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ðåäàêòîð æóðíàëà Ãðàæäàíñêîå îáùåñòâî, ïðåäñòàâëÿþùåãî íåïðàâèòåëüñòâåííûå îðãàíèçàöèè Àáõàçèè. ×ëåí Ñîþçà ïèñàòåëåé Àáõàçèè. ÂÎÈÍÑÊÈÉ Àëåêñàíäð Àëåêñàíäðîâè÷, áûâøèé êîìàíäóþùèé âîåííî-ìîðñêèìè ñèëàìè Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ, êàïèòàí 1-ãî ðàíãà, Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 26 äåêàáðÿ 1946 ã. â ã. Òóàïñå (Ðîññèÿ). Ðóññêèé.  1947 ã. ñåìüÿ âåðíóëàñü â ã. Ñóõóì; îêîí÷èë ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹7. Ïîñëå îêîí÷àíèÿ ìîðåõîäíîãî ó÷èëèùà ðàáîòàë íà ðàçëè÷íûõ äîëæíîñòÿõ â Ñóõóìñêîì ìîðñêîì ïîðòó, Ñàõàëèíñêîì è Ìóðìàíñêîì ìîðñêèõ ïàðîõîäñòâàõ, â äðóãèõ ìîðñêèõ ó÷ðåæäåíèÿõ ÑÑÑÐ. Ñ íà÷àëîì âîéíû 1992 ã. âåðíóëñÿ â Àáõàçèþ è ïðèíÿë ó÷àñòèå â áîåâûõ äåéñòâèÿõ â äîëæíîñòè êîìàíäèðà Ãóäàóòñêîãî äèâèçèîíà.  1993–2001 ãã. – êîìàíäóþùèé ÂÌÑ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ, êàïèòàí 1-ãî ðàíãà. Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Ñ 2001 ã. – â îòñòàâêå. Æåíàò, øåñòåðî äåòåé. ÂÎÐÎÍΠÞðèé Íèêîëàåâè÷ (1941–1995), äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà (1991–1995), âèöå-ïðåìüåð Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1993– 1995), èçâåñòíûé àðõåîëîã-êàâêàçîâåä. Ðîäèëñÿ 8 ìàÿ 1941 ã. â ãîðíîì ñ. Öåáåëüäà Ãóëüðèïøñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Ðóññêèé. 160

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 1959 ã. îêîí÷èë ñóõóìñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹3.  1960–1965 ãã. – ñòóäåíò îòäåëåíèÿ åãèïòîëîãèè âîñòî÷íîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Ëåíèíãðàäñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà.  èþíå – èþëå 1961 ã. ó÷àñòâîâàë â ðàñêîïêàõ Êàðìèð-Áëóðà (Àðìåíèÿ) ïîä ðóêîâîäñòâîì àðõåîëîãà àêàäåìèêà Á.Á. Ïèîòðîâñêîãî.  ÿíâàðå 1962 ã. ïî èíèöèàòèâå èçâåñòíîãî àðõåîëîãà À.À. Èåññåíà âûñòóïèë ñ äîêëàäîì â Ëåíèíãðàäñêîì îòäåëåíèè Èíñòèòóòà àðõåîëîãèè ÀÍ ÑÑÑÐ î ðåçóëüòàòàõ èññëåäîâàíèé â Öåáåëüäå. Ñ ÿíâàðÿ 1964 ïî ÿíâàðü 1965 ã. – ðóêîâîäèòåëü «òðîéêè» âî Âñåðîññèéñêîì õðèñòèàíñêîì ñîþçå îñâîáîæäåííûõ íàðîäîâ (Îãóðöîâ, Ñàäî è äð.) â Ëåíèíãðàäå. 23 äåêàáðÿ 1965 ã. çàùèòèë äèïëîìíóþ ðàáîòó íà òåìó «Åãèïåò è Íóáèÿ â ýïîõó Ñðåäíåãî Öàðñòâà».  1966–1975 ãã. – èíñòðóêòîð, ÷ëåí ïðåçèäèóìà, ó÷åíûé ñåêðåòàðü Àáõàçñêîãî ñîâåòà Ãðóçèíñêîãî îáùåñòâà îõðàíû ïàìÿòíèêîâ êóëüòóðû; ñòàðøèé íàó÷íûé ñîòðóäíèê Öåíòðàëüíîé íàó÷íî-èññëåäîâàòåëüñêîé ëàáîðàòîðèè ïî òóðèçìó è ýêñêóðñèÿì (ÖÍÈÈËÒÝ) ÂÖÑÏÑ. 28 àïðåëÿ 1971 ã. íà çàñåäàíèè ó÷åíîãî ñîâåòà Ìîñêîâñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà çàùèòèë êàíäèäàòñêóþ äèññåðòàöèþ íà òåìó «Èñòîðèÿ Àáõàçèè ñ äðåâíåéøèõ âðåìåí äî ðàííåãî ñðåäíåâåêîâüÿ (ïî äàííûì àðõåîëîãèè)». 1 èþëÿ 1975 – 16 äåêàáðÿ 1986 ã. – ñòàðøèé íàó÷íûé ñîòðóäíèê îòäåëà àðõåîëîãèè Àáõàçñêîãî èíñòèòóòà ÿçûêà, ëèòåðàòóðû è èñòîðèè èì. Ä. Ãóëèà. 16–17 ôåâðàëÿ 1979 ã. ñåêðåòàðü ÖÊ ÊÏ Ãðóçèè Ã. Åíóêèäçå ïîëó÷èë ñîîáùåíèå ñåêðåòàðÿ ÖÊ ÊÏÑÑ Ì. Ñóñëîâà, ÷òî ïîñëå âûõîäà â ñâåò íàøóìåâøåé êíèãè «Â ìèðå àðõèòåêòóðíûõ ïàìÿòíèêîâ Àáõàçèè» (Ìîñêâà, 1978) â ìîñêîâñêèõ èçäàòåëüñòâàõ áåç ðàçðåøåíèÿ ãðóçèíñêèõ èññëåäîâàòåëåé ðóêîïèñè êíèã Þ. Âîðîíîâà ïðèíèìàòüñÿ íå áóäóò, ïîñêîëüêó îíè «ëüþò âîäó íà ìåëüíèöó áóðæóàçíîé ïðîïàãàíäû». 18 èþëÿ 1983 ã. ó÷àñòâîâàë â ïðàçäíèêå â ÷åñòü 50-ëåòèÿ Å. Åâòóøåíêî íà òåððèòîðèè äðåâíåé êðåïîñòè Öèáèëèóì â ñ. Öåáåëüäà (Àáõàçèÿ). 22 ôåâðàëÿ 1985 ã. íà çàñåäàíèè ñïåöèàëèçèðîâàííîãî ñîâåòà Èíñòèòóòà àðõåîëîãèè ÀÍ ÑÑÑÐ (Ìîñêâà), âîïðåêè ïðîòåñòàì Òáèëèñè, çàùèòèë äîêòîðñêóþ äèññåðòàöèþ íà òåìó «Âîñòî÷íîå Ïðè÷åðíîìîðüå â æåëåçíîì âåêå: âîïðîñû õðîíîëîãèè è èíòåðïðåòàöèè ïàìÿòíèêîâ VIII â. äî í.ý. – VIII â.í.ý.». 16 äåêàáðÿ 1986 – 11 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1995 ã. – âåäóùèé íàó÷íûé ñîòðóäíèê Àáõàçñêîãî èíñòèòóòà ÿçûêà, ëèòåðàòóðû è èñòîðèè (ñ 1994 ã. Èíñòèòóò ãóìàíèòàðíûõ èññëåäîâàíèé Àêàäåìèè íàóê Àáõàçèè). 6 íîÿáðÿ 1987 ã. â ðîäîâîì äâîðÿíñêîì ïîìåñòüå «ßñî÷êà» (ñåð. XIX â.), îñíîâàííîì â ñ. Öåáåëüäà Í.È. Âîðîíîâûì, ðåäàêòîðîì «Ñáîðíèêà ñâåäåíèé î êàâêàçñêèõ ãîðöàõ», îòêðûò ìåìîðèàëüíûé äîì-ìóçåé ñåìüè Âîðîíîâûõ. 16 íîÿáðÿ 1988 ã. – ÷ëåí Âñåñîþçíîé (íûíå Ðîññèéñêîé) àññîöèàöèè âîñòîêîâåäîâ (Ìîñêâà). 15 èþëÿ 1989 ã. – ïîãðîì ãðóïïîé ãðóçèíñêèõ ýêñòðåìèñòîâ ìóçåÿ «ßñî÷êà» â ñ. Öåáåëüäà. Ñåíòÿáðü 1989 – àâãóñò 1992 ã. – ñîïðåäñåäàòåëü Ñóõóìñêîãî îáùåñòâà èíòåðíàöèîíàëèñòîâ.  1991–1995 ãã. – äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – 161

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ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè ïî Ïèöóíäñêîìó èçáèðàòåëüíîìó îêðóãó. 2 ìàðòà 1992 – 1 äåêàáðÿ 1993 ã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïîñòîÿííîé êîìèññèè Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçèè ïî ïðàâàì ÷åëîâåêà è ìåæíàöèîíàëüíûì îòíîøåíèÿì. 5–25 ìàÿ 1992 ã. ÷èòàë ëåêöèè â Ñîðáîííå è ó÷àñòâîâàë â ìåæäóíàðîäíîì êîëëîêâèóìå â Ñåí-Æåðìåí-àí-ëè. 7–12 èþëÿ 1992 ã. ïðåäñòàâëÿë Àáõàçèþ â Èòàëèè (Ìèëàí – Ãåíóÿ) íà âûñòàâêå, ïîñâÿùåííîé 500-ëåòèþ îòêðûòèÿ Õðèñòîôîðîì Êîëóìáîì Àìåðèêè. Ñ 14 àâãóñòà 1992 ã. – â Ãóäàóòå, à çàòåì â Ìîñêâå. 3 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1992 ã. âìåñòå ñ Á. Åëüöèíûì, Ý. Øåâàðäíàäçå, Â. Àðäçèíáà è äð. ó÷àñòâîâàë â îáñóæäåíèè ìîñêîâñêîãî Èòîãîâîãî äîêóìåíòà ïî óðåãóëèðîâàíèþ ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîãî êîíôëèêòà. 9 îêòÿáðÿ 1992 ã. ãðóçèíñêèìè îêêóïàöèîííûìè âëàñòÿìè çëîíàìåðåííî ñîææåíû çäàíèÿ Àáõàçñêîãî èíñòèòóòà ÿçûêà, ëèòåðàòóðû è èñòîðèè è Öåíòðàëüíîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî àðõèâà Àáõàçèè. 22 àïðåëÿ – 2 ìàÿ 1993 ã. âìåñòå ñ äåïóòàòîì Ñ. Ëàêîáà, ïåðåâîä÷èöåé Ë. Êâàð÷åëèÿ êîìàíäèðîâàí ðóêîâîäñòâîì Àáõàçèè â Âåëèêîáðèòàíèþ äëÿ ó÷àñòèÿ â íàó÷íîé êîíôåðåíöèè ïî Ñåâåðíîìó Êàâêàçó â Ëîíäîíñêîì óíèâåðñèòåòå. Àáõàçñêàÿ äåïóòàöèÿ áûëà ïðèíÿòà â ïàðëàìåíòå è ÌÈÄå Âåëèêîáðèòàíèè. Âñòðå÷è â ïîääåðæêó Àáõàçèè ïðîøëè â Êåìáðèäæå, Îêñôîðäå, Ýäèíáóðãå è Êèëìàðíîêå – ãîðîäå-ïîáðàòèìå Ñóõóìà.  1993 ã. â Ìîñêâå âûøëà â ñâåò äîêóìåíòàëüíàÿ «Áåëàÿ êíèãà Àáõàçèè» (â ñîàâòîðñòâå ñ Ï. Ôëîðåíñêèì è Ò. Øóòîâîé). 12 äåêàáðÿ 1993 – 7 ôåâðàëÿ 1995 ã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. 25 ìàÿ 1994 ã. èçáðàí ÷ëåíîì-êîððåñïîíäåíòîì Ìåæäóíàðîäíîé ñëàâÿíñêîé àêàäåìèè íàóê, îáðàçîâàíèÿ, èñêóññòâà è êóëüòóðû (Ìîñêâà). 16 èþëÿ 1994 – 11 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1995 ã. – ñîó÷ðåäèòåëü è ñîïðåäñåäàòåëü Êîíãðåññà ðóññêèõ îáùèí Àáõàçèè. Ñ 20 äåêàáðÿ 1994 ã. – ïðîôåññîð Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà. Ñ 18 ôåâðàëÿ 1995 ã. – âèöå-ïðåìüåð Êàáèíåòà ìèíèñòðîâ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Àâòîð ìíîæåñòâà êíèã, ìîíîãðàôèé, ñòàòåé, î÷åðêîâ ïî èñòîðèè è êóëüòóðå äðåâíåãî è ñðåäíåâåêîâîãî Êàâêàçà, âîñòî÷íîãî Ïðè÷åðíîìîðüÿ. 11 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1995 ã. óáèò â Ñóõóìå íà ïîðîãå ñâîåé êâàðòèðû. Îñòàëèñü æåíà, òðîå äåòåé. ÃÀÃÓËÈß Ãåííàäèé Ëåîíèäîâè÷, ïðåìüåð-ìèíèñòð Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ â 1995–1997 è 2002–2003 ãã. Ðîäèëñÿ 4 ÿíâàðÿ 1948 ã. â ñ. Ëûõíû Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1966 ã. îêîí÷èë ãóäàóòñêóþ øêîëó ¹1.  1966–1972 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ íà ñòðîèòåëüíîì ôàêóëüòåòå Áåëîðóññêîãî ïîëèòåõíè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà; èíæåíåðñòðîèòåëü.  ñåíòÿáðå 1972 – èþíå 1974 ã. – ñòðîéìàñòåð, ïðîðàá òðåñòà «Ïèöóíäàñòðîé» â ã. Ãóäàóòà; â èþëå 1974 – 1977 ã. – ãëàâíûé èíæåíåð òðåñòà ¹16.  1977 ã. – çàìåñòèòåëü äèðåêòîðà êîìáèíàòà îáùåñòâåííîãî ïèòàíèÿ íà îçåðå Ðèöà Ìèíèñòåðñòâà òîðãîâëè Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ.  1986 ã. – 162

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ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéïîòðåáñîþçà.  èþëå 1991 ã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî êîìèòåòà ïî âíåøíåýêîíîìè÷åñêèì ñâÿçÿì Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ. Ñ íîÿáðÿ 1992 ã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  ÿíâàðå 1995 – èþíå 1997 ã. – ïðåìüåð-ìèíèñòð Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (Ñóõóì). Ñ ñåíòÿáðÿ 1997 ã. – ïîìîùíèê äåïóòàòà Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé äóìû ÐÔ (Ìîñêâà). Ñ ìàðòà 2000 ã. – àêàäåìèê Ìåæäóíàðîäíîé àêàäåìèè äóõîâíîãî åäèíñòâà íàðîäîâ ìèðà.  äåêàáðå 2002 – àïðåëå 2003 ã. – ïðåìüåð-ìèíèñòð Àáõàçèè. Ñ äåêàáðÿ 2003 ã. – ãëàâà Àäìèíèñòðàöèè Ïðåçèäåíòà Àáõàçèè. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ÃÂÀÐÀÌÈß Àëåêî Àëåêñååâè÷, ðåêòîð Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà, äîêòîð ôèçèêî-ìàòåìàòè÷åñêèõ íàóê, ïðîôåññîð, àêàäåìèê Àäûãñêîé ìåæäóíàðîäíîé àêàäåìèè íàóê, äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – Ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1991–1996). Ðîäèëñÿ 7 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1940 ã. â ñ. Ãóï Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Ïîñëå îêîí÷àíèÿ òêâàð÷åëüñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëû ¹ 2 ïîñòóïèë â Ñóõóìñêèé ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé ïåäàãîãè÷åñêèé èíñòèòóò. Ñ 3-ãî êóðñà ìàòåìàòè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà ñòàë ïîñåùàòü èññëåäîâàòåëüñêèå ñåìèíàðû êàôåäðû âûñøåé àëãåáðû Ìîñêîâñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà. Íà 4-ì êóðñå íàïèñàë ïåðâóþ íàó÷íóþ ðàáîòó, ñ êîòîðîé âûñòóïèë íà Âñåñîþçíîì àëãåáðàè÷åñêîì êîëëîêâèóìå (ïðîõîäèë â Áåëîðóññêîì óíèâåðñèòåòå). Ó÷èëñÿ â àñïèðàíòóðå íà êàôåäðå àëãåáðû è òåîðèè ÷èñåë ïîä ðóêîâîäñòâîì èçâåñòíîãî àëãåáðàèñòà Ë. Êóëèêîâà. Áóäó÷è àñïèðàíòîì, âûñòóïèë íà Âñåñîþçíîì êîíãðåññå ìàòåìàòèêîâ. Çàùèòèë êàíäèäàòñêóþ äèññåðòàöèþ íà òåìó «Èññëåäîâàíèå íåêîòîðûõ êëàññîâ êâàçèãðóïï ñ òîæäåñòâàìè».  Ìîëäàâñêîé ýíöèêëîïåäèè íàçâàí îäíèì èç ëó÷øèõ ó÷åíèêîâ èçâåñòíîãî ìàòåìàòèêà, ïðîôåññîðà Â. Áåëîóñîâà.  1985 ã. â Èíñòèòóòå ìàòåìàòèêè Ñèáèðñêîãî îòäåëåíèÿ ÀÍ ÑÑÑÐ çàùèòèë äîêòîðñêóþ äèññåðòàöèþ «Àêñèîìàòèçèðîâàííûå êëàññû êâàçèãðóïï è ìíîãîñîðòíàÿ óíèâåðñàëüíàÿ àëãåáðà». Àâòîð îêîëî ñòà íàó÷íûõ ñòàòåé, ìîíîãðàôèé, ó÷åáíûõ ïîñîáèé è äð. Òðóäû âûõîäèëè â ÑÑÑÐ, ÑØÀ, Ãåðìàíèè, Ñèíãàïóðå, Âåíãðèè, Þãîñëàâèè, ×åõèè, Ïîëüøå, Áîëãàðèè. ßâëÿåòñÿ ñîàâòîðîì ìîíîãðàôèè «Àëãåáðàè÷åñêèå ñòðóêòóðû â òåîðèÿõ àâòîìàòîâ è áàç äàííûõ». Ñèíãàïóð, Íüþ-Äæåðñè, Ëîíäîí, Ãîíêîíã, Ìèðîâàÿ íàóêà. 1992 è ó÷åáíîãî ïîñîáèÿ äëÿ âóçîâ «Ýëåìåíòû àëãåáðàè÷åñêîé òåîðèè àâòîìàòîâ» Ì., Âûñøàÿ øêîëà. 1994. Âûñòóïàë ñ äîêëàäàìè íà 18 ìåæäóíàðîäíûõ è 30 âñåñîþçíûõ êîíôåðåíöèÿõ ìàòåìàòèêîâ.  1986 ã. ÂÀÊ ïðè Ñîâåòå Ìèíèñòðîâ ÑÑÑÐ ïðèñâîèë ó÷åíîå çâàíèå ïðîôåññîðà.  1992 ã. èçáðàí àêàäåìèêîì, ÷ëåíîì ïðåçèäèóìà, ðóêîâîäèòåëåì îòäåëåíèÿ ìàòåìàòèêè, ìåõàíèêè è èíôîðìàòèêè Àäûãñêîé ìåæäóíàðîäíîé 163

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àêàäåìèè íàóê (ÀÌÀÍ). ×èòàë ëåêöèè â Ìîñêîâñêîì, Áåðëèíñêîì, Ëåéïöèãñêîì, Ïîòñäàìñêîì, Ñîôèéñêîì, Áóäàïåøòñêîì è äð. óíèâåðñèòåòàõ. Ïîäãîòîâèë ÷åòûðåõ äîêòîðîâ íàóê â Ãåðìàíèè. Ñ 1989 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ðåêòîð Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà (ÀÃÓ).  íîÿáðå 1993 ã. ÀÃÓ ñòàë ÷ëåíîì Åâðàçèéñêîé àññîöèàöèè óíèâåðñèòåòîâ (Ìîñêâà). Ïðèíèìàåò àêòèâíîå ó÷àñòèå â äåÿòåëüíîñòè Ñîþçà ðåêòîðîâ âóçîâ Ðîññèè. Ìåæäó ÌÃÓ è ÀÃÓ çàêëþ÷åí äîãîâîð î ñîòðóäíè÷åñòâå.  1991–1996 ãã. – äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ê âîññòàíîâëåíèþ ÀÃÓ ïðèñòóïèë âî âðåìÿ âîéíû, â àïðåëå 1993 ã. â ã. Ãóäàóòà. Äîëãîå âðåìÿ ÿâëÿëñÿ ïðåäñåäàòåëåì Ôåäåðàöèè áîêñà Àáõàçèè. Æåíàò, èìååò ñûíà. ÃÎÃÓÀ Àëåêñåé Íî÷åâè÷, ïèñàòåëü, â 1988–1991 ãã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Íàðîäíîãî ôîðóìà Àáõàçèè «Àèäãûëàðà» («Åäèíåíèå»). Ðîäèëñÿ 15 ìàðòà 1932 ã. â ñ. Ãóï (ïîñåëîê Àäæàìïàçðà) Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîíà, â êðåñòüÿíñêîé ñåìüå. Àáõàç. Åäèíñòâåííûé áðàò ñåìè ñåñòåð. Ó÷èëñÿ â íåñêîëüêèõ øêîëàõ – â Àäæàìïàçðå, ã. Òêâàð÷àë è ñ. Ïîêâåø. Îêîí÷èâ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó, ïîïûòàëñÿ ïîñòóïèòü â Ñóõóìñêèé ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé ïåäàãîãè÷åñêèé èíñòèòóò íà ôàêóëüòåò ðóññêîãî ÿçûêà è ëèòåðàòóðû. Îäíàêî èç-çà íåçíàíèÿ ãðóçèíñêîãî ÿçûêà íå áûë äîïóùåí ê ó÷åáå. Çàòåì ðàáîòàë íà Òêâàð÷àëüñêîé øàõòå è íà Öåíòðàëüíîé îáîãàòèòåëüíîé ôàáðèêå ã. Òêâàð÷àë. Íà ñëåäóþùèé ãîä ñòàë ñòóäåíòîì Ñóõóìñêîãî ïåäèíñòèòóòà.  1955–1960 ãã. – ñòóäåíò Ìîñêîâñêîãî ëèòåðàòóðíîãî èíñòèòóòà èì. À.Ì. Ãîðüêîãî; ó÷èëñÿ ó èçâåñòíûõ ïèñàòåëåé è ïðîôåññîðî⠖ Â. Øêëîâñêîãî, Â. Àðõèïîâà, Ñ. Áîíäè, Ã. Ïîñïåëîâà, Ñ. Àðòàìîíîâà è äðóãèõ. Ïîñëå îêîí÷àíèÿ ëèòèíñòèòóòà ðàáîòàë îòâåòñòâåííûì ñåêðåòàðåì àáõàçñêîãî æóðíàëà Àëàøàðà (Ñâåò), ñòàðøèì ðåäàêòîðîì ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî èçäàòåëüñòâà, ãëàâíûì ðåäàêòîðîì äåòñêîãî æóðíàëà Àìöàáç, ïðåäñåäàòåëåì ïðàâëåíèÿ Ñîþçà ïèñàòåëåé Àáõàçèè, ðóêîâîäèë îáùåñòâåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêèì äâèæåíèåì Íàðîäíûé ôîðóì Àáõàçèè «Àèäãûëàðà», ñûãðàâøèì áîëüøóþ ðîëü â íàöèîíàëüíî-îñâîáîäèòåëüíîé áîðüáå, áûë íàðîäíûì äåïóòàòîì ÑÑÑÐ (1988–1991).  íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ïðåäñåäàòåëü êîìèññèè ïî ãîñóäàðñòâåííûì ïðåìèÿì èì. Ä.È. Ãóëèà. Ñòèõè è ðàññêàçû ïèñàë ñ äåòñòâà. Âïåðâûå íàïå÷àòàëñÿ â 1949 ã. Àâòîð áîëåå 10 êíèã ïðîçû (ðàññêàçû, ïîâåñòè, ðîìàíû), äâóõ ïüåñ, êðèòè÷åñêèõ è ïóáëèöèñòè÷åñêèõ ñòàòåé è î÷åðêîâ. Ëàóðåàò ïðåìèè èì. Ä.È. Ãóëèà ïî ëèòåðàòóðå. Ïåðåâîäèëñÿ íà ðóññêèé è äðóãèå ÿçûêè íàðîäîâ áûâøåãî ÑÑÑÐ. Îòäåëüíûå ðàññêàçû ïåðåâåäåíû íà ôðàíöóçñêèé, íåìåöêèé, ïîëüñêèé, áîëãàðñêèé 164

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

ÿçûêè. Ïåðåâåë íà àáõàçñêèé ðÿä ïðîèçâåäåíèé Ë. Òîëñòîãî, Ô. Äîñòîåâñêîãî, À. Ïëàòîíîâà è äðóãèõ ïèñàòåëåé. Æåíàò, òðîå äåòåé. ÃÓÐÄÆÓÀ Âàëåðèé Òåáîâè÷, ïðåäñåäàòåëü Àðáèòðàæíîãî ñóäà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ, äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè (1991–1996). Ðîäèëñÿ 29 äåêàáðÿ 1947 ã. â ã. Ñóõóì (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1956 ã. îêîí÷èë àáõàçñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹10 èì. Í. Ëàêîáà.  1969– 1973 ãã. – ñòóäåíò Ñåâåðî-Îñåòèíñêîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà, à çàòåì Õàðüêîâñêîãî þðèäè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà.  1973–1974 ãã. – â ðÿäàõ Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè.  ôåâðàëå 1975 – íîÿáðå 1976 ã. – ñëåäîâàòåëü ÌÂÄ Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ. Ñ 1976 ã. – ÷ëåí ÊÏÑÑ.  íîÿáðå 1976 – ôåâðàëå 1978 ã. – ïîìîùíèê ïðîêóðîðà Ñóõóìñêîãî ðàéîíà.  ôåâðàëå 1978 – ôåâðàëå 1982 ã. – ïîìîùíèê ïðîêóðîðà ã. Ñóõóì.  ôåâðàëå 1982 – íîÿáðå 1985 ã. – ïðîêóðîð ã. Òêâàð÷åëè. Ñ íîÿáðÿ 1985 ã. – ïîìîùíèê ïðîêóðîðà Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ. Ñ èþíÿ 1986 ã. – ïðîêóðîð ñëåäñòâåííîãî îòäåëà Ïðîêóðàòóðû Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ. Ñ ÿíâàðÿ 1989 ã. – ïðîêóðîð Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîíà.  èþíå 1989 ã. ïðèêàçîì Ãåíåðàëüíîãî ïðîêóðîðà ÑÑÑÐ ïðèñâîåí êëàññíûé ÷èí «ñîâåòíèê þñòèöèè». 8 ÿíâàðÿ 1990 ã. ïðèêàçîì Ãåíåðàëüíîãî ïðîêóðîðà ÑÑÑÐ îñâîáîæäåí îò äîëæíîñòè ïðîêóðîðà Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîíà, áóäó÷è îáâèíåí â èþëüñêèõ 1989 ã. ñîáûòèÿõ (ïåðâûå ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêèå ñòîëêíîâåíèÿ) â Àáõàçèè. Ïðèãîâîðîì Ñóäåáíîé êîëëåãèè ïî óãîëîâíûì äåëàì Âåðõîâíîãî ñóäà ÑÑÑÐ îò 30 àâãóñòà 1990 ã. îñóæäåí íà äâà ãîäà ëèøåíèÿ ñâîáîäû ñ îòáûòèåì íàêàçàíèÿ â èñïðàâèòåëüíî-òðóäîâîé êîëîíèè óñèëåííîãî ðåæèìà. Ñîäåðæàëñÿ â òþðüìå «Ìàòðîññêàÿ òèøèíà» (Ìîñêâà). Îñâîáîæäåí äîñðî÷íî. 13 îêòÿáðÿ 1991 ã. èçáðàí íàðîäíûì äåïóòàòîì Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçèè. Ñ 15 ÿíâàðÿ 1993 ã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïàðëàìåíòñêîé êîìèññèè ïî îáîðîíå è áåçîïàñíîñòè; ñ 18 ìàðòà 1995 ã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïðàâîâîé êîìèññèè ïàðëàìåíòà. Ñ 7 àâãóñòà 1996 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Àðáèòðàæíîãî ñóäà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. 25 äåêàáðÿ 1998 ã. ðåøåíèåì Êâàëèôèêàöèîííîé êîëëåãèè ñóäåé Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ ïðèñâîåí 1-é êâàëèôèêàöèîííûé êëàññ. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ÄÀÌÅÍÈÀ Îëåã Íåñòîðîâè÷, äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1991–1996). Ðîäèëñÿ 15 àâãóñòà 1937 ã. â ñ. Ãóï Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ) Àáõàç.  1944–1952 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â ïîêâåøñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå.  1955–1960 ãã. – ñòóäåíò ôèëîëîãè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîñïåäèíñòèòóòà. Ñ îêòÿáðÿ 1960 ïî íîÿáðü 1962 ã. ñëóæèë â àðìèè.  1963 – àâãóñòå 1964 ã. – ïðåïîäàâàòåëü àáõàçñêîãî è ðóññêîãî ÿçûêîâ è ëèòåðàòóðû â ãóïñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå.  îêòÿáðå 1964 – äåêàáðå 1966 ã. – ñåêðåòàðü êîìñîìîëüñêîé îðãàíèçàöèè 165

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

Ñóõóìñêîãî ïåäèíñòèòóòà. Ñ äåêàáðÿ 1966 ïî äåêàáðü 1969 ã. – àñïèðàíò Èíñòèòóòà ôèëîñîôèè ÀÍ ÑÑÑÐ (Ìîñêâà). Ñ àïðåëÿ 1970 ã. – êàíäèäàò ôèëîñîôñêèõ íàóê.  1970 – ôåâðàëå 1975 ã. – ïðåïîäàâàòåëü êàôåäðû ôèëîñîôèè Ãðóçèíñêîãî èíñòèòóòà ñóáòðîïè÷åñêîãî õîçÿéñòâà (Ñóõóì).  ôåâðàëå 1975 – àïðåëå 1984 ã. – äîöåíò êàôåäðû ôèëîñîôèè Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà (ÀÃÓ). Ñ àïðåëÿ 1984 ïî îêòÿáðü 1997 ã. – ïðîðåêòîð ïî íàóêå ÀÃÓ.  1991–1996 ãã. – äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè. Ñ äåêàáðÿ 1997 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – çàâåäóþùèé ëàáîðàòîðèåé ñîöèàëüíîé ýêîëîãèè Èíñòèòóòà ýêîëîãèè ãîðíûõ òåððèòîðèé ÐÀÍ ïðè Àäûãåéñêîì óíèâåðñèòåòå. Ñ 2000 ã. – ñîïðåäñåäàòåëü îáùåñòâåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî äâèæåíèÿ Àáõàçèè «Àéòàéðà». Àâòîð áîëåå 50 íàó÷íûõ ðàáîò, â òîì ÷èñëå äâóõ ìîíîãðàôèé è äâóõ ñáîðíèêîâ ñòàòåé. Îñíîâíàÿ òåìàòèêà íàó÷íûõ èññëåäîâàíèé – ïðîáëåìû ôèëîñîôèè è êàâêàçñêîé êóëüòóðû. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ÄÁÀÐ Áåñëàí Àíäðååâè÷, ìèíèñòð îáðàçîâàíèÿ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1995–2002). Ðîäèëñÿ 6 äåêàáðÿ 1958 ã. â ñ. Áëàáóðõâà Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1965–1975 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â êàëäàõâàðñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå.  1980 ã. îêîí÷èë áèîëîãî-ãåîãðàôè÷åñêèé ôàêóëüòåò Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîñïåäèíñòèòóòà.  1980–1992 ãã. ðàáîòàë ó÷èòåëåì, çàìåñòèòåëåì äèðåêòîðà è äèðåêòîðîì ñðåäíåé øêîëû â Áëàáóðõâà. Ñ èþíÿ 1992 ïî 1994 ã. – çàâåäóþùèé Ãóäàóòñêèì ðàéîííûì îòäåëîì îáðàçîâàíèÿ.  ïåðèîä Îòå÷åñòâåííîé âîéíû íàðîäà Àáõàçèè 1992–1993 ãã. íàõîäèëñÿ â ñîñòàâå Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðåçåðâíîãî áàòàëüîíà, ÿâëÿëñÿ ïðåäñåäàòåëåì Âðåìåííîãî êîìèòåòà ïî îðãàíèçàöèè ïîõîðîí ïîãèáøèõ âîèíîâ. Ñ ÿíâàðÿ 1995 ïî 2002 ã. – ìèíèñòð îáðàçîâàíèÿ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ñ 2002 ã. – ãëàâà àäìèíèñòðàöèè Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîíà. Æåíàò, ïÿòåðî äåòåé. ÄÁÀÐ Ðîìàí Ñàèäîâè÷, íà÷àëüíèê Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé ýêîëîãè÷åñêîé èíñïåêöèè Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ, ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïðàâëåíèÿ Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ýêîëîãè÷åñêîãî ôîíäà Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 14 íîÿáðÿ 1957 ã. â ïîñ. Ïèöóíäà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1974 ã. îêîí÷èë áèîëîãè÷åñêèé ôàêóëüòåò Ñàðàòîâñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà. Ó÷èëñÿ â àñïèðàíòóðå Ýêîëîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà ÀÍ ÑÑÑÐ (Ëåíèíãðàä). Çàùèòèë êàíäèäàòñêóþ äèññåðòàöèþ.  1988–1990 ã. – çàâåäóþùèé ëàáîðàòîðèåé èíòðîäóêöèè Àáõàçñêîé îïûòíîé ñòàíöèè çàùèòû ðàñòåíèé.  1991–1993 ãã. – çàâåäóþùèé êàôåäðîé áîòàíèêè è çîîëîãèè, äåêàí áèîëîãî-ãåîãðàôè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Àá166

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

õàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà. Êàê ýíòîìîëîã-ñèñòåìàòèê îïèñàë áîëåå 30 íîâûõ äëÿ íàóêè âèäîâ íàñåêîìûõ èç ßïîíèè, Ìîíãîëèè, Ñðåäíåé Àçèè, Ñèáèðè, Êàâêàçà è Êèïðà.  1992–1993 ãã., âî âðåìÿ âîéíû ñ Ãðóçèåé, – çàìåñòèòåëü êîìàíäèðà ðîòû, ðóêîâîäèòåëü èíôîðìàöèîííî-àíàëèòè÷åñêîãî îòäåëà ÌÈÄ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ, ÷ëåí òðåõñòîðîííåé Îáúåäèíåííîé êîìèññèè ïî óðåãóëèðîâàíèþ â Àáõàçèè ïðè ïîñðåäíè÷åñêîé ìèññèè ìèíèñòðà Ì×Ñ Ðîññèè Ñ.Ê. Øîéãó.  1993–1995 ãã. – ìèíèñòð ýêîëîãèè â ïîñëåâîåííîì ïðàâèòåëüñòâå Àáõàçèè.  1993–1994 ãã. èíèöèèðîâàë ñîçäàíèå îáùåñòâåííîé ýêîëîãè÷åñêîé îðãàíèçàöèè «Àïñàáàðà» («Ïðèðîäà»). Ñ 1995 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – íà÷àëüíèê Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé ýêîëîãè÷åñêîé èíñïåêöèè Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ, ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïðàâëåíèÿ Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ýêîëîãè÷åñêîãî ôîíäà Àáõàçèè.  1999 ã. èçáðàí äåéñòâèòåëüíûì ÷ëåíîì Ìåæäóíàðîäíîé àêàäåìèè íàóê ýêîëîãèè, áåçîïàñíîñòè ïðèðîäû è ÷åëîâåêà (ÌÀÍÝÁ), (Ñ.-Ïåòåðáóðã), ïðåçèäåíò Àáõàçñêîãî îòäåëåíèÿ ÌÀÍÝÁ. ÄÁÀÐ Ñåðãåé Ïëàòîíîâè÷ (1946–2002), ãåíåðàë-ëåéòåíàíò, Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè, â 1993–1996 ãã. – íà÷àëüíèê Ãåíåðàëüíîãî øòàáà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ, âèöå-ñïèêåð ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè (2002). Ðîäèëñÿ 2 ìàÿ 1946 ã. â ñ. Ìãóäçûðõâà Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1963 ã. îêîí÷èë ñðåäíþþ øêîëó.  1963–1964 ãã. ðàáîòàë â êîëõîçå ñ. Ìãóäçûðõâà.  1964–1968 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â Áàêèíñêîì âûñøåì îáùåâîéñêîâîì êîìàíäíîì ó÷èëèùå.  1968–1979 ãã. ïðîõîäèë ñëóæáó â äîëæíîñòÿõ êîìàíäèðà âçâîäà, ðîòû, áàòàëüîíà.  1979–1982 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â Âîåííîé àêàäåìèè èì. Ôðóíçå.  1982–1990 ãã. ïðîõîäèë ñëóæáó â êà÷åñòâå êîìàíäèðà ïîëêà, íà÷àëüíèêà øòàáà äèâèçèè.  1990 ã., ïî ïðîñüáå ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Àáõàçèè, ïåðåâåäåí íà äîëæíîñòü Âîåííîãî êîìèññàðà ã. Ñóõóì è Ñóõóìñêîãî ðàéîíà.  àâãóñòå 1992 ã., ñ íà÷àëîì âîéíû ñ Ãðóçèåé, áûë íàçíà÷åí íà÷àëüíèêîì îáîðîíû ãîðîäà Ñóõóì. Ïîñëå ñòàáèëèçàöèè ôðîíòà ïî ðåêå Ãóìèñòà ñòàë íà÷àëüíèêîì øòàáà Áçûáñêîãî îáîðîíèòåëüíîãî ðóáåæà.  îêòÿáðå 1992 ã. ðóêîâîäèë îñâîáîæäåíèåì ã. Ãàãðà. Ïîñëå óñïåøíî ïðîâåäåííîé îïåðàöèè íàçíà÷åí êîìàíäóþùèì Ãóìèñòèíñêîãî ôðîíòà. Ñ ìàÿ 1993 ïî 1996 ã. – íà÷àëüíèê Ãåíåðàëüíîãî øòàáà Âîîðóæåííûõ ñèë Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1996–2001 ãã. – ñîâåòíèê ïðåçèäåíòà Àáõàçèè.  1999–2001 ãã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ñîþçà âåòåðàíîâ âîéíû â Àáõàçèè.  2001–2002 ãã. âîçãëàâëÿë Ñîþç çàùèòíèêîâ Àáõàçèè «Àìöàõàðà» – ñàìóþ âëèÿòåëüíóþ îáùåñòâåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêóþ îðãàíèçàöèþ â ñòðàíå.  2002 ã. èçáðàí âèöå-ñïèêåðîì ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè. Ñêîðîïîñòèæíî ñêîí÷àëñÿ â èþíå 2002 ã. 167

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Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Íàãðàæäåí îðäåíàìè: Êðàñíàÿ Çâåçäà, Çà ñëóæáó Ðîäèíå â Âîîðóæåííûõ Ñèëàõ ÑÑÑÐ, à òàêæå äåñÿòüþ ìåäàëÿìè ÑÑÑÐ, ÃÄÐ, Âåíãðèè, Ýôèîïèè. Îñòàëèñü æåíà, äâîå ñûíîâåé. ÄÆÅÐÃÅÍÈß Àíðè Ìèõàéëîâè÷, Ãåíåðàëüíûé ïðîêóðîð Àáõàçèè (1992–2001), ïðåìüåð-ìèíèñòð Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (2001–2002), ëè÷íûé ïðåäñòàâèòåëü ïðåçèäåíòà Àáõàçèè íà ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêèõ ïåðåãîâîðàõ. Ðîäèëñÿ 8 àâãóñòà 1941 ã. â ã. Ëåíèíãðàäå (Ðîññèÿ). Àáõàç.  1948–1958 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â ðàçëè÷íûõ øêîëàõ ã. Ñóõóìà.  1958–1963 ãã. – ñòóäåíò þðèäè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Ìîñêîâñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà.  1963–1973 ãã. – ñëåäîâàòåëü, ñòàðøèé ñëåäîâàòåëü ÌÂÄ Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ.  1973–1975 ãã. – ñòàðøèé ñëåäîâàòåëü ïðîêóðàòóðû ã. Ñóõóì.  äåêàáðå 1975 – ÿíâàðå 1978 ã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Íàðîäíîãî ñóäà ã. Ñóõóì.  ÿíâàðå 1978 – ôåâðàëå 1992 ã. – ÷ëåí Âåðõîâíîãî ñóäà Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ. Ñ ôåâðàëÿ 1992 ïî àïðåëü 1994 ã. – Ïðîêóðîð Àáõàçèè.  àïðåëå 1994 – ìàå 2001 ã. – Ãåíåðàëüíûé ïðîêóðîð Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ñ ìàÿ 2001 ã. – ïðåìüåð-ìèíèñòð Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ñ 1991 ã. – çàñëóæåííûé þðèñò Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ. Ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé ñîâåòíèê þñòèöèè 2-ãî êëàññà (ãåíåðàë-ëåéòåíàíò). Ñ 1990 ã. ïðèíèìàåò àêòèâíîå ó÷àñòèå â ïåðåãîâîðàõ ïî óðåãóëèðîâàíèþ ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêèõ îòíîøåíèé â êà÷åñòâå ëè÷íîãî ïðåäñòàâèòåëÿ ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçèè (1990–1994 ã.), ïðåçèäåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (ñ 1994). Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ÄÆÈÍÄÆÎËÈß Ñîêðàò Ðà÷åâè÷, äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè (1991–1996, 1996–2001), ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Àáõàçèè è ìèíèñòð èíîñòðàííûõ äåë (1993–1994), ñïèêåð ïàðëàìåíòà – Íàðîäíîãî Ñîáðàíèÿ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1996–2002). Ðîäèëñÿ 11 äåêàáðÿ 1937 ã. â ñ. Áåäèà Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Ó÷èëñÿ â ñóõóìñêîé è î÷àì÷èðñêèõ ñðåäíèõ øêîëàõ. Îêîí÷èë ôèëîëîãè÷åñêèé ôàêóëüòåò Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà.  1956–1959 ãã. ïðîõîäèë ñëóæáó â Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè. Òðóäîâóþ äåÿòåëüíîñòü íà÷àë ðàáî÷èì íà Òêâàð÷åëüñêîé ÃÐÝÑ â íîÿáðå 1959 ã.  1967 ã. èçáðàí ñåêðåòàðåì Òêâàð÷åëüñêîãî ãîðîäñêîãî Ñîâåòà íàðîäíûõ äåïóòàòîâ.  1985 ã. ïåðåâåäåí â Òêâàð÷åëüñêèé ãîðêîì ïàðòèè íà äîëæíîñòü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ ïàðòêîìèññèè.  òîì æå ãîäó íàçíà÷åí çàâåäóþùèì îòäåëîì ïðîïàãàíäû è àãèòàöèè.  ÿíâàðå 1988 – äåêàáðå 1992 ã. – ãëàâíûé ðåäàêòîð ãàçåòû Òêâàð÷åëüñêèé ãîðíÿê.  ñåíòÿáðå 1991 ã. èçáðàí äåïóòàòîì Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçèè, â äåêàáðå 1992 ã. – çàìåñòèòåëåì ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Ðåñïóáëèêè 168

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

Àáõàçèÿ.  îêòÿáðå 1993 ã. íàçíà÷åí ïðåäñåäàòåëåì Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ è ìèíèñòðîì èíîñòðàííûõ äåë Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1993–1994 ãã. âîçãëàâëÿë îôèöèàëüíóþ äåëåãàöèþ Àáõàçèè íà Æåíåâñêèõ ïåðåãîâîðàõ ïî óðåãóëèðîâàíèþ ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîãî êîíôëèêòà, ïðîõîäèâøèõ ïîä ýãèäîé ÎÎÍ, ïðè ïîñðåäíè÷åñòâå Ðîññèè è ó÷àñòèè ÑÁÑÅ (ÎÁÑÅ). 26 íîÿáðÿ 1994 ã. èçáðàí ñïèêåðîì ïàðëàìåíòà – Íàðîäíîãî Ñîáðàíèÿ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1996–2002 ã. – ñïèêåð Íàðîäíîãî Ñîáðàíèÿ âî âíîâü èçáðàííîì ïàðëàìåíòå Àáõàçèè. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ÄÆÎÍÓÀ Íèêîëàé Òàåâè÷ (1944–1994), çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà îáîðîíû Àáõàçèè, ïîëêîâíèê. Ðîäèëñÿ 1 äåêàáðÿ 1944 ã. â ñò. Ñòàðîìèæñêàÿ Êðàñíîäàðñêîãî êðàÿ (Ðîññèÿ). Àáõàç. Ïîñëå îêîí÷àíèÿ ñóõóìñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëû ñëóæèë â àðìèè. Ó÷èëñÿ íà ôèëîëîãè÷åñêîì ôàêóëüòåòå Ñóõóìñêîãî ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà.  1970–80-õ ãã. ðàáîòàë êîððåñïîíäåíòîì, çàâåäóþùèì îòäåëîì ðåäàêöèè ãàçåòû Ñîâåòñêàÿ Àáõàçèÿ. 1985–1989 ãã. – ðåäàêòîð ãàçåòû Àáõàçñêèé óíèâåðñèòåò. 1989–1992 ãã. – ðåäàêòîð ãàçåòû Íàðîäíîãî ôîðóìà Àáõàçèè Åäèíåíèå. Ñ íà÷àëà ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíû âîåâàë íà Ãóìèñòèíñêîì ôðîíòå.  îêòÿáðå 1992 ã. íàçíà÷åí çàìåñòèòåëåì êîìàíäóþùåãî Ãóìèñòèíñêîãî îáîðîíèòåëüíîãî ðóáåæà. 21 ÿíâàðÿ 1993 ã. – çàìåñòèòåëü êîìèññàðà Âîîðóæåííûõ ñèë Àáõàçèè. 13 ÿíâàðÿ 1994 ã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà îáîðîíû Àáõàçèè ïî ðàáîòå ñ ëè÷íûì ñîñòàâîì. Ïîëêîâíèê. Íàãðàæäåí Îðäåíîì Ëåîíà. Îñòàëèñü æåíà, äî÷ü. ÇÀÍÒÀÐÈß Àñëàí Èâàíîâè÷ (1961–1992), îðãàíèçàòîð àáõàçñêîãî ñîïðîòèâëåíèÿ íà Âîñòî÷íîì ôðîíòå, Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 29 îêòÿáðÿ 1961 ã. â ñ. Òàìûø Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1969–1979 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â òàìûøñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå. Çàíèìàëñÿ ñïîðòîì, óâëåêàëñÿ ëèòåðàòóðîé. Ïîñëå îêîí÷àíèÿ øêîëû ïîñòóïèë íà ãåîãðàôè÷åñêèé ôàêóëüòåò Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà, íî ñêîðî îñòàâèë ó÷åáó.  1980–1982 ãã. ñëóæèë â òàíêîâûõ âîéñêàõ â Êèðîâàáàäå. Îêîí÷èë ïðîôåññèîíàëüíî-òåõíè÷åñêîå ó÷èëèùå è ñòàë ðàáîòàòü â øêîëå ïðåïîäàâàòåëåì òðàêòîðîâåäåíèÿ. Îäíîâðåìåííî áûë çàâåäóþùèì àãðîîòäåëåíèåì â ýôèðíîìàñëè÷íîì ñîâõîçå-çàâîäå ñ. Òàìûø.  1983 ã. ïîñòóïèë â Ëèòåðàòóðíûé èíñòèòóò èì. À.Ì. Ãîðüêîãî (Ìîñêâà). Âìåñòå ñ áðàòîì Çàçîé ïðèíèìàë àêòèâíîå ó÷àñòèå â ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ ñîáûòèÿõ 169

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

1989 ã. â Àáõàçèè, â ã. Ñóõóìå, áûë ÷ëåíîì Íàðîäíîãî ôîðóìà Àáõàçèè «Àèäãûëàðà» («Åäèíåíèå»). Êîãäà ãðóçèíñêèå âîéñêà âòîðãëèñü â Þæíóþ Îñåòèþ, â ÷èñëå äðóãèõ ïðåäñòàâèòåëåé Àáõàçèè áûë ïîñëàí â ã. Ãðîçíûé íà êîíôåðåíöèþ Àññàìáëåè ãîðñêèõ íàðîäîâ Êàâêàçà (ïîçäíåå Êîíôåäåðàöèþ íàðîäîâ Êàâêàçà). Ñîáûòèÿ â Þæíîé Îñåòèè óáåäèëè åãî â íåèçáåæíîñòè âîéíû Ãðóçèè ñ Àáõàçèåé.  êîíöå 1991 ã. â ÷èñëå ïåðâûõ âîøåë â Àáõàçñêóþ ãâàðäèþ, ãäå ïîçíàêîìèëñÿ ñ Ìóøíè Õâàðöêèÿ. Ïåðåä âîéíîé âìåñòå ñ áðàòüÿìè Çàçîé, Àñòàìóðîì Çàíòàðèÿ, Âëàäèìèðîì Àíöóïîâûì è äðóãèìè îðãàíèçîâàë áîåâóþ ãðóïïó «Êàòðàí».  ñîñòàâå ýòîé ãðóïïû ïðèíèìàë ó÷àñòèå âî âçÿòèè 24 èþíÿ 1992 ã. çäàíèÿ ÌÂÄ Àáõàçèè è âûäâîðåíèè ìèíèñòðà Ã. Ëîìèíàäçå. 14 àâãóñòà 1992 ã., â äåíü âòîðæåíèÿ ãðóçèíñêèõ âîéñê â Àáõàçèþ, íàõîäèëñÿ ñ íîâîáðàíöàìè â ïîñåëêå Àãóäçåðà (íåäàëåêî îò Ñóõóìà), ãäå ïðèíÿë áîé è âûâåë ñâîèõ ñîëäàò èç îêðóæåíèÿ. Îáúåäèíèëñÿ ñ áðàòîì Çàçîé, âìåñòå ñ êîòîðûì îíè âîäðóçèëè ñïóùåííûé ìåñòíûìè âëàñòÿìè ôëàã Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ íàä çäàíèåì àäìèíèñòðàöèè ã. Òêâàð÷àë, è âìåñòå ñ òîâàðèùàìè îðãàíèçîâàëè ñîïðîòèâëåíèå, áëàãîäàðÿ êîòîðîìó áûë ñîçäàí Âîñòî÷íûé ôðîíò â ã. Òêâàð÷àë Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîíà.  àâãóñòå 1992 ã. – êîìàíäóþùèé Âîñòî÷íûì ôðîíòîì âìåñòî Â. Àðøáà.  ñåíòÿáðÿ 1992 ã. áûë ðàíåí, íà ëå÷åíèè íàõîäèëñÿ â ãóäàóòñêîì ãîñïèòàëå. Ðàéîííûå ÷èíîâíèêè ñäåëàëè âñå, ÷òîáû îòñòðàíèòü åãî îò çàíèìàåìîé äîëæíîñòè. Îäíàêî ïîñëå ðàíåíèÿ îí áûë íàçíà÷åí êîìàíäóþùèì íàïðàâëåíèÿ Àäçþáæà – Ëàáðà. 14 äåêàáðÿ 1992 ã. âìåñòå ñ æåíîé Íàòàëüåé Ñàçîíîâîé ñãîðåë â âåðòîëåòå, ïåðåâîçèâøåì æåíùèí è äåòåé èç áëîêèðîâàííîãî ã. Òêâàð÷àë. Âåðòîëåò áûë ïîäáèò ãðóçèíñêîé ðàêåòîé â ðàéîíå âûñîêîãîðíîãî ñ. Ëàòà. Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. ÇÀÍÒÀÐÈß Àñòàí (Çàçà) Èâàíîâè÷ (1960–1993), îðãàíèçàòîð àáõàçñêîãî ñîïðîòèâëåíèÿ íà Âîñòî÷íîì ôðîíòå, Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 20 àâãóñòà 1960 ã. â ñ. Òàìûø Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1977 ã. îêîí÷èë òàìûøñêóþ øêîëó è ïîñòóïèë â Íîâî÷åðêàññêèé ãåîëîãîðàçâåäî÷íûé òåõíèêóì.  1978 ã. ïîñòóïèë íà ôàêóëüòåò ýëåêòðîíèêè è âû÷èñëèòåëüíîé òåõíèêè Òáèëèññêîãî ïîëèòåõíè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà, îäíàêî ñêîðî îñòàâèë ó÷åáó.  1980–1981 ãã. ñëóæèë â Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè, â ëåòíîé ÷àñòè â Ëèåïàå (Ëàòâèÿ). Ïîñëå àðìèè, â 1982 ã., áûë àðåñòîâàí è îñóæäåí íà ÷åòûðå ãîäà çà íîøåíèå îðóæèÿ. Ñèäåë â Ñóõóìñêîé, Çóãäèäñêîé òþðüìàõ è â Êóòàèññêîé êîëîíèè. Âûéäÿ èç çàêëþ÷åíèÿ, îòêðûë â ðîäíîì ñåëå ìàñòåðñêóþ ïî ðåìîíòó àâòîìàøèí.  1988–1991 ãã. ðàáîòàë íà ðàçëè÷íûõ ïðåäïðèÿòèÿõ Ðîññèè. Ñ êîíöà 1991 ã., êîãäà ñèòóàöèÿ â Àáõàçèè áûëà êðàéíå íàïðÿæåííîé, âìåñòå ñ áðàòîì Àñëàíîì ñòàë ñëóæèòü â Àáõàçñêîé ãâàðäèè. Ïî õàðàêòåðó áûë íåçàâèñèìûé, ðåøèòåëüíûé, öåëåóñòðåìëåííûé. 170

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Ñ ïåðâûõ ìèíóò âîéíû 14 àâãóñòà 1992 ã. îêàçàëñÿ â ñàìîé ãóùå ñîáûòèé – íà Îõóðåéñêîì ïîñòó (áëèç ã. Î÷àì÷èðà). Ïðèíÿë ïåðâûé áîé è ñîõðàíèë ÁÐÄÌ, ïðèñòðîèâøèñü ê õâîñòó ãðóçèíñêîé êîëîííû, âêëþ÷àâøåé äî ñîòíè åäèíèö áðîíåòåõíèêè. Óëó÷èâ ìîìåíò, ñâåðíóë â ñòîðîíó ã. Òêâàð÷àë.  ñ. Äæãåðäà (Î÷àì÷èðñêèé ðàéîí) ñîçäàë ãðóïïó ïî ðåìîíòó áðîíåòåõíèêè. Îòëè÷èëñÿ â áîÿõ çà Àíóàðõó, îñâîáîæäàë ñåëà Ëàáðà, Êî÷àðà è äð. Ïîñëå ãèáåëè áðàòà Àñëàíà åìó áûëî ïðåäëîæåíî ñòàòü êîìàíäóþùèì Âîñòî÷íûì ôðîíòîì, îäíàêî îí ïðåäëîæèë âìåñòî ñåáÿ Ì. Êèøìàðèÿ, à ñàì ñòàë çàìåñòèòåëåì êîìàíäóþùåãî ïî òåõíèêå. 2 èþëÿ 1993 ã. ñûãðàë îãðîìíóþ ðîëü â îáåñïå÷åíèè âûñàäêè ìîðñêîãî äåñàíòà (èç Ãóäàóò) â ñ. Òàìûø. Äîñòîéíûé ñàìûõ âûñøèõ íàãðàä çà áåñïðèìåðíóþ äîáëåñòü, îí áûë ïðåäàòåëüñêè óáèò 10 èþëÿ 1993 ã. èç çàñàäû íà òåððèòîðèè, ïîäêîíòðîëüíîé àáõàçñêèì ïàðòèçàíàì. Âìåñòå ñ íèì ïîãèáëè åãî áîåâûå äðóçüÿ À. Êàìêèÿ, Ð. Êîðòàà, Ò. Ïèëèà, Á. Ïàïáà. Êàê è åãî áðàò, îêàçàëñÿ îäíîé èç ñàìûõ òðàãè÷íûõ ôèãóð ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíû. Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. ÇÀÍÒÀÐÈß Âëàäèìèð Êîíñòàíòèíîâè÷, âèöå-ïðåìüåð Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ, ëèòåðàòîð, äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà ÐÀ (1991–1996). Ðîäèëñÿ 27 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1953 ã. â ñ. Òàìûø Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Îêîí÷èë ñðåäíþþ øêîëó.  1971–1975 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ íà ôèëîëîãè÷åñêîì ôàêóëüòåòå Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà.  1976– 1999 ãã. – êîððåñïîíäåíò íàöèîíàëüíîé ãàçåòû Àïñíû, àáõàçñêîãî ðàäèî, ãëàâíûé ðåäàêòîð àáõàçñêîãî òåëåâèäåíèÿ, ïðåäñåäàòåëü Àáõàçñêîé ãîñòåëåðàäèîêîìïàíèè, ñåêðåòàðü ïðàâëåíèÿ Ñîþçà ïèñàòåëåé Àáõàçèè, äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà (1991–1996), ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ôîíäà êóëüòóðû Àáõàçèè. Ñ 1999 ïî 2001 ã. – ìèíèñòð êóëüòóðû. ×ëåí Ñîþçà ïèñàòåëåé è Ñîþçà æóðíàëèñòîâ Àáõàçèè, ïîýò, ïåðåâîä÷èê, àâòîð ðÿäà êðèòè÷åñêèõ ñòàòåé ïî ïðîáëåìàì ñîâðåìåííîé àáõàçñêîé ëèòåðàòóðû. Ñ 2001 ã. – âèöå-ïðåìüåð Àáõàçèè. Ïåðåâåë íà àáõàçñêèé ÿçûê ðÿä äîêóìåíòîâ (êîíâåíöèé) ïî ïðàâàì ÷åëîâåêà. Àâòîð ìíîãèõ òåëåâèçèîííûõ ïåðåäà÷ è äîêóìåíòàëüíûõ ôèëüìîâ.  1994 ã. – ó÷àñòíèê êðóèçà ïèñàòåëåé ìèðà ïî ñòðàíàì ×åðíîãî, Ýãåéñêîãî è Ñðåäèçåìíîãî ìîðåé íà ãðå÷åñêîì òåïëîõîäå «Ðåíåññàíñ».  2000 ã. – ðóêîâîäèòåëü àáõàçñêîé äåëåãàöèè íà IV Ìåæäóíàðîäíîì òåàòðàëüíîì ôåñòèâàëå â ã. Ïëîâäèâå (Áîëãàðèÿ). Æåíàò, òðîå äåòåé. ÇÀÐÀÍÄÈß Èâàí (Âàæà) Èëëàðèîíîâè÷, ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Àáõàçèè (1992–1993). Ðîäèëñÿ 1 íîÿáðÿ 1932 ã. â ñ. Îêóì Ãàëüñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Ãðóçèí. Ïî îêîí÷àíèè îêóìñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëû, â 1951–1954 ãã. ðàáîòàë â êîëõîçå èì. Ëåíèíà ñ. Îêóì.  1955–1960 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ íà èñòîðèêî-ôèëîëîãè÷åñêîì 171

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

ôàêóëüòåòå Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà.  ñåíòÿáðå 1960 – ìàðòå 1961 ã. – ïðåïîäàâàòåëü èñòîðèè îêóìñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëû.  ìàðòå 1961 – ÿíâàðå 1965 ã. – ñåêðåòàðü êîìèòåòà êîìñîìîëà Ãðóçèíñêîãî èíñòèòóòà ñóáòðîïè÷åñêîãî õîçÿéñòâà (ÃÈÑÕ) â ã. Ñóõóìå.  ÿíâàðå 1965 – íîÿáðå 1967 ã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü îáúåäèíåííîãî ïðîôñîþçíîãî êîìèòåòà ÃÈÑÕà.  íîÿáðå 1967 – àâãóñòå 1971 ã. – èíñòðóêòîð Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè.  1971–1974 ãã. – çàâåäóþùèé îòäåëîì Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè.  ÿíâàðå – íîÿáðå 1974 ã. – çàâåäóþùèé îòäåëîì ñåëüñêîãî õîçÿéñòâà Àáõàçñêîãî ãîðêîìà ïàðòèè.  ÿíâàðå – íîÿáðå 1974 ã. ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ñóõóìñêîãî ðàéîííîãî èñïîëíèòåëüíîãî êîìèòåòà.  íîÿáðå 1974 – äåêàáðå 1991 ã. – íà÷àëüíèê Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé çàãîòîâèòåëüíîé èíñïåêöèè Ìèíèñòåðñòâà çàãîòîâîê ÑÑÑÐ ïî Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ. Ñ 5 ìàÿ 1992 ã. ïî 12 äåêàáðÿ 1993 ã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Àáõàçèè. Ñ äåêàáðÿ 1993 ã. ïî àïðåëü 1994 ã. – ãëàâà àäìèíèñòðàöèè Ãàëüñêîãî ðàéîíà. Ñ àïðåëÿ 1994 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ áåçðàáîòíûé. Çàñëóæåííûé ðàáîòíèê ñåëüñêîãî õîçÿéñòâà Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ. Íàãðàæäåí ñîâåòñêèì îðäåíîì «Çíàê Ïî÷åòà» è ìåäàëÿìè. Æåíàò, òðîå äåòåé. ÈÑÊÀÍÄÅÐ Ôàçèëü Àáäóëîâè÷, âûäàþùèéñÿ ðóññêèé ïèñàòåëü. Ðîäèëñÿ 6 ìàðòà 1929 ã. â ã. Ñóõóìå (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Îòåö, èðàíåö ïî ïðîèñõîæäåíèþ, â 1938 ã. áûë âûñëàí èç ÑÑÑÐ, ìàëü÷èê ðîñ ó ðîäñòâåííèêîâ ïî ìàòåðèíñêîé (àáõàçñêîé) ëèíèè. Ïîñòóïèë â Ìîñêîâñêèé áèáëèîòå÷íûé èíñòèòóò, â 1951 ã. ïåðåâåëñÿ â Ëèòåðàòóðíûé èíñòèòóò èì. À.Ì. Ãîðüêîãî (îêîí÷èë â 1954 ã.). 1952 ã. – ïåðâûå ïóáëèêàöèè, ïèøåò ñòèõè. 1954–1956 ãã. – ðàáîòàåò æóðíàëèñòîì â Áðÿíñêå è Êóðñêå. Ñ 1956 ã. äî íà÷àëà 1960-õ ãã. æèë â Ñóõóìè, ðàáîòàë â Àáõàçñêîì ãîñóäàðñòâåííîì èçäàòåëüñòâå, âûïóñòèë êíèãè ñòèõîâ «Ãîðíûå âåðøèíû» (1957), «Äîáðîòà çåìëè» (1959), «Çåëåíûé äîæäü» (1960), «Äåòè ×åðíîìîðüÿ» (1961), «Ìîëîäîñòü ìîðÿ» (1964). Ñ êîíöà 1950-õ ãã. ïå÷àòàåòñÿ â æóðíàëàõ Þíîñòü, Íåäåëÿ, Íîâûé ìèð. Ìãíîâåííóþ è ãðîìêóþ èçâåñòíîñòü ïðèíåñëà ïîëíàÿ þìîðà è ãðîòåñêà ïîâåñòü «Ñîçâåçäèå Êîçëîòóðà» (1966). 1966–1989 ãã. – ïóáëèêàöèÿ ðîìàíà «Ñàíäðî èç ×åãåìà», ñîñòîÿùåãî èç öèêëà íîâåëë. 1979 ã. – â çàïðåùåííîì ñîâåòñêèìè âëàñòÿìè àëüìàíàõå Ìåòðîïîëü íàïå÷àòàí ñàòèðè÷åñêèé ðàññêàç «Ìàëåíüêèé ãèãàíò áîëüøîãî ñåêñà». 1982 ã. – â æóðíàëå Þíîñòü âûøëî ïðîèçâåäåíèå ïèñàòåëÿ «Êðîëèêè è óäàâû», èìåâøåå íåîáûêíîâåííûé óñïåõ. 1983 ã. – êíèãà äåòñêèõ ðàññêàçîâ «Çàùèòà ×èêà». 1987 ã. – êíèãà ñòèõîâ «Ïóòü». 1991 ã. – êíèãà ïóáëèöèñòèêè «Ïîýòû è öàðè». 172

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

1989 ã. – çà ðîìàí «Ñàíäðî èç ×åãåìà» ïðèñóæäåíà Ãîñóäàðñòâåííàÿ ïðåìèÿ ÑÑÑÐ. Ïèñàòåëü óäîñòîåí Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé ïðåìèè Ðîññèéñêîé Ôåäåðàöèè (1993), ïðåìèè Ìàëàïàðòå (Èòàëèÿ), Ïóøêèíñêîé ïðåìèè (Ãåðìàíèÿ), ïðåìèè íåçàâèñèìîãî áëàãîòâîðèòåëüíîãî ôîíäà «Òðèóìô», îáùåñòâåííîé ïðåìèè «Çà ìóæåñòâî â ëèòåðàòóðå». Î ñåáå ãîâîðèò: «Ðóññêèé ïèñàòåëü, ïåâåö Àáõàçèè».  íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ æèâåò è ðàáîòàåò â Ìîñêâå, ÷àñòî ïîñåùàåò ðîäíóþ Àáõàçèþ. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. Ñì.: Ðóññêèå ïèñàòåëè è ïîýòû. Êðàòêèé áèîãðàôè÷åñêèé ñëîâàðü. Ì., 2000. ÊÀÊÀËÈß Âèêòîð Øàëèêîâè÷, ïîëêîâíèê, êîìàíäóþùèé Âîîðóæåííûìè ñèëàìè Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1992). Ðîäèëñÿ 6 îêòÿáðÿ 1949 ã. â ñåìüå âîåííîñëóæàùåãî â ñ. Ãðîäåêîâî Ïîãðàíè÷íîãî ðàéîíà Ïðèìîðñêîãî êðàÿ (Ðîññèÿ). Àáõàç.  1966 ã. îêîí÷èë ñðåäíþþ øêîëó â ã. ×àðäæîó â Òóðêìåíèè. 1966–1970 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ è ñ îòëè÷èåì îêîí÷èë Õàðüêîâñêîå ãâàðäåéñêîå âûñøåå òàíêîâîå êîìàíäíîå ó÷èëèùå. 1970–1981 ãã. – êîìàíäèð òàíêîâîãî âçâîäà, ðîòû, áàòàëüîíà â Ïðèêàðïàòñêîì âîåííîì îêðóãå, Ãåðìàíèè, Ìîñêîâñêîì âîåííîì îêðóãå. 1981–1982 ãã. – â äîëæíîñòè êîìàíäèðà òàíêîâîãî áàòàëüîíà íàïðàâëåí â Àôãàíèñòàí, ïðèíèìàë ó÷àñòèå â áîåâûõ äåéñòâèÿõ, ñïåöèàëüíûõ ðåéäàõ; ðóêîâîäèë ñâîäíûì îòðÿäîì (òàíêîâàÿ, ìîòîñòðåëêîâàÿ, ðàçâåäûâàòåëüíàÿ ðîòû, àðòèëëåðèéñêàÿ áàòàðåÿ, çåíèòíûé âçâîä) â Ïàíäæåðñêîé îïåðàöèè.  ìàå 1982 ã. òÿæåëî ðàíåí â ðàéîíå ïåðåâàëà Ñàëàíã. 1983–1986 ãã. – ó÷èëñÿ â Âîåííîé àêàäåìèè áðîíåòàíêîâûõ âîéñê; îêîí÷èë ñ çîëîòîé ìåäàëüþ. 1986–1989 ãã. – ñëóæèë â îïåðàòèâíîì óïðàâëåíèè øòàáà Çàêàâêàçñêîãî âîåííîãî îêðóãà (Òáèëèñè). Îêòÿáðü 1989 – ñåíòÿáðü 1991 ã. – â øòàáå Öåíòðàëüíîé ãðóïïû âîéñê (×åõîñëîâàêèÿ). Ïîñëå âûâîäà âîéñê èç ×åõîñëîâàêèè, íàïðàâëåí â Òâåðü, â Âîåííóþ àêàäåìèþ ÏÂÎ ñòàðøèì ïðåïîäàâàòåëåì êàôåäðû îïåðàòèâíîãî èñêóññòâà è òàêòèêè Ñóõîïóòíûõ âîéñê.  ôåâðàëå 1992 ã. ïî ïðèãëàøåíèþ Ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Â. Àðäçèíáà ïðèáûë â Àáõàçèþ è çàíÿëñÿ ñîçäàíèåì ïîëêà âíóòðåííèõ âîéñê («Àáõàçñêîé ãâàðäèè»), à íà åãî áàçå Âîîðóæåííûõ ñèë Àáõàçèè. 24 èþíÿ 1992 ã. ïîäãîòîâèë è îñóùåñòâèë ñ íåáîëüøîé ãðóïïîé îïåðàöèþ ïî çàõâàòó çäàíèÿ ÌÂÄ Àáõàçèè â Ñóõóìå è âûäâîðåíèþ ìèíèñòðà Ã. Ëîìèíàäçå, îòêàçàâøåãîñÿ ïîä÷èíèòüñÿ ðåøåíèþ ïàðëàìåíòà.  ýòîò ïåðèîä çàíèìàë äîëæíîñòü ïîìîùíèêà Ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçèè ïî êîîðäèíàöèè äåÿòåëüíîñòè âîèíñêèõ ÷àñòåé. 14 àâãóñòà 1992 ã. âñòðåòèë âîéíó íà Êîäîðñêîì ìîñòó, óøåë â Òêâàð÷åëè. 19 àâãóñòà âûøåë ÷åðåç ãîðû ê ñâîèì, â Ñóõóì, è ïðèíÿë êîìàíäîâàíèå îáîðîíîé. 21 àâãóñòà îðãàíèçîâàë ðåéäû äâóõ îòðÿäîâ â òûë ïðîòèâíèêà â 173

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ðàéîíå âîêçàëà è ó÷õîçà. Ïðèíèìàë ó÷àñòèå â îòðàæåíèè ãðóçèíñêîãî íàñòóïëåíèÿ â Ýøåðàõ â êîíöå àâãóñòà 1992 ã.  êîíöå ñåíòÿáðÿ íàçíà÷åí êîìåíäàíòîì Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîíà. Îáåñïå÷èâàë àðìèþ îðóæèåì è áîåïðèïàñàìè.  ÿíâàðå è ìàðòå 1993 ã. – ó÷àñòíèê íàñòóïàòåëüíûõ îïåðàöèé íà Ñóõóì. Ïîñëå âîéíû âûåõàë â Òâåðü. 1994–2004 ãã. – âèöå-ïðåçèäåíò Òâåðñêîãî ãîðîäñêîãî áàíêà. Ïîëêîâíèê. Íàãðàæäåí îðäåíîì Êðàñíîé Çâåçäû. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ÊÀÏÁÀ Ýíâåð Ýðàñòîâè÷, äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1991–1996), 1-é ñåêðåòàðü ÖÊ Êîìïàðòèè Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 20 îêòÿáðÿ 1936 ã. â ã. Ãàãðà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1955 ã. îêîí÷èë ãàãðñêóþ ðóññêóþ øêîëó.  1956–1962 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ íà ôèçèêî-ìàòåìàòè÷åñêîì ôàêóëüòåòå Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà, à çàòåì íà ñòðîèòåëüíîì ôàêóëüòåòå Ãðóçèíñêîãî ïîëèòåõíè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà (Òáèëèñè).  1962–1967 ãã. ðàáîòàë â ðàçëè÷íûõ ñòðîèòåëüíûõ îðãàíèçàöèÿõ Àáõàçèè, â ã. Ãàãðà, ïðîøåë ïóòü îò ìàñòåðà äî íà÷àëüíèêà ñòðîèòåëüíîãî óïðàâëåíèÿ.  1967–1970 ãã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ãàãðñêîãî ãîðîäñêîãî Ñîâåòà (ìýð ã. Ãàãðà).  1970 – àïðåëå 1975 ã. – äèðåêòîð Îáúåäèíåíèÿ ïàíñèîíàòîâ êóðîðòà Ïèöóíäà (Àáõàçèÿ). Ñ àïðåëÿ 1975 ïî 1980 ã. – ñåêðåòàðü Ñîâåòà ïðîôñîþçîâ Ãðóçèè (Òáèëèñè).  1980–1986 ãã. – 1-é ñåêðåòàðü Ãàãðñêîãî ãîðêîìà ïàðòèè. Ñ ãðóïïîé ýíòóçèàñòîâ ïðîâåë çíà÷èòåëüíóþ ðàáîòó ïî èñïðàâëåíèþ äîïóùåííûõ â 1930–50-å ãã. èñêàæåíèé â àáõàçñêîé òîïîíèìèêå, ÷òî è ïîñëóæèëî ïîâîäîì ê ñðî÷íîìó ïåðåâîäó â Òáèëèñè. Ñ ìàðòà 1987 ïî 1990 ã. – çàâåäóþùèé îòäåëîì òîðãîâëè è áûòîâîãî îáñëóæèâàíèÿ ÖÊ ÊÏ Ãðóçèè, à çàòåì (ñ 1988 ã.) çàâåäóþùèé ñîöèàëüíî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêèì îòäåëîì ÖÊ ÊÏ Ãðóçèè (Òáèëèñè).  1990 ã. ðåøåíèåì Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçèè íàçíà÷åí çàìåñòèòåëåì ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Àáõàçèè. Ñ 17 ìàðòà 1991 ã. âîçãëàâëÿë â Àáõàçèè ðàáîòó ïî ðåôåðåíäóìó î ñîõðàíåíèè ÑÑÑÐ, â êîòîðîì Ãðóçèÿ íå ïðèíèìàëà ó÷àñòèÿ. Íàñåëåíèå Àáõàçèè (75% îò 500 òûñ. ÷åë.) â ñâîåì àáñîëþòíîì áîëüøèíñòâå (98%) ïðîãîëîñîâàëî çà ñîõðàíåíèå ÑÑÑÐ.  1991 ã. âîçãëàâèë Ãîñóäàðñòâåííóþ êîìèññèþ ïî óòâåðæäåíèþ ôëàãà, ãèìíà, ãåðáà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1991–1996 ãã. – äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. 14 àâãóñòà 1992 ã., ñ íà÷àëîì ãðóçèíîàáõàçñêîé âîéíû, áóäó÷è äåïóòàòîì, íàõîäèëñÿ â Ãàãðå. Ïîñëå îñâîáîæäåíèÿ Ãàãðû âíîâü íàçíà÷åí çàìåñòèòåëåì ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Àáõàçèè. Ñ 1995 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – óïîëíîìî÷åííûé àññîöèàöèè «Ñåâåðíûé Êàâêàç è Þã Ðîññèè», â êîòîðîé Àáõàçèÿ ñîñòîèò êàê àññîöèèðîâàííûé ÷ëåí. Ñ èþíÿ 1997 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – 1-é ñåêðåòàðü ÖÊ Êîìïàðòèè 174

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Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Îäíîâðåìåííî, ñ 20 èþíÿ 2000 ã., – íà÷àëüíèê âîåííîãî ñàíàòîðèÿ «Ãàãðà» 12-ãî Ãëàâíîãî óïðàâëåíèÿ Ìèíèñòåðñòâà îáîðîíû Ðîññèéñêîé Ôåäåðàöèè. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ÊÂÀÐ×ÅËÈß Ëèàíà Âëàäèìèðîâíà, ïåðåâîä÷èê, ïðåäñòàâèòåëüíèöà íåïðàâèòåëüñòâåííûõ îðãàíèçàöèé Àáõàçèè (ÍÏÎ). Ðîäèëàñü 2 äåêàáðÿ 1959 ã. â ã. Ñóõóìå (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàçêà.  1976 ã. îêîí÷èëà ñóõóìñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹10 èì. Í. Ëàêîáà.  1976–1982 ãã. – ñòóäåíòêà Ïÿòèãîðñêîãî èíñòèòóòà èíîñòðàííûõ ÿçûêîâ; àíãëèéñêîå îòäåëåíèå. Àñïèðàíòêà èíñòèòóòà èíîñòðàííûõ ÿçûêîâ èì. Ìîðèñà Òîðåçà â Ìîñêâå.  1986 ã. çàùèòèëà êàíäèäàòñêóþ äèññåðòàöèþ íà òåìó «Ñåìàíòè÷åñêàÿ ñòðóêòóðà ÷àñòîòíûõ ñóùåñòâèòåëüíûõ àíãëèéñêîãî ÿçûêà».  1986–1989 ãã. – ïðåïîäàâàòåëü êàôåäðû àíãëèéñêîãî ÿçûêà Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà (ÀÃÓ).  1989–1992 ãã. – çàâåäóþùàÿ êàôåäðîé àíãëèéñêîãî ÿçûêà ÀÃÓ.  1992–1993 ãã. – ñîòðóäíèê ïðåññ-ñëóæáû ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Àáõàçèè â Ìîñêâå.  1993–1996 ãã. ðàáîòàëà ïåðåâîä÷èêîì â ÌÈÄ Àáõàçèè è àäìèíèñòðàöèè ïðåçèäåíòà Àáõàçèè. Ó÷àñòâîâàëà â ïåðåãîâîðàõ ïîä ýãèäîé ÎÎÍ â Æåíåâå è Íüþ-Éîðêå. Ñ 1994 ã. – âîëîíòåð àáõàçñêîé íåïðàâèòåëüñòâåííîé îðãàíèçàöèè (ÍÏÎ) «Öåíòð ãóìàíèòàðíûõ ïðîãðàìì». Ñ 1997 ã. – êîîðäèíàòîð ïðîãðàììû «Äîáðîâîëüöû ÎÎÍ â Àáõàçèè».  íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ìåæäóíàðîäíûé ñòàæåð â áðèòàíñêîé íåïðàâèòåëüñòâåííîé îðãàíèçàöèè «Responding to Conflict», ïîëèòîëîã. ÊÅÖÁÀ Òàìàç Èâàíîâè÷, ñîïðåäñåäàòåëü îáùåñòâåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî äâèæåíèÿ Àáõàçèè «Âîçðîæäåíèå», äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè (1996–2001). Ðîäèëñÿ 2 ôåâðàëÿ 1962 ã. â ã. Ñóõóìå (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1968–1978 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â ñóõóìñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå ¹14.  1983 ã. îêîí÷èë þðèäè÷åñêèé ôàêóëüòåò Ëåíèíãðàäñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà.  1983–1991 ãã. ðàáîòàë â êîìñîìîëüñêèõ îðãàíèçàöèÿõ Àáõàçèè: èíñòðóêòîðîì, 2-ì ñåêðåòàðåì Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîðêîìà.  1991 – àâãóñòå 1992 ã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ñîþçà ìîëîäåæè Àáõàçèè.  ïåðèîä ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíû ïðèíèìàë ó÷àñòèå â áîåâûõ äåéñòâèÿõ: íà÷àëüíèê øòàáà Íîâîàôîíñêîé ðåçåðâíîé áðèãàäû, êîìàíäèð îòäåëüíîé ñòðåëêîâîé ðîòû Ãóìèñòèíñêîãî îáîðîíèòåëüíîãî ðóáåæà, ó÷àñòíèê Òàìûøñêîãî äåñàíòà.  1994 – íîÿáðå 1996 ã. – àäâîêàò Ñóõóìñêîé ãîðîäñêîé þðèäè÷åñêîé êîíñóëüòàöèè.  1996–2001 ãã. – äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè. Ñîïðåäñåäàòåëü Ôîíäà «Ãðàæäàíñêàÿ èíèöèàòèâà è ÷åëîâåê áóäóùåãî». Ñ 2000 ã. – ñîïðåäñåäàòåëü îáùåñòâåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî äâèæåíèÿ Àáõàçèè «Âîçðîæäåíèå». Íàãðàæäåí Îðäåíîì Ëåîíà. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. 175

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ÊÈØÌÀÐÈß Ìåðàá Áîðèñîâè÷, âîåííûé êîìèññàð Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ, ãåíåðàë-ëåéòåíàíò, Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 3 àâãóñòà 1961 ã. â ã. Î÷àì÷èðà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1978 ã. îêîí÷èë î÷àì÷èðñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó è ïîñòóïèë â òêâàð÷åëüñêîå ïðîôåññèîíàëüíî-òåõíè÷åñêîå ó÷èëèùå ¹22. 20 îêòÿáðÿ 1978 ã. ïðèçâàí â ðÿäû Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè. Ñëóæáó ïðîõîäèë â ã. ×àðäæîó (Òóðêìåíèÿ).  1980–1984 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â Àëìà-Àòèíñêîì îáùåâîéñêîâîì êîìàíäíîì ó÷èëèùå èì. Ìàðøàëà Ñîâåòñêîãî Ñîþçà È.Ñ. Êîíåâà. Ïîëó÷èë äèïëîì èíæåíåðà è çâàíèå ëåéòåíàíòà. Ñ 5 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1984 ïî 13 ìàÿ 1986 ã. – êîìàíäèð ìîòîñòðåëêîâîãî âçâîäà 162-ãî ìîòîñòðåëêîâîãî ïîëêà 58-é ìîòîñòðåëêîâîé äèâèçèè 36-ãî àðìåéñêîãî êîðïóñà â Êèçèë-àðâàòå (Òóðêìåíèÿ). Ñ 13 ìàÿ 1986 ïî 16 ôåâðàëÿ 1989 ã. íàõîäèëñÿ â Àôãàíèñòàíå â êà÷åñòâå êîìàíäèðà ìîòîñòðåëêîâîé ðîòû, êîìàíäèðà êîìåíäàíòñêîé ðîòû è çàìåñòèòåëÿ êîìàíäèðà ìîòîñòðåëêîâîãî áàòàëüîíà 371-ãî ãâàðäåéñêîãî ìîòîñòðåëêîâîãî ïîëêà 5-é ãâàðäåéñêîé ìîòîñòðåëêîâîé äèâèçèè 40-é îáùåâîéñêîâîé àðìèè. 8 àâãóñòà 1986 ã. ïðèñâîåíî çâàíèå ñòàðøåãî ëåéòåíàíòà, 9 èþíÿ 1988 ã. – êàïèòàíà (äîñðî÷íî). Ïðèíèìàë àêòèâíîå ó÷àñòèå â 16 áîåâûõ îïåðàöèÿõ â Êàíäàãàðå, Ãåðàòå, Äæåëàëàáàäå, Ïàíøåðå è äð. Íàãðàæäåí ñîâåòñêèì îðäåíîì Êðàñíîé Çâåçäû (26 èþëÿ 1988 ã.) è àôãàíñêèì îðäåíîì Çâåçäû 2-é ñòåïåíè (6 ìàðòà 1988 ã.) ëè÷íî ïðåçèäåíòîì Äåìîêðàòè÷åñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè Àôãàíèñòàí Íàäæèáóëëîé.  àïðåëå 1988 ã. ïîäîðâàëñÿ íà ìèíå â Ïîëèõóìðè (îêîëî Êàíäàãàðà) è, áóäó÷è ðàíåííûì, áûë âòîðè÷íî òÿæåëî ðàíåí ñíàéïåðîì. Ëå÷èëñÿ â òàøêåíòñêîì ãîñïèòàëå. Ñ 16 ôåâðàëÿ 1989 ã. âåðíóëñÿ â ñòðîé, ñëóæèë â 40-é àðìèè â ã. Êóøêå (Òóðêìåíèÿ), íà ãðàíèöå ñ Àôãàíèñòàíîì. 21 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1989 ã. íàïðàâëåí â ðàñïîðÿæåíèå Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî âîåííîãî êîìèññàðà Àáõàçèè. Ñ ìàðòà 1990 ã. ïî 14 àâãóñòà 1992 ã. ðàáîòàë ñòàðøèì èíñïåêòîðîì Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîííîãî îòäåëà âíóòðåííèõ äåë.  ïåðâûé æå äåíü âòîðæåíèÿ ãðóçèíñêèõ âîéñê â Àáõàçèþ (14 àâãóñòà 1992 ã.) âñòóïèë â áîé â ñ. Àðàäó Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîíà è äîáûë ïåðâûå àâòîìàòû. 17 àâãóñòà 1992 ã. â äðåâíåàáõàçñêîì Ìîêâñêîì ìîíàñòûðå ñîáðàëîñü äî 300 ÷åëîâåê; èçáðàí êîìàíäèðîì ïàðòèçàíñêîãî îòðÿäà.  íîÿáðå 1992 ã. íàçíà÷åí íà÷àëüíèêîì Øòàáà ïàðòèçàíñêîãî äâèæåíèÿ Âîñòî÷íîãî íàïðàâëåíèÿ (Òêâàð÷àë – Î÷àì÷èðà – Ãàë). Ñ äåêàáðÿ 1992 ã. – êîìàíäóþùèé Âîñòî÷íûì ôðîíòîì. Îñóùåñòâèë öåëûé ðÿä óñïåøíûõ áîåâûõ îïåðàöèé ïðîòèâ ãðóçèíñêèõ âîéñê.  ñåíòÿáðå 1993 ã. ñîåäèíèëñÿ ñ ÷àñòÿìè Çàïàäíîãî ôðîíòà è ñîâìåñòíî ñ íèìè îáðàòèë â áåãñòâî ãðóçèíñêóþ àðìèþ. 30 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1993 ã. âûøåë ê ð. Èíãóð è îñòàíîâèëñÿ íà ãðàíèöå ìåæäó Àáõàçèåé è Ãðóçèåé.  íà÷àëå îêòÿáðÿ 1993 ã. ïî ïðèêàçó êîìàíäîâàíèÿ è ïî ëè÷íîé ïðîñüáå ïðåçèäåíòà Ãðóçèè Ç. Ãàìñàõóðäèà â ñîñòàâå îäíîãî àáõàçñêîãî áàòàëüîíà, íåñêîëüêèõ åäèíèö áðîíåòåõíèêè è àðòèëëåðèè ïåðåøåë ïîãðàíè÷íóþ ð. Èíãóð, ðàçáèë âîéñêà Øåâàðäíàäçå è âçÿë ã. Õîáè â Ìåãðåëèè, ïîñëå ÷åãî âåðíóëñÿ â Àáõàçèþ. 176

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 ñåðåäèíå íîÿáðÿ Ç. Ãàìñàõóðäèà âíîâü îáðàòèëñÿ çà ïîìîùüþ ê ðóêîâîäèòåëÿì Àáõàçèè â áîðüáå ñ ðåæèìîì Ý. Øåâàðäíàäçå. Àáõàçñêèé áàòàëüîí âíîâü îòòåñíèë ãðóçèíñêèå âîéñêà è äîøåë äî ã. Ñåíàêè (Ìåãðåëèÿ). Ñ äåêàáðÿ 1993 ã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà îáîðîíû Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ñ îêòÿáðÿ 1994 ã. – 1-é çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà îáîðîíû. Ñ 20 èþíÿ 1996 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – âîåííûé êîìèññàð Àáõàçèè. 28 äåêàáðÿ 1993 ã. ïðèñâîåíî çâàíèå ãåíåðàë-ìàéîð.  èþíå 1998 ã. çà óñïåøíî ïðîâåäåííóþ â ìàå 1998 ã. Ãàëüñêóþ îïåðàöèþ («øåñòèäíåâíàÿ âîéíà» ñ Ãðóçèåé) óäîñòîåí çâàíèÿ ãåíåðàë-ëåéòåíàíò. Ñîïðåäñåäàòåëü ñàìîãî âëèÿòåëüíîãî îáùåñòâåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî äâèæåíèÿ âåòåðàíîâ âîéíû «Àìöàõàðà». Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Æåíàò, èìååò ÷åòûðåõ ñûíîâåé è äâóõ äî÷åðåé. ÊÎÁÀÕÈß Àñëàí Àëåêñååâè÷, ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî òàìîæåííîãî êîìèòåòà, Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 23 ìàðòà 1960 ã. â ñ. Ëûõíû Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1977 ã. îêîí÷èë ñðåäíþþ øêîëó.  1978–1980 ãã. ñëóæèë â Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè.  1981–1985 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ íà ýêîíîìè÷åñêîì ôàêóëüòåòå Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà.  1982–1992 ãã. ðàáîòàë â ñèñòåìå àáõàçñêîãî Ñîâåòà ïî òóðèçìó è ýêñêóðñèÿì íà ðàçíûõ äîëæíîñòÿõ. Ñ 14 àâãóñòà 1992 ã. ïðèíèìàë àêòèâíîå ó÷àñòèå â áîåâûõ äåéñòâèÿõ ïðîòèâ ãðóçèíñêèõ îêêóïàíòîâ â äîëæíîñòè êîìàíäóþùåãî àðòèëëåðèåé Ãóìèñòèíñêîãî ôðîíòà.  íîÿáðå 1993 ã. íàçíà÷åí êîìàíäóþùèì àðòèëëåðèåé ìèíèñòåðñòâà îáîðîíû Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ñ 10 ôåâðàëÿ 1994 ã. – çàìåñòèòåëåì Ìèíèñòðà îáîðîíû Àáõàçèè. 17 îêòÿáðÿ 1994 – 30 ÿíâàðÿ 1995 ã. – çàìåñòèòåëü íà÷àëüíèêà Óïðàâëåíèÿ íàëîãîâîé ïîëèöèè Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. 30 ÿíâàðÿ 1995 – 20 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1995 ã. – íà÷àëüíèê Óïðàâëåíèÿ âíóòðåííèõ äåë ã. Ñóõóì. 20 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1995 ã. íàçíà÷åí ïðåäñåäàòåëåì Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî òàìîæåííîãî êîìèòåòà Àáõàçèè. ßâëÿåòñÿ ïðåäñåäàòåëåì Îáùåñòâåííîãî ôîíäà «Êèàðàç». Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Ãåíåðàë-ìàéîð òàìîæåííîé ñëóæáû. Æåíàò, èìååò òðîèõ äåòåé. ÊÎËÁÀß (ÊÀËÃÛ) Ãåîðãèé Íèêîëàåâè÷, ñîâåòíèê Êîìèòåòà Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé äóìû ÐÔ ïî áåçîïàñíîñòè. Ðîäèëñÿ 7 ÿíâàðÿ 1940 ã. â ã. Ãóäàóòà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1958 ã. îêîí÷èë ãóäàóòñêóþ àáõàçñêóþ øêîëó.  1958–1962 ãã. – ñòóäåíò Õàðüêîâñêîãî þðèäè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà, êîòîðûé îêîí÷èë ñ îòëè÷èåì.  àâãóñòå – îêòÿáðå 1962 ã. ñëåäîâàòåëü ïðîêóðàòóðû Ñóõóìñêîãî ðàéîíà.  îêòÿáðå 1962 – èþëå 1963 ã. – ñëåäîâàòåëü ïðîêóðàòóðû ã. Ñóõóì.  èþëå 1963 – íîÿáðå 1967 ã. – ïîìîùíèê ïðîêóðîðà ã. Ñóõóì. Ñ 16 íîÿáðÿ 1967 ïî 177

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16 ôåâðàëÿ 1971 ã. – àñïèðàíò Èíñòèòóòà ãîñóäàðñòâà è ïðàâà Àêàäåìèè íàóê ÑÑÑÐ (Ìîñêâà).  1967 ã. ïðèíèìàë ó÷àñòèå â ìàññîâûõ âûñòóïëåíèÿõ â ã. Ñóõóì è ñ ýòîãî âðåìåíè ñ÷èòàëñÿ âëàñòÿìè «àáõàçñêèì íàöèîíàëèñòîì».  ìàå 1971 ã. çàùèòèë êàíäèäàòñêóþ äèññåðòàöèþ, âåðíóëñÿ â Àáõàçèþ, îòêàçàëñÿ îò äîëæíîñòè íà÷àëüíèêà ÎÁÕÑÑ (îòäåë ïî áîðüáå ñ ýêîíîìè÷åñêèìè ïðåñòóïëåíèÿìè) ÌÂÄ Àáõàçèè. Îêîëî ãîäà áûë áåç ðàáîòû.  àïðåëå 1972 – ìàðòå 1975 ã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ïðîêóðîðà ã. Ñóõóì.  ýòîò ïåðèîä ÊÃÁ Àáõàçèè ïðåäïðèíèìàåò ïîïûòêó äèñêðåäèòèðîâàòü åãî (ìàðò 1973 ã.), çàïîäîçðèâ â êîíòàêòàõ ñ èññëåäîâàòåëüíèöåé-ãåðîíòîëîãîì èç ÑØÀ ïðîôåññîðîì Ñóëîé Áåíåò, íàõîäèâøåéñÿ â Àáõàçèè (çàíèìàëàñü àáõàçñêèìè äîëãîæèòåëÿìè). Âñêîðå ïðåäñåäàòåëü ÊÃÁ Àáõàçèè Ãàëóñòîâ áûë âûíóæäåí ïðèíåñòè åìó ñâîè èçâèíåíèÿ.  ìàðòå – äåêàáðå 1975 ã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Íàðîäíîãî ñóäà ã. Ñóõóì.  äåêàáðå 1975 – 28 àïðåëÿ 1977 ã. – çàâåäóþùèé îòäåëîì àäìèíèñòðàòèâíûõ îðãàíîâ Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè. Âñòóïèë â áîðüáó ñ ïðèñëàííûì Ý. Øåâàðäíàäçå èç Òáèëèñè ìèíèñòðîì âíóòðåííèõ äåë Àáõàçèè Î. Êî÷ëàäçå, êîòîðûé âìåñòî îðãàíèçàöèè áîðüáû ñ ïðåñòóïíîñòüþ çàíèìàëñÿ îðãàíèçàöèåé óêðûâàòåëüñòâà ïðåñòóïëåíèé îò ó÷åòà, ÷òî ñîçäàâàëî îáñòàíîâêó ìíèìîãî áëàãîïîëó÷èÿ, ñóëèëî ÷èíû è íàãðàäû. Ðóêîâîäñòâî Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè íå ïîääåðæèâàëî ñâîåãî çàâåäóþùåãî îòäåëîì, è òîò ïîäàë â îòñòàâêó. Îñâîáîæäàëè íà àïðåëüñêîì 1977 ã. ïëåíóìå Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè, êîòîðûé ïðîâîäèë 1-é ñåêðåòàðü Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè Â. Õèíòáà è 2-é ñåêðåòàðü ÖÊ ÊÏ Ãðóçèè Ã. Êîëáèí.  àïðåëå 1977 – èþíå 1983 ã. – ãëàâíûé ãîñàðáèòð Ãîñàðáèòðàæà ïðè Ñîâåòå Ìèíèñòðîâ Àáõàçèè. Ñ 22 èþíÿ 1983 ïî 6 èþëÿ 1989 ã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Âåðõîâíîãî Ñóäà Ãðóçèíñêîé ÑÑÐ (Òáèëèñè). Ñ 6 èþëÿ 1989 ïî äåêàáðü 1991 ã. – ñóäüÿ Âåðõîâíîãî ñóäà ÑÑÑÐ (Ìîñêâà). Ïðåçèäèóìîì Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà ÑÑÑÐ ïðèñâîåí 1-é êâàëèôèêàöèîííûé êëàññ.  êîíöå 1991 ã. ïðåäëîæåíî ñòàòü Ïðîêóðîðîì Àáõàçèè, íî íàçíà÷åíèå íå ñîñòîÿëîñü. Ñ ÿíâàðÿ 1992 ã. – â Àáõàçèè. 14 àâãóñòà 1992 ã., â äåíü íà÷àëà âîéíû, ïðèøåë íà íåñîñòîÿâøååñÿ çàñåäàíèå Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçèè. 2 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1992 ã. âìåñòå ñ äåëåãàöèåé Àáõàçèè âûëåòåë â Ìîñêâó íà âñòðå÷ó ñ ðóêîâîäñòâîì Ðîññèè, Ãðóçèè, Ñåâåðîêàâêàçñêèõ ðåñïóáëèê.  äåêàáðå 1992 – 1993 ã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Âåðõîâíîãî ñóäà Àáõàçèè (ã. Ãóäàóòà) (èçáðàí Âåðõîâíûì Ñîâåòîì Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ). Ñ êîíöà 1993 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – êîíñóëüòàíò, ñîâåòíèê Êîìèòåòà Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé äóìû ïî áåçîïàñíîñòè (Ìîñêâà). Ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé ñîâåòíèê ÐÔ 3-ãî êëàññà (ïî ëèíèè ãîññëóæáû – ãåíåðàë-ìàéîð). Ñ 1983 ã. – çàñëóæåííûé þðèñò Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ. Ñ 11 èþëÿ 2000 ã. – çàñëóæåííûé þðèñò ÐÔ. Æåíàò, òðîå äåòåé. 178

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ÊÓÏÀËÁÀ Ãàððè Ñåðãååâè÷, ïðåäñåäàòåëü Öåíòðàëüíîé èçáèðàòåëüíîé êîìèññèè ÐÀ, çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà îáîðîíû Àáõàçèè, ïîëêîâíèê. Ðîäèëñÿ 17 àâãóñòà 1954 ã. â ã. Ãóäàóòà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Îêîí÷èë ñóõóìñêóþ øêîëó-èíòåðíàò ¹1.  1971–1976 ãã. – ñòóäåíò ôèçèêî-ìàòåìàòè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà.  1976–1980 ãã. ïðåïîäàâàë ôèçèêó â ñåëüñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîíà.  1978–1991 ãã. ðàáîòàë îòâåòñòâåííûì ñåêðåòàðåì Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîííîãî îòäåëåíèÿ îáùåñòâà «Çíàíèå», èíñòðóêòîðîì, çàìåñòèòåëåì çàâåäóþùåãî îòäåëîì ïðîïàãàíäû è àãèòàöèè, çàâåäóþùèì îáùèì îòäåëîì Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéêîìà ïàðòèè.  1991 – àâãóñòå 1992 ã. – äèðåêòîð Ãóäàóòñêîãî áþðî çàíÿòîñòè íàñåëåíèÿ.  ïåðèîä âîéíû 1992–1993 ãã. – çàìåñòèòåëü êîìàíäèðà ðîòû Ãàãðñêîãî áàòàëüîíà, íà÷àëüíèê îòäåëåíèÿ âîåííîé ðàçâåäêè è êîíòððàçâåäêè çîíû ã. Ãàãðà, 1-é çàìåñòèòåëü íà÷àëüíèêà Óïðàâëåíèÿ âîåííîé ðàçâåäêè, èñïîëíÿþùèé îáÿçàííîñòè íà÷àëüíèêà âîåííîé ðàçâåäêè Ìèíèñòåðñòâà îáîðîíû Àáõàçèè.  1993 – àïðåëå 1995 ã. – íà÷àëüíèê îòäåëåíèÿ âîåííîé ðàçâåäêè. Ñ àïðåëÿ 1995 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà îáîðîíû, ïîëêîâíèê. Íàãðàæäåí Îðäåíîì Ëåîíà.  1996 – ÿíâàðå 2000 ã. – ÷ëåí Öåíòðèçáèðêîìà. Ñ ÿíâàðÿ 2000 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ïðåäñåäàòåëü ÖÈÊ. Æåíàò, ÷åòâåðî äåòåé. Ê×À× Àëìàñáåé Èâàíîâè÷, ìèíèñòð âíóòðåííèõ äåë Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1996–2003), ñåêðåòàðü Ñîâåòà áåçîïàñíîñòè Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 19 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1958 ã. â ñ. Áàðìûø Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Èìååò âûñøåå þðèäè÷åñêîå îáðàçîâàíèå.  1978–1991 ãã. ðàáîòàë íà ðàçëè÷íûõ äîëæíîñòÿõ â ñèñòåìå ÌÂÄ, â 1991–1993 ãã. – â ñëóæáå îõðàíû âûñøèõ îðãàíîâ âëàñòè.  1993–1996 ãã. – íà÷àëüíèê ñëóæáû îõðàíû âûñøèõ îðãàíîâ âëàñòè.  1996–2003 ãã. – ìèíèñòð âíóòðåííèõ äåë Àáõàçèè. Ñ àïðåëÿ 2003 ã. – ñåêðåòàðü Ñîâåòà áåçîïàñíîñòè Àáõàçèè. Ãåíåðàë-ìàéîð. Æåíàò, èìååò ÷åòâåðûõ äåòåé. ËÀÁÀÕÓÀ Çóðàá Àêàêèåâè÷ (1938–2003), çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Ãðóçèíñêîé ÑÑÐ (1987–1990), çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Àáõàçèè (1990–1993). Ðîäèëñÿ 3 íîÿáðÿ 1938 ã. â ã. Ñóõóì (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Îêîí÷èë ñ çîëîòîé ìåäàëüþ ñóõóìñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹ 10 èì. Í. Ëàêîáà.  1963 ã. çàâåðøèë ó÷åáó â Ãðóçèíñêîì ïîëèòåõíè÷åñêîì èíñòèòóòå (Òáèëèñè); èíæåíåð-ñòðîèòåëü.  1963–1969 ãã. – èíæåíåð-êîíñòðóêòîð ïðîåêòíîãî èíñòèòóòà, ìàñòåð, ñòàðøèé ïðîðàá, ãëàâíûé èíæåíåð îáùåñòðîèòåëüíîãî òðåñòà ¹6 «Àáõàçñòðîé» Ìèíèñòåðñòâà ñòðîèòåëüñòâà Ãðóçèè.  1969– 179

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1980 ãã. – èíñòðóêòîð ïðîìûøëåííî-òðàíñïîðòíîãî îòäåëà Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè, ñåêðåòàðü Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîðêîìà ïàðòèè, ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîðèñïîëêîìà (ìýð ãîðîäà), ìèíèñòð ìåñòíîé ïðîìûøëåííîñòè Àáõàçèè, çàâåäóþùèé ïðîìûøëåííî-òðàíñïîðòíûì îòäåëîì Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè (Ñóõóì).  1981 ã. îêîí÷èë Àêàäåìèþ îáùåñòâåííûõ íàóê ïðè ÖÊ ÊÏÑÑ (Ìîñêâà).  1980–1985 ãã. – ñåêðåòàðü Ñîâåòà ïðîôñîþçîâ Ãðóçèè.  1985–1987 ãã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Êîìèòåòà ïî îáåñïå÷åíèþ íåôòåïðîäóêòàìè Ãðóçèè (Òáèëèñè). Ñ ìàðòà 1987 ïî íîÿáðü 1990 ã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Ãðóçèíñêîé ÑÑÐ, ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ãîññòðîÿ Ãðóçèè.  íîÿáðå 1990 – àïðåëå 1993 ã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Àáõàçèè. ßâëÿëñÿ ðóêîâîäèòåëåì àáõàçñêîé ãðóïïû Êîìèññèè ïî êîíòðîëþ è èíñïåêöèè (ÊÊÈ) Èòîãîâîãî äîêóìåíòà ìîñêîâñêîé âñòðå÷è 3 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1992 ã. ïî óðåãóëèðîâàíèþ ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîãî êîíôëèêòà. Áûë ÷ëåíîì Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî êîìèòåòà îáîðîíû è ïîëíîìî÷íûì ïðåäñòàâèòåëåì ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Àáõàçèè ïî ã. Òêâàð÷àë, Î÷àì÷èðñêîìó è Ãàëüñêîìó ðàéîíàì. 18 ÿíâàðÿ 1993 ã. âåðòîëåò, â êîòîðîì îí íàõîäèëñÿ, áûë ïîäáèò òåïëîâîé ðàêåòîé è ÷óäîì ñîâåðøèë ïîñàäêó â âûñîêîãîðíîì ñ. Ñàêåí (Àáõàçèÿ), íàõîäèâøåìñÿ ïîä êîíòðîëåì ãðóçèíñêèõ âîåííûõ.  ÿíâàðå – àïðåëå 1993 ã. íàõîäèëñÿ â ãðóçèíñêîì ïëåíó â Ñóõóìå è Òáèëèñè êàê «ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé ïðåñòóïíèê».  àïðåëå 1993 – 2001 ã. ïðîæèâàë â Ìîñêâå; áûë ñîâåòíèêîì ìèíèñòðà ïî äåëàì íàöèîíàëüíîñòåé è ôåäåðàòèâíûì îòíîøåíèÿì ÐÔ, à òàêæå ìèíèñòðà ïî äåëàì ÑÍÃ.  1993 ã. îðãàíèçîâàë ôîíä âîçðîæäåíèÿ Àáõàçèè «Ôåíèêñ-À» äëÿ îêàçàíèÿ ýêîíîìè÷åñêîé ïîìîùè ïîñëåâîåííîé Àáõàçèè.  ÿíâàðå 1994 ã. èçäàë â Ìîñêâå êíèãó «Ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêàÿ âîéíà. Íåêîòîðûå äîêóìåíòû, èíòåðâüþ, ïèñüìà, êîììåíòàðèè 1992–1993 ãã.», â êîòîðîé èçëîæèë ñâîþ ïîçèöèþ ïî ðÿäó âîåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ è ýêîíîìè÷åñêèõ âîïðîñîâ. Ïîäâåðãàëñÿ ðåçêîé êðèòèêå ñî ñòîðîíû îôèöèàëüíûõ âëàñòåé. Ðóêîâîäèë ñòðîèòåëüíûì êîìïëåêñîì îäíîãî èç âåäóùèõ êîíñîðöèóìîâ ÐÔ (Ìîñêâà). Çàñëóæåííûé èíæåíåð ðåñïóáëèêè. Ïî÷åòíûé òðàíñïîðòíûé ñòðîèòåëü ÑÑÑÐ. Ðàçðàáîòàë ïðåäëîæåíèÿ ïî ñîâìåñòíûì ïðîåêòàì, ïðîãðàììàì âçàèìîâûãîäíîãî ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî ñîòðóäíè÷åñòâà è ðàçâèòèÿ Ðîññèè, Ãðóçèè è Àáõàçèè, êîòîðûå áûëè îïóáëèêîâàíû è ïðåäñòàâëåíû çàèíòåðåñîâàííûì ñòîðîíàì. Æåíàò, òðîå äåòåé. ËÀÊÅÐÁÀß Çóðàá Ãðèãîðüåâè÷, èñïîëíèòåëüíûé ñåêðåòàðü ãðóçèíîàáõàçñêîé Êîîðäèíàöèîííîé êîìèññèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 15 èþíÿ 1953 ã. â ñ. Ëåïåëü Âèòåáñêîé îáëàñòè (Áåëîðóññèÿ). Ãðóçèí. Ñ 1953 ã. æèâåò â Ñóõóìå (Àáõàçèÿ).  1970 ã. çàêîí÷èë ñóõóìñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹11.  1970–1975 ãã. – ñòóäåíò ôàêóëüòåòà ìåõàíèçàöèè Ãðó180

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çèíñêîãî èíñòèòóòà ñóáòðîïè÷åñêîãî õîçÿéñòâà.  1975–1976 ãã. ñëóæèë â Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè â ã. Êðàñíîÿðñêå.  1976–1981 ãã. – èíñòðóêòîð, çàâåäóþùèé ëåêòîðñêîé ãðóïïîé Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà êîìñîìîëà.  1981–1988 ãã. – ñåêðåòàðü ïàðòêîìèññèè, èíñòðóêòîð, ïîìîùíèê 1-ãî ñåêðåòàðÿ Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè.  1989–1992 ãã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî êîìèòåòà ïî òðóäó; ìèíèñòð òðóäà è ñîöèàëüíîé çàùèòû.  1992–1994 ãã., â ñâÿçè ñ âîéíîé â Àáõàçèè, – âðåìåííî áåçðàáîòíûé. Ñ 1994 ã. ïî ïîðó÷åíèþ ðóêîâîäñòâà Àáõàçèè è Ãðóçèè – ïîñðåäíèê íà ïåðåãîâîðàõ ïî óðåãóëèðîâàíèþ ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîãî êîíôëèêòà. Ñ 1996 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – èñïîëíèòåëüíûé ñåêðåòàðü äâóñòîðîííåé ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé Êîîðäèíàöèîííîé êîìèññèè ÎÎÍ, ïîëíîìî÷íûé ïðåäñòàâèòåëü ïðåçèäåíòîâ Ãðóçèè è Àáõàçèè ïî îñîáûì ïîðó÷åíèÿì â ñòàòóñå âèöå-ïðåìüåðà ïðàâèòåëüñòâ îáåèõ ñòîðîí. 25 ñåíòÿáðÿ 2003 ã. áûë òÿæåëî ðàíåí â Òáèëèñè â ðåçóëüòàòå òåððîðèñòè÷åñêîãî àêòà, ñ 1 ôåâðàëÿ 2004 ã. ïðèñòóïèë ê ðàáîòå. Êàíäèäàò ýêîíîìè÷åñêèõ íàóê (1987). Æåíàò, èìååò äî÷ü. ËÀÊÅÐÁÀß Ëåîíèä Èâàíîâè÷, ñîïðåäñåäàòåëü îáùåñòâåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî äâèæåíèÿ Àáõàçèè «Âîçðîæäåíèå», äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè (1991–1996; 2000–2001). Ðîäèëñÿ 1 ÿíâàðÿ 1947 ã. â ã. Êóòàèñè (Ãðóçèÿ), ñûí âîåííîñëóæàùåãî. Àáõàç.  1954 ã. ïîøåë â ñðåäíþþ øêîëó â Öõàêàÿ (íûíå Ñåíàêè).  1962 ã., ïî îêîí÷àíèè 8 êëàññîâ ãóäàóòñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëû ¹2, ïîñòóïèë íà àâòîìåõàíè÷åñêèé ôàêóëüòåò Ìîñêîâñêîãî àâòîìîáèëüíî-äîðîæíîãî òåõíèêóìà.  1970 ã. äåìîáèëèçîâàí èç ðÿäîâ Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè.  1970–1975 ãã. – ñòóäåíò Ìîñêîâñêîãî àâòîìîáèëüíî-äîðîæíîãî èíñòèòóòà (ÌÀÄÈ). Ñ 1975 ã. íà÷àë ðàáîòàòü èíæåíåðîì â Ãàãðñêîì àâòîòðàíñïîðòíîì îáúåäèíåíèè, â 1979–1985 ãã. – äèðåêòîð Ãàãðñêîãî ãðóçîâîãî àâòîïðåäïðèÿòèÿ. Ñ 1985 ã. – äèðåêòîð ýêñïåðèìåíòàëüíîãî çàâîäà áûñòðîçàìîðîæåííûõ ïðîäóêòîâ «Ãàãðà» Ãîñàãðîïðîìà ÑÑÑÐ.  1991–1996 ãã. – äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  äåêàáðå 1992 ã. íàçíà÷åí 1-ì çàìåñòèòåëåì ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Àáõàçèè.  ÿíâàðå – äåêàáðå 1993 ã. èñïîëíÿë îáÿçàííîñòè ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ñ äåêàáðÿ 1993 ã. ïî àïðåëü 1995 ã. – 1-é âèöå-ïðåìüåð ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Àáõàçèè, çàòåì âûøåë èç ñîñòàâà ïðàâèòåëüñòâà.  èþëå 1995 – àâãóñòå 1996 ã. – ìèíèñòð èíîñòðàííûõ äåë Àáõàçèè; óøåë â îòñòàâêó, çàíèìàëñÿ ïðîèçâîäñòâåííîé äåÿòåëüíîñòüþ. Ñ àïðåëÿ 2000 ã. ïî 2002 ã. – äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè. Ñ êîíöà 2000 ã. – ñîïðåäñåäàòåëü îïïîçèöèîííîãî îáùåñòâåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî äâèæåíèÿ «Âîçðîæäåíèå». Æåíàò, òðîå äåòåé. ËÀÊÎÁÀ ßêóá Âàñèëüåâè÷, ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïîëèòñîâåòà Íàðîäíîé ïàðòèè Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 2 àâãóñòà 1949 ã. â ïîñ. Íîâûé Àôîí (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. 181

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Äî 1954 ã. (äî ðåàáèëèòàöèè ñåìüè «òðîöêèñòîâ») ïðîæèâàë â ã. Ãóäàóòà (Àáõàçèÿ) ñ ìàòåðüþ è ìëàäøèì áðàòîì, ñ 1954 ã. – â Ñóõóìå.  1956–1966 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â ñóõóìñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå ¹2 èì. À.Ñ. Ïóøêèíà.  1966–1971 ãã. – ñòóäåíò þðèäè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà ÌÃÓ (Ìîñêâà).  1972–1982 ãã. ðàáîòàë â àïïàðàòå Ïðåçèäèóìà Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ. Ñ 1974 ã. – ñåêðåòàðü îáúåäèíåííîé êîìñîìîëüñêîé îðãàíèçàöèè Ïðåçèäèóìà Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà è Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ, ïðåäñåäàòåëü ðåâèçèîííîé êîìèññèè Ñóõóìñêîé ãîðîäñêîé êîìñîìîëüñêîé îðãàíèçàöèè, çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîðêîìà è ÷ëåí ïðåçèäèóìà Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïðîôñîþçà ðàáîòíèêîâ ãîñó÷ðåäæåíèé.  1979 – äåêàáðå 1999 ã. – ñòàðøèé ïðåïîäàâàòåëü êàôåäðû þðèñïðóäåíöèè Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà, ÷ëåí ó÷åíîãî ñîâåòà óíèâåðñèòåòà. Âî âðåìÿ Îòå÷åñòâåííîé âîéíû (1992–1993) ïðèíèìàë ó÷àñòèå â äîñòàâêå îðóæèÿ è ìåäèêàìåíòîâ äëÿ àáõàçñêîé àðìèè, ÿâëÿëñÿ çàìåñòèòåëåì ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Êîìèòåòà îáùåñòâà Êðàñíîãî Êðåñòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ ïî âíåøíèì ñâÿçÿì è ïðàâó. Ñ àïðåëÿ è àâãóñòà 1997 ã. ÿâëÿëñÿ ñîîòâåòñòâåííî ïðåäñåäàòåëåì Ñóõóìñêîé ãîðîäñêîé îðãàíèçàöèè è ãëàâíûì ðåäàêòîðîì ãàçåòû Íàðîäíîé ïàðòèè Àáõàçèè. Ñ àïðåëÿ 1998 ã. – äåïóòàò Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîðîäñêîãî ñîáðàíèÿ. Ñ 1999 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïîëèòñîâåòà Íàðîäíîé ïàðòèè Àáõàçèè. Ñ ìàðòà 2001 ã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü êîìèññèè ïî ïðàâîâûì âîïðîñàì, ýêîëîãèè è êàäðàì Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîðîäñêîãî ñîáðàíèÿ âòîðîãî ñîçûâà. Àâòîð ïóáëèêàöèé ïî ïðîáëåìàì èñòîðèè Àáõàçèè, ïîëèòè÷åñêîé ñèñòåìû, òåîðèè ãîñóäàðñòâåííûõ ãðàíèö, êîíñòèòóöèîííîé èñòîðèè Àáõàçèè, Òóðöèè. Ïðèíèìàë ó÷àñòèå â ìåæäóíàðîäíûõ êîíôåðåíöèÿõ è ñèìïîçèóìàõ ó÷åíûõ þðèñòîâ è ïîëèòîëîãîâ. ËÎÌÈß (ÀËÀÌÈÀ) Ãåííàäèé Øàëèêîâè÷, 1-é âèöå-ïðåçèäåíò Êîíôåäåðàöèè íàðîäîâ Êàâêàçà, ïîýò, äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè (1991– 1996). Ðîäèëñÿ 24 èþíÿ 1949 ã. â ñ. Êóòîë Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1966 ã. îêîí÷èë êóòîëüñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó èì. È. Êîãîíèà.  1966– 1969 ãã. – ñòóäåíò ôèçèêî-ìàòåìàòè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà.  1969–1973 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â Ìîñêîâñêîì ëèòåðàòóðíîì èíñòèòóòå èì. À.Ì. Ãîðüêîãî.  1973–1974 ãã. – ëèòåðàòóðíûé ñîòðóäíèê æóðíàëà Äðóæáà íàðîäîâ (Ìîñêâà).  1974–1977 ãã. – êîððåñïîíäåíò ãàçåòû ã. Ðàìåíêè (Ìîñêîâñêàÿ îáëàñòü).  1977–1978 ãã. ðàáîòàë â ìåìîðèàëüíîì Äîìå-ìóçåå Ä. Ãóëèà.  1978–1982 ãã. – êîððåñïîíäåíò àáõàçñêîé ãàçåòû Àïñíû Êàïø.  1982–1987 ãã. – ëèòñîòðóäíèê àáõàçñêîãî äåòñêîãî æóðíàëà Àìöàáç.  1987–1988 ãã. ÷èòàë ëåêöèè ïî àáõàçñêîé ëèòåðàòóðå è ôîëüêëîðó â Ìîñêîâñêîì ëèòåðàòóðíîì èíñòèòóòå.  1989–1992 ãã. – ÷ëåí ïðåçèäèóìà Íàðîäíîãî ôîðóìà Àáõàçèè, ðåäàêòîð ãàçåòû Àèäãûëàðà (Åäèíåíèå).  1989–1995 ãã. ïðîâîäèë ðàáîòó, íàïðàâëåííóþ íà êîíñîëèäàöèþ 182

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íàðîäîâ Ñåâåðíîãî Êàâêàçà.  1991–1996 ãã. – äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè.  1993–1994 ãã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1994–1996 ãã. – âèöå-ñïèêåð ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè. Ñ 1989 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – 1-é âèöå-ïðåçèäåíò Êîíôåäåðàöèè íàðîäîâ Êàâêàçà.  1998–2001 ãã. – ãëàâíûé ðåäàêòîð æóðíàëà ×åðêåññêèé ìèð. Ñ 2000 ã. – ÷ëåí èíèöèàòèâíîé ãðóïïû îïïîçèöèîííîãî ÎÏÄ Àáõàçèè «Âîçðîæäåíèå». ×ëåí Ñîþçà ïèñàòåëåé ÑÑÑÐ ñ 1973 ã. Àâòîð âîñüìè ñáîðíèêîâ ñòèõîâ. Ïåðåâîäèëñÿ ñ àáõàçñêîãî íà ðóññêèé, àíãëèéñêèé, ïîëüñêèé, àðìÿíñêèé, àðàáñêèé, èñïàíñêèé, óêðàèíñêèé, ìîëäàâñêèé è äð. ÿçûêè. ßâëÿåòñÿ àâòîðîì òåêñòà Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ãèìíà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Æåíàò, ÷åòâåðî äåòåé. ÌÀÒÎÑßÍ Ñåðãåé Âëàäèìèðîâè÷, ïîëêîâíèê, Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 22 èþëÿ 1952 ã. â ã. Ãàãðà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àðìÿíèí.  1970 ã. îêîí÷èë ãàãðñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹4. Ñ 1970 ã. ñëóæèë â ðÿäàõ Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè â Ïîëüøå. Ïîñëå äåìîáèëèçàöèè ó÷èëñÿ â Õàðüêîâñêîì òåõíîëîãè÷åñêîì òåõíèêóìå.  1978 ã. íàïðàâëåí íà êóðñû îôèöåðîâ çàïàñà ïî ïîäãîòîâêå îôèöåðîâ íàâåäåíèÿ 75-ãî êîìïëåêñà ÏÂÎ. Äî 1985 ã. ðàáîòàë ïî ñïåöèàëüíîñòè íà ðàçëè÷íûõ ïðåäïðèÿòèÿõ îáùåñòâåííîãî ïèòàíèÿ â Ãàãðå.  1985–1992 ãã. çàíèìàëñÿ áèçíåñîì. Ñ ïåðâûõ äíåé ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíû ïðèíèìàë àêòèâíîå ó÷àñòèå â áîåâûõ äåéñòâèÿõ â Ãàãðå è íà Ãóìèñòèíñêîì ôðîíòå â êà÷åñòâå êîìàíäèðà áàòàëüîíà. 15–16 ìàðòà 1993 ã. ïåðåøåë ðåêó Ãóìèñòà è ïðèíÿë ó÷àñòèå â øòóðìå ã. Ñóõóìà. 22 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1993 ã. ïîëó÷èë ðàíåíèå ïðè îñâîáîæäåíèè ñòîëèöû Àáõàçèè; â òîò æå äåíü ïîãèá áðàò, Âèòàëèé Âëàäèìèðîâè÷ Ìàòîñÿí, íà÷àëüíèê ìåäèöèíñêîé ñëóæáû áàòàëüîíà, êàïèòàí.  àïðåëå 1994 ã. íàçíà÷åí êîìàíäèðîì àðìÿíñêîãî áàòàëüîíà èìåíè ìàðøàëà Áàãðàìÿíà â Ëàòñêîì íàïðàâëåíèè (Êîäîðñêîå óùåëüå).  îäíîì èç áîåâ ïîëó÷èë îñêîëî÷íîå ðàíåíèå.  1994–1999 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ íà ýêîíîìè÷åñêîì ôàêóëüòåòå Àáõàçñêîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà. Ñ 1995 ã. – íà÷àëüíèê ïîãðàíè÷íîé ñëóæáû Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1996–2001 ãã. – äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè. Ñ èþëÿ 2000 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – íà÷àëüíèê îòäåëà ïî ðàáîòå ñ ëè÷íûì ñîñòàâîì ÌÂÄ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ïîëêîâíèê. Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ÌÈÊÀÍÁÀ Âëàäèìèð Òà÷åâè÷, âèöå-ïðåìüåð Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1992–1999), ìèíèñòð îáîðîíû (1996–2002). Ðîäèëñÿ 23 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1931 ã. â ïîñ. Íîâûé Àôîí Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîíà. Àáõàç. Ïîñëå îêîí÷àíèÿ ñðåäíåé øêîëû â 1951 ã. ïðèçâàí â ðÿäû Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè. Òðè ãîäà ïðîñëóæèë â ìîðñêîé ïåõîòå â ã. Áàêó.  1955–1960 ãã. – 183

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

ñòóäåíò Ìîñêîâñêîãî àâòîäîðîæíîãî èíñòèòóòà, èíæåíåð-ìåõàíèê.  1960– 1975 ãã. ïðîøåë òðóäîâîé ïóòü îò ñìåííîãî ìåõàíèêà äî äèðåêòîðà Ñóõóìñêîãî ëåãêîâîãî òàêñîìîòîðíîãî ÀÒÏ.  1975–1985 ãã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü èñïîëêîìà Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîðîäñêîãî Ñîâåòà íàðîäíûõ äåïóòàòîâ.  ìàðòå 1985 – èþëå 1985 ã. – ìèíèñòð ìåñòíîé ïðîìûøëåííîñòè Àáõàçèè.  èþëå 1989 – ìàå 1992 ã. – ïåðâûé çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Àáõàçèè.  ïåðâûå äíè Îòå÷åñòâåííîé âîéíû (1992–1993) â Àáõàçèè íàõîäèëñÿ â ã. Ñóõóìå, îêêóïèðîâàííîì âîéñêàìè Ãîññîâåòà Ãðóçèè. Ïîñëå ïîïûòêè àðåñòà 17 àâãóñòà ïåðåáðàëñÿ â ã. Ãóäàóòà. Ñ îêòÿáðÿ 1992 ïî 1999 ã. – âèöå-ïðåìüåð Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  òå÷åíèå âîéíû âåë ðàáîòó ñ ëèäåðàìè ðåñïóáëèê Ñåâåðíîãî Êàâêàçà è Þãà Ðîññèè. Ñ èþíÿ 1996 ïî 1999 ã. ñîâìåùàë äîëæíîñòè âèöåïðåìüåðà è ìèíèñòðà îáîðîíû.  1996–2002 ãã. – ìèíèñòð îáîðîíû Àáõàçèè. Íàãðàæäåí ñîâåòñêèìè ìåäàëÿìè, â òîì ÷èñëå «Çà òðóäîâóþ äîáëåñòü» è «Çà òðóäîâîå îòëè÷èå». Ïðåçèäåíòîì Àáõàçèè íàãðàæäåí îðäåíîì «ÀõüäçÀïøà». Íåîäíîêðàòíî îòìå÷àëñÿ ïî÷åòíûìè ãðàìîòàìè, à òàêæå óäîñòîåí áðîíçîâîé ìåäàëè ÂÄÍÕ çà èçîáðåòåíèå ïîäúåìíîãî êðàíà. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ÌÈÊÂÀÁÈß Àðòóð (Çàóð) Àðòåìîâè÷, ïðåäïðèíèìàòåëü. Ðîäèëñÿ 2 ìàÿ 1949 ã. â ã. Ñóõóìå (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1956 –1966 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â ñóõóìñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå ¹10 èì. Í. Ëàêîáà.  1966–1969 ãã. èãðàë çà ôóòáîëüíóþ êîìàíäó «Äèíàìî» Ñóõóì.  1969– 1981 ãã. ðàáîòàë íà ñóõóìñêîì ìåëüçàâîäå ðàáî÷èì, áðèãàäèðîì, çàìåñòèòåëåì íà÷àëüíèêà ñìåíû, íà÷àëüíèêîì ñìåíû.  1974–1976 ãã. ñëóæèë â Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè. Èçáèðàëñÿ îñâîáîæäåííûì ñåêðåòàðåì êîìèòåòà ÂËÊÑÌ â/÷ 1266.  1976–1977 ãã. ñíîâà ðàáîòàë íà ñóõóìñêîì ìåëüçàâîäå, ñíà÷àëà èíæåíåðîì îòäåëà íàó÷íî-òåõíè÷åñêîé èíôîðìàöèè, à çàòåì íà÷àëüíèêîì ýëåâàòîðà. Ñ 1977 ã. – íà ïàðòèéíîé ðàáîòå.  1977–1979 ãã. – èíñòðóêòîð Ñóõóìñêîãî ðàéêîìà ïàðòèè.  1978 ã. îêîí÷èë Âñåñîþçíûé èíñòèòóò ïèùåâîé ïðîìûøëåííîñòè ïî ñïåöèàëüíîñòè èíæåíåð-òåõíîëîã õðàíåíèÿ è ïåðåðàáîòêè çåðíà.  1986 ã. îêîí÷èë Âûñøóþ ïàðòèéíóþ øêîëó.  1979– 1988 ãã. – èíñòðóêòîð, çàìåñòèòåëü çàâåäóþùåãî ýêîíîìè÷åñêèì îòäåëîì Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè.  1988–1991 ãã. – âòîðîé ñåêðåòàðü Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîðêîìà ïàðòèè.  1991–1992 ãã. çàíèìàëñÿ ïðåäïðèíèìàòåëüñêîé äåÿòåëüíîñòüþ. Ïðåçèäåíò õîëäèíãîâîé êîìïàíèè, â ñîñòàâ êîòîðîé âõîäèëè áàíê, òîðãîâûé äîì, ñòðàõîâîå îáùåñòâî, èíâåñòèöèîííîå óïðàâëåíèå è ò.ä. Ñ 1992 ã. ïðîæèâàåò â Ìîñêâå. Äî 2001 ã. áûë ðåãèîíàëüíûì ìåíåäæåðîì â íåôòÿíîé êîìïàíèè «ÞÊÎÑ». Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ÍÀ×À×-ÎÃËÛ Âëàäèìèð Ýìèíîâè÷, äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè (ñ 2002 ã.), ñîïðåäñåäàòåëü ÎÏÄ «Àìöàõàðà», âîåííûé ïðîêóðîð Ðåñïóá184

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

ëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1993–2002) , ãåíåðàë-ìàéîð, Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 22 àâãóñòà 1940 ã. â ñ. Íèæíÿÿ Ýøåðà Ñóõóìñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1948–1957 ãã. âìåñòå ñ ðîäèòåëÿìè íàõîäèëñÿ â ññûëêå â Ñèáèðè, â Òîìñêîé îáëàñòè (ñ. Ìàëèíîâêà Ïàðãèáñêîãî ðàéîíà).  1958 ã. îêîí÷èë ñóõóìñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹10 èì. Í. Ëàêîáà.  1959–1961 ãã. ñëóæèë â Âîåííî-ìîðñêîì ôëîòå ÑÑÑÐ.  1962–1966 ãã. – ñòóäåíò Ìîñêîâñêîãî þðèäè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà; ïðàâîâåä.  1968–1992 ãã. ðàáîòàë íà ðàçëè÷íûõ äîëæíîñòÿõ â ÌÂÄ Àáõàçèè. Ñ íà÷àëîì ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíû ïðèíèìàë àêòèâíîå ó÷àñòèå â áîåâûõ äåéñòâèÿõ â êà÷åñòâå êîìàíäèðà, áûë ðàíåí.  àïðåëå 1993 – ìàðòå 2002 ã. – âîåííûé ïðîêóðîð Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ, çàìåñòèòåëü Ãåíåðàëüíîãî ïðîêóðîðà. Ñ 2002 ã. – äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè, âîçãëàâëÿåò êîìèññèþ ïî çàêîíîäàòåëüñòâó. Ñîïðåäñåäàòåëü íàèáîëåå âëèÿòåëüíîãî â Àáõàçèè îáùåñòâåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî äâèæåíèÿ âåòåðàíîâ âîéíû «Àìöàõàðà». Ãåíåðàë-ìàéîð. Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Æåíàò, òðîå ñûíîâåé. ÍÈÊÈÒ×ÅÍÊÎ Ãåííàäèé Âàñèëüåâè÷, ïðåäñåäàòåëü Êîíãðåññà ðóññêèõ îáùèí Àáõàçèè, äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1996–2001). Ðîäèëñÿ 21 ÿíâàðÿ 1946 ã. â ã. Åíàêèåâî Äîíåöêîé îáëàñòè (Óêðàèíà). Ðóññêèé.  1964 ã. îêîí÷èë ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹4 ã. Åíàêèåâî.  1964–1967 ãã. ñëóæèë â Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè â ã. Æèòîìèðå.  1967–1978 ãã. ðàáîòàë íà ìåòàëëóðãè÷åñêîì çàâîäå â ã. Åíàêèåâî è ó÷èëñÿ â Ãîðíî-ìåòàëëóðãè÷åñêîì èíñòèòóòå â ã. Êîììóíàðñêå ïî ñïåöèàëüíîñòè èíæåíåð-ýëåêòðèê. Ñ 1978 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ æèâåò â Àáõàçèè.  1978–1986 ãã. – ãëàâíûé èíæåíåð Î÷àì÷èðñêîé ïòèöåôàáðèêè.  1986– 1992 ãã. – íà÷àëüíèê óïðàâëåíèÿ ìåõàíèçàöèè òðåñòà ¹7 Ãðóçàãðîñòðîé (ã. Î÷àì÷èðà).  àâãóñòå 1992 – ÿíâàðå 1993 ã. – íà÷àëüíèê øòàáà Ìåðêóëüñêîãî áàòàëüîíà.  ÿíâàðå – ñåíòÿáðå 1993 ã. – çàìåñòèòåëü êîìàíäóþùåãî Âîñòî÷íûì ôðîíòîì ïî òåõíèêå è âîîðóæåíèþ. Ñ 1994 ã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Êîíãðåññà ðóññêèõ îáùèí (ÊÐÎ) Àáõàçèè. Ñ 1995 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ÷ëåí Ñîâåòà ñîîòå÷åñòâåííèêîâ ïðè Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé äóìå ÐÔ. Ñ 1997 ã. – ïðåäñòàâèòåëü ÌÈÄ ÐÔ â Àáõàçèè. Íàãðàæäåí àáõàçñêèì Îðäåíîì Ëåîíà, ñîâåòñêèì îðäåíîì Òðóäîâîãî Êðàñíîãî Çíàìåíè, ìåäàëÿìè. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ÎÇÃÀÍ Êîíñòàíòèí Êîíñòàíòèíîâè÷, äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1991–1996), 1-é âèöå-ïðåìüåð ïðàâèòåëüñòâà (1997–1999), âèöå-ñïèêåð ïàðëàìåíòà (ñ 2002 ã.). Ðîäèëñÿ 15 ìàÿ 1939 ã. â ñ. Ëûõíû Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1957 ã. îêîí÷èë ëûõíåíñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó.  1958–1961 ãã. ñëóæèë â Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè, â Òóðêìåíñêîì âîåííîì îêðóãå. Ñ îòëè÷èåì îêîí÷èë 185

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âûñøóþ ïîëèòè÷åñêóþ øêîëó ïðè ïîëèòîòäåëå äèâèçèè.  1967 ã. îêîí÷èë Ãðóçèíñêèé èíñòèòóò ñóáòðîïè÷åñêîãî õîçÿéñòâà (ã. Ñóõóì) ïî ñïåöèàëüíîñòè èíæåíåð-òåõíîëîã.  1967–1976 ãã. – íà÷àëüíèê ñìåíû, ãëàâíûé èíæåíåð, äèðåêòîð Ãóäàóòñêîé ÷àéíîé ôàáðèêè.  1976–1978 ãã. – íà÷àëüíèê Óïðàâëåíèÿ ñåëüñêîãî õîçÿéñòâà Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîííîãî èñïîëíèòåëüíîãî êîìèòåòà.  1978–1989 ãã. – 1-é ñåêðåòàðü Ãóäàóòñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè, îäíîâðåìåííî (1978–1990 ãã.) äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ.  1978–1987 ãã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ïðåçèäèóìà Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ.  1987–1990 ãã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ.  1981 ã. ñ îòëè÷èåì îêîí÷èë Âûñøóþ ïàðòèéíóþ øêîëó ïðè ÖÊ ÊÏÑÑ.  1978 è 1989 ãã. – àêòèâíûé ó÷àñòíèê ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ âûñòóïëåíèé â Àáõàçèè. Çà ó÷àñòèå â íàöèîíàëüíî-îñâîáîäèòåëüíîì äâèæåíèè àáõàçñêîãî íàðîäà îñâîáîæäåí îò äîëæíîñòè 1-ãî ñåêðåòàðÿ Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéêîìà ïàðòèè ïî íàñòîÿíèþ ðóêîâîäñòâà Ãðóçèè.  1989 ã. àáñîëþòíûì áîëüøèíñòâîì ãîëîñîâ èçáðàí ïðåäñåäàòåëåì Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéèñïîëêîìà. Òîãäà æå ñ ïîäà÷è Ïðîêóðàòóðû Ãðóçèíñêîé ÑÑÐ âîçáóæäàåòñÿ óãîëîâíîå äåëî Ïðîêóðàòóðîé ÑÑÑÐ çà ó÷àñòèå â ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ ñîáûòèÿõ.  1991–1996 ã. – äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ; ÷ëåí ïðåçèäèóìà, ïðåäñåäàòåëü Êîìèññèè ïî ñîöèàëüíî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêîìó ðàçâèòèþ.  1996–1997 ãã. – ìèíèñòð èíîñòðàííûõ äåë Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1997–1999 ãã. – ïåðâûé âèöå-ïðåìüåð, ìèíèñòð ýêîíîìèêè Àáõàçèè.  äåêàáðå 1999 – 2002 ã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé íàëîãîâîé ñëóæáû Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ñ 2002 ã. – âèöå-ñïèêåð ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè.  1989–1994 ãã. – àêòèâíûé äåÿòåëü Êîíôåäåðàöèè ãîðñêèõ íàðîäîâ Êàâêàçà (ÊÍÊ); ïðåäñåäàòåëü Êîìèòåòà êàâêàçñêèõ ñîîáùåñòâ ÊÍÊ.  ïåðèîä Îòå÷åñòâåííîé âîéíû â Àáõàçèè 1992–1993 ãã. – ÷ëåí Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî êîìèòåòà îáîðîíû (ÃÊÎ). Áîëüøóþ ðàáîòó ïðîâîäèë ñðåäè äîáðîâîëüöåâ Ñåâåðíîãî Êàâêàçà, êàçà÷åñòâà Ðîññèè è äàëüíåãî çàðóáåæüÿ. Ïî çàäàíèþ ðóêîâîäñòâà Àáõàçèè íåîäíîêðàòíî âñòðå÷àëñÿ ñ ãëàâàìè Êðàñíîäàðñêîãî, Ñòàâðîïîëüñêîãî êðàåâ, Ðîñòîâñêîé îáëàñòè, Ðåñïóáëèêè Àäûãåÿ, Êàðà÷àåâî-×åðêåññêîé ðåñïóáëèêè, Êàáàðäèíî-Áàëêàðñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè, Ðåñïóáëèêè Ñåâåðíàÿ Îñåòèÿ (Àëàíèÿ), Èíãóøñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè, ×å÷åíñêîé ðåñïóáëèêè, ðåñïóáëèêè Äàãåñòàí. Çíà÷èòåëüíóþ ïîëèòèêî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêóþ ðàáîòó ïðîâîäèë ñ êàçà÷åñòâîì Þãà Ðîññèè, Âñåâåëèêèì âîéñêîì Äîíñêèì, êàçà÷åñòâîì Êóáàíè, Ñîþçîì êàçàêîâ Ñòàâðîïîëüÿ. Íåîäíîêðàòíî ïðèíèìàë ó÷àñòèå â ðàáîòå Áîëüøèõ Êðóãîâ êàçà÷åñòâà (Êðàñíîäàð, Íîâî÷åðêàññê, Ñòàâðîïîëü). Îðãàíèçàòîð çàêëþ÷åíèÿ Äîãîâîðà ìåæäó êàçà÷åñòâîì Þãà Ðîññèè è Êîíôåäåðàöèåé íàðîäîâ Êàâêàçà (1993). Ìàéîð Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè. Íàãðàæäåí îðäåíîì «Çíàê Ïî÷åòà». Æåíàò, òðîå äåòåé. ÎÑÈß Îòàð Âëàäèìèðîâè÷, ìèíèñòð çäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ, íà÷àëüíèê ìåäèöèíñêîé ñëóæáû Ìèíèñòåðñòâà îáîðî186

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

íû Àáõàçèè (1992–1993). Ðîäèëñÿ 3 ÿíâàðÿ 1949 ã. â ã. Ãóäàóòà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1966 ã. îêîí÷èë ñóõóìñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹4.  1967–1968 ãã. – ñàíèòàð ñóõóìñêîé ñêîðîé ïîìîùè. 1968–1970 ãã. ñëóæèë â Ãåðìàíèè; ñàíèíñòðóêòîð.  1970 ã., ïîñëå àðìèè, âíîâü ðàáîòàë â ñóõóìñêîé ñêîðîé ïîìîùè. 1970–1977 ãã. – ñòóäåíò Òáèëèññêîãî ìåäèöèíñêîãî èíñòèòóòà. 1978–1982 ãã. – ãëàââðà÷ äóðèïøñêîé ñåëüñêîé ó÷àñòêîâîé áîëüíèöû. 1982 ã. – â îðäèíàòóðå Èíñòèòóòà îðãàíèçàöèè çäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ èì. Ñåìàøêî (Ìîñêâà). 1983–1988 ãã. – çàâåäóþùèé ñåêòîðîì çäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ è ñîöîáåñïå÷åíèÿ Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè. 1988–1991 ãã. – ïîìîùíèê 1-ãî ñåêðåòàðÿ Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè. 1991–1993 ãã. – 1-é çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà çäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ Àáõàçèè. Âî âðåìÿ ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíû 1992–1993 ãã. – íà÷àëüíèê ìåäèöèíñêîé ñëóæáû Ìèíèñòåðñòâà îáîðîíû Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. 1993–1995 ãã. – ìèíèñòð çäðàâîîõðàíåíèÿ Àáõàçèè. Ñ 1995 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – äèðåêòîð íàó÷íî-èññëåäîâàòåëüñêîãî Öåíòðà êóðîðòîëîãèè è íåòðàäèöèîííîé ìåäèöèíû èì. À. Êóäæáà Àêàäåìèè íàóê Àáõàçèè. Íàãðàæäåí Îðäåíîì Ëåîíà. Æåíàò, òðîå äåòåé. ÏÅÒÐΠÎëåã Ïåòðîâè÷, âèöå-ñïèêåð ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè (1996– 2001), ãåíåðàë-ìàéîð. Ðîäèëñÿ 29 îêòÿáðÿ 1947 ã. â ã. Ãóäàóòà (Àáõàçèÿ). Ðóññêèé.  1954–1965 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â ãóäàóòñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå ¹2.  1965 ã. ïîñòóïèë íà ðàáîòó â ãóäàóòñêîå àâòîòðàíñïîðòíîå ïðåäïðèÿòèå.  1966–1969 ãã. ñëóæèë â Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè, àâèàöèîííûé ìåõàíèê.  1969–1972 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â Êðèâîðîæñêîì ãîðíîîáîãàòèòåëüíîì òåõíèêóìå.  1972–1977 ãã. – ñòóäåíò Êðèâîðîæñêîãî ãîðíîîáîãàòèòåëüíîãî èíñòèòóòà.  1977–1985 ãã. ðàáîòàë â ñòðîèòåëüíûõ îðãàíèçàöèÿõ ã. Ãóäàóòà. Ñ 1985 ã. – èíñòðóêòîð Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéêîìà ïàðòèè.  1987 ã. èçáðàí çàìåñòèòåëåì ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéèñïîëêîìà.  1987–1989 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â Áàêèíñêîé âûñøåé ïàðòøêîëå.  1992–1993 ãã. ïðèíèìàë ó÷àñòèå â Îòå÷åñòâåííîé âîéíå â Àáõàçèè.  îêòÿáðå 1993 ã. íà Áîëüøîì Êðóãå êàçàêîâ Àáõàçèè èçáðàí Âåðõîâíûì àòàìàíîì çåìëÿ÷åñòâà êàçàêîâ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1993 ã. íàçíà÷åí íà äîëæíîñòü 1-ãî çàìåñòèòåëÿ ìèíèñòðà ïî ñòðîèòåëüñòâó.  1994 ã. íà Áîëüøîì Êðóãå Âñåâåëèêîãî âîéñêà Äîíñêîãî ïðèñâîåí ÷èí êàçà÷üåãî ãåíåðàë-ìàéîðà. Ñ 1996 ã. – ñîâåòíèê ïðåìüåð-ìèíèñòðà Àáõàçèè ïî äåëàì êàçà÷åñòâà.  1996–2001 ãã. – äåïóòàò Íàðîäíîãî Ñîáðàíèÿ – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ, âèöå-ñïèêåð ïàðëàìåíòà. Êàâàëåð Îðäåíà Ãåîðãèÿ 2-é ñòåïåíè. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. 187

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ÏÀÒÓËÈÄÈ Íèêîëàé Ãåîðãèåâè÷, äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè (1996– 2001), ïðåäñåäàòåëü ãðå÷åñêîé îáùèíû Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 13 àâãóñòà 1944 ã. â ñ. Äìèòðèåâêà Ñóõóìñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Ãðåê.  1949–1956 ãã. ïîäâåðãñÿ ñòàëèíñêîé äåïîðòàöèè èç Àáõàçèè.  1960 ã. – ðàçíîðàáî÷èé.  1962 ã. îêîí÷èë ñóõóìñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ðàáî÷åé ìîëîäåæè ¹1.  1966 ã. äåìîáèëèçîâàëñÿ èç Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè. Ñ 1966 ã. ðàáîòàë øîôåðîì, òåõíèêîì, èíæåíåðîì, íà÷àëüíèêîì òåõîòäåëà àâòîáàçû â âåäîìñòâàõ «Çàêòðàíññòðîÿ» è Àáõàçîáëñîâåòà ïî òóðèçìó è ýêñêóðñèÿì.  1970 ã. çàî÷íî îêîí÷èë Ïîëòàâñêèé òåõíèêóì òðàíñïîðòíîãî ñòðîèòåëüñòâà.  1981 ã. îêîí÷èë Ìîñêîâñêóþ Âûñøóþ øêîëó ïðîôäâèæåíèÿ ÂÓÑÏÑ. Ñ 1985 ã. îäíîâðåìåííî ðóêîâîäèë â Ñóõóìå ãðå÷åñêèì íàðîäíûì òåàòðîì. Äî àâãóñòà 1992 ã. áûë îòâåòñòâåííûì ñåêðåòàðåì Ãðå÷åñêîãî êóëüòóðíîãî öåíòðà, ñ ôåâðàëÿ 1994 ã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü ãðå÷åñêîé îáùèíû Àáõàçèè.  1996–2001 ãã. – äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè. Ñ 2001 ã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà êóëüòóðû Àáõàçèè. Àâòîð ñåìè ïîýòè÷åñêèõ êíèã íà ðóññêîì ÿçûêå. Çàñëóæåííûé ðàáîòíèê êóëüòóðû Àáõàçèè. Æåíàò. ÑÌÛÐ Âàäèì Àëåêñååâè÷, äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè (1996–2001). Ðîäèëñÿ 17 ìàðòà 1960 ã. â ã. Ãóäàóòà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1967–1977 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â ãóäàóòñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå ¹1 è ñóõóìñêîé øêîëå-èíòåðíàòå ¹1.  1978–1983 ãã. – ñòóäåíò èñòîðè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà.  1980–1992 ãã. – òðåíåð äåòñêî-þíîøåñêîé ñïîðòèâíîé øêîëû ïî ëåãêîé àòëåòèêå (Ïèöóíäà).  1989– 1992 ãã. – ÷ëåí Ãàãðñêîãî ñîþçà «Àáðñêèë». 26 ìàÿ 1990 ã. çàâåäåíî óãîëîâíîå äåëî çà ó÷àñòèå â àêöèÿõ ïðîòåñòà àáõàçñêîãî íàñåëåíèÿ. Óãîëîâíîå ïðåñëåäîâàíèå áûëî ïðåêðàùåíî â ñâÿçè ñ àìíèñòèåé, îáúÿâëåííîé ïðåçèäåíòîì Ãðóçèè Ç. Ãàìñàõóðäèà â 1991 ã. Ó÷àñòíèê âîéíû 1992–1993 ãã.  1996–2001 ãã. – äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè, ÷ëåí êîìèññèè ïî îáîðîíå è áåçîïàñíîñòè. Ó÷àñòíèê «øåñòèäíåâíîé âîéíû» â Ãàëüñêîì ðàéîíå Àáõàçèè â ìàå 1998 ã. Ñ 2000 ã. – ÷ëåí èíèöèàòèâíîé ãðóïïû ÎÏÄ «Âîçðîæäåíèå». ÑÎÑÍÀËÈÅ Ñóëòàí Àñëàìáååâè÷, ìèíèñòð îáîðîíû Àáõàçèè (1993– 1996), ãåíåðàë-ëåéòåíàíò, Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 23 àïðåëÿ 1942 ã. â ã. Íàëü÷èêå (Êàáàðäèíî-Áàëêàðèÿ). Êàáàðäèíåö.  1959 ã. îêîí÷èë ñðåäíþþ øêîëó.  1961–1964 ãã. – êóðñàíò Ñûçðàíñêîãî àâèàöèîííîãî ó÷èëèùà.  1965–1989 ãã. – íà ðàçëè÷íûõ êîìàíäíûõ äîëæíîñòÿõ èñòðåáèòåëüíîé àâèàöèè ïðîòèâîâîçäóøíîé îáîðîíû (ÏÂÎ). Ïðîøåë ïóòü îò ëåò÷èêà äî êîìàíäèðà ïîëêà.  1978 ã. îêîí÷èë Âîåííóþ êîìàíäíóþ àêàäåìèþ èì. ìàðøàëà Ã.Ê. Æóêîâà, íà÷àëüíèê àâèàöèîííîãî öåíòðà.  1985 ã. óäîñòîåí ïî÷åòíîãî çâàíèÿ «Çàñëóæåííûé âîåííûé ëåò÷èê ÑÑÑл. 188

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Ïîñëå óâîëüíåíèÿ â çàïàñ ðàáîòàë çàìåñòèòåëåì ãåíåðàëüíîãî äèðåêòîðà «Êàááàëêãðàæäàíñòðîé». Ñðàçó ïîñëå âòîðæåíèÿ ãðóçèíñêèõ âîéñê â Àáõàçèþ â àâãóñòå 1992 ã. îäíèì èç ïåðâûõ ïðèáûë íà ïîìîùü â êà÷åñòâå äîáðîâîëüöà ñ Ñåâåðíîãî Êàâêàçà. Ñ àâãóñòà 1992 ïî ñåíòÿáðü 1993 ã. ïðèíèìàë ó÷àñòèå â áîåâûõ äåéñòâèÿõ â Ðåñïóáëèêå Àáõàçèÿ, çàíèìàë äîëæíîñòè íà÷àëüíèêà øòàáà îáîðîíû, íà÷àëüíèêà Ãåíåðàëüíîãî øòàáà, ìèíèñòðà îáîðîíû Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1993 – àâãóñò 1996 ã.). Ãåíåðàë-ëåéòåíàíò. Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Íàãðàæäåí îðäåíîì Áîåâîãî Êðàñíîãî Çíàìåíè, äåñÿòüþ ñîâåòñêèìè ìåäàëÿìè, à òàêæå îðäåíîì Âîåííîãî Êðåñòà.  íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ ïðîæèâàåò â ã. Íàëü÷èêå. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ÒÀÁÀÃÓÀ Áàòàë Èâàíîâè÷, ìèíèñòð þñòèöèè Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ðîäèëñÿ 29 îêòÿáðÿ 1962 ã. â ñ. Êóòîë Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Îêîí÷èë ñðåäíþþ øêîëó.  1980 ã. ïîñòóïèë íà þðèäè÷åñêèé ôàêóëüòåò Êðàñíîÿðñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà.  1984–1986 ãã. ñëóæèë â Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè â ã. Êðàñíîÿðñêå. Ñ 1987 ã., ïî îêîí÷àíèè óíèâåðñèòåòà, ðàáîòàë þðèäè÷åñêèì êîíñóëüòàíòîì â ðàçíûõ îðãàíèçàöèÿõ Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîíà. Ñ 1990 ã. ðàáîòàë â ïðåçèäèóìå Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ çàâåäóþùåì ñåêòîðîì ïî ðàáîòå ñ ïðàâîîõðàíèòåëüíûìè îðãàíàìè, â îòäåëå ïî çàêîíîäàòåëüñòâó. Ñ 14 àâãóñòà 1992 ã. ïðèíèìàë ó÷àñòèå â âîéíå ñ Ãðóçèåé.  ïåðâûé æå äåíü âîéíû ïðèíÿë ïåðâûé áîé â Ñóõóìå, íà Êðàñíîì ìîñòó.  äàëüíåéøåì ó÷àñòâîâàë â ïàðòèçàíñêîì äâèæåíèè â Î÷àì÷èðñêîì ðàéîíå (Âîñòî÷íûé ôðîíò), íàõîäèëñÿ â ãðóïïå «Äåëüôèí».  îêòÿáðå 1993 – ñåíòÿáðå 1995 ã. – ãëàâà àäìèíèñòðàöèè Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîíà. Ñ ñåíòÿáðÿ 1995 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ìèíèñòð þñòèöèè Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Áûë ïðåäñòàâèòåëåì ïðåçèäåíòà ÐÀ â ïàðëàìåíòå Àáõàçèè, ÿâëÿëñÿ ÷ëåíîì Êîîðäèíàöèîííîãî ñîâåòà ïî ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîìó óðåãóëèðîâàíèþ, çàìåñòèòåëåì ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Öåíòðàëüíîé èçáèðàòåëüíîé êîìèññèè Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Æåíàò, èìååò ÷åòâåðûõ äåòåé. ÒÀÐÁÀ Àñòàìóð Áîðèñîâè÷, ãåíåðàë-ìàéîð, ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ñëóæáû ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé áåçîïàñíîñòè Àáõàçèè (1993–1999), 1-é âèöå-ïðåìüåð Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (ñ 2003 ã.). Ðîäèëñÿ 13 ÿíâàðÿ 1961 ã. â ã. Ñóõóì (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1978 ã. îêîí÷èë ñóõóìñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹10 èì. Í. Ëàêîáà.  1978– 1983 ãã. – ñòóäåíò òåõíîëîãè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Ãðóçèíñêîãî èíñòèòóòà ñóáòðîïè÷åñêîãî õîçÿéñòâà (ã. Ñóõóì).  1983 ã. – ñìåííûé òåõíîëîã Ëûõíåíñêîé ÷àéíîé ôàáðèêè. Ñ íîÿáðÿ 1983 ã. ïî ìàé 1985 ã. ñëóæèë â ïîãðàíè÷íûõ âîéñêàõ ÑÑÑÐ.  1985–1986 ãã. ðàáîòàë íà Ëûõíåíñêîé ÷àéíîé ôàáðèêå.  1986–1988 ãã. – ðåôåðåíò àãðîïðîìûøëåííîãî îòäåëà Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ.  1988–1990 ãã. – èíñòðóêòîð Îòäåëà ïðîìûøëåííîñòè, 189

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òðàíñïîðòà è ñâÿçè Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ÊÏÑÑ.  1990–1992 ãã. çàíèìàëñÿ ïðåäïðèíèìàòåëüñêîé äåÿòåëüíîñòüþ. Ñ ìàÿ 1992 ã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ãëàâû àäìèíèñòðàöèè Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîíà. Ñ 15 àâãóñòà 1992 ã. – â íàðîäíîì îïîë÷åíèè, êîìàíäèð ãðóïïû, âçâîäà.  ÿíâàðå 1993 ã. ïðèêàçîì ìèíèñòðà îáîðîíû Àáõàçèè íàçíà÷åí êîìàíäèðîì ìîòîñòðåëêîâîãî áàòàëüîíà.  ìàðòå 1993 ã. ïðåçèäèóìîì Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ íàçíà÷åí 1-ì çàìåñòèòåëåì ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ñëóæáû áåçîïàñíîñòè (ÑÁ) Àáõàçèè.  ñåíòÿáðå 1993 – äåêàáðå 1999 ã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü ÑÁ, à çàòåì Ñëóæáû ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé áåçîïàñíîñòè Àáõàçèè. Ñ ôåâðàëÿ 2000 ã. ïî 2003 ã. – ñåêðåòàðü Ñîâåòà áåçîïàñíîñòè Àáõàçèè. Ñ àïðåëÿ 2003 ã. – 1-é âèöå-ïðåìüåð ïðàâèòåëüñòâà. Ãåíåðàë-ìàéîð. Æåíàò, èìååò ñûíà. ÒÀÐÊÈË Ñàèä Ðîäèîíîâè÷, äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1991–1996), ìèíèñòð èíîñòðàííûõ äåë Àáõàçèè (1992–1993). Ðîäèëñÿ 15 ìàÿ 1951 ã. â ã. Ãóäàóòà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1958–1968 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â ñóõóìñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå ¹10 èì. Í. Ëàêîáà.  1969–1974 ãã. – ñòóäåíò þðèäè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Ðîñòîâñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà.  1974–1975 ãã. ðàáîòàë â Ìèíèñòåðñòâå þñòèöèè Àáõàçèè â äîëæíîñòè êîíñóëüòàíòà ïî ïðàâîâûì âîïðîñàì.  1975 ã. ïåðåâåäåí íà äîëæíîñòü ñòàðøåãî êîíñóëüòàíòà ïî ïðàâîâûì âîïðîñàì, èçáðàí ñåêðåòàðåì êîìèòåòà êîìñîìîëà çàâîäà «Ñóõóìïðèáîð».  1976 ã. óòâåðæäåí â äîëæíîñòè çàâåäóþùåãî îòäåëîì êîìñîìîëüñêèõ îðãàíèçàöèé Ñóõóìñêîãî ðàéêîìà êîìñîìîëà.  1976–1977 ãã. ðàáîòàë âòîðûì ñåêðåòàðåì Ñóõóìñêîãî ðàéêîìà êîìñîìîëà.  1978–1979 ãã. – çàâåäóþùèé îòäåëîì àãèòàöèè è êóëüòìàññîâîé ðàáîòû Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà êîìñîìîëà.  1979– 1980 ãã. – ïåðâûé ñåêðåòàðü Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéêîìà êîìñîìîëà.  1980–1982 ãã. ðàáîòàë çàâåäóþùèì ñåêòîðîì ïî ïðàâîâûì âîïðîñàì, à çàòåì çàìåñòèòåëåì îòäåëà èíôîðìàöèè ÖÊ êîìñîìîëà Ãðóçèè.  ÿíâàðå 1982–1987 ãã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü èñïîëêîìà Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîííîãî Ñîâåòà íàðîäíûõ äåïóòàòîâ.  1987–1988 ãã. ïåðåâåäåí â ÖÊ êîìïàðòèè Ãðóçèè, ãäå ðàáîòàë èíñïåêòîðîì îòäåëà îðãàíèçàöèîííî-ïàðòèéíîé ðàáîòû ÖÊ.  íà÷àëå 1988 ã. èçáðàí ñåêðåòàðåì Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè è â òîì æå ãîäó ðåøåíèåì ïëåíóìà îáêîìà ïàðòèè áûë îñâîáîæäåí îò çàíèìàåìîé äîëæíîñòè è íàçíà÷åí çàâåäóþùèì îòäåëîì ïî ðàáîòå ñ ñîîòå÷åñòâåííèêàìè çà ðóáåæîì ïðåçèäèóìà Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1990 ã. ïîñòóïèë â Äèïëîìàòè÷åñêóþ àêàäåìèþ ÌÈÄ ÑÑÑÐ, îäíàêî â ñâÿçè ñ îáîñòðåíèåì ïîëèòè÷åñêîé ñèòóàöèè â Àáõàçèè, íå çàâåðøèâ ó÷åáó â àêàäåìèè, âåðíóëñÿ íà ðîäèíó. Âî âðåìÿ âûáîðîâ â Âåðõîâíûé Ñîâåò Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ áûë èçáðàí äåïóòàòîì Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçèè.  ïåðèîä ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíû (1992–1993) ðàáîòàë ïðåäñåäàòåëåì êîìèññèè ïî ìåæäóíàðîäíûì äåëàì Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà, à çàòåì ìèíèñòðîì 190

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èíîñòðàííûõ äåë Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1994–1999 ãã. – ãëàâà àäìèíèñòðàöèè Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîíà. Ñ 1999 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – äèðåêòîð Ðèöèíñêîãî ðåëèêòîâîãî íàöèîíàëüíîãî ïàðêà. Æåíàò, òðîå äåòåé. ÒÀÐÍÀÂÀ Âèòàëèé Ãðèãîðüåâè÷, äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè (ñ 2002 ã.), ÷ëåí ïîëèòñîâåòà ÎÏÄ «Àìöàõàðà». Ðîäèëñÿ 20 ÿíâàðÿ 1954 ã. â ã. Ãàãðà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Ó÷èëñÿ â ãàãðñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå.  1971–1976 ãã. – ñòóäåíò Àñòðàõàíñêîãî èíñòèòóòà ðûáíîé ïðîìûøëåííîñòè è õîçÿéñòâà; èíæåíåð-òåõíîëîã; èíæåíåðýêîíîìèñò.  1976–1987 ãã. – òåõíîëîã, ìàñòåð, ãëàâíûé èíæåíåð, äèðåêòîð ïðåäïðèÿòèÿ ñîþçíîãî ïîä÷èíåíèÿ – Ãàãðñêîãî ðûáçàâîäà â Ïèöóíäå.  1987– 1992 ãã. çàíèìàëñÿ áèçíåñîì. Ñ íà÷àëà ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíû 1992–1993 ãã. â ñîñòàâå íàðîäíîãî îïîë÷åíèÿ ïðèíèìàë àêòèâíîå ó÷àñòèå â îñâîáîæäåíèè ã. Ãàãðà è â ìàðòîâñêîì 1993 ã. íàñòóïëåíèè íà Ñóõóì. Ñ ìàÿ 1993 ã. – êîìàíäèð ìîòîñòðåëêîâîãî áàòàëüîíà. Ñ 10 èþëÿ 1993 ã. âìåñòî Ãåðîÿ Àáõàçèè Ã. ×àíáà èñïîëíÿë îáÿçàííîñòè êîìàíäèðà 2-é áðèãàäû âî âðåìÿ áîåâ çà Øðîìñêèå âûñîòû íàä Ñóõóìîì. Ïîñëå îêîí÷àíèÿ âîéíû äî ôåâðàëÿ 1994 ã. ïðèíèìàë ó÷àñòèå â îõðàíå ãðàíèöû ñ Ãðóçèåé ïî ð. Èíãóð.  àïðåëå 1994 ã. ó÷àñòâîâàë â Ëàòñêîé îïåðàöèè â Êîäîðñêîì óùåëüå.  õîäå áîåâ áûë íåîäíîêðàòíî ðàíåí. Îäèí èç ðóêîâîäèòåëåé âëèÿòåëüíîãî âåòåðàíñêîãî îáùåñòâåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî äâèæåíèÿ «Àìöàõàðà». Ñ 2002 ã. – äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè. Íàãðàæäåí Îðäåíîì Ëåîíà. Æåíàò, òðîå äî÷åðåé. ÒÎÏÎËßÍ Àëüáåðò Ãàñïàðîâè÷, çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1992–1996). Ðîäèëñÿ 2 àïðåëÿ 1935 ã. â ã. Ñóõóì (Àáõàçèÿ). Àðìÿíèí.  1953 ã. îêîí÷èë ñóõóìñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹2.  1953–1959 ãã. – ñòóäåíò Åðåâàíñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ìåäèöèíñêîãî èíñòèòóòà.  1959–1964 ãã. ñëóæèë â Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè â äîëæíîñòè ïîëêîâîãî âðà÷à, íà÷àëüíèêà ëàçàðåòà.  1964–1967 ãã. – äåæóðíûé âðà÷, ñòàðøèé âðà÷ ñòàíöèè ñêîðîé ïîìîùè ã. Ñóõóì (Àáõàçèÿ).  1976–1990 ãã. ðàáîòàë êàðäèîëîãîì Ñóõóìñêîé ãîðîäñêîé áîëüíèöû ¹2 èì. Â. Øåðâàøèäçå.  1990 ã. ñîçäàë àðìÿíñêîå êóëüòóðíîáëàãîòâîðèòåëüíîå îáùåñòâî «Êðóíê» («Æóðàâëü»), êîòîðîå âîçãëàâëÿë äî 2001 ã.  1991 ã. èçáðàí äåïóòàòîì ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1992– 1996 ãã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1993 ã., âî âðåìÿ ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíû, ñôîðìèðîâàë äâà àðìÿíñêèõ áàòàëüîíà â ñîñòàâå Âîîðóæåííûõ ñèë Àáõàçèè.  ïîñëåâîåííûé ïåðèîä – âèöå-ñïèêåð ïàðëàìåíòà, âèöå-ïðåìüåð ïðàâèòåëüñòâà.  2001 ã. ñîçäàë áëàãîòâîðèòåëüíûé ôîíä «Òîïîëÿí À.Ã.», êîòîðûé è âîçãëàâëÿåò ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. 191

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ÒÐÀÏÈÇÎÍßÍ Ãàëóñò Ïàðíàêîâè÷, äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè (1996–2001), Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 12 ìàÿ 1958 ã. â ñ. Êîëõèäà Ãàãðñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àðìÿíèí.  1975 ã. îêîí÷èë ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹3 èì. Õ. Àáîâÿíà â ã. Ãàãðà.  1976–1978 ãã. ñëóæèë â Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè (ÂÂÑ, ðàäèîòåõíè÷åñêèå âîéñêà) â ã. Êàðãîïîëü Àðõàíãåëüñêîé îáëàñòè.  1979–1984 ãã. ðàáîòàë íà çàâîäå Ñàíòåõìîíòàæ â ã. Âîðîøèëîâãðàäå.  1984–1989 ãã. – ñòóäåíò Âîðîøèëîâãðàäñêîãî ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà èì. Ò. Øåâ÷åíêî.  1990–1993 ãã. – ó÷èòåëü ãàãðñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëû ¹3 èì. Õ. Àáîâÿíà.  1992–1993 ãã., â ïåðèîä ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíû, ïðèíèìàë àêòèâíîå ó÷àñòèå â áîåâûõ äåéñòâèÿõ, ïîëó÷èë òÿæåëîå ðàíåíèå.  1994–1996 ãã. – çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà îáðàçîâàíèÿ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1994–1998 ãã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïðàâëåíèÿ àðìÿíñêîãî êóëüòóðíîãî îáùåñòâà «Êðóíê».  1995 ã. ïîñòóïèë íà þðèäè÷åñêèé ôàêóëüòåò Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà.  1996– 1997 ãã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïåíñèîííîãî ôîíäà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1996–2001 ãã. – äåïóòàò Íàðîäíîãî Ñîáðàíèÿ – ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè. Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Æåíàò, äâîå ñûíîâåé. ÕÀÄÆÈÌÁÀ Ðàóëü Äæóìêîâè÷, ãåíåðàë-ìàéîð, ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ñëóæáû ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé áåçîïàñíîñòè Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1999–2002), ìèíèñòð îáîðîíû (2002–2003), ïðåìüåð-ìèíèñòð Àáõàçèè (ñ àïðåëÿ 2003 ã.). Ðîäèëñÿ 21 ìàðòà 1958 ã. â ã. Òêâàð÷àë (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1974 ã. îêîí÷èë òêâàð÷åëüñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹5.  1975–1976 ãã. ðàáîòàë íà Òêâàð÷åëÃÐÝÑ.  1976–1978 ãã. – â ðÿäàõ Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè.  1979–1984 ãã. – ñòóäåíò þðèäè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà (ÀÃÓ).  1985–1986 ãã. ñòàæèðîâàëñÿ â Âûñøåé øêîëå ÊÃÁ ÑÑÑÐ (Ìèíñê).  1986 – àâãóñòå 1992 ã. ðàáîòàë â Òêâàð÷åëüñêîì îòäåëå ÊÃÁ, â çâàíèè êàïèòàíà.  àâãóñòå 1992 – îêòÿáðå 1993 ã., âî âðåìÿ âîéíû ñ Ãðóçèåé, íàõîäèëñÿ íà Âîñòî÷íîì ôðîíòå; íà÷àëüíèê ñëóæáû ðàçâåäêè è êîíòððàçâåäêè Âîñòî÷íîãî íàïðàâëåíèÿ.  1993–1994 ãã. – íà÷àëüíèê îòäåëà Ñëóæáû áåçîïàñíîñòè Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1995– 1999 ãã. – 1-é çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Òàìîæåííîãî êîìèòåòà Àáõàçèè. Ñ 17 äåêàáðÿ 1999 ã. ïî 2002 ã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ñëóæáû ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé áåçîïàñíîñòè Àáõàçèè.  2002 – àïðåëå 2003 ã. – 1-é âèöå-ïðåìüåð, ìèíèñòð îáîðîíû Àáõàçèè; íà÷àë ïðîâîäèòü âîåííóþ ðåôîðìó ïîñëå Êîäîðñêèõ ñîáûòèé. Ñ àïðåëÿ 2003 ã. – ïðåìüåð-ìèíèñòð Àáõàçèè. Íàãðàæäåí Îðäåíîì Ëåîíà. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ÕÀÐÀÁÓÀ Ðóñëàí Çàáååâè÷, âèöå-ñïèêåð ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1996–2001), Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 1 èþíÿ 1968 ã. â ã. Ñóõóì (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. 192

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

 1974–1985 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â ñóõóìñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå ¹10 èì. Í. Ëàêîáà.  1985–1986 ãã. ðàáîòàë íà Ñóõóìñêîé îáóâíîé ôàáðèêå.  1986 ã. ïîñòóïèë íà èñòîðè÷åñêèé ôàêóëüòåò Ìîñêîâñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà.  1987–1989 ãã. ñëóæèë â ðÿäàõ Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè â Ãåðìàíèè, ñ 1989 ã. ïðîäîëæèë ó÷åáó â ÌÃÓ.  1992 ã., ñ íà÷àëîì âîéíû, âåðíóëñÿ â Àáõàçèþ, à ïîñëå òÿæåëîãî ðàíåíèÿ – â Ìîñêâó.  1993 ã. îêîí÷èë ÌÃÓ.  1993–1996 ãã. – àñïèðàíò Ðîññèéñêîé àêàäåìèè ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé ñëóæáû ïðè Ïðåçèäåíòå ÐÔ.  1996 ã. çàùèòèë äèññåðòàöèþ íà òåìó «Ïîëèòè÷åñêèå êîíôëèêòû íà Êàâêàçå: ñóùíîñòü, ïóòè è îñîáåííîñòè èõ ðåãóëèðîâàíèÿ»; êàíäèäàò ïîëèòè÷åñêèõ íàóê.  1996–2001 ãã. – äåïóòàò Íàðîäíîãî Ñîáðàíèÿ – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ, âèöå-ñïèêåð. Âèöå-ïðåçèäåíò Ìåæäóíàðîäíîé ÷åðêåññêîé àññîöèàöèè. Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Æåíàò. ÕÀØÁÀ Íîäàð Âëàäèìèðîâè÷, ñîâåòíèê ìèíèñòðà ÐÔ Ñ.Ê. Øîéãó, ðóêîâîäèòåëü äåïàðòàìåíòà Ìèíèñòåðñòâà ïî ÷ðåçâû÷àéíûì ñèòóàöèÿì Ðîññèéñêîé Ôåäåðàöèè (Ì×Ñ). Ðîäèëñÿ 1 îêòÿáðÿ 1951 ã. â ã. Òêâàð÷àë (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Ïîñëå îêîí÷àíèÿ òêâàð÷åëüñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëû ¹2 ó÷èëñÿ â Õàðüêîâñêîì èíñòèòóòå èíæåíåðîâ êîììóíàëüíîãî ñòðîèòåëüñòâà, à çàòåì â Àêàäåìèè îáùåñòâåííûõ íàóê ïðè ÖÊ ÊÏÑÑ (Ìîñêâà). Ïî ñïåöèàëüíîñòè – èíæåíåð-ãðàäîñòðîèòåëü, êàíäèäàò ýêîíîìè÷åñêèõ íàóê. Ñ 1973 ïî 1977 ã. ðàáîòàë â ã. Òêâàð÷àë íà ðàçëè÷íûõ èíæåíåðíûõ äîëæíîñòÿõ, áûë íà÷àëüíèêîì îòäåëà êàïèòàëüíîãî ñòðîèòåëüñòâà ÃÐÝÑ.  äåêàáðå 1977 ã. ïåðåâåäåí íà êîìñîìîëüñêóþ ðàáîòó â ã. Ñóõóì.  ðàçíîå âðåìÿ ÿâëÿëñÿ çàâåäóþùèì îòäåëîì îáêîìà êîìñîìîëà, èçáèðàëñÿ âòîðûì ñåêðåòàðåì Ñóõóìñêîãî ðàéêîìà êîìñîìîëà. Ñ 1983 ïî 1989 ã. íà ïàðòèéíîé ðàáîòå, çàâåäóþùèé îòäåëîì ñòðîèòåëüñòâà è ãîðîäñêîãî õîçÿéñòâà Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè.  1990 ã. íàçíà÷åí çàìåñòèòåëåì ìèíèñòðà êîììóíàëüíîãî õîçÿéñòâà Àáõàçèè, à â 1991 ã. èçáðàí ïðåäñåäàòåëåì Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîðñîâåòà (ìýðîì ã. Ñóõóì).  ïåðèîä âîéíû ñ Ãðóçèåé, â 1992–1993 ãã., áûë çàìåñòèòåëåì ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî êîìèòåòà îáîðîíû, çàìåñòèòåëåì ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Àáõàçèè, ÿâëÿëñÿ ñîïðåäñåäàòåëåì îáúåäèíåííîé êîìèññèè ïî óðåãóëèðîâàíèþ êîíôëèêòà (ïðåäñåäàòåëü Àáõàçñêîé ÷àñòè êîìèññèè).  1993–1995 ãã. – ãëàâà àäìèíèñòðàöèè ã. Ñóõóì (ìýð ãîðîäà). Ñ 1995 ã. ðàáîòàë â Ì×Ñ Ðîññèè íà ãðàæäàíñêîé äîëæíîñòè.  íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ñîâåòíèê Ìèíèñòðà Ðîññèè Ñ.Ê. Øîéãó ïî äåëàì ãðàæäàíñêîé îáîðîíû è èíâåñòèöèé ìèíèñòåðñòâà ïî ÷ðåçâû÷àéíûì ñèòóàöèÿì ÐÔ. Âî âðåìÿ âîéíû â Þãîñëàâèè ðàáîòàë â Êîñîâî, çàíèìàëñÿ âîçâðàùåíèåì íà èñòîðè÷åñêóþ ðîäèíó, â Àäûãåþ, ïðîæèâàâøèõ òàì àäûãîâ. Ðóêîâîäèë îïåðàòèâíîé ãðóïïîé Ì×Ñ Ðîññèè â Þãîñëàâèè. 193

Êòî åñòü êòî â Àáõàçèè

Íàãðàæäåí ðîññèéñêèì îðäåíîì «Äðóæáû Íàðîäîâ». Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ÕÂÀÐÖÊÈß Ìóøíè Õóìñàåâè÷ (1955–1992), Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 27 ìàðòà 1955 ã. â ñ. Âåðõíÿÿ Ýøåðà Ñóõóìñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1962–1973 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â ñóõóìñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå ¹10 èì. Í. Ëàêîáà.  1973–1975 ãã. ñëóæèë â Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè.  1976–1982 ãã. – ñòóäåíò èñòîðè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà.  1979– 1987 ãã. – ñîòðóäíèê îòäåëà àðõåîëîãèè Àáõàçñêîãî èíñòèòóòà ÿçûêà, ëèòåðàòóðû è èñòîðèè. Ïðèíèìàë ó÷àñòèå â àðõåîëîãè÷åñêèõ ýêñïåäèöèÿõ, âûÿâèë ðÿä ïåùåðíûõ ñòîÿíîê ýïîõè ïàëåîëèòà, íàèáîëåå èçâåñòíàÿ èç êîòîðûõ – ìóñòüåðñêèé ïåùåðíûé ïàìÿòíèê Ìà÷àãóà â ñ. Õóàï Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîíà. Ïîä ðóêîâîäñòâîì èçâåñòíîãî àðõåîëîãà Ëþáèíà ðàáîòàë â Ëåíèíãðàäñêîì îòäåëåíèè Èíñòèòóòà àðõåîëîãèè ÀÍ ÑÑÑÐ è ó÷èëñÿ â àñïèðàíòóðå. Ïóáëèêîâàëñÿ â æóðíàëå Ñîâåòñêàÿ àðõåîëîãèÿ. Ñ 1987 ã. – ñîòðóäíèê Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ìóçåÿ. Ñ 1988 ã. – àêòèâèñò, ÷ëåí ïðàâëåíèÿ Íàðîäíîãî ôîðóìà Àáõàçèè. Ñ àïðåëÿ 1992 ã. ñëóæèë â Àãóäçåðñêîì áàòàëüîíå Àáõàçñêîé ãâàðäèè – çàìåñòèòåëü êîìàíäèðà ïî ëè÷íîìó ñîñòàâó. 14–15 àâãóñòà 1992 ã., â ïåðâûå äíè âòîðæåíèÿ ãðóçèíñêèõ âîéñê â Àáõàçèþ, – îäèí èç îðãàíèçàòîðîâ îáîðîíû Êðàñíîãî è Áåëîãî ìîñòîâ ã. Ñóõóìà.  àâãóñòå – äåêàáðå 1992 ã. áûë êîìàíäèðîì áàòàëüîíà ñïåöèàëüíîãî íàçíà÷åíèÿ, êîìàíäóþùèì Ãóìèñòèíñêîé ëèíèåé ôðîíòà, ïðåäñòàâèòåëåì Àáõàçñêîãî êîìàíäîâàíèÿ íà Âîñòî÷íîì íàïðàâëåíèè ôðîíòà. Ïîãèá â äåêàáðå 1992 ã. â áîþ çà ñ. Ëàøêåíäàð Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéîíà. Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Ïîëêîâíèê. Åñòü ñûí. ÕÜÞÈÒÒ (Áðàéàí) Äæîðäæ, ïðîôåññîð êàâêàçñêèõ ÿçûêîâ (SOAS), êàðòâåëîëîã, ÷ëåí Áðèòàíñêîé àêàäåìèè, Ïî÷åòíûé Ïðåäñòàâèòåëü Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ â Âåëèêîáðèòàíèè (ñ 1993 ã.). Ðîäèëñÿ 11 íîÿáðÿ 1949 ã. áëèç Ëîíäîíà, â Äîíêàñòåðå (Éîðêøèð). Àíãëè÷àíèí. Îêîí÷èë ãðàììàòè÷åñêóþ øêîëó äëÿ ìàëü÷èêîâ â Äîíêàñòåðå.  1969– 1972 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â êîëëåäæå Ñâ. Èîàííà â Êåìáðèäæå (ñòèïåíäèÿ Àðòóðà Ãåíðè Òîìàñà â îáëàñòè ãóìàíèòàðíûõ êëàññè÷åñêèõ íàóê).  1971 ã. óäîñòîåí ñòèïåíäèè Äæîíà Ñòþàðòà, óíèâåðñèòåòà Ðåíîõà è ïðèçà Ãðåéâç Êîëëåäæà. Ñ 1972 ã. – áàêàëàâð.  1972–1973 ãã. – ñòèïåíäèàò Óîððà â îáëàñòè êëàññè÷åñêèõ íàóê.  1973 ã. ïîëó÷èë äèïëîì ëèíãâèñòà, ñ 1975 ã. – ìàãèñòð, ñ 1982 ã. – äîêòîð íàóê.  1975–1976 è 1979–1980 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ ïî ïðîãðàììå Áðèòàíñêîãî Ñîâåòà ïî îáìåíó àñïèðàíòàìè â Òáèëèñè (Ãðóçèÿ).  1978–1980 ãã. – ñòèïåíäèàò Ìàðäæîðè Óîðäðîï ïî èññëåäîâàíèþ ãðóçèíñêîãî ÿçûêà.  1981–1988 ãã. – ïðåïîäàâà194

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òåëü ëèíãâèñòèêè â óíèâåðñèòåòå Õàëëà.  1988–1992 ãã. – ëåêòîð ïî ÿçûêîçíàíèþ è êàâêàçñêèì ÿçûêàì.  1992–1996 ãã. – ëåêòîð êàâêàçñêèõ ÿçûêîâ â Øêîëå âîñòî÷íî-àôðèêàíñêèõ èññëåäîâàíèé (SOAS) Ëîíäîíñêîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà. Ñ 1985 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ÷ëåí èçäàòåëüñêîé êîëëåãèè Revue des Etudes Georgiennes et Caucasiennes, ñ 1993 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – æóðíàëà Öåíòðàëüíî-Àçèàòñêîå îáîçðåíèå (Central Asian Survey).  1985–1990 ãã. – ÷ëåí Ñîâåòà ôèëîëîãè÷åñêîãî îáùåñòâà.  1986–1990 ãã. – ïåðâûé ïðåçèäåíò Societas Caucasologica Europaea (SCE). Ñ 1993 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ïî÷åòíûé ïðåäñòàâèòåëü Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ â Âåëèêîáðèòàíèè. Ñ 1997 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ïî÷åòíûé ÷ëåí Ìåæäóíàðîäíîé ÷åðêåññêîé àññîöèàöèè. Ñ 1983 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ÷ëåí ïðàâëåíèÿ ðóêîâîäèòåëåé Ôîíäà Ìàðäæîðè Óîðäðîï, Îêñôîðä. Àâòîð ìíîãèõ èññëåäîâàíèé ïî èñòîðèè, êóëüòóðå è ÿçûêàì íàðîäîâ Êàâêàçà. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ÖÓÃÁÀ Âÿ÷åñëàâ Ìèõàéëîâè÷, ïðåìüåð-ìèíèñòð Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (1999–2001). Ðîäèëñÿ 1 ÿíâàðÿ 1944 ã. â ñ. Ààöû Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Îêîí÷èë ãóäàóòñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹2.  1962 ã. ïîñòóïèë íà ôèëîëîãè÷åñêèé ôàêóëüòåò (àáõàçñêèé ÿçûê è ëèòåðàòóðà, àíãëèéñêèé ÿçûê) Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà.  1963 ã. ïðèçâàí â ðÿäû Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè.  1970 ã. îêîí÷èë Ñóõóìñêèé ïåäèíñòèòóò.  1970–1975 ãã. – íà êîìñîìîëüñêîé ðàáîòå.  1973–1975 ãã. – 1-é ñåêðåòàðü Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà êîìñîìîëà.  1975–1977 ãã. – 1-é ñåêðåòàðü Î÷àì÷èðñêîãî ðàéêîìà ïàðòèè.  1977–1978 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â àñïèðàíòóðå Àêàäåìèè îáùåñòâåííûõ íàóê ïðè ÖÊ ÊÏÑÑ (Ìîñêâà).  1978–1989 ãã. – 1-é çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ñîâåòà Ìèíèñòðîâ Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ. Íåîäíîêðàòíî èçáèðàëñÿ äåïóòàòîì Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçñêîé ÀÑÑÐ.  1989–1993 ãã. – íà ïðîôñîþçíîé ðàáîòå. Ñ 1993 ã. – ÷ëåí ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Àáõàçèè.  1991–1999 ãã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Öåíòðàëüíîé èçáèðàòåëüíîé êîìèññèè Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ñ äåêàáðÿ 1999 ïî ìàé 2001 ã. – ïðåìüåð-ìèíèñòð Àáõàçèè. Íàãðàæäåí ñîâåòñêèìè îðäåíàìè Òðóäîâîãî Êðàñíîãî Çíàìåíè, «Çíàê Ïî÷åòà», ïÿòüþ ìåäàëÿìè. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ×ÀËÌÀÇ Ìèõàèë Ðîìçàíîâè÷, ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïðàâëåíèÿ êîììåð÷åñêîãî áàíêà Àáõàçèè «Ãàðàíò-áàíê». Ðîäèëñÿ 6 ñåíòÿáðÿ 1969 ã. â ã. Ñóõóìå (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Âíóê èçâåñòíîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî äåÿòåëÿ Àáõàçèè 1920–30-õ ãã. Ìèõàèëà ×àëìàç (ñîðàòíèê Íåñòîðà Ëàêîáà), ðàññòðåëÿííîãî â íîÿáðå 1937 ã.  1986 ã. îêîí÷èë ñóõóìñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹14. 1986–1991 ãã. – ñòóäåíò ýêîíîìè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà. 195

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 1992–1993 ãã. ïðèíèìàë àêòèâíîå ó÷àñòèå â áîåâûõ äåéñòâèÿõ Îòå÷åñòâåííîé âîéíû íàðîäà Àáõàçèè. Áûë ðàíåí. Íàãðàæäåí ìåäàëüþ «Çà Îòâàãó». Ñ 1994 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ïðåäñåäàòåëü ïðàâëåíèÿ ÷àñòíîãî êîììåð÷åñêîãî áàíêà «Ãàðàíò-áàíê» (ã. Ñóõóì). Ñ 2001 ã. – àñïèðàíò Êóáàíñêîãî ãîñóíèâåðñèòåòà (ã. Êðàñíîäàð). Ñ ìàðòà 2001 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – äåïóòàò Ñóõóìñêîãî ãîðîäñêîãî ñîáðàíèÿ, ïðåäñåäàòåëü êîìèññèè ïî áþäæåòó. 2000– 2002 ãã. – ïðåçèäåíò Ôåäåðàöèè äçþäî è ñàìáî Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. 2003 ã. – îñíîâàòåëü ìîëîäåæíîé ñïîðòèâíîé øêîëû ïî äçþäî è ñàìáî â Ñóõóìå. ×ÀÌÀÃÓÀ Âèòàëèé Çèåâè÷, ãëàâíûé ðåäàêòîð «Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ» – ãàçåòû ïàðëàìåíòà è ïðàâèòåëüñòâà Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 19 èþíÿ 1951 ã. â ã. Ãóäàóòà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Ó÷èëñÿ â ãóäàóòñêîé àáõàçñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå èì. Í. Ëàêîáà, êîòîðóþ îêîí÷èë â 1968 ã.  1969–1970 ãã. – ðàáî÷èé Ãóäàóòñêîãî ïðîìûøëåííîãî êîìáèíàòà.  1970–1972 ãã. ñëóæèë â Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè.  1973–1978 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â Ìîñêîâñêîì ãîñóäàðñòâåííîì óíèâåðñèòåòå íà ôàêóëüòåòå æóðíàëèñòèêè.  1978–1979 ãã. – êîððåñïîíäåíò ãàçåòû Ñîâåòñêàÿ Àáõàçèÿ.  1979–1981 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â Âûñøåé ïàðòèéíîé øêîëå â ã. Áàêó.  1981–1990 ãã. – êîíñóëüòàíò, ëåêòîð, èíñòðóêòîð îòäåëà ïðîïàãàíäû è àãèòàöèè Àáõàçñêîãî îáêîìà ïàðòèè.  1990–1991 ãã. – 1-é çàìåñòèòåëü ãëàâíîãî ðåäàêòîðà ãàçåòû Àáõàçèÿ. Ñ 1991 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ãëàâíûé ðåäàêòîð ãàçåòû Ðåñïóáëèêà Àáõàçèÿ. Ñ 1990 ã. – ÷ëåí Ñîâåòà Ìåæäóíàðîäíîé êîíôåäåðàöèè æóðíàëèñòñêèõ ñîþçîâ (Ìîñêâà). Ñ 1991 ã. – 1-é çàìåñòèòåëü ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ñîþçà æóðíàëèñòîâ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1998 ã. íàãðàæäåí þáèëåéíîé ìåäàëüþ â ÷åñòü 80-ëåòèÿ Âñåðîññèéñêîãî Ñîþçà æóðíàëèñòîâ. Æåíàò, èìååò ñûíà è äî÷ü. ×ÀÍÈß Èçèäà Òåðåíòüåâíà, ðåäàêòîð íåçàâèñèìîé «Íóæíîé ãàçåòû». Ðîäèëàñü 10 ôåâðàëÿ 1962 ã. â ã. Ñóõóì (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàçêà.  1978 ã. îêîí÷èëà ñóõóìñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹2 è ïîñòóïèëà â Àáõàçñêèé ãîñóäàðñòâåííûé óíèâåðñèòåò; ïî ñïåöèàëüíîñòè áèîõèìèê. Ñ 1983 ã. ðàáîòàëà ó÷èòåëåì õèìèè â ñóõóìñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå ¹20, êîððåñïîíäåíòîì ìåñòíûõ ãàçåò. Ñ 1986 ã. – ñòàðøèé ëàáîðàíò Èíñòèòóòà ýêñïåðèìåíòàëüíîé ïàòîëîãèè è òåðàïèè Àêàäåìèè ìåäèöèíñêèõ íàóê ÑÑÑÐ (ëàáîðàòîðèÿ ðàäèîáèîëîãèè). Ñ 1987 ã. – êîððåñïîíäåíò Àáõàçñêîãî òåëåâèäåíèÿ. Ñ 1988 ã. – êîððåñïîíäåíò «Èíòåðôàêñà», «Ïîñòôàêòóìà», «Ýêñïðåññ-õðîíèêè». Ñ 1990 ã. – ïðåññ-ñåêðåòàðü Íàðîäíîãî ôîðóìà Àáõàçèè «Àèäãûëàðà» («Åäèíåíèå»). Ñ 1992 ã. – â ïðåññ-ñëóæáå ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà Àáõàçèè. Ñ 1994 ã. – íà÷àëüíèê îòäåëà èíôîðìàöèè – Ìèíèñòåðñòâà èíôîðìàöèè è ïå÷àòè Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ñ 1995 ã. – â àãåíòñòâå «Àáõàçïðåññ» («Àïñíûïðåññ»). Ñ 1996 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ðåäàêòîð íåçàâèñèìîé Íóæíîé ãàçåòû. Èìååò äî÷ü. 196

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×ÈÐÈÊÁÀ Âÿ÷åñëàâ Àíäðååâè÷, ïîëíîìî÷íûé ïðåäñòàâèòåëü Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ â Çàïàäíîé Åâðîïå (ñ 1993 ã.), ïîñòîÿííûé ïðåäñòàâèòåëü Àáõàçèè â Îðãàíèçàöèè Íåïðåäñòàâëåííûõ íàðîäîâ (ÎÍÍÍ). Ðîäèëñÿ 17 ìàðòà 1959 ã. â ã. Ãàãðà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1966–1976 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â ãàãðñêîé ñðåäíåé øêîëå.  1977–1982 ãã. – ñòóäåíò îòäåëåíèÿ èíîñòðàííûõ ÿçûêîâ Õàðüêîâñêîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà (Óêðàèíà); ñïåöèàëèçàöèÿ – àíãëèéñêèé ÿçûê è ëèòåðàòóðà; âòîðîé ÿçûê – ôðàíöóçñêèé.  1982–1986 ãã. – àñïèðàíò Èíñòèòóòà ÿçûêîçíàíèÿ ÀÍ ÑÑÑÐ; ñïåöèàëèçàöèÿ – ôèëîëîãèÿ, îáùàÿ è èñòîðè÷åñêàÿ ëèíãâèñòèêà, êàâêàçñêàÿ ëèíãâèñòèêà; êàíäèäàò ôèëîëîãè÷åñêèõ íàóê.  èþíå 1986 – ÿíâàðå 1991 ãã. – íàó÷íûé ñîòðóäíèê îòäåëà êàâêàçñêèõ ÿçûêîâ Èíñòèòóòà ÿçûêîçíàíèÿ ÀÍ ÑÑÑÐ (Ìîñêâà).  1989–1990 ãã. – ãëàâíûé ðåäàêòîð ãàçåòû Àëàøàðà (Ìîñêâà).  àïðåëå 1991 – àïðåëå 1996 ã. ó÷èëñÿ â Ëåéäåíñêîì óíèâåðñèòåòå (Íèäåðëàíäû) íà ôàêóëüòåòå ãóìàíèòàðíûõ íàóê; äîêòîð ôèëîëîãèè. Ñ 1993 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ïîëíîìî÷íûé ïðåäñòàâèòåëü Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ â Çàïàäíîé Åâðîïå.  1993–1994 ãã. – ÷ëåí àáõàçñêîé äåëåãàöèè íà ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêèõ ìèðíûõ ïåðåãîâîðàõ ïîä ýãèäîé ÎÎÍ â Æåíåâå.  ìàðòå 1996 – ìàå 1997 ã. – ñîòðóäíèê Èíñòèòóòà ìåæäóíàðîäíûõ îòíîøåíèé «Êëèíãåíäàåë», Ãààãà.  1998 ã. îñíîâàë èíôîðìàöèîííûé Àáõàçñêèé áþëëåòåíü.  ìàå 1999 – ÿíâàðå 2000 ã. – ÷ëåí Èñïîëíèòåëüíîãî êîìèòåòà Îðãàíèçàöèè Íåïðåäñòàâëåííûõ íàðîäîâ (ÎÍÍÍ). Ñ ìàÿ 2000 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – íàó÷íûé ñîòðóäíèê, ïðåïîäàâàòåëü çàïàäíî-êàâêàçñêèõ ÿçûêîâ Ëåéäåíñêîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà (Íèäåðëàíäû). Àâòîð ìíîãèõ ðàáîò ïî âîïðîñàì àáõàçñêîãî, óáûõñêîãî, àäûãñêîãî è äðóãèõ êàâêàçñêèõ ÿçûêîâ. ×ëåí Societas Caucasologica Europeae (SCE). ×ëåí Àññîöèàöèè ïî èçó÷åíèþ ÿçûêîâ â äîèñòîðè÷åñêîå âðåìÿ. Îäèí èç îðãàíèçàòîðîâ 8-ãî Ìåæäóíàðîäíîãî êîëëîêâèóìà SCE â èþíå 1996 ã., Ëåéäåíñêèé óíèâåðñèòåò, Íèäåðëàíäû. Äîêëàä÷èê íà êîëëîêâèóìàõ SCE â Ëîíäîíå (1990), â Ìàéêîïå (1992), Ìàðáóðãå (1994), Ëåéäåíå (1996), Ìþíõåíå (2000). Âûñòóïàë ñ äîêëàäîì íà êîíôåðåíöèè ïî ñåâåðîçàïàäíîé êàâêàçñêîé ëèíãâèñòèêå (1994), Óíèâåðñèòåò Áîãàçè÷è, Ñòàìáóë, Òóðöèÿ. Ñîîðãàíèçàòîð êîíôåðåíöèè «Ðàçäåëåííûé ñóâåðåíèòåò è ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêèé êîíôëèêò» (îêòÿáðü 1997), Ñâîáîäíûé óíèâåðñèòåò, Áðþññåëü, Áåëüãèÿ. Èìååò ñûíà. ØÀÌÁÀ Îëåã Áàãðàòîâè÷, ïðîðåêòîð Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà, àêàäåìèê. Ðîäèëñÿ 19 àïðåëÿ 1938 ã. â ã. Ñóõóì (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1957 ã. îêîí÷èë ñóõóìñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹10.  1957–1962 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â Ìîñêîâñêîì èíæåíåðíî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêîì èíñòèòóòå èì. Ñ. Îðäæîíèêèäçå.  ÿíâàðå 1963 – èþíå 1965 ã. – ñòàðøèé òåõíèê-ñìåò÷èê, ïðîèçâîäèòåëü ðàáîò Ñóõóìñêîãî ôèçèêî-òåõíè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà Ãîñêîìèòåòà ïî àòîìíîé 197

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ýíåðãèè ÑÑÑÐ.  èþíå 1965 ã. íàçíà÷åí ãëàâíûì ñïåöèàëèñòîì Ìèíñåëüõîçà Àáõàçèè, à çàòåì íà÷àëüíèêîì îòäåëà (óïðàâëåíèÿ) ñòðîèòåëüñòâà.  ìàðòå 1973 – 1982 ã. – ãëàâíûé èíæåíåð Ñóõóìñêîãî ôèëèàëà ïðîåêòíîãî èíñòèòóòà «Ãðóçãèïðîãîðñòðîé».  1975 ã. çàùèòèë êàíäèäàòñêóþ äèññåðòàöèþ â Ìîñêîâñêîì èíæåíåðíî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêîì èíñòèòóòå. Ñ 1978 ã. – ñòàðøèé íàó÷íûé ñîòðóäíèê.  ìàðòå 1982 – èþíå 1993 ã. çàíèìàë äîëæíîñòè çàìåñòèòåëÿ ìèíèñòðà ñåëüñêîãî õîçÿéñòâà Àáõàçèè, à çàòåì çàìåñòèòåëÿ ïðåäñåäàòåëÿ Ãîñàãðîïðîìà.  ïåðèîä ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîé âîéíû 1992–1993 ãã. ðàáîòàë âîåííûì êîððåñïîíäåíòîì è ñòàðøèì ðåäàêòîðîì ðàäèî Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  ïîñëåâîåííûé ïåðèîä – ïåðâûé çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà, à çàòåì çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà ýêîíîìèêè Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ è îäíîâðåìåííî çàâåäóþùèé êàôåäðîé áóõó÷åòà è àóäèòà Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà. Ñ 1995 ã. – äåéñòâèòåëüíûé ÷ëåí Àêàäåìèè èíâåñòèöèé è ýêîíîìèêè ñòðîèòåëüñòâà ÐÔ. Ïðèñâîåíî çâàíèå ïî÷åòíîãî àêàäåìèêà ñòðîèòåëüíîãî êîìïëåêñà ÐÔ. Ñ àïðåëÿ 1997 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ïðîðåêòîð ïî íàóêå Àáõàçñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà.  ôåâðàëå 1998 ã. ïðèñâîåíî çâàíèå ïðîôåññîðà.  2000 ã. èçáðàí àêàäåìèêîì Ìåæäóíàðîäíîé àêàäåìèè íàó÷íî-ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî îáðàçîâàíèÿ (ÌÀÍÏÎ) è Ìåæäóíàðîäíîé àêàäåìèè èíâåñòèöèé è ýêîíîìèêè ñòðîèòåëüñòâà (ÌÀÈÝÑ). ßâëÿåòñÿ àâòîðîì ñâûøå 360 ðàäèîðåïîðòàæåé è ñòàòåé, 190 íàó÷íûõ òðóäîâ, â òîì ÷èñëå 60 ìîíîãðàôèé, êíèã, ó÷åáíûõ ïîñîáèé. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. ØÀÌÁÀ Ñåðãåé Ìèðîíîâè÷, äåïóòàò ïàðëàìåíòà Àáõàçèè (1991– 1996), ìèíèñòð èíîñòðàííûõ äåë (ñ 1997 ã.). Ðîäèëñÿ 15 ìàðòà 1951 ã. â ã. Ãóäàóòà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç. Îêîí÷èë ñóõóìñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹10 èì. Í. Ëàêîáà.  1969–1973 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ íà èñòîðè÷åñêîì ôàêóëüòåòå Òáèëèññêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ïåäàãîãè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà.  1973–1975 ãã. – îðãàíèçàòîð ëåêöèé îáùåñòâà «Çíàíèå».  ìàå 1975 – ìàå 1976 ã. ñëóæèë â Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè â ã. ×èìêåíòå.  èþíå 1976 – ìàðòå 1990 ã. – ëàáîðàíò, íàó÷íûé ñîòðóäíèê îòäåëà àðõåîëîãèè, ó÷åíûé ñåêðåòàðü Àáõàçñêîãî èíñòèòóòà ÿçûêà, ëèòåðàòóðû è èñòîðèè (ã. Ñóõóì).  îêòÿáðå 1983 ã. çàùèòèë êàíäèäàòñêóþ äèññåðòàöèþ íà òåìó «Ìîíåòíîå îáðàùåíèå â äðåâíåé è ñðåäíåâåêîâîé Àáõàçèè».  ìàðòå 1990 – ôåâðàëå 1992 ã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü îáùåñòâåííî-ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî äâèæåíèÿ «Àèäãûëàðà» («Åäèíåíèå», Ñóõóì).  íîÿáðå 1991 – íîÿáðå 1996 ã. – äåïóòàò Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà – ïàðëàìåíòà Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ; ïðåäñåäàòåëü êîìèññèè.  ÿíâàðå – îêòÿáðå 1993 ã. – ãëàâíûé êîìèññàð Âîîðóæåííûõ ñèë Àáõàçèè, 1-é çàìåñòèòåëü ìèíèñòðà îáîðîíû Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ (ã. Ãóäàóòà). Ïî îêîí÷àíèè âîéíû óâîëåí â çàïàñ â çâàíèè ïîëêîâíèêà.  ìàðòå 1996 – ìàå 1997 ã. – ïðåäñåäàòåëü Ôîíäà êóëüòóðû Àáõàçèè (Ñóõóì). 198

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Ñ ìàðòà 1997 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ìèíèñòð èíîñòðàííûõ äåë Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ. Ïðèíèìàë ó÷àñòèå âî ìíîãèõ àðõåîëîãè÷åñêèõ ðàñêîïêàõ íà òåððèòîðèè Àáõàçèè, àâòîð ÷åòûðåõ êíèã, ìíîãèõ ñòàòåé, äðóãèõ ïóáëèêàöèé íàó÷íîãî è ïîëèòè÷åñêîãî õàðàêòåðà.  àâãóñòå 1991 ã. â ñîñòàâå äåëåãàöèè Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà ÑÑÑÐ ïîáûâàë â Èðàêå è Èîðäàíèè.  èþíå 1992 ã. ïðèíèìàë ó÷àñòèå â ñîñòàâå àáõàçñêîé äåëåãàöèè â ìåæäóíàðîäíîé âûñòàâêå «Êîëóìá-500» (Èòàëèÿ). Ñ 1997 ã. – íåïðåìåííûé ó÷àñòíèê ãðóçèíî-àáõàçñêîãî ïåðåãîâîðíîãî ïðîöåññà, â òîì ÷èñëå Æåíåâñêèõ âñòðå÷ ïîä ýãèäîé ÎÎÍ è ïðè ïîñðåäíè÷åñòâå ÐÔ.  íîÿáðå 1998 ã. çàùèòèë äîêòîðñêóþ äèññåðòàöèþ â Èíñòèòóòå àðõåîëîãèè è ýòíîãðàôèè ÀÍ Àðìåíèè íà òåìó «Ïîëèòè÷åñêîå, ñîöèàëüíî-ýêîíîìè÷åñêîå è êóëüòóðíîå ïîëîæåíèå äðåâíåé è ñðåäíåâåêîâîé Àáõàçèè ïî äàííûì àðõåîëîãèè è íóìèçìàòèêè (VI â. äî í.ý.– XIII â. í.ý.)». Æåíàò, èìååò ñûíà è äî÷ü. ØÀÌÁÀ Òàðàñ Ìèðîíîâè÷, äèðåêòîð Èíñòèòóòà êîììåð÷åñêîãî ïðàâà Ìîñêîâñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî èíñòèòóòà êîììåðöèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 29 èþëÿ 1938 ã. â ã. Ñóõóì (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1958 ã. îêîí÷èë àáõàçñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó ¹10 èì. Í. Ëàêîáà.  1958– 1963 ãã. – ñòóäåíò þðèäè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Ìîñêîâñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà (ÌÃÓ); þðèñò-ïðàâîâåä. Ïîñëå îêîí÷àíèÿ óíèâåðñèòåòà ðàáîòàë â ïðàâîîõðàíèòåëüíûõ îðãàíàõ Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ.  1975 ã. çàùèòèë êàíäèäàòñêóþ, à â 1985 ã. äîêòîðñêóþ äèññåðòàöèè. Ïðîøåë ïóòü îò ñòàðøåãî ïðåïîäàâàòåëÿ Àêàäåìèè îáùåñòâåííûõ íàóê ïðè ÖÊ ÊÏÑÑ (íûíå Àêàäåìèÿ ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé ñëóæáû ïðè Ïðåçèäåíòå ÐÔ) äî ïðîôåññîðà êàôåäðû ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ñòðîèòåëüñòâà è ïðàâà Àêàäåìèè ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé ñëóæáû ïðè Ïðåçèäåíòå ÐÔ.  1989 ã. èçáðàí äåïóòàòîì Âåðõîâíîãî Ñîâåòà ÑÑÑÐ. Ñ 1992 ã. – ïðåçèäåíò Âñåìèðíîãî êîíãðåññà àáõàçî-àáàçèíñêîãî íàðîäà.  íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – äèðåêòîð Èíñòèòóòà êîììåð÷åñêîãî ïðàâà Ìîñêîâñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî èíñòèòóòà êîììåðöèè. Äåéñòâèòåëüíûé ÷ëåí âîñüìè ìåæäóíàðîäíûõ àêàäåìèé: Ìåæäóíàðîäíîé àêàäåìèè èíôîðìàòèçàöèè ïðè ÎÎÍ, Ìåæäóíàðîäíîé Ôðàíöóçñêîé Ïëàòîíîâñêîé àêàäåìèè íàóê è èñêóññòâà, Àäûãñêîé ìåæäóíàðîäíîé àêàäåìèè íàóê è äð. Æåíàò, èìååò äâîèõ äî÷åðåé. ÝÍÔÅÍÄÆßÍ Àðòóð Ãåîðãèåâè÷, ïîëíîìî÷íûé ïðåäñòàâèòåëü Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ â Ñ.-Ïåòåðáóðãå. Ðîäèëñÿ 9 èþëÿ 1942 ã. â ñ. Öåáåëüäà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àðìÿíèí.  1949–1959 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â öåáåëüäèíñêîé è ñóõóìñêèõ øêîëàõ.  1960– 1962 ãã. – ïðåïîäàâàòåëü ôèçêóëüòóðû.  1962–1965 ãã. ñëóæèë â Ñîâåòñêîé àðìèè.  1965–1966 ãã. ðàáîòàë â ïëàâñòðîéîòðÿäå ¹9 (ã. Ñóõóì).  1966– 1971 ãã. – ñòóäåíò ôèëîëîãè÷åñêîãî ôàêóëüòåòà Ëåíèíãðàäñêîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî óíèâåðñèòåòà (ËÃÓ).  1971–1973 ãã. – íà÷àëüíèê ÎÊÑà Ìåäèöèíñêîãî 199

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ïåäèàòðè÷åñêîãî èíñòèòóòà (ã. Ëåíèíãðàä).  1973–1974 ãã. – çàìåñòèòåëü äèðåêòîðà ÑÏÒÓ ¹56 (ã. Ëåíèíãðàä).  1974–1975 ãã. – ñòàðøèé èíæåíåð ËÈÑÈ (ã. Ëåíèíãðàä).  1975–1988 ãã. – íà÷àëüíèê óïðàâëåíèÿ ýêñïëóàòàöèè, ïðîèçâîäñòâà, ìåäèêî-ñàíèòàðíîãî îáåñïå÷åíèÿ Ãëàâíîãî óïðàâëåíèÿ ïðîôòåõîáðàçîâàíèÿ ã. Ëåíèíãðàäà è Ëåíèíãðàäñêîé îáëàñòè.  1988–1989 ãã. – äèðåêòîð îáúåäèíåíèÿ «Òðóäîâûå ðåçåðâû» (ã. Ëåíèíãðàä).  1989–1991 ãã. – äèðåêòîð ìàëîãî ãîñóäàðñòâåííîãî ïðåäïðèÿòèÿ «Ãëàâîðòïîìîùü» Ìèíèñòåðñòâà ñîöèàëüíîãî îáåñïå÷åíèÿ ÐÑÔÑÐ. Ñ 1991 ã. ïî íàñòîÿùåå âðåìÿ – ãåíåðàëüíûé äèðåêòîð Ñåâåðî-Çàïàäíîãî ïðîèçâîäñòâåííîãî ïðîòåçíî-îðòîïåäè÷åñêîãî îáúåäèíåíèÿ. Ñ ôåâðàëÿ 2000 ã. – ïîëíîìî÷íûé ïðåäñòàâèòåëü Ðåñïóáëèêè Àáõàçèÿ â Ñ.-Ïåòåðáóðãå. Ñ 2001 ã. – àêàäåìèê Ìåæäóíàðîäíîé àêàäåìèè ðåàëüíîé ýêîíîìèêè. Çàñëóæåííûé ðàáîòíèê ïðîôòåõîáðàçîâàíèÿ ÑÑÑÐ. Æåíàò, èìååò ñûíà. ÝØÁÀ Âÿ÷åñëàâ Àõìåòîâè÷, êîìàíäóþùèé Âîåííî-âîçäóøíûìè ñèëàìè (1993–2003), ìèíèñòð îáîðîíû Àáõàçèè (ñ 2003 ã.), Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Ðîäèëñÿ 13 ìàðòà 1949 ã. â ñ. Äóðèïø Ãóäàóòñêîãî ðàéîíà (Àáõàçèÿ). Àáõàç.  1966 ã. îêîí÷èë ñåëüñêóþ ñðåäíþþ øêîëó.  1967–1970 ãã. îáó÷àëñÿ â Åãîðüåâñêîì àâèàöèîííî-òåõíè÷åñêîì ó÷èëèùå (Ìîñêîâñêàÿ îáëàñòü). Ðàáîòàë àâèàòåõíèêîì â Ñóõóìñêîì àýðîïîðòó.  1971–1973 ãã. ó÷èëñÿ â Êðåìåí÷óãñêîì ëåòíîì ó÷èëèùå (Ïîëòàâñêàÿ îáëàñòü, Óêðàèíñêàÿ ÑÑÐ).  1973– 1978 ãã. – ïèëîò ñàìîëåòà «ÀÍ-2» â Ñóõóìñêîì àýðîïîðòó.  1978–1983 ãã. – â Ëåíèíãðàäñêîé àêàäåìèè ãðàæäàíñêîé àâèàöèè. Èíæåíåð-ïèëîò I êëàññà. Äî íà÷àëà âîéíû ñ Ãðóçèåé â 1992 ã. ëåòàë íà ñàìîëåòàõ: «ÀÍ-2», «ÒÓ-134», «ÒÓ-154». Çàíèìàë äîëæíîñòè êîìàíäèðà êîðàáëÿ, ïèëîòà-èíñòðóêòîðà, êîìàíäèðà àâèàýñêàäðèëüè, êîìàíäèðà àâèàîòäåëà Ñóõóìñêîãî àýðîïîðòà. Ñ àâãóñòà 1992 ïî ñåíòÿáðü 1993 ã. – ó÷àñòíèê Îòå÷åñòâåííîé âîéíû â Àáõàçèè. Âûïîëíèë îêîëî 80 áîåâûõ âûëåòîâ â äíåâíîå è íî÷íîå âðåìÿ. Âî âðåìÿ âûïîëíåíèÿ áîåâîãî ïîëåòà áûë ïîäáèò ïðîòèâíèêîì â èþëå 1993 ã. ïðè ïîïûòêå âûñàäèòü äåñàíò íà ã. Àõáþê (áëèç Ñóõóìà). Áóäó÷è ðàíåííûì, âûøåë èç îêðóæåíèÿ.  ôåâðàëå 1993 ã. ïðè âûïîëíåíèè íî÷íîãî ïîëåòà íà Âîñòî÷íûé ôðîíò (ðàéîí Òêâàð÷àëà) ïîòåðïåë àâàðèþ.  àâãóñòå 1992 – äåêàáðå 1993 ã. – êîìàíäèð àâèàãðóïïû.  äåêàáðå 1993 – 2003 ã. – êîìàíäóþùèé Âîåííî-âîçäóøíûìè ñèëàìè Àáõàçèè è ãåíåðàëüíûé äèðåêòîð ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé êîìïàíèè «Àáõàçñêèå àâèàëèíèè». Ñ 2003 ã. – ìèíèñòð îáîðîíû Àáõàçèè. Ëåòàåò íà ïÿòè òèïàõ âîçäóøíûõ ñóäîâ. Îáùèé íàëåò: 9500 ÷àñîâ. Ïîëêîâíèê. Íàãðàæäåí ñîâåòñêèì îðäåíîì Òðóäîâîé Ñëàâû III ñòåïåíè. Ãåðîé Àáõàçèè. Æåíàò, äâîå äåòåé. 200

ÓÊÀÇÀÒÅËÜ ÈÌÅÍ Àáàñ-îãëû À.Ø. 111, 119 Àáàøèäçå À. 131 Àáîâÿí Õ. 192 Àáóõáà 77 Àâàëèàíè Ñ. 43, 90 Àâàëîâ (Àâàëèøâèëè) Ç. 83, 94, 135, 142 Àâåòèñÿí Ã. 91 Àâèäçáà Â.Ä. 144, 146 Àâèäçáà Ë.Á. 145, 146 Àâèäçáà Õ. 67 Àâòîíîìîâ À.Ñ. 82, 94 Àãàðêîâ 27 Àãðáà À.Ñ. 116, 117 Àãðáà Ã.Ê. 144, 145, 147, 153, 155 Àäà (ñì. Öåêâàâà À.) Àäàìñ Ò. 130 Àäæàìîâ Ã. 51, 69 Àéáà À. À. 147 Àéáà Ð.Ò. 148 Àéíàð 10 Àêàáà Í.Í. 145, 148 Àêàáà Í.Ð. 149 Àêèðòàâà Í. 13, 85, 87 Àêêè (ñì. Äæèõ-îãëû À.À.) Àêøáà Ý.Ì. 109 Àëàíèÿ Ä. 46, 68, 69, 76, 78–80 Àëåêñàíäð I 18, 19, 23, 25–27, 30 Àëåêñàíäð II 42 Àëåêñååâ Ì.Ñ. 60, 65, 66 Àëèåâ Ã. 129 Àëèõàíîâ-Àâàðñêèé 77 Àëøèáàÿ 71, 72 Àëüòìàí 120 Àìêóàá (Ìèêâàáèÿ) Ã.À. 145, 149 Àíäðååâ 113 Àíäðåé Ïåðâîçâàííûé 10 Àíêâàá À.Ç. 145, 150 Àíòåëàâà È.Ã. 17, 20

Àíòèÿ Ò. 118 Àíòîíîâà À. 121 Àíòîíîâà Ý. 121 Àíóà Â.È. 144, 151 Àíöóïîâ Â.Â. 144, 150, 170 Àí÷àáàäçå Â.Ò. 78, 113 Àí÷àáàäçå Ã. 38, 39, 89, 90 Àí÷àáàäçå Ç.Â. 37, 91, 118, 150 Àí÷àáàäçå Ï. 44 Àí÷àáàäçå Þ.Ä. 91, 151, 155 Àðäçèíáà Â.Ã. 15, 124, 143, 152, 155, 162, 173 Àðäçèíáà Ð. 145 Àðäçèíáà Ñ.Ç. 153 Àðòàìîíîâ Ñ. 164 Àðõèïîâ Â. 164 Àðøáà Â.Ã. 144, 154, 170 Àðøáà Â.Ø. 145 Àñàòèàíè Ñ. 28, 29 Àòàðáåêîâ Ã. 88, 89, 95, 100 Àòàòþðê 85 Àõáà È.Ì. 144, 155 Àõáà Ì.Ñ. 115 Àõóáà Ä.Â. 156 Àõóáà Ê. 117 À÷áà Ç.Ê. 62, 63, 144, 157 À÷óãáà Ò.À. 90 Àøóáà Ê. 67 Àøóáà Í. 145 Àøóáà Õ. 67 Àøõàöàâà Ñ.Ì. 46, 47, 68, 69, 78 Áàáåëü È. 84 Áàãàïø Ì. 67 Áàãàïø Ñ.Â. 145, 157 Áàãðàìÿí 183 Áàãðàò III 11 Áàçáà 77

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Óêàçàòåëü èìåí Áàéêîâ Á. 60 Áàêðàäçå À. 38 Áàììàò Ã. 58 Áàðàìèäçå Ì. 39 Áàðãàíäæèÿ Ä.À. 158 Áàðöèö Ê. 77, 80 Áàñàðèÿ È. 155 Áàñàðèÿ Ñ.Ï. 46, 48, 51, 56–58, 61, 62, 65, 67, 77, 92 Áãàæáà Î. 9 Áãàæáà Õ.Ñ. 37, 93 Áãàíáà Ë.Ä. 145, 159 Áåäèÿ 108 Áåéêåð Äæ. 128–130 Áåëèíñêèé 116 Áåëîóñîâ Â. 163 Áåíåò Ñ. 178 Áåíèÿ Ø. 113 Áåðäçåíèøâèëè Ä. 38 Áåðäçåíèøâèëè Ë. 38, 90 Áåðäçåíèøâèëè Í. 37 Áåðåçîâñêèé Á.À. 135 Áåðèÿ Ë.Ï. 2, 3, 5, 7, 14, 37, 89, 101, 103–121 Áåðèÿ Ì.Â. 111 Áåðèÿ Í. 112 Áåðèÿ Ñ.Ë. 108 Áåðóëàâà Ì. 79 Áåñåëèÿ 106 Áåõîôôåð Ê.Ý. (Bechoffer C.E.) 60, 92 Áè÷ 75, 76 Áëýð Ò. 127 Áîãäàíîâ 105 Áîëüøàêîâ Ë. 121 Áîíäè Ñ. 164 Áîöèåâ Î.È. 159 Áðàéòôîðä 70 Áðèããñ 67, 75 Áðîäñêèé È. 6 Áðîíåâñêèé Ñ. 17, 35 Áóáíîâà Â.Ä. 157 Áóäåííûé Ñ. 112 Áóëàíîâ À.Ì. 103 Áóðäæàíàäçå Í. 131, 136 Áóø Äæ. 126, 130, 138 Âàâèëîâ Í.È. 101, 112, 121 Âàðäàíèÿ À. 110 Âàñèíà Ì.Â. 119 Âà÷íàäçå Ä. 83 Âåëüÿìèíîâ 32 Âåíåäèêòîâà Í.Þ. 145, 160

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Âåðà Ãåîðãèåâíà (ñì. Ëàêîáà Â.Ã.) Âëàñèê 105 Âîèíñêèé À.À. 144, 160 Âîðîáüåâ Í. 60, 65 Âîðîíîâ Í.È. 161 Âîðîíîâ Þ.Í. 144, 156, 160, 161 Âîðîøèëîâ Ê.Å. 105, 108 Âðàíãåëü 83, 93 Ãàãóëèÿ Ã.Ë. 145, 162 Ãàçàðÿí Ñ. 89 Ãàëàâàíîâ 118 Ãàëóñòîâ 178 Ãàìàõàðèÿ Ä. 45, 48, 50, 91, 93 Ãàìñàõóðäèà Ç. 38, 39, 60, 82, 176, 177, 188 Ãàíãèÿ Ð.À. 113, 114, 119 Ãâàçàâà Ã. 47 Ãâàðàìèÿ À.À. 163 Ãåãå÷êîðè Å. 60, 65–67, 75, 76 Ãåêêåð 83 Ãåëîâàíè Ï.Ë. 74 Ãåëüôðåéõ Â. 112 Ãåíäåðñîí 73 Ãåîðãèé II 11, 187 Ãåòìàíåíêî 106 Ãåòüå Ô.À. 96 Ãå÷ (Ãå÷áà) 24 Ãèáàëü Ï. 36 Ãîãåáàøâèëè ß. 12, 45 Ãîãëèäçå Ñ.À. 106, 114 Ãîãóà À.Í. 164 Ãîæáà À. 33 Ãîëèöûíà Ò. 33 Ãîíäæóà Ì.Õ. 111 Ãîðäàäçå Ò. 37, 89 Ãîð÷àêîâ Ï.Ä. 34, 36 Ãîðüêèé À.Ì. 160, 164, 169, 172, 182 Ãðèãîëèÿ Ì.Ë. 74 Ãóäàâà Ò. 90 Ãóäîâè÷ 18, 19, 22, 23, 28–30 Ãóëèà Ä.È. 64, 152, 157, 161, 164, 209 Ãóëèà Ò. 155, 182 Ãóìáåðèäçå Ç. 135 Ãóðàíäóõò 11 Ãóðãóëèÿ Ì. 145 Ãóðäæóà Â.Ò. 50, 51, 55, 56, 79, 165 Ãóñåâ 99 Äàâëèàíèäçå 118 Äàäèàíè Ãåîðãèé 24 Äàäèàíè Ãðèãîðèé 20, 21, 24, 28, 29

Óêàçàòåëü èìåí Äàäèàíè Ë. 20, 21, 22, 24, 29, 31, 33 Äàäèàíè Í.Ã. 4, 18–20, 22–30 Äàäèàíè Ò. 29, 32, 34 Äàìåíèà Î.Í. 165 Äàíèëîâ Ñ. 57, 94 Äàðåäæàí 112, 113 Äáàð Á.À. 166 Äáàð Ð.Ñ. 166 Äáàð Ñ.Ï. 144, 153, 167 Äåäÿí À.Ì. 116 Äåëáà Ì. 118 Äåíèêèí À.È. 51, 52, 57, 60, 62, 64, 66, 67, 70–73, 75, 76, 81, 84, 91–93, 127 Äæàíàøèÿ Ñ.Â. 115 Äæàïàðèäçå Î. 39 Äæåêñîí Á. 130 Äæåðãåíèÿ À. 145 Äæåðãåíèÿ À.Ì. 168 Äæåðãåíèÿ Ä.È. 111, 117, 118 Äæèíäæîëèÿ Ñ.Ð. 168 Äæèõ-îãëû 85 Äæèõ-îãëû À.À. 118 Äæèõ-îãëû Ë.À. 118 Äæèõ-îãëû Ì.À. 113, 118 Äæèõ-îãëû Ìóñòî À. 118, 124 Äæèõ-îãëû Í.À. 118 Äæèõ-îãëû Õ.À. 118 Äæîíóà Í.Ò. 169 Äæóãåëè 77 Äçàïøáà Ë. 151 Äçåðæèíñêèé Ô.Ý. 95, 96, 100, 101 Äçèãóà Ï. 48 Äçèäçàðèÿ Ã.À. 17, 20, 22, 35, 42, 90, 93, 94 Äçêóÿ Ä. 77 Äçóêóÿ 77 Äçÿïø-èïà (Äçÿïøèïà) 20, 22, 103 Äèìèòðèé 18 Äèìèòðîâ Ã. 112 Äîäò 26, 27 Äîñòîåâñêèé Ô. 165 Äóáðîâèí Í. 17, 21, 35 Åâòóøåíêî Å. 161 Åâôðàò 10 Åãîðîâ 108 Åæîâ Í.È. 95 Åëüöèí Á.Í. 126, 162 Åíèêóäçå À. 88 Åíóêèäçå Ã. 161 Åðìîëîâ À.Ï. 24, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 63 Åðîôàëîâ 106

Æâàíèÿ Ç. 131 Æãåíòè Â.Ê. 115 Æîðäàíèÿ Í. (Zhordania N.) 59, 69–71, 73, 76, 78, 81, 83, 86, 91, 93 Æîðæîëèàíè Ã. 39, 40, 44, 45, 48 Æóêîâ Ã.Ê. 188 Çàíòàðèÿ Àñëàí È. 144, 151, 169, 171 Çàíòàðèÿ Àñòàìóð È. 151, 170 Çàíòàðèÿ Àñòàí (Çàçà) È. 144, 151, 169, 170 Çàíòàðèÿ Â.Ê. 171 Çàðàíäèÿ Èâàí (Âàæà) È. 171 Çàðóáèí 106 Çàõàðîâ Ä. 50, 79 Çåâà 21 Çåäãåíèäçå È. 43 Çèíîâüåâ 88, 99, 110 Çîçóëÿ Å. 107 Çîëèíà Í.Ò. 122 Èâàíîâ È. 129 Èåññåí À.À. 161 Èíàë-èïà À. 44 Èíàë-èïà Ê. 40, 41, 85, 117–121 Èíàë-èïà Í.Ê. 120 Èíãîðîêâà Ï. 37–39, 44, 45, 62, 92 Èîñåëèàíè È. 25, 29, 30 Èñêàíäåð Ô. 156, 172 Êàãàíîâè÷ Ë.Ì. 107 Êàäàãèøâèëè 118 Êàêàëèÿ Â.Ø. 144, 151, 173 Êàêóáà Ð.È. 51–57, 74 Êàêó÷àÿ 114 Êàìåíåâ 88, 110 Êàìêèÿ À. 171 Êàìî 112 Êàïáà Ý.Ý. 174 Êàðöèâàäçå Í. 47 Êàóðîâ 96 Êâàð÷åëèÿ Ë.Â. 145, 162, 175 Êâàð÷èÿ Â.Å. 90 Êâèíèòàäçå Ã. 83 Êåìàëü-ïàøà 85, 86 Êåðçîí 66 Êåöáà Ò.È. 175 Êèëàäçå Ñ. 92 Êèëàðäæèøâèëè À. 119 Êèïøèäçå 116 Êèðîâ 108 Êèóò Ê. 67

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Óêàçàòåëü èìåí Êèøìàðèÿ Ì.Á. 117, 144, 171, 176 Êîáàõèÿ 77 Êîáàõèÿ À.À. 177 Êîáóëîâ 106, 118, 120, 121 Êîâà÷ Ê. 122, 123 Êîãîíèà È. 182 Êîëáàÿ (Êàëãû) Ã.Í. 177 Êîëáèí Ã. 178 Êîëóìá Õ. 162 Êîíåâ È.Ñ. 176 Êîíðàäèíè 26 Êîíñòàíòèí 10 Êîïïèòåðñ Á. 91 Êîðòàà Ð. 171 Êîðòóà È. 115 Êîñòàâà Ì. 38 Êî÷ëàäçå Î. 178 Êðàóòõàììåð ×. 127 Êðåññ ôîí 65, 71 Êóäæáà À. 187 Êóäðÿâöåâ Ê. 17, 35, 36 Êóëèêîâ Ë. 163 Êóïàëáà Ã.Ñ. 146, 179 Êóïóíèÿ 77 Êóðíàòîâñêèé 32 Êóðîäà Ò. 157 Êóøíåðåâ 120 Ê÷à÷ À.È. 145, 179 Ëàáàõóà Ç.À. 179 Ëàâðåíòèé (ñì. Áåðèÿ Ë.Ï.) Ëàâðîâ Í.È. 106 Ëàäàðèÿ Â. 103, 117, 118 Ëàêåðáàÿ Ç.Ã. 180 Ëàêåðáàÿ Ë.È. 145, 181 Ëàêîáà Â. 113, 117–119, 121 Ëàêîáà Â.Ã. 121, 122 Ëàêîáà Ç. 121 Ëàêîáà Ì. 85, 100, 109, 113, 117–119, 121 Ëàêîáà Í.À. 2, 3, 5, 7, 14, 85, 86, 89, 95–119, 123, 124, 149, 151, 155, 157, 165, 175, 179, 184, 185, 189, 190, 193–196, 198, 199 Ëàêîáà Í.Ì. 120–122 Ëàêîáà Ð.Í. 3, 118–121 Ëàêîáà Ñ. 3, 59, 90–94, 102, 110, 112–115, 117–119, 162 Ëàêîáà Ñ.Ç. 1, 2, 4, 141, 142, 144, 209 Ëàêîáà Ñ.Ì. 121, 122 Ëàêîáà Ñàèäà 121 Ëàêîáà Ò.Â. 120, 121

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Ëàêîáà Óðóñ (Ëàêâàðè) 34, 123 Ëàêîáà ßêóá Â. 181 Ëåæàâà Ã.Ï. 44, 90, 92 Ëåêèøâèëè Ñ. 45 Ëåíèí Â.È. 3, 82, 85–87, 95–98, 155, 171 Ëåîí II 10, 152, 155, 169, 175, 179, 185, 187, 191, 192 Ëèïêèí Ñ. 102, 110 Ëèòâèíîâ 21, 29 Ëîìàäçå Ã. 134 Ëîìèíàäçå Ã.Í. 151, 170, 173 Ëîìèÿ (Àëàìèà) Ã.Ø. 182 Ëîìîíîñîâ Ì.Â. 155 Ëîìòàòèäçå Ê. 37 Ëîðäêèïàíèäçå Ì. 38 Ëîññîâ ôîí 49, 50, 58 Ëóêîìñêèé À.Ñ. 57, 60, 66, 75 Ëþáèí 194 Ëþäåíäîðô 51 Ëþôòè (ñì. Äæèõ-îãëû Ë.À.) Ìàãîìåäîâ À. 133, 141 Ìàçíèåâ (Ìàçíèàøâèëè) Ã. 59–62, 65, 76, 77 Ìàéëç Ð. 130, 131, 138 ÌàêÊåéí Äæ. 130 Ìàëàøåíêî À. 91 Ìàìàëàäçå 115 Ìàìóëîâ Ñ.Ñ. 116 Ìàíäåëüøòàì Í.ß. 122–124 Ìàíäåëüøòàì Î.Ý. 3, 122–124 Ìàíó÷àð 20 Ìàðãàíàäçå 71, 72 Ìàðãàíèÿ È. 69, 76, 78 Ìàðãàíèÿ Í. 47 Ìàðãàíèÿ Ò. 40, 41, 49 Ìàðãèàíè Ã. 43 Ìàðøàíèÿ Ì. 40, 41, 43 Ìàðøàíèÿ Ò. 46, 58, 67 Ìàòîñÿí Â.Â. 183 Ìàòîñÿí Ñ.Â. 144, 183 Ìà÷àâàðèàíè Ê. 17, 41, 64 Ìãàëîáëèøâèëè Ã. 112 Ìäèâàíè Á. 95 Ìåäæèò (ñì. Äæèõ-îãëû Ì.À.) Ìåíàãàðèøâèëè È. 159 Ìåíòåøàøâèëè À. 5, 40, 44–49, 52, 55, 57– 60, 63, 64, 66, 67, 71, 72, 80–82, 87, 90–94 Ìåðëèíè 27 Ìåð÷óëå Ã. 37 Ìåñõè Ê. 47

Óêàçàòåëü èìåí Ìåõëèñ 109 Ìèêàíáà Â.Ò. 183 Ìèêâàáèÿ À. 151 Ìèêâàáèÿ Àðòóð (Çàóð) À. 184 Ìèêåëàäçå À.Í. 106 Ìèêëóõî-Ìàêëàé Í.Í. 151 Ìèêîÿí 109 Ìèëüí 73 Ìèíîñÿí À. 119 Ìèõàèë 18 Ìèõèí 34 Ìèøà (ñì. Ëàêîáà Ì.) Ìîãèëåâñêèé Ñ. 85, 95, 100 Ìîëîòîâ 113 Ìóñòî À. (ñì. Äæèõ-îãëû Ì.À.) Ìóñõåëàøâèëè Ä. 39 Ìÿñíèêîâ À. 89, 100 Íàäàðåéøâèëè Ò. 136 Íàäåæäà Êîíñòàíòèíîâíà 98 Íàäåæäà ßêîâëåâíà (ñì. Ìàíäåëüøòàì Í.ß.) Íàäæèáóëëà 176 Íàçèÿ (ñì. Äæèõ-îãëû Í.À.) Íàïîëåîí 28 Íà÷à÷-îãëû Â.Ý. 184 Íåññåëüðîäå 30, 32 Íåñòîð (ñì. Ëàêîáà Í.À.) Íèêèò÷åíêî Ã.Â. 185 Íèêîëàé (Êóêóøà) (ñì. Ëàêîáà Í.Ì.) Íèêîëàé II 13 Íèêîëî 21 Íèíà (ñì. Äàäèàíè Í.Ã.) Íîäàðàÿ 103 Íîäèÿ Ã. 91 Îãóðöîâ 161 Îäèøåëèäçå È. 63, 83 Îçãàí Ê.Ê. 185 Îëüäåíáóðãñêèé À.Ï. 46 Îìåð-ïàøà 35 Îðàõåëàâøèëè Ì. 104 Îðáàé (Àøõàðóà) Ð. 85, 86 Îðáåëèàíè Ä. 26 Îðâåëàøâèëè Í. 128 Îðäæîíèêèäçå À. 119 Îðäæîíèêèäçå Ã. (Ñåðãî) 13, 86. 87, 95–97, 99, 100–102, 104, 108, 109, 113, 197 Îðäæîíèêèäçå Ç. 113 Îñèï Ýìèëüåâè÷ (ñì. Ìàíäåëüøòàì Î.Ý.) Îñèÿ Î.Â. 186

Ïàâëåíêîâ Ô. 64 Ïàé÷àäçå Ã. 40, 44 Ïàïàñêèðè Ç. 93 Ïàïáà Á. 171 Ïàòóëèäè Í.Ã. 188 Ïàóýëë Ê. 138, 139 Ïà÷óëèà Â. 90 Ïà÷óëèÿ Ã. 113, 114, 118 Ïàøàëèäè È. 50, 79 Ïåòðîâ Î.Ï. 187 Ïåòðîâñêèé Ã. 112 Ïèëèà Ò. 171 Ïèëèÿ À. 106 Ïèîòðîâñêèé Á.Á. 161 Ïëàòîíîâ À. 165 Ïîíîìàðåâ Á. 107 Ïîñïåëîâ Ã. 164 Ïîòòî Â. 17 Ïóòèí Â. 16, 126, 128, 130, 138 Ïóøêèí À.Ñ. 182 Ïøåìèíñêèé Á.È. 121 Ïÿòàêîâ 99 Ðàêîâñêèé Õ. 88 Ðàêîöè 34 Ðàìèøâèëè È. 55, 56, 62, 70, 73–76 Ðàìèøâèëè Í. 64, 67, 70, 75, 76 Ðàóô (ñì. Ëàêîáà Ð.Í.) Ðåáèÿ-õàíóì Ìàðøàí 24, 31 Ðèõòåð Ç. 99 Ðòèùåâ 31 Ðóäåíêî Ð.À. 114, 119 Ðóìÿíöåâ Í.Ï. 23 Ðûêãîô 18, 22, 26, 29, 30 Ðûêîâ À.È. 95 Ñààêàøâèëè Ì. 4, 16, 131, 138, 139 Ñàâèöêèé 118 Ñàãàðàäçå 88, 118 Ñàãàðèÿ Á.Å. 90, 93, 94, 118 Ñàäî 161 Ñàçîíîâ 66 Ñàçîíîâà Í. 170 Ñàêâàðåëèäçå Ï. 47 Ñàëòûêîâ 30 Ñàðèøâèëè-×àíòóðèÿ È. 135 Ñàðèÿ (ñì. Ëàêîáà Ñ.) Ñàðû÷åâ 26 Ñâÿòîïîëê-Ìèðñêèé 40 Ñåäîâà Í.È. 97 Ñåéñÿí Ï. 117, 118

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Óêàçàòåëü èìåí Ñåìàøêî 187 Ñåìåðäæèåâ È.Ã. 112, 113 Ñåìåðæäèåâ Ê. 113 Ñåðãåé (×èâà) (ñì. Ëàêîáà Ñ.Ì.) Ñåðãî (ñì. Îðäæîíèêèäçå) Ñèäàìîíèäçå Ó. 45 Ñèìîí Êàíàíèò 10 Ñèìîíîâè÷ 25, 26 Ñìåöêèé 98 Ñìèðíîâ È. 88 Ñìûð Â.À. 188 Ñìûð Ñ. 146 Ñìûðáà Õàøèì 107 Ñîëîìîí II 21, 29 Ñîðîñ Äæ. 131 Ñîñíàëèåâ Ñ.À. 144, 188 Ñòàëèí È.Â. (Êîáà) 2, 3, 5, 7, 13, 86–89, 95–97, 99–113, 117–119 Ñòàëü 32 Ñòîêñ 71, 72 Ñòîëûïèí Ï.À. 13 Ñòðàæåâ Â.È. 17, 18, 35 Ñòðàòîôèë 10 Ñòþàðò Äæ. 194 Ñóðãóëàäçå À. 45, 55, 90 Ñóñëîâ Ì. 161 Òàáàãóà Á.È. 189 Òàâäãèðèäçå Í.Ê. 74 Òàëåéðàí 22 Òàðáà À.Á. 189 Òàðêèë Ñ.Ð. 190 Òàðíàâà Â.Ã. 191 Òàðíàâà Ì. 46, 47, 68, 76–80, 91, 93 Òáèëåëè À. 10 Òèãëàòïàëàñàð I 9 Òîèäçå Ë. 40, 45, 46, 48, 50, 78, 82, 86 Òîëñòîé Ë. 165 Òîìàñ À.Ã. 194 Òîìñêèé 99 Òîìñîí 71, 72 Òîïîëÿí À.Ã. 144, 191 Òîðåç Ì. 175 Òîðìàñîâ 25–28 Òðàâåðñå È.È. äå 26 Òðàïèçîíÿí Ã.Ï. 144, 192 Òðåãóáîâ È. 142 Òðåíèí Ä. 91 Òðîöêèé Ë.Ä. 3, 51, 71, 73, 83, 84, 87–89, 91, 93, 94, 96–98, 100, 101, 124, 127, 141

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Òðóáíèêîâ Â. 136, 137 Òóëóìäæÿí À. 92 Òóìàíîâ Ã. 51, 55, 56, 69 Òóìàðêèí Ë.Ì. 70, 74 Òóðêèÿ Ñ.Ñ. 111, 117, 118 Òóõàðåëè 69, 77, 78 Òóõà÷åâñêèé 108 Òýëáîòò Ñ. 130 Óáèðèÿ À. 79 Óëüðèõ Â.Â. 120 Óîêêåð 73 Óîðäðîï Ì. 194, 195 Óÿìà Ò. 3, 5 Ôàäååâ À.Â. 17, 22, 35, 42, 90 Ôåäîðåíêî 122 Ôåäîðîâ 106 Ôåäîðîâà Å. 119 Ôåëüøòèíñêèé Þ. 94 Ôåîäîñèé Ñëåïîé 11 Ôëîðåíñêèé Ï. 162 Ôðóíçå 99, 167 Õàäæèìáà Ð.Ä. 145, 192 Õàçàí À. 118, 121 Õàðàáóà Ð.Ç. 192 Õàñàé À. 73 Õàõìèãåðè Ì. 98 Õàøáà Í.Â. 145, 193 Õàøèã Ð. 145 Õàøèì (ñì. Ñìûðáà Õàøèì) Õâàðöêèÿ Ì.Õ. 144, 153, 170, 194 Õâàò 120, 121 Õèíòáà Â. 178 Õðóùåâ Í.Ñ. 7, 105, 119 Õüþèòò (Áðàéàí) Äæîðäæ 38, 144, 194 Öàãóðèÿ Á. 47 Öàãóðèÿ Ì. 46, 76, 79 Öàòóðîâà-Àãàáàáîâà À. 119 Öâèæáà 77 Öâèæáà Ò. 67 Öåçàðü 6 Öåéáà È. 113 Öåêâàâà À. 115, 116 Öåêâàâà Ì.Ñ. 115 Öèììåðìàí Å. 121 Öèöèàíîâ 21 Öóãáà Â.Ì. 147, 155, 195 Öõàêàÿ Ì. 112

Óêàçàòåëü èìåí ×àëìàç Ì. 113, 117, 118, 195 ×àëìàç Ì.Ð. 119, 195 ×àìàãóà Â.Ç. 196 ×àíáà Ã. 191 ×àíáà Ñ.ß. 74, 93, 156 ×àíáà Õ. 117 ×àíèÿ Â. 91, 93 ×àíèÿ È.Ò. 145, 196 ×à÷áà (Øåðâàøèäçå) Àñëàíáåé (Àðñëàí, Àðñëàíáåé, Àñëàíáåê) 3, 4, 11, 17–20, 23, 24, 26–28, 30–35, 40, 90 ×à÷áà (Øåðâàøèäçå) Êåëåøáåé (Êåëåøáåé, Êåëåøáåê, Êåëåø-Àõìåä-áåê) 4, 11, 17–19, 22–24, 28, 29 ×à÷áà (Øåðâàøèäçå) Ñåôåðáåé (Ñåôåðáåê, Ñåôåð-Àëè-áåé, Ãåîðãèé) 11, 17– 19, 22–32, 34 ×à÷áà Áàòàëáåé 24, 31, 32 ×à÷áà Â. 69 ×à÷áà Ãàñàíáåé 24, 31, 32 ×à÷áà Çóðàá 20 ×à÷áà Êó÷óêáåé 23 ×à÷áà Ìàí÷à (Ìàíó÷àð) 20 ×à÷áà Ðîñòîìáåé 31, 32 ×à÷áà Òàèðáåé 31, 32 ×à÷áà Øèðâàí 20 ×åðìîåâ Ò. 58 ×å÷óëèí Ñ. 105 ×èãàøåâ 106 ×èêîâàíè Ë. 119 ×èðèêáà Â.À. 144, 155, 197 ×î÷óà À. 56, 77 ×óáàéñ À. 128, 135 ×óêáàð À. 44, 77 ×õåíêåëè À. 46–48, 52 ×õèêâèøâèëè Á. 69, 70, 76, 77 ×õîòóà Ð. 47, 56, 68, 69 Øàëèêàøâèëè Äæ. 130 Øàìáà Ë.Õ. 149 Øàìáà Î.Á. 197 Øàìáà Ñ. 145 Øàìáà Ñ.Ì. 198 Øàìáà Ò.Ì. 199 Øàìáà Õ.Î. 149 Øàõóñíà 113, 119 Øâàðöìàí 121 Øåâàðäíàäçå Ý. 4, 16, 90, 126–134, 159, 162, 176–179 Øåâ÷åíêî Ò. 192 Øåíãåëàÿ Ë. (Ë. Êèà÷åëè) 80

Øåðâàøèäçå À. 46, 47, 49, 51, 58, 67, 72, 103 Øåðâàøèäçå Â. 50, 54, 61, 62, 65, 67–70, 79, 80, 115, 191 Øåðâàøèäçå Âàðëàì 51, 67, 75, 79 Øåðâàøèäçå Ã.Ì. 41, 42 Øåðâàøèäçå Äìèòðèé (Îìàðáåé) 32–34 Øåðâàøèäçå Ì. 36, 44 Øåðâàøèäçå Ìèõàèë (Õàìóäáåé) 34, 36 Øåðèïîâ À. 46, 47 Øèðàê Æ. 127 Øêëîâñêèé Â. 124, 164 Øëàòòåð Ì. 69, 115 Øîéãó Ñ.Ê. 167, 193 Øîíèÿ Â. 118 Øïèëü 88 Øðåäåð Ã. 127, 139 Øóëåíáóðã 58 Øóëüãèí Â.Â. 66 Øóòîâà Ò. 162 Ùóêî Â. 112 Ýáæíîó Ñ. 117, 118 Ýçóõáàÿ Á. 44 Ýëèàøâèëè Ë. 130 Ýìóõâàðè À. 50, 75–77 Ýìóõâàðè À. (Äìèòðèé) 48 Ýìóõâàðè Á. 40, 41, 43, 103 Ýìóõâàðè Ä. 69 Ýìóõâàðè Ë. (Âëàäèìèð) 48 Ýìóõâàðè Ì. 44, 47, 48 Ýíãåëîâ À. 112, 115–118 Ýíôåíäæÿí À.Ã. 199 Ýñàäçå Ñ. 36 Ýøáà 86, 103 Ýøáà Â.À. 200 Ýøáà Âÿ÷. 144, 145 Ýøáà Å. 85–87, 94 Ýøáà Ð.Ä. 117 Þäåíè÷ 81, 92, 93 Þñòèíèàí I (Âåëèêèé) 6, 10 ßãîäà Ã.Ã. 95, 109, 110 ßçûêîâ 26 Hewitt G. 90, 208 Hizal, Ahmet Hazir 91 Wajima M. 142

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СТАНИСЛАВ ЗОСИМОВИЧ ЛАКОБА (р. 1953), профессор Абхазского государственного университета, лауреат Государственной премии Абхазии имени Д.И. Гулиа (1992), известный историк, литератор, автор многих публикаций по вопросам археологии, истории, политики и культуры народов Кавказа. В 2000 и 2004 гг. в качестве приглашенного профессора занимался исследовательской работой в Центре славянских исследований Университета Хоккайдо. Является автором и редактором книг и монографий: «Крылились дни в Сухум-Кале». Историко-культурные очерки (Сухуми, 1988); Очерки политической истории Абхазии (Сухуми, 1990); История Абхазии. Учебное пособие (Сухум, 1991; Гудаута, 1993); The Abkhazians / ed. by G. Hewitt (London - New York, 1999); Ответ историкам из Тбилиси (Сухум, 2001); Абхазия – де-факто или Грузия – де-юре? О политике России в Абхазии в постсоветский период (Саппоро, 2001); Абхазский архив (Москва, 2002) и др. Станислав ЛАКОБА известен и как политик. Во время грузино-абхазской войны 1992-1993 гг. был депутатом Верховного Совета – парламента Республики Абхазия (1991-1996 гг.), в 1993-1994 гг. являлся 1-м заместителем председателя Верховного Совета Абхазии, а в 1994-1996 гг. – 1-м вице-спикером парламента. Принимал участие в Женевском процессе урегулирования грузино-абхазского конфликта под эгидой ООН и при посредничестве России. В последние годы в рамках «Бергхоф-центра» (Германия) и неправительственной организации «Ресурсы примирения» (Великобритания) – участник неформальных грузино-абхазских встреч в Австрии и Германии (Шляйнингский процесс). Лакоба Станислав Зосимович АБХАЗИЯ ПОСЛЕ ДВУХ ИМПЕРИЙ. XIX-XXI вв. Очерки Редактор Д.Б. Павлов Корректоры Е.И. Логачева, Г.С. Холодилина Компьютерная верстка Л.А. Горшковой Подписано к печати 9.08.2004 г. Формат 60х90/16. Бумага офсетная. Печать офсетная. Гарнитура Таймс. Печ. л. 13. Тираж 800 экз. ООО «Издательская фирма “Материк”» 101000, Москва, ул. Мясницкая, д. 24, стр. 3 Тел./факс 925-02-62 E-mail: [email protected] http://www.materik.info 208

ВВЕДЕНИЕ Известно, что на территории бывшего СССР исторические споры вокруг автохтонности той или иной нации на спорных землях (проще говоря, о том, чьи предки появились там раньше) стали одной из причин ряда войн между тогда формировавшимися, а позже ставшими непризнанными, государствами и их бывшими сюзеренами. Это явилось общим фоном войн между Приднестровьем и Молдовой (1992 г.), Нагорным Карабахом и Азербайджаном (1992-1994 гг.), Грузией и Абхазией (1992-1993 гг.), Грузией и Южной Осетией (1991-1992 гг.). Хотя эти конфликты были вызваны постсоветским правовым вакуумом1, их чрезвычайную жестокость трудно представить без учета историографического оправдания претензий сторон. Этой теме посвящено много работ В. Шнирельмана2, С. Лакобы3 и С. Китагавы4. Почти пятнадцать лет спустя наблюдается заметное историографическое развитие, особенно на стороне бывших вассалов (это естестБывшие сюзерены оказались бесспорными фаворитами международного сообщества, признавшего в качестве новых независимых государств только бывшие союзные республики СССР. В ответ автономии настаивают на том, что они подчинялись союзным республикам только как административным единицам большего государства, то есть СССР (причем, чрезвычайно неохотно), и не подчинялись независимым Молдове, Грузии и Азербайджану. Поэтому, по их мнению, об автоматическом переводе их административного подчинения в государственную принадлежность речи быть не может. 2 Shnirelman V.A. The Value of the Past: Myths, Identity and Politics in Transcaucasia. Osaka, 2001 (рус. версия: Шнирельман В.А. Войны памяти: мифы, идентичность и политика в Закавказье. М., 2003); Shnirelman V. The Politics of a Name: Between Consolidation and Separation in the Northern Caucasus // Acta Slavica Iaponica. 2006. Vol. 23. P. 37-73 (http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publictn/acta/23/02_shnirelman.pdf). 3 Лакоба С. Ответ историкам из Тбилиси: документы и факты. Сухум, 2001; Он же. Абхазия после двух империй: XIX-XXI вв. Саппоро, 2004 (http://src-h.slav. hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no5_ses/contents.html). 4 Китагава С. Национальные вопросы и исторические нарративы в Закавказье (на япон. яз.). Хиросаки, 1998. 1

ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ венно, так как при коммунизме образование у них значимых школ историков не допускалось). Наступило время для повторного суммирования и анализа историографий непризнанных государств5, с чем любезно согласились видные представители исторической науки Грузии, Приднестровья, Нагорного Карабаха и Южной Осетии. В исследовании также принял участие японский специалист по Армении Т. Ёсимура. Настоящий сборник является частью исследовательского проекта «Непризнанные государства в бывших социалистических странах: сравнительный и многослойный подход» (2005-2008 гг.), а также программы COE (Center of Excellence) XXI века как генерального спонсора наших трудов6. Поэтому было бы целесообразным коротко изложить принципы составления сборника. В первую очередь я поставил целью максимальное участие историков обеих сторон не только ради повышения научности сборника, но и для того, чтобы само его издание стало шагом вперед к мирному сосуществованию конфликтовавших сторон. Неучастие абхазской историков объясняется достаточной известностью их взгляда благодаря активной работе Станислава Лакобы, в том числе его трудам, опубликованным под эгидой Центра славянских исследований7. Что касается молдавской историографии, то мы готовим издание, посвященное комплексному анализу приднестровской проблемы, в том числе ее историографического аспекта. Пожалуй, печальным недостатком настоящего сборника является то, что в нем не представлен голос азербайджанских историков, несмотря на все старания редактора. Однако отрадно, что состоялся высокопрофессиональный диалог между К. Дзугаевым и Т. Джоджуа — представителями южноосетинской и грузинской историографии. Странный на первый взгляд контраст между методологической общностью историков противостоящих лагерей (они разделяют примордиализм) и расхождением в интерпретации ими истоНедавно я исследовал процесс создания истории абхазской православной церкви. См.: Мацузато К. Патронное президентство и политика в сфере идентичности в непризнанной Абхазии // Acta Eurasica (в печати); Matsuzato K. Religions, Ethnicities and Identity Politics in Unrecognized Abkhazia // Russia Profile (в печати). 6 Оба проекта финансирует Министерство образования, культуры, спорта, науки и технологии Японии. 7 Кроме упомянутой антологии, его книгу «Абхазия — де-факто или Грузия деюре: о политике России в Абхазии в постсоветский период, 1991-2000 гг.» (Саппоро, 2001; http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publictn/lakova/lakova-contents.html) прочитали и В. Путин, и Э. Шеварднадзе. 5

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ВВЕДЕНИЕ рических фактов имеет корень, подобно самим вооруженным конфликтам, в советских способах государственного строительства. СССР был империей, в которой нацменьшинствам предоставлялись преимущественные права («affirmative action empire»)8. Большевики, испуганные национальными движениями, появившимися на территории бывшей Российской империи в 1917-1921 гг., а также внезапным распадом Габсбургской империи, пересмотрели свое до тех пор несколько циничное отношение к национальным вопросам. Они решили, что лучше даровать элементы национальной свободы сверху, нежели уступить их под давлением снизу. В относительно короткий период после прихода к власти большевики изобрели систему «научного» определения этнонимов и этнических категорий (в дореволюционной России даже украинцы не имели эндоэтнонима), установили иерархию национальных территориальных образований, основанную на своеобразном понятии «титульная нация», а также систему образования школьников на родных языках и воспитания национальных кадров. В этом контексте поощрялось создание национальных историографий с целью оправдания формирующейся иерархии наций, в частности, привилегии союзных республик. Национальные историографии СССР служили также орудием оправдания административных границ, значительная часть которых после распада СССР превратится в государственные границы. Если западные страны старались преодолеть межнациональные различия в плане образования и иных социальных возможностей с помощью нетерриториальных мероприятий, нацеленных на индивидов, в СССР присваивали статус этнотерриториальным образованиям. Республики с союзным статусом (например Грузия) имели наилучшие условия для развития, территориальные образования с автономным статусом (например абхазы) — менее благополучные, а этнические группы без территориального образования (например мегрелы) преодолевали огромные трудности с целью сохранить свой язык и идентичность. Так сложилась иерархия наций, для оправдания которой советские историки легко распрощались с марксистским представлением о том, что нации являются буржуазной конструкцией (то есть присущи новому времени). Советские историки начали искать генезисы наций в тысячелетнем прошлом, Известное определение СССР гарвардским историком Терри Мартином (Terry Martin). См. его The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939. London, 2001. 8

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ что завершилось установлением маризма9. В то время как на Западе преобладало конструктивистское понимание наций, советская историография выглядела как остров примордиализма. Нельзя недооценивать примордиализм, считая его просто старомодной методологией. Т. Уяма отмечает, что маризм все-таки был развитием прежней методологии, объяснявшей национальную историю в основном миграцией якобы чистокровных этнических сообществ10. В самом деле, благодаря примордиализму советская национальная историография развивалась как междисциплинарная и многосторонняя наука, интегрирующая не только историю, но и археологию, этнографию, фольклористику и антропологию. Советский примордиализм дал импульс, в частности, исследованию древней истории Евразии. Как лишний раз показали авторы настоящего сборника, богатые фактические материалы, собранные в ходе поиска истоков наций, интересны сами по себе даже для тех, кто не разделяет эту методологию. Наилучшие школы советского примордиализма, например, школа Р.Г. Кузеева из Башкортостана, до сих пор не потеряли своего мирового значения. Это особенно важно, если иметь в виду, что конструктивистский подход к национальной истории, уделяя слишком большое внимание проблемам этнонимов, самоидентификации и дискурсов, иногда превращается в игру слов. Независимо от его научной значимости, самая серьезная проблема советского примордиализма заключалась в том, что он оказался инструментом национальной политики, основанной на этнотерриториальном федерализме и концепции титульных наций. Основное содержание этого подхода следующее. 1. Автохтонная этническая группа должна стать титульной нацией данной территории. 2. Желательно, чтобы административное деление и этнический состав населения совпали, но автохтонность важнее демографического веса. (Поэтому в СССР титульная нация часто составляла меньшинство на «своей» территории). 3. Представители титульной нации должны пользоваться преимуществом в образовании и карьере, в частности, в сфере политического руководства и научно-культурной деятельности на данной территории. Uyama T. From "Bulgharism" through "Marrism" to Nationalist Myths: Discourses on the Tatar, the Chuvash and the Bashkir Ethnogenesis // Acta Slavica Iaponica. 2002. Vol. 19. Р. 163-190 (http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/publictn/acta/19/uyama.pdf). 10 Ibid. P. 174. 9

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ВВЕДЕНИЕ Без учета этих материальных мотиваций трудно себе представить тот необыкновенный подъем интереса к этногенезу, который наблюдался в советской историографии. Однако этнотерриториальный федерализм, предоставлявший преимущество титульным нациям, по сути центробежен. В социалистических федерациях, таких как СССР и Югославия, эта система функционировала более или менее нормально только благодаря монополии Коммунистической партии на дефиницию этнических категорий и этнонимов, на определение статуса той или иной нации в этнотерриториальной иерархии и вследствие беспощадного подавления любого отклонения от «ленинских принципов» советского федерализма. Когда это условие было потеряно, этнотерриториальный федерализм превратился в теоретическую основу для вооруженных конфликтов в СССР и Югославии. Трудно считать логичным такое поведением, когда, с одной стороны, критикуют дискриминацию второго поколения русскоязычного населения в Латвии и Эстонии (то есть тех, кто там родился), а с другой, считают, что тот народ, пращуры которого освоили какую-либо территорию, например, в Х в., имеет на нее больше прав, чем тот, чьи предки пришли туда в ХVIII в. Однако этноконфессиональный федерализм, понятия «автохтонность» и «титульная нация» укоренились в мышлении политиков и интеллигенции бывшего СССР (в том числе непризнанных государств и их бывших сюзеренов) столь прочно, что повторяемые международными организациями (ООН, ОБСЕ и Советом Европы) разъяснения о том, что история не имеет никакого значения в урегулировании конфликтов, просто не доходят до их ушей. Неотложной задачей представляется освобождение советского примордиализма от его традиционной политической функции, а после этого наука решит свою задачу самостоятельно. Настоящий сборник демонстрирует разницу в возможностях будущего историографического диалога между непризнанными государствами и их бывшими сюзеренами. Он может состояться без особых проблем между историками Молдовы и Приднестровья. В отличие от карабахских и южноосетинских историографов, эталоны для которых были сформированы еще в советское время в Армении и Северной Осетии, историки Приднестровья вынуждены были создавать историографию с нуля. Об этом подробно пишет Н. Бабилунга. Поскольку Приднестровье многонационально, региональный (неэтнический) подход не мог не стать ведущей идеей новорожденной историографии. Предки сегодняшних жителей региона переселились 9

ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ сюда сравнительно недавно — после победы генерала А.В. Суворова над Османской империей в 80-е годы XVIII в., и не были найдены ни фольклор, ни археологические данные, которые можно связать с современным населением; короче, нет ни одного из любимых орудий примордиалистов. Молдавская историография расколота между румынистами и молдавистами, иначе говоря, в Молдавии не сложились доминантные дискурсы национальной историографии, что расширяет возможность диалога с приднестровскими историками. Отношения между историками Грузии и Южной Осетии несколько сложнее, однако Т. Джоджуа разделяет мнение осетинских историков о том, что ирано-язычные аланы — предки современных осетин. Т. Джоджуа и К. Дзугаев расходятся только по вопросу о том, насколько южнее хребта кавказских гор проживали аланы до XVII в. Дзугаев мобилизует для своих аргументов источники этимологического характера, а Джоджуа — археологические находки. Дзугаев признает, что Цхинвальский регион был территорией, на которой сожительствовало протоосетинское и картлийское население, и предполагает союзнические отношения между этими племенами до их разгрома монголами. Пожалуй, наиболее сложными являются отношения между армяно-карабахской и азербайджанской историографиями. Как показано в главах В. Балаяна и Т. Ёсимура, наиболее спорными пунктами являются так называемая албанская теория и справедливость решения Кавказского бюро ЦК РКП (б) от 5 июля 1921 г., которое изменило свое предыдущее решение, принятое за день до того, и подчинило Нагорный Карабах Азербайджанской ССР. Азербайджанские историки считают древних кавказских албанцев предками современных азербайджанцев. Поскольку в настоящем сборнике азербайджанские историки не участвовали, советую читателям ознакомиться с трудами В. Шнирельмана, в которых подробно проанализирована албанская теория11. Что касается решения Кавказского бюро от 1921 г., то статья С. Алиджарли раскрывает позицию, близкую азербайджанской12. Счастливым исключением представляется диалог между грузинским и южноосетинским историками, состоявшийся в настояShnirelman V. The Value of the Past. P. 113-147; Шнирельман В. Войны памяти. С. 147-194. 12 Alijarly S. The Republic of Azerbaijan: Notes on the State Borders in the Past and the Present // Transcaucasian Boundaries. Ed. Wright J.F.R. et al. London, 1996. P. 113133. 11

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ВВЕДЕНИЕ щем сборнике. Попытки подобного историографического диалога часто заканчиваются лишь сопоставлением взглядов, сопровождаемым резкими обвинениями в адрес коллег-историков, находящихся на противоположной стороне баррикад. В самом деле, разногласия сторон в интерпретации исторических фактов просто поразительны. Однако если учесть, что подобный историографический диалог между Японией и Кореей или Китаем, между Польшей и Украиной, между Россией и Украиной, между США и Вьетнамом либо находится в зачаточном состоянии, либо вообще не начат, то неудивительно, что историки сторон, находящихся в состоянии «ни войны, ни мира», не успели найти общий язык. Нельзя недооценивать значения хотя бы сопоставления позиций в одном сборнике или, что было бы еще лучше, в одной аудитории. Помня и скорбя о тех человеческих жертвах, к которым привели упомянутые войны, рискну отметить, что такие регионы, как Закавказье и Западное Причерноморье, являются сокровищницами этнической истории и весьма привлекательным полигоном для методологий ее анализа. Когда историки освободятся от того заблуждения, что история может не оправдать чье-либо проживание на той или иной территории, и когда они вспомнят о профессиональном уважении друг к другу, эта сокровищница, несомненно, будет служить мировой науке в полной мере. Кимитака Мацузато доктор юридических наук, профессор Центра славянских исследований университета Хоккайдо Саппоро, 19 февраля 2007 г.

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ПРИДНЕСТРОВСКАЯ МОЛДАВСКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА: ПРИЗНАННАЯ ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННОГО ГОСУДАРСТВА1 Николай Бабилунга зав. кафедрой Отечественной истории Института истории, государства и права ПГУ им. Т.Г. Шевченко, профессор Как известно, бесконечное переписывание учебников истории, ее модернизация и освещение исторического прошлого в зависимости от политики партийных лидеров в годы господства коммунистической идеологии привели к тому, что Советский Союз во всем мире считали удивительной страной, которая имеет «непредсказуемое прошлое». Еще в середине прошлого века в Соединенных Штатах Америки вышел коллективный сборник статей под редакцией Лео Яроша «Переписывание русской истории» (Rewriting of Russian History. NY. 1956, ed 1962), авторы которого на примере конкретных материалов показали, как советская историография меняет интерпретацию важнейших проблем истории России и СССР в зависимости от политической конъюнктуры. Изменилось ли что-нибудь с тех пор? Насильственный развал СССР не только не положил конец этой постыдной практике, но и придал ей новый мощный импульс. Независимые государства, образованные на развалинах советской супердержавы, пережили настоящий бум очередного пересмотра исНастоящая статья представляет собой переработанный вариант доклада, с которым автор выступил 17 марта 2000 г. на конференции «Проблемы российской, советской и постсоветской истории», организованной Центром славянских исследований Университета Хоккайдо (г. Саппоро, Япония). 1

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торического прошлого своих народов. После ниспровержения догм исторического материализма началось торопливое переписывание истории, которое, как правило, основывалось не на достоверных и социально значимых исторических фактах, не на глубоких и разносторонних объективных исследованиях, а на национальных мифах, сказаниях, балладах, легендах, народных преданиях и даже анекдотах. Политическая заданность и ангажированность создаваемых национальных историй не только не приблизила их к научной объективности, но, пожалуй, отдалила даже в большей степени, чем официальную советскую историографию. ПОПЫТКИ РУМЫНИЗАЦИИ МОЛДОВСКОЙ И ПРИДНЕСТРОВСКОЙ ИСТОРИОГРАФИЙ

Приступив к изучению исторического прошлого региона в первые же дни после провозглашения Приднестровской Молдавской Республики (2 сентября 1990 г., то есть еще до распада СССР), небольшая группа исследователей посчитала совершенно недопустимым использование истории для решения тех или иных политических проблем. Основанием для разработки в Приднестровье своей историографии послужили насущные задачи переживаемого момента. Прежде всего это касалось системы народного образования.Дело в том, что в конце 80-х годов в Республике Молдова отказалась от преподавания курса «История СССР» («История Отечества») в школах и вузах. Также был запрещен курс «История Молдавской ССР», программа которого носила отпечаток своего времени. В ней получили достойное отражение основные официозные доктрины и «достижения» советской историографии брежневской эпохи и она изобиловала такой терминологией, как «развитой социализм», «новая историческая общность», «созвездие республик-сестер», «неуклонное повышение благосостояния», «развернутое строительство коммунизма» и проч. В то же время, многие драматические и трагические страницы истории замалчивались. Так, из истории «выпали» голодные послевоенные годы, так называемый голодомор и массовая гибель населения, а также проявления сталинской тоталитарной системы — беззаконие, депортация людей и т. д. Однако массовая критика в печати сложившейся в Молдове историографии привела не к очистительным изменениям и углубленному изучению истории народа, а к замене одной официозной доктри13

ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ ны другой. В начале 90-х годов место эталона, утвержденного высшими сферами власти, занял курс «История румын», в котором тезис о принадлежности молдаван к единой румынской нации принят в качестве не требующей доказательств аксиомы, определившей основные элементы концептуальной модели новой историографии Молдовы. Они сводятся главным образом к следующему: румынская нация сформировалась не в XIX в. с созданием независимого Румынского государства, а в период римской колонизации Балкано-Дунайских земель и сопровождавшей ее романизации варварских племен; история румын на протяжении веков связана с попытками алчных соседей, главным образом «восточных варваров» и «славянских кочевников», разорвать «единую румынскую общность» и расчленить ее территорию; эта общность, то есть румынская нация, на протяжении своей многотысячелетней истории ведет героическую борьбу за создание в «румынском пространстве» единого великого государства, основы которого были заложены еще в дохристианскую эру и включают территории многих независимых государств Европы, на которых якобы когда-то проживали румынские (то есть фракийские) племена. Естественно, что в такой системе координат критерием прогрессивности и моральной оправданности того или иного исторического факта или исторического деятеля становится то, насколько он способствовал решению объявленной сверхзадачи — государственному объединению всех румын и румынских территорий с древнейших времен до наших дней. Молдавское государство, молдавская культура и в целом молдавская история во всей ее неповторимости и уникальности рассматриваются лишь как досадная ошибка, нарушившая целостность румынского этноса, суверенитет единого румынского государства, существовавшего до 1359 г. (то есть до создания молдавского феодального княжества) в виде некоего желанного идеала. В хаотичной мозаике были соединены разнородные, не связанные друг с другом факты молдавской, валашской, трансильванской и собственно румынской историй. Все славяне и особенно дореволюционная Россия и СССР были представлены в качестве естественного и зловещего врага молдаван (именуемых в историографии Молдовы «бессарабскими румынами»). Однако научный мир весьма скептически воспринимает тезис о полной тождественности всех восточных романцев как и концепцию о формировании румынского этноса и его государственности чуть ли не с библейских времен. Фрагментарность тех явлений истории Румынии и Молдавии, на которые опирается данная концепция в ущерб 14

ПРИДНЕСТРОВСКАЯ МОЛДАВСКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА целым эпохам и важнейшим историческим событиям, исключает даже рассмотрение формационной структуры исторического процесса и ее сдвигов по вертикали, не говоря уже о горизонтальных направлениях эволюции общественных систем в рамках той или иной формации2. Возможно поэтому эффективность пропагандистских усилий по изменению традиционной этнической идентичности молдаван в последние десятилетия весьма низка. Как показали референдум «Молдова — наш общий дом», проведенный властями в 1995 г., а также последняя перепись, румынами себя признают лишь несколько процентов населения. Подавляющая же часть молдаван, как и прежде, идентифицирует себя как самостоятельную нацию, отличную от окружающих ее народов, с которыми имеются не только существенные сходства в языке, культуре и истории, но и принципиальные различия. Еще меньший успех попытки румынизации имели в Приднестровье. Местные молдаване отказались перевести молдавский язык на румынскую графику и подвергнуть его латинизаторскому «очищению». Молдавский язык в ПМР сохраняет традиционную кириллицу, которой молдаване пользовались на протяжении пяти веков, и является одним из трех равноправных официальных языков ПМР. Молдаване составляют примерно одну треть населения Приднестровья и вместе с украинцами и русскими являются основой полиэтнической общности приднестровского народа, поэтому отказ Молдовы от преподавания в учебных заведениях истории Молдавии был воспринят населением Приднестровья крайне негативно. Охотников обучать своих детей по программам и учебникам, написанным кишиневскими историками, здесь не нашлось.

ОТ ЭТНОЦЕНТРИСТСКОГО К РЕГИОНАЛЬНОМУ ПОДХОДУ — СОЗДАНИЕ ПРИДНЕСТРОВСКОЙ ИСТОРИОГРАФИИ

Через полгода после провозглашения государственности ПМР (12 марта 1991 г.) высший законодательный орган республики, ее Верховный Совет принял постановление «О первоочередных мерах по сохранению самобытности молдавского народа, его языка и культуры». Отметив, что «в последнее время в ССР Молдова резко активиБабилунга Н.В., Бомешко Б.Г. Программа курса по истории Молдавии для неисторических факультетов. Тирасполь, 1991. С. 3. 2

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ зировался процесс румынизации молдавского народа» и «проводится антинациональная политика забвения самобытности молдавского народа, его культуры, языка, традиций», Верховный Совет ПМР наметил ряд практических мер по сохранению молдавского самосознания и культуры3. В том числе было решено создать в Приднестровском университете научно-исследовательскую лабораторию по изучению истории Молдавии и Приднестровья, а также собрать авторский коллектив для написания учебников по истории Молдавии и Приднестровья для народного образования республики. Планировалось создание объективной и всеобъемлющей картины истории Приднестровья с древнейших времен до наших дней4. Такова предыстория зарождения приднестровской историографии. В отличие от многих других республик, оставшихся на развалинах распавшегося Советского Союза, власти Приднестровья не навязывали исторической науке официальные доктрины и утвержденные властями постулаты. Более того, подобных «истин» и быть не могло, поскольку история Приднестровья представлялась сферой достаточно туманной и неясной. Даже историки-профессионалы имели в этой области довольно фрагментарные познания, и на то были свои причины. Обобщающих трудов по истории этого региона никогда не было, поскольку его государственность определилась лишь в ХХ в. В дореволюционной историографии России и Украины, а также Польши, Турции и Румынии, специальных работ, посвященных истории левобережья Днестра не было. За полстолетия развития советской исторической науки было издано крайне незначительное количество работ, которые затрагивали различные проблемы истории региона в период существования Молдавской Автономной Советской Социалистической Республики в составе Украинской ССР с 1924 по 1940 гг. или в период гражданской и Великой Отечественной войн (работы С.Я. Афтенюка, З.М. Ивановой, А.М. Лазарева, А.В. Репиды, К.В. Стратиевского и др.)5. Тогда же было издано несколько исследоНепризнанная республика: Очерки. Документы. Хроника. Т. I. М., 1997. С. 142. Там же. С. 143. 5 См.: Афтенюк С.Я. Ленинская национальная политика Коммунистической партии и образование советской государственности молдавского народа. Кишинев, 1971; Он же. Начало создания молдавской советской государственности // Из истории революционного движения и социалистического строительства в Молдавии. Кишинев, 1963; Афтенюк С.Я., Стратиевский К.В., Царанов В.И. Осуществление ленинского кооперативного плана в молдавской деревне. Кишинев, 1963; Клобуцкий В.С. Роль печати МАССР в формировании молдавской социалистической нации. 1924-1940. Кишинев, 1976; Круглицкий Ф.Я. Радиовещание Советской 3 4

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ПРИДНЕСТРОВСКАЯ МОЛДАВСКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА ваний по истории Тирасполя и армянской колонии Григориополь, а также по социально-экономическим вопросам развития левобережного Приднестровья в XIX в. (работы Ж.А. Ананяна, И.А. Анцупова, Е.И. Дружининой, И.И. Жаркуцкого, В.М. Кабузана и др.)6. Внимание историков привлекали главным образом два периода: 1) когда шел процесс активного освоения и колонизации Новороссии в Северном Причерноморье (с конца XVIII в.) и Приднестровье стало одной из самых густозаселенных частей Российской империи; 2) когда после Октябрьской революции и захвата румынскими войсками Бессарабии Приднестровье явилось для большевиков исМолдавии: Страницы истории. 1928-1941 гг. Кишинев, 1979; Иванова З.М. Левобережные районы Молдавии в 1918-1924 гг. Кишинев, 1979; Она же. Комнезамы Молдавской АССР. 1920-1933 гг. Кишинев, 1970; Она же. Борьба за ликвидацию неграмотности в Левобережной Молдавии (1520-1924 гг.) // Культурное строительство в Советской Молдавии. Кишинев, 1974; Лазарев А.М. Воссоединение молдавского народа в единое Советское государство. Кишинев, 1974; Он же. Молдавская советская государственность и бессарабский вопрос. Кишинев, 1974; Репида А.В. Образование Молдавской АССР. Кишинев, 1974; Стратиевский К.В. Социалистическая реконструкция и развитие промышленности и сельского хозяйства МАССР (19261937 гг.). Кишинев, 1974; Он же. Участие комсомола Молдавии в социалистическом строительстве в довоенные годы. Кишинев, 1959; Молдавская ССР в Великой Отечественной войне Советского Союза. 1941-1945 / Сб. док-ов и мат-лов: В 2-х т. Т. I: На фронтах войны и в советском тылу. Кишинев, 1975. Т. II: В тылу врага. Кишинев, 1976; Молдавская ССР в Великой Отечественной войне Советского Союза. 19411945 гг. / Под ред. С. Афтенюк, Д. Елин, А. Коренев, И. Левит. Кишинев, 1970 и др. 6 Ананян Ж.А. Армянская колония Григориополь. Ереван, 1969; Анцупов И.А. Крестьяне Левобережного Поднестровья в дореформенный период. Кишинев, 1990; Он же. Русское население Бессарабии и Левобережного Поднестровья в конце XVIII — XIX вв. Кишинев, 1996; Он же. Русские на Очаковской земле. Кишинев, 2003; Он же. Казачество российское между Бугом и Дунаем. Кишинев, 2000; Жаркуцкий И.И. Развитие промышленности и торговли в левобережных районах молдавского Поднестровья в пореформенный период. Кишинев, 1985; Зеленчук В.С. Население Бессарабии и Поднестровья в XIX в. (Этнические и социально-демографические процессы). Кишинев, 1979; Кабузан В.М. Народонаселение Бессарабской области и левобережных районов Приднестровья (конец XVIII — первая половина XIX вв.). Кишинев, 1974; Он же. Заселение Новороссии (Екатеринославской и Херсонской губерний) в XVIII — первой половине XIX вв. М., 1976; Дружинина Е.И. Северное Причерноморье в 1775-1800 гг. М., 1959; Она же. Южная Украина в период кризиса феодализма. 1825-1860 гг. М., 1981; Койфман И.В. Из истории экономического развития восточных районов Молдавии в конце XVIII — начале XIX вв. // Учен. зап. Кишиневского гос. ун-та. 1964. Т. 73; Караман И.И., Мунтян М.П. К вопросу о развитии сельского хозяйства в Левобережной Молдавии в первой половине XIX в. // Социально-экономическое развитие Бессарабии в XIX в. Кишинев, 1977; Марецкий С.К. Тирасполь. Кишинев, 1958; Очерки истории Тирасполя. Кишинев, 1967 и др.

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ пытательным полигоном молдавской советской государственности — была образована автономия в составе Украинской ССР. Но до 1924 г. молдавской государственности на этих казацких землях не существовало, и границы Молдавского княжества никогда не простирались восточнее Днестра. Поэтому молдавские исследователи эпохи феодализма не проявляли интереса к данному региону. Украинские историки не занимались этим регионом по причине того, что с 1940 г. Приднестровье стало частью другой союзной республики — Молдавской ССР. Слабая изученность истории Приднестровского региона к моменту создания здесь государственности (в 90-е годы ХХ в.) оказалась просто вопиющей. Особенности его геополитического положения и этносоциального развития были известны профессионалам лишь в самых общих чертах, а для широких слоев населения, учителей, студентов, школьников целые исторические эпохи представляли собой сплошные белые пятна. Это не только ненормально и нетерпимо, но и удивительно, ведь Приднестровские земли занимали исключительно важное положение на огромных пространствах Евразии, представляя собой контактную зону для самых разных цивилизаций и культур. Они являлись геополитическим пограничьем между оседлыми земледельцами и кочевниками, мусульманами и христианами, православными и католиками, восточнославянской и романо-германской цивилизациями. Берега Днестра — один из любопытнейших регионов Европы, где встречаются более древние археологические славянские памятники, чем, например, в Центральной России. На них оставили свои следы многие из существующих ныне или давно исчезнувших народов. Археологи находят здесь огромное количество памятников — древнегреческих, романских, скифских, тюркских, славянских и др.7 В течение тысячелетий Приднестровье являлось ареной борьбы различных народов, пытавшихся утвердить свое господство на этих землях. Проживавшее здесь население, не создавшее собственной государственности, являлось объектом политики более сильных держав и жертвой их кровавых конфликтов. Во времена Гомера Приднестровье было западной границей воинственного Киммерийского царства, затем — Скифии и Сарматии, а после переселения из Скандинавии в Северное Причерноморье германских племен (в первые века нашей эры) Днестр стал границей между варварскими державаВ данной статье мы не рассматриваем историю изучения археологических памятников Приднестровских земель и становления археологической науки в ПМР, поскольку эта тема должна стать предметом отдельного широкого исследования. 7

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ПРИДНЕСТРОВСКАЯ МОЛДАВСКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА ми остготов и вестготов, разбитых гуннами в эпоху Великого переселения народов. Во времена славянской колонизации Приднестровские земли стали пограничьем между двумя мощными союзами славянских племен — антами и склавинами. Затем они вошли в состав Киевской Руси и, находясь на важном торговом пути «из славян в греки», превратились в достаточно густонаселенный и оживленный регион Древнерусского государства. В начале II тысячелетия через Приднестровье проходили многочисленные перемещения кочевых народов (мазаров, берендеев, печенегов, узов, половцев и проч.) из Азии в Европу, что привело к упадку существовавшей здесь славянской цивилизации. После распада Киевской Руси Приднестровье становится ближним зарубежьем мощного восточнославянского Галицко-Волынского княжества. Монголо-татарское завоевание превратило Приднестровье в часть Подольского улуса Золотой Орды, а после изгнания ордынцев в Крым оно стало частью Русско-литовского государства и вошло в состав Киевского княжества. Продолжительное соперничество Польского королевства и Великого княжества Литовского закончилось образованием Люблинской унии, и в 1569 г. северная часть Приднестровья была включена в Речь Посполитую, а южная часть, захваченная крымскими татарами, обозначила западные границы Крымского ханства, вассала Османской империи. Так на протяжении многих веков Приднестровье являлось территорией, где сталкивались интересы мощных враждебных друг другу держав — католической Речи Посполитой, мусульманского Крымского ханства и православного Молдавского княжества, подчинявшегося Оттоманской порте. На этой земле также шла национально-освободительная борьба казачества и украинского народа. Бесконечные татарские набеги, казацкие восстания и войны, польско-турецкие войны XVII в. и русско-турецкие войны XVIII в. наполняли жизнь местного населения кровавыми конфликтами и одновременно закаляли его характер. Поскольку помощи ждать было неоткуда, способность к самозащите стала для приднестровцев одним из важнейших условий выживания. Лишь в конце XVIII в., когда Россия провела границу с Турцией по Днестру, присоединив Приднестровские земли к империи и переселив татарские орды в Крым, начался самый длительный мирный период в истории региона. На протяжении целого века здесь не велось никаких войн, не было вражеских нашествий и военных конфликтов. С переносом границы с 19

ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ Днестра на Прут Приднестровье перестало быть геополитическим пограничьем, и эти земли очень быстро освоили украинцы, молдаване, русские, болгары, армяне, немцы, евреи и др. Этническая толерантность, веротерпимость и дружелюбие также стали отличительными чертами приднестровской социальной общности, чему способствовали межнациональные браки. Более двух веков в Приднестровье нет этнического большинства, которое могло бы заявить о своих претензиях на господство в регионе. Основные этнические составляющие приднестровской общности — молдаване, украинцы и русские — представлены примерно в равных пропорциях. Поэтому с такой настороженностью и неприятием относятся приднестровцы к попыткам кишиневских властей объявить главными историческими хозяевами этих земель «бессарабских румын», а всех остальных, — «пришельцами» и «оккупантами». Присоединение Бессарабии к Румынии в 1918 г. возвратило Днестру его роль геополитического пограничья. В середине 20-х годов ХХ в., когда на левобережье Днестра сосредоточилось большое количество беженцев из Бессарабии и Румынии, большевики образовали в этой части Украины Молдавскую АССР, несмотря на то, что сами молдаване не составляли в автономии и трети населения, а украинцев было более половины. Это обстоятельство для проникнутых интернациональным духом приднестровцев не имело значения. За 16 лет существования молдавской автономии в Приднестровском регионе Украины никаких этнических трений не возникало. Ликвидация государственности в Приднестровье была связана с вытеснением из Бессарабии румынских властей войсками Красной Армии в июне 1940 г., что означало мирное разрешение Бессарабского вопроса в сложных международных условиях уже разгоревшейся Второй мировой войны. В начале августа 1940 г. молдавская автономия на Украине была упразднена. Приднестровская часть МАССР вместе с бессарабскими районами, заселенными главным образом молдаванами, вошла в состав новой союзной республики — Молдавской ССР. Это государство успешно просуществовало в рамках Советского Союза (вплоть до его распада) в течение 50 лет. Гибель Советского Союза, которой всячески способствовали националистические элиты бывших союзных республик, в том числе и Молдовы, не могла не спровоцировать распад и ряда суверенных республик, которые были созданы сталинским режимом искусственно и существование которых было возможно только в рамках СССР. Приход к власти в Молдове националистических сил, объ20

ПРИДНЕСТРОВСКАЯ МОЛДАВСКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА явление этой республики «оккупированной румынской землей» и «незаконным образованием» советского оккупационного режима, рост межэтнической напряженности в Молдове и начало гражданских конфликтов на этой почве, заявление руководства Молдовы о выходе из состава Союза глубоко взволновали население Приднестровья. Идея возрождения своей утерянной в сталинские времена государственности стала массовой, представляясь приднестровцам единственным шансом предотвратить развитие событий по еще худшему сценарию, не исключавшему геноцид, тысячи жертв и сотни тысяч беженцев. ТРУДНОСТИ СОЗДАНИЯ ПРИДНЕСТРОВСКОЙ ИСТОРИОГРАФИИ

В 1990 г. после проведенных референдумов народ Приднестровья во второй раз за свою историю приступил к созданию своей государственности — Приднестровской Молдавской Республики. Это гарантировало приднестровцам самосохранение, безопасность, свободу и ненасилие в решении спорных вопросов и возникающих конфликтов. Однако кровавый ничем не спровоцированный конфликт на Днестре в Дубоссарах и Бендерах 1991-1992 гг. зародил в приднестровцах мысль о необходимости получения полной независимости от враждебного для них государства. При этом постоянные попытки задушить приднестровскую государственность в тисках различного рода блокад — финансовой, информационной, таможенной, коммуникационной, экономической и проч. — все более убеждает население в правильности выбранного пути на полное и окончательное отделение от соседнего государства. Приднестровцы уверены, что их выбор должен быть понят и адекватно воспринят всем миром; их право на самоопределение является имманентным, а право на создание своей государственности не нуждается в санкционировании Молдовой, Россией, Украиной, Румынией или любой другой страной мира. Многотысячелетняя история Приднестровья, которая после десятилетия кропотливого изучения предстала перед нами в своем уникальном и неповторимом виде, включает огромное разнообразие элементов истории очень многих государств и народов на их хронологически обозримом пути. Совершенно бессмысленной и непродуктивной в этих условиях была бы попытка ограничиться лишь государственными границами современной Приднестровской Мол21

ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ давской Республики, которые сложились в ХХ в. зачастую в силу случайных причин. При изучении различных периодов истории региона исследователям приходится выходить за их пределы, обращаясь к истории других государств и народов, без чего комплексное исследование края было бы невозможным. Это одна из основных особенностей становления приднестровской исторической школы. Историю Приднестровья очень часто определяли изменения внешнеполитического положения и внутриполитической ситуации в таких государствах, как Польша, Венгрия, Османская империя, Киевская Русь, Галицко-Волынское княжество, Речь Посполитая, Молдавское княжество, Российская империя и др. Многие периоды приднестровской истории, особенно в Средние века, насыщены войнами и конфликтами, разорительными набегами, карательными походами, истребительной борьбой между различными группами населения и враждующими странами. Для исследования края потребовалось привлечение специалистов самых разных направлений из научных центров как Приднестровья, так и России, Молдовы и Украины, а также координация их научно-исследовательских работ. Еще одна особенность приднестровской историографии связана с трудностями источниковедческого характера. Дело в том, что архивная служба в ПМР была образована лишь после создания республики. Поэтому в отличие от археологов, которым Приднестровье может подарить богатые памятники материальной культуры, исследователи письменного периода истории региона должны обращаться к архивам и библиотекам Западной и Восточной Европы, Балканских стран и Азии. Молдова также не имеет документов по средневековому периоду истории Приднестровья, поскольку, как уже отмечалось, территории восточнее Днестра никогда не входили в состав Молдавского княжества. Почти нет подобных материалов и в архивах Румынии. Сложившаяся ситуация объясняется положением Приднестровья как геополитического пограничья этого региона Европы. Источники по истории северной части Приднестровья почти исключительно на латинском и польском языках сосредоточены главным образом в Польше и, возможно, Ватикане. Документы относящиеся к истории южного Приднестровья в большинстве случаев на татарском, турецком и арабском языках находятся в Стамбуле и других центрах, куда доступ исследователям затруднен. Для их изучения требуются специалисты редкого профиля, знающие восточную мусульманскую палеографию, умеющие читать и анализировать документы, начертанные арабской вязью. 22

ПРИДНЕСТРОВСКАЯ МОЛДАВСКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА Многие источники на церковно-славянском, старомолдавском, литовском, армянском, еврейском, белорусском, новогреческом и украинском языках, даже опубликованные (как правило, в XIX — начале ХХ вв.), представляют собой настоящие раритеты и в первозданном виде хранятся в архивах разных стран, куда доступ также затруднен. Сведения по Приднестровью имеются в трудах иностранных путешественников, написанных на немецком, французском и других европейских языках. Очень малое их количество было переведено на русский, да и те хранятся только в специальных фондах редких книг в нескольких библиотеках крупных научных центров. Иными словами, приднестровская историография фактически начиналась с чистой страницы. Наша республика не располагала кадрами, получившими соответствующую подготовку, квалификацию и опыт. Их «выращивание» заняло бы многие десятилетия. В этом случае написание всеобъемлющей истории Приднестровья с древнейших времен до наших дней было бы возможно в лучшем случае в середине XXI столетия. Привлечь к работе подготовленных высококвалифицированных специалистов было чрезвычайно трудно. Последнее десятилетие ХХ в., которое характеризовали такие события, как распад Советского Союза, разрушение финансовой системы единой страны и введение национальных валют, экономический кризис, установление блокады Приднестровья и вооруженные действия, было явно неблагоприятным для спокойной кабинетной работы ученых и формирования исторической концепции. Кроме того, историкам, воспитанным марксистской материалистической школой исторических исследований, непросто отказаться от формационных рамок. Но история Приднестровья — и в этом кроется еще одна ее отличительная особенность — при внимательном изучении дает просто парадоксальные примеры, выходящие за все известные теоретические представления. Например, в средние века на сравнительно небольшой территории в одном и том же хронологическом отрезке времени сосуществовали сеньориальная рента, крепостничество, барщина, оброк в польских владениях и кочевой феодализм в татарской пустыне, в южном Приднестровье. Иными словами, одновременно можно обнаружить и элементы переходного типа так называемого молдавского феодализма, характерного для данников Порты, и особые республиканские отношения у казаков («казацкая вольница»), и другие самые разнообразные формы и типы феодальных отношений. Поэтому четкое выделение в ис23

ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ торической эволюции Приднестровья формационных эпох, их степени зрелости и направленности развития в каждый конкретный момент представляет немалую сложность. Часто являясь ареной для войн, Приднестровье не имело возможности развиваться как окружающие его державы. Внешние и зачастую случайные причины могли в одночасье привести к кардинальному изменению его положения. Поэтому историки были вынуждены отказаться от периодизации исторического прошлого региона на основе эволюции формационной структуры общества, которая в Приднестровье почти не просматривается. Поскольку на территории региона как правило одновременно сосуществовали различные базовые отношения во всем разнообразии их форм и модификаций, решено было основать периодизацию на отдельных выдающихся вехах и событиях, изменивших историю общества. Это могут быть мощная миграция населения, смена этносов, цивилизаций и культур, включение края в состав другого государства, военная кампания и т.д. Хорошо осознавая масштабы как поставленной задачи, так и трудностей, возникающих при ее реализации, сотрудники созданной в 1991 г. в Приднестровском госуниверситете научно-исследовательской лаборатории «История Приднестровья» (заведующий — Н.В. Бабилунга, ведущий научный сотрудник — Б.Г. Бомешко, главный научный сотрудник — В.Я. Гросул) взялись за разработку концепции и стратегии подготовки фундаментального труда «История Приднестровской Молдавской Республики». Написание этого трехтомника стало сверхзадачей при выполнении многих других исследовательских проектов, объединивших как опытных высококвалифицированных специалистов по различным проблемам и периодам истории Юго-Восточной Европы — археологов, исследователей отечественной и всеобщей истории, так и начинающих исследователей, краеведов, нумизматов, любителей истории и студентов. Организация исследований и координация усилий специалистов осуществлялись из единого центра — НИЛ «История Приднестровья». Были изданы серия учебных брошюр «Курс лекций по истории Молдавии»8, сборник документов «Бессарабский вопрос и обраБабилунга Н.В., Бомешко Б.Г. Курс лекций по истории Молдавии. Лекция I: Древнейшие люди на территории Молдавии. Первобытнообщинный строй и зарождение классового общества. Тирасполь, 1992; Лекция II: Ранний феодализм на территории Молдавии. Тирасполь, 1993; Лекция III: Развитой феодализм в Молдавии. Тирасполь, 1993; Лекция IV: Османское иго в Молдавии. Тирасполь, 1993; Лекция V: Молдавия в русско-турецких войнах XVIII в. Тирасполь, 1997; Лекция VI: Бессарабия в составе России. Тирасполь, 1997; Лекция VIII: Молдавия в годы во8

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ПРИДНЕСТРОВСКАЯ МОЛДАВСКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА зование Приднестровской Молдавской Республики»9, мемориальный справочник «Книга Памяти защитников Приднестровья»10, брошюры «Бендеры — расстрелянные, непокоренные»11, «Дубоссары — кровоточащая рана Приднестровья»12, «Приднестровский конфликт: исторические, демографические, политологические аспекты»13, а также коллективная монография «Феномен Приднестровья»14 и многие другие работы. В каждой из них были рассмотрены те или иные страницы истории Приднестровья, которые объединялись в общую картину, дававшую наглядное представление о реальной истории края и его сегодняшних проблемах. Особую роль в становлении приднестровской историографии сыграл издаваемый лабораторией с 1987 г. журнал «Ежегодный исторический альманах Приднестровья»15. Задуманный как достаточно демократичный и в то же время глубоко научный издательский проект, альманах очень быстро нашел своего читателя и приобрел широкую популярность в республике и известность далеко за ее пределами. На его страницах можно найти как научные исследования известных ученых — профессоров и академиков, так и материалы, отражающие поиски краеведов, музейных сотрудников, архивистов, студентов, и даже школьные работы по изучению родного края. енной интервенции и гражданской войны. Борьба за воссоединение Бессарабии с СССР. Тирасполь, 1992; Лекция IX: Молдавская АССР. Тирасполь, 1993; Лекция X: 1940 год: восстановление Советской власти в Бессарабии и образование Молдавской ССР. Тирасполь, 1994; Лекция XI: Молдавия в период Великой Отечественной войны и восстановления народного хозяйства. Тирасполь, 1994. Серия лекций не была завершена, лекции VII «Молдавия в эпоху русских революций» и XII «Молдавия в последних десятилетиях ХХ в.» не вышли в свет, поскольку курс «История Молдавии» на неисторических факультетах Приднестровского госуниверситета и в средних школах ПМР был заменен курсом «История Приднестровья». 9 Бессарабский вопрос и образование Приднестровской Молдавской Республики: Сб. официальных док-ов / Сост. В.Н. Яковлев, Н.В. Бабилунга, Б.Г. Бомешко и др. Тирасполь, 1993. 10 Бабилунга Н.В., Бомешко Б.Г. Книга Памяти защитников Приднестровья. Тирасполь, 1995. 11 Они же. Бендеры — расстрелянные, непокоренные. Тирасполь, 1993. 12 Они же. Дубоссары — кровоточащая рана Приднестровья. Тирасполь, 1993. 13 Они же. Приднестровский конфликт: исторические, демографические, политологические аспекты. Тирасполь, 1998. 14 Феномен Приднестровья. Тирасполь, 2000; Феномен Приднестровья. Изд. 2-е, перераб. и доп. Тирасполь, 2003. 15 Ежегодный исторический альманах Приднестровья. № 1-9. Тирасполь, 19872005.

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ Хорошие результаты принесли международные конференции, первая из которых — «Приднестровье: прошлое, настоящее, будущее»16 была организована лабораторией в Тирасполе в 1992 г. вскоре после окончания военных действий. Слова генерала А.И.Лебедя, сказанные им тогда с трибуны: «Вы даже сами не можете представить себе, какое огромное значение имеет ваша конференция для вашего будущего!», сейчас не могут не восприниматься как пророческие. Исследователи охотно делились своими познаниями о различных периодах истории Приднестровья и окружающих его государств Нередко приднестровские историки вместе со специалистами из России, Молдовы, Гагаузии, США и других стран и регионов включались в выполнение исследовательских проектов по социологии, конфликтологии, политологии, этнологии и др. Результаты совместных исследований были опубликованы как в ПМР, так и в странах ближнего и дальнего зарубежья17. Подобные представительные конференции и симпозиумы, объединяющие интеллектуальные силы ученых в познании исторических и современных проблем Приднестровского региона проводятся по несколько раз в год. Материалы некоторых из них были опубликованы в специальных сборниках и по сути стали настоящим кладезем коллективного разума, являя собой пример решения актуальных проблем методом «интеллектуального штурма»18. Также спеПриднестровье: прошлое, настоящее, будущее: Документы международной научной конференции, посвященной 200-летию со дня основания г. Тирасполя. 14-16 октября 1992 г. Тирасполь, 1992. 17 Русские в новом зарубежье: Миграционная ситуация, переселение и адаптация в России. М., 1997; Савоскул С.С. Русские нового зарубежья: Выбор судьбы. М., 2001; Губогло М.Н. Идентификация идентичности: Этносоциологические очерки. М., 2003; Он же. Тяжкое бремя конкурирующих идентичностей. Опыт Приднестровья // Непризнанная республика. Очерки. Документы. Хроника. Т. 3. М., 1999; Губогло Е.М. Приднестровский конфликт и постконфликтный синдром // Ежегодный исторический альманах Приднестровья. № 5. 2001; Бабилунга Н.В. Тайна приднестровского феномена // Национальные образы мира: единство-разнообразие-справедливость. Кишинев, 2003; Он же. Особенности этнического самосознания молдаван Украины: прошлое, настоящее, будущее. Одесса, 1999; Он же. Этническая идентичность населения Приднестровья // Этническая мобилизация и межэтническая интеграция: истоки, факторы, горизонты. Кишинев, 1999; Он же. Территориальная идентичность как фактор политической стабильности Приднестровья // Этническая мобилизация и межэтническая интеграция. М., 1999; Он же. Идентичность — аргумент стабильности? // Мысль (Общественно-политический журнал Партии коммунистов Республики Молдова). № 3. 1998 и др. 18 Берил С.И., Галинский И.Н., Благодатских И.М. Приднестровье в геополитической системе координат XXI в. Тирасполь, 2002; Берил С.И., Галинский И.Н., Кушаков М.Н. и др. Приднестровская государственность в контексте современного 16

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ПРИДНЕСТРОВСКАЯ МОЛДАВСКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА циалисты лаборатории довольно часто выезжают на научные форумы различного уровня за рубеж. ПОПЫТКИ СОЗДАНИЯ МОЛДОВОЙ

ОБЩЕЙ ИСТОРИОГРАФИИ C

Показательным является стремление миссии ОБСЕ в Молдове способствовать взаимопониманию между представителями молодой приднестровской историографии и кишиневского румынофильского направления. Впрочем, это не имело успеха. Чтобы в полной мере понять причины такого положения, нельзя обойтись без нескольких общих замечаний. Разделение Советского Союза на ряд «суверенных» государств привело к печальным последствиям, несмотря на то, что идеологический и партийно-пропагандистский пресс был во многом сломан и исследователи смогли достаточно свободно получать информацию из закрытых ранее источников. Разрыв единого информационного поля, в котором многие десятилетия жили наши народы, развивались научные исследования и формировались целые научные школы, означал закрытие тех приоритетных направлений, которыми ученые этих республик могли по праву гордиться. Разрушение академического духа советских времен, когда молодые научные школы в различных республиках имели возможность развиваться под благотворным влиянием ведущих научных центров страны и прежде всего институтов АН СССР, привело к безвозвратной утрате наработок, совершенных в послевоенные десятилетия, и даже коллапсу многих научных учреждений. Безбрежные ранее информационные потоки были перекрыты национальными границами новых государств. Однако в отличие от футбольной или хоккейной команды наука не может быть национальной по своему определению, чего не в силах были понять политики начала 90-х годов, не говоря уже о лидерах всевозможных «саюдисов», «рухов» и прочих «народных фронтов». Последние, будучи на пике своей популярности, попытались даже ввести в практику новую разновидность научной истины — митинговую, которая должна была стать путеводной звездой для представителей официальной науки, ученых, «погрязших» в теоретических международного опыта федерализма. Тирасполь, 2003; Берил С.И., Галинский И.Н., Благодатских И.М. и др. Приднестровская государственность: история и современность. Тирасполь, 2005.

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ и прикладных исследованиях. Их изгоняли из вузов, академических и отраслевых научно-исследовательских институтов способами, напоминающими показательные аутодафе, совершавшиеся во времена средневекового мракобесия и охоты на ведьм. Что же в итоге? Объявленное в конце 80-х годов «национальное возрождение» обернулось в конечном счете беспрецедентным в истории крахом национальной культуры и духовности большинства народов, вырванных из привычной и благодатной для них среды и помещенных в национально замкнутые резервации, в которых не остается места не только для науки, просвещения и духовности, но даже и для элементарной грамотности. Таковы масштабы этой действительной национальной трагедии псевдовозрождения, которая оставляет слишком мало шансов для решения любой из проблем устойчивого развития. Что касается качества жизни абсолютного большинства населения в постсоветских республиках, то оно хорошо известно. Молдова же в этом печальном списке занимает арьергардные позиции. Правда, по уровню коррумпированности чиновничества Молдова умудрилась войти в первую десятку мира и борется за первенство с Колумбией и др. наркопроизводящими странами. Успешно поделив общенародную собственность и приведя общество на грань гражданской войны, олигархические кланы руководят республикой, обогащаясь за счет обнищавшего народа и разворовывая зарубежные инвестиции и финансовую помощь Запада. Приднестровье, в отличие от Молдовы, хотя и переживает период неимоверных экономических, финансовых и социальных трудностей, во многом искусственных и вызванных политикой удушения республики кольцом всевозможных блокад, но находится в ином положении. Наше государство сохранило свой экономический потенциал и даже в определенной мере наращивает его. Руководство республики пользуется доверием и поддержкой подавляющего большинства населения. Каждый гражданин ПМР защищен Конституцией и законодательством ПМР от любых посягательств на его честь и права, от любых форм дискриминации на почве этнической принадлежности, языка, политических пристрастий и проч. В Приднестровье не закрывали научных учреждений и не перетряхивали их сотрудников на основе языкового, этнического или политического критериев. Открываются новые научные учреждения. Так, одним из первых решений руководства молодой республики осенью 1990 г. стал указ о создании Приднестровского университета. 28

ПРИДНЕСТРОВСКАЯ МОЛДАВСКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА Возникает вопрос: существует ли возможность наладить и развивать информационное сотрудничество между исследователями Молдовы и Приднестровья, живущими в настолько несхожих системах? И есть ли в нем необходимость? Научно-исследовательская лаборатория истории Приднестровья ПГУ им.Т.Г.Шевченко накопила более чем 15-летний опыт сотрудничества с учеными из Молдовы и других стран. Это позволяет сделать некоторые выводы относительно путей его оптимизации и расширения. После резкой смены курса официозной историографии Кишинева и замены истории Молдавии псевдонаучной доктриной «истории румын», после беспощадного разгрома в научных и образовательных учреждениях Молдовы сложившейся молдавской исторической школы и массовых увольнений ее носителей многие из них в полуподпольных условиях продолжили изучать историю молдавского государства, которая в Молдове фактически приняла характер контристории. Многие из этих мужественных людей, несмотря на серьезную угрозу их благополучию и даже жизни, стали постоянными сотрудниками нашей лаборатории и будучи высококлассными специалистами приняли участие в подготовке таких изданий, как двухтомная «История ПМР» в трех книгах, «Феномен Приднестровья» и др., они также постоянно сотрудничают в «Ежегодном историческом альманахе Приднестровья». Это такие авторитеты исторической науки, как И.А.Анцупов, Л.Е.Репида, И.Д.Чобану, П.М.Шорников, А.П.Лисовина, А.Ю.Скворцова, Е.А.Богнибов и др. Тем не менее, было бы ошибкой полагать, что такое тесное сотрудничество с учеными Кишинева является правилом. Все обстоит как раз наоборот, учитывая чудовищное давление румынизаторов на политику, общественную жизнь и общественное сознание жителей Молдовы на протяжении последних полутора десятков лет. В эти годы там усиленно насаждалась идеология агрессивного румынизма: курсы, программы и учебники были разработаны в духе отрицания самобытности молдавского народа, напичканы прорумынскими и даже профашистскими фалангистскими пропагандистскими штампами времен Антонеску и Железной гвардии. При этом любая оппозиция прорумынскому официальному курсу подавлялась с такой непримиримостью, что борьба с инакомыслием коммунистических времен показалась интеллектуалам золотым веком плюрализма и открытости. Написание подобной научной, учебной и методической литературы подкреплялось высокими гонорарами из самых разных фондов как местных, так и зарубежных. Неудивительно, что за эти годы было подготовлено целое поколение историков, которых по29

ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ добная ситуация устраивает не только в материальном отношении, они просто не мыслят себя в другой системе координат. Часть из них заняла наиболее экономически выгодные позиции в определении приоритетных тематик исследований, а также издаваемых книг и учебников. Контролируя финансовые потоки, направляемые на эти цели, эта группа представляет собой нечто вроде спаянного клана и не допускает никакой конкуренции. Они скорее подведут общество к новому витку гражданского конфликта, чем позволят кому-либо из лагеря молдавенистов изменить планы, тематику и направление научных исследований, а тем более школьных и вузовских программ и учебников по истории. Вполне понятно, что нет никаких шансов на достижение компромисса с представителями этого клана. Поэтому попытки сотрудников Миссии ОБСЕ в Молдове, в частности г-на Готфрида Ханне, сблизить позиции историков Молдовы и Приднестровья в изучении и преподавании истории родного края закончились безрезультатно. За несколько лет были проведены семинары в Кишиневе и Тирасполе, создан Координационный комитет по школьному образованию, состоящий из Группы анализа школьных учебников по истории и Группы научной экспертизы в области истории (мне довелось работать сопредседателем второй группы). После многочасовых дискуссий с коллегами из Кишинева был разработан проект плана деятельности рабочих групп, который, однако, не был реализован, несмотря на искреннее стремление к достижению согласия и все усилия дипломатов. Думается, что благородное стремление Миссии ОБСЕ в Молдове создать Внутреннюю Молдавскую историческую комиссию по работе над школьными учебниками, чтобы опираясь на опыт подобных исторических комиссий Польши и Германии, добиться лучшего взаимопонимания между сторонами и принять приемлемые для всех трактовки наиболее спорных проблем истории Молдавии, было обречено на неуспех с самого начала. Представители современной контристории Республики Молдова, патриоты Молдавии и сторонники молдавенизма к работе в комиссии, к сожалению, привлечены не были. Бессмысленно пытаться достичь компромисс в трактовке проблем истории Молдавии с теми, кто отрицает существование самой Молдавии, кому невыгодно заниматься историей родного края по чисто финансовым соображениям. Состоявшийся в сентябре 2002 г. в Кишиневе семинар «Обучение истории в Молдове», проведенный Информационным бюро Совета Европы в Молдове, Министерством образо30

ПРИДНЕСТРОВСКАЯ МОЛДАВСКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА вания РМ и Миссией ОБСЕ в Молдове, только подтверждает этот вывод. Главные споры и дискуссии разгорелись между представителями клана монополистов и независимыми исследователями, членами Ассоциации ученых им.Милеску-Спатару, а также учителями Молдовы и Гагаузии. Последние были возмущены поведением кишиневских румынофилов, которые преследовали лишь одну цель — добиться от сотрудников Совета Европы освящения разработанных ими «куррикулумов» по истории и получить индульгенцию на прорумынское зомбирование молодого поколения молдаван. Однако практика показывает, что в Молдове существует целая группа относительно независимых историков. Не являясь сторонниками государственности Приднестровья либо нейтрально относясь к этому вопросу, они готовы к обмену информацией, результатами исследований и даже к сотрудничеству с коллегами из ПМР для выполнения определенных исследовательских проектов, инициируемых не Тирасполем или Кишиневом, а другими центрами. В 1998 г. сотрудники лаборатории участвовали в реализации проекта «Национальные процессы, языковые отношения и идентичность», автором которого явился профессор Стенфордского университета Дэвид Лейтин, а соавтором и руководителем — зам. директора Института этнологии и антропологии Российской Академии наук профессор Михаил Губогло. Совместно с Центром изучения межнациональных отношений ИЭиА РАН, с которым научно-исследовательская лаборатория истории Приднестровья сотрудничает согласно подписанному договору, в социологическом исследовании приняли участие ученые Молдовы под эгидой Департамента национальных отношений и функционирования языков, а также Народное Собрание Гагаузии. Результатом этого стали многочисленные публикации в научных изданиях Приднестровья, Молдовы, России, США и других стран. Они показали, что стремление к объективности, честность и добросовестность исследователей различных политических взглядов и убеждений может служить объединяющим началом и способствовать успеху в науке. Другим характерным примером такого рода информационного сотрудничества может служить реализация международного исследовательского проекта «Перспективы урегулирования конфликта между Молдовой и Приднестровьем: роль строительства гражданского общества», поддержанного программой «Research Support Scheme» Института открытого общества (Прага). Руководитель проекта — Владимир Колосов, доктор географических наук, директор Центра геополитических исследований Института географии РАН, 31

ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ участники — Д.В.Заяц и А.Д.Криндач (Москва), Л.Друмя (Кишинев), Н.В.Бабилунга (Тирасполь). К работе привлекались и другие исследователи. Ее успешное завершение сопровождалось рядом интересных публикаций в различных странах на разных языках (русском, французском, английском). Результаты исследования размещены в интернете и оживленно комментировались периодической печатью различных стран. Иными словами, разумный прагматизм и политическая непредвзятость способны дать хорошие результаты и повысить шансы на успех в науке. В сентябре 2002 г. в Кишиневе состоялась презентация интернет-журнала «Молдавское научное обозрение» под редакцией доктора истории О.Галущенко. Первый номер называется «Приднестровье — от прошлого к будущему» и всецело посвящен рассмотрению такой болезненной для Молдовы проблемы, как конфликт на берегах Днестра. Уникальность этого журнала состоит в том, что он стал подобием трибуны в лондонском Гайд-парке и в равной степени предоставляет свои страницы представителям враждующих сторон. Историки, политологи, социологи, филологи и представители других наук Молдовы и ПМР получили возможность высказать свою точку зрения на прошлое нашего края, его настоящее и возможные пути решения конфликта. Трудно сказать, может ли непосвященный читатель представить себе достаточно ясно историю и суть описываемых событий, опираясь исключительно на мнения специалистов из Кишинева и Тирасполя. Однако случайный человек вряд ли заинтересуется этим сайтом (http://www.iatp.md/ academicreview), а компетентный читатель отдаст должное редактору журнала и его авторам, которые излагают свои позиции, предоставив читателю право решить, чьи аргументы более весомы, а цели законны. Задача журнала «Moldova Academic review» и других подобных изданий заключается в том, чтобы ознакомить мировую общественность с процессами, происходящими на Днестре. Надеемся, что они помогут образумиться тем, кто строил «мосты из цветов» на Пруте, разрушая до основания прочные железобетонные мосты на Днестре. Сейчас трудно судить о том, насколько возможно в обозримом времени объединение Молдовы и Приднестровья. Еще кровоточат раны, нанесенные народам обеих сторон преступной войной, еще не наказаны те преступники, которые развязали эту братоубийственную бойню, более того, они являются действующими политиками. Да и насколько необходимо нашим народам это искусственное соеди32

ПРИДНЕСТРОВСКАЯ МОЛДАВСКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА нение разных экономик, культур и менталитетов (при всей несомненной схожести исторических путей их формирования)? Пока геополитические устремления и политические цели наших государственных систем противоположны, а наши представления о свободе, правах человека и других нетленных ценностях имеют мало общего. Тем не менее, опыт показывает, что информационное взаимодействие с историками Кишинева возможно и желательно. Однако область этого взаимодействия не так широка, как хотелось бы. Можно предположить два сценария их развития в зависимости от того политического вектора, который будет выбран руководством этой страны. Если Молдова пойдет путем укрепления своей государственности и демократизации режима, связи будут расширяться. Если же будет происходить ее постепенная инкорпорация в румынскую государственность, поле сотрудничества будет сужаться. СОВРЕМЕННЫЙ ЭТАП РАЗВИТИЯ ПРИДНЕСТРОВСКОЙ ИСТОРИОГРАФИИ

После лишения коммунистической идеологии ее монопольного права на умы, сердца и души людей, в нашем обществе стала возрождаться роль религии и особенно православной церкви. Нельзя не отметить то плодотворное воздействие, которое Русская Православная церковь оказывает на современную приднестровскую историографию. Ежегодные Покровские чтения, устраиваемые с 1999 г. Тираспольско-Дубоссарской Епархией и Приднестровским госуниверситетом им. Т.Г. Шевченко, дали толчок к расширению краеведческих исследований. До настоящего времени издано семь книг: преподаватели, студенты, краеведы опубликовали свои небольшие исследования, посвященные истории духовности и церкви в нашем крае в различные исторические периоды19. Становление приднестровской исторической школы сопровождается самым настоящим ренессансом краеведческих исследований, в которых участвуют не только преподаватели вузов, но и работники музеев и архивов, журналисты, краеведы, а также студенты и школьники. За полтора десятилетия существования ПМР издано большое число работ, освещающих самые разные периоды истории нашего Покровские чтения / По благославлению преосвященнейшего Юстиниана, Епископа Тираспольского и Дубоссарского. Кн. 1-7. Тирасполь, 2000-2005. 19

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ края20. Однако это имеет и оборотную сторону: дилетанты в науке с их оригинальным видением и непременным желанием навязать его обществу иногда способны до неузнаваемости исказить научную картину, затруднить и даже затормозить объективные исследования. Ярким примером такого рода является издание исторического Атласа ПМР, авторы которого (А.З. Волкова, И.И. Крисько, А.А. Темников и др.) сделали неудачную попытку осветить историю края, ограничившись современными границами ПМР, и без связи с процессами, происходившими в тех странах, частью которых в тот или иной период являлось Приднестровье21. Впрочем, данный Атлас атласом не является, а по количеству исторических, орфографических и прочих ошибок просто не имеет себе равных. Но главная опасность подобного рода работ кроется в претензии на научность, политическую актуальность и официальность. Не имея возможности более подробно осветить успехи и проблемы развивающейся исторической школы Приднестровья на конкретных примерах, отметим тот уровень, на который она вышла к началу XXI в., после десятилетнего периода становления. В 20002001 гг. НИЛ «История Приднестровья» было издано трехтомное исследование «История Приднестровской Молдавской Республики»22, в котором приняли участие несколько десятков ученых из Приднестровья, России, Молдовы и Украины. В первом томе освещен период с древнейших времен, появления на берегах Днестра первых людей и становления первобытнообщинных отношений, появления классов и государств, включения Приднестровья в состав КиБалицкая М. Каменка-390. Тирасполь, 1998; Из истории родного города. Вып. 1. Тирасполь, 1997; Вып 2. Тирасполь, 1998; Вып. 3. Тирасполь, 2000; Приднестровские исторические чтения. Вып. 1. Тирасполь, 2002; Аствацатуров Г. Бендерская крепость. Бендеры, 1997; Гросул В.Я. Карагаш. М., 2001; Он же. Черки истории села Парканы. Ч. 1. Бендеры, 1995; Ч. 2. Бендеры, 1996; Боговид А.С. Черноморское казачье войско (1991-2001 гг.), Тирасполь, 2002; Гросул В.Я. Карагаш — минувший и нынешний (История одного приднестровского села). М., 2001; Лобанов Е.А. Бендеры. Страницы истории. 1408-1812. Бендеры, 2003; Федоров Г.И. Герои Приднестровья. К 60-летию Великой Победы. Тирасполь, 2005; Полушин В. Тирасполь на грани столетий. Кн. 1. Тирасполь, 1995; Кн. 2. Тирасполь, 1996; Путешествие в историю города Бендеры (Бендерский историко-краеведческий музей 1914-1994). Бендеры, 1995; Руденко Н.П. Дубоссары — город защитников ПМР. Дубоссары, 1995; Унгурян Э.Г., Унгурян А.П., Борисова Т.И. История образования, заселения и развития немецких колоний в Левобережном Приднестровье в XIX в. Тирасполь, 2003 и др. 21 Атлас. Приднестровская Молдавская Республика. История. Тирасполь, 2005. 22 История Приднестровской Молдавской Республики / Сост. В.Я. Гросул, Н.В. Бабилунга, Б.Г. Бомешко и др. Т. I. Тирасполь, 2000; Т. II. Тирасполь, 2001. 20

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ПРИДНЕСТРОВСКАЯ МОЛДАВСКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА евской Руси, Галицко-Волынского княжества, Золотой Орды, Великого княжества Литовского и Русского, Польского королевства, Речи Посполитой, Крымского ханства, Российской империи, до февральской революции и падения монархии в России, образования демократической республики и организации первых Советов. Во втором томе представлена советская эпоха — подготовка и осуществление социалистического переворота и установление в крае власти Советов, гражданская война, создание молдавской государственности на левобережье Днестра в составе Украинской ССР, оккупация края в годы Великой Отечественной войны и превращение румынскими фашистами губернаторства Транснистрия в территорию массовых казней и геноцида, послевоенная история Приднестровских земель в составе Молдавской ССР до распада Советского Союза и раскола Молдавии в конце 80-х — начале 90-х гг. ХХ в. Наконец, последний том описывает драматические события, связанные с восстановлением государственности в Приднестровье, образованием ПМР, ее героической защитой от внешней агрессии, а также многотрудные будни современного периода истории Приднестровья, его экономическое положение, социальное, политическое и культурное развитие. Выход в свет этого издания стал знаковым событием в общественно-политической жизни республики, важным этапом становления собственной историографии и формирования исторической школы непризнанного пока государства. На основе этого труда была разработана концепция исторического образования, созданы школьные учебники по истории родного края23, осуществляется подготовка учебно-методической и вспомогательной литературы. В настоящее время во всех средних и высших учебных заведениях ПМР история Приднестровья изучается в качестве обязательного предмета и на родных языках, чему способствовало издание учебников не только на русском, но и на молдавском языках. В молдавБабилунга Н.В., Бомешко Б.Г. История родного края. Учебник для общеобразовательных учебных заведений. 6-7 классы. Тирасполь, 2004; Они же. История родного края. Учебник для общеобразовательных учебных заведений. 8-9 классы. Тирасполь, 2005; Этим учебникам предшествовало учебное пособие для 5 класса средней школы ПМР (Бабилунга Н.В., Бомешко Б.Г. Страницы родной истории. Тирасполь, 1997), которое носило экспериментальный характер в период поиска единой концепции исторического образования как в России, так и в ПМР. С ее принятием и утверждением учебных планов и стандартов по предметам исторического цикла рассказы по родной истории, как и курс «Введение в историю», в школах больше не изучаются. 23

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ских школах республики предусмотрено также изучение истории Молдавии, а в школах с украинским языком обучения — истории Украины. В Республике Молдова молдавская история не преподается, а изучается сомнительный в научном отношении курс «История румын». Дети же Приднестровья наравне с историей родного края изучают и историю Молдавии. Трудно прогнозировать дальнейшее развитие Молдовы в качестве самостоятельного государства или румынской провинции. Но у нас есть все основания полагать, что в непризнанном государстве — ПМР — сложилась признанная историография. Надеемся, что это будет способствовать признанию и самого государства в обозримом будущем.

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ АРЦАХА (НАГОРНО-КАРАБАХСКАЯ РЕСПУБЛИКА) Ваграм Балаян канд. исторических наук, доцент, зав. кафедрой истории АрГУ ПРОТОАРМЯНСКИЕ ГОСУДАРСТВА Известно, что историческая родина индоевропейских народов находилась между Иранским плоскогорьем, Восточной Анатолией Северного Междуречья и рекой Кура, где расположены Армянские восточные провинции Арцах и Утик. Армяне Арцаха не только принадлежат арменоидной ветви индоевропейской языковой семьи, но и являются самыми яркими представителями этой группы1. Это подтверждают и найденные в Арцахе материалы, которые имеют общность с памятниками, обнаруженными на территории Армянского Нагорья. В VIII в. до н.э. Арцах был включен в состав первого могущественного государства Армянского Нагорья — царства Ван (Урарту). Сын Аргишти I, Сардурий II (764-735 гг. до н. э.), завоевал восточные берега Севана, а затем и Арцах. Об этом свидетельствуют клинописные надписи, которые сохранились около села Цовак на восточном берегу Севана и в Ване. Арцах упоминается в них под именем Уртехе. Эту область исследовали Б. Пиотровский, Г. Меликишвили, Гр. Капанян, Ов. Карагезян2 и другие ученые. После падения ВанскоСм.: Бунак В. Антропологический состав населения Кавказа // Вестн. гос. музея Грузии. Т. XIII. 1946. С. 94. 2 Пиотровский Б. Ванское царство. М., 1954; Меликишвили Г. Урартские клинообразные надписи. М., 1960; Капанцян Гр. История Урарту. Ереван, 1940; Карагезян Ов. Клинописные названия местностей в Арарате и близлежащих провинциях. Ереван, 1998. 1

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ го (Урартского) царства Арцах и Утик находились в составе царств Ервандидов, Арташесидов и Аршакидов. Как армянские, так и грекоримские источники свидетельствуют о том, что границей между Великой Арменией и Албанией являлась река Кура, а ее правый берег был частью Армении3. Страбон представляет Арцах в качестве одной из провинций Армении и называет его Орхистина. Волей судьбы находясь на перекрестке дорог, ведущих с востока на запад, Армения являлась ареной воин, которые развязывали могущественные империи. Oсобую роль в распаде Армении сыграли Персия и Византия. В 428 г. пало царство Аршакидов, и Арцах оказался в составе албанского марзпанства. Поддерживаемый армянами Арцаха и Утика, Вачаган Араншахик стремился создать в восточных провинциях армянское царство. Сведения об этом содержатся в работах Егише, Лазаря Парпеци, Мовсеса Каганкатваци4. В IV-VII вв. история и география, этнография и политическая жизнь Арцаха и Утика явились объектом исследования А. Яновского, К. Гана, И. Шопена и К. Тревера5. В конце VI — начале VII вв. вследствие завоевательской политики Персии Алуанское марзпанство было раздроблено на севере на отдельные мелкие княжества, которые, выступая под именами живших там отдельных племен или правивших княжеских домов, утратили ставшее для них лишним наименование «Албания». На юге Утик и Арцах образовали отдельное армянское царство Араншахиков, которых сменили Микраниды. Но в отличие от княжеств, существовавших на территории к северу от Куры, они сохранили название «Алуанк», что для них имело лишь географическое значение. «Агванк» стал синонимом упоминаемых в трудах древних армянских историков названий «Восточный край Армении», «Северо-восточный край», «Агванский край», «Армения Глубинная». Так, например, древнеарСм.: История Армении Моисея Хоренского / Пер. Н. О. Эмира. М., 1893; Агатангесос. История Армении. Тифлис, 1909 (на арм. яз.); История Армении Павстоса Бузанда / Пер. с древнеарм. Ереван, 1953; Страбон. География. Л., 1964; Плиний Старший. Естественная история // Античная география / Сост. проф. М.С. Боднарский. М., 1953; Плутарх. Сравнительные жизнеописания. М., 1963; Томсон Дж. О. История древней географии. М., 1953. 4 История Егише Вардапета / Пер. с арм. П. Шаншиева. Тифлис, 1853; Парпеци Л. История Армении. Тифлис, 1904 (на арм. яз.); Каганкатваци М. История страны Алуанк. Ереван, 1983 (на арм. яз.). 5 Яновский А. О древней Кавказской Албании // Журнал МНП. 1846. Ч. II; Ган К. Опыт объяснения географических названий. Тифлис, 1909; Шопен И. Исторический памятник состояния Армянской области. СПб., 1852; См.: Тревер К. Очерки по истории и культуре Кавказской Албании. Л., 1959. 3

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ АРЦАХА мянский историк XI-XII вв. Маттеос Урхаеци пишет: «Страна Албания, которую называют Глубинной Арменией…»6. В VII в. н. э. Арцах был этнически армянской провинцией, и в нем существовал окраинный диалект армянского языка (арцахский), о чем свидетельствует один из толкователей Дионисия Фракийского Стефан Сюнеци7. Этим вопросам посвятили свои труды А. Мнацаканян, Лео, Н. Адонц, Г. Алишан, К. Патканян, Махакия архиепископ Орманян, Макар епископ Бархударянц, Ал. Акопян, Ал. Акопян, П. Мурадян и К. Юзбашян. Особый интерес представляет работа Б. Улубабяна8. В VII в. мир на армянской земле был нарушен завоевательными походами арабов. Подобно жителям других армянских провинций, армяне Арцаха начали освободительную борьбу против захватчиков. О событиях периода арабского владычества свидетельствуют Себеос, Вардапет Гевонд, католикос Иованнес, Товма Арцруни, Степанос Таронеци Асохик, Вардапет Вардан9. Освободительная борьба армянского народа против арабского владычества привела к восстановлению независимости Армении. В 885 г. арабский халифат признал Ашота I Багратуни высшим владыкой (князем князей) Армении (Мец Айк). Арцах снова оказался в составе всеармянского объединенного государства. Багратидам уда6 7

187.

Урхаеци М. Хроника. Вагаршапат, 1898. С. 230 (на арм. яз.). См.: Адонц Н. Дионисий Фракийский и армянские толкователи. Пг., 1915. С.

Mнацаканян А. О литературе Кавказской Албании. Ереван, 1969; Лео (Бабаханян А.). История армянского народа. Т. II. Ереван, 1967 (на арм. яз.); Адонц Н. Армения в эпоху Юстиниана. СПб., 1908; Алишан Г. Айапатум. Венеция, 1901. Он же. Сисакан. Венеция, 1893 (на арм. яз.); История Агван Моисея Каганкатваци, писателя X в. / Пер. с древнеарм. К. Патканяна. СПб., 1861; Орманян М. Азгапатум. Константинополь, 1912; Бархударянц М. Арцах. Баку, 1895. Он же. Страна Алуанк и соседи. Тифлис, 1893. Он же. История Алуанка. Т. 1: Вагаршапат, 1902; Т. 2: Вагаршапат, 1907; Акопян Ал. Албания-Алуанк в греко-латинских и древнеармянских источниках. Ереван, 1987; Акопян Ал., Мурадян П., Юзбашян К. К изучению истории Кавказской Албании (по поводу книги Ф. Мамедовой «Политическая история и историческая география Кавказской Албании (III в. до н. э. — VIII в. н.э.)») // К освещению проблем истории и культуры Кавказской Албании и восточных провинций Армении. Т. 1. Ереван, 1991; Улубабян Б., Очерки из истории восточного края Армении (V-VIIвв.). Ереван, 1981. 9 Себеос. История. Ереван, 1939 (на арм. яз.); Гевонд. История. СПб, 1897; История Армении католикоса Иованнеса Драсханакертци. Тифлис, 1912 (на арм. яз.); Товма Арцруни и Аноним. История дома Арцруни. Тифлис, 1917 (на арм. яз.); Всеобщая история Степаноса Таронеци Асохика. СПб., 1885 (на древнеарм. яз.); Всеобщая история Степаноса Таронеци Асохика по прозванию писателя XI столетия / Пер. К. Эммина. М., 1864; Всеобщая история Вардана Великого / Пер. К. Эммина. М., 1861. 8

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ лось сформировать государство подобное конфедерации, что сделало возможным создание сильных местных институтов власти. Это способствовало развитию политической, экономической и культурной жизни страны. Подобный статус имели такие княжества (меликства) Арцаха, как Хачен, Парисос и Дизак. Хорошо осведомленный в административно-политических делах сопредельных стран Закавказья византийский двор знал, что Хаченское княжество находится в Армении. Поэтому император Константин Порфирородный (913959 гг.) адресует письмо на имя князя Хачена «в Армению»10. Княжествам Арцаха удалось противостоять нашествиям туроксельджуков, монголов, тюркменских племен, персов и турок. Интересные сведения об истории Арцаха X-XVI вв. сообщают памятные рукописи, часть которых была опубликована11, а другая хранится в Матенадаране им. Маштоца в Ереване. Ценный материал представляют собой и настенные надписи, частично опубликованные12. Самым богатым и наиболее полным является собрание настенных материалов Вардапета Макара Бархударяна. Он лично побывал почти во всех старых и новых поселениях Восточного Закавказья, крепостях и монастырских комплексах, собирая настенные надписи и переписывая памятные записи рукописей. Большое количество материалов содержится и в работе С. Бархударяна13. Неоценимы также труды известного арменоведа Иосифа Орбели, посвященные истории Арцаха IX-XVI вв.14 Константин Порфирородный. О церемониях Византийского двора. Кн. II. Гл. 48. 11 См.: Католикос Гарегин I. Свод памятных рукописей. Т. I. Антилиас, 1951; Памятные записи армянских рукописей 14-го века / Сост. Л. Хачикян. Ереван, 1950; Памятные записи армянских рукописей 15-го века / Сост. Л. Хачикян. Ч. 1: (14011450). Ереван, 1955; Ч. 2: (1451-1480). Ереван, 1958; Ч. 3 (1481-1500). Ереван, 1967 (на арм. яз). 12 См.: Архимандрит Саргис Джалалянц. Путешествие по Великой Армении. Ч. I: Тифлис, 1842; Ч. 2: Тифлис, 1858 (на арм. яз.). Епископ Ованес Шахатунянц. Описание соборной церкви Эчмиадзин пяти Араратских провинций. Т. 2. Эчмиадзин, 1842 (на арм. яз.); Топчян А. Список собраний архимандрита Хачика Дадяна. Ч. I. Вагаршапат, 1900 (на арм. яз.). 13 Свод армянских надписей. Вып. V: Арцах / Сост. С. Г. Бархударян. Ереван, 1982 (на арм. яз.). 14 Орбели И. Избранные труды. Ереван, 1963; Нефритовая кинжальная рукоять с армянской надписью // «Известия» Императорской Академии наук. 1909. Сер. VI. Т. III. № 5; Асан-Джалал, князь Хаченский // Там же. № 6; Надписи Гандзасара и Аваптука / Собрал и приготовил к печати Иосиф Орбели. Пг., 1919; Бытовые рельефы на хаченских крестных камнях XII-XIII вв. // Записки Восточного отделения Императорского русского археологического общества. 1915. Т. XXII. Вып. III — IV. 10

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ АРЦАХА Начиная с Михаила Чамчяна, армянские историки и филологи всегда проявляли живой интерес к вопросам истории и культуры Восточной части Армении и особенно Арцах-Хачена. В произведениях Гевонда Алишана — «Воспоминания о родине», «Айапатум», «Сисакан», «Албания» — можно найти описание административно-политического устройства и этнического состава Восточного Закавказья в разные исторические эпохи. Заслуженный ученый, католикос Гарегин Овсепян15 и епископ Карапет16 сообщают ценные сведения о княжеских домах Хахбакянов и Допянов. Роль свободолюбивого населения этой горной местности в многовековой истории армянского народа, а также освободительные движения и история отдельных княжеских домов детально описаны в работах Лео и Ашота Иоаннисяна17. Заслуживают упоминания также монографии Б. Аракеляна «Города и ремесла в Армении в IX-XIII вв.» и Л. Бабаяна «Социально-экономическая и политическая история Армении в XIII-XIVвв.». Восточной Армении посвятили свои исследования и зарубежные востоковеды, такие как М. Броссе, Г. Гьюбшман, Я. Маркварт, В. Минорски и Ч. Довсет. В XVI-XVIII вв. в горных провинциях Арцаха отдельным ветвям княжеских домов Араншахиков удалось противостоять нашествиям пришельцев и сохранить жизнеспособные остатки местных органов управления, существовавших в крае на протяжении веков. МЕЖДУ ИРАНОМ И ТУРЦИЕЙ С начала XVI в. до конца 30-х годов XVII в. Армения была ареной междоусобных войн между Ираном и Турцией. В результате договоров, подписанных двумя государствами в 1555 и 1639 гг., Армения была разделена на две части. Западные провинции перешли Турции, а восточные — Персии. Несмотря на то, что меликства Арцаха в составе Персии пользовались только внутренней независимостью, Овсепян Г. Собрание Дзагавана. Кн. 1. Вагаршапат, 1913; Хахбакяны или Прошяны в истории Армении. Вагаршапат, 1928 (на арм. яз.). 16 Епископ Карапет. Материалы об армянском меликстве. Вып. 2. Эчмиадзин, 1914 (на арм. яз.). 17 См.: Лео. История армянского народа. Т. II: Ереван, 1967; Т. III: Ереван, 1968 (на арм. яз.); Он же. Мои воспоминания (сведения из наших гор и ущелий). Шуша, 1890; Он же. История армянской епархиальной духовной школы Карабаха, 18381913 гг. Тбилиси, 1914; Он же. Торговый капитал. Ереван, 1934; Иоаннисян А. Очерки из истории армянской освободительной мысли. Кн. 1: Ереван, 1957; Кн. 2: Ереван, 1959; Он же. Княжеский род Гегама и Цара // Вестник научного института Армении. Кн. 1, 2. 1921-1922. 15

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ благодаря гибкости и храбрости правителей этих княжеств они стали гарантией сохранения армянской независимости, содействовали развитию самобытной армянской культуры, а позже стали центрами освободительной борьбы. В 20-х годах XVIII в. в Карабахе развернулась национально-освободительная борьба против персидского ига. Одновременно армяне Арцаха боролись против турецких оккупационных войск. Это продолжалось до 1735 г., когда вступившие в Закавказье персидские войска нанесли поражение туркам. Благодаря вооруженной борьбе пять меликов Нагорного Карабаха обрели самостоятельность, и Надир-шах был вынужден это признать. В результате была создана новая административная единица под названием меликства Хамсы (союз пяти меликов). Отсутствие централизованной власти и борьба за престол привели к тому что, многие правители разных областей Ирана получили независимость. Сложившейся ситуацией воспользовались кочевые тюркоязычные племена, которые обосновались в междуречье Куры и Аракса. В середине XVIII в. один из лидеров этих племен, Панах, воспользовался разрозненностью армянских меликов и вторгся в Нагорный Карабах, основав там Карабахское ханство. Таким образом в горном Арцахе обосновался первый турок. Однако мелики Арцаха пытались покончить с этим владычеством с помощью России. Длительная борьба закончилась 12 октября 1813 г. подписанием мирного русско-персидского договора в Гюлистане, по которому Арцах передали во владение царской России18. В архивах Баку, Тбилиси, Москвы, Петербурга, Тавриза, Исфагана хранится огромное количество первоисточников, которые предоставляют богатый материал по истории Арцаха XVI-XVIII вв. Армянская историография также затрагивала эти вопросы19. О богатом См.: Даврижеци А. История. Ереван, 1988; Джалалян Есаи Асан. Краткая история страны Агванк. Ереван, 1997; Шараф-Хан ибн Шамсадин Битлиси. Шараф-намэ / Пер. Е. И. Васильевой. Т. I. М., 1967; Мирза-Адигезал-Бек. Карабах-наме. Баку, 1950; Джеваншир Мирза Джемаль. История Карабаха. Баку, 1959; Бакиханов А. ГюлистанИран. Баку, 1926; Раффи. Меликства Хамсы. Вена, 1906 (на арм. яз.); Нерсесов Карабаги Мирза Йусуф. Тарих и Сафи. Ереван, 2000 (на арм. яз.); Джеваншир А. О политическом существовании Карабахского ханства (1747-1805). Баку, 1961; Эзов Г. Сношения Петра Великого с армянским народом. СПб, 1898; Бутков А. Материалы по новой истории Кавказа. СПб, 1869. 19 См.: Лео. История Армении. Т. III. Ереван, 1946; Армяно-русские отношения в первой трети XVIII в.: Сб. док-ов / Под ред. А. Иоаннисяна. Т. II. Ч. 1. Ереван, 1964; Арутюнян П. Освободительное движение армянского народа в первой четверти XVIII в. М., 1954; Арзуманян З. Возникновение сгнахов и их военно-политическое значение // Вестник. 1982. № 9; Армяно-русские отношения… Ч. 2. Ереван, 1967; 18

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ АРЦАХА наследии армянской культуры и ее уничтожении турецкими племенами в восточных провинциях Армении рассказывают работы С. Карапетяна, А. Гуляна, Б. Карапетяна20. Интересные сведения содержат сборники, опубликованные в Грузии21. Войдя в состав России, ни Восточная Армения, ни Арцах не получили желаемой свободы. Персидское иго сменилось российским. Царская Россия стремилась превратить завоеванные территории в свои колонии и в рынок для производимых товаров. Правительство пыталось унифицировать законодательство и административное деление Закавказья. Одновременно в целях использования межнациональных разногласий царские власти стремились образовать административные деления со смешанным населением. Для отвлечения внимания народа от внутренних проблем правительство иногда подстрекало армян и татар (азербайджанцев) к столкновениям. Однако царская Россия была более передовой страной, чем Персия, что создавало благоприятные условия для развития экономической и культурной жизни края. Интересные сведения о столетнем (1813-1917 гг.) периоде правления царской России сохранились в русских источниках22. Армянские авторы23 также посвятили свои работы событиям этого века. Папазян А. Надпись на входе в приемную мелика Егана // Вестник общественных наук. АН Арм. ССР. 1985. № 5; Иоаннисян А. Р. Россия и армянское освободительное движение в 80-е годы XVIII ст. Ереван, 1947; Нерсисян М. Г. Суворов и русскоармянские отношения в 70-90-е годы XVIII в. Ереван, 1981; Сафрастян А. Турецкие источники об Армении, армянах и других народах Закавказья. Ч. 1: Ереван, 1961; Ч. 2: Ереван, 1964; Хачатрян Г. Военное сотрудничество армянского и русского народов в Каспийском походе русской армии. Ереван, 1972. 20 См.: Карапетян С. Памятники армянской культуры в зоне Нагорного Карабаха. Ереван, 1999; Северный Арцах. Ереван, 2004; Гулян А. Меликские замки Арцаха и Сюника. Ереван, 2001; Карапетян Б. Шушинская крепость. Ереван, 2000. 21 См.: Грамоты и другие исторические документы XVIII ст., относящиеся к Грузии (1768-1774) / Под ред. А. А. Цагарели. Т. 1. СПб, 1891; Мачарадзе В. Г. Материалы по истории русско-грузинских отношений второй половины XVIII в. Ч.. 3. Вып. 1. Тбилиси, 1968. 22 См.: Собрание актов, относящихся к обозрению истории армянского народа. Ч.1. М., 1833; Акты Кавказской археографической комиссии. Т. 1. Тифлис, 1866; Договоры России с Востоком, политические и торговые / Собрал и издал Т. Юзефович. СПб, 1869; Обозрение Российских владений за Кавказом в статистическом, этнографическом, топографическом и финансовом отношениях. Ч. 1. М., 1836; Колониальная политика российского царизма в Азербайджане в 20-60-е годы XIX в. Ч. 1. М.;Л., 1936; Кавказский календарь. 1849-1900; Потто В. Геройская оборона крепости Шуши. СПб, 1903; Первые добровольцы Карабаха в эпоху водворения русского владычества. Тифлис, 1902. 23 См.: Тер-Ованесян Г. Краткая биография митрополита Багдасар Асан-Джалаляна // Пордз. № 5. 1880; Ерицян А. Всеармянское католичество и Кавказские ар-

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ ОСВОБОДИТЕЛЬНАЯ БОРЬБА В 1917-1920 ГГ. После февральской, а затем октябрьской революций 1917 г. многие территории царской России, в том числе и Арцах, переживали трудные времена. В целях установления порядка, а также создания легитимной власти в крае по инициативе партии Дашнакцутюн и при участии других армянских политических сил в декабре 1917 г. в г. Шуши был создан правительственный орган — Межпартийное бюро, наделенное законодательными и исполнительными полномочиями. Восстановленные государственные институты армян Арцаха управляли политической, экономической и культурной жизнью как армян, так и национальных меньшинств, в том числе и татар (азербайджанцев), проживавших на территории от окрестностей Гандзака до реки Аракс. Фактически в декабре 1917 г., за несколько месяцев до образования трех национальных закавказских республик в Нагорном Карабахе был создан государственный орган, который до 1920 г., то есть до установления советской власти, боролся против агрессивных действий турок и татар (азербайджанцев). Некоторые участники освободительной борьбы 1917-1920 гг. и очевидцы тех событий оставили свои воспоминания, которые сегодня представляют исключительную ценность. Большая их часть опубликована (записи Арсена Микаеляна, Егише Ишханяна, Амбардзума мяне в 19 в. Т. 2. Тбилиси, 1895; Гулишамбаров Ст. Обзор фабрик и заводов Закавказского края. Тифлис, 1894; Армяно-татарские столкновения на Кавказе в 19051906 гг. Ереван, 1907; Лео. Тридцатилетнее армянское благотворительное общество на Кавказе (1813-1911). Тбилиси, 1911; Гилханданян А. Кавказский край, народ и история. Ч. 1. Париж, 1943; Лисицян Ст. Армяне Нагорного Карабаха (этнографическая справка) // Армянская этнография и фольклор. № 12. Ереван, 1981; Лалаян Е. Варанда, этнодемографический обзор. Кн. Б. Тифлис, 1897; Документы по истории армянской церкви. Кн. 9: Арцахская община армянской апостольской церкви (1813-1933) / Сост. С. Бейбутян. Ереван, 2003; Саркисян Г. Население нагорного Карабаха за 100 лет (1823-1923): Этнодемографический обзор. Ереван, 1992; Население Восточной Армении в XIX — начале XX вв.: Этнодемографическое исследование. Ереван, 2002; Он же. Из истории градостроительства Шуши. Ереван, 1996. Ованесян Л., Арутюнян М. О некоторых вопросах этнодемографической истории Арцаха конца 18 — 19 вв. (согласно зарубежным источникам) // Историографические исследования. Ч. 1. Степанакерт, 2003; Тер-Гаспарян Р. Шуши. Ереван, 1993; Вирабян А. Из глубины веков. Выдающиеся деятели Арцаха и Сюника. Ереван, 1998; Арутюнян Г. Армянская школа Арцаха в 5-19 вв. Степанакерт, 2000; Севян В. Шуши. Ереван, 1991; Карапетян Б. Крепость Шуши. Ереван, 2000; Шуши, один век культурной жизни (1820-1920). Ереван, 1992.

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ АРЦАХА Тертеряна, Рубена Тер-Минасяна, Овака Степаняна, Сарура Саркисяна, Арутюна Туманяна). Ряд армянских авторов24 также посвятили свои работы событиям 1917-1920 гг. В местной и зарубежной прессе были опубликованы многочисленные статьи. В мае 1920 г. в Нагорном Карабахе была установлена советская власть. Пятого июля 1921 г. руководители Советской России, руководствуясь идеями всемирной революции и учитывая выгоды Турции и находящегося под ее покровительством Азербайджана, насильственно присоединили Нагорный Карабах к Советскому Азербайджану. Вследствие недовольства армян Нагорного Карабаха таким положением в 1923 г. Нагорному Карабаху был предоставлен статус автономии, однако Северный Арцах был от него оторван. Несмотря на притеснения, на протяжении десятилетий армяне Арцаха боролись за воссоединение с исторической родиной — Арменией. Оценке событий этого периода посвящены специальные исследования, статистические сборники, брошюры. Не осталась без внимания и экономика Арцаха25. Ценные фактические данные по истории советского периода Нагорного Карабаха содержат сборники областных статистических управлений как НКР, так и Азербайджана26. Культурной, экономической и политической жизни Советского КаСм.: Мелик-Шахназаров З. Записки карабахского солдата, М.. 1995; Каграманян К. Северный Арцах. Ереван, 2000; Мкртчян Ш. Арцах. Ереван, 1991; Симонян Г. Время Андраника. Ереван, 1996; Хуршудян Л. Истина — единственный критерий исторической науки. Ереван, 1989; Барсегян Х. Истина дороже: к проблеме Нагорного Карабаха. Ереван, 1989; Нагорный Карабах в 1918-1923 гг.: Сб. док-ов и мат-лов / Под ред. В. Микаеляна. Ереван, 1992; Улубабян Б. Арцахская борьба. Т. 1. Ереван, 1993; Абрамян Г. Борющийся Арцах (1917-1923). Кн. 1. Ереван, 1997. 25 См.: Кочарян Г. Нагорный Карабах. Баку, 1925; Сейран Г. Экономическая жизнь Арцаха и ее перспективы. Тбилиси, 1928; Аракелян А. Шелководство в Автономной Области Нагорного Карабаха. Степанакерт, 1939; Захарян А. Производство шелка Нагорного Карабаха. Баку, 1970; Барсе С. Нагорный Карабах. Баку, 1963; Шахназаров Н. Автономная Область Нагорного Карабаха. Баку, 1960; Ованесян Г. Победа плана ленинской кооперации в Автономной Области Нагорного Карабаха. Баку, 1958; Установление советской власти в Нагорном Карабахе. Ереван, 1971. 26 См.: Достижения Советского Нагорного Карабаха за 40 лет в цифрах. Степанакерт, 1963; Нагорный Карабах за годы советской власти. Степанакерт, 1969; Делегату XXVI конференции Нагорно-Карабахской областной организации КП Азербайджана. Степанакерт, 1974; Достижения Нагорного Карабаха в девятой пятилетке. Степанакерт, 1976; Азербайджан в цифрах: Краткий статистический сборник. Баку, 1964; Народное хозяйство Азербайджанской ССР в 1984 г.: Статистический сборник. Баку, 1985; Азербайджанская ССР. Документы и материалы. Баку, 1989. 24

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ рабаха посвятили свои труды С. Абовян, Г. Григорян, Г. Арутюнян, Г. Абрамян и др. государственные и культурные деятели27. В период Великой Отечественной войны армяне Арцаха дали стране ряд маршалов, адмиралов, генералов, героев Советского Союза. Эта тема рассмотрена в серии работ28. Если армянские авторы советского периода создавали свои труды, руководствуясь коммунистической идеологией, то армянские историки Диаспоры, такие как Арташес Абегян29, Рубен30 и др., анализируя важные проблемы национальной политики Азербайджанской ССР, свидетельствовали о дискриминационном положении армян Арцаха. ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕЗАВИСИМОГО АРЦАХА В 1985 г. горбачевская «перестройка» предоставила возможность армянам Нагорного Карабаха выступить в защиту своих национальных прав и потребовать воссоединения НКАО с Армянской ССР. Однако власти Азербайджана при поддержке руководства СССР попытались подавить народное движение посредством жесткой силы. См.: Авакян С. Пресса Советского Карабаха. Баку, 1962; Григорян Г., Арутюнян Г. Арцахская школа с древних времен до наших дней. Ереван, 2005; Абрамян Г. Воюющий Арцах (1923-1985). Кн. 2. Ереван, 2005; Советский Нагорный Карабах. Баку, 1983; В братской семье. Баку, 1973; Хачатрян С. Заслуженная честь. Степанакерт, 2002; Адамян С. Колхоз «Коммунизм». Ереван, 1973; Арутюнян Г. Светлая тайна души. Ереван, 2003; Он же. Народный учитель. Ереван, 2001; Даниелян А. Родной очаг. Ереван, 1993; Сарумян Н. Политическое и культурное состояние НКАО в 1960-80 гг. Степанакерт, 2001; Шагинян М. Нагорный Карабах. М., 1930; Дневники. 1917-1923. Ленинград, 1932; Мкртчян Ш. Арцахские записки. Ереван, 2001; Нагорный Карабах. Анатомия свершенного Азербайджаном геноцида. Ереван, 2003; Нагорно-Карабахская Автономная Область. Баку, 1970. 28 См.: Карапетян С. Храбрые сыны Нагорного Карабаха. Баку, 1969; Шахраманян П. Комсомольская организация Нагорного Карабаха в годы Великой Отечественной войны Советского Союза (1941-1945). Степанакерт, 1958; Бабаян Б. Арцахская женщина в истории, Степанакерт, 1998; Григорян Г. Участие армян Арцаха в Великой Отечественной войне (1941-1945): Автореф. дисс….канд ист. наук. Ереван, 2004; Арутюнян К. Участие армянского народа в Великой Отечественной войне Советского Союза (1941-1945). Ереван, 2004; Шахраманян Г. Нагорно-Карабахская областная организация коммунистической партии Азербайджана в годы Великой Отечественной войны Советского Союза (1941-1945): Автореф. дисс…. канд. ист. наук. Баку, 1964; Вирабян А. Знаменитые арцахцы. Ереван, 1992. 29 Абегян Арт. Армяно-азербайджанские отношения (вопросы национальной политики) // Айреник. № 11. 1929; Он же. Свободная, независимая и объединенная Армения (вопросы национальной политики) // Там же. № 10. 1927. 30 Рубен. Армения и Азербайджан // Там же. № 6. 1927. 27

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ АРЦАХА Второго сентября 1991 г. население НКАО, воспользовавшись правом, предоставленным Конституцией СССР, провозгласило свою независимость. Это вызвало неадекватную реакцию со стороны одного из субъектов советского Азербайджана — Советской социалистической республики Азербайджан (советский Азербайджан состоял из трех субъектов: Нахичеванской Автономной республики, НагорноКарабахской Автономной области и непосредственно Советской социалистической республики Азербайджан). Азербайджан предпринял попытку завоевать территорию соседней страны — Нагорного Карабаха и подвергнуть геноциду его коренное население — армян. Арцахская освободительная война, которая продолжалась с 1991 до 1994 гг., закончилась поражением Азербайджана. Армяне Арцаха взялись за создание новой государственности, одновременно пытаясь интегрироваться в мировое сообщество. Первому этапу арцахского движения (1988-1991 гг.) посвящены многочисленные книги-мемуары, хронологии, статьи, статистические и фактические сборники31. Часть этих работ была написана по свежим следам, и в некоторых случаях не отличалась глубоким, многосторонним анализом. Ряд публикаций32 посвящен политике См.: Товмасян В., Атаджанян В., Нерсисян Ю. Карабахский вопрос. Степанакерт, 1991; Нагорный Карабах — весна-осень 1990 (док-ты и мат-лы). Ереван, 1990; Азербайджанская аргументация и ее опровержение. Ереван, 1989; Нагорный карабах и вокруг него. Глазами независимых наблюдателей, Ереван, 1991; Нагорный Карабах. Историческая справка. Ереван, 1988; Арутюнян В. События в Нагорном Карабахе. Ч. 1-6. Ереван, 1990-1997; Балаян З. Ад и Рай. Ереван, 1995, Доктор Марутян и его «У войны долгий след». Ереван, 1999; Карапетян Б. И вокруг него. Ереван, 1990; Арцахская одиссея англичанки. Ереван, 1994; Улубабян Б. Арцахская борьба. Ереван, 1999; Хронология Арцахской борьбы. Ереван, 1997; Григорян В. Армения в 19881989 гг. Ереван, 1999; Авакян Г. Нагорный Карабах, ответ фальсификаторам. Ереван, 1991; Ходжабекян В. Арцах в час испытания. Ереван, 1991 (на арм. яз.); Азизбекян Р. Армения с момента перестройки до независимости. Краткая справка. Ереван, 1992; Каграманян К. Северный Арцах. Борьба за выживание. Кн. 2. Ереван, 1993; Абрамян Г. Арцахская борьба за выживание. Ереван, 1991; Когда родина в опасности. Ереван, 1997; Навстречу судьбе. Ереван,.2001; Аршакян А. Арцахская борьба (1885-1992 гг.). Ереван, 2004; Арустамов С. Правда о Нагорном Карабахе. Ереван, 1999; Акопджанян А. У истоков арцахской освободительной борьбы. Ереван, 2001; Мкртчян Ш. АрцахКарабах со своим прошлым и будущим. Афины, 1988; Бабанов И, Воеводский К. Карабахский кризис. СПб, 1992; Сахаров А. О Нагорном Карабахе. Ереван, 1996; Золян С. Нагорный Карабах: проблема и конфликт. Ереван, 2002; Григорян Г. Карабахский дневник (1988-1992). Ереван, 2005; Петросян А. Артур Мкртчян. Ереван, 2004; Саркисян С. Арцах. Историко-географические уточнения/ Ереван, 1996. 32 См.: Чобанян С. Государственно организованный терроризм. Геноцид армян в 1988-1991 гг. Ереван, 1992; Мовсесова И., Овнанян А. Геноцид в Баку. Ереван, 1992; Мелик-Шахназарян Л. Военные преступления Азербайджана против мирного на31

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ Азербайджанского руководства, направленной на уничтожение армян или их депортацию из Нагорного Карабаха и прилегающих регионов. Некоторые авторы33 описали освободительную борьбу 19911994 гг., образование армии обороны и ее военный путь, а также отдельные эпизоды войны. Следует выделить энциклопедическое издание «Карабахская освободительная война 1988-1994 гг.» (Ереван, 2004), в котором не только приводятся биографии погибших участников Арцахской войны, но и дается общая картина военных действий. Отдельно описано участие в войне некоторых врачей, искусствоведов и писателей. К сожалению, биографии некоторых заслуженных людей в нее не вошли. Многие авторы посвятили свои работы трансформации карабахской проблемы из внутрисоюзной в междуселения Нагорного Карабаха. Ереван, 1988; Кокс Керолайн, Айбнер Джон. Этническая чистка продолжается. Война в Нагорном Карабахе. Ереван, 1998; Мелик-Шахназарян Л. Гандзак. Неутраченный мир (воспоминания очевидца). Степанакерт, 1996; Улубабян Г., Золян С., Аршакян А. Сумгаит… Геноцид… Гласность. Ереван, 1989; Вермышева С. Депортация населения армянских сел НКАО и прилегающих районов: апрель-июнь 1991 г. Ереван, 1995; Заключение комитета Верховного Совета РСФСР по правам человека по итогам слушаний, посвященных конфликтам в ряде районов Азербайджанской республики и республики Армения (конец апреля — май 1991 г.). Ереван, 1992; Геноцид армян в Азербайджане. Степанакерт, 1998; Аннексия и депортация. Степанакерт, 1998; Дневник судебного процесса о преступлениях против армянского населения Сумгаита. Степанакерт, 1998. 33 См.: Асратян С. Борьба за выживание (Краткий путеводитель по истории военного пути армии обороны НКР). Степанакерт, 1998; Карабахская война. Ереван, 2001; Генерал Иванян. Ереван, 2005; Петросян Р. Арцах, война, перемирие. Ереван, 2001; Камалян С. Карабах на пути к бессмертию. Краснодар, 1994; Аво нашими глазами. Ереван, 1994; Согомонян Н. Кольцо. Ч. 1, 2, 3. Степанакерт, 19972000; Багдасарян Д. Противостояние: воспоминания. Ереван, 1998; Марутян В. У войны долгий след (записи военврача). Ереван, 1996; Буниатян А. Кровавые дни: Мартакерт (док-ты). Кн. 1. Ереван, 2000; Маркарян С. Мартакерт: огненная точка необъявленной войны (факты). Степанакерт, 1999; Гарибян Г. Артур. Он был полетом орла. Ереван, 1999; Аршакян А. Неосознанная смерть — смерть, смерть осознанная — бессмертие. Ереван, 1993; Абрамян Г., Мкртчян Ш. Дизакцы, павшие за Арцах. Ереван, 2000; Арустамян Г. Моя любовь с тобой. Живые и мертвые. Ереван, 1998; Нанагулян С. Орлы стремятся к высоте. Кн. 1, 2, 3, 5. Ереван, 19921993; Есаян Э. Плеяда павших. Ереван, 1996; Мусаелян Б. За Арцах и родной Мартуни. Степанакерт, 1998; Аракелян В., Азизян Г. Они обессмертились славой. Ереван, 1996; Атаян И. Навсегда с нами. Степанакерт, 1995; Мирзоян В. Саргсашен. Степанакерт, 1997; Нанаголян С. Шаген. Ереван, 1993; Саакян Р. Страна, поклоняющаяся орлам. Ереван, 2004; Балаян В., Балаян Р., Арутюнян М. Памятная книга храбрости. Степанакерт, 2004; Оганджанян П. Освободительная война Карабаха. Ереван, 2000; Арутюнян М. Начало Арцахской войны и освобождение Шуши. Ереван, 2000; Демоян Г., Мелик-Шахназарян Л. Ходжалинское дело...; Демоян Г. Карабахская драма: скрытые действия…

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ АРЦАХА народную34. Исследования35 об укреплении государственности НКР, ее внутренней и внешней политике, социально-экономических реформах, развитии культуры сравнительно малочисленны. В последнее время преподаватели и аспиранты АрГУ проводят большую работу по описанию мирной творческой деятельности армян Арцаха. В журналах и газетах издаются многочисленные статьи. Интересные сведения содержат сборники, опубликованные государственным статистическим управлением НКР. Опираясь на разнообразные источники, историю Арцаха с древнейших времен и до наших дней представили в своих работах Б. Улубабян «История Арцаха» (Ереван, 1991) и В. Балаян «История Арцаха, с античности до наших дней» (Ереван, 2002). После установления советской власти в Азербайджане (1920 г.) на государственном уровне велась политика депортации армянского населения с исторических областей Армении, присваивались созданные на протяжении веков культурные ценности армян. Руководство Азербайджана как советского, так и постсоветского периода подстрекало своих ученых к обоснованию того, что не только Нагорный Карабах, но и вся территория Армении, включая Ереван, является азербайджанской. Особенно энергично добивался этого Гейдар См.: Ступишин В. Карабахский конфликт, 1992-1994. М., 1998; Айвазян А. Урегулирование карабахского конфликта и безопасность Армении. Ереван, 1998; Освобожденная территория Армении / Сост. А. Айвазян. Ереван, 2006; Балаян Т. Карабахский конфликт и международная дипломатия (1991-1994): Автореф. дисс.... докт. ист. наук. Ереван, 2002; Карапетян А. Карабахский и другие региональные вооруженные конфликты в Закавказье и Российской Федерации (1991-1994): Автореф. дисс.... канд. ист. наук. Ереван, 2002; Демоян Г. Карабахский конфликт и турецкий фактор. Ереван, 2002; Манасян А. Карабахский конфликт, ракурсы правового подхода. Ереван, 1997; Карабахская освободительная борьба сквозь призму армянского политического сознания. Ереван, 2003; Мурадян И. Политика США и проблемы безопасности региона Южного Кавказа. Ереван, 2000; Барсегов Ю. Народ Нагорного Карабаха — субъект права на самоопределение. М., 1993; Право на самоопределение является основой в деле урегулирования межнациональных проблем. Ереван, 1990; Статус Нагорного Карабаха в политико-правовых документах и материалах. Ереван, 1995; Оганесян Н. Карабахский конфликт, ракурсы правового подхода. Ереван, 1997. 35 См.: Культурное и духовное наследие Нагорного Карабаха. Ереван, 1998; Дабагян А., Габриелян М. Шуши в 1992-2000 гг. Возвращение армян в освобожденный город. Ереван, 2004; Образование, культура и спорт в Арцахе. Ереван, 2006; Каграманян Г., Минасян Ш. Налоговая система НКР. Ереван, 2003; Акопян С. Государственный аппарат и основные пути его развития (по материалам НКР). Ереван, 2003; Мелкумян С. Нагорно-Карабахская Республика. Ереван, 1999; Нагорно-Карабахская Республика: Путь к вершинам. Степанакерт, 2001. 34

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ Алиев36. В этом же духе выступает и нынешний президент, Ильхам Алиев, который в декабре 2005 г. в своей речи в Академии наук Азербайджана заявил, что готов заплатить любую цену, если азербайджанские историки докажут, что армяне Нагорного Карабаха являются пришельцами. В годы советской власти исследование политической, экономической и культурной жизни как древнего Арцаха, так и какой-либо армянской исторической территории, находившейся за пределами Советской Армении, для армянских ученых было запретной темой. Историки советского Азербайджана, пользуясь покровительством высшего партийного и государственного руководства, искажали историю Армении, согласуя ее с государственными выгодами. Еще в 1960-е годы Зиа Бунятов37 ввел в обиход так называемую албанскую теорию, которая в дальнейшем была развита его учениками38. Они включили в территорию Албании не только нынешний Азербайджан, но и большую часть нынешней Республики Армения и всю территорию НКР. В соответствии с этой теорией жители как кавказской, так и армянской Албании являются предками азербайджанцев. Известные армянские церкви Гандзасар, Амарас и др. были признаны албанскими, такие деятели культуры, как Мовсес Каганкатваци, Мхитар Гош и др., — албанцами-азербайджанцами, а хачкары — хачдашами. Присвоив эти памятники, но будучи уверены, что последние никакого отношения к ним не имеют, азербайджанцы беспощадно их уничтожают, особенно в последние годы. Азербайджанские «историки», желая сделать албанскую теорию более убедительной, иногда выдают нынешних азербайджанцев за потомков древних народов, живших на территории Восточного Закавказья. Доказательством тому якобы служит общность между азербайджанским и урартским языками. Не добившись в этом деле существенных успехов, азербайджанские «историки» теперь заявляют, что армяне появились на территории Арцах-Карабаха лишь в начале XIX в., после подписания Туркменчайского договора, по котоСм.: Бакинский рабочий. 23 декабря 1997; 23 января 1998; 31 марта 1998. Бунятов З. Азербайджан в VII-IX вв. Баку, 1965. 38 См.: Алиев К. Кавказская Албания (I в. до н. э. — I в. н. э.). Баку, 1974; Мамедова Ф. Политическая история и историческая география Кавказской Албании (III в. до н. э. — VIII в. н. э). Баку, 1986. Ахундов Д. Архитектура древнего и средневекового Азербайджана. Баку, 1986; Ямпольский З. Об этногенетической непрерывности на почве Азербайджана // Вопросы истории Кавказской Албании. Баку, 1962; Алиев К. Племена древней Кавказской Албании (I в. до н. э. — I в. н. э.) // История Азербайджана. Т. I. Баку, 1960. 36 37

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ АРЦАХА рому Восточная Армения была присоединена к России39. Более того, они пытаются показаться великодушными, поскольку именно они якобы предоставили армянам место для поселения на своей территории. С первых дней Арцахского движения националистические круги Азербайджана начали искажать историю. С подобными статьями и монографиями выступили Д. Гулиев, М. Исмаилов, Е. Токаржевский, Т. Кочарли, Э. Намазов, А. Даштамиров и др. Было срочно опубликовано собрание документов и материалов «Из истории образования Нагорно-Карабахской области Азербайджанской ССР, 1918-1925» (Баку, 1989). После образования НКР в Арцахском государственном университете предпринимаются практические шаги в развитии историко-научной мысли. В 1989 г. в Степанакерте силами НАН РА, институтов истории, археологии и этнографии, искусства и матенадарана был образован арменоведческий центр, в котором работали 12 сотрудников. В годы войны исходя из ситуации его деятельность была приостановлена. В 1997 г. силами армян Диаспоры и местных жителей его работа была возобновлена, а чтобы она стала более плодотворной, 1 декабря 2005 г. был создан совет из семи человек, включая трех историков, двух археологов и двух филологов. Центр имеет также двух постоянных сотрудников, которые собирают материалы об армянских селах, арцахском освободительном движении, арцахской истории, этнографии, топографии и фольклоре. С 2003 г. издается сборник «Исторические исследования». В последнее время усилиями сотрудников центра проводятся археологические раскопки. Намечается создание музея, экспонатами которого станут найденные материалы. В НКР большое внимание уделяется подготовке историков. Сегодня на факультете истории АрГУ учатся 300 студентов и аспирантов, которые впоследствии станут опорой в деле развития историко-научной мысли в новосозданной республике.

См.: Алиев И. Нагорный Карабах. Баку, 1989; Ахундов Д. Архитектура древнего и средневекового Азербайджана. Баку, 1986; Мамедов А. Некоторые аспекты современной этнической ситуации в Азербайджане // Центральная Азия и Кавказ. № 5 (6). 1999; Гулиев Дж. Под знаменем ленинской национальной политики. Баку, 1972; Шушинский Ф. Шуша. Баку, 1968; Токаржевский Е. Из истории иностранной войны в Азербайджане. Баку, 1957; Искендеров М.C. Из истории борьбы Коммунистической партии за победу советской власти. Баку, 1958. 39

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SOME ARGUMENTS ON THE NAGORNO-KARABAGH HISTORY Takayuki Yoshimura Lecturer, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

INTRODUCTION Disputes about history are often concerned with political issues, especially territory questions among newly independent countries. When a country becomes independent, it is difficult to settle its borders because both that nation and the neighboring nation usually live together on the frontier. Under these conditions, ethnic conflict is likely to break out, and when a new state manipulates this conflict by, for example, allowing historians to deal with territory issues in order to enforce the nation’s unity or broaden its territory, the conflict will worsen significantly. The Nagorno-Karabagh question is such a combination of political and historical arguments. The “Mountainous Black Garden” is 4,800 km2. Small as it is, this region is crucial to both Armenia and Azerbaijan today; the ethnic conflict between them over the region, which lasted from February 20, 1988 to May 17, 1994, greatly influenced not only the relationship between the two peoples, but also the historiography of each nation.1 About the progress of the conflict, see Levon Chorbajian, ed., The Making of Nagorno-Karabakh: From Secession to Republic (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001); Michael P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications (West Port: Praeger, 1998); Thomas De Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War (New York: New York University Press, 2003); V. G. Mitiaev, “Karabakhskii konflikt v kontekste mezhdnarodnykh otnoshenii,” E. M. Kozhokin, ed., Armeniia: problemy nezavisimogo razvitiia (Moscow, 1998), pp. 487-554. 1

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During the conflict, both of them insisted on their sovereignty of the land, showing historical facts and sources. In this chapter, I discuss some of the arguments among Armenian and Azeri researchers on the Nagorno-Karabagh history, that is, the legitimacy of ruling Karabagh and the Communist Party’s decision to render the region to Azerbaijan SSR, and compare their viewpoints. WHO REIGNED OVER KARABAGH? A DISPUTE OVER LEGITIMACY 1965 saw arguments on the “historical territory” of ancient kingdoms between Armenian and Azerbaijani historians. In this year, the fiftieth anniversary demonstration of the Armenian massacres under Ottoman domination in 1915 gave birth to an Armenian political movement. During the demonstration, some attendants insisted that not only the eastern part of Turkey, where Armenians lived before World War I, but also NagornoKarabagh “conquered” by Azeri Turks, be rendered to them.2 In ancient times, the Karabagh region belonged to the (Caucasian) Albanian Kingdom, which lasted from the fourth to the eighth century: Ziia Buniatov’s 1965 monograph entitled “Azerbaijan in the Seventh-Ninth Centuries” says that modern Azeris are descendants of the Caucasian Albanians. According to him, in antiquity, the Albanians were one of the three major peoples of Caucasus with a state extending from Lake Sevan eastwards to the Caspian Sea, and from the Caucasian Mountains southwards to the Arax River. Initially, adherents of Christianity, the majority of the Albanian population, converted to Islam in the seventh century and were linguistically turkified four hundred years later. In 1967, Asatur Mnatsakanyan, a historian, and Paruyr Sevak, a famous writer, criticized Buniatov’s idea, saying that most of the rulers of the region were Armenians preserving Armenian culture.3 When it comes to Karabagh history, Armenian researchers often point out the long-lasting Armenian autonomy in the region. In the most authoritative Armenian history textbook in Yerevan State University, the author explains the political situation in the early eighteenth century as follows: Ronald G. Suny, Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 228. 3 Seiichi Kitagawa, “Zakafukasuni okeru rekishigakuto seiji — Arubania mondai wo megutte,” Soren kenkyuu, [“Historiography and Politics in Transcaucasus: Around the Albanian Question,” Soviet Studies], No.11, 1990, pp. 110-113. 2

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ “There were Armenian semiautonomous meliktyuns, principalities in the Karabagh and Syunik region under Safavid Persian rule, and during the 1720s, an Armenian, Davit Bek, rose in rebellion against the Ottoman army invading the Karabagh and Zangezur region, which is estimated to be the awakening of modern Armenian nationality. After Nadir Shah (reign: 1736-1747) forced to the Ottoman army to withdraw from the former Safavid territory, he proclaimed his enthronement of the shah. He understood that in whole Transcaucasia, the Armenians were the only power with the skill to resist the Turks. Armenians driven to fight with Turkey acted as Nadir’s allies. He undertook to unify the principalities in Karabagh into a political army unit. By his special edict, five principalities in Karabagh were united into a province. The control of the khan of Gandzak (Gyanja in Azeri Turkish) was removed from the newly founded province, and it became an independent administrative unit. The five principalities, like neighboring Gandzak, Shirvan, Yerevan, and some other khanates, would be directly subject to the Azerbaijani viceroy, Ibrahim Afshar Khan, who was Nadir Shah’s elder brother. As a matter of fact, in Transcaucasia, new administrative autonomous unification was founded from the principalities of Karabagh. Essentially, Nadir Shah certified what Karabagh Armenians had gained through the fifteen-month-long struggle.”4

Needles to say, Azerbaijani historians are completely against this Armenian viewpoint. For example, Igrar Aliev said that it had no grounds and discussed the Armenian population in this area as follows: “Karabagh was annexed to Russia not as an Armenian land but the very ‘Muslim’ territory. This is proved with official documents at that time. In the 1820-30s during the Russo-Iranian and Russo-Turkish war years, the Karabagh army composed of Azerbaijanis gained courage. The outstanding growth of the Armenian population, that is, Armenianization of Nagorno-Karabagh to some extent, took place much later. Even at the end of the first quarter of the ninteenth century, the Armenians in Karabagh were in the minority. According to the data in ‘A Record on Karabagh Province in 1823 collected by a civil servant, Mogilevsky, and a colonel, Ermolov (Tiflis, 1866),’ there were 90,000 inhabitants in the Karabagh khanate, and there was a city and 600 villages, just 150 of which were Armenian villages. On the other hand, about 1,048 Azerbaijani families and 474 Armenian families lived in Shusha, 5 and about 12,902 Azerbaijani families and 4,331 Armenian families lived in the villages.

4

125.

Hr. R. Simonyan, ed., Hayoc patmut’yun [Armenian History] (Yerevan, 2000), pp. 123-

Shusha is the old center of Karabagh, which is located near the new center, Stepanakert or Khankendi. 5

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SOME ARGUMENTS Only in those years did more than 130,000 Armenians, a low estimate, immigrate to Transcaucasia, especially to Karabagh. According to other data, the number of the immigrants outstandingly surpassed 200,000 people.”6

It is interesting that while Armenian researchers mention Nadir Shah’s privileging Armenian princes in Karabagh, Azerbaijani researchers discuss the Azeris’ overwhelming majority over the Armenians in the region concerning population. This historical reign of the land is one aspect, and the population ratio is another; each standpoint is valid. WHY DID KARABAGH BECOME PART OF AZERBAIJAN? A CAUSE OF THE CONFLICT The second controversy between them is the decision made by the Communist Party in 1921 that Karabagh belongs to Azerbaijan SSR. This led to the dispute at the end of Soviet era. In the mid-nineteenth century, national movements appeared in Transcaucasia, and the Armenians and Azeris claimed their political rights. These movements did not, however, include the division of the territory at first. It is true that during the Armeno-Tatar (Azeri) war, Armenian military corps fought with Azeri corps in the area, but it was not just over Karabagh. In 1919 and 1920, the Dashnak Party (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) ruling independent Armenia and the Musavat Azerbaijani government fought over mountainous Karabagh. This was because the deportation and massacre of Armenians by the Ottoman government during World War I and the Ottoman army’s invasion of Transcaucasia worsened relations between the Armenians and Azeris. In addition, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia had already gained independence in 1918, and these countries had to divide the territories. The Armenian uprising in Nagorno-Karabagh in late March 1920 made Azerbaijan shift the bulk of its army to the mountainous region, where it fought numerous engagements, eventually laying waste to the Armenian stronghold of Shusha. Seeing a virtually undefended border before them, the Bolsheviks took the opportunity to gain a foothold in Azerbaijan. The Eleventh Red I. Aliev, Nagornyi Karabakh (Baku, 1989), pp. 75-77. Aliev is quoting from N. I. Shavrov, Novaia ugroza russkomu delu v Zakavkaze: predstoiashchaia rasprodazha Mugani inorodtsam (St. Petersburg, 1911), p. 59. 6

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ Army entered Baku unopposed on April 27, and Azerbaijan became a Soviet Socialist Republic.7 At the end of May 1920, the Red Army seized Karabagh, and on August 10, an agreement was signed between Armenia and Moscow providing for the Soviet occupation of Karabagh and the surrounding territories until an equitable and final solution could be reached on their status. The Red Army conquered Armenia in December 1920, and the Nagorno-Karabagh question was transformed overnight from an interstate dispute into an internal matter of the Soviet regime. Then, Azerbaijani communists withdrew claims to this region, and they sent the following telegram to the government of Armenia: “As of today, the border disputes between Armenian and Azerbaijan are declared resolved. Mountainous Karabagh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan are considered part of Soviet Republic Armenia.” Nariman Narimanov, the Azerbaijani communist leader, however, repudiated and reasserted his republic’s claim to Nagorno-Karabagh. The Caucasian Bureau of the Communist Party took up the question of Karabagh on June 12, 1921 and proclaimed: “Based on the declaration of the Revolutionary Committee of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan and the agreement between the Socialist Soviet Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, it is hereby declared that Mountainous Karabagh is henceforth an integral part of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Armenia.” Narimanov, present at the meeting, was outraged and warned that the loss of Karabagh could foment anti-Soviet activity in Azerbaijan. Then, the fate of the Karabagh was determined at two bizarre meetings. At first, it was decided that Karabagh would be transferred to Soviet Armenia at the Caucasian Bureau with Narimanov present on July 4, 1921, but the next day, this decision was overturned.8 When Armenians began to make a claim on Karabagh during the Perestroika era, they argued again regarding who changed the abovementioned decision and why. In the pamphlet “Nagorno-Karabakh” issued in 1988, an academician of Armenia explains as follows: “N. Narimanov protested and demanded that the final solution to the question be prolonged in the Central Committee of RCP(b). The Caucasian Bureau decided so. However, the Caucasian Bureau’s decision was not carried out, and the next day, they called a meeting of the Caucasian Bureau. At this meeting, the above-mentioned decision was reconsidered and decision For details, see R. G. Hovannisian, “Mountainous Karabagh in 1920: An Unresolved Contest,” Armenian Review 46, no. 1-4, 1993. 8 Croissant, op. cit., pp.18-19. 7

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SOME ARGUMENTS favorable to Narimanov was made without deliberation or a formal vote, and the Bureau released the following decision: Proceeding from the necessity for national peace among Muslims and Armenians, for economic ties between upper and lower Karabagh, and for permanent ties with Azerbaijan, mountainous Karabagh is to remain within the borders of Azerbaijan SSR, receiving wide regional autonomy with the administrative center at Shusha, becoming an autonomous region. The Central Committee of Armenia, however, disagreed with this decision on the Nagorno-Karabagh question. In a meeting on June 16, 1921, the disagreement was determined with the conclusion of the Caucasian Bureau, which would be drawn on July 5, 1921. The conclusion on July 5, 1921 was received under pressure from Stalin and Narimanov’s statement threatening an ultimatum. Narimanov, staying in his position, not only made threats of possible ‘catastrophe,’ but also exercised ‘resignation tactics.’ He proclaimed that if Karabagh was transferred to Armenia, ‘Azerbaijani Sovnarkom would resign from the charge.’ In fact, discussions never took place at the meeting. This is Aleksandr Myasnikyan’s explanation of this meeting.9 At the first meeting of the Armenian Communist Party held from January 26 to 29, 1922, Myasnikyan, answering the question of why Karabagh was not annexed to Armenia, said, ‘If you characterize the last meeting of the Caucasian Bureau, it seemed as if Aharonyan, Topchibashev, and Chkhenkeli10 were seated there. Azerbaijan says that if Armenia claims Karabagh, they will not send oil’.”11

Whether or not Narimanov succeeded in changing the decision of the Caucasian Bureau regarding the status of Karabagh under pressure from Stalin is so far unknown because of the lack of sources. It seems, however, that Armenian communists were forced to abandon their claim to Karabagh for economic reasons; Armenia was worn out owing to the seven-year-long war since World War I. As far as the Armenian population of Karabagh is concerned, Armenian historians discuss the population not in the nineteenth century, but in the twentieth century. They give the following explanation: “As a whole, with the loss during the Great Fatherland War, that is, World War II (more than 20,000 Armenians), about 2,000 a year Armenians on average emigrated from Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast every year from 1926 to 1979, while the number of Azeris increased, excluding their emigrants whose great mass grew essentially in 1959 to 1979 (just slightly fewer than 1,000 people a year). In Nagorno-Karabagh, the Azeri population in 1959-1979 more than doubled, while the number of Armenians increased only by 12%. During the period between the census in 1970 and 1979, the Myasnikyan was the chairperson of Armenian Sovnarkom. They were respectively members of the Dashnak Party, Musavat, and Georgian Menshevik. 11 Akademiia nauk Armianskoi SSR, Nagornyi Karabakh (Erevan, 1988), pp. 32-33. 9

10

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ absolute Armenian population growing in the region clearly diminished, and there were only 2,000 people. In those years, just a tenth of the Armenians born in Karabagh stayed there, and the rest emigrated from NKAO. As a result, the Armenian population in Karabagh grew from 111,700 in 1926 to 123,100 in 1979, while that of the Azeris grew from 12,600 to 37,200.”12

After the distribution of this pamphlet, both Armenians and Azerbaijani historians published documents and materials about Karabagh history,13 and disputes among them grew more intense. Azerbaijani historians rarely discuss the Caucasian Bureau’s decision on the Karabagh question at that time. It must have been difficult for them to criticize the Communist Party, which had preserved their rights and interests during the meeting on the territorial question. Rather, they tended to concentrate on the above-mentioned ancient Albanians and the population in the region in the nineteenth century. Kh. Khalilov, an Azerbaijani historian, points out that 29,350 Azeri families out of 54,841 lived in Karabagh according to the census of the Russian Empire (1897).14 He explains the reason for the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabagh augmenting since the end of the nineteenth century by the tsarist government’s policy to immigrate Armenians to Karabagh for the purpose of making it a fortress against Iran. In fact, as Khalilov noticed, most Armenians lived in the cities. For example, the census in 1897 shows that in Shusha, 14,483 out of 25,881 people were Armenians.15 It is difficult to decide which people was the ethnic majority in Karabagh at the end of the nineteenth century.

CONCLUSION In investigating arguments on the Karabagh question, even the topics that Armenian historians take up differ from those of Azerbaijani historians. It seems, however, that both of them regard the other party as latecomers to the land in insisting on their own legitimacy. In political Ibid., p. 45. See the table of the annex. See Karabakhskii vopros: istoki i sushchnost’ v dokumentakh i fakty (Stepanakert, 1989); Akademiia nauk Azebaidjanskoi SSR, Istoriia Azerbaidzhana po dokumentam i publikatsiiami (Baku, 1990). 14 Kh. D. Khalilov, Iz etnicheskoi istorii Karabakha, Istoriia Azerbaidzhana po dokumentam i publikatsiiami (Baku, 1990), p. 40. 15 Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis’ naseleniia Rossiskoi Imperii 1897g., Vol.63 “Elisavetpol’skaia guberniya” (St. Petersburg, 1905). 12 13

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SOME ARGUMENTS arguments, some historical facts are easily confused with the idea, “first come, first served.” This sort of phenomenon can be observed in other areas. Victor Shnirelman, for example, points out that in the Northern Caucasus some arguments on ethnic names took place between Chechens and Ingush, Karachays and Balkars owing to their passion for “neo-traditionalism” that embraced all the post-Soviet states in the late 1980s and 1990s under the slogan of the “people’s revival.” In 1960s-1980s an ethnic name “Vainakh,” which symbolized the united identity between Chechens and Ingush was intentionally imposed upon the two peoples by the Soviet authority and local intellectuals, and increasingly grew popularity in the Checheno-Ingushskaia ASSR. Yet, at the turn of the 1990s some Chechen politicians, who were struggling for their independence, dreamed of a new unification within the Republic of “Vainakhia” during the 1990s while Ingush would not accept this idea. On the contrary, some nationalists of Balkars and Karachais, who had found themselves in different administrative units during the Soviet Union, searched for a new Turkic alliance in the 1990s. In search of the deep historical roots of that alliance, they propagated the idea that Alans had been Turkicspeakers, and represented the Alans as the direct ancestors of both Karachais and Balkars. As aresult, today one can observe not only a belief in the ethnic unity of the both ethnic groups, but also their attempts to identify themselves with the Alans. Shnirelman also mentions that an ethnic name reveals people’s values and their expectations in respect to their place in the world in general and among neighboring peoples in particular, signifies their political ambitions and alliances, defines their cultural and territorial claims, points to their origins, recalls their historical achievements and failures, enables one to distinguish between allies and enemies, and determines directions of ethnic gravitation and antagonisms16. In building a state, not only the politicians, but also the historians of an ethnic group tend to be influenced by the political circumstances. As a lesson of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, however, one should, at least, bear in mind that both Armenians and Azeris lived together for a long time before the ethnic conflict broke out, and every inhabitant of Karabagh had a family, a life, and a history of which no one could deprive them. V. Shnirelman, “The Politics of a Name: Between Consolidation and Separation in the Northern Caucasus,” Acta Slavica Iaponica, Tomus 23, pp. 68-73. 16

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1926

1939

1959

1970

1979

Total population

123.3

150.8

130.4

150.3

162.2

Armenians ratio (%)

111.7 89.1

132.8 88.1

110.1 84.4

121.1 80.6

123.1 75.9

Azeris (%)

12.3 10.1

14.1 9.3

18.0 13.8

27.2 18.1

37.3 22.9

0.6 0.5

3.2 2.1

1.8 1.4

1.3 0.9

1.3 0.8

Russians (%)

Appendix. Ethnic Composition of the NKAO (1,000 persons) according to the USSR Censuses

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РЕСПУБЛИКА ЮЖНАЯ ОСЕТИЯ: ИСТОРИЯ И СОВРЕМЕННОСТЬ Коста Дзугаев доцент каф. философии Юго-Осетинского гос. университета В настоящей работе мы ставим целью дать представление об этногенезе южных осетин как органичной части единого осетинского народа, о политической самоорганизации южных осетин и их борьбе за выбор собственного исторического пути. Республика Южная Осетия — самоопределившееся государство на южных склонах и предгорьях Главного Кавказского хребта в пределах меридианов 610 -62017` восточной долготы и 42031`-42036` северной широты1. Территория Южной Осетии составляет 3,9 тыс. кв км, население (на 1989 г.) — 99 тыс. человек, из них 67% осетин, 27% грузин, 2,1% русских, 1% армян, 0,7 % евреев и др.2 Республика была провозглашена 20 сентября 1990 г. Решением XIV сессии Юго-Осетинского областного совета народных депутатов 20-го созыва «О преобразовании Юго-Осетинской автономной области в Юго-Осетинскую Советскую Демократическую Республику»3 по инициативе народного лидера Т.Г. Кулумбегова, ставшего первым руководителем Республики. Юго-Осетинская автономная область, входившая в Грузинскую Советскую Социалистическую Республику, была образована декретом Всегрузинского Центрального ИсполЮго-Осетинская автономная область. Цхинвали, 1962. С. 53 Харебов Б.К. Народ Южной Осетии // Южная Осетия. 10 лет Республике / Отв. ред. К.Г.Дзугаев. Владикавказ, 2000. С. 32-33. См. также: Цотниашвили М.М. Осетинское сепаратистское движение в Грузии и его сущность: Автореф.… канд. ист. наук. Тбилиси, 1998 (на груз. яз.). 3 Решение XIV сессии Юго-Осетинского областного совета народных депутатов 20-го созыва / Южная Осетия… С. 8. 1 2

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ нительного Комитета 20 апреля 1922 г. в соответствии с постановлением Кавказского бюро Центрального Комитета Российской Коммунистической Партии (большевиков) 31 октября 1921 г.4 Республика Южная Осетия — государство, созданное южной ветвью осетинского народа. Северные осетины имеют свое национально-государственное образование в составе Российской Федерации — Республику Северная Осетия — Алания. Необходимо подчеркнуть, что осетины являются единым народом и свою этническую родину воспринимают как единую Осетию. Самоназвание осетин — «ирон», Осетии — «Ирыстон». Термин «Осетия» происходит от «ос», «овс» — вариант этнонима «ас», в изобилии документированного. ОТ СКИФСКИХ ВРЕМЕН ДО НАШЕСТВИЯ МОНГОЛОВ

История осетинского народа, в том числе южной его ветви, является весьма древней и достаточно сложной для исследования. Понадобились усилия нескольких поколений ученых, чтобы прояснить основные ее этапы и сделать некоторые выводы. В настоящее время можно считать надежно установленным, что «начиная по крайней мере с VII в. до н.э., когда часть скифов прочно обосновалась на Северном Кавказе, мы сталкиваемся в этом районе с непрерывной цепью ираноязычных племен, остатком которых являются современные осетины. Этногенез осетин — это прежде всего результат длительного внутреннего развития скифо-сармато-аланских племен Северного Кавказа»5. Иными словами, на протяжении более чем 2,5 тыс. лет отчетливо прослеживается этногенетический и культурно-преемственный скифо-алано-осетинский исторический «ствол», вобравший в себя в качестве органичного элемента также и хорошо различимые следы ассимилированных соседних кавказских этносов иных языково-культурных групп. Западные исследователи проявляют большой интерес к указанной проблематике. Свидетельством этого могут служить рабоРоссийский центр хранения и изучения документов новейшей истории, ф. 64, оп. 1, д. 2, л. 80. 5 Гаглойти Ю.С. Аланы и вопросы этногенеза осетин. Тбилиси, 1966. C. 241. Эта монография явилась этапной в осетиноведении, большинство ее положений не устарело по сей день. Особенно примечательно то, что она была издана в Тбилиси, пройдя рецензирование грузинских историков, а также гос. цензуру. 4

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РЕСПУБЛИКА ЮЖНАЯ ОСЕТИЯ ты Ж.Дюмезиля6, Б.Бахраха7 и А.Алеманя8. Перевод исследования А.Алеманя на русский язык, осуществленный в 2003 г., стал серьезным событием в осетиноведении. В качестве одного из библейских народов скифы упоминаются в Новом Завете: «По образу Создавшего его, где нет ни Еллина, ни Иудея, ни обрезания, ни необрезания, варвара, Скифа, раба, свободного, но все и во всем Христос»9. В IV в. до н.э. скифы достигли пика своего могущества под управлением царя-объединителя Атея, они были сильны еще во второй половине I в. н. э.10 Этнокультурную эстафету скифов приняли аланы. Современная научная этимология этнонима «алан» объясняет его как производную форму от общего наименования древних ариев и иранцев «arya». Древнеиранское «aryana» означает «арийский», что получило «безупречное с фонетической стороны осетинское оформление allon»11. Одно из первых свидетельств скифо-аланской преемственности оставил Иосиф Флавий: «Мы раньше объясняли, что племя аланов есть часть скифов…»12. Хорошо известно о вторжении алан в Закавказье в 72 г., когда сильнейшему разорению подверглись АрДюмезиль Ж. Осетинский эпос и мифология. М., 1976. Он же. Скифы и нарты. М., 1990. 7 Бахрах Бернард С. Аланы на Западе (от первого их упоминания в античных источниках до периода раннего средневековья). М., 1993. 8 Alemany Agusti. Sources on the Alans. Leiden; Boston; Köln, 2000. См. также: Алемань А. Аланы в древних и средневековых письменных источниках. М., 2003. 9 Послание к колоссянам святого апостола Павла, 3, 11 // Библия. Книги Священного Писания Ветхого и Нового Завета. М., 1988. С. 1292. 10 Бахрах Б.С. Аланы… С. 5-6. 11 Абаев В.И. Осетинский язык и фольклор. М.;Л., 1949. С. 246. «Это древнеиранское «арийский» «предполагает с необходимостью более старую форму *allan… т.е. мы приходим к известному этническому термину алан, названию средневекого народа… исторические связи которого с современными осетинами можно считать прочно установленными» (Абаев В.И. Историко-этимологический словарь осетинского языка. Т. 1. М., 1996. С. 47. Репринт изд. 1958 г.). В осетиноведении считается, что первым западным ученым, правильно определившим этническое происхождение осетин, был Ю.Клапрот. На заседании Азиатского общества 4 ноября 1822 г. он прочел «Доклад, в котором доказывается идентичность осетин, народности Кавказа, и средневековых алан» (Аланы и Кавказ. Владикавказ; Цхинвал, 1992. С. 233-238), опубликованный на французском языке (Nouvelles annales des Voyages, de la géographie et de l’histoire. Paris, 1822. T. XVI. P. 243-256). 12 Флавий Иосиф. О войне иудейской. Цит. по: Латышев В. В. Известия // Вестник древней истории. 1947. № 4. С. 277. Вообще же на Западе считается, что впервые об аланах упомянул в своей пьесе Сенека: «…Дунай, за которым скрываются могущественные аланы?» (Seneka. Thyestes. II. 627 ff). 6

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ мения и северная Мидия-Атропатена; аланы достигли тогда северозападного Ирана. Примечательно, что одно из свидетельств аланского проникновения получено японской археологической экспедицией, осуществленной в 1960 г. под руководством профессора Намио Эгами, который открыл катакомбный могильник первых веков н. э. в горной долине Дайламан у юго-западного побережья Каспийского моря. Японские археологи не указали этническую принадлежность долихокранных погребенных, однако это с достоверностью было установлено советскими учеными13. История алан неразрывно связана с историей христианства на Кавказе. Исторические источники сообщают, что христианство аланы получили что называется из первых рук — от апостолов Андрея Первозванного и Симона Кананита. Об этом сообщают историки III-V вв. Ориген, Евсевий Памфил, святой Дорофей, Епифаний Кипрский. Позже это обстоятельство нашло свое отражение в грузинских хрониках, а также, что весьма важно, в православных Четьих Минеях: «Симон же и Андрей идоста в Аланию»14. В V в. ценные сведения о распространении христианства у алан фиксирует армянский источник «Житие Сукиасянцев»15. Следующий документированный контакт алан с христианством приходится на середину VII в. и связан с историей ссылки одного из столпов православия Максима Исповедника16. Описание его пребывания на Кавказе дает представление о глубоком проникновении христианства в аланское общество, в том числе во властную элиту: именно на это время приходится радикальная конфессиональная переориентация высшей аланской власти — царем становится христианин Григорий. Источники также сообщают о существовании в Алании монастыря Иоанна Крестителя. Заднепровский Ю.А. Namio Egami and Sninji Fukai, Seiichi Masuda. The Excavations at Noruzmahale and Khoramrud. Tokyo, 1960. The Institute for oriental culture, the University of Tokyo, 1966 (рецензия) // Советская археология. 1969. № 1. С. 304307. На этом пути в Ленкорани есть река Аланиачай, а в Мукринском Курдистане и сейчас есть племя и округ «алан» (Вильчевский Щ. Курды. Москва; Ленинград, 1961. С. 136). В.А.Кузнецов по этому поводу делает предположение, что «возможно, какая-то группа алан вошла в состав ираноязычных курдов» (Кузнецов В.А. Очерки истории алан. Орджоникидзе, 1984. С. 27). 14 Гедеон, митрополит Ставропольский и Бакинский. История христианства на Кавказе до и после присоединения его к России. Москва; Пятигорск, 1992. С. 15-16. 15 Армянские источники об аланах. Ереван, 1985. Вып. 1. С. 43-45. 16 Шестаков С.П. Очерки по истории Херсонеса в VI-X вв. по Рождеству Христову. М., 1908. 13

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РЕСПУБЛИКА ЮЖНАЯ ОСЕТИЯ Алания оказалась на стыке борьбы за влияние ислама (насаждавшегося в Азербайджане и Дагестане с VIII в.), иудаизма, принятого правителями Хазарии в IX в., и христианства, установившегося в Армении, Грузии и Абхазии. Попытки Арабского халифата утвердиться на Кавказе встретили противодействие Византии и Хазарии, и аланы выступили как союзники хазар в арабо-хазарских войнах. Несмотря на первые успехи арабы были в конечном счете разбиты, военно-политический союз алан и хазар укрепился, и часть аланской социальной верхушки, имевшей с хазарами не только политические, экономические и культурные связи, но и связи династические (брачные), вслед за хазарскими правителями приняла иудаизм. «Именно это способствовало ускоренному проникновению тюркизмов (этническая принадлежность хазар) и определенной части еврейской терминологии в осетинский язык»17. К началу X в. аланы были вполне готовы к христианизации в ее каноническом понимании, но политические условия для этого сложились лишь после высвобождения Алании от политического контроля Хазарского каганата. Резко возросла военная мощь алан, развивалась раннефеодальная государственность. В этих условиях активные и целенаправленные действия по христианизации Алании предприняла Византия. Весьма информативная работа по данной проблеме принадлежит Ю.А.Кулаковскому, установившему в своих исследованиях, что «просвещение алан светом христианства совершилось в патриаршество Николая Мистика … когда он вторично занял патриарший престол»18. В.А.Кузнецов, анализируя ряд источников по проблеме, приходит к выводу, что «в качестве даты крещения правителя (царя) Алании и его окружения можно принять 916 год. …Предлагаемая дата официального крещения и принятия христианства как государственной религии Алании ее царем и социальной верхушкой … представляется нам вполне обоснованной и вероятной. Это важный позитивный вывод»19. Исследователь подчеркивает, что в 48-й главе сочинения Константина Багрянородного «Церемонии Византийского двора» только трое адресатов названы «духовными Тменов В.Х., Бесолова Е.Б., Гонобоблев Е.Н. Религиозные воззрения осетин (история религии — в истории народа). Хрестоматия. Владикавказ, 2000. С. 42. 18 Кулаковский Ю.А. Христианство у алан // Избр. тр. по истории аланов и Сарматии / Сост. С.М.Перевалова. СПб, 2000. Киевскому профессору принадлежит почетное авторство первого свода источников по аланам, изданного им в 1899 г. С. 168. 19 Кузнецов В.А. Христианство на Северном Кавказе до XV в. Владикавказ, 2002. С. 42. 17

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ сыновьями» императора — правители Армении, Алании и Болгарии. «Тем самым Алании вводилась в состав византийской «семьи народов» и приобретала высокий статус, определявший место в иерархии государств»20. В нотициях Алания занимает 61-е место вслед за Россией, причем не в качестве архиепископии, а в качестве митрополии. Союз (симфония) светской и церковной властей в Алании складывался медленно, само православие испытывало сильное влияние дохристианских верований21 и в массовом восприятии было сильно упрощено. Тем не менее, процесс шел, в том числе строились культовые сооружения, наиболее значимым из которых является Зеленчукский храмовый комплекс Нижне-Архызского городища в бассейне верхней Кубани. Его северный храм является наиболее крупным и монументальным не только в Алании, но и на всем Северном Кавказе. Следует отметить неслучайный выбор места: долина закрыта горными хребтами (ее высота над уровнем моря составляет 1150 м, климат мягкий) и занимает выгодное положение на одном из главных ответвлений Великого шелкового пути, а через легко преодолимые перевалы Адзапш и Санчаро имелся кратчайший путь в Севастополис (Сухуми). В отношении аланского (староосетинского) языка в течение XX в. было сделано четыре открытия: были найдены Ватиканская рукопись (в 1927 г. византинистом Дьюлой Моравчиком), Венская (1953 г., византинист Юлиан Немет) с аланскими фразами Иоанна Цеца, а также Ясский глоссарий (1958 г., Герберт Хунгер, тюрколог) и СанктПетербургская литургическая рукопись с маргиналиями на осетинском языке (1992 г., Сиссе Энгберг, музыковед (!)). Широко известна Зеленчукская надпись, открытая в 1888 г. Она сделана греческими буквами на осетинском языке и прочитана В.Ф.Миллером, а затем с использованием более совершенного научного аппарата В.И.Абаевым. Глубокие исследования письменности алан-осетин принадлежат Г.Ф. Турчанинову22. Там же. С. 43. Чибиров Л.А. Древнейшие пласты духовной культуры осетин. Цхинвали, 1984. Данная монография — одна из наиболее информативных для получения представления об этнокультурном менталитете, национальной психологии осетин. См. также: Хубаева С.А. Религиозные верования осетин: прошлое и настоящее (религия в Республике Южная Осетия) // Непризнанные государства Южного Кавказа и этнополитические процессы на Юге России. Южнороссийское обозрение. № 29. 2005. С. 196-209. 22 Турчанинов Г.Ф. Древние и средневековые памятники осетинского письма и языка. Владикавказ, 1990. 20 21

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РЕСПУБЛИКА ЮЖНАЯ ОСЕТИЯ Считается, что история не знает сослагательного наклонения, и по установившейся традиции мы не можем поставить вопрос: что было бы, если бы не монгольский удар по Алании? Однако выдающийся английский историк А.Тойнби предложил свою разработку исторических альтернатив, считая этот прием полезным для познания истории свершившейся. Так или иначе, в 1238 г. началось татаро-монгольское завоевание Алании. Для Алании это был период внутренних противоречий и феодальных усобиц. Политически децентрализованное государство (так же, как Кипчакию и Русь, тоже не сумевшие объединиться) монголы завоевывали по частям. Походу на Аланию придавалось большое значение: хан Бату назначил руководителями армии вторжения своих двоюродных братьев Менгу-каана, Гуюка и Кадана; войска были оснащены тяжелыми метательными орудиями. Главное событие войны, решившее исход борьбы, — взятие монголами наиболее сильного города Алании Магаса. За ожесточенное сопротивление город был стерт с лица земли, исследователи до сих пор не могут найти его предполагаемое местонахождение; погибло около 200 000 человек. «В результате кампании 1238-1239 гг. значительная часть равнинной Алании оказалась захваченной татаро-монголами, сама Алания как политическое образование перестала существовать. Это была крупнейшая для средневекового Северного Кавказа катастрофа, резко изменившая соотношение политических сил в регионе, перекроившая всю его жизнь и положившая начало новой исторической эпохе…»23. Источники сообщают, что определенная часть феодалов-«князей» сумела избежать военного столкновения с монголами, изъявила им покорность и перешла на их сторону, сохранив свои социальные (классовые) позиции. Более того, некоторые из них принимали участие в штурме Магаса, т.е. совершили прямое предательство своего народа. Источники сообщают красноречивые сведения об измене в верхушке аланского общества: «Юй-ваши был ас. Его отец Еле-бадур (Илья-богатырь, — К. Д.) пришел с правителем его государства и подчинился Угэдэю. Ему было повелено быть в гвардии … особо был учрежден отряд асов и ему было поручено командовать ими»24 (20, с. 288). «Хан-ху-сы был родом ас. Он был правителем владения асов. Когда войска Угэдэя достигли границ его (владения), Хан-ху-сы с народом подчинился Угэдэю», и получил за это «звание «бадура», дана Кузнецов В.А. Очерки истории алан. Орджоникидзе, 1984. С. 259. Иванов А.И. История монголов (Юань-ши) об асах-аланах // Христианский Восток. Т. II. Вып. III. СПб, 1914. С. 288. 23 24

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ была золотая пайцза и повелено было властвовать над своею землею и народом»25. Опираясь на данные папского легата Иоанна Мариньоли, посетившего Китай с длительным визитом, а также на другие источники, В.А. Кузнецов делает вывод, что «после монгольского завоевания Алании имела место крупная миграция в глубь Центральной Азии, в результате которой аланские феодалы, перешедшие на сторону завоевателей, увлекли за собой массу зависимого населения. Это население для Алании было потеряно навсегда, а ее людские ресурсы понесли весьма ощутимый урон (причем, судя по источникам, на Восток ушла наиболее активная и дееспособная часть аланского воинства)»26. Численность этой части аланов он оценивает в 100 000 человек. Другая часть ушла на Запад, образовав поселения в Византии, Румынии и Молдавии. Особую известность получили их селения в Венгрии (область Ясшаг с центром в г. Ясберень). Потомки этих ясов и сейчас сохраняют национальное самосознание, и хотя они утратили язык, в венгерском, на котором они разговаривают, сохранились десятки и сотни асских слов27. Но часть аланов-асов («ясов» в русских летописях, «осов (овсов)» в грузинских летописях) продолжала сражаться за независимость и сумела сохранить свободу, закрепившись в трудно доступных для монголов Кавказских горах на севере и на юге. Были потеряны огромные территории этнического проживания, вошедшие в улус Джучи Золотой Орды; была утрачена письменность; сильно деградировала религиозная и общекультурная жизнь народа. Энергия нации уходила не на развитие, а на элементарное выживание в условиях суровой природы и давления соседних племен. Тем не менее, вторгшийся в 1395 г. на Кавказ среднеазиатский эмир Тамерлан (Тимур) столкнулся в горах с упорным сопротивлением осетин, в конечном счете так и не подчинившихся грозному завоевателю. Имеются достаточно веские основания для утверждения, что аланы приняли участие в этногенезе не только современных осетин, но и ряда других северо-кавказских народов. Также было высказано мнение, что термин «алан» распространялся не только на этнически близкие народы (племена), но и на представителей других языковых групп. Возможно, в какой-то мере так оно и было, но мы более согласТам же. С. 282-283. Кузнецов В.А. Очерки истории алан. С. 267. 27 Абаев В.И. К алано-венгерским лексическим связям // Europa et Hungaria. Congressus ethnographicus in Hungaria. Budapest, 1965. P. 517-537. 25 26

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РЕСПУБЛИКА ЮЖНАЯ ОСЕТИЯ ны с авторами, придерживающимися точки зрения о преобладающей этнической однородности Алании. Так или иначе, после монгольского катастрофического удара Алания перестала существовать, этноним «алан» вышел из употребления, а в истории южных аланасов-осов начался принципиально новый этап, связанный со взаимоотношениями с их давними историческими соседями — грузинами. ДВА НАРОДА: ДРУЖБА И СОПЕРНИЧЕСТВО По грузинской исторической традиции, зафиксированной Леонтием Мровели (историком XI в.), грузино-осетинские взаимоотношения начинаются вместе с появлением грузинской государственности. В своей «Жизни картлийских царей» — «Картлис цховреба», дословно «Жизнь Картли» (Иберии, Иверии) он начинает повествование с этнарха Картлоса, сына Таршиса, сына Иафета, сына Ноя. История первого царя Картли Фарнаваза излагается в связи с легендарным нашествием Александра Македонского в Закавказье: «Местные племена привели Александра в изумление своим образом жизни, и он истребил их, пощадив лишь потомков Картлоса»28. Согласно Мровели, Фарнаваз, представитель знати города Мцхета (ныне пригород Тбилиси), поднял грузин на борьбу против завоевателя страны Азона и обратился за помощью к осетинскому царю, а также заключил союз с Эгрисским эриставом (правителем Западной Грузии) Куджи. Союзники победили и добились независимости, Фарнаваз стал первым царем, объединившим Картли и Эгриси. Одну из своих сестер он выдал замуж за царя овсов, другую — за Куджи. Его наследником стал его сын Саурмаг. Когда против Саурмага поднялся дворцовый переворот, он бежал, позвал на помощь царя овсов — своего двоюродного брата, и разгромил заговорщиков29. Исследователи давно провели анализ этих и многих других имен картлийских царей и высших представителей знати. Так, алано-осетинское происхождение имени Куджи нашло подтверждение в работе Цулая Г.В. Предисловие // Жизнь картлийских царей. М., 1979. С. 4. Мровели пишет следующее: «Александр … и нашел он всех картлийцев злейшими из всех племен и родов, ибо, прелюбодействуя, не блюли они родства при вступлении в брак, съедали всякую тварь, поедали прах, как звери бессловесные, и об образе действий их нет слов…Дался диву Александр, ибо никакое из племен не творило /ничего/ подобного» (С. 27-28). 29 Мровели Л. Жизнь картлийских царей. Извлечение сведений об абхазах, народах Северного Кавказа и Дагестана. М., 1979. С. 30. 28

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ М.К. Андроникашвили30; легко читается на осетинском имя Саурмаг («saw arm» — смуглорукий31, черная рука). Известная Армазская билингва (1-2 вв.)32 сообщает имена Зевах, Иодманган, Хсефарнуг, которые без затруднений читаются на осетинском как соответственно «ленивый», «тщедушный» (в дигорском диалекте осетинского языка) и «наделенный фарном». Академик Г.С.Ахвледиани подчеркивает, что эти этимологии «правильно растолкованы … как осетинские (аланские)». Он делает вывод, что картвельские и овские племена длительно жили общей жизнью, тесно взаимодействуя с последних веков до нашей эры, а взаимоотношения картвельского и овского-осского-осетинского языков можно назвать «скорее взаимопроникновением, граничащим с двуязычием, нежели взаимовлиянием»33. Имя царя Вахтанга Горгасал «напоминает нартовское wærxtænæg … — «имеющий волчье тело»»34, при этом в грузинской летописи Х в. он сравнивается с нартом — согласно осетинской мифологии, представителем легендарного народа героев и полубогов. Когда греки захватили Эгриси, Вахтанг бежал в Осетию и затем, «выступив из Осети, десницею своею отнял у греков границу свою…»35. К аланскому кругу имен относятся Радамист, АсАндроникашвили М.К. Очерки по иранско-грузинским языковым взаимоотношениям. Тбилиси, 1973. С. 138-139. 31 Абаев В.И. О некоторых осетинских элементах в грузинском языке // Тр. Инта языкознания. Т. VI. М., 1956. С. 441. 32 Церетели Г.В. Армазская билингва. Тбилиси, 1941. С. 23. 33 Ахвледиани Г.С. О некоторых вопросах аланско-осетино-грузинских языковых взаимоотношений // Сб. избранных работ по осетинскому языку. Т. I. Тбилиси, 1960. С. 170. Исследований, посвященных этой проблеме, к сожалению, немного. См. например: Тедеева О.Г. Грузинская лексика в осетинском языке. Тбилиси, 1974. Как правило, речь идет о нескольких десятках слов. Однако в последние годы появилось исследование Ц.Цициати «Грузино-осетинские лексические схождения» (подготовлено к печати, находится в производстве), где анализируются свыше трех тысяч слов (!). Работа получила положительные отзывы доктора филол. наук Н.Г.Джусойты и канд. филол. наук З.А.Битарти — видных деятелей осетинской интеллигенции. Следует также отметить, что грузины не являются автохтонами Южного Кавказа — этот вывод давно был сделан серьезной, а не идеологизированной, как ныне, грузинской исторической наукой. Так, академик Иванэ Джавахишвили писал, что «Кавказ не был первоначальной родиной грузинского народа, что в древности грузины не жили на Кавказе … и поэтому здесь (в Грузии. — К.Д.) не надо искать источники их культуры» (Джавахишвили И.А. История грузинского народа (на груз. яз.). Тбилиси, 1959. С. 34). См. также: Большая Советская Энциклопедия. Т. ХIX. М., 1930. С. 558). 34 Абаев В.И. О некоторых осетинских… С. 441. 35 Вахушти Багратиони. История царства грузинского. Тбилиси, 1976. С. 221. 30

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РЕСПУБЛИКА ЮЖНАЯ ОСЕТИЯ паурук, а также имя двух царей Кахетии XI-XII вв. — Ахсартан — от осетинского «æхсар» — «сила, отвага, доблесть», являющееся фонетически близким именам героев нартовского эпоса осетин Ахсар и Ахсартаг. Наконец, слово «фарн», входящее в целый ряд древнегрузинских имен, по сей день является живым словом осетинского языка, это «общеиранское полурелигиозное понятие … будучи дериватом «неба-солнца», оно обозначало все то благое, источником чего древние мыслили небо-солнце: «небесная благодать», «благополучие», «преуспевание», «благопристойность», «мир», «тишина». Оно восходит к иранскому hvarnah (от hvar — «солнце»), персидскому farr («блеск», «великолепие», «пышность»)»36. Иными словами, по мнению Г.А. Меликишвили, сомневаться в факте распространения имен этого облика среди представителей картлийской знати нельзя37. Союзнические, тесные отношения картвелов (грузин) и аланосов (осетин) продолжали развиваться и в последующие века, и мы согласны с выводом Г.Д. Тогошвили о том, что «основной тенденцией грузино-осетинских взаимоотношений с древнейших времен являлась совместная борьба против иноземных завоевателей»38. С помощью осетин картлийские цари Азорк и Армазели вернули утерянные ими территории. Особое значение дружеским отношениям с алано-осетинскими правителями придавал царь Асфагур, кстати говоря, скончавшийся в Осетии при подготовке к очередному походу против Персии. Именно в союзе с осетинами грузины отстаивали свою независимость от персидских и византийских завоевателей, а с VII в. и от арабов. Сближению этих народов способствовало укрепление христианства в Грузии и Осетии. В Х-ХIII вв. грузино-осетинские отношения особенно интенсифицировались. Было заключено множество династических браков, среди которых историки выделяют брак царя Грузии Георгия III и дочери осетинского царя Худана Борене. Дочь от этого брака, царица Тамар, в свою очередь, вышла замуж за осетина Сослана, в крещении Давида из знатного рода Царазоновых. При Сослане-Давиде и Тамар Грузия достигла пика своего развития, чему Абаев В.И. Историко-этимологический словарь… С. 42. Меликишвили Г.А. К истории древней Грузии. Тбилиси, 1959. С. 473. 38 Тогошвили Г.Д. Сослан-Давид. Владикавказ, 1990. С. 5. Автор подверг критике насаждаемую в грузинской истории версию о Сослане-Давиде как «муже-слуге» Тамар, доказав на основании грузинских источников, что Сослан-Давид являлся реальным царем — правителем Грузии (С. 74-77). 36 37

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ в решающей степени способствовали военно-политический дар Сослана-Давида и поддержка, оказываемая ему из Осетии. «Под руководством Сослана-Давида и при его личном участии были одержаны такие замечательные победы, как разгром в 1195 г. в Шамхорской битве объединенных сил сельджукских султанов во главе с Абубекром, взятие турецкой твердыни Карса и разгром в Басианском сражении 1205 г. войск западнотурецких правителей во главе с султаном Рума Рукн-ад-Дином»39. Большой интерес представляет еще один исторический документ — летопись рода Эриставов. Он датируется XIV в. и называется «Хроника ксанских эриставов». В нем повествуется о борьбе за верховную власть в Осетии, в ходе которой проигравшая ветвь царского рода в лице трех своих представителей (Ростом, Бибила и Цитлосан) с сыновьями и слугами покинула столичную область и переселилась в горную часть Осетии — Туалгом (Двалети в грузинских летописях). Туальцы приняли их, но когда Ростом обнаружил намерение стать царем в Туалгоме, они отвергли это притязание и вынудили его покинуть Туалгом. Вместе с братьями он перебрался в Ксанское ущелье, где стал правителем. Позже этот род распространил свою власть и на Арагвское ущелье и некоторые другие земли вплоть до города Гори и принял наименование Эристави (от грузинского «правитель»), войдя в высший круг грузинской знати. Этот род принадлежал одной из пяти главных осетинских фамилий — Сидамоновых. Очерки истории Юго-Осетии. Т. 1. Цхинвали, 1969. С. 59. Сослану также посвящены строки выдающегося памятника грузинской литературы — поэмы средневекового поэта Грузии Шота Руставели «Витязь в тигровой шкуре» («Вепхвис тхъаосани»), перевод Н.Заболоцкого: «Божеству грузин Давиду, что грядет путем светила, // Чья с восхода до заката на земле известна сила, // Кто для преданных опора, для изменников — могила, — // Написал я эту повесть, чтоб досуг его делила. // Мне ли петь дела Давида, возглашая славу слав. // Я служил ему стихами, эту повесть отыскав» (строфа 1584). Более точный по смыслу перевод с грузинского на осетинский дал один из лучших осетинских поэтов второй половины ХХ в. Георгий Бестаев: «Арын гуырдзыйы хуыцауы — хур-Дауыты ном мæ фысты…» («Нахожу (именую, возношу) грузин бога — солнце-Давида имя моими письменами…») (Шота Руставели. Стайы Цармдарæг. Изд. 2-е. Цхинвали, 1986. С. 277). Однако в тбилисском издании 1983 г. в переводе с грузинского Пантелеймона Петренко при участии и под редакцией Константина Чичинадзе (редактор — членкорреспондент Академии наук Грузинской ССР Саргис Цаишвили), когда грузинский национализм уже начал усиливаться, именование осетина богом грузин было признано невозможным, и строфа звучит так: «Царь Давид наш солнцеликий, славный в думах и делах, // От Восхода до Заката на врагов наводит страх…». 39

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РЕСПУБЛИКА ЮЖНАЯ ОСЕТИЯ Став частью грузинской элиты («…тогда назвались потомки Сидамона Сидамон-Эриставами», — пишет об этом в своем генеалогическим списке грузинских княжеских родов царевич Иоанн в 1799 г.40), Эристави поколение за поколением рассматривали Туалгом-Двалетию как свою законную вотчину и пытались ее захватить. Позже такие попытки начали предпринимать и представители грузинского рода Мачабели. На предгорных равнинах возле Цхинвали последние имели частичный успех, хотя конечной цели так и не достигли. Что же касается горной (южной) части Осетии, то здесь горцы, защищая свою свободу в условиях военно-родовой демократии, оказали поработителям упорное сопротивление и не подчинились чужому господству. Неоднократные военные вторжения грузин не смогли сломить воли южных осетин к самостоятельности и вызывали резкий отпор. После разгрома монголами Алании-Осетии, а затем удара по Грузии отношения между двумя соседними народами обострились, актуализировалась и приобрела гипертрофированные размеры конфликтная составляющая. С одной стороны, грузинская феодальная (тавадская) верхушка сделала естественный вывод, что южные осетины, потерявшие свою государственность, не смогут отстоять независимость от грузинского государства. С другой стороны, значительный приток с северокавказских равнин спасающихся от уничтожения монголами соплеменников вызвал сильное демографическое давление внутри югоосетинских общин, с неизбежностью векторизовавшееся на картлийскую равнину. Грузинские общины начали испытывать растущую силовую и демографическую экспансию со стороны Осетии. Этот период остался в историографии и народном фольклоре грузин под названием «осианоба», или «овсоба» — «осетинщина». В творчестве основоположника осетинской литературы Коста Хетагурова есть произведение, которое так и называется — «Особа». «Отец мой, — пишет К.Хетагуров, — скончавшийся в 1892 г. 82-летним стариком, был живым свидетелем последней эпохи того невозвратного прошлого в истории Осетии, которое несет название особа»41. Автор указывает, что «даже самые могущественные из осетинских царей не предъявляли никаких прав» на Нарскую котловину — центИнститут рукописей Академии Наук Грузии, ф. S, р. 3729, л. 6. Отметим, что сами Сидамоновы-Эристави связывают свое переселение и возвышение со временем и личностью императора Юстиниана (527-565 гг. до н. э.). 41 Хетагуров К.Л. Особа (Этнографический очерк). Собр. соч.: В 5 т. Т. IV. С. 311. М., 1960. С. 311-371. 40

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ ральную (горную) Осетию, жители которой имели особо тесные отношения с южными осетинами42. Отдавая себе отчет в деликатности темы, автор в основном сосредоточивается на этнографическом описании тогдашнего быта осетин, сравнительно редко непосредственно затрагивая проблему особа. «Убить и умереть для осетина времен особа были синонимы; убивая сегодня, он знал, что сам тоже будет убит, если не завтра, то послезавтра или через неделю. Прежде чем оплакивать убитого, осетины оплакивают убийцу»43. «Во время особа ограбление осетина осетином даже не было предусмотрено обычным правом. Но делать набеги за перевалы и грабить инородцев ставилось в заслугу»44. При особом доверии хозяин дома (сакли) может показать гостю разные ценности, доставшиеся ему «после набега на владения какого-нибудь грузинского князя»45. В социальной стратификации общества имелся немногочисленный слой совершенно бесправных людей — купленный, похищенный либо «взятый в плен во время набега в какое-нибудь отдаленное ущелье, всегда иной национальности, этот несчастный … делался жертвой полнейшего произвола своих хозяев, это был безусловный раб, которого можно продать, купить, убить и помиловать»46. К. Хетагуров отмечает, что «есть, впрочем, в Осетии местности, где (таких рабов, — К.Д.) называли «гурдзиаг» — грузин»47. Из грузинских авторов развернутое исследование проблемы «особа» предпринял Вахтанг Итонишвили. Ученый констатирует, что по причине «одностороннего подхода к этому вопросу, крайне жесткой цензуры и конформистской позиции части грузинских ученых «отечественная» наука долгое время обходила молчанием такую мрачную страницу многовековой истории Грузии, какой является «осианоба» (в буквальном переводе «осетинщина»)»48. «Весьма симптоматичен факт превращения в наипопулярнейшего персонажа фольклора осетин, наследников ас-алан, Ос-Багатара (или БагатарОса), «прославившегося» именно разорением и грабежом Картли, и причисление его к величайшим национальным героям осетинского народа. Исходя из вышесказанного, вполне возможно допустить возТам же. С. 313. Там же. С. 364. 44 Там же. С. 365. 45 Там же. С. 325. 46 Там же. С. 321. 47 Там же. 48 Итонишвили В. Осетинщина // Осетинский вопрос / Сост. А. Бакрадзе и О. Чубинидзе). Тбилиси, 1994. С. 210. 42

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РЕСПУБЛИКА ЮЖНАЯ ОСЕТИЯ никновение термина «осианоба» // «овсоба» («осетинщина») или же создание благоприятной почвы для подобной номинации уже в ту еще невиданную по своей продолжительности эпоху «вражды» асалан и грузин (XIII-XIV вв.), которую для должной наглядности, наверное, резонно условно назвать ас-аланским (или алано-осетинским) этапом «осетинщины»»49. В последующее время, по мысли автора, «после XIV в. предпочтительнее говорить об иронском (или ос-иронском) этапе «осетинщины», который с начала XVII столетия … быстро «набирает силу» и по своим масштабам и остроте с самого начала превосходит предшествующий ему так называемый алано-осетинский (или ас-аланский) период «осетинщины»»50. Автор отвергает определение некоторыми специалистами периода особа как времени владычества осетин в Грузии, утверждая, что это «является явной гиперболизацией осетинщины и возведением ее в ранг таких явлений, какими были в свое время владычество арабов (грузинское «араба»), турок («туркоба»), кызылбашей («кызылбашоба»)»51. Вместе с тем, он отмечает, что по сообщениям старейших информаторов, в их время была «страшная овсоба, ночью и носа высунуть нельзя было»52, и в фольклоре грузин-мтиульцев цикл осетинщины весьма впечатляет53. В.Итонишвили считает, что «специфику осетинщины («осианоба» // «особа») определяет и то обстоятельство, что имевшее довольно ограниченный радиус действия осетино-грузинское противостояние, как правило, было лишено этноконфессиональной подкладки, в результате чего сознание большей части грузин оказалось почти полностью застрахованным от видения даже в осетине-насильнике врага, что, вероятно, и помешало…назвать это явление соответствующим ему именем»54. Характерно, что исследователь избегает упоминания о карательных экспедициях в Осетию Ксанских эриставов во второй половине XIV в., походах царя Георгия V Блистательного в начале XV в., шаха Аббаса в начале XVII в., царя Георгия VII (Георгия Саакадзе) в первой половине XVII в., Вахтанга V Шахнаваза в середине XVII в., царя Вахтанга VI в начале XVIII в. и царя Ираклия в середине XVIII в. и др. Осетины не подчинились. Там же. С. 214. Там же. С. 215. 51 Там же. С. 221. 52 Дзидзигури Ш. Материалы грузинской диалектологии. Тбилиси, 1974 (на груз. яз.). С.115. 53 Итонишвили В. Осетинщина… С. 226. 54 Там же. С. 227. 49

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ ПОД ЭГИДОЙ РОССИИ Продвижение России на Кавказ создало новую историческую реальность. Осетия присоединилась к России добровольно в 1774 г., причем в осетинском посольстве в Санкт-Петербурге большинство составляли южные осетины. Грузия, как известно, заключила с Россией Георгиевский трактат в 1783 г. и окончательно вошла в состав России в 1801 г. (когда был издан Манифест Александра I о присоединении Картли-Кахетии), спасаясь от неминуемого порабощения со стороны мусульманских завоевателей. В настоящее время, выполняя антироссийский политический заказ, грузинские историки рисуют Россию как завоевательницу Грузии, но на самом деле это было спасением погибающей страны. «В 1795 году персидский шах Ага-Мухаммед-хан, — напоминает М.М. Блиев, — недовольный тем, что Ираклий II не явился на его коронацию и тем выразил свою независимость, подвел войска к Тифлису. Сюда, к Тифлису, шахские войска пригоняли мирное население, которое специальные отряды подвергали геноциду. Так, за несколько дней было уничтожено более 80 тысяч грузин. В Тифлисе к мосту через Куру был выставлен образ Святой Марии. Сюда согнали более трех тысяч мужчин. Обнажив их, шах приказал каждому подходить к образу Святой Марии и имитировать половой акт. Отказывавшихся выполнить волю шаха с отрубленной головой бросали в реку. Массы грузинского населения покидали Грузию. Беженцев вылавливали и тут же с ними расправлялись. Во всем этом вместе с персидскими отрядами участвовали также многие грузинские тавады, демонстрировавшие свою покорность шаху»55. В помощь единоверной стране Россия направила три военных отряда, вместе с ними выступил и осетинский отряд. В Крцанисской битве с персами осетинский отряд особенно отличился, а один из осетин — Туаури Ора — за боевые заслуги получил тарханство (освобождение от всяких повинностей)56. Царская администрация прилагала усилия к тому, чтобы нормализовать отношения грузинских властей и осетинских обществ Южной Осетии. Южные осетины получили возможность отстаивать свои права не только силой оружия, но и в судебных инстанБлиев М.М. Южная Осетия в коллизиях российско-грузинских отношений. М., 2006. С. 28. 56 История Осетии в документах и материалах (с древнейших времен до конца XVIII в.) / Сост. Г.Д. Тогошвили, И.Н. Цховребов. Т. 1. Цхинвали, 1962. С. 223. 55

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РЕСПУБЛИКА ЮЖНАЯ ОСЕТИЯ циях Российской империи, что было уникальным для Кавказа проявлением высокого уровня политико-правовой борьбы. Для пресечения посягательств со стороны Мачабели и Эристави южные осетины указом Николая I от 8 июня 1852 г. были переведены в разряд казенных, то есть государственных крестьян. Двенадцатого сентября 1852 г. правительствующий Сенат подтвердил отказ грузинским князьям в установлении крепостного права над осетинами57. Было произведено важное административно-территориальное деление: в 1842 г. были образованы Тушино-Пшаво-Хевсурский, Горский и Осетинский округа (южные районы Осетии вошли в Горский и Осетинский округа), а в 1859 г. главнокомандующий и наместник Барятинский вывел из состава Осетинского округа Нарский участок, а также из Горского округа юго-восточную часть Осетии в качестве Осетинского участка и передал в Осетинский округ Горийского уезда. Таким образом, за исключением небольшой территории на юго-западе, входившей в Рачинский уезд, Южная Осетия административно консолидировалась. Царские власти осознавали ненадежность грузинской политической элиты и рассматривали Осетинский округ как средство влияния на Грузию. «Царизм не желал, чтобы южные осетины полностью растворились в грузинском народе, на всякий случай Южную Осетию хотели сохранить как своеобразный плацдарм, с которого также можно было бы давить на строптивых грузинских правителей»58. Вместе с тем, русские наместники, уступая настойчивым требованиям грузинских феодалов-тавадов, не раз направляли русские воинские контингенты в составе грузинских отрядов для наказания осетин, отказывавшихся платить подати и не признававших грузинское господство. При этом, что характерно, осетины не боялись вооруженных столкновений с грузинскими отрядами, но избегали вооруженных конфликтов с русскими солдатами. В эти десятилетия упрочилась политическая и культурная ориентация осетин на Россию. Когда в 1917 г. в России произошла революция, Грузия в числе первых объявила о своей независимости. Южная Осетия этого не сделала, хорошо осознавая угрозу попасть в зависимость от грузинских властей. Ситуация быстро обострялась, и в 1920 г. грузинский нациБлиев М.М. Южная Осетия… С. 238. Галазов А.Х. Народы-братья. Языки-братья. Орджоникидзе, 1987. С.117. В постсоветский период А.Х. Галазов — один из президентов Республики Северная Осетия — Алания. 57

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ онал-экстремизм, получивший государственную базу, совершил агрессию против Южной Осетии и ликвидировал ее как этнотерриториальную основу южных осетин. Осетин насчитывалось тогда около 40 тысяч, из них 5 тысяч погибли в боях и на горных перевалах при отступлении на Северный Кавказ, еще около 15 тысяч беженцев погибли в Терской области от голода и эпидемий в ходе гражданской войны в России; кроме того, была осуществлена этническая чистка оставшихся (не успевших бежать) осетин59. Лишь в начале 1921 г., с введением в Грузию 11-й Красной Армии южные осетины смогли вернуться и восстановить свою сожженную родину60. В коммунистической России идеология интернационализма и чрезвычайно эффективный аппарат контроля подавили межнациональные разногласия; предпринимались меры по сближению народов. В грузино-осетинских взаимоотношениях этого периода наблюдались и позитивные, и негативные тенденции. Южные осетины добились больших успехов в социально-экономическом развитии, глубоко интегрировались в грузинское общество и государство, процент смешанных браков был очень высок. Вместе с тем, все эти десятилетия имела место «мягкая» дискриминация автономной области тбилисскими властями, ее развитие искусственно тормозилось по сравнению с грузинскими регионами61.

Из истории осетино-грузинских взаимоотношений / Под ред. проф. Н.Г.Джусойты. Цхинвал, 1995. С. 40. 60 Джугели В. Тяжелый крест. Тифлис, 1920. Это книга командующего карательными войсками Грузинской Демократической Республики в Южной Осетии. «Всюду вокруг нас горят осетинские деревни, — писал он. — Ужасная расправа, но иного пути нет» (С. 230). 61 Любопытным бюрократическим отражением дискриминационной политики грузинских властей в отношении южных осетин может послужить название одного из документов того времени — Приложение 2 к Постановлению Пленума Юго-Осетинского областного комитета Коммунистической партии Грузии: «Уточненные сроки реализации мероприятий, предусмотренных постановлением Центрального Комитета Коммунистической Партии Грузии от 25 февраля 1985 г. №117 «О дополнительных мерах по обеспечению выполнения постановления ЦК КП Грузии и Совета Министров Грузинской ССР от 9 марта 1982 г. №190 «О записке Юго-Осетинского обкома КП Грузии и исполкома Совета народных депутатов Юго-Осетинской АО о недостатках по выполнению ранее принятых решений по социально-экономическому развитию автономной области с учетой решений задач XII пятилетки» (Советская Осетия. 1989. 30 сентября). О «мягкой» дискриминации, точнее говоря, о «мягком» геноциде см. также: Пухаев К.П. К вопросу о геноциде // Южная Осетия. 2004. 28 июля. 59

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РЕСПУБЛИКА ЮЖНАЯ ОСЕТИЯ НЕЗАВИСИМАЯ ЮЖНАЯ ОСЕТИЯ Когда Советский Союз начал разваливаться, Грузия опять в числе первых (вслед за прибалтийскими республиками) вышла из «красной» Российской империи, и вновь южные осетины сделали свой выбор в пользу России. Это было необходимо, поскольку грузинский национал-экстремизм открыто высказал свою программу. Так, огромный резонанс в Юго-Осетинской автономии получила статья профессора Т.Кванчилашвили62, в которой он призвал ограничить рождаемость у негрузинских этносов. С приходом же к власти З.Гамсахурдиа лозунг «Грузия — для грузин!» стал реализовываться государственными средствами. Именно тогда была утверждена идеологема об искусственности Юго-Осетинской автономной области и самого понятия «Южная Осетия»: «В истории не существовало «Южной Осетии» ни как географической, ни как политической реальности»63. Рубежным событием стала попытка проведения митинга устрашения 23 ноября 1989 г. в Цхинвале: тогда к городу (с населением 42 тыс. человек) подошла колонна активистов грузинского нациоКванчилашвили Т. Что нас ждет потом // Литературули Сакартвело. 1988. 30 сентября (на груз. яз.). В качестве одной из актуальных угроз для грузин профессор назвал осетин. 63 Бакраде А. Вместо предисловия // Осетинский вопрос. Тбилиси, 1994. С. 3. Эта книга в общественном сознании осетин (и не только) является аналогом «Майн кампф» для евреев. Нет необходимости развернуто критиковать указанную идеологему. Приведем лишь в качестве примера знаменитый школьный учебник выдающегося грузинского педагога и общественного деятеля Якова Гогебашвили «Врата природы» («Бунебис кари») для детей 3-4 годов обучения. Впервые он был издан в 1868 г и ко времени советизации Грузии выдержал свыше двадцати изданий. В разделе «Соседние страны» автор пишет: «Осетины являются горским народом. Они занимают срединную часть Кавказского хребта, от Хевсуретии до Сванетии. Одни из них живут по ту сторону хребта, на его северных склонах, другие на этой стороне, на южных склонах. По этой причине Осетия разделяется на две части: Северную Осетию и Южную Осетию» (Гогебашвили Я. Врата природы. Тбилиси, 1912. С. 540-541 (на груз. яз.). Другой автор географии Грузии С.Робакидзе отмечает: «Хотя Осетия не представляет собой настоящей части Грузии, однако она столь близка нашей стране, что знакомство с ней для нас весьма полезно… Потустороннюю Осетию называют Северной Осетией, посюстороннюю — Южной Осетией» (Робакидзе С. Описание Родины. Изд. 3-е. Кутаиси, 1917. С. 81 (на груз. яз.). Исчерпывающей по данному вопросу является работа Ю.С. Гаглойти: «Письменная история застает южных осетин в основном на территории их нынешнего расселения — на южных склонах Центрального Кавказа от Дарьяльского ущелья до Мамисонского» (Гаглойти Ю.С. Проблемы этнической истории южных осетин. Цхинвал, 1996. С. 56) 62

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ налистического движения численностью до 50 тыс. человек, собранная со всей Грузии по инициативе блока «Круглый стол» (лидер — З.Гамсахурдиа). Колонна была остановлена группой осетинской молодежи у въезда в Цхинвал и после полуторасуточного противостояния отошла обратно. Тогда впервые проявилась способность южных осетин к быстрой самоорганизации, созданию дееспособных структур противодействия. Шестого января 1991 г. Цхинвал был захвачен несколькими тысячами грузинских полицейских и национал-экстремистов. К вечеру того же дня началась вооруженная борьба самоорганизовавшихся горожан против захватчиков. После двадцатидневных боев город был освобожден, и боевые действия переместились в районы провозглашенной Республики Южная Осетия. Они приобрели особенно жестокий характер весной-летом 1992 г., когда в Цхинвале под ракетноартиллерийскими обстрелами ежедневно погибали и были покалечены десятки людей. Грузинская сторона широко использовала террористические акты. Так, 18 марта 1991 г. у грузинского села Ередви возле южной окраины Цхинвала грузинские неформалы захватили 25 осетин, которых они ссадили с военной автомашины «Урал» Внутренних войск МВД СССР (подразделение сопровождения не приняло мер по их защите и спасению). Женщины и дети были избиты и погнаны к Цхинвалу, 12 мужчин после зверских избиений и жестоких пыток (описание которых мы опускаем) изуродованными бросили в овраг, облили бензином и подожгли, а затем еще живыми засыпали землей. С целью сокрытия следов место захоронения (у карьера возле Ередви) было утрамбовано бульдозером, над ним провели дорогу. Очевидцы сообщили, что стоны из-под земли были слышны более суток. (25 и 27 сентября 1993 г. сотрудники МВД и Прокуратуры РЮО совместно с представителями правоохранительных органов Грузии, миротворцами, родными и близкими погибших произвели эксгумацию останков и установили личности погибших64). Двадцать шестого марта 1991 г. было совершено нападение на село Тлиакан Цхинвальского района; были сожжены дома вместе с шестью стариками, не имевшими возможности скрыться65. В то вреАрхив Министерства по особым делам — Югоосетинской части Смешанной контрольной комиссии по урегулированию грузино-осетинского конфликта. См. также: Крутиков Е. У каждого своя Вальхалла // Голос. 1991. № 13; Южная Осетия: и кровь, и пепел. Владикавказ; Москва, 1991. С. 106. 65 Южная Осетия. Хроника событий грузинской агрессии. 1988-1992 / Cост. Б.Е.Чочиев, М.К.Джиоев. Цхинвал, 1996. С. 36. 64

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РЕСПУБЛИКА ЮЖНАЯ ОСЕТИЯ мя грузинские формирования не ставили себе задачу захвата села. Это было сделано 18 августа 2004 г. в ходе второй попытки силового решения «югоосетинского вопроса». Теракт против жителей села Тлиакан имел очевидную цель — посеять панику в окрестных селах и районном центре Дзау, убедить жителей в невозможности защитить села и Транскавказскую автомагистраль. Двадцатого мая было совершено самое страшное преступление грузинского национал-экстремизма (нацизма) против южных осетин: на Зарской дороге, которая в период блокады и войны стала для осажденного Цхинвала «дорогой жизни», в лесу в нескольких километрах от грузинского анклава севернее Цхинвала грузинское подразделение устроило засаду и расстреляло беженцев из Цхинвала. Погибли 33 человека, более 30 получили тяжелые ранения, абсолютное большинство из них — женщины, старики и дети66. В этих условиях Верховный Совет РЮО 29 мая 1992 г. принял Акт провозглашения независимости: «Исходя из смертельной опасности, которая нависла над Республикой Южная Осетия в связи со злодеяниями, поставившими на грань вымирания ее народ и культуру, геноцидом осетин, с жестокостью и вероломством осуществляемым Республикой Грузия в процессе распада СССР в 1989-1992 гг. … учитывая волеизъявление народа, выраженное в референдуме от 19 января 1992 г. ... Верховный Совет РЮО провозглашает независимость Южной Осетии и создание самостоятельного государства Южная Осетия»67. Война была остановлена 14 июля 1992 г. после ввода в зону конфликта трехсторонних миротворческих сил68. В 1994 г. начался переговорный процесс по урегулированию грузино-осетинского конфликта, результатом которого явилось существенное продвижение. Была создана Смешанная контрольная комиссия (единственный легитимный орган с сопредседательством Грузии, Южной Осетии, России и Северной Осетии). Шестнадцатого мая 1996 г. в Москве был подписан Меморандум о мерах по обеспечению безопасности и укреплению взаТам же. С. 44-45. Там же. С. 1. См. также: Южная Осетия: и кровь, и пепел...; Южная Осетия глазами журналистов (1991- 1992) / Сост. А. Маргиев. Цхинвал, 2001; Региональные конфликты в Грузии — Юго-Осетинская автономная область, Абхазская АССР (1989-2001) // Сб. политико-правовых актов / Сост. Т.Диасамидзе. Тбилиси, 2002; Санакоев И.Б. Истоки и факторы эволюции грузино-осетинского конфликта. Владикавказ, 2004; Дзайнукова М.И. Проблема национального самоопределения южных осетин (1918-2002): Дисс…. канд. ист. наук. Владикавказ, 2002. 68 Южная Осетия: миротворческая миссия. Десять лет мира и спокойствия. Цхинвал, 2002. 66 67

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ имного доверия между сторонами в грузино-осетинском конфликте (уникальный документ по решению этнополитических конфликтов на территории бывшего СССР). Состоялись три встречи лидеров сторон — Э.А. Шеварднадзе и Л.А.Чибирова. «Конфликт Грузия — Южная Осетия находится в состоянии затухания: фактически нормализованы отношения людей на бытовом уровне, обе стороны возглавляют лидеры, не участвовавшие в вооруженном конфликте и поддерживающие между собой постоянные контакты, включая обмен визитами»69. Ситуация резко изменилась после победы в Грузии «оранжевой революции» и прихода к власти М. Саакашвили. Летом 2004 г. начались боевые действия против РЮО, достигшие своей кульминации 18 августа: в тот день грузинские подразделения захватили Тлиаканскую высоту в зоне боев с угрозой перерезать Транскавказскую автомагистраль и выйти к стратегически важному Рукскому тоннелю. Ответным штурмом высота была отбита, а грузинские войска понесли значительные потери и отступили. Россия выступила с жестким заявлением о намерении не допустить силового решения югоосетинского вопроса, и 19 августа М. Саакашвили отдал приказ об отводе войск. В настоящее время между Грузией и Южной Осетией сохраняется положение вооруженного перемирия. Нынешний президент РЮО Э.Д. Кокойты имеет решительную поддержку среди народа в противостоянии режиму М. Саакашвили. С грузинской же стороны продолжаются многочисленные провокации с человеческими жертвами и опасными обострениями обстановки70. Юридически позиция РЮО неуязвима. При Президенте Л. Чибирове миссия ОБСЕ в Грузии дала согласие на проведение юридической экспертизы документов, принятых Южной Осетией с 1989 г. Однако она до сих пор не проведена, что можно объяснить политической установкой на сохранение территориальной целостности Грузии. Вместе с тем, обоснование позиции РЮО развернуто изложено в ряде публикаций и юридически никем не опровергнуто71. Мамсуров Т.Д. Регионы — центр: проблема согласования интересов. М., 2000. С. 75. В настоящее время автор является главой Республики Северная Осетия — Алания. 70 Дзугаев К.Г. В Южной Осетии продолжается война // Сеть этнологического мониторинга и раннего предупреждения конфликтов. Бюллетень № 61. М., 2005. С.100-102. Он же. Южная Осетия: вот и лето прошло…// Кавказский эксперт (журнал для депутатов Госдумы России). 2005. № 3. С. 30-34. 71 См.: Медоев Д.Н. Южная Осетия: право на свободу // 5 лет Республике Южная Осетия / Сост. Б.К.Харебов. Цхинвал, 1996. С. 84-89. «Вхождение Южной Осетии в состав независимой Грузии можно было обеспечить до 23 ноября 1989 г. пре69

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РЕСПУБЛИКА ЮЖНАЯ ОСЕТИЯ РЮО — государство, доказавшее свою демократичность. В нем четырежды проводились выборы в Верховный Совет — Парламент, дважды — выборы Президента (с переходом в 1996 г. к президентской форме власти), дважды проводились референдумы. Республика имеет Конституцию, соответствующую всем нормам современного международного права72. В условиях напряженного противоборства на Южном Кавказе различных геополитических сил исключительное значение в грузиноосетинских отношениях приобретает исторический аргумент. «Именно исторический фактор, — утверждает Ю.С. Гаглойти, — является решающим аргументом в проблеме легитимизации Республики Южная Осетия и грузино-осетинском (югоосетинском) конфликте в целом. Аргумент этот заключается в том, что согласно более чем достоверным свидетельствам греко-латинских, древнегрузинских и древнеармянских нарративных источников территория Южной Осетии с древнейших времен являлась частью этнической территории формирования осетинского этноса»73. Несомненно, в этом отдают себе отчет и грузинские политически ангажированные историки, чем объясняется их целенаправленная и активная фальсификаторская деятельность. По этому поводу известный осетинский историк В.Д. Дзидзоев отмечает: «Они вплотную приближаются к тому, чтобы не просто сфальсифицировать историю взаимоотношений грузин с осетинами… а украсть полностью древнюю и средневековую историю последних»74. Мы, однако, солидарны со Страбоном: «…старина, вымысел и чудесное называются мифами, история же — будь то древняя или новая — требует истины»75. доставлением статуса автономной республики в составе Грузии, или до 6 января 1991 г. на федеративных условиях, или до осетино-ингушского конфликта 1992 г. на условиях конфедерации» (С. 88). См. также: Гатикоев П.С. Справка об историко-правовом обосновании необходимости объединения Осетии // Там же. С. 71-75; Южная Осетия — навеки с Россией! Историко-правовое обоснование вхождения Республики Южная Осетия в состав России // Сб. док-ов и мат-лов / Сост. В.С.Чижевский. М., 2004. 72 Конституция (Основной Закон) Республики Южная Осетия. Принята референдумом 8 апреля 2001 г. Цхинвал, 2005. 73 Гаглойти Ю.С. Необходимое дополнение // Южная Осетия. 2006. 27 мая. Автор ранее работал министром иностранных дел РЮО, а ныне — ведущий научный сотрудник Юго-Осетинского научно-исследовательского института, зав. кафедрой истории Юго-Осетинского госуниверситета. 74 Дзидзоев В.Д. Кавказ конца ХХ в.: тенденции этнополитического развития. Владикавказ, 2004. С. 27. 75 Страбон. География. XI, V, 3.

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ ЦХИНВАЛЬСКОГО РЕГИОНА (ЮЖНАЯ ОСЕТИЯ) Темо Джоджуа зам. директора Института истории и этнологии Грузинской АН

ОБЩАЯ ХАРАКТЕРИСТИКА РЕГИОНА Цхинвальский регион расположен на Кавказе, в частности, на южном склоне Центрального (Большого) Кавказского хребта. Его северная граница проходит вдоль гребня Главного, или Водораздельного, Кавказского хребта, а восточная — вдоль Алевского хребта. Западная граница региона пересекает хребты Лихский, Рачинский и Кедела, ущелия рек Дзирула, Квирила, Джеджора и Гарула и завершается непосредственно у Мамисонского перевала. И, наконец, южная граница проходит по северной периферии равнины Шида (Внутренней) Картли. На севере Цхинвальский регион граничит с Аланией — Северо-Осетинской республикой Российской федерации, а в остальных трех направлениях — с административными единицами Грузинской республики: на востоке — с Казбегским и Душетским районами, на юге — с Каспским, Горийским, Карельским и Хашурским, а на западе — с Сачхерским и Онским районами1. Территория Цхинвальского региона занимает 3800 км2. Население по данным 1989 г. достигало 98 500 чел., из них 65 200 осетин (66,2 %), 28 500 грузин (29 %), 2 100 русских (2,2 %), 1 000 армян (1%), 100 См.: Юго-Осетинская автономная область // Грузинская советская энциклопедия (ГСЭ). Грузинская ССР. 1981 (на груз. яз.). 1

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азербайджанцев (0,1%) и 1 600 представителей других национальностей (1,5%). В пределах Цхинвальского региона расположены собственно город Цхинвали и четыре поселка: Ахалгори (бывший Ленингори), Знаури, Кваиса и Джава, а также села Балаани, Дореткари, Ларгвиси, Гду, Коринта, Базуани, Квемо (Нижний) Захори, Салбиери, Дзуката, Корниси, Квемо Дзагина, Балта, Авневи, Гаристави, Дзвилети, Курта, Кемерти, Дзари, Белоти, Ванати, Берула, Ксуиси, Гвриа, Квемо Бикари, Арцеви, Эдиса, Квемо Рока, Ванели, Квемо Хвце, Мсхлеби, Кешелта, Кемулта, Часавали, Цона, Синагури и др2. Цхинвальский регион характеризуется высокогорным (на севере) и средней высоты (на юге) рельефом. Высокогорный рельеф представлен Главным, или Водораздельным, Кавказским хребтом и рядом сопровождающих его разветвлений. В этих местах высота Центрального Кавказского хребта по сравнению с другими его частями заметно понижена (менее 4 000 м). В центральном и южном районах Цхинвальского региона высота горных вершин колеблется в пределах 2 000 м, а сопредельные с равниной Шида Картли некоторые водораздельные хребты едва достигают 1 000 м. Водосток основной части территории Цхинвальского региона составляет бассейн р. Куры (впадающей в Каспийское море), а малой части — бассейн р. Риони (впадающей в Черное море). Главную речную систему в этих местах образуют реки Диди (Большой) Лиахви, Патара (Малый) Лиахви, Ксани, Меджуда, Лехура, Проне и др. Около половины территории Цхинвальского региона занимает лесной массив, а остальную часть — альпийские и субальпийские луга. На равнинах крайнего юга имеются также степи с колючим кустарником3. АШЕЛЬСКИЙ И МУСТЬЕРСКИЙ ПЕРИОДЫ На территории Цхинвальского региона сохранились следы обитания первобытного человека, восходящие к эпохе нижнего палеолита. По мнению известного грузинского ученого-археолога, академика О. Джапаридзе, уже с наступлением ашельского периода (1 500 000 / См.: Знаури // ГСЭ. Т. 4. 1979; Знаурский район // Там же; Кваиса // Там же. Т. 5. 1980; Юго-Осетинская автономная область…; Ленингори // ГСЭ. Т. 6. 1983; Ленингорский район // Там же; Джавский район // Там же. Т. 11. 1987; Цхинвальский район // Там же; Цхинвали // Там же; Пирцхалава Г. Население Грузии: национальный состав, семьи, миграция (по данным переписи 1970, 1979, 1989 гг.). Тбилиси, 1997 (на груз. яз.). 3 См.: Юго-Осетинская автономная область... 2

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ 1 300 000 — 200 000 / 120 000 гг. до н. э.) первобытный человек пересек восточное Средиземноморье и Малую Азию и появился на территории Кавказа. Здесь он довольно широко освоил богатый андезитом Цхинвальский регион. На сегодня памятники-жилища ашельского периода засвидетельствованы как в низменно-равнинной полосе (Лашебалта, Чрдилети и др.), так и в высокогорных районах (Кударо, Цона и др.) Цхинвальского региона. Особый интерес вызывает пещера Кударо (расположенная на высоте 1 600 м над уровнем моря), в которой обнаружено большое количество каменного инвентаря (ручные рубила, ощепы и т.д.), а также останки разных животных (в основном кости пещерного медведя)4. Первобытный человек все более интенсивно осваивает территорию Цхинвальского региона с наступлением мустьерского периода нижнего палеолита (200 000 / 120 000 — 40 000 / 35 000 гг. до н. э.). Археологические памятники тех времен — в основном открытые поселения — засвидетельствованы в предгорной полосе Цхинвальского региона: в ущельях рек Лиахви, Ксани, Проне и Меджуда (Морго, Джиджоети, Кусирети, Тамарашени, Пеквинари и др.). Примечательно, что выявленные в окрестностях г. Цхинвали памятники мустьерской эпохи из-за характерных особенностей здешней каменной индустрии часть ученых-археологов выделила в отдельную, так называемую Цхинвальскую мустьерскую группу. В указанное время первобытный человек по-прежнему использует Кударскую и Цонскую См.: Джапаридзе О. Археология Грузии (Каменный век и эпоха бронзы). Тбилиси, 1991 (на груз. яз.); Он же. На заре этнокультурной истории Кавказа. Тбилиси, 1989; Он же. У истоков этногенезиса грузинского народа. Тбилиси, 2006 (на груз. яз.); Верещагин Н. Млекопитающие Кавказа. М.; Л., 1959; Любин В. Высокогорная пещерная стоянка Кударо I (Юго-Осетия) // Известия Всесоюзного геогр. об-ва. Т. 91. Вып. 2. М., 1959; Он же. Палеолит Кавказа и Северной Азии. Л., 1989; Он же. Ашельская эпоха на Кавказе. СПб., 1998; Он же. Нижнепалеолитические памятники Юго-Осетии: Мат-лы и исслед. по археологии СССР. Т. 79. Палеолит и неолит СССР. Т. 4. М.; Л., 1960; Он же. Изучение нижнего палеолита Кавказа // Краткие сообщения Ин-та археологии АН СССР. Вып. 118. М., 1969; Любин В., Левковская Т. Пещера Кударо III // Мат-лы и исслед. по археологии СССР. Вып. 185. Палеолит и неолит СССР. Т. 7. Л., 1972; Каландадзе А., Тушабрамишвили Д. Цонская пещера // Археология и палеография раннего палеолита Крыма и Кавказа. М., 1978; Зубов А. О зубе архантропа из пещеры Кударо I // Кударские пещерные стоянки Юго-Осетии. М., 1980; Кударо // ГСЭ. Т. 6. 1983; Лашебалта // Там же; Палеолит // Там же. Т. 7. 1984; Цона // Там же. Т. 11. 1987; Археология Грузии. Каменный век. Т. I. Тбилиси, 1991 (на груз. яз.); Ашельская культура // Грузия. Энциклопедия. Т. 1. 1997 (на груз. яз.); Лордкипанидзе Д. Эволюция природной среды на Южном Кавказе и основные этапы расселения ранних гоминидов (Hominidae): Автореф. дис.... канд. ист. наук. Тбилиси, 2001 г. (на груз. яз.). 4

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ ЦХИНВАЛЬСКОГО РЕГИОНА пещеры, однако уже не для постоянного поселения, а в качестве охотничьего стойбища. В этой связи заслуживает внимания соображение академика О. Джапаридзе, который опираясь на вещественный материал, выявленный в Кударо и Цона, предполагает, что упомянутые пещеры использовались как временные стойбища не местными жителями предгорной полосы Цхинвальского региона, а охотниками, прибывавшими сюда из Западной Грузии (через ущелье р. Квирила)5. ЭПОХИ ВЕРХНЕГО ПАЛЕОЛИТА, НЕОЛИТА И ЭНЕОЛИТА

С наступлением эпохи верхнего палеолита (40 000 / 35 00012 000 / 11 000 гг. до н. э.) климат на Кавказе стал холоднее. Надо полагать, что именно это обстоятельство вынудило местное население покинуть обжитые места (то есть горную полосу Кавказа) и переселиться в Западную Грузию, в основном в приморские районы. Указанные процессы коснулись и Цхинвальского региона, в результате чего в этих местах следы обитания первобытных людей, относящиеся к этому довольно продолжительному периоду, не найдены. К концу верхнего палеолита на Кавказе вновь изменились климатические условия: завершился ледниковый период и наступила эпоха мезолита (XII-XI — IX-VIII тыс. до н. э.). Вооруженные луками и стрелами и объединенные в раннематриархатные общины, первобытные люди стали постепенно возвращаться в горную полосу Кавказа. Их жилища вновь появляются и на территории Цхинвальского региона (Кударо, Цона, Пичиджини, Джермухи, Село и др.). Надо полагать, что Кавказ в мезолитическую эпоху стал ареной крайне значительных этнокультурных процессов. Согласно наблюдению академика О. Джапаридзе, к концу эпохи мезолита процесс распада лингвоэтнокультурного единства Кавказа уже завершился и все основные языковые группы, в том числе и праязыки — картвельский (Южный Кавказ), абхазо-адыгейский (северо-западный Кавказ) и вейнахо-дагестанСм.: Джапаридзе О. Археология Грузии…; Он же. У истоков этногенезиса…; Он же. На заре этнокультурной…; Верещагин Н. Млекопитающие Кавказа…; Любин В. Высокогорная пещерная стоянка…; Он же. Нижнепалеолитические памятники Юго-осетии…; Он же. Мустьерские культуры Кавказа. Л., 1977; Он же. Палеолит Кавказа...; Каландадзе А., Тушабрамишвили Д. Цонская пещера…; Кударо…; Палеолит...; Мустьерская культура // ГСЭ. Т. 7. 1984; Цона // Там же. Т. 11. 1987; Археология Грузии. Каменный век. Т. I. Тбилиси, 1991 (на груз. яз.); Грузия в антропогене. Тбилиси, 1991; Лордкипанидзе Д. Эволюция природной среды… 5

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ ский (северо-восточный Кавказ), приняли более или менее окончательный вид. Что касается Цхинвальского региона, то в интересующую нас эпоху наряду с другими областями Южного Кавказа он был населен племенами — носителями пракартвельского языка6. Человек эпохи неолита (IX-VIII — VI тыс. до н. э.) постепенно отказывается от присваивающего хозяйства и закладывает основу для новых отраслей производящих видов хозяйства — земледелия и скотоводства. За этим следует так называемая неолитическая революция, в ходе которой кардинальным образом меняется весь уклад общественной жизни, возникают поселения сельского типа с искусственными строениями, распространяется качественно новая техника обработки камня, человек впервые создает глиняную посуду и т.д. Примечательно, что в означенную эпоху особенно густо была населена западная часть Южного Кавказа, то есть Колхида (Западная Грузия). Тем не менее, неолитические поселения в большом количестве выявлены и в Цхинвальском регионе (Нагутни, Зурахо, Джиджоети и др.). Знаменательно и то, что архологический материал из этих мест проявляет органическое сходство с каменным инвентарем, обнаруженным в сопредельных с Колхидой нагорных районах. Академик О. Джапаридзе на этом основании предполагает, что на протяжении неолита так же, как и в эпоху мезолита, территорию Колхиды и Шида (Внутренней) Картли населяли пракартвельские племена7. См.: Джапаридзе О. Археология Грузии…; Он же. У истоков этногенезиса…; Он же. На заре этнокультурной…; Формозов А. Обзор исследования мезолитических стоянок на Кавказе // Советская археология. Вып. 4. 1963; Любин В., Левковская Т. Пещера Кударо III...; Алексеев В. Происхождение народов Кавказа. М., 1974; Бердзенишвили Н. Вопросы истории Грузии. Вып. VIII. Тбилиси, 1975 (на груз. яз.); Габуния М., Церетели Л. Мезолит Грузии // Краткие сообщения Ин-та археологии АН СССР. Вып. 149. М., 1977; Каландадзе А., Тушабрамишвили Д. Цонская пещера // Археология и палеография раннего палеолита Крыма и Кавказа. М., 1978; Кударо // ГСЭ. Т. 6. 1983; Цона…; Археология Грузии. Каменный век…; Дьяконов И. Три корня этногенеза. Кавказ и цивилизации Востока в древности и средневековье. Владикавказ, 1993; Он же. Алародии (хуриты, урарты, кутии, чеченцы и дагестанцы). Махачкала, 1995; Кадагидзе Н. К вопросу взаимоотношения голоцена и мезолитической культуры // Археологический сборник. Вып. II. Тбилиси, 1998 (на груз. яз.). 7 См.: Джапаридзе О. Археология Грузии…; Он же. У истоков этногенезиса…; Он же. На заре этнокультурной...; Меликишвили Г. Наири-Урарту. Тбилиси, 1954; Джапаридзе О., Джавахишвили Ал. Культура древнейшего земледельческого населения на территории Грузии. Тбилиси, 1971 (на груз. яз.); Небиеридзе Л. Неолит Западной Грузии. Тбилиси, 1972 (на груз. яз.); Киквидзе Я. Земледелие и земледельческий культ в древней Грузии. Тбилиси, 1976 (на груз. яз.); Кигурадзе Т. Периодизация раннеземледельческой культуры Восточного Закавказья. Тбилиси, 1976 (на груз. 6

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ ЦХИНВАЛЬСКОГО РЕГИОНА В последующую эпоху, эпоху энеолита (вторая пол. VI тыс. — первая пол. IV тыс. до н. э.) в центральных районах Южного Кавказа закладывается основа так называемой раннеземледельческой культуры Сиона. Согласно наблюдению акад. О. Джапаридзе, по всей вероятности, в ареале данной археологической культуры помимо других областей находилась и вся Шида Картли, а вместе с ней и территория Цхинвальского региона. Население так называемой сионской культуры проживало в домах с каменными фундаментами, со стенами из сырцового кирпича и было вооружено преимущественно каменным инвентарем. Кроме того, в хозяйственном быту употреблялась керамическая посуда, изготовленная вручную и довольно качественно обожженная, которая с точки зрения форм, орнаментации и технологии изготовления сходна с обнаруженным в Западной Грузии керамическим материалом той же эпохи. Основываясь на упомянутом сходстве, а также на других археологических данных, большинство грузинских ученых предполагает, что в эпоху энеолита западные и центральные области Южного Кавказа, в том числе и Цхинвальский регион, по-прежнему были населены картвельскими племенами8.

ЭПОХА БРОНЗЫ В эпоху ранней бронзы (вторая пол. IV — первая пол. III тыс. до н. э.) на территории центральных и восточных областей Южного Кавказа начинает распространяться археологическая культура известная в научной литературе под названием куро-араксской. Для нее характерны ярко выраженная бронзовая металлургия и специфического вида керамический материал. Собственно куро-араксская культура состоит из нескольких локальных вариантов. Из них слеяз.); Григолиа Г. Неолит центральной Колхиды. Палури. Тбилиси, 1977 (на груз. яз.); Энеолит Кавказа // Энеолит СССР. М., 1982; 8 См.: Джапаридзе О. Археология Грузии…; Он же. У истоков этногенезиса…; Киквидзе Я. Земледелие и земледельческий культ…; Менабде М., Кигурадзе Т. Археологический памятник Сиони. Тбилиси, 1981 (на груз. яз.); Чиковани Г. Шида Картли в V-IV тыс. до н. э. (по археологическим мат-лам): Автореф. дис…. канд. ист. наук. Тбилиси, 1995 (на груз. яз.); Кипиани Г. Бериклдееби, храм и каменная ограда // Вестн. гос. музея Грузии. Т. XLII-В. Тбилиси, 1997 (на груз. яз.); Кигурадзе Т. Переходный период от энеолита к ранней бронзе в Восточном Закавказье // Археологическая конференция Кавказа. Тбилиси, 1998 (на груз. яз.); Небиеридзе Л. Сионское поселение — поздненеолитический памятник Грузии // Разыскания. Вып. 7. Тбилиси, 2001 (на груз. яз.).

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ дует отметить особо так называемый вариант Шида Картли, который охватывает территорию Цхинвальского региона (Згудрисгверда, Нацаргора, Кулбакеби, Дзагина, Нули, Сакирееби и др.), восточные районы Колхиды и центральные области Северного Кавказа. По мнению академика О. Джапаридзе, куро-араксская культура складывалась на основе двух местных археологических культур эпохи энеолита — сионской и шулавер-шомутепе. Сионскую культуру создавали картвельские племена, а культуру шулавер-шомутепе — хурриты и вейнахо-дагестанское население. Следовательно, по мнению ученого, куро-араксскую культуру последующей эпохи формировали те же картвельские, хурритские и вейнахо-дагестанские племена. Что касается непосредственно локального варианта шида картли, то ареал его распространения на Южном Кавказе почти полностью совпадает с пределами распространения сионской культуры. Это указывает на то, что в эпоху ранней бронзы территория Цхинвальского региона и восточных областей Колхиды по-прежнему населялась картвельскими племенами, которые также интенсивно осваивали и центральные районы Северного кавказа9. В эпоху средней бронзы (вторая пол. III — вторая пол. II тыс. до н. э.) на территории центральных и восточных областей Южного См.: Джапаридзе О. Археология Грузии…; Он же. У истоков этногенезиса…; Он же. К истории грузинских племен на ранней ступени металлопроизводства. Тбилиси, 1961 (на груз. яз.); Куфтин Б. Археологическая маршрутная экспедиция 1945 г. в Юго-Осетию и Имеретию. Тбилиси, 1949; Гобеджишвили Г. Нацаргора Сталинира // Мимомхилвели (Обозреватель). Вып. II . Тбилиси, 1951 (на груз. яз.); Археология Грузии. Тбилиси, 1959 (на груз. яз.); Дьяконов И. Некоторые лингвистические данные к проблеме связей населения Восточного Кавказа и Закавказья с Древним Востоком в III тыс. до н. э.: Тезисы. Баку, 1966; Меликишвили Г. К вопросу о древнейшем населении Грузии, Кавказа и Ближнего Востока. Тбилиси, 1965 (на груз. яз.); Чубинашвили Т. Древние культуры Южного Кавказа (V-III тыс. до н. э). Л., 1970; Техов Б. Очерки древней истории и археологии Юго-Осетии. Тбилиси, 1971; Джавахишвили А. Строительное дело и архитектура поселений Южного Кавказа V-III тыс. до н. э. Тбилиси, 1973; Мунчаев Р. Кавказ на заре бронзового века. М., 1975; Киквидзе Я. Земледелие и земледельческий культ…; Мусхелишвили Д. Основные вопросы исторической географии Грузии. Тбилиси, 1977 (на груз. яз.); Нацаргора // ГСЭ. Т. 7. 1984; Нулийский могильник // Там же; Кулбакеби // Там же. Т. 10. 1986.; Дзагинский могильник // Там же. Т. 11. 1987; Ростунов В. Куро-аракские могильники Северной Осетии. Погребальный обряд древнего и средневекового населения Северного Кавказа. Орджоникидзе, 1988; Абхазава Н. Этнокультурные процессы в северо-западной части Шида Картли с древнейших времен до позднего средневековья (по археологическим материалам) // Осетинский вопрос. Гори; Тбилиси, 1996 (на груз. яз.); Махарадзе З. Некоторые проблемы археологии Кавказа эпохи энеолита-ранней бронзы // Разыскания. Вып. 1. Тбилиси, 1998 (на груз. яз.). 9

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ ЦХИНВАЛЬСКОГО РЕГИОНА Кавказа, в том числе и в Цхинвальском регионе, происходят важные изменения. Сюда с севера постепенно перемещаются кочевые индоевропейские племена и несмотря на свою малочисленность существенным образом меняют уклад хозяйственной жизни местного земледельческого населения. В результате с археологической карты данной территории разом исчезли поселения или сельбища всех видов и появились не известные до этого курганные захоронения. Однако несмотря на резкие перемены и образование новой, блестящей триалетской культуры, следы местной культурной традиции устойчиво сохранились в археологических материалах, обнаруженных при раскопках тех же самых курганов (бронзовые вещи, керамика и др.). Эти материалы проявляют генетическую связь с более ранним феноменом — куро-араксской культурой. Таким образом, налицо факт органического слияния двух культур — картвельского населения и прибывших с севера индоевропейских племен. О наличии генетической связи между куро-араксской и триалетской культурами наглядно свидетельствует археологический материал эпохи средней бронзы, обнаруженный в Цхинвальском регионе на тех памятниках (Квасатали, Нацаргора, Кулбакеби, Нули, Сакирееби и др.), где до этого были зафиксированы следы прослоек эпохи ранней бронзы. Исходя из этих, а также многих других обстоятельств, академик О. Джапаридзе высказал соображение, что ареал распространения триалетской культуры, то есть центральные и восточные области Южного Кавказа, включая территорию Цхинвальского региона, в эпоху средней бронзы по-прежнему населяли картвельские и отчасти ассимилированные индоевропейские племена10. См.: Джапаридзе О. Археология Грузии…; Он же. У истоков этногенезиса…; Он же. Квасатальский могильник эпохи бронзы в Юго-Осетии // Краткие сообщения Ин-та истории материальной культуры. Вып. 60. М., 1955; Куфтин Б. Археологическая маршрутная экспедиция…; Гобеджишвили Г. Нацаргора Сталинира…; Меликишвили Г. К истории древней Грузии. Тбилиси, 1959; Он же. К вопросу о древнейшем населении…; Гогадзе Е. Генезис и периодизация Триалетской курганной культуры. Тбилиси, 1972 (на груз. яз.); Джавахишвили А. Строительное дело и архитектура…; Мунчаев Р. Кавказ на заре бронзового века. М., 1975; Киквидзе Я. Земледелие и земледельческий культ…; Кавтарадзе Г. Хронология археологических культур Грузии эпохи неолита и бронзы в свете последних данных. Тбилиси, 1981 (на груз. яз.); Нацаргора...; Нулийский могильник // ГСЭ. Т. 7. 1984; Гамкрелидзе Т., Иванов В. Индоевропейские языки и индоевропейцы. Тбилиси, 1984; Могильник в Квасатали // ГСЭ. Т. 10. 1986; Кулбакеби // Там же; Пицхелаури К. Центральное Закавказье в конце III и начале II тыс. до н. э. // Кавказ в системе палеометаллических культур Евразии. Тбилиси, 1987; Бердзенишвили Н. Вопросы истории Грузии. Тбилиси, 1990 (на груз. яз.); Кавтарадзе Г. Вопросы этнической истории Кавказа 10

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ В эпоху поздней бронзы и раннего железа (вторая пол. II — первая пол. I тыс. до н. э.) на территории Кавказа возникает несколько локальных археологических культур, среди которых следует отметить самостоятельные культуры, сформировавшиеся в западной и центральной частях Южного Кавказа, а точнее — в Западной и Восточной Грузии. Поскольку расположенный в северо-западной части Грузии Цхинвальский регион граничит с Западной Грузией, господствующая на его территории местная восточно-грузинская культура испытывает влияние западно-грузинской, то есть колхидской культуры. Следы соприкосновения этих культур отчетливо проявились в археологических памятниках, выявленных в Цхинвальском регионе (Нацаргора, Квасатали, Сакирееби, Цоиси, Тлиа, Дзарцеми, Квемо Авлеви и др.). Действительно, в вещественном материале из здешних мест в одном ряду представлены, с одной стороны, восточногрузинские кинжалы и наконечники копьев, а с другой стороны, — колхидские топоры и мотыги. с одной стороны, — типичная шидакартлийская керамика, а с другой стороны, — западногрузинские глиняные сосуды и т. д. Параллельно с этим в археологических памятниках Цхинвали прослеживается довольно слабое влияние северо- и центрально-кавказской культур. Исходя из этого, известный грузинский археолог Н. Абхазава предполагает, что в эпоху поздней бронзы — раннего железа территория Цхинвальского региона была по-прежнему населена картвельскими племенами, вернее, сформировавшимися после распада общекартвельского этнического массива грузинским, занским и сванским элементами. Кроме того, по мнению ученого, на данной территории предположительно проживали также и многочисленные северокавказские этнические группы — вейнахские11. и Анатолии и проблемы хронологии и периодизации. Тбилиси, 1992; Орджоникидзе А. Комплекс смешанной керамики из Шида Картли. Тбилиси, 1992 (на груз. яз.); Абхазава Н. Этнокультурные процессы…; Турманидзе К. О направлении развития Закавказья (3005-1400 гг. до н. э.) // Археологический сборник. Вып. II. Тбилиси, 1998 (на груз. яз.); Мирцхулава Г. Этапы возникновения и развития колесного транспорта в Грузии // Разыскания. Вып. 5. Тбилиси, 2000 (на груз. яз.); Меликишвили И. Теория языковых контактов и вопрос картвело-индоевропейского генетического взаимоотношения // Этногенезис грузинского народа. Тбилиси, 2002 (на груз. яз.); Мусхелишвили Д. К проблеме этногенезиса грузин // Там же. 11 См.: Джапаридзе О. Археология Грузии…; Он же. Сокровища Цхинвали // Вестник гос. Музея Грузии. Вып. XVI. Тбилиси, 1950 (на груз. яз.); Он же. Квасатальский могильник эпохи бронзы в Юго-Осетии // Краткие сообщения Ин-та истории материальной культуры. Вып. 60. М., 1955; Он же. Северная полоса Шида Картли в эпоху бронзы // Друг памятника. Вып. 14. Тбилиси, 1968 (на груз. яз.); Абхазава Н. Этнокультурные процессы…; Б. Куфтин. Археологическая маршрутная экспедиция…;

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ ЦХИНВАЛЬСКОГО РЕГИОНА VII-VI ВВ. ДО Н. Э. В VII-VI вв. до н. э. на территории Кавказа разворачиваются весьма интересные события. По сведениям «Истории» древнегреческого летописца Геродота (ок. 485-424 гг.), в это время в направлении Южного Кавказа предпринимают масштабные военные экспедиции ираноязычные скифские племена, обитающие в северном Причерноморье. Предположительно организованные скифами (хазарами) военные походы на Кавказ описаны также и в сочинении грузинского историка Леонтия Мровели (XI в.) «История царей». Достоверность сообщений Геродота и Леонтия Мровели полностью подтверждается выявленным в разных областях Кавказа археологическим материалом (VIIVI вв. до н. э.), в котором отчетливо выделяются элементы так называемой скифской культуры. На сегодня военное оборудование скифов и свойственные их погребальному обряду отдельные элементы зафиксированы в памятниках, обнаруженных в Цхинвальском регионе (Тлиа, Корниси и др.). Наиболее важным из них является могильник из Тлиа, в котором представлены не чисто скифские комплексы, а их отдельные элементы, первоначально сосуществующие с местными культурными элементами, а к V в. до н. э. уже полностью исчезающие из вещественных материалов. Подобной картине, выявленной как в упомянутом выше могильнике Тлиа, так и в других памятниках Цхинвальского региона, специалисты дают двоякое объяснение. По мнению археолога Н. Абхазава, в VII-VI вв. до н. э. на территории Цхинвальского региона не подтверждается факт оседания каких-либо значительных групп скифского населения. Имело место лишь частичное усвоение скифсГобеджишвили Г. Нацаргора Сталинира...; Он же. Археологические раскопки в Советской Грузии. Тбилиси, 1952 (на груз. яз.); Мусхелишвили Д., Цкитишвили Г. Результаты разведочной экспедиции Шида Картли в 1955 г. // Сб. исторической географии Грузии. Вып. I. Тбилиси, 1960 (на груз. яз.); Кушнарева К., Чубинашвили Т. Древние культуры Южного Кавказа. Л., 1970; Абрамишвили В. К толкованию названия реки Лиахви // Мнатоби. Вып. 1. Тбилиси, 1971 (на груз. яз.); Техов Б. Очерки древней истории...; Он же. Центральный Кавказ в XVI-X вв. до н. э. М., 1977; Пицхелаури К. Основные проблемы истории Восточногрузинских племен (XV-VII вв. до н.э.). Тбилиси, 1973 (на груз. яз.); Мусхелишвили Д. Основные вопросы исторической…; Могильник в Тлиа // ГСЭ. Т. 4. 1979; Бедошвили Г. Грузинская топонимика и некоторые аспекты исследования этнологических вопросов // Иберо-Кавказское языковедение. Вып. XXII. Тбилиси, 1980 (на груз. яз.); Хидашели М. Графическое искусство центрального Кавказа в эпоху раннего железа. Тбилиси, 1982 (на груз. яз.); Нацаргора…; Очерки истории Юго-Осетинской автономной области. Вып. I. Тбилиси, 1985; Могильник в Квасатали // ГСЭ. Т. 10. 1986.

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ ких культурных традиций со стороны местных, кавказских жителей. Следовательно, по мнению ученого, этническая картина, засвидетельствованная еще в эпоху поздней бронзы — раннего железа, когда территорию Цхинвальского региона населяли только картвельские и лишь отчасти северокавказские (вейнахские) племена, VII-VI вв. до н. э. осталась неизменной. В настоящее время выводы Н. Абхазава по существу полностью разделяют грузинские историографы. Иной позиции придерживается известный осетинский археолог Б. Техов, который предполагает, что в указанное время на территории Цхинвальского региона, хоть и в небольшом масштабе, произошло укоренение скифского этнического элемента, который вскоре смешался с местным населением. Его точку зрения почти полностью разделяют осетинские ученые, которые полагают, что упомянутый скифский этнический элемент, инфильтрованный в VII-VI вв. до н. э., является далеким предком современного осетинского народа, в настоящее время проживающего на Кавказе12. РАННЕАНТИЧНЯЯ, ЭЛЛИНИСТИЧЕСКАЯ И ПОЗДНЕАНТИЧНЯЯ ЭПОХИ

Памятники раннеантичной эпохи (VI-IV вв. до н. э.) в Цхинвальском регионе были обнаружены лишь в двух местах — в Садзегури и Канчаети. Грузинские и российские ученые Г. Гобеджишвили, Я.Смирнов, Ю. Гагошидзе, Ш. Амиранашвили и др. предполагают, что выявленный в этих местах вещественный материал, несмотря на вполне заметное влияние ахеменидского искусства, имеет преСм.: Абхазава Н. Этно-культурные процессы…; Скифы и центральный Кавказ в VII-VI вв. до н. э. М., 1980; Гобеджишвили Г. Археологические раскопки в Советской Грузии. Тбилиси, 1952 (на груз. яз.); Мровели Л. История царей // Картлис цховреба. Тбилиси, 1955 (на груз. яз.); Гаглоити Ю. Аланы и вопросы этногенеза осетин. Тбилиси, 1966; Калоев А. Осетины. М., 1967; Техов Б. Очерки древней истории...; Геродот. История / Пер. с греч., предисловие и указатель Т. С. Каухчишвили. Тбилиси, 1975 (на груз. яз.); Ковалевская В. Скифы, Мидия, Иран во взаимоотношениях с Закавказьем по данным Леонтия Мровели // Известия. Серия истории, археологии, этнографии и истории искусства. Т. 6. Тбилиси, 1975; Мусхелишвили Д. Основные вопросы исторической…; Абаев В. Скифы и осетины // Курьер. 1977 (январь); Пирцхалава М. К вопросу о распространении памятников скифской культуры на территории Грузии // Вопр. археологии Грузии. Т. 1. 1978 (на груз. яз.); Могильник в Тлиа…; Есаян С., Погребова М. Скифские памятники Закавказья. М., 1985; Очерки истории Юго-Осетинской автономной области. Т. I. Тбилиси, 1985; Очерки истории Грузии. Т. I: Грузия с древнейших времен до IV в. н. э. Тбилиси, 1989. 12

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ ЦХИНВАЛЬСКОГО РЕГИОНА имущественно местное происхождение и его потребителями были выходцы из местного населения, занимавшие высокое положение в социальной иерархии. Согласно наблюдению ученого Н. Абхазава, археологический инвентарь, обнаруженный в Садзегури и Канчаети, проявляет органическое сходство с вещественным материалом той же эпохи, засвидетельствованным в западных и центральных областях Южного Кавказа, в частности, в Западной и Восточной Грузии (Вани, Кавтисхеви и др.). Все это, в свою очередь, указывает на то, что в раннеантичную эпоху на территории Цхинвальского региона не наблюдалось каких-либо этнических перемен, здесь по-прежнему обитало грузинское население13. На рубеже IV-III вв. до н. э. на территории Южной и Восточной Грузии образовалось Картлийское, или Иберийское, царство. По сообщению «Истории царей» Леонтия Мровели, основатель Картлийского государства и первый его правитель прославленный царь Фарнаваз (конец IV в. — первая пол. III в. до н. э.) разделил свои владения на девять военно-административных единиц, из них восемь были «саэристао» (во главе с «эриставами») и один «саспаспето» (во главе с «спаспети»). Территория последней и самой важной административной единицы, которой управляло верховное военное лицо — спаспети, целиком охватывала историческую Шида Картли, в том числе и интересующий нас Цхинвальский регион. Образованная царем Фарнавазом система военно-административного устройства практически в неизменном виде просуществовала на протяжении всей эллинистической эпохи (IV-I вв. до н. э.) и позднеантичного периода (I-IV вв. н. э.). Все это время территория Цхинвальского региона, входившая в состав картлийского саспаспето, оставалась неотъемлемой частью Картлийского царства. Согласно «Истории царей» Леонтия Мровели, в это время Цхинвальский регион по-прежнему был населен грузинским этническим массивом. Некоторые перемены в этом отношении наблюдаются лишь в III в. до н. э., когда картлийский царь Саурмаг привел часть вейнахских племен («дурдзуков») на Южный Кавказ и поселил См.: Абхазава Н. Этнокультурные процессы…; Смирнов Я. Ахалгорский клад. Тифлис, 1934; Гобеджишвили Г. Археологические раскопки в Советской Грузии. Тбилиси, 1952 (на груз. яз.); Гагошидзе Ю. Памятники раннеантичной эпохи из Ксанского ущелья. Тбилиси, 1964 (на груз. яз.); Амиранашвили Ш. История грузинского искусства. Тбилиси, 1971 (на груз. яз.); Мусхелишвили Д. Основные вопросы исторической…; Канчаетский могильник // ГСЭ. Т. 10. 1986; Лордкипанидзе О. Наследие древней Грузии. Тбилиси, 1989; Очерки истории Грузии. Т. I: Грузия с древнейших времен…; Сокровища из Ахалгори // Грузия. Энциклопедия. Т. I. 1997. 13

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ их вдоль северной границы Картлийского царства, в том числе и в высокогорной области Цхинвальского региона. Однако Страбон (ок. 64 / 63 гг. до н. э. — 23 / 24 гг. н. э.) в своей «Географии» сообщает, что проживавшие в горной полосе Картлийского (Иберийского) царства иберийцы находились в соседстве и родстве со скифами и сарматами, населявшими Северный Кавказ. Достоверность этого признали известные грузинские историки — академики С.Джанашиа, Н. Бердзенишвили и Г. Меликишвили, которые высказали мнение, что на рубеже старого и нового летоисчисления низменность и предгорные районы Цхинвальского региона были населены грузинским этническим массивом, а в расположенной к северу от них высокогорной полосе вместе с грузинами проживали родственные ираноязычным сарматам племена (по предположению археолога Б. Техова — предки нынешних осетин). В отличие от перечисленных выше ученых, археолог Н. Абхазава критически относится к сообщению Страбона. Наряду с данными историко-культурологического характера он учитывает также и то обстоятельство, что в обнаруженных в северных районах Картлийского царства археологических памятниках (Аркнети, Сохта, Стирфази, Монастырь, Кливана, Захори и др.) практически нет следов скифско-сарматских культурных традиций. Следовательно, с IV в. до н. э. по IV в. н. э. в высокогорных областях Цхинвальского региона отсутствовал ираноязычный, а, точнее, сарматский этнический элемент. Античные авторы — Плиний Старший (23 / 24 — 79 гг. н. э.) и Птолемей (II в. н. э.) — предоставляют иные сведения: они указывают, что в высокогорной полосе Цхинвальского региона обитало племя двалов («талов», «валов», «уалов»), корни которого одна часть ученых связывает с вейнахским, а другая — с картвельским (занским) этническим миром14. См.: Абхазава Н. Этнокультурные процессы…; Джанашиа С. Древнейшее национальное сведение о первичном местообитании грузин в свете истории Ближнего Востока // Вестник ИЯМК. V-VI. Тбилиси, 1940 (на груз. яз.); Он же. Труды. Т. I. Тбилиси, 1949 (на груз. яз.); Ингороква П. Древнегрузинская летопись «Обращение Грузии» и список иберийских царей античной эпохи // Вестн. гос. Музея Грузии. Т. XI-B. Тбилиси, 1941 (на груз. яз.); Мровели Л. История царей…; Ломоури Н. Клавдий Птолемей. Географический учебник // Мат-лы по истории Грузии и Кавказа. Вып. 32. Тбилиси, 1955 (на груз. яз.); Каухчишвили Т. «География» Страбона. Сведения о Грузии. Тбилиси, 1957 (на груз. яз.); Меликишвили Г. К вопросу о хронологии истории Картлийского (Иберийского) царства // Тр. Ин-та истории им. Ив. Джавахишвили. Т. 4. Вып. I. Тбилиси, 1958 (на груз. яз.); Он же. Древняя грузинская, армянская и греческая историческая традиция и вопрос образования Картлийского (Иберийского) царства // Вестн. отдела общественных наук АН Грузинской ССР. Вып. 2. Тбилиси, 1962 (на груз. яз.); Он же. К истории древней Грузии. Тбилиси, 14

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ ЦХИНВАЛЬСКОГО РЕГИОНА IV-VIII ВВ. В 20-30-е годы IV в. картлийский царь Мириан (первая пол. IV в.) объявил христианство государственной религией. С этого времени до середины VI в. верховные духовные и гражданские лица активно осуществляли всеобщую христианизацию картлийского населения. Особо следует отметить церковные реформы, проведенные царем Вахтангом I Горгасали (вторая пол. V в.) в последней четверти V — начале VI вв. В результате реформ в составе автокефального картлийского католикосата образовалось несколько новых епархий, в том числе в Руиси, Урбниси, Никози и Самтависи, которые охватили всю территорию Цхинвальского региона. В частности, в состав Руисской епархии входили ущелья рек Западная Фроне, Средняя Фроне, Восточная Фроне и Пца. Епархия в Никози охватывала примерно половину Лиахвского ущелья, Двалети и Маграндвалети. В Урбнисскую епархию вошли 1959; Он же. О пробелах, имеющихся в списках Картлийских (Иберийских) царей // Известия. Серия истории, археологии, этнографии и истории искусства. Вып. 3. Тбилиси, 1978 г.; Гамрекели В. Двалы и Двалетия в I-XV вв. н. э. Тбилиси, 1961; Гавритишвили Д. Очерки из истории Грузии (XII-XIV вв.). Тбилиси, 1962 (на груз. яз.); Гагошидзе Ю. Памятники раннеантичной эпохи из Ксанского ущелья. Тбилиси, 1964 (на груз. яз.); Обращение Грузии // Памятники древнегрузинской агиографической литературы. Т. I. Тбилиси, 1964 (на груз. яз.); Гвасалиа Дж. Вопросы исторической географии Ксанского ущелья // Сб. исторической географии Грузии. Вып. 3. Тбилиси, 1967 (на груз. яз.); Он же. К исторической географии Шида Картли // Известия. Серия истории, археологии, этнографии и истории искусства. Вып. 1. Тбилиси, 1976; Очерки истории грузии. Т. I: Грузия с древнейших времен до IV в. н. э. Тбилиси, 1970 (на груз. яз.); Техов Б. Очерки древней истории...; Хидашели М. К истории художественной обработки бронзы в античной Грузии. Тбилиси, 1972 (на груз. яз.); Бердзенишвили Н. Вопросы истории Грузии. Т. VIII. Тбилиси, 1975 (на груз. яз.); Мусхелишвили Д. Основные вопросы исторической…; Абрамишвили Т., Сланов А. Монеты античного времени из Сохтинского могильника // Известия Юго-Осетинского научно-исслед. ин-та. Вып. XXI. Тбилиси, 1977; Сланов А. Сохтинский могильник. Тбилиси, 1988; Очерки истории Грузии. I: Грузия с древнейших времен…; Он же. Археологические находки из с. Кливана // Известия Юго-Осетинского научно-исслед. ин-та. Вып. XXIII. Тбилиси, 1978; Двалы // ГСЭ. Т. 3. 1978; Двалети // Там же; Мамулиа Г. Классовое общество и образование государства в древней Картли. Тбилиси, 1979 (на груз. яз.); Гаглоев Р. Об одном погребальном комплексе из Монастырского могильника // Известия Юго-Осетинского научно-исслед. ин-та. Вып. XXV. Тбилиси, 1980; Гвасалиа Дж. Очерки исторической географии Восточной Грузии (Шида Картли). Тбилиси, 1983 (на груз. яз.); Сохтинский могильник // ГСЭ. Т. 9. 1985; Техов Б. Материальная культура населения среднего течения реки большой Лиахви в I-VIII вв. Тбилиси, 1987; Могильник в Аркнети // Грузия. Энциклопедия. Т. I. Тбилиси, 1997; Цари Грузии. Тбилиси, 2000 (на груз. яз.); Атлас истории Грузии. Тбилиси, 2003 (на груз. яз.).

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ другая половина Лиахвского ущелья и ущелье р. Малая Лиахви, а в епархию Самтависи — ущелья рек Ксани и Лехура. Цхинвальский регион в IV-V вв. по-прежнему являлся частью Картлийского царства или, точнее, Шидакартлийского саспаспето. Однако обстановка кардинально изменилась в первой половине VIII в., когда первое лицо Картлийского государства — эрисмтавар Арчил (первая пол. VIII в.), следуя завещанию своего старшего брата Мира, разделил между двумя местными феодалами — Нерсе Нерсианом и Адарнасе Адарнасианом — территорию Шида Картли, в том числе и Цхинвальский регион, в качестве родового имения (вотчины) На территории Цхинвальского региона выявлено множество археологических памятников (преимущественно могильников) эпохи раннего средневековья (Стирфази, Сакирееби, Алеви, Едиси и др.) — так называемые грунтовые, или земляные, могилы, что типично для археологической культуры Восточной Грузии данного периода. Примечательно, что здесь не встречаются могилы подбойного, или катакомбного, типа, которые в эпоху раннего средневековья были широко распространены на Северном Кавказе, являясь главнейшим характеризующим признаком местной аланской культуры. Кроме того, абсолютному большинству могильников Цхинвальского региона IV-VIII вв. свойственна одна особенность: похоронные обряды здесь были или полностью христианскими, или явно испытывали влияние христианства. Этим упомянутые памятники кардинально отличаются от образцов распространенной на Северном Кавказе языческой аланской культуры, однако они проявляют органическую связь с восточногрузинской христианской археологической культурой. Принимая во внимание эти, а также другие данные, грузинский археолог Н. Абхазава предполагает, что будучи в составе Картлийского царства, Цхинвальский регион в IV-VIII вв. был населен исключительно грузинами-христианами. Иного мнения придерживаются осетинские археологи Р. Дзаттиаты и Б. Техов. Последний не отрицает, что в IV-VIII вв. Цхинвальский регион входил в состав Картлийского царства и был населен грузинами-христианами. Однако опираясь на некоторые вещественные образцы, выявленные на упомянутых выше археологических памятниках, которые также характерны для аланской культуры синхронного периода, Б. Техов предположил, что в IV-VIII вв. на территории Цхинвальского региона рядом с грузинским этническим массивом в достаточном количестве были представлены и прибывшие с Северного Кавказа ираноязычные аланские 98

ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ ЦХИНВАЛЬСКОГО РЕГИОНА этнические элементы, то есть народы, прямыми потомками которых согласно позднейшим письменным источникам являются осетины, локализованные в этих районах15.

IX-XIII ВВ. Относительно истории Цхинвальского региона IX-XIII вв. немало материалов предоставляют грузинские исторические сочинения синхронного периода, в том числе анонимных авторов — «Летопись Картли» (XI в.), «История царя царей Давида» (XII в.), «Истории и восхваления венценосцев» (XIII в.), «Столетняя летопись» (XIV в.), а также «История царицы Тамар» Басилия (ХIII в.) и сочинение См.: Абхазава Н. Этно-культурные процессы…; Мровели Л. Обращение Грузии просветительницей Нино // Картлис цховреба / По всем основным спискам текст установлен С. Каухчишвили. Т. I. Тбилиси, 1955 (на груз. яз.); Он же. Мученичество царя Арчила // Там же; Джуаншер. История царя Вахтанга Горгасали // Там же; Тогошвили Г. Из истории грузино-осетинских взаимоотношений (с древнейших времен до конца XIV в.). Сталинир, 1958 г. (на груз. яз.); Гамрекели В. Двалы и Двалетия в I-XV вв. н. э. Тбилиси, 1961; Гавритишвили Д. Очерки из истории Грузии...; Обращение Грузии // Памятники древнегрузинской агиографической литературы. Т. I. Тбилиси, 1964 (на груз. яз.); Гвасалиа Дж. Вопросы исторической географии Ксанского ущелья // Сб. исторической географии Грузии. Вып. 3. Тбилиси, 1967 (на груз. яз.); Он же. К исторической географии...; Он же. Очерки исторической географии Восточной Грузии (Шида Картли). Тбилиси, 1983 (на груз. яз.); Очерки истории грузии. Т. I: Грузия с древнейших времен до IV в. н. э. Тбилиси, 1970 (на груз. яз.); Техов Б. Материальная культура населения среднего течения реки большой Лиахви в IVIII вв. Тбилиси, 1987; Он же. Очерки древней истории...; Царевич Вахушти. История царства Грузинского // Картлис цховреба. Т. IV. Тбилиси, 1973; Очерки истории Грузии. Т. II: Грузия в IV-X вв. Тбилиси, 1973 (на груз. яз.); Кузнецов В. Аланская культура Центрального Кавказа и ее локальные варианты в V-XIII вв. // Советская археология. 1973. Вып. 2; Мусхелишвили Д. Основные вопросы исторической географии Грузии. Тбилиси, 1977 (на груз. яз.); Он же. Грузия в IV-VIII вв. Тбилиси, 2003 (на груз. яз.); Двалы // ГСЭ. Т. 3. 1978; Двалети // Там же; Абхазава Н. Материальная культура Восточной Грузии. Тбилиси, 1979 (на груз. яз.); Он же. Квемо Авлеви в раннем средневековье. Тбилиси, 1988 (на груз. яз.); Гаглоев Р. Стырфазский могильник. Цхинвали, 1981; Мирианашвили Н. Из истории материальной культуры Шида Картли. Тбилиси, 1983 (на груз. яз.); Абхазава Н., Гагошидзе Ю., Гоцадзе К. Отчет о работе отряда Ксанского ущелья археологической экспедиции в Шида Картли // Экспедиции гос. Музея Грузии. Т. VIII. Тбилиси, 1986 (на груз. яз.); Дзаттиаты Р. Раннесредневековый могильник в селении Едыс (Южная Осетия) // Советская археология. 1986. Вып. 2; Очерки истории Грузии. Т. II: Грузия в IV-X вв.…; Сланов А. Сохтинский могильник. Тбилиси, 1988; Бердзенишвили Н. Вопросы истории Грузии. Тбилиси, 1990 (на груз. яз.); Цари Грузии. Тбилиси, 2000 (на груз. яз.); Атлас истории Грузии… 15

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ анонимного историка — современника Гиоргия-Лаша (XIV в.). Согласно перечисленным источникам, в IX-X вв. за территорию Цхинвальского региона велись перманентные войны между образованиями, сформировавшимися вследствие распада единого грузинского государства (VIII в). Особой активностью выделялись Абхазское царство (Западная Грузия), Тао-Кларджетское княжество (Юго-Западная Грузия) и Кахетский хорепископат (Восточная Грузия). Поначалу после продолжительной войны победу одержали Кахетский хорепископат и Тао-Кларджетское (Картвельское) княжество. В первой половине IX в. они поделили между собой спорную территорию — Ксанское ущелье осталось за Кахетским князем, а владения к западу от него были присоединены к Тао-Кларджетскому княжеству. Однако со второй половины IX в. обстоятельства существенно изменились: предприняв успешную экспансию к востоку от своих границ, Абхазское царство захватило те области Шида Картли (и, соответственно, Цхинвальского региона), которые до этого принадлежали Тао-Кларджетскому княжеству, и в начале X в. на этой территории была образована военно-административная единица — Картлийское эриставство. С этого времени до конца X в. ожесточенная борьба между абхазскими царями и кахетскими хорепископами за владение Цхинвальским регионом не прекращалась. Помимо внешних сил в военном противостоянии активно участвовали и проживавшие в Цхинвальском регионе представители местных, грузинских феодальных домов, в том числе Тбели, Канчаели, Схвилосели, Коринтели, Цирквалели и др. Однако в начале XI в. под руководством Баграта III завершился продолжительный процесс политического объединения грузинских земель: Картлийское эриставство, до этого подчинявшееся абхазскому царю, вместе с Цхинвальским регионом стало военноадминистративной единицей объединенного грузинского государства. Примечательно, что политический статус и административные границы Картлийского эриставства не подвергались существенным изменениям вплоть до распада единого Грузинского государства, то есть до 40-х годов XIII в. В церковной же географии Цхинвальского региона никаких изменений в IX-XIII вв. не наблюдалось: на этой территории по-прежнему действовали четыре грузинские епархии — в Руиси, Урбниси, Никози и Самтависи. Им принадлежали многочисленные церкви и монастыри, многие из которых являются блестящими образцами грузинского зодчества IX-XIII вв.: храмы в Армази (864 г.) и Цир100

ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ ЦХИНВАЛЬСКОГО РЕГИОНА коли (VIII-IX вв.), базилика в Ередви (906 г.), церковь Сабацминда в Хеити (X в.), церковь Цхракара в Додоти (X-XI вв.), купольные храмы — в Никози (X-XI вв.), Икорта (1172 г.) и Тигва (XII в.), монастырь в Хопа (XIII в.) и др. Следует отдельно отметить богатейший эпиграфический материал IX-XIII вв., выявленный также на терриории Цхинвальского региона. Это надписи в церкви Армази с упоминанием абхазского царя Георгия I (861-868 гг.) и старосты Георгия (864 г), в церкви Цорбиси с упоминанием Иванэ Эристави и старосты Савваий (880 г.), в церкви Ередви с упоминанием абхазского царя Константина III (893-922 гг.), картлийского эристава («упали») Иване Тбели и епископа Никозского Степана (914 г.), в церкви Цирколи с упоминанием абхазского царя Леона III (957-967 гг.), в церкви Биети с упоминанием эриставт-эристава Иоанна Канчаели (IX-X вв.), а также строительная надпись в церкви Тигва, в которой упоминается епископ Георгий Мровели (первая половина XI в.), просительная надпись с упоминанием бывшей Ширванской царицы Тамар (1152 г.) в той же церкви, просительная надпись в церкви Икорта с упоминанием эриставт-эриставов Бешкена и Вардана (1172 г.), надпись в церкви в Ожоре с упоминанием некоего Сиаоша Александрес-дзе (XII-XIII вв.) и др. В заключение отметим, что эпиграфические памятники IX-XIII вв. в Цхинвальском регионе, большинство которых составлено местными духовными и гражданскими лицами, написаны на грузинском языке (за исключением нескольких фресковых надписей в церкви в Канчаети) и выполнены посредством двух видов древнегрузинской письменности — асомтаврули и нусхури. Опираясь на упомянутые эпиграфические материалы, грузинский историк Г. Отхмезури высказал соображение, что в IX-XIII вв. Цхинвальский регион являлся неотъемлемой частью грузинского государственного объединенного пространства и был населен исключительно грузинским этническим массивом. Аналогичного мнения придерживается и археолог Н. Абхазава, который, изучив обнаруженные в Цхинвальском регионе археологические материалы эпохи средневековья (Земо Едиси, Сау-Дзуари, Коринта и др.), предположил, что интересующая нас территория в IX-XIII вв., как и в раннюю эпоху, была населена грузинским этническим элементом. В отличие от упомянутых ученых, археолог Б. Техов высказал соображение, что некоторые образцы обнаруженного в Цхинвальском регионе археологического материала IX-XIII вв. проявляют значительное сходство с зафиксированными на Северном Кавказе экземплярами так назы101

ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ ваемой аланской культуры. Следовательно, в упомянутую эпоху на территории Цхинвальского региона помимо грузинского населения был представлен также и осетино-аланский этнический элемент16.

XIII-XVIII ВВ. Истории Цхинвальского региона XIII-XVIII вв. посвящены грузинские письменные источники «Столетняя летопись» анонимного автора (XIV в.), «Памятник эриставов» — фамильная летопись Ксанских эриставов (XIV-XV вв.), «История Грузии» Парсадана Горгиджанидзе (XVII в.), «Новая история Грузии», составленная советом «учеСм.: Абхазава Н. Этнокультурные процессы…; Отхмезури Г. Эпиграфика нагорной Шида Картли // Осетинский вопрос. Гори; Тбилиси, 1996 (на груз. яз.); Очерки истории Грузии. Т. II: Грузия в IV-X вв….; Бахтадзе М. Институт эриставов в Грузии. Тбилиси, 2003 (на груз. яз.); Чубинашвили Г. Архитектурные памятники VIII и IX вв. в Ксанском ущелье. Тбилиси, 1936; Летопись Картли // Картлис цховреба. Т. I . Тбилиси, 1955 (на груз. яз.); Историк Давида Строителя. История царя царей Давида // Там же; Летописец времен Гиоргия-Лаша // Там же; Меписашвили Р. Полупещерный памятник IX в. в селе Биети // Грузинское искусство. Вып. 6-А. Тбилиси, 1963; Он же. Церковь Бери // Грузинское искусство. Т. 7. Тбилиси, 1971 (на груз. яз.). Он же. Архитектурный памятник 906 г. в Ередви // Грузинское искусство. Вып. 4. Тбилиси, 1955 (на груз. яз.); Истории и восхваления венценосцев // Картлис цховреба. Т. II. Тбилиси, 1959; Басилий. История царя царей Тамар // Там же; Столетняя летопись // Там же; Рчеулишвили Л. Тигва. Строительная деятельность Ширванской царицы Тамар. Тбилиси, 1960 (на груз. яз.); Мегрелидзе И. Надписи и другие древности в Икорте // Вестник отдела общественных наук АН Грузии. Вып. 3. Тбилиси, 1963 (на груз. яз.); Он же. Надписи и другие древности Лиахвского ущелья // Известия. Серия языка и литературы. Вып. 2. Тбилиси, 1981 (на груз. яз.); Он же. За Корниси, в Цорбисе // Коммунист. № 138. Тбилиси, 1981 (на груз. яз.); Макалатиа С. Лехурское ущелье. Тбилиси, 1964 (на груз. яз.); Гвасалиа Дж. Вопросы исторической географии Ксанского ущелья // Сб. исторической географии Грузии. Вып. 3. Тбилиси, 1967 (на груз. яз.); Он же. Очерки исторической географии…; Техов Б. Очерки древней истории…; Меписашвили Р., Цинцадзе В. Архитектура Нагорной части исторической провинции Грузии — Шида-Картли. Тбилиси, 1975; Джатиев Р. Археологический материал из Сау-Дзуар Ерман // Известия Юго-Осетинского научно-исслед. ин-та. Вып. XXI. Тбилиси, 1977; Корпус грузинских надписей. Т. I. Лапидарные надписи. Т. I. Восточная и Южная Грузия (V-X вв.) / Сост. Н. Шошиашвили. Тбилиси, 1980 (на груз. яз.); Закараиа П. Монастырский комплекс в Хопа // Известия. Серия истории, археологии, этнографии и истории искусства. Т. 4. Тбилиси, 1992; Он же. К истории зодчества нагорной Шида Картли // Осетинский вопрос. Гори; Тбилиси, 1996 (на груз. яз.); Цари Грузии. Тбилиси, 2000 (на груз. яз.); Каухчишвили Т. Корпус греческих надписей Грузии. Т. II. Восточная Грузия. Тбилиси, 2000 (на груз. яз.); Мусхелишвили Д. Грузия в IV-VIII вв. Тбилиси, 2003 (на груз. яз.); Атлас истории Грузии… 16

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ ЦХИНВАЛЬСКОГО РЕГИОНА ных мужей» (XVIII в.), «История царства Грузинского» Вахуштия Багратиони (XVIII в.), «История царей» Сехнии Чхеидзе (XVIII в.), «История Грузии» («Амбавни Картлисани») Папуны Орбелиани (XVIII в.), «Царствование Ираклия Второго» Омана Херхеулидзе (XVIII в.), а также грузинские дипломатические памятники XIII-XVIII вв., сочинения и записки иностранных путешественников и др. Перечисленные источники повествуют о том, что в 40-е годы XIII в. единое грузинское государство распалось на две части и образовались Западно-Грузинское и Восточно-Грузинское царства. Картлийское эриставство вместе с Цхинвальским регионом оказалось в составе Восточно-Грузинского царства, которое, в свою очередь, подчинялось монгольским ханам (Ильханам). В 60-70 годах XIII в. от Картлийского эриставства отделилось Ксанское ущелье и в этой части Цхинвальского региона образовалось Ксанское эриставство. В первой половине XIV в. царь Георгий Блистательный (1299, !313-1346 гг.) восстановил единое грузинское государство. Картлийское и Ксанское эриставства вместе с территорией Цхинвальского региона опять стали частью единой Грузии. Однако в 1480-1482 гг. объединенное Грузинское царство снова распалось. Цхинвальский регион и на этот раз оказался в пределах Картлийского царства с той лишь разницей, что его территория была разделена между двумя новыми военно-административными ведомствами — II (правым) и IV (арьергардным) воеводствами (садрошо). С этого времени вплоть до середины XVIII в. военно-административный статус Цхинвальского региона практически не менялся. В 1762 г. царь Ираклий II объединил Восточную Грузию в единое Картли-Кахетское царство, вследствие чего территория Цхинвальского региона оказалась частью II (правого) воеводства. Двенадцатого сентября 1801 г. российский император Александр I (1801-1825 гг.) обнародовал манифест об упразднении Картли-Кахетского царства и присоединении последнего к России. Согласно этому акту вся Восточная Грузия (и, следовательно, Цхинвальский регион) вошла в состав Российской империи. В XIII-XVIII вв. на территории Цхинвальского региона действовало несколько местных грузинских феодальных сеньорий. Следует особо отметить представителей княжеских домов Сурамели, Квенипневели, Тавхелисдзе-Мачабели, Габелисдзе-Амиреджиби, Зевдгинидзе-Амилахори, Палавандишвили и Павленишвили. Примечательно, что многие из членов этих знатных фамилий занимали высокие должности в грузинской государственной иерархии. В XIII-XVIII вв. ряд областей Цхинвальского региона являлись доменом правящего царского дома Багратионов. 103

ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ В упомянутую эпоху церковная география исследуемого региона практически не менялась: в XIII-XVIII вв. духовными пастырями местного православного населения оставались епископы Мровели, Урбнели, Никозели и Самтавнели, которые подчинялись Картлийскому католикосу-патриарху. В числе известных грузинских церквей и монастырей Цхинвальского региона были Цирквали (VIII-IX вв.), Канчаетская Кабени (IX-XIII вв.), церковь Сабацминда в Хеити (X в.), Икорта (XII в.), Тири (XIII-XVII вв.), Ларгвиси (XIV-XVIII вв.) и др. На территории Цхинвальского региона было выявлено можество эпиграфических памятников XIII-XVIII вв., подавляющее большинство которых, за исключением нескольких позднейших армянских надписей, выполнено на грузинском языке с использованием обоих видов грузинской письменности (асомтаврули и мхедрули). С исторической точки зрения особо интересны надписи в монастыре Тири с упоминанием главного казначея страны — Хела и его братьев — Сиаоша, Рати, Мачабела и Асата Тавхелисдзе (XIV-XV вв.), надпись в храме Икорта с упоминанием Картлийской царицы Родам и Ксанского эристава Иесе (1673 г.), надпись в монастыре Тири с упоминанием епископа Филиппа Мровели и его братьев — Ардашела и Элизбара Тактакисдзе (1682 г.), надгробная эпитафия из Хеитской церкви Сабацминда с упоминанием Гиоргия Мачабели, его супруги Елены и отца последней — Иотама Амилахвари (1745 г.), а также надпись в церкви Икорта с упоминанием картлийской царицы Кетеван (1798 г.) и др. На заключительном этапе рассмотренного нами довольно продолжительного исторического периода на территории Цхинвальского региона развернулись значительные этнические процессы: началось массовое перемещение проживавших на Северном Кавказе осетин в сторону Южного Кавказа, в результате чего они постепенно расселились в разных областях Цхинвальского региона. В связи с этим представляет интерес одна из грузинских грамот (датированная 1621-1650 гг.), в которой идет речь об «обезлюдении по вине осетин» высокогорной полосы Цхинвальского региона, в частности, Земо Джава. Опираясь на этот документ, грузинские ученые — историк Дж. Гвасалиа, географ К. Харадзе и этнограф Б. Гамкрелидзе высказали мнение, что, возможно, уже в первой половине XVII в. область Земо Джава, как и вся высокогорная полоса Цхинвальского региона, ввиду постоянных набегов осетин лишилась грузинского населения. Иными словами, по их предположению, именно в это время (ближе к первой половине XVII в.) прибывшие с Северного Кавказа осетины захватили высокогорные селения, до этого населенные этническими 104

ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ ЦХИНВАЛЬСКОГО РЕГИОНА грузинами. Содержание упомянутой выше грамоты было своеобразно истолковано осетинскими учеными — Г. Тогошвили и И. Цховребовым, которые выдвинули версию о том, что речь идет об опустении Джавской области не от грузинского населения, притесненного осетинами, а, напротив, — от собственно осетинского этнического элемента, который, по их мнению, уже к первой половине ХVII в. прочно обосновался в высокогорной полосе Цхинвальского региона. В этом отношении интересно сообщение русского князя Михаила Татищева, побывавшего в Грузии в качестве посла. Согласно Татищеву, с наступлением XVII в. в высокогорной полосе Цхинвальского региона, в частности, в северной части ущелья р. Большой Лиахви, было засвидетельствовано осетинское население. В пространном историческом сочинении известного грузинского историка Вахушти Багратиони «История царства Грузинского» (1743-1745 гг.) есть подтверждение того факта, что в первой половине XVIII в. осетины компактно проживали в высокогорной полосе Цхинвальского региона — в ущельях верхнего течения рек Большой Лиахви, Малой Лиахви, Меджуда, Лехура и Ксани. В предгорной и низинной областях Цхинвальского региона, по сведениям Вахушти Багратиони, проживало грузинское население. Согласно демографической переписи 1770 г., во второй половине XVIII в. на территории Цхинвальского региона рядом с грузинами существовала довольно большая колония осетин — примерно 2 860 дворов, из них 2 000 дворов в пределах Ксанского эриставства и 860 в имениях, принадлежавших князьям Мачабели. При этом проживавшие в Цхинвальском регионе осетины являлись подданными Картли-Кахетского царства и имели те же гражданские права и обязанности, что и местное грузинское население17. См.: Бахтадзе М. Институт эриставов в Грузии...; Абхазава Н. Этнокультурные процессы…; Отхмезури Г. Эпиграфика нагорной Шида Картли…; Очерки истории Грузии. Т. I:. Грузия в IV-X вв. Тбилиси, 1973; Гвасалиа Дж. Шида Картли и осетинская проблема // Осетинский вопрос. Гори; Тбилиси, 1996; Он же. Вопросы исторической географии Ксанского ущелья // Сб. исторической географии Грузии. Т. III. Тбилиси, 1967 (на груз. яз.); Он же. Вопросы исторической географии Лиахвского ущелья // Там же. Т. VI. Тбилиси, 1982; Он же. К вопросу о взаимоотношении…; Харадзе К. Против подделывания топонимов в Шида Картли // Там же; Гамкрелидзе Б. К вопросу о расселении осетин в Грузии // Там же; Чхеидзе С. История царей // Картлис цховреба. Т. II. СПб., 1854 (на груз. яз.); Белокуров С. Сношения России с Кавказом. М., 1889; Хроники и другие материалы по истории Грузии / Собрал, хронологически распределил и объяснил Федор Жорданиа. Кн. II. Тифлис, 1897 (на груз. яз.); Горгиджанидзе П. История Грузии // Исторический вестник. Т. 2. Тбилиси, 1925 (на груз.яз.); Документы из социальной истории Грузии. Т. I. Тбилиси, 1940 17

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ 1801-1918 ГГ. Большое количество источников относится к периоду 18011918 гг. Это официальные документы, поступившие из разных государственных ведомств Российской империи (отчеты, описания и др.), многочисленные публикации в русских и грузинских периодических изданиях (газеты, журналы, сборники и др.), материалы, опубликованные грузинскими, русскими и иностранными авторами или хранящиеся в архивах и т. д. (на груз. яз.); Давид и Баграт Багратионы. Новая история Грузии / Изд. Т. Ломоури. Тбилиси, 1941 (на груз. яз.); Жизнь Иесе Бараташвили, или завещание детям // Мат-лы по истории Грузии и Кавказа. Т. 28. Тбилиси, 1950; Джанашиа С. Труды. Т. II. Тбилиси, 1952 (на груз. яз.); Месхиа Ш. Памятник эриставов // Мат-лы по истории Грузии и Кавказа. Т. 30. Тбилиси, 1954 (на груз. яз.); Гавритишвили Д. Из социальной истории феодальной Грузии. Тбилиси, 1955 (на груз. яз.); Закараиа П. К истории зодчества…; Он же. Архитектурный ансамбль Ларгвиси // Вестник Музея Грузии. Т. XIX-В. Тбилиси, 1956 (на груз. яз.); Столетняя летопись // Картлис цховреба. Т. II. Тбилиси, 1959; Эгнаташвили Б. Новая история Грузии // Там же; Цотниашвили М. К истории Цхинвали. Сталинир, 1961 (на груз. яз.); К вопросу о происхождении двалов…; Путешествие Гюльденштедта по Грузии / Изд. Г. Гелашвили. Т. I :Тбилиси, 1962; Т. II: Тбилиси, 1964 (на груз. яз.). История Осетии в документах и материалах. Т. I. Цхинвали, 1962; Мегрелидзе И. Надписи и другие древности в Икорте // Вестник отдела общественных наук АН Грузии. Вып. 3. Тбилиси, 1963 (на груз. яз.); Андгуладзе Н. Надписи монастыря в Тири // Известия. Серия истории, археолоии, этнографии и истории искусства. Вып. 6. Тбилиси, 1969; Тогошвили Г. Грузино-осетинские взаимоотношения в XIV-XVIII вв. Тбилиси, 1969 (на груз. яз.); Гамрекели В., Цкитишвили З. Демографический список от 5 апреля 1770 г. // Известия. Серия истории, археологии, этнографии и истории искусства. Вып. 1. Тбилиси, 1973; Царевич Вахушти...; Меписашвили Р., Цинцадзе В. Архитектура Нагорной части исторической провинции Грузии — Шида-Картли. Тбилиси, 1975; Андгуладзе Н. Архитектурный ансамбль монастыря в Тири. Тбилиси, 1976 (на груз. яз.); Хоштариа Э. Для понятия некоторых реалий «Памятника эриставов» // Мравалтави. Т. VII. Тбилиси, 1980 (на груз. яз.); Орбелиани П. Амбавни Картлисани (История Грузии) / Изд. Е. Цагареишвили. Тбилиси, 1981 (на груз. яз.); Арахамиа Г. Древнегрузинские фамильные летописи. Тбилиси, 1979 (на груз. яз.); Херхеулидзе О. Царствование Ираклия Второго / Изд. Л. Микиашвили. Тбилиси, 1989 (на груз. яз.); Чичинадзе З. Переселение осетин в Картли. Тбилиси, 1990 (на груз. яз.); Итонишвили В. Из истории восточногрузинского нагорья. Тбилиси, 1992 (на груз. яз.); Гунашвили В. Политическая история Цхразмийского эриставства в 20-50 гг. XIV в. // Известия. Серия истории, археологии, этнографии и истории искусства. Вып. 4. Тбилиси, 1992; Харадзе К. Историческая география Грузии. Шида Картли. Тбилиси, 1992 (на груз. яз.); Беридзе В. Грузинское церковное зодчество XVI-XVIII вв. Тбилиси, 1994 (на груз. яз.); Отхмезури Г. Эпиграфика нагорной Шида Картли // Осетинский вопрос. Гори; Тбилиси, 1996 (на груз. яз); Цари Грузии. Тбилиси, 2000 (на груз. яз.); Атлас истории Грузии...

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ ЦХИНВАЛЬСКОГО РЕГИОНА Согласно этим источникам, с упразднением Картли-Кахетского царства в 1802 г. имперские власти России разделили эту территорию на два уезда — Горийский и Душетский. В тот год, если верить одному из документов синхронного периода, некоторые высокогорные селения Цхинвальского региона (Корниси, Тбети, Кусирети, Гудиси, Фотриси, Чвриси, Мгвриси, Сатихари, Кулбити, Хромисцкаро, Жамури и др.) были компактно населены осетинами, а в некоторых (Дзвилети, Свери, Ередви, Корди, Дици, Ацерисхеви, Чареби, Снекви, Белоти, Сацхениси, Ванати, Зардиаанткари, Мерети, Карби, Арбо и др.) проживало смешанное население — и грузины, и осетины. В отличие от высокогорной области, предгорье и низинная полоса Цхинвальского региона были почти полностью освоены грузинским населением. В городах и поселках — Цхинвали, Ахалгори, Джава — помимо грузин проживали только евреи и армяне. Этнические реалии, которые российские государственные чиновики зафиксировали в Цхинвальском регионе в начале XIX в., они довольно своеобразно интерпретировали. К примеру, в рапорте императорскому двору, составленном генералом Карлом Кноррингом во время его пребывания в Грузии (в 1802 г.), высокогорные области Цхинвальского региона, в которых преобладало осетинское население, именуются Осетией, остальная же территория, населенная в основном грузинами, — Грузией. В других российских документах первой трети X1X в. помимо терминов «Осетия» и «осетины» используются также «Грузинская Осетия» / «Грузинские осетины», «Осетия, принадлежащая Грузии» / «Осетины, принадлежащие Грузии», «Осетия Северной Картли» / «Осетины Северной Картли» и т. д. В 1830 г. в издаваемой в Грузии русскоязычной газете «Тифлисские ведомости» была опубликована статья анонимного автора, в которой он использовал термины «Южная Осетия» (для обозначения населенных осетинами областей Цхинвальского региона) и «Северная Осетия» (населенная осетинами территория Северного Кавказа). С этого времени термин «Южная Осетия» постепенно вытеснил из обращения все другие и прочно обосновался как в грузинских, так и в русских и иностранных изданиях. В 1840 г. территория Восточной и Западной Грузии была объединена в новую административную единицу — Грузино-Имеретинскую губернию. Цхинвальский регион при этом оказался в составе Горийского уезда. Немного позже, в 1842 г. из состава Горийского уезда был выделен так называемый Осетинский округ Грузино-Имеретинской губернии, который охватывал населенную осетинами вы107

ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ сокогорную полосу Цхинвальского региона и был разделен на три участка — Джава, Малая Лиахви и Нара. В 1843 г. от Горийского уезда были отторжены еще два участка (также населенные осетинами) — Горный и Ксанский, которые вошли в состав Горного округа ГрузиноИмеретинской губернии. В 1846 г. Грузино-Имеретинская губерния распалась и взамен образовались две административные единицы — Тбилисская и Кутаисская губернии. Территория Цхинвальского региона и на этот раз была распределена между тремя административными единицами — Горийским уездом, Осетинским и Горным округами. В 1859 г. Осетинский округ был упразднен, а его территория, за исключением ранее отделенного от Тбилисской губернии Нарийского округа, была возвращена Горийскому уезду и была названа Осетинским участком. В 1864 г. к Горийскому уезду присоединили так называемый Ксанский участок, однако ненадолго: в 1867 г. последний вошел в состав Душетского уезда — новообразованной административной единицы Тбилисской губернии. С этого времени вплоть до Февральской революции 1917 г. и преобразования системы управления в Российской империи административный статус Цхинвальского региона практически не менялся. Во второй половине XIX в. процесс переселения северокавказских осетин в Цхинвальский регион достиг невиданных доселе масштабов: если в 1860 г. на Северном Кавказе проживало 47 000 осетин, а в Цхинвальском регионе — только 19 000, то к 1880 г. их число возросло до 59 000 и 52 000 соответственно. Столь резкое увеличение численности осетинского населения нарушило исторически установившийся этно-демографический баланс в Цхинвальском регионе. К этому добавились многосторонние последствия проводимой в Грузии имперской русификаторской политики, в результате которой новоприбывшие осетинские поселенцы наперекор исторической традиции интегрировались не в грузинское, а в русское военно-политическое, социально-экономическое и культурно-языковое пространство. За этим последовал процесс отчуждения проживавшего в Цхинвальском регионе грузинского и осетинского населения, зачастую перераставший в вооруженные столкновения18. См.: Очерки истории Грузии. Т. IV: Грузия с начала XVI в. до 30-х гг. XIX в. Тбилиси, 1973; Т. V: Грузия в 30-90 гг. XIX в. Тбилиси, 1970; Гвасалиа Дж. Шида Картли и осетинская проблема // Осетинский вопрос. Гори; Тбилиси, 1996; Итонишвили В. Южная-Осетия в Центральной Грузии?! // Там же; Тотадзе А. Осетины на грузинской земле // Там же; Лекишвили С. Когда появился термин «Южная Осетия» // Там 18

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ ЦХИНВАЛЬСКОГО РЕГИОНА 1918-2005 ГГ. Самые многочисленные письменные сведения по истории Цхинвальского региона сохранились в материалах 1918-2005 гг. Прежде всего следует отметить официальные документы (законы, приказы, постановления, отчеты и др.), поступившие из разных государственных ведомств Союза Советских Социалистических республик (1917-1991 гг.), Грузинской демократической республики (19181921 гг.), Грузинской республики (с 1991 г.) и Российской Федерации (с 1991 г.), а также многочисленные публикации, сохранившиеся в периодических изданиях на грузинском, осетинском, русском и иностранных языках, материалы, обнародованные российскими и иностранными авторами или хранящиеся в личных архивах последних и т. д. Опираясь на этот богатейший письменный фонд, можно восстановить основные перипетии истории Цхинвальского региона за 1918-2005 гг. Вскоре после Октябрьской революции 1917 г. Грузия воспользовалась развернувшейся в России Гражданской войной и 26 мая 1918 г. восстановила утраченную государственную независимость. В составе новообразованной Демократической республики Цхинвальский регион, как и в 1867-1917 гг., был распределен между двумя административными единицами — Горийским и Душетским уездами. же; Акты Кавказской археографической комиссии. Т. III: Тифлис, 1869; Т. IV: Тифлис, 1870; Т. VI. Вып. 1: Тифлис, 1874. Иваненко З. Гражданское управление Закавказьем. Тифлис, 1873; Путеводитель и собеседник в путешествии по Кавказу. М., 1885; Сборник сведений о Кавказе. Т. IX. Тифлис, 1885; Свод статистических данных о населении Закавказского края извлеченных изъ посемейнных списковъ 1886 г. Тифлис, 1893; Эсадзе С. Историческая записка об управлении Кавказом. Вып. I. Тифлис, 1907; Чхетиа Ш. Система российского управления в Грузии // Вестник ИЯМК. Т. VIII. Тбилиси, 1940; Документы по истории Грузии. Т. I. Вып. 1. Тбилиси, 1954; Абаев В. Экономическое развитие Юго-Осетии в феодально-крепостническую эпоху (1800-1864 гг.) // Известия Юго-Осетинского научно-исслед. ин-та. Т. VII. Тбилиси, 1955;. Он же. Экономическое развитие Юго-Осетии в период капитализма (1864 — 1917-1921 гг.). Т. 2. Тбилиси, 1956; История Осетии в документах и материалах. Т. I: Сталинир, 1960; Т. II: Цхинвали, 1962; Тогошвили Г. Взаимоотношения грузин и осетин в 1801-1921 гг. Тбилиси, 1969; Душетский уезд // ГСЭ. Т. 3. 1978; Тбилисская губерния // Там же. Т. 4. 1979; Периодическая печать Кавказа об осетии и осетинах. Т. IV. Цхинвали, 1989; Очерки истории Грузии. Т. V: Грузия в XIX в. Тбилиси, 1990; Харадзе К. Историческая география Грузии. Шида Картли. Тбилиси, 1992 (на груз. яз.); Он же. Против подделывания топонимов в Шида Картли // Осетинский вопрос. Гори; Тбилиси, 1996; Гамкрелидзе Б. К вопросу о расселении осетин в Грузии // Там же; Атлас истории Грузии...

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ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВ В марте 1918 г. Кавказский краевой комитет (крайком) правящей в России большевистской партии по письменным указаниям из Москвы организовал в Цхинвальском регионе вооруженное восстание. Местное осетинское население региона, большинство которого придерживалось пророссийской ориентации, примкнуло к восставшим большевикам. Проживавшие же в регионе грузины поддерживали меньшевистское правительство страны. Власти новообразованной демократической республики подавили восстание, и конституционный режим в регионе был восстановлен. В мае 1920 г. Юго-Осетинский комитет большевистской партии поднял еще одно, на этот раз широкомасштабное вооруженное восстание. Провозгласив Советскую власть, большевики выдвинули требование о вступлении региона в состав России. Как и в 1918 г., большая часть местного осетинского населения поддержала восстание. Грузинские власти предприняли ответные меры и отправили в Цхинвали войска для его подавления. При содействии местного грузинского населения правительственные войска за короткое время одержали победу, а большевистских руководителей изгнали в Россию. Примечательно, что в один пункт региона — с. Рока были введены военные отряды из Москвы, но вследствие проведенных тбилисскими властями энергичных дипломатических мероприятий, а также давления международных организаций, они были отозваны обратно в Москву. Осетинские граждане, принимавшие участие в восстании (20 000 чел.), покинули Грузию и перебрались в Россию. Вслед за этим, в 1921 г. Россия начала агрессию против Грузинской республики. Двадцать пятого февраля 1921 г. после ожесточенных боев российские войска заняли Тбилиси и поставили во главе страны образованное ими большевистское правительство. Лишившись государственной независимости, Грузия вступила в Союз Советских Социалистических республик. На территорию Цхинвальского региона вернулось осетинское население, покинувшее Грузию в 20-м году, и при помощи местных большевиков выдвинуло требование о создании собственной государственной единицы. После переговоров, продолжавшихся в течение года, 20 апреля 1922 г. большевистские власти в Тбилиси обнародовали декрет о создании ЮгоОсетинского автономного округа в пределах Грузинской Советской Социалистической республики. Помимо населенной осетинами территории, в состав новообразованного автономного округа вошло множество таких пунктов и селений, в которых проживало смешанное грузино-осетинское или ис110

ИСТОРИОГРАФИЯ ЦХИНВАЛЬСКОГО РЕГИОНА ключительно грузинское население. Административным центром Юго-Осетинского автономного округа был объявлен г. Цхинвали, в котором к тому времени не проживало ни одного осетина. В том же году территория Цхинвальского региона была разделена на три административные единицы — Цхинвальский (в 1931-1961 гг. — Сталинирский), Ахалгорский (с 1934 г. — Ленингорский) и Джавский районы. В 1936 г. от Цхинвальского региона была отделена часть территории, на которой была образована четвертая административная единица — Знаурский (в 1936-1938 гг. — Оконский) район. В 1963 г. Цхинвальский район был упразднен, а его территория поделена между Знаурским и Ахалгорским районами. Однако в 1965 г. Цхинвальский район был восстановлен в своих прежних границах. В конце 1980-х годов в Грузии развернулось широкомасштабное общественно-политическое движение, ставившее целью выход из состава Советского Союза и восстановление государственной независимости. Грузинское население Цхинвальского региона полностью разделяло эти требования. Однако осетины, как и прежде, придерживаясь пророссийской ориентации, выступили за сохранение Союза. Вслед за этим, 21 сентября 1990 г. Совет народных депутатов Юго-Осетинского автономного округа принял решение о провозглашении Юго-Осетинской советской демократической республики. В тот же день это Постановление было аннулировано на сессии Верховного Совета республики Грузия. Шестнадцатого октября 1990 г. Совет народных депутатов автономного округа подтвердил Постановление от 21 сентября и избрал правительство республики, а 9 декабря состоялись выборы верховного представительного органа. В ответ на это 11 декабря Верховный Совет Грузинской республики принял решение об упразднении Юго-Осетинского автономного округа. Двенадцатого декабря между грузинами и осетинами начался вооруженный конфликт. Грузинскую часть населения открыто поддерживало правительство Грузии, а осетин — руководство СевероОсетинской автономной республики РФ и центральная власть Российской Федерации. Грузино-осетинский вооруженный конфликт затянулся на два года. Четырнадцатого июля 1992 г. в зону конфликта были введены российские и грузино-осетинские миротворческие силы. Военные действия прекратились, однако вооруженные столкновения локального характера и отдельные эксцессы происходят и по сей день. 111

Развернувшийся на территории Цхинвальского региона грузино-осетинский конфликт до сих пор не завершен и нуждается в улаживании19.

См.: Ментешашвили И. Осетинский сепаратизм в 1918-1920 гг. // Осетинский вопрос. Гори; Тбилиси, 1996; Он же. Как создавался Юго-Осетинский автономный округ. Тбилиси, 1991 (на груз. яз.); Тоидзе Л. Образование Осетинской автономии в Грузии // Там же; Итонишвили В. Южная Осетия в Центральной Грузии?! // Там же; Борьба за победу Советской власти в Грузии: Сб. док-ов. Тбилиси, 1958; Документы внешней политики СССР. Т. II. М., 1958; Уратадзе Г. Воспоминания грузинского социал-демократа. Станфорд, 1965; Тогошвили Г. Взаимоотношения грузин и осетин в 1801-1921 гг. Тбилиси, 1969 (на груз. яз.); Очерки истории Грузии. Т. VII: Грузия в 20-30 гг. XX в. Тбилиси, 1976; Знаури // ГСЭ. Т. 4. 1979; Знаурский район // Там же; Цотниашвили М. Знаур Айдаров. Цхинвали, 1982 (на груз. яз.); Ленингори // ГСЭ. Т. 6. 1983; Ленингорский район // Там же; Джавский район // Там же. Т. 11. 1987; Цхинвальский район // Там же; Цхинвали // Там же; Статистические материалы об экономическом и социальном развитии союзных и автономных республик, автономных областей и округов. М., 1989; Сборник правовых актов Грузинской деократической республики. 1918-1921. Тбилиси, 1990 (на груз. яз.); История и современность Шида Картли (О чем сообщают архивные документы) // Молодой коммунист. 1990. 20 января (на груз. яз.); Фруидзе Л. Так называемиая Южная Осетия глазами Гиоргия Бочоридзе // Осетинский вопрос. Гори; Тбилиси, 1996; Гамкрелидзе Б. К вопросу о расселении осетин в Грузии // Там же; Гвасалиа Дж. Шида Картли и осетинская проблема // Там же; Лекишвили С. Когда появился термин «Южная Осетия» // Там же; Харадзе К. Для чего или для кого строилась Цхинвали-Алагирская перевалочная автомагистраль? // Там же; Он же. Против подделывания топонимов в Шида Картли // Там же; Атлас истории Грузии... 19

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About the cover photographs The cover was designed by Kaol Ito. The castle on a lake is Trakai (Lithuania, originally built in the fifteenth century but some historians regard its restoration in 1959-61 as problematic from the viewpoint of authenticity) from Raimondas Paknys and Arunas Baltėnas, Lietuva (Vilnius, 2000). The armored truck, made in Romania, belonged to the Moldavian army but was seized by Transnistrian guardsmen in the Bendery conflict (June 1992), from N.V. Babilunga and B.G. Bomeshko, Bendery: rasstreliannye nepokorennye (Tiraspol’, 1993). The portrait is of Said-Afandi Chirkeiskii, the most influential Sufi sheikh in Dagestan.

Emerging Meso-Areas in the Former Socialist Countries: Histories Revived or Improvised Edited by Kimitaka Matsuzato

Copyright © 2005 by Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University Kita-9, Nishi-7, Kita-ku, Sapporo 060-0809 Japan Tel: (+81)-11-706-2388 Fax: (+81)-11-706-4952 URL: http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/ E-mail: [email protected] First Published in 2005 Publisher: Osamu Ieda Editor: Kimitaka Matsuzato This book is based on the papers presented at an international symposium, entitled “Emerging Meso-Areas in the Former Socialist Countries: Histories Revived or Improvised?” held at Hokkaido University (Sapporo, Japan) on January 28-31, 2004. Emerging meso-areas in the former socialist countries: histories revived or improvised? / edited by Kimitaka Matsuzato. Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 2005 (Slavic Eurasian studies ; no. 7) p. ; 21cm. ISBN 4-938637-35-9 I. Matsuzato, Kimitaka, 1960-. 1. Eurasia — Politics and government 2. Former Soviet republics — Politics and government Printed in Japan

Contents PREFACE (Kimitaka Matsuzato) ...............................................7 1. REGIONAL IDENTITIES AND MESO-MEGA AREA DYNAMICS IN SLAVIC EURASIA: FOCUSED ON EASTERN EUROPE (Osamu Ieda) ................................................................. 19 2. ON SAILS AND GALES, AND SHIPS DRIVING IN VARIOUS DIRECTIONS: POST-SOVIET UKRAINE AS A TEST CASE FOR THE MESO-AREA CONCEPT (Yaroslav Hrytsak) ................. 42 3. THE STUDY OF MESO- AND MEGA-AREA DYNAMICS: METHODOLOGICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS (Vello Pettai) ................................................................ 69 4. TATARS AS MESO-NATION (Dmitry Gorenburg) ....................... 83 5. MOLDOVA AND THE POLITICS OF MESO-AREAS (Stephen White and Ian McAllister) ................................. 93 6. UKRAINIAN GAS TRADERS, DOMESTIC CLANS AND RUSSIAN FACTORS: A TEST CASE FOR MESO-MEGA AREA DYNAMICS (Shinkichi Fujimori) ..................................................... 113 7. WILL THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT COUNTERBALANCE SUPERPRESIDENTIALISM? (Oleksandr Syniookyi) .................... 137 8. PECULIARITIES OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS BETWEEN BELARUS AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ASPECTS (Andrei Lobatch) ............................ 155 9. THE REPRESENTATION OF THE BELARUSIAN LANGUAGE IN CONTEMPORARY BELARUSIAN LITERATURE (Go Koshino) ....... 177 10. DAGESTAN’S APPROACH TO THE ISLAMIC MEGA-AREA? THE POTENTIALS AND LIMITS OF JIHADISM (Dmitry Makarov) .... 195

11. ALIEN BUT LOYAL: REASONS FOR THE “UNSTABLE STABILITY” OF DAGESTAN, AN OUTPOST OF SLAVIC EURASIA (Magomed-Rasul Ibragimov and Kimitaka Matsuzato) ....... 12. BETWEEN IMPERIAL TEMPTATION AND ANTI-IMPERIAL FUNCTION IN EASTERN EUROPEAN POLITICS: POLAND FROM THE EIGHTEENTH TO TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Andrzej Nowak) .......................................................... 13. THE MOST EUROPEAN SCIENCE IN RUSSIA: DEFINING THE EMPIRE ANTHROPOLOGICALLY (Marina Mogilner) ............ 14. FROM ETHNOCENTRIC TO CIVIC HISTORY: CHANGES IN CONTEMPORARY LITHUANIAN HISTORICAL STUDIES (Darius Staliūnas) ........................................................ 15. EMPIRE OR POST-EMPIRE? THE CONCEPT OF “LONG CENTURY” AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBALIZATION (Norihisa Yamashita) .................................................... 16. ABKHAZIA UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF THE DIVISION OF THE WORLD (Stanislav Lakoba) ................................... 17. IS IT EASY TO GLOBALIZE THE WORLD? THE EXPANSION OF THE SCHENGEN TERRITORY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN A WIDER EUROPE (Vitaly Merkushev) ........................... 18. OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITS OF SELF-CREATION AND IDENTITY POLITICS: TATARSTAN’S PARADIPLOMATIC PROJECT (Gulnaz Sharafutdinova) ...............................................

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PREFACE KIMITAKA MATSUZATO This collection is based on the papers presented at the International Symposium coupled with the International Workshop by Junior Scholars “Emerging Meso-Areas in the Former Socialist Countries: Histories Revived or Improvised?” (Hokkaido University, 28-31 January 2004). This was the first international event of the Twenty-First Century COE Program “Making a Discipline of Slavic Eurasian Studies: Meso-Areas and Globalization” (2003-2008), financed by the Japan Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. The purpose of this program is to reconstruct the framework of area studies of the former socialist territories (named Slavic Eurasia in this collection). For this purpose we proposed a new concept of meso-areas. The collapse of the socialist regimes in 1989-1991 seemed to imply the demise of the most distinguishing common peculiarities of Slavic Eurasia. Since then the area study that had covered this region diversified ceaselessly into Central European, Baltic, Caucasian, Ukrainian, Central Asian and other studies. As a matter of fact, it appears difficult to categorize the Czech Republic, Turkmenistan and the Far North of Russia as the same “area.” During the 1990s there existed a quasi-discipline to cover these territories, that is, transition studies, but the transition of these territories to one or another type of capitalism has largely finished. Undoubtedly, the self-assertion of Baltic, Ukrainian, Central Asian, Caucasian and other studies has a number of merits. For example, by this territorial specialization it will become easier to provide graduate students with language education and to find financial support from the private sector which, as a rule, is interested in one or another relatively narrow, concrete region rather than in abstract mega-regions such as Slavic Eurasia. However, if the dismal situation whereby the specialists of the Baltic countries have quite poor knowledge of the Visegrad countries (and vise versa) or the specialists of Russia know very little about Ukraine and Belarus (and vise versa) continues, these narrowly defined area studies will soon run out of their innovative potential. Comparison and deconstruction of spatial perception are the vital tools of any area study.

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There are several reasons for the excessive territorial specialization of the former socialist studies during the last fifteen years. First of all, many scholars continue to believe that only Soviet socialism coercively and artificially integrated Slavic Eurasia. Therefore, once Soviet socialism fell, they argue, the studies of the former socialist countries should diversify according to their real (unfortunately disrupted by Soviet socialism) peculiarities. Another reason is the fact that Russia and Russian scholars have not played their legitimate role in the study of the former socialist countries. As a rule, former suzerains play an important role in the study of their former colonies for a long time (consider the role of France and Japan in the studies of Vietnam and Taiwan respectively). In contrast, there is only a very insignificant influence of Russian scholars in Baltic or Ukrainian studies. I even heard that the Library of the Russian Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg (BAN) ceased to compile Ukrainian and Belarusian literature. This tragic situation does not stop Russian historians from criticizing “Ukrainian ethnocentric historiography.” Even the fact that they, as a rule, do not read Ukrainian and Belarusian cannot be the reason to make them hesitant. Besides Russian ethnic prejudice, this situation was caused by the academic structure inherited from the Soviet Union, which imposed the studies of union republics on themselves, in other words, “regionalized” these studies.1 The previous area studies premised a significant homogeneity and one-tier structure of areas. Globalization has damaged the persuasiveness of this understanding of areas. Europe, Asia and many other areas of the world share the “identity crisis” which Slavic Eurasia has suffered during the last fifteen years. Today we do not know where Europe begins and ends. Our program argues that the territories which were traditionally named “areas” proved to be conglomerates of mesoareas and therefore have at least two tiers (a mega-area composed of meso-areas). The peculiarities of meso-areas remain latent in times of stability but become self-assertive when they face external impact, such as globalization and the collapse of socialist regimes. Some Russian academic institutions try to overcome this structural problem. For example, the Institute of Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences introduced the Division of Eastern Slavs under the leadership of Leonid Gorizontov to cover Ukraine and Belarus. 1

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It is obvious that the self-assertion of meso-areas has been motivated by their interaction with their neighboring outer worlds. For example, the emergence of the Baltic/Visegrad, Central Eurasian, and Russian Far Eastern meso-areas has been affected by the EU expansion, Islamic revival, and economic growth of the East Asian “tigers” respectively. Unsurprisingly, these interactions have various forms and intensities. On the other hand, centripetal factors, such as Eurasian mentalities (relatively undeveloped national consciousness because of constant migration of the population, fatalism, populism and yearning for heroes, to name but a few) and painful experiences of socialism and capitalist transition, continue to integrate the Slavic Eurasian mega-area. Meso-areas can be multinational (the Baltic/Visegrad meso-area), transnational (the Central Eurasian meso-area composed of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Russian Volga-Ural region), or subnational (the Russian Far East). With the passage of time, a meso-area may (1) become a new independent mega-area, (2) become incorporated into the neighboring mega-area or the former outer world, (3) continue to be dependent on the host mega-area despite its self-assertion (in other words, the host mega-area will preserve a certain wholeness as a loose conglomerate of meso-areas) for a significant time, or (4) become reunited into the former host mega-area, weakening its self-assertion. In my view, the most probable scenario for meso-areas of Slavic Eurasia is the third option. This is why we believe in the analytical potential of our program’s main concepts. The self-assertion of meso-areas is simultaneously a result of and a resistance to globalization. A meso-area emerges even despite its collective “rejection symptoms” against the norms imposed by outer actors. The EU expansion to the Baltic/Visegrad meso-area was a result of globalization and, at the same time, the resistance to globalization under American hegemony. However, this cannot but produce euroskepticism in the “New Europe” (see below). By the same token, the resurgence of Salafism (fundamentalism) in the Islamic world is a resistance to the globalization under American hegemony and this resistance has penetrated into the Central Eurasian meso-area. However, Central Eurasian Islam has its own peculiarities (for example, the predominance of the Shafii school of law and the strong Sufist tradition

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in Dagestan) distinguished from Arab or Turkish Islam. Encounters with Arab or Turkish Islam often make Central Eurasian Muslims more conscious of their own “traditional Islam” and induce them to build an independent Muslim world. Overall, the concept of meso-areas enables us to recognize the dynamism of “areas” (mega-areas) as an arena of competition between centrifugal and centripetal forces. Exploiting this concept, we may understand the peculiarities of regions clearer through macro-regional comparison. This concept is interdisciplinary by nature since it pays attention to the interaction between international influence on a region as well as its historical background, the significance of its location, and its natural and cultural surroundings. This concept facilitates empirical analyses of international relations beyond the narrow scope of interstate relations. This concept is in particular useful for the analyses of newly independent states which have been vulnerable to the international environment and still have amorphous state identities. This collection is composed of five parts and eighteen chapters. Since these parts and chapters are structured clearly, I do not think it necessary to provide a detailed explanation of each of them here. Instead, let me disclose the articulated and latent polemics revealed in the symposium. The first issue concerns to what extent meso-areas are analytical (constructive) or, to the contrary, ontological (really existing). In other words, should meso-areas be constructed for one or another research purpose or should they be supposed to have certain geocultural homogeneities and collective consciousness of the population. There seems little room for doubt that Central Eurasia, covering the vast and remotely located territories of Central Asia, Caucasus, and the Volga-Ural region of Russia can only be analytical. However, some authors of this collection argue that even the Visegrad/Baltic meso-area, which seemed homogeneous and definitely had collective consciousness in its way with regard to the EU accession, is dissolving quickly. This question is combined with another problem, namely, to what extent the location of a country or territory matters in the era of globalization. Once accepted into the EU, the Baltic/Visegrad countries immediately realized that they were not equal with “Old Europe.” This might strengthen the identity of this “New Europe,” which often results

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in its alliance with the United States against “Old Europe,” as was shown by the diplomatic game around the Iraq War. On the other hand, Vello Pettai (Chapter 3) challenges Ieda’s structure-oriented arguments presented in Chapter 1 by adding the factor of agents (actors) to the theoretical framework of meso-areas. Because of their successful accession to the EU the Visegrad/Baltic countries have lost their common purpose. Pettai argues that policy preferences of the government often matter more than the country’s historical background. For example, market-oriented Estonia prefers to ally with Britain, the US, and the Nordic countries than with the social democratic “Old Europe,” let alone its neighbor Latvia, with which Estonia has a shared history. An interesting remark is that the dichotomy of Northern and Southern Europe, characteristic of the Renaissance period, replaced the Western and Eastern European dichotomy, which became prevalent after the Enlightenment, at least in Estonians’ minds.2 There is an argument that the Nordic identity of Latvia (as well as Estonia) has deeper historical roots than the policy preferences of these countries.3 Chapter 17 by Vitaly Merkushev also demonstrates that policy choices (in the case of visa-regimes, Merkushev bears in mind policies made by not only sovereign states but also international entities) affect the meso- and mega-area formation drastically. One thing seems clear: the geographic identity of the three Baltic states was a consequence, at most, of the events in the twentieth century, such as the fragile independence during the interwar period, the MolotovRibbentrop Pact, and the Soviet occupation. This identity culminated in the “human chain” in 1990, which combined the three capitals of these republics, but split into three separate identities after their independence. Nevertheless, I dare to say that if Estonia and Latvia have actually become Nordic countries, specialists of Finland or Denmark should be able to analyze the problems that these countries are facing better than specialists of Slavic Eurasia (or post-communism). Like it or not, such an academic situation will not emerge in the coming few decades. The empirical data on which Pettai’s argument relies are provided in his “Narratives and Political Development in the Baltic States: History Revised and Improvised,” Ab Imperio 1 (2004), pp. 405-432. 3 Valters Ščerbinsk is, “Looking for Neighbors: Origins and Development of Latvian Rhetoric on Nordic ‘Closeness’,” Marco Lehti and David J. Smith, Post-Cold War Identity Politics. Northern and Baltic Experiences (London, Portland, 2003), pp. 157-172. 2

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As already mentioned, another dismantling factor of the Visegrad/ Baltic identity would seem to be the “reemergence of Rzeczpospolita [the Polish-Lithuanian state],” which lies beyond the boundaries between the EU and CIS, as is indirectly argued by Yaroslav Hrytsak, Andrzej Nowak and Darius Staliūnas. Despite the vast difference of their political choices in the post-communist era, the former Rzeczpospolita, i.e. Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus, have common political characteristics, such as semipresidentialism (in contrast to parliamentarism in the former “German,” including Ostzei/Estonia and Latvia, territories) and the protesting/volatile voting behavior of the population. During the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine (2004) such leaders as Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Valdas Adamkus, and even Lech Wałęsa expressed their will to mediate the conflicting parties. Without a sense of common fate shared by the countries deriving from the former PolishLithuanian state this kind of intervention would not have taken place. Recent events, the victory of this “Orange Revolution” and the vigorous resurgence of Catholicism in Right Bank Ukraine and Western Belarus might possibly strengthen the homogeneity of the former PolishLithuanian territories. Another issue raised in the symposium was to what extent location matters. It is true that the events in the Visegrad/Baltic countries, Central Eurasia, and the Russian Far East cannot be understood without considering their proximities to “Old Europe,” the Middle East and the East Asia/Pacific Rims. As was shown by the example of the quick demise of the Baltic identity, however, neighboring location does not always matter. From the historical point of view, Marina Mogilner (Chapter 13) and Norihisa Yamashita (Chapter 15) argue that if we focus on the relations between mega-areas (empires), what matters is common values and ethics, not geographic proximity. The discussion at the symposium confirmed a widely recognized fact that we cannot reconstruct spatial perceptions in the postcommunist territories without rejecting nation-based interpretations of histories and contemporary situations of these territories. Yaroslav Hrytsak (Chapter 2) explains the formation of the Ukrainian nation and identity as a result of multi-layered, complex interactions of the Steppe, Rus’, Polish, Habsburg, Russian imperial, and Soviet

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traditions.4 Dmitry Gorenburg (Chapter 4) proposes a concept of mesonations, an example of which is the Tatars. Their relations with the meganation (meaning Russians in the case of the Tatars) change according to political conjuncture, exactly as meso-areas begin to assert themselves when the mega-area they belong to faces crisis. Chapter 12 by Andrzej Nowak describes the centuries of vacillation which the Poles experienced between imperial and purely ethnic identities. Nowak finds a crucial factor in this process in ethnic Poland’s relations with the former territories of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (the present Lithuania, Belarus and Right Bank Ukraine), thus confirming the argument presented in Chapter 14 by Darius Staliūnas. The chapters by Hrytsak, Nowak and Staliūnas make us understand why ethnocentric historiographies could not have become dominant in these countries, which seemed quite nationalistic in their struggle against Moscow, in the post-communist era. The experience of an empire or mega-area (the Polish-Lithuanian state) in the medieval and early modern periods left the concept of “political nation,” which counterbalanced the ethnocentric historiographies and political actions in times, for example, of Romantic nationalism from the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries and of Perestroika. Another issue of the symposium was the strength of the centrifugal and centripetal forces affecting Slavic Eurasia: whether this mega-area will remain as such or be torn apart in the twenty-first century. Chapters 10 and 11 by Dmitry Makarov and by Magomed-Rasul Ibragimov and Kimitaka Matsuzato provide case studies of interaction of external temptation and internal cohesion affecting a peculiar Slavic Eurasian region, namely Dagestan. Both chapters argue against the overestimated understanding of the danger of “Wahhabism” in the North Caucasus. Makarov analyses the inherent limitations of the Salafite movement in Dagestan and Chechnia. Ibragimov and Matsuzato describe the unexpected stability of Dagestan’s socio-political structure, focusing on territorial communities (jamaats) and the Sufi tradition. Generally, in contrast to Visegrad/Baltic countries’ approach to the European megaThis approach is timely also because the turmoil caused by the presidential elections in 2004 again provoked the banal bipolar understanding of Ukraine: the pro-Russian Eastern and the pro-European Western Ukraine. 4

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area, which has actually been accompanied by structural changes of their societies, Central Eurasia’s approach to the Islamic world has only declarative characteristics or is just a journalistic exaggeration. This is also confirmed by Chapter 18, by Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, who analyzes Tatarstan’s paradiplomacy. The analytical flexibility of the concept of meso-areas was proved by Part II, devoted to collective case studies of an Orthodox and reformslacking meso-area composed of Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova. Based on wide-ranging public opinion surveys, Chapter 5 by Stephen White and Ian McAllister concludes that Moldova looks too exceptional to be categorized into any of the meso-areas in Slavic Eurasia. Citizens of this country have tangibly preserved Soviet values but are salient in their pro-Western (pro-EU and pro-NATO) orientation. However, I am obliged to add that a similar “contradiction” is also observed in Ukraine, as Yaroslav Hrytsak demonstrates. Chapters 6 and 7 by Shinkichi Fujimori and Oleksandr Syniookyi focus on two determining factors of Ukrainian politics, patrimonial clientalism and strong presidentialism. These chapters were written before the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine, but they explain not only the background of this “revolution” but also the objective limitations of Ukrainian politics, which will prevent us from idealizing this “revolution.”5 Chapters 8 and 9 by Andrei Lobatch and Go Koshino propose new approaches to Belarusian politics. Lobatch explains the mechanism of “verbal Eurasianization” (the phraseology of the unification with Russia) exploited by A. Lukashenka to make his regime more legitimate, which is comparable to the function of “verbal Europeanization” in Ukrainian and Moldavian politics. Koshino’s chapter revises the widespread stereotype of the weakness of Belarusians’ national identity and argues that mixed language use and the artificial creation of a Belarusian pornographic lexicon, both of which are byproducts of the “weak national identity,” might enrich the possibilities of Belarusian literature. Recently, Henry Hale proposed a concept of “patronal presidentialism” to explain why these apparently invincible regimes based on clientalism and strong presidency can be defeated in elections. See his paper “Institutions and Transitions: The Russian Federation and Ukraine,” presented at the International Symposium “Reconstruction and Interaction of Slavic Eurasia and Its Neighboring Worlds” (Hokkaido University, 8-10 December 2004). 5

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Chapter 16 focused on an unrecognized state in the postcommunist territories, Abkhazia, was included in this collection not because of the assumption that a “clash of civilizations” (between megaor meso-areas) caused the military conflicts around this issue. On the contrary, I believe that these conflicts have deeply subjective characteristics. Unrecognized states attract our attention because this issue reveals the multiple layered characteristics of the conflicts in the post-communist territories. At the global level we face a lack of rules to recognize the territories requesting independence and the geopolitical rivalry between the US, Russia and “Old Europe,” for example, around the Trans-Caspian pipelines. At the regional level (composed of the meso-area and the neighboring outer countries) we find the unexpected influence of regional powers, such as Turkey, Iran, Ukraine, and Romania, on the problem of unrecognized states. At the host state level we should pay attention to the “role” of the Transnistrian, NagornoKarabakh, and Abkhazian problems in the domestic politics of Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. At the territorial level we will be surprised to recognize that we know almost nothing about the political regimes and societies of these unrecognized states. The last thing to remark upon in this introduction is the rules for transcription. In principle, this collection transcripts Cyrillic into Latin letters. However, for Chapter 9, devoted to Belarusian literature, transcription would create unnecessary difficulties for readers (in particular, specialists of the issue) and, therefore, we did not transcript Cyrillic letters. We rely upon the standard Library of Congress system, so we, in principle, use “ia,” “iu,” and “e” (not “ya,” “yu,” and “ye”) for Russian я, ю, and е. However, proper nouns widely accepted in English-speaking countries (such as Yeltsin, Yushchenko, Yanukovych, and Yuliia Tymoshenko) and the names of the participants in this collection with a preference for other rules (such as Yaroslav, not Iaroslav, and Dmitry, not Dmitrii) are exceptions to this rule. We relied upon contemporary English place names (Warsaw, not Warszawa; St. Petersburg, not Sankt-Peterburg; Moscow, not Moskva), but when the place names per se are political issues (Kiev or Kyiv; Minsk or Mensk), we relied upon the preference of the quoted authors.

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PART I CONCEPTUALIZING MESO-AREAS

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1 REGIONAL IDENTITIES AND MESO-MEGA AREA DYNAMICS SLAVIC EURASIA: FOCUSED ON EASTERN EUROPE OSAMU IEDA

The mega- area of the northern half of Eurasia, the former Soviet Union and the East European regions, has changed its face dramatically since the collapse of the communist regimes. Four states in the area, USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and GDR, disappeared, and altogether 27 states came into existence. The number would be thirty or more, when including Transnistria (Pridniestr), Abkhazia, Kosovo, and so on, which are not yet recognized as independent states. Following these changes, post-communist regional cognitions are almost chaotic.1 Research institutes have not yet created any common naming for the area and its regions. 2 Rather, they have changed the definitions from time to time; initially there was a trend to divide the area into regions to be analyzed separately,3 and recently re-unification of the divided units with a new name, Eurasia, is the fashion. What are the connotations of Eurasia? The answers are again chaotic, because, for one thing, Eurasia greatly deviates from the common understanding, that is, Asia and Europe as the whole continent. Even if we understood it as an academic jargon – namely, Eurasia relates only to the post-communist countries – its coverage is quite different among users. A symbolic example is Eurasian Geography and Economics, an academic journal, whose former names were Post-soviet Geography “… regional studies are challenged by a lack of precise definition as thematic strive to overcome geography. What are the components of a region or regional studies? … Who are we?”: quoted from Maria Carlson, “Old Battles, New Challenges,” Newsnet: News of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 43:5 (2003), p. 2. 2 The cover story of the first issue of Europe-Asia Studies, “From Soviet Studies to EuropeAsia Studies” reflects well the difficulty how to name the post-communist domains meaningfully; Europe-Asia Studies, 45:1 (1993), pp. 3-6; George J. Damko and Matthew J. Sagars, “Post-Soviet Geography,” Post-Soviet Geography, 33:1 (1992), pp. 1-3. 3 Kimitaka Matsuzato, Chuikiken no gainen nitsuite [On the Concept of Meso-areas], http://src-home.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/research-e.html. 1

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till 2002 and Soviet Geography till 1992. This journal now “features … geographic and economic issues in the republics of the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, and the socialist countries in Asia.” The other end of the usage-scale, that is, the narrowest definition of Eurasia, may be the “Russian and Eurasian Studies Centre” at St Antony’s College, the University of Oxford, formerly the Russian and East European Centre till July 2003. The center says in its circulation letter, “After covering Eastern Europe for more than a decade of postcommunist transition, we decided that the region’s ‘migration’ to Europe was so advanced that it should also migrate within the College and come under the European Studies Centre. We shall continue to concentrate on Russia and move to develop our research on Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia. The new name of the Centre was chosen to convey this geographical coverage, not in any way to signal ‘Eurasianist’ leanings!” Compared with these flexible and ‘geographical’ ways of regional perceptions of the mega- area, the ‘disciplinary’ naming of the area seems rather chronological and stiff. Specifically, the new nations and states in the area, though more than ten years have passed since the systemic changes happened, are still called ‘transition’ economies or ‘postcommunist’ countries. Though this naming does not help us to perceive and describe the diversity within the area, it clearly suggests the common heritage of the area from the communist past. Indeed, for many cases we could not draw any closer pictures of the emerging political and economic institutions and the behaviors or value systems in the area without taking into consideration the communist legacies.4 Besides, the peoples in the area still share an identity based on common experiences in the communist era. This is the reason why the peoples still use “we” when identifying themselves with the former communist camp as a See, for example, Kimitaka Matsuzato, “From Communist Boss Politics to PostCommunist Casiquismo: the Meso-elite and Meso-governments in Post-Communist Countries,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34 (2001), pp. 175-201, and his other related papers; James Toole, “Straddling the East-West divide; Party organization and communist legacies in East Central Europe,” Europe-Asia Studies 55:1 (2003); Osamu Ieda, ed., Transformation and Diversification of Rural Societies in Eastern Europe and Russia (Sapporo, 2002); Osamu Ieda, ed., The New Structure of the Rural Economy in Post-Communist Countries (Sapporo, 2001); Osamu Ieda, ed., The Emerging Local Governments in Eastern Europe and Russia, Historical and Post-Communist Developments (Hiroshima, 2000). 4

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whole even nowadays. We call this bond with the common past of the mega-area as the institutional identity. So the institutional identity is, more or less, based on reality. In this context, the terms, ‘transition’ and ‘post-communist’, are still useful. However, the ‘disciplinary’ naming is not sufficient for us, because the diversity within the mega-area has developed more and more clearly. Thus we have to consider not only “the region’s ‘migration’” but also the regions’ ‘migration’, or emerging meso-areas in our terminology. The ‘disciplinary’ naming can suggest only a set of possibilities in post-communist development; that is, market economy and parliamentary democracy. In reality, various regions or sub-regions came into existence in the mega area, such as Central Asia, Caucasia, South Eastern Europe, Central Eastern Europe, Russian Far East, Eastern and Western Siberia. So far, we have no systematic frames how to categorize and analyze these regions and Eurasia.5 Instead, the borders of the former states and republics still function for grouping the regions, such as the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Baltic and CIS countries, or East Central Europe and the Balkans.

Katharine Verdery’s “regionalization” likely suggests a trend of regions’ migration. See her “Post-Soviet Area Studies?,” Newsnet: News of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies 43:5 (October 2003), pp. 7-8. 5

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The purpose of this paper is to create concretely a new methodological terminology to analyze the emerging regions, or mesoareas; changing regions both in regional perceptions and in political and economic institutions. Our main object to be interpreted by the new terminology is the post-communist meso-areas emerging in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, or the Slavic Eurasian Mega-area in our geographical definition. The mega-area is a changing unit, whose regions have shared the Soviet type of political and economic institutions, and an identity as well in its active and passive senses. The mega-area is, though the communist regime collapsed, still a unit combining meso-areas on the basis of institutional identity, and it likely remains a unit, though it may be looser and looser in the future. At the same time, we aim to review the current regional divisions based on the state borders from a new perspective of meso-areas. We aim also to temper the new terminology so that the terminology of meso- and megaareas would help us to understand better any areas and regions in the world which are changing their identities under regional or global integration.6 In this paper, firstly, we will define the key concept, meso-areas, by regional integration, institutional identity, self-identity, and external identity. Then, in the second half of the paper, we try to generalize the notions of meso- and mega-area. The notions were initially invented in order to understand systematically the changing and reorganized Slavic Eurasia, but, supposing that the notions could be useful beyond the area, we formulate the dynamics of meso- and mega-areas in a general setting. Finally, synthesizing the notions, we find that they could de- and re-construct the modern unilateral perspectives of the world regions.

See Mie Ooba, “Kyokai-kokka to tiiki no jiku ron [Border States and Spatial Definition of Areas],” Leviathan 26 (2000), pp. 99-131. This essay tries to conceptualize the changing identities of some countries (Japan and Australia) under the pressures of regional-global integration in the Asian-Pacific area. 6

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MESO- AND MEGA-AREAS IN SLAVIC EURASIA INSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY AND REGIONAL DIS- AND RE-INTEGRATION A meso-area is a changing part of a mega-area in its regional perceptions and institutions. This change happens when the mega-area diminishes its centripetal forces and/or is challenged by an external momentum, such as an economic-political integration by a neighboring region, a cultural influence, an economic expansion, or an impact of globalization. A meso-area is, therefore, a product of the relatively weakening mega-area. At the same time, it premises that the megaarea still sustains the centripetal force sufficiently enough to keep the meso-areas under its visible or invisible hands. In other words, mesoareas stand on the balance between the centripetal force of the Megaarea and the external momentum. The centripetal force on a meso-area is embodied by factors such as political and economic institutions, experiences, pattern of behaviors, and ecosystems. These are the institutional identity of the meso-area, which is shared by the other meso-areas in the same mega-area. We can call this identity as Sein. In contrast to this, a common external momentum functions as Sollen in a meso-area. For example, in the case of the relations between the East European meso-area and Western Europe, the EU norms, Acquis Communautaire, are Sollen for the candidate countries to accept and to implement in order to be members of the EU. The set of market economy and parliamentary democracy is also a norm, but is not a specific Sollen to EU membership. It is a general Sollen in the global integration. The East European Meso-area, although mentioned often here and in the following as an example, is not regarded as typical. It is rather a unique case, where dis- and re-integration is carried very systematically and comprehensively. The reason why the region is taken for our examples is that it would clearly show us an intensive and condensed course of meso-area formation. The European integration, additionally, seems very social, compared to other dis- and re-integrations in Slavic Eurasia, namely, the East Asian integration toward the Siberia and Russian FarEast Meso-area is restricted to the economy, and as for Central Eurasia

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(Central Asia, Caucasia, and a part of the southern Russian Federation), the external momenta are individual and multiple, for example, Islamic, South Asian, and Chinese factors are mixed in this meso-area. Other mesoareas may be supposed according to the meso-area formulation presented later in this paper. A meso-area is a field where the momenta of the two different dimensions, Sein and Sollen meet and interact with each other, and this meeting and interacting provides dynamism to the meso-area. Due to the dynamism, the meso-area’s spatial borders are variable. For instance, again the East European Meso-area under the integration pressure of Western Europe is the case. The eight countries – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia – will have full membership of the EU in May 2004. Then the second candidate group consisting of Romania and Bulgaria may become member countries in the near or medium future, and potentially Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro, and even Ukraine, Belarus7 and Moldova8 can be candidates of EU membership in the distant future. Moreover, we have no definite reasons to eliminate possibilities for Caucasian countries to enter the EU in the more distant future, though Russia will less likely realize its membership of the EU. In any case, the essential point here is that the reach of EU integration pressure and the people’s will for EU membership – a new regional self-identity as Sollen – is changeable and flexible. Actually the pressure and the self-identity are interactive. As a consequence, the East European Meso-area is elastic enough to change its borders, and thus the meso-area is not necessarily identical to the current candidate countries for EU membership. A meso-area is applicable for this kind of flexible unit that may vary its shape in accordance with the changing identities. Sollen is a will of human beings, without which no new regional identities could be evoked, and is reflected in self- and external regional identities. Therefore, meso-areas inseparably relate to cognition of the peoples in the concerned regions. See Uladzimer Rouda, “The Reserves of the Policy of Soviet Populism in Modern Belarus,” presented at the international symposium “Emerging Meso-areas in the Former Socialist Countries: Histories Revived or Improvised?” held from 28-31 January 2004 at SRC, Hokkaido University. This Belarusian author suggests EU as “the third way for a more suitable” alternative than the union with Russia. 8 See Chapter 6. 7

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REGIONAL SELF-COGNITION As seen above, meso-areas are a regional notion to be defined substantially (that is, institutional identities) on the one hand, and also a perceptional notion to be identified by the peoples in the related regions, especially including the neighboring peoples (that is, perceptional identities). Therefore, essential for a meso-area is how the people recognize their own region firstly (self-identity), then, secondly, how its external or neighboring regions recognize it (external identity).9 The peoples in Eastern Europe, for example, changed their regional self-perception from “Eastern Europe” to “Central Europe” at the beginning of the systemic changes.10 Their “Central Europe” is not one which really existed in history, such as the Mitteleuropa of Nazi Germany in the Inter-war period or the Habsburg Empire before WWI. The post-communist Central Europe was, first of all, a statement that they rejected “Eastern Europe” as it had been inseparable from the socialist experience. Instead, the people wanted to be Europeans, or West Europeans. “Return to Europe” was their pronouncement at that time. However, the new selfcognition, ‘Central’, implied another clear self-understanding, that is, that they were not yet full members of Europe due to the institutional identity. Thus the Central European identity reflected their perceptional location, which was neither Eastern nor Western; precisely speaking, no more Eastern, but not yet Western.11 ‘Central Europe’ is typically a meso-area self-identity, constructed by the relations between the past Asian studies, especially Southeast Asian Studies in Japan have had many surveys and theoretical essays on regional identities from the perspective of cognition, including regional self-cognitions; for example, Toru Yano, ed., Tonan Azia gaku no shuho [Methodology of Southeast Asian Studies], Series of Southeast Asian Studies, 1 (Tokyo, 1990), including Toru Yano, “Chiikizo wo motomete: soto bunmei to uchi sekai [Quest for New Images of Areas: External Civilization and Internal World],” pp. 1-30; T. Hamashita and N. Karashima, eds., Tiikishi toha nanika [What Is Regional History] (Tokyo, 1997), including the editors, “‘Chiiki no sekaishi’ no shiten to houhou [Perspectives and Methodology for the ‘World History of Regions’],” and T. Hamashita, “Rekishi kenkyu to chiiki kenkyu [Historical Studies and Area Studies].” Nevertheless, few works have been done, relating the interactions among various perceptions on regional identities. 10 See Timothy G. Ash, “Does Central Europe Exist?,” and other essays in The Use of Adversity, Essays on the Fate of Central Europe (New York, 1990), pp. 179-213. 11 Gusztáv Molnár, “The Geopolitics of EU-Enlargement,” Foreign Policy Review 1 (2002), pp. 39-45. 9

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and current reality (institutional identities) and the future belonging to be realized (perceptional identities). Triadic Dynamics of Regional Definition: Deviation, Interaction and Amalgamation Field (Meso-area) and cognition (Identity)

External Identity

Institutional Self Identity Identity DEVIATION

DEVIATION

MESO-AREA

(field) AMALGAINTERACTION MATION

No Triadic Dynamism: No Meso-Area

Stable Regional Identity

Institutional Identity

‘Central European identity,’ replacing the former identity of Eastern Europe in the initial stage of the post-communist era, was widely accepted among the peoples in Eastern Europe and in some parts of the former Soviet Union as well. However, its substantial uniformity became very suspicious in the following stages of post-communist development, because the region began to experience different courses inside. For instance, ways of nation-building, manners of response to the systemic changes, membership of European integration such as NATO and EU were different from each other’s. A considerable change could happen in the political and economic institutions. As a result, Central European identity was challenged both internally and externally. Consequently, divided perceptions began to shape according to the institutional realities; for example, “Central East European Countries (CEECs)” related to those countries which have adjusted themselves in a good student manner for adaptation of the EU norms. Some other countries, however, which were regarded as problematic students in their

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Europeanization or EU-nization, were labeled as South East Europeans – a sophisticated name for the Balkans – or under-developed reformist countries – those CIS countries whose systemic transformation was going on but very slowly or stagnantly, such as Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova.12 Central Europe, after all, became less useful as the common name for the regional identity of “No more Eastern but not yet Western”. The post-communist East European Meso-area identified itself as ‘Central Europe’ at the initial stage of the post-communist developments, then given various sorts of self- or external naming in accordance with the changing perceptions, has fluctuated its geographical coverage between the two ends: Western Europe, the Sollen, and Eastern Europe, the Sein. Floating perception is a basic feature for meso-area identities, but “No more Eastern but not yet Western” remains as the common regional identity for the East European Meso-area. Other meso-areas share a floating type of regional identity between their specific Sollen and the common Sein of the mega-area. With this common ambivalent consciousness, the peoples throughout the mega-area still identify themselves collectively as “we”. A self-identity of a meso-area, therefore, has no strict correlations with the institutional reality. Thus the East European Meso-area may cover any post-communist countries, which not only will have EU membership in 2004, but also may have it in the future, or only want to have it someday in the distant future. As a matter of fact, on the basis of the institutional identity, the difference between the divisions within the East European Meso-area is still in a phase of beginning, so the divisions within the Meso-area are relative. For example, some analysts consider that the It seems very difficult to name and categorize – eventually analyze – these countries commonly. “The outsiders” is given for the post-Soviet countries, which have “no immediate prospect of membership of the EU”, and “for the foreseeable future they will constitute a borderland between full members of the European family and the rest of the Eurasian landmass.” in S. White, I. McAllister, M. Light and J. Löwenhardt, “A European or a Slavic Choice? Foreign Policy and Public Attitudes in Post-Soviet Europe,” Europe-Asia Studies 54:2 (2002), p. 181. The idea of “the outsiders” and “borderland” can be overlapped with the conceptualization of the changing regions, meso-areas. “Near abroad” can be also a close notion, in a sense, to a meso-area in its Russian political usage. See, for example, relating the Diaspora question, Andrei Edemsky and Paul Kolstoe, “Russia’s policy towards the Diaspora” in Paul Kolstoe, Russian in the Former Soviet Republics (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1995), p. 259. 12

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CEECs are now consolidating their transition to EU membership, and South East European countries, on the contrary, still remain in a transition in which the nation-building can be an issue, and to be completed in time. However, the status law established in 2001 by Hungary, one of the CEECs, was scandalous enough to demonstrate that the process of nationbuilding or new nation-building was still a national and regional agenda for Hungary both politically and diplomatically. Moreover, the conflicts on the law between Hungary and its neighboring countries and between Hungary and the EU resulted in consolidation of the meso-area identity on both sides, the EU members and the candidate countries. The public statement of the Hungarian government below, released just after the negotiations with the EU over the question of public assistance by the law for private commercial companies, is a good example to the “No more Eastern but not yet Western” identity of the meso-area. “It was repeatedly required in the negotiation with the EU that we should respect the disciplines of fair competition. However, on this issue there were misunderstandings and controversies, and we might continue exchanges of opinions regarding the legal principles; namely, they should be concerned with the questions; for example, how indispensable the assistances to local industries were for the aim of preserving the national minority, or how contrary the assistances were against the fair competition. I will not explain this in details now. At any rate, we have accepted, for peace, the requirement to delete the related article of the draft, which clearly prescribed assistance to commercial companies.”13 (Italicized by the present author – O. I.)

This statement shows an ambivalent attitude, a floating identity, between the norms to be implemented for EU membership – here, fair competition in the market economy – and the reality or the institutional identity – preferential and anti-market assistance to the Hungarian minorities abroad. What is more essential is the connotation of “for peace”: namely, it means eventual neglect against the EU norm, since the Hungarian government inserted an additional phrase into the final draft of the law, which is de facto a revival of the deleted phrase.14 This ambivalent self-perception and behavior stimulated the EU to recognize Hungary as ‘not yet European’, that is, the EU’s external identity The statement of Zsolt Németh, “Hungarian Vice-Foreign Minister,” at the press conference on 13th June, 2001: www.kum.hu 14 The second sentence of the 18th article of the Status Law.

13

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toward the East European Meso-area; “No more Eastern but not yet Western”. This regional identity will very likely survive EU membership of the East European candidate countries both internally and externally.

REGIONAL IDENTITY AND EXTERNAL COGNITION We may give up drawing clear-cut boarders of meso-areas if introducing perceptional identities, that is, factors of Sollen or desire, into regional definition. However, spatial divisions of areas have never been objective. In fact, objective areas have never existed. They have been created according to external perceptions. Needless to say, for example, the postwar Eastern Europe and Western Europe, that is, the East-West division of Europe was constructed by the imperialist view of politics in the Cold War. Geographically or historically we have no categorical reasons to separate Greece, Turkey, Austria, the Baltic countries, Finland or other countries in the western part of the former USSR from the East or Central European region. Another case outside Slavic Eurasia is South East Asia. This area is well known for its colonialist naming, that is, the regional notion was created from the remaining parts other than the major Asian regions, which had been also made up by the imperialist divisions of the world. The world areas reflect directly the unilateral worldview of Orientalism. It is another problem that a colonialist unilateral cognition of areas has a crucial influence on the emerging regional self-identities; thus the East Europeans, for example, adjusted their identity to communist Eastern Europe, and then shared the concept of the communist camp in general.15 External regional identities are not necessarily coincident with the institutional identity of the meso-area or with the regional self-identity, either. The essential difference between the imperialist regional identity and the post-communist one is interactivity between the external and self perceptions in making the post-communist regional identity, and a working interactivity between the external and self- identities is fundamental for the formation of meso-areas. A regional identity is an 15 Miklós Szabó, Politikai kultúra Magyarországon (Budapest: Medvetánc Könyvek, 1989), pp. 225-251; Osamu Ieda, “The Zigzag Way of Thought of a Hungarian Populist,” Japanese Slavic and East European Studies 18 (1998), pp. 115-128.

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interactive product of self- and external perceptions, mutually influencing each other’s construction of regional identity, and a regional identity is re-makable when any side of the perceptions begins to change with or without new developments in the institutional realities. Meso-Area Dynamics-I Triadic Formation of Meso-Areas

Stable : No Triad External Identity

Initial Triad

Self Identity

TRIAD Institutional Identity

High Triad

FORMULATION OF MESO- AND MEGA AREA DYNAMICS MESO-AREA DYNAMICS Taking the factors above into consideration, we can re-define the regions in a general setting, in contrast to the world areas reinforced by the unilateral perceptions in the 20th century. Our regional definition is based on dynamics of the triadic identities; that is, deviation, interaction, and amalgamation among self-, external, and institutional identities. We call this the triadic dynamics of meso-area. Hypothetically we formulate the triadic dynamics as follows; 1) A regional cognition is stable when the institutional and selfregional identities correspond to each other. At this stage, an external

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identity or integration may exercise an influence on the other identities very restrictively. (No triadic dynamism, no meso-area) 2) A stable regional identity is based on a common value system between the self- and institutional identities in the region internally, but externally a common value may induce a triadic dynamism. In other words, a region eventually has no external identity when no value systems are shared by both of the peoples in the region and in its external world. Or, the opposite, a meaningful external cognition premises a common value system at any level with the residents in the region. (Stability of regional identities) 3) A region may have not single value systems; therefore it may have multiple identities. Thus, a region can have different regional identities at the same time in accordance with their corresponding external identities. (Multiple identity) 4) A regional cognition is to be de- and re-constructed if some considerable change happens in any of the three identities, resulting in deviation among the triadic identities. (Initial triad) 5) A meso-area emerges when all of the triadic identities begin to change under a new internal or external momentum, and the mesoarea exists as long as the triadic dynamics works among the changing identities. (High triad) 6) Meso-areas emerge differently depending on different self- and external identities within one mega-area, though the initial institutional identity is the same. (Various triad). Below we suggest a typology relating to the Slavic Eurasian Meso-areas. A) Intensive (communal) integration: the East European type of triadic dynamism. A societal membership is essential in this triad, and the membership requires the meso-area to accept the political, economic, social, and cultural criteria. Therefore, the interaction in the triadic dynamics should be high, and this process may need a long duration to complete the implementation of the comprehensive criteria. The intensive integration may result in a new community of the regions. (Communal type) B) Systemic integration: the Far Eastern and Siberian type of triadic dynamism. Economic relations are essential in this triad, and the interaction and amalgamation are high, though selectively. Namely, the integration is not inclusive over the other spheres of

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human and societal activities. This integration may bring about an economic system among the regions. The duration can be relatively short to make up the system due to the incomprehensive feature of the integration. (Systemic type) C) Extensive and individual (network) integration: the Central Eurasian type of triadic dynamism. A network membership is essential in this triad, and the membership requires the meso-area to accept the political, economic, social, and/or cultural criteria, though not communally, but individually. Because of the individuality of integration, the interaction and amalgamation is not necessarily high, at least superficially, and the integration process is not clear, though the triadic dynamics can bring about an extensive formation of networks among the regions. The duration can be short to make up the networks due to the individual feature of the integration. (Network type)16 These types of triad are inductive and hypothetic; therefore, they are not exclusive or comprehensive at all. 7) Multiple regional identities may not generate single triads (multiple triad) 8) Triadic dynamism does not necessarily result in a new region (final triad); A) A meso-area may go back into the original mega-area due to greater deviation, insufficient interaction, minor amalgamation, and a strong institutional identity. (backlash triad) B) A meso-area may be basically absorbed into the external integration due to sufficient interaction, minor amalgamation and strong external identity enough for disappearance of the specific regional identities of the meso-area (transitional triad). C) A meso-area may remain as a meso-area for a considerable duration due to greater deviation and insufficient amalgamation (transformational triad). In this triad a new regional identity may Tomohiko Uyama, “From Bulgharism through Marrism to Nationalist Myths: Discourses on the Tatar, the Chuvash and the Bashkir Ethnogenisis,” Acta Slavica Iaponica 19 (2002), pp. 163-190. 16

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engender among the various peoples in the meso-area.17 (A meso-area identity) D) A meso-area may grow into a new region through sufficient interaction and considerable amalgamation enough to create a unique regional identity (evolutional triad). 9) A mega-area can be identical with a single meso-area. 10) External momenta are generated by globalization and regional, economic, cultural, and other integration. 11) Requirements of external integration can be coincident with that of globalization, such as market economy, parliamentary democracy, World Trade Organization membership, and so on. In reality, however, the connotations of the requirements often deviate essentially from the original understandings, or their local implication and implementation is significantly different from each other’s. 12) Globalization prevents triadic meso-areas from backlash, but it does not necessarily dismantle areas and regions. Rather it works to de- and re-construct areas and regions in accordance with the single value system throughout the world, resulting in not only a transitional but also a transformational or evolutional triad.

MEGA-AREA DYNAMICS A mega-area emerges when a meso-area is emerging in it. Therefore, a mega-area is a companion notion of meso-area. At the same time, a pair of meso- and mega- areas must be complemented by emergence of another mega-area, which has external momentum on the meso-area. We call the former mega-area “exit mega-area,” and the latter “entry mega-area.” In other words, an emerging meso-area is accompanied by a pair formation of mega-areas. These mega-areas work For example, the Baltic peoples and the former East European peoples have had no significant common identity, and we may also talk about no mutual perceptions within the Baltic republics to be shared as a solid regional identity in the Soviet and earlier eras. However, a common status for EU membership, that is, the candidate countries, and the communist past (the institutional identity) create the common regional identities among the peoples in Baltic and East European countries. How consistent is the mesoarea identity depends on the type of triadic dynamics. 17

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just as the plus-minus electrodes in the triadic dynamics of meso-areas, and their functions – that is, the institutional and external identities in the meso-area – can be convertible from each perspective of the megaareas. From the viewpoint of the exit mega-area, namely, the institutional identity is less and less substantial or more and more reminiscent in the process from the initial to the high triad of the dynamics of meso-areas. This process, however, seems opposite from the perspective of the entry mega-area; that is, the institutional identity of the exit mega-area seems as an external identity for the entry mega-area, and the external identity for the exit mega-area functions as no other than the institutional identity for the entry mega-area. In this reversed perspective, the institutional identity of the entry mega-area becomes more and more substantial, or less and less normative along with the diminishing momentum of the exit mega-area. This reversibility is important all the more, when the exit and entry mega-areas may convert their positions on the way of the winding triadic dynamics. In brief, we understand the exit and entry mega-areas not as discrete categories but a transferable notion. The transferability may extend availability of the notion.

Meso-Area Dynamics-II Four Types of Final Triad of Meso-Area Exit Mega-area Backlash Triad

Area

Entry Mega-area

Meso-Area

Transitional Triad

Meso-Area

Transformational Triad

Meso-Area

Evolutional Triad

Meso-Area

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Meso-Area Dynamics-III Types of Regional Integration

Mesoarea

COMMUNAL TYPE Mega-Area EUROPEAN UNION

Central Eurasian

Mesoarea

NETWORK TYPE Mega-Area SOUTHERN EURASIA

Far Eastern & Siberian

Mesoarea

SYSTEMIC TYPE Mega-Area EAST

REGIONAL INTEGRATION

SLAVIC EURASIAN MEGA-AREA

East European

GLOBALIZATION

ASIA

Taking into account these relations among the three elements – mesoarea, exit mega-area, and entry mega-area -, we formulate the triadic dynamics of mega-area on the basis of the meso-area dynamics as follows; 1) No mega-area exists when no meso-areas emerged. 2) An emerging meso-area is accompanied by a pair of mega-areas; one is an exit mega-area, to which the meso-area has belonged, and the other is an entry mega-area, which exercises external momentum on the meso-area. These are the actors of the dynamism of the mega-area, and they correspond to the Triadic identities of meso-area. (Triadic Mega-area) 3) Triadic dynamics of the mega-area emerge differently depending on the triadic dynamics of the meso-area. (Various Triadic Mega-area) 4) A mega-area can be constructed entirely as a new domain. (Imagined triadic mega-area)

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5) Multiple triadic dynamics can emerge in a meso-area when plural external integrations work on the meso-area at a time. (Concentrative Triadic Mega-area)18 6) Multiple triadic dynamics can emerge in an entry mega-area when the entry mega-area exercises integration momenta not on single meso-areas. (Expansive triadic mega-area)

Meso-Area Dynamics-IV Interactive De- and Re-Construction of Meso-Mega Areas

Stable : No Triad

Region A

Initial Triad

Mega-Area A

High Triad

Mega-Area A’

Region B

MesoArea A

Mega-Area B

MesoArea A’

Mega-Area B’

7) Multiple triadic dynamics can emerge in an exit mega-area when not single meso-areas emerge in the exit mega-area. (Lethal Triadic Mega-area) 8) Triadic dynamics of a mega-area terminates differently depending on the final triad of the meso-area (Final Triadic Mega-area); A) Due to the backlash triad of the meso-area, the exit and the entry mega-areas superficially return to the original positions where the regions have been before, however, the triad may have caused and the potential triad may cause some changes in their regional identities, See Chapter 2 as a good case for this in the geographic, Rus’, Pole, Habsburg, and Soviet external identities in the Ukrainian Meso-area identity from the historical perspective. 18

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and these changes may induce a new triadic dynamism in the regions. (Backlash and Potential Triad of Mega-area Dynamics). B) Due to the transitional triad of the meso-area, the domain of the entry and the exit mega-areas changes noticeably. Moreover, the identities, the less visible features, of the regions have also changed in both of the meso- and mega-areas due to the interaction and amalgamation in the triadic dynamics. (Transitional Triad of Mega-area Dynamics) C) A triadic mega-area remains for a considerable duration, due to the transformational triad of the meso-area. Under the duration the exit and entry mega-areas may change their own regional identities by the impact of the triadic dynamism in the meso-area. (Transformational Triad of Mega-area Dynamics) D) Due to the evolutional triad of the meso-area, the exit megaarea diminishes its domain, and cannot help changing its regional identities, internally and externally. The entry mega-area, on the other hand, though remaining spatially as it has been, may have to review its regional self-identity because of the changing inter-regional relations due to the new region out of the triad. (Evolutional Triad of Mega-area Dynamics) 9) Globalization or the world systems are phenomena or effects of an expansive triad of mega-area dynamics. (Global Triadic Mega-area) 10) An exit mega-area may have experienced a triadic dynamics of mega-area as an entry one, and an entry mega-area, on the contrary, would experience a triadic dynamism as an exit one in the future. (Vicissitudinous Triadic Mega-area) 11) The positions of mega-areas, namely, exit and entry, are convertible in accordance with the process of the triadic dynamics of a Mega-area.

INFERENCE OF MESO-MEGA AREA DYNAMICS Formulating the meso- and mega-area dynamics in the previous sections, we have a basis to infer its implications from the triadic relations as follows;

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1) Parallels of integration in meso- and mega-areas: A meso-area is an objective to be integrated into a mega-area. In this respect, we may have a deduction on the correlation between the types of the triadic dynamics of the meso-area and the institutional identities of the entry mega-area. Namely, what generates the external momenta in the triadic dynamics of the meso-area is identical with none other than the patterns of integration in the entry mega-areas themselves. We may call it membership in the region. Regarding the Slavic Eurasian Meso-areas, the formulation of this parallel is as follows; 19 A) The communal type of triadic dynamism in the East European Meso-area corresponds to the societal membership in the EU Megaarea which requires the members to accept the political, economic, social, and cultural criteria. B) The systemic type of triadic dynamism in the Siberian and FarEastern Meso-area corresponds to the selective economic integration of the East Asian Mega-area which requires the members to accept the systemic economic relations in the regions. C) The network type of triadic dynamism in the Central Eurasian Meso-area corresponds to the network membership of the South Eurasian Mega-area which requires the members to accept the political, economic, social, and/or cultural criteria, though not communally, but individually. 2) Reversibility of meso- and mega-areas: meso- and mega-areas are theoretical and relational categories, not primordial notions. A mesoarea can develop into a mega-area, and an evolutional triad of mesoarea may stimulate the region even to grow into a mega-area. This can See the paradoxical developments of the modern state system in Western Europe; Takao Sasaki, “Kokusai sisutemu, kokusai shakai to chiiki sisutemu, chiiki shakai: Chuiki ken gainen wo megutte [System and Society; International Contra Regional: Reflections on the Concept “Meso-Area”],” presented at the SRC Forum of Regional Studies and Mesoareas on 26 November 2003, Hokkaido University. The paper suggests that “international public goods” provide the basis to Europe for the societal integration beyond the solid modern state system, though the system was created in Europe. On the contrary, no other regions than Europe have developed “international public goods” sufficiently. The implication of this thesis is that the East Asian economic integration, for example, can develop to the communal type of regional integration with a great difficulty, and thus it rather remains a sub-system under the solid state system. This contrast between Europe and Asia can be an economic and political background of the meso-area typology. 19

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happen through the way of the expansive triadic dynamism of megaarea. For instance, communist Russia had been a mega-area in the twentieth century, following the evolutional triadic dynamics of mesoarea in the capitalist European and the imperialist Russian Mega-areas in the nineteenth century. Another case in contemporary Eurasia is South East Asia. The region was created through a concentrative triadic dynamics of mega-area, including the Chinese, European, Japanese and American Mega-areas, and now the region is emerging as a mega-area through the expansive triadic dynamism, involving the neighboring countries and regions (from the ASEAN to the enlarging ASEAN). The East European Meso-area would develop into a unique region after a long winding process of transitional, transformational, and evolutional triadic dynamics due to the great cleavage symbolized by the difficulties to implement “the 31 chapters of Acquis Communautaire,”20 and then the region would develop further to a mega-area, inducing surrounding regions on the basis of “No more Western, rather Central European or Eurasian” identities. Or, what seems more likely to happen is that, while the meso-area is de- and re-constructed in accordance with the EU norms, de-EU-nization of the EU is brought about by the eastward enlargement of the EU. Namely, the triadic dynamism of the EU Mega-area, preparing its expansion of the membership, has changed its internal basic features. For example, the rule in decision-making of the EU changed fundamentally from the parity system among the member countries to the efficiency and hegemony discipline.21 If the mega-area enlarges further toward such regions as the south and east Mediterranean regions, the Black Sea region, the Middle East region, it might result in a totally new region with an identity of, for example, “Not only European, but also Eurasian – or No more European, but Eurasian”. 3) Eurasian dynamism: Due to a range of meso-areas emerging in the Slavic Eurasian Mega-area since the collapse of the communist regime, today’s Eurasian Continent consists of various mega-areas, Csaba Tabajdi, “The Re-formulation of the Central European Thought,” Foreign Policy Review 1 (2002), pp. 22-28. 21 See the Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts; http://europa.eu.int/ eur-lex/en/search/search_treaties.html

20

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linked and intermediated by the meso-areas. Therefore, any regions in the continent now interact cooperatively or competitively as the actors in the triadic dynamics of the meso-mega areas. This multiple and comprehensive dynamism in the Eurasian continent necessitates collaborations among the regional studies, such as East Asian, South East Asian, South Asian, Islamic, Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, European, North American, Slavic Eurasian Studies, and so on, because, otherwise, regional studies could not draw any actual realities or persuasive interpretations on the regions, and rejuvenate the regional studies in accordance with the changing Eurasia and the world as well. 4) Interactive formation of the world: The triadic dynamics of mesoand mega-areas may interpret the inter-regional relations in contemporary international relations and in world history as well in a different way from the unilateralist ones, such as Orientalism, dependence theory, the world system of modern capitalism, the colonial division of world areas, and so on. The triadic dynamics, instead, introducing the dual perceptional identities as the crucial and interactive factors in the formation of regional identities, could be a new cognitive framework to understand the regions (meso- and mega-areas) in the context of bilateral or multilateral interdependency. In other words, the emergence of meso-areas is an agency to cause a chain of changes in regional identities not only of meso-areas but also of mega-areas. Thus even the centers and the suzerains, or, in our terminology, the entry mega-areas, also change their own regional identities in effect of the meso-area formation, since the triadic dynamism de- and re-constructs the regional identities of both meso- and mega-areas. Thus the modern European identity was, in our understanding, nothing but a countercreature, when the Orient and the world areas were constructed by the European Mega-area; in brief, not “modern Europe” created the world areas, but the world meso-areas invented “modern Europe”. In the changing contemporary world, the global power requires the regions to acclimatize themselves to the market economy and parliamentary democracy as the normative identities, thus inducing Triadic dynamics throughout the world. The global triadic dynamism, in turn, brings about global issues out of regional or local issues of the meso- and exit mega-areas, or vice-versa, for example, human security,

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cross-border migration, socio-regional divisions, and environmental problems,22 and due to the concentration of these issues onto the entry mega-area in a natural effect of the triadic dynamics, the mega-area is more, or at least as much seriously threatened in its security over the lands and peoples as the meso-areas are threatened. This is the reality in the triadic dynamics with which the new identities are to be created regionally and globally as well. It is very likely that the new regional and global identities would be rather reluctant from “Free Movement of Good and Persons,” though the initial momentum of the triadic dynamism was the introduction of the free market system throughout the world. According to our formulation of the possible finals in the triadic dynamics, namely, among backlash, transition, transformation, and evolution, the global triad seems to be headed to one other than the expected one, transitional. At any rate, the most important and significant actors in our dynamics are the perceptional cognitions in the emerging identities; namely, the wills of human beings, and their interactivity in the triadic dynamics. Briefly, not the global power creates the world regions, but the meso-areas are inventing the future of global power and global identities as well.

See the interactive functions of the self- and external cognitions for inventing the historical identities of the regions, for example, Go Kato, “Minzoku shi to chiiki kenkyu, tasha heno manazashi [Ethnography and Area Studies: Looks Towards ‘Others’]” in T. Yano ed., Chiiki kenkyu no shuho [Methodology of Area Studies], (Tokyo 1993), pp. 104-106. 22

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2 ON SAILS AND GALES, AND SHIPS DRIVING IN VARIOUS DIRECTIONS: POST-SOVIET UKRAINE AS A TEST CASE FOR THE MESO-AREA CONCEPT YAROSLAV HRYTSAK “One ship drives east and another drives west With the selfsame winds that blow ’Tis the set of sails and not the gales Which tells us the way to go” Ella Wheeler Wilcox (1850-1919)

BEYOND A REVOLVING DOOR Since the collapse of communism, historians of Eastern Europe have been increasingly involved in the search for new paradigms for writing history. There are at least two sources of pressure for a paradigm shift. The first is political. The break-up of the Soviet Union undermined the vision of Eastern Europe as a solid block. It led to a reemergence of the alternative concepts of East Central Europe as a territory covering the former Rzeczpospolita [Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth] or Central Europe as the realms of the former Habsburg monarchy. Now, with EU enlargement in 2004, both concepts seem to be losing their salience; new political borders will divide countries that claimed common historical and cultural legacies (such as Ukraine and Belarus, on the one hand, and Poland, Lithuania, or Hungary on the other). The second reason for a paradigm shift is of an academic nature. It is related to the emergence of post-modernist and post-colonial interpretations. Combined with political changes, these have led to a loss of prestige of the old paradigms, organized around a class, an empire

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or a nation as the main research unit. The same goes for the West/East dichotomy that has been widely used in non-communist historiography of the region, and which is now very much discredited as a part of an orientalist discourse.1 Several strategies have been proposed for moving beyond a restricted research agenda. Some of them essentially stick to the old field of inquiry, even though they try to modify it by writing multiethnic/multicultural history, 2 combining national and social history,3 introducing recent theories of nationalism into East European studies,4 moving to a more fashionable cultural history,5 or using a comparative approach.6 Others suggest shifting to a broader “Eurasian”7 To be sure, these new Western trends have not shattered traditional historiographic discourses in Eastern Europe. In post-communist historiography, the only significant change has been a decline of the class paradigm, and, more generally (and more regrettably), of social history. Most indigenous historians still work along familiar empirical and/or national lines, and essentially are not interested in the newest theories and approaches. The search for a new paradigm reflects the delicate position of a much smaller group of scholars trying to bring their research agenda in line with recent developments in the Western academic world and thus “normalize” their own field. For a general overview of East European historiographies, see: Klio ohne Fesseln? Historiographie im östlichen Europa nach dem Zusammenbruch des Kommunismus, edited by Alojz Ivanisevic et al. (Wien, Frankfurt am Main, New York, 2002) 2 Andreas Kappeler, Russland as Vielvölkerreich. Entstehung – Geschichte – Zerfall (München, 1993); Mark von Hagen, “Does Ukraine Have a History?,” Slavic Review 54:3 (Fall 1995), pp. 658-673; Paul Robert Magocsi, A History of Ukraine (Toronto, Buffalo, London, 1996). 3 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past. Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford, 1993); Boris Mironov, The Social History of Imperial Russia, 1700-1917, Vol. 1-2 (Boulder: CO, Oxford, 2000). 4 See, for example, Yaroslav Hrytsak, Narys istorii Ukrainy. Formuvannia modernoi ukraiinkoi natsii (Kyiv, 1996); Aleksei Miller, “Ukrainskii vopros” v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraia polovina XIX v.) (St. Petersburg, 2000); Tomasz Kizwalter, O nowoczesności narodu. Przypadek Polski (Warsaw, 1999). 5 Orlando Figes, Natasha’s Dance: A Cultural History of Russia (London, New York, 2003). 6 Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, After Empire. Multiethnic Societies and NationBuilding. The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires (Boulder: CO, Oxford, 1997). See also two recent international projects that are underway in Moscow (“Empires, Comparative History, Development of Education in Russia Megaproject”: website address: www.empires.ru) and in Budapest (“Empires Unlimited University Seminar at the Central European University”: website address: www.ceu.hu/pasts) 7 Mark von Hagen, “Eurasia as a New Post-Soviet Paradigm,” American Historical Review 109:2 (2004), pp. 445-468. 1

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and even “global”8 context, or practicing so-called “entangled history.”9 Without denying the legitimacy of these strategies, this chapter suggests a new one: it seeks to test the validity of the meso-region concept in the light of recent empirical research on different aspects of post-communist transformation in Eastern Europe. Such a test helps us to move beyond the “revolving door” of discourse analyses,10 following the line of an argument that “the boundaries of the field can only be determined by empirical investigation.”11 The suggested approach reflects also a growing belief in the crucial role that diverse historical legacies play in shaping different patterns of post-communist economic, political, and cultural developments in Eastern Europe. As a Polish scholar has observed: “It was history that “carved” the regions, in the same way as it made states and nations. A historical factor was also very important for creating an ethnic situation, as well as cultural, linguistic, religious and economic ones. For this reason, the historical dimension [deserves] special attention.”12

This approach is not intended to replace the old teleological vision of history with a new one. Rather, it reflects an understanding that even during periods of radical change historical continuity has to be given its due. Or, to put it in terms of “path-dependence” theory, “where you can get to depends on where you’re coming from.”13 While tracing the structural constraints and advantages that the historical legacy imposes on the present, E. Thomas Ewing, “Russian History in Global Perspective,” NewsNet: News of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies 42: 4 (September 2002), pp. 1-4. 9 Philipp Ther, “Beyond the Nation: The Relational Basis of a Comparative History of Germany and Europe,” Central European History 36 (2003), pp. 45-74. 10 I borrowed this image from Nancy F. Partner, who defined “linguistic turn” in contemporary Western historiography as “a revolving door” in which “everyone went around and around and got out exactly where they got in” (Nancy F. Partner, “Historicity in an Age of Reality-Fictions,” Frank Ankersmith and Hans Kellner, eds., A New Philosophy of History (London, 1995), p. 22. 11 Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J.D. Wacqant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago, London, 1992), p. 100. 12 Roman Szul , Perspek tywy regionalizmu Galcyjskiego w Polsce na tle tendencji międzynarodowych, Jerzy Chłopiecki, Helena Madurowicz-Urbańska, eds. Galcija i jej dziedzictwo. Vol. 2. Społeczeństwo i Gospodarka (Rzeszów, 1995), p. 78. 13 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, 1993), p. 179.

8

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historians are at the same time enriching their understanding of the past. And by implication, they help us to see “what is alive” and “what is dead” in historical divisions between and within Eastern and Central Europe. As a case in point, I have chosen post-communist Ukraine. Until 1991, Ukraine was largely absent from dominant discourses in both “East” and “West,” and by the same token it has a strong “revisionist” potential to challenge them.14 Ukraine is per se an assemblage of different regions, each with a distinctive past, and regionalism is held to be a key factor in modern Ukrainian history.15 Because of its large size and internal regional diversity, Ukraine makes a perfect case for the issue under discussion; it can be simultaneously inscribed in different historical and geographical contexts and thus serve as a test for several concepts of meso-regions. To be sure, the suggested approach has its own limitations and shortcomings. They are, however, reduced to a minimum by the two following considerations: first, it limits itself to a test of old divisions and does not seek to introduce a new one; secondly, unlike a national paradigm, it does not treat Ukraine as something exceptional or pre-given. In my view, for the purpose of the suggested analyses Ukraine could be replaced by any other country or region of Eastern Europe.16 The choice of Ukraine is dictated by considerations of efficiency and - last but not least - of my personal convenience, since this is the case that I know best.17 I tried to develop this point in my “Wie soll man nach 1991 die Geschichte der Ukraine unterrichten?, ” Internationale Schulbuchforschung 23 (2001), pp. 1-25. 15 David Saunders, “Modern Ukrainian History,” European History Quarterly 21:1 (1991), p. 85. 16 So far I have found only one case of denial of “path-dependency theory” when it comes to former communist countries: Walter C. Clemens in his “Why Study the Baltics? How?” (NewsNet: The News of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies 42: 5 (December 2002), p. 2) writes that “Balts, however, were not ‘path dependent,’ as were Aalborg, Denmark, and Italy – north and south – according to major scholars. Their lives were shaped but not paralyzed by history – not straitjacketed by the long durée.” The quoted statement seems to be untenable, and it is based on an inadequate understanding of the theory; history “matters” in both success and failure of transformation, so even the Baltic success requires a “path-dependent” explanation. 17 Since 1994, as a director of Institute for Historical Research, L’viv National University, I have been involved in several interdisciplinary and international projects that dealt with regionalism in Ukraine, with a special focus on two cities, L’viv in Western and Donets’k in Eastern Ukraine. The results of these projects have been published in several articles (see footnotes 75 and 79 below). In addition, they will be presented and summarized in a separate collection of essays that will be published simultaneously as Volume 10 of the Institute’s Annual Ukraina moderna. 14

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DOES GEOGRAPHY MATTER? The recent turn in identity studies is characterized by a “return of geography,” the latter understood in the sense both of “real” (the impact of physical environment) and “symbolic” (constructed/imagined/ invented).18 The importance of the geographic factor in the Ukrainian case can be discerned from the very name of the country: Ukraine, like Baluchistan, Nagaland, Scotland, Zululand and others, is a country whose name reflects a claim upon special territory by a people.19 Since its very emergence, Ukrainian national historiography has seen the history of Ukraine as a function of its geography.20 While there seems to be a general agreement on this point, historians cannot agree on how geography affected identity formation. One school of thought sees Ukraine as a rather compact territory. Ukrainian historians who belong to that school emphasize the relative isolation of Ukrainian lands by forest belts in the west and the northeast, and by marshes in the northwest and mountains in the west and south. This isolation supposedly limited contacts on the Ukrainian-Russian, Ukrainian-Polish, Ukrainian-Belarusian and Ukrainian-Hungarian borderlands. Ethnic borders to a large extent coincided with later political and administrative divisions in Kyivan Rus’ and Rzeczpospolita, as is confirmed, among other things, by onomastic and toponomic data.21 It is not hard to place this school in the context of current discourses on nationalism: it shares the general assumptions of a trend that reifies ethnic groups as a thing. Its weak point lies in ignoring the transactional character of ethnic identity, since for any definition of what is and what is not a separate ethnic group, external factors are no See: David Hooson, “Afterword: Identity Resurgent – Geography Revived,” David Hooson, ed., Geography and National Identity (Oxford, Cambridge: MA, 1994), p. 369. 19 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism. The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, 1994). p. 77. 20 Mykhailo Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus’, Vol. 1, From Prehistory to the Eleventh Century (Edmonton, Toronto, 1997), pp. 7-12; Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, 3rd ed. (Toronto, Buffalo, London, 2000), pp. 3-5. For a brief overview see: Natalia Iakovenko, Paralel’nyi svit: Doslidzhennia z istorii uiavlenn’ ta idei v Ukraini XVI-XVII st. (Kyiv, 2002), pp. 334-336. 21 For a recent example of such views see: Yaroslav Isaevych, Ukraina davnia i nova: Narod, relihiia, kul’tura (L’viv, 1996), pp. 63-74. 18

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less important (to say the least) than the self-identification of the given group itself.22 In this sense, the making of Ukraine must be seen not only as a result of a growing identification within a certain group, enhanced by its geographical isolation, but of numerous encounters of various groups over geographic borders as well. Adherents of the other school of thought claim that it is precisely the absence of clear-cut geographic borders that has constituted an essential feature of Ukrainian history,23 and, by implication, affected identity formation. The modern Ukrainian ethnic territory is part of the vast East European plain that runs from west to east as far as the Ural Mountains and is bounded on the north and south by the Baltic and Black Seas. In contrast, say, to the French “isthmus,”24 the plain never formed a single and coherent territory. It has often been called “a paradise for generals,” since this part of the European continent displays no major geographic barriers that would hinder the planning of largescale military operations.25 The only exception is the Prypiat (Pripiat) marshes in Polissia (Полісся) – now part of the border region between Belarus and Ukraine. They were hard to cross and hindered the progress of large armies, as was the case with Charles XII’s campaign in 1706 and with the Nazi offensive in the summer of 1941.26 But even the Prypiat problem was of a relative character; the marshes could not stop the progress of the Russian troops during so-called “Brusilov offensive” in 1916 or of the Red Army during the Polish-Soviet war in 1920 and World War II in 1943. In any case, the geographic isolation of Polissia never led to the emergence of a separate East Slavic Polishchuk nation (even For a recent critique of the primordial approach (which, paradoxically, affected both national non-communist and Soviet historiographies of the region) see: Florin Curta, The Making of the Slavs. History and Archeology of the Lower Danube Region, c. 500-700 (Cambridge: UK, New York, 2001), pp. 6-35. 23 See, e.g.: Omelian Terletskyi, Vplyv pryrody na istoriiu Ukrainy (Lviv, 1930), p. 30; Magocsi, A History…, p. 5. 24 Fernand Braudel, The Identity of France. Vol. I. History and Environment (translated from the French; New York, 1988), pp. 265-300. 25 Norman Davies, Orzeł biały, czerwona gwiazda. Wojna polsko-bolszewicka 1919-1920 (Kraków, 1997), p. 29. This is translated from: White Eagle, Red Star: the Polish-Soviet War, 1919-20 (London, 1983). 26 A. Filippi, Pripiatskaia problema. Ocherk operativnogo znacheniia Pripiatskoi oblasti dlia voennoi kampanii 1941 goda (Moscow, 1959); Andrei Kotliarchuk, Shvedy u historyi i kul’tury belarusau (Mensk, 2002), p. 184. 22

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though attempts at such belated nation-building were made by local intellectuals during the Gorbachev era).27 Whether geography matters for the making of Ukrainian ethnic borders with Russia, Poland, Belarus and Hungary remains a matter of dispute. There is, however, agreement between the two schools when they discuss the role of a large steppe zone in the southeast. The Ukrainian steppe forms the western part of a long Eurasian belt that starts in Mongolia and extends through southern Siberia, Central Asia, the southern Ural and Lower Volga regions, and the Don area up to the Black Sea coast, ending in Romania. Rich in natural resources, with a warm, dry climate, it was an ideal environment for cattle breeding and served as a broad corridor where nomadic people roamed unhampered by any geographical barriers. The presence of a great steppe zone, underpopulated because of continuous attacks — first by nomadic people, and then (sixteentheighteenth centuries) by Crimean Tartars — is considered to be one of the most characteristic features of Ukrainian history. It is responsible, among other things, for the multiethnic character of the population.28 Uncontrolled by any political body, the steppe attracted thousands and thousands of refugees, colonizers, and adventurers, who found shelter and constructed military settlements there, like the Zaporozhian Host. The situation changed by the end of the eighteenth century, when the Ukrainian steppes were incorporated into the Russian empire and both the Crimean Tartar Khanate and the Zaporozhian Host were abolished. The multiethnic character, however, persisted. Under the Russian empire (1785-1917) and in the Soviet Union (1917-1991), the steppe zone was a center of a booming agriculture, modern industry and rapid urbanization. It gave a rise to a huge economic migration from the adjacent Ukrainian and Russian cores, as well from the Black Sea coast and the Balkans. This nation-building started in 1985, with the first publication of a literary work in a Polishchuk patois. In 1988, an organization, “Polissia,” was founded to promote a separate Polishchuk identity. In 1990, Polishchuk nation-builders started to publish their newspaper “Prabudzhennia” (“Прабуджэння” meaning “Awakening”) and came out with a political program. In 1994, Polishchuk put up their own candidate for the presidential election in Belarus. After the victory of Lukashenka the movement ceased to exist; its last manifestation was a festival of Western Polissia songs in 1996. See: Andrei Dyn’ko, “Nainoushaia historyia iatsviagau,” (http://www.geocities.com/g_naumovets/jitvegi.htm). 28 Alfred Rieber, “Struggle Over the Borderlands,” S. Frederick Starr, ed., The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (New York, London, 1994), p. 61-90. 27

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As a land allegedly awash with “milk and honey” and inhabited by savage, untamed people, the Black Sea steppe was a powerful concept in imaginary geography. This image can already be found in Herodotus and Ovid. During the Enlightenment, the Ukrainian steppe played a very important role in shaping the term “Eastern Europe.”29 It is strongly rooted in modern Russian, Polish and Ukrainian intellectual traditions as a symbol of a free and glorious past. From the early Romantics onwards, it acted on peoples’ minds like a powerful leaven. In the specific context of Ukrainian intellectual history, the Zaporozhian Host and Cossack Ukraine were sacralized by many authors, Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861) above all. It became a major historical and geographical symbol around which the image of Ukraine as the national homeland revolved. 30 In terms of political geography, the steppe remained a territory that was hard for any political regime to control, the Soviet included; in 1919 and then again in 1930 it was a zone of mass peasant uprisings and wars, and by the end of Soviet rule there had emerged a mass workers’ movement that contributed strongly to the fall of Communist power. The geographic division between the settled forest and unsettled steppe zones persists in contemporary Ukraine. According to the last Soviet (1989) census, the region west and north of the steppe frontier had a population that is 84.8 percent Ukrainophone, while in the territory east and south of it only 18.7 percent used the Ukrainian language.31 In the first years of Ukrainian independence, the ethnolinguistic and geographical cleavage acquired a dangerous political dimension. During the 1994 presidential elections, the rivalry between two main candidates developed into a political antagonism between the two large regions: the Ukrainian-speaking west and north voted for Kravchuk, and the Russian-speaking east and south opted for Kuchma. These 29 Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford, 1994). 30 George Grabowicz, “Between History and Myth: Perception of the Cossack Past in Polish, Russian and Ukrainian Literature,” American Contribution to the Ninth International Congress of Slavists (Kyiv, 1983), pp. 173-188; idem, The Poet as Mythmaker: A Study of Symbolic Meaning in Taras Sevcenko (Cambridge, MA, 1982). 31 Dominique Arel, “Ukraine: The Temptation of the Nationalizing State,” Vladimir Tismaneanu, ed., Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, London, 1995), p. 169.

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developments gave a rise to alarmist scenarios about forthcoming civil war and a possible death of the young nation state.32 These fears, fortunately, proved to be groundless in the longer term. The next presidential and parliament elections in 1998, 1999 and 2002 revealed that regional differences in Ukraine are in fact subsiding. Despite this tendency, the image of “two Ukraines”, or of Ukraine as “a cleft country”33 continues to be very persistent in political writings. This “imaginary political geography” remains a source of concern for both the presidential party and the opposition in their struggle for power. To conclude this part, one has to say that geography firmly places the Ukrainian case in a Eurasian context. The geographical peculiarities of Eurasia – a large expanse of space without interior geographical divisions – led to wholesale confusion and to contests over the definition of territorial and ethnic boundaries. It has been said, “[t]here is probably no other region of the world in which empire building and state-building have been subject to such ambivalence.”34

THE LEGACY OF RUS’ Among other long-term factors, in the Ukrainian case the legacy of Christianity is first in importance. It traces its beginning from the baptism of the Kyivan princedom of Rus’ by Volodymyr (Vladimir in Russian) in 988. With the break-up of Christianity (1054) into Western and Eastern branches, Rus’ came to represent the church unity of the East Slavs, as reflected in the ecclesiastical title of the metropolitanate “of Kiev and of all Rus’.” This was the sole unity that Rus’ possessed. “Ukraine – The Birth and Possible Death of a Country,” The Economist, 7 May 1994. Mykola Riabchuk, Vid Malorosii do Ukrainy: paradoksy zapizniloho natsietvorennia (Kyiv, 2000); Idem, Dvi Ukrainy: Real’ni mezhi, virtual’ni viiny (Kyiv, 2003); Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York, 1996), pp. 165-168. For a critique see: Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Dylemy ukrajins’koho natsiotvorennia, abo shche raz pro stare vyno u novykh mikhakh,” Ukrains’kyi humanitarnyi ohliad 4 (2000), pp. 11-33; Paul Globe, “Russia: Analysis From Washington – The Specter of Disintegration,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/ 2001/03/ 22032001112304.asp) (last visited on March 26, 2001). 34 Mark R. Bessinger, “The Persisting Ambiguity of Empire,” Post-Soviet Affairs 11:2 (1995), p. 180. 32

33

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No political concept of a single complete Rus’ state emerged either in the Kyivan period (tenth to thirteenth centuries) or later; there was no single ruler in the Rus’ territory, only a single spiritual authority. The origins of the term Rus’ are very obscure. It has numerous etymologies, and they place it in different cultural and political traditions.35 Originally, the term was used for a small region on the right bank of the Dnieper, around Kyiv; later, it evolved into a broader meaning as a term for the whole East Slavic territory. Its derivatives were also used to describe certain territories (Red Rus’ for Galicia; White Rus’ for contemporary Belarus, but, at one period, also for the Ukrainian lands of Kyiv and Volyn’ [Volhynia],36 Black Rus’, Little Rus’, and Great Rus’, Southern and Northern Rus’, and, lastly, all Rus’). More often than not, these terms were not the proper names but described the fluctuating legal status of the East Slavic lands and people.37 On the basis of the extent of use of the Church Slavonic language, historians and linguists define this vast region as Slavia Orthodoxa, or Byzance après Byzance. It comprised, along with the East Slavs, Romanians and Balkan Slavs as well. Within that space, there emerged some common features of high culture, such as sacral architecture, painting, and music,38 as well as a popular culture shared by Eastern Christian peasants until World War I.39 There were also some important intellectual patterns. Eastern Christianity, transplanted from the Byzantine Empire to Eastern Slavic territory, limited itself to emulating Byzantine (Greek) cultural achievements, never seeking to supersede them. It was marked by an extreme dogmatism and conservatism, and poverty of intellectual production. Suffice it to say that the range of reading of a literate Orthodox Evhen Nakonechnyi, Ukradene imia. Chomu rusyny staly ukraintsamy (L’viv, 2001), pp. 33-70. 36 Nicholas Vakar, Belorussia. The Making of a Nation (Cambridge: MA, 1956), pp. 2-3. 37 Borys Floria, “Evoliutsiia znachennia terminu ‘Rus’ i pokhidnykh vid neho u skhidnoslovians’kykh dzherelakh XII-XIV stolittia,” Yaroslav Hrytsak and Yaroslav Isaevych, eds. Druhyi mizhnarodnyi kongres ukrainistiv. L’viv, 22-28 serpnia 1993. Dopovidi i povidomlennia. Istorija. 1 (L’viv, 1994), p. 3; Omeljan Pritsak and John S. Reshetar, “Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building,” From Kievan Rus’ to Modern Ukraine: Formation of the Ukrainian Nation (Cambridge: MA, 1984), pp. 24-25 (second pagination). 38 Isaevych, Ukraina davnia i nova, passim. 39 Leonid Heretz, “Russian Apocalypse, 1891-1917: Popular Perceptions of Events from the Year of Famine and Cholera to the Fall of the Tsar” (Ph. D dissertation, Harvard University, 1993).

35

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believer in the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries was basically the same; it was limited to 200-300 titles, with no book of secular, historical, or scientific content.40 If book-printing was a major tool of modern identity formation, then in Slavia Orthodoxa a transformation of sacred community into modern nation was seriously hampered by the scarcity of printed books. While 200 million copies of thousands of titles had been printed in the Western Christian territories by the beginning of the seventeenth century, in Rus’ the figure was no more than 40,000-60,000.41 The Rus’ legacy is held to be responsible for the persistence of a certain set of political traditions. While the “Western pattern” of politics lies in the separation of the religious and secular spheres, Eastern Europe was characterized by a blurring of the religious and secular powers. The rivalry of the ruler and the Church in the West made it possible for third parties to emerge with their own sources of power. It formed the historical basis for what was later called civil society. In contrast to that, the subordination of the Eastern church to the state led to the absence of a second political actor, and so, by definition, of any other actors. In the words of a contemporary political analyst, “The symbolic drama of Canossa illustrated this vividly. In no other historical tradition was it conceivable that a powerful secular ruler like Emperor Henry IV would undertake a penitent’s pilgrimage, in a hair shirt with a rope around his neck, to expiate his politico-religious sins or, in power terms, to recognize the religious authority of Pope Gregory VII, whom he had unsuccessfully challenged. The idea of the tsar of Muscovy or the Byzantine emperor or the Ottoman sultan performing an analogous penance is an inherent absurdity.”42 40 George Fedotov, The Russian Religious Mind (Belmont, MA, 1975): Vol. 1, pp. 21- 60, 365-412; Vol. 2, pp. 32-33; Ihor Ševčenko, Ukraine between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century (Edmonton, 1996), passim. 41 Markus Osterrieder, “Von der Sakralgemeinschaft zur Modernen Nation. Die Entstehung eines Nationalbewusstseins unter Russen, Ukrainern und Weissruthenen im Lichte der Thesen Benedict Andersons,” Eva Schmidt-Hartmann, ed., Formen der nationalen Bewusstsein im Lichte zeitgenössischer Nationalismustheorien (München, 1994), p. 207. Osterrieder mistakenly gives 20 numbers of copies for the Eastern Christian Slavic region, where it must be 20 books (titles). If we assume that the maximum number of copies of a title was 2,000-3,000, we get as upper limit of 40,000-60,000 copies. 42 George Shöpflin, “The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe,” Eastern Europe... Central Europe... Europe, issued as Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 119: 1 (Winter 1990), p. 57.

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Since major nation-building projects in Eastern Europe were basically anti-imperial, they had to rely on the resources of civil institutions. But given local political traditions, the latter were very feeble and lacked continuity. Therefore local nationalisms were seriously handicapped in their development, much to the despair of local nation-builders (the same holds true, as Geoffrey Hosking suggests,43 even for Russian nationalism). As a Ukrainian socialist from the Russian empire wrote in the 1870s, “[b]esides three groups, Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians, there exists a fourth one: allRus’, something hopeless, a dense stratum of [different] ethnic groups and nationalities covering Rus’.”44 The making of modern Ukraine (as well as Russia and Belarus) was therefore bound to be the unmaking of old Rus’. This project remains largely unfinished. Mass sources allow us to trace the persistence of the Rus’, Rus’kyi (Ruthenian) identity, as distinct from modern Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian identities, well into the 1930s.45 In the post-communist Ukraine, it is reflected in a phenomenon that sociologists call “Eastern Slavic proximity”; within a range of various Eurasian and North American nations, Ukrainians tend to see their interests as shared with Russians and Belarusians, while feeling increasingly alienated from others. 46 The persistence of the Rus’ legacy predetermines (if not in rigid terms) identification with East Slavic Europe. And that identification will persist for a long time. In the words of a historian, “[t]he Byzantine heritage of […] Ukrainian populations and more recent long-range developments — the latest of which is the Russian cultural impact upon a large part of Ukrainian lands — can recede into the background in the heady atmosphere of change, but their effects will not disappear overnight.”47

Geoffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917 (Cambridge, 1997). Cited in: Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, Z pochyniv ukrainskoho sotsialstychnoho rukhu. Mykh. Drahomanov i zhenevs’kyi sotsialistychnyi hurtok (Vienna, 1922), p. 64. 45 Tragediia sovetskoi derevni. Kolektivizatsiia i raskulachivanije. Dokumenty i materialy, in 5 volumes. Vol. 1-2 (Moscow, 1999; 2000), passim. 46 Natalia Panina, “Nepodolana Dystantsiia,” Krytyka 7: 7-9 (July-August 2003), p.18. 47 Ševčenko, Ukraine between East and West, p. 10. 43

44

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TABLE. FORMER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES RANKED BY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX AND OTHER VALUES Country

HDI Rank

GDI* Rank

Freedom Index

Economic Index

Honesty Rank

Slovenia

29

26

Free

79 (MU)

27

Czech Republic

33

32

Free

32 (MF)

52

Hungary

35

35

Free

32 (MF)

33

Slovakia

36

34

Free

60 (MF)

52

Poland

37

36

Free

45 (MF)

45

Estonia

42

n.a.

Free

4 (F)

29

Croatia

48

43

Free

108 (MU)

51

Lithuania

49

42

Free

29 (MF)

36

Latvia

53

46

Free

38 (MF)

52

Belarus

56

50

Not Free

148 (RE)

n.a.

Russian Federation

60

52

Partly Free

131 (MU)

71

Bulgaria

62

53

Free

108 (MU)

45

Romania

63

55

Free

131 (MU)

77

Macedonia

65

n.a.

Partly Free

97 (MU)

n.a.

Armenia

76

62

Partly Free

45 (MF)

n.a.

Kazakhstan

79

n.a.

Not Free

125 (MU)

88

Ukraine

80

66

Partly Free

137 (MU)

85

Georgia

81

n.a.

Partly Free

108 (MU)

85

Azerbaijan

88

n.a.

Partly Free

118 (MU)

95

Moldova

105

86

Partly Free

105 (MU)

93

* Gender-Related Development Index Code: Economic Freedom: F=free; MF =mostly free; MU=mostly unfree; RE=repressed Source: Walter C. Clemens,”Why Study the Baltics? How?,” NewsNet. News of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies 42: 5 (December 2002), p. 3.

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It clearly undermines, to a large extent, the viability of both European and Eurasian projects in Ukraine. A large part of the Ukrainian population does not look optimistically toward either European integration (even if it involved close cooperation with the Poles, who in general terms have a very positive image in Ukraine) or the Eurasian option (feeling rather cold toward Central Asia and fearing the prospect of involvement in the Chechnia conflict). The last 10-15 years have revealed the long-term effect of the religious factor in another way: the division between “winners” and “losers” in the post-communist transformation, as based on a comparison of various data of economic, social and political performance, coincides roughly with a division between countries with a West Christian tradition on the one hand, and an East Christian tradition on the other (see the Table). It does not mean to say that the latter group was doomed to failure. To say this is to fall under the spell of historical fatalism; history does not work that way, and it is always pregnant with various possibilities. It is rather to say these countries seem to follow a different historical trajectory, and their “return to Europe” may take longer than it was initially overoptimistically expected by local pro-“Western” and anti-communist elites.

“POLISHING”48 RUS’: THE ROLE OF THE POLISH LEGACY In medieval and early modern times, what was referred to as Rus’, was under different political regimes and was never homogenous in ethnic terms. Its population shared common Eastern Church rituals (either Orthodox or Greek-Catholic, with Sloveno-Ruthenian as the sacral language), spoke mutually comprehensible vernaculars, and had a diffuse memory of their common descent from Kyivan Rus’. Only gradually, under the centrifugal influences of such culturally I use this word as a witticism, implying that, in the context of Rus’, even Orthodoxes of the Rzeczpospolita resisting Polonization defended their identity with intellectual weapons which they obtained through the Polish influences. 48

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productive centers as L’viv, Kyiv, Vil’no (Vilnius), Kraków, Moscow and others, did distinctive national identities emerge.49 Until recently, the Eastern European past has stood in the shadow of the Russian and Soviet empires. But both are relatively recent phenomena. Modern Ukraine, like Belarus and the Baltic states, was incorporated into the Russian empire rather late; most of this territory became Russian after the partition of Rzeczpospolita in 1772-1795. The newly incorporated territories were little affected by Russian cultural and political influences. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Russian Decembrist Nikita Murav’ev confessed that the local population knew as much about Russians as they did about the Chinese.50 Until the middle of the nineteenth century Polish cultural influences dominated in Kyiv,51 and extended as far as Kharkiv University in the RussianUkrainian borderland.52 The role of the Polish legacy for the shaping of identities in this region cannot and should not be ignored. The problem is, however, that “Polish legacy” is rather an awkward term. It covers diverse and loosely connected phenomena that are hard to reduce to a single common denominator. Among other things, some of them were not Polish per se. They included, for example, German urban law53 and the “Jewish question.” To simplify, but not to distort the picture, one may say that Polish influences were responsible for channeling Western (Western Christian) political and cultural phenomena into western and southern Rus’. They “polished” it in a West European style. John A . A rmstrong, “ Myth a nd Hi story i n the Ev oluti on of Ukrai nia n Consciousness,” in Peter J. Potichnyj, Marc Raeff, Jaroslaw Pelenski, and Gleb N. Žekulin, eds., Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter (Edmonton, 1992), pp. 129-130. 50 Zakhar Shybeka, Narys historyi Belarusi, 1795-2002 (Minsk, 2003), p. 40. 51 Michael F. Hamm, Kiev. A Portrait, 1800-1917 (Princeton, 1993). See especially Chapter 3. 52 Stepan Kozak, Ukraińscy spiskowcy i mesjaniści Bractwa Cyryla i Metodego (Warsaw, 1990). 53 On the spread of German urba n la w see: Teti ana Hoshko, Na ry sy z istoii Magdeburz’koho prava v Ukraini XIV – poch. XVII st. (L’viv, 2002); Paul Robert Magocsi, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe (Seattle, 1993), Map # 12 f. A historical memory of Magdeburg law could be traced among Ukrainian peasants on the verge of the Soviet collectivization (see: William Noll, Transformatsiia hromadians’koho suspil’stva. Usna istoriia ukrains’koi selians’koi kul’tury 1920-1930 rokiv (Kyiv, 1999). 49

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This influence can be discerned in the origins of such basic elements of Ukrainian identity as language and historical memory. Due to numerous borrowings from Polish, German, Czech and Latin, early modern Ukrainian (so called prosta mova) was closer to the Western Slavic languages than to Church Slavonic or Russian in its vocabulary. Polish linguistic influences persisted even during the harshest PolishUkrainian conflicts until the first quarter of the twentieth century.54 Polish historical treatises served as the main source for Ukrainian history-writing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries — to the extent that early modern authors even studied the period of Kyivan Rus’ through the lens of Polish chronicles; the authentic ancient Rus’ chronicles could not satisfy their refined tastes.55 Polish annexation of a significant part of Eastern Slavic territory — under the Polish crown in the fourteenth century, and later, in 1569, under Rzeczpospolita — served as a long-term integration factor for both Ukrainian and Belarusian ethnic territories. It led to the possibility of a common Rus’ identity for both Ukrainians and Belarusians, as an alternative to both Polish and Russian nation building (this concept was still being discussed in the nineteenth century). A separate concept of a Ukrainian Cossack state and Ukrainian fatherland emerged in a confrontation with Catholicism and Rzeczpospolita in the seventeenth century. It proved to be viable in the context of Cossack autonomy within the Russian empire — but then again, it was largely based on a Polish concept of patria (ojczyzna).56 Following the partitions of the Rzeczpospolita in 1772-1795 and until World War II, the most persistent Polish influence in Eastern Europe was nationalism. Polish nationalism did for East European peoples what French nationalism did for the Western Europeans: it nationalized them, i.e. made them accept the logic and practices of G.Y. Shevelov, “Language,” Encyclopedia of Ukraine 3 (Toronto, 1993), p. 44. Frank E. Sysyn. The Cultural, Social and Political Context of Ukrainian History-Writing: 1620-1690, Europa Orientalis 5 (1986), pp. 285-310; Oleksii Tolochko, “Rus’ ochima ‘Ukrainy’: V poshukakh samoidentyfikatsii ta kontynuitetu,” Hrytsak and Isaevych, eds., Druhyi mizhnarodnyi kongres, pp. 68-75. 56 Zenon Kohut, “Derzhavnotvorchi derzhavnoshukannia,” Krytyka 4:6 (July 2000), p. 5; Frank Sysyn, “Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture,” forthcoming in Ukraina moderna 11 (2005). 54

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nationalism. Suffice it to say that both the Ukrainian and the Jewish national anthems begin with a line that is a paraphrase of the Polish anthem “Jeszcze Polska nie zginęła” (Poland has not yet died).57 If one were to draw on a contemporary Ukrainian map the historical zones of the Polish Drang nach Osten, they would coincide with the intensity of Ukrainian identity and spread of the Ukrainian language.58 Recent surveys on post-Soviet Eastern Europe reveal that ethnicity and ethnic differentiation are losing their salience among ordinary people, while social identification (such as with “workers” or “business(wo)men”) is becoming increasingly important for the way people perceive both themselves and ongoing political and economic changes. It is not the case, however, in Lithuania and Western Ukraine – the two most “Polish” zones – where national identification axes are the most salient.59

AS A

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The Western Ukrainian lands deserve special treatment. There is little reason to treat them as a historical unit before the end of the eighteenth century. They can be seen as a unity only ex negativo: with the exception of Volhynia, which was a part of the Russian empire from 1795 to 1920, these were Ukrainian lands that were not under Russian/ Soviet rule until World War II.60 On the other hand, it is rather hard to think of them as Ukrainian; these were lands that until the 1860s were on the periphery of Ukrainian nation building, and, in some periods Ukrainian identity had very little chance to prevail here. The local dominant elites were Polish, Austrian-German or Hungarian, and Jews Shlomo Avineri, “The Presence of Eastern and Central Europe in the Culture and Politics of Contemporary Israel,” Eastern European Politics and Societies 10:2 (Spring 1996), p. 166. 58 Ševčenko, Ukraine between East and West; Szul, Perspektywy regionalizmu Galcyjskiego, p. 80. 59 Arthur H. Miller, Thomas F. Klobucar, William M. Reisinger, and Vicki L. Hesli, “Social Identities in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania,” Post-Soviet Affairs 14:3 (1998), pp. 248-286. 60 John-Paul Himka, “Western Ukraine between the Wars,” Canadian Slavonic Papers 34:4 (December 1992), pp. 391-412. 57

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predominated numerically in the urban population. The local East Slavic population traditionally identified themselves as Rusyny/Rus’ki/ Rusnaky, i.e. belonging to Rus’. To this very day, Ruthenian identity prevails in the Ukrainian-Hungarian and Ukrainian-Slovak borderlands. It provides a basis for several nationalistic intellectuals to attempt to construct a separate nation of Rusyn – a fourth East Slavic nation alongside Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians.61 Until the very beginning of World War I (and in Transcarpathia, until World War II) the local Eastern Slavic elites were occupied with a discussion of their national identity. The majority opted for a Rus’ solution. Their Rus’ was neither Russia nor Ukraine, but a kind of mystical union of both; it represented a conservative Utopia, Gemeinschaft rather than Gesellschaft, Holy Rus’ of Moscow and Kyiv rather than the modern Russia of St. Petersburg.62 But there is no other Ukrainian region that denied its Rus’ legacy so drastically to embark on a modern Ukrainian project. Ukrainian identity won out everywhere here before World War II, and the Soviet integration that followed did little to change it; until the very end of the Soviet Union, Western Ukraine was among the least Russified and Sovietized regions. Western Ukrainians reveal conservative and nationalist attitudes, strongly marked with religious influences; they proved to be very resistant, both politically and militarily, to the Communist regime. They are also very actively engaged in building what is called a civil society; recent statistics reveal that Galicia and Transcarpathia – the lands of the former Habsburg empire – are not matched by any other Ukrainian regions in terms of frequency of NGOs per capita.63 Western Ukrainians share these attitudes with their neighbors across the borders. This is especially evident in the case of the former Austrian Galicia, which between 1772 and 1918 comprised the major See: Timothy Garton Ash, “Hail Ruthenia,” New York of Books 46:7 (22 April 1999), pp. 54-55; Chris Hahn, “Intellectuals, Ethnic Groups and Nations: Two Late-twentieth-century Cases,” Sukumar Periwal, ed., Notions of Nationalism (Budapest, 1995), pp. 106-128. 62 Anna Vernonika Wendland, Die Russophilen in Galizien. Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Rußland 1848-1915 (Wien, 2001), pp. 89, 151, 180-181. 63 Counterpart data on Ukrainian NGOs (2000): http://www/viaduk.net/cp/cpk e.nsf/ (last visited in June 2000). This table is reproduced in my book: Yaroslav Hrytsak, Strasti za natsionalizmom. Istorichni esei (Kyiv, 2004), p. 211. 61

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part of Western Ukraine together with the southwestern borderlands of contemporary Poland. Warsaw-based Polish political scientist Tomasz Zarycki studied post-communist electoral behavior in five countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Ukraine. He came to the conclusion that Galicia is exceptional. In his words, “ [t]his is one of the few places in the present study where one would like to extend the map beyond the present-day political boundaries and present differentiation of the Polish-Ukrainian political space in order to show the persistence of the 19th-century Galician borders.”64 There was, however, very little in either the local geography or its pre-Austrian history that could have made Austrian (i.e., PolishUkrainian) Galicia a separate historical region. The Habsburgs revoked its existence, to legitimize the annexation of new lands in East. But this decision was met by many angry voices among local intellectuals, both Poles and Ruthenians (Ukrainians), who were rather unhappy about the shape of their new homeland.65 And yet in the long run, the former Austrian Galicia proved to be a region with a very distinctive set of attitudes and loyalties. A comparison with Western Belarus – a region that was also outside the Soviet Union until 1939, but still succumbed to Russification and Sovietization66 – underlines once again the role of the Habsburg legacy in shaping Western Ukrainian peculiarity. The Habsburg heritage had a very ambiguous character. On the one hand, each ethnic group within the empire inherited constitutional and liberal practices whose longterm impact is still apparent in their political organizations. On the other hand, most of the civic institutions and arenas for public discussion were staffed and attended according to the national identities of their members. As a result, instead of a single one, several competing civil Tomasz Zarycki, The New Electoral Geography of Central Europe: Comparative Study of Regional Political Cleavages in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Ukraine (Lund, Warsaw, 1998), p. 58. 65 Zbigniew Fris, Galicja (Wrocław, 2000), p. 58; Iakiv Holovatskii, “Karpatskaia Rus’. Geografichesko-statisticheskie i istoriko-statisticheskie ocherki Galichiny, SeveroVostochnoi Ugrii i Bukoviny,” Slavianskii Sbornik 2 (St. Petersburg, 1878), p. 55. 66 Szporluk Roman, “West Ukraine and West Belorussia: Historical Tradition, Social Communication, and Linguistic Assimilation,” Soviet Studies 31:1 (January 1979), pp. 76-98. 64

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societies developed along national lines.67 This links Western Ukraine to Central Europe, with its long and mixed historical record of multiethnic diversity and interethnic conflicts.68

THE SOVIET LEGACY Ukraine in its contemporary political borders is clearly a Soviet artifact. But there is certainly more to the Soviet legacy than political geography. Ukraine falls into the category of post-Soviet societies (the majority of them) where this legacy is so strong that for many years – probably generations – an authoritarian system, disguised as democracy, will prevail there, and the national economies will continue to decline before they improve.69 The Soviet legacy also strongly affected identity formation. On the one hand, under Soviet rule basic elements of the Ukrainian identity were not just preserved, but their role increased (as in the case of territorial identification).70 On the other, key elements of modern Ukrainian identity - such as a literary language and national history - went through a strong revision that sought to minimize differences between Russians and Ukrainians. Soviet rule led to an increase of the Russian factor in Ukraine, first of all, through a mass migration of Russians into the Ukrainian SSR – to the extent that some demographers consider the scale of this migration unprecedented in twentieth-century Europe 71 – and then through the linguistic Russification of Ukrainians. Walentyna Najdus, “Kształtowanie się nowoczesnych więzów społeczno-organizacyjnych ludności ukraińskiej Galicji Wschodneij w dobie konstytucyjnej,” Henryk W. Żaliński, Kazimierz Karolczak, eds., Lwów: Miasto – Społeczeństwo – Kultura 2 (Kraków, 1998), p.

67

166-167. 68 Timothy Garton Ash, “The Puzzle of Central Europe,” New York Review of Books 46:5 (18 March 1999), p. 22. 69 See: Roy D. Laird, The Soviet Legacy (Westport, 1993). 70 Bohdan Krawchenko, Social Change and National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine (Edmonton, 1987), pp. 219-250; Taras Kuzio and Andrew Wilson, Ukraine: Perestroika to Independence (Edmonton, Toronto, 1994), pp. 152-170; P. T. Shelest, ... Da ne sudimy budete. Dnevnikovye zapisi, vospominania chlena Politbiuro TsK KPSS (Moscow, 1995). 71 Piotr Ebelhardt, Przemiany narodościowe na Ukrainie XX wieku (Warsaw, 1994), p. 244.

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It remains, however, a matter of dispute whether linguistic Russification was tantamount to national assimilation. 72 There are good reasons to believe that in many cases it was not. The Soviet regime promoted not so much a Russian as a Soviet identity built on Russian lines. 73 One of the greatest surprises to be revealed after the demise of the Soviet Union was that a Soviet people had actually developed, especially among Russians living in non-Russian states. The Soviet identity proved to be very popular in Southern and Eastern Ukraine. 74 Ukrainian identity is the most salient of all group identities everywhere in the Ukraine, with the exception of the South. Regional differences become more pronounced if one considers the hierarchy of the most popular social identities in Ukraine. For example, in L’viv, the symbolic capital of Western Ukraine, the assertion of Ukrainian identity in 1994 was associated with the popularity of identities that had been repressed by the Soviet regime (notably “Greek-Catholic” and “Westerner”). In a contrast to that, Ukrainian identity in Donets’k, the largest industrial center in the East, was linked with the sense of being “Soviet” and “Worker,” identities that were promoted by the Soviet regime.75 There are good reasons to believe that people who regarded themselves as “Soviets” are not necessarily those who vote for Communists and feel nostalgia for the Soviet Union. They bought the whole package of the Soviet legacy beyond Communist ideology, including the unrealistically high expectations of government support and the lack of private initiative. Part of that package is an inability to See: Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytskyi, Istorychni ese 2 (Kyiv, 1994), pp. 471-476. Yaroslav Bilinsky, “The Concept of the Soviet People and its Implication for Soviet Nationality Policy,” The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States 14:37-38 (1978-1980), pp. 87-133; Roman Solchanyk, “Molding ‘the Soviet People’: The Role of Ukraine and Belorussia,” Journal of Ukrainian Studies 1 (Summer 1983), pp. 3-18. 74 Paul S. Pirie, “National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine,” EuropeAsia Studies 48:7 (1996), pp. 1079-1104. 75 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “National Identities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Case of Lviv and Donetsk,” Zvi Gitelman, Lubomyr Hajda, John-Paul Himka, and Roman Solchanyk, eds., Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk (published as Vol. 22 (1998) of Harvard Ukrainian Studies), p. 267. 72 73

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organize continuous and efficient pressure on decision makers and power centers “from below.” People in the East of Ukraine on average are much less politically mobilized than their compatriots in the Western Ukraine. The former may have a desire to reunite Ukraine with Russia or to restore the Soviet Union. Still, as the experience of the last few years has proved, it is unlikely that they can organize any political movement to promote their goals.76 As strange as it may sound, it is this mixture of “Ukrainianness” with “Sovietness” that provides the post-Communist Ukrainian leaders with an opportunity to keep the country together. The ruling elites are doing their best to preserve a balance between two alternative versions (Soviet and non-Soviet) of the modern Ukrainian identity.77 This line has proved to be quite effective; at the end of a decade of Ukrainian independence the regional differences within Ukraine seem to be losing their political salience. 78 Along with these changes, Soviet identity seems to be fading away even in the most Sovietized region.79 While the project of the Soviet nation is doomed to disappear with the demise of the Soviet Union, its corollaries may be here to stay for a long time. This is reflected, among other things, in a specific social attitude that is shared by most of the Ukrainian population, regardless of regional differences, and that can be described as a lack of social trust. In the post-Communist Ukraine people tend not to trust each other if they are not members of the same family, relatives or close friends. Or, to put it in a more sophisticated way, they have noncommunitarian social capital, which, if we are to believe Robert Putnam, constitutes a serious impediment to successful democratization. This might be regarded as a psychological legacy of Soviet rule; as state socialist institutions did not efficiently provide goods and services, Ibid., p. 276. Catherine Wanner, Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine (Pennsylvania, 1998). 78 Peter R. Craumer and James I. Clem, “Ukraine’s Emerging Electoral Geography: A Regional Analysis of the 1998 Parliamentary Elections,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 40:1 (1999), pp. 1-26; Vybir Ukrajiny-99. Shcho dali. Zbirnyk stattei i dovidkovykh materialiv (Kyiv, 1999), pp. 102-103, 108, 238-239, 254-255. 79 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Ukrainian Nationalism, 1991-2001: Myths and Misconceptions,” CEU History Department Annual 2001-2002 (2002), pp. 243-244. 76 77

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people had to rely on personal contacts and networks.80 Even though Western Ukraine is distinctive in voter turnout and electoral terms, it would be too bold to claim that a uniquely Western Ukrainian/Galician civic culture exists within Ukraine today; even here in the least Sovietized L’viv, non-communitarian social capital continues to permeate the experience of daily life.81 If this is so, then the fading away of the Soviet legacy does not automatically mean better prospects for the Ukrainian state. To a large extent this legacy is responsible for providing a minimum of political stability and of internal cohesion. But on the other hand, it creates serious impediments for successful political and economic reforms. The crucial issue is whether any other internal cohesion will develop in Ukrainian society besides the one that has a clear Soviet pedigree. For if the Communist past has some lessons to teach us, one of the most important would be that a social solidarity imposed “from above” proves not to be the most efficient way to build a stable society in the long run.

A POST-SOVIET TENDENCY, IF NOT A NEW LEGACY During the last decade, Ukraine has experienced developments that may be characterized as, if not a post-Soviet legacy, then rather stable post-Soviet tendencies. On the one hand, Ukraine falls into a category of countries that are “losers” in the post-Communist transformation. It shares this fate with most of the former Soviet republics (the Baltic states excluded) and the countries of Eastern Christianity (Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Macedonia). On the other hand, Ukraine proved to be distinctively different at least in two major aspects. First, it was the only country in the post-Soviet space (again, excluding the Baltic region) that This point was elaborated by Catherine Wanner, Burden of Dreams. See especially Chapter 3, “On Being Soviet,” pp. 49-75. 81 Martin Åberg, “Putnam’s Social Capital Theory Goes East: A Case Study of Western Ukraine and L’viv,” Europe-Asia Studies 52:2 (2000), pp. 303-313; John O’Loughlin and James E. Bell, “The Political Geography of Civic Engagement in Ukraine,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 40:4 (1999), pp. 233-266 (see, especially, pp. 253 and 255). 80

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managed to transfer presidential power from one group of ruling elites to another peacefully and without manipulation.82 This was so in 1994, but during the 1999 presidential elections Ukraine failed to repeat such a transfer. Secondly, despite the failure in 1999, Ukraine remains one of two countries in the post-Soviet space (the second is Georgia) where a political opposition is still a major factor in local politics. The viability of those two distinctive features will be tested during the 2004 presidential elections. It makes these elections crucial for determining Ukraine’s place in the post-communist space for the foreseeable future. So far, this place is shrouded in ambivalence. Such ambivalence reflects a current popular mood. In the words of a leading Ukrainian social scientist, “[a] person in an ambivalent state of mind, while mentally sound, may simultaneously go for a multi-party system and against all ‘new-baked’ parties, for both freedom of movement and restrictions in border control, for an increase of market economy and state regulation of prices, [...], for the independence of his or her state and the restoration of the Soviet Union.”83

This ambivalence is reflected, among other things, in a choice of external orientation; a 2002 survey demonstrated that 69 percent of the population would support integration with both the European Union and Russia.84 Seen from another perspective, this ambivalence may provide Ukraine with a unique opportunity; it opens a window for creative politicians to make advantage of this ambivalent public opinion that corresponds to interests of long-term and sustained Ukrainian development without antagonizing the other part, thus avoiding the risk of a social confrontation.85

Dmitrii Furman, “Ukraina i my. Natsional’noe samosoznanie i politicheskoe razvitie,” Svobodnaia mysl’ 1 (1995), p. 70. 83 E. I. Golovakha, “Postkommunisticheskoe razvitie Ukrainy i Rossii (sravnitel’nyi analiz sotsial’no-politicheskikh protsesov),” T. I. Zaslavskaja, ed., Kuda idet Rossia?... Sotsial’naia transformatsiia postsovetskogo prostranstva 3 (Moscow, 1996), p. 51. 84 Liliia Utkina, “Back to the USSR,” Ukrains’ka Pravda, 14 January 2003; Ivan Smishko, “Ukrainets – tse zvuchyt zahadkovo,” Postup, 16-22 January 2003. 85 Golovakha, “Postkommunisticheskoe razvitie Ukrainy,” p. 51. 82

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CONCLUSIONS By way of preliminary and very tentative conclusions, I would like to propose four statements: (1) The Ukrainian case belies any clear-cut and distinctive divisions in post-communist Eastern Europe. It could be compared with the famous Russian Matreshka doll (which is nothing more than an East Slavic imitation of the Japanese nesting doll)86; it is firmly located in several regional/national/international/supranational landscapes. The comparison fails, however, in one respect: Ukraine belongs not to one, but to several nested geographies. Their number is not unlimited, and one can count it on the fingers of two hands: Eastern Europe, East Slavic Europe, Central Europe, Eastern Central Europe, the former Soviet space, and former Slavia Orthodoxa, not to mention the obvious megascales of Europe and Eurasia. And yet you cannot disentangle Ukraine from any of them without a risk of destroying a facet of multilayered Ukrainian identity. (2) In the general balance of “sails” and “gales” that drives Ukraine in various directions, politics are much more important than geography, and culture takes precedence over both. Among the cultural factors, a civilization divide – the division between Western and Eastern Christianity – seems to have had a major long-term effect, although not along Huntington’s lines. It explains some peculiarities of Ukrainian nation-building, as well as patterns of post-communist transformation (the placement of Ukraine among “outsiders,” using the term suggested by Osamu Ieda87) — which corresponds to the historical meso-area of Slavia Orthodoxa. (3) Within the latter region, one may envision the emergence of another meso-area that would comprise the former Western and Southern borderlands of the Russian Empire/Soviet Union minus the Baltic region. This new meso-area might include Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia as potential – although in a very distant perspective – members of the EU. That this region is not a mere speculation may be confirmed by recent initiatives to create GUAM as 86 87

Figes, Natasha’s Dance, p. 267. See Chapter 1 of this volume.

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an alternative political union within the NIS. One may also anticipate as possibilities other combinations made by these states and their neighbors (for example, Poland claiming a special role vis-à-vis both Ukraine and Belarus in their (future) European integration, or a possible union of Moldova and Rumania). The worst case – and, fortunately, the least possible – scenarios would be either an inner disintegration of these countries into separate regions which would drift in different directions (for example, Western Ukraine seeking independent entry into the EU, in accordance with the mood of some younger intellectuals in Galicia), or conscious efforts of a ruling elite to isolate their country to preserve its power (the current Belarusian case). (4) One thing is, however, certain: the recent experience of the post-communist transformation provides us with too short a period to make a sound judgment as to the future placement of Ukraine and the neighboring countries. A comparison with interwar Eastern European history could be very instructive: for example, contemporary Ukraine grapples with the same structural problems of a young state that interwar Poland did.88 To paraphrase the path-dependency theory, the record of the last decade helps in understanding “where you come from” better than “where you get to.” After all, history matters in various ways, and it is always pregnant with many possibilities. In the case under consideration, the variety of possibilities is both reflected and overlaid by a large ambivalence of local institutional identification. Or, to put in other terms, there is not that much of Sollen in the region, while Sein is still very ambivalent. Only time will tell whether this ambivalence will fade away in the longer run. As I suggested at the very beginning, the Ukrainian case does not seem to be either unique or exceptional. For the sake of our discussion, it can be relatively easily replaced by any other case – for example, even by the case of present Israel, which is strongly rooted in East and Central European history and politics.89 The generalization that variety is the rule rather than the exception may be the soundest generalization of all. This is not to deny the validity of drawing meso-regional borders as I tried to develop this point in my article: “Pro mozhlyvist’ pobudovy politychnoi natsii v odnii okremo vziatii (U)kraini, abo choho nas vchyt dosvid Pol’shchi,” Ї 13 (1998), pp. 28-39. 89 Avineri, “The Presence of Eastern and Central Europe,” pp. 163-172. 88

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a valuable academic exercise. It is just to remind us that the choice of scope and scale is not “objectively” pre-given and that it depends on the questions we ask ourselves. To this extent, the analyst is as much a factor in any analysis as any other “objective” factor. While indulging in this kind of academic exercise, one has no choice but to practice a certain modesty and even self-irony.

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THE STUDY OF MESO- AND MEGA-AREA DYNAMICS: METHODOLOGICAL AND EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS1 VELLO PETTAI One of the most intriguing questions posed by the model of mesoand mega-area dynamics is: does a discipline of post-communist studies still exist? The question is relevant to the degree that different areas of the former Soviet empire increasingly exist in entirely different social, political and economic contexts. The processes and realities of one region have in many instances completely ceased to have to any relation to the processes and realities of another. In the extreme, one could ask, for instance, what could there possibly still exist in terms of comparative analytical points between such disparate countries as Turkmenistan and Slovenia? The totalitarian restoration and international isolation of the one jars glaringly with the successful democratization and regional integration of the other. To say that they both share a “communist past” seems almost like an irrelevant fact of history. Yet in the social and political sciences, the study of divergence from a common starting point represents as important a scholarly discipline as the study of convergence – no matter how normatively superior the latter may be considered to the former. The story of post-communism is one of vast divergence over time. But it is a story that still needs conceptual and theoretical modeling – such as has been proposed by Osamu Ieda. This paper will begin with some methodological considerations that stem from Ieda’s introductory text. These will concern the relationship between mega-areas and geopolitics, structure vs. agency, and external vs. self-identities. The second and third parts of the paper will be devoted to some empirical notes that derive from the example of the Baltic states as well as the European Union. Here I will examine how well the Baltic Funding for this research was provided in part by a Targeted Financing Grant from the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research, nr. 0182573. 1

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states fit the dependent and independent variables posited by the model. In a conclusion, I will consider the potential contribution of meso- and mega-area research to large-scale comparative theory.

METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS In Osamu Ieda’s theory of meso- and mega-area dynamics, the central hypothesis can be summed up as follows: differential (triadic) interactions among the external, self- and institutional identities of a meso-area will determine the kind of movement (backlash, transitional, transformational or evolutional) that the meso-area will undergo between two (exit and entry) mega-areas. Put in more operational terms, we could say: the more a meso-area remains burdened by institutional identities, the more likely it will end up in a backlash mode; · the more a meso-area succumbs to an external identity, the more likely it will undergo a transitional entry into the new mega-area; · the more a meso-area puts forth its own self-identity during its movement toward the new mega-area, the more likely it will engender a transformational dynamic of both the exit and entry mega-areas; · the more a meso-area’s identity remains a vague mixture of the three identities, the more likely it will develop an evolutional status between mega-areas. ·

In this framework, therefore, the key analytical task involves assessing correctly the interaction and balance between the three identity forces. It requires adequately operationalizing and measuring both the amplitude of each identity force as well as any change in this amplitude over time. In simple terms, we must be able to figure out: -what are the indicators of external, institutional and self-identity? -how do we assess whether each of these is strong or weak? -how do we know when an identity has become stronger and weaker? and -how do we figure out how much this change has been?

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Only when we have answered these questions for all three identity types can we produce a composite value for the independent variable of “triadic identity interaction,” which we would then need to correlate with the dependent variable of degree or type of mega-area exit or entry. To be sure, exacting such methodological rigor from a conceptual framework such as this one might be too stringent, since the model already has great intellectual value as a simple abstraction. Still, it is worth trying to make as explicit as possible the methodological bases of our analyses, in order to ensure the validity of our empirical conclusions. For in the end, simple conceptual models can eventually become fullscale theories or laws, if their variables are sufficiently operationalized and they yield consistent, predicted outcomes over a range of cases.2 A second methodological point concerns the question of agency within meso-mega area dynamics. To an important degree, the analysis of meso-mega area dynamics represents the study of global geopolitics. While change in meso-mega areas is inevitably slow (usually lasting at least a decade, if not more), this does not mean that such evolution is not the object of willful attempts to influence its path or to steer this movement toward some politically desired direction. To be sure, single political leaders can rarely hope to achieve large-scale meso-mega area change during their individual term in office. In this sense, it would seem irrational for leaders to try and alter the shape of regional geopolitics if they know that they will not be able to see the fruits of this transformation during their political career. At the same time, the will to leave a lasting mark on society (as well as perhaps even a wish to “improve” society, however improvement is defined) does result in political decisions and policies often being adopted, which aim at significant meso-mega area change. In a word, the argument here is merely to problematize the degree to which meso-mega area change can be viewed as simply a spontaneous, unconscious blending of different regions. Or should it be seen also within a conscious geopolitical context, where relevant political players view this change as involving certain stakes or interests and therefore they act in a deliberate manner, when formulating opinions and adopting policies? Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference In Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J., 1994). See also Stephen Van Evera, (1997), Guide To Methods For Students Of Political Science (Ithaca, 1997).

2

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This does not mean that meso-area shifts between two mega-areas should necessarily be interpreted as “battlefield” politics or as a “clash” between geopolitical tectonic plates. Clearly, superpower politics in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus region or Central Asia could all too easily lend itself to this kind of analysis. It is, however, to say that even mesoarea leaders (alongside mega-area ones) will always aim to steer their region’s course in the direction of some desired end and that all political decision-making will be willful or goal-oriented to some degree. In this respect, the basic question of how much identities are crafted by conscious agency or instead pre-determined by structural-historical legacies remains at issue. When we speak about the triadic interaction of “self-identity,” “institutional identity” and “external identity,” we are in fact pitting at least two conscious political decision-making processes (self- and external identity) with a third, more structural one (institutional identity). To a certain degree, therefore, both the self- and the external identities can be seen as purposefully struggling against some kind of institutional legacies, while institutional identities remain a more static, passive force. The latter can simply drag a meso-area back, but it cannot be a strong proactive element on its own. In this way the essence of meso-mega area change must be seen as intentional and not merely arbitrary or sundry. By default, therefore, such a conclusion influences the way in which we must evaluate the behavior of actors involved in meso-mega area change. In particular, meso-area actors are not necessarily pawns in a chess game between mega-areas. Rather, meso-mega area change may actually require meso-area actors to be the initiators and protagonists of change, rather than being merely its object. This in turn means that we must re-assess the capacity of meso-areas to actually transform the identity of the mega-areas they both exit and enter. In this respect, mesoareas may not represent simply minnows cast out at sea, ready to be eaten up by larger fish. Rather, they may become conscious and constituent elements of a new mega-area, and thus prompt transformation of the entry mega-area much more frequently than one might imagine. Lastly, it is worth recalling the degree to which mega-areas also undergo a triadic interaction of identities, and that their behavior may not only be the product of self-identity or even institutional identity.

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Rather, mega-areas may also be subject to external identities, be they the pressures of globalization, the normative prescriptions of human rights law or (more broadly) the worldwide trend toward democracy. Mega-areas such as the United States, Russia and even increasingly China have felt these influences quite significantly. Thus, mega-areas are not just broad areas of hegemony or political influence. They also involve certain responsibilities or the provision of collective goods in order to make the mega-area work. While meso-areas may be subordinated to certain rules or procedures of the mega-area, they may still be in their rights to demand the maintenance of basic services provided by the mega-area, which may be necessary for the meso-area to operate. Here, the argument resembles that of hegemonic stability theory in international relations, where the hegemon may rule over large areas of the international economy, but it must also bear the burden of providing and enforcing general rules that resemble collective goods.3 For example, in the case of the US during the Cold War, Washington’s political superiority was paired with a burden to maintain the dollar as an international currency – at least until 1971 when this task no longer proved sustainable and the Bretton Woods system was abandoned. Likewise, meso-areas can appeal to certain principles or norms enforced by the mega-area in order to attract the latter’s attention or extract greater assistance from it. As we will see, the fact that the European Union represents a community of democratic norms and solidarity means that meso-areas that equally maintain (or aspire to) such ideals may demand due recognition of this fact and may even demand equivalent access to such a union – all of which may not be in the initial interest of the mega-area. In this respect, a mega-area may be as much obliged to integrate new areas as it is covetous of them. With these methodological considerations laid out, we can proceed to a more concrete empirical analysis of the Baltic states as a meso-area between the former Soviet Union and the European Union. But here two questions arise. First, what is the precise value of the Baltic states on the dependent variable of meso-area dynamics? Where should we place Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on the scale of “backlash,” Meaning smaller players, e.g. meso-areas, benefit from the existence of the rules without having to pay into the cost of their creation or their enforcement. 3

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“transitional,” “transformational” and “evolutionary” dynamics? Second, once we have determined a value on the dependent variable, does this correspond with the model’s predicted values on the independent variable? Does our assessment of the meso-area dynamic of the Baltic states match with the predicted amplitude or combination of self-, institutional and external identities? Only when both of these questions are answered can we assess the model of meso-mega areas on the level of theory.

MESO-AREA DYNAMICS IN THE BALTIC STATES With the Baltic state’s formal entry into the European Union in May 2004, it is clear that we are not dealing with a “backlash” type of meso-area dynamic. Indeed, some analysts might say that “backlash” became out of the question as soon as Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius decided to reject participation in the Commonwealth of Independent States. For others, meanwhile, the question might have hinged on the definitive withdrawal of ex-Soviet, Russian troops from the Baltics in 1993 and 1994. Lastly, some may see lingering signs of backlash to the degree that Baltic transit trade with Russia remains high or Moscow retains political strings it can draw in the Baltics (such as agitation of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia or the influence of Russian-born politicians such as Yuri Borisov or Viktor Uspaskikh in Lithuania). Be these interpretations as they may, it seems clear that some kind of definitive exit from the Russian mega-area has taken place. Likewise, the inclusion of the Baltic states in EU enlargement means that these states have also not been left in an “evolutionary” gray zone. They are not likely to become their own separate area, neither as a sort of “Baltic union” nor in tandem with, say, the Nordic area. Suggestions of a special union between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania surfaced only briefly during 1989-1990, but quickly faded. Meanwhile, integration with the Nordic countries has primarily been economic, not political, and this at the behest of the Nordics themselves. It remains, therefore, to qualify the Baltics’ meso-area dynamic as either transitional or transformational. As defined by Ieda, a transitional

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dynamic would represent a situation, where the meso-area is entirely absorbed by the entry mega-area, and although a certain part of the entry mega-area is influenced by the presence of the new meso-area, it retains its primary character and instead integrates most of the mesoarea into its own system. By contrast, in a transformational situation, the meso-area remains a separate entity for still some time; but in contradistinction to an evolutionary situation, the meso-area still influences in some indirect way the character of both its exit and entry mega-areas. In sum, the difference between transitional and transformational dynamics rests in the degree to which a meso-area influences its entry mega-area either from inside or outside. In the case of the Baltic states, our task involves examining how much these states have changed the character of the EU and from where they have done it, i.e. from being inside or outside the Union. It is my argument in this paper that in a paradoxical fashion the Baltic states (along with the other erstwhile “candidate countries”) have actually influenced the character of the EU more as applicant states than they will now as formal member states. This argument involves the simple fact that the EU itself decided to accept these states and in so doing was forced to confront its own institutional, political and economic underpinnings before beginning accession negotiations. Put in other words, the EU itself opened a process whereby it would have to re-examine its entire raison d’être in order to make enlargement possible. To be sure, the candidate countries would have to go through their own process of adopting EU rules and regulations, and these procedures would certainly alter the character of the candidate countries. But if one considers that the EU also began a process of reckoning with a new type of Union by adopting the Copenhagen criteria (1993), devising a whole new system of accession aid packages, restructuring its voting mechanisms, and ultimately drawing up an entirely new Constitution for the Union, it is clear that the Union has done just as much adaptation in its own way as the candidate countries have on their side. It has had to take on a vast share of the ultimate responsibility for dealing with the legacies of the Cold War in Europe by designing an extremely detailed political process and institutional structure whereby the continent could be united again. This was far beyond the capacities of either the Council of Europe or even the Organization for Cooperation

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and Security in Europe. It may yet even be beyond the capacities of the EU. Time will tell. But it is important to note that in agreeing to undertake the massive enlargement of the Union, EU leaders have agreed to radically transform the substance itself of their erstwhile community. The Union is no longer a simple economic club for those private members who founded it in the 1950s. It is an organization, which has taken upon itself large-scale responsibilities for the economic, political and social reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe. To be sure, some of these capacities were already developed during the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal to the Union. But nothing on the present scale has ever been undertaken, indeed not only in Europe, but anywhere in the world. In this respect, the oft-cited debate between “deepening vs. widening” in the EU is real, and to a certain extent widening has won out over deepening. The EU has not and will not undergo a major degree of deepening in terms of formulating a common foreign and security policy or harmonizing its socio-economic policies in the near future. Major international crises such as the Iraq conflict will most likely divide Europeans again and again in the future, while debates over whether to unify tax rates or standardize unemployment benefits will continue. However, in an important way the Union has deepened by widening, since as argued above the task of widening (or indeed doubling the number of member-states) involves such immense preparation and transformation of the Union itself that it does represent a qualitative change in the way the Union operates and must learn to get along with its different constituent parts. The process of European re-unification across the entire continent is itself an important type of deepening, since it is bringing together once and for all the people of Europe in a way they have never been together before. The case can, therefore, be made that the entry of the Baltic states into the EU – together with, of course, all of the other new memberstates – represents a transformational type of meso-area change. The new member-states are naturally being absorbed into an EU-mandated system of political and economic cooperation. But this system has itself been re-crafted so extensively that it is hardly the same as it was before. The entry of the Baltic states into the EU is not a transitional dynamic to the extent that the EU has change much more than a simple enlargement would have entailed. If one takes as the classic case of transitional

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dynamics the absorption of East Germany into West Germany, then the enlargement of the EU has been something qualitatively different, infinitely more complex. In sum, the dynamic of the Baltic meso-area has revealed itself to be, on the one hand, a misnomer to the extent that the Baltic states themselves have not constituted a clearly delineable meso-area. Instead, they have been part of a wider meso-area, meaning the dozen or so countries slated to join the EU during the current decade. At the same time, they have participated in a transformation of the EU and its fundamental goals – much more than is often remembered or acknowledged now-a-days. Whether this new EU will work out remains to be seen. But as an unprecedented example of political and economic partnership, its achievements have already been notable.

TRIADIC IDENTITY CHANGE IN THE BALTIC STATES The next stage in testing the propositions put forward by the model of meso-mega area dynamics is to assess the types and degrees of triadic identity change among the Baltic states to see if they match with the transformational type of meso-area dynamics noted above. If the hypotheses stated in the first section of this paper are correct, then the Baltics should show a somewhat greater level of self-identity, which has in turn helped to overcome the drag-effect of institutional identity or the smothering effect of external identities. Osamu Ieda speaks of members of the Eastern European meso-area as still having an “ambivalent consciousness.” They are “No more Eastern, but not yet Western.” They are still caught between a Sollen and a Sein. Yet, if the above analysis of EU enlargement is correct, then it may well be important to question whether the Sollen of Western Europe was in fact such a stable composite of norms throughout the last ten years, and whether this external identity did not itself evolve during this time. If it turns out that the external identity to which a meso-area must aspire is itself transformed over a certain period, then it becomes more difficult to assess analytically how a meso-area’s triadic identity is supposed to adapt. If the Sollen is in fact a constantly moving target, how can it be Sollen?

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In the case of the EU, of course, the criteria set for accession by the new member states were fairly clear-cut and stable. In this sense, I do not argue that the formal nature of the Copenhagen criteria or of the acquis communautaire ever changed. This dimension of Sollen remained. What did change, however, was the type of Union that the new states (including the Baltics) would be joining. It would be a Union, which would have to make sufficient room for the new entrants together with access to all of the same rights and obligations. EU enlargement would have to build a place for the new members, while recognizing that this process would in and of itself restructure the Union. It is in this sense that the Sollen changed, and indeed most likely for the better. It is also reflective of the point made earlier that megaareas, too, have their external identity. In this case, it is the EU’s external identity as a standard-bearer of democratic political integration. Increasingly, the EU has taken upon itself the role of democratic magnet, which draws to it new devotees and helps spread democratic norms. This is an impressive undertaking. At the same time, this attraction requires a lot from the EU in terms of engagement and interaction with the new partners in order to make sure the new norms take root. The allure of the EU as a stable, cooperative and prosperous union is strong. In this respect, Ieda’s characterization of the EU as a “communal” type of mega-area is entirely accurate and a key reference point. But the integration that serves as the basis for this success is not easy to bring about. When extending the prospect of membership to all of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the EU itself has to live by its principles of democratic political integration and hence restructure its own essence. This adaptability is at one and the same time a precondition as well as virtue of such democratic magnetism. The corollary to this phenomenon is that self-identities in the mesoarea are more likely to remain in tact, and indeed influence the new mega-area, rather than be overwhelmed by the external identity. The principle of democratic integration between the meso-area and the megaarea will mean that the meso-area will potentially be able to contribute to the new structure of the mega-area, rather than be overrun by it. The fact that the peoples of ex-Communist Europe are “no more Eastern, but not yet Western” may not be that important if they themselves help to reconfigure what Europe as a whole will mean for the continent. Self-

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identities may quickly become simply “European” to the extent that peoples are engaged in a continent-wide endeavor. Regional identities may not hold such powerful sway when placed within the context of a multi-national cooperative political project. An indication of this blurring of self-identities has begun to emerge from the patterns of alliance-formation among both old and new member-states in the European Union. Some new entrants, such as like Estonia, rarely sought to form coalitions with the other Baltic states or even more broadly with the other Eastern European states simply on the basis of geographical proximity or common recent history. The perception among many candidate country elites of their country’s true national interests has often been much more multi-dimensional, meaning that on certain issues greater alliance can be found with older memberstates than with newer ones. For example, at different points in time Estonia has sought to cast itself as a pro-market liberal tiger, which has more in common with the United Kingdom and Ireland, than with Lithuania, Poland or even Finland. In this kind of context, self-identities are no longer Eastern or Western; they are simply policy-based. Among average Balts, of course, self-identities are slower to change. For example, in a 2004 survey conducted in Estonia immediately after the June European Parliament elections, only 44 percent of respondents said that they think of themselves as EU citizens either “often” or “sometimes.”4 (Indeed, only 6.4 percent of the respondents actually answered “often.”) Likewise, only 25 percent said they were either “very proud” or “rather proud” to be an EU citizen. Fully 36 percent said they were “not at all proud.” Lastly, the survey revealed that at least among Estonians levels of trust toward other Europeans remain highly region-specific. The highest rates of trust (i.e. where 5060 percent of respondents said “I trust them very much”) were reserved for the Latvians, Lithuanians, Finns, Swedes, Danes and Germans. Midrange levels of trust (i.e. 40-50 percent) were accorded to most of the Western European nations (UK, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium, France). Countries belonging to both Eastern and Southern Europe, however, The poll was conducted among 1606 respondents as part of the 2004 European Election Survey. It was executed in Estonia by the Department of Political Science at the University of Tartu and Turu-uuringute AS. 4

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ranked low (between 20 and 40 percent), including Poles, Slovenes, Hungarians and Czechs, along with Italians, Spaniards, Greeks and Portuguese. In this respect the cleavages did not run along east-west lines, but rather north-south. Institutional identities among Balts, though present, also seem to be fading. One of the strongest institutional legacies believed to exist in ex-communist Europe is a yearning for strong, single-person rule instead of chaotic multi-party government.5 In the Baltic states, support from such rule has declined over the years. Whereas in the beginning of the 1990s, as many as 60 percent of Balts would agree that a single, strong leader would do more for the country than many individual parties,6 by 2004 this number in Estonia was down to just 34 percent (European Election Survey). Differences continued to exist between the native populations (Estonians, Latvian, Lithuanians) and their Slavic minorities (Russians and/or Poles), where the latter supported one-man rule slightly more. But on the whole, there was little nostalgia for nondemocratic government.7 Perhaps more indicative of democratic frailty as an institutional legacy in the Baltic states was the degree of party system instability. In particular between 2002 and 2004, all three countries saw the meteoric rise of new populist parties, all of which promised either new honesty in politics, greater social spending or better protection of national interests.8 Each party received roughly a quarter (if not more) of all The example of Turkmenistan again comes to mind, alongside Belarus, Azerbaijan and many others. 6 For data from the early 1990s, see the surveys conducted by Richard Rose (University of Strathclyde) as part of the New Baltic Barometer. 7 To be sure, surveys like the EU’s Eurobarometer continued to show up to 60 percent of Balts being “not very satisfied” or “not satisfied” with “the way democracy works in their country.” But as Linde and Ekman have argued, this survey question is more likely to reveal popular opinion toward the current government in power than with the broader notion of democratic support. Moreover, given the possibility of varying understandings of democracy across Europe, certain respondents may have a higher standard of democracy than others, thus skewing the comparison of opinions. See Jonas Linde and Joakim Ekman, “Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used indicator in comparative politics,” European Journal of Political Research 42:3 (2003), pp. 391-408. 8 These parties were Res Publica in Estonia, New Era in Latvia and the Labor Party in Lithuania. 5

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votes cast during the first parliamentary election they participated.9 The result was a bouleversement of the party system in each country, and a scramble among politicians to try and figure out new alliances and possibilities for governing coalitions. In Latvia, this proved particularly chaotic, prompting three different governments to rotate in office during just two years. Clearly many more electoral cycles will be needed before both voters and political elites will come to form more stable preferences. The institutional legacy of not having any fixed cleavages or organized interests will remain for some time.

CONCLUSIONS This paper has had two main aims: 1) to raise some methodological reflections concerning the general model of meso-mega area dynamics, and 2) to provide some empirical considerations concerning the specific case of the Baltic states and the European Union. We have seen that the meso- and mega-area framework provides much food for thought in terms of studying how countries and people have shifted their geopolitical attachments and patterns of societal integration across the former Soviet empire. A comparative view such as this is essential if we are to place the general issue of post-communist transformation into a broader context and not get too caught up in our own regional specificities. In addition, however, the meso- and mega-area model provides a distinct method for juxtaposing old and new trends amidst this general process, for comparing structural- vs. agent-based variables, and for delineating types of eventual integration. While more work awaits in order to fully conceptualize and operationalize variables such as the different types of triadic identity, the model does provide the tools we need to begin to make sense of how divergences have emerged among the different areas of the post-communist space. Variance hitherto In Estonia, Res Publica received 24.6 percent of the vote during the 2003 Riigikogu elections. New Era in Latvia swept 23.9 percent of the votes during the 2002 Saeima elections. And in the most recent 2004 Lithuanian Seimas elections, the Labor Party triumphed with 28.4 percent of the votes cast in the party-list voting. 9

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understood in mere geographic or cultural terms is now becoming more conceptually and causally defined. As concerns the empirical validity of the model, the notion of a separate meso-area for Baltic states proved somewhat over-stated. Indeed, one could argue that all of the ex-communist countries of Europe are fading as a meso-area to the extent that they become involved in the new European integration project and its attempt to build a consolidated political community among nearly 30 individual states. In general, we might categorize this development as a transformational, rather than transitional dynamic, although here too we might see a completely separate type emerge if the new European Union succeeds. This new mega-area would instead be a collective creation by all its members. In this respect, Baltic identities do correspond to the conceptual model. Institutional identities have gradually been overtaken by external identities. Yet given the fact that the Sollen of the European Union has itself changed, the space for Baltic self-identities to contribute to the new European community has also been expanded. The more accommodative possibilities offered by the EU’s democratic, communal type of integration means that the otherwise competitive or apparently confrontational nature of the triadic identity nexus (i.e. that all three identities somehow vie amongst themselves) might actually be harmonized into a positive-sum game. If this were to happen, it would certainly prove to be one of the most impressive outcomes of postcommunism.

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DMITRY GORENBURG The concepts of meso-area and mega-area, as developed by Osamu Ieda and Kimitaka Matsuzato, can be useful in describing relationships between ethnic minorities and the majority population of the country in which they live. Just as a meso-area is defined as a region whose identity is formed through interaction with neighboring regions and with the core areas known as mega-areas,1 so a meso-nation might be considered as emerging from a set of cultural and political interactions between itself and its neighbors, and especially between itself and the majority population. In this chapter, I seek to develop the idea of mesonation by examining the relationship between Tatars as meso-nation and Russians as mega-nation. I examine three aspects of this relationship: the Tatars’ position as the Russians’ other, the duality of Tatar identity as they relate to Russians and to other neighboring ethnic groups, and the duality of Tatarstan’s international position as a Muslim sovereign entity within the Russian Federation.

THE RUSSIANS’ OTHER Tatars have traditionally seen themselves and been seen by Russians as part of Russia but not Russian. In this way they have served as the Russians’ most significant “other.” The Tatar ethnonym came into common usage during the period of Mongol control of Russian lands and was then applied by Russian ethnographers and officials during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as an identifier for all Turkic groups living on Russian-controlled territory.2 In this way, only “What are Meso-areas?,” Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University. (http://srch.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/program2-e.html) 2 M.Z. Zakiev, “Etnonimika i etnogenez” in M.Z. Zakiev, Tatary: problemy istorii i iazyka (Kazan, 1995), pp. 105-110. 1

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distantly related Turkic groups living in the Crimea, the Volga region, the Caucasus, and Siberia all came to be known as Tatars. During the pre-Soviet period, members of these groups did not refer to themselves as Tatars, preferring instead to use ethnonyms based on region of habitation, (Kirimli for the Crimean Tatars, Kazanly for Volga Tatars) or clan or tribal origin (Koibaly in present-day Khakassia, Nogai among present-day Astrakhan Tatars), while many identified generically as Turks or Muslims. While some of the ethnic groups that were called Tatar by Russians in the nineteenth century continue to call themselves Tatar, others were given new names by Soviet officials and ethnographers in the 1920s, leading to the appearance of new ethnonyms such as Khakass and Shor in Siberia. Russian perceptions of Tatars as their others have influenced interactions between the two groups since the conquest of Kazan in 1552. Most importantly, the Tatars came to be associated with the Mongol Horde that conquered Russia in the thirteenth century. As a result, many negative stereotypes came to be associated with the Tatars, including untrustworthiness and cruelty. Some of the stereotypes persist among the Russian population to the present day. The Tatar response has been somewhat ambivalent. One segment of the Tatar intellectual elite seeks to distance the Tatar ethnic group from the Mongols by downplaying the Tatar role in the Mongol invasion and the subsequent period of Golden Horde control of Russia and focusing instead on Tatar descent from the pre-Mongol Bulgar population of the region.3 Another segment of the elite instead seeks to emphasize the historical greatness of the Tatars by focusing on their past history of regional dominance and independent statehood, both in the Bulgar state and in the Golden Horde and its successor, the Kazan Khanate.4 The former group wants to show that Tatars were as much victims of the Mongol yoke as the Russians were while the latter group seeks to portray the Tatars as, at least historically, equals to the Russians. The end result of this uncertain relationship between Russians and Tatars is that while most Tatars see themselves as citizens of Russia and M.Z. Zakiev, “Zolotaia Orda v sisteme gosudarstvennosti Tatarskogo naroda” in M.Z. Zakiev, Tatary, pp. 111-117. 4 Ravil Fakhrutdinov, Zolotaia Orda i Tatary (Naberezhnye Chelny, 1993). 3

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therefore Russians in a non-ethnic sense, they maintain a certain cultural distance from Russians. As I show in subsequent sections of this chapter, this duality is most evident in differences in Tatar and Russian attitudes toward the Muslim world.

MINORITY OR IMPERIAL NATION? Throughout history, the Tatars have often played a role as intermediaries between the Russian majority and other neighboring ethnic groups. In recent decades, this intermediary position has resulted in the somewhat contradictory position taken by Tatar elites on the question of ethnic assimilation. These elites have gone to great lengths to denounce perceived efforts to assimilate Tatars as Russian imperialism, while at the same time undertaking very similar efforts toward other ethnic minorities in the region. This ironic contradiction came out most clearly during the run-up to the 2002 Russian census. Tatar activists decried the centuries of Russian cultural and political domination of Tatars, pointing to symbolic events such as the killing or exile of the entire Tatar population after the sacking of Kazan in 1552 and the history of mass forced conversions to Christianity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. They saw Soviet efforts to eliminate Tatar culture and language as the continuation of the tsarist Christianization and Russification programs that sought over time to turn as many Tatars as possible into Russians. Throughout the 1990s, Tatar leaders campaigned to reverse the decline in Tatar language and cultural knowledge, attributing this decline to a Russification campaign undertaken by the Soviet government and specifically to the elimination of Tatar language schooling from urban areas in Tatarstan and from virtually all schools in Tatar-populated areas outside of Tatarstan. They also complained about efforts to eliminate the Tatar language from the public sphere through official refusal to interact with the public in Tatar and the reprimands given by Russian speakers to anyone speaking Tatar in public. Academic studies showed that Tatars living outside of Tatarstan had high rates of intermarriage and that the vast majority of children

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resulting from such intermarriages listed their ethnic identity as Russian rather than Tatar.5 In order to redress these grievances, Tatar leaders sought to revive Tatar language education by opening Tatar-language schools in urban areas and especially in Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan. They also encouraged the revival of Tatar language schooling outside of Tatarstan by increasing the supply of teachers and textbooks to areas where Tatars were compactly settled. In order to equalize the position of the Tatar and Russian languages within Tatarstan, the Tatarstan parliament passed a law declaring both languages as the republic’s official languages.6 This law made Tatar language instruction mandatory for all schoolchildren in the republic, regardless of ethnicity. It also required government offices to function in both Tatar and Russian. Finally, it enacted several symbolic measures, such as ensuring that all street signs and public announcements were fully bilingual. Outside of the language realm, Tatar cultural revival measures included efforts to open republic film and radio studios, restoration and cleanup of Tatar architectural and archeological monuments, and the establishment of an independent Tatarstan Academy of Sciences. While Tatar intellectuals protested and sought to counter linguistic Russification and assimilation, they proposed very similar policies toward related minority groups in the name of Tatar unity. In particular, the 2002 census brought a concerted effort on the part of Tatar cultural leaders to portray small groups such as the Kriashen, Astrakhan Tatars, and various branches of Siberian Tatars as all comprising a united and indivisible Tatar nation. Efforts by cultural leaders of these groups to assert their separate ethnic identity were met with hostility and cries of treason. For example, the prominent Tatar intellectual Damir Iskhakov argued that Siberian Tatars were just a geographically separate part of the Tatar nation that did not have the requisite attributes, such as its own language and distinctive cultural practices, for recognition as a separate ethnic group. He warned that if they were recognized as a separate ethnic group after the 2002 census, they could no longer count T.A. Titova, Etnicheskoe samosoznanie v natsional’no-smeshannykh sem’iakh, (Kazan, 1999), p. 45. See the text of the language law, reprinted in Damir Iskhakov, ed. Suverennyi Tatarstan, Vol. 1. (Moscow, 1998), pp. 48-58, at p. 49. 5

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on assistance from the Tatarstan government in fulfilling their cultural and educational needs, a development which would undoubtedly, in his view, lead to a speedy assimilation of these groups by the Russian majority. Kriashen activists were warned that their group was just a subset of the Tatar nation and that by insisting they comprised a separate group they were betraying the interests of the Tatar group to the Russians, who wanted to divide Tatars among themselves in order to weaken them politically.7 Throughout this public campaign to ensure that Tatars achieve the maximum possible numbers in the 2002 census, Tatar intellectuals refused to allow that individual choice must be at the basis of any determination of ethnic identity, focusing instead on historical, anthropological, and cultural factors that “proved” the existence of a single and indivisible Tatar nation. Tatar activists’ concern about assimilation by the larger Russian nation ironically increased their efforts to assimilate related ethnic groups, at least some of whose leaders asserted that they should be considered entirely separate from the Tatar nation. Because of the Tatars’ status as a meso-nation, they sought to distance themselves from the Russian nation while following Russian ideas on ethnic identity and ethnic categorization.

SUPPORTER OF ISLAMISTS OR RUSSIA’S LINK TO THE MUSLIM WORLD? The duality of Tatar leaders’ international position is the final aspect of Tatars’ dual identity that I address in this chapter. On the one hand, Tatar politicians have repeatedly expressed their opposition to Russian support of Christian states engaged in conflict with predominantly Muslim states. On the other hand, they have sought to act as Moscow’s bridge to the Muslim world when such connections are required. Tatarstan’s foreign policy aspirations are much more muted now than they were in the early 1990s, when the Tatarstan government Damir Iskhakov, “Perepis naseleniia i sud’ba natsii,” in D.M. Iskhakov, ed., Tatarskaia natsiia: istoriia i sovremennost’ (Kazan, 2002), pp. 7-20.

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opened its own representative offices in several countries around the world and the Tatarstan legislature passed a resolution announcing the region’s desire to become a constituent member of the Commonwealth of Independent States.8 But the two situations where Tatarstan’s leaders have forcefully opposed the Russian government’s foreign policy show the importance of cultural ties in both sides’ foreign relations. The first of these situations is Russia’s conflict with Chechnia. In the first Chechen war, Tatar leaders stated their opposition to the war and initially refused to let local draftees be sent to the Caucasus. They also expressed opposition to the second war, although by 1999 they did not have the power to prevent draftees from being sent there.9 Second, when the Russian government condemned U.S. airstrikes against Serbia during the Kosovo conflict, Tatarstan’s President Shaimiev and other top officials put themselves on the side of the Muslim Kosovar Albanians and condemned the “fascist” policies of Yugoslav president Milosevic.10 These examples show that while Tatar leaders generally followed Russian foreign policy, they were conscious of their status as leaders of Russia’s Muslim community and opposed Russian policy when it went against fellow Muslim groups. Tatarstan’s leaders sought to ensure that Moscow saw Tatarstan as a moderate Muslim region. This task was accomplished by formulating the doctrine of Euro-Islam, a moderate Islam that was focused on culture rather than ritual and was designed to directly contrast to the radical brand of Islam practiced in parts of the Caucasus and Central Asia. EuroIslam was portrayed as a direct descendant of the jadidist, reformist Islam of the late nineteenth century.11 As moderate Muslim regions, Tatarstan and its neighbor Bashkortostan came to serve as crucial links between the Russian government and Muslim states and organizations. Thus, Kazan hosted an international conference on Islamic culture and President Shaimiev was at the forefront of Russian efforts to gain membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).12 E. Tagirov, Tatarstan: natsional’no-gosudarstvennye interesy (Kazan, 1996), p. 125. RFE/RL Tatar-Bashkir Daily Report, 21 September 1999. 10 RFE/RL Tatar-Bashkir Daily Report, 1 April 1999 and 6 April 1999. 11 Rafael Khakim, Kto ty Tatarin? (Kazan, 2002), pp. 30-38. 12 RFE/RL Tatar-Bashkir Weekly Report, 17 August 2004. 8

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Tatarstan’s efforts to develop a foreign policy that both reflected its position as part of the Russian state and its status as the homeland of a Muslim ethnic group showed its status as the homeland of a mesonation working in the shadow of the Russian majority and therefore seeking to separate itself from Russian policies while remaining within the Russian cultural sphere of influence.

CONCLUSION The concept of a meso-nation, which I have begun to develop in this paper, allows for the conceptualization of a relatively small ethnic group whose culture is dominated by a larger group (the mega-nation) but which nevertheless seeks to emphasize its distinctiveness to the extent possible under the circumstances at any given time. This paper is a preliminary illustration of the concept. A fuller treatment should examine the dynamic nature of this characterization, with the mesonation’s closeness to the mega-nation depending on the relative cultural and political strengths of each party at any particular time. In the Tatar case, the middle and late Soviet period, when the Russian cultural component of the state was at its peak, saw the weakening of Tatar culture and language. The decline of the Soviet/Russian state in the late 1980s and early 1990s allowed Tatar leaders to distance themselves from the Russian state and from Russian culture. They did so by undertaking a cultural revival, renegotiating the relative standing of Tatars and Russians within the Tatar homeland republic, and staking out independent positions on issues of foreign policy. As the Russian state appears to be regaining its strength in the first part of the twentyfirst century, it seems likely that the Tatar meso-nation will again be drawn closer to the Russian mega-nation.

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PART II A MESO-AREA OF REFORM SLACKERS OR THROES OF CREATION? — UKRAINE, BELARUS, AND MOLDOVA

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IAN MCALLISTER

Moldova presents a series of challenges for the student of megaand meso-areas. It was a constituent republic of the USSR, and is accordingly a part of Slavic Eurasia. But its culture is predominantly Latin rather than Slavic; its religion is Orthodox, but independent; and it falls outside the “vodka meso-area,” with a culture that relates more closely to wine and cognac. The national territory is itself something of an accident: it has at various times come under Turkish, Romanian and Russian rule and acquired its modern boundaries as late as 1940, when Romania was forced to cede Bessarabia to the USSR and the Moldovian Soviet Socialist Republic was established. When the last Soviet census took place, in 1989, Moldovans accounted for 65 percent of the national population, Ukrainians for 14 percent and Russians for 13 percent;1 this, indeed, was where Pushkin had served some years of exile, and where Leonid Brezhnev took up his first position as party leader of a Soviet republic in the 1950s. The closest cultural affinity is however with Romania, an affinity that was reinforced when – in 1989 – Moldovan began once again to be written in the Latin rather than the Cyrillic script. Within the postcommunist world, Moldova is again distinctive. It is, for a start, a divided society, with the eastern bank of the Dniester under the control of a nominally independent government based in Tiraspol, underpinned by the presence of Russian troops. And more than this: it is a postcommunist country under communist rule, in that the parliamentary elections of February 2001 were won by the Communist Party of Moldova, with 50 percent of the vote and 70 percent of seats in the country’s single-chamber assembly. The new parliament duly elected the Communist leader, Vladimir Voronin, as president the following April.2 As of the end of 2003, the Communist Party was the Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniya SSSR (Moscow, 1991), p. 122. See Ronald J. Hill, “Moldova votes backwards: the 2001 parliamentary election,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 17:4 (December 2001), pp. 130-39. Earlier developments are covered in Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford, 2000).

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2

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only one of Moldova’s parties that a significant level of national support (64 percent would have voted for it if a general election had taken place “the following Sunday”), and the party’s leader, Voronin, was the only politician who commanded a national following (for 30 percent he was the ‘politician they trusted the most’, although nearly as many ‘trusted nobody’ or declined to answer).3 In this paper we consider the place of Moldova within the world of “emerging meso-areas” using several bodies of evidence. We draw, first of all, upon a national survey carried out in early 2000 and representative of the adult population of right-bank Moldova although not of Transnistria, which is not accessible for purposes of this kind (further details are provided in the Appendix). A parallel questionnaire was administered at the same time in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, allowing cross-regional comparisons. In addition, we draw upon the Barometer of Moldovan Public Opinion that is conducted regularly by the Institute for Public Policy in Chisinau, most recently in November 2003,4 and upon comparable exercises in the UK, the US and European Union member countries. We focus in turn upon evaluations of the present regime, of civic institutions, and political values. In a final section we focus on Moldova’s international orientations as it moves towards its own choice of meso-area: between a “Western choice” represented by the member countries of the European Union, and a “Slavic choice” associated with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

EVALUATING THE CURRENT POLITICAL REGIME Moldovans are broadly in line with their colleagues in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine when they are asked to evaluate “the way this country is governed” (see Table 1). Only 4 percent, in 2000, believed According to the Barometrul de Opinie Publica, November 2003. The Barometrul was inaugurated in 1998 under the auspices of the Institutul de Politici Publice in Chisinau. The November 2003 survey was conducted by Iligaciu, an agency based in Chisinau; the sample was 1161 persons aged 18 or over, selected by a stratified, probabilistic, two-stage method, and interviewed face to face in either Moldovan (Romanian) or Russian between 1 and 17 November 2003; the datafile was consulted at www.ipp.md. 3

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Moldova was “a democracy,” but 37 percent thought it was “making progress towards democracy” and another 22 percent thought it was “less undemocratic than it used to be” (just 19 percent thought it had been “more democratic in the Soviet period”). Moldovans, however, were very dissatisfied with “the way democracy was working” in their country, and more dissatisfied than their counterparts in almost all of the other post-Soviet republics. Only 11 percent were “very” or “fairly satisfied,” similar to Ukraine but about half the level of Belarus, and among the lowest figures across the entire Commonwealth of Independent States.5 These figures themselves are lower than in any of the EU candidate countries (where satisfaction averages 32 percent), and lower again than among the EU’s existing membership, where as many as 58 percent are “fairly” or “very satisfied” with the working of their democracy.6 Nor is there much belief that human rights or the rule of law are widely respected. Just 15 percent thought individual human rights were respected to some degree, which was similar to the figure in Russia and Ukraine but just half the corresponding proportion in Belarus (and again much lower than among the EU candidate countries).7 There is also a very general perception that the rule of law is weak, and that levels of corruption are high and increasing. Not many think any of the post-Soviet republics is close to the rule of law, but Moldovans were likely to think their state was further away from that ideal than their counterparts in Russia and Ukraine, and (by a considerable margin) in Belarus, where authoritarian forms of government have had the effect of limiting some of the most obvious abuses of office. Some 36 percent thought “almost everyone” in the Only Russia, on Eurobarometer figures, had a lower level of satisfaction with the “way democracy [was] developing” (6 percent): Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 6 (Brussels, 1996), Annex Figure 6. 6 Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2 (2003), p. 19 (accessed at www.europa.eu.int). The “candidate countries” are defined as the ten that were set to become members on 1 May 2004, and also Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. “Satisfaction with democracy” measures are admittedly problematic: see Jonas Linde and Joakim Ekman, “Satisfaction with democracy: A note on a frequently used indicator in comparative politics,” European Journal of Political Research 42:3 (May 2003), pp. 391-408. 7 Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 6, Annex Figure 7 (40 percent of respondents in the Europe Agreement countries thought there was “a lot” or “some respect” for individual human rights). 5

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national government was engaged in bribery and corruption, and another 43 percent thought “most officials” were engaged in it. And nearly three-quarters believed corruption had “increased a lot” since the Soviet period, a larger proportion than in Russia and Ukraine and more than twice as large as in Belarus. 8 The same impression emerges from the November 2003 Barometer of Moldovan Public Opinion, which considered not only the level of corruption in the country as a whole but also the extent to which ordinary Moldovans had to offer goods, money or services in order to “solve problems” in their daily life. Very substantial proportions said they had to offer inducements of this kind in their dealings with the health service (43 percent), the courts (31 percent), the police (27 percent) and the education system (23 percent). Smaller but far from negligible proportions said they had to offer similar inducements in their dealings with employers (12 percent) or local authorities (9 percent). More generally, only 13 percent thought the police operated within a “legal framework”; only 11 percent thought people could “run their own business with no need to bribe public officials”; and only 9 percent thought the judicial system “treated all people equally and punished the culprits regardless of their status.”9 A 2002 survey commissioned by the US Department of State found similarly that only 10 percent believed the police “operated within the law,” and that only 7 percent thought there was “equal justice for all.”10 Nor was it only Moldovans themselves who took this view. According to Transparency International, which records levels of corruption (as their respondents choose to define it) not among local populations but among businessmen who regularly have dealings in foreign countries, Moldova is in fact one of the world’s most corrupt regimes. According to their latest survey, made public in October 2003, Moldova ranked as the 100th most corrupt country of the 133 that were included, well below Belarus (53) and the Russian Federation (86) Corruption within the postcommunist region, although not in Moldova, is considered further in William L. Miller, Ase B. Grodeland and Tatyana Y. Koshechkina, A Culture of Corruption? Coping with Government in Post-communist Europe (Budapest, 2001). 9 Barometrul de Opinie Publica, November 2003. 10 US Department of State, “Moldova struggles toward democracy,” M-103-02, 18 September 2002, p. 6 (the survey was conducted by Civis of Chisinau, n=1150). 8

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TABLE 1. ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE POLITICAL SYSTEM A democracy? How satisfied? Human rights respected? A rule of law state? How corrupt? Increasingly corrupt?

Moldova 4 11 15 27 79 70

Belarus 2 22 28 46 57 36

Russia 2 n.a. 19 30 82 63

Ukraine 2 11 9 36 77 58

Question wordings were: “In your opinion, the course of development that has been adopted by our country characterises it as…” (response: “a properly formed democracy”); “Tell me please how satisfied you are with the level of democracy in [country]?” (response: combines “very” and “fairly satisfied”); “And to what extent at the current time are individual human rights respected?” (response: combines “greatly” and “somewhat respected”); “How close do you think the central government embraces the idea of a rule-of-law state?” (response: combines “very closely” and “to some extent”); “In your opinion, how widespread are bribery and corruption in the central organs of power in [capital]?” (response: combines “almost everyone” and “most officials”); “Compared with Soviet times, would you say that the level of bribery and corruption in our country has…” (response: “significantly increased”). Responses show percentages. Sources: Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine surveys, 2000; Russia survey, 2001 (the corruption question records those who believed it was “widespread”).

although just above Ukraine (106). In 2002 Moldova ranked 93, the same as Uganda, and in 2001 it came in at 63, above Russia as well as Ukraine, although fewer countries were included in the rankings in both of these years. 11 Overall, our evidence suggests that Moldovans share a broadly negative view of the democratic credentials of their postcommunist system with counterparts elsewhere in the region, but they are particularly likely to be sceptical about the integrity of their legal system and more likely than others to believe that corruption is widespread and increasing.

11 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, 1963).

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MOLDOVANS AND THEIR POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS Among the most fundamental attributes of a pluralist political order is trust in civic institutions, and in other citizens. For Almond and Verba, writing in their Civic Culture,12 it was clear that pluralist politics would be strongest where popular attitudes were most supportive, and that supportive attitudes helped to sustain a corresponding set of political institutions. Within this complex of attitudes, moreover, trust has generally been seen as one of the most important. Trust, for instance, could “indicate the extent of diffuse political support,” and a high level of trust in some institutions could “compensate for low or declining confidence in others, or cushion and blunt the effect of their temporarily deficient credibility.” 13 But conversely, a lack of confidence in the democratic process had been one of the factors that undermined Weimar Germany, and the gradual withdrawal of confidence in politicians and the political system as a whole had considerable implications for the stability and even the survival of democratic government in later decades.14 One of the most generally supported conclusions of survey research into postcommunist values has been that ordinary citizens have low levels of trust in their civic institutions, and particularly in their political institutions. Russians, for instance, are actually quite ready to trust their fellow citizens – it was through social networks of this kind that they survived the communist period, and through such networks that they continue to make good the shortcomings of the consumer market.15 But there are much lower levels of trust in civic institutions of all kinds: from the churches to organs of government, including structures such as trade unions and political parties that nominally represent the interests of newly enfranchised citizens. Indeed, there is less trust in 12 The Corruption Perceptions Index was consulted at www.transparency.org. In 2002 there were reports on 102 states; in 2001, on 91. 13 Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Ulram and Harald Waldrauch, Democratic Consolidation in EastCentral Europe (London, New York, 1998), p. 111. 14 Russell J. Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 3rd ed. (New York, 2002), p. 237. 15 William L. Miller, Stephen White and Paul M. Heywood, Values and Political Change in Postcommunist Europe (London, New York, 1998), p. 100.

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the new and independent trade unions than in their Soviet-period equivalents.16 Levels of trust, moreover, have generally been declining, even for the churches and armed forces, which had traditionally enjoyed the greatest public confidence.17 Distrust is a much more general characteristic of the postcommunist nations, according to the survey evidence. Popular evaluations of postcommunist institutions “range from sceptical … to outright distrust”; there is most trust in the least democratic institution, the armed forces, and least of all in the institutions of representative government, especially parliaments and political parties. Across all institutions in eleven postcommunist societies in the mid-1990s, 31 percent expressed trust, 22 percent were sceptical, and 47 percent were distrustful. The “overall pattern” was one of “severe skepticism, bordering on outright distrust of current institutions”; positive trust in any institution was extremely limited, and “even skepticism [was] in short supply.”18 Low levels of trust, in turn, depress support for the new regime, and increase support for military, authoritarian and other alternatives.19 Within this context, do Moldovans, compared with others, believe they can have confidence, not just in their political institutions, but in civic institutions of all kinds? Or are they alienated, disaffected and disengaged? We set out the evidence in Table 2, drawing upon survey evidence for two time points and for a range of national locations. Broadly, Moldovans have most confidence in their religious institutions, and increasingly so. As in other countries inside and outside the postcommunist world, they also have confidence in their armed forces.20 Ibid., p. 102, and (for trade unions) Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, New Russia Barometer III: The Results (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1994), p. 32. 17 For VTsIOM time-series data see Stephen White, Russia’s New Politics (Cambridge, 2000), p. 270. 18 William Mishler and Richard Rose, “What Are the Origins of Political Trust?” Comparative Political Studies 34:1 (February 2001), pp. 30-62 (at p. 41). Moldova did not form part of this investigation, nor of the New Democracies Barometer on which it was based. 19 Richard Rose, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and its Alternatives: Understanding Post-communist Societies (Cambridge, 1998), p. 155. 20 The US Department of State survey found most confidence in the Moldovan Orthodox Church (75 percent), followed by the presidency (52 percent), but rather less in the armed forces (33 percent) and least of all in the legal system (just 13 percent) (“Moldova struggles toward democracy,” p. 5). 16

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However, it is only in relation to the church that levels of confidence are comparable with those in the European Union. In every other respect levels of confidence are lower in Moldova and the other postcommunist countries, with dramatic differences in respect of law enforcement: the courts, and most of all the police and armed forces. It is also notable that in the postcommunist countries there are particularly low levels of confidence in political institutions of all kinds: in the presidency, parliament, and political parties. Nor is there much more confidence in other institutions by which social interests might otherwise be represented, such as private business or the trade unions. Among the postcommunist countries we have been considering the Moldovan figures are not untypical, although the church enjoys relatively more confidence and the armed forces rather less. Levels of confidence in 2003 appear also to have been boosted by a “honeymoon effect” stemming from the Communist victory in the election two years earlier, which has raised popular support for the presidency (which is no longer directly elected), and to some extent for parliament and the political parties. Social institutions have nonetheless retained more confidence, as a whole, than political institutions (parties are still the least trusted of all). And in nearly every case levels of confidence, even in 2003, are lower than their equivalents in the European Union, with the widest discrepancies in relation to law and its enforcement by the police or armed forces; levels of confidence are also lower than in the candidate countries, with the greatest disparities once again in relation to the police and legal system.21 Communist societies had high levels of membership – but it was overwhelmingly compulsory membership, of trade unions, youth or women’s associations. Membership of a political party was more selective, but levels of membership were relatively high in comparative terms. Membership of the Soviet Communist Party approached 10 percent of all adults, and a third of all those who had a college degree; membership of the ruling party was higher than this – more than one adult in five – in Romania and the German Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2 (2003): trust in the armed forces averaged 72 percent in the candidate countries, in the churches 57 percent, in parliament 43 percent, in the national government 47 percent, in the police 54 percent and in the legal system 44 percent (pp. 18, 21). 21

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TABLE 2. TRUST IN CIVIC INSTITUTIONS Church Army Courts Police President Trade unions Private business Parliament Political parties

Moldova 2000 63 36 33 25 24 23 22 19 14

Moldova 2003 71 39 30 30 57 28 31 36 24

Belarus 56 50 28 20 41 25 27 23 12

Russia 48 49 18 18 22 21 16 12 9

Ukraine 35 49 20 16 30 19 20 10 7

EU 15 44 70 51 67 48 39 33 51 18

Question wordings were: “To what extent do you trust each of these social institutions to defend your interests?” (figures show the percentage who chose 5, 6 or 7 on a 7-point scale), or (in 2003) “To what extent do you have confidence in…?” (figures show the percentage who chose “full” or “some trust”). For the EU 15, the figure for “President” relates to “national government” and for “private business” to “big companies”; for Moldova 2003, “private business” refers to “banks.” Sources: as Table 1 (for Moldova 2000, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine); Barometrul de Opinie Publica conducted under the auspices of the Institutul de Politici Publice, November 2003, consulted online at www.ipp.md; and Eurobarometer 56, fieldwork November 2001, accessed at europa.eu.int (for the EU 15).

Democratic Republic. 22 Postcommunist systems operate within a rather different environment: there are no single ruling parties, constitutions generally specify a multiparty system, there is a separation of powers, and associational membership is, in principle, entirely voluntary. The consequence has been, in every case, that levels of membership have fallen dramatically. Moldova is representative of this wider picture (Table 3). Democracy, as elsewhere, is supposed to operate in “conditions of political pluralism, incompatible with dictatorship and totalitarianism” (article 5 of the constitution). Taken as a whole, adult citizens are less likely to be engaged in civic associations than their counterparts in Belarus, particularly in F. F. Petrenko et al., Partiinoe stroitel’stvo v sotsialisticheskikh stranakh (Moscow: Politizdat, 1980), note party membership of a million or more in the USSR, GDR, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Korea, Vietnam (and, they might have added, China) (p. 68).

22

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TABLE 3. LEVELS OF ASSOCIATIONAL MEMBERSHIP Sporting or health group Musical, literary or cultural society Political party Residential or neighbourhood group Charity Trade union

Moldova 6 7 4 4 5 22

Belarus 10 4 2 3 3 38

Ukraine n.a. 3 1 2 3 24

Russia 8 2 1 2 1 19

Sources: As Table 1 (figures show percentages indicating membership).

terms of trade union membership, but more likely to be engaged than in Ukraine or Russia. Overwhelmingly, Moldovans are not members of a political party (the only substantial membership is claimed by the Communist Party, with about 15,000 members throughout the country, and it is the only one with a functioning national organisation), and relatively few (about 14 percent in our 2000 survey) identify themselves as “supporters” of one or other of the parties. Predictably, former members of the CPSU were more than twice as likely to be party supporters as the sample as a whole, and four times as likely to be a member. In a broader comparative perspective, all of these patterns of civic association are relatively low. As Howard has shown, for all types of organisation – except trade unions – average levels of associational membership are much lower in the postcommunist countries than in post-authoritarian countries such as Spain, Brazil or South Africa, as well as in the older democracies. The postcommunist countries have particularly low levels of membership of associations that are political in character, such as political parties or environmental groups. They are also low in terms of church membership, and in terms of participation in educational, cultural and artistic organisations. Among the postcommunist countries themselves, moreover, levels were lowest of all among the former Soviet republics, such as Russia, Estonia and Ukraine (Moldova was not separately identified); and generally, memberships were tending to decline still further.23 Marc Morje Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 67, 66, 90. 23

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Membership of civic associations is of course only one of the ways in which citizens can attempt to influence the regime that rules in their name, and membership may not in itself convey a sense of political efficacy – during the communist period, clearly, it was almost entirely formal. If Moldovans find aspects of their situation unsatisfactory, such as high levels of corruption, do they have the means to change them – or at least, do they believe they can attempt to do so? And how important are competitive elections in this context? We explored this dimension of Moldovan politics more closely by asking a series of questions about individual political efficacy: whether elections, in the view of ordinary citizens, “made a difference,” whether elections allowed ordinary citizens themselves to exercise an influence on government, and whether, whatever their views about the effectiveness of the electoral mechanism, ordinary citizens believed they should take part. We set out our results in Table 4. Nowhere, clearly, is there a political system that simply reflects the political preferences of its members, nor is there a population that believes it can exercise such an influence. Nonetheless, it is not a universal that citizens have a low opinion of their ability to influence government decisions. In the United States, for instance, fully 50 percent, according to natural surveys, believe they can exercise a degree of influence of this kind.24 In the United Kingdom the proportion is rather lower, but still about a quarter of those who were asked in the 2001 British Election Study thought they had “some say” in government decisions. 25 Levels of political efficacy in postcommunist Europe, however, are much lower than this: in Moldova just 2 percent believed they could have “a lot” of influence on the making of government decisions and 18 percent believed they could have “some influence,” with similar proportions in the other post-Soviet republics. Moldovans are also representative of opinion throughout the region in their view of the extent to which elections can “change the future course of events in our country,” and in their belief that they can influence government in this way (Russians were exceptionally pessimistic). Moldovans, however, are much less representative of opinion in the other post-Soviet republics in their view of the importance of taking a personal part in the electoral process. Fewer than half thought 24 25

See the National Election Studies database at www.umich.edu/~nes, table 5b.2. See the 2001 British Election Study held at the UK Data Archive, question BQ65A.

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TABLE 4. MEASURES OF POLITICAL EFFICACY Do elections make a difference? Can people like you influence government? Do elections allow people like you to influence government? Should you vote?

Moldova 14 20

Belarus 22 24

Ukraine 17 16

Russia 11 12

38

56

43

5

43

79

79

66

Question wordings were: “Some say that elections can change the future course of events in our country. Others say that however you vote, nothing will change. What do you think?” (response: “elections can definitely change the course of events”); “How much influence do people like you have on the actions of the central government?” (response: combines “a lot” and “some”); “What do you think, does participation in national elections allow people like you to influence the government [upravlenie] of the country or not?” (response: “definitely”); “In your opinion, how should people like you behave when there are national elections?” (response: “make every effort to take part”). Sources: As Table 1.

they should “make every effort” to do so, and rather more thought either that there was “no point” in doing so (28 percent) or that there was no overriding need to do so if it was for any reason “inconvenient” (20 percent). Turnout in the February 2001 election was higher than these figures would suggest, at 68 percent; they may nonetheless reflected the peculiar nature of the Moldovan electoral system, in which the entire exercise takes place through a national contest between party lists and there are no deputies with an attachment to a particular constituency. Voters, in these circumstances, are more likely to regard themselves as spectators rather than participants.

MOLDOVANS AND THEIR POLITICAL VALUES If, finally, Moldovans were able to influence government decisions, in which direction would they choose to exercise that influence? We asked a series of questions about policy choices and larger philosophical

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TABLE 5. POLITICAL VALUES: MOLDOVANS COMPARED Military rule? Communist rule? Monarchy? A strong leader? A communist party? A planned economy?

Moldova 12 39 12 59 16 37

Belarus 8 26 11 22 10 33

Russia 11 42 10 29 19 39

Ukraine 7 30 8 44 21 40

Question wordings were: “There are different opinions about the nature of the state. To what extent do you think it would be better to restore the communist system? That the army should govern the country? That it would be better to have a strong leader and get rid of parliament? That a return to monarchy would be better?” (percentage in complete or partial agreement); “If there was a parliamentary election this week, what party orientation would you vote for?” (percentage opting for “a communist party”); “Which of the following statements are you more inclined to agree with? State ownership is the best way to run an enterprise OR an enterprise is best run by private entrepreneurs?” (percentage in complete agreement with the first statement). Sources: As Table 2.

positions in this connection. We were interested, for a start, in forms of rule. Did Moldovans, given their clearly expressed electoral preferences, favour a communist system in principle – or at least to a greater extent than in the other post-Soviet republics? Did they favour a planned or a market economy? Did they think of themselves as on the “left,” the “right,” or neither? And what view did they take, in retrospect, of Soviet system? Clearly, there is little support anywhere in the region for military rule, and little more for a restoration of the monarchy (see Table 5). Moldovans were more favourable than most towards the return of communist rule, but less so than Russians; and they showed no more enthusiasm than their counterparts elsewhere for “a communist party” when they were given a choice of political orientation. Their most distinctive preference was for a “strong leader” who would get rid of parliament – not a democratic option, but not a straightforwardly communist one either. There was no stronger support for a planned

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economy than in the other post-Soviet republics; nor was there any greater propensity to identify with the political left. Only 7 percent of our Moldovan respondents placed themselves “on the left,” as compared with 5 percent in Belarus, 10 percent in Russia and 14 percent in Ukraine; the overwhelming response, however, was not a different political identity, but none at all (63 percent). We asked, in other questions, about attitudes to the Soviet past. There was some support for a communist party in general, and for the Moldovan Communist Party in particular, according to election results as well surveys. But are Moldovans more likely than other postcommunist publics to support the principles of the Soviet system, and (in this sense) to identify with Slavic-Eurasian rather than Western values? We asked a series of questions in this connection about the “best” as well as the “worst features” of the Soviet system. What were the major shortcomings of the Soviet system, in the view of members of the ordinary public across the region? What, if any, were its positive features? And what were the views of Moldovans compared with their counterparts in other countries? We set out our evidence in Table 6. Moldovans, it emerges, are broadly representative of the postcommunist region in their responses. In each of our four countries, the most positive feature of the Soviet system was its guarantee of full employment; Moldovans were particularly likely to take this view, although our Ukrainian respondents were even more inclined to do so. Two other features of the Soviet system were identified by up to a quarter of our respondents, and by substantial proportions of Moldovans: it provided a stable economic environment, in which prices and wages were determined centrally and were relatively predictable over long periods, and it maintained peace between the various ethnic groups. Very few, in Moldova or elsewhere, believed it was a system with no redeeming qualities. There was a similar level of agreement about the “worst features” of the Soviet system. The worst feature of all, in each of our four countries, was the massive and unaccountable bureaucracy that dominated public life across the region. Moldovans shared this view; but almost as many, and twice as many as in any of the other countries, thought the Soviet system had no negative features at all. The next most frequently cited deficiency was human rights, but no more than one in

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TABLE 6. THE “BEST” AND “WORST FEATURES” OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM (A) THE “BEST FEATURES” Job security Economic stability Inter-ethnic peace Greater equality Law and order No good features

Moldova 39 17 16 11 11 3

Belarus 24 22 22 9 11 4

Ukraine 44 25 11 6 6 2

Russia 27 20 24 11 11 2

(B) THE “WORST FEATURES” Bureaucracy No bad features Human rights Economic stagnation Pollution Corruption

Moldova 26 25 12 9 8 7

Belarus 26 8 12 20 7 13

Ukraine 25 11 19 10 10 8

Russia 26 12 9 18 8 12

Sources: As Table 1; don’t knows and others excluded. Respondents were asked to identify a single most important fault from a list provided.

eight of our Moldovan respondents thought this was the Soviet system’s most serious shortcoming; others identified economic performance, but less often than in Belarus and Russia. Overall, Moldovans shared a pattern of responses that was characteristic of the other countries in the SlavicEurasian area; they were if anything “more Soviet than the Soviets themselves,” in that they were by some margin the most likely to find no faults at all in the Soviet system. Moldovans were also representative of opinion in the other postcommunist countries when we asked in which particular ways they thought their freedoms had been enhanced since the end of Soviet rule. There was overwhelming agreement, for instance, that it had become easier to practice a religion (83 percent agreed). It was easier

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to choose whether or not to take an interest in politics (70 percent), and to express one’s opinions (69 percent). But what about the ability of citizens to exercise an influence over government? In these respects there was a much more qualified set of responses. Fewer than a third (32 percent) thought they were less likely to be arrested without justification; even fewer (22 percent) thought their influence over government had increased since the end of communist rule; and only 12 percent thought the postcommunist government treated them more fairly and equally than its Soviet predecessor. These responses were very typical of the post-Soviet region as a whole: civil liberties, it was thought, had improved considerably, but there had been no transformation in the relationship between citizen and state, and in some respects the influence of ordinary citizens appeared to be less than it had been in the late Soviet period.

MOLDOVA AMONG THE NATIONS We turn finally to the place that, for ordinary Moldovans, their country should occupy in a world of emerging meso-areas. Did they, in particular, favour an international orientation that was directed towards the member countries of the European Union, ideally extending as far as membership, and towards NATO? Or did more of them lean towards an association with Russia and the other post-Soviet republics, as their strongly communist electoral preferences (and, for instance, their view of the Soviet system) might have suggested? We set out the evidence on these and other issues in Table 7. Moldovans, in fact, were no more likely than their counterparts in the other former republics to stress the importance of good relations with Russia. They simply reflected a widely shared opinion throughout the region, which itself reflected geographical proximity, family relations and commercial associations that had been established over many years. About a quarter of our Moldovan respondents, for instance, had a close family member who lived in Russia or one of the other CIS states; and Russia was still by far the country’s largest trade partner. Moldovans, equally, were no more likely than any others to regret the passing of the

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TABLE 7: INTERNATIONAL ORIENTATIONS: MOLDOVANS COMPARED Relations with Russia USSR nostalgia EU membership NATO membership

Moldova 71 62 69 60

Belarus 69 65 54 29

Russia n.a. 48 36

Ukraine 72 57 58 36

Question wordings were: “With which countries do you think it is important for [country] to have good relations?” (percentage identifying good relations with Russia as “very important”); “How much do you agree with the following statement: ‘It is a great misfortune that the Soviet Union no longer exists’?” (percentage in complete or partial agreement); “If our country were to join the European Union in the future, how would you feel about this?” (percentage strongly or somewhat in favour); “Do you think that our country becoming a member of NATO would be…” (percentage indicating “a very good” or “a good thing”).

Sources: As Table 2. USSR, in spite of their strong electoral support for a communist party and the Communists’ declared intention of restoring a closer relationship with Russia and eventually joining the Russian-Belarus Union. Conversely, Moldovans were the most enthusiastic of the postSoviet republics about a Western orientation, including not simply membership of the European Union but also of NATO. Moldova’s Communist leadership had refused to sign the declaration that was issued by the country’s other parties in favour of EU membership, but in spite of this, the country’s strongly Communist electorate was overwhelmingly favourable towards the idea of EU membership, and strongly supportive of the idea of NATO membership – the only one of the four post-Soviet republics in which this was the case. The evidence of the Barometer of Public Opinion was similarly that a very large majority (68 percent) would vote in favour of EU membership; twice as many thought Moldovan foreign policy should be oriented towards the EU rather than the CIS, and attitudes towards the EU were markedly more favourable than towards any other international organisation.

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Were these distinctively pro-Western orientations characteristic of Communist voters, and not just of a mass electorate within which they formed the largest group of party supporters? There were differences, certainly, but relatively modest ones. Those who said they were likely to vote for the Communists “next Sunday” in our 2003 survey were also supportive of EU membership, but just less emphatically so (57 percent compared with 69 percent for the entire sample). Prospective Communist voters were strongly of the belief that good relations with Russia were “very important” (84 percent): but so were their counterparts who supported other parties (71 percent). Communist identifiers were actually somewhat less likely to regret the demise of the USSR than the sample as a whole (57 percent “completely agreed” it was a misfortune, compared with 62 percent for the entire sample). Conversely, they were more cautious about membership of NATO, but still supported it by a plurality (47 percent) if not an overall majority. Given the divided nature of Moldovan society, we also related these patterns of international orientation to language use. Here again there were relatively few differences, at least in relation to the European Union. Moldovan speakers were strongly supportive of the EU as an institution, but hardly less so than their Russian-speaking counterparts (63 percent in the first case, 67 percent in the second). Both were strongly supportive of admission (68 and 64 percent respectively). Russian speakers, however, were more favourable towards the Commonwealth of Independent States (62 percent as compared with 46 percent among their Moldovan-speaking counterparts), and somewhat less favourable towards NATO (30 percent as compared with 39 percent). They were also less likely to favour the idea – an entirely hypothetical one – of NATO membership (just 11 percent of Russian speakers were supportive and 44 percent were opposed, compared with 30 percent of Moldovan speakers who supported NATO membership and 16 percent who opposed it). Moldovans, accordingly, are indeed something of a paradox within the Slavic-Eurasian mega-region. They share the political values of the Slavic countries that represent its core; they are at least as strongly committed to the Soviet system as our Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian respondents, and they are unique within the postcommunist world in electing a Communist government with the support of a majority of the

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voting electorate. But at the same time they are strongly oriented towards membership of the European Union, which is based on very different principles of economic and political management, and they are almost as strongly committed to membership of NATO, which has at least historically been dedicated to the defence of Western countries against a communist external threat. This, as we have seen, is a paradox that runs through Moldovan society: less in terms of its party-political allegiances, and rather more along the lines of its division by language, religion and culture. These are divisions that in turn make it difficult to place Moldova among the meso-areas. There is general approval of many “Soviet” values, but also of a closer relationship with the European Union. At the same time there are differences on the kind of relationship that Moldova should have with the other former Soviet republics, and on whether it should affiliate not simply with the EU but also with the military alliance of the Western world. These differences, and the still larger differences that exist between the two parts of a divided country, are likely to mean that Moldova will remain a paradox for some time to come.

APPENDIX Our Moldovan survey was carried out by the Chisinau agency Opinia under the direction of Tudor Danii, in association with Socis of Kyiv. Fieldwork took place between 12 and 19 February 2000. The universe for the study was the resident population of Moldova aged 18 and over, excluding residents of the self-declared republic of Transnistria, which is disproportionately Russian in population. A multistage stratified sample was constructed in accordance with Opinia’s normal practices; 111 interviewers were employed, who conducted 1000 face-to-face interviews in respondents’ homes. In addition, 37 monitors checked all stages of the fieldwork. A full set of results may be consulted in Stephen White, Public Opinion in Moldova (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, SPP 342, 2000). Our survey in Belarus was conducted by Novak of Minsk under the direction of Andrei Vardomatsky. Fieldwork took place between 13

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and 27 April 2000. The total number of interviews was 1090, using the agency’s normal three-stage stratified sampling model. Our Russian surveys were conducted by the All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (n=1940, fieldwork 19-29 January 2000), and by Russian Research (n=2000, fieldwork 10-26 April 2001). In Ukraine our survey was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology under the direction of Vladimir Paniotto and Valeriya Karuk. Fieldwork took place between 18 February and 3 March 2000, using a four-stage stratified sample; interviews took place on a face to face basis in respondents’ homes, yielding a valid total of 1590.

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6 UKRAINIAN GAS TRADERS, DOMESTIC CLANS AND RUSSIAN FACTORS: A TEST CASE FOR MESO-MEGA AREA DYNAMICS SHINKICHI FUJIMORI Since independence, Ukraine has struggled to consolidate democracy and institute a market economy. Despite its advantageous geopolitical location on the European continent and self-identification as a Central East European Country (CEEC), Ukraine still lags behind its western CEEC neighbors. Its accession to the EU and NATO are distant prospects.1 Like other CEECs, Ukraine launched neo-liberal reforms guided by the IMF in late 1994, but tangible economic growth was recorded only in 2000, after 10 years of ruinous recession. On the other hand, the influence of Russia, which shares a common past and similar institutional settings with Ukraine (according to Osamu Ieda, an “institutional identity”), has remained significant in Ukrainian politics and economics. Russia has been the largest trading partner of Ukraine since its independence. In addition, Russia is the de facto largest foreign investor in Ukraine’s economy, whose extremely unpredictable investment climate has made its “older brother” (but not the West) the only investor capable of handling this uncertainty. This situation reminds us of the controversial concept of the “liberal empire,” recently pronounced by A. Chubais, who argues that the Russian government is able to and should encourage Russian entrepreneurs to run businesses and buy stocks in neighboring CIS countries.2 Ukraine, as well as Belarus and Moldova, was neither able to exploit its advantageous geographic location to be quickly accepted by the EU nor to create a meso-area between Europe and Eurasia conducive to indigenous reformism. This chapter tries to elucidate the reasons for The Ukraine-EU Co-operation Council was established in 1998, but there are neither concrete schedules nor discussions dedicated to Ukraine’s EU accession. Ukraine declared that it intended to gain full EU membership by 2011, but the EU expressed no desire to incorporate Ukraine. 2 Anatolii Chubais, “Missiia Rossii v XXI veke,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 1 October 2003. 1

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this failure, based on a case study of Ukrainian gas traders. This topic was chosen since it reveals a specific combination of domestic and international politics. Domestically, Ukraine’s system of gas trade was a hotbed of clan politics. 3 Internationally, Ukraine has not found any alternative to the old, Soviet unified energy system and it is impossible for this country to ignore Russia’s will in this sphere. The next section explains the significance of this issue and gives a brief overview of the natural gas sector in Ukraine. The following sections examine the chronological development of Ukraine’s gas market during 1993-2003. The last section offers tentative conclusions.

WHY DOES NATURAL GAS MATTER? First of all, natural gas concerns both the IMF and Russia. Natural gas is one of the most necessary commodities in Ukraine. About 40 percent of primary energy consumption comes from natural gas and Ukraine produces only one quarter of its total need (Table 1). Ukraine remains highly dependent on foreign producers for its natural gas supplies and it owes several billion USD in debt to them. For this reason, there is a significant possibility of interference from foreign gas producers, above all Russia’s Gazprom, as well as the IMF, which assists Ukraine with its foreign debt problem and advises on economic reforms. The IMF believes that the unreformed gas market was the main source of Ukraine’s foreign debts, and that it requires neo-liberal reform of the gas market. There are numerous state regulations on the gas sector and these regulations attract many people seeking privileges from the state. For this reason, we can identify a patron-client relationship based on the gas business. The dynamics of the gas business have always depended on political patrons who guaranteed favorable business conditions. The natural gas problem involves both internal politics and the IMF and Gazprom’s influences. The interaction between external and internal politics has caused the transformation of the gas market in Ukraine. On the clan characteristics of Ukraine’s politics, see Kimitaka Matsuzato, “Elite and the Party System of Zakarpattia Oblast: Relations among the Levels of Party Systems in Ukraine,” Europe-Asia Studies 54:8 (2001), pp. 1265-1299. 3

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TABLE 1. UKRAINE’S DEPENDENCY ON RUSSIAN GAS

A. Imported from Russia (bcm) B. Domestic gas production (bcm) C. Domestic consumption (bcm) Dependency on Russia (A/C) (%) Self sufficiency (B/C) (%)

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

NA

54.7

56.7

52.8

51.1

57.6

54.9

52.8

39.7

28.7

25.3

26.0

20.9

19.3

18.3

18.2

18.4

18.1

18.0

18.1

17.9

18.3

18.7

19.5

113.4

102.8

92.4

85.4

86.0

81.3

75.6

73.6

73.4

70.5

69.7

76.4

NA

53

61

62

59

71

73

72

54

41

36

34

18

19

20

21

21

22

24

25

24

26

27

26

Source: Poslannia prezydenta Ukrainy do Verkhovnoi rady Ukrainy: pro vnutrishne i zovnishne stanovyshche Ukrainy u 2002 rotsi,p. 343; Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2001 rik, p. 104, Table 6.9; Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2002 rik, p. 106, Table 6.10; Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1993; 1994; 1995; 1996, p. 355, Table 358; 1997, pp. 590-591, Table 19.10-11; 1998, p. 757, Table 25.14; 1999, pp. 575-576, Table 24.15; 2000, p. 589, Table 24.16; 2001, p. 617, Table 24.17; 2002, p. 627, Table 24.17; Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine press release, 20 February 2004, URL (http://mpe.energy.gov.ua)

The structure of the natural gas industry in Ukraine is outlined in Figure 1. 4 In this figure, foreign gas producer means a legal person extracting natural gas and exporting it to Ukraine. In Ukraine, because of the absence of a liquid natural gas (LNG) process or alternative gas pipelines, only Russia and the Central Asian republics (Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) feature as foreign gas producers. The export of Russian gas is carried out by Gazprom itself (Gazeksport, to be precise) and its “mysterious partner” Itera.5 Turkmenistan gas reaches Ukraine through Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Russian territory, and this long-distance transport is operated not by Turkmenistan but by various commercial firms, including Itera. Domestic gas producer means a legal person extracting natural gas in Ukraine. Most of the domestic gas fields are owned and controlled by state companies whose share of output capacity is over 90 percent. For each definition, please refer to Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2003. 5 See Petr Vrasov, “Upolnomochennye po delam Sodruzhestva,” Ekspert 11 (20 March 2000), pp. 26-30. 4

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FIGURE 1. THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY IN UKRAINE* Foreign gas producer National border Importer

Gas traders Domestic gas producer

Distributor

Distributor Transmission / Distribution system

Regional Supplier

Household consumers

Non-household consumers

*This figure excludes exports from Ukraine.

Domestic natural gas only covers one quarter of national demand for gas; the gap is filled with imported natural gas. Domestic natural gas is much cheaper than imported gas and is primarily allocated to household consumers. Gas Importer means a legal person importing natural gas to the territory of Ukraine and selling it to consumers. Importers must be licensed and registered in Ukraine. The state company (Ukrhazprom until 1998, NaftoHaz Ukrainy after 1998), which receives 25-30 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Russian natural gas from Gazprom annually as a transit fee, can also be categorized as an importer.6 Gas Distributor means a legal person buying natural gas and selling natural gas to consumers. Distributors can be classified into two categories, the first selling natural gas to household consumers through regional gas suppliers (Oblhaz), and the second selling gas to non-household consumers. With very few exceptions, for example Timoshenko’s gas trading company, United State company means a company, more than 25 percent (a “controlling packet”) of whose shares belong to the state. 6

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TABLE 2. THE STRUCTURE OF GAS CONSUMPTION AND DOMESTIC PRODUCTION IN UKRAINE (BCM) Non-household consumers Household consumers Technological needs* Total (A)

1990 914

1991 87.7

1992 81.1

1993 65.2

1994 54.4

1995 45.8

1996 46.5

1997 45.3

1998 34.9

1999 33.2

2000 38.2

2001 34.0

2002 30.9

2003 34.4

213

24.3

26.6

30.2

30.7

31.9

31.3

28.6

33.0

32.9

27.5

29.5

31.5

34.4

6.1

6.1

5.7

7.4

7.3

7.7

8.2

7.4

7.6

7.5

7.7

7.0

7.4

7.5

118.8

118.1

113.4

102.8

92.4

85.4

86.0

81.3

75.6

75.7

73.4

70.5

69.7

76.4

* Natural gas, which is required for the operation of GTS itself. Source: Naftohaz Ukrainy HP URL http://www.ngu.com.ua, read by author 20 August 2001; Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine press release, 20 February 2004, URL (http://mpe.energy.gov.ua)

Energy Systems of Ukraine (see below), the state companies have monopolized distribution to household consumers. Regional Supplier (Oblhaz) means a legal person supplying natural gas to household consumers on commission from the distributor. The territories covered by the 55 Oblhaz largely coincide with the administrative districts. They are partially privatized, but the state (or state company) and regional governments retain a large share.7 Regional Suppliers not only supply natural gas and collect the bills, but are also responsible for the operation, security and maintenance of the regional distribution system (low pressure pipeline networks). Household consumers means customers purchasing natural gas for their own household consumption. Also, in the case of Ukraine, we include municipal services and public organizations in this category. Nonhousehold consumers, or industrial consumers, means consumers purchasing natural gas not for their own household consumption. Power stations are included in this category. Gas transmission system (GTS) means the transport of natural gas through a high-pressure pipeline network (35,000 km in total length) and 12 underground gas storage facilities (UGS, 30 bcm in total capacity). This GTS is the most valuable asset in Ukraine and is owned and 7 See Irina Dubrova, “Oblgazy: Put’ k reorganizatsii,” Energeticheskaia politika Ukrainy (February 2001), pp. 74-76.

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operated by the state.8 In 2002, the GTS contributed six percent of the state budget. Currently, negotiations are being held between Gazprom and the Ukrainian government to establish common control of the GTS (“Gas consortium”), since the Ukrainian GTS serves as a main gas export route for Gazprom. In this paper, we focus on the dynamics of importers and distributors to non-household consumers (Table 2) since these categories have been objects of liberalization. In contrast to these, regional supply and GTS are still under state monopoly. A commercial company or non-state company that distributes natural gas to non-household consumers, we define as “gas trader.” In some cases, gas traders have a license to import. What is important is that gas traders have no property, such as gas fields or GTS, but only the license to trade. It is around these licenses that political patron-economic client relations have developed.

HOW TO MAKE PROFITS FROM GAS? It is well known that distributors to non-household consumers, or gas traders, operate one of the most profitable businesses in Ukraine.9 At the same time, Ukrainian gas consumers have been notorious for their low payment rate. How can a high rate of profit be consistent with poor consumers? How could gas traders make a profit in Ukraine? There are several explanations for this paradox. The first reason is the market’s scale. Despite a long economic depression, Ukraine is still highly dependent on gas. As of 2002, natural gas’s share in primary energy consumption was 38 percent. 10 The world’s sixth largest gas consumption market is attractive to gas traders. Moreover, the gas traders only cover non-household, or industrial consumers, which are wealthy in comparison to household consumers. In 1995, Arthur D. Little, commissioned by the EBRD, estimated GTS’s value at 2228.7 billion USD. 9 “Vse bogatye liudi Ukrainy zarabotali cvoi kapitaly na Rossiiskom gaze,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 16 October 1998. 10 Derzhavnyi komitet statystyky Ukrainy, Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy 2002, p. 105, Table 6.12. 8

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The second reason is Ukraine’s dependency on imported gas. As mentioned above, Ukraine has to import approximately 50-70 bcm of gas annually. This figure includes Russian gas, which the Ukrainian state company receives as a transit fee, amounting to 25-30 bcm. The remaining 25-45 bcm has to be purchased from foreign gas producers. This portion of the gas supply is allocated on the basis of licenses, and provides the business opportunity for the gas traders. The third reason for the profitability of the gas trade is non-monetary transactions. Ukraine’s economy is still subject to de-monetarization. This de-monetarization was led by the tight fiscal monetary policy, which was originally a reaction to the hyperinflation of 1993, and then accelerated under the IMF’s guidance (Graph 1). Under these constraints, nonmonetary transactions, or payment by barter, debt equity swap and payment in discounted industrial bills of exchange became common between the gas traders and their consumers. These non-monetary transactions gave a great advantage to the gas traders. First, commercial gas traders became more effective than state companies in collecting payments from consumers. It was not a coincidence that gas traders appeared at the moment when the state gas distribution companies proved themselves incapable of collecting on bills from consumers. State companies are bound by the law in their actions, and they are more tolerant of non-paying consumers than commercial companies. The prices achieved by gas traders through non-monetary transactions were two to three times higher than the fixed price, sometimes five to six times higher. Moreover, gas traders could bring companies that were not able to pay for their gas consumption under their control through debt equity swapping and payment in discounted bills of exchange, and these companies’ products contributed to the gas traders’ further profit. The fourth reason for the profitability of the gas trade is state protection. The gas traders had to pay the foreign gas producers for their supplies, and the state GTS company for transporting the gas. But their payments fell into arrears. In some cases, gas traders’ arrears were covered by the Ukrainian government for diplomatic and political reasons. Also, out of necessity, the government gave a state guarantee on gas traders’ imports. And when the gas traders could not pay, the government had to. The gas traders were thus able to make a profit at the government’s expense.

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GRAPH 1. MONETARIZATION OF THE UKRAINE ECONOMY ％ 60

50

40

32,5

26,7

20

12,6

13,3

11,1

16,6

15,0

18,5

22

28,5

36

0 92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

2000

2001

2002

2003 year

M2/GDP

M2 means the aggregation of cash currencies, savings, and fixed-time deposits. Source: National Bank of Ukraine HP URL (http://www.bank.gov.ua)

THE BIRTH OF GAS TRADERS (1993-1994) After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s Gazprom gradually increased its natural gas export price and, from January 1, 1993, introduced the so-called “world market price” for Ukraine. Turkmenistan took a similar step. In May 1993, the then prime-minister Leonid Kuchma declared an “energy crisis,” claiming that gas prices had increased 40 times in just four months.11 Ukraine could not adjust its national economy, since its industries and communal services were built on the assumption of cheap natural gas. At that time, Ukrhazprom, which was a state monopoly of all the gas industries from gas extraction to wholesaling, handled the import of gas.12 Ukrhazprom’s non-payment arrears to foreign gas producers became part of the state debt. To counter Ukraine’s arrears, Gazprom and the Turkmenistan government reduced the gas supply to Ukraine. Many households had their gas supply cut off, and central heating stations and plants were blocked out. Under this energy crisis, Donets’k, a coal Prime minister Kuchma’s parliamentary speech on May 18, 1993. Interfax-Ukraine, 18 May 1993. 12 Ukrhazprom was founded in 1966; after Ukraine’s independence it became a stateowned joint stock company. There was no financial relationship between RAO Gazprom and Ukrhazprom.

11

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rich region, became more prominent in national politics. Backed by a coal miners’ strike, Donets’k men replaced Kuchma’s cabinet ministers in September 1993. At this critical moment, gas traders were born. Due to Ukr aine’ s non-payment , in Februar y 1994 t he Turkmenistan government totally stopped the gas supply to Ukraine and stated that resumption of supply would be conditional on payment of the debt. In 1993 alone, the Ukraine government owed 671.9 million dollars to the Turkmenistan state gas producer.13 To solve this problem, in April 1994 the Ukrainian government designated “Respublika,” a commercial corporation established only a few months earlier by the young businessman Ihor Bakai, to pay off the state’s gas debt through barter operations. Bakai’s company assumed the obligation of mediator in paying off the state gas debt. Furthermore, in agreement with the Turkmenistan government, Ukraine’s government gave Respublika a license to import gas from Turkmenistan. Remarkably, the repayment program and the gas imports were state guaranteed, that is, Respublika bore no financial responsibility for either operation. Under these contracts, in 1994 Respublika imported 9.2092 bcm gas from Turkmenistan at the Turkmen-Uzbek border price of 50 USD per 1,000 cm. This privileged agreement was a true product of Bakai’s lobbying. Respublika was linked to the then Prime Minister V. Masol; when Respublika did not fulfill its obligations, Masol ordered the state bank to cover Respublika’s debts. 14 In the end, this repayment plan only benefited Bakai and further worsened the state’s budgetary situation. And when Masol was ousted from the cabinet, Respublika was eliminated from the gas market. Kuchma dismissed Masol from his post. In October 1994, new President Kuchma declared the beginning of an economic reform backed by the IMF. The accumulation of state gas debts motivated Kuchma to launch the reform. In his address to the parliament (Verkhovna Rada), he stressed the necessity of the IMF’s help. This sum was fixed by a bilateral treaty on 5 November 1994, titled “Uhoda mizh Uriadom Ukrainy ta Uriadom Turkmenystanu pro restrukturizatsiiu derzhavnoho borhu Ukrainy Tukmenystanu za 1993 rik.” 14 Rosporiadzhennia vid 13 zhovtnia 1994 (13 October 1994) “Pro nadannia banku ‘Ukraina’ garantiinykh zobov’iazan’ shchodo pohashennia kredytiv, nadanykh korporatsiii ‘Respublika’ dlia oplaty postavok prirodnoho hazu iz Turkmenystanu.” 13

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Kuchma said, “I want all of you to understand that at the end of this year, more than one billion USD is needed to pay the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan just for gas. We do not have such a sum. So, do think about the outcome if we break off negotiations with international organizations.”15 Thanks to the IMF’s support, Russian Gazprom agreed to restructure Ukraine’s gas debts through a government bond (Gazpromovok) worth 1.4 billion USD in March 1995.16 This meant two creditors, the IMF and Gazprom, appeared as influential foreign actors with a voice in Ukraine’s gas policy. Under this reform program, the import and distribution sector was gradually liberalized and several commercial companies joined this business. Among them were Bakai’s new company Interhaz, Iu. Tymoshenko and V. Pinchuk’s Spivdruzhnist’, and Itera’s predecessor Omurania. They made direct contracts with Gazprom or the Turkmenistan government and sold to non-household consumers.

THE RISE OF THE GAS TRADERS THE EMERGENCE OF A REGIONALLY DIVIDED DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (1996-1997) It was Pavlo Lazareko who institutionalized this liberalization and added a regional aspect to the gas trading business. In 1996, Lazarenko introduced his reform plan, the “regional divided distribution system.” However, this was a typical example of “partial reform” and only benefited himself and his client.17 There were several actors that affected Lazarenko’s decision. The first was the IMF. The IMF’s main concern was to cut the internal payment arrears in Ukraine, which had been 15 “Obrashchenie presidenta Ukrainy k Verkhovnomu Sovetu,” Golos Ukrainy, 13 October 1994. 16 This agreement was a condition imposed by the IMF for granting Russia a large-scale stand-by credit. See Margarita Mercedes Balmaceda, “Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies: The Case of Ukraine,” Europe-Asia Studies 50:2 (1998), p. 262. 17 Joel S. Hellman, “Winners Take All. The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions,” World Politics 50 (January 1998), pp. 203-234.

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building up arrears to foreign gas producers and burdening the country with heavy state debts. For this reason, the IMF called for the imposition of tight financial discipline and a gas tariff adjustment. The IMF strongly criticized the state guarantee for the gas traders’ import payments, as damaging to the state budget.18 It also urged a market-oriented reform of the gas sector to lighten the burden on the state. The second actor that facilitated Lazarenko’s reform was Russia’s Gazprom, whose main concern was non-payment by Ukrainian importers. Ukrhazprom, a state gas monopoly had poor payment capability due to internal arrears. From this point of view, Gazprom, like the IMF, favored further commercialization of the Ukrainian gas market. Since the gas traders’ commitment was limited to non-household consumers, they could be expected to suffer less from internal arrears. Gazprom regarded the gas traders as more capable business partners than Ukrhazprom. And if a gas trader did fall into debt to Gazprom, Gazprom could simply replace it with another. At the same time, Gazprom used its creditor position to claim not only a property right to the GTS, but also the right to access the Ukrainian gas market to develop its own gas trading business. Gazprom pressured the Ukrainian government to give a large share to its favorite gas trader, the Itera company. 19 Since late 1994, Itera had been handling and supplying Turkmenistan gas to the Ukrainian market through certain Ukrainian gas traders such as Spivdruzhnist’ and Omrania, but at that time it had no direct access to Ukraine’s consumers. Moreover, in October 1995, Gazprom, preparing for the liberalization of the Ukrainian market, founded the joint venture company “TurkmenRosGaz” to export Turkmenistan gas to Ukraine.20 For these reasons, 1996 was the best time for Gazprom to develop its business in Ukraine. The third actor facilitating Lazarenko’s reform was the new president Kuchma. Having been the general director of the Southern Machinery Factory (“PivdenMash” or “IuzhMash”) in Dnipropetrovsk, Amer Bisat, “Ukraine’s Gas Arrears: Issues and Recommendations,” IMF paper on Political Analysis and Assessment, April 1996. 19 Pavel Aleksandro, “Bolezn’ neplatezhei zagnali vnutr’, no ona rvetsia naruzhu,” Kommersant Daily, 3 April 1996. 20 The Turkmenistan government held a 51 percent stake in this joint venture, while Gazprom had 45 percent and Itera held only four percent.

18

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TABLE 3. NUMBER OF MPS BY FRACTION, AS OF MAY 1995 Fractions

Number of MPs

Communists

90

Agrarians

47

Socialists

27

People’s Rukh

28

“State”

28

“Independence”

30

“Center”

30

Unity

31

IDG

30

“Reform”

35

Non-fraction

29

Total

405

Source: O. Haran’, O. Maiboroda, eds., Ukrains’ki livi: Mizh leninizmom i sotsial-demokratieiu (Kyiv, 2000), p. 102, Table 10.

Kuchma had weak power bases both in the government and in parliament. In the government, there were many elites from Donets’k who came to Kyiv at the peak of the energy crisis, while the left forces dominated parliament (Table 3). President Kuchma removed the old power structures and brought leaders from his homeland Dnipropetrovs’k to Kyiv. The main target of Kuchma’s purge was leaders from Donets’k. In autumn 1993, supported by striking Donbass miners, the then Donets’k city mayor and a coal mine director, Iukhim Zviahil’s’kyi, had driven the prime minister Kuchma to resign and took his place. Now it was Kuchma’s turn for revenge. During Kuchma’s political purge, Zviahil’s’kyi was forced to flee to Israel for several years.21 In the parliament, Kuchma’s faction, the “Interregional Deputies’ Group” (Mizhrehional’na deputats’ka grupa; IDG), included only 30 parliamentarians, while the Communists, Socialists, and Agrarians had together over 150 parliamentarians and secured the posts of speaker 21

Zviahil’s’kyi is Jewish.

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TABLE 4. GROUPING BY REGIONS SUPPLY OF NATURAL GAS IN 1996

FOR THE Name of Oblast

Odesa, Kherson, Vinnytsia, Poltava, Zaporizhzhia, Rivne, Khmel'nyts’kyi, Donets’k, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, L’viv, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Ivano-Frankivs’k, Kirovohrad, Luhans’k, City of Kyiv, Crimea, City of Sevastopol' Dnipropetrovs’k, Donets’k, Cherkasy Chernivtsi, Volyn’, Poltava, City of Kyiv, Kyiv Oblast Motor Sich, Mariupoli Ilich, Azov Stal' Rest of Oblasts

Name of the Distributor Interhaz

Annual amount distributed (bcm) 7.8

Itera-Energy

16.8

United Energy Systems of Ukraine Olhaz

25.2 (12.3 for nonhousehold and 12.9 for household consumers) 3.5

Motor Sich Mriupoli Ilich Azov Stal' Ukrhazprom

1.0 1.1 1.29

Source (bcm) Gazprom (10.0) From Central Asia Gazprom (25.1) Gazprom Gazprom

Source: Derzhavnyi komitet naftovoi, hazovoi ta naftoperepobnoi promyslovosti Ukrainy “Derzhnaftohazprom, ” quoted in Zerkalo nedeli, 27 January 1996, p. 6.

and first deputy speaker. Kuchma had to cooperate with a propresidential fraction, “Unity (Ednist’),” led by Pavlo Lazarenko. Lazarenko was the presidential representative in Dnipropertovs’k Oblast and a strong supporter of Kuchma in the 1994 presidential elections (Table 3). President Kuchma invited him to be the first deputy prime minister in September 1995. After Kuchma removed Marchuk from the premiership in May 1996, Lazarenko succeeded to the post. Charged with Kuchma’s authority, Lazarenko launched a partial reform of the gas sector. In 1996, the government under Lazarenko proposed a policy to reform the system of gas trading. At the beginning, this plan aimed to satisfy the IMF, Gazprom, Kuchma, and every party concerned. As Lazarenko explained it, he aimed to reduce the state company’s role and stop the further accumulation of state debts to Russia and Turkmenistan. As a result of Lazarenko’s reform, the non-household consumer market was divided along oblast and district lines.22 Each 22 See Lazarenko’s interview with Zerkalo nedeli. Alla Eremenko, “Avtor pravil igry,” Zerkalo nedeli, 20 April 1996.

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gas trader who received a license covered only specified regions (Table 4). According to Lazarenko, this scheme combined commercial principle with a social safety net. Under the scheme, each commercial gas trader would make profit on a commercial basis, while relatively poor consumers were protected to an extent. Each gas trader had a monopoly of distribution within each “territory,” but they had to supply whether their consumers were profitable or not. According to Lazarenko, each region had both rich and poor consumers, so that overall gas traders would be able to make profits. If the gas traders could not turn a profit, the government would replace these gas traders with other gas traders. The government would control the gas price: inter-governmental negotiation would set import prices and the government would fix transport and storage fees. However, barter operations would easily bypass this price control. Each gas trader made direct purchase agreements with Gazprom. The government did not guarantee their import payment. This non-guarantee policy was the IMF’s main concern and Lazarenko himself had on several occasions stressed this principle. However, the non-guarantee policy was frequently ignored at Gazprom’s request. In order to maintain social tranquility, the state company Ukrhazprom covered all household consumers, as well as nonhousehold consumers in relatively poor regions. Ukrhazprom was able to compensate with its own resources. First, Ukrhazprom had the cheapest gas sources, such as the domestic gas fields and Russian gas received as a transport fee from Gazprom. This cheap gas was primarily allocated to household consumers. Second, Ukrhazprom received transport fees from the gas traders. Each gas trader contracted with Ukrhazprom to transport and store gas. The transport fee and storage fee were fixed at 2 “conditional units”23/1000 cm and 10 “conditional units”/1000 cm respectively. The most controversial aspect of Lazarenko’s system was which traders were granted the rich regions, namely Dnipropetrovs’k and Donets’k Oblasts (Tables 4 and 5). These two were the largest gas consumers. Also, metallurgy and machine-building enterprises were In Russia and Ukraine US dollars have been called by this term since the governments have prohibited the settlement of accounts by foreign currencies. 23

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concentrated in these two regions. Having control over these enterprises through gas distribution guaranteed profit. TABLE 5. GRP AND GAS CONSUMPTION BY REGIONS (PERCENTAGE OF ALL UKRAINE) 1 2 3 4 5

GRP (in 1996) Donets’k Dnipropetrovs’k Kyiv City Kharkiv Zaporizhzhia

12.3 9.4 7.4 6.3 5.4

Gas consumption (in 1998) Donets’k 15.9 Dnipropetrovs’k 13.7 Kharkiv 6.8 Luhans’k 6.8 L’viv 5.7

Source: Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 2001 rik (Kyiv, 2002), p. 47, Table 2.9; Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 1998 rik (Kyiv, 1999), p. 97, Table 5.9.

Lazarenko allocated his home region to Yuliia Tymoshenko’s gas trading company, United Energy Systems of Ukraine (Edyni Enerhetychni Systemy Ukrainy; UESU). The partnership between Lazarenko and Tymoshenko could be traced to 1992, when Lazarenko was the governor of Dnipropetrovs’k and granted her company the monopoly on gasoline supplies to agro-industrial complexes.24 Unlike other gas traders, UESU had a license to supply household consumers in Dnipropetrovs’k. Why did the UESU want to supply these poor consumers? UESU sold natural gas to household consumers through regional gas suppliers, and could offset any losses with the bills of exchange from the enterprises, which the regional administration collected as tax.25 Donets’k was divided into three sections, and Itera took the largest share.26 Donets’k Oblast’ itself asked the Kyiv government to grant the gas trading license. In winter 1995, prior to the introduction of the regionally divided system, Donets’k oblast Rada (regional council) adopted a resolution creating an “Industrial Union of Donbass” (Industrial’nyi soiuz Donbassa; IUD), which it was hoped could be the “Yuliia Tymoshenko kak simvol Ukrainskoi revoliutsii,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 25 April 2001. 25 V. Khmurych and T. Tkachenko, “Opportunities for Corruption in the Ukrainian Gas Market,” Eurasia Foundation, 1999. URL (http://www.eurasia.org/programs/eerc/ kiev/papers/khtk.htm) 26 See Itera’s press release, 7 April 2004. 27 Biznes, 25 June 1996. 24

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TABLE 6. GROUPING BY REGIONS FOR THE SUPPLY OF NATURAL GAS IN 1997 Name of Oblast

Name of the Distributor

Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Crimea, City of Sevastopol', Donets’k

Ukrhazprom, Ukrnafta, Chornomor naftohaz

Odesa, Kherson, Vinnytsia, Poltava, Zaporizhzhia, Khmel'nyts’kyi, Kharkiv Luhans’k, IvanoFrankivs’k, Kyiv (Bila Tserkva), L’viv, Mykolaiv, Sumy, Ternopil’, Stipol Dnipropetrovs’k Cherkasy, Zhytomyr, Rivne Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovs’k, Zaporizhstal' Poltava

Interhaz

Donets’k

Annual amount distributed (bcm) (for non-household/ household consumers) 30.73 (8.83/21.9)

Source (bcm)

8.3 (8.3/ 0)

Recieved from Gazprom as a transit fee (32.0) Domestic production (15.0) Gazprom (10.0)

11.1 (11.1/ 0)

From Central Asia (11.5)

15.5 (5.4/ 10.1) 4.0 (4.0/ 0)

Gazprom (15.5) From Central Asia (4.0)

Uzbekhazsintez

3.0 (3.0/0)

From Central Asia (3.0)

Poltava Gazonafta Company Ukranian Gas-resource Company

0.3 (0.3/0)

Poltava Gazonafta Company N/a

Itera-Ukraine

UESU Ukraine Gas Company

10.0 (8.0/2.0)

Total

82.93 (48.93/34.0)

Source: Derzhavnyi komitet naftovoi, hazovoi ta naftoperepobnoi promyslovosti Ukrainy “Derzhnaftohazprom, ” List vid 19 kvitnia 1997 roku, No. 17-174; Postanova KM vid 23 hrudnia 1996 r. (23 December 1996) No. 1539.

exclusive supplier of natural gas to the whole of Donets’k oblast. Donets’k mayor V. Shcherban’ pushed Kyiv to grant IUD a license, but Lazarenko rejected his petition as “illegal.”27 Eventually, Lazarenko compromised by issuing licenses to two giant metallurgy complexes in Donets’k, as well as to the Zaporizhzhia-based turbine engine manufacturer “MotorShich” and automobile manufacturer “AvtoZaz.” These companies obtained the right to contract directly with Gazprom for their own consumption. The heyday of Lazarenko and Tymoshenko continued into 1997. In addition to Donipropetrovs’k, they attempted to extend their influence to the Donets’k region. In 1997, Lazarenko took the initiative of creating the “Ukrainian Gas-resource Consortium” (Ukrains’kyi hazoresursnyi konsortsium; UGC). Formally, this was a joint venture of UESU and

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Ukrhazprom. In practice, however, UGC was under the control of Lazarenko-Tymoshenko since UESU and its related company kept a large portion of the consortium’s shares and M.I. Syvul’s’kyi, Lazarenko’s economic adviser, was appointed as its president. UESU had thus captured two of the most profitable oblasts, Donets’k and Dnipropetrovs’k. Itera lost the lion’s share in Donets’k, while Interhaz maintained its share (Table 6). Lazarenko-Tymoshenko’s heyday did not continue long. His system was attacked by President Kuchma and Gazprom, and finally collapsed in the middle of 1997. For Kuchma, Lazarenko was a threat because his sponsorship by UESU meant that he could be a powerful contender in the future presidential elections. Gazprom objected to the fact that UESU together with UGC had eroded Itera’s market share. In July 1997, under pressure from Kuchma, Lazarenko resigned and went back to his hometown. He still held the governor’s seat in Dnipropetrovs’k. At the same moment, Gazprom shut off gas supplies to UESU because of its arrears. According to Gazprom, UESU owed 50 million USD as of October 1997. UESU was not the only gas trader in arrears; others were too, including Interhaz. At that that point, Interhaz owed 320 million USD to Gazprom. However, Interhaz found a stronger patron in President Kuchma and the new Prime Minister, Valerii Pustovoitenko. For Kuchma and Pustovoitenko, the enemy of their enemy was their friend. In August 1997, 12 bcm of gas belonging to Interhaz, was accidentally discovered in UGS.28 Thanks to this gas, Interhaz could continue business, while UESU was forced to retreat because of the fall of its political patron. UESU’s share was taken by Interhaz, Itera, IUD and Interpipe. Also, like other gas traders, UESU owed 49 million USD to Ukrhazprom in transit fees (as of August 1997). UESU had to give up its holdings, such as stock in the Khartsiz Tube factory (KhTZ), to offset this debt. And in 1998, UESU failed to renew its license and ceased its gas trading business de jure. Bakai’s situation contrasted with Tymoshenko’s; his company continued business, and in September 1997 he was named first deputy chairman of the State Committee of Oil and Gas. See the trilateral negotiation between Gazprom, Ukrhazprom and Interhaz, reported by Zerkalo nedeli, 6 September 1997. 28

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THE DUOPOLY OF ITERA AND NAFTOHAZ UKRAINY (1998-2002) The experience of Lazarenko’s regional distribution system provided costly lessons for the IMF, Gazprom and President Kuchma. The IMF took several occasions to denounce Ukraine’s partial reform policies. First, the IMF strongly criticized Ukrhazprom’s vertically integrated structure. An IMF paper declared that, “the current vertical integrated structure of Ukrgazprom (production, transmission, and storage by one company) should be broken up.”29 Disintegration and privatization of Ukrhazprom were necessary to reduce state interference as well as attract foreign capital, the IMF believed. Second, the strict implementation of the “no guarantee” policy remained the IMF’s concern. While Lazarenko stated on several occasions that the government would not guarantee commercial gas traders’ gas imports, there were still several cases when the government guaranteed gas import payments, especially in the winter season when the demand peaked. In the close relationship between government officials and the gas traders, the latter easily drew guarantees from the former. Gazprom was disturbed by the fact that the partial reform did not resolve the payment arrears. Many gas traders accumulated debts. According to Gazprom, UESU and Interhaz had to repay debts in the amount of 400 million USD to Gazprom. The governmental guarantees further complicated collection of the debts, since it was difficult to agree who took responsibility for the debt, the government or the gas traders. Kuchma and his camp were running for parliamentary election in 1998 and the presidential election in 1999. Pavlo Lazarenko and his client UESU were the main threat to Kuchma’s reelection. Kuchma learned the lesson from Lazarenko that a regional distribution system gave an advantage to political patrons. Also, he learned to keep control over the market in order to counter Gazprom-Itera’s expansion. Kuchma’s answer was to reverse liberalization. In February 1998, Kuchma ordered the dissolution of Ukrhazprom and the creation of Laszlo Loveu and Konstantin Skorik, “Commercializing Ukraine’s Energy Sector” in Peter K. Cornelius and Patrick Lenain, eds., Ukraine: Accelerating the Transition to Market (IMF, 19 February 1997), pp. 204-207. 29

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NaftoHaz Ukrainy.30 According to this presidential decree, NaftoHaz Ukrainy was to be a national company in which the government retained 100 percent of the stock, and its purpose was to increase the level of the state’s security as well as improve the efficiency and development of the oil and gas complex. The vertically integrated structure of Ukrhazprom was broken up and specialized companies were formed. However, NaftoHaz was able to control these companies because it held the majority of their stock. Unlike Ukrhazprom, NaftoHaz also brought state oil companies such as Ukrnafta (oil production) and Druzhba (oil transport) into affiliation with its structure (Table 7). TABLE 7. NAFTOHAZ UKRAINY’S VERTICAL INTEGRATION STRUCTURE Production GTS Import Distribution

Daughter companies (% of NaftoHaz’s shares, as of January 1999 ) Chornomor Naftohaz (100%), Ukrnafta (50%+1 stock), Ukrhazvydobuvannia (100 %) Ukrtranshaz (100%) NaftoHaz Ukrainy Haz Ukrainy (100%)

Source: Biznes, 1 February 1999, p. 29.

The establishment of NaftoHaz can also be seen as an attempt by President Kuchma to regain control of the whole gas sector. This was the reason why he appointed Ihor Bakai as the first president of NaftoHaz Ukrainy. Bakai had twice bankrupted his companies and damaged the state budget, but Kuchma was less interested in his business ability than in his political loyalty. From the viewpoint of collecting gas payment debts, the creation of NaftoHaz benefited Gazprom, since the government guaranteed NaftoHaz’s gas import payments. But Gazprom continued to push Itera into Ukraine’s gas market. Gazprom stopped supplying to those gas traders that had nonpayment arrears to Gazprom and replaced them with Itera. 31 By the end of 1998, there were only two gas importers in Ukraine: NaftoHaz and Itera. All other gas traders were limited to gas distribution, purchasing their gas from NaftoHaz or Itera. 30 31

Uriadovyi kur’ep, 5 February 1998. Interfax-Ukraine, 27 November 1998.

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RETURN TO THE STATE MONOPOLY THE TWILIGHT OF GAS TRADERS (2002-) Despite the Ruble Crisis in August 1998 and the default of Ukrainian government bonds in 2000, the year 2000 was the first since Ukraine’s independence that the country’s economy experienced growth. Although the incumbent Prime Minister V. Yushchenko’s reforms certainly contributed to this economic growth, the largest contributor was Russia, Ukraine’s biggest trading partner. Even after the ousting of Yushchenko from the government, the National Bank of Ukraine continued to buy US dollars on the inter-bank market to increase the circulation of the Hryvnia and promote further monetarization of the economy, exploiting a positive balance of trade as well as of current account. This monetarization, together with economic recovery, eliminated nonmonetary transactions and resolved wage and pension arrears. This led to an improvement of payment discipline as well as an increase in cash payments (Table 8).32 According to Haz Ukrainy, the distribution branch of NaftoHaz, the collection rate was 74.5 percent in 1999, 77 percent in 2000, and 98.0 percent in 2003.33 Also, the rate of collection in cash rose dramatically from 29.9 percent in 1998 to 90.4 percent in 2003. TABLE 8. INCREASE IN COLLECTION RATE Collection rate (%) Paid in Cash (%)

1999 74.5 29.9

2000 77 NA

2001 89.4 87.0

2002 90.4 88.9

2003 98.0 90.4

Source: Energeticheskaia politika Ukrainy, July 2000, p. 49; NaftoHaz Ukrainy press release, 21 January 2004 and 31 January 2003.

The monetarization of the economy had two effects. For the gas traders, the decline of barter transaction was disadvantageous for business. From the gas importers’ perspective, the increase in the cash collection rate implied that NaftoHaz and Itera no longer needed gas State pricing policy also contributed to this improvement. Since April 1999, the gas tariff for household consumers has been fixed at 185 UAH per 1,000 cm. 33 These figures only cover customers of Haz Ukrainy. In 2002, Haz Ukrainy sold 44.4 billion cubic meters, the equivalent of 60 percent of total national gas demand. 32

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traders. Now, the importers could easily overcome payment arrears without the mediation of gas traders.34 As a result, from July 2002, NaftoHaz and Itera moved to the “direct regime,” excluding the middlemen who stood between gas importers and the end consumers.35 At this point, the history of the gas traders seemed to be at an end. But this regime only survived for half a year. Itera suddenly disappeared from the Ukrainian market. Itera’s ousting was mainly led by Gazprom, or President Putin, who wanted to keep control of Gazprom. Under his Gazprom reform, the “mysterious partnership” between Gazprom and Itera was revoked. Clearly, Gazprom intended to push Itera out of the CIS market. This plan took shape in the winter of 2002. From 25 November 2002, Gazprom started to limit supply to Itera, on the grounds of Itera’s payment arrears in the amount of 30 million USD. On 20 January 2003, Gazprom announced a full halt to gas supplies to Itera, citing non-payment. According to Itera, from the beginning of 2003, Gazprom suddenly insisted on 100 percent pre-payment from Itera, while other companies remained under the previous payment regime.36 At the same time, Gazprom adopted even more blatant means to squeeze Itera. Gazprom offered NaftoHaz a cheaper tariff for the transport of Turkmenistan gas, which was previously operated by Itera. Gazprom’s tariff was 38 percent of the value of the gas that NaftoHaz bought from TurkmenNefteGaz, a state monopoly company, while Itera’s previous tariff was 41 percent. Itera had received gas from NaftoHaz in payment for this transportation and sold it to the Ukrainian market; so the loss of NaftoHaz’s business meant a loss of gas resources for Itera.37 Without Gazprom and Turkmenistan as sources of gas, Itera Interview with A. Kiselev, general director of Haz Ukrainy in Alla Eremenko, “‘Razvitie biznesa v interesakh gosudarstva – osnovnaia zadacha NAKa,’ – schitaet general’nyi direktor DK ‘Gaz Ukrainy’ Aleksandr Kiselev,” Zerkalo nedeli, 10-17 August 2002. 35 “Protokol o namereniiakh po itogam rabochii vstrechi rukovodstva NAK ‘Naftogaz Ukrainy’ i MEK ‘Itera’ otnositel’no mekhanizma postavok i realizatsii v Ukraine prirodnogo gaza iz resursov MEK ‘Itera’ vo II polugodnii 2002 g.”; Press release of Naftohaz Ukrainy “NAK ‘NaftoHaz Ukrainy’ pereishov na realizatsiiu prirodnoho hazu vykliuchno za priamymy dohovoramy,” Kyiv, 5 July 2002. 36 Itera’s press release, 24 January 2003. 37 “‘Gazprom’ reshil prekratit’ postavku gaza ‘Itery’ v Ukrainu”, Ukrainskaia investitsionnaia gazeta 4 (2003), pp. 17 and 23. 34

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could not supply Ukraine’s market, and in January 2003 NaftoHaz agreed to Gazprom’s plan to eliminate Itera from both the distribution and import sectors. The Gazprom-NaftoHaz alliance used the same tactics against Itera as Gazprom and Kuchma had used to oust UESU in 1997. Gazprom introduced Itera to Ukraine’s gas market and, a decade later, removed it.

CONCLUSIONS The political and economic realignment of the former socialist space can be understood only with the help of approaches combining analyses of domestic and international affairs. This chapter examined ten years of interactions between Ukraine’s domestic clan politics and the Russian factor. The last decade of development in the gas distribution market is summarized as a cycle of state monopoly, liberalization, and then a new state monopoly. However, the current monopoly is not a simple renewal of the previous one. The former was a residue of the socialist economy; the Ukrainian state simply took over this monopoly from the Soviet regime. As we discussed above, Ukraine could not sustain this remnant of the socialist economy and was forced to launch reforms. On the other hand, natural gas extractive countries, such as Russia and Turkmenistan, or Belarus relying on the gas export countries’ mercy, can resist the worldwide trend of neo-liberal reform. Recent conflict between Gazprom and the Lukashenka regime shows that Belarus no longer maintains a system that functions on the assumption of cheap Russian gas. Belarus will have to follow the Ukrainian experience to a certain extent. In Ukraine, this monopoly was dissolved by the de-monetarization of the economy, by changing political conditions, and above all under pressure from Gazprom and the IMF. Partial reform and political turmoil created a peculiar gas market system, nurturing the gas traders while allowing Russian capital’s penetration. However, economic recovery and especially monetarization and the consolidation of presidential power removed the spaces in which

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gas traders and their patrons operated. The present state monopoly is a result partly of changes in the presidency, partly of the reform of Gazprom, and partly of the progress of monetarization. By comparison with the previous monopoly, it is far more rooted in a money-based economy. As NaftoHaz explained, monopoly was a first step to fundamental reform since monopolization wiped out tax evasion and other aspects of the black market in which some gas traders operated. 38 Throughout this decade, the role of the Russian government has been disputable. In September 1995, President Yeltsin issued his decree on the Establishment of the Strategic Course of the Russian Federation with CIS member states in order to accelerate the process of reintegrating former Soviet republics through multilateral and bilateral agreements and institutional arrangements. However, what happened in 1996 was that Russian capitalists pursued their own interests rather than pressure Ukraine into the CIS integration process. And in 2003, in contrast to Chubais’s “liberal empire” idea, the Russian government withdrew Russian capital from the Ukrainian gas market. At that moment, Putin’s priority was Gazprom’s reform rather than the expansion of the Russian capital into Ukraine’s market. And, to some extent, the importance of the role of these non-state actors would confirm the development of interdependence between the two countries. In addition, the role of IMF is less important than previously. Due to the four-year-long stable economic growth, Ukraine no longer relies on the IMF’s credit. Since 2002, Ukraine has drawn no credit from the IMF. Moreover, Ukraine concluded a Standby Arrangement with the IMF in March 2004. There are voices arguing that Ukraine should maintain a good relationship with the IMF not for the sake of credit but as a symbol of commitment to economic reform, which helps to attract foreign investment. Currently, the Ukrainian government plans to reform its gas market and to re-liberalize to harmonize with EU legislation.39 Though Ukraine shares borders with EU member countries and her aspiration “Okonchatel’noe reshenie gazovogo voprosa,” Ukrainskaia investitsionnaia gazeta 21 (2003). 39 The EU requires member states to open at least 33 percent of the total annual gas consumption to the national gas market. See Directive 2003/55/EC, Article 28 (3). 38

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for EU membership is high, there is little momentum from the EU on this matter. Rather, the Russian capitalists would be potential candidates to operate in this re-liberalized market. Putin’s Russia will probably advance the presence of Russian capital in Ukraine. However, it is unlikely that Russian capitalists will intrude into Ukraine as actively as in 1996, because Russia’s government and Gazprom have less leverage than before. Thanks to stable economic recovery, Ukraine is no longer under pressure from Gazprom or its large shareholder. The Ukrainian government fulfilled its obligations to Gazprom on schedule, and since 2000 Ukraine has paid almost all of its import gas fees. Still, it is uncertain whether Ukraine is on the way to joining its western neighbors, the European mega-area, or, on the contrary, to being re-absorbed by its long time northern economic partner.

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OLEKSANDR SYNIOOKYI INTRODUCTION It has become conventional wisdom that one of the decisive reasons for the polarization of the political regimes of the former socialist countries is the balance of power between the parliament and the president. Western post-communist (Višegrad and Baltic) countries, which are moving toward the Eur opean Mega-A rea, chose parliamentarism or semi-presidentialism with a weak presidency, while Eastern post-communist (CIS or Eurasian) countries chose semipresidentialism with extremely strong presidency. 1 According to this parameter, despite its self-assertion as a European country, Ukraine has remained a typically Eurasian country. This situation becomes even more intriguing if one considers that Ukraine is a rare case among CIS countries, in which the constitution was adopted in a civilized way, by compromise between the president and the parliament, while in other CIS countries the constitutions were adopted after shelling the parliament or an anti-constitutional plebiscite-“referendum.” As a result, the 1996 Ukrainian Constitution has a certain (if not significant) number of merits, absent in the constitutions of other CIS countries, the most significant of which is the lack of presidential prerogative to dissolve the parliament in case of the its repeated rejection of the presidential candidate for prime minister. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian parliamentary opposition has not been able to exploit this advantage. Recent political developments in Ukraine added actuality to the study of this issue. From the end of 2003 to April 2004, the pro-Kuchma forces attempted to amend the 1996 Constitution for transition from a Kimitaka Matsuzato, “Semi-Presidentialism in Ukraine: Institutionalist Centrism in Rampant Clan Politics,” forthcoming in Demokratizatsiya. 1

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president-parliamentary to a premier-presidential system.2 This attempt was based on the perspective that V. Yushchenko, Kuchma’s rival, would win the 2004 presidential elections. Although, in this negative context, the pro-Kuchma forces’ attempts revealed that a decisive factor determining the characteristics of the Ukrainian political regime is the relations between the president and parliament. With this situation in mind, this chapter will focus on the interrelations between parliamentarism and presidentialism in Ukraine, paying attention to the political and judicial factors that affected this relationship. Based on this empirical investigation, this author hopes to propose several measures to strengthen the role of the parliament. Unfortunately, a study of the bibliography on this subject suggests that neither Ukrainian nor foreign researchers have studied it deeply. Political scientists in Ukraine describe contemporary Ukrainian parliamentarism in the context of the tradition of Western democracy or Ukrainian ancient history. Reading their writings, one gains the impression that he/she will learn more about American, British or German than Ukrainian parliamentarism. Likewise, the literature dedicated exclusively to Ukrainian parliamentary history provides detailed descriptions of ancient historical events (beginning with the Greek settlements within the boundaries of present-day Ukraine and Kievan Rus’), but the authors appear to run out of energy as they come closer to the present-day Ukrainian politics. The studies of the contemporary Ukrainian parliament, as a rule, target technical aspects, such as various regulations and procedures, rather than the fundamental issue of its relations with other branches of power.3 In contrast, non-governmental think tanks in Ukraine show interest towards parliamentarism. These think tanks are producing most valuable research today. Western political scientists seem to have been more interested in ethnolinguistic factors in Ukrainian politics,4 elections and electoral 2 On the concept of semipresidentialism, see: Robert Elgie, ed., Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (Oxford, New York, 1999). On the concepts of president-parliamentary systems and premier-parliament systems, see: Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (New York, 1992), pp. 55-75. 3 A rare exception to this dismal situation is: R.M. Pavlenko, Parlaments’ka vidpovidal’nist’ uriadu: svitovyi ta ukrains’kyi dosvid (Kyiv, 2002). 4 Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s. A Minority Faith (Cambridge: UK, 1997); Idem, The Ukrainians. Unexpected Nation (New Haven, London, 2000).

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geography,5 and political parties and clans,6 than political institutions. Rare exceptions to this tendency7 reveal the infancy of its study. This becomes yet stranger if one considers that the Russian parliament, however weak it is, continues to attract scholarly interest.8 Only very recently, under the impact of the aforementioned attempted constitutional reform to strengthen the parliament, experts and representatives of foreign organizations began to pay more attention to the Ukrainian parliament.

THE EMERGENCE OF PARLIAMENTARISM AND PRESIDENTIALISM IN UKRAINE 1990–1996 Even before the first free parliamentary elections in 1990 the Supreme Rada of Ukraine, ruled by the 1978 Constitution of the UkrSSR, shared a number of formal features with Western democratic legislatures. In reality, however, the Rada operated on a temporary basis, Peter R. Craumer and James I. Clem, “Ukraine’s Emerging Electoral Geography: A Regional Analysis of the 1998 Parliamentary Elections,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 40:1 (1999), pp. 1-26; Sarah Birch, Elections and Democratization in Ukraine (New York, 2000); Kimitaka Matsuzato, “All Kuchma’s Men: The Reshuffling of Ukrainian Governors and the Presidential Election of 1999,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 42:6 (2001), pp. 416-439. 6 Hans van Zon, The Political Economy of Independent Ukraine (Houndmille, London, 2000); Kimitaka Matsuzato, “Elite and the Party System of Zakarpattia Oblast: Relations among the Levels of Party Systems in Ukraine,” Europe-Asia Studies 54:8 (2002), pp. 1265-1299. 7 Andrew Wilson, “Ukraine: Two Presidents and Their Powers,” Ray Taras, ed., Postcommunist Presidencies (Cambridge: UK, 1997); Idem, “Ukraine,” Robert Elgie, ed., Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (Oxford, New York, 1999); Charles R. Wise and Volodymyr Pigenko, “The Separation of Powers Puzzle in Ukraine: Sorting Out Responsibilities and Relationships between President, Parliament, and the Prime Minister,” Taras Kuzio et al., eds., State and Institution Building in Ukraine (Houndmills, London, 1999), pp. 25-55. 8 Joel M. Ostrow, Comparing Post-Soviet Legislatures: A Theory of Institutional Design and Political Conflict (Columbus, 2000); Thomas F. Remington, “The Evolution of ExecutiveLegislative Relations in Russia since 1993,” Slavic Review 59:3 (2000), pp. 499-520; Idem, “Majorities without Mandates: The Russian Federation Council since 2000,” EuropeAsia Studies 55:5 (2003), pp. 667-691. 5

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convening twice a year for brief sessions, which were well-orchestrated to pass bills and laws unanimously. The agenda was always carefully deliberated to every technical detail. The Supreme Rada’s activities were guided by its Presidium. Under Article 106 of the 1978 Constitution, the Presidium was established as a permanent body of the Supreme Rada that performed as the highest state authority between sessions. It was a collective body vested with the functions of the head of state. The Presidium was entitled to issue decrees, interpret laws, cancel resolutions and instructions of regional councils, set up and abolish ministries and state committees on the request of the cabinet of ministers, appoint and dismiss ministers and authorize representatives of the UkrSSR in foreign countries, and accept foreign credentials.9 Such a cumbersome model of government was not able to cope with the acute social and economic crises in the USSR at the end of 1980s. Therefore, after declaring the sovereignty of Ukraine on July 16, 1990, the Supreme Rada began to amend the UkrSSR Constitution and other laws of the republic in order to introduce a presidency in the UkrSSR. In accordance with the new Article 114-1 of the amended Constitution, the president was the highest public official of the Ukrainian state and simultaneously the head of the executive branch.10 The president was to propose to the parliament candidates for prime minister, request his dismissal, and appoint the ministers of defense, national security and emergencies, internal affairs, foreign affairs, finance, and justice, as well as the head of the State Security Committee with the consent of Supreme Rada.11 Moreover, the Rada adopted the Law on Presidential Powers, which provided the president with all necessary authority to govern the country. At the beginning of 1992, the 1978 Constitution was amended again to include the provisions that deprived the Supreme Rada’s Presidium of its prerogatives and The powers of the Presidium of the UkrSSR Supreme Rada are listed in accordance with Article 106 of the UkrSSR Constitution. However, the majority of these powers were gradually taken away from the Presidium after mid-1991. 10 Note that under the current Constitution passed on June 28, 1996 the president is only the head of state with no subordination of the executive branch. 11 Zakon URSR “Pro zasnuvannia posta Prezidenta Ukrains’koi RSR i vnesennia zmin ta dopovnen’ do Konstytutsii (Osnovnoho zakonu) Ukrains’koi RSR” vid 5 lipnia 1991 roku (5 July 1991), No. 1293-XII, No. 1293-XII // Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady, No. 33 (1991), st. 445. 9

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distributed them among the parliament, the president, and the cabinet of ministers (government). Thus, the basic features of Ukrainian semipresidentialism took shape by the spring of 1992. The president was vested not only with the powers of the head of state, previously exercised by the Presidium’s chairperson, but also with the right to determine government policies. The president was to organize the government, while the role of the parliament in this matter was substantially limited. Before the constitutional amendment in 1992, the Supreme Rada had been authorized to appoint and dismiss all members of the cabinet of ministers. Now the parliament preserved only the right to give its consent to the candidacies of the prime minister, ministers of defense, foreign affairs, emergencies, finance, justice, and the chairman of the State Security Committee, all proposed by the president. In 1992, the list of powers that the president exercised with the consent of the Supreme Rada was extended to the appointment of the chairmen of the State Customs Committee and the State Border Guard Committee.12 The constitutional legislation did not define the mechanisms of cooperation between the Supreme Rada and the cabinet of ministers over the implementation of the governmental Plans of Action. It did not prescribe the procedure of either how the parliament gave its consent to the presidential candidate for the prime minister or how parliamentary committees exercised their oversight functions. Under such conditions, the parliamentary oversight functions were limited to deputy requests and appeals, control over the use of public accounts, and consideration of the government’s reports on its activity. There were also certain discrepancies within the constitutional provisions. Thus, according to the Constitution, if the parliament voted no confidence in one or another member of the cabinet of ministers, this should provide a reason for his/her resignation. But since the same Constitution prescribes that the dismissal of high officials of the executive branch falls under the president’s competency, the parliamentary resolution of no confidence did not result in automatic reshuffling of cabinets. Zakon Ukrainy “Pro vnesennia zmin i dopovnen’ do Konstytutsii (Osnovnoho zakonu) Ukrainy” vid 14 liutoho 1992 roku (14 February 1992), No. 2113-XII, // Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady, No. 20 (1992), st. 271. 12

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Since the constitutional amendments described above did not solve the problem of regulating the relations between the branches of power, the Supreme Rada chair Oleksandr Moroz and President Leonid Kuchma signed the Constitutional Agreement on June 8, 1995, aimed at regulating the state and substate government in Ukraine during the period until the adoption of a new Ukrainian Constitution. This agreement, at least de jure, transformed Ukraine into a country of almost pure presidentialism by placing the cabinet of ministers under the complete subordination of the president. The president acquired not only the right to guide and oversee governmental policies, but also limitless powers to form the highest organ of the executive branch of power. The parliament was deprived of the right to confirm the presidential candidacies for prime minister and other “key” ministers. In addition to the legal limitations that regulated the status of the parliament before 1996, there were also a number of political factors that laid the ground for the future superpresidentialism. First of all, the lack of stable parliamentary factions made the participation of the legislature in appointments and removals of prime ministers purely nominal.13 The Supreme Rada constantly broke into marginal factions and was unable to put forward alternative candidates. Moreover, the president behaved tactfully, proposing candidates who enjoyed certain popularity among the majority of faction leaders.14 In 1991 and 1994, Vitold Fokin and Vitalii Masol were such candidates, backed by the leftist parliamentary majority. In 1992, both the communists and Rukh supported Leonid Kuchma.15 Once the parliament gave its consent to the appointment of the prime minister, the president obtained a free hand to appoint other “key” ministers. According to Oleh Protsyk, “the president repeatedly used his power of cabinet nomination to construct a situational majority around his choice of prime minister. In this sense, the parliamentarians tended to rely on the president in solving their problem of collective action in regard to cabinet formation.” Oleh Protsyk, “Troubled SemiPresidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine,” EuropeAsia Studies 55:7 (2003), p. 1079. 14 Halyts’ki kontrakty, No. 50 (2000), p. 14. 15 Sergei Rakhmanin, Yuliia Mostovaia, “Ukraina partiinaia, Chast’ 2, Nasha Ukraina,” Zerkalo nedeli, No. 6 (2002), pp. 1-2. 13

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The Supreme Rada had even less influence on the dismissal of prime ministers. Thus, out of the five prime ministers who held office during 1990-1996, one resigned on his own (Vitalii Masol, 1990-1991); two were dismissed by the president (Vitalii Masol, 1994-1995,16 and Yevhen Marchuk, 1995-1996), while only two governments, headed by Vitold Fokin (1991-1992) and Leonid Kuchma (1992-1993), were dictated to resign by the parliament.17

FROM THE 1996 CONSTITUTION TO THE PRESENT (2004) The constitutional process was in a deadlock in 1996. More than 6,000 amendments were proposed to the constitutional draft that passed the first reading in May 1996. Parliamentarians did not have any vision in regard to the most important articles of the new constitution, such as the state language, national symbols, deployment of foreign military bases on the Ukrainian territory, and concurrence of parliamentary executive offices.18 This made the president and the majority of deputies believe that the constitution would not be passed by the end of 1996, or, even if passed, would hardly be acceptable to the president. Leonid Kuchma used this uncertain situation and signed on June 26, 1996 a Decree on the Organization of a National Referendum on Adoption of the New Constitution of Ukraine, planned for September 25, 1996.19 At The formal reason for Masol’s dismissal was his own desire to resign. In fact, the prime minister was forced to resign after the president appointed Evhen Marchuk, Petro Sabluk, and Viktor Pynzenyk as deputy prime ministers, and Valerii Pustovoitenko as minister of the cabinet of ministers (all of them were Kuchma’s men). This deprived the prime minister of political support in the government. See Pavlenko, Parlaments’ka vidpovidal’nist’ uriadu, p.166. 17 Both prime ministers resigned after parliamentarians accused them of being unable to improve the economic situation in the country and voted no confidence in them. 18 Iryna Pohoryelova, “My ne mozhem zhdat’ milosti ot naroda. Dat’ emu Konstitutsiiu – nasha zadacha,”Zerkalo nedeli, 22-28 June 1996 (http://www.zerkalo-nedeli.com/nn/ index/90); Iuliia Mostovaia, “Delo chest’,” Zerkalo nedeli, 29 June – 5 July 1996 (http:// www.zerkalo-nedeli.com/nn/index/91). 19 Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy “Pro provedennia vseukrains’koho referendumu z pytannia novoi Konstytutsii Ukrainy” vid 26 chervenia 1996 roku (26 June 1996), No. 467/96 // Uriadovyi kur’er, 4 July 1996. 16

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this referendum people were to express their opinion on a constitutional draft that considerably extended the powers of the president. However, during the next day and night (which would be memorialized in Ukrainian history as “constitutional night”) deputies compromised and passed the new Constitution of Ukraine. On July 1, 1996, President Kuchma canceled the decree on the national referendum. In comparison with the Constitutional Agreement of 1995, the new Constitution of Ukraine substantially limited the presidential powers. The president has nothing to do with the executive branch because the Constitution made the cabinet of ministers the highest body of the executive branch of power. However, a number of staffing and controlling powers over the executive branch allowed the president to exercise considerable influence on the implementation of governmental policies. He is the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces and the guarantor of national security, and guides foreign policies. He appoints members of government and other highest executives, including regional governors, based on the proposals of the prime minister. He has the right to dismiss any executive official on his own initiative (from the prime minister down to chiefs of the raion, district state administrations). The president introduces, reorganizes, and abolishes central executive bodies, based on the proposals of the prime minister, and cancels governmental acts. The Constitution provided the president with significant levers of influence on the legislature too. The main lever is the presidential right to veto bills passed by the parliament. This right was set in the Constitution in quite contradictory and undeveloped norms. First of all, the Constitution does not determine whether presidential proposals to a bill or the veto can be appealed to the Constitutional Court. Secondly, the Constitution does not regulate the procedures of official promulgation of laws in case the parliament overrides a presidential veto and the president groundlessly refuses to sign the law. Having vested the president with important powers on the coordination of national security and law-enforcement bodies, and with the right to dismiss at his own discretion the Prosecutor General of Ukraine (which made this office dependent on the president), the Constitution provided the president with another lever of influence on parliamentarians. It is no secret that the majority of them combine their parliamentary activities

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with business. Not surprisingly, it would be absurd for businessmen deputies to confront the president, who wields broad powers in lawenforcement. In the present-day Ukraine it is impossible for businessmen to follow all norms of tax, customs, and economic legislation, which are not liberal enough to allow normal entrepreneur activities. The Constitution does not prescribe individual political accountability of ministers to the parliament. Article 98 of the Constitution has considerably restrained the parliament’s powers to exercise efficient financial control over the operation of the government and other executive authorities, because this article empowers the Accounting Chamber to control only the use, but not formation, of public accounts in Ukraine. The Constitution limited the principle of checks and balances between the president and parliament to the latter’s right to appeal to the Constitutional Court against the noncompliance of presidential acts with the Constitution, deputies’ requests (that in addition shall be supported by one-third of members of parliament), and a very inefficient impeachment procedure. The latter, for example, may result in the situation in which the president can continue exercising his powers even though found guilty by the Supreme Court, as long as three fourths of deputies do not support the decision on pre-term termination of his powers under the impeachment procedure. The situation mentioned above suggests that the Constitution of Ukraine has become the primary reason that strengthened presidentialism in the system of governance in Ukraine.

THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME RADA AND THE PRESIDENT CONTEMPORARY POWER TRIANGLE OF UKRAINE

IN THE

The members of the fourth parliament (2002-2006) spent almost one month simply in order to elect the speaker and committee chairpersons. In a situation in which the parliament has been eroded by internal contradictions and the majority and opposition are formed according to only one criteria, pro et contra the president, it is difficult to imagine that the legislature has any serious influence on the executive power. Even though the government headed by Viktor Yanukovych

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was formally organized on the “coalition principle,” i.e. by delegations of ministers from the fractions that composed the so-called “parliamentary majority” in 2002, these fractions were unable to control their members.20 A number of ministers behaved independently from the parties that delegated them to the cabinet, such as minister of finance Mykola Azarov, minister of transportation Heorhii Kyrpa, and minister of economy and European integration Valerii Khroshkovs’kyi. The ministers’ term of office depends not on the will of parliament,21 but exclusively on the president. The parliament has no influence at all on the appointments to some executive offices, such as the ministers of foreign affairs, internal affairs, defense, the chiefs of central executive authorities outside the government, as well as regional governors and local chiefs. For example, the parliament failed to make the president dismiss the chief of the L’viv Tax Administration Serhii Medvedchuk (brother of the chief of the presidential administration Viktor Medvedchuk), even though the profile parliamentary committee revealed serious violations of the current legislation committed by the agency headed by him.22 Broad powers vested in the president of national security, lawenforcement, and gover nanc e of foreign policies have also strengthened the role of the presidential administration, which de jure provides legal, organizational, consultative, and expert support to the head of state. Today, however, the presidential administration influences the appointments and dismissals of executive officials and coordinates the operation of executive organs. The role of the presidential administration in the power triangle is evidenced by its structure; it is composed of the Main Department for Organization, A manifest proof of this observation is the decree issued by the president on December 5, 2003 to dismiss Vitalii Haiduk, vice prime minister in charge of the fuel and power sector, after Haiduk expressed publicly his position concerning energy policies (the reverse use of the Odesa-Brody oil pipe-line, privatization of power distribution companies, and setup of the Russian-Ukrainian gas transporting consortium). See Alla Eremenko, “Tekh komu veriat, proveriaiut te, komu doveriaiut,” Zerkalo nedeli, No. 48 (2003): http://www.zerkalo-nedeli.com/ie/show/473/44559/ 21 Tet’iana Silina, “Sergei Tigipko. Tochki nad ‘i’ v voprose EEP rasstavit parlament,” Zerkalo nedeli, No. 36 (2003): http://www.zerkalo-nedeli.com/nn/show/461/42215/ 22 Sergei Smirnov, “Brat za brata ne otvechaet?,” Zerkalo nedeli, No. 34 (2003): http:// www.zerkalo-nedeli.com/nn/show/459/41668/ 20

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Staffing Policies and Cooperation with Regions, the Main Oversight Department, the Main State and Legal Department, the Main Departments for Foreign, Internal, Economic and Information Policies, Judicial Reform, Operation of Military Units and Law-Enforcement Bodies.23 It is the departments of the presidential administration, not parliamentary committees, that guide the daily operation of the ministries and other executive authorities, while the president makes the final decision on dismissal of executive officers.

POLITICAL FACTORS BEHIND SUPERPRESIDENTIALISM DURING 1996-2004 A significant reason for the hypertrophy of the presidential office was the lack of stable parliamentary majorities throughout 1994-2003. Even after the 1998 parliamentary elections, which resulted in the left wing’s victory, 24 they (communists, socialist, the Peasant and Progressive Socialist Parties) failed to create a parliamentary majority (226 deputies) and participate in the allocation governmental offices. On the other hand, the parties representing financial-industrial groups were unable to unify. Even after the so-called “Rosy Revolution” in parliament (the removal of the leftist parliamentary leadership in January-February 2000), the illusive “majority” with heterogeneous political and financial interests had minimal influence on the formation and operation of the government headed first by Viktor Yushchenko, and then by Anatolii Kinakh. The 2002 parliamentary elections produced a result similar to that of 1998 with the only difference that first place, formerly occupied by the communists, was passed to Our http://www.president.gov.ua/authofstate/prezidlist/prezidentadmin/ In 1998 eight parties overcame the four percent threshold, namely, the Communist Party (with 24.65% of votes and 84 parliamentary seats), People’s Movement of Ukraine (Rukh) (9.4% of votes and 32 seats), Bloc of the Socialist and Peasant Parties (8.55% of votes and 29 seats), Green Party of Ukraine (5.43% of votes and 19 seats), Popular Democratic Party (5.1% of votes and 17 seats), Hromada (4.67% of votes and 16 seats), Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (4.04% of votes and 14 seats), and United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (4.01% of votes and 14 seats). See the website of the Central Electoral Committee of Ukraine: http://195.230.157.53/pls/vd2002/webproc0v?kodvib=1&rejim=0 23 24

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Ukraine under the leadership of former prime minister Viktor Yushchenko. The new “parliamentary majority” formed after the 2002 elections consisted of pro-presidential political forces, but the economic policies of this “coalition government” were nothing more than a medley of the conflicting interests of the financial and industrial interests composing the “majority.” One reason for the fragmentation of parliamentary factions is the mixed parliamentary election system used both in 1998 and 2002, according to which fifty percent of deputies were elected in single-seat constituencies by a relative majority of votes, and the other half were elected on the party lists in the single nationwide election constituent. This system allowed the executive branch to influence considerably the formation of the Supreme Rada and facilitated the recruitment into politics of people who won the elections not by their political programs but by the amount of money they spent on the electoral campaign. The affiliation of deputies elected in single-seat constituencies had a significant influence on faction discipline in parliament. For example, the most cases of transfers from one party to another in the parliament were committed by deputies elected in single-seat constituencies. Another reason for fragmentation is the weakness of the Ukrainian party system. As Andrew Wilson notes, besides the amorphous and embryonic nature of civil society common for post-communist countries, ethnolinguistic divisions at the subnational level hindered the creation of nationwide parties in Ukraine.25

LEGAL FACTORS PROMOTING SUPERPRESIDENTIALISM DURING 1996-2004 The Constitution of Ukraine defined only the principles of operation of top public authorities in Ukraine. The procedure of formation and operation of the cabinet of ministers, central executive authorities, procedures of parliamentary oversight, creation of the hierarchy of regulative and legal acts, and the status of presidential 25

Wilson, “Ukraine,” p. 272.

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decrees were to be regulated by laws. A number of them were filed for parliamentary consideration back in 1996, but none of them was accepted and signed by the president. The basis for the operation of the government’s Law on the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine was passed seven times by the parliament and eight times returned for repeated consideration with presidential proposals. The president did not like the provisions requiring political consultations between the president and parliamentary factions and groups to discuss candidate prime ministers and norms depriving the president of the monopoly right to cancel acts of the Cabinet of Ministers. Since the president has not signed this law, it is impossible to discuss the Law on Central Public Executive Authorities. As a result, the operation of all public executive authorities with nationwide competence is regulated by acts of the president . Violating the Const itution, the president independently defines the structure of the public executive system and establishes procedures for appointment and dismissal of top officials within public executive bodies. For example, on December 15, 1999, the president issued the Decree on Changes in the Structure of Public Executive Authorities, which granted a special status to certain bodies within the executive branch to subordinate them directly to the president, thereby taking them away from subordination to the cabinet of ministers. 26 As to the parliamentary oversight powers, their normative regulation is also not well developed. Today, parliamentary control is exercised on the basis of the obsolete Parliamentary Rules of Procedure, passed in 1994, and the Law on Parliamentary Committees, passed in 1995. 27 At the same time, the Constitution of Ukraine requires that the parliamentary rules of procedure be regulated by a law. Since the president vetoed even less important laws regulating parliamentary oversight functions (such as the Law on Temporary Special and Investigative Parliamentary Commissions), many parliamentarians began to believe that even if the parliament adopted the Law on Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy “Pro zminy u strukturi tsentral’nykh organiv vykonavchoi vlady”vid 15 hrudnia 1999 roku (15 December 1999), No. 1573/99. 27 Reglament Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy vid 27 lypnia 1994 roku (27 July 1994) No. 129a/ 94-VR; Zakon Ukrainy “Pro Komitety Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy” vid 4 kvitnia 1995 roku (4 April 1995), No. 116/95-VR, Vidmosti Verkhovnoi Rady, No. 19 (1995), st. 134. 26

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Parliamentary Rules of Procedure, there would be very little chance that it would be signed by the president. This is why the parliament has not considered a number of bills on parliamentary rules of procedure. There is also no legislative regulation of the functions and powers of the president. The status of the president, as well as consultative and advisory bodies supporting his work, are regulated by the Constitution of Ukraine, by the Law on the President of the Ukrainian SSR passed in 1991 (with some of its provisions contradicting the Constitution), and regulative acts of the head of state. The absence of a Law on the President of Ukraine allows the president to fill in gaps in legal regulations of public affairs, which he often does by violating constitutional provisions in order to influence operation of the government.

THE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN STRENGTHENING PRESIDENTIALISM Since the Constitution is the main legal document that defines functions and powers of the Supreme Rada, the president and the cabinet of ministers, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine has the leading role in differentiating the powers among branches of power and implementating the principle of checks and balances. From the very first moment of its creation the Constitutional Court was doomed to be involved in political matters. The lack of the notion of the “civil constitutional appeal” concentrated the operation of the Constitutional Court only around the issues of division of powers among different public authorities. Before 2000, there were no grounds to accuse the Constitutional Court of a biased attitude either toward the parliament or the president. The majority of Court’s decisions in those times could be criticized from a legal perspective, but they were not politically motivated. In the context of influence on the operation of the president and the parliament, there were two crucial decisions ruled by the Constitutional Court between 1996 and 2000. One was on the constitutionality of Decree No. 371 on the National Investigation

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Bureau of Ukraine, issued by the president on April 24, 1997,28 and another on the formation of factions in the Supreme Rada29. By the first decision the Constitutional Court on April 24, 1997 ruled that the Constitution allows the president only to create central executive authorities, while the structure and subordination of their top officials, as well as appointment and dismissal of officials, shall be defined exclusively by the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, and not by acts of the president. This legal decision of the Constitutional Court should have kept the president from abusing his constitutional powers in the regulation of organization and operation of central public executive authorities. In practice, however, the president’s aspiration to subordinate executive authorities continued, in many cases owing to the support of the Constitutional Court. In contrast, the decision of the Constitutional Court on December 3, 1998 concerning the formation of factions in the Supreme Rada weakened the parliament. With this decision the Constitutional Court ruled unconstitutional the provisions of the Parliamentary Rules of Procedure, according to which “factions in the Supreme Rada shall be formed by parties and blocs that overcame the four percent threshold at the parliamentary elections.” This ruling destroyed the eight-faction structure of the parliament. In March 2002 there were 14 factions and groups in the parliament. This trend towards the lack of solid faction structure, caused by the ruling of the Constitutional Court, would continue in the future. In 2001 the Constitutional Court completely fell into the hands of the president. The Court violated the Constitution and the Law on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine by refusing to consider the appeal of Rishennia Konstytutsiinoho Sudu Ukrainy vid 6 lypnia 1998 roku (6 July 1998) No. 10-rp/98 u spravi za konstytutsiinym podanniam narodnykh deputativ Ukrainy shchodo vidpovidnosti Konstytutsii Ukrainy (konstytutsiinosti) Ukazu Prezydenta Ukrainy vid 24 kvitnia 1997 roku (24 April 1997) No. 371 “Pro Natsional’ne biuro rozsliduvan’ Ukrainy (sprava shchodo utvorennia Natsional’noho biuro rozsliduvan’ Ukrainy),” Ofitsiinyi Visnyk Ukrainy, No. 27 (1998), p. 146. 29 Rishennia Konstytutsiinoho Sudu Ukrainy vid 3 hrudnia 1998 roku (2 December 1998), No. 17-rp/98 u spravi za konstytutsiinym podanniam narodnykh deputativ Ukrainy shchodo vidpovidnosti Konstytutsii Ukrainy (konstytutsiinosti) Postanovy Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy “Pro vnesennia zmin do Rehlamentu Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy” (sprava pro utvorennia fraktsii u Verkhovnii Radi Ukrainy), Ofitsiinyi Visnyk Ukrainy, No. 49 (1998), p. 41. 28

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parliamentarians about the unconstitutionality of the Presidential Decree on Regular Measures for Further Implementation of Administrative Reform in Ukraine, issued on May 29, 2001.30 By this decree the president introduced the offices of state secretaries in the cabinet of ministers and ministries, established procedures for their appointment and dismissal, and defined their functions. If the Constitutional Court followed its earlier ruling concerning the introduction of the National Investigation Bureau, the decree on May 29, 2001 should also have been recognized as unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court, however, abstained from any decision. In 2001-2003, the Constitutional Court acted especially discriminatorily. It ruled that the right of parliamentarians to be accepted without delay by state and municipal officials was not extended to the president.31 By another ruling, the Constitutional Court supported the president’s right to veto not only ordinary laws, but also laws on constitutional amendments.32

CONCLUSIONS: A CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM TO MAKE UKRAINE MORE EUROPEAN? In this paper, I analyzed the process that generated a typical Eurasian (CIS) political regime, semi-presidentialism with a extremely strong presidency, in Ukraine. The first cause of this is the vagueness of Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy “Pro cherhovi zakhody shchodo dal’shoho zdiisnennia administratyvnoi reformy v Ukraini” vid 29 travnia 2001 roku (29 May 2001), No. 345/ 2001. 31 Rishennia Konstytutsiinoho Sudu Ukrainy vid 10.04.2003 No. 7-rp/2003 u spravi za konstytutsiinym podanniam Prezydenta Ukrainy pro ofitsiine tlumachennia polozhen’ chastyn druhoi, tret’oi statti 17, chastyny druhoi statti 27 Zakonu Ukrainy “Pro status narodnoho deputata Ukrainy” (sprava pro harantii diial’nosti narodnoho deputata Ukrainy), Ofitsiinyi Visnyk Ukrainy, No. 17 (2003), p. 131, st. 789. 32 Rishennia Konstytutsiinoho Sudu Ukrainy vid 11.03.2003, No. 6-rp/2003 u spravi za konstytutsiinym podanniam 73 narodnykh deputativ Ukrainy shchodo vidpovidnosti Konstytutsii Ukrainy (konstytutsiinosti) zdiisnenoho Prezydentom Ukrainy prava veto stosovno priiniatoho Verkhovnoiu Radoiu Ukrainy Zakonu Ukrainy “Pro vnesennia zmin do statti 98 Konstytutsii Ukrainy ta propozytsii do n’oho (sprava shchodo prava veto na zakon pro vnesennia zmin do Konstytutsii Ukrainy), Ofitsiinyi Visnyk Ukrainy, No. 16 (2003), p. 55, st. 710. 30

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provisions of the 1996 Constitution that was passed overnight. Its abstract definitions and inherent contradictory approach to determinating the place and role of the “head of state” in the system of public authorities created legal prerequisites for the development of superpresidentialism. The second, even more important, factor was the lack of political stability in Ukrainian society and consequently factional instability in the Ukrainian parliament. The third factor promoting superpresidentialism was Leonid Kuchma’s personal characteristics. Unlike his predecessor Leonid Kravchuk, Kuchma did not seek consensus, but constantly harassed his opponents. He made four attempts to use the people to damage the parliament and his opponents (an attempted referendum asking the people’s confidence in the parliament in 1995; an attempt to submit the presidential draft of the constitution to a referendum in 1996; the referendum to amend the Constitution in 2000; and in 2003, the organization of a nationwide discussion of the draft amendments to the Constitution aiming to neutralize Viktor Yushchenko as an undesirable presidential contender for Kuchma). At the same time, Kuchma pressured oppositional deputies (beginning with the Hromada in 1998 and ending with the Our Ukraine in 2003), offered electoral support to the deputies loyal to the president by using “administrative resources,” and used law-enforcement organs for political purposes. The fourth factor is the clan characteristic of the Ukrainian politics, revealed in the fight among financial and industrial groups for the favor of the president. Accordingly, political forces representing interests of financial and industrial groups and forming the majority in parliament have never been prone to resisting the president. The final factor is the gradual involvement of the Constitution Court in political matters. Few in Ukraine deny the necessity of political reform and the redistribution of powers among public authorities. At the same time, each political force has a different vision of the ultimate aim of the reform. Pro-presidential forces that pursue the restriction of presidential powers see the reform as an instrument to fix the existing power and as a mechanism to prevent the transition of power to somebody who does not support the interests of both the current incumbent and the financial and industrial groups backing him.

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In my view, the redistribution of powers among public authorities by amending the Constitution will not increase the role of the parliament and the government in the power triangle. For example, if the parliamentary form of governance is introduced in the country, in which the president is elected by the parliament, the victory of one party at parliamentary elections will allow it to make their leader the president and another member of the party – the prime minister. Under these circumstances, the constitutional norms will hardly play any essential role in strengthening the role of either the parliament, or the government, but both will be subordinated to the president. A similar situation has developed in Moldova where a parliamentary-presidential republic was established. Therefore, the implementation of constitutional reform should not be given the highest importance, especially considering that the full potential of the Constitution of Ukraine has not been used over the whole period of its existence. The restriction of presidentialism is possible even within the framework of the current Constitution. For example, the adoption of a purely proportional system in Ukraine on March 25, 2004 was a great victory for this purpose.33 The system of proportional representation will decrease? the violations of electoral laws and bring the results of the elections into compliance with the real will of the people. This system will also improve party and faction discipline. As a result, the parliament will acquire more realistic possibilities to form a coalition government, while the influence of the president on the executive branch will be reduced. For further enhancement of parliamentarism, it is necessary to pass a number of basic laws to regulate relations among the branches of power, specifically the laws on the Cabinet of Ministers, on the President of Ukraine, on Central Executive Authorities, on Parliamentary Rules and Procedures and others. However, this will be possible only after the election of a new president in 2004.

Zakon Ukrainy “Pro vybory narodnykh deputativ Ukrainy” vid 25 bereznia 2004 roku (25 March 2004) No. 1665-IV, Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady, No. 27-28 (1992), st. 366. 33

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8 PECULIARITIES OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS BETWEEN BELARUS AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ASPECTS ANDREI LOBATCH The emergence of new meso-regions within Eurasia has gone through an extensive process of disintegration. The huge bloc that seemed so solid broke into pieces suddenly and violently, causing great economic and social shocks with long-term consequences. The disintegration process of the 1990s affected the entire Soviet empire. This resulted in diplomatic wars over industrial and military legacies of the Soviet Union, as well as prolonged bloody ethnic conflicts. Most of the newly independent states tried to distance themselves from Russia and shake its political influence. Moldova’s and Ukraine’s applications to join the European Union and pro-European discourse of politicians seemed to begin the creation of new meso-area between Europe and Eurasia. However, the declarations did not match the policies and, unlike in Central Europe and in the Baltics, rapid structural reforms were not launched. Macro-scale disintegration in Eurasian mega-area was incomplete partly because the political ambitions of the newly independent elites could not overcome economic realities: the former republics required Russian natural resources and its huge market. Another reason was incompetence of the governments and the lack of political will. During the last 10 years Ukrainian and Moldovan politicians used pro-European discourse to disguise a very slow pace of economic reforms. It has been interesting to observe how, in these circumstances, Russian political elites attempted to launch the processes of reintegration within Eurasian mega-area to maintain the country’s influence in the region. These attempts translated into military reintegration via a collective security pact (1992), the building of a functional customs union (1995), the establishment of a Eurasian Economic Community (2000) and a recent call to create a single economic

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space. Russian support of Transdnestria may be viewed as an attempt to impede the creation of Eastern European meso-area. Yet, Russia does not possess sufficient economic might to restore its influence over those countries at a micro-level, i.e. via private capital. Integration “from above” is much weaker than “from below” and that is the reason why the reintegration processes in the CIS are more formal than real. Through this “evolution of disintegration” in the 1990s when all the former Soviet states started to pursue their own political and economic interests and attempted to escape from the permanent shadow of Moscow, most Western observers were surprised by the serious intentions of Belarus to re-integrate with Russia. The most puzzled were the Poles, whose culture and history have had much in common with that of Belarus. According to the former, 1988-1990 was a period of liberation from the hated (in their words) “dominance” of Moscow rather than a time signifying the collapse of the state-planned economy and communist ideology. Re-integration with the Russian Federation became the most important vector of Belarusian foreign policy since the country’s independence. During the last ten years the integrationist rhetoric has been an integral part of the statements conveyed by government officials and the Belarusian president. On several occasions, the Russian leadership was criticized by its Belarusian counterpart for “impeding the unity process of the fraternal peoples.” Pro-Russian political discourse implied that Belarus became a core-partner of Russia to renew Eurasian mega-area. This integrationist position seemed to be peculiar in the region. At the same time, the offers of Russian President Vladimir Putin to incorporate Belarus into the Russian Federation and an even “softer” variant – to conclude a monetary union have suddenly met severe resistance within the Belarusian establishment. Although the integration theme until recently dominated the official mass media, its essence has always been unclear to the Belarusian and Russian people. The process has been full of endless populist declarations, which contradicted the actions of both sides. Belarusian experts have two opposing opinions on what has been implemented between the two countries. The first argues that, “save in name, integration has transformed Belarus into a part of the Russian Federation.” The second argues that the unification process has resulted

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in the creation of an artificial entity separated from reality. A third view suggests that the outcomes of the integration process are dependent upon the compatibility of Lukashenka’s ambitions in relation to Belarus and Russia and developments in Russian internal and foreign policies. The evidence shows that similar to Ukraine’s and Moldova’s proEuropean aspirations, Belarus’ integration with the Russian Federation has been more declarative than real. This paper attempts to present a deeper analysis of the economic and political aspects of Belarus-Russia integration. The major focus is on the undercurrents, which reveal actual motivations, rationale and the outcomes of this project. As it will be argued it the paper, entire integration process helped the Belarusian leadership to avoid structural reforms. From this point of view, Belarus, along with Ukraine and Moldova becomes a part of “reform-slacking meso-area.”

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF BELARUS – RUSSIA INTEGRATION The intentions of the Belarusian leadership to re-integrate with the Russian Federation after the break-up of the Soviet Union may be explained by the three major factors. First, by the beginning of the 1980s Belarus had become the “assembly workshop” of the USSR. There were many giant factories built throughout the country to serve the needs of the entire Union, while Russia was a main supplier of raw materials. Having just 3.5 percent of the USSR’s total population, Belarus produced 4.2 percent of its GDP. 1 Political elites and the industrial lobby renounced the creation of efficient borders and the introduction of a national currency because, in their opinion, they could impede the supplies of cheap raw materials and energy resources from Russia. 2 Unlike in the Baltics or Poland where rapid market-oriented reforms were launched, the Belarusian leadership opted to avoid sliding down an economic crisis by preserving old industrial relations with its eastern neighbour. The first attempts at creating a monetary 1 N. Sergeev and A. Fadeev, “Anatomiia soiuza Rossii i Belorussii,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 23 September 1998, p. 5. 2 Ibid.

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union with Russia date back to late 1993, when the Belarusian government aspired to reach monetary stabilization not by unpopular reforms but at the expense of the Russian budget. The second factor explaining Belarus’ eastward aspirations was the inability of the country’s leadership to deal with “sudden” independence. For them, unexpected sovereignty came as a burden rather than an opportunity. The Supreme Soviet (the ruling body of the country at that time) comprised the old Communist Party nomenclature that was unable to take responsibility for an independent way of future development.3 Although the example of the Baltic States showed that it was possible, Prime Minister Kebich declared: “…[A]nd the matter is not only in the brotherhood by blood, we are united (with Russia) in economic terms. Almost all energy resources, raw materials, and components come from Russia and two thirds of our products go there. Dismantling of the USSR and breaking-off economic ties was a tragedy, catastrophic consequences of which affected all the republics, and which turned into an economic Chernobyl for our country. And salvation is only in integration. Unification of both monetary systems is just a step towards a full economic union with Russia. This is, if you like, the only way to save our sovereignty.”4 The third factor was a lack of national identity that was a result of intensive Russification of the Belarusian people during the Socialist era. This made most of the population absolutely indifferent to independence; hence public support for re-integration with Russia was quite strong.5 The new impulse for integration endeavours with Russia was prompted by the political and economic isolation of the country that came with the presidency of Aleksandr Lukashenka. The policies pursued by his government since 1994 resulted in a negative image of Belarus abroad. This image worsened relations with many international V. Tarasevich, A. Lobatch, “Ekonomicheskie effekty integratsii Respubliki Belarus i Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” R. Antczak, M. Guzhin’skii, P. Kozazhevskii, eds., Belorusskaia ekonomika. Ot rynka k planu. 1995-2000 (Warsaw, 2002), pp. 265-296, at p. 266 (www.case.com.pl/upload/publikacja_plik/bg10.pdf). 4 V. Kebich, “Zakhavats’ suverenitet my zmozham tol’ki z Rasiiai,” Narodnaia gazeta, 8 December 1994, p. 2. 5 J. Zaprudnik, “Belarus: In Search of National Identity, 1990-2000,” Belarusian Review 13: 2 (2001), p. 25. 3

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political and financial institutions (OSCE, the EU, Council of Europe, IMF, EBRD, etc.) and isolated the country from the global economic trends. Consequently, the country turned almost completely to Russia, which offered economic and political support and made some promises relating to Lukashenka’s ambitions. Russian economic interests to integrate with Belarus have been quite vague. Official statements of Yeltsin, Putin or Russian ministers never clearly indicated any economic benefits that Russia could derive from union with Belarus. However it was mentioned that Belarus was an important transportation corridor for Russian exports to the greater European markets. According to some estimates, approximately 70-75 percent of Russian exports to the European Union cross Belarus’ territory. 6 Of more importance is the great interest of Russian big business to have privileged access to the privatization of large Belarusian chemical and petrochemical enterprises. Some other explanations mention that Belarus falls within Russian geopolitical interests and has therefore strategic significance as, for example, a buffer to NATO expansion (Belarus provides an air-defense shield for Russia as well as low frequency naval communications base). The major stages of Belarus-Russia integration are presented in the following table: TABLE 1. MAIN STAGES OF BELARUS-RUSSIA INTEGRATION Period

Stage of integration

Characteristics of the stage

26 June 1992 – 6 January 1995

Establishment of diplomatic relations between Newly Independent States, participation in structures of CIS

Participation in economic union (1993) and creation of free economic zone (1994) among CIS states; attempts to establish a payments union in the CIS and intergovernmental CIS bodies; attempts to establish a Belarus-Russia monetary union (1993).

6 January 1995

Agreement on the customs union

Abolishment of customs at the borders; signature of the treaty on friendship, good neighborliness and cooperation.

6 L. Zaiko, “Formula integratsii,” Natsional’naia ekonomicheskaia gazeta (NEG), No. 14 (April 2003), p. 7.

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Stage of integration

Characteristics of the stage

2 April 1996

Community Treaty of Belarus and Russia

The declared goal of the Community was a political and economic unification, unification of resources and intellectual potential for faster economic development, raising living standards. The governments took obligations to coordinate foreign policy, security, border control and combating crime. New institutions were created: Supreme Council, Executive Committee, and Parliament Assembly.

2 April 1997

Transformation of the Community to the Union of Belarus and Russia

The governments signed treaties granting equal rights to citizens of Belarus and Russia and equal conditions for economic agents. The final goal of integration was the establishment of a Belarusian-Russian state (keeping the sovereignty of each country), establishment of supranational institutions and introduction of a single currency. Other tasks included the creation of a single economic space, common transportation and energy systems, coordination of customs policies and economic reforms, unification of monetary systems and tax legislation.

9 December 1999

Union State Treaty of Belarus and Russia

The governments agreed to create the following supranational bodies: Supreme State Council, Council of Ministers, Permanent Committee, and Parliament (which has not been established yet). The unification of other policies was declared (carrying out a common structural policy; unification of civil legislation and creation of a conception of Union State property; creation of a common market for communication services; creation of a common technological space; realization of common policies in environmental security; coordination of labour and social security policies, etc.) It was agreed to introduce the Russian ruble as the only currency within the Union State from 1 January 2005.

Source: V. Tarasevich and A. Lobatch, “Ekonomicheskie effekty integratsii Respubliki Belarus i Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” R. Antczak et al, eds. Belarusian Economy from Market to Plan, 1995-2000 (Warsaw, 2001), p.268.

As can be inferred from the table above, the formal integration of Belarus and Russia is quite extensive. The reality though clearly shows that economic unification between the two countries did not proceed beyond declarations. Every year since 1995 new integration initiatives faced growing difficulties to find consensus. Incompatibilities of models and approaches to economic development, differences in economic potential, geopolitical aims and interests became apparent.

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The Belarusian economy comprises approximately 3 percent of Russia’s and the population of Belarus is 15 times less than that of its eastern neighbour. Is it possible to create an effective Union State endowed with supranational institutions between countries with such enormous differences in size and potential? For President Lukashenka true integration with Russia would bring about a threat to his political power. On the one hand, a creation of common economic space may happen only if Belarus advances in market-oriented reforms. This means that the state would have to drastically reduce its presence in the economy, which would cause an emergence of large private business. The present political regime in Belarus is based on almost absolute control over economic agents and therefore the present political elite could not accept a scenario of “liberal marketization.” On the other hand, it is quite obvious that real integration with such a colossal neighbour would sooner or later result in the virtual absorption of Belarus by the Russian Federation. To preserve any tangible sovereignty in these circumstances would simply be impossible. This scenario would lead to the demotion of the Belarusian president to the rank of a provincial governor and the political elite to a provincial bureaucracy. The political ambitions of Lukashenka (as of any other president) run contrary to such an outcome. Therefore the creation of a common economic space based on harmonization of legislation, unification of tariffs, coordination of economic reforms, etc. remained a mere populist declaration. Even the customs union, which has officially functioned for eight years, has not been working properly: there are approximately 130 unified tariffs.7 In fact, the Belarusian leadership needed the integration process (not the integration) with Russia to reach two major goals: 1) cheap energy resources (natural gas and oil); and 2) unlimited access to Russian markets. This made Russia an economic policy donor: cheap energy resources and the absence of tariffs allowed Belarusian production to be price competitive in Russia without necessary structural reforms. Additional benefits derived from the possibility of exchanging Russian raw materials and energy for Belarusian goods (barter trade). In 1997 Ia. Romanchuk, “Kormit uzhe Rossiia,” Belorusskaia gazeta (BG), No. 10 (March 2003), p. 7.

7

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Belarus paid just 3 percent in cash for Russian natural gas, the rest was exchanged for products.8 In these circumstances the model of stateregulated economy could proceed much longer – at least until the price/ quality ratio of Russian goods would become much better (which seemed to take a long time). The same “pragmatism” inspired the ideas for monetary unification. The strategy pursued by the Belarusian leadership was to achieve “full integration” with “full sovereignty”: utilization of all the benefits of monetary union (primarily, monetary stabilization via introduction of foreign currency), and, at the same time, avoidance to pay for these benefits (preserving some autonomy in monetary policy by saving a second issuing center – the Belarusian National Bank). If the conditions for monetary unification proposed by the Belarusian side were accepted, the Russian budget would have obtained a huge “hole.” Therefore what the Belarusian leadership needed was an endless bureaucratic integration. One of its best examples has been the attempt to design and implement various common programs to enhance cooperation between Belarusian and Russian enterprises. Two of the most famous include the creation of a so-called “Union TV set” (linking Belarusian and Russian state owned television manufacturers for the creation of advanced and competitive televisions) and establishing an automobile consortium of Belarusian and Russian automobile and engine makers called “BelRusAuto.” As many experts anticipated, those programs appeared to be other populist stillborn babies.9 In 2000 only few out of 52 declared common programs were launched. In general, as a government official noted, by 2002 only one third of all common programs were “more or less alive.”10 Both experts and government officials explained the poor performance of the common programs by the absence of a sound economic rationale.11 For example, Belarusian “Horizon” televisions are S. Bogdankevich, “Nuzhna li korrektirovka integratsionnogo protsessa?,” NEG, No. 71 (October 2002), p. 4. 9 See, for example, M. Tumilovich, “Ekanamichny idealagichny sens manetarnai integratsyi Belarusi i Rasii,” Belaruska-rasiiskaia integratsyia. Analitychnyia artykuly (Minsk, 2002), pp. 83-130. 10 Bogdankevich, “Nuzhna li korrektirovka,” p. 4. 11 Tumilovich, “Ekanamichny idealagichny sens,” p. 91.

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competitive in Russia and Belarus only because they contain components produced by Philips or Thompson. An attempt to manufacture an advanced TV set based on Belarusian and Russian technologies given current circumstances is simply wishful thinking. Another reason has been the excessive trust in the bureaucratic mechanisms of the programs’ realization. The resistance of the ministries in both countries to delegate authority to supranational institutions of the Union State has been quite strong. Besides, the programs continuously lacked direct subsidies from the Union State budget; the latter has also been poorly financed.12 Bureaucratic integration processes that were realized in common programs and populist treaties did not show any significant results. Belarusian enterprises continued to rely on the unlimited access to Russian markets. The economic effects of such an opportunity were ambiguous. First, the ‘single vector’ policy led to a situation whereby 57 percent of Belarusian foreign trade was concluded with Russia (as for 2002), which made the Belarusian economy extremely sensitive to decisions taken by the Russian government.13 For comparison, other CIS states comprise just 4.4 percent of Belarusian foreign trade. In 2002 Russia imported 83.6 percent of all machine-tools produced in Belarus, 73.8 percent of bicycles, 70 percent of automobile tires, 68.4 percent of TV sets, 68 percent of tractors, 66.7 percent of trucks, 47.2 percent of refrigerators, 43.8 percent of chemical fibers, etc. At the same time, the share of Russian exports to Belarus comprised, among others, 100 percent of natural gas, 97.3 percent of coal, 89.6 percent of ferrous metals, and 86.5 percent of oil.14 Second, the resulting trade diversion from the advanced markets, where competition stimulated introduction of modern technologies, preserved old and, in many cases, inefficient economic relations with Russian enterprises. While in 1995 Belarus imported around 65 percent of the so-called “investment goods” from advanced countries, in 1999 over 50 percent of them came from the Russian Federation.15 It froze the much-needed restructuring of Belarusian state enterprises and kept Zaiko, “Formula integratsii, ” p. 7. Tarasevich, Lobatch, “Ekonomicheskie effekty integratsii,” p. 279. 14 Vneshniaia torgovlia Respubliki Belarus v 2002 g. (Minsk, 2003), p. 33. 15 V. Rudenkov, “Vneshniaia torgovlia RB mashinostroitel’nymi tovarami,” Belorusskii ekonomicheskii zhurnal, No. 5 (May, 2003), p. 21. 12 13

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production reliant on heavy resource and energy consumption. This situation led to continual deterioration of the price/quality ratio of Belarusian goods. In general, Belarus lost the precious opportunity to smooth the effects of structural reform. The ability to sell goods in Russia could have absorbed the painful impact of restructuring for many Belarusian companies. The time is already lost as the revival of Russian industries and manufacture of better quality products started to squeeze Belarusian goods out of the Russian markets.16 With the advent of Putin, the economic policy of the Russian government became very pragmatic and strict. It enforced tight fiscal discipline, worked to mobilize all state resources and to eliminate “black holes” in the state budget and the customs system. As a result, energy prices for Belarusian customers rose and barter trade had to be substituted with cash payments. The major message from Moscow was that Russia stopped donating to the Belarusian economic model and terminated the use of integration to avoid economic reforms. Forcing out barter schemes from mutual trade hit hardest those Belarusian enterprises that could not sell their products otherwise, and eliminated price distortions that were often very favourable to Belarusian partners. The enhanced competitiveness of Russian industries, which was a result of reforms, forced Belarusian producers to lower prices, in some cases even below cost (e.g. Minsk Tractor Factory [MTZ] and Minsk Automobile Factory [MAZ] in years 2001 and 200217). Moreover, the elimination of trade distortions was reflected by Belarusian statistics: in 2001 the quantity of exports to Russia grew by 9.5 percent while revenue from exports dropped by 7.5 percent.18 In 2001, the Russian government reviewed the integration process with its western neighbour and in particular, the provisions relating to the possible creation of a monetary union with Belarus. It was well understood that the Belarusian economic model that used monetary expansion to stimulate economic growth would create a great “hole” in the Russian budget if monetary unification took place. Therefore, Russia Problems of competitiveness of Belarusian products in Russia have been largely discussed in BG and Belorusskii rynok through 2002-2003. 17 Rudenkov, “Vneshniaia torgovlia RB,” p. 23. 18 Vneshniaia torgovlia Respubliki Belarus v 2002 g., p. 9. 16

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determined certain conditions for monetary integration with Belarus, insisting that the Belarusian government: a) refuse to finance budget deficits from National Bank loans; b) stop subsidies and privileged loans; c) intensify small-scale privatization; d) sells state shares of large companies on the stock market; e) sells enterprises that are close to bankruptcy; and f) unify taxation and customs laws with Russia’s.19 In fact, these requirements resembled standard IMF recommendations stated in economic stabilization and structural transformation programs. The peculiarity of the Russian requirements was an attempt to force full-scale privatization, in which Russian companies would have excellent opportunities to obtain relatively cheap control over Belarusian industries. As was mentioned, Belarusian chemical and petrochemical industries are of a great interest for Russian big business. Compared to other Belarusian sectors the equipment in those industries has not been worn out; the enterprises are profitable and have potential for growth. Russian oil and gas giants (Gazprom, Lukoil, Itera, Surgutneftegaz, and TNK) officially expressed interest in buying those enterprises. Full economic dependence on Russia and absence of economic cooperation with the advanced economies placed Belarus under pressure to sell them exclusively to Russian investors.20 Belarus needs investments badly and it is unlikely that foreign companies will participate in tenders (the business climate in the country ranks very low and important foreign investors, such as Ford, Ikea, and MAN left the country). It is no secret that Russian oil companies have powerful lobbyists in the Kremlin and they have direct access to Lukashenka. This would make their interests in Belarus very well protected. In 2002 the Belarusian leadership rejected Putin’s integration radical proposal – to include Belarus into the Russian Federation. Nonetheless, the Russian government since then has been very persistent in its integration initiatives: it continues to insist on the introduction of the Russian ruble in Belarus and, explicitly or implicitly, on privatization of state enterprises. 19 V. Silitski, “Ekanamichnaia palityka Lukashenki,” Belaruska-rasiiskaia integratsyia, pp. 33-82. 20 See, for example, N. Grib, “Milliard za ‘Naftan’ s ‘Polimirom’ nikto ne dast,” BG, No. 22 (June 2003), p. 6; and Ia. Romanchuk, “Balans truby,” BG, No. 48 (December 2003), p. 5.

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At this time, the economic policies of both countries have deviated so much that the introduction of the Russian ruble in 2005 or 2006 would cause a serious shock for the Belarusian economic model, in which economic growth has been induced by monetary expansion. Monetary unification in the long run would inevitably lead to a conflict in implementation of the monetary policy between the two countries. The exchange rate of the Russian ruble for the most part depends on fluctuations of world oil prices. An increase in the price of oil leads to inflow of foreign currency to Russia and appreciation of the ruble and, at the same time, a decrease in competitiveness of Russian production. Belarus may benefit from this only having a softer currency, which would allow the possibility to successfully compete on Russian markets because of the lower prices for goods.21 A single currency in these circumstances would cause a recession of Belarusian industries. In general, the Belarusian government realizes that introducing the Russian ruble would force painful economic structural reforms. The possibility to keep inefficient enterprises by unlimited state subsidies would be eliminated and this would cause a rise in unemployment and serious social tensions. That is why the Belarusian government postpones and drags out the final treaty on monetary union by setting new conditions barely acceptable by the Russian side. For example, Belarus asks for compensation of US $ 2 billion and a number of technical credits.22 Another bid in this “game” was the future price of natural gas. The Belarusian president ordered the government to keep the price of gas low (at an internal Russian level) “at all costs”. In 2003 Belarus bought 10.2 billion m3 of gas from Gazprom at US $ 36 per 1000 m3. Gazprom intends to raise the price up to US $ 50.23 In this case the direct loss would amount to approximately US $ 143 million. At the time this paper was written, the price for gas was not yet fixed. Thus, Belarus formally “drops out” a meso-area that emerges between Europe and Eurasia. Renewal of Eurasian mega-area seems to be the county’s strategic goal. However, the evidence shows that the A. Luchenok, “Plokhogo bol’she chem khoroshego prineset perehod na rossiiskii rubl’,” NEG, No. 91 (December 2002), p. 4. 22 S. Zhbanov, “Rubl’ ne tonet – poka net ‘chrezvychainykh proisshestvii’,” BG, No. 46 (December 2003), p. 12. 23 N. Grib, “Miller v tumane: deshevyi gaz dlia Belarusi dorozhe kontrol’nogo paketa Beltransgaza,” BG, No. 46 (December 2003), p. 3. 21

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process of economic integration during the last 10 years was conducted for simple purposes: access to cheap resources and large Russian markets. The Belarusian economy, which saw little reform and remained 85 percent state owned, could survive only in these circumstances. Integration with Russia became an “iron lung”, which softened the consequences of poor domestic economic policies. From this angle Belarus is similar to Ukraine and Moldova, where slow structural reforms have been disguised under political declarations. Therefore the three countries comprise “a reform-slacking meso-area”.

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF BELARUS-RUSSIA INTEGRATION Aleksandr Lukashenka used integration with Russia as one of the main points in his program during his presidential campaign in 1994. Later, in 1995 he faced a serious weakening of his political position in Belarus, which was caused by mismatched economic policies aimed at preserving the old system with the necessity of reform. He was strongly criticized by several Belarusian parliamentarians as well as by international institutions for the inadequacies of his policies. In these circumstances, he turned to Russia seeking political and economic support. Lukashenka overcame conflicts in his relations with Moscow – that appeared during the first few months of his presidency – by making some generous integration offers which could not be refused by Russia. These were stipulated in the Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation signed in 1995: a) prolongation of Russia’s military presence in Belarus until 2010 and access to anti-aircraft defense; b) creation of a customs union (the western border of Belarus in fact was to become a military and customs border of the Russian Federation as it was suggested to have joint border control and customs services); c) Belarus was ready to provide a transit corridor to Kaliningrad; d) additionally, Belarus agreed to waive duties for transit of some Russian goods (mainly oil and gas) to Europe.24 In turn, Belarus obtained guaranties for further Iu. Drakokhrust, D. Furman, “Perepetii integratsii (razvitie protsessa belorusskorossiiskogo ob’edineniia),” Belorussia i Rossiia: obshchestva i gosudarstva (Moscow, 1998), p. 34-49, at p. 39. 24

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energy supplies at reduced prices and unlimited access to Russian markets. Although the opposition protested, the Supreme Council ratified the treaty in April 1995. This integration initiative appealed to the majority of Belarusians because “national patriotism” failed to fill the ideological vacuum in society at that time. The president’s plea for traditional attitudes coined as “Soviet conservatism” was actually an effective political maneuver.25 During the first stages of the integration process, the Belarusian president was a major initiator of the activities, none of which was imposed on him. The ability to determine the conditions of Belarus – Russia unification provided the Belarusian leader: -guaranteed support of Russian political and economic elites in his struggle for power; -significant economic benefits from Russia, which assisted in the relative success of his economic model and helped to avoid internal destabilization and massive dissatisfaction with his policies; -minimization of the outcomes of international isolation via the creation of an “alternative system” of international relations that bypassed European institutions; -the standing (though short lived) of an influential independent player in Russian politics.26 Both Russian political elites and society expressed an interest in integration with Belarus during mid-1990s. The restoration of the Russian Empire and the re-establishment of political and economic domination over the republics of the former Soviet Union became the foremost political tasks at that time.27 Even though reintegration of the former republics was almost unachievable, the readiness of Belarus for fast multilevel political, economic and military unification provided an excellent opportunity to the Russian political elites to declare the general probability of the integration project to voters. Lukashenka successfully made himself a symbol of hope for the restoration of former Russian eminence.28 For the Kremlin, relations with Lukashenka helped to negate Ibid., p. 40. See V. Silitski, “Palitychnaia ekanomiia belaruska-rasiiskai integratsii,” Belaruskarasiiskaia integratsyia, pp. 222-270, at p. 225. 27 Ibid., p. 227 28 Ibid.

25 26

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accusations in absence of political will and neglecting of Russian interests. The Belarusian president was able to manipulate the attitudes of the Russian political elites deriving benefits for his personal power inside Belarus. In 1996, when the Treaty on the Community of Belarus and Russia was prepared, Lukashenka basically stated the price for his intentions of rapprochement with Russia: writing off approximately US $ one billion of Belarusian debts (which was implemented). Yeltsin, in turn, used the new treaty for demonstration of his firmness to renovate the broken relations with the former Soviet republics and expiate his “guilt” for dismantling of the USSR, which was still considered as betrayal by many people.29 The integration process run by LukashenkaYeltsin assisted both presidents to reach their on-going political goals; it was stagnating every time when their interests diverged and was reviving again only when the mutual need for showing integration activities was coming to light. Discussions surrounding the prospects of Belarus-Russia integration in the late 1990s in were centered on the issue of whether the Belarusian leader intended to vie for the Russian presidency by using the integration process to reach this aim. Although personal intentions and hidden hopes are difficult to confirm with documents, Lukashenka’s vision of integration, the nature of his requirements from the Russian leadership, which he presented along with every integration agreement, the way of his appearance on the Russian political scene, and the effect of his political actions witness about such ambitions. Since 1995 it became evident that Lukashenka was not interested in a merger of the two countries but rather in a tight confederation. He intended to create a supranational structure where every participant was equal and able to keep sufficient independence in internal affairs. If this plan had been successfully realized the Belarusian president would have legalized his presence in Russian politics having kept unlimited power within his own country.30 Even if the idea that the Russian Federation give up a substantial part of its sovereignty for the sake of union with its neighbour, which is 15 times smaller in population seems absurd, however it almost came to being in April 1997. The Draft 29 30

Drakokhrust, Furman, “Perepetii integratsii,” p. 37. Ibid., p. 41.

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Treaty on the Union of Belarus and Russia envisaged a transfer of some authority in the spheres of defense, security, fiscal and monetary policies to the Supreme Council of the Union. The latter was a supranational body consisting of four representatives from each country: presidents, prime ministers, heads of upper and lower chambers of the parliaments. These eight participants would in turn elect one chancellor. Decisions in the Supreme Council were taken by simple majority voting. In this situation four Belarusian votes plus a vote of Gennadii Seleznev (the head of Russian Duma at that time), who was a communist and an old supporter of Lukashenka, gave more power to the Belarusian president in the new Union de facto and de jure. Two days before the signature of the treaty a text was leaked to media that caused a scandal. The liberals headed by Anatoliy Chubais and Boris Nemtsov accused the communists and Lukashenka in collusion to remove Yeltsin from power. In a few days Yeltsin ordered to rewrite the treaty, which turned into another formal pact.31 It was mentioned by Russian politicians that open support of Lukashenka by communists and nationalists was caused by their inability to reach their political goals by their own means.32 Despite the fact that they had a majority in the Duma and controlled a number of regions, they lacked a charismatic leader admired by certain sectors of society, without whom they were doomed to be outsiders in political struggles. Many of them considered the Belarusian president to be the figure they were looking for. Confederation with Belarus in league with Lukashenka allowed Russian communists to become influential in supranational bodies of the Union.33 Real integration and a virtual merger with Russia would diminish the Belarusian president’s status to the level of a provincial governor and was obviously acceptable neither by Lukashenka nor by his supporters in Russia. Along with strengthening of the alliance with communist and nationalist opposition, Lukashenka started to seek support from Russian regional leaders. Starting from 1996 he made several visits to various Russian regions, during which he signed agreements on economic 31 32 33

See, for example, Zaprudnik, “Belarus,” pp. 29-30. Ibid. Zaiko, “Formula integratsii, ” p. 7.

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cooperation. Besides, he actively promoted the “Belarusian economic model” to the inhabitants of the Russian provinces. Economic turmoil in Russia during the 1990s and especially enormous delays of wage payments made the “Belarusian model” very attractive for many Russian citizens. The Belarusian president’s speeches contained unveiled criticisms of Yeltsin and the economic policies of his government. These criticisms got particularly pointed in those regions, where their leaders shared dissatisfaction with Kremlin policies.34 Russian liberals and their allies in Yeltsin administration realized the potential danger of Lukashenka’s alliance with the communists, but they did not have enough power to halt the integration process since the attitudes of the Russian society were very much in favour of it.35 In 1999 the Belarusian leader made another endeavor to enter the Russian political scene. The next integration experiment attempted to create a strange formation barely known in the international experience – the Union State. This treaty was prepared by the supervision of Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin (a known liberal), who had very modest aspirations towards Belarus-Russia integration. His variant of the treaty that was made public in mid-1999 excluded the position of the Union State president (in the Belarusian variant the post of president rotated in two-year periods). It was suggested that all resolutions of the Union approved by the Union State parliament and the Supreme Council had to be confirmed (signed) by the two presidents to have legal power. Such a variant limited the abilities of the supranational institutions, which could have been manipulated by the Belarusian president (given the support of the communists in the union parliament and the Supreme Council). Accordingly, the scope of authority of the supranational institutions was much smaller compared to what was suggested by Lukashenka. In general, the treaty reduced the chances for the Belarusian leader to enter internal Russian politics to zero. Lukashenka met the Russian variant of the treaty with an unhidden anger. In his emotional commentaries he called the suggested treaty “empty” and publicly accused Stepashin of undermining the integration process. 34 35

Silitski, “Palitychnaia ekanomiia,” p. 240. Ibid., pp. 240-241.

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The Belarusian variant of political union was only attractive to the anti-Yeltsin opposition, and this fact increased the determination of Yeltsin’s supporters to “derail the integration train”. According to Russian analysts, opponents of the “integration with Lukashenka” outweighed its supporters in the government as well as among the persons who determined information policies of the media. Although a “pro-Lukashenka camp” was quite powerful in the Duma, its real influence in post-communist Russia was incomparable with the might of government officials and oligarchs, whose alliance encircled Yeltsin. Starting from early 2000, it became very likely that Russia would insist on “the Eastern German” variant of unification, which meant virtual absorption of Belarus by the Russian Federation. Apart from Lukashenka himself, resistance to this scenario was expressed not only by the Belarusian nomenklatura, which would turn into a provincial bureaucracy if the country’s sovereignty was lost, but also, unexpectedly for Russians, the majority of Belarusian society. The most surprising was that despite the dominance of integration issues in Belarusian politics during the entire period of Lukashenka’s presidency, support for unification among Belarusians declined significantly. It dropped from 45.6 percent in 1994 to less then 16 percent in 2002.36 This tendency reflected the fact that Belarusians got accustomed to their independence. Another explanation of this trend was a number of political, economic and military crises that happened in Russia during the 1990s. According to Belarusian analysts, the hidden policy of Russification that accompanied the integration process did not halt the support for Belarusian sovereignty. The Russian language, fostered by the current political system, in many cases became the language of the country’s cultural revival. Much the same can be said about the Belarusian language. Advocates of the country’s sovereignty comprised adherents to both “ethnic” and “civil” or “state” nationalism.37 Putin’s assertion to the Russian presidency in changed the political essence of the integration process. Unlike his predecessor, Putin did not have a “complex of guilt” for the dismantling of the USSR. Having These figures show respondents that supported merger in one state; see Tumilovich, “Ekanamichny idealagichny sens,” p. 112. 37 Silitski, “Palitychnaia ekanomiia,” p. 235. 36

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vast civil support in his country, Putin did not need to draw into integration games with Belarus to increase his political capital. Rather, the institutions created by Yeltsin and Lukashenka were used for “privileged political exile” of certain members of the “Yeltsin family”. Case in point, Pavel Borodin, the mighty former head of Yeltsin’s administration, became chancellor of the Union State in 2000. Progress in relations with the West released the Russian government from a duty to “feed” its population with illusions of the country’s growing eminence by creating pseudo-alliances. As was mentioned earlier, these developments carried an open defiance to the economic and political plans of the Belarusian leader: Moscow had neither need nor desire to pay for integration with Belarus. On the contrary, it was time for Belarus to pay for integration. The last blow to the “Belarusian economic model” could become the privatization of the best pieces of Belarusian industry to Russian oligarchs. The Belarusian leader understands that the privatization and consequent loss of control over Belarusian enterprises, which provide around 80 percent of the hard currency revenue of the Belarusian industrial sector, would drastically decrease his economic and political power in the country. This is why the process of privatization has been constantly dragged out by deliberately unacceptable conditions set to potential investors: the government offered to sell no more than 43 percent of shares. In turn, investors had to buy entire production chains rather than single enterprises. Investors were restricted in firing workers and were obliged to maintain a social infrastructure (kindergartens, health clinics, etc.). Moreover, the stated price was, according to Russian businessmen, “ridiculously high.”38 The first call for tender to participate in Belarusian privatization in 2002 resulted in no applications. In the present circumstances, when the dependence of the Belarusian economy on Russia is enormous, a key question remains: how long will Lukashenka be able to keep his (and the country’s) political sovereignty? If Russia persists introducing the Russian ruble in Belarus, this could be the most serious step towards political annexation of the country. It may be well observed that the Russian government is N. Grib, “Trillion v Ustavnoi fond: Problemy belorusskoi privatizatsii,” BG, No. 11 (March 2003), p. 5.

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purposefully squeezing the “vice” and eliminating places for maneuver for the Belarusian leader. In fact, all those benefits and privileges, which Belarus has been using to fuel its economic model, are becoming an object of economic and political blackmail (i.e. it could be easily inferred from official statements that the price for natural gas to Belarus depends on the willingness of the Belarusian government to privatize certain companies on acceptable conditions). Alternatively, some opinions state that Lukashenka requires guarantees for his political future (i.e. support for his third presidential term and securing his position as an independent ruler in Belarus) to start the sale of Belarusian property to Russian businessmen. Thus, the model of political integration with the Russian Federation did not result in any viable structure imposing any serious commitments on both sides. In fact, the process of political integration did not attempt to launch re-integration of Eurasian mega-area. In reality, the Belarusian president used it to reach his personal political goals. Integration with Russia has been the only political scene for Lukashenka, where he could demonstrate “great achievements” of his rule to his electorate. He could either bear an image of “great integrator” or become “staunch defender of Belarusian sovereignty” but still be “big and important guy” in the eyes of Belarusian public. In fact, integration theme was constantly used to hide failures in foreign and domestic economic policies.

CONCLUSIONS Together with Ukraine and Moldova, Belarus is a part of the Eastern European meso-area emerging between Europe and Eurasia. The position of the country is quite peculiar: while two other states declare pro-European aspirations, Belarus seems to become Russia’s major partner to launch re-integration in Eurasian mega-area. BelarusRussia integration process has over ten years of history. It comprised a number of treaties on unification that declared mutual aspirations to create an economic union between the two countries as well as the establishment of supranational institutions. However, a closer look shows that the bulk of integration remains on paper.

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Aleksnadr Lukashenka used the integration process to demonstrate his willingness to bring about rapprochement between both states. As such, Belarus was given the possibility to purchase Russian energy resources at internal Russian prices and unlimited access to Russian markets. In turn, Boris Yeltsin needed to demonstrate post-Soviet reintegration to improve his political image at home. What happened in reality was that Russia became a donor to the Belarusian economy, whereby the Belarusian leader could avoid marketoriented reforms and strengthen his political power inside the country. Furthermore, the efforts of the president to create a confederation with Russia implied that he tried to use the establishment of supranational ruling bodies to gain access to Russian political levers. Opening borders to Russia brought about disadvantages for economic development in Belarus since they created trade diversion from more competitive and technologically advanced markets in Western Europe to the less competitive and less demanding Russian markets. “Easy” exports to Russia postponed necessary structural reforms in state-owned Belarusian companies and made the Belarusian economy dependent on a single trading partner and, correspondingly, on its internal political and economic situation. With the advent of Putin’s presidency the integration process between Belarus and the Russian Federation shifted from declarations to practical steps. Russian economic policy became much more pragmatic and Moscow displayed its determination to continue marketoriented reforms. The message to Minsk was that Russia stopped subsidizing the Belarusian economic model. Moreover, the Russian leadership expressed its intentions to use Belarus’ economic dependence in the interests of Russian business; namely to obtain control over Belarusian industries. The political ambitions of Lukashenka to enter Russian politics were restrained not only by the concrete actions of the Russian government and the presidential administration, but also by Putin’s personality. According to the majority of Belarusian political scientists, Putin would win the elections of the Union State president not only in Russia, but also in Belarus. The introduction of the Russian ruble in Belarus, which is now starting to be “softly” imposed by Russian government, would become

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very painful for the unreformed Belarusian economy. Relative economic and social stability in Belarus has been supported by soft fiscal and monetary policies; a transition to tighter policies pursued by the Russian government and the Russian Central Bank would eliminate the possibilities of unlimited subsidies to Belarusian enterprises and the use of devaluation to enhance the competitive advantage of Belarusian goods in Russia. If reforms are not launched, it would lead to inevitable stagnation of many Belarusian industries. In general, the Belarusian leadership used the process of BelarusRussia integration to avoid structural reforms that would have decreased the power of the state and, consequently, the power of the president. As a politician, Lukashenka used integration rhetoric simply to create an image of a great ruler and to disguise failures in foreign and domestic policies. In this sense Belarus becomes similar to Ukraine and Moldova, where political discourse masks inefficient and insufficient structural reforms. This way, three countries comprise “a reform-slacking meso-area”.

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THE REPRESENTATION OF THE BELARUSIAN LANGUAGE CONTEMPORARY BELARUSIAN LITERATURE GO KOSHINO

It is a conventional wisdom that Belarus has a weak national consciousness and undeveloped ethno-linguistic identity. On the other hand, it is a rare case that the presence or absence of ethno-linguistic identity of a nation has such a tremendous geopolitical significance, as in the present Belarus. This chapter tries to elucidate a thorny path towards a Belarusian ethno-linguistic identity, based on an analysis of the contemporary situation of national language in Belarusian literature. From the linguistic point of view, Belarus would seem to be the most Russified country among the former Soviet republics. Most Belarusian people, of course, know Belarusian, but speak Russian in daily life. They respect Belarusian as the language of the nation, but prefer Russian as a means of verbal communication. In Minsk one can see many Belarusian words on the street signs and billboards, but one hears only Russian in people’s conversations. While in major bookshops like “Dom Knigi” the Belarusian literature section equals in size those of Russian or other foreign literatures, in book markets, which are more subject to economic pressure, it is difficult to find books written in Belarusian. Such writers as Boris Akunin, Viktor Pelevin and Murakami Haruki are as popular in Belarus as in Russia. The linguist N. B. Mechkovskaia argues that what is dominant for Belarusian is not “the major linguistic function” (as a communicative means), but “the ethnic function” (as a symbol which unifies a nation and distinguishes it from others).1 Here I will offer a general view of the linguistic situation in Belarus with some statistics. I will focus on the difficulty of writing novels in Belarusian, caused by the unreality of conversation scenes; the use of Russian words in Belarusian texts; and references to the Belarusian N.B. Mechkovskai a, “ Iaz ykovai a situatsiia v Bel arusi: Etnicheskie kol liz ii dvuiazychiia,” Russian Linguistics 18: 3 (1994), p. 308. 1

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language. At the same time, I will examine the future of Belarusian literature by discussing a rock musical with its multilingual text, indecent “neologisms,” and Belarusian popular literature.

THE LINGUISTIC SITUATION IN BELARUS BELARUSIAN, RUSSIAN, AND THE MIXED LANGUAGE “TRASHANKA” According to Table 1, 74 percent of the Belarusian population regard Belarusian as their mother tongue on the one hand, but, on the other, only 37 percent really use it at home. People of Belarusian nationality show the same tendency. In addition, Table 1 tells us that Belarusian is less spoken in cities (in the capital Minsk only 13 percent of the population use it at home), while it is used more in the rural areas. TABLE 1. LINGUISTIC COMPOSITION BASED ON THE 1999 CENSUS (PERCENTAGE) Mother tongue

Total Minsk Urban population (including Minsk) Rural population Belarusians Russians Poles Ukrainians Jews

Belarusian 73.7 61.9 66.9 89.2 85.6 9.1 67.1 14.3 17.1

Russian 24.1 36.7 31.1 8.3 14.3 90.7 16.2 42.8 77.0

Language usually spoken at home Belarusian Russian 36.7 62.8 12.9 86.9 19.8 79.8 74.7 41.3 4.3 57.6 10.2 3.8

24.5 58.6 95.7 37.7 83.5 95.7

Source: Itogi perepisi naseleniia Respubliki Belarusi.1999 god, Vol. 1 (Minsk, 2000), pp. 214-219. According to this census, the population of Belarus is 10,045,000. In terms of nationalities: Belarusians – 8,159,000 (81.2%), Russians – 1,142,000 (11.4%), Poles – 396,000 (3.9%), Ukrainians – 237,000 (2.4%) and Jews – 28,000 (0.3%). 6,962,000 people (69.3%) live in the urban areas, 3,084,000 (30.7%) in the rural.

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TABLE 2. “WHAT LANGUAGE DO YOU SPEAK IN YOUR DAILY LIFE?” (PERCENTAGE) Russian Total Minsk Regional capitals Medium-sized cities Small cities Villages

40.3 60.6 66.0 50.5 35.4 16.8

Both languages 21.9 23.4 15.7 21.8 26.5 21.3

“Trashanka”

Belarusian

32.4 11.8 16.2 24.8 34.1 52.5

4.5 3.4 1.3 2.7 3.5 8.1

Source: Michitaka Hattori, Hushigi no kuni, Berarusi [The Wonderland of Belarus] (Tokyo, 2004), p. 139. This table sums seven opinion polls by the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) from November 1997 to July 2000.

Table 1 does not take account of the existence of the BelarusianRussian mixed language, “Trashanka.” According to Table 2 (based on surveys by an independent organization), the most popular language in the rural areas is neither Russian nor Belarusian, but “Trashanka.” In the countryside eight percent and in the cities only four percent of the population use Belarusian in their daily life. It is remarkable that a slightly higher proportion of the population of Minsk is Belarusianspeaking than in other main cities, which may be explained by the presence of the nationalistically-minded intelligentsia in the capital city, who consciously choose to speak in their mother tongue.

“TRANSLATION BY THE AUTHOR” OR THE LANGUAGE THEY SPEAK IN FICTION YONEHARA MARI, OL’GA MORISOVNA’S IRONICAL RHETORIC2 You should be taking this more seriously. What do you think are the first Russian words spoken by the children from non-Russian regions? Yonehara Mari, Origa Morisobuna no hango-hou [Ol’ga Morisovna’s Ironical Rhetoric] (Tokyo, 2002), p. 15. 2

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“Ass” or “fuck you” wouldn’t be so bad. Those kids who can’t even say “thank you” and “hello” in Russian, they say “rotten balls,” “The other guy’s dick always looks bigger”! And even “You son of a bitch”! Oh, it’s dirty, it’s shameful. I’ve said such words for the first time in my life. I thought Russian kids had taught them those words. But in fact the dance teacher in our school is responsible for all this! You, the person in charge as the principal, should attend the lessons of Ol’ga Morisovna!

This quotation is from a translation of a Japanese novel, but the scene is set in a Russian international school in Prague. Almost every character in the novel (including the Japanese heroine) must be speaking in Russian. So the quoted part of the conversation, in which a Russian language teacher is complaining about her pupils’ favorite indecent words, is in fact “translation by the author” from Russian to Japanese. ULADZIMIR KARATKEVICH, “THE LITTLE BALLERINA”3

3

- Больш ніколі не танцуйце лебедзя, - глуха сказаў ён, - Вам нельга.

“Never dance the Swan any more”, he said quietly, “You must not.”

- Чаму?

“Why?”

- Вам нельга гінуць. Нават на сцэне. Вы поўная жыцця, сонца, вы шчырная да гэтага неба і гэтых людзэй. І я не ведаю, ці прыходзяць калі-небудзь дрэнныя думкі ў вашу галоўку.

“You mustn’t be killed. Even on the stage. You are full of life and the sun, you are so true to this sky and this people. I don’t know, whether evil intentions ever come into your pretty head.”

- Часам прыходзяць

“They do sometimes.”

- Не веру, - сказаў ён.

“I don’t believe you,” he said.

Караткэвіч У.С. Маленькая балерына // Творы. Мінск, 1996. С. 403.

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This quotation is from a novel written in Belarusian, but the scene is set in Moscow, where Stalin and the heroine of the novel are having a romantic conversation. We must imagine their actually spoken words in Russian. It is quite natural for authors to translate some conversations, if the scenes are set in foreign countries or some foreign characters appear there. In this paper I tentatively call such examples “translation by the author.” THE 20TH TALE, “GAZAVIK (THE GAS FITTER),” FROM “DAMAVIKAMELON” BY ADAM GLOBUS4 Калі Газавік са стажорам выйшаў з кватэры, дык закурыў і сказаў:

When Gazavik got out from the flat with his apprentice, he had a cigarette and said:

-Адразу відаць, што ў хаце няма гаспадара.

“I soon saw that her husband wasn’t home.”

-Лепш бы мы грошы і віно ўзялі, у тон працягнуў стажор.

“We should have taken the money and the wine,” the apprentice chimed in.

-Слімак! – сказаў Газавік і ўдарыў стажора кулаком у патыліцу.

“You coward!” - Gazavik said and struck the apprentice with his fist on the back of the head.

As mentioned above, the use of Belarusian is limited even inside the country. In this quotation the dialogue between the gas fitter and his apprentice is written in Belarusian. This choice of language seems unnatural or, at least, exceptional. “Damavikamelon” consists of 66 short tales and almost all are set in cities. The title of each tale is the occupation of the main character, such as “Gazavik (the gas fitter),” “Deputat (the parliamentarian),” “Prybiral’nik (the sanitation worker),” ”Masavik (the maestro),” “Manekenshchytsa (the model),” “Rabaunik (the robber),” and even “Damavik (the spirit of the house)” and “Liftavik (the spirit of the lift).” Since it is unconceivable that all the characters from very 4

Глобус А. Дамавікамелон // Тэксты. Масква, 2000. С. 321.

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different social classes would be speaking in Belarusian, at least some part of the novel must be “translation by the author” from Russian (or “Trashanka”) to Belarusian. The predominance of Russian and “Trashanka” in daily life in Belarus makes it somewhat difficult (psychologically and aesthetically) for novelists to write only in Belarusian. Especially conversation scenes in fiction would seem unnatural, as if translated from a foreign language. In this sense the “safe genres” that ensure linguistic realism in a work are limited to: (1) historical novels, since here Belarusian appears to be more realistic; (2) village novels, because Belarusian is relatively more spoken in the rural regions; and (3) novels about World War II, a genre with a mixture of characteristics of both the historical and the village novel.5 Actually these genres account for a major part of Belarusian prose literature in the 20th century: for example, U. Karatkevich and U. Arlou (historical novels), I. Ptashnilkau and I. Melezh (village novels), and V. Bykau and A. Adamovich (war novels). All the characters must be some kind of nationalistically-oriented intellectuals for a piece of contemporary urban fiction to be written only in Belarusian or else it must be unnatural “translation by the author” as in the urban short stories in “Damavikamelon.”

THE UNEQUAL SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TWO LANGUAGES, OR WHEN ARE RUSSIAN WORDS INSERTED IN BELARUSIAN TEXTS? “WHERE DID OUR ANCESTORS COME FROM?,” ULADZIMIR ARLOU6 Накіроўваючы на нашу зямлю ўсё новыя і новыя войскі, цар наказваў ваяводам на сваім шляху ўсё паліць і разбураць, а каб болей панішчыць – назад ісці іншымі

Sending more and more new armies to our land, the tsar ordered his commanders to burn and destroy everything on their way, and to return by a different route so as to devastate even

Arnold McMillin, Belarusian Literature in the 1950s and 1960s (Köln, 1999), pp. 139-171. These three categories are used by McMillan in the analysis of prose genres in the 1960s. 6 Арлоў У.А. Адкуль наш род. Вільня, 2000. С. 84.

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мясцінамі. Захаваліся пісаныя ў Маскву граматы ваяводы Трубяцкога, дзе ён паведамляў цару: “Вокруг Слуцка велели мы все выжечь, а идучи дорогою до Слонима, села, и деревни, и хлеб, и сено по обе стороны жгли и людей побивали, и разоряли совсем без остатку, а в Клецке в городе людей побили всех». Сваімі рабункамі ворагі давялі народ да страшнага голаду.

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more places. The report sent to Moscow by the commander Trubetskoi is preserved, in which he told the tsar: “We commanded that everything around Slutsk be burned, on the road to Slonim we fired villages,and hamlets, and corn, and hay on both sides, and killed people, and razed every habitation to the ground, while we killed everyone in the city of Kletsk.” The enemies brought terrible famine to the people.

Popular historical novelist Arlou uses Russian words only one time in his juvenile historical textbook “Where Did Our Ancestors Come from?” In the quotation above he describes the invasion of what is now Belarusian territory by the Grand Duchy of Moscow in 1655 and quotes a report, written to the tsar by a Muscovite commander. But the quotation is not written in seventeenth century Russian. The invader’s words, translated into not Belarusian, but contemporary Russian, give the latter language a negative image. It is a fact that Belarusian territory lost a large percentage of its population in the war in the middle of the seventeenth century, but the description in this quotation makes the reader feel the horror more deeply because it has echoes of Soviet historical discourse about brutal acts by Nazi armies (especially in Belarusian territory) which here are those committed by Muscovite armies. “THE RETURN IN RADIOACTIVITY,” LEANID LEVANOVICH7 Крама была зачынена, на дзвярах бялеўся аркуш пареры. “Сынок, зірні, што там напісана”, - сказаў Сцяпан сыну. Сяргейка спрытна пабег, замільгалі ногі ў старых чаравічках – валёнкі ён зняў з радасцю. 7

The shop was closed, a sheet of paper on the door showed white. “My son, go and see what is written there”, S’tsiapan said to his son. Siarheika ran lightly, his feet in old shoes came into sight on and off. He had cast off his felt boots with pleasure.

Левановіч Л.К. Вяртанне ў радыяцыю. Мінск, 1997. С. 118.

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Ма-га-зин закрыт на переучет – гучна чытаў ён.

“Closed for stock…tak…ing,” he read it aloud.

“Няўжо закрылася наша крама назусім?” – сумна падумаў Сцяпан, павярнуў на мост цераз ручай. Сын дагнаў яго, пайшоў побач.

“Has our shop been closed forever?”, S’tsiapan thought sadly, and turned to the bridge over a stream. His son caught up with him and they walked side by side.

Even those who always speak Belarusian cannot avoid contact with Russian (or “Trashanka”), the superior language in daily life everywhere in Belarus. In this sense Belarusian is surrounded by other languages and exposed to a hostile exterior. The novel “The return in radioactivity,” quoted above, is set in a village polluted by the Chernobyl accident. The characters speak Belarusian, while the paper on the shop’s door is written in Russian. On the one hand Russian words inserted unexpectedly into Belarusian texts suggest the outside world, where another language has achieved a dominant place. Some irresistible exterior force (like nuclear accidents) may be represented by the Russian language. On the other hand the characters actually speak Belarusian, that is to say, there is no “translation by the author.” Non-Belarusian quotation in novels makes the Belarusian-speaker’s world naked and vulnerable, while a certain realism is secured by the texts being written in Belarusian.

THE HIGH FREQUENCY OF REFERENCE TO THE BELARUSIAN LANGUAGE ITSELF IN BELARUSIAN LITERATURE “THE WOLF HOLE,” VASIL BYKAU8 Яна была куды старэйшая за салдата, мела жвавы і востры позірк з-пад цёмных, не памаляваных броваў; на яе вуснах таксама не было прыкметна слядоў 8

She was far older than the soldier, had persistent and piercing eyes under dark, non-dyed brows. No trace of lipstick could be seen on her mouth too, which seemed not

Быкаў В.У. Баўчыная яма. Мінск, 2001. С. 109-111.

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памады, і яны здаваліся не надта выразнымі на худаватым твары. Вольная манера гаворкі і не беларуская мова давалі зразумець, што жанчына не тутэйшая, хутчэй за ўсё з горада. Але як яна апынулася тут? Што ёй трэба?

so conspicuous on her thin face. The free style of her speech and non-Belarusian language showed that she was not a local woman, but from a city in all likelihood. How did she come to be here, though? Why did she need it?

(...) - А сякеры няма? – папыталася жанчына, (...)

(...) “Do you have a hatchet?,” the woman asked him, (...)

Novelists who write in Belarusian frequently refer to their language itself. The prose piece “The Wolf Hole,” quoted above, describes people living in the uninhabitable Chernobyl zone. In the quotation there is a mention that a new female stranger’s speech is non-Belarusian. Although it is evident from the context that she speaks in Russian, it is more important here that she does not speak in Belarusian. So her words, written in Belarusian, must have been “translated by the author” from Russian. The fact that Belarusian-speaking people are relatively few in reality causes authors writing in Belarusian to mention consciously the language which characters use in their novels. “DEATH IS A MALE,” ADAM GLOBUS9 Няўжо і надалей беларус будзе думаць, што Бог пачуе толькі, як па-польску ці па-расейску да Яго звяртацца? Таму і надпісы на помніках і крыжах у нас адпаведныя: ці па-заходняму, ці паўсходняму. А па-тутэйшаму толькі ў паэтаў. Вось і яшче адзін даказ, што беларус – паэт.

Will Belarusians think in future that God will listen to them only if they address Him in Polish or Russian? So the epitaphs on gravestones and crosses in our country are also appropriate: written in the western or the eastern tongue. Only those of poets are in the local language. That’s one more evidence that Belarusians are poets.

In this passage from “Death Is a Male,” which consists of various thoughts and episodes about death, the narrator also refers to the 9

Глобус А. Смерць – мужчына // Тэксты. Масква, 2000. С. 249-250.

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Belarusian language. He argues that Belarusians are poets, because only poets use Belarusian. This declaration can be interpreted in two ways. The unpopularity of the Belarusian language is exposed ironically, while the beauty of the rarely used language is compared to poetry. Authors writing in Belarusian often refer to their language itself, which makes their works self-conscious, as in the case of “Death Is a Male.”

THE ROCK MUSICAL “NARODNY ALBOM” AND THE LITERARY POTENTIALITIES OF THE MULTILINGUAL WORLD “Narodny Albom (The National Album)” is a rock-musical, which is set in Western Belarus during the Soviet-Polish War (19191920) and the rule of Poland (1921-1939). Although “Narodny Albom” has never been performed as a drama on the stage, the concert and the album of the songs, which featured many famous rock musicians (such as Liavon Volsky), were a great success. In comparison with literature, film and other categories of contemporary Belarusian art, rock music sung in Belarusian has gained more popularity especially among the youth. It is worth mentioning from a linguistic viewpoint that besides 21 Belarusian songs “Narodny albom” includes two Russian, one Polish, one Yiddish and even two “Trashanka” songs (see Appendix). Some of the actors’ spoken lines are also written in Russian and “Trashanka.” The chaos of the linguistic situation reflects the confused national identity of Belarusians in the musical: one acts as a Polish spy, another expects Soviet tanks to come, a third goes to battle for another nation’s independence, to name but a few. All the Belarusian characters lack clear national identity, but they are full of vitality. So some “cheerful nihilism” can be felt throughout the work. It is possible to suppose that the unpopularity of the language may limit authors writing in Belarusian in their choices of materials. However, this also implies that when it describes the multilingual actuality directly (without “translation”), Belarusian literature can acquire certain special potentialities.

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BELARUSIAN INDECENT SLANG NEOLOGISMS AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF POPULAR LITERATURE “THE RETURN IN RADIOACTIVITY,” LEANID LEVANOVICH10 “Што за жыццё, тваю маць... Ні рабіць, ні адпачыць па-людску нельга. Ні выпіць, ні закусіць. Ні бабу прылашчыць... Пракляты Чарнобыль! Жілі б мы з Верай, як людзі. Свая хата, вёска родная. Бесядзь з малых гадоў любая. І рыбу лавіў, і грыбы збіраў. А цяперыцька нельга.(...)”

“What a fucking awful life... You can’t either work or rest like a humanbeing. Not to drink, not to eat. Not to caress a woman... Hateful Chernobyl! I wish we were living with Vera like other people. Our own house and our home village. I love the village of Besiadz’ from my childhood. I would catch fish and gather mushrooms. Now that is forbidden too.”

Some people insist that originally Belarusian did not have any indecent slang. According to them, indecent slang in the present Belarusian was mainly borrowed from Russian. The chairperson of the Belarusian Language Society, Aleg Tursau, proposes excluding all “mat” slang with Russian origin from Belarusian. 11 One can see many indecent slang words in Belarusian literary works. For example, abusive words (“tvaiu mats’”) in the quotation above are certainly very close to the equivalent Russian words. For those who know Russian “mat” words well, it is easy to guess the unprinted word in the indecent poem, quoted below. “HOW BELARUSIANS ARE ENGEGED IN SEX,” RYHOR BARADULIN12 The gipsy woman has a new apron,

У цыганкі хвартух новы,

Левановіч Л.К. Вяртанне ў радыяцыю. С. 110. Турсаў А. Месца і роля рускай мовы ў грамадскім жыцці Беларусі // БЕЛАРУСІКА. 2001. № 19. С. 244-247. 12 Рыгор Барадулін. Як беларусы сэксам займаюцца // www.svaboda.org 10

11

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А ў цыгана х... дубовы.

And the gipsy man has a hard d*** like an oaktree.

Хвартух новы не парвецца,

The new apron can’t be torn.

Х... дубовы не сагнецца.

The d*** like an oaktree can’t be snapped off.

“Popular literature” written in Belarusian is not highly developed because the readers always regarded it as a lowbrow genre and they can read it in Russian if they wish. Some people around the literary magazine “ARCHE” try to create pornography in Belarusian, like the example quoted below. THE 9TH TALE, DAMAVIK (THE SPIRIT OF HOUSE)-3 FROM “DAMAVIKAMELON” BY ADAM GLOBUS13 Праз акно спальнага пакоя мне было цудоўна відаць мноства вашых палавых актаў. Мне спадабаўся сваім тэмпераментам партнёр, і чэлес у яго нармальных памераў.

Many times I had a marvelous view of you having sex through the window of your bedroom. I took a fancy to your male partner by my own fever. His cheles (penis) is normal size.

The advocates for the creation of Belarusian pornography actively use native Belarusian slang words, which are not part of most people’s vocabulary. Most such words were probably found in ethnolinguistic materials. For example, the list of “Forgotten Slang” quoted below was collected in the 1970s in Belarusian villages.

13

Глобус А. Дамавікамелон. С. 295.

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“THE FORGOTTEN SLANG. THE TOP 100,” LUBOU SZATALAVA AND ULADZIMIR KATKOUSKI14 Entry Абібок абізг’ал ані’быль апівош ашалотак байсял’ць бздура

Explanation in Belarusian English translation/explanation Гультай, лайдак, лезабок боўдзіла, тупы чалавек чорт, шайтан п’яніца ненармальн чалавек казаць абы-што дзівацтва, бык, глупства

lazy-bones, idle, slothful moron, dumb ass devil drunkard lunatic, crazy person to talk bullshit bullshit, stupidity

Adam Globus, who is often called “the Father of Belarusian pornography,” is the most famous author in this school and applies these indecent words cleverly. In the quotation below the actor and the actress seem to play lovers, but in fact their unfamiliar words mean the opposite. Using uncommon slang consciously, the author satirizes the unfamiliarity of Belarusian language drama for those who have no practical need for Belarusian in their daily life. THE 7TH TALE, MASAVIK (THE MAESTRO) “DAMAVIKAMELON” BY ADAM GLOBUS15

FROM

- Ты мая далігойла, магнітафонным голасам сказаў актор і шырока раскінуў рукі.

“You are my dalihoila (dirty woman),” the actor said with a voice like a tape recorder and reached out his hands.

- Ты мой абізгал, - акторка стала на дыбачкі і выструнілася.

“You are my abizhal (dumb ass),” the actress stood on tiptoe and stretched out.

In the magazine “ARCHE” such erotic literature as “The Dead Man” by Georges Bataille and the Kamasutra were translated into

14 15

http://www.pravapis.org/art_top100.asp Глобус А. Дамавікамелон. С. 288

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Belarusian using this revived slang.16 Such indecent “neologisms” give a certain artificial impression, but offer the possibility of developing a new area for Belarusian literature.

CONCLUSION It is difficult to say that the Belarusian language and Belarusian literature have a bright future. Some positive policies advantageous to the language were adopted by the government only at the beginning of the 1990s and the potential number of readers for Belarusian literature is slowly diminishing. However, even if there were only five percent of the population who use Belarusian in their daily life, five percent of ten million people would be a sufficient number as a social and cultural entity. Literary works are influenced and limited by the languages in which they are written, and languages, in turn, are changed and enriched by the prose and poetry which are created using them. Interesting writing can draw potential readers to the Belarusian language. I will continue to focus on how such new literary tendencies, as are seen in Belarusian rock music and the pornography of Adam Globus influence the linguistic situation of the younger generation in Belarus.

APPENDIX: “NARODNY ALBOM”, MIKHAL ANEMPADYSTAU AND LIAVON VOLSKY17 RUSSIAN SONG: “АТЬ-ДВА ЛЕВОЙ!” (LEFT, LEFT, LEFT-RIGHT-LEFT!) Выходите, привечайте, С хлебом-солью нас встречайте, Обнимайте, целовайте, Мы свои, вы так и знайте.

Come out and greet us, Welcome us with bread and salt, Embrace us, give a kiss, We are friends, know it please.

16 Сматрычэнка С. Камасутра // ARCHE. 2000. № 5. С. 129-152; Жорж Батай. Нябожчык // ARCHE. 1999. №4. Пераклад з Французскай Міколы Шакеля; http://arche.home.by/ index.html 17 Анемпадыстаў М. і Волскій Л. Народный Албом. Беласток, 2000.

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POLISH SONG: “JA ŚPIEWAM PO POLSKU” (I SING IN POLISH) Ja jestem po prostu samotnym aktorem, /Słuchajcie mnie rano, słuchajcie wieczorem, /Słuchajcie mnie w nocy, słuchajcie, słuchajcie, /Ja kocham was mocno, i wy mnie kochajcie.

I’m only a lonely actor, /Listen to me in the morning, listen to me in the evening, /Listen to me at night, listen, listen please, /I love you passionately, so love me please.

TRASHANKA SONG: “НАДЗЕНЬКА” (NADZIENKA) Ой, дзевачкі беларускія, Не ўлюбляйцесь ў ваенных рабят, Бо ваенныя ўсе жанатыя, У заблужджэньне прыводзяць дзяўчат. Адна дзевушка – раскрасавіца, Празывалася Надзяй яна, Улюбілася у ваеннага, Но ня знала, што дома жана.

Oh, Belarusian girls, Don’t fall in love with soldiers, For all soldiers have their wives, They lead girls astray. A girl, a regular beauty, Whose name was Nadzia, Fell in love with a soldier, But didn’t know about his wife at home.

YIDDISH SONG: “LOMIR ZIX IBERBETN” (LET’S MAKE PEACE WITH ME) Make peace with me, peace with me, I’ll serve you with a samovar. Make peace with me. We will not play the fool.

Lomir zix iberbetn, iberbetn, Štel dam samovar, Lomir zix iberbetn, Zaj že nit kejn nar.

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PART III ISLAM IN DAGESTAN: GRAVITY FROM OUTSIDE AND INTERNAL COHESION OF A EURASIAN REGION

THE

10 DAGESTAN’S APPROACH TO THE ISLAMIC MEGA-AREA? POTENTIALS AND LIMITS OF JIHADISM1 DMITRY MAKAROV

Few will doubt that the military conflict in Dagestan in 1999 shook the whole Russian Federation. This incident continues to make us think of the fate of the Slavic Eurasian Mega-Area. Will its Southern rims be attracted toward and eventually incorporated into the neighboring Islamic Mega-Area? The attempts made by Arabic countries to introduce Salafism (the so-called Wahhabism) into the territories of the former Soviet Union, Dagestan in particular, and the rise and fall of this Salafi movement during the 1990s and the early 2000s provides us with valuable materials to examine this question. This does not imply that I premise that the main source of the inspiration and resources of the Salafi movement was foreign agents, although the propaganda arguing this has been vigorously unfolded by the Dagestani religious and secular authorities. Rather, in my view, the Salafi movement was a natural reaction to the deep crises which the Dagestani society underwent during the 1990s. I emphasize the international context of the Salafi movement in order to contribute to the methodological objectives set by this volume. Since the study of Dagestani Islam has displayed visible development recently,2 the focus on the international factors encouraging the Salafi movement will not give the reader a distorted image of Salafism in Dagestan. In this chapter the author relied upon the sources collected with the assistance of the John and Catherine MacArthur Foundation (Grant No. 02-73288-000-GSS). 2 Hilary Pilkington and Galina Yemelianova, eds., Islam in Post-Soviet Russia: Public and private faces (London, New York, 2003); D.V. Makarov, Ofitsial’nyi i neofitsial’nyi Islam v Dagestane (Moscow, 2000); Aleksei Malashenko, Islamskie orientiry Severnogo Kavkaza (Moscow, 2001); Kimitaka Matsuzato and Magomed-Rasul Ibragimov, “Islamic Politics at the Subregional Level of Dagestan: Tariqa Brotherhoods, Ethnicities, Localism and the Spiritual Board,” paper presented at the 9th Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, 15-17 April 2004, Columbia University, New York. 1

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For the same reason, this chapter will compose a tandem study with the following chapter written by Magomed-Rasul Ibragimov and Kimitaka Matsuzato. I will analyze the non-traditional, “foreign” Islam in Dagestan, while Ibragimov and Matsuzato will examine the traditional fundaments of the Dagestani society, namely, ethnicities and Sufism, which, at least temporarily, overcame the Salafis’ challenges during the 1990s.

THE EMERGENCE OF RADICAL ISLAMIC GROUPS: LOCAL ROOTS The first radical Islamic movements in Dagestan began to emerge as early as the late 1980s and the early 1990s. From the historical point of view, Dagestan played the role of bridgehead to expand Islam to the whole North Caucasus. It was here where, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the deepest tradition of religious science and education, the most numerous strata of religious activists, and the strong and stable organizational structures of unofficial, “popular” Islam in the form of Sufi brotherhoods (tariqa), guided by teachers-sheikhs, took shape. All of these factors enabled Dagestani Islam to survive the merciless atheist repressions and confinements during the Soviet period, although with significant sacrifices. The beginning of the liberalization of social and political life in the USSR under M. Gorbachov created the conditions for a “renaissance” of Dagestani Islam. Since the end of the 1980s, and in particular after the collapse of the CPSU regime in 1991, the vigorous process of construction and restoration of mosques, the registration of local religious communities, the creation of institutions for religious education, and the publication of religious literature began in Dagestan. Moreover, Muslims became free to contact their co-believers in other countries, to make pilgrimages to Mecca in Saudi Arabia, and to receive religious education abroad. In Dagestan, various religious and social organizations, movements and parties began to operate. Organizational consolidation of the radical Islamic movement did not take place quickly. At the beginning, the movement displayed the form of various communities (jamaat), composed of mainly young people

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who oriented themselves to Bagauddin Kebedov (who later renamed himself Bagauddin Muhammad), a charismatic preacher whose family comes from a mountain village called Santlada. Bagauddin was characterized by his uncompromising attitudes toward the official clergy, strictly criticizing them for their collaboration with the authorities and their deviation from the real norms of Islam. The theological basis of Bagauddin’s ideology was Salafism—the idea that Islam should be purified from unallowable innovations (bid‘a) and the renewal of the religion of the “pious ancestors”, namely Muslims of the first generations (salaf). This doctrine, which emerged repeatedly in the world history of Islam, witnessed its most complete realization in Saudi Arabia where this doctrine has become an official ideology. The spiritual father and founder of Saudi Arabian Salafism was a theologian of the eighteenth century, Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and for this reason contemporary Salafism is often called Wahhabism. The main enemy and object of criticism of Salafism was always Sufism. The Salafis found the most dangerous violation of the main principle of Islam, namely monotheism (tawhid), in substantial characteristics of Sufism, i.e. the cult of saints and extreme honoring of the Prophet Muhammad and sheikhs-teachers. The Salafis have been also offended by many elements of Sufi ritual practice. Bagauddin, who had received traditional education from local Dagestani scholars (ulama), got acquainted with Salafism mainly through literature and also through rare contacts with Arab students studying in the USSR. He became a follower of the strict version of Salafism, emphasizing the provocative and conflicting aspects of the doctrine - takfir (the accusation of infidels) and widely using this doctrine against those Muslims who did not fit the strict Salafi criteria of “true belief.” One may attribute the extreme, near pathological hatred of Sufism by Bagauddin to his personal ambitions and anger. The problem was that at the end of the 1980s, Bagauddin and his followers, unifying with the supporters of several tariqa sheikhs, strove to reshuffle the existing leadership of the Spiritual Board of the Muslims in the North Caucasus, which was accused by them of connections with the KGB and violations of moral and ethic norms. However, when the mufti Mahmud Gekkiev was eventually released from the post in May 1989, the control over the new muftiate was passed to the traditionalist Sufis, while Bagauddin was left without

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any influence. After this event his anti-Sufi rhetoric became especially strident. Another basic element of Bagauddin’s ideology was the unacceptability of any mutual cooperation, except for the most inevitable one, with state structures, which Bagauddin regarded as “those of unbelievers (kafir).” It is well-known, for example, that Bagauddin even rejected to raise a law suite against a newspaper which published insulting accusations of Wahhabis, justifying this decision by the unacceptability for Muslims to address the court of “unbelievers.”3 At that time, the beginning of the 1990s, Bagauddin had not begun to preach armed jihad against the existing authorities to establish Islamic order, nevertheless his views facilitated the conversion of the communities of his supporters into fanatic groups antagonistic to the rest of the society; their overt conflict with that society was only a matter of time and conditions. After the creation of the Islamic Revival Party (Islamskaia Partiia Vozrozhdeniia: IPV) unifying the main Islamic movements and organizations in the territory of the USSR, Bagauddin and his brother Abas became the leaders of its Dagestan branch. As the leader of the whole IPV, a famous Dagestani religious activist, Ahmad-Qadi Akhtaev, was elected. Akhtaev also had Salafi convictions but with a softer version and argued for dialogue with Sufis to unify Muslims and for their active participation in the social and political life of Russia. In 1992, he even became a deputy of the Supreme Soviet (parliament) of Dagestan. By that time, disagreement between the supporters of Akhtaev and Bagauddin had become so acute that the IPV declared self-dissolution in August 1992. After that, Akhtaev founded and led the cultural and educational organization “Al-Islamiya,” while Bagauddin became the leader of the radical wing of the Dagestani Salafis, which would later be named the “Islamic Community of Dagestan” (Islamskii Dzhamaat Dagestana: hereafter abbreviated simply to “Jamaat”). Before long, Bagauddin’s former student Anguta Omarov (who adopted an ‘Islamic’ name of Aiub) forsook Bagauddin and began to hold even more extreme views with regard to takfir and attitudes toward the secular authorities. Meanwhile, the community of Aiub’s supporters in Dagestan remained marginal and did not display noticeable political activities. Abdurashid Saidov, Taina vtorzheniia: Glava “Rokovaia oshibka uchenogo islamista” (http://lib.baikal.net/koi.cgi/POLITOLOG/saidov.txt). 3

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Steadily, Bagauddin’s Jamaat became the most numerous and influential Salafi group in Dagestan. Even though more or less exact data on the number of its members do not exist, it seems fairly realistic to suppose that it actually had several thousand members.4 Bagauddin’s Jamaat had the most stable positions in lowland Kiziliurtovskii and Khasaviurtovskii, highland Tsumadinskii and Botlikhskii Raions, and in Makhachkala City, while not insignificant communities of his supporters operated in practically the whole republic, with the exception of several raions in southern Dagestan. In its ethnic composition the Jamaat was mainly Avar: Avars were dominant not only among its leaders but also lay believers. Purely Dargin Salafi communities took shape only in the villages of Karamakhi, Kadar, and Chabanmakhi of Buinakskii Raion (the so-called Kadar zone) and the village of Gubden in Karabudakhkentskii Raion. By the end of the 1990s, the influx of the representatives of other Dagestani ethnic groups — Laks, Lezgins, Kumyks — became stronger to an extent. The most salient characteristic of the social appearance of the Jamaat was the predominance of the youth therein. Salafi communities in villages were, as a rule, stronger and more numerous than in the cities. Each community was guided by an emir and usually had a consultative council (shura) as well. Moreover, the Jamaat had a judicial organ which resolved problems among the members of the community on the basis of the divine law (sharia). As a whole, the Salafi religious communities had a fairly well organized and mobilized structure. Though sharing general ideal settings of the Jamaat and recognizing the spiritual authority of emir Bagauddin, several communities (above all Karamakhi) preserved a certain level of organizational and operational autonomy. In the course of the 1990s, Bagauddin’s Jamaat actively propagated its ideas and built its organizational infrastructure. As early as 1991, in Kiziliurt Town, Bagauddin officially registered a medresse called “Hikma,” in which nearly 700 people were being educated. Small medresse operated in all relatively large Salafi communities. The Jamaat propagated its ideas through the mosques under its control, through Z.M. Zalimkhanov and K.M. Khanbabaev, Politizatsiia islama na Severnom Kavkaze (Makhachkala, 2000), p. 72; V.O. Bobrovnikov, “Islam na postsovetskom Severnom Kavkaze (Dagestan): mify i realii,” Alexei Malashenko and Martha Brill Olcott, eds., Islam na postsovetskom prostranstve: vzgliad iznutri (Moscow, 2001), p. 91.

4

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missionary expeditions of its members to the raions of Dagestan, through religious literature with foreign origins as well as printed by the publishing house “Santlada” (later renamed “Badr”) belonging to the Jamaat, and through leaflets, audio and video cassettes containing Bagauddin’s preachings and lectures by radical Islamic ideologues. The legal façade of the Community was the “Caucasus Center” (Tsentr Kavkaz), which was officially registered in 1996 and had branches in Makhachkala and Kiziliurt. Bagauddin’s influence steadily expanded beyond the borders of Dagestan to the other North Caucasian republics, above all Chechnia and Ingushetiia, Karachaevo-Cherkesiia, Kabardino-Balkariia, Stavropol’skii Krai (particularly raions with a predominant Nogai population). In these territories also emerged communities translating the ideology and copying the methods of the activities of the radical Dagestani Salafis. There were legitimate reasons for the tangible success of the Salafi propaganda in Dagestan and other North Caucasian territories. Under the conditions of the worsening economy, the Salafis’ call for the rejection of the wasteful practice of extravagant implementation of funerals and memorial rituals had great appeal. Many people were attracted by the simplicity and accessibility of the ideas proclaimed, the healthy outlook of Salafi communities, and the spirit of fraternity and mutual help ruling in these communities.5 The Salafis’ request of strict worship only of Allah was perceived to have the effect to emancipate individuals from patriarchal traditions since this request provided religious sanction for the yearning for emancipation from the control of the older generation, which was significant for the youth. Lastly, the Salafi ideology, with its call for social justice and equality and its rigorous criticism of the existing secular regime, proved to be an excellent channel to express a mood of protest caused by the ruin of a significant part of the population, the increasing unemployment, criminality, corruption, and the general moral decline of the society. Only to an insignificant extent was the attraction toward Salafism motivated by ethnic problems though, as a background, these problems unarguably played a certain role. Here I mean, above all, the Balkars who regarded themselves as a discriminated 5

A. Iarlykapov, Problema vakhkhabizma na Severnom Kavkaze (Moscow, 2000), p. 5.

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minority in their own republic as well as the Nogais of Stavropol’skii Krai who were discontent with the nationality policy conducted by the Krai administration. Remarkably, the supporters of Salafism among these Nogais were significantly more numerous than among the Nogis in neighboring Dagestan, where they have their ethnic “home,” namely Nogaiskii Raion.6 Why did the most radical, extremist forces aiming at armed jihad against the state become dominant among the Salafi movement in Dagestan in the second half of the 1990s? To answer this question, it is necessary to pay attention to two important factors, which influenced the dynamism of the Salafi movement: foreign (above all Arab) assistance and the war in Chechnia.

RADICALIZATION FROM OUTSIDE: RELIGIOUS MESSIANISM AND GEOPOLITICS The Islamic revival in Dagestan began against the background of the explosion of Islamic radicalism in the Middle East. This explosion was facilitated by numerous factors, such as the victory of the Islamic resistance in Afghanistan, which achieved the retreat of Soviet troops in 1989, and the eventual decline of the former pro-Soviet regime in 1992; painful perceptions of the majority of Muslims toward the stationing of American troops in Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-1991; the active role played by Islamic groups in the Palestinian uprising (Intifada) which began in 1989 in the occupied territories of the West Bank of the River Jordan and the Gaza strip; the civil war in Algeria which began at the beginning of 1992 after the military’s intervention prevented Islamists from exploiting their victory in the parliamentary elections; and the factual declaration of war against the government by radical Islamic groups in Egypt. All these events consolidated the moral atmosphere among the Dagestani Islamist hardliners and reinforced their arguments. Idem., “Natsional’noe i religioznoe v Nogaiskoi stepi,” Etnopoliticheskaia situatsiia na Severnom Kavkaze. Biulleten’ “Konflikt-dialog-sotrudnichestvo” 1 (September-November 1999), p. 63. 6

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Soon after the borders of the USSR were opened, many foreign Islamic organizations began to unfold their activities in its territories, including in the Caucasus. They were mainly non-governmental, charity organizations based in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan and Jordan. They gave financial help to construct mosques and medresse, publish and distribute Islamic literature, and offered humanitarian help and conducted missionary activities, inviting young Russian Muslims to study abroad. What were the purposes and motives of all this assistance? Here existed a sincere yearning to help co-believers in need and messianism, in particular characteristic of Saudi Arabia, and mercenary interests of the bureaucracy of charity funds, for which programs of help were always a good source of income. No doubt, however, there was a political element in the activities of the foreign organizations. They offered significant financial assistance not to official Spiritual Boards but to parallel Islamic structures opposing the authorities. As justification the Arabs referred to cases of corruption and ineffective management in Spiritual Boards, but actually they were also interested in the creation of independent channels transmitting their ideas, and afterwards political influence in the post-Soviet space. It would be misleading to regard this foreign influence as something monolithic. In Russia, the representatives of various, often mutually conflicting, trends and orientations of foreign Islam tried to operate. Among them, the most noticeable were Salafis, “Muslim Brothers,” and Tablighis (the international movement “Tablighi Jamaat” based in Pakistan). It was often the case that they transplanted their rivalry to Russia, thus confusing and splitting the Russian Muslims even more. The majority of international Islamic charity organizations, more or less connected with Saudi Arabia and other Arabic countries, preferred to operate with the Salafis who were ideologically closer to them. Gradually, Bagauddin became the main receiver and distributor of foreign financial aid in Dagestan. His name became something like a password opening the door into many Saudi charity organizations. In particular, it was through Bagauddin that Ramazan Borlakov, director of a medresse in the village of Uchkeken (Karachaevo-Cherkesiia), received access to foreign financial aid. This medresse was transformed

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into one of the main centers for the expansion of radical Islamic ideology in the northwestern Caucasus.7 Why did Arabs wager on Bagauddin? On the one hand, his strict, dogmatic Salafism possibly impressed them more than the excessively “liberal” views of A. Akhtaev. Moreover, the Arabs, poorly understanding the reality of Russian Islam and Russia’s situation in general, often did not comprehend that the introduction of such a version of Islam would generate more harm than good by provoking conflicts, panic, and splits among Russian Muslims. However, the most plausible reason seems to be that the ambitious and imposing Bagauddin was a much more suitable partner to realize the radical Islamic project which intended the removal of Russia from the North Caucasus to create an independent Islamic state there. Akhtaev always tried to defend the right of the Russian Islamic movement to follow its own strategy, key principles of which were, in his view, to maintain sound relations with the secular authorities and to reject coercive methods of Islamization. Despite the ideological closeness of the IPV with the “Muslim Brothers,” Akhtaev rebuffed the proposal made by their emissaries to unify the IPV to this international association, though this proposal was very attractive from the financial point of view. The “Muslim Brothers” did not forget this rejection. A high-ranking representative of the Egyptian branch of the “Muslim Brothers” supported Bagauddin’s position when he was invited to speak as an arbitrator in a debate between Akhtaev and Bagauddin’s group in the summer of 1992.8 It was this incident that served as the last blow to destroy the IPV. Bagauddin was much less punctilious in regard to proposals of assistance. It is possible to argue about the scale of the funds he received, but the very fact of enormous and steady financial aid given to his Jamaat by international Islamic organizations leaves no room for doubt. These organizations included the Al-Haramain Foundation, the International Islamic Relief Commission (“Al-Ighassa al-Islamiya”), the Taibah International Aid Organization, and the World Assembly of Islamic Youth. Recently the Saudi authorities at last admitted that foreign Author’s interview with Muhammad Bidzhiulu (Muhammad Karachai), Moscow, 13 October 2003. He founded the Uchkeken medresse and was its director until 1994. 8 Interview with Muhammad Karachai (see fn. 7), the secretary of the IVP and a close associate of A. Akhtaev at that time. 7

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branches of these organizations often offered support to extremist Islamic groups. In March 2002, the Saudi government blocked the account of the branches of the Al-Haramain Foundation in Bosnia and Somalia after the fact that these branches assisted terrorist activities and terrorist organizations including Al-Qaeda was confirmed. In May 2003, Saudi Arabia requested the Al-Haramain Foundation and all Saudi Arabian charity funds to cease their activities beyond the borders of Saudi Arabia until adequate mechanisms for monitoring and control of the money to prevent it from being used for illegal purposes were devised.9 The middle-range aims of the supporters of the radical Islamic project in the North Caucasus — to destabilize the situation and weaken the position of Russia in this region — paradoxically corresponded to certain interests of their sworn enemies in the West and the Middle East. These interests were as follows: (1) To exploit radical Islamism as an instrument for geopolitical competition with Russia (based on the proven success of the example of Afghanistan). (2) To prevent the emergence of the northern, Russian pipeline route for the transportation of Caspian oil to the West. (3) To shift the rising wave of radical Islamism from the West, Israel, and the Middle Eastern regimes toward other areas of the world, including the North Caucasus. The described constellation of external forces and interests, combined together, accelerated the radicalization of Dagestani Salafism and escalated its conflict with the state. The destructive, destabilizing influence of the external factors had intensified since the beginning of the conflict in Chechnia.

“Initiatives and Actions Taken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Combat Terrorism, September 2003,” p. 12 (www.saudiembassy.net). 9

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THE FIRST CHECHEN WAR (1994-1996): PRECONDITIONS FOR THE JIHADIZATION OF DAGESTANI ISLAMISM Chechen separatism at the beginning of the 1990s developed, in principle, under nationalist slogans. No sooner than the beginning of the war in 1994 did it gain a distinct Islamic tinge, which nevertheless did not become dominant in the separatist movement. The main reason for the reorientation of Chechen separatists toward Islam was a purely pragmatic desire to attract the Islamic world, with its enormous financial, political and human resources, to their side. Recognizing the complete absence of the religious cause in the Chechen resistance at the beginning of the war, Bagauddin rejected to qualify it as jihad. He even said that it was a war of infidels against other infidels and those who participated in the war would be burnt in hell. However, under the influence of Arabic religious authorities, including Islamic activists visiting Chechnia to support co-believers, Bagauddin changed his position as early as January 1995 and appealed to his supporters to participate in the “Chechen jihad.”10 From that moment, many members of the Jamaat visited Chechnia.11 The first Chechen war, which ended in 1996 with the retreat of Russian armies out of the republic and the emergence of a quasiindependent Chechnia, produced a powerful impulse to develop radical Islamism in Dagestan and the whole North Caucasus toward the cause of militarization and jihadization. For this change, a series of new prerequisites appeared: (1) Moral and psychological. The retreat of Russia from Chechnia was evaluated as a sign of the weakness of the Russian state and its incapability to maintain control over the Caucasus. As a result, radical Islamists were encouraged, their ambitions were greatly expanded, and now they were not only unafraid of the Russian military machine but also believed that they were able to beat it. Intoxication with violence Author’s interview with Anzor Astemirov, a leader of the Islamic jamaat of KabardinoBalkaria, Nalchik, 6 February 2003, and Zagir Arukhov, Deputy Minister (now – Minister) of Nationality Affairs, Dagestan, Makhachkala, 8 August 2003. 11 However, the participation of the Caucasus youth in the Chechen War was not limited to Salafis. The supporters of Sufism also went to Chechnia. In particular, a detachment of tariqaist Ahmad Kadyrov actively fought against federal forces there. 10

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and the false sense of their own superiority implacably pushed the Islamists toward a new, decisive fight with Russia. (2) Political. Radical Salafi groups obtained allies among “Islamizing” radical Chechen nationalists (Sh. Basaev, M. Udugov, Z. Iandarbiev and others), for whom Salafism was not only the key to foreign support but also a convenient instrument for the “export of the Chechen revolution” to other regions of the Caucasus. This alliance added to the Dagestan radical Islamists political weight in their confrontation with the authorities. Besides, a wide campaign which unfolded in Islamic countries aimed at solidarity with the Chechen people convinced Dagestani radicals that they would always be able to count on political, financial and human support from the world Islamic community in their future activities. (3) Geopolitical and military. Radical Islamists in Dagestan and the whole North Caucasus received a long-awaited strategic outpost uncontrolled by Russia, namely Chechnia. They built military training camps in Chechnia, and also guided ideological and propagandist preparation for the new stage of jihad from there. By the end of the war, radical Islamists had sufficiently large, armed formations well-supplied with arms and technology. Many Islamists received practical experience in using weapons and conducting partisan battles. (4) Personnel. The war facilitated the staffing of religious communities of various kinds with marginalized elements who regarded the war as a way to subsistence and employment. For these people the nihilistic attitude of Salafism toward a number of traditional norms of morality and behavior served as an excellent justification for any of their activities, beginning from elementary disrespect and violence toward their surroundings and ending with such kinds of criminal activities as kidnapping and commerce in hostages. As a result, quantitative growth of radical Salafi communities was accompanied by tangible deterioration in their “quality.” In these communities, religious and ideological aspects were given only a secondary, subsidiary role in the realization of their main task, namely the preparation of the warriors of jihad. (5) Organizational. The most important consequence of the war was the emergence in the region of a whole network of jihadist groups, the backbone of which was composed of veterans of the Chechen war as

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well as those who underwent military and ideological preparation in the camps in Chechnia. These groups were not strictly centralized but, all the same, served as a valuable mobilizational resource of radical Islamism. To sum up, in many points Chechnia became such a nursery of jihadism for Dagestan and the whole North Caucasus, as Afghanistan had been for the Middle East, northern Africa and other regions of the Islamic world. The first Chechen war transferred the idea of the radical Islamic project for the North Caucasus into practical dimensions. From this moment it became impossible to understand the dynamism of the radicalization of Dagestani Islamism separately from events within Chechnia.

ATTEMPTS TO REALIZE THE RADICAL ISLAMIC PROJECT IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS: CHECHNIA AND DAGESTAN (1997-1999) What was the radical Islamic project? It was a project of alternative stabilization: the establishment of Islamic order was requested to stabilize the society and salvage it from social, economic, political, and spiritualmoral crises. It was a unifying project: its eventual purpose was to create a united Islamic state in the Caucasus. Unsurprisingly, it was a separatist and anti-Russian project, aimed at dividing the North Caucasus from Russia. Lastly, it was an expansionist project since the independent Islamic North Caucasus was regarded as a bridgehead for the further expansion of Islam, above all toward the north, deeper into Russia with the perspective of reaching the Muslim republics of the Volga basin and creating a united Islamic space from the Black Sea to the Urals. The geopolitical nucleus of this project was Chechnia, while the first candidate to be unified to it was Dagestan. The initiative to realize this project unarguably belonged to radical Chechen leaders and the Arabic emissaries close to them – Sh. Basaev, M. Udugov, Z. Iandarbiev, I. Halimov, Omar ben Ismail, Amir Khattab, Abu Omar as-Seif, and others. The role and influence of Arabs tangibly rose because of their military contributions (detachments of Arab commanders were one of

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the most militant and efficient sub-divisions of the Chechen resistance), religious authority (many Arabs had religious educations and actually served as spiritual leaders of local religious communities), and mainly because of their financial resources, since it was through Arabic emissaries that the assistance from international Islamic organizations and funds arrived. Arabs did not intervene overtly in internal political struggles within Chechnia, appealing to Chechens to unify for the fight over Russia’s presence in the Caucasus. Nevertheless, several Arab Islamic organizations (“Muslim Brothers”) helped President A. Maskhadov more than others, while other (mainly those with a radical Salafi orientation) helped his political rivals, such as Basaev, V. Arsanov (vice-president of Chechnia), and others. As a result, the Arab factor provided another source of the intensification of internal conflict in Chechnia. Bagauddin found himself as a junior partner in the geopolitical game played by Chechen and Arab extremists. The dependent position of Bagauddin became even more obvious after he and many of his supporters shifted their base to the territory of Chechnia at the beginning of 1998 for the purpose of escaping repression by the Dagestani authorities. After the end of the war, the radical Salafis in Chechnia successfully occupied a solid position in such state structures as Sharia Guards, sharia courts, and the system of sharia security. Having been consolidated politically, they began to enforce their order on Chechen society. A significant part of the population was disturbed by the unjust punishments given by ignorant judges in sharia courts, attempts by Islamists to enforce Chechen women to wear Islamic clothes, the fight developed by them against the sale and consumption of alcohol, and thefts of petrol products. These measures were accompanied by violence toward the people, elimination of wine, and plunders of petrol wagons and small oil distillation factories.12 Trying to limit the influence of radical Islamists, Chechen president A. Maskhadov issued a law on the prohibition of Wahhabism in August 1997. Accumulating tension between Maskhadov’s supporters and V. Akaev, “Religiozno-politicheskii konflikt v Chechenskoi respublike Ichkeriia,” Tsentral’naia Aziia i Kavkaz 4:5 (1999), p. 102. 12

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Islamists resulted in a large-scale armed conflict in Gudermes in July 1998. Only the intervention of Sh. Basaev, Z. Iandarbiev, V. Arsanov and other prominent radical figures could save the Islamists from a serious defeat.13 After these events the Islamists were cast out from state structures, while the armed Salafi communities transformed into a military appendage of the radical Chechen opposition headed by Basaev. In the eyes of the population they became progressively associated with semi-criminal activities and kidnapping of the people. In this way, the anticipation that radical Islamism would become a stabilizing factor in Chechnia was betrayed. On the contrary, it only facilitated the further split of the political elite and the instability of Chechnia’s statehood, which had been weak even without that. In substance, radical Islamism was a banner of marginal forces counter-posing themselves against the overwhelming part of the society. As the Islamic project suffered danger in Chechnia, its supporters progressively shifted the accent to the task to unify with Dagestan and fight against the Russian presence. The establishment of Islamic control over Dagestan with its economic, demographic, and geo-strategic resources, including the exit to the Caspian Sea, would have meant the most serious damage to Russia’s position in the Caucasus, and, at the same time, would substantially have raised the geopolitical and economic status of Chechnia in international relations. Moreover, such a project would have secured the continuance of financial influx from Islamic organizations and, lastly, would have helped to dress up somehow the growing tension in Chechnia’s internal politics. In Dagestan itself, radical Salafi communities, even after the end of the Chechen war, did not hurry to enter the overt confrontation with the authorities, limiting themselves to verbal criticism of the situation in the republic. On December 23, 1997, in order to push Dagestanis toward more radical steps, Chechen warriors headed by Amir Khattab carried out an audacious raid deep into Dagestan and attacked a Russian military unit stationed in Buinaksk. At the same time, it was made public A. Kudriavtsev, “‘Vakhkhabizm’: problema religioznogo ekstremizma na Severnom Kavkaze,” Tsentral’naia Aziia i Kavkaz 3:9 (2000), p. 120; V. Akaev, Sufizm i vakhkhabizm na Severnom Kavkaze. Konfrontatsiia ili kompromiss? (Makhachkala, 1999), pp. 30-31; M. Iusupov, “Islam v sotsial’no-politicheskoi zhizni Chechni,” Tsentral’naia Aziia i Kavkaz 2:8 (2000), p. 169. 13

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that an agreement between the representatives of the Jamaat and S. Raduev14 had been signed on December 20, 1997. Not limited by the provision on mutual military aid “in cases of aggression by third parties,” this agreement, in practice, recognized Bagauddin’s Jamaat as the only legitimate representative of the Dagestani people. 15 This statement gave the agreement an extremely provocative characteristic. The wave of repressions, which followed the raid on Buinaksk, forced Bagauddin to move to Chechnia, where, as early as January 1998, he made a statement declaring, in practice, a war against the Dagestan government. 16 This event marked the fundamental turn in the development of Dagestani radical Islamism. From that moment the Jamaat began to transform quickly into a military-political organization overtly proposing coercive overthrow of the ruling regime. Akhtaev’s sudden death in March 1998 deprived Dagestani and North Caucasian Islam of the only leader that could somehow prevent this tendency by his personal authority. In April 1998, the “Congress of Peoples of Ichkeriia (Chechnia) and Dagestan” (Kongress narodov Ichkerii (Chechni) i Dagestana; KNID), headed by Basaev, was created as a political instrument for mutual assistance between Dagestani and Chechen radicals. The task of this Congress was to prepare a kind of “fifth column” within Dagestan to support the Islamic project. The so-called “Islamic Peacekeeping Battalion” under Khattab’s command was created to offer military support to KNID’s activities. The important step on the way to realize the Islamic project was to establish the complete control by the Salafis over villages of the Kadar Chechnia’s famous field commander, who at that time commanded the so-called “the Army of General Dudaev.” 15 “... Today we concluded an Agreement on mutual assistance between Degestan and Ichkekiia. This is a fact since today the Islamic Jamaat of Dagestan represents the interests of Dagestani people, aimed at serving Allah. And at the same time the ‘Army of General Dudaev’ legitimately represents the whole Chechen people because the Army firmly keeps the way of Allah, the way towards the freedom and independence of Caucasus ...,” I. Rotar’, “Raduev otmetilsia v Buinakske?,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 3 February 1998. 16 “... The relations between the Jamaat and the pro-Russian authorities of Dagestan should be regarded as a war situation with the whole consequences deriving from this fact ... At the full scale Islamic call activated ... to carry out Jihad against infidelity and those who incarnate it ...” (Al’-Kaf, Groznyi, May 1998, p. 4). 14

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zone. If the removal of the militia (police) staff from there in May 1998 took place almost spontaneously as a result of a routine round of the long-repeated conflicts between the militia and local religious communities,17 the factual proclamation in August 1998 that the Kadar zone was an independent Islamic territory, in which only sharia operated,18 already appeared as an overt political challenge against the state. This perception was amplified by the actions of KNID leaders who were threatened by their armed intervention in the case that the Dagestan authorities attempted to liquidate the emerged Islamic enclave by force. The Kadar zone became a desirable base for conducting Islamic propaganda (before long, a TV transmitter was built there), while the medresse operating in Karamakhi became the center of military-sport preparation and jihadist indoctrination of the Dagestani Salafis. On March 23, 1999 the leaders of Salafi communities of Dagestan and Chechnia declared the beginning of jihad and appealed to the Caucasian youth to join the “Islamic army of the Caucasus” and come to the places where Islamic military forces were stationed, carrying with them all the necessary things for living in the field.19 The main theme of Bagauddin’s speeches during this period was the removal of the Russian army from Dagestan. One of the ideologues of Caucasian jihad, Magomed Tagaev, in one of his interviews in the spring of 1999, asserted: “We will emancipate Dagestan at any price … and without any delay, even parallel with the emancipation of Dagestan, we should emancipate the Caucasus... The summer of 1999 should become the beginning of decisive battles against the empire.”20 Actually, in the spring and summer of 1999 the number of provocations on the Chechen-Dagestan border and attacks on Russian military sub-units significantly increased, testifying to the intensification of the process to prepare jihad. In August 1999, detachments of Bagauddin and Basaev invaded the mountain raions of Dagestan (Tsumadinskii and Botlikhskii), while in September they made an attempt to cross deeper into Dagestan Z. Arukhov, Ekstremizm v sovremennom islame (Makhachkala, 1999), p. 130; Molodezh’ Dagestana, 29 May 1998. 18 V. Il’in, “Ochag separatizma v Dagestane,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 18 August 1998. 19 Interview with Bagauddin published in the newspaper Molodezh’ Dagestana, 18 June 1999. 20 Russkaia mysl’ (Paris), No. 4269, 13 May 1999. 17

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through Novolakskii Raion. However, at all points they were pushed back by the joint efforts of the Russian army, Dagestani militia and local self-defense detachments. Moreover, the Russian army liquidated the Kadar enclave after a twoweek storm. It is necessary to remark that the militant strategy of Bagauddin and representatives of the “external Jamaat” (i.e. Jamaat located in Chechen territory) was not shared by all the members of the “internal Jamaat,” namely Salafi communities in Dagestan. Bagauddin enjoyed the largest support in the raions of mountain Dagestan, while in the foothills and plains (the circum-Caspian lowlands) many Islamists regarded that the chances to expand the Jamaat’s influence steadily and peacefully had not been exhausted and that overt confrontation with the authorities would be ruinous, considering the real balance of power. Many members of the internal Jamaat looked at the increasing intervention by Chechens in the affairs of Dagestani Islam with suspicion. Understandably, the activists of the internal Jamaat had fairly strong separatist and anti-Russian feelings and some of them joined the invading warriors of Basaev. However, the religious communities within Dagestan did not try to make any organized anti-Russian protests. In other regions of North Caucasus jihad also did not occur. On the contrary, in 1999, many members of jihadist groups moved into Chechnia and joined Chechen armed formations to realize jihad in their localities according to the desire of Basaev and Khattab. Many of them were guided not so much by idealistic considerations as by their desire to hide from prosecution from the authorities or just to earn money. Eventually, all the Chechen territory was occupied by Russian troops again and Chehcen separatists returned to the tactics of partisan war, as they did in 1994-1996. The radical Islamic project in North Caucasus misfired because of several fundamental reasons: (1) The inability of Islamists to create an attractive model of Islamic order in Chechnia. Formal steps toward Islamization of social and political life in Chechnia, including the declaration of Chechnia as an Islamic republic at the beginning of 1999, were only followed by deepening social and political chaos, lack of security, and economic catastrophe. The Chechen experience of sovereignization and Islamization was becoming progressively astonishing and repulsive for Dagestan and other Caucasian republics. Despite the difficulties of

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marketization and Europeanization, the experience of East European and Baltic countries during the last decade continues to be an attractive model for a certain part of the Belarus, Ukrainian, and Moldova populations. In contrast, the Chechen model only pushed Dagestan and the whole North Caucasus back into Eurasia. (2) Underestimation of the ethnic factor. Dagestanis perceived the march into Dagestan in August and September 1999, above all, as Chechen aggression. Accordingly, in the eyes of the Dagestan population the local Islamists immediately became the collaborators of these aggressors and national traitors. Here, Muslim solidarity did not work. The integrating potential of Islam proved to be much weaker than radical Islamists counted on. (3) Overestimation by Islamic leaders of their potential and resources, and also underestimation of the potential and political will of the Russian leadership not to allow the separation of Dagestan from Russia and to renew control over rebellious Chechnia.

THE REACTION OF THE STATE: CONTRADICTORY CONSEQUENCES During the several years before the invasion in 1999, however paradoxical it seems, it was the policies conducted by the Dagestan authorities in regard to the Jamaat that facilitated its radicalization. Until the end of the first Chechen war, the Dagestan government did not pay special attention to radical Salafi movements. Bagauddin and his people did not intervene in politics and the problem of his conflicts with the representatives of the official clergy did not appear a priority against the background of acute social-economic and ethno-political problems which literally tore the republic during the first half of the 1990s. When the Salafi movement began to activate and politicized tangibly after 1997, the state’s lack of a consistent and complex strategy to counteract religious and political extremism resulted in the situation that the reactions of the authorities were limited to punitive actions against one or another step made by the Jamaat. Moreover, the hatred toward “Wahhabism” imposed by the official, pro-Sufi Spiritual Board had not

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only produced a popular stereotype but also become an element of state policy. This was often expressed by the provocative behavior of militia in its relations with the members of religious communities, and illegal violation of their elementary civil rights and dignity. Such “small nagging” tactics only embittered and consolidated the Jamaat, making its position progressively anti-government. Accusations motivated only by one or another’s belonging to the Jamaat motivated many young Islamists to visit Chechnia, where they quickly became convinced jihadists. On the other hand, Islamic activists saw that the regime was incapable of giving a decisive answer to real and serious challenges to its dignity, such as the emergence of an autonomous enclave in the Kadar zone. On September 1, 1998, by signing an agreement on the principles to regulate the crises with the religious community of this zone, the Dagestan government actually consoled itself to the new state of affairs. Such a “soft” approach to the problem of the Kadar zone, as well as inconsistent and contradictory government policies which sometimes bordered on permissiveness towards the radical Salafis, were caused by a series of tactical considerations. The presence of the “Wahhabi threat” helped the Dagestan authorities to lobby their interests in the federal government more successfully. Another reason was that the Dagestan government did not receive any clear command from Moscow in regard to the Karamakhi question. The Dagestan leadership interpreted the visit of the Minister of Internal Affairs, S. Stepashin, to Karamakhi in September 1998 as a signal not to strain the situation. No less important was that the Karamakhi Salafis had strong allies such as Sh. Basaev and Khattab, who in the midst of crisis declared their readiness to offer active military help to the Karamakhi activists. Last but not least, the Karamakhi Islamists were Dargins, as were the core members of the ruling elites of Dagestan, for whom the Karamakhi activists remained, despite everything , “their own people” in the context of the rivalry between Dargins and Avars. Although strange from hindsight, it seemed completely reasonable to regard the Karamakhi activists as a counterweight against the strengthening Avar pressure, including the pressure exerted through the Spiritual Board of Dagestan, which began to politicize tangibly under mufti S.-M. Abubakarov (1996-98).21 In any 21

Makarov, Ofitsial’nyi i neofitsial’nyi islam, pp. 19-22, 44-46.

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case, however, the Jamaat interpreted the Dagestan authorities’ behavior as a sign of weakness, with which the group of Islamists that proposed the most prompt shift to armed struggle for power speculated quite tactfully. During the 1990s, other republican authorities of the North Caucasus largely shared this appeasement policy towards the radical Islamists. Astonished by the invasion of 1999, the authorities in Dagestan and other North Caucasian republics decided to demonstrate their force, running a total war against radical Islamic groups. The targets of this campaign of persecution were not only actual extremists and participants of the terrorist networks, but also many usual believers characterized by strict piety and social activeness. It was these people that composed a significant part of the so-called “lists of Wahhabis” which were compiled by the organs of the Dagestani Ministry of Internal Affairs during recent years. It was often the case that in these lists those who had no relation with religion were included. According to many local officials, politicians, and religious activists, even including the principal antagonists of Islamism, the hunting of “Wahhabis” became widely used as an instrument to explore personal and political information and also to enrich corrupt militiamen. Widespread adoption of coercive, punitive methods including methods of collective threatening of Islamic activists proved only partially effective. These methods affected some of them in just the opposite way, provoking their revenge on the representatives of the authorities in the localities, or their departure for Chechnia to fight. Nevertheless, one should admit that wide-ranging repression against radical Islamists, such as the deportation of foreign missionaries, the closure of the representative offices of international charity funds, and the continuance of strict monitoring of the situation, helped, at least temporarily, to soften the acuteness of the problem of radical Islamism in Dagestan, particularly 1999-2000, however costly these measures were. However, it is also clear that the task to prevent a new upsurge of religious-political extremism requires reliance upon more diversified instruments. We need a more differentiated approach to the phenomenon of the Islamic movement, recognizing its heterogeneousness and the presence of the various vectors of its further evolution.

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RADICAL ISLAMISM AT THE CROSSROADS: BETWEEN TERRORISM AND PRAGMATIC ADAPTATION The military-political defeat in 1999 and the coercive liquidation of the majority of Salafi communities by law enforcement organs resulted in a deep organizational and ideological crisis of radical Islamism in Dagestan. The Salafi movement was deprived of its “head”; the previous leaders were killed in military operations or escaped from the republic to hide themselves in Chechnia, other regions of Russia, or even Middle East countries. The Jamaat ceased to exist as a single organization, splitting into many individual groups. Because of the strict control by militia and intelligence, many previous activists practically ceased to be involved in the movement. They have not found new charismatic leaders capable of consolidating and mobilizing the remnants of previous religious communities and the new generation of young believers, attracted toward Salafi ideas. One of the pretenders for this role was the former chairman of the Union of Muslims of Russia and the former deputy of the Russian State Duma, Nadir Khachilaev, who was killed in August 2003.22 The direction of further transformation of the movement will be mainly determined by the factor of who will lead the present unstructured and ideologically disoriented masses of Salafi supporters. In reality, two poles of gravitation are taking shape. On the one hand, there is a small but fanatically inclined group of jihadists who have gone underground. For these people, the incident of 1999 only confirmed the anti-Islamic substance of the Russian state and thus they are destined Nadir Khachilaev was a former sportsman, who made huge money in the first half of the 1990s through semi-criminal business activities (mostly caviar production). Then he turned to politics, and in 1996 he became the head of the Union of Muslims of Russia and the deputy of the Russian State Duma. After the events of May 1998, when a crowd led by Khachilaev stormed the House of the Government in Makhachkala, he had to flee to Chechnia, but following disagreement with radical Chechen leaders he returned to Dagestan and was arrested there (or, as some claim, he handed himself over to the authorities). After several months of imprisonment and investigation he got a conditional sentence and was released in 2000. According to some testimonies, after all these trials he became a much more devoted Muslim. He tried to come back to politics, but on August 11, 2003 he was assassinated by unknown gunmen at the doorstep of his house in Makhachkala. 22

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to continue their fight against it at any cost. They are urged on by a heated desire to obtain revenge for their comrades who were killed in battles with Russian armies and for the harassment and torture often conducted by the staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on suspects in connection with extremists. It was these jihadist groups that performed a number of terrorist acts and kidnappings of the representatives of the authorities, military, and militiamen during 2000-2004. One should not overestimate the number and military and political potential of these groups. However, under the conditions of contemporary Dagestan, in particular as long as the war in Chechnia is continuing, the tendency toward jihadism will inevitably find a certain support among the population. Moreover, an analogical tendency is developing vigorously in the world Islamic movement as well. From the tactical point of view, the jihadist groups shifted from methods of uprising to sabotage-terrorist partisan actions. A new element in their activities was the use of suicide bombers, including women, though this is more characteristic for Chechen than Dagestani extremists. For the members of these groups, armed jihad is becoming the supreme meaning of their existence and the main factor attracting them toward Islam. They were hardly interested in the idea to instill Islam into the society and to build Islamic states. In other words, concrete national and local Islamic projects, by which “traditional” Islamic movements had been guided, do not interest them. This is practically a new type of radical Islamism deprived of concrete territorial or national attachment and indulging only in total war with the enemies of Islam. One may find examples of similar mutations of Islamism in Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, and other “hot points” or periodically “blazing up points” of the Islamic world. Al-Qaeda and Bin Laden incarnate this type of Islamism. A French Islamic specialist, Olivier Roy, figuratively called Al-Qaeda an “apocalyptic sect, having split out of political Islam.” He characterizes this neo-fundamentalist radicalism in the following way: “Bin Laden’s movement … is never connected with real social problems; [this tendency is connected more with problems of existentialism and self-identification than with the logic of class struggle and conflicts of interests]; Bin Laden does not have any strategy to seize power in any concrete country. He gives desperate people the chance of vengeance but does not give them either hope or an alternative … he

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calls the Muslim ‘people’ to their conscience with the help of examples of martyrdom and moral influence of attack directed to the heart of the Babylon of our days. However, he does not have any concrete political project and promises of a bright future.”23 Jihadist groups in Dagestan largely correspond to these social-psychological characteristics. At the same time, they are not independent at all and, as before, have remained an object of manipulation from various sides chasing their own interests in the framework of Caucasian geopolitical rivalry. The alternative to this destructive radicalism is pragmatic adaptation of the Salafi movement to the existing realities, its “nationalization” or steady integration into the national social-political process, as happened with many leading radical Islamist movements and organizations in the Middle East.24 One may observe a similar, though yet weakly formulated, tendency in Dagestan. Here, a stratum of young, educated Islamic activists is taking shape. They are inclined to critically rethink the experience of the Jamaat in the 1990s, understand the reasons for the bankruptcy of the previous Islamic project, and work out new, more realistic guidelines for the Islamic movement in Dagestan.25 For this purpose, they address the ideological heritage of A. Akhtaev and also seek answers in writings by a relatively “liberal” contemporary Islamic ideologue from Egypt, Yousef al-Qaradawi. This attitude marks a visible tendency to overcome the strict limits of conservative Salafism in Bagauddin’s interpretation. They seek possibilities of legal Islamic educational, social, and, eventually, political activities in the framework of the existing secular state. Individual Salafi communities surviving from the 1990s in several rural raions of Dagestan were located between these two poles. They did not participate in the events of 1999 and, today, not rejecting their religious views, nevertheless completely peacefully coexist in their villages with the supporters of tariqa Islam. As examples, one may list O. Roy, “Ben Laden: apokalipticheskaia sekta, otklovshaiasia ot politicheskogo islama,” Konstitutsionnoe pravo: Vostochnoevropeiskoe obozrenie 4:37 (2004), p. 76. 24 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 25 One may find the results of these attempts in an interesting dissertation by a young Dagestani political scientist, A.A. Mantaev, titled “’Vakhkhabizm’ i politicheskaia situatsiia v Dagestane” (Dissertatsiia na soiskanie uchenoi stepeni kandidata polic hic heskikh nauk, Mosc ow, 20 02) (http://www .ya seen.ru/files/ wahabizm_Mantaev.doc). 23

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villages of Kirovaul of Kiziliurtovskii Raion, Kvanada of Tsumadinskii Raion, and others. Members of these communities, sometimes called “Peaceful Salafis,” are placed under constant control by militia, but, as a matter of fact, any illegal activities performed by them have not been recorded.26 Today, it is difficult to estimate to what extent one may talk about the emergence of the solid model of peaceful integration of Salafism into Dagestani society. Several observers regard that the Salafis only changed tactics and hide themselves, and are only waiting for an advantageous situation to take up arms again. Nevertheless, the description above testifies to at least the diversity of the further development of the radical Islamist movement in Dagestan.

CONCLUSIONS By all accounts the peak of activities of radical Islamism in Dagestan has passed. Despite its visible activeness, jihadism is progressively transformed into a marginal, peripheral trend, which will remain a more or less relevant background factor for a long time but will not have strategic, human and other resources for a qualitative breakthrough. This is not to say that there will be no episodic outbreak of radicalism, but obviously the possible outbreak will hardly achieve the level of 1999. Simultaneously, a tendency toward the integration of the Islamic movement into the social-political life of the republic is growing. This contradictory tendency promises to soften the problem of extremism on the one hand, but on the other, may transform into a complete change of the whole political-ideological landscape of Dagestan. As for the mobilizing potential of radical Islamism, already today we are observing its obvious limits. The radical Islamic project is not able, today or in the future, to become a unifying and stabilizing factor in the mosaic of Dagestani society, in which ethnicities and clans have remained the most important determinants of political behavior. The factor of radical Islamism by itself is not able to undermine the The author’s talks with Kirovaul residents at the village’s “traditionalist” mosque and with the officials of the Kiziliurt raion administration, Kirovaul Village, Kiziliurt Raion, 12-13 November 2002, 12 and 20 August 2003. 26

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stability of the present political regime in Dagestan. However, in case of critical exacerbation and/or accumulation of social, economic, and ethno-political contradictions, the Islamic factor may possibly play a role as the last straw in causing instability.

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11 ALIEN OF

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REASONS FOR THE “UNSTABLE STABILITY” DAGESTAN, AN OUTPOST OF SLAVIC EURASIA1

MAGOMED-RASUL IBRAGIMOV

AND

KIMITAKA MATSUZATO

The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to the conceptualization of a meso-mega approach to Slavic Eurasia through a case study of Dagestani politics.2 Dagestan is an extreme case since it appears very alien to Slavic Eurasia and closer to the Islamic Middle East. The only reservation to this assertion would seem to be that religious leaders in Dagestan boast that Dagestanis are more pious than Arabic peoples. Actually, Dagestan today is seething with Islamic revival. As of December 1, 2004, 1766 mosques (among them 1107 Friday mosques), 13 institutes of Islamic higher education with 43 local branches, 132 madrasah, and 278 mosque primary schools were in operation in Dagestan, which as a multi-confessional population of only a two and half million.3 The numbers of pilgrims to Mecca was about 1200 in 1991, 6000 in 1992, 9398 in 1995, 12,525 in 1996, 12,208 in 1997, and 13,268 in 1998.4 Although the number of pilgrims began to decline after 1999 for political and practical reasons, Dagestan continues to send more than five thousand pilgrims to Mecca each year, while (for example) Bashkortostan sends only tens of pilgrims. In many cities and villages of Dagestan the adhan (call to prayer), transmitted by powerful This chapter is one of the results of the research project “Islam and Politics in Russia: Multi-Layered and Comparative Approach” (2003 – 2006) financed by the Japan Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Sciences and Technology. The phrase “instable stability” was taken from brochure, Russia’s Soft Underbelly:The Stability of Instability in Dagestan, by Edward W. Walker (Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, Winter 1999-2000). 2 Dagestan has a population of 2,580,000 (data from the 2002 census). The republic is characterized by a low level of urbanization (about 60 percent of the population still live in rural areas) and the highest birthrate and natural demographic growth among all of Russia’s regions. 3 Data provided by the Dagestan Government Committee on Religious Affairs. 4 Religii i religioznye organizatsii v Dagestane, 2001, pp. 72-73. 1

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loudspeakers, wakes up the population at about four o’clock every morning. Many signboards of shops and gas stations are written in Arabic, which is taught in elementary schools if the parents wish it. Even among village mosque imams one can easily find young people who studied Islam for several years in Arabic countries, while in the Volga regions those who finished three-year courses in madrasah often become imams. The decisive resistance of the Dagestan population to the invasion, under the slogan of building an Islamic state, by Chechen militants commanded by Shamil Basaev into Eastern Dagestan in August 1999 provided an example of the unexpected coherence of Slavic Eurasia. We tend to think from hindsight that Basaev committed a suicidal mistake by invading Dagestan, because this adventure resulted in the liquidation of semi-independent Chechnia, which had become an international military and proselityzing base of radical Islamism. However, if we consider the growing influence of Salafism in Dagestan during the 1990s (see Chapter 10 of this volume), caused both by this republic’s painful social situation and influences from outside, and the successful precedent of transborder Islamic radicalism in Central Asia,5 it is possible to suppose that the Chechen warlords made a “rational choice.” What remains to be explained is why Dagestanis resolutely resisted the invasion, even at the cost of hundreds of victims. By this action, objectively, Dagestan not only chose to remain in, but also to defend the integrity of Slavic Eurasia as an outpost region. This choice can be attributed to the “unstable stability” of Dagestan society, which in the 1990s proved to be capable of overcoming the furious challenges of radical Islamism from both outside and within..

NESTED CLEAVAGES OF DAGESTAN SOCIETY The authors of this chapter are not the first scholars to attempt to explain Dagestan’s “unstable stability.” Enver Kisriev and his fellow scholars criticized ethnocentric interpretations of Dagestani politics. See, for example, Vitaly V. Naumkin, Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, Spring 2003). 5

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Despite the vast behavioral differences among the ethnic groups of Dagestan, they have developed a common structure of settlement – jamaats (territorial communities).6 Severe natural, topographical and geopolitical conditions had already forced pre-Islamic Dagestani peoples to stand together devotedly around their territorial communities. This tendency was strengthened by the Shafii school of law7 followed by Dagestani Sunnites,8 because this school strictly requests solidarity of territorial religious communities (see below). V. O. Bobrovnikov remarks that Imam Shamil’s war against the Russian Empire in the nineteenth century, the merger of jamaats with the system of village soviets after the revolution of 1917, and the Collectivization during the 1930s wiped out the inter-ethnic differences (which had already been insignificant in the nineteenth century) of the jamaats. Paradoxically, in such mountainous raions as Akhvakhskii, Akhtynskii, Rutul’skii, Tabasaranskii, and Tsumadinskii, where the population’s resistance to Collectivization was most furious in the 1930s, the collective farm system enjoyed strong support among the population in the 1990s.9 The revival of Sunnite Islam with the Shafii interpretation in the post-communist era strengthened the social functions of the jamaats. According to Kisriev, it has been the jamaats, not ethnicities, to which the Dagestani people feel most loyal.10 6 M. A. Aglarov, Sel’skaia obshchina v Nagornom Dagestane v XVII – nachale XIX v. (Moscow, 1988). 7 One of the four schools of law of Sunni, established by Idris al-Shafii in the eighth – ninth centuries. This school was very influential under the protection of the Seljuq Turk and one of the most important Sunnite jurists and Sufi philosophers, Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) was from this school. Later, the Shafii school declined mainly for political reasons. Today this school continues to be dominant only in the peripheries of the Muslim world, such as Eastern Africa, Southeast Asia and Dagestan. 8 The only exception is the Nogais settling in the north of the republic, who follow the Hanafi school of law. In addition, Azerbaijanis in Derbent City (southern Dagestan) practice Shiism. 9 V. O. Bobrovnikov, “Sovremennoe Dagestanskoe selo,” S. A. Artiunov, A. I. Osmanov, G. A. Sergeeva, eds., Narody Dagestana (Moscow, 2002), pp. 90-91. 10 E. F. Kisriev, Natsional’nost’ i politicheskii protsess v Dagestane (Makhachkala, 1998), p. 32. Kisriev even argues that in Dagestan tribal identities gave place to political identifications with territorial states, such as Serir, Khaidak, the Emirate of Derbent, and others. It was this political/territorial (not tribal/ethnic) identification that made the Dagestan ASSR survive since its establishment in 1920 to the present, while another autonomous republic of the North Caucasus established at the same time, Gorskaia ASSR, split into eight ethno-territorial units within only two years after 1920 (Ibid., pp. 31-32).

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The second argument Kisriev makes to challenge ethnocentric interpretations of Dagestani politics is that ethnicities per se cannot be the units of political actions. According to Kisriev, we should term the units (actors) in Dagestani politics “ethnic parties.” These parties are composed of leaders belonging to the same ethnicity, but it is absolutely possible, for example, that a Dargin party will ally with a Kumyk party in its rivalry with another Dargin party. 11 Kisriev’s argument has an interesting parallel with our understanding of the relations between macro-tariqa and concrete Sufi brotherhoods in Islamic politics in Dagestan. 12 Kisriev’s argument is exemplified by the fact that Makhachkala mayor Said Amirov (a Dargin) has been supported by his own clan based on the people from his home village in Sergokalinskii Raion (Central Dagestan close to Caspian Sea), the Karachev brothers (Kumyk by ethnicity),13 and “khadzhalmakhintsy” (a Dargin community in Makhachkala composed of the migrants from Khadzhalmakhi, a huge center of fruit cultivation in Central Dagestan). This coalition, as well as any other, is based on common interests, not ethnic loyalties. Ibid., p. 33. Tariqa is a key concept of Sufism, originating from a word meaning “way” in Arabic. In early Sufism (the ninth – tenth centuries) tariqa meant the “method” to achieve a certain spiritual condition (tariqa-method). After the rapid spread of Sufi institutions of “teacher (sheikh, murshid, ustaz) – disciple (murid)” in the Muslim world during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, tariqa began to mean these institutions as well (tariqaorders). During this period the tariqa-method was qualified to imply “mythic methods of cognition of truth.” However, the worldwide expansion of Sufism has made classic overreaching orders meaningless as political actors. For example, the Naqshbandi, stretched from Gibraltar to Indonesia allegedly with hundreds of thousands of disciples, but without regular organizational connections among themselves, it can hardly be seen as any unit of concrete political action. Instead, coherent collectives-brotherhoods, each composed of a sheikh and his disciples, have become the units of Sufi politics, on which this chapter focuses. For more detail, see our coauthored essay, “Islamic Politics at the Subregional Level of Dagestan: Tariqa Brotherhoods, Ethnicities, Localism and the Spiritual Board,” forthcoming in Europe-Asia Studies 57: 5 (2005). 13 The eldest son, Khairulla (b. 1943), is the head of the construction department of the Dagestan government. The second eldest son, Murtazali (b. 1952), is one of the sheikhs in Dagestan who founded the oldest Islamic university in Dagestan as early as 1989. The third son, Sapiiulla (b. 1957), is the chief administrator of Kumtorkalinskii Raion of Dagestan. The youngest son, Nabiiulla (b. 1963), is the head of the Administration “Western Caspian Fishery” (in practice, the minister of fisheries of Dagestan). 11 12

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Peoples in Dagestan, irrespective of ethnicities, share strong solidarity among relatives, famous under the name of tukhum, covering relatives within seven or eight degrees of relationship. Though political scientists and anthropologists have often overestimated its significance, tukhum can actually be used as an instrument for political mobilization. Edward W. Walker explains the “unstable stability” of Dagestani politics by examining the nested structure of ethnic, religious, local, clientelistic, tukhum, and other cleavages. Actually, in this society coalitions and confrontations of various groups may have different patterns in response to specific issues. For example, Dargin Islamic leaders are discontent with the pro-Avar DUMD’s monopoly over religious resources, but the Dargin secular politicians cannot but ally with Avar politicians, since Avars are most populous in the republic and might possibly challenge the present Dargin hegemony in secular politics of Dagestan. Likewise, Russians are Orthodox Christians, Nogais and Kukyks practice the Hanafi and Shafii school of law of Sunni respectively, and Azerbaijanis are Shiites, but they are all allies when they encounter the massive migration of Mountain Caucasians’ (Avars, Dargins, Lezgins and Tabasarans’) to lowland Dagestan, though these Caucasians share the Shafii school of law with Kumyks. In contrast to the situation in Dagestan, in other countries where various cleavages of a society overlap each other and the society is separated clearly into two parts, there is a greater possibility of civil war, as was shown by Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia.14 An antipodal situation is observed in Dagestan, where the ethnoconfessional “impurity” of one or another group often strengthens its legitimacy. For example, the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Dagestan (Dukhovnoe upravlenie musliman Dagestana, DUMD) under the influence of Said-Afandi Chirkeiskii (an Avar) has been criticized for its attempts to “Avarize” the religious life of the republic. Said-Afandi’s supporters can refute this criticism, referring to his strong influence on ethnically Kumyk Buinakskii raion. This influence was realized by Said-Afandi’s Kumyk disciple, Arslanali Gamzatov, who is the chairman of the Council of Ulama of Dagestan and the rector of Imam Saipully Kadi Islamic University in Buinaksk City. By the same token, the presence of 14

Walker, Russia’s Soft Underbelly, p. 18.

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Magomedsaid Abakarov, a respected Avar alim (who died in 2004), in the anti-Chirkeiskii opposition raised its authority, since the opposition could demonstrate that Said-Afandi was criticized even among his own people (Avars). Robert Bruce Ware, Kisriev and Walker argue that the political regime functioning in Dagestan is a kind of consociationalism, a concept elaborated by Arend Lijphart in the 1970s to describe a nonmajoritarian political system with formal and informal rules for powersharing between ethnic groups, as in the Netherlands and Belgium. The most famous element of formal consociationalism, prescribed by the Dagestan Constitution adopted by the Constitutional Assembly on July 26, 1994, are a collective presidency (which would emerge again in the Bosnian Constitution) under the name of a State Council composed of 14 representatives of the same number of state/ indigenous ethnicities. Moreover, 64 of the 121 single-mandate electoral districts of the republican parliament were defined by the republican electoral law as “national.” In other words, the right to run for deputyship in these districts is limited to the members of a certain nationality. 15 During the mid-1990s similar systems were introduced at the municipal level. Needless to say, the existence of these national electoral districts is problematic from the viewpoint of equality of citizens. Putin’s centralizing reform put an end to these consociational arrangements. In accordance with the Federal Law on General Principles of Organization of Legislative and Executive Organs of State Power in Federal Constituents, but against the popular will to reject individual presidency expressed by two separate republican referenda in 1992 and 1993, the federal authorities forced the Dagestan authorities to introduce an individual presidency and hold the first presidential elections in 2006. 16 National electoral districts were Walker, Russia’s Soft Underbelly, pp. 20-22; Robert Bruce Ware and Enver Kisriev, “Political Stability and Ethnic Party: Why Is There Peace in Dagestan?,” Mikhail A. Alexseev, ed., Center-Periphery Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia: A Federation Imperiled (Houndsmills, London, 1999), pp. 107-112. 16 The new constitution which introduced the individual presidency was adopted by the constitutional assembly, composed of 121 parliamentarians of the republic and 121 delegates from raions and cities, on July 10, 2003. Konstitutsiia Respubliki Dagestan (Makhachkala, 2003). 15

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abolished at the both republican and municipal levels.17 In other words, the federal center forced Dagestan to shift to a purely majoritarian, quota-free democracy. Unofficial consociationalism has typically been demonstrated by the genius of the State Council Chairman Magomedali Magomedov (a Dargin), who has managed to reshuffle profit-making posts among representatives of all major ethnic groups. As Ware and Kisriev note, if a Dargin replaces an Avar in a ministry, “then another Avar must receive a compensatory post. If this results in the displacement of a Kumyk, then the latter must be given another position even if it displaces a Lezgin or a Lak…”18 In 1998 Murtazali Karachaev, sheikhentrepreneur and one of the leaders of the Kumyk nationalist movement, started to produce bottled mineral water and other nonalcohol beverages. 19 Recognizing that mineral water makes a great deal of money, the State Council Chair M. Magomedov practically proposed Karachaev to sell his company to the republic. Karachaev could not reject this proposal and M. Magomedov gave this “republican property” to his own son. In compensation, Magomedov fired the head (an Avar) of the public enterprise “Western Caspian Fishery” and gave this post to Murtazali’s younger brother, Nabiiulla (who was vice-mayor of Makhachkala, namely mayor Amirov’s then right hand man) in 1999. This post, in practice the minister of fisheries of Dagestan, is extremely profitable because of its connection with the caviar business. Officially earning only a few hundred US dollars a month, Nabiiulla is able to hire twelve armed bodyguards. Arriving at the post, Nabiiulla immediately de-Avarized the “Western Caspian Fishery” by firing tens of staff members. Enraged Avars surrounded the head office of this enterprise armed with machine guns, while Nabiiulla and his men entrenched themselves in the office, holding the same weapon. 20 For the final solution of this situation The last republican parliamentary elections based on national electoral districts were held in 2003. 18 Ware and Kisriev, “Political Stability,” p. 118. 19 Makhachkalinskie izvestiia, 7 August 1998, p. 7. 20 Nabiiulla Karachaev, interviewed by K. Matsuzato in Makhachkala on 25 February 2004. Nabiiulla’s elder brother, Sheikh Murtazali, said that “it would be wrong to see the problem from such a point of view, but the two events coincided chronologically” (interviewed by M.-R. Ibragimov in Makhachkala on 10 February 2005). 17

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M. Magomedov is proposing the Avar leaders a newly (artificially) created position of minister of public services. To sum up, the unexpected stability of Dagestan society is explained by (1) the coherence of territorial communities (jamaats), which neutralize conflicts at the republican level; (2) the nested structure of cleavages, which neutralizes a serious conflict around one issue by a different constellation of interests around another issue; (3) the tradition of ethno-confessional tolerance, which discourages “ethnic purity” of one or another political camp and encourages interethnic alliances; and (4) consociational arrangements, which console a loser with the anticipation that the loss will be compensated by a gain in another sphere and thus prevent him from resorting to arms. Further, we will examine these mechanisms of tolerance in the confessional and ethnic spheres.

SUFI BROTHERHOODS AND JAMAATS: CONFESSIONAL STABILIZERS IN DAGESTAN Remarkably, most harsh religious rivalry in post-communist Dagestan has taken place among Sunnites (as was shown by the confrontation between the Salafites and “traditional Islam” during the 1990s) or even within the Shafii school of Sunnites (that is, among tariqa brotherhoods), while relationship between Muslims, Christians, and Judaists, as well as between Sunnites and Shiites has traditionally been amicable. This situation distinguishes Dagestan from conflict-ridden regions in Middle East and South Asia. It is true that the rivalry between the “traditional (Sufi) Islam” and Salafites during the 1990s was liquidated in a compulsory (sometimes even coercive) manner. In Dagestan the so-called “Wahhabism” was made illegal by law after the military conflict in 1999, although Russian federal law does not prohibit it. However, the prohibition of “Wahhabism” in Dagestan was a result of a global geopolitical rivalry, which actually caused victims among citizens. Before the military conflict in 1999, traditionalists often criticized

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Dagestan’s secular authorities for their appeasement towards the Salafites.21 One reason why Dagestanis rejected the Chechen militants’ call for a jihad against the Russian authorities in 1999 was their deeply rooted self-image as pious Muslims. The Dagestani intelligentsia has often been irritated by the fact that Russian scholarship starts the description of the Christian and Islamic histories of Russia from the conversions of Kievan Rus’ and the Volga Bulgar respectively. As a matter of fact, Southern Dagestan accepted Christianity as early as the fourth century (under the influence of the Byzantine Empire) and Islam in the seventheighth centuries (because of the expansion of the Umayyad Caliphate), though it took almost eight centuries for Islam to penetrate Central and Mountain Dagestan. It was because of this early conversion that only Dagestan and Chechnia follow the Shafii school of law, while the other Muslim territories in the former USSR practice the Hanafi school. This fact is a source of pride for the Dagestani Muslims since it implies that the Dagestani peoples accepted Islam almost directly from the Prophet Muhammad, in contrast to the other Muslim peoples in the former USSR, who became acquainted with Islam through the Golden Horde or the Ottoman Empire (both sponsored the Hanafi school). Even within the same Shafii school, the history of Islam in Dagestan is much more ancient than that of Chechnia. In 1999, therefore, it was unconceivable for the Dagestanis to make a life-or-death decision dictated by Chechnia’s “superficial” Muslims. The rivalry within the traditional, Sufi Islam (among tariqa brotherhoods), no less harsh than that between the Salafites and traditionalists, has intensified only to the brink of bloodshed. In religious life in Dagestan, among the four conditions of “unstable stability” listed in the previous section three (autonomous jamaats, the nested structure of cleavages, and the discouragement of “ethnic purity”) have been secured. The only condition absent has been the consociational Dmitrii Makarov and Rafik Mukhametshin, “Official and unofficial Islam,” in Hilary Pilkington and Galina Yamelianova, eds., Islam in Post-Soviet Russia: Public and private faces (London, New York, 2003), pp. 145-149. The chairman of the Dagestan Government Committee on Religious Affairs, A. Magomedov, justifies his behavior during the critical period of 1998-99 by his consideration that “someone needed to contact them” to prevent them from becoming uncontrollable (interview by the authors, Makhachkala, 20 August 2003). 21

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arrangements of ethno-confessional interests, because of the DUMD’s penchant for monopoly under the hegemony of Said-Afandi Chirkeiskii’s brotherhood and Avar leaders. This behavior distinguishes the DUMD from that of the secular authorities of Dagestan under the brokering leadership of M. Magomedov. Nevertheless, Chirkeiskii’s DUMD has been restricted by certain rules of the game. Why has this restriction become possible? We will explain it by the interaction of three factors: (1) pluralism inevitably generated by the interactions amongst Sufi brotherhoods, (2) attempts made by Said-Afandi’s ruling brotherhood to renew the tradition of state Islam in Russia, and (3) the autonomy of jamaats. PLURALISM AMONGST SUFI BROTHERHOODS In Dagestan Sufi brotherhoods operate as if they were the substitutes of political parties, representing clientelist, ethnic, and local interests. This is not only because influential sheikhs in Dagestan, such as Said-Afandi Chirkeiskii (b. 1937), Magomed-Mukhtar Babatov (a leader of the Kumyk opposition to Chirkeiskii, b. 1954), Sirazhudin Ispafilov (the leader of the Southern opposition to Chirkeiskii, b. 1954), Arslanali Gamzatov (Chirkeiskii’s rare Kumyk disciple, b. 1956), Magomed-Gadzhi Gadzhiev (a Dargin sheikh allied with Kumyk leaders against Chirkeiskii, b. 1956), have several thousands murids (disciples) and thus objectively deserve to pretend to be leaders of “mass parties,” but also because the Islamic revival in extremely pious Dagestan generated an ideal type of Islamic politics based on the famous principle of indivisibility of social/material and spiritual life.22 Once spiritual life is indivisible from political life, ethnic, social, and local cleavages of the society cannot but be transferred into religious (but not necessarily theological or canonic) rivalry, the organizational basis of which in Dagestan is the Sufi brotherhoods. Remarkably, in this peculiar competition the judicious fear among actors of “ethnic purifying” (or ethnicizing multi-façade conflicts) In this sense, the Islamic revival in Dagestan has manifestly differed from that in the once completely secularized Tatarstan, where the problem of whether Islam should be placed at the center of social-political life or whether Islam is only a component of the regenerated Tatar identity has constantly been an issue of public and theological debate. 22

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continues to be effective. To our question why the religious oppositions had been so hesitant to struggle against Said-Afandi’s brotherhood, a visible leader of the Kumyk opposition, Il’ias Il’iasov responded: “Today there are many religious authorities of other nationalities who are able to rally around themselves a large number of their supporters. But they fear that, by this path, problems of inter-ethnic relations, land questions and others are resolved within the framework of ‘Saidism.’ Such a state of affairs does not contribute to the consolidation of inter-ethnic peace and stability in the republic.”23 On the other hand, in this pluralist competition, Chirkeiskii’s DUMD cannot but behave flexibly by differentiating its policies towards the uncompromising Kumyk opposition and the more compromising actors, such as the localist opposition of Southern Dagestan. In particular, the DUMD has gained a certain influence on Lezgins settling in the South. Moreover, the DUMD has maintained more or less cooperative relations with the secular authorities of Dagestan under the hegemony of the Dargin elites, renowned for their opportunist behavior. Last but not least, the DUMD has built a good relationship with the Nogais settling in the north of the republic, practicing the Hanafi school of law, and pretending to a territorial change to reunify the Nogai people, divided presently in three regions (see below). RENEWAL OF STATE ISLAMISM Said-Afandi Chirkeiskii’s religious hegemony in post-communist Dagestan has been consolidated, first, by the coercive liquidation of the legitimate DUMD and the creation of the pro-Avar DUMD in 1992 and, secondly, by the prohibition of alternative spiritual boards in 1997. The third stage of this consolidation was the “struggle against Wahhabism” after the military conflict in 1999. Under this pretext, the DUMD tried to professionalize Muslim higher education by the establishment of the North Caucasian Islamic University and to introduce an ecclesiastical hierarchy. All these attempts are targeted at gaining the secular authorities’ guarantee of Said-Afandi’s monopoly of religious resources. This strategy to make Islam state-protected is neither new nor unique. The DUMD is an example of spiritual boards of Muslims, which 23

Interviewed on 21 August 2003 in Makhachkala.

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have been historically practiced in Russia. After Catherine II, such an institution had managed the Muslims incorporated into the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. This institution was a semi-bureaucratic, monopolist channel between the state and the Muslims. The chief of this institution began to be called mufti, which in Arabic originally meant only the one who has the right to issue fatwa (judgments based on sharia). After the collapse of the Soviet Union this system diversified. On the one hand, Central Asian countries, Tatarstan, and the Northwest Caucasian republics of Russia continue to resort to or have renewed Catherine II’s principle of state Islamism. This state Islamism strives to have only one spiritual board in each country or federal constituent; and these spiritual boards are to be very obedient to the secular authorities. Moreover, in many of these countries and republics the spiritual boards, de facto or de jure, began to appoint local and even mosque imams. At the other extreme, in the Volga and Siberian regions of Russia (such as Bashkortostan, Perm’ and Orenburg Oblasts), spiritual boards split under the influence of the nationwide schism of umma between the traditional Central Spiritual Board, under the leadership of Talgat Tadzhudin, and nationalist/regionalist Muslim leaders (who created the Council of Muftis in Moscow in 1996). The fragmented spiritual boards were transmuted into a kind of voluntary association, which can be created, split, and abolished. Both approaches, divisions according to the state boundaries and pluralization, facilitated the increase of the number of spiritual boards. There were only four spiritual boards in the Soviet Union, and now “43 spiritual boards of Muslims” are operating in Russia alone.24 Struggles for hegemony over the DUMD might appear to demonstrate that Dagestan, having vacillated constantly between the single and plural principles of spiritual boards, seems to lie between the state Islamism and pluralist voluntarism. But this impression is not correct. The state Islamism and the endless split of spiritual boards are the two sides of the same coin; in these territories the “revival of Islam” was an artificial phenomenon initiated from above. The development Kaflan M. Khanbabaev, deputy chairman of the Dagestan Government Committee on Religious Affairs, interviewed by K. Matsuzato in Makhachkala City on 18 February 2004. 24

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of Islamic politics in Dagestan, which allowed neither overt state Islamism nor the emergence of an alternative Spiritual Board after the mid-1990s is an alternative model to the post-Soviet “revival of Islam.” AUTONOMY OF JAMAATS The Shafii school of law is characterized by its strict interpretation of sharia (divine law) in regard to the territorial solidarity of Muslims. According to this interpretation, only inevitable circumstances allow a settlement to build the second Friday mosque (in which all Muslims of the settlement are expected to gather at Friday prayers). This is allowed, for example, when the settlement has grown to the extent that it is impossible for one Friday mosque to seat all the Muslims in the settlement on Friday prayers, or when a bridge combining two parts of the settlement was destroyed by a flood. A Friday prayer conducted separately from the rest of the community without these legitimate reasons is regarded as not being acceptable to Allah.25 The Hanafi school, dominant in the other territories of the former USSR, shares this rule but interprets it very “flexibly.” The importance of jamaats for the Shafii school is testified by the fact that in the religious statistics in Dagestan Friday mosques are categorically distinguished from “quarter mosques,” while the similar statistics in the Volga-Ural region only boast of the total number of mosques without this distinction. The Dagestani religious authorities try to build gigantic Friday mosques in populous cities so that the Muslims of the city can actually enjoy the possibility to gather on each Friday, while, for example, the Friday mosque (Lya-lya Tiuripan) of Ufa City with a million people (more than half of whom are formally Muslims) does not respond to this request at all, despite its post-modernist, luxurious architecture. Likewise, the Islamic principle of the rejection of professional clergy is interpreted quite “flexibly” in the other Sunnite regions of the former USSR, where the clergy (receiving salaries from the state in Magomed-Mukhtar Babatov, a theological leader of the Kumyk opposition, and Mavludin Netifov, imam of the Belidzhi mosque, interviewed by the authors in Kakhlai Town, Makhachkala (23 February 2004) and Belidzhi Town, Derbent Raion (26 February 2004) respectively. Shamil Shikhaliev, a former expert of the Dagestan Government Committee on Religious Affairs, interviewed by M.-R. Ibragimov in Makhachkala (31 December 2004). 25

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various hidden forms) has transformed itself into something like a subdivision in charge of ideology of the presidential or executive organ of power. In Dagestan the non-professional principle of Muslim leaders is still viable. In the other post-Soviet Sunnite regions mosques have often been built by donors (“businessmen”) and the state, with the result that mosques are rarely connected with communities. In contrast, in Dagestan it is the jamaats that build and manage mosques and pay salaries to imams. This is why in Dagestan religious elites at the republican level, both the DUMD and the opposition, are unable to control religious communities in terms of cadre policy; they must respect the imams elected by the communities or recommend candidates for imams who are attractive to the communities. Our fieldwork identified only several examples of the construction of the “second Friday mosques” by the DUMD – a measure the DUMD resorts to when it is not able to establish hegemony over a community.26 Even these few cases provoked furious protest of the opposition. On the other hand, there are cases in which the DUMD attempted to appoint its own candidate to the imam position in a community but failed because of the community’s rejection (Belidzhi Town of Derbent Raion), while an imam in an apparently anti-DUMD community became a sympathizer of the DUMD because of the latter’s daily assistance to his services (Kullar Village of the same raion). Moreover, our fieldwork demonstrated that an almost ideal example of the realization of the triad of the domination of Said-Afandi, Avar, and DUMD in the mountainous Untsukul’skii Raion did not imply the sterile bureaucratization of religious life, but rather it revealed lively community activities and the presence of religious leaders enjoying genuine public respect. The strength of territorial religious communities in Dagestan has generated a paradoxical situation: on the one hand, Said-Afandi, thirteen years after obtaining his hegemony over the DUMD, has barely been able to extend his influence over the border of Avar, Dargin, and Nogai raions. On the other hand, however, the DUMD has been able to penetrate communities of oppositional raions, if it recommends an attractive candidate for imam or builds good relations with the imam elected by the community. The same is true for the opposition. 26

The most serious case of these took place in Derbent City. See our “Islamic politics…”

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DAGESTAN AS THE LAST TEST SITE OF ETHNO-TERRITORIAL FEDERALISM The Dagestani population has been composed of three linguistic families. One is the Nakh-Dagestan branch of the North Caucasian family (we will call them “North Caucasians” for simplification). The branch of North Caucasians includes Avars (who compose 29 percent of the total population of the republic), Dargins (16.5 percent), Lezgins (13 percent), and Laks, Tabasarans, and Chechens (approximately 4 – 5 percent each). The second linguistic family is the Turkic-speaking groups of the Altaic language family, who are represented in Dagestan by the Kumyks – 14.2 percent, Azerbaijanis – 4.3 percent, Nogais – 1.5 percent, and Tatars – 0.2 percent. The third, Indo-European, family is represented by the Russians (4.7 percent) and other small populations of Ukrainians, Mountain Jews (or Tats), and Armenians. From the ethno-political point of view, the political system functioning in Dagestan before Putin’s centralizing reform might be called “ethno-territorial federalism with some elements of consociationalism.” It is true that Dagestan was (and continues to be) one of the only two republics in the USSR which are named after the place but not the titular nation(s).27 However, this fact does not imply that Dagestan was an exception of ethno-territorial federalism established by V. I. Lenin and later popularized among socialist countries.28 As is well-known, there have been two approaches to resolve the problems of national minorities. One is the attempt to promote the members of the minority in education and careers individually, without territorial autonomy. The Austrian Marxists’ request for cultural autonomy belonged to this category and most of the contemporary ethnic affirmative actions in North America and Western Europe target individuals, not territorial communities. The other group, Lenin above all, argued that individual affirmative actions Another example is Crimea, the titular nation of which is Crimean Tatars. As already mentioned, the Gorskaia ASSR could have become the third example, but it existed too briefly. 28 A number of scholars confuse the numerousness of titular nations with the lack of titular nations. See E. F. Kisriev, Islam i vlast’ v Dagestane (Moscow, 2004), p. 45; Aleksandr Kynev, “Izbiratel’naia reforma v Dagestane” (October 2003; http://intellectuals.ru/ cgi-bin/proekt/kynev/kynev.cgi?action=articul&statya=viewstat&id=id26). 27

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without territorial independence (or autonomy) would remain fictive. Ethno-territorial federalism generated a peculiar concept of titular nations, the members of which were to be privileged in education and promoted in “their” territory. Dagestan was named after the place simply because it contains too many titular (state-forming) ethnicities, of which 14 ethnicities are classified today. Dagestan is not an exception of ethno-territorial federalism but rather its extreme example; in this republic the most radical experiment in ethno-territorial federalism, the indigenization policy (korenizatsiia) of the 1920s, has practically continued to this day. During the 1920s the concept of titular nations was adopted not only for union and autonomous republics, but also for raions and villages. For example, there were many Polish raions and villages in Ukraine during the 1920s, where the official documentation was in Ukrainian and Polish. This costly policy was abandoned by the end of 1920s, but in Dagestan the indigenization policy continues to function in order to handle its ethnic mosaic-ness.29 Today, Dagestan’s “ethno-territorial federalism with some elements of consociationalism” faces serious challenges, not only because (as mentioned above) Putin’s centralizing reform liquidated the consociational elements, but also because ethno-politics in postcommunist Dagestan actually revealed the limits of this approach. We will examine this situation through the issues of (1) Mountain Caucasians’ immigration to lowland Dagestan, (2) divided nations and attempts to create mono-ethnic republics, (3) representation of extremely small nations, and (4) inequality between the “repressed peoples” and “compulsorily migrated peoples.” MOUNTAIN CAUCASIANS’ IMMIGRATION TO LOWLAND D AGESTAN Before 1917, the North Caucasians settled in the mountainous parts of Dagestan, while Turkic-speaking and Indo-European peoples lived in the foothills and plains. The policy of shifting highlander Caucasians to the plain lands, which was continuously pursued by the Soviet authorities from the 1920s to 1970s, has shaped the present interethnic For example, raion newspapers in Dagestan are published in the languages of the ethnicities dominant in the raion. 29

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relations in Dagestan. During these years about 300,000 Mountain Caucasians migrated to the plains. For them 76 new settlements and more than 100 collective and state farms were organized. The Soviet authorities in Dagestan (dominated by Avars and Dargins after the 1930s) tried to resolve the problem of land shortage in mountainous areas at the expense of lowlanders’ interest. After the reform of land and water use in 1927-1934, stockbreeding collective farms in mountain areas obtained the right to use land on the plains for winter pasturage. For 280 stockbreeding collectives in 21 mountain raions 1.5 million hectors of arable land on the plains were secured.30 As time passed, the mountaineers began to live there. After the Chechens were deported in 1944, the Soviet authorities made Mountain Caucasians in Dagestan migrate to part of Chechnia’s territory. After the Chechens were rehabilitated and returned to their homeland to renew the Chechnia-Ingush ASSR, the Soviet authorities made these mountaineers migrate to Kumyk lands, not to their former territories. During the 1960s viticulture began to develop in Dagestan, the labor force for which was partly provided from mountainous areas. The catastrophic earthquakes in 1966 and 1970 accelerated the massive migration of mountaineers to the plains. As a result, lowlanders (Kumyks, Nogais, Russians, the Terek Cossacks settling in Kizliarskii Raion, and Azerbaijanis settling in Derbent city and raion) have been deprived of a significant part of their land and mono-ethnic environment. They have become the “minorities in what had been their own ethnic territories from time immemorial.”31 This situation is particularly humiliating for Kumyks and Azerbaijanis, because they continue to regard themselves as “more civilized” than highlander Caucasians. Until the 1920s, the Kumyk and Azerbaijani languages were lingua franca for Central and Southern Dagestan A. I. Osmanov, Agrarnye preobrazovaniia v Dagestane i pereselenie gortsev na ravninu (20-70-e gody XX v.) (Makhachkala, 2000), p. 95, passim. 31 A. I. Osmanov, A. C. Gadzhiev, G. A. Iskenderov, Iz istorii pereselencheskogo dvizheniya i resheniya agrarnogo voprosa v Dagestane (Makhachkala, 1994), p. 26. On the ethnodemographic situation in Dagestan see Magomed-Rasul A. Ibragimov, “Naselenie (etnodemograficheskii obzor),” S. A. Arutiunov et al., Narody Dagestana (Moscow, 2002), pp. 36-49; Enver Kisriev, Respublika Dagestan: Model’ etnologicheskogo monitoringa (Moscow, 1999), pp. 19-23. 30

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respectively (Azerbaijani, to a significant extent, continues to be so for the South even now). As might be expected, there are a number of anecdotes among Kumyks making fun of the provincial behavior of Avars and Dargins. The same situation can be found in Southern Dagestan. Azerbaijanis in Derbent City are anxious about the massive immigration of Lezgins and Tabasarans during the last few decades, significantly “Sunni-fying” this city, which has an ancient tradition of Shiism. Aleksandr Kynev argues that the mountaineers’ migration to the lowlands have, in fact, enhanced inter-ethnic coexistence, since it changed the geographic distribution of ethnicities in Dagestan from the previous “patchwork-type” to the present “network-type;” major cities in Dagestan have become multi-ethnic.32 But Kynev ignores the fact that this process was asymmetrical: while the tradition of “title nations” at the subregional levels was destroyed for lowlanders, mountaineers continue to enjoy it. The lowlanders have become unable to make their ethnic representatives win the mayoral elections in “their” cities and raions. This situation led the representatives of the lowlanders to propose to institutionalize de jure the system of “title nations” at subregional levels, but this proposal contradicts federal law completely and will hardly persuade Putin. PROBLEMS OF D IVIDED NATIONS AND ATTEMPTS TO CREATE MONO-ETHNIC REPUBLICS The nationalist movements in Dagestan during 1990-1992 were characterized by a tendency to demand that Dagestan as a multiethnic republic be dismantled in order to create mono-ethnic republics, such as Avarstan (combining the Avar territories of Dagestan and Chechnia; Avars are ethnically close to Chechens), Kumykstan (covering lowland Dagestan), and Lezgistan (covering Southern Dagestan and part of Kynev, op. cit. For example, Makhachkala is composed of all ethnicities of Dagestan; Khasaviurt is composed of Kumyks, Chechens, Avars, Chechens, and Lacks; Buinaksk located in Central Dagestan are settled by Kumyks and Avars; Izberbash by the Caspian Sea – by Kumyks and Dargins; Derbent in Southern Dagestan is settled by Azerbaijans, Lezgins, and Tabasarans; and Kizliar in Northern Dagestan is settled by Russians, Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, and Nogais. 32

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northern Azerbaijan). Though this tendency has lost its acuteness and violent characteristics, the problem of “divided nations” continues to be a convenient card for politicians to play. For example, the Lezgins’ movement to request their own autonomous republic existed already in the late Perestroika period, as was represented by the Lezgin organization, “Sadval” (meaning “unity,” established in 1989). But the collapse of the Soviet Union made this movement much more radical, because the Lezgins then became a nation divided by Samur River (which borders Russia and Azerbaijan). Friends, neighbors and relatives abruptly became “foreigners.”33 However, since 1998, the Lezgins’ movement became more parliamentarian, targeted at gaining deputy seats at the federal and republican levels. The present leader of “Sadval,” R. Ashuraliev, emphasizes not the creation of territorial autonomy, but the cultural and economic development of Lezgin raions. This moderate position made the Lezgin movement split and the radical part allies with the nationwide Lezgin organization named the Federal Lezgin National-Cultural Autonomy. This organization is mainly composed of the Lezgins living outside Dagestan (mainly Moscow) and tries to influence the Lezgins in the Azerbaijan territory. In northern Dagestan (Kizliar City and Raion, Tarumovslii Raion), which has traditionally been ethnic Russians’ territory, Russians have become the minority because of their massive emigration since 1991 and the continuing immigration of Mountain Caucasians. In this territory the Kizliar Okrug (Division) of the Terek Cossack Army functions. This Cossack organization was admitted as a border defense force by the Russian government in 2000. Allied with the most radical part of the Russian Cossack movement of Stavropol’ Krai and based on the Russian Federal law on the rehabilitation of repressed nations, the Kizliar Cossacks requested the re-establishment of the Terek (Cossack) Oblast, which had existed until 1922. Another part of Cossacks and the Russian population demand the transfer of the northern Dagestan to Stavropol’ 33 Respublika Dagestan: sovremennye problemy natsional’nykh otnoshenii. V dokumentakh Verkhovnogo Soveta, Soveta Ministrov i obshchestvennykh ob”edinenii (Makhachkala, 1992), p. 197; A. G. Agaev, Kontseptsiia natsional’nogo razvitiia lezginskogo naroda (Makhachkala, 19 94); M. R. Kurba nov , G.I. Iusupova, Lezginy: pro blemy razd elenno go naro da (Makhachkala, 1996), pp. 25-26.

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Krai. Somewhat strangely, the Kizliar Cossack movement has common interests with Nogais (settling in the same northern Dagestan) since both of them request a territorial change in the northern Dagestan. The territory in which Nogais settle were divided into three parts, Dagestan, Stavropol’ Krai and Chechnia, by the decree of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on January 9, 1957, which reestablished the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic. 34 The Nogais’ national movement, “Birlik” (“Unity”), calls for the cancellation of this decree in order to reunify the Nogai territory and create a new constituent of the Russian Federation, though “Birlik” also pursues a more moderate policy of cultural autonomy without territorial change. The examples referred to here reveal the “traditionalism” of various Dagestani nationalists’ discourse. They construct their policy within the classic framework of national policies such as ethno-territorial federalism (more radical) and cultural autonomy (more moderate). On the other hand, the issue of divided nations demonstrates the nested structure of the constellation of ethno-confessional interests in Dagestan. For example, the Kizliar (Terek) Cossacks and Nogais, uncompromising foes historically, have become allies requesting territorial changes in northern Dagestan. REPRESENTATION OF EXTREMELY SMALL NATIONS In April 1999, after protracted discussions the Russian parliament adopted a Law “on the Guarantees of Rights of Native Small Nations in the Russian Federation.”35 Article One of this law prescribes that “Considering the uniqueness of the ethnic composition of the population of the Republic of Dagestan, in terms of the number of the nations settling in the territory, the State Council of the Republic of Dagestan determines the numbers and other specifics of the native small nations and also compiles the list of these nations to be included into the United List of the Native Small Nations of the Russian Federation.” Thus, the Dagestan Tsentral’nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Respubliki Dagestan, f. 22, op. 39, d. 88, l. 5; A. Kazanbiev, Sozdanie i ukreplenie natsional’noi gosudarstvennosti narodov Dagestana (Makhachkala, 1970), p. 364. 35 Federal’nyi zakon “O garantiiakh prav korennykh malochislennykh narodov RF” promulgated on 30 April 1999. 34

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leadership unexpectedly obtained the right to define which of the nations of Dagestan should and should not be included in the United List of the Native Small Nations. The present Dagestan constitution admits only four “small nations”: Aguls, Mountain Jews, Rutuls, and Tsakhurs. This is explained by the fact that small ethnicities in Dagestan, since the end of the 1930s, have been merged into more numerous ones. For example, fourteen smaller ethnicities (such as Andis, Archis, Akhvakhs, Bagulals) began to be classified as Avars. Likewise, Kaitaks and Kubachis have been classified as Dargins. In other words, the existence of these small ethnicities was denied in both legal and statistical senses. These policies of Avarization and Darginization were conducted to consolidate the hegemony of these two largest mountaineer nations over the republic’s party and government organs. It is necessary to remark that a fundamental prerequisite for the normal functioning of ethno-territorial federalism in the Soviet Union was the Communist Party’s monopoly on the right to determine ethnic categories.36 Moreover, the right of these ethnicities, for example, to be educated in their native language, depends on whether they have territorial autonomy and titular (state-forming) status. The ethnic minorities forcibly merged into the larger ethnicities continued to preserve their ethnic consciousness, which quickly came to the fore after Perestroika. Today, some representatives of these ethnicities want to restore their previously independent ethnic status and representation in the State Council. Unsurprisingly, the promulgation of the aforementioned Russian Federal Law on “the Guarantees of Rights of Native Small Nations” intensified their claims to obtain the status recognized by the state. For example, Andis, who established the National Council of Andis in May 1998, intensified their activities after the military conflict in August-September 1999, in which Andis fought heroically and were officially praised by the republican authorities. In April 2000, Andi activists organized a “convention of the assemblies of villages settled by Andis,” in which they requested to On a similar situation in the Volga Region, in which Teptiary and Mishary lost their status as ethnicities during the 1920s, see Dmitry Gorenburg, “Identity Change in Bashkortostan: Tatars into Bashkirs and Back,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 22: 3 (1999). 36

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create an Andis’ town in the territory of Khasaviurt City and to recognize them as a nation equal with the other nations in Dagestan. INEQUALITY BETWEEN THE “REPRESSED PEOPLES” “COMPULSORILY RESETTLED PEOPLES”

AND

The rehabilitation of the nations repressed during the 1940s seemed a proof of democracy during the Perestroika period. But this measure ignored the rights of the populations compulsorily resettled to fill the vacant territories that had belonged to the deported nations. As a result, the authorities began to request that the compulsorily resettled peoples leave the territories, in which they had lived for more than half century, to the former inhabitants, i.e. the “repressed peoples,” without guaranteeing new settlements to the former. In Dagestan, this paradoxical situation took place between Chechens and Laks. In 1943, the southeastern part of Khasaviurtovskii Raion (bordering Chechnia) was divided in order to create Aukhovskii Raion, the titular nation of which was Chechens-Akkins. However, at the beginning of the next year they were deported to Central Asia and the most of the vacant territory was filled by Laks, who formed Novolakskii Raion, while two large villages in the territory were settled by Avars and passed to the neighboring (Avar) Kazbekovskii Raion. On April 26, 1991, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet adopted the Law on “the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples.” Responding to this law, as early as July 23, 1991, the Third Convention of People’s Deputies of Dagestan decided to recreate Aukhovskii Raion within five years (by 1996) by making the Laks living there move to the plains, in particular to Kumyk territories,37 which unsurprisingly provoked strong protests from the Kumyks. 38 However, this decision was not realized for financial reasons; it was not easy to build houses and other social infrastructure for the fifteen thousand Laks. Moreover, the military conflict in 1999 changed the Laks’ attitude towards this issue. Having Respublika Dag estan: So vremennye problem y...; Dag estan: ch ech entsy-akk intsy (Makhachkala, 1993), pp. 99-102; Chechentsy-akkintsy Dagestana: k probleme reabilitatsii (Makhachkala, 1993), pp. 30-42. 38 Dagestan: kumykskii etnos (Moscow, 1993), pp. 36-42. 37

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defended the Novolakskii Raion from the Chechens’ invasion at the cost of their lives, they no longer wish to abandon it. On the other hand, Chechens-Akkins not only protest against the delay in realizing the decision of the Convention of People’s Deputies in 1991, but also demand a complete “territorial rehabilitation,” requesting two villages of the neighboring Kazbekovskii Raion, which belonged to the Aukhovskii Raion in 1943-44 but now are settled by Avars. This demand provoked serious conflicts between Chechens and Avars during the first half of the 1990s. Recognizing the unequal treatment of repressed and compulsorily migrated nations, the Dagestan Ministry of National Policies, Information and International Relations prepared two bills “on Rehabilitation of Repressed Chechens-Akkins of Dagestan and the State Support for Their Revival and Development” and “on Compulsorily Resettled Peoples” for the consideration of the Russian State Duma; both of them have not been discussed in the Duma.39 The four issues analyzed here (Mountain Caucasians’ migration to lowland Dagestan, divided nations, extremely small nations, and inequality between the “repressed peoples” and “compulsorily resettled peoples”) reveal how strongly Dagestani peoples have been ruled by ethno-territorial discourse and thinking. All of these actors, Lowlanders who have become minorities “in their historical territories,” divided nations, extremely small nations, repressed nations, and compulsorily resettled nations, demand their own territories and titular (state-forming) status, rather than individual affirmative action. This way of thinking not always facilitated the reasonable resolution of nationality problems in Dagestan. But we need to recognize that the four conditions of “unstable stability” of Dagestani ethnopolitics (autonomous communities, the nested structure of cleavages, the discouragement of “ethnic purity,” and consociational arrangements of ethnic interests) have been secured within the framework of ethno-territorial federalism.

N. T. Shcherbakova, head of the department of national policies of the Dagestan Ministry of National Policies, Information and International Relations, interviewed by M.-R. Ibragimov in Makhachkala on 12 May 2004. 39

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CONCLUSION This essay revealed that the present “unstable stability” in Dagestan is the product of a time-honored tradition of multi-ethnic and multi-confessional coexistence, which was supplemented by institutional arrangements of Catherine II’s Muslim Spiritual Board and V. Lenin’s ethno-territorial federalism, however problematic those policies have otherwise been. We might find an important centripetal force of Slavic Eurasia in this combination of local tradition of tolerance and Russian-Soviet innovations; we may also uncover the reason why the Dagestani people eventually rejected the Middle Eastern model of ethno-confessional development, which lacks effective mechanisms for preserving inter-ethnic and inter-confessional peace.

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PART IV BOOMING RUSSIAN IMPERIOLOGY AND THE CONCEPTS OF MESO- AND MEGA-AREAS

12 BETWEEN IMPERIAL TEMPTATION AND ANTI-IMPERIAL FUNCTION IN EASTERN EUROPEAN POLITICS: POLAND FROM THE EIGHTEENTH TO TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ANDRZEJ NOWAK WAS THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH AN EMPIRE? There are two questions: how to analyse effectively the political structure and function of a vast Eastern European realm named through centuries the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and what it should properly be called? “Imperiological” studies, rapidly growing in the past two decades, form an original context in which a new answer to this perennial historical question seems possible: the Commonwealth was an empire. In fact, this name has been already given to the Polish-Lithuanian state, rather intuitively however, and in a not very convincing manner, in a few recent studies. “It is not customary to speak of a Polish empire, [...] but I do not see why the Swedes, with a Grand Duchy of Finland and other possessions in northern Germany, had an empire while the Poles did not” – based solely on this statement, a Harvard historian of Eastern European geopolitics, John P. LeDonne, posits a Polish empire on a par not only with the seventeenth century Swedish state, but with the Russian Empire of Peter the Great and his successors as well. Another American scholar, a political scientist, Ilya Prizel, stresses similarities between the Russian and Polish empires – as he calls them – due to their multinational structure and their supra-national elites. 1 John P. LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World 1700-1917. The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment (New York, Oxford, 1997), p. 371; Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy. Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine (Cambridge, 1998), p. 3. 1

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The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had several of the characteristics of an empire, such as territorial greatness or at least extension beyond ethnic borders, multinationality, and formation of a supra-national elite. These features fit the reality of the state that evolved from the so-called Polish Crown lands between the late fourteenth century and 1569 (the year of the Lublin Union with Lithuania) and lasted till the partitions at the end of the eighteenth century. One might quote just the very beginning of the Polish king’s list of titles from the year of the Lublin union: “King of Poland, Grand Duke of Lithuania, Lord and Heir of Ruthenia, Prussia, Mazovia, Samogitia, etc.” (Król Polski, Wielki Książę Litewski, Ruski, Pruski, Mazowiecki, Żmudzki, itd., Pan i Dziedzic). It is worth remembering too that the territory of this state was close to one million square kilometers at that time. But are these characteristics enough to confirm that this state was an empire? There was of course no single Polish emperor. “The Commonwealth was Europe’s largest early modern realm, governed by early modern Europe’s largest citizenry, the noble nation,” as its historian from Yale University, Timothy Snyder, aptly observes.2 In the political structure of this specific republic as was created after the Lublin union and the end of the Jagiellonian dynasty, the nobility could be portrayed as a candidate for a collective emperor. However this ruling, multiethnic elite had no geographical center. It would be very difficult to confirm any systematic form of centralizing policy or of unequal economic exchange between some imagined Polish political center (be it Warsaw or Cracow), and non-Polish peripheries. The power and wealth of a Ruthenian magnate (like Wiśniowiecki) or a Lithuanian one (like Radziwiłł), sitting in their manors beyond the Dnieper or Dvina, were in many cases greater than anything the elected king in his palace in Warsaw had at his disposal. Political domination of a center over peripheries, centralizing practices of the former, and a systematic unequal flow of goods between center and peripheries – is any empire possible without these characteristics? Most modern definitions would disagree.3 Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999 (New Haven, London, 2003), p. 210. 3 To find the most elaborated definitions see, for example, Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, 1986); Alexander J. Motyl, Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (New York, 2001).

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There was, however, another factor in the Commonwealth’s cultural and political fabric that could be – and is – employed as a key argument in the debate over its imperial character. It was the bloodless triumph of the Polish vernacular in the late sixteen century over its potential rivals, such as Latin, old Church Slavonic (and vernacular Ruthenian), as the language of politics, law, and culture. Polish became thus a common high language of multiethnic elites. “Though I myself was born Lithuanian and a Lithuanian I shall die, in our country (that is as citizens of the Commonwealth – A.N.) we have to use the Polish language,” wrote the richest Lithuanian magnate, Prince Janusz Radziwi, to his brother Krzysztof at the beginning of the seventeenth century. In the middle of that century even the Cossack elites that led the uprising against the Polish gentry used Polish as their language of command and of negotiations with the Commonwealth. They did not understand – it is worth stressing – the Muscovite dialect at that time, so that Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi had letters in this dialect translated into Latin, just to be able to read them.4 So if every empire is about power and conquest, this cultural “c onq uest” could most d efinit ely be mentioned in t he Commonwealth’s case. However, it was not a forced one, but the result of a more spontaneous, natural attraction to the best means of communication with the broader, European culture. 5 Polish was the language to assimilate the surrounding population not only to the great innovations and small pleasures of Western European postRenaissance thought, but also to a specific republican culture of the Polish gentry liberties, their extensive constitutional protection against arbitrary actions of the king. It became the language to assimilate the surrounding population to the specific laws, customs and institutions. If, as in many definitions, a general form of ideology or a shared See: Stanisław Kot, “Świa domość narodowa w Polsce w XV-XVII w.,” Kwa rtalnik Historyczny 52 (1938), pp. 15-33; O. Pritsak, J. Reshetar, “Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building,” Slavic Review 22:2 (1963), pp. 224-255. 5 It is, again, worth remembering that in the seventeenth century only seven books of purely secular content were printed in the Russian state, as contrasted with thousands of book s a nd brochu res on secu la r su bjects circula ting in tha t centu ry in the Polish Commonwealth – printed in Polish of course. See S.P. Luppov, Kniga v Rossii v XVII veke (Leningrad, 1970), p. 29.

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political belief – with at least potentially universal appeal6 – is another necessary precondition for the foundation of any empire, then the Commonwealth acquired one. Through its constant battle against the incursions of the Ottoman empire into Europe, the Commonwealth gained its identity as a defender of Christianity. Through the success of assimilation of the most of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania elites to it s republic an culture in it s Polish language package, t he Commonwealth acquired its identity as a distinct civilization of free citizens – opposed to and contrasted mostly with the Muscovite or the Ottoman despotism. The “Sarmatian” myth of the common descent of all the Commonwealth’s gentry formed a popular basis for the very original ideology of this unique state. It was founded on the belief that this was the promised land of a free people -– the brave and independent “Sarmatians.” One of the most original and prolific political writers of the sixteenth century, Stanisław Orzechowski, who coined the phrase “gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus” (ethnically Ruthenian and politically Polish) as the two-layered definition of his identity, expressed that belief in the following, rhetorical question: “Could Poland have conquered the ancient and more numerous peoples, such as the Rus’, otherwise than by these liberties?”7 One and a half centuries later, another ideologue of the “Sarmatians“ perfect civilization, a Jesuit, Walenty Pęski, wrote even more forcefully: “In freedom lies Poland’s strength. [...] We do not live in a foreign way, nor as Frenchmen, nor as Germans do, but in our own native Polish way. What is more, it is rather not a human but a heavenly way of life. The words Polus (heaven in Latin – A.N.) and Polonus are very close [...] and this results in forms of existence. [...] We do not blame foreign ways of life, they are good for foreigners but not for Poles, because they would harm our freedom, which is the most precious and pleasant thing for us.”8 See the especia lly revealing discussion of these aspects of “imperial definitions” in Sviatoslav Kaspe, Imperiia i modernizatsiia. Obshchaia model’ i rossiiskaia spetsifika (Moscow, 2001), pp. 19-84. 7 Stanisław Orzechowski, Wybór pism, oprac. J. Starnawski (Wrocław, 1972), pp. 99-114. 8 Cited after: Jerzy Michalski, “Sarmatyzm a europeizacja Polski w XVIII wieku,” Zofia Stefanowska, ed., Swojskość i cudzoziemszczyzna w dziejach kultury polskiej (Warsaw, 1973), p. 115. 6

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The rudiments of the identity shared by the Commonwealth’s rulers (nobility), quoted above, show two different aspects of its influence on future generations of Polish elites looking for their – and their country’s – identity after the collapse of the state. A remembrance of the relative success of the Polish language as the means of communication of the Western (or rather Southern) European culture to the eastern/northern part of the continent in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century would inspire the belief that Poland could be again the gateway for European influences among Eastern Slavs, their elder sister in civilizational development. In this case Poland would be a very active part of the periphery of a Western European center. In another variant, relating to a perceived function of the Commonwealth as the bulwark of Christian Europe against Islam or the “schismatics,” a reborn “Polish empire” could play a passive role on the European periphery: that of the wall against the barbarians.9 On the other hand, however, there was a firm belief that the Commonwealth had constituted the best political order in the world, giving more freedom and rights to its citizens not only than the eastern despotisms of Muscovy or the Ottoman Empire, but also more than the absolute monarchies of Western Europe. The idealized model of the lost world of “Sarmatians” could thus become an inspiration to a vision of Poland as not a periphery of anything but as an independent center in its own right: a unique civilization of republican liberty and self-government. Its natural realm was coextensive with the Commonwealth’s borders. This was a specific meso-arean perception of the Polish place in the center, or rather in between two or more alien civilizations: Moscow’s despotism, Turkish Islam and Western European bureaucratic absolutisms. As we may observe, not only in the opinion of an eighteenth century Jesuit, quoted above, but also in hundreds of other documents of the “Sarmatian” thought, the self-perception of this specific civilization was concentrated on its own perfection rather than on any idea of expansion. This was a kind of Utopia realized, as most of its citizens believed. In order to make any Utopia stable, it is advisable however to keep it on an island. Unfortunately, the Commonwealth was not an island. It was placed in the middle of a geopolitical Janusz Tazbir, “Przedmurze jako miejsce Polski w Europie,” J. Tazbir, Rzeczpospolita i świat (Wrocław, 1971), pp. 63-78.

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whirlwind, among real empires. So it has been rather difficult to stay passive and self-satisfied in this place of the continent. The temptation to influence, to actively change the surrounding societies and states was quite evident in this case. The question was in what direction, and by what means? Occupying the borderlands between the Latin West and the Greek East, most of the Commonwealth’s citizens recognized the roots of their political identity in the former – either in a Roman-Catholic or in an ancient Roman-republican version. So the further transfer of the values connected to this identity could lead only to the North/East – as had already been the case with the assimilation of Lithuania to the Polish nobility’s political culture. Could it lead further – to Muscovy? In the beginning of the seventeenth century a part of the Commonwealth’s elites tried to answer this question in the affirmative – with the only clear example of imperial expansion of this state: the so-called Polish intervention during the Russian Times of Troubles.10 Some of the Jesuit thinkers who so strongly influenced the Commonwealth’s Counter-reformation movement spurred the expansionist spirit of the Polish nobility: “We do not need the East and West Indies. Lithuania and the North (that is the eastern orthodox Muscovy – A.N.) are a true India,” father Piotr Skarga wrote in that time. Another ideologue of the Polish intervention in “the North” – Paweł Palczowski – used this comparison again to describe truly colonial perspectives for the Commonwealth’s expansion: Muscovy was to PolandLithuania as the West Indies were to Spain and Portugal, as the object of a Christian and civilizing mission as well as a land of huge resources.11 For the best a nd the most bala nced account of this problem (and the place of the Polish intervention in it) see Chester S. L. Dunning, Russia’s First Civil War. The Time of Troubles and the Founding of the Romanov Dynasty (University Park: Penn, 2001). See also Wojciech Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę. Polityka Rzeczypospolitej wobec Moskwy w latac h 1 60 7-16 12 (Toruń, 1 99 5), a s well as the older stu dy of Jarema Ma ciszewsk i, Po lska a Mo sk wa 16 03 -16 18 . Opinie i sta no wiska szla ch ty po lskiej (Wa rsaw, 1968 ), which shows the relative u npopularity of the interventionist policy among the majority of the Commonwealth’s nobles. 11 Ks. Piotr Skarga, Listy, ed. by J. Sygański (Kraków, 1912), p. 55; Paweł Palczowski, Kolęda moskiewska to jest wojny Moskiewskiej przyczyny słuszne (Kraków, 1609); both quotations are discussed very interestingly by David A. Frick, “Lazar Baranovych, 1680: The Union of Lech and Rus,” Andreas Kappeler, Zenon Kohut, Frank E. Sysyn, Mark von Hagen, eds., Culture, Nation, and Identity. The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter (16001945) (Edmonton, Toronto, 2003), pp. 34-36. 10

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The Polish occupation of the Moscow’s Kremlin as a consequence of this “mission,” however fateful for future Polish-Russian relations, was an isolated episode in the attitude of the Commonwealth’s elites’ attitude towards the means of influencing its eastern Slavic neighbor. The idea of extending the peaceful experiment of co-opting the Lithuanian Grand Duchy boyars to the Polish gentry’s privileges and freedom and of repeating this process with all of Russian tsardom’s elites was an older and more popular tradition in this respect. This idea had been launched seriously for the first time when the Polish throne fell vacant after the death of the last Jagiellon in 1572. Ivan the Terrible was presented then as a serious candidate – on condition that the whole fabric of the structures and mores of his own state would be opened to the Commonwealth’s political culture. In 1600, the great ambassadorial mission of the Lithuanian chancellor Lev Sapieha to Moscow presented to Boris Godunov an elaborated idea of a union between the PolishLithuanian and the Muscovite states. The subjects of both rulers were to be free to serve the other ruler, travel to his country, contract marriages with the other ruler’s subjects, own land and go to study in the other ruler’s country.12 I do not intend to go into details of this seemingly extravagant idea, repeated several times in different versions during the seventeenth century. It is enough here to stress its exponents’ belief in the attractive power of the Commonwealth’s political model at least for the whole Eastern Slavic world: “ut in perpetuum respublica Polona cum Domino Moschorum sit una respublica in aevum.”13 To transform the Russian tsardom into a republic modeled on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – such were the most ambitious prospects (and the limits) of the “Sarmatian” ideological “imperialism” in the East. See: Wiktor Weintraub, “Ivan the Terrible as the Gentry’s Candidate for the Polish Throne: A Study in Political Mentality,” Cross Currents, Vol. 1 (1982), pp. 45-54; Boris Floria, Russko-pol’skie otnoshenia i politicheskoe razvitie Vostochnoi Evropy vo vtoroi polovine XVI – nachale XVII v. (Moscow, 1978); Alexander Yanov, The Origins of Autocracy: Ivan the Terrible in Russian History (Berkeley, 1981); Andrzej Nowak, “Russo-Polish Historical Confrontation,” The Sarmatian Review 28:1 (January 1997), pp. 432-442. 13 Quotation from a letter by a Polish negotiator of the truce with Russia in Niemiża, dated 25 September 1656 – after: Hans-Joachim Torke, “Moscow and Its West: on the “Ruthenization” of Russian Culture in the Seventeenth Century,” Kappeler et al., eds., Culture, Nation, and Identity, p. 107. 12

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THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: A MENTAL TRANSFER OF THE COMMONWEALTH TO A EUROPEAN PERIPHERY By the middle of the seventeenth century the Polish-Lithuanian state had stumbled on the Ukrainian (Cossack) problem and lost its strategic contest with the Russian tsardom. At the beginning of the next century, Russia under the leadership of Peter the Great became not only a great European power, but it was officially declared an empire, while the massive intervention of the Russians and the constant presence of their troops in the Commonwealth’s territory during the great war between Peter I and Charles XII of Sweden transformed the PolishLithuanian state into a Russian protectorate. From a geo-political perspective the Commonwealth, instead of being a core power, at least on a regional level, became just a “limitrophe,” that could be used either as a means of introducing Russian influences to the heart of Europe, or – in the opposite direction – as a Western European power leverage against the rising ambitions of Russia. This state of affairs began to influence the self-perception of at least some of the Commonwealth’s elites. The reality of political dependence brought into being the idea of independence as an aim to be pursued. How to attain this new aim? The eighteenth century Enlightenment prompted the idea of modernization, which was necessary to compete more effectively with the surrounding, modernizing empires: not only the Russian one, but the Habsburg, and the Prussian too. The old “Sarmatian” ideal could be seen in this new perspective not as the essence of the Polish originality, but as an obstacle to success in the fight for the state’s independence. It was not by chance that the harbinger of the Enlightenment reforms, Father Stanisław Konarski, was the first person to use “Sarmatian” pejoratively and introduced the word “independence” into Polish political literature.14 “Emphasizing the ‘infinite difference’ separating Poland from the progressive countries of Western Europe, such as England, Switzerland, or Holland, [...] he scored the myth of Polish distinctiveness ‘a peculiar and unheard of pretense of superiority over 14 Michalski, “Sa rmatyzm a eu ropeiza cja,” pp. 13 7-13 8; Władysław Konopczyńsk i, “Narodziny nowoczesnej idei niepodległości w Polsce – 1733-1755,” Pamiętnik V Zjazdu Historyków Polskich w Warszawie (Lwów, 1930), part I.

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mankind,’ as well as the Sarmatian claim of Poland’s special Divine protection.”15 The eighteenth century, especially in its Enlightened version, can be described as the age of crisis for the idea of Poland as a separate civilization, a distinct cultural-political center, with its separate mission and ideological sphere of influence. Father Konarski’s followers, authors of most of the political reforms and cultural innovations introduced so rapidly during the reign of the Commonwealth’s last king Stanisław August Poniatowski, accepted the place of their state on the periphery of the one and only civilization: the Enlightenment, with its center somewhere around Paris/London. This was the time when the semiorientalizing concept of Eastern Europe, so clearly evident in the writings of intellectuals like Voltaire or Diderot,16 was invented. However, due to the concentric structure of this imagined community of the enlightened, the late Commonwealth’s elites could aspire to be at least closer to the center than some other Eastern European societies. They could aspire to be less “barbarian” than, for example, Russians, doomed by their more eastward geographical position. Deprived of their “Sarmatian” originality, modernizing Polish elites could look for consolation by imagining a place for their nation on the “better” side of Europe. A reinvigorated and reformed Commonwealth could perceive itself to be an “Eastern March” of the Enlightenment and Europeness. The question was, whether it should serve as a bridge or rather as a bulwark again? With the onset of the revolutionary era, the tenet of liberty, so deeply ingrained in the Commonwealth’s political culture, regained its privileged place in the imagined structure of modernity, lessening the sense among Poles of backwardness – which the Enlightenment’s prerevolutionary civilizational categories had made so evident. The American experiment was observed with considerable interest by Polish 15 Konstantin Symmons-Symonolewicz, National Consciousness in Poland: Origin and Evolution (Meadville: Pa., 1983), p. 36 16 Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment (Stanford, 1994); Larry Wolff, “Voltaire’s Public and the Idea of Eastern Europe: Toward a Literary Sociology of Continental Division,” Slavic Review 54:4 (1995), pp. 932-942; Robin Okey, “Central Europe/Eastern Europe: Behind the Definitions,” Past and Present 137 (1992), pp. 102-133.

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republican ideologues, who saw in Washington and Jefferson followers of the same ideal that formed the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of noble citizens. The first echoes of the French version of the new political order, launched under the banner of liberté, egalité, fraternité were received with enthusiasm in some other circles in Warsaw and Vilnius as a formula quite familiar to the traditional political culture of the nobiliary republic. The elites of the Commonwealth, or rather those part of them that prepared the first European constitution of May 3, 1791, and then led the last fight to defend the constitution, independence, and remnants of the state against the final Russian intervention, found a new identity for the spirit of the dying Commonwealth. This new identity combined a few elements of the old “Sarmatian” myth of Polish freedom as something unique, at least in Eastern Europe, with a new ideology of a revolutionary, post-Enlightenment Europe. The latter extolled not so much the difference between the “perfumed” ones and the “unwashed,” but rather the fight for freedom against tyrannies and different forms of oppression – and who could feel more keenly all political injustice, and who understood better the necessity of freedom than a revolutionized Polish noble, fighting against armies of three empires that had decided to eliminate the Commonwealth and its political nation from the map of Europe? The Commonwealth, just starting a painful process of modernization of the spirit of the nation during the last years of its existence and first decades after its final dismemberment, was perceived by its most active political elites more and more as a champion of freedom – opposed more and more to Russia, seen as a champion of tyranny again. One can call this model of the deceased Commonwealth, as it evolved on the verge of the nineteenth century, as a regional power of freedom, responsible for its preservation or its further transmission eastward. After the final dismemberment, the political hopes of the leaders of the last battles for the Commonwealth’s independence led them to look to revolutionary, and then Napoleonic, France as the anti-status quo superpower. Their strategic program was formulated comprehensively in an anonymous political brochure, published in 1800, Czy Polacy wybić się mogą na niepodległość? [Can the Poles win back their independence?], ascribed to Tadeusz Kosciuszko’s secretary, Józef

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Pawlikowski. This was a vision of Poland, operating not only within the former Commonwealth’s borders, but inciting revolutions in all three empires, those of the Habsburgs, the Hohenzollerns, and the Romanovs, that partitioned the Polish-Lithuanian state. The author urged Polish political elites to launch a war of opinion against the tsardom within the Russian nation, as well as to incite non-Russian nations, Ukrainians in the first place, to rise against the empire that was portrayed as the prison of nations. Seven years later, the same author prepared a plan for the dismemberment of the Russian state along its ethnic borders. 17 New Polish patriotism began to identify its role as a leader of nation-awakening movements in Eastern Europe. The final aim of this role would be to crush all of the three empires dominating the region (Russia, Austria, and Prussia), which had been the participants in the partitions of the Commonwealth, and to make room for new actors in political arena, that is, nations instead of dynastic states and bureaucratic empires. Had the Polish “ideal” become essentially anti-imperial by then? No. There were just “evil” empires and “good” ones in this pattern. The addressee of Pawlikowski’s project of destroying the Russian empire was the leader of another one: the French emperor, Napoleon. Children of the Enlightenment could not imagine a totally independent role for an Eastern European political-cultural entity. They were not able to conceive of a regenerated Commonwealth and its mission in the region without practical support from a Western strategic patron. Nothing better confirms these limits to the political imagination of the first generation of the Commonwealth’s orphans than the works of such eminent thinkers as Stanisław Staszic and Hugo Kołłątaj. I mean here their works published during the short-lived existence of the Duchy of Warsaw, which was an embryo of the Polish state as the Western power’s “Eastern March” and also the French military outpost on the Russian border. Both philosophers envisaged Europe as a federation of nations under the leadership of France. This was to be a community of civilization and enlightened order, and the chaos beyond would be kept at bay. The principal meaning of the Duchy of Warsaw, enlarged to the [Józef Pawlikowski], Czy Polacy wybić się mogą na niepodległość (Warsaw, 1967) (introduction by E. Halicz). See also Andrzej Nowak, Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium? Idee polskiej polityki wschodniej (1733-1921), 2nd ed., (Kraków, 1999), pp. 50-52. 17

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borders of the pre-partition Commonwealth would consist in being the easternmost flank of this community, once again a wall defending Europe against potential dangers stemming from Asia. In order to strengthen this “eastern march” of Napoleonic Europe, Poland should become the kernel of a Slavic federation, a regional representative, so to speak, of the Enlightenment and civic liberties. Russia, on the other hand, was to be excluded from this union and relegated to Asia, to chaos, to the status of barbarians beyond the wall – at least as long as it continued to be another Empire, the “evil” one.18 It was not a concept of a meso-area, but of a distinct differentiation between two worlds, with Poland on the right or “good” side as the door-keeper, important as long as there was a strategic tension between her western patron-power and the eastern enemy power just over the border. This concept was destroyed together with Napoleon’s Grand Army and the Duchy of Warsaw. For the next hundred years there would be no Western power interested in posting Poland as its plenipotentiary in the east of the continent, or in recreating the Commonwealth in any form. A new territorial order established in Vienna in 1815 on the postCommonwealth realm opened up the possibility of Poland (now given the rump form of the Congress Kingdom) being made the vanguard of the Eastern Empire aiming at the center of the continent. Tsar Alexander I took most of the former Duchy of Warsaw territories under his rule, radically changing the proportions of the three partitioning empires’ shares in the Commonwealth’s heritage. Now, the Russian tsars had 82 percent of the Commonwealth’s lands, the Austrians – 11 percent, and the Prussians – 8 percent. Together with the largest share of territory, the ethnic Polish center included, the Russian state “absorbed more nobles of Polish culture than there were nobles of Russian culture in the entire Russian empire. In the early nineteenth century,” as Timothy Snyder reminds us, “far more subjects of the tsar could read Polish than Russian.”19 This change had enormous consequences. 18 Stanisław Staszic, “O statystyce Polski,” S. Staszic, Pisma filozoficzne i społeczne, Vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1954), pp. 298-300; Hugo Kołłątaj, Uwagi nad teraźniejszym położeniem tej części ziemi polskiej, którą od pokoju tylżyckiego zaczęto zwać Księstwem Warszawskim (Lipsk, 1808). See also Andrzej Nowak, Między carem a rewolucją. Studium politycznej wyobraźni i postaw Wielkiej Emigracji wobec Rosji (Warsaw, 1994), pp. 13-15. 19 Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations, pp. 25-26.

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The eastern, former Lithuanian provinces of the Commonwealth were again under the same scepter as the Polish cultural-ethnic core. This very fact made any attempt to absorb the Lithuanian-Ruthenian part of the Russian state’s acquisitions much more difficult. The Russian Empire’s elites had to either agree to a kind of cultural condominium over these territories, or engage in a deadly struggle with the Polish element. Fifteen years after the Kingdom of Poland was attached to the Russian Empire it was already clear which direction had been taken: the November uprising of 1830 constituted an official declaration of war between Poland and Russia over the Lithuanian-Ruthenian borderlands. Can this fateful conflict, that overshadowed the whole history of nations in this region of Europe for the next hundred years or more, be called a clash of two imperialisms? This question is by no means easy to answer.

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First, we should take into consideration the role that “the Polish question” objectively played in destroying the Russian Empire. Tsar Alexander I tried to keep the Congress Kingdom of Poland not only as a valuable strategic outpost of Russia’s influence in central Europe, but as a kind of testing ground, where he tried out new ideas for reforming his state in order to bring it closer to western standards. The fact that he gave Poland a liberal constitution, while Russia still had no constitution of any kind (and indeed would have to wait nearly 180 years for her own liberal constitution) symbolized this situation. The Russian westernized elite, however, took it an insult, an affront to the victorious generation of 1812 war heroes, later to become the Decembrists. It was during the reign of the same Alexander I that the Russian-language elite expressed its outrage at the prospect of being once again invaded – this time internally, so to speak – by the late Commonwealth’s elites, with their political ambitions and traditions so alien to the Russians. It was against such figures as Prince Adam Czartoryski, Tsar Alexander’s friend and the Empire’s foreign minister for a few years (1804-06) that a

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new Russian national – exclusive – consciousness began to form. “The father of Russian historiography,” Nikolai Karamzin best voiced this new, national idea, generated in opposition to Poland. He addressed his warning directly to the Emperor in 1819: “No, Sire, the Poles will never be our true brothers nor our faithful allies. Now they are weak and defenseless. [...] When you strengthen them they will wish to be independent and their first step will be to separate from Russia.” Karamzin was the first to express so sharply a vision of the deadly struggle between two cultural-political cores, Russian and Polish, over the lands of the former Kievan Rus’ and for domination of the whole of Eastern Europe. His verdict on the geopolitical realities was tough. There was a simple choice – Either, or. There was no room for two ruling elites. Either the Russians would dominate, or the Poles, so it was the obvious duty of a Russian citizen to extirpate all Polish influence from the Lithuanian-Ruthenian lands, and to eliminate a Polish statehood in any form whatsoever.20 This logic made Karamzin’s warnings a self-fulfilling prophecy. An important part of the former Commonwealth’s elites had not been satisfied with the separation of the Kingdom of Poland from the socalled western gubernii, that is the eastern half of the Commonwealth. They were already been on the path that led – through modernization – to a new, national re-construction of their identity, with the idea of state independence as a natural consequence and guarantor of it. Another and still quite substantial part of the former Commonwealth gentry (ethnic Poles included) saw nothing bad or compromising in serving the Empire and promoting their personal careers in the tsarist administration and army, but were trapped between the independenceminded Polish group and the Russian national reaction. This spiral of recriminations and aggression on both sides of the conflict confounded See: Andrei Zorin, Kormia dvuglavogo orla... Literatura i gosudarstvennaia ideologiia v Rossii v poslednei treti XVIII–pervoj treti XIX veka (Moscow, 2001); Andrzej Nowak, “‘Oświecony’ rosyjski imperializm i Polska. Od Piotra I i Katarzyny II do Karamzina i Puszkina,” Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium, pp. 12-38; idem, “Imperializm, nacjonalizm i historia: refleksje nad politycznym i ideowym kontekstem polsko-rosyjskiej współpracy naukowej w pierwszej ćwierci XIX wieku,” Roman Jurkowski, Norbert Kasparek, eds., Dawna a nowa Rosja (z doświadc zeń transformacji ustrojowej). Stud ia ofiarowane profesorowi Janowi Sobczakowi...(Warsaw, 2002), pp. 299-314. 20

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the imperial logic of the tsarist state. Poles (equated in the traditional, still officially pre-national system, with Catholics) began to be excluded from the Empire’s elite just because they were Poles.21 This meant the beginning of the “nationalization” of the Empire that finally led to its destruction. Two Polish uprisings of 1830-31 and 1863-64 and the waves of Russian national reaction to them were milestones in this process. As different scholars agree now, unable either to throw off Russian domination or submit meekly to it, Poland became a permanent festering sore on the Russian body politic. “It demonstrated vividly the problem of an Asiatic empire trying to dominate an European nation” – writes Geoffrey Hosking, very much in the tradition of Edmund Burke and Lord Acton. The Polish nobility were, as Andreas Kappeler reminds us, pioneers of modern nation-building in the Empire, challenging not only the tsarist administration but Russian elites, as well as Ukrainians, Lithuanians and other nations of the region to follow.22 How did the Polish elites of the former Commonwealth transform themselves into pioneers of modern nation-building, and how were they able to challenge the Empire and “awake” the nations of Eastern Europe? It is necessary to stress here the importance of a specific ideology coined during the Romantic era, following the first great uprising of 1830. Actually it was not a modern ethnic nation-state ideology, but – on the contrary – a new faith in the Commonwealth’s binding capacities. Beaten in the field, the old Republic should have its spiritual revenge on the Russian and all other despotisms. This new idea was presented in the post-insurrection emigration by the most talented Polish poets, such as Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Słowacki, and their teacher, the historian from Wilno University, Joachim Lelewel. All of them represented the traditions of the historical Grand Duchy of Lithuania, their native land. All of See: L.I. Gorizontov, Paradoksy imperskoi politiki: Poliaki v Rossii, Russkie v Pol’she (Moscow, 1999); M. Dolbilov, “Kul’turnaia idioma vozrozhdenia Rossii kak faktor imperskoi politiki v Severo-Zapadnom krae v 1863-1865 gg.,” Ab Imperio, No. 1-2 (2001), pp. 227268; Witold Rodkiewicz, Russian Nationality Policy in the Western Provinces of the Empire (1863-1905) (Lublin, 1998); Theodore R. Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863-1914 (DeKalb, 1996). 22 See: Andreas Kappeler, Rußland als Vielvölkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall (München, 1992); Goeffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire. 1552-1917 (London, 1997), p. 30 (quotation); Kaspe, Impieriia i modernizatsiia, pp. 124-126. 21

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them stressed the importance of voluntary union as a principle of the Commonwealth’s political system. All of them extolled the unique character of the republican virtues of the Commonwealth’s citizens and their liberties, as opposed not only to the Russian or the Ottoman political traditions, but to Western European bureaucratic formalism, and state absolutism in different guises. They re-interpreted the “Sarmatian” idea in a more democratic form, that should open up citizenship of a regenerated Polish republic to all its inhabitants. At the same time, they identified the post-partition political body of Poland as a symbol of all oppression. In Mickiewicz’s and Słowacki’s messianic-religious interpretation, Poland became the nation-martyr, even the Christ of nations. Every struggle for Polish independence, every subsequent insurrection – from the Bar confederation, through the Kosciuszko uprising, up to the latest (1830-31) war with Russia – was interpreted as a model of a brave consistency in striving for freedom’s sake. Lelewel was the originator of the battle-cry of the uprising of 1830-31, “For your freedom and ours,” which was then repeated in the emigration as the new motto of the Polish mission. And indeed, Polish emigrants were active and very much visible in every possible political turmoil in Europe between 1831 and 1863. The revolutions of the so-called Spring of Nations in 1848-49 formed the peak of this revolutionary Polish activity. The paradoxical nature of the ideology that led the Polish emigrants to this hectic activity could be described most concisely as an international nationalism, a call to solidarity of nations in their fight against the solidarity of despotic monarchs as represented by the Sacred Alliance, initiated by Tsar Alexander I, Francis I – Austrian emperor, and Frederick William IV – king of Prussia. Polish Commonwealth regenerators would be natural leaders in this specific nationalist international. The ultimate consequences of their plans are vividly described by Mickiewicz in his futuristic vision of the year 1899 (written in 1832), when he expected a hetman (that is, military leader) of the Commonwealth to come back from the Urals after defeating the last remnants of the forces of tsarist despotism, thus enabling a Free Republic of Siberia to be firmly established. All nations were to be liberated – Siberia included – and the center of their liberation was to be in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, regenerated

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and united anew with Poland. 23 The whole Eastern and Central European post-tsarist realm was to be transformed into a set of democratic, nation-based republics, modeled on and liberated with the help of the reestablished Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. And so the latter was to be a kind of anti-imperial empire. In reality this vision inspired revolution-oriented national movements in many parts of Europe, and future Zionist leaders as well.24 For Lelewel and Mickiewicz any geopolitical considerations were rather alien. They sternly believed in the attractive force of an ethical appeal connected to the example of the Polish fight against the tsarist imperial arch-enemy – and extended this belief even to the Russian nation, which they saw as one of the victims rather than as the most important of their enemies. In other versions of the Polish emigrants’ political thought, however, the Polish “liberation doctrine” took a more geopolitically oriented shape, distinctly opposing Poland and Russia as two contradictory poles of political attraction in Eastern Europe, and in Slavdom in general, not only in terms of some idealistic principle but in a harsh reality of state interests. Poland, reconstituted in its old, prepartition borders, would form then a kind of anti-Russian strategic magnet. In order to make the future place of Poland secure its aim would be not so much to create a Polish Empire, as to disperse the existing Russian Empire, diversifying its geopolitical territory into as many elements/states as possible. This idea was quite close to the one implemented two centuries earlier by Cardinal de Richelieu against the German states in order to make France’s strategic position in the east unbeatable. As an example of this mode of Polish political thought one can mention General Ludwik Mierosławski’s geopolitical treatise, published in 1857. He explained the necessity of balancing the much too powerful 23 Adam Mickiewicz, Dzieła, vol. VI: Pisma prozą, part II (Księgi Narodu polskiego i pielgrzymstwa polskiego, Pisma polityczne z lat 1832-1835) (Warsaw, 1955), pp. 159-161. For general interpretations of Polish romantic “international nationalism” see: Andrzej Walicki, Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: The Case of Poland (Notre Dame, 1983); Andrzej Nowak, Między carem a rewolucją. Studium politycznej wyobraźni i postaw Wielkiej Emigracji wobec Rosji 1831-1849 (Warsaw, 1994), pp. 94-116, 172-203, 286-356. 24 Ezra Mendelsohn, Zionism in Poland. The Formative Years (New Haven, London, 1981), pp. 344-345.

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and dangerous Russian political realm with a strong Poland and her influence in all Slavdom (Russia excluded). Poles (together with Ruthenians) should play a central role in the liberation of the Slavonic race from despotisms ruling in Eastern Europe, and connect the world of the Slavs to western civilization.25 Even more illustrative in this respect may be the last stage of Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski’s political career and thought. In 1831 the former foreign minister of the Russian Empire became the prime minister of the Polish insurgents’ government, and ended as the head of the most implacable enemy of the Russian Empire’s territorial integrity, for thirty years leading his propaganda and diplomatic fight against the tsarist state from his émigré base in Paris. Disappointed in the idea of a just empire, which he had cherished during his service in the court of Alexander I, he developed a highly original concept of nations and the priority of their right to independence over imperial states in organizing a new political order in Europe. He expressed this new idea first in his extensive Essay on Diplomacy (written in 1823 and printed in 1830), and then tried to realize it against the Russian Empire. Leading the post-insurrection diplomacy and propaganda of the Polish emigration for thirty years, prince Czartoryski became the main patron of using all ethnically non-Russian elements of the Empire in order to tear it apart. His battle against the Tsar Nicholas I’s state was independence for Don Cossacks, Tatars, Circassians (Chechens), Finns, Estonians and other ethnic or religious minorities he portrayed as victims of the Russian Empire’s oppression. Inspired by the prince’s agents, and backed by Western European powers, especially by the British, these new nations were to form an important element of Czartoryski’s plan for the Russian Empire’s destruction and formation of a new political order in all of Eastern Europe. It is worth stressing that Czartoryski was consistent in extending his principles and efforts to lands of the Ottoman and – to a lesser extent – Habsburg empires, backing national movements of the Rumanians, Serbs, Croatians, Hungarians, and Bulgarians.26 25 Ludwik Mieroslawski, De la nationalité polonaise dans l’equlibre européen (Paris, 1857). 26 Andrzej Nowak, “Europa narodów: wizja księcia Adama Jerzego Czartoryskiego,” Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny 1:3 (2001), pp. 179-206 (in Russian, “Evropa narodov: vzgliad kniazia Adama E. Czartoriskogo,” Jewropa: Żurnał Polskogo Instituta Mieżdunarodnych Dieł 1:1 (2001), pp. 35-64; idem, Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium, pp. 81-162..

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Was he, however, consistent enough to apply his idea of the right of nations within the realm of the former Commonwealth? This key question may be broadened out and applied to other political thinkers as we search for the true meaning of Polish imperialism in the nineteenth century. Czartoryski himself was the main financial and political patron of this group within the emigration which tried to defend the old unity of the Commonwealth – as a multiethnic, multireligious, and even multilingual entity founded on common republican virtues and on a belief in the revival of the old Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian power within its pre-partition frontiers.27 They even organized themselves as the Society of the Lithuanian and Ruthenian Territories, established in Paris at the end of 1831. It had a member of Czartoryski’s circle as its president, Mickiewicz as vice-president, Słowacki as treasurer, and Lelewel as the head of its historical section. The Society’s aim was to promote unity of Lithuanian and Ruthenian lands with Poland, and their specific historical character and the political traditions that differentiated them from Russia proper (called quite frequently Muscovy). At the same time, however, the Society had to defend its principles against a new enemy, internal this time. The defeat of the insurrection led to heated debates among the emigrants: why did we lose? The most radical section of their opinion went along with the logic of democratization and modernization: the main reason for the defeat was the fact that the uprising failed to mobilize all strata of society, especially the peasantry. In order to arouse them it is necessary to address them in their own, vernacular language. What language should it be: Polish, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Belarusian? For the leaders of the largest democratic party in the emigration – the Polish Democratic Society – it was obvious that it should be Polish and that centralization was a necessary step to success, first in the next uprising and then in organizing the new state. The early modern conception of a republican nation began to be replaced by the modern concept of nation as the sum of vernacular speakers, a necessary precondition for modern democracy, as it seemed. So they (Tadeusz Krępowiecki and Adam Gurowski especially harshly) criticized the old Commonwealth supra-ethnic conception as a Wiktor Weintraub, “National Consciousness in Polish Romantic Litera ture,” Cross Currents, No. 6 (1987). 27

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destructive and anarchic one. Any “regionalism,” such as cultivating a separate Ruthenian (Ukrainian) or Lithuanian culture and language, should be strictly forbidden. The eastern half of the former Commonwealth should just be a part of Poland similar to any other part.28 Another attack came from a political thinker, Maurycy Mochnacki, who criticized the “international” character of the obligations adopted by Mickiewicz or Lelewel in their concept of Romantic nationalism. Poles should shed their blood for the Polish cause only. Any solidarity of nations was just a dangerous chimera. Mochnacki and Krępowiecki in their concurrent critique of Romantic missionism foreshadowed a crisis of the concept of the Commonwealth’s regeneration and of its “liberation mission” in Eastern and Central Europe. Intellectually, they paved the way for modern nationalists, not only in Poland, but in Lithuania and Ukraine as well. “Modern politics after 1863 meant shrugging off the Commonwealth as a burden and embracing the peasant and his language as the nation.”29 For Poles it meant an attempt to treat the whole post-Commonwealth realm as a future Polish “empire.” For the first time ethnic Poles began to think about Kiev or Smolensk as properly Polish. Their modern nationalism became a model for Lithuanians and Ukrainians with this new Poland as a main rival. So the very fundamentals of a specific Romantic-republican ideology of the future Polish state as the cultural and political center for a major part of Eastern and Central Europe were undermined. This crisis was exacerbated by the tragic defeat of the next great uprising – in 1863. It provoked another wave of criticism of the Romantic idea of Poland, this time formulated on the right wing of the Polish intellectual 28 Tadeusz Łepkowski, “Pogląd na jedno- i wieloetniczność narodu polskiego w pierwszej połowie XIX w.,” Zofia Stefanowska, ed., Swojskość i cudzoziemszczyzna w dziejach k ultury p o lsk iej (Wa rsa w, 1 9 73 ), pp. 2 32 -2 45 ; Alina Barszczewsk a-Krupa , “ Rola Towarzystwa Litewskiego i Ziem Ruskich w popularyzacji wiedzy o Litwie i Białorusi na emigracji (1832-1836),” Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego. Nauki HumanistycznoSpo łeczne, seria I, 53 (Łódź, 196 7), pp. 45-6 9; idem, “Société Lithua nienne et des Territoires Biélorusses et Ruthènes à Paris 1831-1836,” Acta Baltico-Slavica 6 (1969), pp. 75-102 ; Andrzej Nowak , “Emigracyjne Towa rzystwo Litewsk ie i Ziem Ruskich (1831-1833): w laboratorium rozpadu ‘przednowoczesnego’ narodu Rzeczypospolitej,” in A. Nowak, Od imperium do imperium. Spojrzenia na historię Europy Wschodniej (Kraków, 2004), pp. 196-223. 29 Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations, p. 31.

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life by conservative historians in Kraków (Józef Szujski and Michał Bobrzyński). They were closer rather to Mickiewicz than to modern nationalists in their concept of a tolerant, multiethnic polity. But they were radically vehement in their assault on the Romantic-“Sarmatian” belief in any specific virtues of the old Polish (Commonwealth) political culture and civilization. Just like the Enlightenment philosophers a century before, Kraków’s historical school renewed a perception of Poland as a retrograde country that should be civilized based on Western European standards and should change radically its political “anarchic” tradition in line with those represented by states with strong central power, such as Prussia or France. They actually deplored the consequences of the union with Lithuania as plunging Poland in the mud of eastern politics and mores; they preferred a smaller Poland, but strictly attached to the West as the only source of civilizational and political patterns. Along with modern nationalists they dealt another blow to the “imperial” belief of the old “Sarmatians” and the nineteenth century “Romantics” that Poland could be an independent political leader for the whole of Eastern Europe, that in this strategically vital region, it could be a leader independent both from Russia and united Germany.

THE SECOND REPUBLIC – AN EMPIRE THAT FAILED? The last practical effort to revive Mickiewicz’s and Czartoryski’s dreams came in the person of Józef Piłsudski and the idea of socialist federalism ascribed to him by his followers. During his period as the leader of the independence-oriented Polish Socialist Party, he recreated the program of restoring the old Polish-Lithuanian union, adding a third element, even more important than the Lithuanian one – namely the Ukrainian. He defended the old concept of early modern nation not as a linguistic, but a status group, sharing the republican idea of Polish citizenship. He defended this concept against his internal rivals – modern nationalists, led by Roman Dmowski, and against modern Lithuanian and Ukrainian nationalists as well. He was determined to defend his beloved idea of a restored unity of a multiethnic republican

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power in the old Commonwealth realm against the traditional, Russian-imperial enemy. Piłsudski grabbed the opportunity when all three partitioning empires crumbled during World War I, and the Polish state emerged. The general aim of his policy as Polish Head of State during the war with Bolshevik Russia was to redress the strategic balance in the region. He planned to achieve this aim by forming a Polish-led coalition of lesser nations in Eastern Europe that would be a counterweight to any Russian state. There is no better exemplar of his political intentions than his manifesto published on the occasion of the taking of Wilno from the Bolsheviks in April 1919. It was addressed to the inhabitants of the Old Grand Duchy of Lithuania and was printed in four languages: Polish, Lithuanian, Yiddish, and Belarusian. He appealed to this multilingual audience to share his vision to become citizens of the new republic that would unite Wilno and Warsaw again. During the campaigns of 1920 Piłsudski revealed the extremely ambitious range of his plans. Strictly in the long tradition dating back to the times of the “Sarmatian liberation doctrine” aimed at Moscow, as well as in a continuation of Mickiewicz’s Romantic vision, the first Polish Head of State intended to form a kind of proPolish party among Russians, and to help them to win power in the Kremlin – in order to change the political system there to a more liberal and democratic one. The central premise of his strategy to influence the nature of any future Russian state was to cut it off from any possibility of regaining its imperial dimension – by cutting off Moscow from Kiev and other strategic borderlands from the Caucasus up to the Baltic republics. It was not only Russians who rejected Piłsudski’s projects. They were rejected as an especially dangerous imperialism by the majority of new national elites of his intended partners from the former Commonwealth, that is, Lithuanians and Ukrainians. They were rejected also by the Western powers, which did not believe (to say the least) in any Polish potential to form the centre of a stable political order in EastCentral Europe. While France was ready to see in a reconstituted Poland a valuable and even relatively strong satellite, just to counter the defeated Germany from the east, for both Anglo-Saxon powers Poland could be nothing more than a small buffer state between the only traditional powers in the eastern half of the continent, Russia and Germany.

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Piłsudski was determined to break this perception of Poland as a necessarily dependent and weak state, but failed.30 His operational success against the invading Red Army in August and September 1920 spared most of the newly created east and central European states the fate of the Soviet republics – for the next 20 years at least. But his political defeat was obvious: Poland did not form any counterweight, either to Russian or to German power. Instead of a federation or at least a close alliance with the nations of the old Commonwealth, Poland was forced to make a new agreement with Russia – Bolshevik this time – to partition Ukraine and the old Duchy of Lithuania territories. This failure was the effect of the lack of really popular partners for Piłsudski’s policy in Ukraine and Lithuania, and of the Poland’s military and economic weakness relative to the great task of constructing and supporting a new independent power between Germany and Russia. Thus modern nationalism triumphed, and in Poland also. The truncated territory of the old Commonwealth – transformed into the Second Polish Republic – was to be treated for most of its existence as an ethnic Polish state in the making. It was treated, at the same time, by its Piłsudskiyte elites at least, as a miniempire, a regional power, struggling against its two powerful neighbours and their revisionist ambitions. If one were looking for an emperor in the modern history of the Polish state, Piłsudski could come the closest: both in personality, his power (after the coup in 1926), and in his ideology: statist and supra-national rather than narrowly nationalistic. For an extended elaboration of my views on the subject, see: Andrzej Nowak, Polska i “trzy” Rosje. Studium polityki wschodniej Józefa Piłsudskiego (do kwietnia 1920 roku), (Kra ków, 2 001 ); idem, “Wobec Rosji. U źródeł polityk i wschodniej Polsk iej Pa rtii Socja listycznej,” A. Koryn, ed., Międ zy mo rze – Po lska i k ra je Europ y Środ ko wo Wschodniej XIX i XX w. Studia ofiarowane Piotrowi Łossowskiemu w 70 rocznicę urodzin (Warsaw, 1995), pp. 77-90; idem, “Czy Józef Piłsudski był federalistą,” Wiesław Balcerak, ed., Polska – Bułgaria w Europie Środkowej i Południowo-Wschodniej w wiekach XVIIXX. Podobieństwa, różnice, uwarunkowania (Warsaw, Łowicz, 2003), pp. 156-177; idem, “Spory o politykę wschodnią Piłsudskiego: bohater, zdrajca, czy kozioł ofiarny,” Prace Ko misji Ś ro d k o wo e u ro p e jsk ie j PAU 11 (2 0 0 3 ), pp. 5 9 -7 6 . For a new, rev ea ling interpretation of Piłsudski’s “socialist federalism” see: Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations, pp. 57-65. To compare the latest analysis of Roman Dmowski’s concept, see: U. Schrade, Mię dzywo jenna polsk a myśl narodowa. Od p atrio tyzmu do globalizmu (Kraków, 2004), pp. 72-120. 30

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In the east of the continent this new state had no strategic partners, but a powerful enemy, the Soviet Russia, and some smaller enemies, with Lithuania at the top of the list. Two concepts, evolved during the period, tried to address the problem of this geopolitically critical position through a revival of the old Commonwealth’s realm and Romantic ideas of a Polish mission in the East. One of them was rather theoretical, developed in historical circles, mostly by professor Oskar Halecki, an eminent historian of the Jagiellons’ state and Polish-Lithuanian unions. He presented his theory of civilizational differences between Western and Eastern parts of Eastern Europe, using for the first time in two historical congresses (in Brussels in 1923 and in Oslo in 1928), the term “East-Central Europe,” where the key position was to be occupied naturally by Poland. The rest, the Eastern Europe proper, was to be cut off as a separate civilization, non-European in its religious roots and cultural-political traditions. The border between East-Central and Eastern Europe coincided more or less with the eastern border of the Second Polish Republic and that of other countries saved in 1920, such as Latvia, Estonia, and Rumania. It is interesting to note that this is exactly the border that was repeated seventy years later in Samuel Huntington’s famous first article and then in his book The Clash of Civilizations... And this was actually the most popular perception among Poles of their country’s place in post-World War I Europe: it was on the verge of the fault-line, ready to play once again the role of an “antemurale,” bulwark, or “cordon-sanitaire” as it was called at that time. But – we should repeat this – the Western powers and most of their public opinion were not interested in this play for a long time.31 While Halecki’s ideas defended conceptually a privileged Polish position in the region, Piłsudski’s intelligence service worked hard in practice to keep alive the traditions of a Polish anti-imperial mission beyond the old Commonwealth’s borders. The term “Prometheism” is usually used in relation to the history of these clandestine efforts. This reminds us both of the idea of liberation and the location of his torment, the Caucasus. Piłsudski’s closest collaborators established a set of contacts with anti-Soviet organizations from Georgia, Azerbaijan, Volga Oscar Halecki, The Limits and Divisions of European History (New York, London, 1950), pp. 105-139.

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and Crimean Tatars, Kuban and Don Cossacks, Ukrainians from Bukovyna, up to Karelians in the North. They gathered them under the banner of the Promethean League of the Oppressed Peoples, operating from Warsaw, Paris, Istanbul, Teheran, and Helsingfors. The aim of this activity was exactly the same as a century earlier Prince Czartoryski’s programme a century earlier: to prepare the elites of non-Russian nations of the Empire to rise in a concerted fight for freedom when the moment would come – on a signal given from Poland.32 The moment would not come, at least not during the existence of the Second Polish Republic. A completely different scenario was realized when two neighbouring powers, neither of which Poland was ready to recognize as its superior, decided to collaborate in a concerted action to annihilate the Polish state. Germany and Russia, now operating as the Third Reich and the Soviet Union, partitioned the power in between, which was too strong (or just believed itself too strong) to voluntarily accept one of them as its patron, and too weak to defend itself effectively. East-Central Europe was carved up along the lines dictated in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. The “Promethean” program was left behind as a totally exotic and anachronistic idea – or as a message from the late Second Republic political elites to some future generation.

FROM CATASTROPHE TO REVIVAL These elites were virtually exterminated during World War II, by Hitler and Stalin’s combined efforts. The latter introduced a new geopolitical position for Poland and new political elites ready to accept this change. The essence of the post-war Soviet-imperial vision of the reduced Poland was expressed most concisely by Maxim Litvinov, Deputy Foreign Minister, already in 1943. During the conference of 32 On “Prometheism” see: Włodzimierz Bączkowski, O wschodnich problemach Polski. Wybór pism, ed. Jacek Kloczkowski, Paweł Kowal (Kraków, 2000); Sergiusz Mikulicz, Prometeizm w polityce II Rzeczypospolitej (Warsaw, 1971); Marek Kornat, Polska szkoła sowietologiczna. 1930-1939 (Kraków, 2003). For the Soviet point of view see: L. Sotskov, Neizvestnyi separatizm. Na sluzhbe SD i Abvera. Iz sekretnykh dossie razvedki (Moscow, 2003), pp. 54-90.

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foreign ministers of the Allies in Washington, he just stated bluntly that “Poles will have to learn to live in their ethnic borders as a small nation. They will have to forget their thought that they had been a great power once. They were a haughty nation with neither skills nor power to realize their excessive nationalism.”33 As a result, Poland was cut off finally from the rest of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania heritage. The bloody cleansing of Poles from what became eventually a western part of the Soviet Ukraine, then the forced “evacuation” of national minorities, Polish from the new Soviet side, and Ukrainian from the diminished Polish realm – all this underlined the tragic end of the “civilising mission in the east, an idea as essential to Polish national identity as the frontier was to the American, or the empire was to the British.”34 The new, Communist elites tried to imbue the decapitated Polish society with a new identity. The People’s Republic of Poland was to play the role of the Soviet-Russian Empire’s western outpost (just as in the time of Tsar Alexander I) with absolutely no independence in international affairs. Poland was moved as far westward as possible, to place her in permanent opposition to Germany (and the West which stood behind the Germans), as well as to make her virtually a hostage of the Russian/Soviet geopolitical patronage. All previous traditions of the Commonwealth, such as its parliamentary institutions, its republican supra-ethnic political ideal, and especially its heritage of a union between the Poles and the nations of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania – all these were condemned as elements of a shameful and anarchic past. Another public enemy in the Communist educational and propaganda system was the Romantic tradition of Polish anti-imperial insurrections and conspiracies, as well as the spirit of political-cultural Polish missionism oriented to the East of Europe.35 Communists could use different allies and different points of ideological reference in their task of changing the historical Polish identity. One, most frequently recalled in this context, was made up of Maxim Litvinov, Notes for a Journal (New York, 1955): Krystyna Kersten, Narodziny systemu władzy. Polska 1943-1948 (Warsaw, 1985), p. 30. 34 Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations, p. 204. 35 Ibid., pp. 210-211.

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selected elements of Roman Dmowski’s ideology. It was his vision of Poland resembling the medieval, Piast state, ethnically united and strategically oriented against Germany, his geopolitical stress on the necessity of choosing Russia against Germany as the most vital support for the Polish state’s existence, and his stress on realism in politics expressed in his trenchant critique of the romantic fantasies and missionisms that led Poland to unwise and counterproductive insurrections against Russia. This reasoning was developed further in the Communist period by some politically active Catholics, who were tolerated by the state. Some of them, grouped in the PAX organization, developed nationalistic and antisemitic elements of Dmowski’s vision. Another group of Catholic intelligentsia, centered around one weekly magazine, “Tygodnik Powszechny,” and two monthlies, “Znak” and “Więź,” and led politically by Stanisław Stomma and Tadeusz Mazowiecki, attached their programme to the tenets of political realism or neo-positivism, as they called it. It was first expressed in a pamphlet by Aleksander Bochenski (he was personally connected to the PAX organization), The History of Foolishness in Poland. His vitriolic attack against all Polish dreams of independent existence as a kind of “third force” between Russia and Germany, against all delusions of Polish grandeur, all messianism, all Romantic traits in Polish political thought, all “heroic” ambitions to influence the world or at least Eastern European history, was followed in many political statements of Stomma, Mazowiecki, and Andrzej Micewski. They declared the necessity of teaching Poles to live within their ethnic boundaries, as a small nation, with no particular ambitions, neither imperial, nor antiimperial, but living quietly under the shield of their powerful protector. They were not so geopolitically pro-Russian as Dmowski or the PAX group, but they were determined to imbue the Polish public with a conviction that Poland was too weak to live without external patronage. It was difficult however to persuade most of the Polish public that the Soviet state could be an appropriate patron for a Catholic nation. 36 Pritzel, National Identity, pp. 79-91, Adam Bromke, Poland’s Politics: Idealism vs. Realism (Cambridge: MA, 1967), ch. 12; Stanisław Murzański, Wśród łopotu sztandarów rewolucji. Rzecz o katolewicy 1945-1989 (Kraków, 1998). 36

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Indeed, it was the Catholic identity of the Polish masses and the use of it by the Church Polish hierarchy that helped Poles to regain the spirit of independence and that of a mission ascribed to Poland. It is worth remembering here, that after the partitions Catholicism was treated both in Bismarck’s and Russian officials’ policies as the essence of the Polish identity, the essence of the Polish intransigence in fighting against domination by the Russian or the German empire. After World War II, when Poland was cut off from her former eastern Kresy, with their predominantly Eastern Ort hodox, Uniate, and Jewish populations, the link between the Polish nation and Catholicism was even strengthened. Despite the efforts of some groups of Catholic intellectuals, ready to collaborate with the Communist regime, the Catholic Church became the most powerful stronghold of all the traditions of “Sarmatian”-Romantic culture and past “grandeur” that the new system intended to extirpate. The old traditions of Poland as antemurale Christianitatis – the bulwark of Christianity (against the Turks and “Schismatics”/Russians) – were easily translated into the new situation where Polish Catholics formed the largest and best organized Church community within the Soviet system. First, the Church became the bulwark of the Polish traditional identity against the new, Communist power and against its educational system. Then the old dreams of a Polish mission to open the European East to Catholic influences could be revived. Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, who led his Church in this fight for survival, and then – after 1956 – for victory, ended his 33 years rule over Polish Catholics with these symbolic words, uttered in his last will and testament, and presented to Polish bishops a few days before his death in May 1981: “The East is opened to the Polish Church, it is to be conquered, all.”37 “The East” meant the old Commonwealth realm, Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania, and beyond it, Russia, as well as other states of the Soviet bloc in East37 Stefan Wyszyński, Nauczanie społeczne 1946-1981 (Warsaw, 1990), p. 1047. As the best account in English of the role of the Church in opposition against the Soviet system see: George Weigel, The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism (Oxford, 1991). For a detailed analysis of Cardinal Wyszyński’s concept of the Polish nation and its role see Andrzej Nowak, “Czy teologia narodu prymasa Stefana Wyszyńskiego jest nadal aktualna,” Krzystof Dybciak, ed., Prymas Wyszyński a kultura katolicka (Warsaw, 2002), pp. 47-64.

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Central Europe, especially those with a distinct Catholic tradition, such as Czechoslovakia or Hungary. “The conquest” meant the break up of the communist system with the force of a spiritual revolution, led or at least inspired by the Polish example. These hopes did not seem so extravagant at the moment when the dying Cardinal uttered them. There was already a Pole at the universal Church’s helm. And there had been the great, 10-millionstrong “Solidarity” movement in Poland, that seemed to embody both the “Sarmatian,” republican dream, and the Romantic, insurrectionistmissionist ideals. Karol Wojtyła – John Paul II – is justly considered to be a strong proponent of the latter, Romantic vision, where being Polish means to have a mission. The essence of this mission, as ascribed to Poland by the new Pope, was revealed fully during his first visit to his native country in 1979. In Gniezno, the cradle of Polish statehood and Christianity in Poland, he presented a program of spiritual liberation of all Slavic nations, and of turning all of them again to Christianity. The Pope believed that the peaceful insurrection he inspired with his words presented to millions of Poles would lead finally to the fall of the evil Empire. Poland was presented in those days as a spiritual super-power that could influence most of the Soviet bloc countries of Eastern Europe and counter effectively more than three decades of the communist ideology in the minds of millions. This impression was even strengthened by the “Solidarity” movement, which led to the gravest crisis in the whole Communist system in Eastern Europe since its formation. The missionary zeal, so evident in those hectic days of 19801981, was best documented in the Appeal of the First Congress of “Solidarity,” addressed to “workers in Eastern Europe” (Posłanie do ludzi pracy w Europie Wschodniej). This appeal to follow the Polish free trade unions’ example in fighting for human and civic rights was an open declaration of war not only on the communist rulers of Poland, but on the Soviet system as a whole, on the Soviet Empire’s ideological domination over its nations. The Soviet authorities treated the Polish example as a mortal threat and serious rival, based on Polish historical traditions in Eastern Europe and on its Catholic, religious identity. They were still able to crush this rival, as the martial law imposed in December 1981 would prove. However, the seeds of unrest had been sown, the

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“Polish core” had played its anti-imperial role for the whole region once again. Or, at least, some Poles believe this is so.38

AN EPILOGUE OR JUST A NEXT CHAPTER? Ten years after martial law was introduced in Poland, the Soviet Union was officially dissolved. The Empire seemed to lie in ruins. The combination of the temporary power vacuum with the serious illness of the Big Brother allowed a renaissance of other historical imperialisms. From Hungarian efforts to extend their political community to all Hungarians living in neighbouring states, former parts of Saint Stephen’s Crown lands,39 through “Russian bombast on behalf of Russian-speakers in the ‘near-abroad’ frightened neighbours,” Russia’s quarrels with Ukraine over Crimea and her armed occupation of Transnistria, to the bloody struggle to keep control over Chechnia, along with the equally bloody struggle to build a Serbian mini-empire on the ruins of the former Yugoslavia – all these events have shown that history is able to take her revenge. But where was the Polish imperialism in this “favourable” time? Fears of its very real revival throughout the post-Commonwealth, and now post-Soviet, Eastern European realm ran high – especially in the Lithuanian capital, Wilno/Vilnius, in Lwów/Lviv in Western Ukraine, and in Belarusian Minsk. In the middle of the 1990s these fears were shown to be almost totally groundless. Already in 1994 Poland had treaties with all her eastern neighbours and had renounced all claims Drogowskazy dla Polaków Ojca Świętego Jana Pawła II, Vol. 1, Pielgrzymki do Ojczyzny 1979, 1983, 1987 (Kraków, 1999), pp. 31-37. See also an interesting series of articles consecrated to the Polish Church and “Solidarity” influences in the western (“postCommonwealth”) part of the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and in the 1980s, as well as to the Soviet authorities’ reaction to it in Józef Darski, Roman Solchanyk, Ivan Hvat’, “Suchanist,” Zeszyt w języku polskim, No. 1-2 (Summer 1985) (München, 1985). For a broader perspective see Roman Szporluk, Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union (Stanford, 2000). 39 See Zoltan Kantor et al., eds., The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protec tio n (Sapporo, 200 4) (http://src-h.slav.hok uda i.a c.jp/coe21 /pu blish/no4 _ses/ contents.html). 38

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regarding the special status of Poles (which was an especially sensitive matter in Lithuania) and all possible territorial demands. “At the end of the twentieth century, the Polish political mainstream has finally broken with both Józef Piłsudski’s Jagiellonian view of Poland as a great power and a multinational Commonwealth engaged in a struggle between Germany and Russia – and Roman Dmowski’s notion that the frontiers of Poland were a reflection of its military prowess. Poland has finally resigned itself to the status of a medium-sized country that wants to expand its ties to Western Europe for cultural and economic reasons while accepting the fact that these ties must be conditioned by Warsaw’s relations with Moscow.”40 This transformation of the Polish elites’ attitudes was quite unexpected for many commentators critical of the Polish “imperial” traditions as represented allegedly both by Piłsudski and Dmowski. It was ascribed to the triumph of a wise political programme which had been formulated in exile by Jerzy Giedroyc (born in Minsk) and Juliusz Mieroszewski (born in Krakow), his closest political collaborator in “Kultura” monthly (published in Paris for more than fifty years). That programme is usually interpreted as supporting the independence of Lithuanian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian nation-states, with no territorial claims against them, and with no reference to their historical ties to Poland, as well as with no hostile intentions towards the Russian nation. The only enemy in this programme was to be a kind of “nationalist imperialism,” whether Russian or Polish, that could start a quarrel over Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian territories. It is possible, however, to connect the lasting influence of “Kultura’s” programme to more general reasons. In the new world ushered in by “the End of History” – as it seemed then at the start of the 1990s – old territorial quarrels and claims were supposed to lose their previous meaning. Political focus on territory is considered as anachronistic and is largely replaced by a tendency to move close to centres of information, finance, and prosperity, driven by economic considerations. As Ola Tunander observes, there is a trend observable in many other cases in Central and Eastern Europe – a trend toward Pritzel, National Identity, p. 104. See also Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations, pp. 232-276.

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greater centrality and actual amputation of ties with more backward peripheries.41 He enumerates in this context the examples of Czechs’ “velvet divorce” with Slovakia, Germans’ willingness to acknowledge their loss of Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia, as well as Russians’ consent to dissolution of the Soviet Union – just in order to get rid of their Asiatic peripheries. Though he does not mention Poland, her relatively easy farewell to the former Commonwealth seems to fit the pattern, too. Like almost every other country under the spell of “End of History” vision, Poland, or rather her inhabitants, preferred to be closer to the Western centre of the only civilization (just as during the Enlightenment) – that is to join the European Union as quickly as possible – than to keep their own, particular nostalgic dreams of historical grandeur. It was not Giedroyc-Mieroszewski’s ideas, but rather a revival of arguments used by the old Krakow school of historians, and Catholic “neopositivistic realists,” both fighting with the same enemy of the Polish Romantic tradition for a new, spiritually and materially smaller Poland, that proved to be useful in sustaining that attitude in Polish political opinion during the 1990s. They repeated the old wisdom of the Enlightenment reformers that it might be necessary to amputate not only eastern peripheries from the imagined dimension of a “Polish civilization,” but also to amputate some essential traits from the Polish self-perception. They insisted that only after this was done would Poland be able to apply for a modest place on the outskirts of the Western European “city on the hill.” But there was no “End of History.” Or at least not everyone was persuaded to believe in it. In the mid-nineties there came another phase. Like the previous one, it could be named after famous essay turned into a book: it was “the Clash of Civilization” phase. After the war in the Balkans had escalated with the NATO bombardments of Serbian positions in Bosnia, and after Russia had dropped her pro-Western course to show her older faces – those of Vladimir Zhirinovskii and Ol a Tu na nd er, “ Po st -Co ld Wa r E u ro pe : A Syn th esis o f a B ip ol a r Fr ie nd -F oe Structu re a nd a Hierarchic Cosmos-Chaos Stru ctu re?,” Ola Tunander, Pa vel Ba ev, Victoria Ingrid Einagel, eds., Ge op olitics in Po st-Wa ll Eu rop e. Se cu rity, Te rrito ry an d Iden tity (London, New Delhi, 1 997), pp. 17-4 5. 41

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Evgenii Primakov – it seemed again that Poland was somewhere on the civilizational “fault-line.” Therefore, with Polish efforts to join NATO and with Russia’s persistent, sometimes hysterical opposition to this step, Russian fears returned. They feared a Polish-led Commonwealth revival, allegedly planned by Zbigniew Brzeziński and John Paul II in a combined conspiracy, in which the new Polish president, Aleksander Kwaśniewski was included. These fears spread even to the so-called serious press (for instance, “Kommersant,” March 1997, “Delovye Liudi,” April 1997),42 not to speak of the more vulgar Russian media. Though there were no intentions of this kind on the Polish side, the change in the political and, so to speak, ideological context encouraged a renaissance of some “imperial,” sometimes more “missionist” ambitions. “I would like Poland to be a regional power (mocarstwo), which doesn’t mean any megalomania. It is just a confirmation of the real position of Poland now. Even our foreign guests speak about Poland as a regional power” – stated Polish foreign minister, Bronisław Geremek in February 1999. This “regional power” was to show many initiatives to influence the situation in the countries of the post-Commonwealth realm, especially in Ukraine – in order to help them to establish more ties with western political-economic structures and standards (or to help the opposition forces, in the case of Lukashenka’s Belarus), and to prevent their re-integration within the Russian sphere of domination, and it was in Poland that the Chechen anti-imperial rebellion found the strongest support. Poland as a constructor of an anti-imperial (read “antiRussian imperial”) “democratic cordon,” Poland as an “advocate” of the post-Soviet, Eastern European states in Western structures – these two metaphors were discussed very vigorously in the late 1990s in Polish media and political circles.43 See: Ola Tunander, Pavel Baev, Victoria Ingrid Einagel, “Rosja w upadku – rozmowa z Andrzejem Walickim,” Arcana, No. 26 (1999), pp. 33-51. 43 Minister Geremek’s statement cited in: Maria Wągrowska, “Polityka na miarę realnej siły Polski,” Rzeczpospolita, 16 February 1999; see also, for instance: idem, “Polska jako mocarstwo,” Rzeczpospolita, 8 June 1998; Leopold Unger, “W oczach Zachodu,” Gazet Wyborcza, 19 September 1997; Zdzisław Najder, “Ukraina, Polska, Europa,” Polska w Euro pie, No. 38 (December 2001 ); Roman Kuźniar, Krzysztof Szczepanik, Po lity ka zagraniczna RP 1989-2002 (Warsaw, 2002), pp. 220-221; Joanna Strzelczyk, Ucieczka ze Wschodu. Rosja w polskiej polityce 1989-1993 (Warsaw, 2002), pp. 461-468. 42

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Not that there was no opposition in Poland to these initiatives. The low-key vision of Poland as a small and humble petitioner or supplicant of the European Union still has many of supporters. They still treat any thoughts of some bolder role for the Polish state in Eastern Europe only as trouble-making and vain bombast. In their political perspective the only feasible Polish foreign policy was to conform to all the EU requirements. Among these the most important in this context is the one, connected to the Schengen accord, which demands that Poland build what is in effect a visas-cum-police wall on the eastern border – with Ukraine, Belarus, and the Russian Kaliningrad oblast. To be on the better, western side of the new wall – this was the only thing that mattered for the opponents of any active Polish policy in Eastern Europe. That would mean one more Polish withdrawal from the East, and one more partition of the post-Commonwealth realm. This mode of reasoning was criticized in turn by supporters of the idea of keeping the Commonwealth’s strategic and cultural legacy alive, which was probably best expressed by Jan Kieniewicz, an eminent historian from Warsaw. According to his interpretation Poland has had a civilizational role as a builder of European structures in the continent’s East, between the Baltic and Black Seas. The Commonwealth was for him rather a model of Europe in the East than an ethnic Polish model. But with the strategic defeat of the Commonwealth in its rivalry with Russia, Europe – in the sense of European civilization – began to be eliminated from the region. In geopolitical terms, Russia stole Poland’s European clothes and started to be treated as a synonym for the whole Eastern Europe. Poland, in turn, started to treat the East as something inferior, something to be ashamed of, and decided to identify herself completely with the West and leave all the concept (and with it all the reality) of Eastern Europe to her successful rival – Russia. And now Poland has to answer this fateful question again: do we want – asks professor Kieniewicz – to accept the place and the role of a periphery? To be just a Western European gatekeeper in the East? Or should Poland become a new European integrator in the East – to open Europe once again to the whole realm of the former Commonwealth?44 Jan Kieniewicz, “Czy Europa Wschodnia jest możliwa?,” Arcana, No. 29 (5/1999), pp. 54-67. Arguments for the opposite, “minimalist” position in the discussion over the Polish “Eastern policy” are summarized in: Bartłomiej Sienkiewicz, “Pochwała minimalizmu,” Tygodnik Powszechny, 24 December 2000. 44

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Another professor – Zbigniew Brzeziński – gave a different, but more practical, geopolitical dimension to this vision. Both in his many articles published in the late 1990s and even more forcefully in some of his more private statements, Brzeziński paints a picture in which Poland becomes a regional leader of a new Central Europe. The latter should cover the former Jagiellonian empire, comprising both the Visegrad group (an idea launched in the beginning of the 1990s to provide a forum of integration for Poland and her southern neighbours: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) and the former Commonwealth countries: from Ukraine to the Baltic republics. Only Russia would stay relegated to Eastern Europe. In Brzeziński’s concept, Poland would draw the strength for her role of a regional power from her key geographical position, her historical traditions, and especially from her current strong ties to American policy. Poland would be again something akin to the Duchy of Warsaw, as imagined by Staszic and Kołłątaj two centuries earlier: an Eastern European outpost of the Western Empire, this time that of the United States.45 John Paul II further strengthened the “missionist” mood, providing another active role for Poland in the east of the continent – in a specific, religious perspective. During his sixth visit to Poland in June 1997 he again presided over the great congregation gathered in Gniezno, to commemorate the meeting there between the first Polish king and the German Holy Roman Emperor in 1000 and the entrance of Poland to Europe. The Pope was greeted there by the presidents of seven Central European states: Germany, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Poland. Poles, according to his words, should accept their duty of being at the centre of a new mission – to form a “pivot” of a united Europe comprising all western and all eastern (mostly Slavic) European nations. As he would stress on many further occasions, Poland, with her strong Catholic identity, should influence both the West and the East of Europe. This vision of a specific Polish moral-religious apostolate bore again strong 45 Zbigniew Brzeziński, O Polsce, Europie i świecie (Warsaw, 2002). Brzeziński’s more private opinions on the role Poland could play are related in a very interesting way in: Rosja w upadku – rozmowa z Andrzejem Walickim, pp. 48-49. See also an interesting collection: Marcin Zaborowski, D. H. Dunn, eds., Poland. A New Power in Transatlantic Security (London, 2003).

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resemblance to the Polish Romantics model of Polish “moral imperialism,” operating against the despotic East and the materialistic West alike. This, so to speak, Gniezno model of Polish all-European engagement is still stressed in the Church’s activity, as it is confirmed in the idea of organising another great political-religious congregation in this city, exactly the day after Poland’s accession to the EU, on May 2, 2004, with all Europe’s Catholic bishops and most of Central Europe’s heads of state present.46 The discussions concerning an active role for Poland were given a new heat and a new dimension by a new geopolitical situation. After “the End of History,” and “the Clash of Civilizations” phases, the new one, introduced with the United States’ open declaration of a “unipolar moment,” and the backlash this ambition provoked in Europe, could be named “the Revenge of History.” The position of Poland, with her drive to become an EU member, and at the same time with her proAmerican policy began to be reviewed as being on a fault-line again. This time not the one between the “Eastern Orthodox” and the “Western” civilizations, which runs somewhere through the eastern border of the former Commonwealth. The new fault line, though geographically lying somewhere in the Atlantic, between Washington and Paris, was introduced into Eastern and Central Europe too. It was heralded by declarations of both Donald Rumsfeld (on “the Old and New Europe”) and Jacques Chirac (castigating the leaders of “the New Europe” for their pro-American commitment). Poland now has to answer a new question. If she wants to retain her position, or perception of herself, as a regional power, influencing a large part of Eastern and Central Europe, she might be pushed to make a choice between treating either the US or the EU (with its hard, FrancoGerman core) as the source of her regional position and mission. The West is divided – so Poland, feeling herself the exponent of Western values, standards and structures in the region, would be tempted to decide for herself: where is “the true” West, the most promising model of development, the most important source of power, a part of which might be delegated to Warsaw? 46 Drogowskazy dla Polaków Ojca Świętego Jana Pawła II, Vol. II, Pielgrzymki do Ojczyzny 1991, 1995, 1997, 1999 (Kraków, 1999), pp. 337-345.

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There is no apter illustration of the Polish choice, than the Polish general commanding an occupation zone in Iraq centring on the ancient Babylon. The Polish veto on changes to the Nice treaty, that France and Germany intended to introduce together with a constitution for the EU, is perceived by most of Polish public opinion as another chapter in the old history of the Polish anti-imperial stand in international politics. Poland poses as – and is accused of being – a spoiler of the new empire in the making. This time a Franco-German Europe is for many a candidate for “the Evil Empire.” It might be viewed as more burdensome for the countries of the region because it is geographically closer to them than the distant American power. That power is ready to affirm its ambitions as a distant ally and to use them effectively, as President George W. Bush asserted during his visit to Kraków on May 31, 2003. In his remarks addressed to “the People of Poland” from the Wawel Royal Castle, he touched all the points that have been elaborated above in this paper as the most fundamental elements of a specific Polish oscillation between an anti-imperial function and a unique missionistimperial tradition. “From this castle, Polish kings ruled for centuries in a tradition of tolerance. Below this hill lies the market square, where Kosciuszko swore loyalty to the first democratic constitution of Europe. And at Wawel Cathedral in 1978, a Polish Cardinal began his journey to a conclave in Rome, and entered history as Pope John Paul II – one of the greatest moral leaders of our time.”47 The first statement reminds us of the traditions of the Commonwealth. The second recalls both the antiimperial role of Polish insurrections in the eastern part of the continent and also suggests the privileged position Polish political culture could take vis-à-vis Western Europe. The third stresses the moral (religious) dimension of Polish missionist ambitions. We still like to listen to this melody. It is not so easy to put to rest five centuries of history and the traditions that make Poland so susceptible to Promethean dreams, dreams that are so hard for neighbouring empires to digest, and so prone to be used by more distant ones. Poland is still here, between the two powerful centres of the Russian Third Rome and the European-German Holy Roman Empire. George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to the People of Poland, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 31 May 2003.

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Eternally too weak to make a stable Empire-in-Between, and too strong (too proud or too self-confident) to accept the position of a small, dependent state. Eternally poised between the European East and West, between its own perception of itself as just a “normal” nation only and as the whole (“Sarmatian”-Romantic) civilization, between the role of a historical victim and that of a perpetrator, between the weak and the powerful. We are still here…48

Is Poland totally unique in this respect? Of course not, at least in the oscillation between an anti-imperial function and an imperial temptation. Almost all empires have had this element in their ideological fundamentals. It is enough to mention a few examples in this respect: the Hungarians as lords of the Saint Stephen Crown lands and the leaders of antiHabsburg national liberation movements; the Serbs as their own little South-Slavic empire creators – and the leaders of anti-Ottoman and anti-Habsburg movements; the Japanese with their anti-“White Men” empire’s programme of Asia for Asiatic peoples – which happened to be the Japan imperialist doctrine; the Russians with a belief in their power’s liberating mission opposed to the “evil empires” of Napoleon or George W. Bush – and with their own empire, known also as “the prison of nations”; Franco-German Europe, believing itself to be the stronghold of an anti-imperial order opposed to Yankee world-domination while being at the same time quite imperial in its relations with “poorer cousins” from “the New Europe.” As a final example we can mention the empire – the United States, whose foreign policy-cum-propaganda is so much influenced by the presumption that Americans have no empire but a universal liberation mission. There is plenty of room for comparisons to be made and lessons to be learnt. 48

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13 THE MOST EUROPEAN SCIENCE IN RUSSIA: DEFINING THE EMPIRE ANTHROPOLOGICALLY1 MARINA MOGILNER INTRODUCTION The concept of mega- and meso-areas aims at explaining the dynamics of historically and geopolitically defined complex regions. While the “vertical” (mega«meso areas) system of communication seems to me more or less theoretically and empirically clear, the “horizontal” (mega«mega areas) dimension of communication and interaction presents a more interesting case. Historically, economically and geopolitically defined mega-areas can belong to the same “intellectual mega-area” on the mental map of the contemporaries, sharing the same repertoire of languages of self-description and selfconstruction (e.g. the discourse of “Enlightenment” or “Modernity”), and thus being able to understand each other and interact. At the same time they pretend to be self-sufficient entities (a “world in itself”) that produce discourses of self-description and self-definitions by themselves and thus do not need any validation from the outside. The understanding of mega-area as an “attractor” (in the sense this concept is used by synergetics theory) and, in a way, a synthesizer of meso-areas predetermines the view of a mega-area as a complex, dynamic and internally heterogeneous construction. It is the interactions inside megaareas and communications among them that provide for the creation of common language(s) of communication and mechanisms of cultural transfer and “translation” (one has to remember, that the mega- and meso-areas model is built around the fundamental situation of “communication”). The analysis of that internal and external interaction of mega-areas requires a special analytical optics focusing on the issues of intercultural translations, geopolitical imagination and the limits of cultural expansion, characteristic of mega«mega areas interaction. 1

This study was supported by the Gerda Henkel Stiftung (Grant AZ 09/SR/02).

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In this chapter I investigate a case of mega«mega areas communication, where one mega-area (Europe) plays the leading role of a standard-setting civilization (a superior mega-area), while the other (Russian Empire) is, presumably, a subordinate mega-area. However, since our analytical model defines the mega-area as a complex entity aspiring for self-sufficiency (which is, in turn, a product of multiple “vertical” and “horizontal” communications of mega«meso and meso«meso areas), the simplistic scheme of communication directed from the donor (a superior mega-area) to the recipient (a subordinate mega-area) can be rejected from the start. Rather, in this case, one deals with two different versions of the same common language of mega«mega areas communication, which in our case is the language of Modernity. At the same time, in our analysis we have to take into account how the actors of communication position themselves: it is quite possible that what looks like an instance of superiority/dependency, or even as mega«meso areas communication by one side, is perceived as a mega«mega areas interaction by the other side. The boundaries of social actors and of the competing mega-areas on the mental map of people do not necessarily coincide with actual geographical borders (for when we talk about megaareas as intellectual constructs we eventually deal with actual people and groups producing knowledge and discourses). For example, a group of Russian intellectuals in the focus of my research viewed themselves as representatives of the “European science” – a virtual mega-area of European Modernity, thus surpassing the conflicting or subordination vectors of mega«mega areas communication. They developed the Russian science of physical anthropology, the science that adopted a “western European” language of racial analysis to redefine Russian imperial space and population in terms of “modernity” and the European nation-state paradigm. Nevertheless, the transfer of European methods of anthropology into Russia did not reinforce the proliferation of nation-state or colonial models in Russian anthropological discourse, but rather it generated peculiar spatial imaginaries based on volosti (see below). Therefore, Russian physical anthropology for a while remained “useless” to the authorities, who could not transform the categories of analysis offered by the science into the categories of political practice. Only during the early Soviet period did anthropology begin to affect the geopolitical imagination of the power-

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holders involved in the designing of Soviet national administrative divisions (new meso-areas of the Soviet Mega-area). However, the discussion of this development is beyond the scope of this paper. All these thoughts testify to the complexity of mega«mega areas system of communication: European racial thought adopted in Russia gave rise not only to a peculiar Russian version of anthropology that reflected the heterogeneity of the Russian Imperial Mega-area, but also to specific visions of Europe itself as an intellectual and geopolitical mega-area. Russian anthropologists constructed the virtual mega-area of European modernity that reflected their ideal of intellectual communication across the political and cultural borders. If we attempted to compose a catalogue of major notions that define the European Mega-area of the mid-nineteenth – first half of the twentieth centuries, the notion of “race” would be among the first to come to mind. Indeed, this notion and the science of physical/racial anthropology had become central for Western European culture in the midnineteenth century and lost its influence only after World War II. During this time an inherently inexact and ambiguous term, “race”, was reconnected with another major European concept – the concept of “nation”. In the words of Nicolas Hudson, who studied the genealogy of the European usage of “race” from the Renaissance through the Enlightenment into the early nineteenth century: [T]he re-union of “race” and “nation” had such important consequences because of the way these terms had been redefined during the Enlightenment. “Race” now meant more than just a “lineage” or even a variation of the human species induced by climate or custom. It meant an innate and fixed disparity in the physical and intellectual make-up of different peoples. “Nation,” in turn, was more than a group of people living under the same government. It was the very “soul” of personal identity, the very life-blood churning through an individual speaking a particular dialect in one of Europe’s innumerable regions. From the often violent coupling of “race” and “nation,” re-fashioned in these new forms, were spawned the most virulent forms of nineteenth-century racism, and finally the political barbarities of our own century.2 Nicholas Hudson, “From ‘Nation’ to ‘Race’: The Origin of Racial Classification in Eighteenth-Century Thought,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 29:3 (1996), p. 258. 2

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In modern post-colonial scholarship, the notion of “race” and the science of physical anthropology have been linked with yet another defining European experience – the experience of colonialism. From this perspective, from the mid-nineteenth to the turn of the century anthropology was reconceived as an imperial science for “white Europeans” to use knowledge in order to manipulate cultural distances, to observe and distance other, distinctly different non-European races.3 The mental map of scholars who study both paradigms – the “racialising” of nation and Orientalism – until recently had excluded Russia. The debates about the so-called “Russian orientalism” and the notion of “race” in modern Russian political and cultural discourse, characterize the very latest stage of the historiographic redefinition of Russia as a part of European modernity.4 The issue under consideration Among general works on the category of “race” and cultural otherness see: G. Stocking, Race, Culture, and Evolution: Essays in the History of Anthropology (New York, 1968); C. Bolt, Victorian Attitude to Race (London, 1971); J. Burke, “The Wild Man’s Pedigree: Scientific Method and Racial Anthropology,” E. Dudley and M. Novak, eds., The Wild Man Within: An Image in Western Thought from the Renaissance to Romanticism (Pittsburgh, 1972), pp. 259-280; P. Weindling, Health, Race and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism, 1870-1945 (Cambridge, 1989); Edward A. Said, Orientalism (London, 1978); Idem, Culture and Imperialism (New York, 1993). 4 See: D. Brower, E. Lazzerini, eds., Russia’s Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700-1917 (Bloomington, Indianapolis, 1997); C. Clay, “Russian Ethnographers in the Service of Empire, 1856-1862,” Slavic Review 54:1 (Spring 1995), pp. 45-61; N. Knight, “Grigor’ev in Orenburg, 1851-1862: Russian Orientalism in the Service of Empire?” Slavic Review 59:1 (Spring 2000), pp. 74-100; Ex Tempore, “Orientalism and Russia”: A. Khalid, “Russian History and the Debate over Orientalism”; N. Knight, “On Russian Orientalism: A Response to Adeeb Khalid”: M. Todorova, “Does Russian Orientalism Have a Russian Soul? A Contribution on the Debate between Nathaniel Knight and Adeeb Khalid,” Kritika: Exploration in Russian and Eurasian History 1:4 (Fall 2000), pp. 691-728; Modernization of Russian Empire and Paradoxes of Orientalism: D. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, “A Subtle Matter – Orientalism”; A. Etkind, “The Saved Man’s Burden, or the Inner Colonization of Russia”; N. Knight, “Was Russia its own Orient? Reflections on the Contributions of Etkind and Schimmelpenninck on the Debate on Orientalism”; E. Campbell, “On the Questions of Orientalism in Russia (in the second half of the 19th – early 20th centuries),” Ab Imperio, No. 1 (2002), pp. 239-311; Discussion: E. Weitz, “Racial Politics without the Concept of Race: Reevaluating Soviet Ethnic and National Purges”; F. Hirsch, “Race without the Practice of Racial Politics”; A. Weiner, “Nothing but Certainty”; A. Lemon, “Without a ‘Concept’? Race as Discursive Practice”; E. Weitz, “On Certainties and Ambivalencies: Reply to My Critics,” Slavic Review 61:2 (Spring 2002), pp. 1-65. 3

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is whether we can apply to Russia the models and paradigms that were designed by “the West” to understand and represent Western European modernity. However, when we talk about the “European Intellectual Mega-area,” we have to keep in mind that this particular “Europe” had been imagined by Western Europeans as much as it was imagined by Russians. In this sense we can measure both Westerners’ and Russians’ “Europeaness” by their own standards and by their imagined Europes and modernities. The science that existed on the mar gins of the official Russian academic world – Russian physical anthropology of the mid-nineteenth – early twentieth century – “professionally” worked with such an archetypical modern European notion as the notion of “race,” but applied it to the Russian imperial context. Russian physical anthropologists – a community of professionals (physicians and teachers) and academics (university professors) – developed a common identity of belonging to the most modernized and “European” science of their time and shared a very specific sense of modernity and Europeaness. Their story is yet to be written; today many Russian anthropologists are known to researchers either as ethnographers or geographers, some are treated as a part of the foreign academic milieu: for example, in Efron’s pioneering book “Defenders of the Race,”5 the Russian Jewish anthropologist Samuel Weissenberg is described as primarily German in his intellectual, political and cultural appearance. Efron ignores the specifically Russian context and implications of Weissenberg’s scholarship as being sec ond ary t o t he hist or ic al und er st and ing of his anthropological agenda – the perception that follows from the simplistic (donor-recipient) model of mega-areas interaction discussed above. Yet Weissenberg was actively involved in the grand project of Russian anthropology – the anthropological cataloguing of the empire. As a renowned anthropologist, Jewish ethnographer and activist he also participated in the construction of Russian-Jewish identity within the borders of the Empire (as against the cross-border Ashkenazi or Ost-juden identities) – another example of mental John M. Efron, Defenders of the Race. Jewish Doctors and Race Science in Fin-de-Siecle Europe (New Haven, London, 1994). 5

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mapping of the inner heterogeneity of the Russian Imperial Megaar ea. A native of Elisavetgr ad, he benefited from German anthropological research scholarships and published in German academic jornals, yet his major anthropological agenda and his application of anthropological methods that he learned in Germany cannot be explained from the perspective of German anthropological discourse (or, as Efron does, from the perspective of German Jewish anthropological disc our se). His European knowledge was reconfigured by the Russian “world in itself.” And Weissenberg is just one example… Further I will draw a picture of Russian physical anthropology as a scholarly discipline and an academic community that attempted to redefine the Russian Mega-area (as a complex entity) in terms of Western European scientific discourse of Modernity. I will discuss self-visions and self-descriptions of Russian anthropologists, their methods and major achievements, and their grand project of the anthropological description of the Empire. At the end I will suggest the examples of alternative usage of academic anthropology in Russia (an attempt at racialising the nation) and bring the discussion to its last point, which is about the imagined Europe and “European science” constructed by Russian anthropologists as the ideal for their Russian anthropological utopia.

THE MYTH OF ORIGIN When, in 1900, Russian anthropologists started their own scholarly journal – Russkii Antropologicheskii zhurnal (Russian Anthropological Journal, RAJ) – they felt confident enough to reflect on the history of Russian anthropology, which at that time, by their estimations, was 40-45 years old.6 The early stages of this history were directly linked to western European anthropology with the first In 1902 Prof. A. A. Ivanovskii, one of the leading Russian anthropologists, calculated the age of Russian anthropology as being around 40 to 50 years. See: Al. Ivanovskii, “Ob antropologicheskom izuchenii inorodcheskogo naseleniia Rossii,” Russkii antropologicheskii zhurnal (RAZh) 9:1 (1902), p. 113. 6

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Russian anthropologists been referred to as the “pupils of Linnaeus” rather then members of the Imperial geographical society or ethnographers. Their German origin and foreign scholarly culture (they wrote in Latin and German) were also stressed (Karl fon-Ber, Middendorf, Kastern, Shrenk, Grubber were named among the first Russian anthropologists).7 At the same time, the most natural predecessor, Russian ethnography, was considered a problematic source for Russian anthropology. While in 1900 the leading Russian anthropologist, Moscow university professor D. Anuchin, credited the Imperial Russian Geographical Society and its Ethnography division for “occasionally collecting anthropological data,”8 in 1916 he noted skeptically that taking ethnography as the predecessor seriously means going back into history to the time of the Primary Chronicle. This is pointless and wrong, Anuchin assumed, since Russian ethnography had never studied “physical characteristics of [human] tribes” before the works on the human brain by academician Fon Ber appeared in the 1850s.9 The RAJ, the mouthpiece of the Anthropological division of the Moscow-based Imperial Society of Lovers (liubiteli) of Natural Sciences, Anthropology and Ethnography, contrary to traditionally Trudy [Papers] published by closed corporate academic societies, was intended for a broad academic and non-academic audience. The journal was very outspoken in equating the history of Russian anthropology with the history of the Moscow Anthropological Division. “The history of Russian anthropology begins with the foundation, on the initiative of Prof. A. I. Bogdanov, of the Anthropological Division of the Society of Lovers of Natural Sciences,” declared Anuchin in one of his articles. 10 Al. Ivanovskii called Russian anthropologists customarily stressed the German origin of the first Russian scholars in the field as well as the importance of French, German and other European examples of anthropological societies for the Moscow anthropological division of the Imperial society of Lovers of natural sciences, anthropology and ethnography. As a typical example see: D. Anuchin, “Beglyi vzgliad na proshloe antropologii i na ee zadachi v Rossii,” RAZh 1:1 (1900), pp. 34-35. 8 Among the “anthropological activities” of Russian ethnographers Anuchin mentions their interest i n ethnographic physic al anthropology (Mainov, Schapov) and prehistorical archeology (Poliakov, Merezhkovskii). Ibid., p. 36. 9 D. Anuchin, “Na rubezhe polutora- i polustoletiia,” RAZh 37-38:1-2 (1916), p. 8. 10 Ibid., p. 9. 7

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Professor of Zoology of Moscow University, A. P. Bogdanov, “the first apostle of anthropology in Russia,” who transmitted it from French to Russian soil. 11 Ivanovskii hinted that Bogdnanov was inspired by the French anthropological society founded in 1860 and directly transplanted French anthropology into Russian – Muscovite – soil. This was the right fitting predecessor for Russian anthropology, not local ethnographic and geographical societies. The pre-Moscow stage of Russian anthropology was painted in the journal as either non-existent or dependent on direct foreign influence and participation. The very fact noted by the same Anuchin that by 1864 – the time of the Division’s foundation – “beside Bogdanov himself, there were no specialists [in anthropology] in Moscow,” did not challenge his major assumption about Petersburg or any other possible pre-Moscow anthropological past.12 This was, indeed, striking, especially in the case of St. Petersburg – the major locus of Russian imperial sciences – geography and ethnography. In the dominant anthropological communal discourse formed and reflected by the RAJ, St. Petersburg emerged as just one of the centers of Russian anthropology alongside Derpt, Kazan, Kiev, Khar’kov, Siberia (due to the ethnographic activities of the exiles) and a few others. Moscow, on the contrary, was the only and the most natural center of attraction and influence for all these “anthropological provinces.” Such rhetoric persisted even after the establishment of two academic anthropological societies in St. Petersburg: the Russian Anthropological Society of the St. Petersburg University (1888) and the Anthropological Society of the Military-Medical Academy (1893). 13 Yet, even before this, thanks to an enthusiast of physical anthropology from the Military-Medical Academy, Prof. A. I. Tarenetskii, St. Petersburg became an actual leader Ivanovskii, “Ob antropologicheskom izuchenii,” p. 113. Bogdanov started kraniometrical research of archeological materials as a way to conceptualize the “great Russian anthropological type.” In 1865 he published “Materialy dlia antropologii kurgannogo perioda v Moskovskoi gub.” He translated into Russian Paul Broca’s instructions for anthropological observation. It was Bogdanov who recruited the first Moscow anthropologists and helped to establish a department (kafedra) of anthropology at Moscow University. 13 The Russian Anthropological Society of St. Petersburg University was established in 1888 and the Anthropological Society of the Imperial Military Medical Academy was established in 1893. 11 12

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in terms of the quantity of anthropological dissertations defended by his pupils. 14 These obvious facts, as well as the generic connection to and intellectual legacy of St. Petersburg were consciously downplayed by the group of anthropologists centering around the Moscow Division and the RAJ. They invented their own “myth of origin” in order to separate themselves from the old Russian imperial science connected (for them) with St. Petersburg. The new community of anthropologists that united academics and professionals outside academia searched for a common European past for itself and pretended to participate in the community of European anthropologists on equal terms. A colonial-like pattern of communication with Western European anthropology ended up with the establishment of the Moscow division. Now the mission of Russian anthropology, besides “our own national self-cognition,” consisted in “broadening the limits of human cognition in general, of cognition of humanity’s bodily and spiritual variations, their mutual interconnections and correlations, their dependence on the environment and time, etc.”15 German anthropologist Rudolf Virhov was cited as stating that the general progress of anthropology depends on Russia, which holds the keys to the major problems of modern European anthropology. 16 Thus, the symbolic (and actual) transfer of the center of Russian anthropology from Petersburg to Moscow was simultaneously an attempt at mental reconfiguration of the Russian modern “intellectual mega-area” and a step toward modern Europe. It signified the universalist stance of the new science, its ultimate “objectivity” and its actual newness, its distance from the old Russian imperial science. Professor A. I. Tarenetskii was one of the leading Russian medical anthropologists who promoted an anthropological approach in the modern Russian military science. Ma ny medica l-a nthropologica l, sanita ry-anthropol ogi cal and ethnogra phi canthropological dissertations were defended under his tutorship. Among them: the anthropological description of Ossetians by N. V. Gil’chenko, of Buriat – by I. I. Shendrikovskii and M. T. Porotov, of Arminians – by I. K. Tvar’ianovich, of Bashkirs – by D. N. Nikol’skii, of the Jews – by M. P. Iakovenko etc. These dissertations are preserved and catalogued in the Library of the Medical Military Academy. 15 D. Anuchin, “Beglyi vzgliad,” p. 40. 16 Ivanovskii, “Ob antropologicheskom izuchenii,” pp. 112-125, at p. 112. 14

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ANTHROPOLOGICAL MODERNITY Existing on the margins of academia (which was not initially a conscious choice but rather the result of the very low level of institutionalization of the new science), 17 Moscow-oriented anthropologists (actually, the majority of Russian anthropologists) were creating their own anthropological utopia, a peculiar kind of anthropological modernity. They used a scholarly journal as a means of empire-wide professional communication within the virtual community of anthropologists, rejected any national or religious biases and allowing into the community representatives of all peoples of the empire, stimulated inorodtsy anthropologists to study the Russian people as well Russian anthropologists routinely complained about the inadequate level of institutionalization of their science. Even few Russian anthropological textbooks treated this issue among the most important. For example, the textbook of E. G. Landau featured a list of countries where anthropology was taught in the universities (Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Switzerland, France, Austria, Hungary, Spain, Japan, etc.) In Russia, according to this textbook, anthropology was “flourishing” only in Moscow and St. Petersburg universities. See: E.G. Landau. Kratkoe rukovodstvo k izucheniiu antropologii (Iur’ev, 1912), p. 2. In fact, in 1912 – the year of Landau’s textbook publication – anthropology was included (in various forms) in the Geography academic programs in Moscow, Petersburg, Khar’kov and Novorosiisk universities. See: D.P. Nikol’skii, “Novyi antropologicheskii organ,” Trudy Antropologicheskogo Obschestva pri Imperatorskoi VoennoMed. Akademii, tom 7 (za 1901-1904 ucheb. G.) (St. Petersburg, 1912), pp. 7-14. Anthropology was also taught at the St. Petersburg Military Medical Academy and in St. Vladimir Kiev University. Moscow University was the first one to introduce a Kafedra of anthropology in 1876 with the help of private donation from K. F. Von Mekk. Yet, the new University Statute of 1884 did not recognize its legitimacy and instead made provisions for a Kafedra of Geography and Ethnography (where anthropology was allowed to be taught) at the departments of History and Philology. However, one year later Kazan University suggested to move these Kafedras from the History and Philology departments to the departments of Physics and Mathematics. St. Petersburg University created a special commission composed of the Professors of the Department of Physics and Mathematics to discuss this issue. The commission accepted the idea of moving Kafedras of Geography and Ethnography to the departments of Physics and Mathematics and instructed these Kafedras to teach two-semester courses in geography, ethnography and anthropology. However when these recommendations reached the Russian Ministry of Education, anthropology as a special university course disappeared from the final version of the University statute of 1884. Anthropology was formally allowed in the Kafedras of Geography, but its status was unclear. See: F. Volkov, “Antropologiia i ee universitetskoe prepodavanie (K peresmotru universitetskogo ustava),” I. Rudenko, Ezhegodnik Russkogo Antropologich. obschestva pri Imperator. Petrograd. Un-te (Petrograd, 1915), pp. 99-107. 17

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as their own (and vise versa), and positioned themselves as a part of the cultural world obsessed with self-cognition. Obviously, they were measuring, calculating and systematizing. In this sense, they represented a modern type of scholarship. Taxonomy, at the same time, was not an end in itself. Typically of the scholarly discourse of the late nineteenth century, Russian anthropology was searching for the laws of historical development, the basic causalities: as Ivanosvskii put it, “modern physical anthropology is not any more satisfied with a simple description and assertion of a fact; it aspires not only to discover morphological variations of mankind, but also to explain the causes of their emergence.”18 Anthropology was “a natural history of Man,”19 and as such provided a new modern scientific umbrella for old disciplines that were to be modernized through their incorporation into anthropology. In Russia this evolution from being one of the sciences exploring the history of humanity, alongside “history proper, the history of culture, ethnography, sociology, geography, geology, etc.,”20 to selfperception as a mega-science encompassing three fields – “physical anthropology, pre-historical archeology and ethnology” (and the latter included the study of folk culture, the history of primitive religions, law and art, and comparative linguistics), took less than two decades.21 The methods of study were universal: the language of numbers, formulas and graphs did not know state borders. This was, in fact, the language of the imagined European “Mega-area” of modernity. Theoretically, there were no special provisions for the study of Russians as against Tatars or Jews. In fact, anthropologists studied not peoples, but the variations of this or that anthropological trait within the population (of a volost’, a guberniia, a region, a country…). The anthropological utopia was, in a sense, the utopia of numbers, of the endless accumulation of anthropological data: “Let us imagine that everywhere in Russia, in various big and small centers observers-anthropologists are dispersed; they collect – according to a certain system and with certain methods – data about the variations of a [racial] type in the surrounding area, data about the distribution among the nearby population of the hues of skin, 18 19 20 21

Ivanovskii, “Ob antropologicheskom izuchenii,” p. 114. Anuchin, “Na rubezhe polutora- i polustoletiia,” p. 4. V. V. Vorob’ev, “Velikorossy (Ocherk fizicheskogo tipa),” RAZh 1:1 (1900), p. 45. Anuchin, “Na rubezhe polutora- i polustoletiia,” p. 4.

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hair, stature, body proportions, the forms of head and face, morphological deviations, physiological and pathological distinctions.” The data were to be placed on the maps, and organized into graphs, diagrams and tables.22 Medical doctors and local teachers were to be the utopian “observers-anthropologists” who acted under the guidance and with the assistance of the Moscow Anthropological Division.23 Obviously, the accent on professionals, on the technological side of the enterprise, revealed a modern utopia that hardly reflected the realities of turn of the century Russia. Compared to their Western European colleagues, Russian anthropologists felt the disadvantages of living in an under-regulated and, in this sense, undermodernized state that did not provide the anthropological community with systematic population statistics. They explained that anthropology was a science of culture and thus a privilege of “cultural countries,” where one could rely on such institutions as mass conscription, mass schooling, the systems of industrial control, social medicine and charities to get the needed quantitative data for anthropological analysis and comparison.24 In Russia, Anuchin was the first to use military data on the height of conscripts to compose a map of height distribution within the Velikorusskii population and tried to find correlations between the variations of height and other anthropological traits. But in most cases Russian anthropologists had to rely on themselves in collecting primary data; hence the utopia of thousands of anthropologists working literarily in every corner of the Empire compensating for the underdevelopment of the modern Russian state. Russian anthropologists were no less concerned with the impact of urbanization, industrial revolution, etc. on the development of human nature. Regardless of the fact that Russia definitely could not hold “the keys” to this particular problem, which was most intensively studied by American and British anthropologists, Russian anthropologists felt it natural to pose the theme of “degeneration” as equally important for Russia. Even participating in the “degeneration” of civilization, their Russia was becoming more modern. D. Anuchin, “O zadachakh i metodakh antropologii,” RAZh 9:1(1902), pp. 72, 73. See Anuchin’s speech at the VIII Congress of Russian medical doctors: Anuchin, “O zadachakh i metodakh antropologii,” pp. 63-88. 24 Ivanovskii, “Ob antropologicheskom izuchenii,” p. 32; Anuchin, “Na rubezhe polutora- i polustoletiia,” p. 5. 22

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It is very tempting to declare all this preoccupation with systematization, classification and tables a classic case of the systematization thinking of modern intellectuals-experts – the “taxonomy” phenomenon described by Foucault.25 But does it really help us to understand the type of modernity shared by the Russian anthropological community? Anthropology was, indeed, a new science, especially in Russia, and its fixation on taxonomy could be easily explained by a real necessity to collect and accommodate a lot of individual data. Foucault’s “taxonomy” model acquires more explanatory power when viewed through the prism of the analysis of genesis, which is, according to Foucault, embedded in taxonomy. One of the major late nineteenth century anthropological dilemmas, of the polygenesis versus monogenesis of humankind,26 could have indeed turned anthropological taxonomy into a potential source of population manipulation policy – another well-known feature of modernity. Yet, the case of Russian anthropology illustrates how misleading this scheme may be. First of all, the Russian state was a very complex organism whose functioning depended on different groups, administrative and political forces with often competing understandings of modernity and modernization. But most importantly, the society actively modernized itself, compensating for the state’s inability to satisfy its needs and aspirations and often refused any “social contract” with this state. Russian anthropologists wanted to have a more efficient and modernized – “cultural” in their own language – state, but they were very careful in preserving their anthropological taxonomy from being used by the state or exploited by any state project. This was one of the reasons (though not the only one) why they were never called by the state “to action,” i.e. the state never attempted to “privatize” anthropology and put it into the service of Russian national, imperial, or some modern sanitary project. Russian anthropologists successfully utilized well-developed early–twentieth-century Russian channels of obshchestvennost’ or civil society. Anthropology in Russia even became an alternative venue for a pseudo-academic career for those who were M. Fuko, Slova i veschi. Arkheologiia gumanitarnykh nauk (trans. From French by V. P. Vizgina, N. S. Avtonomovoi), (St. Petersburg, 1994). 26 Theories of respectively one or several initial “racial types” that preceded the present human diversity.

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deprived of this opportunity by the state. Two leading Russian Jewish anthropologists, Samuil Weissenberg and A. Elkind, used the Moscow Division, the RAJ and the informal anthropological network in general to build up solid academic reputations and enter the world of academia through the back door, so to speak. While Weissenberg never abandoned his medical practice in Elisavetgrad,27 Dr. Elkind, under the tutorship of Anuchin, defended his dissertation on Jewish anthropology and got an academic degree from Moscow University. In 1916 he became the editor of RAJ, which was the peak of his “alternative” academic career. Naturally, Russian anthropologists had their own political views and ideological biases, but the anthropological discourse in which they participated was consciously cleaned up from any extra-scholarly, in their understanding, considerations. Not only political discussions, but also value judgments were censured on the pages of RAJ (which does not mean that we cannot deconstruct these texts as ideological). When Weissenberg, writing about the Caucasian Jews, allowed himself such a judgment, he was reproached by a fellow anthropologist Kurdov for being not quite objective and scientific. Russian anthropological taxonomy was kept value free, and there was no other hierarchy except the hierarchy of figures and the alphabetical order hierarchy. This is especially evident in the case of Russian Jewish anthropologists, almost all of whom participated in the Jewish sanitary project either in its Zionist version, or later on within the framework of the Society for the Preservation of the Health of Jews (Obshchestvo okhraneniia zdoroviia evreev). At the same time, they never allowed this kind of “applied” anthropology in their “academic” writings. Being latecomers to the European anthropological community, Russian anthropologists had the advantage of learning from others’ mistakes. In a sense, their anthropological modernity was more modern than the European one, for they retained the ideal of a value-free, objective and universal science. They could live with this illusion because the semi-modernized Russian state did not actually need their modern discourses to redefine itself as a modern manipulative state. Thus the specific Russian conjuncture of political, cultural and social factors and the questionable “practicality” Weissenberg neither moved to Moscow nor emmigrated to Germany, where he was known as a distingui shed a nthropologist. In other w ords, his “a lterna tiv e” anthropological career did not involve actual relocation to the centers of his science. 27

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of anthropological activity within the Russian context motivated Russian anthropologists to produce a utopian hierarchy of intellectual meso- and mega-areas topped by the idealized mega-area of European modernity.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPIRE Western European anthropologists of the turn of the century directed their efforts at studying the “uncivilized people” outside Europe as well as “civilized” European populations, the natural scale for the study of which was provided by the nation-state: French anthropologists were studying the racial outlook of the population of France; German anthropologists were doing some of their research within the borders of the German state, etc. Russian anthropologists, living in an empire, demonstrated very little interest in “colonial” anthropology and were inspired by the European anthropological project. Being European for them meant, among other things, placing Russia on the anthropological map of Europe. They seemingly easily adopted the scale of the empire to the normative European nation-state principle of anthropological grand-projects. In fact, accepting as a legitimate framework the borders of the Russian empire and studying, measuring, cataloging and classifying its different peoples, Russian anthropologists carefully avoided the core-periphery or a more explicit colonial model. Instead they were fascinated by the picture of interactions and successive changes of racial types over a huge territory “from Poland in the West to the Amur region and Kamchatka in the East, from southern people (narodnosti) of TransCaucasus, Middle Asia and the borderland Chinese lands to the abandoned (zabroshennye) in the Far North lopari, samoedy, tunguzy and chukchi. Within these wide limits multiple physical types succeed each other…”28 Anuchin, “Beglyi vzgliad na proshloe,” p. 41. Nathaniel Knight in his dissertation (“Constructing the Science of Nationality: Ethnography in Mid-Nineteenth Century Russia,” Ph.D. dissertation; Columbia University, 1995) made a categorical statement that Russian ethnography failed to produce a “colonial other.” Russian ethnographers studied all peoples of the empire including Russians and thus did not share in the European racial discourse. Knight makes general conclusion about the redundancy of the category of race in the history of modern Russia. Focusing only on ethnographers, Knight does not study anthropologists actually working with the concept of race and with European race discourses. More important, he views ethnography (and anthropology) as a colonial science and does not consider its evolution on the European continent under the impact of nationalism. 28

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What actually could be distilled from hundreds of individual texts of Russian anthropologists was a vision of the “empire” that could be metaphorically presented as a huge patch-work quilt, every scrap of which was painted with a number of fusing colors. The general number of colors was fixed for the whole quilt, only their proportions and combinations varied. Since nobody in the Russian anthropological community rationalized this vision and explained it in political terms (this would have been against the high scholarly code of the community), we can also speculate that their political ideal was some kind of Rossiiskaia nation within the common historical borders of the empire. In any case, advancing the project of the “anthropological exploration of Russia,”29 Russian anthropologists inescapably acted within the imperial context, but in their “exploration” they used the language and the format of European turn of the century nation-state anthropology. They recognized how difficult and complex the task of anthropological exploration of the Russian Empire was, but they never questioned the very nation-state principle adopted from the West. The only problem they saw was the problem of Russia’s size and unprecedented inner diversity, but this problem was not of a methodological nature and only stimulated their taxonomist zeal: the “ethnic composition of the Russia’s population is characterized by a degree of diversity that has no parallels in any western-democratic state – the diversity of physical types and cultural stages. To break this composition down into its component parts, to choose among them the most and least important, to find their similarities and differences, to establish the level of their kinship…”30 seemed to be a huge, but realistic task. The map of a nation-state where the outer borders defined the natural limits of anthropological enquiry and the inner borders were drawn by the anthropologists according to their vision of the population’s “physical type” or “types” was the most adequate graphic model of nation-state European anthropology and definitely the most “Antropologicheskoe izuchenie Rossii”: A. Ivanovskii, “Ot Antropologicheskogo Otdela Imperatorskogo Obschestva Lubitelei estestvoznaniia, antropologii i etnografii,” RAZh, 1:1 (1900), p. 1. 30 Ivanovskii, “Ob antropologicheskom izuchenii,” p. 112. 29

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logical form of representation for the anthropological taxonomy in the age of nations and nationalism. In fact, the most adequate analogues to the exemplar maps cited by the Russian anthropologists – the maps of the relative recurrence of the dark-haired types in Germany, Belgium and Switzerland (Ranke), the map of the distribution of height of the male population in France (according to Broca), the map of the relative distribution of the dark-haired types in France (according to Topinar), the map of the distribution of the figures of cephalic index (according to Collignon and Houze), etc. 31 – would have been, in the Russian case, the map of Siberia, or the map of inner Russia or any other map of a relatively small historical region with an ethnically more or less homogeneous population. But the state-nation model adopted by the Russian anthropologists to their imperial setting necessitated the natural limits of their ideal maps – the existing borders of the Empire, i.e. of their state. Curiously, in this approach Russia simultaneously stood for mega-area (the largest self-sufficient entity) and meso-area (a nation-state on the map of Europe). D. Anuchin, the leading Russian (Moscow) anthropological voice, invited his followers to carry out an “anthropological photography of Russia, which is a project similar to topographic or geological photography, a statistical survey, the investigation of soils, or – and this analogue is better – to the collection of observations about the elements of climate that are gathered by a net of meteorological stations; on the basis of these data conclusions are made about the climate of the whole country…”32 Not surprisingly the main form of graphic representation of data in each of the fields cited by Anuchin – topography, geology, the study of soils, meteorology – was a map. While the outer borders of the anthropological map of Russia as Mega-area were set up “historically,” the inner borders (i.e. the scale of meso-areas) depended on the focus and scale of a particular research project. In fact, the criteria for drawing the anthropological meso-areas remained vague. There was a general disparity between the actual prevailing anthropological practice of studying the regions (the 31 32

For their analysis see Anuchin, “O zadachakh i metodakh antropologii,” pp. 72-81. Anuchin, “O zadachakh i metodakh antropologii,” p. 72.

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Western Region,33 the Caucasus,34 the Volga region,35 etc.)36 – the protonation-states, and a popular theoretical premise according to which the smallest administrative unit for the anthropological research of Russia was the volost’. The idea of studying racial variations volost’ by volost’ was, of course, born out of the Russian anthropological utopia, but it was justified on the grounds of a critical assessment of the uezd or gubernia-scale anthropology: typically, these type of studies gave so many variations of physical characteristics that it was impossible to postulate any dominant “physical type.”37 For example, studying the racial outlook of the Velikoruskii population of Russia, anthropologist V. V. Vorob’ev examined 325 men born in the Riazan Province (guberniia). He failed to find any pure “physical type” among the group and concluded that the predominant guberniia Great Russian racial type was the “mixed” one (60 percent).38 Such examples can be multiplied. See, for example, Iu.D. Tal’ko-Gryntsevich, “Poliaki,” RAZh 5:1 (1901), pp. 1-30; idem, “Pol’skaia antropologicheskaia literatura (s portretami I. Maiera i I. Kopernitskago),” RAZh 5:4 (1900), p. 76. See also À.D. El’kind, “Evrei (sravnitel’no-antropologicheskoe issledovanie, preimushchestvenno po nabludeniiam za pol’skimi evreiami,” Izvestiia Imperatorskogo Obshchestva Lubitelei Estestvoznania, Antropologii i Etnographii 104 (1903); A.D. El’kind, “Evrei (sravnitel’no-antropologicheskii ocherk), RAZh 11:3 (1902), pp. 1-44. 34 S. Weissenberg, “Die autochthone Bevölkerung Palästinas in anthropologischer Beziehung (Fellachen, Juden, Samaritaner), “ Zeitschrift für Demogr. und Statistik der Juden (ZDSJ) (1909); Idem, “Peki’in und seine Juden,” Globus 96:3 (1909); Idem, “Die jemenitischen Juden,” Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, No. 3-4 (1909); Idem, “Die Spaniolen,” Mitteilung der Anthropologisch Gesellschaft in Wien (MAGW) 39 (1909); Idem, “Die persischen Juden in anthropologischer Beziehung,”ZDSJ, No. 1 (1911); Idem, “Die mesopotamischen Juden in anthropologischer Beziehung, ” Arch. für Anthropologie, No. 2-3 (1911); Idem, “Zur Anthropologie der nordafrikanischen Juden,” MAGW (1912); Idem, “Kavkazskie evrei v antropologicheskom otnoshenii,” RAZh, 30-31:2-3 (1912), p. 137; “Noveishie issledovania evreev d-ra S. A. Weissenberga,” RAZh 30-31:2-3 (1912), p. 190; A.N. Dzhavakhov, “K antropologii Gruzii: gruziny Kakhetii,” RAZh 27-28:3-4 (1907), pp. 127-165; Idem, “K antropologii Gruzii,” RAZh 33-34:1-2 (1913), pp. 99-161; Idem, “Kavkazskie evrei,” RAZh 32:4 (1912), p. 58; K.M. Kurdov, “Gorskie evrei Dagestana,” RAZh 23-24:3-4 (1905), pp. 57-87; Idem, “Gorskie evrei Shemakhinskogo uezda, Bakinskoi gubernii,” RAZh 30-31:2-3 (1912), pp. 87-99. 35 Robert P. Geraci, Window on the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia (Ithaca, 2001), Chapters 5 and 9. 36 For more details see: Ivanovskii, “Ob antropologicheskom izuchenii,” pp. 114-115. 37 Anuchin, “O zadachakh i metodakh antropologii,” p. 82. 38 V.V. Vorob’ev, “Ob antropologicheskom izuchenii slavianskogo naseleniia Rossii, RAZh 9:1 (1902), pp. 103-109. 33

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Yet, we should not forget that the volost’ – uezd – guberniia – region hierarchy at the beginning of the twentieth century was the most popular scheme of obschestvennost’/Zemstvo network-building (the project of volost’ agronomists, the discussions about the volost’ zemstvo, etc.). It was, actually, the modernist project of nation building bottom-up, a project of the self-organizing obschestvennost’ substituting for the state. In this sense, Russian anthropological discourse recoded the language of social mobilization into the language of scholarship and constructed volost’ as the elementary unit of the ideal anthropological map of Russia. At the same time, the volost’ argument could have been an unconscious reaction to the inadequacy of the nation-state model for the anthropological research of Russia: the imperial borders did not allow for the construction of the ethnically homogeneous and racially more or less fixed “state-nation,” the volost’ borders, at least, allowed for a possibility of locating a more or less definite “physical type.” The model of a nation-state within the Russian context lacked a nation. The anthropology of Russians only superficially resembled the anthropology of Germans or of the French, for the symbolic and geographical boundaries of Russianness were not clear. Russian anthropologists preferred to use such categories as Velikorusy, Malorusy, but the favorite one was the least precise – the “Slavic population” of the empire: the “…modern Slavic population of Russia,” wrote a leading expert in the anthropology of Velikorusy, V. V. Vorob’ev, “is not only mixed, but it varies according to different places of habitation; it is composed of different racial elements, or of the same elements which interact differently in different regions.”39 Anthropological examination not only fragmented the “Russian nation” to the level of volost’ “type,” but also explicitly postulated the presence of “physical traits characteristic of the peoples (narodnosti) of other anthropological groups”40 within the Slavonic anthropological group. Anuchin dared to study “Russians” (russkii narod), but the method was a “comparative anthropological analysis that has to explicate the racial composition of this people, to establish its types and show their relation to the types of West and East…”41 Ibid. Al. Ivanovskii, “Opyt antropologicheskoi klassifikatsii naseleniia Rossii,” RAZh 1516:3-4 (1903), pp. 153, 155. 41 Anuchin, “Beglyi vzgliad,” p. 41.

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The project of anthropological description and cartography of the empire received its most ambitious expression in the works of Aleksei Arsenievich Ivanovskii, a graduate of Moscow university and a holder of the Doctor of Philosophy degree (Doctor philosophiae at atrium, 18941895) from the university of Leipzig, where he specialized in geography (under the tutorship of Professors Fr. Ratzel and Gettner) and anthropology (with Prof. Em. Shmitt). His first dissertation at Moscow University – “About the anthropological composition of Russian population” – brought him an MA in geography. Prior to the defense he had to pass three magisterial exams: in geography, meteorology and anthropology. In 1913, after the successful defense of the dissertation “World population. An attempt at anthropological classification,” he became a Doctor of geography. Such educational background made Ivanovskii a perfect candidate for an anthropological synthesis on the imperial scale. The comparative method of anthropological classification invented by Ivanovskii was based on a number of major racial “indicators” (pokazateli) such as the color of hair and eyes, the height and the form of the head, the “height-longitudinal” skull index, facial index (a ratio of the maximum width of the face to its length), nasal index (a ratio of the maximum nasal width to nasal length), the length of the body, length of arms and legs, etc. Having calculated these indicators for all population groups studied by Russian anthropologists within the limits of the empire, Ivanovskii coded them and established three levels of racial kinship amongst all the population groups/ narodnosti: the highest level of kinship had a ratio of differences between the “indicators” of less than one; the second level – less than two and the third – no more then three. 42 The classification itself was organized in alphabetical order starting with Afghani (afgantsy), followed by Aisors, Armenians, Bashkirs, Buriats, Belarusians…, Great Russians and then the other peoples in alphabetical order up to the Iakuts at the end of the list. The Russian alphabet was the only organizational principle of Ivanovskii’s classification. Overall, it produced an impression of the absence of pure “races” (except Jews – but this is a special topic for discussion) that could have been used as 42

Ivanovskii, “Opyt antropologicheskoi klassifikatsii,” pp. 107-165.

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“objective” bases for constructing nations. The level of racial heterogeneity within the Slavic group was simply unprecedented. Ivanovskii distinguished the “Slavonic anthropological group” that included Great Russians, Little Russians and Belarusians (yet excluded the Little Russians of the Kiev Province and the Kuban’ Kozaks), Poles, Lithuanians, Kazan Tatars, Bashkirs and Kalmyks.43 As a result of such a grouping, one of the major terms balancing the Russian imperial order – “inorodets” – lost any sense: if Tatars belonged to the “Slavonic racial group,” how could they be viewed as literally ino-rodtsy? However, Ivanovskii’s decomposition of the Russian population did not stop here. The groups composing the Great Russian narodnost’ demonstrated only the third level of racial kinship.44 At the same time, Great Russians measured at a guberniia level showed the highest level of kinship with Poles, and only the second and third degrees of kinship with Belarusians. However, compared to the Great Russians, the Little Russians were diversified even more. “Regional differences of the Little Russian type express themselves in such a sharp way that cannot be found either among the Great Russians, or among the Belarusians” wrote Ivanovskii. “Little Russians of the Kiev Province stand absolutely alone, Little Russians (kozaks) of the Kuban’ district enter an entirely different group (the Osetians’) and only Little Russians of Volyn’ Province possess the third degree kinship with the Little Russians taken as a group and with the Belarusians.”45 And all this diversity of types and kinships, established on the basis of thousands of measurements and calculations, was put on maps. Ivanovskii’s immense efforts resulted in a classification that was, with some reservations, adopted by the anthropological community and provided a general scholarly framework for the realization of the Russian anthropological utopia. It remained an expression of the ideal of objective, total and universal science, whose language and form of representation were “European.” However, actual European anthropology at that time was becoming increasingly monopolized (in different forms) by the nation-states and the language of science was quickly turning into the language of a new social (sanitary projects in 43 44 45

Ibid. p. 153. Ibid. pp. 153, 155. Ibid. p. 156.

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Great Britain and Germany) and national politics. The ideal Europe as a world of a modern universalistic and humanistic culture (the ideal of human self-cognition is, of course, a great humanistic ideal) kept inspiring the anthropological community of the country whose European status, as well as membership in the community of cultural nations, were questionable for many Europeans. In Russia, the grandanthropological project designed under the influence of Western nationstate anthropology, did not provide for the construction of either a “soil and blood” type of Russian nation (mega-area as a nation-state), or the three-part Russian nation (Russian Mega-area composed of three mesoareas (namely, Great Russian, Little Russian, and Belarusian mesoareas), or the imperial vision of the Russian core and inorodtsy periphery (a colonial model).

ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE NATION This is not to say that there were no attempts by other agencies beside the state to use anthropology and the category of race in politics, especially at the beginning of the twentieth century with rapid modernization, the emergence of mass politics, the rising importance of the “national question” in the empire, etc. In this respect, the most interesting cases were Russian Jewish anthropology (in its connection to the Zionist and Diaspora national projects) and the racialization of Russian popular nationalist discourse. Both topics remain understudied and the question of whether new political discourses influenced the integrity of the dominant scholarly anthropological discourse and changed the “power-knowledge” balance in Russian anthropology are still unanswered. Among the cases of direct application of racial anthropology by the ideologists of Russian nationalism, probably the most interesting is the case of Ivan Alekseevich Sikorskii, Professor of Kiev St. Vladimir University, a recognized psychiatrist and neurologist, whose scholarly works were translated into European languages and acknowledged internationally. Today he is mostly known for having been a medical expert in the Beilis trial, at which he testified in favor of the ritual

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murder version. 46 Sikorskii’s nationalist vision has not been seriously studied, even though he was one of the modernizers of Russian nationalism and consciously worked with the category of race. 47 Writing about the Russian nation and nationalism, Sikorskii posed as an academic anthropologist and tried to build a corresponding scholarly reputation. 48 The documents from the Kiev archives tell the story of his and a few other Kiev university professors’ attempts to found an academic anthropological society in Kiev. 49 As a university professor he tried to teach the anthropological ABC to his students and even published a catalogue of his home library, which contained a relatively large number of anthropological works, mostly foreign, in order to make them accessible to his students. 50 Quite in line with the spirit of the epoch of “nations and nationalisms” he redefined the empire along the lines of the nation-state model with the Russian nation constructed as a majority (a historical amalgam of Great Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians), a core population surrounded by the racially inferior inorodtsy population (interestingly, to get such a result For more see the collection of documents: R.Sh. Ganelin, V.E. Kel’ner, I.V. Lukoianov, Delo Mendelia Beilisa. Materialy Chrezvychainoi sledstvennoi komissii Vremennogo pravitel’stva o sudebnom protsesse 1913 g. po obvineniiu v ritual’nom ubiistve (St. Petersburg, 1999). 47 More on I. A. Sikorskii, see A. Tkach, “Rytsar’ nauki,” Zerkalo nedeli, No. 31 (7-13 August 1999), pp. 3-4; Sergei Vyrovoi, Sergei Karamash, “Ivan Sikorskii – vrach, uchenyi, chelovek,” Agapit: Ukrains’kyi istoriko-medychnyi zhurnal, No. 13 (2001); L.I. D’iachenko, “K istorii razvitiia psikhiatricheskoi nauki v Ukraine,” I.I. Kut’ko i P.T. Petruk, eds., Istoriia ukrainskoi psikhiatrii: Sbornik nauchnykh rabot Ukrainskogo NII klinicheskoi i eksperimental’noi nevrologii i psikhiatrii i Khar’kovskoi gorodskoi klinicheskoi psikhiatricheskoi bol’nitsy No. 15 (Saburovoi dachi) (Khar’kov, 1994), Vol. 1, pp. 45-48. As the most detailed recent research see Vadim Menzhulin, Drugoi Sikorskii. Neudobnye stranitsy istorii psikhiatrii (Kiev, 2004). Sikorskii’s name in the context of the discussion of Russian nationalism see D.A. Kotsiubinskii, Russkii natsionalizm v nachale XX stoletiia: Rozhdenie i gibel’ ideologii Vserossiiskogo natsional’nogo souza (Moscow, 2001), pp. 78, 83, 102, 117, passim. 48 See the following of Sikorskii’s works: “Cherty iz psikhologii slavian,” “Dannye iz antropologii,” “Russkie i Ukraintsy,” “Kharakteristika chernoi, zheltoi i beloi ras v sviazi s voprosami russko-iaponskoi voiny,” “Antropologicheskaia i psikhologicheskaia genealogiia Pushkina,” “Ekspertiza po delu ob ubiistve Andrushi Iuschinskogo,” “Znaki vyrozhdeniia,” in V.B. Avdeev, Russkaia rasovaia teoriia do 1917 goda (Moscow, 2002). 49 Derzhavnyi arkhiv m. Kyiv (DAK), f. 16, op. 465, spr. 255, ark. 25-28; See also: Tsentral’nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukrainy v m. Kyevi (TsDIAU), f. 707, op. 262, spr. 8. 50 Sistematicheskii katalog chastnoi biblioteki, prinadlezhashchei professoru Universiteta Sv. Vladimira Ivanu Alekseevichu Sikorskomu (Kiev, 1895), Razdel “Antropologiia,” pp. 33-39. 46

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he ignored the existence of Volga Tatars living in the midst of the Russian “core” nation). The initial unity of the Russian nation had been formed at the stage of its racial existence (Sikorskii insisted that Jews were stuck at this pre-historical stage) and currently, at the stage of a national existence, remained the elementary basis for a more sophisticated historical, cultural, and psychological unity. Russians, in Sikorskii’s interpretation, were “Aryans,” representatives of a higher race. Thus, using the authority of academic anthropology, he introduced the models of racialized national discourse and racial hierarchy. He used the same models that were consciously rejected by the Russian anthropological community, even though at a practical level they allowed a solution to many burning issues of modern Russian politics: they helped to adjust the archaic empire to the nationstate standards and defined it as a modern geographically, culturally and racially unified (even if potentially) mega-area; and they made the national claims of innorodtsy look irrelevant since inorodtsy were “objectively” destined to be absorbed by a higher racial and cultural entity. Most important, only such a reading of anthropology allowed one to construct a “Big Russian nation,” for the category of race was something much more fundamental than any “linguistic” or “cultural” nationalism. And this reading was “European,” as was the discourse of Russian anthropological community at the turn of the century. However, Sikorskii had never been allowed into the anthropological community; his name was never mentioned on the pages of RAJ. 51 On the other hand, Sikorskii tried to limit his “scholarly” references to quotations from foreign anthropologists and very limited and biased quoting of Russians; Sikorskii’s unique (for Kiev) anthropological library did not contain RAJ or published anthropological dissertations defended in Moscow or St. Petersburg. 52 To be more precise, since 1889 Sikorskii was a member of the Russian Anthropological Society of St. Petersburg University. However, he did not participate in its activities and never published in its periodicals and collections. See: S. N. Danilo, ed., Protokoly Zasedanii Russkogo Antropologicheskogo Obshchestva pri Imperatorskom SPb. Universitete za 1889 g. (St. Petersburg, 1890), pp. 1-12, 13. 52 For more on Sikorskii’s racial discourse see: M. Mogil’ner, “Entsiklopediia russkogo natsional’nogo proekta: predislovie k publikatsii,” Ab Imperio, No. 3 (2003), pp. 225-240. 51

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*** … After a short break RAJ was resumed in 1916. In the Editorial the newly appointed editor, A. Elkind, wrote that the popularity of anthropology as a science would grow with the spread of culture.53 Even the realities of the European war did not challenge the basic paradigm of Russian anthropology – the paradigm of a universalistic modern culture with Europe as its major locus. Probably, such was the paradox of “catching-up development” that many historians tend to understand as a disadvantage. In recent historiography the “catching-up” metaphor has been replaced by the metaphor of “telescoped development,” which implies two things: first, the stages of development that in their original context took a lot of time to traverse, in the Russian context lacked this time, mingled, and distorted each other; and secondly, that Russians did not actually experience many processes (capitalism, industrialization, etc.) that they fiercely criticized, dismissed, and reconsidered together with the “modernized” world. It seems that Russian anthropologists knew – both from the experience of their own country and from foreign experience – what they were criticizing and rejecting, they had less time compared to their western colleagues, but they also joined the movement at its advanced stage and were wise enough not to “re-invent the bicycle” – an authentic Russian anthropology. They used the language and methods of European anthropology and designed their grand-project according to the European plan. And they did not “distort” the plan. Interestingly enough, they managed to extract its major components and save them from what they considered as distortions: from the manipulative state, from the constructivist nationalist projects, and from the vulgarization of the scientific method. They synthesized an anthropological modernity as a universal European “Intellectual Mega-area” free from excessive geographical determinism. The controversy between the anthropological Russia as a mega-area (composed of meso-areas of different levels, from “nations” and “racial types” to volost’) and the other Russia as a meso-area on the A. El’kind, “O zadachakh vozobnovliaemogo zhurnala,” RAZh 37-38:1-2 (1916), pp. 1-3.

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anthropological map of Europe did not seem so obvious within this imagined space. The European “intellectual mega-area” of Russian anthropologists was based on the ideals of universal culture and objective science – an instrument of human self-cognition and human perfection. In this sense Russian anthropology was more “European” than its inspiration – the archetypal European anthropological science.

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14 FROM ETHNOCENTRIC TO CIVIC HISTORY: CHANGES IN CONTEMPORARY LITHUANIAN HISTORICAL STUDIES DARIUS STALIŪNAS One could analyze the changes that have taken place in Lithuanian historical writing over the past fifteen years in various ways. There is an institutional aspect to this question, namely how the creation of new, or the transformation of existing institutions, has affected developments in writing history.1 Another aspect of the issue concerns methodology; changes in the range of topics covered by historians, or in other words, the filling in of so-called “blank spaces”; and the relationship between mass historical consciousness and historiography. It is not feasible to deal with all these issues in a single article. Here we wish to draw attention to a well-known phenomenon whereby changes in historical paradigms are connected with changes in collective identity, be it national2 or European identity. 3 Here we will concentrate on how attitudes to the object of Lithuanian historical study and Lithuanicity have changed over the past fifteen years in Lithuanian historical writing. If we wish to understand recent changes we must of course begin with a short review of earlier Lithuanian historical studies.

In the case of Lithuania it would be interesting to look at the effect of a particular kind of decentralization: practically speaking fifteen years ago historical research was carried out only in Vilnius, but now we have strong academic centres in the universities of Kaunas and Klaipėda and work has begun in Šiauliai University. When looking at Holocaust studies we should investigate to what extent they have been influenced by Lithuania’s Presidential Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet Occupations. 2 Erik Lönnroth, Karl Molin, Ragnar Björk , eds., Co nc ep tion s of Na tion al Histo ry (Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 78) (Berlin, New York, 1994). 3 S. Puntscher Riekmann, “The Myth of European Unity,” Geoffrey Hosking, George Schöpflin, eds., Myths and Nationhood (London, 1997), pp. 60-71. 1

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THE RISE AND FALL OF NATIONAL NARRATIVE IN LITHUANIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY The Lithuanian historical narrative came into being in the nineteenth century as a component part of a newly-forming Lithuanian national discourse. The most important and most difficult task facing the construction of modern Lithuanian identity was the building of barriers between Lithuanian and Polish identities and also Russian-ness, although the Russian identity was less dangerous than Polish during the “purification” of Lithuanian national (ethnic) identity.4 Thus it is no surprise that the Lithuanian interpretation of history was construed as an alternative to Polish and to a lesser extent, Russian conceptions. Most nineteenth-century Polish political movements, including schools of history, acknowledged no independent political future for Lithuanians and, thus, when regarding Lithuania’s past, they were inclined to emphasize, first and foremost, the benefits of Polish culture and civilization. Therefore, when Lithuanians came to construe their own historical narrative, they had no other choice but to set up their own authentic folk culture as a counterweight to Polish civilization. Lithuanians constructed their concept of history in relation to their understanding of Lithuanicity as primarily ethnocultural values. The history of Lithuania was understood to be the history of ethnic Lithuanians. This revealed itself most clearly in interpretations of the past of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The earlier history of the Grand Duchy before the time of Vytautas (reg. 1392-1430) or the Union of Lublin (1569) was treated by Lithuanians as “their own” because it was created and controlled by Lithuanians. Episodes from the later history of the Grand Duchy were also admitted to the Lithuanian historical canon, but usually only when there was discussion of the use of the Lithuanian language or the social conditions of the peasantry and so forth, that is, in cases that formed a sort of prehistory for the nineteenth-century reborn nation. Meanwhile, nineteenth-century history was already dominated clearly by topics connected with “national rebirth.” In this case we come up against the same concept of history as we find among other Central and 4

Here we will not deal with alternative options for the construction of Lithuanicity.

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East European nations. According to this concept, once upon a time there was a strong and mighty nation that later suffered greatly as a result of external conditions and its national consciousness “fell asleep.” Given favourable conditions, however, the nation was reborn or “awakened.” Here particular stress is laid on the role played by the “fathers of the national revival.” Such a concept, of course, implies an unchanging understanding of national identity, which usually has a clear ethnocultural accent.5 Admittedly a political dimension accompanied the ethnolinguistic component of Lithuanian national identity. Here we might apply the observation of Anthony D. Smith that national identity has dual internal and external functions.6 To rephrase Smith’s observation, we can say that the first function is connected with the nationalization of individuals. It was easiest to turn the peasants into “Lithuanians” by applying ethnolinguistic criteria. The “internal” functions of collective identity are particularly important during the early stage of nationalism, although they may also be important at other points of development.7 Relatively separate “external” functions are connected with socio-economic, political and territorial aspects of collective identity. From the very outset Lithuanian nationalism had to seek not only the transformation of the masses into a nation but also to justify its rights as a “historical nation,” that is, to prove that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was a Lithuanian state and that Vilnius was a Lithuanian city; that the Lithuanian gentry (or at least, part of it) was Lithuanian, and not Polish, and so forth. Modern Lithuania was connected with the Grand Duchy via political tradition. In 5 On Lithuanian historical narrative in the nineteenth century, see Darius Staliūnas, “Die Teilung des Kulturerbes des Großfürstentums Litauen und der Schutz der historischen Denkmäler vom Ende des 19. bis zum Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts,” Nordost-Archiv. Ze itschrift für Reg ion alg esc hich te, Bd.VI/199 7, H. 1: Das Denkma l im nördlichen Ostmitteleuropa im 20. Jahrhunderts. Politischer Kontext und nationale Funktion, S. 147166; idem, “Die litauische Nationalidentitä t und die polnischsprachige Literatur,” Y. Varpio, M. Zadencka, eds., Literatur und nationale Identität II. Themen des literarischen Nationalismus und der nationalen Literatur im Ostseeraum (Tampere, 1999), pp. 201216; idem, “Alternatywa początku XX wieku: Historia etnosu czy państwa,” LituanoSlavica Posnaniensia, Studia Historica 8 (2001), pp. 81-95. 6 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London, 1991), p. 16. 7 In the case of Lithuanians the inter-war conflict with Poland and the subsequent imposition of Soviet Marxism and Russian culture created a constant real or apparent danger that national identity might be lost.

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other words, the political dimension of nationality was stressed to some extent, but it was conceived of as a supplement to the ethnolinguistic dimension, rather than as an alternative. In the inter-war period the traditions of historical narrative that had formed earlier were continued. For example, most work was devoted to the so-called “age of the grand dukes,” the period between the creation of the state (which was deliberately dated as early as possible in order to deny possible external influences) and the death of Grand Duke Vytautas in 1430. The basic credo of historians was probably the slogan coined by Adolfas Šapoka, namely that Lithuanian historians should “look for Lithuanians in Lithuanian history.”8 At the same time, however, romanticism was replaced by positivism, that is, priority was given to more detailed research into source material. The most serious changes here took place in interpretations related to the history of the Grand Duchy between the Union of Lublin and the final partition of Poland-Lithuania (1569-1795). The Russian-born historian Ivan Lappo and the Lithuanian Adolfas Šapoka wrote that the Union of Lublin did not mean at all the incorporation of Lithuania into Poland. Historians claimed that Poland benefited more through that union and that, after the union was proclaimed, Lithuania retained several features of statehood and considerable autonomy. For example, the Third Lithuanian Statute (1588) contradicted, in many provisions, the treaty of union proclaimed at Lublin. During the Soviet period (1940 – 1990), especially during the first two decades after World War II social class replaced the nation and state as the most important historical agents. The concept of Lithuanian history as reworked according to the canons of Russian Marxism had the task of proving the theory that Russia and the Russians were the Lithuanians’ natural allies. Thus, for example, it became compulsory to assess the incorporation of part of the Commonwealth of the Two Nations into the Russian Empire at the end of the eighteenth century in a positive light. Historians who tried to hold back from the vulgar Marxism imposed upon them began to give priority to empirical description. On the other hand, Marxism with Russian elements was 8 Adolfas Šapoka, “Raskime lietuvius Lietuvos istorijoje,” Naujoji Romuva, No. 21 (73) (1932), pp. 481-482.

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countered by an interest in Lithuanian ethnic culture, the national movement. The topic that provoked most interest in the factographic sense was the prohibition of publications in the Lithuanian language in the Latin alphabet and the resistance to this prohibition along with ideologically-based subjects, such as the formation of the working class, the creation of the Marxist parties, and the establishment of Soviet power. In other words, alongside the sociologized Marxist concept of history a paradigm of ethnic history also thrived in Soviet Lithuanian historical writing. In certain cases these two paradigms had clear points of conjuncture: the borders of the Soviet socialist republics conditioned geographic projections into the past. The history of the LSSR began from primitive social communities and these borders had to be maintained in the analysis of all historical periods. According to the ethnolinguistic concept, an ethnic territory was regarded as belonging to a particular group. Thus, as representatives of the “exploiter” class and as the greatest “de-nationalizers” of the Lithuanians, Poles and Polishness were not worthy of attention. The political changes that began in Lithuania in 1988 helped to reinterpret the historical past. After 1988, as I understand it, greater significance has been attributed to “political Lithuanicity,” but this does not mean, of course, that ethnolinguistic understandings of nationality are disappearing. There are several reasons for these changes. First of all, Lithuanian intellectuals realized that after liberation from the Soviet Union there were no real threats to Lithuanian folk culture (the processes of globalization and Europeanization were not at first seen as posing a serious danger). At the same time, it was clear that the ethnocentric interpretation of history provided no possibilities for ethnic minorities to find their place in Lithuania’s history and thereby feel themselves to be fully-fledged Lithuanian citizens. Secondly, opportunities to learn Western historical methodologies and, in the end, the application of the simplest principle of historicism forced Lithuanian historians to rethink the objectives of Lithuanian history and Lithuanicity in the past. Great influence on the reinterpretation of certain issues, primarily the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the nineteenth century, has come from Polish academics (Juliusz Bardach, Jan Jurkiewicz), who emerged from the narrow confines of ethnolinguistic nationalism earlier.

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Thirdly, we cannot rule out the influence of recent political changes. 9 Lithuania’s joining NATO and the European Union has changed concepts of what is politically correct, including concepts of the past. Increasing attention is being paid to the history of ethnic minorities, primarily the Jews, and this has been influenced by political convenience as well as the phenomena mentioned above. Directly or indirectly Lithuanians have been told that only democratic states, that is those which are able to speak openly and objectively about their past, especially about the Holocaust, can be admitted to the European Union or NATO. In order to illustrate these changes in Lithuanian historical writing we have selected three topics from different periods: the “Lithuanicity” of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; the nineteenth-century concept of Lithuanian history and the formation of the modern Lithuanian nation; and research into Jewish history, especially the Holocaust.

PROBLEMS WITH THE HERITAGE GRAND DUCHY OF LITHUANIA

OF THE

There should not be any problem in defining the object of research in the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, because the Grand Duchy did exist as a state with clearly defined borders. Looking at the place of the Grand Duchy in contemporary ethnic Lithuanian historiography, we can detect increased attention to nation-formation and the question of its development. Although even today there are still authors who claim that the Lithuanian nation formed before the mediaeval state, we come across increasing numbers of assertions in Lithuanian scholarship to the effect that the transformation from tribal to national consciousness takes place only after a state had been created as ties formed with a ruling dynasty and a certain social group, the nobility, came into existence as the “carrier” of that consciousness.10 We should also note the influence that historical thought has had on political practice. Alvydas Nikžentaitis, Nuo Daumanto iki Gedimino. Ikikrikščioniškos Lietuvos visuomenės bruožai (Klaipėda, 1996), pp. 74-83. 9

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As before, in Lithuanian historiography emphasis is laid on the claim that the nation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was in the political sense Lithuanian. Sharing out the heritage of the Grand Duchy has not only not weakened during the past fifteen years but has even grown more intense. We bear in mind here in particular the “late” development of the Belarusian nation, which sometimes leads historians to claim uncompromisingly that the Grand Duchy was a purely Belarusian state.11 Thus Belarusian statements of the numerical eastern Slavic domination within that state are “countered” by claims in line with the principles of historicism that the life of the state was determined by the nobility who, despite their varied ethnic origins and the written and spoken language they used, regarded themselves as the Lithuanian political nation. That political nation was dominated by nobles from ethnic Lithuanian lands and the centre and capital of the state, Vilnius, was in ethnically Lithuanian land.12 Stress is also laid on the fact that not only Ruthenians but also certain ethnic Poles began to identify themselves with the Lithuanian political nation, gente polonus, natione lituanus [Polish by birth, Lithuanian by nationality], as one seventeenth-century bishop of Žemaitija was described.13 Analysing the history of the Grand Duchy after the union of Lublin (1569-1795), Lithuanian scholars acknowledge that changes took place in the nobility’s (the political nation’s) identity. Some authors claim that in the political sense the nobility remained Lithuanian, that is, it identified with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and distinguished between its interests and those of the kingdom of Poland, but in the cultural sense it became Polish.14 Others write about the formation of a dual political consciousness whereby from the end of the sixteenth century the nobility regarded itself increasingly not only as Lithuanian but also as Polish, that is, citizens of the Commonwealth of the Two Jakub Zejmis, “Belarusian National Historiography and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a Belarusian State,” Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung 48 (1999), H. 3, pp. 383-396. 12 Zigmantas Kiaupa, Jūratė Kiaupienė, Albinas Kuncevičius, The History of Lithuania Before 1795 (Vilnius, 2000), pp. 167-169. 13 Alfredas Bumblauskas, “Kaip galimos LDK paveldo dalybos?,” Naujasis židinys-Aidai, nr. 6 (2003), p. 325. 14 Kiaupa et al., The History of Lithuania, pp. 298-299, 363. 11

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Nations, which came to be called with increasing frequency simply Poland. Thus the term “Poland” gained two meanings: the crown of Poland and also the joint body including both Poland and Lithuania. This body is referred to as a macro-nation.15 Some historians regard the Polonization process itself as the unavoidable price of Europeanization.16 It is noticeable that Poland played a large role in making Lithuania European. Polish influence can be detected in law, the development of estate structure, the economy, art, and other areas.17 Thus when analysing political processes many Lithuanian historians stress the political Lithuanicity of the nobility and discuss events and processes that happened throughout the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. A similar situation has developed in discussions of cultural processes, especially literature. The processes and events connected directly with ethnic Lithuania are always studied in greater detail. This situation is determined often by the fact that Vilnius was an undoubted cultural centre and ethnic Lithuanian historians are more familiar with these kinds of sources. Many researchers including literary historians analyze written texts from throughout the Grand Duchy.18 This involves material written in Lithuanian, Latin, Polish, and East Slavonic. For example, cultural-linguistic models of social development discussed in Lithuanian society include the Lithuanian, Latin, Slavonic and Sarmatian (Polish).19 The literary historian, Sigitas Narbutas, has formulated his stance briefly and succinctly: “not only the history of our old literature 15 Edvardas Gudavičius, Lietuvos europėjimo kelias. Istorinės studijos (Vilnius, 2002), p. 187. 16 It should be stressed that discussions of Lithuania’s place in Europe have multiplied and ethnocentricity has declined. Meanwhile, at least some authors have not taken to the opposite extreme and there is no rush to assert unconditionally that Lithuanians have always been Europeans. It is clearly understood that Europeanness was always construed like any other collective identity such as, for example, nationality. See Darius Staliūnas, ed., Europos idėja Lietuvoje: istorija ir dabartis (Vilnius, 2002). 17 Gudavičius, Lietuvos europėjimo kelias, pp. 211-226. 18 The term literature is understood in a broad sense, including not only belles letters but also state documents. 19 Darius Kuolys, “Visu omenės raidos projek cijos XVI amžia us Lietu vos Didžiosios Kunigaikštystės raštijoje,” Šešioliktojo amžiaus raštija (Senoji lietuvių literatūra, kn. 5) (Vilnius, 2000), pp. 9-23.

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but also analyses of all cultural processes within the Grand Duchy of Lithuania should be based on state, that is civil links with Lithuania rather than thematic or any other authorial connection with Lithuania.”20 However, this position is not the only one available when we discuss cultural processes throughout the Grand Duchy. It is open to criticism for a certain lack of consistency; for Narbutas himself, like many Lithuanian literary historians, regards literature created in Lithuanian in Lithuania Minor, a part of Prussia and never a part of the Grand Duchy, as being Lithuanian. While no great problems arise with Reformation authors, who had left the Grand Duchy and wrote in part for a readership within the Grand Duchy; it becomes much more difficult when we follow the “civil” affiliation criterion and place the eighteenthcentury writer Kristijonas Donelaitis, who lived in Lithuania Minor, within the category of “Lithuanian” literature.21 It should be stressed that we do not criticize the affiliation of Donelaitis to Lithuanian literary history per se, but rather the making of the civil criterion into an absolute. At the same time, the earlier view that regards only the processes that took place in the territory of the modern Lithuania as being “Lithuanian” (or in the fashionable jargon, “ours” rather than “theirs,” whoever “they” might be) has survived.22 According to this view, among Latin publications published in the territories of the GDL only those published in the territory of the present Lithuania, or whose authors are ethnic Lithuanians or people originating from (ethnic) Lithuania, as well as those written for the use of the GDL or financed by Lithuanians, and, finally, those published outside the present Lithuanian territory 20 Sigitas Narbutas, Tradicija ir originalumas Jono Radvano “Radviliadoje” (Vilnius, 1998), p. 220. 21 Brigita Speičytė, “LDK literatūros istorijos modelis,” Literatūra 38:1 (2000), pp. 131–137. 22 “In dealing with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania we will study what the relationship of this movement was with the state, how it affected its social structure and institutions, [and] what was the power and scale of its effect on society as a whole. These problems are studied by analysing processes that had an effect throughout the state. When dealing with the significance of the reformation for ethnic cultures, most attention will be paid to the history of Lithuanian culture … in this work we seek to complement research into the cultural history of Lithuanians within the context of the cultural development of other peoples,” quoted from Ingė Lukšaitė, Reformacija Lietuvos Didžiojoje Kunigaikštystėje ir Mažojoje Lietuvoje. XVI a. trečias dešimtmetis-XVII a. pirmas dešimtmetis (Vilnius, 1999), pp. 46-47.

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but “connected in some way or other with Lithuania” can be regarded as “ours.”23 Thus, the books published in Latin but outside the present Lithuanian territory, for example, in Minsk by the native gentry and distributed within the ethnically Belarusian land should not be an object of Lithuanian historical and literature studies. It is very interesting that these authors describe political processes that affected the whole of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania but deal only with those literary processes that affected “ethnic Lithuania”; they see no lack of consistency in their stance. This is most likely the result of a balancing act between two poles of Lithuanian historical consciousness, the political and the ethnolinguistic. Ethnolinguistic Lithuanicity lies closer to the hearts of these authors and is more natural; hence, they concentrate on cultural processes connected solely with ethnic Lithuania. Since these criteria would not provide “proof” that the Grand Duchy in the period 1569-1795 was an ethnic Lithuanian state, the stress is laid on the Lithuanian political consciousness of the nobility and gentry. At the same time, the cultural Polonization of the gentry is regarded in a negative light. Sometimes we even encounter a reproach to the gentry: “the GDL nobility never realized that the rights of the Lithuanian language and culture had to be legitimized in the official state.”24 Thus some historians wonder why the mediaeval and early-modern gentry did not understand what is completely obvious to a modern nationalist. Despite this thriving, basically ethnocentric tradition, we can state that today Lithuanian historiography is dominated by the view that the whole of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is “ours” in a cultural as well as a political sense. In other words, historians have passed through several stages since the beginning of the formation of the Lithuanian historical narrative: first of all, it was guided by the ethnolinguistic view which regarded only works written in Lithuanian as being Lithuanian; later all cultural processes affecting ethnic Lithuania were appropriated, including literature created in other languages (primarily Latin); now the dominant view is that the development of culture throughout the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania should be studied. Eugenija Ulčinaitė, Lietuvos Renesanso ir Baroko literatūra (Vilnius, 2001), pp. 9-10. Kiaupa et al., The History of Lithuania, p. 300. We should, however, note that the authors of this remark discuss cultural processes in the Grand Duchy throughout the state.

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FORMATION OF A MODERN NATION: BETWEEN PRIMORDIALISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM Over the past fifteen years, the history of the nineteenth century has received more attention than throughout the earlier period of professional Lithuanian historical writing. After 1988 the traditional understanding of “national rebirth” or, in academic speak, “the primordialist view of the nation” did not disappear from Lithuanian historiography. Not only the older generation but many of the middle generation of Lithuanian historians treat the nation as a quantity that never changes its parameters (or to put it more simply, for them the Lithuanian language was always and continues to be the criterion for judging Lithuanian identity). The nation-building process is defined as an “awakening,” that is, if we may put it this way, a “reminder” to the peasants who formed the basis of the Lithuanian people of their national identity which exists “objectively.” Thus the “national rebirth” in this case is treated as an inevitable, natural process, which could take on only those forms that it has taken on. As a result, it is hardly surprising that these historians regard the history of nineteenth-century Lithuania essentially as the history of ethnic Lithuanians. However, since 1988 we have seen another tendency. A new view of nineteenth-century Lithuanian history and the nation-building process is represented by a group of historians, who formed around the Lietuvių atgimimo istorijos studijos [Studies in the History of the Lithuanian Rebirth] series of publications. What is new here? First of all, these researchers realized that they could not transpose ethnocultural or ethnolinguistic concepts of Lithuania back to the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries while maintaining the principle of historicism. Therefore, when dealing with this period in Lithuanian history, Lithuania was defined in the territorial sense interpreted by the society at that time and the Russian authorities, namely as the territory of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Later, the concept or rather concepts of Lithuania tout court became relevant, for at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there was no dominant theory of what Lithuania meant in public discourse. For the first time since the Third Partition of the

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Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, during this period there already appeared a clear concept of ethnographic Lithuania (and indeed of Belarus). Attention to the role of other non-dominant ethnic groups in the history of nineteenth century Lithuania was connected with these changes. 25 Lithuanian nationalism has come to be analyzed just like any other historical phenomenon. Quite quickly references appeared in the texts of Lithuanian historians to western theories of nationalism (citing the work of Ernest Gellner, Anthony D. Smith and Benedict Anderson), albeit using fragmental comments from these authors rather than their sociologized historical schemes, the application of which is usually regarded somewhat skeptically. 26 Thus, while the primordialist treatment of national problems was rejected (in this sense the title “Studies in the History of the Lithuanian Rebirth” is misleading), historians from Lithuania have not become radical constructivists. Of the aforementioned theorists of nationalism Smith is probably closest to most researchers, in that he acknowledges the continuity between ethnic groups and modern nations. Lithuanian nationalism is treated as an inevitable process dating from about 1820, while it is stressed that the form it took (here we have in mind its ethnolinguistic nature with a very marked anti-Polish element) was not inevitable. Attention has been drawn in Lithuanian historical writings to the fact that the cultural Polonization of the gentry did not necessarily mean political identification with the forming modern Polish nation, and furthermore, a large section of the Žemaitijan gentry was affected only slightly by cultural or linguistic Polonization. Extensive research has shown too that in the midnineteenth century a separate programme for studying Lithuanian historical sources had been developed with the clear aim of proving the distinction between “our” history and that of Poland.27 Thus it has Tamara Bairašauskaitė, Lietuvos totoriai XIX amžiuje (Vilnius, 1996); Remigijus Civinskas, “Kauno žydų integracija į miestiečių luomą,” Darbai ir dienos, nr. 28 (2001), pp. 51-66. 26 An example is the frequent references to Gellner’s stress on the role of industrialization for the formation of nationalism, which does not work for the economically quite backward Lithuanian case. 27 Reda Griškaitė, Simono Daukanto raštai, Laiškai Teodorui Narbutui: epistolinis dialogas (Vilnius, 1996), pp. 11-170. 25

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become quite popular to speak of the dual ethno-political consciousness of the Lithuanian gentry, which identified as much with a greater body, the macro-nation that included the whole of the Polish-speaking gentry of the former Commonwealth of the Two Nations, as with the historically-formed Lithuanian nation that was subordinate to that same macro-nation. In recent times, Polish scholars have stated that the process of transformation from the gentry political nation to the ethnolinguistic modern nation has not yet been fully researched and that connections with the land were a very important, perhaps the essential factor in collective identity on the territory of the former Commonwealth in the mid-nineteenth century. 28 The idea that the Lithuanicity of the gentry in the 1850s could be regarded as a regional identity has been raised in Lithuanian scholarship. It is important to stress that in this case Lithuania is conceived as a separate historical-cultural region: that is, the term ‘regional identity’ does not mean that Lithuania is treated as a component part of Poland. 29 Mostly on the basis of descriptions by the famous Vilnius cultural figure Adam Kirkor, Antanas Kulakauskas even draws the conclusion that “we may assert that on the eve of the 1863-64 Uprising conditions had formed in Lithuania for a Lithuanian national culture to form (that is a modern national culture typical of modern times) and the basis for this was a synthesis of peasant sub-culture with the values of the gentry culture of the Grand Duchy. The tendency for a united trilingual community to form became clear. This tendency could have spread if the 1863 Uprising had been a success.”30 This interpretation does not explain why all the nationalisms that formed in East-Central Europe were more ethnolinguistic than civil in form (although it is hardly likely that these two ideal types existed in reality). 28 Roman Wa pińsk i, Polsk a i małe o jc zy zn y Polak ów. Z d zie jó w kszta łtowa nia się świadomości narodowej w XIX-XX wieku po wybuch II wojny światowej (Wrocław, Warsaw, Kraków, 1994), p. 60. 29 Darius Staliūnas, “Lietuviškojo patriotizmo pėdsakai XIX a. viduryje,” Lietuvos istorijos metraštis 2000 (Vilnius, 2001), pp. 310-325. 30 Antanas Kulakauskas, “‘Šaka atskilusi nuo tautos...’ Lietuvos bajorijos ir LDK bajoriškosios kultūros vaidmuo lietuvių tautiniame atgimime,” Sietynas 3 (1988), pp. 91-92.

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Thus the nineteenth-century Lithuanian gentry became “our own” although most of them spoke Polish. This situation has been depicted graphically by one of the editors of the “Studies in the History of the Lithuanian Rebirth” series: “a historian of the older generation is sad that Narbutt, Syrokomla or Mickiewicz31 wrote in Polish and he rejects them on the basis of this ethnolinguistic criterion, but for us this is a fact that does not actually alter the nature of the question being researched.” 32 The form that Lithuanian nationalism took is linked by Lithuanian scholars with the failed Uprising of 1863-64 or, more accurately, with the repressive policies implemented after it by the Russian authorities primarily against the “Poles.” In Lithuanian scholarship it is stated that the new leaders of Lithuanian nationalism came from the Suwałki Gubernia and many of them studied in Russian universities with special state scholarships; later, in seeking rights for Lithuanians they were happier communicating with the Russian authorities than with Poles. Other authors say that the leaders of modern Lithuanian nationalism in the second half of the nineteenth century adopted the pan-Slavic concept of the “ethnographic nation,” which on the one hand allowed them to distance themselves ethnoculturally from the Poles, but, on the other hand, they felt “shoved” into the Russian geopolitical sphere of influence. 33 At the same time, other historians stated that the post-Uprising repressions destroyed cultural centres in former Grand Duchy territories, primarily Vilnius, and the local gentry became “consumers of the cultural production” created in ethnic Polish lands; in other words, they began to see the Grand Duchy as just another Polish province. Clearly, Teodor Narbutt was a historian, while Władysław Syrokomla-Kondratowicz and Adam Mickiewicz were poets. 32 “Tautos istorinio tapatumo beieškant,” Kultūros barai, nr. 2 (1995), p. 5. 33 Česlovas Laurinavičius, Netradicinė recenzija Leono Sabaliūno monografijai “Lietuviška Socialdemokratija iš perspektyvos, 1893-1914 m.,” Lietuvių atgimimo istorijos studijos, t. 4: Liaudis virsta tauta (Vilnius, 1993), pp. 437-448. Č. Laurinavičius thinks that the pan-Sla vic concept of the “ethnogra phic nation,” adopted by the Lithuanian national movement, allowed them to distance themselves from the Poles, since the concept was a counterargument against the concept of the “[Polish] political nation” to unify all national groups in this territory. Moreover, the concept was very useful for Russian geopolitical purposes to split the lands of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania. 31

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these are more comments or hypotheses than conclusions based on indepth research. Attempts have been made recently to link Lithuanian nationalism with the specific formation of an intelligentsia in Central and Eastern Europe, one which was conditioned by the nature of the modernization of this region, namely its backwardness and underdevelopment. The theory is more or less as follows: the modernization initiated in the Russian Empire by the bureaucratic apparatus went hand in hand with unifying tendencies that led to the cultural assimilation of other ethnic groups; at the same time, the modernization process created conditions for a new social class, the intelligentsia, who experienced difficulties in finding their place in the imperial structures that were still for the most part traditional. Therefore, the intelligentsia created or joined opposition movements. It looked for support among the peasantry and so had no option but to stress the importance of ethnocultural values. The significance given to these values should also be connected with the intelligentsia’s clear aim to distance itself from the traditional elite.34 This interpretation, as we see, concerns the ethnocultural type of Lithuanian nationalism as essentially “inevitable,” that is, conditioned by the “backwardness” of the empires of Eastern and Central Europe. Although, of course, this interpretation should not be equated with the “inevitability” of the primordialist view. The move from ethno-centric to civil concepts of history is illustrated well by the great and perhaps even excessive interest that has developed in the Krajowcy 35 movement. The leaders of this movement, who were descended from GDL gentry and mostly identified with Polish culture, put forward a model for social development at the beginning of the twentieth century, which was intended to neutralize ethnic nationalism by forming a civil society on the territory of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania rather than an ethnocultural one. Thus, those who proposed an alternative development for Lithuanian society at the beginning of the twentieth century are now receiving almost as much 34 Vladas Siru tavičiu s, Vincas Kudirk a’s progra mme for modernizing society and the problems of forming a na tional intelligentsia, Lithu ania n h istorical stu die s 5 (2 000 ), pp. 99-11 2. 35 From the Polish word kraj, which means land or territory.

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attention as the leaders of the “victorious” nationalism.36 We may say with confidence that at the present time the krajowcy have become a component part of the history of Lithuanian political thought. Of course, this does not mean at all that they cannot belong at the same time to the Polish or Belarusian political traditions. These developments in the “mental map” have a bearing on another, different view of the nationalities policy of the Russian Empire. The view is becoming ever stronger in Lithuanian historical writing that this policy should be researched with regard to all non-dominant ethnic groups and should not be linked solely with the growth of Russian nationalism, but should also be seen within the context of the Empire’s modernization needs and financial resources. All this leads us toward the conclusion that fewer and fewer historians stand by the view that the authorities sought to assimilate other ethnic groups from the very moment Lithuania was incorporated into the Russian Empire.

COMING TO TERMS WITH AN AWKWARD PAST: LITHUANIAN JEWRY Probably the most difficult issue facing contemporary Lithuanian historiography and especially mass historical consciousness is the history of Lithuanian Jewry. First of all, in the ethnocultural and confessional sense the Jews are considerably more alien to Lithuanians than the Poles. Rimantas Miknys, “Stosunki polsko-litewskie w wizji politycznej krajowców,” Zeszyty Histo ry czne 10 4 (Pa ris, 19 93 ), pp. 1 23 – 12 9; D. Sta liū na s, “Grazhdanin Velik ogo Kniazhestva Litovskogo,” Vil’nius (март-апрель 1995), pp. 122-143; Lietuvių Atgimimo istorijos studijos, t. 13: Mykolas Römeris (Vilnius, 1996); Mykolo Römerio mokslas apie valstybę (Vilnius, 1997); Jan Jurkiewicza, ed., Krajowość – tradycje zgody narodów w dobie nacjonalizmu. Materiały z międzynarodowej konferencji naukowej w Instytucie Historii UAM w Poznaniu (11-12 maja 1998) (Poznań, 1999); Jan Sawicki, Mykolas Römeris ir buvusios Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštystės žemių tautinės problemos (Lietuvių a tg imimo isto rijos studijo s, t. 15) (Vilniu s, 199 9); R. Miknys, “ Problem kształtowania się nowoczesnego narodu Polaków litewskich w pierwszej połowie XX wieku,” Biuletyn historii pogranicza, nr. 1 (Białystok, 2000), pp. 21-31; Idem, “Wileńscy autonomisći i ich projekty autonomii politycznej Litwy w latach 1904-1905,” LituanoSlavica Posnaniensia, Studia Historica 8 (2001), pp. 97-114. 36

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Thus it is no surprise that historians in the inter-war period, with a few exceptions, such as the leftist Augustinas Janulaitis, showed almost no interest in the history of Lithuania’s Jews. Moreover, the active part played by some Lithuanians in the Holocaust undermines the myth embedded in Lithuanian consciousness that they and they alone are a martyred people.37 In addition to what we might call “domestic reasons,” there were other circumstances in Soviet Lithuania that prevented open discussion of the history of the Jews in Lithuania, especially concerning the Holocaust. After 1945, when Lithuanian historiography was under the influence of Russian Marxism, the major historical agents were held to be the social classes; if Jews were mentioned at all, it was only as part of the working class, Marxist activists, and so forth. Even during investigations of crimes committed during the World War II mention was made only of “Soviet citizen victims.” The Holocaust was not a subject for separate discussion. Lithuanian Emigrants were dominated by the ethno-centric understanding of history that they took with them from inter-war Lithuania; discussions of the Holocaust were influenced, to a large extent, by those who had taken an active part in war-time events and who placed all the blame for what happened in Lithuania on the German Nazis. True, there was a variety of opinion among émigrés, and their liberal press, such as Akiračiai, did begin before 1988 to discuss the problem of Lithuanian involvement in the Holocaust. Since the arrival of pluralism in Lithuanian historical writing after 1988, more favourable conditions have formed for open discussions of the Holocaust. At that time, Soviet propaganda “recalled” Lithuanian participation in the murder of Jews (according to the historical literature this card was also played during the Cold War to attack Lithuanian émigrés). In other words, there were attempts to frighten the world with the As is well known, Lithu ania is one of those European countries where the largest proportion of Jews was murdered during the World War II. Various figures are given in the literature but the most usual is 95 percent destruction. Pogroms began in Lithuania in the first days of the war and later certain Lithuanian self-defence brigades under German command participated in mass murders of Jews. The Lithuanian Provisional Government (not recognized by the Germans) even managed to pass anti-Jewish laws during its brief existence. 37

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“dangerous Lithuanians,” who were seeking independence from Moscow. This has caused further psychological problems for discussion of this painful subject.38 During the past fifteen years great changes have taken place in this area. 39 Lithuanian historians now describe the stages in the mass murder of Lithuanian Jewry like their colleagues in the West and Israel and, I would say, there are no longer any serious arguments over the number of those killed or other such matters.40 Nevertheless, there are disagreements over certain basic matters. Some historians from other countries, primarily Israel, stress the initiative shown by Lithuanians in the murder of Jews in summer 1941 and later (we should draw attention to the fact that in these works the memoirs of Jewish survivors are a very important source), while most Lithuanian historians, although they do not deny the anti-Semitic mood of certain Lithuanian groups, stress that without the German occupation and the Nazis’ deliberate attempts to draw local inhabitants into the murders, crimes on such a scale would not have been conceivable. Lithuanian historians base their work on the documents issued by the occupation regime, criminal evidence collected during the Soviet period and the memoirs of Lithuanians. Vytautas Berenis, “Holokaustas ir lietuvių istorinė sąmonė,” Politologija 3 (2000), p. 15. Lietuvos žydų žudynių byla. Dokumentų ir straipsnių rinkinys, compiled by Alfonsas Eidintas (Vilnius, 2001); A. Eidintas, Žydai, lietuviai ir holokaustas (Vilnius, 2002); see the chapters by A. Eidintas, “Das Stereotyp des ‘jüdischen Kommunisten’ in Litauen 194041,” Valentinas Brandišauskas, “Neue Dokumente aus der Zeit der Provisorischen Regierung Litauens,” Arūnas Bubnys, “Die litauische Hilfspolizeibataillone und der Holokaust,” and Liudas Truska, “Litauische Historiographie über den Holocaust in Litauen,” in Vincas Bartu sevičius, Joachim Ta uber, Wolfram Wette, eds., Holoc a ust in Lita u en . Krieg , Judenmorde und Kollaboration im Jahre 1941 (Köln, Wien, 2003), pp. 13-25, 51-62, 117-131, and 262-276; Alvydas Nikžentaitis, Stefan Schreiner, Darius Staliūnas, eds., The Vanished World of Lithuanian Jews (Amsterdam, New York, 2004); V. Berenis, “The Holocaust and Lithuanian Historical Consciousness” (http://www.artium.lt/4/berenis.html); also see many articles written for Lithuania’s Presidential Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet Occupations: http://db.komisija.lt/default.eng.asp 40 There are not many historians who are still trying to lessen the scale of Lithuanian participation in these murders or excuse those involved. Their comments are marginal within the general historiographical context. This situation has been dealt with briefly by Liudas Tru sk a in his “ Litau ische Historiogra phie ü ber den Holocau st in Litau en,” Bartusevičius et al., eds, Holocaust in Litauen, pp. 268-269. 38

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Although on occasion Lithuanian historians stress that the roots of the participation of Lithuanians in the Holocaust should not be traced back to the anti-Semitism typical of nascent nineteenth-century Lithuanian nationalism, most agree that in the 1930s ethno-nationalist elements did become stronger in the outlook of part of Lithuanian society, especially young right-wingers. A “healthy” state, according to the ethno-nationalist canon is one that is ethnically monolithic. Nevertheless, Lithuanian historians are more inclined to stress the influence of specific circumstances at that time, such as the political crisis within the state. Thus, in 1938 Lithuania was forced to open diplomatic relations with Poland as a result of an ultimatum. The Klaipėda District [Memelland] was forcibly returned to Germany in 1939. In that same year Soviet military bases were forced on Lithuania and in 1940 the Soviet occupation began. Another specific reason, to which Lithuanian historians often refer, is the Lithuanians’ assertion that Jews lent all manner of support to the Soviet occupation, although research has in fact shown that during the Soviet occupation of 1940-41 Jews suffered no less than Lithuanians and in percentage terms just as many of them as Lithuanians were exiled by the Soviet regime. Although proportionately there were more Jews in Communist party structures than might be expected from the proportion of Jews in society at large, they certainly did not dominate the Communist party. In addition, material benefit is often put forward as a motive for Lithuanians to take part in anti-Semitic actions. If we recall how long it took West German society to begin to speak openly about the murder of Jews organized by the Nazis41 and that in Ukraine, for example, historians still avoid speaking about the participation of local inhabitants in the Holocaust,42 we can say that a considerable amount has already been achieved in Lithuania. Further research into the events of World War II will, of course, help to form a more critical relationship with the past, but, in my view, if we wish to answer one of the most important questions here, that is, why Lithuanians took such an active part in the mass murder of Jews, 41 J. Tauber, “Coming to Terms with a Difficult Past,” Schreiner et al., eds., The Vanished World, pp. 297-305. 42 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Ukrainskaia istoriografiia: 1991-2001. Desiatiletie peremen,” Ab Imperio, No. 2 (2003), p. 442.

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we need to research in greater depth not only the stereotypes held on both sides but also the dynamics of earlier Jewish-Gentile relations in Lithuania. There is a dominant view in the historical consciousness of Lithuanians and in part too in academic literature, which holds that, with the exception of the period 1941-1944, there was no great amount of violence in Lithuano-Jewish relations during the period these two groups dwelt in the same land. However, preliminary research has already shown that there were anti-Jewish acts of violence in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Lithuania (and we might call these “pogroms”). It is also obvious that conflicts, violence, and attacks here did not take on the scale they reached in Ukraine or Poland. Therefore, we must investigate which factors increased tension between the two ethnic groups. Secondly, we should establish which factors conditioned an increase in such attacks and turned them into direct collective physical violence. Thirdly, we should explore which factors contributed to the relatively low intensity of tension and collective violence; for example, what role was played here by the authorities, the power of the law or similar factors?43 Although we should agree with those historians who claim that there remain many other problems to be researched in connection with the Holocaust in Lithuania (and moral as well as academic imperatives oblige Lithuanian historians to deal with these), concentration on just this aspect of the question may be dangerous in my view. Here we face the danger of looking at the whole of the history of Lithuanian Jewry solely through the prism of the Holocaust and treating it solely as Shoah prehistory. In a similar way nineteenth-century Polish historiography most often viewed the whole Polish-Lithuanian past solely through the prism of the partitions of the state at the end of the eighteenth century. Thus Lithuanian historians’ interest not only in Lithuanian views of the Jews and state policy towards this ethnoconfessional group but also in the development of Jewish society itself is a step to be welcomed. Of course, it will take time for such tendencies to begin to develop – for example Yiddish and Hebrew must be learned. This problem was the subject of a conference “When Xenophobia Becomes Violence: the Dynamics of Lithuanian and Jewish Relations in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century,” held at the Lithuanian Institute of History on December 23, 2003. 43

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CONCLUSIONS This brief survey of developments in Lithuanian historical thought over the past fifteen years shows that the popularity of ethno-centric Lithuanian history has declined and more and more historians are writing civic history, in others words, about how Lithuanian society has always been multi-cultural. No longer just politically but also culturally, the whole history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania has come to be regarded as “Lithuanian.” When the history of nineteenth-century Lithuanian nationalism is analyzed, alternative developments are discussed. Gradually, other ethnocultural groups, including the Jews, are becoming a part of Lithuanian history. Historians are beginning to acknowledge that various concepts of the cultural history of the Grand Duchy are feasible: Lithuanian, Belarusian, and so on.44 However, these changes mainly affect professional historians and, to a certain degree, textbooks, which are often written by them. These views still do not predominate in mass historical consciousness. Lithuanians are very keen on appropriating famous Lithuanian figures who wrote and spoke Polish, such as Ignacy Domeyko (Ignotas Domeika) and Tadeusz Wróblewski (Tadas Vrublevskis), but there are no Polish inscriptions on memorial tablets to these men. In other words, Lithuanians are still unwilling in their mass consciousness to share the historical heritage with other nations. Events from the past belong either to “us” or to “them.” Considerable differences have arisen between professional historiography and mass historical consciousness, for example, in discussions of the Holocaust and Jewish life in Lithuania in general. In non-academic texts the “two genocides theory” still thrives and the participation of a certain sector of Lithuanian society in the Holocaust is apparently justifiable on the basis of “criminal” Jewish behaviour during the first Soviet occupation of 1940-1941. Whether or not the changes that have taken place in historical science will affect mass historical consciousness remains an open question.

44

Brigita Speičytė, “LDK literatūros istorijos modelis,” Literatūra 38:1 (2000), pp. 131–137.

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15 EMPIRE OR POST-EMPIRE? THE CONCEPT OF “LONG CENTURY” AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBALIZATION NORIHISA YAMASHITA EMPIRE OR POST-EMPIRE? “Empire” has been an academic buzzword for a few years. Apparently, the increasing irrelevancy of the nation-state as the only unit of political legitimacy in the world-system underlies this trend.1 But it is not the case that the retreat of the nation-state is taking place everywhere alike in the whole world-system, but that whereas nationstates are being deconstructed in some (mostly developed) areas, the nation-state (and substantial sovereignty) is still persistently sought for in other (mostly less developed) areas. Moreover, there are (mostly least developed) areas in which even quasi-states are virtually lost and the idea of the nation-state does not offer any relevant prescription any longer.2 The term “empire” is used by various authors to infer the subsequent predicament of these heterogeneous mutations in somewhat a wholesale way. Plus, in the case of the Eurasian area/s (or the former Soviet area), the usage of “empire” is still more obfuscated, given the deep historical background of the Russian empire. Apparently, most students of Russian history normally seem to share the conventional periodization in which the history of Russia is punctuated with the formation of Tsarism, the Russian revolution, and the collapse of the USSR. “Imperial” Russia usually denominates the period starting with Ivan III (or Ivan the Terrible or Mikhail Romanov) and ending in 1917. Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: the Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge, 1996); Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York, 1996) for just a few examples. 2 R.H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (Cambridge, 1990).

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However, there are not a few authors, like Dominic Lieven, who emphasizes the essential continuity between so-called “imperial” Russia and the USSR in their pattern of socio-political processes.3 Furthermore, Emmanuel Todd, a historical anthropologist, argues that the empire is the authoritative definer of legitimacy in the world-system, like the UK in the nineteenth century and the US in the Cold War period, and that while the USSR had been contained by the Euro-American coalition with American “imperial” leadership during the Cold War period, the recent unilateralist/neo-conservative turn of George W. Bush’s administration turns this Cold War picture upside down: now the US may be being contained by a Euro-Russian coalition as we saw in the UN Security Council just before the Iraqi War in March 2003. In other words, Todd suggests that Russia might be the new empire defining some sort of legitimacy to contain the neo-conservative menace in the twenty-first century.4 Anyway, it is sure that the spatial order of the world-system is now undergoing serious transformation which involves multiple regional processes of redefining spatial imagination. And the Eurasian region is no exception. The purpose of this chapter is, first, to extend the geo-historical context, by introducing a concept of the early modern empire, in which the recent Eurasian regional trans/formation may be better comprehended; secondly, to re/assess the ongoing process of globalization as the transformation of spatial order in a wider and longer macro-historical perspective with the idea of the alternation of “long centuries”; and, thirdly, to speculate about the destinies of various mesoareas around the Eurasian mega-area.

THE EARLY MODERN EMPIRES Andre Gunder Frank, once renowned as one of the theoretical leaders of the so-called dependency school and in a close academic relationship with Immanuel Wallerstein, recently came up with a very Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (New Haven, 2000). Emmanuel Todd, After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order (translated by C. Jon Delogu, New York, 2003).

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provoking and thoroughly (self-)critical work against the received Wallersteinian concept of the modern world-system. The title of his work is Reorient.5 Wallerstein defines his concept of world-system as the unit of totality which theoretically guarantees epistemological relevance on the one hand.6 He draws, on the other hand, the actual geographical boundary of the world-system with the scope of division of labor of staple goods.7 Frank argues, in Reorient, that if we are to seek for the truly total entity of the human socio-historical system, we do not have any reason to take one specific type of linkage, namely the division of labor of staple goods, as the yardstick of systemic demarcation, and to black out other types of relations like the circulation of luxury goods, military contact, or intellectual influence.8 In other words, the modern world-system (which emerged in the western end of the Eurasian continent in the sixteenth century, then geographically expanded itself over centuries to be a global system, and still exists at this moment) carved out by Wallerstein from the whole geo-historical scope of humanity is not the only possible or relevant unit of analysis, but rather a set of blinkers which prohibit alternative conceptualization of past geo-historical reality. From this standpoint, what Frank actually demonstrated in his Reorient is the existence of global economic inter/networks during the fifteenth-eighteenth centuries through which silver – the key currency of the time — was relayed and circulated inter-regionally or globally. In this early modern global economy with a de facto silver-standard, Europeans were only marginal actors whose access to Asian precious goods was substantially dependent on silver from the Americas. In short, Frank accuses Wallerstein of Eurocentric historiography. Indeed, as far as the fifteenth-eighteenth centuries are concerned, the Wallersteinian concept of the modern world-system covers only a regional (European/Atlantic) portion of the globe. And Wallerstein assumes that the other regions were dominated by pre-modern worldsystems, which he calls “world-empires,” whereas the European modern Andre Gunder Frank, Reorient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley, 1998). Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I (New York, 1974), pp. 3-11. 7 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy (New York, 1979), pp. 5-15. 8 Andre Gunder Frank, Reorient, pp. 1-51; Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall, Rise and Demise: Comparing World Systems (Boulder: CO, 1997), pp. 27-56. 5

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world-system is defined as the (capitalist) “world-economy.” This picture with a “world-empire”/“world-economy” dichotomy is too reductive and unfairly underestimates the early modern globality that Frank has shown in his Reorient. However, the early modern global economy was not a monolithic or homogenous space of commerce and communication. While Frank’s approach was successful in demonstrating the presence of a global circuit of material communication at some level, it is apt to see inter-regional interaction only as evidence of connection and to neglect the construction of regionality that regulates the global connectedness. What is needed here is to reconstruct the structural reality of early modern regionality in the shared context of the early modern globality. To approach the historical construction of the early modern regionality, it may be helpful to rethink the concept of the “long sixteenth century” which has been considered as the cradle of the modern worldsystem.9 The concept of the long sixteenth century originally referred to the almost two-century-long period (circa the 1450s to 1640s) of socioeconomic expansion in the European/Atlantic world in which the late medieval Mediterranean and the Flanders-Hanseatic economies were dissolved to form the European capitalist world-economy. Usually, this long period is divided into two contrastive phases in terms of the rate and orientation of socio-economic expansion. The first phase of the long sixteenth century (up to the 1550/70s) is the period of sharp and risk-taking economic vitalization. Having hit the bottom of the so-called “medieval crisis,” the European economy saw a recovery of basic socio-economic productivity in this period, which entailed very active, entrepreneurial and even adventurous commercial activities, most conspicuously in the (West and East) “Indies” but also substantially within the (expanded) European world-economy. The second phase is the period of stable and rent-seeking economic institutionalization. As the returns of experimental activities in the previous phase became somewhat clear, those new commercial channels turned out to be sources of rent and various political forces Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I, pp. 67-68; Fernand Braudel, “Qu’est-ce que le XVIe siecle?,” Annales E.S.C. 8:1 (janv-mars 1953), p. 73.

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attempted to intervene to “protect” them. 10 So-called early modern mercantilism associated with the absolutist states represented a major part of this process. The above is rather a standard picture of the long sixteenth century, but the important point that Reorient implies (and I would like to underscore) is that this overall pattern of the long sixteenth century can be observed not only in the European/Atlantic world but also on the global scale. Let us just browse the global picture of the first period from the 1450s through the mid-sixteenth century. The Ottoman Empire underwent vigorous westward expansion, symbolically from the fall of Constantinople in 1453 to Suleyman’s golden age of the 1550s and 1560s. Moscow principality in Russia became independent circa 1480 and steadily expanded its sphere from then on until Ivan the Terrible claimed himself Tsar of all Russia in 1547. In the Indian oceanic world, the shrinking spiral of maritime commercial networks hit the bottom in the mid-fifteenth century catalyzed by the entry of the Chinese and Portuguese, and reactivation of the Indian-Ocean-wide trade network went on until the inland-looking Mughal empire’s presence became evident with the enthronement of Akbar the Great in 1556. East Asia saw the process of inclusive/expansive formation of the Sino-centric tributary trade system through this period under the presence of the Ming dynasty. Then in the second phase of the long sixteenth century, these parallel outward-looking expansionisms reached the point of refraction with major political re-organization, which essentially resulted in regional consolidation of trade circuits, often intertwined with taxation/redistribution circuits. In South Asia, Mughal expansionism from Akbar to Aurangzeb structured the significant portion of the circum-subcontinent economy, which traded off with maritime commercial networks.11 In West Asia, the geo-economic orientation of the Ottoman Empire was reversed after the defeat of Lepanto (1571). 10 About the concept of “protection rent,” see Frederic C. Lane, Profits from Power: Readings in Protection Rent and Violence-Controlling Enterprises (Albany: NY, 1979). 11 See Frank, Reorient, pp. 84-92; K. N. Chaudhuri, Asia before Europe: Economy and Civilization of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 112-148.

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Istanbul was no longer an open door between the Mediterranean and the Orient but a bolted gate and started to function as the center of the Ottoman redistributive system of staple goods.12 In north Eurasia, preRomanov Russian expansionism was interrupted by the frequent peasant revolts and political turmoil in the late sixteenth century through the early seventeenth century. When Russian territorial expansion resumed in the mid-seventeenth century, its expansionism was orientated basically eastward, incorporating the frontiers into a Moscowcentered system.13 In East Asia, in the process of transition from the Ming to Qing dynasties, the Sino-centric tribute trade system was transformed into the aggregation or alignment of immigration/trade control systems in the multiple East Asian dynasties.14 The so-called “Seclusion Policy” of Tokugawa Japan is just a part of this region-wide transformation. 15 Similar immigration/trade control policies were adopted by Korea and Vietnam as well as China.16 Thus, the overall pattern of the long sixteenth century is shared globally, and more importantly, on this basis of global commonality, there took place a parallel formation of regionality in North Eurasia, West Asia, South Asia, East Asia, and Europe. I would like to call this regionality deriving from the global long sixteenth century the early modern empire, emphasizing its construction or structure of spatial imagination. Many readers may be upset when they read that I, proposing the concept of “early modern empire” above, call early modern Europe an “empire.” Indeed, there can be observed no single political entity which covered all or even the important parts of the European world in the early modern centuries. This is why Wallerstein retains the sharp Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II (Paris, 1966; republished in 1990), tom 2, pp. 289-294 and tom 3, pp. 330-333. 13 Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I, pp. 301-324. 14 Takeshi Hamashita, Kindai chuugoku no kokusaiteki keiki [International Moment of Modern China] (Tokyo, 1990). The essential argument of this Japanese book is presented in his “The Tributal Trade System and Modern Asia,” A.J.H. Latham and Heita Kawakatsu, eds., Japanese Industrialization and the Asian Economy (London, New York, 1994), pp. 91-107. 15 See my book, Sekai shisutemuron de yomu Nihon [Japan’s Modernization in WorldSystemic Perspective] (Tokyo, 2003), pp. 107-129. 16 Ibid., pp.96-104. 12

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dichotomy between the European world-economy and the Oriental or Asiatic world-empires. However, when I use the word “empire,” I do not define it in terms of territoriality of direct political domination and/ or economic appropriation, but in terms of structural spatial imagination which preconditions the behavioral options of actors in the “empire.” Unlike the post-Revolution modern world-system, the spatial imagination of early modern Europeans assumed Europe as the world which should ideally be ruled by a single and universal authority.17 In other words, dynasties in the European early modern empire acted not in the arena of equally authorized multiple actors (or in the “anarchical society” to use Hedley Bull’s phrase18) but in the imaginary empire of its own which should cover the whole (European) world. The actual world split among struggling dynasties was conceived as a temporal and deviated situation in which the political actions of each dynasty were intended to intervene to restore the ideal (or imaginary) “empire.” Thus defined, the concept of early modern empire deconstructs the dichotomy between world-economy (single axial division of labor with multiple territorial sovereignties) and world-empire (single redistributive system of staple goods under single territorial control). For it is not merely that what Wallerstein called the European worldeconomy is more like the contemporary (early modern) empires among Eurasia than the post-Revolution modern world-system after the nineteenth century, but also that the (early modern) regionality is characterized not by empire-as-territoriality but by empire-as-idea or imaginary empire shared by actors in a region at the level of their behavioral precondition in the ex-European areas as well. That is to say, for example, the East Asian early modern empire is not identical with the Chinese empire, but with the system composed of all those dynasties like Korea, Japan, and Vietnam as well as China, all of which shared the idea of regional universality (projected on the geo-historical presence of Chinese empire). The early modern empire is a regional system defined by spatial imagination legitimized by the shared idea of empire or regional universality. Braudel, La Méditerranée, tom. 1, pp. 374-385; Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain, and France. C. 1500-c. 1800 (New Haven, 1995). 18 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London, 1977).

17

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All in all, in terms of structure of spatial imagination and its effect on regional formation, it seems better to say that there were five early modern empires including the European one in Eurasia, all of which were variations of the same type of regional system, in spite of the apparent (and still commonly accepted) contrast between the centralized world-empires in the “Orient” and the de-centralized world-economy in “Europe.”

ALTERNATION OF “LONG CENTURIES” The on-going process of globalization is often characterized as liquidation of the existing system which has been supposed to provide us with some sort of certainty. And this system on the verge is commonly identified with the world-system in which the nation-state is the only unit of political legitimacy. Indeed, nation-states are now losing their legitimacy quite fast, as they lose their dual functions: the internal function as the unit of income redistribution and the external function as the unit of self-determination with political sovereignty.19 The malfunction of the national redistributive system, or the socalled “welfare state,” became evident in the 1970s in developed countries. But, at that time, the problem was conceived mainly in terms of economic inefficiency of “large government.” Today the crisis of the national welfare state is much deeper. For the unity between bearers and beneficiaries of income redistribution is being lost. Fundamentally speaking, the idea of income redistribution can hardly be legitimized without the assumption that, under progressive taxation, the taxpayers are collectively identical to the beneficiaries of welfare policies financed by tax revenues. It is needless to say that this assumption cannot be perfectly true in practice. It is a kind of political fiction on which the whole system is based. And the content of this fictitious unity is one of the very important aspects of the idea of nation. As the transnational flow of socio-economy is accelerated by globalization, estrangement between bearers and beneficiaries of income 19

Sassen, Losing Control?

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redistribution systems became too evident to be absorbed by the fiction of national unity. Thus, the national welfare states are losing their legitimacy. The second front of de-legitimization of the nation-state is the malfunction of the idea of self-determination of nations. In the last decade, there can be seen a tendency that the long-accepted order of international law based on the principle of national sovereignty is somehow overruled by the “universalist” claims as in the “humanitarian intervention” in Kosovo affairs by the Clinton administration and the Iraqi war justified by the presumed possession of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam’s regime. Originally, the logic of self-determination of the nation was introduced to the discourse of international politics as the justification of independence from imperial domination. The liberation of the nation was equated with its having its own state in this logic. In other words, the nation is supposed to be the unit of sovereignty.20 Sovereignty is the power that cannot be bound by anything but agreement made by itself. In short, sovereignty is the power with no higher authority. Therefore, the sovereign nation-state cannot be subject to intervention by any external force in principle. Of course, this principle has not always been respected at face value. Rather, it would be more true to say that the major powers utilized this principle as rhetoric to contain the expansionist moves of each other. Just be reminded of the attitudes of the former USSR towards East European countries and the actions of the US in Nicaragua and Grenada in the Cold War period. All those actions violated sovereignties legally, but were somehow accepted in the actual scene of international politics. However, the principle of national sovereignty is becoming irrelevant at a much deeper level in the post-Cold-War period. For what we are now witnessing is not merely the (ab)use of rhetoric but rather the replacement of that very rhetoric. The sovereignty of the nationstate is now being redefined, if not abolished, by the advocators of a new kind of universalism. The so-called neo-conservatives in the Bush administration who semi-publicly insist to limit (or even deny) the 20

Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, 1999).

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sovereignty of what they consider anti-democratic states are typical of this tendency.21 Thus, nation-states are now losing their legitimacy, malfunctioning in both internal and external terms. Now, returning to the macro-historical context, this kind of “end of the nation-state” view of globalization is affiliated with the conventional historiography of the modern world-system, in which some sort of linear development is assumed, such as the transition from feudal monarchy through absolutist state to modern nation-state. And, in such a framework, the absolutist state in early modern times is usually considered as the transitional form from the medieval political system to the modern one. In other words, we are immersed in the paradigm that the nation-state is the telos or normalcy of modern history.22 However, as discussed in the previous section, the early modern spatial formation in a global perspective culminated in the parallel establishment of the five early modern empires around the Eurasian continent in the mid-seventeenth century, and the structural process of the nineteenth century was not so much building the international system as dismantlement of the early modern empires. To put it forcibly, what we have been calling the international system is actually, in a manner of saying, the systematized absence of system in the vacuum of empire(s). The nation-state is not necessarily the normalcy but a transitional or exceptional phase of the longer and wider human history.23 Indeed, zooming out of the panorama of human history, we see imperial order in the mid-thirteenth century through the mid-fifteenth century under the Pax Mongolica,24 and then we see the transitional phase in the mid-fifteenth century through the mid-seventeenth century, 21 Robert Kagan’s Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York, 2003) is a very symptomatic book. 22 Charles Tilly’s The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, 1975) is one of the classic examples. 23 Revisionist works which illustrate the constructedness of “nation” are now rather common. A few of classic examples are Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Community, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger’s The Invention of Tradition, and Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism. 24 See Janet Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 (New York, Oxford, 1989).

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that is the global long sixteenth century discussed in the first section, which led to the next imperial order with the parallel early modern empires which operated until the mid-nineteenth century. Then we entered “the era of the nation-state,” which may actually be another transitional phase (so we may better call this phase “the long twentieth century”) to the coming new imperial order expected in a few decades from now if we assume that the same alternating process would go on in the same time-scale (Figure 1). FIGURE 1. 1250-1450 Imperial Order “Pax Mongolica”

1650-1850 Imperial Order Early Modern Empires

1450-1650 Transition “Long 16th Century”

2050Imperial Order? New Empire?

1850-2050 Transition “Long 20th Century”

Although this model of an alternating pattern of imperial orders and long centuries is quite a rough sketch, it is of some use to relativize the conventional paradigm of 50-year or at most 150-year perspective, in which the current situation is supposed to be the demise of the existing context, namely the Cold War regime and nation-state system. Instead, we may be standing at the end of the two-century long phase of transition, which is comparable with the moment in the early seventeenth century when the early modern empires were being consolidated after the (global) long sixteenth century.

DESTINIES OF MESO-AREAS: A SPECULATION Having introduced the rough but totally alternative model of macro-historical context in which the current regional (re)formation and globalization may be better analyzed, we are swiftly going to speculate

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on the destinies of the Eurasian meso-areas. Three points are to be made: a) the decline of marcher regions which fail to participate in any imperial order; b) the lowered relevancy of geographical proximity to spatial order (re)definition; and c) the refraction of Sollen factors. THE DECLINE OF MARCHER REGIONS As is discussed above, the global long sixteenth century was the process of redefining the spatial order, of which the course was not linear or determined at all. It was full of trials and errors. Various attempts at empire-building were made and failed. Eventually, at the last phase of the long sixteenth century, the five early modern empires were consolidated, but they did not cover 100 percent of the Eurasian space. There remained marcher areas, such as Central Asia, Persia, Southeast Asia, the northernmost part of the Far East and so on. Actually these areas had been very active and even prosperous as the turntables of inter-regional trade and communication in the course of the long sixteenth century, especially in the first half when the empires had not yet been consolidated. 25 But once the early modern empires were consolidated and the spatial imagination was structured in a centripetal manner, those marcher areas were deprived of their space of activity and oppressed by the surrounding empires, often militarily or forcibly incorporated. The commercial activeness of Central Asia up to the sixteenth century is reasserted by Morris Rossabi in his “The ‘Decline’ of the Central Asian Caravan Trade,” James D. Tracy, ed., The Rise of Merchant Empires (Cambridge, New York, 1990), pp. 351-370. John Foran discusses the long-term shift of the politico-economic presence of Safavid Persia between the earlier long sixteenth century and the latter in his “The Long Fall of the Safavid Dynasty: Moving beyond the Standard Views,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 24 (1992), pp. 281-304. S. A. M. Adshead further pointed out that these long-term shifts in central Asia and Persia are co-related in his China in World History (London, 1988) and Central Asia in World History (London, 1993). As for Southeast Asia, Anthony Reid’s Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680 (New Haven, London, 1988, two vols.), which emphasizes the socio-economic vigor in the earlier phase of the long sixteenth century (Reid is explicitly inspired by Braudel on this point), is widely appreciated. Shiro Sasaki’s Hoppou kara kita kouekimin [Traders from the North] (Tokyo, 1996), one of the very few accessible works about the dynamism of Northeast Asian cross-cultural commercial networks, pointed out that cross-cultural traders in Northeast Asia underwent hard times in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries when the Russian and Qing Empires were being consolidated while struggling with each other. 25

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Assuming that we are now living in the last phase of the long twentieth century, we may expect that the meso-areas that fail to participate in any (presumably coming) imperial order will follow the same destiny of, say, Safavid Persia or Jungar in the seventeenth century. THE IRRELEVANCY OF GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY The critical difference which distinguishes the long twentieth century from the sixteenth is discursive globalization. Today, we globally share the discourses on basic values (such as human rights, civil liberty, and democracy) at an unprecedented level, which certainly affects the course of the redefinition of spatial imagination. Whereas, in the early modern period, geographical proximity more or less corresponded with ethnic, religious, and cultural proximity, which preconditioned the definition of spatial imagination of the early modern empires, today such geocultural consistency is seriously undermined. Due to cultural hybridization by globalization, the basic discourse on legitimacy is diffused trans-regionally cutting across the traditional (or “civilizational”) geocultural unity. Even anti-global activists (including so-called “Islamic fundamentalists”) often use the language of “democracy” and “human rights” to assert their interests and justice. East European meso-areas are not simply fluctuating between the gravity of the Soviet/Russian mega-area and prospective Westernization. Besides the institutional influence of the Soviet/Russian mega-area, they appropriate the discourse of neo-conservatism and market fundamentalism at the level of rhetoric, while their socioeconomic structure has become more and more dependent on the relation between the core countries of the EU, or what the neoconservatives call “Old Europe.” What does the term “West” actually mean here? The situation cannot simply be projected on a twodimensional map. Moreover, the development of cyberspace reinforces this tendency at the socio-cultural level. THE REFRACTION OF THE SOLLEN FACTOR Osamu Ieda formulates the transitive nature of Eurasian mesoareas in terms of the Sein/Sollen dichotomy, that is the tension between the existing regionality defined by the Soviet/Eurasian mega-area and

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the centrifugal orientation towards the Western world. I agree that at this moment the Sollen factor is operating in the centrifugal direction against the Russian gravity. However, assuming that the alternation from the long twentieth century to the new imperial order with consolidated spatial imagination is coming, the Sollen factor is likely to undergo drastic refraction from the simple westward direction. There are three possible consequences of this refraction. The first possibility is that the meso-areas make some sort of nativist turn to resist any kind of imperial consolidation or definition of region and follow the destiny of the early modern marcher societies. The second possibility is that the Sollen factor is converged with neo-conservative universalism and the meso-areas become parts of multiple enclaves of the Pacific (i.e. US-China and/or US-Japan axis) imperial order. The third possibility is that the Sollen factor is redefined by negotiation between the EU and Russia. In this case, meso-areas in East Europe are likely to be the hinterland of greater Europe, whose process may in the long run somewhat resemble the process of the division of Poland by early modern empires in the eighteenth century.

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16 ABKHAZIA UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF THE DIVISION OF THE WORLD STANISLAV LAKOBA During the last years, irreversible changes have taken place in the world. First of all there was the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Ethiopia, the unification of Germany, and the emergence of a number of so-called independent states which have received international recognition. The arch of instability, which originally extended from the Balkans to the Caucasus, now extends from the US to Korea. Only after the last ten years is it possible to outline the approximate contours of the most complex and dramatic period of contemporary history which should be examined in the context of the impetuous processes of globalization and world-wide unrest. After the split of the Soviet Union, Abkhazia went through several stages under the conditions of the division of the world. The first stage covers the period from December 1991 to September 1994, and is closely connected with the first division of the post-Soviet space in Transcaucasia (or South Caucasus), which was a part of the world-wide division. This first stage had the following peculiarities: (1) Monopolist hegemony of Russia in the Transcaucasia; (2) The management of the Georgian-Abkhazian War and its manipulation during 1992-1993; (3) Practical non-intervention of the United States and European countries in Russia’s policies in its neighboring foreign countries (blizhnee zarubezh’e); (4) Underestimation by the Georgian leadership of the geopolitical factor in 1993 and, accordingly, accession of Georgia into the CIS to return to the sphere of Russian influence. The second stage in Transcaucasia covers the period from September 1994 to the autumn of 1999 (or September 2001) and is characterized as a relatively peaceful period when all conflicts in this region were temporarily frozen. In September 1994, Western oil

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companies signed with the Azerbaijan government the “contract of the century” on the supply of Caspian oil bypassing Russia and Iran simultaneously. In September 1994, the United States and European countries frankly declared their strategic interests in the Transcaucasia in connection with the large deposits of oil and gas reserves and rejected to recognize this region as Russia’s exclusive sphere of influence. By the end of 1994, processes for political regulation of conflicts had been worked out in all conflicting places in the Transcaucasia. On the other hand, secret rivalry between Russia and the US continued in the region, in particular on the questions of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the transportation of Caspian oil, and the Eurasian transportation corridor through Georgia (TRASESA). From the autumn of 1999 or from September 11, 2001, the political history of Abkhazia entered into the third stage and, at the same time, the second division of the Southern Caucasus under the conditions of the global division of the world began.1

IN THE

THE “ROSE REVOLUTION” IN GEORGIA CONTEXT OF THE POST SEPTEMBER 11 WORLD

After the end of the Georgian-Abkhazian War in 1993, the Yeltsin administration began to run a hard-line policy in regard to Abkhazia, again declaring against this de facto independent state a complete blockade including financial-economic and informational aspects from SeptemberDecember 1994 up to the autumn of 1999. With the advent of V. Putin, the policy of the “stick” run by Yeltsin was replaced by a policy of the “carrot” which was undoubtedly caused by the anti-Russian behavior of Tbilisi in a number of problems of military-strategic character. The decisive change of Russian policies in advantage of Abkhazia took place after the tragedy of September 11, 2001 in the US and the Kodori Incident in October 2001.2 The next stage was the negotiation of Putin with Stanislav Lakoba, Abkhaziia – de-facto ili Gruziia de-iure? O politike Rossii v Abkhazii v postsovetskii period 1991-2000 gg. (Sapporo, 2001). 2 In October 2001, a detachment of Chechen militants intruded from the Pankisi Canyon of Georgia to the Kodori Canyon of Abkhazia with the help of Shevardnadze. 1

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Bush in Moscow in May 2002 on the agenda of which the Abkhazian question was included. In direct testimony of this were the massive requests by the multi-national population of Abkhazia in June 2002 for obtaining of Russian citizenship. During the summer of 2002, Russian policies in regard to Abkhazia became even more active. In August, a delegation from the Kremlin visited Abkhazia. The presence of the delegation itself symbolized the territory as being under Russia’s protection. At present, the US and Russia are “enforced” allies. It is obvious that the US needs Russia’s support in regard to Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea, and, of course, Iraq. The caricatured behavior of Shevardnadze in this geopolitical context, his attempt to make the US conflict with Russia, and his double-dealing caused additional irritations. Washington became more and more conscious that it is impossible for it to dispense with regional support by Russia, which had been weakened but was quickly recovering power. The new Russian pragmatists, seemingly, finally made their will not only toward Abkhazia. Every event taking place in this part of the world today reminds us of the past great struggle for the Caucasus. On September 11, 2001 the substantially new second stage of the division of the Transcaucasia began. The strategic task of the US and the European Union was to consolidate its holding of Caspian oil in the region and secure its transportation to the West; Russia’s task is to renew its control over this territory (which is of life-or-death importance for the security of Russia’s southern flank) for the peacekeeping of the Northern Caucasus. It should be remembered that during the period 1917-1921, Russia temporarily but completely lost control over the Transcaucasia where at first German and Turkish and afterwards Anglo-French armies dominated. At that time the countries of the entente, which were also attracted by “west Baku oil,” were similarly disappointed. “The path to Baku goes through Batumi – Tiflis,” Lev Trotsky wrote in the 1920s. “This last point (Baku – S.L.) is the strategic focus of the Transcaucasia … The struggle continues because of oil and manganese. It makes no difference for oil companies how to reach oil: through Denikin, through the Muslim party Musavat, or through the gates of ‘national self-definition’.”3 3

L. Trotskii, Sochneniia, Vol. 12 (Moscow, 1925), pp. 241-242.

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Obviously, history is being repeated or is what is happening a new improvisation? Even before the events of the November “Velvet Revolution” in Tbilisi, Abkhazian observers came to the conclusion that “the United States will tactically sacrifice Shevardnadze, giving him hope by words and sending warm letters …”4 It is also necessary to note that already for the third time in Georgia a situation is emerging which Western experts characterized as an “uncompleted state.” The first was after the defeat in Abkhazia in 1993 and the second was after the military conflicts in Gali (southern Abkhazia) in May 1998.5 Facing difficulties in global issues, which are becoming more and more visible, and scattering its military-political forces and financialeconomic resources all over the world, the US as a superpower began to experience complexities. For example, the new “Desert Storm” turned into a real “storm” in Europe and NATO, when France (Jacques Chirac) and Germany (Gerhard Schroeder) openly spoke against the war in Iraq. A devoted ally, Tony Blair, was experiencing serious difficulties in the British parliament and with public opinion. The operation in Iraq is disturbing Turkey which is seriously anxious about the problem of a united Kurdistan as well as the plans for the federalization of Iraq giving Kurds a wide range of autonomy. The actual position of a number of influential Arab states in regard to Israel’s military actions against the Palestinians needs no further comment. Particular unease was caused by the might of Islamic fundamentalism and the energetic development of China. On this problem, with well-grounded preoccupation, Charles Krauthammer remarked: “The hard fact is that war on many fronts is consuming and containing American power. While America spends blood and treasure in faraway places like Baghdad, China builds the economic and military superpower of the future.”6 In this context of global politics, Russia will transform more and more from an enforced ally of the US into an ally indispensable to Western civilization. Sbornik materialov respublikanskoi konferentsii, posviashchennoi 9-letiiu Pobedy i provedennoi 26 sentiabria 2002 goda (Sukhum, 2002), pp. 54-55. 5 Known as the “Six Day War.” Georgian troops intruded into Gali District of Abkhazia, neighboring Georgia, but were defeated within six days. 6 Time, 163:2 (12 January 2004), p. 45. 4

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It is no secret that Russian gas and oil magnates assembled in Texas in 2002, where remarkably they discussed the question of contemporary politics and whether the West would rely exclusively upon Russia’s supply of oil and gas, rejecting the service by the Arabic world. Washington addresses Russia for help not only in regard to the hot problem of Iraq but also for the difficulties connected with Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea, and with nuclear weapons. The interaction of Russia and the US and their coordination are being devised through the example of Transcaucasian policies. It is well known, for instance, that in the summer of 2003 the US and Russia had secret consultations about the future of the Transcaucasia, including Abkhazia, as well as about the demarcation of spheres of influence and cooperation in this region. Thus, the Abkhazian public unexpectedly experienced a very important incident with not so much economic as political characteristics: on July 31, 2003 two important agreements were concluded. The Russian Gazprom and the Georgian government signed an agreement on strategic cooperation in the gas sphere with a term of 25 years and the President of the American corporation, AES, declared that his corporation sold the controlling share of stock (75 percent) of the Tbilisi Power Supply Company, TELASI (ТЭЛАСИ), to “United Energy System of Russia” (РАО “ЕЭС”). In 1998, when the American AES bought the share of stocks of TELASI for US$ 25 million, its arrival in Georgia was regarded as an important political decision and a strategic step. This time it was Russia that made an important political step. In fact, the US already at that time forsook Shevardnadze. This was done with apparent ease and the ubiquitous Anatolii Chubais, visiting Tbilisi on August 15, 2003, made the whole event public. Russia became the monopolist in the sphere of Georgian energy and obtained the main gas pipeline. The leading expert of the Institute for the Economic Development of Georgia, Niko Orvelashvili, stated that: “In fact, an overturn happened. In general, actually, the 11th Russian Army (the military unit that occupied Georgia in 1921 – S.L.) is already not necessary, it is enough to advance ‘United Energy System of Russia’ and Gazprom to the south.”7 By all appearances, it was in this summer of 2003 that the Americans eventually decided to replace 7

Panorama, No. 6 (August 2003), p. 2.

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the corrupt Shevardnadze. This was testified to by the two-day visit of the former US Secretary of State, James Baker, to Tbilisi at the beginning of July. Baker brought a new scheme of parliamentary elections to Georgia on November 2. Interestingly, the “friend” of Shevardnadze did not behave at all friendly, proposing a new electoral code and the formation of electoral commissions at all levels. The new chairman of the central electoral committee of Georgia was separated from the influence of President Shevardnadze and the OSCE received the right to appoint the office. On July 24, 2003, the parliament of Georgia, after heated debate, adopted the bill of the electoral code, which was a serious defeat for Shevardnadze.8 Generally, for the Transcaucasia as a whole that autumn turned out to be a hot time. As already mentioned, along with cooperation, latent or sometimes demonstrative rivalry between Russia and the US continued. Among the three recognized states in the Transcaucasia, only Armenia continues to be Moscow-oriented, but the presidential elections there have already been held. In regard to the presidential elections in Azerbaijan, apparently, the US and Russia agreed on the son of Geidar Aliev. It would seem that a similar Russian-American compromise existed also in regard to Georgia in which the change of leadership was prepared. Besides it is quite symptomatic that, in Yalta in September 2003, on the eve of the meeting of the representatives of the US and Russia at Camp David, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Igor Ivanov, blocked the question raised by Georgia to discuss its statement on Abkhazia. Shevardnadze had never been so coldly accepted by the Russian leadership. “Do you know how difficult it was to adopt the Statement in Yalta? It was very a difficult situation,” – said Shevardnadze later in Tbilisi.9 At the press conference held in Yalta on September 19, President V. Putin did not refer to the “territorial integrity of Georgia.” He responded to a Georgian journalist: “In the post-Soviet space, unfortunately, there are still many conflicting points. One of the most acute is Abkhazia and we all wish that this and other problems with similar features would be regulated with justice on the basis of international law and the realities in which we live, so that these 8 9

Soiuznaia gazeta, No. 10 (September 2003), p. 10. Svobodnaia Gruziia (SG), 23 September 2003, p. 1.

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problems can be regulated with justice for the advantage of all peoples who live in the territories of the conflicting regions.”10 Participating in the meeting of the leaders of CIS countries in Yalta, Shevardnadze understood that he was placed in a very difficult situation, in particular after Baker’s visit and his capitulation in energy affairs before the “United Energy System of Russia” and Gazprom. Under these conditions the President of Georgia decided to perform one more somersault. At a reception in Yalta, he proposed a toast in Putin’s honor, for which he would be forced to apologize in Tbilisi, saying that this toast did not have any groveling but the Russian and Georgian mass media compared his speech to his own famous phrase from Soviet times: “For Georgia, the sun is shining from the north.” The President of Georgia called Putin “accessible, communicable, decent, and amazingly understanding of the nuances of today and the future.” He said that he was “proud that Russia is headed by such a strong and responsive leader. All of us should be convinced that we are with Great Russia and the Russian people.”11 Feeling that the West had turned its back on him, Shevardnadze decided to improve relations with Moscow again, despite his overtly Russophobic speeches in the recent past. This could not but be exploited by the opposition. The people were discouraged with such quick changes by their president. But just around the corner, the parliamentary elections in Georgia and the cold winter were very close. Therefore, there was no alternative but to make friends with Russia again. Georgia was not able, despite the enormous sum of Western credit, to create its own security in energy affairs without which all the conversations about “independence” remained empty. On the eve of the election, the Ambassador of the US, Richard Miles, suddenly declared: “In Georgia, we have an unfavorable investment environment.”12 All over the world, the opinion that Georgia was an undesirable partner became widespread. Following Yalta, in September 2003, the negotiations of Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin were held in the US. The meeting at the highest level at Camp David was, according to Shevardnadze, a logical continuation of the Moscow meeting in May 2002. It continued SG, 29 September 2003. Versiia, No. 37 (2003), p. 8. 12 Sakartvelos Respublika, 30 October 2003. 10

11

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for about two hours and during this conversation the issue of conflicts was mainly discussed, including the Georgian-Abkhazian, Transnistrian, Nagorno-Karabakh and other conflicts. The head of the Georgian state remarked: “I regard it as very important that the presidents of two large states discuss the questions of regulating conflicts.” Motivated by this remark, a TV announcer threw out the following comment: “The confrontation of interests between these two countries may possibly squash Georgia.”13 The events which took place after Camp David testified that the US changed to a stricter position in regard to the official Georgian authorities. For example, the representative of the US State Department, Thomas Adams, when he left Shevardnadze’s office, expressed dissatisfaction with the reforms conducted in Georgia and suggested that “Georgia will be left without the help of the United States.”14 Anxiety in regard to the coming elections was expressed by the famous American politicians, militaries, and diplomats who visited Georgia: the former Secretary of State, James Baker, Senator John McCain, General John Shalikashvili, the former First Deputy of the State Secretary, Stroub Talbot, the President of the NATO project “Transtion Democracy,” Bruce Jackson, and others. 15 On the very eve of the elections, TV journalist Liuba Eliashvili asked about the many Western politicians and diplomats who “unanimously declared that the realization of democratic elections will be a decisive factor for the country.” Eduard Shevardnadze answered in a somewhat perplexed manner: “And I often think why do they show their special interest toward Georgia? All of us remember Baker’s visit to Georgia and the plan proposed by him. … In accordance with these points the electoral campaign should be organized. Later other visitors came too.” Very sluggishly and even with unease, he also remarked that he knew how generously the opposition was financed by several foreign countries.16 On the very eve of the elections, on October 31, 2003, the US President sent a special message to the head of Georgia in which he reminded him of the agreement with James Baker on the question of SG, 3 October 2003, p. 2. Ibid. 15 SG, 14 October 2003, p. 2; SG, 29 October 2003, p. 1. 16 SG, 31 October 2003, pp. 2, 3. 13 14

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the conduct of the elections on November 2. As always, Bush supported the consolidation of independence and the territorial integrity of the country and proposed to work for the resolution of the conflict in “Abkhazia or other conflicts in the region … ”17 After his enforced resignation, Shevardnadze gave a number of interviews to Western and Russian mass media in which he accused the US of being committed to his resignation. For example, the Canadian newspaper The Globe and Mail described the fact of the support by the financier and billionaire, George Soros, of oppositional forces to which a significant sum of money was paid. With his help, the leaders of the “nationalist movement” and Georgian students underwent special courses in Serbia in which they learnt how to conduct a “bloodless revolution.” (November 27, 2003). The British Daily Telegraph reported, based on the former president’s words, that his resignation was organized by the West, which Shevardnadze ac cused of ingr atitude and betr ayal. He d id not hide his disappointment caused by the American Ambassador in Georgia, Richard Miles, who supported the opposition. “When he needed my support in regard to Iraq, I gave it. What has happened now, I can’t explain,” – remarked Shevardnadze (November 27, 2003). As is well known, foreign policies have many dimensions and there have been a number of unexpected difficulties between Russia and the US. One of these stumbling blocks is Georgia. By all appearances the two super-powers were interested in the replacement of Eduard Shevardnadze, which actually took place after the elections as a result of the “Rose Revolution” on November 23, 2003. In many points, because of the coordination and joint actions in Georgia it was possible to limit the events to a bloodless course— although a coup took place. However, they pursued different aims, as would be confirmed by the further development of events. Actually, from that moment leap-frogging in the relations between Russia and the US began. A new situation developed because, as a result of the replacement of the leadership, a pro-Western triumvirate came to power: M. Saakashvili, Z. Zhvaniia, and N. Burdzhanadze. Such an overturn in events did not satisfy Moscow at all. As a result, in Georgia 17

SG, 4 November 2003, p. 1.

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a peculiar dual power arose: figuratively speaking, the US controlled Tbilisi, while Russia controlled the regions of Georgia which fell to pieces from the bottom. Ajaria unified with the de facto independent republics of Abkhazia and the South Osetia. Its leader, Aslan Abashidze, and parliament declared an extraordinary situation in Ajaria on the same day with the revolution, November 23.18 Following the events in Tbilisi, Russia demonstratively had consultation with leaders from Ajaria, Abkhazia, and the South Osetia in Moscow. Speaking at a meeting of the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OSCE in Maastricht, N. Burdzhanadze remarked that such actions might lead to harm in the relations with Moscow and strengthened the intention to remove the two Russian military bases remaining on Georgian territory. However, as is well known, the supply of power and natural gas to Tbilisi depends on Moscow. It is worthwhile for Russia to cut the supply in winter; then all the euphoria emerging from the arrival in power and the removal of “Shevardnadze’s dictatorship” will evaporate like mist only after several days and dark, cold nights. Tbilisi is not able to afford to pay completely for the energy while the debts grows unchangeably.19 The financial situation in the country is just catastrophic. The deficit of the budget of Georgia on December 1, 2003, amounted to $135 million, while the foreign debts were more than $1.5 billion. A number of influential Western publications regard the events in Georgia as raising a number of questions. For example, Shevardnadze turned out to be the second president of the country who was replaced before the end of his term. Would this not become the norm for Georgia and the whole Caucasus? Considering economic factors (electric power, gas, and more than one million Georgians living in Russia and sending their relatives in Georgia more than $1 billion each year), political factors (the former autonomies), and military factors (Russian bases), the influence of Russia on Georgia may even increase because of the recent events. “Washington should act quickly to prevent the strengthening of the Russian Federation’s influence on Georgia,” remarked the Wall Street Journal (November 25, 2003). 18 19

www.toprbc.ru/25 November 2003 www.toprbc.ru/1 December 2003

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The Kommersant writes that Russia threatens the new Georgian authorities by the possibility of establishing a “protectorate” over Abkhazia, Ajaria and the South Osetia if the events will not develop according to the Russian scenario. Moreover, arguably, Russia took the responsibility to defend not only the population of these semi-states (among them there are large number of owners of Russian passports), but also their territories.20

GREAT GAME AROUND THE TRANS-CASPIAN PIPELINES Global military-political games in the Southern Caucasus and, in particular, in Georgia and Abkhazia are combined with the strategic rivalry of the US and EU with Russia in regard to a series of most important political-economic directions. Russia, as the legal successor of the USSR, does not wish that the West take away the significant reserves of energy resources from the Caspian region, namely from under its nose. In addition, in the post-Soviet period, a stable resource orientation with an emphasis on oil and gas became consolidated in Russian economics. The weight of oil and gas composes more than 34 percent in the present structure of Russian exports. Russia pumps across valuable resources from the Kazakhstani part of the Caspian Sea by the Tengis-Novorossiisk pipeline and Russia is not interested in competition, namely in the construction of alternative oil and gas pipelines which can avoid its territory. It was exactly such an EastWest energy corridor that Georgia is trying to get supported by the US, Turkey and the EU countries, which seriously threatens the national security of Russia. Therefore, Russia cannot but be anxious about: (1) the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline being built avoiding Russia; (2) the project of the South Caucasian Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas pipeline; (3) the problem of the Eurasian transportation corridor through Georgia (TRASESA). If these projects are realized, Russia will be in danger of losing the export of gas and oil completely, particularly to EU countries. The 20

Kommersant, 29 November 2003, p. 1, 4.

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explosive situation covering not only Georgia and Abkhazia but also a significant part of the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, the Persian Gulf, Iraq and so on, can be largely explained by these geostrategic circumstances. It is exactly this broad region stretching from the mouth of the Volga to the Sultanate of Oman that received the name “the Caspian-Persian energy ellipse.”21 It is estimated that this region has more than two-thirds of the known world reserves of oil and more than 40 percent of the natural gas. In the Persian Gulf there are more than 600 billion barrels of oil and 1600 trillion cubic feet of gas. Several sources estimate the Caspian reserves at 200 billion barrels of oil, though the practical number is regarded as 90 billion barrels. The attractiveness of the Caspian region in terms of energy is that it is the continuation of the oil deposits of Iraq and the whole Middle East.22 The Caspian region is called the energy storeroom of the twenty-first century. However, a fundamental problem of the Caspian region is how to transport oil to the outside markets. At this point, an ancient geopolitical principle is working: those who control the main routes will control the whole contents of the politics. The secret of the predominance of the British Empire was its control over key transition points of the world: Gibraltar, Malta, the Suez Canal, and so on. Under new conditions the number of internal and external players in the Caspian region has increased (in the nineteenth century there were only two active players, the Russian and British Empires). The main focus of their battle is oil and gas resources. If, in the nineteenth century, it was regarded that everything in the region was decided by the network of railways, current perspectives of strategic predominance in the region depends on the construction of pipelines which carry the oil and gas of the region to external markets. Arbakhan Magomedov remarks: “The paths of potential oil pipelines for export, more than anything else, will be determined by the constellation of local political interests and the direction of external influence. To where the future oil pipelines will go – north, south, east or west – will determine how this influence will affect the future. Thus, namely, along oil pipelines one may see how the Arbakhan Magomedov, “Kapiiskaia neft’ i rossiiskie regiony: meniaiushchaiasia priroda lokal’nykh interesov vdol’ nefteprovoda Tengiz-Novorossiisk. Sravnitel’nyi analiz,” Acta Slavica Iaponica 19 (2002), pp. 21-23. 22 Magomedov, “Kaspiiskaia neft’,” pp. 22-23. 21

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constellation of large money, large ambitions, and the large egos of giant oil companies, political leaders and ruling groups is formed.”23 The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (KPC) Tengiz-Novorossiisk (in which the governments of Russia, Kazakhstan, and the Sultanate of Oman participate and which has a length of 1580 km) was created in 1992 for the purpose of consolidating the Russian dominance over the Caspian – Black Sea territories. The KPC keeps Kazakhstan and Central Asia under the transition pressure of Russia which continues to have the status of the main “controller” of Caspian oil. Literally several days before the parliamentary elections of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, as if he were muttering to himself, reflected about energy independence: “I still have one and a half years of presidency, or a little more. I wish the business to build the gas pipeline goes to the extent that there should be no way to return. Not to the north, not to the south, not to the other directions …”24 Shevardnadze referred to the project of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, in the case of the realization of which Georgia will, at best, receive natural gas by the end of 2006. Its construction will require one billion dollars but until then Georgia should exist only on the basis of Russian gas, which cannot but influence its political situation. Generally, the question of energy resources, their supply to Georgia, especially to its capital, causes very stormy, negative reactions in Georgian society. In the autumn and winter people are practically deprived of power and heating. On the eve of the elections, an official newspaper Svobodnaia Gruziia, raised most actively the topic of the future energy independence of the country. Thus, for example, it reported that the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline was going successfully since Georgia had already received 236 km of pipes (of the necessary 248 km) produced in Japan.25 Russia was far from delighted when Shevardnadze, completely confused in his orientation between the Kremlin and the White House, personally participated in Tbilisi on October 30, 2003 in the signing of an agreement between the management of the South Caucasian Gas Pipeline Company Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum and the Georgian International Magomedov, “Kaspiiskaia neft’,” pp. 24-25. SG, 31 October 2003, p. 1. 25 SG, 28 October 2003, p. 3. 23 24

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Oil Corporation to supply natural gas to Georgia. This project anticipated the completion of the construction in 2006. It was reported that: (1) As transitional fee Georgia will receive 5 percent of the total transported gas volume (1.5 billion cubic meters of gas each year) for free; (2) In the following 20 years, Georgia will be allowed to buy 500 million cubic meters a year from the investors at the fixed price of US$55 for 1000 cubic meters; (3) Georgia will receive seven billion US dollars for the whole period, namely on average 175 million dollars each year.26 Such a supply of Caspian natural gas through Georgia and Turkey to Europe could never be coordinated with Russian political-economic strategy. In my view, plans of this kind accelerated the development of political events in Tbilisi and resulted in the removal of Shevardnadze before the end of his term. It is necessary to note that a Georgian publicist, Giia Lomadze, dedicated an article to this important problem. According to him, certain forces in Russia “always think about the reanimation of the Soviet Union” and they arguably have a plan according to which they operate in the former Union republics. The purpose of these forces is the renewal of the sphere of influence of Russia, for which the Russian political elite began to use the term “liberal-imperialism.” The accent is placed on economic annexation. G. Lomadze argues that, “external forces were activated in particular in realizing projects of international scale. I imply this to mean the “Great Silk Road,” TRASESA, the oil pipeline BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan, gas main. If Russia gains control over these grandiose objects, it will obtain a key to the gates of Europe and Asia …”27 This kind of comment is not new from the historical point of view. For example, at the very beginning of the twentieth century the renowned Georgian jurist and specialist of international relations, Z. Avarov (Avalishvili), noted that, “the incorporation of Georgia to Russia was a political event of first-rate importance. It was from the time of this incorporation that Russia stood on the way which will possibly lead it to the shores of the Persian Gulf.”28 One of the famous politicians of Georgia, Irina SarishviliChanturiia, in a heated period of electoral passion in Tbilisi, declared SG, 30 October 2003, p. 5. SG, 31 October 2003, p. 5. 28 Z. Avalov, Prisoedinenie Gruzii k Rossii (St. Petersburg, 1906), p. 3. 26

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officially that destabilization was indispensable for Russia for the purpose that the route of international oil and gas pipelines should be changed and go not across Georgia but through Armenia which was friendly toward Moscow. For several Georgian politicians such a scheme completely fits the concept of so-called Russian liberal imperialism. The suspicion of Tbilisi on this matter became particularly tangible after A. Chubais’s visit in August to Georgia and the meeting of the leaders of CIS countries in Yalta in September, in which the “single economic space” was documented. Observers interpreted the single economic space as Russia’s new policy to hold the situation in the post-Soviet territories under its control for the purpose of exploiting the questions of economic cooperation for political purposes.29 For the successful realization of the project of the “East-West” energy corridor through Georgia, it was above all necessary to regulate the conflicts in Transcaucasia, including the Georgian-Abkhazian, for the purpose of the safe functioning of pipelines. To resolve the Georgian-Abkhazian problem and realize Russia’s interest in terms of the smooth export of oil to Turkey and on to Europe, avoiding the Straits of Bosphorus and Dardanelles, the construction of a “connection” between the western branch of Baku-Supsa (western Georgia) and the northern branch leading to Novorossiisk was proposed in 1997. 30 This proposal was made despite that experts regarded the former military port Ochamchira in Abkhazia as having clear merits as a terminal in comparison with Supsa (in Georgia) and Novorossiisk (in Russia). However, all hopes collapsed immediately when the “Six Day War” broke out in Gali Raion of Abkhazia, bordering Georgia, in May 1998. It was on the eve of the elections in Azerbaijan and Georgia in the autumn of 2003 that the topic of the Novorossiisk-Supsa pipeline (through Abkhazian territory) and further to Ceyhan was raised again. The Georgian ambassador in Azerbaijan, Z. Gumberidze, commented: “This is an independent pipeline through which Russian and Kazakhstani oil would be able to be exported from Novorossiirsk to the Turkish port Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea, avoiding the SG, 24 September 2003, p. 3. One of the initiators of this plan was the then secretary of the Security Council of Russia, Boris Berezovskii (Lakoba, Abkhazia – de-fakto, pp. 98-99).

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Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits.”31 The ambassador remarked as if the question of the incorporation of the Novorossiisk-Supsa pipeline into the pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan had not been discussed between Russia and Georgia.

INTENSIFYING RIVALRY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE US AFTER THE “ROSE REVOLUTION” Many politicians in Georgia and Abkhazia have become conscious that the substantial reason for conflicts was the redivision of spheres of influence in the Caucasus. A leader of Georgian refugees, T. Nadareishvili, remarked: “This process has not been completed; for some reason during the last ten years we don’t have any results. Though it is possible to suppose today that this division is coming closer to completion, the Caucasus region was left. And now the second stage has arrived – the regulation of conflicts. Because of the mutual compromises between Russia and the US, these two countries can achieve a certain agreement which satisfied the two parties...”32 As already mentioned, the cooperation of main players in the region — the US, Russia, and the EU countries — has experienced elements of latent, sometimes demonstrative, rivalry. This is characteristic also for other conflict zones within the borders of the CIS, but the US reacts with extraordinary anxiety to the attempts to regulate conflicts in Moldova-Transnistria and Georgia-Abkhazia. For example, the almost finished compromise project for the regulation with Transnistria on the basis of the asymmetrical federalization of Moldova was cancelled literally the day before its signature. The OSCE and the US in a literal sense cut off the possibility to regulate the confrontation according to the Russian scenario and postponed the resolution of the problem for years. All of these things, I would note, took place in parallel with the change of government in Georgia. The first deputy minister of foreign affairs of Russia, Viacheslav Trubnikov, remarked on the improvement of mutual relations between 31 32

SG, 7 October 2003, p. 2. SG, 17 October 2003, p. 4.

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Russia and the US on the eve of the elections in Azerbaijan and Georgia. According to him, “[This improvement] will affect the political situation in the Southern Caucasus positively.” Nevertheless, there are quite a few problems and contradictions between them, in particular in the military aspects. These problems include the debate over the realization by Russia of obligations which it promised at the Istanbul summit of the OSCE in 1998 in regard to the removal of military bases from Georgian territory, and Georgia’s strange anti-terrorist operation in Pankis which was made public two weeks before it was carried out (Trubnikov suggested that Georgia gave Chechen militants the time for dislocation). As for the education of 2000 Georgian soldiers by the Americans according to the so-called “Education and Equipment” program, the position of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is that it welcomes the “unification of two thousand professionally trained fighters in the struggle against terrorism.” But there is a danger that they will be used “to resolve internal problems of Georgia. Of course, I mean Abkhazia.”33 Russia regards that it fulfilled its obligations required by the Istanbul Agreement by dismantling its bases in Vaziani and Gudauta. As for the bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki, it will not be possible to remove them sooner than nine-eleven years later though Georgia insists on a term of three years. On September 30, 2003, while staying in Moscow, the Speaker of the Georgian parliament, Nino Burdzhanadze, spoke about the contradictions in Russo-Georgian relations. She emphasized that as early as a year before, Russia and Georgia stood on the brink of war, at first because of the events in the Pankis Canyon and afterwards because of the events in Abkhazia and the Kodori Canyon, when Russian paratroopers landed there.34 Russian influence on the Abkhazian problem causes serious discontent in Georgia. For example, there is debate over the associative relations of Abkhazia with Russia, the prompt acquisition of Russian citizenship by as much as 80 percent of the population of the multinational, unrecognized republic (this is interesting also in the context of the recently declared new military doctrine of Russia foreseeing 33 34

SG, 7 October 2003, p. 4. SG, 2 October 2003, p. 2.

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preventative damage and the defense of its citizens), railways connections between Sochi-Sukhum, the restoration of the Inguri railway bridge, the construction of a pedestrian bridge over the border river Psou, and many other questions. Georgian politicians are irritated when Moscow talks about the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Russia and, at the same time, introduces a non-visa regime at first for Abkhazia and the South Osetia and, after the “Velvet Revolution” in Tbilisi, for Ajaria as well. In this manner, the practical division of Georgia is taking place and this process will be enhanced by the uncompromising attitude of Tbilisi “democrats.” Recently, voices requesting the autonomy of Javakhk (bordering with Armenia), where Armenian settlements are concentrated, can be heard more and more loudly. The populous communities of Azerbaijanis (almost 700,000 people) also express their discontent. It is exactly through these settlements that a main oil pipeline Baku-Ceyhan runs. The relations with Ajaria worsened to the extreme. It is not by chance that people began to compare Georgia to Yugoslavia. After military specialists of Western countries, in particular the US, began to educate several Georgian battalions according to the NATO program, Russia began to pay more attention to Abkhazia. For example, the former director of the Service of International Intelligence, one of the leaders of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Viacheslav Trubnikov, said more or less that the Georgian military trained by the Americans might possibly be used in Abkhazia. “Namely this makes us anxious. If our anxiety is justified, we will not welcome such steps by Georgia.”35 It is necessary to emphasize the unprecedented activity of the US administration in Central Asia and the Transcaucasia after the events of September 11. The fight against international terrorism and the Taliban in Afghanistan resulted in the stationing of American military bases, arguably on a temporary basis, in a series of former Soviet countries in Central Asia. Similar plans of Washington are brought forward in regard to the Transcaucasia as well. One should not underestimate that the “Afghanistan pretext” for the consolidation of its presence and military bases could be repeated in detail here, for 35

SG, 7 October 2003, p. 2.

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example, in the case of certain new military operations or militarypolitical pressure on Iran. In this context, how is the interest of Washington toward proRussian Armenia, which has grown extremely strong recently, to be explained? And why was the enormous territory of nine hectares with a garrison of 500 required for the American embassy in Yerevan (the largest embassy of the US in the world which can be transformed into a military base at any moment)? Several experts interpret that the purpose of the US activities in Armenia is neighboring Iran and the expansion of the sphere of US interests to the Caucasus, as far as the border with its ally, Turkey.36 It was not by chance that the prime minister of Turkey remarked in January 2004 that Washington will deliver a military attack on Iran and Syria in the near future. A significant activation is being observed in the Caspian region as well. American military and naval forces are working out operations to guard oil platforms together with the Azerbaijanis. There is a testimony that the US is planning to station an air force base in Azerbaijan. 37 During the recent period the US made a serious attempt to consolidate its presence in Georgia. As a result of the “Rose Revolution” in November 2003 and M. Saakashvili’s coming to power, the US expressed overt interest in supporting the new regime. For example, the ambassador, R. Miles, overtly declared in January 2004 that the American military in Georgia was indispensable to guard the BakuTbilisi oil pipeline.38 The Secretary of State, C. Powell, in Tbilisi frankly spoke in favor of the removal of Russian bases from Akhalkalaki and Batumi. It is true that the Secretary of State softened his position after his meeting with President V. Putin at sea and gave his word that there will be no US military bases in Georgia. However, everyone well understands the price of these words – once “new circumstances” arise Russia will be faced with a fait accompli. Moscow perceives with great anxiety whatever is happening in its neighboring countries, in particular in the Caucasus, which Russia regards as a zone of its national security from ancient times. A Spanish www.regnum.ru/allnews(5 February 2004) The Daily Telegraph, 9 January 2004. 38 www.abkhazeti.ru/news (24 January 2004)

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newspaper reports: “On the chess board which at present is the substance of that zone, the interests of various players in the international arena, not only Russia and Georgia are clashing. But the US is busy with Iraq, the Middle East and Afghanistan and the US influence has not been established in any of these zones and therefore does not have the possibility to spare the necessary endeavors to resolve the Georgian question. All the measures adopted by the US remind us more of the desire to play off the interests of many sides than an attempt to find a real solution to the problem. As a matter of fact, the desire of Russia to maintain stability in the post-Soviet space, to some extent is advantageous for the Europeans and Americans.”39 However, Washington is trying to remove Russia from the Transcaucasia by all possible means. In this sense, Georgia was assigned a certain “locomotive” role. The accumulation of political passions and black PR around the Transcaucasia coincide with the coming presidential elections in Russia (March 2004) and the US (November 2004). By all appearances there are influential forces which desire to undermine the position of V. Putin on the eve of the elections and accordingly to raise George Bush’s authority, which has become somewhat shaky, by “successful” actions in the Caucasus. Moreover, Georgia, which is bankrupt in the political and economic sense, continues to receive unprecedented aid from Western countries. On January 25, 2004, at the inauguration in Tbilisi, Colin Powell declared that the US spared 166 million dollars for Georgia. Following this, about 100 units of heavy armored vehicles were unloaded at Port Poti. The NATO program, which was previously planned to continue for two years, was prolonged. American instructors of all kinds of troops visited Georgia. Against this background, the new Georgian leaders did not cease to state revengeful declarations addressed to Abkhazia, the South Osetia and Ajaria. The Chancellor of Germany also declared his support of M. Saakashvili and Germany spared 12 million Euros for aid and promised an additional 26 million Euros. Furthermore, G. Schroeder promised Tbilisi Germany’s support in military affairs, remarking that Georgia is playing a key role in the conflicted Caucasus region and, therefore, 39

Rebellion, 23 January 2004.

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Germany supports this country.40 Such an interest of Germany is again combined by all appearances with the supply of oil. In addition, with the new main pipeline through Georgia, Ukraine, and Poland to Germany, avoids not only Russia but also Turkey, because another “politicized” version Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan remains problematic since it completely depends on the stability in the region of Central Asia – Caucasus and in Turkey. With this new pipeline Georgia and Ukraine pretend to play a key role in the transportation of the hydrocarbons of the Caspian region to Europe. This new plan will transport the resources along the Baku (Azerbaijan) – Supsa (Georgia) branch and by tankers through the Black Sea to a terminal built in Odessa and further transported by the Odessa – Brody (Ukraine) – Plotsk (Poland) pipe to EU countries. Thus, at the end of January 2004, the American company Chevron-Texaco proposed to the Ukrainian government to use the Brody pipe to run six millions tons of oil each year for German manufacturing.41 In this context, it is interesting to note that M. Saakashvili’s first official visit after the “revolution” was to Ukraine, while his first official visit as president was to Germany. One may have the impression that these international players are encouraging the new president of Georgia into military adventures which will possibly bring all Georgia into the arena of military actions. The purpose of this provocation is to force Russia to retreat from the Caucasus. However, such a policy of pressure may end in the opposite result. It is obvious that in this case the “winning small war” will not take place. Such actions will only make the international situation more complex and the confusion will not be limited to regional conflicts. The geostrategic intentions of Washington are fairly understandable. This superpower hurries to “mark” borders in this region of life-or-death importance in world affairs, i.e. the “CaspianPersian energy ellipse,” surrounding it by military bases from all directions. The task of the US is to remove Russia from it and prevent the presence of vigorously developing China in Central Asia, as well as in the Caucasus in the near future. However, it is very unlikely that Washington will be able to control the enormous space of Central Asia 40 41

Dilis gazeti, 31 January 2004. www.utro.ru Article by Ivana Tregubova, 9 February 2004.

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independently, without Russia’s assistance. Likewise, Russia will not be able to remain, as before, the guarantor of security in this vast territory without the support of the US. Only by joint endeavor will this superpower and regional power be able to contain the pressure of China which is becoming manifest. Today there are 13 various main pipelines of energy resources in the Caspian region, not only to the west but also to the east.42 Two large projects are combined with China. While Moscow and Washington severely compete in the region of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Beijing silently stole forward and without fuss tries to realize important geostrategic projects. Here I mean the Kazakhstan – China oil pipeline and the Turkmenistan – Uzbekistan – Kazakhstan – China gas pipeline.43 Among the 13 main pipelines, four projects are operating now: the Tengiz (Kazakhstan) – Novosibirsk (Russia) oil pipeline; the Baku (Azerbaijan) – Novorossiisk (Russia) oil pipeline; the Baku (Azerbaijan) – Supsa (Georgia) oil pipeline; and the Korpeje (Turkmenistan) – Kurtkui (Iran) gas pipeline. In addition, there are other variations which could be realized in the near future but they depend directly and unconditionally on the constellation of geopolitical powers in the region: the Kazakhstan – Turkmenistan – Iran oil pipeline; the Kazakhstan – Turkmenistan – Afghanistan – Pakistan oil pipeline; the Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan oil pipeline; the Shakh-Denis (Azerbaijan) – Tbilisi – Erzurum (Turkey) gas pipeline; the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline through Turkmenistan, the bottom of the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus and Turkey; the Turkmenistan – Iran – Turkey gas pipeline; and the Dovletabad (Turkmenistan) – Afghanistan – Pakistan gas pipeline. Not only China but also Japan participates actively in the projects to transport Caspian oil. Japanese giants such as Itochu and Impex are interested in the investment and construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, while Sumitomo has already supplied Georgia with the necessary volume of special pipes. Miki Wajima, “Kasupi kai shuhen no tennen shigen [Natural Resources around the Caspian Sea],” Tomohiko Uyama, ed., Chuo Ajia wo shiru tameno 60 sho [60 Chapters to Know Central Asia] (Tokyo, 2003), p. 275. 43 Ibid. 42

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Obviously, the process of globalization and the new world order imagined after the collapse of the Soviet Union could not but strain the military-political situation in the Transcaucasia as a whole and the Georgian-Abkhazian relationship in particular. It appears that the period of protracted, almost ten-year rivalry between Russia and the US in this important region (1994-2004) is being replaced by a period of “rivalry-cooperation” and of absolute uncertainty. For large states, the Georgian-Abkhazia conflict has unfortunately the peculiar applicative characteristics determined by the transit corridor of oil and gas pipelines. In this sense, unsurprisingly, the fate of Abkhazia as well as Georgia will eventually be determined after a clear demarcation and definition of spheres of influence of Russia and the US in this part of the Transcaucasia. Without this most important condition, under the continuing onslaught of globalization and the process of redivision of the world, it is impossible to resolve the problem of regulating the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict and any isolated approach seems misleading. By all probabilities one of the two parties will be forced to compromise its interests (possibly partially) in the region to the advantage of the other, but it is indisputable that Georgia and Transcaucasia are of much greater importance for the national security of the Russian federation than of the US.

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17 IS IT EASY TO GLOBALIZE THE WORLD? THE EXPANSION OF THE SCHENGEN TERRITORY AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN A WIDER EUROPE VITALY MERKUSHEV BASIC LEGAL FRAMEWORKS SCHENGEN AGREEMENTS

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The full scale of the Schengen agreements, such as the introduction of common visa regime, the abolition of the police and customs controls on the internal borders and the common set of rules for external border control, came into force in seven European Union countries1 on April 1, 1995. The Schengen law was fully introduced in Italy and Austria in October 1997, in Greece in 1998, and in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland in 2001. Norway and Iceland have also been participating in the Schengen system de facto since 1999,2 and the full package of agreements was adopted in these countries in 2001. The UK and Ireland are not bound by the Schengen law, but they participate in a part of this legal framework (excluding, however, the common visa regime, which is the main subject of this chapter). Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain, and Portugal. Together with Sweden, Finland and Denmark, Iceland and Norway belong to the Nordic passport union, which abolished their internal border checks. Sweden, Finland and Denmark became members of the Schengen group when they joined the EU. Iceland and Norway have been associated with the development of the agreements since December 19, 1996. Although they did not have voting rights on the Schengen Executive Committee, they were able to express opinions and formulate proposals. An agreement was signed between Iceland, Norway, and the EU on May 18, 1999 in order to extend that association [Official Journal L 176 of 10.07.1999]. They continue to participate in the drafting of new legal instruments, building on the Schengen acquis. These acts are adopted by the EU Member States individually. They apply to Iceland and Norway as well. See URL: http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/ lvb/l33020.htm 1 2

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At present, among the range of problems facing Russia in its relations with the European Union, the issues of the mutual border crossing and visa regime are perhaps the most pressing ones. What are the basic legal frameworks of the Schengen system of border crossing and common visa regime? The term Schengen Law and other related definitions like Schengen visa (Shengen area, Schengen zone, Schengen territory, and so on) originated from the name of the old castle and village of Schengen, located in Luxembourg near the border with France and Germany. Because of this symbolic location (on the crossroads of three member states of the EU), in the late 1980s, Shengen was selected as the place for the signing of two important documents by several member-states of the European Community (at that time the Schengen law was not considered to be a part of European Community law). These documents were historically named the Schengen agreements. The first agreement was signed only by five EC countries; on June 14, 1985 France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands signed the Schengen agreement, whose aim was to create a territory without internal borders. The second agreement, officially known as the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, was signed on June 19, 1990 (more often this document is called the Schengen Convention). The former agreement is considered as a main legal mechanism of the socalled Schengen law. The latter could be seen just as a basic legal framework; it created a preliminary basis for this law and as a legal source is now only of historical interest. The Schengen agreements were signed later by other EU member states. Italy signed the agreement on November 27, 1990, Spain and Portugal joined on June 25, 1991, Greece followed on November 6, 1992, then Austria on April 28, 1995 and finally Denmark, Finland, and Sweden joined on December 19, 1996. (Part of the agreements was adopted by the United Kingdom and Ireland in 1999-2002, but, as mentioned above, the common visa regime procedures were not accepted by these member states). After the Amsterdam Treaty came into force in May 1999, the Schengen agreements became part of the European Union Law. The socalled Schengen acquis began to be integrated into EU law. The scope of application of Schengen law can be considered in terms of territories and of subjects. In the former case we can speak about countries and

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territories where Schengen law is binding (paragraph one of the agreement). In the latter, we can consider the objects of Schengen law and the social relations that are affected by it. The term “Schengen territory” or “Schengen area” means the territory where all the norms of this law are fulfilled in practice. As was mentioned above, at present, this territory includes twelve EU countries (plus the two non-member states, Norway and Iceland). In legal terms, the Schengen territory is characterized by the permeability of internal borders. It means an absence of personal checks on the borders connecting the member states. The Schengen zone also implies the introduction of common police controls on the external borders, that is on the border with countries not participating in the Schengen agreements. Finally, it refers to a common visa regime. After EU enlargement in May 2004, new EU members in Central Europe will not be included into the Schengen area automatically. The negotiations on the final date of their full accession to Schengen are still going on. It is, however, known that the preliminary date of full accession of these new members to the Schengen territory is nearly fixed for 2007.

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EUROPEAN BORDER CROSSING REGIMES RUSSIAN CITIZENS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The Schengen zone is the region geographically and culturally closest to the western part of the Slavic Eurasian Mega-area. As far as the Russian Federation is concerned, the EU countries are not only its main economic partners, 3 but also the area that Russian citizens most frequently visit. This has been especially true in recent years, when relative prosperity in the RF has led more and more people to cross the Schengen borders. They have had many reasons to travel: personal (meeting with relatives, friends, and acquaintances), tourist, educational. The most striking example of the increase in mobility is tourism; in 2002, about five million Russians visited the EU countries as tourists. 3

In year 2003, 39 percent of all Russian trade was with the EU.

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Although the famous longing of Russians for travel abroad is on the rise, the overall percentage of Russians among those who visit Europe is still small. Sometimes, it looks as though on the Costa Brava, or in Nice, every other tourist is Russian, but visits to these particular places are increasing largely as a result of the work of Russian travel agencies, which prefer traditional destinations (identified mostly during last decade) because of language problems. So, even in Spain, the most popular Schengen destination for Russian citizens, just 370,000 Russians crossed the Spanish border in 2002; they made up only 0.8 percent of the total number of foreign visitors to Spain, while in the same year Russians were only 0.4 percent of the total number of tourists in France. By contrast, for instance, in 2003, about 0.8 million Russians visited Egypt and more than 2 million traveled to Turkey as tourists or on business (making up 17 percent of the overall tourist population in Turkey). In both these countries the total number of Russians crossing the borders was second only to that of German citizens. It is known that both Egypt and Turkey have non-visa regimes with Russia (so-called visas permitting a two-month stay can be bought by any Russian citizen for 20 USD (in Turkey) or for 15 USD (in Egypt) in the airports and at other points of entry to these countries, simply upon submission of a passport). Conversely, after Poland introduced a visa regime for Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia on October 1, 2003, the number of Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Russian crossing the Polish border decreased by December 2003 by 60 percent. During the three months following July 1, 2003 (the date of the introduction of a visa regime by Lithuania for the Kaliningrad region) the number of Lithuanians visiting Kaliningrad Oblast decreased almost by 90 percent; the number of Russians visiting Lithuania exclusively (excluding those in transit to or from mainland Russia) decreased by 75 percent.4 These examples show that the EU visa regime (including the Schengen visa regime and relevant visa regimes introduced by accession countries, like good pupils of the EU, in advance of accession) at border crossing presents a real human right problem for Russians. Despite Russia having been moved unofficially from the so-called grey list to 4

URL: http://www.russiantravelmonitor.com

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the white list in the consulates of the Schengen territory states,5 officially acquiring a Schengen visa is a difficult enterprise for Russian citizens. This difficulty has both a subjective dimension (like the time limits fixed by consulates for the processing of visas) and an objective one, since people in regions geographically remote from Moscow and St Petersburg (where the majority of EU consulates are located) suffer big disadvantages in terms of the cost of time-consuming trips to the capital cities for interviews and applications for a Schengen visa. These constraints on Russians’ legal acquisition of the Schengen visa, which operate in the majority of RF regions, lead to a situation in which so-called budget tourism (e.g. automobile tourism), the most popular in Europe, is in fact prohibited for the vast majority of Russians. The majority of Russian tourists in the Schengen zone are people with a family income equal to that of the upper middle class of the richest EU countries. This contrasts sharply with the economic circumstances of the average tourist going to the EU from Central European countries. From 1815 to 1917 citizens of the Russian Empire could travel freely in all European countries using only a so-called foreign passport. For instance, it is well known that a number of Russian revolutionaries used this opportunity to escape from prosecution, and the “diasporas” of Russian students in Germany and France were among the biggest foreign student populations in these countries. Some European cities were even Russified in many aspects; for instance, the famous German resort Baden-Baden was frequently called the third capital of Russian literature6 at the beginning of twentieth century, when 15 percent of its permanent population were citizens of the Russian Empire. Those non-Schengen countries whose citizens need to receive a Schengen visa are unofficially divided by the foreign ministries of Schengen states into three categories: (1) Black list: citizens from these countries can receive Schengen visas only if they represent official delegations (e.g. Sudan, Afganistan, Northern Korea), (2) Grey list: citizens can be denied a Schengen visa without explanation (this list includes Iran, Central Asian countries, and many African countries). (3) White list: the visa procedure is somewhat simplified Unfortunately, there seems to be no published source for these lists. This information was received by the author during his study trip to the European Commission in 1996. 6 Such famous Russian authors as Zhukovskii and Turgenev lived for many years there, and Dostoevskii was in Baden-Baden many times. It was after his one day trip to a local Casino that he wrote his Igrok (The Gambler). 5

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Of course, travel and contacts with Europeans abroad were not always an important factor for personal and creative development in the Russian Empire. For instance, the world-famous Russian poet Alexander Pushkin never went abroad. Despite the fact that Pushkin served for many years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tsar Nikolas I never signed Pushkin’s application for a foreign (that is international) passport. However, such an obstacle did not influence the development of Pushkin’s genius. The history of the Russian Empire and the Soviet experience7 show clearly that Russians, as a rule, were welcomed in Europe and the main obstacle to this freedom of movement at those times was their own government.8 In the process of globalization of the contemporary world, freedom of movement for the purposes of tourism, study, and work in other countries will no doubt make individual life more harmonious and interesting, and the realization of this basic right will also increase people’s adaptability to rapid changes in social and economic spheres; this is particularly important for people who lived for many years behind an “iron curtain.” In today’s wider Europe, such basic rights as freedom of movement cannot be realized on a full scale as long as strict visa regimes like the Schengen one exist in this region. Modern visa regimes for border crossing appeared in Europe only in the twentieth century; they originated in two bloody world wars and the Cold War, which divided the continent into two camps. With the disappearance of the “iron curtain,” visa regimes for Europeans in Europe can be seen as an anachronism. In this regard, the beginning of the “diplomatic struggle” with the Schengen area group for a non-visa border crossing regime seems very Until 1989, all Soviet citizens traveling from the USSR for the first time had to receive permission (officially it was conducted in the form of so-called ideological training, unofficially it was called an exit visa) from a party body. In the case of travel to the Warsaw Pact states, this permission was relatively formal and was usually issued by the Raikom (city district party committee). In case of first-time travel to other countries (including even some socialist countries like Cuba and Yugoslavia), the interviews were more rigorous and were conducted by the ideological organ of the Obkom or Kraikom (oblast or krai party committees). 8 Since the beginning of the 1990s, attempts to introduce exit visas or at least exit duties were undertaken in several post-Soviet states. They had some success only in Armenia, where since 1995 all citizens pay 10,000 Armenian drams, or 25 USD each time they leave the country. 7

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belated, especially from the perspective of the Russian Federation, the main loser in this situation — but it is better late than never. The symbolic commencement9 of these efforts was undertaken on August 27, 2002, when President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin sent messages about the problems of the vital supplies for Kaliningrad Oblast to European Commission President Romano Prodi and to the heads of member-states of the EU.10 These messages were sent after Lithuania and Poland, following the directives of the EU, made the decision in principle to introduce the visa regime for citizens of the Kaliningrad region in 2003, a decision that meant in reality the beginning of the next wave of expansion of the Schengen territory. In the messages, it was stressed that Russia is ready for a further deepening of its cooperation with the European Union. Putin also emphasized that this cooperation should lead gradually to a real strategic partnership. The Russian President suggested to his European partners that they consider in depth the question of the unimpeded movement of transport and people between Kaliningrad and mainland Russia. It was pointed out, too, that a solution to the Kaliningrad problem must constitute part of a gradual transition towards the more ambitious goal of a non-visa border crossing regime between the Russian Federation and the European Union. Putin also emphasized that Russia expects due consideration to be given to its national interests in relation to free access to the Russian enclave, which will very soon be inside the European Union. The very day after Putin sent his messages, during negotiations with the Head of Russian Council of Federation, Sergei Mironov, in Warsaw, President of Poland Aleksander Kwaśniewski expressed his approval of Putin’s initiative. Kwaśniewski pointed out that this is a twenty-first century approach, looking to the future rather than the past. This Polish official opinion is especially symbolic. It was with the abolition of the visa regime between Germany and Poland in December 1989 that the contemporary history of the rapid integration of Central and Western Europe and rapprochement between Poland and the EU The earlier sporadic attempts to raise this issue at a lower diplomatic level both in the Council of Europe and in the Russian Representation to EU did not influence either public opinion or actual policies. 10 URL: http://nw.rian.ru/news.html?nws_id=31234&date=2002-08-27 9

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began. In some respects the Polish example can serve as a basis for solving the current difficulties in Russian-EU relations. In December 1989, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl made a unilateral decision on the abolition of visas for Poles without any consultation with his EU partners. Germany, abolishing the visa regime with Poland, stressed the historical necessity of this step, which could symbolically close the last page in the post-war history of German-Polish antagonism. In 1989 Helmut Kohl and German Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher believed that in the context of German unification the historical agreement on the post-war German-Polish borders on the Oder and Neisse rivers (which was signed by their predecessor Willy Brandt) was no longer a necessary condition of the partnership and friendship with their Eastern neighbor. This non-visa regime could be considered an understandable gesture of friendship towards the Polish people. From the point of view of the German leadership, the measure was even more profitable for Germany,11 allowing full-scale pursuit of its national interests in relations with the Visegrad states. While criticizing Germany’s move, other EU countries also had to introduce the non-visa regime for Poland in 1990, despite substantial fears of illegal labor migration of Poles to Western Europe. The de facto permeability of the EU borders did not allow any other choice for Germany’s partners in Western Europe. In 1990-1991, similar decisions were adopted towards Czechoslovakia and Hungary,12 and as early as the beginning of 1991 all citizens of the Visegrad countries were able to cross the borders of all EU and Scandinavian countries without visas. At the end of 1991, the Scandinavian countries and (in 1992) Great Britain abolished the visa regime for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Schengen visas were abolished for the citizens of these three Baltic countries in 1999. In April 2001 the non-visa regime with the Schengen area was introduced for Bulgaria and in December 2002 for Rumania. If one considers the fact that that the SFRY never in its post-war history had a visa regime with West European countries and that after One of the reasons behind this was again the scarcity of unskilled labor, which happened after the abolition of the agreements on guest workers from Turkey, Yugoslavia and Maghreb countries. 12 It should be stated that these two countries had non-visa regimes with some of the West European countries before Poland received this opportunity. 11

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the break-up of this country in the early 1990s such former Yugoslav republics as Slovenia and Croatia also benefited from a non-visa regime with the Schengen area states, it can be concluded that for the first time in 60 years, citizens of Western and Central European countries were able to enjoy full freedom of movement in their regions. The non-visa regime for Central Europeans meant that the citizens of former socialist block states could cross the borders of the EU states and could stay in a country for up to three months in succession without the right to work. What was the situation in terms of freedom of movement for the citizens of the new Russia at that time? As early as the beginning of the 1990s, during the euphoria of the “velvet revolutions” and the rapid withdrawal of the Russian (former Soviet) troops from Central Europe, and without any diplomatic pressure from the Russian Federation, such countries as Hungary, Czechoslovakia (after 1993 the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Poland, Bulgaria and Rumania introduced quite liberal non-visa regimes for some of the former Western USSR republics, including Russia. Like Central Europeans in Western Europe, citizens of Russia could spend up to three months on the territory of these six Central European countries without visas. The mutual border crossing regime in the CIS allows CIS citizens to stay in any country of this region without a time limit. Moreover, all CIS citizens needed only an internal passport13 to cross the internal borders of the CIS. These non-visa regimes can be regarded as very important voluntary institutional arrangements undertaken for the sake of continuing coexistence in one Slavic Eurasian Mega-Area. At the same time, differences between non-visa regimes, like those for RF citizens in Central Europe and in the CIS respectively, reflected differences between the changing political and even geographical forms of the emerging Slavic-Eurasian meso-areas. At present, the border crossing situation in the CIS is more or less stable; with the exclusion of Turkmenistan and Georgia, the non-visa regime established in the 1990s still exists in the CIS. The East European meso-area has proved to be the most changeable in the last decade, and in respect of the visa issue, these changes can be characterized as heavily externally influenced, very subjective and arbitrary. The internal passports of citizens of this group of the former USSR states did not even need to be stamped at the border. 13

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RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPEAN UNION VISA REGIMES FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION Since 2000, the above-mentioned six Central European countries one by one (starting with Czech Republic in May 200014 and ending with Rumania in March 2004) have introduced a full-scale visa regime in relation to the Russian Federation. The main rationale for the introduction of the visa regime was the accession of these states to the European Union. The political explanations offered for the quite unexpected introduction of Schengen rules for the RF by non-Schengen accession countries were typically simplistic: the fear of illegal labor migration (both permanent and “shuttle” migration), organized criminality, human and drug trafficking, and so on (concerning other problems relating to the conversion of the border-crossing problem into a security issue, please see the annex to this article). Despite these fears and the significant conversion of the border crossing issue into a security one in the European Union, as early as January 1, 2003, 45 countries had non-visa agreements with the Schengen group; among them are Panama, Honduras, Guatemala, Romania and Bulgaria.15 The standards of living and average salaries in these countries are lower than in Russia. Even taking into account that the last two are going to be members of the EU in a few years, from the Russian point of view the Schengen visa regime looks like a typical example of the double standard in European politics. In order to explain this point of view, let us go back to the nearest historical example of the introduction of a non-visa regime in Europe. In comparative perspective, the nearest example is perhaps the Polish one. At the point at which the non-visa regime with EU countries was introduced in the early 1990s, Poland was in the midst of a so-called “shock therapy” economic reform. This policy led to the rapid impoverishment of the already relatively poor population of this Central European giant, some 38 million people. Hyperinflation, unemployment and an average salary of about 30-40 USD per month were the reality for the majority of Poles at that time. 14 15

URL: http://www.turist.ru/onews/newsline/index.shtml?2004/06/03/45294 URL: http://www.russiantravelmonitor.com

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It is estimated that the number of illegal workers16 in the EU from Poland reached two million in 1995. Was that number of migrants the consequence of the introduction of the non-visa regime? The examples of other post-socialist states show us that it was not. If we consider the number of illegal immigrants per capita, the number of Albanians (from Albania) and Romanians working illegally in EU was higher than, or at least equal to the Polish illegal population in EU. The introduction by the Schengen group of a non-visa regime for Romanians in 2002 did not increase the illegal working population from this country. The overall number of Russian illegal workers in the EU is difficult to estimate, but compared to the numbers mentioned above this population is very small. Thus, according to a Belgian government official statement, in 1999 about 1000 Russians lived illegally in Belgium (80 percent of them were accused of being involved in fake marriages), while in the same year the number of Poles illegally working in Belgium was 60,000. In 2001, the Portuguese government announced during the visit of Russian Prime Minister Kas’ianov that 800 Russian women enslaved in the illegal sex industry in Portugal would be granted Portuguese citizenship. After a passport check, only 60 women among 800 proved to be Russian citizens; the others were from 10 different countries. Thanks to its huge territory and larger labor market as well as wider opportunities for relatively well-paid unskilled work, Russia has in the last decade become the second-ranking country among those accepting migrants (after the USA). Illegal migration, organized criminality, and human trafficking have been proven to be inadequate and even misleading reasons for maintaining the visa regime for Russia on the part of the Schengen group. In almost all Russian newspapers that publish tourism advertisements there are announcements offering visas for any Schengen country in one day to anybody at the price of 100-300 Euros, while a multi-entry visa for six months will cost from 250 to 500 Euros (depending on the country). In order to get this visa a person needs only an international passport (without any invitation, or In this case we are speaking about the so-called “shuttle migration,” which means that, benefiting from the non-visa regime, illegal workers work without permits and have to re-cross the border every three months (the maximum period allowed by the EU states to stay without visa on their territory) in order to remain legally in the EU. 16

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any other documents proving the necessity for a visa). These channels can of course be used by anybody from the unwelcome social groups (including organized crime). As far as human trafficking is concerned, the visa regime has proved to be more dangerous for its victims. It is much easier to enslave a person if she or he has had to use an illegal visa; in contrast, a non-visa regime gives a victim an extra chance to escape and contact the authorities of the host state. The attempts of the European Commission to combat these visa agencies have already failed several times; even after the EU Commission issued a statement on this question in July 2002 the situation did not change. Since the dissolution of the “iron curtain,” Europe’s democracies share such a compact territory and such widespread human connections that rigid visa regimes cannot be sustained, particularly under the added pressure of globalization. In order to keep the borders shut, they need to institute or tolerate abuses of basic human rights (such as permanent street passport checks and systems of denunciation). Ironically, Russia, a country with too many still unsolved problems of democratic institution-building, can be considered an example of a “good globalizer” in terms of progressive migration and border crossing policies. Russia still maintains a very liberal non-visa regime with 10 CIS countries,17 and migration control is in much better shape than was predicted by many European experts.18 The per capita number of illegal immigrants in Russia is also lower than in the EU. The current economic situation and even standards of living in the Russian Federation obviously look much better than for instance in Poland at the beginning of the 1990s. The opportunities for the introduction of a non-visa regime also look quite promising. The perception of the border crossing issue as a security one on the part of some EU countries seems to be waning, while Russia’s aspiration towards Europe at the level of humanitarian and cultural cooperation Here the argument of economic disparities does not play any role; for instance, the difference in the standard of living between the RF and Tajikistan is much higher than that between the RF and the biggest EU states. 18 For instance in the British Council’s report on Migration Problems in CIS and RF, issued in 1996, it was predicted that in the year 2000 the number of Chinese migrants in Russia would be more than five million – an obviously exaggerated number from the present point of view. 17

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is receiving increasing support from the top EU state policy makers. The strongest supporter of the introduction of a non-visa regime between the Schengen group and the Russian Federation is Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Positive statements on the part of German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, French President Jacques Chirac, and even from EU General Secretary Javier Solana have appeared in the European media. After the Russian-German summit in Ekaterinburg in 2003, Germany took the first real step towards the introduction of a non-visa regime for Russia; since December 2003, Russian students, academics, researchers and citizens who are involved in cultural exchanges can be granted five-year multi-entry visas for their visits to Germany.19 France and Italy introduced he same visa receiving procedures for Russian citizens in May 2004. These examples of the friendly actions of so-called “old Europe” towards Russia still contrast with the very “Atlantically” dependent policies of Russia’s Central European neighbors.20 However, positive tendencies in this sphere also influence the emerging mesoareas in the Slavic Eurasian world, and in the wake of further globalization processes, they will lead to positive moves towards the realization of such basic human rights as freedom of movement.

It should be said that this German decision could be considered as significant deviation from the Schengen law. 20 However, it should be noted, that even some of these countries (having some economic losses, because of the visa regime introduction with their big Eastern neighbor) using their new opportunities as members of the EU have already started some kind of lobbying campaign in favor of the return of the non-visa regime with Russia. For instance, in the statement of the Ministry of Regional Development of Czech Republic, it was stated that the introduction of the visa regime with Russia caused during four years the economic losses for 550.3 millions USD. These losses happened since May 2000 (after the introduction of the visa regime between the Czech Republic and Russia) only due to the 60 percent decrease in the number of Russian tourists visiting Czech cities and resorts. 19

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ANNEX. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE NON-VISA REGIME BORDER CROSSING FOR A WIDER EUROPE COMPARED POSITIVE n EUROPEAN SECURITY n STRATEGIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION ¯ n DIRECT INVESTMENTS n INDIRECT INVESTMENTS ¯ n REGIONAL COOPERATION ¯ n TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS DEVELOPMENT ¯ n SOCIAL MOBILITY ¯ n CULTURAL EXCHANGE ¯ n EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE ¯ nPEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE RELATIONS ¯ n AIR TOURISM ¯ n BUDGET TOURISM ¯ n CROSS BORDER SMALL TRADE

NON-VISA REGIME

VISA REGIME

- n “SHUTTLE” ILLEGAL LABOR MIGRATION ¯ n “PERMANENT” ILLEGAL LABOR MIGRATION - n SMUGGLING n FINANCIAL FRAUD n COMMON CRIMINALITY n DRUG TRAFFICKING n ORGANIZED CRIME ¯ n HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SLAVERY

NEGATIVE

This scheme reflects the author’s opinion of the consequences of different visa regimes most frequently discussed in the European mass media in terms of the relative importance of each one to the introduction

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and abolition of visa/non visa regimes. (The relative importance is shown by the position of the phenomenon on the grid: the further the sign “·” from the axis, the less related the issue is to the perception of border crossing problems as a security issue.) The size and direction of the symbols “-” and “¯” show the intensity (importance of the problem for safety and security) and the trends of the negative and positive phenomena (decreasing “¯”, or increasing “-”) after the introduction of non-visa regime.

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18 OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITS OF SELF-CREATION AND IDENTITY POLITICS: TATARSTAN’S PARADIPLOMATIC PROJECT GULNAZ SHARAFUTDINOVA INTRODUCTION The opening up of Russia’s regions to world affairs could be seen as one of the manifestations of the concurrent and often competing processes of globalization and regionalization, offering new challenges and new opportunities to the actors in the international system. The new types of trans-border interactions and the phenomenon of paradiplomacy (international activities of governments on the sub-national level) became a widespread practice involving numerous regions of the Russian Federation.1 Such practices resulted, on the one hand, from political and economic changes associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of a new, independent Russia, and, on the other hand, they were enabled by the growth of the border-less global economy, global communications and information systems that reduced the role of the state and brought to the fore an array of other, non-state actors.2 Andrei Makarychev and Vasilii Valuev, “External Relations of Tatarstan: Neither Inside, Nor Outside But Alongside Russia” Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research Working Paper (Zurich, 2002); Jeronim Perovic, “Internationalization of Russian Regions and Consequences for Russian Foreign and Security Policy,” Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research Working Paper (Zurich, 2000); Stephan De Spiegeleire, “Gulliver’s Threads: Russia’s Regions and the Rest of the World,” Kimitaka Matsuzato, ed., Regions: A Prism to View the Slavic-Eurasian World: Towards a Discipline of “Regionology” (Sapporo, 2000), pp. 293-310; Leonid Vardomskiy, “Foreign Economic Relations of Ryazan Oblast in the Context of New Security Environment,” Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research Working Paper (Zurich, 2001). 2 Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler and Tony Porter, eds. Private Authority and International Relations (Albany, 1999); Louis W. Pauly, Who Elected the Bankers? Surveillance and Control in the World Economy (Ithaca, 1997); James Rosenau, Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization (Princeton, 2003); Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton: NJ, 1990); Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: Diffusion of Power in World Economy (New York, 1996). 1

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The autonomous (if to a limited degree) interaction of Russia’s regions with different countries and regions of the world has, as one of its consequences, Russia’s federal units undergoing varying external influences and developing distinct regional identities through their interaction with “ the Other.”3 These developments, in turn, might pose a potential challenge of weakening the “national” identity of the region as a constituent unit of the Russian Federation and, therefore, present a danger of federal disintegration.4 At the very least, the processes of formation of regional identities through the interaction with the external world create a need for a more refined understanding of the identity of the Russian Federation as a whole, made more complex by the activities of its constituent parts. In the framework of the initiative advanced by the Slavic Research Center of Hokkaido University, Osamu Ieda suggests that the space of the former communist countries, referred to as Slavic Eurasia, could be currently seen as a mega-area featuring an emergence of various meso-areas inside it.5 The meso-areas emerge under the influence of external integration forces from the neighboring regions such as the Islamic revival impetus coming from Central Asia or the EU enlargement drive affecting Central Eastern Europe.6 In light of this approach, the fate of Russia – the central and the most significant country of Slavic Eurasia – is, once again, very uncertain, as various parts of Russia’s vast territory fall under the influence of different external forces and develop differing versions of “the Self.” It has been commonly accepted that the construction of identity starts with and is based upon the opposition between self and other. On the concept of “identity,” see Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City: Doubleday, 1959). For a “rediscovery” of identity in International Relations, see for example, Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder, 1996). For a discussion of regional ideologies in the context of international relations, see also Arbakhan Magomedov, “Regional Ideologies in the Context of International Relations,” Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research Working Paper (Zurich, 2001). 4 This idea has been specifically debated in regards to the Far East region of Russia, which could be seen as falling in the orbit of North-East Asian (and, specifically, Japanese and Chinese) influence. For a comprehensive discussion of these issues, see the working papers produced at the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research (Switzerland) in the framework of the project entitled “Regionalization of Russian Foreign and Security Policy.” (Papers available at: http://www.fsk.ethz.ch). 5 See Chapter 1 of this volume. 6 Ibid. 3

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Below I focus on the external relations of one unit of the Russian Federation – the Republic of Tatarstan – to assess the opportunities and limits posed by the newly-found practice of paradiplomacy for the development of distinct regional identity. The argument developed here combines a constructivist approach as a framework that allows for capturing the political significance of regional paradiplomacy with the analysis of domestic politics of the Russian Federation that allows for delineating the limits of identity-construction through the interaction with the external world. A case study of the international activities of the Republic of Tatarstan uncovers the ways in which such activities reflect the process of regional identity formation. Particularly, it is argued below that, in the case of Tatarstan, paradiplomacy represents an incorporation of the elements of statehood into the republic’s identity. Through its international activities Tatarstan has been “acting like a state” in order to be recognized by international actors. Therefore, paradiplomacy in this case has taken on an important symbolic meaning by embodying the behavior of a sovereign state. Such “acting like a state” in the absence of international recognition did not make a sovereign state out of Tatarstan, which remained an unalienable part of the Russian Federation; however, the greater international exposure did add prestige and influence to the Tatarstani government at home, in Russia. This study allows for evaluating the expectations drawn from Ieda’s conceptualization of post-communist Slavic Eurasia. As a predominantly Muslim region, Tatarstan could be expected to experience a strong pull from the outer Turkic-Muslim mega-area and stress these elements in its regional identity. The evidence below demonstrates that indeed Tatarstan has special relationships with the Turkic-Muslim and even some non-Turkic Muslim states. However, such special links did not result in the consolidation of an identifiable “meso-area” characterized by a strengthening Muslim identity of the republic and a growing “identity gap” between Tatarstan and the Russian Federation. Despite the presence of the Muslim factor and its influence on the international contacts of the republic, internal political dynamics within the Russian Federation take precedence over the external integration forces highlighted by Dr. Ieda. Over the 1990s, despite active engagement with the external world, the symbolic

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significance of paradiplomacy diminished. The political meaning of paradiplomatic activities was more important in the moments of political fluidity and uncertainty in the federal center in the early 1990s. As the federal political regime stabilized and the federal authorities focused on consolidating the Russian state (especially under president Putin), Tatarstan’s paradiplomacy lost its initial symbolic significance. Furthermore, Tatarstan’s interaction with the outside world carried a more varied character than that expected by the aforementioned framework. The republic pursued various paths of engagement with the external world, not limited to the Muslim direction and often emphasizing European orientation as an important component of its international strategies. The gradually changing meaning of regional foreign policy-making in case of one of the most recalcitrant federal units in Russia reveals the limits of identity politics and the possibilities of constructing “the Self” through the interaction with the external world. In case of the Russian Federation and its constituent units, the domestic politics and the developments of the national (federal-level) political regime appear as more consequential for the fate of the regions of Russia.

PARADIPLOMACY AND THE “POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION” The social theory of international relations promoted by constructivists emphasizes the importance of intersubjective structures influencing state behavior as opposed to material capabilities. 7 Intersubjectivity is constituted by collective meaning systems in which states participate and which they reproduce through their practices. Thus, for constructivists sovereignty has been the single most important intersubjective structure that has underpinned the international system composed of sovereign states.8 This system would not be viable if For the most systematic elaboration of the constructivist approach see Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: UK, 1999). Despite continuing debates over the content of constructivism and particularly Wendt’s version of constructivism, no other such textbook-like attempt at presenting this approach exists. 8 Indeed, it is also a long-contested concept; see for example Stephen Krasner’s Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: NJ, 1999). 7

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sovereignty is not recognized and actualized by the members of the international community. In fact, constructivists claim that sovereignty is one of the constitutive norms that define states and their prerogatives and that are incorporated into the state identity.9 The concept of identity is understood as “relatively stable, rolespecific understandings and expectations about self.”10 It has been elevated by constructivists as a crucial element in international politics.11 In opposition to a primordialist view of identities as based on such nonchanging characteristics intrinsic to collectivities as language and ethnicity, constructivists perceive identities as a result of “construction” that is usually done by the elites, both political and cultural. 12 Furthermore, identities are defined through interaction with the “other.” Therefore, they depend on the behavior of both parties to interaction. Thus, statehood itself “depends partly on position in the international society of states.”13 Some scholars have even argued that certain weak states might continue to exist mostly by virtue of their external recognition.14 Paradiplomacy might be directly related to a search for external recognition on the part of the sub-national units – recognition of the regional “self” as presented by the governments of these political entities. Such “image-making” activities or “the politics of representation” might be specifically important at the times of more fluid politics on the national arena, when the relationships between the federal center and the constituent units of the federation have not been stabilized. The external image of a sub-national unit then could be expected to indirectly affect other relevant political actors. For one of the latest analyses of the concept of sovereignty from a constructivist viewpoint that also contains an extensive bibliography see Wouter G. Werner and Jaap H. De Wilde’s “The Endurance of Sovereignty,” European Journal of International Relations 7:3 (2001), pp. 283-313. 10 Wendt, Social Theory, p. 21. 11 Wendt, Social Theory; Lapid and Kratochwil, The Return of Culture. 12 See, for example, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger’s The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: UK, 1983). 13 Peter Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York, 1996), p. 24. 14 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: UK, 1990). 9

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Foreign policy-making has been traditionally considered to be an inherent attribute of a sovereign state. Ashley, for example, treats foreign policy as being a “kind of social practice that constitutes and empowers the state, defines its socially recognized competence, and secures the boundaries that differentiate the domestic and international economic and political spheres of practice and, with them, the appropriate domains in which specific actors may secure recognition and act competently.”15 Therefore, international activity could carry special significance for the regions with statehood aspirations. If a region has the goal of constructing its identity as a state, it would attempt to engage in foreign activities with the aim of “signaling” its statehood to the outer world and with the ultimate aim of having other international actors to reciprocate and recognize the entity as a sovereign state. Thus, foreign activities might constitute the politics of representing a region in a certain image and could be an essential part of the identity-construction project, through which the regional government attempts to incorporate the elements of sovereign statehood in the regional identity. The Republic of Tatarstan provides an excellent case for demonstrating the distinct “identity-constructing” component in its foreign activities through which the government seeks the representation of the republic as a sovereign state.

THE CASE OF TATARSTAN The first international contacts of Tatarstan on the governmental level occurred in the late 1980s.16 However, the more systematic pursuit of foreign contacts started after the adoption of the Declaration of Sovereignty in August 1990.17 In 1993, Tatarstan created its Ministry of Foreign Economic Affairs and put forward “The Conception of the Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 23 (91), 1998, p. 179. 16 Timur Akulov, “Mezhdunarodnaia deiatel’nost’ Respubliki Tatarstan,” Gasyrlar avazy – Ekho vekov, No. 1-2, 2000, pp. 61-66. 17 Declaration of Sovereignty, 1990: “Deklaratsiia o gosudarstvennom suverenitete Tatarskoi Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki,” 30 August 1990, Special publication of Tatarstan-related documents (Kazan: Obrazovanie, 1998), pp. 7-8. 15

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Foreign Economic Policy of Tatarstan.”18 Currently, the Department of Foreign Affairs of the President of the Republic of Tatarstan is the main institution coordinating and organizing the foreign activities of the government of the republic. Created as a small body by a presidential decree in 1995, the department was transformed and expanded in August 1997 with the addition of the Department of State Protocol and a few specialized sections. The decree on the creation of the State Protocol department specifically mentioned that this new body was established as a step towards “further practical realization of state sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan in the sphere of international relations.”19 This reorganization resulted in transferring the control over foreign relations from the Cabinet of Ministers to the Presidential Administration.20 It also reflected the significant enlargement of the scope of foreign activities of Tatarstan and specifically, the emerging representational role of the President.21 These activities have increasingly acquired the character of state-to-state interactions with certain countries and, in some cases, the President of Tatarstan has been received with the protocol accorded to the heads of sovereign states.22 Furthermore, the government advanced an idea of training its own foreign policy personnel. In March 1995, a Department of International Relations (a branch of the prestigious Moscow State Institute of International Relations) was opened at Kazan State University with the aim of producing Tatarstani diplomats and specialists in the International Relations field. In fact, this new department has received special financing from the Cabinet of Ministers. In the 1990s Tatarstan has developed a broad practice of foreign representation by opening 16 missions abroad. On the other hand, the representation of foreign countries in Tatarstan is almost non-existent. There is only one foreign consulate – the Consulate General of Turkey – Izvestiia Tatarstana, 20 October 1993. The ministry was dissolved in 1997 with the enlargement and reorganization of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the President of Tatarstan. 19 “Polozhenie ob Upravlenii gosudarstvennogo protokola pri Departamente vneshnikh sviazei Presidenta Respubliki Tatarstan,” p. 1, http://www.tatar.ru/append86.html. 20 Tatarstan has a mixed presidential system akin to the system of the Russian Federation. 21 Shaimiev’s personal reputation grew enormously during the 1990s. 22 For example, in his official trip to Egypt in February 1997. 18

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that was opened in 1996. In addition, there is a permanent representative of the Republic of Dagestan and a trade representation of KabardinoBalkaria, as well as the representation of Ivanovo oblast. Tatarstan also hosts a permanent representation of the Chechen Republic, which was closed down under pressure from Moscow in February 2000 and reopened again in October 2000.23 The list of agreements signed by the government of Tatarstan includes over 50 documents (international agreements, declarations, protocols on cooperation or intentions, and memorandums). From this list, 14 agreements are with foreign states (Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Hungary, Lithuania, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkey, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Poland, San-Marino and the Czech Republic). All of these agreements are confined to cooperation in economics, trade, science, technology or cultural and educational issues; no agreements concerning security issues have been signed. Many agreements have been signed with sub-national entities; they are also confined to the issues mentioned above.24 While all the agreements signed by the government of Tatarstan are economic or cultural in character, some of them have a considerable political flavor to them. For instance, the agreement on friendship and cooperation signed with Abkhazia in August 1994 spurred a large amount of controversy around it. This was not the first international agreement for Tatarstan. More than 15 agreements had already been signed by the republican government prior to that treaty. What was novel about this agreement was that it went against the official Russian stance on the Georgian-Abkhazian issue.25 The republican government denied that this agreement had anything to do with Russia and claimed that “the treaty between Tatarstan and Abkhazia was not aimed against any third country, nor This information is available at the Tatarstani government’s official website at www.tatar.ru 24 “Perechen’ deistvuiushchikh dogovorov (soglashenii, protokolov), zakliuchennykh ot imeni Respubliki Tatarstan i ot imeni Pravitel’stva Respubliki Tatarstan s zarubezhnymi gosudarstvami,” http://www.tatar.ru/index.php?&node_id=178. 25 Unofficially, Russian policy has been more complex and Russia had, in practice, supported Abkhazian separatism, so in this situation Russia was more bothered by the fact of Tatarstan’s interference into the realm of foreign policy as such than by Tatarstan’s specific position on the Georgia-Abkhazia issue (I thank Peter Rutland for this useful comment). 23

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did it affect the two sides’ commitments under other agreements.”26 However, based on the fact that Tatarstan does not have any economic interest in Abkhazia (Georgia is ranked 49th among the foreign economic partners of Tatarstan), or any cultural and religious affinity, it is clear that the agreement between the two republics had a purely political rationale. Specifically, it was a demonstration of a certain level of commonality of interests between the two regions fighting for greater autonomy within a larger state and striving for international recognition. Not surprisingly, Moscow reacted harshly to this agreement. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement in which it acknowledged that “The signing of the treaty between Tatarstan and Abkhazia contravenes the Russian Federation’s obligations under its treaty of friendship, goodneigbourliness and cooperation with Georgia signed on February 3, 1994.”27 The statement noted that the treaty “directly affects Russia’s foreign policy and international relations.”28 A similar agreement on friendship and cooperation was signed between Tatarstan and Chechnia and between Tatarstan and Ingushetia in May 1997. 29 Although Chechnia and Ingushetia are not foreign countries (Chechnia is an arguable case because in 1994-1999 it was de facto independent, though not recognized by the international community), the rationale behind these agreements certainly went beyond merely economic considerations. It would have arguably made much more economic sense to develop links with geographically close neighbors, such as Udmurtiia or Mordoviia. These bilateral agreements do not necessarily indicate strong economic and trade links between the partners. In fact, the majority of the agreements carry a merely declaratory character and are not being actually implemented.30 Thus, many of the agreements signed by Tatarstan cannot be comprehended using functionalist logic and are better viewed as symbolic deeds on the part of the republic. “Tatarstan in need for Coordinated Foreign Policy,” FBIS-SOV-94-173. “Moscow Says Tatarstan-Abkhazia Accord Violates Obligations,” FBIS-SOV-94-162. 28 Ibid., p. 1. 29 Boris Bronshtein, “Voz’met li Maskhadov primer s Shaimieva,” Izvestiia, 22 May 1997. 30 The author’s own work experience in the Department of Foreign Affairs of the President of the Republic of Tatarstan (1997-1998). 26 27

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During the past decade Tatarstan has also demonstrated its interest in joining international organizations and participating in international forums. It is a member of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe31 and, despite the fact that the republic does not get any economic and other direct benefits from this membership, it is viewed as having a symbolic value for the republic’s sovereignty.32 Furthermore, in his assessment of the foreign policy of Tatarstan, the state adviser to the President noted that Tatarstan could represent Russian interests in the Islamic international organizations.33 Tatarstan had also initiated contacts with some organizations of the UN (such as UNESCO and UNIDO) and the League of Arab States.34 Furthermore, Graney noted that Tatarstani officials tried to stress “the unmediated quality of its ties with international organizations, and the republic’s pretensions to join international multilateral regimes” to differentiate the republic’s identity as a sovereign state actor.35 Furthermore, in a number of cases Tatarstan has been involved with the issues related to the overall Russian foreign policy. As was mentioned earlier, some of its agreements (as with Abkhazia) even went against Russian commitments in the international arena. The most recent well-known case of Tatarstan’s developing its own independent position on the issue concerning the larger Russian foreign policy occurred in relation to the Kosovo crisis. On April 8, 1999 the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan voted for a declaration, which expressed concern regarding the war in Yugoslavia and called for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. This declaration followed the interview given by the President Shaimiev in which he offered his opinion about the events in Yugoslavia. During the interview he expressed his opposition to Russia’s involvement in the crisis in Yugoslavia and suggested that no volunteers This organization was established in 1994 as a consultative body of the Council of Europe with the main aim of helping the member-states to establish effective local and regional self-government (see their website: http://www.coe.fr/cplre). 32 From the interview with Mikhail Stoliarov (ex-deputy chief of the Tatarstan’s Representation in Moscow). 33 R. Khakimov, “Vneshniaia politika Respubliki Tatarstan: real’nost’ i perspektivy” (unpublished manuscript), p. 10. 34 Akulov, “Mezhdunarodnaia deiatel’nost’.” 35 Katherine Graney, “Projecting Sovereignty: Statehood and Nationness in Post-Soviet Russia” (Ph.D., diss; University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1999), p. 213. 31

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should be allowed to go to fight for any side of the conflict. He criticized the position of the Russian government that “went too far already in supporting the rather questionable politics of the Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic.”36 Still further, he spoke sharply against the idea of providing military aid to Yugoslavia that was proposed at the Federation Council on March 31, 1999, arguing that Russia’s involvement in the Yugoslav conflict might lead to unexpected consequences.37 A similar position was expressed by the state adviser to the President, Rafael Khakimov, who viewed the NATO strikes against Yugoslavia as justified.38 Furthermore, on July 5, 1999, the State Council adopted another declaration in response to the decision by the Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation regarding sending Russian peacekeeping troops to Kosovo. The Declaration criticized the decision on the grounds that the peacekeeping operations, at a time when the Russian state itself is in a deep crisis and cannot provide a decent living for its citizens, are an indication of “political hypocrisy and immorality.”39 Further, the State Council of Tatarstan declared that it would not let its citizens participate in military units of the Russian army in Kosovo (meaning that no conscripts from Tatarstan will be sent to Kosovo). This type of critical reaction towards Russian policy on the Balkans has arisen not only in Tatarstan but also in some other republics in Russia. Specifically, the presidents of Bashkortostan and Ingushetia have also expressed their critical assessment of Russia’s involvement in the Kosovo crisis.40 At first glance, this foreign policy demarche on the part of these republics could be viewed as driven by the fact that part of “M. Shaimiev: Yugoslavii nuzhna pomoshch’. Diplomaticheskaia i gumanitarnaia,” Respublika Tatarstan, 9 April 1999. 37 Ibid. 38 RFE/RL Tatar-Bashkir Report, 6 April 1999, http://www.rferl.org/bd/tb/reports/ archives/1999/04/060499.html. 39 “Zaiavlenie Gosudarstvennogo Soveta Respubliki Tatarstan v sviazi s priniatiem Sovetom Federatsii Federal’nogo Sobrania Rossiiskoi Federatsii postanovleniia ‘Ob ispol’zovanii voinskikh formirovanii Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii v mezhdunarodnom prisutstvii po bezopasnosti v Kosovo, Soiuznaia Respublika Yugoslaviia’” (http://www.tatar.ru). 40 Vera Postnova, “Tatarstan protiv otpravki nashikh voisk v Kosovo,” Nezavisiamaia gazeta, 7 August 1999. 36

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their population, in fact their titular population, is Islamic and, therefore, the leaders of these republics refuse to be involved in a war against Albanian Muslims. Russia, on the other hand, with a predominantly Orthodox population, was on the side of Serbia. This view, though plausible, is not quite satisfactory. Assuming that politicians are rational actors with the main goal of surviving in power, a more instrumental interpretation seems to be necessary for explaining this particular demarche. Considering the political context of the upcoming presidential elections in Russia and the high level of uncertainty regarding the position of ethnic republics in the Russian Federation (revealed in much talk about the necessity of reconsidering the federal relations), this policy could be viewed as an attempt to reassert the special status that the republics were able to achieve during previous years. Similar motivations, I would argue, evoked a negative reaction on the part of Tatarstani leaders to the idea of a union between Russia and Belarus. This was another major line of opposition of Tatarstan to Russian foreign policy. The President of Tatarstan repeatedly stated that if Russia and Belarus signed the Union Treaty, Tatarstan would enhance its status to the level of the Union republic (to be on the same level as Russia and Belarus). He argued that in the case of the Union between the two countries, the 1994 Treaty41 between Tatarstan and Russia would change its meaning (since Russia then would be a new state). The fact that this position was merely a bluff was revealed immediately after the agreement was reached and the Presidents of Russia and Belarus signed the treaty on December 8, 1999. Shaimiev commented that there was no need for Tatarstan to become a union republic as the agreement was not really about creating a new unified state but rather amounted to a treaty of an economic nature between two sovereign independent states.42 It is not clear whether his reaction would have been very different if the treaty between Russia and Belarus was more serious (though it is hard to imagine what he could have Dogovor Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Respubliki Tatarstan “O razgranichenii predmetov vedeniia i vzaimnom delegirovanii polnomochii mezhdu organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti Respubliki Tatarstan’ (15 February 1994), Rossiiskaia gazeta, No. 33 (890), 18 February 1994, p. 5. 42 Vera Postnova, “Shaimiev prochital dogovor i uspokoilsia,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 12 October 1999. 41

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realistically done to counter this union). However, the politics of Tatarstan’s government vis-à-vis this treaty with Belarus demonstrated particularly clearly the extent to which the leaders are concerned with the image of Tatarstan rather than some substantive, practical issues. These independent positions taken by the Tatarstani elite regarding foreign affairs seem to confirm the idea that the republican government has been in practice trying to project the sovereign status of the Republic of Tatarstan despite its location within the political space of the Russian Federation. FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS The main economic partners of Tatarstan are in the West. The statistical data on foreign trade demonstrate that during 1997-2001, Tatarstan’s main trade partners were Germany, Finland, the UK, Switzerland, Ukraine, Poland and France. Furthermore, among the joint ventures with participation of foreign capital, most companies in Tatarstan are created with capital coming from the US, Germany and the UK. Thus, it seems plausible to suggest that, indeed, it would make the most economic sense to develop diplomatic relations with these states. However, among these countries, only two of them – the US and France – have Tatarstani plenipotentiary representations. While Finland and Poland have, at least, Tatarstani trade missions,43 the UK and Switzerland lack any permanent representation in the republic. No major agreements have been signed with most of these countries, except for Ukraine, Poland, and some German Lander. It appears, therefore, that these countries cannot be considered as the main diplomatic partners of the republic; they do not have significant contacts with Tatarstan on a state-to-state level. The analysis of most diplomatic efforts made by Tatarstani leaders reveals the significance of the Islamic factor in developing foreign relations. Specifically, over the past decade Tatarstan has developed The major difference between the plenipotentiary representations and trade missions is the source of financing. While plenipotentiary representations are financed from the republican budget, most trade missions are self-financed through their own commercial activities. 43

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special relations with Turkey, Egypt, the UAE, and Jordan. It was in Egypt that President Shaimiev was received as a head of a sovereign nation-state.44 It was in Jordan that the Prime Minister of Tatarstan met King Hussein in November 1997 and was awarded the prestigious order dedicated to the friendship between the two peoples.45 It was in Turkey where during his vacations the President of Tatarstan never passed a chance to meet with the then President Suleiman Demirel.46 These special diplomatic ties with some of the Muslim countries cannot be justified on pure economic grounds. Therefore, a case could be made for cultural and religious factors as driving forces behind these contacts. Due to cultural and religious links, Tatarstan gets distinct attention and recognition from these states, which consider Tatarstan’s “statehood” more seriously than the countries in the West. This is clearly revealed in the formalities surrounding the visits of official delegations. To the extent that the sovereignty of the republic depends on the recognition by other states, it is not surprising that the republican leaders would pursue wider contacts with states that recognize Tatarstan as a sovereign state (at least through the protocol) and are willing to bypass Moscow in their relations with Tatarstan. This is not the entire story, however. The composition of exports from the republic reveals that Tatarstan’s relations with its main trade partners are based on the export of oil and petrochemical products – a fact that explains the stability of these contacts since the demand for oil does not fluctuate significantly. On the other hand, the Islamic (Southern) direction of foreign contacts of the republic presents an opportunity to promote the industrial goods and products produced in Tatarstan. While not competitive in the advanced European countries, trucks, helicopters, equipment, and even defense-related products manufactured in Tatarstan attract more interest in the lesserThis visit to Egypt in February 1997 is actually treated as a landmark in the development of foreign ties with Egypt. The fact that the President of Tatarstan was honored as a head of a sovereign state is given a lot of symbolic meaning by the authorities of Tatarstan (from interviews with the officials from the Foreign Affairs Department). 45 The press in Tatarstan emphasized the exceptional quality of this award noting that it has not yet been awarded to any Russian leader. 46 Tatar-Inform Weekly, No. 34 (28 September – 5 October 1999). 44

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developed countries.47 Thus, the attention paid by the Tatar government to relationships with India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran, the UAE, and Egypt – the southern direction of foreign contacts – could be explained by a combination of two goals on the part of the government. First, it is an attempt to open up new markets for Tatarstan’s products and, second, to establish closer ties with culturally closer countries to enhance the distinct status of the republic within the Russian Federation by actualizing its statehood. Further, it is plausible to suggest that these two goals are closely interrelated since cultural affinity and the special ties between Tatarstan and these states could be conveniently used by the government for promoting its industrial goods in that region.

THE LIMITS OF IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION: WHO SETS THE BOUNDARIES? How can one understand such behavior on the part of the Tatarstan’s elites? What enabled them to get involved in the pursuit of state sovereignty, while denying the accusations that they wish to separate from Russia? Why did the republican elites started to “imagine” themselves as a state and “construct” the republican identity as that of a sovereign state? How exceptional is this case within the Russian Federation? The idea of “constructedness” of identity does not mean that it could be “imagined” in any way. There are boundaries as to how one can imagine “the self” and Tatarstan had always remained within those boundaries or otherwise it would not have received a growing Unfortunately, no statistical figures on the export structure by countries are publicly available. The analysis of specific foreign visits and the results of their negotiations demonstrates that delegations from Poland, Finland, and Germany show interest in oil and petrochemical products, while the visits to and from Iraq, India, Algeria, Pakistan, and Iran result in agreements related to purchases of helicopters, planes, ships, trucks, oil equipment as well as opening branches of Tatarstan’s companies producing cars. For some examples see Shamil’ Idiatullin, “Mezhdunarodnye sviazi: V Tatariiu privezli ne tekh poslov,” Kommersant-Daily, No. 124 (18 July 2002); Sergei Babusenko, “Rupii idut v delo,” Trud, No. 221 (28 November 1998); “Poland: Kwasniewski on Expansion of Cooperation with Tatarstan,” FBIS-EEU-96-209-A. 47

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recognition from all of its main partners – including the Russian Federation and other states. The interesting theoretical and practical question is who sets those boundaries or “rhetorical frames” that “engender a collective field of imaginable possibilities”48 and how this is achieved. Constructivists argue that the field’s boundaries are set up at critical points “along with new sets of power relations and the rhetorical settlements that accompany their construction.”49 The pursuit and projection of Tatarstan’s identity as a sovereign state originated in the critical juncture of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. At the time when the USSR was the state recognized by the international community as representing the people living in that territory, the declarations of sovereignty – be it the Russian Federation’s or Tatarstan’s – did not have any qualitative difference in their degree of legitimacy. In fact, Tatarstan and other republics within Russia followed on the footsteps of Russia, simply imitating all the actions undertaken by Yeltsin (adopting declarations of sovereignty and holding elections of the president). Republics used the same arguments of democratization and national self-determination as used by Russia vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.50 Furthermore, based on the claims of representing the distinct ethnic group of Tatars and historical claims of statehood, Tatarstan demanded participation in the signing of the Union Treaty as an equal partner, along with Russia as opposed to being a part of the Russian delegation. The events of August 1991 prevented signing of the Treaty and led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, in some ironic way, the ultimate victory of Russia that emerged as the legitimate and recognized state after the Belovezh agreements legitimated the actions of the Tatarstani elites that were grounding their actions in the same Concuelo Cruz, “Identity and Persuasion: How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make Their Futures?” World Politics 52:3 (2000), pp. 275-312. 49 Ibid, p. 277. 50 In fact, the main ideas and even some wording in the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Russian Federation and that of the Republic of Tatarstan are strikingly similar (the English version of the text of the Russian Declaration of State Sovereignty can be found in FBIS-SOV-90-115, p. 102-103; for the text of Tatarstan’s Declaration of Sovereignty see fn. 17. 48

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arguments as the actions of the Russian elites were framed prior to the Soviet collapse. The rhetorical frame set by Russia emerged as a victorious one following Yeltsin’s victory. Based on that same frame of adhering to democratic principles and the right for national selfdetermination, the republic maintained its stand on equality with Russia and did not participate in signing of the Federal Treaty in March 1992, demanding instead a separate treaty on delegation of powers between Russia and Tatarstan. The republic was the first constituent unit in the federation to conclude in February 1994 a Treaty on Delimitation of Powers and Authorities with the central government.51 The Treaty endowed the government with wide-ranging powers that included the right not only to conduct its foreign economic affairs, but more generally, to engage in international activities. Katherine Graney, who studied the political discourse of the elites in Tatarstan, found that that the republican elites have consistently represented their efforts in the international arena within the framework of the overall sovereignty project, “holding up their foreign policy activities as evidence of Tatarstan’s sovereign statehood.”52 In fact, such rhetoric could be viewed as an element of the “power politics of identity” in which power is expressed not through physical force, but through a specific kind of “representational force” embodied in forceful narratives (in this case made forceful by the Russian elites themselves).53 The conduct of foreign activities has been only one of the components of Tatarstan’s strategy aimed at the pursuit of sovereignty. In addition to other symbolic measures such as acquiring the formal attributes of statehood – a flag, anthem, and Constitution – the government made legal provisions for Tatarstan’s status as a sovereign state. Starting with the Declaration of Sovereignty of August 1990 and a referendum to determine a public support for sovereignty held in March 1992, the government adopted the Constitution of Tatarstan in The practice of signing such Treaties (though with different rights and jurisdictions) has been widely spread since then. In all, 46 treaties were signed between the federal center and the constituent units of the federation. The recent trend in the context of Putin’s federal reforms has been to abrogate these treaties. 52 Katherine Graney, “Projecting Sovereignty,” p. 213. 53 For a more specific elaboration of this idea see Janice Bially Mattern’s “The Power Politics of Identity,” European Journal of International Relations 7:3 (2001), pp. 349-397. 51

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November 1992, which declared the republic “a sovereign state, and subject of international law.”54 Further, the republican authorities have undertaken policies designed to “realize” the declared sovereignty of the republic. This is clearly seen at the level of educational policy, for example. Katherine Graney has demonstrated that the attempts to project sovereignty in the domain of educational policy consisted of “the republicanization of the former branches of the RAN (the Russian Academy of Sciences – G. S.), …efforts to transfer the production of textbooks used at all levels of the educational process away from Moscow to the republican level, the introduction of a significant republican-initiated component into the general education system, and the reform of the ‘national schools’.”55 In brief, both in its actions and in its rhetoric, the republican government has demonstrated a commitment to the goal of realizing its sovereignty and actualizing its status as a state. How far did this state sovereignty project bring the republic? The political significance of Tatarstan’s paradiplomatic activities faded away along with the political consolidation that occurred in the federal center. The main breakpoint in this regard is associated with the policies and politics of President Putin.

PUTIN’S REFORMS The policies of recentralization undertaken by President Putin since May 2000 represent a powerful challenge to the rhetorical frame that originated in the period of struggle between Yeltsin and Gorbachev and was maintained during Yeltsin’s presidency through the efforts of such republics as Tatarstan. The challenge came in the The Constitution of the Republic of Tatarstan, Article 61. “Konstitutsiia Respubliki Tatarstan,” adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan with alterations, Law No. N1665-XII (30 November 1992). The constitution was amended several times from 1992-2000, and a version incorporating all amendments was published in Izbiratel’ Tatarstana (Kazan: Tsentral’naia Izbiratel’naia Komissiia Respubliki Tatarstan, 2000), pp. 2-33. 55 Katherine Graney, “Education Reform in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan: Sovereignty Projects in Post-Soviet Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 51:4 (1999), p. 613. 54

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form of the new rhetoric of “dictatorship of law” and the interests and the strength of the state. This rhetoric was supported by a set of concrete actions demonstrating the seriousness of the intentions directed towards reformulating the unstable federal bargain that was achieved under Yetsin. Putin established seven federal districts and placed trusted people as presidential envoys in these districts (the envoys’ first task was a campaign of legal standardization and harmonization). 56 In addition, the State Duma adopted a set of new laws removing the regional governors from the Federation Council (and thus depriving them of their immunity) and allowing the president to fire the governors under certain circumstances. Within the same campaign of revising the federal relations and strengthening the position of the center, in June 2000 the Constitutional Court ruled against the Republic of Altai’s Constitution and, specifically, its declared sovereignty status.57 This was widely perceived as a beginning of a campaign against all the other declarations of sovereignty adopted by Russia’s republics. How did Tatarstan react to these policies? In the face of enormous difference in resource endowment of the two political actors (Tatarstan and Russia), Tatarstan could not contain the pressure coming from the federal center without making some concessions. However, while making the concessions, the government remained true to the model of relationships with Russia that emerged in the 1990s: the government demanded bilateral negotiations over each and every point of the necessary changes. Ultimately, the concessions were made from both sides. Tatarstan’s State Council worked on revising the republican laws and the Constitution but left the new Constitution containing some articles that contradicted the federal legislation. For one of the most recent analyses of Putin’s federal reforms, see Peter Reddaway and Robert W. Orttung, eds., The Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin’s Reform of FederalRegional Relations (Lanham, Boulder, 2004). For one of the earlier analyses, see Matthew Hyde’s “Putin’s Federal Reforms and their Implications for Presidential Power in Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 53:5 (2001), pp. 719-743. 57 Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii po delu o proverke konstitutsional’nosti otdel’nykh polozhenii Konstitutsii Respubliki Altai i Federal’nogo zakona “Ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii zakonodatel’nykh (predstavitel’nykh) i ispolnitel’nykh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Rossiiskaia gazeta, 21 June 2000, p. 5. 56

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Particularly, it incorporated the 1994 Treaty as an essential part of the republic’s basic law, and maintained the rhetoric of sovereignty (despite the earlier rulings by the Russian Constitutional Court regarding the unconstitutionality of sovereignty of the subjects of the Russian Federation).58 This could be seen, on the one hand, as a confirmation of the power of identity and representational force. Tatarstan was able to maintain and re-enforce the rhetoric of sovereignty and statehood in its founding document despite the enormous pressure emanating from Moscow. On the other hand, it has to be noted that the real sovereignty (or the control over domestic affairs) is fleeing the republic’s elites as they have to adapt to the changes promoted by the federal center. The government of Tatarstan was not able to oppose such practical federal steps as the opening of the branch of the federal treasury in Kazan and reconsidering the division of taxes between the republic and the center.59 The republican elites also have to adhere to the new law on political parties that made it impossible to create regionally-based parties. Furthermore, the new rules on forming regional legislatures require that at least half the seats in regional legislatures be allotted to candidates from party lists, thus ensuring federal reach into the regions. This innovation unavoidably enhances the influence of the central authorities in the regions through the party of power. Tatarstan will also have to adjust its rules governing the local governments. Currently, the republic adheres to the Soviet model of local self-government in which local government is essentially a part of the state controlled by the executive branch of power. An introduction of the system of local government that would be independent from the state control would undoubtedly threaten the current political regime in Tatarstan, as it would allow for the emergence of autonomous political forces in the republic. The new constitution can be found in “Zakon Respubliki Tatarstan ‘O vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Konstitutsiiu Respubliki Tatarstan’,” Respublika Tatarstan, No. 87-88 (30 April 2002), pp. 3-4 59 The issue of taxation was probably one of the most significant blows to the sovereignty of the republic – the balance between the republic and the center in terms of tax division changed significantly in favor of the center. Although the republican government was able to negotiate a federal program of socioeconomic development of the Republic of Tatarstan for 2001-2006 that provided for a large amount of financial inflow into Tatarstan’s economy from the center, this was more of a one-time deal and could not compensate for the autonomous control over financial resources. 58

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In this context of national re-centralization, the political meaning of paradiplomacy loses its ground in Tatarstan. Although the government has continued its state-like behavior, claiming that Russia’s Constitution itself proclaims the republics to be states, its foreign policy actions are devoid of real political meaning and represent more of an attempt to “keep the face.”60 It is becoming apparent that the republic’s foreign activities are shifting more into the functional realm as its symbolic significance is rendered meaningless by Putin’s project of the consolidation of the Russian state.61 On the symbolic level, this is seen from the fact of the opening of the representation of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation in Kazan as well as other developments within the republican institutional environment.62

CONCLUSION This study attempted to capture the symbolic aspect of paradiplomacy and bring to light its significant role in constructing the identity of a region as a sovereign state. As was demonstrated in this chapter, Tatarstan sought to practice its statehood through the conduct of its foreign policy, projecting its state-like identity externally. However, such practice of statehood started to lose its symbolic meaning as the center sought to consolidate its powers under President Putin. Hence, it appears that the construction of the self through the interaction with the external world in the context of a federation appears to be only The most recent examples included such a state-like gesture on the part of the republic as humanitarian aid to Afghanistan (Irina Ksenofontova, “Gumanitarnaia pomoshch’ dlia naseleniia Afganistana,” Respublika Tatarstan, No. 2-3 (5 January 2002) and direct contacts with the Pope in Vatican (that once again raised much controversy within Russia because of the problems in the relationships between the Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church) (Don Hill and Rim Guilfanov, “Tatarstan: Three-Way Tug of War Strains “Kazan Mother of God’s Icon,” RFE/RL Report, 10 August 2001). 61 This assessment is based on my conversations with the officials from the Foreign Affairs Department in the past several years. 62 The protocol section of the Foreign Affairs Department, for example, has been universalized to serve all the domestics visits and republican official events, which indirectly demonstrates the loss of clout associated with international affairs and their meaning for the republican identity. 60

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meaningful in the moments of political fluidity and chaos in the center. In the moments of political stability in the center, it is the domestic political regime and the domestic actors that define what a region is. Returning to the initial issue of how the evolution of regional identities through external interaction could affect the identity of Russia as a whole, it appears possible to suggest that the impact of the politics of identity on the sub-national level should not be overestimated. The sub-national involvement in international policy-making does not pose a threat of disintegration for Russia. Ultimately, the issues of state integrity depend on the strength of the national political regime and the policies of the center in regards to consolidating and integrating the various territories of Russia economically, politically and culturally.

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THE CONTRIBUTORS Kimitaka Matsuzato is a Professor at the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Japan. Osamu Ieda is a Professor at the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Japan. Yaroslav Hrytsak is Chairman of Slavic History at Lviv State University, Ukraine. Vello Pettai is Head of the Department of Politics at Tartu University, Estonia. Dmitry Gorenburg is Director of Russian and East European Programs, CAN, USA. Stephen White is Professor of politics at the University of Glasgow, UK. Ian MsAllister is Professor of politics at the Australian National University, Australia. Shinkichi Fujimori is a Lecturer at the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Japan. Oleksandr Syniookyi is a Lecturer at Kyevo-Mohyla Academy University, Ukraine. Andrei Lobatch is an independent scholar, Belarus. Go Koshino is a Lecturer at Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Japan. Dmitry Makarov is Senior Researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia. Magomed-Rasul Ibragimov is an Associate Professor at Dagestan University, Russia. Andrzej Nowak is chief editor of the journal “Arcana,” Poland. Marina Mogilner is an editor of the journal “Ab Imperio,” Russia. Darius Staliûnas is Deputy Director of the Institute of Lithuanian History, Lithuania. Norihisa Yamashita is an Associate Professor in the Department of Literature, Hokkaido University, Japan. Stanislav Lakoba is a Professor at Abkhazian University, Abkhazia. Vitaly Merkushev is a researcher at the Institute of Philosophy and Law, Ural Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia. Gulnaz Sharafutdinova is an Assistant Professor of politics at Miami University, USA.

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Настоящий сборник является частью международного исследовательского проекта «Непризнанные государства в бывших социалистических странах: сравнительный и многослойный подход», финансированного Министерством образования, науки, культуры, спорта и технологии Японии (апрель 2005 г. — март 2008 г.). Общим спонсором наших многочисленных проектов выступает программа «Center of Excellence» 21-го в. «Создание славяно-евразийского исследования», также финансируемая этим министерством (2003-2008). Как и в предыдущем сборнике, изданном год назад1, редактор поставил первоочередной задачей участие авторов, представляющих разные позиции (иначе сборник не может претендовать на научность). К счастью, это удалось осуществить, и в настоящем сборнике приняли участие исследователи Приднестровья, Молдовы, Японии, Германии и Украины, представляющие и евроатлантическую, и панъевразийскую позицию. Можно лишь сожалеть об отсутствии голоса из Румынии. Если предыдущий сборник организовал заочный диалог между историками непризнанных государств и их бывших стран1 Историографический диалог вокруг непризнанных государств: Приднестровые, Нагорный Карабах, Армения, Южная Осетия Грузия / Под ред. К.Мацузато. Саппоро, 2007. (http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no18/contents.html)

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сюзеренов, то настоящий посвящен Приднестровью (Приднестровской Молдавской Республике — ПМР) и его целью является попытка проанализировать проблемы, связанные с этим регионом, в макрорегиональном (трансграничном) контексте черноморского побережья. Этот подход достаточно оригинален, так как проблемы непризнанных государств обычно рассматриваются либо в свете их отношений с бывшими странами-сюзеренами, либо с точки зрения геополитического противостояния России и евроатлантического альянса. Однако нельзя не учитывать тот факт, что все непризнанные государства на территории бывшего СССР появились на черноморском побережье, и в этом есть определенная закономерность. Страны черноморского побережья находятся между Восточной Европой и Ближним Востоком. В Восточной Европе, несмотря на то, что национально-государственное строительство здесь началось поздно, к настоящему времени уже имеются более или менее устойчивые образования. На Ближнем Востоке, напротив, религиозная и языковая специфика чрезвычайно затруднила это строительство, и там до сих пор имеются трансграничные национальные и конфессиональные меньшинства (например, курды или алевийцы — группа шиитов), способные расколоть местные национальные сообщества. Неслучайно непризнанные государства начали складываться именно в этом мезо-регионе. Черноморский регион привлекает внимание мировой общественности и науки из-за цветных революций на Украине и в Грузии, подъема исламизма в Турции, дипломатического соперничества вокруг нефте- и газопроводов и энергоносителей, вступления Румынии и Болгарии в Евросоюз, наконец, из-за решения МОК провести зимнюю Олимпиаду 2014 г. в г. Сочи и проч. Ухудшение международных отношений вокруг непризнанных государств после цветных революций и прихода Евросоюза на черноморское побережье является лишь одним из факторов, увеличивающих важность этого региона. Однако аналитическая перспектива большинства специалистов остается в рамках либо евроцентризма (например, постановка проблемы типа «Способствует ли восточная политика Евросоюза демократизации этого региона»), либо классической геополитики. Нельзя не отметить, что подобный исследовательский подход страдает от стереотипов, сформированных еще во время холодной войны.

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Чтобы проанализировать положение Черноморского региона более субстанциально изнутри, мы опираемся на трансграничность как самый определяющий атрибут политических и этноконфессиональных процессов, происходящих в этом регионе. Историков такой подход не удивит, поскольку в исторической науке под черноморской историей подразумевается макрорегиональная перспектива, включающая не только сухопутную, но и морскую историю. Эта традиция имеет почти вековую историографию, чего, к сожалению, нельзя сказать о политологии. Термин «трансграничные народности» (trans-border nations), характеризующий особенность Черноморского региона, часто встречается в этнографической литературе, но не в политологии. Трансграничная политика, типичным примером которой является политика вокруг непризнанных государств, отличается и от внутренней политики, совершаемой в пределах одного государства, и от международных отношений, основными акторами которых являются государства. Она осуществляется трансграничными акторами, такими как НПО, религиозные организации, представители международного бизнеса (например газтрейдеры) и трансграничные этносы2. Трансграничная политика не ограничивается пределами одного государства. Настоящий сборник демонстрирует, как неразделимо переплетена политика Приднестровья, Молдовы, Украины и России.

ТРАНСГРАНИЧНОСТЬ КАК СУЩНОСТЬ ЧЕРНОМОРСКОГО РЕГИОНА Нахождение черноморского побережья между Восточной Европой и Ближним Востоком привело к тому, что, во-первых, любое разногласие по этногенезу или легитимности государства может иметь здесь более серьезные, чем в Восточной Европе, последствия. 2 Левые партии в межвоенный период тоже являлись трансграничными акторами, однако в современном мире закон часто запрещает деятельность трансграничных партий ввиду опасности использования ими иностранных сил с целью вмешательства во внутреннюю политику данного государства.

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Так, в 1990 г. и Литва, и Молдова объявили Секретный протокол, сопровождавший договор Молотова-Риббентропа, не имеющим силу со времени его подписания (1939 г.). Справедливое замечание, прозвучавшее тогда в Литве, о том, что в таком случае Литва обязана вернуть Вильнюс Польше, никто серьезно не воспринял. В Молдове же, напротив, ретроспективное аннулирование Секретного протокола дало Приднестровью повод для проведения референдума за независимость (см. гл. 1 настоящего сборника)3. В то время как Польша не предъявляет территориальных претензий ни к Литве, ни к Украине, ни к Беларуси, политические партии Румынии, даже занимающие противоположные позиции по внутренней политике, не могут распрощаться с мечтой о восстановления исторической Румынии, воссоединив Бессарабию4. Во-вторых, в Черноморском регионе трансграничные меньшинства могут иметь не столь деструктивное, как курды и алевийцы, но тем не менее достаточно серьезное влияние. Самоутверждения моравцев, кашбаев и жамайтов остаются маргинальными в Чехии, Польше и Литве и почти не влияют на государственное строительство в этих странах. Напротив, соотношение сил между румынизмом и молдавизмом прямо определяет стратегию государственного строительства не только Молдовы, но и Приднестровья. 3 Правда, в Комиссии под председательством А.Яковлева (1989), посвященной исторической оценке Пакта Молотова-Риббентропа, литовские и украинские представители повели хитрую политику, требуя восстановить суверенитет своих государств без обсуждения территориальных вопросов. Представитель Литвы сказал: «Мы хотим обсудить только один аспект, чтобы литовское население не беспокоилось, что может произойти какое-то изменение в территориальном статусе государства». Представители же МССР, пребывая в эйфории, предложили безусловное ретроспективное аннулирование Пакта, не понимая сути проблемы, не говоря уже о катастрофических результатах этого акта. Этот эпизод свидетельствует о весьма ограниченном кругозоре элиты и интеллигенции советской Молдовы. Японский исследователь Кеижи Сато исследует ход дискуссии в яковлевской комиссии. 4 В статье, опубликованной в 1994 г., Ч.Кинг назвал этот феномен «комплексом Косово»: «Определенная часть территории в составе исторической родины мистично связана с коллективным благополучием этноса». Кинг отмечает, что этот комплекс доминировал в румынской печати во время конфликта в Приднестровье в 1992 г. См.: Charles King, “Moldovan Identity and the Politics of Pan-Romanianism,” Slavic Review, 53: 2 (1994), p. 363.

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В-третьих, на черноморском побережье конфессиональные и этнические категории, такие как молдаване и мегрелы, используются политическими игроками чрезвычайно конструктивистки. Именно возможность инструментальной манипуляции этноконфессиональными категориями сдерживает в этом регионе применение силы как способа решения конфликтов. Черноморское побережье правильнее охарактеризовать не как территорию с богатой историей вооруженных конфликтов, а, наоборот, с ограниченным применением оружия, чего трудно ожидать, например, в южно-восточной Турции и Карабахе, где этносы понимаются чисто онтологически (примордиалистски). Черное море является озером православия и ислама, что также активизирует трансграничное взаимодействие игроков. Мало кто сомневается в трансграничности (надгосударственности) ислама. Так, Диянет (Духовное управление) Турции направляет преподавателей исламского учения на теологические факультеты не только суннитских Казахстана, Кыргызстана, Болгарии и Татарстана, но и шиитского Азербайджана. Более того, Диянет отправил около 20 имамов в Крым5. На черноморском побережье действуют не только первая и вторая в мире по численности верующих православные церкви, а именно Русская и Румынская, но и «старший брат» православия — Константинопольская экуменическая церковь. Правда, православие часто ассоциируется с цезарепопизмом и поэтому считается по сути национальной и внутригосударственной религией. Однако оно не менее трансгранично, чем ислам. Постоянное требование канонического оправдания в православной политике делает эту конфессию достаточно независимой от светского государства. Можно вспомнить, что Румынская церковь стала независимой (Патриархатом) только через сорок семь лет после получения независимости румынским светским государством. Константинополю потребовалось сорок шесть лет, чтобы признать решение И.Сталина об образовании Грузинской автокефалии (1943). 5 Интервью, полученное автором у Мехмет Гёрмез (Mehmet Görmez), вице-президента Диянета Турции 29 марта 2007 в г. Анкаре. Теологические факультеты Турции, хотя сама она является суннитской страной, проводят глубокие исследования шиизма, поэтому Диянет имеет возможность содействовать шиитам Азербайджана даже теологически.

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Появление непризнанных государств является и результатом, и катализатором трансграничного политического процесса Черноморского региона. Весьма распространенное представление об изолированном положении непризнанных государств неверно. Из-за огромных трудностей, с которыми сталкиваются эти государства, религиозные и другие неправительственные организации, а также этнические меньшинства, проживающие на их территории, отчаянно ищут поддержки и понимания по ту сторону границы. Со своей стороны, этноконфессиональные акторы, действующие за рубежом, также не могут оставаться равнодушными к судьбе своих единоверцев/единоплеменников. Более того, непризнанные государства стараются укрепить свою легитимность через включение трансграничных народностей, например, таких как мегрелы и молдаване, в национальное сообщество. Отнюдь не отрицая полезность геополитического подхода к проблеме непризнанных государств, отметим, что геополитика должна быть дополнена макрорегиональной, исторической, этнографической, религиоведческой и гуманитарной в целом перспективами. Вот почему исследование непризнанных государств не может не внести большой вклад в развитие гуманитарных и социальных наук. Я назвал бы эту новую исследовательскую стратегию «культурной геополитикой», которую очевидно разделяют и авторы настоящего сборника. Н.В.Бабилунга, профессор Приднестровского университета и основной составитель знаменитого трехтомника, посвященного истории Приднестровья6, подходит к анализу этого региона как контактной зоны. Он убежден, что историю современного Приднестровья следует рассматривать в свете макрорегиональных взаимодействий империй и этносов на черноморском побережье и в юго-восточной Европе. П.М.Шорников, историк из Кишинева, лидер молдавистской исторической школы, недавно издавший чрезвычайно интересную монографию7, анализирует причины и характер приднестровского конфликта с точки зрения как румы6 История Приднестровской Молдавской Республики / Сост. В.Я. Гросул, Н.В. Бабилунга, Б.Г. Бомешко и др. Т. 1: Тирасполь, 2000; Т. 2 (Ч. 1, 2): Тирасполь, 2001. 7

Шорников П.М. Молдавская самобытность. Тирасполь, 2007.

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низма, так и молдавизма. Д.А.Чувашенко, главный редактор газеты «Молдавские ведомости», которая является почти единственной оппозицией в Молдове после формирования большой парламентской коалиции коммунистов и христианских демократов в 2005 г., объясняет, почему именно при В.Воронине, пришедшем к власти с обещанием нормализовать отношения с Приднестровьем, приднестровская политика страны стала такой демагогической и безответственной, какой не была даже при М.Снегуре. Чувашенко тщательно анализирует внутренние и внешние причины изменения поведения Воронина. Д.Чувашенко и Ш.Муцушика по-разному объясняют провал меморандума Козака (2003 г.). Уильям Хилл (William Hill), глава миссии ОБСЕ в Молдове в 1999-2006 гг., в недавней беседе со мной сказал, что ему удалось уговорить представителей США и Европы согласиться с черновиком меморандума, который подразумевал федерализацию новой Молдовы с практическим предоставлением права вето Приднестровью и Гагаузии. Однако на последнем этапе переговоров Россия внезапно добавила пресловутую статью о продлении дислокации российских войск в Приднестровье до 2020 г., после чего стало невозможно получить согласие Запада8. А.С.Волошин, будучи тогда главой администрации президента РФ, отметил, что никто иной как сам В.Воронин попросил представителей России не афишировать статью о долгосрочном военном присутствии России в Приднестровье, чтобы не провоцировать оппозицию Молдовы9. Так или иначе, наивно считать причиной неудачи Козака разногласия по поводу будущего конституционного режима Молдовы. Интересно замечание Чувашенко о том, что камнем преткновения в отношениях между В.Ворониным и И.Смирновым, которые до весны 2001 г. были хорошими, оказалось событие, связанное с Ново-Нямецким монастырем (с. Кицканы, около Бендер). Весной 2001 г. светские и церковные власти Приднестровья (президент Смирнов и епископ Русской православной церкви Юстиниан) освободили духовного лидера РПЦ епископа Доримедонта (доста8 Беседа автора с Уильямом Хиллом, состоявшаяся 17 ноября 2007 г. в г. Нью-Орлеан, США. 9

Беседа автора с А.С.Волошиным, состоявшаяся 25 января 2008 г. в г. Токио.

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точно прорумынскую фигуру) от должности фактического ректора Кишиневской духовной семинарии, находившейся на территории монастыря. Это было уступкой со стороны Кишиневской митрополии РПЦ Тираспольской епархии, но правоохранительные органы ПМР не позволили президенту Молдовы В.Воронину приехать в с. Кицканы для урегулирования конфликтной ситуации10. Летом того же года Воронин сделал ставку на смену власти в Приднестровье после предстоявших президентских выборов (декабрь 2001 г.). Заявление Воронина в этом контексте: «Со Смирновым мы ничего не решим» очень напоминает пресловутое высказывание премьерминистра Японии Ф.Коное в отношении правительства Гоминдан в Китае (январь 1938 г.). Работы Чувашенко и Процика/Волентира/Букатуру свидетельствуют, что самое значимое изменение молдавской внутренней политики связано с переменой позиции коммунистов во главе с В.Ворониным. ПКРМ стала отрицательно относиться к идее федерализации Молдовы и менее осторожной в вопросе применения сил для решения приднестровской проблемы. В то же время, согласно данным О.Процика и др., противоречие между самооценкой партии, данной партийными функционерами, и ее экспертной оценкой извне является показателем того, что позиция коммунистов аморфна и непоследовательна и именно поэтому ПКРМ имеет больше шансов, чем другие партии, успешно провести переговоры с Приднестровьем. Будучи осведомлен не только в официальной политике, но и в «кухне» Евросоюза, Шигео Муцушика считает 2003-й годом переворота. До этого времени Евросоюз передоверял решение проблемы ОБСЕ и России. Приближение границ Евросоюза к Черному морю изменило его позицию, развитие ситуации после этого нам известно. Муцушика отмечает почти параллельное усиление приднестровской политики Евросоюза и России. Так, практическая блокада Приднестровья с помощью EUBAM11 и усилия России по 10 Спаси и сохрани // Независимая Молдова. 2001. 07. 20 (www.nm.md/daily/ article/2001/07/20/0905.html); Кицканский сценарий: действующие лица и исполнители (www.pravoslavie.ru/analit/kitskany.htm). 11 European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine. См.: www. eubam.org

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укреплению своих позиций в регионе после провала меморандума Козака осуществлялись одновременно. Интересно расхождение в оценках Парижского протокола 28 октября 1920 г., признавшего присоединение Бессарабии к Румынии, которые дали Муцушика и Бабилунга. Из четырех стран, подписавших этот документ, он не был ратифицирован лишь Японией, которая соблюдала секретный протокол Советско-японской конвенции 20 января 1925 г., устанавливавшей дипломатические отношения между двумя странами. Муцушика считает, что ратификация Японией Парижского протокола придала бы ему юридическую силу и тогда румыны/молдаване могли бы опереться на балтийскую модель восстановления государственности и территории межвоенного периода. По мнению Бабилунги, Парижский протокол, для обработки которого не были приглашены ни Германия, ни СССР, то есть бывший сюзерен Бессарабии, в любом случае не мог иметь юридической силы. В.Кулик и В.Якушик рассматривают политику Украины в отношении Приднестровья при президенте Ющенко. Авторы доказывают, что она зависела от социальной психологии Украины. Сначала была революционная эйфория, сопровождаемая иллюзией, что Ющенко может выступить самостоятельным лидером Черноморского региона. Однако осознав свой достаточно ограниченный потенциал в мировой геополитике, «оранжевая коалиция» быстро сменила свою позицию и стала угождать Евросоюзу в надежде получить более выгодные условия вступления Украины в ВТО. Поразительна интерпретация авторами факта отстранения П.Порошенко от должности секретаря СНБОУ в 2005 г. как дела рук молдавских спецслужб. Глава Мацузато посвяшена сравнительному исследованию межправославных отношений и трансграничных народностей в Абхазии и Приднестровье и тем самым дополняет геополитическое исследование черноморского побережья гуманитарными сюжетами. Попытаемся обобщить указанные работы в хронологическом порядке. Ожидание улучшения региональной ситуации вокруг Приднестровья непосредственно после прихода к власти молдавских коммунистов не оправдалось. Камнем преткновения послужил конфликт вокруг Ново-Нямецкого монастыря (весной-летом 2001 г.).

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Крайне агрессивное настроение Воронина, возможно, объяснялось приближением президентских выборов в ПМР (2001 г.). Воронин недооценил стабильность режима Приднестровья и считал, как до сих пор полагают и некоторые иностранные наблюдатели, что он получил поддержку населения недемократическим путем, а поэтому усиления идеологического воздействия извне будет достаточно для свержения не только администрации Смирнова, но и его наследника. Поворотным стал 2003 г., когда непризнанные государства оказались между молотом и наковальней: на западе Евросоюз начал серьезно обкатывать свою черноморскую политику, необходимую также для стабилизации Балкан, а с востока наступали «цветные революции». Логическим результатом этого явилась блокада Приднестровья путем создания EUBAM. К счастью для непризнанных государств, те же «цветные революции» развенчали иллюзию России о «большом евразийстве», и она стала поддерживать малых, но близких союзников (непризнанные государства) намного более последовательно, чем раньше (об этом речь пойдет ниже).

ОБЩИЙ ЦИКЛ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОГО РАЗВИТИЯ В НЕПРИЗНАННЫХ ГОСУДАРСТВАХ

Позвольте кратко изложить последние политические события в ПМР. Циклы политического развития этой республики и других непризнанных государств имеют много общих черт. Все они победили в войнах со своими бывшими сюзеренами, которые по численности населения превосходили их в несколько, а то и в десятки раз. Привыкшие к героизму военного времени, жители государств, родившихся в огне гражданской войны, с трудом адаптировались к жизни в условиях обычной демократии и рыночных отношений. Используя это обстоятельство, друзья и родственники местных президентов постепенно сосредоточивали в своих руках богатства и власть, тогда как отцы-основатели независимости один за другим оттеснялись на задний план. Когда негативные тенденции переходили через край, начиналась новая массовая мобилизация за редемократизацию.

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Нагорный Карабах (НКР) этот критический момент в своей истории пережил во время так называемой военной диктатуры — в период с 1994 г. (прекращение огня) по приблизительно 1998 г. Политическая и деловая жизнь республики оказалась подчинена бывшим полевым командирам, героям Карабахской войны во главе с Самвелом Бабаяном. В 1997 г. президент НКР Роберт Кочарян был приглашен на пост премьер-министра Армении, а в 1998 г. его наследником стал Аркадий Гукасян. За годы его работы гражданские руководители республики постепенно оттеснили полевых командиров от власти, некоторые из которых за прошлые преступления были отправлены за решетку. В марте 2000 г. А.Гукасян едва не стал жертвой покушения, и хотя многое в этом покушении осталось загадочным, республиканский суд признал виновным в его организации С.Бабаяна, который был отправлен в тюрьму на четыре с лишним года12. По иронии судьбы Азербайджанская амнистия, критикуя положение с правами человека в Карабахе, постоянно поднимала вопрос о пытках, которые применялись в заключении к Бабаяну, — человеку, который всего десять лет назад так досаждал Азербайджану. Монополия власти Гукасяна продлилась недолго: в 2004 г. мэром столичного Степанакерта стал представитель левоцентристской оппозиции — «Движения-88»13. Характерно, что НКР — единственное государство в Закавказье, мэр столицы которого избирается. Президент Абхазии Владислав Ардзинба, переизбранный в 1999 г. при поддержке подавляющего большинства, вскоре заболел. Со временем стиль его руководства становился все более авторитарным и характеризовался выдвижением на первые роли его ближайших друзей. Оппозиционные партии, которые появились в 2002 г., на выборах 2004 г. своим кандидатом в президенты выдвинули Сергея Багапша, а в вице-президенты — Станислава 12 Выйдя из тюрьмы., С.Бабаян дал автору интервью (26 декабря 2005 г., г. Ереван), в котором намекнул, что А.Гукасян сам организовал нападение. Он сослался на тот факт, что нападавшие стреляли не пулями, а дробью, то есть хотели ранить, но не убить. 13 Подробнее см.: Мацузато К. Непризнанное государство: Нагорно-Карабахская республика (1988-2005 гг.) // Вестник Тамбовского ун-та. Вып. 1 (45). Тамбов, 2007. С. 31-41.

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Лакобу и, по заключению ЦИК Абхазии, победили уже в первом туре голосования. Однако сторонники Рауля Хаджимба, преемника Ардзинба, не признали результаты выборов, ссылаясь на ошибки в подсчете голосов и якобы имевшие место массовые нарушения в Гальском (мегрельском по составу населения) районе. Республика оказалась на грани вооруженного конфликта, однако стремясь предотвратить дальнейшее российское вмешательство, стороны согласились на компромисс. С.Багапш пошел на перевыборы в тандеме с Р.Хаджимба в качестве вице-президента, отвечающего за силовой блок (вооруженные силы, силы безопасности и внутренних дел Абхазии)14. Поскольку в Южной Осетии также произошла смена правительства, единственным президентом, который остается у власти с 1990-х годов, оказался Игорь Смирнов (Приднестровье). Однако ему противостоит влиятельная оппозиция — партия «Обновление» во главе с молодым (1968 г. р.) Евгением Шевчуком15. «Обновление» имеет 23 (из 43) депутатских мандата в Верховном Совете ПМР16 — существенно больше, чем пропрезидентская Республиканская партия. Е.Шевчук возглавляет корпорацию «Шериф», которая контролирует розничную торговлю в Приднестровье. По слухам, корпорация тратит на охрану своей торговой сети больше, чем вся ПМР на государственную безопасность. Многие руководители партии «Обновление» — молодые энергичные бизнесмены; их раздражение «вечно правящим» Смирновым напоминает недовольство молодых абхазских лидеров Ардзинбой в последние месяцы его власти. Они недоумевают: «Почему человек преклонных лет, очевидно ничего не понимающий в рыночных отношениях, вместе со своими сыновьями и родственниками продолжает руководить экономикой республики? Почему страна должна пассивно реагировать на провокации и демагогические заявления бывшего государства-сюзерена? Почему мы не можем задать вопросы и заставить их (руководителей Молдовы) ответить?» 14 Подробнее см.: Мацузато К. Патронное президентство и политика в сфере идентичности в непризнанной Абхазии // Acta Eurasica. 2006. № 4. P. 137-143. 15

http://vspmr.org/Deputy/?ID=46 (последний доступ 4 октября 2007 г.).

Маркедонов С. De facto государства постсоветского пространства // Непризнанные государства. Научные тетради. Вып. 1. М., б/д. С. 21. 16

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С 2000 г. бизнесмен Е.Шевчук начал активно заниматься политикой и сумел победить на парламентских выборах. Спикер Верховного Совета ПМР Григорий Маракуца тут же предложил его в свои заместители. Когда же (в 2005 г.) Е.Шевчук победил во второй раз, Маракуца передал ему свои полномочия. Лидеры Приднестровья будут еще долго вспоминать речь Маракуцы при выдвижении Шевчука: «Я нашел этого человека и я же воспитал его. Я буду голосовать за него и предлагаю вам, уважаемые депутаты, последовать моему примеру». Однако события вокруг местной исполнительной власти развивались по значительно менее приглядному сценарию. Игорь Смирнов твердо решил участвовать в президентской кампании декабря 2006 г., хотя приближался к своему 65-летию, а 38-летний Шевчук упорно придерживался принципа неучастия в президентских выборах, пока Смирнов не уйдет в отставку по собственной воле. Российское руководство сделало ставку на Смирнова. Тот, в свою очередь, запросил у В.Путина огромную материальную поддержку для успешного проведения референдума в сентябре 2006 г., который должен был подтвердить независимость Приднестровья и его будущие ассоциативные взаимоотношения с Россией (по образцу Пуэрто-Рико и США), а также президентских выборов в декабре. Российское правительство пошло на это, потребовав взамен провести административную и финансовую реформы. Первая в числе прочего предусматривала упразднение «чистого президентства» (ПМР — единственная из бывших социалистических стран, президент которой является одновременно и премьер-министром), а вторая была необходима для более стабильной конвертируемости приднестровского рубля в российский. Будучи переизбран, И.Смирнов положил эти реформы в долгий ящик, и в 2007 г. его отношения с Москвой испортились. Когда высокопоставленные российские чиновники спросили у Е.Шевчука в бытность его в Москве о причинах такого поведения Смирнова, тот ответил украинской пословицей: «Бачіли очі, що купували»17. 17 Интервью, данное автору Алексеем Мартыновым, исполнительным секретарем Межпарламентской ассамблеи государств — членов ассоциации «За демократию и права человека» в Москве 27 августа 2007 г. В эту ассоциацию входят представители Абхазии, Приднестровья и Южной Осетии. Нагорный Карабах добивается международного признания с помощью США и других западных стран и потому

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Воронинская администрация Молдовы, озабоченная скорейшим завершением своей «винной войны» с Россией, тут же попыталась сыграть на российско-приднестровских противоречиях. Если раньше российское руководство ответило бы на эти инициативы без замедления, поскольку Смирнов нарушил данные обещания, то на этот раз Кремль решил проявить терпение и подождать, пока приднестровский лидер одумается. Возникает вопрос: почему в 2004 г., когда жители Абхазии отказали в доверии кандидату, которому покровительствовал В.Путин, Россия закрыла свою границу с этой непризнанной республикой, а теперь (в случае с Приднестровьем) она вдруг стала столь терпеливой? Возможно, дело в том, что Россия отказалась от балансирования между непризнанными государствами и их бывшими сюзеренами. Как Ельцин, так и Путин (во время своего первого срока) тешили себя иллюзией, что Россия все еще способна оказывать особое влияние на бывшие советские республики. В период своих добрых отношений с Тбилиси и Кишиневом Москва была готова даже пожертвовать интересами непризнанных государств. Другими словами, Ельцин и Путин (в отмеченное нами время) считали Шеварднадзе и Воронина президентами, как бы сидящими в правом кармане, а Ардзинбу и Смирнова — в левом. «Оранжевая революция» на Украине положила конец этим иллюзиям. Сегодняшняя Россия стремится классифицировать государства по принципу дружественности и с недругами строить принятые в мировом сообществе взаимоотношения, включая установление рыночных цен на нефть и газ. Этот подход можно назвать «малым евразийством». Россия отказалась от проведения особой дружественной политики ради призрачной надежды на ответное дружелюбие другой стороны. Это «малое евразийство» явилось фоном жесткой позиции Кремля после 2006 г. в отношении косовского вопроса. Москва предупредила Вашингтон, что признание независимости Косова явится прецедентом для решения проблем Абхазии и Южной Осетии18. представлен в ней лишь наблюдателем. 18 См., напр., замечания Константина Косачева, председателя думского Комитета по международным делам, сделанные накануне встречи Путина и Саакашвили в Петербурге в июне 2006 г.: http://palm.newsru.com/russia/13jun2006/vstrecha.html (последний доступ 20 октября 2007 г.).

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Кульминационным пунктом нормализации молдавско-приднестровских отношений стал меморандум, подписанный 8 мая 1997 г. в Москве президентами Петром Лучинским и Игорем Смирновым. Приднестровье получило право экспортировать квотированное количество товаров, минуя таможенные службы Молдовы. Результатом этого компромисса явилось «приднестровское чудо» (экономическая реставрация) конца 1990-х — начала 2000-х годов. Вопреки распространенному представлению, экономики Приднестровья и Молдовы дополняют друг друга. Это означает не только то, что экономический бум в первом создает условия для развития сельхозпроизводства и виноделия во второй. Дело еще и в том, что за 90-е годы многие руководители Молдовы, не исключая и самого Лучинского, тихо-мирно завели в Приднестровье собственный бизнес. Одним из первых шагов президента Владимира Воронина (фигуры в этом отношении незапятнанной) стало обновление таможенной печати Молдовы, тем самым он фактически отменил действие важной статьи меморандума 1997 г. В апреле 2005 г. украинский президент В.Ющенко огласил свой план по урегулированию приднестровской проблемы. С самого начала казалось невероятным, что в Молдове найдет поддержку его предложение провести в Приднестровье выборы под международным контролем с тем, чтобы сделать его стороной конфликта (подобно Абхазии), способной легитимно вести переговоры на международной арене. Уже в июле того же года парламент Молдовы принял резолюцию, которая фактически дезавуировала план Ющенко. Тем же летом штаб Ющенко оставил честолюбивый замысел превратить своего президента в независимого лидера черноморского побережья и предался размышлениям о преимуществах установления пограничного контроля (в долгосрочной перспективе), на котором настаивали Евросоюз и Молдова. Также следовало обеспечить лучшие условия вступления Украины в ВТО, несмотря на то, что народному хозяйству страны будет нанесен кратковременный ущерб. Возможно также, что украинский лидер не забыл: более 90% приднестровских украинцев (граждан Украины) в 2004 г. проголосовало за В.Януковича19. В самом деле, в отличие от прези19

В 2004 г. в ответ на конфликт, возникший вокруг румынских школ в Приднест-

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дентских выборов 2004 г., на парламентских выборах 2006 г. Украина не открывала избирательные участки на территории ПМР. Третьего марта 2006 г. правительство Украины запретило допуск на свою территорию приднестровских товаров, не имеющих печати таможенной службы Молдовы. Украинско-приднестровская граница была взята под контроль EUBAM — специально созданной для этих целей силами Украины, Молдовы и Евросоюза организацией. Предприятия ПМР лишились права экспорта без регистрации в Молдове, иными словами, они оказались под двойным налоготаможенным обложением — ПМР и Молдовы. Неудивительно, что они потеряли свою конкурентоспособность на мировом рынке. Правительство ПМР утверждает, что связанные с этим ежедневные потери республики составляют 2-2,5 млн долл. США. Если учесть, что в среднем за год между ПМР и приграничными областями Украины совершается сделок на сумму 270 млн долл. США (см. главу 6), то станет очевидным и ущерб, нанесенный украинской экономике. Явившись, таким образом, причиной огромных экономических потерь как для ПМР, так и для Украины, за полтора года существования совместного пограничного контроля (до октября 2007 г.) EUBAM так и не обнаружила на границе ни оружия, ни наркотиков, ни женщин-рабынь20. *** С тех пор, как я начал исследовать Приднестровье, прошло пять лет. За это время я убедился, что самое ценное богатство этого региона — люди. Своим молчаливым трудолюбием приднестровцы напоминают белорусов. Это качество, которое так выделяет эти два народа из соседних, наверное, дает мне моральное право завершить это введение цитатой из моего любимого белорусского поэта. ровье, Молдова прекратила выдавать сертификационные документы на экспортные товары непризнанной республики. Однако премьер Янукович при президенте Кучме продолжал пропускать приднестровский экспорт через территорию Украины. Естественно, что в результате он стал чрезвычайно популярен на левом берегу Днестра. 20 Можно спорить, было ли это достижением EUBAM по пресечению незаконной торговли (интерпретация Муцушика), или оружие и проч. являлось лишь предлогом, как в случае с оружием массового поражения в Ираке, для введения блокады, нацеленной на подрыв экономической основы ПМР (версия В.Кулика и В.Якушика). Настоящий сборник представляет обе версии.

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Адчыніце ўсе дзверы, Паламіце замкі, Адпусціце ўсе душы На чатыры бакі. Паляцелі ўсе душы На чатыры бакі, Зачыніліся дзверы, Іржавеюць замкі. Я стаю на крыжы Беларускіх дарог І не бачу дзвярэй, За якімі ёсць Бог21 2 января 2008 г., г. Саппоро

Кимитака Мацузато доктор юридических наук, профессор Центра славянских исследований Университета Хоккайдо

21

Адам Глобус. Скрыжаванне (http://kamunikat.net.iig.pl/5088.html)

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ЧТО ТАКОЕ ПМР? Приднестровская Молдавская Республика — это молодое самопровозглашенное государство, созданное по воле проживающего здесь народа его законно избранными прямыми представителями в период распада Советского Союза. Второго сентября 1990 г. депутаты всех уровней от Приднестровья, опираясь на результаты впервые проведенного на территории СССР регионального референдума, объявили на своем съезде об образовании Приднестровской Молдавской Республики, тем самым реализовав волю подавляющего большинства населения края. Фактически этот акт восстановил государственность, которой регион лишился в 1940 г. при образовании союзной Молдавской ССР, когда Левобережное Приднестровье волевым решением сталинского руководства было лишено автономии в составе Украины и присоединено к части правобережных районов Бессарабии, за месяц до этого события освобожденной от власти фашистского режима боярской Румынии. Восстановление государственности в Приднестровье находится в полном соответствии с международно-правовыми нормами и законами. Руководствуясь «жизненно важными интересами сохранения и процветания целостной румынской нации», парламент Республики Молдова в июне 1990 г. провозгласил Молдавскую ССР незаконным образованием на оккупированной и расчлененной земле Бессарабии и Буковины. Тем самым Приднестровье получило необходимые юридические основания для государственного самоопределения, поскольку левобережье Днестра никогда не являлось ни частью

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Молдавского княжества, ни частью Бессарабии, ни тем более Румынии. И этой возможностью народ Приднестровья воспользовался вполне, сумев восстановить государственность и защитить свою республику — продукт коллективного разума и опыта, единых устремлений многонациональной приднестровской общности. Ныне Приднестровская Молдавская Республика является суверенным независимым демократическим государством, президентской республикой, основанной на праве и законе. Ее парламент — Верховный Совет ПМР — высший представительный и законодательный орган государственной власти, который избирается всеми гражданами республики на пятилетний срок путем тайного голосования на основе всеобщего равного и прямого избирательного права. Государство расположено в юго-восточной части Европы на левом и частично правом берегах Днестра и граничит на западе с Молдовой, а на востоке — с Украиной. Его территория составляет свыше 6100 кв. км, а население (согласно последней переписи, состоявшейся в ноябре 2004 г.) — около 555 тыс. человек1. По национальному составу это полиэтническая общность молдаван (31,9%), украинцев (28,8%) и русских (30,4%). В республике проживают также болгары (2,5%), евреи (0,2%), немцы (0,4%), гагаузы (0,7%), белорусы (0,7%) и др.2 Официальные языки, закрепленные в Конституции ПМР, — молдавский, украинский и русский. Большая часть верующего населения исповедует православие. На территории государства действуют Тираспольско-Дубоссарская Епархия Русской Православной Церкви, а также католические и протестантские храмы, синагоги и молитвенные дома. Часть населения составляют буддисты, кришнаиты и сторонники некоторых других религиозно-философских вероучений. ПМР — светская республика, в которой церковь отделена от государства и строго соблюдается закон о свободе совести. Столицей республики является г. Тирасполь, в котором проживают около 160 тыс. человек. Столичные функции он выполняет 1 Диаконова Л.В. Итоги переписи населения в Приднестровской Молдавской Республике // Экономика Приднестровья. 2006. № 7. С. 6. 2

Там же. С. 11.

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во второй раз в своей истории: с 1929 г. по 1940 г. Тирасполь был столицей Молдавской АССР в составе Украины. С конца XVIII в. до Октябрьской революции город являлся уездным центром Херсонской губернии. Крупнейшие города и административные центры ПМР — Бендеры (105 тыс. жителей), Рыбница (около 54 тыс.), Дубоссары (около 24 тыс.), Григориополь (11,5 тыс.), Каменка (свыше 10 тыс.), Слободзея (23,5 тыс.)3. По своему административно-территориальному устройству ПМР является унитарным государством и состоит из пяти административных районов — Каменского, Рыбницкого, Дубоссарского, Григориопольского и Слободзейского. По форме правления ПМР — президентская республика.

ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЕ КАК ГЕОПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЕ ПОГРАНИЧЬЕ ЮГО-ВОСТОЧНОЙ

ЕВРОПЫ

Конфигурация современных государственных границ Приднестровской Молдавской Республики определилась в ХХ в. На нее оказали влияние во многом случайные факторы, в том числе территориально-государственное размежевание двух союзных республик — Украины и Молдавии. Эта земля была и остается частью очень важного в геополитическом отношении региона Европы, который протянулся с севера на юг вдоль Днестра от Карпат до Черного моря. На всем обозримом протяжении человеческой истории Днестр играл исключительно важную роль, являясь естественной границей между различными этнокультурными зонами Восточной Европы. Земли, простирающиеся к Востоку от Днестра, являются составной частью славянского ареала славяно-православной цивилизации «срединной земли», Евразии. Они никогда не входили в островную сферу влияния, или береговую зону, которая имеет свойство пере3

Там же. С. 8.

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ходить из одного геополитического пояса в другой и обратно, как это постоянно происходит с Пруто-Днестровским междуречьем, исторической территорией Бессарабии, которую некоторые исследователи называют «европейской Месопотамией»4. В отличие от береговой, дисконтинентальной зоны, в которую, несомненно, входит территория Республики Молдова, Приднестровье уже несколько столетий является частью такого культурно-исторического и цивилизационного феномена, как Русский мир. Последний объединяет различные православные народы и государства подобно тому, как понятие «Германия» объединяет немцев, — оно оставалось единым всегда, несмотря на то, что в различные эпохи существовало множество германских государств. Самоидентификация многонационального народа Приднестровья как неотъемлемой части православного русского пространства в самом широком смысле этого слова подчеркивает значение этой сравнительно небольшой территории, где граничат влияния Русской Православной Церкви и автокефальной Румынской Православной Церкви, проповедующей экуменизм и сближение с Ватиканом. Постоянно наращивая с помощью Запада свое присутствие в Молдове, Румынская Православная Церковь все более активизируется как политическая сила, что выводит Приднестровский регион на одну из ключевых ролей в геополитической системе координат восточно-христианской цивилизации5. Роль геополитического пограничья и контактной зоны различных пластов человеческой цивилизации и культур Приднестровье выполняло на протяжении столетий и даже тысячелетий. Здесь сталкивались оседлые земледельцы Балкано-Карпатского региона и кочевые цивилизации Великой степи, восточно-славянский мир православия и западно-славянская католическая культура, мир христианства и мир ислама, германо-романское пространство и пространство славянское. На протяжении веков ни о какой стабильности на этих землях не было и речи. За эти территории боролись 4

Хаусхофер К. О геополитике: работы разных лет. М., 2001. С. 162.

Фролов К.А. Приднестровский регион в геополитической системе координат восточно-христианской цивилизации // Приднестровье в геополитической системе координат ХХI в. Тирасполь, 2002. С. 68-69. 5

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могущественные державы, и очень часто Приднестровье переходило из рук в руки. Известный немецкий социолог, один из классиков геополитики как науки Карл Хаусхофер относил Днестр к рекам, имеющим наиболее дестабилизирующее значение. «Из самого беглого рассмотрения границы по востоку, — писал он, — вытекает с точностью одно: она становится все сложнее [для охраны], чем больше русло реки развивается в рамках культурного ландшафта, чем более освоенным оно становится. Все пограничные реки мира — Рейн, Дунай, Висла, Прут и Днестр, Инд, Шатт-эль-Араб, Амур, Красная река, Рио-Гранде — становятся в возрастающей степени исходной точкой политических волнений и угроз не только для соседей, но и для всех, для мира во всем мире, чем больше возрастает их коммуникационная и энергетическая ценность, чем нераздельнее хозяйственное развитие по обоим берегам связывает соседей, тем больше враждебный жизни и сношениям облик крупной реки отходит на задний план перед дающими энергию и дружественно связующими процессами»6. В работе «Границы в их геополитическом значении», написанной в 30-е годы, когда Бессарабия была оккупирована, а Днестр стал временной пограничной линией между СССР и Румынией, профессор Хаусхофер сравнил Пруто-Днестровское междуречье с Месопотамией: «Междуречье в «Промежуточной Европе», которое в двухтысячелетней истории отражает в миниатюре судьбы классического месопотамского Двуречья вследствие борьбы вокруг его речных границ, — это Бессарабия. Здесь на долю полосы земли, составляющей около 45 000 кв. км, с абсолютно гетерогенным населением выпала сомнительная честь вслед за проблемой трех крупных рек Внутренней Европы — Рейном, Дунаем и Вислой — и вылупившимся Изонцо образовать границу Европы по водотоку между Прутом и Днестром, о которой много говорилось. В самом узком месте две судьбоносные реки сближаются до расстояния 22 км, сухопутная граница с сопредельной, ныне живущей в том же самом союзе Буковиной равняется 55,5 км — расстояние по географической широте основного центра власти Кишинева (Хизинау)— 77 км, 6

Хаусхофер К. Указ. соч. С. 161-162.

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самое большое растяжение при впадении рек в Дунай и берегам лимана — 198 км»7. Но больше всего поражает то, что немецкий классик уже тогда осознавал ненормальность навязанного Днестру статуса, который был не только вреден и не выгоден никому экономически, но и создавал очаг военного противостояния. Если в 1940 г. Советскому Союзу удалось предотвратить подобное противостояние мирным разрешением Бессарабского вопроса 28 июня 1940 г., когда румынские войска освободили край и граница была восстановлена по Пруту, то в 90-х годах ХХ в. Бессарабский вопрос был возрожден кишиневским режимом как политическая проблема. Днестр вновь приобрел функции пограничной реки, и Молдова сумела превратить политическое противостояние в военную агрессию против возродившейся государственности Приднестровья. Еще в 30-е годы К. Хаусхофер, считая вполне естественной принадлежность Пруто-Днестровского междуречья России, что снимало бы с Днестра статус пограничья и ликвидировало бы угрозу войны на его берегах, писал: «Из-за своеобразия двух многократно оспаривавшихся речных границ известная страна видится отчетливейшим образом: оказывавший ранее услуги сообщению, проходимый для плоскодонных пароходов, по меньшей мере на небольших участках, извилистый Днестр сегодня по причине навязанного пограничного своеобразия полностью парализован с точки зрения ценности реки как коммуникации и источника энергии. Нынешний Днестр — это всего лишь отличная подпора для контрабанды между разными экономическими системами — Советским Союзом и капиталистической Румынией и арена политических происков, очаг войны не только в Европе, но и в мире; тем более, что Япония и, само собой разумеется, Советский Союз еще не признали границу по Днестру и более чем сомнительно, что кто-то действительно вступился бы за нее»8. 7

Там же. С. 160.

Там же. С. 161. Речь идет о том, что 28 октября 1920 г. Англия, Франция, Италия и Япония подписали с Румынией Парижский протокол, по которому стороны признали «суверенитет Румынии над Бессарабской территорией». Однако ратификация этого протокола так и не была завершена: Англия ратифицировала его в 1922 г., Франция — в 1924 г., Италия — в 1927 г., Япония не ратифицировала вообще, Соединенные Штаты отказались принимать участие в его разработке и подписании, а 8

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Именно Хаусхофер обратил внимание на принципиальную разницу геополитического значения границы по водоразделу (wasserscheigerenze) и по водотоку (wasserlaufgrenze). В первом случае река служит разделительным пограничьем между противоборствующими силами в условиях конфликта этносов, конфессий, цивилизаций. Во втором случае приоритетным становится единство жизненного цикла, когда река удовлетворяет самые разные потребности населения в бесконфликтном состоянии. Она служит и водопоем для охотников и скотоводов, и источником орошения для земледельцев, и транспортным путем для купцов, и средством коммуникации, источником энергии и проч. Второй случай более характерен для ситуации, когда река не несет более разделительных функций и становится внутренней артерией того или иного геополитического плато. При таком важном геополитическом значении Днестр мог легко выступать как в одной, так и в другой ипостаси. «Вся история Бессарабии, — говорит К. Хаусхофер, — …важное обвинение превратностям природы, делающим невозможной границу по крупной реке, ведущим к расколку единых жизненных областей, и это тем пагубнее лежит бременем на соседях, чем больше развивался или мог развиваться культурный прибрежный ландшафт, чем чаще единоплеменные слои населения и расы издревле пересекали реку, оставляя на ее берегах лишь местно чуждые противоречия силы. Здесь граница по водотоку, — здесь граница по водоразделу!»9. В I тыс. до н. э. Днестр разделял земледельческие фракийские племена и степных кочевников — киммерийцев, скифов, сарматов и др. ираноязычные племена скотоводов. В III-IV вв. н. э. река являлась границей между остготами и вестготами, в VI-VIII вв. — между близкородственными славянскими племенами антов и склавинов, а Советский Союз, Германия и другие страны не привлекались даже к его обсуждению. Поэтому Парижский протокол от 28 октября 1920 г. не имел международно-правовой силы и считался дипломатами неправомочным. Поскольку на момент 25 октября 1917 г. все жители Бессарабии являлись гражданами России, Советский Союз продолжал рассматривать их как своих подданных, а земли от Днестра до Прута как свою территорию, временно оккупированную соседней державой, с которой ни Россия, ни Советский Союз не находились в состоянии войны, более того, — они являлись союзниками по Антанте. 9

Хаусхофер К. Указ. соч. С. 161.

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в IX-XI вв. — между тиверцами и уличами. Во времена татаро-монгольского завоевания Днестр служил естественной границей между двумя этнокультурными зонами Золотой Орды, что доказали археологи по локализации погребений конца XIII — начала XIV вв. С образованием Молдавского независимого княжества по договоренности между господарем Петром Мушатом и польским королем Владиславом Ягайло в 1387 г. Днестр становится границей между Молдавией и Русско-литовским государством. После вхождения Молдавского княжества в состав Османской империи с середины XVI до конца XVIII вв. (за исключением последней четверти XVII в., когда оба берега Днестра подчинялись турецкому султану) Днестр разграничивал польскую и турецкую сферы влияния. С 1789 по 1812 гг. река разделяла Российскую империю и Османскую, а с 1918 по 1940 гг. — Советскую Россию (СССР) и королевскую Румынию. Однако Днестр не раз становился и внутренней рекой: во времена существования европейской Сарматии (I-II вв.), в период Киевской и Галицкой Руси (XI-XIII вв.), после установления власти Золотой Орды к востоку от Карпат (середина XIII в.), в период прохождения по реке Прут границ Российской империи (1812-1917 гг.) и Советского Союза (1940-1991 гг.) . Уже отмечалась характерная тенденция: «Днестр становится внутренней рекой только в те периоды, когда то или иное отчетливо континентальное телурократическое Евразийское государство, достигая пика своего могущества, распространяется на оба берега Днестра. Земля к востоку от Днестра никогда не входила в островную сферу влияния, а следовательно, геополитически она является частью того образования, что мы вслед за Макиндером называем Евразией, «геополитической осью истории», «сердцевиной Земли». С геополитической и геокультурной точек зрения эта граница совпадает с границей славянского ареала…»10 В настоящее время Приднестровская Молдавская Республика граничит с Республикой Молдова, которая располагается на значительной части «Европейской Месопотамии» и после победы блока НАТО в холодной войне против Советского Союза и организации 10 Букарский В.В. Геополитическое значение Днестра как границы // Ежегодный исторический альманах Приднестровья. 2004. № 8. С. 79.

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Варшавского договора сменила свою геополитическую ориентацию с евразийской на атлантическую. Попытки националистического пронатовского руководства Молдовы (под какими бы лозунгами оно ни выступало — от нацистских до псевдокоммунистических) пристегнуть к своему атлантическому курсу и многонациональное прорусское евразийское Приднестровье привели к ожесточенному противостоянию и кровопролитной войне 1991-1992 гг. Националистический постулат «кровь превыше всего», заимствованный правителями Молдовы у румынского классика Михая Эминеску и выдвинутый еще группировкой Снегура-Друка в качестве стратегической направленности реальной политики, вызвал протест у всех жителей Приднестровья, в том числе и молдаван. Этот протест аккумулировался во всеобщую готовность с оружием в руках защищать свою государственность как единственный гарант своего образа жизни, приоритетов и ценностей, своего менталитета. Жителям Приднестровья ближе евразийский мультикультуралистский принцип — «почва превыше крови», чем постулаты, объявленные священными правящим в Молдове политическим классом. Он близок к евангельскому «нет эллина, нет иудея» — принцип сакральной верности родной земле вне зависимости от этнической или религиозной принадлежности населяющих ее жителей11.

ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЕ В ДРЕВНЕЙШИЕ ИСТОРИЧЕСКИЕ ЭПОХИ

Уже в конце II тыс. до н. э. Днестр стал границей между воинственными племенами киммерийцев (упоминаемых еще в гомеровской «Одиссее»), обитавшими в Северном Причерноморье, и племенами фракийцев, проживавшими западнее Днестра, на Балканах и в Карпатах. Здесь проходила западная граница Киммерийского царства, располагавшегося в Северном Причерноморье с центром в Восточном Крыму. «Отец истории» Геродот, посетивший 11

Там же. С. 80.

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в V ст. до н. э. греческий город-республику Ольвию на Черном море, рассказывал о высоком кургане на берегу Днестра. Под этим курганом лежали последние киммерийские цари, которые, не желая покоряться наступавшим скифам, перебили друг друга. Они были похоронены своими соплеменниками со всеми почестями и богатыми приношениями. «Могилу царей там можно видеть и поныне», — пишет Геродот12. После отступления киммерийцев в Малую Азию, где они были наголову разбиты, степи Северного Причерноморья заняли скифы, ираноязычные кочевники, заселившие в конце VII в. до н. э. территорию от Дона до Днестра и низовьев Дуная. Хотя земли Приднестровья являлись западной периферией Скифии, они имели для скифов очень большое значение, ибо отсюда в V-IV вв. до н. э. они совершали далекие завоевательные походы на Ближний Восток и набеги на фракийские племена, оттесняя их в лесистые районы Днестровско-Карпатских земель. Здесь велись и оборонительные войны скифов против персов и войск Александра Македонского. На территории Приднестровья до сих пор сохранилось большое количество скифских курганов и захоронений. С I в. до н. э. по IV в. н. э. Днестр является западной границей Европейской Сарматии. Подобно киммерийцам и скифам, сарматы вели постоянные войны с проживавшими западнее Днестра фракийскими племенами гетов и даков, которые создавали воинственные союзы и отправлялись в далекие грабительские походы. Жители греческих городов-полисов Северного Причерноморья старались поддерживать с сарматами дружеские отношения в надежде на их защиту в случае нападения варварских племен с правобережья Днестра. Однако в I в. до н. э. гето-дакийские племена под предводительством своего вождя Буребисты огнем и мечом прошлись по территории причерноморских степей, стерев с лица земли богатые греческие колонии Ольвию, Тиру и др. В III в. н. э. германские племена готов, которые пришли в Северное Причерноморье из Прибалтики и Скандинавии, положили конец господству ираноязычных сарматов.

12

Геродот. История. Л., 1972. С. 190.

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В первые десятилетия III в. н. э. Днестр становится пограничной рекой теперь уже между двумя варварскими государствами — вестготов, подчинивших себе население Днестровско-Карпатских земель, и остготов, проживавших к востоку от Днестра и объединивших под своей властью разрозненные племена Северного Причерноморья. Переживавшие период разложения первобытно-общинных отношений варварские племена вели постоянные войны с Римской империей. Нижнее Поднестровье, в частности г. Тира, стал для них объединяющим центром, откуда уходили пешими и отправлялись многочисленные флотилии на разорение римских провинций. Несмотря на отчаянное сопротивление, римляне не в силах были сдерживать натиск объединенных варварских племен на своих границах и в конце III в. вынуждены были уйти за Дунай, на Балканы вместе с романизированным фракийским населением. Вестготы (тервинги) получили полное господство над ДнестровскоКарпатскими землями вплоть до Тисы, заняв Нижнее Поднестровье и Подунавье, низовье Прута и Сирета. На востоке же от Днестра безраздельно господствовали остготы (грейтунги), которые создали мощный племенной союз во главе с Германарихом. Таким образом, Днестр разделил Готию на две части13. Более века Днестр являлся границей между двумя племенными государствами германцев. Однако в 70-е годы IV в. по Великой степи из Монголии в Европу пришли дикие тюркоязычные племена гуннов, которые подошли к берегам Днестра в 376 г. Здесь произошло грандиозное сражение, в котором гунны нанесли сокрушительное поражение германским племенам, а вместе с ними и сарматам, аланам, фракийцам, карпам и др. Престарелый Германарих покончил с собой. Катастрофическое гуннское нашествие практически оставило земли Северного Причерноморья и Днестровско-Карпатский регион без населения. Около ста лет, до конца V в. эта территория оставалась пустынной и незаселенной — ее жители либо были уничтожены, либо сбежали.

13 Рикман Э.А. Этническая история населения Поднестровья и прилегающего Подунавья в первые века нашей эры. М., 1975. С. 323-324.

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ФОРМИРОВАНИЕ СЛАВЯНСКОЙ ЦИВИЛИЗАЦИИ НА

ДНЕСТРЕ

С конца V в. Приднестровские земли заселяются славянами, которые начали свое движение с севера и востока на Балканы к границам Византийской империи. Приднестровье стало частью обширного ареала славянской колонизации — от Дона до Эльбы, от Балтики до Мраморного моря. Будучи земледельцами, славяне осваивали новые земли постепенно, по мере заселения и окультуривания пустынных территорий, в отличие от скотоводов-кочевников, продвигавшихся стремительно единым неудержимым потоком. Они селились на берегах Днестра и других крупных рек — Днепра, Южного Буга, Прута, Сирета, а также их притоков, небольшими поселками по 5-10 полуземлянок. Эту колонизацию в VI-VII вв. осуществляли три крупные группы славянских племен: венеды, заселившие север между Карпатами, Днепром и Балтийским морем, анты, жившие в степях между Днепром, Днестром и Дунаем, и склавины, поселившиеся к северо-западу от антов, от Днестра до Эльбы. Условной границей между двумя сильнейшими союзами племен — антами и склавинами — становится Днестр. Во второй половине VII в. через земли антов на Балканы прошло племя протоболгар во главе с ханом Аспарухом. Анты были разгромлены тюркоязычными кочевниками, а их название исчезло из употребления. Имя «склавин» стало собирательным для обозначения славян как близкородственных племен, а территорию антов заняло новое объединение — Русь, ядро которого совпало с центром антского союза. С конца VII в. земли Приднестровья осваиваются новой волной славянских племен — тиверцами. На севере Приднестровского региона они группировались в районе современного с. Ломачинцы, на юге — близ с. Оланешты14. В VIII-IX вв. славяне становятся основным оседлым населением Приднестровья. В верховьях Днестра обитали племена белых (русских) хорватов, в среднем течении — тиверцы, а на юге восточнее 14 Тельнов Н., Степанов В., Русев Н., Рабинович Р. «И… разошлись славяне по земле»: из истории Карпато-Днестровских земель VI-XIII вв. Кишинев, 2002. С. 43-44.

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Днестра — племена уличей. По Днестру проходил и водораздел между южными и восточными славянами. После создания Первого Болгарского царства на территории Семи славянских племен на Балканах и признания его Византией его воины построили в районе современного с. Калфа пограничную крепость, южнее которой к западу от Днестра и в Подунавье господствовала Балкано-Дунайская культура, а к северу и востоку — восточно-славянская культура Киевской Руси. До середины Х в. славяне Приднестровья сопротивлялись попыткам киевских князей включить их в состав Древнерусского государства. При этом они участвовали в походах Киевской Руси на Царьград в 907 и 944 г. в качестве союзников, но не подданных князя. Однако необходимость защищаться от набегов беспокойных соседей в конце концов приводит к включению Приднестровских земель в состав Древнерусского государства. Дело в том, что эта территория была привлекательная не только для славян, но и для других народов, главным образом степных кочевников.

СЛАВЯНЕ И КОЧЕВНИКИ В ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЕ С конца V в. протоболгарские тюркоязычные племена кутригуров и утигуров заселяют степную полосу Северного Причерноморья от нижнего Дуная до Азовского моря. В середине VI в., ослабленные междоусобными войнами, они были покорены аварами во главе с каганом Баяном. Не имея точных границ, Аварский каганат с центром в Паннонии объединил под своей властью и кочевников, и часть славян на больших пространствах от Дона до Адриатики, что определило временность и непрочность этого государственного образования. Протоболгарские племена оногуров, пришедшие в Днестровской регион из Восточного Приазовья в 70-е годы VII в., покончили с властью каганата. Вместе с местными славянами они вытеснили авар, а затем переселились за Дунай. Признание византийским императором Константином IV Дунайской Болгарии в 881 г. оказало благотворное влияние на дальнейшее развитие

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Приднестровья. Однако с конца VII в. нижний Днестр становится границей между Хазарским каганатом и Болгарией15. На протяжении VIII в. земли Нижнего Приднестровья не знали мира. Проживавшее здесь население подчинялось Хазарскому каганату с центром в г. Итиль на нижнем течении Волги. В начале IX в. болгары во главе с ханом Омуртагой захватили земли каганата от Днестра до Днепра. Но пришедшие в конце 30-х годов IX в. в Северное Причерноморье и на Дунай венгры вытеснили болгар и создали страну Ателькузу (от старовенгерского «этелькез» — междуречье) на территории между реками Варух (Днепр), Куву (Южный Буг), Труля (Днестр) и Сирет. Избранный мадьярами в 896 г. первым князем Арпад увел свои племена из княжества Ателькузы в Паннонию, где впоследствии было создано венгерское королевство. Место мадьяр в Северном Причерноморье занимают тюркские кочевые племена печенегов, которые перешли Волгу в 900 г. и на завоеванных землях создали новое государство — Пачинакию (Печенегию). На его территории расселилось восемь фем племенных союзов кочевников во главе с великим князем. Днестр снова стал пограничьем: теперь уже между фемой Гиазихопон на левом берегу среднего Днестра и фемой Хавуксингила на правом берегу. Враждебные отношения между кочевниками и славянами заставляли последних покидать нижнее Приднестровье в поисках безопасной земли в лесистых районах среднего и верхнего течения Днестра. Если в 885 г. объединенные силы тиверцев и уличей смогли успешно отразить поход киевского князя Олега с целью присоединения их земель к Руси, то в середине Х в. при князе Святославе Игоревиче большая часть Приднестровья и Днестровско-Карпатского региона прочно вошла в состав Киевской Руси. Славяне искали защиты от кочевников под сенью мощного государства. В X-XI вв. Приднестровские земли являлись неотъемлемой частью Древнерусского государства, где правили посадники киевского князя со своими дружинниками. Для Руси эта территория имела стратегически важное значение, поскольку являлась частью пути «из 15 История Приднестровской Молдавской Республики. Т. I. Тирасполь, 2000. С. 95-96.

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варяг в греки». Это был достаточно оживленный регион восточнославянского мира, население которого участвовало в формировании единой древнерусской народности. После 944 г. ни тиверцы, ни уличи в летописях уже не упоминаются, восточные славяне становятся единым древнерусским этносом, русским народом. В начале XI в. из-за волжских степей на владения печенегов начинают совершать набеги их конкуренты — тюркоязычные племена торков. Обессиленные войной против русских дружин Ярослава Мудрого, в середине XI в. печенеги уходят за Дунай в пределы Византийской империи, надеясь найти покой и защиту. Степные районы Пачинакии заселяют торки, впрочем, ненадолго, поскольку сыновья Ярослава Изяслав, Святополк и Всеволод в 1068 г. изгоняют их из Приднестровья. Но поскольку Византия отказалась их принимать, остатки торков вернулись на окраинные славянские земли в качестве союзников Руси как «черные клобуки». Гораздо более серьезную опасность для славян представляли половцы, которые в 1068 г., разбив русские дружины братьев Ярославичей, начинают предпринимать систематические набеги на Русь. Захватив в 70-80-е годы XI в. огромные пространства земли от Алтайских гор до Днестра и устья Дуная, половцы основали на них несколько крупных военных союзов — Приднепровский, Приазовский, Лукоморский и др. На Днестре кочевали «дикие половцы», не вошедшие ни в один из союзов. Днестр в его нижнем течении ограничивает великую Евразийскую степь, которая у восточных авторов получает название Дашт-е-Кыпчак — Половецкая степь, ибо ее территория контролировалась половцами и являлась плацдармом для военных походов на ослабленные усобицей русские княжества. Во второй половине XII в. масса половцев наводнила нижнее течение Днестра, что привело к упадку и исчезновению многих славянских поселений, жители которых были вынуждены уходить на север, в пределы Галицкой Руси. Близкое соседство с кочевниками нанесло серьезный удар славянской цивилизации в Приднестровье, но не уничтожило ее полностью.

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ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЕ КАК ПОНИЗЬЕ ГАЛИЦКОЙ РУСИ Распад Киевской Руси после смерти сына Владимира Мономаха князя Мстислава ознаменовал начало раздробленности и ослабления государственности у славян, что имело особенно трагичные последствия в таких пограничных районах, как Приднестровье. Князья прилагали большие усилия, чтобы подчинить себе земли Приднестровья по всему течению реки до Черного моря и включить их в состав Галицкого княжества. Но господство кочевников в этой части русских земель не позволяло это сделать. Галицкое княжество находилось на северо-восточных склонах Карпат, на территории, называемой в те времена Подгорье. На юго-востоке к нему примыкала территория так называемого Понизья — среднее и нижнее течение Днестра, а также Подунавье с городами Белгород, Малый Галич (Галац) и область Берладь. В Понизье помимо кочевников селились и бежавшие сюда жители Галицкого княжества, называемые галицкими выгонцами и бродниками, чтобы вести на Днестре достаточно независимую, но смертельно опасную жизнь рядом с кочевниками. При князе Ярославе Осмомысле (1153-1187 гг.) эти земли были подконтрольны Галичу. Но в целом Понизье сохраняло свою самостоятельность, хотя и входило в зону притяжения Подгорья, являясь его «ближним зарубежьем». Приток беженцев в Подгорье из Приднестровья, Побужья и Попрутья способствовал усилению Галицкого княжества, росту его мощи. Но и на землях Приднестровья к середине XIII в. скопилось большое количество бродячего русского населения, известного по источникам как бродники. Чуждые оседлой жизни, находясь в тесных контактах с кочевниками, временами враждуя, временами сближаясь и ассимилируясь с ними, эти русские люди из галицких выгонцев и бродников положили начало формированию в днестровско-черноморских степях новой общности, основанной на двух культурах: славяно-оседлой и кочевой. Эта общность стала прототипом казачества и в ХII-ХШ вв. сыграла заметную роль в политических событиях эпохи.

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Вместе с половцами бродники принимали участие в византийско-болгарской войне на Балканах на стороне восставших против империи болгар. Бродники, как и половцы, находились в центре внимания римской церкви, стремившейся к расширению католического влияния в Восточной Европе. Днестровско-дунайские земли в ту пору были объектом притязаний Византийской империи, Венгрии и Польши. Через эти экономически богатые районы тогда проходил важный международный торговый путь: Балтийское море — Висла — Западный Буг — Днестр — Черное море. Галицкие князья энергично сопротивлялись попыткам других стран контролировать Днестровскую часть этого пути16. В конце XII в. князь Роман Мстиславич (1170-1205) овладел Галицким княжеством и объединил Южную и Западную Русь. Понизье находилось под властью этого сильнейшего из князей Руси, пока он не погиб от рук поляков в 1205 г. После ряда боярских смут на престоле Галицкого княжества оказался новгородский князь Мстислав Удалой. Ипатьевская летопись упоминает пограничные с Понизьем Галицкие города Ущица на верхнем Днестре, Микулин на Сирете, Бакоту, Калюс, Кучельмин на Днестре и крепость Каменец. Этот район верхнего Поднестровья был южной окраиной Галицкого княжества. Мстислав Удалой отдал свою дочь Марию за сына венгерского короля Андрея и передал ему Галицкий престол. Для себя он наметил Понизье, где собирался основать княжество со столицей в Бакоте на Днестре. Впоследствии он рассчитывал соединить это княжество с Поросьем. Однако его смерть в 1228 г. разрушила эти планы17. Очевидно, это был первый после развала Киевской Руси (но далеко не последний) проект соединения всех русских земель от Днестра до Днепра в составе одного государства. Время правления Даниила Галицкого (1238-1264) стало периодом наибольшего экономического, политического и культурного подъема Галицко-Волынского княжества и его Понизья, несмотря на монголо-татарское нашествие. В конце 1240 г. орды хана Батыя 16

Там же. С. 102-103.

Бабилунга Н.В. Приднестровье в составе Великого княжества Литовского (исторический очерк) // Ежегодный исторический альманах Приднестровья. 1997. № 1. С. 9. 17

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захватили Галицко-Волынское княжество, разрушили Киев и другие древнерусские города. Даниил Романович вынужденно подчинился власти Золотой Орды и получил из рук хана ярлык на правление своей землей. Его попытки заручиться поддержкой католического Запада для борьбы с монголо-татарами не увенчались успехом. Во второй половине XIII в. Приднестровье было включено в Улус Ногая и стало частью Подолии, территории Золотой орды. После смерти Даниила в Галицко-Волынском княжестве начались смуты, раздоры и усобицы, которые привели к его распаду на четыре части. Разорительное нашествие Батыя означало новую катастрофу для приднестровских славян. Население отчасти было уничтожено, отчасти бежало в гористые и лесистые районы, труднодоступные для кочевников. Оставшихся жителей монголо-татары обложили данью. Большинство славянских городов было разрушено, летописи XIV в. указывают на отсутствие в Подольской земле городов. Кочевья ордынских темников, владевших Приднестровской территорией, были расположены в степной полосе Подолья. До 1257 г. Понизье оставалось в руках Галицкого князя. Однако монголо-татары захватили главное укрепленное поселение Понизья крепость Бакоту, располагавшуюся на берегу Днестра между речкой Студеницей, левым притоком Днестра и поселением Старая Ушица. Связь Понизья с Галицким княжеством была прервана, поскольку степная зона Приднестровья вошла в отдельный от Золотой Орды улус, где хозяйничали татары. Правда, Понизье пользовалось значительной автономией, поскольку татары были заинтересованы в оживлении хозяйственной жизни и увеличении дани, которую собирали для них представители местных общин — атаманы. Эти люди возглавляли мелкие административные единицы Подолии — тьмы и назначались татарами из местного славянского населения. Они подчинялись баскакам, которые контролировали их деятельность, а также собирали дань и подчинялись татарским князьям. Летописи сохранили имена трех последних татар — владельцев Подольских земель: Хаджибей, Кутлубуга и Димитрий, которых литовская летопись называет «отчичами и дедичами Подольской земли»18. 18 Гульдман В.К. Памятники старины Подолии: Мат-лы для составления археологической карты Подольской губернии. Каменец-Подольский, 1901. С. 175.

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ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЕ В СОСТАВЕ РУССКО-ЛИТОВСКОГО ГОСУДАРСТВА В 1362 г. русско-литовское войско под командованием Ольгерда Гедиминовича разгромило татар в битве на реке Синие Воды (правом притоке Южного Буга). После этого часть татар ушла в Золотую Орду, а часть в Крым. С этого времени Подолия была включена в состав Великого княжества Литовского, простиравшегося от Балтийского до Черного морей. Подолией с середины XIV в. до конца XVI в. называли территорию, охватывавшую всю левую половину бассейна Днестра от впадения в него речки Сирет севернее Черновиц до черноморского побережья, включая бассейн реки Южный Буг и нижнюю часть правобережья Днепра до впадения в него реки Рось. Ольгерд изгоняет из Киева подручного Орды Федора и передает город своему сыну Владимиру, а Подолию получили в лен четыре брата, племянники Ольгерда — Юрий, Александр, Константин и Феодор. С середины 60-х годов XIV в. вооруженные дружины братьев Кориатовичей обороняют Подолию от посягательств татар, укрепляя на Днестре старые крепостные сооружения (Бакота) и возводя новые (Смотрич, Каменец, Скала и др.). При этом Юрий поселился в Каменце, Александр — в Смотриче, Константин — в Бакоте, а Феодор — в Червонограде. По-видимому, братьям принадлежали земли не только левобережного Поднестровья, но и ДнестровскоПрутское междуречье. Однако в 1386 г. Кревская уния провозгласила соединение Литвы и Польши под властью короля Владислава Ягайло. Братья Кориатовичи поспешили принести присягу на верность польской короне. Молдавский господарь Петр I Мушат, основатель новой династии господарей в княжестве, также являлся вассалом польского короля. В 1387 г. польский король и молдавский господарь договорились о том, что границы их владений будут проходить по Днестру. Так в конце 80-х годов XIV в. граница между Молдавией и Русско-литовским государством, все более втягиваемым в орбиту польской государственности, прошла по реке Днестр. С тех пор вплоть до ХХ в. границы молдавской государственности никогда не включали земли восточнее Днестра.

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Со смертью его братьев единственным владельцем Подолии остался Феодор Кориатович, который после Кревской унии принес вассальную клятву королю Владиславу Ягайло и продолжал править на Днестре. Но двоюродный брат короля великий литовский князь Витовт заключил Феодора в тюрьму и стал самолично править Подольем. Однако Витовт Кейстутович вскоре уступает Подолье полякам, и эта территория заселяется шляхтой и магнатами под руководством вельможи Спытка Мельштинского, получившего территорию от Днестра до Южного Буга в лен за службу королю. Но в 1410 г. Витовт выкупает у короля эту территорию и начинает ее освоение. В течение двух десятилетий, вплоть до смерти Витовта в 1430 г. не только в верхнем, но и в среднем и нижнем течении Днестра литовцы и русские строят крепости и замки, укрепляя границу Русско-литовского государства. В устье Днестра был построен замок Черный город, в среднем течении — крепость Караул, а в районе современной Одессы — гавань Хаджи-бей. Укрепляя государственность, Витовт развивал восточнославянскую колонизацию, раздавая привилегии на право основания новых городов и сел, которые были хорошо защищены кольцом военных укреплений. Это не устраивало поляков, желавших присоединить эти земли к польскому королевству. Весной 1431 г. между польским королем и великим литовским князем Свидригайло началась война за земли Подолья, в которой поляки захватили четыре западных повета. У Литвы осталась лишь Брацлавщина, пятый повет. При этом крепость на Днестре Бакота была уничтожена и больше уже никогда не возрождалась. Истощив свои силы в борьбе с Московской Русью, литовцы не cмогли противостоять польской экспансии. В середине XV в. Приднестровье как часть Брацлавского и Подольского княжеств было включено в состав Киевского княжества, и Свидригайло по сути стал последним подольским князем. После его смерти в 1452 г. поляки больше не раздавали эти земли местным князьям. В 1471 г. они уничтожили в Киевщине княжеский престол, а Киевское княжество было раздроблено на поветы и превращено в воеводство. Приднестровье вошло в длительный период стагнации и кризиса. Местное население испытывало не только экономический и сословный гнет, но и притеснения со стороны господствовавшей в Польше

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католической церкви. Литовцы переняли у поляков узкосословную организацию общества и католичество и более не играли в этих землях существенной роли.

ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЕ В СОСТАВЕ РЕЧИ ПОСПОЛИТОЙ И КРЫМСКОГО ХАНСТВА В 1453 г. с падением Константинополя гибнет Византийская империя, на обломках которой возникает новое мощное военнофеодальное государство — Османская империя. Захватив ряд стран восточной и юго-восточной Европы, турки хотели превратить Черное море во внутреннее озеро своей империи, чтобы все его побережье стало мусульманским. В 70-е годы XV в. крымские татары принимают ислам и начинают периодические набеги на Подолье и Киевщину. Татары могли беспрепятственно убивать и угонять в рабство местное православное население, поскольку ни поляки, ни литовцы не защищали эти земли. В 1506 г. хан Менгли-Гирей в своем торжественном манифесте объявил всю южную Русь и даже Русско-литовское государство своим родовым владением. Польский король Сигизмунд II Август за свое 40-летнее царствование не предпринял ни одной попытки защитить жителей страны от турок и татар. Именно он допустил в страну иезуитов и в 1569 г. соединил по Люблинской унии скипетры Польши и Литвы. Территорию Подолья, захваченную когда-то у Литвы, поляки были вынуждены поделить с крымскими татарами, которые после ряда разорительных набегов на Приднестровье и южную Русь в целом чувствовали себя здесь хозяевами, поскольку местного славянского населения в Подолии уже просто не осталось. Междуречье Днестра и Южного Буга южнее речки Ягорлык (левого притока Днестра в его среднем течении) вплоть до Черного моря подчинялось крымскому хану. По Днестру крымчаки граничили с Молдавским княжеством, которое с 1538 г. окончательно вошло в Османскую империю. Эта территория называется в источниках поразному — Очаковская земля, Едиссан, Эть-Шан, Татарская пустыня, Ханская Украина и т.д. Здесь кочевали татарские орды — ногаи, во-

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шедшие впоследствии в Едиссанскую, Буджакскую и другие орды. Под влиянием турецкого султана и ввиду трусливой политики польского и литовского правителей аппетиты татар постоянно возрастали и они в своих походах доходили до Белой Руси, Черной Руси и даже до Литвы. Южная часть Приднестровья почти не имела своего постоянного земледельческого населения за исключением района Дубоссар и Очакова. По этой территории кочевали татарские орды и уничтожали любые возникавшие здесь населенные пункты, а их жителей убивали или угоняли в плен для продажи на рынках рабов на Ближнем Востоке. Такие рынки существовали также в Дубоссарах на Днестре, где продавались молодые рабы для использования на тяжелых работах. Здесь пополняли свои гаремы татарские мурзы и агенты султана, а захваченных еврейских, армянских, греческих, генуэзский и прочих купцов продавали тем, кто рассчитывал получить от их родственников богатый выкуп. В Дубоссарах проживал ответственный представитель крымского хана в Едиссане (дубоссарский каймакам), который был послушным проводником воли турецкого султана, объявившего себя главой мусульманского мира. Конечно, русское, украинское и молдавское население часто бежало в эти плодородные степи от притеснений помещиков, крепостной неволи, от турецкого режима и религиозных гонений. Но надежного укрытия они не давали, ибо татарские орды постоянно грабили и сжигали возникавшие поселения, угоняя в Крым пленников. Особенно большим бесчинствам и разорениям подвергалась приднестровская часть Едиссана в периоды войн и вооруженных конфликтов между Польшей, Турцией, Крымским ханством и Россией. Что касается северной части Приднестровья, то эта территория в пору польской экспансии была заселена польскими шляхтичами и магнатами, закрепостившими большую часть крестьянского населения, которую составляли главным образом православные украинцы и молдаване. Их называли «диссидентами» и «схизматиками» и не считали гражданами Речи Посполитой. Административно эта территория севернее р. Ягорлык входила в Брацлавское воеводство Речи Посполитой. Эти земли также не раз подвергались разорительным нашествиям турок и татар, поэтому сельского населения здесь было немного, а городское укрывалось за прочными крепостными

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стенами. Нормальное поступательное развитие этой территории в сложившихся условиях было невозможно. Местное население, брошенное правителями на милость врагов, могло рассчитывать только на свои силы, а потому все большее значение приобретала казацкая самооборона. Приднестровье было ее первым уровнем; постоянное наблюдение за степью и предупреждение о появлении противника стало постоянной функцией местного казачества. Здесь начинался и второй уровень — отпор с использованием крепостей, гарнизонных, войсковых частей и ополчения на наиболее опасных участках — переправах, бродах и проч. В польской системе обороны Приднестровье стало играть незаменимую роль, и поляки были вынуждены специально создавать и содержать полки так называемого реестрового казачества. Но не менее важной казацкая самооборона была для самих приднестровцев, их борьбы против иноземных захватчиков. Они получали богатый опыт самовыживания в условиях, когда помощи ждать неоткуда. Такой опыт особенно пригодился в XVI в., во время борьбы украинского народа за национальное освобождение. Потомки Галицких выгонцев и бродников, приднестровские казаки были одними из основателей своеобразной казацкой государственности — Запорожской Сечи, в которой все они считались равноправными и свободными и жили по законам устного права и обычаям земли, которые неукоснительно соблюдались и передавались из поколения в поколение. С середины XVI в. Запорожская Сечь стала центром обширных территорий, включавших левобережье Днепра, Киевщину, Подолье, Волынь и Брацлавщину. Казаки не признавали польскую администрацию и подчинялись гетманам, которых сами избирали. Приднестровье вошло в состав Винницкого и Брацлавского полков. Приднестровье было и казацким плацдармом для походов в оккупированную турками Молдавию. Предводители казачества вынашивали планы вытеснения турок за Дунай, освобождения княжества от османского ига и создания на землях от Днестра до Буга буферного казацкого государства, не подчинявшегося ни туркам, ни полякам, ни татарам. Казаки не раз спасали Польшу от полного разгрома во времена польско-турецких войн XVII в. В период между Зборовским и Белоцерковским миром (с августа 1649 г. по сентябрь 1651 г.) Приднестровье было официально признано частью казацкой

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автономии в Украинском государстве, пока поляки вновь не подчинили эти земли себе. В январе 1654 г. по решению Переяславской Рады, которая увенчала Освободительную борьбу украинского народа, Приднестровье вместе с другими украинскими землями вошло в состав России, правда, ненадолго: согласно Андрусовскому перемирию 1667 г. Россия его потеряла.

ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЕ РОССИЙСКОЙ ИМПЕРИИ

В СОСТАВЕ

Российская империя в течение всего XVIII в. боролась за возвращение южнорусских земель и выход к Черному морю. В многочисленных русско-турецких войнах она несла значительные материальные и человеческие потери, но давала надежду единоверным балканским народам на освобождение от османского гнета. Россия как великая держава считала себя вправе вместе с другими европейскими странами вмешиваться и во внутренние дела Польши, покровительствуя православным и протестантам, испытывавшим притеснения со стороны католиков. Это давало населению Приднестровья надежду избавиться от религиозных притеснений и воссоединиться с остальной частью Украины. В русских войсках против турок и татар воевало много приднестровцев-добровольцев, казаков распущенной Екатериной II Запорожской Сечи, а также волонтеров из Молдавии, Валахии, Болгарии, Сербии и других порабощенных Турцией стран. По инициативе фельдмаршала Г.А.Потемкина, командовавшего русскими войсками в войне 1787-1791 гг., из бывших запорожцев был создан «Кош верных казаков», насчитывавший более 12 тыс. человек и переименованный затем в Черноморское казачье войско. Война закончилась подписанием Ясского мира, по которому территория между Бугом и Днестром (южнее р. Ягорлык) была присоединена к России, а граница между Османской и Российской империями впервые в истории соединилась и прошла по Днестру. Воины Черноморского казачьего войска и других казачьих соединений были расселены «на привольных местах» левого берега Днестра от

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Терновки доЧерного моря, где было основано 25 больших казачьих куреней (станиц), ставших опорными пунктами России на новых рубежах. Так Приднестровье — исконно казацкий край в составе России заселяется первыми жителями, его освободителями — казаками, украинцами, молдаванами, русскими и представителями других народов. Эдиссанская орда татар была переселена в Крым, который к тому времени стал российской территорией и жители которого приняли присягу на верность России. Чтобы защитить мирное население от возможных вылазок турок из-за Днестра, началось строительство ряда крепостей вдоль реки по специальному плану, который разработал русский полководец А.В.Суворов. Невдалеке от мощной турецкой крепости Бендеры была построена другая, вокруг которой быстро возникло поселение. Екатерина II назвала его Тирасполем. Вскоре Тирасполь становится уездным городом в составе Херсонской губернии. Со временем он превратился в важный военно-стратегический и административный центр России на ее юго-западных рубежах, в торгово-ремесленный, транспортный, хозяйственный, политический и культурный центр Новороссии. Северное Приднестровье было присоединено к России несколько позже, в 1793 г. в результате второго раздела Польши. При этом Брацлавское воеводство Речи Посполитой было ликвидировано, а Россия получила часть Белоруссии и Украины, в том числе территории между Днестром и Бугом севернее Ягорлыка. Эти земли были включены в состав Ольгопольского уезда Подольской губернии. В них входили основанная в XVIII в. Каменка, украинское село Рашков, близ которого в средние века находилась литовская крепость Караул, местечко Рыбница и другие населенные пункты. Вскоре казна выкупила у польских магнатов принадлежавшие им земли, и правительство стало раздавать их феодальной знати, в том числе молдавским боярам, сражавшимся против турок на стороне русских. Они стали завозить своих крестьян из-за Днестра на территорию Новороссии. В течение считанных лет пустовавшие ранее земли Приднестровья были заселены казаками, украинскими и русскими беглыми крепостными, молдавскими крестьянами, а также колонистами, которых правительство России принимало с особой охотой, — бол-

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гарами, немцами, армянами и проч. Девяностые годы XVIII в. стали новым поворотным моментом в истории Приднестровья. Сложились самые благоприятные условия для хозяйственной деятельности, мирного труда, взаимоассимиляции культур различных народов. На протяжении 125 лет здесь не было никаких войн и военных действий. Край, казалось бы, самой историей и своим географическим положением обреченный на вечную борьбу всех против всех, зажил неторопливой мирной жизнью. Несмотря на пестроту населения, никаких этнических, конфессиональных и прочих конфликтов с конца XVIII в. по начало XX в. зарегистрировано не было. В большой степени это объясняется, вероятно, утратой Приднестровьем своего статуса геополитического пограничья. Дело в том, что русско-турецкая война 1806-1812 гг. закончилась Бухарестским миром, по которому обе империи договорились, что граница между ними пройдет по реке Прут. Иными словами, Россия освободила от турок часть Молдавского княжества, и Днестр потерял свое значение пограничной реки. Эту роль стала играть Бессарабия, ПрутоДнестровское междуречье. Утратила свою военно-стратегическую важность и Тираспольская крепость, как и Сорокская, Бендерская, Аккерманская, Хотинская, Каменец-Подольская, — все крепости по Днестру. Река стала внутренней водной артерией России, на берега которой больше не претендовали другие державы. Это на долгие годы приостановило кровопролитие на Днестре. Нахождение в составе Российской империи стало самой продолжительной мирной эпохой в обозримой истории Приднестровья. Вместе с другими регионами России население Приднестровья прошло значительный исторический путь — от первых казаков-поселенцев Татарской пустыни, осваивавших заброшенный край бывших ногайских кочевий и разоренных поляками областей до многонационального народа сравнительно развитой капиталистической области с товарным зерновым производством, ориентированным на экспорт. Однако в начале XX в. эту землю стали раздирать многочисленные внутренние противоречия и революционные взрывы, поскольку русский путь капиталистического развития неумолимо вел к обострению социальных катаклизмов и конфликтов.

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ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ ПЕРВОЙ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОСТИ НА

ДНЕСТРЕ

Победа большевистской революции в октябре 1917 г. и оккупация Бессарабии войсками королевской Румынии вновь превратили Приднестровский регион в потенциально конфликтный на балканском геополитическом направлении, на Юго-Востоке Европы. Советы не признавали законности оккупации Бессарабии Румынией, продолжая считать эту территорию советской, но временно оккупированной румынским феодально-монархическим режимом. Однако Днестр снова превратился в пограничную реку, и территория Приднестровья стала привлекательной для многих политических сил и держав. В годы гражданской войны (1918-1920 гг.) за нее боролись власти украинской Центральной Рады, бессарабского прорумынского органа «Сфатул цэрий», петлюровцы, белогвардейцы, красногвардейцы, не говоря уже о крестьянских повстанческих отрядах и бандах всевозможных батьков. Здесь побывали немцы, австрияки, румыны, французы. После окончательной победы красных в гражданской войне Левобережное Приднестровье стало украинской территорией и вошло в состав Подольской и Херсонской (позже Одесской) губерний Украинской ССР. В декабре 1922 г. жители Приднестровья в качестве граждан Советской Украины участвовали (пусть и формально) в создании СССР, в то время как население оккупированной румынами Бессарабии было лишено этого права. Этот факт также сыграет свою роль в будущем воссоздании государственности в Приднестровье. В начале 20-х годов, в период формирования государственности малых наций и народностей СССР, в среде лидеров революционного подполья Бессарабии, румынских коммунистов, работавших в Коминтерне и коммунистическом университете национальных меньшинств, а также участников гражданской войны возникает идея образовать молдавскую государственность. Поскольку Бессарабия находилась в составе Румынского королевства, это было предложено сделать на тех землях, которые никогда Молдавии не принадлежали, но на которых молдаване проживали на протяжении веков, то есть

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в Левобережном Приднестровье. В инициативную группу, выдвинувшую это предложение в начале 1924 г., вошли Г.И.Котовский, П.Ткаченко, И.Дическу-Дик, А.Николау и другие большевики. На протяжении нескольких месяцев на Южной Украине проходили массовые митинги в поддержку этого предложения. Высшие органы государственной власти получали обращения и письма с просьбой образовать на территории украинского Приднестровья молдавскую государственность. Интересны мотивы этого предложения. В условиях всеобщего революционного энтузиазма, ожидания скорого свершения мировой революции и торжества коммунистических идей образование молдавской государственности в Приднестровье связывали с интересами мирового коммунистического движения и внешнеполитическими аспектами. Считалось, что создание такой республики на Днестре активизирует революционное движение крестьян Бессарабии, а затем и всей Румынии. Революционные искры разожгут гражданскую войну в Болгарии и других балканских странах, а оттуда революционный пожар может переброситься и в Западную Европу. Как население, так и руководителей меньше всего интересовал тот факт, что на территории создаваемой республики молдаванское население составляло менее трети, тогда как украинское — почти половину. В июле 1924 г. Политбюро ЦК РКП (б) принял специальное постановление, в котором признавалось «необходимым прежде всего по политическим соображениям выделение молдавского населения в специальную автономную республику в составе УССР»19. В сентябре того же года в своем новом постановлении в Акте о создании республики Политбюро определило, что ее границей должна стать государственная граница СССР по реке Прут, что еще раз напомнило бы народу Бессарабии о незаконности его оккупации Румынией. Наконец, 12 октября 1924 г. на III сессии Всеукраинского Центрального исполнительного Комитета восьмого созыва был принят закон о создании Молдавской Автономной Советской Социалистической Республики в составе Украинской ССР. На ее территории более 8 тыс. кв. км было образовано 11 районов, куда вошли земли 19 Галущенко О.С. Как создавалась республика на Днестре (к 80-летию МАССР) // Ежегодный исторический альманах Приднестровья. № 8. 2004. С. 45.

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бывшего Тираспольского, Балтского и Ольгопольского уездов с населением 550 тыс. человек. Столицей нового государства стал г. Балта, а с 1929 г. она была перенесена в Тирасполь. Республика имела свои органы власти, правительство, законы, Конституцию, герб, гимн и другие атрибуты государственности. В таком качестве она просуществовала до августа 1940 г., то есть около 16 лет. За те годы, что история отпустила первой государственности Приднестровья, здесь произошли выдающиеся экономические, социальные и культурные сдвиги, несмотря на трагические коллизии сталинской эпохи. Однако самым характерным итогом этого периода является укрепление складывавшегося веками менталитета населения края, для которого всегда были характерны согласие, взаимопомощь, доброжелательность, открытость, отсутствие этнической нетерпимости и религиозной розни.

ЛИКВИДАЦИЯ МОЛДАВСКОЙ АВТОНОМИИ И СОЗДАНИЕ СОЮЗНОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ

Летом 1940 г. бессарабский вопрос был решен бескровно, что часто объясняют подписанием в Москве в августе 1939 г. так называемого Пакта Молотова-Риббентопа, в котором Советский Союз заявил о своих интересах в ряде регионов Европы, в том числе и о нерешенном территориальном споре с Румынией. Как это ни странно, но именно с решением бессарабского вопроса связана ликвидация первой государственности на Днестре. Бессарабия была освобождена от румынских оккупантов 28 июня 1940 г. Буквально через месяц без учета разницы экономических потенциалов Бессарабии и МАССР, а также национального состава населения и менталитета жителей двух берегов Днестра сталинское руководство принимает решение ликвидировать Молдавскую АССР и создать союзную республику из части районов Бессарабии и части молдавской автономии, созданной на древних славянских землях Украины. Впервые в истории эти земли были включены в состав молдавского государства на обоих берегах Днестра. Таким образом, первая государственность в Приднестровье стала жертвой пресловутого

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Пакта Молотова-Риббентропа, о чем сейчас мало кто вспоминает. Республики Прибалтики не потеряли своей государственности, лишь изменили ее форму. До 1940 г. они существовали в качестве буржуазных демократий весьма сомнительного свойства, а после вхождения в состав СССР были превращены в республики советского образца. При этом они даже выиграли в территориальном отношении за счет Польши и России. Ни Бессарабия, ни Западная Украина не имели своей государственности в составе Румынии или Польши. В территориальном отношении пострадала лишь Украина, у которой были отняты ее границы по Днестру (однако эта республика получила территории Южной Бессарабии и Северной Буковины). Свою государственность из всех названных образований утратило лишь Приднестровье. В первые же дни после освобождения Бессарабии от румын Молдавский обком КП(б)У и СНК МАССР вышли с предложением в высшие органы власти СССР образовать единую союзную Молдавскую ССР на базе заселенных молдаванами районов освобожденной Бессарабии и Молдавской АССР. Москва это предложение поддержала, затем произошло рожденное в спорах территориальное размежевание, и наконец 2 августа 1940 г. на VII сессии Верховного Совета СССР был принят закон об образовании Молдавской Советской Социалистической Республики и принятии ее в состав СССР. Эту республику составили шесть уездов бывшей Бессарабии (Бельцкий, Бендерский, Кагульский, Кишиневский, Оргеевский, Сорокский) и шесть районов бывшей МАССР (Григориопольский, Дубоссарский, Каменский, Рыбницкий, Слободзейский, Тираспольский). Столицей МССР был определен г. Кишинев. Создание нового территориально-государственного образования — МССР, как и объявление молдаван титульной, государствообразующей нацией, совершенно не учитывало исторических особенностей Бессарабии и Приднестровья и заложило заряд огромной разрушительной силы. Произвольно кроя географические карты, сталинский режим руководствовался лишь сиюминутными выгодами, пытаясь с помощью высокоразвитых левобережных районов Днестра подтянуть отсталые регионы Бессарабии, превращенной румынами за 22 года их господства в колонию и сырьевой придаток

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Старого королевства. При этом сталинский режим не остановился перед нарушением своих собственных законов. Современный юридический анализ Закона «Об образовании союзной Молдавской Советской Социалистической Республики» от 2 августа 1940 г. показывает, что он не мог иметь правовой силы, поскольку территория Молдавской АССР (6 районов) была передана вновь образованной республике без ясного и документально подтвержденного согласия на то Украины, ее верховных органов власти, а также без согласия верховных органов власти МАССР и без соответствующего опроса (референдума) населения, как этого требовали действовавшие тогда конституции СССР, УССР и МАССР; постановление ЦК ВКП(б) и СНК СССР от 10 июля 1940 г. «Об образовании союзной МССР» противоречит целому ряду статей конституций СССР, Украины и МАССР, поскольку может рассматриваться как расчленение территории УССР и МАССР по решению высшего партийного органа, не имеющего на то соответствующих полномочий; названное постановление противоречит и пункту «в» статьи 14 действовавшей тогда Конституции СССР, согласно которому к ведению Союза ССР относилось принятие в состав СССР новых республик, но отнюдь не их искусственных образований, созданных к тому же с расчленением территорий других республик; согласно Основному закону государства высшие органы государственной власти МАССР, УССР и СССР должны были разработать и принять соответствующие правовые акты, базируясь на свободном волеизъявлении народов Украины, Молдавской АССР и Бессарабии, чего сделано не было.

СОЗДАНИЕ ВТОРОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ НА ДНЕСТРЕ — ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЯ

ВОЗРОЖДЕНИЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОСТИ

Ликвидация государственности в Приднестровье в 1940 г. лишь в наши дни выглядит достаточно драматично и вызывает много вопросов. Для современников этот акт не имел такого значения и был, вероятно, воспринят с радостью, а вопросы его точного юриди-

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ческого оформления вряд ли интересовали кого-либо. Дело в том, что, пожалуй, любая из бывших союзных республик была создана незаконно с точки зрения современного права, как и весь Советский Союз. Впрочем, это можно сказать, наверное, о большинстве ныне существующих признанных государств. Но главное не в этом. В бывшем Советском Союзе границы между республиками были в достаточной степени формальными. Они не разделяли народы, не мешали передвижению людей, товаров, информации и т.д. В те полстолетия, когда Приднестровье вместе с бессарабскими частями Молдавии находилось в составе СССР, всякая мысль об отделении от Молдавской ССР и создании собственного Приднестровского государства могла показаться чистым безумием. Положение коренным образом изменилось с началом распада СССР и торжеством националистического мракобесия в большинстве бывших «республик-сестер». Воссоздание второй республики появилось в повестке дня, когда административные границы между республиками стали превращаться в границы государственные. Уже сам выход Молдавской ССР из единого Союза поставил население Приднестровья, лишенное своей государственности в 1940 г., перед реальной угрозой геноцида. Пришедшие в Кишиневе к руководству республикой силы не скрывали своего желания присоединить территорию Молдавской ССР к Румынии и очистить эти земли от «оккупантов» и «пришельцев» для румын — якобы истинных хозяев этой земли. Надо сказать, что в период Великой Отечественной войны фашистские оккупанты вновь сделали Днестр пограничной рекой. На территории между Днестром и Прутом румыны создали губернаторство Басарабия, а на землях восточнее Днестра — губернаторство Транснистрия, центром которого сначала был Тирасполь, а затем Одесса, переименованная фашистами в город Антонеску. Эта территория находилась под совместным управлением румынской администрации и рейхскомиссариата «Украина». Из Румынии и Бессарабии оккупанты свозили в созданные ими в Транснистрии еврейские гетто и лагеря смерти евреев, цыган, гагаузов, русских, болгар и других «инонационалов» для «расчистки» завоеванных румынами земель. Румыны уничтожили в Транснистрии сотни

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тысяч граждан, местное население ненавидело оккупантов и активно боролось с ними. В апреле 1944 г. Советская Армия в ходе молниеносной операции освободила Приднестровье, а в августе и остальную часть Молдавии, что означало немедленное восстановление республики в границах 1940 г. О реальности повторения печального опыта истории убедительно свидетельствовали события, происходившие в Молдове в 1989-1990 гг. Народный фронт, лозунги которого были на слуху у всех: «Чемодан! Вокзал! Россия!», «Русских — за Днестр, евреев — в Днестр!», «Утопим русских в жидовской крови!» и проч., сформировал свое правительство. Эти лозунги стали открыто претворяться в жизнь с принятием законов о функционировании языков, по которым в Молдове фактически запрещалось публичное использование любых языков, кроме молдавского (румынского), с объявлением Молдовы «вторым румынским государством» и назначением государственной символики румынского толка — герба, флага, гимна, с разделением на правительственном уровне всех жителей на «коренных румын», «оккупантов», «пришельцев», «манкуртов» и т.д. В этих условиях создание и защита своей государственности стали для народа Приднестровья единственным шансом для спасения, единственной возможностью обеспечить свои права, сохранить свою историческую самобытность, демократию и свободу. Идея о возрождении государственности охватила массы жителей Приднестровья, а те, кто выступал против нее, утрачивали свой политический вес и авторитет в глазах общества. Не только кишиневские власти, но и местная партноменклатура очень быстро исчерпала кредит доверия у приднестровцев и была лишена возможности эффективного управления. Вся полнота власти перешла к созданным на заводах, предприятиях и учреждениях новым органам Советов трудовых коллективов и забастовочным комитетам, которые избрали Объединенный совет трудовых коллективов. По форме и содержанию ситуация приближалась к социальной революции, когда господствующие классы не могут управлять по-старому и не могут сохранить свое господство, нужды и бедствия народа достигают критических величин, а политическая активность народных масс возрастает в значительной степени.

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В августе 1989 г. в Тирасполе забастовало более 30 промышленных предприятий, около 40 тыс. человек. В начале сентября в Тирасполе остановилось 63 предприятия, в Бендерах — 45, Рыбнице — 31, Дубоссарах — 8, к ним присоединились предприятия других населенных пунктов Приднестровья и Молдовы.20 Всего в республике бастовало 179 трудовых коллективов, еще более 400 выразили солидарность с ними, оказывали им материальную поддержку. Общее число бастовавших превысило 200 тыс. человек, политические митинги в городах Приднестровья собирали десятки тысяч жителей. Их требования сводились к проведению всенародного референдума относительно закона о языках, что было для тех лет довольно диковинным инструментом, поскольку ранее компартия никогда не использовала референдумы, считая себя представительницей и выразительницей воли народа. Однако кишиневское руководство отвергло всякую возможность проведения плебисцита и приняло законы о языках в том виде, в котором считало нужным. Никогда за всю свою историю, включая три русские революции и годы румынской оккупации Бессарабии, проходившие под знаком постоянных протестов местного населения, Молдавия не знала такого размаха забастовочного движения. Это было не уличное буйство группы пьяных маргиналов, а осознанный массовый протест наиболее активной части общества, которая остро почувствовала, что приближается большая беда, раскол, кровопролитие…21 Требования бастовавших были вполне умеренными, они не выступали против придания молдавскому языку статуса государственного и перевода его с кириллической графики на латинскую, деликатно оставляя решение этого вопроса самим молдаванам. Но партийная номенклатура в кишиневском руководстве упорно вела курс на раскол республики и разжигание межнационального конфликта. Более того, первый секретарь ЦК Компартии Молдавии С.К.Гроссу на XV пленуме КПСС заявил: «Принятые законы о языках… не противоречат конституционным требованиям. Важно также подчерк20 Кондратович Д.Ф. Приднестровская революция. 1989-2002 гг. // Ежегодный исторический альманах Приднестровья. №3. 1999. С. 24. 21

Феномен Приднестровья. Тирасполь, 2003. С. 151.

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нуть, что принципиальные положения этих законов соответствуют платформе КПСС по национально-языковой политике партии в современных условиях, и это свидетельствует о правильности взятого нами курса».22 Неожиданная поддержка пришла к приднестровцам… из Кишинева. В июне 1990 г. парламент Молдовы, желая ускорить процесс соединения с Румынией, преподнес приднестровцам подарок: высший орган государственной власти Молдовы в одностороннем порядке отменил Закон от 2 августа 1940 г., по которому была создана МССР и ликвидирована государственность на Левобережье Днестра. Провозгласив этот акт незаконным, а собственную республику оккупированной румынской землей, парламент фактически отменил преемственность власти в Молдове и начал процесс ее политической самоликвидации. МССР как союзная республика просуществовала ровно полвека. Через год, в августе 1991 г. в Декларации о независимости Республики Молдова парламент вновь подчеркнул, что МССР была создана без согласия на то населения Бессарабии и Молдавской АССР, а установлением новых границ по Пруту «…пытались оправдать, при отсутствии какого-либо реального правового обоснования, расчленение этих территорий и принадлежность новой республики СССР».23 Таким образом, парламент Молдовы признал, что включение Приднестровья в состав МССР и дальнейшее нахождение этой территории в составе рвущейся к Румынии Молдовы является историческим и юридическим нонсенсом. Выход Молдовы из Советского Союза и объявление незаконности создания Советами Молдавской ССР поставили народ Приднестровья перед выбором: восстановить ли свою автономию в составе Украины (на что требовалось согласие ее руководства), войти ли заново в состав суверенной и независимой Молдовы (и тем самым рано или поздно вновь оказаться провинцией Транснистрия) либо создать свою собственную государственность, потерянную полвека назад в результате одного росчерка пера «отца народов». 22

Там же. С. 152.

Бессарабский вопрос и образование Приднестровской Молдавской Республики / Сб. официальных док-ов. Тирасполь, 1993. С. 144. 23

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Проведенный в начале 1990 г. во всех городах и селах Приднестровья референдум выявил мнение абсолютного большинства жителей края: необходимо воссоздать собственную государственность как единственную реальную защиту своих прав, интересов, образа жизни и своего будущего. Точные сведения об участии населения Приднестровья в референдуме таковы: в г. Бендеры в голосовании приняли участие 68 634 человек (80% избирателей), при этом за Приднестровскую республику высказались 66 753 чел. (97,3%), в Тирасполе — 125 775 (93%) и 120 561 (95,9%), Дубоссарах — 16 312 (77%) и 15 834 (97%), Дубоссарском районе — 6 136 (30%) и 5 830 (95%), Рыбнице — 37 092 (82%) и 29 232 (91%), Рыбницком районе — 23 498 (94%) и 22 479 (95,7%), Григориопольском районе — 20 432 (57,6%) и 19 209 (94%), Каменском районе— 22 130 (88%) и 21 687 (98%), Слободзейском районе — 56 000 (70%) и 53 760 (96%) соответственно. Всего по Приднестровью в референдуме приняли участие 371 017 чел. (79% избирателей), а за создание собственной государственности высказались 355 345 чел. (95,8% принявших участие в голосовании, или 75,3% всех избирателей). Таким образом, за республику высказалось квалифицированное большинство — более 75% избирателей («против» проголосовали 8 998 человек — 1,9%)24. После изгнания из парламента Молдовы всех депутатов от Приднестровья, 2 июня 1990 г. в болгарском селе Парканы собрался съезд депутатов всех уровней Приднестровья (Верховного Совета СССР, парламента Молдовы, городских, районных и сельских Советов), который принял решение о создании Приднестровской свободной экономической зоны в рамках Республики Молдова. Это вызвало настоящий психоз у ряда кишиневских национал-радикалов, которые стали создавать военизированные «волонтерские» подразделения для организации карательного похода против «обнаглевших пришельцев» в восточных районах Республики Молдова. Только после этого, 2 сентября 1990 г. на Втором чрезвычайном съезде депутатов всех уровней Приднестровья в Тирасполе было принято решение о реализации воли народа, высказанной на референдуме. Съезд принял Декларацию о суверенитете, Декларацию о государственной власти и другие важнейшие документы, избрал 24

Кондратович Д.Ф. Указ. соч. С. 24.

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Временный Верховный Совет республики и заложил основы ныне существующей приднестровской государственности. Так во второй раз в истории в Приднестровье возникла государственность, была создана Приднестровская Молдавская Республика.

ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЕ В 21-М ВЕКЕ Как суверенное государство Приднестровская Молдавская Республика имеет все необходимые атрибуты независимости (герб, гимн, флаг и другие государственные символы), свободно избранные представительные органы республиканской и местных властей, исполнительную власть в лице всенародно избранного президента и подотчетного ему кабинета министров, собственную судебную, образовательную, социальную, финансовую, оборонную и правоохранительную системы. В ПМР существует и свой собственный бюджет, имеющий независимые источники пополнения и обеспечивающий экономическую и финансовую безопасность страны. Денежная единица государства — приднестровский рубль, который свободно обменивается в республике на молдавские леи, российские рубли, украинские гривны, американские доллары, евро и пр. Как индустриально-аграрная республика с высокоразвитым ориентированным на внешний рынок экономическим комплексом Приднестровье сполна испытало на себе все негативные последствия разрушения народнохозяйственного организма некогда единой страны. Тем не менее, основной экономический потенциал удалось сохранить, а во многих отношениях и приумножить. Политическая независимость от Молдовы в эпоху некомпетентных и губительных «реформ», грабительской приватизации и опасных экономических экспериментов, разваливших весь народнохозяйственный комплекс этой страны, благоприятно сказалась на экономической инфраструктуре Приднестровья. В условиях независимости республика смогла учесть ошибки многих стран на переходном пути к рыночной экономике.

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Коренные изменения в отношениях собственности на средства производства, а также в системе управления народным хозяйством на макроэкономическом уровне в ПМР удалось провести в сравнительно легкой и безболезненной для основной массы трудящихся форме, избежав закрытия многих промышленных предприятий, обнищания абсолютного большинства населения, безработицы и т.д. Нормативно-правовая база постепенного вхождения в рыночные отношения формирует благоприятную среду для предпринимательской деятельности, развития личной инициативы и вложения капиталов. Все большую силу набирают акционерные общества, совместные предприятия (включающие иностранных инвесторов), финансово-промышленные корпорации, объединения и группы, производственные кооперативы, частные предприятия, фермерские хозяйства. Наряду с ними на рынке действуют государственные, арендные, муниципальные предприятия, а их приватизация, как правило, способствует расширению их деятельности, выходу на новые рынки и дает новый импульс к развитию. Несмотря на экономическую, транспортную и финансовую блокаду республики со стороны внешних сил, основными отраслями экономики продолжают оставаться черная металлургия и металлообработка, машиностроение, легкая и пищевая промышленность, производство строительных материалов и электроэнергетика. Агропромышленное производство обеспечивает основные продовольственные потребности населения. Постепенные глубокие системные изменения структуры экономики, приводящие к сокращению доли материального производства и расширению сферы услуг, выводят республику на стадию постиндустриального развития. Этот процесс сопровождается изменениями в социальной структуре населения. Часть активного населения, ранее занятая в сфере материального производства на государственных предприятиях, перешла в общественное питание, финансово-кредитную сферу, а также сферы высоких технологий и интеллектуального труда. Государство в необходимых пределах поощряет переквалификацию работников. Социальную защиту граждан республики обеспечивает Фонд социального страхования и Пенсионный фонд ПМР, а также ряд внебюджетных фондов

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и негосударственные страховые компании. Часть населения в поисках спроса на свою квалификацию мигрировала на рынки других стран. Переход к рыночной экономике, естественно, сопровождается возникновением ряда социальных проблем и неустройств, но они не имеют острой дестабилизирующей направленности и не носят деструктивного характера, вполне управляемы и решаемы. ПМР последовательно идет по пути укрепления и развития рыночной социально ориентированной экономики. Несмотря на жесткую таможенную блокаду, ПМР продолжает активизировать внешнеэкономическую деятельность, которая стабилизирует экономическое положение республики и повышает жизненный уровень населения. Государство развивает торговые отношения почти с сотней стран мира. Приднестровье поставляет своим партнерам черный металл, продукцию машиностроения, легкой и пищевой промышленности, сельского хозяйства, а также строительные материалы. Республика импортирует газ и нефтепродукты, машины, металлолом, хлопковое волокно и др. Все больше создается совместных предприятий и фирм, увеличивается иностранное инвестирование перспективных экономических субъектов. Сравнительно стабильное и благополучное состояние экономики при плавном переходе на рыночные отношения позволило успешно развивать образование, культуру, медицинское и пенсионное обслуживание населения. Система народного образования в ПМР идентична российской и опирается на российские программы и стандарты. Самый крупный научный и образовательный центр ПМР Приднестровский государственный университет им. Т.Г.Шевченко аттестован Министерством образования и науки Российской Федерации в качестве университета классического типа, а его дипломы признаются теми странами, которые признают дипломы вузов России. Большой популярностью в республике пользуются государственный симфонический оркестр, государственный ансамбль народного танца «Виорика», государственный хор, государственный цирк и Тираспольский театр драмы и комедии им. Н. Аронецкой. В Приднестровье развивается сеть библиотек, музеев, других

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культурно-просветительных учреждений, а также множество самодеятельных и народных коллективов, в которых проявляют себя дарования и таланты. Спортсмены ПМР известны своими победами на Олимпийских играх, чемпионатах мира и Европы. Общенародный референдум, проведенный в ПМР 17 сентября 2006 г., в котором приняло участие подавляющее число граждан республики, убедительно показал всему миру, что приднестровский народ смотрит в будущее с оптимизмом и надеждой. Почти все население республики отказалось от соединения с Молдовой на любых возможных условиях — в качестве уезда унитарной Молдовы, федерации или даже конфедерации. Приднестровцы не намерены отказываться от своей государственности, которую они отстояли в суровых условиях всевозможных блокад, военных конфликтов, провокаций и даже развязанной Молдовой кровопролитной войны. Эта государственность является единственной надежной гарантией свободного развития и благополучия нашего народа.

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bnim`

b hqŠnphncp`thh

peqorakhjh lnkdnb` oeŠp xnpmhjnb

Днестровская война 1992 г. явилась самой острой фазой гражданского конфликта в Молдавии, спровоцированного в 1989 г. и до настоящего времени не урегулированного. Войну и ее последствия и поныне обсуждают историки, политики, дипломаты. В Республике Молдова сформировались два основных направления исследований. Сначала возникло унионистское направление, которое представляют румынские и молдавские авторы, отрицающие молдавский этнокультурный суверенитет и право молдаван на государственность1. Второе направление выражает взгляды молдавских традиционалистов, рассматривающих события с точки зрения интересов молдавской нации и молдавской государственности2. 1 A se vedea: Barsan V. Masacrul inocentilor. Razboiul din Moldova, 1 martie — 29 iulie 1992. Bucuresti. Editura Fundatiei Culturale Romane. 1993; Turcanu I. Basarabia din nou in fata optiunii istorice: impresii si marturii privind miscarea nationala a romanilor basarabeni la sfarsitul anilor 80 — inceputul anilor 90. Chisinau. Universitas. 1994; Moraru A. Istoria romanilor — Basarabia şi Transnistria. (1812-1993). Chişinău. 1995.; Chifu Iu. Razboi diplomatic in Basarabia. O istorie ultramoderna. Bucuresti. 1997; Gribincea M. Politica rusa a bazelor militare: Georgia si Moldova. Chsinau. 1999; Cojocaru Gh.E. Separatismul in slujba imperiului. Chisinau. Civitas. 2000; История Бессарабии (От истоков до 1998 г.) / Сост. Иоан Скурту. Кишинэу, 2001; Fruntasu Iu. O istorie etnopolitica a Basarabiei. 1812-2002. Bucuresti / Chisinau. Cartier. 2002; Istoria Romanilor: curs universitar / Vasile Vasilos; Univ. Tehnica a Moldovei. Chisinau. Civitas. 2003; Munteanu Anatol. Sacrificiu si tradare. Razboiul de secesiune din Republica Moldova (1990-1992). Bucuresti. 2005. 2 A se vedea: Conflictul din Transnistria: adevarul asa cum a fost el. Materialele Conferinţei ştiinţifico-practice «Interesele de stat şi rolul organelor de interne în asigurarea ordinii constituţionale, drepturilor şi libertăţilor omului în raioanele de est ale Republicii Moldova». Chşinău, 12-13 ianuarie 1993; Istoria Republicii Moldova din cele mai vechi timpuri pînă în yilele noastre. Chişinău. 1997 (1998, 2004); Шорников П.М. Покушение на статус: Этнополитические процессы в Молдавии в годы кризиса. 1988-1996.

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Cпецифичны позиции некоторых зарубежных авторов, чьи работы на эту тему3 переизданы в Кишиневе, а также мемуары, посвященные вооруженному конфликту4. Представляется целесообразным рассмотреть трактовку ключевых вопросов истории Днестровской войны, данную представителями обоих направлений.

ТРАКТОВКА ПРИЧИН ВООРУЖЕННОГО КОНФЛИКТА

Унионистская историография Республики Молдова, претендующая на статус официозной, игнорирует этнополитические и социально-экономические причины приднестровского конфликта и пытается трактовать его как конфликт между русскими и молдаванами либо между Молдовой и Россией. Однако румынские авторы, хорошо знакомые с ситуацией в Молдавии, изначально отвергли определение Днестровской войны как межэтнической. Виктор Бырсан, впоследствии посол Румынии в Республике Молдова, уже в 1993 г.5 признал, что прорумынские национал-радикалы Кишинева сами сеяли отчуждение между молдаванами двух берегов Днестра, именуя левобережных конационалов шантистами (от диалектного слова шанти — «затем») и манкуртами (согласно киргизскому писателю Чингизу Айтматову, люди, утратившие память). Кишинев, 1997; Istoria Moldovei în date — Elaborata: Vasile Stati. Chisinau. 1998; Stati V. Istoria Moldovei. Chisinau. Vivar-Editor. 2002; Aspecte ale conflictului transnistrean / Colectiv de autori. Chsinau. Stiinta. 2001; История и культура гагаузов / Coord. St. Bulgar. Chisinau. Pontos. 2006; Степанюк В. Государственность молдавского народа: исторические, политические и правовые аспекты. Кишинев, 2006; Ангели Ф. Гагаузская автономия. Люди и факты (1989-2005 гг.). Кишинев, 2006. 3 A se vedea: King Ch. Moldovenii. Romania, Rusia si politica culturala. Chisinau. ARC. 2002; Nouzille J. Moldova. Istoria tragica a unei rgiuni europene. Chisinau. Prut International. 2005. 4 См.: Крянгэ П. Я хочу рассказать…Кишинэу, 1998; Руссу И.Г. Заметки о Смутном времени. Кишинев, 1999; Моцпан Дм. Шипы и розы. Кишинев, 2005; Grecu V. O viziune din focarul conflictului de la Dubasari. Chisinau. Prut International. 2005. 5 A se vedea: Barsan V. Masacrul inocentilor. Razboiul din Moldova, 1 martie — 29 iulie 1992. Bucuresti. Editura Fundatiei Culturale Romane. 1993.

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Молдавские традиционалисты основное внимание уделяют исследованию роли молдаван восточного берега Днестра в создании Приднестровской республики и их участию в ее защите. В политическом трактате «История Молдавии в датах»6, написанном в форме хроники исторических событий, его автор Василе Стати, забывая об участии рабочих-молдаван в Республиканской забастовке 1989 г., в этнополитическом расколе молдавской нации, якобы единой до провозглашения в Кишиневе требований о присоединении Молдавии к Румынии, во всем обвиняет унионистов. Левобережные молдаване, отмечает он, были оскорблены ярлыками «манкурты» и «шантисты», навешанными на них кишиневскими румынистами. «Основание сепаратизма приднестровских молдаван, — цитирует автор крупнейшего композитора Молдавии уроженца Приднестровья Евгения Догу, — было заложено здесь, в Кишиневе[…] Термин «румын» для абсолютного большинства жителей Приднестровья звучит издевательски». Причину войны В.Стати усматривает в нараставшем в 19891991 гг. недоверии «между совместно проживающими национальностями и титульной нацией». Считая вооруженный конфликт национальной трагедией Молдавии, автор, тем не менее, отказывает нетитульному населению в праве на защиту своих этнокультурных и социальных интересов. В исследовании «История Молдовы»7 забастовку августа-сентября 1989 г. в защиту национального равноправия историк, игнорируя участие в ней десятков тысяч рабочихмолдаван, бездоказательно трактует как абсурдную, направленную «против придания статуса государственности молдавскому языку, родному языку народа (65% населения), давшего название этому государству!» Вину за провоцирование вооруженного конфликта автор, однако, возлагает на прорумынских национал-радикалов и вошедшую с ними в сговор часть партийной номенклатуры, которые, игнорируя историю этих молдавских районов, их национальную специфику — культурную, лингвистическую, обострили отношения между населением двух берегов Днестра. Официальный Кишинев «грубо 6

A se vedea: Istoria Moldovei în date — Elaborata: Vasile Stati. Chisinau. 1998.

7

A se vedea: Stati V. Istoria Moldovei. Chisinău. 2002.

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отверг» предложение властей Приднестровья придать статус государственного двум языкам: молдавскому и русскому. Войну против Приднестровья, «трагические дни великого стыда и боли», автор рассматривает как братоубийственную. Думитру Моцпан, лидер партии аграриев, в 1992 г. сыгравший активную роль в прекращении войны на Днестре, также не усматривает связи между принятием законов о языке и сепарацией регионов. Причину возникновения Приднестровской и Гагаузской республик он видит в политике на разрыв с Москвой и включение Молдовы в состав Румынии, которую вело правительство прорумынского национал-радикала Мирчи Друка8. Член Партии коммунистов Республики Молдова, депутат парламента Виктор Степанюк в своей книге «Государственность молдавского народа» также подчеркивает роль молдаван в создании приднестровской государственности9. В основе их позиции, отмечает автор, лежало стремление сохранить молдавскую национально-культурную самобытность перед угрозой румынизации. «Прорумынские силы из комиссии Верховного Совета, — отмечает он, —…навязали республике, ее образовательной системе «историю румын», [лингвоним] «румынский язык», румынский алфавит… В молдавских районах Левобережья Днестра учителя и все общество воспротивилось такому наглому навязыванию чужой идеологии и политики». Включение в закон «О функционировании языков на территории Молдавской ССР» положения об идентичности молдавского и румынского языков было воспринято как свидетельство курса на присоединение Молдавии к Румынии. Однако авторская трактовка причин Приднестровского конфликта противоречива. Действия румынизаторов В.Степанюк определяет лишь как их тактическую ошибку: «квазиединством ошибки было навязывание в режиме force majore румынского языка, румынского алфавита, триколора румынского государства, герба румынского государства». Молдавские традиционалисты, явствует из книги, уже летом 1990 г. предлагали либерализовать закон «О функционировании языков…» и отказаться от использования 8

См.: Моцпан Дм. Указ. соч.

9

См.: Степанюк В. Указ. соч.

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румынской государственной символики. Однако унионистское руководство парламента отказалось от возможности предотвратить дезинтеграцию Молдавии и тем самым гражданскую войну. Признавая роль молдаван в создании и защите Приднестровской государственности, историки, выражающие интересы нетитульного населения Молдавии, основное внимание уделяют анализу социально-политических и экономических последствий развернутой в 1989 г. насильственной языковой реформации. Сепарацию Приднестровья и Гагаузии авторы «Истории Республики Молдова с древнейших времен до наших дней»10 трактуют как естественную самооборону населения восточного и южного регионов от деструктивной политики республиканского Центра. Придание государственного статуса только молдавскому языку, отмечают они, создало юридическую основу для проведения политики национальной дискриминации в праве на труд. Дезинтеграцию республики и вооруженный конфликт 1992 г. они считают закономерным продолжением таких событий, как решение 13-й сессии Верховного Совета МССР о придании государственного статуса только молдавскому языку, республиканская политическая стачка (1989 г.), ограничение доступа к образованию на русском языке, массовые увольнения служащих недостаточно владеющих молдавским языком, поход молдавских «волонтеров» против гагаузов, участие Молдовы в «параде суверенитетов» (1990 г.), распад СССР (1991 г.) и угроза аннексии Молдавии Румынией. Проведенная унионистами кампания массовых увольнений не только русских и украинцев, но и политически неугодных прорумынским радикалам молдаван под предлогом незнания ими государственного языка, раскрытая в книге «Покушение на статус»11, явилась одним из главных факторов разрушения промышленного производства, науки, здравоохранения. Наряду со свертыванием образования на русском языке эта политика необычайно обострила этногосударственные отношения в Молдавии и привела к созданию Приднестровской и Гагаузской республик. Как попытка избежать 10 A se vedea: Istoria Republicii Moldova din cele mai vechi timpuri pînă în yilele noastre. Chişinău. 1997 (1998, 2004). 11

См.: Шорников П. Указ. соч.

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национальной дискриминации и включения региона в состав Румынии представлена сепарация Приднестровья и Гагаузии и в труде «История и культура гагаузов»12. Не вдаваясь в подробности, профессор Стэнфордского университета (США) Чарлз Кинг пытается совместить все три версии. «Парламентское голосование в пользу молдавского языка, — полагает он, — стало началом событий. В ответ на это голосование местные Советы Тирасполя и других городов проголосовали против регламентов, переданных из центра, и постановили, что законы о языке не признаются действующими восточнее Днестра. Напряженность возросла в недели после голосования. Столкновения между молдавской полицией и вооруженными «частями самообороны» приднестровцев, все более частые, множились… Несколько кишиневских членов движения «Единство» также поддержали это движение; некоторые из них предпочли переселиться в Тирасполь, чтобы помочь приднестровцам, чем продолжать работать в молдавской политической системе»13. И, наконец, имеется и экзотическая версия причин конфликта, принадлежащая политологу-унионисту Георгию Кожокару. Дезинтеграция республики, полагает он, явилась следствием заблуждения. Население якобы ошиблось, восприняв законы 13-й сессии как дискриминационные и расценив перспективу включения Молдавии в состав Румынии как угрозу. Он громко заявляет об инициативной роли Кремля в сепарации Приднестровья, но никак это не обосновывает14.

12

История и культура гагаузов / Coord. St. Bulgar. Chisinau. Pontos. 2006.

A se vedea: Charles King. Moldovenii. Romania, Rusia si politica culturala. Chisinau. ARC. 2002. Р.192. 13

14 A se vedea: Cojocaru Gh.E. Separatismul in slujba imperiului. Chisinau. Civitas. 2000.

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КОНСПИРОЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ ВЕРСИЯ НАЧАЛА ВОЙНЫ

В 90-е годы ХХ в. историки сознавали, что политический процесс в Молдавии развивался в основном под воздействием внешних силовых полей, прежде всего событий в России, а после распада СССР — и под влиянием Румынии. В мемуарах о Днестровской войне фигурирует тезис о провокационном вмешательстве «третьей силы». В убийстве начальника милиции г. Дубоссары Игоря Сипченко, послужившем предлогом для начала военных действий, Влад Греку, участник войны против ПМР, обвиняет подростка, получившего оружие (не называя его имени). Но версию о том, что убийство осуществлено по приказу из Тирасполя или случайно, опровергает депутат молдавского парламента Федор Ангели, проводивший расследование по свежим следам событий. Убийство, полагает он, представляло собой «заранее спланированную провокацию, целью которой было создать военный очаг на берегах Днестра». Подготовка вторжения в Приднестровье началась сразу после упразднения СССР. Еще в январе-феврале 1992 г., свидетельствует он, на подступах к Дубоссарам и Бендерам, а также близ моста через Днестр у села ГураБыкулуй, откуда удобно наступать на Тирасполь, были созданы базы молдавской полиции15. Для вторжения нужен был лишь повод. Красноречивы также факты о действиях «третьей силы», приведенные Владом Греку далее. Житель села Кочиеры Александр Лукьянов, который вел переговоры с офицерами, осажденными в расположении российской понтонной части, признает мемуарист, был убит выстрелом в спину в расчете на то, что это преступление будет приписано российским офицерам. В Приднестровье, отмечает он, был совершен ряд жестоких убийств местных жителей, не причастных к войне ни на чьей стороне. Преступления не были раскрыты, но автор, склонный приписать их приднестровским формированиям, в большинстве случаев не делает этого и признает, что несколько групп самообороны, получивших оружие от МВД Молдовы, терроризировали противника16. 15

См.: Ангели Ф. Указ. соч.

16

A se vedea: Grecu V. O viziune din focarul conflictului de la Dubasari. Chisinau. Prut

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Причину такого самочинного террора Ч.Кинг усматривает в отсутствии контроля в рядах вооруженных сил Молдовы: полицейские, вооруженные гражданские лица, войска МВД и бывшие советские солдаты, лояльные независимой Молдове, действовали не считаясь с приказами, поступавшими из Кишинева17. Молдавские традиционалисты обвиняют в организации террористических актов Министерство национальной безопасности Молдовы и видят в них попытку ужесточить борьбу и распространить военные действия, развернувшиеся в районе Дубоссар, на другие районы18. В апреле 1992 г., как отмечается в «Истории Республики Молдова», в Бендерах из бронетранспортеров Молдовы были расстреляны два микроавтобуса приднестровской милиции и гвардии, а также автобус, перевозивший рабочих фабрики, которые никакого отношения к сепаратистским формированиям не имели. Террористы МНБ убили также политического деятеля Приднестровской республики, депутата парламента Молдовы Николая Остапенко. В мае гагаузская милиция захватила оперативную группу МНБ, направленную с террористическим заданием в г. Чадыр-Лунгу. Пять членов группы избежали ареста, но по ошибке были расстреляны молдавской полицией. В мае же артиллерийским снарядом, прицельно выпущенным с западного берега Днестра, были убиты шесть директоров промышленных предприятий г. Дубоссары, выходивших из здания городского Совета. Эти и другие нападения и террористические акты, по мнению ряда историков и других специалистов Молдовы, свидетельствуют о глубокой проработке сценария войны спецслужбами. Косвенно подтверждая конспирологическую версию, генерал П.Крянгэ, зам. министра обороны в период войны, утверждает, что для него ввод сил Молдовы в Бендеры явился неожиданностью19. Другой мемуарист, офицер полиции Анатолий Мунтяну, объясняет ввод в город бригады специального назначения инициативой International. 2005. 17 A se vedea: Charles King. Moldovenii. Romania, Rusia si politica culturala. Chisinau. ARC. 2002. Р. 196. 18 A se vedea: Istoria Republicii Moldova din cele mai vechi timpuri pînă în yilele noastre. Chişinău. 1997 (Ed. A 2-а, 2004). 19

См.: Крянгэ П. Указ. соч.

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ее командира Антона Гамураря. Однако тут же оговаривается, что оперативно-тактические направления ввода войск и их состав были расписаны заранее20. В.Стати обоснованно трактует вторжение в Бендеры как попытку сорвать выполнение постановления об урегулировании конфликта на основе компромисса, принятого парламентом Молдавии 16 июня21. В труде «История и культура гагаузов»22 относительно Бендерских событий сказано: «В Бендерах полиция Молдовы спровоцировала вооруженное столкновение с местными гвардейцами, и в город была введена бригада спецназа МВД и другие части. Начались уличные бои». В книге рассказано о гибели одного из приднестровских бойцов — гагауза по национальности. Ч.Кинг также возлагает ответственность за вторжение в Бендеры на официальный Кишинев, считая это попыткой отвоевать стратегически важную позицию23. Для вторжения требовался лишь повод. Характерно, что 17 июня, после заседания Совета Безопасности, очевидно, принявшего решение о проведении этой операции, министр обороны генерал И.Г.Косташ подал президенту заявление об отставке.

ХАРАКТЕР ВООРУЖЕННОГО КОНФЛИКТА Умалчивая тот факт, что провозглашенную 27 августа 1991 г. независимость Республики Молдова первой признала Российская Федерация, некоторые авторы-унионисты пытаются представить днестровский конфликт как молдавско-российскую войну за независимость24. В составленных ими учебниках возникновение автономий объясняется стремлением Кремля расчленить Молдавию. Однако

20 A se vedea: Munteanu Anatol. Sacrificiu si tradare. Razboiul de secesiune din Republica Moldova (1990-1992). Bucuresti. 2005. Р. 209. 21

A se vedea: Stati V. Istoria Moldovei. Chisinau. Vivar-Editor. 2002.

22

См.: История и культура гагаузов...

23

King Ch. Op. cit., P. 197.

24

A se vedea: Munteanu Anatol. Op. cit.

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никаких доказательств этого не приводится. Более того, они даже избежали описания событий Днестровской войны 25. Некоторые из бывших участников этих событий не смогли избежать соблазна демонизировать противника. Армия и полиция Молдовы, утверждал в 1993 г. министр внутренних дел Константин Анточ, боролись против «самой одиозной тоталитарной системы на свете». По его мнению, жители Приднестровья были лишены самых элементарных прав человека. Будь это так, население Приднестровья поддержало бы действия официального Кишинева. Но картина гражданского неповиновения населения административным структурами Кишинева, которую описал его подчиненный, бывший начальник полиции г. Бендеры полковник Виктор Гусляков26, свидетельствует об обратном. Не считая нужным рассматривать лишенные фактических оснований суждения министра и его единомышленников, а также тезис о войне за независимость, Василий Стати и авторы соответствующих разделов «Истории Республики Молдова» признают высокую степень политической сплоченности приднестровцев. Это подтверждают приводимые в работах молдавских традиционалистов сведения о масштабах участия населения Приднестровья в вооруженной борьбе с силами официального Кишинева. Можно, конечно, поставить под ружье какое-то количество призывников, которые, спасая свои жизни, сдадутся в плен или сбегут из района боевых действий при первой же возможности. Но как объяснить массовую запись в народное ополчение сотен и тысяч жителей Приднестровья от юнцов до стариков — тех самых людей, которые по уверению кишиневских полицейских лишены самых элементарных прав человека? В ходе войны приднестровские власти вооружили 14000 рабочих, а для спасения мирных жителей взорвали мосты через Днестр и взяли под охрану плотину Дубоссарской гидроэлектростанции27. 25 A se vedea: Istoria romanilor: curs universitar./ Vasile Vasilos; Univ. tehnica a Moldovei. Chisinau. Civitas. 2002. 26 A se vedea: Conflictul din Transnistria: adevarul asa cum a fost el. Chşinău, 12-13 ianuarie 1993. 27

См.: Стати В. История Молдовы. Кишинев, 2003.

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Молдавские традиционалисты отмечают массовое уклонение молдаван от мобилизации в Национальную армию. В ходе конфликта власти Кишинева смогли поставить под ружье всего 7,5 тыс. резервистов (хотя предполагалось мобилизовать 60 000 чел.). В июле-августе численность личного состава Национальной армии была доведена до 18 000 чел. Поскольку приднестровские формирования не уступали противнику в вооружении и боевой выучке, соотношение сил на поле боя осталось в целом равным. Этот объективный факт можно обойти вниманием, но его трудно утаить. Из литературы, посвященной конфликту, явствует, что армия Молдовы не желала воевать. Полковник К.Анточ и генерал П.Крянгэ, возглавлявшие соответственно полицейские и армейские подразделения на Днестре, поддерживали телефонную связь с приднестровским командованием, а солдаты договаривались с приднестровскими ополченцами не стрелять друг в друга. Подобные прецеденты, а они имели массовый характер, послужили для некоторых авторов основанием для обвинения в политическом и военном поражении Молдовы в Днестровской войне тех, кто не желал объединения Молдовы и Румынии и тормозил этот процесс в парламенте, правительстве, силовых структурах — на всех уровнях государственной власти. Подтверждая тезис о нежелании молдаван воевать, авторы-унионисты любую неудачу в борьбе против сепаратистов объясняют изменой в штабах войск Молдовы, саботажем боевых действий многими молдавскими офицерами, успешной работой шпионов противника28. Число лиц, добровольно принявших участие в войне против Приднестровья, оказалось невелико. Возникновение вооруженных групп в некоторых селах Левобережья Днестра В.Греку представляет как ответную меру их жителей на действия анархических вооруженных групп, не контролируемых Тирасполем. О нескольких сотнях «волонтеров», вместе с войсками и полицией принявших участие в Бендерской операции, историки-унионисты предпочитают умалчивать. Ни они, ни мемуаристы не берутся объяснить эти действия патриотическими мотивами29, признавая тем самым, 28

A se vedea: Munteanu Anatol. Sacrificiu si tradare. Bucuresti. 2005.

29

A se vedea: Conflictul din Transnistria: adevarul asa cum a fost el.

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что имели место массовый грабеж, элементарная уголовщина и мародерство. Историки Молдовы, придерживающиеся различных взглядов, приводят факты, опровергающие тезис о межэтническом характере Днестровской войны: в формированиях Приднестровья 30% бойцов составляли молдаване, а на стороне официального Кишинева воевали также русские и украинцы30. Вооруженными силами ПМР командовал румын — уроженец Буковины, отставной полковник Советской Армии Штефан Кицак, а его сын Андрей руководил приднестровским ополчением в районе Дубоссар. С другой стороны, среди пяти главных молдавских «героев» войны против Приднестровья — трое русских и один украинец. Война была спровоцирована извне и осталась чисто политической. С этим мнением согласно, пожалуй, большинство историков, хотя понимание слова «извне» остается очень широким. Впрочем, встречаются и достаточно оригинальные точки зрения. Так, унионист Юлиан Фрунташу основными виновниками поражения Кишинева в Днестровской войне считает молдаван. Обличая «национальную бестактность молдаван, неспособных сделать шаг к необратимой самоидентификации с румынами»31, он сетует на прочность молдавского национального и государственного сознания и подходит к парадоксальной мысли: существование Приднестровской республики молдаване, за небольшим исключением, не расценивают как угрозу национальным интересам молдавской нации. Заключение автора неожиданно. По его мнению, итогом Днестровской войны стали «победа русского национал-шовинизма, продвижение антирумынского молдавизма и удержание Республики Молдова в российской зоне влияния». Иными словами, провал попыток унионистов ликвидировать Приднестровскую республику благотворно сказался на молдавском национальном сознании.

30 A se vedea: Istoria Republicii Moldova din cele mai vechi timpuri pina in zilele noastre. Chisinau. 1997 (Ed. A 2-a 2002); Grecu V. O viziune din focarul conflictului de la Dubasari. Chisinau. Prut International. 2005. 31 A se vedea: Fruntasu Iu. O istorie etnopolitica a Basarabiei. 1812-2002. Bucuresti/ Chisinau. Cartier. 2002.

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КТО ВИНОВАТ? РОССИЯ, РУМЫНИЯ, УКРАИНА … Авторы «Истории Бессарабии» (2001 г.), ссылаясь на недостоверную газетную публикацию, утверждают, что «Генеральный штаб Советской Армии выработал детальный план создания двух новых республик, который должен быть осуществлен немедленно при помощи со стороны вооруженных сил Одесского округа». Эти и другие авторы-унионисты повторяют тезис о политической, экономической, военной и информационной поддержке Приднестровья Россией32. Без ссылок на источники приводятся данные об увольнении в запас 300 офицеров 14-й российской армии и их зачислении в вооруженные формирования Приднестровья, о передаче им с армейских складов вооружения, боеприпасов и боевой техники. Утверждения о помощи, оказанной приднестровцам офицерами регулярных войск, не опровергают и молдавские традиционалисты: 80% личного состава 14-й армии, отмечено в «Истории Республики Молдова», составляли уроженцы Приднестровья. Вместе с российскими офицерами, семьи которых проживали в Тирасполе и других городах, они сочувствовали согражданам, сражавшимся в составе формирований ПМР. В книге «Покушение на статус» признана выдающаяся роль российских СМИ, особенно телевизионного канала «Останкино», в прорыве информационной блокады вокруг событий на Днестре, установленной официальным Кишиневом. Однако эти факты, полагают неангажированные исследователи, еще не свидетельствуют о поддержке Приднестровья российским правительством. Информационная поддержка Приднестровья Россией отражала позицию российской общественности; позиция правительства была менее определенной. Переход офицеров 14-й армии в приднестровскую гвардию, признает Ч.Кинг, представлял собой нарушение воинской дисциплины, но может быть понят в хаосе 1991 г. После дня уличных боев в Бендерах, утверждает американский историк, 14-я армия все же вмешалась в конфликт и в ночь с 20 на 21 июня воевала вместе с силами ПМР дабы изгнать правительственные войска из города. Насилие в Бендерах, угроза 32 A se vedea: Aspecte ale conflictului transnistrean./ Colectiv de autori. Chsinau. Stiinta. 2001.

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населению города, преимущественно русскому, отмечает он, вынудили российские войска вмешаться в ход событий. Решение было принято аппаратом командующего армией генерала Ю.Неткачева, а не правительством Б.Ельцина. Действия российской стороны Ч.Кинг расценивает положительно. Активное вмешательство Российской Федерации, отмечает он далее, привело к заключению соглашения о прекращении огня33. При всей логичности этого построения, доверие к сообщению об участии в бою российских подразделений подрывает ссылка автора на публикацию в румынской газете. Румынские авторы, утверждая, что с 19 июня по 7 июля 1992 г. подразделения 14-й российской армии «приняли участие в боях совместно с сепаратистами»34, этого факта не приводят. Молдаванка Наталия Киртоакэ, стремясь обосновать тезис об участии России в боевых действиях, приводит данные, свидетельствующие о том, что инициатива создания ПМР и ее вооруженных формирований принадлежала населению Приднестровья, а оружие со складов 14-й армии приднестровцы получили вопреки воле ее командования и при содействии ее военнослужащих — уроженцев Левобережья Днестра35. Не будучи знакомым с традициями межэтнических отношений в регионе, французский историк Жак Нюзиль36 проблему Приднестровья видит в том, что 60% ее населения составляют русскоязычные, а сама область представляет геополитический интерес для России. Однако отмечая инициативную роль приднестровских лидеров Игоря Смирнова и Григория Маракуцы в консолидации приднестровской государственности и выдвижении требований о признании ее Россией, автор по сути опровергает положение об ответственности России за самоопределение Приднестровья. Путая события 1992 г. с походом на гагаузов в 1990 г., автор утверждает, 33

A se vedea: Charles King. Moldovenii. Romania, Rusia si politica culturala. P. 195-

197. 34

См.: История Бессарабии (от истоков до 1998 г.). Кишинэу, 2001

A se vedea: Aspecte ale conflictului transnistrean/ Colectiv de autori. Chsinau. Stiinta. 2001. 35

36 A se vedea: Nouzille J. Moldova. Istoria tragica a unei rgiuni europene. Chisinau. Prut International. 2005.

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что вооруженные формирования Приднестровья составляли всего 4500 солдат и офицеров. Аргументация поддержки Россией Приднестровья в период вооруженного конфликта, приведенная молдавским унионистом М.Грибинчей, основана на признаниях российского президента Бориса Ельцина и заявлениях приднестровских лидеров, сделанных с целью поднять дух населения37. Другие факты, приведенные в его книге, по сути опровергают этот тезис. Офицерские собрания, проведенные в частях 14-й армии в конце 1991 г., на которых была принята резолюция о переходе их под юрисдикцию Приднестровской Республики, свидетельствуют о выходе армии из-под контроля Б.Ельцина. Офицеры, передававшие оружие и технику приднестровским формированиям, действовали как мятежники, вопреки приказам командующего армией генерала Ю.Неткачева. По собственной инициативе пришли на помощь Приднестровью и российские казаки. Как отмечает автор, «российские власти продемонстрировали как свое бессилие, так и страх перед стихийными движениями вообще и движением казачества в частности». В целом ответственность Москвы за кровопролитие на Днестре до сих пор является излюбленным мотивом в историографии Молдовы, который представлен в работах авторов самых разных политических взглядов. Гораздо меньшее внимание историков привлекает причастность Румынии к событиям на Днестре. Визит президента И.Илиеску в Кишинев в мае 1992 г., помощь вооружением, боевой техникой, информационная и дипломатическая поддержка, оказанная румынским правительством Кишиневу, лишь вскользь упоминаются в работах молдавских государственников. Что касается авторовунионистов, то они склонны осуждать румынское правительство за недостаточную активность. Однако румынские историки приводят все новые данные о вовлеченности Румынии в Днестровскую войну. Румынский политолог Юлиан Кифу38 описал «вклад» Румынии в 37 A se vedea: Gribincea M. Politica rusa a bazelor militare: Georgia si Moldova. Chsinau. 1999. 38 A se vedea: Chifu Iu. Razboi diplomatic in Basarabia. O istorie ultramoderna. Bucuresti. 1997.

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подготовку аннексии Молдавии и разжигание Днестровской войны. Еще в 1990 г. Бухарест ввел в действие секретный план «Свобода для Бессарабии». Его осуществлением руководил румынский министр торговли и промышленности Ион Вэтэшеску. В 1992 г., как признают и авторы «Истории Бессарабии», Румыния предоставила Молдове целевой заем в сумме 20 млрд леев для закупки горючего39. Румыния, отмечает М.Грибинча, оказала Молдове серьезную помощь в борьбе с сепаратистами. Она предоставила не только стрелковое оружие (2000 автоматов), но и боевую технику (боевые машины пехоты) и тяжелое оружие (артиллерийские системы), а также понтонные средства, необходимые Национальной армии для форсирования Днестра. Однако факт участия румынских офицеров в боевых действиях автор отрицает, признавая лишь присутствие в Бендерах 24 военных наблюдателей. Стремясь оправдать вмешательство румынского правительства в Приднестровский конфликт, Ю.Фрунташу пополняет список «врагов» Румынии за счет украинских националистов, которых он обвиняет в содействии приднестровцам. Часть вины за такую позицию Украины он возлагает на прорумынские круги Кишинева. Нервируемый высказываемым в Кишиневе мнением о необходимости возвратить Румынии территорию Северной Буковины, отмечает он, Киев уклонился от установления блокады на границе с Приднестровьем. Более того, устами украинских национал-радикалов из организации УНА-УНСО он объявил Приднестровье украинской землей40. И, наконец, Приднестровский конфликт, полагает политолог, якобы выявил «антирумынизм» гагаузов и болгар Молдавии. И те, и другие приняли участие в боевых действиях в составе формирований Приднестровья, а Болгария и Турция выступили в их защиту. Историография вооруженного конфликта 1992 г. переживает период стабилизации. Ее характерная черта — принципиальная ориентация авторов-унионистов на клише национал-радикальной части румынской историографии и рассмотрение событий с точки зрения государственных интересов не Молдавии, а Румынии. Мол39

См.: История Бессарабии... С. 345.

40

A se vedea: Fruntasu Iu. Op. cit.

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давские историки-традиционалисты сохранили концептуальный суверенитет, но не располагают поддержкой государственных институтов, а их трактовка причин и характера Днестровской войны грешит молдавским этноцентризмом. Краткое, но наиболее методологически сбалансированное изложение событий 1992 г. содержит труд «История Республики Молдова с древнейших времен до наших дней».

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Тема Приднестровья находится в повестке дня Партии коммунистов Республики Молдова (ПКРМ) более десяти лет, с момента ее возникновения и по настоящее время. За эти годы позиция партии претерпела существенные метаморфозы, от негласного признания отколовшейся от Молдовы Приднестровской Молдавской Республики и готовности любой ценой договариваться с ее лидерами до объявления региона «резиденцией мафии» и стремления решить приднестровскую проблему силой с помощью международного сообщества.

ОТНОШЕНИЕ ВОРОНИНА К ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЮ ДО ПРИХОДА К ВЛАСТИ

О приднестровской проблеме лидер молдавских коммунистов Владимир Воронин говорил уж на первом съезде партии 24 декабря 1994 г. «Мы с вами знаем и помним причины, приведшие к отделению этих территорий от всей республики. Мы будем всегда помнить братоубийственную войну и тех, кто ее развязал. Придет время, и всем будет воздано по заслугам», — сказал он в отчетном докладе съезду1. В 90-е годы в газете «Коммунист» и общественно-политическом журнале партии «Мысль» было опубликовано много статей, содержащих апологию Приднестровской Молдавской Республики. В те годы члены партии открыто использовали словосочетание 1

Прорыв. Кишинев, 2003. С. 18.

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ПМР. Впервые ПКРМ активно вмешалась в переговорный процесс по приднестровской проблеме в конце 1996 — начале 1997 гг. Летом 1996 г. президент Мирча Снегур не подписал со своим российским коллегой Борисом Ельциным уже парафированный «Меморандум об основах нормализации отношений между Республикой Молдова и Приднестровьем». Этот документ предполагал строительство государственно-правовых отношений, давал Тирасполю право самостоятельной внешнеэкономической деятельности, определял Россию и Украину в качестве гарантов урегулирования, подтверждал продолжение миротворческой операции, начатой в 1992 г. ПКРМ резко осудила Снегура за отказ подписать меморандум и призвала его соперника на президентских выборах Петра Лучинского в случае его избрания поставить свою подпись под этим документом. Лучинский пообещал это сделать, но после его избрания на пост президента при ключевой поддержке ПКРМ долго на это не решался. В феврале 1997 г. Владимир Воронин в своем выступлении на отчетно-выборной конференции коммунистов г. Бельцы уделил основное внимание приднестровской проблеме. «Мобилизуя избирателей против снегуровского режима, едва ли не основным аргументом мы считали то, что Снегур и его команда никогда не пойдут на объединение берегов Днестра, на мирное и окончательное урегулирование конфликта. И, соответственно, сделали во втором туре ставку на Лучинского, имея прежде всего в виду его политический опыт, благоразумие, широко известную приверженность тактике разумных компромиссов. Не хотелось бы сегодня убеждаться, что в чем-то мы с вами здесь просчитались. Но, увы, первые же шаги нового президента и его команды в отношении приднестровской проблемы не могут не вызвать некоторого недоумения. Одним из самых весомых и привлекательных пунктов предвыборной платформы Лучинского было обещание в случае победы сразу же подписать меморандум «Об основах нормализации отношений между Республикой Молдова и Приднестровьем». И это было тем более логично, что его же подпись в качестве спикера появилась под данным документом летом прошлого года. И что же? Не успели, как говорится, отзвучать фанфары инаугурации, как твердый курс на

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подписание сменился не менее твердыми сомнениями в целесообразности столь ожидаемого простыми людьми шага. Выходит так, что толкование вопроса Лучинским-спикером и Лучинским-президентом отличаются? Согласитесь, так недолго и запутаться. Не внесла здесь никакой ясности и в очередной раз вспыхнувшая пропагандистская перепалка между Кишиневом и Тирасполем. Ничего нового, кроме залпа взаимных обвинений, не привнесли ни обращение лидера Приднестровья Игоря Смирнова, ни ответ ему президента Петру Лучинского. Давайте же, товарищи, вспомним, что по нашей Конституции главный субъект власти в республике — народ. Значит, мы с вами. В соответствии с этой непреложной истиной и возьмемся сообща за решение острейшей проблемы страны. В вашем городе, к слову, уже перешли от слов к делу. Именно так можно расценить те договоренности, что достигнуты недавно между городскими властями Бельц и Тирасполя в области торгово-экономического сотрудничества. Это по-настоящему реальный шаг из сферы народной дипломатии, который следует всемерно поддерживать и развивать. Но шаг далеко не единственный. Наши депутаты — коммунисты Парламента все настойчивее ставят вопрос об усилении роли высшего законодательного органа республики, чья специально созданная комиссия по Приднестровью стараниями прежнего режима всеми силами отодвигалась в сторону. Активнее нужно быть и в высшей исполнительной власти, не упускающей случая все спихнуть на политику. Наконец, весь ход решения труднейшей, конечно же, проблемы должен быть поставлен под строгий контроль общественности. А то, знаете, получается довольно странно. От имени и в интересах якобы народа руководители обоих берегов регулярно встречаются, регулярно же не соглашаются друг с другом, а потом этот самый народ должен питаться информационными крохами с мифического стола переговоров, когда «вдруг» выясняется, что они уже состоялись. Причем такими крохами, которые соблаговолят нам отпустить средства массовой информации Кишинева и Тирасполя, ангажированные чаще всего теми или иными силами. А теперь перейдем к главному. Суммировав все вышеперечисленные соображения, глубоко проанализировав весь этот вялотекущий процесс решения проблемы Приднестровья, Центральный Комитет ПКРМ намерен незамедлительно обратиться (и я хочу об этом с вами

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посоветоваться) к высшим властям Молдовы и Тирасполя, к партиям и движениям, к общественности со следующими конкретными предложениями: 1. Организовать в ближайшее время совместные слушания парламентариями Кишинева и Тирасполя вопроса о подписании меморандума «Об основах нормализации отношений между Республикой Молдова и Приднестровьем»; 2. Провести в Кишиневе «круглый стол» по проблемам Приднестровья с участием ведущих политиков с обоих берегов, представителей России и Украины, международных организаций; 3. Широко опубликовать текст меморандума (варианты от 17 и 29 июля 1996 г.) в прессе Молдовы и Приднестровья; 4. Провести в Кишиневе и Тирасполе социологический опрос (независимыми экспертами) по вопросу подписания меморандума; 5. Провести на ТВ публичный диспут (в прямом эфире) Петру Лучинского и Игоря Смирнова по вопросу подписания меморандума; 6. Предложить властям Кишинева и Тирасполя незамедлительно пересмотреть действующую контрольно-пропускную систему между Молдовой и Приднестровьем. Снять все посты, кроме постов миротворческих сил; 7. Поручить правительству Молдовы выработать систему экономических стимулов (налоговых, кредитных, таможенных и пр.) для хозяйствующих субъектов с обоих берегов к взаимовыгодному сотрудничеству, деятельности совместных производств, торговли и т.д.»2.

Политисполком ПКРМ выступил со специальным призывом к властям, партии и общественности способствовать быстрейшему подписанию меморандума. В конечном итоге под давлением Воронина 8 мая 1997 г. Лучинский подписывает в Москве меморандум со Смирновым. Спустя несколько дней в газете «Коммунист» публикуется еще одно заявление Политисполкома ПКРМ, в котором приветствуется это событие3. Перед парламентскими выборами 2001 г. тема Приднестровья вновь всплыла в документах партии. В 2

Коммунист. Февраль 1997 г.

3

Там же. Май 1997 г.

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своей предвыборной платформе ПКРМ обещала «активно способствовать мирному и окончательному разрешению приднестровского конфликта»4.

«МЕДОВЫЙ МЕСЯЦ» ВОРОНИНА И СМИРНОВА На парламентских выборах 25 февраля 2001 г. ПКРМ получила конституционное большинство в законодательном органе. Четвертого апреля 2001 г. лидер партии Владимир Воронин был избран президентом страны. На протяжении нескольких последующих месяцев он высказывал готовность к компромиссу с Тирасполем, провел несколько встреч с лидером ПМР Игорем Смирновым и подписал с ним серию документов. Выступая 10 марта 2001 г. в парламенте, Воронин сказал: «От прежних правлений нам остался тяжелый груз, глубокая рана на теле страны — проблема Приднестровья. Для меня она прежде всего является проблемой души. Я там родился, там провел свое детство, туда часто еду повидаться со своей мамой. Я всегда считал и продолжаю считать, что только близорукость, амбиции, безответственность и, не в последнюю очередь, тайные экономические интересы политиков с одной и с другой стороны Днестра являются причинами вражды, которая разъединила наши берега. Мог бы быть естественный путь решения конфликта — уйти на пенсию всем тем, которые породили его. В Кишиневе дело будто прояснилось. Остается, чтобы избиратели Приднестровья сказали свое слово. Но до тех пор готов в любое время продолжать прежние переговоры или начать новые с тираспольским руководством. При двух условиях: 1) чтобы эти переговоры в действительности имели конкретную конечную цель во времени и четко сформулированные задачи; 2) чтобы переговоры не ставили под вопрос территориальную целостность Республики Молдова»5.

В инаугурационной речи 7 апреля 2001 г. третий президент Молдовы уделил большое внимание проблеме Приднестровья:

4

Там же. Январь 2001 г.

5

Прорыв. С. 412.

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«Консолидация общества и ветвей власти будет способствовать и восстановлению территориальной целостности страны, окончательному разрешению приднестровского конфликта. Необходима консолидация в самом широком смысле слова — от простого населения, предпринимательских структур вплоть до политических партий и органов власти. Но такая консолидация не произойдет сама собой. Тем более, что искусственное разделение страны и народа в течение десяти лет кому-то приносит весьма немалые дивиденды. Кому политические, кому чисто финансовые. Значит, нужны эффективные усилия, чтобы жестко пресечь этот опасный «бизнес» и начать извлекать экономические выгоды от движения навстречу друг другу. И в данном случае опять необходима прежде всего политическая воля, чтобы изменить сами принципы переговорного процесса. Следует отказаться от непродуктивных взаимных обвинений и придирок и сформулировать взаимоприемлемые, конкретные предложения, основанные на разумном компромиссе. Только при этом условии станет по-настоящему плодотворной роль других участников переговорного процесса, в первую очередь России»6.

Спустя два дня после инаугурации, 9 апреля 2001 г., Воронин встречается в Кишиневе с тираспольским лидером Игорем Смирновым. По итогам встречи было подписано «Совместное заявление руководителей Республики Молдова и Приднестровья», в котором говорилось: «В ходе встречи 9 апреля 2001 г. руководители Республики Молдова и Приднестровья обсудили состояние и ход переговорного процесса, а также новую политическую ситуацию в Республике Молдова. Были затронуты вопросы, связанные с восстановлением экспертной работы в рамках существующего переговорного процесса, установлены сроки следующей встречи экспертных групп сторон, подтверждена действенность ранее подписанных документов. Руководители Республики Молдова и Приднестровья условились встречаться ежемесячно. Стороны подтверждают намерения рассмотреть вопрос о вступлении в Союз Белоруссии и России, а также о придании русскому языку статус государственного. 6 Инаугурационная речь Президента Республики Молдова Владимира Воронина. Кишинев, 2001. С. 15.

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Стороны согласились создать необходимые условия для реального улучшения экономической ситуации, роста благосостояния населения сторон и сделать экономическое взаимодействие приоритетным направлением перспективной деятельности. В этих целях: - осуществить гармонизацию налогового и таможенного законодательств сторон, в том числе с учетом вступления РМ во Всемирную Торговую Организацию, и на основе этого упразднить таможенные и налоговые посты, установленные при въездах в Приднестровье со стороны Республики Молдова; - реализовать совместные скоординированные меры, обеспечивающие привлечение и защиту иностранных инвестиций. Обсудив проблему взаимного признания действия на территории РМ и Приднестровья документов, выдаваемых компетентными органами сторон, была достигнута договоренность о необходимости ускорения работы по согласованию этого перечня и подписанию совместного Протокола. Достигнута договоренность способствовать беспрепятственной деятельности на территории Приднестровья и Республики Молдова средств массовой информации, распространению печатных изданий и телепрограмм сторон. Стороны выражают приверженность принципам мирного политического урегулирования, взаимосогласованных решений и равенства сторон в переговорном процессе и исходят из необходимости скорейшей разработки и подписания итогового документа о всеобъемлющем урегулировании отношений между Республикой Молдова и Приднестровьем, а также соглашения о мерах доверия, взаимных и внешних гарантиях. В рамках экспертного взаимодействия в переговорном процессе стороны будут учитывать собственные проекты и разработки, а также рекомендации и предложения посредников. Стороны считают, что реализация намеченных шагов отвечает взаимным интересам и будет способствовать утверждению атмосферы взаимопонимания и сотрудничества между Республикой Молдова и Приднестровьем»7.

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Спустя месяц, 16 мая 2001 г., в Тирасполе прошла вторая встреча Воронина со Смирновым (как оказалось, она стала последней). В «Протоколе встречи руководителей Республики Молдова и Приднестровья» Кишинев обязался погасить свою задолженность перед Тирасполем за поставки электроэнергии с Молдавской ГРЭС и подготовить проект решения о возмещении Приднестровью ущерба, нанесенного во время вооруженного конфликта 1992 г.8 Стороны подписали также «Протокол о взаимном признании действия на территории Приднестровья и Республики Молдова документов, выдаваемых компетентными органами Сторон»; протокольные решения «О гарантиях привлечения и защиты иностранных инвестиций и сотрудничества в области инвестиционной деятельности», «О гармонизации налогового и таможенного законодательства», «О мерах по содействию беспрепятственной деятельности на территории Республики Молдова и Приднестровья средств массовой информации, распространения периодических изданий и телепрограмм»9. На этом «медовый месяц» в отношениях нового молдавского и старого кишиневского лидеров закончился. После того как летом 2001 г. силовые структуры Приднестровья не пропустили Воронина в Кицканский монастырь, расположенный в Левобережье Днестра, отношение молдавского президента к Тирасполю резко изменилось. Осенью началась кампания по выборам президента ПМР, назначенным на 9 декабря 2001 г. Именно тогда прозвучали первые залпы пропагандистской войны между Ворониным и Смирновым, которая не утихает и сегодня.

«СО СМИРНОВЫМ МЫ НИЧЕГО НЕ РЕШИМ» Лето и осень 2001 г. прошли под знаком резких нападок официальных лиц и средств массовой информации Молдовы на тираспольского лидера Игоря Смирнова с очевидной целью не 8

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http://www.olvia.idknet.com/documenti_yr.htm; http://www.olvia.idknet.com/ reshenie16.htm; http://www.olvia.idknet.com/customs16.htm; http://www.olvia. idknet.com/smi16.htm; 9

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допустить его переизбрания на пост президента ПМР. В интервью газете «Известия» 10 июля 2001 г. Воронин сказал: «Со Смирновым мы ничего не решим. Так же как и на правом берегу требовалась смена политиков, у которых руки были в крови, — я имею в виду Мирчу Снегура, — так и в Тирасполе необходима смена власти. К управлению там должны прийти трезвомыслящие люди, патриоты Приднестровья и Молдовы, с которыми можно было бы вести диалог. Смирнов — это ведь не все Приднестровье. Полагаю, жители левого берега устали от Смирнова, от постоянного нагнетания страха и напряжения, от беспрецедентного для такой маленькой территории разгула преступности, от нищеты и отсутствия перспектив. В декабре там предстоят выборы, и я не исключаю, что в Приднестровье могут произойти серьезные перемены. На этот раз Смирнову будет не так легко, как раньше, сохранить свою власть»10

В это же время Кишинев выдвинул против руководства Приднестровья обвинения в том, что они превратили регион в «мафиозный рай». «Сформировавшиеся за эти годы мафиозно-государственные структуры Приднестровья очень заинтересованы, чтобы все оставалось по-прежнему. Неподконтрольное правительство, прозрачные для контрабанды, коррупции, криминалитета границы и тому подобное», — сказал Воронин 7 августа 2001 г. во время интернет-конференции портала GazetaSNG.ru. В самый разгар избирательной кампании в Приднестровье Воронин выступает по российской радиостанции «Маяк» и повторяет: «С Игорем Смирновым вести переговоры невозможно. Смирнов и его ближайшее окружение не заинтересованы в нормализации отношений. Их устраивает нынешнее положение, создавшееся за последние 10 лет, и они хотят законсервировать ситуацию. Введение нового таможенного обеспечения с особенной ясностью показало, что единственная цель нынешней администрации Приднестровья — сохранить в регионе «коридор контрабанды», которая все эти годы поддерживается коррумпированными, мафиозными структурами»11.

10

http://www.izvestia.ru/rubr.cgi?idr=523&idbl=&id=2214

11

Независимая Молдова. 22 ноября 2001 г.

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Пропагандистские залпы сопровождались дипломатическим и экономическим давлением. Тридцать первого августа 2001 г. МИД Молдовы обратился с рекомендацией к дипломатическим миссиям, аккредитованным в Кишиневе, не выдавать въездные визы представителям органов государственной власти Приднестровья, и к странам СНГ с призывом не поддерживать контакты с представителями Приднестровья. С 1 сентября 2001 г. Молдова аннулировала таможенные печати, которые ранее выдала таможенным органам Приднестровья, и ввела новое таможенное обеспечение, объясняя это необходимостью выполнять требования Всемирной торговой организации. На выборах в декабре 2001 г. молдавские средства массовой информации активно поддержали главу администрации г. Бендеры Тома Зеновича и депутата Верховного Совета ПМР Александра Радченко. Последнего Воронин даже принимал в своей резиденции в Кишиневе. Однако фавориты Кишинева набрали не более пяти процентов голосов, а Игорь Смирнов вновь уверенно победил 9 декабря 2001 г. С 1 января 2002 г. Молдова изменила порядок выдачи сертификатов происхождения, не признавая право соответствующих органов Приднестровья осуществлять таможенное оформление. Предприятиям региона было предложено вести внешнеэкономическую деятельность в соответствии с законодательством Молдовы, для чего зарегистрироваться в Кишиневе и перечислять платежи в молдавский бюджет. В Тирасполе эти меры расценили как нарушение прежних договоренностей и начало экономической блокады. Восемнадцатого февраля 2002 г. Смирнов выступил с заявлением, в котором, в частности, говорится: «Сложившаяся ситуация является разрушительной для экономики Приднестровья в целом. Предприятия несут огромные убытки, оказываются не в состоянии осуществлять экспорт продукции в полном объеме, не имеют возможности отвечать по своим обязательствам перед зарубежными партнерами. Силовое давление на Приднестровье сопровождается беспрецедентной информационной войной с использованием необоснованных, не имеющих связи с реальностью обвинений, дискредитирующих руководство Приднестровья и весь приднестровский народ».

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За действиями Кишинева, считает Смирнов, кроется «намерение любой ценой завладеть экономическим потенциалом Приднестровья, продлить агонию тоталитарной власти в Молдове»12. Обращаясь к народу по случаю первой годовщины вступления в должность президента, Воронин подтвердил, что «задача объединения страны остается приоритетной и будет решена сугубо демократическим путем»13.

МНОГО ПЛАНОВ — И НИЧЕГО В последующие пять лет в среднем выдвигалось по одному плану решения проблемы Приднестровья в год, но воз и ныне там. В июле 2001 г. был обнародован так называемый Киевский документ посредников, в котором впервые говорилось о федерализации Молдовы. «Республика Молдова — демократическое федеративное правовое государство», — записано в проекте Соглашения, которое должны были подписать представители Кишинева и Тирасполя. Проект предусматривал создание в рамках Молдовы государственно-территориальных образований со своими конституциями, законами и органами государственной власти, изменение Конституции Молдовы и избрание нового двухпалатного парламента федеративного государства14. Официальный Кишинев приветствовал инициативу посредников. Президент Владимир Воронин заявил: «План интеграции нашего государства, предложенный ОБСЕ, вероятно, навсегда войдет в историю этого столетия. Это первый план не «культурного развода» противостоящих сторон, а план объединения сторон, разрешения конфликта, план, закладывающий исторически апробированные и выверенные формы возможного государственного устройства»15.

12

http://www.olvia.idknet.com/ol52-02-02.htm

13

Независимая Молдова. 9 апреля 2002 г.

14

Там же. 9 июля 2002 г.

15

Там же. 17 июля 2003 г.

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Однако никаких практических шагов по реализации проекта этого соглашения сделано не было, и этот документ так и остался лишь проектом. В феврале 2003 г. Воронин обнародовал инициативу принятия новой Конституции Молдовы, в соответствии с которой Приднестровье получило бы статус субъекта молдавской федерации16.Он заявил: «Совместная разработка и принятие новой Конституции государства станут лучшей гарантией нашей взаимной искренности, открытости и конструктивности. Я убежден, что новая Конституция станет лучшей гарантией того, что печальный опыт десятилетней давности не повторится никогда»17.

По решению парламента Молдовы и Верховного Совета ПМР была создана совместная конституционная комиссия для разработки проекта Основного закона федеративного государства. Одновременно, на фоне работы комиссии летом 2003 г. президент Владимир Воронин обращается к своему российскому коллеге Владимиру Путину с просьбой активнее помочь в урегулировании приднестровского конфликта. Путин командирует в Молдову зам. главы своей администрации Дмитрия Козака, который проводит не один раунд челночной дипломатии между Кишиневом и Тирасполем, результатом которой стал проект меморандума о нормализации отношений между Молдовой и Приднестровьем больше известный как меморандум Козака, или проект асимметричной федерации. Он был опубликован в правительственных изданиях Молдовы 18 ноября 2003 г., после чего в течение недели активно обсуждался в молдавских СМИ, получив самые позитивные оценки президента. Двадцатого ноября 2003 г. Владимир Воронин встречается с дипломатическим корпусом, аккредитованным в Кишиневе, и заявляет: «Россия предложила свой план урегулирования. Сразу хочу сказать, что данный план не возник на пустом месте. В значительной мере он опирается на наши инициативы. Сегодня, как никогда прежде, 16

Там же. 16 февраля 2003 г.

17

Там же. 18 марта 2003 г.

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шансы урегулирования возросли, и будет непростительной ошибкой не воспользоваться всеми выгодными сторонами сложившейся ситуации. Пойти на подписание меморандума — это, конечно, большая смелость, грандиозная ответственность. Но это куда меньший риск, чем риск дальнейшего противостояния. Мы знаем, что в случае подписания этого документа будет много недовольных, но мы должны сегодня руководствоваться интересами большинства. Их голос и будет определяющим на референдуме по проекту новой Конституции. Я уверен, что будущая Конституция станет Основным законом, по которому уже никогда на берегах Днестра не прольется кровь»18.

Двадцать четвертого ноября 2003 г. появляются сообщения о том, что на следующий день утром в Кишинев для участия в церемонии подписания меморандума прибывает президент России Владимир Путин. И тут в события вмешивается Запад. Из Брюсселя Воронину звонит действующий председатель ОБСЕ Яап де Хооп Скеффер и сообщает, что эта организация не может одобрить российский меморандум. Администрацию президента Молдовы навещает посол США в Кишиневе Хетер Ходжес. Воронину звонят генеральный секретарь Совета Европы Вальтер Швиммер и верховный комиссар Европейского союза по внешней политике и безопасности Хавьер Солана. Они также не одобряют проект меморандума. Утром 25 ноября 2003 г. в Кишиневе проходят акции протеста оппозиции, в ходе которых сжигаются российские флаги и портреты Путина. В этот момент администрация Воронина объявляет о том, что визит Путина не состоится. Пресс-служба Воронина выступила с разъяснением, суть которого сводилась к тому, что Россия не смогла договориться с международным сообществом по поводу своего плана для Молдовы. В тот же день Дмитрий Козак проводит в кишиневском аэропорту пресс-конференцию, на которой демонстрирует журналистам оригинал проекта меморандума, на каждой странице которого стоят подписи Владимира Воронина и Игоря Смирнова. Поведение молдавских партнеров Козак расценил как нечто находящееся «по ту сторону добра и зла». Правительственная газета «Независимая Молдова» пишет: 18

Там же. 21 ноября 2003 г.

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«Трудно представить себе подписание документа о приднестровском урегулировании, который не получил поддержку ОБСЕ — ключевого участника процесса. Срыв подписания меморандума — это моральный удар по процессу переговоров. Но обвинять только Кишинев в том, что меморандум не подписан, было бы неверно, хотя, может быть, для кого-то и утешительно. Жизнь не кончилась — хотя радости в ней тоже не прибавилось»19

Неподписание в ноябре 2003 г. уже парафированного российского плана по урегулированию приднестровской проблемы стало рубиконом, после которого молдово-российские и молдово-приднестровские отношения стали развиваться от плохого к худшему. Первого июня 2004 г. президент Молдовы предпринимает новую попытку реанимировать переговорный процесс. Он обнародует инициативу «Пакт стабильности и безопасности для Молдовы», которая предполагала проведение политической конференции на уровне глав внешнеполитических ведомств России, США, Румынии, Украины и Европейского союза и подписание ими «Пакта для Молдовы». Этот документ признавал бы ее территориальную целостность и нейтралитет и предусматривал урегулирование приднестровской проблемы на основе федеративных принципов государственного устройства20. Ни одна из сторон, к которой обращался президент Воронин, не дала положительного ответа на его инициативу. Шестого марта 2005 г. в Молдове прошли очередные парламентские выборы. Депутаты нового законодательного органа переизбрали лидера Партии коммунистов Владимира Воронина на пост президента. Первым документом, который принял новый парламент, стала декларация о поддержке проевропейского выбора Молдовы. Кишинев стал активно настаивать на расширении формата переговоров по Приднестровью путем подключения к ним в качестве наблюдателей Европейского союза и США. Выступая 22 апреля на саммите региональной организации ГУАМ в Кишиневе, президент Украины Виктор Ющенко объявил, что намерен предложить свой план урегулирования приднестровской 19

Там же. 27 ноября 2003 г.

20

Молдова суверанэ. 2 июня 2004 г.

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проблемы. Он был обнародован в мае21. «Приднестровье в составе Республики Молдова является особой административно-территориальной единицей в форме республики», — говорилось в плане. Он включал три этапа, каждый из которых не превышал по времени шести месяцев, а его целью была объявлена «реинтеграция Республики Молдова на основе единства территории и государственной власти, демократического политического устройства». На первом этапе Украина предлагала парламенту Молдовы не позднее июля 2005 г. принять закон об основных положениях статуса Приднестровья и провести не позднее октября-ноября 2005 г. выборы в Верховный Совет Приднестровья под международным контролем. Согласно плану Украины единственным субъектом международного права должна была оставаться Молдова, а Приднестровье стало бы республикой в ее составе со своей конституцией, символикой, тремя официальными языками — молдавским, украинским и русским — и правом устанавливать внешние контакты в экономической и гуманитарной сфере. Система гарантий для Приднестровья должна была включать право выхода из состава Молдовы в случае ее присоединения к другому государству и (или) с утратой международной правосубъектности. На втором этапе новоизбранный Верховный Совет Приднестровья должен был делегировать своих представителей в комиссию парламента Молдовы, которой следовало разработать закон об особом правовом статусе Приднестровья. Третий этап предполагал «полное урегулирование приднестровской проблемы, правовое обеспечение особого статуса Приднестровья в составе Молдовы». Планировалось разработать договор между Молдовой, Россией, Украиной и ОБСЕ о гарантиях этого статуса. Договор должен был утвердить парламент Молдовы, после чего вступал бы в силу закон об особом статусе Приднестровья, и Верховный Совет региона принял бы собственную конституцию. Десятого июня 2005 г. парламент Молдовы принимает «Декларацию об инициативе Украины по урегулированию приднестровского конфликта»22, а 22 июля 2005 г. — «Закон об основных 21

Независимая Молдова. 20 мая 2005 г.

22

Monitorul Oficial, N83-85, 17 июня 2005 г.

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положениях особого правового статуса населенных пунктов левобережья Днестра (Приднестровья)»23. В Декларации депутаты парламента зафиксировали принцип «3 Д» — демилитаризации, декриминализации и демократизации Приднестровья, который предполагалось реализовать до получения регионом особого автономного статуса. Молдова призвала Россию вывести свои войска и вооружения из приднестровского региона до конца 2005 г. Депутаты предложили провести выборы в Приднестровье под международным контролем, а перед этим ликвидировать местные структуры госбезопасности, допустить молдавские партии и средства массовой информации в левобережье Днестра и подтвердить молдавское гражданство участвовавших в выборах приднестровцев. Парламент высказался за свертывание российско-молдавско-приднестровской миротворческой операции и замену ее механизмом международных военных и гражданских наблюдателей под эгидой ОБСЕ. Молдавский закон о статусе Приднестровья предусматривает сохранение Молдовы как унитарного государства и предоставление Левобережью статуса автономии. Тирасполь расценил решения парламента Молдовы как фактическое дезавуирование плана Ющенко. График, который был обозначен в этом документе, был сорван, и сегодня план украинского президента уже не рассматривается в качестве реальной «дорожной карты».

НЕОПРЕДЕЛЕННОЕ БУДУЩЕЕ МОЛДОВЫ Так озаглавлен последний доклад по Молдове, выпущенный в августе 2006 г. International Crisis Group24. Этот заголовок очень точно отражает перспективы как молдавского государства в целом, так и возможностей приднестровского урегулирования в частности. Тридцатого декабря 2005 г. было подписано совместное заявление премьер-министров Молдовы и Украины, согласно которому Украина признает лишь таможенные печати Молдовы, 23

Monitorul Oficial, N101-103, 29 июля 2005 г.

24

http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?1=1&id=4340.

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а Молдова облегчает регистрацию в Кишиневе приднестровских предприятий. Реализация этого заявления началась третьего марта 2006 г. Тирасполь и Москва назвали это экономической блокадой Приднестровья, а Кишинев, который поддержали Киев, Вашингтон и Брюссель, — наведением порядка на молдавско-украинской границе. Ужесточение позиции Кишинева и Запада по отношению к Тирасполю привело к введению экономических санкций со стороны России в отношении Молдовы. В 2006 г. Газпром в два раза повысил тариф на поставляемый Молдове газ — с $80 до $160 за 1.000 кубометров. Россия ввела запрет на ввоз в страну молдавской винодельческой продукции, для которой российский рынок всегда был основным. В результате международные финансовые организации снизили прогноз экономического роста Молдовы в 2006 г. с 6-7 до 3-4%. Переговорный процесс был прерван, и перспективы его возобновления выглядят весьма неопределенными. Одна из последних оценок, которую президент Владимир Воронин дал сложившейся ситуации, была сделана 15 июня 2006 г. во время его выступления в Фонде Фридриха Эберта в Берлине: «Территориальный конфликт между Кишиневом и Тирасполем 1992 г., выйдя из своей горячей фазы, завершился сговором чиновников с обоих берегов Днестра и оформлением Приднестровья в качестве черного оффшора, надежно охраняемого приднестровскими спецслужбами и иностранным военным присутствием. Судите сами, 460 км приднестровского участка молдавско-украинской границы, которые не контролировались ни Киевом, ни Кишиневом, позволили создать уникальную и сверхдоходную модель, в которой такие операции, как фиктивный экспорт и импорт, контрабанда, были самыми невинными действиями. Курс на европейскую интеграцию во многом стал причиной нового понимания всего того, что называется гарантиями приднестровского урегулирования. В ноябре 2003 г. мы, например, не могли согласиться с тем, что условием реинтеграции станет военное присутствие России до 2020 г. Согласиться с таким предложением значило бы отказаться от избранного пути развития, сделать Молдову заложником замороженного конфликта минимум на полтора десятилетия. Подобного рода гарантии — анахронизм, такие гарантии, как правило, ничего

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по существу, кроме сохранения разделительных линий, не гарантируют. Напомню, приднестровский конфликт — не межэтнический, не межконфессиональный, это не конфликт, как часто пишут в западной прессе, русскоязычного анклава и Молдовы. Это не так. Только в одном Кишиневе русскоязычных проживает больше, чем во всем Приднестровье, а Молдова официально именует себя полиэтничным государством. Конфликт этот исключительно состоит в том, что в Приднестровье сегодня сформировался авторитарный милитаризованный клан, правящий при помощи политической полиции и прикрывающийся военным присутствием России. С нашей точки зрения, гарантии урегулирования — это в первую очередь необратимость европейского курса Молдовы, инициирование нормального демократического процесса в Приднестровье, население которого обретет, наконец, все свои гражданские права, получит паспорта, узаконит свою собственность, сможет участвовать в выборах в общегосударственные и региональные институты власти. Это и есть гарантии, а не чье бы то ни было военное присутствие. Но, так или иначе, эта позиция серьезно осложнила наши двусторонние отношения с Россией. Кроме того, значительная часть боеприпасов и военного имущества, принадлежащих Российской Федерации, вопреки стамбульским обязательствам 1999 г. остается на территории Молдовы. А это около 22 тыс. тонн рассыпающихся от ветхости, коррозии и времени снарядов и мин. Солидарный европейский выбор Молдовы и Украины позволил нашим странам занять единую позицию в дни тяжелого газового кризиса, который случился в самом начале этого года. Когда Газпром в холодные январские дни полностью перестал подавать газ Молдове, нас фактически спасла позиция президента Украины Виктора Ющенко. Украина в течение двух недель обеспечивала Молдову своим газом. Эту поддержку наш народ будет помнить всегда. Но и общность позиции по приднестровскому урегулированию остается самым значительным капиталом наших двусторонних отношений, наших отношений с Европейским союзом. Совместные действия Кишинева, Киева и ЕС на приднестровском участке молдавско-украинской государственной границы разрушили наконец бесперебойную работу черного оффшора в Приднестровье и создали условия для беспрепятственной и легальной деятельности приднестровских предпринимателей. Конечно, жаль, что и этот процесс вновь оказался заложником приднестровских властей, занявших позицию самоизоляции и самоблокады. Вызывает озабоченность и то, что

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именно из-за этой нашей позиции Россия вводит против Молдовы настоящее эмбарго на все виды нашего экспорта — от плодоовощной продукции до вина. Но мы уверены в том, что и в Москве скоро оценят справедливость нашего общего подхода к приднестровской проблеме, равно как и безальтернативность европейской интеграции для Молдовы»25.

Однако Москва не торопится оценить кишиневский подход к приднестровской проблеме, о чем свидетельствует поддержка, которую оказали российские государственные структуры и неправительственные организации референдуму о независимости Приднестровья, проведенному 17 сентября 2006 г. На референдум были вынесены два вопроса: «Поддерживаете ли вы курс на независимость Приднестровской Молдавской Республики и последующее свободное присоединение Приднестровья к Российской Федерации?» и «Считаете ли вы возможным отказ от независимости Приднестровской Молдавской Республики с последующим вхождением Приднестровья в состав Республики Молдова?». Избиратели почти единогласно проголосовали за независимость отколовшегося от Молдовы региона и его возможное присоединение к России. При необходимой явке в 50% плюс один голос на избирательные участки пришли 78,6% из 390 000 зарегистрированных избирателей. По первому вопросу «за» проголосовали 97,1%, «против» — 2,3%, по второму вопросу «за» — 3,4%, «против» — 94,6% избирателей. Молдова, Европейский союз, ОБСЕ, западные страны заранее объявили, что считают референдум в Приднестровье незаконным и не признают его результатов. После объявления итогов референдума лидер региона Игорь Смирнов сказал в обращении к приднестровцам, что общего государства с Молдовой уже не будет. «В Приднестровье и Молдове выросло целое поколение молодых людей, которые разделяют разные ценности. Мы выбираем Россию, а они стремятся в Европейский союз и НАТО... Только сумасшедший может попытаться объединить это. Приднестровский народ видит свое будущее только в сотрудничестве с Великой Россией»26. 25 Press Digest on Transnistrian Conflict. Foreign Policy Association of Moldova, May 19, 2006, Special issue 19. 26

Ольвия-пресс. 18 сентября 2006 г.

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Россия призвала Запад и международные организации признать референдум как факт политической жизни и направила в Приднестровье группу наблюдателей — депутатов Государственной думы и представителей общественных организаций. Министр иностранных дел России Сергей Лавров заявил, что результаты референдума были предсказуемы. «Это лишнее подтверждение того непреложного тезиса, что урегулировать конфликт надо на основе всех имеющихся договоренностей», — сказал Лавров27. Тирасполь рассчитывает, что недавний референдум о независимости Черногории и предстоящее признание независимости Косово создадут прецедент и будут способствовать признанию независимости Приднестровья и других сепаратистских регионов на территории бывшего СССР. Однако на Западе заявляют, что опыт автономий бывшей Югославии нельзя переносить на экс-советские республики. Официальный Кишинев, как магическое заклинание, повторяет слова о том, что международное сообщество признает территориальную целостность Республики Молдова. Формально это так, но на сегодняшний день территориально целостная Молдова — это лишь возможность, но никак не реальность. Придя к власти в 2001 г., лидер Партии коммунистов Владимир Воронин призывал урегулировать приднестровскую проблему за один год. С тех пор прошло уже пять с половиной лет, а проблема Приднестровья находится гораздо дальше от своего разрешения, чем в момент прихода Воронина к власти. Позиции сторон выглядят непримиримыми как никогда. Закон Молдовы о статусе Приднестровья настаивает на сохранении унитарного характера молдавского государства. Приднестровцы на своем референдуме высказались против объединения с Молдовой и за присоединение к России. Удастся ли когда-либо Кишиневу и Тирасполю договориться о взаимоприемлемом компромиссе, сегодня не возьмется предсказать никто. Кишинев, сентябрь 2006 г.

27

Интерфакс. 18 сентября 2006 г.

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Приднестровский конфликт продолжает оставаться одной из самых больших проблем для политических партий и экспертного сообщества Молдовы. С самого начала посткоммунистического переходного периода в молдавском обществе сформировался запрос на предложения по разрешению конфликта, что заставляет политические партии определяться по комплексу вопросов, связанных с конфликтом. Аналогично и экспертное сообщество сталкивается с необходимостью объяснять и интерпретировать своей аудитории внутри страны проблематику конфликта. Эксперты опираются на свое собственное видение причин и путей его разрешения. Авторы данного исследования используют методологию опроса партийных и экспертных элит для определения позиционирования политических партий и экспертного сообщества по ряду проблем, относящихся к приднестровскому конфликту. Предлагаемое исследование содержит детальный анализ задокументированных различий и сходств позиций ведущих политических партий Молдовы по различным аспектам приднестровского конфликта. Мы также попытались зафиксировать и проанализировать временную динамику партийной конкуренции по приднестровской проблеме в Молдове.

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МЕТОДОЛОГИЯ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ Для проведения опроса партийных функционеров и членов экспертного сообщества мы разработали анкету, основанную на шкале Ликерта. Наряду с общими идеологическими вопросами, в нее был включен и ряд вопросов, относящихся к приднестровскому конфликту. Партийным функционерам было предложено оценить по 10-балльной шкале позиционирование собственной партии, а также других политических партий по каждой приоблеме. Членов экспертного сообщества попросили оценить позиции партий, а также указать свою собственную точку зрения. Опрос проводился с декабря 2005 г. по февраль 2006 г. (Приложение I). В исследование были включены политические партии и блоки, получившие более 2% голосов на последних парламентских выборах в марте 2005 г.: Партия коммунистов Республики Молдова (ПКРМ), Партия Альянс «Moldova Noastra» (АМН), Христианская демократическая народная партия (ХДНП), Демократическая партия Молдовы (ДПМ), Социал-либеральная партия (СЛП), Социал-демократическая партия Молдовы (СДПМ) и блок «Патрия-Родина-Равноправие» (П-Р-Р). В Приложении V представлена краткая характеристика каждой партии / партийного блока. Всего был опрошен 101 партийный функционер: по 15 представителей от ПКРМ, АМН, ХДНП, ДПМ, СЛП и СДПМ, а также 11 членов блока П-Р-Р. Наименьшее представительство П-Р-Р отражает тот факт, что эта партия имеет наименьшее число территориальных организаций по сравнению с другими партиями, участвовавшими в опросе. Ее организационные структуры представлены только в нескольких административно-территориальных объединениях в северной части Молдовы, в основном в муниципии Бельцы, а также в Гагауз-Йери и муниципии Кишинэу. На начальной стадии исследования мы обратились в секретариаты политических партий с просьбой предоставить нам имена по крайней мере трех функционеров партии в каждом из следующих пяти географических регионов: Север, Центр, Юг, Гагауз-Йери и Кишинэу. Гагауз-Йери был единственным регионом, где мы столкнулись с трудностями в определении респондентов. В нем

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имеют свои организационные представительства только ПКРМ, П-Р-Р и в меньшей степени АМН. Возможно, это является следствием недостаточной интеграции Гагаузии в общенациональный политической процесс. Также были проведены детальные анкетные интервью с 11 членами экспертного сообщества, которые были отобраны по статусу, знаниям и опыту исследования проблем партийной системы. Они представляли различные сегменты гражданского общества: аналитические центры (Институт общественных политик, Ассоциация по демократии, Институт по развитию и социальным инициативам «Viitorul»), прессу (радио «Свободная Европа», газета «Молдавские ведомости», газета «Журнал Chişinău»), а также академические институты (Молдавский государственный университет, Институт политических исследований и международных отношений). Экспертам, как и партийным функционерам, было предложено оценить позиции партий на текущий момент (2006 г.), а также дать их ретроспективную оценку в 2001 г.1 Среди молдавских аналитиков существует мнение, что парламентские выборы 2001 г. ознаменовали кардинальные изменения в партийной системе Молдовы. Прежде всеґо они характеризуются приходом к власти коммунистической партии, которая доминировала в молдавской политической жизни длительный период. Исходя из этих соображений 2001 г. был выбран как базовый для изучения динамики изменения позиций главных политических партий. Анкета для 2001 г. включала большинство вопросов, предложенных в анкете для 2006 г., однако некоторые из них не были включены в силу их неактуальности в 2001 г. Список вопросов, включенных в анкету, и формулировка альтернатив ответов для каждого из вопросов представлены в Приложении II. Вопросы должны были соответствовать двум критериям: быть актуальными и резонансными, а также спорными, то есть такими, в отношении которых существуют позиционные альтернативы. Мы старались избегать включения в анкету вопросов, по которым между позициями партий нет серьезных различий и они лишь оспаривают способности своих конкурентов реализовать определенный 1 Часть анкеты, касающаяся ретроспективной оценки позиций партий, была заполнена только десятью опрошенными экспертами.

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политический курс, так называемых валентных вопросов. Примером последнего в случае с Молдовой может быть вопрос о необходимости добиваться реинтеграции Приднестровья.

ГРАДАЦИЯ ВАЖНОСТИ ВОПРОСОВ И УРОВНЕЙ ПОЛЯРИЗАЦИИ ПАРТИЙНОЙ СИСТЕМЫ: РЕЗУЛЬТАТЫ АНКЕТИРОВАНИЯ

Представление результатов мы начинаем с краткого обсуждения оценок степени важности отдельных вопросов и степени партийной поляризации по каждой из проблем. Различия в оценках являются ценным источником информации о характере партийной конкуренции в данной политической системе. Во второй части исследования мы представляем детальный анализ позиций партий по некоторым ключевым вопросам. Важность / значимость проблем, имеющих отношение к конфликту При заполнении анкеты респонденты должны были оценить по 5-балльной шкале важность каждого вопроса. В Приложении III показано распределение вопросов согласно этому критерию. Значимость для партийных элит каждой из включенных в анкету проблем была рассчитана как среднеарифметическая оценок, данных всеми политиками независимо от их партийной принадлежности. Тот факт, что ни по одной из проблем среднее значение степени важности, рассчитанное как на основе полной выборки, так и на основе выборок, включающих только функционеров отдельных партий, не было ниже 3 баллов, указывает на то, что вопросы анкеты созвучны проблемам, с которыми сталкиваются партийные функционеры. Вопрос о государственном устройстве, содержащий альтернативу федеральная / унитарная модель, был обозначен партийными функционерами как наиболее важный. Возможно, это отражает общественный резонанс, который вызвала инициатива по федера-

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лизации, предложенная коммунистической партией как база для разрешения приднестровского конфликта в начале парламентского срока 2001-2005 гг. Изменение формата переговоров по разрешению приднестровского конфликта (придание ЕС и США статуса полноправных участников), а также вопрос о российском военном присутствии в Приднестровье также были оценены как крайне важные. Вопрос об участии Румынии в переговорах по разрешению конфликта был оценен как наименее важный среди включенных в анкетный опрос. Также оказалась среди последних по значимости и проблема дальнейшего усовершенствования автономного статуса Гагаузии, которая иногда поднимается в контексте обсуждения вопроса о будущем статусе Приднестровья. Вопрос об участии Румынии наглядно показывает значительную вариацию в политических приоритетах отдельных партий. Как видно из Приложения ІІІ, респонденты из Христианско-демократической народной партии, которая традиционно является наиболее прорумынской, считают его крайне важным (5 баллов), в то время как опрошенные из ряда других партий оценили его важность менее чем в 4 балла. В целом данные, приведенные в Приложении ІІІ, свидетельствуют о том, что партийные деятели относят вопросы, связанные с приднестровским конфликтом, к особо важным. Средняя оценка важности вопросов, перечисленных в Приложении, составила 4.55. Это очень высокий результат и в сравнительном плане. Одно из влиятельных исследований, использовавшее аналогичную методологию для анализа важности разных групп проблем в партийных системах Центральной Европы, приводит данные, согласно которым средний показатель важности вопросов экономического плана, которые традиционно являются очень острыми, колебался для отдельных стран между 4.12 и 4.78 балла2. Существует, однако, и иная интерпретация столь высокого показателя важности группы вопросов, касающихся Приднестровья. Тот факт, что молдавские политики оценили все вопросы анкеты как практически одинаково важные, может свидетельствовать о недостаточной способности вычленять наиболее важные проблемы, 2 Kitschelt H., Mansfeldova Z., Markowski R. and Toka G. Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation and Inter-party Cooperation. Cambridge University Press, 1999. P. 162-163.

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связанные с приднестровским конфликтом. Иначе мы получили бы более низкий балл средней значимости группы вопросов, посвященных конфликту. Уровень поляризации позиций партий по отдельным вопросам Для оценки степени поляризации позиций партий по вопросам, перечисленным в анкете, мы использовали другой стандартный показатель, который часто применяют в литературе о партийных системах. Это стандартное отклонение средних баллов оценки позиций отдельных партий респондентами из числа партийных функционеров. Для оценки партийного позиционирования мы использовали 10-балльную шкалу. Более высокий балл стандартного отклонения указывает на то, что позиции партий по данной проблеме более разнообразны и поляризованы. Низкое стандартное отклонение означает меньшую степень поляризации.3 Приложение IV содержит информацию о позиционировании партий по проблемам, связанным с приднестровским конфликтом, а также оценки поляризации позиций партий по каждой отдельной проблеме. Самый высокий уровень поляризации обнаружен по вопросу об участии Румынии в переговорах по разрешению конфликта и о Российском военном присутствии в регионе. Наши респонденты считают, что ХДНП и П-Р-Р — две политические силы, расположенные на противоположных концах политического спектра, занимают наиболее радикальные позиции именно по этим вопросам. Наименее разбросанными оказались позиции партий по вопросу об использовании силы для разрешения приднестровского конфликта. Стандартное отклонение в 1.08 балла свидетельствует о 3 Как отмечают в своем исследовании Китчелт и его соавторы, предложенный показатель имеет определенные недостатки. Высокий балл стандартного отклонения может быть интерпретирован как свидетельство того, что позиции партий по предложенной проблеме являются четкими и значительно различными. Однако, с другой стороны, наличие четких позиций партий по данному вопросу создает стимул для респондентов использовать всю длину шкалы. Таким образом, величина стандартного отклонения растет вне зависимости от уровня реальной поляризации позиций партий. К сожалению, формат анкеты не позволяет нам разграничить эти варианты интерпретации данного показателя.

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лишь небольших различиях. Большинство партий позиционирует себя посередине 10-балльной шкалы, крайние точки которой были заданы в анкете как «военная сила не должна быть использована ни при каких обстоятельствах» и « военная сила может быть использована в случае необходимости». Полученные в результате нашего исследования величины стандартных отклонений свидетельствуют о довольно значительной поляризации партийных позиций по вопросам приднестровского конфликта. Среднеарифметическая величина стандартных отклонений по вопросам, включенным в Приложение IV, составляет 2.06 балла. Для 10-балльной шкалы, на которой отмечены позиции семи партий, стандартное отклонение в 2-2.5 баллов свидетельствует о высоком уровне поляризации, а стандартное отклонение в 1-1.5 баллов — о его низком уровне4. Высокие баллы стандартных отклонений по приднестровской проблеме — в значительной мере результат того, что существуют большие различия между позицией П-Р-Р и всех других партий практически по каждому вопросу, включенному в анкету. Хотя партии, которые находятся в процессе слияния в П-Р-Р, на парламентских выборах 2005 г. суммарно набрали почти 8% голосов избирателей, высокий электоральный порог и организационная раздробленность этих политических сил не позволили им получить представительство в парламенте. Как свидетельствуют данные Приложения IV, между парламентскими партиями существуют намного менее значительные различия по большинству вопросов, связанных с приднестровским конфликтом. Детальный анализ этих различий по некоторым ключевым вопросам предлагается в следующем разделе этой статьи.

4 Это обычная практика интерпретации величины стандартного отклонения. См., напр.: H. Kitschelt and R. Smyth, Programmatic Party Cohesion in Emerging PostCommunist Democracies: Russia in Comparative Context, Comparative Political Studies 35:1228, 2002.

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ПАРТИЙНОЕ ПОЗИЦИОНИРОВАНИЕ ПО КЛЮЧЕВЫМ ВОПРОСАМ

В этой части статьи анализируется информация, полученная в результате использования нескольких индикаторов партийного позиционирования по вопросам приднестровского конфликта. По каждому обсуждаемому вопросу в виде графика представлены среднеарифметические данные экспертных оценок позиций партий в 2001 г. и 2006 г. Следующий график содержит среднеарифметические оценки позиций партий в 2006 г., полученные в результате опроса всех партийных функционеров, включенных в нашу выборку. Как уже отмечалось, им было предложено оценить позицию каждой партии по каждому отдельному вопросу. Последний график представляет данные партийной самооценки, просчитанной как среднеарифметическая оценка партийными функционерами позиции своей партии. Таблицы содержат информацию о том, как эксперты оценили свои собственные позиции по обсуждаемым проблемам. Мы посчитали эти данные важными, поскольку они свидетельствуют о предпочтениях социальной группы, которая играет существенную роль в формировании общественного мнения по вопросам урегулирования приднестровского конфликта. Федерализация Предложение об изменении государственной структуры Республики Молдова приняло четкие очертания после прихода к власти Коммунистической партии в 2001 г. Переход от унитарной системы к федеральной рассматривался как возможность разрешения приднестровского конфликта и гарантия реинтеграции Приднестровья. Однако план по федерализации оказался очень проблематичной инициативой, которая вызвала резко негативную реакцию во многих слоях молдавского общества. Он не позволил существенно продвинуться в процессе урегулирования конфликта, и к концу первого срока пребывания Коммунистической партии у власти утратил свою актуальность. Тем не менее, некоторые меж-

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дународные эксперты считают, что определенная разновидность федерального конституционного устройства, с более сбалансированным разделением власти, чем тот, что был предложен в плане Козака (2003 г.), может создать основу для реинтеграции страны. ГРАФИК 1. ФОРМА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО УСТРОЙСТВА: ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОЕ ГОСУДАРСТВО VERSUS УНИТАРНОЕ ГОСУДАРСТВО

1 А. ДИНАМИКА ПОЗИЦИОНИРОВАНИЯ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ ПАРТИЙ (ЭКСПЕРТНАЯ ОЦЕНКА) 2001 ПКРМ ЭБАБ ДПМ ПВСМ ХДНП 1,8 3,5 5,2 7,8 9,7 ■▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▲▼▬▼▬▲▬■ 1 8,0 9,1 10 СДПМ СЛП 2006 ДПМ 6,5

ПКРМ СЛП 7,3 7,8

ХДНП 9,6

■▬▬▬▬▬▼▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▲▼▬▲▼▬▲▬▬▬▲▬■ 1 2,3 6,7 7,3 10 П-Р-Р СДПМ АМН

1 — федеральное государство 10 — унитарное государство

1 В. ПОЗИЦИИ ПАРТИЙ В ОЦЕНКЕ ПАРТИЙНЫХ ФУНКЦИОНЕРОВ (ОБЩАЯ ВЫБОРКА, 2006 Г.) ПКРМ ДПМ АМН СЛП ХДНП 5,9 6,8 7,4 8,3 9,2 ■▬▬▬▬▬▼▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▲▬▼▲▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▲▬■ 1 2,3 7,2 10 П-Р-Р СДПМ

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1 C. ПАРТИЙНАЯ САМООЦЕНКА (ОЦЕНКА ПОЗИЦИИ ПАРТИИ ПАРТИЙНЫМИ ФУНКЦИОНЕРАМИ — ЧЛЕНАМИ ЭТОЙ ПАРТИИ, 2006 Г.) ПКРМ СЛП ДПМ АМН ХДНП 6,3 7,7 8,4 9,6 9,9 ■▼▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▼▲▬▬▬▲▲■ 1 1,2 8,1 10 П-Р-Р СДПМ

Как свидетельствуют результаты нашего исследования, большинство политической элиты Молдовы, включая представителей правящей партии, на сегодняшний день не разделяет оптимизма по поводу перспектив федерализации. График 1а представляет экспертную оценку динамики изменения позиций партий по проблеме федерального устройства (полная формулировка этого вопроса представлена в Приложении І). Данные графика 1 a указывают, что, по мнению экспертов, между 2001 г. и 2006 г. в позициях главных политических партий произошли драматические изменения в отношении к идее федерализации. Большое разнообразие взглядов на эту проблему является характерной особенностью экспертной оценки позиций политических партий в 2001 г. Эксперты считают, что и ПКРМ и ЭБАБ в начале 2000-х годов допускали возможность федерального устройства. ДПМ заняла центристскую позицию в этом вопросе. Остальные крупные политические силы имели примерно схожие предпочтения и выступали за сохранение унитарного устройства государства. К 2006 г. позиции ключевых политических партий по проблеме федерализации, согласно мнению экспертов, стали существенно ближе. Сохранение унитарной структуры государства стало предпочтением, разделяемым всеми политическими партиями, представленными в парламенте. Наиболее сильно изменилась позиция коммунистической партии (ПКРМ), которая отказалась от идеи федерализации после провала конституционных переговоров с Приднестровьем в 2003 г. Этот факт, а также исчезновение ЭБАБ с политической сцены, означает, что после выборов 2005 г. в парламенте не осталось политических сил, поддерживающих федерализацию.

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График 1 a также свидетельствует, что среднеарифметические оценки экспертами позиций ПКРМ и АМН, двух главных антагонистов последних парламентских выборов в Молдове, совпали. Хотя этот факт является случайностью, он говорит о том, что в целом эксперты не видят больших различий в позициях этих партий по вопросу о федерализации На графиках 1 b и 1 c представлены оценки позиций партий в 2006 г., основанные на мнениях партийных функционеров, опрошенных в ходе нашего исследования. График 1 b отражает позиции партий, рассчитанные на основе мнений всех респондентов. В ґрафике 1 c они рассчитаны на основе мнений респондентов — членов этих партий. Данные этих двух графиков подтверждают общие выводы, сделанные из экспертных оценок. По мнению партийных функционеров, все партии, за исключением П-Р-Р, отдают предпочтение модели унитарного государства. Важно отметить, что оценки позиций партий, выступающих за унитарную модель, функционерами данных партий, представленные в графике 1 c, указывают на более радикальное предпочтение унитарного устройства, чем это следует из оценок полной выборки функционеров (график 1 b). Так, оценка позиции АМН, основанная на мнении всех респондентов выборки, составила 7.4 балла, в то время как функционеры АМН оценили позицию собственной партии в 9.6 баллов. Среди партий, предпочитающих унитарную модель, эта тенденция отсутствовала только в случае с СЛП. Правящий статус ПКРМ делает позиции этой партии по проблеме государственного устройства особенно важными. В отличие от экспертов, функционеры коммунистической партии и других партий, включенных в выборку, считают позицию коммунистов по вопросу государственного устройства наименее радикально унитарной среди партий, представленных в парламенте. Партия была инициатором создания плана по федерализации в начале 2000-х годов, и хотя отказалась от него после провала переговоров в 2003 г., возможно, это продолжает формировать восприятие позиции коммунистов функционерами других партий. Кроме неудачных переговоров, причиной столь существенного изменения отношения к проблеме федерализации между 2001 г. и 2006 г. стала и та нега-

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тивная общественная реакция, которую вызвала эта инициатива в молдавском обществе. Ключевую роль в формировании такой реакции сыграло экспертное сообщество — эксперты особенно остро критиковали план федерализации. Коммунистическая партия оказалась не в состоянии убедить экспертное сообщество в полезности идеи федерализма для разрешения конфликта и не смогла получить поддержку этой группы, имеющей серьезное влияние на формирование общественного мнения. Данные по собственным предпочтениям опрошенных экспертов свидетельствуют, что как группа они в целом поддерживают унитарное устройство Молдовы (таблица 1). ТАБЛИЦА 1. ИНДИВИДУАЛЬНЫЕ ПОЗИЦИИ ЭКСПЕРТОВ ПО ПРОБЛЕМЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО УСТРОЙСТВА: ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОЕ ГОСУДАРСТВО VERSUS УНИТАРНОЕ ГОСУДАРСТВО

Эксперт Оценка

E1 9

E2 5

E3 5

E4 10

E5 1

E6 10

E7 5

E8 10

E9 9

E10 10

E11 9

Среднее 7,55

Средний показатель по группе (7.55 баллов) указывает на близость позиций экспертов и партий — сторонниц идеи унитарного государства. Взгляды экспертов окажутся еще более проунитарными, если не учитывать мнение эксперта E5, которое резко отличается от других не только по этому вопросу, но и по многим другим. В таком случае (excluding an outlier) средний показатель экспертной оценки окажется 8.2 балла, что означает, как свидетельствуют данные за 2006 г. в графике 1 а, более радикальную позицию, чем экспертная оценка позиций всех парламентских партий за исключением ХДНП. Характер неприятия идеи федерализма парламентскими партиями и подавляющим большинством экспертного сообщества необходимо уточнить. Дело в том, что идея федерального устройства ассоциируется в Молдове с провалившимся меморандумом Козака (2003 г.). Последний известен среди молдавских политиков прежде всего формулировками конституционных принципов, которые в случае принятия плана создали бы предпосылки для фрагментар-

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ности и неэффективности процесса принятия решений на уровне центральной власти. Другая формулировка вопроса о перспективах федерализма в нашей анкете могла бы привести к другим ответам со стороны партийных функционеров и, возможно, экспертов. Например, СЛП, которая симпатизирует идее европейского федерализма, уже в 2002-2003 гг. официально заявила, что, возможно, поддержит федерализм как симметричное федеральное устройство с наличием более чем одного федерального субъекта и одинаковым статусом всех федеральных единиц. Эта модель, которая иногда приобретает форму децентрализованного регионализма, часто обсуждается в политическом и экспертном сообществах Молдовы. Статус автономии для Приднестровья Вопрос о характере автономии ставил целью выяснить позиции партий и экспертов в случае, если конфликт мог быть урегулирован на основе предоставления Приднестровью специального статуса в конституционных рамках унитарного государства. Крайние точки 10-балльной шкалы по этой проблеме были определены как широкая / ограниченная автономия для Приднестровья. Решение использовать такую простую формулировку было продиктовано желанием избежать сложных определений вариантов автономии, поскольку это потребовало бы нереалистично глубокого понимания нюансов автономного устройства от наших партийных респондентов. Как видно из графика 2 a, схема позиционирования политических партий по статусу Приднестровья имеет общие черты с той, что была представлена в графике 1 a. С точки зрения экспертов коммунистическая партия очень существенно изменила свою позицию между 2001 и 2006 гг. Несмотря на то, что величина этого изменения не настолько велика, как по проблеме федерализма, это свидетельствует о перемене отношения к формату возможного соглашения об автономии внутри коммунистической партии. Подобно графику 1 а, график 2 а указывает на то, что, по мнению экспертов, по обсуждаемой проблеме между ПКРМ и АМН существуют лишь незначительные различия.

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ГРАФИК 2. СТАТУС ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЯ:

ШИРОКАЯ АВТОНОМИЯ

VERSUS ОГРАНИЧЕННАЯ АВТОНОМИЯ

2 А. ДИНАМИКА ПОЗИЦИОНИРОВАНИЯ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ ПАРТИЙ, ЭКСПЕРТНАЯ ОЦЕНКА

2001 ПКРМ ДПМ ПВСМ ХНДП 1,5 5,6 7,6 9,1 ■▬▬▬▲▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▼▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▼▬▼▲▬▬▬■ 1 4,1 8,4 8,8 10 ЭБАБ СДПМ НЛП 2006 ПКРМ ДПМ СЛП ХДНП 5,4 5,6 7,6 8,5 ■▬▼▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▼▬▲▲▬▼▬▬▬▲▬▬▲▬▬▬▬▬▬■ 1 1,2 5 6,2 10 П-Р-Р АМН СДПМ

1 — широкая автономия 10 — ограниченная автономия

2 B. ПОЗИЦИИ ПАРТИЙ В ОЦЕНКЕ ПАРТИЙНЫХ ФУНКЦИОНЕРОВ (ОБЩАЯ ВЫБОРКА, 2006 Г.) ПКРМ ДПМ АМН СЛП ХДНП 5,4 6,2 7,2 8,3 8,9 ■▬▬▬▬▼▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▲▬▬▬▼▬▲▬▬▬▲▬▲▬▬▬■ 1 2,1 6,9 10 П-Р-Р СДПМ

2 C. ПАРТИЙНАЯ САМООЦЕНКА (ОЦЕНКА ПОЗИЦИИ ПАРТИИ ПАРТИЙНЫМИ ФУНКЦИОНЕРАМИ — ЧЛЕНАМИ ЭТОЙ ПАРТИИ, 2006 Г.) ПКРМ ДПМ СЛП АМН ХДНП 3,7 6,7 7,9 8,3 9,3 ■▼▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▬ ▼▬▲▬▲▬▬ ▲▬■ 1 1,1 7,5 10 П-Р-Р СДПМ

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Среди партий, которые, как ПКРМ, на протяжении 20012006 гг. сохранились организационно, позиции СДПМ претерпели наиболее значительные изменения. В текущем парламенте эта партия не представлена, но ее позиции известны респондентам в силу того, что это одно из самых старых молдавских политических образований. Их изменение вызвано, скорее всего, переменами в руководстве. После отставки партийного лидера, пребывавшего на этой должности длительное время, новое руководство стало придерживаться более умеренной точки зрения на проблему автономного статуса для Приднестровского региона. Похожие изменения наблюдались и по вопросу о федерализме, а также по некоторым другим вопросам, включенным в анкетный опрос. Результаты опроса функционеров, которые представлены в графиках 2 b и 2 с, несколько схожи с результатами, полученными при опросе экспертов. Главный вывод, вытекающий из сравнения графиков 2 b и 2 c: члены ПКРМ считают, что их партия имеет намного более примирительный подход к вопросу о возможности широкой автономии, чем думают партийные функционеры, включенные в нашу выборку. Они оценили позиции собственной партии в 3.7 балла, в то время как средняя оценка, данная партийными функционерами, — 5.4 балла. Это дает основания предположить, что среди парламентских партий ПКРМ наиболее открыта для идеи урегулирования конфликта в Приднестровье на основе предоставления широкой автономии региону. Опираясь на партийную самооценку, можно сделать вывод, что различия в политике коммунистов и АМН (второй наиболее успешной партии на выборах 2005 г.) по этому вопросу очень существенны (разница составляет 4.6 балла). Если же проанализировать данные общей выборки на графике 2 b, то различия между двумя партиями окажутся менее разительными, хотя и значительными — 1.8 балла. В то же время, оценка позиций этих партий, представленная на графике 2 a, предполагает минимальные различия между ними и даже позиционирует АМН несколько ближе к полюсу широкой автономии, чем ПКРМ. Противоречивые мнения о позиции АМН по этой проблеме частично объясняются внутрипартийными кадровыми изменениями, которые произошли в анализируемый период. На момент

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проведения исследования от АМН откололось социал-демократическое крыло, которое традиционно занимало более примирительную позицию по отношению к Приднестровью. Нашими респондентами от этой партии стали, скорее всего, представители национал-либерального крыла, что объясняет их неприятие широкой автономии (см. график 2 с), а также радикальную оппозицию идее федерализации (см. график 1 с). Идеологические последствия организационных изменений внутри АМН на момент проведения опроса могли быть менее очевидными для респондентов не из числа функционеров АМН, что объясняет разницу в оценках позиции партии экспертами и респондентами из других партий. Существенное различие во мнениях респондентов могло быть также результатом позиционирования партии в период парламентской кампании 2005 г., когда лидеры АМН подавали сигналы, указывавшие на то, что они более способны привлечь власти Приднестровья к налаживанию переговорного процесса. Кроме того, в ходе выборной кампании политические противники АМН и некоторые СМИ Молдовы критиковали лидеров партии за их якобы причастность к нелегальным деловым операциям с сепаратистскими лидерами Приднестровья. ТАБЛИЦА 2. ИНДИВИДУАЛЬНЫЕ ПОЗИЦИИ ЭКСПЕРТОВ ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЯ: ШИРОКАЯ АВТОНОМИЯ

ПО ПРОБЛЕМЕ СТАТУСА

VERSUS ОГРАНИЧЕННОЯ АВТОНОМИЯ

Эксперт

E1

E2

E3

E4

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E8

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оценка

10

4

5

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1

1

1

8

10

10

10

Среднее значение 6,18

Мнения экспертов по вопросу о возможности автономии для Приднестровья были поляризованы в значительно большей степени, чем по вопросу о федерализме. В таблице 2 представлены результаты позиционирования экспертов. В то время как среднее значение в таблице указывает на то, что центральная тенденция — в пользу ограниченной автономии, индивидуальные оценки свидетельствуют об кардинальных различиях во мнениях экспертов. Прежде всего, очевидно, что эксперты

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занимают самые радикальные позиции по этой проблеме. Семь из одиннадцати экспертов определили свою позицию на одном из противоположных полюсов шкалы. Четыре эксперта оценили свою позицию в 10 баллов, а трое из них — в 1 балл. Это свидетельствует об отсутствии согласия по данной проблеме в экспертном сообществе. Такой результат является неожиданным, поскольку характер автономного устройства для Приднестровья обсуждается экспертами Молдовы в течение уже многих лет. Формат переговоров по урегулированию конфликта Существующий формат переговоров известен как «5+2». Он включает Молдову, Приднестровье, ОБСЕ, Россию и Украину как полноправных участников, а с 2005 г. — ЕС и США как наблюдателей. Молдавские политики и представители гражданского общества традиционно критиковали первоначальный пятисторонний формат среди прочего за то, что были созданы условия, которые, по мнению критиков формата, позволяют России доминировать в процессе переговоров. Официальное включение ЕС и США как наблюдателей на переговорах в 2005 г. не изменило ситуацию. Альтернатива, которую предлагают ряд ведущих политических деятелей и экспертов в Молдове, предусматривает предоставление ЕС и США статуса полноправных участников переговоров. Результаты градации вопросов по степени важности/значимости, которые представлены в Приложении III, указывают на то, что партийные элиты считают проблему формата переговоров одной из самых важных. Как показывает график 3 a, позиции партий по этой проблеме существенно изменились с течением времени. Динамика этих изменений схожа с той, что наблюдалась по предыдущим вопросам. Как свидетельствует график 3 а, эксперты полагают, что только партии с четко сформулированной прозападной позицией ратовали за изменение формата в 2001 г. Коммунистическая партия, пришедшая к власти в 2001 г. благодаря программе, которая одной из целей внешней политики ставила более близкие связи с Россией,

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надеялась найти разрешение конфликта в сложившемся формате переговоров. К 2006 г. положение дел радикально изменилось. Президент Воронин и руководство Коммунистической партии, разочарованные отсутствием прогресса на переговорах, радикально изменили свою позицию в пользу модификации формата. ГРАФИК 3. ФОРМАТ ПЕРЕГОВОРОВ: СОХРАНЕНИЕ СУЩЕСТВУЮЩЕГО ФОРМАТА VERSUS ИЗМЕНЕНИЕ СУЩЕСТВУЮЩЕГО ФОРМАТА

3 A. ДИНАМИКА ПОЗИЦИОНИРОВАНИЯ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ ПАРТИЙ, ЭКСПЕРТНАЯ ОЦЕНКА

2001 ПКРМ ДПМ ПВСМ ХДНП 1,6 6,1 8,1 9,6 ■▬▬▲▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▼▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▼▼▲▬■ 1 3,7 9,4 9,5 10 ЭБАБ НЛП СДПМ 2006 П-Р-Р ПАМН ДПМ ПКРМ СЛП ХДНП 1 7,5 7,7 8,3 9,6 9,8 ▲▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▲▼▲▬▬▲▬▬▬▲▲■ 1 7,6 10 СДПМ

1 — сохранение существующего формата (5 участников в 2001 г., 5+2 участника в 2005 г.) 10 — изменение существующего формата (7 участников)

3 B. ПОЗИЦИИ ПАРТИЙ В ОЦЕНКЕ ПАРТИЙНЫХ ФУНКЦИОНЕРОВ (ОБЩАЯ ВЫБОРКА, 2006 Г.) ПКРМ ДПМ АМН ХДНП СЛП 6,4 7,3 7,8 9 9,1 ■▬▬▬▬▼▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▲▬▼▲▬▬▬▬▬▲▲▬▬■ 1 2,2 7,8 10 П-Р-Р СДПМ

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3 C. ПАРТИЙНАЯ САМООЦЕНКА (ОЦЕНКА ПОЗИЦИИ ПАРТИИ ПАРТИЙНЫМИ ФУНКЦИОНЕРАМИ — ЧЛЕНАМИ ЭТОЙ ПАРТИИ, 2006 Г.) П-Р-Р ПКРМ ДПМ АМН ХДНП 1 7,1 8,2 9,3 9,7 ▲▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▬▬▬▲▼▬▬▲▼▲■ 1 8,5 9,5 10 СДПМ СЛП

Результаты опроса партийных респондентов, представленные на графиках 3 b и 3 c, отражают общую тенденцию главных политических партий, за исключением П-Р-Р, поддержать идею изменения формата. В то время как оценка общей выборки указывает на существование некоторых различий между партиями, результаты самооценки, представленные в графике 3 c, свидетельствуют, что позиции большинства партий по этой проблеме наименее вариативны. Тот факт, что позиция коммунистов наименее радикальна в вопросе изменения формата, может говорить о том, что некоторые функционеры коммунистической партии не разделяют официальный энтузиазм руководства партии относительно включения в переговоры представителей Запада. В отличие от вопроса о характере автономии для Приднестровья, вопрос о формате переговоров не вызвал больших разногласий среди членов сообщества экспертов. При сравнении уровня поляризации позиций экспертов по всему комплексу приднестровских проблем оказалось, что по этому вопросу существуют наименьшие разногласия. ТАБЛИЦА 3. ПОЗИЦИИ ЭКСПЕРТОВ ПО ПРОБЛЕМЕ ФОРМАТА ПЕРЕГОВОРОВ: ПОДДЕРЖАНИЕ СУЩЕСТВУЮЩЕГО ФОРМАТА VERSUS ИЗМЕНЕНИЕ СУЩЕСТВУЮЩЕГО ФОРМАТА

Эксперт

E1

E2

E3

E4

E5

E6

E7

E8

E9

E10

E11

Среднее значение

Оценка

10

9

8

10

6

10

10

10

10

10

10

9,36

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Данные таблицы свидетельствуют о том, что эксперты почти единодушны в своих оценках необходимости изменения формата переговоров и полного вовлечения ЕС и США в процесс переговоров. Такая позиция сообщества экспертов имеет свою предысторию. Дело в том, что некоторые из них были непосредственно вовлечены в разработку инициативы гражданского общества о стратегии «3-х Д» (демилитаризация, декриминализация, демократизация) в отношении Приднестровья или публично поддержали ее. Предложение об интернационализации процесса урегулирования конфликта было важным компонентом этой инициативы. Последовательность стадий процесса урегулирования конфликта Возобновление интереса к вопросу о демократизации Приднестровского региона, катализатором которого стал план Ющенко, напомнило об одной из старых проблем, с которой столкнулись молдавские власти в процессе переговоров с Приднестровьем. Акцентируя важность внутренних изменений в отколовшемся регионе, Кишинев не может избежать вопроса о статусе Приднестровья в составе реинтегрированного государства. Ясность в вопросе статуса — важный фактор успеха демократических реформ в регионе. В настоящее время молдавские власти воздерживаются от предоставления деталей предлагаемого статуса. В законодательных актах лета 2005 г., принятых молдавским парламентом, ответ на этот вопрос отсутствует5. Отсутствие детальных предписаний относительно статуса в представлении миссии ОБСЕ в Молдове, которая является ключевой международной организацией в регионе, затрудняет достижение прогресса в поиске формулы окончательного урегулирования конфликта. По мнению миссии ОБСЕ, переговоры о статусе, которые включают среди прочего и вопрос о распределении компетенций между центральными и региональными властями, 5 О законодательных актах, принятых парламентом Молдовы летом 2005 г., см.: Oleh Protsyk, Moldova’s Dilemmas in Democratizing and Reintegrating Transnistria, Problems of Post-Communism. Vol. 53/4 (2006): 29-42.

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должны проводиться параллельно с переговорами, направленными на достижение внутренних изменений в Приднестровье6. Эта проблема в нашем анкетном опросе была сформулирована как альтернатива первоочередности: внутренние преобразования в Приднестровье / достижение соглашения о статусе региона. Как показывают данные Приложения III, наши респонденты от политических партий не считают эту проблему одной из самых важных. Она перестала часто обсуждаться в молдавском обществе после того, как молдавский парламент задекларировал так называемый национальный консенсус о подходах к приднестровским проблемам (после принятия законодательных актов летом 2005 г.). ГРАФИК 4. ПОСЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬНОСТЬ ПЕРЕГОВОРОВ ПО УРЕГУЛИРОВАНИЮ: СНАЧАЛА ДОСТИЖЕНИЕ СОГЛАШЕНИЯ ПО СТАТУСУ ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЯ VERSUS СНАЧАЛА БЕЗОГОВОРОЧНАЯ ДЕМОКРАТИЗАЦИЯ ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЯ 4 А. ДИНАМИКА ПОЗИЦИОНИРОВАНИЯ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ ПАРТИЙ, ЭКСПЕРТНАЯ ОЦЕНКА

2001 ПКРМ ДПМ ПВСМ СДПМ ХДНП 1,7 5,8 7,8 8,9 9,7 ■▬▬▬▲▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▼▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▬▲▼▬▬▲■ 1 4,3 9,2 10 ЭБАБ НЛП 2006 ДПМ ПКРМ СЛП ХДНП 6,9 7,6 9,3 9,7 ■▬▼▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▲▼▬▲▼▬▬▬▬▲▬▲■ 1 1,3 7 7,7 10 П-Р-Р АМН СДПМ

1 — сначала достижение соглашения по статусу Приднестровья 10 — сначала безоговорочная демократизация Приднестровья 6 Презентация Готтфрида Ханне, зам. руководителя Миссии ОБСЕ в Молдове, на семинаре «Дороги к демократизации Приднестровского региона», 27 сентября 2006 г., г. Кишинев.

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4 B. ПОЗИЦИИ ПАРТИЙ В ОЦЕНКЕ ПАРТИЙНЫХ ФУНКЦИОНЕРОВ (ОБЩАЯ ВЫБОРКА, 2006 Г.) ПКРМ ДПМ АМН ХДНП СЛП 5,7 6,6 7,5 8,4 8,6 ■▬▬▬▬▬▬▼▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▲▬▼▲▬▬▬▲▲▬▬▬▬▬■ 1 2,6 7,3 10 П-Р-Р СДПМ

4 C. ПАРТИЙНАЯ САМООЦЕНКА (ОЦЕНКА ПОЗИЦИИ ПАРТИИ — ЧЛЕНАМИ ЭТОЙ ПАРТИИ, 2006 Г.)

ПАРТИЙНЫМИ ФУНКЦИОНЕРАМИ

ПКРМ ДПМ АМН СЛП ХДНП 5,6 6,9 8,9 9,1 9,9 ■▬▬▼▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▬▬▲▼▬▬▬▬▬▲▲ ▬▬▲■ 1 1,5 7 10 П-Р-Р СДПМ

Как показывают данные графика 4 a, эксперты полагают, что с приходом к власти (в 2001 г.) коммунисты были готовы вести переговоры о статусе Приднестровского региона без каких-либо предварительных условий. Эта позиция претерпела полную трансформацию к моменту проведения нашего исследования, когда молдавский парламент объявил об официальной поддержке плана Ющенко. Оценки экспертов и респондентов от партий указывают на то, что существует общая тенденция для партий, представленных в текущем парламенте, отдавать приоритет достижению внутренней демократизации в Приднестровье. В то же время, оценки позиции правящей коммунистической партии, представленные в графиках 4 b и 4 c, очень близки к средней отметке шкалы. Это дает основания предполагать, что коммунистическая партия готова оценить потенциальные выгоды, о которых говорит значительная часть международных наблюдателей, от проведения переговоров о статусе параллельно с переговорами по демократизации. Анализ личных позиций экспертов указывает на их склонность поддерживать приоритет демократизации в значительно большей мере, чем, как они полагают, это делает правящая партия (см. экспертную оценку позиции ПКРМ в 2006 г., график 4 а).

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ТАБЛИЦА 4. ИНДИВИДУАЛЬНЫЕ ПОЗИЦИИ ЭКСПЕРТОВ ПО ПРОБЛЕМЕ ПОСЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬНОСТИ СТАДИЙ ПЕРЕГОВОРОВ: СНАЧАЛА СОГЛАШЕНИЕ ПО СТАТУСУ

ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЯ VERSUS ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЯ

СНАЧАЛА БЕЗОГОВОРОЧНАЯ ДЕМОКРАТИЗАЦИЯ

Эксперт

E1

E2

E3

E4

E5

E6

E7

E8

E9

E10

E11

Оценка

10

9

6

8

4

10

6

10

10

10

10

Среднее значение 8,45

Среднее значение позиций экспертов (8.45 балла) достаточно близко к полюсу приоритета демократизации. Этот результат подтверждает тот факт, что демократизация Приднестровья как предварительное условие урегулирования конфликта находит поддержку среди членов сообщества экспертов. Демократизация была одним из краеугольных камней в стратегии по разрешению конфликта «3-х Д», разработанной членами сообщества экспертов, и получила весомую поддержку со стороны гражданского общества Молдовы. Применение силы в урегулировании конфликта Применение военной силы для разрешения сепаратистских конфликтов является стратегической опцией, которую страны, имеющие дело с сепаратизмом, заинтересованы сохранить в арсенале возможных средств влияния на ситуацию. В этом отношении молдавское государство не является исключением. Сила была применена в течение короткого периода весны-лета 1992 г., когда молдавские полицейские подразделения и вновь созданные воинские части предприняли попытку насильно реинтегрировать сепаратистский регион. Этот опыт оказался достаточно негативным и привел к эскалации конфликта и прекращению переговоров. Мы попросили экспертов и партийных функционеров дать оценку позициям партий по проблеме применения силы. Альтернативы были определены на 10-балльной шкале как невозможность применения силы ни при каких условиях / возможность применения силы при необходимости.

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ГРАФИК 5. ВОЗМОЖНОСТЬ ПРИМЕНЕНИЯ СИЛЫ ДЛЯ РАЗРЕШЕНИЯ ПРИДНЕСТРОВСКОГО КОНФЛИКТА: СИЛА НЕ МОЖЕТ БЫТЬ ПРИМЕНЕНА НИ ПРИ КАКИХ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВАХ VERSUS СИЛА МОЖЕТ БЫТЬ ПРИМЕНЕНА ПРИ НЕОБХОДИМОСТИ

5 А. ДИНАМИКА ПОЗИЦИОНИРОВАНИЯ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ ПАРТИЙ, ЭКСПЕРТНАЯ ОЦЕНКА

2001 ПКРМ ДПМ ПВСМ ХДНП 1,6 2,1 2,4 4,3 ■▬▬▲▼▬▬▲▬▲▼▬▬▬▬▬▼▬▲▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬■ 1 1,6 2,7 3,7 10 ЭБАБ СДПМ НЛП 2006 П-Р-Р АМН ПКРМ СЛП ХДНП 1,5 3,3 3,7 4,3 5,4 ■▬▬▲▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▼▲▼▲▬▬▲▬▬▬▲▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬■ 1 3,1 3,5 10 ДПМ СДПМ

1 — сила не может быть применена ни при каких условиях 10 — сила может применяться при необходимости

5 B. ПОЗИЦИИ ПАРТИЙ В ОЦЕНКЕ ПАРТИЙНЫХ ФУНКЦИОНЕРОВ (ОБЩАЯ ВЫБОРКА, 2005 Г.) ДПМ ПКРМ СЛП ХДНП 3,9 4,4 4,7 6,3 ■▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▼▬▬▬▬▬▲▼▲▼▲▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬■ 1 2,7 4,1 4,7 10 П-Р-Р СДПМ АМН

5 C. ПАРТИЙНАЯ САМООЦЕНКА (ОЦЕНКА ПОЗИЦИИ ПАРТИИ — ЧЛЕНАМИ ЭТОЙ ПАРТИИ, 2005 Г.)

ПАРТИЙНЫМИ ФУНКЦИОНЕРАМИ

П-Р-Р ПКРМ СЛП ХДНП 1 1,6 3,6 5,3 ▲▬▬▲▬▼▬▬▬▬▼▬▲▼▬▬▬▬▬▬▲▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬■ 1 1,8 3,1 3,6 10 ДПМ СДПМ АМН

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Ограниченные, но тем не менее существенные изменения в позициях большинства политических партий по вопросу использования силы произошли в период между 2001 г. и 2006 г. Неожиданностью явилось направление этих изменений. График 5 a свидетельствует о том, что, по мнению экспертов, политические партии стали более склонны к использованию силы. Это одинаково относится как к правящей партии, так и к партиям, находящимся в оппозиции. Позиция ПКРМ, которая была категорически против использования силы в 2001 г., изменилась гораздо существеннее, чем позиции других партий, в силу ее изначальной категоричности. Экспертные оценки отношения партий к вопросу о применении силы в 2005 г. также указывают на то, что КПРФ занимает среднее положение среди парламентских партий. Согласно этим оценкам, СЛП и ХДНП более, чем ПКРМ, склонны к использованию силы, а ДПМ и АМН менее. Однако, как показывает график 5 a, политическое расстояние между парламентскими партиями по этой проблеме не очень существенно (за исключением ХДНП). Оценки, полученные в ходе опроса партийных элит, представлены в графике 5 b. Они подтверждают тезис о сходстве позиций парламентских партий по этой проблеме. Респонденты партийной выборки отмечают лишь незначительные различия (исключение составляет ХДНП). Оценки, полученные в результате опроса партийных респондентов, также размещаются немного правее на шкале, чем оценки экспертов. Представители партийных элит оценили позиции своих партий (график 5 c) существенно ниже, чем полная выборка респондентов. Очевидно, что большинство политических партий Молдовы стремится создать себе имидж миролюбивой политической силы. Это особенно заметно в отношении правящей партии, средняя оценка функционеров которой равна 1.6 балла. В то время как политические партии демонстрируют невысокий уровень поляризации по вопросу применения силы (Приложение IV), мнения экспертов варьируются весьма существенно.

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ТАБЛИЦА 5. ИНДИВИДУАЛЬНЫЕ ПОЗИЦИИ ЭКСПЕРТОВ ПО ПРОБЛЕМЕ ПРИМЕНЕНИЯ СИЛЫ: СИЛА НЕ МОЖЕТ БЫТЬ ПРИМЕНЕНА НИ ПРИ КАКИХ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВАХ VERSUS СИЛА МОЖЕТ БЫТЬ ПРИМЕНЕНА ПРИ НЕОБХОДИМОСТИ

Эксперт

E1

E2

E3

E4

E5

E6

E7

E8

E9

Оценка

3

1

1

5

1

1

10

10

3

E10 E11 1

8

Среднее значение 4

Позицию пяти экспертов, которые оценили свое отношение к проблеме в 1 балл, можно интерпретировать как то, что они полностью исключают необходимость использования военной силы в приднестровском конфликте. С другой стороны, два эксперта были также решительны в поддержке тезиса о возможности применения силы. Позиции остальных экспертов расположились между этими двумя радикальными мнениями. Средняя оценка в 4 балла означает, что коллективное мнение экспертов близко к средней позиции парламентских партий в 2006 г. (см. график 5 a). Скорее всего, это неприятие безусловного использования силы, но и не исключение возможности применения механизмов государственного принуждения с целью урегулирования конфликта.

ВЫВОДЫ В данном исследовании было предложено несколько альтернативных оценок позиций политических сил по проблемам, связанным с Приднестровьем, которые остаются существенным вызовом политической системе Молдовы. Изменения, введенные недавно в избирательное законодательство, а также продолжающийся спад популярности правящей коммунистической партии, вероятно, усилят партийную конкуренцию в плюралистической политической системе страны. Поиск адекватных индикаторов позиций политических сил способствуют углублению понимания возможных сценариев урегулирования приднестровского конфликта. Некоторые из таких сценариев будут включать и выбор альтернатив, предложенных в этом исследовании. Как показывают

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данные, существуют серьезные различия в предпочтениях отдельных политических партий. Они не исчезли после объявления о достижении национального консенсуса в отношении приднестровского конфликта летом 2005 г. В частности, партийные самооценки указывают на то, что особо существенные различия между наиболее электорально успешными партиями наблюдаются по вопросам о характере возможной автономии для Приднестровья и последовательности этапов переговорного процесса. Результаты исследования также указывают на необходимость изучения позиций партий во временной динамике. Проведенный анализ подтвердил мнение, высказанное многими аналитиками, о радикальной эволюции правящей коммунистической партии. Существенные изменения были зарегистрированы и в позициях других партий — долгожителей партийной системы страны. Внутренний и международный политический контекст будет продолжать вносить существенные коррективы в их позиции по тем или иным аспектам переговорного процесса. Как показывает формат исследования, сообщество экспертов рассматривалось не только как источник экспертизы по партийному позиционированию, но и как важный субъект политического процесса. Оно обладает значительным влиянием на формирование общественного мнения. Это было особенно очевидно при обсуждении инициативы по федерализации как возможного механизма разрешения конфликта. Исследование динамики взаимоотношений между экспертным сообществом и политическими партиями является важным элементом системного подхода к изучению партийного позиционирования. Сохранение атмосферы открытых общественных дебатов по урегулированию приднестровского конфликта не является достаточным условием его разрешения. Но их продолжение с вовлечением политических партий и экспертного сообщества увеличивает шансы достичь прогресса в разработке конструктивных механизмов его урегулирования.

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Приложение I АНКЕТА позиционирование главных политических партий Республики Молдова (Данный опрос является анонимным, и собранная информация будет использована только в научных целях. Исследование проводится по заказу ЕСМI, Flensburg, Germany) 1. Ваша партийная принадлежность _____________________________ 2. Какую политическую должность вы занимаете в партии или ее выборных органах ___________________________________________________ 3. Какую внутреннюю организационную структуру вы представляете (местную, региональную) ____________________________________________ 4. Профессия __________________________________________________ 5. Возраст ______________________________________________________ 6. Пол _________________________________________________________ Инструкция: опросник призван отразить позиционирование главных политических партий Республики Молдова. Убедительно просим Вас указать 1. степень важности вопроса для Вашей партии 2. позицию Вашей партии по данному вопросу 3. позиции, которые, по вашему мнению, занимают остальные партии по данному вопросу Вопросы Форма государственного устройства Республики Молдова: федеративное государство versus унитарное государство Некоторые политики считают, что Республика Молдова должна быть унитарным государством и допускают лишь очень ограниченный уровень автономии для Приднестровья и Гагаузии. Другие же видят перспективу государственного устройства республики в высоком уровне автономии для регионов, вплоть до создания федеративного государства. • Насколько важен этот вопрос для вашей партии? не важен

1—2—3—4—5

126

очень важен

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• Просим охарактеризовать позицию вашей партии, а также других партий в отношении этих форм государственного устройства, пользуясь приведенной ниже схемой федеративное государство

1—2—3—4—5—6—7—8—9—10

унитарное государство

A. Партия коммунистов Республики Молдова

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

B.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Партия «Альянс Молдова Ноастрэ»

C. Христианско-демократическая народная партия

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

D. Демократическая партия Молдовы

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

E.

Социал-либеральная партия

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

F.

Социал-демократическая партия Молдовы

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

G. Блок «Равноправие-Патрия-Родина»

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

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Приложение II Список анкетных вопросов по приднестровскому конфликту Issue Форма государственного устройства Республики Молдова Статус Приднестровья Статус Гагаузии Характер приднестровского конфликта Вмешательство внешнего фактора в развязывание и развитие приднестровского конфликта Российское военное присутствие на Днестре Очередность этапов разрешения приднестровского конфликта Вопрос демилитаризации Легитимность приднестровского руководства Условия проведения выборов в Приднестровье

Формат переговоров по приднестровскому конфликту Участие Румынии в переговорном процессе по поводу разрешения приднестровской проблемы Возможность использования силы в процессе разрешения приднестровского конфликта

Point 1 федеративное государство расширенная автономия расширение автономии этнический конфликт внутренний конфликт

Point 10 унитарное государство ограниченная автономия ограничение автономии политический конфликт геополитический конфликт

стабилизирующий дестабилизирующий фактор фактор первоочередность первоочередность соглашения о статусе демократизации Приднестровья Приднестровья демилитаризация демилитаризация всей Республики Молдова только Приднестровья представительные узурпаторские органы органы власти власти выборы могут выборы должны быть состояться только проведены, даже если после полного не все условия по демократизации будут выполнения условий по демократизации выполнены изменение формата (предоставление сохранение ЕС и США статуса существующего полноправных формата посредников в переговорах) Румыния может участвовать только через ЕС

Румыния должна напрямую участвовать в переговорах

военная сила военная сила может не должна быть быть использована в использована ни при случае необходимости каких обстоятельствах

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Приложение III Градация вопросов по приднестровскому конфликту по степени их важности (среднеарифметические данные по партиям) Версия анкетного опроса, подготовленная для политиков, включает вопрос о степени важности каждой отдельной проблемы, которую они должны оценить по 5-балльной шкале

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Mean per issue

П-Р-Р

5

СДПМ

4

СЛП

3

ДПМ

2

Форма государственного устройства Республики Молдова Формат переговоров по приднестровскому конфликту Российское военное присутствие на Днестре Характер приднестровского конфликта Вмешательство внешнего фактора в развязывание и развитие приднестровского конфликта Возможность использования силы в процессе разрешения приднестровского конфликта Статус Приднестровья Легитимность приднестровского руководства Вопрос демилитаризации Очередность этапов разрешения приднестровского конфликта Условия проведения выборов в Приднестровье Статус Гагаузии Участие Румынии в переговорном процессе по поводу разрешения приднестровской проблемы Grand mean, all issues

ХДНП

1

Партии

очень важна

АМН

Проблемы

1—2—3—4—5 ПКРМ

не важна

4.9

4.7

5.0

4.9

4.7

4.7

4.9

4.84

4.5

4.8

4.9

4.9

4.8

4.6

4.5

4.70

4.5

4.5

5.0

4.6

4.8

4.5

4.9

4.70

4.8

4.7

4.9

4.6

4.7

4.4

4.6

4.68

4.9

4.7

4.9

4.5

4.8

4.5

4.5

4.67

4.8

4.7

4.1

4.3

4.6

4.7

5.0

4.61

4.9

4.4

4.9

4.3

4.7

4.1

4.8

4.58

4.5

4.5

4.7

4.6

4.5

4.5

4.2

4.52

4.7

4.6

4.9

4.2

4.3

4.3

4.5

4.50

4.7

4.3

4.9

4.1

4.6

4.3

4.3

4.44

4.7

4.4

4.7

4.2

4.7

4.2

3.7

4.38

4.3

4.1

4.4

4.3

4.2

4.3

4.7

4.31

4.3

4.7

5.0

3.7

4.6

3.9

3.5

4.26

4.65 4.55 4.79 4.40 4.62 4.40 4.48 4.55

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Приложение IV

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

П-Р-Р

5

СДПМ

4

СЛП

3

Российское военное присутствие на Днестре Формат переговоров по приднестровскому конфликту Статус Приднестровья Легитимность приднестровского руководства Форма государственного устройства Республики Молдова Условия проведения выборов в Приднестровье Очередность этапов разрешения приднестровского конфликта Вмешательство внешнего фактора в формирование и развитие приднестровского конфликта Характер приднестровского конфликта Статус Гагаузии Вопрос демилитаризации Возможность использования силы в процессе разрешения приднестровского конфликта

ДПМ

2

Участие Румынии в переговорном процессе по разрешению приднестровской проблемы

ХДНП

1

АМН

Проблемы

ПКРМ

Партийная позиция (среднеарифметическая оценка позиции каждой партии)

Стандартное отклонение

Партийная поляризация по проблемам, относящимся к приднестровскому конфликту

4.4

7.3

9.2

6.0

8.8

7.0

1.8

2.60

6.3

8.0

9.4

7.2

9.2

7.7

1.9

2.54

6.4

7.8

9.0

7.3

9.1

7.8

2.2

2.36

5.5

7.2

8.9

6.2

8.3

6.9

2.1

2.25

7.7

8.0

9.3

7.7

9.3

8.0

2.7

2.23

5.9

7.4

9.2

6.8

8.3

7.2

2.3

2.21

7.1

7.7

9.0

7.3

9.0

7.6

2.5

2.19

5.7

7.5

8.4

6.6

8.6

7.3

2.6

2.04

6.7

7.9

9.2

7.1

8.8

7.6

3.2

1.97

6.8

8.0

8.6

7.5

8.7

7.8

3.2

1.91

6.0 7.4

7.5 7.5

8.5 8.6

6.4 7.1

7.9 8.0

7.5 7.1

2.9 3.7

1.89 1.56

4.4

4.7

6.3

3.9

4.7

4.1

2.7

1.08

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ПРИЛОЖЕНИЕ V

КРАТКАЯ ПРЕЗЕНТАЦИЯ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ ПАРТИЙ / БЛОКОВ, ВКЛЮЧЕННЫХ В ИССЛЕДОВАНИЕ

Партия коммунистов Республики Молдова (ПКРМ) — политическое формирование, находящееся у руководства страной с 2001 г., когда с большим отрывом выиграло парламентские выборы (71 мандатов из 101). На парламентских выборах 6 марта 2005 г. ПКРМ сохранило свои руководящие позиции, сумев собрать 45,98% голосов избирателей, пришедших на выборы, и получить 56 депутатских мандатов. Большинство голосов позволяет коммунистам создать собственное правительство. Четвертого апреля 2005 г. ПКРМ сумело продвинуть своего кандидата и на пост президента Республики Молдова. Официальная идеология партии — коммунистическая, корнями уходящая в классическое марксистко-ленинское учение. На последнем конгрессе партии в декабре 2004 г. ее руководство изъявило желание перенять еврокоммунистическую платформу. Конгресс поддержал эту идею, но комиссия, созданная для пересмотра политической программы партии, до сих пор не представила своих выводов. Конгресс по учреждению ПКРМ прошел в октябре 1993 г. Новая партия объявила себя наследницей Коммунистической Партии Молдавской Советской Социалистической Республики, объявленной вне закона в 1991 г. вследствие московского коммунистического путча 19-21 августа 1991 г. Местные выборы 1995 г. стали для молдавских коммунистов первыми. Далее ПКРМ принимала участие во всех выборах в Республике Молдова (парламентских, президентских, местных). Кульминационным моментом электорального успеха коммунистов стал 2001 г., когда они с большим отрывом выиграли парламентские и президентские выборы. Основатель, он же лидер партии Владимир Воронин избран на пост президента Республики Молдова (2001 г., 2005 г.). На данный

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момент он самый популярный политик Республики Молдова1. В советское время он занимал ряд ответственных постов в коммунистической административной системе, поднявшись до должности министра внутренних дел (1998-1990 гг.). В первые годы независимости республики В.Воронин стремился вернуть легальность Коммунистической партии. Партия «Альянс Молдова Ноастрэ» (ПАМН) — молодое политическое формирование молдавской политической системы, которое создавалось как демократическая альтернатива ПКРМ. На парламентских выборах в марте 2005 г. ПАМН заняла руководящую позицию в электоральном блоке «Молдова Демократэ» (БМД), в который входили также Демократическая партия и Социал-Либеральная партия. БМД сумела собрать 28,53% голосов избирателей и получила 34 депутатских мандата. В результате распада БМД в короткий срок после начала деятельности нового парламента Альянсу отошли 23 мандата и он стал второй парламентской фракцией по количеству мандатов. На данный момент, несмотря на продолжающийся распад ПАМН, эта парламентская фракция насчитывает 13 депутатов. Официальная доктрина партии — социал-либерализм. После ухода социал-демократической группы из состава ПАМН доминантными остались либерально-национальные ценности. Альянс Молдова Ноастрэ был основан 19 июля 2003 г. в результате слияния трех формирований: Социал-демократический альянс Молдовы2, Либеральная партия3 и Альянс независимых Республики Молдова4. В достаточно короткий срок к ПАМН присоединилась и Народная Демократическая партия Молдовы. Альянс Молдова 1

Согласно опросам общественного мнения.

Конгресс по созданию СДАМ на основе Партии социальной демократии «Фурника» (1997 г.) состоялся в декабре 2001 г. К СДАМ присоединилось социально-политическое движение «Плай Натал» (1999 г.). 2

3 Либеральную партию сформировали партии правой ориентации, которые потерпели крах на выборах 2001 г.: Партия возрождения и согласия Молдовы, Социал-либеральный союз «Форца Молдовей», Национальная крестьянская партия христиан-демократов. 4 Основу партии составили представители органов местного самоуправления, находившиеся в оппозиции к партии власти.

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Ноастрэ создавался, опираясь на идею объединения сил оппозиции. В данный момент партия проходит через болезненный процесс распада. Из ПАМН вышли представители СДАМ, как и другие лидеры либеральных взглядов. Нынешний председатель партии — Серафим Урекян 1950 г.р. Административно-политическую деятельность он начал еще в советский период, занимая ряд важных должностей в партийном аппарате и советской администрации. Являлся депутатом первого парламента Независимой Молдовы (1990-1994 гг.). В современной политической жизни Молдавии стал известным благодаря должности генерального примара муниципия Кишинэу (1994-2005 гг.). Христианско-демократическая народная партия (ХДНП) — народное формирование христиан демократического толка, политический и правовой наследник Народного фронта Молдовы, главная антикоммунистическая социально-политическая организация периода национально-освободительного движения (1988-1991 гг.). На парламентских выборах в марте 2005 г. получила 9,07% голосов и 11 депутатских мандатов5. Без ХДНП нельзя представить историю развития партийной системы в Республике Молдова. Это единственная партия, имевшая парламентских представителей во всех легислатурах, но она так не смогла заявить о себе как о партии власти. Электоральная величина христиан-демократов всегда варьировала вокруг 8-10%. Христиан-демократическое формирование появилось в политической жизни Молдовы во время национально-освободительного движения конца 80-х годов. Эволюция христиан-демократов: Народный фронт Молдовы (1989 г.) — Народный христиан- демократический фронт (1991 г.) — Христиан-демократическая народная партия. Формирование всегда характеризовалось национал-румынской риторикой. Нынешний лидер ХДНП Юрий Рошка (с 1994 г.) унаследовал эту должность от И.Хадыркэ (с 1989 г.) и М.Друка (с 1992 г.). Он родился в 1961 г., по профессии журналист. С 1994 г. до настоящего времени — депутат парламента Республики Молдова.

5

В результате внутренних конфликтов три депутата (из 11) вышли из ХДНП.

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Демократическая партия Молдовы (ДПМ) в результате выборов в марте 2005 г. попала в парламент, являясь частью блока «Молдова Демократэ» (34 мандата). После распада последнего ей отошло 8 мест в законодательном органе. Согласно ее политической программе это социал-демократическая партия. ДПМ была основана в 1997 г. в качестве партии власти, что должно было обеспечить парламентское представительство президенту страны П.Лучинскому (1997-2001 гг.). Ее первичное название — Движение за демократическую и процветающую Молдову. Позже партия начала проводить собственную политику и имела свое представительство в парламенте между 1998 и 2001 гг. В парламентских выборах в феврале 2001 г. она участвовала самостоятельно, но не смогла переступить 6%-ный электоральный барьер. Лидер формирования с момента его основания — Думитру Дьяков (1952 г. р.). В советский период занимал важные должности в ВЛКСМ, по профессии журналист. В период независимости сформировался как профессиональный политик. С 1994 г. по 2001 г. являлся депутатом, а с 1998 г. по 2001 г. — председателем парламента. Социал-либеральная партия (СЛП) также имеет парламентское представительство, хотя и незначительное. После выхода из электорального блока «Молдова Демократэ» партия осталась с тремя парламентскими мандатами. СЛП появилась на политической сцене Республики Молдова 9 мая 2001 г.6 Ее образовали три социально-политические организации: Группа социально-либеральной инициативы (2001 г.), Женская христиан-демократическая лига (1990 г.) и Национальная лига молодежи Молдовы (1991 г.). Последняя присоединилась к СЛП осенью 2001 г. В декабре 2002 г. с СЛП также объединилась Партия демократических сил (ПДС), которая ранее уже имела представительство в парламенте. Доктрина партии — социал-либерализм. Первоочередная цель — интеграция Республики Молдова в евроатлантические структуры, формирование новой, молодой политической элиты. Председатель партии — Олег Серебрян, видный представитель политической науки Республики Молдова. 6 Девятое мая выбрано не случайно, данное формирование пыталось подчеркнуть свою проевропейскую направленность.

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Социал-демократическая партия Молдовы (СДПМ) — первая партия Республики Молдова, которая пыталась продвинуть социал-демократические идеи. На выборах в марте 2005 г. набрала лишь 2,92% голосов, так и не сумев перейти 6%-ный барьер. Такой электоральный счет был характерен для социал-демократов на протяжении всех парламентских выборов (около 2-4%). Конгресс по созданию СДПМ состоялся в марте 1990 г., первыми сопредседателями стали А.Кошелев, О.Нантой и И.Негурэ. В феврале 2004 г. председателем партии был выбран Ион Мушук, представитель молдавского бизнеса. СДПМ — член Социалистического интернационала, сотрудничает с рядом социал-демократических партий Европы и стран СНГ. Патрия-Родина-Равноправие (П-Р-Р) — политический альянс, созданный в основном на базе двух партий: «Патрия-Родина» (председатель В.Абрамчук) и Республиканское социально-политическое движение «Равноправие» (председатель В.Клименко). Данные формирования еще не слились, но готовы к такому шагу. Ситуация прояснится к будущим парламентским выборам. В парламентских выборах 2005 г. они участвовали раздельно и им не удалось перейти электоральный барьер. В частности, блок «Патрия-Родина»7 собрал 4,97% голосов, а Движение «Равноправие» — 2,83%. Официальная идеология блока — демократический социализм. П-Р-Р пытается отойти от марксизма-ленинизма ПКРМ. Для его представителей характерна пророссийская риторика. Это единственное значимое формирование, категорично выступающее против интеграции Республики Молдова в Европейский Союз. Партия социалистов «Патрия-Родина» была основана в 1997 г. (под названием Партия социалистов Республики Молдова) в результате откола от Социалистической партии (СПМ). Последнюю в 1992 г. сформировали несколько бывших членов Коммунистической партии советской Молдавии. Политики, вышедшие из СПМ и сформировавшие ПСРМ, представляют собой умеренное крыло, которое не выступало за воссоздание СССР и ратовало за независимое развитие молдавского государства. 7 Социалистический электоральный блок «Патрия-Родина» был создан на основе двух партий: Партия социалистов Республики Молдова и Социалистическая партия (В. Морев).

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Республиканское социально-политическое движение «Равноправие» было создано позднее, в 1998 г. Если социалисты в большей степени заняты некоторыми классическими идеологическими моментами, то «Равноправие» имеет главной целью продвижение в Республике Молдова интересов русских и украинцев. Лидеры П-Р-Р — В.Абрамчюк и В.Клименко. Оба пришли в политику из академической среды, по профессии историки, в советский период не занимали важных административных должностей. Электоральный блок «Альянс Брагиш» (ЭБАБ) — альянс, созданный на парламентских выборах 25 февраля 2001 г., который набрал 13,36% голосов избирателей и прошел в парламент. Был создан вокруг Д.Брагиша, на тот момент премьер-министра Республики Молдова. Решающую роль в формировании блока сыграл тогдашний президент страны П.Лучинский (1998-2001 гг.). ЭБАБ не имел ясной идеологической концепции, так как партия создавалась не по принципу идеологического союза, а на основе лояльности к основателям блока (в особенности П.Лучинскому). Однако анализ доктрины ЭБАБ дает основания причислить эту партию к социал-демократическим. ЭБАБ был сформирован из 6 политических движений левого и левоцентристского толка (социально-политическое движение «Форца Ноуэ», движение профессионалов «Сперанца-Надежда», Социалистическая партия, Союз труда, Центристский союз и партия социальной демократии «Фурника»). Вскоре после вхождения блока в парламент часть депутатов покинула парламентскую фракцию, однако Д.Брагиш сумел ее сохранить и удержать свои позиции лидера. На основе парламентской фракции ЭБАБ и ПСД «Фурника» сформировался Социал-демократический альянс во главе с Д.Брагишем. В 2003 г. СДАМ слился с другими формированиями и был образован АМН. В итоге в 2006 г., после выхода Д.Брагиша и группы депутатов из АМН, была создана партия Социальной демократии, председателем которой был избран Д.Брагиш. Д.Брагиш — политический лидер средних лет, начал свою карьеру в советские времена, но проявился как политик в период независимости. Он принадлежит к тем комсомольцам, которые после развала коммунистического режима успешно адаптировались к новым правилам игры.

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Партия возрождения и согласия Молдовы (ПВСМ) — социально-политическое формирование, которое самостоятельно выступило на выборах в феврале 2001 г. Для прохождения в парламент партии не хватило совсем немного — она получила 5,89% в условиях электорального барьера 6%. ПВСМ не имела четкой официальной политической доктрины, но продвигала идеи и ценности, характерные для молдавского правого крыла. Она была создана в 1995 г. группой депутатов правоцентристских взглядов, покинувших Демократическую аграрную партию. Основатель партии — М.Снегур, первый президент Республики Молдова. Жизнеспособность данного формирования прямо зависела от популярности ее лидера. Со снижением рейтинга М.Снегура падала и электоральная поддержка ПВСМ. Поскольку на парламентских выборах 2001 г. ПВСМ не сумела перейти 6%-ный барьер, ее лидеры были вынуждены ее реформировать. В итоге электоральный блок слился с другими партиями, проигравшими на выборах, сформировав новую политическую силу правого толка — Либеральную партию (2002 г.). В 2003 г. она стала одной из основательниц ПАМН. Национальная либеральная партия (НЛП) — самое представительное либеральное формирование первого десятилетия существования молдавской партийной системы. НЛП была основана в 1993 г., ее самый известный лидер — М.Русу. Доктрина партии совмещает националистические идеи с либеральными. В политической истории Республики Молдова национал-либералы известны больше своими национально-патриотическими проектами и риторикой объединения (например, проект создания государственного союза Румыния — Республика Молдова). НЛП участвовала как в парламентских выборах, так и в местных, однако не сумела стать парламентской партией. Электоральный счет, характерный для НЛП на национальных (парламентских) выборах, варьировал между 2 и 3%. После электорального проигрыша в 2001 г. НЛП повторила судьбу других партий правого толка: прекратила свое существование, участвуя в формировании новых партий (в данном случае АМН).

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Расширение Европейского союза на восток привело к увеличению вероятности столкновения его «политики соседства»1 c новым курсом России в отношении вновь образованных независимых государств Запада (Western New Independent States). Евросоюз принял решение пойти по пути углубления и расширения сотрудничества со своими новыми соседями для того, чтобы сообща бороться с угрозами безопасности, а также обеспечить участие этих государств в предупреждении конфликтов и кризисном управлении в регионе. Однако как в свое время Российская империя, так и до недавних пор Советский Союз стремились к усилению своего влияния на сопредельных территориях — в Центральной Азии, на Кавказе, Балканах, в Восточной Европе и Балтийском регионе. С распадом СССР Россия уделяет особое внимание бывшим советским республикам, называя их ближним зарубежьем. Евросоюз декларирует стремление разрешать конфликтные ситуации, возникающие на территории его новых соседей, в сотрудничестве с Россией. Но какой может быть реакция России на рост интересов Евросоюза в регионе, который она по традиции рассматривает как собственную зону влияния? Пожертвует ли Евросоюз собственным видением путей разрешения конфликтов и обеспечения стабильности в «новососедних» государствах ради сохранения добрых отношений с Россией? Или он по-прежнему будет отстаивать здесь интересы своей безопасности в ущерб этим отношениям? В данной статье мы попытаемся найти ответы на эти вопросы на примере проблемы Приднестровья. 1 Ее официальное название — «Европейская политика соседства» (ENP), которое было принято после расширения Евросоюза в мае 2004 г. взамен старого — «Политика в отношении новых соседей» (The New Neighbours Policy).

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ПОЧЕМУ ПРОБЛЕМА ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЯ НЕ БЫЛА РАЗРЕШЕНА ТАК ЖЕ, КАК ЭТНИЧЕСКИЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ В ЭСТОНИИ И ЛАТВИИ? В начале марта 1992 г. между армией Молдовы и вооруженными силами Приднестровья произошел полномасштабный вооруженный конфликт с участием расквартированной здесь 14-й российской армии и казаков, прибывших через украинскую территорию. В июле 1992 г. российский президент Борис Ельцин и его молдавский коллега Мирча Снегур подписали договор о прекращении огня2. Несмотря на это, и по сию пору наряду с миротворческими силами в Приднестровье продолжают находиться регулярные воинские части России. Остается неясным и правовой статус этой территории — юрисдикция Кишинева на нее фактически не распространяется. Почему возник этот конфликт и по какой причине, в отличие от кризисов в странах Балтии, он не был урегулирован? Во-первых, Молдова не могла использовать балтийскую модель в решении этнических проблем, которая предполагает стабильность в государстве и обществе благодаря установлению и корректировке политического партнерства. Последнее обстоятельство вызывает в памяти высказывания С.Хантингтона (S.P. Huntington) о том, что, во-первых, в странах «третьего мира» стабильность важнее демократизации и, во-вторых, эта стабильность может быть достигнута за счет институализации с помощью «контроллинговой мобилизации»3. Поскольку в странах Балтии подобный контроль был обеспечен главным образом по этническому критерию, эту модель принято называть «этнической демократией», или «моделью контроля»4. Утверждают, что переход от гражданской модели к этнической определился в прибалтийских республиках в дни августовского путча 1991 г. и свой отсчет она начала с принятием нового закона о гражданстве. 2

Sfatul Tarii. 1992. 07. 24. Р. 2.

Samuel P. Huntington. Political Development and Political Decay // World Politics. 1965. Vol. 17. P. 386-430. 3

4 Velo Pettai. Emerging Ethnic Democracy in Estonia and Latvia // Managing Diversity in Plural Society / Magda Opalski ed. Ottawa, 1998.

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Согласно этому закону, гражданство могут получить лишь те, у кого (или у чьих предков) оно было до советской оккупации в июне 1940 г. Принятие этого закона аргументировалось тем, что советская армия незаконно уничтожила независимость прибалтийских республик в июне 1940 г. и что, следовательно, исходным для восстановления их суверенитета должно явиться их состояние на момент оккупации. Такую точку зрения нельзя считать беспочвенной — после Первой мировой войны независимость Эстонии и Латвии признали на Западе. В итоге нововведения, осуществленные в Эстонии и Латвии, были признаны как балтийский путь решения названной проблемы. Правда, с тех пор в адрес этой модели было высказано немало критических суждений. С одной стороны, нельзя не признать, что этническая модель действительно не способствует участию в политической жизни части населения по этническим мотивам. Но не менее очевидно и то, что она обеспечила стабильность в обоих прибалтийских государствах после обретения независимости весьма уязвимых с этой точки зрения. В результате, в отличие от Молдовы, в Эстонии и Латвии вооруженных конфликтов не произошло. Отчасти это объясняется давлением на правительства этих стран со стороны Организации по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе (ОБСЕ) и Евросоюза, которые настояли на корректировке чрезмерно ограничительных статей законов о гражданстве, и за счет этого более успешной интеграцией нацменьшинств в местное сообщество. Этот курс нейтрализует разочарования нацменьшинств и, таким образом, стабилизирует ситуацию в республиках на основе общественного компромисса. В этом проявилось благотворное воздействие Евросоюза. Однако успеху балтийской модели способствовали и другие обстоятельства. Мировое сообщество в лице США, стран Скандинавии, ОБСЕ и Евросоюза требовало вывода российских войск из государств Балтии. Демократические силы России воздействовали на местное русское меньшинство, удерживая его от акций насилия и протеста; базировавшиеся здесь войска напрямую контролировались Москвой. Кроме того, большая часть русского меньшинства Эстонии и Латвии ощущает свою общность с этими государствами, особенно после обретения ими независимости. Наконец, здесь никогда не существовало анклавов типа Косово или Нагорного Кара-

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баха, которые ощутимо отличались бы от окружающих территорий и могли претендовать на отделение. Ситуация в Молдове была кардинально иной, чем в Прибалтике. Во-первых, ее независимость и воссоединение с Румынией после Первой мировой войны не были международно признаны, поскольку Япония, подписавшая Парижский протокол 28 октября 1920 г., который предусматривал объединение Румынии и Бессарабии, впоследствии отказалась его ратифицировать. Этот отказ был обусловлен ее отношениями с СССР, а именно — статьями секретного протокола, приложенного к советско-японской конвенции 20 января 1925 г. В итоге Молдова была лишена возможности выдвигать аргументы, подобные прибалтийским образца 1991 г. Во-вторых, население Молдовы разделяется на три группы — прорумынскую, молдавскую (включающую этнических молдаван, которые подчеркивают свое отличие от румын) и прорусскую, ориентированную на СНГ. Если прорусская часть населения в большинстве своем настаивала на укреплении взаимоотношений с Россией и СНГ, то этнические молдаване оказались расколоты на две подгруппы, одна из которых (прорумынская) требовала воссоединения с Румынией, а другая выступала за нейтралитет Молдовы. Последние заявили, что говорят не по-румынски, а по-молдавски (впрочем, автор этих строк без труда общался с молдаванами на румынском языке, который изучал в Бухаресте). Очевидно, что в силу разницы их идентичности эти два этнически молдавские субкультурные сообщества не могли сплоченно воздействовать на местное этническое меньшинство. Поэтому Молдова была не в состоянии контролировать мобилизацию в том виде, как это было в прибалтийских государствах. К тому же, эти три группы населения вступили в острое политическое соперничество. В результате молдавское общество оказалось дестабилизировано. В-третьих, в Молдове есть небольшая территория, явно отличающаяся от других, которая может созреть для выхода из состава государства. Она занимает площадь 4 118 кв. км по берегу Днестра, между рекой и молдавско-украинской границей. По-румынски эта область называется Транснистрией, по-русски — Приднестровьем, ОБСЕ предпочитает использовать гибрид этих названий — Трансднестрия. С 1924 г. эта территория являлась частью Молдавской авто-

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номной советской социалистической республики в составе Украинской ССР, а затем в соответствии с указом Верховного Совета СССР от 2 августа 1944 г. вошла в Молдавскую ССР. Создавая эту автономию, Сталин рассматривал ее как базу для включения Молдовы в СССР после провала советско-румынских переговоров весной 1924 г. Превратившись в своеобразный аванпост советского социализма, этот регион сыграл стратегически важную роль в упрочении советского влияния на Балканах. После развала СССР лидеры Приднестровья выступили за реставрацию Союза и коммунистического режима, объявив себя форпостом безопасности России, передовым отрядом в противодействии расширению НАТО5. Символично, что статуя В.И.Ленина по-прежнему возвышается в центре Тирасполя. По своим умонастроениям местные жители отличаются от тех граждан Молдовы, которые проживают к западу от Днестра. Так, лишь 8,8% приднестровцев поддержали независимость Молдовы, в то время как 45,6% выступили за интеграцию с Россией и 41,7% — за вхождение в состав СНГ6. В-четвертых, в отличие от прибалтийских республик, в которых было заметно влияние демократических сил России, в Приднестровье наблюдается тесное взаимодействие местных лидеров с националистическими и консервативными российскими кругами. В советские годы председатель Верховного Совета СССР А. Лукьянов в письмах советским руководителям настойчиво предлагал пойти навстречу пожеланиям приднестровских лидеров и образовать на молдавской территории Республику Приднестровье7. После распада СССР российский вице-президент А. Руцкой неоднократно посещал Тирасполь, всякий раз призывая к созданию Приднестровского государства. В 1995 г. российская Государственная дума приняла обращение к президенту Ельцину о признании независимости Приднестровья8. Со своей стороны, И. Смирнов, который переехал в Приднестровье из России лишь в конце 1980-х годов, обратился к 5

Днестровская правда. 1995. 08. 22; 1995. 09. 16.

Fundatia Moldova Moderna, Sondaj comandat de Universitatea din Oslo, Departamentul Studii Europei Orientale, 1999. 6

7 Moldova Suverana. 1992. 05. 25. Интервью со следователем прокуратуры Республики Молдова П.Л.Лутенко. 8

Днестровская правда. 1995. 09. 16; OMRI Daily Digest. 1995. 9. 12.

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Думе, настаивая на официальном признании независимости Приднестровья либо его включении в состав СНГ9. Россия до сих пор не выполнила условия Московского соглашения от 21 октября 1994 г., которое предусматривало вывод из Приднестровья российских войск, вооружения и военного снаряжения в течение трех лет, на том основании, что оно не было ратифицировано Думой. Еще одним аргументом Москвы является нерешенность вопроса об официальном статусе Приднестровья, что было предпосылкой для вывода войск. В 1995 г. российский министр обороны Павел Грачев пытался убедить своего коллегу в Кишиневе построить в Молдове российскую военную базу10. Однако правительство Молдовы сослалось на свою Конституцию, которая запрещает базирование иностранных войск на территории Молдовы. Тогда Россия видоизменила свое военное присутствие, назвав свой воинский контингент ограниченным миротворческим и фактически сделав его постоянным. Наконец, Россия поддержала лидеров Приднестровья в вопросе создания молдавской конфедерации, введя концепцию общего государства. В-пятых, на сегодняшний день по-прежнему не решен вопрос о правовом статусе Приднестровья, хотя ОБСЕ вместе с Россией и Украиной выступили посредниками в соответствующих переговорах между Кишиневом и Тирасполем. Переговоры зашли в тупик отчасти потому, что лидеры Приднестровья настаивали на конфедеративном или федеративном принципе взаимоотношений между двумя независимыми государствами с намерением впоследствии добиться суверенитета, тогда как правительство Молдовы выступило с позиций унитарного государства. Точка зрения Тирасполя противоречила условиям июльского договора 1992 г. о прекращении огня, подписанного Ельциным и Снегуром, в котором возможность выхода Приднестровья из состава Молдовы обусловливалась объединением последней с Румынией11. Возможно, Тирасполь настаивал на предоставлении независимости Приднестровью отчасти опасаясь слияния Молдовы с Румынией (как это произошло в 1918 г.), а отчасти стремясь обеспечить свои 9

Moldova Suverana. 1995. 11. 21.

10

Moldova Suverana. 1995. 06. 27; Днестровская правда. 1995. 06. 28.

11

Sfatul Tarii. 1992. 07. 24. Р. 2.

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политические и экономические интересы. Утверждают, что в основе автократического режима Тирасполя лежит монополизация власти кучкой лидеров, которые сумели прибрать к рукам теневую экономику этой территории. С этнической точки зрения этот режим представляет собой господство лидеров русского меньшинства над молдавско-украинским большинством: по данным на 1989 г., 39,9% населения Приднестровья составляли молдаване, 28,3% — украинцы и только 25,5% — русские. Наконец, следует отметить отсутствие интереса мирового сообщества к делам Молдовы. Поэтому перечисленные выше проблемы не решаются годами в отличие от ситуации в Латвии и Эстонии, из которых российские войска были выведены уже к 1994 г.

УЧАСТИЕ ЕВРОСОЮЗА В РАЗРЕШЕНИИ МОЛДАВСКОПРИДНЕСТРОВСКОГО КОНФЛИКТА И РЕАКЦИЯ

МОЛДОВЫ

С конца 2002 г. ситуация в Молдове заметно изменилась — сказалось влияние Евросоюза, в рамках которого началось серьезное обсуждение различных аспектов «политики в отношении новых соседей». Проблема Приднестровья все чаще попадает в поле зрения мирового сообщества. Саммит ОБСЕ, прошедший в Стамбуле в декабре 1999 г., принял резолюцию о выводе из Молдовы российских войск, вооружения и военного снаряжения до конца 2002 г., а ОБСЕ выделил на эти цели необходимые средства. Однако российская сторона не выполнила своих обязательств по выводу войск ни к 2002 г., ни к 2003 г., хотя сократила свое военное присутствие в регионе примерно до 1500 солдат, а военное снаряжение с 40 тыс. т до 20 тыс. т. Мировое сообщество все чаще упрекает ОБСЕ в низкой эффективности деятельности, а Россию — в безответственности. В этих условиях Евросоюз стал демонстрировать еще большую заинтересованность в делах Молдовы и выразил неудовлетворенность темпами выполнения стамбульских договоренностей12, хотя ранее избегал вмешиваться в проблему Приднестровья, передоверив 12

EN 15272/02. Press 387. Р. 181.

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этот вопрос ОБСЕ. Согласно некоторым данным, когда Молдова добивалась присоединения к Пакту стабильности для Юговосточной Европы (the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe), именно Евросоюз настоял на том, чтобы Кишинев отказался от причисления этой проблемы к вопросам сотрудничества на юго-востоке Европы13. В итоге Евросоюз предпринял самостоятельную попытку решить приднестровскую проблему. В марте 2003 г. Крис Паттэн (Chris Patten) инициировал переговоры с Молдовой и Украиной об учреждении смешанных украинско-молдавских таможенных пунктов (ранее этот вопрос безуспешно пытались решить при посредстве ОБСЕ и России). Украина взяла на себя обязательство не принимать импорт из Молдовы без соответствующей отметки молдавской таможни в Кишиневе. Тогда же Евросоюз направил своего наблюдателя в Конституционную комиссию Молдовы14. Двадцать седьмого февраля 2003 г. Евросоюз опубликовал совместное с США заявление, в котором со ссылкой на систематический срыв переговоров лидерами самопровозглашенной республики Приднестровье, вставших на путь обструкции и демонстрирующих явное нежелание менять status quo в регионе, объявлялось о введении санкций, а именно об отказе в выдаче виз тем деятелям Тирасполя, которые препятствуют политическому решению конфликта. Евросоюз также выразил озабоченность по поводу связанной с конфликтом нелегальной деятельности. На повестку дня Евросоюза встали вопросы о его участии в переговорах относительно правового статуса Приднестровья и о реорганизации миротворческих сил (PKF) в регионе. Обсуждалась возможность изменения формата переговоров для того, чтобы Евросоюз стал их полноправным участником. По предложению голландского министра иностранных дел (в июле 2003 г. действующего председателя ОБСЕ) предполагалось создание PKF Евросоюза и превращение их в многонациональную организацию. В результате последовавших переговоров было решено создать группу из 500 13 V. Gheorghe. European Strategy of Moldova. Institutul de politici publice, 2004. 1. Р. 1 (www.ipp.md/publications/EurStratMold.doc. Р. 1). Об этом учреждении см.: www. stabilitypact.org. 14 Nicu Popescu. Noile oportunitati de solutionare al problemei transnistrene prin mecanismele Europei moderne // Euro Journal.org. Institutul de Politic Publice. Р. 14.

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миротворцев, включая российских. Очевидно, это было сделано под влиянием того, что Евросоюз урегулировал вопросы о полиции в Македонии и о войсках в Боснии-Герцеговине. Именно эти прецеденты рассматривались на заседании Совета по взаимодействию между Молдовой и Евросоюзом 18 марта 2003 г. как возможный путь решения приднестровского конфликта. В мае того же года обращение Совета относительно Приднестровья обсуждалось на заседании Комитета по безопасности и политическим вопросам Евросоюза. Итоговая декларация Комитета по межпарламентскому сотрудничеству между Молдовой и Евросоюзом, принятая в июне 2003 г., подтвердила уверенность сторон в необходимости более активного участия Евросоюза в реализации соглашения по проблеме Приднестровья15. В этих условиях Молдова начала активно реагировать на инициативы Евросоюза. В ходе предвыборной кампании 2001 г. компартия Молдовы подчеркивала необходимость укрепления отношений с Россией и участия в российско-белорусском союзе. Однако, победив на выборах, коммунисты сменили внешнеполитические приоритеты и заявили о желательности вхождения Молдовы в Евросоюз. В Кишиневе появилась Национальная комиссия по европейскому сотрудничеству, а в МИДе Молдовы— Отдел Евросоюза. Молдавское внешнеполитическое ведомство подчеркивало, что оно рассматривает вхождение Молдовы в Евросоюз как результат дальнейшей стабилизации и сближения на Балканах, а отнюдь не как образование славянского союза в рамках Западных новых независимых государств. Представители высших эшелонов правительства Молдовы стали часто наведываться в Брюссель: министр иностранных дел Николае Дудау посетил его в феврале 2003 г., премьер-министр Васил Тарлев — в марте, а президент Владимир Воронин — в июне того же года. В ходе своего визита молдавский руководитель обратился к Хавьеру Солана с просьбой открыть в Кишиневе официальное представительство Евросоюза и высказался за его прямое и более активное участие в разрешении приднестровского конфликта16. 15

Nicu Popescu. Op. cit. Р. 20-21.

16

Puncte de reper pentru intrevederea d-lui Vladimir Voronin, Presedintele Republica

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Однако во внутренней политике коммунистическое правительство пыталось следовать курсом русификации Молдовы и одновременно молдаванизации этнических молдаван (в сфере культуры, истории, образования и духовной жизни), но никак не романизации. Возможно, усиление молдавской этнической идентичности и повышение влияния молдавской и русской культур стали актуальны ввиду грядущего вступления Румынии в Евросоюз. По-видимому, руководство молдавских коммунистов опасается, что молдавская этничность будет поглощена румынской. Эти опасения станут понятны, если учесть, что от 400 тыс. до 1 млн молдаван постоянно работают за рубежом. Многие из них живут в романских Италии и Испании (молдавский/румынский язык относится к группе романских). У молдаван появилась возможность стать гражданами Евросоюза в составе других романских наций (в случае получения ими соответствующего гражданства). Однако сама Молдова обречена оставаться за рамками Евросоюза; в результате она становится более хрупкой как государство, а впоследствии может возникнуть и угроза ее существованию. Политика кишиневского руководства, направленная на русификацию и молдаванизацию населения республики, явилась ответом на эти угрозы. Другая причина связана с попытками молдавского правительства разрешить проблему Приднестровья в сотрудничестве с Россией.

ПОДГОТОВКА МЕМОРАНДУМА КОЗАКА И ДВИЖЕНИЕ ПРОТЕСТА ПРОТИВ ЕГО ПОДПИСАНИЯ

Несмотря на новые тенденции в политике Евросоюза и Молдовы Россия продолжала отстаивать традиционный пятичленный способ урегулирования приднестровской проблемы. Заместитель министра иностранных дел России Вячеслав Трубников несколько Moldova cu d-l Javier Solana, Secretar General al Cousiliului UE, Inalt Reprezentant pentru Politica Externa si de Securitate Comuna, Bruxells, 23 iunie 2003 (О беседе между президентом Молдовы В. Ворониным и Генеральным секретарем Совета Евросоюза Х. Солана, состоявшейся в Брюсселе 23 июня 2003 г.).

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раз посещал Кишинев, а специальный представитель этого ведомства Александр Новожилов наведывался то в Кишинев, то в Брюссель17. В период между запуском Евросоюзом широкой программы в отношении новых соседей (осень 2002 г.) и оформлением упомянутого мартовского (2003 г.) послания по молдавско-приднестровским вопросам лидеры России, Молдовы и Приднестровья приступили к обсуждению новой схемы решения проблемы. Эти дискуссии шли параллельно с работой комиссии-«пятичленки». Утверждают, что 7 февраля 2003 г. молдавский президент Воронин обратился к президенту Путину с просьбой о содействии в скорейшем разрешении проблемы Приднестровья. В результате был образован смешанный кишиневско-тираспольский Конституционный комитет. В течение полугода ему предстояло выработать проект Конституции, который затем на протяжении двух месяцев должен был пройти общественное обсуждение. В феврале 2004 г. надлежало провести референдум, а спустя еще год — всеобщие выборы. В мае 2003 г. Кишинев с неофициальным визитом посетил зам. главы администрации президента России Дмитрий Козак, который встретился с советником президента Молдовы Ворониным. В августе того же года он приехал в столицу Молдовы уже с проектом решения на руках, а затем совершил раунд челночной дипломатии между Кишиневом и Тирасполем. Семнадцатого ноября 2003 г. российский проект федерализации Молдовы, более известный как меморандум Козака, был неожиданно представлен на рассмотрение участников «пятичленки». Позднее он был опубликован и в интернете. Вокруг меморандума развернулась борьба с участием нескольких политических акторов. Козак встретился с лидерами политических партий Молдовы. Президент Воронин консультировался с двумя своими предшественниками — Снегуром и Лучинским, руководителями политических партий и представителями дипкорпуса в Кишиневе, пытаясь убедить их принять документ. Оппозиционные партии, усмотрев в меморандуме Козака угрозу молдавской государственности и единству общества, образовали Комитет защиты независимости и Конституции Республики Молдова (Comitetul pentru Apararea Independentei si Constitutiei Republicii Moldova). По стране прокатилась волна широкомасштабных антиправитель17

Popescu. Оp. cit. Р. 12.

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ственных митингов, развернулось движение против меморандума Козака. «Президент» Приднестровья И. Смирнов, со своей стороны, предложил включить в документ статью о продлении срока пребывания российских войск в регионе на 30 лет. Российский министр обороны Сергей Иванов сообщил на пресс-конференции, что в его ведомстве готовится документ, согласно которому российские войска получат право находиться в Приднестровье вплоть до 2020 г. Двадцать третьего ноября 2003 г. пресс-секретарь президента Воронина заявил, что на церемонию подписания документа руководителями Молдовы и Приднестровья, намеченной на 25 ноября, прибудет президент Путин. Это заявление настолько возмутило участников движения протеста, что толпа демонстрантов, собравшись у здания российского посольства в Кишиневе, публично сожгла портрет Путина и российский флаг. Наконец в конфликт вмешалось мировое сообщество. С Ворониным связались председатель ОБСЕ министр иностранных дел Голландии Яап де Хооп Шеффер, Хавьер Солана, а в последний момент и американский посол в Кишиневе. Встреча американского дипломата с молдавским президентом прошла настолько напряженно, что посольство США в Кишиневе отказалось комментировать содержание состоявшейся беседы. Как заявил Воронину голландский министр, «консультации с заинтересованными странами показали, что этот документ не пользуется всеобщей поддержкой». Он также отметил, что некоторые из них имеют серьезные замечания по содержанию меморандума, а именно считают недостаточно четким распределение полномочий между центральными и местными органами власти, оспаривают фактическое право вето Приднестровья в Сенате по крайней мере до 2015 г., указывают на отсутствие приемлемой системы межнациональных гарантий18. Мировое сообщество в лице Евросоюза, ОБСЕ, американского посольства и представительств других западных стран в Кишиневе тщательно проанализировало меморандум Козака и обнаружило в нем ряд других серьезных недостатков. Во-первых, он устанавливал российское военное присутствие в регионе до 2020 г., что противоречило стамбульским договоренностям, согласно которым россий18 Press Release: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Chairman-inOffice. 24 November 2003.

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ские войска должны были покинуть Молдову до конца 2002 г. Если верить одному западному дипломату, наиболее болезненно на этот пункт отреагировали США: реализацию стамбульских решений американцы считали предпосылкой для ратификации договора по CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe). Во-вторых, согласно меморандуму Козака, Республика Молдова должна была состоять из трех частей, включая Приднестровье и Гагаузию, что давало возможность последним отклонять решения республиканского парламента. Поскольку из 26 мест в верхней палате парламента 13 должны были принадлежать представителям этих двух республик (9 и 4 соответственно), это позволяло им, используя право вето, блокировать любое законотворчество. Другими словами, в меморандуме Козака таился механизм, препятствовавший законодательной работе, что могло привести к административному параличу и государственному банкротству. В-третьих, мировое сообщество было обеспокоено возможными последствиями в случае подписания меморандума Козака, поскольку в столице проходили массовые демонстрации протеста. Таким образом, накануне приезда Путина в Кишинев мировое сообщество высказалось против подписания этого документа. В ночь на 24 ноября, буквально за несколько часов до прибытия Путина, президент Воронин неожиданно объявил, что не намерен подписывать меморандум и поэтому визит российского президента не состоится. Похоже, его обеспокоило грядущее ухудшение отношений с западным сообществом и возможный срыв переговоров о вступлении Молдовы в Евросоюз. Вероятно, он принял во внимание и внутренние проблемы, которые возникли бы в случае подписания этого документа. Кроме того, нельзя было не учитывать и события в Грузии. Возможно, молдавский президент провел параллель между судьбой президента Эдуарда Шеварднадзе, который был смещен со своего поста под давлением антиправительственных демонстраций и администрации США, и своей собственной участью. Так или иначе, он отказался подписывать документ, подготовленный в Кремле. В заявлении, опубликованном три дня спустя, итальянское руководства Евросоюза приветствовало этот шаг19. 19

Permanent Council. №. 479. 27 November 2003. EU Statement on Moldova.

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ЕВРОПЕЙСКАЯ «ПОЛИТИКА СОСЕДСТВА» ПРОТИВ НОВОГО ЗАРУБЕЖНОГО КУРСА РОССИИ В СВЕТЕ ДЕЛА О МЕМОРАНДУМЕ КОЗАКА Непосредственным результатом отказа молдавского президента подписать документ Козака явилось охлаждение между Россией и Западом, которое проявилось на встрече министров стран — членов ОБСЕ в Маастрихте 2-3 декабря 2003 г. Встреча закончилась единогласным требованием стран Запада вывести российские войска из Приднестровья и Грузии. Госсекретарь США Колин Пауэлл выразил сожаление по поводу того, что в Маастрихте не удалось достичь соглашения по Молдове и Грузии, и подчеркнул, что России следует безотлагательно выполнить те обязательства, которые она взяла на себя в Стамбуле20. Глава российского внешнеполитического ведомства Игорь Иванов со своей стороны констатировал: «Меморандум, подготовленный при посредничестве Москвы, был одобрен всеми сторонами. Мы убеждены, что его подписание сделало бы возможным решение проблемы Приднестровья в рамках одного государства. К сожалению, под давлением некоторых стран и организаций документ так и не был подписан»21. Во вступительной части этой статьи мы высказали предположение, что новая «политика соседства» Евросоюза и российский новый зарубежный курс могут столкнуться из-за проблемы WNIS, поскольку расширение Евросоюза сделало неизбежным рост его интересов в зоне традиционного российского влияния. Это не плод фантазии, а реальность, как в случае с Молдовой, когда Евросоюз и Россия столкнулись лицом к лицу. Россия попыталась обеспечить здесь рост своего влияния путем заключения официального соглашения с Молдовой пока европейская «политика соседства» еще не приняла зримых очертаний. Кремль торопился решить проблему Приднестровья до маастрихской встречи министров ОБСЕ, чтобы обеспечить свое военное присутствие в Молдове и исключить возможность для Евросоюза и Запада в целом вмешиваться в вопрос о 20 Statement in response to the Chairman’s Statement. MC. DEL/64/03. 2 December 2003. 21

MC. DEL/11/03. 1 December 2003.

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статусе Приднестровья и состоянии миротворческих сил. Вероятно, военное присутствие рассматривалось в Москве отчасти как мера против передислокации сил НАТО в «новую Европу», а именно в Польшу, Румынию и т. д., о чем ходили упорные слухи22, а отчасти как инструмент для усиления своего влияния в Молдове. Успех в Молдове мог дать России серьезные дивиденты и в других районах нового зарубежья. Однако эта попытка натолкнулась на твердую и неуступчивую позицию Евросоюза и Запада в целом, которые опасались, что Россия постарается еще больше вовлечь Молдову в свою орбиту и превратить эту республику в нестабильное и даже дисфункциальное образование. Время от времени Евросоюз заявлял о желании сотрудничать с Россией в решении конфликтов на территории своих новых соседей, но подчеркивал стремление соблюдать при этом собственные интересы. В информации о взаимоотношениях России и Евросоюза, опубликованной 9 февраля 2004 г., говорилось, что «Евросоюз будет проявлять готовность к сотрудничеству с новыми независимыми государствами на основе собственных стратегических устремлений и во всемерной кооперации с Россией»23. Кроме того, в июне 2004 г. Совет Евросоюза обсуждал возможность включения Кавказа в число бенефициариев своей программы помощи новым соседям24. Это решение показало, что заявляя о стремлении к сотрудничеству с Россией в решении проблем сопредельных с ней государств, Евросоюз в то же время имел твердое намерение обеспечить здесь свои интересы без оглядки на российскую концепцию нового зарубежья. Нас интересует, способна ли столь твердая позиция Евросоюза пробудить в России ответное желание к сотрудничеству, в том числе в решении проблемы Приднестровья. 22 Третьего декабря 2003 г. военный министр Ион Паску заявил, что в ходе планируемого визита в Бухарест американской военной делегации будет обсуждаться вопрос о размещении на территории Румынии американских военных баз. См.: Radio Free Europe. Daily News. 2003. 12. 4. 23 COM(2004)106. 9 February 2004. Р. 5. Информация Комиссии Совету Европы и Европарламенту об отношениях с Россией. 24 Совет Европы решил включить в этот список Армению, Азербайджан и Грузию. См.: Press Release. 2590th Council Meeting. General Affairs. 14 June 2004. 10189/04 (Press 195). Р. 12.

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ОТЗВУКИ НЕУДАЧИ МЕМОРАНДУМА КОЗАКА Провал затеи с меморандумом Козака изменил взаимоотношения Молдовы с Евросоюзом, с одной стороны, и обострил конфликт по линии Молдова — Россия/Приднестровье, с другой. Произошла смена курса официального Кишинева в отношении приднестровской проблемы. Политика воронинского кабинета всегда отличалась двойственностью: Молдова просила Евросоюз и США принять участие в переговорах по вопросам статуса Приднестровья и миротворцев и одновременно поощряла Россию в ее усилиях по решению приднестровской проблемы. Когда же российский вариант был отвергнут, Кишинев обратил свои взоры на Запад. Первого июня 2004 г. президент Воронин высказался за подписание договора о стабильности и безопасности Молдовы, гарантами которого выступали бы Румыния, Украина, Евросоюз, США и Россия. До сих пор в этом качестве выступала только Россия, как это было оговорено в российско-молдавском договоре 2002 г. Кроме того, Воронин усомнился в возможности решить приднестровскую проблему путем федерализации Молдовы и подчеркнул, что следует искать иной, не федеративный способ25. Изменения в политике Кишинева по проблеме Приднестровья привели к быстрому сближению Молдовы с Евросоюзом и НАТО. В феврале 2005 г. начал осуществляться выработанный ранее Молдовой и Евросоюзом план действий в рамках ENP. В марте в Приднестровье был назначен специальный представитель Евросоюза, а осенью в Кишиневе открылось представительство этой организации. В 2003-2004 гг. финансовая помощь Евросоюза Молдове составляла 20 млн евро, а в 2005-2006 гг. — уже 42 млн. В конце сентября 2005 г. наблюдатели от Евросоюза и США включились в переговорный процесс по приднестровскому урегулированию. В декабре 2006 г. конференция организаций-доноров приняла решение направить в Молдову 1,2 млн долл. в качестве экономической компенсации за ущерб, понесенный от санкций со стороны России. Укрепились и взаимоотношения Молдовы с НАТО. Кишинев был осторожен с НАТО отчасти из опасения резкого ухудшения 25

Azi. 2004. 09. 30.

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отношений с Москвой, а отчасти потому, что Конституция Молдовы предусматривает ее нейтралитет. Несмотря на это, в июне 2005 г. президент Воронин вновь посетил Брюссель, где подписал протокол «Плана действий в рамках индивидуального партнерства» (Individual Partnership Action Plan), принятого по решению пражского (2002 г.) саммита НАТО для укрепления взаимодействия между НАТО и странами — участницами IPAP. На этом фоне заметно охладились отношения между Кишиневом и Москвой/Тирасполем. Сразу после неудачи с меморандумом Козака президент Воронин неоднократно по нескольким каналам пытался связаться с российским лидером, чтобы объяснить ему мотивы своего отказа подписать документ в последний момент. Однако президент Путин избегал каких-либо контактов с Ворониным, и отношения между государствами существенно ухудшились. Дальнейшие шаги Тирасполя и Москвы заставили Воронина понервничать. В июле 2004 г. Тирасполь распорядился закрыть на своей территории школы, в которых изучался румынский язык с использованием латинского алфавита (некоторые из них находились под управлением Кишинева). ОБСЕ, включая Верховную комиссию по делам нацменьшинств (High Commissioner on National Minorities), Евросоюз, Совет Европы и США осудили эту акцию, но Россия ее поддержала. Более того, в сентябре 2004 г. на саммите СНГ в Астане Москва объявила о создании единого экономического пространства в составе России, Украины, Казахстана и Белоруссии. Утверждают, что это решение больно ударило по самолюбию Воронина и заставило его заявить, что Молдова и дальше будет укреплять свои отношения с Евросоюзом26. Далее, 6 декабря 2004 г. Россия объявила о нежелании ставить свою подпись под Декларацией о стабильности и безопасности Молдовы, которую предстояло подписать на декабрьском саммите ОБСЕ в Софии27. Молдавский министр иностранных дел Андрей Стратан, со своей стороны, выступил на этом саммите с суровой критикой российского военного присутствия в Приднестровье, назвав российские войска оккупационными. 26

Azi. 2004. 09. 14.

27

Azi. 2004. 12. 06.

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Отношения между Москвой и Кишиневом продолжали ухудшаться и в ходе парламентских выборов в Молдове в марте 2005 г. Незадолго до них президент Воронин объявил главным приоритетом своей внешней политики вхождение в Евросоюз и зимой 2005 г. подтвердил свой прозападный курс на встречах с президентами Украины (Ющенко), Грузии (Саакашвили) и Румынии (Basescu). В такой ситуации Россия дала ясно понять, что в ходе избирательной кампании поддержит молдавскую оппозицию — блок «Демократическая Молдова». Однако Кишинев изгнал из Молдовы российских представителей, наблюдавших за ходом парламентских выборов, обвинив их в подделке документов и деятельности, выходящей за рамки наблюдательной28. В ответ 18 февраля 2005 г. российская Дума одобрила ряд санкций против Молдовы — была повышена цена на импортируемые ею нефть и газ, сокращен вывоз из нее алкогольной продукции и табака, а также введены ограничения на получение виз гражданами этой страны29. Опираясь на это решение Думы, с мая 2005 г. Россия начала вводить запрет на ввоз из Молдовы сначала некоторых продуктов питания, а затем и вина — самой существенной статьи ее экспорта. В январе 2006 г. на две недели была прекращена поставка в Молдову природного газа.

ВЛИЯНИЕ «ОРАНЖЕВОЙ РЕВОЛЮЦИИ» После истории с меморандумом Козака и во многом из-за «оранжевой революции» на Украине осенью 2004 г. обстановка вокруг проблемы Приднестровья обострилась еще больше. Вопрос стал рассматриваться уже с участием Евросоюза, Украины и Молдовы, которые решили изменить формат переговоров и сменить их участников с приднестровской стороны. В стремлении обеспечить свое членство в Евросоюзе весной 2005 г. новое правительство Украины выдвинуло так называемый план Ющенко по урегулированию приднестровской проблемы в развитие плана ENP, запущенного в феврале того же года. Суть пред28

Moldova Azi. 2005. 02. 11, 21, 23.

29

Moldova Azi. 2005. 02. 21, Interlic. 2005. 02. 21.

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ложения украинского президента сводилась к тому, чтобы в декабре 2005 г. провести в Приднестровье свободные и демократические парламентские выборы, а затем обсудить проблему урегулирования уже с вновь избранным руководством территории. Как отмечали местные наблюдатели и представители украинского политического бомонда, этот план явился результатом компромисса старой и новой политических элит Киева. Хотя в отношении этого плана прозвучала критика — провести в Приднестровье демократические выборы уже в декабре считалось невозможным, его сильной стороной было намерение вести переговоры с демократически избранным и реалистически настроенным новым местным руководством. Учитывая последнее, правительство Молдовы приняло предложение Ющенко, обусловив его «тремя Д» — демилитаризацией, демократизацией и декриминализацией Приднестровья. Молдавский парламент 22 июля 2005 г. принял специальный закон, в котором он отказывался от идеи федерализации Молдовы и предусматривал вывод из Приднестровья российских войск, а также начало переговоров по урегулированию с руководителями, избранными в ходе местных демократических парламентских выборов. В результате начали осуществляться два из «трех Д» — декриминализация и демократизация, но демилитаризация не продвинулась ни на шаг. Декриминализация Приднестровья началась в декабре 2005 г. главным образом усилиями структуры Евросоюза под названием «Миссия помощи в решении проблем границ» (EUBAM — European Union Border Assistant Mission). Ее основная цель заключалась в мониторинге деятельности таможенных служб и наблюдении за украинско-приднестровской границей. Считалось, что экспорт из Приднестровья контролируется исключительно Тирасполем, по преимуществу нелегален и непрозрачен для мирового сообщества; существующая же система не обеспечивает должной охраны границ и допускает нелегальную эмиграцию, контрабанду наркотиков, оружия, отмывание денег и прочие виды криминального бизнеса. Поэтому с началом работы EUBAM приднестровским компаниям-экспортерам было предложено зарегистрироваться в таможенных органах Кишинева, экспортный поток был поставлен под международный контроль, и в результате некоторые виды нелегальной деятельности действительно были прекращены.

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В Приднестровье начались и демократические перемены. На парламентских выборах в декабре 2005 г. победила партия «Обновление», костяк которой составили предприниматели, а группа Смирнова, которую поддерживали радикальные политические силы, отошла в тень30. Сообщали, что после победы на парламентских выборах в партии «Обновление» обсуждалась возможность выдвижения ее лидера Е.Шевчука кандидатом на президентские выборы 2006 г. После выборов спикер парламента Малакута, отправляясь в отставку, призвал Смирнова также уступить свое кресло представителю более молодого поколения. Как видим, план Ющенко способствовал демократизации Приднестровья. Еще одним условием урегулирования конфликта Молдова, Украина и Евросоюз считали смену формата переговоров. Москва и Тирасполь не поддержали их стремление увеличить число участников переговоров, которых изначально было пять — ОБСЕ, Россия, Украина, Молдова и Приднестровье. В конце сентября 2005 г. был найден компромисс — Евросоюз и США направили в комиссию своих наблюдателей по системе «5+2». Тирасполь и Москва согласились на такую комбинацию, по-видимому, будучи уверены, что голоса двух наблюдателей не смогут изменить соотношение сил в комиссии и организации, которые их направили, будут дискредитированы.

ВОЗОБНОВЛЕНИЕ ВЛИЯНИЯ РОССИИ МОЛДОВЫ

И НОВОЕ СБЛИЖЕНИЕ С НЕЙ

Отмеченные новые (после провала меморандума Козака) тенденции и подходы к решению приднестровской проблемы, вызванные к жизни соединенными усилиями Евросоюза, Украины и Молдовы, в 2006 г. пошли на спад. Приднестровский лидер Смирнов в сентябре 2006 г. сумел провести региональный референдум по вопросу независимости Приднестровья, одновременно использовав его для критики деятельности EUBAM и мобилизации своих сторонников в преддверии новых президентских выборов в 30 ОБСЕ и другие западные институты так и не признали эти выборы демократическими.

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Приднестровье в декабре 2006 г. Поэтому итоги работы EUBAM оценивают двояко: эта организация, с одной стороны, усилив контроль на украинско-приднестровской границе, заблокировала каналы для нелегальной экономики, а с другой, содействовала переходу власти к более умеренным политическим силам и тем самым способствовала отклонению Приднестровья от демократического пути. Давно известно, что тираспольский лидер пользуется финансовой и моральной поддержкой Москвы. Начиная с весны 2006 г. Россия ежемесячно выделяла Приднестровью по 40 млн долл. в качестве компенсации за те потери, которые последняя понесла в результате контроля EUBAM, перекрывшего каналы для теневой экономики. В итоге Евросоюз, Украина и Молдова не смогли здесь найти новых переговорщиков, и план Ющенко пришлось отложить. Переговоры в формате «5+2» также оказались парализованы. Первый их раунд состоялся в Кишиневе и Тирасполе в конце января 2006 г., второй — в конце февраля того же года. В ходе февральской встречи представители Молдовы и Приднестровья долго спорили, под чьей юрисдикцией находится деревня Дроцкая. Далее последовали важные события — июльский саммит «большой восьмерки», референдум в Приднестровье (в сентябре), а затем и декабрьские президентские выборы. В итоге переговоры в этом формате прекратились. В таких условиях Молдова пошла на возобновление переговоров с Россией относительно приднестровского урегулирования. Причиной этого явилось стремление добиться от России пересмотра введенного ей эмбарго на сельхозпродукцию и вино, а также сомнение в способности Киева и дальше участвовать в решении приднестровской проблемы, поскольку по итогам парламентских выборов, которые прошли на Украине весной 2006 г., произошел развал «оранжевого» блока. В ходе визита в Москву в августе 2006 г. президент Воронин снова обратился к Путину за помощью в решении названной проблемы, взамен пообещав предоставить России некоторые преференции. Москву неоднократно посещали министр Василий Шова и помощник Воронина Марк Ткачук, которые продолжили переговоры с русскими партнерами. Кишинев настаивал, во-первых, на всеобъемлющем характере переговоров, во-вторых, на предоставлении Приднестровью прав

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автономии и, в-третьих, на отказе от идеи федерализации Молдовы на основе закона о Приднестровье, принятого в июле 2005 г. Поговаривают, что учитывая горькие уроки, связанные с меморандумом Козака, Молдова знакомила с ходом московских переговоров третью сторону, а также международные организации. Согласно информации Кишинева, Молдова представила России проект решения с просьбой одобрить его. Проект предусматривает предоставление Приднестровью статуса автономии, немедленный вывод оттуда российских войск в соответствии с решениями саммита ОБСЕ в Стамбуле 1999 г., придание миротворческим силам международного характера под эгидой ОБСЕ, запрет на базирование в Молдове любых иностранных войск и строгое соблюдение ей нейтралитета, предоставление гарантий приватизированным российским предприятиям в Приднестровье, а также благожелательное отношение к русскому языку в Молдове. На встрече в Минске в ноябре 2006 г. президенты Воронин и Путин договорились о нефедеративном статусе Молдовы, об отказе от единой сферы компетенции центральных органов власти в Молдове и местной в Приднестровье, о введении системы гарантий прав нацменьшинств (учитывая автономию Приднестровья) и территориальной целостности Молдовы после вывода российских войск из Приднестровья. Сообщают, что весной 2007 г. Россия направила Молдове ее проект в исправленном виде и теперь его обсуждают в Кишиневе. Наблюдатели ожидают разрешения проблемы Приднестровья в ближайшее время и строят догадки о том, каким путем будет достигнуто это соглашение. Мы же попытаемся ответить на поставленный ранее вопрос: встречает ли участие Евросоюза в решении приднестровской проблемы ответное желание сотрудничать со стороны России? Из нашего анализа видно, что Россия никогда не выказывала подобных стремлений в отношении Евросоюза, всегда оставаясь на собственной позиции. В конечном счете именно в этом следует искать причину того, что Молдова возобновила переговоры с Россией по приднестровской проблеме.

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ПРЕДЫСТОРИЯ Официальный Киев заинтересован в скорейшем решении приднестровского вопроса, поскольку Приднестровье является постоянным источником вызовов и угроз для безопасности Украины. Преодоление нестабильности входит в число внешнеполитических приоритетов Киева, который не может позволить, чтобы конфликт на Днестре разгорелся вновь. Реальные условия для урегулирования взаимоотношений между Молдовой и Приднестровьем как сторонами конфликта появились спустя два года после окончания (в 1992 г.) военных действий. Это фактически предопределило начало переговорного процесса и вступление в него Украины в качестве посредника. Главной задачей, которую стороны ставили перед собой в начале переговоров, было решение вопросов безопасности. Так, 5 июля 1992 г. было подписано Соглашение о неприменении во взаимных отношениях военной силы и экономических санкций. Оно стало первым международным документом, подписанным сторонами конфликта, которые впервые обратились к Украине с просьбой выступить в роли гаранта его соблюдения. В дальнейшем переговоры шли в направлении разработки основ взаимоотношений между Приднестровьем и Молдовой. Восьмого мая 1997 г. в Москве был подписан меморандум «Об основах нормализации отношений между Республикой Молдова и Приднестровьем», определивший основные принципы построения госу-

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дарственно-правовых отношений между сторонами и закрепивший ряд ранее достигнутых договоренностей. Меморандум утвердил новый подход к проблемам урегулирования между Молдовой и Приднестровьем. В нем появились такие понятия, как «общее государство», «международная правосубъектность», «экономическая самостоятельность», «система гарантий». На основании обращения сторон РФ и Украина стали гарантами выполнения достигнутых договоренностей. ОБСЕ, отказавшись от участия в переговорном процессе в качестве гаранта, сохранила за собой статус посредника. Однако отсутствие действенного механизма гарантий препятствовало осуществлению гарантами своих функций, что вынудило их ограничиться лишь наблюдением за выполнением достигнутых договоренностей. Одной из серьезных проблем на этом этапе стало разное толкование сторонами понятия «общее государство». В этом отношении важную роль сыграла многосторонняя встреча в Киеве, состоявшаяся 16 июля 1999 г. Принципы, заложенные в Декларации об общем государстве, нашли свое отражение в Совместном заявлении по итогам Киевской встречи. В переговорном процессе изначально принимали участие делегации, возглавляемые президентами сторон. Также были образованы комиссии по координации и обеспечению переговорного процесса — группы политических экспертов и межведомственные комиссии, которые были призваны обеспечивать решение социально-экономических вопросов. Кроме того, действовали парламентские комиссии, а также Объединенная контрольная комиссия. Эффективный трехсторонний механизм с участием военных наблюдателей от Украины создал основу для нормального диалога. В результате были подписаны документы, которые признали как стороны, так и международное сообщество. Вместе с тем, с конца августа 2001 г., с приходом к власти в Республике Молдова коммунистов, переговорный процесс между Молдовой и Приднестровьем стал испытывать серьезные затруднения. Так, 1 сентября 2001 г. Республика Молдова ввела таможенные печати нового образца, что лишило Приднестровье возможности самостоятельно осуществлять внешнеэкономическую деятельность. Пятого сентября 2001 г. Верховный Совет Приднестровья рекомендовал

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президенту И.Смирнову приостановить переговоры на неопределенный срок. Переговорный процесс прервался почти на год. В Братиславе 19-20 февраля 2002 г. состоялась встреча представителей России, Украины, ОБСЕ и Приднестровья, в ходе которой было принято решение создать Постоянное совещание по политическим вопросам в рамках переговорного процесса по приднестровскому урегулированию. Представители от Республики Молдова не приняли участия во встрече и присоединились к этой инициативе лишь в мае 2002 г. В начале июля 2002 г. в Киеве на очередном заседании Постоянного совещания уже с участием представителей от РМ была достигнута договоренность продолжить диалог на уровне представителей по политическим вопросам в существующем пятистороннем формате. Главным достижением этой встречи стало то, что посредники вручили сторонам предложения, предполагавшие новый подход к урегулированию отношений на основе федеративной идеи. Пятого декабря 2002 г. полномочные представители ОБСЕ, РФ, Украины и Приднестровья подписали декларацию о намерениях, в которой были закреплены основные принципы выработки формулы федеративной концепции, заложенной в Киевском документе от 3 июля 2002 г. Очередным знаковым событием, которое, как предполагалось, будет иметь историческое значение в переговорном процессе, явился так называемый план Козака — Меморандум об основных принципах государственного устройства объединенного государства Молдовы и Приднестровья, который предстояло подписать в 2003 г. Предполагалось, что на эту церемонию прилетит президент России В.Путин. Однако в последний момент под давлением США и Европы президент РМ В.Воронин отказался подписывать российские инициативы1. Переговоры фактически зашли в тупик. В связи с тем, что представители Приднестровья и России продолжали настаивать на своем подходе к урегулированию, руководство Молдовы переориентировалось на Запад. Украина же находилась в преддверии президентских выборов.

1 Макаркин А. План Ющенко и план Козака // http://www.rian.ru/analytics/200 50615/40526451.html.

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Таким образом, для данного этапа приднестровского урегулирования были характерны • нейтральность руководства Украины по отношению к позициям конфликтующих сторон; • согласование действий Украины и России как стран-гарантов в процессе урегулирования; • отсутствие четко выраженных экономических и политических интересов Украины, которые вступали бы в конфликт с интересами других игроков в процессе урегулирования. Очевидно, что позиционирование себя как нейтрального игрока, не поддерживающего ни одну из сторон, в тот период приднестровского урегулирования уберегло руководство украинского государства от обвинений в предвзятости (в то время как российскую сторону систематически обвиняют в лоббировании интересов Приднестровья). С другой стороны, явным было и то, что Украина с точки зрения среднесрочной перспективы теряла свои геополитические позиции. Анонсированный в 2005 г. план Ющенко давал Украине возможность занять нишу регионального лидера, что, как предполагалось, должно было подкрепиться перспективой разрешения приднестровского конфликта. Однако влиять на эти процессы Украина практически не имела возможности. Конфликтующие стороны уже давно находились под экономическим и политическим влиянием других субъектов геополитики. Приднестровье в переговорном процессе поддерживали представители России, и большинство основных бюджетообразующих предприятий региона уже находились в собственности российских бизнесменов. Руководство же Молдовы после отклонения меморандума Козака рассчитывало на получение многомиллионных вливаний в экономику со стороны Запада и международных финансовых организаций, что предопределило его позицию. Украина же не имела реального влияния на экономические и политические процессы ни по одну, ни по другую сторону Днестра. Несмотря на то, что российский бизнес стремительно инвестировал в экономику Приднестровья, в 2003-2004 гг. большая часть предприятий региона находилась в собственности непризнанной

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Приднестровской республики. Руководители региона и близкие к ним бизнес-структуры понимали, что принадлежность большей части предприятий России может привести к тому, что регион станет заложником ее внешнеполитических интересов. Поэтому после прихода к власти в Украине В.Ющенко и его амбициозных заявлений о перспективах регионального лидерства у представителей украинской политической и бизнес-элиты появилась возможность распространить свое влияние на приднестровский регион.

«ОРАНЖЕВАЯ» ЭЙФОРИЯ ЮЩЕНКО

НАКАНУНЕ ПРЕДЛОЖЕНИЯ

Долгие годы Украина шла в фарватере российских инициатив, поддерживала проекты Москвы по урегулированию приднестровского конфликта или тихо их саботировала, оставаясь простым статистом в процессе урегулирования. И вот наконец президент Украины Виктор Ющенко дал понять, что Киев собирается стать игроком в приднестровском урегулированиия, выступив с инициативой разработки своего плана решения конфликта. Дело в том, что после «оранжевой» революции перед Украиной открылись новые возможности. Благоприятная внешнеполитическая конъюнктура, поддержка со стороны стратегических партнеров на Западе создавали необходимые условия для усиления роли Киева на всем постсоветском пространстве. В начале 2005 г. в Киеве господствовала атмосфера мессианизма, готовности стать центром демократизации постсоветского пространства. Революция 2004-2005 гг.2 не только принесла с собой изменения в руководстве государства, но и привела к существенной корректировке правил игры в политике и методов управления. Гражданское общество почувствовало себя субъектом политики. За 2 См.: Якушик В. Українська революція 2004-2005 років. Спроба теоретичного аналізу // Політичний менеджмент. 2006. № 2. С. 19-36. (http://www.politik.org. ua/vid/magcontent.php3?m=1&n=56&c=1180); Якушик В. Политические и цивилизационные аспекты украинской революции 2004-2005 гг. // ПОЛИТЭКС. СПб., 2006. Т. 2. № 2. С. 289-298. (http://politex.info/mambo/content/view/196/40/).

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первую половину 2005 г. количество судебных исков граждан к органам власти возросло в 400 раз (!), а в январе-мае 2005 г. существенно увеличилось число акций протеста и фактов самоорганизации населения (только в одном Киеве было зафиксировано более 3000 неформальных инициатив, направленных против уплотнительной застройки, реформы ЖКХ и пр.)3. Местная власть под давлением общественности начала принимать решения в пользу граждан. Все это усиливало эйфорию, возникло ощущение, что открываются возможности для глубокого демократического переустройства страны. Начали создаваться институты «демократии участия», местные советы стали рассматривать возможность проведения референдумов по местным бюджетам и пр. Естественно, что подобные тенденции усиливали мессианские настроения и в среде политической элиты. Интересно, что этот мессианизм в некоторых вопросах выходил за рамки дискурса, привносимого Западом. Триумфальная поездка президента В.Ющенко по США и странам ЕС дала дополнительную подпитку подобным настроениям. Западное общественное мнение позитивно воспринимало любые внешнеполитические инициативы Киева, будь то требование В.Ющенко к Еврокомиссии дать четкий месседж о вхождении Украины в ЕС и предоставлении Украине статуса государства с рыночной экономикой или к США отменить поправку Джексона-Вэнника. Саммит ГУУАМ, состоявшийся в Кишиневе 22 апреля 2005 г. (на котором был озвучен план Ющенко), также принял во многом именно украинскую концепцию направления потоков нефти из региона Каспия в страны ЕС (через Украину). Все это создавало в среде правящей элиты ощущение прорыва на внешнеполитическом направлении. Поэтому Киев позволял себе выходить за рамки алгоритмов, разработанных Западом. План Ющенко оказался именно таким документом. С одной стороны, он исходил из рекомендаций ЕС по укреплению границ с Приднестровьем, а с другой, содержал такое видение решения этой сложной проблемы, которое не вписывалось в привычную западную парадигму. 3 Бюллетень Центра исследований проблем гражданского общества. 2007. № 7. С. 4.

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ПЛАН ЮЩЕНКО В своем выступлении на саммите ГУУАМ в Кишиневе 22 апреля 2005 г. президент Украины В.Ющенко выдвинул ряд предложений относительно урегулирования приднестровской проблемы. Если ранее главным образом обсуждались вопросы статуса Приднестровья, то в тезисах, озвученных президентом Украины, речь шла об изменении самой сути политического режима, о содействии демократическим преобразованиям в Приднестровье. Это, безусловно, стало новым словом в урегулировании. Основные идеи плана В.Ющенко «К урегулированию — через демократию» сводились к следующему. Первое. Администрации Приднестровья было предложено создать необходимые условия для развития в регионе демократии, гражданского общества и многопартийной системы как регионального, так и общегосударственного уровня. Украина выразила готовность способствовать этому процессу. Второе. В ближайшее время в правовых условиях статуса Приднестровья предполагалось провести свободные и демократические выборы в Верховный Совет как представительский орган Приднестровского региона Республики Молдова. Третье. Украина обратилась к ЕС, ОБСЕ, Совету Европы, России, США, другим демократическим странам совместно обеспечить контроль за проведением свободных и демократических выборов в Верховный Совет Приднестровья. Четвертое. Украина поддержала намерение ЕС и США способствовать приднестровскому урегулированию. Пятое. Предлагалось трансформировать существовавший формат миротворческой деятельности в регионе в международный механизм военных и гражданских наблюдателей под эгидой ОБСЕ. Украина выразила готовность увеличить количество своих наблюдателей в Приднестровье. Шестое. Администрации Приднестровья было предложено допустить международную мониторинговую миссию с участием украинских специалистов на предприятия военно-промышленного комплекса региона.

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Седьмое. Украина выразила готовность допустить на свою территорию краткосрочные мониторинговые миссии ОБСЕ с целью проверки передвижения людей и грузов через украинскомолдавскую государственную границу и призвала Приднестровье осуществить аналогичные меры4.

ПАССИВНОСТЬ КИЕВА ЮЩЕНКО

И ДЕМОНТАЖ ПЛАНА

В целом можно выделить следующие этапы продвижения плана Ющенко. С апреля по июнь 2005 г. — поддержка Плана всеми участниками переговорного процесса, включение в его обсуждение ОБСЕ, РФ, ЕС, РМ и ПМР. С июля по декабрь 2005 г. — попытки торпедирования Плана со стороны РМ и сворачивание активного участия Украины в приднестровском диалоге. Тридцатое декабря 2005 г. — подписание правительством Юрия Еханурова совместного с Молдовой заявления о необходимости в кратчайшие сроки упорядочить передвижение товаров и грузов на приднестровском участке украинско-молдавской государственной границы. США и ЕС отреагировали на украинские предложения с объяснимым опозданием. Только 10 мая 2005 г. секретарь Совета национальной безопасности и обороны Украины Петр Порошенко получил от специального представителя ЕС по вопросам Молдовы посла Адриана Якобовича де Сегеда более-менее внятный ответ о позиции ЕС по плану Ющенко: «в целом поддерживаем». США ограничились подтверждением «заинтересованности в реализации» украинских инициатив. Подобная сдержанность (и отчасти растерянность) объясняются прежде всего тем, что план Ющенко предполагал предоставление Приднестровью определенной субъектности, официальной возможности принимать участие 4 План урегулирования приднестровской проблемы (план Ющенко) // http:// www.allmoldova.com/index.php?action=viewdoc&id=1118922034&lng=ru.

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в переговорном процессе на равных с другими политическими игроками процесса урегулирования. Это не вписывалось в общую концепцию решения вопроса, разработанную ОБСЕ и руководством Республики Молдова. По их мнению, Тирасполь следовало вытеснить из активного переговорного процесса, а диалог должны вести Кишинев и Москва5. Первая официальная оценка Кишиневом украинских предложений по приднестровскому урегулированию прозвучала 10 июня 2005 г. на заседании парламента РМ, посвященном обсуждению плана Ющенко. Тон задавал президент Молдовы В.Воронин, который в своем вступительном докладе отметил, что «план Украины устанавливает механизм демократизации региона и дальнейшую реинтеграцию Молдовы». По результатам заседания парламент РМ принял Декларацию относительно плана Украины по урегулированию приднестровской проблемы, а также Обращение о принципах и условиях демилитаризации и Обращение о критериях демократизации Приднестровского региона. В частности, в Декларации основными критериями демократизации молдавская сторона называет «ликвидацию местного МГБ, обеспечение доступа парламентских партий РМ в регион, реформирование судебной власти, устранение препятствий в работе свободных СМИ и освобождение политзаключенных»6. Вместе с тем, молдавские парламентарии отметили, что План не учитывает ряд принципиальных моментов, а именно порядок вывода российских войск и установление надлежащего контроля на приднестровском участке молдавско-украинской границы. По их мнению, эти проблемы нужно решать при поддержке международного сообщества и энергичном содействии Украины. По словам В.Воронина, главным вкладом России в приднестровское урегулирование должен стать вывод российских войск, Молдове не нужно иностранное военное присутствие на своей территории. В Обращении выдвигалось требование к РФ вывести войска и 5 Соловей И. Российский план урегулирования приднестровского конфликта: перезагрузка // http://www.glavred.info/archive/2005/10/21/105859-5.html. 6 Енин Е., Левусь Д. Кто не с нами, тот — против… урегулирования приднестровского конфликта // Зеркало недели. (Киев). 18-24 июня 2005. № 23 (551) (http://www. zerkalo-nedeli.com/ie/show/551/50373/).

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вооружения до конца 2005 г. и ликвидировать ее миротворческое присутствие в зоне безопасности до конца 2006 г., а также предлагалось миротворческую миссию заменить на институт военных и гражданских наблюдателей под мандатом ОБСЕ. Украинский план в отличие от большинства аналогичных инициатив был представлен в пятистороннем формате, а также вынесен на широкое общественное обсуждение. Но в июне 2005 г. украинские эксперты выразили беспокойство в связи с отсутствием оценок этих инициатив со стороны Кремля как одного из ключевых игроков приднестровского конфликта. В дипломатических кругах Молдовы настойчиво распускались слухи об активной подготовке российского контрплана урегулирования приднестровского конфликта, а также о якобы секретном решении Совбеза РФ, предусматривавшем порядок совместных российско-приднестровских мероприятий в случае обострения ситуации в Приднестровье. Политический туман несколько рассеялся после консультаций, прошедших в Москве 9-10 июня 2005 г. по инициативе украинской стороны. Комментируя их результаты, посол по особым поручениям МИДа Украины Д.Ткач заявил, что у россиян нет принципиальных возражений по плану Ющенко и украинские инициативы не вызывают раздражения в Кремле. Москва, как оказалось, тщательно прорабатывала украинский план, чтобы сделать его своего рода «дорожной картой» приднестровского урегулирования. Уже 14 июля 2005 г. глава МИД РФ Сергей Лавров заявил, что Россия считает план Ющенко по Приднестровью приемлемым, но требующим доработки7. Таким образом, официальный Кремль не планировал сразу «торпедировать» этот документ, а был готов принять его за основу, оставив за собой право на его доработку по ходу реализации. Однако 22 июля 2005 г., пользуясь бездеятельностью Киева, парламент Молдовы принял в первом и во втором (окончательном) чтениях Закон об основных положениях особого правового статуса населенных пунктов левобережья Днестра, предусматривавший предоставление Приднестровью статуса автономии. Он устанавливал, что выборы в Верховный Совет Приднестровья должны проходить 7 Россия считает, что план Ющенко по Приднестровью нужно доработать. (14. 07. 2005) // http://www.proua.com/news/2005/07/14/170515.html.

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строго в рамках избирательного законодательства Республики Молдова. Более того, молдавские парламентарии закрепили положение о том, что основанием для проведения свободных и демократических выборов в Приднестровском регионе являются демилитаризация и демократизация в соответствии с декларациями, принятыми парламентом Молдовы в июне 2005 г. (в числе обязательных условий — полный вывод российских войск и вооружений до конца 2005 г., ликвидация местного МГБ, свободная деятельность молдавских политических партий в регионе и т.д.)8. Такой шаг молдавского парламента шел вразрез с украинским планом урегулирования и выявил истинную суть подхода официального Кишинева к этому процессу: пока этот план вписывается в рамки наших устремлений — мы сторонники украинского варианта урегулирования, но если речь идет об уступках и следовании правилам игры, предложенным В.Ющенко, мы его не придерживаемся. Этот закон сразу завел в тупик еще не возобновившийся переговорный процесс. Официальный Киев промолчал по этому поводу. Только отдельные эксперты отметили, что Кишинев торпедирует украинские инициативы. МИД Украины ограничился констатацией, что все стороны в формате «пять плюс два» (Молдова, Приднестровье, Украина, Россия, ОБСЕ, США и ЕС) одобрили план Ющенко. Тирасполь же объявил о своем категорическом несогласии с линией Кишинева. Как заявила зам. министра информации и телекоммуникаций ПМР Светлана Антонова, принятие такого закона без каких-либо консультаций с Тирасполем — «политика выкручивания рук, когда по вопросам, по которым не было достигнуто согласия, принимаются решения в одностороннем порядке». Она напомнила, что переговоры были заблокированы молдавской стороной год назад и с того времени статус Приднестровья не обсуждался. По ее мнению, предложенный молдавской стороной вариант преследует пропагандистские цели и «накалит и без того напряженную обстановку в регионе»9. 8 Енин Е., Левусь Д. Приднестровье на перепутье. Какая судьба ждет регион и кто позаботится о его жителях // Зеркало недели. 30 июля — 5 августа 2005. № 29 (556) (http://www.zn.ua/1000/1600/50771/). 9 Тирасполь подверг критике принятый парламентом Молдавии закон о статусе Приднестровья (25 июля 2005) // http://www.podrobnosti.ua/power/ local/2005/07/25/229642.html.

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Несмотря на то, что руководство Приднестровья в целом поддержало украинские инициативы, оценки украинского плана политиками и бизнесменами Тирасполя расходились. Основными его недостатками считался декларативный характер и возможность неоднозначного толкования ряда его положений. Беспокоила также неопределенность с системой выборов в парламент Приднестровья, запланированных на декабрь 2005 г. Провести выборы по молдавскому избирательному закону было практически невозможно, вопервых, из-за очень низкого уровня взаимного доверия между конфликтующими сторонами, а во-вторых (и это отлично понимают сами молдаване), за многие годы в РМ и Приднестровском регионе сформировались диаметрально противоположные избирательные системы. Приднестровцы голосуют за депутатов-мажоритарщиков, а РМ формирует свой парламент по классической пропорциональной системе, строго по партийным спискам. Вполне естественным было и опасение приднестровцев, что в случае проведения выборов по молдавскому закону проголосовать смогут лишь те жители левобережья Днестра, которые имеют гражданство РМ (только треть). Руководство парламента ПМР считало, что выборы в Приднестровье могли бы пройти по закону, предложенному ОБСЕ или по модифицированному на основе рекомендаций ОБСЕ приднестровскому закону. В таком случае главной задачей стран-гарантов и международных наблюдателей на выборах в приднестровский парламент было бы обеспечение объективного волеизъявления жителей региона на основе демократических принципов. Принятие указанного выше закона РМ и пассивная позиция Киева привели к тому, что выборы в Верховный Совет в Приднестровье прошли по старому избирательному закону. Их, естественно, не признали ни Россия, ни ЕС, ни Украина, ни ОБСЕ, ни РМ. План Ющенко был фактически заблокирован. Официальный Киев не проводил информационной кампании по разъяснению своей позиции в РМ, ПМР, на Западе и в РФ, не способствовал появлению проукраински ориентированного лобби в Приднестровье и не пытался расширить свое экономическое, информационное и гуманитарное присутствие в регионе.

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РЕШИТЕЛЬНЫЙ ПОВОРОТ: БОРЬБА МЕЖДУ МИД И СНБОУ Как только план Ющенко был фактически заблокирован, тема приднестровского урегулирования стала предметом противоречий между Советом национальной безопасности и обороны Украины (СНБОУ) и МИДом Украины. Двадцать второго августа 2005 г. в Киеве состоялось совещание послов Украины, и президент Украины Виктор Ющенко подписал указ об усилении координирующей роли МИД в осуществлении внешней политики Украины, возложив на это министерство координацию деятельности всех структур исполнительной власти в сфере внешней политики. Таким образом, позиции Бориса Тарасюка усилились. Сама идея указа о координирующей роли МИДа в выработке внешней политики Украины не нова. Еще в сентябре 1996 г. был издан указ президента Украины о координирующей роли МИД. Но в 2000-х годах центр принятия решений по вопросам внешней политики переместился в окружение действовавшего тогда президента Леонида Кучмы, а МИД выполнял в основном формальные функции и не занимался внешнеполитическим креативом. Естественно, что новая власть была намерена усовершенствовать механизмы принятия внешнеполитических решений. Правительство в Украине формируется на основе партийных квот. Это налагает существенный отпечаток на процесс принятия решений, от которых веет идеологическими штампами. Такова сущность украинской политической культуры и специфика политической системы. Как отмечают эксперты, «аргументация «тарасюковской гвардии» в экспертном сообществе о том, что секретариат президента и СНБОУ забираются в «чужой огород», больше свидетельствует о банальной «жабе», которая душит МИД. Пассивность и инфантильность украинского МИДа в вопросах защиты национальных интересов Украины уже не только поражает отечественных политологов, но и вызывает удивление на Западе»10. 10 Кузка С. Молдавский гамбит // http://politika.org.ua/rus/ie/show_img/54109/ b2.pl?sh=pub_singl&num=560.

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В начале августа 2005 г. молдавские спецслужбы осуществили спецоперацию против секретаря СНБОУ П.Порошенко. Двенадцатого августа 2005 г. «приднестровская» ассоциация «Pro Europa» опубликовала в СМИ заявление, в котором назвала П.Порошенко криминальным бизнесменом прямо лоббирующим интересы приднестровского режима Смирнова-Антюфеева. Порошенко был обвинен также в заказе на убийство акционера молдавского АО «Jemeni» Шупарского и его семьи. Более того, лидер «Pro Europa» Борис Асаров заявил, что П.Порошенко связан с деятельностью С.Могилевича, который якобы готовит покушение на украинского премьера Ю.Тимошенко11. Молдавская сторона неоднократно использовала «Pro Europa» для дискредитации приднестровского руководства. Эта ассоциация делала и антиукраинские заявления во время активизации переговорного процесса по приднестровскому урегулированию, критикуя предложенный Киевом план решения конфликта на Днестре. Кишинев считал, что на пути реализации его планов «умиротворения» Приднестровья стоит секретарь СНБОУ П.Порошенко. Именно с его именем молдавское руководство связывало нежелание Киева принимать сторону Молдовы и участвовать в экономической блокаде Тирасполя, которая привела бы к силовому присоединению ПМР к РМ. Ведь именно по инициативе П.Порошенко было приостановлено действие постановлений правительства Украины №123 и №126 о запрете экспорта из Приднестровья с таможенным оформлением ПМР (об этом см. ниже). Явно преувеличивая роль П.Порошенко в приднестровской политике Украины, молдавские спецслужбы начали кампанию по его дискредитации. Поэтому обвинение, выдвинутое в его адрес «Pro Europa», следует воспринимать как стремление устранить П.Порошенко из механизма принятия внешнеполитических решений в Украине (или как минимум снизить его вес при выработке позиции Украины в Приднестровском вопросе)12. Это заявление получило широкое распространение и в Молдове, и на Западе, и в Украине. Некоторые эксперты отмечают, что оно было специально синхронизировано с инициативой 11

Там же.

12

Там же.

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МИДа Украины по возвращению себе контролирующей функции во внешней политике. Таким образом, МИД отобрал инициативу у СНБОУ и в вопросе приднестровского урегулирования. Усиление внутренних политических противоречий привело к провалу внешнеполитических инициатив В.Ющенко. В начале сентября 2005 г. началось смещение акцентов с внешнеполитических приоритетов на внутренние проблемы. В этом месяце состоялась череда отставок главных политических игроков. Седьмого сентября 2005 г. ушел в отставку с поста секретаря СНБОУ П.Порошенко, В.Ющенко также уволил премьер-министра Юлию Тимошенко. Анатолий Кинах, который пришел на место П.Порошенко в СНБОУ, не проявлял особого интереса к приднестровской тематике.

ПРОБЛЕМЫ ЮГО-ЗАПАДНЫХ ГРАНИЦ УКРАИНЫ И ПУТЬ К БЛОКАДЕ

Ни для кого не секрет, что жизнеспособность Приднестровья зависит от его промышленности, ориентированной на экспорт. Среднегодовой внешнеторговый оборот Приднестровья составляет сегодня 770 млн долл. Наиболее развиты электроэнергетика, черная металлургия, машиностроение и металлообработка, которые вместе с другими отраслями представляют 144 предприятия. Они обеспечивают внешнеэкономические отношения региона с 58 странами по экспорту и с 59 — по импорту. Основной транзит продукции этих предприятий осуществляется через Украину. Именно в этом и лежат истоки нынешнего конфликта — решение Украины о введении новых правил регистрации приднестровских товаров было воспринято Тирасполем как начало экономической блокады. Категорически отказавшись выполнять новые таможенные правила, Приднестровье перекрыло железнодорожный транзит из Украины по своей территории, отчего на подступах к границе образовались километровые очереди железнодорожных составов. Вопрос о необходимости введения унифицированного порядка пересечения украинско-молдавской границы начали поднимать в 2000-2001 гг., когда молдавские власти намеревались склонить ук-

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раинское руководство к подписанию двустороннего соглашения. С приходом к власти в Украине «оранжевых» и назначением на пост министра иностранных дел откровенно прозападного политика Бориса Тарасюка молдавская сторона стала использовать все рычаги воздействия на Украину для принятия выгодных для себя решений. Следует отметить, что введенный в Украине с марта 2006 г. режим пропуска приднестровских грузов уже действовал с мая 2003 г. по июль 2004 г. Некоторые приднестровские предприятия пытались тогда оформлять и оплачивать в Молдове экспортные документы, но Молдова до сих пор не вернула им НДС в объёме более 40 млн долл. К тому же регистрация в Кишиневе дает молдавским властям основание требовать уплаты всего объема налогов и в любое время без каких-либо объяснений отказывать в выдаче экспортных документов. Поэтому большинство приднестровских предпринимателей отказывались регистрироваться в Молдове, а по негласной команде Леонида Кучмы товары из Приднестровья пропускали на украинский рынок без молдавских штампов. Когда в 2004 г. в ответ на решение Тирасполя закрыть несколько школ с обучением на румынском языке Молдова прекратила выдавать приднестровским экспортерам сертификаты происхождения товара, премьер-министр Украины Виктор Янукович распорядился пропускать грузы без молдавских штампов. В результате на украинских президентских выборах 2004 г. за него проголосовали 90% приднестровцев с украинскими паспортами. Об отсутствии генеральной линии у «оранжевой» команды свидетельствует тот факт, что в мае 2005 г., непосредственно после объявления плана Ющенко правительство Ю.Тимошенко приняло два постановления, направленные на упорядочение деятельности Государственной таможенной службы Украины в сфере перемещения товаров и грузов через приднестровский участок украинскомолдавской границы, что фактически означало экономическую блокаду Приднестровья. Однако эти нормативные акты не вступили в силу из-за противоречий между представителями КМУ и СНБОУ. Результатом внутриполитического кризиса в Украине, обусловленного обвинениями в коррупционных действиях в адрес ряда «оранжевых» лидеров, стала смена в сентябре 2005 г. руководства правительства и СНБОУ.

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Новое руководство фактически отказалось от активной дипломатии в регионе. Кишинев воспользовался этой ситуацией и привлек Украину на свою сторону в качестве участника экономической блокады Приднестровья. Введение новых таможенных правил совпало с отменой для Украины поправок Джексона-Вэнника, которые сдерживали украинский товаропоток в США. Кроме того, Вашингтон подписал с Киевом соглашение по ВТО. Украинские эксперты получили основание трактовать эти действия как политический обмен: блокада ПМР взамен на «добро» от США в вопросе интеграции Украины в ВТО13. Тридцатого декабря 2005 г. премьер-министрами Украины и Молдовы было подписано совместное заявление, в котором говорилось о необходимости в ближайшее время упорядочить организацию передвижения товаров и грузов на приднестровском участке украинско-молдавской государственной границы. Для реализации этих договоренностей Гостаможслужбе было поручено начиная с 1 марта 2006 г. обеспечить таможенное оформление товаров и транспортных средств, ввозимых в Украину из Республики Молдова, с соблюдением положений Протокола между Государственной таможенной службой Украины и Таможенным департаментом Республики Молдова о взаимном признании товаротранспортных, коммерческих и таможенных документов и таможенных обеспечений от 15 мая 2003 г. Эти правила планировалось ввести в действие с 25 января 2006 г. Против этого невыгодного для Украины шага выступили украинские промышленники и предприниматели. Так, 24 января 2006 г. в Одессе они организовали семинар, на котором осудили губительный для украинского бизнеса внешнеполитический реверанс в сторону Кишинева. На семинаре присутствовал премьер-министр Украины Юрий Ехануров. Он внимательно выслушал высказанные мнения и пообещал «дать команду, чтобы немедленно была создана рабочая группа с участием всех заинтересованных сторон (в том числе и ПМР), которая будет контролировать и анализировать ситуацию». Действие соответствующих постановлений правительства Украины было приостановлено. 13 Чаленко А. Приднестровье обменяли на ВТО и Джексона-Вэнника // Сегодня. 14. 03. 2006. № 2298. С. 9.

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Согласно совместному заявлению премьер-министров Украины и Молдовы 30 декабря 2005 г., новый порядок должен был вступить в действие после разработки четкого механизма внешнеэкономической деятельности хозяйствующих субъектов Приднестровья и регистрации их в органах власти Молдовы. Несмотря на отсутствие такого механизма, с 1 марта 2006 г. вступило в действие распоряжение кабинета министров Украины, которое фактически заблокировало возможность свободной внешнеэкономической деятельности для предприятий Приднестровья. Третьего марта 2006 г. председатель Государственной таможенной службы Украины Александр Егоров заявил, что отныне все грузы через территорию Приднестровья будут идти только с обеспечением таможенной службы Молдовы, о чем он подписал соответствующее распоряжение. Таким образом, Украина фактически начала выполнять принятые ранее постановления, введя серьезные ограничения для товаропотока из Приднестровья в Украину и обратно. Введение новых таможенных правил для Приднестровья свидетельствовало о том, что Украина перестала быть самостоятельным игроком в регионе. Ей навязали чужие правила и поставили в ситуацию, когда она была вынуждена за свой счет решать проблемы молдавской стороны. Правда, Киев оставил небольшую лазейку, настояв на паритетных условиях: введение ограничений для деятельности приднестровских экономических агентов в обмен на прозрачную и эффективную схему взаимодействия Кишинева и Тирасполя в экономических вопросах. Официальный Кишинев утверждал, что от приднестровских компаний требуется только регистрация в Торгово-промышленной палате Республики Молдовы (ТПП РМ) и осуществление установленных платежей в бюджет Молдовы, которые затем будут возвращены в Приднестровье. Против такого решения проблемы в Киеве не возражали. Второго августа 2005 г. правительство РМ приняло постановление № 815, в котором отмечалось, что возвращение сумм налоговых платежей должно осуществляться через специальный счет Центрального казначейства (это дало бы возможность аккумулировать приднестровские платежи отдельно от остальных доходов бюджета). Но уже 18 января 2006 г. постановлением правительства РМ № 48 были внесены изменения: теперь возмещение предполагалось осу-

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ществлять с банковских счетов таможенных бюро без выделения приднестровских платежей из остальных поступлений. Кроме того, появилась возможность отказаться от возвращения платежей в связи с отсутствием соответствующих средств на счетах таможенных бюро РМ. Вдобавок к этому в постановлении от 18 января 2006 г. право на возмещение платежей предусмотрено лишь для специально уполномоченных таможенных бюро. Иными словами, молдавская сторона создала максимально усложненную непрозрачную схему работы с приднестровскими предприятиями, которая позволяла оказывать политическое давление на Тирасполь.

РЕАКЦИЯ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО СООБЩЕСТВА НА БЛОКАДУ

Итак, нерешительность Киева в приднестровском вопросе совпала с подписанием им двустороннего соглашения с США об условиях присоединения Украины к ВТО. Симптоматичной является также бурная поддержка украинских действий генеральным секретарем Совета Европейского Союза, верховным представителем ЕС по вопросам внешней политики и общей безопасности Хавьером Соланой, который заявил, что «осуждает любые усилия самопровозглашенных приднестровских властей, направленные на препятствование свободной международной торговле»14. Молдова, которая уже является членом ВТО и провозгласила курс на европейскую и евроатлантическую интеграцию, в вопросе приднестровского урегулирования пользуется полной поддержкой Евросоюза. Устами своего верховного представителя по внешней политике и безопасности Хавьера Соланы за день до принятия Киевом новых таможенных правил ЕС заявил о необходимости 14 В данном случае речь шла, конечно, не о либеральной ценности «свободной торговли», а о факторе безопасности. ЕС и США обеспокоены тем, что РФ не выполняет решений Стамбульского саммита и не выводит свой военный контингент из Приднестровья. Фактически остановлен и вывоз вооружений. Расширение НАТО и ЕС на восток поставило перед Западом вопрос о безопасности его восточных границ, а именно о сокращении военного присутствия РФ в регионе.

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«решения конфликта путем становления демократического Приднестровского региона в составе объединенной и демократической Молдовы». Сегодня даже те, кто имеют противоположные взгляды на приднестровскую проблему, совпали во мнении, что нынешняя позиция Киева создает долгожданную для Кишинева возможность экономически реинтегрировать молдавское государство. Россия оказалась по другую сторону баррикад. По заявлению МИДа РФ, нынешняя позиция Украины — не что иное как попытка оказать на Тирасполь экономическое давление с целью принудить его к политической капитуляции в вопросах урегулирования. В Москве уверены, что позиция Киева способствует прямому нарушению прав Приднестровья на внешнеэкономическую деятельность, зафиксированных в Меморандуме о принципах нормализации отношений между Молдовой и Приднестровьем от 1997 г. Правительство РФ приняло программу оказания «комплексной помощи» Приднестровью. Речь идет не только о более чем 50 млн долл., которые Россия предоставила Тирасполю на поддержку бюджетной и пенсионной сферы, но и о специальном кредите в помощь приднестровским предприятиям (150 млн долл.). Естественно, что за это придется платить и, скорее всего, государственным имуществом. По информации российской «Независимой газеты», в «залоговый список» могут попасть машиностроительные, электротехнические и оборонные предприятия. Российский капитал уже присутствует на Молдавском металлургическом заводе (инвестором является «Уральская сталь»), россияне также купили винзавод «Букет Молдавии», Бендерский шелковый комбинат, обувную фабрику «Флоаре», завод «Прибор» и др.15 Для того, чтобы обеспечить свои интересы после политической реформы и введения должности премьер-министра ПМР россияне, скорее всего, попробуют поставить своего человека во главе приднестровского кабинета министров. Протекционистская позиция России в конфликте абсолютно объяснима: из 600 тыс. жителей Приднестровья 127 тыс. являются гражданами России, и защитить их интересы для Москвы — дело чести. Украине стоит поучиться 15 Савченко С. Украину вытеснили из Приднестровья // http://www.grani.kiev. ua/exp.php?ni=12463&type=1&PHPSESSID=1d5e3d71d00fb4ae05f12090804aca65.

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у своей северо-восточной соседки, поскольку число украинских граждан, проживающих в Приднестровье, составляет более 67 тыс., а общая численность этнических украинцев в регионе — ни много ни мало 200 тыс. Обвинив Киев в блокаде Приднестровья по просьбе Молдовы, президент Приднестровья Игорь Смирнов заявил о выходе Тирасполя из переговорного процесса в формате «пять плюс два». По его словам, введение нового таможенного режима призвано расколоть приднестровское общество по линии власть — бизнес, вызвать социально-экономический кризис, смену руководства в Приднестровье и таким образом ликвидировать непризнанное государство. Украина же, по мнению И.Смирнова, из гаранта безопасности Приднестровья превратилась в его обидчика.

ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЕ ПОСЛЕДСТВИЯ БЛОКАДЫ Приднестровье ежегодно экспортирует в Украину продукции в среднем на 12 млн долл., а импортирует (в основном продукты питания) на сумму 300 млн долл. Объем продукции, ввозимой в Приднестровье только из Винницкой, Одесской и Николаевской областей, оценивается в 270 млн долл., что составляет 70% годового импорта. Почти 30 предприятий Приднестровья поддерживают экономические контакты с более чем 55 крупными предприятиями Украины. Наибольшая часть экспортно-импортных операций осуществляется Молдавским металлургическим комбинатом в г. Рыбница, который лишь в 2004 г. приобрел в Украине сырья на сумму свыше 50 млн долл. Каждый месяц ММК покупает в Украине от 70 до 100 тыс. тонн металлолома. Через украинские порты Рыбницкий металлокомбинат ежемесячно отправляет 85 тыс. тонн металлопроката16. В результате введения новых таможенных правил в первую очередь пострадали предприятия приграничных областей и компании, осуществляющие поставки продуктов питания в Приднестровье. Из-за ответных действий Тирасполя на длительное время остано16

Чаленко А. Приднестровье обменяли на ВТО...

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вилось движение товаров и людей на отрезке Приднестровской государственной железной дороги. В марте 2005 г. было отменено движение двух поездов Кишинев — Москва, на границе накапливались грузы, было затруднено даже сообщение автомобильным транспортом. По данным президента Торгово-промышленной палаты Приднестровья Василия Кожана, результатом введения Украиной новых таможенных правил станет многократное усиление финансовой нагрузки на предприятия Приднестровья, которым придется отчислять дополнительные налоги и сборы в бюджет Молдовы на сумму не менее 150 млн долл. Двойное налогообложение и таможенное оформление повлечет за собой дополнительные финансовые затраты, которые существенно увеличат себестоимость продукции и приведут к снижению ее конкурентоспособности и потере рынков сбыта. Среди прочего это может привести к срыву международных контрактов и, соответственно, начислению штрафных санкций и потере деловых партнеров. Результатом подобной политики может стать остановка производства на предприятиях, рост цен на товары первой необходимости на 30-50% и в конечном итоге масштабная гуманитарная катастрофа. Немалые потери ожидают и Россию, поскольку ее поставки в Приднестровье через Украину оцениваются в 200 млн долл. в год17. Самым непосредственным образом от кризиса пострадает и Украина. Блокирование товарооборота с непризнанной республикой, составляющего свыше 270 млн долл., приведет, помимо прочего, к огромным потерям такого гиганта украинской промышленности, как Одесский морской порт, который служил морскими воротами для экспорта приднестровских товаров (включая продукцию Молдавского металлургического завода).

17 Маргвелашвили Е. Киев уменьшит давление на Приднестровье // http://www. nr2.ru/kiev/81779.html.

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ПАРЛАМЕНТСКИЕ ВЫБОРЫ 2006 Г. И ПОРАЖЕНИЕ УКРАИНСКОЙ ДИПЛОМАТИИ

Украина ввела экономическую блокаду Приднестровья в канун выборов в Верховную Раду 26 марта 2006 г. В Молдове открылось лишь два избирательных участка, тогда как в 2004 г. их было восемь (включая расположенные на территории Приднестровья). По словам зам. министра иностранных дел Украины Николая Маймескула, это было обусловлено тем, что законы в Молдове изменились, а Украинский МИД должен с ними считаться. Таким образом, Киев не только вмешался во внутреннюю проблему Молдовы по реинтеграции РМ (начал блокаду Приднестровья), но и расписался в своем бессилии обеспечить права соотечественников в Приднестровье. Руководство РМ и раньше заявляло о том, что не может гарантировать безопасность украинских избирательных комиссий в Приднестровье. Но это не помешало Киеву путем политического и экономического давления на Кишинев обеспечить право украинских граждан Приднестровья на избрание своих представителей в парламент Украины. Нежелание Молдовы открывать в Приднестровье избирательные участки совпало с интересами «оранжевой» украинской власти: известно, что более 90% населения Приднестровья, имеющих украинские паспорта, на президентских выборах 2004 г. проголосовали за В.Януковича. Очевидно, что на парламентских выборах они отдали бы свои голоса Партии регионов. Во время парламентских выборов 2006 г. в Украине почти все знаковые политические силы стремились использовать приднестровский и молдавский электорат в своих интересах. Особенно активно в Приднестровье действовали так называемые маргинальные политические силы — блок Дмитрия Корчинского и Прогрессивной социалистической партии Украины (ПСПУ). Они планировали использовать потенциал протестного электората, недовольного политикой официального Киева. Большинство населения непризнанной республики проголосовало за «неоранжевые» партии Украины в надежде на то, что, придя к власти, они отменят экономическую блокаду Приднестровья.

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В Тирасполе делали ставку на то, что следующий Кабинет министров будет сформирован с участием Партии регионов, как и случилось в 2006 г. Однако придя к власти в августе 2006 г. , правительство В.Януковича не отменило предыдущие распоряжения о таможенном режиме на приднестровской границе. Дело в том, что Партия регионов сама зависит от благосклонности Запада. Став премьер-министром, В.Янукович подчеркнул, что намерен вести проевропейскую политику, в том числе и в отношении Приднестровья. Несмотря на то, что в этом регионе активно работают поддерживающие Партию регионов бизнес-структуры, правительство не предприняло существенных мер по защите их интересов. Как показало время, новому украинскому правительству было не до Приднестровского региона. На сегодняшний день политические силы Украины — от «Нашей Украины» и Партии регионов до СДПУ(о) и Прогрессивной социалистической партии — не имеют комплексной программы защиты интересов своего электората в ближнем зарубежье, в том числе и в Приднестровье. Это привело к росту разочарования среди политической элиты и населения ПМР не только в Януковиче, но и в Украине в целом. В результате Украину как политического игрока стали постепенно вытеснять из региона. В Молдове и Приднестровье, где проживают около 200 тыс. этнических украинцев и около 67 тыс. граждан Украины, нет реальной проукраинской политической силы, ориентированной на Киев общественной среды, и украинское руководство максимально этому способствовало. Вместо поддержки соотечественников, тонкой политической игры на противоречиях Киев в ущерб собственным экономическим интересам способствовал блокаде Приднестровья. В обмен Украина не получила от Молдовы и ЕС даже декоративных компенсаций. Подыгрывание Молдове во имя интеграции в Европу привело к тому, что Украина потеряла доверие соотечественников в Приднестровье. Поэтому на приднестровском референдуме 17 сентября 2006 г. вопрос о присоединении к Украине (а это могло произойти еще в 1992 г.) даже не рассматривался, а 97,1% проголосовавших высказались в пользу России. Это стало сокрушительным поражением президента Украины с его политическим курсом в отношении Приднестровья.

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ЖЕЛЕЗНОДОРОЖНЫЙ ИНЦИДЕНТ Молдове удалось добиться согласия Украины на ряд решений, которые отвечают лишь интересам РМ. Было заблокировано железнодорожное сообщение с Приднестровьем, а также железнодорожный транзит грузов через его территорию. Четвертого сентября 2006 г., при антиоранжевом Януковиче (!) было фактически перекрыто железнодорожное сообщение между Украиной и Молдовой. Украинская сторона перестала пропускать пассажирские поезда на перегоне Окница — Сокиряны — Ларга — Кельменцы из-за плохого состояния полотна. Четвертого-шестого сентября были отменены рейсы пассажирских поездов Кишинев — Москва и Кишинев — Санкт-Петербург. Ранее были изменены маршруты пассажирских поездов в связи с ремонтом железнодорожного моста через Днестр на участке Могилев-Подольский (Украина) — Вэлчинец (Молдова). Закрытый маршрут оставался единственным путем для молдавских поездов на восток, после того как в марте 2007 г. было прекращено движение через Приднестровье по маршруту Кучурган — Бендеры. Это привело к тому, что украинские и другие железнодорожные грузы, направляющиеся на Балканы, должны двигаться либо через другие пограничные переходы (Чоп), либо через МогилевПодольский — север Молдовы и дальше по территории Молдовы к границе с Румынией. Вследствие этого увеличилось время нахождения грузов в пути, а также возросла стоимость транзита через территорию Молдовы. На новом маршруте Одесса — Жмеринка — Могилев-Подольский — Бельцы — Унгены время прохождения грузов по территории РМ увеличивается вдвое по сравнению с обычным транзитным железнодорожным маршрутом Одесса — Кучурган — Тирасполь — Бендеры — Унгены. При этом молдавская сторона отказывается даже рассматривать вопрос о выплате Украине компенсации за возросшую транзитную плату. Еще один существенный недостаток нового маршрута — его существенно меньшая пропускная способность. Если через станцию Кучурган за сутки в среднем проходило 14 пар грузовых и 10 пар пассажирских поездов, то Могилев-Подольский участок пропускает лишь 8 пар грузовых

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и 7 пар пассажирских поездов. Кроме того, блокирование железнодорожного транзита через Приднестровье усложнило работу морских портов Одесской области. Единственная соединяющая их одноколейная железнодорожная ветка не в состоянии выдержать нагрузку и обеспечить сроки грузовых перевозок. Строительство новой ветки Рени — Измаил в обход Молдовы и Приднестровья или реконструкция существующей ветки приведет к значительным затратам украинской стороны18. Блокирование железнодорожного сообщения через Приднестровье больно ударило и по пассажирским перевозкам, не только международным, но и внутренним украинским. Украина осталась без железнодорожного сообщения с Приднестровьем. К сентябрю 2006 г. в Киеве осознали, что в течение полутора лет (2005-2006 гг.) в отношениях с Молдовой накапливался негатив: сахарные войны 2005 г., повышение таможенных сборов для украинских товаров, создание препятствий для украинских дипломатов и т.д. Новое правительство, созданное «неоранжевой» Антикризисной коалицией, попыталось максимально экономизировать свою внешнюю политику и избежать убытков. Поэтому украинская сторона пошла на «политический» ремонт моста через Днестр. В личном разговоре с одним из авторов этой статьи высокопоставленный чиновник украинского министерства транспорта отметил, что ремонт моста в случае несговорчивости Кишинева может затянуться на неопределенное время. Шестого сентября 2007 г. в фактически безвыходной для себя ситуации молдавская рабочая группа подписала с украинской стороной протокол, согласно которому был возобновлен транзит железнодорожных составов через территорию Приднестровья (по маршруту Кучурган — Бендеры). В свою очередь, мост через Днестр был сдан в эксплуатацию уже в середине сентября 2007 г. Однако железнодорожный инцидент с Молдовой не означал кардинального изменения политики в вопросе приднестровского урегулирования. Киев настаивал на реализации плана Ющенко: демократизации и демилитаризации региона, создании оценочной 18

Кулик В. Рельсовая целесообразность // http://www.grani.kiev.ua/exp.php?ni=

11866&type=1&PHPSESSID=a1d8ba9804c7e5d753d526ab2747f65a.

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миссии (мониторинг демократических процессов), проведении свободных демократических выборов в Верховный Совет и возобновлении переговоров между Тирасполем и Кишиневом. Мониторинговая миссия ОБСЕ, подводя итоги своей работы, заявила, что ни о каком нелегальном трафике на этом участке границы речь уже не идет. Каналы нелегальных поставок, в том числе оружия, из региона за границу следует искать не в Украине, а в первую очередь в Молдове, без попустительства официальных лиц которой «приднестровская контрабанда» не могла бы осуществляться.

БИЗНЕС-ИНТЕРЕСЫ УКРАИНЫ В ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЕ С приднестровским рынком связаны некоторые крупные украинские финансово-политические группы. Готовность идти навстречу Украине проявляет и приднестровское руководство. Однако представители крупного украинского бизнеса постепенно избавлялись от собственности на территории Приднестровья в большинстве случаев в пользу российского и местного капитала. Эти процессы были вызваны тем, что, во-первых, молдавская сторона отказывалась признавать право собственности на приватизированные в Приднестровье предприятия, а, во-вторых, позиция руководства Украины все более тяготела к разрешению конфликта в пользу молдавской стороны, поддерживаемой Западом. Интересы украинских компаний в Приднестровье можно условно разделить на несколько уровней. В первую очередь это Молдавский металлургический комбинат в Рыбнице — единственное крупное предприятие региона, к которому пробился украинский капитал. До сих пор предпочтение при продаже приднестровских производственных активов отдавалось российским инвесторам. На ММЗ работают несколько крупных украинских компаний. В апреле 2006 г. Итера, которой принадлежало 75% акций ММЗ, продала свой пакет австрийско-украинскому трейдеру — Hares Group, который теперь контролирует около 90% акций завода. Но, как заявил президент компании Hares Group Holdings GmbH, советник Виктора

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Ющенко сириец Харес Юссеф, он является собственником только 10% акций, 15% акций ММЗ принадлежат украинцам Григорию Суркису (владельцу ФК «Динамо-Киев») и Игорю Коломойскому (владельцу компании «Приват») и по 30% — россиянам Алишеру Усманову и Вадиму Новинскому («Смарт-групп»)19. Кроме того, компания Газметалл, подконтрольная Алишеру Усманову и его партнерам, договорилась о тесном сотрудничестве с Индустриальным союзом Донбасса, что еще больше привязывает украинскую сторону к ММЗ. Свой интерес к ММЗ имеет и ММК им. Ильича (Мариуполь Донецкой области, директор Владимир Бойко), который занимается поставками на завод металлолома и заготовок. Закупка лома для ММЗ начала эксклюзивно осуществляться через кипрскую оффшорную компанию «Panfermag Holding Ltd» (Мариупольский «ММК имени Ильича» — «Panfermag Holding Ltd» плюс некоторые другие кипрские оффшоры — Рыбницкий ММЗ)20. Интерес к ММЗ объясняется тем, что около 60-70% его продукции экспортируется в страны Западной и Восточной Европы. Завод интересен с точки зрения и номенклатуры продукции, и состояния оборудования и технологии. Построенный в 1985 г. он является одним из самых современных сталелитейных предприятий на территории бывшего СССР. Кроме металлургического комплекса, украинский бизнес представлен на рынке транспортных перевозок через ПМР (корпорация «Межрегиональный промышленный союз», Укрпроминвест и др.), торговли и услуг, торговли алкогольными напитками (совместные компании, торгующие товарами коньячного завода «Квинт», винзавода «Букет Молдавии» и др.). Общий сегмент украинского бизнеса в ПМР составляет не менее 1 млрд долл. в год. Следует также отметить, что бизнес-структуры, работающие в Приднестровье, связаны с самыми разными политическими силами Украины (и с пропрезидентским НУ — НС, и с Партией регионов). Однако эти компании не лоббируют открыто свои интересы в вопКулик В. Приднестровье продано? // http://politika.org.ua/cgi-bin/b2.pl?sh=pub_ singl&num=1084. 19

20 «Че Гевара» для Черновецкого, или за все проплаЧЕно // http://www.kpk.org. ua/2007/01/30/che_gevara_dlja_chernoveckogo_ili_za_vse_proplacheno.html.

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росе приднестровского урегулирования. Украинский бизнес всячески избегает участия в публичных дискуссиях и осуществляет лишь точечное лоббирование своих интересов на уровне «серых схем». Это в корне отличается от стратегии российских компаний, которые не только принимают участие в выработке Кремлем решений по вопросу ПМР, но и выступают спонсорами гуманитарных проектов в регионе (Итера, Газпром и др.). Украинские бизнес-структуры предпочитают находиться в тени и придерживаются кулуарного формата участия в приднестровской политике. Это приводит к потере Украиной инициативы в сфере экономического присутствия в Приднестровье.

ЕСТЬ НАДЕЖДА! — ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЕ И ОБЩЕСТВЕННОСТЬ УКРАИНЫ Приднестровье и Украину связывают не только сотни тысяч украинцев, проживающих в республике, но и общая граница и общее культурное пространство. Тысячи приднестровцев работают или учатся в Украине21. Поскольку Россия не учитывает интересы всех приднестровских игроков, в регионе формируется группа бизнесменов, которые заинтересованы в более тесном сотрудничестве с Украиной. Поэтому на сегодняшний день есть определенные возможности влиять на Приднестровье, осуществлять культурную и информационную экспансию, а также формировать проукраинское лобби как в бизнес-сообществе, так и в политических кругах. Проблема Приднестровья воспринимается абсолютным большинством граждан Украины как внутреннее дело иностранного государства, непосредственно не влияющее на жизнь простого украинца. О ней знают не понаслышке лишь жители приграничных с Приднестровьем областей Украины — в основном Одесской и в несколько меньшей степени Винницкой областей. Однако они смотрят на эту проблему сквозь призму сугубо локальных и бытовых вопросов. В то же время, на уровне экспертного сообщества сущес21 Довженко Т. Четырежды непризнанный // http://www.grani.kiev.ua/exp. php?ni=13787&type=1&PHPSESSID=a9c4c8d2a15595786703db01f3278e94.

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твуют «резонаторы» (аналитические НГО), которые озвучивают определенные мнения по вопросу приднестровского урегулирования. Условно их можно разделить на две группы: 1) сторонники ассистентской политики Киева, сами выступающие ассистентами для внерегиональных игроков — США, ЕС или РФ, и 2) сторонники активной дипломатии, отстаивающие идею самостоятельной политики Украины в регионе. Первые фактически призывают украинские власти отказаться от роли самостоятельного игрока в приднестровском урегулировании и предлагают рефлексировать в русле курса Брюсселя, Вашингтона или Москвы. Примером этого является «Трехсторонний план решения приднестровской проблемы, разработанный при участии украинских, молдавских и румынских экспертов», который был профинансирован фондом «Возрождение» (Фондом Сороса). Эта инициатива характеризуется тем, что в ее разработке принимали участие представители гражданского общества трех соседних государств — Украины, Молдовы и Румынии. Но, с другой стороны, для нее характерно неприятие любой инициативы, исходящей от Приднестровья (участие экспертов республики в разработке плана даже не декларировалось). Отрицается возможность существования даже зародыша гражданского общества в Приднестровье, игнорируются результаты волеизъявления жителей региона, если они не соответствуют концепции, разработанной авторами плана. При этом в нем явно доминирует румынская составляющая. Предложения этой инициативы не учитывают интересы Украины, а ее практическая реализация по сути предусматривает втягивание Украины в конфликт на стороне Молдовы при безусловном усилении роли Румынии как регионального лидера и занятии Молдовой пассивной позиции без реального участия в урегулировании конфликта. Вместе с тем, авторам инициативы удалось создать довольно эффективно действующую экспертную группу, которая некоторое время активно демонстрировала свои достижения и наработки с использованием современных методов «паблик рилейшнз» и при информационной поддержке СМИ трех стран. На «Трехсторонний план» опираются и другие инициативы, имеющие четко промолдавскую и прорумынскую окраску и базовую ориентацию на официальный Кишинев. В определенной сте-

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пени развитием положений «Трехстороннего плана» можно считать ряд заявлений «Общественного форума» — встреч представителей НГО РМ, Румынии и частично Украины и Приднестровья. Вместе с тем, в период 2005-2007 гг. при проведении большинства научных конференций, круглых столов и т.п., посвященных приднестровскому урегулированию и организованных по инициативе экспертов Молдовы и Украины при поддержке западных грантодателей, участие представителей приднестровских общественных организаций не предусматривалось. Вторая группа экспертных НГО, специализирующихся в том числе и на исследовании Приднестровья, акцентирует необходимость создания совместных с приднестровской стороной площадок для дискуссий и выработки совместных рекомендаций властям государств региона. Примерами могут служить «Одесская инициатива» (начало сентября 2005 г.) во главе с Ассоциацией «Ковчег» и «Джарылгацкая инициатива» (24 мая 2006 г.), организованная Центром исследований проблем гражданского общества и Центром изучения украинского южного пограничья. Речь идет о создании дискуссионных площадок для экспертов и представителей «третьего сектора» из Украины, России, Молдовы и Приднестровья. Участники этих инициатив отмечали, что именно представители гражданского общества способны наиболее полно и ответственно содействовать решению конфликтов. Так, в Декларации «Одесской инициативы» отмечается, что проблема демократизации касается не только Приднестровья, но и другого берега Днестра. Важным достижением «Джарылгацкой инициативы» стало создание постоянно действующего межнационального экспертного совета (группы) по вопросам приднестровского урегулирования и формирование соответствующей базы экспертов. Эти инициативы имели целью сформировать поддержку плана Ющенко в гражданском обществе Украины, России, Молдовы и Приднестровья. Участники этих встреч выступали за активную политику Украины в регионе. Продолжением этого направления стал проект «Безопасная Европа: гражданское партнерство для урегулирования Приднестровского конфликта» (реализован в 2006 г. Центром исследований проблем гражданского общества при поддержке посольства Польши в Украине). Сотрудники Центра провели опрос экспертов из Укра-

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ины, Молдовы и Приднестровья о перспективах урегулирования. Согласно опросу, большинство экспертного сообщества по обоим берегам Днестра считает, что урегулирование приднестровской проблемы должно осуществляться на паритетных основах, с учетом интересов обеих сторон22. Для Украины происходящее в Приднестровье особенно важно еще и потому, что эти события наглядно демонстрируют не только разнообразие корней и механизмов возникновения сепаратизма, но и схожесть его последствий как для страны, где возникают подобные проблемы, так и для конкретного региона и для мирового сообщества в целом.

22 Безопасная Европа: гражданское партнерство для урегулирования Приднестровского конфликта. К., 2006. С. 40.

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nŠmnxemh“

h Šp`mqcp`mh)m{e m`pndmnqŠh bnjprc meophgm`mm{u cnqrd`pqŠb.

qp`bmemhe ophdmeqŠpnb|“

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`au`ghh

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Настоящая глава посвящена почти не изученным проблемам, которые существуют вокруг непризнанных Абхазии и Приднестровья, а именно — взаимоотношениям между русской, грузинской и румынской православными церквями, а также трансграничным нацменьшинствам — мегрелам и молдаванам. Причина такого подхода заключается в стремлении рассмотреть парадокс непризнанных государств: несмотря на постоянную угрозу блокады со стороны как бывших государств-сюзеренов, так и других соседних стран, эти образования по самой своей природе способствуют трансграничному взаимодействию. Трудно оправдать отсутствие интереса исследователей к религиозному аспекту жизни этих государств. Так, Абхазия находится на границе между сферами влияния Русской и Грузинской православных церквей. Истоки проблемы церковной принадлежности Абхазии нужно искать, как минимум, в начале 19 в., когда грузинское православие инкорпорировалось в Русскую православную церковь (РПЦ), но пользовалось привилегированным статусом экзарха. Исторически спорной зоной между Русской и Румынской православными церквями является правый, а не левый берег Днестра, но, тем не менее, как свидетельствуют события вокруг Ново-Нямецкого монастыря (2001 г.; см. введение), религиозное соперничество в правобережной Молдове существенно влияет на религиозную и, соответственно, политическую ситуацию в Приднестровье.

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Как уже отмечалось во введении, представление о православии как о цезарепапской, моноэтнической и внутригосударственной религии неверно. Правда, за падением Османской империи последовал раскол Константинопольской экуменической церкви, и появилось несколько национальных церквей, юрисдикция которых почти совпала с территориями светских государств. Однако нельзя забывать, что раскол константинопольской церкви занял несколько десятилетий. Наблюдая этот процесс, РПЦ прошла хороший «учебный бой», то есть теологическую и организационную подготовку к возможному расколу своего покровителя — светского государства1. Она накопила опыт в дебатах с зарубежными украинскими церквями, а также Румынской церковью, которая во время Второй мировой войны вместе с фашистским светским государством Румыния оккупировала не только Молдову, но и южную Украину. Вот почему РПЦ в начале 1990 г., на полтора года раньше, чем несчастный М.Горбачев попытался заключить новый федеральный договор, федерализировала свою структуру (пока не поздно), передав существенные полномочия национальным (украинской, белорусской и молдавской) митрополиям. Благодаря дальновидности руководства РПЦ пока удается удерживать многонациональное имперское пространство под своей юрисдикцией. Ни одна из православных церквей мира, включая румынскую и константинопольскую (соперников русского православия), не признает каноничность Киевского патриархата, учрежденного в 1992 г. Несмотря на горячую поддержку со стороны украинских светских властей, этот патриархат смог привлечь лишь 2 781 общину, тогда как 9 049 местных общин находятся под юрисдикцией Московского патриархата2. Сомнительное прошлое патриарха Филарета (при 1 В 19 в. некоторые деятели Русской православной церкви, следуя своему панславизму, хотели поддержать движение за автокефалию на Балканах, но другие ее представители отметили, что поддержка балканских автокефалистов лишит легитимности противодействие РПЦ возможному образованию грузинской автокефалии. 2 RISU, или Религиозная информационная система Украины, управляемая Украинским католическим университетом (Львов). http://www.risu.org.ua/eng/major. religions/orthodox.kp/; http://www.risu.org.ua/eng/major.religions/orthodox.mp/ (последний доступ 3 ноября 2007 г.). По подсчетам Тараса Кузио (правда, без указания источника), под управлением Киевского патриархата и Украинской автокефальной церкви находится 6 тыс. приходов (см.: Taras Kuzio, “The Struggle to

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социализме) помешало его признанию даже в националистически настроенной Галиции3. Отец Николай (Балашов), в ведении которого находятся взаимоотношения Московского патриархата с другими православными церквями, назвал критерии признания новой автокефальности в православном мире. Это инициатива нескольких епископов, одобренная мирянами определенного числа приходов, которые поддерживают новую организацию, и признание со стороны «материнской» церкви (той, в которую ранее входила новая религиозная общность)4. Характерно, что Балашов не ссылается на такие критерии, как национальность или государство, которые обычно ассоциируются с православием. Он отметил, что критерии определения независимости церкви в православном мировом сообществе остаются крайне спорными. В самом деле, моноэтнические церкви, такие как румынская, придерживаются иного взгляда на этот вопрос5. Учитывая мнение православных церквей мира, которые часто противоречат друг другу, Константинопольская экуменическая церковь принимает окончательное решение о предоставлении автокефалии. Эта процедура подразумевает относительную независимость православных церквей от светских государств, на территории которых они действуют. Establish the World’s Largest Orthodox Church”, 2000. http://www.ualberta.ca/~cius/ stasiuk/st-articles/an-church.htm). Оставив в стороне вопрос о противоречиях между этими двумя национальными православными церквями, которые Т.Кузио не учитывает, отметим, что его подсчеты выглядят неправдоподобными (по данным RISU, число приходов двух церквей — 3 795). Сомневаясь в справедливости данных Кузио, я отнюдь не ставлю под вопрос правомочность Киевского патриархата, но хочу лишь отметить, что расколоть церковь значительно труднее, нежели светское государство: политика православной церкви всегда нуждается в каноническом обосновании, а потому несовместима с поспешностью. 3 Местные украинские националисты группируются вокруг греко-католической церкви и не нуждаются во второй национальной церковной организации. 4 Интервью протоиерея Николая (Балашова), секретаря по межправославным отношениям Отдела внешних церковных связей Московского патриархата, данное автору в Москве 29 августа 2007 г. 5 Так, в русской и румынской православных церквях существуют различия в толковании Апостольского канона и положений Третьего экуменического собора в Эфесе 431 г., которые явились ответом на тогдашние споры вокруг кипрской автокефалии.

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В Абхазии и Приднестровье, где проживают трансграничные народности, вынуждены быть внимательными и тактичными по отношению к национальным меньшинствам даже по простым демографическим причинам6. В Приднестровье три титульные национальности (русские, украинцы и молдаване) представлены примерно в одинаковых пропорциях. Этой многонациональностью здешние идеологи оправдывали свое стремление к независимости, противопоставляя многонациональность левобережья панрумынской национальной нетерпимости правого берега Днестра. Абхазы составляют лишь треть жителей своей республики, несмотря на значительный рост их доли в составе населения по итогам грузино-абхазской войны 1992-1993 гг. Успешное вхождение трансграничных этносов в национальные сообщества Абхазии и Приднестровья дает последним хороший контраргумент против подозрений мирового общественного мнения в их стремлении осуществить у себя «чистку» по национальному признаку и повышает их авторитет на международной арене. Более того, Абхазия и Приднестровье могут использовать внутренний раскол в Грузии и Молдове, удовлетворив притязания мегрелов и молдаван на своей территории. Лидеры Приднестровья включили проблему молдаван в повестку дня с самого начала борьбы за независимость, руководители же Абхазии, похоже, осознали «ценность» мегрельского вопроса в 1998 г. В настоящей главе основное внимание будет уделено Приднестровью, опыт Абхазии упоминается лишь в сравнительном контексте. Тем, кто интересуется Абхазией, следует обратиться к статье, посвященной ее внутренней политике и проблемам идентичности7. Ниже читатель найдет анализ (1) межправославных отношений и (2) проблем мегрелов и молдаван. Первый вопрос предполагает обращение не только к Приднестровью, но и к правобережной Молдове.

6 Что в значительной степени отличает их от моноэтничного Нагорного Карабаха. 7 Мацузато К. Патронное президентство и политика в сфере идентичности в непризнанной Абхазии // Acta Eurasica. 2006. № 4. P. 132-159.

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ПОЯВЛЕНИЕ В АБХАЗИИ НЕПРИЗНАННОЙ ЦЕРКВИ

Абхазы, как и японцы, относятся к той редкой категории наций, в основе идентичности которых лежит не религия, а прочные семейно-клиентальные отношения и поведенческие стереотипы. В их практике религия занимает место утилитарного инструмента, а их религиозные воззрения эклектичны. Формально говоря, конфессиональная история Абхазии делится на дохристианский, христианский (IV-XV вв.), исламский (XV-XIX вв.), исламо-христианский (вторая половина XIX в. — 1993 г.) и преимущественно христианский (после 1993 г.) периоды. Однако христианство и ислам всегда сосуществовали здесь с языческими традициями8. Типичным примером сугубо утилитарного отношения абхазов к религии может служить принятие «прото-абхазами» ислама в VIII в., что было вызвано их стремлением избежать византийского ига9. Подобные примеры можно найти и сегодня — перед войной за независимость большинство абхазов считали себя мусульманами или язычниками просто потому, что христианство в тех условиях выступало средством их «грузинизации». Как только на территории Абхазии была создана собственная, хотя и неканоническая, епархия, эта опасность исчезла, и абхазы массово начали креститься. В 1851 г., когда Кавказская война близилась к концу, царское правительство сделало попытку рехристианизировать Абхазию, подчинив вновь открытую здесь епархию грузинскому экзархату. В 1851-1885 гг. она входила в состав Имеретии (Западная Грузия), но в 1885 г. была преобразована в самостоятельную Сухумскую епархию, причем ее клир подвергся существенной русификации (дегрузинизации). В ходе подготовки этой реформы некоторые российские православные деятели высказались за полное отделение Абхазии от грузинского экзархата путем включения ее в состав таких этнически русских епархий, как Кубанская или Ставропольская; однако было очевидно, что подобный шаг вызовет раздражение грузинских 8 Смыр Г.В. Ислам в Абхазии и пути преодоления его пережитков в современных условиях. Тбилиси, 1972. С. 76-82. 9

Там же. С. 65.

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церковных кругов10. Незадолго до проведения этой реформы конфликты между греческими и русскими монахами в Старом Афоне заставили основать близ Сухум Новоафонский монастырь, который внес значительный вклад в просвещение абхазов. Монастырская школа взрастила целое поколение местной интеллигенции — от религиозных деятелей до революционеров. В годы первой русской революции грузинские националисты попытались преобразовать грузинский экзархат в автокефалию. Критикуя эти планы, руководители РПЦ отметили, что, говоря современным языком, экзархат есть имперская мезоструктура, юрисдикция которой выходит далеко за рамки территории, населенной представителями одной нации, а потому, если грузины желают автокефалии, им следует отказаться не только от Абхазии и Осетии, но также и от Имеретии, Мегрелии и Гурии11 (в те годы жители этих регионов не считались грузинами). Таким образом, эта дискуссия стала предвестником грузино-абхазских споров, которые развернулись после 1988 г. В 1917 г. Грузинская православная церковь объявила о своей автокефалии, однако Сухумская епархия отказалась ей подчиниться. После оккупации Абхазии грузинскими меньшевиками на территории Абхазии функционировали две церкви — официальная под началом Тбилиси и нелегальная «тихоновская». В годы Второй мировой войны И.Сталин санкционировал независимость Грузинской православной церкви, передав в ее подчинение и Абхазию. Но поскольку было очевидно, что на этот шаг советского лидера толкнули сугубо политические соображения, Константинополь признал грузинскую автокефалию лишь в 1990 г. Так завершился длительный процесс трансформации грузинского экзархата в национальную автокефальную церковь, однако противоречие между ее моноэтническим характером и многонациональным составом верующих так и не было разрешено. Оно существовало и в 19431988 гг., но в латентной форме, поскольку религия не играла в советском обществе важной роли, а священники Абхазской епархии 10 Сида Киоко. Опорный пункт «чисто русского православия»? Роль Новоафонского монастыря в Абхазии // Исследования культур и переход границы. Саппоро, 2008 (на яп. яз.; в печати). 11 Paul Werth. Georgian Autocephaly and the Ethnic Fragmentation of Orthodoxy // Acta Slavica Iaponica. 2006. Vol. XXIII. Р. 74-100.

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в основном были русскими. Ситуация изменилась, когда местный епископ Давид (Чкадуа, 1983-1992, умер в годы грузино-абхазской войны) начал использовать свою епархию как инструмент «грузинизации» Абхазии. К 1993 г. в Абхазии оставалось всего четыре священника, которые и объявили о создании Сухум-Абхазской епархии. Новоафонский монастырь, закрытый коммунистическим режимом, в 1994 г. официально возобновил свою деятельность и сыграл заметную роль в подготовке молодых священнослужителей. В 2006 г. в Абхазии насчитывалось уже 15 священников и монахов. Многие из них родились в 1970-е годы и прошли обучение в мировых православных центрах, таких как Москва и Салоники. Эта молодежь стремится создать историографию абхазского православия с «золотым веком» в VIII-X ст. Победу над арабами в 730-е годы в битве при Анакопе они сравнивают со сражением при Тур-Пуатье (Tours-Poitier). Отец Дорофей (Дбар) утверждает, что уже в раннее средневековье абхазский язык имел письменность на основе греческого языка, что абхазская церковь сыграла огромную роль в христианизации аланов и готов и ее представители обучали постройке церквей в Киевской Руси. Последующий упадок абхазского православия он объясняет двойным — османским и грузинским — игом, а в усилении здесь язычества видит реакцию абхазов на грузинизацию церкви: лишенные своих священников, они стали отправлять религиозный культ по собственному разумению12. В последние 15 лет Сухум-Абхазская епархия энергично добивается признания своей каноничности. Она стремилась к прямому подчинению Константинополю в первой половине 90-х годов и не исключает возможности восстановления дружественных отношений с грузинской церковью. Служители этой епархии были рукоположены русским майкопским владыкой, однако сама епархия в числе православных по-прежнему не значится. Если РПЦ согласится на включение Сухум-Абхазской епархии в свой состав, она лишится возможности протестовать против «нарушений канонического права» на Украине и в Молдове. Более того, в отличие от светских 12 Иеромонах Дорофей (Дбар). Краткие очерки истории Абхазской православной церкви. Новый Афон, 2006.

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руководителей Грузии, которые докучают России провокационными акциями и тем самым подталкивают ее к Абхазии, Грузинская православная церковь ведет себя более тактично, и РПЦ в своей глобальной стратегии по-прежнему рассматривает ее в качестве надежного союзника. Отец Дорофей извлек следующий урок из личного опыта переговоров с грузинской церковью: «Русские понимают, что мы (абхазы), хотя и православные, все же отличаемся от них. Но такого понимания не приходится ждать от Грузинской православной церкви, поскольку она моноэтнична по самой своей природе»13. В отличие от православия, ислам в послевоенной Абхазии угасает: из 300 тыс. жителей республики его исповедуют менее 200 человек. На территории Абхазии действуют лишь две мечети, а муфтий Духовного управления мусульман Абхазии работает на общественных началах. Попытки обучить своих мусульманских деятелей в Каире и Уфе не увенчались успехом. Абхазские мусульмане потеряли былой авторитет сразу после грузино-абхазской войны, и даже традиционные контакты с турецкими единоверцами их не спасли. Руководство турецкого Диянета (Духовного управления) ограничивается тем, что отвечает на запросы зарубежных мусульман только по светским — правительственным — каналам14. Очевидно, что если Диянет будет помогать им напрямую, это вызовет дипломатические осложнения между Анкарой и Тбилиси. Авторитет ислама в Абхазии упал главным образом потому, что местные светские власти и РПЦ активно поддерживают абхазское православие. Однако, похоже, есть и иная причина, а именно — полное отрицание мусульманами язычества и отказ от вина, что отталкивает от них абхазов. По иронии судьбы в прошлом распорядитель Мусульманского духовного управления Абхазии Тимур Дзиба и о. Дорофей — бывшие одноклассники. Один из них (Дорофей) превратился в восходящую звезду абхазского православия, а другой (Дзиба), несмотря на свои очевидные интеллектуальные способности и искреннюю приверженность вере, 13

Интервью, полученное автором у о. Дорофея в Новом Афоне 20 августа 2006 г.

Интервью М.Гёрмеза, вице-президента Диянета Турции, данное автору в г. Анкара 29 марта 2007 г. 14

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так и не сумел остановить упадок ислама в Абхазии, невиданный даже в коммунистическую эпоху. Дзиба высказывает удивление «либеральностью» Абхазской православной церкви и жалуется: «Нас критикуют за пренебрежение национальными традициями, но что есть традиция? Полуодетые женщины и пьяные мужчины? …В Абхазии живущих по христианскому закону еще меньше, чем нас, двухсот мусульман»15. В 2005 г. Духовное управление мусульман Абхазии заключило договор о сотрудничестве с Советом муфтиев России (СМР). Предполагается, что Равиль Гайнутдин и СМР будут инструктировать своих абхазских единоверцев, основываясь на опыте более гибкой политики исламского возрождения в России.

СОПЕРНИЧЕСТВО РУМЫНСКОГО И РОССИЙСКОГО ПРАВОСЛАВИЯ В ПРАВОБЕРЕЖНОЙ

МОЛДОВЕ

Восприятие Молдовы как далекой периферии бывшего Советского Союза затрудняет осознание важной роли, которую сыграла в истории православия Бессарабия — территория в междуречье Прута и Днестра. В XVIII в. православие в Бессарабии процветало под властью Османской империи и при господстве Константинопольской экуменической церкви. Когда в результате русскотурецкой войны 1806-1812 гг. Бессарабия отошла России, в ней насчитывалось 775 приходов — почти столько же, сколько их сейчас в правобережной Молдове16. Такая концентрация приверженцев православия удивительно контрастировала с ситуацией в Южной Украине, население которой после покорения Россией Крымского ханства резко сократилось. Русское правительство и Синод упорно стремились закрепиться в Бессарабии, чтобы впоследствии сделать ее оплотом православной экспансии в северное Причерноморье. В 1813 г. во вновь созданной Бессарабской губернии Синод учредил 15 Интервью полученное автором у Т.Дзиба, управляющего делами Духовного управления мусульман Абхазии в г. Сухум 23 августа 2006 г. 16 Nicolae Popovschi. Istoria bisericii din Basarabia în veacul al XIX — lea sub ruşi. Chişinău, 2000. Р. 29.

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Кишинево-Хотинскую епархию, поставив во главе ее о. Гавриила (Bănulescu-Bodoni), но Константинопольский экуменический патриархат опротестовал это решение как неканоническое. Румынская православная церковь, считая себя вправе наследовать румыноязычную территорию константинопольской церкви, рассматривает Бессарабию как свою irredenta (еще не возвращенную территорию). Епископ Гавриил учредил в Кишиневе богословскую семинарию и типографию, в которой печатались официальные материалы на русском и молдавском языках. Другими словами, под русским владычеством молдавский язык пользовался в Бессарабии правами официального, причем раньше, чем в соседнем княжестве Молдова17. Однако в 1871 г. архиепископ Павел (Лебедев) приказал отправлять церковные службы только на русском языке. Епархиальная газета, ранее двуязычная, также стала печататься исключительно на русском. Впрочем, после революции 1905 г. епархиальные власти вернулись к более гибкой политике, публикуя в своих изданиях и статьи на молдавском языке18. В 1918 г. Румыния аннексировала Бессарабию и учредила здесь митрополию румынской православной автокефалии. Вскоре (в 1925 г.) эта автокефалия окончательно стала Бухарестским патриархатом. Подчиняясь этому патриархату, кишиневский митрополит управлял тремя епархиями — в Хотине, Кишиневе и Измаиле. Сегодня румынисты рассматривают межвоенный период румынского владычества как «золотой век» в истории бессарабского православия. Церковь управляла богословским факультетом, активно публиковала религиозную литературу, в деревнях действовала густая сеть созданных ей кредитных кооперативов19. В результате подписания пакта Молотова-Риббентропа Советский Союз оккупировал Бессарабию и, соединив территории по обоим берегам Днестра, создал Молдавскую Советскую Социалистичес17

Шорников П.М. Молдавская самобытность. Тирасполь, 2007. С. 47.

Краткая история Кишиневской Епархии (текущий архив Кишинево-Молдавской митрополии РПЦ). 18

19 Romeo Cemârtan. Cazul Mitropoliei Basarabiei: interferenţe politice şi religioase. Chişinău, 2004. Р. 15-27; интервью, полученное автором у Влада Кубрякова (Vlad Cubreacov), депутата парламента Молдовы от Христианско-демократической народной партии в г.Кишинев 24 августа 2007 г.

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кую Республику (МССР). Советские власти немедленно запретили деятельность Румынской православной церкви, конфисковали ее имущество, а многих священнослужителей казнили. Затем Бессарабию, Приднестровье и Одессу захватила нацистская Германия, и эти земли попали под юрисдикцию той же Румынской православной церкви. РПЦ считает события 1941-1944 гг. неканоническими, как и румынское православие произошедшее в 1813 г. Однако даже Тираспольско-Дубоссарская епархия, этот убежденный противник румынизма, в брошюре, изданной в 2005 г., уважительно отзывается о возрождении православия на оккупированных территориях20. Вскоре после восстановления в Бессарабии советской власти, в 1945 г. РПЦ вновь открыла Кишинево-Молдавскую епархию, причем румынские православные священники были сосланы в Сибирь и Казахстан. Подготовка клира для новой епархии была возложена на Одесскую духовную семинарию и Духовную академию в подмосковном Загорске. Из всех послевоенных кишиневских владык наиболее заметной фигурой был архиепископ Нектарий (Григорьев, 1947-1969). Характерно, что вплоть до упразднения Тираспольской епархии в 1951 г. он одновременно состоял и епископом Тирасполя, управляя остальной частью МССР с левобережья. В послевоенные годы советская власть, готовая даже отчасти пожертвовать своими атеистическими принципами, взяла курс на вывод молдаван из-под румынского влияния путем усиления позиций русского православия. Правда, в МССР, как и всюду в СССР, проводились антирелигиозные кампании: в 1958-1988 гг. здесь было закрыто более 300 церквей, и к концу 80-х годов на территории республики осталось лишь 193 церкви и 230 священнослужителя. Монастыри были почти полностью ликвидированы21. Поскольку на левом берегу осталось всего три церкви, имеются основания пред20 Тираспольско-Дубоссарская епархия. Страницы истории. Тирасполь, 2005. С. 8-9. 21 Cemârtan. Cazul Mitropoliei Basarabiei. Р. 33. Уцелел лишь женский монастырь в с. Жапка (Japca) в северном, Каменском районе левобережья. Вплоть до XVIII в. этот район входил в состав Речи Посполитой. Если верить Семартану, большинство послушниц этого монастыря составляли этнические польки и русские, которые разделяли панславянские настроения, и только поэтому советские власти терпели его существование.

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полагать, что на правом (в Бессарабии) их было 190. Таким образом, три левобережные церкви обслуживали 700-тысячное население, тогда как 190 правобережных — менее трех миллионов (2,8 млн). Ни одна советская республика, за исключением, пожалуй, Литвы, не пользовалась подобными духовными привилегиями. Кишинево-Молдавская епархия стала митрополией в 1987 г. Однако первый митрополит Серапион (Фадеев) был настроен слишком пророссийски, чтобы выдержать тактичную линию поведения в условиях безудержного роста панрумынского национализма. В 1989 г. ему на смену пришел Владимир Кантарян (Cantarean). Наделенный от природы способностями дипломата, о. Владимир занимает этот пост и поныне, причем он сумел сохранить в Молдове влияние русского православия. Оборотной стороной медали явилось то, что клир митрополии, в целом разделяя взгляды румынистов на конфликт с Приднестровьем 1991-1992 гг., не попытался выступить посредником в этом конфликте (подробнее об этом см. ниже). Как уже отмечалось в начале статьи, после 1990 г. РПЦ предоставила украинской, молдавской и белорусской митрополиям известные автономные права, пытаясь таким образом предотвратить развитие религиозного сепаратизма. Объем этих прав зависит от «веса» митрополии, а именно, от количества приходов, находящихся под ее управлением. Киевская митрополия как самая крупная имеет право закрывать епархии, открывать новые или менять их подчинение, перемещать епископов и строить монастыри. Для этого не требуется санкции Московского патриархата, достаточно решения своего синодального собрания. Автономия Кишинево-Молдавской митрополии не так широка, однако митрополия имеет право учреждать богословские школы и награждать людей по собственному усмотрению. Более мелкие автономии, типа эстонской, обладают еще меньшим объемом прав22. Неудивительно, что поборники румынского православия и Киевского патриархата утверждают, что эти автономии фиктивны, а Молдавская и Украинская митрополии есть не что иное, как экзархаты Московского патриархата23. 22 Упомянутое интервью, данное автору о. Николаем (Балашовым); интервью, полученное автором у о. Максима (Мелинти), директора архива Кишинево-Молдавской митрополии РПЦ, в г. Кишинев 20 августа 2007 г. 23

См., напр.: Т. Кузио. The Struggle to Establish...

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В сентябре 1992 г. группа верующих, собравшись в Бельцы (Bălţi), потребовала восстановления Бессарабской митрополии Румынской православной церкви. Бухарестский патриарх отметил, что речь идет лишь о возобновлении деятельности митрополии, которая румынской церковью никогда не упразднялась24. Московский патриарх Алексий II, со своей стороны, осудил этот шаг как политический и националистический, имеющий целью воссоединение Молдовы с Румынией25. Эти слова стали камертоном высказываний других представителей РПЦ. По их мнению, потерпев фиаско в попытке присоединить Молдову к Румынии, румынисты, особенно христианские демократы, стараются использовать набожность молдаван в своих политических целях. В отличие от светских властей Украины, которые, как мы уже отмечали, энергично поддерживают Киевский патриархат, правительство Молдовы, включая президента Мирча Снегура, которому более или менее близок панрумынизм, упорно отказывалось регистрировать Бессарабскую митрополию и в качестве единственно легитимной православной церкви в Молдове признавало Кишинево-Молдавскую. В ответ священники РПЦ наставляют паству голосовать за коммуниста В.Воронина, который, в свою очередь, произносит неординарную речь о том, что Иисус Христос был первым коммунистом. В итоге Бессарабская митрополия в течение первого десятилетия после своего восстановления оставалась незарегистрированной. В декабре 2001 г. Европейский суд по правам человека поддержал ее иск и предписал правительству Молдовы выплатить ей порядка 27 тыс. евро в виде компенсации за ущерб, понесенный за эти годы. У правительства Воронина не осталось выбора, и в июле 2002 г. Бессарабская митрополия была зарегистрирована26. За вердиктом Европейского суда последовало решение внутреннего судебного органа, признавшего Бессарабскую митрополию законной наследницей одноименной организации межвоенных лет. Митрополия возбудила против правительства 24

Cemвrtan. Cazul Mitropoliei Basarabiei. Р. 42.

См.: Iulian Chifu, Vlad Cubreacov, Milai Potoroacă. Dreptul de proprietate al Mitropoliei Basarabiei şî restituirea averilor bisericeşti: Studiu asupra practicilor şi legislaţiei aplicabile în Republica Moldova. Chişinău, 2004. Р. 12-13. 25

26

См.: Cemârtan. Cazul Mitropoliei Basarabiei. Р. 88.

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новый иск, на этот раз потребовав возвращения всего имущества, принадлежавшего до войны Румынской православной церкви. Сегодня, в 2007 г., под управлением Бессарабской митрополии Румынской православной церкви находятся 4 епархии, объединяющие примерно 320 общин верующих27 (включая незарегистрированные), и всего 170 приходов28. В том факте, что под управлением Кишинево-Молдавской митрополии РПЦ находятся порядка 1200 приходов29, одни видят свидетельство высокой притягательности румынского православия, которую оно продемонстрировало по прошествии всего лишь пятилетия после регистрации, а другие — доказательство все еще ощутимого превосходства РПЦ. Бессарабский митрополит Петру Падрару (Petru Pădraru) официально именуется «экзархом отдаленных земель». Этот титул предполагает, что в его ведении находится распространение влияния румынского православия в северо-восточном направлении, то есть в каноническую территорию РПЦ. В самом деле, группа верующих (этнических русских), вышедшая из русской православной церкви в начале 1990-х годов, создала благочиние в составе нескольких московских и сибирских приходов под управлением бессарабского экзарха30. Канон строго воспрещает межправославный прозелитизм, таким образом, создание экзархата с целью распространения своего влияния на каноническую территорию соседней православной церкви, — явное нарушение. Однако руководители Бессарабской митрополии утверждают, что РПЦ первая нарушила канонические законы в 1813 г. и они просто пытаются восстановить справедливость. По их мнению, РПЦ держит под своим контролем два с половиной миллиона бессарабских православных как заложников, и то, что Румынская православная церковь распоряжается несколькими приходами Москвы и Сибири, — это лишь скромная контрмера. Как только РПЦ уйдет из Бессарабии, уверяют румынисты, эти приходы будут возвращены Московскому патриархату. 27

В это число входят не только приходы, но и благотворительные братства.

Интервью, полученное автором у дьякона Андрея (Делеу), заведующего канцелярией Бессарабской митрополии в г. Кишинев 21 августа 2007 г. 28

29 Интервью, полученное автором у о. Максима (Мелинти) в г.Кишинев 21 августа 2007 г. 30

Упомянутое интервью автора с Кубряковым.

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За прошедший год немало приходов западной Молдовы приняло решение примкнуть к Румынской православной церкви. Непосредственной причиной этого стало стремление Московского патриархата сделать архимандрита Петру (Мустяцэ), крайне непопулярного среди своих коллег, епископом Унгенским и Ниспоренским (запад Молдовы). Если верить его противникам из числа священнослужителей, в свое время Петру сделал крупное пожертвование в Московский патриархат и, став епископом, попытался заменить священников своими людьми с тем, чтобы «вернуть капиталовложение». Это вызвало череду серьезных конфликтов и стычек, включая публичное избиение самим Петру одного из своих противников. Для обсуждения сложившегося положения в Унгенском районе собрались 40 священников, и лишь семеро из них отказались примкнуть к Румынской православной церкви. В соседнем районе Калараши (Călăraşi) такое решение поддержали три прихода, а 29 заявили, что остаются под юрисдикцией РПЦ. Московский Синод направил в Молдову инспекционную группу, которая рекомендовала сместить епископа Петру. Он был смещен, но в виде компенсации Синод назначил его викарием (вице-епископом) при Кишинево-Молдавской митрополии. В настоящее время он освобожден и от этой должности и является епископом Хункусским, пребывания в своем прежнем монастыре Хынку31. Священники, которых я интервьюировал в Унгенах и Калараши, подчеркивали, что дело Петру явилось последней каплей, которая переполнила чашу их терпения и подтолкнула в сторону Румынской церкви. После восстановления Бессарабской митрополии в 1992 г. они постоянно спрашивали себя: не следует ли вернуться в лоно церкви родного языка и культуры? Они также жаловались на тяжелые поборы со стороны РПЦ, которая поставляет в Молдову подсвечники, богослужебные книги и церковную утварь за очень высокую плату, часто много выше, чем в самой России; «так русское православие бесчестно эксплуатирует набожность молдаван». Напротив, Румынская православная церковь предоставляет, например, церковную библиотеку даром и выделяет священникам денежные субсидии. «Румынолюбие» священнослужителей подогревают и 31

Данные уточнены с помощью о. Николая Балашова.

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конфликты с местной светской администрацией, все еще нередко настроенной атеистически и промосковски. Так, администрация Унген немедленно освободила от уплаты налогов семь церквей, в которых служат упомянутые «верноподданные» священники. В такой ситуации, даже если РПЦ сумеет окончательно замять дело Петру, считают местные православные священнослужители, трудно ожидать, что «вода потечет обратно»32. Как ни странно, ситуация на западе Молдовы мало волнует как Кишиневскую митрополию, так и Московский патриархат. О. Максим (Мелинти), служащий в Кишинево-Молдавской митрополии, утверждает, что сложности возникают лишь с Бессарабской митрополией, которая в своей деятельности руководствуется политическими соображениями, а взаимоотношения с самой Румынской православной церковью в целом вполне нормальные и даже дружественные. Многие молодые представители клира учатся и получают теологические степени в Румынии. Румынское правительство, со своей стороны, платит стипендии не только студентам от Бессарабской митрополии, но и от Кишинево-Молдавской. Митрополит Владимир определяет язык богослужения в зависимости от этнического состава прихожан церкви. Кишинево-Молдавская митрополия дорожит принципом «двуязычие как минимум», и потому ее бессмысленно упрекать в том, что она является инструментом русификации. Популярность среди священников румынского православия о. Максим относит на счет получаемых ими денежных субсидий. Руководство РПЦ, часто ссылаясь на тот факт, что неофициальным идеологом Бессарабской митрополии является Влад Кубряков (Vlad Cubreacov), депутат парламента от Христианскодемократической народной партии, видит в этом доказательство политический подоплеки деятельности митрополии. Так или иначе, священник из Калараши, которого я интервьюировал, высказал благодарность этому депутату за консультации по вопросам светского права и помощь в регистрации приходов. Все деятели РПЦ, с которыми мне приходилось беседовать, говорили спокойно и 32 Интервью, полученные автором у о. Иона Порческу (Ion Porcescu), священника церкви Александра Невского в Унгенах, и у о. Ивана Муту (Ivan Mutu), священника церкви Св. Троицы в г. Калараши (Călăraşi) 25 августа 2007 г.

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бесстрастно (даже несколько монотонно), и их ответы были точны. Вероятно, психологически трудно противостоять таким людям. Священник из Унген отметил, что они правильно поступили, перейдя в румынскую церковь коллективно: если бы это было сделано в индивидуальном порядке, «они [русские церковники] явились бы группой и разделались с каждым поодиночке».

ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЕ: ПРИЗНАННАЯ ЦЕРКОВЬ В НЕПРИЗНАННОМ ГОСУДАРСТВЕ

В Приднестровье, в отличие от правобережной Молдовы, гонения на православие в советские годы достигли такого масштаба, что к моменту начала горбачевской перестройки здесь сохранились лишь три церкви, а верующие были нередко вынуждены обращаться к староверам (репрессии против них были сравнительно мягкими), чтобы использовать для отправления культа их молельные дома. В 1987 г., сразу после своего назначения Кишинево-Молдавским митрополитом, Серапион пригласил в Тирасполь иркутского священника Михаила (Шевчука), однокурсника Серапиона по Московской духовной семинарии. Поскольку к тому времени в Тирасполе церквей уже не было, о. Михаил начал с постройки новой. Исполком Тираспольского горсовета, все еще состоявший из атеистов, в издевку над ним отвел под застройку низкое место — старое русло Днестра. Однако благодаря сотрудничеству с директорами государственных предприятий Михаилу удалось поднять уровень грунта на шесть метров, и вскоре на этом месте появилась первая вновь отстроенная в Тирасполе церковь — Покровская33. В 1990 г. под управлением Кишинево-Молдавской митрополии было создано Бендерское викариатство. В период вооруженного конфликта между Молдовой и Приднестровьем 1992 г. священники левобережья отказалось поминать павших в войне, заявив, что сепаратисты приравниваются к банди33 Интервью, данные автору в г. Тирасполь Петром Заложковым, уполномоченным президента ПМР по делам религии (22 августа 2007 г.) и о. Михаилом (Шевчуком), священником Никольской церкви (23 августа 2007 г.).

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там. Родственники погибших были вынуждены ехать в Одессу, чтобы их похоронить. Единственным исключением явился о. Михаил, который обслуживал христиан вне зависимости от их политических воззрений, чем и завоевал авторитет как среди казаков, так и среди добровольцев. Приднестровские христиане, оскорбленные поведением промолдавски настроенных священников, ходатайствовали перед Московским патриархатом, чтобы учредить самостоятельную епархию с прямым подчинением Москве, минуя Кишинев. Однако тогда это оказалось невыполнимым из-за нехватки священников. Вскоре приднестровские священники (кроме, разумеется, Михаила) перебрались на правый берег Днестра34. В такой сложной ситуации молодые священники украинской автокефалии направились в Приднестровье служить этническим украинцам и распространять свое влияние в регионе. Они учредили собственную епархию в составе восьми приходов, которые обслуживали также и добровольцев. Сегодня это выглядит забавным, но в те годы даже ультранационалисты типа УНА-УНСО направили в Приднестровье добровольцев для защиты единоплеменников от вооруженного нападения Молдовы. В начале 90-х годов администрация И.Смирнова рассматривала возможность воссоединения с Украиной и поэтому поддерживала украинскую автокефалию на своей территории. Однако по окончании войны условия деятельности местной неканонических епархии и приходов ухудшились. Ситуацию осложняли и непростые отношения между Украинской автокефалией и Киевским патриархатом. В июле 1995 г., когда Московский патриархат принял решение учредить Дубоссарское викариатство, подчиненное Кишинево-Молдавской митрополии, украинские автокефалисты (пятеро из них тогда еще находились в Приднестровье) объявили о своем желании примкнуть к РПЦ. Если РПЦ и Румынская православная церковь имеют в православном мире легитимный статус и переход из одной в другую в принципе возможен, то принадлежность к украинской автокефалии или Киевскому патриархату считается раскольничеством. Поэтому прежде 34 «Дубоссарско-Приднестровская епархия (Украинской православной церкви Киевского патриархата)» (Справка Тираспольской епархии РПЦ); упомянутое интервью автора с о. Михаилом (Шевчуком).

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чем перейти в лоно РПЦ автокефалисты должны были покаяться в прежних грехах; кроме того, работа в составе раскольнической церкви не засчитывается в их духовном послужном списке. Несмотря на это, и о. Михаил, и митрополит Владимир выказывали уважение автокефалистам и относились к ним как к священникам еще до их официального покаяния35. Бывшие автокефалисты не остались в долгу — сегодня они одни из самых активных священников Тираспольской епархии. Несмотря на неприятные воспоминания периода гражданской войны, лидеры приднестровского православия остались в каноническом подчинении Кишинево-Молдавской митрополии, и это объяснимо. В отличие от Абхазского православия и светских властей Приднестровья, Тираспольская епархия признана. Со своей стороны, Кишинево-Молдавская митрополия более не демонстрирует вражды к светским властям Приднестровья и приветствует их попытки возродить православие на левобережье. Нет ничего удивительного в том, что Бессарабская митрополия критикует примирительное отношение своего соперника к «сепаратизму». На должность Дубоссарского викария Московский патриархат назначил Юстиниана (Овчинникова), который после преобразования викариатства в епархию автоматически стал епископом. Родом из Владимирской области Юстиниан (1961 г.р.) получил религиозное образование в Бухаресте (что впоследствии очень помогло его карьере). Он был приглашен в Московский патриархат, но почему-то прослужил в Отделе внешних церковных связей только полгода. Покинув Москву, Юстиниан проявил свои способности хозяйственника в Твери, где восстановил огромный Вознесенский собор, и это было замечено Алексием II36. Территория, управляемая Дубоссарским викарием (от Гагаузии до Дубоссар), не совпала с административными границами, а приходы к северу от Дубоссар образовали благочиние с прямым подчинением Кишинево-Мол35 «Дубоссарско-Приднестровская епархия»; интервью полученные автором у бывших украинских автокефалистов о. Василия (Карпова), благочинного игумена Каменки (в Тирасполе) и о. Феодора (Кривуля), священника Вознесенской церкви (в Григориополе) 23 августа 2007 г. 36 http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/80876.html; www/pravoslavie.ru/analit/kitskany.htm.

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давской митрополии. Дубоссарское викариатство начало свою деятельность с чистого листа — в его распоряжении не было ни помещения (даже резиденции для викария), ни технического аппарата, ни транспорта. Однако всего два года спустя под его управлением было уже 43 прихода с 27 священнослужителями37. В конце концов в октябре 1998 г. была создана Тираспольско-Дубоссарская епархия, включающая всю территорию непризнанной ПМР. В начале 90-х годов, потерпев неудачу в попытке получить покровительство Украины, администрация Смирнова в качестве своей официальной идеологии избрала русское православие и начала вкладывать в это огромные деньги. Православный епископ входит в число восьми государственных деятелей, охрану которых финансирует казна. Вместе с тем, между президентом и епископом сложилось латентное напряжение. Советник президента по делам религии Петр Заложков отметил следующие проблемы в епархии Юстиниана: алкоголизм, коррупция, большое число «мертвых душ» (фиктивных приходов, не имеющих священников), чрезмерно высокие поборы, которые вынуждают священнослужителей покидать свои места, скрытая деятельность Киевского патриархата в деревнях, примыкающих к украинской границе и т.д. Заложков уже неоднократно обращался в Московский патриархат с просьбой сместить Юстиниана, который, в свою очередь, отлучил этого чиновника от церкви. О. Михаил, один из самых заслуженных деятелей со времени гражданской войны, передал Покровскую церковь епархии и на окраине Тирасполя построил новую — Никольскую (в обиходе именуемую казачьей), где ведет почти отшельнический образ жизни. Несмотря на впечатляющее многообразие религий в Приднестровье (помимо православных, здесь есть католики, староверы и протестанты), на его территории не существует зарегистрированных организаций ни Румынской православной церкви, ни Киевского патриархата. Бессарабская митрополия имеет в своем составе епархию Дубоссар и всего Приднестровья, но это виртуальная организация, прописанная в Кишиневе. Советник президента Залож37 «Дубоссарское викариатство (Кишинёвско-Молдавской митрополии РПЦ)» (Справка Тираспольской епархии РПЦ).

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ков рассматривает раскол в традиционной религии (православии) как нетерпимый, поскольку, по его мнению, он неизбежно ведет к государственному сепаратизму. В отличие от Заложкова, депутат Верховного Совета ПМР, ответственный за регистрацию религиозных организаций, считает, что в Приднестровье существует полная свобода вероисповедания. По его словам, организации, представляющие Киевский патриархат или Бессарабскую митрополию, могут быть зарегистрированы без всяких проблем, если представят необходимые документы38. Надо ли говорить, что Румынская православная церковь никогда не станет обращаться в тираспольское министерство юстиции с подобным ходатайством.

МЕГРЕЛЬСКАЯ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТЬ ГАЛЬСКОГО РАЙОНА

И ПРОБЛЕМА

По данным переписи 1989 г., 46% населения Абхазской АССР были грузинами (239 872 чел.), тогда как абхазы составляли лишь 18% (93 267 чел.), армяне и русские — по 15%, а греки — 3%39. В 1995 г., после гражданской войны, доля абхазов возросла до 29% (91 162 чел.), а количество грузин сократилось почти до такого же числа (29%, или 89 928 чел.). Доля армян и русских увеличилась незначительно (до 20 и 16%, соответственно), а большинство греков и представителей других малых народов покинуло Абхазию40. Таким образом, по сравнению с довоенным периодом абхазские грузины, несмотря на уменьшение их абсолютной численности, восстановили свой демографический паритет с абхазами, причем еще до того, 38 Интервью, полученное автором у Вячеслава Тобуха, депутата Верховного Совета ПМР (от партии «Обновление»), члена парламентского Комитета по вопросам общественных объединений, молодежной политики, спорта и СМИ в г.Тирасполь 22 августа 2007 г. 39 Статистический комитет Содружества независимых государств. Итоги всесоюзной переписи населения 1989 г. Т. 1. Ч. 2. Миннеаполис, 1993. С. 452. Кроме того, в Абхазии были зарегистрированы представители еще более 100 этносов — факт, который абхазские лидеры и население республики горделиво называли олицетворением дружбы народов СССР. 40

Эхо Абхазии. 1999. 18 мая. С. 1.

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как власти республики призвали вернуться на родину население Гальского района — мегрелов (1998 г.). В общем, правительство Абхазии столкнулось с проблемой: как справиться с «неблагоприятной» демографической ситуацией в республике, возможно ли инкорпорировать мегрелов в абхазское национальное сообщество и если да, то каким путем? Гальский район наравне с Кодорским ущельем явился очагом грузино-абхазского конфликта, поскольку он расположен на правом берегу реки Ингур — на границе с Грузией — и большинство его населения составляют мегрельские грузины. После прекращения огня в 1993 г. и до августа 2006 г. грузинские «партизаны», пришедшие с противоположного берега Ингури, убили 101 миротворца СНГ и 311 местных жителей. Комиссия, состоящая из представителей Абхазии, Грузии, ООН и миротворческих сил СНГ, пытается урегулировать стычки, возникающие между сторонами. С другой стороны, в Гальском районе производится 55% сельхозпродукции Абхазии, в том числе чай, цитрусовые и мясо. Несмотря на катастрофическое состояние дороги, соединяющей Галь с соседним Очамчиром (ее постоянно разбивают броневики ООН), фермеры-мегрелы, чтобы продать свой товар, ездят на автобусах в туристические центры, Сухум и на реку Псоу на российской границе. Деревни самого Гальского района выглядят богато — большинство фермеров имеют двухэтажные дома с большими балконами. Когда в сентябре 1993 г. в ходе контрнаступления абхазские войска приблизились к Гальскому району, испуганное население вместе с грузинской армией эвакуировалось на противоположный берег Ингури. Однако невыносимые условия жизни в грузинских лагерях беженцев заставили многих из них сразу после прекращения огня вернуться в родные места. Если принять на веру, что мегрелы представляют собой подгруппу грузин, следует признать, что их поголовная репатриация перевернула бы демографический баланс в Абхазии. Администрация Ардзинбы не проводила какого-либо последовательного курса в мегрельском вопросе, но в 1998 г. он начал призывать беженцев из Гальского района возвращаться домой41. 41 Сергей Маркедонов называет это «новой восточной политикой». См.: Маркедонов С. Непризнанную Абхазию признают // Непризнанные государства. Научные тетради. Вып. 1. Москва, 2006. С. 115.

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Основной целью этого было стремление стабилизировать военную ситуацию на юго-востоке Абхазии, но, возможно, одновременно абхазское руководство хотело смягчить критику проводимых им «национальных чисток» со стороны мирового сообщества. После 1998 г. абхазские политики рассуждают примерно следующим образом: «Мегрелы отличаются от грузин. Мы сражались с последними, но не с первыми. По крайней мере, с XIX столетия мегрелы являются автохтонным населением юго-востока Абхазии, тогда как грузины, которые после 1937 г. начали заселять другие районы к западу от Галя (такие как Очамчир, Сухуми или Гагры), были искусственными переселенцами, набранными из внутренних горных районов Грузии, призванными “огрузинить” Абхазию. Если во время грузиноабхазской войны гальские мегрелы придерживались нейтралитета, то здешние грузинские деревни фактически превратились в базы грузинских войск; армии Абхазии ничего другого не оставалось, как их уничтожать. Поэтому мегрелы имеют законное право вернуться домой, тогда как репатриацию грузин следует поставить в зависимость от уровня доверия между Грузией и Абхазией…»42

Призыв Ардзинбы к мегрелам вернуться домой чрезвычайно политизировал мегрельский вопрос. Руководство Грузии считает вернувшихся в Галь предателями. Абхазское же руководство ходатайствует перед ООН о проведении местной переписи, которая, по его расчетам, должна доказать, что большинство жителей вернулось. Грузия блокирует это предложение. Второй поворотной точкой в процессе инкорпорации мегрелов в национальное сообщество Абхазии стали президентские выборы 2004 г. Подавляющее большинство мегрелов голосовало за С.Багапша, который обещал порвать с режимом Ардзинбы. 42 Интервью, полученное автором у С. Шамба, министра иностранных дел Абхазии (г. Сухум, 22 августа 2006 г.) и у Р. Кушнария, председателя Гальского районного собрания (г. Галь, 25 августа 2006 г.). Конечно, эти рассуждения спорны. Во-первых, нет статистических сведений, которые доказывали бы преобладание немегрелов в составе бывшего грузинского населения за пределами Гальского района. Во-вторых, сами представители этнических меньшинств нередко выступают ярыми сторонниками грузинского империализма — мегрелами были, например, и Лаврентий Берия, и Звиад Гамсахурдиа; в 2003 г. именно из мегрельской «столицы» Зугдиди Саакашвили начал свой марш на Тбилиси для захвата власти.

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Преемник последнего, Р.Хаджимба навесил на Багапша ярлык прогрузински настроенного антипатриота и тем самым только убедил мегрелов голосовать за него. Сыграло свою роль и то, что в 80-е годы Багапш работал первым секретарем райкома партии соседнего Очамчирского района. Когда в 1999 г. его уволили с должности премьер-министра Абхазии, он вернулся в Очамчир, где возглавил Черноморэнерго43. Также важно и то, что Багапш женат на мегрелке. В итоге он победил благодаря голосам мегрелов. Хаджимба, ссылаясь на «массовые нарушения» в ходе выборов в Гальском районе, стал требовать проведения повторного голосования44. После прекращения огня главой администрации Гальского района президент Абхазии назначил Руслана Кушнария, преемником которого в 2004 г. стал Юрий Квеквескири. Оба — абхазы, родились в соседнем Очамчирском районе, свободно владеют грузинским и мегрельским языками. В разговоре со мной Квеквескири утверждал, что мегрельское население понимает, почему их мэром должен быть абхаз, но после того, как мировое сообщество признает Абхазию, республика перейдет к выборной системе районных глав, и в таком случае мэром Гальского района определенно станет мегрел45. Районная администрация финансирует издание газеты на мегрельском языке (выходящей также на русском и абхазском), чего нет в Грузии. Когда эта газета (Гал) готовилась к изданию в 1995 г., президент Э.Шеварднадзе лично звонил Ардзимбе, требуя не допустить ее издания46. Я спросил мэра Квеквескири, почему абхазские власти не доводят начатое до конца, имея в виду превращение Галя в центр мегрельской идентичности. Он ответил, что Абхазия не 43

Лакоба С. Абхазия после двух империй XIX-XXI вв. Саппоро, 2004. С. 157-158.

Мой вопрос относительно этих «массовых нарушений» вызвал лишь смех у руководителей деревни Шашквара Гальского района, в котором я проводил полевые исследования 25 августа 2006 г. С другой стороны, было очевидно, что мои собеседники сделали все, чтобы мобилизовать голоса за Багапша на президентских выборах 2004 г. Чачей (грузинским и абхазским 80-градусным спиртом) были сдобрены бесчисленные тосты «за руководителей района и республики», поднимать которые пришлось и мне. 44

45 Интервью, данное автору Ю. Квеквескири, главой администрации Гальского района 25 августа 2006 г. в Гале. 46 Интервью, полученное автором у Н. Салакая, главного редактора газеты Гал 25 августа 2006 г. в Гале.

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желает вмешиваться «в их [грузинские и мегрельские] внутренние дела». В действительности мегрелы в своих абхазских паспортах идентифицируют себя как грузины и разъезжают по обоим берегам Ингури на автобусах ООН. В школах своих детей они обучают на грузинском языке, самоуничижительно квалифицируя мегрельский язык как бесписьменный. Знаменитый лингвист Джордж Хюит (George Hewitt) сокрушается, что даже в Гальском районе мегрельский язык не используется в учебном процессе, однако это желание самих его обитателей. Зависимость детей мегрелов от грузинских учебников ограничивает их последующие карьерные возможности: продолжить учебу они способны только в Грузии и, не владея ни русским, ни абхазским, не могут рассчитывать найти работу за ее пределами. Понимая важность знания этих двух языков, родители и учителя нетерпеливо ждут появления в их районе русско- и абхазоязычных учебников из Сухум, чего, однако, не происходит по причине скудости абхазской казны. Это в корне отличается от ситуации в Приднестровье, о котором скоро вновь пойдет речь. Тактичное и целеустремленное поведение мегрелов развеивает широко распространенное представление о них как об угнетаемом нацменьшинстве, по крайней мере в Абхазии. Вспомним, как трудно было выжить в Советском Союзе этносам, не имевшим собственной территориальной автономии. Мегрелы стали исключением из этого правила и, очевидно, готовятся пережить возможный новый вооруженный конфликт.

СУДЬБА МОЛДАВИЗМА В ПРИДНЕСТРОВЬЕ Абхазия, инкорпорируя мегрелов в 1998 и 2004 гг., несомненно, повысила свой кредит в глазах мирового сообщества. То, что мы наблюдаем в отношении молдаван в Приднестровье, похоже, имеет обратное значение. В конце 80-х — начале 90-х годов Верховный Совет МССР закрепил курс на превращение румынского языка в единственный государственный. В соответствии со взглядами, господствовавшими тогда в молдавской гуманитарной науке, молдавской национальности никогда не существовало — это

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мол искусственное образование, созданное русификаторами. Вскоре правительство утвердило «Историю румын», написанную П.Панаитеску (P. Panaitescu) в 1943 г. (в период господства в Румынии профашистского режима), в качестве учебника истории47. В такой ситуации лидеры Приднестровья стали поднимать не только проблему прав человека в отношении русско- и украиноговорящей части населения, но и самой категории молдаван как этноса. В ходе обсуждений о том, как назвать новое государство, в сентябре 1990 г. на втором съезде приднестровских депутатов всех уровней представители севера вместе с депутатами-украинцами предложили именовать ее просто Приднестровской республикой. Но съезд добавил к предложенному прилагательное «молдавская». Этот эпизод показывает, какое значение имела легитимация нового государства в качестве «последнего бастиона молдавской идентичности», если на правом берегу Днестра само существование этой национальности отрицалось. Первые три жертвы молдаво-приднестровской конфронтации — молодые люди, погибшие в Дубоссарах в ноябре 1990 г., были представителями трех основных национальностей, проживающих в Приднестровье. Это случайное обстоятельство активно использовалось в государственном мифотворчестве48. Важной предпосылкой конечной победы Приднестровья явилось то, что в 1992 г. многие молдаване левобережья с оружием в руках оказывали сопротивление войскам Молдовы. Тандем русского по национальности президента Игоря Смирнова и молдаванина спикера парламента Григория Маракуцы, как и появление молдаванина на посту ректора Приднестровского университета сыграли важную символическую роль при создании нового государства. В марте 1991 г., спустя всего полгода после декларации независимости Приднестровья, Верховный Совет ПМР принял постановление «О первоочередных мерах по сохранению самобытности 47 См.: Panaitescu Р. Istoria romanilor (переиздана в Кишиневе в 1992 г.). К сожалению, мне не удалось ознакомиться с содержанием этой работы, но молдавский историк Петр Шорников оценивает ее как достаточно объективную «по сравнению с трудами современных румынистов». См.: Шорников П. Молдавская самобытность. С. 9. 48 Бабилунга Н.Б., Бомешко Б.Г. Дубоссары: кровоточащая рана Приднестровья. Тирасполь, 1993. С. 14.

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молдавского народа, его языка и культуры», в соответствии с которым в Приднестровском университете была создана специальная лаборатория для изучения «истории Молдавии и Приднестровья» (курсив мой. — К.М.) и подготовки соответствующей учебной литературы49. Сотрудниками лаборатории стали такие историки, как Николай Бабилунга и Борис Бомешко, которые переехали в Тирасполь, поскольку были возмущены панрумынским национализмом Кишинева. Итогом десятилетней работы лаборатории стало появление трехтомной «Истории Приднестровской Молдавской республики»50. На постсоветской территории мы нередко наблюдаем столкновения примордиализма малых народов и более крупных (например, мишарей и татар). При этом часто бывает, что примордиализм малых народов даже более фантастичен и мифологичен. Новейшая молдавистская литература (например, книга П.М.Шорникова «Молдавская самобытность», изданная в 2007 г.) создает другое впечатление. Во-первых, как это часто бывает с примордиалистскими интерпретациями истории в бывших социалистических странах, румынисты склонны чрезвычайно широко по времени применять этноним и лингним «румыны» и «румынский» — понятия сравнительно недавние, ранее XVIII в. не использовавшиеся; молдавизм же более скрупулезен в работе с источниками. Во-вторых, румынисты воображают существование в древности обширной территории, населенной (прото-)румынами. Это также роднит их с примордиалистами бывших социалистических стран. Напротив, Шорников доказывает, что появление как молдавской, так и румынской идентичностей явилось «проектом», выработанным во взаимодействии нескольких протоэтносов Северного Причерноморья и юго-востока Европы. Естественным результатом такого подхода явилось то, что книга Шорникова изобилует модными «империологическими» терминами типа «национальный проект». Симптоматично, что эта 49 Бабилунга Н. Приднестровская Молдавская республика: Признанная историография непризнанного государства // Историографический диалог вокруг непризнанных государств: Приднестровье, Нагорный Карабах, Армения, Южная Осетия и Грузия. Саппоро, 2007. С. 15-16. 50 См.: История Приднестровской Молдавской республики. Т. 1, 2. Тирасполь, 2000-2001.

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книга была опубликована в Тирасполе, а не в Кишиневе, причем ее издание было профинансировано Союзом молдаван Приднестровья. Все это дало повод для обвинения группы Бабилунги в молдавофилии. В 2001 г. Владимир Воронин стал президентом Молдовы, пользуясь лозунгом молдавизма. Но, как и многие другие свои предвыборные обещания, этот курс он не реализовал — в молдавских школах по-прежнему преподают на румынском языке, а историю страны изучают по «Истории румын» 1943 г. Несмотря на это, некоторые представители приднестровской науки, такие как директор Института истории, государства и права Приднестровского университета Илья Галинский и советник президента ПМР Анна Волкова, считают политически некорректным и нецелесообразным пропагандировать в Приднестровье молдавизм. Галинский заявляет, что есть два постмолдавских государства — РМ и ПМР, и государственной идеологией первого является молдавизм, а второго — приднестровский патриотизм51. Анна Волкова тоже называет новую государственную наднациональную идеологию приднестровским патриотизмом52. Таким образом, в Приднестровье постепенно ликвидируют один из важных компонентов легитимации рождения этого государства. Взамен правительство ПМР предпринимает усилия для социального продвижения молдаван. Как отмечает Ребекка Чемберлейн-Крянга (Rebecca A. Chamberlain-Creangă)53, ощущение причастности индивидуума к данному государству зависит от уровня его жизни, доступа к образованию и возможности продвигаться по социальной лестнице. Президент Союза молдаван Приднестровья Валериян Тулгара полагает, что в многонациональном государстве статус каждой нации обусловлен степенью активности ее представителей. Он признает, что молдаване по своей природе люди деревенские и в своей познавательной активности уступают, 51 www.femina-news.ru/cultura/news_2007-10-16-22-10-03-595.html (последний доступ 5 ноября 2007 г.). 52 Интервью, полученное автором у Анны Волковой, советника президента ПМР в г. Тирасполь 22 августа 2007 г. 53 Rebecca Chamberlain-Creangă. “Transnistrian People”? Citizenship and Imaginings of ‘the State’ in an Unrecognized Country // Ab Imperio. 2006. № 4. Р. 371-399.

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например, русским. Именно по этой причине, с его точки зрения, для молдаван особенно важно, сколько они подготовили кандидатов наук и выдающихся спортсменов54. Еще в 1990 г. в городах Приднестровья не было ни одной молдавской школы, тогда как сегодня в нем насчитывается 16 молдавских школ и 21 смешанная (молдаво-русская)55. Помимо родного языка, школьники изучают один из трех государственных языков, а гимназисты — все три. Серьезной проблемой стали школьные учебники. В отличие от детей мегрелов в Абхазии, школьники-молдаване не могут использовать учебники Молдовы, поскольку образовательные стандарты Приднестровья, согласованные с российскими, выше, чем в Молдове, где они выработаны по румынскому образцу56. Учебники по естественным дисциплинам можно просто перевести с русского, но руководства по гуманитарным предметам (молдавскому языку, литературе и истории) нужно было создавать с чистого листа57. Труднее всего подготовить учебник истории. Россия и Украина охотно и безвозмездно посылают в Приднестровье свои учебники в надежде, что здешние школьники будут изучать российскую или украинскую историю. В самой Молдове молдавскую историю как таковую не изучают уже более 15-ти лет. Поэтому группа Бабулинги, едва завершившая известный нам трехтомный труд по истории ПМР, была мобилизована на подготовку учебника по молдавской истории, который и был издан в 2004 г.

54 Интервью, данное автору Валерияном Тулгара, депутатом Верховного Совета ПМР, президентом Союза молдаван Приднестровья, в г. Тирасполь 23 августа 2007 г. 55 Кроме того, имеется семь чисто украинских и пять смешанных (украинско-русских) школ. Это впечатляющее достижение, однако, имеет отрицательную сторону. Р. Чемберлейн-Крянга отмечает, что из-за распространения чисто молдавских школ многие молодые молдаване не владеют русским языком, а это мешает их карьерному росту в республике. 56 Приднестровские педагоги прогнозируют, что этот разрыв сократится, когда Россия и, соответственно, Приднестровье перейдут на Болонскую систему, которая, как ожидается, заметно снизит уровень российского высшего образования. 57 Интервью, полученное автором у Елены Бомешко, помощника президента ПМР по вопросам образования, науки и культуры в г. Тирасполь 24 августа 2007 г. (жена историка Бориса Бомешко, в 1998-2006 гг. была министром образования ПМР).

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Несколько лет назад президентский советник Анна Волкова попыталась перепрофилироваться в профессионального историка58 и оказалась в конкуренции с группой Бабилунги. Параллельно с действующими кафедрой Бабилунги «по истории Отечества» и его лабораторией «по истории Приднестровья» Волкова создала свою кафедру и лабораторию по «истории ПМР». Подобную роскошь на сколь-либо длительный срок не могут себе позволить даже богатейшие университеты мира. В 2005 г. Волкова издала под своей редакцией исторический атлас Приднестровья; эта публикация должна была явиться ее научным дебютом в качестве ведущего историка Приднестровья. К сожалению, в атласе оказалось немало ошибок. В 2006 г. «Исторический альманах Приднестровья», выходивший под редакцией Бабилунги и Бомешко, опубликовал 24-страничную рецензию, не оставив и камня на камне от волковского атласа59. В результате выпуск альманаха был приостановлен, Волкова учредила новый исторический журнал, а университет принял решение до конца 2007 г. закрыть лабораторию Бабилунги60. Совещание деканата, которое состоялось в университете 17 июля 2007 г., практически превратилось в допрос Бабилунги и его коллег, обвиненных в косвенной поддержке В.Воронина. Его участники отметили, что история славяно-молдавских отношений, изучением которой занималась группа Бабилунги, является темой другого государства и не имеет никакого отношения к Приднестровью61. Почти одновременно несколько ветеранов гражданской войны 1992 г. направили в Верховный Совет республики ходатайство об исключении из ее названия слова «молдавская», мотивируя это тем, что якобы из-за этого прилагательного мировое сообщество от58 Правда, и до этого у нее были публикации полунаучного характера: биография Смирнова (Волкова А. Лидер. Тирасполь, 2001), хронологическое описание референдумов, прошедших в Приднестровье (Волкова А.З. Референдумы в Приднестровской Молдавской республике (1989-2003 гг.). Тирасполь, 2005). 59

См.: Исторический альманах Приднестровья. 2006. № 10. С. 184-207.

Regnum ИА. Глава комитета Верховного Совета: закрытие «Исторического альманаха Приднестровья» является преждевременным. www.regnum.ru/news/898590. html (последний доступ 7 января 2008 г.). 60

61 Regnum ИА. Приднестровских ученых лишили финансирования за научную критику советника президента? www.regnum.ru/news/fd-abroad/896191.html (последний доступ 11 октября 2007 г.).

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казывается признать Приднестровье. В общем, 2007 г. стал трагическим для приднестровской исторической науки. Следует отметить, что суть дела не в гонениях на молдавизм, а в соперничестве двух людей — Бабилунги и Волковой, а молдавизм лишь стал орудием критики Бабилунги. Конфликт получил широкий резонанс, пожалуй, даже чрезмерно широкий. Его обсуждали в журналах, газетах и интернете. В конце 2007 г. соперничество между двумя группами историков приобрело политическую окраску: Верховный Совет во главе с «Обновлением» взял на себя спонсорство лаборатории Бабилунги, в то время как группа Волковой все больше опирается на поддержку президентской администрации. Ситуация с Бабилунгой и Бомешко, основателями приднестровской историографии, напоминает историю о. Михаила. Гордым отцам-основателям государства трудно адаптироваться к неизменной власти, в основе которой лежат патрональные отношения. Это можно отметить и в последние годы руководства Бабаяна и Ардзимбы. В то же время, конфликтующие пары (епископ Юстиниан / Заложков, Волкова / Бабилунга) усиленно стараются поддерживать хорошие отношения с президентом И.Смирновым, который, в свою очередь, упивается ролью верховного арбитра, — феномен едва ли возможный в бабаяновском Карабахе или в Абхазии времен Ардзинбы.

ЗАКЛЮЧЕНИЕ Исследование трансграничных акторов позволяет лучше понять события, происходящие на берегах Черного моря, и квалифицировать их как макропроцесс. Политика православной церкви по своей динамике и транснациональности вовсе не уступает исламской. Постоянная необходимость в канонической легитимизации делает православие менее зависимым от государства. Другими словами, эта политика ставит под сомнение справедливость знаменитой концепции цезарепапистского делегирования прав, что, в свою очередь, подрывает упования на возможность превращения

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православной церкви в простой инструмент борьбы за национальное освобождение. В этом контексте события в Абхазии и Приднестровье полярно противоположны. Абхазская епархия оказалась вынужденно независимой (вместе с государством), а поэтому и утратила свой канонический статус. Возрождение абхазского православия началось после 1993 г., в условиях независимости республики, причем молодость ее клира — залог привлекательности и силы этой церкви. В Приднестровье же, несмотря на воспоминания периода гражданской войны, православные священники предпочли остаться в подчинении Молдавской митрополии, поэтому здесь сложился специфический симбиоз светской (независимой) и церковной (подчиненной) власти. Благодаря этому выбору приднестровское православие обрело каноническую легитимность и получило щедрую поддержку со стороны светских властей. Но последняя не всегда благотворна, поскольку нередко развращает церковнослужителей. В отличие от приднестровского «штиля», Бессарабию сотрясают столкновения между русской и румынской православными церквями. Для РПЦ это соперничество намного более трудное, чем борьба с Киевским патриархатом или украинской автокефалией в 1990-е годы, по той простой причине, что Румынская православная церковь канонична. Возможно, Бессарабии суждено сыграть роль испытательного полигона, на котором РПЦ продемонстрирует, разделит ли она судьбу константинопольской церкви. Путем инкорпорирования в свои национальные сообщества мегрелов и молдаван Абхазия и Приднестровье повысили свою легитимность на международной арене, бросив вызов стратегии моноэтничного государственного строительства в Грузии и Молдовы. Попытка исключить молдавизм из приднестровского государственного идеологического «меню» — явление мимолетное. Не говоря о личной мотивации подобных попыток и научной несостоятельности концепции приднестровского патриотизма, отмечу поддержку, которую гонимые молдавистские историки получают из-за рубежа (и не только с противоположного берега Днестра), свидетелем чего я был сам.

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Объективно говоря, трансграничные взаимодействия этноконфессиональных акторов вносят вклад в укрепление мира и демократии. Исследования по конфликтологии показывают, что в государствах, в которых разные социальные, языковые, конфессиональные и другие границы переплетены и не накладываются друг на друга, редко случаются гражданские войны, поскольку в таких условиях один раскол нейтрализует другой. Ситуация гражданской войны возникает лишь в случае, когда несколько расколов накладываются один на другой и поляризуют общество на два лагеря62. В этой работе я попытался рассмотреть последствия переплетенных расколов не только в самом государстве, но и за его пределами. Поддержка Тираспольской епархии — важный ресурс КишиневоМолдавской митрополии в ее соперничестве с Бессарабской. Аналогично, решение мегрельской и молдавской проблем показывает, что трансграничные расколы связывают непризнанные государства и их бывшие страны-сюзерены веревками Гулливера и потому они чреваты перерастанием в вооруженные конфликты. Как мог убедиться читатель, изучая происхождение трансграничных отношений, мы нередко обращались к далекому прошлому. Это дает основание утверждать, что трансграничные взаимодействия были, есть и будут характерны для государств Причерноморья, в них заключается традиционный местный способ коммуникации и поддержания мира. Вершители судеб этого региона должны первыми изучить их механизм. Без понимания указанной специфики вмешательство в дела региона посторонних сил, действующих даже из лучших побуждений, может привести к нарушению в нем мира не только в результате непредумышленного разрушения вышеотмеченных механизмов, но и вследствие создания грандиозного легиона «ослов в львиных шкурах». 62 Edward W. Walker и автор этих строк применяли теорию «переплетенных расколов (nested cleavages)» для объяснения неожиданной стабильности, или «стабильной нестабильности», дагестанской политики. См.: Edward W. Walker. Russia’s Soft Underbelly: The Stability of Instability in Dagestan (Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, Winter 1999-2000); Magomed-Rasul Ibragimov, Kimitaka Matsuzato. Alien but Loyal: Reasons for the “Unstable Stability” of Dagestan, an Outpost of Slavic Eurasia // Emerging Meso-Areas in the Former Socialist Countries: Histories Revived or Improvised? Sapporo, 2005. Р. 221-246.

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Об авторах Мацузато Кимитака доктор юридических наук, профессор Центра славянских исследований университета Хоккайдо (г. Саппоро)

Бабилунга Николай Вадимович профессор Приднестровского государственного университета им. Т.Г. Шевченко (г. Тирасполь)

Шорников Петр Михайлович кандидат исторических наук, научный редактор международного журнала «Русин» (г. Кишинев)

Чубашенко Дмитрий Алексеевич главный редактор газеты «Молдавские ведомости» (г. Кишинев)

Волентир Андрей координатор программы, Молдавский институт европейских исследований (г. Кишинев)

Букатару Игорь старший преподаватель, Молдавский государственный университет (г. Кишинев)

Муцушика Шигео доктор юридических наук (университет Бухарест, 1985), профессор Префектурного университета Шизуока

Кулик Виталий Александрович директор Центра исследования проблем гражданского общества (г. Киев)

Якушик Валентин Михайлович доктор политических наук, профессор Национального университета «Киево-Могилянская Академия»

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Uspofiádal Emil Souleimanov

Rusko a postsovûtsk˘ prostor Sborník pfiíspûvkÛ

VIP Books, s. r. o. Praha 2008

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Odborní recenzenti:

Obsah

Doc. PhDr. Lubo‰ ·vec, CSc., Katedra rusk˘ch a v˘chodoevropsk˘ch studií, Institut mezinárodních studií Fakulty sociálních vûd Univerzity Karlovy v Praze. Tomበ·míd, PhD., Katedra politologie, Fakulta sociálních studií Masarykovy univerzity v Brnû.

Ve‰kerá práva vyhrazena, publikace ani její ãásti nesmûjí b˘t reprodukovány a pfievádûny jak˘mkoli zpÛsobem elektronicky, mechanicky, v podobû fotokopií, záznamÛ nebo jinak bez pfiedchozího písemného svolení nakladatelství VIP Books, s. r. o.

© Dimitrij Bûlo‰evsk˘, Filip âern˘, Jakub Dürr, Lubomír Gombos, Slavomír Horák, Bohuslav Litera, TomበMuÏík, Emil Souleimanov, Richard Stojar, Karel Svoboda, Vít Stfiíteck˘, Jaroslav ·imon, Jan ·ír, Lubo‰ Vesel˘, Markéta Îídková, 2008, II. vydání ISBN 978-80-87134-12-2

Úvod - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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Rusko - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1. V˘voj ruské státnosti za Putinovy éry Jaroslav ·imov - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2. Ekonomická politika za vlády Vladimíra Putina Karel Svoboda - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3. Ruská armáda a bezpeãnostní sloÏky v procesu transformace Richard Stojar - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4. Normalizace v âeãensku a její následky Emil Souleimanov - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5. Rusko a „blízké zahraniãí“: od m˘tÛ o dominaci k realitû dobrého sousedství Dimitrij Bûlo‰evskij - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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Ukrajina, Bûlorusko, Moldávie (Evropská ãást) - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6. Ukrajina 2005–2006: Impérium vrací úder Lubo‰ Vesel˘ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7. Bûlorusko-ruské spojenectví po roce 1991 a jeho dal‰í perspektivy Markéta Îídková, Jakub Dürr - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 8. Vnitropolitická situace v Moldavské republice v letech 2001–2005 Lubomír Gombos - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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Kavkaz - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 217 9. Nová konfliktní geopolitika JiÏního Kavkazu Emil Souleimanov, Vít Stfiíteck˘ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 218 10. Ekonomick˘ v˘voj ÁzerbajdÏánu Filip âern˘ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 239 Stfiední Asie - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 11. Integrace a dezintegrace v postsovûtské Stfiední Asii Slavomír Horák - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12. Kazachstán: anal˘za vnitropolitického v˘voje po roce 1991 Jan ·ír - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 13. Rusko a postsovûtsk˘ prostor. V˘voj v postkoloniálním TádÏikistánu: klany v procesu budování státu TomበMuÏík - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 14. Ropa a zemní plyn v oblasti Kaspického mofie Bohuslav Litera - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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Rusko a postsovûtsk˘ prostor – tento pojem se bûhem posledních patnácti let vÏil pro oznaãení jedné ‰estiny zemûkoule, kdysi známé pod souborn˘m názvem Svaz sovûtsk˘ch socialistick˘ch republik. To, co se pod tímto pojmem skr˘vá – nepatfií do nûj tfii pobaltské zemû, které byly pomûrnû záhy inkorporovány do prostoru „evropsko-unijního“ – bezesporu není oblastí monolitní, pfiestoÏe dodnes uchovává podobné rysy, dané víceménû blízk˘m politicko-historick˘m pozadím dvanácti postsovûtsk˘ch státÛ. Záhy po rozpadu sovûtského impéria vykrystalizovaly pomûrnû v˘razné regionální rozdíly, které byly patrné i bûhem jeho sedmdesátileté existence, ba je‰tû v carské dobû. Mezi onen postsovûtsk˘ prostor – ãi, pouÏijeme-li dal‰ího termínu, oblíbeného v prostfiedí nûkdej‰ích sovûtologÛ, euroasijsk˘ – patfií Kavkaz, stfiední Asie a evropská ãást b˘valého SSSR; v poslednû jmenovaném pfiípadû zabránila absence jasnû definovaného zemûpisného vymezení i pomûrnû odli‰n˘ vnitropolitick˘ v˘voj v Ukrajinû, Bûlorusku a Moldávii uvaÏovat o zvlá‰tním regionu. (Pan)regionem a tématem par excellence je Rusko, které pfies jisté oslabení v minulé dekádû vykazuje v posledních letech náznaky rÛstu jak v ekonomické, tak zahraniãnûpolitické sféfie, aÈ jiÏ jeho pÛvodce ãi specifika vnímáme jakkoliv. Sborník, kter˘ drÏíte v rukou, je pokusem patnácti odborníkÛ z ãeské akademické a expertní obce vystihnout vybrané – troufáme si fiíci, Ïe nikoliv málo dÛleÏité – aspekty politického v˘voje postsovûtského prostoru, kter˘ pfies gravitaci âeské republiky a jejích postkomunistick˘ch sousedÛ západním smûrem uchovává nesmírn˘ v˘znam nejen v oblasti bezpeãnostní. Pfiíspûvky jsou koncipovány regionálnû, pfiiãemÏ jsou upfiednostÀována témata s mezinárodním – ãi spí‰e regionálním – komponentem; zvlá‰tní pozornost je pfiitom vûnována Rusku, které navzdory neutuchajícímu zájmu

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[ RU S KO A P O S TS OV ù T S K ¯ P RO S TO R

ze strany odborné a laické vefiejnosti stále je‰tû je velkou neznámou, jejíÏ v˘voj ovlivní – a ovlivÀuje – dûní v rozsáhlém pásmu od Pacifiku aÏ po Atlantik. Autofii jsou si plnû vûdomi, Ïe pfiedkládan˘ sborník je pouhou kapkou v mofii vûdomostí o studované problematice. Pfiesto povaÏujeme tento titul za uÏiteãn˘ pfiíspûvek do domácí diskuze o tom, co se na v˘chod od na‰ích nûkdej‰ích hranic dûje. ·ífiit povûdomí o v˘znamn˘ch problémech svûtové politiky, které tak ãi onak mají dopad na na‰e Ïivoty, je ostatnû posláním ediãní fiady praÏského vydavetelství VIP Books „Aktuální otázky mezinárodní politiky“. Pfiejeme pfiíjemné a uÏiteãné ãtení. Za autorsk˘ kolektiv Emil Souleimanov V Praze dne 28. února 2008.

RUSKO

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V˘voj ruské státnosti za Putinovy éry]

1. V˘voj ruské státnosti za Putinovy éry Jaroslav ·imov

Silvestr roku 1999 je v soudob˘ch dûjinách Ruska v˘znamn˘m datem. Toho dne rezignoval první prezident Ruské federace Boris Jelcin, kter˘ stál v ãele postkomunistického ruského státu od roku 1991, a pfiedal otûÏe vlády svému nástupci, tehdej‰ímu premiérovi Vladimíru Putinovi. Tento do té doby relativnû neznám˘ politik, jehoÏ Jelcin prohlásil za nejschopnûj‰ího a nejvhodnûj‰ího pro prezidentskou funkci, byl vût‰inou politick˘ch analytikÛ ze zaãátku povaÏován za pouhou loutku v rukou vlivné skupiny politikÛ a velkopodnikatelÛ. Tato skupina byla známa jako „Rodina“1 a dosáhla v posledních letech Jelcinovy vlády rozhodujícího politického a ekonomického vlivu. Málokdo pfiedpokládal, Ïe se Vladimíru Putinovi velmi rychle podafií nejen se osobnû odpoutat od „Rodiny“, které vdûãil za svÛj strm˘ politick˘ vzestup, n˘brÏ eliminovat její nûkdej‰í vliv a nastolit vládu vlastní skupiny, jíÏ se v ruské politické hant˘rce brzy zaãalo fiíkat pitûrsko-silovaja2. Av‰ak za Putinovy vlády zaÏilo Rusko mnohem hlub‰í a rozsáhlej‰í zmûny neÏ pouhé stfiídání vládnoucích klanÛ. Od roku 2000 se v˘raznû zmûnila role nûkter˘ch státních institucí, struktura ruské politické elity, vztahy mezi 1

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Do „Rodiny“ patfiila Jelcinova ambiciózní mlad‰í dcera TaÈána Djaãenková, b˘val˘ ‰éf prezidentovy administrativy a TaÈánin manÏel Valentin Juma‰ev, jeho nástupce ve funkci ‰éfa administrativy Alexandr Volovin, vlivn˘ podnikatel a „‰edá eminence“ ruské politiky v 90. letech Boris Berezovskij, místopfiedseda vlády Nikolaj Axenenko a nûkolik dal‰ích osobností. Pitûrskij znamená v ru‰tinû „pocházející z Pitûru“, coÏ je hovorov˘ název Petrohradu, rodného mûsta prezidenta Putina. Siloviki se fiíká vedoucím pfiedstavitelÛm ozbrojen˘ch sloÏek státu – armády, policie a tajn˘ch sluÏeb. Název pitûrsko-silovoj odráÏí pfiítomnost mezi ãleny vládnoucí skupiny, která se za Putina dostala v Rusku k moci, lidí spojen˘ch s prezidentem buìto díky spoleãnému petrohradskému pÛvodu anebo díky spoleãné sluÏbû v sovûtském KGB, jehoÏ dÛstojníkem do roku 1991 byl Vladimír Putin.

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jednotliv˘mi skupinami uvnitfi této elity, ideologické zamûfiení ruské vlády, ekonomická, vnitropolitická a zahraniãnûpolitická situace v Rusku a kolem nûj, nálada a názory ruské spoleãnosti. Rusko roku 2006 je úplnû jinou zemí, neÏ bylo Rusko roku 1999, nicménû mají spolu leccos spoleãného. Jak za Jelcina, tak za Putina Rusko stále hledá svou cestu mezi demokracií a autoritáfistvím, mezi Západem a V˘chodem, mezi imperiální expanzí, na níÏ si Rusové zvykli za carské a sovûtské doby, a snahou nastolit normální vztahy se sousedními státy, které vznikly po rozpadu Sovûtského svazu. Putinovo Rusko je ponûkud paradoxním historick˘m jevem. Je totiÏ jak pokraãováním, tak odmítnutím Jelcinova Ruska, hodnû toho od nûj pfievzalo a je‰tû víc zavrhlo. Tento ãlánek je zamûfien pfiedev‰ím na anal˘zu zmûn, které se za Putinovy éry odehrály ve v˘voji a struktufie ruského státu. Toto zamûfiení vypl˘vá z povahy ruské spoleãnosti, pro níÏ je pfiíznaãn˘ vût‰í etatismus neÏ pravdûpodobnû pro jakoukoliv jinou evropskou zemi. O pfiíãinách tohoto jevu stejnû jako o jeho historick˘ch kofienech lze dlouho diskutovat. Faktem je v‰ak to, Ïe v Rusku stát není jen souãástí spoleãnosti, n˘brÏ jejím nejdÛleÏitûj‰í, rozhodující sloÏkou, která ve velké mífie ovlivÀuje, nezfiídka kontroluje obãanskou spoleãnost a omezuje osobní práva a svobody. Zájmy obãanÛ jsou ve znaãné mífie podfiízeny zájmÛm státu3 , coÏ je rys, kter˘ sbliÏuje Rusko, jinak z historického a kulturního hlediska nepochybnû evropskou zemi, s asijsk˘mi kolektivistick˘mi spoleãnostmi. Abychom pochopili podstatu zmûn, které se v Rusku bûhem posledních ‰esti let odehrály, musíme se pfiedev‰ím podívat na promûny ruské státnosti v oznaãeném období. To v‰ak neznamená, Ïe budeme sledovat pouze institucionální zmûny. Jsou dÛsledkem zmûn sociálních a politick˘ch, proto je tfieba udûlit pozornost také nejdÛleÏitûj‰ím tendencím ve v˘voji rusk˘ch elit a spoleãnosti jako celku.

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Znám˘ rusk˘ historik 19. století Vasilij Kljuãevskij napsal o této ruské zvlá‰tnosti: Stát tloustl, lid chfiadnul (Gosudarstvo puchlo, narod chirel).

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Centrum a regiony „Upevnûní vertikály moci“ lze povaÏovat za vnitropolitické heslo celé Putinovy éry. Bûhem prvního prezidentského období Vladimíra Putina (2000–2004) se tímto v˘razem z byrokratického slovníku rozumûla pfiedev‰ím zmûna vzájemn˘ch vztahÛ mezi federálním centrem a regiony – ve smûru vût‰í centralizace. V 90. letech se stále vût‰í ãást mocensk˘ch pravomocí v Rusku soustfieìovala v rukou regionálních elit, pfiedev‰ím gubernátorÛ oblastí a prezidentÛ autonomních republik, které tvofií Ruskou federaci (RF). Legislativa více neÏ 60 subjektu federace z 89 obsahovala v˘nosy a zákony, pfiíãící se zákonÛm i Ústavû RF. Koncem Jelcinova vládnutí byla pravdûpodobnost dezintegrace ruského státu pomûrnû vysoká. Vladimír Putin fiekl v kvûtnu 2006 v rozhovoru pro ruskou televizi o tehdej‰í situaci: „Zemû se rozpadala a fakticky se nacházela ve stavu obãanské války“ 4. To je ponûkud pfiehnané hodnocení, kdyÏ ponecháme stranou situaci v âeãensku a Dagestánu, kde v roce 1999 skuteãnû do‰lo k váleãnému stfietnutí mezi ruskou armádou a separatisty. Nicménû nelze popfiít existenci na konci 90. let jisté hrozby rozpadu Ruské federace. Nûktefií ru‰tí intelektuálové si to uvûdomovali a proti tomuto nebezpeãí varovali. Dûlali to v‰ak pro Rusko tradiãním zpÛsobem, sice vychvalováním rusk˘ch autoritáfisk˘ch tradic a silné ústfiední vlády. Napfiíklad laureát Nobelovy ceny Alexandr SolÏenicyn, kter˘ se do Ruska z amerického exilu vrátil v roce 1994, tvrdil, Ïe „tak velk˘ stát jako Rusko nemÛÏe existovat, aniÏ by mûl silnou centrální vládu… Co je to za nesmysl, nûjaké smlouvy5 mezi centrem a regiony? V jednotném státû musí existovat jediná smlouva pro v‰echny regiony“ 6. Nelze vylouãit, Ïe se Vladimír Putin nechal inspirovat právû tûmito my‰lenkami. Mûl totiÏ v roce 2000 se SolÏenicynem nûkolik dÛvûrn˘ch setkání, o nichÏ tehdej‰í liberální tisk psal s podivem, nechápaje, co mÛÏe mít b˘val˘ disident SolÏenicyn spoleãného s b˘val˘m dÛstojníkem

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[ RU S KO A P O S T S OV ù TS K ¯ P RO S TO R

Sumskoj V., Putin poobe‰ãal prejemnika. Online: http://www.gazeta.ru/2006/05/13/oa_199361.shtml. Smlouvy mezi ruskou federální vládou a vládami regionÛ byly zavedeny na zaãátku 90. let. Jejich hlavním úkolem bylo vymezování pravomocí vlády v Moskvû na jedné stranû a jednotliv˘ch subjektÛ Ruské federace na stranû druhé. Tyto smlouvy byly nezfiídka zneuÏívány regionálními elitami, které se snaÏily dostat od federální vlády co nejvíce politick˘ch a ekonomick˘ch ústupkÛ. SolÏenicyn A., Rossija v obvale. Moskva 1998, s. 121.

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KGB Putinem? Spoleãn˘ jmenovatel se v‰ak zfiejmû na‰el. Byla to právû ruská tradice autoritáfiského etatismu, o nûmÏ jiÏ bylo zmínûno. V roce 2000 rozdûlil Kreml zemi na 7 velk˘ch federálních okresÛ, do jejichÏ ãela byli postaveni zplnomocnûní zástupci prezidenta (polpredy). Jak konstatuje ruská socioloÏka Olga Kry‰tanovská, „polpredy zkonsolidovali síly federálních struktur a postavili je proti regionálním. Zpod kontroly gubernátorÛ se postupnû vymkla jejich hlavní opora – správa vnitfiních záleÏitostí…, coÏ pfiipravilo místní elitu o v˘znamné mocenské páky… Kreml získal rozvûtvenou síÈ opûrn˘ch skupin ve v‰ech regionech“ 7 . Mezi polpredy dominovali Putinovi loajální pfiedstavitelé armády a tajn˘ch sluÏeb, coÏ bylo prvním pfiíznakem nástupu nové vládnoucí elity. Byla zároveÀ provedena legislativní reforma, v jejímÏ dÛsledku se podafiilo uvést do souladu ustanovení regionálních zákonÛ s federálními. Byl také zmûnûn princip sestavování Rady federace, horní komory ruského parlamentu. Zatímco za Jelcina se ãleny Rady federace automaticky stávali vedoucí ãinitelé subjektÛ RF, pak nyní horní komoru tvofií jacísi „zástupci regionÛ“ jmenovaní provinãním vedením po dohodû s centrální mocí. Politick˘ v˘znam Rady federace za Putinovy éry prudce poklesl, coÏ nepochybnû pfiispûlo k dal‰ímu upevnûní postavení prezidenta a federální vlády. V kvûtnu 2003 se rusk˘ prezident ve svém projevu v parlamentu pochlubil v˘sledky centralizaãní reformy: „Právnû i fakticky jsme obnovili jednotu zemû. Upevnili jsme státní moc. PfiiblíÏili jsme státní moc k regionÛm. Díky obnovení jednotlivého právního prostoru jsme se mohli pustit do vymezení pravomocí mezi centrem a regiony… Pfiistoupili jsme k budování akceschopné“, finanãnû zabezpeãené moci v místních podmínkách“ 8. Vrcholem centralizaãního úsilí Kremlu se v‰ak stalo zru‰ení pfiímé volby gubernátorÛ a prezidentÛ autonomií. K této reformû do‰lo na zaãátku druhého Putinova prezidentského období (2004–2008), a to za dramatick˘ch okolností. Byla totiÏ navrÏena prezidentem 13. záfií 2004, vzápûtí po stra‰livém teroristickém útoku na stfiední ‰kolu v Beslanu. Podle Putina mûli b˘t gubernátofii voleni zákonodárními shromáÏdûními regionÛ, jejich kandidatury by musel navrhovat prezident Ruské federace. Nezbytnost této zmûny vysvûtlil Pu7 8

Kry‰tanovskaja O., ReÏim Putina: liberal’naja militokratija? In: Pro et contra 2002, sv. 7, ã. 4. Online: http://pubs.carnegie.ru/p&c/vol7–2002/4/09ok.asp. Poslanije Prezidenta RF V. V. Putina Federal’nomu sobraniju Rossii. Moskva, Kreml’, 16 maja 2003 g. Online: http://kremlin.ru/text/appears/2003/05/44623.shtml.

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tin mimo jiné potfiebami boje proti teroristÛm, jenÏ podle jeho mínûní vyÏaduje koncentraci moci a vytvofiení „jednotného mocenského systému, kter˘ by mûl fungovat jako jeden organismus“ 9. Za nûkolik mûsícÛ vstoupil prezidentem navrhovan˘ zákon v platnost. Od té doby má Kreml k dispozici dal‰í nástroj kontroly nad regiony. Putinova reforma zároveÀ fakticky urovnala postavení gubernátorÛ oblastí a prezidentÛ autonomií, ktefií disponovali dfiíve o nûco vût‰í samostatností. Za dal‰í souãást centralizaãní reformy se dají povaÏovat referenda, která byla v letech 2005–2006 uspofiádána v nûkolika regionech (Permská, Kamãatská, Irkutská oblast) a rozhodla o spojení tûchto subjektÛ federace se sousedními tzv. autonomními okresy. V tomto pfiípadû jde spí‰e o racionalizaci vícestupÀového územního uspofiádání, které dne‰ní Rusko zdûdilo po RSFSR10. Je v‰ak pfiíznaãné, Ïe iniciátorem tûchto krokÛ byla prezidentova administrativa, aãkoliv oficiálnû se mluvilo o iniciativû „zdola“, ze samotn˘ch regionÛ. Zatímco se Boris Jelcin na konci svého vládnutí zdál b˘t ãímsi jako primus inter pares a v mnohem byl závisl˘ na dobré vÛli regionálních náãelníkÛ a jejich ochotû spolupracovat s centrální mocí, vytvofiil si Vladimír Putin naprosto odli‰né postavení. Na první pohled se zdá, Ïe do jisté míry obnovil tradici ruského samodûrÏaví, za jehoÏ doby byla ve‰kerá státní moc soustfiedûna v rukou mocnáfie. Toto zdání v‰ak klame. Ve mnoha pfiípadech jde totiÏ více o pfiedstíranou loajalitu regionálních vÛdcÛ neÏ o skuteãnou kontrolu Moskvy nad tím, co se odehrává v regionech, jako jsou Kalmycko, Dagestán ãi Pfiímofisk˘ kraj11. Nejextrémnûj‰ím pfiípadem této nekontrolovatelné situace je samozfiejmû âeãensko, kde radikální separatisté a náboÏen‰tí extremisté stále pokraãují v partyzánské válce proti ruské armádû a jejím ãeãensk˘m spojencÛm. Promoskevská vláda v‰emocného místního vládce Ramzana Kadyrova odpovídá rozsáhl˘mi represe-

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Vystuplenije Prezidenta RF V. V. Putina na zasedanii Pravitel’stva RF s uãastijem glav regional’nych administracij. Moskva, 13 sentjabrja 2004 g. Online: http://kremlin.ru/text/appears/2004/09/ 76651.shtml. 10 Ruská Sovûtská Federativní Socialistická Republika, oficiální název Ruska v letech 1918–1991 (od 30. prosince 1922 byla jednou z republik SSSR). 11 Je pfiíznaãné, Ïe v posledních letech ztratili prezidentovi zplnomocnûnci (polpredy) nûkdej‰í politick˘ v˘znam a nejsou zdaleka tak aktivní, jak to bylo v letech 2001–2004. Lze tvrdit, Ïe se pozvolna stávají „pát˘m kolem u vozu“, ponûvadÏ splnili úkol, kter˘ jim byl svûfien na zaãátku Putinovy éry.

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mi. Nejvlivnûj‰í regionální politikové se s Putinem zfiejmû domluvili. Podmínky této smlouvy jsou pravdûpodobnû jednoduché: místní náãelníci nevyvíjejí Ïádnou politickou aktivitu, která by mohla ohrozit zájmy prezidenta a centrální vlády, zatímco Kreml jim dovoluje Ïít a vládnout témûfi stejn˘m zpÛsobem jako dfiíve. NejváÏnûj‰í je z tohoto hlediska situace v autonomních republikách Severního Kavkazu. Politolog Lilija ·evcovová míní, Ïe v této oblasti postsovûtsk˘ systém „nabyl extrémního v˘razu klanového autoritáfiství, které existuje díky federálním dotacím a bajonetÛm ruské armády. Moskva se stala rukojmím místních náãelníkÛ typu Ramzana Kadyrova, ktefií pfiená‰ejí ve‰kerou politickou zodpovûdnost [za dûní v tûchto regionech] na Kreml, coÏ jenom podporuje protiruskou náladu ãásti [místního] obyvatelstva. Nelze vylouãit, Ïe v pfiípadû prudkého zhor‰ení situace na Kavkazu bude ruská vláda muset pouÏit mimofiádná opatfiení, ponûvadÏ nedisponuje jin˘mi mechanismy fie‰ení podobn˘ch problémÛ. To by v‰ak mohlo b˘t poslední ránou zasazenou federativnímu uspofiádání [Ruska]“ 12. Zkorumpovanost a prohnilost vût‰iny kavkazsk˘ch reÏimÛ je vefiejn˘m tajemstvím. Jak poznamenal zpravodaj britského t˘deníku The Economist, „zakázáno“ znamená dnes na Kavkaze ve skuteãnosti „bude to nûco stát“ 13, coÏ je obzvlá‰È nebezpeãné v regionech se zv˘‰enou aktivitou teroristÛ a extrémistÛ. Prezident Z ústavnûprávního hlediska není mezi Jelcinovou a Putinovou epochou Ïádn˘ rozdíl, neboÈ stále platí ústava z roku 1993, která prohlásila Rusko federativní prezidentskou republikou. Ve skuteãnosti se v‰ak vztahy mezi vedoucími sloÏkami státní moci – prezidentem, vládou a parlamentem – za Putina zmûnily stejnû jako vztahy mezi federální vládou a regiony. Ru‰tí politologové si s ústavními problémy pfiíli‰ hlavu nelámou. Podle prokremelského experta Andranika MigraÀana „není Ústava posvátnou krávou… Je to Ústava pro pfiechodní období a za nûjakou dobu bude Rusko stejnû potfiebovat jinou Ústavu. AÏ budeme dostateãnû zralí na konsolidovanou de12

·evcova L., Rossija – god 2006: logika politiãeskogo stracha. âast’ 2, Nezavisimaja gazeta, 16. XII. 2005. Online: http://www.ng.ru/printed/ideas/2005–12–16/1_russia2006.html. 13 The Economist 2004, Sept. 11th–17th, s. 25.

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mokracii, skuteãné rozdûlení moci a jiné mechanismy, vznikne úplnû jiná Ústava. Zatím v‰ak staãí jenom prÛbûÏnû doplÀovat nûkteré ãlánky [dne‰ní Ústavy]“ 14. Jin˘mi slovy, mezi ústavnûprávními základy ruské státnosti a politickou skuteãností existuje podstatn˘ rozdíl. Prezident je ústfiedním bodem ruského politického systému. V tomto pfiípadû je skuteãnost v naprostém souladu s ãlánky Ústavy RF. Tento stav je odrazem jak historické tradice ruského autoritáfiství, tak politick˘ch okolností ze zaãátku 90. let. Prezidentská republika (nûktefií právníci mluví dokonce o republice „superprezidentské“) zakotvená v dne‰ní Ústavû je totiÏ v˘sledkem vítûzství prezidenta Jelcina v roce 1993 nad tehdej‰ím parlamentem, Nejvy‰‰ím sovûtem. Nov˘ systém vyhovoval zájmÛm jak samotného Jelcina, tak politick˘ch sil, které jej podporovaly. Rozsáhlé pravomoce, jimiÏ prezident Ruska disponuje, znamenají, Ïe osobní vlastnosti a politické názory ãlovûka, kter˘ se dostane do nejvy‰‰í funkce, mají v Rusku mnohem vût‰í v˘znam neÏ v zemích, kde nejsou pravomoce hlavy státu tak velké. Neznamená to v‰ak, Ïe v dne‰ním Rusku panuje naprost˘ despotismus a vÛle hlavy státu se automaticky stává zákonem pro v‰echny obãany. Rusko není Severní Korea nebo Turkmenistán. Pfiímá volba prezidenta, aãkoliv v Rusku neprobíhala vÏdy v pfiesném souladu s pravidly existujícími v zemích s dlouhou demokratickou tradicí, zaruãuje, Ïe hlava státu je do jisté míry odrazem stavu spoleãnosti a vyjadfiuje pfiání vût‰iny voliãÛ. Právû proto jsou Jelcin a Putin natolik odli‰n˘mi osobnostmi a jejich politick˘ kurs má ãím dál ménû styãn˘ch bodÛ. B˘val˘ pfiedseda ruské vlády, iniciátor ekonomick˘ch reforem 90. let, Jegor Gajdar tvrdí, Ïe „Jelcin a Putin jsou ztûlesnûním odli‰n˘ch období rusk˘ch dûjin. Jelcin byl vÛdcem revoluce, která vedla ke zhroucení starého [komunistického] reÏimu. Putin je naopak symbolem porevoluãní stabilizace, tj. doby, kdy spoleãnost pocítila únavu ze v‰eho toho chaosu, nepofiádku a zmûn a zaãala prahnout po pofiádku, zákonech a normálnû fungující vládû. Právû proto [Putin] vyhrál“ 15. A právû proto zniãil systém politick˘ch brzd a protivah, kter˘ vytvofiil v 90. letech Jelcin, aby zÛstal arbitrem v konfliktech mezi konkurujícími vlivn˘mi skupinami a klany. Putin Ïádnou takovou konkurenci nepotfieboval. Jak fiekl v únoru

2000 v rozhovoru pro ruskou televizi ORT, „stát musí stanovit základní principy fungování ekonomiky a zaruãit, Ïe tyto principy budou aplikovány spravedlivû… Nesmí existovat jakékoliv v˘hody a zvlá‰tní v˘sady pro urãité lidi, skupiny, firmy atd. To je nejdÛleÏitûj‰í funkce státu a povaÏuji ji za funkci nav˘sost morální“ 16. Znamenalo to nejen zámûr nového ruského vládce skoncovat s mocí znepfiátelen˘ch oligarchick˘ch skupin, ale zároveÀ snahu prosadit novou úlohu státu i samotného prezidenta jako nejvy‰‰ího státního ãinitele. Právû prezident by mûl urãovat pravidla politické a ekonomické hry, tvrdí Vladimír Putin. Ze zaãátku se zdálo, Ïe tato pravidla budou za nového kremelského pána vskutku spravedlivá a oligarchickému bûsnûní pozdního Jelcinova období pfiijde konec. Stalo se v‰ak nûco jiného. Vladimír Putin nepouÏil obrovsk˘ch prezidentsk˘ch pravomocí k tomu, aby zmûnil podstatu ruského systému, jenÏ spojuje prvky státního kapitalismu, oligarchie a tzv. fiízené demokracie, n˘brÏ zneuÏil své moci pfiedev‰ím k odstranûní konkurentÛ a prosazení zájmÛ vlastní skupiny. Tato skupina se skládá pfiedev‰ím z politikÛ blízk˘ch prezidentovi, b˘val˘ch pfiíslu‰níkÛ KGB, a s nimi spojen˘ch podnikatelÛ. V tomto smûru zÛstal prav˘m dûdicem Jelcinovy doby, aãkoliv ústfiedním bodem Putinovy ideologie je odmítnutí vût‰iny pfiedstav a hodnot pfiíznaãn˘ch pro toto období. Podle Lilije ·evcovové „Putin skuteãnû omezil ty sloÏky pfiedchozího reÏimu, které ãinily nárok na dominující postavení, a zároveÀ se vzdal Jelcinovy zbrklosti, coÏ znamenalo zmûnu stylu vládnutí. Tyto kosmetické úpravy se staly zpÛsobem záchrany základÛ systému, k nimÏ patfií jak osobní moc [prezidenta], tak spojení politické a ekonomické moci“ 17. Putinova popularita byla a je mimo jiné dÛsledkem toho, Ïe si vût‰ina ruské spoleãnosti zfiejmû nev‰ímá této spfiíznûnosti dne‰ního ruského reÏimu s reÏimem b˘val˘m, pro nûjÏ jen málo RusÛ najde dnes slova chvály. Zmûna pfiedstavy voliãÛ o postavení hlavy státu (siln˘ Putin urãující pravidla politické hry místo slabého Jelcina snaÏícího se manévrovat mezi oligarchick˘mi klany) mûla za dÛsledek prudk˘ rÛst podpory druhého prezi-

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Migranjan A., O reformach gosustrojstva v Rossii. Izvestija 13. X. 2004. Online: http://www.izvestia.ru/ comment/article524113. 15 Gajdar Je., Predel rosta. Moskovskij komsomolec, 6. II. 2003.

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Putin V. V.: «Kto nas obidit, tot i trech dnej ne proÏivet». Online: http://www.gazeta.ru/interput.shtml. ·evcova L., Rossija – god 2006: logika politiãeskogo stracha. âast’ 1, Nezavisimaja gazeta 13. XII. 2005. Online: http://www.ng.ru/printed/ideas/2005–12–13/1_russia-2006.html.

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denta Ruska, která pfievy‰uje 55–60 procent po celou dobu jeho vládnutí. (Ve sv˘ch druh˘ch prezidentsk˘ch volbách v bfieznu 2004 dostal Putin dokonce kolem 75 procent hlasÛ). Dostavily se v‰ak i jiné dÛsledky, kvÛli nimÏ mnoho rusk˘ch a zahraniãních politologÛ mluví o politické „osamûlosti“ kremelského vládce. Liberální analytici jiÏ v roce 2002 pojmenovali prezidenta „Atatürkem bez mladoturkÛ“ 18, státníkem, kter˘ by sice chtûl mnoho vûcí v Rusku zmûnit k lep‰ímu, av‰ak nemá k dispozici dostateãné mnoÏství aktivních a schopn˘ch pomocníkÛ jak mezi pfiíslu‰níky politické elity, tak v celé ruské spoleãnosti. Zdá se, Ïe Rusové, ktefií tak snadno uvûfiili Putinov˘m heslÛm „diktatury zákona“ a „spravedlivého státu“, preferují pasivní podporu prezidentov˘ch slov a ãinÛ pfied aktivní spoluúãastí na reformách. Díky tomu se Vladimír Putin dostal do jistého politického vakua. Jeden z ideologÛ Putinova reÏimÛ, kontroverzní politolog Gleb Pavlovskij fiekl v fiíjnu 2003: „Potfiebujeme stát, kter˘ je schopen alespoÀ nûco provést rychle a efektivnû, stát, kter˘ by se podobal jednotné korporaci… To je projekt, kter˘ Putin slíbil národu. Neslíbil v‰ak, Ïe to v‰echno uskuteãní sám!“ 19. V tom pravdûpodobnû spoãívá Putinova tragédie jako státníka. Nechybûl mu ze zaãátku jist˘ reformátorsk˘ elán a aãkoliv pravdûpodobnû nikdy nebyl pfiesvûdãen˘m demokratem, nebyl ani diktátorem. Vyjadfioval pfiání spolupracovat s obãanskou spoleãností, i kdyÏ pouze v mezích pfiijateln˘ch pro nûj jako prezidenta. Chtûl najít spolupracovníky, nikoliv soupefie a oponenty. Proto odmítl spolupráci se stále vÛãi nûmu kritiãtûj‰ími liberálními kruhy stejnû jako s radikálními nacionalisty ãi komunisty. ZÛstal pfiedev‰ím technokratem, umírnûn˘m liberálem v ekonomice, umírnûn˘m autokratem ve vnitfiní politice a umírnûn˘m nacionalistou v politice zahraniãní. Jako b˘val˘ dÛstojník mûl vÏdy velk˘ smysl pro hierarchii, loajalitu a pfiesné plnûní rozkazÛ a jako prezident poÏadoval totéÏ po sv˘ch podfiízen˘ch a vÛbec po spoluobãanech. Díky tûmto zvykÛm se v‰ak dostal do rozporu s vlastními snahami o dialog s obãanskou spoleãností. Lze pfiedpokládat, Ïe to byl je-

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Babajeva S., Bovt G., Polden’ prezidenta: dva goda odinoãestva. Izvestija 24. III. 2002. Online: http:/ /izvestia.ru/politic/article16108. Pavlovskij G., Putin – demokratiãeskij princeps. Online: http://www.russ.ru/politics/20031029_pavlovsk.html.

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den z dÛvodÛ postupného návratu ruského prezidenta do star˘ch autoritáfisko-byrokratick˘ch kolejí. PutinÛv reÏim, obzvlá‰È v druhém prezidentském období, zkostnatûl a témûfi úplnû pfii‰el o jakékoliv reformní zámûry, které se snaÏil uskuteãnit v prvních letech vládnutí. Pfiesnûji fieãeno, reformy, jejichÏ hlavním iniciátorem je stále prezident, jsou teì realizovány v rámci ponûkud megalomansk˘ch „nacionálních projektÛ“ 20, jimiÏ se zab˘vá velké mnoÏství ministerstev, departmentÛ a jin˘ch státních struktur. Tyto struktury nezfiídka soupefií o pfiízeÀ hlavy státu a vytváfií pro nûj byrokratickou „virtuální realitu“, která se hodnû li‰í od reality skuteãné. Obãané povût‰inu zÛstávají stranou tûchto procesÛ, ponûvadÏ pro Rusko je pfiíznaãn˘ zajímav˘ spoleãensk˘ fenomén: aãkoliv Rusové mají sklon slepû dÛvûfiovat nejvy‰‰ím státním ãinitelÛm, nemají zároveÀ témûfi Ïádnou dÛvûru ve vût‰inu jin˘ch státních a spoleãensk˘ch institucí, snad s v˘jimkou armády a pravoslavné církve. Toho je si vûdom prezident, kter˘ v zatím posledním vystoupení pfied ãleny obou komor parlamentu fiekl: „V posledních letech jsme usilovnû pracovali na likvidaci existujících disproporcí ve státní a sociální oblasti. Musíme v‰ak pfii plánování dal‰ího postupu mít na zfieteli souãasn˘ stav spoleãnosti… Jedním z dÛleÏit˘ch rysÛ na‰eho spoleãenského Ïivota je nízká dÛvûra obãanÛ k nûkter˘m státním orgánÛm a k velkému byznysu… Velké nadûje byly na zaãátku 90. let vkládány do tehdej‰ích reforem, av‰ak jak státní moc, tak velkopodnikatele zklamali“ 21. Tyto my‰lenky jsou pro Putina charakteristické. Hlavní pfiíãiny nezdaru reformních snah stále hledá v 90. letech, nikoliv v dobû vlastního prezidentování. Je zároveÀ stále vût‰ím gosudarstvennikom (stoupencem dominantní úlohy státu v Ïivotû spoleãnosti), coÏ je zpÛsob my‰lení v Rusku hodnû roz‰ífien˘, av‰ak bránící vzniku rozvinuté obãanské spoleãnosti. Spoleãnost, stát a jeho hlava pro Putina a jeho stoupence postupnû témûfi spl˘vají v jedno. Zde lze hledat pfiíãiny soustavného pronásledování Putinem nezávisl˘ch medií a nûkter˘ch nevládních organizací, k nimÏ má prezident silnou nedÛvûru, nefiekneme-li averzi. Podle zprávy organizace Human Rights Watch z roku 2005 „od té doby, co se Vladimír Putin dostal k moci, dÛslednû demontuje systém zdrÏovatelÛ a závaÏí, kter˘ je 20 21

Jsou to strategické plány v˘voje nejdÛleÏitûj‰ích ekonomick˘ch odvûtví a sociálních programÛ. Poslanije Prezidenta RF V. V. Putina Federal’nomu sobraniju Rossii. Moskva, Kreml’, 10 maja 2006 g. Online: http://www.president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2006/05/105546.shtml.

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klíãov˘m faktorem pro zodpovûdnost vlády. Minulostí je nezávislá televize a do znaãné míry i nezávisl˘ tisk, politická opozice je omezena na minimum, ,neposlu‰ní‘ podnikatelé byli vyhnáni ze zemû nebo vsazeni za mfiíÏe“ 22. PutinÛv sklon k zákulisnímu jednání na úkor vefiejné politiky se projevil v otázce nástupnictví, kterou se ruská politická elita zab˘vá jiÏ od zaãátku druhého a podle Ústavy posledního Putinova prezidentského období, které skonãí v bfieznu 2008. Kolem tohoto tzv. „problému 2008“ kolují nejrÛznûj‰í fámy a nikdo pfiesnû neví, zda Putin zvolí nûjakou právní „fintu“, která by mu poskytla moÏnost kandidovat na prezidenta potfietí23, anebo se pfiece jen rozhodne odejít. V tomto posledním pfiípadû se nejspí‰e bude opakovat schéma pfiedání moci pfiedem jmenovanému nástupci, tj. Putin udûlá totéÏ co Jelcin v roce 1999. Prezidentské volby budou pouh˘m plebiscitem o dÛvûfie Putinovu nástupci. O v˘sledku tohoto plebiscitu nemÛÏe b˘t vzhledem k dne‰ním politick˘m pomûrÛm v Rusku nejmen‰ích pochyb. Jako o nejpravdûpodobnûj‰ích kandidátech na Putinova nástupce se zatím nejãastûji mluví o dvou pfiíslu‰nících pitûrsko-silové skupiny, místopfiedsedovi vlády Dmitriji Medvûdûvovi a ministru obrany Sergeji Ivanovovi. AÈ uÏ se Putinov˘m „korunním princem“ stane jeden z tûchto muÏÛ nebo nûkdo jin˘, v kaÏdém pfiípadû pÛjde o dal‰í pfiíklad „fiízené demokracie“, která má málo spoleãného s demokracií skuteãnou. Av‰ak Rusko skuteãnou demokracii, s v˘jimkou velmi krátk˘ch období v roce 1917 a na pfielomu 80. a 90. let, ani nezaÏilo. Právû proto je Putinovo prezidentování „dal‰í ukázkou toho, jak Rusko lpí na tradicionalismu. Putin dosáhl bodu, kdy by mûl uznat, Ïe tradiãní rusk˘ systém [vládnutí] neodpovídá pomûrÛm 21. století. Toto uznání by v‰ak vyÏadovalo hodnû odvahy“ 24. V˘voj politiky ruského prezidenta v posledních letech svûdãí o tom, Ïe tato odvaha mu zatím chybí.

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Russia After Beslan. Online: http://www.hrw.org/russian/press/russia/2004/220904_beslan.html. Nejvíce se spekuluje o dvou variantách. První je pfiípadná zmûna ruské Ústavy na referendu, v jehoÏ dÛsledku by byl zru‰en ãlánek omezující moÏnost setrvání v prezidentském úfiadu dvûma 4let˘mi obdobími. Druhá varianta pfiedpokládá sjednocení Ruska s jedním ze sousedních státÛ, napfiíklad s Bûloruskem nebo Kazachstánem, coÏ by Putinovi umoÏnilo úãast ve volbách hlavy tohoto nového státního útvaru. Shevtsova, L.: Putin’s Russia. Washington D.C. 2003, s. 251.

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Vláda, parlament, politické strany Nevyhnuteln˘m dÛsledkem upevnûní pozic hlavy státu je pokles v˘znamu ostatních rusk˘ch politick˘ch institucí, pfiedev‰ím vlády a parlamentu. Kabinet ministrÛ se za Putina stal orgánem, kter˘ provádí politiku, o jejíÏ základních principech se rozhoduje mimo moskevsk˘ „Bíl˘ dÛm“, sice v Kremlu a na Starém námûstí25. Do únoru 2004 byl pfiedsedou ruské vlády Michail Kasjanov, b˘val˘ ministr financí, kter˘ se za Jelcina zab˘val problémem zahraniãního dluhu Ruska. Byl povaÏován za pfiedstavitele Jelcinovy „Rodiny“ a jeho setrvání ve funkci bylo domluveno pfii nástupu Vladimíra Putina v roce 2000. Kasjanov nebyl v˘raznou politickou osobností, zachovával vÛãi novému prezidentovi loajalitu, provádûl v‰ak vyhranûnou liberální ekonomickou politiku. Mûl dobré vztahy s nûkter˘mi velkopodnikateli (oligarchy) vãetnû Michaila Chodorkovského, proti nûmuÏ se Putin na konci prvního prezidentského období obrátil. To v‰echno zpÛsobilo KasjanovÛv pád a následující vstup do fiad liberální opozice. B˘val˘ premiér jiÏ oznámil, Ïe bude v roce 2008 kandidovat na prezidenta, jeho popularita není v‰ak zdaleka dostaãující na to, aby mûl skuteãnou ‰anci vyhrát volby. Kasjanovov˘m nástupcem v premiérské funkci se stal dfiíve témûfi neznám˘ Michail Fradkov, b˘val˘ fieditel federálního daÀového úfiadu a po nûjakou dobu rusk˘ vyslanec v EU. Fradkov pÛsobí dojmem ãlovûka bez jak˘chkoliv politick˘ch ambic, coÏ byl pravdûpodobnû jeden z dÛvodu jeho jmenování do ãela vlády. O Fradkovovi se od zaãátku mluvilo jako o „technickém premiérovi“ a tato prognóza se splnila. Podle rusk˘ch zákonÛ jsou nûktefií ãlenové vlády (ministfii obrány, vnitra a zahraniãí, ‰éfové tajn˘ch sluÏeb) podfiízeni pfiímo prezidentovi, coÏ je dal‰ím faktorem oslabujícím pozice premiéra. Uvnitfi dne‰ní vlády sice existují jistá seskupení, jejichÏ pfiíslu‰níky lze povaÏovat za konkurenty (liberálnûj‰í skupina kolem ministrÛ ekonomiky a financí Germana Grefa a Alexeje Kudrina a skupina silovikÛ v ãele se Sergejem Ivanovem a fieditelem FSB Nikolajem Patru‰evem), jejich souboj v‰ak nemá velk˘ politick˘ v˘znam, ponûvadÏ tento v˘znam 25

„Bíl˘ dÛm“ – sídlo vlády RF na Krasnopresnûnském nábfieÏí v Moskvû. Staré námûstí v centru ruského hlavního mûsta je místem, kde se nachází prezidentská administrativa. Do roku 1991 ve stejn˘ch budovách sídlil Ústfiední v˘bor KSSS.

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postrádá celá vláda, jejíÏ ãleny jsou (moÏná s v˘jimkou „kandidátÛ na Putinova nástupce“ S.Ivanova a D.Mûdvûdûva) „technokraté nemající pfiístup ke skuteãné moci“ 26. Premiérské kfieslo není zatím ani mÛstkem ke kfieslu prezidentskému. Tím se Putinova éra rozhodnû li‰í od doby Jelcina, kter˘ pouÏíval jmenování do premiérské funkce jako zkou‰ky pro své pfiípadné nástupce. Proto se v letech 1998–1999 v Rusku vystfiídalo pût pfiedsedÛ vlády27, zatímco bûhem více neÏ ‰esti let za Vladimíra Putina – jenom dva. K velk˘m zmûnám do‰lo v posledních letech také v ruském parlamentu a v stranickopolitickém systému. Jak jiÏ bylo zmínûno, zmûna principu volby do horní komory parlamentu témûfi zlikvidovala Radu federace jako samostatn˘ politick˘ faktor. Ke sloÏitûj‰ím procesÛm do‰lo v dolní komofie, Státní Dumû. Je‰tû za Jelcina bûhem parlamentních voleb v roce 1999 vzal za své základní politick˘ antagonismus z 90. let, kdyÏ hlavními politick˘mi soupefii byli tzv. demokraté (k nim patfiili rÛznorodí stoupenci Jelcinovy politiky, oligarchie, liberální inteligence, stfiední tfiída, umírnûní gosudarstvenniky a radikální antikomunisté) na jedné stranû a Komunistická strana jako jádro protijelcinovské opozice na stranû druhé. V roce 1999 zÛstali komunisté na tfietím místû. Souboj o vítûzství ve volbách svedly novopeãené strany Jednota („Jedinstvo“ ) a Otãina („Otûãestvo“ ), které zastupovaly dvû soupefiící politicko-oligarchické skupiny. Jednota byla stranou vytvofienou Jelcinovou „Rodinou“ pro podporu Vladimíra Putina, jehoÏ politická hvûzda právû stoupala, zatímco Otãina obhajovala zájmy ptotijelcinovsky zamûfiené skupiny kolem b˘valého premiéra Jevgenije Primakova a vlivného moskevského starosty Jurije LuÏkova. Vítûzství Jednoty v prosinci 1999 znamenalo, Ïe „Rodina“ dosáhla rozhodující pfievahy nad protivníky. Konkurenti kapitulovali, Primakov se rozhodl nezúãastnit se nadcházejících prezidentsk˘ch voleb. Znamenalo to vyklízení cesty do Kremlu pro Putina. Odpovûdí nového kremelského pána bylo smífiení s b˘val˘mi oponenty, coÏ mu pomohlo zkonsolidovat vládnoucí oligarchicko-byrokratickou

vrstvu a zároveÀ zbavit se poruãníkování ze strany „Rodiny“. V roce 2000 se nûkdej‰í soupefii Jednota a Otãina splynuly v nov˘ politick˘ subjekt, kter˘ byl pojmenován Jednotné Rusko („Jedinaja Rossija“, zkrácenû JedRo). Vznikla „strana náãelníkÛ“, která se z ideologického hlediska povaÏuje za centristickou, av‰ak ve skuteãnosti ideologii postrádá, neboÈ jejím hlavním cílem a raison d‘étre je pouze podpora politiky Vladimíra Putina. V parlamentních volbách v roce 2003 získala strana JedRo 36 procent hlasÛ a dvû tfietiny míst v Dumû28. Byly to vlastnû hlasy odevzdané Putinovi, ponûvadÏ mezi vÛdci JedRa v˘razné osobnosti chybí. (Pfiedseda strany, souãasn˘ speaker Státní Dumy Boris Gryzlov dokonce dostal díky své nev˘raznosti a strnulému chování od známého novináfie a satirika Maxima Kononûnka pfiezdívku „Android“, tj. robot, kter˘ se navenek podobá ãlovûku). JedRo lze stûÏí povaÏovat za vládnoucí stranu v tom slova smyslu, v kterém mÛÏe b˘t v âeské republice vládnoucí âSSD, ODS nebo jiná strana ãi koalice stran. Pfiipomíná spí‰e „státostrany“ vytvofiené v minulosti totalitními a autoritáfisk˘mi reÏimy v Itálii, Nûmecku, ·panûlsku, Sovûtském svazu a jin˘ch státech. MoÏná proto je PutinÛv reÏim v zahraniãí obãas srovnáván (ne zcela právem) s reÏimem Benita Mussoliniho v Itálii: „Jisté shody s ‚klasick˘m‘ fa‰ismem Mussoliniho ov‰em najdeme v oblasti fungování státní moci. Nejde ani tak o tolik, a ãasto pfiehnanû, zdÛrazÀovanou úlohu silov˘ch struktur, jako spí‰e o cílené anulování demokratick˘ch mechanismÛ. ‚Jsme stát, kter˘ kontroluje v‰echny podstatné pÛsobící síly,‘ hlásal duce“ 29. Jednotné Rusko je fakticky jedním z nástrojÛ tohoto „anulování demokratick˘ch mechanismÛ“. Má totiÏ pfiedev‰ím kontrolní a sjednocující funkci. Sjednocuje státní byrokracii a s ní spfiíznûné oligarchické skupiny kolem Putina a uskuteãÀuje kontrolu nad loajalitou obãanÛ vÛãi státu, jehoÏ ztûlesnûním je prezident. Tato úloha je pochopitelnû nesluãitelná s politickou a ideologickou konkurencí, která je podstatou demokratického systému.

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Babajeva S., Duma o tret’jem. Izvestija. 8. XII. 2003. Online: http://www.izvestia.ru/elections2003/ article41994. Viktor âernomyrdin (prosinec 1992 – bfiezen 1998 a na krátkou dobu jako úfiadující premiér v srpnu a záfií 1998), Sergej Kirijenko (bfiezen – srpen 1998), Jevgenij Primakov (záfií 1998 – kvûten 1999), Sergej Stûpa‰in (kvûten – srpen 1999) a Vladimír Putin (srpen 1999 – bfiezen 2000, od ledna 2000 souãasnû ve funkci úfiadujícího prezidenta RF).

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K poslancÛm zvolen˘m podle kandidátky této strany je tfieba pfiipoãíst tzv. odnomandatniky, tj. kandidáty, ktefií zvítûzili ve sv˘ch okrscích ve volbách, probíhajících podle stejného systému jako senátní volby v âR. Od roku 1993 se polovina z 450 poslancÛ v Dumû volila podle stranick˘ch kandidátek, druhou polovinu tvofiili odnomandatniky. V roce 2005 byly schváleny zmûny volebního zákonu, podle nichÏ se pfií‰tí dumské volby budou konat pouze podle kandidátek. Má‰a P., Putin jako fa‰ista. Lidové noviny, 27. II. 2005. Online: http://lidovky.centrum.cz/ tisk.phtml?id=332144.

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Právû proto pfiijal PutinÛv reÏim jistá opatfiení, která pÛsobí navenek demokratick˘m dojmem, ve skuteãnosti v‰ak mají za cíl dal‰í upevnûní moci pitûrsko-silového klanu a jim vytvofien˘ch politick˘ch institucí vãetnû „státostrany“ Jednotné Rusko. Od roku 2007 budou v‰ichni poslanci Státní Dumy voleni pouze podle stranick˘ch kandidátek. Vzhledem k pozici, kterou má JedRo v dne‰ním politickém systému, je to zpÛsob prodlouÏit na dal‰ích 4 roky panování této strany na ruské politické scénû. V pfií‰tích parlamentních volbách bude také poprvé uplatnûna sedmiprocentní bariéra pro strany snaÏící se dostat se do Dumy. (Dosud byla tato bariéra o 2 procenta niωí). DÛsledkem se zfiejmû stane definitivní „vyklízení“ Dumy od men‰ích opoziãních stran, které sice nemají velk˘ politick˘ vliv, mohou v‰ak otevfienû kritizovat vládu a prezidenta na parlamentní pÛdû. Dal‰í novinkou je zákaz pro poslance, ktefií byli zvoleni za jakoukoliv politickou stranu, pfiestupovat bûhem volebního období do jiné strany. Toto opatfiení musí zabránit pfiípadnému rozkolu v stranick˘ch fiadách, coÏ se t˘ká pfiedev‰ím JedRa, tohoto Putinova obrovského a ideologicky nevyhranûného Leviatana. Dal‰ím Putinov˘m zámûrem je uãinit vládu zodpovûdnou pfied parlamentem30 a poskytnout stranû, která zvítûzí ve volbách, právo nominovat pfiedsedu vlády. Zdá se, Ïe jde o aplikování principÛ parlamentní demokracie do ruského politického systému. Tento pfiedpoklad je v‰ak myln˘ vzhledem k tomu, Ïe se za Putinovy éry politick˘ prostor pro demokratickou soutûÏ v Rusku znaãnû zmen‰il. Vznik „státostrany“ Jednotné Rusko a její totální dominace na politické scénû svûdãí spí‰e o tom, Ïe „parlamentarizace“ dne‰ního systému bude znamenat jenom dal‰í propojení a stmelení rÛzn˘ch sloÏek reÏimu. Nevyhnuteln˘m v˘sledkem tûchto zmûn bude samozfiejmû dal‰í vytlaãování opoziãních stran a hnutí na okraj politického prostoru, aãkoliv jiÏ dnes nejsou pozice tûchto stran nûjak závidûníhodné.

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Podle dne‰ní Ústavy RF prezident jmenuje premiéra, jehoÏ kandidatura musí b˘t schválena Dumou. Pokud se to nestane (procedura se mÛÏe opakovat tfiikrát), má prezident právo Dumu rozpustit a vyhlásit nové parlamentní volby, do nichÏ je úfiadujícím pfiedsedou vlády prezidentem jmenovaná osoba. Duma má zároveÀ právo vyjádfiit nedÛvûru vládû, to v‰ak také mÛÏe vést k rozpu‰tûní parlamentu a nov˘m volbám.

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Tato situace nevznikla v‰ak jenom díky mohutné politické ofenzivû prezidenta a jim vytvofieného kolosu, Jednotného Ruska. Rusk˘ stranick˘ systém jen v malé mífie splÀuje funkci komunikátoru mezi spoleãností a státními institucemi, jak ji známe ze standardních demokracií. V podstatû jen málo stran lze v dne‰ním Rusku nazvat stranami v tom smyslu, jak tento pojem obyãejnû interpretují politologové, tj. velk˘mi skupinami lidí, ktefií jsou spojení spoleãn˘mi názory na aktuální sociálnû-politické problémy a usilují o moc za úãelem prosazování tûchto názorÛ. Vût‰inou jde spí‰e o úfiednicko-lobbistická sdruÏení spojená s mocensk˘mi politick˘mi klany a seskupeními zvlá‰tním vztahem partnerství-soupefiení. Kromû toho, v Rusku se politické strany nejãastûji organizují na základû nikoliv ideologického, n˘brÏ pragmatického principu, tzn. kolem známého politika nebo ve vztahu k tzv. spoleãenské objednávce („sociaºnomu zakazu“) rÛzn˘ch skupin politické elity. K personalistick˘m politick˘m stranám patfií napfiíklad liberální Jabloko a nacionalistická LDPR, jimÏ se ãasto fiíká podle jmen jejich zakladatelÛ a lídrÛ „strana Javlinského“ resp. „strana Îirinovského“. Pfiíkladem strany vzniklé „na zakázku“ je populistická Vlast, která se zorganizovala v roce 2003 a ihned dostala v parlamentních volbách témûfi 10 procent hlasÛ. Program Vlasti je smûsí nacionalistick˘ch a socialistick˘ch hesel. Za své hlavní úkoly povaÏuje ukonãení oligarchického kapitalismu v Rusku, provádûní politiky sociální spravedlnosti a obranu zájmÛ etnick˘ch RusÛ jako „státotvorné“ vût‰iny obyvatelstva Ruské federace. Jak tvrdí politolog Mark Urnov, „úspûch Vlasti je svûdectvím toho, Ïe agresivita, kritika vlády, socialismus a rovnostáfiství slité v jedno zaãínají v ruském politickém establishmentu nabírat na síle“ 31. Pfiedpokládá se, Ïe Vlast je produktem kremelské politické technologie, namífiené k oslabení vlivu komunistÛ a vytvofiení dal‰ího „ochoãeného“ kvaziopoziãního politického subjektu podle vzoru Îirinovského LDPR. Av‰ak v˘robce Vlasti udûlali podle v‰eho chybu. Tento „politick˘ Golem“ se totiÏ brzy vymkl jejich kontrole a transformoval se do podoby skuteãnû opoziãního, a to velice agresivního populistického subjektu, jehoÏ popularita ve mnoha rusk˘ch regionech prudce stoupá. Proto zaãal Kreml vyvíjet na vlastní neposlu‰né

31

Urnov M., Socializm i uravnilovka vozvra‰ãajutsja. Online: http://www.gazeta.ru/elections/2003/ 12a_70215.shtml.

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dítû politick˘ nátlak. Vlasti nebyla pod rÛzn˘mi právními záminkami dovolena úãast v nûkolika regionálních volbách. Na zaãátku roku 2006 pfiimûla Putinova administrativa lídra této strany a pfiedsedu její parlamentní frakce Dmitrije Rogozina k tomu, aby se obou funkcí vzdal. Nicménû Vlast zÛstává dÛleÏit˘m politick˘m ãinitelem a její perspektivy v nadcházejících volbách do Státní dumy, které se budou konat na konci roku 2007, nejsou ‰patné. TotéÏ v‰ak nelze fiíct o vyhlídkách do budoucna celého ruského stranického systému. Nejrozhodnûj‰ími odpÛrci Putinovy politiky jsou mimoparlamentní marginální skupiny typu Národnû bol‰evické strany skandálního spisovatele Eduarda Limonova. Co se „legální“ opozice tyãe, je nejen roztfií‰tûná, ale také témûfi nejeví známky skuteãného odporu vÛãi omezení demokratick˘ch svobod a jin˘m znepokojujícím rysÛm prezidentova politického kurzu. To se projevilo v dobû parlamentních voleb: „Nikdo v zemi se nerozhodl pfiímo a tvrdû oponovat státní moci… V‰echny politické strany zaujaly slabou obojakou pozici podle zásady – jsme pro prezidenta, ale proti represím, jsme proti zpÛsobu vlády, ale s oligarchy je tfieba skoncovat. Tím také strany pomohly vládû zaujmout postavení arbitra a získat postavení nad stranami“ 32. Tato situace ohroÏuje stabilitu politického v˘voje v Rusku. Pro pfiípad krize, která mÛÏe pfiijít napfiíklad z dÛvodu ekonomick˘ch (Rusko je pfiíli‰ závislé na svûtov˘ch cenách zemního plynu a ropy, které jsou jeho hlavními v˘vozními komoditami), nejsou totiÏ Ïádné mechanismy a záruky mírného a legálního pfiedání moci jin˘m politick˘m silám. Stabilita Putinova reÏimu je klamavá, neboÈ se souãasnému vládci Ruska a jeho stoupencÛm nepodafiilo vytvofiit základy politického systému, jenÏ by fungoval za jin˘ch podmínek a za jiné hlavy, státu neÏ je Vladimír Putin. PutinÛv systém je vyroben Putinem pro nûj samotného, maximálnû pro jeho pfiípadného nástupce z fiad vládnoucího pitûrsko-silového klanu, nikoliv v‰ak pro budoucí Rusko.

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Leibin V., Okonãatel’nyje itogi vyborov. Online: http://www.polit.ru/docs/630463.html.

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Elita a spoleãnost Jedním z hesel, která pfiinesla Putinovi velkou popularitu, byl vyhlá‰en˘ zámûr omezit vliv oligarchÛ – nejvût‰ích rusk˘ch podnikatelÛ, ktefií za Jelcinovy doby soustfiedili ve sv˘ch rukou obrovské bohatství (dobyté vût‰inou ne zcela zákonn˘mi zpÛsoby) a byli úzce spjati se zkorumpovan˘mi státními strukturami. Právû oligarchové jsou v ruském masovém povûdomí symbolem „divokého“ kapitalismu bez sociálních garancí, kter˘ se v zemi objevil v 90. letech. Právû s jejich odstranûním od pák politické moci mnozí poãítali, kdyÏ se v Kremlu objevil Vladimír Putin. Nov˘ prezident se v‰ak omezil na obratnou politickou kombinaci. Oligarchové náhradou za upu‰tûní od otevfieného vmû‰ování do politick˘ch záleÏitostí získali moÏnost nejen roz‰ifiovat svÛj ekonomick˘ vliv, ale i nadále ovlivÀovat politiku státu, av‰ak zákulisnû. Za obûÈ padli nejdfiíve pouze dva oligarchové, Boris Berezovskij a Vladimír Gusinskij, ktefií byli nuceni emigrovat, aãkoliv byl to právû Berezovskij kdo sehrál v˘znamnou roli v tom, Ïe se Putin stal v roce 1999 Jelcinov˘m nástupcem. Mnozí ru‰tí analytici pfiedpokládají, Ïe jednou z podmínek domluvy mezi Putinov˘m okolím a oligarchy byla jejich ochota „uskrovnit se“ a uvolnit tak pfiístup ke zdrojÛm moci a bohatství pro novou skupinu ruské elity – poãetné Petrohraìany, ktefií se s Putinem dobfie znali jiÏ od dob jeho pÛsobení v 90. letech jako námûstka petrohradského primátora. Vliv „pitûrsk˘ch“ v prvních letech Putinova prezidentování ‰el strmû vzhÛru. Pfiedstavitelé „severní metropole“ se objevili jak ve v˘znamn˘ch státních funkcích (ministr obrany Sergej Ivanov, ‰éf Centrální banky Sergej Ignatûv, prezidentÛv zmocnûnec v strategicky dÛleÏitém JiÏním federálním okruhu Dmitrij Kozak aj.), tak mezi tûmi, kdo není vefiejnosti pfiíli‰ znám, disponuje v‰ak velk˘m zákulisním vlivem (námûstkové ‰éfa prezidentovy administrativy Igor Seãin a Viktor Ivanov, fieditel MûÏprombanky Sergej Pugaãev aj.). Je‰tû pÛsobivûj‰í neÏ nástup „pitûrsk˘ch“ byl nárÛst poãtu vojákÛ a pfiedstavitelÛ tajn˘ch sluÏeb v horních patrech rusk˘ch politick˘ch a administrativních struktur. JiÏ v letech 2000–2002 tvofiili „lidé s nárameníky“ témûfi 35 procent nov˘ch námûstkÛ ministrÛ, jmenovan˘ch do rÛzn˘ch rezortÛ. Nejmasovûj‰í pfiíliv pocházel z Federální bezpeãnostní sluÏby, nástupkynû KGB. V roce 2002 stáli v ãele devíti regionÛ Ruska vojáci. Hod-

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nost generála mûli pût ze sedmi polpredÛ, zatímco mezi jejich námûstky pfiedstavovali vojáci témûfi 70 procent. Militarizace rusk˘ch státních struktur v následujících letech ponûkud ustála, nicménû mají generálové a dÛstojníci stále velk˘ podíl na státní moci. Hlavní pfiíãinou tohoto jevu není jen minulost Vladimíra Putina jako dÛstojníka KGB, ale i v ruské spoleãnosti roz‰ífiená pfiedstava, Ïe „nesprávnû pojaté demokratické svobody dovedly zemi k sociální nestabilitû hrozící rozvratem a chaosem. Nejrychlej‰ím a nejjednodu‰‰ím zpÛsobem, jak v takové situaci upevnit stát, je opfiít se o vojáky jako o hlavní sílu pofiádku“ 33. Jistá militarizace a „KGBizace“ státních struktur má v‰ak svou odvrácenou stranu. Mezi tûmi, kdo se dostali k pákám státní moci, je pfiíli‰ málo samostatn˘ch iniciativních lidí. Mají ve zvyku spí‰e plnûní rozkazÛ „shora“ neÏ navrhování vlastních iniciativ. Analytik vlivného ãasopisu Kommersant – VlasÈ Sergej Kredov tvrdí, Ïe se za Putina k moci dostali „lidé breÏnûvského formátu… KdyÏ jim nafiídíte udûlat nûco samostatnû, bude z toho jenom ostuda. U vesla jsou ‰edí úfiedníãkové. S orgány státní moci se bûhem pûti let odehrálo nûco zvlá‰tního. Témûfi v‰echny se totiÏ staly potûmkinov˘mi vesnicemi: jakoby Duma, jakoby Rada federace, jakoby Státní rada, jakoby Rada bezpeãnosti… DÛleÏité je, Ïe ani personálii, ani strukturní zmûny zavedené za Vladimíra Vladimíroviãe nepfieÏijí jeho odchod z politiky. Znamená to, Ïe on nebo jeho nástupci potfiebují vyhrát [prezidentské] volby v roce 2008, pak v roce 2012 atd. Za kaÏdou cenu“ 34. Strach pfied zmûnami a skuteãn˘mi reformami, kter˘ je cítit v horních patrech souãasné ruské moci, pramení z pochybností dne‰ní ruské elity ohlednû vlastních schopností. Tito lidé by nechtûli mûnit v podstatû nic, aby se nemuseli setkávat s problémy, které nejsou schopni vyfie‰it. Podle ruského sociologa Dmitrije Ore‰kina je jednou z pfiíãin tohoto jevu „negativní selekce, kterou zaÏily tfii generace ruské elity za sovûtské doby. Lidé, ktefií mûli moc, museli po celá desetiletí buìto lhát anebo poãítat s tím, Ïe budou zniãeni. Nezfiídka se stávalo obojí“. Po pádu komunismu, pokraãuje Ore‰kin, „rostli noví administrátofii v jistém slova smyslu na holé zemi, jako nûjak˘ bodlák. Pouze po jist˘ch zmûnách mohou u nás vzniknout v˘hon-

ky nové politické kultury. Stále Ïijeme v‰ak v ‚dobû bodláku‘, aãkoliv má dne‰ní elita o sobû nepochybnû lep‰í mínûní. Silová skupina, která se teì dostala k moci, se vlastnû niãím neli‰í od na‰í divoké podnikatelské elity. Aãkoliv pouÏívá pojmy jako ãest a odpovûdnost, ví moc dobfie, jak se pfiichází k velk˘m penûzÛm, a znaãná ãást této skupiny se právû tímto zab˘vá“ 35. Proto lze pfiedpokládat, Ïe hlavním úkolem lidí, ktefií obklopují prezidenta Putina, je nikoli zmûnit Rusko k lep‰ímu, n˘brÏ pfiedev‰ím udûlat tak, aby vládnutí jejich klanu trvalo co nejdéle. Musíme v‰ak podotknout, Ïe snad upfiímnû myslí, Ïe právû to je pro Rusko nejlep‰í variantou do budoucna. Nezb˘vá neÏ souhlasit s pro Rusko nepfiíli‰ lichotiv˘m závûrem politologa Alexandra Neklessy: „Dne‰ní Rusko pfiedstavuje objekt anal˘zy spí‰e pro orientalisty… Reálie postindustriální epochy v zemi… se doplnily o rysy neofeudalismu a orientálního klanového zfiízení“ 36. Nejznámûj‰ím pfiíkladem toho, Ïe politick˘ boj je v dne‰ním Rusku pfiedev‰ím soubojem mezi konkurujícími klany (a v tom se Putinova éra moc neli‰í od dnes tolik proklínané doby jeho pfiedchÛdce), je kauza JUKOS. Majitel této ropné spoleãnosti, nejbohat‰í Rus a jeden z nejvlivnûj‰ích oligarchÛ, Michail Chodorkovskij byl v fiíjnu 2003 zatãen a v roce 2005 odsouzen za údajné finanãní podvody, machinace s akcemi nûkolika spoleãností a daÀové úniky. Dnes odpykává 8let˘ trest v jedné z tzv. pracovních kolonií na Sibifii. Kromû Chodorkovského bylo zatãeno a odsouzeno nûkolik dal‰ích b˘val˘ch spolumajitelÛ a vedoucích manaÏerÛ JUKOSu. Prosperující ropná spoleãnost byla otfiesena v základech po té, co její nejdÛleÏitûj‰í souãást Jugansknûftûgaz byla za pochybn˘ch okolností prodána státnímu koncernu Gazprom. Chodorkovskij a jeho stoupenci prohlásili, Ïe JUKOS je obûtí konkurenãního boje majícího politické pozadí, ponûvadÏ jeho majitel mûl velk˘ vliv a jisté pro Kreml nebezpeãné politické aspirace. Ani rusk˘ liberální tisk, kter˘ je vÛãi Chodorkovskému pfiíznivû naladûn, nepopírá moÏnost, Ïe se vedení JUKOSu v 90. letech skuteãnû dopustilo jistého poru‰ování zákonu. To v‰ak vzhledem k okolnostem tehdej‰í „divoké“ privatizace platí v Rusku nepochybnû pro v‰echny oligarchy

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Kry‰tanovskaja, cit. dílo. Kredov S., Vladimir Vladimiroviã toãka. Kommersant˝ – VlasÈ 2005, ã. 3 (606). Online: http:// www.kommersant.ru/k-vlast/get_page.asp?page_id=2005379–30.htm&show=print.

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Ore‰kin D., Novaja elita: dveri zakryvajutsja? Online: http://www.polit.ru/publicism/country/2004/ 03/11/elite.html. Neklessa A., Anatomija anomii. Online: http://www.russ.ru/politics/20030409–nekl-pr-html.

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a mnoho jin˘ch podnikatelÛ. Av‰ak obûtním beránkem se stal zejména Chodorkovskij, zatímco jiní oligarchové pronásledováni nejsou. Lze se domnívat, Ïe buìto jsou s Putinov˘m klanem spfiíznûní anebo mu slíbili loajalitu v˘mûnou za beztrestnost. Nejznámûj‰ím z tûchto prokremelsk˘ch oligarchÛ je Roman Abramoviã, b˘val˘ majitel spoleãnosti Sibnûft (kterou vãas a bez reptání prodal státu) a gubernátor vzdálené âukotky, jejíÏ záleÏitosti fiídí z Lond˘na, kde je majitelem známého fotbalového t˘mu Chelsea. Vladimír Putin a jeho okolí v‰echno spoãítali správnû. Kauza JUKOS nevyvolala v ruské spoleãnosti s v˘jimkou nepoãetn˘ch liberálních kruhÛ Ïádn˘ odpor. Ba naopak, pronásledování Michaila Chodorkovského a jeho druhÛ uãinilo protioligarchicky a rovnostáfisky naladûné ãásti RusÛ zadost. Nicménû vût‰ina RusÛ hodnotí podstatu tohoto konfliktu pomûrnû realisticky. Podle prÛzkumu uskuteãnûného sociologick˘m stfiediskem Levadacentr vzápûtí po Chodorkovského zatãení, pouze 15 procent respondentÛ mínilo, Ïe jsou tyto události spojené v˘hradnû s finanãními machinacemi ‰éfÛ JUKOSu a nemají nic spoleãného s politikou. Dal‰ích 18 procent pfiedpokládalo, Ïe je kauza JUKOS „epizodou v boji o moc mezi politick˘mi klany“, zatímco 11 procent preferovalo verzi, Ïe je to „zaãátek nové vládní kampanû namífiené proti oligarchÛm“. Dal‰ích 18 procent tvrdilo, Ïe jde o pfiedvolební akci, která by mûla zv˘‰it popularitu vlády u vût‰iny voliãÛ. 34 procenta v‰ak buìto nic o kauze JUKOS nesly‰elo, anebo nemûlo Ïádn˘ vyhranûn˘ názor37. Tyto v˘sledky pfiivedly fieditele oznaãeného stfiediska Jurije Levadu k závûru, Ïe vût‰ina ruské spoleãnosti je zatím apatická, „na v‰echno zapomíná a v‰echno pfiijímá“. Je to vlastnû nejvhodnûj‰í nálada pro uplatÀování „mûkkého“ autoritáfiství pfiíznaãného pro PutinÛv reÏim. Nelze opomenout ani jiné tendence v souãasném v˘voji ruské spoleãnosti. V Rusku prakticky chybí systém celonárodních hodnot sdílen˘ch absolutní vût‰inou obãanÛ. Putinova vláda se snaÏí tento systém vytvofiit umûle, „shora“, nemÛÏe v‰ak pfiipustit vítûzství pfiíli‰ radikálních názorov˘ch proudÛ a politick˘ch sil, které volají po uskuteãnûní vyloÏenû nacionalistick˘ch, fa‰istick˘ch ãi komunistick˘ch my‰lenek. V tomto pfiípadû by totiÏ byla ohroÏena podstata Putinova reÏimu jako umírnûného autoritáfi-

ství, které dovoluje vládnoucí skupinû tûÏit z hospodáfisk˘ch zdrojÛ zemû, aniÏ by pfiitom uskuteãÀovala rozsáhlé reformy a provádûla mobilizaci spoleãnosti za úãelem fie‰ení nejnaléhavûj‰ích problémÛ. PutinÛv reÏim bytostnû potfiebuje stabilitu, která v‰ak pozvolna pfiechází do stagnace. Proto je obãas srovnáván s jin˘m obdobím stagnace, kterou SSSR zaÏil za vlády Leonida BreÏnûva (1964–1982). Podporování Kremlem umírnûného nacionalismu a ponûkud pfiepjatého vlastenectví, vyuÏití za tímto úãelem v˘znamn˘ch dûjinn˘ch událostí, pfiedev‰ím vítûzství sovûtského Ruska nad nacismem v druhé svûtové válce, to v‰echno je jen ideologick˘m „plá‰tíkem“, kter˘ skr˘vá skuteãnou ideovou prázdnotu souãasného ruského reÏimu. Putinovo ideologické úsilí v‰ak má jisté opodstatnûní. Nálada ruské spoleãnosti se ve srovnání s 90. lety skuteãnû v˘raznû zmûnila. Sociolog Leontij Byzov mluví o „neokonzervativní vlnû“, která se v Rusku zvedla na pfielomu 20. a 21. století, coÏ se ãasovû shodlo s pfiíchodem Vladimíra Putina do Kremlu. „Na zaãátku 90. let byli prakticky v‰ichni konzervativci v Rusku zároveÀ gosudarstvenniky, zatímco demokraté se pfiiklánûli k individualismu témûfi anarchistického raÏení. V poslední dobû se objevily jiné v˘znamné skupiny, pro nûÏ je pfiíznaãná náklonnost vÛãi pevnému sociálnímu pofiádku… Tento faktor urãuje souãasn˘ pfiechod [vût‰iny spoleãnosti] ke konzervativnûj‰ím postojÛm“ 38. Neznamená to v‰ak, Ïe se Rusko názorovû sjednotilo. Mezi stoupenci „pevného sociálního pofiádku“ jsou lidé velmi odli‰n˘ch názorÛ. A pouze jejich ãásti vyhovuje eklektická ideologie „putinismu“. Nûktefií z „nov˘ch konzervativcÛ“ by rádi vidûli u moci rozhodnûj‰í, agresivnûj‰í a sebevûdomûj‰í vládu. Jin˘m by naopak vyhovovalo jisté uvolnûní pomûrÛ, av‰ak ne za cenu návratu do chaotické situace 90. let. Dal‰í by si pfiáli od ruské vlády v˘raznû levicovûj‰í a „sovût‰tûj‰í“ kurs napodobující politiku bûloruského vÛdce Alexandra Luka‰enka. Existují také radikální skupiny hlásající nacionalistická a rasistická hesla. Velk˘ poãet rasistick˘ch útokÛ proti cizincÛm, pfiistûhovalcÛm a pfiedstavitelÛm etnick˘ch men‰in v rusk˘ch mûstech svûdãí o tom, Ïe radikalismus je v Rusku na vzestupu, aãkoliv vláda se snaÏí krotit jeho nejbrutálnûj‰í projevy. Její úsilí nemûní v‰ak nic na skuteãnosti, Ïe ruská spoleãnost je stále roz‰tûpená a vnitfiní

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Levada Ju., Ljudi vse zabyvajut i vse prinimajut, Izvestija 30. X. 2003. Online: http://www.izvestia.ru/ community/article40495.

Bykov L., Neokonservativnaja volna. Nezavisimaja gazeta, 12. VIII. 2001. Online: http://www.ng.ru/ politics/2001–12–08/2_wave.html.

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politické antagonismy z velké míry vyvolané sociálními problémy jsou hrozbou pro budoucnost této zemû. Dne‰ní ruská skuteãnost je velice vzdálená oné sovûtské, av‰ak nepfiipomíná ani skuteãnost západní. Nalezení základu nûjakého spoleãenského konsenzu se jeví jako úkol témûfi nesplniteln˘. Prozápadní liberalismus v Rusku zfiejmû zklamal nejen kvÛli chybám, jichÏ dopustili reformátofii na zaãátku 90. let, ale také z toho dÛvodu, Ïe v Rusku zavrÏení ideologie a reality komunistického reÏimu a snaha dojít k demokratick˘m hodnotám nikdy nebyla tak intenzivní jako napfiíklad v zemích stfiední Evropy. Jak poznamenal politolog Andrej Melviº, dokonce i v poãátcích postkomunistické transformace nechtûla vût‰ina RusÛ jednoznaãnû dojít od socialismu ke kapitalismu, ale radûji se chtûla ocitnout tam, kde je moÏné spojit nejlep‰í z obou svûtÛ v nûjakém spekulativním ideálu, zkonstruovaném z fragmentÛ sovûtského stylu Ïivota zbaveného tûch hor‰ích rysÛ a z urãit˘ch norem a principÛ liberálního Západu39. Takov˘ „koãkopes“, jak se ukázalo, ve skuteãnosti neexistuje, proto zaÏila vût‰ina RusÛ trpké zklamání a proto je dnes povûst liberálních reformátorÛ v Rusku nenávratnû po‰kozena. Vycítil to dokonce i Michail Chodorkovskij, kter˘, jak se zdá, ani ve vûzení se nevzdává nadûjí na pokraãování politické aktivity. Zvefiejnil proto v liberálních rusk˘ch médiích dva ãlánky – „Krize liberalismu v Rusku“ a „Obrat doleva“, v nichÏ se snaÏí analyzovat chyby, kter˘ch se dopustili ru‰tí liberálové a velkopodnikatelé. Je to jist˘ druh pokání, protoÏe Chodorkovskij ne‰etfií v tûchto ãláncích sebe ani své b˘valé kolegy z oligarchického prostfiedí. Hlavní vinu na zkáze ruského liberalismu pfiipisuje v‰ak v‰emocné zkorumpované byrokracii, která byla podle jeho názoru vÏdy mocnûj‰í neÏ oligarchové: „Oligarchie znamená spoleãenství nûkolika mála lidí, jimÏ patfií moc. My jsme v‰ak byli vÏdy závislí na v‰emohoucím byrokratovi… Na‰e spoleãné schÛzky s Jelcinem byly pouhou kulisou. Byli jsme na vefiejnosti soustavnû obviÀováni ze v‰ech nesnází této zemû, ale nepochopili jsme vãas, co se dûje. Byli jsme jednodu‰e oklamáni. Mûli jsme moÏnost pokusit se zmûnit pravidla této hry, pfiesnûji fieãeno, hru bez pravidel. Av‰ak na‰e shovívavost a pokornost, snaha vyhovût v‰emu, o co nás [státní moc] poprosí.

a dokonce i tomu, o co zatím nepoprosila, to v‰echno vedlo k fiádûní byrokracie…“ 40. Chodorkovského argumentace a obzvlá‰È levicovû populistické závûry, k nimÏ ve sv˘ch ãláncích pfiichází, jsou diskutabilní. Jsou v‰ak dÛkazem toho, Ïe nûktefií s vedoucích aktérÛ ruské ekonomické a politické transformace cítí jisté rozãarování a jako by se stydûli toho, na ãem se v 90. letech podíleli. Je pochopitelné, Ïe pocity obyãejn˘ch RusÛ, jimÏ liberální reformy nepfiinesly kdysi slíben˘ blahobyt, jsou mnohem hor‰í. Proto dne‰ní Rusko trpí jistou averzí vÛãi liberálním a demokratick˘m hodnotám a proto je stále silnûj‰í ruská nevraÏivost vÛãi Západu, kter˘ je s tûmito hodnotami spojován. Putinova vláda tûchto nálad vyuÏívá a obãas i zneuÏívá, a tak se v ruském tisku objevují propagandistické texty, za nichÏ by se pravdûpodobnû nestydûla ani komunistická Pravda ze 70. let. Napfiíklad b˘val˘ podnikatel a souãasn˘ poslanec Dumy Michail Jurjev, jenÏ má podle nûkter˘ch informací dÛvûrn˘ vztah k vlivn˘m ãinitelÛm prezidentovy administrativy, publikoval v roce 2004 v Komsomolské pravdû rozsáhl˘ ãlánek. Tvrdil v nûm, Ïe Rusko má mnoho vnûj‰ích a vnitfiních nepfiátel, s kter˘mi je tfieba se co nejdfiív vypofiádat. Tito nepfiátelé byli dokonce pojmenováni: „Ti, kdo navrhují reformovat ekonomiku a politiku pouze podle doporuãení západních zemí a MMF, jsou nepfiátelé… Ti, kdo litují NTV z Gusinského doby41, protoÏe teì v televizi nejsou uráÏky Ruska, jsou nepfiátelé. Ti, kdo si myslí, Ïe není tfieba zat˘kat miliardáfie prahnoucí po politické moci, protoÏe to pr˘ ‰kodí zahraniãním investicím, jsou nepfiátelé. Ti, kdo tvrdí, Ïe v Ïivotû jsou jen peníze a poÏitky tím nejdÛleÏitûj‰ím a v‰echno ostatní je nesmyslem, kter˘ vymyslela zaostalá pravoslavná civilizace, jsou nepfiátelé…“ 42.

40 41

42 39

Mel’vil’ A., Politiãeskije cennosti i orientacii i politiãeskije instituty. Moskva 1998, s. 156.

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Chodorkovskij M., Krizis liberalizma v Rossii. Citováno podle http://www.polit.ru/dossie/pv/2004/ 03/29/khodor_st.html. Vladimír Gusinskij byl v letech 1994–2001 majitelem soukromé televize NTV, která byla jednou z nejsledovanûj‰ích v Rusku a mûla v˘raznû liberální zamûfiení. V dobû politického vzestupu Vladimíra Putina podporoval Gusinskij jako jeden z nejvlivnûj‰ích oligarchÛ Putinovy konkurenty. To se mu brzy vymstilo. V roce 2000 byl obvinûn z podvodÛ a finanãních machinací a pfiinucen vzdát se vût‰iny podnikÛ v Rusku. NTV ovládl v roce 2001 státní koncern Gazprom, coÏ vedlo k v˘razné zmûnû informaãní politiky této televize. Vladimír Gusinskij emigroval, v souãasné dobû podniká v Izraeli. Jur’jev M., Vnutrennij vrag i nacional’naja ideja, Komsomol’skaja pravda 6. XI. 2004. Online: http:/ /www.kp.ru/daily/23398/33754/.

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Nelze fiíct, Ïe tato propaganda má v ruské spoleãnosti velk˘ úspûch. Nechává v‰ak jisté stopy v masovém povûdomí a pfiispívá tím ke konfrontaci Ruska se Západem, která je Putinovou vládou pfiedstavována jako dÛkaz „obrození“ Ruska a jeho návratu do velmocensk˘ch pozic. Jako mnoho jin˘ch vûcí v Rusku za souãasného reÏimu, je to spí‰e zdání neÏ skuteãnost. Putinovo Rusko je vskutku bohat‰í, stabilnûj‰í a z geopolitického hlediska vlivnûj‰í neÏ Rusko, které Jelcin pfiedal v roce 1999 svému nástupci. Nezbavilo se v‰ak mnoha problémÛ, které se za ménû pfiízniv˘ch ekonomick˘ch okolností mohou ukázat jako velmi nebezpeãné a dokonce zhoubné. Místo Putinem slíbené „diktatury zákona“ do‰lo bûhem posledních ‰esti a pÛl let k obnovení v 90. letech zformované kombinace oligarchie a byrokracie (av‰ak v jiné sestavû) zastfie‰ené autoritou populárního prezidenta a zastfiené vlasteneckou rétorikou. Místo pfiesnû strukturovaného systému politick˘ch stran a normální demokratické soutûÏe vznikla obrovská prezidentovi loajální „strana náãelníkÛ“, která vytlaãila opoziãní strany na okraj politického prostoru. Místo efektivnû fungující ekonomiky, která by mohla vzniknout v dÛsledku hlubok˘ch strukturálních reforem, je tu tradiãní v˘voznû-surovinové schéma, které dûlá Rusko mimofiádnû závisl˘m na stavu svûtov˘ch trhÛ s ropou a zemním plynem. Místo sice velmi nedokonalé, ale pfiece jen postupnû se vyvíjející demokracie a obãansk˘ch svobod vznikla situace, která se nebezpeãnû blíÏí realitû policejního státu. To v‰echno je udûláno vlastnû za jedin˘m úãelem koncentrace ve‰keré politické moci a ekonomick˘ch prostfiedkÛ v rukou nepoãetné skupiny politikÛ, úfiedníkÛ, vojákÛ, dÛstojníkÛ tajn˘ch sluÏeb a podnikatelÛ spojen˘ch spoleãn˘m pÛvodem, minulostí a ekonomick˘mi zájmy – klasick˘ pfiíklad systému, jemuÏ západní politologové fiíkají crony capitalism. Av‰ak, jak trefnû poznamenává Richard Pipes, „uÏ samotná pfiedstava toho, Ïe politiku lze oprostit od v˘kyvÛ Ïivota a uãinit jí monopolem jedné skupiny ãi jedné ideologie, se v podmínkách moderního Ïivota jeví neuvûfiitelnou. Jakákoli vláda, která na této pfiedstavû trvá, musí dát vût‰í prostor policejnímu aparátu – a nakonec se stane jeho obûtí“ 43. Tyto Pipesovy závûry se tykají nûkdej‰í vlády rusk˘ch carÛ, jsou v‰ak velice aktuální také pro dne‰ní Rusko.

2. Ekonomická politika za vlády Vladimira Putina Karel Svoboda

Úvod Ruská ekonomika za patnáct let své transformace urazila notn˘ krok na cestû od plánovaného hospodáfiství ke standardnû fungující ekonomice.1 Úkolem tohoto ãlánku bude sledování tohoto v˘voje v posledním období. Zamûfiíme se hlavnû na reformní kroky, které následovaly po krizi ze srpna roku 1998. Stalo se jiÏ tradicí povaÏovat prezidentskou moc Vladimira Vladimiroviãe Putina za silnou vládu, která se je‰tû upevÀuje nûkter˘mi reformami v politické rovinû. Po Jelcinovû vládû, která byla fiízena rÛzn˘mi klany, aÈ jiÏ oligarchick˘mi nebo ãistû zájmov˘mi, je toto vnímání zcela pochopitelné. I pfies sníÏení vlivu oligarchÛ nemÛÏe prezident jednat naprosto bez ohledu na názory zájmov˘ch skupin. Tyto skupiny se rekrutují buì z kruhÛ politick˘ch, regionálních, ale také profesních. To má potom za následek rÛzné zmûkãování zmûn a jejich pfiizpÛsobování rusk˘m podmínkám, prakticky tedy spí‰e jejich zru‰ení. V pfiípadû reformy energetick˘ch monopolÛ se potom setkáváme s jejím naprost˘m zablokováním. Chronologick˘ rámec celého ãlánku je vymezen lety 1998–2006, tedy pomûrnû ‰irok˘m prostorem. Finanãní krize v létû roku 1998 se stala obecnû pfiijíman˘m mezníkem.2 Z na‰eho pohledu je nejdÛleÏitûj‰ím zlomem posun ve vnímání nutnosti okamÏit˘ch a hlubok˘ch reforem. Zajímavé je toto období také z toho dÛvodu, Ïe rokem 1999 Rusko zahájilo rychl˘ 1

43

Pipes, R. Rusko za starého reÏimu. Praha 2004, s. 384.

2

Zde se kloníme k tradiãnímu pojetí roku 1991 jako poãátku transformace, byÈ není toto pojetí zcela pfiesné. Zmûny, byÈ nezam˘‰lené ve sv˘ch dÛsledcích, zaãaly jiÏ nûkter˘mi gorbaãovov˘mi pfiemûnami v roce 1987. Sutela P., The Russian Market Economy (Kikimora Publications Helsinki 2003), p. 118.

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hospodáfisk˘ rÛst o v˘‰i zhruba 7 % roãnû. Toto ohromující ãíslo bylo sice dosaÏeno v kontextu stejnû rychle rostoucích cen ropy, Rusko se pfiesto vydalo cestou ekonomick˘ch reforem. Budeme se vûnovat opatfiením, která mûla mít strukturální charakter a která mûla zajistit dlouhodobou prosperitu a rozvoj. Tematicky se tedy dotkneme mnoha oblastí od reformy daÀové, celní, finanãní, bankovní a jin˘ch. Naproti tomu se sociálních a politick˘ch reforem, byÈ je jejich dÛleÏitost pro ekonomiku naprosto zásadní a neoddiskutovatelná, dotkneme jen velmi nepatrnû. âlánek si klade za cíl dát pfiehled o ekonomickém v˘voji a opatfieních k jeho urychlení, stejnû jako jejich zhodnocení ve vztahu k dne‰nímu dni. Nelze ani v nejmen‰ím doufat, Ïe bude jejich seznam úplnû vyãerpán. Proto, spí‰e neÏ o vyãerpávající studii, má jít o inspiraci k dal‰ímu zkoumání nastolen˘ch otázek, neboÈ kaÏdá z dílãích oblastí by vydala na samostatnou rozsáhlou práci. Krize 1998 Finanãní krize v roce 1998 znamenala pro zotavující se ruskou ekonomiku tûÏkou ránu. Po mnoha letech hospodáfiského úpadku, zpÛsobeného váhav˘m pfiístupem k implementaci fiady reforem, zemû poprvé v roce 1997 zaznamenala rÛst HDP, i kdyÏ jen o 1,4 %.3 Pro dal‰í období se zdálo, Ïe bylo dosaÏeno obratu v nepfiíznivé ekonomické situaci. O to hÛfie potom udefiila krize, na kterou, i pfies varování v podobû asijské finanãní krize, nebyla ruská ekonomika pfiipravena. Jak ukázaly pozdûj‰í události, celá stabilita byla spí‰e domnûlá, nûktefií autofii tak mluví o virtuální ekonomice.4 Ruská ekonomika se dlouhodobû pohybovala v nejist˘ch kolejích vysok˘ch rozpoãtov˘ch schodkÛ financovan˘ch pomocí stále nov˘ch státních krátkodob˘ch dluhopisÛ (GKO). Tímto zpÛsobem se vytváfiela pyramida v podobû financování star˘ch dluhÛ za pomoci nov˘ch, zatímco zkvalitnûní v˘bûru daní se státu nadále nedafiilo. Nové dluhopisy byly vydávány se stále krat‰í dobou splatnosti a stále vy‰‰ími úroky. Vûfiitelé, mezi nimiÏ byly hlavnû ruské banky a za-

hraniãní investofii, pomûrnû ochotnû vkládali své prostfiedky do tûchto státních cenn˘ch papírÛ. Stát se kromû jiného nemohl spoléhat ani na tradiãní zdroj pfiíjmÛ státního rozpoãtu, tedy pfiíjmÛ z exportu ropy. Ta se pohybovala na jafie 1998 na pouh˘ch deseti dolarÛ. Situace se státními financemi byla naprosto neudrÏitelná a pfiispûla 23. bfiezna k odvolání premiéra Viktora âernomyrdina. Na jeho místo nastoupil mlad˘ technokrat Sergej Kirijenko. Jeho úkolem bylo dát do pofiádku státní finance. Jedním z prvních opatfiení bylo drastické omezení státních v˘dajÛ, pokusy o získání zahraniãních pÛjãek, zlep‰ení v˘bûru daní. Nicménû, ani tak se nepodafiilo zabránit propadu a zemi zasáhla 17. srpna 1998 krize. Vláda vyhlásila 90denní moratorium na splácení zahraniãního dluhu, pfiistoupila k zavedení plovoucího kurzu rublu s koridorem 6,5–9 rublÛ za dolar, omezení moÏnosti pro cizí pfiíslu‰níky vkládat prostfiedky do státních dluhopisÛ s dobou splatnosti krat‰í neÏ jeden rok. Krize zasáhla celou ekonomiku bez v˘jimky. Obzvlá‰tû citelnû postihla ruské banky, a to vãetnû státem ovládaného Sberbanku. Do toho, spolu s dal‰ími nûkolika „vyvolen˘mi“ bankami, Centrální banka nalila finanãní prostfiedky, aby alespoÀ odvrátila totální kolaps systému. Podniky se navrátily k barterov˘m obchodÛm (podíl aÏ 53 % na celkové produkci), do‰lo k hlubokému propadu smûnného kurzu rublu vÛãi dolaru z 6,24 v srpnu 1998 na 24,6 na konci bfiezna 1999.5 Nejhor‰í následky ale mûla tato krize pro bûÏného obãana, neboÈ znamenala pád mnoha podnikÛ, pro státní zamûstnance a dÛchodce opûtovné zpoÏìování jejich v˘plat atd. Zatímco nûkteré nepfieÏily, pro ãást finanãnû-prÛmyslov˘ch skupin otfies znamenal moÏnost jak roz‰ífiit a konsolidovat svÛj majetek. Jednou z nejagresivnûj‰ích byla skupina kolem banky Menatep, av‰ak ani zdaleka nebyla jedinou. V politické rovinû mûla krize pfiímo fatální následky pro osobu premiéra. Sergej Kirijenko byl donucen uÏ 23. srpna 1998 opustit úfiad, byÈ pouze hasil poÏár, kter˘ svojí nezodpovûdností v rozpoãtové politice zaloÏil uÏ premiér âernomyrdin za vydatného pfiispûní prezidenta Jelcina. „Kompromisní“ premiér Primakov posléze, i pfies nûkteré populistické sli-

5 3 4

Jiné zdroje uvádûjí 0,8 %. Zde pracujeme s údaji Státního statistického úfiadu Ruské federace (GKS). Gaddy C. G., Ickes G. W., Beyond a Bailout: Time to Face Reality about Russia’s Virtual Economy http://www.brook.edu/views/articles/gaddy/199806.htm.

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Sutela P., The Financial Crisis in Russia, BOFIT Online 11/1999, p. 6, 24 April 2006 http:// www.bof.fi/bofit/fin/7online/abs/pdf/bon1199.pdf. Nikoliç M., Russia and the IMF: Pseudo lending for pseudo reforms, Journal of Economic Literature, http://www.ssees.ac.uk/publications/working_papers/wp6.pdf.

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by, pokraãoval v politice pfiísného hlídání rozpoãtov˘ch v˘dajÛ, stejnû jako v dal‰ích restriktivních opatfieních. Fakticky hlavním úkolem v‰ech „krizov˘ch“ i „pokrizov˘ch“ vlád byla stabilizace ekonomiky a zabránûní volnému pádu. Pfii plnûní tohoto úkolu mohly ruské vlády tûÏit ze stoupajících ceny ropy, která se ze zhruba 10 dolarÛ za barel na jafie roku 1998 zvedla na 25 dolarÛ. Devalvace rublu v srpnu 1998 o 75 % prakticky okamÏitû pfieru‰ila ve‰ker˘ dovoz, ãímÏ ulehãila Ïivot pro domácím v˘robcÛm. Navíc se pomûrnû rychle podafiilo zabezpeãit návrat od barterové k penûÏní ekonomice. DÛleÏit˘m momentem se ukázalo b˘t upevnûní rozpoãtové disciplíny je‰tû premiérem Kirijenkem, které vedlo ke drastickému sníÏení v˘dajÛ. V souãasné dobû je tak pomûr celkov˘ch vládních v˘dajÛ k HDP zhruba o deset procent niωí neÏ pfied krizí.6 Krize se tak pfies svoji hloubku ukázala b˘t krátkodobou a zemû se pomûrnû rychle vrátila k rÛstu. Nástup Vladimira Vladimiroviãe Putina Z hlediska reforem nastala intenzifikace procesÛ zapoãat˘ch za pfiedchozích vlád (napfiíklad první kroky v daÀové reformû). Díky tomu jiÏ bylo moÏné stavût na stabilizované ekonomické situaci. Rusku citelnû pomohly ceny ropy a surovin vÛbec, které zaãaly prudce rÛst. Zdánlivû paradoxnû se leitmotivem ve‰ker˘ch reforem stalo osvobození ruské ekonomiky od závislosti na v˘vozu surovin. Z hlediska politické situace byla Putinova pozice dvojseãná. Po období pomûrnû velk˘ch zmatkÛ krize roku 1998 ru‰tí obãané poÏadovali jednoznaãnou nápravu nejvût‰ích pfiehmatÛ Jelcinovy vlády, nicménû slova jako „reforma“, „liberál“ nebo „demokrat“ vyvolávala negativní konotace. Z toho dÛvodu nemûl Putin stejnou ‰anci jako Jelcin na zaãátku devadesát˘ch let, kdy v‰eobecné pfiijetí nutnosti reforem bylo daleko silnûj‰í. Tento konsenzus byl ale promrhán na poloviãaté reformy namísto skuteãnû radikálních reforem. „·oková terapie“ byla pouh˘m názvem, za ní se skr˘valo zachování systému úlev z reforem, zmûkãování dopadÛ a jin˘ch forem ekonomické sebevraÏdy. 6

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Ahrend R., Tompson W., Fifteen years of Economic Reform in Russia: What has been achieved? What remnains to be done? OECD Working Paper, 17/2005, p. 18, http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/ 2005doc.nsf/linkto/eco-wkp(2005)17.

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Vladimir Vladimiroviã Putin zahájil jiÏ jako málo znám˘ premiér fiadu krokÛ, na které mohl navázat jiÏ jako prezident. Pro vypracování programu reforem si pfiizval hned nûkolik sv˘ch spolupracovníkÛ z Petrohradu. K této skupinû patfiil napfiíklad souãasn˘ ministr pro ekonomick˘ rozvoj a obchod German Gref, ministr financí Alexej Kudrin ãi dlouholet˘ poradce a také pomûrnû ostr˘ kritik vládní ekonomické politiky v rámci systému Andrej Illarionov. Pod vedením Centra strategick˘ch anal˘z v ãele s Germanem Grefem byla vypracována strategie reforem, kterou vláda zaãala bezprostfiednû uvádût do praxe. V Poselství ke ãlenÛm Federálního shromáÏdûní na rok 2000 pojmenoval mnoho rámcov˘ch problémÛ ruské ekonomiky. Vladimír Putin definoval svoji politiku v ekonomické oblasti jako liberálnû orientovanou se siln˘m dÛrazem na posílení právního prostfiedí (diktatura zákona). Jako nejdÛleÏitûj‰í reformní zásah uvedl zavedení fiádu a pfiehlednosti do daÀové soustavy. Tyto plány se potom projevily v Programu vlády Ruské federace v oblasti sociální politiky a modernizace ekonomiky. Tím byl dán koncepãní rámec ekonomick˘ch reforem.7 Ruská ekonomika se nacházela ve stadiu rÛstu, pfiesto bylo moÏné zaznamenat i negativní tendence v podobû nevyrovnaného smûfiování investic. Ty ‰ly ze 40 % do palivoenergetického sektoru, coÏ jen zvy‰ovalo ruskou závislost na tomto odvûtví. Vzhledem k zastaralosti infrastruktury ale ne‰lo ani tak o pfiesouvání investic z této oblasti do jin˘ch, jako spí‰e o jejich posílení v jin˘ch sektorech. Na zaãátku své vlády se prezident Vladimir Putin a jeho t˘m soustfiedili hlavnû na reformy strukturální, pfiiãemÏ se jednalo o reformy velmi radikální. Bylo novelizováno hned nûkolik zákoníkÛ. Od poloviny roku 2000 tak probíhala daÀová reforma (zavedení rovné danû, zjednodu‰ení daní pro malé firmy), zmûnou pro‰el Zákoník práce, Zákoník o pÛdû, byla zapoãata i soudní reforma. Ta zavedla pevnou hranici mezi arbitráÏními soudy a soudy obecn˘mi. Stejnû tak omezila moc prokuratury vstupovat do samotného soudního jednání. Rok 2001 potom pfiinesl pravdûpodobnû nejpfielomovûj‰í reformy ruské ekonomiky vÛbec. Reforma daÀového systé-

7

Haaparanta P., Pirtillä J. Reforms and Confidence, Helsinki School of Economics, 21 March 2005, http://www.bof.fi/bofit/fin/6dp/05abs/05pdf/dp0105.pdf.

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mu pfiinesla zemi rovnou daÀ z pfiíjmu fyzick˘ch osob (rezidentÛ Ruské federace) ve v˘‰i 13 %, coÏ je i na pomûry tranzitivních ekonomik nízká úroveÀ (Slovensko zavedlo obdobnou daÀ ve v˘‰i 19 %). Reforma cel potom v˘raznû zjednodu‰ila tuto oblast zavedením pûti sazeb (5, 10, 15, 20, 25 %)8, Oproti vysokém tempu reforem v letech 2001–2002 se na pfielomu let 2003–2004 tyto reformy znaãnû zpomalily. Na konci roku 2003 se konaly parlamentní volby, v dubnu potom prezidentské. V tûchto volbách nenastalo Ïádné pfiekvapení, prezident stejnû jako Jednotné Rusko zaznamenali v˘razn˘ úspûch. V˘mûna na postu premiéra se odehrála pomûrnû v klidu, korupãními skandály stíhaného Michaila Kasjanova nahradil Michail Fradkov, b˘val˘ ministr obchodu a také vnûj‰ích ekonomick˘ch vztahÛ. Druhé volební období sk˘tá obvykle vût‰í prostor pro provádûní bolestivûj‰ích opatfiení, která si politik ucházející se o pfiízeÀ voliãÛ nemÛÏe dovolit. Ruské obãany tak ãekalo citelné zvy‰ování cen energií a komunálních sluÏeb, dále penzijní reforma, nov˘ impuls dostal proces privatizace. Rozdûlení reforem Reformy prezidenta Putina v ekonomické oblasti lze rozdûlit do nûkolika skupin. Tou první jsou reformy ãistû ekonomické, jako je daÀová ãi bankovní reforma. Z dílãích, ale z hlediska diverzifikace ekonomiky bezpochyby velmi dÛleÏit˘ch reforem je moÏné uvést zfiízení svobodn˘ch ekonomick˘ch zón. Do druhé skupiny potom budou pravdûpodobnû patfiit opatfiení sociálnû-ekonomická jako napfiíklad penzijní reforma nebo pozemkov˘ zákoník. Do tfietí skupiny spadají reformy, které se sice nedají oznaãit za ekonomické, jejich vliv na ekonomiku je v‰ak velmi siln˘. Do takové oblasti spadají napfiíklad zmûny v oblasti soudnictví nebo v technick˘ch normách, popfiípadû administrativní reforma. Tyto reformy pfiedstavují minimálnû stejnû zásadní pfiínos pro ekonomiku, neboÈ ustavují instituce, bez nichÏ by ekonomická opatfiení, jako je privatizace, zÛstávala ve vzducho-

prázdnu. Jak ukazuje nesãetná ekonomická literatura, právû nevyvinutost institucí, jako jsou soudy a úfiady, má vût‰í vliv na mal˘ rozvoj ekonomiky státu neÏ ona „ãistû“ ekonomická.9 Z celkového kontextu není moÏné vyfiadit ani ãistû politické zmûny. Pro pochopení v˘voje reforem a jejich implementace jsou neménû dÛleÏité. Pfii zkoumání reforem naráÏíme na realitu politického prostfiedí, ve kterém se vlády pohybují. Îádná vláda nemÛÏe pfiijímat ãistû ekonomická fie‰ení, neboÈ ta b˘vají ve vût‰inû pfiípadÛ velmi drastická a nepopulární. V ekonomické politice tak jde primárnû o dosaÏení vhodného kompromisu obou jejích sloÏek, respektive o co nejvy‰‰í prÛchodnou míru ekonomick˘ch fie‰ení. Tento fakt b˘vá ãasto zmiÀován jako argument ve prospûch autoritativních reÏimÛ, nicménû jeho platnost je velmi omezená, neboÈ ani ty nemají sebemen‰í zájem na ztrátû popularity. Navíc, pokud opatfiení neprocházejí standardní oponentní procedurou v podobû vefiejn˘ch diskuzí ãi sloÏitého prosazování v parlamentech, dochází ãasto k jejich pfiijetí v nepfiíli‰ kvalitní podobû. Ruská vláda a hlavnû ministerstvo pro ekonomick˘ rozvoj a obchod definovaly reformy provádûné do roku 2002 jako první fázi celkové pfiemûny spoleãnosti. V té bylo nutné stanovit základní ekonomické mechanismy, jako funkãní systém daní, bankovní reforma, reforma penzijní atd. Tyto reformy mÛÏeme podle na‰í terminologie zafiadit mezi ãistû ekonomické, ãásteãnû sociální. Ve druhé fázi definované Stfiednûdobou strategií rozvoje ruské ekonomiky pfiistupují ruské orgány k opatfiením, jako je reforma ‰kolství, zdravotnictví atd. Navíc, i pfies tvrzení rusk˘ch úfiadÛ nejsou tato opatfiení ani zdaleka u konce.

9 8

Z tohoto systému nicménû existují v˘jimky, na které je aplikováno tzv. sloÏené clo, které je vy‰‰í. Broadman H. G. Global Economic Integration: Prospects for WTO Accession and Continued Russian Reforms, The Washington Quarterly, p. 82, http://www.twq.com/04spring/docs/ 04spring_broadman.pdf.

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Poster Richard A., Creating a legal framework for economic development, The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January 1998), 13 April 2006, http://www.worldbank.org/research/journals/wbro/obsfeb98/pdf/article1.pdf. Fungáãová Z., Building a Castle on Sand: Effects of Mass Privatization on Capital Market Creation in Transition Economies, CERGE-EI Working Paper 256, http:/ /www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/abstract/Wp256a.pdf.

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Privatizace a zahraniãní investice Privatizace je povaÏována za jeden z hlavních nástrojÛ zvy‰ování v˘konnosti hospodáfiství, nicménû rozdílné názory panují na zpÛsob jejího provedení.10 Nejefektivnûj‰ím zpÛsobem odstátnûní je jednoznaãnû prodej majetku zahraniãnímu vlastníku, na opaãné stranû stojí ponechání podniku v rukou státu. Krystalick˘m dÛkazem tohoto faktu je mizivá efektivita ruského plynárenského prÛmyslu, s obrovsk˘m podílem státu ve srovnání s v˘konností ropného prÛmyslu v dobû, kdy byl vlastnûn soukrom˘mi vlastníky. Vzhledem ke zpÛsobu jejího uskuteãÀovaní v prÛbûhu devadesát˘ch let si privatizace získala mnoho nepfiátel, proto se jedná z hlediska politiky o velmi citlivé téma. Pro Rusko je typick˘ vy‰‰í dÛraz na podporu domácího vlastnictví neÏ zahraniãního. Zákon o privatizaci státního majetku byl pfiijat v roce 2001 s platností od 2002. Rusko jiÏ mûlo za sebou hlavní privatizaãní vlnu, aÈ jiÏ v podobû ruské verze kupónové privatizace z let 1992–1994, tak i takzvaného programu pÛjãky za podíly let 1994–1996.11 Oba tyto zpÛsoby prodeje státního majetku byly ãasto ne neprávem kritizovány, proto se zhruba od roku 1997 pfiistoupilo k pfiímému prodeji. Z pfiímého prodeje byly vylouãeny takzvané „strategické“ podniky. Jejich mnoÏství se na pfielomu století odhadovalo zhruba na tisícovku. Celkovû se oãekává, Ïe se toto ãíslo v˘raznû sníÏí, nicménû je tûÏké odhadnout, na jaké úrovni se ocitne. Ostatní podniky jsou prodávány prostfiednictvím jednotliv˘ch ministerstev. V˘jimku v tomto tvofií nejvût‰í firmy, jako je Gazprom, RAO JES ãi Rossijskije ÎD, pro jejichÏ prodej je nutné schválit speciální zákon. Podle zákona O liberalizaci akcií spoleãnosti Gazprom z roku 2005 tak mohou zahraniãní vlastníci drÏet ve firmû podíl ve v˘‰i 50 % minus 1 akcii. Rusku se doposud nedafiilo lákat dostateãné objemy pfiím˘ch zahraniãních investic (FDI). Celkov˘ dosavadní objem akumulovan˘ch pfiím˘ch 10 11

K debatám o zpÛsobech privatizace v ruském pfiípadû napfiíklad Sutela P., Russian…, s. 193–208, Fungáãová Z., Building… Stát si v tomto programu pÛjãoval od podnikatelÛ na svoje základní fungování. Za to zástavou nabízel podíly ve firmách. Ve skuteãnosti ale nebylo nikdy v plánu tyto dluhy splatit. Podnikatelé se tak dostali k miliardov˘m majetkÛm za niωí neÏ trÏní ceny. Na druhou stranu se tyto podniky jiÏ nacházely pod jejich kontrolou a bylo vysoce pravdûpodobné, Ïe by je ovládli i bez tohoto programu.

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zahraniãních investic dosahoval pouze 50 mld. dolarÛ, coÏ není v porovnání s ostatními tranzitivními ekonomikami nijak závratné ãíslo. Zlep‰ující se investiãní klima nicménû zaãíná nést v˘sledky i v podobû zvy‰ování se tohoto ukazatele. Jen za rok 2005 se pfiímé zahraniãní investice do ruské ekonomiky zv˘‰ily na 13,1 mld. dolarÛ, plány na investování v zemi oznámilo hned nûkolik velk˘ch firem, a to i z Japonska, na investiãní klima velmi citlivého. Pfiílivu by mûly napomoci i svobodné ekonomické zóny. Ty mají poskytovat investorÛm nûkteré v˘hody, jako jsou zrychlené odpisy nebo daÀové úlevy. Prozatím se poãítá se zónami technologick˘mi a v˘robními, v procesu schvalování jsou potom je‰tû zóny turistické. Z pozitivních tendencí jde jmenovat také otevírání rusk˘ch firem svûtu, které ãasto souvisí s uvádûním firem na kapitálové trhy. PrÛkopníkem v této oblasti se stala firma Jukos, která jiÏ v roce 1999 zvefiejnila své akcionáfie, následovaly ji i dal‰í firmy. Jako poslední lze jmenovat Alfa banku, která úzkostlivû svoji vlastnickou strukturu skr˘vala. Vstup na svûtové burzy se potom oãekává i u takov˘ch firem, jako je Gazprom, nebo RosnûfÈ, pfiiãemÏ se u nich poãítá se zahraniãními podílníky. S akciemi nûkter˘ch rusk˘ch spoleãností se obchoduje na lond˘nské burze, dal‰í vstup na burzy v zahraniãí chystají. Striktní pravidla pro prÛhlednost hospodafiení, stejnû jako zvefiejÀování informací ukazují na zlep‰ující se vztah firem k investorÛm. Pozitivnû se na akciov˘ch trzích podepsalo také zlep‰ení dohledu nad dodrÏováním pravidel. DaÀová a rozpoãtová reforma V daÀové oblasti stálo pfied vládou premiéra Michaila Kasjanova hned nûkolik úkolÛ, spojen˘ch s celkovou zmûnou struktury daÀového zatíÏení. Konec Jelcinovy vlády se nesl ve znamení sloÏitého daÀového zákonodárství, s mnoha v˘jimkami, úlevami atd., celkovû byl soubor daní velmi chaotick˘, navíc stále existovaly natolik nesmyslné daÀové odvody, jako byly danû z obratu atd. Bez zavedení pofiádku prakticky nebylo moÏné zajistit efektivní v˘bûr daní. Hlavními cíli tak bylo zjednodu‰ení a poté sníÏení daÀové zátûÏe, stejnû jako její efektivnûj‰í smûfiování. První zákonodárné akty v oblasti daní byly pfiijaty v roce 2000, hlavní ãást reforem se ale zapoãala o rok pozdûji. V ní byly zavedeny zmûny

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t˘kající se danû ze zisku a danû z pfiírodních zdrojÛ. Od ledna roku 2001 pak byla zavedena jednotná sazba danû z pfiíjmÛ fyzick˘ch osob ve v˘‰i 13 % (do té doby byly sazby 12, 20 a 30 %). Reforma získala ‰irok˘ ohlas, neboÈ rok po jejím zavedení vzrostly v˘nosy danû z pfiíjmÛ fyzick˘ch osob o 26 %. Toto ãíslo ov‰em nelze vykládat jako jednoznaãn˘ v˘sledek reformy, je nutno mít na pamûti vysok˘ rÛst ekonomiky jako takové a také platÛ, navíc ne‰lo ani zdaleka o jedinou reformu daÀového zákonodárství. Pfiesto je neoddiskutovateln˘m faktem, Ïe se zv˘‰ila daÀová disciplína u nejvy‰‰ích platov˘ch tfiíd.12 Stejnû dÛleÏit˘m bylo zavedení jednotné sociální danû namísto systému plateb do fondu penzijního, sociálního poji‰tûní a fondu zamûstnanosti, zdravotního poji‰tûní. Celková úroveÀ tûchto odvodÛ byla pro zamûstnavatele 38,5 %, pro zamûstnance potom 1 %. Po reformû byla maximální úroveÀ danû stanovena na 35,6 %, které platí zamûstnavatel. Od 1. ledna 2005 byla zmûnûna na 26 % a byla i roz‰ífiena pásma této degresivní danû.13 V roce 2004 byla sníÏena i základní sazba danû z pfiidané hodnoty, a to z 20 % na 18 % (niωí sazba zÛstává na 10%). DaÀ z pfiíjmu právnick˘ch osob byla reformou v roce 2002 sníÏena z 35 % (pro banky a poji‰Èovny dosahovala sazba danû 43%) na 24%, byly zru‰eny investiãní v˘hody a urychlila se moÏnost odpisÛ. V roce 2003 byl zjednodu‰en systém daní i pro malé podniky s obratem men‰ím neÏ 15 mil. dolarÛ (od roku 2007 20 mil.) a ménû neÏ 100 zamûstnanci. Zru‰ení se doãkaly také nûkteré dal‰í danû, které byly prakticky danûmi z obratu (daÀ na správu sociální infrastruktury atd.). Reforma dále odstranila nûkteré úlevy pro vojáky a emigranty, pfieadresovala pfiíjmy z daní z pfiíjmu fyzick˘ch osob (nyní pfiecházejí v plném objemu regionÛm), v˘znamné je odvádûní daní podnikateli v místû jejich podnikání, nikoli místû registrace, coÏ platí i pro jejich filiálky.14 Toto opat12 13

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Ivanova A., Keen M., Klemm A., The Russian Flat Tax Reform, IMF Working Paper, WP/05/16, January 2005. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp0516.pdf. Zatímco daÀ 35,6 % se platila ze 100.000 rublÛ platu, 20 % z dal‰ích 101–300 tisíc, 10 % z 301– 600 tisíc a 2 % nad tuto ãástku, nyní jsou rozsahy 26 % – z 200.000, 10 % 201–600 tisíc a 2 % nad tuto sumu. 2005 Survey of Taxation Issues in Russia, Ernst&Young, s. 17, http://www.ey.com/ global/download.nsf/Russia_E/TaxSurvey_2005E/$file/TAX_survey2005E.pdf. BlíÏe k fiskálním vztahÛm mezi centrem a regiony viz. Solanko L., Tekoniemi M., To recentralise or decentralise – Some Recent Trends In Russian Fiscal federalism, BOFIT Online, 5/2005. http://www.bof.fi/bofit/eng/7online/05abs/05pdf/bon0505.pdf.

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fiení bylo sice zavedeno spí‰e proti tzv. daÀov˘m optimalizacím, nicménû má pozitivní vliv i na místní orgány, které jsou motivovány k pfiilákání co nejvût‰ího poãtu podnikatelÛ. Poslední zmûnou je zru‰ení dûdické danû a danû darovací. Tyto sráÏky prakticky pfiedstavovaly dvojí zdanûní, navíc jejich v˘bûr byl oproti v˘nosu pfiíli‰ drah˘. Celkovû se dá fiíci, Ïe kumulovaná daÀová zátûÏ v Ruské federaci je v souãasné dobû na pomûrnû nízké úrovni, alespoÀ ve srovnání se zemûmi stfiední a v˘chodní Evropy. Rusk˘m problémem tak není ani v˘‰e daní, jako problematická administrativa kolem platby. I pfies v˘razné zjednodu‰ení daÀového zákonodárství (z 52 rÛzn˘ch daní a 2 speciálních reÏimÛ na 15 a 4)15 tento problém pfietrvává. Zmatek v zákonech slouÏí k úãelov˘m v˘kladÛm, coÏ jen podporuje jiÏ tak vysokou míru korupce. Typick˘m pfiíkladem takového zmatení je situace kolem v˘bûru DPH a jeho vracení. Sem smûfiují hlavní v˘hrady podnikatelÛ, ktefií v Rusku buì jiÏ podnikají nebo se tam chystají, daleko ãastûji neÏ na samotnou v˘‰i daní.16 Bankovní systém Standardní trÏní ekonomiky je moÏno z hlediska zpÛsobu, jak˘m firmy získávají kapitál pro svÛj rozvoj, rozdûlit na dva typy. Prvním typem jsou ponejvíce anglosaské zemû s vysok˘m podílem trhÛ cenn˘ch papírÛ. Oproti tomu dominantnû kontinentální typ klade vût‰í dÛraz na bankovní sluÏby. Takové dûlení je samozfiejmû jen velmi pfiibliÏné, neboÈ ani jeden z obou typÛ není jednoznaãn˘. Ruská ekonomika roku 1998 prakticky nepatfiila ani do jednoho z tûchto dvou typÛ, nejvût‰í podíl investic v ní tvofiily reinvestované zisky. Vzhledem k prozatím skomírajícímu akciovému trhu, na kterém reálnû obchoduje zhruba deset titulÛ, bude mít pro její dal‰í rozvoj zásadní v˘znam rozvoj bankovního sektoru. Rusk˘ bankovní systém byl tûÏce zasaÏen krizí roku 1998. Nejvût‰í banky umísÈovaly své prostfiedky do v˘hodn˘ch státních dluhopisÛ, coÏ se posléze ukázalo jako sebezniãující strategie. Vzhledem k slabé roli bank v eko-

15 16

Shatalov, Tax Reform in Russia: History and Future, s.12. http://www.iticnet.org/publications/ShatalovLSELecture10Nov2005FinalEng.pdf. 2005 Survey…, s. 6.

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nomice jako takové nebyla jeho krize pro ekonomiku katastrofální.17 Banky se namísto transformace úspor do úvûrÛ vûnovaly spí‰e spekulacím na finanãních trzích. Reforma bankovního sektoru je rozdûlena do dvou fází, pfiiãemÏ první je detailnû popsána ve Strategii rozvoje bankovního sektoru Ruské federace na období do roku 2008.18 Ta definuje základní cíle jako zv˘‰ení konkurence na ruském bankovním trhu, zv˘‰ení ochrany vûfiitelÛ ãi zv˘‰ení role bankovního sektoru v ruské ekonomice, ãímÏ pfiímo navazuje na Program zhodnocení finanãního sektoru Ruské federace, na kterém ruské úfiady spolupracovaly s Mezinárodním mûnov˘m fondem a Svûtovou bankou v letech 2002–2003. Druhá fáze, pro kterou je‰tû nebyl pfiíslu‰n˘ programov˘ dokument zpracován, je zamûfiena spí‰e na zv˘‰ení konkurenceschopnosti ruského bankovního sektoru vÛãi zahraniãním subjektÛm. Jako jeden z hlavních úkolÛ souvisejících se zv˘‰ením dÛvûry v bankovní sektor stanovuje Strategie pro vládu i Centrální banku pfiijetí zákona o povinném poji‰tûní vkladÛ. Jeho urychlenému uvedení do Ïivota (sám zákon byl schválen po dlouhé dobû projednávání v prosinci roku 2003, ale chybûly k nûmu provádûcí zákony) pomohla letní krize z roku 2004 (nûkdy také „minikrize“, „krize dÛvûry“ ãi také „krize likvidity“), kdy vedle zablokování mezibankovního trhu do‰lo k rychlému odlivu prostfiedkÛ drobn˘ch klientÛ z postiÏen˘ch bank. V souladu se zákonem byl zfiízen fond poji‰tûní vkladÛ, do kterého jsou v‰echny banky zafiazené do systému povinny odvádût pfiíspûvky a z nûhoÏ se poté aÏ do v˘‰e 100.000 rublÛ vyplácejí náhrady.19 Zákon pokr˘vá pouze vklady fyzick˘ch osob v bankách na ruském území, na coÏ pfiipadá asi 85 % v‰ech vkladÛ. V ruském pfiípadû není na místû obava z nezodpovûdného jednání bank v souvislosti s tímto zákonem, neboÈ tyto prostfiedky tvofií jen men‰í ãást celkov˘ch pasiv sektoru.20 Stabilitû bankovního sektoru by mûl pfiispût i zákon O úvûrové historii ze 30. prosince 2004. Ten zakládá Úfiad pro úvûrovou historii, ve kterém 17 18 19 20

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Ahrend R. Tompson W., Fifteen years of economic reforms in Russia… Strategija razvitija bankovskogo sektora Rossijskoj Federacii na period do 2008 goda, http:// www.cbr.ru/today/publications_reports/print.asp?file=str_2008.htm. V dobû psaní tohoto pfiíspûvku bylo projednáváno zv˘‰ení limitÛ postupnû na 190 a 250 tisíc. Srov. Tompson W., Banking reform in Russia: Problems and Prospects, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No 410, OECD Publishing, http://www.sourceoecd.org/10.1787/ 346560635401, s. 14–16.

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se budou shromaÏìovat informace o dluÏnících. Tím by se mûlo zamezit úvûrov˘m podvodÛm, nicménû otázkou zatím zÛstává ochrana osobních údajÛ. Podle zákona O bankách a bankovní ãinnosti a následného pfiedpisu Centrální banky byly v‰echny banky povinny zavést toto úãetnictví do 1. ledna 2004. Tento krok pfiispívá k vût‰í kontrolovatelnosti a prÛzraãnosti v sektoru.21 Aãkoli k 1. únoru 2006 na ruském území pÛsobilo 1247 bank, jejich podíl je znaãnû nevyrovnan˘. Bankovní sektor je poznamenán v˘sadním postavením jednoho subjektu, kter˘m je Sberbank. Ten má naprosto dominantní postavení, aÈ jiÏ co se celkov˘ch aktiv t˘ãe (kolem 25 %), v˘‰e vkladÛ fyzick˘ch osob (58 %), poskytnut˘ch úvûrÛ (50 % fyzick˘m, 29 % právnick˘m osobám). Jeho v˘jimeãná role se projevila v prÛbûhu otfiesÛ v létû 2004, kdy Centrální banka, která Sberbank kontroluje, instruovala banku k ochotnûj‰ímu poskytování úvûrÛ na mezibankovním trhu, ãímÏ se zv˘‰ila jeho likvidita. Banka tak plní i nûkteré úkoly, které komerãnímu subjektu nenáleÏí. Podle Strategii rozvoje bankovního sektoru Ruské federace na období do roku 2008 si stát hodlá ponechat v této, stejnû jako druhé státní bance, nadpoloviãní podíl. Postupné klesání podílu Sberbank na trhu, jehoÏ jsme svûdky, potom umoÏní státu privatizovat i tuto banku. Zatímco v roce 1998 byla role bank v ekonomice velmi malá, v souãasné dobû jsme svûdky tendence k jejímu zvy‰ování. Pomûr bankovních aktiv k HDP vzrostl z 32,9 % v lednu roku 2000 na 45 % v lednu roku 2006, podíl úvûrÛ nefinanãním organizacím na celkov˘ch aktivech bank z 31,9 % na 55,9 % a jejich pomûr k HDP z 10,5 % na 22,5 %.22 Celková aktiva rusk˘ch bank dosahují úrovnû 300 mld dolarÛ. âasto uÏívan˘m je v tomto pfiípadû srovnání s Dresdner bank, jejíÏ aktiva ãiní 600 mld. dolarÛ.23 S rÛstem vlivu bank na ekonomiku koresponduje klesající role vlastních prostfiedkÛ v investicích do základního kapitálu. Pfiesto není doposud situace ideální, jak dokládá i samotná Strategie.

21 22 23

O kreditnych istorijach, http://www.akdi.ru/gd/proekt/094951GD.SHTM. O bankach i bankovskoj dejatel’nosti, http://www.consultant.ru/popular/bank/. Obzor bankovskogo sektora Rossijskoj Federacii, No. 41, mart 2006 goda, http://www.cbr.ru/analytics/bank_ system/obs_060201.pdf. Dresdner Bank – An Overview, http://www.dresdner-bank.com/content/03_unternehmen/01_zahlen_fakten/04_geschaeftsbericht/pdf/geschaeftsbericht_2004/Overview.pdf.

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S pfiíchodem zahraniãních bank, a tedy i s v˘razn˘m rÛstem konkurence na bankovním trhu, roste také nabídka jednotliv˘ch produktÛ od hypoteãních po spotfiebitelské úvûry. Tyto segmenty zaznamenávají obrovsk˘ nárÛst, kter˘, jak se zdá, bude je‰tû sílit. Spolu se sektorov˘m roz‰ífiením sluÏeb dochází také k regionální expanzi. Vzhledem k tomu, Ïe konkurence v Moskvû a Petrohradu je jiÏ dostateãnû ostrá, banky pronikají i do dal‰ích oblastí, hlavnû milionov˘ch mûst a oblastí tûÏby ropy a zemního plynu. Banky s více neÏ padesátiprocentním podílem zahraniãního kapitálu kontrolují pfiibliÏnû 8,5 % aktiv bankovního sektoru a dá se oãekávat dal‰í rÛst jejich podílu.24 V souãasné dobû neexistuje Ïádn˘ práh pro podíl zahraniãního kapitálu v ruském bankovním sektoru (do roku 2002 bylo tímto prahem 25 %). Velmi oblíben˘m tématem debat je ideální poãet bank a finanãních organizací nebankovního typu. Tato otázka, byÈ se zdá logickou, je ponûkud nesmyslná, neboÈ normativní urãení jejich poãtu je vÏdy sporné. Jako srovnání lze uvést evropské zemû, kde v Nûmecku pÛsobí 2247 finanãních ústavÛ, zatímco ve Velké Británii „pouze“ 497. Tzv. ideální poãet tedy není v Ïádném pfiípadû moÏné urãit a vÏdy se pfiizpÛsobuje potfiebám zemû. Z toho potom plyne, Ïe v zemi s velkou regionální diverzitou jako je Rusko, bude poãet v˘raznû vy‰‰í neÏ napfiíklad v územnû homogenní Francii. Daleko dÛleÏitûj‰í je proto v˘znam sektoru pro ekonomiku jako takovou a zde mají ruské banky co dohánût. Ruské banky jsou také vût‰inou malé. Z celkového poãtu finanãních institucí na ruském trhu jich pouze jedna polovina dosahuje vy‰‰ího základního kapitálu, neÏ je pût milionÛ euro. Tato suma byla stanovena jako minimální pro bankovní instituce dodatky k zákonÛm O bankách a bankovní ãinnosti a zákonu O Centrální bance Ruska.25 S úãinností od roku 2007 budou muset v‰echny novû vznikající banky dosáhnout této hodnoty.26 Tím vláda plánuje podpofiení koncentrace v bankovním sektoru. Poslední trendy ukazují, Ïe, byÈ zatím velmi nesmûle, stoupá dÛvûra rusk˘ch obãanÛ k bankám, kter˘m se postupnû dafií dostávat peníze zpod mat24 25 26

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Obzor bankovskogo sektora…tab. 9. O Central’nom banke Rossijskoj Federacii (Banke Rossii), http://www.akdi.ru/GD/ PROEKT/ 084012GD.SHTM. PÛvodní verzi zákona, která poÏadovala tuto úroveÀ pro v‰echny banky bez rozdílu se podafiilo Asociaci rusk˘ch bank zmírnit. Banky, které jiÏ na trhu fungují a nedosahují této úrovnû, budou moci pokraãovat ve své ãinnosti, ale v˘‰e jejich základního kapitálu nebude moci poklesnout.

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rací na úãty. Tomuto jevu v˘raznû dopomohla opatfiení, jako jsou Zákon o poji‰tûní vkladÛ, zv˘‰ení povinného základního jmûní, stejnû jako pfiíchod zahraniãních bankovních spoleãností. Vklady v rublech za první ãtvrtinu roku 2005 vzrostly o ohromujících 30 %, vklady v zahraniãních mûnách o 20 %. Jde tedy o pozitivní trend pfiíklonu Ruska od dolarÛ k rublÛm. Mocnû rostou odvûtví, jako je napfiíklad spotfiebitelské úvûrování, hypoteãní kredity atd. To ale s sebou nese nebezpeãí v podobû zhor‰ující se kvality aktiv a klesání kapitálové pfiimûfienosti. Ta jiÏ nyní podle západních úãetních standardÛ nedosahuje u ãásti bank ani poÏadovan˘ch 2 %. Pro tyto banky potom zv˘‰ení tohoto ukazatele na 8 % bude znamenat váÏné problémy. Na druhou stranu právû nejrychleji se rozvíjející oblasti, jako je spotfiební úvûrování jsou pod kontrolou buì bank se siln˘m zahraniãním vlastníkem (Russkij Standart-vlastníkem BNP Paribas, Home Credit-vlastníkem PPF) nebo velk˘mi státními bankami (Sberbank, Vnû‰torgbank), coÏ ponûkud sniÏuje nebezpeãí otfiesu v tomto segmentu.27 Reforma státních monopolÛ Mezi státní monopoly fiadíme pfiedev‰ím energetické firmy. Tyto firmy, na rozdíl od obdobn˘ch firem na Západû, nevznikly pÛsobením trhu, ale byly zfiízeny státem. Ceny jejich produkce jsou regulovány státem, kter˘ tak ochraÀuje domácí v˘robce i individuální spotfiebitele. Na druhou stranu tak brání ustavení cen na trÏní úrovni. Ceny produkce poskytované monopoly potom znaãnû pfiispívají k rÛstu inflace. Tyto firmy plní kromû své komerãní role také roli regulaãní. Jejich rozhodnutí urãuje podmínky pro vstup konkurence do jejich rozvodn˘ch sítí, coÏ jistû není ideální stav. V této reformû dosáhlo Rusko a jeho prezident nejménû úspûchÛ a Vladimír Putin byl donucen pochopit limity své „absolutní“ moci. V roce 2000 ministr pro ekonomick˘ rozvoj a obchod German Gref vystoupil s programem na rozdûlení státních monopolÛ, vyãlenûní z nich pfiirozen˘ch monopolÛ (tedy pfiepravní kapacity) a následnû plná liberalizace. Gazprom tak mûl b˘t zbaven transportního systému, v jeho moci mûla b˘t ponechána 27

Ruské banky nejsou v hrozbû sniÏování kvality úvûrového portfolia zdaleka osamoceny – EU Banking Sector Stability, October 2005, http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/eubankingsectorstability2005en.pdf, s. 5.

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pouze tûÏba a prodej plynu. Takov˘ program je jistû z ekonomického pohledu správn˘, pfiesto se jej nepodafiilo pro odpor pfiedstavitelÛ monopolÛ prosadit, a systém zÛstal beze zmûny. Ne‰lo tak ani o svobodné rozhodnutí, jako spí‰e o neschopnost jej prosadit.28 Plynárensk˘ monopol Gazprom také trpí velkou zadluÏeností. Vzhledem k povaze jeho podnikání, které vyÏaduje obrovské investice v fiádech miliard dolarÛ, pochází vût‰ina jeho úvûrÛ ze zahraniãí. Navíc, stále rostoucí náklady na stavbu Severomofiského plynovodu nepochybnû je‰tû dluhy zv˘‰í. Z tohoto dÛvodu byl neúspûch pohlcení Rosnûfti Gazpromem pozitivním v˘sledkem. Pravdûpodobnû je‰tû vût‰í potfiebu v rychlé reformû ukazuje sektor elektrárensk˘, jak ukázaly v˘padky v dodávkách energie v zimû 2005–6. Zvlá‰tû silná je potfieba velk˘ch investic, stejnû jako zv˘‰ení doposud nízk˘ch cen za elektrickou energii. Hlavní dÛraz reforma klade na vytvofiení konkurenãního prostfiedí v sektoru prostfiednictvím rozdûlení energetické soustavy na v˘robce, rozvodnou síÈ a prodejce. V roce 2003 byl pfiijat program volného obchodu s energií (5–15 Market). Základní ideou celého projektu je rozdûlení státního energetického monopolu RAO JES na jednotlivé podniky podle teritoriálního i sektorového principu. Firma by tak mûla zaniknout do konce roku 2006.

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dle vûku (hranicí je 80 let vûku) bez ohledu na v˘‰i pfiíspûvkÛ, dal‰ím stupnûm je povinné poji‰tûní, které platí zamûstnavatel za svého zamûstnance a je evidováno na individuálním úãtu (pfiedstavuje závazek státu vÛãi budoucímu penzistovi, nicménû jsou z nûj placeny souãasné dÛchody), a tfietím stupnûm, jímÏ je investiãní ãást, kterou od 1. ledna 2003 mÛÏe obãan investovat buì do státního, nebo nestátného fondu. Nepfiízniv˘ pomûr poãtu ekonomicky aktivního obyvatelstva vÛãi dÛchodcÛm potom vytváfií tlak na zvy‰ování vûku odchodu do dÛchodu.29 Stejnû tak byla na zjednodu‰ení sociálního systému zamûfiena i reforma takzvan˘ch sociálních v˘hod. Její podstatou bylo pfievedení nepenûÏních v˘hod pro ‰iroké skupiny obyvatelstva, jako byli hrdinové práce, váleãní veteráni, obûti âernobylu a jiné, na penûÏní platby. Reforma byla odstartována od ledna 2005 a i pfies svou ekonomickou opodstatnûnost vzbudila ‰irok˘ odpor a musela b˘t zmírnûna, navíc nebyla ani vláda, ani regionální zástupci dostateãnû pfiipraveni na její uvedení do Ïivota, nedostateãné bylo i financování. Nûkteré regiony, zvlá‰tû ty nejbohat‰í, potom pfiistoupily k jejímu zru‰ení. Stfiednûdob˘ plán ruské vlády na roky 2006–2008 definoval reformy v sociální oblasti jako hlavní úkol pro toto období. V˘hodou tûchto opatfiení je, Ïe na rozdíl od armádní reformy ãi reforem v oblasti energetiky nenaráÏejí oblasti zdravotnictví ãi ‰kolství na tak silnou opozici v podobû lobbyistick˘ch skupin.30

Penzijní a dal‰í sociální reformy Soudní reforma a vymahatelnost práva Rusko v souãasné dobû ãelí velmi nepfiíznivé demografické situaci. Pfiedpokládaná délka vûku obãanÛ narozen˘ch v roce 2002 se u muÏÛ odhaduje na pouh˘ch 58,5, coÏ je dokonce pod úrovní vûku odchodu do dÛchodu, u Ïen potom na 72 let. Vzhledem k tomu, Ïe ani vyhlídky do budoucna nejsou nijak pfiíznivé, systém se stává v dlouhodobém horizontu neudrÏiteln˘m. Zemû je nucena reagovat na tyto trendy, a to hned dvûma zpÛsoby – sociální a penzijní reformou. Reformou penzijního systému od 1. ledna 2002 zavedlo Rusko trojstupÀov˘ systém. Prvním stupnûm je základní dÛchod diferencovan˘ po-

Soudy jsou naprosto zásadními institucemi dobfie fungujících spoleãností. Problémem Ruska není ani tak v˘jimeãnû ‰patná kvalita zákonÛ, jako spí‰e mnoÏství pfiedpisÛ a problémy s jejich vymáháním. Proto byla jednou z prvních vyhlá‰en˘ch reforem reforma soudní. Ta se hlavnû zamûfiila 29

30 28

Jiného názoru je Hardt J., Putin’s Windows of Economic Oportunity, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 52, No. 4, July/August 2005, s. 14–21.

Podrobnûji k penzijní reformû viz. Sinyavksaya O., Pension reform in Russia: A Challenge of Low Pension Age, PIE Discussion Paper, http://www.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/pie/Japanese/discussionpaper/dp2004/ dp267/text.pdf. Ponûkud cynicky se mÛÏeme dohadovat, zda ‰iroká publicita, které se dostalo brutálnímu zmrzaãení vojína Syãova pfii v˘konu základní vojenské sluÏby, nebyla namífiena právû proti vojenské lobby. The Economy And Investment Climate In Russia, s. 8, http://www.amcham.ru/publications/investment_reports/p906060506104903.

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na zv˘‰ení dÛvûryhodnosti rusk˘ch soudÛ, omezení korupce v nich a na posílení jejich nezávislosti. Z dílãích, leã dÛleÏit˘ch úkolÛ potom na vymezení pravomocí arbitráÏních soudÛ, zavedení arbitráÏních odvolacích soudÛ. AÏ do této doby bylo totiÏ pomûrnû ãasté, Ïe se soud arbitráÏní neshodl na rozsudku se soudem obecné jurisdikce. Tím potom vznikaly zmatky, je‰tû umocÀující jiÏ tak velk˘ chaos v nûkdy si protifieãících zákonech. Soudní moc byla celkovû posílena, zavedeny byly nûkteré normy pro regulaci vy‰etfiovacího procesu. Vedle nejednotnosti v˘kladÛ je dal‰ím problémem doba, po kterou jsou pfiípady projednávány. Napfiíklad 64 % sporÛ veden˘ch ohlednû daní je projednáváno déle, neÏ 6 mûsícÛ, na druhou stranu stejn˘ v˘zkum spoleãnosti Ernst&Young uvádí, Ïe 60 % soudních sporÛ v daÀové oblasti bylo rozhodnuto ve prospûch plátcÛ (s tím, Ïe dal‰ích 32 % bylo v dobû prÛzkumu v projednávání).31 Nakolik toto ãíslo mluví o zvy‰ující se nezávislosti soudcÛ schopn˘ch rozhodnout i proti státnímu orgánu a nakolik jde spí‰e o ‰patnou práci prokuratury popfiípadû daÀov˘ch úfiedníkÛ, je tûÏké zmûfiit, pfiesto jde o signál zvy‰ující se moÏnosti dosáhnout spravedlivého rozsudku. Ruské soudnictví trpûlo velkou mírou korupce a politického vlivu na rozhodování. Zákon O statutu soudcÛ z roku 2003 se snaÏí posílit pfiedev‰ím institut soudce, do‰lo díky nûmu k v˘raznému zv˘‰ení platÛ, roz‰ífiení se doãkají také poãetní stavy nejen soudcÛ, ale i soudních úfiedníkÛ. K rozvoji v oblasti vymahatelnosti práva pfiispívá i integrace zemû do mezinárodních organizací. Rusku se podafiilo dosáhnout v˘znamného pokroku na cestû do WTO. Do roku 2006 úspû‰nû ukonãilo dvoustranné rozhovory s prakticky v‰emi ãleny organizace, kromû USA. Jedním z hlavních problémÛ je otázka autorsk˘ch práv (vedle otevfienosti finanãního sektoru atd.) Po velmi dlouhé dobû ostentativního nezájmu se ruské úfiady zaãaly tûmito otázkami váÏnû zab˘vat a, byÈ situace není v Ïádném pfiípadû ideální, pfiijaly pfiíslu‰ná opatfiení.

Negativní tendence Aãkoli je moÏno celkovû politiku souãasné vlády v oblasti reforem hodnotit spí‰e pozitivnû, nelze nevidût ani negativní tendence, které by ekonomiku mohly ohrozit. V oblasti státních financí si Rusko stojí velmi dobfie, o ãemÏ svûdãí i neustále se zvy‰ující ratingy úvûrové spolehlivosti od v‰ech tfií svûtov˘ch agentur (Fitch, Moody’s a Standard&Poot’s). Rusko splácí své závazky dokonce s pfiedstihem, jak ukázalo splacení dluhu PafiíÏskému klubu vûfiitelÛ ve v˘‰i 18 mld. dolarÛ v ãervnu 2005. Ruské valutové rezervy (vãetnû zlata) pfiekroãily v bfieznu roku 2006 úroveÀ 200 mld. dolarÛ. Je ov‰em otázkou, do jaké míry jsou tyto pozitivní ukazatele dány dobrou fiskální politikou. Patrn˘m trendem je totiÏ rostoucí podíl pfiíjmÛ z ropy ve státním rozpoãtu. Stát tak není nucen ‰etfiit, namísto toho dochází k neefektivnímu vynakládání prostfiedkÛ. Zatím neúspû‰n˘m zÛstává boj s inflací. Ta se pohybuje na úrovni kolem 12 % roãnû a optimistické odhady doufající v její sníÏení pod 10 % zÛstávají spí‰e na úrovni pfiání. V boji proti inflaci negativnû pÛsobí pfiedev‰ím vyhlá‰ení cíle zdvojnásobení HDP do deseti let. Tento cíl zv˘‰il tlak na pouÏití prostfiedkÛ Stabilizaãního fondu vytvofieného v roce 2004. Funkce fondu jako brzdy inflace je jiÏ tak oslabena díky existenci prahu 27 dolarÛ za barel ropy, pfii které jiÏ pfiíjmy nejdou do rozpoãtu, ale do fondu. Tato cena se jiÏ dvakrát od zavedení Stabilizaãního fondu zv˘‰ila a je nebezpeãí, Ïe ne naposledy. Stejn˘ inflaãní efekt mÛÏe mít i Investiãní fond v rozmûru 74 mld. rublÛ, jehoÏ cílem jsou investice do vybran˘ch infrastrukturních projektÛ, hlavnû z dÛvodu trvale nízké efektivity státních investic v Rusku. Postupné rozvolÀování rozpoãtové disciplíny, kterou se Rusku v pfiedcházejících letech dafiilo udrÏet tak mÛÏe b˘t velkou do budoucna hrozbou.32 Rozdûlení rozpoãtu na dvû ãásti, na ropnou, kam by se soustfiedily v‰echny zisky ze surovinové oblasti, a neropnou, do které by patfiily v‰echny ostatní, je sice velmi správnou ideou, ale nezdá se, Ïe by bylo moÏné ji prosadit. Z tûchto prostfiedkÛ by bylo moÏné financovat jednorázové v˘daje bez dal‰ích ná32

31

2005 Survey…, s. 2.

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BlíÏe k otázce Stabilizaãního fondu viz Svoboda K., Rusk˘ Stabilizaãní fond – Záchrana ãi hrozba? Mezinárodní politika, 2/2005, s. 29–30.

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sledkÛ, tedy reformy penzijní nebo v˘padek pfiíjmÛ z Jednotné sociální danû. âásteãnû budou také finance ze Stabilizaãního fondu pouÏity na pokrytí schodku Penzijního fondu ve v˘‰i 75 mld.33 Mnoho otázek také vzbuzují nûkterá „budovatelská“ vyhlá‰ení prezidenta Putina. Politická zadání, jak˘m byla napfiíklad idea zdvojnásobení HDP do deseti let v Poselství k Federálnímu shromáÏdûní Ruské federace v kvûtnu roku 2003, pozdûji byl tento cíl je‰tû zv˘‰en na zdvojnásobení do roku 2010. DosaÏení pÛvodního cíle by pfiitom vyÏadovalo roãní rÛst zhruba o 7,2 %, zv˘‰en˘ o 10,4 %. Takového rÛstu nedosáhlo Rusko ani v pokrizovém roce 2000, kter˘ byl zatím nejúspû‰nûj‰ím rokem Ruské federace. Vedle inflaãních tlakÛ je problémem Ruska smûfiování k vût‰í kontrole byrokracie nad ekonomikou. Reformy prvního období (2001–2002) smûfiovaly k jejímu omezení, tento problém definoval prezident uÏ ve svém Poselství Federálnímu shromáÏdûní na rok 2000: „Podstata státního kontroly ekonomiky nespoãívá v tom, Ïe se budeme opájet administrativními nástroji, ani v expanzi státu do jednotliv˘ch odvûtví (to uÏ jsme zkusili a bylo to neefektivní), ani v podpofie jednotliv˘ch podnikÛ, ale v obranû soukromé iniciativy a v‰ech forem vlastnictví.“34 Na konci roku 2005 potom sledujeme politiku diametrálnû odli‰nou v podobû expanze vlivu státu do energetiky, podpory firmám jako je RosnûfÈ atd. Pod státní kontrolu se tak dostaly spoleãnosti AvtoVaz, Kamov, Silovyje ma‰iny, Rosnûftí byl pfievzat Jugansknûftûgaz, Gazpromem SibnûfÈ, Vnû‰torgbank je posilován za státní peníze atd. Podle nûkter˘ch scénáfiÛ si Rusko hodlá v tûchto podnicích ponechat kontrolní podíl, minoritní potom prodat soukrom˘m investorÛm, vãetnû zahraniãních. Navíc je státní podíl v tûchto podnicích ãasto velmi mal˘, coÏ jejich prodej je‰tû znesnadÀuje. Stát zatím situaci fie‰í koncentrací sv˘ch podílÛ tak, aby pfiípadn˘ prodej podílÛ byl pod jeho kontrolou, nikoli pod kontrolou soukromého subjektu, jak to zam˘‰lel Michail Chodorkovskij pfii chystaném prodeji podílu v Jukosu spoleãnostem ExxonMobil nebo ChevronTexaco. Zde ale hrozí velké nebezpeãí v podobû neviditelné opozice rÛzn˘ch zájmov˘ch skupin, které nebudou mít zájem se jednou ovládnutého podniku zbavit.

Alarmujícím faktorem ruského podnikatelského prostfiedí je úroveÀ korupce, která pfiímo úmûrnû roste s rostoucím vlivem úfiedníkÛ na ekonomiku. V Ïebfiíãku organizace Transparency International, kter˘ i pfies svoji nepochybnou subjektivitu pfiedstavuje jisté mûfiítko její úrovnû pokleslo Rusko na úroveÀ Venezuely. V nûkter˘ch pfiípadech nelze prakticky jiné neÏ zahraniãní zájemce oãekávat vzhledem k celkové trÏní kapitalizaci firmy. Ta napfiíklad v pfiípadû koncernu Gazprom dosahuje 200 mld. dolarÛ. Budování vertikálnû fiízen˘ch spoleãností je povaÏováno za krok k efektivizaci jejich práce a tím i ke zv˘‰ení ceny, kterou mÛÏe stát pfii prodeji utrÏit35. Zahraniãní vlastnictví je pfiitom v Rusku vnímáno v mnohem vût‰í mífie jako politick˘ problém. Nelze oãekávat, Ïe by nastala v krátkém ãasovém horizontu situace jako napfiíklad v ãeském bankovním sektoru, kter˘ je témûfi stoprocentnû vlastnûn zahraniãními subjekty. Rusko je velmi atraktivní pro zahraniãní ropné spoleãnosti díky pomûrnû vysoké mífie stability, coÏ se o jin˘ch regionech (rovníková a severní Afrika, Persk˘ záliv, Venezuela) rozhodnû fiíci nedá. Tato politika etatizace má negativní vliv na situaci v ropném a plynárenském sektoru, které jsou pro Rusko zásadní.36 Prakticky ve v‰ech firmách, které byly získány státem (aÈ v té ãi oné formû), poklesla v˘konnost a tûÏba. Rusko zde zaãíná ãelit váÏn˘m problémÛm v sektorech, které tvofií podle oficiálních ãísel aÏ 25 % HDP.37 Ty spoãívají v zastaralosti technologií, zadluÏování firem v zahraniãí a nedostateãné investiãní aktivitû, kterou sice lze ãásteãnû vysvûtlovat cyklick˘mi jevy (v dobû nízk˘ch cen mají firmy tendenci tlumit investice, v dobách vysok˘ch je naopak zvy‰u-

35 36

37 33 34

The Economy… Poslanije Federal’nomu Sobraniju Rossijskoj Federacii 8 ijulja 2000 goda, http://www.kremlin.ru/ appears/2000/07/08/0000_type63372_28782.shtml.

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S jist˘m zjednodu‰ením se struktura Gazpromu dá pfiirovnat k âEZu, kter˘ se také sestává z v˘robních, distribuãních i prodejních souãástí. Problematikou ruské politiky vÛãi zahraniãním investicím v energetickém sektoru se detailnû zab˘vá: Brill Olcott M., The Energy Dimension in Russian Global Strategy. Vladimir Putin and the Geopolitics of Oil, James A., Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, October 2004. http:// www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/PEC_Olcott_10_2004.pdf. âlánek také obsahuje velmi zajímav˘ rozbor prezidentov˘ch názorÛ na soukromé vlastnictví v surovinovém sektoru. Sutela P., Will growth in Russia continue? Bank of Finland bulletin, 2005/4, s. 15. http://www.bof.fi/ bofit/eng/10pub/Bulletin_PS.pdf. Problémem je, Ïe tato ãísla ãasto zahrnují pouze samotn˘ prodej a tûÏbu surovin. Jejich pfieprava je potom zahrnuta mezi sluÏby. Proto také premiér Fradkov odhadoval podíl energetického zásobování na 31 %.

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jí, nicménû díky povaze podnikání se právû zv˘‰ená investiãní aktivita projevuje aÏ s ãasov˘m odstupem). Rusku prozatím nehrozí tzv. holandská nemoc, kdy dominance jednoho sektoru zpÛsobuje rÛst investic do nûj a ignorování potfieb ostatních, následnû posílení mûny, ãímÏ je zniãena konkurenceschopnost dal‰ích odvûtví. Z toho dÛvodu je dÛleÏitá bude diverzifikace ekonomiky. Velmi negativní událostí, která znejistila celé podnikatelské prostfiedí, byla aféra kolem firmy Jukos, zvlá‰tû po zatãení Michaila Chodorkovského v fiíjnu 2003. Pfiípad nelze zjednodu‰it na stíhání nevinného, sama firma provádûla aÏ do urãité doby operace znaãnû pochybné (zvlá‰tû zpÛsob, jak˘m se Chodorkovskij zbavil minoritních akcionáfiÛ, byl velmi nevybírav˘, stejnû tak operace vyuÏívající daÀov˘ch rájÛ z hlediska bûÏného ruského obãana minimálnû nemorální a podle nûkter˘ch názorÛ zpÛsobil jeho problémy38). Problémem se ale stala selektivní povaha zákroku. Zatímco Jukos byl systematicky likvidován ãasto fantastick˘mi nároky berních úfiedníkÛ a majiteli byl prakticky bez ohledu na cokoli odebrán (podivné okolnosti aukce, kdy firma byla v jednom t˘dnu ocenûna nejdfiíve na 9 mld. dolarÛ, o t˘den pozdûji na patnáct), minimálnû stejnû problematická spoleãnost SibnûfÈ Romana Abramoviãe, která jednala je‰tû na podzim roku 2003 o spojení s Jukosem, byla prodána za trÏní cenu. Abramoviã byl pravdûpodobnû varován pfied následky plánované fúze. Takové praktiky zpochybÀují rovnost pfied zákonem i nezávislost soudÛ a investory musí vést k opatrnosti. Svoji roli v tomto pfiípadû sehrály také nûkteré zahraniãní banky, které se státem na likvidaci Jukosu velmi ochotnû spolupracovaly. Právû selektivnost aplikace právních norem byla dÛvodem odstoupení A. Illarionova z funkce prezidentova poradce pro ekonomiku.39 Kromû znejistûní investorÛ, ktefií si nicménû celou akci pfieloÏili jako pouhou individuální akci vÛãi do politiky pfiíli‰ aktivnû zasahujícímu oligarchovi byla zlikvidována nejefektivnûj‰í ruská firma. V souãasné dobû ruské firmy bojují s nízkou efektivitou, která sráÏí jejich konkurenceschopnost. Dal‰ím problémem jsou paradoxnû nízké náklady na energie. Ty umoÏÀují podnikÛm dlouhodobû hospodafiit bez ja-

kéhokoli tlaku na sníÏení energetické nároãnosti v˘roby. Stát tak fakticky subvencuje neschopné podnikatele. Stále nízká je velikost investic do základního kapitálu, které v Rusku dosahují pfiibliÏnû 18 %, zatímco ve vyspûl˘ch zemích se toto ãíslo pohybuje minimálnû na úrovni 22 %. Pokud vezmeme v úvahu zastaralost v˘robních prostfiedkÛ, dostáváme nepfiíli‰ radostnou situaci pro budoucnost. Firmy prostû pouze obnovují souãasné kapacity a nerozvíjejí se, navíc valnou vût‰inu tûchto investic zaji‰Èuje reinvestovan˘ zisk, zatímco podíl bankovních úvûrÛ je relativnû mal˘ – v roce 2004 dosahoval 7,7 % (oproti 5,2 v roce 2003). Díky tomu zÛstává produktivita práce na nízké úrovni, ruské firmy pro svoji v˘robu potfiebují v˘raznû více zamûstnancÛ, neÏ jejich protûj‰ky z vyspûl˘ch trhÛ. Zmûna tohoto faktu bude mít nepfiízniv˘ krátkodob˘ vliv na vzrÛst nezamûstnanosti, která nyní dosahuje 7,7 %. V souãasné dobû je sociální zodpovûdnost byznysu chápána spí‰e jako v˘roba zamûstnaneck˘ch míst bez ohledu na jejich potfiebu. Proces pfiijímání zákonn˘ch norem nutn˘ch pro ekonomické reformy obvykle probíhá formou nekritického pfiijetí prezidentského návrhu a jeho postupném „vylep‰ování“ ze strany poslancÛ. Problémem rusk˘ch ekonomick˘ch reforem ale není tolik jejich kvalita (v nûkter˘ch pfiípadech jsou v˘raznû progresivní i v celosvûtovém mûfiítku), jako spí‰e neschopnost státního aparátu uvést je do praxe. Aãkoli Rusko disponuje kvantitativnû velmi silnou administrativou, není schopné reformní kroky implementovat, popfiípadû jsou zavádûny v pokroucené podobû. Pokus o administrativní reformu vyhlá‰en˘ v Poselství prezidenta za rok 2003 a dále rozveden˘ pfiíslu‰n˘m v˘nosem mûl v‰echny tyto problémy odstranit. Reforma zavádûla trojstupÀov˘ systém s Federálními ministerstvy s funkcemi utváfiení státní politiky a normativnû právními funkcemi, federálními sluÏbami, které pfiedstavují dohled a kontrolu a federálními agenturami s funkcí poskytování státních sluÏeb a správy státního majetku. Dokument také pfiedpokládal slouãení nûkter˘ch ministerstev, jiná pfievedl do federálních sluÏeb ãi agentur. 40 40

38 39

Olcott M. The Energy Dimension in Russian Global Strategy… s. 12. Illarionov A., Drugaja strana, Kommersant˝, No. 10 (№ 3341), http://www.kommersant.ru/ doc.html?docId=642781.

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Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii ot 23 ijulja 2003 g. No. 824 O merach po provedeniju administrativnoj reformy v 2003–2004 godach, http://www.businesspravo.ru/Docum/DocumShow_DocumID_83095.html. Ukaz Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii ot 9 marta 2004 g. No. 314 O sisteme i strukture federal’nych organov ispolnitel’noj vlasti, http://www.kadastr.ru/documents/ docs/3438/.

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Vedle deformací se také reformy pfiijímají pomûrnû dlouhou dobu. Pokusy o efektivizaci v podobû centralizace státní moci vedou pouze k opaãnému efektu. Zákony nejsou pfiijímány na základû konfrontace s opozicí, jejich podoba je spí‰e v˘sledkem lobbyistick˘ch tlakÛ. Tím, kromû jin˘ch pfiíznakÛ, politika v˘raznû negativnû promlouvá do ekonomiky.

3. Ruská armáda a bezpeãnostní sloÏky v procesu transformace Richard Stojar

Závûrem Ekonomické reformy za vlády Vladimira Putina zasáhly nesmírnû ‰irokou oblast sahající od daÀové problematiky aÏ po reformy soudní nebo administrativní, z ekonomického pohledu lze vykládat i reformy politické. Cílem reforem je „znormalizování“ ruského podnikatelského prostfiedí prostfiednictvím zjednodu‰ování a zpfiehledÀování a posunutí na úroveÀ standardní trÏní ekonomiky s fungujícími institucemi. Tomu také odpovídají zákonné normy, které jiÏ vût‰inou odpovídají pomûrÛm ve standardních trÏních ekonomikách. Problémem je tak spí‰e implementace zákonÛ do praxe, zvlá‰tû na regionální úrovni. Enormní rozdíly mezi regiony tak brzdí prosazování dal‰ích opatfiení a vláda na nû zatím není schopna adekvátnû reagovat. Zemû se tak i nadále nachází ve stavu pfiechodu od jednoho modelu ekonomiky ke druhému a pfii tomto pfiechodu se pfiirozenû pot˘ká s nûkter˘mi problémy. Na jejich zvládnutí, stejnû jako na ochotû v reformách pokraãovat, bude záviset dal‰í v˘voj zemû. ByÈ je je‰tû pfiíli‰ brzy na jejich reálné zhodnocení, zdá se, Ïe se zemû v ekonomické oblasti ubírá správn˘m smûrem.

Podobnû jako celá ruská spoleãnost pro‰ly i ruské ozbrojené síly po rozpadu Sovûtského svazu sloÏit˘m v˘vojem, kter˘ hluboce zasáhl jejich dosavadní uspofiádání a postavení. Na tento v˘voj se snaÏila reagovat celá fiada mnohdy nekoncepãních a chaotick˘ch reforem, které mnohdy jen znásobily krizi, která uvnitfi rezortu obrany a struktur bezpeãnosti panovala. Situace v ruské armádû, jednom z pilífiÛ ruské i sovûtské státnosti, tak byla v 90. létech odrazem spoleãenské i ekonomické krize v Ruské federaci, nástupnickém státu sovûtské supervelmoci. Nûkdej‰í nejmohutnûj‰í armáda svûta se musela vyrovnat se staÏením poãetn˘ch kontingentÛ ze základen na území b˘val˘ch ãlensk˘ch státÛ Var‰avské smlouvy a pozdûji i z dosavadních svazov˘ch republik a následnû ãelit fiadû regionálních konfliktÛ. Hospodáfiská krize a celkov˘ ekonomick˘ úpadek prohloubily tuto krizi a mûly mimo jiné za následek i pokles do té doby relativnû vysokého statutu armády v ruské spoleãnosti. Vrchol úpadku a poníÏení ruské branné moci pak znamenala tzv. první ãeãenská válka, charakterizovaná naprostou nekompetencí odpovûdn˘ch armádních sloÏek i politického vedení státu. Tato trpká lekce poukázala na nutnost systémov˘ch reforem rusk˘ch ozbrojen˘ch sil. Nová geostrategická situace pfiinesla v rámci diskuse o nové vojenské doktrínû Ruské federace dvû hlavní koncepce. První, zastávaná b˘val˘m náãelníkem generálního ‰tábu gen. Kva‰ninem, kladla dÛraz na udrÏení potenciálu pozemních vojsk a omezení strategick˘ch jadern˘ch sil s cílem zajistit jejich rovnocennost ve srovnání s pozemními silami Spojen˘ch státÛ a NATO, jeÏ byly v duchu studené války vnímány jako stálá bezpeãnostní hrozba. Druhá koncepce, jejímÏ pfiedstavitelem byl nûkdej‰í ministr obrany mar‰ál Sergejev, naopak vzhledem k inferioritû rusk˘ch

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konvenãních sil preferovala strategii jaderného zadrÏování.1 Ani jedna v‰ak nezískala dominantní postavení v prÛbûhu transformaãního procesu. Dal‰ím nejvíce diskutovan˘m pfiedmûtem se stala otázka poãetního stavu ruské armády, jenÏ by mûl b˘t dosaÏen v rámci reforem. I zde se stfietávaly dvû koncepce, z nichÏ jedna povaÏovala za nezbytné minimum k zaji‰tûní obrany armádu disponující 1 aÏ 1,5 miliónem vojákÛ, druhá preferovala men‰í síly s pfiibliÏnû 500 aÏ 700 000 vojáky s vysok˘m podílem vojensk˘ch profesionálÛ.2 Nov˘ impuls k provedení nutn˘ch reforem pfii‰el se snahou administrativy prezidenta Putina vrátit Rusku ãást jeho nûkdej‰ího mocenského postavení a vlivu ve svûtû. Ruské ozbrojené síly by se mûly adaptovat na nové podmínky tak, aby byly schopny zajistit obranu státu a zároveÀ sehrát roli aktivního aktéra ve velmocenské politice v regionálním i globálním mûfiítku. DosaÏení tûchto cílÛ má zajistit poslední verze dlouhodobého programu pfiipravená Radou bezpeãnosti Ruské federace v roce 2005, která pfiedpokládá rozsáhlou modernizaci vojenského aparátu, vãetnû, po negativních zku‰enostech z 90. let, omezení eventuálních ministersk˘ch zásahÛ do tohoto procesu. Program se t˘ká v‰ech dosavadních struktur, zahrnuje reformu vojensk˘ch útvarÛ a jejich poãetní redukci, transformaci vojenského ‰kolství, logistiky, technologickou modernizaci apod. Velká pozornost je zde vûnována i modernizaci strategického jaderného potenciálu s ohledem na jeho v˘znam pro obranu ruského teritoria v 21. století. Obrovské území Ruské federace zahrnující 17 075 400 km a 146 miliónÛ obyvatel bylo v dobách Sovûtského svazu rozdûleno na ‰estnáct vojensk˘ch okruhÛ, od 1. srpna 1998 byl jejich poãet vzhledem k nov˘m podmínkám zredukován na ‰est tzv. strategick˘ch zón: Severozápad (Petrohrad a Leningradská oblast), Západ (moskevská oblast), Jihozápad (oblast severního Kavkazu), Stfiedoasijská zóna (vojensk˘ okruh PovolÏí a Uralské oblasti), Sibifiská zóna (vojensk˘ okruh Sibifi) a V˘chod (dálnûv˘chodní vojensk˘ okruh). K provedení transformace ruské armády a bezpeãnostních sloÏek je nezbytné vyãlenit odpovídající finanãní zabezpeãení tohoto procesu, coÏ

byla v dobách ekonomické krize hlavní pfiíãina neúspûchu v‰ech dosavadních reformních pokusÛ. Zatímco v polovinû 80. let pfiedstavoval vojensk˘ rozpoãet tehdej‰ího Sovûtského svazu pfiibliÏnû 15 –17 % z HDP, coÏ napfiíklad v roce 1988 ãinilo 21 miliard rublÛ (v té dobû ekvivalent cca 33 miliard USD), na poãátku 90. let podíl vojensk˘ch v˘dajÛ z HDP zaznamenal první v˘razn˘ pokles a pohyboval se mezi 4 aÏ 7 % HDP.3 Události z roku 1991, rozpad sovûtské supervelmoci a vznik Ruské federace i ãásteãné rozdûlení b˘val˘ch svazov˘ch ozbrojen˘ch sil mezi nástupnické postsovûtské státy, se adekvátnû neodrazily na potfiebách finanãního zabezpeãení rusk˘ch vojsk. Ruská federace se totiÏ v mnoha pfiípadech stala témûfi univerzálním dûdicem (strategické jaderné síly, námofinictvo) a obrovskou finanãní zátûÏ pfiedstavovala i jiÏ probíhající redislokace jednotek stahovan˘ch ze státÛ b˘valého sovûtského bloku a Pobaltí i zapojení ruské armády v regionálních konfliktech v postsovûtském prostoru. Politická a hospodáfiská krize v 90. letech v‰ak potfiebné zdroje k zabezpeãení transformace nepfiinesla a rozpoãet rezortu obrany v roce 1997 pfiedstavoval ani ne desetinu svazového rozpoãtu z roku 1987. Zmûnu pfiinesl aÏ konec 90. let – letecké údery NATO na Jugoslávii bûhem kosovské krize, roz‰ífiení Severoatlantické aliance o státy stfiední Evropy, vpád ãeãensk˘ch radikálÛ do sousedního Dagestánu, následovan˘ tzv. druhou ãeãenskou válkou, ekonomick˘ rÛst Ruské federace a nástup Vladimíra Putina do ãela státu – to v‰e se odrazilo na rostoucím objemu finanãních prostfiedkÛ urãen˘ch armádû a bezpeãnostním sloÏkám. V roce 2000 celkové pfiíjmy ministerstva obrany z federálního rozpoãtu ãinily pfiibliÏnû 24,9 miliard USD (141 miliard rublÛ), v roce 2002 jiÏ tento rezort disponoval 50 miliardami USD (282 miliard rublÛ).4 V roce 2003 podíl v˘dajÛ na obranu z HDP pfiedstavoval 2,6 %, v roce 2005 zaznamenal nárÛst na 2,9 % z HDP i to v‰ak bylo ménû neÏ pfiedpokládal vládní návrh z pfiedchozího roku.5 V pfiípadû Ruské federace jsou v‰ak tyto údaje ponûkud zkreslující, neboÈ velké finanãní prostfiedky ze státního rozpoãtu (dohromady 5 % z HDP) absor3 4

1 2

Balabán M., Rusko: stabilizace síly, In: Mezinárodní politika, roã. XXV., ã. 5, s. 23. Bouldin M., The Ivanov Doctrine and Military Reform: Reasserting Stability in Russia, In: Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 17(4)/2004, s. 626.

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5

Le Pautremat P., Dossier: L’Armée russe: Entre restructuration et modernisation, RAIDS, No. 227, Avril 2005, s. 32–48. Batkovskij A., Sistemnye parametry perspektivnogo oblika vooruÏennych sil Rossii, In: Mirovaja ekonomika i meÏdunarodnyje otno‰enija, 6/2005, s. 47. Údaje o v˘‰i vojensk˘ch v˘dajÛ se dle rÛzn˘ch zdrojÛ li‰í. Napfi. Atlantic News No. 3685 (Annex) s. 9, 10. 6. 2005 uvádí pro RF tato data 2002 – 3,0 % z HDP, 2003 – 3,3 % z HDP.

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bují i dal‰í silové rezorty: ministerstvo vnitra a ministerstvo spravedlnosti, které nesou v éfie boje s terorismem hlavní odpovûdnost za vnitfiní bezpeãnost a politiku prevence. Vojska ministerstva vnitra také v tomto období od armády plnû pfievzala odpovûdnost za situaci ve stále nestabilním âeãensku, coÏ mûlo z finanãního hlediska pro ministerstvo obrany pozitivní dopad. Ruské ozbrojené síly zahájily v nedávné minulosti s relativnû mal˘m zpoÏdûním oproti vût‰inû evropsk˘ch státÛ proces profesionalizace, jeho podoba v‰ak má díky specifick˘m rusk˘m podmínkám i potfiebám ponûkud odli‰n˘ prÛbûh. O eventuální plné profesionalizaci armády se uvaÏuje prozatím jen v dlouhodobém ãasovém horizontu, ãásteãná profesionalizace se v‰ak jiÏ stala jednou z priorit probíhající transformace. Na základû federálního programu reformy ozbrojen˘ch sil z ãervna roku 2003 má dojít k plné profesionalizaci 80 jednotek schopn˘ch bezprostfiedního bojového nasazení, v nichÏ by mûlo slouÏit celkem 147 600 profesionálních vojákÛ a praporãíkÛ a jiÏ Ïádní vojáci ve v˘konu základní vojenské sluÏby. V armádû se to t˘ká 72 jednotek se 133 400 vojáky, v pohraniãní stráÏi (v rámci FSB RF) tfií útvarÛ se 4 400 profesionály a u vojsk ministerstva vnitra pûti útvarÛ s 6 700 pfiíslu‰níky.6 Tento krátkodob˘ program zahájen˘ v roce 2004 by mûl b˘t ukonãen v roce 2007. Cílem této ãásteãné profesionalizace je, mimo politickou objednávku, naplnûní priorit rusk˘ch vojensk˘ch reforem, pfiedpokládajících rozsáhlou redukci poãetních stavÛ pfii souãasném zachování, resp. obnovení akceschopné a v˘konné vojenské síly. SniÏování poãetních stavÛ ruské armády sice bylo jejím charakteristick˘m rysem v uplynulém desetiletí, nebylo v‰ak doprovázeno její systematickou reformou a reorganizací.7 Celá fiada nedotaÏen˘ch a nûkdy si i v zásadû odporujících reforem zpÛsobila v rezortu obrany a ozbrojen˘ch silách stav permanentního chaosu.8 Oproti pfiedchozím reformám pfiiná‰í ta aktuální nûkolik nov˘ch prvkÛ. Jedním z cílÛ je vytvofiení plnû profesionálních jednotek s ãímÏ pfiedchozí reformy nepoãítaly a kladly dÛraz pouze na redukci, aniÏ se pfiitom systematicky zab˘valy otázkou potfiebné reorganiza6 7 8

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V následujícím roce 2008 by mûlo b˘t plnû profesionálních jiÏ celkem 115 jednotek. Cymbalov A., Oãevidnaja slabina „Vojennoj doktriny Ivanova“, In: Nezavisimoje vojennoje Obozrenije, No. 6/2005, s.7. Golts, M., Putnam, L., State Militarism and Its Legacies. Why Military reform Has Failed in Russia, In: International Security 29:2/ 2004, s. 123.

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ce a zaji‰tûním poÏadovan˘ch schopností. V rámci tohoto projektu se pfiedpokládá, Ïe právû v profesionálních jednotkách by nastupující garnitura dÛstojnického sboru mohla najít vût‰í moÏnost uplatnûní a podafiilo by se zamezit odchodu velkého poãtu mlad˘ch dÛstojníkÛ, pro které perspektiva vojenské kariéry v armádû ztrácí na atraktivitû. Jen v roce 2002 ode‰lo pfiedãasnû do zálohy na 29 000 dÛstojníkÛ nespokojen˘ch se sv˘mi Ïivotními podmínkami, spoleãensk˘m statutem i malou moÏností profesního vzestupu. Ruskou armádu opou‰tí po relativnû krátké sluÏbû témûfi 40 % nov˘ch poruãíkÛ a fiada studentÛ vojensk˘ch vysok˘ch ‰kol pfiestupuje pfied dokonãením studia na civilní univerzity. Profesionalizace by mûla zabezpeãit i profesionální praporãick˘ a poddÛstojnick˘ sbor pro jednotky v nichÏ budou i nadále tvofiit základ vojáci základní sluÏby. Ve zprávû ministerstva obrany Ruské federace z fiíjna 2003, zab˘vající se budoucností rusk˘ch ozbrojen˘ch sil, byla sice vyjádfiena podpora ãásteãné profesionalizaci, zároveÀ v‰ak deklarovala, Ïe plná profesionalizace není a nebude cílem souãasn˘ch reforem. ¤editel Hlavního organizaãnû mobilizaãního fieditelství generálního ‰tábu generál Smirnov v této souvislosti uvedl, Ïe ke sníÏení kontingentu povolan˘ch brancÛ dojde teprve v dobû, kdy bude mít armáda k dispozici 50 aÏ 60 % profesionálÛ ze svého celkového poãetního stavu. To je ov‰em moÏné pfiedpokládat v jen dlouhodobém ãasovém horizontu, neboÈ podle souãasn˘ch propozic mají profesionální vojáci v roce 2008 tvofiit 25 % pfiíslu‰níkÛ ozbrojen˘ch sil. Je otázkou, zda se podafií tento ambiciózní plán naplnit, neboÈ dosavadní prÛbûh rekrutace vojenského personálu nekoresponduje s plánem.9 Ministerstvo obrany Ruské federace sice oãekává, Ïe v prÛbûhu let 2005 aÏ 2007 vstoupí do ozbrojen˘ch sil celkem 147 000 nov˘ch profesionálních vojákÛ, souãasná situace tomu v‰ak neodpovídá navzdory pfiání prezidenta Putina, aby po roce 2007 tvofiili profesionálové 50 % vojákÛ nastupujících sluÏbu v armádû. V souãasnosti jsou vojen‰tí profesionálové, v ruské terminologii oznaãovaní neologismem kontraktniki (vojáci na smlouvu – kontrakt), soustfiedûni zejména v jednotkách zvlá‰tního v˘znamu, jakou je napfiíklad 76. v˘sadková (resp. aeromobilní) divize posádkou v Pskovû, tedy ukázkovém elitním útvaru rozmístûném na hranicích tzv. blízkého zahraniãí, resp. v˘chodní hranici Se9

Aleksandrov, V., Skol’ko stoit soldat – dobrovolec, In: Rossijskoe vojennoje obozrenije, 10/2004, s. 31–36.

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veroatlantické aliance. Tato divize pfiedstavuje z hlediska sloÏení a schopností vzorov˘ model pro ruské jednotky 21. století, alespoÀ dle pfiedstav architektÛ probíhající reformy. O sluÏbu v této prestiÏní jednotce projevilo bûhem roku 2003 zájem 2 665 uchazeãÛ, z nichÏ bylo po nároãn˘ch testech 1 673 pfiijato. Nicménû 546 vojákÛ brzo pfiehodnotilo svÛj postoj a vzhledem k nedostateãnému finanãnímu ohodnocení a problémÛm s ubytováním od podpisu profesionální smlouvy odstoupilo. Teprve v následujícím roce se zde díky vût‰ímu poãtu zájemcÛ podafiilo plánované stavy naplnit. Cílem pro období let 2006 a 2007 zÛstává v prvé fiadû transformace 80 % elitních jednotek, zejména rusk˘ch sil rychlé reakce na jednotky plnû profesionální. Zde je moÏné zmínit i 42. motostfieleckou divizi, nasazenou na území âeãensko-Ingu‰ské autonomní republiky, neboÈ právû ãeãensk˘ konflikt se stal jiÏ v druhé polovinû 90. let v˘razn˘m impulsem pro profesionalizaci ozbrojen˘ch sil a to jak z dÛvodÛ politick˘ch, tak i ryze vojensk˘ch. Vysoké ztráty rusk˘ch brancÛ v ãeãenském konfliktu a jejich medializace se staly v tomto období citlivou politickou otázkou pro vedení státu a armády, pfiiãemÏ vojen‰tí experti poukazovali na nízkou bojovou morálku a efektivitu vojákÛ základní sluÏby v konfliktech tohoto typu. Vojenské jednotky nasazené v tomto regionu bûhem tzv. druhé ãeãenské války tak jiÏ byly z 20 % sloÏeny z kontraktníkÛ. Podle prÛzkumu ruského Centra pro v˘zkum vefiejného mínûní (VTOM) provedeného v dubnu roku 2000 více neÏ 68 % respondentÛ podporovalo vojenské operace v âeãensku, ale cel˘ch 69 % z nich zde zároveÀ odmítalo aktivní úãast svou, ãi sv˘ch blízk˘ch, coÏ zfietelnû vypovídá o postoji ruské spoleãnosti k nasazení brancÛ ve vojensk˘ch operacích. V záfií roku 2002 publikovalo ministerstvo obrany poprvé údaj o poãtu dezertérÛ z fiad vojákÛ základní sluÏby – jednalo se o 2 265 osob za první polovinu roku. Tato oficiální ãísla okamÏitû zpochybnila nevládní organizace V˘bor rusk˘ch vojensk˘ch matek, která odhaduje, Ïe vojenskou sluÏbu nenastoupí, ãi pozdûji z armády dezertuje kaÏdoroãnû na 40 000 povolancÛ. Proces profesionalizace, kter˘ by mûl uvedené problémy odstranit v‰ak mÛÏe kromû nedostatku financí ohrozit i jiÏ zmínûn˘ mal˘ zájem o sluÏbu v armádû. Ruské ozbrojené síly ztratily v 90. letech svÛj tradiãnû vysok˘ kredit ve spoleãnosti, coÏ se odráÏí i v nedostatku potencionálních rekrutÛ a ani demografická situace a její prognózy do budoucna nevyznívají v kontextu profesionalizace optimisticky. Kritici argumentují tím, Ïe pokud není z ãeho vybírat kvalitní a per-

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spektivní vojáky, samotn˘ proces profesionalizace ztrácí smysl. Mal˘ zájem rusk˘ch obãanÛ o kariéru profesionálního vojáka lze ilustrovat na nedostatku zájemcÛ v Samarské oblasti. Rekrutaãní potenciál této oblasti byl povaÏován za relativnû vysok˘, vzhledem ke skuteãnosti, Ïe se jedná o na ruské pomûry lidnatou oblast (3 217 000 obyvatel znamená 11. místo z 89 regionÛ Ruské federace) s vysokou mírou nezamûstnanosti. Poãet dlouhodobû nezamûstnan˘ch muÏÛ ve vûku od 18 do 35 let zde pfiesahuje 19 000. Za první polovinu roku 2005 zde v‰ak uzavfielo smlouvu pouze 16 nov˘ch rekrutÛ, zatímco minimální plánovan˘ poãet byl stanoven na 230.10 Zmûnit tento nepfiízniv˘ stav má i zákon umoÏÀující sluÏbu v rusk˘ch ozbrojen˘ch silách potenciálním zájemcÛm ze zemí Spoleãenství nezávisl˘ch státÛ, zejména z fiad rusk˘ch etnick˘ch men‰in, pro nûÏ by sluÏba v ruské armádû mohla pfiedstavovat zajímavou Ïivotní perspektivu. Îe lze tento rekrutaãní potenciál vyuÏít je zfiejmé na pfiípadu Operativní skupiny rusk˘ch vojsk (OGRV), tj. ruského vojenského kontingentu v podnûsterském regionu Moldavské republiky. Tento kontingent ãítá 1500 muÏÛ, z nichÏ je pouze 200 vojákÛ ve v˘konu základní vojenské sluÏby. Hlavní ãást tvofií kontraktniki, obãané Ruské federace, 70 % z nich v‰ak pochází z tzv. Podnûsterské republiky.11 MoÏnost nabytí ruského obãanství a sociálních v˘hod po odslouÏení urãitého poãtu let by se mohla stát pro ekonomicky i politicky nivelizované etnické Rusy z nestabilních stfiedoasijsk˘ch ãi kavkazsk˘ch republik dal‰í motivací ke sluÏbû v rusk˘ch ozbrojen˘ch silách. SloÏit˘ komplex ekonomick˘ch a sociálních podmínek v Ruské federaci bude i nadále hrát pfii procesu transformace rusk˘ch ozbrojen˘ch sil v pfií‰tích letech klíãovou roli. Jedním z omezujících faktorÛ profesionalizace mÛÏe b˘t i nedostatek bytÛ pro profesionální vojáky a jejich rodinné pfiíslu‰níky. Armáda má k dispozici pfiibliÏnû 190 tisíc bytov˘ch jednotek, pro vyfie‰ení bytové potfieby sv˘ch zamûstnancÛ by jich v‰ak potfiebovala 480 tisíc. Uveden˘ deficit by mûl b˘t sníÏen prostfiednictvím dlouhodobého programu v˘stavby vojensk˘ch bytÛ v gesci ministerstva obrany, jenÏ se má realizovat do roku 2015.12 10 11 12

Plugatarjov, I., Cyganok, A., Rossija stroit novuju armiju starogo tipa, In: Nezavisimoje vojnnoje obozrenije 11/ 2005, s. 1. Tichonov A., Rossijskij pridnestrovskij kontingent, In: Krasnaja zvezda, 15. 1. 2005, s. 5. Balabán M., Bezpeãnostní politika Ruské federace (2003—2005), Ústav strategick˘ch studií Univerzita Obrany, Brno 2006, s. 12.

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Strategické jaderné síly Ruské federace Strategické jaderné síly si pfii popisu rusk˘ch ozbrojen˘ch sil zasluhují zvlá‰tní pozornost neboÈ zÛstávají do budoucna dÛleÏit˘m komponentem ruského obranného systému i faktorem, kter˘ garantuje velmocenské postavení ruského státu a jeho v˘znam v globálním mûfiítku. K zachování jejich vojenského i politického potenciálu má pfiispût rozsáhl˘ proces modernizace. V rámci programu akvizic pro rok 2005 bylo rozhodnuto o pofiízení pûti nov˘ch raketov˘ch odpalovacích systémÛ, ãtyfi nukleárních stfiel s víceúãelov˘mi hlavicemi a devíti vojensk˘ch kosmick˘ch satelitÛ pro prÛzkum, komunikaci a navádûní. Strategické jaderné síly sovûtské supervelmoci disponovaly na sklonku bipolární éry 300 000 vojáky s více neÏ 1 400 mezikontinentálními raketami a 300 nosiãi jadern˘ch zbraní rozmístûn˘mi na 28 základnách. Po rozpadu Sovûtského svazu a redukci probíhající v první polovinû 90. let se sníÏily poãetní stavy tûchto sil na necel˘ch 100 000 osob v roce 1996, z nichÏ polovinu tvofiili vojáci základní vojenské sluÏby. Reorganizace rusk˘ch ozbrojen˘ch sil se t˘kala i této sloÏky a v roce 1997 do‰lo k jejímu slouãení se silami urãen˘mi k operacím v kosmickém prostoru, coÏ byl identick˘ proces jako slouãení sil protivzdu‰né obrany se vzdu‰n˘mi silami v následujícím roce. Plná autonomie, kterou strategické síly, tzv. Raketnyje vojska strategiãeskogo naznaãenyja, v rámci rezortu obrany ztratily v první polovinû 90. let, má b˘t obnovena v tomto roce. V letech 2001 aÏ 2003 do‰lo k v˘raznému nárÛstu poãtu umûl˘ch druÏic zemû (o 350 %), tûch v souãasnosti operuje na orbitu planety asi stovka a jejich prioritou má b˘t dle prohlá‰ení náãelníka kosmick˘ch sil generála Perminova protiraketová obrana. Poãetní stavy strategick˘ch sil pfiedstavuje 60 000 osob, s vysok˘m zastoupením vojensk˘ch profesionálÛ, reforma ozbrojen˘ch sil pak pfiedpokládá rozsáhlou modernizaci jejich v˘zbroje. Akvizice moderních prostfiedkÛ je v posledních letech u tohoto druhu vojsk oproti ostatním silám v˘raznû nadprÛmûrná. V roce 2000 bylo pofiízeno více neÏ o 20 % nového materiálu neÏ v roce 1999, v roce 2002 pak více neÏ o 40 % oproti roku 2001. Zastaralé systémy typu SS-18, SS-20 a SS-22 mají b˘t do roku 2016 plnû nahrazeny moderním systémem Topol-M (SS-27), jenÏ je v souãasnosti zavádûn do v˘zbroje a mÛÏe b˘t umístûn i na nukleárních ponorkách typu Bulava. Do v˘zbroje byl v roce 2006 zaveden i nov˘ operãnû taktick˘ raketov˘

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systém Iskander-M.13 V roce 2012 má mít Rusko k dispozici, v souladu se smlouvou START 1 (jejíÏ platnost v‰ak skonãí jiÏ v roce 2009), 1 700 aÏ 2 200 jadern˘ch hlavic oproti 3 115 u pozemních odpalovacích systémÛ, 1 744 u námofiních a 624 u letectva, jimiÏ disponovalo v roce 2002. Redukce tohoto arzenálu se dotkne zejména taktick˘ch jadern˘ch hlavic, zatímco potenciál jaderného odstra‰ení má b˘t v co nejvy‰‰í mífie zachován. Moderní nosiãe jadern˘ch hlavic by mûly dle odhadu rusk˘ch vojensk˘ch ãinitelÛ v rozmezí let 2010 aÏ 2015 eliminovat úãinnost novû zavádûn˘ch protiraketov˘ch systémÛ u euroatlantick˘ch armád. Kromû systémÛ Topol- M a Iskander-M má schopnosti strategick˘ch sil zv˘‰it i nová generace umûl˘ch druÏic, vãetnû v souãasnosti vyvíjen˘ch komunikaãních satelitÛ Meter, Dialog a Condor s pfiedpokládanou Ïivotností 5 aÏ 10 let, které budou vypou‰tûny na obûÏnou dráhu z kosmodromÛ Bajkonur a Plesetsk. Protiraketovou obranu Ruské federace má posílit modernizace systémÛ vãasné v˘strahy na základnách Baranoviãi (v Bûlorusku) a Nurku (TádÏikistán). Operaãních schopností dosáhl i systém protiraketové obrany na základnû Sofrino v moskevské oblasti.14 Proces modernizace a reorganizace rusk˘ch ozbrojen˘ch sil Podle probíhajícího programu modernizace ozbrojen˘ch sil, vypracovaného v roce 2000, má b˘t v období let 2002–2010 provedeno rozsáhlé pfiezbrojení ruské armády moderními zbraÀov˘mi systémy poslední generace srovnateln˘mi se západoevropskou a severoamerickou produkcí a zamezit tak technologickému zaostávání Ruska v této oblasti. Produkce domácího obraného prÛmyslu urãená ruské armádû v˘raznû poklesla v 90. letech, vzhledem k jiÏ nûkolikrát zmiÀovan˘m ekonomick˘m potíÏím ruského státu a to navzdory v˘znamnému vlivu mocného vojenskoprÛmyslového komplexu. Oproti roku nula (1991) klesla v roce 1997 produkce, resp. objem dodaného materiálu, o 80 %. Napfiíklad poãet novû vyroben˘ch tankÛ domácí produkce pro potfieby pozemních sil poklesl v uvedeném ãasovém rozmezí z 1600 na pouh˘ch pût, poãet bojov˘ch le13 14

Belous V., Jadernoje oruÏije kak zalog stabil’nosti, Nezavisimoje vojennoje obozrenije, 2/2005, s. 4. Le Pautremat, P., Dossier: L’Armée russe: Entre restructuration et modernisation, In: Raids, 227/2005, s. 38.

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tounÛ pro letectvo z 430 na 70. Ruská armáda si v uplynulém období nemohla z finanãních dÛvodÛ dovolit pofiízení nejkvalitnûj‰ích produktÛ domácí provenience a ty tak byly nabízeny zahraniãním zájemcÛm. Pfies rozsáhlou redukci v˘robních kapacit, znamenající mimo jiné i ztrátu témûfi jednoho miliónu pracovních míst, dosáhl rusk˘ obrann˘ prÛmysl se sv˘mi v˘robky fiady exportních úspûchÛ, coÏ umoÏnilo v fiadû pfiípadÛ zachovat kontinuitu domácí v˘roby do souãasnosti, kdy pfiíznivûj‰í hospodáfiská situace prozatím umoÏÀuje postupné plnûní stanoveného modernizaãního programu.15 V roce 2005 bylo na nákup nové v˘zbroje a v˘stroje urãeno z rozpoãtu rezortu obrany pfiibliÏnû 11 miliard USD, coÏ sice bylo o 20 % ménû, neÏ pfiedpokládal dlouhodob˘ program akvizic, nicménû to staãilo zajistit pokrytí prioritních oblastí. Tûch bylo definováno celkem 28 a nejvy‰‰í prioritu z nich má pak pofiízení nov˘ch systémÛ velení a fiízení, prÛzkumu, komunikace, navigace a zaji‰tûní projektÛ kosmického v˘zkumu. Pfii modernizaci vojenské techniky na úrovni jednotek mají pochopitelnû opût prioritu elitní útvary, jako jsou v˘sadkové jednotky tvofiící základ rusk˘ch sil rychlé reakce. Proces modernizace má mít dle slov Vladimíra Putina dlouhodob˘ charakter s pfiesahem horizontu roku 2015, z ãehoÏ vypl˘vá i zámûr navy‰ovat kaÏdoroãnû vojensk˘ rozpoãet o pfiibliÏnû 15 %. V tomto roce by mûl dosáhnout v˘‰e 668 miliard rublÛ, coÏ je o 114 miliard více neÏ v roce 2005. Jedním z cílÛ je i dosaÏení strukturálních zmûn ve v˘dajích ministerstva obrany. V souãasné dobû je 60 % zdrojÛ alokováno na zaji‰tûní provozních nákladÛ a 40 % na dal‰í v˘stavbu ozbrojen˘ch sil, vãetnû zmiÀované modernizace v˘zbroje. Podle Putinova vyjádfiení by tato korelace mûla dosáhnout pomûru 50:50 a v dal‰í perspektivû pak i pomûru 40:60. Strukturální sloÏení rusk˘ch ozbrojen˘ch a bezpeãnostních sil Proces transformace ovlivnil i samotn˘ základ ruské bezpeãnostní struktury a oproti sovûtské éfie novû vymezil pÛsobnost a odpovûdnost jednotliv˘ch sloÏek. Tento proces reorganizace byl pomûrnû komplikovan˘ a silnû

ovlivnûn˘ politick˘mi zásahy administrativy b˘valého prezidenta Borise Jelcina.16 Zatímco v b˘valém Sovûtském svazu se silové struktury skládaly ze tfií entit – ministerstva obrany, ministerstva vnitra a KGB, pod nûÏ spadaly v‰echny kompetence v bezpeãnostní oblasti, Ruská federace jich má v souãasnosti deset. Pfied reorganizací probíhající pod kuratelou prezidenta Putina v letech 2003 a 2004 mûla tûchto entit dokonce ãtrnáct. Nûkteré z nich vznikly za jelcinovské éry od‰tûpením od stávajících institucí, jiné byly zcela novû vytváfieny. Charakteristická je tak pro ruskou bezpeãnostní architekturu strukturální disbalance, armáda zde pfiedstavuje pouze jeden ze silov˘ch pilífiÛ Ruské federace a ostatní struktury, tzv. siloviky, jako je ministerstvo vnitra nebo federální bezpeãnostní sluÏba nadále tvofií v intencích aktuálního politického pojetí urãitou protiváhu armádû v jejím potenciálním politickém vlivu.17 Teroristické operace ãeãensk˘ch islámsk˘ch radikálÛ v Moskvû a Beslanu oÏivily debatu o efektivnûj‰í spolupráci tûchto bezpeãnostních sloÏek a podobnû jako ve Spojen˘ch státech po 11. 9. 2001 se i zde objevily hlasy navrhující zfiízení jediné superagentury, která by vznikla slouãením dosavadních specsluÏeb (integraci FSB, FSO, SVR do struktury analogické k sovûtskému KGB).18 Mezi nejv˘znamnûj‰í bezpeãnostní struktury Ruské federace náleÏí: Ministerstvo obrany Ruské federace Ministerstvo obrany pfiedstavuje nejvût‰í a nejv˘znamnûj‰í strukturu ruské bezpeãnostní architektury. Hlavním úkolem ministerstva je zaji‰tûní obrany území federace pfied vnûj‰ími hrozbami a její teritoriální integritu. Ministerstvo nese odpovûdnost za hlavní vojenskou sílu státu – pozemní síly, vzdu‰né síly, námofinictvo, strategické jaderné síly a samostatná v˘sadková vojska.19 V roce 2004 byla do struktur ministerstva obrany navrácena Ïelezniãní vojska (FSZV) a Zvlá‰tní stavební sluÏba (Spetsstroj), která zároveÀ získala statut federální agentury.20 Pod tento rezort spadá i vojenská 16 17 18

15

V roce 2002 pfiedstavovaly pfiíjmy z exportu vojenského materiálu dle rÛzn˘ch zdrojÛ cca 5 aÏ 6 miliard USD.

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19 20

Renz, B., Russia’s „Force Structures“ and the Study of Civil-Military Relations, In: Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 18/2005, s. 559. Holzer J., Bezpeãnostní politika Ruské federace, Ústav strategick˘ch studií VA Brno, 2001, s. 22 Moltenskoj V. I., Marcenjuk Ju. A., âekinov S. G., Ob organizacii antiterroristiãeskoj dejatel’nosti gosudarstva, Vojennaja mysl’, 1/2005, s. 24. Viz www.mil.ru. Viz www.spetsstroy.ru.

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v˘zvûdná sluÏba Státní správa rozvûdky (GRU) s pfiibliÏnû 12 000 osobami. V roce 2004 poãetní stavy v rámci tohoto rezortu ãinily dle dostupn˘ch zdrojÛ 960 600 osob, mimo cca 50 000 pfiíslu‰níkÛ FSZV a 14 000 pfiíslu‰níkÛ Spetsstroje.21 Ministerstvo vnitra (MVD) Ministerstvo vnitra Ruské federace je institucionálním následníkem sovûtského MVD a to navzdory pokusu Borise Jelcina z roku 1991 o vytvofiení zcela nové struktury pod názvem Ruské ministerstvo bezpeãnosti a vnitra, jehoÏ vznik oznaãil rusk˘ ústavní soud za ilegální akt. Ministerstvo vnitra má dvojí úlohu, jednak zaji‰tûní vnitfiní bezpeãnosti a ochranu právního fiádu, jednak tvofií v˘znamnou ãást ruského systému obrany a jeho pfiíslu‰níci mají dle federálních zákonÛ stejn˘ status jako pfiíslu‰níci armády. Kromû bûÏné agendy, jakou tvofií boj s kriminalitou a organizovan˘m zloãinem na národní i mezinárodní úrovni, administrativnû-správní ãinnost disponuje nezanedbateln˘m vojensk˘m potenciálem, jenÏ tvofií zejména nástupci nûkdej‰ích Vojsk ministerstva vnitra. Úlohou tûchto jednotek má b˘t podpora vlastních policejních jednotek pfii udrÏování vefiejného pofiádku a bezpeãnosti, boj s terorismem, aktivní úloha pfii zaji‰tûní obrany teritoria Ruské federace a podpora ãinnosti pohraniãních jednotek. Jedná se zejména o speciální operaãní jednotky Altaj a Tuva a samostatnou divizi zvlá‰tního urãení ODON, nástupce nûkdej‰ího elitního útvaru Vojsk ministerstva vnitra 19. divize DzerÏinského, pod níÏ spadá i protiteroristická jednotka Vitjaz.22 V˘znamná role pfiipadla prostfiednictvím tûchto zvlá‰tních útvarÛ ministerstvu vnitra v ãeãenském konfliktu a pováleãné stabilizaci âeãensko-Ingu‰ské autonomní republiky, za jejíÏ bezpeãnostní situaci nese v souãasnosti MVD hlavní odpovûdnost.

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1999) se FSB stala jedním z objektÛ politicky motivované kritiky, která zesílila zvlá‰tû po nav˘‰ení jejích kompetencí a s tím spojeného vlivu bûhem prvních let Putinovy vlády. Vliv FSB na ruskou politickou scénu byl Putinovou osobou personifikovan˘ v nejvy‰‰í politické funkci, je v‰ak moÏné zmínit i pÛsobení prvního civilisty ve funkci ministra obrany v postsovûtské éfie, b˘valého generála KGB Ivanova, coÏ spolu s jin˘mi pfiípady vedlo k pfieceÀování vlivu tajn˘ch sluÏeb do té míry, Ïe se hovofiilo o ãekizaci ãi KGBizaci ruského státu.23 Podobnû jako ostatní bezpeãnostní sloÏky prodûlala FSB v minulosti fiadu reorganizaãních peripetií. V letech 1992–1993 byla souãástí tehdej‰ího ministerstva bezpeãnosti, poté pÛsobila jako Federální kontra‰pionáÏní sluÏba (FSK) a na základû zákona z roku 1995 pak pÛsobí pod sv˘m nynûj‰ím názvem. V roce 2003 získala nov˘ status, kter˘ mimo jiné zahrnoval opûtovnou integraci sloÏek Federální pohraniãní stráÏe do jejích struktur i pfievzetí agendy zanikající Federální agentury vládních komunikací a informací (FAPSI). Jako hlavní úkoly FSB jsou definovány zpravodajská a kontra‰pionáÏní ãinnost zamûfiená k zaji‰tûní bezpeãnosti státu a rusk˘ch národních zájmÛ, boj proti organizovanému zloãinu ve spolupráci s ostatními státními orgány a boj s terorismem.24 Do jejích kompetencí po zániku FAPSI spadá i zaji‰tûní informaãní bezpeãnosti, vãetnû ochrany telekomunikaãních systémÛ. Do struktur FSB náleÏí i proslulé speciální jednotky, tzv. spetsgruppy, Alfa a Vympel, které si získaly mediální pozornost díky operacím v ãeãenském konfliktu (zásah proti skupinám Basajeva a Radujeva v Buìonovsku a Pervomajsku) v letech 1995 a 1996 a protiteroristick˘m operacím v Moskvû (divadlo Dubrovka v roce 2002) a Beslanu (2004). FSB také v roce 2001 pfievzala od ministerstva obrany odpovûdnost za zaji‰tûní bezpeãnosti v âeãensko-Ingu‰ské autonomní republice, kterou pfiedala v ãervnu 2003 ministerstvu vnitra.25

Federální bezpeãnostní sluÏba (FSB) Federální bezpeãnostní sluÏba je jedním ze ãtyfi institucionálních nástupcÛ sovûtského KGB (vedle SVR, FSO a GUSP) a to nástupcem nejv˘znamnûj‰ím co do v˘znamu a stanoven˘ch pravomocí. Vzhledem k pÛsobení Vladimíra Putina v jejím ãele (byl fieditelem FSB v letech 1998 aÏ 23 21 22

The Military Balance, 103(1)/(2003-2004), s. 89. L’Armee russe au combat, Raids, Special Tchetchenie – Collection hors-série Raids, Paris, 2000, s. 8.

24 25

Viz. napfi. Anderson, J. The Chekist Takeover of the Russian State, In: International journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 19/2006, s. 237–288. Viz. www.fsb.ru. Renz, B., cit. dílo, s. 572.

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Ruská armáda a bezpeãnostní sloÏky v procesu transformace]

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SluÏba zahraniãního zpravodajství (SVR) SVR je dal‰ím z nástupcÛ b˘valého KGB a vznikla v prosinci 1991 na základû nûkdej‰ího hlavního fieditelství pro operace v zahraniãí a zastává podobnou úlohu jako nûmecká BND ãi britská MI6. Dle zákona pfiijatého v roce 1996 je SVR jednou ze sloÏek zaji‰Èujících bezpeãnost pfied vnûj‰ími hrozbami, jako je boj s mezinárodním terorismem, organizovan˘m zloãinem ãi hrozbou proliferace zbraní hromadného niãení. Do její agendy v‰ak pochopitelnû spadají i tradiãní úlohy, jako je vojenská zpravodajská ãinnost a prÛmyslová ‰pionáÏ. Jednotlivé souãásti SVR jsou rozdûleny do tfií hlavních skupin: operativního oddûlení (vnitfiní bezpeãnost, ekonomické a technologické zpravodajství apod.), analytické oddûlení pokr˘vající osm vymezen˘ch regionÛ na celém svûtû a oddûlení podpory (zahraniãní vztahy, spojení s ostatními bezpeãnostními sloÏkami, administrace, technická a logistická podpora apod.). Federální správa ochrany (FSO) Hlavní úlohou Federální ochranné sluÏby je zaji‰tûní bezpeãnosti osoby prezidenta a dal‰ích v˘znamn˘ch státních pfiedstavitelÛ Ruské federace, zároveÀ je odpovûdná za ostrahu vládních budov a jin˘ch objektÛ zvlá‰tního strategického v˘znamu pfied potencionálním napadením.26 Jedná se zejména o oficiální rezidenci prezidenta, budovy ministerstev, Státní dumy a Rady Ruské federace. FSO vznikla na základû struktur sovûtské KGB odpovûdn˘ch za ochranu vládních a stranick˘ch ãinitelÛ. Byla zaloÏena v roce 1992 pod názvem Státní oddûlení ochrany (GUO) a zahrnovala v této dobû i 27. motostfieleckou brigádu zvlá‰tního urãení, pluk prezidentské stráÏe v Kremlu, 119. v˘sadkov˘ pluk a speciální jednotky Alfa a Vympel, které pozdûji pfie‰ly pod FSB. Pod souãasn˘m názvem FSO pÛsobí od roku 1996, kdy byla do její struktury integrována Jelcinova bezprostfiední ochranka, tzv. Prezidentská bezpeãnostní sluÏba (SBP).27 Také FSO je díky sv˘m vojensk˘m sloÏkám schopn˘m bojového nasazení souãástí ruského systému obrany.

Ruské ozbrojené síly a jejich ambice Pro Ruskou federaci v souãasnosti nab˘vá, vzhledem k prioritám ruské bezpeãnostní a zahraniãní politiky, na v˘znamu prostor zahrnující teritorium Spoleãenství nezávisl˘ch státÛ (SNS). Vzhledem ke geostrategickému ústupu ruského vlivu charakterizovaném ukonãením vojenské pfiítomnosti v prostoru mimo hranice b˘valého Sovûtského svazu a následn˘m staÏením rusk˘ch peacekeepingov˘ch jednotek z Kosova a Bosny a Hercegoviny se areál SNS stává posledním v˘znamn˘m zahraniãním regionem z hlediska zaji‰tûní rusk˘ch bezprostfiedních bezpeãnostních zájmÛ.28 Tento fakt se odrazil na summitu státÛ SNS v roce 2005, kde se ruská strana snaÏila iniciovat koncepãní rozvíjení projektÛ vojenské spolupráce zúãastnûn˘ch stran do roku 201029 i v doktrinálním dokumentu Aktuální úkoly ozbrojen˘ch sil Ruské federace.30 Zde jsou definovány nové hrozby a rizika, které by ruské ozbrojené síly mûly eliminovat a zajistit tak bezpeãnost Ruské federace. ZmiÀovány jsou v této souvislosti aktivity zahraniãních teroristick˘ch a separatistick˘ch skupin i organizovaného zloãinu, jejichÏ operaãní rádius zahrnuje teritorium Ruské federace a jejích spojencÛ i teritorium dal‰ích státÛ. Ruské ambice v‰ak nerezignovaly ani na geostrategické nasazení sv˘ch ozbrojen˘ch sil, o ãemÏ vypovídají i v˘cvikové aktivity neb˘valého rozsahu, k nimÏ do‰lo v uplynul˘ch dvou letech. Vojenské manévry Mobilnost 2004 z ãervence 2004 byly dle slov ministra obrany Ivanova nejvût‰ím vojensk˘m cviãením, jaké kdy Rusko vidûlo (mínûna pochopitelnû pouze éra Ruské federace). Bûhem této v˘cvikové operace do‰lo, za nasazení padesáti transportních letounÛ, k pfiesunu jednotek ze západní ãásti státu na Dáln˘ v˘chod. Tohoto cviãení se zúãastnilo na 800 vojensk˘ch profesionálÛ, pfiíslu‰níkÛ 76. v˘sadkové divize posádkou ve Pskovû, jednotky námofiní pûchoty Severní flotily a jednotky z vojenského okruhu VolhaUral a stovka obrnûn˘ch vozidel. Mobilnost 2004 absorbovala více neÏ 16 % finanãních prostfiedkÛ urãen˘ch v tomto roce na v˘cvikové aktivity v rámci 28 29

26 27

Viz www.svr.gov.ru. Renz, B., cit. dílo, s. 574.

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30

Balabán M., Bezpeãnostní politika Ruské federace (2003–2005), Ústav strategick˘ch studií Univerzita Obrany, Brno 2006, s. 10. Mazurkeviã, A., Lja‰ãenko, A., KrepiÈ avtoritet i bezopasnosÈ Rossii, In: Krasnaja zvezda, 15. 3. 2006, s. 1 a 3. de Haas, M., Putin’s Security policy in the Past, Present and Future, In: Baltic Defence Review, No. 12 Volume 2/2004, s. 39–58.

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celého rezortu obrany a mûla prokázat pfiipravenost Ruské federace zasáhnout v pfiípadû potfieby na ochranu sv˘ch národních zájmÛ ãi intervenovat v rámci SNS na podporu sv˘ch spojencÛ.31, Geostrategické ambice vypl˘vají i z uzavfiení strategického partnerství s âínskou lidovou republikou32 na nûÏ navázalo spoleãné rusko-ãínské cviãení, Mírová mise 2010 v srpnu 2005, které si získalo v dobû okurkové sezóny celosvûtovou mediální pozornost. Prakticky paralelnû probûhla i série dal‰ích vojensk˘ch manévrÛ, které mûly mimo vlastní v˘cvikov˘ obsah za cíl i demonstraci ruské vojenské pfiipravenosti a operaãních schopností. Za osobní úãasti Vladimíra Putina se konalo cviãení strategického letectva, kdy letouny typu Tu160 simulovaly raketov˘ jadern˘ úder v prostoru polygonu Vorkuta a ruské námofinictvo, resp. jeho Severní flotila, provedlo rozsáhlé námofiní cviãení v jehoÏ prÛbûhu byla odpálena mezikontinentální balistická stfiela v námofiní verzi. V Kaspické oblasti probûhlo v téÏe dobû cviãení Kaspik-antiteror 2005, jehoÏ námûtem byla likvidaci diverzních a teroristick˘ch skupin v energetickém objektu strategického v˘znamu za nasazení speciálních protiteroristick˘ch jednotek rusk˘ch silov˘ch struktur. Provedení této ‰iroce pojaté série cviãení, která nemûla v uplynul˘ch letech obdoby, je pravdûpodobnû odrazem jednoho ze závûrÛ nové ruské vojenské doktríny, kde je mj. uvedeno: Ozbrojené síly Ruské federace musí b˘t schopny v dobû míru i za mimofiádn˘ch situací, pfií zachování potenciálu jaderného zadrÏování a plnûní úkolÛ udrÏování bojové pfiipravenosti, splnit úspû‰nû s vojsky stálé pfiipravenosti souãasnû úkoly ve dvou ozbrojen˘ch konfliktech jakéhokoliv druhu a to bez provedení doplÀující mobilizace a realizovat operace na podporu míru jak samostatnû, tak i v sestavû mnohonárodních kontingentÛ.33

31 32 33

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Gloaguen, C., Les tropismes centre-asiatiques de la Russie, In: Défence Nationale, 11/2004, s. 13. Ivanov V., Plugatarev I., Moskva i Pekin zakrepjat vojennyj sojuz na pole boja, Nezavisimoje vojennoje obozrenije No. 48, 23. 12. 2004, s. 1. The priority tasks of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Moskva 2004, s. 67, dostupné i na www.mil.ru.

4. Normalizace v âeãensku a její následky Emil Souleimanov

„Je tfieba vyvést âeãence z chaosu a zasadit je do normálního lidského prostfiedí, aby byli vychováváni v ideálech osvícenství a dobra“. Vladimir Putin, prezident Ruské federace „Prezidentské volby v âeãenské republice, které vláda Ruské federace pfiedkládá jako v˘znamn˘ krok na cestû ke stabilizaci, nepfiivedly k pfielomu situace se zvÛlí a násilím v regionu. Násilná mizení, znásilÀování, t˘rání a mimosoudní popravy, uskuteãÀované jak federálními silami, tak ãeãensk˘mi bojovníky, zÛstávají v‰edními reáliemi Ïivota v republice.“ Spoleãné prohlá‰ení Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Medicínského fondu ochrany obûtí t˘rání a Stfiediska pro ochranu lidsk˘ch práv Memoriál, 08. 04. 2004 „O jakémpak zlep‰ení situace mÛÏe vÛbec b˘t fieã? Copak musíme b˘t natolik tupí, abychom nechápali, Ïe zlep‰ení v âeãensku nikdy nenastane, dokud tam nepfiestanou zabíjet mírové obyvatele, nepfiestanou beze stopy mizet mladí lidé? Lidé jsou t˘ráni, kdykoli se provádûjí zaãistky, odpalují domy, poniÏují studenty, ktefií chodí na v˘uku, zastfielují na místû, pokud se jim nûkdo nelíbí, a pak fiíkají, Ïe to byl separatista. A nikdo za to zodpovûdnost nenese. O jakém zrekonstruování ekonomiky lze vÛbec hovofiit, pokud ve dne v noci zabíjejí jeden druhého!?“ Aslambek Aslachanov, poslanec Státní Dumy Ruské federace od âeãenské republiky „JiÏ v lednu 1995, kdyÏ jsem vidûl federální vojáky házet houfu ãeãensk˘ch Ïen a starcÛ bochníky – tak se hází kost psÛm – najednou jsem pochopil, Ïe koneãn˘m cílem kaÏdé války je nikoli obsazení území a likvidace vojákÛ znepfiátelené strany. NejdÛleÏitûj‰í je dovést mírové obyvatelstvo do takového stavu, aby byli ochotni akceptovat jakoukoli vládu. AÈ jiÏ svoji, cizí, ba dokonce marÈanskou- jen aby byl pofiádek, jídlo a ochrana.“ Alexandr Mnacakanjan, novináfi

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Rekonstrukce mírového Ïivota a stabilizace v âeãensku spoleãnû s obnovením územní celistvosti patfiila jiÏ od zaãátku mezi vefiejnû deklarované úkoly Putinovy vlády. V návaznosti na „osvobozování“ stále nov˘ch oblastí âeãenska vyvstalo pfied kremelsk˘mi ãiniteli akutní dilema, jak˘m zpÛsobÛm fiízení republiky dát pfiednost. Zpoãátku proti sobû stály dva základní pfiístupy. Ten první pfiedpokládal v severokavkazské zemi zfiízení postu generálního gubernátora ruské národnosti, kter˘ by ve sv˘ch rukou soustfiedil kontrolu nad vojensk˘mi, politicko-administrativními a ekonomicko-finanãními mechanismy a kter˘ by podléhal bezprostfiednû ruskému prezidentovi. Za tento plán, kter˘ ve‰el do povûdomí spoleãnosti na sklonku let 2000 a 2001 jako „NûmcovÛv plán“1, se postavila fiada vlivn˘ch osob – mimo jiné tehdej‰í zvlá‰tní zmocnûnec prezidenta Ruské federace v JiÏním federálním okruhu armádní generál Viktor Kazancev a fiada lidí z FSB,2 ale i Nikolaj Ko‰man, pfiedstavitel vlády Ruské federace v âeãensku.3 Uveden˘ plán mûl podle názoru jeho zastáncÛ zaji‰Èovat nepfieru‰ené fungování „vertikály moci“ a zároveÀ z procesu fiízení problematické republiky vyluãovat âeãence, jejichÏ oddanost ústfiední moci v Moskvû sice mohla, ale nemusela b˘t nezpochybnitelná. N. Ko‰man demonstroval v˘hody tohoto modelu obrazn˘m vyjádfiením: „Pfii pfiímé prezidentské vládû si nikdo nedovolí s prezidentem vtipkovat.“4 Tento stav mûl rovnûÏ napomoci pfiedejít tahanicím o moc ze strany nejrÛznûj‰ích místních klanÛ ãi jednotlivcÛ, jejichÏ pohnutky se nemusely shodovat se strategickou linií centra. Podle tehdej‰ího vyjádfiení Maliky Gezimijevové, pfiedsedkynû administrace Gudermeského okresu, „Na ãele [republikové] administrace musí stát Rus, neboÈ tejpové kofieny ãlovûku znemoÏÀují b˘t nestrann˘m a ãestn˘m.“5 Dal‰ím dÛleÏit˘m faktorem byla skuteãnost, Ïe zavedení pfiímé prezidentské vlády by znesnadnilo únik znaãn˘ch finanãních prostfiedkÛ, investovan˘ch do rozbíhajících se rekonstrukãních prací v âeãensku. Za jednoho z hlavních kandidátÛ na roli prezidentského zmocnûnce v republice, prosazovaného 1 2 3

4 5

Normalizace v âeãensku a její následky]

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Podrobnûji k plánu tehdej‰ího guvernéra oblasti NiÏního Novgorodu viz napfi. Moskovskij komsomolec. 7. 2. 2001; Itogi, 13. 2. 2001; Tribuna, 28. 3. 2001. Nezavisimaja gazeta. 13. 1. 2001. N. Ko‰man v letech 1995–1996 pÛsobil jako ministersk˘ pfiedseda v promoskevské vládû D. Zavgajeva, v letech 1996–1999 ve funkci poradce zvlá‰tního zmocnûnce prezidenta Ruské federace v âeãensku a pozdûji ve vládû Ruské federace jako námûstek ministra dopravy. Kommersant˝ Daily. 31. 03. 2000. Kommersant˝. 14. 06. 2000.

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pfiívrÏenci tohoto modelu, byl povaÏován velitel Sjednoceného vojenského uskupení v âeãenské republice armádní generál Gennadij Tro‰ev.6 Opaãn˘ pfiístup pfiedpokládal v âeãensku zfiízení místní správy z fiad âeãencÛ. V˘hodou tohoto pfiístupu by bylo, Ïe ustálení administrativnûpolitického uspofiádání, bûÏného pro jiné etnické autonomie Ruska, by zapadalo do oficiálnû proklamované vize stabilizujícího se âeãenska, v nûmÏ je ucelen˘ ozbrojen˘ odpor zlomen a místo vojenské operace pfiicházejí na fiadu ãistû policejní, „adresná“ opatfiení proti nepoãetn˘m hnízdÛm separatistÛ a teroristÛ. Ze zaãátku se za tento plán postavili Bislan Gantamirov7 (pfiesvûdãen˘ opoziãník a odpÛrce my‰lenky ãeãenského separatismu, jehoÏ loajalita Moskvû se vícekrát osvûdãila) a b˘val˘ muftí âeãenské republiky Iãkerija Achmat-hadÏi Kadyrov. Záhy se ukázalo, Ïe V. Putin vsadil na syntézu obou tûchto variant: nastolení „ãeãenské“ vlády v republice spolu se souãasn˘m udrÏením a upevnûním federálních bezpeãnostních sloÏek, pfiednû FSB. Toto rozhodnutí v‰ak nepadlo jednodu‰e – pfiedcházely mu totiÏ zufiivé kuloární bitvy znepfiátelen˘ch seskupení jak v Grozném, tak pfiedev‰ím v Moskvû. JelikoÏ se jednalo o komplikovan˘ a ãasto nejednoznaãn˘ proces, kter˘ se ãasovû protáhl, jeho jednotliv˘mi aspekty se budeme zab˘vat postupnû. Kreml se zaãal aktivnû vûnovat v˘bûru eventuálních uchazeãÛ na roli svého námûstka v severokavkazské republice jiÏ bezprostfiednû pfied vyvrcholením váleãn˘ch operací, v fiíjnu 1999. Tehdy se uskuteãnilo v˘‰e zmiÀované setkání ministerského pfiedsedy V. Putina s poslanci parlamentu âeãenské republiky, jenÏ byl „zvolen“ za v˘razné asistence Moskvy v létû 1996, av‰ak po Chasavjurtsk˘ch ujednáních zcela zapomenut. Na tomto setkání oznaãil Putin parlament za „jedin˘ legitimní orgán v republice“, coÏ bylo nûkter˘mi poslanci vykládáno jako pozvánka k úãasti v sestavovan˘ch administrativních strukturách, které mûly nahradit Maschadovovy mocenské sloÏky. Zanedlouho poté nûkolik desítek nad‰en˘ch poslancÛ spolu s ãeãensk˘mi byznysmeny pÛsobícími v Rusku uspofiádali z vlastní iniciativy v moskevské restauraci „Praga“ mimofiádné setkání, na kterém byl hlavou „ãeãenské vlády v exilu“ zvolen 35let˘ ãlen poãetného a moc6 7

Nezavisimaja gazeta. 19. 10. 2000. Tro‰ev ov‰em pozdûji lobboval za kandidaturu Achmata Kadyrova. Zpoãátku se mûlo za to, Ïe propu‰tûní Gantamirova z moskevské Lefortovské vûznice, kde si odpykával trest od dubna 1999, bylo zam˘‰leno pfiednû jako protiváha M. Sajdullajevovi.

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ného tejpu Benoj a vÛdãí osobnost ãeãenské diaspory v Moskvû, Malik Sajdullajev.8 Kandidatura tohoto úspû‰ného obchodníka, fieditele známé loterie „Ruské loto“ se v‰ak Kremlu nezamlouvala, a s její potvrzením se tudíÏ pfiíli‰ nespûchalo. V. Putin se nerozhodl ani pro Bislana Gantamirova. Tento velitel promoskevsk˘ch ãeãensk˘ch milicí za první války, osvobozen˘ v listopadu 1999 zvlá‰tní prezidentovou milostí z vûznice, kde si odpykával trest za zpronevûru neb˘vale vysok˘ch ãástek (o tom jiÏ byla fieã v pfiedcházejících kapitolách), to nakonec dotáhl aÏ na námûstka doãasné administrace âeãenska. Pfii zpûtném pohledu si uvûdomíme, Ïe PutinÛv kalkul zdaleka nepostrádal logiku. B. Gantamirov byl totiÏ sv˘mi krajany vnímán jako pfiíli‰ odiosní postava, která je pro získání pfiístupu k moci a penûzÛm ochotna s aÏ nepfiístojnou bezohledností hrát roli „loutky Moskvy“. Jeho oponent Malik Sajdullajev, o nûmÏ je‰tû bude fieã, byl zase Moskvou pokládán za nevyzpytatelnou postavu, tedy vlastnû postavu, nezatíÏenou konfliktem se separatisty. Skuteãnost, Ïe obchodník dÛslednû volal a stále volá po jednáních se v‰emi politick˘mi silami v republice, tedy i „s Maschadovem, s brigádními generály“, a tudíÏ byl v˘hledovû schopen nevhodn˘ch „improvizací“, které by mohly ohrozit strategickou linii Moskvy v republice, byla rovnûÏ nepfiijatelná. ¤ada Sajdullajevov˘ch pfiíbuzn˘ch se nadto za Maschadovova reÏimu domohla vysokého postavení, coÏ také sniÏovalo jeho vûrohodnost.9 Volba Kremlu nakonec padla pro mnohé ponûkud neãekanû na Achmata Kadyrova, kter˘ byl hlavou prozatímní ãeãenské administrace jmenován v polovinû roku 2000.

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Pozdûji M. Sajdullajev vystupoval jako pfiedseda tzv. Státní rady âeãenské republiky, která v‰ak byla a je efemérní institucí, existující pouze na papífie. Jeden byl lídrem vlivného dÏihadistického oddílu, zatímco dal‰í zastával post námûstka fieditele odboru pro sociální zabezpeãení vlády âeãenské republiky Iãkerija. Podle nûkter˘ch zpráv Sajdullajevovi okamÏitû po jeho zvolení hlavou exilové ãeãenské vlády v Moskvû vyhlásili pfiedstavitelé jeho vlastního tejpu krevní mstu a vypálili jeho dÛm v âeãensku. M. Sajdullajev tuto skuteãnost opakovanû potvrdil. Viz napfi. Kommersant˝-Vlast’. 19. 10. 1999.

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Achmat Kadyrov Achmat-hadÏi Kadyrov se narodil roku 1951 ve vyhnanství v kazachstánském mûstû Karaganda. Patfiil k tejpu Benoj. V roce 1957 se rodina pfiestûhovala do âeãensko-Ingu‰ska, kde se usadili ve vesnici Centoroj v Kurãalojevském okrese. V roce 1968 Kadyrov maturoval. V tomtéÏ roce absolvoval kombajnérsk˘ kurz ve vesnici Kalinovskaja v Naurském okrese. V letech 1969–1971 Ïil a pracoval v Gudermeském okrese. V letech 1971–1980 pracoval na stavbách v centrálním Rusku a na Sibifii. V roce 1980 absolvoval islámskou ‰kolu Madrasa Mir-Arab v uzbekistánské Bucháfie, za nûkolik dal‰ích let pak vystudoval Islámskou univerzitu v Ta‰kentu. Poãátkem devadesát˘ch let studoval na ‰ariátské fakultû Jordánské univerzity v Ammánu. Byl pfiívrÏencem taríqu kádiríja. V roce 1989 zaloÏil v obci Kurãaloj Islámskou univerzitu a do roku 1994 pÛsobil jako její rektor. Aktivnû prosazoval reislamizaci republiky – zakládání ‰áriátsk˘ch soudÛ, zavedení nov˘ch islámsk˘ch zákonÛ atd. V letech 1994–1996 se spoleãnû se sv˘mi syny – star‰ím Zelimchánem a mlad‰ím Ramzanem – zúãastnil bojÛ v fiadách ãeãensk˘ch povstalcÛ. Ve své nové funkci vyhlásil Rusku svatou válku – ghazavat. Tehdy Achmat Kadyrov pronesl notoricky znám˘ v˘rok, kter˘ mu del‰í dobu nemohli odpustit ru‰tí generálové: „âeãencÛ je jeden milion, RusÛ je 150 milionÛ. Zabije-li kaÏd˘ âeãenec 150 RusÛ, tuto válku zaruãenû vyhrajeme.“10 V roce 1995 byl prezidentem na BasajevÛv popud jmenován muftím (nejvy‰‰í duchovní hodnost) âeãenska. Získal rovnûÏ od DÏohara Dudajeva nejvy‰‰í státní vyznamenání âeãenské republiky Iãkerija – fiád „Chlouba národa“. V roce 1996 se podílel na rusko-ãeãensk˘ch mírov˘ch jednáních. Na podzim roku 1996 se opûtovnû stal hlavou muftíjátu âeãenské republiky Iãkerija. V meziváleãném období patfiil mezi nejzarytûj‰í odpÛrce „wahhábismu“, ãímÏ zfiejmû ovlivnil i my‰lení prezidenta A. Maschadova, jehoÏ ov‰em obviÀoval z nerozhodného pfiístupu, z „mûkkosti“ vÛãi „wahhábitÛm“. Posléze se nechal sly‰et, Ïe A. Maschadov11 je pouh˘m „Ba10

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V âeãensku se hovofiilo i o nechutnû metafofie, kterou imám bûhem První války údajnû pouÏil: „ru‰tí psi“. ¤ada Kadyrovov˘ch zastáncÛ v‰ak tvrdila, Ïe nic takového nikdy nefiekl a Ïe se jedná o souãást ‰ir‰í kampanû na diskreditaci Kadyrova, kterou zahájili (aã nezávisle na sobû) N. Ko‰man a B. Gantamirov. Maschadov zpûtnû Kadyrova obvinil z toho, Ïe se v letech 1996–1999 pokou‰el vyvolat v republice obãanskou válku.

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sajevov˘m stínem“. Posléze A. Kadyrov pfieÏil nûkolik útokÛ, organizovan˘ch „wahhábity“. Následkem jednoho z fiady tûchto atentátÛ, k nûmuÏ do‰lo nedlouho pfied zahájením druhé rusko-ãeãenské války (25. kvûtna 1999), zemfielo pût jeho ochráncÛ, mezi nimi i tfii jeho synovci, ãímÏ byla mezi jeho rodem a fiadou vlivn˘ch dÏihadistick˘ch vÛdcÛ (mimo jiné Chattábem) nastartována krevní msta. Po dagestánské invazi oddílÛ dagestánsk˘ch a ãeãensk˘ch dÏihadistÛ a jejich sympatizantÛ kategoricky odmítl zúãastnit se nové války proti Rusku. To patrnû byla pro celou dÏihadistickou obec poslední kapka – zvlá‰tní fatwou nad ním byl vynesen rozsudek smrti. A. Maschadov v fiíjnu 1999 zbavil Kadyrova, odmítajícího vypovûdût Rusku ghazavat navzdory prezidentovû poÏadavku, postu muftího a prohlásil ho za „nepfiítele ãeãenského národa“, kter˘ „má b˘t zlikvidován“.12 A. Kadyrov tehdy prohlásil na podzim 1999 fiadu v˘chodních oblastí âeãenska (okresy Gudermesk˘, Kurãalojevsk˘ a NoÏajjurtovsk˘) „zónou prostou wahhábismu“. ·ámil Basajev pfiislíbil za jeho hlavu sto tisíc dolarÛ: tuto ãástku následnû zv˘‰il aÏ na pÛl milionu, podle jin˘ch informací aÏ na milion dolarÛ. Poãátkem listopadu 1999 byl díky Kadyrovovi a bratrÛm Jamadajevov˘m federálním jednotkám umoÏnûn vstup do Gudermesu bez boje. Pfiedtím Jamadajevovi ozbrojenci zabránili jednotkám ·ámila Basajeva a Ruslana Gelajeva, aby vnikly do mûsta a vybudovaly zde pfied postupujícími rusk˘mi vojsky obranné linie. Jmenování A. Kadyrova, „osobního v˘tvoru Putina“13 a vlivného fieditele prezidentské kanceláfie Alexandra Volo‰ina, kter˘ organizovával mimofiádná prezidentská setkání, zpoãátku mnohé poboufiilo, ale je‰tû více lidí zmátlo, a to jak v âeãensku, tak v Rusku. Do nynûj‰ka byly do ãela republiky jmenovány v˘hradnû osoby pocházející obvykle ze severních rovinn˘ch oblastí, jejichÏ loajalita vÛãi Moskvû byla povaÏována za takfika bezmeznou – D. Zavgajev, U. Avtorchanov, S. HadÏijev aj. Velice ostrého nesouhlasu se tomuto jmenování dostalo od pfiedstavitelÛ „staré“ ãeãenské opozice, ktefií svoji vûrnost Moskvû, osvûdãenou ãasem i skutky, povaÏovali za faktor opravÀující je k v˘nosn˘m pozicím v novû sestavované administrativû republiky. Jmenování – abychom pouÏili terminologii Bislana 12 13

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Následnû mu ‰ariátsk˘ soud „oficiálnû“ vynesl rozsudek smrti. Vyjádfiení publicistÛ Dmitrije Balburova a Denise Kirillova. Russkij fokus. 17. 5. 2004. Právû A. Volo‰in je obecnû povaÏován za duchovního otce „ãeãenizace“.

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Gantamirova – „duchovního vÛdce Maschadova, Gelajeva a Chattába“ vyvolalo napfiíklad rozpaky u tehdej‰ího námûstka doãasné administrace Jakuba Denijeva, zaslouÏilého odpÛrce Dudajevova reÏimu. Ten jmenování oznaãil za „facku ãeãenskému národu“ a demonstrativnû rezignoval. Dvanáct fieditelÛ okresních administrací sepsalo na Ko‰manÛv popud otevfien˘ dopis Kremlu, v nûmÏ Ïádali o pfiehodnocení tohoto „nesmyslného rozhodnutí“ a dokonce hrozili rezignací. V tomto spoleãném komuniké mimo jiné ruského prezidenta upozorÀovali: „[…] nikdo nesly‰el, Ïe by Kadyrov pfiiznal svÛj díl odpovûdnosti za smrt desítek tisíc lidí a destrukci republiky spolu s Dudajevem, Maschadovem aj. Prohla‰ujeme, Ïe nemáme morální právo s tímto ãlovûkem spolupracovat a nacházet se v jeho blízkosti.“ S jasn˘m poukazem na Alexandra Volo‰ina uvádûli, Ïe V. Putin byl zfiejmû „uveden do omylu nepoctiv˘mi rádci, ktefií vûdomû ãi nevûdomû smûfiují k zrestaurování Dudajevova reÏimu a v pofiadí jiÏ tfietí válce“.14 Jejich obavy v‰ak zÛstaly nevysly‰eny. Jeden z pfiedních aktivistÛ oné „staré“ protidudajevské opozice Ruslan Martagov z Nadtûreãného okresu vzpomíná: „Nikolaj Ko‰man ,vybojoval‘ setkání delegace okresních administrací s Putinem. Vydali se do Moskvy, aby ho poÏádali o zavedení pfiímé prezidentské vlády v âeãensku. Tehdy se zdálo, Ïe je Vladimir Putin pochopil, neboÈ slíbil, Ïe jejich my‰lence bude vûnovat maximální pozornost. VÏdyÈ kdyÏ doma hofií, není ãas volit hlavního hasiãe, je zapotfiebí jasného rozhodnutí – ty jdi vpravo, ty vlevo. Na jednom z kremelsk˘ch chodeb se v‰ak fieditelé okresních správ srazili s b˘val˘m muftím. Zeptali se, co tu dûlá, naãeÏ Achmat mlãel. A kdyÏ jsme se vrátili domÛ, po dvou ãi tfiech t˘dnech jsme dovûdûli velikou zprávu: Kadyrov se stal jejich ‰éfem, aniÏ by byla vyhlá‰ena pfiímá prezidentská volba ãi v˘jimeãn˘ stav. V‰em âeãencÛm bylo jasnû naznaãeno, Ïe nበnázor Moskvu zajímá aÏ na posledním místû.“15 Zásah ruské generality a pozdûji hrozba sankcemi ze strany Kadyrovova klanu v‰ak kategoriãnost „star˘ch“ opoziãníkÛ v˘znamnû zmírnila, i kdyÏ zcela nezlikvidovala – v následujících mûsících pfiedstavovala ãasovanou bombu, která hrozila kdykoli, jakmile zeslábne podpora imámovi ze strany Moskvy, v˘buchem.

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Nezavisimaja gazeta. 21. 6. 2000. Citováni Dmitrij Balburov a Denis Kirillov podle Russkij fokus. 17. 5. 2004.

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Zvlá‰tû negativní reakce pfii‰la ze strany nûkter˘ch vysoce postaven˘ch armádních dÛstojníkÛ, ktefií jmenování islámského duchovního volajícího pfied pouh˘mi pûti roky do svaté války proti ruskému vpádu, pokládali za absurdní. Oddanost ãlovûka s takovouto minulosti my‰lence âeãenska jakoÏto integrální souãástí Ruské federace se zdála b˘t pofidérní. Mnozí totiÏ vûfiili, Ïe by v tomto pfiípadû nastalo bezprostfiední riziko, Ïe Kadyrov pfii jakékoli neshodû zradí a pfiidá se k nûkdej‰ím spolubojovníkÛm v horách, ãímÏ by znegoval v˘sledky beztak obtíÏného pÛsobení Ruska na severním Kavkaze. Odli‰n˘ pfiístup sdílela fiada rusk˘ch generálÛ znal˘ch spleti kavkazsk˘ch zvlá‰tností, mezi nimi i ãeãenského rodáka Gûnnadij Tro‰ev, kter˘ se s Kadyrovem staãil spfiátelit bûhem kapitulace Gudermesu. Fakt, Ïe mezi Kadyrovem a fiadou vlivn˘ch dÏihadistÛ platila krevní msta, totiÏ vyluãoval byÈ jen hypotetickou moÏnost, Ïe by v pfiípadû eventuální konfrontace s Ruskem opûtovnû zmûnil politickou orientaci a vrátil se zpátky k separatistÛm. Volba Kremlu tedy byla bezesporu promy‰lenûj‰í, neÏ se pÛvodnû mohlo zdát. Jmenování nûkdej‰ího v˘znamného úãastníka protiruského odboje a uznávaného duchovního hlavou republiky mûlo zfiejmû podle kalkulací moskevsk˘ch stratégÛ vnést rozkol do fiad separatistÛ, dodat loutkové administrativû potfiebnou váÏnost a pfiedev‰ím vytváfiením prorusk˘ch milicí sejmout ãást bfiemene bojÛ z rusk˘ch federálních vojsk. Pro pfiíslu‰níky tûchto jednotek, tzv. kadyrovce, to v‰ak spí‰e znamenalo, Ïe dostali zelenou pro vyrovnávání úãtÛ s krajany, jeÏ si staãili znepfiátelit v období faktické nezávislosti. Dal‰í neménû dÛleÏitou skuteãností bylo, Ïe ‰lo o v˘znamného odpÛrce „wahhábistÛ“, ktefií podle vût‰iny âeãencÛ vehnali republiku do nové krvavé války s Ruskem. Mnozí veteráni první války rovnûÏ obviÀovali své nûkdej‰í spolubojovníky z provokaãního vpádu do Dagestánu, kter˘m rodnou zem dohnali na pokraj vyãerpání jejích lidsk˘ch i materiálních zdrojÛ. „Jmenování Kadyrova muselo poslouÏit jako signál k usmífiení s b˘val˘mi dudajevci a maschadovci, zastánci tradicionalistického islámu. Postava muftího Kadyrova mûla podle plánu Kremlu sjednotit v‰echny âeãence schopné ke kompromisu a spolupráci s federálním centrem.“16 Je pfiíznaãné, Ïe podle nûkter˘ch svûdectví A. Kadyrov, kter˘

v besedách s prezidentem tyto argumenty hojnû pouÏíval pro utvrzení své kandidatury, ujistil Putina, Ïe se mu bûhem dvou mûsícÛ podafií dosáhnout toho, aby dva tisíce ozbrojencÛ veden˘ch polními veliteli sloÏily zbranû. O jist˘ch nadûjích, vkládan˘ch Kremlem do Kadyrova, svûdãí i prohlá‰ení prezidentova tajemníka Sergeje JastrÏembského z ledna 2001, ve kterém zdÛraznil, Ïe „federální centrum bude vítat Kadyrovovy kontakty s bojovníky, vyústí-li v kapitulaci zloãineck˘ch uskupení“.17 Samotn˘ Vladimir Putin v interview západnímu novináfii oznaãil Achmata Kadyrova za „nejlep‰ího partnera v jednáních“ a dokonce ponûkud chlubivû upozornil, Ïe Kadyrov „není v Ïádném pfiípadû prorusk˘“.18 Navíc „jeho [Kadyrovovy] kontakty s tûmi lidmi, ktefií stále je‰tû kladou nám v âeãensku odpor […], budou pozitivní“.19 Zastupitelství Vlády Ruské federace v âeãensku, fiízené N. Ko‰manem a formované pfiednû b˘val˘mi ãleny Zavgajevova t˘mu, tedy bylo jevem doãasn˘m. Posláním tohoto exekutivního orgánu bylo organizovat vefiejn˘ Ïivot v novû obsazovan˘ch oblastech republiky. Tato instituce byla prezidentov˘m zvlá‰tním v˘nosem zru‰ena. Záhy nato, 12. ãervna 2000, do‰lo ke zvefiejnûní nafiízení „O organizaci doãasného systému v˘konné moci v âeãenské republice“, v jehoÏ ãele stanul A. Kadyrov. Toto nafiízení mûlo podle názoru nûkter˘ch komentátorÛ znamenat faktické zavedení prezidentské vlády v republice.20 PÛlroku nato, v lednu 2001, podepisuje Vladimir Putin v˘nos s názvem „O systému orgánÛ v˘konné moci âeãenské republiky“, signalizující definitivní pfievládnutí koncepce „fiízené ãeãenizace“, tedy ústup od faktické pfiímé prezidentské vlády. Podle tohoto nafiízení mûla b˘t doãasná administrace transformována ve stálou vládu âeãenské republiky s ‰ir‰ími a jasnû vymezen˘mi kompetencemi. Proces stabilizace sociálnûpolitického Ïivota v republice mûl b˘t doprovázen vytvofiením potfiebn˘ch atributÛ demokratické státnosti – ústavy, institutu prezidentství a zákonodárné moci (parlamentu). Koneãn˘m cílem se mûlo stát podepsání 17 18 19 20

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Gakajev, D., âeãenskij konflikt: Novaja faza razvitija. In: Sovremennaja konfliktologija v kontekste kul’tury mira. (editor neuveden) Moskva 2001. Str. 237.

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Citováno podle Kommersant˝-Vlast’. 23. 1. 2001. Interfax. 22. 12. 1999. Http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns-dvbr.nsf/0/432569d80022638743256db80029a64c?OpenDocument. [10. 11. 2004]. Podle platné ruské ústavy by zavedení pfiímé prezidentské vlády mohlo nastat pouze v pfiípadû vyhlá‰ení v˘jimeãného stavu, coÏ se ov‰em nestalo – proto tedy k formálnímu vyhlá‰ení prezidentské vlády nedo‰lo. Viz soudobé komentáfie expertÛ k této problematice In: Ob‰ãaja gazeta. 15. 6. 2000.

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smlouvy o rozdûlení pravomocí mezi âeãenskou republikou a federálním centrem. Demografie ãeãensk˘ch voleb Ústavní referendum V polovinû roku 1999, tedy v pfiedveãer druhé ãeãenské války, oficiální pfiedstavitelé Ruské federace opakovanû poukazovali ve snaze ukázat rozmûr humanitární katastrofy, postihnuv‰í zem bûhem let 1996–1999, na nesmírnû nízk˘ poãet obyvatelstva âeãenska. Ve funkci ministerského pfiedsedy hovofiil Vladimir Putin o pfiipravenosti k politickému dialogu s 220 tisíci RusÛ a 550 tisíci âeãencÛ, ktefií opustili âeãensko.21 Aby legitimizoval postavení ãeãenského „exilového parlamentu“, uvedl na podzim 1999, Ïe „parlament je oprávnûn vyvíjet iniciativu zejména s ohledem na skuteãnost, Ïe je nyní v Rusku více âeãencÛ neÏ v samotném âeãensku“.22 PfiipomeÀme si, Ïe poãet âeãencÛ trvale usídlen˘ch v republice do roku 1994 byl nanejv˘‰ 900 tisíc lidí. Z jednoduch˘ch v˘poãtÛ na základû tûchto oficiálních údajÛ logicky vypl˘vá, Ïe pfied zahájením invaze koncem záfií 1999 mohl poãet âeãencÛ nacházejících se ve vlasti pfiedstavovat 300 aÏ 350 tisíc lidí (nebudeme-li ov‰em brát v potaz obûti první rusko-ãeãenské války). Jak známo, drtivá vût‰ina nevajna‰ského obyvatelstva (mezi nimi témûfi v‰ichni místní Rusové a rusky hovofiící, ãítající pfied válkou cca 300 tisíc lidí23) zemi do poloviny devadesát˘ch let opustila. Stfiízlivé odhady o poãtu obyvatelstva âeãenské republiky v souãasnosti v‰ak hovofií o 600 tisících24 aÏ 700 tisících.25 Je zajímavé, Ïe podle údajÛ Federálního projektu rekonstrukce hospodáfiství a sociální sféry âeãenské republiky za rok 2001 mûlo její obyvatelstvo tvofiit 603,4 tisíc lidí, z nichÏ 145 tisíc Ïilo ve mûstech a 458,4 tisíc na vesnici. Poãet obyvatel v produktivním vûku – tedy pfieváÏná ãást voliãstva – ãinil v roce 2000 podle oficiálních údajÛ kolem 400 tisíc lidí.26 21 22 23 24 25

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Http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/N-Caucas/habitants.htm. [18. 12. 2004]. Kommersant˝-Vlast’. 19. 10. 1999. Http://www.hro.org/war/2004/02/25-4.php. [28. 12. 2004]. Http://www.memo.ru/hr/news/demo02b.htm. [28. 12. 2004]. Mala‰enko A., âeãnja dlja vnutrennego i vne‰nego pol’zovanija. Díl 5. 9–10/2003. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Moskva.

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Od roku 2000 se v‰ak priority zmûnily. Zaãala b˘t pociÈována potfieba ukázat rozsah stabilizace Ïivota v âeãensku, kterou s sebou pfiiná‰í legitimní – ruská, federální– vláda, a zdÛvodnit s tím související rostoucí poãet obyvatel âeãenska, a tak zahájila Moskva masivní vysidlování ãeãensk˘ch uprchlíkÛ z táborÛ v Ingu‰sku, kde jich Ïilo minimálnû kolem 50 tisíc. Podle informací Human Rights Watch jsou pfii pfiesidlování „registrovány praktiky zastra‰ování a vydírání, pouÏívané migraãními úfiady“.27 Souãasnû s odmítnutím prodlouÏit OBSE, ale i jin˘m mezinárodním organizacím ãeãensk˘ mandát z konce roku 2002 se násiln˘m zpÛsobem zaãaly zavírat tábory v Ingu‰sku a „v situaci, kdy se teploty pohybují pod bodem mrazu, se úfiady hrozbami a sliby pokou‰ejí [ãeãenské uprchlíky] pfiimût k návratu do de facto zóny bojov˘ch operací“. „Pfiedstavitelé migraãních úfiadÛ podrobují obyvatele táborÛ stálému tlaku, hrozí jim zatãením na vykonstruovaném základû, odepfiením pfiídûlÛ potravin a odpojením plynu a elektfiiny na zimu, v nûkter˘ch pfiípadech i vysídlením ze stanÛ,“ konstatuje Human Rights Watch.28 Poslední tábor ãeãensk˘ch uprchlíkÛ byl zru‰en 10. ãervna 2004. VraÈme se v‰ak k samotnému ústavnímu referendu. Pozornost zaslouÏí údaje zji‰tûné bûhem sociologického v˘zkumu uskuteãnûného pfiedstaviteli Memoriálu pouh˘ch nûkolik t˘dnÛ pfied referendem. Podle tohoto terénního dotazování pouze 12 % dotázan˘ch uvedlo, Ïe se chystá hlasovat, 20 % váhalo a 68 % si bylo jisto, Ïe se referenda nezúãastní.29 Z 656 dotázan˘ch ve více neÏ 70 obytn˘ch místech pouze 4 % souhlasila s tvrzením, Ïe v souãasném âeãensku existují vhodné podmínky pro svobodné a spravedlivé volby, zatímco 79 % odpovûdûlo zápornû. ·est procent dotázan˘ch oãekávalo v dÛsledku referenda patrné zlep‰ení situace, 36 % pfiedpokládalo, Ïe v‰e zÛstane pfii starém beze zmûn, a 34 % oãekávalo zhor‰ení pomûrÛ.30 V˘sledky referenda, uskuteãnûného 23. bfiezna 2003, v‰ak ponûkud „paradoxnû“ pfiinesla zcela odli‰ná ãísla. Na jednu ze tfií otázek „Pfiijímáte ústavu âeãenské republiky?“ odpovûdûlo 96,03 % respondentÛ kladnû a 2,69 26 27 28 29 30

Rossijskaja gazeta. 20. 2. 2000. Http://www.hrw.org/russian/reports/2003/russia/osce-chechnya.php. [18. 11. 2004]. TamtéÏ. Chechnya Weekly. Jamestown Foundation. 03. 03. 2003. TamtéÏ.

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% zápornû. S uskuteãnûním prezidentsk˘ch voleb v republice souhlasilo 95,03 % âeãencÛ (pouh˘ch 2,84 % se vyslovilo proti) a podobné rozloÏení bylo zaznamenáno i u otázky o nutnosti uskuteãnûní voleb do parlamentu âeãenské republiky.31 Podle oficiálních údajÛ se referenda o ústavû 23. bfiezna zúãastnilo 89 % dospûlého obyvatelstva republiky, pfiiãemÏ aktivita hlasujících byla paradoxnû nejvy‰‰í nikoli v tradiãnû promoskevsky orientovan˘ch severních okresech (78,45 % v ·elkovském a 68,11 % v Naurském okrese), nicménû v ba‰tû separatistÛ, tj. v Iãkerii zmítané boji, kde se pro vyslovilo 82,92 % voliãÛ v ·atojském rajonu, 99,58 % v ·aroji, 91,37 % v Itum-Kale a 88,23 % ve vesnici Vedeno, rodovém hnízdû Basajevov˘ch.32 Je zajímavé, Ïe PutinÛv tajemník S. JastrÏembskij jiÏ pfied referendem upozorÀoval na „tradiãnû vysokou“ volební úãast v âeãensku.33 Hlavním posláním referenda tedy bylo stvrzení vÛle ãeãenského národa o pfietrvání republiky v rámci Ruské federace. Vzhledem k oãekávanému fal‰ování odmítly prÛbûh referenda monitorovat uznávané mezinárodní organizace, a jako pozorovatelé se tudíÏ zúãastnili jen zahraniãní novináfii a delegace ShromáÏdûní Rady Evropy.34 K volební úãasti uvedla reportérka Le Monde Nathalie Nougayredová: „Grozn˘ byl v den voleb prakticky opu‰tûn˘. Na jednom nebo dvou volebních okrscích jsem vidûla pár lidí, moÏná ãtyfii nebo pût, tak 20 aÏ 25 lidí za cel˘ den. KaÏd˘, s k˘m jsem se bavila nûkolik dnÛ pfied referendem, tvrdil, Ïe se hlasovat nechystá.“35 Podobn˘ postfieh zaznamenali i pracovníci Human Rights Watch ve zprávû z roku 2003: „Oficiální zprávy o referendu hovofiily o neb˘vale vysoké úãasti ve volebních místnostech, o entuziasmu a nadûji, s nimiÏ ãeãenské obyvatelstvo vnímalo referendum, vyjadfiovan˘mi zpûvem a tancem na ulicích. Tomuto obrázku ov‰em zcela protifieãí zprávy novináfiÛ a jin˘ch pozorovatelÛ, ktefií nav‰tívili âeãensko samostatnû, coÏ zadává dÛvod k pochybnostem o legitimitû referenda. Podle informací z dal‰ích nezávisl˘ch zdrojÛ Ïádn˘ nával lidí ve volebních

místnostech nebyl zaznamenán a Grozn˘ pÛsobil víceménû opu‰tûn˘m dojmem (opomeneme-li protestní mítink proti „mizením“).“36 Pfiedseda V‰eruské centrální volební komise Alexandr Ve‰njakov den po referendu prohlásil, Ïe poãet hlasujících byl dokonce vy‰‰í neÏ 540 tisíc zaregistrovan˘ch voliãÛ. Tento údaj – 540 tisíc zaregistrovan˘ch voliãÛ – znamenal, Ïe se poãet obyvatel republiky od roku 1999 do roku 2004 fakticky zdvojnásobil. Není rovnûÏ bez zajímavosti, Ïe podle údajÛ sãítání lidu, uskuteãnûného v âeãensku v fiíjnu 2002, tvofií jeho obyvatelstvo 1 088 000 lidí (!)37 Natolik optimistick˘ stav se A. Ve‰njakov pokusil zãásti vysvûtlit skuteãností, Ïe se referenda zúãastnili mnozí âeãenci z uprchlick˘ch táborÛ v Ingu‰sku.38 Pfies nátlak, aby se referendu úãastnili, jenÏ na nû byl vyvíjen ze strany federálních a republikov˘ch úfiadÛ, byla podle Anny Neistatové z Human Rights Watch, která strávila den voleb bezprostfiednû v Ingu‰sku, úãast ve volbách „nesmírnû nízká. Podle na‰ich informací se z 50 000 zaregistrovan˘ch voliãÛ z fiad nucen˘ch migrantÛ zúãastnilo referenda jen 5 000“.39 Zprávy nestátních médií navíc hovofií o doslova nulové úãasti v referendu mimo ãeãenská mûsta. Obrazovky rusk˘ch televizí se v‰ak v den referenda hemÏily dlouh˘mi frontami pfied volebními místnostmi. Mnohem vût‰í bylo ov‰em pfiirozenû nad‰ení rusk˘ch vojákÛ slouÏících na ãeãenském území, kter˘m byla umoÏnûna úãast v referendu. Alexandr Ve‰njakov jiÏ vpfiedveãer referenda prohlásil, Ïe se hlasování zúãastní 38 tisíc rusk˘ch vojákÛ „permanentnû dislokovan˘ch v âeãensku“.40 Podle neoficiálních údajÛ, na nichÏ se shodne vût‰ina nezávisl˘ch komentátorÛ, tvofií kontingent okupaãních vojákÛ „permanentnû dislokovan˘ch“ na ãeãenském území kolem 80 tisíc lidí.41 Deník Krasnaja zvûzda 25. bfiezna s odvoláním na zdroje z Ministerstva vnitra vítûznû uvedl, Ïe se voleb zúãastnilo 98,7 % rusk˘ch vojákÛ slouÏících v republice.

36 37 31 32 33 34 35

RIA Novosti. 24. 03. 2003. Chechnya Weekly. 03. 04. 2003. Chechnya Weekly. 20. 03. 2003. Chechnya Weekly. 27. 03. 2003. Radio Radicale. 25. 03. 2003.

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38 39 40 41

Http://www.hrw.org/russian/reports/russia/2003/chech_rights.html [26. 12. 2004]. Grani.ru. 29. 10. 2002. A podle v‰eho mûl „pravdu“: v nûkter˘ch volebních okrscích, zfiízen˘ch poblíÏ uprchlick˘ch táborÛ v âeãensku, se totiÏ voleb zúãastnilo aÏ 190 % z poãtu registrovan˘ch (!). Grani.ru. 25. 3. 2003. BBC News. 21. 3. 2003. Die Welt. 31. 12. 2002; Ruská sekce BBC. 26. 3. 2003; Tribune de Genève. 4. 3. 2004.

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V návaznosti na v˘sledky referenda prezident V. Putin ruské vefiejnosti sdûlil, Ïe vysoká volební úãast „pfiedãila na‰e nejoptimistiãtûj‰í oãekávání“.42 ZároveÀ py‰nû zdÛraznil, Ïe „národ âeãenska to [svoji volbu] uãinil pfiímo a tím nejdemokratiãtûj‰ím zpÛsobem“.43 JiÏ t˘den pfied referendem, 17. bfiezna, se totiÏ nechal sly‰et, Ïe „referendum je nesmírnû dÛleÏit˘m krokem v boji s devastací. A cestou k pofiádku. Jsem pfiesvûdãen˘: Ústava, pfiijatá národem, je základem pro politické fie‰ení v âeãensku. Její pfiijetí umoÏní zvolit si skuteãnû demokratickou vládu, opírající se o dÛvûru lidí.“44 Datum volby ãeãenského prezidenta tedy bylo stanoveno na 5. fiíjna 2003. Prezidentské volby S pouÏitím vyzkou‰en˘ch prostfiedkÛ se v âeãensku uskuteãnily prezidentské volby. Potenciální pozorovatelé z respektovan˘ch mezinárodních organizací se odmítly zúãastnit monitorování voleb, av‰ak fiada pozorovatelÛ z ãlensk˘ch zemí SNS a pfieváÏnû ze stfiedov˘chodních a africk˘ch zemí (Organizace islámské konference, Liga arabsk˘ch zemí, Organizace pro solidaritu národÛ Asie a Afriky) byla ve vybran˘ch volebních místnostech pfiítomna. Pozornost zaslouÏí v˘zkum pfiedvolebních preferencí voliãÛ proveden˘ agenturou Validata v polovinû roku 2003. Podle tohoto v˘zkumu disponoval Achmat Kadyrov vÛbec nejniωím ratingem dÛvûry ze strany ãeãenského obyvatelstva – 11,4 %. Vût‰ina dotázan˘ch dÛvûfiovala mladému ãeãenskému miliardáfii Maliku Sajdullajevovi (20,1 %), dále pak poslanci Státní dumy Aslambeku Aslachanovovi (18,3 %) a profesorovi ekonomie moskevské Plechanovovy akademie Ruslanu Chasbulatovovi (19,2 %) – v‰ichni tfii jiÏ del‰í dobu Ïijí v Moskvû. Na otázku „Pro koho z uveden˘ch politikÛ byste v Ïádném pfiípadû nehlasovali?“ navíc uvedlo 66,5 % respondentÛ Achmata Kadyrova.45 V samotn˘ pfiedveãer voleb bylo ov‰em trojici reáln˘ch Kadyrovov˘ch soupefiÛ znemoÏnûno se voleb zúãastnit. Podle v˘stiÏného shrnutí Alexeje 42 43 44

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RFE/RL. 31. 3. 2003. Nezavisimaja gazeta. 25. 3. 2003. Kompletní znûní prohlá‰ení V. Putina k obyvatelstvu âeãenské republiky viz na webov˘ch stránkách Tiskové sluÏby Prezidenta Ruské federace. Online: http://www.president.kremlin.ru/text/psmes/2003/03/40678.shtml. [11. 11. 2004]. Nezavisimaja gazeta. 18. 7. 2003.

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Mala‰enka: „DÏabrailova pofiádnû vydûsili, Sajdullajeva znemoÏnili lacin˘mi pomluvami. Elegantnûji se v‰ak zachovali v pfiípadû Aslachanova, jemuÏ bylo nabídnuto stát se poradcem ruského prezidenta v JiÏním federálním okruhu. Takové nabídky se neodmítají, tím spí‰e Ïe v opaãném pfiípadû by mohlo dojít (a zajisté by do‰lo) na jiné, ménû humánní metody pfiesvûdãování.“46 Pravda, Malik Sajdullajev, cenûn˘ ve vlasti pro svoji humanitární ãinnost a nepo‰kozené renomé, byl z volební kampanû vylouãen na Ïádost básníka Nikolaje Pajzulajeva, jednoho z osmi zbyl˘ch uchazeãÛ o prezidentsk˘ úfiad. Jako formální dÛvod poslouÏilo obvinûní, Ïe ãást voliãsk˘ch podpisÛ nasbíran˘ch na podporu Sajdullajevovy kandidatury byla padûlána. Po zru‰ení Sajdullajevovy registrace Nejvy‰‰ím soudem âeãenské republiky podal obchodník Ïádost o pfiezkoumání tohoto rozhodnutí k Nejvy‰‰ímu soudu Ruské federace, kter˘ v‰ak napadenému rozhodnutí ãeãenského soudu ponechal právní platnost. V této souvislosti je zajímavé, Ïe pfiíslu‰ná komise vzápûtí prozkoumala podpisy sesbírané Sajdullajevov˘m t˘mem a uznala je za autentické, nicménû na finální rozhodnutí zplnomocnûn˘ch orgánÛ to nemûlo vÛbec Ïádn˘ vliv. Navíc „stíÏnost, na jejíÏ základû byl Sajdullajev vylouãen, aã se to mÛÏe jevit smû‰nû, nesla datum 1. srpna a zároveÀ obsahovala odkazy na 27. srpna“.47 Pajzulajevova stíÏnost tedy byla z formálnû-právního hlediska naprosto nepfiijatelná. Dal‰í obchodník z Moskvy, Husejn DÏabrailov, bratr majitele sítû hotelÛ a kasin v Moskvû Umara, odstoupil po konzultacích s Alexandrem Volo‰inem, aby se nestal „pfiíãinou obãanské války“, jak se svûfiil poslanci Státní dumy Aslambeku Aslachanovovi s poukazem na nátlak, jemuÏ byli vystaveni jeho (ozbrojení) pfiíbuzní ze strany ozbrojencÛ Kadyrovovy ochranky. Jeho obavy, které sice získaly konkrétní obrysy po zmínûné mimofiádné schÛzce s Volo‰inem, oãividnû mûly i domácí pfiíãiny a nebyly vÛbec plané. O rozhodnosti „ãeãensk˘ch“ âeãencÛ nenechávala nikoho na pochybách Gantamirovova „pravá ruka“ Sultan Satujev, kter˘ roku 2000 prohlásil:. „Svoje právo na moc v âeãensku jsme si zaslouÏili vlastní krví. Tuto 46 47

Mala‰enko A., âeãnja dlja vnutrennego i vne‰nego pol’zovanija. Díl 5. 9–10/2003. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Moskva. Inych uÏe net, a te daleãe. Istorija snjatija Sajdullajeva. In: Prezidentskije vybory v âeãne: pravoza‰ãitnyj monitoring. Avtorskije stat’i. Online: http://www.mhg.ru/24957D5/26E7AAD. [15. 11. 2004].

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moc se nám ale pokou‰ejí vzít takzvaní ,moskev‰tí âeãenci‘. Vysedávají ve sv˘ch pûkn˘ch bytech a nechce se jim s námi sdílet tu ‰pínu, zato se v‰ak usilovnû derou k moci. A jestli se pokusí nám na‰e právo na moc odebrat, vyhlásíme jim válku.“48 Tento princip v posledních letech platil ve vztahu mezi rÛzn˘mi skupinami âeãencÛ a obdobn˘ pfiístup zcela zfiejmû existoval mezi Kadyrovov˘mi zastánci v roce 2003 vÛãi témuÏ DÏabrailovovi, Sajdullajevovi aj. Aslambek Aslachanov se v interview pro list Moskevskovskij komsomolûc pfiiznal, Ïe bûhem mimofiádného setkání s Vladimirem Putinem mu prezident poloÏil otázku: „ ,Nechtûl byste pracovat v orgánech v˘konné moci?‘ A nabídnul mi funkci prezidentova poradce na jihu Ruska a v âeãensku.“ 49 Natolik „lichotivé nabídce“ Aslachanov skuteãnû odolat nedovedl. Ke dni voleb tak kromû Kadyrova zbylo sedm málo znám˘ch uchazeãÛ, ktefií plnili Kremlem pfiedem urãené role, tj. „demokratizovali“ pozadí politického divadla. Není bez zajímavosti, Ïe na poslední chvíli si svoji kandidaturu rozmyslel Ruslan Chasbulatov, kter˘ podle vyjádfiení Petry Procházkové, jeÏ s ním vedla rozhovor, „vãas vycítil, Ïe se druhá role ve fra‰ce nesmí hrát.“50 V˘sledkem bylo, Ïe pfii 87,7% volební úãasti hlasovalo pro Kadyrova 82,55 % voliãÛ.51 âeãenského vládce by moÏná ãekal dlouh˘ a ‰Èastn˘ Ïivot, neb˘t v˘buchu 9. kvûtna 2004 na stadionu Dynamo v centru Groznému, kter˘ stál Ïivot nejenom samotného Kadyrova, ale i dal‰ích pûti lidí, mezi nimi sedmileté holãiãky. Okolnosti atentátu pfiitom jasnû poukazovali na skuteãnost, Ïe náloÏ museli instalovat lidé z Kadyrovova okolí – ti, ktefií ke stavebním pracím na stadionu mûli dostup. V dojemném proslovu k obyvatelÛm âeãenska a Ruska Putin oznaãil Kadyrova za „skuteãného hrdinného ãlovûka“, kter˘ „ode‰el neporaÏen“. Posmrtnû mu udûlil Hvûzdu Hrdiny Ruské federace a pojmenoval po nûm ulici na novû budovaném pfiedmûstí Moskvy.

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Ob‰ãaja gazeta. 23. 3. 2000. Moskovskij komsomolec. 13. 9. 2003. Samotn˘ A. Aslachanov ov‰em hrdû prohla‰oval, Ïe své rozhodnutí rezignovat na úãast v nadcházejících volbách pfiijal jiÏ pfied zmínûn˘m setkáním s V. Putinem. http://www.watchdog.cz/index.php?show=000000-000014-000434-000006&lang=3. [03. 09. 2003]. Interfax. 07. 09. 2003.

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Kadyrov a osudy „ãeãenizace“ âeãenské volby byly naplánovány a uskuteãnûny v duchu probíhajícího administrativnû-právního utvrzení legitimity federální moci v republice; neoddiskutovatelnou souãástí tohoto procesu byla samozfiejmû diskvalifikace Maschadovova „teroristického“ reÏimu. Pfiíznaãné je prohlá‰ení Vladimira Putina ze dne 24. ãervna 2003, Ïe „nastávající proces obnovení funkãních vládních orgánÛ má b˘t dokonãen do konce tohoto roku“ a Ïe po nûm „pfiistoupíme k dal‰í etapû stabilizace – k pfiijetí ústavy“.52 Vzne‰en˘ch proslovÛ se nevyvaroval ani ctiÏádostiv˘ Achmat-hadÏi, av‰ak polohlasem prohodil upfiímnûj‰í poznámku, jeÏ nikoho nenechala na pochybách o jeho konkrétní motivaci: „Teì uÏ mû nikdo nebude naz˘vat Putinovou loutkou.“53 PoÏadavek legitimnosti zfiejmû sehrál nezanedbatelnou roli i v tom, Ïe Vladimir Putin vsadil na A. Kadyrova, tedy na osobu disponující v té dobû v âeãensku urãit˘m renomé a nejednoznaãnou „neruskou“ minulostí. Jmenování Bislana Gantamirova, osoby s kriminální minulostí, by totiÏ stûÏí pochopil Západ,54 zatímco Sajdullajevova postava se zase na rozdíl od Gantamirova nezamlouvala generálÛm. Jiní akceptovatelní kandidáti v podstatû nebyli. B˘val˘ imám se kremelsk˘m stratégÛm ukázal jako správn˘ ãlovûk na správném místû, jehoÏ potenciál mûl b˘t patfiiãnû vyuÏit. V tomto kontextu nepostrádá zrnko zdravého rozumu ironick˘ v˘rok imámova odpÛrce ·amsuddina Mamajeva, Ïe „podle této logiky by se jako nejvhodnûj‰í kandidát na funkci hlavy âeãenska jevil hlavní iniciátor války ·ámil Basajev“. Putinova volba by s nejvût‰í pravdûpodobností padla na „zaslouÏilej‰ího“ pfiedstavitele odbojového hnutí, pokud by tento krok mohl pfiinést (vût‰í) politické dividendy. Îádn˘ takov˘, kter˘ by se dal na vefiejné pokání, se v‰ak kromû Kadyrova v té dobû neobjevil, a proto se sázka na nûj (za stávajících okolností a pfii akceptaci takto pojíman˘ch pravidel hry) jevila jako optimální fie‰ení. Toto rozporuplné dilema ruské pacifikaãní strategie v âeãensku vyjádfiil Alexandr Arbatov slovy: „âeãence, na které se dá spoleh52 53 54

Http://194.226.82.50/appears/2002/06/24/1158_type63380_29002.shtml [03. 09. 2004]. Citováno podle ãlánku P. Bakera a S. Glassera. The Washington Post, 10. 05. 2004. Segodnja. 13. 7. 2000.

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nout, v âeãensku stûÏí seÏene‰. Buì jsou loajální Moskvû, a nemají v âeãensku Ïádn˘ vliv, nebo mají ve vlasti vliv i oporu, ale nejsou Moskvû loajální“.55 Kadyrovova nominace se tudíÏ vzornû vepsala do oficiální koncepce slibující „dialog s cel˘m ãeãensk˘m národem“.56 Navenek signalizovala absenci dogmatiãnosti v ruském pfiístupu a celkovou vÛli ke kompromisu i s b˘val˘mi nepfiáteli ve jménu dosaÏení spoleãného cíle „v‰ech obãanÛ Ruské federace“ – nastolení mírového Ïivota a pofiádku v zemi zmítané násilím a anarchií. Jmenování tohoto duchovního s drsn˘m vystupováním, veterána povstaleckého hnutí, mûlo zv˘‰it dÛvûryhodnost prezidentovy politiky na severním Kavkaze nejen na Západû, ale i v islámsk˘ch zemích; zfiejmû mûly b˘t vyuÏity i Kadyrovovy kontakty s muslimsk˘mi autoritami, které údajnû navázal bûhem pÛsobení v úfiadu muftího republiky. Imámovo pÛsobení mûlo taktéÏ svûdãit o tom, Ïe se v âeãensku nejedná o válku pro vûc islámu, coÏ mûlo následnû napomoci zpfietrhat finanãní a materiální podporu separatistÛm ze strany vlivn˘ch islamistick˘ch organizací a fondÛ. Není proto nahodilé, Ïe byl Kadyrov bohatû „vyváÏen“ na zahraniãní cesty.57 „Na Celosvûtovém fóru náboÏensk˘ch a duchovních lídrÛ v New Yorku prohla‰oval Kadyrov, Ïe Maschadovovi a Basajevovi emisafii se rozjeli po celém svûtû a roz‰ifiují dezinformace o tom, Ïe v âeãensku se vede válka proti islámu, proti muslimÛm […] Tvrdil, Ïe v âeãensku Ïádná válka nemífií proti islámu, ale proti mezinárodním teroristÛm, ktefií jsou nepfiáteli nejenom islámu, ale i celého lidstva.“58 Ve spleti mocensk˘ch orgánÛ, ustavovan˘ch v âeãensku v letech 2000– 2001 ov‰em Kadyrov nebyl zdaleka prvním ãlovûkem, coÏ svûdãilo o jis55 56

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Ob‰ãaja gazeta. 15. 6. 2000. Celkové znûní této koncepce, obsaÏené v Prohlá‰ení vlády Ruské federace o situaci v âeãenské republice a opatfieních k jejímu vylep‰ení ze dne 25. fiíjna 1999, deklarovalo pfiipravenost vlády Ruské federace k „dialogu s tûmi politick˘mi silami v âeãenské republice, které jsou pfiipraveny: respektovat Ústavu Ruské federace, svrchovanost a územní integritu Ruska; odsoudit terorismus ve v‰ech jeho projevech; odzbrojit nezákonné formace a pfiedat federální vládû osoby, vinné uskuteãÀováním teroristick˘ch útokÛ, zadrÏováním rukojmích a zloãinn˘mi aktivitami; osvobodit v‰echny rukojmí nacházející se na území âeãenska; zajistit dodrÏování lidsk˘ch práv a základních svobod a vytvofiit podmínky pro bezpeãn˘ návrat lidí, ktefií byli nuceni opustit místo trvalého pobytu“. Online: http://www.nns.ru/press-file/dagestan/zaiav1.html. [15. 12. 2004]. Byl napfiíklad ãlenem ruské delegace bûhem Putinovy náv‰tûvy sídla OSN v New Yorku v záfií 2003. Jako host se A. Kadyrov rovnûÏ zúãastnil zasedání Organizace Islámské konference atd. Akajev, V., Islam i politika (na primere âeãni).

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tém nedostatku dÛvûry. Ve prospûch této skuteãnosti hovofií i to, Ïe druh˘m ãlovûkem v administraci byl vÏdy jmenován nûkdo rusky hovofiící a absolutnû loajální Moskvû, jenÏ mûl plnit úlohu jakési pojistky. Tento pfiístup ostatnû v republice pfietrvává dodnes – ministersk˘m pfiedsedou je Sergej Abramov. Je pozoruhodné, Ïe dopisovatel deníku Nezavisimaja gazeta Ilja Maksakov v polovinû roku 2000 spravedlivû konstatoval, Ïe „fiediteli ãeãenské administrace podléhají pouze fieditelé místních [okresních] administrací, nikoli federální struktury se v‰emi patfiiãn˘mi finanãními toky“.59 Kadyrovova úloha se totiÏ ze zaãátku ustavovala ne-li zcela, pak alespoÀ zãásti jako dekorativní. Pro tuto tezi hovofií mimo jiné skuteãnost, Ïe pravomoci „polep‰eného imáma“ byly ze zaãátku spí‰e formální, ponûvadÏ statut doãasného fieditele republikové administrace pfiedpokládal faktickou prezidentskou nadvládu, uskuteãÀovanou prostfiednictvím komplikovaného systému federálních pfiedstavitelÛ. Del‰í dobu totiÏ souãasnû fungovaly Doãasná administrace âeãenské republiky, formovaná pfieváÏnû z místních âeãencÛ, i Pfiedstavenstvo vlády Ruské federace, pfiiãemÏ probíhala „otevfiená diskriminace prvního [z obou orgánÛ]. Financování a celkové zabezpeãení Pfiedstavenstva je mnohem lep‰í neÏ u Administrace, jejíÏ mnozí zamûstnanci dodnes nedostali v˘platu […].“60 Mimoto paralelnû existovaly a dosud existují okresní administrace a vojenské komandatury uznávající pouze jurisdikci ministerstva obrany a hlavního ‰tábu Ruské armády v âeãenské republice. Podobná je i situace v orgánech ministerstva vnitra, kde vzhledem k pfiekr˘vání kompetencí republikov˘ch oddílÛ milice a doãasn˘ch oddílÛ vnitra, do nichÏ jsou sezónnû vysíláni milicionáfii z rusk˘ch oblastí, ãasto dochází k (v˘razn˘m) tfienicím.61 ZmûÈ administrativnû-politick˘ch orgánÛ (vojenská sloÏka totiÏ i nadále byla a z velké ãásti dosud zÛstává soustfiedûna v rukou velitele Sjednocené skupiny vojsk, GRU a FSB) vynikala mimofiádnou chaotiãností. Kompetence jednotliv˘ch úfiadÛ se navzájem pfiekr˘valy a je tomu tak do jisté míry i dodnes, a proto musel Kreml dfiíve ãi pozdûji vsadit na jednu z osob (i kdyÏ to nemuselo vyluãovat jejich vzájemné vyváÏení), coÏ by ná59 60 61

Nezavisimaja gazeta. 23. 3. 2000. Citován ãlánek Lioma Turpalova. Nezavisimaja gazeta. 6. 4. 2000. TamtéÏ.

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slednû mûlo dopad i na typ vlády v republice.62 Celou tuto dobu bylo postavení Kadyrova vratké, coÏ si patrnû dobfie uvûdomoval, a tento problematick˘ stav se snaÏil fie‰it demonstrováním upfiímnosti sv˘ch zámûrÛ. Právû upevnûní vlastního postavení doma i v Moskvû (a nikoli proklamované vylep‰ení situace v republice, „boj za mír a obnovení âeãenska“) se tak stalo jeho úhlavním úkolem pro nejbliωí období. V pfiesné interpretaci tedy ‰lo o to získat dÛvûru Putina a v maximální moÏné mífie i generálÛ z FSB a vnutit jim my‰lenku o vlastní nenahraditelnosti. Pro politickou figuru, zatíÏenou balastem pÛsobení v jádru (separatistického) ãeãenského establishmentu to znamenalo, Ïe se v první fiadû musí zamûfiit na prokazování oddanosti my‰lence integrity Ruska – aÈ jiÏ byla tato my‰lenka motivována jakkoli a navenek byla prezentována jak˘mikoli argumenty. Tato rétorika pfiedpokládala v neposlední fiadû zdÛrazÀování naprosté nenávisti vÛãi „wahhábitÛm“ a separatistÛm (v Kadyrovovû podání ãasto proti v‰em jeho odpÛrcÛm), ve v‰ech smrteln˘ch hfií‰ích. Podle jeho charakteristického v˘roku „konec války nastane pouze tehdy, kdyÏ nebudou [tj. budou zlikvidováni] pohlaváfii jako Chattáb, Basajev…“63 âeãenská milice RozloÏit separatistické hnutí zevnitfi bylo povaÏováno za jeden z pfiedních úkolÛ, ne-li vÛbec úkol nejpfiednûj‰í Achmata Kadyrova, za jehoÏ splnûní, obraznû fieãeno, ruãil vlastní hlavou. K tomu, aby b˘valí ãi souãasní pfiíslu‰níci separatistick˘ch formací zaãali pfiecházet do promoskevského tábora, bylo zapotfiebí jednak utvofiit instituci, která by jejich setrvání na stranû federálÛ institucionálnû zastfie‰ovala, jednak pro to vytvofiit právní pozadí. Institucionálním pfiístfie‰ím se tak staly ãeãenské milice, zatímco 62

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Na pfielomu let 2000 a 2001 se v âeãensku utvofiil administrativnû-mocensk˘ systém, kter˘ bez vût‰ích zmûn pfietrvává dodnes: Zfiízena byla funkce ministra Ruské federace pro koordinaci pÛsobnosti federálních orgánÛ exekutivní moci, ãinn˘ch v procesu obnovy a sociálnû-ekonomického v˘voje âeãenské republiky (V. Jelagin). ZároveÀ do‰lo k vytvofiení vlády âeãenské republiky, jejímÏ prvním premiérem se stal S. Iljasov, b˘val˘ ministersk˘ pfiedseda Stavropolského kraje. SoubûÏnû funguje Vládní komise Ruské federace pro âeãenskou republiku, fiízená námûstkem federálního premiéra V. Christenkem. Velk˘ vliv na âeãensko mûl a stále má i Pfiedstavenstvo plnomocného zmocnûnce prezidenta Ruské federace v JiÏním federálním okruhu, jehoÏ fiízením byl povûfien jiÏ zmiÀovan˘ V. Kazancev. Kommersant˝-Vlast’. 23. 1. 2001.

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úlohu druhého zmínûného faktoru mûla sehrát amnestie vyhlá‰ená na PutinÛv návrh Státní dumou 13. prosince 1999. Tento zákon mûl platnost do 1. února 2000, av‰ak jiÏ 20. února téhoÏ roku byla platnost amnestie prodlouÏena do 25. kvûtna 2000. (Amnestie v zónû ãeãenského konfliktu se ostatnû vyhla‰ovaly jiÏ dfiíve – vÛbec první byla vyhlá‰ena Doku Zavgajevem v polovinû roku 1996, dal‰í pak byla pfiijata Státní dumou v bfieznu 1997 a t˘kala se období od 9. prosince 1994 do 31. prosince 1996). Amnestie se v‰ak v podmínkách pokraãujících ozbrojen˘ch stfietÛ z pochopiteln˘ch dÛvodÛ nesetkala na stranû válãících âeãencÛ s pfiíli‰n˘m nad‰ením a slibovan˘ masov˘ pfiechod separatistÛ na stranu Moskvy se nekonal. Dal‰í amnestie, t˘kající se „rusk˘ch obãanÛ“, ktefií rezignovali na úãast v nezákonn˘ch ozbrojen˘ch formacích, respektive dobrovolnû sloÏili zbranû a munici“,64 pak byla prosazena Achmat-hadÏim Kadyrovem v ãervnu 2003 s platností do 1. záfií a byla chápána jako vdûk Moskvy za „správnou volbu“ âeãencÛ na ústavním referendu. Kadyrov si totiÏ uÏ del‰í dobu stûÏoval, Ïe neúspûch pfiedchozí amnestie je dÛsledkem nedostatku pravomocí, které mu byly k tomuto úãelu svûfieny. Masová euforie na stranû potenciálních zájemcÛ o amnestii tedy zaznamenána nebyla. Bezpeãnostní rizika byla nesmírná; dostavit se v pfiedem urãen˘ ãas na urãité místo, sloÏit zbraÀ a pfiihlásit se, tj. uvést svoji identitu – to v‰e nedávalo jedinci pfiíli‰nou ‰anci na to, Ïe se on a jeho rodina (do budoucna) nestane objektem zv˘‰eného zájmu ze strany jist˘ch federálních struktur, ba spí‰e naopak. JakoÏto zrádce se navíc mohl stát objektem pomsty ze strany b˘val˘ch spolubojovníkÛ. Na rozhodnosti mu bezesporu nepfiidávaly ani body amnestie, které stanovovaly, Ïe posuzování Ïádostí o amnestii musí probíhat individuálnû vy‰etfiovacími orgány a soudy. Cílem tûchto opatfiení bylo znemoÏnit amnestii lidí podezfiívan˘ch ãi obvinûn˘ch z tûÏk˘ch zloãinÛ vãetnû organizace a uskuteãÀování teroristick˘ch akcí, na které se amnestie pfiirozenû vztahovat nemûla. Podle paragrafu 9 mûlo navíc platit, Ïe „rozhodnutí o uplatnûní amnestie, pfiijatá vy‰etfiovacími orgány, orgány ministerstva vnitra, vedeními nápravn˘ch zafiízení a jin˘ch míst nedobrovolného zadrÏování, kriminálnû-exekutivními inspekcemi, stejnû jako velitelstvím disciplinárních vojensk˘ch jedno-

64

Plné znûní zákona vy‰lo v deníku Rossijskaja gazeta. 6. 6. 2003.

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tek, musejí b˘t schválena státním prokurátorem.“65 V˘sledkem bylo, Ïe „osud kaÏdého ãlovûka se dostává do rukou nesãetn˘ch komisí, v jejichÏ pfieváÏné ãásti sedí ti, ktefií mají v popisu práce odhalovat ,nepfiítele‘ vÏdy a v‰ude“.66 Závazky v‰ak bylo tfieba plnit, a proto amnestie nakonec – podle jiÏ ustálené místní tradice – alespoÀ zãásti získala rozmûr laciného ‰pektáklu, kdyÏ pfied televizními kamerami rusk˘ch kanálÛ Kadyrovovi lidé pfiedvádûli kádry vzdávajících se údajn˘ch ãeãensk˘ch separatistÛ. âasto pfiitom „vznikal dojem, Ïe ,separatisté‘ byli pfiivezeni z nedalekého sanatoria. Mladí, zdraví chlapci, v‰ichni v módním civilním obleãení. Upravené tváfie, které jistû nezakusili tûÏk˘ Ïivot partyzánÛ v horách a lesích. KaÏdého ov‰em dokonale nauãili dûlat pfied kamerami provinilou tváfi“.67 Ostatnû místní obyvatelé ãasto ve vzdávajících se „separatistech“ rozpoznávali syny místních mocipánÛ, doãasnû dovezené sem speciálnû k tomuto úãelu z Moskvy, Petrohradu a jin˘ch vzdálenûj‰ích a bezpeãnûj‰ích míst. Úsmûvn˘ byl pfiípad „kapitulace“ údajného brigádního generála Arbího Bisultanova, kter˘ s sebou podle tvrzení Kadyrovova úfiadu v polovinû roku 2000 pfiivedl aÏ 300 ãlenÛ svého oddílu – v‰ichni sloÏili zbranû a byli slavnostnû amnestováni – radostnou událost filmovaly desítky kamer televizních stanic z âeãenska, ale hlavnû z Ruska. Pfiitom v‰ichni v republice vûdûli, Ïe se jedná pouze o zástupce pfiedváleãného Penzijního fondu, ne‰kodného ãlovûka, kter˘ se v Ïivotû nechopil zbranû a z nûhoÏ válka uãinila prostého uprchlíka. Spolu s desítkami dal‰ích uprchlíkÛ poté získal pfiístfie‰í v me‰itû ingu‰ské vesniãky Jandyrki a v okamÏiku „vzdání se“ pÛsobil jako námûstek fieditele penzijního oddílu Aãchoj-Martanovské okresní administrace. Uchu bûÏného Rusa ov‰em jeho jméno znûlo snad stejnû nebezpeãnû jako jména vyhledávan˘ch separatistick˘ch vÛdcÛ a teroristÛ. Kadyrovovo úsilí se ov‰em zdaleka neomezovalo na boj s neexistujícími „polními veliteli“ a „brigádními generály“. Pfiíznaãn˘ byl v tomto smûru pfiípad kapitulace brigádního generála Magomada Chambijeva, iãkerijského ministra obrany a „pravé ruky“ A. Mas65 66 67

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Jedná se o paragraf 9 amnestie z roku 1999; zmínûná ustanovení se v‰ak nezmûnila ani v amnestii z roku 2003. Verze online: http://zakon.kuban.ru/nd2/pgs4785.htm. [11. 11. 2004]. Kazarjan, A., Amnistija na sluÏbách politiãeskoj reklamy? In: Prague Watchdog. 10. 7. 2003. Online: http://www.watchdog.cz/?show=000000-000004-000001-000078&lang=2. [12.11.2004]. TamtéÏ.

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chadova, na nûjÏ byl pfiíslu‰níky ãeãensk˘ch milicí a federály po celém âeãensku uspofiádán rozsáhl˘ hon. Neúspû‰né pokusy pfiimût Chambijeva, aby se vzdal, v‰ak vedly aÏ k tomu, Ïe kadyrovci podle rÛzn˘ch zdrojÛ zajali 40 aÏ 200 blízk˘ch pfiíbuzn˘ch generála, mimo jiné i jeho sestru, kter˘m bylo vyhroÏováno zabitím, pokud se M. Chambijev nevzdá. Po rozhovorech se stafie‰iny M. Chambijev poãátkem bfiezna 2004 kapituloval, coÏ bylo tehdy povaÏováno za obrovsk˘ úspûch republikové administrativy, jenÏ mûl b˘t podle A. Kadyrova zaãátkem konce hnutí odporu. Podle zprávy Memoriálu, „v situaci, která vznikla kolem nûho samotného, jeho rodiny a desítek aÏ stovek blízk˘ch i vzdálen˘ch pfiíbuzn˘ch, nemûl Chambijev jiné v˘chodisko […]. Odli‰nou volbu z jeho strany by obyvatelé âeãenska nepochopili a nepfiijali – vykoupit vlastní svobodu svobodou a Ïivoty pfiíbuzn˘ch by znamenalo poru‰it nepsané zákony a mravy.“68 Podobné metody se stále ãastûji pouÏívají jak pfiíslu‰níky ãeãensk˘ch milicí, tak separatisty a federálními jednotkami, o ãemÏ bude fieã v následujících kapitolách. Nelze popfiít, Ïe jist˘ zájem o amnestii ze strany povstalcÛ pfiece jen existoval. Zpoãátku to byli vesmûs nûktefií b˘valí polní velitelé a spolu s nimi i okruh blízk˘ch z jejich oddílÛ, ktefií se s Kadyrovem osobnû znali z dfiívûj‰ích dob, a mohli proto usilovat o osobní záruky bezpeãnosti, coÏ se mûlo projevit získáním konkrétní pozice v republikov˘ch orgánech. Právû Kadyrovem osobnû dané slovo dokázalo pochybující âeãence pfiimût k pfiechodu do promoskevského tábora. Tomu, Ïe se federálÛm nemá dÛvûfiovat, nasvûdãovaly i události kolem Turpal-Aliho Atgerijeva. Ten se totiÏ podle pfiedchozí domluvy rozhodl jít s Rusy vyjednávat, „vstoupil pfiedem u vchodu odevzdav pistoli do místnosti ke generálu [Germanu] Ugrjumovovi, tehdej‰ímu fiediteli FSB v âeãensku, a byl okamÏitû zatãen“.69 Následoval soud, kter˘ generálovi uloÏil 15 let vûzení; krátce nato v‰ak Atgerijev za nejasn˘ch okolností v ruské vûznici zemfiel. Pokud v‰ak ‰lo o moÏnost kapitulace skuteãn˘ch polních velitelÛ, jejich jména i obsah rozhovorÛ Kadyrov udrÏoval v tajnosti, a proto lze jen tûÏko uvést jména skuteãn˘ch polních velitelÛ, ktefií pfie‰li na stranu Moskvy. Bylo tomu tak i bûhem konzultací fieditele doãasné administrace âeãenska se ‰esti polními veliteli (v záfií 2000), „jejichÏ jména Kadyrov odmítl uvést, aby na sebe 68 69

Http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/caucas1/msg/2004/03/m13451.htm. [11. 11. 2004]. Grani.ru. 9. 3. 2004. Je pfiíznaãné, Ïe Atgerijev byl ve váÏném konfliktu s Basajevem.

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nepfiivodil hnûv pfiátel ve zbrani […].“70 Informace o konkrétních jedincích se tedy shánûjí velice obtíÏnû. Podle nûkter˘ch zdrojÛ na Kadyrovovu stranu pfie‰li b˘val˘ fieditel zvlá‰tního oddílu ãeãenského prezidenta Boris Ajdamirov, ‰éf prezidentovy ochranky ·aa Turlajev; prosl˘chalo se, Ïe pfiechod zvaÏoval samotn˘ Ruslan (Hamzat) Gelajev, jeden z nejvlivnûj‰ích ãeãensk˘ch polních velitelÛ – nepfiím˘m dÛkazem toho je Maschadovovo varování na jeho adresu: „pokud to Gelajev uãiní, zneuctí sám sebe“.71 Motivace uchazeãÛ k pfiechodu do Kadyrovova tábora byla podmínûna rÛznû. Zaprvé, sluÏba v ãeãenské milici mûla jejím ãlenÛm (a teoreticky i ãlenÛm jejich rodin) zaji‰Èovat jakous takous fyzickou ochranu pfied zvÛlí federálních vojákÛ, neboÈ za jejich bezpeãnost ruãil svojí autoritou sám Kadyrov. To platilo zejména ve vztahu k v˘znamnûj‰ím pfiedstavitelÛm separatistického hnutí, ktefií se k promoskevské vládû pfiidali poté, co získali imámÛv osobní pfiíslib bezpeãnosti. „Z velké vût‰iny jde o mladé muÏe, ktefií vzhledem k nepokojÛm zmítajícím âeãenskem od poãátku devadesát˘ch let, nemají vzdûlání a jejichÏ jedin˘m fiemeslem se stala sluÏba ve zbrani. Volba mezi kriminální ãinností, která pfiiná‰í pravideln˘ zisk spolu s pocitem moci vypl˘vajícím z kvalitního zásobování a v‰eobecného strachu panujícího v âeãensku z Kadyrovov˘ch jednotek na jedné stranû, a vy‰etfiováním, soudem a mnohalet˘m trestem na stranû druhé nemÛÏe neÏ vyznít ve prospûch první z obou moÏností s tím, Ïe druhá varianta ov‰em mÛÏe nastat kdykoli.“72 Mnozí z tûch, ktefií se rozhodli pfiidat ke „kadyrovcÛm“, v tom nacházejí zpÛsob, jak si kr˘t záda pro vypofiádání se se sv˘mi – zdaleka nejen politick˘mi – oponenty, konkrétnû s krajany, které si staãili znepfiátelit v pfiedchozích letech, aÈ jiÏ ‰lo o úãastníky separatistického hnutí ãi nikoliv.73 Nûkter˘m âeãencÛm se úãast v promoskevsk˘ch milicích jevila jako moÏnost, jak v podmínkách chaotického boje o moc, komplikovaného 70 71 72

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Kommersant˝-Vlast’, 23. 1. 2001. Expert. 3. 7. 2000. Dikajev, U. (pseudonym), Kauza Kadyrov, aneb profil budoucího prezidenta. In: Prague Watchdog. 24. 8. 2003. Online: http://www.watchdog.cz/index.php?show=000000-000014-000434000004&lang=3 [18.11.2004]. K pochopení této problematiky není od vûci se zmínit, Ïe mezi zájemci o sluÏbu v promoskevsk˘ch ãeãensk˘ch milicích byl patrn˘ znaãn˘ podíl pfiedstavitelÛ slab‰ích ãi „zhanoben˘ch“ klanÛ, ktefií byli v meziváleãném období vystaveni nedÛstojnému zacházení, tj. „utrpûli uráÏku“ ze strany nûkter˘ch polních velitelÛ.

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reáliemi ozbrojeného konfliktu, zajistit pro sebe a své blízké bezpeãnost pfiidáním se k militarizované pospolitosti, fungující na principech vzájemnosti. V situaci, kdy tradiãní rodovû-klanové vazby jiÏ nemohly v plné mífie zajistit ochranu jedince, vyvstala pfiirozenû potfieba alternativnû vymezen˘ch skupin, které by onu bezpeãnost zajistily. Odvûká ãeãenská snaha zajistit a upevnit bezpeãnost jedince v rámci skupiny, jeÏ mûla pÛvodnû málo spoleãného s jakoukoli ideologií, se tak zaãala poznenáhlu politizovat. Podobné tendence se v ãeãensk˘ch dûjinách naposledy vyskytly v meziváleãném období v podobû rekrutování do dÏihadistick˘ch dÏamaatÛ. Ideologické zdÛvodnûní této racionální potfieby pfii‰lo ãasem. Oddíly místní milice byly fakticky vytvofieny jiÏ v prosinci 1999, kdyÏ bylo zfiízeno fieditelství Ministerstva vnitra Ruské federace pro âeãensko. PÛvodnû se v‰ak jejich ãinnost omezovala vesmûs na hlídkování na kontrolních stanovi‰tích a na ochranu administrativních budov a pfiedstavitelÛ proruské vlády, v obojím pfiípadû spoleãnû s federálními jednotkami. Oficiálnû vznik milicí datuje k 1. lednu 2003, kdy byly stávající oddíly reorganizovány do samostatné instituce – Ministerstva vnitra âeãenské republiky, které spadalo pod bezprostfiední jurisdikci A. Kadyrova. Existence a ãetnost ãeãensk˘ch milicí byly povaÏovány za indikátor reálného Kadyrovova vlivu v republice. Jejich vytvofiení bylo chápáno jako dal‰í krok k upevnûní Kadyrovova postavení. Podle pravidelnû deklamovaného zámûru mûla ãeãenské milice pfievzít tíhu vedení bojÛ se „zbyl˘mi teroristy a kriminálníky“ mimo jiné proto, Ïe „pfiíjezd vojákÛ s vojenskou technikou do vesnic vyvolává paniku a nahání lidem strach. Pfiitom taková opatfiení se zcela míjejí úãinkem: vojáci zat˘kají v‰echny bez rozdílu, vãetnû zcela nevinn˘ch“.74 Deklarovan˘ zámûr se hodil i Moskvû, neboÈ navenek signalizoval pokraãující stabilizaci, jakoÏ i skuteãnost, Ïe se jedná nikoli o válku, ale o boj proti kriminálníkÛm a teroristÛm, tedy o typick˘ vnitropolitick˘ konflikt spojen˘ s potfiebou nastolit ústavní pofiádek, zabezpeãovan˘ pfiedev‰ím lokálními strukturami, nad nimiÏ „federální centrum“ pouze dohlíÏí. Jak se vyjádfiil V. Putin: „Poãítám s tím, Ïe samotní âeãenci na sebe vezmou bfiímû boje proti terorismu“.75

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Kadyrovovo vyjádfiení citováno podle Kommersant˝. 19. 5. 2003. Nezavisimaja gazeta. 21. 3. 2003.

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Od samého poãátku, kdy bylo Kadyrovovo postavení obzvlá‰tû nejisté, mûla existence ãeãensk˘ch milicí zásadní v˘znam, neboÈ v praxi dosvûdãovala jeho odhodlání vést nekompromisní boj proti „nesmifiiteln˘m“. DÛraz byl proto od poãátku kladen spí‰e na kvantitu neÏ na kvalitu rekrutÛ.76 KdyÏ se ov‰em pozdûji poãty naplnily, kritéria náboru se zpfiísnila; teì jiÏ bylo zapotfiebí penûz ãi známostí, aby se uchazeã o zamûstnání mohl v milicích uplatnit. Dal‰í institucí, jejíÏ pfiítomnost byla legalizována v systému promoskevsk˘ch ozbrojen˘ch jednotek, je takzvan˘ ãeãensk˘ OMON. Podle nûkter˘ch zdrojÛ se tento orgán nachází pod kontrolou GRU a FSB. OMON je sice formálnû loajální Kadyrovovu klanu, av‰ak tvofií ho v˘hradnû zarytí „antidudajevovci“; b˘val˘m separatistÛm je sem vstup zakázán. Mezi OMON a kadyrovci existuje napûtí, které je ostatnû v âeãensku posledních nûkolika let bûÏné mezi jednotkami tvofien˘mi pfiedstaviteli „staré“ opozice a „pfiebarven˘mi kriminálníky“, jak byli b˘valí separatisté „star˘mi“ opoziãníky nazváni. AÏ do zaãátku roku 2003, kdy byl krevními nepfiáteli zabit Musa Gazimagomadov, velitel OMON, byla nevraÏivost na kadyrovce velmi váÏná. Velikost tûchto jednotek, které jsou povaÏovány za nejbojeschopnûj‰í a nejbrutálnûj‰í, se odhaduje na 300 aÏ 400 lidí. DÛleÏitou organizací byla tzv. SluÏba bezpeãnosti prezidenta, jejímÏ fieditelem byl AchmatÛv mlad‰í syn Ramzan, boxer se stfiedo‰kolsk˘m vzdûláním a od roku 2000 ‰éf SluÏby bezpeãnosti prezidenta âeãenské republiky. Na základû této instituce byl následnû vytvofien tzv. Antiterroristiãeskij centr (Protiteroristické stfiedisko); zbytek si ponechal pÛvodní název. V âeãensku je Ramzan „pro mnohé dûsivou postavou. Povídky o Ramzanu Kadyrovovi se podobají legendám o dobrodruzích amerického Divokého západu“.77 Podle svûdectví nûkter˘ch âeãencÛ osobnû se zúãastnil t˘rání zadrÏen˘ch (údajn˘ch) separatistÛ; o tom, Ïe Ramzan provozuje „soukromé vûzení“ v rodné vesnici Centoroj, hovofiila pfied nûkolika lety i novináfika Anna Politkovská. Do SluÏby bezpeãnosti prezidenta, která oficiálnû ãítala 76 77

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Není nahodilé, Ïe A. Kadyrov dÛslednû nadsazoval poãty ãeãensk˘ch milicí. Mala‰enko, A.: âeãnja: vybory posredi terrora. Brifing. Díl 6. 8–9/2004. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Moskva. KadyrovÛv star‰í syn Zelimchán, milicejní velitel, kter˘ mûl slabost pro alkohol a údajnû bral i drogy, byl v âeãensku a Dagestánu znám svojí aÏ pfiíli‰ impulzivní povahou a pravidelnû stûÏoval svému otci Ïivot. Zemfiel kvÛli selhání srdce pouhé tfii t˘dny po otcovû vraÏdû.

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kolem 100 lidí – i kdyÏ nûkteré zdroje uvádûjí nûkolikanásobnû vy‰‰í stav –, se tradiãnû rekrutovali Kadyrovovi pfiíbuzní, jejich loajalita se povaÏuje za absolutní. V dubnu roku 2006 bylo Protiteroristické stfiedisko koneãnû rozpu‰tûno. Jeho ãlenové byli pfiemístûni pod hlaviãku dvou novû vytvofien˘ch batalionÛ, a sice „Sever“ (kolem 700 ozbrojencÛ pod velením kapitána Alibeka Delimchanova) a „Jih“ (kolem 500 ozbrojencÛ pod velením poruãíka Muslima Iljasova). Oba bataliony jsou zahrnuty do rámce ruského ministerstva vnitra. Bezprostfiednû pod velení Ramzana Kadyrova spadá jeho osobní garda, tzv. specnaz, jejíÏ velikost ãítá zhruba 500 lidí, aãkoli se hovofií aÏ o 3 000 ozbrojencích odpfiísáhnuv‰ích vûrnost Kadyrovovu klanu.78 I kdyÏ se v posledních mûsících kritéria pro vstup do specnazu razantnû zpfiísnila, nejreálnûj‰í moÏností pro pfiijetí zÛstávají stále stejnû jako u ãeãenské milice osobní vazby. Vstupní procedura pfiitom vypadá takto: „[…] k Ramzanovi pfiijde ãlovûk a tvrdí, Ïe ho honí krevní nepfiátelé a wahhábité, nemá kam jít, a pr˘ vem mû k sobû. Ramzanovi lidé zjistí, jestli nelÏe. KdyÏ je v‰echno v pofiádku a uchazeãovi váÏnû hrozí smrt, nabídnou mu, aby pfiivedl je‰tû tfii lidi, vût‰inou pfiíbuzné. Dají mu prÛkaz, zbraÀ, ãasto i auto, a fieknou mu: ,Teì si tû nikdo nedotkne, ale musí‰ plnit v‰echny rozkazy.‘ KdyÏ není nûco v pofiádku, zabijou nejen rekruta, ale i ty tfii jeho pfiíbuzné. Nováãci, co mají takhle ,hlavu na ‰palku‘, se stávají takzvan˘mi ,vlkodlaky‘. Mají na starosti fyzickou likvidaci Kadyrovov˘ch nepfiátel a jiné ,delikátní‘ úkoly. VÏdyÈ co jim jinak zb˘vá?“79 Tento zvyk v‰ak není v âeãensku a okolních oblastech nikterak nov˘m: muÏ ruãí Ïivotem sv˘m a sv˘ch blízk˘ch za ãlovûka, kterého doporuãuje. S Kadyrovov˘mi ozbrojenci tûsnû spolupracuje zmínûn˘ „ropn˘ pluk“ (kolem 250–300 lidí) pod velením Movladiho Bajsarova. Tato struktura sice oficiálnû funguje na ochranu ropovodÛ, av‰ak kaÏd˘ v republice ví, Ïe jejich hlavním posláním je kontrolovat ropovod s tím, aby z nûj neãerpali ropu „cizí“, respektive aby fiádnû platili daÀ. Kromû kadyrovcÛ v âeãensku operuje tzv. batalion specnazu „V˘chod“, kter˘ má základnu v Gudermesu a formálnû spadá do struktur Ministerstva 78 79

Nutno fiíci, Ïe mezi Ramzanov˘m specnazem a SluÏbou bezpeãnosti prezidenta neexistuje pfiesn˘ rozdíl. Russkij fokus. 17. 5. 2004.

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obrany Ruské federace. Obávan˘ batalion „V˘chod“ sestává asi z 500 ãlenÛ, av‰ak v pfiípadû nouze se mÛÏe prostfiednictvím mobilizace nûkolikanásobnû zvût‰it.80 Velitelem byl do roku 2003 DÏabrail, nejstar‰í ze zmiÀovan˘ch bratrÛ Jamadajevov˘ch. Poté, co zemfiel pfii v˘buchu svého domu v Gudermesu (atentát mûli údajnû na svûdomí Jamadajevovi krevní nepfiátelé z fiad dÏihadistÛ), mu bylo Moskvou posmrtnû udûleno nejvy‰‰í státní vyznamenání – Hvûzda hrdiny Ruské federace –, a velení pfievzal mlad‰í bratr Sulim. Mimochodem, dva z pûti bratrÛ Jamadajevov˘ch svého ãasu, za A. Maschadova, získali titul brigádních generálÛ a v letech 1994–1996 se navíc zúãastnili války proti rusk˘m vojskÛm.81 Sulim Jamadajev mûl sice od druhé poloviny roku 2000 neshody s Achmatem Kadyrovem, av‰ak i on – stejnû jako jeho jednotky – v konfliktních situacích drÏí pohromadû s kadyrovci. Tmelí je nejenom spoleãn˘ nepfiítel – separatisté a zejména „wahhábité“ – ale i napjaté vztahy s ozbrojen˘mi jednotkami tvofien˘mi z ãlenÛ oddílÛ „staré“ opozice, vûrn˘ch napfiíklad B. Gantamirovovi, ãeãenskému OMON a batalionu „Západ“. Velitelem batalionu „Západ“, ãítajícího kolem 400 lidí a nacházejícího se ve sluÏbách GRU, jenÏ je rovnûÏ podfiízen v˘luãnû ruskému Ministerstvu obrany, je jednoruk˘ a jednook˘ Said-Magomed Kakijev, rovnûÏ Hrdina Ruské federace. Vyznamenání nezískal nahodile nikterak: jiÏ v roce 1993 zorganizoval v pofiadí snad první atentát na DÏohara Dudajeva, av‰ak granát vybuchl pfiedãasnû a zpÛsobil mu váÏná zranûní, která vedla k amputaci. V obou válkách se zúãastnil ozbrojen˘ch akcí na stranû RusÛ. Patfií mezi nesmifiitelné odpÛrce Kadyrovova klanu a „b˘val˘ch separatistÛ“, z nichÏ s mnoh˘mi je ve stavu krevní msty. Praktika „ãeãenizace“, tedy snaha o pfienos ozbrojeného konfliktu z roviny rusko-ãeãenské na ãeãensko-ãeãenskou, nakonec zaãala pfiiná‰et ovoce. Mladíci ocitnuv‰í se v milicejních jednotkách, jsou stále ãastûji vyuÏíváni republikovou vládou – zde se popud Moskvy shoduje s iniciativou místních ‰éfÛ – v bojov˘ch operacích proti separatistÛm ãi pfii preventivních opatfieních k vykofieÀování jejich základen, tedy zaãistkách. „Podle

80 81

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Takov˘ potenciál ostatnû u Jamadajevov˘ch existuje vzhledem k tomu, Ïe patfií k poãetnému tejpu Benoj. Viz napfiíklad Kommersant˝. 23. 11. 2001. Prostfiední z bratrÛ Chalid pak byl Moskvou jmenován ‰éfem ãeãenské poboãky provládní strany Jedinaja Rossija (Jednotné Rusko).

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pravidel, která zde platí, museli b˘t do skupiny uskuteãÀující ,zaãistku‘ zaãlenûny jak místní, tak ru‰tí milicionáfii. V poslední dobû v‰ak b˘vají na v˘jezdech s oddíly okresní vojenské komandatury v˘luãnû âeãenci“.82 Bûhem posledních nûkolika let se kadyrovci pfiidali k rusk˘m kolegÛm a podíleli se na únosech, t˘ráních a vraÏdách stovek mlad˘ch âeãencÛ, podezfiívan˘ch z úãasti v odbojovém hnutí nebo ze sympatií vÛãi nûmu. Neménû aktivní je „ekonomická“ ãinnost pfiíslu‰níkÛ ãeãensk˘ch milicí – i tam se totiÏ dostávají nejrÛznûj‰í lidé-, a nejenom jich. ZneuÏívají chaosu panujícího v republice, aby si pfiivydûlali na únosech lidí. Nasazením ãeãensk˘ch milicí do ozbrojen˘ch operací se Kadyrov snaÏil v praxi dosvûdãit svoji loajalitu Moskvû, kterou bezpodmíneãnû potfieboval k upevnûní sv˘ch pozic v republice tváfií v tváfi neskr˘van˘m mocensk˘m aspiracím soupefiÛ. Tato strategie ov‰em mûla (a má) i jin˘, neménû dÛleÏit˘ v˘znam. KadyrovÛv klan má totiÏ v âeãensku ãetné nepfiátele, jejichÏ pfiítomnost je pro jeho pfiíslu‰níky noãní mÛrou; do jisté míry platí tvrzení, Ïe dokud Ïije aspoÀ jeden z lidí, ktefií Kadyrovovi vyhlásili krevní mstu, nemohl se on ani jeho pfiíbuzní cítit vskutku bezpeãnû. Nav˘‰ení poãtÛ ãeãensk˘ch milicí spoleãnû s jejich stále intenzivnûj‰ím nasazením do ozbrojen˘ch operací proti skuteãn˘m ãi domnûl˘m separatistÛm a jejich pfiíbuzn˘m – tedy v podstatû Kadyrovov˘m osobním nepfiátelÛm – podle obrazného ãeãenského termínu „váÏe krví“ mladíky z fiad milicionáfiÛ, neboÈ neutuchající vraÏdy, t˘rání a poniÏování, ve které operace ústí, je stmelují s Kadyrovov˘m klanem – i vniknout se zbraní v ruce za práh domu, tedy „znesvûtit rodinn˘ krb“, je totiÏ na horském Kavkaze dosud povaÏováno za nesmírnou uráÏku. Teì uÏ ale musí, aby za zhor‰ené bezpeãnostní situace pfieÏili, drÏet pohromadû s Kadyrovov˘m klanem – dostávají se totiÏ do pasti, z niÏ není úniku: mosty zpût do spoleãnosti jsou jiÏ spálené. I zde lze vidût pfiíãiny stále brutálnûj‰ího zacházení ãeãensk˘ch milicionáfiÛ s vlastními krajany, aÈ jiÏ pfiíbuzn˘mi separatistÛ ãi jejich aktivními sympatizanty, stejnû jako nevybíravûj‰ího pouÏití násilí ze strany separatistÛ vÛãi ãeãensk˘m milicím a jejích pfiíbuzn˘m v republice. Málokoho asi proto nyní pfiekvapí, Ïe vûtu „zvlá‰tní adresné operace se mají provádût neustále a vynikat surovostí“ pronesl âeãenec, Ramzan Kady82

Alijev T., âeãency opasajutsja moskovskich planov sozdanija dlja nich „svojej milicii“. IWPR Caucasus Reporting Service. 11. 12. 2002.

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rov.83 Teror „kadyrovcÛ“ je pfiitom „moÏná stra‰nûj‰í neÏ teror ,federálÛ‘, pro nûÏ v‰ichni âeãenci vypadají stejnû: ti pfiece znají kaÏdého a pfiíbuzné kaÏdého také znají“.84 Zákony krevní msty a kolektivní odpovûdnosti, panující v ãeãenské spoleãnosti, tedy zajistily, Ïe se konflikt skuteãnû zãásti transformoval do vnitroãeãenské podoby – muωtí pfiíbuzní âeãencÛ, ktefií padli za obûÈ kadyrovcÛm, se totiÏ musí pomstít buì na milicionáfiích samotn˘ch, nebo na jejich muÏsk˘ch pfiíbuzn˘ch z otcovy strany a naopak. âím hloubûji A. Kadyrov, jeho pfiíbuzní a pfiívrÏenci zapadali do baÏiny vnitroãeãenské zá‰ti, tím více jsou odkázáni na podporu Moskvy a tím bezohlednûji musejí postupovat v souladu s jejími specifick˘mi zájmy. Stávají se tak nástrojem ruské politiky a jejich nenávist a odhodlání v boji proti „kriminálníkÛm, teroristÛm a hrdlofiezÛm“ z fiad vlastních krajanÛ ãasem pfievy‰uje, ne-li jiÏ pfiedãilo, obdobnû motivovanou nenávist a odhodlanost rusk˘ch vojákÛ. Pouze Putinova pfiízeÀ mohla Kadyrovovi zaruãit setrvání u moci, kterou potfieboval jako sÛl, aby pro sebe a své vûrné zajistil bezpeãnost, to jest zÛstal naÏivu a v neposlední fiadû také uhájil získané bohatství. V tomto ohledu se nezdály jako nadsazené nûkdej‰í v âeãensku roz‰ífiené zvûsti o tom, Ïe pokud se rusk˘ prezident odvrátí od svého ãeãenského chránûnce a vsadí na jiného, lze oãekávat ozbrojené protesty ze strany oddílÛ osobnû Kadyrovovi vûrn˘ch, pocházejících z jeho klanu, jelikoÏ ti uÏ doslova „nemají co ztratit“. I proto A. Kadyrov patfiil mezi nejdÛslednûj‰í odpÛrce ãeãenského dialogu, aã pÛvodnû byl za tímto úãelem (podle oficiálních manifestací) povolán. Neustále uji‰Èoval Putina, Ïe odpor ze strany separatistÛ je zlomen, Ïe dokonce i A. Maschadov je ochoten se vzdát, a sliboval „dobrovolnou kapitulaci“ dal‰ích a dal‰ích polních velitelÛ, respektive jejich likvidaci, jak o tom také pravidelnû referoval.85 Pfiípadnému zahájení jednání s vÛdci separatistÛ (A. Maschadovem, A. Zakajevem aj.) se ov‰em Kadyrov urputnû bránil, neboÈ se obával, Ïe v pfiípadû dosaÏení kompromisu mezi Kremlem a separatisty bude vy‰achován se v‰emi z toho plynoucími smutn˘mi dÛsledky pro nûj i jeho pfiívrÏence. Rozhovory s A. Maschadovem podle nûj byly moÏné pouze v jednom pfiípadû: 83 84 85

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Interfax. 13. 11. 2004. âlánek L. Ruzova. JoÏ. â. 120. 18. 5. 2004. ·ermatova, S., Bol’‰aja oblava. In: Prague Watchog. 12. 3. 2004.

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„Beru na sebe zodpovûdnost za zaji‰tûní bezpeãnosti Maschadova, pokud se dostane do rukou pfiíslu‰n˘ch orgánÛ. Pokud Maschadov pfiijde sám, budu pro nûj u prezidenta Ruska Vladimira Putina Ïádat milost“.86 Dokonce i kdyÏ nahlas a mnohdy krajnû nediplomaticky hovofiil o nutnosti staÏení rusk˘ch vojsk z republiky („Vojska jsou problém. Setrvávání vojsk je poru‰ením v‰ech norem a zákonÛ.“),87 musel si patrnû uvûdomovat, Ïe by bez podpory rusk˘ch dûl jen tûÏko zÛstal v zemi u moci.88 Tato skuteãnost nemohla zÛstat stranou pozornosti FSB a zfiejmû právû zde lze vystopovat pfiíãiny dlouhodobé, jak se v Rusku fiíká, Putinovy „Ïelezné“ sázky na Kadyrova, totiÏ sázky, respektive dÛvody hodnocené nûkter˘mi komentátory jakoÏto prezidentova proslulá politická „vûrnost“.89 NeÏ o altruismu V. Putina lze v‰ak, jak se zdá, v tomto ohledu hovofiit spí‰e o jeho pragmatismu. Putin nejenÏe zajistil jeho setrvání u moci, potaÏmo schvaloval ‰ífiení jeho pravomocí a pfiivíral oãi nad zpronevûrami finanãních prostfiedkÛ, jeÏ zfiejmû vnímal jako nejmen‰í zlo. „Záhy po svém jmenování A. Kadyrov na Kremlu vytrvale a dÛslednû vymáhal pfietvofiení své administrace v plnohodnotnou vládu âeãenska, oprávnûnou samostatnû formovat exekutivní moc v republice a nakládat s prostfiedky vyãlenûn˘mi z federálního rozpoãtu“.90 Jin˘ natolik loajální politik v âeãensku „svázan˘ krví“ s Moskvou neexistoval a zfiejmû je‰tû dlouho existovat nebude. Úskalí „ãeãenizace“ Politika Moskvy v âeãensku trpí pfies v‰echen stroh˘ kalkul fiadou slabin, které se jí v dlouhodobé perspektivû nemusejí vyplatit. Pfiednû amnestie úãastníkÛ hnutí odporu, byÈ nezbytná pro úspû‰nost „ãeãenizace“, sice 86 87 88

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Trud. 9. 4. 2004. Izvestija. 10. 10. 2003. Nûktefií komentátofii namítali, Ïe Kadyrovovy ostré v˘roky na adresu federálních vojákÛ je nutno chápat v mezích politického divadla, sehrávaného ‰éfem ãeãenské administrace a Kremlem v pfiedveãer referenda ãi voleb, neboÈ tímto zpÛsobem si mohl zajistit pfiízeÀ ze strany krajanÛ. Jak zdÛrazÀuje Musa Tumsojev: „[…] slova ãeãensk˘ch ãinovnikÛ o tom, Ïe ru‰tí vojáci nejsou faktorem stability, ale zdrojem reprodukce násilí, pfiedpokládá jejich osobní odvahu a vyvolává jist˘ respekt mezi lidmi“. Viz Tumsojev M.: cit. dílo. I kdyÏ tuto tezi zfiejmû nelze zcela popfiít, nutno dodat, Ïe se imámovy kritické poznámky v nemalé mífie zaslouÏily o zhor‰ení Kadyrovov˘ch vztahÛ s ruskou generalitou, která dÛslednû odmítala a odmítá pfiipustit samotn˘ fakt bezohledného jednání bûhem „zaãistek“, na kontrolních stanovi‰tích atd. Ani behavioralistick˘ pohled v‰ak podle mého názoru nelze podceÀovat.

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nebyla podle oãekávání masová, nicménû postaãila k tomu, aby do novû sestavovan˘ch administrativních orgánÛ pronikli (b˘valí) separatisté – coÏ ostatnû bylo jejím hlavním zámûrem. To, co se naprosto vymykalo dÛvûryhodné kontrole, byla otázka, nakolik je do promoskevského tábora pfiivedlo pokání, nakolik pragmatické úvahy a do jaké míry si uchovávali sympatie ãi pfiímo spojení se sv˘mi (b˘val˘mi?) spolubojovníky a nenávist vÛãi RusÛm a jejich partnerÛm mezi krajany. Varování velitele ãeãenského OMON Musy Gazimagomadova, kter˘ byl vzápûtí zavraÏdûn, Ïe „pfiibliÏnû polovina z personálu [jedné z okresních poboãek republikového ministerstva vnitra] Ïádala separatisty o dovolení, aby se pracovnû uplatnili v milici. PfieváÏejí bandity, zbranû, v˘bu‰niny […],“91 bylo by naivní to interpretovat pouze jako dÛkaz jeho osobní zá‰ti vÛãi Kadyrovovi a jeho (staro)nové mocenské základnû. V republice není pro nikoho tajemstvím, Ïe pfiinejmen‰ím ãást ãlenÛ ãeãensk˘ch milicí stále udrÏuje kontakty se sv˘mi kamarády. Tuto skuteãnost ostatnû pfiiznával i samotn˘ A. Kadyrov. Jak se vyjádfiil Vladimir Kolesnikov, námûstek hlavního prokurátora Ruské federace, tedy osoba nikoli z armády ãi FSB, „ãasto jsou okresní oddíly ministerstva vnitra sestavovány na tejpovém, respektive pfiíbuzenském principu, aniÏ by byla provedena dostateãná provûrka ohlednû jejich pfiíslu‰nosti k nezákonn˘m ozbrojen˘m formacím“. Tent˘Ï Kolesnikov s odvoláním na operativní zdroje uvádí, Ïe personál republikového ministerstva vnitra v Grozném je zhruba ze 60 % tvofien b˘val˘mi nebo stávajícími ãleny nezákonn˘ch ozbrojen˘ch formací, pfiiãemÏ v nûkter˘ch okresech jejich podíl dosahuje aÏ 80 %!92 Nezavisimaja gazeta k tomu podot˘ká, Ïe „za tohoto stavu nebuìme pfiekvapeni, Ïe bûhem minulého roku [2003] se objasnûnost trestn˘ch ãinÛ nejenÏe nezv˘‰ila, ale naopak sníÏila. Ze 360 trestn˘ch ãinÛ evidovan˘ch v kolonce „terorismus“ jich bylo objasnûno pouze 39.“93 ·éf ãeãenské administrace opakovanû hovofiil o plánech provést rozsáhlé provûrky, av‰ak jaká by mûla b˘t kritéria, podle nichÏ by se dalo vytu‰it, nakolik je ten kter˘ amnestovan˘ ãlen ozbrojen˘ch formací ministerstva vnitra „b˘val˘“? Îádné provûrky se tedy nekonaly – bylo jasné, Ïe jakékoli pokusy pfiehodnotit status quo by v fiadách promoskevsk˘ch 90 91 92 93

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Tumsojev, M.: cit. dílo. Russkaja mysl’. â. 4431. 14. 11. 2003. Izvestija. 16. 6. 2003. Citován Andrej Riskin. Nezavisimaja gazeta. 18. 6. 2003.

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milicí zpÛsobily znaãn˘ poplach, a to by mohlo otfiást Kadyrovov˘m renomé, zúÏit jeho pracnû budovanou mocenskou základnu a vést k nepfiedvídateln˘m situacím. Mnoh˘m b˘val˘m polním velitelÛm navíc A. Kadyrov garantoval imunitu, coÏ znamenalo, Ïe za ni ruãil nejen Ïivotem sv˘m, ale i sv˘ch pfiíbuzn˘ch. Kdyby navíc Kadyrov pfiistoupil na „zaãistku“ mezi personálem ministerstva vnitra, fakticky by tím dal zelenou rozsáhlému vmû‰ování do celého procesu jak ze strany federální armády, tak FSB, jimÏ by ochotnû poskytnuté informace ãi rovnou asistence ãeãenského OMON a dal‰ích jednotek tvofien˘ch pfiíslu‰níky „staré“ opozice, pfiipravily v˘teãné pole pÛsobnosti. Právû Kadyrovova rozhodnost, se kterou blokoval jakékoli pokusy ruské generality „probrat“ fiady sv˘ch b˘val˘ch spolubojovníkÛ, iãkerijsk˘ch dÛstojníkÛ se zvuãn˘mi jmény angaÏovan˘ch na vysok˘ch republikov˘ch postech v posledních letech podmínila v˘razné zhor‰ení jejich vzájemn˘ch vztahÛ. Ironická poznámka tehdej‰ího federálního ministra vnitra Vladimira Ru‰ajla bûhem pfiehlídky oddílÛ ãeãenské milice: „Jsou zde pfiítomní v‰ichni, kromû Basajeva a Chattába,“ tak byla moÏná ta nejnevinnûj‰í z toho, co a jak se prosl˘chalo mezi rusk˘mi generály, ktefií neblaze nesli Kadyrovovy „zvlá‰tní“ vztahy s V. Putinem a v‰emoÏnû se jim snaÏili ‰kodit. Ostatnû zákulisní bitvy rÛznorod˘ch lobbyistÛ v Kremlu nepfiestaly ani na okamÏik. Nehledû na strategiãnost Putinovy sázky na Kadyrova Moskva, jak se zdá, ani na chvíli neustoupila od vyzkou‰eného mechanismu „pojistek a protivah“. Del‰í dobu byl v âeãensku jako (pfiípadná) trumfová karta ve vztahu k (pfiípadnû) „nerozumnému“ ex-muftímu udrÏován B. Gantamirov; podobnû jako si v „rezervû“ uchovávali proruské politické ãinitele, jimÏ slibovali „velkou budoucnost“, ale zároveÀ Ïádali o trpûlivost – jejich ãas prostû je‰tû nenastal.94 âasto aÏ do posledního okamÏiku, konkrétnû do voleb, nemûl Kadyrov a jeho zastánci plnou jistotu ohlednû toho, zda se Kreml nepfieorientuje na soupefie – aÈ jiÏ z fiad místních ãi moskevsk˘ch âeãencÛ. UdrÏování nutné hladiny vnitroãeãenské nesná‰enlivosti je nedílnou souãástí strategie „ãeãenizace“, neboÈ posilování vzájemné nejistoty opaãn˘ch stran upevÀuje jejich závislost na Moskvû, a tedy i loajalitu. Politika „rozdûl a panuj“ ve fragmentované ãeãenské spoleãnosti skuteãnû vytváfií velice napjatou atmosféru, která je obzvlá‰tû patrná v prostfiedí 94

Tumsojev, M.: cit. dílo.

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ozbrojen˘ch formací, formálnû loajálních Rusku. Batalion „Západ“ tak neustále nevraÏí na batalion „V˘chod“; ãeãensk˘ specnaz, SluÏba bezpeãnosti prezidenta a jiné oddíly sdruÏené pod pfiístfie‰ím ministerstva vnitra a kontrolované v˘luãnû kadyrovci mají tradiãnû komplikované vztahy s místním OMON a ozbrojen˘mi formacemi B. Gantamirova atd. Na stranû ruské armády a FSB existuje nedÛvûra jak ke gantamirovcÛm, tak zejména ke „kadyrovcÛm“ v‰ech odstínÛ. NevraÏivost pfiitom podle ãeãensk˘ch reálií zdaleka nemusí mít politické pozadí – staãí málo (nedostateãnû uváÏlivû vyfiãené slovo, „podivn˘“ pohled atd.) – a konflikt je na svûtû.95 Nutnost tyto formace neustále vzájemnû vyvaÏovat pak Rusy nutí, aby je podle momentální potfieby vyzbrojovali ãi naopak „krotili“, coÏ samozfiejmû nikterak neprospívá jejich konsolidaci a vytváfií v fiadách promoskevsk˘ch âeãencÛ perspektivnû nebezpeãn˘ pocit ukfiivdûnosti i ve vztahu k „federálnímu centru“. Je pfiíznaãné, Ïe jakmile se prezidentem republiky stal Alu Alchanov, FSB a GRU okamÏitû z jeho pfiíbuzn˘ch a zastáncÛ zaloÏily pomûrnû poãetnou ozbrojenou formaci. Pravda, „podobné závody ve zbrojení asi tûÏko napomohou âeãensku k vybudování mírového Ïivota.“96 V˘sledkem je, Ïe republika je doslova pfielidnûna bezpoãtem ozbrojen˘ch âeãencÛ obtíÏnû identifikovatelné pfiíslu‰nosti. Nepfiehlednost (formálnû) promoskevsk˘ch ozbrojen˘ch formací je zdrojem zv˘‰eného napûtí a v minulosti jiÏ nûkolikrát vyústila v otevfiené stfiety, mimo jiné i s federálními vojáky. „Ru‰tí milicionáfii ãasto potkávají ve mûstû [v Grozném] po zuby vyzbrojené lidi neznámé politické pfiíslu‰nosti. Na Ïádost o pfiedloÏení dokladÛ zpravidla cvakají pojistky na zbraních: [ru‰tí] milicionáfii se od nich radûji drÏí dál, protoÏe [ãeãen‰tí milicionáfii] jako první neútoãí. Asi pfied mûsícem [v ãervenci 2000] v Grozném témûfi vypukl boj s oddílem v pfiestrojení. Jejich velitel (âeãenec) ukázal prÛkaz podplukovníka GRU, oddíl v‰ak pfiesto zÛstal zablokován pfiímo na ulici. Vojensk˘ komandant Grozného nafiídil rozejít se v míru, ale milicionáfii si byli jistí, Ïe ,pfiíslu‰níci GRU‘ jsou obyãejní bandité.“97 Mimochodem, v bfieznu 2006 95

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Nutno fiíci, Ïe mezi samotn˘mi rusk˘mi vojsky (FSB, armádou a oddíly federálního ministerstva vnitra) pfietrvává jisté napûtí, které je ov‰em spí‰e jevem typick˘m pro rozliãné druhy vojsk ãinné v konfliktní oblasti. Citován Vladlen Maximov. Novyje Izvestija. 27. 8. 2004. Citován Bachtijar Achmedchanov. Ob‰ãaja gazeta. 13. 7. 2000.

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kolem padesáti pfiíslu‰níkÛ proãeãensk˘ch milicí uteklo k separatistÛm do hor, coÏ nakonec uznali i promoskevské ãeãenské úfiady. V pfiípadû konfliktu podle kavkazsk˘ch zvykÛ razantnû zasahují „star‰í“ znesváfien˘ch stran – aÈ jiÏ uplatnûní na vysok˘ch pozicích v republikové administrativû ãi stafie‰inové, ktefií na nû mají vliv – a spory b˘vají urovnány. Ostatnû poãtem pfievaÏující ru‰tí vojáci základní sluÏby ani pfiíslu‰níci ministerstva vnitra, ktefií jsou do âeãenska posíláni na krátkodobou (zpravidla pÛlroãní aÏ roãní) sluÏbu, zpravidla mívají pramálo ochoty zasahovat do „interních“ ãeãensk˘ch záleÏitostí, aby si zbyteãnû nepfiidûlávali starosti navíc a po uplynutí termínu se Ïivi a zdrávi vrátili domÛ. V˘jimkou v tomto ohledu nejsou ani Ïoldnéfii (kontraktnici), jejichÏ vztahy jak s pfiíslu‰níky ãeãensk˘ch milicí, tak vojáky ruského OMONu a federálního ministerstva vnitra jsou tradiãnû napjaté a jejichÏ hlavní motivací je zisk z drancování, pfiípadnû vzru‰ující úãast na sankciovan˘ch t˘ráních a „zaãistkách“. Jejich ãinnost se tak omezuje na zdaÀování na kontrolních stanovi‰tích a zaji‰tûní vlastní bezpeãnosti tváfií v tváfi útokÛm ze strany separatistÛ. V˘jimkou jsou zvlá‰tní „adresné operace“ a „zaãistky“, jimiÏ v‰ak trpí vesmûs nevinní lidé, ktefií s odporem nemají nic spoleãného, neboÈ separatisty o nadcházejících operacích informují vãas jejich pfiíbuzní ãi „b˘valí“ spolubojovníci, zamûstnaní v orgánech promoskevské vlády. Pfiísloví „V‰ichni âeãenci jsou si pfiíbuzní“ dobfie vystihuje hloubku rodovûklanov˘ch loajalit, jejichÏ platnost nemÛÏe b˘t pfiekryta ani politickou orientací. Záhy po Kadyrovovû vraÏdû se hodnû hovofiilo o fiasku „ãeãenizace“ – o tom, Ïe ve skuteãnosti se jednalo o „kadyrovizaci“ atd.98 Ano, bylo-li v plánech Moskvy ustálit fungující ãeãensk˘ stát, kter˘ by se opíral o vnitroãeãensk˘ konsenzus a zahrnoval by (podle kremelské terminologie) pfiívrÏence „konstruktivnû naladûn˘ch politick˘ch sil“, potom „ãeãenizace“ vskutku neuspûla. V reálné politice, kterou Kreml uplatÀuje bûhem posledních ãtyfi, pûti let v âeãensku (ponecháme-li stranou brilantnû formulované politické deklarace), je skuteãnost bohuÏel zcela odli‰ná. Bylo-li ov‰em posláním „ãeãenizace“ zasít, nebo spí‰e vypûstovat zrno ãeãenskoãeãenské nenávisti, pak se tento úkol podafiilo splnit dokonale. I kdyby se 98

DÛleÏit˘m komponentem tohoto procesu je soustfiedûní v rukou Kadyrovova klanu takfika v˘luãné kontroly nad ropn˘mi zdroji republiky.

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dnes, hypoteticky vzato, ruská vojska stáhla, situaci v âeãensku by to zdaleka nevyfie‰ilo a mír tím v republice automaticky nenastal. Pfiespfiíli‰ bylo totiÏ âeãenci prolito ãeãenské krve, pfiespfiíli‰ padlo uráÏek. S novou mocenskou situací by zaãalo vzájemné vyfiizování úãtÛ, které se pfienese na dal‰í generace, a ty by tak vlastní krví platily za hfiíchy sv˘ch otcÛ. A to mÛÏe trvat desetiletí a zpÛsobit obyvatelÛm zemû mnoho Ïalu. Ruská politika v âeãensku je nicménû postavena na vratk˘ch základech. JiÏ dnes je Moskva nucena udrÏovat v zemi rozsáhl˘ vojensk˘ kontingent (minimálnû 80 tisíc lidí mezi asi 650tisícov˘m obyvatelstvem) mimo jiné proto, aby uhlídala pestrobarevnou armádu formálnû prorusk˘ch ãeãensk˘ch milicí a ozbrojen˘ch oddílÛ novû vynofiiv‰ích se polních velitelÛ – celkov˘ poãet aktivnû ãinn˘ch separatistÛ rusk˘mi generály a jejich ãeãensk˘mi partnery se jiÏ del‰í dobu nehledû na pravidelné zprávy o likvidaci desítek a stovek „teroristÛ“ dlouhodobû odhaduje na „pouh˘ch“ 1 500 lidí. Tento poãet je aÏ desetinásobnû niωí, neÏ je jejich (formálních) nepfiátel v uniformách s dvojhlav˘m orlem. Vojensko-politická moc Moskvy v zemi, pfiedstavovaná reálnou vojenskou silou, tak nesmí klesnout pod kritick˘ bod, aby u fiady âeãencÛ nespokojen˘ch s okupací (a takov˘ch je vût‰ina) nevznikla oãekávání, Ïe sjednocením a soustfiedûn˘m útokem lze dosáhnout vojenského vítûzství. Zdá se, Ïe právû udrÏení hladiny strachu v republice na takové úrovni, aby u pfiípadnû se zotaviv‰ích obyvatel nevzniklo pfiání vzná‰et politické nároky, je jedním z pfiedpokladÛ úspû‰nosti této ve své podstatû patové situace. I proto zÛstává spí‰e u slov v pravidelnû se opakujících hlá‰eních o staÏení vojsk z republiky,99 „kvalitativní zmûnû“ operace z vojenské na policejní, kdy „armáda jiÏ svÛj úkol splnila“ a na fiadu pfiicházejí jednotky FSB (podle prezidentov˘ch slov „specializovaného orgánu, kter˘ má podle ústavy vést boj proti terorismu“)100, ale i federálního a republikového ministerstva vnitra, jejichÏ posláním je cílen˘ boj proti teroristÛm. I kdyÏ ãas od ãasu odejde ten kter˘ pluk, zpravidla chybí zmínka o tom, Ïe se jedná o pouhé nahrazení jednûch formací jin˘mi. Souãasná situace má tedy rysy dokonalé tragikomedie: válka, která zaãínala pod hesly sjednocení ãeãenské spoleãnosti, konsolidace a nastolení míru a pofiádku, znásobila ve skuteãnosti nenávist mezi lidmi, pfiinesla mezi

nû nov˘ rozkol a nadlouho zakofienila v jejich myslích – i k míru je velmi daleko. Moskva, která mûla za cíl zlikvidovat v âeãensku nelegální tûÏce ovládatelné a nevyzpytatelné ozbrojené formace, dnes dûlá v‰e proto, aby je udrÏela pfii Ïivotû: „[…] zdá se, Ïe jsme tam ‰li právû proto, abychom znovu nastolili ústavní pofiádek, aby jedin˘mi ozbrojen˘mi formacemi byly federální struktury“.101 Stabilizace je tak nahrazena vidinou stabilizace, mír vidinou míru, av‰ak pro skuteãné fie‰ení konfliktu, nikoli pro jeho (jak se zdá, doãasné) utlumení a konzervaci se nedûlá nic. To se ostatnû v˘teãnû vr˘vá do obrazu ãeãenského zákulisí. Nic se tedy nemûní na tom, Ïe ãást ãeãensk˘ch milicí, dosud vûrn˘ch my‰lence nezávislosti ãi veden˘ch rÛznû motivovanou snahou o pomstu, se mÛÏe kdykoli, jakmile ze strany Kremlu oslábne kontrola nad republikou, pfiidat na stranu separatistÛ a zopakovat tím pro ruskou armádu fatální srpnov˘ (1996) útok na hlavní mûsto republiky. Zfiejmû se nem˘lí obyvatel Grozného Mahomed, kter˘ se nûmecké novináfice svûfiil: „Stovky lidí Ïijí v oãekávání pomsty. Mnozí z nich stále je‰tû nosí milicejní uniformu“.102 Podle pfiiléhavého ãeãenského pfiísloví, charakterizujícího mnohé z jevÛ ãeãenského „opozicionalismu“ (aÈ jiÏ proseparatistického ãi promoskevského), „abys vyrovnal dluh cti, mÛÏe‰ se sbratfiit i s ìáblem“. V této souvislosti lze vyvodit pozoruhodné paralely se zpÛsobem uvaÏování abrekÛ o století dfiíve, zmiÀované rusk˘m historikem Jurijem Botjakovem: „ […] msta, která byla dominantou, smyslem existence abreka, mohla b˘t v rÛzné mífie namífiena nejenom na krevního nepfiítele, civilistu nebo pfiedstavitele vlády. Odtud pramení i komplikovan˘ obraz jeho chování, kdy abrek mohl napfiíklad vstoupit do spojenectví s pfiedstaviteli rivalova tábora, kter˘ byl nezfiídka pfiedstavován Ruskem. V takovém pfiípadû se fakt spolupráce s Ruskem jevil pouze jako jeden ze zpÛsobÛ pomsty, zam˘‰lené abrekem.“103 Mimochodem, i existence ãeãensk˘ch milicí není nikterak nová; v minulém století byly rusk˘mi guvernéry rekrutovány – pfieváÏnû z jedincÛ, ktefií byli ve stavu krevní msty s imámem ·ámilem ãi s jeho naiby – napfiíklad oddíly tzv. dagestánské milice, které se aktivnû zúãastÀovaly bojÛ na ruské stranû a rovnûÏ slouÏily nepostradateln˘m zdrojem informací. 101

99 100

Viz napfi. Itogi. 20. 3. 2001; Nezavisimaja gazeta. 6. 3. 2003. Citováno podle Nezavisimaja gazeta. 23. 1. 2001.

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102 103

citován Andrej Piontkovskij. http://www.svoboda.org/programs/cauc/2004/cauc.051404.asp. [17. 12. 2004]. http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1143437,00.html. [17.12.2004]. Citováno podle Nezavisimoje vojennoje obozrenije. 29. 8. 2003.

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Tomu, Ïe ke zmûnû Kadyrovova svûtonázoru nedo‰lo pfies noc, svûdãí i replika, kterou pronesl pfied mítinkem sv˘ch stoupencÛ v ãeãen‰tinû: „400 let jsme válãili s Ruskem pro nezávislost. A niãeho jsme nedosáhli. Navrhuji âeãencÛm vynaloÏit aspoÀ sto let na to, abychom nezávislost získali jin˘mi zpÛsoby“. ZároveÀ nevyluãoval, Ïe „ãasem je zapotfiebí národu umoÏnit Ïít tak, jak se mu chce.“104 Polní velitel Sulim Jamadajev, kter˘ je pfiifiazován k promoskevsk˘m âeãencÛm, tento nesoulad vystihl tvrzením, které se dá pouÏít i o nûm samotném, respektive o nemalé ãásti souãasn˘ch „rehabilitovan˘ch“ separatistÛ: „Nevûfiím tomu, Ïe se Kadyrov, kter˘ nedávno volal ke svaté válce proti nevûrn˘m, k jejich popravám, k uvedení ‰áriátsk˘ch soudÛ, teì najednou polep‰il a zaãal s Rusy kamarádit“.105 AÈ jiÏ skuteãnost byla jakákoliv, dnes mÛÏeme fiíci, Ïe osud pfiidûlil Ahmadu Kadyrovovi, nejednoznaãnému ãlovûku Ïijícímu v nejednoznaãn˘ch dobách, zvlá‰tní roli – stát se symbolem a nástrojem normalizaãní politiky Kremlu v âeãensku, politiky, která je nyní pokraãována jeho mlad‰ím synem Ramzanem; o tom v‰ak bude fieã níÏe. „Svobodné prezidentské volby Aluho Alchanova“ Achmat Kadyrov byl charismatick˘m, mezi ãástí obyvatelstva obávan˘m i uctívan˘m vÛdcem, jehoÏ autorita jakÏtakÏ zabezpeãovala fungování republikov˘ch orgánÛ. Nûkteré b˘valé polní velitele a jejich druÏiny udrÏoval v ãeãensk˘ch milicích pouze on tím, Ïe jim dovedl zajistit imunitu ze strany federálních bezpeãnostních orgánÛ. Po jeho smrti bylo klíãov˘m úkolem zachránit v˘dobytky „ãeãenizace“, tedy zajistit za stávajících okolností mocenskou kontinuitu v republice. Nepoãítáme-li sem Ramzana Kadyrova, váÏnû se uvaÏovalo o dvou místních kandidátech (Tausovi DÏabrailovovi a Alu Alchanovovi – nikoli sice politicích, ale lidech co nejbliωích A. Kadyrovovi a jeho klanu), kdeÏto „moskev‰tí âeãenci“ nepfiicházeli v úvahu. DÏabrailova kandidatura (specializoval se na politické technologie a pomohl Kadyrovovi k úspûchu v prezidentsk˘ch volbách) byla brzo smetena ze stolu, mimo jiné proto, Ïe není povaÏován za natolik vlivného a charismatického politika, aby dovedl zajistit „pofiádek“ v republice. Opti-

mální volbou by b˘valo bylo pfiedat moc Ramzanovi.106 Tuto alternativu v‰ak vyluãoval jeho mlad˘ vûk: Ramzanovi bylo sotva 28 let, pfiiãemÏ paragraf 3 ãerstvû pfiijaté ãeãenské ústavy stanovoval minimální vûk pro uchazeãe o prezidentské kfieslo na 30 let. Pfii zachování a upevnûní reálné moci Ramzana, kter˘ byl tfii dny po otcovû smrti jmenován do funkce námûstka premiéra, padla Putinova volba na Alu Alchanova, jehoÏ vûrnost Kadyrovovu klanu a Moskvû se opakovanû osvûdãila. Podle ãeãenského politologa Timura Muzajeva se „na osobû Alu Alchanova shodly zájmy Kremlu, kter˘ usiluje o zakonzervování stávající situace v republice (ani mír, ani válka), a zájmy vládnoucí ‰piãky, jejímÏ hlavním cílem je setrvat u moci a navíc si udrÏet a upevnit kontrolu nad hlavními finanãními toky v âeãensku“.107 Alu Alchanov se narodil v lednu 1957 v kazachstánském vyhnanství. Patfií k tejpu Gendergenoj; rodová vesnice Geldigen. Po deportaci se jeho rodina usídlila v mûsteãku Urus-Martan, povaÏovaném za ba‰tu prorusk˘ch sil v centrálním âeãensku. Po absolvování mogiljevské milicejní ‰koly slouÏil v armádû a po vojnû vystudoval roku 1992 vy‰‰í milicejní ‰kolu v Rostovû. PÛsobil v rÛzn˘ch funkcích na ministerstvu vnitra âeãeno-Ingu‰ské autonomní sovûtské socialistické republiky. V letech 1992–1997 byl námûstkem fieditele, pozdûji fieditelem groznûnského ústfiedí Severokavkazského velitelství vnitra. Bûhem první rusko-ãeãenské války se zúãastnil váleãn˘ch operací na stranû rusk˘ch vojsk. Na pfielomu let 1996–1997 opustil území republiky a v letech 1997–2000 velel okresnímu milicejnímu oddílu ve mûstû ·achty v Rostovské oblasti. Poté se vrátil do úfiadu fieditele groznûnského ústfiedí Severokavkazského velitelství vnitra. V roce 2003 vystfiídal Ruslana Cakajeva ve funkci ministra vnitra âeãenské republiky. Je generálmajorem milice a nositelem ¤ádu odvahy. Je Ïenat˘, má tfii dûti. Pfiedãasné prezidentské volby v âeãensku, uskuteãnûné 29. srpna 2004, probûhly zcela v intencích Kremlu – Alu Alchanov s jasnou pfievahou zvítûzil. Pfii úãasti 84,6 % se za nûj vyslovilo 73,8 % oprávnûn˘ch voliãÛ. Nic jiného se ostatnû ani neãekalo – poté, co byl kvÛli bezv˘znamné formalitû (uvedení v poloÏce pasu místa narození „âeãenská republika” místo „âe106

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Citováno podle Ekspert, 03. 07. 2000. Citováno podle Kommersant, 14. 06. 2000.

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Tehdy se v‰ak zaãalo s novou silou spekulovat o moÏnosti, kterou prosazovali ru‰tí generálové, tedy o zfiízení postu „generálního gubernátora“. Citováno podle Respekt. 37/2004.

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ãensko-Ingu‰ské autunomní sovûtské socialistické republiky”) republikovou Volební komisí v pfiedveãer voleb staÏen Malik, moskevsk˘ byznysmen ãeãenského pÛvodu Malik Sajdullajev. (Mimochodem, stejn˘ „prohfie‰ek“ v Alchanovû pase byl upraven den pfied registrací; byl mu urychlenû vydán nov˘ pas). Tomu bylo zabránûno v registraci kvÛli údajn˘m nepfiesnostem v pase. Dal‰í „kandidáti“, plnící roli dublérÛ, získali podstatnû ménû hlasÛ: Movsur Hamidov 8,48 %, Abdulla Bugajev 4,62 %, Vacha Visajev 4,14 %, Umar Abujev 3,21 %, Mahomed Ajdamirov 0,72 %.108 Logiku Kremlu lze vysledovat v postoji vládního deníku Rossijskaja gazûta, kter˘ nûkolik dnÛ po volbách poukazoval na to, Ïe ãeãen‰tí voliãi prokázali „opravdu vysokou aktivitu, podstatnû vy‰‰í, neÏ ãiní rusk˘ prÛmûr, a bez váhání hlasovali pro kandidáta vlády, kterého pfied pÛlrokem moÏná ani neznali […]. Proã Alu Alchanov? Zaprvé, ãeãen‰tí voliãi by hlasovali pro témûfi kteréhokoli ãlovûka, kterého by jim doporuãil Vladimir Putin, jenÏ je pro nû jedinou nadûjí díky jeho tvrdosti a dÛslednosti v boji proti teroristÛm, v obnovování politické moci, ekonomiky a civilizace [!] v âeãensku.“109 Skuteãn˘ stav vûcí evidentnû nebyl tak malebn˘, jak ho vylíãily oficiální ruské úfiady a jejich partnefii ze zahraniãí. KdyÏ bylo nakonec rozhodnuto o Alchanovovû kandidatufie, Moskva uplatnila jiÏ vyzkou‰ené „volební mechanismy“. Skuteãní protivníci byli z pfiedvolebního klání vylouãeni a dal‰ím byla urãena role statistÛ – jejich „pfiedvolební kampaÀ“ se omezila na pár vesnic ãi mûstsk˘ch ãtvrtí, v nichÏ jim Rusové narychlo sestavili volební ‰táby. Volební kampaÀ kremelského chránûnce je sv˘m rozsahem zcela pfieválcovala – Alchanova pfiijel osobnû podpofiit sám Putin, jeho proslovy v televizi znûly ve dne v noci, média neustále referovala o jeho ambiciózních plánech na rekonstrukci republiky. Opakovanû zaznûly i sliby o odchodu rusk˘ch vojsk, coÏ je vût‰inou âeãencÛ chápáno jako skuteãn˘ a nezbytn˘ pfiedpoklad mírového Ïivota. NejdÛleÏitûj‰ím mechanismem ale bylo, Ïe Kreml opûtovnû vyuÏil potenciálu „mrtv˘ch du‰í“. Jako minule se voleb zúãastnily i desetitisíce rusk˘ch vojákÛ dislokovan˘ch v republice. Nezávisl˘m pozorovatelÛm se Grozn˘ v den voleb jevil jako „zcela prázdn˘“. „V místnostech, kde jsme pobyli (asi 15–20 minut) jsme potkali zhruba

dva, tfii lidi,“ uvedla v˘konná fieditelka moskevské Helsinské federace Tatjana Lok‰inová. Nezávisl˘ pozorovatel petrohradského stfiediska Strategie Antuan Arakeljan nav‰tívil volební místnosti ve vesnicích Vedeno, Ca-Vedeno, ·ali a Germenãuk a „v‰ude byli ve stejnou dobu maximálnû dva, tfii voliãi“. Pfiedstavitel Memoriálu Grigorij ·vedov upozorÀoval, Ïe „ve v‰ech okrscích nesouhlasily poãty hlasujících u volební komise a u pozorovatelÛ – pfiedsedové volebních komisí jich mûli 4–5krát více. Druhou zvlá‰tností je nespoãet vojákÛ, jichÏ je tu více neÏ voliãÛ.“ Svûdek voleb Alexej Mala‰enko hovofiil o naprosté „apatii potenciálních voliãÛ“, kterou se tyto volby odli‰ovaly od dfiívûj‰ích, a její pfiíãiny shledával v tom, Ïe „vloni existovala takfiíkajíc jakási kuráÏ: aÈ za Kadyrovem stojí samotná Moskva, aÈ je koneãn˘ v˘sledek dopfiedu znám˘, stejnû fiekneme své slovo, aspoÀ tím, Ïe budeme strhávat a niãit plakáty s jeho tváfií, tím, Ïe pÛjdeme volit svého, nikoli Moskvou diktovaného kandidáta. Letos nikdo plakáty nestrhával, míÀ vzruchu bylo i ve volebních ‰tábech Alchanovov˘ch soupefiÛ“.110 Celková situace má do proklamované stabilizace skuteãnû velmi daleko. Ve‰keré snahy Moskvy vyfie‰it ãeãensk˘ konflikt „politick˘mi zpÛsoby“ – byÈ jejich náplÀ tomuto úãelu ani vzdálenû nepfiispívá – mají i dal‰í podstatn˘ háãek. NezohledÀují totiÏ pfiedstavy strany, s níÏ se fakticky nacházejí ve stavu války a jejíÏ reakce na „ústavnû-právní“ aktivity Kremlu jsou v republice vesmûs negativní. âasto jsou proto diverznû-teroristické aktivity naãasovány na dny voleb, aby od úãasti na nich odradily obyvatele. Nadchnuti úspû‰n˘m skoncováním s pfiedním „zrádcem ãeãenského národa“ Achmatem Kadyrovem vystupÀovali separatisté diverznû-teroristické aktivity jak na území âeãenska, tak mimo nû. Bûhem letních mûsícÛ tak do‰lo k soustfiedûn˘m útokÛm na ingu‰skou metropoli NazraÀ a Groznyj, jichÏ se zúãastnily stovky ozbrojencÛ. Zvlá‰tní aktivizace je zfietelná u sebevraÏedn˘ch komand, která se podílela na teroristick˘ch útocích v Moskvû a nejnovûji v severoosetském mûstû Bislan. Nadûjn˘ pfiíslib jednání s Aslanem Maschadovem, pro povstalce jedin˘m legitimním prezidentem, Alchanov záhy dementoval. „Nikdy jsem netvrdil, Ïe je nutné jednat s Aslanem Maschadovem,“ prohlásil novû zvolen˘ ãeãensk˘ prezident

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Polit.ru. 30. 8. 2004. Citován Sergej Markov. Rossijskaja gazeta. 31. 8. 2004.

Mala‰enko, A., âeãnja: vybory posredi terrora. Brifing. Díl 6. 8–9/2004. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Moskva.

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a pokraãoval: „Maschadov má jedinou ‰anci – omluvit se ãeãenskému lidu, jejÏ vehnal do války, a vydat se soudu.“111 Ramzanova éra S Kadyrovovou vraÏdou poprvé naléhavû vyvstala otázka v˘znamu nejen kádrové politiky Kremlu, ale i efektivity formy vládnutí a – ‰ífieji vzato – dosavadní politiky Moskvy v této severokavkazské republice. Politika „ãeãenizace“ posledních nûkolika let byla totiÏ témûfi bezv˘hradnû postavena na osobû Ahmad-hadÏiho, která jí dávala strukturu a smysl; v polovinû kvûtna 2004 se zdálo, Ïe sázka na jednoho ãlovûka se patrnû nevyplatila, ãímÏ bylo nûkolikaleté úsilí Moskvy v sázce. Pokud by totiÏ mûl Kreml v úmyslu onu politiku pfiehodnotit, nastal právû nejvy‰‰í ãas tak uãinit, a to i pfies v tomto pfiípadû nezbytné vefiejné kondolence a posmrtnou úctu vzdávanou zavraÏdûnému a jeho nejbliωímu okolí. A i kdyÏ volba nakonec formálnû padla na Aluho Alchanova, ãlovûka nav˘sost stfiízlivého, loajálního a v ãeãensk˘ch souvislostech málo v˘znamného, pozornost se záhy soustfiedila na Kadyrovova mlad‰ího syna Ramzana. Spekulace o tom, Ïe by mladík bez maturity112, narozen˘ 3. fiíjna 1976 ve vesnici Centoroj Kurãalojevského okresu a vlastnící kromû fiady exotick˘ch zvífiat republikové fotbalové muÏstvo „Terek“, po sobû pojmenovan˘ boxersk˘ klub a sbírku luxusních dÏípÛ, mohl zaujmout uvolnûné místo po otci, se vynofiily ihned poté, co byl jiÏ nûkolik hodin po atentátu pfiijat v Kremlu samotn˘m Putinem. Televizní obrazovky po celém svûtû obletûly zábûry audience v prezidentovû kanceláfii, na nichÏ RamzanÛv sportovní úbor ostfie kontrastoval s Putinov˘m stroh˘m oblekem. Audience byla prezidentem zfiejmû uãinûna ve snaze zabránit horkokrevnému boxerovi, aby okamÏitû nastartoval s nasazením stovek sv˘ch stoupencÛ v zemi kampaÀ krevní msty proti údajn˘m a skuteãn˘m otcov˘m vrahÛm, pfiípadnû – coÏ Moskvu zfiejmû znepokojovalo nanejv˘‰ – si pojistil své „legitimní“ právo na otcovo kfieslo tváfií v tváfi „cizím“ aspiracím.

Likvidace Ahmada Kadyrova totiÏ sice nakrátko probudila z letargie nûkolik odvûk˘ch uchazeãÛ o moc v zemi – zejména Bislana Gantamirova – a pfiimûla je k zápolení o pozici ãeãenského „rovnûj‰ího mezi rovn˘mi“.113 Otázka, kdo moc v zemi získá, se v‰ak podle ustálené tradice fie‰ila daleko od kavkazsk˘ch hor v kremelsk˘ch kuloárech. Záhy se totiÏ ukázalo, Ïe pro Kreml byla smûrodatnou snaha zajistit kontinuitu dosavadní politiky; pfiístup na „ãeãenizaci“ konfliktu zÛstal neotfiesen, ba naopak byla urgentnû pociÈována potfieba její v˘dobytky chránit. V tomto ohledu mûla klíãov˘ v˘znam strategická sázka na Ramzana. Pravda, jak bylo naznaãeno v˘‰e, ideální volbou by bylo „pfiedat“ moc rovnou mladému Kadyrorovi. Pokud by se dostal k moci, ruãil by tento razantní, dojmem vesnického burana pÛsobící mladík svojí hlavou za platnost pfiísah a slibÛ, které kdysi uãinil jeho otec. Tak praví ãeãensk˘ obyãej. Tím by pak zajistil kontinuitu nejenom dosavadní politiky Moskvy, ale – stejnû jak ãinil jeho otec – zajistil by bezpeãí i pro „kadyrovizované” ãleny odboje, aÈ jiÏ vÛãi (pfiípadn˘m) útokÛm ze strany rusk˘ch generálÛ ãi nepfiátel z fiad rozliãn˘ch promoskevsk˘ch ãeãensk˘ch frakcí. Bez v˘znamu pro moskevské stratégy nebylo rovnûÏ vûdomí, Ïe otcova vraÏda je‰tû více upevnila stav krevní msty, do níÏ byl Ramzan po dobu ‰esti let „automaticky“ zapleten; jedná se ostatnû o ãlovûka, kter˘ v‰ím srdcem nenávidí otcovy vrahy a nepfiátele a snad i zoufaleji neÏ Moskva usiluje o jejich patfiiãné potrestání. Nutno dodat, Ïe Ramzan – zfiejmû na popud Moskvy, která moÏnost urychlené zmûny ãeãenské ústavy vylouãila – oznámil, Ïe o její zmûnu nikterak neusiluje. Doãasnû se tedy musel spokojit s postem námûstka premiéra s kompetencemi v klíãové oblasti bezpeãnosti, tedy de facto získal kontrolu nad silov˘mi rezorty. Tento post mu byl nabídnut pouhé tfii dny po otcovû vraÏdû. Reálná, tedy vojenská, moc byla i nadále koncentrována v rukou Kadyrorova klanu, kter˘ nyní nikterak neskr˘vá své dalekosáhlé politické – vãetnû prezidentsk˘ch – ambice. Nav˘sost dÛleÏité rovnûÏ bylo, Ïe „kadyrovci“ si udrÏeli nejvy‰‰í posty v republice – k jejich „obnovû“ Alchanovo113

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Respekt. 37/2004. Mlad˘ Kadyrov v‰ak nedávno získal „na dálku“ diplom jedné dagestánské univerzity. Poãátkem leto‰ního roku byl rovnûÏ pov˘‰en na ãestného ãlena Akademie pfiírodních vûd Ruské federace.

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Tehdy se zaãalo znovu spekulovat o zfiízení postu „generálního guvernéra“, vize, podporované nûkter˘mi rusk˘mi generály; za kandidáta na tento post se napfiíklad povaÏoval zplnomocnûn˘ zmocnûnec ruského prezidenta v JiÏním okruhu Viktor Kazancev. Je zajímavé, Ïe Gantamirov byl vzápûtí úãinnû „pacifikován“ poté, co byli ãtyfii jeho osobní stráÏci a zároveÀ pfiíbuzní, uneseni Ramzanovy ozbrojenci. Podobnû své prezidentské ambice zmírnil Aslakhanov, kter˘ spatfiuje v mladém Kadyrovovi „faktického lídra“.

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v˘mi stoupenci nedo‰lo. Skuteãnost, Ïe Putinova „dÛvûra“ v Kadyrova star‰ího následnû pfie‰la na jeho syna, byla potvrzena, kdyÏ Putin poskytnul mladému Kadyrovovi neãekan˘ silvestrovsk˘ (2005) dárek – Hvûzdu hrdiny Ruské federace, nejvy‰‰í vyznamenání ve státû. Tehdy to vyvolalo poboufiení v ruské spoleãnosti. Otázkou zÛstávalo, kdy – pokud vÛbec – se neotesan˘ Ramzan nauãí zpÛsobÛm správného vefiejného vystupování, které by mu umoÏnilo v budoucnu zaujmout nejvy‰‰í politick˘ post. Ramzanov˘m hlavním cílem v následujících letech se tak stalo – v ãeãensk˘ch podmínkách obzvlá‰tû aktuální – neustálé upevÀování mocenské základny v zemi a souãasnû dÛvûry a dojmu nepostradatelnosti v klíãov˘ch bezpeãnostních otázkách ze strany moskevsk˘ch stratégÛ, coÏ jako jediné mohlo poslouÏit jako témûfi zaruãen˘ recept k politickému rÛstu, moÏného jedinû pfii „sankciování“ Kremlem. Skuteãnost, Ïe se Ramzan poãátkem leto‰ního bfiezna dopracoval do pozice premiéra114 tedy svûdãí pfiedev‰ím o tom, Ïe strategická sázka na Kadyrova mlad‰ího dosud nebyla Putinem zpochybnûna. Jeho obsazení premiérského kfiesla, které lze vnímat jako pouhou legalizaci Ramzanova jiÏ existujícího postavení jako nejmocnûj‰ího muÏe v âeãensku je nûkter˘mi analytiky interpretována jako více ãi ménû vynucená snaha o „appeasement“ Ramzana, neboÈ vzhledem k tomu, Ïe Kadyrov „jiÏ má tolik moci, Ïe neochota ho jmenovat na [prezidentskou] pozici by se v návaznosti na jeho vliv mohla obrátit v opozici proti Moskvû“.115 Kromû dÛsledného pokraãování v otcovû „boji proti teroristÛm a banditÛm“ – z nichÏ se jeho mimofiádné zá‰ti „tû‰í“ zejména ·ámil Basajev, jehoÏ vraÏdu v otevfiené bitvû by povaÏoval Ramzan za „ãest“ – se nov˘ premiér zamûfiil na to, aby „nastolil v republice pofiádek“ – v neposlední fiadû tedy pofiádek ekonomick˘, „mravní“ apod. Kadyrov mlad‰í se tak více ãi ménû úspû‰nû stylizuje do role „hospodáfie“, sluhy národa, jemuÏ nade v‰e záleÏí na strastech a tuÏbách sv˘ch spolukmenovcÛ. Ve svém image âeãence oddaného svému národu jde tak daleko, Ïe se tento otec pûti dûtí dokonce nechal sly‰et: „Pokud nás [ãeãensk˘] národ poÏádá, abychom válãili proti Rusku, budeme muset se mu [národu] podfiídit“.116 Zatím v‰ak zahájení 114

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Stalo se tak poté, co se dosavadní premiér Sergej Abramov po jistém váhání, která nastala po autonehodû, rozhodnul, Ïe odejde, bude-li premiérské kfieslo po nûm obsazeno jeho „pfiítelem“ Ramzanem, aãkoli se pÛvodnû hovofiilo o zdravotních dÛvodech rezignace. Na tento post jmenoval Ramzana Alu Alchanov, coÏ ãeãen‰tí poslanci po dvou dnech jednomyslnû schválili. Citováno podle RFE/RL Caucasus Report, 3. 3. 2006. Citováno podle Nezavisimaja gazeta, 22. 07. 2004.

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války proti Rusku Kadyrov mlad‰í v plánu rozhodnû nemá – aspoÀ tedy nikoliv v pfiísném slova smyslu. Na pofiadu dne Ramzana a Aluho Alchanova je spí‰e pokraãování ve specifické ekonomické politice, kterou nastolil je‰tû Ahmad-hadÏí. Pfii souãasném centralizovaném systému distribuce finanãních prostfiedkÛ na obnovu zemû pfiedpokládá tato ekonomická politika v prvé fiadû zaji‰tûní co nejvy‰‰ích dotací z federálního rozpoãtu. Ty pfiicházejí v rámci kaÏdoroãnû obnovovaného Federálního cílového programu (FCP) „Rekonstrukce hospodáfiství a sociální sféry âeãenské republiky“. Formálním fiízením prostfiedkÛ se zab˘vá instituce s vágním statutem a nejasn˘mi kompetencemi, nacházející se v centru Moskvy – Direkce stavebních a rekonstrukãních prací v âeãenské republice. Podrobnosti pfiijímání konkrétních rozhodnutí a jejich obsah zÛstávají pfiitom Groznému utajené. Místní tradice rodovû-klanové soudrÏnosti navíc zajistily, Ïe se na lukrativních postech nacházejí v˘hradnû prezidentovi pfiíbuzní a dÛvûrní pfiátelé, jejichÏ loajalita vÛãi vládnoucímu klanu je nezpochybnitelná. Profesionalita a odborné kvality obecnû tedy hrály a hrají pfii v˘bûru osob do v˘znamn˘ch funkcí okrajovou roli. Rozhodujícím kritériem pro pfiístup ke zdrojÛm a jejich (pfie)rozdûlování je tedy stupeÀ dÛvûry a kvalita osobních vztahÛ mezi fiediteli institucí podílejících se na procesu obnovování republiky, nikoli objektivní faktory. Zkorumpovan˘ systém a masové zpronevûry lze tudíÏ vnímat jako „pfiím˘ dÛsledek distribuãního systému kompenzací a dávek, bez ustání pfiicházejících do âeãenska z federálního rozpoãtu“.117 Ru‰tí novináfii to vystihli takto: „Rozpoãtové prostfiedky na rekonstrukci âeãenska se i nadále permanentnû a dÛslednû rozkrádají. Tohoto procesu se úãastní v‰echny zainteresované strany – ‰éfové okresních administrací, hlavy poboãek rusk˘ch korporací, fieditelé ãeãensk˘ch podnikÛ. Kradou v‰ichni…“ 118 Systém jednotliv˘ch dotací na rÛznû vymezené objekty tudíÏ je‰tû více posiluje typicky ãeãensk˘ nepotismus a partikularismus, ale je rovnûÏ Ïivnou pÛdou pro konfrontaci ze strany navzájem si konkurujících úfiadÛ, klanÛ a osob. Neposlední úlohu v tomto „filtrování“ ekonomick˘ch prostfiedkÛ pfiicházejících z Ruské federace hrál Ahmad Kadyrov, nyní ji sehrává jeho syn. 117 118

Grani.ru, 14. 10. 2004. Citováni Ofitova, S., Galkin, M., Nezavisimaja gazeta, 13. 03. 2003.

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Alarmující stav související se zpronevûrou znaãn˘ch ãástek se opakovanû stal pfiedmûtem zájmu fiady federálních institucí, zejména pak Úãetní komise Ruské federace, fiízené Sergejem Stûpa‰inem. Tuto zpronevûru v‰ak zfiejmû nemají na svûdomí pouze âeãenci. Podle zprávy Stûpa‰inova úfiadu z listopadu 2001 bylo v samotném âeãensku zpronevûfieno „pouh˘ch“ 57 milionu rublÛ, kdeÏto 40 % penûz urãen˘ch na rekonstrukci republiky tam vÛbec nepfiiteklo.119 Problém tkví zãásti v tom, Ïe se peníze rozkrádají v Moskvû jiÏ pfiedtím, neÏ se do âeãenska vÛbec dostanou. Stejná situace byla zaznamenána i tfii roky po zvefiejnûní tohoto závûru: zpráva Úãetní komise z ãervence 2004 totiÏ prohla‰uje, Ïe „z 13,2 miliard rublÛ urãen˘ch k realizaci uvedeného úkolu [Federálního cílového programu na rok 2004] Ministerstvem financí Ruské federace v první ãtvrti roku 2004 byla do republikového rozpoãtu pfievedena pouze jedna miliarda rublÛ, z nichÏ je vyuÏito pouze 361,6 milionÛ rublÛ“.120 Podobn˘ stav platí i v pfiípadû skromn˘ch kompenzací zdevastovan˘ch domÛ a bytÛ, jejichÏ vyplácení (50 000 rublÛ za po‰kozen˘ majetek a 300 000 rublÛ za zcela zniãen˘ majetek) se buì neustále protahovalo nebo bylo podmiÀováno zaplacením „od‰kodného“ ve v˘‰i aÏ poloviny z celkové ãástky republikov˘m úfiedníkÛm. Odli‰ná situace platila – a platí – ve vztahu k pfiíbuzn˘m a spolukmenovcÛm fieditelÛ státních úfiadÛ a velk˘ch podnikÛ, ktefií kompenzaci nezfiídka získávají nûkolikrát po sobû, tfieba i za zcela nepo‰kozen˘ majetek. Obdobné problémy provázejí i v˘platy dÛchodÛ, dávek a platÛ státních úfiedníkÛ, které se fiádnû uskuteãÀují pouze v pfiedveãer referenda, voleb a v˘znamn˘ch svátkÛ. Nehledû na pfietrvávání zmínûného systému jsou pfiesto patrné jisté zmûny: Ramzan se totiÏ skuteãnû investovat snaÏí pomûrnû znaãné prostfiedky do obnovy zemû, pfiednû Grozného a okolí. Koneãnû se uklízí trosky, staví se silnice, mosty, administrativní budovy, sniÏuje se poãet tzv. blokpostÛ, po nûkolikaletém slibování se oãekává zprovoznûní groznûnského leti‰tû v Chankale, opravují se i obytné domy, pfiednû v centru hlavního mûsta. Lidi dojímá i taková zdánlivá „maliãkost“ budící nostalgické reminiscence na pfiedváleãn˘ Grozn˘ jako zrekonstruování Domu módy ãi vybudování vefiejné fontány v centru mûsta. Plánová119 120

Podrobnûji viz napfi. Souleimanov, E., Chechnya: Economic Renewal or Embezzlement? In: Prague Watchdog, 18. 05. 2005. Strana.ru. 02. 07. 2004.

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na je rovnûÏ v˘stavba sportovních a zábavn˘ch komplexÛ. Leto‰ní rok je Ramzanem vyhlá‰en jako rok obnovy âeãenska. Toto v‰e jsou vefiejné náznaky toho, Ïe se Ïivot pfiece jen pomalu mûní k lep‰ímu, Ïe se republika dostává ven z období války, která se zdála b˘t nekoneãná. Takové náznaky jsou pro obyãejné âeãence nepfiedstavitelnû hodnotné. K realizaci tohoto úãelu, kter˘ je mimofiádnû dÛleÏit˘ pro zaji‰tûní pfiíznû krajanÛ, je v‰ak zapotfiebí stále více penûz z Moskvy. Pfiíznaãn˘ je v této souvislosti dlouhotrvající spor o vlastnictví v˘nosÛ z prodeje ãeãenské ropy. Té se roãnû vytûÏí kolem dvou milionÛ tun, coÏ pfii dne‰ních cenách ãiní minimálnû 15 miliard rublÛ. PouÏívaje heslo „my zde v âeãensku víme lépe, kam a co se má investovat“, Ahmad Kadyrov dÛslednû usiloval o roz‰ífiení kontroly nad finanãními toky, coÏ se mu ke druhé polovinû roku 2003 a poãátku roku 2004 zãásti podafiilo uskuteãnit. JiÏ poãátkem roku 2001 získal Kadyrov podstatn˘ podíl akcií podniku Groznûftûgaz, ãerstvû zaloÏeného tehdej‰ím rusk˘m ministersk˘m pfiedsedou Michailem Kasjanovem. Kontrolní paket akcií (51 %) v‰ak nehledû na Kadyrovoy usilovné snahy pfiipadl podniku s v˘raznou ruskou státní úãastí Rosnûftûgaz. Pfies jisté ústupky Groznému Kreml odmítá peníze z ãeãenské ropy vloÏit plnû do rukou âeãencÛ, ale snaÏí se ãást tûchto penûz do republiky „vracet“ prostfiednictvím kaÏdoroãnû udûlovan˘ch dotací. Tento mechanismus znemoÏÀuje, aby se pod kontrolou republikové vlády ocitly stabilnû vysoké pfiíjmy, které by mohly znamenat v˘raznou ekonomickou svobodu. Pro Kreml je v˘hodnûj‰í prostfiedky Groznému kaÏdoroãnû „dávkovat“ a podmiÀovat je nezbytnou mírou loajality. Ramzan se v˘znamnû angaÏuje i v „duchovním“ Ïivotû republiky. Rozsah i obsah jeho nejnovûj‰ích vefiejn˘ch v˘stupÛ, které ãasto mají nejednoznaãnou rezonanci nejen v ãeãenské spoleãnosti, ale i za jejími hranicemi, je pozoruhodn˘. Nedávno – spoleãnû s nov˘m muftím republiky Sultanem Mirzajevem – se fakticky podílel na vydání fatwy vyhla‰ující dÏihád „wahhábismu“, jevu oznaãenému za „mor 20. a 21. století. „Ramzan projevil specifick˘ smysl pro muslimskou solidaritu, kdyÏ v návaznosti na „skandál karikatur“ zakázal dánsk˘m obãanÛm vstup na území republiky – rozhodnutí, které kvÛli protestÛm z Moskvy musel záhy stáhnout. Nastartoval nekompromisní boj proti spoleãensk˘m nefiestem, v jehoÏ rámci apeloval na ‰irokou ãeãenskou vefiejnost. V televizi si postûÏoval, Ïe „ãeãenská mládeÏ jiÏ nectí takové na‰e národní hodnoty jako ãest a dÛstojnost“ a upozornil,

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Ïe „kaÏd˘ muÏ má vûdût, co dûlají a jak se chovají jeho pfiíbuzní“.121 Terãem Ramzanova hnûvu se stala prostituce – jev v ãeãenské spoleãnosti dosud nevídan˘, kter˘ je ãasto ztotoÏÀován s nepfiíli‰ seriózním chováním Ïen – ale i drogy, alkoholismus apod. Rozkázal bûhem deseti dnÛ zlikvidovat hrací automaty v republice. Doporuãil Ïenám zahalovat vlasy a zároveÀ se vyslovil pro zavedení polygamie. KdyÏ se zjistilo, Ïe v zemi kolují SMS s choulostiv˘mi obrázky, pouÏili to nûktefií mlad‰í kadyrovci k tomu, aby zaãali dívkám v Grozném preventivnû „zabavovat“ mobilní telefony. Jeho nejnovûj‰í v˘zvy provést úpravu hranic âeãenska se sousedními republikami jiÏ vzbudily protesty v sousedních zemích a oblastech, pfiedev‰ím v Dagestánu a Stavropolském kraji. Smysl Ramzanov˘ch iniciativ shrnul Lev Levinson slovy: „To, proti ãemu jsme v âeãensku bojovali – ‰áriát, v˘chod z jediného právního pole, neúãinnost rusk˘ch [federálních] zákonÛ na území republiky – tedy v‰echno, z ãehoÏ byl obviÀován Dudajev a po ujednání Chasavjurtské smlouvy pak Maschadov, se v republice nyní dûje pod patronátem Moskvy“.122 Nicménû Ramzanovy aktivity, aãkoliv ãasto skandálního rázu, mu pfiinesly jisté uznání ze strany obyãejn˘ch âeãencÛ, neboÈ v nich mûl projevit rozhodnost, sílu, ráznost, patriotismus ãi vefiejnû demonstrovanou oddanost tradiãním hodnotám.123 Mlad˘ Kadyrov je sympatick˘ nûkter˘m star‰ím âeãencÛm, v˘razné maskulinní rysy jeho povahy, úspû‰nost v relativnû mladém vûku a vliv mu naproti tomu zajistily jist˘ obdiv ze strany mládeÏe a nûktefií se ho dokonce snaÏí napodobovat. Obecnû symbolizuje snahu drtivé vût‰iny obyvatelstva Ïít nov˘ Ïivot v míru, usiluje o omezení neomezené pÛsobnosti federálních vojsk v zemi – ãas od ãasu se vyjadfiuje pro sníÏení velikosti ruského kontingentu. Znalost místních reálií a sv˘ch nepfiátel mu navíc umoÏÀuje, aby proti separatistÛm ãi jejich sympatizantÛm postupoval sice neménû brutálnû, neÏ ãinili a ãiní ru‰tí vojáci, zato více „adresnû“ a ménû „masovû“. Snad nejvût‰ím pfiínosem jeho politiky je 121 122 123

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âeãenskoje ob‰ãestvo, ã. 2, 2006. Citováno podle âeãenskoje ob‰ãestvo, ã. 5, 2006. Tato Ramzanova vlastnost je v‰ak ponûkud sporná. Je totiÏ v‰eobecnû známo, Ïe pravidelnû prohrává solidní ãástky v moskevsk˘ch kasinech; je rovnûÏ oddan˘m fanou‰kem kuleãníku a psích zápasÛ; jak známo, islám nepodporuje hazard. Na tomto místû tfieba zmínit videozáznam, publikovan˘ na stránkách separatistÛ Chechen.org, na nûmÏ byl ãlovûk, vypadající jako Ramzan a s hlasem, podobn˘m jeho, zachycen ve spoleãnosti prostitutek v Moskvû.

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vidina fiádu vracejícího se de zemû. Heslem je „loajalita v˘mûnou za klidn˘ Ïivot“, tedy jev, kter˘ Timur Alijev pojal slovy: „Kadyrovci“ jsou svébytnou propagandou pochopení toho, Ïe „rad‰i je b˘t s námi, neÏ proti nám“.124 Tento stav je dále umocnûn Ramzanovou ‰ikovnou mediální prezentací a propagandou. Neuplyne den, aby se neobjevil v televizi, kde ‰tûdfie rozdává studentÛm uãebnice, policistÛm auta, stavitelÛm cihly, lékafiÛm potfiebné pfiístroje a ãeãenskému národu povzbuzující rady. Vztah vÛãi Ramzanovi v‰ak není v ãeãenské spoleãnosti nikterak jednoznaãn˘, coÏ je ostatnû rys, charakterizující pfiístup obyãejn˘ch âeãencÛ vÛãi jak˘mkoliv vládcÛm ãi polním velitelÛm obecnû. Podobnû se nikdy nevyznaãoval jednoduchostí vztah pfiíslu‰níkÛ promoskevské ãeãenské opozice – aÈ jiÏ protidudajevské ãi protimaschadovské – vÛãi Rusku a RusÛm. Dlouze oãekávaná volba ãeãenského parlamentu – poslední fáze „návratu“ âeãenska do ústavnû-právního prostranství Ruské federace, se nesla ve stínu sílícího vlivu Ramzana. Je zajímavé, Ïe podle v˘zkumu vefiejného mínûní, uskuteãnûného v republice v pfiedveãer voleb, 72 % respondentÛ pfiipustilo, Ïe projdou v reÏii Kadyrova mlad‰ího; v minul˘ch letech by totiÏ málokdo mohl zpochybnit prim Moskvy v natolik závazné záleÏitosti.125 Na volbách, které se uskuteãnily s pouÏitím jiÏ mnohokráte vyzkou‰en˘ch „volebních mechanismÛ“ a které odmítly monitorovat solidní mezinárodní organizace, zvítûzila „strana vlasti“ – frakce „Jediné Rusko“, které získalo 60,65 % hlasÛ, komunisté pak 12,2 % a Svaz pravicov˘ch sil 12,39 %.126 Do parlamentu se nedostal Ïádn˘ skuteãnû samostatn˘ ãi v˘znamn˘ ãeãensk˘ politik, kter˘ by mohl pfiedstavovat hrozbu Ramzanovû v˘sostn˘m zájmÛm. Finální „zaãistka“ kandidátky byla zaji‰tûna jiÏ pfied volbami: jedin˘ opoziãní kandidát, kter˘ by mohl teoreticky ohrozit Kadyrovovo v˘sadní postavení, Bislan Gantamirov, byl „neãekanû“ z kandidátky ultranacionalistické strany „Rodina“ (Vlast) nûkolik t˘dnÛ pfied volbami vylouãen, a to bez udání srozumiteln˘ch dÛvodÛ. Vzápûtí se zjistilo, Ïe se tak stalo v dÛsledku pomûrnû banálního incidentu – jeho bratr byl totiÏ kadyrovci unesen a staÏení své kandidatury bylo právû tou cenou, kterou musel pro

124 125 126

Citováno podle âeãenskoje ob‰ãestvo, ã. 17, 2005. RFE/RL Caucasus Report, 24. 11. 2005. âeãenskoje ob‰ãestvo, ã. 26, 2005.

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jeho osvobození zaplatit. Tak dopadly parlamentní volby, které Putin oznaãil za „dal‰í váÏn˘ krok smûrem k politickému usmífiení v republice“.127 Charakteristick˘ je pfiístup Moskvy k otázce rozdûlování ziskÛ z prodeje ãeãenské ropy a obtíÏná jednání ohlednû Smlouvy o rozdûlení pravomocí mezi Moskvou a Grozn˘m. Nyní je nejvy‰‰í ãas, aby se tato smlouva finalizovala a byla podepsána – tomu v‰ak brání údajnû maximalistické poÏadavky Grozného v oblasti zejména ekonomické, ale i politické suverenity, které vzbuzují v fiadách nûkter˘ch rusk˘ch politikÛ a politologÛ pohor‰ení. Pro pfiípad (stûÏí) kontrolovateln˘ch Ramzanov˘ch choutek je v‰ak Moskvou v republice udrÏována svého druhu strategická personální rezerva v podobû Gantamirova a bratrÛ Jamadajevov˘ch, Ruslana (Hamzata) a Sulima. Není bez zajímavosti, Ïe jejich vztahy se nikdy nevyznaãovaly srdeãností. Tvofií totiÏ – spolu s Kadyrovov˘m klanem –tfii hlavní centra moci v âeãensku. Lze sem zafiadit i obãasné pokusy, aã nepfiíli‰ dÛkladné – a vycházející pfiednû z útrob ruské armády a FSB – „zastfie‰ením“ ozbrojen˘ch sil v republice docílit zredukování Kadyrovovy mocenské základny. Zdá se, Ïa místo politiky „ãeãenizace“, provádûné Kremlem, definitivnû nastala éra „kadyrovizace“. Prostfiednictvím vlastního aktivismu pfiispûla Moskva k vytvofiení a konsolidaci neúmûrnû silné vnitfiní síly v republice, která se opírá jak o podporu obyvatelstva, tak ozbrojen˘ch formací. Jak uvedl Edilbek Chasmagomadov, „v˘hody, vytvofiené pro nûho [Ramzana] centrální vládou […] mu umoÏnily, aby se transformoval v jediného politika. ProtoÏe nemá Ïádné reálné oponenty v zemi, kdo by jeho pozice zpochybnil, a jako absolutní vládce âeãenska, on [Ramzan] pfiirozenû zaãíná hrát roli opozice ve vztahu k federální vládû. A tak pfiirozenû zaãíná prosazovat jisté regionální a národní zájmy.“ 128 „Podpora [ze strany ãeãenského obyvatelstva] umoÏÀuje Ramzanu Kadyrovovi ãas od ãasu otevfienû vystupovat proti federálnímu centru tam, kde se podle jeho názoru po‰kozují zájmy âeãenské republiky.“ 129 Pozapomeneme-li za nûkteré Ramzanovy jasnû populistické v˘roky, jako v˘‰e zmínûn˘, ona „vnitfiní opozice” je díky existenci poãetn˘ch a odhodlan˘ch bojovníkÛ v rámci jednotek kadyrovcÛ o to váÏnûj‰í. 127 128 129

Citováno podle Chechnya Weekly, 07. 09. 2005. Citováno podle âeãenskoje ob‰ãestvo, ã. 5, 2006. Citován ChoÏ-Achmed Zacajev podle âeãenskoje ob‰ãestvo, ã. 2, 2006.

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Jsme tak svûdky paradoxní situace: ãím více se separatisté oslabí, tím ménû závislé budou Kadyrovovi lidé na Moskvû, ãímÏ se zredukuje potfieba zohledÀovat její poÏadavky, a naopak. Takto vzniká nová strategická situace, ve které je v Ramzanovû Ïivotním zájmu maximálnû potlaãit separatisty, zatímco by Putin mohl mít zájem o jisté pfietrvání separatistického faktoru jako zpÛsobu jak si pojistit loajalitu Kadyrovova klanu. Pravda, jako dÛsledkem znaãného posílení kadyrovcÛ, coÏ není zdaleka institucionální pojem, jejich poãtÛ a stmelenosti, ãasy jsou, jak se zdá, nenávratnû pryã, kdyÏ bylo postaãující podporovat GantamirovÛv nebo JamadajevÛv klan, z nichÏ kaÏd˘ má nûkolik set lidí. I kdyÏ moderní dûjiny âeãenska zaÏily mnohem razantnûj‰í pfierody, bylo by zavádûjící tvrdit, Ïe se z Ramzana ãasem stane separatista Dudajevova typu. Je v‰ak pravda, Ïe si Kreml svoji „one-clan policy“ nesmírnû omezil vlastní prostor pro manévrování: rozhodne-li se Kreml pro to, aby se zbavil mladého Kadyrova, respektive oslabil jeho pozice v republice, napfiíklad na nadcházejících prezidentsk˘ch volbách (2008), na nichÏ povaÏuje svoji kandidaturu za jistou, narazí to patrnû na seriózní odpor ze strany kadyrovcÛ, jehoÏ sebejistota a poÏadavky budou sílit úmûrnû tomu, jak si bude tuto skuteãnost uvûdomovat. Loajalita KadyrovovÛ vÛãi Moskvû se tedy opírala – a opírá – nikoliv o ideologické pfiíãiny (zásadní odmítání separatismu, respektive principiální snaha b˘t „subjektem federace”), ale o úvahy o osobní, resp. klanové bezpeãnosti, které se mohou ãasem – v návaznosti na zmûnu aktuální situace – mûnit.

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5. Rusko a „blízké zahraniãí“: od m˘tÛ o dominanci k realitû dobrého sousedství Dimitrij Bûlo‰evsk˘

Pád sovûtského komunismu vnímaly jako historické vítûzství ve studené válce nejen zemû západních demokracií, ale také národy Sovûtského svazu a pfiedev‰ím jeho satelitní vazalové, jeÏ se do podruãí Moskvy dostaly po druhé svûtové válce, aby jako „tábor socialismu“ vytvofiily protiváhu kapitalistickému svûtu. Obû strany vidûly v konci bol‰evické utopie, jeÏ se od samého poãátku svého urození promûnila v dûsivou antiutopii, zaãátek cesty k normálnímu svûtu, nerozdûlenému na dva nepfiátelské tábory, v nichÏ byl mír zachováván jen díky existenci niãiv˘ch zbraní, schopn˘ch nûkolikanásobnû zniãit celou planetu. Podobnû byl v prvotní fázi vnímán i rozpad Sovûtského svazu. Z pohledu USA a Západu do‰lo k zániku bipolárního svûta, v nûmÏ byly osudy lidstva do znaãné míry urãovány rozhodnutími dvou dominujících supervelmocí. Poãáteãní euforie nov˘ch (pfiesnûji fieãeno staronov˘ch) rusk˘ch elit, jeÏ v fiadû pfiípadÛ se znaãnou mírou flexibility konvertovaly od komunistické vûrouky pojímané zpravidla fundamentalisticky, vzácnûji motivované kariéristick˘mi motivy, k neménû fundamentalistickému vz˘vání demokracie a liberálních hodnot západní provenience, v‰ak nemohla mít dlouhého trvání. Pfiedstava, Ïe nové Rusko, jeÏ se vzdalo komunistické ideologie, otevfienû nepfiátelského postoje vÛãi Západu dokonce po rozpadu SSSR, zachová svoji b˘valou moc jen proto, Ïe (1) je stále nejvût‰ím státem v rámci postsovûtského prostoru, (2) prohlásilo se za „následníka SSSR“ se v‰emi pozitivními (mimo jiné ãlenství v Radû bezpeãnosti OSN) (3), kontroluje jadern˘ potenciál zemû a disponuje mohutn˘m vojenskoprÛmyslov˘m, komplexem, byla od samého poãátku o‰idnou iluzí.

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Oãekávání, Ïe svût otevfie svou náruã, aby nové, podle vlastních deklarací demokratické Rusko pfiijalo za rovnoprávného ãlena svûtového spoleãenství, se nenaplnilo. Rusko, byÈ svobodné a opro‰tûné od dávno vyvûtralého balastu komunistické ideologie, vy‰lo ze studené války jako poraÏen˘, v lep‰ím pfiípadû pak oslaben˘ hráã a Západ si toho byl plnû vûdom. Dokonce jeden z nejtvrd‰ích a nejvytrvalej‰ích kritikÛ Ruska, americk˘ politolog a b˘val˘ poradce prezidenta USA J. Cartera Zbigniew Brzezinski pfiipou‰tûl, Ïe „krach SSSR vyvolal kolosální geopolitické rozpaky“. Vnímal v‰ak i „historick˘ ‰ok, kter˘ zaÏili Rusové, kdyÏ na dvacet miliónÛ rusky hovofiících obãanÛ zÛstalo po vzniku Spoleãenství nezávisl˘ch státÛ v zemích s nacionalistick˘mi elitami“.1 Navíc tu ‰lo o podíl Ruska na konci studené války, respektive na jeho roli v konci studené války. „Na Západû si nûktefií politici chtûjí pfiisvojit vítûzství ve „studené válce“. Podivnû v tomto smyslu vyznívá tvrzení b˘valého prezidenta USA Bushe star‰ího, Ïe právû USA dobyly vítûzství… Netfieba zapomínat, Ïe poãáteãní iniciativy, t˘kající se ukonãení „studené války“ vycházely po roce 1985 od Sovûtského svazu, jehoÏ nové vedení pochopilo, Ïe nezmûrná tíha závodÛ ve zbrojení nezbytnû pfiivede svût k je‰tû ostfiej‰í formû raketové konfrontace, a stejnû tak k ekonomickému krachu fiady zemí.“2 KdyÏ pak v kvûtnu 2005 rusk˘ prezident Vladimir Putin u pfiíleÏitosti oslav 60. v˘roãí konce Velké vlastenecké války (jak byla dfiíve v SSSR a nyní i v Rusku oznaãovaná úãast SSSR ve druhé svûtové válce) oznaãil „rozpad Sovûtského svazu za nejvût‰í geopolitickou katastrofu XX. století“, byl jeho v˘rok ve svûtû vnímán po celém svûtû s podivem, ne-li se zdû‰ením. Média se ‰iroce rozepsala o „komunistické nostalgii“, která se v Rusku doãkala své renesance. Paradoxnû se pfiitom zapomnûlo na skuteãnost, Ïe právû za Putinovy vlády se podafiilo omezit na minimum vliv, za jeho pfiedchÛdce Borise Jelcina aÏ nebezpeãnû znaãn˘, kdysi jednolité fiady komunistické opozice rozpt˘lit ortodoxní levici do fiady neporovnatelnû ménû vlivn˘ch stran. Vlivn˘ politolog Alexandr Rahr, podle nûjÏ není Putinovo prohlá‰ení v˘hradnû projevem komunistické nostalgie, o tom napsal: „Na události let 1 2

BrÏeÏinskij Z., Bol’‰aja ‰achmatnaja doska. Moskva 1998, s. 109–110. Jakovlev A., Sumerki. Moskva 2003, s. 598–599.

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1990–1991 existují dvû absolutnû odli‰ná hlediska. Západ vidí v Sovûtském svazu umûl˘ artefakt, koloniální velmoc, jeÏ okupovala jiné zemû, utiskovala vlastní obyvatelstvo a v roce 1991 se rozpadla. To je srovnáváno s rozpadem koloniálních fií‰í Anglie a Francie v Africe a v Indii. Rusk˘ pohled je diametrálnû odli‰n˘. Centrální regiony byly souãástí tisícileté ruské fií‰e. Sv˘mi kofieny patfií do Kyjevské Rusi, tedy nynûj‰í Ukrajiny. Bûlorusko napfiíklad do roku 1991 byla rovnûÏ neoddûlitelnou ãástí (SSSR, D. B.), stejnû jako pozdûji Sibifi, Tatarstán a Kavkaz… Rozpad b˘valého impéria byl pro znaãnou ãást elity bolestnou poráÏkou v geopolitickém zápase a zejména ve studené válce.“3 Pfii bliωím pohledu na kontext Putinova kontroverzního prohlá‰ení tak nab˘váme dojmu, Ïe bylo urãeno spí‰ neÏ svûtu onûm s kaÏd˘m rokem fiídnoucím vojákÛm druhé svûtové války, ktefií sv˘mi nesãetn˘mi obûtmi pfiispûli k tomu, Ïe svého ãasu byl Sovûtsk˘ svaz byl vnímán navzdory budoucím následn˘m historick˘m událostem jako hlavní vítûz ve válce s nacismem. Skuteãnost, Ïe do boje s nacistickou totalitou vstoupila jiná (jiÏ pro délku svého trvání krvavûj‰í) totalita, nemûní nic na skuteãnosti, Ïe na poráÏce reÏimu, kter˘ má na svûdomí holocaust, se podílela sovûtská armáda. Je tu i dal‰í aspekt okázal˘ch, dost moÏná nepfiíli‰ vkusn˘ch a vÛãi fiadû men‰ích státÛ, které proti nacismu bojovaly, dokonce uráÏliv˘ch oslav. Pochod po Rudém námûstí znamenal vzhledem k vûku veteránÛ dost moÏná jednu z posledních reminiscencí b˘valé jednoty národÛ tvofiících kdysi Sovûtsk˘ svaz. Vztah mezi Ruskem a b˘val˘mi postsovûtsk˘mi státy, tvofiícími od roku 1922 Sovûtsk˘ svaz, zÛstává totiÏ i po patnácti letech existence postsovûtského Spoleãenství nezávisl˘ch státÛ nanejv˘‰ komplikovan˘ a nejasn˘.

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„Rozpad Sovûtského svazu byl nevyhnuteln˘. Otázkou bylo jen to, jak k nûmu dojde – zda normálnû, tedy prostfiednictvím vyjednávání, nebo chaoticky. Komunistiãtí oponenti ãas od ãasu rozehrávají tezi o tom, Ïe na

Maltû do‰lo k jakési tajné dohodû mezi Gorbaãovem a Bushem. To v‰e jsou jen smy‰lenky. Îádná dohoda neexistovala.“ 4 Svûdectví nadmíru informovaného b˘valého ideologa KSSS a posléze jednoho z „otcÛ perestrojky“ Alexandra Jakovleva potvrzuje i skuteãnost, Ïe o krachu SSSR jiÏ dávno hovofiili jako o moÏném konci komunistické diktatury zdaleka nejen lídfii Západu, ale i ãetní sovût‰tí disidenti. SchÛzka lídrÛ Ruska, Bûloruska a Ukrajiny Borise Jelcina, Stanislava ·u‰keviãe a Leonida Kravãuka, jeÏ se konala 8. prosince 1991 v BûlovûÏském pralese v Bûlorusku a o níÏ se první a poslední prezident SSSR dozvûdûl aÏ post faktum, tak v prosinci 1991 rozhodla o zániku SSSR navzdory skuteãnosti, Ïe v nedávném referendu se vût‰ina obyvatel vyslovila pro zachování Svazu, i kdyÏ na podstatnû demokratiãtûj‰ích principech, respektujících práva svazov˘ch státÛ, národÛ i národností v daleko vût‰í mífie, neÏ tomu bylo v minulosti. Jistou legitimitu v‰ak postup tfií vÛdcÛ slovansk˘ch republik mûl, neboÈ právû Rusko, Ukrajina a Bûlorusko byly v roce 1922 zakladateli Sovûtského svazu. Kofieny by bylo jistû moÏno hledat ve vzájemné fievnivosti dvou klíãov˘ch politikÛ druhé poloviny 80. let minulého století. Michail Gorbaãov, tvÛrce „perestrojky“ (ãesk˘mi skalními skeptiky nezfiídka oznaãované za „pfiestrojení“) a „glasnosti“ (analogicky oznaãované za „halasnost“) si pfiál zachování socialismu i Sovûtského svazu, jenÏ by v‰ak pfiestal b˘t hrozbou pro civilizovan˘ svût i pro své sousedy. Jeho rival a posléze první prezident Ruska Boris Jelcin od poãátku vsadil na antikomunistickou rétoriku, aniÏ by v sebemen‰ím pociÈoval rozpaky nad skuteãností, Ïe on sám po cel˘ch tfiicet let svého Ïivota byl klíãov˘m pfiedstavitelem oblastní partajní nomenklatury. Jelcinova populistická snaha poskytnout 89 rusk˘m regionÛm „tolik suverenity, kolik jí unesou“, na‰la svÛj zrcadlov˘ odraz i ve volání po osamostatnûní Ruska a tím vyvolala posléze „defilé suverenit“, jeÏ vyhla‰ovaly svazové republiky. Pfiipoãteme-li k tomu pfiedcházející etnické konflikty, jeÏ svou neãinností nedokázal zabránit sám Michail Gorbaãov, rozpad SSSR se stal nevyhnutelností. Pro rozpad SSSR v‰ak existovaly i hlub‰í pfiíãiny. Stal se jím pád m˘tu o „novém sovûtském ãlovûku“, o jednolitém „sovûtském lidu“, jenÏ mûl svého pfiedchÛdce v „internacionalismu“, kter˘ pfiedstavoval vedle tfiídního boje

3

4

Kontinuita impérií

Rar A., Putin ne diktator, 14. 6. 2005, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/articles/4177.html.

Jakovlev, cit. dílo. S. 602.

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klíãové heslo bol‰evikÛ Leninovy gardy. Stalin posléze pfiemûnil heslo internacionalismu v prázdnou skofiápku a pfii zachování oficiální marxistické ideologie se navrátil k my‰lence i praxi b˘valého carského Impéria, byÈ v podobû mnohem krvavûj‰í. Ruské impérium, v té podobû, v jaké existovalo v 19. a na poãátku 20. století, bylo kontinentální (podobnû jako rakousko-uherské a turecké) a jiÏ tím se radikálnû li‰ilo od koloniálních impérií západních zemí, napfiíklad Británie ãi Francie, ·panûlska ãi Portugalska. V tûch totiÏ existovala jasná hranice mezi metropolí a koloniemi. Od hranic vlastní koloniální metropole totiÏ oddûlovalo jejich kolonie mofie. „Pfii takové organizaci se procesy, probíhající v metropoli jen zfiídka, mohou dostat do kolonie,“ tvrdí pfiední rusk˘ specialista na problematiku SNS Dmitrij Furman.5 AÈ jiÏ v zemi kolonizátora probíhají jakékoli zmûny, jejich dopad na obyvatelstvo kolonie je minimální. Kolonii totiÏ spravují úfiedníci vyslaní z metropole. Tak se napfiíklad Francie mohla stát republikou, aniÏ by dala svobodu sv˘m koloniím. Podle Furmana prostû existovala Francie „sama o sobû“ a na druhé stranû Francie jako impérium pro koloniální národy. V kontinentálních impériích, k nimÏ Rusko nepochybnû patfiilo, podobné oddûlení metropolitního centra a koloniální periférie nemÛÏe existovat. Hranice mezi obûma ãástmi je totiÏ lehce pfieklenutelná. Metaforicky fieãeno, ruskému kolonizátorovi postaãilo, kdyÏ pobízel svého konû k cestû smûrem na v˘chod. âím dále a hloubûji pronikal, tím více rostla Ruská fií‰e. Rusko sice z hlediska hierarchie a „centra“ zaãínalo v Moskvû, v té dobû pfiesnûji fieãeno v severní metropoli Petrohradû, nebylo v‰ak vÛbec snadné urãit jeho nejodlehlej‰í hranice. Demokratizace metropole ãi centra je ov‰em v kontinentálním Impériu ztíÏena. Pokud se bude dÛslednû rozvíjet demokracie, impérium musí ãasem zaniknout. Proces demokratizace centra není totiÏ teritoriálnû oddûlen od periférie, a proto se lavinovitû ‰ífií dále, protoÏe neexistuje hranice mezi kolonizátorem a kolonizovan˘m. Rozdíl mezi „bíl˘m sáhibem“ a „ãern˘m rik‰ou“ existuje jen v umístûní na pfiíãce Ïebfiíãku sociální hierarchie, v mnohem men‰í mífie na pfiístupu k informacím o dûní v metropoli. V historii Ruské fií‰e ov‰em realitû spí‰e odpovídá rozdûlení na „Rusy“ 5

Rusko a „blízké zahraniãí“: od m˘tÛ o dominaci k realitû]

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Furman D., Ot Rossijskoj imperii do raspada SNG. http://www.polit.ru/lectures/2005/10/05/furman.html.

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(etnické oznaãení pfiíslu‰nosti k „dominantní“ populaci) a tak zvané „Jinorodce“ (pfiíslu‰níky nerusk˘ch etnik). Pfiesto podle D. Furmana procesy demokratizace, zprvu spí‰e sociální neÏ politické, probíhaly v Rusku po celé 19. století. Naru‰ovaly pevnost ruského impéria stejnû tak, jako procesy demokratizace a modernizace v tomto období sniÏovaly odolnost v‰ech impérií, pfiedev‰ím v‰ak kontinentálních. Sociální procesy: urbanizace, roz‰ifiování vztahÛ, posilování horizontální i vertikální mobility, sjednocování obyvatelstva do vût‰ích skupin, ‰ífiení vzdûlanosti a hromadn˘ch sdûlovacích prostfiedkÛ, oslabování stavovského povûdomí a soubûÏné posilování etnické sounáleÏitosti vedly ke korozi tûchto impérií. ·lo o procesy vytváfiení národÛ, sjednocování etnick˘ch skupin v celek, definující se jako jednota.6 V ruské fií‰i nab˘vá proces tvorby národÛ dvojí formy. „Slavjanofilové“, usilují o pfiemûnu desítek, ba stovek etnik, Ïijících na území ruské fií‰e v „Rusy“: Furman tu pfiipomíná prohlá‰ení pana Kankrina, jednoho z ministrÛ cara Mikulá‰e I., Ïe adekvátnûj‰í neÏ „Rusové“ by bylo oznaãení „petrov‰tí“ (podle cara Petra I. Velikého) nebo „romanov‰tí“ (podle dynastie Romanov˘ch). V jistém smyslu tak Kankrin pfiedjímá umûle vytvofien˘ termín „sovûtsk˘ národ“, kter˘ byl uÏíván k oznaãení obyvatel SSSR o desítky let pozdûji. Vedle omezení práv národnostních men‰in poÏadují slavjanofilové kolonizaci „periferie“ a unifikaci impéria. Paralelnû v‰ak probíhají procesy budování jin˘ch národÛ, které ob˘vají ruskou fií‰í. V dÛsledku soubûhu obou procesÛ se rodí nacionalismus. Carská moc na ni odpovídá rusifikací obyvatel ruské fií‰e. JiÏ v souãasné dobû, po roce 1991 nabude problém terminologického vyústûní. Vedle slova „Rus“, definujícího etnickou pfiíslu‰nost k ruskému národu, se znovuobjeví termín „Rossijanin“, zahrnující nejen etnické Rusy, ale i pfiíslu‰níky v‰ech zhruba sto padesáti ãi dokonce sto sedmdesáti národností ob˘vajících Ruskou federací. „Rossijaninem“ se mÛÏe stát i b˘val˘ obãan kterékoli z postsovûtsk˘ch republik, získá-li ruské obãanství a pob˘vá-li vût‰inu ãasu na území Ruska. NepfieloÏitelnost termínu Rossijanin vedla po desetiletí k tomu, Ïe zvlá‰tû na Západû byli v masmédiích a leckdy i publicistice, ãi dokonce odborné literatufie oznaãování termínem „Rus6

Ibid.

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sians“ pfiíslu‰níci v‰ech národÛ Sovûtského svazu. Leckdy paradoxnû vãetnû obyvatel pobaltsk˘ch republik. Nacionalistické tenze mezi jednotliv˘mi etniky se paradoxnû podafiilo na ãas pfieklenout bol‰evikÛm Leninovy gardy, ktefií za pomocí hesla o internacionalismu zahnali vnímání národnostní pfiíslu‰nosti do „podvûdomí“. Právû tím se jim – podle D. Furmana – povedlo na ãas zabránit rozpadu ruské fií‰e, ba dokonce obnovit ji pod názvem Sovûtsk˘ svaz. Tak jako byla utopií svûtová revoluce na celém svûtû, byla utopií i rovnoprávnost národÛ Svazu sovûtsk˘ch socialistick˘ch republik. „Nejrovnûj‰ím“ mezi rovn˘mi se zvlá‰tû za doby Josifa Stalina stává Rusko, respektive Rusové, aãkoli právû oni nemají zastoupení ani v Radû bezpeãnosti OSN, ani vlastní komunistickou stranu. Mezi politicky, ekonomicky i ideologicky dominující Sovûtsk˘ svaz a nejvût‰í ze svazov˘ch (federativních) republik je postaveno rovnítko, které propfií‰tû umoÏní ztotoÏÀovat zloãiny kteréhokoli politika Sovûtského svazu (bez ohledu na jeho národnostní ãi etnickou pfiíslu‰nost) se zloãiny provádûné „Russians“. Opût tu stojí za uvedení citát z Furmanovy citované práce. „JestliÏe je Lenin zanícen˘ internacionalista, enormnû vá‰niv˘ odpÛrce ruského ‰ovinismu, dalo by se dokonce fiíci – rusofob (máme-li uÏít souãasného jazyka)… pak Stalin, jenÏ na jedné stranû nepfiestává b˘t marxistou a vûrn˘m Leninov˘m Ïákem, ba dokonce nov˘m klasikem marxismu, se jiÏ stává klasick˘m rusk˘m autoritáfisk˘m samovládcem – vûrn˘m Ïákem Ivana Hrozného a Petra I.. Za Stalina vznikající neuvûfiitelná kombinace imperiálních symbolÛ, pocitu sounáleÏitostí se star˘m rusk˘m impériem a souãasn˘m zachováním marxistick˘ch a internacionalistick˘ch symbolÛ nachází odraz ve vûtû ze staré sovûtské hymny, otfiesn˘ ve své rozporuplnosti i svém ‰ílenství: „Союз нерушимый рэспубликсвободных сплотила на векы Великая Русь“. Jinak fieãeno, republiky jsou sice svobodné, jejich svazek je v‰ak vûãn˘ a neporu‰iteln˘ a vjedno je navûky spojila jedná republika – Veliká Rus.“7

Civilizovan˘ rozvod Zrod Spoleãenství nezávisl˘ch státÛ, jenÏ následoval po rozpadu Sovûtského svazu, b˘vá zpravidla hodnocen jako relativnû úspû‰n˘ pokus o „civilizovan˘ rozvod“ v „bratrské rodinû“ b˘val˘ch sovûtsk˘ch republik, jenÏ mûl zabránit tfienicím a krvav˘m formám rozpadu toho, co nynûj‰í odpÛrci Putinova (a pfiedtím Jelcinova i Gorbaãovova) reÏimu oznaãují za „trosky sovûtské civilizace“. „Konec dûjin nastává v dûjinách kaÏdé civilizace pfiinejmen‰ím jednou, nûkdy i vícekrát. Jakmile se v civilizaci objeví univerzální stát, její pfiíslu‰níci jsou zaslepeni tím, co Toynbee pojmenoval „fata morgana nesmrtelnosti“ a nab˘vají pfiesvûdãení, Ïe právû jejich spoleãnost je koneãnou formou lidské spoleãnosti.“8 V pfiípadû SSSR byla tato ‚fata morgána nesmrtelnosti‘ pfiímo zakotvena v marxistickém uãení i jeho leninsko-stalinsk˘ch interpretacích, v nichÏ dûjiny lidstva konãily aÏ definitivním vítûzstvím komunismu na celém svûtû. Apokalyptické líãení „soumraku bohÛ“ a následného v˘voje postkomunistického Ruska, jeÏ se objevuje v pracích Sergeje Kara-Murzy9, ãi b˘valého emigranta Alexandra Zinovjeva, známého za sovûtsk˘ch dob pfiedev‰ím ãtenáfiÛm zakázaného samizdatu10, proto nepfiekvapuje. Nic to v‰ak nemûní na skuteãnosti, Ïe rozpad SSSR byl zcela nevyhnuteln˘. „Pfii své ve‰keré vnûj‰í mohutnosti SSSR (vynalezen˘ Leninem ke konci jeho Ïivota) nebyl vnitfinû zdrav˘m státním útvarem, a to vãetnû sv˘ch mezinárodních vztahÛ. ‚Vûãná druÏba národÛ‘ a ‚vytvofiení jednotného sovûtského národa‘ byly pouh˘mi m˘ty. Leninská národnostní politika zakotvená v budovû SSSR nemohla udrÏovat tento stát donekoneãna: právû ona totiÏ probudila k Ïivotu odstfiedivé síly… V pováleãn˘ch letech v sovûtsk˘ch koncentraãních táborech, posléze v kazachstánském vyhnanství se mi dafiilo zhusta pozorovat ono reálné odcizení a vzájemnou nedÛvûru sovûtsk˘ch národností a to i navzdory halasnû vytrubované jednotû. UÏ tehdy zfietelnû prosakoval budoucí moÏn˘, ãi dokonce nevyhnuteln˘ rozpad.“11 JiÏ ve své star‰í práci, napsané je‰tû ve Vermontu v bfieznu 1994 8 9 10

7

Ibid.

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11

Huntington, S., Stfiet civilizací. Praha 2001, s. 367. Sovetskaja civilizacija. Moskva 2002. Zinov’jev A., Russkaja tragedija. Moskva 2005. SolÏenicyn A., Rossija v obvale. Moskva 1998, s. 36–37.

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Alexandr SolÏenicyn upozorÀuje: „Ne‰tûstí nespoãívá v tom, Ïe se SSSR rozpadl – to bylo prostû nevyhnutelné. Tragedie – a propletenec i pro vzdálenou budoucnost – plyne z toho, Ïe rozpad automaticky probûhl podle fale‰n˘ch leninsk˘ch hranic a oddûlil tak od Ruska celé oblasti.“12 Rozpad neprobûhl podle SolÏenicynova projektu, kter˘ si pfiedstavoval na místû sovûtského impéria „Slovanskou drÏavu, spojující Rusko, Bûlorusko, Ukrajinu a severní ãást Kazachstánu“. Místo toho vznikly suverénní postsovûtské státy v rámci onûch hranic, které byly vymezeny pfii podpisu Svazové smlouvy v roce 1922, na jejímÏ základû vstupovaly republiky do Svazu sovûtsk˘ch socialistick˘ch republik, a pozdûj‰ích úprav, za nimiÏ stáli Josif Stalin a Nikita Chru‰ãov.13 Odtud pramenilo jak nejednoznaãné postavení rusk˘ch minorit, Ïijících na územích nov˘ch postsovûtsk˘ch státÛ, tak také póza ruské metropole, stavící se v rámci Spoleãenství nezávisl˘ch státÛ do pozice „star‰ího bratra“. Sporn˘ termín „blízké zahraniãí“ Spoleãenství nezávisl˘ch státÛ (SNS) bylo vytvofieno v prosinci roku 1991. DÛvodem bylo fie‰ení zásadního problému, kter˘ vypl˘val z hektického rozpadu Sovûtského svazu. ·lo o definování vztahÛ mezi nyní jiÏ suverénními postsovûtsk˘mi státy. V té dobû bylo moÏné zvaÏovat ãtyfii modely vzájemn˘ch vztahÛ. Prvním byl rozvoj jednotliv˘ch zemí s oporou na vlastní síly a moÏnosti. Druhá cesta vedla pfies vytvofiení spoleãenství nezávisl˘ch státÛ po vzoru Severoamerického spoleãného trhu (NAFTA), Evropské asociace volného obchodu, spoleãenství zemí Jihov˘chodní Asie (ASEAN), ãi sdruÏení státÛ latinské Ameriky (skupina Rio de Janeiro). Tfietí cestou bylo formování integraãního modelu po vzoru Evropské unie, ãtvrtou pak vytvofiení integrovaného vojenskopolitického uskupení po vzoru NATO.14

12 13 14

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SolÏenicyn A., „Russkij vopros“ k koncu XX veka. In: SolÏenicyn A., Lenin v Cjuriche. Rasskazy. Krochotki. Publicistika. Jekaterinburg 1999, s. 726. Zdravomyslov A., MeÏdunacional’nyje konflikty v postsovetskom prostranstve, Moskva 1997, s. 203. Moskvin L., SNG: 1991–2001 (nekotoryje itogi). http://www.rau.su/observer/N11_01/11_09.HTM.

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Do SNS vstoupily s v˘jimkou tfií pobaltsk˘ch republik, jeÏ se od SSSR distancovaly jiÏ na poãátku roku 1991, v‰echny postsovûtské státy aÏ na Gruzii, jeÏ se k SNS pfiipojila aÏ v roce 1993. Ruská diplomacie na poãátku 90. let za vlády Borise Jelcina ve své vnímání svûta zaujala zaãala prosazovat politiku „koncentrick˘ch kruhÛ“. Vedle zahraniãí jako takového (oznaãovaného leckdy jako zahraniãí „vzdálené“) zavedla pojem „blízkého zahraniãí“. JestliÏe ke (vzdálenému) zahraniãí byly pfiifiazovány svûtové velmoci Západu i V˘chodu, s nimiÏ Moskva hodlala udrÏovat rovnoprávné partnerské vztahy, „blízké zahraniãí“ bylo od poãátku oznaãením pro bezprostfiední „sféru vlivu“ Ruska, tedy pro zemû Spoleãenství nezávisl˘ch státÛ. Je zfiejmé, Ïe podobnû paternalistick˘ vztah (pfiipomínající dávn˘ postoj koloniální metropole ke sv˘m koloniím) nemohl vyvolávat v zemích SNS nad‰ení a tehdej‰í ministr zahraniãí Ruska Andrej Kozyrev se nejednou setkal pfii jeho vyslovení s jasn˘m nesouhlasem sv˘ch partnerÛ. Je pfiíznaãné, Ïe v negativním hodnocení pfiístupu Moskvy k SNS, byÈ z odli‰n˘ch pozic, se shodují tak protikladné osobnosti, jako jsou Zbigniew Brzeziƒski na jedné stranû, na druhé stranû Alexandr SolÏenicyn jako obránce rusk˘ch zájmÛ. „Akcent na ‚blízké zahraniãí‘ nebyl jen doktrínou regionální ekonomické spolupráce. V jeho geopolitickém obsahu je obsaÏen imperiální aspekt.“ V je‰tû pomûrnû umírnûném prohlá‰ení Moskvy z roku 1992 se hovofiilo o obnoveném Rusku, jeÏ nakonec nastolí strategické partnerství se Západem, „partnerství, v nûmÏ Rusko bude regulovat situaci ve v˘chodní Evropû, Stfiední Asii a na Dálném v˘chodû…Jurij Ambarcumov, tehdy pfiedseda zahraniãního v˘boru Státní dumy, v roce 1994 prohlásil, Ïe b˘val˘ sovûtsk˘ prostor je v˘hradní sférou ruského geopolitického vlivu“.15 Jinak, byÈ neménû kriticky vidí situaci SolÏenicyn. „JiÏ v roce 1994 SNS nejevilo Ïádné známky nadûje na dlouhovûkost, na reáln˘ Ïivot. Rusko v nûm trvale ztrácelo své pozice. Prezident (Boris Jelcin, DB) pfiitom s Ïeleznou pravidelností vyhla‰oval jednou „nበstrategick˘ kurs na svazek SNS“, jindy „pfiíznivé podmínky pro integraci SNS“, a v roce 1996 dokonce tvrdil, Ïe se moÏná bude chtít pfiipojit k SNS i Pobaltí.16 15 16

BrÏeÏinskij, cit. dílo, s., s. 130. SolÏenicyn A., Rossija v obvale, s. 40.

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Iluze Jelcinova Kremlu o tom, Ïe Rusko se záhy vrátí do ranku ne-li supervelmoci, tedy alespoÀ globální velmoci, schopné kontrolovat prostor, jenÏ byl do roku 1991 Sovûtsk˘m svazem, byly o to trvalej‰í, oã neúãinnûj‰í byly pokusy o efektivní integraci SNS, oznaãovaného rusk˘mi masmédii stále ãastûji za „klub prezidentÛ“. Termín „blízké zahraniãí“ se tak stále více stával iluzí, aÏ posléze z ruské diplomacie prakticky zcela vymizel. Proã je politika Ruska v postsovûtském prostoru tak málo úspû‰ná? Pro ãlenské státy SNS jako celek neexistuje Ïádn˘ stimul, kter˘ by je nutil k uωímu napojení na Moskvu. „Nové postsovûtské státy budují svou státnost ve vût‰inû pfiípadÛ na základû nacionalismu. Na budování nov˘ch národních m˘tÛ, coÏ znamená, Ïe se stále zfietelnûji vzdalují od Moskvy. Nacionalismus totiÏ pfiedpokládá zvût‰ování distance mezi b˘valou kolonií a b˘valou metropolí“.17 Navíc je zfiejmé, Ïe organizace, jeÏ byla od samého poãátku zam˘‰lena jako nástroj civilizovaného rozvodu, tady dezintegrace v její nejménû nepfiíznivé a nebezpeãné podobû, nemÛÏe naplÀovat integraãní funkci. Jinak fieãeno, od samého poãátku bylo SNS destruktivní organizací. Projevilo se to jiÏ ve skuteãnosti, Ïe v prÛbûhu 90. let v ní docházelo k dûlení na men‰í uskupení s konkrétnûj‰í náplní. V rámci SNS tak vznikla v roce 1992 Celní unie, z níÏ se v roce 2000 stalo Euroasijské hospodáfiské spoleãenství (EuroAzES, tvofiené Ruskem, Bûloruskem, Kyrgyzstánem, Kazachstánem a TádÏikistánem), v roce 2003 Jednotn˘ ekonomick˘ prostor (JEP, k nûmuÏ patfií Rusko, Ukrajina, Bûlorusko a Kazachstán), v roce 2002 pak Organizace dohody o kolektivní bezpeãnosti (ODKB, ãlenové: Rusko, Arménie, Bûlorusko, Kazachstán, Kyrgyzstán a Kazachstán), jeÏ je jako jediná pokládána za funkãní, neboÈ boj proti pa‰ování narkotik a terorismu se t˘ká v‰ech. Dal‰í z organizací zvaná ·anghajská organizace pro spolupráci (·OS) dokonce pfiesáhla rámec SNS. Vedle Ruska, Kazachstánu, Kyrgyzstánu, TádÏikistánu a Uzbekistánu k ní patfií také mohutná âína. Zvlá‰tû tato skuteãnost nutí k zamy‰lení, zda je nespokojenost Moskvy s pfiítomností Spojen˘ch státÛ ve Stfiední Asii, jeÏ se projevuje ve v˘rocích fiady politikÛ nejen nacionalistického raÏení, vskutku oprávnûná. Iniciátorem zaloÏení ·OS totiÏ

nebyla Moskva, ta se k organizaci pouze pfiipojila. „âína pokládá Stfiední Asii za své „blízké zahraniãí“ právû tak, jako to ãinilo Rusko. Pro âínu je Stfiední Asie strategick˘m zázemím. S rÛstem ekonomick˘ch svalÛ narÛstají také geopolitické chutû âíny.18 V situaci, kdy na území Ruské federace pronikají legálnû i ilegálnû desítky, ba stovky tisíc âíÀanÛ, by Moskva mûla zvaÏovat situaci mnohem váÏnûji a ménû truchlit nad ztrátou svého vlivu v prostoru. Polarizace v‰ak probíhala také v postojích k Moskvû. V rámci SNS zaãala pozvolna vyrÛstat „nová berlínská zeì“. Jsou-li v˘‰e zmínûné substruktury SNS vÛãi Moskvû naladûny více ãi ménû pozitivnû, ãi alespoÀ neutrálnû, spoleãenství GUAM, tvofiené Gruzií, Ukrajinou, ÁzerbajdÏánem a Moldavskem se netajilo tím, Ïe se orientuje více na Západ neÏ na Moskvu. GUAM, vytvofien˘ v roce 1997, se o dva roky pozdûji pfiemûnil pfiipojením Uzbekistánu v GUUAM, po odchodu Uzbekistánu v roce 2005 se spoleãenství opût promûnilo v GUAM. Ten byl pozdûji pfietvofien v Organizaci za demokracii a ekonomick˘ rozvoj (ODER) s jiÏ otevfienû prozápadnû (a protirusky) orientovan˘m programem. Nad rámec SNS bylo v prosinci 2005 vytvofieno nepokrytû protiruské SdruÏení demokratické volby (SDV), tvofiené jiÏ nikoli jen postsovûtsk˘mi, ale i postkomunistick˘mi zemûmi, tedy Ukrajinou, Moldavskem, Litvou, Loty‰skem, Estonskem, Rumunskem, Makedonií, Slovinskem a Gruzií. V pfiípadû SDV jiÏ nelze hovofiit o postsovûtském uskupení, ale o klubu zemí, jejichÏ postoj vÛãi Rusku je – tu více, tu ménû – vÏdy v‰ak kritick˘. SDV odmítá dominaci a vliv Moskvy v jakékoli podobû. Dûlení SNS na substruktury v‰ak naznaãilo cestu k fie‰ení sporu o budoucnost postsovûtského prostoru. Politick˘ m˘tus o obnovû ãi znovuvybudování rozdûleného prostoru b˘valého Sovûtského svazu byl nahrazen daleko realistiãtûj‰í pfiedstavou o v˘hodnosti ãi naopak nev˘hodnosti bilaterálních vztahÛ zaloÏen˘ch na konkrétních zájmech, pfii nichÏ by dominace jedné ze stran nebyla oficiálnû deklarována ani v pfiípadech, kdy je latentnû ve vztazích pfiítomna.

18 17

Michejev S., Rossii nuÏna Ïestkaja politika v SNG…, http://www.rustrana.ru/print.php?nid=12228.

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Cohen, A., Competition over Eurasia: Are the U. S. and Russia on a Collision Course?, The Heritage Foundation, http://www.inosmi.ru/translation/223346.html.

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Role barevn˘ch revolucí Citelnou ránu propagandistick˘m deklaracím Kremlu o ne-li funkãnosti, tedy alespoÀ Ïivotaschopnosti SNS zasadily „barevné“ revoluce, jeÏ za tiché nejen morální, leã také finanãní podpory Západu (a pfiedev‰ím USA) a za bezmála hysterické, zcela neadekvátní a proto kontraproduktivní reakce Moskvy probûhly v Gruzii, Ukrajinû, Kyrgyzstánu a (neúspû‰nû) v Uzbekistánu. JiÏ na konci roku 2004 francouzsk˘ politolog Gérard Chaliand v listu Libération tvrdil, Ïe „oranÏová“ revoluce v Ukrajinû pfiedstavuje vrchol zatlaãování Ruska, kter˘ zahájily Spojené státy záhy po rozpadu SSSR. Konfrontaãní vztahy poté zesílily a válka slov se promûnila v „obchodní“ válku, kdy Rusko zv˘‰ilo ceny dodávan˘ch surovin (ropy, plynu i elektfiiny) „revoluãním“ zemím z dosavadních „bratrsk˘ch“ tarifÛ na mnohanásobnû vy‰‰í ceny trÏní. Z hlediska ekonomiky i národních zájmÛ logick˘, byÈ ‰patnû naãasovan˘ a ideologizovan˘ krok Moskvy byl Západem oznaãen za pokus Ruska o „obnovu impéria“. Na schÛzce ãlensk˘ch zemí SDV v litevském Vilniusu viceprezident USA Richard Cheney postup Kremlu podrobil ostré kritice. Rusko pfiitom navíc rozpoutalo i dal‰í fázi „obchodní války“ proti Moldavsku a Gruzii, kdyÏ odmítlo dovoz jejich vinafiské produkce. Pro obû postsovûtské zemû je pfiitom právû tato produkce klíãovou poloÏkou exportu.19 Ani v tomto pfiípadû Moskva nejednala adekvátnû. Navzdory pozvání na vilniuskou schÛzku se nedostavil Ïádn˘ z oficiálních vyslancÛ Kremlu. Vznikl tak prostor pro „neoficiální“ hosty z Moskvy. ¤editel moskevského Centra strategick˘ch v˘zkumÛ Andrej Piontkovskij tak ve Vilniusu mohl prohlásit: „Úspûch sousedních zemí – Pobaltí, Moldavska, Ukrajiny a Gruzie – je nejlep‰ím dÛkazem úspû‰nosti demokracie. Nejbliωích pár let úspû‰ného v˘voje Ukrajiny na této cestû pfiinese rozhodn˘ pfielom – putinismus bude nevyhnutelnû poraÏen. V˘voj Ukrajiny rozhodne také o osudu Ruska.20 Obvinûní Moskvy z uÏití ekonomického „dûlostfielectva“ vÛãi sousedÛm a nepfiímo i svûtu v‰ak vyvolává nejednoznaãnou odezvu. „V Ïalobách Ev-

ropy a nyní i USA – za pfiíklad mÛÏe poslouÏit vystoupení Dicka Cheneyho v Litvû – na to, Ïe Rusko vyÏívá dodávky ropy a zemního plynu k uspokojení vlastních potfieb, a nikoli v zájmu Evropy a USA, lze vycítit znepokojivou neupfiímnost… Evropa a Amerika neuznávají zásadní problém, Ïe spotfiebovávají více energií, neÏ jich mohou získat dodávkami… Zaãínají proto zbyteãnou a poniÏující válku se sv˘mi dodavateli. Nemají jinou moÏnost, neboÈ bombardování Ruska by mûlo zcela jiné následky, neÏ ty, které vyvolalo bombardování Iráku.“.21 „Globalizace“ otázky pozice Ruska v postsovûtském prostoru a ostatnû i sama pfií‰tí existence SNS tak v poslední dobû nab˘vá na stále vût‰ím v˘znamu. „Barevné“ revoluce, jeÏ poslouÏily jako roznûtka pravdûpodobného, ne-li nevyhnutelného rozpadu SNS, jsou v‰ak navzdory provenienci i kladen˘m cílÛm vÏdy právû jen revolucemi a nesou v‰echny jejich znaky. Dokonce jeden ze strÛjcÛ rozpadu SSSR Alexandr Jakovlev upozorÀuje na jistá nebezpeãí. „Dûjiny ukazují – a únorová (demokratická, DB) revoluce roku 1917 v Rusku je vhodn˘m pfiíkladem, Ïe jak revoluci, tak i kontrarevoluci nakonec provádí v podstatû zpolitizovaná men‰ina pfii pasivní pozici ãi naprosté apatii lidov˘ch mas. Roz‰ífiení mítinkové demokracie ‰lo ruku v ruce s rÛstem vlivu iracionality. Sama technika nekoneãn˘ch mítinkÛ, jednoduchá a masám dostupná hesla vût‰inou destruktivního charakteru, vedla k vulgarizaci beztak primitivního vûdomí.“22 Export demokracie je stejnû o‰idn˘ jako export diktatury. Tím spí‰e, Ïe v nejménû ve dvou pfiípadech barevn˘ch revolucí v SNS ‰lo pouze o generaãní v˘mûnu spojenou se zmûnou geopolitické orientace. Jak v pfiípadû Gruzie, tak v pfiípadû Ukrajiny se díky revolucím dostali k moci politici pocházející ze „stájí“ sv˘ch pfiedchÛdcÛ. V pfiípadû Gruzie nahradil Eduarda ·evardnadzeho jeho odchovanec Michail Saaka‰vili, v pfiípadû Ukrajiny byl Leonid Kuãma svrÏen sv˘mi b˘val˘mi spojenci Viktorem Ju‰ãenkem a Julií Tymo‰enkovou. Barevné revoluce a pfiedtím úãelová (promoskevská ãi prozápadní) uskupení vytvofiila v postsovûtském prostoru jakousi novou berlínskou zeì dûlící SNS na dvû ãásti, jejichÏ póly pfiedstavují prozápadní ODV, usilující 21

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Http://www.prognosis.ru/news/iworld/2005/5/6/che.html. Http://www.rosbalt.ru/print/252730.html.

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Atkins J., Russia is not morally obliged to supply US and Europe with gas. http://www.inosmi.ru/print/ 227334.html. Jakovlev, cit. dílo, s. 97.

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o dal‰í revoluãní ‰ífiení demokracie, a ·OS, usilující o obranu proti revoluãním zvratÛm a zachování statu quo. Nyní v‰ak lze jiÏ smûle hovofiit o dal‰ím tfií‰tûní SNS. Spoleãenství osamûl˘ch Na poãátku 90. let navrhl charismatick˘ prezident Kazachstánu Nursultan Nazarbajev ruskému prezidentovi Borisi Jelcinovi vytvofiení Eurasijského svazu, tvofieného Ruskem, Bûloruskem, Ukrajinou a Kazachstánem, v nûmÏ v té dobû Ïila poãetná ruská men‰ina. Îárliv˘ Jelcin nabídku smetl se stolu. Následky Jelcinova kroku jsou nyní jasné. Vazby Kazachstánu na Moskvu slábnou, neboÈ zemû bohatá na nerosty, suroviny i prÛmysl vyvolává zájem USA, âíny i Turecka. Zpracovatelsk˘ prÛmysl Kazachstánu nezaostává za tûÏbou ropy a o zahraniãní investice nemá zemû nouzi. Kaza‰ské elity pfiitom nemají o svém postavení ve svûtû pfiemr‰tûné iluze a vystupují z realistick˘ch pozic.23 Vztahy s Bûloruskem, s nímÏ Rusko vytvofiilo formální, leã zcela nefunkãní svazov˘ stát, jsou neménû ambivalentní. Alexandr Luka‰enko inicioval vytvofiení Svazu jako minikopie SSSR za vlády Borise Jelcina, tû‰ícího se za své vlády trvale chatrnému zdraví. Tehdy bylo jasné, Ïe autokratick˘ bûlorusk˘ sportovec se lehce mÛÏe stát svazov˘m prezidentem a roz‰ífiit své léno z Bûloruska na celé eurasijské Rusko. Za Putinovy vlády se situace zmûnila. Kremlu nepfiíli‰ vyhovuje Luka‰enkovo image „posledního diktátora Evropy“. Také Luka‰enko, jehoÏ Kreml jiÏ nehodlá nadále rozmazlovat nízk˘mi cenami za ropu a plyn, není pfiíli‰ naklonûn pfiechodu Svazu z podoby ryze formální a deklaratorní do podoby reálné. „Aãkoli lze u vût‰iny BûlorusÛ jen stûÏí hovofiit o vyhranûnû protiruském nacionalismu, nepokládají se za ãást jednotného národa, kter˘ je nutné po rozdûlení znovu spojit. Podobnû jako Ukrajinci i Bûlorusové vnímají svou vlastní národní identitu. Probíhá tu promûna regionálního vûdomí. Ani jedna z postsovûtsk˘ch republik a postkomunistick˘ch zemí se nechce

vrátit do V˘chodní Evropy. Daleko radûji se zafiazují do stfiední Evropy, ãi prostû do Evropy. Po ‚slovanském‘ svazu jiÏ není Ïádná poptávka.“24 Probuzení v‰ak nastává i ve Stfiední Asii. I zde se konala revoluce, jeÏ probûhla v bfieznu 2005 v Kyrgyzstánu. O dva mûsíce pozdûji, v kvûtnu 2005, potlaãila státní moc brutálnû nepokoje v Uzbekistánu. Období let 2005–2006 dokazuje, Ïe epocha „klidn˘ch“ a „sametov˘ch“ revolucí je ta tam. Evropsk˘ revoluãní koncert byl dohrán. Zaãíná „probuzení“ a politické (stejnû jako civilizaãní) sebeurãení Stfiední Asie.25 Podle francouzského islamisty Oliviera Roi byl rychl˘ úspûch revoluce v Kyrgyzstánu zákonit˘m dÛsledkem politického v˘voje této zemû v postsovûtském období. Projevila se tu tendence ke vzniku autokratick˘ch a dokonce diktátorsk˘ch reÏimÛ. Platí obecnû pro reÏimy Stfiední Asie. JenÏe v Kyrgyzstánu byly specifické podmínky. Po jistou dobu se dokonce hovofiilo o „kyrgyzském zázraku“ a prezident Askar Akajev byl pokládán za reformátora mnohem demokratiãtûj‰ího, neÏ jeho kolegové ze sousedních zemí. Skuteãná specifika zemû v‰ak spoãívala v tom, Ïe kyrgyzská státní moc byla slab‰í neÏ moc ostatních stfiedoasijsk˘ch reÏimÛ. V celé Stfiední Asii probíhá nyní modernizace islámského V˘chodu, jeÏ musí b˘t uÏ z logiky v˘voje postsovûtsk˘ch zemí modernizací „dohánûjící“ ostatní svût. V islámském svûtû byly dosud úspû‰nû realizovány dva modely politického rozvoje. Tím prvním je autoritáfisk˘ svûtsk˘ reÏim se v‰emi z toho plynoucími negativy (klanová struktura, nepotismus, bující korupce). Panuje tu prezident, jeho manÏelka, bratfii, syn hlavy státu – ti v‰ichni se dûlí o posty a vzdálenûj‰í pfiíbuzní se stávají poslanci parlamentu. Sází se pfiitom na sociálnû ekonomickou modernizaci za souãasného potlaãení úlohy náboÏenství v politice. Pfiíkladem mohou b˘t právû Kyrgyzstán a rovnûÏ Kazachstán, Archetypem je Turecko. Druh˘ z modelÛ sází na ideologii religiózní obrody a islámská dogmata. Zde je pro postsovûtsk˘ Uzbekistán a TádÏikistán vzorem Írán.

24 23

Kalinin A., Kazachstan kak energetiãeskaja derÏava. http://www.prognosis.ru/news/invest/2006/5/17/ kazakhstan.html.

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Romanenko S., Slavjanskij sojuz ne nuÏen http://www.prognosis.ru/print.html7id=267. Markedonov S., ProbuÏdenije Central’noj Azii i osobennosti dogonjaju‰ãej modernizacii http://www.politcom.ru/print.php?id=2758.

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Revoluce, aÈ jiÏ barevné, nebo klasicky krvavé, ve státech kladoucích dÛraz na náboÏenství a potlaãující sekulární sloÏky spoleãenského Ïivota, se mohou stát nejen nebezpeãn˘m experimentem, ale i rozbu‰kou vedoucí k explozi fanatismu, která by se stala hrozbou nejen pro Západ, ale i pro sekulární V˘chod a cel˘ svût. Stranou stojí Turkmenistán. „Slunci podobn˘“ Turkmenba‰i Saparmurat Nijazov neponechává nikomu Ïádn˘ prostor pro modernizaci reÏimu. ¤e‰ením se mÛÏe stát buì palácov˘ pfievrat nebo vojenská intervence. Odpor „shora“ je v‰ak pfiesto moÏn˘ podobnû, jako tomu bylo v dobû, kdy se Stalinovo Politbyro rozhodlo zbavit Velkého diktátora. Paranoia Turkmenba‰iho urãuje i jeho vztah ke svûtu – je stejnû protizápadní jako protirusk˘. Za nejbliωího spojence Ruska byla donedávna pokládána Arménie. I zde se v‰ak pozice Moskvy oslabily. Formálnû pfiátelské vztahy mezi Moskvou a Jerevanem jsou z hlediska pragmatismu ekonomicky ménû efektivní, neÏ mohutn˘ vliv poãetné arménské diaspory pfiedev‰ím v USA, která dokáÏe se znaãnou razancí oslovovat svûtovou vefiejnost a lobbovat zájmy staré vlasti. Arménie navíc nemusí volit mezi Ruskem a USA, neboÈ (právû díky diaspofie) byla vÏdy vnímána zãásti jako souãást Západu.26 V rámci spoleãenství GUAM zaujímá ponûkud v˘sadní postavení ÁzerbájdÏán. Kvûtnov˘ summit GUAM znovu potvrdil, Ïe hlavní cíl dané organizace spoãívá v boji proti ruskému vlivu v postsovûtském prostoru a rovnûÏ ve vytvofiení jistého koridoru státÛ od Baltského aÏ ke Kaspickému mofii, které se orientují pfiedev‰ím na zájmy západních zemí. JestliÏe ãlenství Moldavska, Ukrajiny a Gruzie v této organizaci je pochopitelné, pak role ÁzerbájdÏánu, stále deklarujícího své pfiátelské vztahy k Moskvû, vyvolává otázky. Baku jako by sedûlo na dvou Ïidlích. DÛvod? Od rozpadu SSSR do Ruska pfiicestovalo (natrvalo, nebo za v˘dûlkem) v historii Ruska bezprecedentní mnoÏství ÁzerbájdÏáncÛ. Tito lidé se v Rusku aktivnû zab˘vají obchodem a posílají do vlasti obrovské mnoÏství penûz. Podle nûkter˘ch údajÛ jde o sumy srovnatelné se v‰emi pfiíjmy ÁzerbájdÏánu z prodeje vlastní ropy, jeÏ tvofií hlavní zdroj pfiíjmové ãásti státního rozpoãtu.27

Podle expertÛ justiãních orgánÛ Ruské federace i velvyslanectví ÁzerbájdÏánu v Rusku sídlí v Rusku 1,5 miliónu ÁzerbájdÏáncÛ a tato diaspora tvofií v˘znamn˘ faktor ekonomického rozvoje ÁzerbájdÏánu.28 Poãet obyvatel celého ÁzerbájdÏánu pfiitom ãiní 8,4 miliónu obyvatel.29 M˘ty nejen geopolitické Pokud se Moskva za Jelcinovy vlády pokou‰ela aÏ do konce rozehrávat kartu „supervelmoci na zdravotní dovolené“, tedy velmoci, jeÏ se jen na ãas vzdala svého statusu jen proto, aby se k nûmu po ãase vrátila, Rusko za Vladimira Putina zvolilo podstatnû realistiãtûj‰í politiku vÛãi SNS. „Putin upfiesnil soustavu priorit Ruska v zahraniãní politice. JestliÏe Jelcin leckdy vÛbec zapomínal na existenci nov˘ch nezávisl˘ch státÛ, Putin poloÏil dÛraz na vztahy Ruska se státy, které vznikly na území b˘valého SSSR. Toto úsilí je pochopitelné, vÏdyÈ Rusko spojují se zlomky b˘valého sovûtského impéria ãetné zájmy. Pfiesto Rusko ani za Putina nedospûlo k definitivnímu rozhodnutí v otázce, jeÏ je pro nû strategická: Jaká má b˘t v budoucnosti jeho systémové role v postsovûtském regionu, tedy, má-li Rusko usilovat v nejbliωím okolí o formování nové aliance státÛ, které jsou na ní nezávislé a pokraãovat tak v imperiálních tendencích (otázkou je, zda je to vÛbec zásadnû moÏné), nebo zda má smûfiovat k vytváfiení spoleãenství státÛ, jeÏ by mohlo b˘t pfiedstupnûm k evropské integraci? Sám prezident Putin oznaãil snahu formovat postsovûtskou integraci na základû vzájemného respektování zájmÛ, a nikoli vyuÏívání Ruska jako „dojné krávy“. JiÏ v tom je moÏné spatfiit pokus o odmítnutí vztahu suveréna a vasalÛ. Moskva zaãala vyuÏívat ekonomické impulsy pro obnovení svého vlivu na nejbliωí sousedy. PfiiãemÏ nosn˘mi pilífii této ekonomické politiky se stal rusk˘ byznys a „pfiirozené monopoly“, v prvé fiadû Gazprom a Jednotn˘ energetick˘ systém Ruska (RAO JES).30 Lilija ·evcovová, jeÏ se nikterak netají kritick˘m pfiístupem k reÏimu prezidenta Putina, tu jen zobecÀovala doktrínu pfiedního ruského liberála, „otce“ více neÏ sporné ruské privatizace a ‰éfa RAO JES Anatolije âubaj28 29

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Markedonov S., Armenija sdelajet razvorot. http://www.prognosis.ru/print.html?id=431. Michejev S., Na ã’jej storone Baku? http://www.politcom.ru{print.php?id=2777.

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http://www.kreml.org/interview_face/103677658?mode=print. http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2006/0237/print.php. ·evcova L., Rossija – god 2005–2006, Nezavisimaja gazeta 21. 1. 2005 25. 5. 2005, http://www.ng.ru/ ideas/2005–01–25_otkat.html.

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se, jenÏ v kampani pfied parlamentními volbami roku 2003, v nichÏ se pokusil získat body pro citelnû oslabenou ruskou pravici, ‰okoval cel˘ svût (a to doslova) vyhlá‰ením stále chybûjící „národní ideologie“ ãi nové „ruské idey“ nynûj‰ího Ruska. Tou se mûla stát „ideologie liberálního imperialismu“. Terminologick˘ „koãkopes“, kter˘ Anatolij âubajs deklaroval, postrádá logiku jen zdánlivû. Program ruské pravice, jejíÏ politika má b˘t protiváhou etatistickému modelu Ruska, budovaného Vladimirem Putinem, se musí v daleko vût‰í mífie a ofenzivnûji zamûfiit na spoleãenství nezávisl˘ch státÛ. Rusko je v souãasné dobû podle Anatolije âubajse jedin˘m a jedineãn˘m pfiirozen˘m lídrem v celém prostoru SNS jak objemem své ekonomiky, tak i úrovní a kvalitou Ïivota. „To je prosté konstatování faktu. Chápu, Ïe jiÏ tato prostá konstatace skuteãnosti mÛÏe u nûkter˘ch na‰ich pfiátel (mínûni jsou liberálové a prozápadnû orientovaná pravice, D. B.) vyvolat hysterickou reakci. Hysterie se v‰ak nejlépe fie‰í ‰okem a vy dobfie víte, Ïe v ‰okové terapii máme jisté zku‰enosti:“ (âubajs tu naráÏí na „‰okovou terapii“ ekonomick˘ch reforem, zahájen˘ch v roce 1992 reformní vládou úfiadujícího premiéra Jegora Gajdara, jeÏ byla odpÛrci reforem nikoli zcela bez pfiíãiny oznaãovány za „‰ok bez terapie“, D. B.). âubajs ve svém vystoupení tvrdí: „Domnívám se, Ïe Rusko je nejen lídrem, ale Ïe také mÛÏe a musí v‰estrannû zvy‰ovat a upevÀovat své vedoucí pozice v této ãásti planety (mínûno SNS, D. B.) v pfií‰tích padesáti letech. ¤eknu to dÛraznûji, domnívám se, Ïe ideologie Ruska, a o tom jsem hluboce pfiesvûdãen, se v dohledné historické perspektivû musí stát ideologií liberálního imperialismu a cílem ruského státu se musí stát vybudování liberálního impéria. Velmi dobfie chápu, nakolik bolestnû je vnímáno slovo „impérium“ mnoha lidmi, chápu nejednoznaãn˘ vztah k tomuto pojmu a jak znaãnû byl sám termín zkompromitován. Chápu, Ïe pro mnohé lidi je toto slovo zcela nemyslitelné ve spojení s takov˘mi pojmy, jako jsou „civilizace“, „demokracie“, „soukromé vlastnictví“, „trh“ a „svoboda“. JenÏe tak tomu bylo ve XX. století a XX. století jiÏ skonãilo. Zaãalo XXI. století… Îijeme v jiném století, v jiné zemi a v jiném svûtû. Ohlédnûte se kolem sebe: jsme v absolutnû nové situaci a v této nové situaci si musíme vytyãovat adekvátní úkoly.“ KdyÏ posléze âubajs vyluãuje ze své koncepce „liberálního imperialismu“ byÈ jen pouhou moÏnost „poru‰ování principu neporu‰itelnosti hra-

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nic, ãi naru‰ování obecnû uznávan˘ch norem národních práv“, pfiechází k jeho konkrétní definici: „Liberální imperialismus pro mne znamená, Ïe Rusk˘ stát bude v‰emi zpÛsoby napomáhat expanzi ruského byznysu za hranice státu – k na‰im sousedÛm. Znamená pro mne, Ïe rusk˘ stát musí bez oklik zákonn˘mi metodami podnikat v‰e pro to, aby podpofiil základní hodnoty svobody a demokracie nejen v Rusku, ale i ve v‰ech sousedících státech.“ Takov˘ postup Ruska je podle âubajse schopen zmûnit vnímání zemû nejen v Rusku samém, ale i chápání role Ruska ve svûtû. Na konci svého z hlediska obsahu znaãnû emocionálního, z hlediska formy tradiãnû stfiízlivého a od vá‰ní tradiãnû zcela opro‰tûného vystoupení Anatolij âubajs konstatuje, Ïe pravicí i liberály ãasto diskutované otázky moÏnosti Ruska o moÏném vstupu do EU ãi NATO jsou iluzí. „Nevejdeme se do nich ani ekonomicky, ani politicky, ani geograficky.“ Místo tûchto iluzorních snah je prostû nutné jiÏ nyní pochopit kontury novû se formujícího svûta XXI. století, v nûmÏ budou pfiítomny USA, v dne‰ní situaci nejvût‰í impérium svûta, nová sjednocující se Evropa, Japonsko – svût, v nûmÏ musí zaujmout své místo i nové Rusko. „Není snadné zaujmout místo v tomto fietûzci a uzavfiít tento okruh velk˘ch demokracií XXI. století. My pro to máme absolutnû v‰echny nezbytné pfiedpoklady. Je to jedin˘ reáln˘ zpÛsob, jak skuteãnû rovnoprávnû, partnersky budovat svou spolupráci s dÛstojn˘mi partnery, abychom spolu s nimi mohli hájit pofiádek a svobodu na Zemi.“31 Podrobná citace technokraticky a veskrze pragmaticky orientovaného ekonoma (v první fiadû) a politika Anatolije âubajse má jisté oprávnûní. Není zfiejmû náhoda, Ïe AnatolijÛv bratr Igor âubajs se jiÏ po léta zab˘vá otázkami vytvofiení nové „ruské idey“, ãi – jak on sám tomu fiíká – „idey nového Ruska“. Stejnû tak není náhoda, Ïe kdyÏ poÏádal prezident Boris Jelcin v polovinû 90. let politology, filozofy a kulturology o vytvofiení nové ruské ideologie, jeÏ by dokázala nahradit nejen odumfielou ideologii sovûtského státu, ale i veskrze zastaralou „ruskou ideu“ z carsk˘ch dob, spoãívající na reáliích, jeÏ jsou pro moderní obyvatelé Ruské federace zcela cizí, nepochodil. Ideologii nelze vytvofiit ani na objednávku, ani ze dne na den. Ideologie se rodí pozvolna a vyvíjí se tak, jako se vyvíjí spoleãnost. 31

âubajs A., Missija Rossii – doklad Anatolija âubajsa. 23. 9. 2003 http://www.poli.ru/dossie/2003/ 09/26/625760.html.

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Osud ãetn˘ch mnohasetstránkov˘ch dûl ruského guru Alexandra Dugina a dal‰ích vyznavaãÛ eurasijské, respektive „neoeurasijské“ idey je ponûkud odli‰n˘. Dugin je pravdûpodobnû nejvût‰ím rusk˘m znalcem, vyznavaãem a propagátorem geopolitick˘ch teorií, neménû vá‰niv˘m odpÛrcem Západu, pfiesnûji fieãeno pfiedev‰ím nynûj‰í jediné „supervelmoci“, USA, a neúnavn˘m propagátorem euroasijské jednoty Ruska a pfiilehl˘ch prostorÛ, zastáncem „tfietí cesty“, po níÏ má Rusko v budoucnosti kráãet. V kontextu na‰eho tématu je dÛleÏité si uvûdomit, Ïe Alexandr Dugin jiÏ fiadu let prosazuje zaloÏení pfií‰tího Eurasijského svazu. K nûmu by vedle b˘val˘ch zemí postsovûtského regionu, tedy Spoleãenství nezávisl˘ch státÛ, mûly patfiit také Írán, Irák, S˘rie a Libye. Navíc Dugin na rozdíl od rusk˘ch nacionalistÛ neprosazuje ani dominaci ruského národa, ani superioritu pravoslavné církve, ale – naopak – vidí v Eurasijském spoleãenství jednotu slovansk˘ch (v jeho pojetí arijsk˘ch), turksk˘ch i dal‰ích národÛ, spojen˘ch spoleãnou my‰lenkou odporu vÛãi atlantismu. Rusko je podle nûj „jádrem planetární alternativy atlantismu a globalizaci a pro zv˘‰ení úãinnosti odporu vÛãi Americe musí vstoupit ve spojení s Evropou.“32 Vnímáno z pohledu politické fiction by mohly b˘t Duginovy práce chápány jako zajímavá ãetba z oblasti alternativní historie. Ve své práci nazvané Filosofie války, doplnûné dosti v˘mluvn˘m mottem jiÏ na titulní stránce: „Kdo není pfiipraven bojovat a umírat, není schopen skuteãného Ïivota“, v‰ak pí‰e: „V dobû vlády prezidenta Jelcina se iniciativa nové vlny eurasijské strategické integrace v Ruské federaci podpofie netû‰ila. Kreml se proti ní nestavûl otevfienû, vnímal ji v‰ak se znaãn˘m odstupem. Z jedné strany tomu napomáhal ekonomick˘ m˘tus, aktivnû ‰ífien˘ mladoreformátory, podle nûjÏ bylo jakékoli sblíÏení se zemûmi SNS pro Rusko ekonomicky nev˘hodné, na druhé stranû tu hrálo roli jednostranná orientace na Západ, coÏ plodilo ve vztahu k b˘val˘m bratrsk˘m republikám pocit skepse a podráÏdûní. Nacionalismus i „západnictví“ se v tomto smûru spojily vjedno. Kromû toho, hektick˘ antikomunismus ztotoÏÀoval jakékoli integraãní iniciativy s „komunistick˘m revan‰em“. AÏ ke konci Jelcinova období, a zvlá‰tû po nástupu Vladimira Putina k moci se situace zmûnila.

Nov˘ prezident, jemuÏ se dostalo solidního geopolitického vzdûlání, vyzkou‰eného v praxi, jiÏ nemohl dále kultivovat nezodpovûdné konjunkturální m˘ty. Postupnû se v Rusku zaãalo obnovovat strategické my‰lení, geopolitické vnímání svûtové situace. S Putinem zaãal proces odvratu od „civilizovaného rozvodu“ k „nové integraci“.33 Máme pfied sebou tedy dva zcela protichÛdné m˘ty, t˘kající se budoucnosti Ruska a jeho role v postsovûtském prostoru. Podle âubajsovy pfiedstavy musí Rusko expandovat do prostoru SNS a ‰ífiit v nûm svÛj ekonomick˘ a kulturní vliv. Pfiedev‰ím pak demokratické hodnoty. Na druhé stranû je tu model, podle nûjÏ se Rusko opût stává strÛjcem, nositelem i vykonavatelem „Velké my‰lenky“ ãi „Mise“, jeÏ ho od samého poãátku staví, zdánlivû „nad“, ve skuteãnosti v‰ak zcela „mimo“ svût, a to nejen západní, oznaãovan˘ za civilizovan˘. Není totiÏ nic tûωího, neÏ nést na bedrech bfiímû „Osudového pfiedurãení“, pfied nímÏ není úniku. Je-li realizace prvního modelu za jist˘ch okolností moÏná, „svût podle Dugina“ a jeho vyznavaãÛ je od poãátku virtuální, ludickou (hrovou) konstrukcí, jeÏ nemÛÏe b˘t naplnûna jiÏ proto, Ïe staví Rusko do pozice jakéhosi demiurga budoucnosti. „Eurasijství je mytologií, rétoricky dekorovanou zlomky empirie. Eurasijsk˘ m˘tus, jako ostatnû kaÏd˘ m˘tus, volá po zázraku. Rusko totoÏné s Eurasií pfiedstavuje prostor, kde nevládnou obvyklé zákony… V Eurasii v podstatû neexistuje (historick˘) ãas, nemûní se geografie Oikumény, nevznikají národní státy, nerozpadají se tu impéria. Rusko totoÏné s Eurasií je mimohistorickou vûãnou entitou. Tedy niãím jin˘m, neÏ m˘tem.“34 ¤e‰ení pro Rusko? JiÏ dfiíve zmiÀovan˘ Ariel Cohen ve své studii o vztazích Ruska a USA v Eurasii35 konstatuje, Ïe studená válka zachovala hluboké ‰rámy nejen na sebevûdomí Ruska, ale i ve Washingtonu. „Leckdo ve Spojen˘ch státech stále je‰tû pokládá Rusko ve své podstatû ze „fií‰i zla“ a to navzdory opako33 34 35

32

Kaledin N., Podpol’je vychodit naruÏu http://www.compromat.ru/main/dugin/podpolje.htm.

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Dugin A., Filosofija vojny. Moskva 2004, s. 208–209. Kaganskij V., Krivda i pravda jevrazijstva (smysl i status jevrazijskoj koncepcii prostranstva Rossii). http://www.polit.ru/docs/620347.html. Cohen, A., Competition over Eurasia: Are the U. S. and Russia on a Collision Course?, The Heritage Foundation, http://www.inosmi.ru/translation/223346.html.

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van˘m prohlá‰ením jeho lídrÛ, Ïe Rusko nemá zájem na obnovení Sovûtského svazu a nedisponuje ani vojenskou silou, ani finanãními prostfiedky, ba ani státními zájmy, aby o to usilovalo. Ale stále se je‰tû leckde oz˘vají hlasy „milujeme Rusko tak silnû, Ïe si pfiejeme, aby jich bylo hned nûkolik“. Tito lidé sní o rozpadu Ruska po liniích jeho regionálních hranic: Severní Kavkaz, Dáln˘ v˘chod, nebo Sibifi a Írán. Tito lidé nechápou nebezpeãí, kterou chaos v Rusku disponujícím jadern˘m arzenálem mÛÏe pfiedstavovat pro území od Pobaltí aÏ po Tich˘ oceán, od Arktidy aÏ po âerné mofie, a rovnûÏ pro cel˘ ostatní svût.“ Cohen dále konstatuje: „Aãkoli Bushova administrativa neprovádí politiku, jejímÏ cílem je rozkol Ruska, nûktefií politikové v Moskvû si pletou vûdecké traktáty b˘val˘ch americk˘ch vysoce postaven˘ch státních ãinitelÛ s reáln˘mi strategick˘mi cíli USA. Je to v zásadû nesprávn˘ pfiístup.“ NaráÏka na v Rusku aÏ pfiehnanû citovanou Velkou ‰achovnici Zbigniewa Brzezinského a v˘roky AmeriãanÛ, ktefií sm˘‰lejí podobnû jako on, je zcela evidentní. Stejnû tak je zfiejmé, Ïe podobn˘ pfiístup vyvolává reakci Moskvy, jeÏ ve snaze dokázat, Ïe její oslabení po konci studené války není fatální, pfiitvrzuje ve své politice v regionech i ve svém hodnocení revoluãních pfiemûn, jeÏ probûhly v uplynul˘ch letech v nûkter˘ch zemích postsovûtského regionu. JiÏ v fiíjnu roku 2004 ostatnû konstatoval Eric Kraus, hlavní analytik investiãní spoleãnosti Sovlink Securities, v ãlánku pro list The Moscow Times: „Na rozdíl od Jelcina, tohoto milého, opilého cviãeného medvûda, pfiipraveného vÏdy tanãit tak, jak Západ pískal, jen aby si tím vyslouÏil pár laskav˘ch slov a pohlazení, staví Putin stále zfietelnûji na první místo zájmy Ruska.“36 Klíãem k pochopení vztahu Ruska ke svûtu i k nejbliωímu okolí zÛstává skuteãnost, Ïe jiÏ nejedno desetiletí, ba dokonce nejedno století, probíhá v rusk˘ch elitách souboj mezi pfiívrÏenci „západní“ cesty v˘voje Ruska a cesty osobité, jeÏ Rusko definuje jako zcela v˘jimeãn˘ fenomén, kter˘ je nucen ubírat se vlastní cestou. Je-li v prvním modelu v˘voje obsaÏen nejen pragmatismus a realistické vnímání svûta, ale i jistá míra pocitu vûdo-

mé submisivity ve vztahu vÛãi Západu, pak druhá cesta obsahuje zfietelné prvky mesianismu, v nûmÏ není tûÏké vystopovat jeho protipól – podvûdom˘ pocit ménûcennosti. Je lhostejné, Ïe v promûnách historie byly obû tendence oznaãovány jako souboj „zapadníkÛ“ a „slavjanofilÛ“. Podstatné ov‰em je, Ïe obû hnutí tvofiili Rusové, pfiesnûji fieãeno „Rossijanû“, neboÈ ne vÏdy ‰lo o pfiíslu‰níky ruského etnika. „Pfiedstava o rusk˘ch „zapadnicích“ jen jako o nositelích liberální ideologie, která vyhla‰uje obãanská práva nejen pro jednotlivé obãany, ale i pro jednotlivé národy a národnosti, které si pfiejí vytvofiit nezávislé státy, neodpovídá skuteãnosti. Wilsonovsk˘ princip sebeurãení národÛ, snadno vtûlen˘ do Ïivota v USA, zemi dobrovoln˘ch emigrantÛ, je sotva uskuteãniteln˘ v Evropû, rozporuplné mnoÏinû vlastí, z nichÏ kaÏdá má historicky konstituovan˘ status, vlastní národní mytologii, národní zájmy, hranice… Skuteãností zÛstává, Ïe „zapadnici“ ve znaãné mífie napomáhali stanovování a upevÀování ruské imperiálního povûdomí XIX. a XX. století. Byli to totiÏ ru‰tí lidé, ktefií pfiáli své zemi politickou moc a rozkvût,“ charakterizuje historii idejí „zapadnikÛ“ polsk˘ vûdec ruského pÛvodu Vasilij ·ãukin.37 „Zapadnici, stejnû jako dûkabristé, slavjanofilové, narodnici, idealisté, sociální demokraté, konzervativní i liberální kfiídlo ruské emigrace XX. století, prakticky v‰echny proudy ruského my‰lení a ruského spoleãenského hnutí, se snaÏili pohlíÏet na svût a jeho politické aspekty v ruském duchu, a nikoli jak˘chkoli jin˘ch národních zájmÛ. Pohor‰ovat se nad tím je nesmyslné.“38 âtrnáct let pramálo efektivní existence SNS nutí k zamy‰lení nad tím, zda má jeho dal‰í trvání smysl. Nefunkãní SNS, jeÏ bylo nástrojem „civilizovaného rozvodu“ je nejvhodnûj‰í urychlenû rozpustit a to dost moÏná z iniciativy Moskvy samé. „V rámci existujícího SNS byla ve skuteãnosti replikována izolacionalistická strategie z dob existence SSSR. Rusko je stále je‰tû pokládáno za svûtové mocenské centrum, stejnû jako Evropa, âína, USA. Termín ‚blízké zahraniãí‘, kter˘ je jiÏ dávno nefunkãní, tento jeho status zpochybÀuje. Strategické svazky by mûlo Rusko uzavírat s vedoucími svûtov˘mi mocnostmi, sousední zemû pak podle potfieby do sféry sv˘ch národních zájmÛ zapojovat ekonomick˘mi, vojensko-politick˘mi

36

37

Kraus E., Uchud‰enije povedenija Rossii vo vne‰nej politike. The Moscow Times. 6. 10. 2004. http:/ /www.compromat.ru/main/vragi/vernut.htm.

38

·ãukin V., Russkoje zapadniãestvo. Lódz 2001, s. 225–226. Ibid, s. 259.

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a humanitárními zpÛsoby a vyuÏívat k tomu jak rusk˘ch minorit, Ïijících v tûchto zemích, tak pfiíslu‰níkÛ pfiistûhovaleck˘ch men‰in pocházejících z jednotliv˘ch postsovûtsk˘ch zemí. Místo nefunkãního politického svazu musí zaujmout práce s národními men‰inami. SNS je tu zcela zbyteãné,“ uvádí Rifat ·ajchutdinov, místopfiedseda v˘boru Státní dumy pro otázky SNS a styky se spoluobãany v zahraniãí.39 Men‰iny pfiitom nejsou zanedbatelné, neboÈ navzdory odstfiediv˘m tendencím probíhajícím v SNS, je pro mnohé obãany zemí Spoleãenství Rusko stále pfiitaÏlivé. Mnozí pfiicházejí do Ruska legálnû, vût‰ina v‰ak za prací do Ruska vyráÏí ilegálnû. Jde tedy o to, najít mechanismy, jeÏ by proces migrace do Ruska postavily do rámcÛ stanoven˘ch zákony. Napfiíklad z bezmála sedmimiliónové populace TádÏikistánu pob˘vá v Rusku aÏ jeden milión TádÏikÛ, z 5,1 miliónu KyrgyzÛ jich v Rusku Ïije aÏ pÛl miliónu, ze 4,2 miliónu obyvatel Gruzie jich v Rusku Ïije a pracuje zhruba milión.40 Legalizací pobytu vût‰iny imigrantÛ fie‰í Rusko nejen demografickou krizi, ale vyráÏí trumfy z rukou tûch, kdoÏ v ní stále vidí nebezpeãné impérium. Stejnû tak by se mûla Moskva více starat o pfiíslu‰níky rusk˘ch minorit Ïijících v zemích SNS. Jejich opomíjení Putin na rozdíl od svého pfiedchÛdce Jelcina sice odsoudil, situace se v‰ak dosud pfiíli‰ nezmûnila. Pfii fie‰ení otázky migrace, jeÏ by se mohlo stát pilífiem navazování vûcn˘ch vztahÛ mezi jednotliv˘mi zemûmi skomírajícího SNS, je v‰ak nutné mít na pamûti i nebezpeãí xenofobie, jeÏ v Rusku pfieÏívá. Pfiesto je vyuÏití kontrolované migrace pro Rusko nezbytné. Pro nacionalistické „jedineãné cesty Ruska“, jak si je pfiedstavuje Dugin a nacionalisté, není místo. Pomineme-li sporn˘ pro mnohé nepfiíjemnû znûjící pojem „národní zájmy“, je navrhovan˘ model vztahÛ Ruska k postsovûtskému prostoru mnohem pfiijatelnûj‰í, neÏ byl v minulosti, kdy bylo SNS pokládáno mnoh˘mi rusk˘mi nacionalisty i kritiky ruské politiky na Západû za potenciální pfiedstupeÀ budoucí neoimperiální integrace, jeÏ by mûla pfiijít v ãasech pro Moskvu pfiíznivûj‰ích. Za pozornost stojí i skuteãnost, Ïe autorem návrhu

39 40

Http://www.polit.ru/analytics/2005/04/13/coommon.html. Amelina Ja., Migracionnaja volna idet iz Srednej Azii. http://www.rosbalt.ru/2006/05/12/ 253237.html.

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na práci s národními men‰inami Rifat ·ajchutdinov není etnick˘ Rus, ale obãan Ruské federace, tedy „Rossijanin“. Bylo by v‰ak utopií oãekávat definitivní fie‰ení situace v nejbliωí budoucnosti. A realizované utopie se, jak známo mûní, ve svÛj opak – v antiutopii. Tou si jiÏ Rusko i v‰echny národy SSSR (a nejen ony) pro‰ly a vûfime, Ïe vÛãi ní získaly dostateãnou imunitu.

UKRAJINA, BùLORUSKO, MOLDÁVIE (EVROPSKÁ âÁST)

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6. Ukrajina 2005–2006: Impérium vrací úder1 Lubo‰ Vesel˘

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povûì, neboÈ události jsou je‰tû pfiíli‰ ãerstvé, stále v pohybu3 a jejich pozadí není zcela rozkryté. Odpovûdi na poloÏenou otázku, jeÏ zatím mÛÏeme nalézt v dílãích komentáfiích, neboÈ dÛkladnûj‰í analytické studie rovnûÏ zatím chybí, jsou stále aÏ pfiíli‰ poplatné emocím a politick˘m sympatiím. Na skuteãnou objektivní a komplexnûj‰í anal˘zu si bude tfieba nûjakou dobu poãkat, nicménû jistou reflexi toho, co se na Ukrajinû za poslední dva roky odehrálo, a nûkteré závûry lze uãinit jiÏ nyní. Revoluce tak trochu napÛl

Revoluce vze‰la z toho, Ïe mocí byla brutálnû po‰lapána lidská dÛstojnost. Revoluce skonãí a dÛstojnost zÛstane. A budoucí prezidenti a premiéfii se budou odpovídat nejen parlamentu, ale také dÛstojnosti ukrajinského národa, vûãnému Majdanu. Miroslav Popovyã2

V dobû vzniku první verze tohoto pfiíspûvku za dvojteãkou v názvu následoval dovûtek dvakrát do stejné fieky a mûlo se jednat pfiedev‰ím o zamy‰lení, jak po v‰ech chybách, kter˘ch se síly oranÏové revoluce dopustily, bude moÏné vytvofiit novou oranÏovou vládu a pokusit se o reparát, kter˘ historie nepovoluje tak ãasto. „Skotaãení“ oranÏov˘ch v‰ak nebralo konce ani v tûch nejkritiãtûj‰ích momentech a v˘sledek je takov˘, jak˘ je. Rok a pÛl po oranÏové revoluci si o moc opût fiekly síly, které byly koncem roku 2004 poraÏeny a v jejichÏ perspektivní budoucnost vûfiil málokdo. Nestalo se tak na základû nûjaké radikální zmûny charakteru tûchto sil, které byly spojeny s b˘val˘m Kuãmov˘m reÏimem, ale témûfi v˘hradnû se na tomto znovuzrození Viktora Janukovyãe, Strany regionÛ (SRU) a v‰eho toho, co je s nimi spojeno, podílela politika, kterou vedli oranÏoví v dobû, kdy získali moc. Budeme-li parafrázovat otázku, která pronásleduje dûní na v˘chodû Evropy od pradávna – kto vinovat – a budeme-li se ptát ponûkud ménû emotivnû, tedy kde se stala chyba, nebudeme schopni dát vyãerpávající od1

2

V˘pÛjãka ze slavné filmové ságy má své opodstatnûní. Po fatálním selhání sil oranÏové revoluce se zpût k moci totiÏ dostává nejen Viktor Janukovyã a jeho Strana regionÛ, ale rovnûÏ silné prÛmyslové impérium, které vzniklo na v˘chodû zemû a jehoÏ zájmy Janukovyãova strana beze zbytku pfiedstavuje. Popovyã M., âervone stolittja, Kyjiv 2006, s. 859.

Od konce 80. let XX. století aÏ do souãasn˘ch dnÛ bylo moÏné na teritoriu nûkter˘ch státÛ stfiední a v˘chodní Evropy zaznamenat nûkolik vln zásadních spoleãensk˘ch zmûn, jeÏ byly více ãi ménû oprávnûnû nazvány revolucemi. Jistou potíÏ s pouÏíváním termínu revoluce zvlá‰tû pfiíkladnû vyjadfiuje pÛvabná kontradikce sametová revoluce, kterou byl oznaãen spoleãensk˘ pohyb v âSSR na pfielomu let 1989–1990. Komunistick˘ tábor ve stfiední Evropû v tomto období ale vskutku zaÏíval zmûny, jeÏ název revoluce snesou. Ne‰lo pfiece o nic jiného neÏ o zásadní pfiemûnu uspofiádání spoleãnosti, kdy byl rÛznû rozvinut˘ komunismus nahrazen nov˘m spoleãensk˘m systémem budovan˘m na demokratick˘ch principech v politice a trÏním hospodáfiství v ekonomice. Úspû‰né zavr‰ení tûchto procesÛ je nejlépe charakterizováno pfiechodem Maìarska, Polska a dvou nástupnick˘ch státÛ b˘valého âeskoslovenska od Rady vzájemné hospodáfiské pomoci do Evropské unie, od Var‰avské smlouvy do NATO. Zhruba za jeden a pÛl generace jde o pomûrnû úctyhodn˘ v˘kon. Po destrukci komunistického systému stfiední Evropa nabrala smûr k demokracii a trhu. Ponûkud dále na v˘chod, kde cel˘ komunistick˘ experiment zaãal, do‰lo na poãátku 90. let XX. století rovnûÏ ke spoleãensk˘m pohybÛm, ale ty byly spojeny pfiedev‰ím se vznikem nov˘ch národních státÛ, které znaãnou ãást více ãi ménû revoluãní energie spotfiebovávaly a spotfiebovávají na potvrzení své samostatnosti. Tento proces, kter˘ stfie-

3

Ostatnû i tento pfiíspûvek byl dokonãen v dobû, kdy se stále je‰tû jednalo o nové vládû, o tom zda parlament rozpustit ãi nikoliv. Proto mu také chybí koncovka, kterou si laskav˘ ãtenáfi bude muset pfii ãtení tûchto úvah doplnit sám.

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doevropské zemû minul, zabral nástupnick˘m státÛm SSSR hodnû ãasu a sil.4 Spektrum reÏimÛ, jeÏ se utvofiily na postsovûtském prostoru, sahá od diktatur stfiedoasijského typu, pfies autokracii bûloruskou k tzv. fiízené demokracii v putinském Rusku, aÏ k oranÏovému pokusu o vybudování demokracie bez pfiívlastku na Ukrajinû. Mezi tûmito body oscilují dal‰í varianty, jeÏ je moÏné spatfiit v zakavkazsk˘ch státech ãi Moldavsku. Obecnû lze konstatovat, Ïe bûhem procesu formování státnosti byly neuspokojivû fie‰eny otázky politického a ekonomického uspofiádání kaÏdé z nástupnick˘ch zemí b˘valého SSSR.5 Tento fakt v polovinû první dekády XXI. století vedl v nûkter˘ch postsovûtsk˘ch státech, kde se je‰tû nestaãil dostateãnû upevnit autokratick˘ reÏim, k procesÛm, jeÏ lze srovnávat s dûním ve stfiední Evropû koncem 80. let XX. století. V listopadu 2003 vypukla v Gruzii revoluce rÛÏí, na Ukrajinû bylo moÏné v prosinci 2004 zaÏít oranÏovou revoluci a koneãnû v bfieznu 2005 do‰lo i na jeansovou revoluci v Bûlorusku, pfiedem odsouzenou k nezdaru, pfiesto ale dÛleÏitou,.6 V‰echny tfii události mûly jedno spoleãné, a to nespokojenost vût‰í ãi men‰í ãásti spoleãnosti s tím, kam mífií v˘voj zemû. Nejãastûj‰í byl pocit zmafien˘ch ‰ancí, kter˘ se den ze dne stával intenzivnûj‰ím a byl i umocÀován oprávnûn˘m názorem, Ïe nová moÏnost, jestli vÛbec, mÛÏe pfiijít za hodnû dlouho. Taková atmosféra byla zvlá‰tû patrná na Ukrajinû, kde v pfiípadû pfiíchodu V. Janukovyãe a donûckého klanu, kter˘ b˘val˘ premiér pfiedstavoval a pfiedstavuje, k témûfi absolutní moci po prezidentsk˘ch volbách mohl znamenat dlouhodobou stabilizaci reÏimu, kter˘ nastolil pfiedchozí prezident Leonid Kuãma. Z tohoto podhoubí vyrostla oranÏová revoluce, jeÏ ve sv˘ch prvních fázích byla spí‰e hnutím proti neÏ hnutím pro. Tomu odpovídal i prÛbûh celé akce, která je symbolizována stany na Majdanu a vûtou ve vzpomínkách pamûtníkÛ: „Kogda my stojali na Majdanû.“ Tato 4

5 6

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Jinak tomu bylo v pfiípadû âeskoslovenska, ale v dobû, kdy se fie‰ila otázka vzniku âeské republiky a Slovenské republiky, byl jiÏ reformní proces v plném proudu. Navíc se rozpad státu odehrával ve srovnání se SSSR v nepomûrnû pfiíznivûj‰ím politicko-ekonomickém prostfiedí. V˘jimku pochopitelnû tvofií baltské státy, ale ty vÏdy pfiedstavovaly i po svém násilném zaãlenûní do SSSR specifickou entitu. Bûlorusk˘ protest proti zfal‰ovan˘m v˘sledkÛm voleb nemûl ‰anci na úspûch právû proto, Ïe v zemi je jiÏ autokratick˘ reÏim pevnû usazen a skupina, která proti nûmu vystoupila nebyla zatím natolik veliká, aby jím mohla otfiást.

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vûta je pro v˘klad událostí na Ukrajinû více neÏ dobr˘m vodítkem. V kostce nám totiÏ podává charakteristiku celé akce, kterou lze pojímat spí‰e jako snahu vybudovat hráz proti nûjakému náporu, neÏ jako aktivní pohyb za nûjak˘m jasnû dan˘m cílem. S trochou pfiátelské ironie lze konstatovat, Ïe jiÏ prÛbûh revoluce, kde hlavní zbraní bylo stát na Majdanu, mûl varovat pfied pfiíli‰n˘mi nadûjemi spojovan˘mi s oranÏov˘m táborem. A jestli zcela bez ironie, potom je nutné konstatovat, Ïe oranÏová revoluce byla vedena osobnostmi, které nepfiedstavovaly skuteãné alternativní elity, tak jako tomu bylo v âeskoslovensku, Maìarsku ãi Polsku, kde na ãele radikálních spoleãensk˘ch pfiemûn stanuli lidé z disentu nebo lidé, ktefií si nezadali s pfiedchozím reÏimem. VÛdcové oranÏové revoluce, opírající se o vyburcovanou obãanskou spoleãnost, provedli vlastnû pfievrat v rámci skupiny, v níÏ se v urãitou dobu sami pohybovali a v níÏ dokonce patfiili ke ‰piãkám. Za prezidentství L. Kuãmy byl Viktor Ju‰ãenko guvernérem Národní banky (1993–1999) a posléze pfiedsedou vlády (1999–2001), Julie Tymo‰enková to dotáhla z podnikatelky na místopfiedsedkyni vlády (1999–2001). Volební seznamy hlavních stran oranÏového tábora, tj. Bloku Julie Tymo‰enkové (BJUT), Národního svazu Na‰e Ukrajina (NSNU) a Socialistické strany Ukrajiny (SSU), byly pfied parlamentními volbami 2006 docela zajímavou pfiehlídkou více ãi ménû v˘znamn˘ch pfiedstavitelÛ Kuãmova reÏimu, aãkoliv boj proti kuãmismu byl jedním z hlavních hesel v pfiedvolebním boji. Ne‰lo tedy o elity alternativní, ale spí‰e o elity uraÏené a poníÏené, které na Majdanu a posléze na vedoucích místech fie‰ily vedle státních problémÛ a zájmÛ i problémy a zájmy ãistû soukromé ãi korporativní. V úfiadech se sice objevili „noví“ lidé, ktefií hlásali nové ideály, ale metody jejich práce a zpÛsob jejich chování ãasto hluboce tkvûly v dobách minul˘ch. Navíc nûktefií z nich se svezli s Majdanem jen proto, Ïe vidûli ‰anci jak naplnit své kariérní ambice. Jakmile se jim to podafiilo, nemûli jiÏ pfiíli‰ velkou vnitfiní sílu a vÛbec snahu pokraãovat dál, svého cíle totiÏ dosáhli obsazením toho kterého úfiadu. Nehledû na to, Ïe oranÏová revoluce byla politicky pfiesnûji vymezena neÏ její pfiedchÛdkynû „Ukrajina bez Kuãmy,“7 stále se v revoluãním tábo7

Protest opoziãních sil Ukrajina bez Kuãmy (2000–2001) byl reakcí na zavraÏdûní novináfie Georgije Gongadzeho a mûl nûkteré rysy, jeÏ pozdûji pfiebrala oranÏová revoluce (spolupráce více politick˘ch

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fie nacházela pfiíli‰ rÛznorodá spoleãnost, kterou více neÏ spoleãné principy spojoval spoleãn˘ nepfiítel. Ve chvíli, kdy byl tento poraÏen, muselo dojít ke stfietu aÏ do této doby situativnû sjednocen˘ch skupin. Tento stfiet se odehrával v rovinû ideologické (co za spoleãnost vytváfiíme), politické (jaké metody zvolíme) a korporativní (kdo bude co kontrolovat). RÛzné pfiístupy k fie‰ení tûchto otázek pfierostly do konfrontace, jeÏ znamenala fatální rozkol revoluãního tábora, mající zásadní negativní dopad na situaci v celé zemi. Jako jiÏ mnohokrát v ukrajinské historii, tak i v prvním období vlády oranÏov˘ch se opût projevila zhoubná vlastnost ukrajinsk˘ch elit, které pfii obhajobû vlastních zájmÛ jdou za sv˘m cílem s takovou vehemencí, Ïe zapomínají nejen na pud sebezáchovy, ale rovnûÏ na osud celé zemû. Tentokrát stfiet v rámci oranÏov˘ch sil ve svém koneãném v˘sledku paradoxnû znamenal vítûzství SRU v prvních skuteãnû demokratick˘ch parlamentních volbách. V˘sledky parlamentních voleb (26. 3. 2006) Poãet hlasÛ (%)

Poãet mandátÛ

Strana regionÛ

Politické uskupení

32,14

186

Blok Julie Tymo‰enkové

22,29

129

Národní blok Na‰e Ukrajina

13,95

81

Socialistická strana Ukrajiny

5,69

33

Komunistická strana Ukrajiny

3,66

21

V˘sledky voleb mûly b˘t pro oranÏové posledním váÏn˘m varováním, Ïe jejich moc je zásadnû ohroÏena, a Ïe pokud nedospûjí k dohodû, mÛÏe dojít k revan‰i. Následná nekoneãná jednání o vytvofiení demokratické koalice, zakonãená odchodem vedení socialistÛ k V. Janukovyãovi, ukázala, Ïe se oranÏoví nepouãili a svoji ‰anci dát zemi jasné politické a ekonomické smûfiování, jiÏ podruhé za necelé dva roky, promarnili.

OranÏová revoluce byla zakonãena v ãervenci 2006, kdy si v parlamentu regionálové se sv˘mi spojenci dûlili moc pfied oãima konsternovan˘ch oranÏov˘ch, ktefií se pouze zmohli na ru‰ení jednání nesouhlasn˘mi v˘kfiiky a jekotem sirén. AÈ jiÏ budeme v této souvislosti mluvit o 18. brumairu, jak ãiní nûktefií ukrajin‰tí komentátofii, ãi budeme hledat jiné historické paralely, jedno je jisté: MoÏnost sloÏit reparát oranÏoví nevyuÏili, respektive se k ní ani nedostali. Dûlení revoluãního ãasu Dvacet mûsícÛ, které uplynuly mezi oranÏovou revolucí a prohrou jejích hlavních protagonistÛ v Nejvy‰‰í radû, bylo naplnûno boufiliv˘m v˘vojem, bûhem nûhoÏ se oranÏoví „systematicky“ krok za krokem blíÏili ke smutnému konci. A pfiitom v‰e zaãínalo více neÏ optimisticky. Ukrajinû se nejprve podafiilo získat uznání a respekt v zahraniãí, kde se zaãaly diskutovat otázky její budoucnosti v euro-atlantick˘ch strukturách. Vysok˘ stupeÀ empatie se ale postupnû promûÀoval v únavu a rozãarování z toho, co nov˘ ukrajinsk˘ establishment pfiedvádûl. Tento proces symbolicky charakterizují dva momenty z ukrajinsko-americké relace. V dubnu 2005 byl prezident V. Ju‰ãenko srdeãnû pfiijat v Bílém domû a ukrajinské perspektivy vypadaly velmi rÛÏovû. A nejen vypadaly. Ukrajinû byl pfiiznán status zemû s trÏní ekonomikou (17. 2. 2006)8, úspû‰né bylo zakonãeno jednání s USA o vstupu do WTO (6. 3. 2006) a zru‰en byl Jackson-VanikÛv dodatek (23. 3. 2006). V ãervenci 2006 v‰ak Bushova administrativa musela kvÛli ukrajinsk˘m vnitropolitick˘m zmatkÛm zapomenout na uvaÏovanou náv‰tûvu Kyjeva, která mûla pfied jednáním G8 v Sankt Petûrburgu dát jasnû najevo podporu Ukrajinû, ãelící soustavnému tlaku svého severního souseda. V podobû aktivit ministerstva zahraniãí a ministerstva obrany, jimÏ v nûkter˘ch fázích dokázalo sekundovat ministerstvo hospodáfiství, Ukrajina dávala znát, Ïe si zvolila cestu na západ a Ïe po ní pÛjde s rozhodn˘m nasazením. Tato sympatická zahraniãnû politická tváfi Kyjeva ale pfiíli‰ neodpovídala domácí realitû.9 Nová premiérka J. Tymo‰enková, s jejímÏ jme8

subjektÛ, protestní stanové mûsteãko uprostfied Kyjeva, podpora protestujících umûlcÛ, hlavní opora ve studentech vysok˘ch ‰kol). ReÏimu se je‰tû podafiilo tuto akci potlaãit. Prezidenta L. Kuãmu tehdy podpofiil premiér V. Ju‰ãenko, kter˘ odmítl nabídku stanout v ãele protestu.

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9

JiÏ dfiíve (1. 12. 2005) tento krok uãinila Evropská unie. 18. 1. 2006 Nejvy‰‰í rada odmítla projednat a schválit zákony potfiebné pro pfiijetí do WTO, parlament rovnûÏ neprojednal vojenská cviãení na ukrajinském území se zahraniãní úãastí, která se bûÏnû konala i za Kuãmova reÏimu.

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nováním prezident V. Ju‰ãenko souhlasil jen se skfiípûním zubÛ,10 sice nocovala ve své úfiadovnû na rozkládacím lehátku, ale pozitiva pfiíli‰ vidût nebylo. Spí‰e naopak. J. Tymo‰enková, dravá podnikatelka se sklonem k bol‰evick˘m metodám fiízení, vedla zemi od problému k problému.11 Odpuzovala a zneji‰Èovala zahraniãní investory ru‰ením svobodn˘ch ekonomick˘ch zón, neustávajícími v˘roky o nutnosti reprivatizace jiÏ zprivatizovan˘ch podnikÛ, stejnû jako extravagantními pfiedstavami o dal‰ím ekonomickém a politickém v˘voji na Ukrajinû. Ostatnû fenomén „Julie Tymo‰enková“ by si zaslouÏil samostatnou studii, k níÏ by ale mûli politologové a historici pfiizvat i experty z oblasti psychologie. Zfiejmû jenom takto sloÏen˘ t˘m by byl schopen objasnit, jak je moÏné dob˘t se takové popularity prostfiednictvím snÛ‰ky populistick˘ch banalit, kuriózních nápadÛ, smûsice pfiekroucen˘ch polopravd a ‰irokého spektra teatrálních gest. Proã právû „Lady Ju.“ prochází to, co jin˘m politikÛm láme vaz. Aãkoliv usiluje o moc za jakoukoliv cenu, vãetnû „odstfielování“ sv˘ch nûkdej‰ích partnerÛ, nikdo ji nesrovnává s Oleksandrem Morozem. Aãkoliv její finanãní pozadí je dostateãnû temné, pfiece není stavûna do stejné fiady s Petro Poro‰enkem ãi Renatem Achmetovem. Aãkoliv není pfiíli‰ vzdûlaná, pfiece nikoho ani nenapadne pfiirovnávat ji k V. Janukovyãovi. Vláda Tymo‰enkové zpÛsobila nûkolik váÏn˘ch ekonomick˘ch otfiesÛ, které se nemohly nepodepsat na celkové náladû v zemi. Snaha postupnû 10

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Ju‰ãenkovo „skfiípûní zubÛ“ je zajímav˘m fenoménem ukrajinské politiky. První váhání s kandidaturou Tymo‰enkové a koneãn˘ souhlas s ní pfiivedl oranÏové k rozkolu. Druhé jeho váhání s toutéÏ kandidaturou a neschopnost prosadit jiného adepta vedly k rozpadu oranÏové koalice po parlamentních volbách. Tfietí váhání, tentokrát s kandidaturou V. Janukovyãe, vede k politické krizi, která se odehraje, byÈ v rÛzn˘ch podobách, aÈ se prezident rozhodne jakkoliv. V prvním pfiípadû byla pfiíãinou „skfiípûní“ obava z pfiíli‰ného rozletu nové premiérky, coÏ se beze zbytku potvrdilo. Ve druhém pfiípadû tady je moÏnost odvety V. Janukovyãe za prohrané prezidentské volby. I zde jsou prezidentovy obavy na místû. Za jeden z prvních krokÛ smûrem k moÏné odvetû je bezesporu zvolení Sergeje Kivalova, pfiedsedy Ústfiední volební komise, která mûla velk˘ podíl na fal‰ování v˘sledkÛ prezidentsk˘ch voleb 2004, do ãela právního v˘boru nové Nejvy‰‰í rady. Velmi nelichotivé, nicménû oprávnûné vysvûdãení za její aktivity v oblasti ekonomiky vystavil A. Aslund v ãlánku pod pfiiléhav˘m titulem The Rise and Decline of Economic Populism after the Orange Revolution. http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/July_September_2005/The%20Rise%20and%20 Decline%20of%20Economic%20Populism.doc Opaãn˘ názor zastává studie Baran, Z., Tuohy, E., Energys Security: Ukraine’s Existential Challenge. Hudson Institute, 2006, s. 3. www.cees.hudson.org/ files/publications/EnergySecurity.pdf Detailnûji se A. Aslund vûnoval vládnutí J. Tymo‰enkové ve studii The Economic Policy of Ukraine after the Orange Revolution. www.eerc.kiev.ua/eroc/seminars/Aslund/ AslundR1.pdf.

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regulovat ceny benzínu, cukru ãi masa vedla k opaãnému efektu a k doãasnému deficitu tûchto produktÛ na ukrajinském trhu. Na nûkolik dní Tymo‰enková rovnûÏ „dokázala“ zah˘bat i s kursem dolaru, kdyÏ stanovila cenové stropy pro benzín.12 Po celou dobu její vlády probíhal ostr˘ boj mezi prezidentsk˘m a premiérsk˘m t˘mem, kter˘ nakonec vyvrcholil jejím odvoláním, coÏ vedlo k odchodu BJUT do opozice, kde se zaãal pfiipravovat na bfieznové parlamentní volby. Jednou z klíãov˘ch otázek pro BJUT bylo, zda se podafií pfiesvûdãit voliãe, Ïe problémy, které musel zaÏít za vlády J. Tymo‰enkové nebyly zpÛsobeny jejími nekompetentními rozhodnutími, ale machinacemi nepfiátel. V˘rok „jej nû dali rabotaÈ“ díky politickému talentu a snad nevyãerpatelné zásobû populistick˘ch postupÛ „zrazené“ premiérky ovládl hlavy pfiíznivcÛ oranÏov˘ch a BJUT se po parlamentních volbách stal nejsilnûj‰í souãástí oranÏového tábora a zároveÀ i jedinou politickou silou v zemi, která dokázala oslovit voliãe prakticky na celém území Ukrajiny.13 Nástup nové vlády Jurije Jechanurova sloÏitou situaci v tábofie oranÏov˘ch je‰tû více zkomplikoval. V této dobû jiÏ plnû resuscitovaná SRU, která v klidu nabírala dech po celou dobu, kdy síly oranÏové revoluce nebyly schopny plnû pfievzít moc v zemi, byÈ k tomu v prvních mûsících roku 2005 mûly v‰echny pfiedpoklady, na‰la své ad hoc partnery jak v prezidentovi, tak i b˘valé premiérce. Poté co napoprvé nepro‰la Jechanurova kandidatura na premiérsk˘ post, se‰el se V. Ju‰ãenko se sv˘m nûkdej‰ím nesmifiiteln˘m protivníkem V. Janukovyãem a dohodl s ním podporu Jechanurova kabinetu. V˘sledkem tohoto kroku bylo podepsání Memoranda o porozumûní mezi vládou a opozicí,14 které vlastnû znamenalo legitimizaci Janukovyãovy strany jako partnera vládního kabinetu. Pfiímûfií s V. Janukovyãem vneslo rovnûÏ zmatek mezi pfiíznivce Na‰í Ukrajiny, z nichÏ si nemalá ãást nalezla nov˘ politick˘ pfiístav v BJUT nebo u nûkteré z men‰ích oranÏov˘ch stran. Stála-li na poãátku Jechanurovy vlády dohoda prezidenta 12

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Varfolomeyev, O., Ukraine Strengthens Currency, Russian Oil Companies Benefit Most. EURASIA DAILY MONITOR Volume 2, Issue 80 (April 25, 2005) =2369642" http://www.jamestown.org/ publications_details.php?volume_id=407&issue_id=3309&article_id=2369642. BJUT dokázal zvítûzit ve 14 regionech z 27, devûtkrát byl druh˘. Vítûzná SRU získala prvenství v 10 regionech, ãtyfiikrát byla druhá. Svého vítûzství dobyla díky vysok˘m ziskÛm, pfiesahujícím 70 % odevzdan˘ch hlasÛ v lidnat˘ch v˘chodních regionech. Podrobnûji viz http://www.cvk.gov.ua/ pls/vnd2006/W6P001. Http://www.partyofregions.org.ua/pr-east-west/433293213c5fb/.

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s V. Janukovyãem, na jejím konci zase pro zmûnu bylo spoleãné hlasování BJUT a SRU za její odvolání. Jak ukázaly pozdûj‰í volební v˘sledky, dokázala J. Tymo‰enková svÛj postup voliãÛm vysvûtlit lépe neÏ V. Ju‰ãenko. Jechanurova vláda nebyla vládou politick˘ch hráãÛ, které sdruÏoval pfiedchozí kabinet J. Tymo‰enkové. ·lo spí‰e o kabinet úfiedníkÛ bez politick˘ch ambicí, kter˘ se pfiedev‰ím soustfiedil na ekonomické problémy. Prezident si takov˘ kabinet pochvaloval, nicménû fakt, Ïe J. Jechanurov nevystupoval aktivnûji jako samostatn˘ politik mûl svÛj dopad na volební v˘sledek NSNU, jehoÏ byl premiér volebním lídrem. Vcelku poklidné období Jechanurovy vlády bylo poznamenáno pfiedev‰ím jednáními s Ruskem o cenách plynu. Dohodnutá smlouva, obsahující celou fiadu temn˘ch zákoutí, se stala pfiedmûtem politického boje, v nûmÏ tahali prezident a vláda za krat‰í konec. Pole plnû ovládla J. Tymo‰enková, která spolehlivû vykonávala funkci nekompromisního kritika vlády15 i za SRU. SRU prakticky nevystupovala proti oranÏov˘m a nechala je, aby se kompromitovali navzájem, coÏ obû skupiny ãinily v mífie nevídané. Regionálové potom pouze upevÀovali své pozice na v˘chodû a pro západní ãást zemû mûli argument, Ïe za nich bylo lépe. A dluÏno dodat, Ïe co se ekonomick˘ch aspektÛ jejich vládnutí t˘ãe, mûli pravdu.16 Za neustálého vzájemného osoãování oranÏov˘ch, v dobû, kdy rostly Ïivotní náklady a panovaly obavy, co se stane, aÏ Rusko zv˘‰í ceny za plyn, dospûla Ukrajina k parlamentním volbám. Ty pfiinesly jen dvû vût‰í pfiekvapení. Prvním byl v˘sledek, kterého dosáhl BJUT. Pfiedpokládalo se totiÏ, Ïe pokud porazí NSNU, bude to jen tûsnû, ale enormní nasazení J. Tymo‰enkové v posledních dnech pfied kampaní, kterou vedla témûfi v˘hradnû prostfiednictvím osobního kontaktu s voliãi, udûlalo své. Velmi pfiekvapiv˘ byl volební neúspûch pfiedsedy Nejvy‰‰í rady Volodymyra Lytvy15

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J. Tymo‰enková si byla dobfie vûdoma, Ïe cesta k volebnímu v˘sledku vede jen pfies získání maximálního poãtu voliãÛ mezi oranÏov˘mi. Proto musela dokázat kritikou vlády i prezidenta, Ïe jen ona sama je jedin˘m stráÏcem odkazu Majdanu. Tento tah jí vy‰el, nicménû nemalou ãást oranÏov˘ch voliãÛ znechutila natolik, Ïe dali své hlasy jin˘m oranÏov˘m stranám, které se nedostaly do parlamentu. OranÏoví tak v koneãném úãtování pfii‰li o více jak jeden milion hlasÛ. Ve srovnání s rokem 2003 za vlády V. Janukovyãe vyrostl v roce 2004 HDP o 12,1 %. Vláda J. Tymo‰enkové dokázala pozvednout HDP ve srovnání s pfiedchozím rokem o 2,8 % a J. Jechanurova v lednu-ãervnu 2006 ve srovnání s dobou, kdy byla u moci J. Tymo‰enková o 5 %. Saldo zahraniãního obchodu ãinilo roku 2004 6 976 milionÛ USD, za vlády J. Tymo‰enkové import pfiev˘‰il export o 748,1 milionÛ USD a Jechanurova vláda disproporci prohloubila na 2 626 milionÛ USD. Bondarenko D., Nasledstvo mol’ãalivogo prem’jera, Delo 17. 7. 2006.

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na. Jeho Národní blok Lytvyna, byÈ vedl jedno z nejnákladnûj‰ích pfiedvolebních taÏení v nejdraωí volební kampani, jakou kdy Ukrajina zaÏila, nebyl schopen pfiekonat 3% hranici. Historicky nejslab‰í v˘sledek zaznamenala Komunistická strana Ukrajiny (KSU), které bezesporu znaãnou ãást voliãÛ odebrala SRU a nûkteré extremistické strany, jimÏ vévodil Blok Natalije Vitrenkové „Lidová opozice“, zcela otevfienû kolaborující s Ruskem. Po zvefiejnûní prvních v˘sledkÛ voleb bylo jasné, Ïe Ïádná ze zúãastnûn˘ch stran nebude schopna sestavit vládu samostatnû. SRU, byÈ volby jasnû vyhrála, mûla jen malou ‰anci na vytvofiení koalice, neboÈ do Nejvy‰‰í rady se kromû komunistÛ nedostal Ïádn˘ politick˘ subjekt, kter˘ by signalizoval ochotu jít s ní do vlády. RegionálÛm nezbylo neÏ ãekat. Jak ukázal dal‰í v˘voj, ãekání se vyplatilo. OranÏoví bûhem koaliãních jednání zabfiedli do neúmûrného taktizování a pfiedev‰ím opût nebyli schopni potlaãit osobní ambice a animozity. První kámen úrazu pfiedstavovalo obsazení premiérského postu. Ten si, a podle v˘sledkÛ voleb oprávnûnû, nárokovala J. Tymo‰enková. S jejím opûtovn˘m pfiíchodem do ãela vlády mûla velk˘ problém jak NSNU, tak i prezident. Ostatnû rovnûÏ oprávnûnû. KrouÏení kolem tohoto oÏehavého bodu, jeÏ se vedlo pod heslem nejprve program, potom teprve posty, si vyÏádalo nûkolik t˘dnÛ, které se pozdûji ukáÏí b˘t osudov˘mi. Opût do‰lo k nûkolika ostr˘m potyãkám a pfieru‰en˘m jednáním. Opût padala silná slova a tvrdá obvinûní. J. Tymo‰enková uzavfiela spojenectví s O. Morozem, kterému za podporu slíbila pfiedsednictví v Nejvy‰‰í radû. Jejich tandem sice bylo vidût a prohlá‰ení stíhalo prohlá‰ení, ale pfiíli‰ efektivní nebyl. NSNU si nakonec prosadil poÏadavek, Ïe místo pfiedsedy parlamentu pfiipadne jemu. OranÏová parlamentní vût‰ina tak mohla b˘t koneãnû vytvofiena (22. 6. 2006),17 a i kdyÏ se vládû J. Tymo‰enkové pfiedpovídalo jen krátké trvání, zdálo se, Ïe oranÏoví pfiece jenom nakonec budou pokraãovat v fiízení zemû.

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Podle zmûnûné ukrajinské ústavy, která pfietváfií Ukrajinu z prezidentského systému na systém parlamentnû prezidentsk˘, musí parlamentní strany vytvofiit vût‰inu, která prezidentovi navrhne premiéra. Poté, co prezident pfiedloÏí tuto kandidaturu ke schválení parlamentu a ten ji schválí, lze sestavit vládu. Pokud se nepodafií parlamentní vût‰inu sestavit ve stanoveném ãase anebo není vãas schválen premiér, mÛÏe prezident parlament rozpustit. Konstitucija Ukrajiny, 2004 (ãl. 83, 90, 106).

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V této chvíli v‰ak pfiichází dal‰í jen tûÏko pochopiteln˘ krok. NSNU deleguje na místo pfiedsedy parlamentu národní alergen, ukrajinského âubajse, P. Poro‰enka. Pokud chtûl NSNU na poslední chvíli pracnû poslepovanou koalici rozbít a pfiipravit si prostor pro jednání se SRU, tak uspûl jen napÛl. Koalice sice byla rozbita, ale karty byly rozdány jinak, neÏ si vÛdcové NSNU pfiedstavovali. Se SRU se na vytvofiení koalice spoleãnû s komunisty totiÏ dohodl O. Moroz, za coÏ získal pfiedsednické kfieslo v Nejvy‰‰í radû.18 OranÏová koalice byla definitivnû zniãena. Za této situace disponoval prezident v podstatû tfiemi moÏnostmi jak vést zemi dál. Buì souhlasit s tzv. antikrizovou koalicí tvofienou SRU, SSU a KSU, nebo rozpustit Nejvy‰‰í radu, anebo v nûjaké podobû roz‰ífiit koalici o NSNU a tím „nafiedit“ nepfiíli‰ vábnû vypadající politick˘ blok, kter˘ se v ãervenci vytvofiil v parlamentu. Pokus o krok smûrem ke tfietí variantû pfiedstavovalo svolání kulatého stolu, kter˘ se poprvé se‰el 27. ãervence 2006 a mûl, za úãasti v‰ech v˘znamn˘ch politick˘ch subjektÛ, dospût k dohodû o dal‰ím smûfiování zemû, jeÏ by umoÏnila vytvofiit vládu, která by neprohlubovala nebezpeãnû vypadající rozdûlení zemû na v˘chodní ãást podporující regionály a západní ãást, stojící za oranÏov˘mi. Podíváme-li se na v˘‰e letmo zrekapitulované období posledních dvou let v˘voje Ukrajiny podrobnûji, mÛÏeme v zásadû vymezit ãtyfii etapy, bûhem nichÏ se postupnû rozpl˘val oranÏov˘ sen. První etapou sledovaného období je bezprostfiednû oranÏová revoluce,19 jejíÏ zaãátek lze stanovit na 22. listopadu 2004, kdy do ulic mûsta Kyjeva zaãaly proudit davy lidí protestujících proti zfal‰ovan˘m v˘sledkÛm druhého kola prezidentsk˘ch voleb. Konec této etapy je dán dokonãením procesu pfiebírání moci oranÏov˘mi, tj. 4. únorem 2005, kdy Nejvy‰‰í rada Ukrajiny schválila premiérskou kandidaturu J. Tymo‰enkové a byli jmenováni noví gubernátofii.

Druhá etapa se kryje s obdobím vlády J. Tymo‰enkové (4. 2. 2005–8. 9. 2006). Vláda, spí‰e ale J. Tymo‰enková,20 zaãala realizovat své pfiedstavy o fiízení zemû, postupnû dochází ke stále silnûj‰ím konfrontacím mezi skupinami kolem prezidenta a premiérky. V‰e vrcholí odvoláním J. Tymo‰enkové z premiérského postu a jeho pfievzetím J. Jechanurovem, tj. 22. záfií 2005. Revoluce pozfiela ãást sv˘ch dûtí. Citlivûj‰í povahy v této souvislosti mluví o zradû ideálÛ Majdanu. Tfietí etapa je spojena s vládou J. Jechanurova (22. 9. 2005–10. 1. 200621) a konãí parlamentními volbami 26. bfiezna 2006. Nová vláda ãásteãnû stabilizuje rozkolísanou ekonomickou situaci v zemi, ale dostává tûÏk˘ úder v podobû zv˘‰ení ceny plynu na poãátku ledna 2006, s nímÏ v kritické dobû zcela neomylnû pfiispûchalo Rusko. Pokraãuje ‰tûpení tábora oranÏov˘ch, prohlubuje se konfrontace mezi BJUT a NSNU. Ta vyvrcholila odvoláním Jechanurovovy vlády, které v parlamentu podpofiila frakce BJUT. Poslední ãtvrtá etapa je v dané chvíli otevfiena. Jejím poãátkem jsou parlamentní volby a její konec bude dán buì vytvofiením nové vlády, anebo rozpu‰tûním parlamentu. Toto období je naplnûno obavami o stav ukrajinské ekonomiky, umocnûn˘mi informacemi o alarmujícím stavu ukrajinského plynafiského odvûtví,22 a nekoneãn˘mi jednáními oranÏov˘ch o koalici, jeÏ procházejí celou fiadou zvratÛ. Nakonec dochází k pfiekvapivé koncovce, která dává do rukou trumfy SRU, kdyÏ socialisté opustili oranÏovou koalici a spoleãnû se SRU, komunisty a nûkolika pfiebûhlíky od BJUT a NSNU vytvofiili tzv. antikrizovou koalici. Zatímco NSNU vyjednával s novou parlamentní vût‰inou o obsazení parlamentních v˘borÛ a dal‰ích míst, BJUT opustil do 25. ãervence parlament a radikálními akcemi se pokou‰el dosáhnout pfiedãasn˘ch parla-

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Lze jen spekulovat, zda toto místo bylo Morozov˘m dlouhodob˘m cílem, k nûmuÏ ‰el nekompromisním prosazováním ústavní reformy, která posiluje úlohu parlamentu a pochopitelnû i jeho pfiedsedy. O. Moroz svého dosáhl, ale v obklopení regionálÛ jeho pozice pfiíli‰ silnou nevypadá. Odkazy na pokusy o první anal˘zy, dokumenty aÈ jiÏ zfilmované nebo psané, umûlecké reflexe, jeÏ byly vydány k prvnímu v˘roãí oranÏové revoluce lze nalézt na stránce internetového politologického Ïurnálu Russkij vopros, www.russkiivopros.com/ruskii_vopros.php?s=26&j=a&a=archiv/2005_2/ &f=&t=review.html&tlc=6 Zásadnûj‰ím odborn˘m pfiíspûvkem na toto téma je práce Aslund, A., McFaul, M., Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthough, Washington Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006. Roku 2006 se dokonce v ukrajinsk˘ch kinech objevil hran˘ film nazvan˘ OranÏove nebo.

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Nûktefií Ukrajinci ponûkud sarkasticky fiíkají, Ïe J. Tymo‰enková zná pouze dva názory: svÛj a nesprávn˘. Osudy Jechanurovy vlády dobfie ilustrují sloÏitou vnitropolitickou situaci na Ukrajinû. Vláda byla parlamentem 10. 1. 2006 odvolána, ale zároveÀ povûfiena fiízením zemû do parlamentních voleb. Nûktefií ministfii, byÈ byla vláda odvolána, byli parlamentem odvoláni je‰tû jednou. Prezident odvolání kabinetu neuznal, takÏe se vlastnû ani nevûdûlo, jak˘ má vláda status. Na prvním zasedání novû zvolené Nejvy‰‰í rady vláda podala demisi 25. 5. 2006), ale vládla dále, neboÈ nová vláda nebyla ani na konci ãervence k dispozici. Tady vznikla kolize s Ústavou, neboÈ poslanec nemá zároveÀ vykonávat dal‰í funkce, coÏ nûktefií ministfii i sám premiér J. Jechanurov poru‰ili. Aby nebylo o zajímavosti nouze, nová Nejvy‰‰í rada odvolala odvolání Jechanurovy vlády z 10. 1. 2006. Nové vedení Naftogazu, státní podnik zaji‰Èující dodávky plynu na Ukrajinu, poÏádalo vládu o jednu miliardu dolarÛ, aby mohlo zaplatit dluhy.

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mentních voleb. Dne 25. ãervence mûl prezident podle Ústavy právo rozpustit parlament, kter˘ nebyl schopen za 60 dní od své první schÛze, kdy stará vláda podle Ústavy podává demisi, vytvofiit nov˘ kabinet. Po dlouhé dobû se V. Ju‰ãenko opût dostal do centra politického dûní. âást oranÏov˘ch po nûm chtûla rozpu‰tûní parlamentu, naproti tomu parlamentní vût‰ina ústy pfiedsedy Nejvy‰‰í rady O. Moroze, pohrozila, Ïe se takovému rozhodnutí nepodfiídí.23 Silná slova padala i v dobû, kdy se nejv˘znamnûj‰í politické síly v zemi se‰ly u kulatého stolu, kter˘ z iniciativy prezidenta V. Ju‰ãenka zaãal jednat 27. ãervence. SRU ve svém prohlá‰ení z 30. ãervence moÏnost vypsat pfiedãasné volby za vydírání a vyzvala prezidenta, aby splnil svoji ústavní povinnost a pfiedloÏil parlamentu ke schválení kandidaturu V. Janukovyãe nejpozdûji do 2. srpna. Jeden z ãeln˘ch pfiedstavitelÛ SRU Jevgenij Ku‰narjov zároveÀ shrnul problémy, které se pfii jednáních zatím nepodafiilo vyfie‰it: vstup do NATO, status ruského jazyka, vztahy Ukrajiny s Ruskem. K tûmto otázkám, jeÏ byly klíãové jiÏ v pfiedvolební kampani, se je‰tû pfiidala diskuse o úãasti komunistÛ v pfiípadné velké koalici. Co mÛÏe a nemusí b˘t ztraceno V‰echny v˘zkumy vefiejného mínûní zkoumající stav myslí a srdcí UkrajincÛ jasnû dokládají, Ïe oranÏové vedení pfiedev‰ím ztratilo dÛvûru sv˘ch pfiíznivcÛ a prohloubilo nechuÈ sv˘ch odpÛrcÛ,24 coÏ mÛÏe do budoucna vést k obdobnému v˘voji jako v sousedním Rusku. Pokus o vybudování demokracie, v podání prezidenta Borise Jelcina pfiivedl vût‰inu RusÛ k názoru, Ïe demokracie v ruské variantû je víceménû totoÏná s anarchií, se 23

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RÛzné moÏnosti jak mohl prezident postupovat po 25. ãervnu jsou dobfie zachyceny v ãlánku Michelson, A., Ju‰ãenko meÏdu Janukoviãom i Charibdoj. www.glavred.info/archive/2006/07/24/141304– 6.html O. Moroz navíc dospûl k závûru, Ïe pokud prezident Nejvy‰‰í radû nepfiedloÏí Janukovyãovu kandidaturu, mÛÏe parlament zvolit premiéra bez prezidentské asistence. To by jiÏ znamenalo totální anarchii. Fond Demokratické iniciativy provedl v ãervnu 2006 ‰etfiení, pfii nûmÏ zkoumal pomûr dÛvûry a nedÛvûry k jednotliv˘m subjektÛm: vláda dosáhla v˘sledku – 39 %, parlament – 29 % a prezident – 20 %. Podle sociologÛ Ukrajina nedisponuje Ïádn˘m politikem, kterému by lidé více dÛvûfiovali, neÏ nedÛvûfiovali: J. Jechanurov je na tom z oranÏov˘ch vÛdcÛ nejhÛfie – 34 %, ale ani dal‰í nemají Ïádn˘ dÛvod k radosti, neboÈ O. Moroz je ocenûn hodnotou – 29 %, V. Ju‰ãenko – 20 % a symbol revoluce J. Tymo‰enková – 19 %. Sice v záporné hodnotû, ale pfiece jenom nejlep‰í v˘sledek zaznamenal V. Janukovyã –13%. http://www.dif.org.ua/data/word/1606061631.doc.

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sniÏováním Ïivotní úrovnû a s rolí Ruska jako svûtového otloukánka. V dÛsledku toho ruská spoleãnost odmítla nastoupenou cestu demokratizace, ekonomick˘ch liberálních reforem, budování mezinárodních vztahÛ prost˘ch imperiálních ambicí a svûfiila svÛj osud Vladimíru Putinovi, kter˘ sice omezil lidská práva, pfiíli‰ ani nezmûnil sociální postavení naprosté vût‰iny obyvatelstva, nicménû zahrál sv˘m spoluobãanÛm na strunu, jeÏ jim libû znûla i za vlády komunistÛ, tj. pfiislíbil jim návrat Ruska mezi svûtové velmoci.25 Ukrajinci by mohli mít o nûco men‰í cíle, ale pro onu povûstnou uvûrennosÈ v zavtra‰nûm dnû by jistû nemalá ãást spoleãnosti byla rovnûÏ ochotna pfiehlédnout nûjaké ty „pfiehmaty,“ tfieba v oblasti svobody slova. Ta je oznaãována za jeden z nejvût‰ích v˘dobytkÛ oranÏové revoluce, ale je otázkou, zda tomu tak skuteãnû je. Bezesporu zmizel produkt Kuãmovy epochy, tzv. tûmnik,26 nicménû svoboda slova na Ukrajinû není úplnou samozfiejmostí. Pro vût‰inu vlastníkÛ médií totiÏ stále je‰tû není jejich pÛsobení v této oblasti otázkou podnikatelskou, ale spí‰e otázkou prosazování svého vlivu a politické orientace mezi pfiíjemci pfiedávané informace. Velmi pomalu probíhá budování vefiejno-právní televize, která by jiÏ nemusela b˘t tak loajální, jako je ta stávající státní. Je-li vcelku uspokojující situace na celostátní úrovni, potom v regionech je ‰éfredaktor na kobereãku u pfiedstavitelÛ místní moci stále pomûrnû bûÏn˘ zjev. Tyto negativní jevy lze stále zatím chápat za problémy rÛstu, nicménû pfii jisté politické konstelaci by se z toho, co dnes povaÏujeme za pfietrvávající v˘jimky mohlo opût stát nemûnné pravidlo. Se svobodou slova úzce souvisí rovnûÏ politické svobody. V bfieznu 2006 Ukrajinci volili v parlamentních volbách skuteãnû svobodnû, coÏ je bezesporu dal‰í nepopírateln˘ pozitivní v˘sledek oranÏové revoluce. VáÏnûj‰ím nedostatkem parlamentních voleb, kter˘ v‰ak nemá nic spoleãného s jejich samotnou procedurou, byl fakt, Ïe se nepodafiilo rozbít spojení politiky s velk˘m kapitálem. Dokonce se tato vazba je‰tû posílila.

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„Tedy nostalgie [v Rusku] jistû existuje, ani ne tak po stabilitû, n˘brÏ po statutu velmoci. KdyÏ byli komunisté u moci, lidé mûli pocit, Ïe svût je respektuje. Právû po tom se jim teì st˘ská.“ Na Rusko pohlíÏejme s obavami. Rozhovor s Richardem Pipesem. Lidové noviny, 8. 7. 2006, s. D/7. Tûmnikem (od slova tûma – téma) byly oznaãovány materiály, které se objevovaly na faxech ãi poãítaãích ‰éfredaktorÛ ukrajinsk˘ch médií a obsahovaly seznam událostí a témat, které se mají/nemají pfiedloÏit vefiejnosti.

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Pfiedvolební kampaÀ probíhala zostra, nicménû v‰ichni její úãastníci mûli rovné podmínky. Zahraniãní vlivy lze ve srovnání s prezidentsk˘mi volbami 2004 oznaãit za minimální. Zji‰tûné nedostatky bûhem samotn˘ch voleb mûly vesmûs technick˘ charakter a ãasto byly dány soubûhem parlamentních a místních voleb. Do‰lo-li k naru‰ení volebního zákona, jednalo se spí‰e o v˘jimky.27 Ani tato nabytá svoboda nemusí b˘t definitivní, pokud se oranÏov˘m nepodafií získat takov˘ podíl na vládû, kter˘ by garantoval zachování nedávno nabyt˘ch svobod. Ukrajina by rozhodnû nebyla v dûjinách prvním pfiíkladem, kdy síla, jeÏ pfii‰la k moci demokratickou cestou, záhy demokracii v zemi zlikvidovala. S oranÏovou revolucí vstoupila do politického Ïivota Ukrajiny zásadní zmûna Ústavy, která pfiemûnila prezidentsk˘ systém na systém parlamentnû prezidentsk˘. Pfiijetí politické reformy, která nejen mûní rozloÏení sil mezi mocí v˘konnou a zákonodárnou, ale rovnûÏ upravuje pravomoci místních orgánÛ, bylo podmínkou pro vyfie‰ení politické krize, jeÏ nastala po zfal‰ovaném v˘sledku druhého kola prezidentsk˘ch voleb. Socialisté totiÏ podmiÀovali podporu oranÏové revoluce pfiijetím ústavní reformy, jejímÏ jedním z otcÛ byl jejich pfiedseda O. Moroz. Reforma zaãala platit 1. 1. 2006 a politick˘ Ïivot v zemi spí‰e ovlivnila svojí nepropracovaností a faktem, Ïe je aplikována v prostfiedí, které na to není pfiipraveno. Jak pfied jejím vlastním zavedením, tak i po nûm, byla reforma zdrojem politického napûtí, neboÈ v souãasné dobû je zfiejmé, Ïe prezident chce pfiedloÏit její posouzení Ústavnímu soudu a má dobré vyhlídky, Ïe se domÛÏe její korekce.28 Parlamentu se pochopitelnû nechce pfiijít o ãást novû nabyt˘ch pravomocí, a tak stále blokuje uvedení ústavních soudcÛ do funkcí. Nefunkãnost Ústavního soudu pochopitelnû vyvolává celou fiadu pro27

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UKRAINE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 26 March 2006 OSCE/ODIHR ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION FINAL REPORT. Var‰ava 23. 6. 2006. http://www.osce.org/documents/ odihr/2006/06/19631_en.pdf. DluÏno podotknout, Ïe vrácení stavu vûcí pfied politickou reformu, tj. opûtovné posílení pravomocí prezidentské administrativy, by pravdûpodobnû nepfiineslo zmûnu k lep‰ímu, neboÈ prezidentská administrativa není v souãasné dobû orgánem, kter˘ by byl schopen systémovû a efektivnû pÛsobit na bûh událostí: „Nehledû na neustálé reorganizace na Bankovní i nadále Ïije podle Murphyho a Parkinsonov˘ch zákonÛ objasÀujících podstatu entropie jemu podobn˘ch struktur. Vliv prezidenta na politickou situaci v zemi a práci státních struktur slábne. Logick˘m v˘sledkem této tendence je kardinální sníÏení dÛvûry k prezidentovi a státním strukturám moci vÛbec. Jednou z hlavních pfiíãin oslabení hlavy státu je institucionální slabost sekretariátu prezidenta.“ Kozak O., Belyj dom Viktora Ju‰ãenko. 1. ãást. www.glavred.info/archive/2006/07/12/112909–0.html.

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blémÛ, protoÏe chybí nejvy‰‰í arbitr pfii fiadû právních kolizí, které reforma vyvolává. Reformu proti prezidentovi budou rovnûÏ hájit místní správy. Tyto jsou, podobnû jako v pfiípadû parlamentu, spí‰e vyuÏívány k vyvolávání napûtí v zemi neÏ ke zklidnûní situace mezi v˘chodem a západem, aã zámûr posílení pravomocí regionÛ sledoval pfiesnû opaãné cíle. Posílené regiony za daného stavu vûcí mohou b˘t Ïivnou pÛdou pro odstfiedivé tendence, jeÏ mohou ohroÏovat územní integritu Ukrajiny. V zajetí vnitropolitick˘ch konfrontací se rovnûÏ ocitly euroatlantické aspirace Ukrajiny. Vláda oranÏov˘ch, pfiedev‰ím potom NSNU, dávala jasnû najevo, Ïe jejím cílem je vstup do NATO a do Evropské unie. Ambiciózní plány pfiedev‰ím na vstup do NATO budou bezesporu zbrÏdûny, neboÈ zfiejmû jako jedin˘ pfiijateln˘ kompromis se jeví uspofiádání referenda o této otázce. Má-li b˘t alespoÀ nûjaká ‰ance na zmûnu postojÛ UkrajincÛ k NATO, potom musí referendum následovat aÏ po kvalitní a dlouhodobé kampani. Na pofiadu dne není ani vstup Ukrajiny do Evropské unie, byÈ zde je odpor ukrajinské spoleãnosti nepomûrnû men‰í, i kdyÏ lze nalézt v˘znamnou skupinu ukrajinsk˘ch politikÛ spojujících Ukrajinu spí‰e s Jednotn˘m ekonomick˘m prostorem. Nejaktuálnûj‰í se pro rok 2006 jeví vstup do Svûtové obchodní organizace. Hlavní tíha odpovûdnosti nyní leÏí na Nejvy‰‰í radû, která musí pfiijmout dosud chybûjící zákony. Hlasování o nich bude bezesporu pfiedmûtem zákulisních jednání, které mohou v˘sledek posunout jak jedním, tak i druh˘m smûrem. Jak je patrné z uveden˘ch faktÛ, dal‰ím negativním v˘sledkem oranÏové revoluce je skuteãnost, Ïe se oranÏov˘m prakticky ani v jednom z klíãov˘ch bodÛ nepodafiilo dosáhnout stavu, kdy by byl nastoupen˘ proces nezvratn˘. Jistû, mÛÏeme hovofiit o tom, Ïe ukrajinská spoleãnost je po revoluci jiná, nicménû v tomto pfiípadû jde o pfiíli‰ subtilní kategorii ve srovnání s moÏnostmi, které má ten, kdo bude reálnû u moci. Moskva nezapomíná Ha‰tefiící se tábory, ponofiené do sv˘ch kaÏdodenních válek, jako by snad ani neregistrovaly soustavné snahy svého velkého souseda o co nejpevnûj‰í ukotvení Ukrajiny na ruské orbitû. Zatímco Moskva v tomto ohledu vede

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konsolidovanou politiku fiízenou z jednoho centra, Kyjev si zatím o konzistentní v‰eobecnû pfiijímané politice vÛãi Rusku mÛÏe nechat jenom zdát. Rusko tuto skuteãnost vyuÏívá beze zbytku. Stávající osazenstvo Kremlu neopomine jedinou pfiíleÏitost, aby se nepokusilo pfiilít oleje do ukrajinského ohnû. MoÏností je více neÏ dost29, neboÈ ani po patnácti letech nezávislosti se Ukrajinû nepodafiilo vyfie‰it nespoãetné mnoÏství nejrÛznûj‰ích problémÛ, na nûÏ bylo zadûláno jiÏ v dobách existence Sovûtského svazu. Ukrajina po rozpadu Sovûtského svazu zdûdila ekonomiku, která byla ze v‰ech sovûtsk˘ch republik nejvíce integrována do sovûtské ekonomiky. Dosud je proto nemálo závislá na v˘vozu nûkter˘ch druhÛ produkce do zemí SNS, pfiedev‰ím do Ruska. Rusko ukrajinské v˘robky potfiebuje, je na nû zvykl˘ i rusk˘ spotfiebitel, ale ne tolik, aby se jich nebylo moÏné ãas od ãasu zfiíci a zpÛsobit tak pfiíli‰ samostatnému sousedovi problémy. Postupnû Moskva shledala ‰kodliv˘m ukrajinské mléko, maso, cukrovinky a za dumping oznaãila ceny ukrajinské oceláfiské produkce. ZároveÀ se snaÏí dát Ukrajinû najevo, Ïe pokud se vztahy nezlep‰í, odnese to i spolupráce v oblasti zbrojního prÛmyslu. Tady by Ukrajina pocítila rusk˘ tlak velmi silnû, neboÈ její zbrojovky bez rusk˘ch objednávek budou mít váÏné problémy.30 JestliÏe lze postupnû otáãet smûr v˘vozu nûkter˘ch komodit, i kdyÏ Ukrajina má smÛlu, Ïe je silná v tûch v˘robních odvûtvích, o jejichÏ produkci není v Evropské unii – hlavním potenciálním trhu – zájem, potom zatím osudovû nepfiekonatelná je otázka závislosti na rusk˘ch dodávkách plynu a ropy. Rusko proto pfiitvrzuje pfiedev‰ím v této oblasti a dosahuje dílãích úspûchÛ. Je schopno zpÛsobovat ukrajinskému prÛmyslu nemalé obtíÏe, coÏ se v rámci politického boje snaÏila hlavnû pfied volbami vyuÏívat jak SRU, tak i BJUT.31 Obû uskupení vyrukovala s tvrzením, Ïe by se s Ruskem dokázala dohodnout na pfiíznivûj‰ích cenách, neÏ jsou nyní. V lomozu politické vfiavy 29

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Pfiehledná inventura hlavních témat ukrajinsko-ruské agendy je udûlána v materiálu Kulik V., Dialog Kijeva i Moskvy: strategiãeskoje partnerstvo ili cholodnaja vojna? www.ura-inform.com/ru/print/politics/2006/05/07/dialog Barabanov M., Ukraina – Rossija: ssora s rabotodatelem. In: Vûdomosti, 24. 6. 2006 www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2006/07/20/109786. Otázka vlivu rÛzn˘ch aspektÛ „plynové“ tématiky na ukrajinskou souãasnost je kvalifikovanû diskutována v studii Baran, Z., Tuohy, E., cit. dílo, s. 8–24.

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nebyla pfiíli‰ diskutována otázka, co by ale za to Rusko chtûlo, neboÈ Vladimír Putin není jiÏ ani zdaleka tak ochoten pfiipou‰tût samostatnou plavbu ve vodách SNS, jak to byl schopen tolerovat patriarchálnû stavûn˘ Boris Jelcin. Navíc bûlorusk˘ pfiíklad ukazuje, Ïe ani patfiiãná loajalita ke Kremlu je‰tû nutnû nemusí ‰etfiit státní kasu. Souãasné Rusko chce obnovit impérium, a to je nemyslitelné bez Ukrajiny. V tom tkví ukrajinská smÛla a v˘hoda zároveÀ. V rámci své nepfiíli‰ umnû provádûné nátlakové politiky, ze v‰ech fieãí o zavádûní trÏních principÛ ve vztazích se zemûmi SNS aÏ pfiíli‰ trãí imperiální ambice a nesouhlas s demokratizaãními procesy v okolních zemích, Moskva zapomíná na fakt, Ïe dotlaãením Ukrajiny k „trÏním“ cenám za plyn ztrácí, pokud se Ukrajina nezhroutí, klíãov˘ prostfiedek nátlaku, kter˘ pfii vhodnûj‰ím pouÏívání mohl pÛsobit podstatnû déle a efektivnûji. Jakmile totiÏ Ukrajinci pochopí, Ïe nemá pfiíli‰ smysl s Ruskem diskutovat o cenách plynu, které je tfieba brát jako cenu za vlastní svobodu, a soustfiedí svoji energii na pfiekonání ekonomick˘ch dopadÛ, uãiní v˘znamn˘ krok k potvrzení své samostatnosti a bude to Moskva, která bude muset hledat nové cesty v ukrajinsko-rusk˘ch vztazích, zvlá‰tû má-li i Ukrajina nûkteré trumfy v rukách (transit ruského plynu a ropy do Evropy, základny ruského âernomofiského loìstva na Krymu, ukrajinské radary slouÏící rusk˘m vzdu‰n˘m silám aj.). Rusko se potom bude muset rozhodnout, jestli bude i nadále drÏet konfrontaãní linii, která bez energetického klacku bude málo efektivní, anebo se pfiece jenom nakonec smífií s tím, Ïe ve svém sousedovi bude mít rovnocenného partnera, kter˘ si ov‰em bude o svém osudu rozhodovat sám. Ukrajin‰tí politici zatím nepfiem˘‰lí v tomto kontextu, a rusk˘ faktor je proto v ukrajinské politice pfiítomen více, neÏ je zdrávo. V politické konfrontaci, probíhající pfied volbami i po nich, byla otevfiena nejedna Pandofiina skfiíÀka, která za pfiispûní nûkter˘ch politick˘ch sil poskytuje Moskvû hned nûkolik moÏností zasahovat do dûní na Ukrajinû. Prohlubování konfrontace mezi v˘chodem a západem zemû, jeÏ se odráÏí v rÛzn˘ch postojích k zahraniãnû politické orientaci zemû, v otázce postavení ruského jazyka, ruské pravoslavné církve, v komplexu problémÛ spojen˘ch s Krymem, je riskantní politickou hrou, která mÛÏe skonãit velk˘mi problémy. Stále je ale je‰tû ãas postupn˘mi konsenzuálními kroky vyjít z této nebezpeãnû se rozvíjející situace. To je dnes podmínûno alespoÀ elementární

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domluvou o rozdûlení moci, kterou musí sdílet obû politické reprezentace, tzn. jak oranÏoví, tak i regionálové. Ukrajina, rozdûlená politicky, jazykovû, konfesionálnû, byÈ se mnohdy jedná o umûle kultivované problémy, nemÛÏe úspû‰nû vyfie‰it problémy, které pfied ní stojí bez toho, Ïe politické elity naleznou alespoÀ v klíãov˘ch otázkách spoleãn˘ jazyk a potlaãí své korporativní zájmy ve prospûch zájmÛ zemû. Není ani v zájmu SRU deklarující pfiátelské vztahy k Rusku a pfiedstavující pfiedev‰ím oblasti, které k Rusku historicky tíhnou, aby ukrajinská suverenita byla oslabena. V ukrajinsk˘ch podmínkách se mohou oceláfiské klany z v˘chodu cítit v‰emocn˘mi pány, nicménû v rusk˘ch vodách by nejspí‰e utonuly. A to neplatí pouze v jejich pfiípadû. ·ance je‰tû zÛstává I pfies celou fiadu nezdarÛ, jeÏ oranÏová vláda utrpûla, mÛÏe Ukrajina v pfiípadû, Ïe nedojde k rozumné dohodû, stále je‰tû mnohé ztratit. Nemá-li k tomu dojít, musí vzniknout vláda ‰iroké koalice, která bude pfiedev‰ím schopná pozvednout ekonomiku zemû a postupnû pfiekonávat antagonismus mezi v˘chodními a západními oblastmi. Vzhledem k jen mal˘m odli‰nostem v ekonomick˘ch programech NSNU a SRU, a o ekonomiku jde v souãasné dobû na Ukrajinû pfiedev‰ím, by právû velká koalice za úãasti tûchto dvou subjektÛ mohla b˘t nejschÛdnûj‰í variantou. Ta by ov‰em vyÏadovala zejména od NSNU krok aÏ na hranici sebeobûtování. V pfiípadû neúspûchu takové koalice, a moÏná i v pfiípadû jejího úspûchu, by spojení se SRU mohlo vést NSNU v pfií‰tích volbách do politického nebytí a prezident V. Ju‰ãenko by nejspí‰e neuspûl v pfií‰tích prezidentsk˘ch volbách. Nicménû za daného rozloÏení karet je kaÏdá jiná varianta uspofiádání vlády, vãetnû moÏnosti pfiedãasn˘ch parlamentních voleb, znaãnû problematická. I to je jeden z nepfiíli‰ povzbudiv˘ch v˘sledkÛ, kter˘ch se Ukrajina doãkala po oranÏové revoluci. 32

U k r a j i n a 2 0 0 5 – 2 0 0 6 : I m p é r i u m v r a c í ú d e r]

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Pozornému ãtenáfii jistû neuniklo, Ïe v celé stati bylo jen málo místa vûnováno prezidentu V. Ju‰ãenkovi. Nejde o autorovo opomenutí, spí‰e se jedná o odraz reálného stavu vûcí. V˘kony prezidenta patfií k dal‰ím zklamáním, které s sebou pfiinesl porevoluãní v˘voj na Ukrajinû. Jeho pokus stát nad stranami totálnû selhal. Za svého jej nepfiijal v˘chod a západ má pro jeho „specificky“ nestrannou pozici rovnûÏ jen málo pochopení. Nelze se tedy divit, Ïe vliv prezidentského úfiadu slábne a obdobnû na tom je i popularita a dÛvûryhodnost prezidenta. Ukrajinci mají v ãele zemû beze-

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I kdyÏ prezident V. Ju‰ãenko není pfiíli‰ velk˘ bojovník,32 pfiece jen má dostatek prostfiedkÛ vypl˘vajících z Ústavy,33 které mu dávají moÏnost zabránit pfiípadnému úplnému revan‰i protioranÏov˘ch sil. Nemalou sílu mají oranÏoví rovnûÏ v Nejvy‰‰í radû, kde by ov‰em museli postupovat jednotnû, coÏ se v ãervenci nedûlo, neboÈ BJUT se soustfieìoval spí‰e na destrukãní aktivity a pouliãní protesty neÏ na propracování opoziãní taktiky na pÛdû parlamentu. Pokusy domoci se jen máloco fie‰ících pfiedãasn˘ch voleb ãi volání po novém Majdanu lze spí‰e chápat jako v˘raz bezmoci a zdû‰ení oranÏov˘ch, ktefií si chtûli vymoci dal‰í ‰anci na napravení toho, co pokazili. Moc vypadla oranÏov˘m z rukou nejen Morozovou zradou,34 ale rovnûÏ pfiiãinûním svefiepého lpûní J. Tymo‰enkové na nejvy‰‰ích mocensk˘ch postech a matn˘ch v˘konÛ V. Ju‰ãenka jako prezidenta Ukrajiny v dobû, kdy se pfied ní otevfiela historická ‰ance zásadním zpÛsobem zmûnit své dûjiny. Tato ‰ance je‰tû sice trvá, nicménû ona perspektiva, která se pfied Ukrajinou otevfiela, se postupnû vytrácí. V pfiípadû její totální ztráty to bude na ‰kodu nejen Ukrajinû: „SelÏe-li ukrajinsk˘ demokratick˘ proces, ekonomické, politické a bezpeãnostní následky pro USA, Evropu a demokratické reformátory kdekoliv mohou b˘t váÏné. ZÛstane-li ale Ukrajina na demokratické cestû a západnû smûfiované trajektorii, v˘hody z toho se roz‰ífií daleko ‰iroko po celém regionu a po celém transatlantickém spoleãenství.“ 35

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sporu poctivého ãlovûka, pfiem˘‰livou osobnost, skuteãného vlastence a velkého vyznavaãe ukrajinské historie a kultury, v dané chvíli by ale spí‰e potfiebovali systémovû a energicky jednajícího politika. Tím ale bohuÏel Viktor Ju‰ãenko není a poÏadavkÛm doby neodpovídá ani jeho nejbliωí okolí. Prezident pfiedkládá návrh na jmenování ministrÛ obrany a zahraniãí, fieditele SluÏby bezpeãnosti Ukrajiny, jmenuje generálního prokurátora, polovinu ãlenÛ Národní banky Ukrajiny, tfietinu soudcÛ Ústavního soudu. Podle odstavce 15 106. ãlánku Ústavy „pozastavuje platnost aktÛ Kabinetu ministrÛ Ukrajiny, pokud neodpovídají Ústavû a zároveÀ se obrací k Ústavnímu soudu, aby posoudil jejich ústavnost.“ Má i právo veta na zákony pfiijaté Nejvy‰‰í radou. K politické situaci po Morozovû odchodu z oranÏové koalice viz blíÏe Kuzmenko Je., Pavlik Moroz, www.ua.proua.com/accent/2006/07/07/130558.html. Securing the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. United States Senate. Republican Policy Committee www.rpc.senate.gov/_files/Mar3105RobustUkraineDF.pdf.

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7. Bûlorusko-ruské spojenectví po roce 1991 a jeho dal‰í perspektivy Markéta Îídková, Jakub Dúrr

Po velkou vût‰inu minulého století patfiilo Bûlorusko do rámce Sovûtského svazu. Komunisté zde mûli pfiipravenu pÛdu dávn˘mi historick˘mi, geografick˘mi, kulturními, ekonomick˘mi a politick˘mi vazbami, jeÏ odráÏely velmi tûsn˘ vztah mezi Bûloruskem a Ruskem. Po rozpadu Sovûtského svazu byly bûloruské a ruské elity postaveny pfied problém, jak v nov˘ch podmínkách a v nevyjasnûné konstelaci navázat a definovat bûlorusko-ruské vztahy. Ze strany BûlorusÛ zapoãaly snahy o integraci s Ruskem ihned po roce 1991. Jako moment zlomu pro dal‰í integraãní v˘voj lze v‰ak vidût zvolení Aleksandra Luka‰enka bûlorusk˘m prezidentem v roce 1994; jím zaveden˘ sultanistick˘ reÏim1 ovlivÀuje kroky integrace s Ruskem jiÏ 12 let. Ekonomická, politická a diplomatická podpora Ruska hrála jednu z klíãov˘ch rolí pro udrÏení Luka‰enkova reÏimu. Integraãní snahy Bûloruska a Ruska, jejich milníky, hlavní aktéfii, problémy, jeÏ vyvstaly bûhem 90. let, a nakonec téÏ perspektivy dal‰ího v˘voje rusko-bûlorusk˘ch vztahÛ jsou pfiedmûtem následujícího pfiíspûvku. NahlíÏí proces integrace bûloruskou perspektivou a ruské reálie a zájmy jsou pro komplexnost rovnûÏ pfiipojeny. Text uvádí krátké historické vysvûtlení nízkého národního uvûdomûní BûlorusÛ jako jedné z pfiíãin pÛvodnû vût‰inového souhlasu s pokraãující postsovûtskou integrací s rusk˘m sousedem. Kromû jiného pfiedstavuje jak bûloruské, tak ruské vnímání tohoto

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Ohlednû typologie bûloruského reÏimu viz blíÏe Kuzio, T.: Belarus and Ukraine. Oxford, 2001. In: Zielonka, J., Pravda, A.: Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe. Volume 2: International and Transnational Factors. Oxford 2001, s. 478.

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specifického svazku, jeÏ bylo utváfieno bûhem 70 let spoleãné existence v rámci Sovûtského svazu. Studie pfiipomíná nejdÛleÏitûj‰í kroky a rámcové dohody, které formovaly dosavadní integraãní proces; kromû specifick˘ch zájmÛ bûloruského prezidenta jsou uvedeny dÛvody integraãních snah ze strany rusk˘ch prezidentÛ Borise Jelcina a jeho následníka Vladimira Putina. Text vûnuje pozornost úzké spolupráci ve vojenské a ekonomické oblasti. V závûru jsou nastínûny perspektivy rusko-bûloruské integrace pro nejbliωí budoucnost. Je zfiejmé, Ïe úzká spolupráce Bûloruska s Ruskem bude pokraãovat z dÛvodÛ geopolitické blízkosti a ekonomické propojenosti obou zemí; její pfiesnûj‰í podoba v‰ak bude záleÏet na tfiech vzájemnû souvisejících faktorech: formû politick˘ch reÏimÛ v Bûlorusku a Rusku, dal‰ích zájmech Ruska a potenciálním vlivu demokratického svûta. Dûjiny vzájemn˘ch vztahÛ Pro pochopení nízkého stupnû bûloruského národního uvûdomûní, projevujícího se v období rozpadu Sovûtského svazu ve srovnání s dal‰ími jeho národy pouze umírnûn˘mi poÏadavky na nezávislost, se musíme obrátit do historie. Bûlorusové existovali vÏdy v rámci impérií jin˘ch, a sice VelkokníÏectví litevského, Rzeczpospolity, tj. spojení VelkokníÏectví litevského a Polské koruny v 16. století; po trojím dûlení tohoto státního celku se Bûlorusko dostalo do podruãí carského Ruska, aby se po pouh˘ch tfiech letech turbulentní samostatné existence (1918–1921) stalo souãástí Sovûtského svazu.2 Historikové upozorÀují na fakt, Ïe bûhem staletí zpÛsobily nejvût‰í ztráty na Ïivotech BûlorusÛ právû války s jejich slovansk˘m sousedem na v˘chodû3, kter˘ procházel odli‰n˘m dûjinn˘m v˘vojem. Jde kon2

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Pro vysvûtlení historick˘ch událostí viz pfi. Ar∏ou˘ , U.: Od Rohovana k BNR. Deset století bûlorusk˘ch dûjin. Praha 2005. In: Ancipienka, A., Akudoviã, V. (eds): Neznámé Bûlorusko. Praha 2005, s. 25–55. Viz téÏ Overy, R: Atlas of the 20th Century. Definitive Account of our Century. New York 1996, s. 135. V. Akudoviã popisuje „krvavou potopu“ v polovinû 17. století, kdy „bûhem války s Moskaly […] zahynul kaÏd˘ druh˘ obyvatel na‰í zemû – ze 4,9 milionu zÛstalo 2,5 milionu (pro srovnání: v dÛsledku války s nûmeck˘m fa‰ismem, která je z nûjakého dÛvodu povaÏována za nejkrvavûj‰í v na‰ich dûjinách, zahynul kaÏd˘ ãtvrt˘ Bûlorus).“ Akudoviã, V.: My a Rusko. Praha 2005. In: Ancipienka, A., Akudoviã, V. (eds), cit. dílo, s. 113. Obdobnû negativnû vnímá rusk˘ vliv v minul˘ch staletích U. Ar∏ou˘ , jenÏ hovofií o „opravdové tragédii“ pro bûloruské (a ukrajinské) zemû jiÏ v souvislosti se zaloÏením Moskvy, která „si podrobila novgorodské etnikum s jeho demokratick˘mi tradicemi a poté vyhlásila své nároky na bûloruské a ukrajinské zemû.“ Ar∏ou˘ , U., cit. dílo, s. 29.

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krétnû o to, Ïe Rusko nepoznalo renesanci ãi reformaci jako „jevy, které urãovaly fundamentální základy evropské civilizace“ 4. O podobn˘ch odli‰nostech se v‰ak dne‰ní bûloruské uãebnice historie nezmiÀují, vyzdvihováno je pfiedev‰ím slavjanofilství, spoleãné rusko-bûloruské vítûzství nad fa‰ismem a období komunistické vlády a ideologie, která souÏití obou národÛ po desetiletí stmelovala. Ani dvacáté století vyfie‰ení problému bûloruské identity a rozpolcenosti národa nepfiineslo. Souvisí to se dvûma jevy. Na jedné stranû se jednalo o shora diktovanou leninistickou ideologii internacionalismu a federalismus sovûtského typu, které vedly k souãasnému vykofienûní vût‰iny bûloruského obyvatelstva. Na druhé stranû transformace agrárního Bûloruska v industriální a urbanistickou sovûtskou republiku byla zpÛsobena centralistick˘m tlakem. Projevoval se zejména v posledních padesáti letech existence SSSR, vedl ke znaãn˘m finanãním transferÛm z federálního rozpoãtu do Minsku a vytvofiil z ekonomicky zaostalého Bûloruska jeden z nejrozvinutûj‰ích státÛ Sovûtského svazu s prÛmyslem na relativnû vysoké úrovni, v˘vozem v˘robkÛ do celého svûta a migrací populace. Vyjádfieno slovy V. Akudoviãe, Bûlorusko „v maximální mífie zmodernizovalo svou Ïivotní úroveÀ podle technokratick˘ch moÏností jedné ze dvou svûtov˘ch supervelmocí“.5 Míru integrace za doby SSSR zfietelnû vyjádfiil v roce 2003 zesnul˘ bûlorusk˘ spisovatel Vasil Bykav: „Bûlorusko se více neÏ 70 let nacházelo ve stavu velkého bratrského pfiátelství s Ruskem, nejúplnûj‰í jednoty, úplné harmonie ve v‰ech oblastech – v politické, ekonomické, kulturní a ideologické.“6 Pfiipoãteme-li dne‰ní proluka‰enkovská média vyzdvihující sovûtské doby a fakt, Ïe pro v‰echny Bûlorusy je samostatnost zcela nov˘m pojmem a pamûÈ i té nejstar‰í generace nesahá do doby pfied Velkou fiíjnovou socialistickou revolucí, není potom zaráÏející, Ïe se Bûlorusové cítí vysoce spjati s rusk˘m národem kulturnû, ekonomicky i politicky. Samostatnou poznámku si zaslouÏí po staletí probíhající proces rusifikace, t˘kající se jak jazyka, tak i náboÏenského vyznání, jímÏ je dnes pfieváÏnû pravoslaví. Silná rusifikace byla patrná od 90. let 18. století, kdy byla na bûloruském území nastolena ruská vláda. Carská vyhlá‰ka z roku 1840

zakázala uÏívání samotného slova Bûlorusko, pouÏíváno bylo oznaãení Severozápadní region. Carské jednotky téÏ krutû potlaãily národnû-osvobozenecké povstání v letech 1863–1864.7 VÛãi intenzivnímu ruskému vlivu kritick˘ U. Ar∏ou˘ povaÏuje 19. století za ãas „dÛsledné politiky úplné rusifikace Bûloruska“8 a podot˘ká, Ïe po celou tu dobu „nedovolilo ruské impérium […] otevfiít ani jednu bûloruskou ‰kolu.“9 Kromû potlaãování jazyka bylo BûlorusÛm upíráno téÏ právo na národní víru, za kterou se pokládalo.10 DÛsledkem ruského náboÏenského tlaku bylo opu‰tûní uniatské víry pfieváÏnou vût‰inou jejích stoupencÛ jiÏ bûhem 19. století. Sovûtsk˘ reÏim následnû ve‰keré náboÏenské vlivy potíral. Jazykovû proces rusifikace podle U. Ar∏ou˘ e kulminoval v 70. a 80. letech, „kdy napfiíklad v Minsku nevyuãovala v bûloru‰tinû ani jediná ‰kola.11 Rusifikaci podporující moskevsk˘ antropolog Valerij Ti‰kov spatfioval v situaci v˘hody. Podle nûj se stala ru‰tina „mocn˘m nástrojem individuální volby lep‰ích moÏností kariéry, stejnû jako prostfiedkem komunikace […] v sovûtské spoleãnosti a zvlá‰tû v etnicky smí‰en˘ch regionech.“12 TfiebaÏe Ti‰kov reflektuje realitu sovûtsk˘ch podmínek, v˘sledkem byl v 90. letech stav, kdy vût‰ina obãanÛ bûloru‰tinu neovládala.13 Nastínûn˘ v˘voj v posledních dvou staletích vede k závûru, Ïe nízké národní uvûdomûní BûlorusÛ na poãátku jejich samostatnosti v 90. letech

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Ar∏ou˘ , U, cit. dílo, s. 37. Akudoviã, V., cit. dílo, s. 118. Bykav, V., Rozmluvy o Bûlorusku. Praha 2005. In Ancipienka, A., Akudoviã, V. (eds), cit. dílo, s. 23.

7 8 9 10

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History and Culture of Belarus. Autor neuveden. http://www.bi.org.by/about/culture.html, (5. 4. 2006). Ar∏ou˘ , U., cit. dílo, s. 48. TamtéÏ, s. 46. TamtéÏ, s. 49. O bûloruském uniatství jako „osobitém spojení bohat˘ch pravoslavn˘ch rituálÛ s podfiízením papeÏi v ¤ímû“ viz Religion in Belarus. Autor neuveden. WWW: http:// www.belarusguide.com/culture1/religion/Religion.html (1. 4. 2006). Svérázn˘m zpÛsobem reprodukují náboÏenství BûlorusÛ dne‰ní oficiální prameny. Napfi. internetové stránky bûloruského ministerstva zahraniãí podávají zavádûjící informace, Ïe obyvatelstvo bylo donuceno mezi 17. a 19. stoletím násilnû opustit svou pravoslavnou víru, aã ta nikdy pfiedtím na území Bûloruska nehrála hlavní roli. Zdroj pfiitom nepopírá fakt, Ïe v daném období aÏ 70 % obyvatel Bûloruska uniatství praktikovalo. Ve zkratce se zde uvádí, Ïe „uniatská církev byla pfiipojena k ruské pravoslavné církvi (1839). Pravoslavná populace v Bûlorusku opût dosáhla poãetní dominance, a sice pfies 66 % na poãátku 20. století.“ http://www.belembassy.org/uk/religion.html (1. 4. 2006). Ar∏ou˘ , U., cit. dílo, s. 52. Ti‰kov, V., citováno In: Altshuler, M., Some Soviet and Post-Soviet National and Linquistic Problems in the Slavic Republics (States): Russia, Ukraine, Belarus. Sapporo 1998. http://www.src-h.slav. hokudai.ac.jp/sympo/97summer/alt.html (15.4.2006). Aãkoli od dob perestrojky existovaly silné tendence zavést povinnou v˘uku bûloruského jazyka ve ‰kolách a uÏívání bûloru‰tiny ve státní správû, Luka‰enkov˘m nástupem toto období skonãilo. Viz níÏe poznámky k referendu 1995.

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20. století bylo mimo jiné dÛsledkem intenzivního vlivu jejich silného v˘chodního souseda. Tento vliv zÛstává i po 15 letech od rozpadu Sovûtského svazu velmi v˘znamn˘. Existují v‰ak téÏ argumenty poukazující na vzrÛstající národní uvûdomûní, jeÏ v kombinaci s politick˘mi ambicemi jak dne‰ní autoritáfiské, tak i potenciální demokratické politické reprezentace pfiedstavuje pro dal‰í integraci s Moskvou v˘znamné limity. Poãátky souãasného sbliÏování (1992–1994) Sovûtsk˘ svaz byl formálnû rozpu‰tûn na základû BûlovûÏsk˘ch dohod podepsan˘ch v Bûlorusku na zaãátku prosince 1991. Dohody zároveÀ zaloÏily Spoleãenství nezávisl˘ch státÛ, v jehoÏ rámci se dnes odehrává v˘znamná ãást spolupráce Ruska a Bûloruska. BûlovûÏské dohody nesou podpisy tehdej‰ího ruského prezidenta Borise Jelcina a nejvy‰‰ího bûloruského pfiedstavitele (pfiedsedy bûloruského sovûtu, chápaného jako prezidenta) Stanislaua ·u‰keviãe – oba jsou dodnes vnímáni jako zrádci spoleãného státu. Na rozdíl od Ruska, kde zavrÏení Gorbaãova, politické a ekonomické reformy a spolupráce se Západem pfiinesly Jelcinovi alespoÀ zpoãátku vysokou popularitu, projevy BûlorusÛ z nabyté nezávislosti14 zdaleka nedosahovaly ruské ãi dokonce ukrajinské a pobaltské euforie. Rozpaãitost byla cítit uÏ v celosovûtském referendu vypsaném Michailem Gorbaãovem v bfieznu 1991. Na otázku, zda obãané „povaÏují za nutné, aby SSSR zÛstal jako obnovená federace rovnocenn˘ch suverénních republik […]“, odpovûdûlo 83 % zúãastnûn˘ch BûlorusÛ kladnû.15 Je tfieba podotknout, Ïe v referendu participovala i ruská men‰ina ãítající 13,2 %16, na nejpozitivnûj‰ím v˘sledku ze v‰ech referenda úãastnících zemí v‰ak mûli hlavní podíl sami Bûlorusové. Bûloruská situace v prvních dvou letech samostatného státu byla komplikovanûj‰í o ekonomick˘ a vojensk˘ rozmûr. DÛleÏitou roli hrála provázanost bûloruské ekonomiky s ruskou a dal‰ími ekonomikami b˘valého SSSR, jakoÏ i vysoká koncentrace sovûtsk˘ch vojensk˘ch zafiízení na bûlo-

ruském území. Vláda a parlament, zvolen˘ v roce 1990 v polosvobodn˘ch volbách17, postrádaly potfiebnou legitimitu k nastolení rázn˘ch reforem. Ve‰keré jejich pfiedstavy byly navíc vázány nutností udrÏet s Ruskem dobré styky. S. ·u‰keviã je pfiesvûdãen, Ïe Bûlorusko nabralo v letech 1992 a 1993 „absolutnû správn˘ smûr“ a Ïe zvládlo vyfie‰it fiadu akutních ekonomick˘ch a vojensk˘ch otázek, mj. se zbavilo jadern˘ch zbraní na svém území „bez jak˘chkoli podmínek“.18 Pfied staronov˘m vedením v‰ak stála fiada pfiekáÏek, pfii jejichÏ fie‰ení musel b˘t brán v potaz komunistick˘ parlament. Právû oblast obrany se stala klíãovou pro ·u‰keviãovu dal‰í politickou kariéru, kdyÏ odmítl v kvûtnu 1992 podepsat ta‰kentsk˘ Pakt o kolektivní bezpeãnosti SNS, protoÏe byl v rozporu s neutrálním statutem zemû.19 Z taktick˘ch dÛvodÛ se ·u‰keviã zasazoval o neutralitu a vybalancování zájmÛ se Západem na jedné a Ruskem na druhé stranû. Parlament se v‰ak obával pfiíli‰ného bezpeãnostního vakua. Aby Bûlorusko, pfiipomínající v té dobû „loì bez kompasu“20, nepfii‰lo o v˘hody vojenské a ekonomické patronáÏe Ruska a nenabralo jin˘ neÏ v˘chodní smûr, donutil parlament v lednu 1994 ·u‰keviãe pakt podepsat.21 Váhání s podpisem pfiispûlo k odstranûní ·u‰keviãe z pozice prezidenta a vypsání prezidentsk˘ch voleb, kter˘ch se v ãervnu a ãervenci téhoÏ roku zÛãastnili tehdej‰í premiér Vyaãeslav Kebiã a neménû prorusk˘ poslanec Aleksandr Luka‰enko. Premiér Kebiã propagoval hlubokou spolupráci s Ruskem22 a zapoãal s ním novodobou reintegraci své zemû. Podepsal se sv˘mi rusk˘mi protûj‰ky Jegorem Gajdarem23 a Viktorem âernomyrdinem24 fiadu klíãov˘ch 17 18 19 20

21 14 15 16

Deklarace o státní suverenitû byla pfiijata 27. ãervence 1990. O rok pozdûji 25. srpna 1991 byla vyhlá‰ena nezávislost Bûloruska. Sakwa, R., Russian Politics and Society. London & New York 1996, s. 21. Viz téÏ Markus, U., Belarus, Ukraine Take Opposite Views. In: Transition 2/23, 15. 11. 1996, s. 21. Garnett, S. W., Europe’s Crossroads: Russia and the West in the New Borderlands. New York 1998. In: Mandelbaum, M. (ed.): The New Russian Foreign Policy. New York 1998, s. 71. Viz téÏ Overy, R, Atlas of the 20th Century. Definitive Account of our Century. New York 1996, s. 136.

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Danilovich, A., Understanding Politics in Belarus. In: DEMSTAR Papers 2001, s. 9. http:// www.demstar.dk/papers/Belarus.pdf (7. 3. 2006). Arias-King, F., Belarus Will Soon Be Liberated. Interview s ·u‰keviã, S. In: Democratizatsiya 12/1, Washington, Winter 2004, s. 59–78. Markus, U., Belarus, Ukraine …, s. 21. Viz téÏ Sakwa, R., cit. dílo, s. 21. Mihailisko, K., Belorussia: setting sail without a compass. In: RFE-RL Research Report 1/1, 1992, s. 39–41. In: Webber, M., The international politics of Russia and the successor states. Manchester & New York 1996, s. 96. SNS Pakt o kolektivní bezpeãnosti byl podepsán Minskem s dodatky umoÏÀujícími jeho neúãast ve vojensk˘ch akcích mimo bûloruské území. Markus, U., Belarus, Ukraine …, s. 21. Colton, T. J.: Belarusian Public Opinion and the Union with Russia. In: Balmaceda, M. M., Clem, J. I., Tarlow, L. L. (eds), Independent Belarus. Domestic Determinants, Regional Dynamics, and Implications for the West. Cambridge 2002, s. 23. Viz napfi. Historické kalendárium. Autor neuveden. Bûloruské centrum v Praze. http:// www.belcentrum.org/calendar3–c.php (2. 2. 2006). Viz napfi. Markus, U., Belarus, Ukraine …, s. 21.

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dohod, mezi nejdÛleÏitûj‰ími dohodu o „rublové zónû“ a mûnové unii.25 Spolu s osobní âernomyrdinovou podporou mu mûly populární kroky zajistit hlasy prorusky orientovan˘ch voliãÛ, pfiesto ve druhém kole voleb populista Luka‰enko získal mandát pfiesvûdãivou vût‰inou 80 %.26 Zvolením Luka‰enka, kter˘ hlásal, Ïe jako jedin˘ nezvedl ruku pro rozpad SSSR, vyjádfiili v roce 1994 Bûlorusové nostalgii po sovûtsk˘ch dobách a dali pfiednost v˘voji spjatému s euroasijsk˘m prostorem. Moskva prostfiednictvím vítûzství Aleksandra Luka‰enka ve svobodn˘ch volbách získala partnera s jasn˘m mandátem pro dal‰í sbliÏování. Éra partnerství Luka‰enka a Jelcina (1994–2000) Luka‰enkÛv tehdej‰í prezidentsk˘ partner Boris Jelcin v té dobû konsolidoval svou moc na základû protiústavního puãe v srpnu 1993 a referendem schválené ústavy zakotvující superprezidentsk˘ systém. V zahraniãní politice pfiecházel v polovinû 90. let rusk˘ prezident od entuziastického atlantismu k realistiãtûj‰ímu eurasianismu, coÏ kromû jiného vyústilo k vût‰í pozornosti vztahÛm v rámci SNS a téÏ samotné rusko-bûloruské integraci. Pro A. Luka‰enka bylo téma aliance mezi Minskem a Moskvou alfou a omegou od doby jeho prezidentské kampanû. Jeho ústfiední my‰lenkou, jeÏ by zdÛvodnila vojenskou a ekonomickou spolupráci s Moskvou, je svérázná ideologie slovanství. V Luka‰enkov˘ch proslovech o integraci zaznívaly úvahy o slovanství a vzájemném osudu tfií v˘chodoslovansk˘ch státÛ, Ruska, Bûloruska a Ukrajiny. Prezident proná‰el v˘roky o nekompatibilitû západního modelu trÏního hospodáfiství a demokracie se slovanskou povahou; jedinou alternativu proto vidûl v reintegraci Bûloruska a Ruska do slovanského bloku, kter˘ se mûl stát dostateãnou protiváhou k Severoatlantické alianci.27 Odezva na slogany o obnovení svazku s Ruskem pfii‰la uÏ v roce 1995, kdy Boris Jelcin v únoru nav‰tívil Minsk a spolu se Smlouvou o pfiátelství, dobr˘ch sousedsk˘ch vztazích a spolupráci souhlasil s projektem celní unie

mezi obûma zemûmi.28 Rusko na skuteãnou integraci podle podnûtÛ a pfiání A. Luka‰enka nespûchalo, protoÏe rozpadem SSSR utrpûlo ménû neÏ nûkteré ostatní státy vãetnû Bûloruska. V roce 1995 se v‰ak poprvé objevila integrace s Bûloruskem jako dÛleÏité téma, které mohlo alespoÀ ãásteãnû upozadit probíhající válku v âeãensku. Pfiehlu‰it ji mûly deklarace o nutnosti rusko-bûloruské politické unie iniciované obûma stranami. Luka‰enko ‰el dokonce tak daleko, Ïe sliboval „svému lidu plnou integraci“ a Jelcin jeho politiku podpofiil slovy: „Vím, Ïe mnoho z vás tady v Bûlorusku chce je‰tû bliωí vazby neÏ je silná integrace.“29 V˘roky obou prezidentÛ se daly interpretovat jako úsilí o ustavení spoleãného státu, coÏ v‰ak ‰lo daleko za v‰echny reálnû uãinûné kroky pfií‰tích deseti let. Ve‰ker˘ integraãní proces se pragmaticky odvíjel od momentálních preferencí jedné ãi druhé strany, pfiiãemÏ zpoãátku byl hlavním hybatelem A. Luka‰enko. UÏ v kvûtnu 1995 uspofiádal referendum, v nûmÏ Bûlorusové odhlasovali zmûnu státních symbolÛ zpût k tûm z dob bûloruské existence jako svazové republiky SSSR, schválení ru‰tiny jako druhého oficiálního jazyka30 a v neposlední fiadû téÏ ekonomickou harmonizaci s Moskvou.31 Bylo to první referendum uspofiádané Luka‰enkem s cílem utuÏit jeho moc, ãemuÏ prohloubení aliance s Ruskem nahrávalo. Pfiesto Luka‰enkovy v˘roky z té doby nejsou vÏdy jednoznaãnû interpretovatelné. Zatímco pro rusk˘ list Izvestia Luka‰enko prohlásil, Ïe „nikdy nemûl problémy s my‰lenkou sjednocení“, pro nûmeck˘ Handelsblatt obhajoval suverenitu své zemû.32 Obdobné nekonzistentní v˘roky provázely v‰echny dÛleÏité dohody v následujících letech. Na jafie 1996 si byl bûlorusk˘ vÛdce vûdom silné pozice, jakou mu sk˘taly nízké Jelcinovy pfiedvolební preference. Nechal se dokonce sly‰et, Ïe kdyby proti Jelcinovi nekandidoval G. Zjuganov, ale on sám, v˘sledek by byl 75 % hlasÛ pro nûj a pouze 25 % ve prospûch Jelcina.33 Podobná vy28 29 30

25 26 27

Ambrosio, T., The Political Success of Russia-Belarus Relations: Insulating Minsk from a ‚Color‘ Revolution. In: ISAS Papers, University of Miami 2005, s. 10. Pro v˘sledky voleb viz pfi. White, S., Korosteleva-Polglase, E.: The parliamentary election and referendum in Belarus, October 2004. In: Electoral Studies 25/1, March 2006, s. 155. Martinsen, K. D., The Russian Takeover of Belarus. Comparative Strategy, 21:401–416, 2002, s. 403.

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Viz napfi. Markus, U.: Belarus, Ukraine …, s. 22. Martinsen, K. D., The Russian Takeover of Belarus. In: Comparative Strategy 21, 2002, s. 408. Drakokhrust, Y., Furman, D., Belarus and Russia: The Game of Virtual Integration. Cambridge 2002. In: Balmaceda, M. M., Clem, J. I., Tarlow, L. L. (eds), cit. dílo, s. 235. Na téma jazykov˘ch zákonÛ, ‰kolství a bilingualismu viz napfi. Markus, U., The Bilingualism Question in Belarus and Ukraine. In: Transition 2/24, 29. 11. 1996, s. 18–20. Markus, U., A War of Referenda in Belarus. In: Transition 2/25, 13. 12. 1996, s. 13. Drakokhrust, Y., Furman, D., cit. dílo, s. 236. Moshes, A., Lukashenka’s Role in Russian Politics. Cambridge 2002. In: Balmaceda, M. M., Clem, J. I., Tarlow, L. L. (eds), cit. dílo, s. 208.

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jádfiení souvisela s Luka‰enkovou dlouhodobou touhou stát se v˘znamn˘m hráãem v ruské politice34, realisticky nicménû Jelcina bûhem kampanû podporoval – a také z toho vytûÏil: kromû odepisování rychle narÛstajících dluhÛ za odbûr ruského plynu inkasoval napfiíklad ãástku 150 miliónÛ rublÛ po podpisu Smlouvy o pfiátelství, dobr˘ch sousedsk˘ch vztazích a spolupráci v roce 1995.35 Minsk na oplátku smazal Moskvû dluh ve v˘‰i témûfi jedné miliardy dolarÛ za ekologické ‰kody, zpÛsobené na bûloruském území ruskou armádou, a dal‰í ãástku za „hodnotn˘ materiál v jadern˘ch zbraních“ odvezen˘ch z Bûloruska.36 Nejviditelnûj‰í podporou Jelcinovy kandidatury byl podpis Smlouvy o vzniku Spoleãenství suverénních státÛ Bûloruska a Ruska z 2. dubna 1996.37 I pfies pfiedchozí vyjádfiení o dÛleÏitosti tohoto kroku pro budoucnost unie se obsahovû jednalo o vágní dokument, jehoÏ bezzubost odráÏela rozdíly v cílech obou stran. Politologové Drakokhrust a Furman zhodnotili moÏnosti dohody jako limitované a integraci neposouvající, neboÈ „zavedené instituce, pfiestoÏe zaloÏené na principu rovného zastoupení Ruska a Bûloruska, byly zcela symbolické.“38 Pfií‰tí smlouva, tzv. Smlouva o svazu Ruska a Bûloruska z dubna 199739, vytvofiila nov˘ orgán Nejvy‰‰í sovût. Jeho rozhodnutí v‰ak podléhala kontrasignaci obou prezidentÛ, coÏ ze své podstaty opût k plánované unii nevedlo a nemûnilo mezinárodnûprávní postavení zúãastnûn˘ch zemí. „Papírová“ integrace pokraãovala i v posledních dvou letech Jelcinova prezidentství.40 Zvlá‰tû rok 1998 byl pro Jelcina turbulentní kvÛli pádu rublu a ekonomické a politické nestabilitû. V ruské spoleãnosti opût moh34 35 36 37 38 39

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TamtéÏ, s. 203. Markus, U.: Belarus, Ukraine …, s. 64. TamtéÏ, s. 64. Viz napfi. Procházková, P., ·tûtina, J.: Moskva a Minsk uãinily zásadní krok k obnovení Svazu. In: Lidové noviny, 9. 12. 1999, s. 9. Drakokhrust, Y., Furman, D., cit. dílo, s. 237. Podpis pod Smlouvou o svazu Ruska a Bûloruska se datuje k 2. dubnu 1997. KvÛli objeven˘m formulacím, jeÏ obratnû do textu vloÏila bûloruská administrativa a jeÏ by postavily bûloruská rozhodnutí na roveÀ rozhodnutím patnáctkrát lidnatûj‰ího Ruska, byla 2. dubna podepsána jen rámcová dohoda. Forma rozhodovacích procedur svazového orgánu, tzv. Nejvy‰‰ího sovûtu, byla dotvofiena a parafována obûma prezidenty aÏ v kvûtnu 1996. Podrobnûji k v˘voji situace viz Drakokhrust, Y., Furman, D, cit. dílo, s. 238–241. Pfi. Igor Ivanov pfiiznal na podzim 1998, Ïe unie existuje více na papífie neÏ ve skuteãnosti. Citováno v Lo, B., Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era. Reality, Illusion and Mythmaking. New York 2002, s. 76.

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la bûloruská karta pomoci k ãásteãnému pocitu stabilizace, proto Jelcin pfii‰el s nabídkou dal‰ích integraãních krokÛ. V prosinci 1998 podepsal s Luka‰enkem dokument deklarující zámûr vytvofiit svazov˘ stát v pfií‰tích dvanácti mûsících. Deklarace si kladla za cíl vytvofiit relevantní svazové orgány a rozvinout mechanismus pro potfieby spoleãné zahraniãní a bezpeãnostní politiky. V ekonomické oblasti se prezidenti zavázali pokroãit v pfiijímání spoleãné mûny, ustavení jednotného finanãního, ekonomického a právního rámce vãetnû spoleãného rozpoãtu.41 Deklarace, jeÏ sv˘m cílÛm nedostála, tak jen pfiedurãila poslední integraãní iniciativu B. Jelcina pfied odstoupením z funkce prezidenta 31. prosince 1999. Tfii t˘dny pfied tím podepsal s Luka‰enkem Smlouvu o vytvofiení svazového státu Ruska a Bûloruska.42 Arkady Moshes vnímal JelcinÛv podpis jako „zámûr korunovat jeho politickou kariéru, […] dovolující mu odstoupit jako sjednotiteli a snad kompenzovat jeho rané hfiíchy.“43 Praktické dopady smlouvy v‰ak mÛÏeme zhodnotit jako minimální. Spoleãn˘ rozpoãet a mûna zÛstaly v rovinû úvah, jakkoli ãasto se v dal‰ích letech hovofiilo o dynamizaci sjednocení. Podpisem Smlouvy o vytvofiení svazového státu navíc nebyla nad‰ena jak ruská, tak bûloruská odborná i laická vefiejnost44; v Minsku se na protestních demonstracích se‰lo v fiíjnu 1999 aÏ 20 tisíc obãanÛ45, coÏ byl rekordní poãet demonstrantÛ za dobu Luka‰enkova reÏimu. V dobû mezi podpisem Deklarace a Smlouvy byla aliance Ruska a Bûloruska zfiejmá v oblasti zahraniãní politiky. V roce 1999 se obû zemû spoleãnû vymezily proti roz‰ífiení NATO o tfii postkomunistické zemû a proti zásahÛm v Jugoslávii. Andrei Sannikov v této souvislosti hovofií pfiímo o „vyuÏití Bûloruska k otestování urãit˘ch rusk˘ch strategií.“46 Probíhaly 41

42

43 44

45 46

„Declaration on Promoting Further Unity between Russia and Belarus“, Trenin, D., The Belarus – Russia Integration Drive: Toward a Union of Independent States. In: The Carnegie Moscow Center Briefing Papers1/1, January 1999, http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/briefings/48330.htm (5. 5. 2006). „Smlouva o vytvofiení svazového státu Ruska a Bûloruska“, 8. 12. 1999. Viz napfi. informace Ministerstva zahraniãních vûcí Bûloruské republiky: Relation between belarus and Russia, creation of the Union State. http://www.mfa.gov.by/eng/index.php?d=policy/bicoop&id=7 (6. 5. 2006). Moshes, A., cit. dílo, s. 211. Luká‰ek, L.: Existence Rusko-bûloruského svazu na pozadí bûlorusk˘ch parlamentních voleb. In: Mezinárodní politika, prosinec 2000, s. 28. TéÏ napfi. Vanûk, M., Bûlorusové protestovali proti sblíÏení s Ruskem. In: Mladá fronta Dnes, 25. 11. 1999, s. 8. Kuznecov A., Prizrak kartofel’noj revoljucii. In: Lenta.ru, 28. 3. 2005. http://lenta.ru/articles/2005/ 03/28/belorution/ (20. 4.2 005). Sannikov, A, Russia’s Varied Roles in Belarus. Cambridge 2002. In: Balmaceda, M. M., Clem, J. I., Tarlow, L. L. (eds), cit. dílo, s. 225.

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vzájemné náv‰tûvy ministrÛ zahraniãí a prezidentÛ Luka‰enka a Milo‰eviãe. Pfii dubnové náv‰tûvû Bûlehradu, kde se dostalo Luka‰enkovi nejvy‰‰ích poct, byly artikulovány ostré protiamerické postoje v˘chodních SlovanÛ a pravoslavn˘ch vûfiících.47 Byl vznesen návrh na pfiivzetí Jugoslávie do projektu spoleãného státního celku, ten v‰ak mûl silné odpÛrce napfiíklad mezi vedením muslimsk˘ch ãástí Ruské federace.48, 49 Lze v‰ak konstatovat, Ïe podobné iniciativy nemûly vzhledem k okolnostem ‰anci na úspûch. Utlumení spolupráce a Putinova pozmûnûná strategie (2000–2006) Tfietí fáze vykazuje v porovnání s etapou druhé poloviny 90. let odli‰né ukazatele. Zatímco se rusko-bûloruské partnerství pfiedcházející doby projevovalo ve vlnách a bylo iniciováno nárazovû a dle potfieb (s pfiítomností „tich˘ch“ období), v posledních letech jde o koherentnûj‰í a plynulej‰í vzájemnou politiku. Zmûnily se osobní vazby. Souãasní vÛdci dvou superprezidetsk˘ch hybridních systémÛ, z nichÏ jeden se k prezidentství dostal Jelcinov˘m protekcionismem v roce 2000 a druh˘ nelegitimními ústavními zásahy prodluÏuje svou prezidentskou kadenci, zformalizovali svá jednání.50 Vladimir Putin, jenÏ pfied nástupem do prezidentského úfiadu nemûl s Luka‰enkem úzké kontakty, vÛãi nûmu uplatÀuje pragmatick˘ pfiístup s akcentem na ekonomické zájmy Ruska. UtuÏením centrální moci a eliminováním liberálnû-demokratick˘ch prvkÛ v ruském politickém systému se Putin stal siln˘m vÛdcem, pro nûhoÏ by bylo nepfiedstavitelné pfiipustit Luka‰enka k fiízení vnitrorusk˘ch politick˘ch záleÏitostí. Putin si rovnûÏ uvûdomuje, Ïe i pro jeho reputaci demokraticky zvoleného politika není vhodné na shody s pfiedstavitelem

posledního nedemokratického reÏimu v Evropû pfiíli‰ poukazovat a snaÏí se vyhnout kritice ze strany Západu.51 Tím v‰ím byl Luka‰enko donucen rezignovat na své plány ohlednû obsazení jím projektované funkce prezidenta celého svazu a musel se smífiit s postupnou ztrátou sv˘ch pozic v ruské politice. 52 Od samého poãátku vlády prezidenta Putina bylo jasné, Ïe Rusko má v úmyslu trvat na ekonomické politice pro nûj v˘hodné. Arkady Moshes uvádí, Ïe jiÏ na poãátku roku 2000 Moskva odmítla poskytnout Minsku stabilizaãní úvûr nebo mu dodat dodateãné dvû miliardy kubick˘ch metrÛ plynu. Dále Rusko striktnû trvalo na tom, aby bylo po zavedení spoleãné mûny ustaveno jediné mûnové centrum, a to v podobû ruského rublu a moskevského fiízení.53 Ve snaze centralizovat moc prezident Putin vystupoval téÏ proti dal‰ím pfiím˘m Luka‰enkov˘m dohodám s regionálními vÛdci a podnikateli. Jak podot˘ká Kaare Dahl Martinsen, tyto kontakty byly v 90. letech klíãové pro rozvinutí v˘mûnn˘ch obchodních vztahÛ: „Jak bûloruské, tak ruské podniky nebyly solventní; prostá v˘mûna v˘robkÛ obûma stranám vyhovovala a bylo podepsáno nûkolik barterov˘ch dohod.“54 PfiestoÏe nûkteré z tûchto dohod zÛstávají v platnosti, získávání dílãích v˘hod a komunikace s regiony se ukázala v posledních letech sloÏitûj‰í neÏ za éry prezidenta Jelcina, coÏ mj. je dáno pevn˘m postavením prezidenta Putina na domácí politické scénû a snahou po centralizaci federace. UÏ v prÛbûhu prvního Putinova volebního období (2000–2004) dávalo ruské vedení najevo, Ïe není ochotno na spoleãn˘ stát s Bûlorusy doplácet. Zjevné neshody se projevily bûhem roku 2002, kdy Putin nejprve pfiednesl Luka‰enkovi argumenty, proã nemÛÏe b˘t Bûlorusko Rusku ve spoleãné 51 52

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V. Chernomyrdin appointed Yeltsin’s special envoy to Yugoslavia, Lukashenko in Belgrade, autor neuveden. In: NUPI Centre for Russian Studies, 14. 4. 1999. http://www.nupi.no/cgi-win/Russland/krono.exe?4116 (13. 4. 2006). Some Regional Leaders Criticize Union Treaty, autor neuveden. In: RFE-RL 1/42, 15. 12. 1999. http://search.rferl.org/rferl/russianreport/1999/12/42–151299.html (15. 3. 2006). Jugoslávsk˘ parlament soubûÏnû schválil oficiální pfiistoupení Srbska a âerné Hory do integraãního uskupení Ruska a Bûloruska. Gombas, L., Mlã, nebo tû umlãím. In: Respekt 21/99, 17. 5. 1999, s. 5. Na rozdíl od Jelcina, o nûmÏ se Luka‰enko obãas vyjadfioval jako o svém „otci“, nastoupil v Putinovi siln˘ partner.

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I pfies snahy toto spojenectví zakr˘t jeho povaha prosvítá. Thomas Ambrosio jej pfiímo naz˘vá nedemokratickou aliancí. Ambrosio, T., cit. dílo, s. 1. Luka‰enkova popularita u RusÛ v prÛbûhu posledních let klesala. ZÛstává sice stále nejpopulárnûj‰ím mimorusk˘m postsovûtsk˘m prezidentem, je v‰ak patrné, Ïe jeho oblíbenost upadá zároveÀ s poklesem entusiasmu pro spoleãn˘ stát. V souãasnosti integraci s Bûloruskem jako nutnou vnímá pouze 20 % RusÛ a je s podivem, Ïe na bûloruské stranû je toto procento identické. To se odli‰uje od dat, která bylo lze získat v prÛzkumech tfii roky star˘ch, kdy podpora integrace ãinila více jak dvojnásobek. Procházková, P., Rusové mají nejradûji Luka‰enka. In: Lidové noviny, 14. 11. 2005, s. 9. Ioffe, G., Understanding Belarus: Economy and Political Landscape. In: Europe-Asia Studies, 56/1, January 2004, s. 104. Viktorov I., Lozungi i realii, Izvestija, 16. 6. 2006. http://www.izvestia.ru/ comment/article3093812/index.html (16. 6. 2006). Moshes, A., cit. dílo, s. 221. Martinsen, K. D., cit. dílo, s. 403.

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unii rovnocenn˘m partnerem55, posléze rusk˘ prezident obvinil bûloruské vedení z pfiání vést integraci k novodobé podobû Sovûtského svazu.56 Luka‰enkova odpovûì se tentokrát opfiela o argumenty preferující suverenitu zemû; prohlásil, Ïe se Bûlorusko nikdy nestane „devadesátou provincií Ruské federace“.57 Byl to jeden z momentÛ, kdy Aleksander Luka‰enko umnû na ãas pfiehodnotil jindy vz˘vané v˘hody spoleãného státu. V krizi z roku 2002, ale také v pozdûj‰ích neshodách bûhem let 2004 a 2005 mohl rusk˘ prezident jednoznaãnû ukázat svou pfievahu, a to zejména v oblasti energetiky. V zimû roku 2004 do‰lo ke ãtyfidenní „válce“ o zemní plyn, jehoÏ dodávky Moskva kontroluje. Moskva dala najevo své geopolitické zájmy, kdyÏ poÏadovala vytvofiení spoleãného plynárenského systému, v nûmÏ by rusk˘ koncern Gazprom mûl moÏnost odkoupit od bûloruské státní firmy Beltransgaz kontrolní balík akcií.58 Obdobné poÏadavky byly jak tehdy, tak i kdykoli poté bûloruskou stranou odmítnuty. Právû z dÛvodu energetické závislosti na rusk˘ch zdrojích se Luka‰enko v posledních letech snaÏil podniknout kroky k alespoÀ ãásteãnému osamostatnûní. Za jeden z nich lze povaÏovat plány na v˘stavbu jaderné elektrárny loni hojnû probírané svûtov˘mi médii. Bûlorusk˘ opoziãní politik Uladzimier Parfenoviã uvedl v této souvislosti na adresu bûloruského vedení, Ïe „zcela zmafiilo moÏnost efektivní ekonomické integrace s Ruskem. Je si plnû vûdomo, Ïe Moskva dfiíve ãi pozdûji vystaví Minsku úãet za dodávky energie jiÏ nikoli v ‚bratrsk˘ch‘, n˘brÏ svûtov˘ch cenách.“59 Jaderná

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Strauss, I., Belarus: Russia as Liberator? In: The Russian Observer.com, 27. 6. 2002. http://observer.strana.ru/stories/02/06/25/1179/ (20. 4. 2006). Nobody Holds Lukashenko in Moscow, autor neuveden. http://www.charter97.org/eng/news/2002/ 08/14/12 (20. 4. 2006). Grib, N., Volkhonsky, B.: Belarus Will Never Be Russia’s Ninetieth Province. In: The Russian Observer.com, 20. 6. 2002. http://observer.strana.ru/stories/02/06/25/1179/15618.html (20. 4. 2006). Dne‰ní Ruská federace je rozdûlena do 89 celkÛ. Bûlo‰evsk˘, D., Putin na adresu Minska: Nejsme dojnou krávou. In: Hospodáfiské noviny, 23. 2. 2004, s. 7. Dal‰í jednání o cenû strategick˘ch surovin, jejich pfiepravû a moÏnosti vstupu ruského kapitálu do bûlorusk˘ch firem se povedou letos v létû. Podle nûkter˘ch informací hodlá Minsk nabídnout 50% podíl ve státní distribuãní firmû Beltransgaz v˘mûnou za dodávky plynu. Kubátová, Z., Vafiátová, H., Gazprom hodlá zdraÏit plyn Ukrajinû. In: Hospodáfiské noviny, 23. 5. 2006, s. 9. Podrobnûji o aktivitách a zámûrech Gazpromu Amzin A., Niãego liãnogo. Putin rasporjadilsja prekratit’ subsidirovanije ekonomiki Belorussii. In: Lenta.ru, 14. 5. 2006. http://www.lenta.ru/articles/2006/05/ 13/nothing/ (15. 5. 2006). Parfenoviã, U., citováno v Bûlo‰evsk˘, D., Luka‰enkÛv plán opozici zdûsil. In: Hospodáfiské noviny, 1. 2. 2005, s. 7.

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elektrárna by v‰ak mohla b˘t postavena pouze za pomoci odborné a finanãní pomoci dal‰ích státÛ, a to jak Ruska, tak tfieba i Francie nebo Spojen˘ch státÛ americk˘ch. Varianta ruské pomoci je pokládána za vylouãenou a ru‰tí experti také pochybují, Ïe by o v˘stavbu mûly zájem dal‰í zemû.60 Plán v˘stavby jaderné elektrárny je v‰ak dÛkazem, Ïe se Luka‰enkÛv reÏim obával scénáfie zv˘‰ení cen energií jiÏ del‰í dobu. Stalo se tak letos v dubnu po bûlorusk˘ch prezidentsk˘ch volbách a se vzniklou situací se bûloruské vedení smifiuje jen velmi tûÏce. PfiestoÏe V. Putin proti Luka‰enkovû politice potlaãování a zastra‰ování opozice pfied a bûhem volební kampanû nijak neprotestoval a k vítûzství v nerovném a nedemokratickém boji se dvûma opoziãními kandidáty mu bez prodlení poblahopfiál61, ekonomická a geopolitická strategie Kremlu vedla bezprostfiednû po volbách k oznámení vy‰‰ích cen exportovan˘ch strategick˘ch surovin. Nové ceny oznámil státní gigant Gazprom; cena plynu, která jiÏ pût let nestoupla, pfiedstavuje 46,68 USD za metr kubick˘ a má b˘t od roku 2007 zv˘‰ena aÏ na 200 USD.62 Posun v cenách za strategické suroviny byl dlouho oãekáván. Pfiesto tento krok Gazpromu oznaãili bûloru‰tí poslanci za vydírání.63, 64 Bûloru‰tí ãinovníci se snaÏili Gazpromu pfiipomenout, Ïe ceny plynu jsou dány Smlouvou o vytvofiení svazového státu. Argumentem má b˘t dohoda o vytvofiení stejn˘ch podmínek pro subjekty jednotného hospodáfiství.65 Nejhlasitûj‰ím odpÛrcem zv˘‰ení cen je prezident Luka‰enko. Jeho staronov˘ postoj shrnula politoloÏka Tatiana Stanovaya: „Rusko a Bûlorusko 60

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Will Lukashenko Be Able to Build Nuclear Power Station?, autor neuveden. In: RIA Novosti, 4. 2. 2005, citováno In: International League for Human Rights. http://www.ilhr.org/ilhr/regional/belarus/updates/BU-2005–PDF/vol8no11–2005.pdf (20. 4. 2006). Putin congratulates Lukashenko on election victory, autor neuveden. In: Interfax, 20. 3. 2006. http:// www.interfax.ru/e/B/0/0.html?id_issue=11482026 (21. 3. 2006). Belorussiju zastavjat platit’ za gaz 200 dollarov za tysjaãu kubometrov, autor neuveden. In: Lenta.ru, 30. 5. 2006. WWW: http://lenta.ru/news/2006/05/30/belgaz/ (30. 5. 2006). V Belorussii sãitajut povy‰enije cen na gaz ‰antaÏom, Novyje Izvestija, 4. 4. 2006, http://www.newizv.ru/ news/2006–04–04/43834/ (5. 4. 2006). Navíc si bûloru‰tí ãinitelé jsou vûdomi ztráty finanãních ziskÛ plynoucích z prodeje strategick˘h surovin dál na západ: od Ruska je nakupují za zv˘hodnûné ceny, ale zemím EU (konkrétnû nejvíce Nizozemí, Velké Británii a Francii) je zprostfiedkovávají díky své tranzitní poloze za ceny trÏní. Zaiko, L., Russia and Belarus: Between Wishing and Reality. In: Russia in Global Affairs, 1/2006, January-March 2006. http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/printver/1003.html (15. 4. 2006). Povy‰enije cen na gaz belorusskije ãinovniki nazvali ‰antaÏom. In: Lenta.ru, 4. 4. 2006. http://lenta.ru/news/2006/04/04/priceup/ (5. 4. 2006).

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by mûly b˘t politicky rozdûleny, ale ekonomicky sjednoceny. Luka‰enko si myslí, Ïe toto je ta pravá unie bratrsk˘ch národÛ, zatímco Rusko tvrdí, Ïe jde v prvé fiadû o subvencování bûloruské ekonomiky.“66 Zatímco se bûloru‰tí ãinitelé staví proti nov˘m cenám a argumentují poru‰ením unijních smluv, vnímá rusk˘ premiér kroky Gazpromu jako zcela legitimní a viceprezident Gazpromu Aleksander Rjazanov si klade otázku, proã by mûla jeho spoleãnost financovat bûloruskou ekonomiku.67 Luka‰enko si je sám vûdom, Ïe Putin a vedení Gazpromu nechystají tentokrát Ïádné ústupky. Navrhl proto zaloÏit bûlorusk˘ stabilizaãní fond, kter˘ má podle jeho názoru pfiechod na nové ceny pomoci pfieklenout.68 Provozování fondu v‰ak podle expertÛ mÛÏe zpÛsobit Bûlorusku ekonomické a sociální otfiesy, protoÏe peníze na jeho financování budou muset b˘t vzaty ze sociální sféry. PutinÛv reÏim fiízené demokracie a trÏní, byÈ státem stále dÛslednûji ovlivÀované ekonomiky, se od Luka‰enkova politicky i ekonomicky strnulého Bûloruska li‰í natolik, Ïe za stávající situace nelze pokraãovat ve slaìování v˘raznû odli‰n˘ch ekonomick˘ch norem a nastolování spoleãné mûny. V oblasti ekonomické jakékoli handicapy ruského trÏního hospodáfiství nelze pfiímo pfiirovnat k bûloruské centrálnû plánované a subvencované ekonomice, charakterizované systémem „státního kapitalismu“.69 V kvûtnu 2006 se bûhem zasedání Euroasijského ekonomického spoleãenství v Minsku rusk˘ premiér Michail Fradkov vyjádfiil ve prospûch spoleãné mûny.70 Byla to v‰ak ze strany Ruska jen rétorická figura a pfiipomenutí dlouhodobû diskutovan˘ch závazkÛ a slibÛ. Vzhledem k okolnostem je totiÏ tento projekt dnes nerealizovateln˘, mimo jiné kvÛli Luka‰enkovû odporu vzdát se suverenity v ekonomick˘ch záleÏitostech a neexistenci strategického dokumentu, kter˘ by mûnovou unii (podobnû jako napfiíklad smlouvy

t˘kající se zavádûní spoleãné evropské mûny v západní Evropû) podrobnûji pfiedpfiipravoval a stanovoval konkrétní podmínky konvergence.71 Za dal‰í neuralgick˘ bod bûlorusko-ruské ekonomické spolupráce lze povaÏovat neochotu Luka‰enka pfiistoupit na ruské poÏadavky ohlednû privatizace bûlorusk˘ch strategick˘ch podnikÛ a vstupu rusk˘ch ekonomick˘ch oligarchÛ na bûlorusk˘ trh. Luka‰enko se po léta brání pfiílivu ruského kapitálu. Jeho stanovisko a dÛvody vyjadfiuje citát: „Proã bych se vzdával vlastnictví dvou ropn˘ch rafinerií? Vlastnictví znamená moc.“72 Pfiijetím zákonÛ vedoucích k ekonomick˘m reformám by Luka‰enko vstoupil na tenk˘ led; vyhovûl by pfiání svého ruského partnera, ale svou vlastní pozici by oslabil.73 Ekonomická a sociální sféra zÛstává v nejbliωí budoucnosti hlavní neznámou dal‰ího v˘voje Luka‰enkova reÏimu. Nabízejí se minimálnû dvû varianty. První scénáfi spoãívá v podlomení reÏimu v dÛsledku potenciálních ekonomick˘ch a sociálních otfiesÛ, spojen˘ch mimo jiné se zv˘‰ením cen strategick˘ch surovin. Druh˘ scénáfi poãítá se zavádûním trÏních mechanismÛ do bûloruské ekonomiky, v jejichÏ rámci by pfiípadné negativní externí faktory bûloruská societa ekonomicky ustála. Souãasn˘ bûlorusk˘ reÏim totiÏ staví na relativnû silné stfiední tfiídû a absenci v˘razn˘ch pfiíjmov˘ch rozdílÛ mezi jednotliv˘mi stranami bûloruské spoleãnosti. Na rozdíl od Ruska existuje v Bûlorusku jen nepoãetná skupina tzv. nov˘ch BûlorusÛ. Vût‰ina odborníkÛ se shodne na tom, Ïe sociálnû-ekonomická situace v Bûlorusku je zatím stabilizovaná a Ïe bûloruská ekonomika je schopna dostát uspokojování fundamentálních potfieb.74 V porovnání s ostatními postsovûtsk˘mi zemûmi nedochází k sociálním tenzím, coÏ ãásteãnû vysvûtluje stabilitu reÏimu a z jistého pohledu mu dodává na legiti71

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Stanovaya, T.: Lukashenko Riscs All. In: RIA Novosti, 13. 6. 2006. http://en.rian.ru/analysis/ 20060613/49427434.html (14. 6. 2006). Rjazanov: poãemu Gazprom dolÏen dotirovat’ belorusskuju ekonomiku?, autor neuveden. In: Naviny.by: 18. 5. 2006. WWW: http://www.naviny.by/ru/print/?id=64417 (20. 5. 2006). Chodaseviã A., Luka‰enko nuÏen milliard dollarov, Nezavisimaja gazeta, 19. 5. 2006. http:// www.ng.ru/cis/2006–05–19/6_lukashenko.html (20. 5. 2006). Diskuse s ·imovem, J.: Bûlorusko po prezidentsk˘ch volbách. Pofiádáno Asociací pro mezinárodní otázky, 17. 5. 2006. Polsk˘ institut, Praha. Fradkov: Vvedenije jedinoj valjuty JevrAzES vozmoÏno, autor neuveden. 19. 5. 2006, http://www.vz.ru/ news/2006/5/19/34300.html (20. 5. 2006).

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O dílãích v˘hodách spoleãné mûny, které by pro Bûlorusko plynuly zejména v oblasti plateb za rusk˘ plyn, se zmiÀuje napfi. ·u‰keviã S., Sojuz s ãistymi rukami, Nezavisimaja gazeta, 28. 11. 2005. http://www.ng.ru/courier/2005–11–28/12_union.html (5. 4. 2006). Drakokhrust, Y., Furman, D., cit. dílo, s. 254. UÏ za Jelcinovy éry docházelo ze strany Ruska k tlakÛm na pfiijetí ekonomick˘ch reforem v Bûlorusku, za Putinova prezidentství tyto tlaky je‰tû zesílily. Viz blíÏe Drakokhrust, Y., Furman, D., cit. dílo, s. 238. Ani Jelcin, ani Putin v‰ak nenutili Minsk ke zmûnám v oblasti politické. Almond, M., Less bizarre than it seems. In: The Guardian, 21. 3. 2006. http://www.guardian.co.uk/ commentisfree/story/0,,1735514,00.html (30. 3. 2006). O pfietrvávajícím sovûtském, nicménû relativnû funkãním sociálním, ale tfieba i zdravotnickém systému viz ·u‰keviã S., Sojuz s ãistymi rukami, Nezavisimaja gazeta, 28. 11. 2005. http://www.ng.ru/courier/2005–11–28/12_union.html (5. 4. 2006).

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mitû. V budoucnu v‰ak nelze oãekávat zlep‰ení, jaké Luka‰enko slíbil na podzim 2005 obãanÛm, kdyÏ mimo jiné nerealisticky naplánoval zv˘‰ení prÛmûrné mzdy z 220 na 500 americk˘ch dolarÛ mûsíãnû.75 Obdobné razantní zlep‰ení socio-ekonomické situace nebude zvlá‰tû po zv˘‰ení cen importovaného plynu v silách bûloruského reÏimu. Export a import patfií tradiãnû mezi sféry, které o vzájemn˘ch vztazích dvou zemí hodnû napoví. A pfiestoÏe je Bûlorusko na Rusku ekonomicky závislé, nemûl by b˘t pfiehlédnut trend ve vzájemném obchodu v roce 2005. Minsk od té doby bojkotuje prohloubení projektu zóny volného obchodu. SnaÏí se zabránit pfiílivu ruského zboÏí na bûlorusk˘ trh uvalením nejrÛznûj‰ích kvót na potravináfiské produkty jako pivo, cukr, mouku a dal‰í. Spoleãnému ekonomickému prostoru obdobná opatfiení neprospûla a Leonid Zaiko v této souvislosti dokonce hovofií o obchodní válce.76 Zaiko dále poukazuje na vychylování bûloruského zahraniãního obchodu smûrem k zemím Evropské unie, konkrétnû k Nizozemí a Velké Británii, nejvût‰ím importérÛm v Bûlorusku zpracované ropy a ropn˘ch produktÛ.77 Tento trend zvy‰ování obchodní bilance se Západem v‰ak opût naráÏí na zv˘‰ení cen strategick˘ch surovin ze strany Ruska a na fakt, Ïe Bûlorusko dnes nedisponuje dal‰í produkcí, která by západní trhy zaujala. Vedle faktorÛ energetick˘ch a ekonomick˘ch zb˘vá je‰tû v souvislosti se souãasnou bûlorusko-ruskou aliancí zmínit faktory geopolitické a vojenské, aby byl v˘ãet oblastí spolupráce a interakcí mezi luka‰enkovskou a putinovskou administrativou úpln˘. Zde platí základní teze, Ïe Bûlorusko vÏdy slouÏilo jako spojnice mezi Ruskem a stfiední, popfiípadû západní Evropou. Ze samotné polohy Bûloruska plynul odvûk˘ geopolitick˘ zájem Ruska uchovat si jej ve svém orbitu. Po cel˘ch uplynul˘ch 15 let hrály dominantní roli geopolitické determinanty, pfiiãemÏ dynamické procesy (jako napfi. demokratizace a socio-ekonomická transformace) stály vÏdy v pozadí. Tím lze také vysvûtlit PutinÛv odpor k tzv. barevn˘m revolucím v postsovûtském prostoru. Strategie geopolitika musí mít pfiednost pfied demokratizací má

udrÏet v ãele sousedních zemí proruské vÛdce typu A. Luka‰enka, I. Karimova a K. Bakijeva a chce zabránit zmûnám ve vedení jako v pfiípadû Gruzie a Ukrajiny.78 Hlavním Putinov˘m zámûrem v zahraniãní politice je za Ïádnou cenu nedopustit dal‰í oslabení ruského postavení v postsovûtském prostoru, naopak mu jde o jeho maximální zaplnûní. Je si vûdom toho, Ïe pfiípadné demokratizaãní zmûny v Bûlorusku by tuto zemi mohly dostat pod vliv EU a USA. Vystihl to zástupce fieditele Centra politick˘ch technologií Alexej Makarkin, kdyÏ fiekl: „Ztratili jsme Ukrajinu a jestli nyní ztratíme Bûlorusko, za jistou dobu bude Severoatlantická aliance stát po celé délce na‰ich západních hranic. […] Je to otázka prestiÏe a bezpeãnosti.“79 Tento scénáfi by znamenal zásadní naru‰ení ve‰ker˘ch pfiedstav, jeÏ byly vyvíjeny v letech po rozpadu SSSR a jejichÏ stfiedobod pfiedstavovala vedle geopolitiky právû vojenská spolupráce. Z vojenského hlediska dosáhlo Rusko v Bûlorusku daleko více neÏ v ostatních b˘val˘ch sovûtsk˘ch republikách. Po rozpadu SSSR se oboustranná spolupráce dále plnû rozvíjela, Andrej Sannikov v této souvislosti referuje o zavedení „tradice podepsat dohodu o vojenské spolupráci bûhem kaÏdého setkání“.80 Politici a generálové tak plynule navázali na období posledních 50 let, kdy se Bûlorusko vypracovalo do pozice nejmilitarizovanûj‰í republiky Sovûtského svazu.81 Rozsáhlá bûloruská zbrojní v˘roba byla v dobû socialismu orientována pfieváÏnû na v˘robu sofistikovan˘ch elektronick˘ch zafiízení. V této souvislosti upozorÀuje Martinsen, Ïe po roce 1991 bûloruské zbrojovky lákaly ruské investory vysok˘mi technick˘mi standardy sv˘ch produktÛ. Rusové by se v pfiípadû úspû‰ného vstupu do struktur bûloruského zbrojního prÛmyslu navíc zbavili bûloruské konku78

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Mazajeva O., Belorusam obe‰ãano ekonomiãeskoje ãudo ãerez polgoda, Nezavisimaja gazeta, 25. 10. 2005. http://www.ng.ru/cis/2005–10–25/8_belorussia.html (10. 5. 2006). Zaiko, L., Russia and Belarus: Between Wishing and Reality. In: Russia in Global Affairs, 1/2006, January-March 2006. http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/printver/1003.html (15. 4. 2006). TamtéÏ.

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Problematiku vztahÛ mezi geopolitikou a demokratizací pfiipomíná Taras Kuzio. Udává pfiíklad geopolitick˘ch soufiadnic USA vÛãi Stfiední a JiÏní Americe bûhem 20. století, resp. diplomacie Francie vÛãi frankofonní Africe ve druhé polovinû téhoÏ století. I v tûchto pfiípadech dali patroni (USA a Francie) pfiednost sv˘m zahraniãnû-politick˘m zájmÛm pfied demokratizací. Kuzio, T., Belarus and Ukraine: Democracy Building in a Grey Security Zone. Oxford University Press, 2001, s. 467. In Zielonka, J., Pravda, A., Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Volume II – International and Transnational Factors. Oxford University Press, 2001. Makarkin, A., citováno dle Russian NGOs to be Brought under financial control, autor neuveden. RIA Novosti, 29. 6. 2005. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20050629/40813899.html (20. 4. 2006). Sannikov, A., cit. dílo, s. 223. V Bûlorusku pfied rokem 1991 pfiipadlo na jednoho vojáka 43 civilistÛ, celkovû ‰lo o 240000 vojensk˘ch pfiíslu‰níkÛ. Na bûloruském území byly navíc rozmístûny sovûtské konvenãní i jaderné zbranû. Podrobnûji viz Sannikov, A., Russia’s Varied Roles in Belarus. Cambridge 2002. In: Balmaceda, M. M., Clem, J. I., Tarlow, L. L. (eds), cit. dílo, s. 223.

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rence.82 Jak navíc podot˘ká Moshes, vojensko-prÛmyslová spolupráce koresponduje se spoleãn˘m cílem pozvednutí vojensko-prÛmyslového komplexu na motor ekonomického rÛstu.83 V neposlední fiadû se jedná i o pravidelná bûlorusko-ruská vojenská cviãení, jeÏ je‰tû více upevÀují spoleãnou obrannou politiku. Rusko navíc bezplatnû vyuÏívá dvou strategick˘ch vojensk˘ch základen na území svého západního souseda, a sice radarového zafiízení v Gantseviãi a námofiní spojovací jednotky ve Vileice. Rusko mÛÏe tato vojenská pfiíslu‰enství vyuÏívat od podpisu smlouvy v lednu 1995 po dobu 25 let.84 V únoru 2006 Moskva oznámila, Ïe má v úmyslu vybudovat na území Bûloruska také stálou vojenskou leteckou základnu. Jejím úkolem má b˘t posílení schopnosti protivzdu‰né obrany spoleãného území.85 Spolupráce ve vojenské oblasti obou zemí tak bude i nadále úzce koordinovaná a bûloruská vojenská infrastruktura zÛstane spolu s novou leteckou základnou souãástí ruského strategického plánování. Shrnutí aneb budoucí spolupráce v odli‰n˘ch siloãarách Platí nûkolik tezí, které urãují minulost a souãasnost bûlorusko-ruského spojenectví. Za prvé, v dobû prezidentství A. Luka‰enka a V. Putina byla vybudována jiná kvalita vzájemn˘ch vztahÛ. Bûlorusko zÛstává v ruské sféfie vlivu a obû zemû rozvíjejí spolupráci v oblasti politické, vojenské a ekonomické. Ruská politická garnitura vyjadfiuje bûloruskému vládci podporu, spolu s ekonomick˘mi oligarchy by v‰ak uvítala hospodáfiské reformy vedoucí ke zv˘‰ení objemu rusk˘ch investic v bûlorusk˘ch podnicích. TéÏ vzájemn˘ trh se nevyvíjí tak dynamicky, jak by si Kreml pfiedstavoval. Za nejdÛleÏitûj‰í událost ve vzájemn˘ch vztazích v první polovinû roku 2006 lze povaÏovat oznámení ruského plynového koncernu Gazprom o trojnásobném zv˘‰ení cen importovaného ruského plynu, rokem 2007 poãí82 83 84 85

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Martinsen, K. D., cit. dílo, s. 406. Moshes, A., cit dílo, s. 221. TamtéÏ, s. 221. Rusové chtûjí mít základnu v Bûlorusku, autor neuveden. âTK, 15. 2. 2006. http://lidovky.zpravy.cz/ ln_zahranici.asp?r=ln_zahranici&c=A060215_183415_ln_zahranici_hlm (15. 4. 2004). Viz téÏ Russia Says Excercises Have No Direct Focus, autor neuveden. Associated Press, 22. 6. 2006. http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/22/AR2006062201193.html (22. 6. 2006).

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naje. Gazprom v této souvislosti hovofií o nastolení realistického kurzu v otázkách obchodu strategick˘mi surovinami a potaÏmo hospodáfiské politiky ruského státu, svého hlavního akcionáfie. Opatfiení se v‰ak setkalo s ostr˘m nesouhlasem bûloruské administrativy, která bude muset ãelit jeho oãekávan˘m ekonomick˘m a sociálním následkÛm. Za druhé autofii argumentují, Ïe z bûlorusko-ruského spojenectví tûÏily doposud obû strany. Pro Bûlorusko ‰lo navíc o benefity nejen v oblasti domácí politiky, ale i mezinárodní politické scény. Luka‰enko, kter˘ je povaÏován za posledního evropského diktátora, se jen díky tomuto svazku neocitl v naprosté mezinárodní izolaci, jíÏ by byl v pfiípadû zavrÏení Moskvou vystaven. Podporu mu pravidelnû vyjadfiují nejvy‰‰í ru‰tí pfiedstavitelé86, ãímÏ poskytují i nadále jeho reÏimu potfiebnou legitimitu a moÏnost vyhnout se evropskému vlivu a hodnotám: trÏnímu hospodáfiství a demokracii. Bûlorusko je spolu s Ruskem téÏ ãlenem nûkolika mezinárodních organizací fungujících v postsovûtském areálu. Patfií mezi zakládající ãleny Spoleãenství nezávisl˘ch státÛ, Euroasijského ekonomického spoleãenství, Organizace smlouvy o kolektivní bezpeãnosti a ·anghajské organizace pro spolupráci. Z v˘‰e uveden˘ch dÛvodÛ Luka‰enko náleÏí k tûm postsovûtsk˘m pfiedstavitelÛm, jeÏ vyz˘vají k dal‰ímu zintenzivnûní spolupráce v rámci tûchto organizací.87 Za tfietí je tfieba vûnovat pozornost dnes zfietelnûji vnímané bûloruské identitû. Bûlorusko pfiivedla v devadesát˘ch letech do svazku s Ruskem mimo jiné nevûdomost v˘znamné ãásti bûloruské spoleãnosti o její vlastní národní historii a carsk˘m i sovûtsk˘m reÏimem zcela utlumené bûloruské národnostní cítûní. V˘hody nezávislosti bûloruského státu sice dnes zdÛ86

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Napfiíklad v kvûtnu 2006 zaznûla ve ·trasburku v den pfievzetí ruského pfiedsednictví Rady Evropy slova ministra zahraniãí Sergeje Lavrova: „Je v zájmu v‰ech, kdo vûfií v ‰ífiení demokracie a dal‰ích principÛ Rady Evropy, navazovat s Bûloruskem dialog. […] Neizolovat jej, ale pfiizvat ke spolupráci.“ Citováno v Zapadu ne stoit provodit’ politiku izoljacii Belarusi – glava MID Rossii Sergej Lavrov, autor neuveden. In: Belta.by, 19. 5. 2006. http://www.belta.by/ru/news/politics?id=94273 (20. 5. 2006). Za dal‰í pfiíklad mohou slouÏit vyjádfiení velvyslance Ruské federace v âeské republice Alexeje Fedotova pro deník Právo. Fedotov oznaãil reÏim A. Luka‰enka za demokratick˘, dÛkazem toho mají b˘t pravidelnû konané volby. Pro cel˘ text interview viz Tureãková, E., PfiibliÏování NATO bude v Rusku vÏdy vyvolávat otazníky. In: Právo, 12. 6. 2006, s. 11. K tématu odvrácení mezinárodní izolace Bûloruska, ale téÏ Uzbekistánu viz Antonenko, O.: Assessing the CIS. In: Russia Profile, 14. 2. 2006. http://www.russiaprofile.org/international/article.wbp?article-id=7A1B2D96–2A00–40E5–A294–4E8289F4E34D (30. 3. 2006).

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razÀuje jak opozice, tak i stávající prezident, av‰ak ani pfies tyto signály z celého spektra bûloruské spoleãnosti nelze zcela vylouãit extrémní formu vyústûní dosavadního integraãního procesu v podobû anexe Bûloruska Ruskem. Hovofií o ní Drakokhrust a Furman88 a nevyluãuje ji ani Jaroslav ·imov.89 První dva jmenovaní dokonce pfiedkládají k úvaze eventualitu, v níÏ se jedna ãi druhá integrující se zemû dopustí jednoduché chyby: „VÏdy je moÏnost, Ïe protivník, sveden (integraãní – pozn. autorÛ) hrou, upadne do jistého druhu pasti a podepí‰e nûco, co podepsat nemûl.“90 Podpis nûjaké dal‰í smlouvy obsahující nejednoznaãnou formulaci by se nakonec mohl ukázat (pfiedev‰ím pro Bûlorusko) jako fatální. K tématu dal‰ího sbliÏování patfií i úvahy o ustavení funkce svazového prezidenta. Zatímco v devadesát˘ch letech se o tuto funkci Ïivû zajímal A. Luka‰enko, v letech 2005 a 2006 se na její atraktivitu ptají V. Putina, jemuÏ vypr‰í prezidentsk˘ mandát v Ruské federaci v roce 2008. MoÏnost obdobné formy prodlouÏení Putinova funkãního období v‰ak Kreml odmítá.91 Nebudou-li ov‰em pfiijaty dlouhodobû avízované kroky k ustavení spoleãn˘ch politick˘ch orgánÛ a nezvedne-li se zároveÀ vÛle Luka‰enka vpustit na bûlorusk˘ trh ruské investory, nelze vylouãit ani moÏnost postupného rozvolnûní dosavadních vazeb mezi obûma státy. K tomu by mohlo dojít téÏ s potenciálním pádem Luka‰enkova reÏimu a nastoupení nové proevropské politické garnitury. Tento scénáfi vnímá jako moÏn˘ napfiíklad V. Akudoviã, kter˘ vidí rozhodující postavení Ruska v bûlorusk˘ch záleÏitostech jako doãasné: „Rusko je a je‰tû nûjak˘ ãas zÛstane dominantním faktorem jak v ekonomice a politice, tak i v kulturním Ïivotû zemû. […] Není v‰ak nutné ‚rusk˘ faktor‘ v osudech na‰í otãiny zveliãovat. […] Rusko je jednou z epizod na cestû z minulosti do budoucnosti.“92 V tomto rámci lze chápat i dnes probíhající integraãní proces.

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Drakokhrust, Y., Furman, D., cit. dílo, s. 254. Diskuse s ·imovem, J., Bûlorusko po prezidentsk˘ch volbách. Pofiádáno Asociací pro mezinárodní otázky, 17. 5. 2006. Polsk˘ institut, Praha. Drakokhrust, Y., Furman, D., cit. dílo, s. 254. Troickij N., Ve‰njakov rasskazal o slijanijach, In: Nezavisimaja gazeta. 25. 10. 2005. http://www.ng.ru/ politics/2005–10–25/2_veshnyakov.html (4. 4. 2006). Akudoviã, V., cit. dílo, s. 127.

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Bûlorusko-ruské sbliÏování lze oznaãit za virtuální. V˘sledky dosavadní integrace v ekonomické a politické oblasti jsou natolik omezené, Ïe vlastní pouÏívání termínu integrace mÛÏe b˘t zavádûjící. Doposud se jednalo o vztah dvou suverénních, v urãit˘ch oblastech spolupracujících zemí. Vzhledem k jejich geopolitické blízkosti lze mezi nimi i v budoucnu pfiedpokládat intenzivní interakce, aÈ uÏ se budou tyto zemû soustfiedit na pfiechod k demokracii nebo budou tíhnout k autoritáfiství. Tento vztah za bûloruskou stranu charakterizoval S. ·u‰keviã: „Ekonomické reálie zkrátka zavazují Bûlorusko ke sbliÏování s Ruskem, a proto jak˘koli bûlorusk˘ politik vystupující proti rozumnému stupni integrace se zcela spravedlivû fiadí k okrajov˘m.“93 I v budoucnu bude Rusko v Bûlorusku vnímáno jako více neÏ jen jeden z jeho sousedÛ a vice versa. Text se pokusil nahlédnout historickou i souãasnou kvalitu bûloruskorusk˘ch vztahÛ a analyzoval ji z pohledu spolupráce v nûkolika sférách. Dospûl k závûru, Ïe pÛvodní rámec formovan˘ Jelcinem a Luka‰enkem doznal pod taktovou prezidenta Putina v˘znamov˘ch zmûn. Bûlorusko-ruská integrace i nadále pokraãovala, av‰ak dostala jin˘ akcent a politické ukotvení. Aktuální stav je urãen podepsan˘mi dohodami a plány, které v‰ak bude z dÛvodÛ odli‰n˘ch a kolidujících oãekávání obou stran tûÏké realizovat. ZÛstává otázkou, zda a jak siln˘ zájem tyto sliby a plány vÛbec naplnit existuje.

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·u‰keviã S., Sojuz s ãistymi rukami, Nezavisimaja gazeta, 28. 11. 2005. http://www.ng.ru/courier/ 2005–11–28/12_union.html (5. 4. 2006).

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8. Vnitropolitická situace v Moldavské republice v letech 2001–2005 Lubomír Gombos

Moldavsko bylo po zániku Sovûtského svazu suÏováno politick˘mi, ekonomick˘mi a krátce i vojensk˘mi krizemi. Nestabilita byla zaÏehnána aÏ pfiesvûdãiv˘m vítûzstvím Strany komunistÛ v parlamentních volbách v únoru 2001. Jedna z ekonomicky nejménû rozvinut˘ch evropsk˘ch zemí se nachází pod stabilní vládou komunistické strany jiÏ ‰est let. Komunisté zvítûzili v parlamentních volbách na základû slibÛ o nastolení pofiádku, kter˘ si Moldavané pamatovali z dob Sovûtského svazu a své vítûzství zopakovali i ve volbách v bfieznu 2005. Komunistická strana sice musela na poãátku své vlády ãelit masov˘m demonstracím ãásti opozice, která vládu obviÀovala z korupce a z pokusu vrátit Moldavsko pod kontrolu Moskvy, av‰ak o tfii roky pozdûji stejná opozice podpofiila pfiedsedu komunistÛ Vladimira Voronina pfii volbû prezidenta na jeho druhé funkãní období a Kreml na‰el ve svém b˘valém spojenci po Ju‰ãenkovi a Saaka‰vilim dal‰ího „nepfiítele“. V˘chozí situace Sovûtské Moldavsko se orientovalo na zemûdûlskou v˘robu a prÛmyslovû bylo zcela závislé na ostatních svazov˘ch republikách. Rozpad Sovûtského svazu zpÛsobil pfiervání hospodáfisk˘ch stykÛ, náhl˘ propad ekonomiky a v jejím dÛsledku radikální propad pfiíjmÛ obyvatelstva. Rychle rostoucí nezamûstnanost donutila kvalifikované techniky a odborníky hledat práci v zahraniãí, ãasto ilegálnû nebo za velmi nev˘hodn˘ch podmínek. Nezamûstnanost dnes stále dosahuje 25 % aktivního obyvatelstva a pod úrovní prahu chudoby podle oficiálních statistik se nachází zhruba 80 %

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obyvatel.1 Nyní v zahraniãí pracuje pfiibliÏnû ãtvrtina obyvatelstva, pfiiãemÏ cílov˘mi zemûmi jsou zejména Ruská federace, Itálie, Rumunsko, Portugalsko, ·panûlsko, ¤ecko, Turecko a Izrael. Poãáteãní impulz pro v˘bûr zemû sehrála jazyková vybavenost (moldav‰tina a ru‰tina), díky které se Moldavané snadno uãí ostatní románské a slovanské jazyky.2 PfiestoÏe moldavská ekonomika v posledních letech nepatrnû oÏila, situace stále zÛstává neuspokojivá. ·patné Ïivotní podmínky, vysoká míra nostalgie po Sovûtském svazu a rovnûÏ znechucení voliãÛ nad ha‰tefiením pravicov˘ch a centristick˘ch vládních politikÛ v 90. letech pak napomohly k neãekanému úspûchu Stranû komunistÛ v parlamentních volbách 25. února 2001. Komunisté získali ve 101ãlenném jednokomorovém parlamentu 71 mandátÛ, coÏ pfiedstavovalo pohodlnou ústavní vût‰inu.3 Vztahy s Rumunskem Politické uvolnûní a omezená svoboda slova na konci 80. let vyvolaly nadûje na politické a ekonomické zmûny v celém Sovûtském svazu, na území Moldavské sovûtské socialistické republiky navíc doplnûné rehabilitováním plánÛ na moÏné budoucí spojení s Rumunskem. Po získání nezávislosti probûhla diskuze, zda se má Moldavsko opûtovnû stát souãástí Rumunska, která ov‰em jednoznaãnou odpovûì neposkytla a politická diskuze utichala, jak v zemi narÛstaly ekonomické a sociální problémy. Úzké pfiátelské vztahy s Rumunskem ov‰em pfietrvaly aÏ do pfiíchodu komunistÛ k moci. Do ãervna 2000 navíc Moldavané mohli cestovat do Rumunska bez cestovního pasu, pouze na obãansk˘ prÛkaz. ProtoÏe Evropská unie trvala na zpfiísnûní hraniãních kontrol se zemûmi, které budou leÏet na vnûj‰í hranici budoucí Evropské unie, tato moÏnost se zru‰ila. Pocit historické sounáleÏitosti je dosud Ïiv˘ na obou stranách hranice. Napfiíklad b˘val˘ moldavsk˘ premiér Mircea Druc (kvûten 1990–kvûten 1991) se pfiestûhoval do Bukure‰ti, pfiijal rumunské obãanství a postavil se 1 2 3

Pfiesné údaje za jednotlivá období lze nalézt na stránkách Národního statistického úfiadu http:// www.statistica.md. O migraci MoldavanÛ více: http://www.migraceonline.cz/clanky_f.shtml?x=160378. Volební v˘sledky z 25. února 2001: Strana komunistÛ 50,07 % (71 mandátÛ), volební blok Braghis¸ova aliance 13,36 % (19 mandátÛ), KfiesÈansko-demokratická lidová strana 8,24 % (11 mandátÛ). Zdroj: http://www.parties.e-democracy.md/en/electionresults/2001parliamentary.

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do ãela Strany národní jednoty Rumunska, která volá po sjednocení s Moldavskem4. B˘val˘ politick˘ vûzeÀ Ilie Ilas¸cu, vûznûn˘ v tiraspolském vûzení v letech 1992–2001 za údajné teroristické ãiny na podnûsterském území, byl rok pfied sv˘m propu‰tûním zvolen za Stranu Velkého Rumunska rumunsk˘m senátorem a dnes Ïije rovnûÏ v Bukure‰ti. V Ki‰inûvû v‰ak unionistické hnutí v prÛbûhu 90. let pomalu zkomíralo a oÏivovalo se obvykle v souvislosti s volbami, nebo bûhem váÏnûj‰ích politick˘ch krizí. Dnes si udrÏuje jistou váhu pouze mezi prorumunsky orientovanou inteligencí, která se soustfieìuje ve Svazu spisovatelÛ, na nûkter˘ch univerzitách a v Akademii vûd. Podle rumunské koncepce jsou Moldavané Rumuny. My‰lenku nûkolikrát vyslovili nejvy‰‰í vládní ãinitelé v Bukure‰ti, napfi. expremiér Adrian Na˘stase (2000–2004) obvinil komunistickou vládu v Ki‰inûvû, Ïe brání etnick˘m RumunÛm, aby se hlásili k vlastnímu jazyku a kultufie. O Moldavské republice se v Rumunsku ze zvyku hovofií jako o Besarábii. Rumunská vláda v lednu 2002 otevfienû podpofiila protestní akce KfiesÈansko-demokratické lidové strany, za coÏ ji moldavsk˘ premiér Vasile Tarlev obvinil z vmû‰ování do moldavsk˘ch vnitfiních záleÏitostí. Obavy pfied v˘vojem v Moldavsku nûkolikrát vyjádfiil i prezident Ion Iliescu a obvinil napfi. ki‰inûvskou vládu, Ïe diskriminuje rumunskou pravoslavnou církev. Jazykovû-kulturní konflikt tak silnû zatûÏuje bilaterální vztahy. Rumun‰tí nacionalisté ãasto vyjadfiují solidaritu s moldavskou prorumunsky orientovanou opozicí, v dobû protestÛ na jafie 2002 zorganizovali v sedmihradském mûstû Cluj masov˘ pochod na obranu „rumunské vlasti“. Nacionalistick˘ magistrát mûsta, znám˘ sv˘mi protimaìarsk˘mi v˘pady, vyzval obãany, aby vyjádfiili s Moldavany solidaritu. Není se co divit, Ïe oficiální Ki‰inûv na mezinárodním fóru opakovanû obviÀuje Rumunsko z rozpínavosti a expanzionismu. Vzpomínka na Velké Rumunsko je stále Ïivá a fiada RumunÛ se nesmífiila s Molotovov˘m-Ribbentropov˘m paktem stejnû jako Maìafii odmítají Trianonskou dohodu. Rumun‰tí nacionalisté, ktefií touÏí po „znovusjednocení s Besarábií“ jsou stále aktivní zejména v rétorice. Proto vztahy mezi obûma zemûmi nejsou v posledních letech dobré. Ministfii zahraniãí Ru-

munska a Moldavska sice v kvûtnu 2000 podepsali v Ki‰inûvû dohodu o privilegovaném partnerství a dobr˘ch sousedsk˘ch vztazích, ale vítûzství komunistÛ v Moldavsku vzájemné vztahy naru‰ilo. Komunistická vláda aktivnû rozvíjí koncept moldavanství, moldavského národa a moldavského jazyka.5 V bfieznu 2002 Moldavsko vyhostilo rumunského vojenského ata‰é, kterého obvinilo z kontaktÛ s opozicí a organizování protivládních protestÛ. Rumunsko reagovalo stejnû a vyhostilo prvního tajemníka moldavského velvyslanectví v Bukure‰ti. Podnûstersko a Gagauzsko PfiestoÏe se moldavská politická reprezentace na poãátku 90. let my‰lenkám budoucího potenciálního sjednocení s Rumunskem nebránila, nemohla ignorovat odpor ãásti obyvatelstva – GagauzÛ, RusÛ a UkrajincÛ, vesmûs rusky mluvících, kter˘ch dohromady v MSSR Ïilo pfies 30 %. Politická reprezentace národnostních men‰in (zejména do té doby upfiednostÀovan˘ch a ve vefiejném Ïivotû dominujících RusÛ) v reakci na prorumunské projevy poÏadovala oddûlení od MSSR. UÏ 12. listopadu 1989 Gagauzové, ob˘vající jiÏní okresy, vyhlásili autonomní republiku v rámci MSSR, následnû 19. srpna 1990 vyhlásili nezávislost. O dva t˘dny pozdûji, 2. záfií, vyhlásila suverenitu Podnûsterská moldavská sovûtská socialistická republika v hranicích b˘valé Moldavské autonomní sovûtské socialistické republiky, která existovala v letech 1924 aÏ 1940. Svou úplnou nezávislost vyhlásila 25. srpna 1991, a potvrzena byla v referendu v prosinci téhoÏ roku. Paradoxnû jako poslední vyhlásilo nezávislost na Sovûtském svazu samo Moldavsko – aÏ 27. srpna 1991. Nov˘ stát, stejnû jako dal‰ích 14 republik SSSR, získal mezinárodní uznání, ale uvnitfi zemû narÛstaly rozpory, které na jafie 1992 pfierostly v obãanskou válku trvající na‰tûstí jen nûkolik mûsícÛ. Dodnes se z rozpoutání konfliktu obviÀují obû strany, moldavská strana navíc viní z podpory separatistÛ Moskvu, která jim pr˘ umoÏnila pfievzít zbranû ze skladÛ b˘valé sovûtské armády v Podnûstersku vedené poz5

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Mircea Druc dokonce v roce 1992 kandidoval jako nezávisl˘ na rumunského prezidenta, získal 2,75 % hlasÛ.

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·ok mezi akademickou vefiejností a prorumunsky orientovanou politickou opozicí vyvolalo vydání moldavsko-rumunského slovníku v Ki‰inûvû v roce 2003 (Dict¸ionar moldovenesc-românesc, Chis¸ina˘u 2003). Jeho sestavitel Vasile Stati se rázem ocitl na ãerné listinû tûchto kruhÛ.

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dûj‰ím rusk˘m prezidentsk˘m kandidátem Alexandrem Lebedûm. Jeho zásah situaci uklidnil, ale zároveÀ dlouhodobû uchoval status quo. Spory trvající pfies 15 let se nepodafiilo pro obû strany uspokojivû vyfie‰it a na území Moldavska (resp. Podnûsterské republiky) zÛstává navzdory slibÛm kontingent ruské armády dodnes.6 Trable s pfiítomností ruské armády jsou o to pikantnûj‰í, Ïe je v rozporu se souãasnou platnou moldavskou ústavou (ãlánek 11: „Moldavská republika vyhla‰uje svou trvalou neutralitu. Moldavská republika na svém území nedopustí rozmístûní vojensk˘ch sil cizích státÛ.“) Opozice v parlamentu vládû rozpor mezi ústavou a skuteãností vyãítá a prezentuje ho jako jeden z dÛkazÛ o neschopnosti komunistÛ vládnout. Napûtí mezi Ki‰inûvem a Tiraspolem stále pfietrvává navzdory pfiítomnosti vyjednavaãÛ z OBSE. Vítûzství komunistÛ paradoxnû ztíÏilo vztahy mezi obûma entitami. Neodvolateln˘ podnûstersk˘ prezident Igor Smirnov na zasedání Nejvy‰‰ího sovûtu v záfií 2001 prohlásil, Ïe „po vítûzství komunistÛ se Ki‰inûv pokou‰í vnutit Tiraspolu svá pravidla hry, coÏ poru‰uje dfiíve podepsané dokumenty, vãetnû moskevského memoranda o normalizaci vztahÛ, které pfiedpokládá zahájení rozhovorÛ na rovn˘ch principech, vycházejících ze souãasn˘ch reálií“7. Poslanci Nejvy‰‰ího sovûtu pohrozili, Ïe Moldavsko odfiíznou od plynovodu, kter˘ vede pfies podnûsterské území, a od elektfiiny, která se vyrábí na levém bfiehu Dnûstru a na které je Moldavsko závislé. V roce 2007 by mûla b˘t proto hlavní ki‰inûvská elektrárna TEC-2 modernizována, doplnûna dvûma nov˘mi plynov˘mi turbínami, díky ãemuÏ v˘konnost elektrárny stoupne o 40 %. Elektrárna má následnû zabezpeãit elektfiinou 70 % moldavsk˘ch potfieb. V souãasnosti pokr˘vá pouze 30 % a Moldavsko je závislé na dodávkách elektrické energie z Podnûsterska, které své postavení vyuÏívá k politick˘m nátlakÛm na Ki‰inûv a dodávky obãas krátkodobû pfieru‰uje. Po privatizaci elektrárny GRES ruskou spoleãností Inter RAO EES v roce 2004 byly dodávky naposledy pfieru‰eny 9. listopadu 2005, protoÏe Moldavsko odmítlo pfiistoupit na vy‰‰í ceny.8

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Rusko pfiislíbilo na summitu OBSE v Istanbulu staÏení vojsk do 31. 12. 2002, pozdûji byl tento termín nûkolikrát prodlouÏen a ruská armáda v zemi nadále setrvává. Nezavisimaja gazeta, 5. 2. 2002. Http://www.vostokexpres.net/39.

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Moldavské elektrárny TEC-1 a TEC-2 leÏící nedaleko Ki‰inûva nedokázaly dosud pokr˘t energetickou potfiebu státu a deficit elektfiiny se fie‰í importem z Ukrajiny. Moldavská vláda, která nemá kontrolu nad hlavní moldavskou elektrárnou GRES leÏící na podnûsterském území, v posledních letech hledala alternativní zdroje elektrické energie. V listopadu 2005 se napfi. dohodla na dodávkách elektfiiny z Rumunska, ale perspektivu vidí jen v posilování vlastních zdrojÛ, které by zabezpeãily energetickou nezávislost zemû. Do roku 2010 chce Moldavsko vlastními zdroji pokr˘vat 90 % spotfieby elektfiiny. V roce 2001 to bylo pouze 10 % a Moldavsko bylo zcela závislé na dodávkách elektfiiny z Podnûsterska a ze zahraniãí. Mezi Podnûsterskem a Moldavskem dochází k drobn˘m incidentÛm nûkolikrát do roka, b˘vají v‰ak ãistû umûlé a vyuÏívají se ke zvy‰ování napûtí. Drobné ‰arvátky znepfiíjemÀují Ïivot pfiedev‰ím obyãejn˘m lidem, ktefií mají na obou bfiezích Dnûstru pfiíbuzné. Napfi. v létû a na podzim 2003 nefungovalo nûkolik mûsícÛ mezi Ki‰inûvem a Tiraspolem pozemní telefonní spojení a oba telekomy se vzájemnû obviÀovaly z pfieru‰ení telefonních linek. Z Evropy se v té dobû dalo dovolat do Tiraspolu bez problémÛ… Moldav‰tí mobilní operátofii zase obviÀují Podnûstersko, Ïe vyuÏívá star˘ch sovûtsk˘ch ru‰iãek k ru‰ení mobilního signálu v Ki‰inûvû a okolí. Podnûstersk˘ telekom naopak obviÀuje Moldavsko, Ïe umûle ru‰í signál jeho mobilní sítû. Podobn˘ch pfiíkladÛ vzájemn˘ch naschválÛ lze vyjmenovat mnoho. Moskva se nadále angaÏuje jako prostfiedník v mírov˘ch rozhovorech mezi Ki‰inûvem a Tiraspolem, ãasto jsou dohodnuty konkrétní závûry, na které se ov‰em po nûjaké dobû zapomene, a jednání zaãínají znovu od zaãátku. V roce 2003 Vladimir Voronin navrhl Podnûstersku vytvofiení federativního státu, ve kterém by získalo rozsáhlou autonomii. Od té doby vyjednavaãi z obou stran projednávají podobu spoleãné ústavy, pfies vzájemné uji‰Èování o upfiímné snaze konflikt vyfie‰it v‰ak rozhovory zatím vÏdy konãily ve slepé uliãce. Vefiejnost v Podnûsterské republice, reprezentovaná nevládními organizacemi a odbory (napfi. kozáci, veteránské svazy, svaz Ïen, uãitelské odbory), ve sv˘ch prohlá‰eních odrazuje svou vládu od rozhovorÛ s Ki‰inûvem a vyz˘vá k opu‰tûní jednání spoleãné ústavní komise. Nelze v‰ak jednoznaãnû urãit, nakolik jsou tyto iniciativy spontánní nebo organizované vládou. V ãervnu 2005 vznikla v Tiraspolu a Benderách mládeÏnická organi-

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zace Proryv! (ãesky PrÛlom!), která se na první pohled nápadnû podobá hnutím Otpor, Pora, Zubr a Kmara. Jejím cílem je aktivizovat apatickou podnûsterskou mládeÏ a získat ji pro my‰lenku plné nezávislosti Podnûsterska, pfiípadnû pro pfiipojení k Ruské federaci.9 Ki‰inûvsk˘ tisk obviÀuje vládu Igora Smirnova, Ïe nemá o znovusjednocení s Moldavskem zájem, protoÏe by ztratil kontrolu nad Podnûsterskem, kde údajnû vládne jako car. O Podnûstersku se v tisku zjednodu‰enû pí‰e jako o stalinistické diktatufie, kam se turistÛm neradí cestovat. V prezidentsk˘ch volbách v prosinci 2001 byl v Podnûstersku zvolen jiÏ potfietí Igor Smirnov, kter˘ stál u zrodu republiky pfied 11 lety. OBSE v‰ak volby nepovaÏovala za svobodné ani spravedlivé a volby samozfiejmû neuznalo Moldavsko. Proti prezidentovi Smirnovovi kandidoval starosta druhého nejvût‰ího mûsta Bendery Tom Zenoviã a pfiedseda strany Vláda lidu Aleksandr Radãenko10. Oba byli vystaveni tlaku úfiadÛ a nedostali na prezentaci stejn˘ prostor jako prezident Smirnov. Zenoviã byl krátce pfied volbami zbaven úfiadu starosty a Radãenka opakovanû z nejrÛznûj‰ích formálních pfiíãin pfiedvolávali pfied soud. Demokratická opozice v Podnûstersku neexistuje a stát fiídí postkomunistická obchodnická oligarchie, tj. b˘valí partajní tajemníci, fieditelé státních závodÛ a sovchozÛ.11 Aãkoliv povaha reÏimu v Podnûstersku je jiná, neÏ v Bûlorusku, Smirnov je mnohem více prezidentem konsenzuálním neÏ samovládcem je pfiirozené, Ïe v prezidentsk˘ch volbách, které se konají v prosinci 2006 jiÏ poãtvrté s pfievahou zvítûzí, neboÈ nemá ve svém okolí konkurenci. Spor mezi Moldavskem a Podnûsterskem je, zdá se, nefie‰iteln˘. Pro Tiraspol je oficiálnû nepfiijatelné jakékoli sníÏení statusu souãasné republiky

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Koordinátofii Proryvu uvádûjí, Ïe hnutí má tisíc ãlenÛ a vzniklo sjednocením pÛvodnû 13 organizací. Vût‰ina stávajících organizací v‰ak ve skuteãnosti pfiedtím existovala ãistû formálnû, bez ãlenské základny. Proryv se dosud zamûfioval na pofiádání drobn˘ch demonstrací a happeningÛ na podporu podnûsterské státnosti, proti moldavské vládû, proti OBSE, ale také bûÏn˘ch kulturních akcí. Radãenko byl v letech 2000–2005 poslancem Nejvy‰‰ího sovûtu. Je povaÏován za jednoho z mála kritikÛ vlády a samotného Smirnova, neusiluje v‰ak o znovusjednocení s Moldavskem, naopak zastává proruské postoje. Poslední volby do Nejvy‰‰ího sovûtu se konaly 11. prosince 2005. Jedním z novû zvolen˘ch poslancÛ je i syn podnûsterského prezidenta podnikatel Oleg Smirnov (38 let), vût‰ina z 43 poslancÛ jsou vesmûs fieditelé velk˘ch podnûstersk˘ch firem a státní úfiedníci. Seznam zvolen˘ch poslancÛ zde: http:/ /www.tiras.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=393

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v budoucí federaci na pouh˘ region, byÈ s ‰irokou autonomií. Neústupnost podnûsterské strany nedává nadûji na jakoukoliv vzájemnou dohodu. Vztahy s Ruskem Rusko hraje v podnûsterském konfliktu dvojí hru. V roce 2003 jmenovan˘ nov˘ rusk˘ velvyslanec v Ki‰inûvû Jurij Zubakov (dÛstojník FSB) nezavítal napoprvé na náv‰tûvu k pfiedstaviteli Moldavska, ale do Tiraspolu, kde se setkal se Smirnovem, popfiál mu „splnûní v‰ech jeho plánÛ“ a nazval ho ãlovûkem, kter˘ „vÏdycky se ctí a dÛstojností slouÏil své vlasti“.12 V souvislosti s moldavsk˘mi volbami v bfieznu 2005 se rusko-moldavské vztahy znaãnû ochladily. Pfiedstavitelé obou zemí se pustili do slovních pfiestfielek, z Moldavska bylo vypovûzeno nûkolik RusÛ, ktefií se pr˘ vmû‰ovali do prÛbûhu volební kampanû. UÏ 9. února bylo vypovûzeno ‰est RusÛ. Následnû 18. února bylo zadrÏeno 18 cizincÛ, z nich 13 RusÛ, jedenáct bylo vypovûzeno. Proti zadrÏení protestovalo ruské ministerstvo zahraniãí. Den nato byly zadrÏeny dal‰í dvû Rusky. Úkolem cizincÛ pr˘ bylo diskreditovat komunistickou stranu, tvrdil tehdy fieditel Bezpeãnostní informaãní sluÏby, kter˘ Rusy pfiímo obvinil ze ‰pionáÏe. V dÛsledku zhor‰ení vzájemn˘ch vztahÛ proto na volby nedorazily pozorovatelé z Ruska ani ze zemí SNS. Moldavsk˘m vládním kruhÛm se nelíbila údajná ruská propaganda pfied volbami. Pfiedseda moldavské Koordinaãní rady pro televizní a rozhlasové vysílání obvinil rusk˘ První kanál, kter˘ je translatován do Moldavska a kaÏd˘ veãer vysílá vlastní moldavské zpravodajství, z neobjektivity a podpory opoziãní koalice Demokratické Moldavsko. Do zpráv 19. února byl totiÏ pozván vÛdce koalice Serafim Urechean, kter˘ komentoval sjezd moldavské diaspory v Moskvû. Moldavská státní média tvrdila, Ïe sjezd zorganizovali kriminálníci a Ïe s moldavskou men‰inou v Rusku nemûl nic spoleãného13. Vzájemné vztahy se natolik vyhrotily, Ïe v ruské Státní dumû se dokonce projednávala moÏnost zavést proti Moldavsku ekonomické sankce. Ty zavedeny nebyly, ale Kreml proti moldavsk˘m komunistÛm zahájil informaãní 12 13

Kommersant˝-Pljus, 31. 10. 2003. Moldpres, 20. 2. 2005.

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válku. 27. února vysílal rusk˘ První kanál ve svém pofiadu Vremja rozhovor s ‰éfem moldavského podsvûtí, podnikatelem Grigorijem Karamalakem. On sám uÏ v Moldavsku neÏije, o svÛj majetek zde pfii‰el (v rozhovoru uvedl, Ïe jeho „podnikatelské aktivity pfie‰ly do rukou Voroninova syna Olega“, ãímÏ se pokusil Voronina otevfienû kompromitovat). Rusko jako garant zájmÛ Podnûsterské republiky s nelibostí nese Voroninovy aktivity vedoucí k izolaci Podnûsterska (diplomatickou ofenzívu, ekonomick˘ nátlak na Tiraspol a absolutní kontrolu toku zboÏí na ukrajinsk˘ch hranicích). V této souvislosti je dobré pfiipomenout, Ïe b˘val˘ ki‰inûvsk˘ primátor a pfiedseda koalice Demokratické Moldavsko Serafim Urechean je uÏ nûkolik let ãast˘m hostem v Tiraspolu a s prezidentem Smirnovem se nûkolikrát setkali. Naopak Voronin po svém zvolení prezidentem v Podnûstersku dosud nebyl (ke skandálnímu zamítnutí Voroninovy cesty do‰lo v roce 2003, kdy se v Tiraspolu na místním stadiónû konal dÛleÏit˘ fotbalov˘ zápas, ale prezident Voronin se ho nemohl osobnû zúãastnit). Moldavská státní média kontrolovaná komunisty dokonce pfied volbami tvrdila, Ïe Smirnov poskytl Urecheanovi na jeho pfiedvolební kampaÀ dva milióny dolarÛ. Rusko má v Moldavsku úãinné páky a mÛÏe místní politiku efektivnû ovlivÀovat. Moldavsko dluÏí za plyn ruskému koncernu Gazprom pfies 1 mld. USD, pfiiãemÏ Gazprom vlastní kontrolní balík akcií spoleãnosti Moldova-Gaz, která plyn v zemi distribuuje, a nemusí ani platit poplatek za tranzit do Rumunska. Gazprom za prominutí dluhÛ dlouho poÏadoval pfievzetí dvaceti klíãov˘ch moldavsk˘ch (nejen) energetick˘ch státních ãi polostátních firem, jejichÏ získáním by ovládl v˘znamnou ãást moldavské ekonomiky. Stejná situace ov‰em panuje i ve vodárenství a teplárenství. Chudí Moldavané neplatí za komunální sluÏby a energetiãtí v˘robci a distributofii se pak stávají dluÏníky pfied sv˘mi dodavateli. Prakticky kaÏdou zimu se lidé krátkodobû ocitají bez dodávek tepla. K velké krizi do‰lo na zaãátku roku 2006, kdy Gazprom zaãal od Moldavska namísto dosavadních 80 dolarÛ za kubick˘ metr plynu poÏadovat 160 dolarÛ.

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Politická opozice a komunistická vláda Sociální a ekonomické problémy, které nevyfie‰ily pfiedchozí vlády, mûli najednou po pfiekvapivû velkolepém vítûzství ve volbách roku 2001 fie‰it komunisté, ktefií ov‰em nemûli Ïádnou pfiedchozí zku‰enost s vládnutím. Komunisté, ktefií se rychle nauãili vyuÏívat média, se pfiesto snaÏí navodit dojem, Ïe jen oni jdou správnou cestou a jen oni mohou zemi vyvést z krize. Naopak opozice, zejména KfiesÈansko-demokratická lidová strana (PPCD),14 obviÀuje vládu ze zavádûní diktatury a nastolení atmosféry strachu. Na zaãátku ledna 2002 vláda zru‰ila ve ‰kolách v˘uku rumunsk˘ch dûjin a naopak zavedla v˘uku moldavsk˘ch dûjin, zkreslen˘ch sovûtskou historiografií. Nacionalistická opozice, která má silnou oporu v inteligenci, v‰ak povaÏuje moldavské dûjiny za souãást rumunsk˘ch, a tak zmûnu ‰kolních osnov politicky vyuÏila a proti vládnímu rozhodnutí zahájila 9. ledna demonstrace. Hlavním svolavatelem byla KfiesÈansko-demokratická lidová strana. Vycházela mj. z toho, Ïe povinné vyuãování ru‰tiny bylo zru‰eno v roce 1989 a mladí lidé dnes uÏ mluví rusky málo. Také podle tehdy dostupn˘ch údajÛ z posledního sãítání lidu 64 % obyvatel upfiednostÀovalo jako první jazyk rumun‰tinu. Pfied parlamentem a prezidentsk˘m palácem stálo od ledna do konce dubna stanové mûsteãko, kde demonstranti nocovali. Demonstrací se dennû úãastnilo stovky aÏ tisíce lidí. KvÛli organizování nepovolen˘ch shromáÏdûní vláda 22. ledna na 30 dní ãinnost PPCD pozastavila, stanové mûsteãko v‰ak nerozehnala. V˘znamnou roli v nepouÏití násilného scénáfie patrnû sehrála pozornost mezinárodního spoleãenství a zv˘‰ená pfiítomnost zahraniãních novináfiÛ. V polovinû února pfiedseda kfiesÈansk˘ch demokratÛ Iurie Ros¸ca na jedné z demonstrací vyhlásil nov˘ cíl: protesty neskonãí, dokud komunistická vláda neodstoupí a nevypí‰e nové volby. PÛvodnû nevinné demonstrace se pfiemûnily v antikomunistické protesty. Pro Voronina ale pfiedãasné volby nepfiicházely v úvahu a koneckoncÛ se nemûl ãeho bát: mûl v parlamentu ústavní vût‰inu 71 mandátÛ. Parlament byl v obleÏení policie, která ho stfieÏila. Nejvût‰í demonstrace se uskuteãnila 24. února, kdy se v centru Ki‰inûva shromáÏdilo 70 tisíc demonstrantÛ. Protesty byly pokojné, policie proti nim ani jednou nezasáhla a spokojila se jen se zat˘14

Rumunsky Partidul Popular Cres¸tin Democrat.

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káním jednotliv˘ch aktivistÛ. Za ãtyfii mûsíce protestÛ bylo ve správním fiízení odsouzeno k pokutû asi sto lidí, tfii poslanci byli zbaveni imunity, proti ãtyfiem poslancÛm bylo zavedeno trestní stíhání (obvinûni z „organizování nepovolen˘ch demonstrací“ a „zneuÏívání neplnolet˘ch k politick˘m cílÛm“). Voronin dokonce obvinil opozici, Ïe demonstrace jsou financovány podnûstersk˘mi separatisty, aby vyvolaly v zemi chaos. Nové napûtí mezi vládou a opozicí vypuklo na konci bfiezna kvÛli zmizení opoziãního pfiedáka Vlada Cubreacova, kter˘ patfiil mezi hlavní organizátory protestÛ. Poslanec a místopfiedseda PPCD zmizel beze stopy 21. bfiezna. Voronin prohlásil, Ïe ho PPCD sama schovala, aby „zv˘‰ila svou nulovou popularitu“. Dal‰í velká demonstrace se konala 31. bfiezna, na kterou pfii‰lo asi 50 tisíc lidí. Dva dny pfiedtím pfiijal parlament ovládan˘ komunisty usnesení, které obãany vyzvalo, aby se demonstrací neúãastnili, a oznaãil je za „nelegální a protiústavní“. Po dvou mûsících se Cubreacov opût náhle objevil 25. kvûtna a tvrdil, Ïe byl unesen, ale neví k˘m. Ve sv˘ch oficiálních Ïivotopisech toto období nepfiipomíná, provládní média v‰ak tuto pfiíhodu ãasto zmiÀují a tvrdí, Ïe PPCD zmizení zinscenovala. Nejvût‰í ãást protestujících tvofiili po celou dobu protestÛ studenti. V nûkter˘ch dnech dokonce fieditelé stfiedních ‰kol, sympatizující s PPCD, ru‰ili vyuãování. Teprve kdyÏ ministr ‰kolství pohrozil propu‰tûním uãitelÛ, pfiestala b˘t v˘uka ru‰ena, av‰ak studenti na demonstrace dále proudili. Ministr ‰kolství studentÛm pohrozil, Ïe pokud se nevrátí do uãeben, budou muset opakovat roãník. Policie dokonce obsadila vchody do univerzit v centru Ki‰inûva, odkud nevypou‰tûla studenty, ktefií mífiili na demonstrace. Podle svûdectví agentury Prima-News to mnozí studenti fie‰ili po svém: opou‰tûli ‰koly okny.15 K demonstrantÛm se v polovinû dubna pfiipojila i ãást stávkujících zamûstnancÛ tehdy je‰tû státní televize. Od konce února totiÏ stávkovala tfietina zamûstnancÛ Teleradio-Moldova, kter˘m vadilo, Ïe komunisté cenzurovali média. Stávkujícím vadila existence seznamu opoziãních politikÛ, ale také znám˘ch hercÛ, umûlcÛ a spisovatelÛ, jejichÏ tváfie se nesmûly na obrazovce zpravodajství vÛbec objevit. NovináfiÛm bylo zakázáno o nich natáãet reportáÏe a vysílat spoty, které neodpovídají názorÛm vlády. Vláda

poslala do televize policii, která stávkující redaktory nevpou‰tûla do budovy. Nûkolik dní se zprávy vÛbec nevysílaly, dokud redaktofii loajální vedení televize nevytvofiili nov˘ zpravodajsk˘ t˘m. Teprve po cestû delegace Rady Evropy do Ki‰inûva na zaãátku dubna byla cenzura ãásteãnû uvolnûna, a televize dokonce mohla odvysílat reportáÏe o zmizení Cubreacova. âtyfii mûsíce trvající protesty ukonãila PPCD 29. dubna, kdyÏ se s komunistickou vládou dohodla na kompromisu, podle nûhoÏ nebude vláda dále trestat úãastníky demonstrací a naopak opozice nebude poÏadovat demisi vlády. Mnohem hÛfie v‰ak dopadli rebelové z televize. âást stávkujících novináfiÛ byla postupnû donucena z televize odejít, ãást byla odstavena od natáãení politického zpravodajství a pfievedena do redakce kultury nebo zcela mimo obrazovku. Vedení televize doãasn˘ nedostatek redaktorÛ vyfie‰ilo mimofiádn˘m náborem mezi studenty Ïurnalistiky ochotn˘mi pfiistoupit na cenzuru, za coÏ jim bylo umoÏnûno takfika pfies noc vyrÛst v televizní hvûzdy. Televizní zpravodajství díky loajálním redaktorÛm nyní zcela otevfienû straní komunistÛm a pfies protesty opozice a kritiku Rady Evropy nelze oãekávat brzkou zmûnu. Plnû se jednostrannost vefiejnoprávní televize a rozhlasu projevila pfied parlamentními volbami v bfieznu 200516. Komunistické stranû dávalo pfiednost ‰est z jedenácti moldavsk˘ch celoplo‰n˘ch a regionálních televizí.17 Napfiíklad ústfiední kanál Moldova 1 bezprecedentnû zv˘‰il poãet zpráv o komunistech: 12. února bylo komunistÛm vûnováno 75 % ãasu urãeného pfiedvolebnímu zpravodajství, 24. února uÏ 85 %. VyváÏené zpravodajství v‰ak nenabídl ani mûstsk˘ ki‰inûvsk˘, magistrátem vlastnûn˘ kanál Euro TV Chis¸inau, kter˘ nejvíce ãasu vûnoval koalici ki‰inûvského primátora Serafima Urecheana Demokratické Moldavsko (33 %), sociálním demokratÛm, ktefií se nakonec nedostali do parlamentu (18 %), kfiesÈansk˘m demokratÛm (11 %) a komunistÛm (jen 8 %). První kanál v Moldovû18 také sv˘m zpravodajstvím stranil koalici Demokratické Moldavsko.

16 17

15

Prima-News, 8. 4. 2002.

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18

V roce 2004 do‰lo k formální transformaci státní televize na vefiejnoprávní. Monitoring Nezávislého centra Ïurnalistiky a Article XIX. Zdroj: Moldavskije vedomosti, 2. 3. 2005. Rusk˘ První kanál vysílá na území Moldavska ve 20:30 vlastní moldavské zprávy.

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Vefiejnoprávní Radio Moldova vûnovalo komunistÛm 83 % ãasu zpravodajství urãeného volbám, Radio Gagauzia dokonce 98 %. Komunisty proteÏovala také vût‰ina FM hudebních stanic, protoÏe jejich vlastníky jsou podnikatelé napojení na komunisty. Ki‰inûvské mûstské rádio vlastnûné magistrátem Antena C vûnovalo Demokratickému Moldavsku 33 % ãasu, komunistÛm 25 %, sociálním demokratÛm 14 % a kfiesÈansk˘m demokratÛm 13 %. Volby byly jinak velmi nudné, nevedla se Ïádná v˘razná volební kampaÀ. Centrem Ki‰inûva obãas pro‰ly skupinky mlad˘ch agitátorÛ z koalice Demokratické Moldavsko, od kfiesÈansk˘ch demokratÛ a komunistické strany, ktefií rozdávali letáãky vyz˘vající hlasovat za tu ãi onu stranu. Kromû klasick˘ch agitaãních letákÛ a broÏur v‰ak aktivisté rozdávali letáky, které se snaÏily diskreditovat konkurenãní strany:19 „Sly‰í‰?! Dûjiny tvofií mládeÏ! Dûjiny tvofií‰ TY! Nedovol, aby se zemû dostala pod kriminální vládu Ïluto-oranÏového moru — Urecheana, Braghis¸e, Diacova, Ros¸cy. ¤ekni této ‰pínû NE! Hlasuj za Moldavsko! Hlasuj za evropskou budoucnost!“ (leták komunistÛ) Dvû velká písmenka EU s dvanácti hvûzdiãkami v rudé barvû (jin˘ leták komunistÛ vyjadfiující souznûní komunistÛ s Evropskou unií) „Pozor: Nebezpeãí! Îluto-oranÏoví se rvou do vlády. Nedovol jim znovu rozkrádat Moldavsko! Do Evropy bez zlodûjÛ a prodejn˘ch politikÛ! Moldavsko ãeká na tvé rozhodnutí! Moldavsko potfiebuje tvÛj hlas!“ (leták komunistÛ) Hlavním pfiedvolebním symbolem komunistÛ byla zdviÏená ruka s prsty do V, samozfiejmû v rudé barvû a heslo „Moldavsko zvítûzí!“ a dále „EU votez, Hlasuj za EU“. Písmenko „e“ ve slovû „votez“ pak nahrazoval srp s kladivem. Stejnû ostfie se o sv˘ch politick˘ch konkurentech vyjadfiovali ve volebních materiálech i kfiesÈan‰tí demokraté. Hlavním motivem jejich volebních novin byl slib, Ïe zatoãí s mafiánsk˘mi vládami. Koalici Demokratické Moldavsko naz˘vali „kágébáckou mafií“, která v letech 1998 a 2001 vládla v Moldavsku, a souãasnou komunistickou vládu „ruskou komunistickou mafií“.

Hlavním sloganem kfiesÈansk˘ch demokratÛ bylo: „Ukrajina volila Ju‰ãenka, oranÏovou, Evropu! Rumunsko volilo Basesca, oranÏovou, Evropu! Hlasujte za srdce, za oranÏovou, za Evropu!“ Blok Demokratické Moldavsko natiskl Ïluté kalendáfiíky s kráãícím Urecheanem s ledabyle zdviÏenou pravicí a ukazováãkem. Nápis vedle vysvûtloval: „Pfiicházíme zlep‰it vበÏivot!“ Není se ãemu divit, Ïe v parlamentních volbách 6. bfiezna 2005 získala Strana komunistÛ 45,98 % hlasÛ voliãÛ (56 mandátÛ), na druhém místû skonãila koalice Demokratické Moldavsko s 28,53 % (34 mandátÛ) a tfietí KfiesÈansko-demokratická lidová strana s 9,07 % (11 mandátÛ). Dal‰í politické strany nepfiekroãily 5% volební prách, aãkoli socialistická strana Patria-Vlast se k hranici tûsnû pfiiblíÏila: získala 4,97 % hlasÛ. Politická situace se volbami ov‰em je‰tû více zkomplikovala. Komunisté sice získali prostou vût‰inu, aby sestavili vládu, ale nemohli zvolit prezidenta (je potfieba 61 hlasÛ). Obû opoziãní strany nezávisle na sobû jiÏ den po volbách oznámily, Ïe hodlají vyvolat pfiedãasné volby. Podle ústavy, pokud není prezident zvolen ani po 45 dnech po prvním hlasování, musí se pfiedãasné volby konat. Obû opoziãní strany spolu nicménû odmítly spolupracovat. Den po volbách se konaly tiskové konference Serafima Urecheana a Iurie Ros¸cy a oba si vzájemnû pfies novináfie pfiedávali rÛzné invektivy. Zajímav˘ byl v této situaci opût postoj ústfiední televize. PfiestoÏe obû parlamentní opoziãní strany svornû pfiislíbily vyvolání pfiedãasn˘ch voleb, vefiejnoprávní televize Moldova 1 o poÏadavku mlãela. Dokonce ani o povolebních tiskov˘ch konferencích pfiedstavitelÛ opozice neinformovala, pfiestoÏe na obou tiskov˘ch konferencích redaktofii televize byli.20 Vefiejnoprávní televize se nepfiímo stala hlavní záminkou, proã opozice pfiedãasné volby poÏadovala. Koalice Demokratické Moldavsko i kfiesÈan‰tí demokraté televizi obvinili, Ïe pfied volbami informovala pozitivnû pouze o vládnoucích komunistech, a opozici buì v‰emoÏnû kompromitovala, nebo o ní zcela mlãela. Zpravodajství skuteãnû obvykle vypadá tak, Ïe o vyjádfiení je poÏádán jen pfiedstavitel komunistÛ, ale jin˘ názor v reportáÏi ne20

19

V Ki‰inûvû se volební letáky ve v˘znamné mífie distribuovaly v ru‰tinû, dokonce i PPCD mûla dvojjazyãné varianty letákÛ: v rumun‰tinû a v ru‰tinû.

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Ruské televize První kanál a NTV o poÏadavku moldavské opozice vyvolat pfiedãasné volby pfiitom podrobnû referovaly (NTV dokonce zprávu zafiadila po Maschadovovi jako druhou nejv˘znamnûj‰í událost dne).

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zazní. O názorech opozice se hovofií buì nepfiímo (novináfi sám vlastními slovy interpretuje postoj opozice k nûjakému problému) a nebo vÛbec. Jako pfiíklad mÛÏe poslouÏit pofiadí reportáÏí hlavního zpravodajského pofiadu Express-Novosti z úter˘ 8. bfiezna 2005, 19:00, tedy dva dny po volbách, kdy je‰tû ov‰em nebyly vyhlá‰eny oficiální volební v˘sledky: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

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V Moldavsku slavíme Mezinarodní den Ïen ReportáÏ o kvûtináfikách na nejvût‰ím ki‰inûvském trÏi‰ti Strana komunistÛ vede ve volebních v˘sledcích ve v‰ech okresech státu USA uznaly volby za demokratické Co pí‰e o moldavsk˘ch volbách zahraniãní tisk (New York Times, Libération) Ruská FSB zabila Maschadova Pfiehled zpráv ze svûta Svaz moldavsk˘ch filmafiÛ pozdravil moldavské Ïeny pfii pfiíleÏitosti MDÎ Konfederace odborov˘ch svazÛ pozdravila své ãlenky pfii pfiíleÏitosti MDÎ V ki‰inûvském gymnáziu Gaudeamus probûhla celostátní soutûÏ ve francouzském jazyce

Pfies vût‰inu, kterou má komunistická vláda v parlamentu, se projevují rozpory uvnitfi vládnoucí strany, kde o moc bojuje tzv. pragmatické kfiídlo na ãele s prezidentem Voroninem, a tzv. ortodoxní kfiídlo, jeÏ má oporu v ãlenské základnû. Ani vláda premiéra Vasile Tarleva není dostateãnû stabilní. Jen za první tfii roky vymûnil prezident 90 % ministrÛ, na nûkter˘ch ministerstvech se ‰éf rezortu dokonce zmûnil dvakrát-tfiikrát. Pfies jisté vnitfiní pnutí nemají komunisté v politickém spektru reálnou alternativu a lze oãekávat jejich opûtovn˘ volební úspûch minimálnû je‰tû v pfií‰tích volbách v roce 2009. Celkov˘ budoucí v˘voj zemû ale neodhadneme, a to ani z v˘sledkÛ prÛzkumÛ vefiejného mínûní. Podle prÛzkumu realizovaného v záfií 2003 si 52,2 % dotázan˘ch pfieje, aby Moldavsko vstoupilo do Evropské unie, 31,6 do NATO, sjednocení s Rumunskem si pfieje 19 % obãanÛ a vstup do Svazu Ruska a Bûloruska 40 %. Z prÛzkumu dále vyplynulo, Ïe ruskojazyãné obyvatelstvo se orientuje spí‰e na V˘chod, naopak rumunojazyãné na Západ.

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Celkem 73 % obãanÛ je hrdo, Ïe jsou obãany svého státu. V kategorii etnick˘ch sympatií v˘sledky dopadly takto: RumunÛm nedÛvûfiuje 24,1 % dotázan˘ch a dÛvûfiuje 10,9 %, RusÛm nedÛvûfiuje 10 % dÛvûfiuje 22,3 %.21 Pfies v‰echny problémy je Moldavsko z b˘val˘ch republik SSSR stále jednou z nejdemokratiãtûj‰ích zemí, av‰ak moldavská demokracie není dostateãnû stabilní (opozice nemá pfiístup do státních médií – naopak je jimi ostrakizována, do vy‰‰ích orgánÛ státní správy a do funkcí v parlamentních v˘borech se dostanou jen lidé loajální komunistické stranû apod.). Jistá dekorativní zmûna nastala aÏ na zaãátku volebního období 2005–2009. Dne 4. dubna 2005 totiÏ ãást kfiesÈansko-demokratick˘ch poslancÛ podpofiila v prezidentské volbû Vladimira Voronina, kter˘ byl takto zvolen na své druhé funkãní období. O podporu sv˘ch poslancÛ se postaral pfiedseda strany Iurie Ros¸ca, kter˘ byl o ãtyfii dny pozdûji „na oplátku“ zvolen místopfiedsedou parlamentu. MÛÏe se ov‰em stát, Ïe v prÛbûhu volebního období se vzájemné kfiehké spojenectví Ros¸cy a komunistÛ naru‰í, a ti svojí vût‰inou ‰éfa kfiesÈansk˘ch demokratÛ z funkce místopfiedsedy zákonodárného sboru odvolají.22 Rozpory ve spoleãnosti ov‰em doãasné politické spojenectví dvou hlavních politick˘ch rivalÛ nefie‰í. DÛvodem je slab˘ stát, v nûmÏ klíãovou roli nehraje obãan, ale státní úfiedník (obvykle zkorumpovan˘), rozrÛznûné a navzájem nepfiátelské elity (napfi. prorumunsky orientované elity ovládly Ki‰inûvskou univerzitu a Akademii vûd, prorusky orientované elity ovládly média a velk˘ prÛmysl) a v neposlední fiadû diametrálnû protifieãící si politické programy tfií hlavních stran. Kritická slova o stavu moldavské demokracie je nucen si vyslechnout Vladimir Voronin pokaÏdé, kdyÏ opustí zemi smûrem na západ. Na zasedání Parlamentního shromáÏdûní Rady Evropy 10. fiíjna 2003 musel odráÏet nepfiíjemné otázky. Ze 14 otázek evropsk˘ch poslancÛ bylo jedenáct jednoznaãnû negativních, tfii neutrální (kdy odejde z Moldavska ruská armáda, zda vláda poru‰uje lidská práva a demokracii, jak se vláda vypofiádá 21 22

V˘sledky prÛzkumu uskuteãnûného Institutem vefiejné politiky a Centrem anal˘zy a prÛzkumu CIVIS, publikováno v: Novoje vremja, 3. 10. 2003. Podpora ze strany Ros¸cy mnohé pfiekvapila, neboÈ pfii poslední prezidentské volbû v roce 2001 osobnû sv˘m tûlem bránil kfiesÈansko-demokratick˘m poslancÛm vstupu do poslaneckého sálu, aby se prezidentské volby nemohli úãastnit.

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s obchodem s lidmi a s lidsk˘mi orgány, budou-li komunisté zestátÀovat, kdy vláda splatí zahraniãní dluh, proã vláda vrací sovûtské osnovy do ‰kol, proã se poru‰ují práva RumunÛ v Moldavsku). ¤ada otázek pfiitom vypl˘vá z neznalosti vnitfiní situace a evrop‰tí poslanci více dÛvûfiují moldavské opozici, která tak bûÏn˘ vnitropolitick˘ boj ideov˘ch koncepcí pfiená‰í na mezinárodní scénu. Je oãividné, Ïe Moldavsko je chudé, coÏ pfiiznává i souãasná vláda. Za kampaní zhor‰ující obraz Moldavska v zahraniãí stojí podle Voronina nûkteré nevládní organizace, které se spojily s opozicí. Témata, v jejichÏ spojení se nejãastûji Moldavsko v západním tisku pfiipomíná, jsou obchod se Ïenami, obchod s lidsk˘mi orgány a levná pracovní síla. Jinak klidn˘ Voronin se jen obãas nechá unést a své kritiky naz˘vá „bfiídily“. Policejní sílu proti opoziãním demonstracím v‰ak vláda uÏívá jen zfiídka a dosud nikdo ze zadrÏen˘ch úãastníkÛ drobn˘ch demonstrací nebyl uvûznûn. Politické strany Strana komunistÛ Moldavské republiky23 Komunistická strana MSSSR byla zakázána v srpnu 1991, její ãinnost byla obnovena v fiíjnu 1993 pod názvem Strana komunistÛ Moldavské republiky. Pfiedsedou strany je od poãátku Vladimir Voronin, v˘konn˘m tajemníkem Victor Stepaniuc, kter˘ se stará o chod strany od roku 2001, kdy byl Voronin zvolen prezidentem republiky. Komunisté se opírají vesmûs o dÛchodce a rusky mluvící obyvatelstvo.24 ProtoÏe mladá generace migruje a star‰í generace, ãasto sympatizanti komunistické strany, zÛstává doma a vzpomíná na „staré dobré ãasy“, kdy Moldavsko bylo souãástí sovûtské fií‰e „blahobytu“, mají komunisté zaji‰tûnu vysokou podporu i v pfií‰tích letech. Tento trend pfiispûl k vítûzství komunistické strany v roce 2001 ve volbách do parlamentu, v roce 2003 ve volbách do místních zastupitelstev a opût se zopakoval v roce 2005 ve volbách do parlamentu.

23 24

PCRM, rumunsky Partidul Comunis¸tilor din Republica Moldova. Ru‰tinu primárnû uÏívá aÏ tfietina obyvatel zemû, komunisté slaví úspûch také u GagauzÛ a dal‰ích men‰in.

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Urãitou konkurencí na levém spektru mohou komunistÛm b˘t nové strany socialistického typu Patria-Vlast a radikálnû socialistická strana Rovnoprávnost. Otevfienou otázkou zÛstává i jistá míra nespokojenosti s Voroninem uvnitfi komunistické strany, která v minulosti poslouÏila k vífiení zvûstí o moÏném rozpadu strany. Voronin v‰ak pokaÏdé krizi uvnitfi strany pfiekonal, snad i díky svému prezidentskému úfiadu. S moÏn˘mi zmûnami uvnitfi strany lze poãítat pravdûpodobnû aÏ po skonãení druhého prezidentského funkãního období Vladimira Voronina, které vypr‰í v roce 2009 a podle ústavy je poslední. Demokratické Moldavsko Pfied parlamentními volbami 2005 vytvofiily volební koalici strany Aliance Na‰e Moldavsko (spolupfiedsedové Dumitru Braghis¸, Veaceslav Untila˘, Serafim Urechean), Demokratická strana Moldavska (pfiedseda Dumitru Diacov) a Sociálnû-liberální strana (pfiedseda Oleg Serebrian). Jako koalice musela ve volbách získat 12 %, aby pro‰la do parlamentu. Sama Aliance Na‰e Moldavsko (v názvu je sice slovo aliance, které by se mohlo pfiekládat i jako svaz, ale jedná se o jednu stranu) vznikla na sluãovacím sjezdu nûkolika stran 19. ãervence 2003. Tehdy se spojily Sociálnû demokratická aliance Moldavska (Dumitru Braghis¸), Liberální strana (Veaceslav Untila˘) a Svaz nezávisl˘ch Moldavské republiky (Serafim Urechean). Pfiedsedové pÛvodních stran se staly spolupfiedsedy nové strany. Tyto strany usilovaly o hlasy voliãÛ na spoleãné kandidátce jiÏ v kvûtnov˘ch komunálních volbách roku 2003, ve kter˘ch získaly pfies 20 % hlasÛ. Hlavním bodem programu byly ekonomické reformy a vstup Moldavska do Evropské unie, kritici nového bloku ale nevûfiili v moÏnost sjednocení sociálnûdemokratické a liberální doktríny, z kter˘ch vychází pÛvodní strany. Moldova Noastra˘ nemá pfiedsedu, ale tfii spolupfiedsedy. Politick˘ stfied je dlouhodobû roztfií‰tûn˘, v 90. letech vznikaly a zanikaly rÛzné centristické koalice, ztrácely hlasy politickou nezfietelností (‰lo o koalice politicky rÛznorod˘ch stran). Podobn˘ osud potkal i koalici Demokratické Moldavsko, která se krátce po volbách 2005 prakticky rozpadla. Dlouhou dobu pfied volbami také nebylo jasné, kdo se stane vÛdãí tváfií volební koalice Demokratické Moldavsko, nakonec tuto pozici získal ki‰inûvsk˘ primátor Serafim Urechean, kter˘ se objevoval na volebních plakátech.

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KfiesÈansko demokratická lidová strana25 Její historie sahá do roku 1989, kdy vznikla Lidová fronta Moldavska (FPM), která se pfietransformovala v politickou stranu. V prÛbûhu 90. let se jmenovala KfiesÈansko demokratická lidová fronta (FPCD), v roce 1999 pfiijala název KfiesÈansko demokratická lidová strana (PPCD). SvÛj program staví na konzervatismu a antikomunismu. V 90. letech vytvofiila zejména média o této stranû negativní obraz a kfiesÈanské demokraty obviÀují z prorumunské orientace. Unionistick˘ program v‰ak strana opustila hluboko v 90. letech a dnes je podporován jen men‰í ãástí ãlenské základny. Odchod od poÏadavku sjednocení s Rumunskem v minulosti vedl k od‰tûpení malé frakce a vzniku nûkolika nov˘ch men‰ích stran. Závûr Vnitropolitická situace v Moldavsku se od roku 2001 podstatnû zmûnila a pfiirozenû se to promítlo i do zahraniãnûpolitické roviny. Vzájemné vztahy s Ruskem se kvÛli podnûsterské otázce zhor‰ily, rovnûÏ vztahy s Rumunskem nejsou vÏdy zcela klidné. Po vítûzství Ju‰ãenka má Moldavsko naopak nejteplej‰í vztahy s Ukrajinou, se kterou úzce koordinuje nátlak na Tiraspol a spoleãnou politiku vÛãi Rusku, i kdyÏ Moldavsko je pro svou nezajímavost pro Ukrajinu jen okrajov˘m spojencem. Rusko negativnû reaguje na postupné vymaÀování Moldavska ze své sféry vlivu. Nenabízí se mnoho fie‰ení podnûsterské otázky, podle dosavadního v˘voje se zdá, Ïe zÛstane i v následujících letech zachován status quo. Podnûsterská republika je sobûstaãná a na Ki‰inûvu zcela nezávislá. RovnûÏ zdej‰í obyvatelstvo se pfiiklání spí‰e k variantû samostatnosti nebo spojení s Ruskem, ménû vûfií v moÏnosti reintegrace s Moldavskem. Dosavadní vnitropolitick˘, ekonomick˘ a sociální v˘voj v 90. letech v Moldavsku opravÀuje k závûru, Ïe vût‰inová vláda komunistické strany po roce 2001 napomohla ke stabilizaci pomûrÛ a v˘hledovû poloÏila základy k pozvolnému zlep‰ování zejména ekonomické a sociální situace. Naopak oblast obãansk˘ch práv a svobody tisku zÛstává slab‰ím ãlánkem vlády, ãasto ke zmûnám dochází aÏ po tlaku Rady Evropy nebo OBSE. 25

FPM, Frontul Popular din Moldovu a FPCM, Frontul Popular Cres¸tin-Ocmocrat.

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PfiestoÏe ve volebním obodobí 2001–2005 mûli komunisté ústavní vût‰inu a po volbách 2005 prostou vût‰inu, svého postavení bezprostfiednû nezneuÏili a kromû v˘jimek neschvalovali sporné zákony proti vÛli opozice. Po zku‰enostech s masov˘mi demonstracemi kfiesÈansko-demokratické opozice na jafie 2002 a vlnû mezinárodních protestÛ (Rada Evropy, OBSE, Evropská unie, Spojené státy) v letech 2001–2002 panuje mezi komunisty a opozicí smír, kter˘ byl krátce pfieru‰en jen pfied parlamentními volbami 2005. Komunisté, ktefií pfied volbami 2001 deklarovali proruskou (prosovûtskou) a prosociální orientaci, pragmaticky pfiistupovali v prÛbûhu své vlády k pozvoln˘m reformám, hovofií dokonce o potenciálním vstupu Moldavska do Evropské unie. Na zahraniãní scénû dosud Moldavsko marnû hledalo v˘znamnou oporu, zahraniãní prezidentské, vládní ãi parlamentní náv‰tûvy se v Ki‰inûvû uskuteãÀují v˘jimeãnû (dvojí cesta Aleksandra KwaÊniewského). Za v˘znamnou lze proto hodnotit ãeskou pomoc pfii modernizaci elektrárny TEC-2, která napomÛÏe upevnûní energetické nezávislosti Moldavska. Navzdory poãáteãním mezinárodním obavám z pfiíchodu k moci komunistÛ ve svobodn˘ch volbách, je pfiedseda komunistické strany a prezident republiky Vladimir Voronin na sv˘ch zahraniãních cestách obvykle pfiijímán pozitivnû. âasto si v‰ak musí vyslechnout (oprávnûnou) kritiku za nedÛsledné dodrÏování obãansk˘ch práv a svobody tisku.

KAVKAZ

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9. Nová konfliktní geopolitika JiÏního Kavkazu Emil Souleimanov, Vít Stfiíteck˘

Po válkách z poãátku 90. let a zakonzervované nestabilitû let následujících vykazuje Kavkazsk˘ region v posledních letech zv˘‰enou v˘vojovou dynamiku. Koncem roku 2003 do‰lo ve dvou ze tfií nezávisl˘ch republik jiÏního Kavkazu – v Gruzii a v ÁzerbajdÏánu – ke zmûnû politického vedení. Zatímco „pfiedání moci“ v Baku se i pfies pomûrnû v˘razn˘ odpor opozice podafiilo uskuteãnit v intencích pfiedem sestaveného plánu a moci se chopil syn stávajícího prezidenta Hejdara Alijeva Ilham, sousední Gruzie se v listopadu 2003 stala svûdkem první „sametové revoluce“ v postsovûtsk˘ch dûjinách. Masov˘ odpor tehdy donutil k rezignaci patriarchu gruzínské i sovûtské politiky Eduarda ·evardnadzeho a do ãela zemû se dostala trojice jeho b˘val˘ch spolupracovníkÛ – Nino BurdÏanadze, Zurab Îvania a Micheil Saaka‰vili. Poslední jmenovan˘, charismatick˘ právník Micheil Saaka‰vili, kter˘ po pÛvodním vládním angaÏmá stál od roku 2001 v opozici k ·evardnadzeho reÏimu, byl 4. ledna 2006 s 96% voliãskou podporou zvolen prezidentem. Události v sousední Gruzii inspirovaly také vÛdce arménské opozice. Jejich poãínání se v‰ak z celé fiady pfiíãin ukázala jako marná. Pfies diametrálnû rozdíln˘ pfiístup k moci mají Ilham Alijev a Micheil Saaka‰vili leccos spoleãného. Na rozdíl od sv˘ch pfiestárl˘ch pfiedchÛdcÛ jsou mladí, ambiciózní a nelze jim upfiít i politick˘ talent. V tomto ohledu jejich vzestup doprovázela pfiedev‰ím Ïivá nacionalistická a militaristická rétorika, coÏ bylo zvlá‰tû patrné v pfiípadû gruzínského prezidenta. V˘sledkem tohoto pfiístupu bylo nastartování nové vlny spoleãenského „klimatu oãekávání“ v obou zemích. Kromû rok od roku se pravidelnû opakujících slibÛ o zlep‰ení Ïivotní úrovnû, s neb˘vale novou intenzitou zaznûly i sliby o navrácení kontroly nad vzpurn˘mi provinciemi – JiÏní Ose-

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tií a Abcházií (Gruzie) a Náhorního Karabachu (ÁzerbajdÏán). Toto téma oba muÏi neotevfieli náhodou. Ztráta zmínûn˘ch oblastí stále je‰tû pfiedstavuje pro gruzínskou a ázerbajdÏánskou vefiejnost znaãnû traumatickou záleÏitost, se kterou se dosud nevyrovnaly. Toto vûdomí posiluje i pfiítomnost radikálnû naladûn˘ch bûÏencÛ, kter˘ch je v Gruzii asi 250 000 a v ÁzerbajdÏánu dokonce více neÏ 850 000 a jejichÏ sociálnû-ekonomická situace není ani zdaleka vyfie‰ena. Urãitou úlohu sehrává i nacionálnû-revan‰istická propaganda, která v obou zemích udrÏuje nezbytn˘ mobilizaãní a perspektivnû váleãn˘ potenciál. Otázka zotavení státu tak je do znaãné míry neustále direktnû asociována s otázkou navracení Náhorního Karabachu, Abcházie a JiÏní Osetie. Tento fakt v sobû tedy pfiirozenû skr˘vá znaãn˘ politick˘ potenciál. Jak jiÏ naznaãily pfiedchozí fiádky, jistou ambicí této kapitoly bude na pozadí vnitropolitick˘ch událostí zachytit geopolitické promûny JiÏního Kavkazu. Stará geopolitika postsovûtské periferie V nejnovûj‰ích dûjinách JiÏního Kavkazu je toto území úzce spojováno s postsovûtskou Stfiední Asií, se kterou tvofií tzv. Kaspick˘ region. Toto z geografického hlediska ponûkud zavádûjící zobecnûní v‰ak má svoji logiku, protoÏe vyzdvihuje v˘znam obrovsk˘ch zásob ropy a plynu v Kaspickém mofii, které se nachází mezi Kavkazem a Stfiední Asií.1 RovnûÏ nezanedbatelná je strategická poloha rozsáhlého kavkazsko-stfiedoasijského panregionu, jehoÏ obyvatelstvo tvofií cca 80 milionu lidí. Jde také o území s rozvinutou infrastrukturou, jeÏ se táhne podél jiÏních hranic Ruské federace v tûsné blízkosti jejích potenciálnû v˘bu‰n˘ch etnick˘ch autonomií. Poãáteãní období po pádu SSSR bylo poznamenáno takfika bezv˘hradnou dominancí Ruska na JiÏním Kavkaze. Pfiedev‰ím ekonomicky a politicky byly ÁzerbajdÏán, Gruzie i Arménie stále naprosto závislé na b˘valé metropoli. Moskvû to umoÏÀovalo pfiedev‰ím obratnû vyuÏívat místních etnick˘ch konfliktÛ pro dosaÏení vlastních geopolitick˘ch cílÛ. Podpora osetinského a zejména abchazského separatismu napfiíklad mûla za následek zfiízení vojensk˘ch základen Ruské federace na gruzínském území. Stejn˘ pfiístup se v‰ak ve vztahu k ÁzerbajdÏánu nakonec nevyplatil, i kdyÏ Ázer1

Podle US Energy Department ãiní v˘‰e pfiedpokládan˘ch rezerv Kaspiku cca 233 miliard barelÛ.

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bajdÏán v dÛsledku karaba‰ské války pfii‰el o zhruba ‰estinu svého teritoria. V regionu se rovnûÏ zaãaly po více neÏ 70 letech angaÏovat Turecko a Írán, jejichÏ vliv se v‰ak v dÛsledku fiady faktorÛ ukázal jako znaãnû omezen˘. USA a pfiední evropské zemû v této dobû nevykazovaly v˘razn˘ zájem o JiÏní Kavkaz, pfiestoÏe reÏimy v ÁzerbajdÏánu a Gruzii, usilující o vymanûní se z ruského mocenského podruãí, mnohdy zoufale dávaly najevo svoje sílící prozápadní cítûní. Pasivita Washingtonu byla ov‰em podmínûna objektivními dÛvody. USA si pfiedev‰ím byly vûdomy znaãné ruské citlivosti vÛãi dûní na Kavkaze a nebyly ochotny popouzet Kreml k neÏádoucímu vmû‰ováním se do regionálních záleÏitostí. Také americko-ruské vztahy byly v prvních letech Jelcinovy vlády spí‰e nadstandardní a neexistoval zájem je komplikovat. Permanentní vnitropolitická nestabilita v zemích zmítan˘ch etnick˘mi konflikty v‰ak redukovala zájem energetick˘ch spoleãností i vlád západních zemí o pronikání na jiÏní Kavkaz a do Kaspického regionu. Novûj‰í geopolitika „velké kaspické hry“ Situace se razantnû promûnila po 20. záfií 1994, kdy byl v Baku podepsán tzv. kontrakt století mezi vedoucími západními energetick˘mi spoleãnostmi a ÁzerbajdÏánem. Zafungovalo pfiíznaãné americké pfiísloví Flag follows trade. JiÏ tehdy se zaãalo uvaÏovat o zv˘‰eném geostrategickém v˘znamu Kavkazu a Kaspického regionu obecnû. Právû v tomto roce, kter˘ se ãasovû shodoval s oficiálnû dokumentovan˘m ukonãením bojÛ v Karabachu (kvûten/ãerven 1994), Bill Clinton oznaãil Kaspick˘ region za „sféru Ïivotních zájmÛ USA“. V této „velké hfie“ o kaspickou ropu se elegantnû proplétá geostrategie s ekonomick˘m zájmem. Podle ideologa americké geopolitiky Zbigniewa Brzezinského má totiÏ dne‰ní Rusko, které se nachází na historickém rozcestí, na vybranou dvû moÏnosti: buìto se vrátí k úloze imperiální mocnosti a zaãne expandovat nejprve do b˘val˘ch sovûtsk˘ch republik, nebo se rozhodne pro demokratick˘ v˘voj a zÛstane ve stávajících hranicích. Nejsnadnûj‰ím zpÛsobem, jak zabránit nepfiíznivému v˘voji v Rusku, je odfiíznout cesty pro jeho pfiípadnou expanzi vytváfiením stabilního cordonu sanitaire pomocí posilování klíãov˘ch státÛ Kavkazu, Stfiední Asie a Ukrajiny. Toho ‰lo do znaãné míry dosáhnout i vybudováním ropovo-

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du, kter˘ by transportoval kaspickou ropu a plyn na západní trhy mimo ruské území.2 Washington tak od poloviny 90. let témûfi v˘hradnû i pfies problematick˘ ekonomick˘ v˘hled3 prosazoval tranzit kaspick˘ch surovin smûrem Baku (ÁzerbajdÏán)-Tbilisi (Gruzie)-Ceyhan (Turecko),4 tedy mimo ruské území. Stejnû tak spoleãnû s ÁzerbajdÏánem a Kazachstánem hájí princip sektorového dûlení kaspického ‰elfu a podnûcuje téÏ úãast pfiedev‰ím americk˘ch energetick˘ch spoleãností v kaspick˘ch konsorciích. Usiluje rovnûÏ o plnohodnotné fie‰ení etnick˘ch konfliktÛ na JiÏním Kavkaze a o celkovou stabilizaci této klíãové ropné oblasti a tranzitní kfiiÏovatky. Tyto aktivity a plány se vehementnû pokou‰ela hatit Moskva, která pokládá Kaspickou pánev za zónu sv˘ch v˘luãn˘ch zájmÛ. Jednou z priorit politiky Moskvy se tak stalo zabránit osvojení ropn˘ch loÏisek Kaspického mofie, které ov‰em pfiitahovaly stále vût‰í pozornost ze strany západních mocností. Pfiedpokládalo se tedy, Ïe v˘znam samotn˘ch energetick˘ch zásob Kaspiku je pro dlouhodobé strategické zájmy Ruska spí‰e zanedbateln˘, neboÈ souãasné Rusko nemá dostatek financí, aby samostatnû, tzn. bez západní asistence, uskuteãnilo miliardové projekty spojené s vytváfiením infrastruktury nutné pro tûÏbu a transport kaspick˘ch surovin. Osvojení bohat˘ch kaspick˘ch nalezi‰È bez v˘luãné ruské participace by se v‰ak mohlo stát ekonomick˘m základem pro intenzivní sociálnû-ekonomickou modernizaci kaspick˘ch zemí, rÛstu vojenskopolitického vlivu USA a NATO, coÏ by pak zajisté pfiivodilo konec mocenského monopolu Moskvy v tomto regionu.

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Brzezinski Z., The Grand Chessboard – American Primacy And It’s Geostrategic Imperatives, New York 1997, citováno podle ãeské verze: Velká ‰achovnice. K ãemu Ameriku zavazuje její globální pfievaha, Praha 1999, str. 152–153. Detailní anal˘za viz napfiíklad Baum R., Timeframes, Markets and Government Influence: An Economic-Based Look at Pipeline Routes for Caspian Sea Oil, Princeton University, 1998, Soligo R., a Amy, M., Jaffe, The economics of Pipeline Routes, in: Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future of Central and the Caucasus, Baker Institute Study, Rice University, 1998, Stauffer T. R., Caspian Fantasy: The Economics of Political Pipelines, http://www.watsoninstitute.org/bjwa/archive/7.2/Oil/Stauffer.pdf. V˘znam Gruzie je zv˘‰en˘, protoÏe pfiedstavuje v podstatû nealternativní tranzitní bod pro tento ropovod. Nealternativní proto, Ïe vzhledem k geografickému situování pro export hlavní ázerbájdÏánské (perspektivnû moÏná i kaza‰ské ãi turkmenské) ropy západním smûrem kromû gruzínského území teoreticky existují jen moÏnosti dopravy pfies Arménii a Írán, které v‰ak byly odmítnuty.

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Ruská strategie se tak zamûfiila na destabilizaci regionu. Tomu mûly napomoci pfiedev‰ím monopolizace managementu konfliktÛ a zakonzervování abchazského, karaba‰ského a jihoosetisnkého konfliktu. Kreml také dÛslednû prosazoval „rusk˘ smûr“ tranzitu kaspické ropy (tedy z Baku, resp. z kazachstánsk˘ch nalezi‰È do ãernomofiského Novorossijsku) a prosazoval princip spoleãného vlastnictví energetick˘ch zdrojÛ Kaspického mofie. Hladké realizaci obfiích „kaspick˘ch projektÛ“ v‰ak stála v cestû váhavost soukrom˘ch investorÛ spojená s vkládáním stovek milionÛ dolarÛ do potenciálnû v˘bu‰ného regionu. Existují totiÏ znaãné obavy jak z destabilizace regionu znovuoÏivením stále nevyfie‰en˘ch etnick˘ch konfliktÛ, tak z vnitropolitického nestability v fiadû v˘znamn˘ch kaspick˘ch státÛ, kterou Rusko navíc nepfietrÏitû podnûcuje. Základním pfiedpokladem tedy bylo, Ïe realizace projektu bude ohroÏena do té doby, dokud bude Rusko dominantní strategickou silou v regionu. Vojensko-politická pfiítomnost Spojen˘ch státÛ tak byla chápána jako pfiedpoklad úspû‰nosti „kaspick˘ch projektÛ“. Pomûrnû negativní v˘hled se zmûnil v dÛsledku událostí navazujících na 11. záfií. Nová geopolitika války proti terorismu Teroristické útoky na americká velkomûsta vnesly do americké strategie v kavkazsko-stfiedoasijském regionu fiadu pozoruhodn˘ch korektur. Chystaná vojenská operace v Afghánistánu motivovala Ameriãany k zaji‰tûní základny severnû od afghánsk˘ch hranic. V fiíjnu 2001 byla v jihouzbeckém Chanabádu zfiízena vojenská základna USA. V tehdej‰í situaci nemohlo Rusko neÏ tento krok akceptovat. Tato událost mûla znaãnou symboliku, neboÈ to bylo poprvé, kdy do‰lo k ustavení vojenské pfiítomnosti ãlenské zemû NATO na území postsovûtsk˘ch republik. Nedávno se k základnû v Chanabádu pfiipojila i letecká základna NATO v kyrgyzském Bi‰keku. Situace po záfiijov˘ch událostech tedy pfiispûla k vytvofiení zcela odli‰né mezinárodní situace, která fakticky umoÏnila i ospravedlnila vojensko-politickou expanzi Washingtonu do kaspického regionu. Tento scénáfi by byl za „normálních“ okolností vzhledem k neústupnosti Ruska velmi tûÏko provediteln˘.5

Záfiijové události rovnûÏ pfiedstavovaly znaãn˘ stimul pro USA i EU zab˘vat se diverzifikací dodávek strategick˘ch surovin. Ne náhodou tak v fiíjnu 2001 do‰lo k definitivnímu schválení tratû Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan.6 Ameriãané navíc znaãnû zintenzívnili snahy vedoucí k dosaÏení souhlasu Astany s vybudováním tzv. transkaspického ropovodu, kter˘ by mûl transportovat znaãn˘ podíl kazachstánské ropy (uvaÏuje se o nalezi‰tích Karaãaganak a Ka‰agan) po dnû Kaspického mofie do Baku s napojením na budované potrubí Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. Tento krok by zjevnû odporoval zájmÛm Moskvy a zfiejmû definitivnû podlomil nohy v regionu jiÏ znaãnû oslabenému Rusku. Také EU zaãala v posledních letech pfiehodnocovat své dlouhodobé opomíjení kavkazského regionu a uvûdomovat si v˘znam tohoto regionu z hlediska diversifikace surovinov˘ch zdrojÛ. V létû 2003 byla na JiÏní Kavkaz dosazena zvlá‰tní reprezentantka EU Heikki Talvitie. V ãervnu 2004 pak byla napravena chyba z pÛvodního opomenutí z bfiezna 2003 a zemû JiÏního Kavkazu byly zahrnuty do Evropské politiky sousedství. Od jara 2002 se také k znaãné nespokojenosti Moskvy zaãala rozvíjet tûsná vojensko-politická spolupráce mezi Washingtonem a Tbilisi, jejíÏ pÛvodním deklarovan˘m cílem byl spoleãn˘ „boj proti ãeãensk˘m teroristÛm“ na severu Gruzie poblíÏ ãeãensk˘ch hranic v oblasti Pankiského údolí. Spolupráce s USA a pfiedev‰ím gruzínské uznání existence „ãeãenského lazaretu“ v Pankisi otevfiely novou dimenzi i doposud zajímavého v˘voje rusko-ãeãensko-gruzínského trojúhelníku. Bliωí pohled na v˘vojovou dynamiku tûchto vzájemn˘ch vztahÛ dobfie ilustruje politické promûny JiÏního Kavkazu. âeãenci v centru geopolitick˘ch promûn I pfies diskutabilní pÛsobení RusÛ v Abcházii byla po válce zdecimovaná Gruzie nucena poÏádat Rusko o podporu v boji proti ZviadistÛm, ktefií vyuÏívali oslabení centrální vlády k rebeliím v západní Gruzii. Rusko svou pomoc podmínilo gruzínsk˘m vstupem do SNS, coÏ Gruzie do této doby striktnû odmítala. V˘sledkem následn˘ch jednání byla i dohoda o právech rusk˘ch vojsk na území Gruzie a také smlouva o pfiátelství podepsaná po6

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Více o Evropské politice sousedství zde http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/index_en.htm.

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Ropovod stál více neÏ 3,7 miliard USD a po problémech pfii dokonãování zaãal fungovat ve druhé polovinû roku 2005.

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ãátkem roku 1994. Oteplení vzájemn˘ch vztahÛ Gruzie potvrdila v dobû prvního vyostfiení rusko-ãeãenského konfliktu v roce 1994, kdy zaujala v˘raznû proruské stanovisko. Tehdej‰í gruzínsk˘ prezident Eduard ·evardnadze se ve zjevné naráÏce na Abcházii nechal sly‰et, Ïe kaÏdá zemû má právo k uÏití ozbrojené síly k udrÏení své teritoriální integrity.7 Gruzínské stanovisko jistû také podpofiil fakt, Ïe âeãenci po ·evardnadzeho pfievratu poskytli útoãi‰tû prvnímu prezidentovi nezávislé Gruzie Zviadu Gamsachurdiovi. Po skonãení první ãeãenské války zaãaly gruzínsko-ruské vztahy postupnû chladnout a paralelnû s tím se rozvíjely vztahy mezi Tbilisi a Groznym. Vyvrcholením gruzínsko-ãeãensk˘ch námluv byla schÛzka prezidenta ·evardnadzeho s ãeãensk˘m vÛdcem Aslanem Maschadovem v srpnu 1997. Naopak krize vztahÛ s Ruskem se prohlubovala. Rusko nedopomohlo Tbilisi k získání kontroly nad Abcházií, coÏ byla podle gruzínské strany jedna z podmínek dohody o právech rusk˘ch vojsk v Gruzii. Navíc nedokázalo ochránit tisíce gruzínsk˘ch uprchlíkÛ, ktefií se navrátili do regionu Gali v západní Gruzii a byli opûtovnû vyhnáni v kvûtnu 1998.8 V bfieznu roku 2001 zavedla Ruská federace pro Gruzii vízovou povinnost, v˘jimku v‰ak dostali obyvatelé Abcházie a JiÏní Osetie.9 Symbolem vzrÛstajících sporÛ se stalo severogruzínské údolí Pankisi leÏící pfii hranicích s âeãenskem, které se poprvé dostalo do hlub‰ího povûdomí mezinárodní vefiejnosti v dobû druhé ãeãenské války v roce 1999. V této dobû do tohoto asi 20 km dlouhého údolí ob˘vaného zhruba 7000– 8000 Kisty10 uteklo asi 4000–5000 ãeãensk˘ch uprchlíkÛ. MÛÏeme v‰ak fiíci, Ïe po celé postsovûtské období centrální gruzínská vláda do tohoto regionu nedosáhla. Region tak byl aÏ donedávna jak˘msi kriminálním a pfiedev‰ím pa‰eráck˘m centrem. Koncem roku 2001 po mnoha pfiedchozích odmítnutích pfiipustil prezident ·evardnadze i pfiíchod ãeãensk˘ch bojovníkÛ, kter˘ch tak v regionu setrvávalo v závislosti na intenzitû bojÛ v âeãensku mezi 150–800.11 7 8 9 10 11

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BBC SWB SU/2181 F/2, 17 December 1994 Per Normark, Russia’s Policy vis-à-vis Georgia: Continuity and Change, Stockholm FOI, 2001 Jamestown Prism 30 March 2001. Kistové jsou etniãtí âeãenci; na rozdíl od vût‰inovû sunnitsk˘ch âeãencÛ v‰ak – stejnû jako pfieváÏná ãást GruzínÛ – vyznávají pravoslavné kfiesÈanství. Walker E. D., Chechnya, the Pankisi Gorge, and US Policy, CCAsP Newsletter Winter 2002–3/16, s. 4.

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V záfií 2002 vydal rusk˘ prezident Vladimir Putin ultimátum, které vzbudilo znaãn˘ ohlas ve svûtû, ve kterém vyjádfiil ruskou pfiipravenost podniknout v Pankisi protiteroristickou operaci, pokud tak v brzké dobû neuãiní Gruzie sama.12 Toto prohlá‰ení pfii‰lo mûsíc poté, co v Pankisi probûhla dopfiedu dlouho ohla‰ovaná gruzínská operace, jejímÏ v˘sledkem bylo zatãení jednoho Araba s francouzsk˘m pasem a údajn˘m napojením na AlKajdu.13 V témÏe mûsíci v‰ak bylo zajato i 13 âeãencÛ, z nichÏ 5 bylo vydáno do Ruska po listopadovém setkání ·evardnadzeho s Putinem v moldavském Ki‰inûvû.14 Krátce pfied summitem také Gruzie uzavfiela oficiální ãeãenskou reprezentaci v Tbilisi.15 V této dobû v‰ak jiÏ narÛstala také americká aktivita rámovaná do rétoriky boje proti terorismu. Saaka‰viliho nástup k moci pouze stvrdil jiÏ ustálené gruzínsko-amerického strategického partnerství. Tento aspekt je vzhledem k fiadû specifik tûsnû spjat s vnitropolitick˘m v˘vojem v Gruzii. Gruzie jako geopolitické ohnisko Je skuteãností, Ïe v souãasné Gruzii (stejnû jako v ÁzerbajdÏánu) neexistují více ãi ménû vlivné politické strany, které by prosazovaly v˘raznû proruskou orientaci. V obou zemích platí, Ïe politik, kter˘ by volal po tûsnûj‰ích vazbách Gruzie na Rusko na úkor Západu a Spojen˘ch státÛ, si nebude schopen zajistit dostateãnou podporu obyvatelstva. Vût‰ina GruzínÛ totiÏ vnímá Spojené státy jako jakéhosi garanta gruzínské nezávislosti, kter˘ by mûl zaruãovat „skromnûj‰í“ mocenské angaÏmá Kremlu na jiÏním Kavkaze. Pfiesto je pfiirozenû udrÏení pfiátelsk˘ch vztahÛ se severním sousedem pfiikládán prioritní v˘znam. Jak se ukázalo, Gruzie se vskutku stává prioritním smûrem euroasijské strategie Spojen˘ch státÛ. Krátce po náv‰tûvû ázerbájdÏánské metropole se americk˘ ministr obrany Donald Rumsfeld vydal do Tbilisi. Stejnû jako 12 13 14

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Gruzie i mezinárodní komunita takovou operaci ihned odsoudily jako pfiípadné poru‰ení základních mezinárodních dohod. RFE/RL Caucasus Report 23 September 2002, Vol. 5, No. 31. IWPR Caucasus Reporting Service, 30 August 2002 AndÏaparidze Z., Will Georgia Cut the Pankisi Knot?, Euroasian Review, 19 November 2002. Vydání âeãencÛ provázely znaãné protesty. Gruzie také dostala doporuãení od Mezinárodního soudního dvora ve ·trasburku vydávat âeãence do Ruska jen proti potvrzení jejich viny. IWPR Caucasus Reporting Service, 31 October 2002.

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v Baku, i zde byly projednávány otázky perspektivního vstupu tûchto zemí do NATO a posílení vojenskopolitické spolupráce se Spojen˘mi státy. Komentátofii si pov‰imli, Ïe ke kavkazskému turné ‰éfa Pentagonu do‰lo ve chvíli, kdy Moskva aktivizovala úsilí v gruzínském smûru. Donald Rumsfeld se pfiitom neomezil na obecná tvrzení o podpofie demokratick˘ch hodnot ãi potfiebû zv˘‰ené spolupráce mezi obûma zemûmi, ale uvítal snahu Gruzie kandidovat v roce 2004/2005 na ãlenství v NATO a oznaãil ji za „správnou“. Neménû dÛleÏité je snad poprvé nedvojsmyslnû vysloven˘ poÏadavek Spojen˘ch státÛ ke staÏení rusk˘ch vojensk˘ch základen, které mûly b˘t dle istanbulsk˘ch ujednání z roku 1999 staÏeny uÏ v roce 2001. Za likvidaci rusk˘ch vojensk˘ch základen se záhy postavili i Colin Powell a Rada NATO. Neobvykle striktní pfiístup Washingtonu v souvislosti s ruskou vojenskou pfiítomností v Gruzii jiÏ vyvolal jisté znervóznûní v Moskvû a pfiispûl k malému diplomatickému skandálu. Pfiedchozí rusk˘ ministr zahraniãí Igor Ivanov totiÏ definoval v˘rok amerického oponenta jako „konjunkturní“, poradil mu „pozornû ãíst podklady, nejradûji v originále“ a naznaãil, Ïe se jedná o v˘hradnû bilaterální záleÏitost rusko-gruzínsk˘ch vztahÛ.16 Podle Moskvy na Istanbulském summitu OBSE totiÏ do‰lo k dohodû, Ïe ruské základny z Gruzie (stejnû jako z moldavského Podnestfií) mûly b˘t do roku 2001 staÏeny „pouze v pfiípadû zaji‰tûní bezpeãnosti jejich odchodu“. Navíc se jednalo o ryze politickou deklaraci o úmyslech, která nemá právní úãinek. Podle v˘roku prvního námûstka ‰éfa ozbrojen˘ch sil Ruské federace Jurije Balujevského si Rusko navíc nepfieje, „aby na‰i vojáci Ïili v uboh˘ch stáncích v prÛbûhu nûkolika zim, jak se stalo pfii stahování na‰ích divizí z Nûmecka.“17 Nynûj‰í oficiální stanovisko Moskvy zní, Ïe pro likvidaci dvou základen je zapotfiebí minimálnû 10 let, zatímco Tbilisi trvá na 2–3 letech. V této souvislosti je zajímav˘ dal‰í diplomatick˘ souboj, kter˘ nejnovûji svedli kolem otázky rusk˘ch základen vysocí státní ãinitelé Tbilisi, Moskvy a Washingtonu. Jak známo, Moskva ve snaze legitimizovat svou neochotu ke staÏení vojenské garnizony z Gruzie v prvé fiadû poukazuje na

absenci finanãních prostfiedkÛ. Washington v‰ak jiÏ roce 2000 poskytl Ruské federaci pomoc pfii staÏení dvou vojensk˘ch základen z gruzínského území a vyjádfiil pfiipravenost pomoc odsun financovat i tentokrát.18 Rusové v zápûtí v diplomatick˘ch kuloárech pro „urychlení“ staÏení sv˘ch základen zaãali zmiÀovat mírnû fieãeno pfiehnanou ãástku 0,5 miliardy dolarÛ. I kdyÏ ruská diplomacie vzápûtí odmítla, Ïe by se v Moskvû o ãástkách vÛbec diskutovalo, Washington podobn˘ „nevyfiãen˘“ návrh striktnû odmítl.19 Zvlá‰tní v˘znam mûl v této souvislosti Istanbulsk˘ summit NATO konající se v ãervnu 2004, kter˘ demonstroval obnoven˘ zájem Aliance o Kavkaz a Stfiední Asii. âlenské zemû zaujaly striktní postoj v otázce staÏení rusk˘ch vojsk z Gruzie (a Moldávie), poradily Rusku splnit závazky, které na sebe vzala na Istanbulském summitu OBSE, ãímÏ de facto podmínily ratifikaci adaptované Smlouvy o konvenãních zbraních v Evropû. Reakce ruského ministra zahraniãí Sergeje Lavrova v tomto ohledu byla pfiedvídatelná. Podle jeho slov, je „tento pfiístup nekorektní“, jelikoÏ „politické dohody nevytváfií termíny pro fyzické kroky“.20 Na ãervnovém summitu v‰ak generální tajemník NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer tlumoãil zfiejmû novou doktrínu Aliance, ve které deklaroval vybudování „tfií mostÛ“ – ve Stfiedomofií, na Kavkaze a ve Stfiední Asii, coÏ v souvislosti s nedávn˘m pfiijetím tfií pobaltsk˘ch zemí do NATO velice zneklidnilo Moskvu. Litva, Loty‰sko a Estonsko navíc vyjádfiily ochotu podûlit se se tfiemi jihokavkazsk˘mi zemûmi zku‰enostmi s reformováním ozbrojen˘ch sil a vytváfiením úãinn˘ch pohraniãních jednotek. V tomto ohledu není bez zajímavosti, Ïe klíãové evropské zemû Aliance – Velká Británie a Nûmecko – se jiÏ v jisté mífie zúãastÀují procesu zaji‰tûní stability Kavkazského regionu. Washington navíc jiÏ zahájil realizaci projektu Kaspická pohraniãní iniciativa, v jejímÏ rámci bude napomáhat modernizaci flotil ÁzerbajdÏánu a Kazachstánu. To se odehrává soubûÏnû s vytváfiením Spojen˘mi státy iniciovan˘ch speciálních ázerbajdÏánsko-gruzín18

16 17

Organda, 6. 12. 2003 Regnum, 6. 12. 2003; PfiipomeÀme si, Ïe zatímco sovûtské vojenské základny ve v˘chodním Nûmecku tvofiily cca 400 000 lidí, rusk˘ch vojákÛ a dÛstojníkÛ na dvou oficiálních základnách v Gruzii je kolem 8000.

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RFE/RL Report, 13. 01. 2004. V souãasné dobû se na gruzínském území oficiálnû nacházejí dvû ruské vojenské základny: 12. základna v AdÏárii a 62. základna v pfieváÏnû Armény obydlené oblasti DÏavacheti na jihu republiky. I kdyÏ základna v abchazské Gudautû (stejnû jako ve Vaziani poblíÏ Tbilisi) byla podle Istanbulsk˘ch ujednání (1999) staÏena v letech 2000–2001, Tbilisi namítá, Ïe tûÏká vojenská technika u rusk˘ch mírotvorn˘ch jednotek v Abcházii stále pfietrvává. Lenta.ru, 15. 01. 2004. Interfax, 29. 06. 2004.

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Jak jsme uÏ naznaãili, jedním ze zásadních zdrojÛ Saaka‰viliho politického kapitálu byla etnoteritotoriální problematika.21 UdrÏení tohoto zdroje v‰ak vyÏaduje znaãnou politickou dynamiku a do znaãné míry zuÏuje manévrovací prostor. Saaka‰vili ve snaze získat pfiízeÀ nacionálnû a patrioticky naladûné vefiejnosti i hlasy gruzínsk˘ch uprchlíkÛ z Abcházie opakovanû zdÛrazÀoval, Ïe povaÏuje znovunastolení územní celistvosti zemû za prioritní úkol a je ochoten toho dosáhnout ve‰ker˘mi – nejen nevojensk˘mi – prostfiedky. Saaka‰vili v televizním interview sdûlil vefiejnosti, Ïe má v úmyslu v rozmezí pûti let znovu nastolit územní celistvost zemû, pfiiãemÏ pro posílení armády je dokonce „pfiipraven si sám obléknout vojenskou uniformu a spát v kasárnách.“ 22

psanou dohodu o tiché toleranci Aba‰idzeho panství v‰ak ukonãila rÛÏová revoluce. Situace poprvé v˘raznûji eskalovala v bfieznu 2004, kdy adÏarské milice nevpustily do AdÏárie prezidentsk˘ konvoj chystající volební mítink v Batumi. Z následné politické pfiestfielky, ve které nov˘ gruzínsk˘ prezident nûkolikrát pohrozil silou, vy‰el Aba‰idze znaãnû oslaben. Jeho blíÏící se pád naznaãovala pfiedev‰ím neochota Moskvy a jejího prodlouÏeného vojenského ramene v Batumi jinak neÏ verbálnû intervenovat v jeho prospûch. Definitivní poráÏka pak pfii‰la po parlamentních volbách, které sice Aba‰idzeho strana v AdÏárii vyhrála, v celogruzínském mûfiítku v‰ak nepfiekonala ani volební práh pro vstup do snûmovny. Bez v˘raznûj‰í opory velkého bratra na severu pak musel Aba‰idze v kvûtnu AdÏárii opustit a usadit se v tradiãním moskevském exilu svûtov˘ch autokratÛ. AdÏarsk˘ pfiípad je‰tû posílil Saaka‰viliho sebevûdomí, pfiestoÏe bylo zjevné, Ïe obnovení centrální správy nad AdÏárií bylo jednoznaãnû nejsnaz‰í. Prezidentova pozornost se vzápûtí obrátila na sever do JiÏní Osetie, kde se nacházely smí‰ené mírové sbory.24

AdÏárie

JiÏní Osetie

První krok v epopeji se „sjednocováním gruzínsk˘ch zemí“ – obsazení AdÏárie – Saaka‰vili úspû‰nû absolvoval hned v prvních mûsících svého úfiadování, ãímÏ docílil celonárodní euforii a vzbudil oprávnûné znepokojení v Suchumi (Abcházie) a Cchinvali (JiÏní Osetie). AdÏárie byla skoro po celou dobu gruzínské nezávislosti v rukou autokratického vládce Aslana Aba‰idzeho. Jeho moc se dlouhodobû opírala pfiedev‰ím o zisky z kontroly pfieshraniãního obchodu s Tureckem, vfielé vztahy s velením ruské vojenské základny v Batumi a neutralitu v abcházském a osetském konfliktu. V praxi tedy mezi ·evarnadzem a Aba‰idzem fungovala tichá dohoda, podle které nemûl adÏarsk˘ potentát komplikovat gruzínskou teritoriální celistvost, za coÏ na oplátku získal znaãnou fiskální autonomii a absolutní kontrolu nad obchodními pro Gruzii klíãov˘mi cestami do Turecka.23 Ne-

JiÏní Osetie na rozdíl od AdÏárie zaÏila koncem 80. a poãátkem 90. let krvav˘ konflikt. JiÏní Osetie není tak jako AdÏárie a Abcházie pfiímofisk˘m rájem a nikdy tak za sovûtské éry nedisponovala zvlá‰tními v˘hodami. Její strategick˘ v˘znam v‰ak spoãívá pfiedev‰ím v tom, Ïe leÏí blízko srdce gruzínské historické státnosti a zároveÀ na opaãném konci tvofií hranici s Ruskou federací v místech, kde se nachází prÛsmyky, kter˘mi lze projít jinak v podstatû neprostupnou kavkazskou bariéru. Na ruské stranû navíc hra-

sko-tureck˘ch jednotek, které by mûly zajistit ochranu ropovodu BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan pfied pfiípadn˘mi sabotáÏními útoky. Zamrzlé konflikty v autonomiích jako neuralgické geopolitické body

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Jedním z nejlep‰ích zdrojÛ pro studium geopolitiky Kavkazu prostfiednictvím nepokojn˘ch autonomií je Svante Cornell, Small Nations Great Powers, Routledge/Curzon, London 2002. ITAR-TASS, 05. 12. 2003. Více o adÏarské problematice lze nalézt napfiíklad v Derlugian G. M., The Tale of Two Rezorts:

Abkhazia and Ajaria before and since the Soviet Collapse, in: Beverly C., and Lipschutz D. R. (eds.), The Myth of Ethnic Conflict, Berkeley, University of California, International and Area Studies Research Series, 1998 ãi Toft D. M., Two-Way Mirror Nationalism: The Case of Aaria, in: Gammer, Moshe G. a Toft M., The Politics of the Caspian, Fran Cass Publishers, London, 2004. Podle podmínek Dagomyské mírové dohody (ãerven 1992), byly v JiÏní Osetii ustaveny smí‰ené jednotky Gruzie, JiÏní Osetie a Ruska (maximální poãet vojákÛ z kaÏdé strany mûl tvofiit 500 lidí) kontrolované Smí‰enou kontrolní komisí. V rámci této komise jsou v posledních tfiech letech ve‰keré pokusy Tbilisi dospût ke kompromisu blokovány formálnû jihoosetinskou stranou, která odmítá jak˘koli návrh, kter˘ neakceptuje její poÏadavek plné svrchovanosti. Tbilisi proto usiluje o pfiímé jednání s Moskvou a hrozí jednostrann˘m v˘chodem z Dagomyské dohody.

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nici tvofií Severní Osetie/Alanie, tedy druhá ãást v sovûtské dobû umûle rozdûlené Osetie.25 Po celé pováleãné období se sice Tbilisi nepodafiilo obnovit kontrolu nad JiÏní Osetií, na druhou stranu se v‰ak do b˘val˘ch domovÛ mohla navrátit znaãná ãást gruzínského obyvatelstva26 a také jihoosetská hranice zÛstala snadno prostupná. Pfiesto v‰ak jihoosetské vedení vytrvale odmítalo a odmítá v‰echny autonomistické návrhy, které neberou v úvahu její pováleãnou de facto nezávislost. Po konci adÏarské krize jiÏ ve druhé polovinû kvûtna 2004 posílilo Tbilisi kontrolní stanovi‰tû na gruzínsko-jihoosetské administrativní hranici. Oficiálním dÛvodem bylo znemoÏnûní kontrabandního obchodu, na kterém se v zásadû zakládá jihoosetská ekonomika. Ekonomick˘ nátlak na Cchinvali byl stupÀován soubûÏnû s politick˘m. Saaka‰vili novû tlumoãil i návrhy na „navracení“ JiÏní Osetie jako autonomie „s nej‰ir‰ími moÏn˘mi právy“ a rozsáhl˘mi ekonomick˘mi v˘hodami do rámce perspektivnû federalizované Gruzie, coÏ v‰ak prezident republiky a rusk˘ obãan Eduard Kokoty opûtovnû rezolutnû odmítl.27 Posílení gruzínsk˘ch ozbrojen˘ch formací v oblasti okamÏitû narazilo na diplomatick˘ protest Moskvy a intenzivní ozbrojování OsetincÛ. Také centrální vláda v‰ak poslala k hranicím jednotky Ministerstva vnitra jako reakci na hrozbu zniãení gruzínsk˘ch kontrolních stanovi‰È. Rozdm˘chání vá‰ní se odehrávalo podle klasické eskalaãní ‰kály, pfiedpokládající soustfiedûní ozbrojen˘ch sil z obou stran, stupÀování „diplomatické války“ ãi obãasné vzájemné ostfielování. Bûhem dal‰ích nûkolika mûsícÛ se zdálo, Ïe obû znepfiátelené strany nemají daleko k vût‰í ozbrojené konfrontaci. JiÏní Osetie byla vÏdy pro Moskvu ze strategického hlediska dÛleÏitá, coÏ je dáno pfiedev‰ím existencí druhé ãásti Osetie v Ruské federaci. Také v období krize kolem poloviny roku 2004 se Moskva angaÏovala a posílila jihoosetinsk˘ mírotvorn˘ kontingent 40 obrnûn˘mi vozidly a jin˘mi tûÏk˘mi zbranûmi. Ru‰tí generálové se v tomto pfiípadû odvolávali na doho25

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Více o historii a charakteru JiÏní Osetie se lze doãíst napfiíklad v JBirch J., Ossetia: A Caucasian Bosnia in Microcosm, Central Asian Survey, vol. 14, no. 1, 1995 ãi v Cvetkovski N., The GeorgianSouth Ossetian Conflict, Danish Association for Research on the Caucasus, 2002. Na rozdíl od AbcházcÛ Osetové svému regionu etnicky dominovali uÏ pfied válkou. Návrat gruzínsk˘ch uprchlíkÛ tak nebyl tak citliv˘m tématem, jak je tomu v pfiípadû Abcházie. Vût‰inû OsetincÛ, stejnû jako AbcházcÛ, bylo poskytnuto ruské obãanství. Od roku 1992 JiÏní Osetie (stejnû jako Abcházie) nûkolikrát poÏádalo o vstup do Ruska.

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du pfiedem sjednanou s Tbilisi.28 Do jihoosetinské metropole také zamífiilo na nûkolik stovek dobrovolníkÛ z ruské Severní Osetie a Abcházie. Moskva a Cchinvali naopak obviÀovaly Tbilisi ze soustfiedûní na 3000 ozbrojen˘ch GruzínÛ v gruzínsk˘ch vesnicích blízko Cchinvali. Gruzínská reprezentace bez obalu poukazovala na jisté síly v ruském politickém prostfiedí, které jsou zainteresované na dezintegraci Gruzie. Toto stanovisko mûlo jasnû zdÛraznit, Ïe gruzínsk˘mi nepfiáteli nejsou stovky osetsk˘ch ãi abchazsk˘ch mladíkÛ, ale vnûj‰í síla usilující o zmafiení gruzínské integrace do NATO. Krize kulminovala v létû, kdy do‰lo po sérii zabití a únosÛ k zásahu gruzínsk˘ch jednotek a konfiskaci 160 nefiízen˘ch raketov˘ch stfiel u ruského mírotvorného kontingentu. Jako odvetu Osetinci zajali na 40 gruzínsk˘ch vojákÛ. Ve chvíli nejvy‰‰ího napûtí se v‰ak podafiilo dohodnout podmínky prozatímní dohody a navrácení zbraní i vojákÛ.29 V podstatû totoÏná situace se opakovala o rok pozdûji v létû 2005. O tom, Ïe je JiÏní Osetie velmi nestabilní oblastí svûdãí nejen periodicky se opakující krize, ale i pfies znaãnou aktivitu prezidenta Saaka‰viliho v podstatû nulov˘ posun v otázce vyfie‰ení jihoosetského statusu uvnitfi Gruzie. Spekulace o moÏné slábnoucí ruské podpofie jihoosetského secesionismu se objevily v prosinci 2005 po summitu OBSE v Lublani, kde Rusko nevetovalo dokument podporující fie‰ení jihoosetského problému mírov˘mi prostfiedky v rámci zachování gruzínské teritoriální integrity.30 Podle mnoh˘ch analytikÛ v‰ak za touto ruskou „shovívavostí“ stála snaha zachovat dosavadní formát Spojené kontrolní komise, kterou se souãasná gruzínská diplomacie snaÏí vehementnû posílit o zástupce Spojen˘ch státÛ a EU. Prozatím se tedy zdá, Ïe Rusko ani v nejmen‰ím nehodlá opustit jeden z pilífiÛ svého slábnoucího vlivu na JiÏním Kavkaze. V‰e také záleÏí na tom, nakolik se Spojen˘m státÛm i evropsk˘m mocnostem bude chtít komplikovat vztahy s Ruskem kvÛli jihoosetskému problému. Naposledy je k vût‰í angaÏovanosti nepfiímo vyzval gruzínsk˘ parlament v únoru leto‰ního roku, kdyÏ otevfienû vyzval Ruské síly k opu‰tûní peacekeepingo28 29

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Izvestija, 21. 07. 2004. Na jednáních Smí‰ené kontrolní komise z 15. ãervence se Gruzie zavázala omezit svoji vojenskou pfiítomnost v JiÏní Osetii na 500 muÏÛ, jihoosetinská strana rozpustit nûkolik stovek dobrovolníkÛ ze severní Osetie a Abcházie. Viz http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/17369_en.pdf.html.

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v˘ch sil a gruzínskou vládu k vypovûzení pÛvodní rusko-gruzínské dohody schvalující pobyt tûchto jednotek na gruzínském území. Podle mínûní gruzínsk˘ch zákonodárcÛ by vojenské síly udrÏující pofiádek v JiÏní Osetii mûly mít ‰ir‰í mezinárodní charakter.31 Abcházie Abcházie byla stejnû jako AdÏárie souãástí b˘valé sovûtské riviéry a podle mnoh˘ch byla vÛbec nejkrásnûj‰ím místem Sovûtského svazu. Nejen z toho dÛvodu je váleãn˘ konflikt, kter˘ probûhl v Abcházii poãátkem 90. let, dodnes v Gruzii nejcitelnûj‰ím. Abchazská válka si vyÏádala obrovsk˘ poãet obûtí. Jejím nejviditelnûj‰ím pfiipomenutím je v‰ak asi ãtvrt milionu gruzínsk˘ch uprchlíkÛ, ktefií se nemohou vrátit do sv˘ch abchazsk˘ch domovÛ a donedávna okupovali hotely a vytváfieli ghetta v centrech gruzínsk˘ch velk˘ch mûst.32 Stejnû jako v pfiípadû JiÏní Osetie byla v˘sledkem abchazské války de facto nezávislost této b˘valé Sovûtské autonomní republiky. Jak jsme v‰ak jiÏ zmínili, zcela zásadním dÛsledkem váleãn˘ch atrocit je také zmûna demografické situace v Abcházii. Podle posledního sovûtského cenzu z roku 1989 tvofiili Abcházci zhruba 18% men‰inu a jejich poãet byl v etnicky heterogenní Abcházii velmi podobn˘ jako poãet ArménÛ a RusÛ. Oproti tomu GruzínÛ, jejichÏ poãet v prÛbûhu celého sovûtského období absolutnû i relativnû narÛstal, Ïilo pfied válkou v Abcházii více neÏ 45 %. Právû dle abchazské interpretace organizovan˘ nárÛst v dobû existence Sovûtského svazu ãasto slouÏí jako ospravedlnûní bránûní návratu gruzínsk˘ch uprchlíkÛ. I kdyÏ v celém pováleãném období nejsou k dispozici pfiesnûj‰í data, podloÏené odhady hovofií o tom, Ïe Abcházci 31 32

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RFE/RL Newsline, 16. 2. 2006. Více o Abcházii a abchazské válce napfiíklad viz Cornell Sv., Small Nations and Great Powers, Routledge Curzon 2003, Giorgi, M., Derlugian G. M., The Forgotten Abkhazia, Northwestern University, January 2001, Giorgi, M., Derlugian M., The Tale of Two Rezorts: Abkhazia and Ajaria before and since the Soviet Collapse, in: Beverly C., and Lipschutz D., Ronnie (eds.), The Myth of Ethnic Conflict, Berkeley: University of California, International and Area Studies Research Series 1998, George Hewitt (ed.), The Abkhazians, Curzon Press 1999, Nodia G., Causes and Visions of Conflict in Abkhazia, Berkeley Program of Soviet and post-Soviet Studies, Working Paper Series, Winter 1997–1998, Normark P., Abkhazia – Time for Conflict Resolution, paper prepared for the Second METU Conference on International Relations, Ankara, June 2003 Otyrba G., War in Abkhazia: The Regional Significance of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict, in: Szporluk R. (ed.), National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Euroasia, M. E. Sharpe, 1994.

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získali se zhruba tfietinov˘m podílem na souãasné populaci Ïijící v Abcházii nûkolikaprocentní vût‰inu. Fakticky pak dûní v Suchumi ovládají zcela. Pováleãn˘ v˘voj není nepodobn˘ tomu v JiÏní Osetii. Abchazská reprezentace vytrvale odmítala jakékoli federalizaãní snahy pfiicházející z Tbilisi a pro podporu se obracela do Moskvy, jejíÏ nepfiiznaná a „neoficiální“ pomoc byla velmi patrná v dobû abchazské války. Také abchazská elita mûla nadstandardní vztahy s mocn˘mi moskevsk˘mi politiky. Sám abchazsk˘ prezident a otec zakladatel nezávislé státnosti Vladislav Ardzinba, kterému skonãil funkãní mandát na pfielomu let 2004 a 2005, mûl velmi blízké a pfiátelské vztahy s dlouholet˘m rusk˘m ministrem zahraniãí Jevgenijem Primakovem, pod jehoÏ patronací v sovûtské éfie pracoval v moskevském orientálním ústavu, ale také napfiíklad s Anatolijem Lukjanovem, kter˘ nechvalnû proslul jako ideolog moskevského tzv. srpnového puãe v roce 1991. Podobnû jako je tomu v pfiípadû OsetÛ, pfiijala vût‰ina AbcházcÛ ruské obãanství a z toho plynoucí minimální sociální dávky. Nejcitlivûj‰ím místem abchazsko-gruzínsk˘ch vztahÛ byl vÏdy návrat uprchlíkÛ. AÈ uÏ se jednalo o ty Ïijící v nuceném exilu nebo o skupinu nûkolika desítek tisíc GruzínÛ, ktefií se navrátili do tradiãnû gruzínského jihoabchazského regionu Gali. Návrat této skupiny uprchlíkÛ vyvolal v provincii urãité napûtí, které eskalovalo v polovinû roku 1998, kdy Gruzie navíc obvinila ruské mírotvorné síly z toho, Ïe nejsou schopny zajistit bezpeãn˘ návrat pÛvodního obyvatelstva. I kdyÏ situace má daleko k jakémukoli pozitivnímu fie‰ení, v posledních letech je v nûkter˘ch aspektech klidnûj‰í, neÏ je tomu v JiÏní Osetii. Abcházii se také dostává vût‰í zahraniãní pozornosti, jejímÏ v˘sledkem jsou napfiíklad mnohé v posledních letech stále úspû‰nûj‰í rekonciliaãní programy zamûfiené na usmífiení obou znepfiátelen˘ch etnik a jejich pfiípravu na eventuální budoucí opûtovné souÏití v ãernomofiském ráji pod kavkazsk˘mi ‰títy. Jak jsme jiÏ zmínili, zásadní událostí posledních let byla v˘mûna dlouholeté abchazské ikony Vladislava Ardzinby v ãele státu. Do volebního klání, v nûmÏ byla úãast podmínûna sloÏením jazykového testu,33 vstoupilo hned nûkolik 33

Abcház‰tina je stejnû jako gruzín‰tina souãástí kavkazské jazykové rodiny, patfií ale do její severozápadní vûtve. Oba jazyky jsou znaãnû obtíÏné (coÏ platí je‰tû více pro abcház‰tinu) a vzájemnû v zásadû nesrozumitelné. V roce 1989 umûla pouze 2 % AbcházcÛ gruzínsky, zatímco abcházsky se nauãilo ménû neÏ 0,5 % GruzínÛ. Více o problematice a vztahu regonálních jazykÛ se lze doãíst v George Hewitt G., Language, in: Hewitt G. (ed.), The Abkhazians, Curzon Press 1999 ãi Hewitt G., Abkhazia, Georgia and the Circassians (NW Caucasus), Central Asian Survey, 18, 4, 1999.

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kandidátÛ, z nichÏ v‰ak dva mûli zcela dominantní postavení. Prvním z nich byl „abchazsk˘ Putin“ Raul ChadÏimba, jehoÏ kariéra, stejnû jako tomu je u jeho kolegy v Kremlu, zaãala v sovûtské tajné sluÏbû. ChadÏimba byl jasn˘ favorit odstupujícího Ardzinby a získal i tentokrát zcela otevfienou podporu Moskvy. Jeho hlavním vyzyvatelem se stal Sergej Bagap‰, kter˘ zprvu neprezentoval radikálnû odli‰né teze, ale vyznaãoval se lehce vlaÏnûj‰ím vztahem k Moskvû (jakkoli v této souvislosti samozfiejmû nelze hovofiit o prolamování obecnû proruské orientace) a naopak smírnûj‰ím postojem k Tbilisi. V této souvislost jistû není bez zajímavosti, Ïe Bagap‰ má za manÏelku etnickou Gruzínku. PfiestoÏe se v‰eobecnû pfiedpokládalo, Ïe volby snadno vyhraje ArdzinbÛv a Moskvou podporovan˘ kandidát, z vítûzství se nakonec po opakovan˘ch volbách i díky hlasÛm etnick˘ch GruzínÛ z regionu Gali radoval Bagap‰, kter˘ po vyhran˘ch prvních volbách pfied opakováním volebního klání uzavfiel spojenectví se sv˘m rivalem ChadÏimbou, kterému slíbil viceprezidentsk˘ post. Tento v˘sledek abchazsk˘ch voleb z pfielomu let 2004 a 2005 do znaãné míry pfiekvapil i znalce kavkazsk˘ch pomûrÛ a vedl k ãetn˘m komentáfiÛm. I kdyÏ nedo‰lo k zásadnûj‰ímu prÛlomu v fie‰ení gruzínsko-abchazského problému, minimálnû komunikace mezi Tbilisi a Suchumi se v˘raznû zlep‰ila. Obecnû se zdá, Ïe prezidentské volby naznaãily urãitou zmûnu nálady v Abcházii charakterizovanou jist˘m prozfiením, Ïe ruské a abchazské cíle nekonvergují tak, jak se je snaÏily prezentovat elity na obou stranách. Zatímco prvotním rusk˘m strategick˘m cílem je pomocí neklidn˘ch autonomií udrÏovat permanentní nestabilitu v pro JiÏní Kavkaz klíãové Gruzii a tím ospravedlÀovat své stávající pozice, Abcházci pod znaãn˘m vlivem nacionální propagandy touÏí po samostatné státnosti. Ruská karta by v‰ak Abcházce mohla dovést maximálnû tak do Krasnodarského kraje. Náhorní Karabach Konflikt v Náhorním Karabachu34 pfiedstavuje do znaãné míry komplexnûj‰í problém neÏ konflikty gruzínské. Vzhledem k rÛzn˘m geopolitick˘m souvislostem jsou do nûj v˘raznû vtaÏeny nejenom ÁzerbajdÏán,

Náhorní Karabach a Arménie, ale i Rusko, Turecko a Írán, coÏ ztûÏuje fie‰ení karaba‰ského konfliktu a pfiedurãuje jeho zv˘‰en˘ v˘znam pro regionální bezpeãnost. Zatímco pûtimilionová Gruzie formálnû (pomineme-li zjevnou ruskou angaÏovanost) má co do ãinûní s nepoãetn˘mi milicemi 130tisícové JiÏní Osetie a stûÏí dvojnásobné populace Abcházie, s nimiÏ se mÛÏe v pfiípadû ruského nevmû‰ování se pomûrnû snadno vypofiádat, 7 milionov˘ ÁzerbajdÏán se nachází v situaci permanentní krize nejenom s zhruba 120tisícov˘m obyvatelstvem Náhorního Karabachu, ale i s cca 2,5milionovou Arménií. Ta je navíc dnes jedin˘m a klíãov˘m spojencem Ruska na jiÏním Kavkaze. Na jejím území se také nachází mocná ruská 102. vojenská základna, vyzbrojená dûlostfieleck˘mi komplexy S-300, stíhaãkami Mi-28, Mi-29 a dal‰í moderní ruskou vojenskou technikou.35 V pfiípadû obnovení váleãného konfliktu v Karabachu mÛÏe Baku samozfiejmû oãekávat vtaÏení Arménie, která bude velmi aktivnû podporována z Moskvy ze strany Moskvy.36 Vzhledem k poãtu vojákÛ a kvalitû zbraní, kter˘mi disponuje zejména arménská strana, lze pfiedpokládat, Ïe by pfiípadná válka byla totální a velmi nákladná. Konflikt v Karabachu má navíc obávan˘ difusní potenciál, díky kterému by mohlo dojít ke vtaÏení dal‰ích regionálních mocností (Turecko, Írán). Situaci komplikuje i zv˘‰ená geopolitická zranitelnost ÁzerbajdÏánu. Tato konstelace podmínila, Ïe Ilham Alijev je ve vût‰í tísni, neÏ jeho gruzínsk˘ kolega, co se t˘ãe volby prostfiedkÛ k dosaÏení územní celistvosti zemû. Jeho ‰tûdfie rozdávané pfiedvolební sliby o brzkém navrácení Náhorního Karabachu a sedmi okupovan˘ch oblastí „v‰emi moÏn˘mi nástroji“ byly proto spí‰e urãené pro domácí potfieby. I kdyÏ nelze podceÀovat jejich v˘znam ve smyslu ovlivÀování vyjednávacího procesu v rámci Minské skupiny OBSE a nátlaku na Jerevan, lze fiíci, Ïe se ázerbajdÏánská strana v dohledné dobû bude muset spokojit s dosud ne pfiíli‰ úspû‰n˘mi politick˘mi mechanismy fie‰ení konfliktu. 35 36

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Podrobnûji viz Souleimanov E., Der Konflikt um Berg-Karabach, in: OSZE-Jahrbuch 2004, Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg (Hrsg.), Baden-Baden.

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Arménie má s Ruskem (a s jin˘mi postsovûtsk˘mi státy) spojeneck˘ úvazek, dokumentovan˘ Smlouvou o kolektivní bezpeãnosti (1992). Nelze rovnûÏ zapomínat na skuteãnost, Ïe se pfiední oddíly karaba‰ské armády nacházejí v cca 30 km od ázerbajdÏánského mûsta Jevlach – strategické kfiiÏovatky, spojující tuto republiku s Gruzií (a Západem). Pfies toto mûsto vede i budovan˘ ropovod Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. Poskytne-li Baku dÛvod k obsazení této kfiiÏovatky, budou zmafieny dalekosáhlé ambice jak Baku, tak Washingtonu, coÏ je nepfiípustné, atd.

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Cel˘ rok 2004 se proto odehrával ve znamení politick˘ch soubojÛ – I. Alijev zpoãátku obvinil Minskou skupinu, Ïe ve sv˘ch návrzích odstoupila od duchu i litery Lisabonsk˘ch ujednání (1996), pfiedpokládajících uznání územní celistvosti ÁzerbajdÏánu, a navrhl zahájit jednání „od nuly“. Aby pfiidal váhu sv˘m slovÛm, neopomenul pfiipomenout i legitimní právo ÁzerbajdÏánu usilovat o navrácení okupovan˘ch území i silou. Armén‰tí pfiedstavitelé na oplátku zdÛrazÀují, Ïe by ÁzerbajdÏán mûl akceptovat realitu prohrané války a prozatím odmítají jednat „od nuly“, neboÈ by do‰lo k negaci ve‰kerého pokroku dosud dosaÏeného na podle jejich názoru komplikovan˘ch jednáních. Jednání se zakonzervovala kvÛli neochotû ÁzerbajdÏánu pfiijmout jakékoli ujednání o statutu Náhorního Karabachu, které by nebralo v potaz zásadu územní celistvosti, zatímco Arménie a Náhorní Karabach odmítají vertikální vztahy mezi Baku a Stepanakertem. Pomineme-li ponûkud ãastûj‰í pfiípady dûlostfieleck˘ch a kulometn˘ch duelÛ na arménsko-ázerbajdÏánském pohraniãí, lze souãasnost situaci shrnout tak, Ïe se aktivity mezi Jerevanem a Baku omezily na oblast verbální války.37 Geopolitick˘ v˘hled JiÏního Kavkazu Na rozdíl od stavu v Náhorním Karabachu a kolem nûj, kde nastávající „geopolitick˘ pat“ bude, jak se zdá, pfietrvávat del‰í dobu, fiada specifik podnítila dynamiãtûj‰í v˘voj v Gruzii. Poslední události v této zemi, která je pokládána za klíã k v˘chodnímu âernomofií a kavkazsko-stfiedoasijskému regionu ze západu, ukázaly, Ïe mocenské soupefiení o tento region vstoupilo do kritické fáze. Je zfiejmé, Ïe po roz‰ífiení NATO o nûkteré zemû stfiední a v˘chodní Evropy, stejnû tak jako rozmístûním americk˘ch vojensk˘ch základen v Uzbekistánu a v Kyrgyzstánu bylo pfiekonáno dal‰í geostrategické tabu, neboÈ vojensko-politická expanze NATO a USA prolomila hranice postsovûtské-

ho prostoru dosud povaÏovaného za takfika v˘luãnou doménu Ruska. V tomto ohledu Istanbulsk˘ summit NATO pouze dokreslil obraz svûdãící o tom, Ïe Aliance má seriózní zájem o pronikání na Ukrajinu, Kavkaz a do Stfiední Asie. Tento proces se zdá b˘t neodvratiteln˘. I kdyÏ je zatím pfiedãasné uvaÏovat o ãlenství jihokavkazsk˘ch státÛ v NATO, lze pfiinejmen‰ím oãekávat, Ïe se do roku 2007–2010 ustaví urãitá forma afiliace ÁzerbajdÏánu a Gruzie s touto organizací. Institucionalizaci tohoto procesu bude pfiedcházet mnohastranné roz‰ífiení spolupráce – jako pfiedtím v pfiípadû Estonska, Loty‰ka a Litvy – která se bude odehrávat ve znamení zaji‰tûní bezpeãnosti jihokavkazského regionu. Podmínkou úspû‰nosti tohoto poãínání bude i pfiístup západních zemí k managementu lokálních etnick˘ch konfliktÛ, kterému dosud vládla Moskva. Aktivnûj‰í západní angaÏovanost by mûla pfiispût k jejich reálnému fie‰ení.38 Podmínkou stabilizace JiÏního Kavkazu je i dokonãená likvidace rusk˘ch vojensk˘ch základen pfiedev‰ím z gruzínského území. V této souvislosti se „boj proti terorismu“ ukázal b˘t jako katalyzátor sblíÏení NATO (nejen) s Baku a Tbilisi, které v‰emoÏnû podpofiily Washington a poskytly alianãním jednotkám pÛsobícím na Balkánû, v Afghánistánu a nejnovûji i v Iráku vojenské kontingenty. Lexikon antiteroristické války byl v‰ak obratnû vyuÏíván nejen Spojen˘mi státy pro ospravedlnûní vojenskopolitického pronikání do kavkazsko-stfiedoasijského regionu, ale i Ruskem. To jiÏ od roku 1999 hlasitû upozorÀovalo na údajnû tûsné vztahy ãeãensk˘ch separatistÛ s „mezinárodní islamistickou internacionálou“, coÏ mu mûlo umoÏnit získat carte blanche pro definitivní pacifikaci âeãenska. Mnozí ru‰tí stratégové v‰ak, ãelíce rostoucí nestabilitû na severním Kavkaze, v posledních letech hovofií také o vzniku „nov˘ch hrozeb“ na jiÏních hranicích Ruska, které vesmûs identifikují s expanzí islamistického terorismu. V zájmu národní bezpeãnosti Ruska v kavkazské perspektivû tak je podle nich nejen pfietrvání vojsk v tomto regionu, ale i jejich podstatné posílení.39 38

37

Není bez zajímavosti, Ïe se tyto obstfiely z arménské strany stupÀují pokaÏdé, kdyÏ opozice v Arménii aktivizuje úsilí k Koãarjanovû svrÏení (naposledy letos v dubnu). UvaÏuje se o tom, Ïe si arménsk˘ prezident touto cestou pfiipravuje pro sebe v kritick˘ch okamÏicích pÛdu pro zavedení nouzového stavu v zemi.

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39

V tomto ohledu zaslouÏí pozornost neochota Moskvy spolupracovat v jihoosetinské záleÏitosti s OBSE, kterou obviÀuje z „neobjektivnosti“. Tbilisi napfiíklad nejnovûji navrhlo, aby byly v Rokském tunelu, kter˘ spojuje jiÏní Osetii se severní Osetii, podél které podle názoru gruzínské strany putují zbranû, munice a dobrovolníci z Ruska do krizové oblasti, dislokovány monitorující jednotky OSZE. Cyganok A., NATO: Nastuplenije na Kavkaz, anal˘za Institutu politické a vojenské anal˘zy, Moskva (09. 07. 2004).

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V tomto geopolitickém kontextu lze napfiíklad interpretovat události v JiÏní Osetii. Pfii stálém zuÏování ruského vlivu – teì jiÏ i v „blízkém zahraniãí“ – Moskva velice bolestivû nese aktivní pokusy nového tbilisského vedení zpochybnit prorusk˘ statut quo v perifériích ustálen˘ na poãátku 90. let. Je totiÏ zfiejmé, Ïe v pfiípadû obsazení JiÏní Osetie gruzínskou armádou by nevyhnutelnû do‰la fiada na Abcházii. MÛÏeme pfiedpokládat, Ïe zanedlouho by Moskva musela pod sílícím nátlakem USA reálnû zaãít uvaÏovat o staÏení sv˘ch zbyl˘ch základen z jihogruzínsk˘ch oblastí – AdÏárie a DÏavacheti. Tyto oblasti jsou klíãové, protoÏe pfies nû, resp. v jejich tûsné blízkosti vede ropovod Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. Pak by se ruská vojenská pfiítomnost v jihokavkazském regionu izolovala na pouhou Arménii, ve které uÏ nyní sílí pochybnosti o úãelnosti nealternativního spoléhání se na Rusko jako garanta bezpeãnosti na úkor rozvíjení vztahÛ se Západem. Poãínající arménské váhání posiluje pfiedev‰ím relativní politická úspû‰nost jejích sousedÛ. „SondáÏ bojem“ uskuteãnûná Saaka‰vilim v JiÏní Osetii tedy ukázala odhodlanost Kremlu bránit svoje zbylé bastiony na JiÏním Kavkaze. V tomto ohledu je rozhodnost gruzínského prezidenta pfiímo úmûrná stupni podpory ze strany Washingtonu a pfiedních zemí NATO. Pfiímá ozbrojená konfrontace, která by mohla mít nepfiedvídatelné následky, v‰ak zatím není v zájmu Tbilisi, Moskvy ani Washingtonu – tím se zfiejmû dá vysvûtlit „vyãkávací“ pozice zúãastnûn˘ch stran. V opaãném pfiípadû by vyvstalo velmi nepfiíjemné a klíãové dilema, o nûmÏ se bohatû spekuluje jiÏ od konce 90. let, a sice budou-li USA ochotny zasáhnout, aby podpofiily svého malého jihokavkazského spojence v pfiípadném ozbrojeném konfliktu s Moskvou. Je moÏné témûfi s jistotou pfiedpokládat, Ïe by tato ochota byla minimální. Prozatím tedy obecnû na JiÏním Kavkaze budou vládnout slova a více ãi ménû nátlaková diplomacie. Tento fakt v‰ak nic nemûní na tom, Ïe geopoliticky stále v˘znamnûj‰í region JiÏního Kavkazu znaãnû nestabilní region, kde lze na velmi malém prostoru poukázat hned na nûkolik moÏn˘ch destabilizaãních ohnisek, která mají také celoregionální destabilizaãní potenciál.

10. Ekonomick˘ v˘voj ÁzerbajdÏánu Filip âern˘

Úvod Zemû a oblasti regionu Kaspického mofie je osídleno etnicky rÛznorod˘m obyvatelstvem, které ãítá pfiibliÏnû 60 miliónÛ lidí. Ti pfiedstavují v˘znamnou ekonomickou sílu, jejíÏ potenciál doposud nebyl docenûn. Nebyl docenûn jednak ve smyslu pracovní síly, neboÈ stálé vysoké míry nezamûstnanosti poukazují na znaãnou podkapitalizovanost kaspick˘ch ekonomik a jednak ve smyslu spotfiebitelském, tento prvek je v‰ak ochromen zoufale nízkou kupní silou. PfiestoÏe v fiadû zemí regionu do‰lo v poslední dobû k hospodáfiskému oÏivení, vzhledem k závislosti na svûtov˘ch cenách surovin jej nelze, zejména z dlouhodobého hlediska, pfieceÀovat. Pfiesto jsou místní zemû pfiedmûtem zájmu zahraniãních investorÛ, snaÏící se umístit svou produkci na zdej‰ích trzích, najít uplatnûní pro pfiebytkov˘ kapitál nebo nalézt levné zdroje surovin ãi pracovních sil. Surovinov˘ prvek je v tomto regionu pfiítomen velmi silnû, v této stati bude v‰ak analyzován pouze do míry nezbytné k popisu pfiíslu‰né hospodáfiské situace. ÁzerbajdÏánská ekonomika prochází v poslední dobû cílen˘mi reformami, které pfiiná‰í ãásteãné v˘sledky v podobû ekonomického rÛstu a obnovené monetární stability. ZároveÀ je ale hospodáfiská politika zatíÏena fiadou ne‰varÛ a pfiekáÏek, ãasto interního charakteru, které pfiedstavují pro dal‰í rozvoj prvofiadé hrozby. Pomocí anal˘zy údajÛ o v˘voji ázerbajdÏánské ekonomiky, zejména jejích zahraniãnûobchodních vztahÛ, se pokusím ukázat, jak˘mi cestami se ubírala tato ekonomika od poãátku devadesát˘ch let, tedy od okamÏiku získání politické nezávislosti, respektive od poãátku tvorby samostatné hospodáfiské politiky, která byla pfiedstavena aÏ o nûkolik let pozdûji. Otáz-

240

kou k zodpovûzení a tedy i cílem práce bude, zda se vedení zemû podafiilo nalézt cestu vedle nezávislosti politické i k nezávislosti hospodáfiské. Text bude doprovázen fiadou grafick˘ch znázornûní, dokládajících diskutovaná fakta. Ekonomika ÁzerbajdÏánu Tato jihokavkazská zemû, rozkládající se na plo‰e 87 000 km2 a ãítající pfiibliÏnû 8 mil. obyvatel, je svou ekonomickou podstatou typickou ukázkou malé postsovûtské republiky se zdûdûn˘mi hospodáfisk˘mi obtíÏemi strukturálního charakteru. UÏ za sovûtsk˘ch ãasÛ byla republika dodavatelem ropy a ropn˘ch produktÛ, vyjma nûkolika pomûrnû úzce specializovan˘ch odvûtví, zejména petrochemického prÛmyslu v Baku, rybolovu a extenzívního pûstování bavlny se Ïádné dal‰í hospodáfiské obory nerozvíjely. Po získání nezávislosti v roce 1991 se zemû na jedné stranû zbavila regulujících mechanismÛ sovûtské centrální moci, jak˘m bylo napfiíklad pûtiletkové plánování, na druhé stranû související rozpad odbytov˘ch trhÛ uvrhl zemi v tûÏkou hospodáfiskou situaci. Zemû se navíc zmítala ve vnitropolitick˘ch nepokojích, vedla ozbrojen˘ konflikt se separatistick˘m Náhorním Karabachem a aÏ do nástupu prezidenta Alijeva k moci se zhor‰ovala i zahraniãnûpolitická situace. Do roku 1994 se HDP zemû propadl o témûfi 50 %, prÛmyslová v˘roba dokonce o 60 %.1 Problematickou se v plné nahotû ukázala minimální diverzifikace prÛmyslové v˘roby – na poãátku 90. let bylo 95 % národního produktu tvofieno 15 komoditami – zejména ropou, bavlnou a nûkolika dal‰ími zemûdûlsk˘mi plodinami, hliníkem a vybran˘mi chemikáliemi. ÚroveÀ hrub˘ch investic se do roku 1994 sníÏila 6,5krát. Závûry vût‰iny anal˘z se ztotoÏnily v pfiíãinách hluboké ekonomické deprese, do které byla zemû uvrÏena po získání nezávislosti: zpfietrhání vnûj‰ích ekonomick˘ch vazeb, chyby v hospodáfiské politice, respektive její neexistence a sloÏitá politická situace vãetnû války o Karabach pohlcující v‰echny fungující zdroje ekonomiky2.

1 2

Ekonomick˘ v˘voj ÁzerbajdÏánu]

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http://www.azerb.com/, sekce „economy“, nav‰tíveno v únoru 2004. Viz k situaci na poãátku 90. let napfi.: Gouliev, R., The Azerbaijani nation cannot be allowed to live under these conditions, and it does not deserve it, dostupn˘ z: http://www.gouliev.com/s3.html.

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Teprve od poloviny 90. let, po nástupu prezidenta Alijeva, dochází k postupné hospodáfiské obnovû, která je taÏena zejména zahraniãními investicemi, pozdûji také obnoven˘m exportem ropy pomocí znovu zprovoznûn˘ch ropovodÛ do pfiístavÛ na bfiehu âerného mofie. Byla také koneãnû definována základní hospodáfiská politika, schválen program prvotní privatizace a zmraÏen konflikt o Karabach. Z dÛvodu vût‰í dostupnosti a verifikovatelnosti údajÛ se ve vût‰inû anal˘z proto ãasovû pfiidrÏím období, které zaãíná vládou Alijeva, pfiibliÏnû vymezeném polovinou devadesát˘ch let. Makroekonomická charakteristika V˘voj a struktura HDP Ekonomika zemû se nachází v pokraãujícím procesu transformace z centrálnû-plánované k trÏní, fiada strukturálních problémÛ ov‰em zÛstává nevyfie‰ena a vyjma ropného sektoru se nedafií obnovovat Ïádn˘ ze sektorÛ hospodáfiství. V polovinû devadesát˘ch let úspû‰nû probûhla první generace strukturálních reforem, pomocí kter˘ch se zejména podafiilo obnovit monetární stabilitu zvládnutím hroziv˘ch mûr inflace a depreciace mûny. Na základû opatfiení doporuãen˘ch MMF byla provedena ãásteãná liberalizace cen a privatizace mal˘ch podnikÛ a zemûdûlství. Druhá fáze v‰ak stále ãeká na uskuteãnûní, mûla by k ní patfiit zejména privatizace bank a ropného sektoru, pokraãující liberalizace zahraniãního obchodu a obecné zlep‰ení podnikatelského prostfiedí. Graf ã. 1 zachycuje v˘voj hrubého domácího produktu zemû v devadesát˘ch letech aÏ do roku 2004. Je z nûj zfiejmé, Ïe stabilní hospodáfisk˘ rÛst nastal kolem roku 1994 s pfiíchodem novû definované hospodáfiské politiky prezidenta Alijeva. HDP v celém období rostlo i pfiesto, Ïe cenová hladina rostla ve stejném ãase velmi mírn˘mi tempy (viz níÏe). DosaÏení úrovnû HDP ze sovûtsk˘ch dob bylo dosaÏeno aÏ v roce 1996, kdyÏ celkov˘ kumulovan˘ propad od roku 1990 pfiesáhl 40 %. Toto ãíslo pfiibliÏnû odpovídá zku‰enosti Ruska i jin˘ch postsovûtsk˘ch republik. Urãité zpomalení ekonomického rÛstu lze pozorovat v roce 1998, které b˘vá pfiipisováno hospodáfiské depresi v Rusku, nebylo ov‰em provázeno skuteãn˘m propadem HDP i díky tomu, Ïe se zemi do té doby podafiilo dostateãnû diverzifikovat zahraniãnû-obchodní vazby (viz níÏe). Pfieklenutí pro-

242

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243

Tempo rÛstu hospodáfiství vykazovalo v uvedeném období zdravé „tygfií“ pfiírÛstky, které by vzbudily závist i u v˘chodoasijsk˘ch novû industrializovan˘ch zemí. BohuÏel vysoká tempa rÛstu se v ÁzerbajdÏánu nezakládaly na rÛstu nov˘ch konkurenceschopn˘ch odvûtví, spí‰ se jednalo o rÛst taÏen˘ investicemi do ropného prÛmyslu. Kromû toho bylo zfiejmé, Ïe z nízkého základu bylo dosahováno vy‰‰ích pfiírÛstkÛ, pfiesto se HDP na obyvatele do dne‰ního dne nepfiehoupl pfies hranici 1000 USD/ob. PfiírÛstky za poslední roky udává tab. ã. 1.

Graf ã. 1: HDP (mil. USD, b.c.) 9000 8000 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000

Rok

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2000

RÛst HDP

10,0

7,4

11,1

9,9

10,6

11,2

8,1

13,6

1000

Tab ã. 1: V˘voj rÛstu HDP ÁzerbajdÏánu 1998–2005, rok 2005 odhad (podle: Mezinárodní mûnov˘ fond, http://www.imf.org/external/np/oth/042304.pdf )

0 1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

V˘voj HDP ÁzerbajdÏánu 1990–2004 (podle: Statistick˘ úfiad ÁzerbajdÏánu, http://www.azstat.org/publications/azfigures/2005/en/010_1.shtml )

padu HDP do pÛvodních hodnot bylo provedeno rychleji neÏ v pfiípadû zemí stfiední Evropy, kde se HDP z pfiedrevoluãních dob objevilo v prÛmûru aÏ po osmi letech transformování jednotliv˘ch hospodáfiství. Analytici Svûtové banky a MMF se ov‰em shodují, Ïe k tomu do‰lo spí‰ z dÛvodu pfiedchozích nízk˘ch hodnot HDP a pfiíznivému v˘voji jin˘ch externích faktorÛ, neÏ z dÛvodu úspû‰n˘ch hospodáfisk˘ch reforem.3 Dal‰ím dÛvodem, kter˘ bude níÏe je‰tû analyzován, jsou ceny ropy na svûtov˘ch trzích. ProtoÏe ÁzerbajdÏán je z hlediska celkového svûtového v˘vozu ropy „price-taker“ (jeho v˘voz je pfiíli‰ mal˘ na to, aby ovlivnil svûtové ceny), mají ceny ropy okamÏit˘ dopad na v˘voj HDP zemû. Ty se odráÏely pfiedev‰ím ve stagnaci let 1998–99 a ve zrychleném rÛstu v letech 2004–05. Na poãátku leto‰ního roku dokonce osciloval kolem neuvûfiiteln˘ch 40 %.4 3 4

Loukoianova, E., Unigovskaya, A., Analysis of recent growth in Low-Income CIS Countries, dostupn˘ z: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04151.pdf. Ismailov, R., Wanted: Investment strategy for Azerbaijan’s oil money, dostupn˘ z: http:// www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav041406.shtml.

Tûmito tempy pfiírÛstku HDP se ÁzerbajdÏán fiadí k nejv˘konnûj‰ím ekonomikám zemí SNS, neboÈ prÛmûrné tempo rÛstu 10,2 % roãnû pfiesáhlo prÛmûrn˘ rÛst zemí SNS o více neÏ 5 %, tranzitivních zemí stfiední Evropy (vãetnû âR) o více neÏ 6 %.5 Dekompozice agregátní poptávky zemû nám umoÏní nalézt odpovûì na otázku, zda je HDP zemû a jeho rÛst tvofien z vût‰í míry domácí spotfiebou, ãi zda se na nûm podílejí více investice, pfiípadnû vnûj‰í sektor. V˘voj struktury ázerbajdÏánské AD je zachycen na grafu ã. 2. Závûry tedy ukazují, Ïe do zlomového roku 1998 byl hospodáfisk˘ rÛst taÏen pfiedev‰ím spotfiebou, která vytvofiila podmínky pro dal‰í investování, pfiedev‰ím do exportnû orientovan˘ch odvûtví. Následoval dynamick˘ rozvoj exportu, taÏen˘ zejména ropou (obnoven˘ v˘voz ropy do gruzínsk˘ch pfiístavÛ u âerného mofie), kter˘ byl oslaben aÏ po 4–5 letech pfiebytkem ropy na svûtov˘ch trzích a exportem vyvolan˘mi dovozy. To dokazuje i v˘voj samotného exportu, kter˘ po celé období témûfi nepfietrÏitû rostl z 23 % na HDP v roce 1998 na 44 % v roce 2002.6 Negativní v˘voj z poãátku devadesát˘ch let, kdy zemû nebyla schopna domácí poptávku uspokojit vlastní produkcí a kryla ji dovozy, byl tedy jiÏ pfiekonán. 5 6

Loukoianova, E., Unigovskaya, A., cit. dílo. Loukoianova, E., Unigovskaya, A., cit. dílo.

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Graf ã. 2: Dekompozice agregátní poptávky

245

Graf ã. 3

120

70%

100

60% 50%

80 C

%

60

I

40

30%

20 0 1992 –20

Agriculture Industry Services

40%

NX

20% 1993

1994

1995

1996 1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002 2003

–40 V˘voj sloÏek agregátní poptávky ÁzerbajdÏánu 1993–2002 (C – soukromá a vládní spotfieba, I –investice, NX – ãisté v˘vozy, podle: Loukoianova, E., Unigovskaya, A.: Analysis of recent growth in Low-Income CIS Countries, dostupn˘ z: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04151.pdf)

V˘voj investic v uvedeném období víceménû odráÏel volatilitu dÛvûry investorÛ v podnikatelské prostfiedí zemû a reagoval velmi intenzivnû na události ve vnûj‰ím svûtû. DÛkazem mÛÏe b˘t pokles investiãní aktivity po roce 1998 vyvolan˘ krizí v Rusku, která dolehla i na dal‰í státy SNS, postupnû se v‰ak promûnila ve v˘hodu, neboÈ obchodníci jin˘ch zemí byli nuceni vyhledávat levnûj‰í dovozy. Struktura ázerbajdÏánského hospodáfiství se od poãátku 90. let vyvíjela v duchu zku‰enosti jin˘ch zemí SNS, dle grafu ã. 1 zaznamenané poãáteãní propadem prÛmyslové produkce, kterou se doposud nepodafiilo plnû restaurovat. Propad prÛmyslové v˘roby se podafiilo pfiibrzdit v polovinû devadesát˘ch let, nicménû od té doby je v˘znam v‰ech sektorÛ hospodáfiství pfiibliÏnû vyrovnan˘ a nedafií se zv˘‰it v˘znam prÛmyslu na zamûstnanosti obyvatel zemû. Statistická data vyjadfiující tento v˘voj jsou k dispozici od roku 1995 a zachycuje je graf ã. 3. Propad prÛmyslové v˘roby dozníval aÏ do roku 1997 – v roce 1995 ãinil pfies 20 % a v roce 1996 témûfi 7 %.7 Jak patrno na grafu ã. 2, tento v˘voj se promítl i do struktury zamûstnanosti. NárÛst podílu primárního

10% 0% 1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000 2001

2002

2003

V˘voj podílu sektorÛ ázerbajdÏánské ekonomiky na zamûstnanosti (podle: Statistick˘ úfiad ÁzerbajdÏánu, http://www.azstat.org/publications/azfigures/2004/en/index.shtml)

sektoru a souãasn˘ pokles v˘znamu sektoru sluÏeb, kter˘ byl zaznamenán v roce 1999 je z vût‰í ãásti zapfiíãinûn zmûnou statistick˘ch metodik vykazování a v˘slednou anal˘zu ãásteãnû zkresluje. Agrární sektor v polovinû devadesát˘ch let produkoval pouze polovinu své v˘roby v roce 19918, tento propad byl z vût‰í ãásti dÛsledkem zhor‰ování technického stavu zemûdûlsk˘ch strojÛ a zavlaÏovacích systémÛ, nesprávn˘m pouÏíváním hnojiv a nedostatky v pfiístupu na trh, kter˘ se jen pomalu vyrovnával s rozpadem centrálního plánování. V souãasné dobû se opírá pfiedev‰ím o pûstování bavlny. Ta spolu s hroznov˘m vínem a tabákem tvofií asi 50 % ázerbajdÏánské zemûdûlské produkce.9 Problémov˘m je stav ázerbajdÏánské pÛdy, kvÛli klimatick˘m podmínkám a ekologické zátûÏi (rozsáhlé plochy, pfiedev‰ím v blízkosti Baku, jsou kontaminovány v dÛsledku tûÏební ãinnosti) je trvale obdûláváno pouze 2,7 % pÛdy, i kdyÏ 7 8 9

Azerbaijan’s Economy-on the Threshold of Revival – záznam konference se státním zástupcem pro ekonomické otázky, viz http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/azerbaijan/links/econreve.html. Singh, R., Laurila, J., Azerbaijan, Recent Economic Developments and Policy Issues in Sustainability of Growth, s. 14, dostupn˘ z: http://www.bof.fi/bofit/eng/6dp/index.stm. Http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/azerbaijan/ECONOMY.html.

10 11 12

âíselné údaje viz http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/aj.html. K situaci o tomto produktu viz http://www.caucaz.com/home_uk/breve_contenu.php?id=173. Singh, R., Laurila, J., cit. dílo, s. 18.

Graf ã. 4: V˘voj podílu ropného sektoru Podíl ropného sektoru v % na prÛmyslu

Podíl ropného sektoru v % na HDP

98

45 40

96

35 94

30 25

92

20 90

% HDP

pro zemûdûlství je vyuÏiteln˘ch asi 20 %. PfiekáÏkou ve v˘raznûj‰í utilizaci pÛdních zdrojÛ je vedle v˘‰e zmínûn˘ch faktorÛ i zanedbaná technická úroveÀ zavlaÏovacích zafiízení10. V minulosti tak proslulá v˘roba ázerbajdÏánského kaviáru je dnes drÏena pod pfiísnou kontrolou a je povolena jen na omezen˘ch plochách Kaspického mofie. Pfiesto se na trh dostává stále velká ãást kaviáru, kter˘ je v‰ak získáván víceménû pytlaãením a je umísÈován pfiedev‰ím na domácím trhu11. V prÛmyslové v˘robû ÁzerbajdÏánu vÏdy v˘raznû dominovala tûÏba a zpracování paliv, zejména ropy, ãásteãnû také zemního plynu. Neropná odvûtví pak zahrnovala pfiedev‰ím tûÏk˘ prÛmysl jako napfi. hutnictví, strojírenství, chemick˘ prÛmysl a prÛmysl stavebních hmot. Tato energeticky nároãná odvûtví byla budována v souladu se sovûtsk˘m plánovacím pfiístupem, kdy ÁzerbajdÏán byl, díky sv˘m blízk˘m bohat˘m surovinov˘m zdrojÛm, jednou z dodavatelsk˘ch základen tûÏkého prÛmyslu pro ostatní republiky SSSR. Rozpad tûchto kvalitativnû nenároãn˘ch trhÛ, nárÛst smûnn˘ch relací neropn˘ch prÛmyslov˘ch odvûtví, cenová liberalizace a nová zahraniãní konkurence zpÛsobily obrovsk˘ propad neropn˘ch prÛmyslov˘ch odvûtví, aÏ na úroveÀ 5–10 % jejich produkce z poãátku devadesát˘ch let.12 Klíãov˘m oborem pro ekonomiku zemû nicménû zÛstává tûÏba ropy a zemního plynu a ãásteãnû také jejich zpracování, pfiestoÏe vût‰ina vytûÏené suroviny jde na export nezpracovaná. Podíl tohoto odvûtví na celkové prÛmyslové produkci zemû je pozoruhodn˘ a zaslouÏí bliωího prozkoumání. Míru závislosti ázerbájdÏánské ekonomiky na tomto odvûtví demonstruji ukazatelem podílu ropného prÛmyslu na celkovém HDP a na prÛmyslu. Z grafu je zfiejmé, Ïe negativní v˘voj prohlubování orientace ázerbájdÏánského prÛmyslu na tûÏbu a zpracování ropy a zemního plynu postupnû akceleroval a ustálil se na nezdravû vysok˘ch 97%. Podíl celého ropného sektoru na HDP zemû na poãátku 21. století osciloval kolem 40%. Pfiíãinou jeho zvy‰ování byla rostoucí svûtová poptávka po ropû a ropn˘ch produktech a následná zvy‰ující se produkce, která mohla k zákazníkÛm proudit znovu zprovoznûn˘mi ropovody na bfiehu âerného mofie. TûÏba

247

Ekonomick˘ v˘voj ÁzerbajdÏánu]

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% prÛmyslu

246

15 10

88

5 86 1998

0 1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

V˘voj podílu ropného prÛmyslu (tûÏby a zpracování ropy) na HDP a celkovém prÛmyslu ÁzerbajdÏánu, poãítáno dle faktorov˘ch nákladÛ (podle: Azerbaijan Republic, statistical appendix, dostupn˘ z: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr0518.pdf )

ropy se v polovinû 90. let pohybovala v rozmezí 9–10 milionÛ tun roãnû, v roce 2003 to bylo uÏ 15,4 milionÛ tun a bylo lze pfiedpokládat, Ïe v souvislosti se zprovoznûním nového ropovodu do tureckého Ceyhanu s kapacitou 1 milion barelÛ dennû toto ãíslo dále poroste.13 V˘znam ropného sektoru na makroekonomice zemû se projevuje pfiedev‰ím v její platební bilanci a mûnové politice, která je ãasto silnû determinována v˘kyvy cen ropy a plynu na svûtov˘ch burzách. V˘znam ropy na exportu je dále ozfiejmûn v ãásti 2.1.3. Diverzifikace prÛmyslov˘ch odvûtví je jedním z klíãov˘ch úkolÛ vládní hospodáfiské politiky. Závislost ekonomiky na petrochemickém odvûtví ãiní ze zemû typ „banánové republiky“ ve smyslu její absolutní podfiízenosti v˘voji cen na svûtov˘ch trzích ropy a zemního plynu. Fázi kolapsu prÛmyslu z poãátku 90. let je proto nutno nahradit novou reindustrializací, a to zejména v neropn˘ch oborech.

13

âíselné údaje viz http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr0518.pdf.

248

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Inflace a ceny – z hyperinflace do mírné inflace Polovina devadesát˘ch byla kromû zastavení propadu prÛmyslové produkce charakterizována i zvládnutím hroziv˘ch mûr inflace z 1600 % v roce 1994 na pfiijateln˘ch 8,5 % o rok pozdûji. Do‰lo také ke sníÏení daÀové zátûÏe, zejména u daní z pfiíjmÛ – korporátní danû byly sníÏeny o polovinu, osobní danû z 55 % na 40 % a byl zv˘‰ena ãástka nezdanitelného minima.14 Pfiehled monetární situace je vyjádfien znázornûním v˘voje spotfiebitelsk˘ch cen od poloviny devadesát˘ch let, kdy do‰lo ke stabilizaci cenového v˘voje. Graf ã. 5 zachycuje v˘voj indexu spotfiebitelsk˘ch cen ve vztahu k základnímu roku 1995. Graf ã. 5 300 280 260 240 General indices

220

180

Food, beverages and tabaco Non-food stuff

160

Services

200

Ze znázornûní je patrné, Ïe indexy cen prÛmyslov˘ch v˘robkÛ (které jsou statisticky rozdûleny na potravinové a nepotravinové) se v uvedeném období vyvíjely pomûrnû stabilnû, oproti dynamickému rÛstu cen sluÏeb. U obou kategorií se nicménû v˘kyvy stabilizovaly, takÏe v˘sledná míra inflace nepfiekraãovala v posledních 4–5 letech úroveÀ 2–3 % roãnû – vyjma roku 2004. V˘voj tempa rÛstu indexu spotfiebitelsk˘ch cen, ze které lze vyvodit tempo míry inflace zachycuje graf ã. 6. Je z nûj zfiejmé, Ïe z hrozivé hyperinflace, kterou zemû zaÏila v první polovinû 90. let (v roce 1994 dosáhla 1788 %!), se na základû opatfiení doporuãen˘ch MMF a Svûtovou bankou podafiilo inflaci zkrotit aÏ na deflaci v letech 1998–1999. Stejnû jako v pfiípadû zastavení propadu HDP byl tento v˘voj uveden pfiedchozí liberalizací cen, pfiedev‰ím cen energií, které byly pfiedtím dotovány. Hloubka deflace v roce 1999 a následující nízké míry inflace v‰ak byly pfiekvapivé i pro fiadu analytikÛ, zvlá‰tû s ohledem na skuteãnost, Ïe se v této dobû jiÏ dafiilo drÏet stabilní reáln˘ mûnov˘ kurz ázerbajdÏánského manatu. Pfiíãinou byla velmi restriktivní monetární politika Národní banky ÁzerbajdÏánu, která v tomto boufilivém období (boufilivém kvÛli ruské hospodáfiské krizi, která vrcholila právû v roce 1998), zv˘‰ila úrokové sazby aÏ na 20 %.15 ÚroveÀ mûnového kurGraf ã. 6 8 6 4 2 0 –2 –4 –6 –8 –10

140

%

120 100 80 1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

V˘voj indexu spotfiebitelsk˘ch cen ÁzerbajdÏánu v l. 1996–2004, index 100 =1995 (podle: Statistick˘ úfiad ÁzerbajdÏánu, http://www.azstat.org/publications/azfigures/2005/en/019_1.shtml)

14

Azerbaijan’s Economy’on the Threshold of Revival – záznam konference se státním zástupcem pro ekonomické otázky, http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/azerbaijan/links/econreve.html.

249

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

V˘voj míry inflace v l. 1997–2004 (podle: Statistick˘ úfiad ÁzerbajdÏánu, http:// www.azstat.org/publications/azfigures/2005/en/019_1.shtml )

15

Singh, R., Laurila, J., cit. dílo, s. 24.

2004

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zu byla zachována díky masivním zásahÛm národní banky, jejíÏ devizové rezervy se v dÛsledku tûchto operací sníÏily o 24 %.16 ZároveÀ s nízkou mírou tvorby monetární báze byl pro tuto dobu typick˘ nedostatek dostupn˘ch dlouhodob˘ch úvûrÛ. Ten byl a je zpÛsobován znaãnou podkapitalizovaností ázerbajdÏánsk˘ch bank a nízká míra k úsporám obyvatelstva, ze kter˘ch by takové úvûry byly financovány. Oba faktory pfiedstavují do budoucna zásadní problém, které lze ãásteãnû odstranit deregulací bankovního sektoru umoÏnûním vstupu zahraniãních bankovních domÛ na domácí trh (pfiiná‰ejících potfiebn˘ kapitál) a zv˘‰ením dÛvûryhodnosti finanãního trhu pro domácí stfiadatele. Souvisejícím problémem je také pomûrnû znaãn˘ stupeÀ hotovosti drÏené v zahraniãních mûnách, pfiedev‰ím v americk˘ch dolarech. Ty nemá obyvatelstvo a firmy zapotfiebí ukládat do bank, neboÈ vklady v tûchto mûnách nepfiiná‰í velké zúroãení a pfied nejist˘m zhodnocením v nedÛvûryhodn˘ch bankách dávají ãasto pfiednost spofiení „pod pol‰táfi“. Neménû dÛleÏit˘m faktorem nízké schopnosti tvorby úvûrÛ v ekonomice je i nevymahatelnost práva – v prostfiedí, kdy vûfiitel nemá jistotu získání kvalifikovan˘ch úvûrÛ v konkurzním fiízení, bude takové úvûry hodnotit jako vysoce rizikové – a zatíÏí je vysokou úrokovou mírou. ¤e‰ením uplatÀovan˘m také v jin˘ch tranzitních zemích je diferencovan˘ pfiístup k jednotliv˘m klientÛm (nutnost obchodní historie) a moÏnost státních záruk. Ty jsou ov‰em v prostfiedí tak silnû prodchnutém korupcí pouze katalyzátorem k dal‰ímu rÛstu tohoto problému a nezaji‰Èují tak distribuci penûÏních prostfiedkÛ z úvûrÛ podle racionálních hledisek. Monetární situace se v posledním statisticky sledovaném roce 2004 ãásteãnû zhor‰ila. Podle dostupn˘ch údajÛ cenová hladina v zemi zaãíná opût rÛst, dÛvodem jsou pfiedev‰ím ceny zemûdûlsk˘ch v˘robcÛ a potravin. Díky nim míra inflace uÏ jen za první ãtvrtletí roku 2005 dosáhla 7,6 %, roãní inflaci tak vytlaãujíc aÏ na 12 %17. Pfiíãiny tak náhlého zvy‰ování cen jsou pfiedmûtem diskusí mezi odborníky vládních institucí i soukrom˘ch organizací. Shodují se ov‰em na tûch nejdÛleÏitûj‰ích, kter˘mi jsou pfietrvávající i nadále monopolizace hospodáfiství, roz‰ífiená korupce a závislost eko16 17

Singh, R., Laurila, J., cit. dílo, s. 25. Ismayilova, K., Azerbaijan fights inflation and looks for culprits, dostupn˘ z: http://www.eurasianet.org/ departments/business/articles/eav062105.shtml.

Ekonomick˘ v˘voj ÁzerbajdÏánu]

251

nomiky na svûtov˘ch cenách ropy a zemního plynu. Kromû toho se v poslední dobû zaãíná projevovat tlak na rÛst domácí cenové hladiny i pfievaÏující závislost vnitfiních cenov˘ch relací na stoupajících cenách hlavní v˘vozní komodity. Tento jev je spojován s v˘skytem tzv. „holandské horeãky“, která bude podrobnûji analyzována níÏe. Vnûj‰í ekonomické vztahy Závislost ázerbajdÏánské ekonomiky na exportu nûkolika málo surovin je znaãná, coÏ ji ãiní zranitelnou cenami na svûtov˘ch trzích. O v˘znamu ropného sektoru pro národní hospodáfiství bylo struãnû pojednáno, stejn˘m zpÛsobem se tento sektor promítá i do v˘vozní struktury zemû. Témûfi ve‰keré zmûny v dynamice exportu lze s ohledem na podíl ropy odÛvodnit právû situací na svûtov˘ch trzích a schopnosti ázerbajdÏánské ropy umístit se na tûchto trzích. Jak lze pozorovat na grafu ã. 7, pád v˘vozÛ i dovozÛ se, na rozdíl od ostatních makroekonomick˘ch veliãin, zastavil uÏ v roce 1993. K opûtovnému rÛstu v‰ak do‰lo aÏ o 5 let pozdûji, v souvislosti s obnovením provozu nûkter˘ch star‰ích ropovodÛ do Gruzie a Ruska. Dovozy víceménû kopírovaly v˘vozy, coÏ je mj. dÛsledkem efektu reáln˘ch smûnn˘ch relací, kdy v systému plovoucího mûnového kurzu vy‰‰í v˘vozy vyvolávají tlak na apreciaci mûny, silnûj‰í mûna následnû stimuluje dovozy, protoÏe jsou relativnû levnûj‰í. A naopak, rÛst dovozÛ tlaãí na depreciaci mûny, která postupnû umoÏÀuje stále vût‰ímu mnoÏství exportérÛ uplatnit svou produkci v zahraniãí. NárÛst kladného salda obchodní bilance na poãátku 21. století lze pfiiãíst rÛstu cen ropy a zv˘‰ené poptávce po ní v souvislosti s iráckou krizí a obnovené schopnosti exportu nûkter˘ch zemûdûlsk˘ch surovin. V˘voj zachycuje graf. ã. 7. Pfiízniv˘ v˘voj bilance zboÏí byl naru‰en aÏ v roce 2003, kdy se v˘znamnû zv˘‰il objem dovezeného plynu a dodávek na v˘stavbu ropovodu BakuCeyhan, které nárazovû zv˘‰ily dovozy. Schodek bûÏného úãtu platební bilance tak v uvedeném období divoce osciloval mezi 0–28% pfii pomûrnû stabilním rÛstu HDP (viz v˘‰e) a pfiedkládá tak dal‰í argument ke znaãné vnûj‰í ekonomické zranitelnosti zemû. Komoditní struktufie dominuje ropa (na v˘vozu) a zemní plyn (na v˘vozu i dovozu). PfiestoÏe ÁzerbajdÏán disponuje znaãn˘mi zásobami zemního plynu, je kvÛli neexistující infrastruktufie na dovozu této suroviny stále závisl˘. Oãekává se, Ïe se situace zmûní po dostavûní paralelního plynovo-

252

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Graf ã. 8: Podíl ropy na exportu

Graf ã. 7: V˘voz a dovoz ÁzerbajdÏánu v l. 1991

tis. USD

3 500 000

Dovoz

3 000 000

V˘voz

2 500 000

Obchodní bilance

%

4 000 000

2 000 000 1 500 000 1 000 000

92 90 88 86 84 82 80 78 76 2000

2001

500 000 0 –500 000

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

–1 000 000

2002 Roky

2003

2004

Podíl ropy a ropn˘ch produktÛ na ázerbajdÏánském exportu 2000–2004 (podle: Statistick˘ úfiad ÁzerbajdÏánu, http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/external_economic_activities/en/xten_20.shtml )

Roky V˘voj v˘vozu, dovozu a obchodní bilance (podle: Statistick˘ úfiad ÁzerbajdÏánu, x.shtml” http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/external_economic_activities/en/xten_1.shtml)

Graf ã. 9: Teritoriální struktura v˘vozu 2004 Ostatní 21%

du s ropovodem Baku-Ceyhan, kter˘ bude vyuÏívat loÏiska zemního plynu v lokalitû Shah-Deniz. âíselnû nám v˘vozní strukturu ekonomiky znázorní následující graf. V˘voj této veliãiny kopíruje podobné znázornûní z grafu ã. 4 se ‰piãkou v roce 2001. Následn˘ pokles podílu ropy na v˘vozech bohuÏel nebyl dÛsledkem zvy‰ujícího se podílu nároãnûj‰ích prÛmyslov˘ch odvûtví, pfieváÏnû se jednalo o rostoucí v˘robu Ïeleza a kovÛ, zv˘‰enou zemûdûlskou produkci a v˘robu potravin. Komoditní struktura zahraniãního obchodu je proto pomûrnû fádní, mnohem zajímavûj‰í pohled nabízí geografick˘ pfiehled umísÈování ázerbajdÏánské produkce na zahraniãních trzích. Z grafu mÛÏeme odeãíst pozoruhodné skuteãnosti. Hlavními v˘vozními partnery byly západní zemû odebírající ropu a zemní plyn, pfiiãemÏ hlavní exportní destinací byly zemû EU (zejména Itálie), které tvofií cca 50 % exportu. Dal‰í v˘znamnou skupinou jsou zemû Blízkého v˘chodu, pfiedev‰ím Izrael a Turecko, jejichÏ podíl trvale roste. Vládû se tedy podafiilo diverzifikovat zahraniãnûobchodní vztahy, úspû‰nû se odpoutala od závislosti na Rusku, které stabilnû drÏí podíl na exportu v rozsahu 5–6 %,

Turkmenistán 4% Itálie 46%

Írán 4% Turecko 5% Gruzie 5% Rusko 6%

Izrael 9%

Teritoriální struktura ázerbajdÏánského v˘vozu (podle: Statistick˘ úfiad ÁzerbajdÏánu, dostupn˘ z: http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/external_economic_activities/en/xten_7.shtml)

253

254

coÏ je zlomek hodnoty ze sovûtsk˘ch dob. Je to nepochybnû dáno i tím, Ïe ÁzerbajdÏán nemá surovinovû zabezpeãenému Rusku co nabídnout. Pozitivnû nicménû lze hodnotit orientaci na solventní a platebnû schopné zemû západu, jeÏ od prostého dovozu surovin mohou ãasem pfienést ãást v˘robních kapacit na nich závisl˘ch (napfi. chemick˘ prÛmysl) do ÁzerbajdÏánu. Jiná situace je na stranû dovozu, kde se na pfiedních místech drÏí Rusko (16 %) a Velká Británie (12 % – tak vysok˘ podíl byl vykázán nepochybnû v dÛsledku v˘stavby ropovodu Baku-Ceyhan konsorciem AIOC vedené britsk˘m BP)18. Podíly to nicménû nejsou vysoké a je zfiejmé, Ïe nedávají témûfi Ïádn˘ prostor pro omezení nezávislosti hospodáfiské politiky, která by umoÏnila nátlakovou zahraniãní politiku. Obecnû lze poznamenat, Ïe slabost ázerbajdÏánské ekonomiky z ní neãiní trh pln˘ konkurenãního boje mezi zahraniãními firmami, které by vãasn˘m pfiístupem do zemû získaly v˘hodnûj‰í pozici a které se zemi, vyjma ropn˘ch spoleãností, spí‰ vyh˘bají. „Holandská horeãka“ Velmi ãasto se také hovofií o hrozbû tzv. „holandské horeãky“. Je to makroekonomick˘ jev, vyskytující se typicky v ekonomikách s jednou ãi nûkolika málo dominantními v˘vozními komoditami (obvykle surovinami). Vytváfií moÏnost nebezpeãné situace, kdy ceny jediné komodity urãují celkovou strukturu dal‰ích v˘vozních a dovozních cen19. Posilující exportní schopnost ekonomiky vyvolává totiÏ tlak na apreciaci domácí mûny, která zaãne zlevÀovat dovozy v sektorech, ve kter˘ch ekonomika není konkurenceschopná a nevyváÏí. Stoupající dovozy mají za následek pfiedev‰ím zhor‰ování bûÏného úãtu platební bilance se v‰emi znám˘mi dÛsledky (zpûtn˘ tlak na devalvaci mûny, inflaãní tlak), navíc ãiní investice v proexportních, importy substitujících odvûtvích neatraktivními. K podchycení tohoto nebezpeãí jsou doporuãovány dvû rÛzné cesty. Za prvé je tfieba sledovat striktní monetární politiku. Pfii její aplikaci je ov‰em nutné pamatovat na nebezpeãí pfiíli‰ného podvázání hospodáfiského rÛstu, kter˘ vyÏaduje dostateãné mnoÏství penûz v obûhu. Vy‰‰í úrokové sazby 18 19

Ekonomick˘ v˘voj ÁzerbajdÏánu]

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Statistick˘ úfiad ÁzerbajdÏánu, http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/external_economic_activities/en/ xten_4.shtml. The oil satrap, In: The Economist, June 11th 05, s. 62.

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(jak bylo naznaãeno v kapitole o inflaci) tedy negativnû ovlivÀují tvorbu penûÏní zásoby a mohou b˘t brzdou dal‰ího v˘voje. Pokud je ov‰em pfiíliv zahraniãní mûny pfiíli‰ siln˘, je nutné pfiistoupit ke sterilizaci, pfiípadnû ke koordinaci mûnové a fiskální nabídky. NárÛst relativní ceny neobchodovaného zboÏí (z angl. non-tradables, tedy zboÏí, které ekonomika neexportuje) vÛãi obchodovanému odpovídá rÛstu reálného mûnového kurzu. Tento fakt vypl˘vá ze skuteãnosti, Ïe rÛstem kurzu se zdraÏuje domácí neobchodované zboÏí a zlevÀují jejich importované protûj‰ky. Taková situace mÛÏe mít v podmínkách tranzitní ekonomiky vliv na strukturální reformy – nutné investice se budou koncentrovat do odvûtví s exportní schopností a jiná, podkapitalizovaná a nev˘konná, budou dále zaostávat. Takové nebezpeãí hrozí pfiedev‰ím ázerbajdÏánskému zemûdûlství. Z v˘voje reálného mûnového kurzu, kter˘ je znázornûn na grafu ã. 10 mÛÏeme odeãíst, Ïe se ázerbajdÏánské národní bance podafiilo hrozící nebezpeãí podchytit a udrÏet vnûj‰í mûnovou stabilitu. K ní pfiispívá i alokace vût‰iny utrÏen˘ch prostfiedkÛ za prodej ropy do zvlá‰tního fondu, o jehoÏ rozdûlení se stále jedná a chvíli je‰tû jednat bude.20 Mûnov˘ kurz ve sledovaném období (tedy po zahájení reforem v roce 1995) osciloval mezi 3800 a 4900 manatÛ za 1 USD a lze ho hodnotit jako stabilní. Dal‰í moÏné dopady tohoto jevu, související s ním nicménû spí‰ druhotnû, lze spatfiovat v regionální politice. Vzhledem k faktu, Ïe vût‰ina ázerbajdÏánského HDP je vytváfiena na Ab‰eronském poloostrovû (v okolí hlavního mûsta Baku), lze i zde oãekávat hlavní tvorbu zdrojÛ a umisÈování investic. Takov˘ v˘voj by v‰ak bylo pravdûpodobnû moÏno oãekávat i v pfiípadû vyrovnanûj‰í struktury hospodáfiství, jak je vidût na pfiíkladu i dal‰ích postkomunistick˘ch zemí – ve stfiední Evropû je to napfi. Maìarsko s ekonomicky velmi atraktivní Budape‰tí, ale zaostávajícím jihem a v˘chodem.

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Ismailov, R., cit. dílo.

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Graf ã. 10: Kurz Manat/USD

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5000 4500 4000 3500 3000 1995

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1997

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1999 2000 Roky

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Reáln˘ mûnov˘ kurz manat/USD (podle: Statistick˘ úfiad ÁzerbajdÏánu, dostupn˘ z: http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/external_economic_activities/en/index.shtml)

Vybrané otázky hospodáfiské politiky vlády a hlavní pfiekáÏky hospodáfiského rÛstu V této ãásti práce se chci vûnovat nástinu rozhodujících faktorÛ mající podíl na souãasném stavu hospodáfiské politiky zemû. Zmíním nejdÛleÏitûj‰í instituce podílející se na tvorbû této politiky a jejich kompetenci, struãnû pfiedstavím rysy vládního privatizaãního programu a dotknu se nejpalãivûj‰í pfiekáÏky pfii tvorbû souãasné hospodáfiské politiky, kter˘m je v této zemi neobyãejnû silná korupce. Instituce ãinné na tvorbû hospodáfiské politiky ÁzerbajdÏánské hospodáfiství je na pfiechodu od centrálnû plánované k trÏní ekonomice a ve srovnání s v˘chodoevropsk˘mi zemûmi má v fiadû pfiípadÛ stále co dohánût. Vykazuje silné autoritativní prvky, prezidentské zásahy do ekonomiky se nejv˘raznûji projevily v roce 2001, kdy prezident Alijev sv˘m dekretem zru‰il 3 ekonomická ministerstva (mj. ministerstvo

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obchodu) a 2 agentury (Agenturu pro zahraniãní investice, antimonopolní úfiad) a nahradil je snadnûji ovladateln˘m ministerstvem hospodáfiského rozvoje. To je víceménû pouze implementaãním nástrojem v rukou prezidenta, o pomûrnû neprofesionální úrovni svûdãí napfi. odhady makroekonomického v˘voje ministerstva na roky 2003–2005, ve kter˘ch se jako velmi odli‰nou ukázala b˘t míra inflace, odhad klíãov˘ch cen ropy a z nich navazujícího podílu ropného sektoru na HDP a v˘vozu.21 Prezident má také klíãovou úlohu pfii v˘bûru a obsazování ministersk˘ch postÛ, je tedy nabíledni, Ïe se obklopuje lidmi, jejichÏ názory nebudou pfiíli‰ konfrontaãní. Národní banka ÁzerbajdÏánu (NBA) je instituce urãená k fiízení bankovní politiky. DohlíÏí na ãinnost dvou státních bank, Mezinárodní banky ÁzerbájdÏánské republiky a Univerzální banky. ¤ídí emise a obûh financí. Je zodpovûdná za stabilitu mûnového kurzu a míru inflace, v situaci dynamického v˘voje svûtov˘ch cen ropy banka obvykle drÏí inflaci a pou‰tí kurz. V ÁzerbajdÏánu je nyní 53 soukrom˘ch bank, pfiiãemÏ jejich minimální kapitál podle poÏadavku NBA je 5 milionÛ USD. Celkovû se na kapitálu soukrom˘ch bank v ÁzerbájdÏánu podílejí z cca 30 % zahraniãní banky.22 Privatizace PfiestoÏe legislativa, která umoÏÀuje zmûnu vlastnictví ze státních do soukrom˘ch rukou ve‰la v platnost jiÏ v roce 1993, vyjma primárního sektoru se cel˘ proces pfiíli‰ nerozbûhl. Tak 90 % zemûdûlsk˘ch podnikÛ je v soukromém vlastnictví, v sekundéru a terciéru je tomu tak pouze u mal˘ch a nedÛleÏit˘ch firem. Zahraniãní investofii v tomto smûru naráÏejí na byrokratické pfiekáÏky, o ãemÏ svûdãí i fakt, Ïe jejich vstup je obvykle dojednáván s vládou a lidmi kolem prezidenta – vãetnû vzniku ropn˘ch konsorcií typu AIOC. ÁzerbajdÏánské hospodáfiské subjekty byly pro potfiebu privatizace rozdûleny do pûti blokÛ, kaÏd˘ z nich s odli‰nou úpravou jednoduchosti pfievodu na soukromé investory – od podnikÛ a institucí, které nelze privati21 22

Viz pfiíslu‰nou stránku Ministerstva pro ekonomick˘ rozvoj: http://www.economy.gov.az/HTML/ Economy/MAIN_FORECASTED_ECONOMIC_INDICATORS.htm. Viz stránky NBA: http://www.nba.az/eng/

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zovat, pfies podniky, které lze privatizovat pouze se souhlasem prezidenta, aÏ k reÏimu privatizace, o které rozhoduje komise státního majetku.23 Fakticky ov‰em zÛstává vût‰ina klíãov˘ch podnikÛ a bank neprivatizována, v soukrom˘ch rukou se nachází jen malé a drobné podnikání, které je ov‰em omezováno administrativou a korupcí. Jako pfiíklad lze uvést pfietrvávající praxi nelegálních kontrol a povolovacích fiízení na místních trzích s potravinami, ovocem a zeleninou, na které lze získat pfiístup teprve po schválení místními pfiedáky ãi starostou. Netfieba zdÛrazÀovat, Ïe takové prostfiedí nabízí znaãn˘ prostor k nelegálním praktikám a omezuje aktivitu soukrom˘ch podnikatelÛ. Jin˘m pfiíkladem je kontrola obûhu vybran˘ch druhÛ zboÏí, tj. jejich importu a distribuce na místní trhy. ProtoÏe jiné firmy nevlastní potfiebné licence, jsou zv˘hodnûné firmy urãovateli cen24. Korupce Korupce je jedním ze souãasn˘ch nejváÏnûj‰ích problémÛ ekonomiky zemû. Podle statistik Transparency International se ÁzerbajdÏán umístil v roce 2004 na 140. místû ze 146 sledovan˘ch, daleko za takov˘mi zemûmi jako je Kolumbie, Rusko ãi âína25. Tento jev má nedozírné dÛsledky na ztráty mal˘ch a stfiedních podnikatelÛ, ochotu k dal‰ím investicím a podnikatelské aktivitû obecnû a podílí se pfiímo i na negativním v˘voji makroekonomick˘ch veliãin, jako je inflace. Kromû v˘‰e uveden˘ch pfiípadÛ z reálné ekonomické situace b˘vá ãasto zmiÀovan˘ pfiíklad pronajímání obchodních prostor v hlavním mûstû Baku. Pro nalezení a najmutí vhodn˘ch kanceláfií ãi prodejní plochy je nutno podplatit pfiíslu‰né úfiedníky v ãástkách desítek tisíc dolarÛ, aniÏ by byla garantována samotná nabídka vhodn˘ch prostor.26

23 24 25 26

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BlíÏe k privatizaãnímu programu http://www.pangaeapartners.com/azpriv.htm. Viz napfi. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav062105.shtml. Viz pfiehled zemí na Indexu vnímání korupce za rok 2004, dostupn˘ z: http://www.transparency.org/ pressreleases_archive/2004/2004.10.20.cpi.en.html. Viz napfi. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav062105.shtml.

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Závûr Cílem práce pojednávající o aktuální situaci ázerbájdÏánské ekonomiky, ekonomiky na pokraji totální závislosti na ropû a ropn˘ch produktech, bylo posoudit moÏnost tvorby samostatné hospodáfiské politiky na pozadí transformaãních hospodáfisk˘ch reforem. ProtoÏe ty byly vedeny ãasto pouze v rétorickém duchu a podléhaly populistickému rozhodování prezidentÛ (zejména nejdéle vládnoucího Gejdara Alijeva), nemohly se v˘raznûji zasadit o zmûnu charakteru hospodáfiství, které tak i nadále zÛstává hospodáfistvím ropy, bavlny a nûkolika málo chemick˘ch produktÛ. V‰echny anal˘zy vybran˘ch ukazatelÛ jednoznaãnû prozradily, Ïe ani v blízké budoucnosti neexistuje alternativa vzniku nov˘ch konkurenceschopn˘ch odvûtví, které by pfievzaly otûÏe hospodáfiského rÛstu. Nízká zamûstnanost obyvatel v prÛmyslu nevytváfií podmínky pro rychlej‰í industrializaci zemû, na základû které by mohly vznikat progresivní sluÏbová odvûtví. V‰udypfiítomná korupce brání v˘raznûj‰í iniciativû svobodného podnikání, které se od urãité velikosti pot˘ká se svazující byrokracií a nutností vytváfiet správné kontakty na správn˘ch úfiadech. ZpÛsob v˘stavby nov˘ch produktovodÛ po‰lapávajících lidská práva, stálé nedostatky v tvorbû základních principÛ demokratického zfiízení a okázalé pronásledování a obtûÏování opoziãních pfiedstavitelÛ zemi bohuÏel dále diskredituje v oãích západních investorÛ. Kombinace tûchto faktorÛ konzervuje pomûrnû vysokou míru chudoby, postihující podle mezinárodnû stanovené hranice chudoby témûfi polovinu populace.27 Pozitivní stránkou rozvoje ekonomiky je témûfi dokonãená transformace a privatizace zemûdûlství, umoÏÀující jeho efektivnûj‰í fungování neÏ za dob kolchozÛ a sovchozÛ. TotéÏ se t˘ká i sektoru malého a drobného podnikání, které pomáhá urãité vrstvû, zejména mûstského, obyvatelstva zvolit za obÏivu vlastní podnikatelskou iniciativu a dovoluje tak alespoÀ ãásteãn˘ rozvoj ducha svobodného podnikání. Neménû dÛleÏit˘m pozitivem je, Ïe ÁzerbajdÏán, na rozdíl od sousední Arménie ãi Gruzie, pfiedstavuje zajímavou investiãní pfiíleÏitost – v úvodní fázi zejména pro naftafiské spoleãnost, prvotní investice mající za následek urãitou internacionalizaci domá27

Podle CIA Factbook dosahující v˘‰e 49 % v roce 2002: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/aj.html.

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cího prostfiedí by mohly ale mít potenciál k vygenerovaní investic do dal‰ích sektorÛ. Zdali se bude zemû ubírat podle pesimistického scénáfie recyklace zaostalosti, nebo se ukáÏe b˘t „kavkazsk˘m tygrem“, se dozvíme jiÏ v blízké budoucnosti.

ST¤EDNÍ ASIE

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11. Integrace a dezintegrace v postsovûtské Stfiední Asii Slavomír Horák

Integraãní a dezintegraãní tendence se na postsovûtském prostoru zaãaly projevovat jiÏ na podzim 1991, tj. v dobû vyhla‰ování samostatnosti sovûtsk˘ch republik. Dezintegraãní tendence byly logick˘m krokem pfii budování nov˘ch nezávisl˘ch státÛ, které se zaãaly chovat jako mezinárodní subjekty, a tudíÏ zde byla snaha o odpoutání se od b˘valého impéria. Navíc v této dobû byly prakticky ve v‰ech sovûtsk˘ch republikách silné nacionalizaãní proudy, které hledûly k nov˘m partnerÛm, investorÛm ãi odbyti‰tím pro zaji‰tûní ekonomické prosperity zemû. Tyto pfiedstavy si na postsovûtském prostoru ãasto vzájemnû konkurovaly, coÏ dezintegraãní tendence jenom podporovalo. Tento fenomén se projevil naplno i ve Stfiední Asii. Hlavním v˘vozním artiklem zemí regionu jsou podobné komodity (ropa, zemní plny, bavlna), a proto jakákoli dohoda o vzájemné spolupráci byla jiÏ od poãátku znaãnû omezená.1 K dezintegraãním tendencím pfiispívaly i velmocenské ambice místních politick˘ch elit. Integraãní tendence se naopak objevovaly v deklarativní podobû. Na schÛzkách a summitech nejrÛznûj‰ích úrovní je aÏ podnes demonstrována nutnost zachovat tradiãní ekonomické a politické vazby. Ve stfiedoasijském regionu se integraãním motivÛm pfiidaly i bezpeãnostní dÛvody. Uzbeck˘

prezident Islom Karimov ostatnû ve své kultovní knize napsal, Ïe „bezpeãnostní hrozby jsou nepfiímo úmûrné úrovni regionální integrace“.2 Na území Stfiední Asie vzniklo proto nûkolik uskupení, které se hlásí zejména k ekonomické nebo bezpeãnostní spolupráci. Anal˘za tûchto integraãních tendencí a role Ruska v nich jsou hlavním tématem tohoto pfiíspûvku. Názory na integraci ve Stfiední Asii se (zejména v pfiípadû postsovûtsk˘ch expertÛ) v˘raznû li‰í od hypertrofovanû oslavn˘ch aÏ pod v˘raznû skeptické. Zde bude snaha o maximální vyváÏenost mezi deklaratorními snahami a jejich reáln˘mi v˘sledky. ·anghajská organizace spolupráce Kofieny této organizace je nutno spojit s kontakty mezi Sovûtsk˘m svazem a âínou v dobû vrcholné fáze perestrojky. KdyÏ v kvûtnu 1989 tehdej‰í generální tajemník ÚV KSSS Michail Gorbaãov nav‰tívil âínu, obû strany podepsaly Smlouvu mezi SSSR a âínou o sovûtsko-ãínské státní hranici na jejím v˘chodním úseku.3 V dobû této náv‰tûvy byla rovnûÏ uzavfiena dohoda o sníÏení vojenské pfiítomnosti armád obou zemí ve stokilometrovém pásmu podél sovûtsko-ãínské hranice. Po rozpadu Sovûtského svazu se rozhovory o hraniãních otázkách pfienesly do formátu 1+4 (âína+Rusko, Kazachstán, Kyrgyzstán a TádÏikistán). Pro âínu bylo v tehdej‰í dobû strategicky dÛleÏité, aby si zabezpeãila své západní a severní hranice a zároveÀ mohla posílit svÛj vojensk˘ potenciál ve vnitrozemí (pfiedev‰ím v autonomní oblasti Tibet a také v centru Ujgurské autonomní oblasti – Sin-È-jangu). V˘sledkem tûchto dlouhodob˘ch jednání byla Smlouva o posílení dÛvûry ve vojenské oblasti, podepsaná 26. dubna 1996 v ·anghaji.4 Na tomto summitu bylo rovnûÏ pfiijato rozhodnutí o kaÏdoroãním konání podob-

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Kurtov A. A., Central’noaziatskaja integracija: neosu‰ãestvlennaja ideja. Materik. Informacionnoanalitiãeskij portal postsovetskogo prostranstva. Institut stran SNG, 27. 1. 2004. http:// www.materik.ru/print.php?section=analitics&bulsectionid=5788. [8. 10. 2004].

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Karimov I., Uzbekistan na poroge XXI veka: ugrozy bezopasnosti, uslovija i garantii progressa. Ta‰kent 1997, s. 291. Struãnû k okolnostem celého v˘voje viz napfi. I‰an’ S., Rossija, Kitaj i novyj miroporjadok XXI veka. Problemy i perspektivy. Materialy 5-oj rossijsko-kitajskoj konferencii. 26–27.10.2000. MGIMO, Moskva 2001, s. 26–27. 10. 2000, МГИМО, Moskva, 2001, s. 169–184. Sogla‰enije meÏdu Rossijskoj Federacijej, Respublikoj Kazachstan, Kyrgyzskoj Respublikoj, Respublikoj TadÏikistan i Kitajskoj Narodnoj Respublikoj ob ukreplenii doverija v rajone granicy. www.businesspravo.ru [26.7.2004]. Tato smlouva pfiesnû definovala informovanost o stavech vojsk a vojensk˘ch cviãeních v pohraniãních oblastech, vzájemné pozorovatelské mise apod. Smlouva je pfiizpÛsobena zejména potfiebám Ruska a âíny, které na místû dislokace disponovaly mnohatisícov˘mi kontingenty.

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n˘ch setkání na nejvy‰‰í úrovni. Této nové formaci, která prozatím fungovala bez vût‰ího nároku na institucionalizaci, se zaãalo fiíkat „·anghajská pûtka“ (Shanghai Five, ·anchajskaja pjaterka). V následující etapû, v letech 1996 aÏ 1999, se âínû jako hlavnímu iniciátorovi setkání „·anghajské pûtky“ podafiilo témûfi definitivû vyfie‰it v‰echny otázky o prÛbûhu státní hranice na dvoustranné úrovni. Summity hlav státÛ (Moskva, duben 1997; Almaty, ãervenec 1998) potom vydávaly rámcová prohlá‰ení k tûmto bilaterálním dohodám. Uskupení se definitivnû zmûnilo z modelu âína + nástupnické státy SSSR na skupinu pûti formálnû suverénních úãastníkÛ rozhovorÛ. PÛvodní cíle organizace byly roz‰ífieny o otázky ‰ir‰í spolupráce zúãastnûn˘ch zemí v diplomatické, vojenské a ekonomické spolupráci, pfiestoÏe v této souvislosti pfievládala pfiedev‰ím deklarativní úroveÀ. Nûkteré ãlenské státy rovnûÏ oãekávaly, Ïe organizace pomÛÏe pfiekonat nûkteré sporné body v dvoustrann˘ch vztazích mezi sebou i vÛãi tfietím zemím. Nehledû na mnoÏství frází lze fiíci, Ïe „pûtka“ se v první fázi svého pÛsobení (1996 aÏ 1999) stala prakticky jedin˘m uskupením v regionu, za nímÏ stály urãité reálné v˘sledky (odsunutí vojsk ze spoleãn˘ch hranic, spoleãná cviãení armád ãlensk˘ch zemí apod.). V roce 1998 pfie‰la vût‰í ãást severního Afghánistánu pod kontrolu fundamentalistického hnutí Tálibán a o rok pozdûji radikální Islámské hnutí Uzbekistánu (IHU) uskuteãnilo ozbrojen˘ v˘pad do Kyrgyzstánu (tzv. první batkenská válka).5 Tyto dvû události, stejnû jako jejich opakování v roce 2000 a oãekávání nového kola násilí v roce 2001, postavily dosavadní fungování organizace pfied novou dimenzi. JiÏ na summitu hlav ãlensk˘ch státÛ v srpnu 1999 v Bi‰keku (tedy v dobû, kdy události v Batkenské oblasti Kyrgyzstánu teprve nab˘valy na dramatiãnosti) se objevil první návrh na zfiízení protiteroristické struktury, pfiestoÏe tato konkrétní formulace nebyla

podchycena v závûreãném komuniké.6 Na podzim 1999 se v‰ak otázka reakce na rÛst radikálního islámu stala klíãovou na v‰ech setkáních ãlensk˘ch státÛ. PÛvodnû velmi volné uskupení státÛ zaloÏené na spoleãn˘ch zájmech se pfiemûnilo na formální vojensko-politickou organizaci. Jedním z hlavních vyhla‰ovan˘ch cílÛ se stal boj proti „trojici zla“ – extremismu, separatismu a terorismu.7 Av‰ak reálného v˘sledku v rámci organizace nebylo dosaÏeno, pfiestoÏe se pfiíliv bojovníkÛ Islámského hnutí Uzbekistánu opakoval i o rok pozdûji. Roz‰ífiení pÛsobnosti ·anghajského fóra vedlo i k zájmu dal‰ích zemí o úãast v tomto uskupení. Pfiedev‰ím se jednalo o Uzbekistán, kter˘ nemá spoleãné hranice s âínou, a tak jednání o její delimitaci a demilitarizaci nepatfiily do zorného pole jeho zájmÛ. Proces pfiipojení Ta‰kentu k ·anghajské skupinû vyvrcholil v roce 2001 na summitu v ·anghaji, kdy byl Uzbekistán pfiijat jako její fiádn˘ ãlen a zároveÀ do‰lo i ke zmûnû názvu na ·anghajskou organizaci spolupráce. V letech 2000 a 2001 byla rovnûÏ ‰iroce diskutována otázka zapojení dal‰ích státÛ mimo region, které se cítily ohroÏeny podobn˘mi v˘zvami (islámsk˘ extremismus s kofieny v Afghánistánu). Zejména se v této souvislosti hovofiilo o zájmu Pákistánu.8 Pfievládající bezpeãnostní hledisko, odraÏené v tzv. ·anghajské konvenci ze summitu ãervnu 2001, na jedné stranû sice zdÛraznili nutnost spolupráce v boji proti terorismu, na stranû druhé se v‰ak ukázalo, Ïe jednotlivé státy pfiikládají rÛzn˘ v˘znam boji proti tomuto fenoménu v rámci „‰estky“.9 Nejvût‰í státy (Rusko, âína a Kazachstán) zdÛrazÀovaly kromû jiného i ekonomické aspekty, zatímco Uzbekistán, Kyrgyzstán a TádÏikistán vyz˘valy k aktivnûj‰ímu pfiístupu v boji proto terorismu v regionu. Bi‰kek

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Tehdy ozbrojená skupina pod vedením uzbeckého polního velitele a ‰éfa organizace Islámské hnutí Uzbekistánu DÏumy Namangáního vtrhla na území jiÏního Kyrgyzstánu, zajala ãtyfii japonské geology a poÏadovala za nû od kyrgyzské vlády v˘kupné. Deklarovan˘m cílem skupiny v‰ak bylo ustavení islámského chalífátu ve Fergánské kotlinû a svrÏení sekulárního reÏimu prezidenta Karimova v Uzbekistánu. BlíÏe k tématu viz napfi. Horák, S., Stfiední Asie mezi Ruskem, âínou a Stfiední Asií. Karolinum, Praha, 2004, zejm. s. 29–35 a 59. Podrobnûji viz také Rashid, A., Jihad. The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. Yale University Press, New Haven, 2002.

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Sovmestnoje zajavlenije glav gosudarstv Respubliki Kazachstan, Kitajskoj Narodnoj Respubliki, Kyrgyzskoj Respubliki, Rossijskoj Federacii i Respubliki TadÏikistan ot 29 avgusta 1999 g. http:// www.businesspravo.ru/Docum/DocumShow_DocumID_67269.html [12. 7. 2004]. Shanghai convention on combating terrorism, separatism and extremism. The SCO website, http:// www.sectsco.org/news_detail.asp?id=93&LanguageID=2 [24. 5. 2005]. Shanghai Five Mulls Expansion in Search of Regional Stability. Eurasianet.org, 14. 6. 2001, http:// www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav061401_pr.html [5. 11. 2004]. ·anchajskaja konferencija (15. 6. 2001), http://www.sectsco.org/news_detail.asp?id=92&Language ID=3 Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization http:// www.sectsco.org/news_detail.asp?id=88&LanguageID=2 [24. 5. 2005].

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se snaÏil znovu prosadit my‰lenku regionální protiteroristické struktury, jehoÏ realizace se v‰ak za dva roky od podpisu Bi‰kecké deklarace v srpnu 1999 pohnula jen velmi málo.10 Útoky proti New Yorku a Washingtonu a válka v Afghánistánu se sice zásadnû dotkly vût‰iny státÛ v regionu, ze strany ·anghajské organizace spolupráce v‰ak nezaznûla Ïádná konkrétnûj‰í nabídka pomoci. Teroristické útoky nebyly pfiímo namífieny proti nûkterému ãlenu organizace a zároveÀ si jednotlivé státy zaãaly budovat vlastní základnu pro vztahy s USA. Proces vytváfiení vnitfiních struktur uskupení (vãetnû regionální protiteroristické struktury v Bi‰keku) byl teprve na svém poãátku. Organizace tak nedokázala vystoupit v tomto momentu jako celek, coÏ její váhu znaãnû oslabilo.11 Zatímco do této doby si mohla organizace ãinit nárok na monopol pfii fie‰ení bezpeãnostních otázek v regionu, se vstupem americk˘ch vojsk do regionu se tato situace v˘raznû zmûnila. Navíc s pádem reÏimu Tálibánu a údajnou likvidací zdrojÛ podporujících radikální islamisty ve Stfiední Asii (nebo v Ujgursku) se zdálo, Ïe cíle organizace (tj. boj proti terorismu) ztratily svÛj raison d’etre. Nov˘m impulzem pro organizaci se mûl stát summit nejvy‰‰ích pfiedstavitelÛ státu v Sankt-Petûrburgu v ãervnu 2002. Pfiedpokládalo se, Ïe Rusko a âína by mohly vyuÏít struktury k vytûsnûní Spojen˘ch státÛ z regionu, stejnû jako k potlaãení zbytkÛ údajn˘ch teroristick˘ch skupin na vlastním území. V˘sledkem summitu bylo podepsání charty ·OS, která mûla upravovat základní mechanismy uvnitfi „‰estky“, a také deklarace a smlouvy o otevfiení regionální protiteroristické struktury v Bi‰keku.12 Jako vÏdy otázkou nadále zÛstávala realizace tûchto závûrÛ. Jako nejménû stabilní stát se v tomto smûru jevil Uzbekistán, tehdy velmi úzce ovlivÀovan˘

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Nûktefií autofii se domnívají, Ïe zaloÏení takového centra by mohlo koncentrovat pozornost „‰estky“ na vojensk˘ aspekt organizace. Tento stav navíc mûl znepokojit ostatní centra síly v regionu (napfi. Guan P., ·anchajskaja organizacija sotrudniãestva v kontekste meÏdunarodnoj antiterroristiãeskoj kampanii, Central’naja Azija i Kavkaz, No. 3 (27), 2003, s. 59). Lze se v‰ak domnívat, Ïe za pozdrÏením otevfiení centra stála pfiedev‰ím v‰eobecná neefektivita celé organizace. Do 11. záfií 2001 nebyly do stfiedoasijsk˘ch záleÏitostí zapleteny Ïádné „dal‰í“ zemû, které by chtûly a byly schopné získat hlub‰í vliv v regionu (vãetnû USA). Podrobnûji napfi. Guan, cit. dílo, s. 56. Ogla‰enije meÏdu gosudarstvami-ãlenami ·anchajskoj Organizacii Sotrudniãestva o Regional’noj antiterroristiãeskoj strukture.

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Spojen˘mi státy.13 Zdálo se, Ïe ·anghajskou organizaci by mohl stihnout podobn˘ osud jako nûkteré dal‰í kooperaãní pokusy v b˘valém SNS. V letech 2003–2004 v‰ak zaãaly rÛst protiamerické nálady ve stfiedoasijsk˘ch spoleãnostech, stejnû jako urãité zklamání místních vládnoucích elit z malého pfiínosu americké vojenské pfiítomnosti v regionu. Tento proces ‰el ruku v ruce s postupn˘m návratem Moskvy do stfiedoasijského prostoru. Z tûchto dvou dÛvodÛ se opût zaãala vynofiovat my‰lenka oÏivení ·anghajské organizace spolupráce. Pro Rusko se ·anghajská organizace stala jedním z nástrojÛ pro upevnûní pozice Ruska ve stfiedoasijského prostoru. Nejvût‰í zájem Kremlu vzbuzoval proamerick˘ Uzbekistán. Návrat Karimovova reÏimu pod vliv Moskvy se stal v letech 2003–2004 jednou z priorit ruské zahraniãní politiky v regionu a jeho ãlenství v ·anghajské organizaci spolupráce mûlo tomuto cíli pomoci. Pfiitáhnout Uzbekistán k aktivnûj‰ímu pÛsobení v „‰estce“ mûlo pomoci, kromû jiného, i umístûní protiteroristického centra do Ta‰kentu místo do Bi‰keku. Naopak se nepodafiilo vynutit si úãast uzbecké armády na propagovan˘ch spoleãn˘ch vojensk˘ch cviãeních ·OS v Kazachstánu a âínû (rok 2003).14 V roce 2003 se rovnûÏ objevila i nová dimenze celé organizace. Na pekingské schÛzce pfiedsedÛ vlád ãlensk˘ch zemí ·OS v záfií 2003 âína navrhla vytvofiení zóny volného obchodu. Tento cíl v‰ak jenom tûÏko mohl b˘t naplnûn uÏ z toho dÛvodu, Ïe ãlenské státy tvofií v ekonomickém smûru velmi nesourod˘ prvek. Hledání svého místa na mapû Eurasie potvrdil i summit ãlensk˘ch státÛ v Ta‰kentu (2004), kter˘ se stal triumfem uzbecké zahraniãní politiky.15 Závûry tohoto summitu vedly k vytvofiení organizaãních struktur – pfiedev‰ím byl potvrzen sekretariát ·OS v Pekingu a Regionální protiteroristic-

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Dubnov A., Trojanskij kon’ ‰anchajskoj integracii. Va‰ington nezrimo pronik v jevrazijskoje bratstvo, Vremja novostej, 10. 6. 2002, http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php4?st=1023683100, [5. 11. 2004]. BlíÏe k tûmto manévrÛm napfi. Kitajskaja dubinka i vojennyje uãenija ·OS. Dialog ekspertov na Radio Svoboda, RFE/RL 19. 8. 2003. Viz také: http://www.centrasia.ru PnewsA.php4?st=1061245740 [5. 11. 2004]. Karimov I., Ta‰kentskij sammit – vaÏnyj etap institucional’nogo stanovlenija ·anchajskoj organizacii sotrudniãestva. In: Mirnaja Ïizn’ i bezopasnost’ strany zavisjat ot jedinstva i tverdoj voli na‰ego naroda. http://2004.press-service.uz/rus/knigi/9tom/12tom_list.htm [17. 5. 2005].

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ké centrum v Ta‰kentu. Kromû toho se mûla pozornost soustfiedit i na pokraãující krizi v Afghánistánu.16 V˘razn˘m projevem rostoucího v˘znamu této organizace se stala schÛzka v ãervnu 2005 v Astanû, která se konala po dvou zásadních událostech první poloviny roku v Kyrgyzstánu a Uzbekistánu. Kyrgyzsk˘ prozatímní prezident Bakijev si cekem snadno nechal nadiktovat celkovou vÛli organizace a zatáhnout se do vyslovení poÏadavku na odsun americk˘ch vojensk˘ch základen ve Stfiední Asii (vãetnû letecké základny USA na leti‰ti Manas v Bi‰keku). Pro uzbeckého prezidenta Karimova znamenala schÛzka dal‰í potvrzení jeho momentální orientace na Rusko a âínu.17 Pfii hodnocení ãinnosti ·anghajské organizace spolupráce je tfieba neustále mít na pamûti, Ïe se jedná pfiedev‰ím o nástroj âíny k prÛniku do Stfiední Asie. Peking také prozatím zÛstává i hlavním motorem celého uskupení. Místní reÏimy ãasto zdÛrazÀují svou souãinnost v rámci ·anghajské organizace spolupráce jako svou souãinnost s âínou, na rozdíl od Smlouvy o kolektivní bezpeãnosti, v jejímÏ rámci státy regionu realizují svou spolupráci s Ruskem.18 âínské vedení si podle v‰eho uvûdomuje obavy stfiedoasijsk˘ch státÛ z pokraãujícího rÛstu vlivu Pekingu, coÏ jej nutí k vût‰ímu respektu k zájmÛm Ruska v regionu. Z ruského pohledu lze organizaci hodnotit jako jeden z nástrojÛ obnovení vlivu Moskvy ve stfiedoasijském regionu. V globálnûj‰ím pohledu je ·anghaj i moÏnou cestou jak udrÏet na pfiijatelné úrovni vztahy s âínou. U nûkter˘ch autorÛ je potom rozvoj ·anghajské organizace spolupráce pokusem o vytvofiení ãínsko-ruského „kondominia“ ve Stfiední Asii jako protiváhy amerického vlivu, které mÛÏe, jak ukázal astansk˘ summit, vést aÏ k nátlaku na odsun USA z regionu.19 I kdyÏ není moÏné prozatím pfieceÀovat ãinnost ·anghajské organizace spolupráce, její deklarované cíle (vytvofiení vojensko-politického bloku) se

prozatím zdají b˘t reálnû splnitelné. K naplnûní tohoto cíle mÛÏe pfiispût pfiípadná nová vlna tzv. islámského extremismu ve Stfiední Asii a v ãínské provincii Sin-È-Jang (Xinjiang), spoleãn˘ postoj vÛãi roli Spojen˘ch státÛ ve svûtû a pfiípadná krize v okolním regionu. Splnûní jakékoli jiÏ uzavfiené dohody sice zabere mnohem více ãasu, neÏ se zdá dnes, nicménû u v‰ech ãlensk˘ch státÛ existuje urãitá vÛle k jejich dodrÏování. Formování organizace mÛÏe b˘t naru‰eno pfiedev‰ím moÏn˘m nárÛstem napûtí mezi ãlensk˘mi státy, pfiedev‰ím mezi Ruskem a âínou, a také dublováním funkcí s jin˘mi organizacemi (zejména Organizace smlouvy o kolektivní bezpeãnosti).20 Paradoxnû hrozbou pro fungování organizace mÛÏe b˘t pfiijetí dal‰ích ãlenÛ.21 V‰echny tyto faktory mohou vést pfiinejmen‰ím k rozmûlnûní uskupení. Organizace smlouvy o kolektivní bezpeãnosti Smlouva o kolektivní bezpeãnosti (DKB) zÛstává jedním z mála reliktÛ fungování dnes jiÏ pouze konzultativního Spoleãenství nezávisl˘ch státÛ. Proces jejího formování byl zahájen podpisem tzv. Ta‰kentského paktu 15. kvûtna 1992, jehoÏ signatáfiem se stalo Rusko, Kazachstán, Kyrgyzstán, TádÏikistán, Uzbekistán a Arménie.22 V roce 1993 se k tomuto uskupení pfiidal je‰tû ÁzerbájdÏán a dále Gruzie a Bûlorusko. V dubnu 1994 byl pfiedán poslední ratifikaãní protokol a podle ãlánku 11 tak smlouva vstoupila v platnost. V tehdej‰í dobû se jejím hlavním smyslem ukázala snaha o zachování urãitého stupnû spoleãné obrany a vojensk˘ch sil na bázi pÛvodní sovûtské armády.23 Armády jednotliv˘ch republik sice na poãátku 90. let získaly tu

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Akmalov ·., ·anchajskaja organizacija sotrudniãestva i problemy regional’noj bezopasnosti, Central’naja Azija i Kavkaz, No. 2 (38), 2005, s. 146–153. Blank, S., Making Sense of the SCO’s Astana Summit. Central Asia and the Caucasus Analyst. 27. 7. 2005, s. 8–10. Dubovcev G., Perspektivy vojennoj integracii v Central’noj Azii (vzgljad iz Kazachstana). Centrasia.ru, 20. 8. 2002, http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php4?st=1029787200, [5. 11. 2004]. Cutler, R. M., The Shanghai Cooperation Organization moves into first gear. Central Asian-Caucasus Analyst, 24. 3. 2004, http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article?php?articleid=2226 [5. 11. 2004].

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Pfies strategické partnerství Ruska a âíny existuje mezi tûmito zemûmi nûkolik sporn˘ch bodÛ – pfiedev‰ím v otázkách v˘stavby ropovodu a plynovodu ze Sibifie k Pacifiku, jak to ukázala náv‰tûva Vladimira Putina v âínû v bfieznu 2006. Tyto drobné rozmí‰ky sice nemusejí b˘t dÛvodem k ochlazení vzájemn˘ch vztahÛ, ale dlouhodobû se podobné provokace nemusejí vyplatit zejména ruské stranû. Hovofií se pfiedev‰ím o státech jiÏní Asie – zájem projevil je‰tû pfied válkou v Afghánistánu v roce 2001 Pákistán, kter˘ má, spolu s Indií a Íránem, status pozorovatele v rámci organizace. Zde i dále citováno podle Dogovor o kollektivnoj bezopasnosti. In: Sbornik dokumentov. 1990– 1992. Moskva 1996, s. 1996, s. 357–360. Minasjan S., Formirovanije sistemy kollektivnoj bezopasnosti SNG, Central’naja Azija i Kavkaz, No. 1 (25), 2003, s. 151.

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ãást v˘zbroje sovûtského obranného komplexu, která v okamÏiku rozpadu SSSR zÛstala na území dané republiky. âasto se v‰ak jednalo o souãásti, které nebyly pro danou republiku potfiebné.24 Po rozpadu Sovûtského svazu vypukly v nûkter˘ch regionech ozbrojené konflikty (pfiedev‰ím Gruzie, TádÏikistán), které donutily signatáfie DKB k jednáním o vytvofiení spoleãn˘ch vojensk˘ch a mírov˘ch sil SNS. Tyto iniciativy sice byly paralelní ke smlouvû o kolektivní bezpeãnosti, na druhou stranu plnû odpovídaly jejím ãlánkÛm.25 Pod hlaviãkou kolektivních sil SNS tak formálnû pÛsobily ruské jednotky v TádÏikistánu (201. motostfielecká divize). Smlouva o kolektivní bezpeãnosti sk˘tá v zárodeãné podobû základ pro vznik vojenské aliance jmenovan˘ch státÛ v ãele s Ruskem. Signatáfiské státy smlouvou na sebe vzaly závazek zejména nevstupovat do vojensk˘ch svazÛ, blokÛ ãi jin˘ch uskupení, stejnû tak jako se nepodílet na nepfiátelsk˘ch akcích namífien˘ch proti nûkteré z ãlensk˘ch zemí (ãl. 1). Souãasnû se zavázaly k vzájemn˘m konzultacím a koordinaci politiky v oblasti mezinárodní bezpeãnosti s cílem prevence a eliminace moÏn˘ch vojensk˘ch hrozeb (ãl. 2). Regulace vztahÛ mezi ãlensk˘mi státy organizace ov‰em není pfiedmûtem smlouvy. Jádro smlouvy – ãl. 4 odst. 2, definující casus foederis analogicky ãl. 2 mezitím vypovûzené Var‰avské smlouvy – jmenovitû urãuje, Ïe „v pfiípadû agrese proti nûkterému z úãastnick˘ch státÛ mu v‰echny ostatní úãastnické státy poskytnou nezbytnou pomoc, vãetnû vojenské, jakoÏ mu i poskytnou podporu prostfiedky, jeÏ mají k dispozici, pfii v˘konu práva na kolektivní obranu v souladu s ãl. 51 Charty OSN“. V pfiípadû ta‰kentského paktu se tak nemohlo jednat o organizaci kolektivní bezpeãnosti, ale spí‰e o organizaci kolektivní obrany. Od roku 1996 funguje jako pracovní orgán smlouvy v Moskvû stál˘ sekretariát organizace v ãele s generálním tajemníkem. Spolu s ním zpra24

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Pfiíkladem mÛÏe slouÏit Kyrgyzstán, na jehoÏ území zÛstala letecká základna nedaleko Bi‰keku a zku‰ební polygon pro ponorková torpéda v oblasti v˘chodního Issyk-Kulu. Kyrgyzské ozbrojené síly nedisponovaly potfiebn˘m obsluhujícím personálem, a proto na území republiky je‰tû do roku 1999 pÛsobily jednotky ruské armády. Základna Kant v rámci DKB tak byla spí‰e „obnovovacím“ neÏ zakládajícím aktem. První snahy o vytvofiení Kolektivních sil pro podporu míru (Kollektivnyje sily po podderÏaniju mira) se objevily je‰tû pfied podpisem DKB – 20. bfiezna 1992 byla v Kyjevû podepsána pfiíslu‰ná smlouva. Viz Diplomatiãeskij vestnik, No. 15–16 (1992), s. 32–33.

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vidla b˘vají k zasedáním rady kolektivní bezpeãnosti pfiizváni rovnûÏ ministfii zahraniãí, ministfii obrany a tajemníci národních bezpeãnostních rad ãlensk˘ch státÛ. Základní strategii smlouvy mûla naznaãit Koncepce kolektivní bezpeãnosti ãlensk˘ch státu DKB.26 V ní byly vytyãeny základní etapy integrace vojensk˘ch i politick˘ch struktur a naznaãeny základní orgány koordinující ãinnost smlouvy. Podle této koncepce mûlo v první fázi dojít ke konsolidaci armád ãlensk˘ch zemí. Místní ozbrojené síly totiÏ stále procházely znaãn˘m chaosem pfii vlastním formování a v pfiípadû TádÏikistánu, kde v této dobû probíhala obãanská válka, bylo navíc znaãnû obtíÏné vysledovat prvky regulérní armády, a to i v pfiípadû polních velitelÛ pod oficiálnû uznanou vládou. Ve druhé etapû pak mûlo dojít k postupnému vytvofiení spoleãn˘ch jednotek, protivzdu‰né obrany a vypracování plánu na opûtovné sjednocení ozbrojen˘ch sil. Ve tfietí fázi se mûl proces vytváfiení systému kolektivní bezpeãnosti zavr‰it, aniÏ by základní dokument definoval pfiesnûji koneãn˘ cíl tohoto systému. PfiestoÏe se v koncepci hovofiilo o otevfienosti vÛãi spolupráci s jin˘mi vojensk˘mi strukturami (zvlá‰tû NATO) na rovnoprávné úrovni, deklarace pfiijatá na stejném zasedání odráÏela tehdy odmítav˘ rusk˘ postoj k roz‰ífiení této organizace a k programu Partnerství pro mír.27 Jako nejvy‰‰í orgán paktu byla smlouvou ustavena tzv. Rada kolektivní bezpeãnosti, sloÏená z hlav státÛ signatáfisk˘ch zemí a – do ãervna roku 1993, neÏ bylo toto velitelství definitivnû rozpu‰tûno – vrchního velitele sjednocen˘ch ozbrojen˘ch sil SNS. Av‰ak institucionální struktura organizace smlouvy zÛstávala dlouho nerozvinuta. JelikoÏ smlouva zahrnovala velkou vût‰inu ãlensk˘ch státÛ SNS, byla povaÏována za jakousi vojenskou odnoÏ SNS, a rozhodnutí v jejím rámci byla tudíÏ pfiijímána u pfiíleÏitosti zasedání rady hlav státÛ, ministersk˘ch rad, popfi. jin˘ch grémií bûhem pravideln˘ch summitÛ SNS. V letech 1996 aÏ 1999 se zdálo, Ïe smlouvu o kolektivní bezpeãnosti postihne stejn˘ osud jako celou fiadu podobn˘ch smluv v rámci SNS. V této dobû se Rada kolektivní bezpeãnosti scházela na ãistû formálních zasedá26 27

Koncepcija kollektivnoj bezopasnosti gosudarstv-uãastnikov Dogovora o kollektivnoj bezopasnosti. Almaty. 10 fevralja 1995 g. 1995. http://www.odkb.gov.ru [7. 10. 2004]. Viz http://www.dkb.gov.ru [7. 10. 2004].

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ních, která obvykle ústila v bezbarvá prohlá‰ení. Základním deklarovan˘m cílem ãlensk˘ch státÛ organizace se stalo vybudování vlastní funkãní armády, které by mohly b˘t pouÏity v rámci budoucích spoleãn˘ch sjednocen˘ch sil.28 Zásadní pfielom v ãinnosti organizace nastal v roce 1999, kdy vypr‰ela platnost zakládající smlouvy. Gruzie, ÁzerbajdÏán a Uzbekistán odmítly podepsat protokol o prodlouÏení svého ãlenství v paktu a daly pfiednost skupinû GUUAM s perspektivou preference spolupráce s USA a západní Evropou pfied Ruskem. Tento krok v‰ak na druhé stranû vedl k deklarované intenzifikaci úsilí o tûsnûj‰í spolupráci mezi zbyl˘mi ãleny smlouvy. Bylo vyhlá‰eno ukonãení první etapy formování smlouvy a zahájení její druhé fáze. Lze konstatovat, Ïe v prÛbûhu druhé poloviny 90. let byly v jednotliv˘ch zemích vytvofieny fiádné ozbrojené síly. Do pravidelné tádÏické armády byly vãlenûny jednotky b˘val˘ch polních velitelÛ opozice i provládních sil. Kyrgyzská armáda zase musela ukázat svou bojovou pohotovost jiÏ v létû 1999 pfii prÛniku ozbrojen˘ch skupin DÏumy Namangání do jiÏních oblastí zemû. Tato válka ukázala ve‰keré problémy místních armád, které zdûdily organizaãní strukturu ze sovûtsk˘ch dob. Nedostatkem se v‰ak ukázala absence zvlá‰tních sborÛ rychlé reakce pfiizpÛsoben˘ch pro boj v nároãn˘ch horsk˘ch terénech. Ve druhé polovinû 90. let také do‰lo k upevnûní institucionálního rámce organizace, a s tím i k aktivizaci její ãinnosti, pfiedev‰ím pod tlakem vnûj‰ích událostí (postup vojsk Tálibánu ve válkou zmítaném Afghánistánu k hranicím b˘valého SSSR, prÛnik islámsk˘ch radikálÛ do Stfiední Asie). Na aktuální problémy a nedostatky pfii plnûní smlouvy se pokusilo reagovat hned v roce 2000 zasedání skupiny v Minsku. Jeho v˘sledkem bylo memorandum o zv˘‰ení efektivity smlouvy. Podle nûj mûla b˘t urychlena druhá fáze programu koncepce kolektivní bezpeãnosti a zahájena transformace místních vojensk˘ch sborÛ vzhledem k aktuální situaci v regionu. Snaha o konkretizaci uvedeného memoranda v‰ak pfiinesla své plody aÏ o rok pozdûji. Mezitím probûhla v létû 2000 tzv. druhá batkenská válka a na léto 2001 byla oãekávána dal‰í vojenská ofenzíva radikálního Islámského hnutí Uzbekistánu. V reakci na sílící hrozby bylo na summitu orga28

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Koncepcija kollektivnoj bezopasnosti gosudarstv-uãastnikov Dogovora o kollektivnoj bezopasnosti. âlánek III., http://www.dkb.gov.ru [7. 10. 2004].

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nizace rozhodnuto o vytvofiení kolektivních sil rychlé reakce, které by mohly b˘t nasazovány v podobn˘ch akcích jako batkenské války. Pfiekvapivû jiÏ v záfií/fiíjnu probûhla první spoleãná cviãení vybran˘ch vojensk˘ch jednotek. Místo nového kola násilí ve Stfiední Asii v‰ak do‰lo k útokÛm z 11. záfií 2001 a k válce proti Afghánistánu jako nejv˘znamnûj‰ímu faktoru ohroÏení pro region. Tyto události ukázaly neschopnost celého uskupení ke konkrétním spoleãn˘m krokÛm. Místo spoleãn˘ch postojÛ stfiedoasijské státy zaãaly koketovat s my‰lenkou spolupráce se spojeneck˘mi vojsky. V této dobû se zdál „odchod“ Ruska z regionu definitivní.29 Po jistém „vystfiízlivûní“ z moÏností Spojen˘ch státÛ se více neÏ v minulosti ukázala potfieba zakotvení stfiedoasijsk˘ch státÛ v relativnû fungující bezpeãnostní struktufie. Smlouva o kolektivní bezpeãnosti tuto alternativu nabízela a bylo otázkou, do jaké míry dokáÏí její ãlenské státy tuto moÏnost naplnit reáln˘m obsahem. JiÏ na summitu bloku v Moskvû v kvûtnu 2002 Rusko pfiedloÏilo sv˘m partnerÛm nabídku dodávek vojenské techniky za domácí ruské ceny. Tento krok mûl zastavit pronikání Spojen˘ch státÛ a obnovit takfika monopol ruské vojenské v˘zbroje v regionu. Tento návrh prozatím dokázal pouze ãásteãnû udrÏet státy regionu u rusk˘ch dodávek.30 V roce 2004 byly otevfieny nové struktury ODKB, které mûly posílit její integraci. Pfiedev‰ím byl posílen post v˘konného tajemníka organizace. Od 1. ledna 2004 funguje, byÈ prozatím formálnû, generální ‰táb ODKB, kter˘ by mûl koordinovat ve‰keré vojenské záleÏitosti bloku, související pfiedev‰ím s velením Kolektivních sil rychlé reakce ve Stfiední Asii, vojensko-technickou spoluprací a plánováním spoleãn˘ch vojensk˘ch operací a cviãení.

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Napfi. Îumagulov S., Kyrgyzstan ‰iroko raspachivajet svoi dveri pered S·A. Caapr.kz, 14. 12. 2001, http://www.caapr.kz/show.php?caa1412–01.htm [16. 12. 2001], k TádÏikistánu napfi. Abdullo R. G., TadÏikistan i vojna v Afganistane. Caapr.kz, 14. 12. 2001, http://www.caapr.kz/show.php?caa1012– 01.htm [16. 12. 2001]. V roce 2003 byla napfiíklad v tomto reÏimu dodána do Kazachstánu technika pfiibliÏnû za 1 milion USD, zatímco technická pomoc ze strany USA téÏe zemi ve stejném období dosáhla pfiibliÏnû ãtyfinásobné v˘‰e. Muchin V., Astana menjajet vojennuju orientaciju. Nezavisimaja gazeta, 13. 1. 2004, s. 5, pfiíp. Grozin A., Ras‰irenije vojenno-politiãeskogo vlijanija S·A na postsovetskom prostranstve. Materik.ru, http://www.materik.ru/index.php?section=analitics &bulid=67&bulsectionid=5784 [26. 11. 2004].

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V otázce spoleãn˘ch jednotek a tzv. Kolektivních sil rychlé reakce je pro potfieby organizace vydûleno pfiibliÏnû 1500 vojákÛ v nûkolika vojensk˘ch útvarech. K tûmto silám je nutno pfiipoãíst vojenskou leteckou základnu Kant v Kyrgyzstánu, jeÏ byla otevfiena na podzim 2003. Dnes je zde rozmístûno pfiibliÏnû 20 letadel a okolo 150 vojákÛ. Kyrgyzské i ruské oficiální kruhy v‰ak tvrdily, Ïe základna bude schopna pfiijmout aÏ 5 000 vojákÛ.31 K silám v rámci ODKB ve Stfiední Asii je nutno pfiipoãíst i pfiibliÏnû 10 000 vojákÛ 4. ruské vojenské základny v tádÏické metropoli Du‰anbe. K v˘znamnému posunu na misce vah ve Stfiední Asii do‰lo v letech 2004–2005, kdy do‰lo k jiÏ nûkolikrát zmínûnému obratu zahraniãní politiky Uzbekistánu. Po vstupu této zemû do ·anghajské organizace spolupráce a v roce 2005 i do JevAzESu zahájila Moskva tlak na návrat Ta‰kentu do této organizace.32 Pro Rusko by to znamenalo alespoÀ formální potvrzení její postupující dominance ve Stfiední Asii. Na druhé stranû prezident Karimov po novém vtaÏení do ruského orbitu naopak nemá, vzhledem ke stále silnûj‰í izolaci reÏimu ze strany mezinárodního spoleãenství, pfiíli‰ jinou moÏnost, k jakému vojenskému bloku se pfiidat. Zdaleka ne v‰echny mechanismy ODKB v‰ak fungují podle pfiedstav Moskvy. Kazachstán tak v roce 2004 získal vojenskou pomoc ze strany USA za více neÏ 4,5 milionÛ USD. V perspektivû se k tomu pfiipojuje i vybudování kaza‰ské flotily na Kaspiku, stejnû jako pfiezbrojení protivzdu‰né obrany Kazachstánu s pomocí západní techniky. Rusko nemá páky, jak by mohlo tûmto krokÛm zabránit. Navíc Kazachstán je vedle Ruska ekonomicky nejsilnûj‰ím státem, kter˘ si mÛÏe dovolit pomûrnû nákladné investice do v˘zbroje. Pfies ve‰keré problémy ve vztazích mezi jednotliv˘mi státy lze konstatovat, Ïe ODKB je jednou z mála organizací na postsovûtském prostoru, jeÏ se pokou‰í vyvíjet alespoÀ nûjakou ãinnost. Cel˘ blok v‰ak do znaãné míry drÏí na snaze Ruska udrÏet si svÛj vliv ve stfiedoasijském prostoru, stejnû jako na momentální provázanosti stfiedoasijsk˘ch státÛ s Ruskem. S rÛstem tendencí k oslabování podobn˘ch vazeb se dá oãekávat i moÏné rozvolÀo31 32

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Pro srovnání Spojené státy mají na nedalekém leti‰ti Manas okolo 30 letadel s personálem asi 800 lidí. V této souvislosti je nutno pfiipomenout náv‰tûvu pfiedsedu ruské Dumy v únoru 2006 v Ta‰kentu, kter˘ se ani netajil sv˘mi cíly. Taksanov A., Zaãem potomkam Tamerlana ODKB? Vernetsja li Ta‰kent v Ta‰kentskij dogovor? Ozod Ovoz, 20. 2. 2006, http://centrasia.org/newsA.php4?st= 1140512760 [22. 2. 2006].

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vání vztahÛ mezi jednotliv˘mi ãlensk˘mi státy organizace. Na druhou stranu nelze vylouãit ani situaci, kdy by do‰lo k zásadnímu ohroÏení stfiedoasijsk˘ch reÏimÛ z vnûj‰ku. Jako u v‰ech popisovan˘ch uskupení i zde v‰ak hrají relativnû slabou roli psané dokumenty, které se mohou stát v pfiíhodném okamÏiku pouh˘mi cáry papíru, zatímco vût‰í váhu mají neformální (a také nejisté) dohody mezi jednotliv˘mi pfiedstaviteli státÛ. Eurasijské ekonomické spoleãenství (Jevrazijskoje ekonomiãeskoje soob‰ãestvo/JevrAzES, Eurasian Economic Community)33 Eurasijské ekonomické spoleãenství (dfiíve celní unie, nûkdy také „celní pûtka“) pfiedstavuje formálnû nejpokroãilej‰í integraãní a kooperaãní strukturu v prostoru b˘valého Sovûtského svazu. Skupina zahrnuje státy, jeÏ lze oznaãit jako urãité uωí integraãní jádro postsovûtsk˘ch republik sdruÏen˘ch kolem Ruska, a zejména v ekonomické a humanitární oblasti postupnû pfiebírá nûkteré funkce, které mûlo pÛvodnû vykonávat Spoleãenství nezávisl˘ch státÛ. U zrodu tohoto uskupení stálo pfiání zainteresovan˘ch stran zachovat v˘hody tûsné integrace národních ekonomik nástupnick˘ch státÛ z dob spoleãné existence v rámci jednoho soustátí. Zpfietrhání tradiãních dodavatelsko-odbûratelsk˘ch vazeb v dÛsledku rozpadu Sovûtského svazu totiÏ pfiineslo pro v‰echny nástupnické státy hlubok˘ hospodáfisk˘ propad, jehoÏ pfiekonání se zdálo b˘t moÏné jen pomocí spoleãného postupu. Nehledû na nesãetné pokusy o sbliÏování ekonomik od samotného poãátku existence SNS (dohoda o zónû volného obchodu z roku 1994 aj.) byl základní právní rámec pro vznik tohoto uskupení vytvofien v letech 1995 a 1996. Sama celní unie nicménû neznamenala o sobû je‰tû integraãní a kooperaãní strukturu ve smyslu mezinárodní organizace, ale jednalo se spí‰e o soustavu bilaterálních a multilaterálních smluv mezi zainteresovan˘mi státy. Teprve vznik samotného Eurasijského ekonomického spoleãenství v letech 2000 a 2001 znamenal pfiechod k institucionální fázi integrace. V˘chozím bodem formování Eurasijského ekonomického spoleãenství byla dohoda o celní unii mezi Ruskou federací a Bûloruskou republikou 33

Za pomoc pfii zpracování této ãásti dûkuji kolegovi PhDr. Janu ·írovi z Institutu mezinárodních studií FSV UK.

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z 6. ledna 1995.34 Dohoda pfiedpokládala integraci hospodáfisk˘ch soustav obou republik ve dvou hlavních etapách. V první fázi mûlo b˘t zavr‰eno mezitím zapoãaté vytváfiení zóny volného obchodu, v jejímÏ rámci mûly b˘t odstranûny v‰echny formy tarifních a netarifních (mnoÏstevních) omezení ve vzájemné obchodní v˘mûnû. A teprve poté, co mûlo b˘t dosaÏeno dostateãného sblíÏení legislativního rámce v oblasti zahraniãnû ekonomické ãinnosti ve vztahu k tfietím zemím (danû, cla, obchodní reÏim, devizová regulace aj.), mûlo b˘t pfiistoupeno k sjednocení celních území obou zemí v jednotn˘ celní prostor. 20. ledna 1995 uzavfiela analogické dohody o volném obchodu a jednotné regulaci zahraniãnû ekonomické ãinnosti s Ruskou federací i Republika Kazachstán. Tyto dohody byly souãasnû inkorporovány do systému dohod o rusko-bûloruské celní unii, k níÏ Kazachstán tímto pfiistupoval.35 Celá soustava dohod nicménû explicitnû potvrzovala právo smluvních stran zavádût ãasovû nespecifikovaná restriktivní opatfiení v zájmu ochrany domácího trhu a pfiedpokládala rovnûÏ fiadu v˘jimek ve vztahu k citliv˘m poloÏkám atp., coÏ mûlo rozhodující dopad na praktickou implementaci uzavfien˘ch dohod. Zónu volného obchodu coby nejniωí stadium hospodáfiské integrace a pfiedstupeÀ celní unie se totiÏ v praxi nepodafiilo v plném objemu realizovat dodnes. 29. bfiezna 1996 se k celní unii pfiipojila Kyrgyzská republika. Souãasnû s tím byla v Moskvû podepsána ãtyfistranná smlouva o prohloubení integrace v hospodáfiské a humanitární oblasti, která pfiedpokládala vytvofiení tzv. Spoleãenství integrovan˘ch státÛ cestou „postupného prohloubení integrace v hospodáfiství, vûdû, vzdûlávání, kultufie, sociální sféfie a jin˘ch oblastech pfii zachování suverenity stran“.36 Kromû toho smlouva zavazovala strany ke koordinaci zahraniãní politiky a spoleãné ochranû vnûj‰ích

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Sogla‰enije o TamoÏennom sojuze meÏdu Rossijskoj Federacijej i Respublikoj Belarus’ (archiv autora). Sogla‰enije meÏdu Pravitel’stvom Rossijskoj Federacii i Pravitel’stvom Respubliki Kazachstan o jedinom porjadke regulirovanija vne‰neekonomiãeskoj dejatel’nosti. http://www.businesspravo.ru/ Docum/DocumShow_DocumID_43425.html; Protokol o vvedenii reÏima svobodnoj torgovli bez iz»jatij i ograniãenij meÏdu Rossijskoj Federacijej i Respublikoj Kazachstan. http:// www.businesspravo.ru/Docum/DocumShow_DocumI D_43357. html [27. 11. 2003]; Sogla‰enije o TamoÏennom sojuze (archív autora). Dogovor o prisojedinenii Kyrgyzskoj Respubliki k sogla‰enijam o TamoÏennom sojuze (archiv autora); Dogovor meÏdu Rossijskoj Federacijej, Respublikoj Belarus’, Respublikoj Kazachstan i Kyrgyzskoj Respublikoj ob uglublenii integracii v ekonomiãeskoj i gumanitarnoj oblastjach. http:/ /www.pavlodar.com/zakon/nzak_right.htm?dok=00358&all=all [5. 8.2 002]

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hranic vytváfieného jednotného celního prostoru. Tento ambiciózní (v prostoru b˘valého Sovûtského svazu) projekt do urãité míry pfiejímal my‰lenky b˘val˘ch Evropsk˘ch spoleãenství. Smlouva nicménû nespecifikovala ãasov˘ harmonogram pro zavádûní konkrétních krokÛ na cestû k deklarované integraci, coÏ sk˘talo zúãastnûn˘m stranám dostatek moÏností k eventuálnímu bojkotu celé akce. Smlouva o prohloubení integrace zároveÀ avizovala zfiízení nûkter˘ch fiídících orgánÛ (mezistátní rada, integraãní v˘bor aj.), av‰ak neochota zainteresovan˘ch státÛ postoupit spoleãn˘m orgánÛm rozhodující pravomoci efektivitu jejich práce zásadnû omezovala. Koordinace celní politiky v praxi proto probíhala dlouho na dvoustranné úrovni prostfiednictvím delegování zástupcÛ celní správy pfiíslu‰ného státu pfii fieditelství cel v Ruské federaci a naopak. Poslední roz‰ífiení celní unie probûhlo 26. února 1999, kdy k uskupení pfiistoupila Republika TádÏikistán. Dlouholetou obãanskou válkou zdecimovaná ekonomika, jakoÏ i právní vakuum, jeÏ nemûlo obdoby v Ïádné jiné postsovûtské republice, ãinily z TádÏikistánu daleko nejslab‰í ãlánek unie a ani neumoÏÀovaly okamÏitou a plnou integraci i v rámci dohodnut˘ch mechanismÛ. Nedílnou souãástí smlouvy o pfiistoupení byl proto protokol o etapách a ãasovém harmonogramu plnûní podmínek vypl˘vajících z dohod o celní unii ze strany TádÏikistánu, ãímÏ se od samotného poãátku mûl na tuto nejchud‰í republiku vztahovat zvlá‰tní reÏim.37 Spolu s pfiijetím TádÏikistánu byla pak hlavami státÛ v Moskvû podepsána smlouva o celní unii a jednotném hospodáfiském prostoru, naznaãující pokraãování hospodáfiské integrace „celní pûtky“ ve tfiech fázích.38 V˘sledkem první fáze mûlo b˘t zaji‰tûní reÏimu volného obchodu vãetnû zru‰ení v‰ech forem tarifních a mnoÏstevních omezení ve vzájemné v˘mûnû jakoÏ i dal‰ích administrativních pfiekáÏek pro voln˘ pohyb zboÏí. Druhá fáze mûla jiÏ zahrnovat vytvofiení efektivní celní unie s atributy, jako je jednotn˘ celní sazebník, zru‰ení kontrol na vnitfiních hranicích ãi sjednocení mechanismÛ regulace ekonomiky a zahraniãního obchodu. Koneãnû tfietí, dosud nediskutovaná fáze mûla vyústit ve vytvofiení jednotného hospodáfiského 37

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Dogovor o prisojedinenii Respubliki TadÏikistan k sogla‰enijam o TamoÏennom sojuze Protokol ob etapach i srokach zaver‰enija Respublikoj TadÏikistan raboty po vypolneniju uslovij sogla‰enij o TamoÏennom sojuze (archiv autora). Dogovor o TamoÏennom sojuze i Jedinom ekonomiãeskom prostranstve. http://www.pavlodar.com/ zakon/nzak_right.htm?dok=00354&all=all [5. 8. 2002].

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prostoru vãetnû volného pohybu osob, sluÏeb a kapitálu. Av‰ak ani tato smlouva neupfiesÀovala ãasov˘ rámec pro realizaci dohodnut˘ch etap. Uskuteãnûní plánovan˘ch projektÛ, které mûly na dlouho pfiedbíhat integraãní realitu, se ukazovalo jako nemyslitelné v dosavadním volném formátu. Pfiedpokladem pro prohloubení integrace musela b˘t proto institucionalizace uskupení. V prÛbûhu roku 2000 byly vypracovány projekty pfiíslu‰n˘ch ustavujících aktÛ. U pfiíleÏitosti schÛzky na nejvy‰‰í úrovni v Astanû 10. fiíjna 2000 byla pak uzavfiena smlouva o zfiízení Eurasijského ekonomického spoleãenství na bázi dosavadní celní unie.39 V˘mûnou ratifikaãních listin k smlouvû, jeÏ byla provedena bûhem následujícího summitu v Minsku 31. kvûtna 2001, do‰lo ke transformaci „celní pûtky“ od pÛvodního systému bilaterálních a multilaterálních smluv k mezinárodní organizaci s relativnû pevnou institucionální strukturou a jasnû specifikovan˘mi závazky ãlensk˘ch státÛ. V souladu se jmenovanou smlouvou mûla nová organizace disponovat jiÏ fiadou nadstátních kompetencí, jeÏ se jí smluvní strany zavázaly dobrovolnû delegovat pfii souãasném zachování vlastní suverenity a mezinárodnû právní subjektivity. Cílem transformace uskupení mûlo b˘t efektivní fiízení procesu ekonomické integrace pfii postupném formování celní unie a jednotného hospodáfiského prostoru, stejnû jako ostatní cíle a úkoly ve smyslu shora uvádûn˘ch dohod z let 1995 aÏ 1999, podle etap, jak byly specifikovány v tûchto dokumentech, prostfiednictvím k tomu zfiízen˘ch orgánÛ. Nejvy‰‰í orgán Eurasijského ekonomického spoleãenství pfiedstavuje tzv. mezistátní rada, svolávaná minimálnû jednou roãnû na úrovni hlav státÛ, kde se zadávají hlavní smûry dal‰ího v˘voje a pfiijímají rámcová rozhodnutí na základû konsenzu. Stál˘m pracovním orgánem je ale tzv. integraãní v˘bor, zasedající na úrovni místopfiedsedÛ vlád, resp. v jeho rámci fungující tzv. komise stál˘ch pfiedstavitelÛ, rozhodující podle principu váÏeného hlasování. Podle tohoto principu je podíl hlasÛ kaÏdého státu odvozen od síly jeho národní ekonomiky. Rusko má v tomto systému váhu 40 % hlasÛ, Bûlorusko a Kazachstán po 20 %, zatímco Kyrgyzstán s TádÏikistánem disponují kaÏd˘ 10 % hlasÛ. Podle stejn˘ch proporcí má b˘t teoreticky for-

mován i rozpoãet organizace.40 Vzhledem k tomu, Ïe rozhodnutí integraãního v˘boru se musejí opírat minimálnû o dvoutfietinovou vût‰inu hlasÛ, zaruãuje tento systém Moskvû fakticky právo veta. K dal‰ím orgánÛm spoleãenství patfií pak tzv. meziparlamentní shromáÏdûní, jehoÏ hlavním úkolem je harmonizace národních legislativ. Tento orgán vypracovává modelové vzory zákonÛ v oblastech spadajících do pÛsobnosti organizace. K fie‰ení obchodních sporÛ mezi úãastnick˘mi státy kromû toho ustavující dokumenty spoleãenství pfiedpokládaly existenci spoleãného soudního dvora. Spoleãné soudní instance v‰ak dosud nebyly zfiízeny, neboÈ jednotlivé státy vãetnû Ruska nejsou ochotny postoupit tomuto rozhodãímu orgánu potfiebné pravomoci. Prioritním smûrem spolupráce státÛ unie, resp. spoleãenství, od druhé poloviny 90. let je koordinace pozic pfii vyjednávání o podmínkách vstupu do Svûtové obchodní organizace (WTO). 3. ãervna 1997 byl v Moskvû podepsán protokol, kter˘ konkretizoval závazky zúãastnûn˘ch stran ke spoleãn˘m krokÛm v této oblasti.41 Zdání jednoty se v‰ak podafiilo udrÏet pouh˘ch nûkolik mûsícÛ. V lednu 1998 byl totiÏ Kyrgyzstán jako vÛbec první a dosud jediná republika tohoto uskupení pfiizván ke vstupu k této globální organizaci. V rámci pfiístupov˘ch podmínek byl pfiitom Bi‰kek nucen radikálnû otevfiít vlastní ekonomiku vãetnû sníÏení dovozních cel vÛãi tfietím zemím hluboko pod úroveÀ obvyklou ve státech celní unie. Tento krok byl ostatními partnery vãetnû Kremlu interpretován jako ohroÏení jejich hospodáfisk˘ch zájmÛ. PfiestoÏe reáln˘ dopad vstupu Kyrgyzstánu do WTO na vzájemn˘ obchod v rámci unie byl vzhledem ke slabosti kyrgyzské ekonomiky a její orientaci zanedbateln˘, ostatní ãlenské státy, obviÀující Bi‰kek z reexportu laciného ãínského dovozu, reagovaly na tento úspûch kyrgyzské diplomacie pfiíznaãnû zavedením odvetn˘ch opatfiení.42 Bûhem

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TamtéÏ. Pfiíznaãnû napfi. bûhem schÛzky hlav vlád v listopadu 2003 bûloruská strana, povaÏující ãinnost Eurasijského ekonomického spoleãenství za ne vÏdy kompatibilní s „integraãními procesy“ probíhajícími v rámci tzv. Svazového státu Ruska a Bûloruska, uznala svÛj dluh vÛãi rozpoãtu organizace za roky 2001 a 2002 s tím, Ïe nemá prostfiedky na uhrazení sv˘ch závazkÛ. Strany JevrAzES podpisali ãetyre sogla‰enija. http://www.bpi.ru/news/19476.html?mode=print [1. 12. 2003]. Protokol o meÏdunarodnych torgovych peregovorach gosudarstv-uãastnikov sogla‰enij o TamoÏennom sojuze pri vstuplenii v VTO (archiv autora). Oficiální rusk˘ postoj k jednostrannému postupu Aleksejev R. F., Michajlov B. P., Jevrazijskoje ekonomiãeskoje soob‰ãestvo. MeÏdunarodnaja Ïizn’, No. 11, 2000, s. 30–35.

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moskevského summitu 13. kvûtna 2002 bylo dosaÏeno shody o tom, Ïe jako základ pro vyjednávání ãlensk˘ch státÛ spoleãenství s WTO budou vzaty podmínky, jeÏ pro sebe vyjedná Ruská federace. Tento fakt nicménû svûdãí o neschopnosti státÛ nejen vypracovat spoleãnou pozici vÛãi WTO, ale i vyuÏít zku‰eností relativnû nejreformovanûj‰ího ãlena skupiny ze vstupu do této organizace. Nehledû na integraãní rétoriku tak v praxi nadále pokraãuje spí‰e dezintegrace jednotného prostoru. Zákony pfiijímané v jednotliv˘ch ãlensk˘ch zemích se ãasto rozcházejí s pravidly celní unie, neÏ aby je respektovaly. V˘sledkem je stav, kdy jedna komodita je zpoplatnûna t˘mÏ druhem danû hned v nûkolika státech najednou. Unifikace nepfiím˘ch daní vãetnû DPH, vykazujících znaãné rozdíly, se dosud nestala ani pfiedmûtem jednání.43 V oblasti regulace zahraniãnû ekonomické ãinnosti preferují ãlenské zemû nadále jednostranné kroky, jak se ukázalo po vypuknutí finanãní krize v Rusku v srpnu 1998. Kazachstán totiÏ s odvoláním na nutnost ochrany domácího trhu pfied zlevÀující konkurencí neváhal vÛãi Rusku zavést tvrdá restriktivní opatfiení vãetnû zákazu dovozu celé fiady potravináfisk˘ch v˘robkÛ.44 Moskva naopak v ãervenci 2002 po letech sporÛ s Astanou uvalila „antidumpingová“ cla na dovoz kaza‰ské oceli, o moÏnostech nediskriminaãního (kdyÏ uÏ ne preferenãního) pfiístupu stfiedoasijsk˘ch surovin k ruské transportnû-komunikaãní infrastruktufie nemluvû.45 Stejnû tak zru‰ení celních kontrol na vnitfiních hranicích se prozatím podafiilo dosáhnout pouze mezi Ruskem a Bûloruskem, a to jen ve vztahu ke zboÏí pocházejícímu z tûchto republik, zatímco na ostatních hranicích jsou kontroly spí‰e utuÏovány. Dohodou ze 17. února 2000 bylo stanoveno 43

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Pro dokreslení, zatímco napfi. daÀová legislativa Kazachstánu zná pouze dvû sazby danû z pfiidané hodnoty, Bûlorusko a Rusko mají tfii sazby, pfiiãemÏ zafiazení jednotliv˘ch poloÏek do té které sazby je ãasto uplatÀováno podle nestejn˘ch kritérií. Rusko také aÏ do roku 2004 v rozporu s obchodní praxí bûÏnou v civilizovaném svûtû vybíralo DPH na vlastní suroviny urãené na export do ostatních postsovûtsk˘ch republik. Dopolnenije k Protokolu o vvedenii reÏima svobodnoj torgovli bez iz»jatij i ograniãenij meÏdu Respublikoj Kazachstan i Rossijskoj Federacijej ot 20 janvarja 1995 goda. http:// www.businesspravo.ru/Docum/DocumShow_DocumID_64013.html [2. 11. 2003]. BlíÏe k celé problematice viz IMF Working Paper WP/01/169. The Russian Financial Crisis and its Consequences for Central Asia. Prepared by Gonzalo Pastor and Tatiana Damjanovic. Washington, D. C., International Monetary Fund, October 2001. âto dajet Kazachstanu ãlenstvo v Jevrazijskom ekonomiãeskom soob‰ãestve? IWPR-Kazakhstan. 29. 07. 2002. http://www.arba.ru/iwpr/3/articles/2002209–1.html [2. 11. 2003].

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pfiechodné pûtileté období pro sestavení spoleãného celního sazebníku vÛãi tfietím zemím, harmonizace sazeb v‰ak probíhá ztuha (dosud bylo unifikováno zhruba 60 % poloÏek, i to ponejvíce mezi Ruskem a Bûloruskem), kdyÏ do roku 2002 se státy nebyly schopny shodnout ani na jednotné nomenklatufie zboÏí.46 Eurasijské ekonomické spoleãenství se navíc stává obûtí geopolitick˘ch ambicí jeho nejvlivnûj‰ího ãlena. Rusko se pomocí této organizace nejen fakticky snaÏí o ovládnutí klíãov˘ch sektorÛ ekonomik jednotliv˘ch ãlensk˘ch státÛ, ale vyuÏívá její existence i pro svoje globální plány. 19. záfií 2003 byla v Jaltû podepsána ãtyfistranná dohoda o jednotném hospodáfiském prostoru mezi Ruskem, Bûloruskem, Kazachstánem – a Ukrajinou. Moskva hodlala tímto krokem vyuÏít slabosti ukrajinského prezidenta Leonida Kuãmy, ocitnuv‰ího se po skandálu okolo nevyjasnûné vraÏdy nekonformního novináfie Georgije Gongadzeho v rostoucí mezinárodní izolaci, k upevnûní vlivu v této z pohledu Ruska daleko nejv˘znamnûj‰í republice v prostoru b˘valého Sovûtského svazu. Deklarovan˘m cílem dohody mûlo b˘t vytvofiení tzv. Organizace regionální integrace, která mûla fakticky dublovat (ov‰em v jiném sloÏení) ãinnost Eurasijského ekonomického spoleãenství (JevrAzES).47 PfiestoÏe po zmûnû reÏimu v Kyjevû na sklonku roku 2004 se tato iniciativa posunula spí‰e do teoretické roviny, dokládá despekt Moskvy vÛãi men‰ím stfiedoasijsk˘m státÛm. Moskva, nehledû na dÛleÏitost integraãního diskurzu na ruské vnitropolitické scénû, tak zjevnû není pfiipravena stavût projekty poskytující preferenãní reÏim ménû vyspûl˘m státÛm postsovûtské Stfiední Asie na úkor prosazování

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Sogla‰enije ob Ob‰ãem tamoÏennom tarife gosudarstv TamoÏennogo sojuza; Sogla‰enije ob ob‰ãej Tovarnoj nomenklature vne‰neekonomiãeskoj dejatel’nosti Jevrazijskogo ekonomiãeskogo soob‰ãestva, prinjatoje re‰enijem MeÏgosudarstvennogo soveta JevrAzES (archiv autora). K sjednocování tarifÛ blíÏe viz Azarov Ju. F., Istomin S. I., Bulavin S. P., Moravek Ja. I., BraÏnikov M. Ju., Muchametzjanova G. R., TamoÏennyj sojuz stran Jevrazijskogo ekonomiãeskogo soob‰ãestva. Kommentarij i dokumenty. Moskva 2003, s. 89–114; Ultanbajev R., Jevrazijskoje ekonomiãeskoje soob‰ãestvo: ternistyj put’ razvitija, Central’naja Azija i Kavkaz, No. 3, 2003. http://www.ca-c.org/online/2003/ journal_rus/cac-03/17.ultrus.shtml [1. 12. 2004]. Sogla‰enije o formirovanii Jedinogo ekonomiãeskogo prostranstva. http://www.kremlin.ru/text/docs/ 2003/09/52478.shtml; Koncepcija formirovanija Jedinogo ekonomiãeskogo prostranstva. http:// www.ln.mid.ru [13. 11. 2003]. V samotném Eurasijském ekonomickém spoleãenství má Ukrajina, stejnû jako Arménie a Moldavsko, velice volnû definovan˘ status pozorovatele.

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vlastních zahraniãnû politick˘ch zájmÛ v ostatních ãástech svûta, coÏ funkãnost jakékoliv spoleãné ekonomické organizace znaãnû limituje. Na rozdíl od úsilí o sbliÏování národních ekonomik, jeÏ tak stûÏí lze hodnotit jinak neÏ jako fiasko, se ve sféfie humanitární spolupráce pûti státÛ pfiece jen podafiilo dosáhnout urãit˘ch v˘sledkÛ. K nejdÛleÏitûj‰ím z nich patfií uzavfiení smlouvy o právním statutu obãanÛ jednoho státu trvale Ïijících na území druhého státu, dohody o zjednodu‰ení procedury nab˘vání obãanství, o vzájemném uznávání a ekvivalenci dokladÛ o vzdûlání, vûdeck˘ch hodností a titulÛ, o zjednodu‰ení reÏimu pfiechodu státní hranice ãi vzájemn˘ch cest, jakoÏ i dohody o vytvofiení podmínek pro retranslaci televizního a rozhlasového vysílání na území zúãastnûn˘ch státÛ.48 I zde v‰ak realizace dohod naráÏí na nedodrÏování podepsan˘ch závazkÛ, poãínajíc nízkou efektivitou pfiíslu‰n˘ch státních orgánÛ pfies v‰udypfiítomnou korupci aÏ po vzájemné ‰ikanování a byrokratickou zvÛli. PfiestoÏe mezi pûti státy byl potvrzen bezvízov˘ reÏim, bûÏnou souãástí jednání na nejvy‰‰í úrovni zÛstává operování s moÏností zavedení vízové povinnosti pro obãany nûkteré z ãlensk˘ch zemí (zejména vÛãi TádÏikistánu). V bfieznu 2005 byl podepsán zvlá‰tní protokol, zpfiísÀující dosavadní reÏim, jímÏ si Moskva vymohla povinnost obãanÛ ãlensk˘ch státÛ spoleãenství prokazovat se pfii pfiekroãení hranic cestovními pasy.49 Na bilaterální úrovni se státy, jeÏ mají 48

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Dogovor o pravovom statuse graÏdan odnogo gosudarstva, postojanno proÏivaju‰ãich na territorii drugogo gosudarstva-uãastnika Dogovora ot 29 marta 1996 goda (archiv autora); Sogla‰enije meÏdu Respublikoj Belarus’, Respublikoj Kazachstan, Kyrgyzskoj Respublikoj i Rossijskoj Federacijej ob upro‰ãennom porjadke priobretenija graÏdanstva. http://www.businesspravo.ru/Docum/DocumShow_DocumID_70271.html; Sogla‰enije meÏdu Pravitel’stvom Respubliki Belarus’, Pravitel’stvom Respubliki Kazachstan, Pravitel’stvom Kyrgyzskoj Respubliki i Pravitel’stvom Rossijskoj Federacii o vzaimnom priznanii i ekvivalentnosti dokumentov ob obrazovanii, uãenych stepenjach i zvanijach. http://www.businesspravo.ru/Docum/DocumShow_DocumID_64011.html; Sogla‰enije ob obespeãenii svobodnogo i ravnogo prava pereseãenija fiziãeskimi licami granic gosudarstv-uãastnikov TamoÏennogo sojuza i besprepjatstvennogo pereme‰ãenija imi tovarov i valjuty (archiv autora); Sogla‰enije meÏdu Pravitel’stvom Respubliki Belarus’, Pravitel’stvom Respubliki Kazachstan, Pravitel’stvom Kyrgyzskoj Respubliki, Pravitel’stvom Rossijskoj Federacii i Pravitel’stvom Respubliki TadÏikistan o vzaimnych bezvizovych pojezdkach graÏdan . http://www.businesspravo.ru/Docum/DocumShow_DocumID_15459.html [2. 11. 2003]; Sogla‰enije o sozdanii blagoprijatnych uslovij dlja rasprostranenija programm televidenija i radio na territorijach gosudarstv-uãastnikov Dogovora ob uglublenii integracii v ekonomiãeskoj i gumanitarnoj oblastjach ot 29 marta 1996 goda (archiv autora). Soob‰ãenije dlja peãati. O podpisanii gosudarstvami-uãastnikami JevrAzES Protokola k Sogla‰eniju o vzaimnych bezvizovych pojezdkach graÏdan ot 30 nojabrja 2000 goda. http://www.ln.mid.ru [5. 6. 2005].

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s Ruskem nejtûsnûj‰í vztahy jako Bûlorusko a Kazachstán, byl v‰ak zachován zjednodu‰en˘ reÏim. Koncem roku 2005 potom uzbeck˘ prezident Karimov na zasedání spoleãenství projevil dlouho oãekávanou Ïádost o pfiijetí ke ãlenství. Vstup Uzbekistánu do klubu JevrAzES v‰ak lze povaÏovat spí‰e za akt politické vÛle, neÏ jeho integraãní pfiipravenosti, stabilitû a spolehlivosti. Kromû provûfiené nestálosti uzbecké zahraniãní politiky totiÏ Uzbekistán není pfiipraven ani na ty plnûní dosud vyjednan˘ch formálních závazkÛ v rámci JevrAzES. PfiestoÏe v lednu 2006 na summitu v Sankt Petûrburgu do‰lo k pfiistoupení Uzbekistánu k JevrAzESu, Uzbekistán by mûl ve stejném roce pfiistoupit k asi 75 dohodám uzavfien˘m v rámci tohoto uskupení. Mezi jin˘mi to znamená napfiíklad zru‰ení vízové povinnosti vÛãi Kyrgyzstánu a TádÏikistánu, coÏ je z uzbecké strany zatím tûÏko pfiedstavitelná vûc. A podobn˘ch otázek lze najít i více. Pfies potíÏe s praktickou implementací dohod se ukazuje, Ïe spolupráce v humanitární oblasti je pro ãlenské státy snaz‰í neÏ integrace národních ekonomik. Humanitární dohody pfiitom slouÏí mnohem úãinnûji nejen udrÏení vzájemn˘ch kontaktÛ mezi ãlensk˘mi státy, ale i zachování vlivu Ruska na tomto území, o coÏ Moskva vehementnû usiluje. Není náhodou, Ïe právû tyto státy udrÏují s Ruskem nejpfiátel‰tûj‰í vztahy, status ru‰tiny je zde nadále nadstandardní a vûdecká ãi kulturní v˘mûna zÛstává pomûrnû intenzivní. Pokud jde o ekonomickou oblast, jakkoli je vytváfiení podobn˘ch integraãních a kooperaãních uskupení logické (kromû v˘vozu surovin mají stfiedoasijské státy málo moÏností uplatÀovat svou produkci na odbytov˘ch trzích mimo postsovûtsk˘ prostor), rÛzn˘ stupeÀ hospodáfiské transformace, dezintegrace právního prostoru, vysoce korupãní prostfiedí a v neposlední fiadû i charakter politick˘ch reÏimÛ zÛstávají hlavní pfiekáÏkou jakékoliv tûsnûj‰í souãinnosti. Dal‰í dÛvodem slabé integrovanosti v rámci JEVRAZES je i fakt, Ïe vût‰ina dohod se fiídí pfiedev‰ím momentální politickou objednávkou, která se mÛÏe podle okolností mûnit a s ní se mûní i preference, kterou jednotlivé státy udûlují tomuto uskupení.50 Dokud nebudou odstranûny v˘‰e uvedené problémy, bude

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Jedním z takov˘ch krokÛ se na podzim stalo i rozhodnutí o slouãení Organizace Stfiedoasijské spoleãenství s Eurasijsk˘m ekonomick˘m spoleãenstvím – viz dále ãást o Stfiedoasijském spoleãenství.

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vytvofiení jakési obdoby Evropské unie na postsovûtském prostoru jen stûÏí pfiedstavitelnou utopií. Obdobnû pak jako v pfiípadû dal‰ích regionálních uskupení, trpí i Eurasijské ekonomické spoleãenství pfiíli‰nou hegemonií Ruska. V mnoha ohledech proto organizace funguje spí‰e jako spoleãná platforma postsovûtsk˘ch státÛ pro narovnání jejich bilaterálních vztahÛ s Moskvou neÏ jako efektivní mnohostranná struktura. Organizace Stfiedoasijská spolupráce (Organizacija Central’no-Aziatskoje Sotrudniãestvo, dfiíve Central’noAziatskoje Ekonomiãeskoje Soob‰ãestvo) Na poãátku této organizace stála smlouva mezi Kazachstánem a Uzbekistánem o vytvofiení jednotného hospodáfiského prostoru z 10. ledna 1994. K této smlouvû se záhy pfiipojil Kyrgyzstán, kter˘ nemûl zájem zÛstávat stranou jakékoliv kooperaãní snahy ve stfiedoasijském prostoru. Proto se pÛl roku po podepsání kaza‰sko-uzbecké dohody zmûnil formát uskupení na trojstrann˘. 30. dubna 1994 tak podepsali prezidenti Kazachstánu, Kyrgyzstánu a Uzbekistánu smlouvu o vytvofiení jednotného hospodáfiského prostoru. K uskuteãnûní tohoto cíle mûl b˘t umoÏnûn voln˘ pohyb osob (bezvízov˘ styk, vzájemné uznávání kvalifikací), zboÏí a kapitálu, odbourány celní procedury, postupnû sniÏovány danû a harmonizována vnitrostátní legislativa. Obãané v‰ech tfií zemí mûli b˘t postupnû osvobozeni od celních prohlídek na vzájemn˘ch hranicích.51 V nûkter˘ch deklaracích zaznûl rovnûÏ smûl˘ plán na mûnovou unii a spoleãné politické orgány ve stfiedoasijském prostoru.52 V bfieznu 1998 se k tomuto uskupení pfiidal TádÏikistán. Stranou tak zÛstal pouze tradiãnû „neutrální“ Turkmenistán. Vzhledem k jeho dlouhodobé zahraniãní politice neangaÏovanosti ani nebylo moÏné pfiedpokládat, Ïe by A‰gabat mûl zájem na ãlenství v této struktufie.

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Viz ãl. 3 a 4 smlouvy. Dogovor o sozdanii jedinogo ekonomiãeskogo prostranstva meÏdu Respublikoj Kazachstan, Kyrgyzskoj Respublikoj i Respublikoj Uzbekistan. http://www.president.kz/articles/state/state_container.asp?lng=ru&art=dogovor [7. 10. 2004]. Kurtov, cit. dílo.

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K roku 2001 byly podepsány dokumenty o vzájemné ochranû investic, o zamezení dvojího zdanûní, o vytvofiení spoleãného vûdecko-technického prostoru a také byl odsouhlasen program spolupráce v oblasti migrace obyvatelstva. Komplex tûchto smluv vyústil ve vyhlá‰ení organizace Stfiedoasijská spolupráce na summitu státÛ v Ta‰kentu v prosinci 2001. Jejím deklarovan˘m cílem se stala roz‰ífiená spolupráce v oblasti politiky, ekonomiky a humanitárních otázek. Do slouãení této organizace s JevrAzESem bylo v rámci Stfiedoasijské spolupráce podepsáno více neÏ 200 smluv a deklarací, které zahrnovaly nejrÛznûj‰í odvûtví mezistátní spolupráce. Ve vût‰inû pfiípadÛ se v‰ak jednalo o velmi vágnû formulované dokumenty, které pfiiznávaly nutnost prohloubení spolupráce zúãastnûn˘ch zemí. Podobnû jako u jin˘ch kooperaãních skupin na postsovûtském prostoru v‰ak vût‰ina smluv zÛstává nenaplnûna. Latentním problémem této skupiny zÛstala existence dvou siln˘ch státÛ, které si dûlaly ambice na hegemonii v regionu (Kazachstán a Uzbekistán). Neexistence jasného lídra nebo vÛdãí skupiny spolupracujících zemí v regionu vedlo k stále vût‰ímu rozmûlÀování vzájemné mnohostranné spolupráce. K formalizaci dohod také pfiispûly spory mezi jednotliv˘mi státy uskupení. Údajné atentáty na uzbeckého prezidenta Isloma Karimova vedly k obvinûní sousedních státÛ (pfiedev‰ím Kyrgyzstánu a TádÏikistánu), podle nûhoÏ se tûchto územích mûli skr˘vat islám‰tí radikálové. V reakci na události v jihokyrgyzském Batkenu v létû roku 1999 pfiistoupil Uzbekistán k zaminování sv˘ch hranic s obûma zemûmi a je‰tû více zkomplikoval celní procedury se sousedními státy. Uzbecká strana navíc na poãátku roku 2003 doãasnû uzavfiela hranice s Kazachstánem, oficiálnû z hygienick˘ch dÛvodÛ. Skuteãn˘m dÛvodem v‰ak byl dlouhotrvající pfiíliv levnûj‰ího spotfiebního zboÏí do Uzbekistánu (a naopak v˘voz levnûj‰ích potravin na pfiíhraniãní kaza‰ské trhy), které ohroÏovaly domácí v˘robu (a tím i zájmy mnoha vlivn˘ch osobností v okolí uzbeckého prezidenta Karimova). Av‰ak i Kazachstán zavedl v roce 1998–1999 omezení na dovoz fiady produktÛ ze sousedních zemí. Problematická zÛstala i situace s tranzitem zboÏí pfies Kazachstán do Uzbekistánu a Kyrgyzstánu. Hranice a omezení pfii jejich pfiekraãování jsou jednou z hlavních pfiekáÏek jakékoliv integrace v regionu. Kromû chronické korupce prakticky na v‰ech hraniãních pfiechodech ve Stfiední Asii, kdy pohraniãníci a celníci vyÏadují úplatek témûfi pfii jakém-

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koliv tranzitu zboÏí. V oblasti celních pfiedpisÛ jednotliv˘ch státÛ navíc existuje znaãn˘ chaos, právû vzhledem k ãasto se mûnícím vnitfiním pravidlÛm. Tím se prostor pro korupci nadále zvy‰uje. Pokud jde o volné pfiekraãování hranic osobami v oblasti, potom staãí opût pfiipomenout vízov˘ reÏim Uzbekistánu s TádÏikistánem a Kyrgyzstánem, zaveden˘m údajnû z hlediska bezpeãnosti. Podobné opatfiení v‰ak pfiineslo malou efektivitu (vût‰ina tzv. islámsk˘ch radikálÛ mûla uzbecké pasy) a zkomplikovalo Ïivot pfiedev‰ím bûÏn˘m obãanÛm. Problémy nastávají také napfiíklad v oblasti energetick˘ch a vodních zdrojÛ v regionu. Zde se projevuje tradiãní snaha o hegemonii Uzbekistánu vÛãi odbûratelÛm jeho energetick˘ch zdrojÛ (dodávky zemního plynu do Kyrgyzstánu a TádÏikistánu), které jsou provázeny chronickou platební neschopností a rÛstem závazkÛ tûchto zemí vÛãi Ta‰kentu. V dÛsledku energetické krize v tûchto men‰ích zemích regionu do‰lo k zadrÏování vodních zdrojÛ, na kter˘ch jsou Ïivotnû závislé nûkteré zemûdûlské oblasti v Uzbekistánu a Kazachstánu.53 Jednotlivé státy uskupení se navíc snaÏily plnit své závazky v rámci jin˘ch organizací, které byly evidentnû pfiednûj‰í – JevrAzES (Kazachstán, Kyrgyzstán, TádÏikistán), WTO (Kyrgyzstán) nebo donedávna GUUAM (Uzbekistán). Cíle tûchto uskupení v˘raznû dublují ãinnost organizace Stfiedoasijská spolupráce, a tak ãiní existenci celé struktury ponûkud zbyteãnou. Charakter organizace se v˘raznû zmûnil v srpnu 2004. Na summitu spoleãenství v Astanû 28. srpna 2004 bylo totiÏ pfiijato Rusko jako plnoprávn˘ ãlen tohoto uskupení.54 Formální aspekty tohoto pfiipojení byly potom ukonãeny na summitu v Du‰anbe v fiíjnu 2004.55 53

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23. ãervna 2001 pfiijal kyrgyzsk˘ parlament zákon o mezistátním vyuÏívání vodních objektÛ, vodních zdrojÛ a vodohospodáfisk˘ch objektÛ Kyrgyzské republiky, kter˘ stanovil vodu jako jeden z pfiírodních zdrojÛ, kter˘ mÛÏe b˘t povaÏován za zboÏí. Tímto se otevfiela cesta ke zpoplatnûní dodávek vody Kazachstánu a Uzbekistánu. V Central’noj Azii nazrevajet novyj konflikt iz-za vody, Central’noaziatskoje agentstvo politiãeskich issledovanij, 27. 7. 2001, http://www.caapr.kz/ show.php?caa277–02. htm. [28. 8. 2001] Rusko mûlo v této organizaci od roku 1997 status pozorovatele. Rossija usilivajet svoje vlijanije v Central’noj Azii, Japonija ne otstajet. Nezavisimaja gazeta, 30. 8. 2004, s. 5. Protokol o prisojedinenii Rossijskoj Federacii k Dogovoru meÏdu Respublikoj Kazachstan, Kyrgyzskoj Respublikoj, Respublikoj TadÏikistan i Respublikoj Uzbekistan ob uãreÏdenii Organizacii Central’no-Aziatskoje Sotrudniãestvo ot 28 fevralja 2002 goda. Du‰anbe, 18 oktjabrja 2004 g., http://npa-gov.garweb.ru [15. 8. 2005].

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Je evidentní, Ïe politická a ekonomická síla Ruska jej okamÏitû pfiedurãila k vÛdãí roli v této organizaci, respektive snahu Moskvy o likvidaci této organizace a pfiitáhnutí Uzbekistánu do své zájmové sféry. K oãekávanému splynutí organizace Stfiedoasijská spolupráce a JevrAzESu potom do‰lo v fiíjnu 2005, kdy Uzbekistán oznámil zájem o vstup do této poslednû jmenované organizace. âinnost Stfiedoasijského spoleãenství tak byla pro historii ãítankov˘m pfiíkladem zcela formální snahy o koordinaci ekonomické politiky na nejrÛznûj‰ích úrovních. Státy stfiedoasijského prostoru ukázaly svou neschopnost fie‰it mezi sebou ãetné spory ve vzájemn˘ch vztazích.56 K problematice ãistû stfiedoasijské integrace lze na závûr této ãásti pfiidat pouze dal‰í z nespoãtu iniciativ tohoto druhu ze strany kaza‰ského prezidenta Nursultana Nazarbajeva. Ten v únoru 2005 navrhl vytvofiení Organizace stfiedoasijsk˘ch státÛ právû na základû Stfiedoasijské spolupráce. Je zajímavé, Ïe tento návrh prezident Nazarbajev posoudil v telefonickém rozhovoru s tádÏick˘m a uzbeck˘m prezidentem.57 Ov‰em podobnû jako mnoho integraãních vizí prezidenta Nazarbajeva, i tato byla odsouzena k nezdaru. GU(U)AM Toto uskupení vzniklo na summitu Rady Evropy v fiíjnu roku 1997 ve ·trasburku. Prezidenti Ukrajiny, Moldavska, Gruzie a ÁzerbajdÏánu tehdy vyjádfiili zájem na vytvofiení „neformální konzultativní struktury“. Zpoãátku své existence deklarovalo sdruÏení orientaci na upevnûní nezávisl˘ch struktur a obchodní spolupráci. Zvlá‰tní místo bylo udûleno rozvoji Eurasijského koridoru Evropa–Kavkaz–Asie (TRACECA) na území zúãastnûn˘ch státÛ. V dal‰í fázi stála snaha o vytvofiení zóny volného obchodu podle vzoru podobn˘ch zón, napfi. EFTA nebo CEFTA.58

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Tuto koncepci pfiedloÏil napfiíklad uzbeck˘ expert Farhad Tolipov z Institutu strategick˘ch studií pfii prezidentu Karimovovi. Tolipov, F., The Expansion of CACO: A Russian offensive or a Central Asian Surrender? Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Vol. 5, No. 23, December 2004, s. 3–5. Vorob’jev V., TadÏikskij majdan. Putin ob»jasnil Rachmonovu, kak ne stat’ Akajevym. Rossijskaja gazeta. Российская газета, 7.4.2005. Ke srovnání potenciálÛ GUUAM a uveden˘ch uskupení viz napfiíklad Linott D., Oun L. E., GUUAM: Sogla‰enije o sozdanii zony svobodnoj torgovli (predvaritel’nyje itogi), Central’naja Azija i Kavkaz, No. 1 (25) 2003, s. 50–64.

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âlenské státy GUAMu také projevovaly své prozápadní postoje a snahu o vymanûní se z ruského zájmového orbitu, coÏ z nich ãinilo objekt zájmu USA. Protiruská rétorika byla tehdy blízká i Uzbekistánu, kter˘ se ke GUAMu pfiipojil na summitu NATO v dubnu 1999 ve Washingtonu. Uskupení zmûnilo název na GUUAM s oficiálnû deklarovanou podporou Spojen˘ch státÛ.59 Vstup Ta‰kentu do GUUAMu v‰ak celé jiÏ tak nesourodé uskupení je‰tû více rozãlenil. Podle oficiálního uzbeckého postoje byla hlavním motivem vstupu Uzbekistánu do GUUAM snaha o vytvofiení z hlediska Ta‰kentu efektivního dopravního koridoru, kter˘ byl na ostatní strany (Afghánistán, Írán, Kazachstán) velmi problematick˘.60 Autofii této koncepce v‰ak opomnûli dodat, Ïe Uzbekistán geograficky nesousedí s Ïádnou z ostatních zemí GUUAMu a na pozemní cestû ke Kaspickému mofii stojí kromû Kazachstánu i neménû problematick˘ Turkmenistán se svou nepfiedvídatelnou politikou. PfiestoÏe v pfiípadû tranzitu zboÏí bylo dosaÏeno urãitého zv˘‰ení efektivity dopravy, na pfievzetí oãekávan˘ch lukrativních tranzitÛ ve smûru v˘chodní Asie – Evropa GUUAM nemohl a nemÛÏe aspirovat. Nebyl dosud vytvofien jednotn˘ systém tarifÛ a celních pfiedpisÛ, zaji‰tûna bezpeãnost nákladÛ a dopravní infrastruktura je velmi nesourodá. Ve v‰ech tûchto faktorech TRACECA nemÛÏe konkurovat dal‰ím transasijsk˘m dopravním projektÛm (napfiíklad Transsibifiská magistrála). RovnûÏ ekonomick˘ v˘voj Uzbekistánu se v˘raznû odli‰oval od evropsk˘ch a kavkazsk˘ch ãlenÛ GUUAM, zejména kvÛli vysokému (i na postsovûtské pomûry) podílu státního dirigismu a pomalému pfiechou k trÏním (pfiípadnû alespoÀ k „pseudotrÏním“) vztahÛm. V geopolitickém mûfiítku v‰ak GUUAM mohl poslouÏit jako svého druhu protiváha vÛãi postupnû se formujícím kooperaãním uskupením v prostoru b˘valého Sovûtského svazu pod vedením Ruska – v ekonomické rovinû Eurasijskému ekonomickému spoleãenství (dfiíve Celní unie) a ve vojensko-bezpeãnostní rovinû Smlouvû o kolektivní bezpeãnosti. I proto

vyvolal vznik podobné skupiny státÛ v samotném Rusku rozporuplné reakce. Nûktefií analytikové ukazovali na v˘raznû protiruské zamûfiení ãlenÛ uskupení a zároveÀ varovali USA pfied vstupem do zájmové sféry Ruska. Stfiízlivûj‰í komentátofii v‰ak nacházeli celou fiadu nesourod˘ch prvkÛ mezi státy této kooperaãní skupiny.61 Ruskému vedení by proto v podstatû nevadila ekonomická forma spolupráce, av‰ak velmi negativnû by vnímalo pfiemûnu GUUAM na jakoukoli formu vojensko-politické aliance.62 Na‰tûstí pro Rusko se ukázalo, Ïe ãlenské státy GUUAMu nejsou schopny vytvofiit nûjakou hlub‰í a reálnû fungující strukturu. Problémem pro v˘raznûj‰í kooperaci, natoÏ pak integraci GUUAMu se staly rozdílné pfiístupy a oãekávání jednotliv˘ch státÛ ve vztahu k této organizaci.63 Potenciál pro ekonomickou spolupráci se ukázal jako velmi nízk˘ a navíc se projevila pokraãující silná závislost jednotliv˘ch státÛ na Rusku.64 Vojensko-politická sféra rovnûÏ odhalila rÛzné priority zahraniãnû-politického smûfiování, stejnû jako bezpeãnostních hrozeb.65 Zatímco v‰ak evropské a kavkazské státy se postavily za tûsnûj‰í spolupráci s NATO ãi EU, Uzbekistán udrÏoval po roce 2001 tûsnou vazbu na USA, aniÏ by v˘raznûji reflektoval vztahy s uveden˘mi dvûma organizacemi. RozrÛznûnost státu tak logicky vedla k neefektivitû sdruÏení a ambiciózní plány (vytvofiení spoleãn˘ch mírov˘ch sborÛ GUUAM, dohoda o zónû volného obchodu, rozvoj dopravní infrastruktury a dopravy ropy aj.) zÛstaly spí‰e na deklaratorní, maximálnû marginální úrovni je‰tû více, neÏ u ostatních skupin v eurasijském prostoru. Krátkou epizodu stfiedoasijské vûtve GUUAM Uzbekistán fakticky uzavfiel v ãervnu 2002 pozastavením svého ãlenství v organizaci a definitivní teãku za tímto angaÏmá uãinil 5. kvûtna 2005 prezident Karimov, kdyÏ na 61 62 63

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Statement of the Presidents of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and the Republic of Uzbekistan. Washington, 24 April 1999. http://www.guuam.org/doc/GUUAM.html [8. 10. 2004]. Gafarly M., Kasajev A. â., Uzbekskaja model’ razvitija: mir i stabil’nost’ – osnova progressa. Moskva 2000. s. 59–60.

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Konzultace autora s expertem Ruského institutu pro strategická studia (RISI) AdÏarem A‰iroviãem Kurtovem v dubnu 2004. Napfiíklad v˘rok prvního námûstka ruského ministra zahraniãí V. Trubnikova. Minasjan S., Formirovanije sistemy kollektivnoj bezopasnosti SNG. Central’naja Azija i Kavkaz, No. 1 (25), 2003, s. 154. Pirozhkov, S.,CIS Integration in the Global and Regional Context. Central Asia and The Caucasus, No. 4 (10), 2001, s. 13. Linott, Oun, cit. dílo. s. 61. Latawski, P. C., Limits of Diversity in the Post-Soviet Space: CIS & GUUAM. Security in the Black Sea Rregion: Perspectives & Priorities. Conflict Studies Research Center, 2001, s. 84.

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summitu v Ki‰inûvû ohlásil definitivní vystoupení Ta‰kentu z této organizace. Souãasné pokusy o reanimaci této organizace z iniciativy Ukrajiny a Gruzie jiÏ Uzbekistán nemohl akceptovat z hlediska rozdílného charakteru reÏimu.66 Lze pfiedpokládat, Ïe demokratizaãní tendence na Ukrajinû, Gruzii ãi v Moldavsku, stejnû jako posilování rusko-uzbeckého partnerství (zároveÀ s ochlazováním americko-uzbeck˘ch vztahÛ) nemohlo dlouhodobû Uzbekistán udrÏet v podobném uskupení. Závûr Integraãní a kooperaãní procesy ve Stfiední Asii lze klasifikovat pfiedev‰ím jako proruské, tj. s pfiímou úãastí Ruska (JevrAzES, ODKB, ·OS) nebo alespoÀ pod vlivem Ruska (donedávna Organizace Stfiedoasijská spolupráce). Do proruského orbitu proto spadají pfiedev‰ím státy, které jsou ãleny tûchto organizací – tj. Kazachstán, Kyrgyzstán a TádÏikistán. Protirusk˘ element se projevoval v regionu pouze v dobû stejného zamûfiení uzbecké zahraniãní politiky, a to ãlenstvím v GUUAMu. Tento element v‰ak vymizel nejprve formálnû pozastavením ãlenství a pozdûji i reáln˘m odchodem Uzbekistánu z tohoto uskupení, jakoÏ i pfiehodnocením uzbecké zahraniãní politiky v prÛbûhu let 2003–2005. Z hlediska funkãnosti je nutno pfiedev‰ím rozli‰it organizace, které jsou schopny vyvíjet alespoÀ minimální aktivitu na mnohostranné úrovni. K takov˘m patfií napfiíklad ·OS ãi ODKB a ãásteãnû JevrAzES. Na druhé stranû za prakticky formální a nefunkãní lze oznaãit pfiedev‰ím GUUAM, stejnû jako Organizace Stfiedoasijská spolupráce. Je pfiíznaãné, Ïe právû tyto organizace jako první zmizely z integraãní mapy stfiedoasijského prostoru. V ekonomické rovinû Ïádné z analyzovan˘ch uskupení nedokázalo zastavit pomalej‰í ãi rychlej‰í pokles vzájemného obchodu na mnohostranné úrovni. Tyto otázky se v reálné rovinû fie‰í pfiedev‰ím na dvoustranné úrovni mezi Ruskem a jednotliv˘mi státy. Mnohem více se (zvlá‰tû od roku 2003 aÏ 2004) prosazují bezpeãnostní témata (napfi. terorismus). Ta se sice na66

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Jedná se o iniciativu prezidentÛ Ju‰ãenka a Saaka‰viliho na podporu demokratizaãních procesÛ ve v˘chodní Evropû – tzv. SdruÏení demokratické volby, které bylo slavnostnû vyhlá‰eno v Kyjevû v prosinci 2005 a jehoÏ cíle zÛstávají prozatím velmi mlhavé.

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dále vyuÏívají spí‰e pro domácí potfiebu a i na summitech jednotliv˘ch skupin vût‰inou rétorika daleko pfiekraãuje reálné moÏnosti, pfiesto se projevuje vût‰í vÛle k urãit˘m spoleãn˘m akcím. I z tohoto dÛvodu je akceschopnost bezpeãnostních organizací typu DKB, ·OS daleko efektivnûj‰í neÏ uskupení postaven˘ch na ekonomickém základu. V dokumentech se ãasto pfiipomíná nutnost velmi postupného pfiechodu k integraci podle moÏností jednotliv˘ch státÛ pfiíslu‰ného uskupení.67 Podobná vyjádfiení v‰ak posilují vágnost integrace a nedodrÏování vytyãení stanoven˘ch cílÛ jednotliv˘mi státy. Nûkteré iniciativy se potom do znaãné míry pfiekr˘vají (ODKB-·OS nebo JevrazES-CAS), aÈ jiÏ z hlediska cílÛ nebo ãlensk˘ch státÛ.68 Tento faktor rovnûÏ znaãnou mûrou pfiispívá k nesourodosti a problematiãnosti jednotliv˘ch pokusÛ o zaloÏení jakékoli integraãní a kooperaãní struktury. V˘sledkem je tedy stav, kdy jsou vytváfieny, roz‰ifiovány a „prohlubovány“ vazby, nebo se alespoÀ navenek podobná integrace okázale demonstruje na ãetn˘ch schÛzkách jednotliv˘ch summitech. Jejich reálná efektivita a fungování jsou pfiitom velmi problematické. Integrace a kooperace ve Stfiední Asii se nachází v jisté schizofrenní situaci. Na jedné stranû stojí nutnost zapojení jednotliv˘ch státÛ do urãit˘ch struktur z ekonomick˘ch a bezpeãnostních dÛvodÛ. Na druhé stranû se ãlenské státy jednotliv˘ch uskupení stále více snaÏí pronikat do mezinárodních systémÛ (napfiíklad vstup Kyrgyzstánu do WTO), ãímÏ jsou nuceny popírat jiÏ dohodnuté smlouvy. Specifick˘m pfiípadem z hlediska integrace (ãi spí‰e neintegrace) je Turkmenistán, jehoÏ tzv. „neutrální“ politika se vyh˘bá úãasti na v‰ech kooperaãních pokusech, aÈ jiÏ úspû‰n˘ch, nebo neúspû‰n˘ch. Av‰ak ani ostatní stfiedoasijské státy ukázaly svou neschopnost fie‰it své problémy ve vnitfiních vztazích pomocí mnohostranné kooperace. Ostatnû, totéÏ lze fiíci i o velké ãásti dvoustrann˘ch vztahÛ ve Stfiední Asii, zvlá‰tû v pfiípadû Uzbekistánu. Bez pfiítomnosti Ruska se jakékoliv uskupení prozatím ukázalo jako zcela neefektivní, coÏ pouze posiluje postavení Moskvy v regionu.

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Alimov R. M. (ed.), Central’naja Azija: geoekonomika, geopolitika i bezopasnost’. Ta‰kent 2002, s. 61. Kosikova L., Nesostojav‰ajasja integracija, ili poãemu ne udajetsja ob»jedinit’ strany SNG. Mir peremen, No. 1, 2004, s. 108–122.

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I formální podepsané závazky se mohou potenciálnû stát jedním z nástrojÛ nátlaku Ruska na své stfiedoasijské partnery, av‰ak není zfiejmé, zda by dvoustranná spolupráce pfiípadnû nátlak na jednotlivé zemû zvlá‰È nebyly efektivnûj‰í. Na druhé stranû existence uskupení státÛ vytváfií pfiedpoklad, Ïe pfiípadné konflikty mezi státy budou fie‰eny v˘hradnû mírovou cestou.

12. Kazachstán: anal˘za vnitropolitického v˘voje po roce 19911 Jan ·ír

Mezinárodní kontext Kazachstán zaujímá dÛleÏité geostrategické postavení mezi Ruskem, âínou a pásmem k islámskému svûtu tíhnoucích novû nezávisl˘ch státÛ tzv. jiÏního kfiídla b˘valého Sovûtského svazu v centrální ãásti eurasijského kontinentu. Rozprostírá se v severní ãásti Stfiední Asie, na ob‰írn˘ch pláních táhnoucích se od kaspické níÏiny pfii dolním toku Volhy na západû po podhÛfií Altaje na v˘chodû a od západosibifiské níÏiny na severu po pou‰È Kyzyl-kum a masiv Ëan-‰an na jihu a jihov˘chodû. Více neÏ polovinu jeho území pokr˘vají pou‰tû a polopou‰tû, pfies ãtvrtinu území pak tvofií stepi. Na severu Kazachstán hraniãí s Ruskem (délka spoleãné hranice ãiní 6846 km), na v˘chodû a jihov˘chodû s âínou (1533 km) a dále na jihu s Kyrgyzstánem (1051 km), Uzbekistánem (2203 km) a Turkmenistánem (379 km). Na západû má pfiístup ke Kaspickému mofii (délka pobfieÏní linie 1894 km). S rozlohou celkem 2 717 300 km2 je Kazachstán vÛbec nejvût‰í zemí stfiedoasijského regionu. Pro svou polohu a rozlohu, s územím osvojen˘m pouze na periferii, zásoby nerostného bohatství, vãetnû ropy, zemního plynu, barevn˘ch kovÛ ãi uranu, jakoÏ i populaci, identifikující se zãásti s jin˘mi národními celky, je Kazachstán potenciálnû nejzranitel-

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Studie byla pÛvodnû zpracována v rámci v˘zkumného grantu ministerstva zahraniãních vûcí âeské republiky ã. RB 15/6/02 „Spoleãensko-politick˘ v˘voj v postsovûtsk˘ch republikách Stfiední Asie v mezinárodním kontextu“. Autor vyjadfiuje tímto svÛj dík zadavateli grantu za laskavou finanãní podporu, jakoÏ i za souhlas s publikací dílãích v˘sledkÛ projektu. Data odráÏejí stav vûcí k lednu 2003.

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nûj‰ím státem regionu; jeho destabilizace a kolaps mohou mít dalekosáhlé mezinárodní dÛsledky.2 Pfiedmûtem mezinárodního zájmu se Kazachstán stal jiÏ se vznikem státu v roce 1991. DÛvodem tehdy byla znaãná bezpeãnostní (proliferaãní a destabilizaãní) rizika související s faktem dislokace zbraní hromadného niãení b˘valého Sovûtského svazu na území této nové stfiedoasijské republiky. V dÛsledku rozpadu Sovûtského svazu Kazachstán totiÏ zdûdil arzenál 104 mezikontinentálních balistick˘ch stfiel, vyzbrojen˘ch celkem 1040 samostatnû navádûn˘mi bojov˘mi hlavicemi, 40 strategick˘ch bombardérÛ, schopn˘ch nést aÏ 370 stfiel s plochou drahou letu, jakoÏ i blíÏe neurãen˘ poãet jadern˘ch zbraní taktického urãení, a mohl se tak v pfiípadû pfievzetí operaãní kontroly tûchto zbraní zafiadit po bok nejvût‰ích jadern˘ch mocností na svûtû.3 V následujících letech se Kazachstán, navzdory snahám tehdej‰ího vedení o protahování procesu odzbrojení s cílem vytûÏit z faktu dislokace jadern˘ch zbraní na území státu nûkteré finanãní dividendy, pod spoleãn˘m rusko-americk˘m tlakem tûchto zbraní zfiekl. Problémy spojené s nûkdej‰ím zbrojním programem na území republiky (brain-drain, nelegální obchod se ‰tûpn˘m materiálem) nicménû pfietrvávají.4

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K a z a c h s t á n : a n a l ˘ z a v n i t r o p o l i t i c k é h o v ˘ v o j e p o r o c e 1 9 9 1]

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CIA. The World Factbook 2002. Kazakhstan. URL [21. 2. 2003]. S ohledem na prÛbûh delimitace a demarkace státních hranic Kazachstánu mohou b˘t pfiíslu‰ná data je‰tû korigována. Viz také Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia. Charles Fairbanks, C. Richard Nelson, S. Frederick Starr, Kenneth Weisbrode. The Atlantic Council of the United States. Central Asia – Caucasus Institute, SAIS, January 2001, pp. 33–35; Zatulin K., Grozin A. V., Chljupin V. N., Nacional’naja bezopasnost’ Kazachstana. Problemy i perspektivy. Moskva: Institut stran SNG, 1998, s. 6–13. Perspektiva zrodu nestabilního nacionalizujícího (islamizujícího) se státu se zbranûmi hromadného niãení v tomto exponovaném regionu logicky alarmovala svûtové spoleãenství. Data podle Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union. Status Report on Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and Export Controls, No. 5 / March 1998, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, in cooperation with the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA, p. 10. (Jedná se o data stanovovaná podle kalkulaãních pravidel pro úãely smlouvy START.) K sovûtskému bakteriologickému programu na území Kazachstánu blíÏe viz Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, Dastan Yeleukenov: Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present, and Future. Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 1999 (Occasional Paper No. 1). K problematice jadern˘ch zbraní v Kazachstánu (kaza‰sk˘ pohled) Laumulin M., Kazachstan v sovremennych meÏdunarodnych otno‰enijach: bezopasnost’, geopolitika. Politologija. Almaty: Kazachstanskij institut strategiãeskich issledovanij pri Prezidente Respubliki Kazachstan. Informacionnoanalitiãeskij centr Kontinent, 2000, s. 142–160.

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Pro zaji‰tûní ekonomické nezávislosti státu, s ohledem na bohatá loÏiska ropy a zemního plynu, která si Kazachstán nárokuje, má zvlá‰tní v˘znam zpfiístupÀování energetick˘ch surovin v bazénu Kaspického mofie. Tato problematika zahrnuje zejména dva okruhy otázek: 1) otázku koneãného urãení statutu mofie ve smyslu úmluvy OSN o mofiském právu z roku 1982 (kondominium vs. delimitace ‰elfu na národní sektory s v˘luãn˘mi právy toho kterého státu na exploataci pfiírodních zdrojÛ na mofiském dnû a v jeho hlubinách v hranicích daného sektoru); 2) otázku smûfiování budoucích produktovodÛ (otázku diverzifikace exportních cest), z hlediska energetické bezpeãnosti Kazachstánu – od vymezení kaza‰ského sektoru mofie, vãetnû práv na vyuÏívání dfiíve sporn˘ch ropn˘ch polí, s pfiilehl˘mi státy v 90. letech – v souãasnosti klíãovou. Zprovoznûním ropovodu Caspian Pipeline Consortium z nalezi‰tû v Tengizu do ruského terminálu v Novorossijsku na bfiezích âerného mofie v roce 2001, zaji‰Èujícím první pfiím˘ pfiístup Kazachstánu na svûtové trhy ropy nezávisle na kaÏdoroãnû pfiidûlovan˘ch kvótách pro pouÏití rusk˘ch potrubních systémÛ, se jiÏ zdají b˘t exportní potfieby Kazachstánu v oblasti pfiepravy ropy kapacitnû pokryty na nûkolik let dopfiedu. Závislost Kazachstánu v transportní sféfie na Rusku tím v‰ak do budoucna prolomena nebyla.5 SloÏité geopolitické a geoekonomické postavení státu (tûsná provázanost s ostatními postsovûtsk˘mi republikami, vãetnû Ruska) zavazuje Kazachstán k aktivnímu pÛsobení na mezinárodní scénû. Zahraniãní politika Kazachstánu má proto dÛleÏitou regionální dimenzi v podobû participace státu na nejv˘znamnûj‰ích kooperaãních projektech v prostoru b˘valého Sovûtského svazu.6 Kazachstán se povaÏuje za souãást tzv. uωího integraãního jádra Spoleãenství nezávisl˘ch státÛ. Úmûrnû postupujícímu pfierodu spoleãenství od pÛvodnû dysfunkãní k dnes jiÏ irelevantní struktufie nicménû relativnû vzrÛstá v˘znam regionálnû funkcionálních uskupení v rámci SNS. V hospodáfiské oblasti se hlavní strukturou tohoto druhu mezitím stalo Eurasijské ekonomické spoleãenství. Ve vojensko-politické sféfie pak tuto funkci plní Smlouva o kolektivní bezpeãnosti, podepfiená v pfiípadû Kazachstánu bilate-

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K problematice produkce a pfiepravy energetick˘ch surovin viz studii Bohuslava Litery „Ropa a zemní plyn v oblasti Kaspického mofie“ v tomto svazku. K problematice regionální spolupráce viz studii Slavomíra Horáka „Integrace a dezintegrace v postsovûtské Stfiední Asii“ v tomto svazku.

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rálními smlouvami o vzájemném poskytnutí pomoci a o spolupráci v dané oblasti s Ruskem. Zatímco z pohledu Moskvy mají integraãní a kooperaãní struktury v postsovûtském prostoru slouÏit v prvé fiadû ke konzervaci dfiívûj‰ího vlivu metropole ve státech na její periferii, z pohledu Astany je ãinnost Kazachstánu v rámci tûchto struktur za úãasti Ruska (pod jeho vedením) v˘razem spí‰e snahy zasadit tytéÏ reálnû existující vztahy a vazby do smluvnû právního rámce a vtisknout jim více civilizovanou podobu. V osobû prezidenta Nazarbajeva Kazachstán vyniká nespoãtem zahraniãnû politick˘ch iniciativ regionálního i globálního dosahu, aÈ jiÏ to byla idea zaloÏení tzv. Eurasijského svazu z roku 1994, Svazu zemí centrálního meridiánu Eurasie (1996), popfi. snahy kaza‰ského prezidenta vystupovat v roli prostfiedníka napfi. v arménsko-ázerbajdÏánském (1991), ãeãenském (1996) nebo tádÏickém konfliktu (1996/97). S pfiíznivou odezvou v zahraniãí se ale setkala snad pouze my‰lenka svolání tzv. Konference o interakci a opatfieních na posílení dÛvûry v Asii. Iniciativa byla pÛvodnû pfiednesena u pfiíleÏitosti 47. zasedání VS OSN v New Yorku 5. fiíjna 1992; a její podstata spoãívá oficiálnû ve vytvofiení efektivního mechanismu preventivní diplomacie na asijském kontinentu, kde na rozdíl od ostatních ãástí svûta není podobn˘ mechanismus dodnes funkãní.7 Vedle v˘razné ideologické komponenty (koncepce „eurasijského mostu“, spojujícího kulturnû civilizaãní okruhy evropského Ruska, islámského pÛlmûsíce a asijsko-pacifického regionu, s centrem v Astanû) mají ve‰keré zahraniãnû politické iniciativy Kazachstánu zfiejm˘ propagandistick˘ cíl, jímÏ je budování image kaza‰ského prezidenta coby konstruktivního státníka a mírotvÛrce mezinárodního formátu ve svûtle prohlubující se neschopnosti ãi nedostatku vÛle dostát vlastním závazkÛm v oblasti demokratizace a lidsk˘ch práv. Jakkoli nejv˘znamnûj‰í bezpeãnostní hrozby Kazachstánu se momentálnû ukr˘vají pravdûpodobnû uvnitfi republiky samotné (nárÛst sociálního a etnického napûtí v dÛsledku nezvládnuté postkomunistické transformace, korupce, prorÛstání státních a kriminálních struktur), dÛleÏit˘ v˘znam pro dal‰í v˘voj Kazachstánu bude mít politika velmocí v regionu, zvlá‰tû pak sousedních, Ruska a âíny. 7

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K historii ideje svolání konference, vãetnû pfietisku relevantních dokumentÛ, do prvního summitu v ãervnu 2002 oficiálnû viz KoÏichov A. G., SVMDA: voprosy i otvety (spravoãnik). Pod redakcijej Sultanova B. K. Almaty: Centr vne‰nej politiki i analiza, 2001.

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Sociální struktura Ze zemí stfiedoasijského regionu má Kazachstán pravdûpodobnû nejsloÏitûj‰í etnickou strukturu. Ta je charakterizována jednak znaãnou rozdrobeností (celkem je na území státu registrováno na 120 národností), jednak relativnû vÛbec nejniωím poãtem pfiíslu‰níkÛ titulárního etnika, a tím i nejvy‰‰ím podílem nepÛvodního (koloniálního) obyvatelstva. K momentu vzniku státu v roce 1991 nemûla v Kazachstánu Ïádná etnická skupina ani absolutní vût‰inu. Vlivem exodu evropsk˘ch národÛ pak podle v˘sledkÛ posledního sãítání lidu v roce 1999 z celkem 14 953 tisíc obyvatel Kazachstánu pfiedstavovali etniãtí Kaza‰i jiÏ s 53,4 % populace vût‰inu, následováni skupinou RusÛ (30,0 %) a dále men‰inami UkrajincÛ (3,7 %), UzbekÛ (2,5 %), NûmcÛ (2,4 %), TatarÛ (1,7 %), UjgurÛ (1,1 %), BûlorusÛ (0,7 %), KorejcÛ (0,7 %) a jin˘ch národností.8 Spoleãnost je v‰ak nadále spí‰e rozdûlena podél etno-kulturních linií na pÛvodní asijskou (turkickou, zpravidla kaza‰skou) a na evropskou (slovanskou, rusofonní) ãást. Situaci komplikuje fakt, Ïe státní jazyk (tj. kaza‰tinu) uvádí jako svou matefi‰tinu, resp. první, nejsnáze zvládnuteln˘ jazyk, ménû neÏ 40 % populace, tedy zdaleka ne ani v‰ichni obãané Kazachstánu, ktefií se hlásí ke kaza‰ské národnosti, a naopak Ïe mezi netitulárními národy se kaza‰tina prakticky nepouÏívá, zatímco ru‰tinu minimálnû jako druh˘ jazyk ovládá drtivá vût‰ina obyvatel. V teritoriálním ohledu (centrum vs. periferie) má Kazachstán neménû problematickou strukturu. Atypicky se totiÏ rozpadá na pût rozdíln˘ch, „rozbíhajících se“ okrajov˘ch regionÛ (v˘raznû ãasto tíhnoucích k dynamicky se rozvíjejícím mocnûj‰ím sousedÛm za hranicemi státu), které jsou navzájem oddûleny geografick˘m centrem, jehoÏ demografické, ekonomicko-ekologické nebo klimaticko-komunikaãní parametry neodpovídají funkci geopolitického jádra státu. Území stfiedního Kazachstánu (pfiibliÏnû vymezené jako plocha trojúhelníka Alma-Ata–Semipalatinsk–AkÈubinsk) je jen fiídce osídleno, minimálnû urbanizováno, aÏ na v˘jimky se zde nenacházejí jednotky progresivních odvûtví ekonomiky, vybudována není ani dopravní infrastruktura. Stávající komunikaãní tepny, spojující centrum 76

Kazachstán je téÏ jako jedin˘ z novû nezávisl˘ch státÛ stfiedoasijského regionu domovem skromné ãeské diaspory. Jedná se cca. o tisícovku osob, soustfiedûnou pfieváÏnû v akÈubinské oblasti.

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Tabulka ã. 1: Národnostní sloÏení Republiky Kazachstán Poãet v roce1999 (v tis.)

Populace celkem

Podíl na celkové populaci v roce 1999 (v %)

Poãet v roce 1989 (v tis.)

Podíl PfiírÛstek PfiírÛstek na celkové v období v období populaci 1989–1999 1989–1999 v roce (v tis.) 1989 (v %)

14953,1

100

16199,1

100

-1246,0

-7,7

Kaza‰i

7985,0

53,4

6496,9

40,1

1488,2

22,9

Rusové

4479,6

30,0

6062,0

37,4

-1582,4

-26,1

547,1

3,7

875,7

5,4

-328,6

-37,5

to periferní postavení) centra tak vytváfií podmínky pro posilování odstfiediv˘ch tendencí, coÏ v pfiípadû destabilizace celospoleãenské situace (nárÛst etnického napûtí) mÛÏe vést k dezintegraci Kazachstánu podle regionálního pfiíznaku s „územím nikoho“ uprostfied. Tabulka ã. 2: Regionální ãlenûní Republiky Kazachstán Region

Administrativnû teritoriální vymezení

Západ

akÈubinská, atyrauská a mangy‰lacká oblast, oblast západního Kazachstánu

Pou‰tní reliéf, suché klima, deficit vody, ekologické zatíÏení v dÛsledku v˘kyvÛ hladiny Kaspického mofie. ¤ídké osídlení, nízk˘ stupeÀ urbanizace. Primitivní formy zemûdûlství (pastevectví), tûÏba ropy v oblasti Kaspiku. S ohledem na surovinov˘ charakter ekonomiky region tíhne k evropské ãásti Ruska, aãkoli v etnickém plánu pfievládají Kaza‰i.

Sever

kustanajská (severní ãást) a pavlodarská oblast, oblast severního Kazachstánu

Ekologicky ãist˘ region. Pásmo lesostepí, fiek, jezer, hor. Relativnû vysoká hustota zalidnûní, vysok˘ stupeÀ urbanizace. Moderní formy zemûdûlství (celiny), rozvûtvená síÈ podnikÛ tûÏebního i zpracovatelského prÛmyslu, vyspûlá dopravní infrastruktura. V etnickém plánu pfievaha RusÛ, zvlá‰tû ve mûstech. S ohledem na tûsné propojení s pfiilehl˘mi oblastmi západní Sibifie region v˘raznû tíhne k Rusku.

Jih

dÏambulská a kyzylordská oblast, oblast jiÏního Kazachstánu

Nejménû vyspûl˘ region Kazachstánu. Nehostinné podmínky pro Ïivot (pou‰È, ekologická katastrofa Aralského mofie). Monokulturní zemûdûlství (bavlna), minimum zpracovatelského prÛmyslu. Relativnû vysoká hustota obyvatel podél hranic s Uzbekistánem, známky agrárního pfielidnûní. V etnickém plánu dominují Kaza‰i. Celkov˘ sociálnû-ekonomick˘ profil regionu obdobn˘ jako v pfiilehl˘ch oblastech Uzbekistánu.

z toho:

Ukrajinci Uzbekové

370,7

2,5

331,0

2,0

39,6

12,0

Nûmci

353,4

2,4

946,9

5,8

-593,4

-62,7

Tatafii

249,0

1,7

320,7

2,0

-71,8

-22,4

Ujgufii

210,3

1,4

181,5

1,1

28,8

15,9

Bûlorusové

111,9

0,7

177,9

1,1

-66,0

-37,1

Korejci

99,7

0,7

100,7

0,6

-1,1

-1,1

Ázerové

78,3

0,5

89,0

0,5

-10,7

-12,0

Ostatní

468,1

3,0

616,8

4,0

Zdroj: Oficiální data národního statistického úfiadu Republiky Kazachstán. O ãislennosti, razme‰ãenii i nacional’nom sostave naselenija Respubliki Kazachstan. URL [25. 4. 2002].

s okrajov˘mi oblastmi, protínají strategické základny cizích státÛ (Bajkonur, Sary-·agan). Obdobnû nepfiízniv˘ stav Ïivotního prostfiedí, spolu s drsn˘m klimatem, místy i nedostatkem vody, ãiní perspektivy moÏného osvojení a dal‰ího rozvoje centrálních oblastí diskutabilní.9 Slabost (de fac9

V administrativnû teritoriálním vyjádfiení toto vymezení stfiedního Kazachstánu zahrnuje zhruba území akmolské, vãetnû hlavního mûsta Astany, karagandské a jiÏní ãásti kustanajské administrativní oblasti.

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Charakteristika

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Region

Administrativnû teritoriální vymezení

Jihov˘chod

almaatská oblast, vãetnû mûsta republikového v˘znamu Alma-Aty

Finanãní a obchodní centrum Kazachstánu (Alma-Ata). Území osvojeno s ohledem na klimatické podmínky v pfiedhÛfií Ala-tau, smûrem do vnitrozemí hustota zalidnûní slábne. V etnickém plánu nadále patrna mírná pfievaha RusÛ ve mûstech, venkov kaza‰sk˘. Ekonomicky, ale i stále zfietelnûji geopoliticky je region pfiitahován k âínû.

V˘chod

oblast v˘chodního Kazachstánu

Pásmo ekologického zamofiení v dÛsledku sovûtského jaderného programu (semipalatinsk˘ polygon). V etnickém plánu pfievaha RusÛ ve mûstech, venkov kaza‰sk˘. Celková geopolitická orientace regionu dosud nevyhranûna, aãkoli nejvíce zalidnûné, prÛmyslovû vyspûlé pravobfieÏí Irty‰e tíhne spí‰e k Rusku.

Charakteristika

Zdroj: Vlastní tabulka na základû vymezení regionÛ podle Masanov N., Nacional’no-gosudarstvennoje stroitel’stvo v Kazachstane: analiz i prognoz. Vestnik Jevrazii/Acta Eurasica, No. 1, 1995, s. 117–128.

Kaza‰ské etnikum je navíc tradiãnû rozdûleno do tfií hlavních, vnitfinû dále znaãnû diferencovan˘ch a hierarchizovan˘ch kmenÛ ãi rodov˘ch svazÛ a skupin, tzv. ÏuzÛ (nebo také hord, ztotoÏÀovan˘ch dfiíve s chanáty). A sice na Ulu-Ïuz (tj. Star‰í neboli Velik˘ Ïuz), zaujímající pÛvodnû oblasti jiÏního a jihov˘chodního Kazachstánu; na Orta-Ïuz (Stfiední Ïuz), ob˘vající pfieváÏnû oblasti stfiedního, severního a v˘chodního Kazachstánu; a na Ki‰i-Ïuz (Mlad‰í neboli Mal˘ Ïuz), usadiv‰í se pfiedev‰ím v krajích na západû dne‰ního Kazachstánu. V dÛsledku dfiívûj‰ího pfiivtûlení kaza‰sk˘ch chanátÛ k Rusku, a tím i relativnû brzkého zahájení modernizaãních procesÛ (usazování koãovn˘ch pastevcÛ a zakládání mûst), urychlovan˘ch aÏ do 60. let 20. století masivní evropskou kolonizací, jiÏ nemusejí b˘t pozÛstatky patriarchálního zfiízení v Kazachstánu zcela zfietelné. Vûdomí rodové pfiíslu‰nosti nicménû zÛstává dodnes v mentalitû zejména venkovského obyvatelstva hluboce zakofienûno a má stále vliv na osobní rozhodování, potaÏmo na pfiístup jednotlivce ke zdrojÛm, vãetnû mocensk˘ch. Mimo

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tradiãní genealogii stojí pfiíslu‰níci dvou poãetnû mal˘ch, leã historicky privilegovan˘ch stavÛ Tore a KoÏa, povaÏovan˘ch za pfiímé potomky âingischána, resp. ArabÛ, ktefií pfiinesli do kaza‰sk˘ch stepí islám, a ztûlesÀujících tím aÏ do ruské revoluce politickou, resp. duchovní elitu národa.10 Na úrovni elit lze péãí osoby souãasné hlavy státu zaznamenat nadmûrné zastoupení KazachÛ z fiad Star‰ího Ïuzu. Poãátek jejich nadvlády se datuje k nástupu dlouholetého pfiedchÛdce Nursultana Nazarbajeva ve funkci prvního tajemníka republikové komunistické strany a Nazarbajevova pfiíbuzného (patrona) Dinmuchameda Kunajeva v polovinû 60. let.11 V dÛsledku ‰iroké reprezentace pfiedstavitelÛ slovansk˘ch etnik (ti plnili v strukturách sovûtského Kazachstánu jistou neutralizaãní a zvlá‰tû kontrolní funkci Moskvy) byl v‰ak klanov˘ faktor potlaãen. S rozpadem Sovûtského svazu se tato situace zmûnila. Emancipace Kazachstánu na svazovém centru pfiinesla záhy odstranûní v‰ech „nekaza‰sk˘ch“ elementÛ z klíãov˘ch rozhodovacích procesÛ. S posilováním etnokratické komponenty reÏimu dochází i k znovuoÏivení vnitrokaza‰ské (Ïuzové) rivality. K upevnûní sv˘ch pozic neváhala stávající nomenklatura sáhnout ani k nûkter˘m ménû standardním opatfiením, jako je pfiestûhování hlavního mûsta Kazachstánu z jiÏní metropole Alma-Aty do centrálnû poloÏené Astany.12 Opatfiení je dlouhodobû spojeno s financováním megalomansk˘ch architektonickourbanizaãních projektÛ na zelené louce a vedle geopolitick˘ch aspektÛ tohoto kroku (potvrzení kontroly centra vÛãi potenciálnû separatistick˘m

10

11 12

Z novûj‰ích prací k tradiãní stratifikaci kaza‰ské spoleãnosti podrobnû viz napfi. Jerofejeva I., Charakter, sostav i struktura pravja‰ãej elity koãevogo ob‰ãestva, in Amrekulov N., Jerofejeva I., Ismagambetov T., Istoriãeskij genezis, struktura i osnovnyje orientacii kazachskogo istabli‰menta. Rabota vypolnena pri podderÏke Research Support Scheme of the OSI/HESP, grant No. 487/1996. Almaty 1997, s. 3–35; Istorija Kazachstana: narody i kul’tury: uãebnoje posobije. Masanov N. E. i dr. Almaty: DaikPress, 2001, s. 10–190. O genetick˘ch pfiedpokladech „mladého a energického komunisty“ Nazarbajeva pro strm˘ kariérní vzestup vypovídají i Kunajevovy pamûti. Kunajev D., Ot Stalina do Gorbaãeva. Almaty: Sanat, 1994. Astana, do roku 1998 Akmola, pÛvodnû ruská pevnost Akmolinsk, zaloÏená roku 1832, v letech 1961–1992 Celinograd. Hlavním mûstem Kazachstánu byla Akmola definitivnû urãena s platností od 10. prosince 1997 na základû v˘nosu prezidenta republiky O prohlá‰ení mûsta Akmoly za hlavní mûsto Republiky Kazachstán z 20. fiíjna 1997. Slavnostní prezentace nové metropole, jiÏ pod jejím souãasn˘m, politicky korektním názvem Astana („Hlavní mûsto“), byla pak uspofiádána 10. ãervna 1998. V roce 1999 mûla Astana podle oficiálních údajÛ cca. 313 tisíc obyvatel.

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regionÛm „ruského“ severu a na ropu bohat˘ch západních oblastí státu) mohlo mít mj. za cíl roz‰ífiení teritoria osídlení Star‰ího Ïuzu na úkor konkurenãních skupin.13 S pokraãující koncentrací ve‰keré moci v rukou prezidenta Nazarbajeva lze na úrovni elit pozorovat dal‰í redukování základny reÏimu aÏ na uωí klientelní spoleãenství se znaky tribalismu (obsazování nejv˘znamnûj‰ích postÛ ve státû prezidentov˘mi nejbliωími rodinn˘mi pfiíslu‰níky a pfiíbuzn˘mi, vãetnû pokrevních) v ryze nepotické podobû. Seznam ã. 1: âlenové vládnoucí rodiny v Kazachstánu (v˘bûr) Nursultan Abi‰eviã Nazarbajev (nar. 1940). Prezident Republiky Kazachstán (od roku 1990). Hlava státu. Dfiíve ãlen politbyra ústfiedního v˘boru komunistické strany SSSR (1991), první tajemník komunistické strany Kaza‰ské SSR (1989–1991), pfiedseda Nejvy‰‰ího sovûtu Kaza‰ské SSR (1990), pfiedseda republikové rady ministrÛ (1984–1989). Hlava rodiny, jejíÏ úhrnné jmûní je podle rÛzn˘ch odhadÛ vyãíslováno v fiádech desítek miliard USD. Oficiální zfiizovatel mnoha mimorozpoãtov˘ch fondÛ (Nacionalnyj fond Respubliki Kazachstan, MeÏdunarodnyj fond razvitija Kazachstana). Neoficiálnû znám také nûkter˘mi soukrom˘mi investiãními projekty, napfi. v oblasti ropného prÛmyslu (terminál v Novorossijsku, ruské rozvodné sítû TransnûfÈ aj.). Lond˘nsk˘mi The Guardian z 3. bfiezna 1998 poãítán mezi osmiãku nejbohat‰ích lidí planety. Ústfiední postava mezinárodního kriminálního skandálu Kazakhgate. Sara Alpysovna Nazarbajeva (nar. 1941). ManÏelka Nursultana Nazarbajeva. První dáma. Zakladatelka a od roku 1992 pfiedsedkynû nejbohat‰ího oficiálnû vefiejnû prospû‰ného fondu v Kazachstánu Bobek (Dítû), jehoÏ prostfiednictvím mohou úspû‰ní zahraniãní investofii v této stfiedoasijské republice pfiispívat mj. na dobroãinné úãely.

13

Masanov N., Kazachskaja politiãeskaja i intellektual’naja elita: klanovaja prinadleÏnost’ i vnutrietniãeskoje soperniãestvo. Vestnik Jevrazii/Acta Eurasica, No. 1 (2), 1996, s. 46–61. Viz také Amrekulov N., Post-sovetskaja pravja‰ãaja elita, in Amrekulov, Jerofejeva, Ismagambetov, cit. dílo, s. 58–77. Vybûr dobového tisku na téma stûhování hlavního mûsta Kazachstánu, vãetnû pfietisku relevantních právních aktÛ, viz sborník Perenos stolicy Kazachstana v zerkale pressy i kommentarijach analitikov. Moskva: MeÏdisciplinarnyj centr Volchonka 14, Informacionno-analitiãeskij centr Jevrazija, 1998.

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Dariga Nursultanovna Nazarbajeva (nar. 1963). Nejstar‰í dcera (údajnû) Nursultana Nazarbajeva. MoÏná pretendentka na prezidentské nástupnictví. Od roku 1994 generální fieditelka pÛvodnû státního mediálního impéria Chabar, které slouÏí jako úãinn˘ nástroj udrÏení propagandisticko-ideologické kontroly stávajícího reÏimu nad spoleãností. Díky pfiedsednictví ve fondu Kazachstanskaja reklama má také vÛdãí postavení na kaza‰ském reklamním trhu. Dále ãlenka národní komise RK pro otázky UNESCO. Pfiedsedkynû federace sportovní gymnastiky RK. Zakladatelka a pfiedsedkynû oficiálnû vefiejnû prospû‰ného fondu na obranu lidsk˘ch práv Ob‰ãestvennaja za‰ãita. Zakladatelka a pfiedsedkynû organizace na obranu hromadn˘ch sdûlovacích prostfiedkÛ a jejich spolupracovníkÛ Kongres Ïurnalistov RK. V posledních letech se v˘raznû podílí na komerãních aktivitách svého manÏela Rachata Alijeva. Rachat Muchtaroviã Alijev (nar. 1962). ZeÈ Nursultana Nazarbajeva, manÏel Darigy Nazarbajevové. VáÏn˘ pretendent na prezidentské nástupnictví. Od poloviny 90. let ãinen v fiídicích funkcích nejv˘znamnûj‰ích silov˘ch struktur – jako náãelník odboru daÀové inspekce pro boj s pa‰ováním a korupcí (1996–1997), náãelník státní daÀové inspekce hlavního mûsta Almaty (1997), fieditel odboru daÀové policie ministerstva financí (1997–1998), pfiedseda v˘boru daÀové policie, první námûstek ministra financí (1997– 1998), v letech 2000–2001 námûstek a první námûstek pfiedsedy v˘boru pro národní bezpeãnost (KNB, b˘v. KGB, státní bezpeãnost, kontrarozvûdka), generál-major. Politick˘mi oponenty, vãetnû vûznûn˘ch, obviÀován z údajnû nápadné intolerance a brutality v osobním styku. Po vládní (rodinné) krizi na sklonku roku 2001 povolán do funkce zástupce náãelníka sluÏby ochrany prezidenta republiky (prezidentské gardy), dále pfiedseda národního olympijského v˘boru, pfiedseda fotbalového svazu RK, od roku 2002 velvyslanec Kazachstánu v Rakousku. Stojí v ãele finanãnû prÛmyslové skupiny Rachat. Pod kontrolou Alijevovy „silové skupiny“ se momentálnû nachází nûkolik podnikÛ ropného a plynárenského prÛmyslu (Mangistaumunajgaz, NûfÈanoj centr, síÈ ãerpacích stanic Mobil), atomového prÛmyslu (státní agentura Kazatomprom, pod kontrolou silov˘ch struktur), finanãnictví (Nurbank, pÛvodnû zaloÏená Darigou Nazarbajevovou) a zvlá‰tû hromadn˘ch sdûlovacích prostfiedkÛ. Mezi média kontrolovaná skupinou patfií televizní stanice NTK, KTK (kanály Chabar oficiálnû fiídí Dariga Nazarbajeva), periodika Novoje Pokolenije, Panorama, Karavan, agentura Kazakhstan Today, rozhlasové stanice Jevropa Pljus Kazachstan, Russkoje Radio, NS ãi vydavatelství Franklin Publishing House. Aktivní rovnûÏ v oboru stavebnictví, hotelnictví (pûtihvûzdiãkov˘ Hyatt Rakhat Palace Hotel v Almaty), produkce a realizace barevn˘ch kovÛ, telekomunikací, potravináfiství aj. Jím

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zfiízená spoleãnost Sacharnyj centr má dominantní postavení na kaza‰ském trhu s cukrem. Otec Muchtar Alijev je b˘val˘m ministrem zdravotnictví.

vem. DrÏí se spí‰e v ústraní; neoficiálnû se v Kazachstánu spekuluje o jejích zdravotních potíÏích v souvislosti s moÏn˘m uÏíváním psychotropních látek.

Dinara Nursultanovna Nazarbajeva (nar. 1967). Prostfiední dcera Nursultana Nazarbajeva. Pfiedsedá mj. státnímu Fondu Nursultana Nazarbajeva pro vzdûlání. V posledních letech zaji‰Èuje komerãní aktivity svého manÏela Timura Kulibajeva.

Bulat Abi‰eviã Nazarbajev. Mlad‰í bratr Nursultana Nazarbajeva. Jím vlastnûná BN Consultancy drÏí tfiicetiprocentní podíl v kaza‰sko-britském joint-venture BN Munai na prospekci akkulského ropného pole. Aktivity v oboru strojírenství (OAO AZTM-Kapremontstroj). Lihov˘ magnát.

Timur Askaroviã Kulibajev (nar. 1966). ZeÈ Nursultana Nazarbajeva, manÏel Dinary Nazarbajevové. MoÏn˘ nástupce prezidenta Nazarbajeva. Od roku 2002 stojí ve vedení státního monopolu v oblasti produkce, zpracování a pfiepravy energetick˘ch surovin Kazmunajgaz (pÛvodnû Kazakhoil a TransNûftûGaz, sloÏená z koncernÛ KazTransOil a KazTransGaz). Pfied fúzí jím spravovan˘ch monopolÛ pÛsobil jako fieditel odboru státního v˘boru pro zahraniãní investice pfii administraci prezidenta republiky. Ropn˘ magnát. Spojen s finanãnû prÛmyslovou skupinou sdruÏenou kolem nejvût‰í komerãní banky v zemi Kazkommercbank. Pod kontrolu Kazkommercbank a Kulibajevovy „olejáfiské skupiny“ momentálnû spadá nûkolik finanãních ústavÛ v republice jako Alma-Atinskij torgovo-finansovyj bank, Narodnyj sberegatûlnyj bank Kazachstana /Halyk bank, Eximbank, poji‰Èovna KazachInStrach, investiãní korporace Akcept, dále státní leasingová spoleãnost KazAgroFinance, telekomunikaãní gigant Kaztelekom, závody na zpracování ropy ·NOS a PNPZ v âimkentu a Pavlodaru, leteck˘ pfiepravce Air Kazakhstan, Ïeleznice Kazachstan temir Ïoly, rozvodné energetické sítû Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company /KEGOC, plynárensk˘ operátor Alautransgas, lihovary Bachus (v‰e zpravidla ã. 1 v daném oboru na národním trhu). Se sv˘m otcem Askarem Kulibajevem (ex-ministr stavebnictví) vlastní rovnûÏ jedin˘ závod v republice na zpracování ãerného kaviáru (Atyraubalyk), ãetná pohostinská zafiízení, casina, spoleãnosti obchodující s realitami. Aktivní v oboru produkce a realizace fosforu (Kazfosfor). Na mediální scénû skupina kontroluje periodika Kontinent a Vremja. Bratr gen. Talgat Kulibajev, aã pÛvodnû businessman, dává v souãasnosti pfiednost zamûstnání v fiídicích strukturách ministerstva vnitra. Alija Nursultanovna Nazarbajeva (nar. 1980). Nejmlad‰í dcera Nursultana Nazarbajeva. Zamûstnána v administraci prezidenta republiky. Ve vrcholné politice pÛsobila v letech 1998 aÏ 2001, kdyÏ byla v rámci dynastické zahraniãní politiky svého otce provdána za star‰ího syna prezidenta Kyrgyzské republiky Askara Akajeva Ajdara. Od ãervna 2002 Ïije ve svazku s dosud ménû znám˘m kaza‰sk˘m businessmanem Danijarem Chaseno-

Nurtaj Abykajeviã Abykajev (nar. 1947). Synovec Nursultana Nazarbajeva. MoÏn˘ pretendent na prezidentské nástupnictví. Vedoucí administrace prezidenta RK. Donedávna pfiedseda KNB (1998–2002) s hodností generál-majora. PovaÏován za hlavního organizátora prodeje nepovolené vojenské techniky do Severní Koreje z roku 1999 prostfiednictvím nejmenované ãeské firmy. Pfiedtím první asistent prezidenta RK (1996– 1998), velvyslanec Kazachstánu ve Velké Británii (1995–1996), první vedoucí aparátu prezidenta republiky (1990–1995), asistent prvního tajemníka komunistické strany (1989), asistent pfiedsedy rady ministrÛ (1988–1989). Nepsaná hlava tzv. „korejské skupiny“, ovládající kaza‰sk˘ trh s produkcí mûdi. Skupina vlastní metalurgické giganty jako Îezkazgancvetmet, Kazachmys (dfiíve Balcha‰mûì), Îezkentskij GOK nebo Vostoãno-Kazachstanskij mûdno-chimiãeskij kombinat. Z médií se pod kontrolou skupiny nacházejí agentura Kazachstan-Press a Dûlovaja gazeta. AchmetÏan Smaguloviã Jesimov (nar. 1950). Synovec Nursultana Nazarbajeva. MoÏn˘ pretendent na prezidentské nástupnictví. V minulosti mj. státní tajemník (1996, v té dobû ã. 2 v hierarchii státních funkcí), první místopfiedseda vlády, tajemník státního v˘boru pro zahraniãní investice (1996–1998), úfiadující pfiedseda vlády (1997), vedoucí administrace prezidenta republiky (1998). Blízk˘ „korejské skupinû“. Roku 1998 odstaven na post velvyslance Kazachstánu v Belgii. V roce 2002 povolán zpût do vlády, v kabinetu Imangali Tasmagambetova zastává funkci vicepremiéra a ministra zemûdûlství.

Zdroj: Vlastní seznam s vyuÏitím nejrÛznûj‰ích pramenÛ a literatury, vãetnû Martha Brill Olcott M. B., Kazakhstan. Unfulfilled Promise. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D. C., 2002; Zdroj Amrekulov N., Îuzy v social’no-politiãeskoj Ïizni Kazachstana, Central’naja Azija i Kavkaz, No. 9, 2000 (); Briãkina L., Otkrovennoje chanstvo. Vlast’ v Kazachstane stroitsja na krovnorodstvennych otno‰enijach, Profil’, 168, No. 46. – 06. 12. 99 (); Lomov D., Sekrety Sem’i Nazarbajeva. Kazachstan pora pereimenovat’ na Nazarbaj-stan, Vremja, No. 12. – 30. 05. 00 (); Mendybajev S., ·elgunov V., Kleptokratija. Kazachgejt. Novoje rassledovanije. Moskva: Institut aktual’nych politiãeskich issledovanij, Kompanija Sputnik +, 2001 (jednoznaãnû nejlep‰í a nejucelenûj‰í práce k tomuto tématu, opírající se o rozsáhl˘ monitoring místního i zahraniãního tisku; dfiívûj‰í verze knihy byla pfieloÏena do angliãtiny a francouz‰tiny); Merlink E., Vvedenije v kazachstanskuju oligarchologiju. Razdelennaja elita-2. Kto jest’ Kto, Gde i s Kem v sovremennom Kazachstane (dannyje na mart 2000 goda), Institut aktual’nych politiãeskich issledovanij, 31 marta 2000 (); Merlink E., Vtoroj prezident Kazachstana: vozmoÏnosti i pretendenty. Prejemnik Nazarbajeva – otkroj liãiko. Central’noaziatskij bjulleten’. 7 aprelja 2000 goda; Razdelennaja elita. Vzaimootno‰enija finansovo-promy‰lennych grupp Kazachstana. Institut aktual’nych politiãeskich issledovanij. Moskva. Maj 1999 g. (); Chljupin V. N., Bol’‰aja sem’ja Nursultana Nazarbajeva. Politiãeskaja elita sovremennogo Kazachstana. Moskva: Institut aktual’nych politiãeskich issledovanij, 1998. Chljupin V., Kazachstanskaja politiãeskaja elita: meÏdu modernizacijej i trajbalizmom. Doklad na 2-m Vserossijskom kongresse politologov. Moskva. MGIMO. 22 aprelja 2000 g. () [19. 9. 2002].

Státní zfiízení Státní zfiízení Kazachstánu je podrobnû upraveno ústavou, ústavními zákony, zákony, v˘nosy prezidenta republiky s platností zákona, vãetnû ústavních zákonÛ, jakoÏ i jin˘mi normativními akty Republiky Kazachstán, pfiitom základní zákon tvofií ústava. Ústava Republiky Kazachstán byla pfiijata kontroverzním celonárodním referendem dne 30. srpna 1995.14 To bylo vypsáno jen krátce po neménû kontroverzním jak druhém rozpu‰tûní zákonodárného sboru, tak i prodlouÏení stávajícího prezidentského mandátu Nursultana Nazarbajeva do konce roku 2000 bez provedení voleb. Podle oficiálnû zvefiejnûn˘ch údajÛ se pro prezidentem pfiedloÏen˘ návrh dokumentu vyslovilo pfies 89 % z více neÏ 90 % voliãÛ, ktefií se referenda podle oficiálních údajÛ zúãastnili. (Opozice vyzvala v pfiedveãer hlasování k jeho bojkotu.) Ústava Republiky Kazachstán ve znûní pozdûj‰ích novelizací definuje Kazachstán jako „demokratick˘, svûtsk˘, právní a sociální stát,

jehoÏ nejvy‰‰ími hodnotami jsou ãlovûk, jeho Ïivot, práva a svobody“. Za jediného nositele státní moci oznaãuje suverénní lid. Pfiedpokládá téÏ trojí dûlbu moci, rovnost obãanÛ pfied zákonem, formálnû dokonce garantuje nûkterá dal‰í obecnû v demokratickém svûtû uznávaná a respektovaná obãanská práva a svobody.15 Obdobnû jako v jin˘ch republikách Stfiední Asie v‰ak ustanovení tohoto druhu platí spí‰e teoreticky. Ústava pfiedpokládá pevnou vertikálu státní moci, na jejíÏ ‰pici stojí prezident.16 Prezident, jakoÏto hlava státu, je nejvy‰‰ím pfiedstavitelem Kazachstánu, urãujícím hlavní linie domácí i zahraniãní politiky a reprezentujícím Kazachstán uvnitfi státu a navenek. Prezident je dále „garantem a symbolem jednoty lidu a státní moci, neporu‰itelnosti ústavy, jakoÏ i lidsk˘ch a obãansk˘ch práv a svobod“. Zaji‰Èuje navíc „koordinované fungování v‰ech sloÏek státní moci a zodpovûdnost jejích orgánÛ ve vztahu k lidu“. Prezident je formálnû volen, a to pfiímo na základû v‰eobecného hlasovacího práva na dobu sedmi let, z fiad rodil˘ch obãanÛ Kazachstánu ne mlad‰ích ãtyfiiceti let, plynnû ovládajících státní jazyk (tj. kaza‰tinu) a trvale Ïijících na území republiky po dobu nejménû patnácti let.17 Pokud v prvním kole hlasování Ïádn˘ z prezidentsk˘ch kandidátÛ neobdrÏí nadpoloviãní vût‰inu hlasÛ, potfiebnou k jeho zvolení, koná se druhé kolo voleb za úãasti dvou nejúspû‰nûj‰ích kandidátÛ z prvního kola.18 Po dobu svého pÛsobení ve funkci hlavy státu prezident nesmí b˘t poslancem zastupitelsk˘ch sborÛ, zastávat jiné placené funkce nebo provozovat podni-

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Konstitucija Respubliki Kazachstan. Konstitucija prinjata na respublikanskom referendume 30 avgusta 1995 g. URL [27. 5. 2002]. Dosud jediná, leã rozsáhlá novelizace stávající ústavy Kazachstánu byla provedena 7. fiíjna 1998.

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Srv. zejména druhou hlavu ústavy (ãl. 10 aÏ 39). Vedle tfietí hlavy ústavy (ãl. 40 aÏ 48) jsou postavení prezidenta a jeho kompetence podrobnû upraveny zejména ústavním zákonem (pÛvodnû v˘nosem prezidenta republiky s platností ústavního zákona) O prezidentu Republiky Kazachstán z 26. prosince 1995 ve znûní pozdûj‰ích novelizací. Konstitucionnyj zakon Respubliki Kazachstan ot 26 dekabrja 1995 g. No. 2733 O Prezidente Respubliki Kazachstan. URL [27. 5. 2002]. Provize t˘kající se povinné znalosti státního jazyka zaruãují za stávajících podmínek de facto v˘sadní postavení etnick˘m KazachÛm z fiad Star‰ího Ïuzu. Rurální oblasti jiÏního a jihov˘chodního Kazachstánu, z nichÏ Kaza‰i Star‰ího Ïuzu tradiãnû pocházejí, byly totiÏ modernizaãními vlivy Ruska resp. Sovûtského svazu, a tím i rusifikací, dotãeny ménû neÏ napfi. severní oblasti Kazachstánu. Podrobnû je procedura prezidentsk˘ch, jakoÏ i ostatních voleb v Kazachstánu upravena zejména ústavním zákonem (pÛvodnû v˘nosem prezidenta republiky s platností ústavního zákona) O volbách v Republice Kazachstán z 28. záfií 1995 ve znûní pozdûj‰ích novelizací. Konstitucionnyj zakon Respubliki Kazachstan ot 28 sentjabrja 1995 g. No. 2464 O vyborach v Respublike Kazachstan. URL [27. 5. 2002].

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katelskou ãinnost. Na stejnou dobu také pozastavuje svou ãinnost v politick˘ch stranách. Ústava dává hlavû státu ve‰keré pravomoci bûÏné v standardních prezidentsk˘ch reÏimech, pfiedev‰ím tedy zodpovûdnost za formování a fungování exekutivní sloÏky moci. V˘konem exekutivních funkcí se ov‰em pravomoci prezidenta Kazachstánu nevyãerpávají. Klíãovou roli hraje prezident i v oblasti legislativy, kdyÏ vedle vypisování referenda nebo uplatÀování efektivního veta má také právo urãovat prioritu pfiijíman˘ch zákonÛ, popfi. vládnout pfiímo pomocí vlastních dekretÛ s platností zákona. To mu v kombinaci s právem rozpou‰tût parlament zaji‰Èuje doslova neomezenou moc. V nespecifikovaném pfiípadû, kdy „demokratické instituty, nezávislost, teritoriální integrita, jakoÏ i politická stabilita republiky a bezpeãnost jejích obãanÛ se nacházejí pod váÏnou a bezprostfiední hrozbou“, prezident ãiní „opatfiení vynucená jmenovan˘mi okolnostmi“, vãetnû vyhlá‰ení v˘jimeãného stavu nebo nasazení armády na území státu. Teoreticky mÛÏe b˘t prezident odvolán z funkce v pfiípadû vlastizrady. Tento termín ov‰em není v ústavû ani v jiném dostupném zákonû definován. Obdobnû mimofiádná procedurální sloÏitost ústavní Ïaloby proti prezidentu zdárné zavr‰ení impeachmentu prakticky vyluãuje. K praxi souãasného prezidenta patfií i ad hoc zfiizování nejrÛznûj‰ích „poradních orgánÛ“ (shromáÏdûní národÛ, národní rada aj.) s diskutabilní oporou v ústavû, jakkoli i ty si mohou reprezentativní funkce (a tomu odpovídající kompetence) nárokovat. Zvlá‰tní postavení v rámci stávajícího právního fiádu zaujímá tzv. ústavní rada,19 zaji‰Èující oficiálnû superioritu ústavy po celém území republiky, a suplující tím v omezené mífie funkce dfiíve zru‰eného ústavního soudu. Rada se skládá ze sedmi ãlenÛ, s pravomocemi na ‰est let. Z toho pfiedsedu rady, disponujícího rozhodujícím hlasem, jakoÏ i dva dal‰í ãleny jmenuje pfiímo prezident, po dvou zb˘vajících pak pfiedsedové kaÏdé z parlamentních komor. Ex-prezidenti se stávají doÏivotními ãleny rady

automaticky. Rada na Ïádost vybran˘ch oficiálních pfiedstavitelÛ a orgánÛ vyná‰í rozhodnutí o otázkách regulérnosti prezidentsk˘ch a parlamentních voleb a referend, o otázkách kompatibility schvalovan˘ch zákonÛ ãi mezinárodních smluv s platnou ústavou, stejnû jako podává závaznou interpretaci ústavních norem. Mimo to rada zpracovává v˘roãní zprávy o stavu lidsk˘ch práv a obãansk˘ch práv a svobod v zemi. Proti ústavnímu nálezu rady mÛÏe prezident vznést ohrazení (veto), které mÛÏe b˘t pfiekonáno pouze opûtovn˘m hlasováním rady, v nûmÏ se pro pÛvodní verzi nálezu vysloví minimálnû dvû tfietiny z celkového poãtu (tj. minimálnû pût ze sedmi) jejích ãlenÛ; to znamená, Ïe i jakákoli interpretace základního zákona, prohlá‰ení voleb za neplatné nebo tfieba zpochybnûní legality právních aktÛ nûkter˘ch státních ãinitelÛ ze strany k tomu zmocnûného orgánu se proti názoru prezidenta mohou ukázat neprÛchodné. Exekutivní moc v souladu s ústavou vykonává a ãinnost exekutivních orgánÛ koordinuje vláda,20 která se v celém rozsahu svojí ãinnosti zodpovídá prezidentovi. âleny vlády na návrh premiéra jmenuje, jakoÏ i podle svého uváÏení odvolává prezident. Ten také urãuje její definitivní strukturu. Jmenování premiéra (nikoli jeho odvolání) má b˘t dodateãnû potvrzeno parlamentem. Demise premiéra znamená demisi celé vlády. Premiér v mûsíãní lhÛtû od jmenování vlády pfiedstupuje pfied parlament s programov˘m prohlá‰ením, které mÛÏe b˘t opakovanû odmítnuto minimálnû dvoutfietinovou vût‰inou v‰ech poslancÛ kaÏdé z parlamentních komor (jinak se povaÏuje za schválené), coÏ zároveÀ znamená vyslovení nedÛvûry vládû. Pokud prezident navrhovanou demisi vlády v souvislosti s vyslovením nedÛvûry nepfiijme, rozpou‰tí parlament. Vláda kromû toho disponuje právem zákonodárné iniciativy. Dvakrát do roka navíc mÛÏe s vlastním návrhem zákona spojit otázku vyslovení dÛvûry, resp. nedÛvûry. (Vyslovením nedÛvûry vládû se parlament vystavuje riziku, Ïe bude pfiedãasnû rozpu‰tûn. V opaãném pfiípadû je zákon bez hlasování schválen v pfiedkládaném

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Podrobnû jsou status a kompetence ústavní rady upraveny vedle ‰esté hlavy ústavy (ãl. 71 aÏ 74) zejména v˘nosem prezidenta republiky s platností ústavního zákona O ústavní radû Republiky Kazachstán z 29. prosince 1995. Ukaz Prezidenta, imeju‰ãij silu konstitucionnogo zakona, ot 29 dekabrja 1995 g. No. 2737 O Konstitucionnom sovete Respubliki Kazachstan. URL [27. 5. 2002]. Zvlá‰tní postavení má rada proto, Ïe ani formálnû nespadá pod soustavu soudÛ.

Postavení, ãinnost a pravomoci vlády jsou vedle páté hlavy ústavy (ãl. 64 aÏ 70) podrobnû upraveny zejména ústavním zákonem (pÛvodnû v˘nosem prezidenta republiky s platností ústavního zákona) O vládû Republiky Kazachstán z 18. prosince 1995 ve znûní pozdûj‰ích novelizací. Konstitucionnyj zakon Respubliki Kazachstan ot 18 dekabrja 1995 g. No. 2688 O Pravitel’stve Respubliki Kazachstan. URL [27. 5. 2002].

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vládním znûní.) Parlamentu se ãlenové vlády zodpovídají v rámci poslaneck˘ch interpelací. Na Ïádost parlamentu mohou b˘t odvoláni, pokud se pro takovou Ïádost, adresovanou prezidentu republiky, opakovanû vysloví nejménû dvû tfietiny v‰ech ãlenÛ nûkteré z komor. Nejvy‰‰í zastupitelsk˘ orgán, povûfien˘ v˘konem legislativních funkcí, ztûlesÀuje stál˘ dvoukomorov˘ parlament.21 Dolní komoru parlamentu tvofií maÏilis. Funkce horní komory vykonává senát. MaÏilis sestává ze sedmdesáti sedmi poslancÛ, ktefií jsou formálnû voleni pfiímo na základû v‰eobecného hlasovacího práva na dobu pûti let. Z toho ‰edesát sedm poslancÛ je voleno v jednomandátov˘ch teritoriálních obvodech (dvoukolovû), zb˘vajících deset pak proporcionálnû na základû stranick˘ch listin v jednom celostátním obvodû. Minimální práh pro vstup té které strany do parlamentu ãiní 7 % hlasÛ. Oproti tomu ãlenové senátu jsou delegováni nepfiímo shromáÏdûními volitelÛ sloÏen˘mi ze zástupcÛ pfiíslu‰ného oblastního maslichatu (zastupitelstva) na dobu ‰esti let po dvou senátorech za kaÏdou administrativní oblast.22 Sedm dal‰ích senátorÛ jmenuje prezident.23 Specifikem popisovaného zfiízení zÛstává, Ïe obû komory parlamentu se navzájem odli‰ují nanejv˘‰ zpÛsobem, jak˘m jsou konstituovány, a ménû jiÏ, co se t˘ãe jejich nejdÛleÏitûj‰ích kompetencí resp. rozsahu a vymezení tûchto kompetencí (spoleãnû poslanci obou komor napfi. schvalují státní rozpoãet, potvrzují navrhovaného kandidáta na funkci premiéra, schvalují programové prohlá‰ení vlády, pfiedávají prezidentu zákonodárné pravomoci,

21

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Postavení parlamentu a jeho kompetence jsou vedle ãtvrté hlavy ústavy (ãl. 49 aÏ 63) podrobnû upraveny zejména ústavním zákonem (pÛvodnû v˘nosem prezidenta republiky s platností ústavního zákona) O parlamentu Republiky Kazachstán a statutu jeho poslancÛ z 16. fiíjna 1995 ve znûní pozdûj‰ích novelizací. Konstitucionnyj zakon Respubliki Kazachstan ot 16 oktjabrja 1995 g. O Parlamente Respubliki Kazachstan i statuse jego deputatov. URL [5. 8. 2002]. KaÏdé tfii roky je obsazována polovina z takto rozdûlovan˘ch senátorsk˘ch kfiesel. Poãet senátorÛ tedy není fixnû urãen; mÛÏe variovat v závislosti na poãtu administrativních oblastí. V souãasnosti má senát 39 ãlenÛ, a to vedle jiÏ sedmi senátorÛ jmenovan˘ch prezidentem téÏ po dvou senátorech za kaÏdou ze stávajících ãtrnácti oblastí (tj. za akmolskou, akÈubinskou, almaatskou, atyrauskou, dÏambulskou, karagandskou, kustanajskou, kyzylordskou, mangy‰lackou a pavlodarskou oblast, oblast jiÏního Kazachstánu, severního Kazachstánu, v˘chodního Kazachstánu a západního Kazachstánu), jakoÏ i za hlavní mûsto Astanu a mûsto republikového v˘znamu Alma-Atu, jeÏ mají administrativnû právní status oblasti. Druhé mûsto republikového v˘znamu, Leninsk (s kosmodromem Bajkonur), bylo s úãinností od roku 1995 pfiinejmen‰ím na dvacet let pronajato Rusku.

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rozpu‰tûn mÛÏe b˘t parlament rovnûÏ pouze jako celek), coÏ ponûkud zastírá smysl existence dvoukomorového parlamentu. Parlament navíc ve vztahu k exekutivû nedisponuje (a to ani formálnû) relevantními kontrolními pravomocemi. Souãasnû ale i trpí z její strany zásahy do vlastní ãinnosti. V dÛsledku to z nûj ãiní poslu‰n˘ nástroj v˘konné moci. Prezidentovo veto zákona, kter˘ jiÏ pro‰el obûma komorami, tak napfi. parlament mÛÏe pfiehlasovat minimálnû dvoutfietinovou vût‰inou v‰ech ãlenÛ v kaÏdé z komor (jinak platí zákon v prezidentovû redakci), coÏ mÛÏe b˘t v praxi problém. Stejné kvorum pak potfiebuje parlament i na opakované zamítnutí programového prohlá‰ení vlády, resp. na vyslovení nedÛvûry vládû, popfi. na zablokování vládního návrhu zákona, s nímÏ kabinet spojil svou demisi. Dále, pokud parlament v prÛbûhu mûsíce neschválí zákon, jehoÏ pfiijetí prezident definoval jako prioritní, pfiecházejí legislativní kompetence v dané záleÏitosti na prezidenta. V otázkách pfiijímání ústavních dodatkÛ a zmûn parlament ani nedisponuje zákonodárnou iniciativou.24 Prezident má pfiitom právo rozpustit parlament, pokud poslanci vyjádfií nedÛvûru vládû (kterou jmenuje prezident), stejnû tak pokud opakovanû odmítnou potvrdit navrhovaného (prezidentem) kandidáta na funkci premiéra, jakoÏ i v pfiípadû nespecifikované „politické krize v dÛsledku nepfiekonateln˘ch rozporÛ mezi parlamentními komorami nebo parlamentem a ostatními sloÏkami státní moci“. Formování státoprávního rámce bylo dovr‰eno schválením ústavního zákona O prvním prezidentu Republiky Kazachstán z 20. ãervence 2000, definujícího politicko-právní postavení osoby prvního prezidenta (tj. Nursultana Nazarbajeva) jakoÏto „jednoho ze zakladatelÛ novû nezávislého státu […] a vÛdce národa“ po skonãení jeho funkãního období.25 Prvnímu prezidentu zde bylo „s pfiihlédnutím k jeho historické misi“ doÏivotnû pfiiznáno právo obracet se k národu Kazachstánu, jeho státním orgánÛm a pfiedstavitelÛm s vlastními iniciativami ve vûci budování státu, domácí a zahraniãní politiky nebo národní bezpeãnosti, jeÏ podléhají obligatorní-

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Parlament se ve vûci novelizace ústavy mÛÏe pokusit iniciovat referendum. O eventuálním vypsání referenda, jakoÏ i o koneãné formulaci otázky nicménû rozhoduje prezident. Konstitucionnyj zakon Respubliki Kazachstan ot 20 ijulja 2000 g. No. 83–1 O Pervom Prezidente Respubliki Kazachstan. URL [5. 8. 2002]. Tento ústavní zákon byl jiÏ fiádnû pfiijat parlamentem.

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mu projednání ze strany dotãen˘ch orgánÛ ãi pfiedstavitelÛ. Stejnû tak mu bylo doÏivotnû pfiiznáno právo vystupovat pfied parlamentem a jeho komorami, zúãastnit se zasedání vlády, pfiedsedat shromáÏdûní národÛ, jakoÏ i b˘t ãlenem ústavní rady a bezpeãnostní rady státu. Prvnímu prezidentu byla dále zaruãena imunita proti trestnímu stíhání za ãiny související s jeho pÛsobením ve funkci hlavy státu,26 v zájmu zaji‰tûní dÛstojného v˘konu jeho dal‰í ãinnosti mu mají b˘t poskytovány velkorysé (i ve stfiedoasijském kontextu) hmotné i nehmotné v˘hody ze státních fondÛ, koneãnû v rodném aulu mu má b˘t zbudováno muzeum a vztyãena socha. Zákon kromû toho pfiedpokládá moÏnost nespecifikovaného roz‰ífiení poskytovan˘ch garancí i na ãleny ex-prezidentovy rodiny. Vnitropolitick˘ v˘voj „Já, jakoÏto prezident státu, jasnû a dÛraznû prohla‰uji, Ïe ve‰keré volby v na‰em státû budou ãestné a transparentní…“ (Nursultan Nazarbajev)

Institucionální rámec stávajícího systému vze‰el ze struktury orgánÛ moci sovûtÛ období perestrojky. Nejvy‰‰ím orgánem státní moci v Kaza‰ské SSR, povûfien˘m v˘konem zákonodárn˘ch funkcí, byl republikov˘ Nejvy‰‰í sovût, jehoÏ funkce mezi jednotliv˘mi zasedáními tohoto „parlamentu“ pfiebíralo stálé prezidium Nejvy‰‰ího sovûtu. Funkce vlády z jeho povûfiení vykonávala republiková rada ministrÛ. Státní zfiízení bylo od konce 80. let podrobováno postupnû dílãím reformám. Podstatn˘ch zmûn ale doznalo teprve v kontextu suverenizace Kazachstánu po volbách do 12. Nejvy‰‰ího sovûtu Kaza‰ské SSR z 25. bfiezna 1990. V dÛsledku nerovného volebního systému (ãtvrtina kfiesel nebyla ani formálnû volena, n˘brÏ vyhrazena pro kandidáty tzv. spoleãensk˘ch organizací, vãetnû komunistické strany a komsomolu) v nich totiÏ poprvé získali vût‰inu pfiedstavitelé stranického

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Nenadálé pfiijetí zákona shodou okolností ãasovû koincidovalo s obstavením bankovních úãtÛ patfiících údajnû v˘znamn˘m ãlenÛm kaza‰ské vládnoucí rodiny, vãetnû Nursultana Nazarbajeva, pfiíslu‰n˘mi úfiady ve ·v˘carsku a ve Spojen˘ch státech v souvislosti se zahájením vy‰etfiování a trestního stíhání nûkter˘ch blízk˘ch prezidentov˘ch spolupracovníkÛ ve vûci závaÏné hospodáfiské kriminality jako korupce a praní ‰pinav˘ch penûz.

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aparátu z fiad etnick˘ch KazachÛ.27 Nejvy‰‰í sovût zfiídil 24. dubna 1990 funkci prezidenta a v duchu sovûtsk˘ch tradic do ní je‰tû tent˘Ï den zvolil prvního tajemníka komunistické strany Kazachstánu Nursultana Nazarbajeva.28 SvÛj mandát Nazarbajev obhájil v celonárodních prezidentsk˘ch volbách 1. prosince 1991, kdyÏ jako jedin˘ kandidát získal podle oficiálnû zvefiejnûn˘ch v˘sledkÛ 98,78 % hlasÛ.29 Dne 16. prosince 1991 Kazachstán deklaroval nezávislost.30 Dne 28. ledna 1993 Nejvy‰‰í sovût Kazachstánu pfiijal první postkomunistickou ústavu,31 znamenající posun k semiprezidentské formû zfiízení. Prezident, jakoÏto hlava státu, stál jiÏ v ãele jednotné soustavy orgánÛ exekutivní sloÏky moci, vãetnû orgánÛ státní moci na oblastní a místní úrovni. Se souhlasem parlamentu jmenoval premiéra, jeho zástupce, hlavy klíãov˘ch ministerstev, silov˘ch struktur a vládních agentur. Nemûl v‰ak právo vydávat zákony ani rozpou‰tût parlament. Vláda (kabinet ministrÛ) a její ãlenové byli podfiízeni v˘luãnû hlavû státu. Parlament (Nejvy‰‰í sovût) si ov‰em, spolu s plnou svrchovaností ve sféfie legislativy, zachoval ve vztahu k vládû nûkteré kontrolní pravomoci. Tímto zpÛsobem tedy ústava novû vymezovala principy dûlby moci. Vzhledem k pfiedãasnému ukonãení existence Nejvy‰‰ího sovûtu nicménû nemohly b˘t tyto principy provûfieny v praxi. Spor mezi jednotliv˘mi sloÏkami moci, vyvolan˘ snahami parlamentu o kontrolu finanãních operací vlády (nakládání se státními pfiíjmy z udûlování licencí na export surovin atp.), vyústil na sklonku roku 1993 v nucené „samorozpu‰tûní“ Nejvy‰‰ího sovûtu. Zákonem O doãasném delegování dodateãn˘ch pravomocí prezidentu Republiky Kazachstán a hlavám

27

BlíÏe k tûmto trendÛm viz Kurtov A. A., Demokratija vyborov v Kazachstane: avtoritarnaja evoljucija. Konstitucionnoje pravo: vostoãnojevropejskoje obozrenije, No. 2 (31), 2000, s. 2–10. Zakon Kazachskoj Sovetskoj Socialistiãeskoj Respubliki ot 24 aprelja 1990 g. Ob uãreÏdenii posta Prezidenta Kazachskoj SSR i vnesenii izmenenij i dopolnenij v Konstituciju (Osnovnoj Zakon) Kazachskoj SSR. URL [5. 8. 2002]. 29 RFE Daily Report. 3 December 1991. 30 Konstitucionnyj zakon Respubliki Kazachstan ot 16 dekabrja 1991 g. O gosudarstvennoj nezavisimosti Respubliki Kazachstan. URL [5. 8. 2002]. 31 Konstitucija Respubliki Kazachstan ot 28 janvarja 1993 goda (Utratila silu). URL [5. 8. 2002]. 28

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místních administrací z 11. prosince 1993 prezident pfiebíral jiÏ ryze zákonodárné funkce.32 Následující parlamentní volby byly vypsány na 7. bfiezna 1994. V souladu s novelizovanou legislativou byl poãet poslaneck˘ch mandátÛ redukován z pÛvodních 360 jiÏ na 177 míst. Z toho 135 kfiesel mûlo b˘t rozdûlováno podle vût‰inového principu na základû v˘sledkÛ dvoukolového volebního klání v jednomandátov˘ch teritoriálních obvodech, zb˘vající 42 poslanci pak byli vybíráni z kandidátÛ zafiazen˘ch na tzv. státní (prezidentskou) listinu. Prezidentu tím bylo, v rozporu nejen s ústavnû garantovan˘m principem rovnosti kandidátÛ, ale i s obecnû v demokratickém svûtû pfiijíman˘mi zvyklostmi, de facto vyhrazeno právo obsadit podle vlastního uváÏení témûfi ãtvrtinu parlamentních kfiesel pouze pfii pasivním souhlasu obyvatel. Mezinárodními pozorovateli byl proto institut státní listiny hodnocen jako váÏné (tfiebaÏe zdaleka ne jediné) poru‰ení elementárních standardÛ KBSE pro pofiádání demokratick˘ch voleb.33 Prohlá‰ení volební procedury v jednom z obvodÛ za neregulérní, sotva se parlament znovu zaãal profilovat spí‰e jako vefiejná tribuna pro beztrestnou kritiku vládního kurzu (poslanci si v roce 1994 mj. bezprecedentnû v stfiedoasijské praxi vynutili odvolání údajnû zkorumpovaného kabinetu Sergeje Tere‰ãenka), poslouÏilo paradoxnû jako formální dÛvod pro zru‰ení mandátu poslancÛ, a tím i pro opûtovné rozehnání Nejvy‰‰ího sovûtu v bfieznu pfií‰tího roku.34 Rozehnáním 13. Nejvy‰‰ího sovûtu 11. bfiezna 1995 se Kazachstán podruhé ve své novodobé historii ocitl bez legitimního parlamentu. Do vyklizen˘ch prostor následnû prezident Nazarbajev svolal tzv. shromáÏdûní národÛ (Assambleja Narodov). To se jej na svojí ustavující schÛzi 24. bfiezna 1995 usneslo poÏádat, aby setrval v úfiadû do konce roku 2000. Aãkoli moÏnost zru‰ení prezidentsk˘ch voleb tehdej‰í ústava vÛbec nepfiedpokládala, v celonárodním referendu dne 29. dubna 1995 my‰lenku mimofiád-

ného prodlouÏení mandátu prezidenta Nazarbajeva do roku 2000 bez provedení voleb podpofiilo podle oficiálních v˘sledkÛ 95,46 % zúãastnûn˘ch voliãÛ.35 30. srpna 1995 pak za srovnateln˘ch podmínek (masivní volební falsifikace, fyzické útoky proti pfiedstavitelÛm nekonformního tisku, 89,14 % populace oficiálnû „pro“) byla pfiijata druhá postkomunistická ústava,36 která likvidovala instituci ústavního soudu a spolu s tím odevzdávala ve‰keré pravomoci v˘konné, jakoÏ i rozhodující pravomoci zákonodárné a soudní do rukou de iure nesesaditelného prezidenta. Teprve poté, co bylo vymezování ústavnû právního rámce formou v˘nosÛ prezidenta republiky s platností ústavního zákona, regulujících nejdÛleÏitûj‰í aspekty vefiejného Ïivota, po mûsících Nazarbajevovy samovlády skonãeno, mohl b˘t ve dnech 5. a 9. prosince 1995 zvolen, resp. jmenován fiádn˘, dvoukomorov˘ parlament. K setrvání v úfiadû do roku 2006 následnû opravÀovalo Nursultana Nazarbajeva oficiální vítûzství v mimofiádn˘ch prezidentsk˘ch volbách z 10. ledna 1999. Pfiedãasné konání voleb bylo vynuceno zmûnami ústavnû právního rámce. 7. fiíjna 1998, v intencích pfiedcházející zprávy národu, v níÏ prezident Nazarbajev nastínil vlastní vizi demokratizace kaza‰ské spoleãnosti pro 21. století,37 totiÏ parlament pfiistoupil k rozsáhlé novelizaci ústavy. Reformou bylo rozhodnuto zejména o prodlouÏení fiádného funkãního období prezidenta z pÛvodnû pûti jiÏ na sedm let (spolu s tím bylo prodlouÏeno i funkãní období poslancÛ maÏilisu a ãlenÛ senátu z pÛvodnû ãtyfi jiÏ na pût, resp. na ‰est let). Odstranûn byl dále maximální vûkov˘ limit 65 let pro potenciální kandidáty na úfiad prezidenta. Zru‰eno bylo i ãasové omezení v˘konu prezidentského mandátu jedné osoby na maximálnû dvû funkãní období.38 Kuriózní novelou byla pak ústava doplnûna o ustanovení umoÏÀující zkrácení jednoho konkrétního prezidentova mandátu z rozhodnutí parlamentu (následujícího dne k tomu staãily hlasy prosté

32

35

Zakon Respubliki Kazachstan ot 10 dekabrja 1993 g. O vremennom delegirovanii Prezidentu Respubliki Kazachstan i glavam mestnych administracij dopolnitel’nych polnomoãij. URL [5.8.2002]. 33 K prÛbûhu voleb viz The Parliamentary Elections in Kazakhstan. Almaty, Kazakhstan. March 7, 1994. A Report Prepared by the Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 34 K politické krizi z jara 1995 viz Kurtov A. A., Partii Kazachstana i osobennosti razvitija politiãeskogo processa v respublike. In: Kazachstan: realii i perspektivy nezavisimogo razvitija. Pod red. Je.M. KoÏokina. Moskva: RISI, 1995, s. 214–219.

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38

OMRI Daily Digest. 2 May 1995. OMRI Daily Digest. 31 October 1995. Rozbor ústavy viz v pfiedchozí kapitole. Poslanije Prezidenta Respubliki Kazachstan narodu Kazachstana O poloÏenijach v strane i osnovnych napravlenijach vnutrennej i vne‰nej politiki: Demokratizacija ob‰ãestva, ekonomiãeskaja i politiãeskaja reforma v novom stoletii. 30 sentjabrja 1998 g. URL [4. 2. 2002]. Zakon Respubliki Kazachstan ot 7 oktjabrja 1998 g. No. 284-1 O vnesenii izmenenij i dopolnenij v Konstituciju Respubliki Kazachstan. Kazachstanskaja pravda. 08.10.1998.

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vût‰iny poslancÛ obou komor) s nutností vypsání pfií‰tích prezidentsk˘ch voleb v nejbliωím termínu.39 OBSE, jejíÏ hodnotící mise na místû dospûla k závûru, Ïe „pfiedvolební podmínky v Kazachstánu jasnû a podstatnû neodpovídají závazkÛm [Kazachstánu ve vztahu k] OBSE“, odmítla volby monitorovat.40 Tabulka ã. 3: Oficiální v˘sledky voleb prezidenta Republiky Kazachstán z 10. ledna 1999 Kandidát

Poãet obdrÏen˘ch hlasÛ (v %)

Nursultan Nazarbajev

79,78

Serikbolsyn Abdildin

11,70

Gani Kasymov

4,61

Engels Gabbasov

0,76

Zdroj: Soob‰ãenije CIK Respubliki Kazachstan Ob itogach sostojav‰ichsja 10 janvarja 1999 g. vyborov i registracii izbrannogo Prezidenta Respubliki Kazachstan. Kazachstanskaja pravda. 16.01.1999. Pozn.: Nursultan Nazarbajev byl v dobû konání prezidentsk˘ch voleb úfiadující hlavou státu. Serikbolsyn Abdildin (jedin˘ kandidát z fiad opozice, jemuÏ nakonec byla udûlena registrace ústfiední volební komisí) pÛsobil jako první tajemník obnovené komunistické strany. Gani Kasymov a Engels Gabbasov, ‰ir‰í vefiejnosti prakticky neznámé osobnosti, kandidovali podle vût‰iny nezávisl˘ch komentátorÛ na popud prezidentské kanceláfie s cílem dodat volbám zdání plurality s ohledem na zahraniãí.

20. ãervence 2000 vstoupil v platnost ústavní zákon o prvním prezidentu Republiky Kazachstán, jímÏ byly Nursultanu Nazarbajevovi garantovány rozsáhlé pravomoci doÏivotnû. Stranická scéna

citnû pfiitom zakazuje nezákonné vmû‰ování státu do záleÏitostí spoleãensk˘ch organizací.41 Provádûcí zákon O politick˘ch stranách (v platnosti od 15. ãervence 2002), regulující tuto sféru vefiejného Ïivota,42 nicménû obsahuje ãetná ustanovení, která ústavnû garantovanou svobodu sdruÏování, a tím i participaci obãanÛ na politickém procesu podstatnû omezují. Problematická ve svûtle mezinárodních závazkÛ Kazachstánu v oblasti demokratizace a rozvoje pluralitního systému se jeví zejména ustanovení zákona vyÏadující minimální ãlenskou základnu 50 tisíc osob, zastoupen˘ch rovnomûrnû ze v‰ech administrativních oblastí, pro eventuální registraci politické strany, stejnû jako ustanovení specifikující (popfi. nespecifikující) podmínky pro moÏnou soudní likvidaci strany.43 Existence tûchto, jakoÏ i jin˘ch ustanovení zákona, jejichÏ aplikace v podmínkách postsovûtského Kazachstánu znamená faktick˘ zánik politick˘ch stran, které se netû‰í oficiálnû podpofie ve spoleãnosti, se stala terãem kritiky jak fiady nevládních organizací ãi opozice, tak i nûkter˘ch mezinárodních organizací.44 Aãkoli Kazachstán prodûlal na stfiedoasijské pomûry vcelku bohat˘ stranick˘ v˘voj, k aktivizaci stranického Ïivota v Kazachstánu do‰lo zejména v souvislosti s dosud posledními volbami do maÏilisu parlamentu republiky ve dnech 10. a 24. fiíjna 1999. Poprvé totiÏ volby probíhaly podle smí‰eného volebního systému. Úpravy legislativy pfiedpokládaly mj. roz‰ífiení poãtu poslaneck˘ch mandátÛ, z pÛvodních 67 kfiesel rozdûlovan˘ch vût‰inovû v jednomandátov˘ch teritoriálních obvodech, o deset míst distribuovan˘ch proporãnû na základû stranick˘ch listin, coÏ mûlo oficiálnû pfiispût k posílení institutu politick˘ch stran a jejich role ve vefiejném Ïivotû Kazachstánu. (Jejich reáln˘ vliv na fungování politického procesu v zemi nicménû zÛstává s ohledem na ne nutnû ideální klima pro jakoukoli politickou 41

Ústavní zfiízení Republiky Kazachstán pfiedpokládá existenci pluralitního politického systému. Ústava zaruãuje práva obãanÛ sdruÏovat se ve spoleãensk˘ch organizacích, vãetnû politick˘ch stran, kter˘m jsou garantována rovná práva pfied zákonem (s v˘jimkou tûch, které jsou zakázány). Expli-

42 43 44

39 40

TamtéÏ. Viz pfiechodná ustanovení, ãl. 94 odst. 1 ústavy. OSCE / ODIHR. Election Assessment Mission. Republic of Kazachstan 1999. Almaty, 11 January 1999. Preliminary Statement, p. 1.

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Viz zejména ãl. 5 odst. 1, 2, 3 ústavy. Ústava jmenovitû nepfiipou‰tí zakládání a ãinnost organizací, „jejichÏ ãinnost a cíle jsou namífieny na násilné svrÏení ústavního pofiádku, naru‰ení integrity republiky, podkopání státní bezpeãnosti a podnûcování sociální, rasové, národnostní, náboÏenské, stavovské ãi rodové nesná‰enlivosti“. Zakon Respubliki Kazachstan ot 15 ijulja 2002 g. No. 344-2 O politiãeskich partijach. URL [5. 8. 2002]. Viz zejména ãl. 10 a 14 zákona, upravující pravidla registrace, reorganizace a likvidace politick˘ch stran. Vûcn˘ rozbor jednotliv˘ch ustanovení zákona, vypracovan˘ experty OBSE, viz Respublika Kazachstan – Zakon o politiãeskich partijach, vstupil v silu 15 ijulja. OBSJe/BDIPâ Bjulleten’ 1. 23 ijulja 2002 g. URL [5. 8. 2002].

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ãinnost nadále omezen˘.) OBSE ve svojí závûreãné zprávû k volbám konstatovala, Ïe zlep‰en˘ legislativní a regulatorní rámec voleb byl zvlá‰tû podkopán 1) nezákonn˘m vmû‰ováním exekutivních orgánÛ; 2) neãestn˘mi volebními praktikami stran napojen˘ch na stávající mocenské struktury; 3) hrozbami byrokratického, administrativního a trestního stíhání, naru‰ujícími ãinnost médií; 4) protûÏováním kandidátÛ a stran podporovan˘ch oblastními a místními orgány moci ze strany volebních komisí na niωích úrovních; jakoÏ i 5) zastra‰ováním opoziãních stran a kandidátÛ a vytváfiením umûl˘ch pfiekáÏek pro jejich volební kampaÀ.45 Tabulka ã. 4: Oficiální v˘sledky voleb do maÏilisu parlamentu Republiky Kazachstán druhé konvokace z 10. a 24. fiíjna 1999 podle pfiíslu‰nosti zvolen˘ch kandidátÛ k politick˘m stranám a uskupením Pfiíslu‰nost

Poãet poslancÛ zvolen˘ch na základû stranick˘ch listin

Poãet poslancÛ zvolen˘ch v jednomandátov˘ch obvodech

Poãet poslancÛ zvolen˘ch celkem

Republiková politická strana Otan

4

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Obãanská strana Kazachstánu

2

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Komunistická strana Kazachstánu

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Agrární strana Kazachstánu

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Republiková lidová strana Kazachstánu Lidovû-kooperativní strana Kazachstánu

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Business

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Provládní

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Ostatní/pfiíslu‰nost neznáma Celkem

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Zdroj: Republic of Kazakhstan – Parliamentary Elections. 10 and 24 October 1999. OSCE/ ODIHR Final Report, Warsaw, 20 January 2000, pp. 28.

45

Republic of Kazakhstan – Parliamentary Elections. 10 and 24 October 1999. OSCE/ODIHR Final Report, Warsaw, 20 January 2000, p. 2.

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Jádro proprezidentsk˘ch stran v souãasnosti tvofií Republiková politická strana Otan („Vlast“). Strana vznikla na poãátku roku 1999 okolo volebního ‰tábu vítûzného prezidentského kandidáta Nursultana Nazarbajeva cestou slouãení nejv˘znamnûj‰ích „progresivních“ sil ve spoleãnosti, vãetnû do té doby dominantní Strany lidové jednoty Kazachstánu, dále Demokratické strany Kazachstánu, Liberálního hnutí Kazachstánu, hnutí Za Kazachstán 2030 nebo Strany spravedlnosti. Funkci v˘konného pfiedsedy strany z povûfiení zastává od roku 2002 Amangeldy Jermegijajev. Na parlamentní pÛdû stranû Otan sekundují zvlá‰tû Obãanská strana Kazachstánu (první tajemník Azat Perua‰ev) a Agrární strana Kazachstánu (pfiedseda Ramin Madinov). K dal‰ím proprezidentsk˘m stranám, popfi. k reÏimem sponzorovan˘m uskupením tzv. konstruktivní opozice je moÏno fiadit Demokratickou stranu Kazachstánu Ak-Îol („Jasná cesta“, pfiedsedající Oraz Îandosov, Bolat Abilov a Alichan Bajmenov), Rolnickou sociálnû-demokratickou stranu Aul (pfiedseda Gani Kalyjev), Stranu obrození Kazachstánu (Altyn‰a‰ DÏaganova), Republikovou politickou stranu práce (BakytÏan Îumagulov), Republikovou demokratickou stranu Jel-Dana („Lidová moudrost“, v ãele Rau‰an Sarsembajeva), Lidovû-kooperativní stranu Kazachstánu (Umirzak Sarsenov) nebo Stranu patriotÛ Kazachstánu (Gani Kasymov). Síly stojící v protireÏimní opozici oproti tomu sdruÏuje Forum demokratick˘ch sil Kazachstánu, ustavené na podzim 1999 v reakci na zmanipulování parlamentních voleb. Vedle jiÏ etablovan˘ch stran, jako jsou Republiková lidová strana Kazachstánu (z exilu fiízená AkeÏanem KaÏegeldinem, odsouzen˘m roku 2001 v nepfiítomnosti k deseti letÛm odnûtí svobody), Komunistická strana Kazachstánu (první tajemník Serikbolsyn Abdildin) nebo Demokratická strana Kazachstánu Azamat („Obãan“, pfiedseda Galym Abilsiitov), na ãinnosti fora dále participují Strana sociální spravedlnosti a ekologické obrody Tabigat („Pfiíroda“, v ãele Mels Jeleusizov), hnutí dÛchodcÛ Pokolení (Irina Savostina), hnutí Orleu („Pokrok“, v ãele Seidachmet Kuttykadam), Dûlnické hnutí Kazachstánu Solidarita (v ãele Madel Ismailov, v minulosti pravomocnû odsouzen˘ na rok do vûzení za uráÏku hlavy státu), Republikové spoleãenské slovanské hnutí LAD („Soulad“, v ãele Viktor Michailov), stejnû jako Mezinárodní kanceláfi Kazachstánu na obranu lidsk˘ch práv a dodrÏování zákonnosti (Jevgenij Îovtis) nebo Asociace nezávisl˘ch elektronick˘ch hromadn˘ch sdûlovacích prostfiedkÛ Stfiední Asie (Rozlana Taukina). Od sklonku roku 2001 forum kooperuje s hnutím Demo-

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kratická volba Kazachstánu (zakladatelé GalymÏan Îakijanov a Muchtar Abljazov, oba t. ã. dlouhodobû na nucen˘ch pracích), iniciovan˘m skupinou mlad˘ch businessmanÛ, technokratÛ a regionálních elit v dÛsledku pnutí uvnitfi vládnoucí rodiny. Zvlá‰tní kategorii sil pÛsobících na republikové politické scénû tvofií ideologicky vyhranûné strany, hnutí a nátlakové skupiny kaza‰ské národní, popfi. radikálnû nacionalistické orientace. Urãitému vlivu se mohou tû‰it zejména v jiÏních regionech zemû. Nejv˘znamnûj‰í nacionalistickou silou v Kazachstánu od poãátku 90. let zÛstává Národní strana Kazachstánu Ala‰ (transformována do dne‰ní podoby byla na jafie 1999 na základû Republikové strany Kazachstánu Azat) v ãele se Sabetkazy Akatajem. K dal‰ím uskupením tohoto druhu je moÏno fiadit Obãanské hnutí Kazachstánu Azat („Svobodn˘“, v ãele Chasen KoÏachmet) nebo dfiíve na platformû Azatu pod t˘mÏ vedením pÛsobící v˘bor, resp. strana Îeltoksan („Prosinec“, usilující pÛvodnû o rehabilitaci osob persekvovan˘ch v souvislosti s almaatsk˘mi nepokoji z prosince 1986). Stávajícím reÏimem jsou tyto síly, dokud jejich kritika adresovaná na hlavu státu za provozovanou „protinárodní“ politiku doma, popfi. za pfiíli‰né „ústupky“ Kazachstánu na mezinárodní scénû nepfiesahuje rámec únosn˘ch mezí, zpravidla tolerovány. Nepfiedstavují pro souãasné pomûry hrozbu a ani jejich ãinnost nebo cíle nemusejí vÏdy nutnû kolidovat s reálnû prosazovan˘m kursem státního vedení. V souladu s jiÏ jmenovan˘m zákonem o politick˘ch stranách z 15. ãervence 2002 byla v Kazachstánu zahájena povinná pfieregistrace v‰ech politick˘ch stran legálnû pÛsobících v zemi. Lze pfiedpokládat, Ïe po ukonãení této procedury, plánovaném pÛvodnû na poãátek roku 2003, se jejich spektrum v˘raznû redukuje.

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pravené postavení poãetné ruské (slovanské) men‰iny. Reáln˘ vnitropolitick˘ kurz Kazachstánu (nutno odli‰ovat od rétoriky elit) nabírá i na tûch nejniωích úrovních (pfiijímání do zamûstnání atp.) zfietelnû etnokratické zabarvení, coÏ se s ohledem na komplikovan˘ národnostní profil Kazachstánu mÛÏe do budoucna stát zdrojem nárÛstu etnického napûtí, a tím i destabilizace celospoleãenské situace. Druh˘m zdrojem politické nestability Kazachstánu, s ohledem na generaãní podmínûnost vládnoucí elity, se pak mÛÏe ukázat absence efektivních, obecnû akceptovan˘ch mechanismÛ pfiechodu nejvy‰‰í moci ve státû. Volba konkrétního prezidentova nástupce, zdá se, definitivnû zatím nepadla. Jisté je nicménû to, Ïe dobrovolnû Nursultan Nazarbajev nepfiedá svou moc nikomu, v kom nebude spatfiovat spolehlivého garanta vlastní nedotknutelnosti, zachování dosavadních privilegií a v˘sad, vãetnû majetkov˘ch, a koho nebude moci ovlivÀovat i po svém eventuálním odchodu z politické scény; to okruh potenciálních adeptÛ na prezidentské následnictví znaãnû omezuje, s pfiihlédnutím k tradicionalisticko-patriarchálním hodnotám koãovného kaza‰ského venkova, v jehoÏ prostfiedí Nursultan Nazarbajev vyrÛstal, dost moÏná pouze na ãleny jeho rodiny.46 S ohledem na zv˘‰enou citlivost Kazachstánu vÛãi vnûj‰ím vlivÛm existuje prostor pro konstruktivní angaÏmá mezinárodního spoleãenství, které pfii dÛsledném vyuÏívání v‰ech dostupn˘ch mechanismÛ, vãetnû tûch v rámci OBSE s jejími standardy v oblasti demokracie a dodrÏování lidsk˘ch práv, mÛÏe sehrát pozitivní roli pfii pfiechodu postkomunistického Kazachstánu k více vyspûl˘m formám spoleãenského uspofiádání.

V˘hled V nejbliωích letech je moÏno v Kazachstánu oãekávat pravdûpodobnû pokraãování procesu konsolidace mocensko-politického systému osobní (rodinné) vlády Nursultana Nazarbajeva, pfiípadnû i za cenu rostoucí opory reÏimu o represivní aparát. Ve stfiednûdobém a dlouhodobém horizontu jsou v‰ak perspektivy dal‰ího v˘voje nejasné. V˘bûr moÏn˘ch scénáfiÛ sahá od tûch problémov˘ch aÏ po pesimistické, v závislosti na fiadû vnitfiních i vnûj‰ích faktorÛ. Kritick˘m aspektem reÏimu zÛstává zejména neu-

46

K moÏn˘m scénáfiÛm transferu nejvy‰‰í moci v Kazachstánu viz Kto budet prejemnikom Nazarbajeva? APR. 30. 10. 2002. Analitiãeskij doklad o vozmoÏnych variantach peredaãi vlasti v Kazachstane. SluÏba politiãeskogo analiza Central’noaziatskogo agenstva politiãeskich issledovanij (APR). URL [17. 2. 2003].

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V ˘ v o j v p o s t - k o l o n i á l n í m T á d Ï i k i s t á n u : k l a n y v p r o c e s u b u d o v á n í s t á t u]

13. V˘voj v post-koloniálním TádÏikistánu: klany v procesu budování státu TomበMuÏík

Politick˘ v˘voj v postsovûtském TádÏikistánu se odvíjí od nestabilního politického prostfiedí a nedostateãnû ukotven˘ch institucí novû nezávislého státu. TádÏikistán vznikl z rozliãn˘ch a nesourod˘ch regionÛ, které historicky spadaly na území stfiedoasijsk˘ch muslimsk˘ch emirátÛ, Buchary, Kókandu a Samarkandu. Území dne‰ního TádÏikistánu bylo integrováno do jednoho politického celku teprve v prÛbûhu sovûtské kolonizace Stfiední Asie. Proces „sovûtizace“ sám o sobû popfiel ve‰keré geografické, etnické i kulturní reálie stfiedoasijského regionu. TádÏikistán tedy nevznikl na základû etnicko-nacionalistického projektu tádÏick˘ch elit, n˘brÏ jako produkt sovûtské koloniální politiky. Budování státu na ãlenitém a pfieváÏnû horském území dne‰ního TádÏikistánu vÏdy naráÏelo na silné regionální a klanové identity, které pÛsobily a dodnes pÛsobí jako alternativní mocenské struktury. Základní jednotkou klanové struktury je avlod. PÛvodnû rodová pospolitost dnes funguje jako dobfie organizovaná sociální jednotka spjatá reáln˘m ãi sociálnû konstruovan˘m pfiíbuzensk˘m vztahem. Vedle základní sociální identity klan sv˘m ãlenÛm zaji‰Èuje pfiedev‰ím ochranu v politické, hospodáfiské i sociální oblasti.1 Spoleãensk˘ dopad klanové struktury v TádÏikistánu je o to vût‰í,

1

Pro potfieby této práce mÛÏeme klany definovat jako spoleãenské celky ustavující vazby solidarity mezi sv˘mi ãleny. Tyto vazby jsou zaloÏeny na ‰iroké síti horizontálních a vertikálních vztahÛ, pfiiãemÏ základním sociálním poutem mezi ãleny je rodov˘ pfiíbuzensk˘ vztah. Horizontálními vztahy rozumíme reáln˘ ãi fiktivní pfiíbuzensk˘ vztah ustavující dÛvûru mezi ãleny. Vertikální vztahy oznaãují pouto mezi fiadov˘mi ãleny a elitami. Bez ohledu na spoleãenskou pozici jednoho kaÏdého ãlena jsou v‰ichni povinni dbát o blahu klanu jako celku. Poviností klanov˘ch elit je poskytovat pomoc a ochranu fiadov˘m ãlenÛm. ¤adoví ãlenové elitám na oplátku garantují osobní oddanost a uznání v˘sadního postavení pfiedákÛ klanu, viz Collins K., Clans, Pacts and Politics in Central Asia. In: Journal of Democracy, Vol 13, No 3, July 2002, str. 147.

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Ïe v zásadû splynul se základním regionálním vymezením jednotliv˘ch podskupin tádÏické populace. Z hlediska politického procesu pÛsobí klanové struktury jako základní brzda politické centralizace shora. V dÛsledku obãanské války v TádÏikistánu nûkteré klany paradoxnû získaly auru ochráncÛ a spojencÛ státní moci. Vztah mezi státní mocí a klanov˘mi strukturami je kaÏdopádnû velmi ambivalentní a nerovn˘. V podmínkách slabû ukotvené státní moci formální instituce ãasto poskytují hlavní arénu mocenskému soupefiení mezi klany. TádÏikové náleÏí k západoíránské jazykové vûtvi. TádÏická identita se ve Stfiední Asii vztahuje k sedentarizovan˘m persky mluvícím sunnitÛm. Obyãejnû nezahrnovala nomády a kmeny. Ostatní majoritní etnika v postsovûtské Stfiední Asii (Uzbeci, Kaza‰i, Kyrgyzové a Turkmeni) jsou turkického pÛvodu. Obyvatelé Horního Badach‰ánu, tzv. Hor‰tí TádÏikové, zvaní téÏ Pamífiané, na rozdíl od etnick˘ch TádÏikÛ mluví jazyky spadajícími do v˘chodoíránské jazykové vûtve, které se od tádÏické per‰tiny znaãnû li‰í. Pamífiané sestávají z mnoha národností a jazykov˘ch skupin. Hlásí se k ‰í’itské ismá‘ílíjské vûtvi islámu. Etnicko-jazykové dûlení v regionu ale komplikuje tradiãní mísení tádÏické a uzbecké populace. Mnoho ãlenÛ mûstsk˘ch komunit Ïije v dvojjazyãném prostfiedí, napfiíklad mûstské uzbecké populace ãasto pfiijaly per‰tinu jako svou rodnou fieã. Per‰tina a turkické jazyky také v regionu zaujímaly specifické funkce a nevztahovaly se v˘hradnû k etnickému ãi teritoriálnímu ãlenûní.2 Oproti historicky podloÏenému etnicko-jazykovému dûlení sovûti vytvofiili novou tádÏickou národní identitu.3 V rámci sovûtského federálního zfiízení tádÏická národnost jed-

2

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Napfiíklad timuridská fií‰e v patnáctém století formalizovala pfiednostní pouÏívání turkického a perského jazyka v jednotliv˘ch oblastech: politicko-vojenské záleÏitosti byly projednávány v turkickém jazyce, zatímco o finanãních a administrativních záleÏitostech se jednalo v per‰tinû. Viz: Rubin, B. R., Russian hegemony and the state breakdown in the periphery: Causes and consequences of the civil war in Tajikistan, in: Rubin, B. R. and Snyder, J. (eds): Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building. London: 1998, str. 137. O rozdûlení sovûtské Stfiední Asie do jednotliv˘ch etno-národních celkÛ, viz.: Sengupta, Anita: Imperatives of national territorial delimitation and the fate of Bukhara1917–1924. In: Central Asian Survey (2000), 19 (3/4), str. 397–418. Zajímav˘ náhled na roli místních bol‰evick˘ch elit pfii sovûtském dûlení Stfiední Asie sk˘tá anal˘za âiãerinov˘ch dopisÛ (lidov˘ komisafi pro zahraniãní otázky 1923–1930) ãlenÛm sovûtského polibyra, viz Karasar, H. A.: Chicherin on the delimitation of Turkestan: native Bolsheviks versus Soviet foreign policy. Seven letters from the Russian archives on razmezhevanie. In: Central Asian Survey (2002) 21(2), str. 199–209.

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nodu‰e sdruÏovala v‰echna stfiedoasijská etnika na území SSSR, která mluvila nûkter˘m z íránsk˘ch jazykÛ. Rozpad Sovûtského svazu zastihl svazovou republiku TádÏikistán zcela nepfiipravenou na pfiechod k nezávislosti. Kolaps státních institucí umoÏnil rozmach neformálních klanov˘ch mocensk˘ch struktur, které se za sovûtského období pfieorganizovaly na silné ekonomické a politické zájmové skupiny. Zde je tfieba podotknout, Ïe sovûtská moc de facto vyuÏila tradiãní struktury klanové spoleãnosti. Kolektivizace a budování velk˘ch zemûdûlsk˘ch druÏstev, kolchozÛ, zachovalo struktury tradiãních avlodÛ. Ze v‰ech sovûtsk˘ch republik byl TádÏikistán tou nejchud‰í a nejvíce závislou na externí pomoci, resp. na toku financí z Moskvy. Závislost na externí vojenské a hospodáfiské pomoci pfietrvává jiÏ druhé desetiletí od rozpadu SSSR. Dne‰ní národní dÛchod z jedné tfietiny zaji‰Èuje zahraniãní hospodáfiská pomoc, druhá tfietina spadá do ‰edé ekonomiky, které vévodí obchod s narkotiky. Podle odhadÛ tádÏického opoziãního novináfie D. Atovullojeva je ‰edesát procent populace TádÏikistánu odkázáno na pfiíjmy tádÏick˘ch gastarbeiterÛ, ktefií za v˘dûlkem ode‰li do Ruska.4 Ekonomické ukazatele sice mohou b˘t lehce nadnesené, stále v‰ak poukazují na obrovsk˘ hospodáfisk˘ propad, kter˘ postihl ‰iroké vrstvy tádÏické populace v dÛsledku zániku sovûtského systému a následné obãanské války. Z pohledu ukotvení státních institucí a identifikace obãanÛ se státní mocí lze TádÏikistán oznaãit za nejslab‰í stát v postsovûtské Stfiední Asii, a to i navzdory silné regionální „konkurenci“ v podobû Turkmenba‰yho pitoreskní totalitní diktatury v Turkmenistánu a Kyrgyzstánu procházejícího od „tulipánové“ revoluce (jaro 2005) vleklou politickou krizí. Otevfien˘ konflikt a rozpad státní moci na poãátku devadesát˘ch let je‰tû posílil tradiãní vliv paralelních mocensk˘ch struktur. Rodové a regionální klany byly základní jednotkou mocensk˘ch formací bûhem obãanské války. Po ukonãení bojÛ provládní klany infiltrovaly formální instituce. Politická soutûÏ ustoupila logice mocenského boje a neformálních paktÛ mezi vládnoucím klanem prezidenta Rahmónóva a dal‰ími neformálními akté-

ry. Vládnoucí reÏim posvûtil logiku klanového soupefiení jako obecn˘ princip politické soutûÏe.5 Nûkteré z mocn˘ch klanov˘ch formací se v dÛsledku politického a hospodáfiského v˘voje v devadesát˘ch letech v˘raznû kriminalizovaly. Kriminalizace klanÛ a nezávisl˘ch polních velitelÛ dnes pfiedstavuje hlavní rizikov˘ faktor z hlediska bezpeãnosti TádÏikistánu.6 Aãkoliv lze souãasn˘ politick˘ reÏim v Du‰anbe oznaãit za relativnû stabilní, politická trajektorie vládní garnitury prezidenta Rachmónóva stojí a padá s podporou jednoho z regionálních mocensk˘ch klanÛ v zemi a tûÏko by pfieÏila bez v˘razné vojenské a hospodáfiské podpory Ruska. Klany, polní velitelé a sítû organizovaného zloãinu stále úspû‰nû parazitují na státní administrativû. Tato práce se zab˘vá problematikou budování státu a mocensk˘ch vztahÛ v post-koloniálním TádÏikistánu. Vzhledem k rozsahu pfiíspûvku si autor neklade za cíl podat ucelen˘ obraz postkoloniální historie TádÏikistánu, n˘brÏ zasadit do obecn˘ch souvislostí pÛsobení klanov˘ch a regionálních mocensk˘ch struktur v TádÏikistánu. Rámec práce se opírá o následující faktory: 1. strukturální problémy TádÏikistánu spjaté s dûdictvím sovûtského systému a nepfiipraveností domácích elit na pfiechod k nezávislosti; 2. ústup moderního státu a státotvorného nacionalismu ve prospûch regionálních klanov˘ch struktur a jejich následn˘ boj o moc; 3. vznik regionální zóny nestability poukazující na propojenost afghánské otázky s dûním v TádÏikistánu a pfiítomnost mocn˘ch regionálních hráãÛ, ktefií mají zájem na udrÏení nestabilního politického prostfiedí a slabé centrální vlády v Du‰anbe.

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Atovullojev dále odhaduje, Ïe dvacet pût procent obyvatel Ïije z obchodu s drogami a patnáct procent ze zahraniãní pomoci a pÛjãek, citováno in: Cornell, S., The Narcotics Threat in Greater Central Asia: From Crime-Terror Nexus to State Infiltration? China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 4, No. 1 (2006), str. 41.

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Viz napfi. Nouzharov, K., Saviours of the nation or robber barons? Warlord politics in Tajikistan. In: Central Asian Survey (June 2005) 24 (2), str. 109–130. Viz napfi.: Oliker, O., Szayna, T. S., Sources of conflict and paths to U.S. involvement, In: Oliker, O., Szayna, T. S. (eds)., Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the US Army, RAND Corporation: 2003, str. 324, v elektronické verzi k náhledu na www.rand.org.

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TádÏikistán v roce nula: budování státu a proces sovûtizace Nejprve se blíÏe podívejme na problematické dûdictví, které sovûtsk˘ systém TádÏikistánu zanechal. Existenãní potíÏe TádÏikistánu jako samostatného státu vycházejí v prvé fiadû jiÏ z jeho materiální/fyzické základny, geografického a geopolitického vymezení a etnické skladby obyvatelstva. Problémy spjaté s materiální základnou státu dále umocnila sovûtská koloniální politika a tzv. „proces sovûtizace“. Základní pilífie státnosti nezávislého TádÏikistánu, tj. území, obyvatelstvo a institucionální rámec, se opírají o velmi vratké základy. Historické dûdictví postsovûtsk˘ch stfiedoasijsk˘ch republik obecnû a TádÏikistánu zvlá‰tû nezahrnuje atributy moderního vestfálského národního státu.7 Hranice pûtky postsovûtsk˘ch státÛ ve Stfiední Asii nevycházejí z geografick˘ch ani etnografick˘ch realit regionu. Smyslem takového uspofiádání nebylo ustavit siln˘ národní stát, ale naopak rozdrobit odpor místního obyvatelstva vÛãi sovûtské administrativû v duchu pravidla ‚rozdûl a panuj‘. Bûhem XIX. a XX. století aÏ do nástupu bol‰evické vlády ve Stfiední Asii byla vût‰ina území dne‰ního TádÏikistánu pod správou nezávisl˘ch chanátÛ a kmenov˘ch vládcÛ, vût‰ina z nich se nacházela ve vazalském vztahu k emíru z Buchary.8 Av‰ak i mocní buchar‰tí emífii ovládali místní feudální vládce pouze formálnû. Státní moc v rozlehl˘ch horsk˘ch oblastech TádÏikistánu nemohla konkurovat struktufie tradiãní klanové spoleãnosti. Éru muslimsk˘ch vládcÛ postupnû ukonãil mocensk˘ prÛnik carského, resp. sovûtského Ruska do Stfiední Asie.9 Rusové tradiãnû usilovali o pfiízeÀ turkestánsk˘ch muslimÛ v rámci geopolitického soupefiení s dal‰í imperiální mocností, Británií. Vût‰inu budoucích sovûtsk˘ch drÏav ve Stfied-

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Pro komparativní anal˘zu procesu budování státu v Evropû a dne‰ní Stfiední Asii viz.: Menon, R., Spruyt, H.: Possibilities for conflict and conflict resolution in post-Soviet CA, str. 104, in: Rubin V. B. R. and Snyder J. (eds), Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building. London 1998, str. 104. Buchara padla do rukou carsk˘ch vojsk v roce 1866. O dva roky se Buchara stala rusk˘m protektorátem. V roce 1920 byla znovu dobyta bol‰evick˘mi vojsky. Dne‰ní pûtka postsovûtsk˘ch stfiedoasijsk˘ch republik se nachází na západní ãásti území, které bylo díky pfiítomnosti muslimsk˘ch turkick˘ch kmenÛ známé jako Turkestán. Západní Turkestán ovládlo Rusko. V˘chodní Turkestán je dnes souãástí âíny a zahrnuje území Ujghurské autonomní oblasti.

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ní Asii získalo carské Rusko zhruba do sedmdesát˘ch let devatenáctého století. Car ovládal dobytá území skrze Turkestánsk˘ vrchní guvernorát, jehoÏ administrativa se nesnaÏila zásadním zpÛsobem reformovat místní turkestánská etnika. ·lo jí spí‰e o bezpeãnostní zaji‰tûní strategické jiÏní hranice ruského impéria. ¤íjnová revoluce zastihla region v období rozmachu modernizaãních politick˘ch proudÛ, pfiedev‰ím nacionalismu, panturkismu a muslimského reformního hnutí, tzv. dÏadídistÛ. Následné období úpadku centrální moci na území carského Turkestánského vrchního guvernorátu vyústilo v prosovûtsk˘ pfievrat a zfiízení Autonomní sovûtské republiky Turkestán (hlavním mûstem nového celku zÛstal Ta‰kent). Bol‰evici pragmaticky vsadili na strategii získání image obráncÛ kolonizovan˘ch národÛ pfied imperiálními mocnostmi, tj. pfiedev‰ím carsk˘m Ruskem a Británií. Formulování bol‰evické politiky vÛãi nacionalistick˘m hnutím v kolonizovan˘ch zemích bylo pfiedmûtem podrobn˘ch debat na II. sjezdu Komunistické internacionály (Kominterny) v ãervenci a srpnu roku 1920. Lenin zde prosadil názor, Ïe burÏoaznû-nacionalistická etapa v b˘val˘ch koloniích je nutnou fází v˘voje k proletáfiské revoluci. Odtud vze‰la povinnost komunistick˘ch vlád napomáhat nacionalisticko-osvobozeneck˘m hnutím v boji s imperiálními mocnostmi.10 Ve skuteãnosti ale bol‰evici pokraãovali v carské imperialistické politice a upevÀování ruského vlivu ve Stfiední Asii. V regionu také pfievzali agendu boje proti hnutí odporu guerillov˘ch muslimsk˘ch bojovníkÛ (tzv. basmaãijÛ) vÛãi imperiální kolonizaãní politice, které získalo masov˘ charakter v dÛsledku násiln˘ch odvodÛ do carské armády a konfiskace stád pro ruskou armádu v letech 1916–1917.11 Jedním z hlavních úkolÛ prosovûtské vlády v Ta‰kentu bylo uskuteãnit pfievrat v posledních muslimsk˘ch autonomních celcích, Buchafie a Chivû. Za pomoci Rudé armády a levicového kfiídla bucharsk˘ch dÏadídístÛ se jí pfiání Moskvy v roce 1920 rychle podafiilo splnit.12 Sovûti dokonali ovlád-

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Viz Sengupta, A., cit. d. Viz napfi. Paksoy, H. B., „Basmachi“: Turkistan national liberation movement 1916–1930s. In: The Modern Encyclopedia of Religions in Russia and the Soviet Union, Florida 1991, Vol. 4, str. 5–20, v elektronické verzi na http://www.angelfire.com/on/paksoy/basmachi.html. Viz.: Khalid, A., Society and politics in Bukhara, 1868–1920. In: Central Asian Survey (2000), 19(3/ 4), 367–396.

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nutí Turkestánu zaloÏením Bucharské lidové socialistické republiky (1920– 23), která v‰ak formálnû nebyla zaãlenûna do Sovûtského svazu (1922).13 Vznik prosovûtsk˘ch republik neznamenal definitivní územní dûlení v Turkestánu. Na základû Stalinovy národnostní politiky byl sovûtsk˘ Turkestán bûhem roku 1924 rozdûlen na tfii nové sovûtské republiky: Kazachskou SSR, Uzbeckou SSR a Turkmenskou SSR. V rámci Uzbekistánu také byla zfiízena Autonomní socialistická republika TádÏikistán. V roce 1929 Moskva vyãlenila TádÏikistán z Uzbecké SSR jiÏ jako samostatnou republiku. K tomuto rozhodnutí ji patrnû pfiivedly sovûtské zahraniãnûpolitické zájmy a mûnící se regionální kontext. Moskva chtûla ve Stfiední Asii vybudovat persanofonní politick˘ celek, skrze kter˘ by mohla kontrolovat území spadající do perské kulturní oblasti (tu tvofiila vedle ãástí ruského Turkestánu zejména Persie a Afghánistán). Aby sovûti dostáli závazku, Ïe kaÏdá svazová republika má mít nejménû jeden milión obyvatel, pfiifiadili k TádÏikistánu i chodÏentsk˘ distrikt ve Ferghanském údolí, kter˘ byl nedílnou souãástí uzbeckého etnického a jazykového prostoru ve Ferghanû.14 ChodÏent historicky spadal do Kókandského chanátu, nacházel se tedy pod ruskou vládou jiÏ od roku 1860 a oproti zaostalému zbytku TádÏikistánu byl mnohem více rozvinut˘. OdtrÏení ChodÏentu od Uzbekistánu bylo místními Uzbeky vnímáno jako kfiivda. Díky kulturní a etnické spfiíznûnosti si Uzbekistán v této oblasti udrÏel svou sféru vlivu, coÏ se projevilo pfiedev‰ím v poãáteãní fázi obãanské války. ChodÏentská inteligence po roce 1929 postupnû získala stûÏejní vliv v Komunistické stranû TádÏikistánu. Tento historick˘ v˘voj je tfieba mít na pamûti, pokud chceme pochopit boj regionálních identit se snahami o centralizaci politického systému na území TádÏikistánu. Politická geografie TádÏikistánu zásadním zpÛsobem ovlivÀuje povahu politického prostfiedí v TádÏikistánu. Pozemní komunikaci mezi jednotliv˘mi ãástmi TádÏikistánu znemoÏÀují hfiebeny Pamíru, které

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Sovûtská moc na území Turkestánu v letech 1919–1924 pfiedstavovala spletitou síÈ vzájemnû si konkurujících mocensk˘ch center, hlavní slovo v‰ak vÏdy mûl moskevsk˘ Stfiedoasijsk˘ úfiad Ústfiedního v˘boru (Sredazbjuro Centralkomitûta). Viz: Keller, S., The Central Asian Bureau, an essential tool in governing Soviet Turkestan, in: Central Asian Survey (June/September, 2003) 22 (2/3), str. 281– 297. ChodÏent byl pozdûji sovûty pfiejmenován na Leninobód. V devadesát˘ch letech byla celá oblast pfiejmenována na Sogd. Dle místních zvyklostí se v‰ak stále nejvíce pouÏívají pfiedchozí dva zaÏité názvy.

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na jihov˘chodû zcela oddûlují Horsk˘ Badach‰án. Zeraf‰ánské pohofií od sebe oddûluje také západní ãásti TádÏikistánu. Celkovû mÛÏeme rozli‰it pût základních regionÛ, které vykazují specifické geografické, etnografické, kulturní a politické rysy: Na jihov˘chodû je to Horsk˘ Badach‰án, kter˘ zaujímá bezmála polovinu celkového území TádÏikistánu, pfiiãemÏ jeho obyvatelé tvofií pouhá tfii procenta ‰esti miliónové populace TádÏikistánu. Na severu leÏí izolovan˘ ChodÏent/Leninabád, kter˘ geograficky spadá do Ferghanské kotliny, je tedy mnohem bliωí Uzbekistánu a Kyrgyzstánu neÏ TádÏikistánu. Následuje oblast Du‰anbe a západní Hissarské údolí. Dále Garm (údolí Garm a Karategin) na severov˘chodû, kter˘ jiÏ tradiãnû nejvíce uniká vlivu centrální vlády. Na jihu leÏí dvû samostatné oblasti, Kuljób a Kurgan Tjube, které byly po válce spojeny do Chatlonské oblasti. Hlavní vnitropolitické dûlení probíhá mezi severní Leninobódskou oblastí a jiÏními regiony.15 Geografickou rozpolcenost doplnila sovûtská hospodáfiská politika. Z hlediska tvorby domácího produktu prÛmyslová v˘roba16 silnû zaostávala za extenzivní zemûdûlskou v˘robou, i ta v‰ak byla jednostrannû orientována na produkci bavlny. Násilná kolektivizace zemûdûlské produkce a pfiechod k extenzivnímu pûstování bavlny pfieru‰ily regionální ekonomickou strukturu a posléze vedly také k radikálním zmûnám mocensk˘ch a spoleãensk˘ch pomûrÛ. Základní ãlenûní tradiãní klanové spoleãnosti v‰ak sovûtsk˘ systém zachoval. Tradiãní feudální a klanové elity pfieváÏnû splynuly s moderními sovûtsk˘mi elitami. Nová distribuce politické a ekonomické moci pÛvodnû vycházela ze vzorcÛ spoleãensk˘ch promûn, které nastavila sovûtská správa.17 Sovûtská politická kontrola TádÏikistánu vycházela ze zaji‰Èování statkÛ v sociální a ekonomické oblasti. TádÏikistán vykazoval charakteristiku tzv. státu-rentiéra, tj. státu, jehoÏ rozpoãet je hrazen pfieváÏnû z externích finanãních zdrojÛ. Na konci sovûtského období TádÏikistán pfiijímal polovinu svého rozpoãtu z Moskvy.18 Dal‰í ãást pfií15 16 17 18

Pro podrobnûj‰í politicko-geografick˘ popis, viz: Horák S., Stfiední Asie mezi V˘chodem a Západem. Praha 2005, str. 139–148. PrÛmysl byl zastoupen pfieváÏnû textilními bavlnáfisk˘mi závody ve Ferghanské kotlinû a jednou vût‰í továrnou na zpracování hliníku v Hissarském údolí. V˘bornou sociologickou anal˘zu povahy a obmûn elit v TádÏikistánu a Stfiední Asii obecnû pfiedstavuje Roy O., La nouvelle Asie Centrale, ou la fabrication des nations? Paris 1997. Rubin B. R., The Fragmentation of Tajikistan. In: Survival, (1994) 35:4, str. 71–91.

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jmÛ pfiímo závisela na prodeji tádÏické bavlny na sovûtském vnitfiním trhu, pfieváÏnû do textilních zpracovatelsk˘ch závodÛ v Rusku. SklizeÀ bavlny navíc byla nemyslitelná bez sovûtsk˘ch dodávek hnojiva a pohonn˘ch hmot. Konec sovûtského hospodáfiského systému tedy zanechal obyvatele TádÏikistánu v tíÏivé sociálnû-ekonomické situaci. Ztráta sovûtské finanãní a hospodáfiské pomoci podnítila boj jednotliv˘ch mocensk˘ch frakcí o pfiístup ke zb˘vajícím zdrojÛm. Na tuto situaci logicky doplatil stát. Státní instituce fakticky pfiestaly fungovat ve chvíli, kdy státní rozpoãet pfii‰el o vût‰inu sv˘ch pfiíjmÛ. Po násilné sovûtizaci hospodáfiství se sovûtská správa zamûfiila na poloÏení základÛ moderního socialistického zfiízení, pfiedev‰ím ‰kolství, národních kulturních institucí atd. Sovûtsk˘m etno-federálním institucím se skuteãnû do jisté míry podafiilo zapustit kofieny moderní tádÏické národní identity. Av‰ak s tím rozdílem, Ïe spontánní historick˘ proces vzniku národní identity musely nahradit umûle vytvofien˘m ideologick˘m nábojem. Úspûch sovûtského politického inÏen˘rství mûl své limity. Sovûtizace tradiãní spoleãnosti a pfiínosy tohoto procesu v sociální a hospodáfiské oblasti zcela nekompenzovaly nedostateãnû zakotvenou tádÏickou identitu v politické oblasti. Sovûtské koloniální uspofiádání neumoÏnilo vznik koherentní státotvorné elity, která by sdílela kolektivní vizi jednotného tádÏického národa.19 Sovûtsk˘ TádÏikistán nezahrnoval centra perské tádÏické kultury ve Stfiední Asii, Bucharu a Samarkand. Tato mûsta pfiipadla Uzbekistánu, obklopena turkick˘mi koãovn˘mi a venkovsk˘mi populacemi. Slabé institucionální zázemí státu znemoÏnilo rozmach obãanského nacionalismu a naopak posílilo jednotlivé regionální a lokální identity. Vedle sovûtské koloniální politiky pramení slabiny tádÏického státotvorného projektu i z tádÏické kolektivní identity a historie. V politické rovinû nemohl tádÏick˘ nacionalismus ãerpat z politické historie v období pfied vpádem bol‰evikÛ do Stfiední Asie, jelikoÏ i zde chybûl odkaz na jednotnou moderní státnost. Navíc by i pfii dobré vÛli bylo velmi tûÏké nastavit geografické hranice v regionu tak, aby dokázaly zahrnout rozpt˘lenou

a promíchanou tádÏickou populaci do jednoho celku. Pokud bychom pfiijali Gellnerovu koncepci nacionalismu (tj. politické pfiesvûdãení, Ïe etnické a teritoriální hranice by se mûly pfiekr˘vat), tak nezb˘vá neÏ konstatovat, Ïe TádÏikové skuteãnû nebyli zrozeni pro souÏití v jednom národním státû a jiÏ vÛbec ne pro souÏití ve státû zfiízeném dle stalinistické národnostní koncepce.20 Ve stfiedoasijském regionu je zkrátka zcela nemoÏné vymezit ucelen˘ prostor, kter˘ by uspokojil poÏadavek na pfiekrytí etnické a teritoriální hranice tádÏické populace. Stejnû jako v pfiípadû afghánsk˘ch etnik se i TádÏikové v postsovûtském prostoru hlásí k etnické identitû, která se primárnû neopírá o jednotné území a jazyk. Vznik moderního sovûtského státu ve Stfiední Asii skrze násilnou centralizaci shora za souãasného popfiení místních sociálních realit a soupefiení místních klanov˘ch elit o podíl na státní moci dal vzniknout obrovskému konfliktnímu potenciálu, kter˘ se plnû projevil v momentu odtrÏení stfiedoasijsk˘ch republik od centrálních moskevsk˘ch institucí. Pfiechod k nezávislosti: rozpad státu, nástup klanÛ Zánik sovûtského impéria TádÏikistánu prakticky vnutil pfiechod k nezávislosti. Místní elity ale nebyly na nezávislost pfiipraveny a hlavnû o ni neusilovaly.21 Vláda v Du‰anbe pfii‰la o hlavní ekonomické zdroje, které stát poskytoval obyvatelÛm v˘mûnou za jejich poslu‰nost. Rozpad SSSR zanechal obyvatele TádÏikistánu v obrovské nejistotû, která se urychlenû projevila dynamickou sociální mobilizací. Na konci roku 1991 byl ve zmanipulovan˘ch prezidentsk˘ch volbách zvolen Rahmón Nabijev, komunistick˘ vÛdce a pfiedstavitel leninobódského/chodÏentského klanu, kter˘ získal hlavní podíl na státní moci bûhem sovûtského zfiízení. Nabijev se snaÏil omezit vliv sílící demokratické a islamistické opozice. Opoziãní pfiedáci v bfieznu 1992 zareagovali svoláním protikomunistick˘ch demonstrací do hlavního mûsta. VÛdci prokomunistick˘ch KuljóbcÛ, druhé mocenské skupiny ve státû, odpovûdûli v kvûtnu demonstracemi na podporu vlády a brzy 20

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Na velké ãásti vlastního území TádÏikistánu vÛbec neexistovala místní vzdûlaná elita. V˘chodní Buchara patfiila k nejvíce zaostal˘m regionÛm sovûtské Stfiední Asie. Vzdûlané elity, které v TádÏikistánu pfievzaly roli nositele sovûtské tádÏické identity, pocházely vût‰inou z fiad bucharsk˘ch a samarkandsk˘ch emigrantÛ.

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21

Pro Gellnerovu koncepci nacionalismu viz.: Gellner, E., Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca, New York 1983. Brill-Olcott M., Nationbuilding and ethnicity in the foreign policies of the new Central Asian states. In: Szporluk, R. (ed.): National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. Armonk 1994, str. 209.

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se ocitli v ozbrojeném stfietu s opozicí. Boje se pfielily také do jiÏních ãástí TádÏikistánu.22 JelikoÏ chodÏentsk˘ klan nedisponoval vojenskou silou na jihu, kde se v rámci nov˘ch politick˘ch stran chopili zbraní horalé z Garmu a Pamífiané, chodÏen‰tí vyzvali k utvofiení vojenské aliance spfiíznûn˘ kuljóbsk˘ klan. Ten jiÏ mezitím aktivizoval mnoho bojovníkÛ z kuljóbsk˘ch podzemních mafiánsk˘ch struktur. Jedním z nejv˘znamûj‰ích mafiánsk˘ch bosÛ na stranû kuljóbcÛ byl bobo Sangak Safarov, známá postava v podsvûtí b˘valého Sovûtského svazu.23 Prezident (resp. pfiedseda Nejvy‰‰ího sovûtu) Nabijev v kvûtnu 1992 osobnû dohlédl, aby byly muÏÛm Sangaka Safarova vydány kala‰nikovy ze státních rezerv. Prezident také z kuljóbsk˘ch ozbrojencÛ sestavil Prezidentskou gardu. V záfií se ale kuljób‰tí ozbrojenci Nabijeva zbavili a v listopadu jiÏ pod taktovkou Sangaka Safarova parlament republiky na zvlá‰tním zasedání v ChodÏentu jmenoval prezidentem do té doby neznámého kuljóbského aparátãíka, Emómali Rahmónóva.24 Prorahmónóvská Lidová fronta pod vedením Sangaka Safarova v prosinci dobyla Du‰anbe. K Lidové frontû (LF) se pfiidali nejrÛznûj‰í polní velitelé z kuljóbsk˘ch, hissarsk˘ch a uzbeck˘ch frakcí. Proti nim válãily milice garmsk˘ch a pamírsk˘ch velitelÛ, které se hlásily ke Sjednocené tádÏické opozici (STO). Obãanská válka probíhala formou postupného zapojování jednotliv˘ch regionálních skupin, pfiiãemÏ hlavní slovo na obou stranách drÏeli klanoví pfiedáci a nezávislí polní velitelé.25 Boje se neomezovaly jen na stfiety mezi provládním táborem a Spojenou tádÏickou opozicí. Polní velitelé si ãasto vyfiizovali i vlastní úãty v rámci jednotliv˘ch spojeneck˘ch blokÛ, pfiiãemÏ jejich základním motivaãním faktorem bylo zaji‰tûní pfiístupu k ekonomick˘m zdrojÛm – velk˘m kolchozÛm a bavlníkov˘m plantáÏím, skladÛm pohonn˘ch hmot, továrnû v Tursunzade atd. Hlavní ãást bojÛ se odehrála v zimû 1992 aÏ 1993. 22

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Pro zjednodu‰ení lze fiíci, Ïe Leninobód‰tí v sovûtském období kontrolovali centrální sovûtské instituce v zemi. V sedmdesát˘ch letech umoÏnili mocensk˘ vzestup také kuljóbskému klanu, jehoÏ stoupenci obsadili pfiedev‰ím státní ozbrojené sloÏky. Viz Akiner S., Tajikistan: Disintegration or Reconciliation? London 2001, str. 18–21. Safarov strávil za vraÏdy 23 let v sovûtsk˘ch vûzeních. V roce 1993 se stal obûtí atentátu. Horák, cit. d., str. 208. Rahmónóv pfiirozenû nebyl vybrán pro své kvality, n˘brÏ pro svou «bezv˘znamnost » z hlediska mocenského rozpoloÏení v kuljóbském klanu. BlíÏe viz Atkin M., Tajikistan. A president and his rivals. In: Cummings, S. N. (ed.): Power and Change in Central Asia, London 2002, 97. Obecnû viz napfi.: Nourzhanov, cit. d.

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Vzhledem k zásadním strukturálním problémÛm, pfiedev‰ím vyvolání nekoneãného kruhu krevní msty a následné odplaty mezi jednotliv˘mi frakcemi, obecné atmosféfie bezpráví, prosazování zájmÛ regionálních mocností a zájmu ozbrojen˘ch frakci na zachování statu quo se mírová jednání mezi vládou a opozicí velmi protahovala, aãkoliv hlavní fáze bojÛ odeznûla jiÏ v roce 1993. Od roku 1993 obãanská válka pfiijala podobu spí‰e sporadick˘ch bojÛ mezi vládou a opozicí. Boje se nejãastûji soustfiedily podél tádÏické hranice s Afghánistánem, odkud opoziãní velitelé podnikali v˘pady proti provládním pohraniãním silám. V roce 1996 do‰lo k opûtovné eskalaci bojÛ v centrální ãásti TádÏikistánu, zejména v Karateginském a Garmském údolí. Po ãetn˘ch jednáních za podpory OSN, OBSE a Ruska nakonec Rahmónóv a pfiedák STO Saíd Abdullo Núrí podepsali v roce 1997 mírovou smlouvu.26 Formální pfiímûfií sice vedlo k jisté stabilizaci na makropolitické úrovni, zato ale nevyfie‰ilo komplikované vztahy mezi sítí nezávisl˘ch ozbrojen˘ch skupin a polních velitelÛ, ktefií nemínili opustit své mocenské pozice.27 Navzdory formálnímu ukonãení konfliktu byly ozbrojené akce v zemi bûÏné aÏ do roku 2001. Mnoho ‰patnû dostupn˘ch oblastí zÛstalo v mocenském podruãí nezávisl˘ch polních velitelÛ a polomafiánsk˘ch vojensk˘ch struktur. Pohled na poãáteãní fázi obãanské války poukazuje na fakt, Ïe rozhodování klíãov˘ch aktérÛ, které vedlo k vypuknutí otevfieného násilí, bylo pfieváÏnû uãinûno pod tlakem atmosféry strachu a nejistoty zapfiíãinûné kolapsem sovûtsk˘ch institucí. Obãanskou válku v TádÏikistánu tedy lze nejlépe vysvûtlit jako dÛsledek interakce systémové strukturální promûnné, tj. rozpadu Sovûtského svazu, a specifick˘ch místních podmínek, zejména slabé pozice institucionalizované státní moci v porovnání se siln˘mi paralelními mocensk˘mi strukturami a blízkostí Afghánistánu, kter˘ sehrál roli regionálního epicentra násilí.28 26

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K jejímu uzavfiení v˘raznû pfiispûla zmûna geopolitické situace v Afghánistánu, zejména raketov˘ nástup tálibÛ. Tálibské milice se v roce 1996 zmocnily Kábulu a do tfií let postupnû dobyly vût‰inu území Afghánistánu. O problematice mírové smlouvy a pováleãného uspofiádání viz napfi.: Tajikistan. An Uncertain Peace. ICG Asia Report, n. 30, Osh/Brussels 2001; Smith, R. G., Tajikistan: the rocky road to peace. In: Central Asian Survey (1999) 18 (2), str. 243–251. Role Afghánistánu byla i zprostfiedkovaná. TádÏikistán napfiíklad zaplavilo obrovské mnoÏství zbraní nelegálnû rozprodávan˘ch ze skladÛ Rudé armády na základnû v uzbeckém Kar‰i, pfies kterou se sovûtská vojenská vojska stahovala z Afghánistánu v roce 1989. Nourzhanov, cit. d., str. 115.

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Politická mobilizace, jeÏ vedla k obãanské válce, zavedla nûkolik vzájemnû konfliktních ideologick˘ch diskurzÛ. Prvním z nich byl politick˘ islám, zahalen do populistického hávu s antiimperialistick˘m nádechem, kter˘ se stavûl zejména proti prosovûtské elitû. Následoval tádÏicko-persk˘ nacionalismus jako protipól vÛãi stfiedoasijské „turkické“ pfievaze. Spektrum ideologií doplnil také obãansko-demokratick˘ diskurz, o kter˘ se opíraly frustrované mûstské elity, ãasto z fiad etnick˘ch RusÛ, UkrajincÛ a dal‰ích pÛvodem nestfiedoasijsk˘ch etnick˘ch men‰in. Ty se cítily ohroÏeny nástupem nov˘ch radikálních politick˘ch aktérÛ. Navzdory rozdíln˘m ideologiím je ale tfieba poznamenat, Ïe stûÏejní konfliktní linie neprobíhaly podél etnick˘ch ãi národnostních hranic, n˘brÏ protínaly napfiíã tádÏickou národnostní skupinu, tak jak ji definoval sovûtsk˘ stát. Sociální identita jednotliv˘ch aktéru splynula s ideologick˘m náhledem na nové politické uspofiádání podle toho, zda bylo v jejich zájmu zachovat pÛvodní mocenské vztahy, jeÏ byly zavedeny v rámci sovûtského systému, ãi naopak usilovat o nezávislost a zmûnu mocensk˘ch vztahÛ uvnitfi státu. Ty skupiny obyvatel, které se cítily ohroÏeny pfieru‰ením pupeãní ‰ÀÛry s Moskvou a jejichÏ identita byla ohroÏena protimoskevskou rétorikou, se zafiadily do vládního (pro-komunistického) tábora. Naopak, odpÛrci sovûtského systému spolu s pfiíslu‰níky tradiãních rurálních ãi horsk˘ch komunit, vybaveni vlastní vizí politického islámu a lokálního patriotismu, se pfiidali k opoziãnímu táboru. Hlavním organizaãním principem se staly mocné regionální a klanové struktury. KaÏdá z jednotliv˘ch stran mûla vlastní regionální základnu. V tomto smyslu regionální identity pÛsobily jako mechanismus pro politickou mobilizaci, zároveÀ ale vyjadfiovaly vztah jednotliv˘ch aktérÛ k dezintegrující se sovûtské a státní moci.29 S rozpadem státní moci pfiestaly fungovat vojenské a policejní síly, které se v TádÏikistánu soustfiedily pfiedev‰ím na ochranu jiÏní hranice s Afghánistánem a nebyly pfiipraveny ãelit rozsáhl˘m sociálním nepokojÛm. Vojenská mobilizace zamíchala mocensk˘mi kartami také v rámci jednotliv˘ch klanÛ. K moci vytáhla ty hráãe, ktefií byli schopni zajistit pfiístup k vojenskému materiálu a finanãním zdrojÛm. Není proto divu, Ïe se mnoho z „nov˘ch“ klanov˘ch vÛdcÛ na obou stranách konfliktu rekrutovalo

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Rubin, Russian hegemony…, cit. d., str. 146.

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z kriminálního podsvûtí a skupin organizovaného zloãinu.30 Struktura nov˘ch paravojensk˘ch sil a zpÛsob náboru bojovníkÛ v˘znamnû ovlivnily prÛbûh války a pováleãné uspofiádání. Klany a politika v TádÏikistánu V˘voj mocensk˘ch elit v TádÏikistánu bûhem sovûtské éry poukázal na fakt, Ïe uspofiádání spoleãnosti dle klanov˘ch, resp. regionálních struktur úspû‰nû pfieÏilo „sovûtizaci“ Stfiední Asie. Klanové a regionální elity dokonale prostoupily sovûtsk˘ systém distribuce moci. V období politického vakua zapoãatého odtrÏením vládnoucích struktur od moskevského mocenského centra a následn˘m kolapsem státních institucí pfiedstavovaly klanové a regionální elity jedin˘ pevn˘ bod na vnitfiní politické scénû v TádÏikistánu. Sovûtizace Stfiední Asie a moskevská koloniální politika tedy paradoxnû vyústily ve specifick˘ vztah mezi obyvatelstvem, mocensk˘mi elitami a státní mocí. Sovûtská správa sice na jednu stranu oslabila tradiãní elity, na druhou stranu ale sama dala vzniknout nov˘m lokálním elitám, které parazitovaly na sovûtské státní správû a zároveÀ pfiijaly identitu místních rodov˘ch a klanov˘ch skupin. Slabá státní správa nezávislého TádÏikistánu na poãátku devadesát˘ch let nedokázala pfiekonat regionální faktor a sjednotit obyvatelstvo za jednotnou státotvornou vizí. S koncem sovûtského systému se vztahy mezi klany navrátily do pÛvodní, anarchické podoby. V atmosféfie nejistoty, hospodáfiské krize a politické nestability rychle do‰lo k resocializaci podél tradiãních regionálních struktur. Je tfieba poloÏit si otázku, v ãem se dne‰ní klany li‰í od tradiãních skupin solidarity ve Stfiední Asii? A v ãem se tádÏické klany li‰í od klientelistick˘ch struktur, které se bûÏnû vyvíjely mezi sovûtsk˘mi aparátãiky na celém území b˘valého Sovûtského svazu? Pro TádÏick˘ regionalismus je pfiíznaãn˘ v˘voj regionálních klanov˘ch struktur od tradiãních skupin solidarity k moderním klientelistick˘m celkÛm, které se vyvinuly uvnitfi sovûtského systému a v jehoÏ rámci mezi sebou soupefiily o zdroje ze státního rozpoã30

JiÏ uveden˘ Safarov je jen jedním z mnoha lídrÛ s v˘znamnou zloãineckou minulostí. Napojení mafiánsk˘ch organizací na místní politiky a pfiedstavitele státu ãasto vycházelo z tradiãní klanové struktury. Mafiánské skupiny prosperovaly díky rozvoji ãerného obchodu v sedmdesát˘ch a osmdesát˘ch letech. V pozdûj‰ích letech Gorbaãovovy vlády jiÏ existovaly ãetné kontakty a vazby mezi kádry státního aparátu a mafií. Viz Nourzhanov, cit. d., str. 115.

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tu. Sovûtsk˘ systém zároveÀ podmínil mocensk˘ rozmach jednotliv˘ch klanÛ pfiístupem ke zdrojÛm komunistického aparátu. Severní oblast se stala mocenskou základnou leninabádského vládního klanu. Na jeho území se nacházely centrální instituce a koncentrovala se zde politická moc. Na mocenské dûlení doplatili stoupenci jiÏních klanÛ. Jejich ãlenové vzhledem k administrativnímu uspofiádání nikdy nekontrolovali vût‰í kolektivní administrativní celek neÏ jednotlivou oblast (rajon). Administrativní dûlení rozdrobilo jiÏanské mocenské struktury, ãímÏ zároveÀ upevnilo vedoucí pozici leninabádského klanu, kter˘ svou moc odvozoval pfiímo od sovûtsk˘ch centrálních institucí. Ze strategick˘ch dÛvodÛ pozdûji leninabád‰tí aparátãíci pfiizvali k podílu na moci ãleny kuljóbského klanu. Garm a Hissar ale zÛstaly pod pfiímou správou ústfiedních orgánÛ v republice. Mocenské a klanové uspofiádání zároveÀ odráÏí hlavní ‰tûpnou linii v TádÏikistánu, tedy rivalitu mezi severními a jiÏními oblastmi. V rámci následné dûlby moci si leninabádské elity vyhradily svrchovanou kontrolu na stranick˘m aparátem a ústfiedními hospodáfisk˘mi institucemi, zatímco kuljóbsk˘m zÛstala kontrola nad jiÏními ãástmi republiky.31 Ztráta mocenského postavení leninabádského/chodÏentského klanu a následná mobilizace klanÛ pro ozbrojen˘ konflikt na jihu zemû pfiemístily poprvé od dvacát˘ch let XIX. století mocenské centrum v TádÏikistánu ze severu na jih. Mocensk˘ rozmach kuljóbského klanu doprovázel v˘znamn˘ pfiíklon jeho ãlenÛ ke kriminální ãinnosti.32 Schopnost kuljóbského klanu aktivizovat své podzemní mafiánské sítû se projevila jako zásadní faktor v momentu rozpu‰tûní sovûtsk˘ch institucí, které garantovaly mocenské uspofiádání uvnitfi republiky. Kuljób‰tí sehráli roli konzervativního odpÛrce nového mocenského uspofiádání, které ohroÏovalo jejich pozici vÛãi konkurenãním regionálním klanÛm. Horalé z centralních oblastí Garmu a Karateginu sice byli prakticky vylouãeni z dûlby politické moci, pfiesto se ale projevili jako dynamická spoleãenské skupina, coÏ platí dvojnásob o garmsk˘ch elitách v Kurgan Tjube. Obyvatelé Garmu svou pozornost obrátili ke vzdûlání a trhu (kon-

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Jádro bojÛ obãanské války se odehrálo mezi kuljóbsk˘mi a garmsk˘mi milicemi v okolí Kurgan Tjube. Mezi prominentní postavy kuljóbského klanu náleÏel vedle Safarova napfiíklad Jakub Salimov, vûhlasn˘ boss kuljóbské mafie v Du‰anbe, kter˘ se dokonce stal ministrem vnitra v Rahmónóvû pováleãné vládû.

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trolovali vût‰í ãást maloobchodu na území TádÏikistánu). Za BreÏnûva vyuÏili druhé vlny tzv. korenizacije, tj. podpory sovûtského reÏimu spoleãenskému postupu místních elit, a zaãali ohroÏovat dominantní pozice chodÏentsk˘ch a samarkandsk˘ch elit v kulturním Ïivotû a státních kulturních a vûdeck˘ch institucích. ZároveÀ podporovali svobodné podnikání, pfiiãemÏ se ãasto dostávali do sporÛ s mocn˘mi pfiedsedy kolchozÛ v Kurgan Tjube (vût‰inou etnick˘ch UzbekÛ ãi pfiíslu‰níkÛ kuljóbského klanu). Garmsk˘m ale chybûl pfiístup ke zdrojÛm politické/administrativní ãi ekonomické moci, na kter˘ch by mohli utuÏit svou kolektivní identitu jako ucelen˘ klan. Jejich mocenská centra, Karategin, Wachiha a Darvaz, zÛstala rozdûlena do mal˘ch celkÛ, které kontrolovaly vládnoucí klany. AÏ zaloÏení politick˘ch stran v nezávislém TádÏikistánu, Demokratické strany TádÏikistánu (DST) a Strany islámské obrody (SIO), poskytlo ãlenÛm garmského klanu jednotnou základnu pro kolektivní akci na regionální i celorepublikové úrovni. Zvlá‰tní místo mezi tádÏick˘mi klany zaujímají Pamífiané. Stejnû jako obyvatelé Garmu se pÛvodnû nedostali k pfiímé politické moci. Jejich situace se ale v˘raznû zmûnila v kontextu války v Afghánistánu. Jejich afghán‰tí pfiíbuzní, tj. ismá‘jíl‰tí tádÏikové, se jako jediná afghánská etnická skupina kolektivnû hlásila k pro-komunistické vládû v zemi. Sovûtská KGB pod vedením Jurije Andropova proto v pamírsk˘ch horalech vidûla potenciální obránce proti prÛniku islamismu na území Sovûtského svazu. Moskva si navíc uvûdomovala, Ïe je tfieba alespoÀ ãásteãnû vyváÏit pfievahu leninabádského klanu a zároveÀ omezit vliv rozvûtvené kuljóbské mafie. KGB tedy v osmdesát˘ch letech nabrala mnoho PamífianÛ do aparátu své tádÏické odboãky a na ministerstvo vnitra v Du‰anbe. Pamífiané zde získali exkluzivní pfiístup ke zbraním a vojenské technice, kter˘ neváhali pouÏít na zaãátku války. Aãkoliv se dívali vlaÏnû na radikální politick˘ islám, kter˘ byl v kurzu u jejich afghánsk˘ch sousedÛ, boj mudÏáhidÛ proti sovûtském okupantÛm je inspiroval do té míry, Ïe se v momentu krize velmi rychle pfiidali k islamistickému protikomunistickému táboru, skrze kter˘ filtrovali svÛj nesoulad s vládním reÏimem. JiÏ jsme zmínili, Ïe klan se primárnû vztahuje k sociální skupinû, která svou kolektivní soudrÏnost odvozuje od pfiíbuzenského vztahu mezi sv˘mi ãleny. Tento pfiíbuzensk˘ vztah v‰ak nutnû nemusí vyjadfiovat biologickou pfiíbuznost. Klanová identita je stejnû jako etnická identita v prvé fiadû

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spoleãensk˘m konstruktem.33 Nûkteré etnické skupiny v ‰ir‰í Stfiední Asii se organizují do patrilineárních rodov˘ch klanÛ, které poté nesou spoleãné rodové jméno, napfi. jednotlivé klany a kmeny mezi afghánsk˘mi Pa‰túny. Naopak klany u etnick˘ch UzbekÛ a TádÏikÛ jsou spí‰e synonymem pro politickou a spoleãenskou soudrÏnost, pfiiãemÏ tato vazba solidarity nemusí b˘t nutnû rodov˘m poutem. Vazby solidarity posílily vztahy mezi ãleny jednotliv˘ch sovûtsk˘ch administrativních celkÛ (horizontálnû) a také mezi ãleny a vedením tûchto celkÛ (vertikálnû). Klanová soudrÏnost byla aktivována v pfiípadû tlakÛ z vnûj‰ku (konkurenti v rámci meziklanové rivality) ãi ze shora (z nadfiazen˘ch administrativních celkÛ a sovûtsk˘ch institucí). Klanoví pfiedáci zároveÀ vyuÏívali své pozice k udrÏování paralelních sítí skrze redistribuci ziskÛ mezi své pfiívrÏence a klienty. Tyto klientelistické sítû se rozvinuly právû díky sovûtskému politickému a ekonomickému zfiízení. Nejv˘raznûj‰ím pfiíkladem je ChodÏentsk˘/Leninábádsk˘ klan, ze kterého se rekrutovala tádÏická sovûtská nomenklatura. Tato skupina aparátãikÛ pÛvodnû nebyla propojena podél rodové linie, n˘brÏ vycházela z klientelistické sítû a silné rodové pouto získala aÏ pozdûji. Leninabádsk˘ klan zastupuje severní elity, které se zformovaly v rámci ústfiedního v˘boru Komunistické strany TádÏikistánu (KST) a nomenklatury Leninabádské oblasti. K moci se dostal v rámci mocensk˘ch ãistek v KST, které odstavily staré v˘chodobucharské elity. V roce 1940 byl tajemníkem KST jmenován zástupce chodÏentského klanu, Abdul Ghaffar Ghaffurov. Jeho jmenováním zapoãalo dlouhé období chodÏentské nadvlády. V rámci stranick˘ch linií chodÏent‰tí lídfii peãlivû upevÀovali síÈ klientelistick˘ch klanov˘ch vztahÛ, pfiiãemÏ moc a legitimitu svého klanu pfiímo odvozovali od samotn˘ch institucí sovûtského státu a komunistické strany. S vyznûním prací o predominantní klanové struktufie, resp. klanové mobilizaci jako hlavnímu faktoru eskalace konfliktu v TádÏikistánu je moÏné souhlasit, zároveÀ bychom ale nemûli upírat velkou ãást politické zodpovûdnosti jednotliv˘m aktérÛm. Politickou agendu v TádÏikistánu nelze jen mechanicky redukovat na nutné vzorce jednání vycházející z pfiíslu‰nosti jednotliv˘ch aktérÛ k nûkterému z regionálních klanÛ. Konflikt v TádÏikistánu vznikl jako místní reakce na dûní v SSSR. Proreformní technokra33

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Viz Collins K., The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories. In: World Politics 56 (January 2004), 224–261.

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té a inteligence podporovali Gorbaãovu perestrojku, konzervativní aparátãíci se naopak nov˘m politick˘m stylem cítili zaskoãeni. ChodÏent‰tí se zãásti rozdûlili podél ideologick˘ch a funkcionálních linií. Aliance Rastochez sdruÏovala nacionalisticky zamûfienou inteligenci a technokraty. S nástupem islamistÛ se technokraté a nacionalisté opût pfiiblíÏili komunistick˘m aparátãikÛm, ktefií postupnû ztráceli moc ve prospûch sv˘ch kuljóbsk˘ch spojencÛ. Pfiesto ale faktem zÛstává, Ïe klíãem k pochopení prÛbûhu obãanské války a následného mocenského uspofiádání v TádÏikistánu je zpÛsob, jímÏ se tádÏická meziklanová politika smísila s mobilizací politick˘ch elit a poté i fiadov˘ch obãanÛ podél regionálních linií. V konfliktu, kter˘ pÛvodnû zapoãal jako místní ideologick˘ a spoleãensk˘ boj v hlavním mûstû, vyuÏily elity klanové klientelistické vztahy a vazby solidarity k masové mobilizaci obyvatel. Ztráta sociálních jistot jen nav˘‰ila moÏné zisky a ztráty v konfliktu z pohledu fiadov˘ch obãanÛ. Tím je uãinila náchylnûj‰í k sociální a politické mobilizaci. Pamírské v˘chodoíránské skupiny a jiÏní tádÏické klany, kter˘m sovûtská správa permanentnû zamezila pfiístup k moci, vyuÏily oslabení státu k pokusu o radikální pfiemûnu spoleãenského uspofiádání. V moderní spoleãnosti klany pÛsobí pfieváÏnû jako strategické celky pro zaji‰tûní politick˘ch, ekonomick˘ch a sociálních v˘hod. Jejich historick˘ vznik v TádÏikistánu podél regionálních linií nebyl náhodn˘. TádÏické klanové struktury jsou projevem historick˘ch kulturních odli‰ností mezi jednotliv˘mi regiony. Obyvatelé Garmu a inteligence z PenÏikentu, ktefií podporovali opozici, jsou obecnû mnohem konzervativnûj‰í a náchylnûj‰í k tádÏickému etnonacionalismu a politickému islámu. Historicky se jedná o nejménû turkizované ãásti dne‰ního TádÏikistánu, které naopak nejvíce podléhaly pfiímému vlivu Persie/Íránu. Pamífiané z Badach‰ánu se zase inspirovali bojem sv˘ch afghánsk˘ch pfiíbuzn˘ch, u nichÏ také na‰li v˘raznou podporu.34 Vládní síly naopak vedl ChodÏentsk˘/Leninabádsk˘ klan, ze kterého pocházela pfieváÏná ãást komunistické nomenklatury. Etniãtí 34

Burhanuddín Rabbání, lídr DÏamáate islámí, jedné z nejv˘znamnûj‰ích afghánsk˘ch frakcí, pochází pfiímo z afghánského Badach‰ánu. Pfies fieku to ze svého rodi‰tû nemûl daleko do mocensk˘ch center tádÏické opozice v Darwazu a Horském Badach‰ánu. Hlavní vojenskou sílu DÏámáate islámí pfiedstavovaly milice Ahmada ·áha Massúda, nejmocnûj‰ího polního velitele mezi afghánsk˘mi TádÏiky (Massúdovy milice ale pfiirozenû zahrnovaly pfiíslu‰níky celé fiady afghánsk˘ch etnik vãetnû Pa‰túnÛ a UzbekÛ).

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Uzbeci z Kuljóbu a Hissaru zajistili podporu Uzbekistánu a dodali rozhodující vojenskou sílu, která vládnímu táboru pomohla vyhrát válku. V‰echny v˘‰e jmenované regiony odpovídají historick˘m politick˘m jednotkám z pfiedsovûtského období. Tento fakt potvrzuje tezi, Ïe sovûtsk˘ systém spí‰e posílil neÏ zlomil pÛvodní klanové struktury. Vztah mezi regionalismem a klany v politickém prostfiedí ale není historicky pfiedem dan˘ a nemûnn˘. Anal˘zy obãanské války v TádÏikistánu ãasto zkreslují skuteãnou podstatu systému rodov˘ch a regionálních klanÛ. Bliωí pohled na pÛvodní klanové struktury naznaãuje, Ïe tádÏické klany v dne‰ním pojetí pro‰ly v˘razn˘mi zmûnami právû díky „modernizaãním efektÛm“ sovûtského politicko-ekonomického systému.35 Kriminalizace klanov˘ch struktur Navzdory implementaci mírového procesu, zahrnující (alespoÀ formální) redistribuci moci, resp. kooptaci opoziãních skupin do vládních kruhÛ, a pováleãné rekonstrukci zemû ústfiední vláda v Du‰anbe jen velmi obtíÏnû prosazuje svou vÛli v nûkter˘ch regionech. StûÏejním v této situaci se jeví fakt, Ïe proklamovanou demokratizaci politického Ïivota po ukonãení obãanské války vystfiídal pfiíklon kuljóbské vládnoucí kliky prezidenta Emomali Rachmónóva k autoritáfiskému zpÛsobu vlády. V rozporu s principy pováleãného mírového uspofiádání Rachmónóv prakticky eliminoval pfiíslu‰níky demokraticko-islamistické opozice z mocensk˘ch pozic ve vládní administrativû, coÏ na jednu stranu zfiejmû vedlo ke krátkodobé stabilizaci politick˘ch pomûrÛ v zemi, z dlouhodobé perspektivy ale stupÀování represe a autoritáfiského zpÛsobu vlády mÛÏe vést aÏ k opûtovné eskalaci konfliktu. V dÛsledku velmi nízké Ïivotní úrovnû a pfietrvávající pÛsobnosti relativnû autonomních polních velitelÛ v odlehl˘ch regionech se v TádÏikistánu dafií drogové mafii a dal‰ím prvkÛm mezinárodního organizovaného zloãinu. Organizovan˘ zloãin ve stfiedoasijském kontextu ãasto pÛsobí právû v symbióze s militantními islamistick˘mi skupinami a nezávisl˘mi polní-

mi veliteli. Sepjetí podsvûtí a mocensk˘ch frakcí posvûtila jiÏ mobilizace jednotliv˘ch táborÛ v pfiedveãer obãanské války. Islámské hnutí Uzbekistánu (IHU) je dal‰ím pfiíkladem pÛvodnû politického hnutí, které se pozdûji pfiiklonilo k obchodu s narkotiky.36 IHU pÛvodnû vzniklo jako ozbrojené islamistické seskupení v uzbecké ãásti Ferghanské kotliny. Jeho hlavním cílem bylo svrÏení uzbeckého prezidenta Karimova a zavedení chalífátu na území Uzbekistánu, potaÏmo v celé Stfiední Asii. IHU se aktivnû zapojilo do obãanské války v TádÏikistánu na stranû islamistické opozice. Svou váleãnou pouÈ IHU dovr‰ilo na stranû tálibského reÏimu v Afghánistánu. Vojensk˘ velitel IHU, DÏuma Namanganí, pravdûpodobnû padl v ãele sv˘ch ozbrojencÛ a souãasnû jako velitel tálibské severní fronty v bitvû o Kunduz v listopadu 2001. âást ãlenÛ IHU se poté uch˘lila s táliby a mezinárodními dÏihádisty do pevnosti Tora Bora, odkud se mnoho bojovníkÛ pfiesunulo pod ochranu pa‰túnsk˘ch kmenÛ na Kmenová území (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) v sousedním Pákistánu. Politick˘ pfiedák IHU Tahir Julda‰ev se údajnû skr˘vá v pákistánském Pé‰ávaru. Podle mnoha západních i asijsk˘ch analytikÛ zaãaly váleãné operace IHU od konce devadesát˘ch let aÏ do spojenecké invaze do Afghánistánu odpovídat spí‰e logice zájmÛ regionálního obchodu s afghánsk˘mi narkotiky. Jejich vojenská aktivita proti vládám Uzbekistánu a Kyrgyzstánu se stupÀovala v obdobích následujících po sklizni a zpracování opia v Afghánistánu. Ozbrojené v˘pady IHU se pfiekr˘valy s hlavními komunikaãními tepnami v TádÏikistánu a Kyrgyzstánu, které vyuÏívají pa‰eráci afghánsk˘ch narkotik.37 Závûr Klany v moderním tádÏickém podání vznikly na základû tradiãních rodov˘ch linií (avlod) a vazeb solidarity (qawm), které byly pfieneseny do hierarchického systému sovûtsk˘ch politick˘ch a ekonomick˘ch institucí v regionu. Spí‰e neÏ anachronick˘m pozÛstatkem z feudálních dob jsou

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Transformaci klanov˘ch struktur v sovûtském období vystihl Olivier Roy, viz napfi. Roy O., Groupes de solidarité, territories, réseaux et État dans le Moyen-Orient et l’Asie Centrale. In: Dawod, Hosham, ed.: Tribus et pouvoirs en terre d’Islam, Paris 2004, str 53–57.

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Cornell, Svante E., Narcotics, Radicalism and Security in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, East European Studies Working Paper no. 84, Uppsala 2004. Weitz, R., Storm Clouds over Central Asia: Revival of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan? In: Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, n.27, str. 505–530.

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dne‰ní klany spoleãn˘m produktem moderních sovûtsk˘ch koloniálních institucí a reakce pÛvodní kolonizované spoleãnosti, která zãásti sovûtsk˘ systém pfiijala a zãásti mu skrze tyto instituce vzdorovala.38 Rozpad státu a obãanská válka v TádÏikistánu v letech 1992 aÏ 1997 jsou pfiím˘m dÛsledkem regionalizace politick˘ch aliancí v podmínkách mocenského vakua zpÛsobeného odchodem koloniální mocnosti, krachem sovûtského ekonomického systému a nepfiipravenosti politick˘ch elit na pfievzetí nového suverénního státu. Desetiletí politické nestability, chudoby a kolapsu státu oslabilo nûkteré tradiãní klanové skupiny, dal‰í v‰ak posunulo z pozice siln˘ch mocensk˘ch struktur na úroveÀ mafiánsk˘ch organizací, které prosperují na slabosti státu.39 Konsolidace TádÏikistánu jako nezávislého a suverénního státu závisí na celé fiadû vnûj‰ích i vnitfiních politick˘ch faktorÛ. Mezi vnûj‰í faktory patfií pfiedev‰ím prosazování národních zájmÛ svûtov˘ch a regionálních velmocí v regionu (tzv. války skrze prostfiedníky, ãi wars by proxies). Údûl TádÏikistánu byl od politické liberalizace na pfielomu let 1990/1991 do znaãné míry ovlivÀován Ruskem v tradici carského/sovûtského imperialismu a také Uzbekistánem, jehoÏ etnikum na území TádÏikistánu de facto reprezentuje jeden z mocensk˘ch regionálních klanÛ. Rusko dnes de facto zÛstává hlavním garantem politické stability zemû. I pfies snahu Spojen˘ch státÛ získat stabilnûj‰í pozici v TádÏikistánu a Stfiední Asii v souãasném boji proti terorismu se nezávisl˘ TádÏikistán pevnû ukotvil v ruské sféfie vlivu.40 V men‰ím rozsahu se k vnitropolitickému v˘voji v TádÏikistánu aktivnû staví také dal‰í regionální mocnosti jako Irán, Indie a Pákistán. Intervence tûchto státÛ se ãasto odvíjely jako reakce na politick˘ v˘voj v sousedním Afghánistánu. Zvlá‰tní kapitolou je samotn˘ Afghánistán, v jehoÏ severních provinciích Ïije v˘znamná tádÏická men‰ina. Díky etnické, jazykové a kulturní spfiíznûnosti má v˘voj v Afghánistánu bezprostfiední vliv na politické, ekonomické i sociální dûní v TádÏikistánu. Z geopolitického hlediska TádÏikistán na‰el své místo v postsovûtském prostoru jako nárazní38 39 40

V ˘ v o j v p o s t - k o l o n i á l n í m T á d Ï i k i s t á n u : k l a n y v p r o c e s u b u d o v á n í s t á t u]

[ RU S KO A P O S TS OV ù TS K ¯ P RO S TO R

Rubin, Russian hegemony…, cit. d., str. 146. Collins, The Logic …, cit. d., str. 255. TádÏikistán se logicky snaÏil vyuÏít nového geopolitického kontextu, zejména snahy USA a NATO o získání trvalej‰í pozice ve Stfiední Asii. Viz Bohr, Anette: Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order. In: International Affairs, vol. 80, n. 3 (2004), str. 485–502. Z praktick˘ch dÛvodÛ se ale TádÏikistán nemÛÏe vymanit z tûsného sepjetí s Ruskem.

343

kov˘ stát, jehoÏ hlavní funkcí je zabránit prÛniku radikálních islamistÛ a skupin organizovaného zloãinu z Afghánistánu do Stfiední Asie. Jak uvádí Slavomír Horák, díky své vnitfiní slabosti TádÏikistán zÛstává pfieváÏnû subjektem mezinárodní politiky.41 Vnitropolitická situace v TádÏikistánu se odvíjí od celé fiady konfliktních faktorÛ, zejména: 1. zachování klíãové role klanÛ v politickém Ïivotû; 2. posilování autoritáfiského reÏimu prezidenta Rachmónóva; 3. kultury warlordismu a obecnû sociální nestability obecnû, která v TádÏikistánu zakofienila v souvislosti s politick˘m v˘vojem sousedním Afghánistánu. Vliv neformálních drÏitelÛ moci v kombinaci se slabû ukotvenou státní správou pfiedstavuje hlavní specifikum tádÏické politické scény i v rámci stfiedoasijského regionu. Faktick˘ rozpad centrální státní administrativy bûhem obãanské války a neschopnost vlády zajistit základní funkce státu vÛãi obãanÛm posílila moc a prestiÏ regionálních a klanov˘ch seskupení. Prezidentu Rachmónóvi se podafiilo ãásteãnû stabilizovat situaci právû za podpory vlastní kliky v rámci kuljóbského klanu. Státní moc v TádÏikistánu stále soupefií o monopol na v˘kon politické moci s neformálními politick˘mi strukturami.

41

Horák, cit. d., str. 119.

344

Ropa a zemní plyn v oblasti Kaspického mofie]

14. Ropa a zemní plyn v oblasti Kaspického mofie1 Bohuslav Litera

TûÏba energetick˘ch surovin je v ‰ir‰ím prostoru okolo Kaspického mofie, kter˘ zahrnuje pfiíslu‰né oblasti pûti státÛ, Ruska, Kazachstánu, Turkmenistánu, Íránu a ÁzerbájdÏánu spjata s loÏisky ropy. Je nerozluãnû spjata s Kaspikem, i kdyÏ pro kaÏdou zemi má svá specifika a nûkteré z nich mají na svém území i dal‰í loÏiska. TûÏba ropy zaãala v oblasti jako jedna z prvních na svûtû jiÏ okolo poloviny 19. století. V roce 1863 ãinila roãní produkce ropy 41 tisíc barelÛ (1 barel = 159 litrÛ), ale do roku 1870 vzrostla jiÏ na 201 tisíc barelÛ. Tehdy byla prakticky v˘hradnû tûÏena na ropn˘ch polích okolo Baku a Grozného. Jejich v˘znam vzrostl mezi válkami a zvlá‰tû za druhé svûtové války, av‰ak od poãátku 60. let rychle ustupovala tûÏbû v PovolÏí a pozdûji zvlá‰tû v oblasti západní Sibifie. Ve Stfiední Asii byla první tûÏba ropy zaznamenána sice jiÏ v roce 1868 ve Ferganské kotlinû, av‰ak její v˘znam byl pouze lokální.2 Teprve po rozpadu Sovûtského svazu zavládly obrovské nadûje a oãekávání nad moÏnostmi zdej‰í produkce energetick˘ch surovin, ropy a plynu. Z ãásti je „Ïivily“ místní vlády a struktury, které chtûly vyvolat zájem západních spoleãností a pfiilákat jejich investice, neboÈ byly a jsou na tûÏbû energetick˘ch surovin ekonomicky závislé. T˘kalo se to zvlá‰tû ÁzerbájdÏánu, kter˘ byl zprvu nejvíce úspû‰n˘, a stfiedoasijského Turkmenistánu a Kazachstánu, ale také vzdálenûj‰ího Uzbekistánu. V této dobû byl prostor 1

2

Studie volnû navazuje na staÈ Wannera, J., Kaspické energetické suroviny a jejich v˘znam pro stfiední Evropu. In: B. Litera, K. Hirman, J. Vykoukal, J. Wanner, Ruské produktovody a stfiední Evropa. Praha 2003. Autor by rád vyjádfiil podûkování PhDr. J. ·írovi, kter˘ mu poskytl fiadu cenn˘ch rad a staÈ „pfiehlédl“. Za formulace a závûry v‰ak v˘hradnû odpovídá její autor. Owen, E. W., Trek of the Oil Finders: A History of Exploration for Petroleum, Tulsa 1975, s. 90nn.

345

Kaspického mofie nezfiídka oznaãován dokonce za pravdûpodobného konkurenta Stfiedního v˘chodu. V prostoru Kaspiku se rozvinula nová varianta tzv. velké hry, ve které v 19. století bojovaly o vliv ve Stfiední Asii Velká Británie, Rusko a âína. Nyní její aktéfii usilovali o pfiístup k rozvoji energetick˘ch zdrojÛ a tranzitních koridorÛ a jejich kontrolu. Soupefiení zahrnuje mezinárodní ropné koncerny, státy prostoru, vlády evropsk˘ch zemí a EU a USA. V posledních letech se do ní velmi aktivnû zapojila také âína. Teprve v prÛbûhu 90. let vystfiídalo euforii stfiízlivûj‰í hodnocení jak moÏností tûÏby a mnoÏství zásob, tak problémÛ spojen˘ch s pfiepravou vytûÏen˘ch surovin na svûtové trhy. Ukázalo se, Ïe oblast evidentnû nebude rovnocenn˘m konkurentem Stfiedního v˘chodu, av‰ak Ïe zdej‰í zdroje budou mít v˘znam pro zásobování nejen sousedních regionÛ, ale patrnû i vzdálenûj‰ích oblastí Evropy a Asie. Platí to jak pro ÁzerbájdÏán, tak zvlá‰tû pro Kazachstán a Uzbekistán. Na jejich území prospekce loÏisek sv˘m zpÛsobem teprve zaãíná a jiÏ v 90. letech vyústila v objevení nûkolika v˘znamn˘ch loÏisek ropy v severní ãásti Kaspiku a zemního plynu v jiÏní. Dokonce se jeví jako pravdûpodobné, Ïe z hlediska rozsahu by mohla b˘t dÛleÏitûj‰í kaspická loÏiska zemního plynu neÏ ropy. ProtoÏe se v‰ak ropa snadnûji pfiepravuje, ropné projekty nabízejí rychlej‰í návratnost investic, zdej‰í infrastruktura je urãena pro tûÏbu ropy, po které je ve svûtû velká poptávka, budou to pro pfií‰tí nejménû desetiletí ropné projekty, které „potáhnou“ rozvoj kaspick˘ch loÏisek. Po rozpadu Sovûtského svazu mûla tûÏba ropy v zemích Kaspického bazénu, s v˘jimkou Ruska a Íránu, následující dynamiku (v mil. tun). 1990

1995

2000

2004

ÁzerbájdÏán

12,5

9,2

14,9

15,7

Kazachstán

25,8

20,6

35,3

60,5

Turkmenistán

5,7

4,1

7,4

10,1

Uzbekistán

2,8

7,6

7,5

6,6

Pramen: British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 2001 a 2005, London, 2001, 2005, s. 6, resp. 7. (Dále jen jako BP s pfiíslu‰n˘m rokem.)

Z uveden˘ch údajÛ je zfiejmé, Ïe u vût‰iny zemí do‰lo po rozpadu SSSR k poklesu tûÏby ropy, kter˘ byl v druhé polovinû 90. let vystfiídán pomûr-

346

Ropa a zemní plyn v oblasti Kaspického mofie]

[ RU S KO A P O S TS OV ù TS K ¯ P RO S TO R

nû rychl˘m nárÛstem. Zdaleka nejvût‰ím producentem je Kazachstán s 60 mil. tun ropy roãnû. Vzhledem k tomu, Ïe v severní ãásti Kaspiku byla nedávno objevena nová loÏiska, se pfiedpokládá, Ïe dále poroste. U ostatních je produkce relativnû málo v˘znamná, i kdyÏ z regionálního hlediska a jako zdroj pfiíjmÛ pro jednotlivé státy není zdaleka zanedbatelná. Údaje o produkci jsou v‰ak do jisté míry zavádûjící, neboÈ ãást produkce se v tûchto zemích také spotfiebuje. V roce 2000 spotfieboval ÁzerbájdÏán 7,4 mil. tun ropy, Kazachstán 6,2 mil. tun, Turkmenistán 4,8 mil. tun a Uzbekistán 6,8 mil tun.3 Pro export je tedy vyuÏiteln˘ pouze rozdíl tûÏba/spotfieba, kter˘ v pfiípadû ÁzerbájdÏánu ãinil asi 7,5 mil. tun, u Kazachstánu cca 29 mil. tun, u Turkmenistánu pouh˘ch asi 2,6 mil. tun, zatímco Uzbekistánu zb˘valo na export jen asi 1 mil. tun. Pro budoucnost mají ov‰em podstatnûj‰í v˘znam odhady o ovûfien˘ch zásob ropy. Pro uvedené zemû jsou tyto odhady následující (v miliardách tun).

1990

1995

2000

2004

ÁzerbájdÏán

9,2

6,2

5,3

4,6

Kazachstán

6,6

5,5

10,7

18,5

Turkmenistán

81,9

30,1

43,8

54,6

Uzbekistán

38,1

45,3

52,2

55,8

Pramen: BP 2001, s. 23. BP 2005, s. 22.

Vlastní tûÏba je tedy v souãasné dobû relativnû velká pouze u Turkmenistánu a Uzbekistánu. Ten v‰ak témûfi v‰echen zemní plyn, kter˘ vyprodukuje, také spotfiebuje. Obdobnû jsou na tom i ostatní státy. V˘znamn˘m exportérem je pouze Turkmenistán, kterému pfii vlastní spotfiebû asi 15 mld. m3 zb˘valo zhruba 40 miliard kubíkÛ na export pfiedev‰ím na Ukrajinu a v men‰ích mnoÏstvích také do Iránu a Ruska. Pomûrnû prudce ov‰em zaãíná narÛstat tûÏba v Kazachstánu. Prokázané zásoby zemního plynu jsou v‰ak velmi slibné a koncem roku 2004 ãinily (v bilionech m3):

2000

pomûr R/P (v letech)

2004

R/P

ÁzerbájdÏán

0,9

63,4

1,0

60,2

ÁzerbájdÏán

1,37

více neÏ 100

Kazachstán

1,1

31,1

5,4

39,6

Kazachstán

3,00

více neÏ 100

Turkmenistán

2,90

53,1

Uzbekistán

1,86

33,3

Turkmenistán

0,1

10,2

0,1

7,4

Uzbekistán

0,1

10,8

0,1

10,6

347

zásoby

pomûr R/P (v letech)

Pramen: BP 2001, s. 4. BP 2005, s. 4.

Pramen: BP 2005, s. 20.

Odhady se kaÏdoroãnû zpfiesÀují a vzhledem k rozsáhl˘m prospektorsk˘m pracím a objevování nov˘ch loÏisek se vût‰inou zvy‰ují. DÛleÏit˘ je pomûr R/P, tj. pomûr zásob k tûÏbû, kter˘ udává, na jak dlouho by pfii stávající úrovni tûÏby té které zemi staãily její zásoby. Z tohoto hlediska je v nejv˘hodnûj‰í pozici ze stfiedoasijsk˘ch státÛ Kazachstán, jehoÏ zásoby prudce vzrostly, i kdyÏ promûnlivost dat je velká. Pfiedpokládá se, Ïe rusk˘ sektor Kaspiku má rezervy asi 0,3 mld. barelÛ ropy a íránsk˘ 0,1 mld. barelÛ, coÏ ve vztahu k jejich celkové tûÏbû není velk˘ podíl. Ponûkud jiná je situace v tûÏbû zemního plynu, kterou nastiÀuje následující tabulka (v mld. m3).

Z hlediska souãasného stavu zásob jsou favority stfiedoasijské republiky, i kdyÏ v poslední dobû do‰lo k objevu pomûrnû siln˘ch loÏisek v ÁzerbájdÏánu, resp. v jiÏní ãásti Kaspického mofie. Stav zásob, kter˘ bude v dal‰ích letech prÛbûÏnû korigován (nejspí‰ smûrem nahoru), je v Turkmenistánu a v Kazachstánu takov˘, Ïe jim umoÏní, aby v této sféfie zaujaly místo regionálních mocností.

3

BP 2001, s. 9.

348

Ropa a zemní plyn v oblasti Kaspického mofie]

[ RU S KO A P O S TS OV ù TS K ¯ P RO S TO R

V˘hled

1999

2005

2010

2015

2020

1350 1032

1100 675

2170 1886

2500 2138

300 157

260 93

130 – 60

100 – 115

100 – 144

349

ÁZERBÁJDÎÁN

Budoucnost tûÏby ropy v oblasti Kaspického mofie bude záviset do znaãné míry na svûtov˘ch cenách. Náklady na tûÏbu a dopravu kaspické ropy na trh ãiní asi 8–10 dolarÛ za barel, svûtové ceny se proto musejí pohybovat minimálnû na úrovni 18 dolarÛ/barel (b/d). V opaãném pfiípadû investice do tûÏby nebudou v˘nosné. Nicménû dlouhodobé v˘hledy poãítaly se stabilizací cen ropy na úrovni 22–27 USD/barel, av‰ak v roce 2004 byla prÛmûrná cena ropy typu Brent 38,27 UDS/b a v následujících mûsících se udrÏovala na relativnû stabilní úrovni okolo 60 USD/b ãi v˘‰e. TûÏba ropy v Kaspiku proto vyvolala zv˘‰en˘ zájem jako potenciál, kter˘ by pomohl stabilizovat rostoucí poptávku a v˘kyvy v cenû a dostupnosti suroviny, jeÏ byly vyvolávány nestabilní situací v jin˘ch zemích (Nigerie, Venezuela). Vlastní v˘‰e tûÏby bude záviset na v˘sledcích intenzivních prospektorsk˘ch prací v pfií‰tích asi pûti letech, které by mûly vyústit ve zv˘‰ení prokázan˘ch zásob ropy. Jak je patrné z následujícího odhadu, celkovû se pfiedpokládá, Ïe v roce 2015 bude oblast Kaspického mofie (bez Ruska) moÏná produkovat témûfi 4 miliony barelÛ ropy dennû. Z tohoto mnoÏství bude pfies 50 % tûÏit Kazachstán a dal‰ích 15–30 % ÁzerbájdÏán. Nepfiedpokládá se, Ïe by Turkmenistán exportoval v˘raznûj‰í mnoÏství ropy. Uzbekistán se naopak patrnû stane jejím dovozcem.4 Scénáfie tûÏby a exportu ropy ÁzerbájdÏánu a stfiedoasijsk˘ch republik (v b/d) znázorÀuje tabulka na následující stranû. JestliÏe investice do tûÏby ropy budou pokraãovat alespoÀ na stejné úrovni jako nyní a jestliÏe bude vybudována odpovídající infrastruktura, IEA na poãátku tisíciletí odhadovala, Ïe podle optimistického scénáfie by zemû uvedené v tabulce mohly v roce 2010 tûÏit celkem 3,9 mil barelÛ ropy dennû (tj. 194 mil. tun roãnû). Podle pesimistického scénáfie, kter˘ kalkuluje s prodlevami pfii zahajování tûÏby, by produkce v tomtéÏ roce dosáhla úrovnû jen 2,7 mil. barelÛ dennû (tj. asi 135 mil. tun roãnû). Znamenalo by to, Ïe se region Kaspického mofie bude na celosvûtové tûÏbû ropy podí-

4

Celkovû se pfiedpokládá, Ïe celosvûtová spotfieba ropy v roce 2010 bude ãinit asi 96 mil. barelÛ dennû a v roce 2020 vzroste na 115 mil. barelÛ. Smith, R., Politics, productions levels to determine Caspian Area energy export options, In: Oil and Gas Journal, vol. 99, No. 22 (May 28, 2001), s. 33n.

tûÏba export

280 155

346 168

1279 1042

KAZACHSTÁN tûÏba export

630 500

tûÏba export

150 60

1350 1176

1645 1423

TURKMENISTÁN 220 112

300 175

UZBEKISTÁN tûÏba export

190 45

165 –3

1250

2081

3354

3920

3960

760

1454

2580

2959

2762

– –

2892 2164

3961 2945

4450 3031

4419 2433

– –

1781 1253

2704 2142

3302 3701

3785 3143

CELKEM tûÏba stfiední odhad export vysok˘ odhad tûÏba export nízk˘ odhad tûÏba export

Pramen: Upraveno dle Smith, R., Politics, production levels, s. 34. Data pocházejí ze zdrojÛ International Energy Agency (IEA).

let asi 4 %. Souãasnû se ale odhaduje, Ïe oblast Stfiedního v˘chodu bude tûÏit pfies 50 % svûtové tûÏby této suroviny.5 Export ropy z bazénu Kaspického mofie by podle základního scénáfie vzrostl z 1,5 mil. barelÛ/den (tj. 75 mil. tun) v roce 2005 na 2,5 mil. b/d 5

Smith, R., Politics…, s. 37. Caspian Oil and Gas: 1999 Update, Paris, IEA 1999, s. 3. Caspian Energy Resources. Implications for the Arab Gulf, Abu Dhabi, The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research 2000, s. 133.

350

v roce 2010 (asi 120 mil. tun roãnû). Maximální v˘‰e exportu by mohla dosáhnout oblast v roce 2015, kdy by státy regionu mohly vyváÏet asi 3 mil. barelÛ dennû (tj. asi 150 mil. tun), i kdyÏ souãasné plány Kazachstánu na v˘‰i tûÏby ropy jsou velmi ambicózní. Pak by v˘voz zaãal jiÏ klesat na pfiedpokládan˘ch asi 2,7 milionÛ barelÛ v roce 2020. Vzhledem k tomu, Ïe tûÏba ropy v oblasti v souãasnosti i blízké budoucnosti závisí jen na nûkolika velk˘ch nalezi‰tích, jakékoliv zmûny ãi zpoÏdûní tûÏby na kterémkoliv z nich by v˘raznû ovlivnily produkci celé oblasti. JestliÏe by se svûtové ceny ropy dlouhodobû udrÏovaly na vy‰‰í úrovni, pak by se úmûrnû tomu zv˘‰ila atraktivita kaspické ropy. Vrchol produkce by pak mohl nastat jiÏ v roce 2010 a nikoliv aÏ v roce 2015, ãi podle pesimistického scénáfie dokonce v roce 2020. Samotn˘ Kazachstán plánuje, Ïe bude jiÏ v roce 2015 tûÏit 150 mil. tun ropy.6 Jak jsme jiÏ konstatovali, nejv˘znamnûj‰í postavení bude mít ropa ze severokaza‰sk˘ch loÏisek, jeÏ mají nadregionální v˘znam pro Rusko, Evropu a âínu. Produkce a export ostatních zemí bude jen regionálního v˘znamu. Pfiíliv kaspické ropy jen slabû ovlivní celosvûtové ceny, i kdyÏ ve spojení s produkcí Ruska by její v˘znam vzrostl. Do roku 2010 ale patrnû vzroste podíl zemí OPEC na celosvûtové tûÏbû. Produkce nûkter˘ch neãlensk˘ch zemí jiÏ zaãne klesat (Severní mofie aj.) a je pravdûpodobné, Ïe kaspická ropa nahradí nanejv˘‰ jen asi polovinu tohoto poklesu. Na rozdíl od ropy rozvoj tûÏby zemního plynu závisí více na poÏadavcích trhu, neÏ na dostupn˘ch zásobách. Zásoby plynu jsou v regionu pomûrnû velké a podle dne‰ních pfiedpokladÛ ani do roku 2020 nedosáhne produkce plynu v oblasti svého vrcholu. S nejvût‰ími pfiírÛstky se poãítá u ÁzerbájdÏánu, Kazachstánu a Uzbekistánu. Právû produkce plynu v Turkmenistánu bude mít v pfií‰tím desetiletí v˘znam nejen pro postsovûtsk˘ prostor (Ukrajina, Rusko, snad také âína aj.), ale pro zásobování Evropy, protoÏe by se mohla stát do jisté míry konkurencí stále draωího ruského zemního plynu.7 Kaza‰sk˘ zemní plyn bude pocházet pfiedev‰ím z ropn˘ch loÏisek Karaãaganak, Ka‰agan a Tengiz, pfiípadnû dal‰ích, av‰ak

6 7

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Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connection 23. 3. 2006. http://www.gasnadoil.com/goc/nawes/ ntc61245.htm z 28. 3. 2006. Woolen, I., Central Asian Gas Crucial to Future Russian Gas Supply, Oil and Gas Journal, vol. 99, No. 33 (August 13, 2001), s. 61–65.

351

vzhledem k tomu, Ïe Kazachstán chce do deseti rokÛ pfiestat dováÏet rusk˘ zemní plyn, moÏnosti jeho exportu tím budou ponûkud oslabeny. Pfiedpokládaná tûÏba a export zemního plynu z ÁzerbájdÏánu a stfiedoasijsk˘ch republik (v miliardách m3) 1999

2005

2010

2015

2020

24,9 12,7

28,9 13,3

36,5 13,2

40,3 7,6

81,8 66,3

92,5 75,4

67,5 6,2

64,2 –3,5

61,1 -13,7

ÁZERBÁJDÎÁN tûÏba export

5,6 0

tûÏba export

9,2 1,3

8,8 2,0

12,4 5,2

KAZACHSTÁN 15,1 3,2

24,3 7,7

TURKMENISTÁN tûÏba export

21,3 10,0

tûÏba export

51,9 2,6

43,8 31,1

70,6 56,5

UZBEKISTÁN 59,7 4,2 CELKEM tûÏba stfiední odhad export vysok˘ odhad tûÏba export nízk˘ odhad tûÏba export

88,0

127,4

174,7

207,4

222,8

13,9

40,5

75,6

88,7

82,6

– –

137,5 38,3

206,3 78,9

265,6 100,7

292,5 77,2

– –

117,1 42,3

131,1 55,2

149,6 71,9

158,7 78,4

Pramen: Upraveno dle Smith, R., Politics…, s. 37. Data pocházejí ze zdrojÛ International Energy Agency (IEA).

Produkce zemního plynu ve stfiedoasijsk˘ch zemích sice je‰tû do roku 2020 asi nedosáhne svého vrcholu, jejich exportní moÏnosti v‰ak patrnû

352

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dosáhnou maxima jiÏ v polovinû pfií‰tího desetiletí. Uzbekistán se stane dovozcem plynu a vzroste vnitfiní spotfieba i v dal‰ích zemích. Rozpad Sovûtského svazu v roce 1991 vedl mj. k silnému naru‰ení do té doby jednotného systému tûÏby, pfiepravy a zpracování energetick˘ch surovin. Ekonomické reformy a ostr˘ pokles v˘konnosti národních hospodáfiství navíc ponechaly vlády jednotliv˘ch, nyní jiÏ nezávisl˘ch státÛ bez finanãních prostfiedkÛ. Na druhé stranû se odhaduje, Ïe vybudování plné infrastruktury na tûÏbu a pfiepravu ropy a plynu ve Stfiední Asii a v Zakavkazsku by vyÏadovalo investice ve v˘‰i asi 200 miliard dolarÛ. Její slabost je jedním z hlavních pfiekáÏek plného vyuÏití moÏností Kaspiku a zvlá‰tû brzdí v˘voz z oblasti. Vlády pfiíslu‰n˘ch zemí proto vût‰inou vytvofiily, resp. musely vytvofiit, podmínky pro investice zahraniãních spoleãností, které hrají klíãovou roli v tûÏbû ropy a plynu a zaji‰Èování exportu. Zahraniãní investofii pfiinesli nejen finanãní prostfiedky, ale také technologie, které umoÏnily tûÏit suroviny i ze silnû vyãerpan˘ch loÏisek, a to metodami ‰etrn˘mi vÛãi pfiírodnímu prostfiedí. Souãasnû státy Stfiední Asie a Zakavkazska musejí o zahraniãní investice usilovat a navzájem soutûÏit. Ropné a plynárenské spoleãnosti jsou vskutku globálními spoleãnostmi a mají moÏnost investovat prakticky na celém svûtû. Volí proto ty pfiíleÏitosti, které jsou v souladu s jejich strategií rozvoje a které nabízejí nejlep‰í návratnost investic. Investiãní klima v té které zemi, ale také v sousedních, kter˘mi povedou exportní trasy, je pfii rozhodování o umístûní investice tudíÏ stejnû dÛleÏité jako technické a geologické kalkulace. Nejatraktivnûj‰í podmínky pro zahraniãní investice vytvofiily ÁzerbájdÏán a Kazachstán. Potvrzuje to do jisté míry i rozbor spoleãnosti Wood Mackenzie, která analyzovala 32 nejdÛleÏitûj‰ích projektÛ v ÁzerbájdÏánu, Kazachstánu a Turkmenistánu. Odhadla, Ïe celkové investice do nich mají v letech 1990-2020 dosáhnout na 100 mld. dolarÛ. Pfiedpokládala se, Ïe z této sumy získá Kazachstán na 71 %, do ÁzerbájdÏánu bude smûfiovat asi 25 % a Turkmenistánu zb˘vající 4 %. K poãátku roku 1999 dosáhly pfiímé investice do energetick˘ch sektorÛ ve Stfiední Asii a v Zakavkazsku v˘‰e asi 5 mld. dolarÛ a budoucí investice podle jiÏ uzavfien˘ch kontraktÛ by mûly dosáhnout více neÏ 60 miliard. Samotn˘ Kazachstán získal v roce 2004 8,4 mld. dolarÛ pfiím˘ch investic a z nich 5,3 miliardy (o 152 % více neÏ v roce 2003) smûfiovalo do tûÏby energetick˘ch surovin. Odborné kruhy

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v‰ak upozorÀují, Ïe financování projektÛ je v politicky a bezpeãnostnû tak rizikovém regionu pro men‰í investory vysoce riskantní.8 Potenciál pro zahraniãní investory je zde sice velk˘, ale velké jsou také pfiekáÏky. Bariéry existují v podobû nedostatku informací o prÛmyslov˘ch podnicích, v podobû státní byrokracie a nevyjasnûn˘ch kompetencí jednotliv˘ch úfiadÛ, v nestabilních místních mûnách, sporech o vlastnictví loÏisek, která se nacházejí ve vzdálen˘ch autonomních oblastech ãi na dnû Kaspického mofie, atd. Dal‰í problémy vytváfií slabû rozvinutá infrastruktura dopravních a komunikaãní systémÛ, nestabilní vládní politika, ale také politická labilita a etnické konflikty. Vût‰ina spoleãností pÛsobí na nûkolika loÏiscích. V tûÏbû ropy stála v roce 1999 na prvním místû spoleãnost Chevron (tûÏila dennû 88 tis. barelÛ ropy), následována spoleãností ExxonMobil (68 tis. b/d), Lukoil (64 tis. b/d), British Petroleum (33 tis. b/d) a fiadou dal‰ích (Agip, BG, Statoil). V tûÏbû zemního plynu „vedla“ spoleãnost Agip, následována spoleãnostmi British Gas, Chevron a Lukoil. K dal‰ím náleÏely Exxon, BP, Statoil aj.9 Produktovody Systém produktovodÛ byl v Kaspiku a ve Stfiední Asii, s v˘jimkou Íránu, budován tak, aby slouÏil potfiebám unitárního Sovûtského svazu, coÏ znamenalo, Ïe byl silnû soustfiedn˘ smûrem do evropské ãásti zemû. Po jeho rozpadu vedou produktovody pfies území nûkolika státÛ, pfiedev‰ím pfies území Ruska, a aÏ do nedávné doby nemûly „vyústûní“ do vnûj‰ího svûta. Toto základní dûdictví minulosti pfietrvává dodnes a je odstraÀováno jen velmi postupnû.

8

9

Mc Cutcheon, H., Osbon, R., Coming to terms with risk in Caspian region. In: Oil and Gas Journal, vol. 98, No. 34 (Aug. 21, 2000), s. 54. Caspian Oil and Gas, s. 35. Caspian Oil and Gas: 1999 Update, s. 6; Adams, T., Caspian Oil Realities. Briefing Paper RIIA No. 23 (Sept. 2001), s. 5. Viz http: //www.riia.org/pdf/briefingpapers/BP%O23.pdf ze 3. ãervna 2002. Alexander’s, 10. 5. 2005 http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc51936.htm z 31. 5. 2005. McCutcheon, H., Osborn, R., Risk management financing availability key to winning in Caspian Region. In: Oil and Gas Journal, vol. 98, No. 30 (July 24, 2000), s. 39 a 42. Pfiehled jednotliv˘ch kontraktÛ a projektÛ viz Rybáfi, J., Kavkaz, Rusko a „nová velká hra“ o kaspickou ropu. Praha 2005, s. 60–62, 67–69. Neff, A., Caspian Nations pursuit oil exports at greatly varying paces. In: Oil and Gas Journal. Vol. 106, No. 22 ( June 13, 2005), s. 36.

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Patrnû nejvût‰ím problémem, kterému musejí ãelit investofii do tûÏby ropy a plynu ve Stfiední Asii a Kaspiku, je nedostateãná infrastruktura ropovodÛ a plynovodÛ, která by umoÏÀovala export tûchto surovin. Prioritu proto má budování nov˘ch exportních produktovodÛ. K hlavním exportním trasám ze Stfiední Asie náleÏí následující ropovody: – Atyrau-Samara. Ropovod o délce 690 km byl postaven pfied více neÏ 30 lety. V Samafie má návaznost na systém ropovodu DruÏba. Pfiepravní kapacita 10,3 mil. tun roãnû je zvy‰ována na 15,4 mil. tun. – Tengiz-Novorossijsk. Ropovod postaven˘ konsorciem Caspian Pipeline Consorcium. Délka 1900 km. Náklady na první fázi, která byla uvedena do provozu v roce 2001 ãinily 2,4 mld. dolarÛ. Kapacita v souãasné dobû ãiní 28 mil. tun roãnû s tím, Ïe ve druhé fázi má b˘t zv˘‰ena aÏ na 66 mil. tun. – Transkaspick˘ ropovod, kter˘ by mûl propojovat Aktau (na kaza‰ském pobfieÏí Kaspického mofie) s Baku v délce 590 km. Zde by navazoval na ropovod Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC). Koncem 90. let byla zpracována základní studie, ale o jeho stavbû nebylo rozhodnuto. – Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, prosazovan˘ z politick˘ch dÛvodÛ Spojen˘mi státy, neboÈ vede mimo ruské a íránské území. Délka 1764 km, kapacita 50 mil. tun s moÏností zv˘‰ení aÏ na 85 mil. tun, náklady na stavbu ãinily 3,6 mld. dolarÛ. Ropovod byl uveden do provozu koncem kvûtna 2005 a první tankery se ve Stfiedomofií zaãaly plnit na podzim téhoÏ roku. – Kazachstán-âína o délce témûfi 3 tis. km a kapacitû asi 20–40 mil. tun. Dohoda o pfiípravû ropovodu byla podepsána v roce 1997, ale o dva roky pozdûji byly dal‰í práce zastaveny. Místo toho zaãala stavba ropovodu Kazachstán – západní âína. Ropovod o poãáteãní kapacitû 10 mil. tun a délce 960 km spojil v prosinci 2005 loÏisko Kumkol v centrálním Kazachstánu s nenasytn˘m ãínsk˘m trhem.10 10

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Zpracováno dle Dorian, J. P., Oil, gas in FSU Central Asia, norhthwestern China. In: Oil and Gas Journal, vol. 99, No. 37 (Sept. 10, 2001), s. 21; Wolowska, A., Caspian Oil and Gas: the facts at the end of the year 2000. In: Prace OSW/CES Studies, No. 1, 2001, s. 49; Smith, R. Politics, production levels to determinate Caspian area energy export options. In: Oil and Gas Journal, vol. 99, No. 22 (May 28, 2001), s. 38. Trend, ã. 21 (24. 6.) 2005, s. 19. Robertson, J., Caspian Oil and Gas. How far have we come and where are we going? In: Oil, Transition and Security in Central Asia. Ed. by Sally N. Cummings. London – New York 2003, s. 153–154.

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Základní exportní trasy a plynovody ze Stfiední Asie jsou následující: – Kaspik a Stfiední Asie – Rusko – Evropa, vyuÏívající stávajících systémÛ postaven˘ch je‰tû za existence Sovûtského svazu. Jejich kapacita ãiní na 110 miliard m3 roãnû a umoÏÀuje napfi. od roku 2002 dodávat Ukrajinû roãnû na 50 mld. m3 turkmenského plynu. – Modr˘ potok (Blue Stream), spojující jiÏní Rusko s Tureckem. Veden je po dnû âerného mofie. První dodávky témûfi 400 km dlouh˘m potrubím zaãaly v prosinci 2001, av‰ak vzhledem ke stagnaci tureckého hospodáfiství se odbûry zatím drÏí jen na úrovni nûkolika miliard kubíkÛ proti plánovan˘m asi 16 miliardám. – Turkmenistán-Irán. Plynovod o kapacitû necel˘ch 10 mld. kubíkÛ byl uveden do provozu v prosinci 1997. Existuje nûkolik návrhÛ na zv˘‰ení jeho kapacity. – Transkaspick˘ plynovod o délce 1686 km, kter˘ by propojoval Turkmenistán, ÁzerbájdÏán a dále Turecko. PfiedbûÏná studie projektu za asi 3 mld. USD byla zpracována. Realizace je zatím nejistá. – Baku-Erzurum, kter˘ by dopravil plyn z ázarbájdÏánského loÏiska ·achDeniz do Turecka a dále pfiípadnû do Evropy. Projekt navrhovan˘ spoleãností BP byl nûkolikrát odloÏen kvÛli nejistotû ohlednû v˘tûÏnosti loÏiska a kvÛli nadbytku plynu na tureckém trhu. – Turkmenistán-âína. Délka by mûla ãinit 8000 km a náklady na stavbu asi 12 mld. dolarÛ. Zatím byla zpracovávána jen pfiedbûÏná studie, i kdyÏ s jeho stavbou poãítá ãínsko-turkmenská dohoda o dodávkách plynu podepsaná 3. 4. 2006.11 Rusko-ukrajinsk˘ spor o cenu plynu a krátké zastavení rusk˘ch dodávek plynu na Ukrajinu na pfielomu let 2005/2006 pfiimûl EU k úvahám jak posílit energetickou bezpeãnost. Jednou z moÏností je projekt Nabucco stejnojmenného konsorcia pûti spoleãností z pûti zemí stfiední a jihov˘chodní Evropy. Jednalo by se o plynovod o délce 3400 km a poãáteãní kapacitû 4,5 mld. m2 roãnû s potenciálem roz‰ífiení aÏ na 25–30 miliard, kter˘ by dopravoval plyn ze Stfiední Asie, ÁzerbájdÏánu, Íránu do Evropy. Pfiípadná realizace projektu je v‰ak záleÏitostí aÏ pfií‰tího desetiletí.12 11

Zpracováno dle Dorian, J. P., Oil, gas in FSU Central Asia… s. 26; Wolowska, A., cit dílo, s. 49n.; Smith, R., Politics, production levels … 28, 2001), s. 38. 12 Alexander’s 17. 8. 2005. http://gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc53362.htm z 31.8. 2005.

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Stejnû jako v pfiípadû exportních tras ropy, i u plynovodÛ existuje fiada dal‰ích návrhÛ, ale moÏnosti jejich realizace jsou z fiady dÛvodÛ v pfií‰tím desetiletí nepravdûpodobné. V roce 1998 napfi. kapacita ropovodÛ pro pfiepravu ropy ze Stfiední Asie a Zakavkazska do Ruska ãinila asi 18,5 mil. tun roãnû a byla témûfi plnû vyuÏita. V následujících letech se dále roz‰ífiila. SloÏitûj‰í byla situace v oblasti exportu zemního plynu. Rusk˘ plynárensk˘ monopol Gazprom, kter˘ kontroluje síÈ tranzitních plynovodÛ, tehdy nepovolil Ïádné zemi export plynu mimo prostor b˘valého Sovûtského svazu. Díky kontrole plynovodÛ mohl zabránit tomu, aby plyn ze Stfiední Asie konkuroval na lukrativních trzích ruskému. Exportní moÏnosti pro Uzbekistán a zvlá‰tû Turkmenistán proto zÛstaly omezeny na nesolventní státy postsovûtského prostoru (zvlá‰tû Ukrajinu). ÁzerbájdÏán a dal‰í zemû dokonce rusk˘ plyn importovaly. Nicménû od pfielomu století se i tento postoj Gazpromu, resp. Ruska zaãal mûnit. DÛvodem je skuteãnost, Ïe chce nakupovat znaãná kvanta turkmenského a kaza‰ského plynu a prosadit svoji opûtovnou kontrolu nad energetickou infrastrukturou v Zakavkazsku i ve Stfiední Asii. V roce 2010 mohou mít stfiedoasijské státy a ÁzerbájdÏán k dispozici pro export asi 120 mil. tun ropy a na 80 mld. m3 plynu. Souãasná kapacita produktovodÛ ale neumoÏÀuje dopravu takového objemu, a proto se jiÏ ve druhé polovinû 90. let pfiistoupilo ke stavbû nov˘ch ãi rekonstrukci nûkolika star˘ch produktovodÛ. Souãasnû se zpracovávaly projekty nov˘ch tras. Vût‰ina z nich ale musí vést pfies krizová území ãi jen nedaleko nich, coÏ vyvolává obavy z toho, Ïe by se staly terãem útokÛ. Jiné trasy, vedoucí pfies Irán, jsou blokovány americk˘mi sankcemi a politikou vÛãi Teheránu. Spojené státy souãasnû usilují o diverzifikaci exportních tras tak, aby se omezila závislost stfiedoasijsk˘ch zemí na Rusku. Posílení energetické bezpeãnosti souãasnû musí b˘t v souladu s ekonomick˘mi parametry, neboÈ se mj. ukázalo, Ïe více produktovodÛ znamená vût‰í ekonomické náklady a men‰í návratnost investic. Ropa ze Stfiední Asie a Zakavkazska mÛÏe na svûtov˘ch trzích s úspûchem konkurovat sibifiské, neboÈ je kvalitnûj‰í (ruská má vysok˘ obsah síry) a její tûÏba je levnûj‰í. Ostatnû o ni projevují zv˘‰en˘ zájem nûmecké, ãeské a dal‰í rafinérie. Logick˘m odbûratelem budou patrnû evropské trhy. Jistá ãást by mohla b˘t umístûna i na jin˘ch trzích. Jako odbûratel se nabízí i âína, která se jiÏ podílí na tûÏbû kaza‰ské ropy. Ze stfiednû a zvlá‰tû

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dlouhodobého hlediska se nepochybnû stane dÛleÏit˘m odbûratelem stfiedoasijské suroviny. Propojení Stfiední Asie s âínou by mohla v˘raznû napomoci stavba vnitroãínského ropovodu ze severozápadních oblastí âLR do ·anghaje. Pfiíslu‰ná dohoda o stavbû 4000 km dlouhého ropovodu v cenû 20 miliard dolarÛ byla podepsána s konsorciem v ãele se spoleãností Royal/Dutch Shell jiÏ poãátkem ãervence 2002.13 Nejvût‰ími pravdûpodobn˘mi odbûrateli ázerbájdÏánského a stfiedoasijského zemního plyn bude postsovûtsk˘ prostor (Uzbekistán, Ukrajina), pfiedev‰ím ale Rusko. V jeho pfiípadû nejsou v souãasné dobû pfiíli‰ jasné perspektivy dal‰ího roz‰ífiení exportu plynu do západní Evropy (snad aÏ na 200 mld. m3 roãnû). Dodávky turkmenského plynu Rusku by uvolnily jeho vlastní pro export do Evropy. Nicménû ve stfiednûdobé perspektivû se jeví jako pomûrnû nadûjn˘ export do západní âíny. Pfiíslu‰nou dohodu o dodávkách 30 mld. kubíkÛ plynu roãnû podepsal turkmensk˘ prezident S. Nijazov s ãínsk˘mi ãiniteli 3. dubna 2006. Ve stfiednû a dlouhodobé perspektivû bude ázerbájdÏánsk˘ plyn smûfiovat do Gruzie a pfiípadnû i do Evropy. Odbûrateli se mohou stát i dal‰í okolní zemû, tj. zvlá‰tû Irán a Turecko, i kdyÏ zde naráÏí na politické pfiekáÏky a v pfiípadû Turecka na silnou konkurenci ruského plynu.14 Jak jsme jiÏ konstatovali, systém produktovodÛ vybudovan˘ za sovûtské éry jako souãást jednoho celku slouÏí dodnes pfiedev‰ím Rusku. Prakticky v‰echny stfiedoasijské zemû ale hledí na ruské zámûry jak v obecné rovinû, tak pokud se t˘ká energetick˘ch surovin zvlá‰tû, s urãitou nedÛvûrou. Navíc minulá léta vnesla do jejich vztahÛ zátûÏ v podobû mnoÏství nejrÛznûj‰ích sporÛ a konfliktÛ. Proto se operátofii kaspick˘ch loÏisek od poãátku 90. let pokou‰eli hledat alternativní moÏnosti, které by zredukovaly závislost tûchto státÛ na Rusku. Aãkoliv se uvaÏovalo o fiadû alternativ, v podstatû Ïádná se dodnes nerealizovala. Kromû nutné ãasové prodlevy pfii pfiípravû projektÛ a finanãních nákladÛ je hlavní pfiíãinou tohoto stavu mimofiádnû sloÏit˘ bezpeãnostní obraz. V oblasti se nachází nûkolik váÏn˘ch ohnisek konfliktÛ, které omezují moÏnosti vedení tras produkto13 14

Hospodáfiské noviny, 8. ãervence 2002, s. 14. Zpracováno dle: Caspian Oil and Gas. The Supply Potencial of Central Asia and Transcaucasia, Paris, 1998. S. 92 nn, 37 nn.; Shenoy, V., Gulen, S. G., Foss, M. M. Caspian Oil export choices clouded by geopolitics, project economics. In: Oil and Gas Journal, vol. 97, No. 16 (April 1999), s. 31nn. Kaspická ropa a Slovensko. In: Trend, ã. 29 (18. 6.) 2001, s. 8–9.

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vodÛ ze Stfiední Asie a Kaspického bazénu. Patrnû nejznámûj‰í je arménsko-ázerbájdÏánsk˘ konflikt o Náhorní Karabach. Od poãátku 90. let zvy‰ují nestabilitu Gruzie konflikty v Abcházii a JiÏní Osetii a navíc celková vnitropolitická situace v republice jeví známky nestability. âeãensko a Dagestán jsou v souãasnosti nepochybnû pod ruskou kontrolou, ale budoucnost tûchto území je pfiinejmen‰ím nejistá. TotéÏ platí také o Turecku, resp. o tureckém Kurdistánu jehoÏ blízkosti vede trasa ropovodu Baku-TbilisiCeyhan. Turecko proto, aby podpofiilo v˘hody této trasy, dále zdÛrazÀuje, Ïe dal‰í zvy‰ování dopravy ropy ÚÏinami (Dardanely, Bospor) je vzhledem k hustotû provozu jiÏ nemoÏné. Do popfiedí zde vystupují také ekologické ohledy.15 Vnitropolitická nestabilita, bezpeãnostní nejistota a permanentní napûtí mezi Pákistánem a Indií a situace v Afghánistánu vedou k závûru, Ïe jihov˘chodní varianta produktovodÛ je nerealistická. Vzhledem k opûtovnû prodluÏovan˘m americk˘m sankcím vÛãi Iránu nemohou b˘t brány váÏnû ani varianty, které by vedly pfies jeho území. V dÛsledkÛ sporÛ o urãení statutu Kaspického mofie má navíc Irán napjaté vztahy s ÁzerbájdÏánem. Celkovû je pak otázkou, zda by Irán byl ochoten povolit pfiepravu vût‰ích kvant ropy a plynu ze Stfiední Asie pfies své území, kdyÏ sám usiluje o zv˘‰ení svého vlastního v˘vozu energetick˘ch surovin. Zdá se, Ïe pouze trasám vedoucím ze západního Kazachstánu ãi Turkmenistánu do âíny nestojí v cestû vût‰í bezpeãnostní rizika. Ov‰em vzdálenost mezi loÏisky v okolí Kaspického mofie a trhy ve v˘chodní, resp. jihov˘chodní âínû, ãi dokonce v Koreji a Japonsku, jsou natolik velké, Ïe pfiípadní investofii budou velmi váhat, neÏ pfievezmou konkrétní závazky. âínské úfiady jsou ale patrnû rozhodnuty tûchto alternativ vyuÏít. âína totiÏ bude v budoucnosti potfiebovat je‰tû vût‰í dovozy ropy i plynu, které si vynutí její ekonomick˘ rozvoj. Navíc má evidentní zájem na posílení svého vlivu ve Stfiední Asii. O realizaci rÛzn˘ch tras budou ale rozhodovat pfiedev‰ím svûtové ceny ropy a plynu.16 15 16

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Clark, M., The Bosporus bottleneck. IN: Petroleum Economist. Vol. 71, No. 6 (June 2004), s. 28–29. Caspian Oil and Gas, s. 133–144; The Politics of Caspian Oil, ed. by B. Gökay, Houndmill, 2001, s. 121 nn.; The New Economy of Oil. Impact on Business. Geopolitics and Society, ed. by J. Mitchell, London 2001, s. 131nn. K diskusím o trasách produktovodÛ blíÏe viz napfi. Olcott, M., Pipelines and Pipe Dreams: Energy Deveploment and Caspian Society. In: Journal of International Affairs, vol. 53, No. 1 (Fall 1999), s. 305–323, nebo Miles, C., The Caspian Pipeline Debate Continues: Why not Iran. In: TamtéÏ, s. 325–346.

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Pro export ropy ze západních regionÛ Stfiední Asie byla navrÏena opût fiada projektÛ a nûkteré z nich se zaãínají pomalu realizovat. Základní tfii smûry vedou pfies Rusko a zvlá‰tû jeho pfiístav v âerném mofii Novorossijsk, dále pfies Zakavkazsko (Gruzii, ÁzerbájdÏán) nebo via Turecko ãi Írán. Trasy vedoucí pfies Rusko zahrnují pfiedev‰ím ropovod postaven˘ konsorciem Caspian Pipeline Consorcium, které sdruÏuje fiadu kaza‰sk˘ch, americk˘ch, rusk˘ch a dal‰ích firem. Ropovodem se dopravuje ropa z loÏiska Tengiz do ruského pfiístavu Novorossijsk. Dále je ji nutné pfiepravovat tankery pfies pfietíÏené turecké ÚÏiny. Jistou alternativu bude nepochybnû sk˘tat moÏnost dopravovat ãást kaza‰ské ropy pfies Ukrajinu ropovodem Odesa-Brody a z BrodÛ pak ropovodem DruÏba do stfiední Evropy, i kdyÏ ho nyní vyuÏívá spoleãnost TNK-BP k dopravû men‰ích objemÛ ropy opaãn˘m smûrem. V souãasné dobû se stále více diskutuje v prodlouÏení tohoto ropovodu dále do Polska, do GdaÀsku. Tím by bylo moÏné dopravovat stfiedoasijskou ropu prakticky do celé Evropy. Ropovod Odûsa-Brody je souãástí tzv. Euroasijského ropného pfiepravního koridoru (Euro-Asian Oil Transport Corridor). Jedná se o mezinárodní projekt, kter˘ má ulehãit pfiepravu kaspické ropy do Evropy, aniÏ by musela procházet pfies ruské území.17 Ropovod Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) má zajistit propojení ÁzerbájdÏánu pfies Gruzii s tureck˘m stfiedozemním pfiístavem Ceyhan. Jeho stavbu silnû podporovaly Spojené státy, jelikoÏ v nûm vidûly pfiedev‰ím diverzifikaci exportních tras z oblasti Kaspiku. PfiestoÏe se jedná o technologicky komplikovanou, ekonomicky diskutabilní a vÛãi Ïivotnímu prostfiedí kontroverzní akci (náklady 3,6 mld. USD), konsorcium pod vedením British Petroleum ropovod postavilo a na jafie 2005 zahájilo provoz. Pfiepravovat má jak ázerbájdÏánskou ropu, tak moÏná také kaza‰skou. Kazachstán souãasnû usiluje o zmen‰ení závislosti na rusk˘ch dodávkách ropy do v˘chodních oblastí svého území, a proto plánuje stavbu vnitrostátního ropovodu ze západního do v˘chodního Kazachstánu, kter˘ by ho zbavil nutnosti nákladné v˘mûny ropy s Ruskem, pfii které jde ãást jeho exportu ropy do Ruska. Kazachstán souãasnû jednal s Tureckem a Íránem o stavbû ropovodÛ, které by ho spojily s Evropou. V tomto pfiípadû nara-

17

Trend ã. 24 (12.6.) 2002, s. 6.

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zil ov‰em na odpor USA. Ty se naopak pokou‰ejí pfiesvûdãit prezidenta N. Nazarbajeva, aby se Kazachstán pfiipojil dodávkami ropy k projektu BTC.18 Pokud se t˘ká velmi omezen˘ch exportních tras zemního plynu, v souãasné dobû má vût‰í exportní moÏnosti pouze Turkmenistán. Írán prÛbûÏnû obviÀuje Spojené státy, Ïe se snaÏí pfiesvûdãit jeho prezidenta Nijazova, aby exportní trasy orientoval na západ pfies ÁzerbájdÏán a Gruzii, spí‰e neÏ pfies Írán, kter˘ nabízí v˘raznû niωí tranzitní poplatky. NejdÛleÏitûj‰ím alternativním návrhem Turkmenistánu byl plán na v˘stavbu Transkaspického plynovodu vedoucího pfies Zakavkazsko do Turecka. Odtud by v del‰í budoucnosti mohl b˘t turkmensk˘ plyn pfiepravován aÏ do Evropy. Plány na stavbu plynovodu Írán-Turecko-Evropa jsou jiÏ zpracovány, stavbû v‰ak brání politické dÛvody. Nicménû jiÏ v roce 1997 byl uveden do provozu 144 km dlouh˘ plynovod, kter˘ propojil loÏiska v západním Turkmenistánu se severním Íránem. UvaÏuje se o trasách pfies Afghánistán do Pákistánu, ale to jsou jen teoretické moÏnosti. Nejvût‰í export turkmenského plynu smûfiuje rusk˘mi plynovody na Ukrajinu a také Rusko, resp. Gazprom má eminentní zájem na dlouhodob˘ch dodávkách jeho plynu. V dlouhodobé perspektivû (minimálnû 10 let) je proto nutné pfiedpokládat závislost Turkmenistánu a celé Stfiední Asie na ruském plynárenském transportním systému, i kdyÏ Turkmenistán uzavfiel dohodu o prodeji a pfiepravû plynu také do âíny. Uzbekistán, svázan˘ rusk˘m monopolem na pfiepravu plynu, uvaÏoval o nûkolika nov˘ch plynovodech. Pfiedpokládá se v‰ak, Ïe ve stfiednûdobém horizontu se stane jeho dovozcem. Jedinou jeho nadûji je odkrytí zatím neznám˘ch loÏisek. Situace v jednotliv˘ch zemích Rozlohou nejvût‰í zemí v prostoru Kaspiku a druhou nejlidnatûj‰í zemí ve Stfiední Asii je Kazachstán, kter˘ disponuje v regionu nejvût‰ími zásobami ropy (5,4 mld. tun) a zemního plynu (jiÏ 3 biliony m3). Odtud pochází jeho ãasté oznaãování jako „nového Kuvajtu“. TûÏba ropy v Kazachstánu dosáhla v roce 2005 denní v˘konnosti 1,3 mil. barelÛ a oãekává se, Ïe do roku 2015 by mûla vzrÛst na 3 mil. b/d (tj. asi 150 mil. tun roã-

nû). V souãasné dobû se tûÏí na klíãov˘ch loÏiscích Tengiz (konsorcium v ãele s ChevronTexaco), Karaãaganak (British Gas) a Ka‰agan (Agip). Kromû ÁzerbájdÏánu nevytvofiil Ïádn˘ stát v oblasti zprvu takové podmínky pro cizí investory jako Kazachstán, aÈ jiÏ pfii vytváfiení pfiíslu‰né legislativy a formulování národní energetické politiky, nebo dokonce pfii odstraÀování byrokratick˘ch prÛtahÛ a pfiekáÏek. Samotn˘ prezident Nursultan Nazarbajev kontroloval postup jednotliv˘ch jednání. Pfiíjmy v exportu ropy a zahraniãní investice ostatnû slouÏí k financování jeho megalomansk˘ch projektÛ, vãetnû v˘stavby nového hlavního mûsta. Díky tûÏbû ropy a jejím vysok˘m cenám mohla kaza‰ská ekonomika rÛst o 9 % roãnû.19 Od poloviny 90. let Kazachstán urychlil proces pfiejímání západní praxe jak v fiízení, tak ve finanãní oblasti. Jeho typickou praxí bylo zakládání spoleãn˘ch podnikÛ mezi západními spoleãnostmi a tehdej‰í kaza‰skou státní spoleãností KazachOjl. V zemi se angaÏovalo nûkolik desítek zahraniãních firem. Nejvût‰í nadnárodní firmy, jako americká Chevron Corp., investovaly do loÏisek jako je Tengiz, které je se zásobami 2,4 aÏ 2,9 mld. tun ropy je nejvût‰ím nalezi‰tûm v zemi. Spoleãn˘ podnik Tengizchevroil (Kazachstán v nûm má 20% , americké spoleãnosti Chevron a ExxonMobil 50%, resp. 25 %ní a ruská spoleãnost LukArco 5% podíl) zde tûÏily na 12 mil. tun roãnû.20 Jiné konsorcium financovalo stavbu ropovodu do ruského Novorossijsku. Kaza‰ská státní spoleãnost KazachOjl, zaloÏená v roce 1997, vlastnila v‰echny státní podíly ve v‰ech ropn˘ch projektech a ve spoleãn˘ch podnicích. V roce 2002 byla zaloÏena spoleãnost KazMunajGaz, která v nov˘ch projektech ovládá jiÏ 50 %. V posledních letech se kaza‰ská vláda pokou‰í revidovat smlouvy s ropn˘mi spoleãnostmi a dosáhnout vût‰ích odvodÛ do státního rozpoãtu. Orientuje se spí‰e na dohody uzavfiené na státní úrovni, neÏ aby vypisovala tendry na prospekci a tûÏbu v jednotliv˘ch tûÏebních blocích. Zahraniãní ropné spoleãnosti proto ãelí dilematu: velké ropné bohatství skr˘vá velk˘ potenciál, souãasnû s tím ale stále sílí tlak státu, kter˘ chce diktovat podmínky i rychlost tûÏby.21 Pfiíkladem souãasného kaza‰ského pfiístupu mÛÏe b˘t mezistátní ruskokaza‰ská dohoda z poãátku ãervence 2005. Rusk˘ Rosnûft a KazMunajGaz 19 20

18

Alexander‘s 6.7.2005. http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntc52755.htm ze 7. 7. 2005.

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21

Gorst, I., Papa knows best. Petroleum Economist, vol. 73 (2006), January, s. 4. Oil and Gas Journal, http: //ogj.pennet.com/news ze 4. 5. 2001. Gorst, I., cit. dílo, s. 5.

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tehdy uzavfiely dohodu s platností na 25 rokÛ a v moÏné v˘‰i aÏ 23 mld. dolarÛ, na rozpracování a tûÏbu ropy v hraniãním naleÏi‰ti Kurmangazy na dnû Kaspického mofie. Jeho zásoby se odhadují na témûfi 1 miliardu tun ropy.22 Vzhledem k rozsahu tûÏby a plánÛm do budoucnosti bude Kazachstán naléhavû potfiebovat nové exportní trasy. Jako alternativa se zde nabízí Spojen˘mi státy a Tureckem prosazovan˘ BTC, Kazachstán v‰ak neuspokojují ekonomické podmínky, a moÏná ani politické konsekvence tohoto projektu. Problematika tradiãního tûÏafie ropy v oblasti, ÁzerbájdÏánu, byla jiÏ v ãeské produkci dostateãnû zpracována.23 Velk˘ problém zemû spoãívá v tom, Ïe fiada prÛzkumn˘ch vrtÛ v jeho sektoru Kaspického mofie skonãila neúspûchem a v lep‰ím pfiípadû objevem loÏiska plynu.24 Zdá se, Ïe pro ÁzerbájdÏán je jedinou nadûjí kontrakt podepsan˘ s konsorciem AIOC, kter˘ zahrnuje loÏiska Azeri, âirag a Gjune‰li. Jako kontrakt století byl v roce 1994 podepsán na 30 rokÛ s AIOC, v nûmÏ je hlavním podílníkem BP. První ropa byla vytûÏena v roce 1997, av‰ak rozhodujícím rokem se stal 2005. Tehdy byl spu‰tûn ropovod BTC, provozovan˘ konsorciem v ãele také se BP. Aby naplnila ropovod, zaãala AIOC zvy‰ovat tûÏbu, která dosahovala koncem roku 2004 130 tisíc b/d, aÏ na 220 tisíc b/d. Pfiedpokládá se, Ïe ji „vybiãuje“ snad aÏ na 754 b/d v roce 2007. Cílem je dosáhnout tûÏby 1 milion barelÛ dennû o rok pozdûji. To v‰ak bude maximum, po nûmÏ zfiejmû nastane propad na 800 tisíc barelÛ na poãátku pfií‰tího desetiletí a 250 tisíc b/d na jeho konci.25 Nyní, kdyÏ ropn˘ boom koneãnû nastal, potfiebuje ÁzerbájdÏán nová naleÏi‰tû. Vyhlídky v‰ak nejsou pfiíli‰ povzbudivé. ¤ada zku‰ebních vrtÛ zÛstala such˘ch a projekty byly ukonãeny. Nadûje se tak soustfieìují k severní ãásti ázerbájdÏánského sektoru Kaspiku, kde provádí prospekci rusk˘ Lukoil a na spornou oblast u hranic ázerbájdÏánsko-íránského, resp. azerbájdÏánsko-turkmenského sektoru. V obou pfiípadech se v‰ak jedná o sporné oblasti. Cestu k jejich exploataci by mohla otevfiít pouze dohoda o spoleãné tûÏbû po vzoru rusko–kaza‰ské dohody. Absence takové dohody a nepravdûpodobnost, Ïe bude uzavfiena v relativnû blízké budoucnos22 23 24 25

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Hospodáfiské noviny 7. 7. 2005, s. 17. Wanner, J., cit dílo, s. 47–80. Rybáfi, J.: cit dílo, s. 52–62. Watson, N. J., To boldly go. Petroleum Economist, vol. 72 (2005), October, s. 21. Neff, A., Caspian Nations pursuing oil export at greatly varying paces. In: Oil and Gas Journal. Vol. 103, No. 22 (June 13, 2005), s. 35n.

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ti, vede k tomu, Ïe tûÏba a export ropy a pfiíliv finanãních prostfiedkÛ závisejí témûfi v˘hradnû na zmínûn˘ch loÏiscích. V dlouhodobûj‰ím v˘hledu v‰ak mÛÏe dojít k doplnûní tûÏby ropy o tûÏbu zemního plynu, neboÈ v nûkter˘ch vrtech byl místo oãekávané ropy objeven plyn. Jedná se zvlá‰tû o loÏisko ·ach-Deniz. Pro takovou zmûnu v‰ak není v zemi vybudována Ïádná infrastruktura, nehledû k zv˘‰en˘m poÏadavkÛm na marketink.26 Vedoucí zemí v produkci zemního plynu je Turkmenistán, kter˘ je jeho exportérem a podle propoãtÛ spoleãnosti BP vlastní osmé nejvût‰í zásoby plynu na svûtû (témûfi 3 biliony m3), v postsovûtském prostoru druhé za Ruskem. Je v‰ak velmi pravdûpodobné, Ïe dal‰í prospekce tento potenciál zv˘‰í. Více neÏ polovina turkmenské produkce plynu pochází z velkého loÏiska DŒwletabad ve v˘chodní ãásti zemi. Základním problémem, kter˘ bude ovlivÀovat moÏnosti zvy‰ování produkce, je v‰ak izolovanost zemû. Dokud nevytvofií spolehlivé transportní trasy na trhy v Evropû, Turecku, ãi dokonce v âínû, zÛstávají nadûje na velk˘ rozmach tûÏby omezené. V tomto ohledu bude Turkmenistán v pfií‰tích letech závisl˘ na ruské politice. TotéÏ platí o produkci ropy, i kdyÏ Turkmenistán nyní tûÏí po propadu na zaãátku 90. let jen pfies 7 mil. tun ropy. Západním i rusk˘m spoleãnostem brání ve vût‰í angaÏovanosti v zemi kombinace ekonomick˘ch a politick˘ch faktorÛ a izolacionistická politika prezidenta Nijazova. Turkmenistán dosud vyváÏel plyn v mal˘ch kvantech do Íránu a z témûfi absolutního nedostatku jin˘ch alternativ pfiedev‰ím na Ukrajinu, která mûla podle dohody odebrat v letech 2002 aÏ 2006 celkem 250 miliard m3 plynu, i kdyÏ se soustavnû pot˘ká s platební neschopností. Klíãovou se v‰ak stala dohoda, jiÏ podepsali prezidenti Ruska Vladimír Putin a Turkmenistánu Nijazov v dubnu 2003. Podle ní má Gazprom postupnû zvy‰ovat nákupy plynu v Turkmenistánu aÏ na 80 mld. kubíkÛ od roku 2009 (v roce 2006 jiÏ 30 miliard). Pfii tak masivním exportu do Ruska je vÛbec otázkou, zda bude Turkmenistán (s tûÏbou v roce 2004 54,6 mld. m3) schopen po roce 2006 udrÏet úroveÀ dodávek na Ukrajinu. Nijazov se navíc je‰tû zavázal k exportu dal‰ích 30 miliard kubíkÛ do âíny od roku 2009. Jak vypl˘vá z ãínsko–turkmenské dohody z dubna 2006, má b˘t tento plyn pfiepravován nov˘m plynovodem a obû strany by mûly provádût spoleãnou prospekci a tûÏbu v povodí fieky 181

Watson, N. J., cit dílo, s. 22.

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Amudarji.27 Je ov‰em moÏné ãi pravdûpodobné, Ïe realizace dohody bude ménû ambiciózní. Geografick˘m centrem Stfiední Asie a tûÏi‰tûm jejího dopravního a energetického systému je Uzbekistán. Stejnû jako Kazachstán a Turkmenistán má pomûrnû znaãné zásoby ropy. Její tûÏba (7,5 mil. tun v roce 2000) se proti poãátku 90. let více neÏ zdvojnásobila a eliminovala nutnost dováÏet ropu pro v˘robu elektrické energie. Uzbekistán dokonce men‰í mnoÏství vyváÏí. Uzbecká ropná a plynárenská spoleãnost Uzbeknûftûgaz se soustfieìuje jednak na osvojení nov˘ch loÏisek a prospektorské práce, jednak na plné vyuÏití jiÏ tûÏen˘ch ãi vytûÏen˘ch loÏisek. Patrnû nejmen‰ími zdroji energií disponuje Kyrgyzstán. Jeho vláda plánuje privatizaci státní spoleãnosti Kyrgyznûft. Energetiku zemû orientuje v‰ak spí‰e na vyuÏití vodní energie. Stejnû jako Kyrgyzstán je hornatou zemí také TádÏikistán, zmítan˘ v 90. letech obãanskou válkou, která pfiispûla k tomu, Ïe se jedná o zemi s nejmen‰ím HDP na ãlovûka v oblasti. Ropn˘ a plynárensk˘ prÛmysl zemû je velmi omezen˘ a ve‰kerou tûÏbu, prospekci realizuje státní spoleãnost TadÏiknûft.28 Írán zaujal ve sporech o urãení statutu Kaspického mofie vÛãi vût‰inû ostatních zemí odmítav˘ postoj a poÏaduje rovn˘ 20% podíl na Kaspiku.29 Rusko, Kazachstán a ÁzerbájdÏán v‰ak dospûly k separátní smlouvû (2003), která mu ponechává (po pfiistoupení Turkmenistánu) pouze 13% podíl. Bez ohledu na tyto spory Írán projevuje pragmatismus a na sv˘ch naleÏi‰tích ropy agresivnû zvy‰uje tûÏbu s cílem dospût z nedávné asi úrovnû 110 tisíc b/d aÏ k tûÏbû aÏ 1,6 mil. b/d koncem desetiletí. LoÏiska v ruském sektoru Kaspického mofie zÛstávají z vût‰í míry stále je‰tû netûÏená a ruské ropné spoleãnosti soustfieìují svoji pozornost k loÏiskÛm mimo region. Rusko se v‰ak v prÛbûhu 90. let aktivnû zúãastnilo „bitev“ o tûÏební práva. Vût‰í dÛraz poloÏila na rozvoj vlastních loÏisek aÏ Puti27 28

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OÊrodek Studiów Wschodnich, 12. 4. 2006. http://www.osw.waw.pl/pub/koment/2006/04/ 060412.htm ze 14. 4. 2006. Dorian, J. P., Oil, Gas i FSU Central Asia, s. 22–27; A soaring comeback continues. In: World Oil, vol 222, No. 8 (August 2001), s. 62 nn. BlíÏe viz také Caspian Oil and Gas, s. 193–296 a Caspian Oil and Gas: 1999 Update, s. 26–33. K problematice statutu Kaspického mofie viz napfi.: Croissant, C. – Croissant, M., The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea: Conflict and Compromise. In: Oil nad Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region, ed. M. Croissant – B. Aras, New York 1999, s. 21–42. Hirman, K., Kaspické more stále ãaká na svoj ‰tátus. In: Trend, ã. 29 (18. 7.) 2001, s. 9.

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nova administrativa. Cestu k jejich rozvoji otevfielo nûkolik smluv s Kazachstánem a posléze také ÁzerbájdÏánem, kter˘mi smluvní strany upravovaly delimitaci dna Kaspického mofie a umoÏnily zakládat spoleãné podniky. V˘sledkem byla dohoda o rusko-kaza‰ské spolupráci pfii rozvoji loÏisek Chvalynskoje a Centralnaja, které se z vût‰í ãásti nacházejí v ruském sektoru, a Kurmangazy, leÏícího více v sektoru kaza‰ském. LoÏiska v ruském sektoru zÛstávají v rusk˘ch rukách a Kreml bude urãovat podmínky jejich rozvoje.30 V˘razn˘m rysem ruského pfiístupu k problematice energetick˘ch surovin Putinovy administrativy a jeho energetické politiky je silná státní podpora rusk˘ch spoleãností v úsilí o návrat a získání pozic v Zakavkazsku a zvlá‰tû ve Stfiední Asii. Kromû zmínûné dohody s Turkmenistánem uzavfiel ‰éf Gazpromu A. Miller v kvûtnu 2003 s TádÏikistánem a Kyrgyzstánem dohody o strategické spolupráci v plynárenském sektoru, vãetnû prospekce a pfiípadné tûÏby plynu a jeho nákupech ze strany spoleãnosti Gazprom. Obdobnou dohodu podepsal také s Kazachstánem. V ní se obû strany stanovily mj. podmínky, za kter˘ch bude moci rusk˘ Gazprom nakupovat kaza‰sk˘ plyn z loÏiska Karaãaganak.31 O dva roky pozdûji, v listopadu 2005, podepsal Gazprom s KazMunajgazem pûtiletou dohodu o v˘kupu celého kaza‰ského exportu plynu (exportovaného do Ruska plynovodem Buchara-Ural) a o tranzitu této suroviny z turkmensk˘ch a uzbeck˘ch loÏisek. Tûsnû pfiedtím, v záfií téhoÏ roku, podepsal s uzbeckou spoleãností Uztransgaz dohodu, v níÏ si na léta 2006 aÏ 2010 rezervoval prakticky celou kapacitu uzbeck˘ch tranzitních plynovodÛ pro plyn z Uzbekistánu a pfiedev‰ím z Turkmenistánu.32 Ekonomické zisky Putinovy podpory uzbeckého reÏimu I. Karimova za boufií v první polovinû roku 2005 se promítly do kontraktu, kter˘ podepsal Lukoil a jenÏ byl souãástí strategického partnerství mezi Ruskem a Uzbekistánem, na prospekci a tûÏbu ropy a ropného kondenzátu v regionu Buchara-Chiva. Evidentním cílem Gazpromu je získat co nejvût‰í míru kontroly nad tûÏbou plynu v kaspickém bazénu a jeho exportem do Evropy, resp. smûfiovat jeho export do Ruska. Dovoz stfiedoasijského plynu by uvolnil jeho vlastní pro export do Evropy a sníÏil by tlak na Gazprom, aby uvádûl do 30 31 32

Neff, A., cit. dílo, s. 36–37. OSW, http://www.osw.waw.pl/publ/koment/2003/05/030522b.htm z 26. 5. 2003. TamtéÏ, http://www.osw.waw.pl./pub/koment/2005/11/051124b.htm z 25. 11. 2005.

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provozu nové tûÏební kapacity. Zdá se, Ïe mj. díky sérii dohod s Kazachstánem, Uzbekistánem a dfiívûj‰í dohodû s Turkmenistánem by se tohoto cíle mohlo podafiit dosáhnout od roku 2007. Odtud také pramení ostr˘ rusk˘ odpor proti Spojen˘mi státy podporovanému projektu plynovodu pod Kaspick˘m mofiem, jenÏ by propojil stfiedoasijská loÏiska a ázerbájdÏánsk˘mi a pfies Gruzii a Turecko tranzitoval plyn na evropské trhy.33 V souãasné dobû nic nenaznaãuje, Ïe by v blízké budoucnosti do‰lo k v˘raznûj‰ímu oslabení pozic Ruska jako prakticky monopolního pfiepravce zemního plynu ze Stfiední Asie a velmi dÛleÏitého pfiepravce ropy a tím i jeho vlivu. Otevfiení ropovodu Tengiz-Novorossijsk jeho postavení jen posílilo. Projekt BTC sice zahájil provoz, ale jeho plné vyuÏití bude z velké míry závislé na pfiepravû kaza‰ské ropy. Vzhledem k odhadÛm vlastní ruské produkce ropy a zemního plynu, rÛstu jeho vlastní spotfieby a nutnosti vyváÏet obû suroviny má a bude mít kontrola exportu z oblasti Kaspiku a Stfiední Asie pro Rusko mimofiádn˘ v˘znam. V nejbliωích letech budou muset místní vlády a energetické spoleãnosti pfiekonat mnoÏství problémÛ spojen˘ch se zv˘‰ením tûÏby energetick˘ch surovin a pfiedev‰ím jejich bezpeãnou pfiepravou na svûtové ãi regionální trhy. Bez zahraniãních investic to nebude moÏné. Jejich v˘znam pro ekonomiky tûchto zemí je natolik velk˘, Ïe prakticky nemají jinou reálnou moÏnost.34 Na druhé stranû investice do tûÏby ropy a plynu a jejich dopravy mohou v˘raznû zv˘‰it pfiíjmy místních vlád a stimulovat investice do ostatních ekonomick˘ch sektorÛ a jejich rozvoj. Ekonomick˘ progres stimulovan˘ investicemi do ropného a plynárenského prÛmyslu a zisky z nûho mohou zajistit finanãní nezávislost mlad˘ch stfiedoasijsk˘ch státÛ, a bude proto záleÏet na jejich vyuÏití. Místní vlády by mûly pfiedev‰ím vytvofiit vhodné investiãní klima, právní a administrativní prostfiedí, vãetnû pfiíslu‰n˘ch fungujících institucí a personálu. Nezbytné tedy bude provést fiadu reforem. Speciálním nebezpeãím je v‰udypfiítomná korupce. Pokusíme-li se shrnout: – TûÏba energetick˘ch surovin, ropy pfiedev‰ím, v ‰ir‰ím prostoru Kaspického mofie je plná politick˘ch, bezpeãnostních i ekonomick˘ch rizik, 33 34

Alexander’s 5. 4. 2006. http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/ntr61472.htm ze 7. 4. 2006. V roce 1995 se energetick˘ sektor podílel 10,1 % na tvorbû HDP Kazachstánu, 10,2 % Turkmenistánu a 11,1 % Uzbekistánu a od té doby se je‰tû zv˘‰il. Caspian Oil and Gas, pozn. 4, s. 34.

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nicménû pro mezinárodní spoleãnosti je velmi lákavá, a proto do ní ve zv˘‰ené mífie investují. Region se stane nov˘m dodavatelem energetick˘ch surovin, není v‰ak pravdûpodobné, Ïe by se stal tak velk˘m nov˘m producentem ropy, Ïe by byl schopn˘ ovlivnit jejich svûtové ceny. – Hlavní pfiekáÏkou rozvoje tûÏby ropy a zemního plynu je stále nerozvinutá infrastruktura a trvající spory ohlednû urãení statutu Kaspického mofie, i kdyÏ hlavní etapa nové „velké hry“ o loÏiska a produktovody jiÏ skonãila. – Za hlavního producenta ropy v regionu je stále povaÏován ÁzerbájdÏán. Jeho tûÏba se v‰ak v pomûrnû blízké budoucnosti patrnû pfiiblíÏí vrcholu a ropn˘ boom zde bude relativnû krátkodobou záleÏitostí. Vût‰í perspektivy jsou v Kazachstánu. Ten v‰ak zaujímá vÛãi mezinárodním ropn˘m spoleãnostem tûÏících jeho obrovské pfiírodní bohatství stále tvrd‰í postoj. Rusko, Turkmenistán a Írán svá loÏiska mají exploatovaná ménû. – Vzhledem k tomu, Ïe se pozornost soustfieìovala na ropu, je, kromû Turkmenistánu, zatím neznámou otázkou problematika tûÏby a exportu zemního plynu z regionu.

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PhDr. Dimitrij Bûlo‰evsk˘, nar. 1945, vystudoval v letech 1968–1976 sociologii a rusistiku na Karlovû Universitû v Praze. PhDr. V roce 1990. Zab˘vá se problematikou Ruska, pfiedná‰í externû na IMS FSV UK. Do roku 1989 pÛsobil jako pfiekladatel a publicista, od roku 1990 pracoval jako redaktor v fiadû ãesk˘ch deníkÛ a periodik, naposledy v Hospodáfisk˘ch novinách (1994–2005). Publikoval odborné i publicistické ãlánky, t˘kající se ruské vnitfiní i zahraniãní politiky Ruska, sociální strukturou ruské spoleãnosti. Ing. Filip âern˘, nar. 1977, absolvoval specializaci Mezinárodní politika a diplomacie na V·E v Praze (2004), kde nyní studuje na doktorandském studiu mezinárodní politické vztahy. Zamûfiuje se na problematiku regionu Kaspického mofie, zejména jeho ekonomickou a surovinovou problematiku s návazností na geopolitické aspekty jednotliv˘ch problémov˘ch oblastí regionu. Publikuje v ãesk˘ch odborn˘ch periodikách. Mgr. Jakub Dürr, nar. 1976; v roce 2000 vystudoval obor politologie a evropská studia na Palackého univerzitû v Olomouci. Vedle toho studoval i na Masarykovû univerzitû v Brnû, Jagelonské univerzitû v Krakovû, Miami University v Oxfordu (USA) a na Loughborough University ve Velké Británii. Vyuãoval na Valdosta State University v USA a Anglo-American College v Praze, v souãasnosti pÛsobí jako odborn˘ asistent na Katedfie politologie a evropsk˘ch studií FF UP. Specializuje se na problematiku politick˘ch systémÛ evropsk˘ch a stfiedoasijsk˘ch zemí, komparace jejich stranick˘ch systémÛ, zab˘vá se dále otázkami evropské integrace a tranzitologie.

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Lubomír Gombos, nar. 1977, vystudoval etnologii a politologii na Univerzitû Karlovû v Praze. Zab˘vá se problematikou politického v˘voje v Bûlorusku, Moldavsku a na Ukrajinû. Publikuje v denním a odborném tisku, provozuje weblog Kremlin (http://kremlin.vostokexpres.net). PhDr. Slavomír Horák, nar. 1976, je absolventem oboru ruská a v˘chodoevropská studia na Institutu mezinárodních studií, Fakulty sociálních vûd UK. V souãasné dobû vûdeck˘ pracovník a doktorand tamtéÏ. Zamûfiuje se na sociální a politick˘ v˘voj eurasijského prostoru se zamûfiením na Stfiední Asii. Autor monografií Stfiední Asie mezi v˘chodem a západem (2005) a Afghánsk˘ konflikt (2005) a fiady odborn˘ch i populárních ãlánkÛ v ãesk˘ch a zahraniãních publikacích. PhDr. Bohuslav Litera, CSc, nar. 1950, studoval historii a geografii na Pfiírodovûdecké fakultû Univerzity Karlovy. Je pracovníkem Historického ústavu AV âR, pfiedná‰í na Institutu mezinárodních studií Fakulty sociálních vûd UK. Zab˘vá se problematikou moderních dûjin Sovûtského svazu a Ruska a v˘vojem mezinárodních vztahÛ. Geograficky se zamûfiuje na Rusko a zemû postsovûtského prostoru. Publikoval nûkolik desítek odborn˘ch studií i publicistick˘ch ãlánkÛ, vedl zpracování, ãi se autorsky podílel na zpracování fiady tematick˘ch sborníkÛ a monografií, vãetnû práce J. Vykoukal, B. Litera, M. Tejchman „V˘chod. Vznik, v˘voj a rozpad sovûtského bloku 1944–1989“, (Praha, Libri 2000. 861 s.). Mgr. Lubo‰ Vesel˘, nar. 1978, absolvent oboru Ruská a v˘chodoevropská studia na Fakultû sociálních vûd Univerzity Karlovy. Pracoval v Kanceláfii prezidenta republiky a Spoleãnosti âlovûk v tísni, od bfiezna 2006 je fieditelem V˘zkumného centra Asociace pro mezinárodní otázky. Zab˘vá se moderními dûjinami a souãasn˘m v˘vojem stfiední a v˘chodní Evropy. Mgr. TomበMuÏík, nar. 1978, je absolventem magisterského oboru Mezinárodní vztahy na Institutu politologick˘ch studií Fakulty sociálních vûd Univerzity Karlovy v Praze. Po studiu na Lycée Carnot v Dijonu (Francie) absolvoval bakaláfiské a magisterské studium oboru politologie a mezinárodní vztahy na IPS FSV UK (2003). Od roku 2004 spolupracuje s v˘zkumn˘m centrem Silk Road Studies Program pfii Up-

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psala University, kde absolvoval roãní studijní stáÏ v roce 2004/2005. Zab˘vá se bezpeãnostními studii s pfiíhledem k regionu stfiední a jiÏní Asie, tematicky se orientuje na problematiku pováleãné rekonstrukce Afghánistánu, islamismus a bezpeãnostní hrozby spjaté s produkcí drog v regionu. TomበMuÏík podnikl nûkolik cest do jihozápadní a jiÏní Asie, naposledy záfií 2000–ãerven 2001. PhDr. Emil Souleimanov, PhD. nar. 1978, studoval germanistiku, anglistiku a rusistiku na univerzitách v Moskvû a v Praze. Je absolventem oboru mezinárodní vztahy na Institutu politologick˘ch studií Fakulty sociálních vûd Univerzity Karlovy v Praze a oboru právo Petrohradské státní polytechnické univerzity. Pfiedná‰í na IPS a IMS FSV UK a na praÏské Vysoké ‰kole vefiejné správy a mezinárodních vztahÛ. Zab˘vá se problematikou bezpeãnostních studií a nation- a state-building; regionálnû se zamûfiuje na Rusko, Kavkaz, Turecko a Írán. Je autorem kolem sta odborn˘ch a publicistick˘ch ãlánkÛ, publikovan˘ch v fiadû ãesk˘ch a zahraniãních sborníkÛ, monografií a periodik, mimo jiné v Middle East Policy, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Problems of Post-Communism, OSCE Yearbook 2004 a 2006, Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2004 aj. Nedávno vy‰la jeho kniha An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspectives (with a preface by Anatol Lieven), Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien: Peter Lang Publishing Group 2007. Pravidelnû pfiispívá do Jane’s Information Group. Vypracoval na dvû desítky expertních anal˘z pro Ministerstvo zahraniãních vûcí, Ministerstvo obrany âR a NATO. Richard Stojar, nar. 1970 je absolventem Filozofické fakulty Masarykovy univerzity v Brnû a pÛsobí jako vûdeck˘ pracovník na Ústavu strategick˘ch studií Univerzity obrany, kde pfiedná‰í na téma bezpeãnostní politiky a mezinárodních vztahÛ. Zab˘vá se problematikou bezpeãnostních studií (zejména oblast bezpeãnostních hrozeb a rizik, etnické konflikty, bezpeãnostní dimenze evropské integrace, anal˘za a predikce v˘voje bezpeãnostního prostfiedí v oblasti jihov˘chodní Evropy). V souãasné dobû zastupuje âeskou republiku v Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistane Centre – SE Europe.

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Mgr. Karel Svoboda, nar. 1979, vystudoval obor v˘chodoevropská studia na Filozofické fakultû UK v Praze. V souãasné dobû je interním doktorandem Fakulty sociálních vûd UK. Absolvoval odborné stáÏe na Moskevské státní univerzitû. Zab˘vá se problematikou ruského ekonomického v˘voje v zemích postsovûtského prostoru se zvlá‰tním zamûfiením na Rusko. Je autorem pfiibliÏnû dvou desítek odborn˘ch i publicistick˘ch ãlánkÛ, jak v âeské republice, tak i v zahraniãí. Jaroslav ·imov, nar. 1973, pochází z Bûloruska. Je absolventem oboru mezinárodní Ïurnalistika na Moskevské státní univerzitû. V 90. letech pracoval jako novinafi v bûlorusk˘ch („Narodnaja gazeta“) a rusk˘ch nezávisl˘ch médiích („Izvûstija“, „Novyje Izvûstija“ aj.). Od r. 1999 pracuje v Praze v ruské redakci Radia Svoboda/Svobodná Evropa. Je kandidátem historick˘ch vûd, obhájil v roce 2002 v Ústavu pro slovanská studia Ruské akademie vûd kandidátskou práci na téma „V˘voj politického systému v âeské republice po roce 1989“. Zab˘vá se politick˘mi dûjinami zemí Stfiední a V˘chodní Evropy. Je autorem monografie Avstro-Vengerskaja imperija („Rakousko-Uherská fií‰e“ – Moskva, 2003), sborníku ãlánkÛ a essajÛ Perekrestok. Centralnaja Evropa na rubûÏe tysjaãeletij („KfiiÏovatka. Stfiední Evropa na rozhraní tisíciletí“ – Moskva, 2002) a více neÏ sta odborn˘ch a publicistick˘ch ãlánkÛ publikovan˘ch v fiadû sborníkÛ a periodik. Je ãlenem autorského kolektivu dvousvazkové práce âechija i Slovakija v XX vûke (âesko a Slovensko ve 20. století – Moskva, 2005) pfiipravené Ústavem pro slovanská studia RAV. V âechách publikoval v ãasopise Mezinárodní politika a v Lidov˘ch novinách. Spolupracuje s ãeskou Asociací pro mezinárodní otázky (AMO). PhDr. Jan ·ír, nar. 1976, absolvent bakaláfiského programu v oboru mezinárodní teritoriální studia a magisterského programu v oboru ruská a v˘chodoevropská studia Institutu mezinárodních studií Karlovy Univerzity v Praze. V souãasnosti pfiedná‰í a pÛsobí jako vûdeck˘ pracovník tamtéÏ. Zab˘vá se problémy bezpeãnostního a politického v˘voje nástupnick˘ch státÛ b˘valého Sovûtského svazu. Je autorem pÛldruhé desítky studií publikovan˘ch vedle âeské republiky v redigovan˘ch sbornících a pfiíslu‰nû zamûfien˘ch odborn˘ch periodicích v Nûmecku, Nizozemsku, ·védsku, Rusku a na Ukrajinû. Podílel se na fie‰ení nûkolika v˘zkumn˘ch projektÛ k aktuálnímu dûní v republikách postsovûtské Stfiední Asie.

PhDr. Vít Stfiíteck˘, nar. 1980, studoval mezinárodní vztahy a konfliktní studia na univerzitách v Praze a ve ‰védské Uppsale a absolvoval také terénní studijní pobyt na Státní univerzitû v Tbilisi (Gruzie). Je absolventem oboru mezinárodní vztahy na Fakultû sociálních vûd Univerzity Karlovy. Na tomto oboru v souãasné dobû studuje v doktorském studijním programu a zároveÀ pÛsobí jako v˘zkumn˘ pracovník v Ústavu mezinárodních vztahÛ v Praze. Zab˘vá se problematikou teorií mezinárodních vztahÛ a bezpeãnostních a konfliktních studií. Regionálnû se pak zamûfiuje na oblast b˘valého Sovûtského svazu, pfiedev‰ím pak Kavkazu a státÛ b˘valého sovûtského jihu. Mgr. Markéta Îídková, nar. 1975, v roce 2002 ukonãila studium politologie-evropsk˘ch studíí na FF UP v Olomouci, v roce 2001 absolvovala magistersk˘ program Contemporary European Studies na britské Loughborough University. V souãasnosti dokonãuje postgraduální studium na domovské FF UP v Olomouci, pÛsobí na FSV UK a Anglo-americké vysoké ‰kole v Praze. Zamûfiuje se na vnitfiní a zahraniãní politiku Ruské federace a situaci v post-sovûtském prostoru.

Uspofiádal Emil Souleimanov

Rusko a postsovûtsk˘ prostor Sborník pfiíspûvkÛ

Vydalo nakladatelství VIP Books, s. r. o., Litevská 8, 100 00 Praha 10, v roce 2008 Obálka a grafická úprava Kamila Schüllerová Sazba a zlom Pavel Hogen, Horní Jifietín Vytiskla tiskárna 1. byznysová kom. spol. Vydání druhé ISBN 978-80-87134-12-2

Второй шанс Центральной Азии

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МОСКОВСКИЙ ЦЕНТР КАРНЕГИ Ф О Н Д К А Р Н Е Г И З А МЕ Ж Д У Н А Р О Д Н Ы Й МИ Р

Второй шанс Центральной Азии

Марта Брилл Олкотт

Москва

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УДК 32 ББК 66.2(5) О-54 Originally published in English by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 2005. Фото на обложке: AP Photo/Sergey Ponomarev, AP Photo/Anatoly Ustinenko, Robert Harding World Imagery, AP Photo/Burt Herman. Martha Brill Olcott. Central Asia’s Second Chance Электронная версия на русском языке: http://www.carnegie.ru/ru/pubs/books/ Издание осуществляется на средства некоммерческой неправительственной исследовательской организации — Фонда Карнеги за Международный Мир при финансовой поддержке благотворительных фондов Carnegie Corporation of New York и Starr Foundation. В соответствии с условиями предоставления грантов издание распространяется бесплатно. В книге отражены личные взгляды автора, которые не должны рассматриваться как точка зрения Фонда Карнеги за Международный Мир или Московского Центра Карнеги.

О-54

Олкотт М. Б. Второй шанс Центральной Азии / Марта Брилл Ол котт ; Моск. Центр Карнеги ; Фонд Карнеги за Междунар. Мир. — Москва ; Вашингтон, 2005. — xviii, 487 с. : карта. ISBN 5-86280-067-0 В монографии рассматривается ситуация, возникшая в Центральной Азии после событий 11 сентября 2001 г. Проведя анализ разных сторон жизни государств региона, автор приходит к выводу, что лидеры советской эпохи, все еще находящиеся у власти в этих странах, попрежнему не склонны проводить демократические реформы. С другой стороны, международное сообщество мало сделало для изменения мировоззрения этих лидеров, хотя, по мнению автора, тщательно продуманное участие Запада — необходимое условие для изменения траекторий развития государств в Центральной Азии.

УДК 32 ББК 66.2(5)

ISBN 5-86280-067-0

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Содержание

Об авторе................................................................................................................................................................. ix Предисловие (Джессика Т. Мэтьюз) .................................................................................................x От автора ........................................................................................................................................................... xiii Сокращения ........................................................................................................................................................ xvi Глава 1. После 11 сентября: неожиданный шанс ................................................................. 1 Глава 2. Центральная Азия: первые десять лет независимости ........................ 25 Глава 3. Геополитика в Центральной Азии до 11 сентября..................................... 67 Глава 4. Попытки решения социально-экономических проблем .................... 106 Глава 5. Проблемы передачи власти при отсутствии демократических политических институтов............................................... 160 Глава 6. Геополитические изменения: меньше, чем можно было ожидать ........................................................................ 224 Глава 7. Экономический рост в 1990—2002 гг. .................................................................. 266 Приложения 1.

Основные сведения о странах Центральной Азии................................................ 321

2.

Основные экономические показатели.............................................................................. 326

3.

Основные социальные показатели...................................................................................... 327

4.

Многосторонняя помощь .............................................................................................................. 328

5.

Помощь правительства США до и после 11 сентября 2001 г. .................... 329

6.

Финансирование на основании Закона о защите свободы в 1992—2003 финансовых годах ............................................................................................ 335

7.

Экономический рост в 1990—2002 гг. ............................................................................... 340

8.

Проекты крупных совместных предприятий............................................................ 341

9.

Добыча энергоносителей и производство электроэнергии ........................... 345

v

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10. Показатели демократизации «Freedom House» ..................................................... 346 11. Борьба с наркотиками .................................................................................................................... 348 12. Основные политические партии ........................................................................................... 349 13. Исламские организации ............................................................................................................... 357 14. Крупнейшие города — старые и новые названия ................................................. 362 Примечания ....................................................................................................................................................... 365 Избранная библиография ..................................................................................................................... 449 О Фонде Карнеги ........................................................................................................................................... 486

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Contents

About the Author ................................................................................................................................................. ix Foreword by Jessica T. Mathews ...............................................................................................................x Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................................ xiii Abbreviations....................................................................................................................................................... xvi Chapter 1.

After September 11, An Unexpected Chance ............................................... 1

Chapter 2.

Central Asia Play: The First Ten Years of Independence................. 25

Chapter 3.

The Geopolitics of Central Asia prior to September 11 ....................... 67

Chapter 4.

Meeting Social and Economic Burdens.......................................................... 106

Chapter 5.

Failures of Political Institution Building Create the Challenge of Succession.................................................................................... 160

Chapter 6.

Changing Geopolitics: Less Has Changed than One Might Think ............................................................................................................. 224

Chapter 7.

What to Expect from the Future: Dealing with Common Problems ......................................................................................................... 266

Appendixes 1.

Basic Information by Country ................................................................................................... 321

2.

Key Economic Indicators ............................................................................................................... 326

3.

Key Social Indicators ........................................................................................................................ 327

4.

Multilateral Assistance .................................................................................................................... 328

5.

U.S. Government Assistance Before and After September 11 ........................ 329

6.

Freedom Support Act Funding, 1992—2003 ................................................................. 335

7.

Economic Growth, 1990—2002 ................................................................................................. 340

8.

Major Joint Venture Projects ..................................................................................................... 341

vii

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Energy Production .............................................................................................................................. 345

10. Freedom House Democracy Indicators .............................................................................. 346 11. Combating the Flow of Drugs .................................................................................................... 348 12. Key Political Parties .......................................................................................................................... 349 13. Islamic Organizations........................................................................................................................ 357 14. Major Cities—Old and New Names....................................................................................... 362 Notes .......................................................................................................................................................................... 365 Selected Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 449 About The Carnegie Endowment......................................................................................................... 486

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Об авторе

М арта Брилл Олкотт — специалист по проблемам Центральной Азии и Каспийского региона, а также по межнациональным отношениям в бывших советских республиках — начала работать в Фонде Карнеги за Международный Мир в 1995 г. Она также является профессором политологии Колгейтского университета. М. Олкотт — сопредседатель программы Московского Центра Карнеги «Религия, общество и безопасность», в рамках которой организуются семинары и конференции и публикуются материалы по проблемам государственного строительства в многонациональных постсоветских государствах, а также по проблемам региональных и этнических конфликтов в России. Ранее она работала специальным консультантом Лоуренса С. Иглбергера, заместителя и исполняющего обязанности государственного секретаря США, и директором Американского фонда поддержки предпринимательства в Центральной Азии. М. Олкотт получила степень магистра в Чикагском университете и с 1975 г. состоит членом преподавательского состава Колгейтского университета. Она автор многочисленных книг, посвященных проблемам Центральной Азии. В частности, это «Казахстан: непройденный путь» (Фонд Карнеги, 2003), «Недопонимание: региональная кооперация и Содружество Независимых Государств», написанная в соавторстве с А. Ослундом и Ш. Гарнеттом (Фонд Карнеги, 1999), «Россия после коммунизма» — совместная редакция с А. Ослундом (Фонд Карнеги, 1999).

ix

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Предисловие

П ское значение Центральной Азии было признано повсемест-

осле террористических актов 11 сентября 2001 г. стратегиче-

но. Последовавшая затем военная кампания в Афганистане под руководством США превратила этот регион в передовую линию всемирной борьбы с террором. Но, несмотря на это, лидеры стран региона до сих пор занимают весьма сдержанную позицию по отношению к демократическим режимам. В своей книге «Второй шанс Центральной Азии» ведущий исследователь Фонда Карнеги, всемирно признанный ученый и политический аналитик Марта Брилл Олкотт, изучавшая Центральную Азию и путешествовавшая по ней в течение тридцати лет, ярко характеризует проблемы, с которыми сталкивается в настоящее время этот регион. Она считает, что возобновление международного интереса к Центральной Азии вряд ли будет способствовать решению стоящих перед ней неотложных социальных и экономических задач, поскольку участие международной общественности в ее делах весьма ограниченно, а власть во всех государствах региона глубоко порочна. Олкотт пишет об обращенных внутрь экономических стратегиях, принятых государствами Центральной Азии после распада Советского Союза, что затруднило региональное сотрудничество. Нынешние руководители этих стран формировались в советскую эпоху, поэтому они гораздо больше озабочены эксплуатацией государственных ресурсов и сохранением контроля над населением, нежели развитием демократических политических институтов или налаживанием регионального сотрудничества. Ни один из них не проявил себя как активный сторонник прозрачности в экоx

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xi

номике, а некоторые наотрез отказались поддержать даже ограниченные рыночные реформы. В сущности, повышение значимости этого региона для всего мира лишь усилило чувство личной безопасности многих здешних лидеров. Будучи уверены, что их поддержка войны с террором представляет для всего мира такую ценность, что она не может быть принесена в жертву «второстепенным интересам», центральноазиатские лидеры по-прежнему почти не реагируют на призывы других стран к осуществлению политических реформ. Неудивительно, что в наибольшей степени это характерно для стран, располагающих собственными энергетическими ресурсами. Население стран Центральной Азии, по-видимому, становится все более активным. В марте 2005 г. после фальсификации результатов парламентских выборов толпы разгневанных избирателей наводнили улицы городов Киргизии, вынудив президента бежать из страны. После революционных событий в Грузии и на Украине эти демонстрации серьезно насторожили и других лидеров региона. Олкотт отмечает глубокую внутреннюю противоречивость политики США в отношении Центральной Азии. Сотрудничество с антидемократическими режимами создает долгосрочные угрозы безопасности в форме политического, экономического и социального недовольства, которое может способствовать активизации терроризма. Однако приоритетность той же угрозы в краткосрочном плане требует продолжения сотрудничества. Кроме того, Олкотт ставит в вину международному сообществу то, что, оказывая помощь развитию этих стран, оно подходит к каждой из них отдельно, без учета общерегиональной структуры. В своей книге она предлагает ряд разумных альтернативных подходов. В настоящее время мир все больше склонен рассматривать Центральную Азию как критически важную зону боевых действий в войне с террором, и Олкотт значительно расширяет и углубляет наши представления об этом чрезвычайно важном регионе планеты, с которым зарубежные специалисты по большей части еще мало знакомы. Ее проницательный анализ проблем государственного строительства и различных аспектов оказания международной помощи этим странам представляет особый интерес для уче-

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Предисловие

ных и политиков, но вместе с тем книга написана ясным и доступным языком, что делает ее интересной и для более широкого круга читателей. Афганистан показал нам, какое разрушительное воздействие может оказать крушение центральноазиатского государства на людей, проживающих за тысячи километров от него. Будучи опытным аналитиком, Марта Олкотт предлагает весьма актуальное исследование внутренних, региональных и глобальных контекстов, которые способствуют усилению нестабильности в этом регионе, одновременно указывая дорогу к более счастливому будущему. Работа Марты Олкотт — неотъемлемая часть программы Фонда Карнеги для России и Евразии. Мы выражаем признательность за поддержку этой программы, которую обеспечивают Carnegie Corporation of New York и Starr Foundation. Джессика Т. Мэтьюз, президент Фонда Карнеги за Международный Мир

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От автора

К ти четыре года, и она не была бы написана без помощи, сове-

нига «Второй шанс для Центральной Азии» создавалась поч-

тов и поддержки со стороны десятков людей в Соединенных Штатах, России, Европе и, в наибольшей степени, в самой Центральной Азии. Я с благодарностью хотела бы отметить поддержку, оказанную мне Фондом Карнеги, который предоставил не только финансовые ресурсы, необходимые для завершения этого проекта, но и идеальные условия для творческой работы в своих вашингтонском и московском офисах. В течение многих часов я обсуждала основные темы книги с Андерсом Ослундом, Энди Качинсом, Машей Липман, Лилией Шевцовой и Дмитрием Трениным. Джордж Перкович, вицепрезидент Фонда по научным исследованиям, который внимательно ознакомился с текстом книги, предоставил мне великолепные комментарии. Я признательна за помощь Кэтлин Хиггс, Крису Хенли и Джиллу Фоксу — сотрудникам библиотеки Фонда Карнеги. Выражаю особую благодарность Алексею Малашенко, сопредседателю программы «Религия, общество и безопасность» Московского Центра Карнеги, который за последние четыре года много раз путешествовал вместе со мной по Центральной Азии и потратил сотни часов на обсуждение различных аспектов этой книги. Я весьма признательна сотруднику Европейского центра НАТО по изучению проблем безопасности им. Джорджа Маршалла Роджеру Кангасу за его глубокие комментарии к книге и бывшему вице-президенту Всемирного банка по проблемам Восточной Европы и Центральной Азии Йоханнесу Линну, который предоставил комментарии и критику ко всем главам, в которых так или иначе xiii

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характеризуются операции и политика международных финансовых институтов в этом регионе. Некоторые материалы для книги представлялись в качестве проектов комментариев для международных конференций, в частности конференции Института Лихтенштейна при Принстонском университете по вопросам самоопределения, которая состоялась в Лихтенштейне в марте 2002 г., совещания в Стамбуле в мае 2002 г., финансировавшегося Центром Джорджа Маршалла, и совещания в Осло в июне 2004 г., финансировавшегося Норвежским институтом иностранных дел. Некоторые главы книги основываются на материалах апрельского совещания 2004 г. относительно будущих направлений развития внешней политики Казахстана, которое Фонд Карнеги финансировал совместно с Институтом стратегических исследований и филиалом Фонда Фридриха Эберта в Алматы, и на материалах «круглых столов», проводившихся при поддержке корпункта Института войны и мира в Бишкеке. Более ранние версии второй и третьей глав сначала появились в статье «Strategic Asia 2002—2003 Asian Aftershocks» под редакцией Ричарда Дж. Эллингса и Аарона Л. Фридберга, которая была представлена на совещании по планированию в Вашингтоне и впоследствии опубликована Национальным бюро исследований. Я признательна также Бену Слею, сотруднику Исследовательского центра Программы развития ООН в Братиславе, за финансирование двух моих поездок в Центральную Азию сразу после событий 11 сентября, в результате которых и возникла идея создания этой книги. Выражаю особую благодарность моим многочисленным друзьям и коллегам из Центральной Азии, а именно Сабиту Юсупову и Маулену Ашимбаеву в Казахстане, Кубану Мамбеталиеву, помогавшему мне в моих путешествиях по стране, и Чинаре Якуповой, руководителю репортерского пункта Института войны и мира в Киргизии. Абдуджабар Абдувахитов, президент Вестминстерского университета в Узбекистане, и Бахтияр Бабаджанов, сотрудник Института восточных исследований, внесли огромный вклад в расширение моих представлений об их стране. Выражаю благодарность также Саодат Олимовой и Музаффару Олимову, которые руководят аналитическим центром «Шарк» в Душанбе, а также Чары Аннарбердыеву и Надие Бадыковой из Туркмении.

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Я хотела бы поблагодарить сотрудников посольств Казахстана, Киргизии и Узбекистана в Соединенных Штатах Америки. Я также очень благодарна за помощь, предоставленную мне послами этих стран: Канату Саудабаеву (Казахстан), Бактыбеку Абдриссаеву (Киргизия), Садыку Сафаеву и Абдулазизу Камилову (Узбекистан). Все они были весьма любезны, щедры, откровенны и оказали мне неоценимую помощь в моих путешествиях по их странам. Эта книга была завершена благодаря труду младших референтов Жанары Науразбаевой, Кейт Влатченко, Салтанат Бердикеевой и Лолы Ибрагимовой, отвечавших за тексты примечаний и приложений. Эти четыре молодые женщины олицетворяют собой высокий интеллектуальный потенциал молодого поколения постсоветских республик. Все они приехали в США для продолжения научной работы и получили ученую степень. Я выражаю особую благодарность Каролине Макгрегор, бывшему младшему научному сотруднику Фонда Карнеги, потратившей немало сил на окончательную отделку моей книги и проявившей при этом замечательные редакторские способности. И наконец, мне не удалось бы написать эту книгу без любви и поддержки моего мужа Тони и моей дочери Хиллари, терпеливо и с большим пониманием относившихся к моим путешествиям и к тем долгим часам и выходным дням, которые я посвящала работе.

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Сокращения

АБР — АМР — ВВП — ВНП — ВТО — ДВК — ДПТ — ЕАС — ЕБРР — ЕС — ИДУ — ИПВ — КГНК — КНР — КПСС — КТК — МАР — МВФ — НАТО — НДК — НДПТ — НДС — НИОКР — ОБСЕ

Азиатский банк развития Агентство международного развития валовой внутренний продукт валовой национальный продукт Всемирная торговая организация «Демократический выбор Казахстана» Демократическая партия Туркменистана Евразийский союз Европейский банк реконструкции и развития Европейский союз Исламское движение Узбекистана Исламская партия возрождения Китайская государственная нефтяная компания Китайская Народная Республика Коммунистическая партия Советского Союза Каспийский трубопроводный консорциум Международная ассоциация развития Международный валютный фонд Организация Североатлантического договора Национальное движение Кыргызстана Народно-демократическая партия Таджикистана налог на добавленную стоимость научно-исследовательские и опытно-конструкторские работы — Организация по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе

xvi

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ОДКБ

— Организация договора о коллективной безопасности ОИК — Организация «Исламская конференция» ООН — Организация Объединенных Наций ОПЕК — Организация стран — импортеров нефти ОТО — Объединенная таджикская оппозиция ОЦАС — Организация центральноазиатского сотрудничества ОЭС — Организация экономического сотрудничества ПИВТ — Партия исламского возрождения Таджикистана РАО ЕЭС — Российское акционерное общество «Единые энергосистемы России» РНПК — Республиканская народная партия Казахстана САДУМ — Духовное управление мусульман Средней Азии и Казахстана СМИ — средства массовой информации СНГ — Содружество Независимых Государств СПИД — синдром приобретенного иммунодефицита СССР — Союз Советских Социалистических Республик США — Соединенные Штаты Америки ШОС — Шанхайская организация сотрудничества «Центразбат» — Центральноазиатский батальон ЮНЕСКО — Организация Объединенных Наций по вопросам образования, науки и культуры ЮНИСЕФ — Детский фонд ООН ЮНОДК — Управление ООН по борьбе с наркотиками и преступностью СЕNТCОМ CRW CTR TACIS «Traceca»

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— Центральное командование США — Caspian Revenue Watch (программа «Прозрачность доходов в Каспийском регионе») — Cooperative Threat Reduction (Программа совместного уменьшения угроз) — Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States — транспортный коридор Европа — Кавказ —Азия

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Глава 1 После 11 сентября: неожиданный шанс

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еррористические акты в Соединенных Штатах 11 сентября 2001 г. наглядно показали, что может случиться, когда международное сообщество поворачивается спиной к какому-то региону (в данном случае — к Афганистану и странам вокруг него) и его проблемам. Однако, несмотря на все деньги, истраченные после этого на войну с террором и предотвращение возникновения обстановки, в которой могла процветать «аль-Каида», перспективы негативного развития новых государств в Центральной Азии сегодня реальнее, чем тогда. В марте 2005 г. президент Киргизии Аскар Акаев был лишен своего поста разъяренной толпой, а меньше чем через месяц президент Узбекистана Ислам Каримов использовал силу, чтобы восстановить управление в Ферганской долине. Почти все первые десять лет независимости руководители государств Центральной Азии ссылались на ситуацию в Афганистане как на источник многих проблем, жалуясь, что она создала среду, в которой политические реформы проводить опасно, а для экономических реформ необходим фундамент в виде политической стабильности. Но население этого региона, воодушевленное, в частности, успехом революций в Грузии и на Украине, больше не хочет слушать подобные отговорки. В Афганистане имеются некоторые признаки стабилизации, даже при том, что процесс реконструкции идет медленно и с отступлениями. Власть вырвана из рук талибов, лагеря «аль-Каиды» в значительной степени ликвидированы, и, кажется, формируется национальный политический консенсус, основанный на 1

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том, что страна должна управляться демократически избранным правительством. Хотя вооруженная оппозиция правительству во главе с президентом Хамидом Карзаем, подпитываемая, в частности, процветающей торговлей наркотиками, по-прежнему существует, изгнание талибов существенно уменьшило главную угрозу безопасности этих государств. И даже если Карзаю суждено пасть, угроза, которую представляет Афганистан для соседей, не будет острой, пока сохраняется значительное американское и международное военное присутствие в Афганистане, поддерживаемое в сфере логистики наличием в Центральной Азии двух американских баз: «Манас» в Киргизии и Ханабад в Узбекистане. Эта новая, более безопасная среда неожиданно предоставила государствам Центральной Азии еще один шанс. С появлением баз возникла перспектива увеличения международной помощи в качестве элемента региональной стратегии, имеющей целью поддержку усилий государственного строительства в Афганистане. Основной тезис данной книги состоит в том, что примерно так же, как и после первых усилий в направлении государственного строительства, маловероятно, что государства Центральной Азии «поймут все правильно». Лидеры советской эпохи, все еще находящиеся у власти в этих странах, сейчас не более (а в некоторых случаях — даже менее) склонны проводить демократические реформы, чем раньше, а стремление к прозрачности, необходимой для поддержки экономических реформ, отсутствует практически во всем регионе. Кроме того, международное сообщество мало сделало для изменения мировоззрения этих лидеров. Хотя финансирование государств Центральной Азии возросло, это увеличение было краткосрочным и — если принять во внимание масштабы стоящих перед ними проблем — относительно небольшим. Государства-доноры не были готовы пересмотреть фундаментальный подход к иностранной помощи и потребностям развития региона, так что стимулы для проведения реформ здесь по-прежнему не работают. Запад быстро теряет интерес к Центральной Азии, отчасти потому, что неожиданно возникли проблемы в других частях мира. Соединенные Штаты занялись войной в Ираке, а первые резуль-

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таты новых усилий в этом регионе быстро разочаровали международное сообщество доноров. В 2004 г. мало кто из внешних наблюдателей считал, что перспективы для реформ в большинстве стран Центральной Азии стали лучше, чем тремя годами раньше, а многие даже полагали, что они ухудшились. И когда президент Джордж Буш в январе 2005 г. в ежегодном послании о положении в стране выдвинул цель создать сообщество свободных и независимых наций, это отнюдь не было признаком того, что изменение режимов и формирование демократических институтов в этой части света является приоритетом для его администрации 1.

Рыба гниет с головы Тщательно продуманное участие Запада — необходимое условие для изменения траекторий развития государств в Центральной Азии, но самого по себе этого участия недостаточно. Внешний мир может обеспечить прямые инвестиции, техническую помощь, займы и дотации, но требуется стремление к реформам в самих государствах региона, как мы это видели в Киргизии. Оно должно исходить от населения, согласного терпеть неурядицы, связанные с политическими и экономическими изменениями. И, что еще важнее, оно должно быть у лидеров, готовых соблюдать сроки пребывания у власти, определенные конституцией, проводить свободные и честные выборы — даже если предвыборные опросы показывают, что их ждет проигрыш, — и оставить свой пост в случае поражения (а демократические реформы часто оборачиваются более короткими сроками пребывания у власти, чем хотелось бы самим лидерам и/или членам их семей). Реформы также требуют от лидеров определенной самоотверженности, способности убедить население, что их действия продиктованы национальными интересами, а не просто стремлением к личной выгоде. Этого элемента в Центральной Азии как раз очень недостает. Даже те руководители, которые более других заботились о национальных интересах, были скомпрометированы обвинениями в том, что они сами или члены их семей извлекали выгоду из жульнических схем приватизации. А наиболее одиозные

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из них ведут себя настолько дико, что представляют собой просто карикатурные образцы жадности и самовосхваления. Ни один президент в регионе не был по-настоящему подготовлен к роли руководителя независимого государства. Конечно, можно спорить о том, какой должна быть идеальная подготовка, но плохую определить очень просто, и, разумеется, успешная карьера с попаданием в верхний эшелон Коммунистической партии Советского Союза, организации, которая требовала от своих членов слепого повиновения и стимулировала неискреннее поведение, — это плохая школа. Почти все нынешние лидеры Центральной Азии входили в советскую элиту, и в момент распада СССР в декабре 1991 г. теперешние руководители Казахстана, Туркмении и Узбекистана были главами компартий соответствующих республик, назначенными Москвой. Аскар Акаев в 1990 г. пришел к власти в Киргизии в результате переворота, организованного местной коммунистической элитой против руководителя, назначенного Кремлем и имевшего перед ним определенные обязательства 2. И лидеры, изгнавшие Акаева в 2005 г., тоже состояли в КПСС. Все эти люди сделали карьеру в советской системе, используя упорство и навыки подспудной политической борьбы, а не благодаря качествам политических лидеров или наличию оригинального мышления. Между тем для решения проблем становления новых государств требуются как раз те качества, которые советская система не поощряла. С распадом СССР государства Центральной Азии получили независимость без всякой борьбы. В некоторых отношениях это было реальным преимуществом, поскольку удалось практически избежать страданий и гибели людей. Однако в результате президенты стран региона ощущают недостаток легитимности, которую обретают лидеры, возглавлявшие борьбу за национальную независимость. Особый случай — президент Таджикистана Эмомали Рахмонов, бывший в советские времена председателем колхоза в отдаленном районе. Рахмонова привели к власти в 1992 г. командиры, в конечном счете выигравшие гражданскую войну (она продолжалась с 1992 по 1997 гг.). Человек очень закрытый, Рахмонов завоевал свою репутацию за счет высокой (даже по местным таджикским стандартам) терпимости к зверствам. Первые годы его правления были временем расцвета кровной мести, отмеченным

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актами правосудия на уровне линчевания подозреваемых врагов. Эти черты сильно затруднили Рахмонову расширение его властной базы, которая почти целиком состоит из уроженцев его родной Кулябской (ныне Хатлонской) области. В Киргизии многое изменилось между началом 1990-х годов, когда самозваный демократ Аскар Акаев воспринимался населением как деятель националистического толка, и 2005 г., когда все более увязавший в коррупции диктатор Акаев был изгнан членами собственной правящей элиты. Физик по образованию, Акаев старался подчеркнуть свое отличие от других лидеров региона. В первые годы пребывания на посту президента он стремился приобрести репутацию «Томаса Джефферсона Центральной Азии», как сказал о нем в 1994 г. Строуб Тэлботт, тогдашний заместитель государственного секретаря США. Его последующие действия, в частности заключение в тюрьму видных политических конкурентов, таких как ставший лидером оппозиции бывший вице-президент Феликс Кулов, сделали эти претензии смешными, и стало ясно, что тщедушный Акаев имеет со своим весьма представительным американским «прототипом» очень мало общего и в сфере политики. Рахмонов и Акаев, как и Нурсултан Назарбаев в Казахстане, Сапармурат Ниязов в Туркмении и Ислам Каримов в Узбекистане, в той или иной степени вели себя как руководители, боящиеся собственного народа. Каждый использовал имевшиеся в его распоряжении структуры, чтобы сохранить власть, сдерживая развитие политических институтов, хотя формально это всегда прикрывалось национальными интересами.

Новое американское присутствие После 11 сентября 2001 г. одним из инструментов, стабилизирующих крепко держащиеся за власть режимы Центральной Азии, стало расширившееся американское присутствие в регионе. Хотя вклад этих государств в борьбу с терроризмом различался по стратегическому значению, каждый региональный лидер полагал, что его усилия должны трансформироваться в новый импульс развития отношений с США.

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Первыми военную базу Соединенным Штатам на своей территории предоставил Узбекистан, перестроив сооружения в Ханабаде под г. Карши перед началом военной кампании в Афганистане. Правительства Таджикистана и Киргизии также предложили американским военным использовать свои базы в надежде, что это принесет существенную пользу их экономике. Аэропорт Душанбе в Таджикистане использовался Соединенными Штатами и Францией как база дозаправки топливом на разных этапах военной операции в Афганистане. В Киргизии США создали полностью оснащенную базу, заняв часть летного поля аэропорта «Манас» (главного коммерческого аэропорта страны около Бишкека) и разместив там 1100 военнослужащих. Кроме того, США получили ограниченное право посадки в трех аэропортах Казахстана 3. Лишь Туркмения строго ограничила военное сотрудничество с Соединенными Штатами, заявив о «позитивном нейтралитете». В то же время Туркмения стала главным транзитным пунктом доставки гуманитарной помощи, направляемой в Афганистан, и Соединенным Штатам этого оказалось достаточно, чтобы вознаградить президента Сапармурата Ниязова визитом министра обороны США Дональда Рамсфельда в апреле 2002 г. Для администрации Буша после событий 11 сентября страны Центральной Азии превратились в прифронтовые государства, хотя до этого американцы мало задумывались о прямом вмешательстве в Афганистане и не придавали особого значения развитию сотрудничества с государствами Центральной Азии в сфере обороны. В течение нескольких лет западные аналитики указывали на угрозы, связанные со сползанием Афганистана к полному беззаконию и предупреждали об увеличении опасности, поскольку «Талибан» утвердился примерно на 90% территории страны. Эту тему часто затрагивали в своих выступлениях видные руководители России и Центральной Азии, и почти все они считали, что активные борцы с правящими режимами в их странах связаны с религиозной верхушкой Афганистана 4. Лидеры Центральной Азии стремились присоединиться к усилиям Америки по изгнанию талибов, поскольку это избавило бы их от неприятного соседа. Они также надеялись, что прямое военное сотрудничество с Соединенными Штатами могло бы транс-

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формироваться в гарантии безопасности со стороны Вашингтона для их собственных все менее популярных режимов. Режим талибов имел мало друзей в Центральной Азии, потому что большинство местных руководителей рассматривало его как угрозу своим светским государственным системам, кроме того (и это вызывало еще большее беспокойство), талибы допускали присутствие на своей территории местных и международных террористических групп, таких как Исламское движение Узбекистана (ИДУ) и сеть «аль-Каиды». Большинство региональных лидеров также связывало с беззаконием в Афганистане серьезное увеличение транзита опиума и героина через свои страны. Но ощущение угрозы в этих странах было неодинаково, так же как и цена, которую разные руководители Центральной Азии были готовы заплатить за смену режима в Афганистане. Однако к концу 1999 г. отношение к «Талибану» во всем регионе ухудшилось, в значительной степени из-за скоординированной серии взрывов в феврале 1999 г. в Ташкенте и вооруженного вторжения спустя несколько месяцев в Киргизию боевиков ИДУ с баз в Афганистане, в ходе которого было взято в заложники несколько иностранцев. Понимая, что с точки зрения безопасности обстановка в Центральной Азии ухудшается, Соединенные Штаты увеличили военную помощь некоторым государствам региона и расширили сотрудничество с ними, но не рассматривали ситуацию как взрывоопасную даже тогда, когда стали больше беспокоиться относительно сдерживания угрозы со стороны «аль-Каиды». Изменение представлений США о стратегическом значении государств Центральной Азии нашло отклик у лидеров региона. Ислам Каримов (Узбекистан), Аскар Акаев (Киргизия) и Эмомали Рахмонов (Таджикистан) долго добивались расширения в той или иной форме международного вмешательства в Афганистане. Все трое также искали пути расширения сотрудничества с Соединенными Штатами, полагая, что внимание Вашингтона к богатым нефтью и газом прикаспийским государствам приводит к тому, что Казахстан и Туркмения затмевают в глазах американцев их собственное значение. Отношения между США и Таджикистаном начали улучшаться после того, как проходившие под международным контролем

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переговоры в июне 1997 г. привели к созданию правительства национального согласия. Рахмонов в рамках своих усилий по поиску стратегических противовесов длительному военному присутствию России стремился продвинуть эти отношения еще дальше 5. Акаев хотел повернуть вспять процесс ухудшения отношений между США и Киргизией, но при этом не изменяя свою внутреннюю политику, которая стала болевой точкой для американских политиков, разочарованных ограничением свободы действий оппозиции и независимых политических групп в республике в конце 1990-х годов. Интерес Акаева к сотрудничеству с Соединенными Штатами подогревался поддержкой американских военных операций со стороны Узбекистана. Альянс между Ташкентом и Вашингтоном изменил бы стратегическое равновесие в Центральной Азии, и Акаев не хотел, чтобы его меньшая по размерам и более слабая страна стала еще уязвимее для давления со стороны более мощного соседа. Американская военная операция «Несокрушимая свобода» («Enduring Freedom») в Афганистане могла показаться просто организованной по заказу Каримова, который считал тесные связи с Соединенными Штатами критически важными для Узбекистана в отношении разработки оборонной политики, полностью независимой от России. В Министерстве обороны США многие были довольны работой узбекских военных, участвовавших в некоторых программах, выросших из программы «Партнерство во имя мира», реализуемой НАТО. Военное сотрудничество двух стран укрепилось после взрывов в Ташкенте в феврале 1999 г., которые, по мнению Каримова, направлялись религиозными экстремистами, как предполагалось, связанными с ИДУ, хотя никто не взял на себя ответственность за эти действия 6. Отказ Каримова проводить настоящие экономические и политические реформы серьезно ухудшил перспективы сближения Узбекистана и США. Как минимум, два министра обороны США, Уильям Перри и Дональд Рамсфельд, вели себя неискренне, когда хвалили Ташкент и говорили о хороших перспективах американо-узбекского сотрудничества. Казалось, Рамсфельду было очень неудобно упоминать о соблюдении прав человека (а в этом отношении у Каримова просто позорный послужной список) как

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критерии оценки потенциальных стратегических партнеров 7. Но Вашингтон в итоге все равно слишком мало выиграл бы от тесного публичного партнерства с отдаленным Узбекистаном, чтобы вносить существенные изменения в двусторонние отношения.

Новый шанс для реформ Формальные обещания Узбекистана и Киргизии, сделанные в связи с неожиданно возникшей у них приверженностью к соблюдению прав человека, сами по себе не сделали эти государства (особенно Узбекистан) менее компрометирующими союзниками для Соединенных Штатов. Но увеличившееся военное присутствие США в регионе в сочетании с декларируемой Вашингтоном готовностью увеличить направляемую туда финансовую помощь могло бы послужить толчком к возобновлению практически остановленного процесса реформ. В данной книге автор пытается как можно точнее определить, что было бы необходимо для этого сделать. В главе 2 обсуждается, были ли существующие в Центральной Азии режимы еще до 11 сентября готовы использовать возобновление международного интереса к региону в связи с этими неожиданными событиями для решения неотложных экономических и социальных проблем. В главе 3 подробно анализируется степень международного участия в жизни региона до 11 сентября и обсуждается, какие там имеются перспективные «опорные элементы», которые могли бы стать основой для такого участия в будущем. Когда террористы направляли самолеты в башни Всемирного торгового центра и в здание Пентагона, все государства Центральной Азии переживали политические или экономические кризисы той или иной степени сложности, отчасти вызванные чередой неверных политических решений правящей элиты. Как показано в главах 4 и 5, большинство стоявших тогда проблем еще предстоит решить, при этом угрозы безопасности, возникающие из-за невозможности или неумения это сделать, продолжают нарастать (эти вопросы обсуждаются в главах 6 и 7). Каждое из государств Центральной Азии имеет сильную президентскую систему, а экстремальный случай — Туркмения, где у

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президента практически абсолютная власть. Политические решения, принимаемые в каждой из этих стран, усложняют неизбежную, но все еще откладываемую передачу власти новому поколению. Ни в одной из них не созданы политические институты, необходимые для обеспечения демократической смены власти. Президенты и парламенты не были избраны демократическим путем, и слишком часто роль парламента лишь едва отличается от роли резинового президентского штемпеля. В некоторых странах целые общественные группы, лишенные гражданских прав, оказывают нарастающее сопротивление. Волнения в Андижанской области Узбекистана в мае 2005 г. предвещают новые беспорядки и показывают, насколько легко они могут вспыхнуть. В Казахстане и Киргизии переход к рыночной экономике протекает хорошо, но в одних странах, например, в Туркмении, он еще не начался, а другие (Узбекистан) пытаются придать новый импульс процессу, который был остановлен на самых ранних стадиях. Коррупция в Центральной Азии наличествует повсюду, а уровень защиты частной собственности совершенно недостаточен, и это тормозит развитие даже самых сильных экономик региона. Во всех государствах Центральной Азии очень велика доля молодежи, численность которой в целом увеличивается быстрее, чем возможности трудоустройства, что создает благодатную почву для вербовщиков из групп радикальных исламистов, которые открыто действуют в регионе с конца 1980-х годов. Все центральноазиатские государства пытаются полностью обновить систему образования и здравоохранения, унаследованную от советской эпохи. Некоторые из них справляются с этой задачей успешнее, чем другие, но во многих районах существует упорное недовольство населения дефектами, которые имеют даже наилучшим образом обоснованные программы социальных реформ. Многие политические и экономические проблемы, порожденные распадом Советского Союза, усугублялись близорукими и эгоистичными стратегиями государственного строительства, которые часто причиняли ущерб соседним государствам. Об этом пойдет речь в следующей главе. Международное сообщество мало сделало, чтобы не допустить этого, потому что при оценке и оказании помощи правительства и прочие учреждения США и других стран Запада практиковали индивидуальный подход к каж-

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дому государству Центральной Азии вместо того, чтобы создавать структуру для укрепления регионального сотрудничества.

Пять государств или один регион? Отношение международного финансового сообщества к Центральной Азии укрепило нежелание местных лидеров создавать базу для решения общих региональных проблем, для которых, как будет показано в главах 3 и 7, предлагаются лишь частичные решения. Даже сейчас (хотя и в существенно меньшей степени, чем в 1991 г.) страны региона остаются до известной степени взаимозависимыми, и это наследство тех времен, когда они были частью единого государства. Все они частично или полностью зависят от водных ресурсов бассейна Аральского моря, совместно используют гидроэнергетические и другие энергетические системы, а их крупные города связаны между собой шоссе, пересекающими в значительной степени произвольно определенные границы прежних республик. Хотя на уменьшение этой взаимозависимости были истрачены десятки миллионов долларов, в том числе и значительные средства международной помощи, эти государства все еще страдают от нехватки эффективных двусторонних или многосторонних организаций для урегулирования потенциальных конфликтов, которые продолжают возникать в силу их «тесной» географии и общей советской истории. В то же время при всех жалобах на произвольность государственных границ и разговорах об относительной «молодости» этих наций, обретя независимость, каждое государство Центральной Азии имеет титульную нацию с собственными культурой, языком и историей. Хотя у всех этих людей много общего, между ними существовали также самые разные формы межнационального соперничества, исчисляемые, как минимум, десятками, и это было особенно заметно при добавлении еще одного элемента в эту смесь из сотни с лишним национальных меньшинств и этнических сообществ, живущих в регионе. Большинство форм соперничества уходит корнями глубоко в историю, но все они обострялись под влиянием методов распределения недостаточных ресурсов, практиковавшихся в советскую эпоху 8.

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Межэтническая конкуренция осложняет процесс формирования государств, о ней еще не раз пойдет речь ниже, потому что она влияет и на внешнюю политику стран региона, и на используемые ими внутренние стратегии. Национальные лидеры Центральной Азии постоянно стремятся демонстрировать свою уникальность, непохожесть на соседей. Казахстан и Киргизия всегда были относительно более открыты рекомендациям международного сообщества, а Таджикистан стал более восприимчив к ним с 1997 г., со времени кульминации гражданской войны, в которой погибло около 60 тыс. человек. Но чтобы подчеркнуть свои отличия, лидеры Узбекистана и Туркмении стремятся разработать модели политического и экономического развития, максимально соответствующие, по их мнению, специфике национальной культуры, вместо того чтобы следовать мощной интернациональной модели развития (которую они считают неадекватной шаблонной стратегией) 9. С открытием перспективы увеличения международной помощи в конце 2001 г. и в 2002 г. узбекское руководство начало пересматривать свои экономические и политические стратегии. Но, как показано в главе 4, власти двигались вперед гораздо медленнее и провели меньше реформ, чем обещали. Введение конвертируемости валютных счетов было запоздалым и неполным, и правительству еще предстоит отменить инструкции, ограничивающие свободную торговлю 10. Стратегия собственного пути, избранная Узбекистаном, в первую очередь ударила по малому и среднему бизнесу, а если взглянуть шире, разрушила перспективы региональной торговли. Эта стратегия оказала серьезное неблагоприятное воздействие и на соседей — Таджикистан и Киргизию, отчасти обусловив неутешительные итоги их экономического развития. Мало того что в Центральной Азии не удалось сформировать региональный рынок, вместо этого здесь процветает протекционизм. На протяжении всего советского периода центральноазиатские государства вынужденно пребывали в гетто, созданном Москвой, но региональная интеграция не обязательно должна сопровождаться международной изоляцией. Региональный рынок облегчил бы вхождение этих государств в глобальную экономику (а не препятствовал бы этому процессу, как ошибочно полагают многие местные лидеры). Поскольку Центральная Азия расположена далеко от рынков Соединенных Штатов, Азии и Европы, развитие регио-

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нального рынка с участием прилегающих районов России, Ирана, Афганистана и Китая дало бы толчок развитию местных предприятий. Объединение производственных мощностей, запасов и рынков этих государств способствовало бы увеличению разнообразия и сложности проектов создания предприятий среднего масштаба, представляющих интерес для инвесторов. Хотя региональные руководители как будто заботятся о расширении сотрудничества, в целом их дела противоречат словам. В 1994 г. Узбекистан, Киргизия и Казахстан объединились, создав Центральноазиатский союз, впоследствии переименованный в Центральноазиатское экономическое сообщество, и расширили его за счет Таджикистана. Но эта организация мало делала для стимуляции развития экономического сотрудничества, во многом из-за того, что ни одна из стран-участниц не делегировала ей никаких полномочий. Вместо этого государства Центральной Азии начали относиться друг к другу как потенциальные конкуренты или, хуже того, как враги. Это стало особенно заметно после выхода на сцену ИДУ в конце 1990-х годов. Дискуссии относительно свободной торговли затихли в связи с введением политики вооруженного протекционизма, в значительной степени порожденной решением Узбекистана в 1999 г. начать обозначать и даже минировать свои границы. В большинстве случаев местные политики не очень беспокоились из-за того, что их действия могут осложнить жизнь в соседних государствах. Опыт, приобретенный ими в советское время, когда раздавались призывы жертвовать национальными (тогда их называли республиканскими) интересами во имя общего блага, свидетельствует, что в итоге такие жертвы приносят скорее ущерб, чем пользу. Каждое государство региона было озабочено собственной международной идентификацией, отличающей его от соседей. Такое изменение психологии распространялось от высших руководителей до начинающих политиков и даже обычных граждан. Это особенно верно в отношении жителей двух самых больших стран региона — Казахстана и Узбекистана. Но если у руководителей Казахстана поиски образцов для подражания со временем расширялись, то элита Узбекистана все больше обращала взор внутрь страны, по крайней мере в плане внутренней политики.

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Туркмения пошла в этом отношении еще дальше. Ашхабад фактически проводил политику изоляционизма, руководствуясь своей доктриной «позитивного нейтралитета» и неприсоединения.

Учиться жить в условиях независимости Неудивительно, что лидерам Центральной Азии потребовалось определенное время, чтобы начать ориентироваться на более крупное международное сообщество (об этом речь идет в главе 3). Они совсем не стремились к развалу СССР, даже при том, что после не удавшегося коммунистического переворота в августе 1991 г. почти все они поняли, что этот развал скорее всего неизбежен, и поддержали подготовленные республиканскими парламентами декларации о независимости 11. По сравнению с беспорядками в большинстве других частей СССР ситуация в Центральной Азии в последние дни советской истории была очень спокойной 12. Единственное исключение — Таджикистан, где творилось почти революционное политическое безумие, энергии которого хватило, чтобы в сентябре 1991 г. вынудить назначенного Горбачевым руководителя республики Кахара Махкамова уйти в отставку, что повлекло за собой целый ряд событий, достигших высшей точки примерно через шесть месяцев, развернувшись в полномасштабную гражданскую войну. Беспорядки в Таджикистане высветили опасности, которые таила в себе независимость. С учетом экономических трудностей, с которыми столкнулись новые правительства после распада СССР, ни один из лидеров не чувствовал себя защищенным от возможности народных волнений. Каждый президент формально стал хозяином экономики своей республики, но не обрел понимания, как ею управлять и как справиться с доставшимися ему в наследство проблемами социального обеспечения. Будучи юридически независимыми, центральноазиатские республики оставались полностью привязанными к Москве, которая помимо прочего печатала все деньги, в том числе для выплаты пенсий и заработной платы. Их лидеры опасались, что президент России Борис Ельцин будет по-прежнему пытаться диктовать им экономические и политические решения, несмотря на формальное

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признание каждой из бывших республик Союза суверенным субъектом международного права. Одновременно сохранялся и глубоко укоренившийся страх — что будет, если Москва предоставит их самим себе. Мало того что республиканские лидеры оставались наедине со все растущими потребностями населения, им, возможно, пришлось бы как-то справляться с претензиями соседей, с которыми у них были нечетко определенные границы и с которыми они все еще были экономически связаны. Но скоро стало ясно, что первоначальные опасения были преувеличены. Разрушительная гражданская война в Таджикистане не стала предвестником аналогичных событий в соседних государствах. Всему приходит конец, и в Таджикистане при международном посредничестве в конце концов в целом успешно прошел процесс национального примирения 13. Но опасности, связанные с независимостью, не исчезли, просто они обрели новые формы. Гражданская война в Таджикистане таила в себе много скрытых последствий включая и укрепление существовавшего у региональной элиты убеждения, что народ склонен к насилию, не поддающемуся никакому контролю. Еще долго после окончания этой войны ее выдвигали в качестве причины того, почему процесс демократизации в государствах Центральной Азии должен идти медленно. Гражданская война в Таджикистане привела также к усилению экономического консерватизма правительства Узбекистана: должностные лица опасались возникновения ситуаций, когда безопасность людей будет так или иначе поставлена под угрозу, а социальные обязательства окажутся не выполненными. В результате государство контролировало цены еще долго после того, как Казахстан и Киргизия отказались от этого, и создало атмосферу экономической изоляции, так как Ташкент боялся, что торговцы из соседних стран будут наживаться за счет более низких цен в Узбекистане. Беспорядки в Афганистане еще больше осложнили процесс формирования государств региона. Оппозиционные группы из Центральной Азии нашли пристанище в Афганистане; в частности, исламисты из Узбекистана и Таджикистана получили убежище даже на территориях, контролируемых Северным альянсом. Это происходило еще до того, как талибы пришли к власти в Аф-

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ганистане и разрешили «аль-Каиде» создать там учебные лагеря для международных террористов. И ситуацию в Афганистане, и гражданскую войну в Таджикистане руководители центральноазиатских государств использовали, чтобы оправдать затягивание решения назревших проблем политического и экономического реформирования. Однако к середине 1990-х годов при всех опасениях, что исламский экстремизм может составить серьезную угрозу безопасности, президенты этих стран обрели значительно бóльшую уверенность в управлении своими странами. Независимость стала казаться необратимой, но одним из следствий этого было то, что больше не было никого, кто поддержал бы их в случае ослабления, и теперь — больше, чем когда-либо, — они не хотели покидать свои посты. Независимость принесла этим людям персональную выгоду, особенно тем четверым, что оставались у власти с 1991 г. Поняв, как управлять передачей экономических полномочий Москвы республикам, региональные руководители и их семьи начали накапливать огромные личные состояния. Независимость обеспечила президентам государств региона контроль практически над всем имуществом в своих странах независимо от его ценности. Если учесть почти полное отсутствие частной собственности при советской системе, процессы экономического перераспределения даже в беднейших республиках могли сделать их лидеров богатыми. Советская система также резко ограничила число потенциальных политических лидеров в новых государствах Центральной Азии. Здесь не было владельцев собственности с определенными экономическими интересами, которые нужно было бы учитывать, и серьезными политическими конкурентами для президентов были только их бывшие коллеги по советской элите, лишившиеся с распадом Коммунистической партии политического механизма, который они прежде использовали, чтобы продвигаться вверх.

Кто кому друг Со временем ощущение угрозы, исходящей от России, также начало притупляться или по крайней мере стало иным. Хотя формально Россия стала наследницей СССР, ей тоже нужно было вос-

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создавать себя, и она столкнулась с теми же экономическими и политическими задачами, что и другие государства, недавно ставшие независимыми. Кремль был занят собственными делами, а также решением проблем, созданию которых он сам способствовал на Кавказе. Поэтому у Москвы было меньше желания и возможностей непосредственно вмешиваться в ситуацию в Центральной Азии, чем ожидали лидеры региона. Россия осталась глубоко вовлеченной в проблемы Таджикистана, но ее военное присутствие там оказалось исключением из правила. В конечном счете лидеры центральноазиатских государств решили, что самые большие угрозы для них исходят от собственных граждан (об этом пойдет речь в главе 2). Хотя риск того, что неудовлетворенные группы населения будет подстрекаться внешними силами, уменьшился, остались опасения, что их может организовать обиженная и отстраненная от власти местная элита. Сохранение независимости не являлось проблемой, но не была гарантирована возможность бессменно находиться у власти. И если власти этих лидеров что-то угрожало, становилось все менее ясно, от кого они могли получить поддержку. В середине 1990-х годов руководство в Москве было озабочено собственными делами, а после того, как в конце 1999 г. к власти пришел Владимир Путин, он быстро увяз в проблемах, связанных с Чечней. Как показано в главе 3, поскольку российская армия была тогда перенапряжена и практически не реформирована, желание Москвы говорить или действовать в интересах своих центральноазиатских соседей уменьшалось почти так же быстро, как ее способность эффективно делать это. Уровень военных обязательств России в Центральной Азии достиг максимума в конце 1992 г. в связи с ее вмешательством в Таджикистане. Ташкентский договор о коллективной безопасности, подписанный 14 мая 1992 г., перестал быть основой региональной системы в 1999 г., когда из него вышел Узбекистан. Уровень военного сотрудничества России с Киргизией и Казахстаном остался довольно высоким, но когда террористы из ИДУ брали заложников в горах Ошской области Киргизии, на просьбу Киргизии о помощи Россия ответила отказом 14. В то время российские вооруженные силы были не в состоянии удовлетворить потребности собственной страны, не говоря уже о центральноазиатских.

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Однако никакой другой региональной силы, готовой или способной заполнить вакуум, не было. Имея общие границы с тремя из пяти государств Центральной Азии, Китай проявлял большой интерес к этому региону, но не торопился максимизировать свое влияние. Он заботился об обеспечении гарантий будущего стратегического преимущества, стараясь в то же время уменьшить риск того, что государства Центральной Азии смогут создать непосредственные угрозы для безопасности Китая. Менее мощные региональные державы, в частности Иран и Турция, видели в создании независимых государств в Центральной Азии потенциальное смещение геостратегического равновесия, которое должно пойти им на пользу. Обе эти страны в культурном отношении очень близки к центральноазиатским государствам, и хотя они проводят в регионе агрессивную политику, у них недостает ресурсов, чтобы приобрести там решающее влияние. Опираясь на существенную американскую поддержку и будучи членом НАТО, Турция могла обеспечить себе в регионе достаточно серьезное, но ни в коем случае не доминирующее присутствие. Долгое время государства Центральной Азии рассматривали сотрудничество с Соединенными Штатами и НАТО как пропуск в будущее. Но до 11 сентября Запад почти не проявлял интереса к финансированию быстрого включения центральноазиатских стран в глобальную систему безопасности, да и теперь положение, кажется, существенно не изменилось.

Регион все еще в опасности Даже если бы не было событий 11 сентября, ослабление влияния России в этом регионе было только вопросом времени вследствие медленно, но непрерывно возрастающей роли Соединенных Штатов, а также расширения тамошними странами связей с Соединенными Штатами и другими европейскими и азиатскими государствами. Можно сказать, что открытие американских военных баз было драматическим актом, одновременно подтвердившим претензии лидеров Центральной Азии на стратегическую важность их региона и обозначившим конец Российской и советской империй.

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Это также стало публичной демонстрацией того, что российские власти пошли на попятную. Москва после многих лет грозных заявлений, предостерегавших Вашингтон от слишком глубокого проникновения в зоны ее влияния, довольно спокойно (по крайней мере как временную необходимость) восприняла то обстоятельство, что Соединенные Штаты заслонили ее в тех областях, где она издавна доминировала. Расширение американского присутствия в Афганистане и Центральной Азии преследовало определенную цель — разгром «Талибана» и удаление «аль-Каиды» из Афганистана. Эти намерения Москва полностью разделяла, но для их реализации ей не хватало денег, военной техники и международной поддержки. Москва также признала, что присутствие Вашингтона на ее «заднем дворе» стало следствием экстраординарных событий, которые никоим образом не связаны с отношением Вашингтона к Москве как к бывшему сопернику в «холодной войне». Хотя Соединенные Штаты быстро признали все пять новых независимых государств, первоначально они готовы были довольствоваться в Центральной Азии второстепенной ролью по сравнению с российской. До 11 сентября стратегические обязательства США в регионе определялись энергетической политикой (об этом речь пойдет в главе 3). Американские политики внесли определенный вклад в успешный поиск путей максимизации роли американских компаний в разработке нефтяных и газовых ресурсов Каспия, но не очень беспокоились об этом, потому что до стадии эксплуатации в ходе реализации самых крупных проектов было еще очень далеко. Однако после 1999 г. стратегический потенциал Центральной Азии стал вызывать все больший интерес у американских военных и служб безопасности, которые хотели расширить сотрудничество с коллегами в регионе. Но при этом совсем не чувствовалось, что Америка непременно желает помочь этим государствам обеспечить их потребности в сфере обороны, реформировать их вооруженные силы или максимально отдалить их от России. Даже с появлением американских баз ситуация практически не изменилась. После 11 сентября Соединенные Штаты увеличили суммы, выделяемые на военную подготовку и общее реформирование вооруженных сил государств Центральной Азии, но не приняли на себя ответственность за руководство процессом ре-

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формирования и доведение его до конца, а также за обеспечение внутренней безопасности этих стран. Кроме того, характер долгосрочных американских обязательств пока не определен. Соглашения о базах и правах посадки обеспечивают Вашингтону максимальную гибкость, позволяя ему остаться в этом регионе надолго или быстро уйти оттуда, когда он сочтет нужным, и пока нет свидетельств того, что Соединенные Штаты собираются в обозримом будущем покинуть Центральную Азию. США подписали с Узбекистаном соглашения о долгосрочном оборонном партнерстве и создали основу для несколько менее расплывчатого военного сотрудничества с Киргизией и Казахстаном. Хотя Соединенные Штаты обещали по-прежнему увеличивать расходы на охрану границ, борьбу с наркотиками, удаление ядерных материалов и обучение офицеров, пока не разработаны долгосрочные обязательства или обязывающие гарантии в сфере безопасности ни для одного из государств региона. Как будет показано в главах 4 и 5, ни обещанная помощь, ни размещение американских войск не устранят угроз, с которыми сталкиваются государства Центральной Азии в сфере безопасности. Регион все еще остается зоной риска. Изменение ситуации в Афганистане обеспечивает центральноазиатским государствам возможность несколько перевести дух. Местным оппозиционным группам теперь просто придется вести подготовку дальше от дома и усерднее заниматься поиском средств для финансирования своих операций. Однако восстановление Афганистана принесло бы этим государствам реальную экономическую выгоду. Оно позволило бы проложить через Афганистан новые транзитные коридоры, обеспечив относительно быстрый доступ к открытым портам Пакистана и возможность поставок нефти и газа из Центральной Азии в Индию, а также открыло бы массу других экономических возможностей. Но пока все эти экономические выгоды — лишь более или менее отдаленные перспективы. Сегодня Афганистан остается для Центральной Азии не источником работы, а источником наркотиков, и нет никаких признаков, что объемы выращивания опиума и торговли героином могут сократиться. Поэтому соседям Афганистана придется тщательно контролировать свои границы. Узбек-

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ско-афганская граница невелика и сравнительно хорошо охраняется, но границы Афганистана с Туркменией и Таджикистаном протяженны и весьма проницаемы 15. После изгнания «Талибана» объемы выращивания опиума увеличились, и все больше наркокурьеров пробираются наземными маршрутами из Афганистана в Центральную Азию, а в итоге наркотики попадают на рынки в Европе. Еще более тревожный аспект — регулярный поток нежелательных лиц включая противников центральноазиатских режимов и в частности остатки ИДУ, которые в Афганистане чувствовали себя в безопасности. И такая зона безопасности, вероятно, по-прежнему будет обеспечиваться боевикам, хотя и на индивидуальной основе, даже при нынешнем руководстве Афганистана. Узбекское и таджикское население Афганистана связано с Центральной Азией многочисленными родственными узами, и даже самые дальние родственники предложат убежище политическим беженцам. Говорят, что семьи, бежавшие в Афганистан, чтобы избежать ареста советскими властями в 1920-х годах, еще сейчас предлагают убежище боевикам ИДУ, скрывающимся от американцев 16. Присутствие американских войск в Центральной Азии имеет огромное психологическое значение, но не способствует решению ни одной из перечисленных проблем. Изменение характера отношений между Россией и центральноазиатскими государствами в этом смысле ничего не дает. Ограничение роли России в этом регионе не делает среду для этих государств более безопасной, но и новое усиление позиций России тоже не обязательно приведет к уменьшению риска. В последние два года и Россия, и Китай продемонстрировали интерес к увеличению своей роли в обеспечении безопасности региона, но новые меры в этой области пока находятся в основном в стадии обсуждения. Хотя это не входило в намерения США, возобновление обязательств со стороны администрации Буша в отношении всех государств Центральной Азии неизбежно изменит картину стратегических связей в этой части мира. Но, вероятно, это будет делаться таким образом, что перемены нелегко будет заметить в течение достаточно продолжительного времени. Изменение среды безопасности в регионе, конечно, помогает завоевать доверие лидеров некоторых центральноазиатских го-

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сударств и прежде всего президента Казахстана Нурсултана Назарбаева, архитектора все более сложной и многовекторной внешней политики. Президент Узбекистана Каримов тоже настойчиво стремится занять позицию союзника нескольких великих держав, а не близкого партнера какой-либо одной страны или блока. Политические деятели, претендующие на роль преемника Акаева в Киргизии, делают примерно то же, сигнализируя о готовности продолжить внешнюю политику Акаева. Хотя некоторые лидеры в регионе старались (пусть и не слишком усердно) по-новому позиционировать себя с помощью методов, разработанных для того, чтобы заинтересовать американские власти после 11 сентября, ни один из них не попытался представить себя сторонником демократии. Если какие-то изменения и произошли, то скорее противоположного свойства: руководители стран Центральной Азии теперь проявляют бóльшую склонность к антидемократизму (подробнее об этом речь пойдет в главе 5). В частности, лидеры государств, богатых энергетическими ресурсами, ощущают себя менее уязвимыми. Хотя это не говорится прямо, но люди, подобные президенту Казахстана Назарбаеву, ясно дают понять, что именно они, а не Соединенные Штаты или другие «посторонние», будут определять пределы изменений в их странах с учетом культурных императивов и опасностей, связанных с наделением населения в азиатских или исламских обществах правами по европейскому образцу. Лидеры Центральной Азии быстро поняли, что американские приоритеты в войне с террором ограничиваются потребностями устранения текущей угрозы. Такой подход, возможно, упростил Вашингтону отношения с нынешними руководителями региона в краткосрочном плане, но это чревато тем, что сегодняшняя политика США способна породить новые угрозы безопасности в будущем. Американские политики понимают, что такое противоречие существует, и это ясно ощущается на всех слушаниях в Конгрессе, касающихся Центральной Азии, которые с 2001 г. проводятся несколько раз в год 17. Почти неизменно эксперты один за другим говорят об угрозах в долгосрочной перспективе, связанных с отказом от экономических и политических реформ, в то время как члены американского правительства подчеркивают стратегическую

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важность региона и объясняют, что интересы США требуют продолжения развития отношений с этими государствами. Хотя определенная доля американской помощи предназначается для стимулирования развития демократических обществ, в действительности Вашингтон вполне согласен делать бизнес с существующей правящей элитой независимо от того, насколько опасной или жадной она окажется. Проблема отчасти состоит в том, что большинство американских политиков так же уверено, что шансов на становление демократии в регионе очень мало, как и сами руководители Центральной Азии. И именно такое отношение способствует развитию социальной и экономической нестабильности, которая служит питательной средой для умножения рядов сторонников террора. Когда эта книга уже была сдана в печать, терпение американского правительства в отношении Узбекистана подошло к пределу. Суд в Андижане над 23 бизнесменами, заподозренными в связях с группой «Акромия», отколовшейся от радикального исламского движения «Хизб ат-Тахрир», вызвал обострение ситуации в городе. Ночь после суда с 12 на 13 мая закончилась тем, что продолжительные мирные протесты сменились насильственными действиями, в ходе которых было захвачено оружие из правительственных складов, а из местной тюрьмы были освобождены заключенные. Случившееся после этого пока является предметом споров; несомненно только то, что меры правительства по подавлению общественных протестов 14 мая привели к значительному числу жертв среди населения. Но хотя эти события широко освещались в СМИ и иногда от Вашингтона просто требовали разорвать все связи с Ташкентом, в распоряжении администрации Буша было мало эффективных рычагов, позволяющих влиять на поведение капризного союзника — президента Каримова, и в отличие от Украины и Грузии здесь не было никого «за кулисами», способного заменить его. После 11 сентября действительно открывалась возможность изменить траекторию развития в этой части мира. Но ни сами государства Центральной Азии, ни международное сообщество не смогли использовать этот «второй шанс» надлежащим образом. Слишком многие все еще полагают, что мир и безопасность в Центральной Азии можно сохранить и без проведения экономи-

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ческих и политических реформ во всех (именно во всех!) этих государствах. Проблемы региона не удастся решить, если его жители не проявят инициативы. Если мы хотим удержать государства Центральной Азии от сползания в хаос, международное сообщество должно помочь им найти решение экономических, политических и социальных проблем, а затем помочь обрести смелость, чтобы решиться вступить на этот путь. К сожалению, пока это не стало приоритетной задачей ни для кого как внутри региона, так и вне его.

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Глава 2 Центральная Азия: первые десять лет независимости

Ч Центральная Азия, чтобы в максимальной степени реализо-

тобы понять, какими возможностями располагают Запад и

вать этот второй шанс на возобновление сотрудничества, следует сначала уяснить, как и почему был безрассудно упущен первый шанс на протяжении десятилетия между распадом Советского Союза в 1991 г. и 11 сентября 2001 г. Чем были первые десять лет независимости стран Центральной Азии — успехом или неудачей, вопрос очень спорный, и он был не менее спорным до событий 11 сентября. Предлагались настолько разные оценки экономических и политических переходов, что часто было трудно поверить, что все обозреватели писали об одной и той же группе стран 1. Те, кто рассматривал ситуацию в очень короткой или, наоборот, очень длительной перспективе, обычно давали наиболее позитивные оценки по сравнению с другими обозревателями, утверждая, что, несмотря ни на что, государства Центральной Азии прожили эти десять лет, пролив сравнительно мало крови. Со временем, уверяли оптимисты, природные богатства региона будут использоваться в том числе и для улучшения жизни народа. Во многом эти утверждения справедливы. Гражданская война в Таджикистане не стала предвестником крушения всего региона (чего многие опасались) и завершилась процессом национального примирения, которое содействовало реализации хотя и отнюдь не самой лучшей, но зачастую дальновидной стратегии экономиче25

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ского и политического восстановления страны. Кроме того, большинство государств региона фактически имеет огромный неиспользованный экономический потенциал 2. Как правило, их экономические активы достаточно разнообразны, чтобы позволить им не стать легкой добычей «голландской болезни», т. е. попадания во все бóльшую зависимость от добычи природных ресурсов как источника экономического роста при сокращении инвестиций в других секторах, в частности, в обрабатывающей промышленности. Наиболее уязвимой в этом отношении выглядит Туркмения, которая располагает огромными запасами природного газа, причем ее недостаточная экономическая диверсификация не является следствием географического положения. В действительности это результат государственной политики, определяемой лишь одним человеком, игнорирующим мнение представителей прежней правящей элиты. На территории Казахстана находится самое большое в мире неиспользуемое месторождение нефти среди обнаруженных за последние тридцать лет, но, кроме того, эта страна имеет богатую и разнообразную экономику с достаточно развитыми резервами черной и цветной металлургии и сильными сельскохозяйственным и индустриальным секторами, доставшимися ей еще от советской эпохи. Узбекистан обеспечивает себя энергией, располагает большими запасами золота и — потенциально — достаточными площадями пахотной земли, чтобы выращивать хлопок на экспорт и обеспечить зерном собственное население. Самую хрупкую экономику в регионе имеют Киргизия и Таджикистан: они располагают металлами для экспорта, но этого недостаточно, чтобы поддерживать экономику, а площади пахотных земель относительно невелики. Однако эти две страны — источник воды для всего региона, они могут разрабатывать гидроэнергетические ресурсы, чтобы экспортировать энергию. Но сильные аргументы выдвигают и пессимисты. К этой категории обычно относятся исследователи, анализирующие среднесрочные перспективы развития региона, возможности сохранения нынешних уровней стабильности и вероятность превращения экономических потенциалов в реальные достижения. Они сильно сомневаются в том, что государства Центральной Азии смогут справиться с проблемами, которые неизбежно встанут перед ними в течение второго десятилетия независимости, в част-

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ности, с проблемами политической преемственности, передачи власти новому поколению и возрастания разрыва между богатыми и бедными, который превышает разрыв, существующий в сравнительно эгалитарных обществах. Они также полагают, что невозможность решить эти проблемы в конечном счете приведет к возникновению существенных угроз для безопасности всей Центральной Азии. Автор этой книги относится к категории пессимистов и разделяет беспокойство относительно избранных этими странами стратегий государственного строительства, не обеспечивающих достаточного выхода активности элиты и порождающих недовольство масс, которое неизбежно будет нарастать 3. Кроме того, эти близорукие стратегии, иногда обусловленные просто жадностью правящего слоя, почти не способствуют максимизации возможностей этих государств обеспечить собственное население или смягчению совокупности действующих ограничений, что позволило бы населению прокормить себя самому. Накануне 11 сентября траектория развития в большинстве стран Центральной Азии была не очень удачной. Ниже рассматривается совокупность факторов, породивших эту ситуацию.

Международное сообщество предлагает ограниченное участие, но не обязательства В 1991—2001 гг. о международных обязательствах в Центральной Азии говорилось много, но реальных действий было очень мало. Россия занималась гораздо более важными и неотложными проблемами. Событиями в Центральной Азии очень интересовался Китай, а также Индия, Иран, Пакистан и Турция. Но Китай не видел необходимости в каких-либо срочных действиях, а другим странам не хватало ресурсов, необходимых для полноценного участия в жизни государств региона. Большинству западных лидеров Центральная Азия казалась слишком отдаленной, несмотря на то что ведущие нефтяные и газовые компании Запада, а также многие компании, занимающиеся добычей минерального сырья, смотрели на этот богатый природными ресурсами регион с большим интересом. К сентябрю 2001 г.

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большинство крупных нефтяных проектов там все еще находилось на ранних стадиях планирования, а трудность ведения бизнеса ослабляла стремление Запада к более активным действиям. Сохранялся интерес только к самым крупным энергетическим проектам, но и в некоторых из них потенциальные иностранные инвесторы все более разочаровывались. Те, кто оказывал помощь развитию этих стран, зачастую сталкивались с теми же проблемами, что и иностранные инвесторы, и в результате в их адрес звучали обвинения, что решения, принимаемые политиками стран-доноров, только усугубляют проблемы Центральной Азии. Различные двусторонние финансовые учреждения все-таки разрабатывали программы для стран региона, но самые крупные из них редко шли дальше этапа проектирования или финансировались в ограниченных масштабах. Чувствовалось, что доноры устали. Если бы не события 11 сентября, международное сообщество вполне могло бы решить, что страны Центральной Азии должны сами решать свои проблемы. Казахстан в известной мере был исключением, потому что его нефтяная и газовая отрасли привлекали миллиарды долларов прямых иностранных инвестиций 4. Хотя страна имела самую агрессивную в регионе программу приватизации, большинство иностранных инвесторов в других секторах считали, что она реализуется с большим трудом, в значительной степени из-за всепроникающей коррупции. Туркмения, напротив, с самого начала шла собственным путем и никогда не принимала директив международных финансовых учреждений. Президент Сапармурат Ниязов решил выбирать партнеров для инвестирования на основании советов нескольких особо доверенных иностранцев и использовать огромные газовые ресурсы страны для финансирования нового типа государства всеобщего благоденствия, которое обеспечивало бы немногочисленному населению Туркмении бесплатные здравоохранение, коммунальные услуги и шестинедельный оплачиваемый отпуск (все это предполагалось реализовать к началу XXI столетия). Но военные действия и другие проблемы в Афганистане в сочетании с контролем Москвы над системой экспортных газопроводов привели к тому, что условия жизни большинства населения Туркмении в этот период не улучшились, а ухудшились.

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Две самых бедных страны региона, Таджикистан и Киргизия, не могли столь решительно отклонять рекомендации международных советников. В действительности первоначальный рывок Киргизии в отношении финансовой реформы и других макроэкономических реформ предусматривал поддержку Всемирного банка, Международного валютного фонда (МВФ) и других доноров, действовавших на двусторонней основе, с целью обеспечения независимости республики. Однако со временем многие киргизские политики, особенно оппозиционные, стали выдвигать несколько наивные обвинения в том, что растущее обнищание основной массы населения вызвано рекомендациями иностранных советников. Многие критики Аскара Акаева гораздо хуже, чем он сам, представляли себе сложность осуществляемых экономических преобразований. С одной стороны, судя по основным экономическим показателям, страна преуспевала, а с другой — увеличивалась бедность и росла социальная задолженность. Этот рост действительно был одним из следствий принятия экономических рекомендаций международных учреждений, целью которых было как раз предотвращение разрастания бедности, обусловленного разрывом экономических связей, существовавших в советскую эпоху. Будучи не в состоянии убедить критиков своей экономической политики, Акаев, чтобы заставить их замолчать, изменил правила игры. Киргизское руководство соблюдало большинство экономических рекомендаций международного сообщества, но при отсутствии механизмов политического контроля члены семьи и другие приближенные Акаева, по-видимому, смогли приумножить и свои личные состояния. Таджикское правительство, слабое и не полностью контролирующее территорию страны, обратилось к международному сообществу за помощью для восстановления разоренной войной экономики. Но в то время как правительство в Душанбе всерьез стремилось к сотрудничеству, на более низком уровне условия для реформ подрывались торговлей наркотиками из Афганистана, которая непрерывно стимулировала дальнейшую криминализацию экономики, уходящую корнями в гражданскую войну. Наркотики, поступавшие из Таджикистана, подрывали также экономику южной Киргизии и способствовали дальнейшему разрастанию коррупции в правоохранительных органах обеих стран.

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Правительство Узбекистана пригласило в страну МВФ в 1994 г., приняло его программу стабилизации, а затем в 1996 г. отказалось от нее 5. С того времени для поддержки национальной валюты (сома) правительство пользовалось собственными резервами, получаемыми от продажи золота и экспорта хлопка. Некоторое время эта схема работала, но конкуренция в экономике за иностранные кредиты была высока, со временем правительственная поддержка сома уменьшилась, и узбекская валюта резко обесценилась. К концу 1990-х годов ведущим экономистам Узбекистана стало ясно, что страна исчерпала активы, не найдя новых источников для обеспечения экономического роста, но у них не было единого мнения относительно того, как следует выходить из все более явной изоляции. При этом в Ташкенте нисколько не беспокоились по поводу того, что экономическая политика Узбекистана нанесла серьезный вред Киргизии и Таджикистану.

Регион давнишнего соперничества Поведение Узбекистана отражало нараставшую региональную тенденцию, которую международное сообщество по неосторожности укрепило, поскольку предложенные им стратегии экономических реформ ориентировали каждую страну региона на преодоление своих специфических проблем, подчеркивая местное «право владения», вместо того чтобы ориентировать эти страны на решение трансграничных проблем. В стремлении сделать свои государства уникальными лидеры Центральной Азии были увлечены стратегиями формирования наций, максимизировавшими соперничество и минимизировавшими сотрудничество. Хотя все они сталкивались со сходными проблемами, каждый руководитель боялся, что его личные позиции пошатнутся, если эти проблемы будут решаться совместно. Подобный стиль мышления — печальный элемент их общего советского бюрократического прошлого и следствие сходных опасений относительно недолговечности каждого из этих национальных государств. Лидеры стран Центральной Азии публично приветствовали независимость как форму восстановления госу-

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дарственности, но все они были весьма озабочены тем, что за этим последует. Каждый понимал, что его страна — в определенной степени продукт советской эпохи. Национальные границы не соответствовали естественным географическим рубежам и — несмотря на недавние противоположные заявления — не соответствовали также историческим схемам землепользования группы этнических сообществ с очень древними и переплетенными между собой историей и культурой. Завоеватели проходили через регион с востока и с запада, изменяя по пути следования генофонд и оставляя в местных культурах смесь, полученную из разных источников. И именно из этого общего перемешанного наследия исходит каждый из президентов стран Центральной Азии, приступая к утверждению национальной уникальности своего государства. Первыми поселенцами здесь были индоевропейцы, предки персидского населения. В VII в. они были обращены в ислам завоевавшими их арабами 6. Потом в регионе доминировали тюркские племена, переместившиеся туда в своем движении на запад. В эпоху Чингисхана монголы победили тюрков и добавили последний важный элемент в доколониальную этническую общность Центральной Азии 7. Нации, живущие здесь сегодня, начали формироваться в XV столетии под конец монгольского владычества. Русские, появившиеся по краям этого региона в XVII в., никогда не вступали в браки с местными жителями, да и местные народы не стремились ассимилироваться с ними. Тем временем датируется упоминание в качестве народов узбеков и казахов; казахи (как и киргизы) испытали очень сильное монгольское, а также тюркское влияние 8. Туркмены в основном консолидировались во времена сельджуков, которые правили в этом регионе с середины XI столетия, пока их во второй половине XII в. не сменили монголы. Нынешние туркмены (как и узбеки) представляют собой результат смешения тюрков с индоевропейцами, в то время как таджики — это потомки ранних индоевропейцев, хотя они тоже смешивались с местными тюркскими группами. Царская Россия обрела контроль над Северным Казахстаном на основании соглашений, подписанных с местной знатью в первой половине XVIII столетия, и расширила подконтрольную ей тер-

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риторию в южном направлении уже путем завоеваний в середине XIX в. С окончанием Крымской войны (1853—1856 гг.) и пленением имама Шамиля в Дагестане русские смогли завершить процесс, начатый в 1840-х годах, а именно покорение Центральной Азии и превращение ее из зоны пастбищ в зону выращивания зерновых культур. Сначала русские подчинили себе казахские и киргизские кланы, а позже нанесли поражение хану Коканда (1864 г.), эмиру Бухары (1868 г.) и хивинскому хану (1873 г.) на территории современных Узбекистана и Туркмении 9. В этот колониальный период формальная этническая принадлежность оставалась расплывчатой и не представляла особой важности. Главным разделяющим признаком в Российской империи было вероисповедание: самые широкие экономические и политические права имели православные, в то время как права самоуправления мусульманского сообщества были ограничены, особенно в сфере семейного права. Формальная этническая принадлежность была введена в советский период. Все советские граждане имели национальность, их этническая принадлежность регистрировалась в пятой графе внутреннего паспорта. В итоге вопрос о том, кто есть кто в Центральной Азии, решил Иосиф Сталин 10. В 1920-х годах несколько произвольным способом он нарезал из российских колониальных приобретений в Центральной Азии пять советских республик 11. Их административные границы много раз менялись и проводились так, чтобы оставить большие группы «ирредентистов», рассеянных по всему региону. И когда в 1991 г. эти республики получили независимость, оказалось, что буквально миллионы жителей Центральной Азии живут вне своих национальных государств. Подобно большинству внешних наблюдателей лидеры Центральной Азии боялись, что эти национальные границы окажутся нестабильными. Они опасались, что многочисленные претензии на те или иные территории могут толкнуть беспокойное по природе своей местное население к тому, чтобы взяться за оружие. Однако в действительности практически никаких межэтнических столкновений в Центральной Азии после распада Советского Союза не было. Даже территориальные проблемы между Узбекиcтаном и Таджикистаном, претендующими на земли бывшего Бухарско-

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го эмирата (и его основные города Самарканд и Бухару, которые сейчас находятся на территории Узбекистана), обсуждаются обеими сторонами относительно мирно. Однако в долгосрочном плане риск возникновения конфликта остается. Подтверждением тому может служить воздвигнутый в центре Душанбе памятник Исмаилу Самани, основателю династии саманидов, и изображение его мавзолея на таджикской купюре в сто сомони (национальная валюта Таджикистана) 12. Проблема состоит в том, что Самани является также национальным героем Узбекистана, а его мавзолей — это самая старая мечеть в Бухаре. Но пока мало оснований утверждать, что прямая конфронтация в той или иной форме неизбежна. Как раз наоборот: здесь (в отличие от Кавказского региона) существует сильное ощущение родства поверх национальных границ, которое помогло лидерам Центральной Азии ослабить межэтническое соперничество, порожденное распадом советской империи и конкурентной борьбой за достаточно скудные ресурсы. Гражданская война в Таджикистане не стала этническим конфликтом, несмотря на то, что она вспыхнула на региональной почве 13. Более того, столкновения между узбеками и киргизами в южной части Киргизии в 1990 г. удалось эффективно прекратить, как и меньшие по масштабам столкновения между таджиками и киргизами в 1989 г. по поводу распределения воды 14. Несмотря на все разговоры лидеров Центральной Азии о воинственности их народов, в первые годы независимости соперничество в регионе в целом протекало мирно.

Скрытые нетрадиционные угрозы безопасности

Опасность, связанная с нехваткой воды Однако, несмотря на относительное спокойствие, корни конфликта, вызванного дефицитом ресурсов, уходят очень глубоко. Конкуренция между земледельцами, жившими в оазисных поселениях, расположенных между Сырдарьей и Амударьей на территории современного Узбекистана, и кочевниками-скотоводами, населявшими горные и степные районы, непосредственно прилегающие

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к нынешним Казахстану и Киргизии, существует на протяжении нескольких тысяч лет. Во многом это была конкуренция за воду, и старая проблема управления ограниченными гидроресурсами Центральной Азии после получения этими странами независимости обрела новый смысл. Большинство водных ресурсов региона относится к бассейну Аральского моря 15. Но теперь вместо кочевников и крестьян, боровшихся за контроль над ними, согласовывать конфликтующие интересы приходится пользователям, берущим воду выше и ниже по течению. Экосистема региона испытывала напряжение еще более чем за десять лет до обретения независимости. Само Аральское море было объявлено мертвым уже в начале 1990-х годов, так как оно катастрофически уменьшилось в размерах и оказалось не способно поддерживать жизнь. Это стало следствием десятилетий порочной сельскохозяйственной практики в советскую эпоху, когда особое значение придавалось повышению производства хлопка (до трех урожаев в год). Такие результаты достигались за счет использования большого количества удобрений, что истощало и загрязняло водную систему Центральной Азии, оставляя обширные зоны региона без запасов питьевой воды 16. Хотя независимость открыла перспективы для более широкого международного участия в решении этих проблем, помощь с привлечением посредников предлагалась на таких условиях, что в регионе в основном сочли цену неприемлемой. Государства Центральной Азии хотели получить помощь в очистке загрязненных водных ресурсов, но при этом они не желали, чтобы им указывали, как распределять воду, или принуждали их исполнять решения, существенно изменяющие традиционные схемы водопользования. Сейчас центральноазиатские государства все еще зависят от несколько модифицированной версии советской системы управления водными ресурсами, которая была разработана так, чтобы удовлетворять потребности «нижних» пользователей (Узбекистана и Туркмении), а не «верхних» поставщиков воды (Таджикистана и Киргизии), заинтересованных в направлении бóльших объемов воды на выработку электроэнергии. Получив независимость, Киргизия начала производить больше гидроэлектроэнергии — намно-

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го меньше, чем ей нужно, но достаточно для увеличения интенсивности сезонных наводнений в Узбекистане и Казахстане. С обретением независимости возросли также потребности в воде для нужд сельского хозяйства, потому что из-за разрушения межреспубликанских экономических связей, существовавших в советскую эпоху, во всех пяти странах начался процесс деиндустриализации. С 1990 по 1998 гг. промышленное производство в них снизилось более чем на 50% 17. В результате большому числу людей пришлось перейти к натуральному сельскому хозяйству. Некоторые из них занялись этим спонтанно, но предпринимались и сознательные усилия для того, чтобы потребности местного населения в продуктах питания в большей мере покрывались за счет местного производства. В то же время главные производители хлопка в регионе пытались сохранить высокие урожаи, поскольку это был главный источник доходов от экспорта. Площади орошаемых земель в Центральной Азии в период между 1995 и 2000 гг. увеличились на 7% 18. Все руководители в регионе понимали, что существующие схемы водопользования таят потенциальные угрозы для безопасности, но воспринимали проблему через призму собственных национальных интересов. Это классический пример проблемы прав на совместное пользование (данный экономический термин используется при отсутствии какого-либо автоматического механизма или стимула для предотвращения злоупотреблений и истощения эксплуатируемого сообща ресурса): каждый глава государства пытался увеличить урожаи сельскохозяйственных культур и мало задумывался о последствиях истощения водных ресурсов, необходимых другим странам.

Угрозы, связанные с экстремистскими идеологиями Способы, которые лидеры Центральной Азии выбирают для борьбы с другими потенциальными угрозами, показывают, что и здесь они проявляют недостаточно внимания к возможным непредвиденным последствиям по другую сторону границы. В особенности это относится к риску, который создает для каждого из этих государств существование радикальных или экстремистских ислам-

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ских групп. Некоторые лидеры реагируют на их активность закрытием границ, другие пытаются прятать голову в песок и игнорировать группы, которые они не могут контролировать, независимо от того, какую опасность те представляют для населения. Уровень риска, создаваемого исламскими экстремистскими группировками, в разных государствах совершенно различен, в значительной степени потому, что возрождение ислама у давно урбанизированных узбеков и таджиков шло совсем не так, как у бывших кочевников — казахов, киргизов и туркмен. После краха коммунизма практика ислама восстанавливается повсюду, но наибольших успехов радикальный ислам добился там, где традиции исламского обучения были самыми сильными, т. е. в старых городах-оазисах в том районе, который носит название Мавераннахр. Формальные отношения между исламом и государством во всей Центральной Азии практически одни и те же. Ездить за границу жителям региона стало намного проще, паломничество в Мекку теперь вполне достижимая цель, мусульманские миссионеры также обратились и к Центральной Азии. Но хотя контакты с уммой (мировым мусульманским сообществом) расширились, каждое из государств держит исламскую иерархию под контролем примерно так же, как это делалось в СССР. Единая бюрократия советской эпохи, которая когда-то стремилась управлять отношениями между верующими и мировым исламским сообществом во всех республиках Центральной Азии, после обретения ими независимости была разделена на пять отдельных национальных ведомств. Каждое управление по делам мусульман, как правило, созданное при госкомитете по религии, подчиненном совету министров, должно было назначать ведущих духовных лиц страны и курировать основные мечети и все религиозные учебные заведения 19. Многие жители Центральной Азии были возмущены тем, что государство продолжает контролировать их духовную жизнь. В особенности это касалось членов радикальных групп исламистов, которые видят себя частью транснациональной идеологической силы, которая обращает мало внимания на национальные границы и не считает себя в чем-то ответственной перед светскими руководителями. Некоторые из них, например, члены Исламского дви-

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жения Узбекистана, образовавшегося из групп радикальных мусульманских активистов в Ферганской долине в середине 1990-х годов, полагают, что ситуация должна быть исправлена силовым путем. Но лидеры Центральной Азии считают, что существующие в регионе группы радикальных исламистов — сторонников ненасильственных действий представляют не меньшую угрозу, если учитывать их цели. Самая большая из них — «Хизб ат-Тахрир аль-исламий» (Исламская партия освобождения), которая была основана в Иерусалиме в 1952 г. Таки ад-дином Набхани аль-Фаластини с целью объединения уммы в новый халифат и возвращения мусульман к исламскому образу жизни. В Центральной Азии это движение начало распространяться с середины 1990-х годов, и к концу десятилетия его влияние здесь заметно возросло. Первоначально членами «Хизб ат-Тахрир» в регионе были узбеки, но сейчас движение уже имеет сторонников во всех пяти странах 20. В течение первых десяти лет независимости было много разговоров о сотрудничестве в борьбе с этими группами, но дело редко доходило до совместных действий. После взрывов в Ташкенте в феврале 1999 г., ответственность за которые была возложена на экстремистов, связанных с ИДУ, обмен информацией между странами Центральной Азии (и Россией) активизировался, особенно в том, что касается членов радикальных исламских групп и местонахождения их руководителей и активистов. Довольно сильным в этом отношении было влияние Узбекистана, который оказывал сильное давление на Киргизию, чтобы она выдала членов ИДУ и «Хизб ат-Тахрир», скрывавшихся в горных районах, а некоторые из них были даже похищены сотрудниками органов государственной безопасности Узбекистана. Сотрудничество между службами безопасности соседних стран на более низком уровне шло вразрез с существующим здесь бюрократическим духом. В системах с сильной президентской властью, характерных для Центральной Азии, существующая наверху атмосфера распространяется вниз. Трансграничное сотрудничество в сфере борьбы с наркотиками связано с риском того, что могут всплыть доказательства участия в наркоторговле высших должностных лиц, поскольку она считается источником финансирования радикальных групп. В результате офицеры органов безопасности предпочитали больше думать о собственном бизнесе. В Тур-

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кмении, наиболее репрессивном из этих государств, даже малейшее выражение несогласия с начальством ставило под угрозу не только карьеру, но, возможно, даже жизнь сотрудника.

Пять уникальных государств Сразу после распада Советского Союза было бы очень разумно подумать о Центральноазиатском регионе как о единой общности с единым комплексом проблем, которые можно было бы решить, используя скоординированные и интегрированные решения. Теперь, десять лет спустя, ситуация явно изменилась. Развитие Казахстана, Туркмении, Киргизии, Таджикистана и Узбекистана шло разными путями, каждая из этих стран приобрела собственный облик и выработала уникальный стиль принятия решений.

Казахстан: непройденный путь Во многих отношениях Казахстан — самая загадочная из центральноазиатских республик, потому что экономический рост, казалось бы, обеспечивает там мало стимулов для политической реформы, а между тем все происходит наоборот. Воодушевляемый в основном надеждой на свой энергетический сектор, Казахстан получал большие иностранные инвестиции, но уровень юридической защиты иностранных инвесторов и казахстанских владельцев собственности оставался неадекватным. К концу 1990-х годов сильная президентская система Казахстана начала быстро сокрушать независимые политические учреждения, хотя президент Нурсултан Назарбаев не вел себя столь деспотично, как его коллеги в Узбекистане и Туркмении. На протяжении большей части советской истории развитие событий в Казахстане больше походило на происходившее в России, чем в других районах Центральной Азии. И действительно, в советские времена этот регион называли «Средняя Азия и Казахстан», не употребляя какой-то общий собирательный термин. В отношении экономического планирования Северный и Центральный Казахстан были связаны с южной Сибирью, а политические со-

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бытия в России часто находили здесь более быстрый отклик, чем в соседних республиках. Казахстан был самой интернациональной из советских республик, с наибольшей в регионе долей русского населения и большим числом этнических немцев, украинцев, узбеков и татар 21. Советская политика переселения привела к тому, что после Второй мировой войны число проживавших здесь русских, как правило, превосходило число казахов 22. Русские начали покидать Казахстан в конце 1980-х годов, когда здесь был принят закон, радикально расширивший роль казахского языка в общественной жизни. После обретения республикой независимости темпы исхода русских увеличились, и за первые десять лет существования суверенного Казахстана страну покинули более 1,5 млн человек 23. Шахты и рудники, обогатительные фабрики и другие предприятия Северного Казахстана играли важнейшую роль в общем индустриальном комплексе СССР, но в начале 1990-х годов, когда межреспубликанские связи советских республик были нарушены, эти отрасли промышленности фактически остановились. Кроме того, Северный Казахстан полностью зависел от поставок нефти и электроэнергии из России, так что у Казахстана в результате попыток поддержать работу предприятий и муниципальных коммунальных служб накопился долг в сотни миллионов долларов, и он все еще выплачивается путем передачи акций казахстанских предприятий уполномоченным российского правительства. Хотя в течение первых нескольких лет этот долг был для Казахстана очень тяжким бременем, экономический переход для него оказался проще, чем для других стран Центральной Азии, отчасти из-за наличия богатых природных ресурсов, а отчасти из-за его человеческого потенциала 24. Однако это время вовсе не было легким: в начале и середине 1990-х годов казахстанская экономика переживала резкий спад и крах наиболее значимых в оборонном отношении секторов. Сельское хозяйство тоже прошло через спад, и к середине 1990-х годов животноводство было на грани падения, потому что поголовье крупного рогатого скота сократилось более чем на 50% 25. Тем не менее к концу 1990-х годов казахстанская экономика начала энергично расти, в значительной степени подпитываясь высокими ценами на нефть. Они также помогли республике выдержать

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последствия российского финансового потрясения 1998 г. Кроме того, Казахстан извлек пользу из жестких макроэкономических реформ, начатых в середине 1990-х годов, включавших введение свободно конвертируемой валюты, создание самого современного в регионе банковского сектора и запуск небольшой, но функционирующей в соответствии с западными стандартами фондовой биржи 26. Была также частично реформирована налоговая система: создана профессиональная налоговая служба и снижен налог на доходы корпораций на 30%, а на доходы граждан — на 5—40%. Правительство реорганизовало пенсионную систему, позволив гражданам выбирать, вкладывать деньги в государственные или частные фонды. Кроме того, началась коренная перестройка систем здравоохранения и образования, но этот процесс шел весьма неоднородно, и многие бедные районы (со слабой местной налоговой базой) фактически остались без обслуживания и с минимумом возможностей для трудоустройства населения. В 1997 г. правительство Казахстана перенесло столицу государства в обновленный город под названием Астана (каз. «столица», прежнее название — Акмола) и приняло амбициозные планы прокладки новых шоссе и рельсовых путей между основными городами страны, которые вследствие стремления СССР к централизации были связаны с крупными центрами в России, но не друг с другом. Однако эти проекты продвигаются очень медленно и вследствие коррупции в ходе реализации планов, и по причине переброски миллиардов долларов из транспортной сферы на программы строительства в новой столице. Правительству пришлось оказать серьезный дипломатический нажим, чтобы заставить иностранные посольства дать обещание переместиться в новую столицу, а сейчас оно пытается (и этого добиться еще труднее) побудить иностранные фирмы пообещать, что они перенесут туда свои штаб-квартиры из Алматы 27. Большинство надежд на будущее Казахстан связывает с разработкой месторождений нефти, которые, вероятно, могут сделать его пятым по величине производителем этого сырья в мире. Оценки нефтяных запасов Казахстана колеблются от 5,4 до 17,6 млрд баррелей, а некоторые оптимисты называют цифры вдвое больше 28. Между 1991 и 2001 гг. Казахстан получил более 14 млрд долл. в виде прямых иностранных инвестиций, по большей части в неф-

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тяной и газовый сектора. А поскольку эти деньги в значительной степени предназначались еще только для запуска крупных проектов, то фактически на ближайшие два десятилетия Казахстан гарантировал себе намного бóльшие иностранные инвестиции. По оценке правительства республики, общий потенциал ее природных ресурсов составляет 8,7 трлн долл., а запасы углеводородного сырья позволяют причислить Казахстан в группе, в которую входят Саудовская Аравия, Россия и Ирак. Казахстан имеет три гигантских месторождения нефти и газа — Тенгиз, Карачаганак и Кашаган, и все они питают государственную казну деньгами либо за счет доходов от производства продукции, либо за счет больших первых взносов компаний, получающих права на эксплуатацию. Месторождение Тенгиз, извлекаемые нефтяные запасы которого по разным оценкам составляют от 6 до 9 млрд баррелей, разрабатывается совместным предприятием «TengisChevroil», при этом доля в 50% принадлежит «Chevron-Texaco», 25% — «ExxonMobil», 20% — казахской государственной энергетической компании «Казмунайгаз», 5% — компании «LUKArco», образованной российской компанией «ЛУКойл» и BP 29. Добыча на этом месторождении началась в 1993 г., но затормозилась из-за сложностей, возникших при обсуждении условий прокладки трубопровода Каспийского трубопроводного консорциума (КТК) через Казахстан к Новороссийску в России 30. Трудности, появившиеся у компании «Chevron» на переговорах с «Транснефтью», российской монополией, владеющей всеми трубопроводами, заставили американское правительство искать альтернативные маршруты для транспортировки каспийской нефти. Сначала администрация Клинтона, а затем администрация Буша оказали давление на Казахстан, чтобы побудить его пойти на транспортировку нефти с месторождения Кашаган по нефтепроводу Баку — Тбилиси — Джейхан (через Азербайджан и Грузию в Турцию). Как и Тенгиз на побережье Каспия, Карачаганак является внутренним месторождением. Оно находится недалеко от границы с Россией к северу от Каспия, и его подтвержденные запасы составляют 2,2 млрд баррелей нефти и 500 млрд куб. м природного газа (что составляет 40% газовых запасов страны). В 1997 г. международный консорциум, в который входит «Chevron-Texaco», заклю-

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чил соглашение о разделе продукции на сумму 7—8 млрд долл., предусматривающее разработку этого месторождения в течение 40 лет, причем объем запланированных к 2006 г. инвестиций составляет 4 млрд долл.31 Третье главное месторождение страны лежит глубоко под Каспием на участке шельфа Кашаган. Оно может содержать до 40 млрд баррелей нефти, т. е. в четыре раза больше, чем Тенгиз, но, как полагают, лишь около четверти этих запасов можно будет извлечь. На месторождении Кашаган, которое может оказаться крупнейшим из открытых за последние сорок лет, работают две американские фирмы, входящие в консорциум «Agip KCO»: «ExxonMobil» с долей 16,67% и «ConocoPhillips» с долей 8,33%. Первоначально предполагалось, что в разработку Кашагана потребуется вложить не менее 12 млрд долл., а эксплуатацию намечалось начать в 2005 г., но потом этот срок был изменен, и оценки стоимости проекта также возросли. Поскольку развитие этого проекта шло медленно, после финансового кризиса 1998 г. в России казахстанское правительство продало свою первоначальную долю, чтобы получить средства в виде первых арендных взносов с компаний, получающих права на эксплуатацию, и выплатить задолженности по пенсиям и заработной плате. На территории Казахстана имеется еще несколько значительных месторождений газа. Главные нефтяные и газовые месторождения — Тенгиз, Жанажол и Уритау, Актобе на севере и Кумкол в Кызылординской области. Неразрабатываемые зоны шельфа, как полагают, тоже скрывают в себе большие запасы газа, но изза неразвитой системы трубопроводов, связывающей месторождения природного газа в западной части страны с потребителями на юге страны, Казахстан по-прежнему импортирует газ, чтобы удовлетворить местные потребности. Может случиться многое, что способно нарушить планы разработки ресурсов ископаемого топлива в этом государстве, практически не имеющем выхода к морю, но настоящей проблемой для Казахстана будет управление доходами от нефти, которое должно осуществляться таким образом, чтобы они приносили пользу как можно большему числу жителей страны. Для этого по рекомендации Всемирного банка и МВФ в 2001 г. был создан Национальный нефтяной фонд — сберегательный счет для накопления доходов от

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нефти. Он функционирует на основе норвежской модели, и деньги на него поступают регулярно. Однако эти суммы все еще составляют относительно малую долю национального бюджета, кроме того, чтобы фонд работал эффективно, необходима определенная экономическая прозрачность, которая в настоящее время в нефтедобывающей промышленности страны отсутствует. Иностранцы часто жаловались на отношение к ним со стороны правительственных и частных подрядчиков. С первых дней независимости они, как и местные предприниматели, регулярно попадали в ситуации, когда им в той или иной форме приходилось платить за «защиту». В случае отказа было практически невозможно успешно заниматься бизнесом, потому что в те годы (даже больше, чем сегодня) суды редко демонстрировали беспристрастность. Коррупция проникла на самые высшие должностные уровни. Она затронула даже президента Назарбаева и его семью. С 1999 г. ходили слухи об офшорных холдингах семейства Назарбаевых и о взятках, вымогаемых его членами у ведущих западных нефтяных компаний. Большинство этих историй было связано с американцем Джеймсом Гиффеном, президентом корпорации «Mercator», специализирующейся на заключении нефтяных и газовых сделок от имени правительства Назарбаева. «Mercator» вел переговоры с «Amoco» и «Texaco» относительно условий, на которых они могли приобрести права участия в проектах разработки месторождений Тенгиз и Карачаганак. Компания «Mercator» была обвинена в том, что часть денег, которые она как брокер получила в процессе работы с этими проектами, она перевела на личные счета президента и других высших официальных лиц Казахстана в качестве вознаграждения, и эти обвинения в конечном счете были поддержаны на слушаниях в большом жюри Нью-Йорка в 2004 г.32 Назарбаев никогда не признавался ни в каких проступках. Но многие близкие к нему люди говорят, что с пути истинного его сбил Гиффен, который убедил его, что набивание собственных карманов — обычная практика мировых лидеров. Кто кого на самом деле уговаривал, вряд ли когда-нибудь станет известно, но коррупционные действия, в которых обвиняют Назарбаева и его семью, весьма соответствуют его эгоцентричному стилю правления.

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Подобно советским партийным боссам Нурсултан Назарбаев демонстрирует желание остаться на политической сцене до конца жизни. Более того, он пошел даже дальше и, по-видимому, собирается основать политическую династию, опираясь при этом либо на свою старшую дочь Даригу (создателя крупной политической партии «Асар», что означает «Все вместе») и ее мужа Рахата Алиева, либо на своего второго зятя Тимура Кулибаева, женатого на его дочери Динаре и занимающего ключевой пост в нефтегазовой промышленности Казахстана. С каждым годом Назарбаев, кажется, укрепляется в мысли сделать свое президентство пожизненным. Он не пожелал столкнуться с серьезной конкуренцией на двух формальных президентских выборах в 1991 и 1999 гг., хотя его популярность была намного выше, чем у любого другого политика в стране, и он, вероятно, легко победил бы любого противника и в честной борьбе. На выборах 1991 г. ему противостояла лишь с символическая оппозиция. В 1995 г. он вообще уклонился от переизбрания, продлив свой четырехлетний президентский срок с помощью референдума. В 1998 г. в Конституцию были внесены изменения, в соответствии с которыми срок пребывания президента у власти увеличивался до семи лет, так что ограничения, которые могли бы воспрепятствовать Назарбаеву и дальше оставаться президентом, снимались, к тому же ему обеспечивались разнообразные политические привилегии после отставки включая иммунитет от судебного преследования. В 1999 г. Назарбаев был успешно переизбран, но только после того, как его главный политический конкурент Акежан Кажегельдин, премьер-министр с 1994 по 1997 гг., был отстранен от участия в выборах из-за якобы совершенных им преступлений (после того как он провел несанкционированное собрание с целью создания собственной политической организации — Республиканской народной партии). В 1998 г. Кажегельдин бежал из страны, жил изгнанником в Европе и США, и ему то и дело грозила экстрадиция для предъявления обвинений на родине. Казахстан выдал ордер на его арест, и в июле 2000 г. его даже арестовали, хотя и ненадолго, в Италии. Он был задержан в главном римском аэропорту «Фьюмичино», содержался под стражей два дня и был освобожден только после вмешательства министра юстиции Италии.

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Один из шагов правительства Назарбаева в стремлении добраться до Кажегельдина имел серьезные последствия и продемонстрировал невежество доверенных лиц президента в международных финансовых делах. В 1999 г. правительство республики официально обратилось к правительству Швейцарии с просьбой об установлении местонахождения банковских счетов бывшего премьер-министра, утверждая, что они содержат присвоенные им государственные активы. Конечно, Назарбаев знал, что в Швейцарии имеются также банковские счета на его имя и на имя преемника Кажегельдина, премьер-министра Нурлана Балгимбаева. В ходе поисков счетов Кажегельдина были обнаружены и их собственные счета (на гораздо более значительные суммы), и швейцарские следователи известили об этом Министерство юстиции США. Тут же встал вопрос об источниках этих денег, и начавшееся расследование привело к скандалу с обсуждением неблаговидного поведения Гиффена и некоторых американских нефтяных компаний в Казахстане. Скандал, связанный с Гиффеном, привлек гораздо большее внимание общественности в США, чем в Казахстане, потому что к тому времени (2002 г.) СМИ Казахстана и его парламент были уже не столь независимыми, как десять лет назад. Последний казахстанский парламент, избранный при советской власти, был распущен в 1993 г. почти сразу после того, как Борис Ельцин насильственным путем ликвидировал парламент Российской Федерации, сохранившийся с коммунистических времен. Но в отличие от своих беспокойных коллег в России казахстанские законодатели вели себя миролюбиво и просто стремились использовать парламент как форум для политических дискуссий. Первая после обретения независимости Конституция была разработана перед выборами 1994 г. Она ввела в Казахстане сильную президентскую власть с ограниченными и четко оговоренными полномочиями парламента. Парламент, избранный в соответствии с этой Конституцией, проработал только год из предусмотренного законом пятилетнего срока и был распущен в 1995 г. по формальным юридическим основаниям 33. Большинство западных наблюдателей не высказало с против этого серьезных возражений, потому что и президент Назарбаев, и премьер-министр Кажегельдин решительно заявили, что парламент стал тормозом для мак-

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роэкономических реформ, которые позже руководство страны провело президентским указом. Законодатели, входившие в состав двух первых парламентов независимого Казахстана, регулярно и энергично обсуждали проблемы законодательства и иногда даже навязывали свою волю сопротивлявшемуся президенту. Конституционные изменения 1995 г. практически гарантировали, что такого больше не будет. Однопалатный законодательный орган Казахстана был заменен гораздо более слабым двухпалатным, причем верхняя палата состояла из сенаторов, в значительной степени подбираемых президентом, а полномочия нижней палаты были резко ограничены 34. Но даже при всем этом парламентские выборы 1999 г. не соответствовали международным стандартам справедливости. Политическая оппозиция в Казахстане становилась все более опасной. Члены семьи Назарбаева начали приобретать контроль над важнейшими СМИ, которые были приватизированы, а по-настоящему независимые журналисты подвергались официальным и неофициальным преследованиям. Число избиений корреспондентов возросло настолько, что официальные объяснения, сводившие эти инциденты к случайным уличным преступлениям, казались совершенно неправдоподобными; в редакциях вспыхивали необъяснимые пожары. Например, возле редакции газеты «Республика» появились изображения обезглавленной собаки с предупреждением, адресованным редактору Ирине Петрушовой (расследовавшей слухи о том, что Назарбаев припрятал на счетах в швейцарских банках 1 млрд долл. из доходов государства от нефти): «никакого следующего раза не будет». Задолго до начала войны с террором ни администрация Клинтона, ни администрация Буша, казалось, не знали, как следует реагировать на ухудшение политического климата в Казахстане и нарастающую полемику вокруг его первого президента. Американское правительство придавало особое значение улучшению условий для инвестиций в Казахстане, особенно в нефтяном и газовом секторе. По большей части власти США не слишком беспокоились по поводу политических событий в Казахстане, и не было почти никаких признаков, что американские политики принимают во внимание возможность того, что действия правительства Казахстана могут в конечном счете создать серьезные проблемы для

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населения страны. Дела в Казахстане шли более успешно, чем в других странах региона, и казалось, что нет никаких причин конфликтовать с режимом Назарбаева, тем более что он еще должен был пообещать транспортировать свою нефть с шельфового месторождения Кашаган по маршруту Баку — Тбилиси — Джейхан (в обход России и Ирана), как того хотели США.

Туркмения: неосуществившиеся мечты Если, по мнению вашингтонских политиков, Казахстан управлял своими ресурсами достаточно хорошо, во всяком случае, лучше, чем ожидалось, то отношение к Туркмении, другому государству Центральной Азии с богатыми запасами ископаемого топлива, было прямо противоположным. Подтвержденные запасы природного газа в Туркмении составляют примерно 2,8 трлн куб. м, и по этому показателю среди постсоветских государств она уступает только России. Кроме того, Туркмения располагает подтвержденными запасами нефти в 1,4 млрд баррелей; предполагается, что там имеются и другие крупные запасы нефти (главным образом в западной части страны и на неразведанных участках шельфа в Каспийском море) 35. Но ни в одной из стран Центральной Азии не было такого контраста между обещаниями, звучавшими сразу после получения независимости, и тем, чего удалось достигнуть за десять лет, нигде западные компании не сталкиваются с такими трудностями. В 1993 г. правительство Туркмении пригласило бывшего госсекретаря США Александра Хейга, чтобы он побуждал американцев увеличивать инвестиции в Туркмении, а также способствовал смягчению позиции Вашингтона в отношении трубопроводов через Иран. Ему удалось воодушевить потенциальных инвесторов 36. Но в 1990-х годах реализация планов Запада по разработке нефтяных и газовых ресурсов откладывалась 37. Обещание предоставить гражданам Туркмении продолжительный оплачиваемый отпуск осталось невыполненным, а те, кто хорошо знаком с ситуацией в стране (как в городских, так и в сельских районах), как правило, сообщают о растущем обнищании населения, что противоречит официальной статистике. Однако выяснить, какой ущерб был нанесен туркмен-

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ской экономике в течение первых десяти лет независимости, очень трудно, поскольку страна была практически закрыта для западных финансовых учреждений, а публикуемые данные экономической статистики вызывают большие подозрения. Самым тревожным было то, что с 1994 г. в Туркмении отмечалось снижение объема добычи газа, и если в 1990 г., еще в советскую эпоху, было добыто 81,9 млрд куб. м газа, то в 1998 г. — лишь 13,3 млрд куб. м 38. Снизилось и производство хлопка, особенно в 1993—1996 гг. Газ — гораздо более проблематичный товар, чем нефть, поскольку для него необходим легко доступный рынок. Географическая изоляция Туркмении, не имеющей выхода к морям (кроме Каспия), серьезно осложняет доставку ее газа. Два самых простых маршрута пролегают через Иран и Россию, но обе эти страны — конкуренты Туркмении, так как сами располагают большими запасами газа и могут использовать их для захвата рынков, предоставляя покупателям скидки в зависимости от объема закупок. Иран пробовал заручиться расположением Туркмении, в то время как главные лица в газовой промышленности России полагали, что туркменские активы должны принадлежать им, поскольку в советскую эпоху в разработку запасов Туркмении делались большие инвестиции, которые именно эти люди и контролировали. Поэтому российский «Газпром» и его дочерние компании стремились получить контроль над туркменским газом и вели себя при этом гораздо агрессивнее, чем в Казахстане или Узбекистане, где запасы газа меньше или менее доступны. Москва хотела, чтобы туркменский газ (продаваемый по низкой цене) поступал в российскую систему трубопроводов и продавался клиентам России в пределах Содружества Независимых Государств (СНГ), не всегда достаточно платежеспособным, оставляя более прибыльный европейский рынок в полном распоряжении частично принадлежащего государству «Газпрома». С 1994 г. переговоры между Москвой и Ашхабадом относительно цены на газ и форм его оплаты шли с большим трудом, и несколько раз Туркмения просто на долгое время отказывалась продавать газ на этом рынке, не желая соглашаться на жесткие условия, предлагаемые Россией 39. Единственная возможность для Туркмении доставлять свой газ на рынки в обход конкурентов состояла в том, чтобы попытаться

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транспортировать его через Афганистан, и этим вариантом правительство Туркмении интересовалось с первых дней независимости. Имелся в виду газ с гигантского Давлетабадского месторождения на юго-востоке страны, запасы которого оцениваются в 1,27 трлн куб. м, и этого достаточно, чтобы гарантировать предложение инвестиций для прокладки экспортного трубопровода в размере более 2 млрд долл. Сначала туркменское правительство заключило сделку с аргентинской компанией «Bridas», но затем склонилось к проекту, предложенному калифорнийской компанией «Unocal», с которой в октябре 1994 г. подписало соглашение о продаже газа с этого месторождения через международный трубопроводный консорциум, в который входит компания из Саудовской Аравии «Delta Oil», известная хорошими рабочими отношениями с различными группировками, борющимися за власть в Афганистане. Этот консорциум обещал продавать давлетабадский газ, транспортируя его по трубопроводу, проходящему через Афганистан к рынкам в Пакистане и, возможно, в Индии 40. Выдвигалось также предложение о прокладке нефтепровода через Казахстан и Узбекистан в Афганистан и далее через Пакистан с выходом к открытым морям. Но правительство Туркмении понимало, что пока в Афганистане не установлен мир, добиться международного финансирования такого проекта невозможно, и полагало, что именно лидеры «Талибана» быстрее и эффективнее всех прочих смогут восстановить порядок в стране. Хотя правительство Туркмении никогда не подтверждало это де-юре, оно позволяло официальным лицам формально поддерживать интересы «Талибана», и в 1996 г. министр иностранных дел Туркмении Борис Шихмурадов даже ездил в Вашингтон, чтобы попытаться побудить администрацию Клинтона признать режим талибов. Такая политика принесла Туркмении мало пользы, к тому же она еще больше отдалила правителей в Ашхабаде от коллег в других странах Центральной Азии. Компания «Unocal», уставшая ждать окончания гражданской войны в Афганистане, которая, казалось, будет длиться вечно, и не пожелавшая сотрудничать с режимом талибов, в 1998 г. отказалась от участия в прокладке трубопроводов 41. В какой-то мере на ее решение повлияли трудности ведения бизнеса в Туркмении, поскольку позиция правительства страны относительно ценности этого проекта была нереалистич-

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ной, если учесть, что именно ему (а не «Unocal») принадлежало Давлетабадское месторождение, и даже о правах на сам экспортный трубопровод шли споры 42. Другие инвесторы в частном порядке тоже высказывали намерение уйти из страны. В 2001 г., как и сейчас, в Туркмении почти полностью отсутствовала правовая инфраструктура. Ответственность в ее обширной и многоуровневой административной системе распределена нечетко, из-за чего часто возникают противоречивые ситуации, ведущие в бюрократический тупик, поскольку все чиновники стремятся, чтобы любое их действие было санкционировано президентом страны. Ниязов имеет очень твердое мнение относительно того, что и как следует делать, в частности относительно приоритетности различных форм обращенных к нему приветствий и подношений, как публичных, так и частных. Первые документировать проще, нежели последние, потому что в середине 1990-х годов Ниязов поручил правительству истратить миллиарды долларов на восстановление главных улиц Ашхабада. Были возведены общественные и частные дворцы, и каждому министру было даже позволено построить маленькую гостиницу-дворец, если доходы позволяли это сделать. Часть денег при этом поступала из общественных источников, часть добывалась путем вымогательства, которое использовалось для наполнения карманов, а также для финансирования официально поддерживаемых проектов. По слухам, часть незаконных доходов (какая именно, установить трудно) поступала от торговли наркотиками 43. Значительные суммы добывались также за счет выкручивания рук потенциальных иностранных инвесторов. В отношении небольших инвестиционных проектов иностранцам приходилось иметь дело с назначенными президентом кураторами (среди которых были некоторые видные турецкие и израильские бизнесмены). Но практически все решения, касающиеся больших проектов, вырабатывались в ходе непосредственных консультаций с самим Ниязовым, не стесняющимся прямо говорить о том, сколько стоит его участие в бизнесе 44. Ниязов, называющий себя «великим Туркменбаши» (т. е. вождем всех туркмен), создал культ личности, который в своих крайних проявлениях превзошел культ личности Сталина. В течение первых десяти лет независимости Ниязов прошел путь от среднего советского аппаратчика, неожиданно ставшего президентом, до

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лица, заполонившего собой всё в Туркмении. В 1999 г. он был объявлен пожизненным президентом, и сейчас его лицо можно видеть буквально повсюду и на всем, от упаковок с йогуртом до национальной валюты. Позолоченная вращающаяся статуя президента, представленная на обложке этой книги, доминирует над панорамой столицы страны. В течение нескольких лет его портрет сияет вместо логотипа в углу экрана на всех национальных телевизионных каналах независимо от содержания программы. Подобно Сталину Ниязов периодически предупреждает подхалимов, назначенных им на ключевые посты, о недопустимости чрезмерного энтузиазма в оказании почестей президенту. Но в действительности никакая критика Ниязова невозможна даже в конфиденциальном порядке. Критиковать руководителя государства здесь не просто неразумно (так считают повсюду в Центральной Азии), это чревато моментальным крушением карьеры. В Узбекистане в большинстве собраний, где присутствует президент Каримов, тоже благоразумнее всего держаться тихо. Но узбекские должностные лица в частном порядке признавали, что Каримов иногда принимал неверные решения, в то время как в Туркмении ни один государственный служащий с начала 1990-х годов не смеет позволить себе ничего подобного. Любое публичное осуждение президента было и остается невозможным. Развитие независимых СМИ подавлялось изначально, как и создание неформальных или формальных независимых политических организаций. Те, кто пытался создавать их, подвергались произвольным арестам, как это было с правозащитниками, старавшимися отслеживать действия правительства в отношении его критиков 45. Критиковать Ниязова — значит критиковать основу туркменского государства. Ниязов ведет себя не просто как президент, но как духовный лидер нации, в свое время он даже пустил слух, что бессмертен подобно пророку. Правда, когда некоторые из соседних с Туркменией мусульманских государств расценили это как богохульство, он отказался от своего заявления. Однако в 1997 г. на международной конференции туркменский заместитель министра атаковал автора этой книги за произнесенные вслух слова, что каждый президент в этом регионе когда-нибудь умрет и его придется заменить.

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Однако, даже будучи смертным, Ниязов — человек в высшей степени самоуверенный, и начиная с середины 1990-х годов его действия основываются на вере, что он способен изменить порядок функционирования международной системы, по крайней мере в отношении государств, недавно ставших независимыми, таких, как его собственное. Именно по этой причине Туркмения с 1995 г. придерживается сформулированной Ниязовым доктрины «позитивного нейтралитета», отказываясь от участия в большинстве региональных и трансрегиональных программ, причем он никогда не объяснял, какие соображения не позволяют ей вступать в одни организации и позволяют вступать в другие. Толкование высказываний этого неадекватно выражающегося руководителя всегда доставляло большие трудности американским политикам. Приверженность позитивному нейтралитету, кажется, побудила Ниязова отказаться от поддерживаемого США проекта транспортировки туркменского газа по транскаспийскому трубопроводу, проходящему по дну моря и соединяющемуся с системой трубопроводов Баку — Тбилиси — Джейхан. Между тем поддержка американского проекта помогла бы Ниязову расширить доступ к рынкам, чего туркменский президент отчаянно добивался, и именно поэтому его поведение кажется американским руководителям непостижимым.

Киргизия: разработанные Западом планы отвергнуты Лидеры сравнительно богатых государств региона, возможно, считали удобным отстраниться от советов и финансовых рекомендаций Запада или, как в Казахстане, использовать эффективные фильтры при принятии решения, какие советы являются допустимыми, а какие нет. Однако руководители бедных государств не всегда могли позволить себе такую роскошь. Пример тому — Киргизия. По крайней мере в первые годы независимости президент страны Аскар Акаев, по-видимому, относился к экономическим и политическим реформам с подлинным энтузиазмом и клялся, что Киргизия станет «Швейцарией Центральной Азии» — финансовым центром, транспортным узлом и местом, притягивающим иностранных туристов. С некоторой долей

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цинизма можно сказать, что Акаев, вероятно, пытался обратить потребности в преимущества, потому что стремился подчеркнуть отличия своей страны и ее руководства от других государств региона. Не располагая богатствами, которые были у некоторых ее соседей, в качестве магнита для привлечения западных инвестиций, займов или помощи, Киргизия мало что могла предложить, кроме личности своего президента. Оказалось, что получить займы и гранты проще, чем инвестиции. Когда Киргизия первой в регионе согласилась на осуществление программы макроэкономических реформ, разные международные организации устремились туда с долгосрочными кредитами и помощью. В мае 1993 г. Киргизия первой в Центральной Азии ввела национальную валюту с поддержкой макростабилизационной программы МВФ. Правительство страны также ввело режим свободной торговли, и в 2000 г. Киргизия первой из постсоветских государств (исключая прибалтийские государства) вступила во Всемирную торговую организацию. Политика протекционизма принесла бы Киргизии мало пользы. При отсутствии регионального рынка перспективы привлечения иностранных инвестиций в производственный сектор были невелики, в частности, это касалось пищевой и текстильной промышленности, которые были в достаточной мере развиты здесь в советский период. Хотя торговая политика Киргизии с экономической точки зрения была благоразумной, обеспечить поддержку со стороны соседей страна не могла. Ни Узбекистан, ни Казахстан не были заинтересованы в том, чтобы открыть свои рынки для киргизских товаров, и это оказало самое неблагоприятное воздействие на крошечную экономику Киргизии и еще больше затруднило ей доступ на огромный традиционный рынок России 46. В результате за первые десять лет независимого существования Киргизия из страны, которую в среде международных организаций, оказывающих помощь в целях развития, воспринимали как многообещающий сервисный центр и «сердце» региона, превратилась в страну, которую сообщество стран-доноров использовало для проверки стратегий сокращения бедности, ставших в Киргизии необходимыми, в частности, из-за большого внешнего долга. С 1995 по 2001 гг. киргизское правительство заняло в общей сложности 1,4 млрд долл. К июню 2001 г. внешний долг страны

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составлял около 130% ВНП, что делало ее главным кандидатом на списание долгов 47. В то же время сумма прямых иностранных инвестиций, которые сумела привлечь Киргизия, составила всего 382,1 млн долл.48 Кроме того, значительная часть этих инвестиций предназначалась для одного определенного проекта — рудника по добыче золота Кумтор, совместного предприятия с канадской компанией «Cameco». Компания «Kumtor Gold» была создана в 1992 г. для разработки этого рудника, запасы золота в котором, по имеющимся оценкам, составляли 263,7 т. Этот проект, производственная стадия которого началась в 1997 г., вызвал в Киргизии большие споры: его критики утверждали, что он приносит выгоду инвестору за счет правительства. В первые годы говорили, что родственники Акаева извлекали выгоду из продажи золота с рудника Кумтор на международном рынке 49. Позже этот проект подвергся резкой критике в связи со сбросом цианидов в озеро Иссык-Куль 50. Благодаря кумторскому проекту экономика Киргизии казалась более устойчивой, чем была в действительности. Например, в первой половине 2001 г. промышленное производство страны выросло на 6%, но когда из рассмотрения были исключены компании, разрабатывавшие Кумтор, оказалось, что промышленное производство за этот период, наоборот, снизилось на 5,4% 51. Сельское хозяйство на большей части территории тоже пришло в упадок, поскольку поголовье крупного рогатого скота в 1990-х годах стремительно сокращалось 52. К концу 2001 г. экономика страны была совершенно подорвана. Зоны новой экономической активности появились в Бишкеке и даже в некоторых мелких городах и деревнях, но большинство киргизов жило в гораздо более тяжелых условиях, чем в предыдущее десятилетие. Разумеется, оппозиция президенту Акаеву усиливалась. Открытую поддержку Акаевым Бориса Ельцина в августе 1991 г. (во время неудавшегося коммунистического переворота) в политических кругах Киргизии сочли смелым поступком. Но к середине 1990-х годов элита осознала, что стране следует быстрее всех в регионе перейти к демократической системе. И это сильно рассердило президента, который поддерживал (а если не поддерживал, то безусловно допускал) политику ограничения политической деятельности в стране.

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Многие независимые СМИ в Киргизии во второй половине 1990-х годов были оштрафованы или даже закрыты, и в ряде случаев именно потому, что пытались публиковать информацию о президентской коррупции. Самый известный независимый журналист страны, редактор газеты «Республика» Замира Сидикова провела двенадцать месяцев в исправительной колонии, поскольку в 1997 г. была признана виновной в публикации клеветы на президента 53. Однако из всех лидеров региона Акаев был более других склонен подчиняться электорату своей страны. Он трижды, в 1991, 1995 и 2000 гг., участвовал в состязательных выборах 54. Только Киргизия из всех государств Центральной Азии провела президентские выборы в 1995 г., в то время как коллеги Акаева просто продлили сроки своего пребывания у власти, проведя референдумы. Главную роль в том, чтобы «помочь» Акаеву принять решение о проведении выборов в 1995 г., сыграло недовольство Вашингтона (в связи с возможностью их отмены), но к концу 1990-х годов политическое давление Соединенных Штатов на Киргизию использовалось реже и было менее эффективным. Действительно, США спокойно отнеслись к тому, какой путь избрал Акаев, чтобы получить возможность баллотироваться на третий срок в 1998 г. Это было сделано через Конституционный суд, который постановил, что записанное в Конституции положение лишь о двух сроках президентства к Акаеву не применимо, потому что его первый президентский срок начался еще до того, как Киргизия стала независимой. Первая Конституция независимой Киргизии, принятая в 1993 г., установила в стране парламентско-президентскую республику, но в результате референдума, состоявшегося в октябре 1994 г., она была изменена, и вместо однопалатного парламента, оставшегося от советской эпохи, был образован двухпалатный парламент с резко сократившимися полномочиями. Как и в Казахстане, цель изменений состояла в том, чтобы сделать законодательный орган более послушным и расширить полномочия президента и его администрации. Но даже после этого парламентские выборы в Киргизии в 2000 г. прошли не в соответствии с международными стандартами, поскольку правительство все-таки опасалось, что не сможет свободно управлять парламентом 55. Президентские выборы 2000 г. вызвали еще большее беспокойство и критику со стороны Организации по безопасности и со-

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трудничеству в Европе (ОБСЕ) в связи с нарушением международных стандартов 56. Предвыборная кампания перестала быть честной задолго до голосования; например, некоторые кандидаты были отстранены от участия в выборах, потому что не сумели сдать экзамен по киргизскому языку (проходивший за закрытыми дверями), причем среди них было несколько дипломированных филологов 57. Более других известна история Феликса Кулова, лидера оппозиционной партии «Ар-Намыс» («Достоинство»). За свое поведение в бытность военным комендантом Фрунзе (прежне название Бишкека) во время гражданских беспорядков в 1990 г. он получил титул «народного генерала». Обладающий определенной харизмой Кулов был единственным политическим деятелем, популярность которого в 1990-х годах приближалась к популярности Акаева. После того как Киргизия обрела независимость, Кулов был вицепрезидентом страны, затем главой Чуйской области, министром национальной безопасности и мэром Бишкека. Именно с последнего поста он ушел в отставку, чтобы создать партию «Ар-Намыс». В марте 2000 г. Кулов был арестован, обвинен в злоупотреблении властью, подлоге и соучастии в другом преступлении. В августе 2000 г. военный суд оправдал Кулова, но государственные обвинители обжаловали это решение, побудив суд отменить оправдательный приговор. Многие думали, что Кулова арестовали, чтобы помешать ему участвовать в президентских выборах. Стремясь остаться жизнеспособной политической фигурой, Кулов предпочел не покидать страну, хотя и отказался от участия в президентских выборах 2000 г.58 Однако вскоре после освобождения в январе 2001 г. он снова был арестован и приговорен к семи годам заключения в колонии особого режима с конфискацией имущества и лишением воинского звания.

Таджикистан: медленное восстановление после гражданской войны К концу 2001 г. в Таджикистане, как и в Киргизии, правительство переживало серьезный долговой кризис. В советский период это была одна из беднейших республик Союза, имевшая подобно

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Киргизии слабую имущественную базу, не позволяющую рассчитывать на большой объем иностранных инвестиций. Но после нескольких лет гражданской войны Таджикистан считался страной с намного более опасной деловой средой, чем его северная соседка Киргизия. Так что у правительства Эмомали Рахмонова практически не было иного выбора, кроме как пригласить экспертов из Всемирного банка, МВФ, а также европейских и азиатских финансовых учреждений, действующих на двусторонней основе, чтобы они помогли его советникам разработать стратегию экономических реформ. Таджикистан ввел национальную валюту в 2000 г., и с этого началось развитие частного банковского сектора. Но прозрачность в Таджикистане была и остается намного меньше, чем в Киргизии, и помощь МВФ этой стране периодически приостанавливалась в связи с обвинениями в адрес должностных лиц в преднамеренном манипулировании официальной статистикой. Отчасти это, конечно, можно было объяснить небрежностью, но небрежность эта помогала скрывать реальное влияние наркоторговли на экономику, хотя предполагается, что в 1990-х годах наркоторговля составляла 50—100% ВНП Таджикистана в зависимости от размера годового урожая мака в Афганистане. Активная торговля наркотиками в Таджикистане частично объясняется крайне убогим положением населения. После десяти лет независимости более 80% населения оказалось за чертой бедности 59. Уровень промышленного производства значительно снизился, производство сельскохозяйственной продукции тоже резко сократилось 60. В первые десять лет существования в качестве независимого государства Таджикистан перенес три серьезных потрясения. Во-первых, были разорваны существовавшие в советскую эпоху трансграничные связи, что имело следствием непосредственные экономические затруднения. Во-вторых, почти сразу после получения независимости страна погрузилась в пучину гражданской войны, причем в 1992 и 1993 гг. столкновения охватили бóльшую часть ее территории 61. Эта война оставалась «замороженным» конфликтом до тех пор, пока почти через пять лет международное посредничество не позволило провести в целом успешный процесс национального примирения 62. Наконец, даже после оконча-

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ния гражданской войны в Таджикистане Узбекистан отказался открыть границы для продажи или транзита таджикских товаров. Гражданская война повлияла практически на все аспекты жизни Таджикистана и во многом определила его развитие. Предполагается, что в 1992—1994 гг. погибло от 60 до 100 тыс. человек, а число внутренних перемещенных лиц составило около 10% населения. По имеющимся оценкам, в результате войны страна потеряла около 7 млрд долл. дохода, а экономика практически лежит в руинах 63. Хотя юридически Таджикистан стал независимым в конце 1991 г., фактически достичь этого не удавалось еще несколько лет. Политическая жизнь в республике вышла из-под контроля после неудавшегося коммунистического переворота в августе 1991 г., поддержанного руководителем республики Кахаром Махкамовым, который был и главой Коммунистической партии, и президентом Таджикистана. По-видимому, изгнать Махкамова с его постов мечтали самые разные политические силы включая и активное продемократическое движение в столице страны Душанбе. Его соперником был также очень честолюбивый, но неудачливый бывший коммунистический лидер Рахмон Набиев, в советское время представлявший мощные экономические интересы Худжанда, расположенного в северной части страны (в таджикской части Ферганской долины, которая была важной частью властного политического блока с центром в Ташкенте), и снятый со своего поста Михаилом Горбачевым 64. Наконец, существовала группа харизматических исламских лидеров, которые заняли видное общественное положение в рамках санкционированной государством политики религиозного возрождения в конце 1980-х годов и полагали, что государственную политику нужно строить на основе исламских ценностей 65. Все три группы (демократические активисты, группировка Набиева и исламские лидеры) были в состоянии мобилизовать на борьбу с Махкамовым множество людей из Душанбе и провинции с помощью священнослужителей, имевших возможность обратиться к набожным сельским жителям. Под давлением общественности Махкамов в 1991 г. ушел в отставку и был заменен Набиевым, который был быстро изгнан демократическими и происламскими группами. Следующей весной большие демонстрации превратились в борьбу группировок, об-

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разованных по региональным и идеологическим признакам. Области вокруг городов Худжанда и Куляба (прокоммунистические цитадели) всегда конкурировали между собой, и представляли их Набиев (от Худжанда) и нынешний президент Эмомали Рахмонов (от Куляба) 66. Основной опорой исламистов был район Курган-Тюбе, а оплотом демократов — Душанбе. Набиев был вынужден уйти в отставку в мае 1992 г., было сформировано коалиционное правительство во главе с Акбаршо Искандеровым (Худжанд), до этого председателем парламента. Страна была охвачена борьбой до тех пор, пока правительство Искандерова в ноябре 1992 г. не было свергнуто при поддержке российских войск, базировавшихся в Таджикистане 67. В то время к власти пришел Эмомали Рахмонов, в советские времена председатель колхоза, и стал постепенно расширять размер подвластной ему территории. Рахмонов был избран президентом в 1994 г. в ходе процедуры, которую большинство сторонних наблюдателей сочло неадекватной, и воспринимается основной массой таджиков (и в особенности теми, кто боролся с ним) как лидер группировки, для которого интересы его родного Куляба выше интересов государства. Поэтому разделение власти, предусмотренное соглашением о национальном примирении, было чрезвычайно важным, и в правительство были включены представители других группировок, в том числе нескольких членов исламистских групп, входивших в состав Объединенной таджикской оппозиции (ОТО) 68. Но предприниматели из Худжанда, ориентирующиеся на Ташкент и в советское время игравшие в республике очень большую роль, по-прежнему отторгались, и это еще больше разделяло узбекское правительство Ислама Каримова и правительство Эмомали Рахмонова. Включение исламистов в таджикское правительство заставило нервничать лидеров Узбекистана, Киргизии и Казахстана почти так же сильно, как присутствие вооруженных исламистов в горах Таджикистана. Правящая элита региона полагала, что между группами исламистов все еще существуют сильные связи и они будут угрожать существующим режимам, координируя внутренние и внешние операции. И когда действия Исламского движения Узбекистана стали более опасными, руководители соседних государств сочли ответ-

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ственным за это таджикское правительство. Боевики ИДУ в 1999 и 2000 гг. вторгались в Баткенскую область Киргизии через горы из Таджикистана 69. Весной и летом 2000 г. они также проникали в горные районы Сурхандарьинской области через таджикскую границу в южной части Узбекистана и вели в самых отдаленных районах бои с правительственными силами почти шесть недель 70. Накануне начала военной кампании США в Афганистане правительство Рахмонова контролировало далеко не всю территорию страны, и именно поэтому боевики ИДУ могли находить убежище в Таджикистане и проходить через его территорию. В 1998 г., в частности, под нажимом Каримова правительство Рахмонова усилило давление на ИДУ, чтобы вынудить его ликвидировать свой оперативный центр в Тавилдарском районе Таджикистана. В 1999 и 2000 гг., используя средства, полученные от «аль-Каиды», ИДУ создало новые лагеря вблизи Балха и Мазари-Шарифа в Афганистане. Боевики и жившие с ними члены их семей (в целом несколько тысяч человек) прибыли туда главным образом из Узбекистана, но среди них были и представители других наций и этнических групп Центральной Азии, и многие члены ИДУ в ходе гражданской войны в Таджикистане сражались вместе с исламскими силами ОТО 71. Хотя лидеры Центральной Азии преувеличивали масштаб и актуальность угрозы, которую представляло ИДУ для безопасности региона, тем не менее в последние годы правления талибов в Афганистане эта угроза все же нарастала, если принять во внимание обучение и оснащение боевиков в афганских лагерях.

Узбекистан: страх в самом сердце Центральной Азии Как и в других странах Центральной Азии, правительство Узбекистана несет на себе заметный отпечаток личности своего первого и пока единственного президента. Родившийся в Самарканде, столице империи Тамерлана (тюрко-монгольского завоевателя XIV столетия, которого называют также Тимуром) и центре таджикских и узбекских традиций, Ислам Каримов представлял себе Узбекистан как центр культуры и цивилизации Центральной Азии. Он полагал, что под его руководством страна будет осу-

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ществлять свое историческое предназначение и возглавлять регион. Его понимание этой миссии было настолько ясным, что он не видел никаких причин добиваться общественного или международного одобрения своих замыслов. Каримова часто сравнивают с президентом Туркмении Ниязовым, но это сравнение некорректно. Каримов — сильная и деспотичная личность, но он не всевластен. Ключевые советники и региональные лидеры ограничивают его власть и берут на себя значительную долю административной ответственности. Наконец, в отличие от Ниязова, он не создал культ своей личности. Национальным героем Каримов сделал не себя, а Тимура. На главной площади Ташкента, столицы Узбекистана, высится огромная статуя Тимура, здесь же расположен большой музей с выставками, подробно разъясняющими его философию сильного, но просвещенного правления. Причины возвеличивания Каримовым Тимура во многом спорны. Очевидно, одна из его целей состояла в том, чтобы, опираясь на исторический прецедент, оправдать решение создать авторитарную политическую систему. Узбекские официальные лица объясняют, что культ Тимура способствует освобождению узбеков от советских версий их истории (с доминированием русских) и показывает, что независимость Узбекистана — это восстановление его государственности, а не случайное и временное историческое отклонение. Но соседи Узбекистана расценивают это иначе — как нарастающую угрозу узбекской гегемонии. Каримов не смог точно предсказать распад Советского Союза, однако он, как и почти вся узбекская правящая элита, считал, что обретение Узбекистаном независимости — позитивное направление развития, кроме того, оно дает возможность свести некоторые исторические счеты, особенно с русскими. Но хотя Каримов резко осуждал решения советской эпохи, нарушавшие нормальное развитие экономики его страны и наносившие ущерб окружающей среде, его мировоззрение формировалось в процессе советского обучения и под влиянием накопленного в то время опыта. Он обещал разработать модель политического и экономического развития, максимально соответствующую специфическим национальным потребностям узбеков, но создаваемая в Узбекистане экономическая и политическая система мало отличается от прежней за исключением того, что правящей элите не хватает идеологической

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и организационной структуры Коммунистической партии, чтобы узаконить свое правление. Каримов остался твердым сторонником командно-административного метода управления экономикой, и его привлекали модели экономических реформ в китайском стиле, когда некоторая часть экономики освобождается, но значительно бóльшая ее часть остается под жестким государственным контролем. Каримов полагал, что система поддержки и субсидирования цен советского типа могла бы сохраниться, если два главных товара, приносящих Узбекистану основные доходы от экспорта, хлопок и золото, останутся под государственным контролем. Это, как он считал, обеспечит сохранение социальной и политической стабильности, особенно если ответственность будет возложена на традиционные местные институты, такие как махалля 72. Экономическая стратегия Каримова была логическим дополнением его политической программы. В последние годы советского правления Узбекистан начинал формировать культуру участия населения в политике с двумя продемократическими политическими партиями — «Бирлик» («Единство») и «Эрк» («Свобода»), основатель которых, известный поэт Мухаммад Салих, был соперником Каримова на президентских выборах 1991 г. Кроме того, активно шло возрождение ислама, стимулом для которого, в частности, стало назначение молодого и динамичного муфтия Мухаммад-Содыка Мухаммад-Юсуфа главой религиозного истеблишмента страны. Коммунистическая элита в своих взглядах на мир также становилась гораздо менее монолитной, и многие деятели из числа реформистов хотели бы видеть руководителем страны тогдашнего вице-президента Шукрулло Мирсаидова, а не более жесткого и авторитарного Каримова 73. Опасаясь, что ему не хватит популярности, Каримов начал принимать меры против конкурентов. В начале 1992 г. Мирсаидов был освобожден от должности, и вскоре после этого лидерам «Бирлика» и «Эрка» пришлось выбирать — отправиться в изгнание или подвергнуться открытому преследованию 74. С тех пор легальными политическими партиями являются только те, что созданы властями. Опасения узбекского правительства в отношении возможности мощного народного восстания усилила гражданская война в Таджи-

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кистане, которая вообще послужила для всего региона оправданием намеренного замедления демократизации. Многие узбеки принимали такую политику, боясь кровавых столкновений, которые происходили в соседнем Таджикистане или, того хуже, в Афганистане. Оказалось, что сдерживать исламское возрождение в стране труднее, нежели светскую оппозицию. Мухаммад-Юсуф был отстранен от должности в ноябре 1992 г., но опорой для радикальных групп исламистов с центрами в Андижане и Намангане по-прежнему оставались тысячи молодых безработных в Ферганской долине, где плотность населения очень высока. В эти годы появилось несколько харизматических исламских лидеров-проповедников, прошедших азы обучения в подпольных школах 1970-х годов, а затем в более свободных условиях конца советской эпохи путешествовавших и обучавшихся в других мусульманских странах 75. И несмотря на то что к середине 1990-х годов самые видные из них были арестованы или изгнаны за границу, идеи радикального ислама продолжали распространяться и в отсутствие шумно приветствовавшихся народом религиозных лидеров 76. Хотя узбекское правительство охотилось за лидерами радикальных исламистов уже с середины 1990-х годов, после взрывов в Ташкенте в феврале 1999 г. оно стало действовать еще жестче 77. Не ограничиваясь лишь теми, кто причислял себя к ИДУ, режим Каримова задался целью уничтожить и реальную, и потенциальную религиозную оппозицию. В течение двух лет было арестовано более 7 тыс. «религиозных экстремистов», к которым причисляли и людей, действительно связанных с подрывными группами, и просто набожных мусульман, и даже тех, кто с виду казался набожным, например, бородатых мужчин или чересчур скромно одетых женщин 78. Численность «Хизб ат-Тахрир», самой большой исламской радикальной группы в Узбекистане, в середине и конце 1990-х годов резко возросла 79. Во всех государствах региона «Хизб ат-Тахрир» объявлена вне закона, хотя руководство партии утверждает, что ее претензии на создание нового халифата подразумевают мирное развитие событий — возвращение мусульман к истинной вере. После массовых арестов сторонники этого движения в Узбекистане ушли в подполье, и ячейки «Хизб ат-Тахрир» начали быстро возникать за пределами страны.

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Взрывы в Ташкенте укрепили намерение узбекского правительства четко определить и защищать рубежи государства. Началось минирование некоторых участков границы с Таджикистаном и Киргизией, чтобы затруднить проникновение в страну боевиков ИДУ 80. ИДУ это не остановило, но сильно пострадали простые люди: на минах подрывались местные крестьяне и их скот, и приграничная торговля была в значительной степени разрушена 81. Введение новых требований в отношении виз также резко ограничило контакты между друзьями и родственниками, живущими по разные стороны границы. На самом деле въездные визы в 1999 г. первой ввела Туркмения, причем эти требования касались всех иностранцев включая граждан СНГ. Но решение Узбекистана о введении визового режима для граждан соседних стран, принятое в том же году, но несколько позже, создало еще более серьезные трудности для огромного числа людей, привыкших добираться из одной точки Таджикистана (а также из Киргизии и Казахстана) в другую через территорию Узбекистана. Исключение было сделано только для жителей приграничных районов, но и они могли попасть в Узбекистан только через специальные пункты безвизового въезда. Международная обстановка, в которой оказался Узбекистан, усилила его экономический консерватизм, поскольку правительство испугалось возникновения ситуации, при которой под угрозу так или иначе будет поставлена безопасность людей или оно не сможет выполнять свои социальные обязательства. Политика поддержания цен в Узбекистане осуществлялась еще долго после того, как от нее отказались Казахстан и Киргизия, и введенные в связи с ней ограничения торговли подавляли в стране предпринимательскую деятельность, а после того как в начале 1999 г. Узбекистан закрыл границы, она вообще практически сошла на нет 82. Трудно определить, какую цену заплатил Узбекистан за решения Ислама Каримова в сфере экономики. Сторонники его режима ссылаются на данные официальной статистики, демонстрирующие рост ВНП Узбекистана в 1992—2001 гг.83 Но эти оптимистические данные в значительной мере объясняются прибыльностью золота и хлопка — двух важнейших товаров, принадлежащих государству и экспортируемых им, и не отражают реальный рост экономики Узбекистана в целом. Точность данных, представляемых

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государственными статистическими службами, также вызывает сомнения. Кроме того, Узбекистан по-прежнему остается в сильнейшей зависимости от «хлопковой экономики» и ее превратностей, но об этом речь пойдет ниже, в главе 4 84. При всех публичных восхвалениях Каримова в конфиденциальных беседах даже его ближайшие сторонники признавали, что к десятой годовщине независимости Узбекистан подошел в состоянии экономического кризиса. Одновременное существование нескольких разных обменных курсов сома (национальной валюты Узбекистана) сильно тормозило экономическую диверсификацию, в которой страна остро нуждалась. Частное предпринимательство развивалось очень медленно, что просто отдает трагической иронией, если вспомнить, насколько активны были узбекские предприниматели в рамках теневой экономики советского периода. Как следует из приведенного обзора, первое десятилетие независимости государств Центральной Азии усилило их дифференциацию, причем в экономическом отношении больше, нежели в политическом. Ни в одной из стран за это время не создана демократическая политическая система. Однако два государства — Казахстан и Киргизия — приняли на себя серьезные обязательства в отношении макроэкономических реформ, которые должны были обеспечить им выход из экономического хаоса, воцарившегося во всех постсоветских государствах после распада СССР и его единой экономической системы. Хотя в краткосрочном плане эта стратегия, возможно, усилила социальные неурядицы, но благодаря ей обеим странам удалось создать экономику, в которой частная собственность уже играет значительную роль. Лидеры Таджикистана, которые тоже выступали за проведение макроэкономических реформ, потеряли критически важные пять лет из-за гражданской войны, в то время как Узбекистан и Туркмения стремились минимизировать социальные проблемы, в значительной степени в ущерб долгосрочным перспективам развития частного сектора. Из-за связей, сформировавшихся еще в советскую эпоху, хотя они и стали намного слабее, экономика этих стран по-прежнему оставалась уязвимой. На восстановление экономики всех пяти стран повлиял финансовый кризис 1998 г. в России (в разной степени, но везде негативно), который укрепил уже существовавшие тенденции к достижению поставленных целей

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либо за счет более широкой внешней ориентации, либо, наоборот, путем концентрации на внутренних проблемах. Каждая из стран региона строит свою политику, не оглядываясь на соседей, но на каждой из них неизбежно сказываются решения, принятые в соседних государствах, поскольку все они зависят одна от другой и географически, и в плане управления совместно используемыми ресурсами. Поэтому принимаемые ими геополитические решения, как минимум, не менее важны, чем решения экономические и политические. Анализ международных связей этих государств приводится в следующей главе.

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Глава 3 Геополитика в Центральной Азии до 11 сентября

Г симыми, и международное сообщество никогда не представляосударства Центральной Азии не ожидали, что станут незави-

ло их себе в этом качестве. Неудивительно поэтому, что в течение десятилетия после распада СССР отношения между этими странами и их более мощными соседям носили экспериментальный характер. В связи с шумихой, поднявшейся относительно огромного потенциала Центральной Азии и Каспийского региона, значительная часть международного сообщества в 1990-х годах долго пыталась определить уровень приоритетности отношений с этими новыми государствами. В свою очередь, сами они не могли выстроить приоритеты относительно предложений, поступавших из-за границы в ответ на призывы о сотрудничестве. Для принятия решений требовались сложные расчеты, поскольку нужно было учитывать потенциальные экономические преимущества и рост общих потребностей в сфере безопасности. Хотя члены мирового сообщества употребляли общий термин «политика в Центральной Азии», как правило, политика их была дифференцирована: они предпочитали сотрудничать со странами, богатыми энергетическими ресурсами 1. И даже государствам, для которых Центральная Азия всегда была приоритетным регионом по географическим и/или историческим причинам (речь идет о России, Китае, Турции и Иране, переживавших не лучшие времена), приходилось решать, во что им обойдется соблюдение своих интересов и в каких странах это лучше делать. 67

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Политики России считали Центральную Азию важнейшим стратегическим регионом. Обретение независимости этими странами, особенно Казахстаном (с учетом протяженности российско-казахстанской границы и значительной доли русского населения в Казахстане), было для Москвы чем-то подобным ампутации руки. Содружество Независимых Государств не смогло cтать эффективным механизмом продвижения российских интересов, а усилия по развитию асимметричных двусторонних отношений с каждой из этих стран также не привели к достижению поставленных целей. Государства Центральной Азии, конечно, опасались гегемонии России, но еще больше их беспокоили долгосрочные намерения Китая ввиду его потенциальной мощи и видимой легкости экспансии в регионе. Они одновременно и страшились успеха экономической реформы в Китае, и хотели учиться у него. На протяжении десяти лет после распада СССР Китай стремился реализовать свои интересы в этом потенциально очень важном пограничном регионе. Пекинские власти старались действовать таким образом, чтобы не выталкивать оттуда Россию, а просто заполнять образующиеся пустоты. Соединенные Штаты в регионе более всего привлекали нефтяные и газовые ресурсы Каспия, в которых были активно заинтересованы также Россия и Иран. Оценки подтвержденных запасов сырой нефти в зоне Каспийского моря колеблются в очень широких пределах. В частности, по оценкам Управления энергетической информации при правительстве США, подтвержденные запасы нефти в Каспийском регионе составляют от 17 до 33 млрд баррелей (заметим, что меньшее из этих значений примерно соответствует запасам члена Организации стран — экспортеров нефти (ОПЕК) Катара, а большее — запасам нефти в США). До 11 сентября Вашингтон не спешил переходить от риторического участия в делах региона к стратегическому, потому что американские политики затруднялись с оценкой его относительной стратегической важности. Турция и Иран увидели в независимости этих государств возможность реализации своих исторических миссий (не совпадающих друг с другом), но в отличие от Соединенных Штатов для эффективной реализации своих национальных интересов в Центральной Азии им недоставало ресурсов. При этом у Турции было

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больше шансов добиться влияния, потому что Вашингтон подумывал о том, чтобы уступить Турции свою роль в регионе. Но эта стратегия постепенно теряла привлекательность по мере того, как американские политики осознавали, что разыграть «турецкую карту» будет непросто и из-за внутренних проблем Турции, и из-за двойственного отношения к государственным и негосударственным турецким деятелям, которое демонстрировали лидеры Центральной Азии. Многие другие государства также вели активную дипломатию в регионе, часто рука об руку с потенциальными инвесторами из своих стран. Какое-то время Соединенные Штаты рассматривали Израиль в качестве возможного «заместителя» в регионе. От этой идеи быстро отказались, но израильтяне сами обеспечили себе заметное присутствие, так как бывшие советские евреи, в свое время эмигрировавшие из этих республик, стали теперь важным источником инвестиций. Интересовались регионом и корейские бизнесмены, отчасти потому, что там до сих пор живут потомки корейцев, высланных в 1930-х годах Иосифом Сталиным 2. В частности, в первые годы независимости Казахстана и Узбекистана корейцы стали в этих странах важным источником капитала и экономических ноу-хау. Япония тоже быстро заинтересовалась возможностями инвестирования в регион, и ее правительство планировало оказать помощь Киргизии. Некоторое время регион также изучали потенциальные инвесторы из Сингапура. Все пять государств Центральной Азии как преемники СССР были приняты в ОБСЕ. Хотя лидеры основных европейских государств ощущали, что эти страны стремятся приобрести в глазах Европы определенный экономический вес, они не ставили цели максимизировать свое прямое участие в экономике Центральной Азии (помимо энергетического сектора). В целом их гораздо больше беспокоило воздействие краха коммунизма на ближайших соседей, т. е. возрождение стран Центральной Европы и крушение Югославии, нежели события в Центральной Азии, хотя они принимали лидеров региона с большой торжественностью и всеми необходимыми церемониями. Благодаря интересу со стороны других государств и международных организаций перед руководителями стран Центральной

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Азии открылись широкие возможности, но вместе с тем возникла и необходимость делать выбор, иногда мучительный. После десятилетий, проведенных за железным занавесом, каждый из президентов стремился учредить дипломатические миссии, обеспечить своей стране уникальную роль на международной арене — и укрепить свою власть. Аскар Акаев обещал превратить Киргизию в «Швейцарию Центральной Азии», Нурсултан Назарбаев заявлял, что Казахстан станет мостом между Европой и Азией, Сапармурат Ниязов пытался придать Туркмении новый международный статус, а Ислам Каримов стремился сделать Узбекистан ценным военным партнером Запада. Весьма ограниченный выбор был только у Эмомали Рахмонова — из-за гражданской войны в Таджикистане и ее последствий. Кроме того, каждый центральноазиатский лидер полагал, что расширение международных связей сделает его первым среди равных в регионе.

Россия: неоимпериализм вместо империализма?

Неудачные попытки России обеспечить господство через многосторонние организации Поначалу главной проблемой внешней политики для всех государств Центральной Азии стало урегулирование отношений с Россией. В первые годы независимости руководители этих стран боялись, что Москва станет посредником между ними и остальной частью международного сообщества. Президент России Борис Ельцин быстро заявил, что Россия является преемницей Советского Союза и даже наглядно продемонстрировал это, заняв кремлевский офис Михаила Горбачева. Подобно тому как контроль над Кремлем определял контроль над Россией, доминирование России на огромных территориях, которые когдато входили в состав Российской империи, имело критически важное значение для сохранения статуса России как великой державы. И мирный роспуск СССР стал частью цены, которую новые лидеры России заплатили за то, чтобы взять под контроль Кремль. Стремясь максимизировать ценность своей победы, Ельцин и другие высшие руководители России пытались найти механизм,

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который позволил бы Москве легко управлять бывшими советскими республиками. Даже наиболее прозападные либералы в московской верхушке, такие как министр иностранных дел Андрей Козырев, полагали, что национальные интересы России должны превалировать над стремлением ее новых соседей формировать и проводить собственную внутреннюю и внешнюю политику 3. Первоначально ожидалось, что СНГ послужит именно этой цели 4. Образование СНГ было механизмом роспуска СССР и трансформации единой страны в двенадцать отдельных государств (три прибалтийских республики стали юридически независимыми в сентябре 1991 г.). Но руководство России надеялось превратить СНГ в нечто большее. Оно настаивало на создании множества координирующих органов, в которых Россия должна была иметь большой вес за счет пропорционального голосования, чтобы гарантировать себе контроль над ключевыми секторами экономики всех стран-членов и официально оформить свое участие в разработке ими стратегий привлечения и использования иностранных инвестиций. Националисты, возглавившие Азербайджан, Грузию и Молдавию, отказались войти в СНГ из-за опасений, что эта организация превратится в инструмент российского неоимпериализма. Деятели коммунистической эпохи, пришедшие к власти в республиках Центральной Азии, беспокоились об этом гораздо меньше. Эти люди восприняли независимость без особого энтузиазма, в частности из-за масштабов связанных с нею проблем, и различные руководящие органы СНГ обеспечили им возможность использования в этот переходный период знакомой с советских времен коллегиальной формы принятия решений. В отличие от менее опытных азербайджанских и грузинских коллег, пришедших к власти прямо из политической оппозиции, стойкие партийные деятели в Центральной Азии понимали, что прямая конфронтация — не лучший способ противостоять российским амбициям 5. Им также казалось очевидным, что для достижения своих целей руководство России будет использовать грубую силу, пусть и в замаскированном виде. События в Приднестровье (Молдавия), Абхазии (Грузия) и Карабахе (Азербайджан) наглядно продемонстрировали, что происходит с теми, кто отворачивается от СНГ. К началу 1994 г. и Молдавия, и Грузия, и Азербайджан стали полноправными членами содружества, отчасти для того, что-

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бы прекратить этнические и гражданские войны, развязыванию которых способствовал их отказ от членства в СНГ 6. Но СНГ так никогда и не стало эффективным инструментом российского господства, потому что главы стран-участниц в большинстве своем активно сопротивлялись передаче большей или меньшей доли национального суверенитета многосторонней организации, в которой доминировала Россия. Непреклонными в этом отношении были руководители Украины, а также президент Грузии в 1993—2003 гг. Эдуард Шеварднадзе и президент Азербайджана в 1995—2003 гг. Гейдар Алиев, крупные деятели с огромным опытом работы в советскую эпоху. Этой же позиции строго придерживались президенты Туркмении и Узбекистана. Кремлевское руководство, со своей стороны, не желало всерьез рассматривать структурные изменения СНГ, превращавшие его в союз равных партнеров. Самым заметным действием в этом отношении стала кампания президента Казахстана Нурсултана Назарбаева в 1994 г. по замене СНГ Евразийским союзом (ЕАС), который должен был функционировать во многом так же, как Европейский союз 7. Со временем администрации Ельцина надоело прилагать усилия для оживления СНГ. К середине 1990-х годов в Кремле осознали, что собственные проблемы России в переходный период оказались намного сложнее, чем первоначально ожидалось, и не существует простого решения, позволяющего использовать ресурсы бывших советских республик в интересах России. Однако это не означало отказ Москвы от СНГ: встречи президентов стран содружества проходили регулярно, по крайней мере пока здоровье позволяло Ельцину в них участвовать. Более того, российскому магнату Борису Березовскому (занимавшему пост исполнительного секретаря СНГ в течение короткого периода с апреля 1998 г. по март 1999 г.) было дано задание возродить эту по всей видимости умирающую организацию. Владимир Путин, став президентом России, снова попытался использовать встречи на высшем уровне, чтобы вдохнуть в нее жизнь, но успеха не добился. К концу 2001 г. СНГ стало просто бюрократической оболочкой, обеспечивавшей синекуры представителям российской элиты, не способным подняться выше по общественной лестнице в условиях конкуренции.

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Но Кремль не отказывался от процесса «интеграции», как любили называть это в Москве, и изучал возможности создания других многосторонних организаций с меньшим числом более заинтересованных партнеров. Самой нетерпеливой была Белоруссия, в 1996 г. подписавшая соглашение, в котором провозглашалась цель полной интеграции с Россией, в то время как значительная часть московской элиты стремилась оттянуть это объединение на неопределенный срок. Существовал также таможенный союз пяти государств, в который первоначально, в 1995 г., вошли Россия, Белоруссия, Казахстан и Киргизия, а в 1999 г. к ним присоединился Таджикистан. Однако этот союз не делал практически ничего для регулирования торговли и тарифов между странами-участницами 8. Нехватка жизненных сил в этом объединении отчасти объяснялась влиянием многосторонних финансовых организаций, которые стремились сделать экономики этих стран независимыми от России, предлагая им финансовую помощь на определенных условиях. Казахстан, Киргизия и Таджикистан оставались также членами Организации договора о коллективной безопасности (ОДКБ) наряду с Россией, Арменией и Белоруссией. Этот договор сначала назывался Ташкентским договором о коллективной безопасности, но был переименован в 1999 г. после выхода из него Узбекистана. ОДКБ была скорее механизмом развода, нежели институтом, способным обеспечить оборонные потребности стран-участниц. К концу 1990-х годов государства региона уже не считали, что Россия способна сделать что-то существенное, чтобы помочь им обеспечить потребности в сфере безопасности, поскольку она (и это было важнее всего) не смогла предотвратить победу «Талибана» в Афганистане. В самом деле, Россия поставляла оружие нескольким командирам Северного альянса через Центральную Азию, но это лишь слегка замедлило продвижение талибов 9. Мало что могла сделать увязшая в чеченском болоте Россия и для того, чтобы помочь этим государствам в решении проблем внутренней безопасности. Когда Киргизия обратилась к России с просьбой о военной помощи для отражения нападений боевиков ИДУ в 1999 и 2000 гг., российское руководство отказало ей, указав на необходимость увеличения роли ОДКБ в укрепления общей безопасности в регионе. Для этого в мае 2001 г. было созданы

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силы быстрого развертывания численностью 1500 человек, которые проводили в регионе полевые учения, но никогда не были развернуты полностью. Ни одна из организаций, созданных Москвой, не достигла поставленных целей, которые состояли в обеспечении возможности использовать потенциал государств, образовавшихся при распаде СССР, для удовлетворения потребностей России. Эти организации мало что смогли сделать и для того, чтобы помочь государствам Центральной Азии справиться с собственными проблемами. Однако они все же способствовали в решении одной очень серьезной проблемы: благодаря наличию общего форума для руководителей государств СНГ, объединенных в различные группы, распад Советского Союза прошел более гладко, чем ожидали многие в Центральной Азии.

Другие механизмы контроля, доступные России В распоряжении российского руководства было также много неформальных рычагов, которые можно было использовать для давления на новых независимых соседей. Поскольку советская экономика была по-настоящему единым и цельным организмом, все постсоветские государства были связаны с Россией экономически. Кроме того, в каждом из этих государств оставалась довольно большая доля русского населения, судьба которого тоже могла стать предметом торговли с целью получения важных уступок (в пользу Москвы). Нуждались во внимании и общие границы. Таджикистан, Узбекистан и Киргизия не имеют границы с Россией, а граница между Россией и Туркменией проходит по Каспийскому морю. Эффективным инструментом российского влияния в этом регионе были и остаются поставки энергоносителей. В первые годы независимости Россия использовала свое положение поставщика энергии для получения уступок от многих новых независимых государств, особенно от Казахстана, который в этом отношении почти полностью зависит от России, поскольку поставки электричества из России обеспечивают потребности Северного Казахстана, а нужды Казахстана в нефти и газе вообще почти целиком покры-

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ваются поставками из России. В конечном счете Казахстан передал часть акций некоторых своих гидроэлектростанций РАО ЕЭС (общенациональной энергосети России, частично принадлежащей государству) в обмен на списание долгов и обещание постепенного перехода к рыночным отношениям в энергетическом секторе. Но в первые годы независимости Казахстану часто приходилось делать Москве нежелательные для него уступки из-за больших долгов, связанных с поставками российских энергоносителей 10. В наследство от СССР России досталась вся система нефтяных и газовых трубопроводов, проходящих по ее территории, и она использовала этот фактор, чтобы добиться уступок от Казахстана, Туркмении и Азербайджана, хотя это и не всегда приносило ожидаемый эффект. Россия (в лице государственной компании «Транснефть», занимающейся эксплуатацией всех этих трубопроводов) вела жесткие переговоры с Каспийским трубопроводным консорциумом о транспортировке нефти с месторождения Тенгиз в Казахстане к российскому порту Новороссийску. Эти действия России подтверждали опасения бывших рыцарей «холодной войны» из Вашингтона и убеждали американских политиков в том, что как можно бóльшая часть каспийской нефти должна поступать на рынки по маршрутам, идущим в обход России. Российская газовая промышленность активно пыталась сохранить контроль над газовым сектором Туркмении, для чего в 1995 г. была создана компания «Туркменросгаз»11. Однако президент Ниязов быстро разочаровался в условиях соглашения с Россией о транзите и продаже туркменского газа и уволил должностных лиц, убедивших его согласиться на эту сделку, решив, что они больше пекутся об интересах российской газовой отрасли, чем о нуждах нового туркменского государства 12. После неудачи с «Туркменросгазом» «Газпром» использовал свой контроль над системой газопроводов, чтобы изолировать туркменский газ от европейского рынка и поставлять его неаккуратным плательщикам из СНГ, таким как Украина и Грузия 13. Ссылаясь на трудности получения оплаты, Москва предложила Ашхабаду бартерную сделку и низкую цену при условии покупки газа на границе Туркмении и не захотела смягчить условия даже тогда, когда в 1997 г. туркменская сторона отказалась от дальнейших переговоров. Поскольку в случае с туркменским газом ника-

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кого иностранного партнера, способного заменить Россию, не было, в 1992—1998 гг. добыча газа в республике упала на три четверти, потому что Ашхабад не смог обеспечить его транспортировку к потенциальным рынкам 14. Эти два случая наглядно демонстрируют весьма агрессивное поведение России в регионе. Между тем у российских военных были свои представления о том, какую политику должна вести их страна в Центральной Азии. Российское руководство практически не оставило выбора Таджикистану в отношении длительного присутствия на его территории 201-й российской мотострелковой дивизии, которую Москва отказалась передать Душанбе или вывести из страны, несмотря на неоднократные утверждения, что российские офицеры поощряют торговлю наркотиками и что эта дивизия все равно в значительной степени состоит из местных жителей, служащих по контракту 15. Россия также сохранила там своих пограничников, охраняющих таджикско-афганскую границу (даже после того, как она начала передавать весь комплекс функций по охране границ местным властям в других центральноазиатских странах), оправдывая свое длительное военное присутствие нуждами собственной безопасности 16. К ограниченному военному присутствию России в Центральной Азии весьма одобрительно относятся не только профессиональные военные, но и простые россияне. В частности, у российских националистов тоже есть твердые представления о том, как Россия должна вести себя в Центральной Азии, и они создали довольно шумное лобби в Государственной думе 17. Они отслеживают и регистрируют проблемы, с которыми сталкиваются этнические русские в этих государствах. Сюда включается все — и бедствия пенсионеров из числа этнических русских (которые составляют основную часть русского населения, оставшегося в Таджикистане после гражданской войны), и мытарства более молодых русских, пытающихся приспособиться к своему недавно обретенному статусу представителей этнического меньшинства. Эти беды представлялись таким жутким образом, что узбекские, казахские и туркменские государственные регулятивные органы начали сокращать эфирное время, отводившееся российским телевизионным каналам, чтобы не допустить дополнительного разжигания страстей среди местных русских.

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В начале 1990-х годов российское правительство интенсивно, но безуспешно пыталось добиться права двойного гражданства для этнических русских, живущих во всех постсоветских государствах. Русские из Центральной Азии имели право на получение российского гражданства, но если они выходили из местного гражданства, то теряли свою долю имущества при приватизации, поскольку в данном случае владение было связано с местопребыванием. Только правительство Туркмении согласилось с идеей двойного гражданства, что и было зафиксировано в соглашении, подписанном в 1993 г. сроком на десять лет. Не принесли успеха также попытки российского правительства заставить страны Центральной Азии предоставить русскому языку тот же юридический статус, который имели национальные языки. В конечном счете в 2001 г. на это согласилось лишь правительство Киргизии, а казахи наделили русский язык хотя и более низким по сравнению с казахским языком, но все же специальным статусом — языка межнационального общения (однако в 2004 г. роль русского языка там заметно уменьшилась). Остальные три государства по-прежнему обеспечивали возможности обучения на русском языке, но при этом финансирование резко сокращалось, а свободное владение национальным языком стало обязательным для желающих сделать карьеру в политике или экономике. В целом, если не принимать во внимание публичные выражения недовольства, Россия оставила местных этнических русских на произвол судьбы в расчете на то, что положение как-то выправится само собой за счет взаимопомощи семей. Миллионы русских покинули регион, и почти все уехали в Россию 18. В абсолютных цифрах больше всего потерял Казахстан: оттуда в 1992—2000 гг. уехали 1,5 млн человек. Трудно определить число русских (и не только русских), которые остались в Центральной Азии, смогли тем или иным способом раздобыть российский паспорт и вопреки местным законам фактически обрести двойное гражданство. Когда граждан России арестовывали по политическим мотивам, как это было в 1999 г. в Усть-Каменогорске (Казахстан), где их обвинили в сепаратизме, Москва ограничивалась слабыми протестами 19. Продвижение России к рыночной экономике побуждало ее более реалистично смотреть на отношения с бывшими советскими республиками. С начала 1990-х годов такие реформаторы, как Егор

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Гайдар и Анатолий Чубайс, пытались убедить руководство России освободиться от тяжелой экономической обузы, «отрезав» эти государства от России. Первоначально Москва попробовала удержать всех членов СНГ в рублевой зоне, чтобы сохранить возможность управлять их экономиками. Но в июле 1993 г. Россия резко ограничила поставку рублей в эти страны, хотя они еще оставались в рублевой зоне 20. Причина состояла в том, что российские реформаторы гораздо больше заботились о сдерживании инфляции, чем о достижении эфемерных неоимпериалистических целей, и это решение ускорило отделение российской экономики от экономик бывших советских республик. Даже в такой сфере, как разработка нефтяных и газовых ресурсов Каспия, где российское правительство и российские фирмы настойчиво пытались сохранить свои позиции, им пришлось отойти на второй план перед более мощными американскими и другими западными компаниями. Россия надеялась усилить свое влияние за счет разделения Каспийского моря на национальные сектора, предусмотрев возможность их совместного развития, чтобы компенсировать свои потери и потери Ирана, так как у обеих стран нет крупных неиспользуемых подводных месторождений в пределах национальных границ (при их строгом соблюдении). Первоначально Россия и Иран предложили, чтобы все прикаспийские страны получили одинаковые доли — по 20%. Однако если бы воды Каспия делились в соответствии с побережьем каждой страны, то Казахстан получил бы 33%, Россия — 19%, Азербайджан — 18%, Туркмения — 17% и Иран — 13%. Не желая дожидаться, пока водные границы будут определены формально, Казахстан, Азербайджан и Туркмения начали искать инвесторов, чтобы вести работы в акваториях, которые они объявили своими национальными секторами 21. Россия избрала сугубо прагматический подход к этим событиям и начала работы в собственном национальном секторе. Она также достигла соглашений относительно условий демаркации границ с Азербайджаном и Казахстаном; определенный прогресс достигнут на переговорах о заключении подобного соглашения с Туркменией 22. В отличие от националистов, интеллектуалов и политконсультантов, утверждающих, что судьба России неразрывно связана с

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ее бывшими колониями, руководители России постепенно осознавали, что они не в состоянии проводить политику, основанную на представлениях о грядущей судьбе России. Формированию более прагматического подхода способствовали изменения в составе и характере российской властной верхушки. Борис Ельцин в конце своего президентства стал снисходительным и неэффективным руководителем. Относительный вакуум в высшем эшелоне российской власти оставлял лидерам Центральной Азии больше пространства для маневра в их отношениях с Москвой. Когда в 1999 г. к власти пришел Владимир Путин, в Центральной Азии ему противостояла группа руководителей, уверенных в своей способности представлять собственные национальные интересы. К тому времени каждый из них имел гораздо больший опыт дипломатии на высшем уровне, чем Путин. Он решил использовать это на благо России, завоевав расположение центральноазиатских коллег тем, что его встречи с каждым из них гораздо больше походили на общение равных, чем это было при Ельцине. И, как будет показано в главе 6, в конечном счете эта стратегия обеспечила России заметный выигрыш. При Путине Москва уже была готова признать, что ресурсы России ограниченны и что ей необходимо раз за разом делать трудный выбор, решая, где и как следует утверждать российское влияние. Многие из этих решений принимались на фоне войны в Чечне, казавшейся бесконечной, и это еще больше укрепило естественную склонность России считать события на Кавказе гораздо глубже связанными с интересами ее безопасности, чем то, что происходит в Центральной Азии.

Китай смотрит в будущее Имея общие границы с тремя из пяти государств Центральной Азии (Казахстаном, Киргизией и Таджикистаном), Китай проявил почти такой же интерес к независимости государств региона, как и Россия, хотя Пекин был гораздо меньше, чем Москва, готов к агрессивному утверждению своих национальных интересов. Китайские руководители признавали (по крайней мере на текущий момент), что центральноазиатские государства относятся к сфере

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влияния России, но при этом хотели обеспечить свои долгосрочные интересы в регионе и защиту от любых краткосрочных угроз, которые могли бы возникнуть в условиях вакуума власти. Поэтому китайские лидеры в общем не собирались вступать в конкурентные отношения с Россией, потому что сильная рука Москвы препятствовала бы образованию вакуума власти, которого китайцы серьезно опасались. Однако Китай напряженно следил за расширением экономического присутствия в регионе Соединенных Штатов и других западных стран, поскольку оно ограничивало возможности будущего влияния Китая на Центральную Азию. Высшие руководители Китая вскоре нанесли визиты в государства региона. В последние годы существования СССР руководители республик Центральной Азии наладили двусторонние отношения с региональными партнерами в Китае. После того как эти страны стали независимыми, Пекин быстро дал понять, что президентам недавно возникших суверенных государств подобает установить непосредственные связи с коллегами в Пекине. Им были переданы официальные приглашения, и президенты и министры иностранных дел стран Центральной Азии направились в столицу Китая, стремясь удовлетворить свое любопытство относительно природы экономического чуда, свершившегося в Китае 23. Премьер-министр Китая Ли Пэн в 1994 г. совершил большое турне по Центральной Азии, широко освещавшееся в средствах массовой информации, в ходе которого он за 12 дней посетил все пять стран региона и подписал много двусторонних соглашений 24. Поездка Ли Пэна должна была продемонстрировать, что Пекин относится к новым соседям с должным уважением, но все же она в большей степени была рекламной акцией, чем попыткой заложить основы тесного двустороннего сотрудничества 25. Однако с образованием новых независимых государств в Центральной Азии возникли новые угрозы для безопасности Китая, поскольку возросли претензии уйгуров и других живущих на самой границе тюркских мусульманских меньшинств на бóльшую автономию или даже независимость. Эти группы активизировались в 1980-х годах в результате развития этнической политики в СССР 26. В Казахстане и Киргизии группы уйгурских сепаратистов пользовались мощной поддержкой казахских и киргизских националистов. Но после первоначального всплеска активности в

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начале 1990-х годов власти Казахстана и Киргизии резко ограничили их деятельность в результате сильного нажима со стороны Китая. Китайское правительство заявило, что практически все организованные группы уйгуров — это либо действующие, либо потенциальные террористы. После серии взрывов в Китае в 1997 г. (как в Синьцзяне, так и за его пределами) правительства Центральной Азии начали соглашаться с китайскими требованиями. Группы изгнанников-уйгуров, базировавшиеся в Казахстане, были обвинены в трех взрывах в автобусах в г. Урумчи на западе Китая в феврале 1997 г., и ни один из лидеров Центральной Азии не хотел терпеть на своей территории вооруженные группы 27. Границы Казахстана и Киргизии с Китаем стали лучше охраняться, отчасти это было вызвано той легкостью, с которой уйгуры пробирались из Афганистана в Таджикистан и затем дальше на север. Положение несколько изменилось после успешной зимневесенней военной кампании «Талибана» в 1997 г., когда китайские власти ввели особый режим на границе с Афганистаном. Лидеры Центральной Азии серьезно отнеслись к утверждениям Китая о том, что уйгурские террористы проходили подготовку в лагерях, организованных Усамой бен Ладеном. Хотя многие западные источники тогда игнорировали эту информацию, журналисты, освещавшие американскую кампанию в Афганистане, нашли в разбомбленных и брошенных лагерях «аль-Каиды» документы на уйгурском языке, которые подтверждали факт пребывания уйгуров в этих лагерях, но не позволяли определить время их прибытия 28. К 1997 г., когда прогремели упомянутые взрывы, Китай уже мог продавливать свою позицию через Шанхайскую организацию сотрудничества (ШОС), созданную в 1996 г.29 Первоначально она должна была стать механизмом установления доверия по обе стороны бывшей китайско-советской границы. Пекин подверг сомнению законность этой границы еще в 1963 г., и хотя на переговорах в середине 1980-х годов был достигнут некоторый прогресс, в 1991 г., когда центральноазиатские государства унаследовали эту границу, формально она еще не была окончательно делимитирована. Соглашение между пятью государствами от апреля 1996 г. определило схему двусторонних переговоров относительно линии гра-

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ницы на еще не согласованных участках 30. Оно предусматривало также создание приграничных демилитаризованных зон, ширина которых, по мнению одних, должна была составлять 20 км, а по мнению других — 100 км. В них вводились строгие ограничения на размещение войск, а также на численность военнослужащих и техники, которые могли находиться там во время учений, и в апреле 1997 г. эти планы были реализованы. В 1998 г. был достигнут значительный прогресс на переговорах об определении линии казахстанско-китайской и киргизско-китайской границы. Совместное заявление, сделанное президентом Киргизии Акаевым и президентом Китая Цзян Цзэминем во время визита Акаева в Пекин в апреле 1998 г., ознаменовало начало периода интенсивных переговоров. В июле 1998 г. Казахстан и Китай также подписали соглашение о разделе 944 кв. км спорных пограничных территорий, причем почти 60% их осталось у Казахстана 31. Однако противники этого соглашения утверждают, что Китай получил самые ценные участки. В обоих случаях было ясно, что переговоры относительно границ проходили более сложно, чем громогласно объявлялось ранее. Формально линия казахстанско-китайской границы была в основном определена в 1999 г., но разграничение территорий Китая и Киргизии удалось завершить лишь в мае 2002 г.32 Как будет видно из главы 5, именно соглашение 2002 г. между Киргизией и Китаем сыграло решающую роль в политическом кризисе, приведшем к отставке президента Акаева, когда представители оппозиции обвинили его в том, что заключение этого соглашения было актом измены. Несмотря на принятые меры по установлению доверия, существование ШОС не привело к ослаблению давления Китая на страны Центральной Азии по поводу территориальных уступок. По утверждениям Азимбека Бекназарова и комиссии других киргизских законодателей, анализировавших эти уступки 33, Акаев передал Китаю 125 тыс. гектаров земли сверх тех территорий, о которых шли переговоры в советский период 34. Кроме того, в 2003 г. некоторые территории были переданы Таджикистану. Территориальные уступки, сделанные Киргизией и Казахстаном Китаю, стали признанием потенциала Китая как главной силы в регионе. Лидеры обеих стран пробовали также снискать расположе-

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ние Пекина более тонкими способами. Министры иностранных дел Казахстана и Киргизии говорили по-китайски, а послы этих стран в Пекине владели китайским языком свободно. В то же время Узбекистан, не имеющий общей границы с Китаем, вел себя с Пекином более свободно, стараясь придерживаться принципов взаимности. Все лидеры Центральной Азии понимали, что благодаря бурному развитию экономики Китай обрел огромную мощь, и его присутствие в сфере торговли уже всерьез ощущается во всем регионе. Официальная статистика не всегда отражает истинную долю Китая в торговле, поскольку не учитывает товарообмен, осуществляемый нелегалами-«челноками» и теми, кто занимается мелким и не регистрируемым импортом и перепродажей китайских товаров. Хотя страны Центральной Азии непрерывно выстраивали все новые барьеры, чтобы воспрепятствовать такой торговле, «челноки» стали важным источником накопления капитала для мелких местных предпринимателей, реинвестирующих свои небольшие прибыли в более стабильные предприятия. В первые годы независимости отмечалась также небольшая нелегальная иммиграции из Китая, когда китайские граждане (часто имеющие родственников в Центральной Азии) переправляли капиталы через границу, чтобы покупать фабрики и фермы в Казахстане и Киргизии, и просто оставались там жить. По поводу численности новых китайских сообществ не существует не только официальных, но даже заслуживающих внимания неофициальных оценок, но нет и никаких свидетельств того, что такая эмиграция намеренно поощрялась китайской стороной. Китайское правительство точно определяет свои долгосрочные экономические интересы в странах Центральной Азии, особенно в энергетическом секторе. В 1997 г. Китайская государственная нефтяная компания (КГНК), выиграв соответствующий тендер, получила 60%-ную долю в разработке месторождений Жанажол и Кенкияк в Актюбинской области Казахстана 35. Китайцы обязались построить трубопровод стоимостью 9,6 млрд долл., но позже масштабы проекта сократились, и к концу 2001 г. утвержденная сумма составляла менее 200 млн долл.36 С тех пор роль Китая в центральноазиатском энергетическом секторе непрерывно растет. Китайское правительство заинтересовано также в развитии транзитных связей, которые позволили бы странам Централь-

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ной Азии активнее использовать систему китайских шоссе, железных дорог и портов, чтобы вести транзитную торговлю в обход России (в этом заинтересованы и сами государства Центральной Азии). Но главный рельсовый путь через этот регион (от поселка Дружба в Казахстане до Урумчи в Китае), открытый в 1992 г., используется слабо, потому что по обеим сторонам границы не хватает складов 37. Согласно существующим амбициозным планам через поселок Дружба должно ежегодно проходить 20 млн т грузов, но в 2001 г. из Казахстана в Китай по этому пути было отправлено только 6 млн т 38. Шоссе, идущие через Центральную Азию в Китай, по-прежнему ненадежны, хотя в 1990-х годах принимались определенные меры по их улучшению включая обновление Каракорумского шоссе из Урумчи в Пакистан. В марте 1995 г. было подписано четырехстороннее торговое соглашение о транспортировке грузов между Китаем, Казахстаном, Киргизией и Пакистаном, предусматривающее единую таможенную политику на этом шоссе, а в октябре 1996 г. по нему торжественно прошла специальная колонна грузовиков из четырех стран, что ознаменовало начало реконструкции, после которой оно должно стать пригодным для круглогодичного использования, а не только с мая по октябрь, как раньше. Каракорумское шоссе, обозначенное на карте, приведенной в этой книге, представляет собой базовую магистраль, связывающую регион с Китаем. Дорога от Бишкека до Каракорумского шоссе через Торугарт уже существует, а модернизация дороги от Оша до Сары-Тоша для соединения ее с дорогой, которую китайцы тянут к границе в поселке Иркештам, частично осуществляется за счет инициированной ЕС программы «Traceca» (сокращение, означающее «транспортный коридор Европа — Кавказ — Азия») 39. В июле 1997 г. премьер-министры Узбекистана и Киргизии вместе с высшими официальными лицами Китая присутствовали на торжественном открытии нового таможенного пункта на существующем несколько веков торговом пути, который был расширен и снабжен покрытием, обеспечивающим возможность движения грузовиков для обслуживания в первую очередь южной Киргизии, южного Казахстана и Узбекистана. Кроме того, существует шоссе, соединяющее, когда позволяет погода, Бишкек с Каши (через Нарын на Торугарт и далее к Ка-

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ракорумскому шоссе), которое является самым коротким путем из Алматы в Китай. Однако на этом маршруте тоже не хватает складских помещений, а те, что есть, используются прежде всего местными торговцами. В феврале 1998 г. Китай, Узбекистан и Киргизия подписали соглашение об автомобильных перевозках, обязавшись закончить реконструкцию этого шоссе к октябрю 1998 г. Для Казахстана существуют еще две точки пересечения с ним: Пахту (в районе Семипалатинска) и Хоргос (в Алматинской области). Китайцы также объявили о планах строительства крупных складов, перевалочных пунктов и создания зоны свободного предпринимательства, предназначенной прежде всего для организации совместных предприятий с участием Казахстана. Со временем к этому шоссе добавлялись новые звенья и ответвления, и разрабатывались планы прокладки новых дорог. В сентябре 1998 г. президент Таджикистана открыл 54-километровый участок ширококолейной железной дороги Курган-Тюбе — Куляб, которая будет соединяться с Каракорумским шоссе. В ноябре 1998 г. Казахстан, Киргизия, Пакистан и Китай подписали соглашение о сотрудничестве, предусматривающее модернизацию дорог, соединяющих Алматы в Казахстане с Карачи в Пакистане 40. Но несмотря на все эти соглашения, проекты строительства и модернизации шоссе и складов продвигаются медленно, и совсем ничего не сделано, чтобы попытаться изменить географические реальности. Горные перевалы на высотах порядка 3 тыс. м, закрытие дорог из-за снежных заносов, ледниковая эрозия — обычное дело для этих мест. В сфере транспорта, как и во многих других областях, основное внимание в отношениях Китая с центральноазиатскими государствами в течение первого десятилетия независимости уделялось созданию основы для будущих более тесных связей. Хотя транспортные коммуникации улучшились, китайцы заняли выжидательную позицию, отложив строительство грузовых терминалов, соответствующих международным стандартам, до тех пор, пока в Центральной Азии, по крайней мере на значительной ее части, не наступит экономический подъем.

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Соединенные Штаты протягивают свою равнодушную руку До 11 сентября американские обязательства в отношении стран Центральной Азии определялись политикой, ориентированной больше на потенциальные долгосрочные угрозы, нежели на защиту от неизбежных опасностей, возникающих в самóм регионе. Единственным исключением были контакты с Казахстаном в сфере ядерной дипломатии, которые были приоритетными и для администрации Клинтона, и для администрации Буша и которые должны были обеспечить удаление с территории этих новых независимых государств всего ядерного оружия, унаследованного от Советского Союза. Однако в середине 1990-х годов главным фактором стала политика в нефтяном и газовом секторе, которая была ориентирована скорее на диверсификацию долгосрочных резервов Запада, чем на решение сиюминутных энергетических проблем. На первый взгляд казалось, что американские политики проявляли нетерпение, стремясь максимизировать свое влияние в регионе. Соединенные Штаты быстро направили туда дипломатических представителей и создали полноценные посольства в Казахстане и Киргизии сразу после получения ими независимости, а в остальных странах — чуть позже. Но в этих первоначальных двусторонних отношениях было гораздо больше показного, чем сущностного. Американская помощь всем пяти странам в 1992—2002 финансовых годах составила меньше 3 млрд долл. (см. приложение 5). Тонко оперируя более чем дюжиной различных категорий, Соединенные Штаты предложили Центральной Азии почти символическую помощь для решения задач экономической, политической и социальной реструктуризации. Конечно, американские политики помогли сформировать приоритеты для Международного валютного фонда и Всемирного банка, а также для Европейского банка реконструкции и развития и Азиатского банка развития (АБР), и все они предоставляли техническую помощь для экономической реструктуризации и вложения капитала в проекты создания инфраструктуры. Главным инструментом политики США был Закон о защите свободы, и соответствующие фонды должны были обеспечивать поддержку медленного — на протяжении нескольких поколений — процесса формирования гражданского общества 41. Это не считалось серьезной

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проблемой, потому что в первые годы после развала Советского Союза у США в Евразии были совсем иные географические приоритеты, и в первую очередь их волновали потенциальные угрозы, которые могли возникнуть в Европе и России. Лидеры Центральной Азии, наоборот, стремились обеспечить тесные связи с Соединенными Штатами и из соображений международного престижа, и поскольку такие связи способствовали дальнейшему отходу их стран от России. Они приезжали в Вашингтон с соответствующими надеждами. Кого-то из них принимали в Белом доме, кого-то нет 42. Когда в 1993 г. сотрудники администрации Клинтона уклонились от встреч с президентом Туркмении Ниязовым, он распространил поддельные фотографии якобы состоявшейся встречи в Белом доме. И мало кто в Туркмении знал, что такой встречи просто не было. Ни один из американских президентов пока не посетил Центральную Азию, хотя приглашения направлялись часто. Госсекретарь США Джеймс Бейкер побывал в Казахстане в декабре 1991 г., а затем еще раз в феврале 1992 г., когда ездил в Киргизию и Узбекистан. В ноябре 1997 г. эти страны посетила первая леди США Хиллари Клинтон, а в апреле 2000 г. — госсекретарь Мадлен Олбрайт. В декабре 1993 г. в Казахстан приезжал вице-президент США Гор. Его визит, в частности, свидетельствовал о том, что администрация Клинтона по-новому оценила значение нефтяных и газовых ресурсов бассейна Каспийского моря, непропорционально распределенных между Азербайджаном, Туркменией и Казахстаном. Сигналом об изменении подхода стало выступление заместителя государственного секретаря США Строуба Тэлботта под названием «Прощай, Флэшмен» в июле 1997 г., в котором была сформулирована новая политика США в отношении Центральной Азии и Южного Кавказа. Тэлботт имел в виду принадлежащего перу Джорджа Макдональда Фрэйзера лихого литературного героя, лейтенанта Гарри Флэшмена, боровшегося за интересы Британской империи в Центральноазиатском регионе, и утверждал, что эти страны больше не будут пешками, которые великие державы могут двигать по собственной воле 43. Центральным элементом новой политики США в Центральной Азии стала переоценка политики России, которая, по мнению ад-

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министрации Клинтона, стала более жесткой и менее стабилизирующей, чем раньше, и поэтому США стали продвигать в жизнь идею прокладки нескольких трубопроводов для экспорта каспийской нефти. Эта идея возникла еще в 1995 г., но не трансформировалась в реальные планы до 1998 г., когда американское правительство начало оказывать давление на западные нефтяные компании и местные правительства, чтобы добиться прокладки трубопровода от Баку (Азербайджан) через Тбилиси (Грузия) к Джейхану (Турция) — так называемого трубопровода КТК 44. За исключением трубопровода КТК, прокладка которого стала условием участия компании «Chevron» в разработке нефтяного месторождения Тенгиз, администрация Клинтона не поддерживала разработку новых экспортных маршрутов для транспортировки каспийской нефти через Россию. Вашингтон выступал также против доставки каспийской нефти через Иран, что оставляло прикаспийским государствам очень небольшой выбор вариантов, отличных от маршрута Баку — Тбилиси — Джейхан 45. Но при этом американцы не желали соглашаться ни на какие расходы, связанные с сооружением этого настойчиво продвигаемого ими трубопровода, и ограничивались в основном выделением средств на технико-экономическое обоснование проекта и гарантиями займов для американских фирм, занимающихся разработкой каспийских месторождений нефти и газа или работающих в сопутствующих сервисных секторах. Однако при всех разговорах о важности каспийских запасов нефти и газа американский интерес к этим государствам был просто ничтожен по сравнению с интересом к производителям нефти в зоне Персидского залива или даже к более мелким, но при этом ближе расположенным производителям, таким как Мексика или Венесуэла. Энергетические ресурсы Казахстана и Азербайджана сделали их предметом особой заботы американских политиков, но они были бы согласны при этом ограничиться совместным фотографированием в Белом доме и готовностью периодически закрывать глаза на нарушения прав человека в этих странах (крупных потенциальных экспортерах нефти и газа) включая и те, о которых регулярно сообщал Государственный департамент, и на их нежелание формировать у себя демократические политические институты.

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Однако со временем, особенно когда стали распространяться слухи о гигантских запасах нефти на шельфовом месторождении Кашаган 46, интерес американцев к Казахстану начал расти. Заметим, что это повышенное внимание стимулировало коррупцию в Казахстане. Тамошние руководители с советским прошлым хорошо знали механизмы коррупции в собственной системе и представали перед западными бизнесменами в роли жадных лоцманов, готовых обеспечить им более или менее безопасную навигацию в «серых» зонах рыночной экономики. Хотя правительство США не имело прямого отношения к этой коррупции и ясно давало американским фирмам понять, что их действия ограничиваются Законом о предотвращении противозаконной деятельности в отношении иностранных юридических и физических лиц, оно не проявляло большого любопытства в отношении этики поведения американцев, состоящих «при дворе» того или иного прикаспийского президента. На самом деле американское правительство, по-видимому, одобряло использование американских посредников, потому что при этом повышалась вероятность получения американскими фирмами больших контрактов. Весьма поучителен случай с президентом корпорации «Mercator» Джеймсом Гиффеном. То, что Гиффен хвастался своим казахстанским паспортом и формальным статусом советника президента Назарбаева, наверняка создавало американским официальным лицам некоторые неудобства, но никто, кажется, не предлагал лишить его американского паспорта (который он в конечном счете был вынужден передать суду в Нью-Йорке в рамках соглашения об освобождении под поручительство), и он мог почти свободно встречаться с высшими политическими руководителями в Вашингтоне 47. Правда, после того как большое жюри в Южном округе Нью-Йорка начало расследование деятельности Гиффена и многих бывших руководителей «Mobil Oil», его доступ в высшие эшелоны власти был резко ограничен. Несмотря на утверждения о коррупции в окружении казахстанского президента и его семьи, было решено, что делать бизнес в Казахстане можно (хотя не всегда просто), так что в большинстве своем люди отнеслись к расследованию в отношении Назарбаева прагматично или даже попытались обернуть эти события к своей пользе.

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В то же время политика Туркмении становилась все менее понятной и ответственной с точки зрения деловых интересов Запада, и большинство американских фирм уже не считало вложение туда денег соблазнительной перспективой, и это несмотря на гигантские запасы газа, на все старания Александра Хейга, госсекретаря в администрации Рейгана 48, и весьма красноречивого министра иностранных дел Туркмении Бориса Шихмурадова, который произвел впечатление на представителей Запада, потому что понимал их опасения 49. Ограниченные возможности транспортировки энергоносителей сделали неблагоприятную деловую среду Туркмении еще менее привлекательной, особенно после захвата власти талибами, практически исключившего возможность транспортировки газа через Афганистан. Американский интерес к Туркмении достиг максимума, когда стало казаться, что калифорнийская компания «Unocal» получит доступ к газу с Давлетабадского месторождения и будет прокладывать трубопровод через Афганистан. В 1996 и 1997 гг. многие считали, что этот проект станет инструментом, способным обеспечить достижение нового национального консенсуса в Афганистане. Финансируемый «Unocal» проект (вместе с обучением и восстановлением инфраструктуры в качестве дополнения к нему) часто выдвигался представителями американского правительства и участниками мирных переговоров в Афганистане, проходивших под эгидой ООН, в качестве стимула. Но после того как разведка США обнаружила связь между лагерями «аль-Каиды» в Афганистане и взрывами американских посольств в Кении и Танзании в августе 1998 г., в качестве возмездия Вашингтон обстрелял крылатыми ракетами базы «аль-Каиды» в Афганистане 50. В связи с изменением оценок уровня безопасности в Афганистане идея трансафганского трубопровода была отложена, потому что «Unocal» приостановила все свои операции сразу после начала бомбежек 51. Но даже тогда политики в Вашингтоне по-прежнему сохраняли надежду на то, что туркменское правительство поддержит финансируемый США проект транскаспийского трубопровода, чтобы увеличить поставки через трубопровод Баку — Тбилиси — Джейхан. Но без главного американского инвестора, активно старавшегося разрабатывать ресурсы Туркмении, иметь дело с Ашхабадом Вашингтону оказалось намного тяжелее, чем ве-

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сти переговоры с Астаной, тем более что без казахстанской нефти прибыль от маршрута Баку — Тбилиси — Джейхан была бы незначительной. Но хотя Казахстан в принципе был согласен с идеей транспортировки какой-то доли своей нефти по этому маршруту, определять ее количество он не желал. Правительство в Ашхабаде было еще менее общительным, и в 2001 г. Вашингтон сбросил со счетов ашхабадские ресурсы нефти и газа, по крайней мере на ближайшую перспективу. Нежелание Астаны твердо пообещать транспортировать нефть по трубопроводу Баку — Тбилиси — Джейхан или окончательно отказаться от этого стало для Казахстана важным рычагом в отношениях с Вашингтоном. К концу 1990-х годов большинство высших политических руководителей в Вашингтоне считало Казахстан самым важным государством в Центральной Азии. Двусторонние отношения регулировались через комиссию Гора-Назарбаева, которая формально обеспечивала Казахстану такой же уровень доступа к администрации Клинтона, какой имела Россия после создания комиссии Гора-Черномырдина, менявшей затем название по мере смены российских премьеров. Заметим, что в американоузбекскую комиссию входил с американской стороны куратор по СНГ (должность, соответствующая рангу посла), а его узбекский коллега был министром иностранных дел 52. Поскольку в регионе усилия по построению демократии были не слишком решительными, некоторые видные члены администрации Клинтона понимали, что если чересчур сильно нажимать на Казахстан, побуждая его всерьез заняться насущными политическими реформами, толку от этого будет немного. Потенциальные издержки, связанные с этим, проявились во время визита Олбрайт в Казахстан в апреле 2000 г., когда возникли некоторые дипломатические затруднения в связи с тем, что на ее публичную критику внутренней политики Назарбаева в Казахстане он ответил столь же публичной и чрезвычайно критической интерпретацией истории расовых отношений в Америке. Растущее ощущение, что в плане создания необходимых политических институтов государства региона оказались несостоятельными, еще больше укрепляло позицию тех политиков, которые утверждали, что Вашингтону следует заниматься прежде всего проблемами безопасности. И в отношении Казахстана Соеди-

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ненные Штаты это уже успешно сделали. Краеугольным камнем сотрудничества между двумя странами в области обороны стало подписанное в декабре 1993 г. семилетнее соглашение об уничтожении пусковых шахт в Казахстане, согласно которому США помогли Казахстану возвратить России унаследованный им ядерный арсенал 53. К 1995 г. все ядерные боеголовки были возвращены, а 147 ракетных шахт разрушены 54. Расширение военного присутствия Соединенных Штатов в этом регионе началось в 1999 г., а в 2000—2001 гг. их военная помощь региону резко увеличилась. Сотрудничество с США и НАТО обеспечило бы центральноазиатским государствам наиболее эффективный путь модернизации вооруженных сил. Однако ни Соединенные Штаты, ни другие страны НАТО не считали приоритетной задачей финансирование быстрого включения Центральной Азии в свою систему глобальной обороны. Основная зона экспансии НАТО располагалась в другом месте, значительно западнее Урала. И даже самые убежденные сторонники расширения сотрудничества с Центральной Азией в Пентагоне имели в виду всего лишь некий медленный процесс, так как военные реформы в этих странах даже с помощью США растянулись бы, как минимум, на одно-два поколения. Центральноазиатские государства присоединились к программе НАТО «Партнерство во имя мира» и вошли в зону оперативного управления Центрального командования США (СЕNТCОМ) 55. Командующий генерал Томми Фрэнкс посетил регион в сентябре 2000 г., а затем в мае 2001 г. При его предшественнике, генерале Энтони Зинни (август 1997 г. — август 2000 г.), американцы тоже проявляли интерес к региону, но трансформировать его в увеличение военной помощи этим странам со стороны США и других государств НАТО оказалось трудно. Возникли проблемы с координацией ответственности за «Партнерство во имя мира» между СЕNТCОМ и американскими военными должностными лицами, а также между разными членами НАТО, стремившимися помочь Центральной Азии. Все это еще больше осложнялось тем, что странам региона было очень трудно работать совместно. Короче говоря, у Запада не было единого плана действий, а у государств, вооруженные силы которых нуждались в реформировании, не было общих представлений о региональных императивах.

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Узбекистан, Казахстан и Киргизия были активными членами программы «Партнерство во имя мира» и ежегодно проводили совместные региональные учения, в которых участвовали и Соединенные Штаты. Первоначально США планировали создать единые общерегиональные миротворческие силы — Центральноазиатский батальон («Центразбат») — для подавления в отдаленном будущем возможных этнических конфликтов. Но в ходе региональных учений, проводившихся в 1997 и 1998 гг. под руководством США, соперничество между военными из разных стран Центральной Азии было настолько острым, что в дальнейшем США стали оказывать этим странам военную помощь в основном на двусторонней основе. Но и это лишь незначительно способствовало улучшению координации американской военной помощи, а в отношении рационализации помощи, предлагаемой другими государствами НАТО, не дало вообще ничего. Узбекистан становился самым важным региональным партнером США в сфере обороны, хотя и не очень крупным. Тем не менее американские политики поняли, что им, возможно, понадобится обратиться к Ташкенту за стратегической поддержкой, особенно ввиду очевидной уже угрозы, которую представляли собой лагеря «аль-Каиды» в Афганистане. В мае 1999 г. представители министерств обороны США и Узбекистана подписали два соглашения о сотрудничестве. Американские официальные лица подтвердили, что они не заинтересованы в получении прав на базирование 56. Но в 2000 г. Соединенные Штаты воспользовались этими соглашениями, чтобы получить возможность направлять в Афганистан беспилотные самолеты «Предейтор», оборудованные ракетами, чтобы попытаться уничтожить Усаму бен Ладена 57. Кроме того, силы специального назначения США некоторое время обучали в Узбекистане местных коллег, а в августе 2001 г. небольшая группа американского спецназа была послана в Таджикистан в рамках операции против талибов 58. В принципе Вашингтон уже был готов помочь государствам Центральной Азии закрыть серьезные бреши в области обороны, но масштабы военных обязательств США в регионе подразумевали начало длительного процесса реформирования и лишь в малой мере могли содействовать решению текущих проблем обеспечения безопасности этих государств.

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Ближайшие соседи и большие надежды При неизменности географии понимание геополитических интересов определяется и переопределяется историей. Многие ближайшие соседи Центральной Азии увидели в распаде Советского Союза возможность восстановить историческую справедливость и расширить сферу своих геополитических интересов за счет усиления влияния на пять недавно возникших независимых государств. Но при этом они сильно переоценили пользу, которую могло принести их влияние, и недоучли самостоятельность лидеров Центральной Азии, не желавших, чтобы их внешнюю политику формировали внешние силы.

Турция: надежды на руководящую роль Турция и Иран увидели в образовании независимых государств в Центральной Азии неожиданно открывшуюся возможность резко усилить свое геополитическое влияние. Для достижения своих экономических и политических целей они попытались использовать фактор исторической и культурной близости. При этом Турция находилась в гораздо более выгодном положении, чем Иран, и становилась более важным экономическим партнером для государств региона. Отчасти это объяснялось тем, что их активно поддерживали американцы, которые к тому же изо всех сил старались изолировать Тегеран. У Турции более сильная экономика, и турецкие бизнесмены стремились вкладывать капиталы в различные проекты в Центральной Азии, прежде всего в строительстве, в пищевой и текстильной промышленности. Наконец, по сравнению с многими американцами и европейцами их гораздо меньше пугала коррупция. Ярым сторонником развития партнерских отношений с новыми независимыми тюркоязычными государствами (Азербайджаном, Казахстаном, Киргизией, Туркменией и Узбекистаном) был Тургут Озал, президент Турции в 1989—1993 гг., который несколько раз собирал их высших руководителей вместе, надеясь, что это приведет к созданию некой формальной организации. Первая такая встреча состоялась в Анкаре в 1992 г., а в 1993 г. Озал сам со-

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вершил широко разрекламированную поездку в регион. После смерти Озала президент Сулейман Демирель продолжил его политику и провел подобные встречи на высшем уровне в 1994, 1995 и 1996 гг., а в 1996 г. посетил регион. Его преемник Ахмет Некдет Сезер в 2001 г. также организовал встречу президентов тюркоязычных стран. Центральноазиатские лидеры тоже часто посещали Стамбул и Анкару, а некоторые, по слухам, даже использовали турецких бизнесменов-посредников для увеличения своих личных состояний. Особое значение имели подобные контакты для туркменского президента, который прибегал к помощи Ахмеда Калика, главы «Calik Holdings», при продаже больших партий тонковолокнистого туркменского хлопка и других товаров. Ходили также слухи, что связями в Турции пользовалось семейство Каримова, как это, очевидно, делал и Назарбаев сразу после того, как Казахстан стал независимым. Турция, хотя она никогда не владела Центральной Азией, тем не менее видит себя «естественным» лидером региона. Турецкие государственные и частные благотворительные организации предложили обучение в своей стране десяткам тысяч студентов из Центральной Азии 59. Турецкие педагоги предложили техническую и финансовую помощь для перехода с кириллицы на латиницу, которая используется в Турции, а турецкие СМИ снизили цены на свои телевизионные программы для жителей Центральной Азии, чтобы сделать их доступными 60. Американские политики одобряли и иногда помогали финансировать подобную деятельность, так как считалось, что это ослабляет роль России в регионе и таким образом способствует укреплению независимости новых государств. Тем не менее в 1990-е годы центральноазиатские лидеры постепенно склонялись к ограничению международного влияния Турции. Конечно, они стремились сохранить ее в качестве важного партнера, но при этом не желали предоставлять туркам роль посредников. Большинство из них полагало, что будет достаточно и одного покровителя. Осложняющим фактором для всех заинтересованных сторон были отношения с Россией. Российские политики не хотели замечать, что руководители Центральной Азии готовы променять Москву на Анкару (или, того хуже, на партнерство с Анкарой и

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Вашингтоном), и оказывали на них серьезное давление, чтобы побудить их вести по отношению к Турции более сбалансированную политику, в рамках которой отношения с Анкарой не вели бы к разрыву давних и традиционных дружеских связей. Россия также оказывала сильное давление на Турцию, чтобы та «знала свое место», и Анкара не могла игнорировать это давление, поскольку торговый оборот между двумя странами превышал торговый оборот между Турцией и всеми государствами Центральной Азии, вместе взятыми.

Иран: геополитические амбиции не приносят особого успеха Лидеры Центральной Азии твердо решили руководствоваться собственными взглядами на то, с кем дружить и кого избегать, и не желали предоставлять ни Москве, ни Вашингтону право вето при решении подобных вопросов. Все пять центральноазиатских государств установили дипломатические отношения с Тегераном, но Ирану предстояла трудная борьба за обретение своей, как он полагал, естественной геополитической роли в регионе. Между тем за последние несколько столетий турки вообще затмили персов, а идеологический характер иранского режима нанес дополнительный ущерб отношениям Тегерана со светской элитой Центральной Азии. Иранское руководство последовательно утверждало, что его интересы в регионе — это интересы традиционного этнического государства. Иран отправил в страны Центральной Азии послов со светскими биографиями, которые особо подчеркивали коммерческие аспекты своих дипломатических миссий. В общем иранские официальные лица сумели убедить местных лидеров, что исламская революция в Иране не представляет для них прямой угрозы. Казахстан и Туркмения не желали поддерживать вашингтонскую стратегию прокладки нефте- и газопроводов в обход Ирана. Туркмения транспортирует газ через Иран и хотела бы получить международную финансовую помощь, чтобы увеличить объемы газа, перекачиваемого по этому маршруту, а президент Назарбаев регулярно подтверждает заинтересованность Казахстана в том, чтобы со временем часть нефти, добываемой им на каспий-

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ском шельфе, поступала на рынки по новому трубопроводу, связывающему эти нефтяные месторождения с Ираном. Только президент Узбекистана Ислам Каримов продолжает относиться к Тегерану с подозрением. С точки зрения Узбекистана Иран (в отличие от Турции) вполне способен резко нарушить баланс сил в регионе, причем его негативное влияние может проявиться и в энергичном отстаивании религиозных ценностей, и в предпочтении, отдаваемом таджикам, которых с иранцами связывают общие культурные корни, в ущерб узбекам, и в общем принижении роли Узбекистана как соседней страны. Но хотя при Каримове Узбекистан поддерживает с Ираном скорее формальные, чем дружественные отношения, Тегеран остается важным торговым партнером Ташкента, покупающим хлопок, который не идет в Россию. В религиозном отношении шиитский Иран и Центральная Азия, где преобладают сунниты, весьма далеки друг от друга. Ни в одной из стран региона практически нет шиитов за исключением небольшого числа исмаилитов в Таджикистане, которые живут в изолированной Горно-Бадахшанской автономной области и которых иранские шииты, верящие в двенадцать имамов, вообще не считают истинными мусульманами 61. Во время гражданской войны правящая элита Таджикистана с подозрением следила за действиями Ирана, поскольку некоторые руководители Партии исламского возрождения имели хорошие связи с Тегераном. Однако эти тревоги постепенно утихли после того, как иранцы использовали эти отношения, чтобы помочь таджикам заключить соглашение о национальном примирении. С середины 1990-х годов Иран наладил тесные отношения с Таджикистаном, население которого говорит на диалекте персидского языка, очень близком к используемому в Иране. Тегеран активно поставляет в Таджикистан разнообразные культурные и учебные материалы, особенно для обновления системы образования, в которой предусматривается постепенный перевод с кириллицы на арабский алфавит 62. Из всех государств Центральной Азии только Туркмения имеет с Ираном общую границу, и ее зависимость от транзита через Иран способствовала установлению тесных связей между Ашхабадом и Тегераном. Но экономические отношения между двумя государ-

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ствами пока не столь тесны, как ожидали обе стороны, потому что американские санкции против Ирана помешали запланированной прокладке через Туркмению, Иран и Турцию трубопровода для транспортировки туркменского газа. Поскольку Иран не смог добиться международного финансирования проекта трубопровода стоимостью в 2,5 млрд долл. с пропускной способностью 30 млрд куб. м газа в год, Туркмении пришлось согласиться на прокладку трубопровода от Корпедже до Курт-Куи стоимостью 190 млн долл. с начальной пропускной способностью 4 млрд куб. м. Этот трубопровод был готов в декабре 1997 г., и теперь по нему передается более 6 млрд куб. м газа в год 63. Поскольку Ирану принадлежит наименее ценный сектор Каспия, единственный реальный шанс иранцев на существенное увеличение доходов от разработки нефтяных и газовых месторождений Каспия связан с транзитом. В целом большие надежды, которые Иран первоначально питал в отношении выгод от улучшения транспортных и коммуникационных путей через Центральную Азию, пока не оправдались.

Индия и Пакистан ждут своего часа Индия и Пакистан также приветствовали предоставление независимости государствам Центральной Азии. И с Индией, и с Пакистаном у них установились тесные дипломатические отношения, но на Индию они смотрели с особым интересом. Лидеры Центральной Азии осознают, какую экономическую и геополитическую мощь приобретает Нью-Дели по мере роста индийской экономики, поэтому относятся к визитам высших индийских руководителей с особым вниманием 64. Задолго до того как эти страны стали независимыми, Индия пользовалась большим авторитетом в регионе из-за давнишних особых отношений с Советским Союзом. Ташкент был крупным узловым аэропортом «Аэрофлота», и Индия даже имела дипломатическое представительство в регионе, тем самым обеспечивая местным жителям некоторые преимущества, которыми при желании можно было воспользоваться. Но с точки зрения индийцев центральноазиатский рынок все еще очень невелик, и трудности работы на нем усугубляются транспортными и политическими

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проблемами, связанными с транспортировкой товаров через Афганистан и Пакистан. Ситуация в Афганистане им практически никак не подконтрольна, а в своих расчетах, касающихся отношений с Пакистаном, они фактически игнорировали этот аспект — настолько малозначим для них свободный доступ на рынки Центральной Азии. Напротив, руководители Пакистана первоначально рассматривали торговлю с центральноазиатскими государствами как путь к частичному решению собственных серьезных экономических проблем. Они тщетно надеялись, что возродившаяся Организация экономического сотрудничества (ОЭС) сможет стать эффективным механизмом для разработки многосторонних проектов, стимулирующих экономические связи. Такую цель они выдвинули совместно с правительством Ирана, в столице которого находится штаб-квартира ОЭС 65. Многие в Исламабаде также надеялись, что перспективы создания новых маршрутов транзита через Афганистан смогут стать для всех враждующих сторон в этой стране эффективным стимулом для создания более или менее работоспособной системы разделения власти. Вполне очевидно, что в Пакистане существовали и группы с намного более мощными интересами, стремившиеся обеспечить победу «Талибана», с которым они связывали реализацию тех же коммерческих перспектив, а также проведение желательных для них внутренних изменений. В то же время многие умеренные пакистанцы видели в Индии рынок, к которому должны вести новые коммерческие маршруты и который окажется недоступным, если пакистанские исламисты добьются победы талибов, и поэтому ссылались на те же коммерческие перспективы, пытаясь отговорить своих более ортодоксальных соотечественников от экстремистской политики. Хотя в 1990-х годах в индийско-пакистанских отношениях было несколько обнадеживающих эпизодов, нормальная торговля между этими странами так и не была налажена. Как и индийцы, пакистанские предприниматели сочли, что вести дела в Центральной Азии труднее, чем ожидалось, причем и тем, и другим было трудно использовать свой опыт в условиях экономики советского типа, которая в тех или иных формах существовала в этих странах.

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Ближний Восток: разочарование в единоверцах После обретения независимости страны Центральной Азии серьезно надеялись, что заметную роль в регионе будут играть ведущие исламские государства, особенно арабские. Но их участие также оказалось намного скромнее, чем можно было ожидать, хотя все пять центральноазиатских государств в конечном счете присоединились к Организации «Исламская конференция» (ОИК) 66. Каспийский рынок просто оказался слишком мал и непривлекателен для большинства бизнесменов из богатых мусульманских стран. Экономика в странах региона в целом была слабее, чем предсказывали местные экономисты, что не способствовало увеличению объемов инвестиций, доступных для среднего предпринимателя. Люди с большими экспортными капиталами обычно находили гораздо более привлекательные места для инвестирования. Однако мелкие и средние предприниматели из стран Персидского залива все же начали делать бизнес в этом регионе, и торговля с Объединенными Арабскими Эмиратами (или через них) играет в Центральной Азии важную роль, помогая местным предпринимателям в накоплении капитала. Связи с арабским миром наложили также заметный отпечаток на религиозную жизнь в странах Центральной Азии, хотя и намного меньший, чем хотелось бы филантропическим организациям из Саудовской Аравии. Значительная часть денег для строительства сотен крупных мечетей и религиозных школ поступает из-за границы, главным образом из арабского мира, но также от турецких религиозных групп. Поначалу руководители стран Центральной Азии активно приветствовали почти все такие вклады, но со временем, особенно после 1999 г., они стали заботиться о том, чтобы упорядочить работу зарубежных исламских миссионеров и ограничить их деятельность исключительно официальными каналами, что позволило бы местным правительствам строже контролировать денежные потоки, идущие на религиозные цели. Президенты центральноазиатских стран понимают, что управляют большими сообществами верующих мусульман и что каждый из них должен пытаться заручиться доверием этих людей. Все они побывали во многих странах арабского мира, а президент

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Казахстана Назарбаев и президент Таджикистана Рахмонов во время своих визитов в Саудовскую Аравию даже совершили некоторые обряды, положенные паломникам 67. Во всех странах региона ежегодное паломничество в Мекку проходит при участии официальных инстанций, и привилегия организации туров для паломников является главным источником дохода для религиозного истеблишмента, извлекающего пользу из покровительства властей. Между тем одно из государств Ближнего Востока, в отличие от всех других, стало играть в странах Центральной Азии намного бóльшую роль, чем первоначально ожидалось. Несмотря на то что некоторые их арабские покровители этого не одобряют, лидеры Казахстана, Туркмении, Узбекистана и Киргизии побывали в Израиле, в частности чтобы снискать расположение потенциальных инвесторов 68. Став домом для десятков тысяч евреев, покидавших Центральную Азию начиная с 1970-х годов, Израиль сделался и главным источником капитала для некоторых из этих стран. Например, израильская корпорация «Merhav» вложила в экономику Туркмении, главным образом в энергетический сектор, более 1,3 млрд долл. 69 В Казахстане Александр Мацкевич и его «Eurasia Group» играют заметную роль в разработке минеральных ресурсов, а возглавляемая Мацкевичем организация «Еврейский конгресс Казахстана» также выполняет важную функцию моста между еврейскими сообществами Казахстана и США 70. Местные руководители, иногда (хотя и редко) возражающие против открытия новых мечетей, не препятствуют открытию синагог и еврейских культурных центров, потому что еврейское население в регионе соблюдает законы, малочисленно (и при этом сокращается) и поэтому не представляет никакой угрозы. Кроме того, развитие отношений с Израилем часто идет на пользу интересам России в регионе, поскольку некоторые израильские инвесторы ведут активную деятельность и в России. Однако хорошие отношения между большинством лидеров Центральной Азии и правительством Израиля практически не замедлили эмиграцию русскоязычных евреев из региона.

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«Большие» друзья из Европы и Азии: осторожное прощупывание Несмотря на высокий уровень взаимного интереса и географическую близость, Турция, Иран, Пакистан и даже страны Ближнего Востока никогда не оказывали такого влияния на Центральную Азию, как Западная Европа, Япония и Корея, потому что только их предприниматели располагают достаточным капиталом и техническим опытом для развития и укрепления экономики региона. Хотя ни одна из развитых промышленных стран не сделала Центральную Азию зоной своих приоритетных интересов, все вместе они теперь доминируют в экономике тамошних государств. Их влияние реализуется в основном через поддерживаемые ими международные финансовые учреждения: Всемирный банк, МВФ, Европейский банк реконструкции и развития (ЕБРР) и Азиатский банк развития 71. Очень большое значение для всех пяти стран Центральной Азии имеют государственные программы иностранной помощи с предложением займов, дотаций и кредитных линий. В частности, сформированы международные группы доноров, чтобы координировать помощь самым бедным из них — Киргизии и Таджикистану. Япония оказывает серьезную помощь Киргизии и является главным иностранным донором, финансирующим программу реконструкции страны. И самостоятельно, и через АБР Япония активно участвует в модернизации транспортной системы Киргизии. Японцы иногда говорят, что их интерес к Киргизии и Казахстану объясняется внешним сходством между жителями этих стран, но стратегические ресурсы, которыми располагают Киргизия и Казахстан, все же имеют большее значение. Японцы также шутят, что помогают киргизам, потому что чувствуют их этническую близость (считается, что некоторые племенные группы, из которых впоследствии частично сформировалось население Японии, первоначально обитали в той же части Сибири, что и древние киргизы). Однако японский энтузиазм в отношении Киргизии несколько спал после того, как летом 1999 г. группа японских геологов была взята в заложники в горах Киргизии, и японскому правительству, по слухам, пришлось заплатить за их освобождение несколько миллионов долларов 72. На короткое время Япония прекратила оказание помощи Киргизии, но в 2001 г. снова стала ее главным донором.

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Правительство Южной Кореи и корейские инвесторы испытывают острый интерес к Центральной Азии, потому что там живет много этнических корейцев. Корейские промышленники используют местных корейцев как посредников, тем самым повышая их относительный статус в Центральной Азии. Крупнейший корейский инвестор в регионе — корпорация «Daewoo», вложившая 1,4 млрд долл. в производство автомобилей в Узбекистане для продажи их по всей Центральной Азии. Работа завода «Daewoo» зависит от компонентов, изготовляемых в соседних государствах, так что в большинстве стран региона эти автомобили имеют льготный тарифный статус продукции, выпускаемой совместным предприятием. После относительно успешного старта эта программа столкнулась с трудностями, которые отчасти были связаны с ослаблением собственных позиций «Daewoo» после азиатского кризиса 1998 г., а отчасти — с ужесточением условий торговли после начала реализации экономической программы, принятой Узбекистаном в 2000 г. В Центральной Азии очень довольны тем интересом, который проявляют к региону Япония и Корея, а также меньшим по масштабам участием компаний из Сингапура, Малайзии и Индонезии. Их деятельность способствует воплощению идеи (наиболее активным приверженцем которой является президент Казахстана Нурсултан Назарбаев), что этот регион в будущем должен стать мостом между Европой и Азией. В первые годы независимости весьма активную роль в Казахстане и Киргизии играла Германия, поскольку в этих странах жило много этнических немцев, предки которых в начале Второй мировой войны были высланы туда с Волги (где они жили на протяжении почти 200 лет). Согласно немецким законам эти люди имели право на репатриацию в Германию 73. После воссоединения Германии немецким властям стало все труднее находить средства на продолжение политики репатриации этнических немцев из бывшего Советского Союза, поэтому они начали делать целенаправленные инвестиции, одновременно и создавая рабочие места для этой группы населения, и способствуя подъему местной экономики в целом, в надежде, что это побудит этнических немцев остаться в регионе. Однако эти инвестиции лишь очень немного замедлили (если замедлили вообще) отток немецкого населения.

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Одним из важнейших совместных проектов европейцев и азиатов стала программа улучшения транспортных путей, идущих через регион в обход России. Главным источником финансирования проекта «Traceca» (транспортного коридора Европа — Кавказ — Азия), предусматривающего создание новой системы торговых маршрутов из Европы через Черное море, Кавказ и Каспийское море в Центральную Азию, является ЕБРР. Планируется создание новых и улучшение существующих транспортных путей, и проект продвигается хоть медленно, но неуклонно. Когда он будет завершен, время транзита из Китая до Европы сократится до нескольких суток. Основная движущая сила проекта «Traceca» — желание европейцев воспользоваться преимуществами все более расширяющегося китайского рынка, параллельно способствуя развитию рынков Украины и прикаспийских государств, чтобы европейские товары там занимали место российских. Медленные темпы реализации этого проекта позволяют европейцам осуществлять инвестирование с учетом изменения рыночных условий и дают возможность приостановить его, если развитие рынка замедлится или возникнут какие-либо беспорядки. Европа уже сейчас стала важным торговым партнером для прикаспийских государств, но по европейским стандартам объем торговли между ними пока очень мал. АБР тоже вкладывает деньги в совершенствование транспортной системы в регионе 74. Однако в конечном счете значительная доля интереса многих европейцев и азиатов к Центральной Азии связана с наличием там нефти, газа и в меньшей степени других минеральных ресурсов. Компания BP стала крупным инвестором в Азербайджане, а первоначально вложила значительные средства и в Казахстане. «British Gas» участвовала в разработке самого крупного в Казахстане месторождения газа Кашаган с 1997 г., когда было подписано соглашение о разделе продукции, до апреля 2005 г., когда она продала свою долю консорциуму «Agip KCO», эксплуатирующему это месторождение. Французская «TotalFinaElf» и итальянская «Agip» (которая в июне 2004 г. влилась в итальянскую государственную энергетическую компанию ENI, приняв и ее название) тоже вложили большие средства в экономику Казахстана, и в 2001 г. «Agip/ENI» стала эксплуатировать месторождение Кашаган. Китайские государственные нефтяные фирмы тоже имеют

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значительные авуары в Казахстане и вынашивают планы транспортировки каспийской нефти в восточном направлении к своим нефтеперерабатывающим заводам. Часть акций Кашагана принадлежит японцам (через компанию «Inpex») 75. Западные фирмы, например, американская «Newmont Mining», участвуют в эксплуатации месторождений узбекского золота, а именно прииска Мурунтау — самого большого в мире открытого золотого рудника. Агентами по сбыту значительных партий золота, добываемого в этой стране, выступают британские и французские банки 76. Государства Центральной Азии пробовали трансформировать свои экономические связи с Европой в членство в европейских и азиатских организациях. Все они являются членами ОБСЕ. Казахстан также участвует в работе Европарламента, который, как и ОБСЕ, весьма критически оценивает события, происходящие в этой стране. ОБСЕ открыто осуждала целый спектр политических событий в регионе, но это редко имело какие-либо последствия. Хотя на словах европейцы придают огромное значение развитию демократии, на деле коммерция управляет их поведением еще в большей степени, чем поведением американцев. Британцы торжественно принимали президента Казахстана Назарбаева, и в ноябре 2000 г., в то время, когда в мировой прессе мелькали копии счетов семьи Назарбаева из офшорных холдингов, а Министерство юстиции США расследовало утверждения о неблаговидном поведении американских нефтяных компаний, работающих в Казахстане, королева Елизавета II наградила его большим крестом ордена св. Михаила и св. Георгия. За десять лет независимости руководители Центральной Азии объехали бóльшую часть мира и накопили много почетных званий, наград и призов. Но, несмотря на все эти поездки, к 11 сентября ни один из них не сумел выбрать совокупность надежных альянсов и определить роль в мире для себя и своей страны. Возможно, эти люди удовлетворены тем, что им и их министрам иностранных дел удалось достигнуть, поскольку несмотря на потенциальную нестабильность (в самой разной степени) их новых международных позиций, каждый из них стал фигурой мирового масштаба, чего в декабре 1991 г. никто из них не мог представить даже в самых смелых мечтах.

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С Центральной Азии обычно предвещали, что их правительства амые мрачные прогнозы относительно будущего государств

не смогут справиться с социальными трудностями и это вызовет в обществе неудовлетворенность, которая может подорвать политическую стабильность. В этой главе анализируются социально-экономические проблемы, с которыми столкнулись страны региона, и связанные с ними угрозы разного характера, а также обсуждается вопрос, способствовало ли развитие событий после 11 сентября 2001 г. смягчению этих проблем. Еще с конца 1990-х годов эксперты, занимающиеся Центральной Азией, предупреждали, что с ростом безработицы, обнищанием населения, развалом систем здравоохранения и образования (особенно в густонаселенных сельских районах) государства региона становятся все уязвимее в отношении этнических конфликтов, распространения радикальных идеологий и крупномасштабных социальных волнений 1. До сентября 2001 г. международные организации, оказывающие помощь в развитии, реагировали на эти проблемы очень слабо. Правда, на изучение проблем региона деньги выделялись, но при этом объем финансовой помощи, которую могли получить входящие в него государства для решения своих проблем, в целом уменьшался. Единственным исключением, как уже отмечалось, была сфера безопасности, где финансирование со стороны США и НАТО увеличивалось. 106

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При этом отдельные доноры, по-видимому, считали, что было бы разумно существенно увеличить помощь этим странам для формирования там необходимых экономических и политических институтов. Однако некоторые иностранные наблюдатели отмечали многие факты, позволявшие сделать вывод, что правительства стран региона должны изменить свои стратегии, и, по мнению большинства этих специалистов, существенное увеличение средств, выделяемых в качестве помощи, означает трату еще бóльших денег впустую. Но особого чувства тревоги по этому поводу не было. Западные доноры не проявляли интереса к проверке предположений о том, что распределение и перераспределение иностранной помощи определяется прежде всего стремлением приукрасить результаты деятельности существующих режимов. На самом деле экономические перспективы государств Центральной Азии изначально оценивались весьма пессимистически, и не было определенности относительно того, какие стратегии развития будут для них наиболее подходящими. Несмотря на сравнительно высокий уровень образования, сильнейшая зависимость экономики от природных ресурсов заставляла считать эти страны слаборазвитыми, что соответствовало российским представлениям об «отсталости» Центральной Азии. Но когда некоторые из этих государств подверглись международной экспертизе, опасения, что они могут потерпеть неудачу при переходе к рыночной экономике, стали уступать место намного более оптимистичным взглядам. Руководство Киргизии согласилось превратить страну в своего рода подопытного кролика для проверки эффективности реформ, Казахстан, казалось, принял весьма амбициозную программу приватизации, и даже Узбекистан, по крайней мере с виду, проявлял определенный интерес к мерам, которые в случае реализации могли бы раскрепостить его экономику. Но прошло несколько лет, и пессимизм вновь усилился, поскольку такие государства, как Узбекистан и Туркмения, отказались от всех разумных зарубежных рекомендаций, а перекосы в экономике Таджикистана оставались практически неизменными, несмотря на значительную иностранную помощь. Даже в Казахстане и Киргизии, где, как считалось, дела шли относительно успешно, отсутствие прозрачности приводило к непропорциональному распределению активов в пользу правящих семей и их

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ближайших сподвижников, что ограничивало перспективы продолжения реформ. Хотя многие эксперты предсказывали просто конец света в этом отдельно взятом регионе, большинству экономистов из числа специалистов по развитию экономики ситуация не казалась столь катастрофичной, и не потому, что дела шли хорошо, а потому, что они шли совсем не так плохо, как в других местах, например, во многих странах Африки 2. Конечно, доля населения, живущего за чертой бедности, в Центральной Азии увеличивалась, но не из одной страны не поступало сообщений о голоде. И хотя некоторые из них избрали чрезвычайно своеобразные стратегии государственного строительства, ни об одной нельзя было сказать, что она вот-вот взорвется. Несмотря на то что напряженность на некоторых границах нарастала, увеличение целенаправленной технической помощи для обеспечения безопасности границ, казалось, снизило вероятность возникновения межгосударственных конфликтов. С учетом всего этого до 11 сентября западные политики, по-видимому, не хотели принимать решения в тех рамках, которые обеспечивали лидерам центральноазиатских государств максимальный комфорт, т. е. при практически неограниченной терпимости к коррупции, которой иногда сопутствовали реформы, шедшие черепашьими темпами. Тем не менее организации, оказывающие помощь, мало что делали помимо критики методов, избранных центральноазиатскими режимами для осуществления программ реформ, получивших международную поддержку, указывая, что эти методы не принесут успеха. Некоторые западные специалисты даже начали повторять аргументы, выдвигаемые лидерами Центральной Азии (о том, что эти страны не готовы к экономическим и тем более политическим реформам ввиду длительного пребывания под российским, а затем советским колониальным ярмом) 3. Эти интерпретации прошлого были не менее упрощенными, чем более ранние социологические и исторические представления советских ученых, долгое время высмеивавшиеся серьезными западными аналитиками, которые теперь были рады укрыться за собственными трескучими фразами. При этом удобно было игнорировать некоторые досадные факты, например, то, что Казахстан и Киргизия опережали Россию

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по многим макроэкономическим показателям. Киргизия первой на постсоветском пространстве занялась реструктуризацией финансовой системы, а Казахстан имел самый мощный банковский сектор среди постсоветских государств. Обе страны, хотя и с некоторыми ограничениями, ввели частную собственность на землю и реорганизовали системы пенсионного обеспечения, здравоохранения и образования, имея в виду добиться их финансовой самодостаточности. Однако это не обеспечило автоматического сохранения условий жизни, которые были у граждан, живших за счет системы социального обеспечения в советскую эпоху. Несмотря на экономические достижения государств Центральной Азии в некоторых областях, западные обозреватели часто не желали оценивать их по стандартам, которые использовались для стран Центральной Европы. Им разрешалось ссылаться на «азиатскую специфику» и оправдывать свои неудачи слишком коротким опытом государственности. Но после 11 сентября международное сообщество стало пересматривать некоторые представления о Центральной Азии и задаваться вопросом, не создает ли пассивность и нерешительность стратегий экономических и политических реформ угрозы безопасности, которые ранее не учитывались. Эта переоценка не привела ни к каким особо драматическим результатам. Государства, демонстрировавшие готовность к реформам, получили кое-какую дополнительную финансовую помощь, но страны, которые не торопились выполнять полученные рекомендации, не подвергались большому нажиму. Хотя проблема списания долгов в регионе волновала международное финансовое сообщество гораздо сильнее, чем несколько лет назад, ранние модели реформ не подвергались сколько-нибудь тщательной экспертизе. Возможно, иностранные политики не понимают, что на ситуацию в Центральной Азии следует немедленно обратить внимание, но жителей региона мало утешает сознание того, что положение должно стать намного хуже, прежде чем внешний мир попытается его изменить. И Узбекистан, и Киргизия, и Таджикистан соответствуют многим критериям Всемирного банка, определяющим страны с низким доходом, находящиеся в напряженной ситуации. Правитель-

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ство Туркмении приводит достаточно высокие цифры средней заработной платы и валового внутреннего продукта на душу населения, которые вроде бы выводят страну из списка проблемных государств, но эти данные очень сомнительны. Единственный (и то пока потенциальный) пример успешного развития в этом регионе — это богатый нефтью и газом Казахстан, но даже там дела идут хуже, чем можно было ожидать, и это специально отмечено в исследовании влияния системной коррупции на экономику Казахстана, проведенном Всемирным банком 4. Кто же виноват в том, что ситуация в большинстве этих государств складывается столь неутешительно? Лидеры, которые не смогли или не захотели следовать рекомендациям международного сообщества и либо отвергли предложенные им программы макроэкономической стабилизации, либо оказались не в состоянии реализовать их достаточно добросовестным образом, закрывая глаза на окружающую их коррупцию? Или это ошибка мирового финансово-донорского сообщества, которое ринулось в малознакомый регион с множеством заранее сформулированных предположений относительно того, как лучше всего провести эти страны из пункта А, в котором они пребывали, в пункт В, в котором внешний мир хотел бы их видеть? Ниже мы подробно обсудим экономическую политику этих государств с 2001 г.

Может ли Казахстан служить примером экономического успеха? Будущее Казахстана представляется наиболее лучезарным среди государств Центральной Азии и из-за его огромных природных ресурсов и мощного человеческого потенциала, и вследствие того, что в последнее десятилетие здесь были приняты некоторые разумные экономические решения. Казахстан одним из первых преодолел экономический кризис, вызванный развалом СССР. Хотя его валовой внутренний продукт еще не вернулся к уровню 1990 г., к 2004 г. начался устойчивый экономический рост, средний доход на душу населения в 2003 г. достиг 1780 долл., что вывело Казахстан по этому показателю на второе место в СНГ (после России) 5. В 1998 г. дела в Казахстане шли намного лучше, чем в России, и он смог достаточно спокойно противостоять

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воздействию разразившихся в тот год финансовых кризисов (российского и азиатского). Курс местной валюты тенге в последние годы остается относительно стабильным, и она фактически стала свободно конвертируемой 6. В Казахстане существуют сильный национальный банк и частные банки с достаточно высоким международным рейтингом во главе с «Казкоммерцбанком», который включен в список 1000 крупнейших в мире банков 7. Все банки должны перейти на международные банковские стандарты включая 8%-ный уровень достаточности капитала с учетом взвешенного риска, установленный Банком международных расчетов. Эта схема привела к сокращению числа банков со 130 в 1995 г. до 35 в 2004 г., и 16 из них включены в систему страхования депозитов, поддерживаемую Национальным банком Казахстана 8. Общественные сбережения в 2003 г. составили 9% валового внутреннего продукта 9. В стране функционирует фондовая биржа, правила которой составлены на основе правил Комиссии по ценным бумагам и биржам США, но она страдает от пока недостаточного объема торговли акциями ведущих компаний 10. Работа фондовой биржи отчасти сдерживается изменениями правительственного графика приватизации самых крупных и в перспективе самых прибыльных государственных предприятий. Правительство также пересматривает ранее принятое решение о постепенной передаче всех государственных активов в частную собственность и решает, не следует ли оставить некоторые нефтяные и газовые ресурсы в общественном владении. Приватизация малых и средних предприятий фактически завершилась, но этот процесс был в лучшем случае полупрозрачным. В настоящее время в частном секторе работает около 50% населения. В сельском хозяйстве занято более 40% негородского населения. Хотя сельское хозяйство обеспечивает работой 35% жителей страны, его доля в ВВП составляет лишь 7,7% 11. Частная собственность на сельскохозяйственные земли была введена в июне 2003 г. вопреки возражениям большинства казахского населения, которое сочло это нарушением традиций прежней кочевой культуры. Земельное законодательство, содержащее много оговорок относительно того, кто может владеть землей и в каком количестве, стоило политической карьеры премьер-министру Имангали Тасмагамбетову, который был уволен после того, как парламент отка-

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зал ему в доверии по этому вопросу 12. В последние несколько лет положение в сельскохозяйственном секторе улучшилось, но он все еще нуждается в существенных инвестициях, особенно для выживания независимых фермеров. Пока наибольшую выгоду от нового законодательства о земле получили удачливые предприниматели, которые скупают земли, чтобы заняться агробизнесом. Реформирована налоговая система и повышена собираемость налогов. В результате реформ, проведенных в 2003 г., налог на добавленную стоимость (НДС) снижен до посильных 15%, а обязательные социальные платежи — до 7—20% 13. В то же время растут опасения, что дальнейшие преобразования налоговой системы могут привести к необходимости новых переговоров с иностранными инвесторами по уже существующим контрактам, а общая налоговая нагрузка на них возрастет. Реорганизована также пенсионная система, введены новые государственные и частные пенсионные планы, реформируются старые финансировавшиеся государством системы здравоохранения и образования, чтобы создать для них более прочную финансовую базу 14. Эти изменения в сочетании с неожиданно высокими ценами на нефть привели к тому, что страдавший ранее постоянным дефицитом бюджет в 2002 г. был сведен с небольшим профицитом, в 2003 г. — с крошечным дефицитом, а далее до 2006 г. планируется ежегодный небольшой профицит 15. Хотя в настоящее время Казахстан считается сравнительно отсталой страной со средними доходами, у него есть возможность развить сильную экономику, и уже сейчас темпы роста ВВП там самые высокие в регионе и в процентах, и в абсолютных цифрах 16. Это объясняется не только высокими мировыми ценами на нефть и увеличением ее добычи. Реальный прирост ВВП страны в 2003 г. составил 9,2% 17. И хотя энергетический сектор обеспечил наибольший вклад в бюджет в 2002 г. (33% всех доходов), пока он не подавляет другие отрасли экономики 18.

Нефтяной сектор Казахстана Надежды Казахстана на будущее связаны в основном с разработкой нефтяных и газовых ресурсов. Сейчас в стране добывается

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чуть больше 1 млн баррелей нефти в сутки, но по прогнозам американского правительства к 2020 г. суточная добыча достигнет 8 млн баррелей 19. Даже если признать, что возможно многое, способное затормозить или даже разрушить некоторые планы развития нефтяной индустрии Казахстана, во втором и третьем десятилетиях XXI в. он наверняка станет крупным производителем нефти. Ожидается, что общая сумма инвестиций в нефтяную и газовую промышленность Казахстана к 2015 г. достигнет 52 млрд долл.20 Сначала правительство видело в иностранных инвестициях единственную возможность финансировать разработку нефтяных месторождений. Но когда со временем руководители страны начали лучше понимать, как работает мировая нефтедобывающая промышленность, они потребовали для себя бóльшую долю собственности в активах (причем как в новых, так и в уже реализуемых проектах) и пожелали играть более значительную роль в определении скорости и условий разработки ресурсов. В государственной программе развития казахстанского сектора Каспийского моря правительство страны изложило свои руководящие принципы. Согласно новым правилам продажи лицензий на разработку пока не используемых береговых и шельфовых месторождений доля Казахстана в таких проектах должна составлять 50%, причем партнером иностранной компании может быть и частная фирма, и государственная нефтяная компания 21. Правительство Казахстана также усилило давление на членов консорциумов в проектах «TengizChevroil» и Кашаган, чтобы провести новые переговоры о «лазейках» и других условиях заключенных с ними контрактов в то время, когда три крупнейших проекта уже вошли в стадию производства или по крайней мере готовы к этому. Начиная с 2002 г. высшие чины в правительстве часто говорят о необходимости пересмотра заключенных нефтяных контрактов. В одном своем часто цитируемом выступлении Касымжомарт Токаев (который в тот период был то премьер-министром, то госсекретарем, то министром иностранных дел) сказал, что это было бы справедливой компенсацией Казахстану за его поддержку Соединенных Штатов в войне с террором. Эти слова вызвали широкое негодование, так что президент Назарбаев вынужден был сделать несколько публичных заявлений, в которых попытался заверить иностранных инвесторов, что условия уже заключенных контрак-

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тов пересматриваться не будут. Однако Казахстан все же зашел достаточно далеко, потребовав права на покупку доли в консорциуме, разрабатывающем месторождение Кашаган, и угрожая в случае отказа внести в законодательство изменения, которые автоматически приведут к корректировке условий действующих контрактов. В Казахстане, кажется, понимают тонкости перемещения зыбучих геополитических песков, но не очевидно, что там осознают всю недолговечность и хрупкость подобных рычагов. Цены на нефть из года в год резко меняются, причем нефть шельфовых месторождений Казахстана технически трудно извлекать, а ее транспортировка стоит дорого, если учесть удаленность этих запасов от открытых морей. Компании, которые уже вложили огромные средства в проекты в Казахстане, конечно, смогут продемонстрировать свою стойкость даже при ужесточении условий работы, но если казахстанское правительство намерено достичь своих целей в отношении инвестиций, ему придется привлекать в страну новые капиталы. Между тем у казахстанских проектов есть серьезные конкуренты в других странах, где инвестиции, возможно, обеспечивают больший доход или более комфортные условия работы. Когда западные нефтяные компании сначала потянулись в Казахстан, у них практически не было возможности заниматься бизнесом в России или начинать новые проекты в Ливии, Ираке и Иране, так как во всех этих странах тогда был совершенно неподходящий инвестиционный климат. Многие руководители в Казахстане согласны рискнуть и замедлить темпы разработки месторождений во имя увеличения доли государственной собственности. Такие задержки можно было бы перенести относительно легко, потому что цены на нефть пока высоки и существующий уровень ее добычи обеспечивает хорошие доходы. Казахстанские реформаторы тоже не возражают против некоторого замедления потока доходов — до тех пор, пока экономика не станет более прозрачной. Несмотря на очередное закручивание гаек, официальные лица утверждают, что правительство стало относиться к инвесторам более дружественно. При этом они ссылаются на проведенную в феврале 2002 г. реорганизацию нефтедобывающей отрасли, когда государственная нефтяная компания «Казахойл» объединилась с

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государственной компанией по транспортировке нефти «Казтранснефтегаз». Они утверждают, что эта реорганизация должна обеспечить им переход на новый профессиональный уровень. Новая компания «Казмунайгаз» также выступает за увеличение доли казахстанской собственности, стремясь сохранить и свое имущество, и надзорные функции в отношении инвестиций, в которых она играет роль партнера. Первым президентом «Казмунайгаза» стал Ляззат Киинов, нефтяник, в прошлом губернатор Мангистауской области, а вторым человеком в этой организации стал зять Назарбаева Тимур Кулибаев (до этого работавший в «Казтранснефтегазе») 22. Еще одна реорганизация была проведена в 2003 г., когда Киинова заменил Узакпай Карабалин, что по-видимому, еще больше увеличило власть Тимура Кулибаева в частности и роль семьи Назарбаева в целом в нефтедобывающей промышленности 23. Некоторый надзор за «Казмунайгазом» осуществляет Министерство энергетики и природных ресурсов, которое возглавляет специалист в области атомной энергии Владимир Школьник, представляющий эту отрасль и защищающий решения, принятые в «Казмунайгазе» и в администрации президента. Очень хорошо, что Казахстан активно улучшает транспортную инфраструктуру. В конце 2001 г. введен в эксплуатацию трубопровод Каспийского трубопроводного консорциума, а в середине 2002 г. начал работать банк качества, необходимый для максимизации прибылей при разработке Тенгизского месторождения. Первый банк качества, созданный в СНГ, обеспечивает Казахстану компенсацию за качество сырой нефти, которое выше качества нефтяной смеси, идущей по трубопроводу, находящемуся под контролем России. С открытием трубопровода КТК экспортные издержки для нефти с Тенгизского месторождения снизились примерно на 50%, а у российской компании «Транснефть» образовался излишек пропускной способности, что побудило ее предложить Казахстану увеличить его ежегодную экспортную квоту. Строительство трубопровода Баку — Тбилиси — Джейхан началось в 2003 г. и должно завершиться в 2005 г.24 Этот трубопровод позволил бы Казахстану транспортировать дополнительно 20 млн т нефти в год танкерами через Каспийское море в Баку. Правительство Азербайд-

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жана склоняет Казахстан принять участие в этом проекте, но он пока уклоняется от решения. Улучшение перспектив транспортировки казахстанской нефти еще больше окрылило правительство республики. Второй этап проекта «TengizChevroil» стоимостью 3 млрд долл., реализация которого, как предполагается, позволит довести добычу нефти до 440 тыс. баррелей в сутки, можно начинать только после того, как трубопровод КТК начнет эксплуатироваться на полную мощность. Этот второй этап был отложен до конца 2003 г. из-за спора между правительством и главными участниками консорциума по поводу изменения графика выплаты амортизационных отчислений и финансирования инвестиционной программы. Соглашение, которого со временем удалось достигнуть, предусматривает снижение темпов разработки, но зато обеспечивает правительству бóльшие налоговые поступления, что, в свою очередь, позволяет ему реализовать более энергичную программу реинвестирования в этот проект 25. Тактика угроз, которую использовало при этом правительство, с обвинениями членов консорциума в налоговых и экологических нарушениях, стала для западных инвесторов предупреждением, что впредь власти будут вести себя с ними еще более жестко. Эту жесткость ощутили на себе и участники консорциума «Agip KCO», разрабатывающего месторождение Кашаган. В отличие от Тенгиза, где Казахстан имеет в консорциуме долю в 20%, здесь правительство продало свою долю (одну седьмую) осенью 1998 г. за 500 млн долл., чтобы смягчить ущерб, нанесенный казахстанскому бюджету финансовым кризисом в России. Многие члены элиты отнеслись к такому решению весьма негативно, утверждая, что правительство продало эти активы иностранцам слишком дешево. Поскольку теперь Казахстан будет получать доходы от этого проекта только в виде лицензионных и налоговых платежей, критически важным для него становится график добычи. Первоначально намечалось, что добыча нефти начнется в 2005 г., но коммерческий план развития, представленный консорциумом «Agip KCO» правительству в 2003 г., предусматривает перенос начала добычи на 2006 г., а большой поток нефти ожидается только в 2008—2009 гг. Этот график члены консорциума тоже сочли нереалистичным, и в 2004 г. было достигнуто новое соглашение с правительством об

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изменении графика добычи. Теперь государство должно получить 150 млн долл. в качестве компенсации за согласие на перенос начала добычи на 2008 г.26 Первоначально предполагается добывать 75 тыс. баррелей в сутки и постепенно довести добычу до 450 тыс. баррелей 27. Но, располагая согласованным ко взаимной выгоде графиком добычи, в июне 2004 г. правительство уведомило консорциум, что заинтересовано в покупке 16,7%-ной доли «British Gas» в проекте Кашаган, которая была выставлена на продажу годом раньше. Правительство также ясно дало понять, что не признает пункты соглашения, которые предоставляли членам консорциума право преимущественной покупки предлагаемых к продаже долей в проекте, которым, как они публично объявили, намеревались воспользоваться члены «Agip KCO». Все это сопровождалось угрозами группы законодателей провести парламентскую проверку всего соглашения о консорциуме, поскольку, по их мнению, при его заключении были нарушены положения Конституции, определяющие полномочия правительства в отношении прав на подземные ресурсы. В начале 2005 г. был достигнут компромисс, предусматривающий покупку правительством доли в 8,33% примерно за 700 млн долл.28 Отчасти преувеличенная жесткость правительства Казахстана связана с прохождением определенного участка «кривой обучения», с чем неизбежно сталкиваются молодые независимые государства. В начале 1990-х годов руководители Казахстана плохо представляли себе, как работает мировая нефтедобывающая индустрия и какую позицию они могут занимать на переговорах с учетом размеров своих активов. Теперь они смотрят на свой экономический потенциал по-иному и начинают понимать, что к невозобновляемым ресурсам нужно относиться с уважением именно потому, что они не возобновляются. Теперь в Казахстане также лучше представляют ценность своих газовых запасов; дело в том, что нефть на шельфе Каспия содержит значительное количество попутного газа, который можно добывать параллельно с нефтью. Для максимального извлечения нефти часть газа затем должна закачиваться обратно в нефтеносные пласты, а оставшийся газ нужно либо сжигать (что на шельфовых месторождениях создает серьезные экологические проблемы), либо собирать с целью продажи. По оценкам казахстанского правительства, производство газа в стране в 2005 г. может достигнуть

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20,5 млрд куб. м (в 2002 г. было 13,14 млрд), в 2010 г. — 35 млрд, а в 2015 г. — целых 70 млрд в зависимости от того, какую часть кашаганского газа придется закачивать обратно в недра. Кроме того, в Казахстане имеются гигантские месторождения, содержащие в первую очередь именно газ. На крупнейшем из них — газовом и газоконденсатном месторождении Карачаганак на самом северо-востоке Казахстана — сейчас заканчивается второй этап развития, который должен обеспечить удвоение добычи конденсата 29. Консорциум «Karachaganak Integrated Organization» уже инвестировал 4 млрд долл. в разработку этого месторождения, и, как ожидается, в последующие 40 лет объем инвестиций достигнет 16 млрд долл., что значительно больше первоначально намечавшихся цифр 30. В июле 2003 г. также начались первые поставки нефти с Карачаганакского нефтяного месторождения, принадлежащего тому же консорциуму, по трубопроводу КТК через недавно проложенную 600-километровую связку. Что касается газового сектора, то Казахстан возлагает определенные надежды на хорошие отношения с газовой промышленностью России. Некоторые западные отраслевые аналитики утверждают, что Казахстан предоставил слишком большую роль российской государственной монополии «Газпром» в транспортировке и сбыте своего газа, которые будет осуществлять совместное предприятие «Казросгаз», принадлежащее поровну «Газпрому» и «Казмунайгазу». В 2004 г. «Казросгаз» планирует продать около 5 млрд куб. м газа 31. Приняв эти условия, Россия согласилась также с тем, что казахстанский газ будет продаваться на европейском рынке (уступка, которой Туркмения так и не смогла добиться), правда, при пониженной закупочной цене 32. Это также гарантирует Казахстану определенный доступ на рынки за счет конкурирующих производителей из Центральной Азии. В Казахстане также надеются, что это приведет к расширению сотрудничества с Россией в сфере обработки и продажи газа с гигантского Карачаганакского месторождения.

Распределение непредвиденных прибылей Нефтегазовая отрасль поглотила более 80% долларовых инвестиций, поступивших в Казахстан с 1999 г., так что эффективное

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управление доходами в энергетическом секторе становится для правительства первоочередной экономической проблемой 33. В 2000 г. был создан Национальный фонд для накопления доходов от налогов с продажи нефти, газа и других минеральных ресурсов 34. Этот фонд должен помочь защитить экономику Казахстана от колебаний цен на нефть, газ и другое экспортируемое сырье. Доходы же от инвестиций должны направляться на пополнение бюджета, в частности, на социальные расходы и поддержку экономической политики страны. Создание Национального фонда — это небольшой шаг к прозрачности. Его функции ограничены управлением налогами, полученными от продажи ресурсов. Его руководители не имеют права голоса в вопросах управления добычей или продажей нефти, решение которых остается в основном прерогативой президента и его семьи, хотя, как уже отмечалось, формально эти полномочия разделены между различными государственными учреждениями, и самые известные из них — Министерство энергетики и природных ресурсов и «Казмунайгаз». Управление нефтедобывающей отраслью по-прежнему открывает много возможностей для личного обогащения. Внешний контроль за деятельностью Казахской государственной нефтяной компании весьма ограничен, так что ее руководители могут списывать огромные средства в виде управленческих расходов и затрат на реинвестирование практически без всяких последствий. Это верно и в отношении других государственных предприятий, эксплуатирующих природные ресурсы, и не только в Казахстане, но и в Киргизии и Туркмении. Продажа и перепродажа нефти и для транспортировки, и «клиентам», которые обычно не более чем посреднические пункты закупки, фактически представляют собой две формы манипулирования трансфертными ценами и создают возможности обогащения для тех, кто имеет доступ к нефти, позволяя им получать прибыль за счет разницы между местной закупочной ценой и ценой на мировом рынке. Например, в 2002 г. вторым по величине торговым партнером Казахстана были Бермудские острова, доля которых в казахском экспорте составила 20%, и практически весь этот объем поставок нефти пошел на перепродажу и перепоставку 35. Ходят слухи, что часть денег от этих операций поступает на офшорные счета президента Назарбаева и членов его семьи, име-

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на которых уже связывают с несколькими офшорными компаниями в рамках продолжающегося расследования взяточничества и коррупции в нефтяной промышленности Казахстана 36. Несмотря на то что документы, представленные в американский суд, позволяют четко проследить цепочку передачи денег американских нефтяных компаний Нурсултану Назарбаеву и бывшему премьерминистру Нурлану Балгимбаеву, казахстанское правительство утверждает, что президент никогда не получал личной выгоды от нефтедобывающей отрасли. После того как в Нью-Йорке разразился скандал в связи с коррупцией в Казахстане, недавно назначенный премьер-министр Имангали Тасмагамбетов признал существование секретного нефтяного фонда в размере 1 млрд долл., депонированного в швейцарских банках в 1997 г.37 Казахстанские власти утверждают, что бóльшая часть этих денег пошла на выплату задолженностей по пенсиям и поддержку национального бюджета и что оставшиеся 212,6 млн долл. были возвращены в новый Национальный фонд 38. Интересно поразмышлять, откуда в действительности взялись деньги, которые были возвращены в Казахстан, потому что большинство счетов, упомянутых в обвинительных актах в суде Южного округа Нью-Йорка, в рамках проводимого расследования было заморожено. Если вспомнить, какое множество офшорных компаний участвует в торговле нефтью, можно сделать вывод, что разыскать деньги, полученные в результате международных нефтяных сделок Казахстана, скорее всего будет невозможно. И независимо от того, верны ли слухи о причастности самого президента или бывшего премьер-министра, многие безусловно получали прибыль за счет большой разницы между внутренними ценами в Казахстане и ценами на мировом рынке. Периодически вводившиеся правительством ограничения на экспорт служат подтверждением существования нелегальной утечки нефти, только частично подконтрольной президенту и его семейству. Хотя Национальный фонд, вообще говоря, не предназначен для решения подобных проблем, в него действительно попадает некоторая часть доходов от продажи нефти. Но структура фонда, его отношения с правительством и решения, которые правительство принимает относительно использования средств фонда (а они в значительной степени инвестируются за границей) — все

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это подвергается критике со стороны МВФ и группы независимых экспертов программы «Прозрачность доходов в Каспийском регионе» (Caspian Revenue Watch — CRW) Института «Открытое общество». Деятельность Национального фонда критикуют и в самом Казахстане, в частности те, кто надеялся, что деньги фонда будут инвестироваться дома либо в форме финансирования определенных проектов развития, либо в форме поддержки казахских инвестиционных фондов. Многие говорили, что решение правительства инвестировать все деньги фонда вне страны — это самое серьезное обвинение в адрес казахстанской экономической реформы, какое только можно вообразить. Однако приглашение иностранных менеджеров для управления Национальным фондом и инвестирование его капиталов за границей по крайней мере хотя бы отчасти помогают уберечь его от политического вмешательства. Если бы Национальный фонд вкладывал капитал во внутренние проекты, то между различными группами, объединенными общими интересами, завязалась бы жестокая борьба. Например, промышленная программа правительства несет на себе отпечаток еще сохранившейся мощи остатков советского военно-промышленного комплекса. Она сформулирована в 2003 г. и предусматривает государственные инвестиции в тяжелую промышленность — тот сектор, который даже по мнению наиболее передовых казахстанских экономистов-реформаторов не сможет работать с прибылью в рыночных условиях 39.

Нужно диверсифицировать экономику Правительство Казахстана понимает, что для обеспечения долгосрочного экономического процветания граждан и приобретения подобающего веса на международной арене экономику страны необходимо диверсифицировать. Однако добиться этого труднее, чем просто делать заявления относительно полезности и желательности такого рода изменений. Подобно многим другим государствам, богатым природными ресурсами, Казахстан должен противостоять искушению финансировать государственные расходы исключительно за счет дифференциальной ренты; он должен инвести-

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ровать эту ренту в проекты, обеспечивающие создание новых источников занятости для населения, которые, в свою очередь, станут новыми объектами налогообложения. Казахстан предполагает вкладывать капитал в некоторые сектора помимо энергетического, в частности в машиностроение, легкую промышленность, производство мебели, фармакологию и бумажную промышленность. Но долгосрочная политика правительства пока остается неопределенной, несмотря на появившийся в 2003 г. пространный документ, посвященный промышленной политике, который, как предполагалось, должен был трансформировать общие идеи в конкретные и осуществимые цели. Новый закон об иностранных инвестициях, принятый в 2003 г., лишь в малой мере способствовал укреплению доверия инвесторов к Казахстану 40. Этот закон упрощает инвестиционный процесс, сокращает число бюрократических ведомств, через которые должен пройти потенциальный инвестор, и количество специальных лицензий; во всем этом иностранцы действительно нуждались. Но многие на Западе опасаются тех положений нового закона, которые, по-видимому, вынуждают иностранных инвесторов решать спорные вопросы не в международных, а в казахстанских судах, поскольку чувствуют, что такое «нивелирование» на самом деле обеспечит серьезные преимущества местным предпринимателям, более приспособленным к деятельности в практически непрозрачной экономической среде Казахстана. Прозрачность экономических сделок в стране увеличивается чрезвычайно медленно, и наименее прозрачными остаются те отрасли экономики, которые теснее других связаны с остатками советского военно-промышленного комплекса. Вопрос о том, насколько тесно Казахстан должен координировать свою экономическую политику с Россией, пока остается спорным для казахстанских экономистов и политических деятелей. Экономическое сотрудничество между двумя странами за последние несколько лет укрепилось, отчасти по геополитическим причинам (об этом говорится в главе 6), но главным образом все же по экономическим. Российский капитал считает Казахстан достаточно привлекательным местом для инвестиций и в тяжелую, и в легкую промышленность, тем более что эти две страны, вероятно, одновременно станут членами Всемирной торговой органи-

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зации, даже при условии, что тарифы между ними все же должны быть полностью согласованы 41. С чисто экономической точки зрения экономика Казахстана стала теперь достаточно прочной, чтобы избежать подавления намного более масштабной российской экономикой, и российский капитал мог бы послужить стимулом для возвращения и реинвестирования казахского офшорного капитала, без которого стране вряд ли удастся осуществить серьезную диверсификацию экономики. За пределами нефтегазовой отрасли западным фирмам часто оказывается трудно конкурировать с российскими компаниями, которые действуют в нескольких конкретных секторах, в первую очередь в цветной металлургии и энергетике. В черной металлургии Казахстана теперь доминирует индийская компания «Lakshmi Mittal». Она основала в Лондоне компанию «Ispat International», которая управляет гигантским Карагандинским сталеплавильным комбинатом, причем настолько успешно, что в 2004 г. она была реорганизована в «Mittal Steel» и активно вышла на глобальный рынок 42. Западные компании, пытающиеся развивать энергетику Казахстана, тоже сталкиваются с трудностями 43. Сотрудничество с Россией и российскими фирмами в этом секторе приобретает все большее значение, а российская государственная электрическая компания РАО ЕЭС играет все более значительную роль в эксплуатации ресурсов Казахстана, что соответствует ее глобальной маркетинговой стратегии. Однако как бы ни были хороши эти проекты с точки зрения инвесторов, экономические реформы в Казахстане можно будет признать успешными только в том случае, если ему удастся преодолеть зависимость от экспорта природных ресурсов как главного источника ВВП 44. Доходы от нефти и газа, по-видимому, смогут лишь частично обеспечить финансирование необходимой диверсификации. Некоторые средства для программ национального развития может предоставить Национальный фонд, но больших прибылей можно ожидать уже через несколько лет, и если резко не увеличить темпы формирования демократических политических институтов, нет никаких гарантий, что эти доходы будут распределяться в условиях полной прозрачности. Проблема не просто в том, чтобы создать рабочие места. С учетом нынешней возрастной структуры населения и прогнозов раз-

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вития нефтяного и газового сектора ожидается, что в 2006 г. нехватка рабочей силы составит примерно 100 тыс. человек. В связи с этим правительство опасается, что большинство этих рабочих мест могут занять иностранные рабочие, и оказывает на западные фирмы сильное давление, побуждая их включать в контракты пункты о найме и обучении местных рабочих. Но эта стратегия не приведет к успеху, если Казахстан не улучшит систему начального и среднего образования и не будет вкладывать достаточные средства в высшее образование. Особенно остро эта проблема стоит в сельских районах, которые весьма неравномерно восстанавливались после кризисов начала 1990-х годов. Расходы казахстанского правительства на социальные нужды в настоящее время составляют 5,4% национального бюджета, и в своем докладе за 2004 г. МВФ приветствовал увеличение расходов на образование, здравоохранение и развитие соответствующей инфраструктуры, которые можно будет покрыть за счет повышающихся доходов от нефти при наличии эффективных бюджетных институтов и проведения бюджетных реформ 45. В долгосрочном плане правительство Казахстана должно также позаботиться о том, чтобы по мере роста экономики какая-то часть населения не оказалась обделенной. Тем, кто часто бывает в Казахстане, кажется, что разрыв между богатыми и бедными увеличивается, хотя согласно индексу Джини дела в этом отношении в Казахстане обстоят хорошо; в самом деле, индекс Джини у Казахстана равен 31,3, что совсем неплохо для развивающейся страны, по сравнению, например, с 33,1 у Канады и 40,8 у США 46. По данным швейцарских аналитиков, доходы не достигают прожиточного минимума лишь у 28% населения страны, и это еще раз подтверждает, что бедность представляет собой в Казахстане меньшую проблему, чем в большинстве соседних стран 47. Если судить по основным показателям, экономическая политика в Казахстане оказалась лучше, чем в любой другой стране региона; тем не менее ожидания значительной части его жителей не оправдались, и это создает политическую угрозу для руководства, которое не было избрано демократическим путем. В конце концов, оценка деятельности правительства населением важнее статистических данных. Хотя правительство упорно старалось рассеять популярные мифы о быстрых неожиданных прибылях

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от нефти и газа, большинству казахстанцев пока трудно понять, почему обилие природных ресурсов не трансформируется в быстрый подъем уровня жизни населения. Существование обширного слоя бедноты (людей, живущих за чертой бедности или близко к ней), сравнительно небольшого по центральноазиатским стандартам, но достаточно массового, чтобы восприниматься как реальная политическая сила, отчасти объясняет отказ руководителей Казахстана от расширения участия граждан в политической жизни. Казахстанцы также ожидают, что правительство направит какую-то часть общественного дохода на решение острейших экологических проблем, оставшихся с советских времен. Некоторые из них связаны с медленной гибелью Аральского моря, площадь которого сейчас составляет лишь 20% той, которую оно имело в 1960-х годах, а 80% его прежней поверхности превратилось в соленую пустыню; другие связаны с испытаниями оружия, проводившимися здесь на протяжении десятилетий. Многие считают, что правительство должно гораздо активнее бороться с новыми социальными болезнями, такими как СПИД, наркомания и туберкулез, которые с приходом независимости развиваются ужасающими темпами 48. Должны пройти годы, прежде чем Казахстан получит шанс стать страной, которую можно будет условно назвать богатой, с обширными новыми ресурсами, использование которых поможет решить социальные проблемы. Этот разрыв между общественными ожиданиями и возможностями правительства должен стимулировать его к решительной борьбе с коррупцией и расширению возможностей участия граждан в экономической жизни, что приведет к увеличению доходов. Но, как будет показано в главе 7, коррупция в Казахстане, как и во всех других странах региона, растет фактически беспрепятственно. К тому же международному сообществу становится все труднее требовать от Казахстана продолжения реформ, потому что его потребности в международной помощи значительно уменьшились. В 2003 г. МВФ закрыл свое казахстанское представительство, потому что правительство страны погасило основные долговые обязательства и не собирается снова занимать деньги.

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Туркмения пока растрачивает свой потенциал Туркмения походит на Казахстан и одновременно резко от него отличается. Она столь же богата природными ресурсами, и хотя ее запасы нефти намного меньше (но все же значительны), запасы газа гораздо больше. Как и Казахстан, Туркмения не имеет больших оснований занимать деньги у международных финансовых учреждений. Так что, вообще говоря, она может привередничать и выбирать, каким международным рекомендациям следовать, а каким нет. Но в отличие от Казахстана Туркмения не имеет выхода на западные рынки, и вряд ли в ближайшее время эту проблему удастся решить. Во многих отношениях Туркмения — единственная страна Центральной Азии, которая «свободно решила» оставаться отсталой. Правительство Туркмении возлагает исключительно большие надежды на получение иностранных инвестиций, ожидая, что к 2020 г. объем их в нефтяной сектор составит 63 млрд долл. Но к 2004 г. инвестиции в новые проекты добычи составили всего 1 млрд долл., и о каких-либо новых крупных инвестициях речи пока нет. Одно время соглашения с правительством Туркмении относительно разработки месторождений нефти и газа заключали и крупные западные фирмы, такие как «Unocal», «Royal Dutch Shell» и «Mobil», и многие более мелкие компании — «Bridas», «Itochi» и «Larmag». Но в конечном счете они решили, что нет смысла дожидаться полного развертывания намечавшихся проектов. С их уходом в Туркмении осталось очень мало иностранных нефтяных и газовых фирм: «Petronas», «Maersk Oil», «Dragon Oil» и, конечно, российский «Газпром», который по-прежнему является главным иностранным партнером Туркмении 49. Кроме того, в Туркмении самый неблагоприятный в регионе инвестиционный климат с нулевой прозрачностью и гиперцентрализацией экономики. Иностранные инвестиции не могут осуществляться без санкции президента, товары не могут экспортироваться, а иностранные резервы распределяться без его подписи 50. И, что особенно неприятно, валюта страны манат практически ничего не стоит. Манат вводился без использования программы стабилизации, обеспечивающей международную поддержку,

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и первоначально его курс был установлен равным доллару (1 : 1), но сейчас даже по официальному курсу за доллар дают 5200 манат (а уличный обменный курс еще в четыре-пять раз ниже), причем правительство мало заботится о ликвидации черного рынка валюты. Мнение иностранных экспертов в Туркмении не ценят, более того, им пренебрегают в такой степени, что теперь его редко предлагают вниманию руководства страны. Представители международных финансовых учреждений не находят слов, чтобы выразить, насколько они разочарованы поведением туркменских властей, и жалуются, что должностные лица в правительстве меняются так часто, что не успевает приобрести хоть какой-то опыт во внешнеэкономических вопросах. Резюме Всемирного банка в отношении Туркмении содержит примечание, что за десять лет для нее было подготовлено десять стратегических программ, но ни одна не имела практически никакого эффекта. В результате Туркмения получила от Всемирного банка только три относительно небольших займа и была лишена права на дальнейшие заимствования из-за отказа сообщить размеры своего внешнего долга 51. Аналогичным образом Европейский банк реконструкции и развития считает Туркмению страной, подходящей лишь для базового, т. е. минимального участия, и его маленькая программа кредитования ориентирована исключительно на еле выживающий сектор малого и среднего бизнеса, который страдает от валютных и экспортных ограничений и развитию которого препятствует весьма ограниченная приватизация ключевых секторов экономики. Приватизация и так шла медленно, а в 2001 г. фактически прекратилась. Законодательство исключает возможность приватизации нефтяных и газовых месторождений. Планы широкой приватизации в сельском хозяйстве регулярно откладываются, последний раз это случилось в 2004 г.52 Однако правительство Туркмении не проявляет никакого интереса к осуществлению изменений, необходимых для привлечения международных финансовых учреждений, и это оставляет им мало возможностей для сотрудничества с Ашхабадом. Для специалиста по экономической статистике Туркмения — просто страшный сон. Практически ничему из того, что сообщает правительство, нельзя верить вплоть до данных о численности

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населения, которое согласно официальным источникам составляет 5,73 млн человек, в то время как некоторые информированные наблюдатели считают, что эта цифра завышена примерно на 25% 53. На самом деле те, кто пробовал анализировать заявления правительства Туркмении, касающиеся большинства социально-экономических секторов, пришли к выводу, что статистические данные в Туркмении представляют тот мир, в котором хотел бы существовать Туркменбаши, а не тот реальный мир, в котором обитает бóльшая часть населения. В частности, большие сомнения вызывают данные о средней продолжительности жизни, детской смертности и распространии инфекционных заболеваний 54. В 2004 г. в Туркмении был введен новый, очень опасный метод «ликвидации» болезней: врачам было запрещено регистрировать целый ряд инфекционных заболеваний включая чуму и гепатит, а затем, в 2005 г., бóльшая часть больниц за пределами столицы была просто закрыта 55. Правительство Туркмении рисует самые радужные картины экономического прогресса, сообщая об увеличении производства в 2003 г. на 23,1% и о том, что третий год подряд темпы роста превышают 20%. Однако ЕБРР считает, что более реалистичная оценка экономического роста за 2003 г. — 11%, и то в основном за счет высоких цен на энергоносители 56. Кроме того, по сравнению с другими странами Центральной Азии в 2003 г. у Туркмении самый плохой индекс переходных индикаторов ЕБРР, что по пятибалльной шкале оценок общего улучшения ситуации соответствует 1 баллу (слабый прогресс или полное его отсутствие) 57. Если принять во внимание условия, на которых Туркмения продает природный газ России, то следует считать сомнительными даже те данные экономической статистики, которые частично подвергаются международной проверке. В последние годы «Газпром» стал вести себя с Туркменией более агрессивно, потому что политики, очевидно, чувствуют, что спокойное отношение к американскому военному присутствию в Центральной Азии позволяет России свободнее вести себя в других областях. В настоящее время «Газпром» закупает 45% туркменского газа. Согласно последнему соглашению, подписанному в апреле 2003 г., за 1 тыс. куб. м газа «Газпром» платит Туркмении 44 долл. (половину деньгами и половину по бартеру) 58. С учетом реальной стоимости бар-

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терных «товаров» получается, что реальная закупочная цена составляет от 22 до 28 долл.59 В начале 2005 г. Ашхабад попробовал проявить жесткость по отношению к русским и потребовал платить ему 60 долл., а не 44. «Газпром» не согласился на это, и Туркмения закрыла вентиль 60. Около 6 млрд куб. м газа теперь уходит через Иран, но при увеличении объема добычи по трубопроводу от Корпедже до КуртКуи можно было бы транспортировать до 10 млрд куб. м в год. Туркмения компенсирует Ирану его долю в стоимости этого трубопровода через доходы от транзита 61. Основа туркменского экспорта — ископаемое топливо и хлопок. Увеличение ВВП Туркмении было результатом возобновления продажи газа России в 1998 г. Точную информацию об экспорте из Туркмении получить невозможно, поскольку правительство страны считает, что это никого не касается. Туркменские экономисты, имеющие доступ к информации, предоставляемой иностранным партнерам, под присягой обязуются сохранять ее в тайне и говорят, что если они нарушат клятву, их самих и их родственников ожидают самые серьезные неприятности. Слухи о том, что торговля нефтью и газом приносит выгоду непосредственно президенту и его семье, настолько многочисленны, что эту гипотезу можно считать достоверным фактом. В частности, утверждают, что часть прибыли поступала от продажи топлива в Афганистан во времена правления «Талибана»; этот поток якобы измерялся миллионами долларов в год, и сделки никак не оформлялись 62. Насколько серьезно стоит в Туркмении проблема президентской коррупции, узнать практически невозможно, потому что Ниязов непосредственно контролирует резервный фонд иностранной валюты, в который поступают доходы от большинства иностранных инвестиций. Он также определяет приоритеты в отношении расходования иностранной валюты, причем непропорционально большие суммы вкладываются в крупные строительные проекты (вместо инвестиций в развитие национальной инфраструктуры) 63. Президент Ниязов и члены его семьи сумели проникнуть практически в каждый сектор экономики страны. Один из туркменских эмигрантов, Мурад Эсенов, даже назвал Ниязова «господин 33%», имея в виду долю от каждой сделки с иностранцами, которая, по слухам, идет президенту или указанному им получателю 64.

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В двух секторах экономики, энергетическом и текстильном, действует одна небольшая, но влиятельная группа иностранных инвесторов. Самые заметные из них — Иосиф Майман из Израиля и Ахмед Калик из Турции. Оба они достаточно богаты, оба, по слухам, помогали и помогают Ниязову и его родственникам увеличивать их личные состояния 65. Понятно, что оба бизнесмена являются доверенными лицами туркменского президента, а Калик, имеющий двойное (турецкое и туркменское) гражданство, некоторое время даже работал в правительстве республики. Компания «Merhav Group» во главе с ее президентом и председателем правления Иосифом Майманом с 1997 г. была официальным подрядчиком правительства и модернизировала крупнейший в стране нефтеочистительный комплекс в Туркменбаши, портовом городе на побережье Каспия, по контракту на сумму 1,6 млрд долл. Модернизация предусматривала обновление существующих и сооружение новых установок. Ниязов также попросил «Merhav» разработать план модернизации завода в Сеиди — второго по величине очистительного комплекса в Туркмении. Ахмед Калик тоже прибыл в Туркмению в середине 1990-х годов. Он строил здесь текстильные фабрики и роскошные высотные здания и попутно стал ближайшим советником Ниязова по экономическим делам и продаже энергоносителей, а также его доверенным лицом, поднявшись формально до уровня заместителя министра текстильной промышленности. В Туркмении Калика подозревают в финансовых махинациях и злоупотреблении доступом к Туркменбаши. Активы Калика в Туркмении оценить трудно, но, например, только одна текстильная фабрика, построенная совместно с японской компанией «Mitsubishi» в Ашхабаде, стоит 169 млн долл. Торговля хлопком в Туркмении пронизана коррупцией. Продажа хлопка-сырца внутри страны и его экспорт все еще почти полностью осуществляются с использованием закупочных цен государственного заказа, и разница между этими ценами и ценами международного рынка позволяет кое-кому сколачивать огромные состояния. По слухам, и здесь президент и его семья получают прибыль от торговли, осуществляемой турецкими посредниками. Существует также много других привилегированных семейств, которым предоставлены квоты на выращивание хлопка и разрешена его частная продажа помимо квот. Колхозы советской эпохи

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скорее переименованы, чем реорганизованы, хотя многие хозяйства были вынуждены частично или полностью перейти на выращивание зерновых культур, так что со времени обретения независимости производство зерна в Туркмении увеличилось десятикратно. Как и в других частях региона, в стране увеличились общие площади обрабатываемых земель, что создает заметное напряжение в и так уже вызывающей беспокойство водной системе. Избранное Ашхабадом частичное решение этой проблемы — создание в восточной части Туркмении гигантского водоема («Великого туркменского озера») — еще больше обострило напряженность, вызванную конкуренцией за водные ресурсы между Туркменией и Узбекистаном 66. Хотя в сфере управления этими ресурсами Туркмения хотела бы получить международные рекомендации (пусть и весьма ограниченные), корректировать планы создания этого водоема она не желает. В целом после 11 сентября возможности влияния международного сообщества в Туркмении сократились, потому что, по мнению Ниязова, увеличение геополитической роли его страны означает, что и дальнейшая централизация власти сойдет ему с рук. Он надеялся, что падение режима талибов приведет к увеличению стратегической значимости его страны и к улучшению экономической ситуации, позволив Туркмении торговать газом и даже нефтью через Афганистан. Однако пока мало признаков того, что изменение геополитических условий вскоре приведет к существенным экономическим сдвигам. Создание международной группы доноров, которая должна помочь финансировать восстановление Афганистана, вызвало новый всплеск интереса к прокладке трубопровода через эту страну, что было формально подтверждено лидерами Афганистана, Пакистана и Туркмении на встрече в Ашхабаде 26 июня 2003 г. Азиатский банк развития взял на себя ответственность за подготовку технико-экономического обоснования этого проекта, причем 1,5 млн долл. поступило в счет японских обязательств в Афганистане. Японские фирмы, «Indonesia Petroleum» и «Itochu Oil Exploration» выразили интерес к разработке Давлетабадского месторождения в Туркмении, но пока ограничились направлением в этот район своих высших руководителей для ознакомления с ситуацией, и представляется, что они больше интересуют-

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ся долгосрочным доступом к данным активам, чем инвестициями в ближайшем будущем 67. Притягательность проекта прокладки трубопровода через Афганистан ослабляется влиянием нескольких факторов. В частности, это ненадежность ситуации в Афганистане в плане безопасности, сомнения относительно перспектив сотрудничества Индии и Пакистана (если газ не будет продаваться в Индию, а только в Пакистан, то рентабельность проекта становится проблематичной) и сохраняющиеся трудности ведения бизнеса в Туркмении. В апреле 2005 г. АБР после существенной задержки наконец объявил, что его специалисты завершили технико-экономическое обоснование проекта и пришли к выводу, что идея трансафганского трубопровода коммерчески жизнеспособна. Но пока не найден достаточно сильный коммерческий партнер для этого проекта и не обеспечены поставки газа из Туркмении, так что он, вероятно, не скоро превратится в стабильный источник дохода для любой из стран-участниц. Хотя географические и геополитические факторы тоже препятствуют развитию газовой промышленности страны, главную роль в том, что потенциальные инвесторы потеряли интерес к туркменской нефти, сыграла сама Туркмения. В отличие от большинства других производителей нефти она находится на рынке покупателей, а не на рынке продавцов. Ее соседи Азербайджан и Казахстан имеют более привлекательные активы и обеспечивают более благоприятные условия для инвестиций. Туркменская нефть по-прежнему транспортируется по сети трубопроводов советской эпохи, которой управляет «Транснефть» (планы «Unocal» построить новый нефтепровод из Туркмении параллельно с прокладкой газопровода провалились). Но несмотря на все попытки американцев убедить Ниязова, он отказался согласиться на транспортировку нефти и газа через поддерживаемую США систему транскаспийских трубопроводов, вливающихся в экспортный маршрут Баку — Тбилиси — Джейхан. Его отказ означал конец проекта сооружения подземного транскаспийского газопровода. Он также означает, что Туркмения остается жестко привязанной к своим конкурентам в области производства газа — России и Ирану, причем обе эти страны, если понадобится для защиты своих рынков, смогут продавать газ дешевле, чем Туркмения.

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Возможно, отчасти из-за проблем, связанных с выбором новых маршрутов для нефтепроводов, правительство Туркмении решило вместо этого развивать свои мощности по переработке нефти. Разумеется, расходы, связанные с этими новыми проектами, еще больше увеличили внешний долг Туркмении 68. Инициатива при этом исходила непосредственно от президента Туркмении, положившегося на рекомендации иностранных инвесторов, таких как Майман и Калик, которым это решение обеспечивает прямую выгоду. Нефтегазовый сектор Туркмении очень страдает от некомпетентности руководства и нежелания высших официальных лиц делегировать ответственность. Люди, занимавшие высокие посты и предлагавшие по-настоящему творческие решения в этих областях, были отстранены 69. С технической точки зрения их уход затрудняет проведение экономических реформ, даже если бы теперь президент Ниязов решил полностью изменить свою политику. В целом с началом оттока российских специалистов (с момента разрушения «Туркменросгаза» в 1993 г.) страна все больше страдает от утечки талантов. Отношение к местному русскому населению в Туркмении ухудшается. Обучение на русском языке в 2001 г. резко сократилось, роль русского языка в официальной жизни снизилась еще в 2000 г., и, наконец, в 2003 г. правительство Туркмении отказалось продлить десятилетнее соглашение с Россией о двойном гражданстве, подписанное в 1993 г., и фактически выслало из страны всех обладателей двойного гражданства, не пожелавших стать лишь туркменскими подданными 70. Это обернулось новым всплеском утечки мозгов в связи с отъездом из Туркмении представителей самых разных национальностей, причем настолько серьезным, что в 2003 г. республике пришлось снова ввести выездные визы, которые были отменены незадолго до этого, в 2002 г. Эта мера, которая оправдывалась необходимостью предотвратить «бегство от правосудия» родственников все более многочисленных политических заключенных, должна была заставить русскоязычных жителей Туркмении остаться в стране 71. Так или иначе, политика Ниязова мало способствовала подготовке граждан Туркмении, говорящих по-русски или по-туркменски, к работе на ответственных постах в экономике страны. Продолжительность среднего образования сократилась с одиннадца-

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ти до девяти лет, срок обучения в университете — с пяти до двух, к тому же число мест в высших учебных заведениях Туркмении уменьшилось примерно на 90%. Программы обучения на всех уровнях были пересмотрены, и теперь значительно больше внимания в них уделяется туркменской истории и культуре, а также руководящим наставлениям Туркменбаши (за счет математики и других наук). Сам Туркменбаши составил своего рода моральный кодекс «Рухнама» («Сказание о Духе»), сочинение отчасти историческое, отчасти философское, а отчасти просто учебник патриотизма для начинающих. Этот не вполне внятный текст изучается в обязательном порядке, и в сентябре 2004 г. вышло его второе издание. В 2004 г. государство начало проводить в жизнь принятое ранее решение о том, что в Туркмении признаются только аттестаты, дипломы и иные документы об образовании, полученные в самой стране или выданные в других государствах, но только по программам учебного обмена, поддерживаемым правительством Туркмении 72. Это решение касается только документов об образовании, полученных после 1993 г., так что на владельцев советских аттестатов и дипломов оно не распространяется. Но теперь любому гражданину, отправившемуся учиться за границу (три самых распространенных варианта — Соединенные Штаты, Россия и Турция) по собственной инициативе, по возвращении фактически будет запрещено работать по специальности. А если эти люди не возвращаются, их родственники попадают в категорию политически неблагонадежных и могут потерять работу, а то и подвергнуться более серьезным преследованиям. Кроме того, в 2002 г. для всех мужчин в возрасте от 17 до 49 лет была введена обязательная воинская повинность, что еще больше сдерживает приток образованных людей в экономику 73. Правда, это позволяет занять значительную часть подрастающей молодежи, но, во-первых, лишь на два года, а во-вторых, при этом молодые люди чаще всего не получают профессиональных навыков, которые могли бы пригодиться им в дальнейшей жизни, так что потом они в основном пополняют ряды бедноты. Никакой надежной информации о том, какой процент населения Туркмении живет за чертой бедности, нет. Правительство относит к этой категории всего 1% населения, но по оценкам ЕБРР бедствует примерно 58% жителей Туркмении 74. По данным Все-

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мирного банка, 44% населения страны живет менее чем на 2 долл. в день; это заметно больше, чем в Казахстане (здесь к этой категории относится менее 10%), и почти соответствует уровню бедности (в том числе и для работающей бедноты) в Киргизии 75. Правда, нужно иметь в виду, что цифры дохода в Туркмении, как и в некоторых других странах Центральной Азии, не вполне точно характеризуют уровень бедности, потому что зачастую здесь очень дешевые или вообще бесплатные коммунальные услуги, например, электро- и газоснабжение 76. Но независимо от точности сегодняшних оценок доля населения Туркмении, живущего в бедности, по-видимому, будет возрастать.

Киргизия: стремление к реформам не обеспечивает процветания Из всех стран региона Киргизия оказалась наиболее восприимчивой к международным рекомендациям, но пока это не позволило ей построить эффективную экономику. Всемирный банк относит Киргизию к странам с низким доходом и высоким уровнем задолженности, причем эта оценка оставалась неизменной в течение всего периода правления Аскара Акаева, так что его насильственное отстранение от власти в марте 2005 г. во многом объясняется именно тем, что население страны было недовольно экономическим застоем. Это очень печально, поскольку считалось, что у Киргизии лучшие перспективы из всех стран Центральной Азии. Значение индекса оценки политических и институциональных преобразований, определяемого Всемирным банком для стран, входящих в Международную ассоциацию развития (МАР), в 2001 г. позволило отнести Киргизию к третьему квинтилю, в то время как Узбекистан и Таджикистан — только к пятому 77. Специалисты из международных финансовых организаций, как правило, считают, что работать с киргизами довольно легко и что в работе они часто демонстрируют высокий уровень профессионализма. Отношения между правительством Киргизии и этими организациями складываются очень хорошо, так что международное финансовое сообщество намерено помочь этой стране с реструктуризацией долга и разработкой новых стратегий заим-

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ствования, чтобы она могла финансировать различные аспекты программ борьбы с бедностью. У Киргизии самое высокое в Центральной Азии отношение задолженности к доходу. Частично это долги за энергоносители, но основная масса киргизских долгов связана с целевыми займами на осуществление экономических и социальных реформ. Эти долги стали для страны тяжелым бременем, потому что экономика Киргизии восстанавливалась не так быстро, как первоначально полагали эксперты. Но если считать, что международное сообщество помогло ввергнуть Киргизию в нынешний кризис, то оно же сейчас помогает ей выбраться из него. В марте 2002 г. в ответ на разработку киргизским правительством (в сотрудничестве со Всемирным банком и другими главными кредиторами) новой программы борьбы с бедностью. Парижский клуб начал реструктуризацию киргизского долга 78. Кроме того, эти кредиторы, со своей стороны, предложили значительные дополнительные займы на достаточно льготных условиях 79. Эти средства также обеспечивают международным финансовым учреждениям новые рычаги давления на киргизское правительство, чтобы оно проявляло бóльшую финансовую ответственность. Хотя правительству Киргизии не удалось достичь всех совместно намеченных целей, в марте 2005 г. Парижский клуб согласился списать ему еще 124 млн долл. долга и перенести сроки выплаты 431 млн долл.80 Финансовая помощь теперь осуществляется под более строгим международным контролем, чем раньше, чтобы не допустить хищений, которые, как полагают, имели место в первые семь-восемь лет независимости. К сожалению, о том, какая доля ранее предоставленной финансовой помощи пропала вследствие прямого воровства, фаворитизма или просто осуществления неудачных проектов, можно судить лишь на основании отрывочной информации. Масштабы киргизской экономики очень малы, и нет практически никаких перспектив ее существенного увеличения. Реальный ВВП страны за 1990—2001 гг. в целом снизился, но темпы его восстановления были выше, чем у некоторых ее соседей 81. Приватизация малых и средних предприятий в Киргизии практически закончена, и к январю 2004 г. общий уровень приватизации достиг 70,7% 82. Эти предприятия дают работу примерно 60% на-

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селения и обеспечивают 85% ВВП; на долю частного сектора приходится также 93% сельскохозяйственного производства 83. Действующие законы в недостаточной степени обеспечивают юридическую защиту частной собственности, однако правительство обещало исправить положение в рамках стратегии сокращения бедности в 2003—2005 гг.84 Но отказ государства от вмешательства в экономику сам по себе не означает ее быстрого восстановления после экономических потрясений, связанных с распадом Советского Союза. По данным правительства Киргизии, в 2003 г. в бедности жило 50% населения страны 85. Состояние экономики в столице Бишкеке и прилегающих районах намного лучше, чем в остальной части страны 86. Согласно данным Программы развития Организации Объединенных Наций, 88% населения Киргизии живет менее чем на 4 долл. в день 87. Уровень безработицы в Киргизии меньше 10%, из чего определенно следует, что проблема бедности в Киргизии — это проблема рабочей бедноты. Однако уровень жизни бедных, кажется, все же повышается, в то время как разрыв между бедными и богатыми сокращается, и в целом показатели, характеризующие бедность в стране, улучшаются. По мнению специалистов Всемирного банка, разработавшего Национальную стратегию сокращения бедности в Киргизии на 2003—2005 гг., пик бедности в республике был пройден в 1999 г. Правительству Киргизии необходимо преодолеть разрыв между севером и югом страны — культурный, экономический и даже географический. Такую задачу ставила перед собой администрация Акаева, но не смогла решить ее достаточно быстро, чтобы сохранить доверие большинства населения южной части страны. И хотя на самом деле в северной части Киргизии есть районы, где люди живут хуже, чем в большинстве общин на юге, оказывается, что в абсолютных цифрах на юге живет намного больше бедных, потому что плотность населения там значительно выше. А поскольку руководителями Киргизии традиционно становятся выходцы из северной части страны, многие южане полагают, что их экономические проблемы объясняются пренебрежительным отношением правительства к проблемам юга 88. Однако государственная стратегия борьбы с бедностью, разработанная правительством при Акаеве, учитывала эти региональные факторы, и к тому времени,

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когда Акаев был изгнан с поста президента, бедность на юге сокращалась быстрее, чем в среднем по стране. Проблема безработицы в южных областях также стоит более остро, и это безусловно серьезно беспокоит преемников Акаева. Им трудно будет быстро справиться с бедностью, если радикально не изменится структура иностранной помощи (к этому мы вернемся ниже, в заключении). В связи с высокой плотностью населения в южной части Киргизии и особенностями его возрастного состава (очень большая доля молодежи) проблемы бедности и безработицы, по-видимому, начинают угрожать национальной безопасности страны 89. Кроме того, южная часть Киргизии — это зона потенциальных этнических и этнорелигиозных конфликтов, потому что более трети населения на юге составляют узбеки, живущие в основном в этнических анклавах в приграничных районах. Здесь еще свежи воспоминания о межэтнических столкновениях в Оше и Джалал-Абаде в 1990 г., но сейчас напряженность в целом снизилась, в значительной степени потому, что уровень жизни местных узбеков (как и киргизов) намного выше, чем у их соплеменников по другую сторону границы, в Узбекистане. Хотя официальная статистика обеих стран этого не подтверждает, наблюдатели, бывающие в этих районах, замечают, что уровень жизни на киргизской стороне границы действительно заметно выше, чем на узбекской 90. Но население на юге страны не только в целом беднее, чем на севере: здесь оно еще и намного более религиозное. Отчасти это объясняется более высокой долей узбекского населения, которое строже относится к предписаниям ислама, чем киргизы, но и киргизы на юге более склонны к соблюдению мусульманских ритуалов, чем их собратья на севере. И радикальным исламским группировкам, таким как «Хизб ат-Тахрир», гораздо легче вербовать сторонников на юге Киргизии (не только среди узбеков, но и среди киргизов), чем на севере. И на севере, и на юге страны население считает, что экономическая политика властей обеспечивает более благоприятные условия другой части страны. В целом, поскольку правительству пока не удается преодолеть экономический спад, ему практически не остается ничего другого, кроме как позволить международному сообществу проводить эксперименты с экономикой. Но размеры выделяемых средств определяют сами международные организа-

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ции, финансирующие проекты в Киргизии, и они же в большинстве случаев указывают, как эти деньги должны быть потрачены. Двусторонние организации предлагают весьма скудное дотационное финансирование, и при этом киргизское руководство практически не имеет рычагов влияния даже на самых благожелательных партнеров, чтобы побудить их выделять больше средств в виде безвозмездной помощи и меньше в виде займов. Размеры дотаций, которые получает Киргизия, в значительной степени определяются ожиданиями иностранных советников относительно темпов роста киргизской экономики, а эти ожидания, в свою очередь, продолжают обнадеживать простодушных киргизов, не имеющих никакой сравнительной базы для оценки экономического потенциала своей страны. Однако предположения, что экономика Киргизии будет расти быстрее, чем это имеет место на самом деле, не были совсем уж иррациональными. Была причина надеяться, что Киргизия сможет «проскочить первой» в плане экономических инвестиций и привлечь иностранный капитал. При более свободных условиях торговли экономическое восстановление Киргизии шло бы более гладко, хотя и не просто. Изначально у международных советников не было никаких оснований ожидать закрытия границ и разрывов торговых связей в Центральной Азии. Кроме того, и правительство, и его международные советники недооценили хрупкость киргизской экономики и переоценили возможности выхода страны со своими товарами на мировые рынки. К сожалению, современное экономическое планирование не всегда в должной мере учитывает реальность. Первоочередной проблемой сейчас является обеспечение страны продуктами питания, и правительство честно заслужило соответствующий кредит, поскольку провело самую широкомасштабную в регионе сельскохозяйственную реформу. Но несмотря на всю важность улучшения показателей работы сельскохозяйственного сектора для обеспечения продовольственной безопасности страны, и МАР, и МВФ полагают, что правительство Киргизии могло бы еще активнее способствовать увеличению роли частного сектора в сельском хозяйстве 91. Однако независимо от того, насколько приватизировано сельское хозяйство, существуют реальные факторы, ограничивающие возможности развития сельскохозяй-

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ственного сектора страны. За годы независимости индекс объема производства продуктов питания в Киргизии заметно улучшился — в отличие от всех остальных стран Центральной Азии (за исключением Туркмении, статистические показатели которой, однако, вызывают большие подозрения). Но площадь пахотных угодий в расчете на душу населения в Киргизии очень мала (0,28 га), и ее нельзя существенно увеличить иначе как за счет сокращения объемов воды, достающихся государствам, расположенным ниже по течению рек. Кроме того, киргизские экономисты изучают возможности развития легкой промышленности в качестве дополнительного источника занятости. Некоторое расширение легкой промышленности действительно возможно, и оздоровление правовой среды в сочетании с благоприятным налогообложением (не более 20%) обеспечило бы Киргизии надлежащий стимул (с учетом того, что региональные торговые ограничения должны когда-нибудь ослабеть). Но трудно предположить, что промышленность Киргизии сможет обеспечить себе прочные позиции в регионе, поскольку все бóльшую роль там играют новые или существенно реорганизованные казахские и российские предприятия. В рыночной экономике Россия и Казахстан ориентируются, как минимум, не хуже Киргизии, но при этом они лучше «оснащены» капиталами. Хотя правительственные экономисты предлагают и оптимистические, и весьма скромные сценарии будущего развития, они признают, что необходимым условием воплощения оптимистических сценариев является радикальное изменение торгового и инвестиционного климата во всем регионе. По правде говоря, трудно будет реализовать даже весьма пессимистический вариант, предусматривающий рост ВВП на 4,9% в год, не говоря уже о 7%, которые фигурируют в более радужных альтернативных сценариях. Дело в том, что приведенный более низкий показатель темпов роста основан на ожидаемом объеме инвестиций на уровне 20% ВВП, однако картина инвестиций за последние несколько лет не дает оснований считать эти надежды сколько-нибудь реалистичными 92. Ведущие экономисты страны продолжают также надеяться на превращение Киргизии в региональный транспортный центр. Значительную долю иностранной финансовой помощи, особенно от ЕБРР и АБР, правительство страны тратит на улучшение

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внутренних транспортных путей, ведущих к границам с Таджикистаном и Китаем, однако слабые надежды на активизацию региональной торговли поневоле заставляют предполагать, что эти усилия вряд ли приведут к заметному увеличению доходов за счет транзита через Киргизию 93. И хотя мечты о превращении в «центральноазиатскую Швейцарию» остались в прошлом, Киргизия все еще надеется стать воротами в Китай, поскольку во всем регионе лишь эти две страны являются членами Всемирной торговой организации. Однако когда Казахстан и Россия тоже вступят в ВТО (что вероятнее всего произойдет в ближайшие несколько лет), это преимущество также будет потеряно. А обе названные страны устроит и старая система рельсовых и автомобильных дорог, идущих через Киргизию. Но пока Россия и Казахстан еще не столь близки к членству в ВТО, они будут продолжать «наказывать» Киргизию за ее самостоятельную политику в отношении этой организации. И Россия, и Казахстан хотели бы продлить существование единой тарифной системы в государствах — партнерах по режиму свободной торговли по крайней мере на 2005 г., а они являются важными торговыми партнерами Киргизии 94. В 2002 г. России и Киргизии, как сообщалось, удалось согласовать тарифы всего лишь на уровне 14% 95. Пока киргизские товары облагаются высокими таможенными пошлинами, да еще следует учесть взятки, которые нужно заплатить, чтобы перевезти товары через границу и через международные контрольно-пропускные пункты в Казахстан и Россию. По оценкам экономистов МВФ, дорожно-транспортные расходы на провоз товаров из Киргизии составляют в среднем 10—15% общих расходов, причем только около трети их идет на горючее 96. Киргизия вынашивает также чрезмерно оптимистичные планы значительного увеличения добычи золота. С учетом высоких затрат на добычу золота из большинства пока не разрабатываемых крупных месторождений расчеты исходят из того, что цена золота будет выше 400 долл. за унцию. Разработка многих из этих месторождений связана с существенным экологическим риском. Между тем население Киргизии гораздо более настороженно относится к подобного рода риску после гибели нескольких сограждан вследствие отравления цианидами, образующимися в ходе работ на крупном месторождении Кумтор 97.

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Весной 2004 г. правительство приняло меры по улучшению инвестиционного климата в золотодобывающей промышленности. Проект «Кумтор» (находящийся сейчас на втором этапе развития) был передан новому юридическому лицу — компании «Centerra», совместному предприятию, созданному корпорацией «Cameco» и киргизским правительством 98. Позже «Centerra» продала 70,2 млн акций (около 9% стоимости компании) из пакета, принадлежащего правительству Киргизии, в рамках первоначального публичного предложения акций на фондовой бирже Торонто. Эта сделка принесла правительству республики примерно 115 млн долл., а его доля в проекте уменьшилась до 16%. Хотя правительство уверяло, что вырученные деньги будут потрачены на борьбу с бедностью, эта сделка вызвала протесты парламентариев, поскольку была проведена постановлением правительства, а не законодательным актом 99. Раздавались также жалобы, что акции были проданы по слишком низкой цене (15,5 долл.), и выдвигалось много разных предположений относительно того, кто мог извлечь из этого выгоду. Планы поиска крупных иностранных инвесторов для развития гидроэнергетики также спорны. Киргизские экономисты пытаются заставить правительство реализовать старые советские планы строительства мощных гидроэлектростанций, которые существенно увеличили бы экспортный потенциал страны. Но при этом они не очень задумываются о возможных геополитических последствиях такого шага, а именно о реакции других стран, использующих те же водные ресурсы ниже по течению. Острее всего на это, вероятно, может отреагировать Узбекистан, потому что Казахстан в определенной степени заинтересован в том, чтобы Киргизия увеличила производство электроэнергии, так как это помогло бы трансформировать связи, унаследованные от советской эпохи, в отношения, в большей мере построенные на рыночных принципах. Управляемая государством российская энергетическая компания РАО ЕЭС живо интересуется использованием гидроэлектрического потенциала Киргизии. В последние годы РАО ЕЭС, уже активно действующая в Казахстане, инвестирует средства в Киргизии и в других частях региона, чтобы дать возможность России продавать собственную избыточную энергию в Европу (подробнее об этом пойдет речь в главе 6). Хотя инвестиции этой квази-

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правительственной российской компании могут обеспечить Киргизии безопасную среду для развития гидроэнергетики, это не позволит ей в максимальной мере использовать местный потенциал для получения дохода. Сходная ситуация существует и в газовом секторе, где российский «Газпром» стремится приобретать активы по всей Центральной Азии и обещает инвестировать прибыли, полученные в регионе, в развитие местных транспортных сетей. Роль «Газпрома» в Киргизии увеличивается, но вряд ли это приведет к существенному расширению их экономических возможностей. Планы разработки новых месторождений нефти и газа в Киргизии, если учесть их небольшие размеры и изобилие подобных ресурсов в соседних государствах, выглядят сравнительно капиталоемкими. Кроме того, весьма перспективным с экономической точки зрения правительству Киргизии представляется развитие туризма, однако вероятность того, что этот сектор обеспечит достижение поставленных целей, очень мала. Здесь придется прямо конкурировать с более масштабной и лучше развитой индустрией отдыха и развлечений в Казахстане, которая во многом зависит от доходов обширного сообщества эмигрировавших оттуда бизнесменов. В настоящее время на долю туризма приходится только 3,9% ВВП Киргизии. Власти хотели бы расширить ассортимент экзотического туризма для гостей с Запада и туризм среднего класса для индийцев, но для этого стране пока недостает международных связей, кроме того, там слишком мало не только перворазрядных, но даже второразрядных объектов туристического обслуживания. Сейчас в Киргизии есть только одна по-настоящему роскошная гостиница, но уровень ее загрузки чрезвычайно низок. Она частично принадлежала жене президента страны, которая согласилась на этот проект, чтобы не допустить ухода из страны корпорации «Hyatt», а не потому, что семья Акаева сочла это выгодным вложением капитала. Наконец, стратегию борьбы с бедностью сильно подрывает всепроникающая атмосфера коррупции. Говорят, что с ней борются, совершенствуя правовую инфраструктуру и судебную систему. И хотя всегда провозглашалось, что ни для кого не делается исключений, в действительности, пока Акаев был у власти, и сам президент, и члены его семьи, и члены семей его приближенных

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фактически пользовались иммунитетом от судебного преследования. Сейчас многие опасаются, что преемники Акаева будут вести себя точно так же. Так что если полномочия президента не будут ограничены, руководители, стоящие выше закона, будут по-прежнему вершить дела в экономике по своему усмотрению. Понадобится много времени, чтобы установить, действительно ли состояния президента Акаев и его родственников достигали размеров, о которых говорили злые языки. Но публичные действия семьи президента, конечно, укрепляли эти слухи. В первые годы независимости государственный комитет по приватизации и государственную золотодобывающую компанию «Кыргызалтын» возглавляли соответственно Аскар Саригулов и Дастан Саригулов, двоюродные братья первой леди Майрам Акаевой. Позднее интересы семьи стали представлять выросшие дети президента и их жены; в частности, сын Акаева Айдар и его казахский зять Адиль Тойгонбаев, по слухам, монополизировали распределение топливной нефти, продажу алкогольных напитков, недвижимости, а также местные кабаре, казино и СМИ, и связанное с этим негодование в значительной степени способствовало ослаблению популярности Акаева 100. Утверждения оппозиционных политиков, что семья президента душит экономическую жизнь в стране, возможно, являются преувеличением, но, по-видимому, была довольно широко распространена практика, когда люди, имевшие бесспорные права на какое-либо имущество, вынуждены были продавать его по заниженной цене после того, как к нему «проявляли интерес» члены влиятельных семейств. Существовавшие в массах представления о коррумпированности Акаева, конечно, способствовали тому, что общественность поддержала его изгнание. Население, особенно на юге, было также возмущено тем, что правительство выделяло недостаточно ресурсов для борьбы с бедностью. Но пока нет уверенности, что преемники Акаева будут вести себя более честно или найдут возможности для увеличения экономической поддержки и реконструкции густонаселенных общин на юге или бедствующих отдаленных районов на севере. Как и в других странах региона, экономическая статистика в Киргизии обеспечивает лишь частичную информацию. Ведущие местные экономисты полагают, что поскольку значительная часть

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людей скрывает доходы, чтобы избежать налогообложения, на самом деле доходы населения вдвое превышают цифры, следующие из официальной статистики. Конечно, в Бишкеке и вокруг него заметно, что уже существует небольшой, но все более расширяющийся средний класс, а также очень немногочисленная прослойка высшего класса. Сам город имеет статус области, что позволяет его жителям получать дополнительную выгоду от восстановления местной экономики. Однако в этом кроется и большой минус: город служит как бы магнитом, так что 83% нового населения в Бишкеке составляют внутренние мигранты, и это обостряет в столице проблемы поиска жилья, трудоустройства и преступности 101. Неравномерность восстановления экономики Киргизии в наибольшей степени сказывается на юге страны. Поэтому там активно идет торговля наркотиками, а «Хизб ат-Тахрир» гораздо легче вербовать в свои ряды новых членов. Помимо того, что «Хизб ат-Тахрир» критикует коррупцию правящего в Киргизии светского режима, она еще платит своим членам от 50 до 100 долл. в месяц за распространение листовок, обеспечивая новый источник занятости там, где проблема поиска работы стоит очень остро. Возможно, изгнание Аскара Акаева обеспечит его преемникам некоторые возможности для маневра, особенно если следующим президентом страны станет южанин, например, Курманбек Бакиев, уроженец Джалал-Абада и бывший губернатор Чуйской области. Но южная часть Киргизии, по-видимому, еще долго будет оставаться источником риска возникновения серьезных социальных и политических волнений.

Таджикистан: можно ли помочь разрушенной экономике? Шесть лет спустя после того, как правительство Таджикистана начало тесно сотрудничать с иностранными экономическими советниками, он все еще остается беднейшим из постсоветских государств и имеет самый низкий валовой национальный доход в Центральной Азии: в 2003 г. этот показатель составлял всего 1,3 млрд долл.102 Тяжким бременем для страны является также внешний долг. Проекты реконструкции заметно увеличили задолженность

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перед соседними странами, накопившуюся за годы гражданской войны 103. Сообщается, что более 80% населения страны живет в бедности, и те, кто серьезно анализировал экономику Таджикистана на месте, как правило, серьезно сомневаются, что правительство сможет достичь даже очень скромных целей сокращения числа бедняков до 75% в 2006 г. и до 60% в 2015 г.104 По имеющимся данным, к тому времени, когда в стране была разработана программа сокращения бедности, работу имели только 56% трудоспособных граждан, хотя статистические данные о занятости, конечно, ненадежны. Три главных источника дохода населения — это участие в незаконной торговле наркотиками, работа на неправительственные организации, спонсируемые иностранцами, и денежные переводы от неквалифицированных рабочих-мигрантов, в основном из России 105. Хотя соотношение этих трех категорий из года в год несколько меняется, формально трудоустроенными числятся только те, кто работает на неправительственные организации. Кроме того, Таджикистан серьезно пострадал от большого оттока талантливых людей разных национальностей, которые начали уезжать оттуда в период гражданской войны и продолжают уезжать поныне. Даже сегодня этнические таджики, имеющие какието экономические альтернативы, отказываются возвращаться домой, что существенно тормозит развитие Таджикистана. Остальным странам Центральной Азии удалось начать процесс государственного строительства, сохранив в целости сложные административные структуры. Существование работоспособных административных органов вплоть до самых низких уровней на местах заметно облегчило решение проблем социального обеспечения даже при том, что бюрократы часто оказывались неподготовленными к решению новых финансовых проблем. Но поскольку гражданская война в Таджикистане фактически была войной между регионами, победители решили изменить административно-территориальное деление страны, увольняя при этом способных людей, которые поддерживали проигравшую сторону 106. Война подорвала доверие народа к правительству, и это еще больше затруднило сбор доходов, в том числе от законных видов бизнеса. Даже официальные лица в частном порядке признают, что оживление экономики в значительной мере связано с торговлей

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наркотиками, особенно в Душанбе. В строительстве, сфере услуг и розничной торговле предприниматели обычно ведут два комплекта бухгалтерских книг, чтобы скрыть от правительственных инспекторов численность персонала и доходы. Следствием гражданской войны стало то, что правительство Таджикистан оказалось более уязвимым в отношении патронажа, чем в других странах, так что должностные лица здесь очень опасаются приватизации. В интервью в январе 2004 г. заместитель председателя одного из госкомитетов заявил, что с 1991 г. до конца 2003 г. было приватизировано 7500 компаний, причем 6900 из них числились малыми предприятиями, и лишь оставшиеся 600 — средними и крупными компаниями; отчасти это связано с тем, что правительство не смогло наладить достаточно прозрачный процесс торгов 107. Приватизацию тормозили также нереалистично высокие цены, малочисленность платежеспособных участников торгов и почти полное отсутствие доступного кредита 108. Но многие из предложенных государством активов просто были малопривлекательны для коммерческого покупателя. Как и во многих других бедных странах, главной опорой для населения стало сельское хозяйство, но при этом страна столкнулась с дилеммой: выращивать товарные (главным образом хлопок) или продовольственные культуры 109. Таджикистан пока не проявил себя как потенциально эффективный производитель продовольствия отчасти вследствие разрушения сельского хозяйства во время гражданской войны, но главным образом из-за почти полного отсутствия реформ в сельскохозяйственном секторе 110. Многие командиры времен гражданской войны теперь стали председателями колхозов и распоряжаются выращенным хлопком в целях личной наживы. Индустриальная база, унаследованная от СССР, также расстроена. Фабрики закрылись, а алюминиевый комбинат в г. Турсун-заде, главное предприятие страны, работающее на экспорт, нуждается в значительных инвестициях для максимизации прибылей. В советские времена Таджикистан был одним из главных производителей алюминия. На заводе в Турсун-заде, построенном в 1975 г., работали около 11 тыс. человек, там выплавлялось 517 тыс. т алюминия в год, что делало его одним из крупнейших алюминиевых предприятий в мире. В 2002 г. там было произведе-

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но 309 тыс. т алюминия. В настоящее время комбинат обеспечивает почти половину доходов Таджикистана от экспорта, а его доля в общем потреблении электроэнергии в стране составляет примерно 40%. Его продукция продается главным образом корпорациям в Китае, Иране, Греции, Нидерландах, России, Швейцарии, Турции и Туркмении 111. Бóльшая часть среднего руководящего персонала покинула страну, и квалификация рабочей силы в целом заметно снизилась. С учетом нынешнего состояния системы образования в стране следует ожидать, что уровень квалификации рабочей силы будет падать и дальше. Поэтому привлечь новые инвестиции Таджикистану будет чрезвычайно трудно. Фактически целое поколение таджиков оказалось брошенным на произвол судьбы, в частности, со значительно худшим доступом к образованию и социальному обеспечению, чем у предыдущего поколения; но пока для решения этих проблем предложено очень мало международных программ 112. Почти 80% детей из самых бедных семей остро нуждаются в материальной помощи государства. Образовательная система пришла в полный упадок; более 50% школ нуждаются в капиталовложениях, и, как легко догадаться, хуже всего с этим обстоят дела в сельских районах. С 1990 г. численность учащихся в начальных и средних школах снизилась, и гендерный баланс в школах тоже изменяется, потому что если родителям приходится выбирать, кому из детей купить зимнюю одежду, они предпочитают отправлять в школу сыновей. Говорят, что так же обстоят дела на большей части территории Туркмении, Узбекистана и даже отчасти в Казахстане и Киргизии. Но в Таджикистане эта проблема стоит острее еще и потому, что число мест в средних школах также сокращается; так, в 1999 г. оно уменьшилось по сравнению с 1990 г., в то время как число детей школьного возраста увеличилось на 12% 113. Таджикистан — самая изолированная из стран Центральной Азии. В советское время более 80% грузов оттуда отправлялось через Узбекистан. Однако правительство Узбекистана сильно затруднило транспортировку грузов по автодорогам через свою территорию, вынудив таджиков отправлять грузы по более сложному маршруту — через Киргизию — и продавать свои товары на значительно менее емком и достаточно насыщенном киргизском

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рынке. Особенно сильно пострадала от этого прежде преуспевавшая Согдийская (ранее Ленинабадская, а до этого Ходжентская) область, экономика которой была чрезвычайно сильно связана с Узбекистаном. Возможно, отчасти такая политика Узбекистана является реакцией на возникшие угрозы для его безопасности, но параллельно с этим узбекское правительство хочет также устранить конкурирующие таджикские товары со своих рынков. Серьезную проблему представляет перевозка грузов в пределах самого Таджикистана. Состояние автомобильных дорог хуже, чем в любой другой стране Центральной Азии, и примерно 90% грузов отправляется из страны по железной дороге. Авиаперевозки в Таджикистане осуществляет государственная авиакомпания CART, которая обеспечивает регулярное сообщение с Россией и очень ограниченное — с соседними странами, а также с Турцией, Ираном и Германией. Как и Киргизия, Таджикистан обладает большими потенциальными возможностями экспорта электроэнергии. В настоящее время он частично удовлетворяет свои энергетические потребности, импортируя газ из Узбекистана (частично по бартеру, в обмен на гидроэлектроэнергию), что является постоянным источником долгов и причиной перебоев с электроэнергией в самом Таджикистане 114. Подобно Киргизии Таджикистан активно сотрудничают с РАО ЕЭС в надежде, что единая электросеть, управляемая российской компанией, обеспечит слабому таджикскому государству более широкие возможности производства гидроэлектроэнергии. Но скорее всего кончится тем, что таджикская гидроэнергетическая система окажется под российским контролем, а объем прибыли, остающейся в стране, будет даже меньше, чем следует из нынешних расчетов. В гидроэнергетических проектах в Таджикистане потенциальными инвесторами являются и иранцы. Таджикистан также хотел бы стимулировать иностранные инвестиции в сферу телекоммуникаций. Но плотность телекоммуникаций в Таджикистане самая низкая в СНГ: например, на 100 горожан здесь приходится примерно 9,3 телефона, а уровень телефонизации в сельских районах — всего 0,6%. Средства в системы ретрансляции и эфирного вещания практически не вкладываются, использование спутниковых антенн также очень ограничено, так что выбор у населения весьма невелик. Кроме того, числен-

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ность телезрителей и радиослушателей сокращается из-за того, что советские телевизоры и радиоприемники ломаются, а денег на покупку новой иностранной электроники у многих людей, особенно в сельской местности, просто нет. Такое положение типично для всей Центральной Азии, но в такой изолированной стране, как Таджикистан, это особенно серьезная проблема. В целом ситуация в Таджикистане благоприятствует распространению экстремистских идеологий, как и дальнейшей криминализации экономики. Таджикистан уже обладает многими признаками «наркогосударства». С ростом производства опиума и героина в Афганистане транзит героина через Таджикистан постоянно увеличивается, одновременно растет экономическое и политическое влияние таджикских наркобаронов. С начала 2004 г. на таджикской границе было перехвачено 4460 кг героина 115. В предыдущем году было перехвачено 5600 кг героина, и нет никаких свидетельств, что положение дел в этой сфере может заметно улучшиться 116. Наконец, пока Рахмонов остается у власти, не следует ожидать осуществления серьезных мер по борьбе с экономической коррупцией, которая пронизывает все таджикское государство, и это вряд ли обрадует тех, кто хотел бы попытаться легальными средствами смягчить проблему бедности в Таджикистане.

Узбекистан: отказ от реформ Многолетние чуть ли не драконовские торговые ограничения в сочетании с проводимой правительством политикой замещения импорта пагубно сказались на многих аспектах экономики Узбекистана, в том числе на величине государственного долга, который в 2001 г. составил 40% валового национального дохода 117. Проблема кроется в решении Узбекистана сохранить оставшуюся с советских времен систему государственных закупок и поддержания цен в сельском хозяйстве, а также множественность валютных курсов. Последняя откровенно нарушала условия соглашения с МВФ о стабилизации экономики, что в 1996 г. привело к прекращению реализации соответствующей программы. Однако президент Узбекистана утверждал, что лучше разбирается в экономи-

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ке страны, чем иностранные специалисты, и следующие несколько лет они вели диалог на разных языках. Правительственная программа поэтапной валютной реформы не привела к установлению единого валютного курса к декабрю 2001 г., когда с директором-распорядителем МВФ был подписан новый протокол о намерениях, где излагались принципы соглашения о структурных реформах. Это соглашение охватывало шестимесячный период до 30 июня 2002 г., к этому времени узбекское правительство обещало провести ряд структурных реформ включая унификацию валютного курса и поэтапную ликвидацию системы государственных закупок хлопка-сырца и зерна. Занятые в этих двух секторах крестьяне (которые большей частью по-прежнему организованы в колхозы) были обязаны выполнять установленные производственные планы, а урожай у них закупался по существенно заниженным ценам 118. Взамен этого МВФ и Всемирный банк должны были помочь узбекскому правительству достичь запланированных показателей дефицита бюджета при условии соблюдения графика структурных преобразований 119. Правительство также обязалось либерализовать торговую политику, которая носила в высшей степени ограничительный характер 120. Однако Узбекистан так и не получил права на эту дополнительную помощь, поскольку не выполнил условия соглашения. Более того, к концу 2002 г. МВФ и Всемирный банк были вновь разочарованы поведением узбекского правительства. Во многом это было обусловлено введением ряда новых тарифов и других торговых ограничений, которые практически привели к краху едва нарождающейся в стране сети оптовой торговли и еще больше затруднили торговлю с соседними государствами (причем до такой степени, что на пути в Узбекистан застряли товары на миллионы долларов). Значительная часть этой драмы разыгралась на фоне резкой международной критики во время ежегодного собрания ЕБРР в мае 2003 г., за право проведения которого на своей территории Узбекистан усиленно боролся, вложив ради этого десятки (если не сотни) миллионов долларов в улучшение внешнего облика своей столицы. На собрании ЕБРР перед правительством Каримова был поставлен ряд политических и экономических задач, на выполнение которых давался год. Но в октябре 2003 г., когда Узбекистан наконец

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установил единый обменный курс своей валюты, международное доверие к его экономике уже почти иссякло 121. Эта мера, не сопровождавшаяся существенным облегчением доступа физических и юридических лиц к твердой валюте, укрепила скорее позиции критиков режима Каримова, нежели его сторонников. С приближением установленного ЕБРР срока (май 2004 г.) критика в адрес политики Узбекистана (как в области прав человека, так и в сфере экономических реформ) усиливалась, и в итоге совет управляющих ЕБРР принял решение о прекращении кредитования правительства и государственных предприятий Узбекистана 122. Несмотря на все публичные заверения президента Ислама Каримова в том, что он лучше знает, что полезно, а что вредно для узбекской экономики, в правящей элите усиливались разногласия по вопросу о целесообразности резкого ускорения темпов структурных реформ. Число сторонников быстрых реформ увеличивалось, и их высказывания звучали все громче. Однако даже эти прорыночные реформаторы опасались, что введение единого валютного курса негативно скажется на уровне жизни рядовых граждан, хотя и полагали, что промедление может обойтись дороже, чем безотлагательное принятие такой меры. В 2002 году ВВП на душу населения в Узбекистане составил 1670 долл. — чуть больше, чем в Киргизии (1620 долл.) и Таджикистане (980 долл.), но значительно меньше, чем в Казахстане (5870 долл.) и Туркмении (4250 долл.) 123. Хотя в результате политики правительства доход оставался низким, в докладе ЕБРР о стратегиях различных стран за 2003 г. говорилось, что Узбекистан избежал сползания к предельному уровню бедности, который наблюдается в некоторых других бедных странах СНГ: по официальным данным, доля граждан Узбекистана, живущих за чертой бедности, составляет 27,5% 124. ЕБРР, как и узбекское правительство, полагает, что при форсированном проведении экономических реформ этот показатель возрастет. Однако реальный уровень бедности в Узбекистане определить нелегко 125. Некоторые факты, а также личные впечатления автора, немало поездившего по Узбекистану, свидетельствуют о резком снижении уровня жизни населения за последние несколько лет. Хотя по данным официальной статистики экономический рост в стране продолжается, Госдепартамент США открыто опровергает это, утверждая,

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что в 2003 г. ВВП Узбекистана возрос лишь на 0,3% 126. А усиление массовых волнений, по-видимому, напрямую связано с ухудшением экономического положения по крайней мере части населения. В ноябре 2004 г. прошли демонстрации на рынках в Коканде и Карши 127. Теракты, состоявшиеся в марте-апреле 2004 г., по мнению некоторых аналитиков, тоже имеют не столько религиозную, сколько экономическую подоплеку 128. Многие считают, что в этом повинны растущие ограничения на нелегальную челночную торговлю между Узбекистаном и соседними странами, благодаря которой местные базары и ларьки раньше снабжались дешевыми товарами, а также новые правила, регламентирующие мелкую торговлю. Это привело к вытеснению из бизнеса множества мелких торговцев, в результате цены на большинство потребительских товаров повысились, и они оказались не по средствам средней узбекской семье — и это несмотря на то, что правительство уделяет большое внимание проблемам социальной защиты: например, в 2001 г. на здравоохранение и образование было израсходовано 7% ВВП, а на социальные выплаты — 6% 129. Серьезные разногласия существуют и по поводу распределения помощи среди малообеспеченных семей через местные советы старейшин — махалли. Хотя считается, что они успешно справляются с этими функциями, выявляя семьи, которые действительно нуждаются в помощи, некоторые западные эксперты настаивают на том, что выдача пособий по бедности через государственную профессиональную социальную службу могла бы обеспечить более справедливое распределение помощи 130. Эти эксперты также утверждают, что слишком много денег тратится на зарплату и многие льготы распространяются в равной мере на богатых и бедных (пособия на членов семьи, дешевый газ, дешевое электричество и жилищные субсидии). Детям оказывается целевая помощь через школы. В начале учебного года ученикам начальных классов по всей стране выдают учебники, ранцы и даже обувь и зимнюю одежду. Школьные обеды, хотя подчас и довольно скудные, являются важным подспорьем в питании узбекских детей. Однако высокие накладные расходы в узбекских школах дают еще один повод для критики в адрес правительства.

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Трудно понять, почему в 2001—2003 гг. реформы в Узбекистане снова затормозились. Одно из возможных объяснений — слухи о плохом состоянии здоровья президента. Не исключено, что ввиду неизбежного скорого прихода к власти его преемника главные претенденты на власть попытались «заморозить» поле экономической деятельности, чтобы максимально увеличить свои шансы на право распоряжаться должностями и на увеличение личного благосостояния. Коррупция в Узбекистане — столь же серьезная проблема, как и в других странах региона, хотя подробные сведения о ней здесь получить труднее, чем в государствах с менее репрессивной системой 131. Нет сомнения, что решения относительно темпов приватизации и других аспектов экономических реформ отчасти определяются личными интересами президента Каримова, его ближайшего окружения и небольшой группы других представителей привилегированной региональной элиты. Частичные государственные закупки хлопка и в меньшей степени зерна по ценам ниже мировых являются источником огромных прибылей для тех, кто ведает экспортом. Немалые состояния наживаются на разнице курсов узбекского сома, богатеет узкий круг лиц, контролирующих крупные коммерческие предприятия розничной торговли. Торможение реформ отчасти объясняется интуитивным и в какой-то степени иррациональным страхом старшего поколения элиты перед возможными последствиями либерализации рынка и приватизации ключевых секторов экономики для социальной стабильности вообще и занятости населения в частности. В 2001 г. безработица в Узбекистане официально составляла 0,6%, а введение единого валютного курса, по оценкам ЕБРР, привело бы к потере 150—250 тыс. рабочих мест и повышению официального уровня безработицы до 3—4%. По тем же оценкам Узбекистан смог бы поддерживать положительные темпы роста на душу населения благодаря своим богатым природным ресурсам 132. Узбекские критики реформ утверждают, что экономическая реформа неизбежно повлечет за собой введение частной собственности на землю, а это, если учесть высокую плотность населения в сельских районах, где проживает более 60% населения страны, по мнению многих, вызовет резкое недовольство, грозящее революционным взрывом. Многие опасаются, что частная собственность на зем-

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лю породит междоусобицу из-за земли и воды, поскольку сельское хозяйство в Узбекистане всецело зависит от ирригации. Сегодня в стране искусственно орошается около 88% пахотных земель (это один из самых высоких показателей ирригации в мире). Однако нынешняя ситуация в сельских районах не дает никаких оснований для подобных опасений. Количество имеющейся земли, приходящейся на душу населения, ничтожно — всего 0,2 га, права на воду являются в регионе извечным источником конфликтов, а превращение хлопка в монокультуру в советскую эпоху оставило в наследство Центральной Азии засоленную почву и загрязненные водоемы. Узбекистан упустил возможность сократить площади, занятые хлопком, в первые годы независимости, когда не составляло особого труда провести гораздо более серьезную диверсификацию сельскохозяйственных культур, чем это было сделано, потому что после объявления суверенитета страна стала поставлять хлопок для российской текстильной промышленности на договорной основе. Узбекистан мог бы изменить соотношение между производством продовольственных культур и хлопка, пойдя по пути развития и укрепления собственного агробизнеса и текстильного сектора. Вместо этого нарождавшиеся отрасли были обескровлены вследствие отказа государства предоставить им свободный доступ к твердой валюте. Связи с российской текстильной промышленностью были подтверждены долгосрочными контрактами на рыночных условиях, которые принесли выгоду тем, кто занимался этой отраслью, и обеспечили узбекскому государству приток твердой валюты 133. В обозримом будущем Узбекистан, по всей вероятности, останется главным поставщиком сырья для российской текстильной промышленности, однако многие узбекские экономисты приходят к мысли, что поэтапная приватизация сельского хозяйства необходима и вполне возможна даже при нынешней зависимости Узбекистана от возделывания хлопка. По их мнению, производители хлопка могли бы продавать его по ценам, близким к мировым, и беспрепятственно получать твердую валюту для закупки семян и сельскохозяйственной техники. Однако пока дела обстоят иначе: в 2003 и 2004 гг. некоторые фермеры предпочли уничтожить выращенный хлопок, чем продать его

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по предлагаемой цене 134. Их недовольство стало питательной почвой для бурных протестов, разразившихся в мае 2005 г. Но даже это не привело к быстрым изменениям в экономической политике правительства в отношении сельского хозяйства, а также мелких и средних предприятий. Частный сектор Узбекистана мало выиграл от введения конвертируемой валюты — в значительной степени из-за того, что реальный доступ к валюте здесь сильно затруднен, поскольку она находится в дефиците. Эта ситуация в равной мере затрагивает и предпринимателей, и потребителей, так как внедрение национальной банковской системы кредитных карт, позволяющих получать заработную плату и оплачивать покупки, ставит в крайне невыгодное положение мелкооптовых и рыночных торговцев. Согласно докладу, подготовленному совместно Швейцарским государственным секретариатом по экономическим делам и Международной финансовой корпорацией, 99% мелких узбекских фирм не занимаются ни одной из форм частной торговли 135. И так было еще до появления в стране кредитных карт, а после этого доступ к наличным деньгам еще более осложнился. За последнее десятилетие энтузиазм узбекских предпринимателей заметно иссяк, и многие из них отказались от мысли заниматься бизнесом. По оценке Всемирного банка, на долю мелких и средних предприятий приходится лишь 15% ВВП Узбекистана, но они обеспечивают 41% общей занятости 136. Эти цифры резко расходятся с официальной узбекской статистикой, утверждающей, что их доля в ВВП страны составляет 29,1% и что в частном секторе занято 89% населения Узбекистана, из них 88% — на малых и средних предприятиях 137. Однако этот последний показатель учитывает главным образом тех, кто занят в сельском хозяйстве. Отсутствие гарантий защиты частной собственности отбивает у потенциальных предпринимателей желание открыть собственное дело. Многие из тех, кто занимался частным бизнесом, лишились собственности в 1993—1995 гг., когда некоторые ранние постановления о приватизации были аннулированы как незаконные, и люди боятся, что это может повториться. Ноябрьский указ 2002 г., подписанный спустя значительное время после того, как узбекское правительство вновь подтвердило свой курс на макроэкономические реформы, не на шутку встревожил представителей малого

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бизнеса. Этот указ давал возможность ренационализации любого предприятия, которое после приватизации сменило основное направление хозяйственной деятельности, а чиновникам открывал лазейки для вымогательства с целью передачи преуспевающего бизнеса «своим людям»; возможно, именно такая попытка (хотя и закончившаяся неудачей) была предпринята в Андижане, когда 23 бизнесмена были арестованы по обвинению в поддержке нелегальных исламистских группировок. Если добавить к этому высокие (и меняющиеся) пошлины на импорт и экспорт товаров, налог на сверхприбыль и трудности маневрирования в условиях многоярусной узбекской бюрократической системы, остается только удивляться, что у кого-то в стране еще хватает энергии и терпения заниматься частным предпринимательством 138. В сложившихся в Узбекистане экономических условиях трудно оценить, что там осталось от ранних этапов предпринимательства и насколько успешными будут попытки страны проникнуть на центральноазиатский рынок, который раньше они могли бы завоевать, но теперь он уже заполнен товарами конкурентов. Часть узбекского капитала была вывезена из страны в начале 1990-х годов, и узбекские предприниматели играют не последнюю роль в Киргизии, Казахстане и Таджикистане, однако тем из них, кто инвестировал средства в соседних странах, может оказаться нелегко проникнуть на рынок собственной страны. Реформаторы в узбекском правительстве понимают, что быстро преодолеть экономический застой, порожденный десятилетием колебаний в вопросах экономических реформ, не удастся. Установление единого валютного курса сома открывает возможности для укрепления в стране частного сектора и будет способствовать формированию местного класса предпринимателей, наличие которого может стимулировать проведение необходимых политических реформ. Однако относительное обнищание населения за тот же период и рост влияния радикальных исламистских сил делают исход менее предсказуемым, а процесс реформирования более рискованным, чем если бы его удалось начать раньше.

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Приведенный в этой главе краткий обзор экономического и социального развития в регионе с 2001 г. по первое полугодие 2005 г. мало обнадеживает. Из всех стран Центральной Азии самую сильную экономику имеет Казахстан, и его позиции еще больше укрепляются высокими ценами на нефть. Руководство Казахстана понимает, что легкие прибыли от добычи природных ресурсов могли бы стать источником средств для долгосрочного экономического развития, которое обеспечило бы будущее страны. Однако неясно, нашло ли оно для этого правильные схемы и хватит ли у него воли, чтобы довести дело до конца. Перед Туркменией стоят те же проблемы проведения структурных реформ, что и пять лет назад. Между тем признаков возможных изменений структуры политической власти и сокрушения бюрократии здесь стало еще меньше, а элита уже не способна справиться с геополитическими проблемами, которые также мешают стране продавать газ по конкурентным ценам. Узбекистану, как и Туркмении, еще предстоит реформировать государственную командно-административную систему экономики, которая серьезно замедлила развитие этих стран, и в частности развитие сельского хозяйства, хлопковый сектор которого до сих пор практически не реформирован. А продолжение Узбекистаном жесткой торговой политики по-прежнему подрывает развитие малого и среднего бизнеса внутри страны и затрудняет его развитие в Таджикистане и Киргизии. Ход событий в Таджикистане и Киргизии наглядно показывает, что в бедных ресурсами странах, даже вступивших на путь макроэкономических реформ, экономические преобразования протекают медленно. Ситуация в обеих странах показывает, насколько трудно балансировать, проводя необходимые реформы под угрозой накопления больших долгов, и в какой мере эта угроза в конечном счете определяет темпы реформ. Экономический прогресс во всех пяти государствах Центральной Азии по-прежнему сдерживается их неспособностью справиться с общими проблемами: отсутствием благоприятного режима торговли в масштабах региона, конкуренцией за воду и отсут-

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ствием общерегионального представления об оптимальном распределении энергетических ресурсов. Свержение Аскара Акаева в Киргизии и прошедшие спустя месяц волнения в Узбекистане показывают, что население Центральной Азии больше не желает молчать, когда ему отказывают в том, что оно считает своими неотъемлемыми экономическими правами.

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Глава 5 Проблемы передачи власти при отсутствии демократических политических институтов

П ла искать способы, как использовать увеличение иностран-

осле событий 11 сентября 2001 г. администрация США ста-

ной денежной помощи странам Центральной Азии для резкого ускорения процесса демократических реформ, первоначально — в рамках региональной стратегии восстановления Афганистана. Но война в Ираке самым серьезным образом отвлекла внимание американских «государствоустроителей», переключив поток их творческой энергии и сократив ресурсы, которые можно было бы использовать в Центральной Азии. И даже после «революции роз» в Грузии, обозначившей реальные перспективы демократических изменений в постсоветских государствах, приоритетными для Америки по-прежнему оставались страны, которые казались лучше подготовленными к демократическим переменам. Улучшение ситуации в области прав человека в государствах Центральной Азии долгое время объявлялось целью США; в частности, об этом красноречиво заявил в 1997 г. заместитель госсекретаря США Строуб Тэлботт в своем выступлении «Прощай, Флэшмен», посвященном американской политике в Центральной Азии и на Кавказе 1. И даже после 11 сентября представителям Госдепартамента вменялось в обязанность осуществлять соответствующий надзор, в частности, помощники госсекретаря Лорн Крейнер (руководитель Бюро демократии, прав человека и труда Госдепартамента) и Элизабет Джонс (курировавшая Европу и Евразию) непрерывно побуждали лидеров Центральной Азии активнее 160

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заниматься проблемами демократизации. Все центральноазиатские государства номинально по-прежнему были привержены идее демократизации власти, которая все больше доминировала в высказываниях членов администрации Джорджа Буша после свержения американскими вооруженными силами Саддама Хусейна в Ираке. В ходе политического кризиса в Киргизии в конце февраля — начале марта 2005 г., который разрешился изгнанием президента Аскара Акаева, американское правительство пыталось оставаться беспристрастным. Представители Госдепартамента выразили недовольство тем, как проходили выборы, но в отличие от Украины, где Виктор Ющенко явно считался пострадавшей стороной, в этом случае Вашингтон предпочел бы договорный компромисс 2. США также предоставили узбекскому президенту Исламу Каримову вполне достаточные возможности для объяснений в связи с использованием силовых мер для подавления протестов в мае 2005 г. Но путь, который избрали Соединенные Штаты, чтобы попытаться улучшить положение в области прав человека и демократизации власти в Центральной Азии, свидетельствовал о сравнительно малой стратегической важности этого региона для администрации Буша. Это наглядно продемонстрировала ситуация с отказом госсекретаря Колина Пауэлла в декабре 2003 г. подтвердить наличие в Узбекистане хотя бы минимального прогресса в области защиты прав человека и осуществления демократических реформ, что было скорее риторическим, чем действительно существенным актом. Возможно, Государственный департамент мог бы попросить Белый дом отказать Узбекистану в помощи, исходя из интересов национальной безопасности США, но предпочел не делать этого. Сокращение ассигнований затронуло лишь 18 млн долл. прямой американской помощи правительству Узбекистана, и даже здесь были найдены пути финансирования некоторых проектов реформирования пенитенциарной системы за счет программ, на которые решение Пауэлла никак не повлияло. Когда на первом году войны с террором значимость Центральной Азии для США резко возросла, определяющими — по сравнению с программами Госдепартамента и Министерства энерге-

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тики — стали потребности Министерства обороны. Точка зрения Пентагона формулировалась просто: стратегическая важность государств Центральной Азии в первую очередь определяется их вкладом в войну с террором и во вторую — их вкладом в энергетическую безопасность США. Проблемы обеспечения долгосрочной безопасности, в частности построения демократии, при этом практически оставались за кадром. Поскольку чтобы добиться сотрудничества центральноазиатских лидеров, их нужно было уговаривать, администрация США хотела обеспечить для этого соответствующие стимулы в виде увеличения иностранной помощи. Но в первые дни войны, когда Министерству обороны пришлось решать проблемы обеспечения тыловой поддержки военных действий в Афганистане, получателям помощи в Центральной Азии старались по возможности предоставить все, чего они хотели, а они хотели увеличения помощи в сфере безопасности. Однако (отчасти чтобы ублажить критиков в Конгрессе, утверждавших, что в рамках войны с террором фактически осуществляется поддержка диктаторских режимов) администрация также предусмотрела включение в программы дополнительной помощи на 2002 финансовый год целевых средств, которые должны были направляться на формирование необходимых политических институтов 3. Американские и узбекские власти понимали, насколько важно изменить международный имидж Узбекистана, чтобы отношения между Вашингтоном и Ташкентом могли превратиться в стратегическое партнерство, потому что правительство Узбекистана часто обвиняли в серьезных нарушениях прав человека. Поэтому президент Узбекистана Ислам Каримов, побывавший в Соединенных Штатах в марте 2002 г., пошел настолько далеко, что обязался в течение пяти лет провести системные политические реформы, результатом которых должно было стать проведение демократических парламентских выборов в 2004 г. и демократических президентских выборов в 2007 г. Однако и президент Каримов, и другие главы стран Центральной Азии довольно быстро поняли, что американские должностные лица проявляют к их странам весьма ограниченный и специфический интерес. Вашингтон, по крайней мере на уровне высшего ру-

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ководства, не собирался глубоко вникать в их внутренние дела, по крайней мере пока его центральноазиатские партнеры вели себя надежно в тех сферах, которые вызывали их общее беспокойство. Центральноазиатские лидеры уяснили, что интерес к их странам, вновь возникший у Вашингтона, позволяет им вести себя свободнее при реализации собственных внутренних программ. Пока они периодически подтверждали свою приверженность совместным целям, играя в то же время важную роль в войне с террором, у себя дома они могли действовать по собственному усмотрению. Первоначально кое-кто на Западе полагал, что лидеры Центральной Азии могут стать более восприимчивыми к политическим реформам, потому что угрозы со стороны террористических групп уменьшались. Американская кампания бомбежек в Афганистане в значительной степени разрушила лагеря Исламского движения Узбекистана, и многие его руководители были уничтожены, а увеличившаяся и более целенаправленная помощь в сфере безопасности со стороны США и других стран НАТО облегчала выявление и устранение новых экстремистских групп. Но вскоре эти надежды Запада угасли, и американские группы, стремившиеся обеспечить финансирование программ реформирования политических институтов в Центральной Азии, заметили, что становится все труднее получать необходимую поддержку. Возникли иные, более острые и насущные потребности в американской финансовой помощи, и руководители США выбирали проекты, быстрее приводящие к нужным результатам или приносящие непосредственную пользу американским налогоплательщикам. Предлагаемый Соединенными Штатами пряник был маленьким, а кнут, которым они размахивали, — настолько мягким, что вообще не воспринимался как угроза. А когда выяснилось, что руководители центральноазиатских государств проявляют мало интереса к серьезным политическим реформам, пряник стал еще меньше, так что вероятность получения хорошего урожая от стратегии «закладки семян гражданского общества» тоже заметно снизилась. Хотя американское руководство выражало недовольство негативными явлениями в Узбекистане (вплоть до некоторого сокращения помощи узбекскому правительству в 2004 г.), это почти не вызывало у лидеров Центральной Азии раздражения, раз-

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ве что целевых средств на развитие демократии в 2004 финансовом году было выделено существенно меньше, чем в 2003-м (и в 2002-м, если учесть выделение дополнительных фондов). Сокращение американской денежной помощи было запланировано также в бюджете на 2005 финансовый год, и мало шансов, что в ближайшем будущем она увеличится 4. Хотя лидеры Центральной Азии не больше других любят получать пощечины, они не чувствуют себя наказанными из-за того, что ресурсы, выделяемые на программы строительства гражданского общества в странах региона, сокращаются. Увеличение помощи Центральной Азии в соответствии с Законом о поддержке свободы в 2002 и 2003 гг. по большей части способствовало активизации деятельности, которую правительства этого региона воспринимают с раздражением, потому что она приносит бóльшую выгоду критикам режима, нежели его сторонникам 5. Существует мало свидетельств того, что администрация Буша когда-либо рассматривала государственное строительство в Центральной Азии, т. е. активную поддержку политических и экономических реформ в этом регионе, как нечто большее, чем расплывчатую и неопределенную цель. В первую очередь это подтверждается замедлением выделения региону новых денежных средств. Хотя в целом денежная помощь возросла и в относительных цифрах увеличение было значительным, в абсолютных цифрах оно совсем невелико. Это относится прежде всего к средствам, выделяемым в соответствии с Законом о поддержке свободы на программы демократизации; например, в Киргизии, которая на душу населения получает наибольшую помощь по сравнению с другими государствами региона, в 2002 г. на каждого гражданина пришлось всего 1,16 долл. такой целевой помощи 6. И хотя центральноазиатские государства получали бóльшую долю помощи, выделяемой республикам бывшего Советского Союза, в прямом денежном выражении это намного меньше (и в расчете на душу населения, и суммарно), чем досталось более близким союзникам США, таким как Израиль и Египет 7. Относительно малые размеры этой помощи оправдываются тем, что она тратится на «закладку семян гражданского общества», а не является изящной формой подкупа, позволяющей помочь лидерам Центральной Азии найти решения некоторых стоящих перед

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ними экономических проблем, но сопровождаемой предупреждениями, что одновременно они должны наращивать темпы развития плюралистических политических институтов. К 2001 г. в Туркмении и Казахстане, богатых энергетическими ресурсами, такая завуалированная форма подкупа, по-видимому, уже потеряла эффективность, хотя с успехом могла использоваться в Казахстане в начале 1990-х годов. Но в Киргизии, Таджикистане и Узбекистане существенное увеличение помощи в соответствии с Законом о защите свободы действительно могло бы привести к существенной трансформации местных органов власти и общенациональной политической жизни, особенно в сочетании со значительным увеличением экономической помощи. Немалую роль в изгнании Аскара Акаева возмущенным народом в марте 2005 г. сыграло то обстоятельство, что американцы долгое время оказывали помощь неправительственным гражданским группам в Киргизии и что здесь существовал финансируемый США независимый пресс-центр. Но во многих сельских районах институты гражданского общества еще очень слабы, так что перспективы демократической передачи власти остаются сомнительными. Более плотная работа с местными элитами могла бы стать стабилизирующим фактором в Киргизии, не говоря уже об Узбекистане, где ошибки на государственном уровне создают все бóльшие угрозы. Все центральноазиатские государства обладают значительной «емкостью» в отношении иностранной помощи, имеют сравнительно высокий уровень образования населения и профессиональную бюрократию. Большинство политиков полагало, что режимы Центральной Азии могли бы эффективно использовать намного бóльшие суммы, чем им выделяются. Это касается прежде всего целевых средств на реформирование подготовки преподавателей и изменение учебных программ по естественным наукам, на реформирование здравоохранения и даже реформирование пенитенциарной системы. В некоторых случаях местные правительства, возможно, могли бы категорически возражать иностранным советникам, но в целом они хотели бы получать больше рекомендаций извне, особенно если бы в итоге изменения оказались не просто демонстративными. К тому же американские политики не считали, что коррупция в этих областях настолько неискоре-

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нима, что увеличение иностранной помощи непременно окажется напрасной тратой денег. Конечно, некоторая часть помощи попадала не по назначению изза некомпетентности руководителей проектов, неудачного выбора партнеров или вследствие неосознанных неправомерных действий иностранных подданных или получателей грантов 8. Однако по большей части деньги все же дошли до программ и целевых групп, для которых были предназначены, и поскольку Агентство международного развития (АМР) США приобрело определенный опыт работы в условиях Центральной Азии, теперь оно усилило контроль за реализацией своих программ. Эта проблема была для США одной из приоритетных. Администрация не обращалась к Конгрессу по поводу выделения средств на оказание помощи именно такого типа, необходимых для обеспечения эффективности американского присутствия, что могло иметь место только при условии, что угроза лишиться этих денег сама по себе являлась бы для правительства-получателя существенным стимулом для изменения политики. Размеры такой «побудительной» помощи должны были быть достаточно большими, чтобы угроза лишиться ее воспринималась населением как серьезная. Но решение проблем центральноазиатских государств с учетом сложности реконструкции фрагментов административно-командной экономики и остатков авторитарных вертикальных иерархий, на основе которых сформировались базовые структуры этих государств, казалось американским политикам недостижимой целью. С уменьшением объемов помощи и ориентацией на использование демонстрационных эффектов проблема выбора подходящих партнеров — получателей помощи стала намного более важной. В частности, в области политических реформ это способствовало дальнейшему ограничению возможностей влияния США, потому что значительная часть помощи предоставлялась именно для того, чтобы попытаться создать некие альтернативы остаткам элит советской эпохи, которые по-прежнему доминировали в каждой из этих стран. Деньги АМР США распределялись через американские неправительственные группы, которые сотрудничали с местными группами, по большей части политически нейтральными, но некоторые из них были открыто оппозиционными по отношению к существующим режимам 9.

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Эти действия в значительной степени основывались на модели, имевшей целью снижение долгосрочных угроз, которые могли исходить из Центральной Азии. Потенциальные краткосрочные угрозы безопасности со стороны государств региона перестали быть для администрации Буша важной проблемой. Этому во многом способствовало появление американских баз в Центральной Азии в конце 2003 г., кроме того, намного большее военное присутствие США в Афганистане само по себе позволяло правительству США думать об изменении статуса их боеготовности с «горячего» на «теплый». В этой главе говорится о том, что попытки создания необходимых политических институтов в странах Центральной Азии оказались неудачными и связанные с этим угрозы продолжают нарастать во всем регионе. Однако размеры потенциальных угроз в разных странах различны. Изгнание Акаева не является хорошим предзнаменованием. Оно скорее предвещает новый всплеск политической нестабильности в регионе, нежели начало плавного перехода к ответственной демократии. Экономические неурядицы, первоначально связанные с обретением независимости, приобретают перманентный характер. Радикальные исламские группировки, похоже, не испытывают никаких трудностей с привлечением в свои ряды новых членов. Поэтому прогнозировать дальнейшее развитие событий в Центральной Азии довольно трудно, и размышления на эту тему вызывают сильное беспокойство за ее будущее.

Киргизия: Соединенные Штаты упустили свой шанс Американские политики могли бы воспользоваться возможностями, появившимися после событий 11 сентября, и настоять на проведении дальнейших политических реформ в Киргизии, так как в этой стране цель формирования здоровой власти казалась потенциально достижимой. Сделай они это, Акаев мог бы остаться на своем посту до конца срока, создавая предпосылки для демократической передачи власти осенью 2005 г., когда истекал срок его полномочий. Вместо этого Акаев пошел на риск и попытался фальсифицировать результаты проведенных в марте 2005 г. пар-

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ламентских выборов. Недовольство результатами выборов, принесшими формальную победу ближайшему окружению президента, привело не только к изгнанию Акаева, оно может дестабилизировать ситуацию и за пределами Киргизии, ибо в других странах расширяется деятельность более активных и амбициозных оппозиционных группировок. До середины 1990-х годов Киргизия двигалась в направлении создания демократического государства, и эта трансформация протекала почти параллельно процессам, происходившим в странах Центральной Европы, таких как Румыния, Болгария и Словакия. Но затем, отчасти под давлением лидеров соседних государств, не говоря уже о собственной семье, президент Акаев утратил интерес к демократическим реформам, и его поведение стало все больше напоминать образ действий других центральноазиатских руководителей. Глубокое уважение, которое американские политики питали к Акаеву, президенту такой вроде бы незначительной страны, вызывало раздражение у президентов Казахстана и Узбекистана Назарбаева и Каримова. Каждый из них считал, что именно его страна должна стать фаворитом США в регионе, и оба искали способы заставить Акаева «заплатить» за его популярность на Западе. Они могли эффективно продемонстрировать малую значимость Киргизии, используя рычаги в сфере торговли и поставки энергоносителей. Акаев смог преодолеть свое ощущение бессилия и даже перестал обращать внимание на растущее неодобрение Запада, когда увидел, с какой легкостью его родственники и друзья начали обогащаться. В конце концов родственные чувства и личные обязательства взяли верх над его идеализмом. Условия, сложившиеся в начале 1990-х годов, больше способствовали развитию идеалистических идей, чем обстановка в конце десятилетия. На пороге нового века у Акаева появились серьезные соперники, для которых слабость киргизской экономики стала аргументом, позволявшим поставить под сомнение его способность управлять государством. В то самое время, когда президентской власти был брошен вызов, Акаев, похоже, все больше чувствовал свою относительную слабость и осознавал, что как бы далеко ни продвинулась Киргизия по пути демократического развития, она всегда будет оставаться в тени более мощных, хотя и менее демократичных соседей.

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Решение США открыть в Узбекистане военную базу стало для Акаева горькой пилюлей, продемонстрировав, что никаких особых отношений между Киргизией и США нет. Всего через месяц после 11 сентября Узбекистан договорился с США об особых партнерских отношениях 10. И здесь снова был упущен удобный случай подтолкнуть Акаева к дальнейшему развитию демократии. Чтобы заполучить на свою территорию американскую военную базу и тем самым нейтрализовать новое стратегическое превосходство Узбекистана, президент Киргизии, наверное, мог бы принять большинство предварительных условий, выдвинутых Соединенными Штатами. Если бы США поставили условия Узбекистану, то создание там военно-воздушной базы замедлилось, а демократическая реформа в стране вряд ли продвинулась бы вперед, тогда как в Киргизии была иная ситуация: подобные условия стали бы эффективным инструментом осуществления политических изменений и нисколько не замедлили бы получение США доступа к аэродромам в Центральной Азии. Это тем более было бы так, если бы условия ставились тактично. Конечно, будучи руководителем суверенного государства, Акаев вряд ли бы принял и выполнил политические требования, представленные списком. На некоторые требования, такие как реабилитация и освобождение из заключения бывшего вице-президента и лидера оппозиции Феликса Кулова, Акаев не согласился бы независимо от размеров вознаграждения. Но если бы предложенные суммы помогли решить проблемы, которые в стране считались назревшими, США получили бы возможность оказать давление на Акаева, чтобы ускорить проведение политических реформ и обеспечить надежное сотрудничество с киргизским правительством. Стратегия преодоления бедности, которую правительство Киргизии совместно со Всемирным банком разработало в 2001 г., предусматривала много политических реформ 11. В частности, это были программы повышения эффективности работы местных органов власти и постепенного перехода от назначения многих местных руководителей к их выборности. Существовали планы тщательного пересмотра сохранившихся элементов советской избирательной системы, чтобы заменить их более демократическими 12. Кроме того, важной частью программы преодоления бедности должно было стать проведение многоаспектной антикор-

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рупционной политики, предусматривавшей переобучение и повышение квалификации сотрудников местных следственных органов, судов и полиции. Главные партнеры Киргизии по линии международной помощи согласились лишь на низкий уровень финансирования всех этих проектов, однако для их расширения киргизы смогли сравнительно легко получить помощь в виде грантов (не займов!) на несколько сотен миллионов долларов 13. Они действительно не смогли бы взять взаймы, а затем вернуть долг, поэтому для Киргизии было критически важно получить дополнительную помощь именно в виде грантов. Значительное (на 100—150 млн долл. в год) увеличение финансирования хотя бы трех проектов (реформы местного управления, реформы избирательной системы и проведения антикоррупционной политики) создало бы в стране более стабильную ситуацию после волнений, завершившихся изгнанием Акаева. Даже если бы Соединенные Штаты и другие западные доноры сконцентрировали внимание лишь на одном направлении, например, на реформе избирательной системы в Киргизии, они, возможно, смогли бы изменить ход событий к выгоде сторонников гражданского общества. Но, например, немецкое правительство не смогло обеспечить своевременную поставку прозрачных избирательных урн для выборов в местные органы власти в октябре 2004 г.14 За три месяца до назначенных на февраль 2005 г. парламентских выборов киргизские власти жаловались, что американцы все еще не выполнили обещание предоставить финансовую помощь в размере 320 тыс. долл. для проведения общенациональной кампании по снятию отпечатков пальцев, чтобы исключить возможность многократного голосования. Однако у США были другие приоритеты, и в 1991 г. они решили направить деньги, предназначавшиеся для Центральной Азии, в Афганистан. Кроме того, Соединенным Штатам просто не хватило бы административных ресурсов, чтобы распределять и контролировать десятикратно увеличившуюся денежную помощь любой из стран Центральной Азии, если учесть, что распределение большей части целевых денежных средств, выделяемых на нужды демократизации, осуществляется через неправительственные организации, которые находятся в Соединенных Штатах или по крайней мере поддерживаются ими

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и тратят значительную часть этих денег на зарплату персоналу и содержание своих офисов. Если бы Соединенные Штаты проявили желание вложить значительные средства в проведения реформ в Киргизии, то Акаев, возможно, согласился бы выполнить многие неприятные для него требования, например, прекратить преследование некоторых своих политических оппонентов. Более того, реформы стали бы для него более привлекательными, если бы Соединенные Штаты пообещали киргизским поставщикам крупные контракты в рамках оказания гуманитарной и технической помощи и осуществления проектов реконструкции Афганистана. Это стало бы мощным стимулом для развития легкой промышленности Киргизии. При таком расширенном политическом и экономическом участии США в делах Киргизии Вашингтон мог бы предупредить Бишкек, что парламентские выборы 2005 г. должны быть проведены в соответствии с демократическими нормами, что Акаев должен убедить оппозицию в том, что покинет свой пост по истечении срока президентских полномочий в октябре 2005 г. и что невыполнение любого из этих двух условий поставит под угрозу дальнейшую помощь США, а следовательно, приведет к ослаблению режима Акаева (и его преемника). Однако американская помощь оказалась недостаточной, чтобы повлиять на поведение Акаева. Работавшие в Бишкеке американские чиновники знали, как сильно стремится Акаев восстановить баланс сил в Центральной Азии. Но вместо того чтобы подойти к проблеме творчески, Соединенные Штаты предпочли не делать ставку на развитие демократических институтов в двусторонних отношениях с Киргизией и ограничились лишь небольшим увеличением помощи. В ноябре 2003 г. в Бишкеке открылся финансируемый Госдепартаментом США Центр поддержки независимых СМИ, в отношении которого правительство Киргизии не могло использовать обычные в таких случаях методы государственного удушения независимых газет и других изданий 15. Этот центр, которым руководит американская неправительственная организация «Freedom House», содействующая развитию демократии, печатает материалы независимых группировок, существующих в Киргизии и Таджикистане. В первом туре парламентских выборов 2005 г. он сыграл такую важную роль, что меж-

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ду первым и вторым турами правительство решилось даже отключить электричество в здании, в котором он находится, так что для возобновления подачи тока пришлось использовать портативные генераторы, установленные с помощью посольства США 16. Существование этого центра будет способствовать обучению будущих журналистов, однако нынешнему поколению работников СМИ вряд ли позволят работать свободно 17. На самом деле в последние три года набирает силу как раз противоположная тенденция. Независимые газеты доводят до банкротства, нескольким журналистам, резко критиковавшим правительство, угрожали арестом, один из них умер при загадочных обстоятельствах, независимый центр СМИ в Оше был разгромлен 18. И все же пресса Киргизии остается самой смелой в регионе. В газетах и электронных СМИ ведутся широкие дискуссии на разные темы (в отличие от других стран Центральной Азии, где подобное невозможно). При этом некоторые обвинения в безответственности, которые предъявляет правительство оппозиционной прессе, вполне обоснованны. Однако и проправительственная пресса не проявляла особой щепетильности, печатая пристрастные и льстивые материалы об Акаеве и его супруге Майрам. В дни изгнания Акаева правительство и оппозиционные СМИ вновь затеяли спор, в частности, о том, какие группировки будут контролировать правительственную прессу. Оппозиция — отнюдь не синоним порядочности. Несомненно, многие обвинения в коррупции в адрес родни президента являются ложными. Многие сторонники президента заработали деньги честным путем, то же можно сказать и об оппозиции 19. Тем не менее в общественной жизни Киргизии много гнили — это относится и к правительству, и к оппозиции. И просто так отбросить обвинения в коррупции нельзя. Например, лидер киргизских правозащитников Рамазан Дирилдаев отвергает широко растиражированные утверждения, что он приобрел собственность за границей на средства, предоставленные иностранными донорами, хотя это обвинение было выдвинуто на основании результатов независимой ревизии деятельности его организации 20. Нет сомнений, что самого известного в стране заключенного Феликса Кулова арестовали по политическим мотивам, однако вполне возможно, что он действительно виновен в некоторых злоупотре-

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блениях служебным положением, которые ему инкриминировали. В апреле 2005 г. на волне тогдашней эйфории его реабилитировали, но без всякой реальной проверки первоначальных обвинений 21. Кроме того, вероятно, Акаеву было обо всем известно и он даже потворствовал некоторым якобы совершенным Куловым сделкам с оружием. Если коррупция пронизывает политическую систему, скомпрометированными оказываются все. И вряд ли изгнание Акаева приведет к быстрому изменению коррумпированной природы киргизского общества. Несомненно, в последние несколько лет правления президента Акаева коррупция усилилась, и такое положение не побуждало ни проправительственные, ни оппозиционные группировки проводить более честную, умеренную и зрелую политику. Напротив, они стремятся отхватить свой кусок пирога, в котором, по их мнению, им отказывают. По мере того как президент все более эффективно расправлялся с критиками, противоречия между правительством и оппозицией продолжали нарастать. Частично это объясняется укреплением сотрудничества между Россией и Киргизией в области внутренней безопасности. Это сотрудничество должно было содействовать превращению Киргизии в «управляемую демократию», а не в общество, которое можно считать демократическим в соответствии с западными стандартами. Проще говоря, российскокиргизское сотрудничество в области внутренней безопасности предусматривало обучение киргизских специалистов искусному и эффективному использованию силовых угроз и политического запугивания, а также проведение таких реформ, которые создавали бы лишь иллюзию участия граждан в политической жизни. Однако эта форма виртуального участия была отвергнута и народом, и большей частью элиты. Киргизия — единственная страна в Центральной Азии, в которой общественное мнение заставило правительство изменить политику. Поведение Акаева, которое становилось все более автократическим, спровоцировало волнения еще в начале весны 2002 г., вскоре после размещения 2 тыс. военнослужащих коалиционных войск в аэропорту «Манас», когда на первый план вышли проблемы стабильности. В январе 2002 г. был арестован популярный политик Азимбек Бекназаров, а в марте пять человек, протестовав-

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ших против его ареста, были убиты. Это вызвало массовые демонстрации, которые продолжались, несмотря на отставку в мае всего правительства. Демонстранты разошлись по домам лишь после того, как апелляционный суд снял с Бекназарова все обвинения. Акаеву так и не удалось полностью восстановить политическую легитимность. Будучи председателем комитета Жогорку Кенеша (парламента) по судебным и юридическим вопросам, Бекназаров призвал объявить Акаеву импичмент в связи с тем, что в ходе переговоров с Китаем о границе правительство решило уступить КНР 125 тыс. гектаров территории 22. Бекназаров, который после отставки Акаева оказался главным обвинителем во временном правительстве Киргизии, утверждал, что на этой территории имеются ценные водные ресурсы, кроме того, там находятся могилы людей, которые погибли при попытке пробраться в Китай, чтобы избежать ареста российскими войсками во время восстания 1916 г.23 Вскоре после описанных событий, 5 января 2002 г., Бекназаров был арестован, обвинен в превышении служебных полномочий в бытность его следователем Токтогульской районной прокуратуры (семью годами ранее). Тогда же, в январе 2002 г., Бекназаров предстал перед судом. В ответ его сторонники начали пикетирование, а некоторые даже объявили голодовку 24. Когда один из участников голодовки умер от инсульта, страсти накалились еще больше, и демонстрации в родном городе Бекназарова Аксы (Джалал-Абадская область) стали более многочисленными, в марте число демонстрантов измерялось уже сотнями, если не тысячами 25. Акаев попытался разрядить кризис, назначив группу специальных следователей 26. Он сам прилетел в Джалал-Абад, что не ослабило, а, напротив, усилило критику в его адрес. Люди были возмущены тем, что он, президент, ограничил свое пребывание аэропортом и не почтил память умерших, посетив их могилы. Конечно, Акаев искал и козлов отпущения. Сначала всю вину возложили на Шермамата Осмонова, руководителя района, в котором происходили демонстрации. Акаев уволил его почти немедленно, хотя Осмонов и вышестоящие должностные лица утверждали, что полиция открыла огонь в порядке самозащиты (при проверке это не подтвердилось). В мае 2002 г. начальники Осмонова тоже были сняты, но вскоре обоих назначили на другие важные посты 27. Были начаты расследования в отношении нескольких местных офице-

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ров полиции, в том числе бывшего начальника полиции ДжалалАбадской области Кубанычбека Токобаева 28. Гибель людей в Аксы и реакция правительства на нее — все это впервые объединило политическую оппозицию. Общественные протесты усиливались, и люди из провинциальных центров начали двигаться к столице маршем протеста. Советники президента опасались, что если выход из кризиса не будет найден, Акаеву придется уйти в отставку 29. В мае 2002 г. Акаев сделал неудачную попытку удовлетворить оппозицию — он уволил премьер-министра Курманбека Бакиева и назначил вместо него Николая Танаева, русского, долгое время работавшего в Киргизии. Затем на протяжении нескольких последующих недель Акаев демонстрировал свое политическое мастерство. Он одновременно обещал наладить отношения с законодательной властью и угрожал расформировать парламент, что лишило бы депутатов всех их привилегий 30. Это не привело к прекращению демонстраций, но тут под рукой оказались новые друзья Акаева из Министерства внутренних дел России, которые предложили показать киргизским коллегам кое-какие новые приемы. Аренда залов для проведения собраний и митингов стала невозможной, и демонстранты были выдворены из Бишкека. Акаев также стремился открыть новые каналы для политического диалога. Он призвал всех граждан страны обсудить изменения, которые необходимо внести в Конституцию, чтобы создать условия для нормального политического процесса 31. По распоряжению президента была создана комиссия, в которую вошли юристы, государственные деятели и политические активисты. Комиссия рекомендовала ограничить власть президента, расширить полномочия премьер-министра и кабинета, сделав их более независимыми, и вновь заменить двухпалатный парламент однопалатным, также расширив его полномочия. Однако вариант Конституции, представленный избирателям 2 февраля 2003 г., заметно отличался от предложенного комиссией. Он был переписан в администрации президента таким образом, что полномочия президента оставались более широкими, чем предлагала комиссия, а импичмент становился практически невозможным 32. Референдум, включавший в себя среди прочего призыв к президенту Акаеву оставаться на его посту вплоть до истечения срока полномочий, прошел на

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ура. Исключительно ради того, чтобы избежать чрезмерного общественного давления на Акаева в период его пребывания на посту президента до конца срока, в преддверии референдума власти приняли несколько конституционных поправок, которые серьезно затрудняли оппозиционным группам получение разрешений на проведение собраний с большим числом участников. Этот опыт убедил киргизскую оппозицию (а также многих людей, прежде не проявлявших особого интереса к политике), что верить президенту не следует и что он всегда найдет способ обмануть или перехитрить своих противников. Вот почему оппозиция так опасалась, что Акаев может предложить вновь избранному парламенту принять поправку к Конституции, которая позволит ему остаться на посту президента и после истечения срока полномочий в 2005 г. Парламентские выборы, проходившие с 27 февраля по 13 марта 2005 г., стали для Акаева испытательным полигоном. Президентское окружение решило не полагаться на помощь Вашингтона и техническое содействие инструкторов ОБСЕ и провести испытание «управляемой демократии». Однако российские советники Акаева, по-видимому, дали ему плохой совет, а киргизские силы безопасности даже после дополнительного обучения не смогли контролировать большие массы людей. Хотя, по имеющимся оценкам, процесс голосования был более прозрачным, чем на предыдущих парламентских выборах, нарушения демократических норм редко были случайными 33. Десятки кандидатов, внесенных в избирательные бюллетени, принуждали к снятию своих кандидатур, чтобы сторонники Акаева могли одержать легкую победу. Несколько видных критиков режима не были включены в списки кандидатов на основании формальных предлогов: например, три бывших посла не соответствовали требованиям ценза оседлости, предъявляемым к кандидатам в члены парламента, поскольку исполняли свои дипломатические (т. е. служебные) обязанности за рубежом. Именно таким образом была отстранена от участия в выборах Роза Отунбаева, бывший министр иностранных дел Киргизии 34. Вернувшись в страну в 2004 г., она попыталась объединить оппозицию. На февральских парламентских выборах Отунбаевой не позволили баллотироваться против дочери Акаева Бермет. При

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этом Отунбаеву, бывшего посла Киргизии в США и представителя ООН в Грузии, не включили в список кандидатов на основании закона, который гласит, что кандидат в депутаты должен последние пять лет проживать в Киргизии. Против независимых и оппозиционных кандидатов велась целенаправленная борьба, и большинство сообщений о подкупе избирателей поступало именно из тех округов, где они баллотировались. Тем не менее шести таким кандидатам все же удалось получить большинство голосов в первом туре. В целом в первом туре было избрано лишь около половины парламентариев. Еще больше усилий с целью нанести поражение кандидатам, противостоящим власти, было предпринято во втором туре. Именно тогда в финансируемом американским правительством Центре поддержки независимых СМИ без всяких объяснений было отключено электричество, что лишило кандидатов от оппозиции возможности печатать свои материалы и таким образом контактировать с избирателями. Во втором туре потерпели поражение два главных кандидата оппозиции, Адахан Мадумаров и Курманбек Бакиев 35, которые, как ожидалось, должны были легко добиться переизбрания в своих округах, и оба объяснили это подтасовками. Поворотным моментом стало в первую очередь поражение Бакиева, бывшего премьер-министра страны, провозглашенного кандидатом в президенты. Он пользовался значительной поддержкой масс и элиты у себя на родине — в плотно населенной и бедной южной части страны. Потерпев поражение, Бакиев объединил силы с другими недовольными политиками юга страны, встав на сторону объединенной оппозиции, которая пыталась лишить Акаева контроля над южными районами Киргизии. Этой цели они смогли достичь всего за несколько дней. При этом им удалось быстро организовать работу новых «народных» или временных исполнительных и законодательных органов власти, и это, несомненно, придало оппозиции уверенности в том, что удастся обеспечить относительно спокойную передачу власти, когда 24 марта на улицы вышли тысячи возмущенных жителей Бишкека. Организаторы демонстрации не ожидали, что некоторые ее участники — главным образом молодые люди — выйдут из повиновения и бросятся громить канцелярию президента. Но когда Акаев бежал, оппозиционеры с радостью подхватили власть, которая сама упала к ним в руки.

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Путь отступления, избранный Акаевым, не делает ему чести. Он принес присягу во вновь избранном парламенте уже после того, как утратил контроль над южной частью страны. Ходили слухи, что когда демонстранты готовились к штурму, он покинул свою канцелярию, завернувшись в ковер. Оказавшись за пределами страны, Акаев в течение нескольких дней сообщал по электронной почте, что не собирается оставлять свой пост, и лишь спустя некоторое время представил заявление о своей отставке, записанное на видеокассету 36. Конституционный кризис усиливался из-за вакуума власти. Прежний парламент назначил Курманбека Бакиева премьер-министром и исполняющим обязанности президента. Этот парламент был избран в 2000 г., теперь его вроде бы сменил новый, депутаты которого были избраны в 2005 г., однако легитимность обоих органов оставалась под вопросом. Чтобы не допустить ситуации, когда в стране не будет ни президента, ни парламента, Бакиев пошел на компромисс: он признал легитимность парламента 2005 г. (за исключением 20 депутатов от округов, где результаты выборов были оспорены), который, в свою очередь, утвердил его в должности премьер-министра, но отказал признать исполняющим обязанности президента. Бакиев назначил Розу Отунбаеву исполняющей обязанности министра иностранных дел, а для координации работы служб безопасности временно привлек Феликса Кулова, бывшего министра государственной безопасности; однако через неделю Кулов отказался от должности, чтобы подготовиться — в качестве соперника Бакиева — к президентским выборам, назначенным на 10 июля 2005 г. В середине мая Кулов договорился с Бакиевым, что в случае победы последнего он станет премьер-министром. Это породило у иностранных наблюдателей сомнения относительно открытости предстоящих выборов и опасения, не будут ли они скомпрометированы продолжающимися закулисными переговорами между политическими фракциями. Как и его коллеги в других странах региона, Аскар Акаев формировал политические институты, которые лишь создавали видимость участия граждан в политике. Они должны были успокоить критиков как за рубежом, так и внутри страны, а вовсе не облегчить перераспределение власти между президентом (вместе

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с его окружением) и другими общественными группами. А когда эти группы стали претендовать на реальную власть, Акаев сначала инстинктивно попытался задушить протест, а потом, потерпев неудачу, постарался выдавить недовольных из политической жизни. Но со временем народ Киргизии и, в частности, оппозиционные элиты научились предугадывать действия президента и в марте 2005 г. попросту перехитрили его. Следует отдать должное Аскару Акаеву: он извлек важный урок из событий в Аксы — понял, что стрельба по невооруженной толпе может привести к гражданской войне, и при всем нежелании уходить в отставку все же не пошел на силовые меры. К сожалению, после применения силы властями Узбекистана в мае 2005 г. нет оснований полагать, что другие президенты центральноазиатских стран в критических ситуациях последуют его примеру.

Казахстан: сможет ли Назарбаев удержать власть? Соединенные Штаты обнаружили, что в последние месяцы правления Акаева у них было мало шансов повлиять на ситуацию и что их возможности оказания нажима с целью сделать выборы 2005 г. свободными и справедливыми весьма ограниченны. Как и в случае Узбекистана, как только военно-воздушная база «Манас» стала реальностью, руки у Вашингтона оказались связанными. Но если в Киргизии иностранным действующим лицам трудно влиять на процесс политической организации общества, то в Казахстане делать это еще сложнее. Поскольку Казахстан располагает богатыми природными ресурсами, западные лидеры неохотно применяют кнут, а так как страна обладает достаточной платежеспособностью, для нее трудно найти потенциальный пряник. С учетом ключевой роли западных фирм в разработке стратегически важных нефтяных и газовых ресурсов Казахстана, западные лидеры не будут слишком настаивать на проведении там демократической реформы до тех пор, пока не придут к выводу, что недемократический характер казахстанского режима подрывает его собственную безопасность в краткосрочном плане. Поскольку Казахстан получает большие доходы благодаря высоким ценам на нефть, в распоряжении международного сообще-

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ства мало позитивных стимулов, позволяющих влиять на ситуацию в этой стране. У Казахстана нет необходимости занимать деньги ни у Международного валютного фонда, ни у Всемирного банка. Он может найти нужные средства на международных рынках капитала и в случае необходимости способен сам оплатить техническую помощь. Азиатский банк развития и Всемирный банк продолжают работать в Казахстане, однако основное внимание они уделяют совместно финансируемым программам технической помощи. В принципе международное сообщество могло бы повлиять на формирование политических институтов в Казахстане, однако для этого трудно найти эффективные способы воздействия. К счастью, многие ключевые фигуры в Казахстане понимают, что, если страна хочет иметь достаточный вес на международной арене и обеспечить благосостояние народа в долгосрочном плане, экономический рост должен сопровождаться созданием необходимых политических институтов. Но демократические реформы в Казахстане маловероятны без сотрудничества с нынешним президентом страны Назарбаевым. Это обстоятельство не обрекает демократические реформы на провал, но усложняет их проведение. Любой человек, заинтересованный в преобразовании политической системы в Казахстане, должен помнить, что президент Назарбаев останется на своем посту до 2013 г., если, конечно, будет пребывать в добром здравии. Назарбаев уже объявил о намерении выставить свою кандидатуру на президентских выборах в декабре 2006 г., и Конституция, реформированная в 1998 г., позволяет ему в случае победы остаться на этом посту на второй семилетний срок. В ходе избирательной кампании 2006 г. необходимо обеспечить прозрачность процесса голосования, не допустить обмана избирателей, предоставить потенциальным кандидатам возможность собирать подписи избирателей, а также проследить, чтобы кандидатам не могли помешать баллотироваться юридические или административные интриги, как это случилось с бывшим премьер-министром Акежаном Кажегельдиным, лишенным в 1999 г. права баллотироваться в Мажилис от Республиканской народной партии Казахстана. Граждане Казахстана сохраняют спокойствие, поскольку уровень жизни в стране продолжает повышаться, а семья президен-

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та не усиливает, а скорее ослабляет свое влияние на экономику страны. Но после «революции роз», «оранжевой революции» и «революции тюльпанов» оппозиция в Казахстане преисполнена решимости дать нынешней власти настоящий бой во время президентской кампании в январе 2006 г. События в Киргизии, Грузии и на Украине показали, что с помощью антиконституционных форм правления Назарбаеву вряд ли удастся и дальше консолидировать в своих руках политическую власть и продолжать тормозить экономическое развитие тех предприятий, владельцы которых не принадлежат к его семейному клану. И сейчас все взоры обращены на него. Политическая система в Казахстане больше всего напоминает киргизскую: в обеих странах уже имеются довольно сильные гражданские общественные институты, политическая и экономическая элита частично раздроблена, а слово «президент» ассоциируется со словом «коррупция». Но есть и серьезные различия. Казахстан намного богаче Киргизии, а его экономика гораздо мощнее. Обе страны проводили примерно одинаковую политику в области экономических реформ, но благодаря крупным нефтяным и газовым ресурсам Казахстану удалось привлечь намного больше иностранных инвестиций; разработка этих ресурсов также позволила стране получать прибыль за счет высоких мировых цен на нефть. Поэтому проблема бедности здесь стоит не так остро, как в Киргизии. К тому же бедное население Казахстана рассеяно по громадной территории страны, что затрудняет его организацию и мобилизацию. Возможно, общественные учреждения в Казахстане не столь развиты. Но самое большое отличие состоит в том, что бóльшая часть политической элиты страны пока не желает портить отношения с президентом. Часть влиятельных членов элиты поддерживает проведение политических реформ, но в большинстве своем элита достаточно молода, чтобы согласиться на постепенную демократизацию политической системы. Номенклатура в основном состоит из этнических казахов, воспитанных в культурной атмосфере, главный принцип которой — уважение к старшим. Основная задача Назарбаева состоит в том, чтобы сохранить их поддержку. Бóльшая часть элиты полагает, что, несмотря на все его недостатки, Назарбаев остается для Казахстана весьма позитивной по-

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литической фигурой: в трудных условиях он сохранил независимость страны, обеспечил максимальную поддержку Запада и при этом не ухудшил отношения с Россией. Эти люди не хотят ни мешать президенту, ни отстранять его от власти. Они желают лишь того, чтобы к моменту ухода Назарбаева в 2013 г. (или раньше — по состоянию здоровья либо в случае кончины) в Казахстане существовала открытая и конкурентная многопартийная политическая система, с нормально функционирующим законодательным органом, как минимум, квазинезависимыми средствами массовой информации и/или иными эффективными возможностями внедрения потенциальных членов элиты в политическую жизнь. Элита, отстаивающая этот подход, становится все более многочисленной и сильной. Ее ряды быстро пополняют представители экономического сектора и те, кто имел возможность получить образование за границей или в казахских учебных заведениях западного образца, а сейчас работает в государственном секторе или других высокоспециализированных областях 37. Становление этой элиты способствует укреплению мнения, что рыночные реформы облегчают развитие демократического общества, так как люди, имеющие экономическую власть, заинтересованы и в достижении политической власти, хотя бы для защиты своей собственности 38. Хотя экономическая жизнестойкость Казахстана способствовала формированию весьма шумной и активной группы, требующей, чтобы экономически и политические решения принимались в более прозрачной атмосфере, пока рано говорить о том, насколько успешно она сможет реализовать свою программу реформ. Число сторонников демократических реформ в Казахстане возрастает, однако у президента еще достаточно возможностей, чтобы при желании заставить критиков замолчать. И в последние годы он несколько раз это продемонстрировал. В конце 2002 г. группа ведущих реформаторов вышла из правительства и образовала политическое движение под названием «Демократический выбор Казахстана» (ДВК), которое выдвинуло цели создания в стране объединенного правительства, совершенствования судебной системы и повышения уровня экономической безопасности путем улучшения защиты частной собственности. Их планы по преобразования движения ДВК в политическую партию были расстроены, однако

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этот процесс обозначил, с одной стороны, пределы власти режима, а с другой — пределы возможностей оппозиции 39. С момента ухода в отставку премьер-министра Акежана Кажегельдина в конце 1997 г. разочарование молодых казахстанских предпринимателей и сторонников экономических реформ непрерывно нарастает. Эти люди образуют сравнительно компактную социальную группу, и никто из них формально не поддерживал усилия Кажегельдина по создании оппозиционной партии, но все они были обеспокоены усилением власти президента и его семейного клана после отставки премьер-министра. Они считали, что реформу следует проводить в рамках существующего политического истеблишмента, заручившись поддержкой ближайшего окружения президента. Они не ставили целью устранение Назарбаева или лишение членов его семьи принадлежащей им огромной собственности. Скорее всего, они хотели просто увеличить свои активы и расширить политическое влияние и полагали, что с увеличением прозрачности им будет гораздо легче добиться этого. Однако зять Назарбаева Рахат Алиев пытался взять под контроль часть собственности сторонников ДВК включая средства массовой информации, а также предприятия, занимающиеся импортом и экспортом алкоголя и сахара. Будучи заместителем главы службы национальной безопасности, он стремился расширить свою экономическую империю, в частности, усилить влияние в органах безопасности Казахстана 40. В ответ на это независимая телекомпания «Тан-ТВ» (принадлежащая члену ДВК Мухтару Аблязову) в одной из своих программ обвинила Алиева в использовании служебного положения в целях собственного обогащения. Это обвинение компрометировало Назарбаева и выставляло на посмешище проводившуюся им политику борьбы с коррупцией, так как Алиев формально как раз контролировал это направление. Назарбаев отправил Алиева «в ссылку», назначив послом в Австрии. Алиев временно потерял контроль над принадлежавшими ему СМИ («Караван» и «Коммерческое телевидение Казахстана»), а назначение на дипломатическую службу лишило его преимуществ в борьбе за политическую власть в Казахстане 41. Алиев был одним из самых яростных противников демократических реформ. Забавно, но именно ему пору-

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чили добиться того, чтобы представитель Казахстана стал председателем ОБСЕ в 2009 г., и соответственно отвечать за представление в эту организацию подробной информации из Астаны обо всех политических реформах, которые должен осуществить Казахстан, чтобы его представитель смог занять этот пост. Судьба тех, кто противостоял Алиеву, сложилась гораздо хуже. Силы, стоявшие за ДВК, стали быстро таять после того, как двое из организаторов этого движения — бывший министр энергетики, промышленности и торговли Мухтар Аблязов и бывший глава администрации северной Павлодарской области Галымжан Жакиянов — были арестованы по нескольким обвинениям в злоупотреблении властью. Арест Жакиянова чуть не стал причиной международного инцидента, когда он укрылся во французском посольстве в Алматы и смог выйти оттуда лишь после того, как послы Франции и Германии получили заверения, что он будет содержаться под домашним арестом на протяжении всего срока расследования того правонарушения, в котором его обвиняли. Тем не менее Жакиянова заключили под стражу, допросили, признали виновным и приговорили к семи годам лишения свободы 42. Аблязова тоже признали виновным по всем предъявленным обвинениям, приговорили к шести годам заключения, но освободили по амнистии в мае 2003 г. после того, как он дал обещание больше не участвовать в политической деятельности. Жакиянов отказался дать подобное обещание, до сих пор находится в заключении и в августе 2004 г. был переведен в штрафную колонию. Наказание Жакиянова и Аблязова обеспечило передышку коекому из основателей ДВК. Нурлан Смагулов, президент компании «Food Corporation», экспортирующей зерно, и Ерзян Татишев, президент ОАО «Банк ТуранАлем», покинули движение после того, как Назарбаев предупредил их, что представители деловых кругов не должны в своей деятельности выходить за пределы экономической сферы, что во многом напоминало действия российского президента Владимира Путина в отношении российских олигархов. Уйдя из политики, Смагулов и Татишев смогли сохранить свою собственность. Два других организатора ДВК — бывший первый заместитель премьер-министра Ораз Жандосов и Алихан Бейманов — порвали

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с ДВК, сформировали партию «Ак жол» («Светлый путь») и вместе с присоединившимся к ним вскоре Булатом Абиловым стали ее сопредседателями, что позволило им сохранить реформаторский импульс, но при этом избежать судьбы Жакиянова и Аблязова 43. Нынешняя стратегия партии «Ак жол» отражает позицию ее руководителей, которые предпочитают умеренность, полагая, что если торопить политические изменения, то это спровоцирует откат и вместо реформ приведет к репрессиям со стороны правительства. Члены партии «Ак жол» надеются, что хотя Назарбаев может преследовать конкретных людей, он не собирается проводить чистку всей прореформаторской экономической элиты в целом, так как ее представители занимают многие ключевые посты в правительстве, банковском секторе и вообще в деловых кругах. Многие из этих людей втайне поддерживают цели «Ак жол», но мало кто из тех, кто напрямую связан с режимом Назарбаева, согласится, чтобы их публично идентифицировали в качестве сторонников этой партии 44. Согласно изменениям в законодательстве, принятым в июле 2002 г., политические партии должны были пройти перерегистрацию, но не все они соответствовали новым, более жестким требованиям к численности членов 45. «Ак жол» прошла повторную регистрацию и выставила кандидатов в местные органы власти и парламент в избирательных кампаниях 2004 г. в составе оппозиционного блока — вместе с ДВК и Коммунистической партией. Это позволило ДВК и Коммунистической партии участвовать в выборах, так как ранее им было отказано в регистрации в качестве политических партий. Тот факт, что эти люди не подвергаются серьезным преследованиям и даже играют определенную роль в политической жизни, показывает, что Казахстан — не авторитарная страна. Хотя Казахстан, конечно, не демократия, его гражданам предоставлены достаточно широкие свободы и возможность располагать своим личным пространством, причем это касается всех этнических групп. Простые граждане не боятся, что их будут преследовать органы безопасности, даже если они начнут критиковать президента, его родственников и их личную жизнь. Однако тем, кто пытается заниматься политикой, дают понять, что у государства

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длинные руки. Будучи фактически диктатором (Назарбаеву все меньше нравится, когда этот термин употребляют публично: он предпочитает, чтобы его воспринимали как некоего «хана нашего времени»), казахский президент все же понимает, что его власть имеет пределы. Назарбаев полагает, что политическая власть во многом определяется обществом, которым он управляет. Казахское общество, как и киргизское, всегда было более открытым, чем узбекское или таджикское. Казахи любят повторять, что причиной такого положения заключается в их кочевом прошлом, которое сделало их культуру более адаптируемой, восприимчивой к внешним воздействиям. Разумеется, за последние несколько столетий традиционное казахское общество почерпнуло от контактов с русской культурой гораздо больше, чем от оседлых «оазисных» культур узбеков и таджиков. Процесс смешивания разных культур начался задолго до периода насильственной ассимиляции наций в советские времена, и вполне возможно, что именно поэтому переход к независимости для казахов (и киргизов) оказался гораздо легче, чем для других народов Центральной Азии. Организация кочевого общества у киргизов и казахов по родам и кланам поддерживала атмосферу открытости, так как на протяжении всей истории Казахстана старейшины клана или племени собирались вместе для обсуждения актуальных проблем. Это имело место еще в XVI и XVII вв., когда три казахских орды были объединены под властью одного правителя. Ни один из казахских ханов не имел такой власти, какая была у Тимура (Тамерлана) — национального героя Узбекистана 46. Тем не менее президент Назарбаев плохо переносит людей, которые наносят ущерб его имиджу. То, что в Казахстане существуют более жесткие, чем в Киргизии, ограничения в области политических высказываний, во многом объясняются доминирующей ролью его семьи в средствах массовой информации. Журналистов, «переступивших черту», жестоко преследуют. В мае 2002 г. Ирина Петрушова, редактор смелой газеты «Республика», опубликовавшей весьма язвительный материал о кумовстве Назарбаева, получила угрожающую записку, которая была прикреплена к телу обезглавленной собаки 47. В том же месяце, когда казахская оппозиционная журналистка Лира Байсеитова уехала из страны, ее

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двадцатипятилетняя дочь Лейла умерла в результате жестоких побоев и травм, нанесенных ей в полицейском участке 48. Еще один пример — преследование журналиста и правозащитника Сергея Дуванова, которого арестовали и признали виновным в изнасиловании несовершеннолетней; об этом деле много писали на Западе, и независимая европейская комиссия пришла к заключению, что обвинения имели политическую мотивировку 49. Дуванов сообщал о ходе расследования большим жюри в Нью-Йорке дела о коррупции в нефтедобывающей промышленности Казахстана и публиковал статьи, в которых в связи с этим расследованием упоминалось имя президента Казахстана 50. Дело Дуванова находилось под неустанным международным вниманием, и в результате в январе 2004 г. он был освобожден из-под стражи и помещен под домашний арест 51. История с Дувановым наглядно демонстрирует противоречивость сигналов, поступающих в последние годы от президента Казахстана. Назарбаев хочет, чтобы его страна была принята в сообщество «серьезных» государств, руководствующихся европейскими нормами. Именно поэтому он стремится к тому, чтобы Казахстан стал первым постсоветским государством, представитель которого займет пост председателя ОБСЕ (выборы должны состояться в 2006 г., а к исполнению обязанностей новый председатель приступит в 2009 г.). Однако собственное поведение Назарбаева и действия, которые он позволяет совершать от своего имени, делают эту цель практически недостижимой. Официальные представители ОБСЕ ясно дали понять лидерам Казахстана, что если они действительно хотят, чтобы их страна председательствовала в этой организации, им необходимо незамедлительно приступить к реформированию политической системы. Они должны провести свободные и честные выборы в парламент, позволить политической оппозиции существовать без какихлибо препятствий, создать предпосылки, необходимые для работы независимых СМИ, и независимую судебную систему 52. Однако пока правительство Казахстана лишь частично выполнило требования своих зарубежных наставников. За последние несколько лет в этом направлении было сделано всего несколько небольших шагов. Например, в 2001 г. некоторые чиновники и депутаты местных законодательных органов стали избираться на

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конкурентной основе, и в принципе власти Казахстана намерены постепенно заменить систему назначений должностных лиц выборами 53. В ноябре 2002 г. президент Казахстана объявил о создании постоянного консультативного комитета, одной из функций которого является оценка деятельности правительства 54. В сентябре 2004 г. парламентские и местные выборы проводились в соответствии с новым избирательным законом, который облегчил независимым кандидатам участие в выборах, а партиям предоставил возможность включать своих представителей в состав местных избирательных комиссий 55. Новый закон о СМИ, принятый 26 декабря 2003 г., подвергся резкой критике со стороны США и представителей ОБСЕ, поскольку он не соответствовал международным стандартам, после чего президент наложил на него вето, что сопровождалось грандиозной шумихой на международной форуме, посвященном СМИ (который финансировала его дочь Дарига), в апреле 2004 г. в Алматы 56. Однако кандидаты от пропрезидентских партий все же имели на выборах огромные преимущества, а если вдруг оказывалось, что они не оправдывают ожиданий и проигрывают, реальный ход избирательной кампании и выборов искажался, чтобы обеспечить этим кандидатам победу. Никто не знает, делалось ли это по приказу Назарбаева, но абсолютно очевидно, что Назарбаев не требовал от своих подчиненных проведения избирательных кампаний в соответствии с европейскими нормами. Если бы он сделал это, результаты выборов были бы гораздо ближе к данным опроса граждан на выходе с избирательных участков, чем это было в действительности. По-видимому, именно из-за подобных уловок правительства члены коалиции не смогли получить справедливую долю мест в парламенте. По результатам опроса на выходе с избирательных участков кандидаты от коалиции набирали 29% голосов, в то время как по официальным данным они получили в парламенте лишь одно место. Кроме того, по коалиции был нанесен еще один удар: как раз накануне выборов был арестован сопредседатель партии «Ак жол» Булат Абилов, в результате чего его кандидатура стала нелегитимной 57. Еще одним сюрпризом стало относительно неудачное участие в выборах возглавляемой Даригой Назарбаевой партии «Асар», которая получила только 11,38% голо-

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сов, хотя по опросам на выходе с участков должна была набрать 19,1%. Больше всего голосов получила самая близкая к президенту партия «Отан»: согласно официальным данным, она набрала 60,62% голосов (согласно опросам на выходе она должна была получить 40,1%) 58. ОБСЕ подвергла эти выборы резкой критике. Партия «Ак жол» отказалась занять свое единственное место в парламенте, заявив, что весь избирательный процесс проходил с серьезными нарушениями законодательства, но Центральная избирательная комиссия Казахстана отказала ей в требовании провести национальный референдум с целью отмены результатов выборов 59. После этого руководство «Ак жол» стало добиваться изменений в структуре правительства и искать поддержки у других крупных лидеров, отошедших от Назарбаева. Среди них следует упомянуть в частности бывшего лидера партии «Отан» и спикера парламента Жамархана Туякбая, подавшего в отставку в знак протеста против результатов выборов, а также Заманбека Нуркадилова, бывшего мэра Алматы и в недавнем прошлом министра по чрезвычайным ситуациям, который официально порвал с Назарбаевым в 1999 г. после того, как Кажегельдина отправили в изгнание за высказывания по поводу коррупционного скандала, связанного с именем Джеймса Гиффена. Нуркадилов обвинил президента в коррупции и «разбазаривании богатых минеральных ресурсов страны»60. После революции на Украине бóльшая часть оппозиционных политических групп в Казахстане объединилась в блок под названием «За справедливый Казахстан», который на съезде, состоявшемся 20 марта 2005 г. в Алматы, выразил поддержку своему единственному кандидату Туякбаю 61. Следующие президентские выборы оппозиция надеется превратить в триумфальную победу по украинскому сценарию. Она действительно пользуется значительной поддержкой населения, особенно в Алматы — самом большом городе страны. Оппозиционерам удалось организовать демонстрации с участием примерно 2 тыс. человек 62, но полиция легко разогнала толпу, и сторонникам Туякбая не хватило сил сохранить контроль над событиями в регионе. Назарбаев располагает большой дискреционной властью и огромным количеством реальных возможностей. Он заявляет, что наме-

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рен провести реальную, но постепенную политическую реформу, сопровождаемую конкретными мерами, направленными на улучшение социальных и экономических условий жизни народа 63. В обращении к нации в феврале 2005 г. он дал ряд обещаний, касающихся социальной сферы, в частности, пообещал десятикратно (до 3 тыс. человек в год) увеличить число молодых людей, ежегодно посылаемых за счет государства в западные учебные заведения для получения степени магистра. Если он выполнит хотя бы это конкретное обещание, его популярность заметно возрастет. Процесс осуществления политических реформ в Казахстане в значительной степени регулируется сверху и должен способствовать созданию впечатления, что демократия — это подарок казахскому народу от его доброжелательного президента, который делает это в полном соответствии с культурой и историей своей страны 64. Несмотря на отчаянное желание Назарбаева вывести Казахстан на мировую арену, он полон решимости идти к этому собственным путем, сохраняя все то, что, по его мнению, является привилегиями и прерогативами президента., Можно, например, вспомнить его взаимоотношения с Джеймсом Гиффеном, история с арестом которого обсуждалась выше. Назарбаев мог (и должен был) прекратить отношения с Гиффеном или заявить о своей полной неосведомленности относительно каких-либо противозаконных действий, в которых мог быть замешан Гиффен. Но вместо этого он вновь привлекает к сотрудничеству корпорацию «Mercator», которую теперь возглавляет сын Гиффена. Если Казахстан планирует построить у себя демократическое общество, именно политические лидеры США и Европы должны четко объяснить руководству страны, что и богатые, и бедные государства должны подчиняться одним и тем же нормам. В течение почти шести лет после начала расследования относительно источника средств, поступавших на банковские счета Назарбаева в Швейцарии, его радушно принимали во многих европейских столицах, он был тепло принят английской королевой и президентом Франции. И стремление Назарбаева выдвинуть страну на руководящую роль в ОБСЕ — замечательная возможность заставить казахстанское руководство вести себя в соответствии с международными стандартами.

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Понятно, что Казахстан не может за несколько лет превратиться в страну с развитой демократией, но если западные лидеры проглотят заявление, что самое большое, чего он может достигнуть, это стать страной с «управляемой демократией», казахстанский президент сможет не только руководить своим народом еще в течение шести лет, но и передать полномочия тому кандидату, которого сам выберет. Лидеры оппозиционных партий полагают, что президент и его семья рассматривают успешную передачу власти по наследству в Азербайджане как приглашение сделать то же самое и в Казахстане, хотя они также понимают, что неудачные попытки Шеварднадзе, Кучмы и Акаева передать свои полномочия преемникам тоже создали новые и более существенные прецеденты 65. У Назарбаева нет сыновей, и, кажется, только одна из трех его дочерей, Дарига, имеет политические амбиции, но она стала его дочерью в результате брака: будущая жена Назарбаева родила ее еще до того, как Назарбаев стал встречаться с ней. Оба его зятя — Рахат Алиев и Тимур Кулибаев — тоже мечтают о президентском кресле. Несмотря на то что Дарига, по всей вероятности, находится на прямой дороге к успеху, и на этом пути могут оказаться ухабы: неожиданно низкий результат партии «Асар» на выборах 2004 г. позволяет предположить, что отец поддерживал ее не слишком энергично 66. Тимур Кулибаев, сын регионального коммунистического босса из богатого нефтью и газом западного Казахстана, приобрел опыт и ценные навыки, будучи вторым человеком в государственной нефтегазовой компании «Казмунайгаз», и может стать весьма опасным соперником. В течение нескольких следующих лет, вероятнее всего, появятся и новые соперники, не имеющие отношения к клану Назарбаева, и они непременно попытаются превратить президентскую гонку 2006 г. в настоящее состязание. Даже если Назарбаев легко победит в 2006 г., конкуренция на выборах 2013 г. будет очень серьезной. Структура казахского общества к тому времени станет более сложной, и перспективы установления династии Назарбаевых станут гораздо менее определенными.

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Узбекистан: обещания в отношении реформ не выполняются Политическая система Узбекистана кардинально отличается от казахстанской и киргизской и гораздо меньше поддается влиянию извне. Опасения, что в Узбекистане назревают политические перемены, усиливаются, и это подтверждает большинство наблюдателей, которые не видят практически никаких свидетельств того, что элита или население страны способны оказать поддержку демократическим преобразованиям. Можно спорить по поводу возможностей участия граждан Казахстана и Киргизии в политической жизни своих стран, но Узбекистан, вне всяких сомнений, представляет собой современную авторитарную систему. Однако, несмотря на то что власть президента и органов безопасности проникает в самые отдаленные уголки страны, для ее реального осуществления требуется поддержка народа, а получить такую поддержку становится все труднее. Узбекистан не смог полностью оградить себя от глобализации. В страну проникли новые технологии, и она совсем не похожа на тоталитарные государства тридцатых годов. Информация из независимых источников доходит до узбекского населения, во всяком случае, до той его части, которая делает попытки получить к ней доступ. Содержание программ новостей, передаваемых по государственным теле- и радиоканалам, тщательно контролируется, но, по различным оценкам, почти половина ташкентских семей имеет доступ к спутниковым программам на русском, английском и турецком языках. И хотя конфиденциальность пользователей здесь обеспечивается не так надежно, как в Киргизии и Казахстане (в Узбекистане используется китайская технология блокирования доступа к «агрессивным» сайтам), почти повсюду в стране работают интернет-кафе. Многие молодые узбеки уже приобрели достаточные навыки работы с компьютером, чтобы знакомиться с материалами, которые государство старается сделать недоступными. В конечном счете степень доступа конкретного человека к свободным источникам информации больше определяется экономическими, чем политическими мотивами. Политическая атмосфера в Узбекистане постепенно становится несколько мягче. Несмотря на то что приглашение явиться в местную прокуратуру до сих пор вселяет страх в сердца обыч-

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ных граждан, иногда это не приносит никакого вреда. В частных и даже не совсем частных беседах простые узбеки уже рискуют обсуждать политические темы и размышлять о будущем страны. Еще до начала широкомасштабных акций протеста в Андижане в мае 2005 г. они начали выражать недовольство на людях: в магазинах, на базарах, в транспортных пробках. Реже можно было слышать формальные публичные протесты, но и они становились все более частыми. Женщины руководили такими демонстрациями гораздо чаще, чем мужчины, потому что в подобных случаях полиция обычно старалась просто разогнать собравшуюся толпу, не прибегая к арестам 67. Более того, после серии взрывов, осуществленных террористами-смертниками в марте-апреле 2004 г., в которых обвинили исламских экстремистов, многие простые узбеки, по-видимому, были склонны в большей степени сочувствовать не жертвам терактов, а тем отчаявшимся людям, которые решились на столь безрассудный шаг 68. И это, судя по всему, повышает готовность других оппозиционных групп к публичным выступлениям, так что на этот раз общественная реакция оказалась совершенной иной, чем после взрывов в 1999 г.69 Все это позволяет предположить, что граждане Узбекистана будут продолжать добиваться политических перемен, даже если государство станет пытаться удержать их под контролем с помощью силы. Проблема заключается в том, чтобы убедить узбекские власти, что ввиду нарастающего в обществе недовольства политическая система в стране должна стать не еще более закрытой, а, наоборот, более открытой. Если же правительство и дальше продолжит закручивание гаек, дело может кончиться гражданской войной. В течение «медового месяца», точнее, целых шести месяцев в конце 2001 г. и начале 2002 г., наблюдатели надеялись, что расширение участия США в жизни Центральной Азии может облегчить проведение столь необходимых политических реформ. Однако реформирование было настолько незначительным, что в конце 2003 г. Госдепартамент США официально обвинил Узбекистан в действиях, нарушающих права человека 70. Могли ли Соединенные Штаты в те годы оказать существенное влияние на политическую эволюцию Узбекистана? В отличие от Киргизии возможности Узбекистана «переварить» значительное

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увеличение целевой иностранной помощи, направляемой на реализацию политических проектов, были весьма невелики. Поддержка таких реформ со стороны элиты была еще более ограниченной, поскольку в стране практически отсутствовал класс независимых предпринимателей, стремящихся обеспечить защиту своей собственности, нажитой законным путем. Тем не менее получение значительной иностранной помощи в течение длительного времени могло бы оказать определенное положительное воздействие за счет повышения уровня профессионализма в судебной и пенитенциарной системах и во всех секторах государственного управления. Кроме того, она способствовала бы формированию слоя независимых предпринимателей, которые могли бы добиваться проведения дальнейших политических реформ. Улучшение обстановки в Афганистане в плане безопасности в конце 2001 г. и в 2002 г. обеспечило узбекскому правительству возможности для осуществления политических реформ — если бы оно действительно этого хотело. Но эти события почти не повлияли на личные амбиции виднейших представителей узбекской элиты. У большинства членов «ближнего круга» президента Каримова политическая карьера строилась в условиях «нисходящего» стиля принятия политических решений, в рамках которого управление и контроль обеспечивались с помощью угроз или силы. Было ясно, что Каримов стремится к стратегическому партнерству с Соединенными Штатами, но обсуждение политических реформ в Узбекистане проходило на совершенно иных основаниях, нежели обсуждение экономических реформ. Многие высшие руководители в Ташкенте полагали, что столь медленное развитие рыночной экономики в стране было ошибкой, но очень немногие высказывались в пользу проведения политических реформ, имея в виду какие-то иные соображения кроме целесообразности увеличения степени доверия к Узбекистану со стороны Соединенных Штатов и Западной Европы. Как уже отмечалось, во время визита Каримова в Вашингтон в марте 2002 г. он дал множество обещаний, а также подписал пять соглашений между США и Узбекистаном. В частности, была подписана важнейшая и всеобъемлющая Декларация об основах стратегического сотрудничества и взаимодействия между Соединенными Штатами Америки и Республикой Узбекистан, которая

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охватывала политические, оборонные, экономические, гуманитарные и юридические вопросы и обязывала узбекское руководство оказывать поддержку демократическим реформам 71. Соединенные Штаты пообещали оказать помощь Ташкенту в случае возникновения внешней угрозы или угрозы нарушения территориальной целостности. При этом официальные коммюнике сообщали: «Узбекистан вновь подтвердил свое обязательство более интенсивно осуществлять демократические преобразования в обществе как в политическом, так и в экономическом плане... и создать... правовое государство и демократическое общество... сформировать систему власти, основанную на соблюдении законов, и продолжать реформировать судебную систему и развивать правовую культуру»72. Парадоксально, но столь сильная формулировка, возможно, появилась в результате давления с узбекской стороны. По одной из версий интерпретации событий Государственный департамент первоначально предлагал более мягкую формулировку заявления, которая позволила бы поставить перед правительством Узбекистана более реальные цели и задачи. Но, согласно этой версии, во время дискуссии, проводившейся параллельно с официальными переговорами, некоторые члены узбекской делегации настояли на более жестком тексте, утверждая, что если не поставить перед правительством почти недостижимые цели, оно вообще ничего не сделает. Но даже если Каримов был искренен в своих обещаниях оказать поддержку политическим реформам, он считал, что путь, который Узбекистан должен пройти, чтобы стать демократическим обществом, будет достаточно долгим — и ничем не угрожающим его личной власти. На референдуме в январе 2003 г. он уже продлил срок своего президентства до 2007 г.73 Фортуна не всегда благосклонна к планам диктаторов, и к середине 2002 г. начали распространяться слухи о плохом состоянии здоровья Каримова. Затем появились и признаки, свидетельствующие, что те, кого считают «крестными отцами» ведущих политических семейств Узбекистана, вступили в тайную борьбу за власть. Эти люди плохо понимали, как работает демократическая система, и не верили в нее (ведь нельзя манипулировать тем, чего не понимаешь).

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Правительство сделало кое-какие, по большей части символические шаги для выполнения некоторых своих политических обещаний. Каримов действительно способствовал постепенному превращению парламента из органа, просто штамповавшего указы и проекты законов, поступавшие из канцелярии президента и его кабинета, в орган, способный к дискуссиям и в конечном счете даже к самостоятельному составлению проектов законов. Законодатели, избранные в 2004 г., работают в новом двухпалатном парламенте, но несмотря на все обещания Каримова, данные им в 2002 г., выборы 2004 г. не были ни свободными, ни справедливыми. Был принят ряд непоследовательных мер для того, чтобы начать формирование политических партий, представляющих разные интересы, но фактически все партии, участвовавшие в выборах 2004 г., были проправительственными, и в большинстве случаев их организовали просто для того, чтобы придать выборам видимость демократических 74. В то же время политическим партиям, организованным не по инициативе правительства, не удалось даже пройти регистрацию 75. Это были новые партии, а также «Эрк» и «Бирлик», которые провели организационные собрания, но не смогли обеспечить выполнение формальных и иногда весьма причудливо толкуемых положений закона о регистрации 76. Формально государственная цензура была ликвидирована, тем не менее правительство продолжало контролировать средства массовой информации, в том числе путем их регистрации, так как СМИ, прошедшие государственную регистрацию, должны были представлять ежегодные планы передач и публикаций с указанием способов передачи новостей. Журналистов, нарушающих неписаные законы, избивали или подвергали аресту за «клеветническое изображение Узбекистана за границей» (в этом плане особенно уязвимы те, кто работает на западные неправительственные организации) 77. Почти такая же стратегия используется и в отношении активистов правозащитных организаций. Некоторые ранее запрещенные группы были официально зарегистрированы, по некоторым ранее запретным политическим темам стали проводиться небольшие или закрытые конференции, хотя иногда такие конференции созываются исключительно для специально приглашенных иностранных гостей 78. Но деятельность правозащитных групп по-

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прежнему строго контролируется, и организации, выходящие за рамки, установленные правительством, как и раньше, подвергаются преследованиям, лишаются аккредитации, а их лидеров заключают под стражу 79. Медленно и трудно идет реформа пенитенциарной системы и обеспечивается защита законных прав обвиняемых. Правда, в некоторых случаях сотрудникам полиции были предъявлены обвинения, их даже признали виновными и осудили на лишение свободы за применение насилия при допросах арестованных по подозрению в религиозном экстремизме 80. Правительство улучшило условия содержания узников совести, в частности, обеспечило лучшие условия для совершения молитв и устранило крайние проявления жестокости 81. Специальному посланнику ООН по проблеме пыток Тео ван Бовену было даже разрешено посетить местные тюрьмы 82. После этого было проведено несколько независимых расследований гибели заключенных (предположительно в результате жестокого обращения с ними в полиции); в одном случае полицейских оправдали 83. Но сокрытие применения пыток на всех уровнях судебной системы остается обычным делом. Наконец, правительство Узбекистана отказалось провести международное расследование применения силы, которое привело к человеческим жертвам в Андижане в мае 2005 г. Ташкент настаивает на том, что «Хизб ат-Тахрир» представляет для Узбекистана военную угрозу. Эта позиция стала еще более твердой после осады в Андижане, ответственность за которую возложили на религиозную группировку «Акромия», отколовшуюся от «Хизб ат-Тахрир». Хотя часть осужденных за религиозные взгляды попала под амнистию, в заключении остается еще несколько тысяч человек, обвиненных в подстрекательских действиях, связанных с религией 84. Власти проявляют к религиозным активистам особую жестокость 85. Суды рассматривают признание обвиняемого как достаточное доказательство вины, поэтому для получения признательных показаний часто применяются крайние меры. После взрывов в марте, апреле и июле 2004 г. правительственная кампания против «Хизб ат-Тахрир» вступила в новую фазу 86. Последние взрывы прогремели во время судов над тринадцатью подсудимыми, которые обвинялись в совершенных раньше нападениях 87.

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Правительство продолжает поиски оставшихся в живых членов ИДУ и аресты людей, связанных с «Хизб ат-Тахрир». По всей стране действует много мелких ячеек этой организации; их состав пополняют новые члены и немногие амнистированные правительством осужденные за религиозные взгляды, а также активисты, отбывшие свои сроки 88. Члены «Хизб ат-Тахрир» по-прежнему ездят в Таджикистан, Казахстан и Киргизию и привозят отпечатанные там материалы. Хотя в этих странах «Хизб ат-Тахрир» тоже не является легальной организацией, тамошние власти не видят в ее деятельности столь большой угрозы, менее строго следят за ее активистами, а осужденные за вербовку новых членов получают меньшие сроки заключения 89. В целом общий уровень озабоченности по поводу опасности, исходящей от «Хизб ат-Тахрир», в регионе возрастает, особенно с тех пор, как ее численность после резкого снижения вербовки сразу после 11 сентября, когда Соединенные Штаты провели глобальную международную кампанию по прекращению финансирования потенциально подозрительных исламских благотворительных организаций, снова стала возрастать. Ей потребовалось совсем немного времени, чтобы восстановить нарушенные цепочки передачи денег в Центральной Азии, поскольку исламским группировкам относительно легко удается собирать небольшие суммы среди своих сторонников в регионе 90. В Узбекистане, как и в других центральноазиатских странах, контроль за религиозной деятельностью находится в руках светских властей, многие представители которых были связаны с прежним атеистическим режимом. Высшее духовное лицо страны, муфтий, номинально избирается на собрании религиозных старейшин, но в действительности он подчиняется Государственному комитету по делам религий. В настоящее время отдельная мечеть может легко собирать деньги и отправлять службы при минимальном вмешательстве чиновников, однако государство все еще строго регулирует открытие религиозных школ, и разрешение на открытие такой школы получить очень трудно, хотя в первые годы независимости их выдавали без особых проблем. Чтобы создать упомянутому госкомитету репутацию сторонника «хороших» верующих, в его состав ввели ряд религиозных деятелей, лояльных к государству. В последние годы комитет несколько расширил полномочия муфтия и его администрации и вернул им

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кое-какую собственность 91. Однако некоторые действия комитета, например, попытки ограничить размах празднований ифта (окончания поста) во время рамадана и на свадьбах, вызвали раздражение верующих, причем настолько сильное, что появились слухи о том, что некоторые религиозные деятели в составе комитета являются членами радикальных исламских группировок и саботируют изнутри политику государства в отношении религии (саботаж состоит в том, что они принуждают государство идти на поводу у тех, кто выступает против ценностей узбекского общества). Остаются в силе введенные в конце 1990-х годов ограничения на ношение религиозной одежды в школах и общественных местах. Сейчас эти ограничения соблюдаются не так строго, главным образом потому, что они выполнили свою задачу: женщины, носящие хиджаб, перестали принимать участие в общественной жизни, а бородатые мужчины побрились или ушли в подполье. Эти акции получили некоторую общественную поддержку, что явилось очередным свидетельством сложности религиозной жизни в Узбекистане, где светские, традиционные исламские и радикальные исламские силы уже длительное борются между собой за влияние. Однако большинство узбеков, хотя бы в минимальной степени соблюдающих исламские ритуалы, по-видимому, придерживаются мнения, что религиозную жизнь в установленных государством гражданских рамках должны регулировать сами верующие. По большинству других вопросов мнения зачастую резко расходятся. В частности, нет единого мнения по вопросу об отношении к экстремистским исламским группировкам, отрицающим доминирующую юридическую традицию ханафизма. В Узбекистане глубоко укоренилась поддержка исламского права в рамках этой традиции, и усиление «Хизб ат-Тахрир», которая отрицает все четыре традиционные исламские правовые школы, свидетельствует об отсутствии достаточно убедительных альтернатив — как светских, так и религиозных. Разумеется, элита центральноазиатских государств формально не выступает против ислама как такового, однако она очень опасается возрождения исламского фундаментализма, который требует, чтобы управление современной жизнью осуществлялось на основе Корана. Элита хочет сохранить светскую власть и старается не допустить, чтобы правоверные мусульмане принудили всех

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единоверцев к публичному соблюдению догматов веры, которое, однако, все шире распространяется во всей Центральной Азии. Жесткая политика режима Каримова в отношении «экстремистских» исламских группировок поставила Соединенные Штаты в неловкое положение, однако поощрение Ташкентом «хороших» (т. е. умеренных) исламских группировок и подавление «плохих» (т. е. экстремистских) вполне соответствуют взглядам официального Вашингтона на эти проблемы. Если не касаться «достижений» Узбекистана в области прав человека, он может служить хорошим примером того, как нужно воспринимать концепцию администрации Буша об использовании умеренной исламской идеологии для сдерживания распространения радикальной идеологии. Даже сейчас американское посольство в Ташкенте приглашает умеренно настроенных духовных лиц и членов Госкомитета по делам ислама посетить США в рамках программы международных обменов. Кроме того, американское правительство выделяет узбекским ученым-исламоведам стипендии и дотации для работы в Соединенных Штатах над исследованиями в области сравнительного изучения ислама с целью достижения большей религиозной терпимости. Конечно, имеются основания для сомнений в практичности или успешности общего подхода США к данной проблеме, однако в Узбекистане он способствовал активизации дискуссии о взаимоотношениях между религией и государством. Побывавшие в Соединенных Штатах узбеки вряд ли нашли там много практических примеров, которые легко воспроизвести в условиях Узбекистана, однако, по-видимому, они покидали США с пониманием того, насколько нетипичными для мирового сообщества являются отношения между государством и религией, сложившиеся в Узбекистане (хотя для Центральной Азии такие отношения вполне обычны). Проблемами межэтнических отношений в Узбекистане международное сообщество озабочено меньше, чем отношением государства к правозащитникам и исламистскому меньшинству. Этническая принадлежность в Узбекистане определяется не так четко, как в других странах Центральной Азии. Желающие считаться узбеками и владеющие узбекским языком считаются узбеками, даже если они происходят из этнически смешанных семей или имеют предков, которые, возможно, числили себя казахами, киргиза-

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ми или таджиками 92. Оценки процентной доли этнических таджиков значительно различаются, однако нет сомнений, что таджики — самое многочисленное меньшинство в Узбекистане, особенно если учесть, что после обретения Узбекистаном независимости русские в массовом порядке выезжали из страны 93. За прошедшие восемьдесят лет многие жители Узбекистана, говорящие по-таджикски, постепенно изменили свою идентификацию, так что в паспортах и других документах они сами и члены их семей значатся узбеками. Но часто это делалось лишь по политическим соображениям, и многие подобные «узбеки» считают себя таджиками и предпочли бы жить в государстве с преобладающим таджикским населением. Раскол между узбеками и таджиками продолжает оказывать реальное влияние на политическую жизнь Узбекистана. Таджики, особенно проживающие в пограничных районах, рассматриваются как потенциально нелояльные граждане. Имело место даже принудительное переселение некоторых таджикских деревень вдоль горного хребта, которым Узбекистан владеет совместно с Таджикистаном (в Кашкадарьинской и Сурхандарьинской областях). Как раз в этом районе летом 2000 г. произошло вторжение боевиков ИДУ 94. Аналогично всякий раз, когда какому-нибудь таджику благодаря связям удается занять высокий политический пост, его начинают подозревать в том, что он будет использовать свое положение для продвижения таджикских интересов. Когда в ноябре 2003 г. премьер-министром был назначен Шавкат Мирзияев, таджик из Самарканда, многие узбеки начали жаловаться, что это лишь первый шаг к отторжению таджиками Самарканда и Бухары, которые, как считает Таджикистан, должны принадлежать ему. Очень важным политическим фактором в Узбекистане является местничество (регионализм), и устойчивая, длительная власть региональных элит — это еще одна причина нежелания Ташкента проводить широкомасштабные политические и экономические реформы. Как и во всем Центральноазиатском регионе, местных руководителей назначает президент, и Каримов постоянно пользуется этим правом, заменяя чиновников, лояльность которых вызывает сомнения. Стабильность намного больше на средних и нижних уровнях власти, и региональные элиты используют доступные

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им политические и экономические рычаги для получения доходов от населения и передают часть их правящей элите в столице. В течение первого десятилетия независимости политическая ситуация нормализовалась, и субнациональные особенности, развитию которых способствовали условия бурных последних лет советского режима, несколько сгладились. Но в эпохи политических перемен существующие в стране социальные и политические разногласия неизбежно обостряются. Все более явные признаки надвигающихся изменений наблюдались в Узбекистане задолго до протестов, вспыхнувших в Андижане в мае 2005 г. Простые люди на улицах говорили, что пришло время, когда президент должен оставить свой пост. Трудно предсказать, когда настанут перемены — через несколько месяцев или через несколько лет, но пока они не произошли, реформировать политическую систему будет очень трудно. В отличие от некоторых других стран Центральной Азии конкурирующие политические силы в Узбекистане не хотят использовать для мобилизации своих сторонников парламентскую или иную западную форму правления, основанную на разделении властей, поскольку ни один из претендентов на власть не чувствует, что вполне овладел такими методами политической борьбы. Однако отсутствие формальных политических институтов, позволяющих умерить накал борьбы между элитами, означает, что политические перемены будут происходить в условиях нестабильности. Группировки, отстраненные от политической жизни, стремясь усилить свое влияние, вероятно, обратятся к региональным и наднациональным группам, чтобы попытаться обеспечить себе более широкую поддержку. Во многом по этой же причине может возрасти роль религиозных оппозиционных групп, особенно наименее радикальных. Один из трагических моментов политической жизни в Узбекистане в последние годы состоит в том, что хотя правительство утверждает, что оно лучше иностранных наблюдателей понимает свой народ и его природную способность осуществить политические и экономические реформы, сохранив при этом стабильность в стране, такая позиция выглядит глубоко ошибочной. Между тем в последние два года режим Каримова все с большей осторожностью принимает иностранную помощь для создания политических

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институтов, а сотрудников американских неправительственных организаций просто считает чуть ли не хорошо одетыми профессиональными революционерами. Подобным иностранным организациям становится все сложнее возобновлять регистрацию, и если нынешняя тенденция сохранится до 2006 г., в Узбекистане по существу не останется западных организаций, пытающихся содействовать проведению честных выборов и соблюдению законов. Печальный побочный эффект этого процесса состоит в том, что одновременно радикально сокращается и иностранная помощь, поступающая в сферу образования (поскольку многие иностранные организации параллельно занимаются и этим). Несмотря на растущее в обществе недовольство, некоторые шансы на мирную передачу власти в Узбекистане все-таки есть. Однако невозможно представить себе, что она будет осуществлена демократическими методами. Стороннему наблюдателю политическая система в Узбекистане может показаться простой: сильный президент и мощная система безопасности могут диктовать политическое и экономическое поведение 25 млн людей, проживающих в стране. Но на самом деле политическая система Узбекистана очень сложна. Она управляется внутренней логикой и правилами, которые непонятны обычным гражданам, но вполне очевидны для тех, кому нужно их знать. Трансформация такой сложной системы происходит очень медленно, особенно если ею руководят «чужаки», которые не вполне понимают, где находятся рычаги власти, не говоря уже о том, как их использовать и кто может это делать. Этого так и не успели усвоить советские руководители Узбекистана. Они (подобно строителям демократии из США и Западной Европы) верили или по крайней мере утверждали, что осуществляют перемены в Узбекистане ради создания более справедливой и равноправной политической системы, которая будет служить народу, а не правителям. Изгнание киргизского президента Акаева нарушило политическое равновесие и в соседнем Узбекистане, и запас терпения у разочаровавшегося в нынешней власти населения иссякает. То, что правительство Каримова использовало силу для сохранения своей власти, лишь усилило угрозы, с которыми оно сталкивается. Понимая, что Узбекистану предстоит трудный путь, большинство свет-

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ских оппозиционных группировок, в число которых входят как демократические активисты, так и пока служащие режиму молчаливые критики Каримова, все еще надеется, что реформы будут проведены вовремя, однако мало кто из них представляет, каким образом можно склонить Каримова к созданию в стране условий для формирования гражданских общественных институтов.

Туркмения: сталинизм в отдельно взятой стране В настоящее время Туркмения — тоталитарная страна, как Германия при Гитлере или Советский Союз при Сталине. Однако западные лидеры не торопятся свергать или изолировать туркменского руководителя, главным образом потому, что не считают его действия серьезной угрозой безопасности других государств, хотя конечно, это не делает его менее одиозной фигурой. В связи с поведением президента Сапармурата Ниязова возникает вопрос, каким образом международное сообщество должно реагировать на тоталитарного правителя, у которого нет глобальных амбиций, и можно ли пренебрегать тяжелым положением туркменского народа в то время, когда диктаторов по всему миру свергают или пытаются свергнуть. Туркменбаши продолжает промывать мозги своему народу, используя весьма далеко зашедший культ своей личности. Признавая легитимность власти Ниязова и проявляя к нему минимум уважения как к руководителю суверенного государства, международное сообщество становится соучастником культа личности Туркменбаши. Забавно, что свою политику в отношении Туркмении американские власти оправдывают тем, что она необходима для войны с террором: именно этим мотивировалось решение о начале войны с Ираком. Вашингтон защищает свое решение о налаживании отношений с Туркменией в области безопасности, несмотря на обширный список вопиющих нарушений прав человека в этой стране, ибо туркменский руководитель разрешил переброску через свою территорию больших объемов гуманитарных грузов в соседний Афганистан, а также предоставил ограниченные права на посадку самолетов и другие вспомогательные услуги действующим в регионе объединенным вооруженным силам.

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Сотрудничество Туркмении с Соединенными Штатами в сфере безопасности обратно пропорционально ее обязательствам относительно перехода к политическому либерализму. Когда в 2003 г. политическая ситуация начала серьезно ухудшаться, Ниязов обрисовал перспективу более тесного сотрудничества с Соединенными Штатами для борьбы с наркобизнесом и другими международными угрозами. Осенью 2004 г. туркменское руководство обсуждало проблемы углубления военно-технического сотрудничества и защиты границ с генерал-лейтенантом Лансом Смитом, заместителем главы Центрального командования США, посетившим Ашхабад после визита генерала Джона Абизейда. Если учесть недостаток профессионализма и масштабы коррупции в туркменских вооруженных силах и службах безопасности, трудно представить, что расширение сотрудничества между Ашхабадом и Вашингтоном приведет к значительным результатам. Несмотря на то что Туркмения вносит в войну с террором гораздо меньший вклад, чем Узбекистан, администрация США мирится с туркменским режимом, хотя он гораздо хуже узбекского и вряд ли переменится, пока у власти остается Ниязов. Американские официальные лица любят подчеркивать свои маленькие победы, например, некоторое ослабление (под мощным давлением США и угрозой применения поправки Джексона-Веника) драконовских ограничений свободы передвижения туркменских граждан 95. За исключением сферы безопасности туркменское правительство практически не получает прямой помощи от США, а назначение тех незначительных сумм, которые поступают неправительственным объединениям в Туркмении, по словам вашингтонских политиков, состоит в том, чтобы не дать заглохнуть гражданским инициативам, какими бы небольшими по масштабам и аполитичными по содержанию ни были финансируемые проекты 96. Всякий, кто общался с Ниязовым, знает, как мало он заинтересован в развитии политических институтов, обеспечивающих участие граждан в политической жизни. Основная часть иностранной помощи для формирования гражданских институтов в Туркмении направляется организациям и оппозиционным группировкам, действующим за границей 97. Но эти деньги, предназначенные исключительно для развития мирных форм политической борьбы, относительно невелики, что отражает и ограниченные возможно-

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сти туркменской оппозиции, обосновавшейся за рубежом, и низкий уровень международного интереса к этой проблеме. Политическая система Туркмении все больше становится театром одного актера. В 2003 г. парламент из пятидесяти депутатов (Мажилис), который уже и так просто штамповал президентские указы, был окончательно лишен властных полномочий. Позже эти полномочия были переданы народному совету (Халк Маслахаты) из 2507 членов, который, по словам Ниязова, больше соответствует традиционной туркменской культуре и является современным аналогом собрания старейшин. Однако в традиционном туркменском обществе старейшины племен обладали значительными полномочиями, тогда как нынешний Халк Маслахаты состоит из делегатов, представляющих различные ветви власти, другие государственные структуры, а также секторы экономики. Ниязов всегда обосновывает свои действия тем, что именно такая политическая система отвечает чаяниям народа. Хотя он говорит о проведении президентских выборов в 2008—2009 гг., никто не верит, что при его жизни могут состояться выборы на альтернативной основе 98. Туркменбаши считает себя всеведущим милостивым ханом, которому для принятия решений достаточно самых беглых консультаций с советниками. Он предпочитает черпать вдохновение из формальных встреч с народом, которые проводятся в Ашхабаде или во время широко рекламируемых поездок по периферии (иногда даже инкогнито, как будто кто-нибудь может не догадаться, кто этот невысокий туркмен, путешествующий с огромной охраной). Пока Ниязов остается у власти, о создании демократического общества или хотя бы его зачатков не может быть речи. То, что представлялось крайне маловероятным прежде, стало практически невозможным после неудачной попытки переворота 25 ноября 2002 г. под руководством бывшего министра иностранных дел Бориса Шихмурадова. Кортеж Ниязова якобы обстреляли, но он не пострадал. Против подозреваемых были приняты жесточайшие полицейские меры: по утверждениям представителей некоторых правозащитных организаций, после предполагаемого покушения было арестовано более 100 человек, в том числе Шихмурадов, которого приговорили к 25 годам лишения свободы за государственную измену. Такой же приговор был заочно вынесен еще

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двум предполагаемым участникам заговора: находящемуся в изгнании бывшему председателю Центрального банка Худайберды Оразову и бывшему послу в Турции Нурмухаммеду Ханамову 99. В соответствии с законом об измене родине их имущество и имущество их родственников было конфисковано. Подробности покушения так и остаются неизвестными. Американские, узбекские и турецкие дипломаты в Ашхабаде на эту тему вообще не говорят. Один из предполагаемых заговорщиков — Леонид Комаровский, натурализованный гражданин США, поддерживавший с Шихмурадовым деловые контакты, — был арестован, но затем освобожден под сильным давлением Вашингтона 100. Его описание событий во многом совпадает с версией сторонников Шихмурадова: бывший министр иностранных дел вернулся в Туркмению в надежде уговорить президента уйти в отставку, продемонстрировав ему, что этого хотят и остальные члены правительства 101. По другим сообщениям, ввиду отсутствия в стране открытой оппозиции к нападению на кортеж Ниязова, следовавший из его ашхабадской резиденции, мог быть причастен кто-то из органов безопасности 102. Трудно вообразить, что Ниязова удалось бы убедить уйти в отставку или что Шихмурадов рассчитывал взять власть без применения силы. Однако вряд ли мы когда-нибудь узнаем об истинных намерениях заговорщиков, даже если Шихмурадов доживет до конца своего двадцатипятилетнего срока. У туркменской элиты был непростой выбор: терпеть своего президента или попытаться его свергнуть. Борис Шихмурадов открыто добивался его отстранения и пытался заручиться соответствующей поддержкой со стороны России, США, Турции и Узбекистана 103. Похоже, кое-кто из узбекского правительства даже способствовал его возвращению в Туркмению. Руководители России, Турции и США, по-видимому, знали о планах Шихмурадова и, возможно, обещали ему поддержку в случае успеха. Поведение Ниязова становилось все более непредсказуемым, это замечали все. Выступая на одной из встреч в Вашингтоне весной 2002 г., Шихмурадов говорил, что очень боится понедельника, потому что именно в этот день Ниязов, в выходные дни предоставленный самому себе, всегда дает самые нелепые политические рекомендации 104. При этом главным, по словам бывшего ми-

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нистра иностранных дел, было убедить Ниязова отказаться от той или иной идеи, прежде чем он успеет к полудню подписать соответствующий указ. Однако многие идеи Ниязова все же успевали принять форму указов, например, переименование дней недели и месяцев года для увековечения событий из жизни самого Ниязова и истории независимой Туркмении 105. В частной беседе Шихмурадов признавал, что несет долю ответственности за политические эксцессы режима Ниязова, поскольку сам шел на уступки 106. Однако в публичных выступлениях он заявлял, что сначала попал под обаяние личности Ниязова и лишь позже разглядел, что за этим скрывается. Ниязов не терпит соперников, а Шихмурадов, в советское время работавший корреспондентом за рубежом (что часто служило прикрытием для сотрудников КГБ), пользовался большим уважением. С середины 1990-х годов, по мере того как Ниязов все чаще стал обращаться за советами к ведущим деловым партнерам за рубежом, влияние на него Шихмурадова стало ослабевать. В 2000 г. Шихмурадов был снят с должности министра иностранных дел, а когда в октябре 2001 г. он, будучи послом Туркмении в Китае, подал в отставку, пошли слухи, что его со дня на день арестуют по обвинению в незаконной продаже России 5 реактивных истребителей фирмы Сухого, 9 тыс. автоматов Калашникова и 1,5 млн патронов (все эти обвинения Шихмурадов категорически отрицал) 107. У этого бывшего дипломата было достаточно связей, чтобы жить за границей в свое удовольствие, но он предпочел создать политическую партию — Народно-демократическое движение Туркмении, став в открытую оппозицию к правящему режиму 108. Однако происхождение Шихмурадова (он наполовину армянин, наполовину туркмен) не позволяло ему считаться реальным претендентом на пост президента 109. Он опасался, что поддержка Ниязовым войны с террором позволит ему еще больше ужесточить репрессии. Став «союзником» Вашингтона, Ниязов, по слухам страдающий атеросклерозом, ощутил, что у него появились возможности для расправы с любыми реальными или потенциальными врагами. Он всегда опасался предательства со стороны своего правительства и поэтому постоянно производил кадровые перестановки в государственном аппарате. Однако после 11 сентября Ниязов в считанные месяцы обрушил свои удары на многих высокопостав-

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ленных чиновников, которые, по его мнению, имели независимую политическую опору. Наиболее открытым стало нападение на бывшего шефа госбезопасности Мухаммада Назарова, уволенного в марте 2002 г. и обвиненного в «предумышленном убийстве, сводничестве, превышении власти, взяточничестве, незаконных арестах, изготовлении и продаже фальшивых документов, печатей, штампов и бланков, хищениях и злоупотреблении служебным положением». Назаров получил максимальную меру наказания — двадцать лет лишения свободы 110. Уголовному преследованию подверглись также 22 человека из числа его подчиненных 111. В марте 2002 г. был снят с должности и начальник Государственной пограничной службы генерал-майор Тиркиш Тырмыев. В мае 2002 г. был уволен глава Центрального банка Худайберды Оразов, и туркменское правительство неоднократно требовало его экстрадиции как изменника родины. После этих арестов Ниязов стал единолично принимать все решения, касающиеся обращения иностранной валюты в стране. В декабре 2002 г. был также арестован бывший министр обороны Курбандурды Бегенджев, которому предъявили обвинение в коррупции по четырем пунктам 112. В довершение всего 8 декабря 2002 г. был арестован преемник Шихмурадова — Батыр Бердыев 113. Но только Шихмурадов, арестованный 25 ноября 2002 г., удостоился показательного судебного процесса в сталинском духе. Явно сломленный и, видимо, накачанный наркотиками Шихмурадов предстал перед законодательным органом республики. Его признали виновным в государственной измене, заменив пожизненное заключение 25 годами колонии особого режима. Ниязов представил это как жест личного великодушия, взамен же бывший министр иностранных дел пропел хвалу духовному руководству Туркменбаши, выступив в эфире с публичным признанием и заявив, в частности, что сбился с пути из-за пристрастия к наркотикам. Текст этого признания, которое частично транслировалось первым каналом российского телевидения, а затем было опубликовано на сайте Шихмурадова в Интернете, похоже, составил кто-то из президентского аппарата, если вообще не сам Ниязов 114. Сказалось на жизни рядовых граждан и повторное введение выездных виз. Они были отменены 1 января 2002 г., но затем в не-

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сколько измененном виде восстановлены в феврале 2003 г. Появились новые ограничения на регистрацию неправительственных организаций и разрешенные им виды деятельности, так что получать иностранную финансовую помощь им стало еще труднее. ОБСЕ, обеспокоенная ситуацией с правами человека, сложившейся в стране после неудачной попытки переворота 2002 г., при энергичной поддержке США пустила в ход «московский механизм»115. Однако докладчику — профессору международного права Парижского университета Эмманюэлю Деко — было отказано в визе на въезд в Туркмению 116. Представители ОБСЕ потребовали также свидания с политическими заключенными, но получили отказ, который подогрел слухи, что бывших высокопоставленных чиновников уже нет в живых или они серьезно больны. Ниязов мотивировал отказ тем, что по туркменским законам свидания заключенным предоставляются только после отбывания пятилетнего срока. После попытки переворота усилилась и дискриминация в отношении двух крупнейших в Туркмении национальных меньшинств — узбеков и русских, так как Ниязов подозревал лидеров Узбекистана и России в причастности к заговору. В Туркмении к узбекскому меньшинству относятся хуже, чем в любой другой стране региона. Хотя скорее всего более важным мотивом были конфликты из-за воды, но и бедственное положение туркменских узбеков тоже, вероятно, стало одной из причин того, что узбекское правительство, по-видимому, способствовало возвращению Шихмурадова в Туркмению 117. В 2003 г. туркменское правительство еще больше сократило количество узбекоязычных учебных заведений и средств массовой информации, практически сведя к нулю их роль в общественной жизни 118. Были также ужесточены правила въезда и выезда. Нужный эффект был достигнут: узбекам, живущим по обе стороны туркменско-узбекской границы, стало трудно навещать родственников и семейные могилы в соседней республике по финансовым причинам, а технически это стало зачастую просто невозможно. Высказывались предположения, что таким образом президент Туркмении рассчитывал обратить недовольство узбеков, живущих в приграничных районах, против президента Узбекистана Ислама Каримова. Ниязов также отобрал управление ислам-

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скими структурами у узбекского духовенства, а бывший муфтий Насрулла ибн Ибадулла в 2004 г. был даже арестован за сопротивление использованию в мечетях книги «Рухнама» и обвинен в государственной измене в связи с предполагаемой причастностью к попытке переворота в 2002 г.119 На туркменско-российские отношения попытка переворота повлияла более сложным образом. После покушения Ниязов был вынужден просить у Москвы покровительства, чтобы удержать ее от поддержки новых Шихмурадовых, которые могли появиться на горизонте. Он счел, что для этого лучше всего согласиться на долгосрочный контракт с российским «Газпромом», и во время визита Ниязова в Москву в апреле 2003 г. в присутствии президента России Путина было подписано достигнутое в 2002 г. соглашение сроком на 25 лет 120. Неизвестно, о чем договорились Путин и Ниязов в ходе конфиденциальных бесед, но у Ниязова осталось чувство неуверенности, а также раздражения из-за того, что ему пришлось уступить значительную часть контроля над своей экономикой в обмен на ничтожную экономическую выгоду. В апреле 2003 г. он обрушился на русскоязычное население Туркмении, отказавшись продлить договор с Россией о двойном гражданстве и дав местным жителям с двойным гражданством срок до 22 июня 2003 г., в течение которого они должны были или выбрать туркменское гражданство, или покинуть страну. Однако новый порядок выезда фактически исключал второй вариант, поскольку для легального выезда всем желающим сохранить российское гражданство необходимо было ехать за визой в Москву, но покинуть страну они, естественно, не могли. И даже тем, кто раздобыл все нужные документы, было трудно улететь из-за резкого сокращения авиарейсов из Туркмении в Россию. Российские граждане, оставшиеся в Туркмении по истечении установленного срока, подвергались риску конфискации имущества. Сообщалось, что несколько тысяч россиян были буквально вышвырнуты из домов на улицу вместе с пожитками 121. Эти события вызвали бурю возмущения в Москве. Состоялись акции протеста перед туркменским посольством, депутаты Госдумы требовали возмездия, однако российское правительство не приняло никаких конкретных мер. Этот инцидент поставил Путина и правительство страны в крайне неловкое положение. Как пи-

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сала российская пресса, людей продали за газ. По иронии судьбы соглашение между Туркменией и «Газпромом» действовало недолго: в конце 2004 г. Туркмения прекратила поставки газа в Россию, а в начале 2005 г. потребовала его пересмотра 122. Решение международного сообщества, а конкретно США и России, мириться с поведением туркменского президента не оставило даже призрачных шансов на политические реформы. Убедить Ниязова начать реформы все равно было бы нелегко, однако если бы Вашингтон и Москва более активно поддерживали туркменскую оппозицию еще до попытки переворота в ноябре 2002 г., Ниязова, возможно, и удалось бы принудить к некоторым, пусть даже самым небольшим шагам в направлении создания более открытой политической системы. А ослабление ограничений в отношении неправительственных организаций и разрешение гражданам выезжать из страны в туристические поездки и на учебу укрепили бы связи туркменского общества с внешним миром. США вполне могли повлиять на ситуацию в Туркмении, особенно действуя совместно с Россией, поскольку режим Ниязова не смог бы выстоять без продажи ресурсов за рубеж, а совместных усилий Москвы и Вашингтона было бы достаточно, чтобы Туркмения оказалась в изоляции. Поэтому при появлении внушающей доверие оппозиции в лице Бориса Шихмурадова они в принципе могли бы сообща вынудить Ниязова пойти на политические уступки под угрозой международного эмбарго. Но ни та, ни другая страна не были настолько озабочены политической ситуацией в Ашхабаде, чтобы сделать такие шаги. Москву прежде всего заботил туркменский газ, который от напуганного Ниязова можно было получать на более выгодных условиях, а Вашингтон не хотел, чтобы решению его приоритетных геополитических задач мешала даже мелкая зыбь. События в Туркмении показывают, насколько быстро правящая элита может повернуться против своего президента. К ноябрю 2002 г. многие представители туркменской элиты пришли к выводу, что гипертрофированная президентская власть ставит под угрозу само их существование, а заодно политическое и экономическое будущее страны и ее граждан. Но эти же события показали, как трудно добиться смены режима в Центральной Азии.

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Вряд ли мы когда-нибудь узнаем, сдержали ли бы Борис Шихмурадов и его сторонники свои обещания создать правительство, поддерживающее экономические реформы, и парламент с реальными полномочиями, сформированный на основе свободных и честных выборов, а также ввести свободу слова, печати и собраний. Но пока у власти остается Ниязов, та крошечная политическая элита, которая существует в стране, не осмелится открыто высказываться даже у себя дома, а небольшая горстка уцелевших (благодаря эмиграции) оппозиционеров будет вести себя осторожно, поскольку их родственники оказались в заложниках у правящего режима. Пока жив Ниязов, в Туркмении скорее всего будет сохраняться по крайней мере видимость стабильности, правда, достигнутая за счет лишения граждан личных свобод. Хотя отдельные вспышки протеста временами все же случаются (например, летом 2004 г. поступали сообщения о появлении в некоторых районах антиниязовских листовок), сам Ниязов убежден, что его судный день еще далеко. В изданном им указе о «возрастах человека» объявлено, что возраст мудрости начинается с 73 лет 123. И он ведет себя так, словно у него впереди еще десятки лет, прежде чем нужно будет назначить мудрого преемника и передать ему свою чуть ли не божественную власть. Однако день, когда Ниязов сойдет со сцены, неминуемо настанет. Согласно ст. 61 Конституции Туркмении преемником президента становится председатель Народного совета, но этот пост по определению может занять только человек, полностью лишенный политических амбиций 124. Чем дольше проживет Ниязов, тем менее вероятно, что те, кто сегодня находится в тюрьме или изгнании, смогут всерьез участвовать в выборе его преемника: бороться за власть будут льстивые царедворцы, которые до сих пор пользуются благосклонностью Туркменбаши 125. Но в отличие от тех, кто в свое время собрался в Кремле, чтобы унаследовать остатки сталинской власти, наследники Ниязова в Ашхабаде немедленно столкнутся с могущественными иностранными патронами, и те, кто контролирует поток туркменских товаров, скорее всего окажутся сильнее даже самых честолюбивых претендентов на высший пост в стране.

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Таджикистан: шаг назад Таджикистан — единственная страна Центральной Азии, президент которой в первой половине 1990-х годов не занимался укреплением собственной власти и не пытался сосредоточить контроль над экономикой в руках своего клана. В Таджикистане сформировалось уникальное для Центральной Азии постконфликтное общество, возглавляемое президентом, получившим власть благодаря тому, что его сторонники взяли верх в расколовшей страну гражданской войне. Хотя Таджикистан вышел из этой войны, не утратив территориальной целостности, его политическая и экономическая структура претерпела существенные изменения: власть на местных уровнях была перераспределена, а всю власть на национальном уровне, естественно, получили победители 126. Можно сказать, что она перешла от уроженцев Худжандской (ныне Согдийской) области к уроженцам Кулябской и от старшего поколения, привыкшего к роскошной жизни высших слоев советской элиты, к младшему — к людям, чьи руки запачканы землей или кровью (часто в буквальном смысле, а иногда опосредованно, с учетом поддержки и финансирования ими боевых действий) 127. Некоторое разделение власти было предусмотрено Общим соглашением об установлении мира и национального согласия в Таджикистане, подписанным в июне 1997 г.128 Это соглашение предусматривало роспуск вооруженных формирований проигравшей стороны — Объединенной таджикской оппозиции — и определяло условия их реинтеграции в государственные структуры 129. Наилучшие возможности у США и других западных стран повлиять на ход событий в Таджикистане появились в период вскоре после подписания соглашения о примирении. Таджикистан, который прежде мог рассчитывать лишь на незначительную западную помощь, отчаянно нуждался в средствах для восстановления разрушенной войной экономики и атрофированных остатков бюрократической инфраструктуры, оставшейся от советской эпохи. Но западные организации, предоставлявшие помощь, не связывали экономические реформы с политическими, что позволило правительству президента Эмомали Рахмонова консолидировать власть таким образом, чтобы ограничить шансы тех, кто попытается бросить ей вызов.

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Хотя Рахмонов и большинство его соратников могли не понимать принципов рыночной экономики и, наверное, плохо представляли себе, каким образом Таджикистан может максимизировать свой вклад в мировую экономику, они тем не менее сознавали, что без определенных экономических реформ ценность их победы окажется не слишком велика, а экономические реформы обеспечат бóльшую прозрачность. Они также понимали, что у России сейчас недостаточно ресурсов для необходимых Таджикистану инвестиций и что хотя Москва и дальше будет мертвой хваткой держаться за Таджикистан в плане безопасности, она в то же время не станет препятствовать расширению участия Запада в различных секторах экономики и в политической жизни страны. Однако у США и западноевропейских государств не было реальной заинтересованности в усилении рычагов своего влияния в Таджикистане. Они были рады, что гражданская война подходит к концу, но ее прекращение никогда не относилось к числу международных приоритетов, отчасти потому, что она протекала на фоне гораздо более масштабного, частично задевавшего Таджикистан и казавшегося неразрешимым конфликта в соседнем Афганистане. Более того, постоянные проблемы обеспечения безопасности в самом Таджикистане побудили ряд государств сократить или даже отозвать оттуда свои миссии 130. Ни США, ни западноевропейские страны не проявляли готовности вкладывать деньги в быструю и капитальную перестройку системы безопасности Таджикистана. Фондов выделялось мало, и были большие сомнения в способности Таджикистана освоить даже эти деньги. Единственным исключением была сфера борьбы с наркоторговлей, куда международное сообщество вкладывало средства, однако до 2001 г. включительно годовой объем финансирования этих программ составлял в среднем менее 1 млн долл. Ситуация была настолько удручающей, что таджикское Агентство по контролю за наркотиками, созданное в 1998 г., несколько раз оказывалось на грани закрытия, хотя его работа оценивалась как в высшей степени профессиональная 131. Торговля наркотиками на территории Таджикистана ограничивала перспективы политических и экономических реформ, но для решения этой проблемы требовалось сократить производство опиума в Афганистане, так как «рента» с наркоторговли являлась

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важным источником личного дохода для некоторых ключевых политических фигур Таджикистана. После 11 сентября у Соединенных Штатов снова возникла возможность повлиять на ход событий в Таджикистане, выделив дополнительные средства на реформирование системы безопасности страны, чтобы открыть путь к политическим преобразованиям. Объем американской помощи некоторым секторам системы безопасности Таджикистана увеличился, а в феврале 2002 г. Таджикистан присоединился к программе НАТО «Партнерство во имя мира», что добавило ему еще один источник финансирования 132. Однако эти дополнительные ассигнования были относительно небольшими или единовременными. Например, в 2002 г. Таджикистан получил на реформирование структур государственной безопасности и охраны правопорядка 21,5 млн долл., а в 2003 г. — всего 1,2 млн долл.133 В том же году США объявили о предоставлении Таджикистану 2,4 млн долл. на борьбу с незаконным оборотом наркотиков, несмотря на то что, по мнению многих экспертов, производство опиума в Афганистане в 2003 г. возросло примерно на 6% 134. Работавшие в Таджикистане американские дипломаты настойчиво добивались увеличения финансирования, утверждая, что правящий режим не только в состоянии успешно освоить дополнительные средства, но и заслужил их, покончив с гражданской войной и приступив к некоторым, пусть скромным структурным экономическим реформам. Однако ни их аргументы, ни ссылки на стратегически важное положение Таджикистана (имеющего протяженную и слабо охраняемую границу с Афганистаном) не возымели большого действия. Военная кампания США в Афганистане не привела к существенной переоценке роли Таджикистана в глазах американских политиков. Опасаясь подорвать позиции правительства президента Хамида Карзая, официальные лица США не хотели идти на конфронтацию с военными руководителями Северного альянса в Афганистане. Многие из этих людей были афганскими таджиками и сотрудничали с сородичами в Таджикистане по линии транспортировки и сбыта контрабандных товаров. А в плане стратегического партнерства таджикское правительство могло предложить гораздо меньше, чем узбекское или киргизское. Мало что мог предложить Таджикистан и с точки зрения культурной или

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политической близости, способной пробудить интерес у вашингтонских политиков, чтобы они могли утверждать, что эту страну стоит поддерживать, поскольку в ней зарождается либо развивается демократия. Кроме того, осознание возросшей стратегической значимости Таджикистана, по-видимому, сделало Рахмонова менее склонным к реформам, и вместо того чтобы двигаться навстречу демократическим принципам, он начал все решительнее от них отходить. Отчасти это объясняется тем, что со временем он научился лучше манипулировать президентскими полномочиями; на это у него ушло около пяти лет — примерно столько же, сколько потребовалось президентам других стран Центральной Азии для консолидации своей власти. Ограничения, наложенные договором о национальном согласии 1997 г., оказалось довольно легко обойти, и сейчас Рахмонов уверен, что надежно держит рычаги власти в своих руках. Охотно признавая на словах необходимость сохранения демократических форм правления, на деле он усиливает институт президентской власти, при этом ясно давая понять, что в ближайшем будущем не намерен покидать свой пост. Рахмонов был настолько уверен в себе, что настоял на проведении в 2003 г. референдума по Конституции, который, как и для Назарбаева в Казахстане, продлил срок президентских полномочий до семи лет и предоставил тому, кто будет избран в 2006 г., право переизбираться еще на два срока. Таким образом, согласно действующему законодательству Рахмонов обязан будет уйти в отставку лишь в 2020 г. в возрасте 68 лет. Сама форма проведения референдума показала, насколько мало его заботит международное общественное мнение: граждане должны были проголосовать «за» или «против» сразу в отношении целого списка из пятидесяти шести поправок, а многие русские жаловались, что им выдавали избирательные бюллетени на таджикском языке без перевода 135. Международных наблюдателей почти не было, поэтому вполне вероятно, что 93,13% голосов «за» явились результатом старой советской практики, когда один человек мог проголосовать за всех членов семьи — достаточно было принести их паспорта 136. А возможно, Рахмонов правильно рассудил, что подавляющее большинство жителей Таджикистана его поддержит. Одно можно сказать наверняка: он точно рассчитал, что США не станут чинить

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ему реальных препятствий. И действительно, все неприятности, связанные с референдумом, свелись к упреку, что от Таджикистана все же ожидали свободных и честных выборов парламента и президента 137. Правительство Рахмонова больше заинтересовано в имитации демократии, чем в ее реальном существовании. Как и в Киргизии, в Таджикистане достаточно развит сектор неправительственных организаций, поддерживаемый международным сообществом и являющийся вторым или третьим по величине работодателем. Рахмонов и его команда понимают, что резкое ограничение деятельности этого сектора лишь усугубит экономические проблемы. Более того, любые радикальные изменения в нормативно-правовой базе, регулирующей деятельность неправительственных организаций, наверняка вызовут громкие международные протесты и поставят под угрозу внушительный объем иностранной помощи Таджикистану. Однако Таджикистан не продвинулся в создании политических институтов и проведении экономических реформ настолько, чтобы добиться списания внешнего долга в той мере, в какой это удалось Киргизии 138. Таджикское правительство непрерывно усиливает давление на независимые средства массовой информации, и их число идет на убыль. Тем, кто критикует правительство, урезают тиражи, затрудняют распространение их изданий и даже отбирают у них лицензии 139. Возможности участия в политической жизни сокращаются. Лидеры Демократической и Социал-демократической партий, выступившие в оппозиции на июньских выборах 2003 г., подверглись еще большей изоляции. Члены некогда влиятельных политических кланов Худжанда так долго были отстранены от ведущих ролей в национальной политике, что теперь стремятся лишь сохранить какое-то влияние в своем регионе. Хотя отношения между Рахмоновым и Партией исламского возрождения Таджикистана (ПИВТ) обостряются 140, он больше не опасается мобилизационного потенциала ПИВТ, чье руководство сегодня расколото на тех, кто готов служить режиму, тех, кто заинтересован в использовании таджикских законов о политических партиях, чтобы выступать в качестве лояльной оппозиции 141, и тех, кто считает, что сотрудничество с режимом ставит

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под угрозу политическую программу партии, пропитанную религиозным духом 142. Правительство воспользовалось существованием последней из названных групп, а также с виду незначительным, но явно растущим влиянием движения «Хизб ат-Тахрир» на таджикской территории, чтобы оправдать усиление государственного контроля над официальными исламскими структурами. В рамках компромисса, достигнутого по окончании гражданской войны, исламские структуры в Таджикистане получили бóльшую свободу самоуправления, чем где бы то ни было в регионе. Однако в 2003 г. правительство Рахмонова начало усиливать контроль за религиозной деятельностью, назначая новых имамов и в целом стремясь регламентировать содержание проповедей в мечетях 143. На дальнюю Горно-Бадахшанскую автономную область это предписание национального правительства распространяется скорее номинально, чем реально. Столица этого высокогорного района с двумя вершинами, поднимающимися более чем на 7 тыс. м, связана с Душанбе дорогой, которая бóльшую часть года непроходима. Сразу после гражданской войны правительство, возглавляемое кулябским кланом, попыталось сломить независимый дух местного памирского народа (здешние жители говорят на одном из таджикских диалектов, а в религиозном отношении относятся к исмаилитам — шиитской секте, проповедующей человеческое достоинство и сострадание; в стране с суннитским большинством они составляют меньшинство), и в то время памирцы, выезжавшие за пределы своего района, просто рисковали жизнью. Со временем был восстановлен относительный мир, в значительной мере благодаря содействию Ага Хана, лидера международного сообщества исмаилитов, которого почитают как потомка пророка Мухаммада 144. Ага Хан, в частности, является одной из главных фигур, занимающихся благотворительностью в Горно-Бадахшанской автономной области, однако его программы в области образования, сельского хозяйства и технической помощи открыты для всех регионов страны. Горный Бадахшан, самая дальняя территория Таджикистана, граничащая с Афганистаном, является также воротами для ввоза в Таджикистан наркотиков и других нелегальных товаров. Такую же роль играет и 200-километровый

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отрезок границы, проходящей через Хатлонскую область (объединившую Кулябскую и Курган-Тюбинскую области). Ходят упорные слухи о тесных связях властей с наркодельцами, причем в коррупции обвиняют государственных служащих всех рангов — от рядовых сотрудников МВД до мэра Душанбе, но никакими документами эти обвинения не подтверждены. Очевидно, это одна из тем, по которым собрать надежную информацию вообще практически невозможно; к тому же немногочисленные письменные свидетельства крайне противоречивы. Одни свидетели сообщают о почти не связанных между собой или одиночных торговцах, дающих взятки чиновникам разных уровней для провоза товаров через страну, другие — о хорошо организованной криминальной структуре, тесно связанной с местными российскими военнослужащими и высшими должностными лицами в таджикском правительстве 145. Правительство пока не проявляет подлинной заинтересованности в избавлении от чиновников, связанных с наркоторговлей 146, в 2004 г. оно даже ненадолго поставило во главе ведомства по борьбе с наркотиками человека, по слухам, причастного к организованной преступности, сняв его лишь после публичного скандала 147. И хотя по поводу курса правительства существуют разные теории, большинство информированных наблюдателей сходится в том, что причастность к наркоторговле таджикских чиновников и сотрудников служб безопасности от низовых звеньев до высших эшелонов сильно осложняет задачу проведения системных политических реформ. На политическую жизнь в Таджикистане, конечно, повлияют события в Киргизии, однако трудно сказать заранее, будет ли это способствовать демократизации или, напротив, активизирует процессы политического и социального разложения. Парламентские выборы в Таджикистане состоялись 27 февраля 2005 г. — одновременно с первым туром выборов в Киргизии. Со стороны ОБСЕ они подверглись критике, поскольку далеко не соответствовали международным нормам. Правящая Народнодемократическая партия получила 80% голосов, тогда как Партия исламского возрождения и Коммунистическая партия вместе набрали только 10% и могут рассчитывать в общей сложности лишь на 6 мест в парламенте из 63.

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Четыре оппозиционные партии — Демократическая, Коммунистическая, Исламская и Социал-демократическая — энергично протестовали против официальных итогов голосования и требовали проведения новых выборов. Однако в отличие от своих киргизских коллег они не сумели повернуть дело так, чтобы протесты вылились в массовые демонстрации против правительства Рахмонова. Оппозиция полагает, что у нее больше шансов победить Рахмонова в 2006 г., чем аннулировать результаты недавних парламентских выборов. Однако с учетом затянувшейся политической апатии, проистекающей из страха перед новой мучительной гражданской войной, ей бы следовало умерить свой оптимизм.

Если «революция тюльпанов» в Киргизии завершится успехом и новый режим, демократический не на словах, а на деле, пустит корни, это положительно скажется во всем регионе, который многие списали со счетов как безнадежный с точки зрения построения демократического общества. Пример Киргизии стал для всех лидеров региона предупреждением, что они должны серьезнее отнестись к необходимости предоставить народу гражданские и политические права, чтобы вообще не лишиться власти. Однако если эта революция потерпит неудачу и новый режим сложится по образу и подобию акаевского с той лишь разницей, что у президента будет другая фамилия, это случится не из-за инертности народных масс, а потому, что правящей элите Киргизии удастся саботировать процесс политических преобразований. Так что даже в случае поражения киргизской революции лидеры других стран Центральной Азии не смогут почувствовать себя в большей безопасности. События в Киргизии убедительно показали, что постоянная поддержка Западом массовых политических организаций может дать нужные плоды. Важнейшую роль в организации последних массовых демонстраций в Бишкеке, приведших к свержению Акаева, сыграли недавно организованные студенческие группы. Фундамент для их создания был заложен в ходе десятилетней работы

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правозащитных организаций, независимой прессы и журналистов, политических наблюдателей. Появление таких групп доказало, что в общественной жизни Киргизии существуют потенциальные возможности для образования новых объединений, которые могут стать реальными, если граждане получат право создавать независимые от правительства общественные организации. В Узбекистане и Туркмении этот естественный фундамент для деятельности неправительственных политических объединений отсутствует, и даже при увеличении объема американской помощи он все равно не возникнет в одночасье. При этом ни в той, ни в другой стране нельзя рассчитывать, что неправильственные объединения сумеют организовать народное сопротивление или направить его в мирное русло. В частности, есть основания опасаться, что в Узбекистане, где риск бессмысленного насилия уже явственно ощутим, роль светских объединений в достижении желательных с точки зрения США политических результатов будет минимальной. Кроме того, здесь увеличивается риск гражданской войны, которая может вспыхнуть, если правящий режим попытается, но не сможет подавить протесты силой. А то, что происходит за видимым фасадом в Туркмении, — во многом вообще terra incognita, настолько это общество непроницаемо для внешнего влияния и закрыто для сторонних наблюдателей. События в Таджикистане прогнозировать труднее. Гражданские общественные объединения там укоренились глубже, чем в Туркмении или Узбекистане, но население уже заплатило огромную цену в ходе гражданской войны, развернувшейся после политических бурь начала 1990-х годов, и, возможно, предпочтет держаться подальше от политики, несмотря на наличие как светских, так и религиозных организаций, стремящихся привлечь народ на свою сторону. Еще бóльшую загадку представляет Казахстан. Гражданские институты там проникли в жизнь общества довольно глубоко, и открытая оппозиция власти президента Назарбаева существует как внутри правящей элиты, так и за ее пределами. Однако пока трудно определить, насколько важно было бы для США иметь возможность влиять на ход событий. Очевидно, Соединенным Штатам следует активно поддерживать проведение в Казахстане прозрачных выборов на альтернативной основе и для этого необходимо ока-

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зывать техническую помощь как правительству, так и оппозиции. Но казахская оппозиция — и в этом ее резкое отличие от киргизской — имеет гораздо больше возможностей финансировать свою деятельность, поэтому не следует создавать впечатление, что она является марионеткой США, помогая ей слишком активно. Как и в Киргизии, смена режима в Казахстане вряд ли вызовет сдвиг в его внешней политике в сторону США. И любой преемник нынешнего президента скорее всего будет стремиться поддерживать тесные связи с Россией и Китаем, не пренебрегая при этом и поддержкой США.

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В тегически более значимыми для Вашингтона, но не вызвала

ойна с террором сделала государства Центральной Азии стра-

в регионе серьезных изменений в плане безопасности. Ни одна из этих стран не двинулась вслед за Латвией, Литвой и Эстонией в направлении НАТО и не получила доступа ни в одну из важнейших политических или экономических ассоциаций Европы. И причина не в том, что они расположены к востоку от Урала, а в том, что их правительства оказались неспособны обеспечить продвижение к европейским политическим и экономическим стандартам. Киргизия, конечно, может заявлять, что изгнание Аскара Акаева — очередная революция, подобная произошедшим в Грузии и на Украине, но в действительности единственное из этих государств, которое имеет какие-то шансы быть принятым в европейские организации в качестве полноправного члена, — это Казахстан, да и ему еще предстоит пройти долгий путь, чтобы его лидер получил надежду занять престижный пост председателя Организации по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе. Ограниченное военное присутствие США в сочетании с гарантированным доступом к запасам нефти сделало Центральную Азию стратегически важным для Соединенных Штатов регионом, но забота о стабильности в этом регионе остается с точки зрения стратегов в администрации Буша делом второстепенным. В конце 2001 г. и почти весь 2002 г. руководители США и других стран Запада много говорили о важности развития отношений с центральноазиатски224

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ми государствами и необходимости более тесного сотрудничества с ними международных финансовых организаций, чтобы помочь справиться с нерешенными проблемами развития, возникшими в связи с распадом Советского Союза и обретением независимости. Однако все это осталось лишь разговорами. И даже после революций в Грузии и на Украине, провозгласивших, что свобода и демократия «на марше», мало что (если вообще что-то) было сделано для стимулирования этой тенденции, и смена режимов в Центральной Азии так и не стала для США приоритетной задачей. Региональные стратегические планы восстановления Афганистана были в значительной степени отложены, когда выяснились масштабы существующих проблем, и почти полностью забыты после начала войны в Ираке. Хотя общий объем международной помощи, поступающей в этот регион, в последние годы возрастал, его рост был относительно скромным и не привел к сколько-нибудь заметному усилению влияния международных финансовых учреждений. К этому добавляется общее ощущение усталости, возникшее у доноров, поскольку и Агентство международного развития США, и Международный валютный фонд, и Всемирный банк, и Азиатский банк развития были связаны более неотложными обязательствами в других регионах. С точки зрения международного сообщества доноров государства Центральной Азии не нуждались в неотложной помощи, потому что они либо относительно преуспевали (Казахстан, Киргизия и Таджикистан), либо в них было трудно действовать эффективно (Узбекистан и Туркмения). Но одновременно это означало, что страны региона в значительной степени остаются один на один со своими неудачными стратегиями развития и нетрадиционными угрозами безопасности, которые они сами стимулировали; было разработано очень мало согласованных планов на случай экстраординарных событий, таких, например, как изгнание находящегося у власти президента.

Новая роль Соединенных Штатов Начало войны с террором вынудило многих американских политиков поделить мир на друзей и врагов, но даже те центральноазиат-

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ские государства, которые быстро продемонстрировали поддержку военных кампаний США в Афганистане и Ираке, обнаружили, что хотя их отношения с Соединенными Штатами и улучшились, они все же весьма далеки от стратегического партнерства. Обе стороны, естественно, больше заботились о том, «что они могут сделать для нас», нежели о том, «что мы можем сделать для них». США не проявляли интереса к инвестициям, имеющим целью превращение каких-либо государств Центральной Азии в надежных партнеров с точки зрения безопасности, а такая страна, как Узбекистан, действительно заинтересованная в установлении подобных отношений с Соединенными Штатами, не хотела проводить системные политические и экономические реформы, необходимые для того, чтобы стать полноценным партнером США и их европейских союзников. Масштабы увеличения американской помощи региону в сфере безопасности формировались просто как реакция на сиюминутные потребности США. После 11 сентября 2001 г. главным действующим лицом, определяющим американские стратегические приоритеты, стало Министерство обороны. Поэтому военная помощь США региону чрезвычайно быстро увеличивалась в 2002 и 2003 финансовых годах, но резко снизилась в 2004 и 2005 финансовых годах, когда относительная важность соответствующих военных баз стала уменьшаться 1. Сокращение помощи отразило изменение приоритетов у высших должностных лиц в Министерстве обороны, хотя они продолжили попытки укрепления двусторонних военных связей с центральноазиатскими государствами 2. Это также было следствием представлений, которых придерживались другие американские политики, в частности из Государственного департамента, а также те, кто ведает внешней политикой в Конгрессе (и конгрессмены, и их сотрудники): отношения США с государствами Центральной Азии не смогут превратиться в нечто похожее на партнерство, пока руководители этих стран не согласятся на далеко идущие (гораздо дальше, чем соглашались заглянуть даже самые либерально мыслящие из них) экономические и политические реформы. Американские политики также не очень задумывались о том, как можно было бы изменить взгляды и склонности этих лидеров или какие новые формы обязательств (может быть, просто

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значительное увеличение финансирования) могли бы привести к совсем иным результатам в регионе. В Соединенных Штатах не было достаточно мощных групп избирателей, желающих заниматься проблемами Центральной Азии. Энергетическое лобби не беспокоилось относительно политического или экономического положения в этих странах. Американские нефтяные компании, активно действующие в регионе и в целом весьма удовлетворенные американо-казахстанскими отношениями, были рады увеличению военного присутствия США. Те, кого в рамках войны с террором интересовал аспект формирования наций, гораздо больше думали о том, как тратятся ассигнования, выделяемые для Афганистана, а затем, после вторжения в Ирак, они вообще переключились на работу со значительно бóльшими суммами, расходуемыми на восстановление этой страны. В отличие от Армении или Украины центральноазиатские государства не имеют больших диаспор в Соединенных Штатах. Существующие землячества малы, их самые активные представители — это политические изгнанники, и их программы во многом совпадают с программами американских групп, отстаивающих права человека. Они также пользуются определенной поддержкой в Конгрессе, но им недостает потенциала лоббирования для обеспечения непрерывного внимания к своим проблемам. Так, хотя Сенат принял поправки к Закону о специальных иностранных ассигнованиях, отражающие недовольство развитием событий в различных странах Центральной Азии, например, заключением в тюрьму бывшего вице-президента Киргизии Феликса Кулова, арестом видного журналиста в Казахстане и преследованием независимых мусульман, такие решения приносят мало пользы 3. В целом после 11 сентября Конгресс не хотел делать ничего такого, что могло бы нанести ущерб позициям США в плане международной безопасности в Центральной Азии или где-то еще. Администрация Буша не намерена использовать угрозу сокращения финансирования как эффективный инструмент внешней политики. Финансовая помощь государствам региона оказалась под угрозой лишь однажды, когда Госдепартамент отклонил соответствующую сертификацию (в результате произошло небольшое сокращение помощи Узбекистану в 2004 г.).

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Узбекистан: прифронтовое государство в Центральной Азии Узбекское правительство становится все более неудобным союзником для Соединенных Штатов, но Вашингтону тем не менее следует найти эффективные рычаги влияния на поведение Ташкента. Уже после того, как эта книга была отправлена в печать, Белый дом и Государственный департамент попытались определить оптимальную реакцию на отказ Каримова позволить провести международное расследование применения силы, вызвавшего гибель людей в мае 2005 г. в Андижане. К концу 2003 г. недовольство Госдепартамента правительством Узбекистана в связи с недостатком прогресса в области прав человека возросло настолько, что государственный секретарь вообще отказался засвидетельствовать такой прогресс, поставив под угрозу продолжение иностранной помощи этой стране включая и помощь в сфере сотрудничества в целях уменьшения угроз безопасности, несмотря на наличие соответствующего президентского документа 4. Шесть месяцев спустя госсекретарь Колин Пауэлл снова отклонил сертификацию, лишив правительство Узбекистана в 2004 финансовом году примерно 18 млн долл. иностранной помощи 5. Действия Пауэлла продемонстрировали изменение отношения официального Вашингтона к Узбекистану, которое произошло в течение относительно короткого времени. Готовясь к президентским выборам, в ходе которых обязательства по построению демократии в Ираке были спорным пунктом, администрация Буша чувствительно относилась к обвинениям, что она проявляет мягкость к диктаторам, и Узбекистан выглядел местом, где можно проявить твердость без ущерба для американских стратегических приоритетов и даже без риска серьезного ухудшения американоузбекских отношений. Государственный департамент искал способы смягчить разочарование Ташкента, связанное с понижением его статуса. В момент оглашения этого решения в столице Узбекистана находилась помощник госсекретаря по европейским делам Элизабет Джонс, возможно, в частности для того, чтобы порекомендовать узбекской стороне, какие изменения могли бы облегчить ей получение иностранной помощи в 2005 финансовом году. Неправитель-

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ственные получатели помощи при этом не пострадали, поскольку их финансирование не было связано с указанной сертификацией. Беспокойство администрации относительно возможной реакции Ташкента заставляет предположить, что сокращение помощи было актом, предназначенным скорее для американской, чем для узбекской аудитории. Однако эти действия Госдепартамента, для блокирования которых Министерство обороны не прилагало никаких усилий, все же обозначили уменьшение стратегического значения Узбекистана для США. Хотя министр обороны Дональд Рамсфельд льстил Ташкенту, говоря о «прочных отношениях, которые становятся еще более прочными», на самом деле в Пентагоне полагали, что в военном отношении Вашингтон уже в достаточной мере присутствует в Центральной Азии, чтобы иметь возможность защитить интересы США 6. Американские силы в Центральной Азии больше не находились на линии фронта, и Пентагон начал понижать статус их готовности, изменив его с «горячего» на «теплый», и даже рассматривал возможность снизить его до «холодного». Хотя новая схема глобального развертывания вооруженных сил США была все еще в стадии становления, ее центральноазиатские столпы казались прочными. Масштабы американского военного присутствия были менее важны, чем долгосрочные права базирования, особенно на базе Карши-Ханабад (где был размещен отряд численностью 1000 человек), которая по-прежнему остается зоной передового развертывания для Центральной группы войск США в этом регионе 7. Решение администрации Буша создать очень ограниченный альянс с государствами Центральной Азии стало новым разочарованием для Узбекистана. Сразу после 11 сентября 2001 г. Узбекистан ухватился за возможность наладить тесное военное сотрудничество с Соединенными Штатами, зная, что это возмутит Москву 8. Увеличение американского присутствия в этом регионе было полезно узбекским властям в плане решения краткосрочных проблем, потому что это соответствовало очень многим приоритетам их внешней политики. Соединенные Штаты принесли бы сюда и военную силу, и моральную правоту, нацеленные на уничтожение террористических групп в Афганистане. Ташкент полагал, что наличие здесь американских баз упростит Узбекистану выстра-

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ивание отношений с Россией и что военное присутствие США побудит Москву вообще лучше вести себя в регионе. Ташкент также надеялся, что это поможет сбалансировать попытки влияния Китая на события в регионе. Но главное — в Узбекистане надеялись, что расширенное партнерство с Вашингтоном в сфере обороны позволит получить средства для увеличения темпов военной реформы и обеспечит стране возможность решать региональные проблемы безопасности. Вплоть до 2005 г. приоритетными для Узбекистана были отношения с США, и акцент переместился на отношения с Россией и Китаем только после того, как стало ясно, что Вашингтон планирует ограничить стратегическое сотрудничество с Ташкентом. Например, из всех государств Центральной Азии только Узбекистан присоединился к возглавляемой американцами коалиции, вторгшейся в Ирак, хотя это нанесло ущерб его отношениям с Россией и с Китаем. Но с мая 2005 г. приоритет его внешней политики сместился в направлении Пекина и Москвы. Хотя правительство США хотело бы поддерживать партнерство с Узбекистаном в области обороны, оно должно осуществляться на американских условиях. Военная помощь США увеличивается и идет в основном на охрану границ и расширение возможностей для борьбы с терроризмом и совершенствование взаимодействия, т. е. на программы, которые со временем могли бы превратить Узбекистан в надежного регионального партнера США. Но уровень поддержки, предлагаемый Соединенными Штатами, предполагает весьма длительную военную реформу. Он рассчитан на то, чтобы помочь Узбекистану эффективнее противостоять угрозам в отношении безопасности, с которыми он сталкивается, но не предлагает никаких гарантий защиты на тот случай, если он не сможет защитить себя сам. Творцы американской политики с удовольствием говорят об общих с Узбекистаном целях в борьбе с терроризмом, но в действительности Вашингтон сделал лишь первые, самые предварительные шаги, чтобы помочь Ташкенту изменить условия, обеспечивающие поддержку исламских террористических групп. По сравнению с тем, что тратится на обучение в сфере обороны и охраны границ, очень мало денег выделяется на реформу судебной и пенитенциарной системы. Например, в 2003 финансовом году на про-

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граммы, связанные с судебной реформой в Узбекистане, Соединенные Штаты израсходовали всего 1,3 млн долл., в то время как на военную помощь в том же году было истрачено 9,7 млн долл.9 На программы «смягчения» ислама тратится больше денег, чем на изменение правовой системы, ущемляющей права верующих. Конечно, увеличение американской финансовой помощи не может уничтожить наследие советской эпохи — жестокость пенитенциарной системы, в которой узников обычно бьют, чтобы добиться от них признания, но оно могло бы помочь созданию атмосферы, более благоприятной для изменений. Коррупция и насилие в правовой системе — общая проблема всего региона, в частности из-за того, что большинству должностных лиц в правоохранительных органах приходится исполнять определенный набор требований в отношении «закрытия дел» примерно так же, как им приходилось это делать в советскую эпоху. В сообщениях Бюро по демократии, правам человека и труду Госдепартамента и международной правозащитной организации «Human Rights Watch» подробно описана практика злоупотреблений в судебной системе Узбекистана. Из них видно, что ситуацию усугубляет высокий уровень коррупции в правоохранительной и судебной системе. Так, невинным людям часто подбрасывают улики, чтобы затем получить взятки за освобождение 10. Полицейские и судьи часто берут взятки, «компенсируя» мзду, которую платили сами, чтобы получить свои должности, и такая практика тоже характерна для всего региона. Но правительство Узбекистана продемонстрировало интерес к реформированию юридической системы, и его программа даже отчасти совпадает с тем, чего добиваются американские защитники демократии, хотя она, конечно, менее содержательна. В сентябре 2003 г. Лондонский Вестминстерский университет открыл в Ташкенте отделение, частично финансируемое из правительственных фондов, которое в частности готовит юристов. Возможности обучения ограничены, и многие способные молодые люди с аттестатом не в состоянии платить за обучение, но альтернатив очень немного. При сохранении нынешних темпов потребуются десятки (если не сотни) лет, прежде чем в Узбекистане наберется критическая масса юристов с уровнем и характером подготовки, соответствующими западным. Узбекское правительство интересуется также

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программами профессиональной переподготовки полицейских и следователей по уголовным делам. В этой области существует много успешных программ, финансируемых АМР США, наряду с программами, реализуемыми в Турции, но здесь их масштабы ограничиваются проблемами финансирования. В целом было намного труднее побудить АМР предоставить средства для реформирования юридической системы в Узбекистане, чем в Киргизии 11. Многие демократические активисты cчитают, что Соединенные Штаты не должны финансировать программы юридических реформ в партнерстве с репрессивными правительствами, и настаивают на том, что работать надо только с независимыми группами. Они утверждают, что поддержка правительственных инициатив превращает Соединенные Штаты в гаранта или партнера соответствующих режимов. Однако финансирование только независимых групп для стимулирования политических реформ превратило бы Соединенные Штаты в открытого сторонника смены этих режимов. В действительности США не являются ни тем, ни другим. После серии взрывов, прогремевших в Ташкенте и Бухаре в течение нескольких дней в марте-апреле 2004 г., Соединенные Штаты предложили Ташкенту помощь в идентификации возможных преступников, которые, как предполагалось, были связаны с местными и внешними (с базами в Афганистане или Пакистане) ячейками Исламского движения Узбекистана 12. Но сверх этого Соединенные Штаты не предложили почти ничего, а специальных следователей послали в Ташкент только после взрывов в июле 2004 г., потому что одной из удачно атакованных целей оказалось американское посольство 13. В то же время Россия предложила Узбекистану возможность участвовать в совместных антитеррористических операциях. Вопрос о том, как относятся к Соединенным Штатам в Узбекистане, критически важен, но для уверенного ответа на него невозможно собрать надежные сведения. Общественная поддержка возглавляемой США войны с террором, по-видимому, со временем уменьшается 14. Но опросы общественного мнения в Узбекистане — дело сомнительное, если принять во внимание общую политическую атмосферу, которая весьма затрудняет объективную оценку связи между узбекско-американскими отношениями

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и как будто наметившимся уменьшением общественной поддержки президента Ислама Каримова. Представляется очевидным, что узбекское руководство не способно с выгодой для себя использовать новое стратегическое партнерство с Соединенными Штатами и связанные с этим признаки укрепления своего международного положения. Например, теплый прием в некоторых столицах западных государств и широкое освещение визитов в Узбекистан ведущих западных государственных деятелей не привели к росту поддержки населением президента 15. Но совсем другое дело — утверждать, что нынешние американо-узбекские отношения являются причиной нарастания внутренних волнений, или что они активно способствуют распространению исламского радикализма, или что они могут отравить взаимоотношения двух стран в будущем 16. Радикальные исламисты критиковали узбекского президента за его проамериканскую и, по их утверждениям, просионистскую политику задолго до 11 сентября, но, по мнению большинства обозревателей, привлекательность этих движений объясняется прежде всего ухудшением социально-экономических условий 17. И гораздо более вероятно, что именно эти условия (а не отношения Узбекистана с другими государствами) могут повлиять на условия смены власти в республике.

Киргизия: неэксклюзивная дружба Напротив, в Киргизии, где находится вторая в этом регионе американская авиабаза, общественное мнение по поводу возглавляемой США войны с террором явно оказало воздействие на политическую жизнь. Отношения американцев с Бишкеком еще более сложны, чем с Ташкентом. Первоначально американское присутствие в Киргизии основывалось на ежегодно возобновляемом соглашении 18. Как это произошло и с базой в Узбекистане, роль и комплектование персоналом военного комплекса США в аэропорту «Манас» также изменились. Эта база теперь играет роль главного тылового концентратора для снабжения операций Соединенных Штатов в Афганистане 19. Министерство обороны США сознает преимуще-

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ства этой базы, но пока не видно никаких путей для того, чтобы можно было трансформировать Киргизию в государство, способное стать опорой для Соединенных Штатов в этом регионе, учитывая малочисленность его населения, ограниченный потенциал экономики, относительно изолированное географическое положение, а также численность и состояние армии 20. Тем не менее Соединенные Штаты всерьез собирались помочь Киргизии повысить ее обороноспособность, и значительная часть американской помощи республике идет на улучшение охраны границ 21. Открытие этой базы сразу сделало присутствие США в Киргизии заметным, в то время как американская база в Узбекистане была гораздо менее заметна из-за отдаленности зоны Карши-Ханабад, так что здесь американское присутствие практически оставалось вне поля зрения. Авиабаза «Питер Дж. Гэнси» в Киргизии была создана за счет расширения главного аэропорта страны, и тех, кто там служит, часто видят в городе 22. В Киргизии были разочарованы тем, что Соединенные Штаты не так активно использовали местные возможности для переправки грузов и людей в Афганистан, но даже и без этого соглашение с США о базе было выгодно. Главное, это помогает в определенной мере нейтрализовать стратегический выигрыш, приобретенный Узбекистаном, когда там в течение короткого времени была единственная в регионе американская база. База в Киргизии обеспечила работой около 100 местных жителей и приносит доход правительству и различным местным поставщикам 23. Однако одним из тех, кто извлек максимальную выгоду, стал Адил Тойгонбаев, зять тогдашнего президента Акаева, поставлявший на базу авиационное топливо. В результате в глазах многих простых киргизов Соединенные Штаты оказались причастны к коррупции правящего семейства. Поскольку уровень отношений, предложенный Соединенными Штатами, был весьма невысок, Киргизия сосредоточила внимание на достижении геополитического равновесия за счет обращения к Китаю и к России, решив не класть все яйца в одну (американскую) корзину. «Продать» эту политику Акаеву было сравнительно просто, потому что мнения в киргизской элите по поводу того, насколько желательно иметь близкие отношения с Соединенными Штатами, разделились. Многие, особенно те, кто имеет отношение к ор-

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ганам безопасности, всегда предпочитали сохранять тесные связи с Россией, в то время как часть дипломатического сообщества весьма интенсивно выступала за дальнейшее развитие отношений с Китаем. Экономические реформаторы в Киргизии, разумеется, стремились к налаживанию тесных отношений с Западом, но даже они не считали, что это должно происходить за счет сокращения обширных связей с традиционными экономическими партнерами Киргизии — Россией и Казахстаном. Кроме того, в отличие от других государств региона, в киргизской прессе велись оживленные дебаты по поводу того, какими должны быть геополитические приоритеты страны. При этом часто звучала критика американской внешней политики и поведения США в войне с террором, в том числе даже в тех СМИ, которые частично поддерживались за счет американской помощи 24. Однако у США эти попытки балансирования со стороны Киргизии не вызывали беспокойства, поскольку (по крайней мере пока) фактически не было сделано ничего, что могло бы ограничить реализацию американцами их стратегических интересов. Представляется, что непосредственные преемники Аскара Акаева должны продолжить политику Киргизии по достижению необходимого баланса. Деловые связи между Соединенными Штатами и семьей Акаева упростили новому руководству страны задачу опровержения обвинений в том, что киргизская революция была так или иначе сделана в Вашингтоне. Переходное правительство смогло восстановить отношения с Москвой быстрее, чем с Вашингтоном, поскольку Соединенные Штаты находились под сильным влиянием наблюдателей от ОБСЕ, утверждавших, что ситуация в Бишкеке еще должна стабилизироваться 25.

Казахстан: отношения набирают силу Государство в Центральной Азии, именуемое Казахстаном, вызывает самый живой интерес у американских лидеров, несмотря на его ограниченную роль в войне с террором. Двусторонние отношения скорее всего будут продолжать улучшаться и могут приобрести долгосрочное значение для обеих стран. Более того, в республике это сознают, и после первоначального осуждения войны

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в выражениях, которые были лишь слегка мягче российских, Казахстан в итоге даже решил послать в Ирак небольшую группу из 27 человек, чтобы поддержать международную кампанию, возглавляемую США 26. Но потепление американо-казахстанских отношений не идет в ущерб также улучшающимся отношениям Казахстана с Россией и Китаем. Тонкость внешней политики Казахстана демонстрирует рост профессионализма элиты, формирующей внешнюю политику страны, причем как тех, кто прямо относится к дипломатической службе, так и тех, кто дает им советы. Это также свидетельствует о хороших дипломатических навыках президента страны, о его растущем понимании и потенциальной мощи его страны, и ее ограниченности. Американо-казахстанские отношения смогли преодолеть сложные кризисы, в частности, как уже отмечалось, продолжающиеся в Нью-Йорке слушания и расследование в связи с коррупцией в нефтедобывающей промышленности Казахстана. Хотя они бросили тень на президента Назарбаева, исключив для него возможность стать официальным гостем американского президента, это не помешало встрече Назарбаева с Бушем и в целом не повредило развитию двусторонних отношений 27. Обе стороны оказались способны локализовать по частям этот коррупционный скандал и не допустить, чтобы он нанес ущерб их отношениям. Американцы продолжают оказывать давление на Казахстан, чтобы побудить его демократизировать политическую систему, причем усиливают нажим всякий раз, когда им кажется, что происходит откат назад, в направлении дальнейшей консолидации президентской власти и роста произвола, но использование угроз в дополнение к официальным предупреждениям приносит мало пользы. В основе американо-казахстанских отношений по-прежнему лежат проблемы энергоресурсов. Война с террором и перспектива нарастания нестабильности в зоне Персидского залива только увеличивают важность нефтяных запасов Каспия. И хотя даже на пике добычи нефтяной экспорт Казахстана никогда не сможет приблизиться к соответствующим показателям Саудовской Аравии или России, казахстанская нефть останется ценным и, вероятно, прогнозируемым ресурсом на международном рынке 28. Соединенные Штаты больше не боятся, что долгосрочный доступ Запада к каспийской нефти может оказаться под угрозой. Про-

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ект нефтепровода Баку — Тбилиси — Джейхан представляется вполне реальным. Хотя Казахстан должен еще дать твердое обещание направлять свою нефть именно по этому маршруту, очень вероятно, что он будет его использовать после увеличения добычи нефти в 2008—2010 гг. и, может быть, даже примет небольшое участие в финансировании этого проекта 29. Что касается расширения военного сотрудничества с Соединенными Штатами, то Казахстан как партнер ведет себя намного осторожнее, чем Узбекистан или Киргизия. Однако он дал твердое обязательство помочь Соединенным Штатам достичь поставленных целей в войне с террором. Между октябрем 2001 г. и маем 2002 г. воздушное пространство Казахстана пересекалось в ходе более чем 600 налетов коалиции, а также во время визита министра обороны Дональда Рамсфельда в регион в апреле 2002 г.30 Американские самолеты имеют право аварийной посадки на трех аэродромах в южной части страны, и, подобно Таджикистану, Казахстан питает пока не осуществившиеся надежды на полное финансирование Соединенными Штатами восстановления этих аэродромов, построенных еще в советское время 31. Хотя министр обороны Рамсфельд хвалил военное партнерство с Казахстаном во время пребывания в Астане в феврале 2004 г., в республике весьма критически отнеслись к планам вторжения США в Ирак без санкции ООН 32. Только в мае 2003 г., когда война была уже свершившимся фактом, Казахстан согласился включить своих специалистов в состав международных сил по поддержанию мира. Однако при этом он с готовностью принимает американскую военную помощь, предназначенную для модернизации казахстанских вооруженных сил и расходуемую на программы обучения, улучшение охраны границы и приобретение военного оборудования 33. В последние годы центральным элементом оказания помощи стала оборона Каспийского моря, и Соединенные Штаты выделили 5 млн долл. на помощь в создании современной береговой охраны, а также флота для защиты морских сооружений и прекращения морской транспортировки наркотиков и другой контрабанды 34. Казахстан также продолжает получать финансовую помощь по Программе совместного уменьшения угроз (Cooperative Threat Reduction — CTR), расходуемую в рамках десяти разных более мелких программ — от ликвидации систем ограниченной

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дальности START и оружия массового уничтожения до сокращения и реформирования вооруженных сил 35. Ни Вашингтон, ни Астана не ощущают, что их сотрудничество как-то ограничивает гибкость Казахстана в международных отношениях. Американо-казахстанские и российско-казахстанские отношения уже не похожи на игру с нулевой суммой. Казахстан сумел улучшить отношения с Россией, пытается добиться того же с Китаем и делает более заметным свое присутствие на международной арене, углубляя связи с Соединенными Штатами в области обороны.

Туркмения и Таджикистан: на периферии американских интересов Туркмения и Таджикистан не занимают значительного места в американских стратегических замыслах относительно Центральной Азии. Учитывая все более своеобразное (а возможно, даже иррациональное) поведение президента Туркмении, Соединенные Штаты практически сбросили со счетов перспективу активного участия американских фирм в развитии нефтяных и газовых ресурсов этой страны, пока Сапармурат Ниязов остается у власти. Реальных надежд на существенные американские инвестиции в эту страну в ближайшее время нет, хотя Туркмения остается рынком сбыта американского сельскохозяйственного, а также нефтяного и газового оборудования 36. Туркмения пытается демонстрировать поддержку войны с террором, которую США ведут в Афганистане, не компрометируя объявленную ею политику позитивного нейтралитета, но иногда это приводит к осложнениям. Разрешив пропускать через свою территорию большие объемы гуманитарной помощи, направляемой в Афганистан, правительство Туркмении, как сообщалось, в какой-то момент не позволило немецким ВВС использовать свои базы в рамках контртеррористической операции 37. Возможно, причиной подобного отказа стал публичный характер запроса, поскольку в комментариях «не для печати» американские должностные лица говорят, что вооруженные силы США имели некоторый доступ к туркменским военным сооружениям, но даже в частных беседах они не очень склонны обсуждать эту тему. Турк-

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мения остается сравнительно неактивным участником программы НАТО «Партнерство во имя мира», хотя она стала первым государством Центральной Азии, присоединившимся к ней 38. Имея право на помощь в рамках программы CTR начиная с 1997 г., Туркмения получает наименьшую в регионе прямую американскую военную помощь 39. При этом повысился уровень сотрудничества между должностными лицами США и Туркмении с целью сдерживания транспортировки через страну героина и опиума, поскольку считается, что наркотрафик по этому маршруту серьезно недооценивается. В феврале 2004 г., всего лишь во второй раз, Туркмения согласилась участвовать в финансируемой США программе подготовки сотрудников правоохранительных органов, занимающихся борьбой с наркотиками 40. Ашхабад предпочел ограничить сотрудничество с Соединенными Штатами в области обороны. Таким образом, то, что Вашингтон пытается делать в Узбекистане, в Туркмении не проходит. Американские политики также хорошо знают, насколько ненадежным партнером может быть эта страна. Хороший пример, характеризующий обстановку и стиль принятия решений в Ашхабаде, — политические декларации Ниязова по Ираку, которые носили характер конфуза: в течение всего лишь двух суток президент Туркмении сначала провозгласил поддержку возглавляемой США военной операции, а затем пошел на попятную и начал критиковать эту войну 41. Тем временем в Таджикистане основной заботой американцев в сфере безопасности остается усиление борьбы с наркотиками. Национальное управление по борьбе с наркотиками в значительной степени финансируется за счет помощи, поступающей от Управления ООН по борьбе с наркотиками и преступностью (ЮНОДК), но Соединенные Штаты — тоже важный источник технической помощи в этом отношении 42. Хотя США оказывают целенаправленное содействие в борьбе с наркотрафиком всем пяти центральноазиатским странам, вашингтонские политики хорошо понимают, что их усилия могут нанести наркоэкономике Таджикистана лишь очень небольшой урон 43. Правительство Таджикистана активно стремится к еще более тесному сотрудничеству с Соединенными Штатами, и силам

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НАТО разрешено использовать дороги, ведущие в Афганистан и обеспечивающие доступ к базам. Душанбе особенно заинтересован в увеличении американской военной помощи, чтобы заменить ею помощь, получаемую от России. Вашингтон, может быть, и желает усилить военную поддержку Таджикистану, но не хочет делать это в размерах, способных обеспечить республике сильную оборонительную позицию перед лицом возможных угроз из Узбекистана, не говоря уже об Афганистане. Это особенно верно потому, что Душанбе мало что может предложить в обмен на увеличение американской поддержки, поскольку правительство Таджикистана совсем не торопится продемонстрировать, что у него много общих с Соединенными Штатами ценностей.

Попытки России изменить характер своего присутствия

Многоаспектное сотрудничество в сфере безопасности По иронии судьбы увеличение американского военного присутствия в Центральной Азии на руку России, хотя Москве придется подумать, как использовать это к своей выгоде. Если Соединенные Штаты не пожелали выступить гарантом существующих в Центральной Азии режимов, то Москва этого сделать не смогла. Владимир Путин в состоянии потребовать расширения российского присутствия в регионе ради достижения геополитического равновесия, добиваясь от тамошних государств уступок, которых иначе можно было бы и не получить, — например, права базирования российского военного контингента в Канте (Киргизия) или улучшения координации с Узбекистаном усилий по защите воздушного пространства. Но эти шаги не вызвали заметной реакции со стороны Соединенных Штатов. Возможно, многие в администрации Буша видят в ослаблении влияния России в Центральной Азии желанную долгосрочную цель, но общественное мнение эту позицию совсем не разделяет. Поддержка Россией войны с террором была безусловно самой неотложной и важной целью, которой не удалось бы достичь, если бы она почувствовала, что Соединенные Штаты решили в рамках этих усилий вытеснить ее из традиционных зон влияния.

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Расширение российского военного присутствия — в значительной мере просто демонстрация, рассчитанная на то, чтобы показать внутренней аудитории способность Владимира Путина успешно подтверждать особую роль России в традиционных для нее областях преобладающего геополитического влияния, даже в условиях вторжения американцев на ее «задний двор». Ситуация в Центральной Азии в сфере безопасности, очевидно, становится более приемлемой для Вашингтона, так как американские политики убеждаются, что при всех высказываниях России по поводу территориальных проблем она все же надеется, что ее будут всерьез воспринимать как часть Европы и Запада вообще. Однако большинство лидеров Центральной Азии желало бы помочь Москве продемонстрировать геополитическую гибкость, пока она стремится к своим стратегическим целям, предлагая им привлекательные стимулы для сотрудничества, а не пользуясь угрозами (такая тактика слишком часто практиковалась в годы правления Ельцина). Несмотря на собственные экономические проблемы, Россия все-таки располагает самой мощной в регионе экономикой и вполне достаточными капиталами предпринимателей, готовых экспортировать их в Центральную Азию, не очень беспокоясь относительно недостатка там прозрачности. Географическое положение России также благоприятствует ее желанию играть главную экономическую роль в этом регионе, особенно в энергетическом секторе. Если перспективы улучшения отношений выглядят позитивно, должностные лица государств Центральной Азии часто с большим энтузиазмом стремятся улучшать двусторонние отношения с Россией. Подавляющая часть правящей элиты в этих странах имеет больше общих целей с российскими коллегами, чем с руководителями других стран, и им легче общаться друг с другом: у лидеров центральноазиатских государств русский — либо первый, либо второй язык. Они также испытывают раздражение из-за того, что США и (в меньшей степени) европейцы считают их «плохими парнями». Все эти государства включая Россию не смогли достичь стандартов ОБСЕ в общественной жизни, в формировании политических и экономических институтов. Хотя различия в их относительных успехах огромны, эти руководители устали от постоянных напо-

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минаний об их промахах. В различных двусторонних связях между государствами Центральной Азии и Россией, конечно, случаются взлеты и падения, но, несмотря на это, встречи их лидеров обычно приносят меньше неприятностей, чем встречи с главами западных стран. Основные правила нового участия России в делах региона, установленные местными лидерами, ясны. Никто из них не собирается торговать суверенитетом ради защиты (поэтому к многосторонним силам безопасности, в которых доминирует Россия, все еще относятся с подозрением). Поскольку России пока не хватает ресурсов, чтобы реформировать собственную армию, предлагаемые ею материальные стимулы для расширения сотрудничества остаются относительно небольшими. Поэтому усилия по превращению Организации договора о коллективной безопасности Содружества независимых государств в эффективную многостороннюю структуру пока не приносит больших плодов 44. Напротив, сотрудничество между учреждениями внутренней безопасности в странах региона (а в этой области Россия безусловно имеет преимущество), кажется, существенно укрепилось, хотя, по-видимому, оно примерно наполовину реализуется вне рамок СНГ. Усилия Путина, а также широко разрекламированные ежегодные учения сделали коллективные силы безопасности СНГ более заметными в регионе. Но пока они не показали себя достаточно компетентными для решения текущих проблем региональной безопасности, а Москва как раз хотела бы, чтобы они могли выполнять именно эту функцию. Фактически через несколько месяцев после решения американцев обзавестись базами в Центральной Азии высшие руководители России старались развить идею относительно признания ООН разделения ответственности за безопасность в регионе между Соединенными Штатами и Россией, с тем чтобы США отвечали за руководство международными силами, обеспечивающими мир в Афганистане, а Россия, используя структуру СНГ, взяла на себя формальную ответственность за Центральную Азию. В апреле 2002 г. генерал-майор Сергей Черномырдин, начальник штаба коллективных сил быстрого развертывания СНГ в Бишкеке, публично предложил именно такое решение 45. Но из этого ничего не вышло, в значительной степени потому, что Соединенные

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Штаты ни в коей мере не были заинтересованы, чтобы военные позиции России в регионе получили международное признание 46. Российское или расширенное (СНГ) военное присутствие в Центральной Азии, вероятно, сохранилось бы еще очень надолго после ухода американских войск из Афганистана. Кроме того, мало что свидетельствовало о том, что центральноазиатские государства хотели, чтобы ООН признала СНГ в качестве региональной организации безопасности (согласно гл. VIII Устава ООН). Путин начал добиваться расширения роли СНГ в Центральной Азии почти сразу после своего прихода к власти, но даже те три страны, которые не вышли из договора о коллективной безопасности СНГ (Казахстан, Киргизия и Таджикистан), предпочли уравновесить связи в рамках СНГ более тесным сотрудничеством с НАТО. Как уже отмечалось, Антитеррористический центр СНГ, созданный в июне 2000 г., к весне 2002 г. подготовил оперативное соединение из 1500 человек (граждан России, Казахстана, Киргизии и Таджикистана) 47. Это соединение проводило учения летом 2002, 2003 и 2004 гг.48 Соединенные Штаты не поддержали просьбу России о признании ООН ее роли в Центральной Азии, но при этом и не чинили препятствий расширению военного присутствия России в регионе. Со стороны США не было никаких формальных заявлений, поднимающих проблему создания новой авиабазы России в Канте, которая была открыта в октябре 2003 г. Эта авиабаза, главной функцией которой является борьба с мятежниками (основные операции для организации коллективной безопасности), относительно невелика: на ней постоянно базируется только десять самолетов и 500 военнослужащих. Тем не менее понадобился целый год, чтобы база достигла нужного уровня готовности 49. Намечено довести число служащих на ней до 1000. Представители российских средств массовой информации, которых на этой базе побывало много, представили своим зрителя и читателям совершенно иную картину: по их версии, силы передового развертывания России в Канте вносят главный вклад в обеспечение безопасности в регионе. В декабре 2003 г. база в Канте была даже использована при прямой телетрансляции в формате «вопрос — ответ», которая связала Путина с группами российского электората, рассеянного по 11 часовым поясам. При этом Кант

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был одним из связующих пунктов. Практически весь личный состав базы был выстроен на поле, и российские солдаты с гордостью говорили о миссии, которую они выполняют. Одна из неявных целей этой передачи состояла в том, чтобы дать этническим русским почувствовать, что обстановка здесь достаточно безопасная, чтобы они могли вернуться в свои дома в Киргизии. Она была рассчитана исключительно на российских избирателей, потому что функции этой базы никоим образом не связаны с защитой местного русского населения, которое жалуется не на недостаточные гарантии безопасности, а на ограничения использования русского языка в жизни республики. База в Канте позволила Путину продемонстрировать россиянам, что расширение присутствия Соединенных Штатов в Центральной Азии осуществляется не за счет интересов Москвы. Как уже говорилось в главе 5, соглашение о базе, по-видимому, дополнялось еще одним побочным соглашением, согласно которому российский президент обещал Акаеву прислать инструкторов, чтобы помочь подготовить новое поколение офицеров для службы безопасности Киргизии, а также политических аналитиков для работы с сотрудниками администрации Акаева. Но либо российские политические аналитики давали Акаеву неудачные советы, либо киргизский лидер просто игнорировал их подсказки; примерно так же завершилась и история с обучением киргизских офицеров безопасности российскими инструкторами, Во время народных выступлений в марте 2005 г. Министерство внутренних дел Киргизии не проявило лояльности к Акаеву. И хотя правительство России впоследствии утверждало, что военные в Канте были готовы эвакуировать российских граждан, их способность сделать это никогда не была проверена на практике. В октябре 2004 г. Путин продемонстрировал россиянам еще одно существенное достижение, открыв в Таджикистане постоянную базу примерно для 5 тыс. военнослужащих 201-й мотострелковой дивизии. Офицеры дивизии расквартированы в Душанбе (как утверждают, вопреки энергичным первоначальным возражениям таджикской стороны), а личный состав размещается в Кулябе и Курган-Тюбе 50. Правительство Таджикистана также согласилось на аренду обслуживаемой русскими станции раннего предупреждения о ракетном нападении в Нуреке сроком на 49 лет, за что Рос-

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сия списала долг в 240 млн долл.51 Это соглашение стало итогом более чем трехлетних сложных переговоров; первоначально россияне хотели, чтобы Таджикистан взял на себя часть расходов по содержанию их военных. Это требование давало Душанбе шанс на уменьшение военного присутствия России, поскольку таджикское правительство не хотело подписывать с Москвой новое соглашение о совместной охране таджикско-афганской границы, которое предусматривало поэтапную передачу охраны границы таджикам, закончившуюся в декабре 2004 г. Первоначально и США, и Россия были обеспокоены этой ситуаций, но передача прошла спокойно. Открытие базы США в Узбекистане, по-видимому, также способствовало улучшению отношений между Россией и Узбекистаном. Хотя Узбекистан не вернулся в систему коллективной безопасности СНГ, откуда он вышел в 1999 г., дух сотрудничества в российско-узбекских отношениях ощущается больше, чем раньше. В какой-то мере это, безусловно, результат расширения отношений между Узбекистаном и США, которое позволяет Ташкенту свободно налаживать более тесные связи с Москвой, не опасаясь угрозы нарастания гегемонии России. Кроме того, личные отношения с Путиным у Каримова лучше, чем были с Ельциным. Прежняя служба Путина в органах безопасности России, возможно, придает ему дополнительную привлекательность в глазах Каримова, который имеет склонность к угрозам и использованию силы. Отчасти это может быть также результатом договоренности с Путиным, предусматривающей расширение военного сотрудничества в обмен на обещание российской помощи в борьбе с внутренними угрозами в Узбекистане. В августе 2003 г. Путин прилетал в Самарканд, чтобы встретиться с президентом Узбекистана. Каримов нанес ответный визит в Россию в апреле 2004 г. после серии взрывов в Ташкенте, и в опубликованном коммюнике говорилось о поддержке Путиным узбекского лидера, об общей угрозе терроризма, с которой сталкиваются оба государства, и о необходимости тесного сотрудничества в сфере обеспечения безопасности с целью взаимной самозащиты 52. По окончании этой встречи Каримов заявил, что «между Россией и Узбекистаном формируется новый уровень доверия»53. Это доверие, как сообщают, предусматривает даже предоставле-

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ние России ограниченных прав базирования самолетов в Ханабаде рядом с американской базой. В рамках значительного улучшения отношений России и Узбекистана планируется также проведение военных учений, особенно в сфере охраны воздушного пространства, которая в этом регионе не отвечала потребностям России 54. Один из признаков важности для Узбекистана новых отношений с Россией — то, что дочь Каримова Гюльнара, о которой иногда говорят как о будущей преемнице отца, живет в Москве и работает советником в посольстве Узбекистана 55. Гюльнара Каримова переехала в Москву после нашумевшего развода с американцем узбекского происхождения Мансуром Максуди, и теперь она открытый и настойчивый сторонник укрепления связей между российским руководством и президентом Узбекистана 56. Партнерство с Россией протекает прекрасно, пока она не пытается диктовать свои условия или требовать исключительного статуса. Так, Москва по-прежнему с большим нетерпением старается определить правила военного сотрудничества (и размежевания) в Каспийском море, но пока ей не удается полностью достичь своих целей. Испугавшись, что Соединенные Штаты могут узурпировать роль России в обороне Каспийского моря, Владимир Путин в апреле 2002 г. объявил, что Россия будет наращивать там свои военно-морские силы и проводить крупномасштабные учения. Учения, прошедшие в августе 2002 г., мало что дали в смысле устранения тени, в которой остается Россия в связи с увеличением американской военной помощи прилегающим к Каспию государствам, и такое положение дел побуждает российское правительство непрерывно предупреждать Соединенные Штаты, чтобы они не заходили слишком далеко в попытках отодвинуть Россию в сторону 57. Россия остается главным поставщиком оружия в регионе, и это понятно, учитывая объективную зависимость всех вооруженных сил Центральной Азии от российского (точнее, советского) оборудования и легкость доставки туда из России запасных частей и выполнения ремонта. В Киргизии и Казахстане говорят об этом как о важной причине продолжающегося тесного военного сотрудничества с Россией 58. Узбекистан по-прежнему получает российское оборудование, а узбекская компания «Uzbek Airways», крупнейший авиаперевозчик в регионе, заключила соглашение об исполь-

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зовании одинаковых кодов и обслуживании с российским «Аэрофлотом»59. Даже американские официальные лица признают экономическую эффективность обеспечения центральноазиатских государств российским оборудованием. Например, в 2004 г. за счет финансовой помощи США Таджикистану было разрешено купить в России автомобили-внедорожники 60. Хотя обучение в западных странах становится все более важным для военных в Центральной Азии, лишь малая их часть прошла обучение в Соединенных Штатах и других государствах НАТО 61. Среди последних наиболее важную роль, пожалуй, играет Турция вследствие близости турецкого, азербайджанского, казахского, киргизского, туркменского и узбекского языков. В частности, узбеки и азербайджанцы, по-видимому, ориентируются на тесное военное сотрудничество с турецкими коллегами. Но должно смениться одно, а то и два поколения, прежде чем западное военное обучение полностью вытеснит российское, поскольку практически весь нынешний высший офицерский состав государств Центральной Азии служил еще в Советской армии, и Россия по-прежнему остается здесь главным источником военного обучения. Связи между бывшими сотрудниками советских служб безопасности еще теснее, чем между военными. Органы национальной безопасности государств Центральной Азии не имеют аналогов на Западе, поскольку они были созданы на основе республиканских отделений советского КГБ. Сотрудничество между службами безопасности в Центральной Азии и их российскими партнерами в России при Путине укрепилось, в значительной степени из-за возрождения российских силовых министерств при нынешней власти. Хотя война с террором способствовала завязыванию новых связей между американской разведкой и соответствующими ведомствами таких государств, как Узбекистан, эти связи пока далеко не столь тесны, как существующие между Россией и ее четырьмя важнейшими партнерами в Центральной Азии. Даже Туркмения в определенной мере сотрудничает с Россией, хотя работники тамошних органов безопасности непосредственно подчиняются прихотям своего президента в такой степени, какая неизвестна в других странах региона. Вообще говоря, российско-туркменские отношения в сфере безопасности в последние годы несколько ухудшились, отчасти,

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вероятно, потому, что военное присутствие США в регионе было воспринято президентом Ниязовым как своеобразная проверка твердости его политики «позитивного нейтралитета». По крайней мере, на его взгляд, помощь, предоставленная Туркмении, послужила балансом для связей с Россией. Подозрения Ниязова в отношении Кремля за эти годы усилились, поскольку Россия стала местом временного убежища туркменских политических изгнанников. Гнев Ниязова подпитывался и его уверенностью, что Россия использует преимущества, которые дает ей географическая изоляция Туркмении, определяя условия, предлагаемые «Газпромом» для долгосрочных закупок туркменского газа. Напротив, казахстанско-российские отношения с появлением в этом регионе американских баз не изменились. Назарбаев постоянно подчеркивает, что дружеские отношения между Казахстаном и Россией имеют особый характер и поэтому тесное сотрудничество между двумя странами в сфере обороны и безопасности будет продолжаться. В ходе визита в Москву в феврале 2003 г. при обсуждении состояния отношений между Астаной и Москвой Назарбаев недвусмысленно похвалил их, сказав: «Никаких проблем между двумя нашими странами нет»62. После этой встречи Путин счел необходимым публично заявить, что в казахстанско-российских отношениях существуют области, ситуация в которых может быть улучшена, особенно в сфере торговли 63. Если оставить в стороне публичные комплименты, следует сказать, что в Казахстане понимают: слабая Россия представляет для республики еще большую угрозу, чем Россия сильная. Пока она остается главным торговым партнером Казахстана и важным источником инвестиций в его малые и средние предприятия, где попрежнему не хватает западных инвесторов 64. Экономическое восстановление России укрепляет региональный рынок, а это означает, что цены на товары российского производства будут подниматься, и казахстанские изделия станут более конкурентоспособными и внутри страны, и в России. Казахстанцы также чувствуют, что в сильной России меньше вероятность распространения шовинистической идеологии и муссирования проблемы тяжелого положения местных этнических русских, которые, вообще говоря, не удовлетворены своим фактическим статусом граждан второго сорта. До сих пор российское правительство в целом мирилось с

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такой ситуацией, хотя группа парламентариев довольно регулярно предлагает принять заявления, выражающие беспокойство по этому поводу 65. Однако в казахстанско-российских отношениях все же есть некоторые точки напряженности, и одна из них — принадлежащий теперь Казахстану бывший советский космодром Байконур 66. Теперь Россия арендует его за 115 млн долл. в год на основании договора, возобновлявшегося в 1994 и 2004 гг. и продленного до 2050 г. Казахстанцы жалуются, что вынуждены сдавать этот объект в аренду по слишком низкой цене, тем более что периодически случающиеся там происшествия по-прежнему подвергают опасности население. Но по возобновленному соглашению обе стороны обязуются организовать ряд совместных коммерческих и военных предприятий с использованием Байконура. Это лишь один маленький признак изменения баланса в улучшившихся казахстанско-российских отношениях.

Рост экономического присутствия России в регионе В отличие от оборонной сферы увеличение роли России в экономике государств Центральной Азии отнюдь не является символическим, но иногда его нелегко определить поверхностным взглядом, исходя из стандартных показателей. Хотя все эти страны все более ориентируются на глобальный рынок, частный и государственный российский капитал продолжает по частям захватывать их рынки, причем используемые при этом методы вряд ли можно назвать эфемерными. Для всех стран региона Россия по-прежнему остается главным торговым партнером, в частности, экономики Киргизии и Таджикистана все еще сильно зависят от товаров, поступающих из России 67. Война с террором и увеличение американского присутствия в регионе не замедлили российскую экономическую экспансию. Возможно, Россия и ее местные партнеры даже извлекли некоторую выгоду из дополнительных займов и поступающих в регион средств, выделенных на оказание технической помощи. Но более всего региональную стратегию Владимира Путина подкрепляет собственный экономический рост России.

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Больше всего российский капитал заметен в Казахстане и Киргизии, которые в 2003 г. повторно обязались сформировать общее с Россией экономическое пространство, возобновив прежние обязательства в отношении общей торговой и, шире, экономической политики 68. Пока рано предсказывать, будет ли эта группа государств эволюционировать в направлении создания организации, аналогичной Европейскому сообществу, создавая общую валюту и притягивая к себе других членов СНГ 69. По мере того как Россия и Казахстан готовятся стать членами Всемирной торговой организации, экономические связи между Казахстаном, Киргизией и Россией, безусловно, углубляются 70. Рост присутствия США в Центральной Азии не мешает России настойчиво стремиться к трем ее главным экономическим приоритетам: она хочет иметь здесь мощное право голоса (если вообще не право вето) в отношении юридических проблем разработки нефтяных и газовых ресурсов шельфа Каспия, доминировать в газовой промышленности и контролировать гидроэнергетические мощности. Юридический статус Каспийского моря все еще определяется пятью прибрежными государствами — Азербайджаном, Ираном, Казахстаном, Россией и Туркменией 71. Несмотря на разговоры об устойчивом прогрессе, окончательное соглашение пока не достигнуто, в основном из-за возражений Ирана и в меньшей степени Туркмении 72. Казахстан и Россия уже очертили национальные зоны, наметив обширные сектора совместной разработки, и несколько совместных проектов в казахстанской зоне шельфа уже реализуются с участием «ЛУКойла», «Роснефти» и казахстанской государственной нефтегазовой компании «Казмунайгаз», в том числе ценнейшее нефтяное месторождение Курмангазы, запасы которого по имеющимся оценкам составляют от 700 млн до 1 млрд т сырой нефти 73. Общий объем инвестиций для его разработки должен составить 10 млрд долл.74 Возможно, российские участники проектов приобрели свои доли не совсем на общих условиях, но принятый в январе 2004 г. закон обязывает их платить повышенные налоги, как и другие иностранные компании, что вызвало у них серьезное недовольство 75. Казахстан также весьма активно сотрудничает с Россией в сфере транспортировки нефти, причем в некоторых проектах участву-

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ют члены семьи президента Назарбаева. Однако в газовом секторе у Казахстана гораздо менее конкурентоспособные позиции. Казахстан и Россия все еще не разработали удовлетворительного долгосрочного соглашения о ценах на газ, поставляемый с гигантского Карачаганакского месторождения на крупное российское очистное предприятие в Оренбурге 76. Газовые отрасли Казахстана и России совместно работают над проблемами транзита природного газа через Казахстан. В 2002 г. они создали совместное предприятие «Казросгаз» с равным участием сторон, которое надеется стать главным в осуществлении транзита газа через Казахстан. Россия по-прежнему предлагает Казахстану относительно низкую закупочную цену на газ, продаваемый на российской границе, но (в отличие от туркменского газа) пропускают часть казахстанского газа непосредственно на европейский рынок, где его можно продать с гораздо более высокой прибылью, чем в России. Иными словами, Казахстан сумел получить небольшую часть российского рынка в Европе 77. Имея в виду намеченное целенаправленное увеличение добычи газа до 70 млрд куб. м к 2015 г., казахстанские руководители хотели бы добиться расширения масштабов этой преференции 78. Они видят в России менее проблематичного конкурента по сравнению с Азербайджаном, который предлагает им альтернативный маршрут. Кроме того, они поняли, что доступ к российской системе трубопроводов позволит им «вытолкнуть» из нее туркменский газ, ослабив таким образом конкурента. Россия хотела бы, чтобы ее отношения с Казахстаном стали моделью для развития газовой промышленности во всей Центральной Азии. За последние несколько лет «Газпром» распространил свою активность на весь регион, подписав соглашение о сотрудничестве с Киргизией и заключив стратегическое соглашение с реорганизованной узбекской государственной газовой компанией «Узбекнефтегаз»79. Киргизия заключила соглашение с большим энтузиазмом. Партнерство с «Газпромом» обеспечивает ей лучшую защиту от узбекского поставщика, произвольно устанавливающего высокие цены, и она надеется, что это также положит конец перебоям в подаче газа при просрочках платежей 80. Узбекистан видит в «Газпроме» не только производителя газа, но и оператора системы транзита газа через республику 81. Эта двойная роль делает его экономической силой, с которой следует

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считаться. Узбекистан сооружает несколько совместных предприятий в нефтяном и газовом секторе с филиалом «Газпрома» компанией «Зарубежнефтегаз» и с «ЛУКойлом», и если эти проекты будут доведены до конца, объем российских инвестиций в нефтяном и газовом секторе страны достигнет 2 млрд долл.82 Эти проекты — элемент общего восстановления отношений между Москвой и Ташкентом, а также отражение возрастающей конкуренции между Узбекистаном и Туркменией 83. Налаживание Россией партнерских отношений с другими производителями газа в Центральной Азии ставит Туркмению в трудное положение, поскольку расширяет возможности России в отношении изоляции Ашхабада, вынуждая его уступить большую долю контроля в сфере маркетинга и развития туркменской газовой промышленности 84. Главной проблемой для России теперь становится не получение доступа к запасам газа в Центральной Азии, а необходимость реконструкции системы трубопроводов. Чтобы продать 90 млрд куб. м газа, которые должны быть поставлены по контрактам к 2010 г., России потребуется более 8 млрд долл., и с учетом других реализуемых проектов «Газпрому», возможно, окажется трудно найти на рынках капитала средства для этих инвестиций 85. Российское акционерное общество «Единые энергосистемы России» (РАО ЕЭС) — электрическая монополия России — в последние несколько лет тоже весьма настойчиво внедрялась в Центральную Азию. РАО ЕЭС действует в Северном Казахстане с начала 1990-х годов, сотрудничая с американской компанией «Access Industries». С 1996 г. «Access Industries» разрабатывает угольный разрез «Богатырь» в Павлодаре, а осенью 1999 г. она получила права на разрез «Северный», который к тому времени принадлежал РАО ЕЭС 86. Эти шаги позволяют РАО ЕЭС рационализировать спрос и предложение в центральной части Сибири. Подобно «Газпрому» РАО ЕЭС хотело бы использовать энергию Центральной Азии для обслуживания европейских рынков. Согласно расчетам его руководства разработка ряда гидроресурсов в Киргизии и Таджикистане была бы гораздо экономичнее, чем в некоторых частях Сибири, тем более что в Центральной Азии существует созданная еще в советское время единая электрическая сеть, охватывающая весь регион, которой РАО ЕЭС помогает управлять.

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Однако с учетом экспортных планов РАО ЕЭС важнее получить контроль над крупными гидроэлектростанциями в Киргизии и Таджикистане, в которые ко времени распада Советского Союза намечалось сделать новые инвестиции. В августе 2004 г. РАО ЕЭС и киргизское правительство подписали меморандум, предусматривающий строительство в Киргизии гидроэлектростанций «Камбарат-1» и «Камбарат-2» (для чего потребуются дополнительные инвестиции в размере 1,9 млрд долл.), подготовлено технико-экономическое обоснование этого проекта 87. РАО ЕЭС также обязалось вложить 250 млн долл. в завершение гидроэнергетического комплекса «Сангтуда» в Таджикистане (еще 250 млн долл. обещали инвестировать в этот комплекс иранцы). Компания «Русский алюминий» («Русал») также объявила о долгосрочных инвестициях в Рогунский гидроэнергетический комплекс в Таджикистане, чтобы облегчить строительство большого предприятия по выплавке алюминия 88. Эти проекты спорны, поскольку подразумевается, что пользователи, расположенные ниже по течению (Южный Казахстан, Узбекистан и Туркмения), будут получать меньше воды, кроме того, это может привести к увеличению сезонных наводнений, которые — с тех пор как Киргизия увеличила производство гидроэлектроэнергии — представляют серьезную проблему для Узбекистана и Казахстана. Хлопковые поля в этих двух странах зависят от внешних источников воды, летом и осенью обеспечивающих около 90% их потребностей в ирригации. В распоряжении Киргизии и извилистые высокогорные реки, и построенная еще в советское время огромная Токтогульская плотина. Киргизии нужна гидроэлектроэнергия, чтобы обогревать граждан зимой, но спуск воды для выработки электроэнергии вызывает ниже по течению сильные наводнения, поскольку зимой северная часть Сырдарьи замерзает, и ее пропускная способность уменьшается 89. По мере увеличения контроля России над гидроэнергетикой региона она начинает играть критическую роль в управлении его водными ресурсами. Все пять центральноазиатских государств по-прежнему полагаются на систему водохранилищ, созданную еще в советскую эпоху, так что их большинство находится в Таджикистане и Киргизии, и вода распределяется на основании соглашений между пятью странами согласно ежегодной системе квот,

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которая благоприятствует сельскохозяйственным пользователям, расположенным ниже по течению 90. В то же время каждое государство региона принимает и односторонние решения, влияющие на распределение воды. Пример — увеличение производства гидроэлектроэнергии Таджикистаном и Киргизией и создание новых водохранилищ в Узбекистане и Туркмении 91. Большинство наблюдателей опасается, что рано или поздно проблемы водопользования вызовут серьезный конфликт в регионе. От международных усилий по финансированию создания новой региональной системы водопользования центральноазиатские государства наотрез отказались. Они намерены решать эту проблему самостоятельно, хотя различные международные агентства развития уже имеют небольшие проекты, имеющие целью постепенное повышение эффективности существующей системы 92. Руководители России понимают, какое геополитическое влияние она сможет оказывать, получив контроль над гидроэнергетическими мощностями и системой газопроводов Центральной Азии, но пока неизвестно, найдет ли Москва достаточные средства, чтобы максимизировать экономический потенциал обоих этих критически важных секторов. Это очевидная цель российского руководства, для достижения которой оно ищет новые рычаги. В октябре 2004 г. Путин собрал лидеров четырех государств региона (кроме Туркмении, которая никогда не участвовала в подобных встречах), чтобы убедить их согласиться на членство России в Организации центральноазиатского сотрудничества. Возможно, участие Москвы сможет вдохнуть новую жизнь в эту почти совершенно неэффективную организацию, которая с момента создания в декабре 2001 г. на базе Центральноазиатской организации экономического сотрудничества не сумела ни разработать, ни проконтролировать ни одной совместной программы. Если Москва сможет манипулировать различными рычагами, которые она создает, ее влияние в регионе определенно должно увеличиться, и в течение ближайших нескольких лет она по крайней мере сможет выдерживать темп, соответствующий темпу роста влияния Китая.

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Китай: завтрашняя супердержава Руководство Китая, кажется, больше озабочено появлением американских военнослужащих в Центральной Азии, чем лидеры России, потому что теперь войска США находятся всего в нескольких сотнях километров от китайской границы. Все признают, что военное присутствие Соединенных Штатов в Киргизии и Узбекистане является вторжением в сферу влияния России, но Китай увидел в этом не менее явное вторжение в свою сферу влияния. И никто не был заинтересован в предоставлении Пекину какой-то компенсации, в значительной степени потому, что китайцы реагировали на угрозы своему будущему влиянию, а не на текущее положение дел. Москва стремилась обратить начатую США войну с террором в Афганистане себе на пользу, но оснований для заключения какойлибо сделки с Китаем у США практически не было. В отличие от России Китай не рассматривался даже в качестве косвенного участника, недовольство которого могло бы как-то повлиять на открытие американских баз. Поэтому он мог получить от Вашингтона очень мало уступок, хотя одна все же была сделана: признание Исламского движения «Восточный Туркестан» международной террористической организацией имело для Пекина большое значение 93. Это повлекло за собой последствия для Центральной Азии, поскольку привело к объявлению вне закона местных уйгурских групп 94. За последние три года Китай смог увеличить свое присутствие в Центральной Азии, отчасти потому, что с успехом представляет себя в Центральной Азии в качестве противовеса и Соединенным Штатам, и России. Если появление американских военных в этом регионе вообще оказало какое-то влияние на Шанхайскую организацию сотрудничества, то скорее оно привело к ее укреплению, чем к ослаблению, хотя некоторые думали, что возникновение баз Соединенных Штатов в Центральной Азии должно нанести организации ущерб. Даже Узбекистан полагал, что влияние ШОС уменьшится. Ташкент, кажется, подумывал совсем выйти из нее. Летом 2003 г. он проигнорировал первые совместные военные учения, проводившиеся ШОС, заявив, что его подразделения не были должным образом к ним подготовлены 95. Однако президент Каримов и высшее руководство Узбекистана довольно быстро пришли к выводу, что

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укрепление связей с Китаем не повредит развитию узбекско-американских отношений. Поэтому Ташкент сменил прежнюю застенчивость на энтузиазм и стал активным членом ШОС. В качестве вознаграждения ему удалось заполучить Антитеррористический центр ШОС, перемещенный из Бишкека в Ташкент, где в январе 2004 г. была фактически открыта его расширенная штаб-квартира; официально она была открыта позже, в июне 2004 г., на встрече глав государств — членов ШОС 96. Более важно, что Китай поддержал применение Каримовым силы против людей, участвовавших в волнениях в Андижане в мае 2005 г. И Китай, и Россия рассматривают антитеррористические действия ШОС как критически важные для компенсации возрастающего влияния США в Центральной Азии, хотя эти две страны придерживается не совсем одинаковой точки зрения на то, как лучше их осуществлять. Китай стремится к военному сотрудничеству с другими членами ШОС, в то время как Россия предпочитает сначала добиться укрепления институтов СНГ, кроме того, она хотела бы, чтобы государства СНГ участвовали в операциях ШОС в качестве единого блока коллективной безопасности. Китай, однако, настаивает на двустороннем сотрудничестве с различными участниками ШОС. Дальше всего зашло военное сотрудничество Китая с Киргизией, которая получила от Китая военное оборудование на 1,2 млн долл., и Казахстаном, закупившим у Китая оборудование на 3 млн долл., в том числе средства связи и оснащения специальных сил 97. Теперь Казахстан отказывается от участия в совместных маневрах 98. ШОС пока не развилась в полноценную организацию. Непонятно, каков ее окончательный потенциал, даже неясно, что означает быть ее членом. В качестве наблюдателей на съездах ШОС побывали представители разных стран. На конференции глав государств — членов ШОС, проходившей в Ташкенте в июне 2004 г., присутствовал афганский президент Хамид Карзай, надеявшийся, что Афганистан, который имеет очень короткую границу с Китаем, будет допущен в организацию 99. Монголию тоже пригласили участвовать в этой встрече на высшем уровне. Велись разговоры о приглашении в ШОС Индии и Пакистана. Похоже, лидеры Центральной Азии намерены продолжать активную работу в ШОС, даже если она не станет более эффек-

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тивной в области обеспечения безопасности и не возьмет на себя функции регулирования экономических отношений между странами-участницами. Осуществление именно этих функций является целью ШОС, которая обсуждалась, но пока не обрела формального выражения 100. ШОС служит форумом, позволяющим подробно обсуждать двусторонние и многосторонние проблемы, а иногда даже решать их. Один высокопоставленный дипломат в неофициальной обстановке заметил: «Когда рядом китайцы, русские не могут прибегнуть к своим обычным уловкам». Эту сентенцию могли бы повторить многие центральноазиатские лидеры. ШОС — лишь один из инструментов, с помощью которых Китай может влиять на события в Центральной Азии, и, наверное, не самый главный. Размеры и экономический потенциал Китая обеспечивают ему по крайней мере молчаливое (а зачастую и зримое, и слышимое) присутствие буквально на всех значимых форумах с участием государств Центральной Азии. Торговля с Китаем приобретает для них все большее значение 101. В отличие от первых лет независимости теперь центральноазиатские правительства поощряют инвестиции и торговлю на легальной основе 102. Наиболее ощутимо экономическое присутствие Китая в Киргизии и Казахстане. Киргизия надеется стать воротами в Китай, поскольку обе страны являются членами ВТО, в то же время Китай — крупный инвестор в нефтедобывающую промышленность Казахстана. Китай стремится получить более широкий доступ к нефтяным и газовым запасам Каспийского моря. Как уже говорилось в главе 4, Китайская национальная нефтяная компания в 1997 г. выиграла торги, получив 60% акций и контроль над компанией «Актобемунайгаз», чтобы разрабатывать нефтяные месторождения Жанажол и Кенкияк в районе Актюбинска, а позднее ее пакет акций увеличился еще на 25% 103. Несмотря на возникшие вначале трудности, сейчас этот проект осуществляется 104. Существуют также планы строительства нефтепровода длиной 2900 км, связывающего месторождение Кенкияк с нефтяным терминалом в г. Атырау на Каспийском море. Этот проект стоимостью 3,5 млрд долл. осуществляется поэтапно. Сначала был проложен участок длиной 450 км и стоимостью 200 млн долл. от Атырау до Кенкияка. Работы были закончены в декабре 2002 г., а эксплуатация участка началась в марте 2004 г. Второй этап проекта предусматривает прокладку

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трубопровода от Атасу в Карагандинской области (Центральный Казахстан) до китайского города Алашанькоу, расположенного на железной дороге, пересекающей Синьцзян-Уйгурский автономный район на западе Китая. Этот участок трубопровода длиной 1240 км позволит Китаю получать каспийскую нефть 105. Во время визита в Пекин в мае 2004 г. Назарбаев подписал с председателем КНР Ху Цзиньтао соглашение о совместных исследованиях и разработке нефтяных и газовых ресурсов Каспийского моря 106. Однако китайское правительство не смогло обеспечить участие двух своих крупнейших нефтяных компаний в разработке гигантского месторождения нефти Кашаган в Казахстане 107. Для уменьшения энергетической зависимости от Ближнего Востока Пекин обращает взоры и на Казахстан, и на Россию. Перспектива поставок нефти Китаю может вызвать к жизни новые совместные инициативы Казахстана и России. Это помогло бы Казахстану нейтрализовать китайское давление в других областях. В то же время экономический и геополитический потенциал Китая вызывает беспокойство по крайней мере у двух центральноазиатских государств, имеющих с ним общую границу. Таджикскокитайская граница сравнительно коротка, и для Китая она имеет ограниченную стратегическую ценность, но о границах Китая с Казахстаном и Киргизией этого сказать нельзя. Договор, заключенный в 2002 г. Киргизией и Китаем, обернулся для президента Акаева серьезным политическим кризисом, и конец его пребывания у власти был омрачен обвинениями со стороны оппозиции в предательстве в связи с подписанием этого договора. Из информации, поступавшей по неофициальным каналам во время переговоров, следовало, что киргизская сторона пошла на территориальные уступки, несмотря на то что Китай не оказывал на нее чрезмерного давления. Однако к таким утверждениям нужно относится осторожно, потому что на других встречах высокого уровня китайские лидеры, возможно, тонко намекали, что претендуют на соответствующую территорию. Передача Киргизией этих земель (тем более вместе с территориями, уступленными Китаю Казахстаном и Таджикистаном) открывает КНР новые возможности в сфере гидроэнергетики и обеспечивает перенос китайско-киргизской границы от подножий некоторых гор к их вер-

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шинам. Таким образом, усиливается юридическая позиция Китая для дальнейшего давления с целью получения новых земель. В Казахстане и Киргизии понимают, что их судьбы и будущее навсегда связаны с Китаем, если учитывать протяженность их общей границы. Однако ничто не указывает на то, что в последние несколько лет они озаботились таким положением дел. Похоже, совсем наоборот. Обе страны, кажется, удовлетворены отношениями с Китаем, в рамках которых от них время от времени требуют уступок, как это произошло при определении границ. Но отношения с Китаем, вообще говоря, более проблематичны, чем отношения с Россией, потому что потенциальная мощь Китая кажется почти безграничной, и когда-нибудь потребности его растущего населения могут оказаться важнее, чем потребности населения Центральноазиатского региона 108. Однако в ближайшей перспективе позиция Китая в отношении стран Центральной Азии представляется вполне предсказуемой и в целом благосклонной к целям их лидеров.

Центральная Азия и остальной мир Увеличение американского присутствия в Центральной Азии не создало реальных препятствий для деловых отношений государств региона с остальным миром. У этих стран по-прежнему сохраняются разнообразные возможности, в значительной степени не осуществленные. Еще несколько лет назад идея использования Турции в качестве моста для связи с Центральноазиатским регионом казалась вполне реалистичной. Хотя его государства остаются очень близкими Турции, но война с террором не способствовала выдвижению ими новых совместных с Турцией инициатив. Фактически, сделав акцент на укрепление прямых оборонных связей с центральноазиатскими государствами, Соединенные Штаты ослабили посредническую роль Турции. Теперь она уделяет все больше внимания проблеме вхождения в Европу, и европейский вектор остается для нее гораздо более важным приоритетом, нежели расширение влияния в Центральной Азии. Тем не менее между тюркоязычными странами существуют тесные культурные и экономические связи 109. В некоторых секторах экономики стран Центральной Азии, напри-

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мер, в строительстве, в хлопковой и в целом легкой промышленности, турецкие капиталовложения играют очень важную роль 110. Визиты руководителей Турции в страны региона широко освещаются средствами массовой информации, их по-прежнему встречают как дорогих гостей. Однако в последнее время число встреч лидеров тюркоязычных стран сократилось 111. В Центральноазиатском регионе Турция продолжает играть намного более важную роль, чем Иран. Какое-то время иранцы надеялись, что война с террором поможет им наладить сотрудничество с Соединенными Штатами. Помимо всего прочего это помогло бы Ирану получить дополнительную выгоду, установив более тесные связи с прикаспийскими странами в сфере продажи их нефти и газа. В апреле 2002 г. президент Ирана Мохаммед Хатами совершил поездку по странам региона, чтобы прозондировать почву относительно новых перспектив, на которые иранцы все еще возлагали надежды. Хатами и президенты стран Центральной Азии подтвердили взаимную заинтересованность в улучшении двусторонних отношений. Руководители Казахстана еще раз подчеркнули заинтересованность в поставках нефти через Иран. Во время визита Хатами Каиргельды Кабылдин, генеральный директор принадлежащей государству нефтяной и газовой компании «Казмунайгаз», заявил, что иранский маршрут — самый привлекательный для поставки нефти на растущие азиатские рынки 112. В ходе этой поездки был также подписан договор Ирана с Киргизией о новых формах сотрудничества. Даже Ислам Каримов, самый осторожный из лидеров стран Центральной Азии, тепло принял иранского руководителя. Однако пока Тегеран остается чем-то вроде международного парии, серьезное усиление его влияния в регионе вряд ли возможно. Затянувшееся определение позиций большинства центральноазиатских стран по отношению к целям войны с террором, которую ведут США, в какой-то мере отдалило их от основных арабских государств. По существу эта установка во внешней политике государств региона была выработана задолго до 11 сентября, и обе стороны с ней согласны. Все центральноазиатские страны являются членами Организации «Исламская конференция» (ОИК). Они посылают своих пред-

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ставителей на основные проводимые ею мероприятия 113. Кроме того, большинство стран региона продолжает получать займы и финансовую помощь от Исламского банка развития 114. Двусторонние отношения государств Центральной Азии с членами ОИК остаются хорошими, но уровень их невысок, так как в последние годы руководители этих стран редко наносили визиты в Центральную Азию на государственном уровне, а политики из этого региона, в свою очередь, нечасто посещали их страны. Хотя все лидеры центральноазиатских государств всегда готовы воспользоваться случаем и продемонстрировать приверженность своего населения исламским традициям, для них это не является политической идентичностью, и не в этом образе они хотели бы присутствовать на международной арене. Связи с арабскими и другими мусульманскими странами сбалансированы желанием поддерживать хорошие отношения с Израилем, который остается важным партнером для всех центральноазиатских государств кроме Таджикистана. Для Узбекистана и Туркмении Израиль — важный источник инвестиций, а Казахстан разыгрывает «еврейскую карту», чтобы сохранять хорошие отношения с Соединенными Штатами. Например, частный металлургический конгломерат «Eurasia Group» возглавляет Александр Машкевич, президент Федерации еврейских общин Казахстана, активно участвующий в работе Федерации еврейских общин СНГ и Всемирного еврейского конгресса, членом правления которого он является 115. Машкевич часто сопровождал Назарбаева в поездках в Соединенные Штаты, через него Назарбаев познакомился с конгрессменом от Флориды Робертом Векслером, который активно поддерживает Казахстан в Палате представителей США 116. Назарбаев настойчиво проводит политику религиозной терпимости, составляющую часть его общей внешнеполитической стратегии. В сентябре 2003 г. он председательствовал на Конгрессе мира и традиционных национальных религий, на котором присутствовали представители ООН, ОБСЕ, Организация Объединенных Наций по вопросам образования, науки и культуры (ЮНЕСКО) и Детского фонда ООН (ЮНИСЕФ) 117. В сентябре 2001 г. Казахстан оказался единственной из стран Центральной Азии, которая имела честь принимать у себя Папу Римского 118. Однако на междуна-

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родную репутацию Казахстана политика религиозной терпимости оказала лишь незначительное влияние. Азиатская стратегия Казахстана представляется потенциально более важной. Из всех стран Центральной Азии у Казахстана есть шанс добиться существенного дипломатического успеха 119. В 1992 г. на Генеральной Ассамблее ООН Назарбаев первым выдвинул идею провести региональный форум по вопросам укрепления безопасности и сотрудничества в Азии. В июне 2002 г. в Алматы в рамках этой инициативы прошла первая встреча на высшем уровне, получившая тяжеловесное название — Совещание по взаимодействию и мерам доверия в Азии. На этом совещании присутствовали президенты России и Китая, премьер-министр Индии, а также представители 13 других государств. Следующая встреча состоялась в Алматы в январе 2003 г.120 Назарбаев выразил надежду, что это может в конечном счете привести к созданию организации, подобной ШОС, или к расширению самой ШОС. Периодические встречи азиатских лидеров в Алматы могут остаться всего лишь форумом для обсуждения проблем, представляющих взаимный интерес, но они создают Назарбаеву рекламу и укрепляют его репутацию в азиатской прессе. Кроме того, этот форум содействует реализации интересов Индии в регионе, так как индийским политикам предоставлена возможность регулярно и на высоком уровне высказывать свое мнение в Центральной Азии. Первому азиатскому саммиту даже предшествовали торжества, посвященные индийско-казахской дружбе, проходившие в Нью-Дели 121. Индия по-прежнему стремится играть более значительную роль в Центральной Азии. Однако ей придется взять на себя перед этими странами повышенные обязательства в области экономики или безопасности. Индийцы ожидают благоприятного случая, наблюдают за развитием региональных тенденций и не хотят впустую тратить дипломатический капитал, не говоря уже о капитале инвестиционном. Потенциальные индийские инвесторы внимательно следят за усилиями по созданию нового транспортного коридора в регионе — проектом «Traceca» (транспортный коридор Европа — Кавказ — Азия). Дели также тщательно отслеживает ситуацию, связанную с безопасностью, и, как сообщается, присутствует небольшими военными силами в Таджикистане — при госпитале на 25 коек в Фархоре, в котором лечили бойцов Северного альянса,

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пострадавших в Афганистане. Предположительно укомплектованная «советниками», эта база имеет оборудование для ремонта ударных вертолетов Ми-17 и Ми-35 и средства воздушной и электронной разведки 122. Пакистан тоже заинтересован в увеличении влияния в регионе, но он настолько слаб экономически и политически, что о его активной роли говорить трудно. Однако если восстановление Афганистана пойдет успешно и он превратится в нормально функционирующее государство, значение Пакистана в регионе несколько возрастет. Это относится и к Афганистану, который сможет усилить свое присутствие в Центральноазиатском регионе, особенно в Таджикистане, правительство которого стремится поддерживать совместные с афганцами инициативы. Государства Центральной Азии весьма заинтересованы в укреплении связей с основными азиатскими державами, в особенности если такое сближение будет сопровождаться ростом инвестиций. Но они не хотят развивать сотрудничество с азиатскими странами в ущерб отношениям с основными европейскими государствами, особенно с сильными промышленными демократиями. Казахстан, Киргизия и Узбекистан мечтают, чтобы их пригласили принять участие в работе европейских институтов, хотя при этом не считают для себя возможным членство в Европейском союзе или НАТО. Самые большие шансы расширить присутствие в Европе имеет Казахстан. Но это зависит от того, насколько ему удастся обеспечить стандарты, необходимые для председательства в ОБСЕ в 2009 г. В целом с конца 2001 г. центральноазиатские государства двигались в сторону, противоположную Европе. Шансы на то, что еще три страны — Таджикистан, Туркмения и Узбекистан — в ближайшее время смогут создать у себя политические и экономические условия, соответствующие европейским нормам, очень малы. А если это сделает Киргизия, результат все равно будет в лучшем случае незначительным, если учесть ее удаленность от Европы, небольшие масштабы экономики и малую территорию. Узбекистан обижен тем, что Европа меняет свои приоритеты в регионе, а также тем, что министры иностранных дел Европейского союза сделали Ташкенту официальное замечание в связи с волнениями в Андижане в марте 2005 г. Заявления ЕС были пред-

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сказуемы, так как они совпали с завершающим этапом изменения отношения Европейского банка реконструкции и развития к Ташкенту. К тому времени, когда совет управляющих ЕБРР собрался в Ташкенте в 2003 г. на ежегодную встречу, состав менеджеров, которые в 1999 г. предоставили Узбекистану привилегию быть страной пребывания, в значительной степени изменился, а новое руководство ЕБРР использовало эту встречу для критики правительства Каримова за отказ проводить экономические и политические реформы 123. Такая тактика потребовалась и для того, чтобы отклонить критику в адрес самого банка в связи с его политикой в Центральноазиатском регионе, которая раньше никогда не связывала оказание помощи с выполнением каких-либо серьезных условий. Руководство Узбекистана, которое в ожидании этого события истратило миллионы долларов на строительство новых гостиничных номеров, было настолько напугано критическими речами, что в один момент даже прекратило прямую телевизионную трансляцию, чтобы узбекские телезрители не видели, как иностранные чиновники отчитывают их руководителей. Поэтому в Ташкенте не удивились, когда год спустя помощь ЕБРР была прекращена под тем предлогом, что Узбекистан не выполнил условий, поставленных ему на встрече в 2003 г.124 В общем, похоже, что европейцы устали заниматься проблемами Центральной Азии, как и проблемами Афганистана. Они, несомненно, надеялись, что восстановить Афганистан будет проще, чем оказалось на деле. Вместо этого они обнаружили, что их столицы превратились в цели для международных террористических групп, которые по-прежнему проходят обучение на территории Пакистана и Афганистана. Хотя в рамках Программы развития ООН региональная стратегия восстановления Афганистана по-прежнему реализуется, и в мае 2004 г. в Бишкеке была даже проведена конференция, посвященная этой проблеме, ООН с каждым годом все труднее находить деньги, обещанные на восстановление Афганистана, не говоря уже дополнительных фондах для реализации каких-либо проектов в Центральной Азии. Это справедливо даже в отношении фондов, предназначенных для борьбы с торговлей наркотиками, которые производятся в Афганистане и проникают в Европу через Центральную Азию. Великобритании было поручено взять на себя соответствующую инициативу, но до

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2004 г. для таких программ выделялись относительно небольшие суммы. Даже после увеличения финансирования европейцы тратят на борьбу с наркотиками всего 100 млн евро 125.

События 11 сентября могли бы вновь привлечь внимание мировой общественности к стратегическому потенциалу Афганистана и Центральной Азии. Но для многих великих держав прозрение было недолгим, поскольку более насущные и традиционные заботы отодвинули в сторону понимание этой новой реальности. Более слабые государства, такие как Иран, Турция и Пакистан, продолжают мечтать об усилении влияния в регионе, но шансов на успех у них немного. Американское присутствие в регионе номинально возросло, но за исключением энергетического сектора новые обязательства Вашингтона выглядят временными. По стратегической важности для США Центральная Азия вряд ли достигнет уровня Ближнего Востока; это справедливо и в отношении европейских союзников Соединенных Штатов. Однако государства Азии могут сблизиться с Казахстаном, но это будет зависеть от того, как Астана распорядится своими запасами нефти. Наконец, Россия и Китай рассматривают страны Центральной Азии как априори неразрывно связанные с их собственным интересами национальной безопасности и полны решимости сохранять в этом регионе тот курс, которого они придерживались в начале столетия. При этом шансы России и Китая на успех, как и прежде, в гораздо большей степени зависят от их внутренних возможностей и слабостей, чем от каких-либо планов Вашингтона.

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Д шингтоне — 11 сентября 2001 г. — стала новой точкой отсче-

ата совершения террористических актов в Нью-Йорке и Ва-

та в международных делах. Во внешней политике США произошли серьезные изменения, Вашингтон решил контратаковать терроризм прямо в центрах его зарождения и призвал мировое сообщество приложить максимум усилий для сокращения поддержки террористических групп. Пока рано говорить о том, достижимы ли в принципе новые цели США в области внешней политики. В Афганистане ситуация в сфере безопасности стабилизируется, работает избранное народом правительство, но до сих пор неясно, сможет ли президент Хамид Карзай получить международную и внутреннюю поддержку, необходимую для восстановления экономики страны и создания современной политической системы. А в Ираке ситуация очень неустойчива. Саддам Хусейн больше не правит страной, состоялись выборы, и все-таки, несмотря на присутствие большого международного военного контингента, в котором доминирующую роль играют США, гражданский порядок в стране восстановить не удается. Вместо того чтобы сдаваться на милость победителей, международные террористические группы, кажется, даже в какой-то мере воодушевлены этой войной с террором. Усама бен Ладен в целом сохраняет свое влияние, создаются новые террористические ячейки, угрожающие внутренне нестабильным государствам. Вместе с тем и на Ближнем Востоке, 266

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и в некоторых других регионах продемократические группировки тоже набирают силу. Основное внимание Соединенные Штаты уделяют государственному строительству в Ираке и Афганистане. Расходы Вашингтона на военные кампании в этих двух странах намного превысили первоначальные расчеты. И в Центральную Азию направляются только те деньги (или мысли о них), которые остаются после покрытия расходов на Ближнем Востоке. Проблемы, с которыми сталкиваются государства Центральной Азии, нарастают, но для их решения у местных правительств пока мало новых инструментов — в виде консультаций, технологической помощи или гарантий безопасности. Экономические перспективы этих стран существенно не изменились за исключением Казахстана, хотя его экономика тоже развивается не благодаря успешно проведенным реформам, а за счет высоких цен на энергоносители. Политические системы в этих странах пока не обеспечивают реального участия в политике широких слоев общества. В Киргизии (вслед за Грузией и Украиной) правящий режим был свергнут организованной элитой, но в других странах региона шансов на это практически нет. Гораздо более вероятно, что взрыв народного возмущения произойдет внезапно и будет подготовлен не светской элитой, лишенной привилегий, а религиозными группировками. В этой главе анализируются общие проблемы и трудности их решения на международном, региональном и национальном уровнях. В частности, это: давняя напряженность, связанная с пользованием общими водными ресурсами; разграничение территорий проживания национальных меньшинств и политика в отношении нацменьшинств; проблемы региональной торговли; угроза, обусловленная транспортировкой наркотиков и организованной преступностью; экспорт и распространение экстремистских идеологий. Но самая серьезная потенциальная проблема — это крах государства в одной или нескольких странах региона, и по мере перехода власти к политикам постсоветского поколения она будет становиться все серьезнее. В конце главы рассматривается вопрос о том, могло ли международное сообщество оказать этим государствам более эффективную помощь в плане создания необходимых политических и экономических институтов и, таким образом, минимизировать опас-

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ность, обусловленную возможными неудачами. Неизбежно ли в государствах Центральной Азии должны произойти революционные изменения до того, как в них сформируются рыночные отношения и политические системы, основанные на разделении властей? Изменились бы перспективы развития государств Центральной Азии, если бы им выделяли больше денег и серьезно пересмотрели подход к оценке их потребностей в иностранной помощи? Сохранилась ли еще возможность влиять на развитие событий в этом регионе?

Является ли Центральная Азия внутренне цельной? Сейчас много спорят, можно ли эффективно решать общие проблемы Центральной Азии, исходя из того, что все страны региона связаны между собой, и рассматривая каждую из них как часть единого целого. Конечно, это суверенные и независимые государства, но, нравится им или нет, их судьбы связаны теснее, чем в любой другой группе соседствующих между собой государств за исключением, быть может, трех стран Закавказья. Московские политики считают, что региональный подход усилит зависимость центральноазиатских стран от России. Поэтому многие американские политики считают, что создание военных баз США в нескольких центральноазиатских странах уменьшит как прямую, так и косвенную зависимость от России, налаживают с ними тесные двухсторонние связи и прилагают усилия к тому, чтобы ускорить распад Центральной Азии как отдельного геополитического субрегиона. Увеличение американского присутствия в Центральной Азии привело к большей дифференциации внешней политики этих стран и ослаблению чувства регионального единства. В то же время война с террором привела к неожиданному противоположному результату. Россия и Китай использовали расширение американского военного присутствия в регионе в качестве предлога для того, чтобы расширить и свое участие в обеспечении его безопасности. При этом, стремясь максимизировать свое присутствие в этих критически важных для них странах, они предпочитают двусторонним отношениям региональный подход.

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С точки зрения американских политиков США мало добьются, если у стран Центральной Азии разовьется сильное чувство единства. Своих стратегических целей в регионе (а это энергетическая безопасность и военное сотрудничество) Вашингтону легче всего достигнуть в рамках развития двусторонних отношений. И хотя США в некоторой степени заинтересованы в региональном сотрудничестве этих стран (чтобы соседи не создавали друг другу дополнительных трудностей), они не верят, что такое сотрудничество будет серьезно способствовать экономическому развитию и политическому реформированию. Более того, некоторые экономические обозреватели утверждают: чрезмерное развитие регионального сотрудничества может привести к нежелательным результатам. Они подчеркивают, что каждому из этих государств нужно ориентироваться на мировой рынок, прежде всего с учетом необходимости развития собственных природных ресурсов. Но при этом они недооценивают значение регионального рынка для обеспечения занятости и экономической диверсификации, а также важность стимулов развития транзитных связей внутри региона, необходимых для доступа на мировые рынки. Существует также опасение, что слишком хорошие отношения между лидерами государств Центральной Азии могут затормозить политические реформы и нарушить стабильность, особенно если при этом они будут активно консультироваться с Россией. Чтобы сорвать поддерживаемые Вашингтоном планы создания демократических институтов, ориентированные на участие в политике широких народных масс, Москва предлагает центральноазиатским странам техническую помощь для реализации концепции «управляемой демократии», во главе которой стоит сильный президент. Но пример Киргизии показывает, что «управляемая демократия» может стать причиной политической нестабильности: после свержения Аскара Акаева ситуация и в самой Киргизии, и во всем регионе стала более неопределенной, чем, возможно, она была бы, если бы он согласился провести свободные парламентские, а затем свободные президентские выборы. Соединенные Штаты обеспокоены также закулисными соглашениями между лидерами государств Центральной Азии и российскими нефтяными и газовыми компаниями. Эти соглашения объективно препятствуют повышению уровня прозрачности в эконо-

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мике и подрывают статус западных инвесторов, а также уменьшают роль США в разработке каспийских энергетических ресурсов и затрудняют военное сотрудничество. После катастрофы 11 сентября во внешнеполитических кругах в Вашингтоне велись разговоры о необходимости разработки США сфокусированной и последовательной стратегии в отношении Центральной Азии, однако администрация Буша отказалась от такой региональной политики. Как и при Клинтоне, Вашингтон продолжает делать ставку на двусторонние инициативы, полагая, что это будет способствовать укреплению независимости государств Центральной Азии. В государственном департаменте США вопросами, связанными с Россией и Центральной Азией, занимается помощник государственного секретаря по европейским делам, но есть и второй помощник, в вéдении которого находятся страны Центральной Азии и Кавказа 1. Решения об иностранной помощи принимаются на двусторонней основе, и по мере ее увеличения находящийся в Алматы региональный офис Агентства международного развития США передает все больше полномочий различным национальным учреждениям 2. Эта структура, а также целенаправленный выбор стран-реципиентов, с которыми можно вести дела на двусторонней основе, сильно затрудняют Соединенным Штатам осуществление приоритетных региональных проектов, таких как развитие торговли в рамках Центральной Азии, что является предметом особой заботы миссий АМР США в Киргизии, Таджикистане и Узбекистане. Считается, что торговые барьеры тормозят экономические реформы. Сейчас, после того как США в течение десяти лет предоставляли помощь странам региона на двусторонней основе, стало значительно труднее находить способы эффективного давления на их правительства, чтобы они в большей мере учитывали возможные негативные воздействия принимаемых ими решений на соседние государства. Двусторонний подход, используемый для достижения поставленных целей в войне с террором, еще больше обесценил ранее принятые региональные проекты США. Один из положительных примеров — программа НАТО «Партнерство во имя мира». Роль НАТО в оказании военной помощи странам Центральной Азии остается значительной. Однако со вре-

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мени начала войны с террором американскую помощь, предлагаемую странам Центральной Азии, следует рассматривать с учетом новой совокупности приоритетов. Эти приоритеты фактически отменяют прежние планы НАТО по реформированию вооруженных сил центральноазиатских стран, единственная цель которых состояла в решении проблем обеспечения коллективной безопасности в регионе. Европейские организации отдают предпочтение региональным задачам. Они руководят реализацией программы «Traceca», которая предусматривает создание транспортного коридора из Европы в Азию через Кавказ и Центральную Азию. Большой вклад в развитие этого проекта внес Азиатский банк развития. Но большинство европейских государств, особенно те, которые участвуют во многомиллиардных энергетических проектах в регионе, стараются развивать главным образом двусторонние связи, содействуя в первую очередь реализации коммерческих интересов своих стран. Корея и Германия отдают особое предпочтение государствам, в которых имеются большие общины соответственно корейцев и немцев. Такие подходы могут принести пользу в краткосрочной перспективе, но они не могут гарантировать, что угрозы региональной безопасности не помешают инвесторам достигнуть своих коммерческих целей в долгосрочном плане. Напротив, Россия и Китай в дополнение к прочным двусторонним связям, которые упорно налаживают их руководители, проводят активную региональную стратегию. Обе страны полагают, что геополитическое влияние легче осуществлять через региональные организации, которые объединяют государства Центральной Азии и в которых они доминируют. Россия рассматривает такие региональные инициативы как необходимое дополнение к двусторонним отношениям, чтобы поддержать свой имидж могущественной страны. Китайцы, стараясь свести к минимуму потенциальные угрозы безопасности, которые могут исходить из Центральной Азии, тоже используют региональный подход, главным образом в рамках Шанхайской организации сотрудничества. Вполне возможно, что региональные стратегии, которых придерживаются Россия и Китай, приведут к сближению стран Центральной Азии, т. е. возьмут верх над политикой США и Европы, которые хотели бы их от-

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даления друг от друга. И в случае ухода Соединенных Штатов из Центральной Азии такое сближение, конечно, произошло бы. При малейших признаках сокращения американских обязательств в Центральной Азии Россия предпринимает усилия, чтобы заполнить потенциальную пустоту. Легко было заметить, как быстро Путин принял меры для укрепления своего влияния после того, как у Ташкента возникли трудности с аттестацией на предмет получения американской помощи в 2004 финансовом году. Хотя высшие должностные лица Пентагона продолжают делать Ташкенту заманчивые предложения в сфере военной помощи, похоже, что военное сотрудничество Узбекистана с Россией развивается быстрее, чем с США. Эту легкую угрозу со стороны США Путин успешно использовал, чтобы проникнуть в ту область, доступ в которую ему долгое время был закрыт. И он, несомненно, продолжит использовать особенности внутренней политики США для дальнейшего отдаления Вашингтона от его наименее важных иностранных друзей. Прагматичный подход Путина к отношениям с Центральной Азией обеспечивает Москве новые возможности для усиления влияния в регионе как в сфере экономики, так и в области обеспечения безопасности, поскольку Россия не собирается связывать свою поддержку с проведением политических или экономических реформ. Хотя Москва, конечно, не хочет, чтобы государства Центральной Азии превращались в серьезную угрозу, в частности, и для самой России, Кремль считает, что максимальная реализация экономического и политического потенциала каждого отдельно взятого государства не принесет ему большой выгоды. Путин и большинство московских политиков хотели бы видеть в Центральной Азии общее экономическое пространство, благоприятствующее не столько развитию стран региона, сколько интересам российского капитала. А для этого лучше всего по-прежнему сохранять здесь атмосферу непотизма и режимы, далеко не соответствующие западным нормам демократии. Именно такой подход представляется большинству россиян и многим жителям Центральной Азии «естественным порядком вещей» и более привлекателен для них, чем попытки Запада трансформировать регион в «то, чем он никогда не собирался быть». Слабость российского государства ставит под сомнение его способность максимально реализовать свои интересы в Центральной

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Азии. Поэтому членство России в Организации центральноазиатского сотрудничества вряд ли вдохнет жизнь в это объединение 3. Москва не заинтересована в том, чтобы многосторонние экономические отношения нарушали ее двусторонние экономические связи с различными членами ОЦАС. Хотя присутствие России может содействовать вступлению Туркмении в ОЦАС, Россия мало что может сделать, чтобы смягчить соперничество между руководителями стран — членов организации. Центральноазиатские лидеры вообще не стремятся акцентировать региональную принадлежность своих стран. Эти пять президентов конкурируют между собой, и каждый стремится обеспечить своей стране максимальный вес на международном уровне. Самое острое соперничество развернулось между Исламом Каримовым из Узбекистана, Нурсултаном Назарбаевым из Казахстана и Сапармуратом Ниязовым из Туркмении (все они были членами последнего Политбюро Михаила Горбачева). Дополнительно затрудняет сотрудничество проводимая Туркменией политика «позитивного нейтралитета», которую Ниязов интерпретирует как отказ от участия в региональных объединениях 4. Кроме того, смена режима в Киргизии тоже сдерживает, по крайней мере временно, региональное сотрудничество, так как остальные президенты Центральной Азии считают членов временного правительства Бакиева политическими узурпаторами. В стиле, напоминающем прежнюю советскую практику, лидеры Центральной Азии заменили реальное экономическое сотрудничество виртуальным; у ОЦАС нет достаточных полномочий и возможностей, чтобы регулировать экономические отношения между входящими в организацию государствами. Ежегодные встречи на высшем уровне — это скорее форумы для обмена мнениями, чем для принятия конкретных решений, и, вероятно, они станут менее частыми, когда нынешних президентов сменит новая когорта, мало знакомая с методами Коммунистической партии. Для улучшения обмена информацией между этими руководителями создано несколько специальных механизмов, однако общие проблемы, которые предстоит решать странам региона, от этого не стали проще. Многие из них лучше всего решать на региональном уровне. Но каждый центральноазиатский лидер уверен, что он лучше, чем соседи, знает, как нужно справляться с этими

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проблемами, поэтому в большинстве случаев решения принимаются изолированно, на национальном уровне, а региональное или более широкое международное участие в этом процессе весьма ограниченно.

Проблемы коллективной безопасности

Борьба с транспортировкой наркотиков через Центральную Азию Вопрос о том, можно ли в принципе успешно трансформировать страны, выращивающие опиум и занимающиеся транспортировкой наркотиков (а если можно, то как сделать это наилучшим образом), остается весьма спорным 5. Однако главное внимание в международной политике уделяется восстановлению Афганистана, а пагубное влияние наркоторговли на Центральную Азию, как всегда, остается на втором плане. Перед всеобщими выборами в Афганистане, которые состоялись 9 октября 2004 г., убедительным для американских политиков был довод, что выращивание опиума — одно из «традиционных направлений» афганской экономики, разрушать которое на этом сложном политическом этапе не следует. Но как только Хамида Карзая избрали президентом, приоритеты США, как и приоритеты афганского правительства, начали меняться. В 2004 г. производство опиума по сравнению с предыдущим годом увеличилось на 64% 6. Однако это сопровождалось лишь незначительным усилением запретительных мер 7. Большую тревогу вызывает то, теперь опиум культивируется в тех районах Афганистана, где раньше его никогда не выращивали. В связи с этим американское и афганское правительства все больше осознают, что им необходимо внести изменения в свою стратегию 8. Декларация о борьбе с незаконным оборотом наркотиков, подписанная на Берлинской конференции стран-доноров в апреле 2004 г., призвала принять необходимые меры для борьбы с незаконным выращиванием, производством и транспортировкой опиума и других наркотических веществ 9. Этот подход был разработан на основе прежних планов, сочетавших толерантность, целевую финансовую помощь фермерам (чтобы убедить их отказать-

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ся от выращивания опиума) и ограниченное применение уголовных санкций в отношении крупных производителей и торговцев наркотиками 10. Однако Соединенные Штаты потеряли уверенность в том, что европейские партнеры смогут организовать международную коалицию, чтобы собрать деньги для этих проектов и эффективно распорядиться ими 11. В марте 2004 г. госсекретарь Колин Пауэлл объявил о выделении еще 1 млрд долл. помощи — в дополнение к 1,2 млрд долл., которые Соединенные Штаты обещали выделить правительству Афганистана на 2004 г. Теперь афганское правительство готово взять на себя бóльшую ответственность за охрану своих границ и предпринять серьезные усилия, чтобы прекратить выращивание опиума и добиться экономической диверсификации 12. Политика выжидания, которую проводило в 2000—2004 гг. международное сообщество в отношении борьбы с наращиванием производства опиума в Афганистане, дорого обошлась жителям Центральной Азии: в двух или трех странах региона повысился уровень криминализации экономики. Это было сочтено «побочным эффектом» намного более важной войны, который можно частично компенсировать усилением охраны границ и укреплением полицейских сил. Если бы для реализации программ борьбы с наркотиками этим странам оказали бóльшую и четче спланированную международную помощь, то криминализация экономики в них не нарастала бы такими темпами. Эти деньги можно было распределять через Управление ООН по борьбе с наркотиками и преступностью, а также, если бы США уделяли больше внимания Центральной Азии в рамках программы борьбы с наркотиками, через Управление национальной политики контроля за наркотиками США 13. Борьба с транспортировкой наркотиков в Центральной Азии осложнялась полным отсутствием современных технологий на границах в начале 1990-х годов; это относится и к бывшим советским республикам, и к соседним государствам — Китаю, Ираку и Афганистану. Положение постепенно выправляется, однако до сих пор большие участки границ, особенно границы Таджикистана с Киргизией и Афганистаном, охраняются слабо или не охраняются вообще, что делает эффективную борьбу с распространением

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наркотиков просто невозможной. И даже если обучение полиции и властей приграничных районов современным методам работы не решит проблему наркотиков в Центральной Азии, это создало бы более благоприятную среду для борьбы с данным злом. Обучение сотрудников органов безопасности в советскую эпоху отличалось от обучения их коллег на Западе, однако те и другие чуствовали себя профессиональными представителями правоохранительных органов, призванными следить за соблюдением правовых норм, чего и требовало от них правительство. Силы безопасности стран Центральной Азии могли бы успешно пройти переподготовку и освоить новые технологии опознания преступников и обнаружения контрабандных грузов 14. Конечно, такие мероприятия не приведут к исчезновению коррумпированных чиновников, но они затруднят появление новых взяточников, особенно если это будет сопровождаться повышением окладов офицеров органов безопасности и ужесточением наказаний для представителей власти, уличенных в торговле наркотиками. Кроме того, эффективность таких мероприятий повысится, если они будут прямо связаны с другими проектами, относящимися к судебной реформе. Даже если это произошло бы только в Киргизии и Таджикистане (а эти страны были готовы ускорить реформирование системы уголовного судопроизводства), торговые маршруты, связывающие их с Афганистаном, были бы перекрыты, и влияние транспортировки наркотиков на эти слабые государства стало бы гораздо менее пагубным. Провести реформы еще не поздно, но если бы реформирование было завершено до 2002 г., т. е. до того, как производства опиума в Афганистане и транспортировка героина из него резко выросли, его результаты были бы намного более весомыми. Кроме того, проводить широкомасштабную судебную реформу нужно было до того, как Россия и страны Центральной Азии договорились об углублении сотрудничества между их органами безопасности. Представления о прозрачности судебной системы в России сильно отличаются от западных, поэтому реформировать взаимосвязанные службы безопасности будет труднее, чем национальные службы безопасности каждой страны в отдельности. Кроме того, углубленное сотрудничество с Россией способствует более тесному взаимодействию коррумпированных элементов в органах без-

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опасности, которые по-прежнему комплектуются офицерами, которые вместе учились и служили в Советском Союзе. Даже при нынешнем уровне финансирования количество героина, конфискуемого в разных транзитных пунктах, значительно увеличилось, особенно на таджикско-афганской границе, на которой в 2003 г. было конфисковано 6 т героина (тысячекратное увеличение по сравнению с 1996 г.) 15. Возросли объемы конфискации наркотиков и в 2004 г.16 Однако настораживает то, что в изымаемых наркотиках значительно увеличилась доля героина; это означает, что увеличилась и плата наркокурьерам, потому что коммерческая ценность героина намного выше, чем опиума 17. Афганские специалисты по борьбе с наркотиками считают, что килограмм героина в Афганистане стоит от 5 до 20 тыс. долл., но на международном черном рынке его цена стремительно растет и в зависимости от качества товара составляет от 70 до 300 тыс. долл.18 Еще несколько лет назад спецоперации по борьбе с наркоторговлей в Центральной Азии обошлись бы намного дешевле и были бы не такими сложными, как в настоящее время. Сейчас эта проблема стала просто более масштабной, потому что в последние годы в Афганистане собирали небывалые урожаи опийного мака. Точную статистическую информацию получить трудно, но можно утверждать, что организованная преступность в Центральной Азии остается по крайней мере столь же серьезной проблемой, как и несколько лет назад. Некоторые местные преступные группировки связаны с криминальными сообществами в Афганистане, и эти мощные криминальные организации, возможности которых благодаря высоким прибылям в последние несколько лет увеличились, будут упорно противодействовать международным усилиям по ликвидации посевов опийного мака в Афганистане. Кроме того, существует опасность, что выращивать опийный мак начнут в отдаленных районах Центральной Азии, чтобы компенсировать возможные потери урожая в Афганистане. Вообще говоря, в относительно небольших масштабах опиум издавна производили во всех пяти центральноазиатских странах 19. Преступные группировки ищут способы продолжить свою деятельность. Один из способов состоит в том, что они продают наркотики по пониженной цене людям в сети распространения, превращая их в наркоманов, тем самым обостряя проблему наркомании. Увеличение числа

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наркоманов приводит к тому, что для перевозки наркотиков используются женщины (таким образом наркоманы зарабатывают деньги), а также к быстрому распространению ВИЧ/СПИДа. В некоторых районах Казахстана, Киргизии и Узбекистана рост наркомании принял характер эпидемии, а число больных ВИЧ/ СПИДом создает непосильную нагрузку для разваливающихся местных систем здравоохранения. Многие центральноазиатские правительства уклоняются от откровенного обсуждения этих проблем, и это мешает международному сообществу оказывать им соответствующую целенаправленную и эффективную помощь 20. Однако размер международной помощи, оказываемой Казахстану, который из всех государств этого региона наиболее открыт для сотрудничества, совершенно не соответствует его потребностям в борьбе с ВИЧ/СПИДом. Если Запад покажет пример и выделит достаточные международные ресурсы на разработку и реализацию программ по предотвращению распространения ВИЧ/ СПИДа и реабилитации инфицированных, будет легче побудить правительства центральноазиатских стран тоже начать борьбу с этими болезнями.

Борьба против терроризма и исламского экстремизма: война умов Руководители стран Центральной Азии по-прежнему считают, что исламские экстремистские группировки финансируют свою деятельность за счет доходов от торговли наркотиками, однако трудно найти этому неопровержимые доказательства. Нет сомнений, что экстремистские группировки используют транспортировку наркотиков для финансирования своей деятельности, но в основном наркотрафик, видимо, контролируют организованные преступные группировки, которые находятся под защитой сторонников режима, а не его противников. Прекращение транспортировки наркотиков не приведет к поражению исламского экстремизма, а устранение исламского экстремизма не отразится на транспортировке наркотиков. Но, разумеется, усиление контроля за отмыванием денег и другими формами перевода незаконных денежных средств затруднит деятельность экстремистских исламских группировок.

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Соединенные Штаты настаивают на принятии международных мер для отслеживания денежных переводов и пытаются привлечь к этой работе центральноазиатские государства. Помощь, оказываемая им в этой сфере, рассчитана на то, чтобы повысить способность этих стран защитить себя от угроз, исходящих от международных террористических организаций. Однако за счет помощи, предлагаемой на двусторонней основе, возможен только медленный и частичный прогресс в этом направлении. На самом деле в этой сфере можно и нужно сделать намного больше. Американская помощь не всегда совместима с той помощью, которую предлагают этим странам Россия и Китай, самостоятельно или через СНГ и ШОС. Такое разнообразие патронов подразумевает, что странам Центральной Азии предлагают разные типы правовых норм, несовместимые представления о законности и очень разные модели сбора информации как в отношении содержания, так и в отношении методов сбора. В октябре 2004 г. посол Великобритании в Узбекистане был вынужден покинуть свой пост отчасти из-за его заявлений о том, что англичане не должны обмениваться информацией со страной, в которой заключенные подвергаются пыткам 21. Между тем трудно представить себе, чтобы какой-нибудь член ШОС выразил несогласие такого рода. Различие технических стандартов у конкурирующих между собой патронов может в конечном счете вынудить центральноазиатские страны сделать выбор между ними, а также сократить участие в одной или нескольких многосторонних организациях или вообще отказаться от него 22. Официальные лица США, России и Китая все как один говорят о необходимости сотрудничества в войне с террором, однако для координации действий этих стран пока сделано мало. Соединенные Штаты не желают делить глобальное лидерство в этой сфере ни с кем, кроме ближайших союзников, в то время как Россия все еще ищет формы деятельности, которые способны оправдать существование СНГ, кроме того, и Россия, и Китай стремится укрепить ШОС. Даже если центральноазиатские государства усовершенствуют свои технические возможности выявления и разоружения экстремистских групп, проблема снижения привлекательности религиозного экстремизма в них все равно сохранится. В главах 4 и 5 мы говорили о том, что риторику религиозных экстремистов питает поведение некоторых президентов Центральной Азии. В глазах

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верующих взяточничество среди чиновников является проявлением их безбожия, то же можно сказать об избиениях и пытках заключенных, арестованных за религиозную деятельность. Такие действия подтверждают правоту заявлений исламских группировок о том, что правительство управляет страной в собственных интересах, а не в интересах граждан. Кроме того, такие методы становятся источником региональных разногласий. Политики соседних государств в приватных беседах говорят, что поведение узбекского правительства не уменьшает, а усиливает привлекательность экстремистских группировок, хотя в целом они разделяют используемые в Узбекистане критерии определения радикальных или экстремистских группировок и согласны с тем, что такие группировки нужно запрещать 23. Но независимо от деятельности правительств радикальные исламские группы продолжают распространять свою идеологию в Узбекистане и других странах. Официальные лица в центральноазиатских государствах, а также их западные партнеры стремятся выявлять и поддерживать местные исламистские организации умеренного толка. Действия американских политиков, которые заняты государственным строительством и продвижением демократических ценностей в мусульманский мир, во многом определяются доктриной отделения церкви от государства, глубоко укоренившейся в христианском наследии. Они считают воскресенье светским днем отдыха, при этом рассматривая возвеличивание пятницы как насаждение потенциально радикального религиозного чувства. Такая точка зрения имеет много общего с предубеждениями центральноазиатских элит. Исходя из своих представлений, сохранившихся еще с советских времен, они считают, что антиклерикализм — это синоним атеизма. Западные власти постоянно упрекают различные центральноазиатские режимы за предвзятое отношение к группам христиан-евангелистов, деятельность которых иногда сильно ограничивается местными властями, хотя в отношении православной и католической церквей такие ограничения не применяются 24. Несмотря на эти проблемы, руководство США считает, что антиклерикализм советского толка, характерный для многих центральноазиатских руководителей, делает их подходящими партнерами для участия в американских программах распростране-

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ния религиозной терпимости. Многие из этих программ предусматривают краткосрочные посещения Соединенных Штатов, и на их реализацию в рамках американской помощи региону выделяется несколько миллионов долларов в год. Эффективность такого рода проектов пока недостаточно изучена; намного более уверенно можно говорить о долгосрочном влиянии программ повышения качества светского образования, для реализации которых требуются такие же суммы. Выскажем небесспорное мнение: если вложить эти деньги в проекты совершенствования системы светского образования, то это будет способствовать секуляризму и распространению религиозной умеренности. Если о реформировании учебных программ можно спорить, то проекты улучшения школьной инфраструктуры, например, ремонт систем отопления и обеспечение школ питьевой водой, пользуются всеобщей поддержкой и помогают детям вернуться в государственные школы. Благодаря таким простым мерам дети получают возможность окончить школу, причем снижается вероятность того, что их привлекут к изучению альтернативных учебных программ, предлагаемых неконтролируемыми религиозными группами.

Охрана границ и защита национальных меньшинств Угроза проникновения исламских террористов усиливает ощущение необходимости надежной охраны государственных границ. Самой радикальной мерой стало минирование границ (в основном Узбекистаном), что привело к десяткам жертв среди граждан Таджикистана и Киргизии 25. В августе 2004 г. узбекское правительство обнародовало планы начала постепенного разминирования границ, однако многим жителям этих стран все еще очень трудно навещать родственников, живущих по ту сторону границы, и вести торговлю с соседними странами 26. Хотя в определении киргизско-узбекской границы наблюдается определенный прогресс, этнические общины по-прежнему остаются разделенными, а национальные меньшинства по-прежнему чувствуют себя в опасности (особенно это касается киргизского меньшинства в Узбекистане) 27. Жизнь этнических киргизов, сосредоточенных в основном на юге Узбекистана, в значительной

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мере зависит от правил пересечения границы, устанавливаемых правительством, так что на них отражаются и изменения в оценке Узбекистаном угроз для своей безопасности. Например, после взрывов, прогремевших весной 2004 г., был введен сбор в 300 долл. за пересечение границы с каждого въезжающего в страну автомобиля. Это немедленно привело к повышению в два раза стоимости проезда на большинстве автобусных маршрутов на юге Киргизии. Кроме того, еще не полностью определен окончательный статус образовавшихся в советскую эпоху в Киргизии небольших анклавов, населенных гражданами Узбекистана и Таджикистана 28. Все это вызывает беспокойство в связи с политикой в отношении национальных меньшинств в Центральной Азии. Ни одно тамошнее государство не ввело права на двойное гражданство. Представители нацменьшинств за исключением проживающих в некоторых анклавах являются гражданами страны, в которой они живут, но многие из них ощущают большую привязанность к соседней стране, с которой они связаны этнически. В Киргизии и Казахстане такое чувство двойной привязанности ослабевает, потому что в этих странах к меньшинствам относятся хорошо и поскольку экономическое положение граждан там в целом улучшается. Однако в остальных странах оно сохраняется на прежнем уровне. В целом международное сообщество оказывает небольшое влияние на политику в отношении нацменьшинств, хотя верховный комиссар ОБСЕ по делам национальных меньшинств внимательно следит за положением этнических меньшинств в Туркмении. В странах региона зачастую имеется лишь минимальное дипломатическое представительство, к которому может обратиться за помощью обиженная этническая группа. Например, в Туркмении все еще нет дипломатического представительства Киргизии. Узбекское правительство тоже внимательно следит за событиями на юге Киргизии. Но во время изгнания Акаева в марте 2005 г. Ташкент всего лишь закрыл границы с Киргизией, то же сделали Пекин, Астана и Душанбе. Большее беспокойство вызывает перспектива массового притока беженцев в Киргизию в случае продолжения волнений в Узбекистане. Развитие экономического сотрудничества с Россией может помочь решить некоторые проблемы, связанные с использованием трудовых ресурсов других стран, и — при надлежащем подхо-

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де — обеспечить юридическую защиту многочисленных рабочихмигрантов в Центральной Азии и России. В целом рабочая сила обычно перемещается из отсталых регионов в своей стране в более благополучные регионы за границей, и, видимо, это будет продолжаться до тех пор, пока границы относительно проницаемы и пока экономическая ситуация в странах исхода не улучшится. Эта проблема, во многом по схожим причинам, беспокоит не только русских, но и казахов и киргизов. Мигранты рассматриваются как потенциальная угроза безопасности, так как среди них есть небольшие группы, пропагандирующие экстремистские идеи. В регионе продолжают работать двусторонние и многосторонние рабочие группы, которым поручено регулировать межгосударственные отношения. Продолжается также работа по определению границ 29. Демаркация казахстанско-узбекской границы завершилась после того, как Казахстан согласился вернуть Узбекистану некоторые территории и населенные пункты, которые в 1956 г. были переданы Казахстану 30. Это вызвало серьезное недовольство местных жителей — казахов. В декабре 2001 г. поселки Багис и Туркестанец в знак протеста против этого решения объявили суверенитет. Свое недолго просуществовавшее государство они назвали Багисской Казахской республикой, или Багисстаном. Взамен уступленной территории казахская сторона получила поселок Багис (с 1059 этническими казахами) и часть водоема Арнасай, в том числе дамбу и пять поселков. Однако казахстанско-узбекская граница с учетом ее длины (2330 км) и проницаемости остается источником некоторой напряженности в отношениях между двумя странами. Узбекскому правительству оказалось намного легче упорядочить торговые связи, чем контролировать потоки людей, пересекающих границу. Предполагается, что некоторые люди, готовившие взрывы весной 2004 г., нашли убежище в Казахстане, а лица, причастные к организации взрывов в июле 2004 г., были связаны с ячейкой Исламского движения Узбекистана, базирующейся в Чимкентской области, расположенной по другую сторону границы с Казахстаном напротив Ташкента 31. Россия и Казахстан согласились передать друг другу некоторые территории, чтобы ранее разделенные этнические общины

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оказались в одном государстве. Такие решения принимались в основном для того, чтобы русские общины оказались на территории России, а казахские — на территории Казахстана, и особых споров они не вызвали. Границы Узбекистана с Таджикистаном и Туркменией пока до конца не определены. Проблема таджикско-узбекской границы, по всей вероятности, сохранится и в будущем, а граница между Туркменией и Узбекистаном была предметом обсуждения на встрече президентов Ниязова и Каримова, состоявшейся в ноябре 2004 г. в Бухаре. На этой встрече обсуждались также проблемы использования Амударьи и меры по облегчению трансграничной торговли и упрощению доступа граждан, живущих в приграничных районах, в соседнее государство. Были подписаны три отдельных соглашения, однако их реализация всецело зависит от доброй воли двух человек, поставивших под ними свои подписи. Как долго между этими двумя президентами сохранятся хорошие отношения, предсказать трудно. На встрече в ноябре 2004 г. было множество экспансивных проявлений дружбы. Были соблюдены традиционные ритуалы уважения; в частности, Каримов подарил Ниязову, который коллекционирует автомобили, легковую машину. Однако марка подаренного автомобиля (недорогой «Daewoo» узбекского производства) убедительно характеризует качество отношений между двумя соперниками 32. Среди потенциальных проблем, стоящих перед центральноазиатскими странами в области безопасности, самая серьезная — это распределение водных ресурсов. В главе 6 говорилось, что возрастающая роль России в гидроэнергетическом секторе может положительно сказаться на управлении общими водными ресурсами и смягчить существующую в регионе напряженность, обусловленную неоплаченными счетами за электроэнергию (деньги в основном должны Узбекистану). Однако долгосрочный план урегулирования этой проблемы пока не разработан, а международному сообществу страны Центральной Азии отводят во всем этом незначительную роль. Некоторые организации, например, Программа развития ООН, которой были предоставлены некоторые возможности заняться этой проблемой, пытались ее решить, но безрезультатно. Например, в 2004 г. при составлении отчета о развитии человеческого потенциала в Центральной Азии Программа развития

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ООН уделила основное внимание проблеме водных ресурсов, но только две страны, Казахстан и Киргизия, своевременно представили соответствующие доклады. Там содержится подробный анализ планов по сохранению и очистке воды и возможных последствий, которые ожидают общество в случае, если повысить качество воды не удастся, однако ничего не говорится о региональных проблемах использования водных ресурсов, и нет никаких предложений, касающихся разработки реальных планов или стратегий, которые помогли бы решить эти проблемы 33.

Скрытые проблемы экономики Все центральноазиатские правительства манипулируют данными экономической статистики, чтобы представить результаты своей работы в лучшем свете. Лидеры Казахстана и Киргизии утверждают, что их экономика выбралась из экономического болота, в котором оказалась после развала Советского Союза. Президенты Узбекистана и Туркмении гордятся тем, что они сохранили многие социальные достижения советской эпохи, а таджикское правительство указывает на послевоенное восстановление экономики. Однако пока ни одно из этих государств не оправилось полностью от экономического краха, вызванного распадом СССР. В одних странах экономические результаты лучше, в других хуже, но ни одна из них не смогла максимально использовать благоприятные возможности для экономического развития, которое открыла перед ними независимость. Это утверждение относится к первому десятилетию независимости, но оно остается справедливым и для тех лет, когда США заметно расширили свое присутствие в регионе.

Частично проблемы Центральной Азии кроются в плохом руководстве Перед руководителями государств Центральной Азии стояли действительно трудные задачи восстановления экономики. Эти лидеры часто сомневались в мотивах, которыми руководствовались те, кто предлагал им советы, и предпочитали доверять своей интуиции. В каждом из них жило глубоко укоренившееся недоверие к

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представителям Запада, сформировавшееся за многие годы работы в советских партийных и государственных структурах. Они опасались, что рыночные реформы окажутся просто инструментом, позволяющим транснациональным корпорациям контролировать их ресурсы и диктовать условия их развития. Президенты Акаев и Назарбаев первыми поняли, что структурные реформы сделают их экономику более конкурентоспособной и чуткой к изменению спроса. Однако мы убедились в том, что Назарбаев попрежнему считает: Казахстан должен защищать свои национальные интересы путем ограничения прав собственности иностранных фирм на нефтяные и газовые запасы Казахстана, хотя такие ограничения раздражают западных инвесторов, которые полагают, что, осуществляя капиталовложения в среде с высоким уровнем риска, они имеют право на высокую прибыль. При этом лидеры Центральной Азии с большим недоверием относились и к мотивам России, но с ними они уже были хорошо знакомы, и поэтому считали, что им будет легче предвидеть и парировать действия России, чем западных правительств, многонациональных институтов или инвесторов. Президенты Назарбаев и Каримов чувствуют себя увереннее в отношениях с Москвой, так как оба в свое время занимали высокие посты в советской экономической системе. Что касается других государств, наибольший интерес для руководителей Центральной Азии представлял Китай, но они понимали, что с учетом обстоятельств, сопровождавших развал Советского Союза, применить китайский опыт в их странах будет трудно. Но даже те лидеры, которые решились строить у себя рыночную экономику, тормозили процесс реформ привычным для них стилем руководства «сверху вниз». Даже в странах, более других настроенных на реформы, из руководства часто вытесняли специалистов с западным образованием, заменяя их теми, кто старался угодить президенту и кого меньше всего беспокоили проблемы прозрачности. Становлению рыночной экономики препятствует существующая в этих странах повальная коррупция, масштабы которой после обретения независимости возросли, так как у чиновников появилась возможность контролировать инвестиции, а также легальную и нелегальную торговлю.

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Возможно, экономики Киргизии и Казахстана смогут в некоторой степени противостоять влиянию коррупции. В последние годы в обеих странах наблюдается быстрый экономический рост, сформировался сильный частный сектор, который требует увеличения прозрачности. Но общественные ожидания изменились уже до такой степени, что обвинения в коррупции способствовали отстранению от власти президента Киргизии. И неясно, сможет ли новое правительство страны соответствовать этим повышенным ожиданиям и надеждам на быстрое повышение уровня жизни. Если новые лидеры сочтут, что избиратели позволят им пробыть у власти лишь недолгое время, то коррупция среди официальных лиц может даже возрасти, так как те, кто объявил себя демократами, кинутся, пока есть время, набивать карманы. В Туркмении и Узбекистане частный сектор настолько мал, а коррупция настолько распространена, что поэтапное реформирование экономики в этих странах может оказаться просто невозможным. Узбекистан упустил возможность реформировать свою экономику в 2002 г., а Туркмения вообще не проявляла никакого желания изменить экономическую систему. Если в Афганистане не произойдет резкого снижения производства опиума, то главной проблемой в Таджикистане станет борьба с наркоторговлей, а экономические реформы отойдут на второй план.

Дурные советы и напряженные бюджеты Международное сообщество в качестве оправдания своей неудачи в осуществлении экономических реформ в регионе ссылается на широко распространенную коррупцию. Если бы международные финансовые институты руководствовались другими правилами работы, а Соединенные Штаты и другие западные доноры проявили готовность выделить больше денег и увеличить количество проектов, предназначенных только для усиления связей с общественностью, то, возможно, экономические достижения в регионе были бы более значительными. Коррупция подрывает экономические реформы. Однако ограниченная поддержка Соединенных Штатов и международных финансовых институтов как прямо, так и косвенно привела к усилению коррупции. Ходили многочислен-

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ные слухи, что часть денег, которые выделялись на ранних этапах иностранной помощи, особенно по кредитным линиям, попадала к фаворитам высшего руководства — членам их семей и тем, кто давал взятки за доступ к этим деньгам 34. Частично эту проблему можно решить путем ужесточения контроля 35. И когда руководители стран со слабой экономикой, например, Киргизии и Таджикистана, поняли, что международное сообщество помогало финансировать проекты реформ, которые не могли обеспечить быстрое развитие рыночной экономики, у них не осталось стимулов для отказа от «погони за рентой» ради получения прибыли в рамках рыночной экономики. В странах с более сильной экономикой, таких как Казахстан и Туркмения, где реструктуризацию экономики может в основном финансировать само государство, у международных финансовых организаций меньше рычагов влияния. В этих случаях стремление к реформам должно исходить от государства. Например, как было показано в главе 4, в Казахстане сторонники проведения реформ оказывают значительное давление на руководство страны. Формы коррупции могут меняться, но борьба с ней всегда порождает замкнутый круг. Неудачные экономические реформы способствовали еще большему распространению коррупции, а «погоня за рентой» отравляла атмосферу, необходимую для проведения реформ. Труднее всего разорвать этот круг в самых бедных странах, где возможности частного сектора ограничены, а правящие режимы вознаграждают региональные элиты за лояльность тем, что позволяют им присваивать часть прибыли в государственном секторе экономики или получать незаконные доходы, например, от наркоторговли. Наличие активного частного сектора изменяет динамику коррупции, так как в этих условиях чиновники вымогают деньги у частного бизнеса и, вообще говоря, могут помешать его расширению до естественных пределов, устанавливаемых рынком, как это слишком часто происходит в Казахстане и Киргизии. По сравнению с воровством денег, поступающих в рамках иностранной помощи, эта форма коррупции гораздо более распространена и превалирует во всей Центральной Азии. Фактически увеличенная помощь может оказаться ценным «благом», которое местные элиты помогут распределить, чтобы ускорить процесс приватизации, исходя из того, что приоритет

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отдается скорости этого процесса, а не его справедливости или долгосрочному финансовому здоровью финансовых учреждений, участвовавших в распределении этой помощи. Только Казахстан и Киргизия поставили себе цель создания банковской системы западного типа, облегчающей кредитование в больших объемах, и только в Казахстане такая система действительно создана. Отсутствие у местных заемщиков доступа к твердой валюте препятствовало развитию кредитования в Туркмении и Узбекистане. Между тем именно доступ к твердой валюте выдвигался большинством международных финансовых организаций в качестве предварительного условия реализации кредитных программ. Международные финансовые организации считают сферу малого кредитования и микрокредитования привлекательной для реализации программ помощи, так как для этого не требуется серьезная банковская инфраструктура, а целевая аудитория гораздо шире. Однако количество имеющихся в регионе денег всегда значительно уступало потенциальному спросу. Поскольку заемщикам не хватало активов для обеспечения ссуд, они были вынуждены брать деньги под высокие проценты, что снижало доходность их бизнеса; кроме того, нередко они платили высокие налоги. Мелкому бизнесу, которому удавалось выжить, было очень трудно добиться финансирования, необходимого для расширения и диверсификация деятельности. Но даже при наличии финансирования крупные деловые операции часто разрушались коррумпированными конкурентами. Вообще говоря, экономическому восстановлению региона могло бы способствовать реструктурирование иностранной помощи, т. е. изменение соотношения между ссудами и грантами. Если бы ссуды выдавались на больший срок и с лучшими условиями погашения, то Узбекистан, возможно, провел бы структурные реформы, в том числе приватизацию, и не отказался бы в 1996 г. от программы стабилизации, предложенной МВФ. Конечно, склонить его к этому было бы нелегко, тем более если учесть паранойю Узбекистана в отношении возможного негативного воздействия на его экономику волнений в Афганистане и беспорядков в Таджикистане. Однако существовали некоторые шансы на то, что Узбекистан согласится на «шоковую терапию», которая предусматривала бы

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постепенный отказ от социальных льгот, сохранившихся с советских времен. Изменение структуры иностранной помощи позволило бы использовать ее для давления на Узбекистан, чтобы он открыл границы для торговли с соседними странами, что содействовало бы росту узбекского частного сектора и экономическому восстановлению Киргизии и Таджикистана. В 2002 г. международное сообщество снова получило возможность повлиять на экономическое развитие Узбекистана; для этого нужно было предложить ему достаточно денег для покрытия запланированного бюджетного дефицита, т. е. еще примерно 500 млн долл. в год. Это можно было сделать и без реструктуризации процесса предоставления помощи. Более того, вполне возможно, что хватило бы и просто более гибкого использования обусловленных кредитов Международного валютного фонда, выходящего за рамки существующих правил. Некоторые экономисты предлагают МВФ рассмотреть возможность изменения этих правил, однако вероятность этого чрезвычайно мала. В рабочем документе МВФ (сентябрь 2001 г.) приводятся доводы в пользу «плавающей» обусловленности в качестве замены нынешних строгих графиков выполнения поэтапных проектов 36. Там же содержатся доводы в пользу обусловленности кредитов достижением определенных результатов, которая позволяла бы МВФ и правительству-получателю договариваться относительно общих политических целей проекта с гибким графиком их достижения и отказаться от непрерывного финансирования на основе прогнозирования целевых показателей в соответствии с жесткими графиками. Последний вариант МВФ применяет неохотно, так как это может привести к завышению стоимости первоначальных этапов. Соединенные Штаты и международное сообщество в целом не проявляли готовности пересмотреть подход к определению своих обязательств по предоставлению иностранной помощи ни в 1991 г., в конце «холодной войны», ни в 2001 г., в начале войны с террором. Европейский банк реконструкции и развития был создан в 1991 г. как дополнительный финансовый инструмент для содействия финансированию восстановления стран, образовавшихся или радикально обновившихся после краха коммунизма 37. Когда началась война с террором, соотношение расходов на оборону и иностранную помощь заметно не изменилось. Практиче-

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ски все деньги, выделяемые на превентивные меры безопасности, тратятся на технологические решения. Администрация Буша попрежнему отстаивает программу создания новой системы противоракетной обороны, стоимость которой может достичь 60 млрд долл. Если не учитывать большую иностранную помощь, предоставляемую Ираку, помощь потенциальным театрам военных действий в войне с террором увеличивается очень медленно. В области предоставления иностранной помощи Соединенные Штаты ввели одно серьезное новшество — программу «Millennium Challenge Accounts». О ее принятии было объявлено в 2002 г., а финансирование открыто в 2004 г. Цель этой программы — стимулирование развития сильного частного сектора в некоторых самых бедных странах, но пока ни одно центральноазиатское государство не признано подходящим реципиентом для получения грантов ввиду недостаточной прозрачности существующих здесь экономических и политических систем 38. Многие жалобы на методы работы международных финансовых организаций, а также на методы предоставления традиционной американской помощи в других частях мира вполне применимы к ситуации, сложившейся в Центральной Азии. Например, критические комментарии, сделанные Николасом Ван де Валле и Тимоти Джонстоном в исследовании международной помощи африканским странам (1996 г.), вполне подходят и к Центральной Азии 39. Авторы исследования выражали недовольство тем, что в работе организаций, предоставляющих помощь, слишком много дублирования, а также тем, что реализовалось слишком много автономных проектов. В Центральной Азии это наблюдалось в меньшей степени, чем в Африке, однако лидеры региона все же столкнулись со сходной проблемой. Дело в том, что для принятия решений о предоставлении займов и технической помощи в определенных секторах разные доноры используют разные критерии. Поэтому политики Центральной Азии получали достаточно противоречивые сообщения. Например, Азиатский банк развития охотно финансировал проекты в сфере образования в Узбекистане, но при этом не требовал такой же готовности к реформированию системы образования или изменению школьных учебных программ, как европейские и американские доноры.

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Правительства стран Центральной Азии волновала еще одна проблема, которую тоже отметили Николас Ван де Валле и Тимоти Джонстон. Они утверждали, что правительства-реципиенты испытывали реальные трудности в покрытии текущих затрат и были разочарованы порядком предоставления помощи, в рамках которого доноры не были заинтересованы в передаче проектов местным правительствам, что еще больше подрывало развитие местных возможностей. Де Валле и Джонстон также сетовали на то, что многие проекты явно разрабатывались не для решения неотложных проблем страны-реципиента, а для того, чтобы ублажить избирателей в стране-доноре. Это, безусловно, справедливо и для многих проектов в Центральной Азии, прежде всего тех, которые имеют отношение к гендерным проблемам и торговле людьми. АМР США уделяет гендерным проблемам в регионе столь большое внимание, что бизнесмены, обращающиеся за кредитами для малых и средних предприятий, используют женскую «крышу», а женщины, желающие создать неправительственную организацию для решения общих проблем в сфере здравоохранения или образования, акцентируют гендерный момент, чтобы получить необходимую поддержку, и скрывают свои более широкие планы. Представители местных правоохранительных органов выражают недовольство тем, что в проектах по борьбе с торговлей людьми не учитывается главная причина — продажа женщин родственниками-наркоманами 40. Кроме того, многие сотрудники организаций, реализующих программы полового просвещения, зачастую просто не понимают, в какой культурной среде они работают; у них нет чувства ответственности за судьбы женщин, «поднявшихся над предрассудками общества», в связи с чем от них впоследствии отказываются их семьи. Некоторые сотрудники организаций-доноров стали жертвой того же энтузиазма, который проявляли многие представители Центральной Азии, и серьезно недооценили трудности обеспечения экономического роста в таких бедных странах, как Киргизия и Таджикистан. В обеих странах экономические расчеты плановиков были необоснованно оптимистичными, они не учитывали изолированность региона и потенциально вредные связи его государств с региональным рынком.

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Известно, что в Центральной Азии работало много неглупых людей из международных финансовых организаций и АМР США; кроме того, в регионе растет число служащих, которые до прибытия туда приобрели достаточные знания в области языков и культуры. Любой заинтересованный читатель может заглянуть на сайт какой-нибудь международной финансовой организации и ознакомиться с хорошо сформулированными объяснениями неутешительных экономических результатов в любой из центральноазиатских стран и с дельными предложениями по исправлению ситуации. Но одна из «проблем» Центральной Азии состоит в том, что положение там не ухудшается до такой степени, чтобы возникла необходимость в проведении международного форума, на котором эти критики настаивали бы на более широком международном участии в делах Центральной Азии или даже на пересмотре используемых парадигм развития.

Развал региональной торговли Международная помощь в создании мощного регионального рынка, который частично захватывал бы Западную Сибирь, Афганистан и даже восточный Иран, принесла бы пользу всем пяти центральноазиатским странам, однако эта тема никогда всерьез не рассматривалась. США стремились в первую очередь побудить руководителей этих государств мыслить глобальными категориями и ослабить сохранившиеся с советских времен зависимости и взаимозависимости, которые при воссоздании регионального рынка могли бы сформироваться снова (но уже на рыночной основе). Крупным региональным производителем обработанных пищевых продуктов, одежды и текстиля мог бы стать, в частности, Узбекистан. Его проблема — упущенные возможности, ибо внутренний рынок этой страны — 26 млн человек, и хотя торговые барьеры нанесли вред узбекской промышленности, они ее не разрушили. Больше всего от отсутствия регионального рынка страдают страны со слабой экономикой, т. е. Киргизия и Таджикистан, легкая промышленность которых едва дышит без доступа на иностранные рынки.

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За исключением Азиатского банка развития международные финансовые организации, консультирующие эти страны, не вполне представляли себе, какой большой ущерб нанесет каждой из них неудача в сфере налаживания региональных торговых связей, а экономисты из АБР не имели возможности влиять на политику других международных организаций. По иронии судьбы отчасти это было обусловлено пожеланиями Всемирного банка и иных финансовых организаций в большей мере, чем в 1970—1980-х годах, учитывать просьбы правительств-реципиентов (тогда эти учреждения подверглись критике за игнорирование местных предпочтений при разработке проектов) 41. Разумеется, и сейчас, и в то время проекты Всемирного банка, МВФ и Программы развития ООН должны получить одобрение правительств-реципиентов. Но можно было использовать международное влияние, чтобы подчеркнуть важность восстановления — на рыночной основе — существовавших в советское время экономических связей между странами региона. Некоторые руководители центральноазиатских государств не проявляли особого интереса к взаимному сотрудничеству, а финансовых стимулов, которые могли бы заставить их изменить точку зрения, было слишком мало. Практически все государства нарушали торговые и пограничные соглашения, подписанные их лидерами, в основном в рамках ОЦАС, из которой вышла Туркмения. Если бы международные финансовые организации заняли более жесткую позицию, то разработанные для каждой страны проекты можно было бы увязывать с соблюдением региональных и двусторонних договоров. Международные финансовые организации должны стремиться к установлению труднодостижимого баланса между вниматель' дением экономиным отношением к просьбам клиентов и своим ви ческого развития, которое в идеале должно быть глубже и точнее, чем у местных экономистов, а также уметь предвидеть неудачи в планировании развития. Как правило, проекты в регионе ориентированы на конкретные страны, и приоритет в них отдается торговле со страной-донором или ее союзниками, причем обычно оговаривается, что поставки необходимой технологии или оборудования обязательно осуществляются именно страной-донором, что препятствует попыткам использования подходящих местных товаров на местных рынках.

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Чтобы получить максимальную прибыль от продажи основных товаров региона — нефти, газа, золота и хлопка, необходимо обеспечить им выход на мировой рынок. Но центральноазиатские государства нуждаются и в проектах, которые должны увеличить занятость, поскольку их население молодо. Вероятнее всего, созданию новых рабочих мест будут больше способствовать региональные, а не национальные инициативы. Сами центральноазиатские страны уделяют мало внимания формированию региональных рынков, ограничиваясь соответствующей риторикой. ОЦАС никогда не разрабатывала механизмы, которые обеспечивали бы согласованность действий. Хотя самый эффективный путь развития торговли между различными государствами состоит в том, чтобы просто аккуратно соблюдать правила международной торговли, темпы осуществления структурных реформ в странах Центральной Азии настолько различаются, что и сейчас быстрая активизация торговли возможна только в рамках режима региональной торговли. Даже если в ближайшие годы ОЦАС докажет свою эффективность, это не компенсирует упущенного в последние годы из-за отсутствия благоприятных условий для развития региональной торговли и невозможности совместных экономических действий. Однако значительная региональная торговля все еще существует, и на ее основе можно создать сильный рынок. Таджикистан, Киргизия и Узбекистан остаются друг для друга важными партнерами, и взаимные поставки товаров составляют значительную часть их экспорта 42. Региональный рынок с учетом населения прилегающих частей России составляет более 75 млн человек. Если упростить условия транзита через границы, можно будет обойтись без значительных транспортных расходов. Затраты на доставку товаров на более удаленные рынки в Соединенных Штатах, Азии и Европе очень велики, намного выше, чем на рынки Китая или Пакистана, причем обе страны конкурируют на этих удаленных рынках, поскольку затраты на рабочую силу и транспортировку у них оказываются меньше. Но многие пищевые продукты, фармацевтические препараты и даже некоторые текстильные изделия местного производства здесь будут дешевле, чем импортированные из Китая. Если сейчас не удастся оживить и расширить местные отрасли

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промышленности и захватить часть рынка, то после вступления России и Казахстана в ВТО, членом которой уже является Киргизия, сделать это будет намного труднее. Неспособность осознать всю важность развития регионального рынка уменьшила шансы на успех парадигмы развития, навязанной центральноазиатским странам, особенно Таджикистану и Киргизии, так что экономические показатели, необходимые для минимизации долгосрочного долга, стали практически недостижимыми. Кроме того, размеры текущего долга и той его доли, которая направляется на оплату услуг иностранных консультантов и на закупку иностранного оборудования, способствовали созданию атмосферы недоверия к западным организациям, которые по-прежнему будут оказывать влияние на внутреннюю политику стран Центральной Азии. Возможно, планы некоторых из этих стран о замене импорта и представления о собственных возможностях производства оборудования, необходимого для реализации технологически сложных проектов, нереалистичны. Однако международные финансовые организации и другие доноры могут способствовать формированию доброй политической воли, если уделят больше внимания использованию оборудования, имеющегося на местном или по крайней мере на региональном рынке. АМР США и международные финансовые организации могут также изменить структуру займов таким образом, чтобы дифференцированная структура заработка иностранных и местных экспертов не встраивалась в займы, а финансировалась из специальных фондов, созданных донором. После обретения независимости прошло пятнадцать лет, и многие иностранные эксперты не отличаются по квалификации от местных экспертов, рядом с которыми они работают. Зачастую в качестве иностранных экспертов выступают бывшие советские эмигранты. Более открытое и творческое мышление могло бы разрушить хотя бы некоторые барьеры.

Неудачи с формированием политических институтов За пятнадцать с лишним лет независимости государства Центральной Азии так и не создали демократических институтов или,

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как минимум, механизма передачи власти, который общество признавало бы легитимным. Каждой из этих стран предстоит пройти нелегкий этап перехода власти от руководителей, сформировавшихся еще в советское время и все еще играющих главную роль в политической жизни, к следующему поколению. Во всяком случае, после прихода в Центральную Азию американских военных тамошние правящие режимы стали менее, а не более демократическими. Государственное строительство не входит в число приоритетов Вашингтона. Американские политики и большинство их западных коллег в значительной степени ухудшили перспективы реформирования нынешней элиты. Население большинства стран региона настолько плохо подготовлено к демократическим изменениям, что желаемого результата, очевидно, можно достичь, лишь используя очень осторожный и постепенный подход к созданию политических институтов. Поэтому большинство политиков, занимающихся Центральной Азией, не видит причин для увеличения сумм, выделяемых на политическую помощь этим странам, или пересмотра парадигм развития, на основе которых определяются принципы предоставления помощи. Лидеры региона преувеличивают опасность, которую представляют экстремистские группы, и переоценивают терпение народа. Психологическое ощущение своей значимости, которое принесла людям независимость, со временем уменьшается. Доказательством того, что ситуация выходит из-под контроля, стали волнения в Киргизии в марте 2005 г. и в Узбекистане в мае 2005 г. Граждане страны должны ощущать некоторую заинтересованность в ее будущем, в противном случае у них возникает беспокойство за собственное будущее или будущее детей. Но правители и подданные в Центральной Азии, кажется, говорят на разных языках. Большинству людей нужна надежда, что положение улучшится, если не при их жизни, то хотя бы при жизни детей. Люди, которые родились еще в Советском Союзе, воспитывались по принципу «будущего вознаграждения», но в условиях независимости, по-видимому, реализуется лишь новая версия этого старого принципа. Люди, рожденные позже, будут, наверное, менее терпеливы. Большинство из них в отличие от родителей напрямую контактирует с глобальным информационным пространством, и

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надежды, которые они возлагают на будущее, частично подпитываются знаниями о том, что происходит в мире. Конечно, при ухудшении положения население региона выйдет на улицы, но, как и в большинстве других стран посткоммунистического мира, предпочтение в таких случаях обычно отдается поиску мирных средств выражения недовольства. Как свидетельствует история общественного протеста последних лет, угроза власти толпы не представляет большой опасности, но она дает ясно понять, что при отсутствии общественного одобрения срок пребывания руководства у власти может оказаться недолгим. За прошедшие десять лет и в других странах помимо Киргизии несколько раз вспыхивали крупные народные протесты, приглушить которые правительствам не удалось. Но, как показали события в Андижане, цена, которую приходится платить за снятие напряженности, растет. В Казахстане народных протестов было меньше, чем в Киргизии. В конце 1990-х годов нерешенные трудовые споры привели к массовым протестам на юге страны. Однако введение более жестких ограничений на проведение демонстраций вкупе с экономическим подъемом, который позволил выплатить государственный долг, в основном разрядили обстановку 43. В последние годы в Казахстане функции общественного протеста во многом взяла на себя элита, что не представляет прямой угрозы для режима Назарбаева. Усилия, которые прилагала оппозиция, чтобы организовать общественные протесты в связи с серьезными нарушениями, имевшими место в ходе парламентских выборов 2004 г., почти сразу потерпели фиаско. Несмотря на новый запрет на проведение демонстраций во время выборов, организованная оппозиция по-прежнему ставит своей целью победу на президентских выборах в январе 2006 г., считая это крайним сроком для смены режима. Растет напряженность в Туркмении и Узбекистане. Небольшие демонстрации в Туркмении были организованы теми, кто был лишен гражданских прав, родственниками политических заключенных и местными жителями русской национальности, которых затронули изменения в законе о двойном гражданстве 44. Подавить их было нелегко. Протесты в Узбекистане носят потенциально дестабилизирующий характер. Некоторые из них были стихийными, например, перекрытие дорог женщинами вблизи Ташкента в июле

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2004 г. в знак протеста против отсутствия питьевой воды в летнюю жару. Другие протесты, видимо, были организованы: например, в ноябре 2004 г. в нескольких крупных городах на демонстрации вышли тысячи базарных торговцев 45. Демонстрации в Андижане в мае 2005 г. были организованы очень хорошо, и вполне вероятно, что там произойдут новые протесты, даже если узбекское правительство снова ответит на них силовыми акциями. Все это свидетельствует, что методы социальной инженерии советского образца, которые применяют лидеры Центральной Азии для формирования новой политической лояльности (частично на национальном, частично на личном уровне), не дают желаемых результатов. Лидеры региона не сумели обеспечить себе статус отцов-основателей, которые — в силу высокой эффективности своей деятельности — могли бы диктовать условия передачи власти преемникам. Однако попытки использования социальной инженерии могут создать потенциально опасные ситуации, потому что они создают ощущение перераспределения прав в пользу титульной нации, а также религиозных оппозиционных группировок, которые утверждают, что коррупция среди правящей элиты — это доказательство ущербной природы ее идеологии. Очень опасными могут быть попытки создать в какой-нибудь из стран Центральной Азии некую современную монархическую систему. Тем не менее некоторые руководители могут вынашивать такие планы. Общество, которым они управляют, очень неоднородно. Население этих стран отказывается примириться с потерей благ, к которым оно привыкло, и ему очень надоели политические и экономические руководители, приспособившиеся к новым условиям. Когда оппозиция в Киргизии объединилась, оказалось, что этого достаточно, чтобы сместить президента, потому что к ней примкнуло достаточно много сотрудников органов безопасности, которые не позволили бы использовать силу и развязать гражданскую войну. Хотя можно было бы организовать передачу власти с помощью нормального избирательного процесса, складывается впечатление, что все президенты стран Центральной Азии намерены обеспечить себе преимущества с помощью плутовства. Президентские выборы могут оказаться свободными и справедливыми по форме, но не по существу. Во всех пяти странах основные политические

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решения относительно того, кто может, а кто не может бороться за высокий пост, по-прежнему будут приниматься за закрытыми дверями; в частности, это относится и к июльским президентским выборам 2005 г. в Киргизии, на которых определится преемник Аскара Акаева. И все же рано или поздно в регионе должна произойти смена поколений руководителей. В краткосрочном плане некоторые центральноазиатские лидеры смогут не допустить таких событий, которые имели место в Грузии, на Украине и в Киргизии, ужесточив условия работы независимых политических группировок, однако им будет все труднее нейтрализовать региональные воздействия в Центральной Азии. Переход власти в одной стране приведет к значительной политизации всего региона, причем с максимальным увеличением неопределенности политических результатов. События, которые произошли в марте 2005 г. в Киргизии и в мае 2005 г. в Узбекистане, нарушили политическую стабильность во всем регионе, однако полностью значение этих событий может проявиться только через несколько лет. Отсутствие острой борьбы внутри элит в большинстве стран региона в значительной степени объясняется неравными условиями. Однако уход действующего президента приведет к мгновенному изменению ситуации, особенно в случае его смерти или принудительного отстранения от должности до истечения срока полномочий. Между президентами и верхними слоями политической элиты, поддержка которой помогает им управлять, непрерывно идет процесс «перетягивания каната». Сейчас во всем регионе это напряжение усилилось, и население понимает, что в политике приближается переходный период. Президенты Ниязов, Каримов и Назарбаев укрепили свою власть, которую они унаследовали после получения их странами независимости, но не сделали ее легитимной. То обстоятельство, что структуры президентской власти создавались из остатков структур республиканских коммунистических партий, обеспечило этим президентам инструменты, которые они использовали для усиления власти. Действующие главы государств укрепили институт президентства, а затем обеспечили себе единоличное правление, отказавшись от коллегиального руководства, характерного для Советского Союза в постсталинскую эпоху.

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Даже те, кто имеет достаточную власть, чтобы передать ее преемникам по своему выбору, не смогут обеспечить им безопасную среду, гарантирующую прочность их власти. А в случае изгнания президента, как это произошло в Киргизии, процесс обеспечения легитимности власти его преемника будет еще более проблематичным. После завершения передачи власти возникнут новые проблемы. Вполне вероятно, что недовольные члены элиты, некоторые давние противники и другие политики, которые прежде молчали, попытаются использовать «наследуемую» слабость нового президента в собственных интересах. Люди, стремящиеся к политической власти, будут использовать для достижения своей цели все доступные средства. Для многих эти схватки будут последним шансом прийти к власти, и в таких условиях субгосударственная принадлежность и этническая лояльность могут иметь большее значение, чем это было в последние несколько лет. Но вряд ли они будут играть такую же роль, как сразу после обретения независимости, когда во всем регионе повысилась значимость этнической, субэтнической и региональной принадлежности. В целом в сегодняшней Центральной Азии субэтническая принадлежность порождает ощущение взаимных обязательств. В отдельных случаях она может способствовать достижению успеха, но для региона в целом это всего лишь один из факторов во все более усложняющейся политической среде. Существование отношений лояльности привносит в ситуацию еще больший элемент неустойчивости. Однако элита стран Центральной Азии (за исключением Таджикистана) хорошо понимает опасность подстрекательства населения к мобилизации по этническому или субэтническому принципу. Сегодняшние политики старшего возраста и следующего поколения вряд ли станут прибегать к такому опасному способу для достижения своих целей, однако нельзя исключать возможность стихийной этнической поляризации. Этнический фактор — только один источник потенциальной опасности. Во всех странах Центральной Азии есть различные неудовлетворенные группы, которые ожидают подходящего момента, чтобы заявить о своем существовании. В них входят люди из президентского окружения, которые чувствуют себя уязвлен-

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ными выбором преемника, а также не допущенные к новой власти члены старой советской элиты и их дети, и многие из них располагают достаточными экономическими возможностями для реализации политических амбиций. В эти группы входят и остатки альтернативной элиты, которая рассчитывала, что независимость даст ей новые экономические и политические возможности, но эти надежды не оправдались. В состав альтернативной элиты входят люди как светской, так и религиозной ориентации. Спектр политических сил в разных странах очень разнится, сильно различаются и возможности и средства борьбы за власть, которыми они располагают. К традиционному арсеналу, который включает манипулирование политической позицией и этническим статусом, большинство этих политиков добавило новые экономические и культуральные средства «глобального охвата». Кроме того, может оказаться, что у следующей группы лидеров, которая идет к власти, гораздо меньше общих интересов, чем у сегодняшних политических руководителей, и вполне вероятно, что их политическая выносливость окажется намного ниже. Следующие президенты стран региона, по-видимому, не будут проявлять друг к другу даже того минимума уважения, который демонстрируют нынешние президенты. Кто-то из них даже может ощутить враждебность, если ему покажется, что руководитель соседней страны пришел к власти, используя методы, представляющие прямую угрозу его политическому долголетию. Поэтому некоторые лидеры региона могут намного активнее вмешиваться во внутреннюю политику соседних стран не только для того, чтобы предотвратить волнения в своих странах, но и для утверждения национального превосходства. Все государства, вероятно, будут решительно противодействовать исламским группировкам, которые могли бы прийти к власти в соседней стране, даже если они будут делить эту власть с другими партиями. Узбекистан и Казахстан, по всей вероятности, внимательно наблюдают за продолжающейся сменой власти в Киргизии и постараются принять все меры, чтобы новый президент обеспечил соблюдение их экономических и демографических интересов, а за событиями в Узбекистане весь регион будет следить с большой нервозностью.

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В тех странах, где институты, регулирующие передачу власти, слабы или вообще отсутствуют, честолюбивая элита будет пытаться достигнуть своих целей, используя противозаконные методы. Мы наблюдали это в Туркмении во время неудавшегося переворота Шихмурадова в ноябре 2002 г. По всей Центральной Азии члены элиты из впавших в немилость кланов и семейств ожидают благоприятной возможности добиться экономической и политической власти. Но поскольку институтов, обеспечивающих мирную передачу власти, не существует, у этих членов элиты нет базы, на которой они могли бы строить свои планы. Когда нынешние лидеры будут покидать свои посты, для населения наступит период трудной эволюции. Некоторые ожидают этого с энтузиазмом, надеясь на окончательную ликвидацию советской системы и возобновление незавершенных демократических преобразований 1989—1991 гг., в то время как другие готовятся к «езде в незнаемое». Первое испытание пройдет в Киргизии, в которой временное правительство, содействовавшее отставке Акаева, должно сделать свою власть легитимной. Исполняющий обязанности президента Курманбек Бакиев, который участвует в президентской гонке и который был утвержден в своей временной должности парламентом (выборы которого прошли в столь коррумпированной обстановке, что действующий президент вынужден был досрочно оставить свой пост), «по наследству» принял на себя ответственность за проведение демократических президентских выборов. После выборов парламент должен решить, следует ли проводить коренную политическую реформу и вводить конституционные гарантии против злоупотребления властью. Кроме того, предстоит рассмотреть вопрос, располагает ли он достаточно легитимным мандатом, чтобы проработать весь предусмотренный законом срок, или ему следует самораспуститься (однако последний сценарий маловероятен). Трудно представить себе, что элита Киргизии готова к выполнению этой задачи, но в противном случае существуют большие опасения, что кредит доверия народа к новым правителям быстро иссякнет. В Узбекистане этот период может оказаться еще короче, особенно если узбекское правительство не проведет экономические реформы, в частности, не введет свободные закупочные цены

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на хлопок и зерно и не облегчит налогообложение малого бизнеса. В обеих странах экономические проблемы усугубляются политическим фаворитизмом и коррумпированностью правящей элиты. Но это проистекает из самой природы смены экономической формации, обусловленной развалом Советского Союза. За последние пятнадцать лет люди привыкли не доверять лидерам. Политическое доверие, унаследованное от советского периода, тоже было невелико, поэтому потребуется много времени, чтобы народы Центральной Азии начали доверять руководству. Демократическое избрание лидеров задало бы хорошее начало этому процессу.

Вина лежит на руководителях региона Нестабильность, угрожающая Центральной Азии, вовсе не была предопределена изначально. Хотя ее причины кроются в местной элите, международное сообщество могло бы оказать в этом отношении более эффективную помощь и в 1991 г., непосредственно перед тем, как эти страны обрели независимость, и после 11 сентября 2002 г., если бы эта помощь была лучше продумана и спланирована. Однако, столкнувшись с прямыми угрозами, международное сообщество предпочло иметь дело с теми, кто в тот момент находился у власти, и не оказывало на них особого давления, чтобы изменить их политику. Отчасти такое решение объясняется тем, что, по мнению западных политиков, действующие правители — меньший источник нестабильности, чем народы, которыми они управляют. Теперь, когда в постсоветских государствах начали свергать руководителей советской эпохи, у США и других западных стран осталось меньше возможностей влиять на ситуацию. Никто так настойчиво не утверждал, что население региона слишком неопытно, чтобы принять все трудности жизни в демократическом обществе, как президенты и другие высшие должностные лица Центральной Азии. Доколониальная история региона полна примеров, которые учат элиту, что властью делиться нельзя. На одном дыхании они говорят об уроках управления государством, преподанных такими властителями, как Тимур (Тамерлан), правивший из Самарканда (в котором несколько веков

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спустя родился Каримов), или Толе-Би — правитель XVIII столетия, родословная которого, как и родословная Назарбаева, берет начало в Большой Орде. В Киргизии тоже говорят об уроках государственности, 2200-летие которой отпраздновали в 2004 г. При этом они тут же добавляют, что их нации слишком молоды и в их современной истории демократические институты пока не играли никакой роли. Истории современной государственности в регионе действительно нет, однако нельзя утверждать, что предпосылки для развития демократических институтов там в корне отличались от аналогичных предпосылок в остальных странах бывшего Советского Союза. Много написано о распространенности клановой структуры в Центральной Азии. В каждой стране региона есть частично основанные на кровном родстве патронажные группы, однако такие группы имеются во всех постсоветских государствах (и даже в развитых демократиях). В Центральной Азии, как и в других странах, эти группы эволюционируют и изменяются в зависимости от складывающихся политических обстоятельств. Но до конца 1980-х годов у народов Центральной Азии не было возможности участвовать в политической жизни. В то время проводились хорошо организованные территориальные выборы, официальное финансирование которых продолжалось до начала или даже середины 1990-х годов. В конце 1980-х и начале 1990-х большой народной поддержкой пользовалась идея введения конкурентных парламентских и президентских выборов с участием независимых кандидатов, и можно было легко собрать подписи в их поддержку. В то время жители Центральной Азии, по-видимому, не считали конкурентные выборы несовместимыми с их глубоко укоренившейся традицией уважения к старшим и властям 47. Но когда выборы стали более контролируемыми и менее конкурентными, население большинства стран региона спокойно с этим согласилось. Это способствовало распространению коррупции, затруднившей организацию следующих демократических выборов, что, в свою очередь, породило социально-политическое давление, которое привело к революциям в Грузии, на Украине и в Киргизии. В демографическом отношении жители Центральной Азии не слишком отличаются от населения других частей Советского Со-

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юза (за исключением уровня образования, который в регионе немного ниже). Хотя большинство граждан Центральной Азии проживало в сельской местности, разрыв между сельской и городской жизнью легко преодолевался благодаря военной службе, доступу к высшему образованию (поступление в вуз зависело от качества подготовки абитуриента) или просто гостеприимству, которое оказывали селянам живущие в городе родственники. Хотя из-за сложившихся условий возможность проведения опросов общественного мнения в Центральной Азии сильно ограничена, имеющиеся данные свидетельствуют, что значительная часть населения Киргизии и Казахстана высказывается в пользу быстрого развития демократических институтов. Исследования, проведенные в 2002 г. Международным фондом по избирательным системам, показали, что бóльшая часть населения поддерживает прямые выборы всех членов законодательного органа (в Казахстане) и усиление власти парламента (в Киргизии) 48. Они также показали, что люди в обеих странах понимают необходимость формирования системы сдержек и противовесов, а также укрепления независимости судебной власти для борьбы с коррупцией 49. Демонстрации в марте 2005 г., которые закончились изгнанием Аскара Акаева, подтвердили правильность результатов этих исследований, во всяком случае, по Киргизии. Исследования по Таджикистану тоже свидетельствуют о поддержке народом дальнейшего развития демократических институтов, но сотрудники упомянутого фонда, которые проводили опросы, с сожалением отметили, что в отличие от Казахстана и Киргизии сельское население Таджикистана недостаточно хорошо понимает, для чего нужны эти органы. Такие же выводы, наверное, можно сделать и в отношении Узбекистана и Туркмении, в которых исследования не проводились. Высокий уровень образования и показатели распространения СМИ во всех пяти странах позволяют утверждать, что здесь существуют намного бóльшие возможности для работы с населением, чтобы убедить его в необходимости создания демократических институтов, нежели утверждают руководители этих стран. Центральноазиатские лидеры также заявляют, что политическая либерализация создает угрозу власти толпы, но и здесь они сочиняют выгодные для себя мифы. По сравнению с Кавказом, Молдавией и некоторыми регионами России насильствен-

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ных действий в Центральной Азии было очень мало. Межэтнические вооруженные столкновения небольших групп национальных меньшинств имели место в Фергане (Узбекистан) и в Новом Узене (Казахстан) в 1989 г., в Оше (Киргизия) в 1990 г. произошли более серьезные столкновения между узбеками и киргизами. Но в отличие от Кавказа, где местные конфликты переросли в региональные войны, после получения независимости в Фергане, Новом Узене и Оше страсти остыли. В таджикской гражданской войне в начале 1990-х годов пролилось много крови, но ее причины коренятся в борьбе за власть между конкурирующими региональными элитами, а не в неуправляемом демократическом движении 50. Даже в Узбекистане, где власть проявляет явные признаки готовности к столкновению, ни одна воинствующая исламская группировка не способна провести мобилизацию масс включая «Хизб ат-Тахрир», которая объявлена вне закона, но относительно которой существуют разногласия в оценках, и ИДУ, которое поддерживает идею достижения своих целей террористическими методами. В действительности формирование демократических институтов в Центральной Азии тормозит не население, а значительная часть правящей элиты. Президенты возражают против проведения реформ еще и потому, что самыми активными сторонниками реформ являются членами конкурирующей с ними элиты. Если учесть, какие огромные состояния сколотили за годы независимости правящие элиты во всех странах региона, нетрудно понять причины их сопротивления политическим реформам как на национальном, так и на местном уровнях. Упорство, с которым местные элиты участвуют в «погоне за рентой» (уменьшая тем самым доходы федеральных элит), отбивает у центральноазиатских правительств всякое желание проводить выборы местных руководителей. Однако в Киргизии и Казахстане начался медленный переход к выборам районных руководителей, за которым последует, как обещают, постепенное введение выборности губернаторов 51. Если сейчас провести в Центральной Азии свободные и честные выборы, то некоторые лидеры сохранили бы свои посты, но многие влиятельные должностные лица на национальном и региональном уровнях потерпели бы поражение. Ответственность пе-

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ред народом изменила бы характер власти на всех уровнях. Она нанесла бы удар по привилегиям властных структур, которые связаны с нынешней системой покровительства, и неизбежно изменила бы отношения между политикой и экономикой. Демократическая реформа принесет в политику бóльшую неопределенность и создаст систему, почти несовместимую со стилем принятия решения «сверху вниз», хорошо знакомым элите, формировавшейся еще в Советском Союзе. В наиболее развитых демократиях такая непредсказуемость смягчается тем, что элиты предлагают народу достаточно большой выбор, позволяющий решать, кому отдать власть — представителям правящих партий или «лояльной» оппозиции. В условиях политического брожения в последние годы правления Горбачева почти во всей Центральной Азии появились зачатки именно такой лояльной оппозиции, поскольку конкурирующие группы внутри правящей элиты в новой, более свободной обстановке имели возможность использовать в борьбе за власть общественное мнение и вступать в политические и экономические дебаты. И многие набирающие силу политики, обращаясь к народу, по крайней мере на словах выступали за создание демократических институтов. Многие из них вышли из советских художественных кругов, пользовались уважением в общенациональном масштабе, и все они стали организаторами или активными членами различных «продемократических» политических групп, о которых говорилось в главе 2 52. Но так или иначе известные самозваные продемократические реформаторы, бывшие частью правящей элиты, были вытеснены из политической системы. Вместо этого во всей Центральной Азии президенты и их приближенные стремились создать собственную централизованную партийную систему, чтобы не допустить развития оппозиционных партий, для создания которых предпринималось много усилий и до, и в особенности после обретения независимости 53. При этом на выборах объектом фальсификации могут стать даже те партии, которые пользуются официальной поддержкой, если они выигрывают у провластных групп, находящихся в еще большем фаворе. Фактически действия лидеров Центральной Азии привели к тому, что у населения меньше возможностей отстаивать свои ин-

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тересы демократическими методами, чем десять лет назад. Ослабление светской оппозиции практически во всем регионе усугубляет опасность, связанную даже с небольшим снижением уровня обязательств Запада, потому что ситуация в большинстве стран Центральной Азии меняется очень быстро, и в тех странах, где прозападные светские группировки сейчас почти вытеснены из политической жизни, им будет очень трудно добиться решающего политического преимущества. Однако было бы несправедливо мазать всех центральноазиатских лидеров одной краской. Да, права человека нарушаются во всех пяти странах, но в совершенно разной степени, и в одних странах граждане пользуются намного большей политической свободой, чем в других. Во всех этих государствах у членов политической оппозиции не очень много возможностей достичь политической зрелости, потому что их почти всегда отстраняют от серьезного участия в принятии решений. В такой ситуации лидеры региона чувствуют себя в большей безопасности, однако в долгосрочном плане нежелание элит проводить политические реформы может оказаться более дестабилизирующим фактором, чем воображаемая «незрелость народа».

Исходные предположения доноров Развитие демократических институтов в Центральной Азии не входило в число приоритетов международного сообщества ни в период обретения ими независимости, ни позже, после начала войны США с террором. На всем постсоветском пространстве применялась одна и та же модель строительства демократических институтов, которую Томас Карузерс назвал «демократическим шаблоном»54. Американская помощь направлялась в основном на проведение честных выборов, создание политических партий, разработку конституций, развитие местного самоуправления и регулирование взаимоотношений между гражданским и военным секторами общества. Подобный подход используется и при реализации европейских программ помощи, например, осуществляемых немецкими политическими партиями, представленными в Европейском парламенте. Но западные строители демократии с само-

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го начала демонстрировали явный пессимизм в отношении применимости этой модели к Центральной Азии. Многие западные обозреватели, наблюдая нынешнюю ситуацию в Центральной Азии, согласились с пессимистическими оценками лидеров этих стран, суть которых сводится к тому, что их население пока не готово к демократии, и поэтому было решено основное внимание уделить не краткосрочным, а долгосрочным проектам, ориентированным на формирование нужной политической среды. К середине 1990-х годов большинство ученых и активистов, занимавшихся политическим развитием Центральной Азии, пришло к выводу, что без изменения правящего режима ни одно из этих государств не сможет развиться в полноценную плюралистическую демократию. Они надеялись, что руководителей Киргизии и Казахстана удастся убедить в необходимости расширить участие народа в политике, и многим эта надежда помогла продолжить активную работу. Свидетельством успеха такого долгосрочного формирования политической среды служит тот факт, что киргизы сумели организовать всенародный протест, который привел к практически мирной отставке президента. Сектор неправительственных организаций в Киргизии организован лучше, чем в других странах региона, и эти организации сыграли важную роль в повышении общественных ожиданий в плане ответственности правительства и во время выборов, и в более широком контексте. Вместо того чтобы просто дестабилизировать правительство, эти организации помогли направить общественное недовольство в мирное русло, а должный уровень информированности общества, повышению которого они содействовали в течение долгого времени, в итоге способствовал быстрому восстановлению порядка в Оше и Бишкеке после штурма демонстрантами правительственных зданий. Перед американскими политиками стоит вопрос, как относиться к правительствам, которые проявляют враждебность к независимым неправительственным организациям. Для тех, кто отслеживает действия этих правительств по развитию демократии, руководители этих стран фактически стали врагами, и с их точки зрения уход этих руководителей из политической жизни был бы благом для населения. В то же время другие члены правительства США

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пытаются добиться согласия этих лидеров на размещение американских войск, на выделение ресурсов и предоставление живой силы, которая совместно с американскими соединениями будет участвовать в войне с террором. Американская стратегия иностранной помощи привела к нарастанию враждебности со всех сторон, но при этом не оказала существенного воздействия на способность (правительства или оппозиции) управлять демократическими методами. Это было очевидно еще до отставки Эдуарда Шеварднадзе в Грузии и с тех пор вызывает еще бóльшую напряженность. Со времени начала войны с террором американские неправительственные организации и их местные отделения, работающие в Центральной Азии, испытывают все большее разочарование. Они хотели бы по-прежнему получать финансирование от США, но при этом выражают недовольство в связи с тем, что в ближайшее время они не получат достаточных средств, чтобы изменить равновесие сил на местном уровне в свою пользу. Кроме того, они недовольны тем, что Соединенные Штаты встали на сторону тирана в Узбекистане, по их мнению, лицемерно объясняя это необходимостью сместить тирана в Ираке. Со своей стороны, партнеры США по войне с террором в Центральной Азии сильно возмущаются тем, что их вносят в список самых репрессивных режимов в мире. По их мнению, их поддержка Соединенных Штатов в первые дни войны с террором и в последующий период должна была обеспечить им большее уважение и материальную выгоду. В начале войны с террором, когда они надеялись на большую иностранную помощь (а она, как выяснилось позже, оказалось намного скромнее, чем ожидалось), руководители этих стран были готовы поддержать постепенные политические изменения. Но когда они увидели, что сравнительно большие деньги в рамках иностранной помощи, предназначенной для формирования политических институтов, передаются тем людям, которых они считали своими врагами, сама идея поэтапного перехода к демократии стала выводить их из себя. Центральноазиатским лидерам трудно взять на себя обязательства проводить непрерывную ротацию элиты, которая является основной ценностью демократии западного типа. Они обретали политическую зрелость в рамках советской системы, в ко-

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торой победитель получал все, и после получения независимости большинство руководителей Центральной Азии продвинули свои политические системы еще дальше в этом направлении. Они боятся, что, потеряв власть, они потеряют не только привилегии, но и накопленные богатства. Они не ожидают большого уважения или понимания со стороны оппозиции. И им трудно понять, почему Запад отдает предпочтение оппозиции, а не нынешним режимам. Если принять во внимание методы, которые используют оппозиционные политические партии, их действия после прихода к власти вряд ли будут сильно отличаться от действий нынешней правящей элиты. Оппозиция в странах Центральной Азии далеко не всегда ведет себя безупречно. Получатели западной политической помощи иногда сами вымогают взятки точно так же, как руководители, которых они хотят заменить. Некоторые из них принимают деньги от бизнесменов с сомнительными доходами, другие практикуют непотизм. Более серьезная проблема состоит в том, что нередко эти группы малочисленны, а иногда вся такая группа состоит из одного человека. Большинство из них не сможет самостоятельно продолжать работу, если перестанут поступать деньги с Запада 55. Кроме того, лидеры оппозиции часто используют такой же авторитарный стиль руководства, как и нынешние должностные лица, и им трудно найти общую почву для переговоров с другими критиками режима. Поэтому сейчас все внимательно наблюдают за Киргизией, где к власти приходит новая элита. Конечно, это не означает, что помощь, направлявшаяся на развитие демократии, была напрасной. Многие проекты перешли в режим саморазвития, иностранную помощь получили многие люди, занимающие нейтральную позицию, множество местных инициатив невозможно было бы реализовать без иностранной поддержки. Однако помощь демократии предполагает молчаливое одобрение существующих режимов — или в силу специфики распределения иностранной помощи для финансирования этих инициатив, или из-за правил, установленных правительствами центральноазиатских стран в отношении проведения выборов, функционирования СМИ, организации политических партий, неправительственных организаций и т. п. Это побуждает центральноазиатские режимы создавать собственные неофициальные неправительственные ор-

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ганизации и партии, во-первых, чтобы эти лояльные группировки тоже могли получать иностранную помощь, а во-вторых, чтобы имитировать демократические формы правления (вместо их реального внедрения). В принципе, все центральноазиатские страны обязаны придерживаться демократических норм, так как они являются членами ОБСЕ. Эта организация внимательно следит за проведением выборов, строго критикует за нарушения гражданских прав и прав человека в регионе, однако обращает мало внимания на несоблюдение демократических норм. Более того, в ОБСЕ происходят дебаты о том, не следует ли вообще отказаться от стратегии создания политических институтов в Центральной Азии, которая, по мнению некоторых членов организации, обречена на провал, и перейти к стратегии, ориентированной на усиление возможностей этих государств противостоять угрозам безопасности. Легко критиковать ОБСЕ за отказ от решения задачи создания политических институтов в Центральной Азии, но в реальности ОБСЕ мало что может сделать. Только около 6% ее финансирования направляется на реализацию проектов в регионе, причем ее национальным миссиям предоставлены лишь ограниченные неофициальные полномочия на проведение политики убеждения, а устав ОБСЕ не предусматривает официальных штрафных санкций 56. Многие из этих претензий можно предъявить и Соединенным Штатам и их стратегии помощи в области создания политических институтов. Выделяемые деньги в основном тратятся на формирование имиджа, а нежелание правящих элит Центральной Азии создавать политические институты, как правило, не вызывает серьезных негативных последствий за исключением того, что выделение денег может быть приостановлено. Сохраняется также большая неопределенность относительно того, каким образом следует вводить демократию в постсоветских государствах. Каждая победа, подобная тем, которые имели место в Грузии, на Украине и, возможно, в Киргизии, подтверждает правильность модели использования параллельного подсчета голосов для мобилизации населения против нарушений в ходе выборов. В то же время каждая неудача в области демократического строительства, например, передача власти от отца сыну, как это

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произошло в Азербайджане, или введенные Путиным ограничения деятельности независимых СМИ и усиление централизации государственной власти, подтверждает мнение многих западных стратегов о невозможности установления демократии в странах Центральной Азии. В заключение отметим, что ни отрицательные, ни положительные результаты не привели к принципиальному переосмыслению стратегии влияния с целью создания политических институтов в регионе. В течение следующих нескольких лет в Киргизии и Казахстане более свободные и справедливые выборы могут стать обычным делом, но похоже, что в обеих странах параметры допустимых политических изменений будет определять сравнительно малочисленная правящая элита. Стремление к усилению роли электората в этих странах питается местными инициативами (а не давлением Запада). Развитие этого движения в равной степени зависит как от поддержки проправительственных реформаторов (среди них много политиков младшего поколения), так и от давления активистов из неправительственных групп, выступающих против правящих режимов. Такие группы получают больше помощи от США и европейских стран, чем проправительственные реформаторы. Аналогичным образом, если в ближайшие десять лет в Узбекистане начнется движение к открытой политической системе (вероятность которого не столь очевидна), оно будет результатом действий проправительственных реформаторов, которым сейчас от 15 до 45 лет, а не давления групп, зависящих от американской помощи. Это не означает, что роль Соединенных Штатов в регионе незначительна. И провластные, и прореформаторские элиты в этих трех государствах стремятся, чтобы их страны пользовались доверием Соединенных Штатов и Западной Европы. Они отдают себе отчет в том, что для этого требуется, как минимум, более целенаправленное продвижение в направлении западноевропейских политических стандартов. Мало кто из них надеется увидеть такой переход завершенным. Но многие люди во всей Центральной Азии, в том числе и талантливые политики в правящих элитах Казахстана, Киргизии и Узбекистана, убеждены в необходимости создания открытых политических систем. В Казахстане и Киргизии эти люди настаивают на усилении ответственности парламента

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перед народом и поддерживают идею выборности местных органов власти, а также свободу прессы, собраний и создания организаций. В Узбекистане и Таджикистане их цели скромнее, и для их достижения потребуется больше времени. Нельзя сказать, что американская помощь в том виде, в каком она осуществляется сейчас, в достаточной степени доходит до сторонников реформ, которые занимают высокие посты и, таким образом, являются членами правящей элиты. Частично это объясняется особенностями распределения помощи и ее сравнительно малыми размерами, но дело заключается также и в том, что американские поборники помощи демократии считают ниже своего достоинства работать с реформаторскими прослойками правящего режима. Если Соединенные Штаты желают содействовать развитию демократических институтов в Центральной Азии в долгосрочной перспективе, они должны научиться эффективно работать и с провластными группами, и с оппозицией, а также с неприсоединившимися политическими группами. Причина нынешних неудач США кроется в том, что на деятельность, связанную с построением демократии в регионе, выделяется слишком мало средств. При этом основная их часть (а всего в расчете на одного жителя Центральной Азии выделяется менее 1 доллара в год) фактически тратится на зарплату и другие административные расходы в американских организациях, работающих в сфере демократического строительства. В абсолютных цифрах бóльшая часть этих денег расходуется на зарплату подданным США и других западных стран, хотя число местных жителей, нанятых партнерскими неправительственными организациями, может намного превышать число служащих-иностранцев. Подобный уклон наблюдается и в расходах на общественную дипломатию: основное внимание при этом уделяется направлению в США большого числа людей на короткое время (вместо того, чтобы направлять сюда небольшое число людей с целью длительного обучения или проживания), что приносит явную выгоду принимающим организациям США (в том числе таким, как мотели и супермаркеты «Wal-Mart» в столицах отдаленных штатов и студенческих городках). Структура долгосрочных расходов тоже такова, что бóльшая часть средств идет не на проведение образовательных

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реформ в странах Центральной Азии, а поступает в высшие учебные заведения США, которые получают от этих программ гораздо больше денег, чем просто за обучение приглашенных студентов, так что именно эти деньги зачастую обеспечивают прибыльность некоторых отделений университетов. Возможно, все эти способы распределения американской помощи следует считать удовлетворительными (и они, несомненно, обеспечат большую популярность тем конгрессменам, избирательные участки которых получат от этого прямую выгоду). Однако вряд ли они значительно повысят вероятность того, что деньги американских налогоплательщиков в ближайшее время смогут существенно активизировать процесс создания демократических институтов в Центральной Азии. В области образовательной реформы Соединенные Штаты с теми же деньгами могли бы добиться намного большего, если бы выделенные средства в основном расходовались внутри соответствующей страны и тратились на зарплату местным преподавателям и на покрытие других сопутствующих расходов. Хотя в каждой стране региона имеются определенные ограничения в отношении проектов, финансирование которых происходит за счет иностранной помощи, тем не менее там (за исключением Туркмении) существует широкий выбор разрешенных видов деятельности. Также все государства региона смогли бы освоить намного бóльшие объемы иностранной помощи при реализации проектов совершенствования судебной системы и системы уголовного судопроизводства. Для полной перестройки правовой системы, унаследованной от советской эпохи, потребуются десятилетия, однако более высокий уровень сотрудничества между официальными лицами из стран Центральной Азии и чиновниками из других, более прогрессивных постсоветских государств может ускорить этот процесс. При этом не обязательно, чтобы советники приезжали из таких стран, как Грузия, Сербия или Украина, они могут приехать из любой страны, чтобы их не подозревали в вынашивании каких-то тайных планов. Кроме того, можно расширять экспериментальные программы по работе с провинциальными органами власти. В отличие от большей части стран третьего мира местные органы власти в Центральной Азии в основном укомплектованы опытными професси-

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оналами, но этим людям крайне необходимо переобучение, и если у правительств-реципиентов нет на это средств, такое переобучение можно было бы осуществлять в рамках экспериментальных проектов. Простое продолжение прежней стратегии планирования и предоставления помощи с целью построения демократии вряд ли принесет значительные результаты. В настоящее время лидеры стран Центральной Азии относятся к мотивам США с бóльшим подозрением, чем в недавнем прошлом. Все они понимают, что сыграли свою роль в войне с террором, но в итоге сами оказались под угрозой лишения своих полномочий. Американские политики тоже испытывают разочарование, ибо сознают, что руководители этих стран стали для них неудобными союзниками, и отказываются упорствовать в безнадежном деле, проявляя лишь готовность содействовать медленным поэтапным изменениям. Со своей стороны, центральноазиатские лидеры уверены в собственной способности противостоять иностранному давлению, направленному на изменение их внутренней политики, откуда бы оно ни исходило — из Пекина, Москвы или Вашингтона. Возможно, они правы, потому что приоритеты внешней политики России, Китая и Соединенных Штатов в Центральной Азии относятся к другим сферам. Однако международная индифферентность не подразумевает безграничного молчаливого одобрения того, что происходит в Центральной Азии. С американской точки зрения приоритетной задачей по-прежнему остается максимизация возможного участия каждого из этих государств в войне с террором. Все прочие цели Соединенные Штаты отставляют на второй план. США остаются верны своим обязательствам содействовать экономическим и политическим реформам. Американские политики уверены, что в случае ухода США из этого региона долгосрочная стабильность там будет подорвана. Однако их нежелание по-новому подойти к решению проблем Центральной Азии или хотя бы сделать их приоритетными в рамках существующих экономических и политических парадигм может привести к тому, что в итоге им придется вести войну с террором и в этих странах.

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Приложение 1. Основные сведения о странах Центральной Азии Таблица 1. Казахстан Официальное название

Республика Казахстан (Казахстан Республикасы)

Происхождение

Тюркское слово «казах» означает «свободный и независимый»; по-видимому, от него же происходит русское слово «казак»

Столица

Астана (население — 288 тыс. человек)

Площадь

2 717 300 кв. км (т. е. примерно вчетверо больше площади штата Техас), что делает Казахстан 9-й страной в мире по площади территории

Границы

С Россией (6846 км), Узбекистаном (2203 км), Китаем (1533 км), Киргизией (1051 км), Туркменией (379 км)

Природные ресурсы

Нефть, природный газ, уголь, железная руда

Население

15,2 млн человек (оценка 2005 г.)

Темпы роста населения

0,26%

Этнические группы

Казахи — 53%, русские — 30%, украинцы — 4%, узбеки — 3%, немцы — 2,4%, уйгуры — 1,4 %, прочие — 6,2%

Религиозный состав

Мусульмане — 47%, православные — 44%, протестанты — 2%, прочие — 7%

Исполнительная власть

Глава государства — президент Нурсултан Назарбаев, срок пребывания в должности — 7 лет, следующие выборы — в 2006 г.

Законодательная власть

Двухпалатный парламент, состоящий из Сената (39 членов, срок — 5 лет) и Мажилиса (77 членов)

Судебная власть

Верховный суд (44 члена), Конституционный совет (7 членов)

Национальная валюта

Тенге

ВВП *

118,4 млрд долл.

ВВП на душу населения *

7800 долл.

Структура ВВП по секторам

Сельское хозяйство — 7,4%, промышленность — 37,8%, услуги — 54,8%

Экспорт

Общий объем экспорта в 2003 г. составил 13,2 млрд долл. Основные статьи — нефть, природный газ, уголь, продукты обработки древесины, металлы, химические продукты, зерно, шерсть и мясо. Основные партнеры — Россия, Украина, Узбекистан, Нидерланды и Китай

Импорт

Общий объем импорта в 2001 г. составил 9,1 млрд долл. Основные статьи — уголь и электроэнергия. Основные партнеры — Россия, Германия и Китай

Прочие сведения

По имеющимся оценкам, в Казахстане сосредоточено около 1% мировых запасов природного газа и нефти. В постсоветское время Казахстан получил около 80% иностранных инвестиций в Центральную Азию

* Оценки 2004 г., паритет покупательной способности. Источники: CIA World Factbook, Library of Congress Country Profiles.

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Таблица 2. Киргизия Официальное название

Киргизская Республика (Кыргыз Республикасы)

Происхождение

В древнетюркском языке «кырг» означает «40», а «ыз» означает «племя», так что вместе эти слова означают «40 племен». Киргизы происходят из Монголии

Столица

Бишкек (население — 824 тыс. человек)

Площадь

191 300 кв. км (чуть меньше площади штата Южная Дакота)

Границы

С Узбекистаном (1089 км), Казахстаном (1051 км), Таджикистаном (870 км), Китаем (858 км)

Природные ресурсы

Изобилие гидроэлектроэнергии, значительные месторождения золота и редкоземельных металлов, локально эксплуатируемые ресурсы угля, нефти и природного газа

Население

5,2 млн человек (оценка 2005 г.)

Темпы роста населения

1,25%

Этнические группы

Киргизы — 67%, узбеки — 14%, русские — 11%, дунгане (этнические китайцымусульмане) — 1%, татары — 1%, уйгуры — 1%, прочие — 5% (оценка Госдепартамента США 2003 г.) Мусульмане-сунниты — 75%, православные — 20%, прочие — 5%

Религиозный состав Исполнительная власть

Глава государства — Курманбек Бакиев (исполняет обязанности президента), срок пребывания в должности — 5 лет, следующие выборы — в июле 2005 г.

Законодательная власть

Двухпалатный Верховный совет (Жогорку Кенеш), Ассамблея народных представителей (70 членов, срок — 5 лет), Законодательная ассамблея (35 членов, срок — 5 лет). Примечание: по результатам референдума 2003 г. после выборов 2005 г. парламент должен стать однопалатным с 75 депутатами

Судебная власть

Верховный суд (судьи назначаются на срок 10 лет); Конституционный суд, Высший арбитражный суд

Национальная валюта

Сом

ВВП *

8,495 млрд долл.

ВВП на душу населения *

1700 долл.

Структура ВВП по секторам

Сельское хозяйство — 28,5%, промышленность — 22,8%, услуги — 48,7%

Экспорт

По имеющимся оценкам, общий объем экспорта в 2003 г. составил 581 млн долл. Основные статьи — хлопок, древесина, мясо и электроэнергия. Основные партнеры — Казахстан, Россия, Китай, США, Узбекистан и Германия

Импорт

По имеющимся оценкам общий объем киргизского импорта в 2003 г. составил 717 млн долл. Основные статьи — ископаемое топливо, машины и оборудование, химические продукты, текстиль и пищевые продукты. Основные партнеры — Россия, Узбекистан, Казахстан, Германия и Китай В Киргизии самые большие в мире дикорастущие леса грецкого ореха

Прочие сведения

* Оценки 2004 г., паритет покупательной способности. Источники: CIA World Factbook, Library of Congress Country Profiles.

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Таблица 3. Таджикистан Официальное название

Республика Таджикистан (Джумхури Тоджикистон)

Происхождение

По-персидски «тадж» означает «корона», «ик» — «голова», так что таджик — это «тот, кто носит на голове корону». Свое происхождение таджики ведут от персов

Столица

Душанбе (население — 590 тыс. человек)

Площадь

143 100 кв. км (чуть меньше площади штата Висконсин)

Границы

С Афганистаном (1206 км), Узбекистаном (1161 км), Киргизией (870 км), Китаем (414 км)

Природные ресурсы

Гидроэнергия, некоторое количество нефти, урана, ртути, бурого угля, свинца, цинка, сурьмы, вольфрама, серебра, золота

Население

7,2 млн человек (оценка 2005 г.)

Темпы роста населения

2%

Этнические группы

Таджики — 65%, узбеки — 25%, русские — 4%, прочие — 6%

Религиозный состав

Мусульмане-сунниты — 85%, мусульмане-шииты — 5%, прочие — 10%

Исполнительная власть

Глава государства — президент Эмомали Рахмонов, срок пребывания в должности — 7 лет, следующие выборы — в 2006 г.

Законодательная власть

Двухпалатная Верховная ассамблея (Маджлиси Оли), состоящая из палаты Маджлиси Намояндагон (63 члена, срок — 5 лет) и Маджлиси Миллий (33 члена, косвенные выборы, срок — 5 лет)

Судебная власть

Верховный суд (судьи назначаются президентом)

Национальная валюта

Сомони

ВВП *

7,95 млрд долл.

ВВП на душу населения *

1100 долл.

Структура ВВП по секторам

Сельское хозяйство — 23,7%, промышленность — 24,3%, услуги — 52%

Экспорт

Объем экспорта в 2003 г. составил 750 млн долл. Основные статьи — алюминий (более половины стоимости экспорта), электроэнергия, хлопок, фрукты, растительное масло, текстиль. Основные партнеры — Нидерланды, Турция, Латвия, Швейцария, Узбекистан, Россия и Иран

Импорт

Объем импорта в 2003 г. составил 890 млн долл. Основные статьи — электроэнергия, ископаемое топливо, алюминий (для переработки), зерно и пшеничная мука. Основные партнеры — Россия, Узбекистан, Казахстан, Азербайджан, Украина и Румыния

Прочие сведения

По имеющимся оценкам, 15—20% трудоспособного населения находится в России. В 2003 г. средняя заработная плата в общественном секторе составляла 10 долл. в месяц, что значительно меньше прожиточного минимума

* Оценки 2004 г., паритет покупательной способности. Источники: CIA World Factbook, Library of Congress Country Profiles.

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Таблица 4. Туркмения Официальное название

Республика Туркменистан (Туркмения)

Происхождение

В тюркских языках «тюрк» означает древних тюрков Азии. Слово «мен» означает «я» или «мы», т. е. «туркмен» означает «я тюрк». Туркмены, первоначально называвшиеся огузами, пришли с территории нынешней Монголии

Столица

Ашхабад (население — 727 тыс. человек)

Площадь

488 100 кв. км (чуть больше площади штата Калифорния)

Границы

С Узбекистаном (1621 км), Ираном (982 км), Афганистаном (744 км), Казахстаном (379 км)

Природные ресурсы

Нефть, природный газ, уголь, сера, соль

Население

4,95 млн (оценка 2005 г.)

Темпы роста населения

1,81%

Этнические группы

Туркмены — 85%, узбеки — 5%, русские — 4%, прочие — 6%

Религиозный состав

Мусульмане-сунниты — 89%, православные — 9%, неизвестно — 2%

Исполнительная власть

Глава государства — президент Сапармурат Ниязов, пребывание у власти пожизненное (решение принято в 1999 г.)

Законодательная власть

В стране два отдельных парламентарных органа: Народный совет (Халк Маслахаты), насчитывающий до 2500 делегатов, и Мажилис (50 членов, срок — 5 лет)

Судебная власть

Верховный суд (судьи назначаются президентом)

Национальная валюта

Манат

ВВП *

27,6 млрд долл.

ВВП на душу населения *

5700 долл.

Структура ВВП по секторам

Сельское хозяйство — 28,5%, промышленность — 42,7%, услуги — 28,8%

Экспорт

Общий объем экспорта в 2003 г. составил 3,5 млрд долл. Основные статьи — природный газ, сырая нефть, продукты нефтехимии, хлопковое волокно, текстиль. Основные партнеры — Украина, Италия, Иран, Азербайджан, Турция

Импорт

По имеющимся оценкам, объем импорта в 2003 г. составил 2,5 млрд долл. Основные статьи — машиностроительное и транспортное оборудование, химические продукты, пищевые продукты. Основные партнеры — Германия, Украина, Объединенные Арабские Эмираты, Россия и Турция

Прочие сведения

80% территории страны занимает пустыня Каракумы. В сфере строительства активно действуют иностранные фирмы; так, компании из Франции, Турции и Украины помогают строить административные здания и участвуют в инфраструктурных проектах. Французские и немецкие компании участвуют в обновлении государственной телекоммуникационной системы

* Оценки 2004 г., паритет покупательной способности. Источники: CIA World Factbook, Library of Congress Country Profiles.

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Таблица 5. Узбекистан Официальное название

Республика Узбекистан (Узбекистон Республикаси)

Происхождение

Считается, что слово «узбек» происходит от двух тюркских слов: «уз», что означает «истинный», и «бек», что означает «настоящий человек». Узбеки — это смесь кочевых тюркских племен и древнего иранского населения

Столица

Ташкент (население — 2,15 млн человек)

Площадь

447 400 кв. км (немного больше площади штата Калифорния)

Границы

С Казахстаном (2203 км), Туркменией (1621 км), Таджикистаном (1161 км), Киргизией (1099 км), Афганистаном (137 км)

Природные ресурсы

Природный газ, нефть, уголь, золото, уран, серебро, медь, свинец и цинк, вольфрам, молибден

Население

26,9 млн человек (оценка 2005 г.)

Темпы роста населения

1,67%

Этнические группы

Узбеки — 80%, русские — 5,5%, таджики — 5%, казахи — 3%, каракалпаки — 2,5%, татары — 1,5%, прочие — 2,5% (оценка 1996 г.)

Религиозный состав

Мусульмане — 88% (в основном сунниты), православные — 9%, прочие — 3%

Исполнительная власть

Глава государства — президент Ислам Каримов, срок пребывания в должности — 7 лет, следующие выборы — в декабре 2007 г.

Законодательная власть

Однопалатная Верховная ассамблея — Олий Мажилис (250 членов, избирается всенародным голосованием на 5 лет)

Судебная власть

Верховный суд

Национальная валюта

Сом

ВВП *

47,59 млрд долл.

ВВП на душу населения *

1800 долл.

Структура ВВП по секторам

Сельское хозяйство — 28%, промышленность — 26,3%, услуги — 35,7%

Экспорт

Общий объем экспорта в 2003 г. составил 2,8 млрд долл. Основные статьи — хлопок, золото, природный газ и удобрения. Основные партнеры — Россия, Украина, Италия, Южная Корея и Таджикистан

Импорт

Общий объем импорта в 2003 г. составил 2,3 млрд долл. Основные статьи — машины и оборудование, химические продукты и пластики, пищевые продукты и металлы. Основные партнеры — Россия, Южная Корея, Германия, США, Турция и Казахстан

Прочие сведения

Наряду с Лихтенштейном это одна из двух стран в мире, вообще не имеющих выхода ни к каким морям и со всех сторон окруженных странами, тоже не имеющими выхода к морям. Минимальная заработная плата — 6,4 долл. в месяц

* Оценки 2004 г., паритет покупательной способности. Источники: CIA World Factbook, Library of Congress Country Profiles.

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Приложение 2. Основные экономические показатели Таблица 6 Показатель

Казахстан

Киргизия

Таджикистан

Туркмения

Узбекистан

ВВП, млрд долл.

118,4

8,495

ВВП на душу населения, долл.

7800

1700

7,95

27,6

47,59

1100

5700

1800

Реальные темпы роста ВВП (оценки 2004 г.), %

9,1

6,0

10,5

7,5 *

4,4

Доля частного сектора в ВВП, %

60

60

Доля городского населения, %

56

34

45

25

45

25

45

37

Доля населения, живущего менее чем на 2 долл. в день (на основании данных о расходах), %

8,5

27,2

50,8

44,0

77,5

Доля обрабатываемых земель, %

8,0

7,3

6,6

3,7

10,8

Постоянные пахотные угодья, %

0,1

0,3

0,9

0,1

0,8

Орошаемые земли (1999—2001 гг.), % площади пахотных угодий

10,8

74,2

68,3

100,1

88,6

Индекс производства продуктов (2000—2002 гг.), % (1989—1991 гг. = 100%) Трудовые ресурсы, млн человек

73,5

132,5

60,5

131,6

122,3

7,95

2,70

3,19

2,32

14,64

Индекс Джини (чем выше значение, тем больше неравенство), %

31,5

29,0

34,7

40,8

44,7

Уровень безработицы (2004 г.), %

8

18

40

60

20 **

Золотовалютные резервы (2004 г.), млрд долл.

14,35

498,70

145,30

3,034.

1,60

Внешний долг (2004 г.), млрд долл.

26,03

1,97

888,00

2,40—5,00

1,35

*

Оценка МВФ. Согласно официальной статистике рост составляет 21,4%, но это нереальное значение (оценка 2004 г.). ** Включая неполную занятость. Согласно официальным данным уровень безработицы в Узбекистане 0,6%. Источники: Transition Report 2004 / European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; International Financial Statistics 2004 / Intern. Monetary Fund; World Development Indicators, 2004 / World Bank; CIA World Factbook / Central Intelligence Agency, updated April 2005.

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Приложение 3. Основные социальные показатели Таблица 7 Показатель Население, млн человек Плотность населения на 1 кв. км

Казахстан

Киргизия

Таджикистан

Туркмения

Узбекистан

15,1

5,0

6,3

4,8

25,3

6

26

45

10

62

Средний годовой прирост населения с 1980 г.

0,0

1,5

2,1

2,3

2,1

Чистая миграция на 1000 человек

3,4

2,5

2,9

0,9

1,7

Общий коэффициент рождаемости на 1000 человек

15

20

23

22

20

Общий коэффициент смертности на 1000 человек

12

7

7

8

6

Коэффициент фертильности (число рождений на одну женщину)

1,8

2,4

2,9

2,7

2,3

Коэффициент детской смертности

7,6

5,2

9,0

7,0

5,5

Доля мужчин, доживающих до 65 лет, %

47

56

62

57

63

Доля женщин, доживающих до 65 лет, %

71

75

75

72

77

Возрастная структура, %: 0—14 лет

24

32

39

36

34

15—64 лет

68

62

56

60

61

старше 64 лет Средний возраст, лет

8 28

6 23

5 20

4 21

5 22

Ожидаемая продолжительность жизни мужчин, лет

60,7

64,2

61,7

58,0

60,8

Ожидаемая продолжительность жизни женщин, лет

71,7

72,4

67,6

65,0

67,7

Грамотность, % Число инфицированных ВИЧ/СПИДом (2003 г.)

98,4

97,0

99,4

98,0

99,3

16 500

3900

Менее 200

Менее 200

11 000

Примечание. Б'ольшая часть данных относится к 2002 г. Источники: World Development Indicators 2004 / World Bank, CIA World Factbook, updated April 2005.

ó

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Приложение 4. Многосторонняя помощь Таблица 8. Общий объем помощи в 1994—2004 гг., млн долл. Страна

Всемирный банк

МВФ

АБР

АМР США 448,3

Казахстан

1248,8

0,4

822,0

Киргизия

443,6

206,7

168,0

318,1

Таджикистан

193,3

134,1

272,9

226,3

Туркмения

32,1

—

—

65,7

Узбекистан

301,8

165,2

971,6

310,0

Источники: сайт Всемирного банка http://www.worldbank.org; сайт ВМФ http://www.imf.org; сайт АБР http://www.adb.org, сайт АМР США http://www.usaid.gov.

Таблица 9. Средний размер многосторонней помощи на душу населения, 1994—2004 гг., долл. Страна

Всемирный банк

МВФ

АБР

АМР США

Казахстан

86,72

0,03

57,08

31,13

Киргизия

92,42

43,06

35,00

66,27

Таджикистан

29,74

20,63

41,98

34,82

Туркмения

5,35

—

—

10,95

Узбекистан

11,61

6,35

37,37

11,92

Источник: Transition Report 2004 / European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. — London, Nov. 2004, оценки численности населения основаны на данных 2004 г.

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4,0

4,0

22,7

9,2

5,4

11,8

Киргизия

Таджикистан

Туркмения

Узбекистан

Источник: Congressional Research Service.

19,0

19,0

33,0

47,2

Казахстан

1996

1995

Страна

21,6

5,0

5,0

20,8

35,4

1997

20,5

5,3

12,0

24,3

40,3

1998

27,3

11,3

13,1

32,0

50,5

1999

20,0

6,2

9,9

30,1

44,8

2000

55,9

12,2

56,4

40,6

71,5

2001

Таблица 10. Распределение помощи правительства США в 1995—2005 финансовых годах, млн долл.

Приложение 5. Помощь правительства США до и после 11 сентября 2001 г.

161,8

16,4

85,3

49,0

81,6

2002

83,5

11,0

49,4

54,7

100,4

2003 (бюджет)

48,4

8,6

32,5

43,2

41,6

2004 (оценка)

53,2

9,3

36,4

39,5

40,2

2005 (запрос)

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Рисунок 1. Средние объемы помощи правительства США до и после 11 сентября, млн долл. 100 90 В среднем до 11 сентября

В среднем после 11 сентября

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Киргизия

Казахстан

Таджикистан

Туркмения

Узбекистан

Примечание. Данные «в среднем до 11 сентября» относятся к 1995—2001 финансовым годам; данные «в среднем после 11 сентября» — к 2002—2005 финансовым годам. Источник: Congressional Research Service.

Таблица 11. Помощь АМР США в 1992—2005 финансовых годах, млн долл. Страна

1992—2000

2001

2002

Казахстан

273,0

48,8

Киргизия

141,5

32,6

Таджикистан

47,2

Туркмения

33,9

Узбекистан

83,9

2005 (запрос)

2003

2004

49,7

43,4

33,3

28,0

71,2

36,9

35,9

33,0

29,4

82,2

35,9

31,7

35,0

6,1

12,1

7,8

5,8

6,0

26,0

124,9

39,4

35,7

36,0

Примечание. Более высокие значения за 2002 г. включают в себя разовые дополнительные выплаты для каждой страны на основании Закона о защите свободы. Источник: Eurasia Program Summary, доступно на сайте http://www.usaid.gov.

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Рисунок 2. Средние объемы помощи АМР США до и после 11 сентября, млн долл. 180 160

В среднем до 11 сентября

В среднем после 11 сентября

140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Казахстан

Киргизия

Таджикистан

Туркмения

Узбекистан

Примечание. Данные «в среднем до 11 сентября» относятся к 1992—2001 финансовым годам; данные «в среднем после 11 сентября» относятся к 2002—2005 финансовым годам. Источник: Eurasia Program Summary, публикация на сайте http://www.usaid.gov.

Таблица 12. Структура помощи США Центральной Азии в 2003 финансовом году, млн долл. Характеристика

Казахстан

Киргизия Таджикистан Туркмения Узбекистан

Демократические реформы

15,3

14,3

7,6

5,2

16,0

Экономические и социальные реформы

27,8

19,9

14,3

2,5

18,5

Безопасность и соблюдение законов

54,4

11,4

1,6

1,2

32,2

1,0

5,3

21,4

0,5

13,1

Гуманитарная помощь Программы, охватывающие разные сектора Всего

CentralAsia-2005.indd 331

4,7

3,9

4,5

2,2

4,4

103,2

54,8

49,4

11,5

84,2

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Приложения

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Таблица 13. Структура недавней помощи США Центральной Азии в 2004 финансовом году, млн долл. Характеристика

Казахстан Киргизия Таджикистан Туркмения Узбекистан

Демократические реформы

10,6

12,2

10,2

4,2

15,7

Экономические и социальные реформы

21,5

21,8

12,6

4,5

21,2

Безопасность и соблюдение законов

39,4

11,6

6,9

1,1

10,7

0,3

4,0

20,5

0,2

2,0

Гуманитарная помощь Программы, охватывающие разные сектора Всего

2,4

1,2

0,5

0,4

1,0

74,2

50,8

50,7

10,4

50,6

Таблица 14. Типы военной помощи США Категория Продажи

Тип помощи

Описание

Продажа иностранных товаров военного назначения

Продажи правительства США иностранным правительствам

Прямые коммерческие продажи

Продажи американских компаний иностранным правительствам

Фмнансирование

Иностранное военное финансирование

Одобренные Конгрессом гранты и займы, выдаваемые иностранным правительствам для обеспечения финансирования указанных продаж

Гранты на поставку оборудования

Дополнительные оборонные статьи

Другое дополнительное оборудование, которое Пентагон передает бесплатно или по низкой цене

Скидки

Гранты на текущие (часто не наносящие вреда) товары оборонного назначения, предоставляемые правительством США в экстренных ситуациях

Международное военное обучение и тренинг

Обучение американцами иностранных военных

Обучение

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Таблица 15. Военная помощь Центральной Азии в 2002—2004 финансовых годах, млн долл. Страна

Обучение

Финансирование

Казахстан

2,9

10,7

Киргизия

2,9

20,9

Таджикистан

1,0

4,4

Туркмения

1,1

1,4

Узбекистан Всего

3,7

54,8

11,6

92,2

Примечание. Эти данные учитывают открытые статьи оборонной помощи. Источник: U.S. Department of State, January 2004.

Таблица 16. Структура расходов по оборонным программам для Центральной Азии в 1992—2001 финансовых годах, млн долл. Ведомство

Программы

Закон о защите свободы и другие фонды

Министерство обороны

Совместное сокращение угрозы

Министерство энергетики

Поддержка контроля за вооружениями

180,1

Министерство энергетики

Охрана, контроль и учет опасных материалов

32,0

Госдепартамент

Варшавская инициатива

29,0

33,1

Госдепартамент

Научные центры

18,2

Госдепартамент

Контроль экспорта и охрана границ

15,4

Госдепартамент

Международные военные обмены и обучение

9,8

Национальный научный фонд

НИОКР гражданского назначения

6,6

Госдепартамент

Антитеррористическая помощь

5,6

Министерство сельского хозяйства

Программа совместных исследований

4,6 4,3

Министерство энергетики

Программы предотвращения распространения

Министерство энергетики

Программа контроля экспорта ядерных материалов

3,6

Министерство обороны

Нераспространение (с участием ФБР)

3,2

Госдепартамент

Фонд нераспространения и разоружения

3,0 3,0

Госдепартамент

Программы нераспространения NADR

Министерство здравоохранения

Здравоохранение и гуманитарные услуги

2,4

Министерство обороны

Таможенная безопасность и нераспространение

2,3

Всего

356,1

Источник: Congressional Research Service.

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Таблица 17. Помощь США Центральной Азии как доля от общих ассигнований на операции за границей (дискреционные фонды), млн долл. Показатель

2003 финансовый год

2004 финансовый год (оценка)

2005 финансовый год (запрос)

Общие расходы на иностранные операции

23 677

38 003

21 331

Суммарная помощь Центральной Азии

307

209

179

Доля общей суммы, %

1,30

0,55

0,84

Источник: Congressional Research Service.

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1,54 2,04 0,20

Министерство сельского хозяйства

Министерство финансов

Министерство юстиции 300,2

—

1,14

1,05

4,39

0,18

0,29

0,72

132,86

18,11

14,81

43,75

34,83

141,46

Киргизия

60,1

—

0,11

0,55

—

79,4

—

—

0,65

4,35

— 4,14

—

0,47

43,83

7,14

2,74

0,10

5,16

18,82

Туркмения

—

0,44

43,77

6,14

4,89

0,23

1,96

9,09

Таджикистан

198,61

0,46

—

1,02

4,60

3,81

0,69

1,69

123,26

17,25

7,82

6,20

20,5

45,83

Узбекистан

1149,50

0,66

3,29

4,81

20,16

14,47

1,29

6,47

527,51

82,67

58,90

128,02

115,08

488,18

Всего в 1992—2000 гг.

127,72

0,07

0,37

0,53

2,24

1,61

0,14

0,72

58,61

9,19

6,54

14,22

12,79

54,24

В среднем за год

Примечание. Приведенные данные характеризуют лишь основные общие направления финансирования, и в них отражены не все категории бюджетных расходов.

511,19

6,82

«Корпус мира»

Всего

0,30 6,34

Национальный научный фонд — гражданские НИОКР

Управление торговли и развития

3,15

183,79

Гуманитарная помощь (через Госдепартамент)

Министерство торговли

28,64 34,03

77,74

Программы развития частного сектора

Госдепартамент

52,63

Экономические реформы

Демократические реформы

272,98

Казахстан

АМР США

Категория расходов

Таблица 18. Некоторые расходы в соответствии с Законом о защите свободы в 1992—2000 финансовых годах, млн долл.

Приложение 6. Финансирование на основании Закона о защите свободы в 1992—2003 финансовых годах

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— 17,26

—

0,13

0,04

0,18

0,09

9,96

0,37

5,64

8,20

2,68

6,49

Киргизия

16,67

—

—

0,01

—

0,10

6,85

0,15

2,02

1,24

—

9,56

Таджикистан

10,85

—

—

0,03

0,02

0,03

3,93

2,25

0,06

0,52

0,02

4,59

Туркмения

38,63

0,21

—

0,08

0,32

0,22

26,71

1,83

3,04

0,93

0,37

7,26

Узбекистан

117,65

0,21

0,14

1,80

0,62

0,91

68,22

6,99

16,58

19,30

7,31

38,76

Всего в 2001 г.

Примечание. Приведенные данные характеризуют лишь основные общие направления финансирования, и в них отражены не все категории бюджетных расходов,

36,24

0,01

Министерство финансов

Министерство юстиции

Всего

0,10 1,64

0,47

Национальный научный фонд — гражданские НИОКР

20,77

Гуманитарная помощь (через Госдепартамент)

Министерство торговли

Министерство сельского хозяйства

5,82 2,39

8,41

Программы развития частного сектора

Демократические реформы

4,24

Экономические реформы

Госдепартамент

10,86

Казахстан

АМР США

|

Категория расходов

Таблица 19. Некоторые расходы в соответствии с Законом о защите свободы в 2001 финансовом году, млн долл.

336 Приложения

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CentralAsia-2005.indd 337

Всего

23,48

—

Министерство сельского хозяйства —

1,46

Министерство торговли

Министерство юстиции

0,54

Национальный научный фонд — гражданские НИОКР

Министерство финансов

2,73 0,64

Госдепартамент

11,7 6,35

Демократические реформы

8,10

Программы развития частного сектора

10,8

18,11

АМР США

Экономические реформы

12,54

—

0,80

0,14

0,13

0,11

0,56

5,13

21,79

—

Киргизия

Казахстан

Категория расходов

7,56

—

—

0,10

0,16

0,03

0,18

2,97

2,09

—

7,09

Таджикистан

2,07

—

—

0,09

0,03

—

0,50

6,71

0,75

—

1,45

Туркмения

Таблица 20. Некоторые расходы в соответствии с Законом о защите свободы в 2002 финансовом году, млн долл.

15,08

0,02

0,01

0,28

0,32

0,77

2,55

2,05

9,03

—

11,13

Узбекистан

60,73

0,02

0,81

2,07

1,18

1,55

6,52

23,21

45,43

8,10

48,58

Всего в 2002 г.

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42,12

Министерство финансов

Всего

43,40

2,37

0,28

0,12

0,11

7,85

5,96

32,32

0,25

0,07

0,04

0,01

8,44

3,55

6,51

—

23,51

Таджикистан

7,58

—

0,09

0,04

—

3,06

0,83

1,23

—

4,39

Туркмения

51,26

1,10

0,42

0,20

0,56

9,32

5,01

6,05

—

39,66

Узбекистан

176,68

6,52

2,05

0,99

0,85

34,22

20,43

42,77

2,62

132,05

Всего в 2003 г.

Примечание. Приведенные данные характеризуют лишь основные общие направления финансирования, и в них отражены не все категории бюджетных расходов.

1,19 2,80

Министерство сельского хозяйства

0,17 0,59

Национальный научный фонд — гражданские НИОКР

5,55

Госдепартамент

Министерство торговли

5,08

Демократические реформы

15,24

1,13

1,49 13,74

Экономические реформы

32,67

Киргизия

31,82

Программы развития частного сектора

АМР США

Казахстан

|

Категория расходов

Таблица 21. Некоторые расходы в соответствии с Законом о защите свободы в 2003 финансовом году, млн долл.

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Таблица 22. Среднегодовой объем помощи от Госдепартамента и АМР США до и после 11 сентября, млн долл. Категория расходов

В среднем за 1992—2001 гг.

В среднем за 2002—2003 гг.

АМР США

52,7

90,3

Экономические реформы

12,2

5,4

Программы развития частного сектора

14,7

44,1

Демократические реформы

7,5

21,8

Госдепартамент

9,0

20,4

Примечания. 1. Бюджетные категории от года к году меняются. 2. Все имеющиеся данные за 2004 финансовый год приведены в табл. 13. К моменту сдачи книги в печать данных за 2005 финансовый год еще не было. Источники: http://www.state.gov, http://www.usaid.gov.

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Страна

Киргизия Казахстан Таджикистан Туркмения Узбекистан

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

2,66 26,90 2,63 3,23 13,40

1990

19 9 0

2,54 24,90 2,54 3,20 13,80

1991

19 9 1

2,32 24,90 1,90 3,20 13,0

1992

19 9 2

2,03 23,40 1,65 2,98 13,10

1993

19 9 3

19 9 4

1,68 21,20 1,65 2,56 12,90

1994

Рисунок 3. Валовой внутренний продукт, 1990—2002 гг.

19 9 5

1,66 20,40 1,23 2,48 13,40

1995

19 9 6

Киргизия Казахстан Таджикистан Туркмения Узбекистан

Приложение 7. Экономический рост в 1990—2002 гг.

1,83 21,00 1,05 2,38 13,90

1996

19 9 7

1,77 22,20 1,12 2,68 10,70

1997

19 9 8

1,65 22,10 1,32 2,86 10,70

1998

19 9 9

1,25 16,90 1,09 3,31 8,67

1999

2000

1,37 18,30 0,99 4,40 7,81

2000

2001

1,53 22,20 1,06 5,96 7,55

2001

2002

1,60 24,60 1,21 7,67 7,93

2002

|

млрд долл.

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Приложение 8. Проекты крупных совместных предприятий Таблица 23 Проект

Партнеры

Основная информация

Казахстан Нефтяное месторождение Тенгиз

«TengizChevroil» (TCO): 50% — «ChevronTexaco» (США), 25% — «Kazakhoil», 25% — «ExxonMobil» (США), 5% — «ЛУКойл» (Россия)

• В 1993 г. организовано совместное казахстанскоамериканское предприятие сроком на 40 лет.

• Оценка расходов: 20 млрд долл. • Основные поля: Тенгиз и Королев с запасами 6—9 млрд баррелей

Нефтяное месторождение Кашаган на шельфе

«Agip KCO» (ранее OKIOC): 18,52% — ENI (Италия), 18,52% — «ExxonMobil» (США), 18,52% — «Royal Dutch/Shell» (Великобритания/Нидерланды), 18,52% — «TotalFinaElf» (Франция), 9,26% — «ConocoPhillips» (США), 8,33% — «Inpex» (Япония), 8,33% — «Казмунайгаз»

• Считается, что извлекаемые запасы месторожде-

ния Кашаган составляют от 9 до 13 млрд баррелей, так что, возможно, это пятое по величине месторождение в мире.

• Если считать, что подтвержденные запасы сырой

нефти здесь составляют около 8 млрд баррелей, запасы одного только поля Кашаган примерно равны запасам нефти Бразилии, второго по величине производителя нефти в Южной Америке.

• Эксплуатирует это месторождение ENI (ранее — «Agip»).

• Первую нефть предполагалось добыть в 2005 г.,

но теперь этот срок отодвинулся на 2007 или даже 2008 г. из-за разногласий между правительством Казахстана и иностранными операторами.

• Расходы на этапе первоначальной разработки

Кашагана могут обойтись консорциуму в 9 млрд долл., так что сегодня это самое крупное в мире предприятие в нефтяной отрасли.

• Согласно проекту к 2015 г. здесь должно добываться 3 млн баррелей нефти в сутки.

• «Eni», «Conoco», «Inpex» и «Total» имеют также доли

в проекте прокладки трубопровода Баку — Тбилиси — Джейхан

Нефтегазовое месторождение Карачаганак

«Karachaganak» (KIO): 32,5% — «British Gas», 32,5% — ENI, 20% — «ChevronTexaco», 15% — «ЛУКойл»

• Работы начались в ноябре 1997 г. • Запасы нефти — 2 млрд баррелей. • Запасы газа — 800 млрд куб. м

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Трубопровод Тенгиз — Новороссийск

Партнеры Каспийский трубопроводный консорциум: 24% — Россия, 19% — Казахстан, 15% — «Chevron-Texaco», 12,5% — «LUKArco», 7,5% — «ExxonMobil», 7% — Оман

Основная информация

• Работы начались в 1999 г. • Расходы на первом этапе (оценка) — 2,6 млрд долл. • Трубопровод длиной 1510 км введен в строй в 2001 г.

• Предполагается в сутки подавать отсюда в Новороссийск (порт на Черном море) до 1,2 млн баррелей

Киргизия Месторождение золота «Centerra Gold Inc.»: 54% — «CaКумтор meco» (Канада), 16% — правительство Киргизии (остальное продается на открытом рынке; в июне 2004 г. «Centerra» зарегистрирована на фондовой бирже Торонто)

• Киргизское правительство уменьшило свою долю с 27% до 16%, продав 7,5 млн акций и получив 116 млн долл.

• Рудник находится к юго-востоку от Бишкека в горах Тянь-Шаня, в 60 км от границы с Китаем.

• По имеющимся оценкам, его запасы составляют около 700 метрических тонн.

• Имиджу проекта повредил инцидент в мае 1998 г.: перевернулся автомобиль, везший около 2 т цианидов, которые попали в реку Барскун; было госпитализировано около 1000 местных жителей.

• В 2003 г. доходы от Кумтора составили 7% ВВП, но ожидается, что в 2010 г. он закроется

Таджикистан Сангтудинская ГЭС

РАО ЕЭС (Россия), Иран, правительство Таджикистана

• Согласно протоколу, подписанному в январе

2005 г., первую очередь ГЭС будут строить Россия и Таджикистан, а вторую очередь — Иран и Таджикистан.

• Работы по проекту начались в 1989 г., но были прерваны гражданской войной в 1992 г.

• Для полной реализации проекта в течение четыре лет потребуется 500 млн долл.

• Строительство ведется на реке Вахш примерно в 200 км к югу от Душанбе.

• Эта ГЭС будет полностью удовлетворять все

потребности Таджикистана в электроэнергии и позволит продавать ее соседям — Афганистану и Пакистану

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Продолжение табл. 23 Проект Рогунская ГЭС

Партнеры «Русский алюминий»

Основная информация

• В октябре 2004 г. «Русал» согласился инвестиро-

вать 560 млн долл. из общей суммы в 600 млн долл., необходимой для строительства Рогунской ГЭС, которая будет вырабатывать дешевую электроэнергию для заводов по переработке алюминия, которые «Русал» планирует построить в Таджикистане.

• Тогда министр экономики Таджикистана Халим

Солиев в интервью российской газете «Ведомости» сказал, что всего в ближайшие семь лет общая сумма инвестиций «Русала» в Таджикистане составит 1,6 млрд долл.

Туркмения Челекен

«Dragon Oil» (Ирландия — Объединенные Арабские Эмираты)

• Подтвержденные запасы: 600 млн баррелей. • Добыча в 2004 г.: 10 тыс. баррелей в сутки. • Соглашение с правительством Туркмении о раз-

деле продукции сроком на 25 лет с 1993 г. касается двух шельфовых месторождений: Джейхун и Джигалибек

Небит-Даг

«Burren Energy» (Великобритания)

• Подтвержденные запасы — 100 млн баррелей. • Добыча в 2004 г. — 10 тыс. баррелей в сутки

Узбекистан Нефтяные и газовые поля Центрального Устюрта и Юго-Восточного Гиссара

«UzPEC Ltd.», дочерняя компания «Trinity Energy» (Великобритания)

• Согласно проекту в 2006 г. добыча нефти должна

составлять 2600 баррелей в сутки; добыча газа — 2 млрд куб. м.

• Прямые инвестиции в проект — 400 млн долл. • В 2001 г. «Trinity» подписала с государственной хол-

динговой компанией «Узбекнефтегаз» соглашение о разделе продукции (первое в стране) сроком на 40 лет, предусматривающее разработку нефтяных и газовых месторождений Устюрта и Гиссара

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Приложения Продолжение табл. 23 Проект

Золотой рудник Мурунтау

Партнеры «Zarafshan-Newmont JV»: 50% — «Newmont Mining» (США), 50% — «Uzbekistan—Navoi Mining» (частная компания) и «Госкомгеология» (государственная организация)

Основная информация

• Оценочные расходы JV: 250 млн долл. • Месторождение Мурунтау (что означает «холмистое место») и г. Зеравшан находятся примерно в 400 км к западу от Ташкента, в пустыне Кызылкум.

• Месторождение разрабатывается открытым способом с 1969 г.

• JV добыла свое первое золото в 1995 г. и планирует продолжать работу до 2011 г.

• По оценкам компании «Newmont» из штата Коло-

радо (США), JV вложила в экономику Узбекистана 500 млн долл. (http://www.newmont.com)

Источники: Министерство энергетики США, агентства новостей, сайты компаний, BISNIS (Служба деловой информации для новых независимых государств, http://www.bisnis.doc.gov).

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Приложение 9. Добыча энергоносителей и производство электроэнергии Таблица 24. Добыча газа, млн куб. м Страна

1990

1996

2003

Казахстан

7 100

6 500

7 200

Туркмения

87 800

35 400

53 400

Узбекистан

41 000

49 000

58 000

Таблица 25. Добыча нефти, тыс. метрических тонн Страна Казахстан

1990

1996

2003

21 700

21 100

44 500

Туркмения

5 000

4 400

8 400

Узбекистан

1 300

3 000

7 100

Таблица 26. Производство электроэнергии, млн кВт · ч Страна

1990

1996

2003

Казахстан

87 400

59 000

63 700

Киргизия

13 370

13 800

14 000

Таджикистан

18 200

15 000

15 200

Туркмения

14,6

10,1

10,8

Узбекистан

56 300

45 400

49 400

Таблица 27. Добыча угля, тыс. метрических тонн Страна Казахстан Киргизия Узбекистан

1990

1996

2003

128 000

76 800

84 700

Н. д.

410

411

6 500

2 840

1 910

Источник: Азиатский банк развития, http://www.adb.org.

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Приложение 10. Показатели демократизации «Freedom House» Таблица 28 Показатель

1997

1998

1999

2001

2002

2003

2004

Казахстан Электоральный процесс

5,50

5,50

6,00

6,25

6,25

6,50

6,50

Гражданское общество

5,25

5,00

5,00

5,00

5,50

5,50

5,50

Независимые СМИ

5,25

5,50

5,50

6,00

6,00

6,25

6,50

Управление

5,50

5,50

5,00

5,00

5,75

6,25

6,25

Конституционная, законодательная и судебная структура

5,00

5,25

5,50

5,75

6,00

6,25

6,25

Коррупция

Н. д.

Н. д.

6,00

6,25

6,25

6,25

6,50

Электоральный процесс

5,00

5,00

5,00

5,75

5,75

6,00

6,00

Гражданское общество

4,50

4,50

4,50

4,50

4,50

4,50

4,50

Независимые СМИ

5,00

5,00

5,00

5,00

5,75

6,00

6,00

Управление

4,25

4,50

5,00

5,25

5,50

6,00

6,00

Конституционная, законодательная и судебная структура

4,50

4,50

5,00

5,25

5,25

5,25

5,50

Коррупция

Н. д.

Н. д.

6,00

6,00

6,00

6,00

6,00

Электоральный процесс

6,00

5,75

5,50

5,25

5,25

5,25

5,75

Гражданское общество

5,50

5,25

5,25

5,00

5,00

5,00

5,00

Независимые СМИ

6,25

6,00

5,75

5,50

5,75

5,75

5,75

Киргизия

Таджикистан

Управление

7,00

6,75

6,25

6,00

6,00

6,00

5,75

Конституционная, законодательная и судебная структура

6,25

6,00

5,75

5,75

5,75

5,75

5,75

Коррупция

Н. д.

Н. д.

6,00

6,00

6,00

6,00

6,25

Электоральный процесс

7,00

7,00

7,00

7,00

7,00

7,00

7,00

Гражданское общество

7,00

7,00

7,00

7,00

7,00

7,00

7,00

Независимые СМИ

7,00

7,00

7,00

7,00

7,00

7,00

7,00

Туркмения

Управление

6,75

6,75

6,75

6,75

6,75

6,75

7,00

Конституционная, законодательная и судебная структура

6,75

6,75

6,75

7,00

7,00

7,00

7,00

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Продолжение табл. 28 Показатель

1997

1998

1999

2001

2002

2003

2004

Н. д.

Н. д.

6,00

6,25

6,25

6,25

6,25

Электоральный процесс

6,25

6,50

6,50

6,75

6,75

6,75

6,75

Гражданское общество

6,50

6,50

6,50

6,50

6,75

6,50

6,50

Независимые СМИ

6,50

6,50

6,50

6,75

6,75

6,75

6,75

Управление

6,00

6,25

6,25

6,00

6,00

6,25

6,25

Конституционная, законодательная и судебная структура

6,50

6,50

6,50

6,50

6,50

6,50

6,50

Коррупция

Н. д.

Н. д.

6,00

6,00

6,00

6,00

6,00

Коррупция

Узбекистан

Примечание. Демократический прогресс оценивается по семибалльной шкале, в которой 1 балл соответствует максимальной оценке, а 7 баллов — минимальной (наихудшей) оценке. Источник: Motyl A., Schetzer A. Nations in Transit, 2004: Democratization in East Central Europe and Eurasia. — New York: Freedom House, 2004.

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Приложение 11. Борьба с наркотиками Таблица 29. Расходы США на борьбу с наркотиками и обеспечение правопорядка, долл. Страна

1992—2000 2001 2002 2003 финансовые финансовый финансовый финансовый годы год год год

Казахстан

2 180 000

750 000

Киргизия

1 340 000 110 000

Туркмения

360 000

20 000

110 000

Узбекистан

1 500 000

32 000

1 070 000

Всего

5 490 000

1 400 000

2 370 000

7 460 000

Таджикистан

В среднем за год до 11 сентября 2001 г.

В среднем за год после 11 сентября 2001 г.

1 050 000

510 000

293 000

146 500

90 000

50 000

1 800 000

143 000

71 500

40 000

90 000

2 820 000

15 000

7 500

770 000

56 000

28 000

1 560 000

182 000

91 000

689 000

344 500

Источник: Госдепартамент.

Таблица 30. Конфискованный опиум (1997—2002 гг.), кг Страна Казахстан

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

1000

297

170

136

36

14

Киргизия

1639

172

151

1405

469

109

Таджикистан

3456

1190

1269

4778

3664

1624

Туркмения

1410

1412

4600

2300

Н. д.

1200

Узбекистан

2364

1935

3292

2008

242

76

Источник: 2004 World Drug Report / U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime.

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Приложение 12. Основные политические партии Казахстан «Отан» («Отечество») Пропрезидентская партия Во время парламентских выборов 1999 г. «Отан» выдвинула наибольшее количество кандидатов (всего около 60) и завоевала наибольшее число мест в парламенте: 20 на выборах по округам и 4 — в национальный парламент. Вскоре после своего образования партия заявила, что ее цель — повторное избрание Назарбаева на президентских выборах 2006 г. На парламентских выборах 2004 г. партия получила почти 43% голосов. «Асар» Пропрезидентская партия Эту партию возглавляет дочь президента Назарбаева Дарига. «Асар» открыто поддерживает политику Назарбаева. Дарига Назарбаева заявляла, что на парламентских выборах 2004 г. партия должна получить 50% мест, но в действительности за нее проголосовали лишь 19,1% избирателей. «Ак жол» («Светлый путь») Оппозиционная партия Отделилась от «Демократического выбора Казахстана» в 2002 г. Собрала 22,9% голосов на парламентских выборах 2004 г. Партия раскололась в феврале 2005 г., когда ее бывшие сопредседатели Булат Абилов, Ураз Жандосов и Алтынбек Сарсенбаев создали новую партию «Нагыз Ак жол» («Настоящий Светлый путь»), не дожидаясь президентских выборов 2006 г. «Демократический выбор Казахстана» Оппозиционная партия, поддерживающая деловые круги Движение было создано осенью 2001 г. членами правительства и деловой элиты, многие из которых получили выгоду от приватизации государственной собственности 1990-х годов и стали «новыми казахами». Основные фигуры в этом движении — министр энерге-

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тики и глава инвестиционной группы «Астана-Холдинг» Мухтар Аблязов, заместитель премьер-министра Ураз Жандосов, глава северного округа Павлодарской области Галымжан Жакиянов и депутат парламента Толен Тохтасинов.

Республиканская народная партия Казахстана (РНПК) Оппозиционная партия Бывший премьер-министр Казахстана Акежан Кажегельдин присоединился к оппозиции в середине 1998 г., и его риторический призыв к реализации демократических идеалов в стране очень быстро получил широкую поддержку. РНПК была организована в 1999 г., но Кажегельдину запретили баллотироваться в президенты. В октябре 1999 г. для усиления борьбы с растущей властью президента Назарбаева члены оппозиции организовали новый «Форум демократических сил Казахстана», председателем которого стал Кажегельдин. Но препятствия со стороны правительства, а также внутренние организационные неурядицы помешали развитию этой группы, и оппозиция почти два года оставалась пассивной. «Азамат» Продемократическая партия В апреле 1996 г. бывшие министры Петер Своик и Галим Абилсиитов создали новое движение «Азамат» совместно с бывшим представителем Казахстана в Китае Муратом Ауэзовым. Однако, несмотря на известность, эта группа не имела достаточного финансирования и связей, чтобы представлять собой серьезную угрозу политическому режиму. Источники: RFE/RL, EurasiaNet.org.

Киргизия Блок «Национальное движение Кыргызстана» (НДК) Курманбек Бакиев Избирательный блок «Национальное движение Кыргызстана» сформировался в сентябре 2004 г., объединив девять партий и движений: Партию коммунистов, Коммунистическую партию, Респуб-

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ликанскую партию, Партию национального возрождения «Асаба», Демократическое движение Кыргызстана, «Кайран Эль», «Новый Кыргызстан», «Эркин Кыргызстан» и «Эркиндик».

Блок «За честные выборы» Мисир Аширкулов Избирательный блок «За честные выборы» был сформирован в мае 2004 г. и объединяет партии «Ар-Намыс», «Эл», «Ата-Мекен» и Социал-демократическую партию. «Ата-Юрт» («Отечество») Роза Отунбаева Роза Отунбаева, бывший министр иностранных дел и представитель ООН в Грузии, пользуется поддержкой на севере республики и в рядах политического истеблишмента. Союз с южанином Бакиевым увеличил ее популярность. «Асаба» Азимбек Бекназаров Националистическая партия, публично выступившая против использования базы в Киргизии коалицией, проводившей военные операции в Афганистане под предводительством США. Раньше «Асаба» выступала против российского присутствия на авиационной базе в Канте в рамках ОДКБ, а также против соглашения об уступке части территории Китаю. Члены партии — преимущественно предприниматели и крестьяне. «Ата-Мекен» («Отечество») Омурбек Текебаев Партия национально-социалистической ориентации. Многие ее сторонники тоже выходцы из сельских районов юга страны. Основная цель партии — увеличение роли южан в политической и экономической жизни страны. «Ар-Намыс» («Достоинство») Феликс Кулов Создана в 1999 г., завоевала прочную репутацию среди студентов, безработной молодежи и сельского населения. Кулов — соперник

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Бакиева на президентских выборах в июле 2005 г. — считает приоритетными задачами стабилизацию политической ситуации, обеспечение безопасности и предотвращение миграции из страны постоянно убывающего русскоязычного населения.

«Алга, Кыргызстан» («Вперед, Кыргызстан») Бермет Акаева Партия, поддерживающая Акаева, с помощью которой сторонники свергнутого президента продолжают политическую деятельность. «Эркиндик» («Свобода») Топчубек Тургуналиев Киргизский националист Тургуналиев выступал с резкой критикой режима Акаева. В 1999 г. он был приговорен к 16 годам лишения свободы за организацию заговора с целью убийства президента. Этот приговор расценивался многими как попытка заставить его прекратить критику Акаева. Через два года Тургуналиева освободили. «Жани-Багыт» Муратбек Иманалиев Бывший министр иностранных дел Иманалиев прежде возглавлял центристскую Партию справедливости и прогресса. Народно-патриотическое движение Турсунбек Акунов Это националистическое движение возглавляет Акунов — активный защитник прав человека и перспективный кандидат в президенты. Источники: RFE/RL, EurasiaNet.org, Reuters, Institute for War and Peace Reporting.

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Таджикистан Народно-демократическая партия Таджикистана (НДПТ) Проправительственная партия Президент Рахмонов официально вступил в эту партию в марте 1998 г. и менее чем через месяц был избран ее главой. С 2000 г. по 2005 г. партия имела 65% мест в парламенте. В январе 2005 г. ее доля в парламенте возросла до 80%. Коммунистическая партия Проправительственная партия Лидер — Шоди Шабдулов. В парламенте выступает в союзе с НДПТ. Партия исламского возрождения Таджикистана (ПИВТ) Оппозиционная партия Члены партии представлены в различных правительственных институтах в соответствии с соглашением о разделе власти, целью которого было положить конец гражданской войне 1992—1997 гг. (ПИВТ доминировала в Объединенной таджикской оппозиции — зонтичной группировке повстанцев). Это соглашение, по которому оппозиционным силам передавалось 30% правительственных постов, в последнее время представляется все более опасным. Лидер партии — Саид Абдулло Нури. Демократическая партия Таджикистана Оппозиционная партия На регистрацию в качестве Демократической партии Таджикистана претендуют две фракции: фракция из Алматы, зарегистрированная в Таджикистане, и тегеранская. Фракцией Алматы руководит Махмадрузи Искандаров, которого арестовывали по уголовным обвинениям, выдвинутым Москвой. Тегеранская фракция, которой руководит Аза Афсали, недавно переименовала себя в партию «Таракийот». Демократическая партия раскололась на две фракции в результате разногласий о том, нужно ли остаться в составе Объединенной таджикской оппозиции и продолжать бороться или начать переговоры с правительством. Фракция Алматы предпочла бороться и была вознаграждена за

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это после подписания мирного соглашения между ОТО и правительством Таджикистана.

Социалистическая партия Партия расколота Партия разделена на две фракции: проправительственную под руководством Абдухалима Гаффарова, все еще зарегистрированную в Министерстве юстиции, и официально не зарегистрированную фракцию, лидером которой является Мирхусейн Нарзиев. Основатель партии Сафарали Кеняев был убит в Душанбе в конце марта 1999 г. После его смерти партия не сумела перегруппироваться. На парламентских выборах 2000 г. она получила менее 2% голосов. Социал-демократическая партия Светская оппозиция Возникла на базе Партии справедливости и развития, запрещенной в 2000 г. На выборах 2005 г. не смогла перейти 5%-ный барьер и получить места в парламенте. Лидер Рахматулло Зоиров обвинил власти и государственные средства массовой информации в попытке связать нынешние оппозиционные партии с исламистской политической оппозицией времен гражданской войны. Источники: RFE/RL, EurasiaNet.org.

Туркмения Демократическая партия Туркменистана (ДПТ) Пропрезидентская партия Основана президентом Сапармуратом Ниязовым и действует под его руководством. Единственная легальная партия в стране. В феврале 2001 г. Ниязов заявил, что следующие президентские выборы состоятся в 2010 г., и подтвердил, что ни одна другая партия до тех пор не будет легализована. ДПТ была единственной партией, принимавшей участие в парламентских выборах 2004 г., и была представлена 131 кандидатом. Они получили 50 мест в парламенте.

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«Объединенная демократическая оппозиция Туркменистана» Оппозиция в изгнании (первая волна) Первоначально была организована в Москве в виде фонда «Туркменистан» первым премьер-министром Туркмении Авди Кулиевым, который вышел из правительства в знак протеста против политики Ниязова в 1992 г. В апреле 1998 г. во время официального визита президента Ниязова в Вашингтон Кулиев предпринял самостоятельную попытку вернуться в Ашхабад, но был по прибытии задержан в аэропорту и в конце концов депортирован из страны. Активность оппозиции была ограничена в 1998—2001 гг. после повторного введения выездных виз, что затруднило критикам Ниязова, находящимся в изгнании, контакты с оппозицией внутри страны. Финансируется за счет грантов неправительственных организаций. Союз демократических сил Туркменистана Оппозиция в ссылке (вторая волна) Руководитель — преемник Кулиева на посту министра иностранных дел Борис Шихмурадов, порвавший с Ниязовым в 2001 г. и посаженный в тюрьму в декабре 2002 г. за участие в попытке переворота. Организация была сформирована в 2003 г. после совещаний в Вене и Праге лидеров партии «Ватан», Республиканской партии Туркменистана и партии «Возрождение». Как и Кулиев, Шихмурадов выступает в защиту демократических принципов; однако в случае смены режима группа Шихмурадова объявила бы 18-месячный переходный период, в течение которого выборы не проводились бы (Кулиев заявил, что он организовал бы срочные выборы). Это был бы период интенсивной экономической реформы, подразумевающей приватизацию ряда государственных отраслей. Несмотря на обвинения в адрес Шихмурадова в использовании должностного положения (на разных постах в правительстве) в целях личного обогащения, его позиция весьма популярна среди прозападных интеллектуалов и образованной молодежи Ашхабада. Шихмурадов заявлял также, что пользуется поддержкой многих официальных лиц, все еще занимающих посты в правительстве Ниязова, которые «сыты по горло» этим экстремальным режимом. Источники: RFE/RL, EurasiaNet.org.

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Узбекистан Народно-демократическая партия (Халк демократия партиясы) Пропрезидентская партия Бывшая Коммунистическая партия Узбекистана, реорганизованная в сентябре 1991 г. Ислам Каримов возглавлял партию до 1996 г. На парламентских выборах 1999 г. она завоевала 45 мест. «Прогресс отечества» («Ватан Тараккийоти») Пропрезидентская партия Оказывала поддержку доминирующей Народно-демократической партии. Завоевала 20 мест на парламентских выборах 1999 г. Социал-демократическая партия «Адолат» Пропрезидентская партия Завоевала 11 мест на парламентских выборах 1999 г. и 2 места на парламентских выборах 2004 г. «Бирлик» («Единство») Оппозиционная партия Лидер партии — Абдурахим Пулот, проживающий в изгнании в США. Несмотря на то что с 1992 г. партия запрещена, она смогла в апреле 2002 г. провести несколько собраний, в том числе семь региональных, без вмешательства властей. Партия стремится к созыву национального конгресса и добивается официальной регистрации, опираясь на открытую поддержку правительства США. Демократическая партия «Эрк» («Свобода») Оппозиционная партия Лидер партии Мухаммад Салих был соперником Каримова на президентских выборах 1991 г. и получил 12% голосов. Краткосрочное сотрудничество с правительством после обретения независимости быстро закончилось, и в 1992 г. партию запретили. Салих бежал из Узбекистана в 1993 г. и нашел убежище в Норвегии. Его обвиняли в участии в организации взрывов в Ташкенте, но правозащитники утверждают, что эти обвинения имеют политические мотивы. Источники: RFE/RL, EurasiaNet.org.

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Приложение 13. Исламские организации Официальные организации

Духовное управление мусульман Средней Азии и Казахстана (САДУМ) Во время Второй мировой войны советское правительство заключило перемирие с духовенством Центральной Азии и сформировало Духовное управление мусульман Средней Азии и Казахстана — центральный региональный орган, штаб-квартира которого в советское время располагалась в Ташкенте. Духовное управление представляло собой ядро официального ислама в послевоенный советский период. Его возглавлял муфтий, в обязанности которого входило управление регистрацией мечетей, назначение имамов, руководящих местными общинами и даже определение содержания проповедей и характера «правильного» толкования ислама на практике. Официальное исламское духовенство привлекли к сотрудничеству и заставили играть по правилам, установленным руководством Коммунистической партии. Однако некоторые жители Центральной Азии ухитрялись исповедовать иные формы ислама втайне и за пределами официального вероучения. В 1992 г. САДУМ было децентрализовано, и в государствах Центральной Азии были созданы отдельные духовные управления с регулятивными функциями. Муфтии центральноазиатских стран, назначаемые государством, контролируют религиозную деятельность так же, как и в советские годы. Предоставив исламу большее пространство для действий, государство по-прежнему испытывает «коммунистическое» недоверие к религии и религиозным фанатикам и удерживает религиозную активность мусульман под строгим контролем через муфтиев. В Центральноазиатском регионе были официально зарегистрированы следующие муфтии: • Узбекистан: Ишан Бабахан бин Абдул Мажид-хан (1943— 1957 гг.), его сын Зияуддин Бабахан (1952—1982 гг.), а затем его сын Шамсуддин-хан Бабахан (1982—1989 гг.). Шамсуддин был изгнан со своего поста, в основном в результате давления со стороны исламской элиты Узбекистана, и заменен Мухаммад-Содык Мухаммад-Юсуфом (1989—1993 гг.). За ним пост муфтия

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занимали Мухтарьян Абдулло аль-Бухари (1993—1995 гг.) и Абдурашид Бахромов (с 1995 г.). Казахстан: Ратбек-кази Нысанбайюлы (февраль 1990—2000 гг.), Абсаттар Дербисалиев (с 2000 г.). Киргизия: Садыкджан Камалов (1990—1995 гг.), Кимсанбайхаджи Абдрахманов (1995—2002 гг.), Муратали-хаджи Джуман-уулу (с августа 2002 г.). Туркмения: Насрулла ибн Ибадулла (приговорен к 22 годам лишения свободы в январе 2002 г.), Какагельды Вепаев (с января 2002 г.; снят с поста в августе 2004 г.), Ровшен Аллабердыев (с августа 2004 г.). Таджикистан: Хаджи Акбар Тураджонзода, Факхуло Шарифзода (с декабря 1992 г.; убит в январе 1996 г.), Амонулло Нематзода (с июня 1996 г.).

Неофициальные организации

Исламская партия возрождения (ИПВ) ИПВ была основана в июне 1990 г. в Астрахани (Россия) в основном татарскими интеллигентами, которые стремились организовать мусульман, проживающих в Советском Союзе, для участия в кампании за введение шариата. Затем ИПВ создала независимые филиалы в центральноазиатских республиках; однако оказалось, что ей нелегко расширить свое влияние после распада СССР. Партия была на легальном положении только в Таджикистане и запрещена во всех остальных республиках Центральной Азии. Сообщалось, что таджикская ИПВ сотрудничает с правящим режимом, что значительно ослабило ее ядро. «Адолат» Эта исламистская военизированная группа, возглавляемая Тахиром Юлдашем, была организована в 1991 г. в узбекском городе Намангане в качестве альтернативы ИПВ. «Адолат» рассматривала ИПВ как марионеточную партию в руках узбекского правительства, не желающую требовать исламской революции. «Адолат» финансировала и поддерживала деятельность многих мечетей и медресе, расположенных в Ферганской долине. Завоевав значительное влияние в Намангане и встревожив этим узбекские вла-

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сти, в 1992 г. под давлением правительства она распалась, и некоторые члены ее руководства вынуждены были бежать в Таджикистан, Иран и Афганистан. Многие из тех, кто не успел бежать, были арестованы.

Исламское движение Узбекистана (ИДУ) ИДУ было основано бывшим лидером организации «Адолат» Тахиром Юлдашем, на смену которому после ее подавления и заключения под стражу ее членов пришел Джума Намангани. Узбекские исламисты, бежавшие в Таджикистан, сражались вместе с Объединенной таджикской оппозицией. Джума Намангани — военный лидер ИДУ — в прошлом был адъютантом влиятельного таджикского полевого командира Мирзо Зиоева. В 1993 г. узбекские исламисты последовали за бежавшими членами таджикской оппозиции в Афганистан, где ИДУ было официально сформировано. ИДУ организовало базы в северном Афганистане (в Кундузе), Узбекистане (в Ферганской долине), Таджикистане (в Тавилдаре, гористой местности в Каратегинской долине) и в южной части Киргизии. Летом 1999 г. боевики ИДУ предприняли вооруженное нападение из Каратегина, стремясь прорваться в Узбекистан через территорию Киргизии. Целью ИДУ было свергнуть узбекское правительство, «освободить» Ферганскую долину и образовать там исламское государство. После тяжелых и продолжительных боев с вооруженными силами Узбекистана и Киргизии боевики отошли в таджикские горы. В 2000 г. они вернулись и вторглись в Киргизию и Сурхандарьинскую область Узбекистана. По сообщениям информационных агентств, осенью 2000 г. большинство боевиков ИДУ переместилось из Таджикистана в Афганистан, где ИДУ создало базы в районах, контролируемых талибами. ИДУ очень ослабло после того, как Соединенные Штаты сокрушили режим талибов в Афганистане; сообщалось, что остатки боевиков рассеялись по Ирану, Таджикистану и отдаленным районам Пакистана. Сообщалось также, что Тахир Юлдаш стремится возродить даже самые малочисленные из оставшихся отрядов боевиков и в настоящее время скрывается в Пакистане, в районах проживания горных племен. По мнению некоторых западных дипломатов, в столице Таджикистана Душанбе с возрождением вооруженных отрядов ИДУ, которое Юлдаш сейчас пытается реформировать, эта группа может принять участие

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в террористических операциях, например, организовывать взрывы в городах, похищения, шантаж и вымогательство и даже вооруженные вторжения на территорию Туркмении.

«Хизб ат-Тахрир» Организация «Хизб ат-Тахрир» (полное название — «Хизб атТахрир аль-ислямий», т. е. Исламская партия освобождения), созданная в 1950-х годах в Палестине, укоренилась в Центральной Азии примерно десять лет назад. В отличие от ИДУ «Хизб ат-Тахрир», которая тоже объявила джихад в Центральной Азии, стремится вновь объединить республики Центральной Азии и в конечном счете ненасильственным способом заменить правительства мусульманского мира исламским государством в форме халифата. Несмотря на то что эта группа проповедует только мирные способы достижения своих целей, правительства республик Центральной Азии уже не раз принимали против нее весьма суровые меры. Узбекские власти подозревают, что эта группа могла стоять за террористическими актами в марте и июле 2004 г., в результате которых погибли люди. По имеющимся оценкам, около 5 тыс. членов «Хизб ат-Тахрир» находятся в узбекских тюрьмах. Другие центральноазиатские правительства также воспринимают эту партию как угрозу их светским конституциям и государственной безопасности. Аналитики предупреждают, что репрессии в отношении членов «Хизб ат-Тахрир» лишь делают ее более радикальной и угрожают посеять семена еще более устрашающего исламского экстремизма. «Джамаат уль-Муджахеддин» Центральной Азии Отдельная группа ИДУ, образовавшаяся после уничтожения лагерей ИДУ в Афганистане после событий 11 сентября 2001 г. В то время как Тахир Юлдаш и другие руководители ИДУ объединились с международными бригадами «аль-Каиды», эта группа попрежнему ориентируется на террористические акты в Центральной Азии. Не следует путать этот «Джамаат» с «Джамаат Таблих» — международной исламской миссионерской организацией, деятельность которой в Узбекистане правительство Каримова тоже пытается пресечь.

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«Байат» Подпольная исламская экстремистская группировка «Байат» (в переводе с арабского «завет») действует в северном Таджикистане. В апреле 2005 г. двое ее членов были осуждены, и еще десять привлечены к суду в ходе национальной кампании по борьбе с экстремизмом. По данным Министерства внутренних дел Таджикистана, с 1991 г. «Байат» начала обучать молодежь в контролируемых ею мечетях в деревне Чоркух. Она также организовала шариатские суды. Во время гражданской войны 1992—1997 гг. члены «Байат» сражались на стороне исламской оппозиции. Позже они стали боевиками «Талибана» в Афганистане, где трое из них были арестованы военнослужащими США и находились под арестом на базе в Гуантанамо. Доктрина «Байат» предполагает борьбу со всеми немусульманскими организациями, а также с чересчур умеренными, по ее мнению, мусульманскими группировками. По сообщениям ИТАРТАСС, в 2003 г. они обезобразили и даже сожгли несколько мечетей в Согдийской области за то, что посещавшие их мусульмане были слишком близки к светским властям. Один из членов «Байат» Садулло Мадыеров недавно был приговорен к 24 лишения свободы за убийство в 2003 г. главы местной баптистской общины Сергея Бессараби. Спецслужбы Таджикистана полагают, что «Байат» была организована активистами ливийского движения «аль-Байат» и некоторых узбекских группировок.

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Приложение 14. Крупнейшие города — старые и новые названия Таблица 31 Нынешнее название

Прежнее название

Казахстан Астана Актау Алматы Актобе Атырау Караганда Оскемен Павлодар Семей Шымкент Тараз

Акмола Шевченко Алма-Ата Актюбинск Гурьев Усть-Каменогорск Семипалатинск Чимкент Джамбул

Киргизия Бишкек Джалал-Абад Кара-Балта Каракол Ош Токмок

Фрунзе

Пржевальск

Таджикистан Душанбе Истравшан Гарм Хорог Худжанд Куляб Курган-Тюбе

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Сталинабад

Ленинабад

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Продолжение табл. 23 Нынешнее название

Прежнее название

Туркмения Ашхабад Балканабад Дашогуз Мары Туркменабад Туркменбаши

Небит-Даг Дашовуз Чарджоу Красноводск

Узбекистан Ташкент Наманган Самарканд Андижан Бухара Нукус Источник: Library of Congress country profiles, updated October 2004.

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Примечания

Глава 1 1

2 3

4

5

6

7

President George W. Bush. State of the Union Address. — [S. l.], Febr. 2, 2005, публикация на сайте http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/ print/20050202-11.html. Акаев сменил Абсамата Масалиева. Казахстан не подтверждал свое участие в антитеррористической коалиции вплоть до визита министра обороны США Дональда Рамсфельда 28 апреля 2002 г. См.: NewsLine / RFE/RL. — 2002. — Apr. 29, публикация на сайте http://www.rferl.org. Во всей Центральной Азии только правительство Туркмении вплоть до 1999 г. настойчиво добивалось международного признания «Талибана», надеясь, что это поможет реализации проекта строительства трубопровода для поставки туркменского газа через Афганистан на рынки Пакистана и Индии. В военном отношении Россия представлена в Таджикистане бывшей советской, а ныне российской 201-й мотострелковой дивизией, которая базируется здесь с 1945 г. (и в которой служит много таджиков), и подразделениями российской Федеральной пограничной службы, созданной в сентябре 1992 г. Всего было шесть взрывов, в том числе несколько взрывов автомобилей, начиненных взрывчаткой, в Ташкенте. Погибло около 15 человек (в том числе двое террористов), еще примерно 150 было ранено. См.: Intercon Daily Report on Russia. — Washington, D.C., Febr. 23, 1999. Подробнее см.: Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with Reuters TV and Wire U.S. // Department of Defense news transcript. — [S. l.], March 4, 2004,

365

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публикация на сайте http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/ tr20040325-secdef0564.html, а также меморандум для прессы от 26 июня 1996 г. о встрече Ислама Каримова с Уильямом Перри, публикация на сайте http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1996/m062696_m144-96.html. Относительно некоторых форм такого соперничества в советский период см.: Nahaylo B., Swoboda V. Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR. — London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990. Первоначально узбекское правительство приняло программу макростабилизации, поддержанную Международным валютным фондом, которая предусматривала такую конвертируемость, но позже отказалось от нее, приняв в 1996 г. национальную стратегию развития, сосредоточенную в основном на внутренних проблемах. Конвертируемость валютных счетов означает, что владельцы коммерческих счетов могут конвертировать национальную валюту (сомы) в доллары, что позволяет им исполнять и получать необходимые платежи. Формально владельцам счетов в Узбекистане разрешено свободно делать это начиная с октября 2003 г., но в действительности все еще существует «очередь» на получение денег из национального банка, и частные лица тоже обычно сталкиваются с нехваткой долларов, когда пытаются купить их на сомы в официальных обменных пунктах. Казахстан объявил о независимости 16 декабря 1991 г., Киргизия — 12 декабря 1991 г., Таджикистан — 9 сентября 1991 г., Туркмения — 27 октября 1991 г., Узбекистан — 31 августа 1991 г. Olcott M. B. Central Asia’s Catapult to Independence // Foreign Affairs. — 1992. — Vol. 71. — № 3. — Summer. — Р. 118—128. Пятилетняя гражданская война в Таджикистане завершилась в июне 1997 г. подписанием в Москве мирного соглашения между воевавшими таджикскими сторонами. Это соглашение, реализация которого затягивалась, предусматривало, что правительство должно отменить запрет на деятельность всех партий в составе объединенной таджикской оппозиции до парламентских выборов 2000 г. Для укрепления безопасности в южных районах Киргизии после событий в Ошской области правительство Киргизии уменьшило размеры области, включив три ее района (Баткенский, Ляйлякский и Кадамджайский) в состав специально созданной Баткенской области (Kyrgyz Report / RFE/ RL. — 1999. — Oct. 12, публикация на сайте http://www.rferl.org). Проблемы безопасности Киргизии обсуждались на совещании государств — участников Договора о коллективной безопасности СНГ (Арме-

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15

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нии, Белоруссии, Казахстана, Киргизии, России и Таджикистана) 5 ноября 1999 г. Эти консультации завершились подписанием руководителями МВД и органов государственной безопасности Китая, Казахстана, Киргизии, России и Таджикистана 3 декабря 1999 г. Бишкекского меморандума о борьбе с международным терроризмом (Kyrgyz Report / RFE/RL. — 1999. — Nov. 5, Dec. 3, публикация на сайте http://www.rferl.org). Длина границы Афганистана с Таджикистаном составляет 1206 км, с Туркменией — 744 км, с Узбекистаном — 137 км. См.: CIA World Factbook / Central Intelligence Agency, доступ в онлайне. Интервью «не для прессы», данные автору в Киргизии и Узбекистане соответственно в 2004 и 2005 гг. См., например: Hill F. Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious Extremism, and Regional Stability. Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, October 29, 2003, публикация на сайте http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/ 90361.pdf; Blank S. Radical Islamic Challenges in Central Asia. Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, October 2003, публикация на сайте http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/108/90361. pdf; Olcott M. B. Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious Extremism, and Regional Stability. Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, October 29, 2003, публикация на сайте http://wwwc.house.gov/international _relations/108/90361.pdf.

Глава 2 1

2

3

Типичные оптимистические оценки перспектив развития Центральной Азии в первые десять лет независимости см.: Starr S. F. Making Eurasia Stable // Foreign Affairs. — 1996. — Jan./Febr. — Vol. 75, публикация на сайте http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19960101faessay4173/sfrederickstarr/making-eurasia-stable.html. Типичные негативные оценки см.: Central Asia a Gathering Storm / B. Rumer, ed. — Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2002. Относительно природных богатств стран Центральной Азии см. приложение 8. См. различные печатные работы и показания Марты Брилл Олкотт: Politics of Economic Distribution in the Caspian Sea States: Testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Eco-

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nomic Policy, Export, and Trade Promotion, Washington, D.C., April 12, 2000, публикация на сайте http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/senatetestimony.asp; Democracy in the Central Asian Republics: Testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific on Democracy in the Central Asian Republics, April 12, 2000, публикация на сайте http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/housetestimony.asp; Testimony before the U.S. Congress’s Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the Challenge of Building Democracy in Kazakhstan, May 6, 1999, публикация на сайте http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kazakhstan/links/olcott. html; Caspian Sea Oil Exports: Testimony before the Subcommitte on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 8, 1998, публикация на сайте http://www.ceip.org/ people/olccaspw.htm; Facing the Future: Twelve Myths about Central Asia: Paper presented at the Central Asian Conference on Regional Cooperation, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 1995 (доклад на Центральноазиатской конференции по региональному сотрудничеству в Бишкеке, Киргизия, в 1995 г.). Информация относительно крупных проектов разработки минеральных ресурсов Центральной Азии приведена в приложении 8. Краткий обзор подхода каждой из этих стран к экономическим и политическим реформам дан в приложении 12. Первые вторжения арабов в Центральную Азию начались около 667 г. н. э. Исламизация местного населения была постепенной и ненасильственной. См.: Gibb H. A. R. The Arab Conquests in Central Asia. — New York: AMS Print, 1970. Чингисхан (ок. 1155—1227) основал Монгольскую империю, объединив под своим знаменем различные монгольские племена к 1206 г. Золотая Орда держала Евразию под своим контролем до XV в. Казахские племена тогда назывались киргизами, а киргизы — каракиргизами, т. е. «черными киргизами». Россия аннексировала Казахстан 1863 г., сделав его своим Степным округом, и большей его частью управляли военные генерал-губернаторы. Хивинское ханство и Бухарский эмират стали российскими протекторатами и уменьшились в размерах. Национальная политика Сталина подробно обсуждается в кн.: Blank S. The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin as Commissar of Nationalities, 1917—1924. — Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994. Туркестанcкое генерал-губернаторство было разделено на Южный Казахстан, Восточную Туркмению, Киргизию, Узбекистан и Таджикистан.

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Западная Туркмения стала частью Закаспийского военного округа, а Северный Казахстан вошел в состав Степного генерал-губернаторства. Самани (849—907) был основателем династии саманидов, говоривших на персидском языке. Фотография памятника Самани помещена на обложке этой книги. Подробнее см.: Atkin M. The Subtlest Battle: Islam in Soviet Tajikistan. — Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Inst., 1989. Стычки между киргизами и узбеками летом 1990 г. в Ошской области Киргизии начались из-за небольшого земельного спора, но вылились в ожесточенные столкновения с большим числом погибших. См.: Elebayeva A. The Osh Incident: Problems for Research // Post-Soviet Geography. — 1992. — Vol. 33. — № 2. — P. 70—78; Khazanov A. After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States. — Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1995. Стычка между местными таджиками и киргизами в районе Исфары в Таджикистане, расположенном между Узбекистаном и Киргизией в Ферганской долине, привела к насилию и гибели одного человека. См.: Nationalities: Current Digest of the Soviet Press. — 1989. — Aug. 9. Поверхность Аральского моря распределяется между странами Центральной Азии следующим образом: Таджикистан — 54,4%, Киргизия — 25,3%, Узбекистан — 8,2%, Афганистан — 6,8%, Казахстан — 2,6%, Иран — 2%, Туркмения — 0,7%. См.: Polat N. Boundary Issues in Central Asia. — New York: Transnational Publishers, 2002. Однако схемы водопользования не имеют с этим ничего общего. Micklin Ph. Managing Water in Central Asia. — London: Royal Inst. of Intern. Affairs, 2000. Например, в тот год объем промышленной продукции в Казахстане составил 68,3% уровня 1991 г., в Киргизии — 58,1%, в Таджикистане — 31,2%, в Туркмении — 61,6%, в Узбекистане — 83,8%. Zettelmeyer J. The Uzbek Growth Puzzle // IMF Staff Papers. — 1999. — Vol. 46. — № 3. — Sept./Dec. — P. 275. Water and Conflict / Intern. Crisis Group, Central Asia. — Osh; Brussels, May 30, 2002. — P. 3. Подробнее см. приложение 13. Подробное описание этого движения опубликовано на сайте GlobalSecurity.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hizb-uttahrir.htm. Полное описание деятельности «Хизб ат-Тахрир» в Центральной Азии см.: Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir / Intern. Crisis Group // Asia Report. — 2003. — № 58. — June 30, доступно через http://www.icg.org.

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По имеющимся оценкам на июль 1998 г. население Казахстана составляло 16,8 млн человек, из них 46% казахов, 34% русских, 4,9% украинцев, 3,1% немцев, 2,3% узбеков, 1,9% татар и 7,1% представителей других национальностей. Первый мощный поток переселенцев из России начался в конце XVIII и самом начале XIX в., причем российское правительство при Столыпине специально поощряло такое переселение. Следующий крупномасштабный приток русских в Казахстан был связан с программой освоения целинных и залежных земель, инициированной Хрущевым в 1950-х годах. См.: Olcott M. B. The Kazakhs: 2nd ed. — Stanford, CA: Hoover Univ. Press, 1995. — Р. 83—99, 225—240. Laruelle M., Peyrouse S. Les Russes du Kazakhstan: Identités nationals et nouveaux États dans l’espace post-soviétique. — Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2003. — P. 336. Суммарный внешний долг более чем удвоился — с 1848 млн долл. в 1993 г. до 4587 млн долл. в 1997 г. Republic of Kazakstan: Recent Economic Developments / Intern. Monetary Fund. — Washington, DC, August 1998. — P. 64. — (IMF Staff Country Report; № 98/84). Поголовье крупного рогатого скота уменьшилось с 9,4 млн в 1993 г. до 4,299 млн в 1997 г. Крупнейшие банки Казахстана — Казахский национальный банк, Тураналембанк, банк «Халик» и повсеместно уважаемый Казкоммерцбанк, имеющий весьма высокий международный рейтинг. На самом деле это было настолько трудно, что в 2005 г. правительство Казахстана объявило, что оно намерено потребовать, чтобы все самолеты, выполняющие международные рейсы в Казахстан, сначала приземлялись в Астане. См.: Kazakhstan Country Analysis Brief / Energy Information Administration. — Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, Nov. 2004, публикация на сайте http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/kazak.html. Первоначально компания «Chevron» была приглашена разрабатывать это месторождение еще президентом СССР Михаилом Горбачевым. После распада Советского Союза «Chevron» заключил с правительством Казахстана новый контракт, по которому обязался инвестировать в этот проект 20 млрд долл. Работы по проекту КТК начались еще в 1993 г., но нефть оттуда пошла лишь в марте 2001 г., а на полную мощность трубопровод заработал только в октябре 2001 г.

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Карачаганакский консорциум включает в себя британскую компанию «British Gas» (32,5%), итальянскую «Agip» (32,5%), американскую «Chevron-Texaco» (20%) и российскую «ЛУКойл» (15%). Руководит проектом компания «Казмунайгаз». См.: U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, United States v. James H. Giffen, Indictment S1 03 Cr. 404 (WHP), April 12, 2004. В начале марта 1995 г. Конституционный суд Казахстана признал правоту Татьяны Квятковской, журналиста из Абилайханского избирательного округа Алматы. Она утверждала, избирательные округа на выборах 1994 г. были нарезаны непропорционально. Конституционный суд признал парламентские выборы 1994 г. в целом неконституционными. Из 47 членов верхней палаты (Сената) 40 избираются региональными ассамблеями (специальными коллегиями выборщиков, состоящими из членов местных советов), а остальные 7 назначаются президентом. 67 членов нижней палаты (Мажилиса) избираются прямым голосованием, и еще 10 избираются по партийным спискам по системе пропорционального представительства избирателями на всей территории государства. Подробнее относительно запасов нефти в Туркмении см.: International Energy Outlook / Energy Information Administration. — Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, Apr. 2004; относительно неразведанных и потенциальных запасов см.: Turkmenistan: Recent Economic Developments / Intern. Monetary Fund. — Washington, DC: 1999. — Р. 9. — (IMF Country Staff Report; № 99/140). Ottaway D. B., Morgan D. Gas Pipeline Bounces between Agendas // Washington Post. — 1998. — Oct. 5. Аргентинская компания «Bridas», вложившая в добычу нефти в Туркмении более 400 млн долл., отказалась от участия в ней после того, как правительство Туркмении отложило выдачу лицензии на экспорт нефти. Нидерландская компания «Larmag Energy Assets» столкнулась с аналогичными проблемами (правда, при меньшем объеме инвестиций). Компания «Petronas» из Малайзии в 1996 г. подписала соглашение о разработке нефтяных и газовых месторождений Туркмении, но все работы также были отложены более чем на год, потому что при действующих в Туркмении ограничениях на экспорт она не получала бы никакой прибыли. Американская компания «Unocal» начала работу над своим проектом в 1994 г., но отказалась от него после 1998 г. Olcott M. B. International Gas Trade in Central Asia: Turkmenistan, Iran, Russia and Afghanistan. — Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Program on Ener-

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gy and Sustainable Development and the James A. Baker III Inst. for Public Policy of Rice Univ., May 2004. — (Working Paper; № 28), публикация на сайте http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20605/Turkmenistan_final.pdf. См. приложение 9. В этот консорциум входят «Unocal-Delta Oil» (с долей 85%), туркменская компания «Туркменросгаз» (5%) и российский «Газпром» (10%). См.: Unocal, Delta Sign MOU with Gazprom and Turkmenrosgaz for Natural Gas Pipeline Project, публикация на сайте «Unocal» http://www.unocal.com/uclnews/ 96htm/081396.htm. Сразу после нанесения американцами ракетных ударов «Unocal» приостановила работы по строительству трубопровода и не возобновляла их, пока США не признали афганское правительство. Zamir R. Unocal Withdraws from Pipeline Project // The Nation. — 1998. — Dec. 6. Подробнее относительно проекта «Unocal» и других существующих проектов трубопроводов для транспортировки туркменского газа см.: Olcott M. B. International Gas Trade in Central Asia... Компания «Bridas» возбудила против правительства Туркмении иск в связи с лишением ее экспортной лицензии и наличием примерно 50 млн долл. долга, числящегося за нефтеперерабатывающим предприятием «Туркменбаши». Со своей стороны, правительство Туркмении возбудило против «Bridas» встречный иск, утверждая, что эта компания нарушила условия соглашения о совместном предприятии. Bridas Likely to Pull Out of Turkmenistan // Dow Jones via Energy. — 2000. — Vol. 24. — Oct. 18; Company News: Central Asia // Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections. — 2000. — Vol. 5. — № 21. — Nov. 16. По сообщению «Немецкой волны», туркменский режим принимает участие в систематической транспортировке наркотиков и наладил связи с производителями мака в Афганистане. Safronov R. Turkmenistan’s Niyazov Implicated In Drug Smuggling // Eurasia Insight, Eurasianet.org. — 2002. — March 29; см. также: Turkmenistan’s Political Crisis: Inside the Niyazov Regime; a Discussion with Boris Shikhmuradov. — Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Intern. Peace, April 29, 2002, публикация на сайте http:// www.ceip.org/files/events/sheikmuradov042902transcript.asp. Очевидцы сами рассказывали автору, что Ниязов просил и получал от потенциальных инвесторов массивные золотые часы «Ролекс» — просто «чтобы задать тон переговорам». Все доклады относительно соблюдения прав человека в Узбекистане, подготовленные Государственным департаментом США, опубликованы на сайте http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy.html.

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Данные о ВНП Киргизии за этот период приведены в приложении 1. 29 июня 2001 г. на заседании Государственного комитета по иностранной помощи и инвестициям министр финансов Киргизии Темирбек Акматалиев заявил, что внешний долг Киргизии достиг 2 млрд долл., что примерно на треть превышает ВНП страны. По имеющимся оценкам, на 1 января 2000 г. суммарный внешний долг Киргизии составлял 1,76 млрд долл. (RFE/RL — 2001. — July 2). Опубликовано на сайте Государственного департамента США http://www. state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5755.htm. Olcott M. B. Central Asia’s New States. — Washington, DC: U.S. Inst. of Peace Press, 1996. — Р. 102. В мае 1998 г. грузовик с Кумтора опрокинулся на горной дороге, и почти две тонны токсичных веществ попало в реку Барскун, впадающую в озеро Иссык-Куль, в результате чего несколько человек погибли от отравления. Biliouri D. The Cyanide Spill in Kyrgyzstan: Measuring Civil Society Development // EurasiaNet.org. — 2000. — Jan. 4, публикация на сайте http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/environment/articles/ eav120799.shtml. Публикация на сайте http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/BISNIS/COUNTRY/ 0110overviewch2_kg.htm. Например, производство мяса снизилось с 254,1 тыс. т в 1990 г. до 180 тыс. т в 1995 г., а производство молока упало с 1185 тыс. т в 1990 г. до 864 тыс. т в 1995 г. Kyrgyz Republic: Recent Economic Development / Intern. Monetary Fund. — Washington, DC, Febr. 5, 1998. — (IMF Country Report; № 98/08). По другим данным, производство мяса в 1995 г. было на 71% ниже, чем в 1990 г., а производство молока — на 73% ниже. Сидикову обвинили в клевете на президента государственной золотодобывающей компании «Кыргызалтын» Дастана Саригулова, родственника жены Акаева, содержавшейся в ряде статей, публикованных в 1993— 1996 гг. После изгнания Акаева в марте 2005 г. З. Сидикова была назначена послом Киргизии в Соединенных Штатах. Относительно политических партий и выборов в Центральной Азии см. приложение 12. Свои первые, безальтернативные президентские выборы Акаев выиграл в октябре 1991 г. На президентских выборах 1995 г. его соперниками были бывший спикер парламента Медеткен Шеримкулов и лидер Коммунистической партии Абсамат Масалиев. В 2000 г. соперниками Акаева были Турсунбек Акунов, Алмазбек Атамбаев, Турсунбай Бакир Уулу, Мелис Ешимканов и Омарбек Текебаев.

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Kyrgyz Republic: Parliamentary Elections, 20 February and 12 March 2000, Final Report / Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Election Observation Mission. — Warsaw: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Apr. 10, 2000. Kyrgyz Presidential Election Fails International Standards: Press release / Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Election Observation Mission. — [S. l.], Oct. 30, 2000. Jakipova Ch. The Challenge of Governance in the Central Asian Countries (an Example of Kyrgyzstan). — Статья, подготовленная для конференции по безопасности в Центральной Азии, проводившейся Международной академией мира в июле 2002 г.в Вене. Кулов оставался в тюрьме вплоть до изгнания Аскара Акаева 24 марта 2005 г., и вскоре после этого с него были сняты все обвинения, что позволило ему участвовать в президентской кампании в июне 2005 г. Согласно официальной статистике в 1999 г. за чертой бедности жило 83% населения Таджикистана, однако эти данные учитывают только легальные, декларируемые доходы. Poverty Reduction, Growth and Debt Sustainability in Low-Income CIS Countries / World Bank and Intern. Monetary Fund. — Washington, DC, Febr. 4, 2002. — Р. 9. Republic of Tajikistan: Recent Economic Developments / Intern. Monetary Fund. — Washington, DC, Febr. 1998. — Р. 14. — (IMF Staff Country Report; № 98/16). Самому большому риск подвергались Вахшский и Бохтарский районы Хатлонской области. Подробнее см.: Jawad N., Tadjbakhsh Sh. Tajikistan: A Forgotten War // Minority Rights Group. — 1995. — Febr. Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace / Intern. Crisis Group. — Brussels, Dec. 24, 2001. — (ICG Asia Report; № 30). В последние годы существования советского режима элита Коммунистической партии Узбекистана из Ташкента доминировала также в политической жизни Ошской области в Киргизии. Самыми известными из них были Акбар Тураджонзода и Саид Абдулло Нури из Исламской партии возрождения. Таджикистан изменил свою систему административного деления. Худжанд (в советское время Ленинабад) в начале 2000 г. стал центром Согдийской области. Куляб был объединен с Курган-Тюбе, и сейчас это Хатлонская область.

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Atkin M. Tajikistan: Reform, Reaction, and Civil War // New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations / Ed. I. Bremmer and R. Taras. — Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997. — Р. 602—627. Подробнее см.: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process / Eds. K. Abdullaev, C. Barnes // Accord Report. — 2001. — № 10. — March, публикация на сайте http://www.cr.org/accord/tajik/accord10/index.shtml. В августе 1999 г. боевики ИДУ взяли в качестве заложников восемь киргизских солдат и четырех японских геологов; японцев, как предполагают, отпустили только после того, как за них был выплачен выкуп в 2 млн долл. Следующим летом боевики ИДУ пришли сюда снова и взяли в заложники много иностранцев, в том числе четырех американских альпинистов. См.: Burgess M. In the Spotlight: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. — Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, March 25, 2002, публикация на сайте http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/imu.cfm. Кажется, 73 жителя Сурхандарьинской области в июне 2001 г. были обвинены в оказании помощи ИДУ и приговорены к различным срокам заключения (от 3 до 18 лет). EurasiaNet.org. — 2004. — Febr. 14. Подробнее о религиозных группах в Центральной Азии см. приложение 13. Слово «махалля» в переводе с узбекского в широком смысле означает «соседство», «местное сообщество». В советское время, как во многом и сегодня, махалля представляла собой орган местного самоуправления, которое осуществлялось через назначаемый властями комитет махалли, состоявший из уважаемых пожилых людей. Шукрулло Мирсаидов был председателем Совета министров Узбекской ССР, а с ноября 1991 г. по январь 1992 г. — вице-президентом Узбекистана. Вскоре после его ухода из правительства против него были выдвинуты обвинения в преступных действиях. В октябре 1995 г. Мирсаидов стал руководителем координационного совета демократической оппозиции. Подробнее см.: http://www.centrasia.ru/person.php4, а также Human Rights Watch Report 1996. — New York, 1996, публикация на сайте http://www. hrw.org/reports/1996/UZBEK.htm. В конце 1993 г. Салих нашел убежище в Турции. Абдураим Пулот, соучредитель «Бирлика», в ноябре 1994 г. уехал в Соединенные Штаты после того, как был жестоко избит в Ташкенте. См.: Roy O. The New Central Asia. — New York: New York Univ. Press, 1997. — Р. 132—133. Самыми известными из них были Абдурали-кори Мирзоев из Андижана и Обид-кори Назаров из Ташкента. Мирзоев, кажется, умер, а Назаров жи-

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вет в изгнании. Olcott M. B., Babajanov B. The Roots of Radicalism in Central Asia. — Carnegie Paper (forthcoming). После этих арестов лидер ИДУ Тахир Юлдаш стал претендовать на роль духовного лидера (несмотря на свой весьма низкий уровень формального образования), а Джума Намангани стал руководить военными операциями. Оппоненты президента Каримова постоянно утверждают, что узбекское правительство само подготовило эти взрывы, чтобы продемонстрировать существование угрозы со стороны исламистов. Эти обвинения ни разу не были подкреплены доказательствами, но если вспомнить, насколько близко к важнейшим правительственным зданиям действовали террористы, вполне можно предположить, что некоторые офицеры узбекских служб безопасности сотрудничали с ИДУ. Uzbekistan, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 2001 / Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. — Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, March 4, 2002, публикация на сайте http://www.state.gov/g/drl/ rls/hrrpt/2001/eur/8366.htm. См. также: Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: Uzbekistan. — New York, 2001, публикация на сайте http://www. hrw.org/wr2k1/europe/uzbekistan.html. См.: Rashid A. Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. — New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2002; The IMU and the Hizb-ut Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign / Intern. Crisis Group. — Osh; Brussels, Jan. 30, 2002. — (Central Asia Briefing). RFE/RL NewsLine: Transcaucasia and Central Asia. — 2000. — Oct. 5. Например, узбекский экспорт в Киргизию упал с 102 млн долл. в 1994 г. до 51,2 млн долл. в 1998 г., в то время как импорт из Киргизии упал с 68 млн долл. в 1994 г. до 19,2 млн долл. в 1997 г.; узбекский экспорт в Туркмению упал с 174 млн долл. в 1994 г. до 41 млн долл. в 1998 г., а импорт из Туркмении упал со 144 млн долл. в 1994 г. до 10 млн долл. в 1998 г. Некоторые торговцы все еще пользуются «дырами» на границе для доставки товаров на базары Узбекистана, например, участком шоссе между Ташкентом и Самаркандом, проходящим через территорию Казахстана, или сравнительно слабо охраняемой узбекско-казахстанской границей на дороге между Ташкентом и Шымкентом. Среднегодовые темпы роста ВНП Узбекистана см. в приложении 2. В начале 1990-х годов сельское хозяйство обеспечивало 30% ВНП Узбекистана, и при этом страна занимала пятое место в мире по объемам производства и экспорта хлопка. Например, в 1993 г. хлопок обеспечивал 41% узбекского экспорта и 23% ВНП, а в 1994 г. — 51% экспорта и 26,5% ВНП.

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Подробнее о геополитике в этом регионе в течение первых пяти лет независимости см.: Olcott M. B. Central Asia’s New States. — Washington, DC: U.S. Inst. of Peace Press, 1996. — Р. 170—179. Сталин депортировал корейцев, потому что опасался их нелояльности в преддверии неизбежного, как он полагал, вторжения Японии. По данным переписи населения СССР 1989 г., в Узбекистане проживали 183,1 тыс. корейцев, в Казахстане — 100,7 тыс., в Киргизии — 18,3 тыс., в Таджикистане — 13,4 тыс., в Туркмении — 2,8 тыс. Андрей Козырев был министром иностранных дел России в 1992— 1996 гг. Первоначально СНГ было образовано 8 декабря 1991 г. президентами Украины, Белоруссии и России, но позже, 21 декабря 1991 г., в Алматы состоялось второе «учредительное совещание», на котором состав СНГ был расширен за счет включения в него еще восьми республик: Азербайджана, Армении, Казахстана, Киргизии, Молдавии, Таджикистана, Туркмении и Узбекистана. Грузия в 1991 г. отказалась от вступления в СНГ, но затем присоединилась к нему в 1993 г. Подробнее о первых годах существования СНГ см.: Getting It Wrong / M. B. Olcott, A. Åslund, and Sh. W. Garnett, eds. — Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Intern. Peace, 1999. Первый президент Грузии Звиад Гамсахурдиа был диссидентом с большим стажем. Абульфаз Эльчибей, избранный президентом Азербайджана в 1992 г., был лидером партии «Народный фронт» и активно боролся за независимость Азербайджана. Руководимая русскими Приднестровская республика объявила о независимости от Молдавии в 1992 г. Борьба за контроль над Нагорным Карабахом началась в 1988 г. и превратилась в настоящую войну в 1993 г., когда Армения при молчаливой поддержке России взяла эту область под свой контроль, тем самым аннексировав 20% территории Азербайджана. Война в Абхазии вспыхнула в августе 1992 г., когда грузинские военные формирования заняли столицу этой республики, претендующей на независимость, но были изгнаны террористами (которых поддерживала Россия), в конце концов взявшими под контроль всю Абхазию. Государства, вошедшие в Евразийский союз, должны были формировать общую политику и взаимовыгодную внешнеэкономическую политику на межправительственной ассамблее, а также иметь общую валюту. Все чле-

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ны ЕАС должны были иметь одинаковые права при голосовании, а решения — приниматься большинством в 80%. См.: Getting It Wrong. — Р. 24. Подробнее относительно таможенного союза см.: Getting It Wrong. — Р. 170—172. Russia in Multi-Million Arms Deal with Northern Alliance // Guardian. — 2001. — Oct. 23. Россия вынудила казахов учитывать постепенное списание этого долга в качестве арендной платы (115 млн долл. в год) за пользование советским космическим центром Байконур около Ленинска (Казахстан). Подробнее об этих переговорах см.: Olcott M. B. Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise. — Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Intern. Peace, 2002. — Р. 45. Рус. пер.: Олкотт М. Б. Казахстан: непройденный путь / Моск. Центр Карнеги. — Москва; Вашингтон, 2003. — С. 63—64. Этой компанией владело туркменское правительство, которому принадлежал 51% акций, российскому «Газпрому» принадлежало 44% акций, а корпорация «Itera International Energy» из США владела 5% акций. Тревоги Ниязова были не совсем беспочвенными. Бывший премьер Сапармурат Союунов с момента своей отставки жил в Москве, как и бывший заместитель премьера Валерий Очерцов, президент «Itera Holding Ltd.» (российского филиала «Itera Group»), частной компании, входившей в состав семейства «Itera», весьма активно участвовавшего в торговле туркменским газом. Украинцы «подпитывались» из европейских поставок, если не удовлетворялись их собственные потребности, а грузинской долг был для России очень удобным политическим инструментом. В 1990 г. добыча газа составляла 81,9 млрд куб. м, в 1995 г. — 30,1 млрд куб. м, а в 1998 г. — 12,4 млрд куб. м. См.: Dorian J. P. Turkmenistan’s Future in Gas and Oil Hinges on Certainty for Export Options // Oil & Gas J. — 2002. — Oct. 12. Подробнее см.: Olcott M. B., Udalova N. Drug Trafficking on the Great Silk Road: The Security Environment in Central Asia. — Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Intern. Peace, March 2000. — (Carnegie Working Paper; № 11). Рус. пер.: Олкотт М. Б., Удалова-Зварт Н. Наркотрафик на Великом шелковом пути: безопасность в Центральной Азии. — М., 2000. — (Раб. материалы / Моск. Центр Карнеги; Вып. 2). Границы Казахстана и Киргизии с Китаем в 1992—1995 гг. патрулировали российские пограничники, а затем до 1998 г. совместные силы. До 1995 г. российские военнослужащие патрулировали также туркменско-иранскую

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границу на основании соответствующего соглашения и, возможно, задержались там еще на долгое время. Некоторое время это лобби концентрировалось вокруг Владимира Жириновского. В него входили также Алексей Митрофанов и Константин Затулин с его Институтом стран СНГ. Пик эмиграции пришелся на середину 1990-х годов, когда из Центральной Азии и с Кавказа, как сообщалось, уехало почти 75% проживавших там 5 млн русских. См.: World Migration 2003: Managing Migration Challenges and Responses for People on the Move / Intern. Organization for Migration // IOM World Migration Report Series. — 2003. — Vol. 2. — Р. 43. Было арестовано 22 человека, в том числе 12 российских граждан. Казахстанские власти утверждали, что Виктор Казимирчук, лидер патриотического движения «Русь», планировал совершение террористически актов. Подробнее см.: Olcott M. B. Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise. — Р. 79— 80 (Олкотт М. Б. Казахстан: непройденный путь. — С. 100). Центральный банк России решил изъять из обращения старые банкноты 26 июля 1993 г. См.: Russia Economic Policy and Trade Practices / U.S. Department of State. — Washington, D.C., Febr. 1994. Этот процесс не всегда идет гладко. Так, Азербайджан и Туркмения заявляют о своих правах на месторождение Сердар-Кяпаз; кроме того, обе страны претендуют на части месторождений Азери и Чирак. См.: EIA Country Analysis: Caspian Sea Region, July 31, 2002 / Energy Information Administration // Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections, News & Trends: Central Asia. — 2002. — Vol. 7. — № 16. — Aug. 23. Эти соглашения в основном были заключены до 11 сентября, хотя протокол между Россией и Казахстаном о разделе поровну трех месторождений нефти в северной части Каспия (Курмангазы, Центральное и Хвалынское) был подписан только в мае 2002 г. Каждая из этих стран имеет 50%-ную долю в их разработке. Этот протокол также определил срединную линию, разделяющую соответствующие сектора этих двух стран в Каспийском море. Он расширил соглашение 1998 г., согласно которому месторождение Курмангазы находилось в казахском секторе Каспийского моря, а два других — в российском секторе. См.: Financial Times. — 2002. — Apr. 27; Kazakhstan Daily Digest / Eurasianet.org. — 2002. — May 14. Президент Казахстана Назарбаев посещал Китай в октябре 1993 г., в сентябре 1995 г., в феврале 1997 г. и в ноябре 1999 г., президент Киргизии Акаев — в 1998 и 2002 гг., президент Таджикистана Рахмонов — в августе 1999 г., министр иностранных дел Таджикистана Талбак Назаров — в

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июне 2001 г., президент Узбекистана Каримов — в октябре 1994 г. и в июне 2001 г. (чтобы присутствовать на встрече лидеров «Шанхайской пятерки»), бывший министр иностранных дел Туркмении Шихмурадов служил послом в Китае с марта по ноябрь 2001 г. Речь идет о межправительственных соглашениях по торговому и экономическому сотрудничеству, дальнейшему развитию культурных связей и гуманитарной помощи. FBIS-SOV-94-080. — 1994. — Apr. 26. Председатель КНР Цзян Цзэминь также посетил Казахстан, Киргизию и Узбекистан в июле 1996 г. RFE/RL NewsLine. — 1996. — July 3. В 1985 г., в 1989 г. и в апреле 1990 г. в Китае состоялись крупные демонстрации, организованные Исламской партией «Восточный Туркестан». Israeli R. A New Wave of Muslim Revivalism in Mainland China // Issues and Studies. — 1997. — Vol. 33. — № 3. — March. — Р. 30. Относительно истории сложных отношений между Москвой и мусульманскими сепаратистами в Китае см.: Olcott M. B. Russian-Chinese Relations and Central Asia // Rapprochement or Rivalry? Russia—China Relations in a Changing Asia / Ed. Sh. Garnett. — Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Intern. Peace, 2000. — Р. 371—400. 9 человек погибло, 74 было ранено. Позже в марте уйгурская сепаратистская группировка под названием «Организация освобождения Восточного Туркестана — Фидаины из Пекина» взяла на себя ответственность за два взрыва в Пекине. Эти слухи начали циркулировать после того, как в Лондоне состоялось совещание нескольких групп исламистов, финансируемых базирующимся в Сирии Движением исламского сопротивления, или «Движением эмигрантов» (Харакат аль-муджахирин), для дискуссий относительно поддержки джихада в Китае. См.: Al-Watan Arabi [Paris]. — 1997. — May 23; FBISNES-97-102. Автор настоящей книги поверила в это, найдя переведенный с арабского языка материал в поддержку такого джихада в процессе сбора информации для статьи 1997 г. См.: Olcott M. B. Russian-Chinese Relations... — Р. 384. ШОС называлась «Шанхайской пятеркой» до тех пор, пока в 2001 г. в нее не вступил Узбекистан; его присоединение принесло дополнительные выгоды пяти участникам соглашения от 1996 г. Правительства Казахстана и Китая подписали несколько соглашений относительно упорядочения пограничных мероприятий до апреля 1996 г. По этому соглашению Казахстан сохранил за собой 442 кв. км территории в горах Зурека в долине реки Чоган-Обо и 442 кв. км в Керегенташе. Ки-

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тайская граница переместилась, охватив еще 187 кв. км. В результате Казахстану досталось 56,9% спорных территорий, а Китаю — 43,1%. Kazakhstan Parliament Ratifies Border Agreement with China // Moscow Interfax (in English 1403 GMT). — 1999. — Febr. 3. Казахстанский парламент ратифицировал это соглашение в феврале (Мажилис) и марте (Сенат) 1999 г. Формально соглашение было подписано на встрече министров иностранных дел Казахстана и Китая 10 мая 2002 г. В июле 2003 г. президент Назарбаев подписал закон, который был одобрен парламентом. В мае 2002 г. киргизский парламент также ратифицировал соглашение с Китаем. См.: Polat N. Boundary Issues in Central Asia. — New York: Transnational Publ., 2002; Kazakhstan Ratifies Protocol on Border with China // Interfax News Agency. — 2003. — July 9. Интервью с Азимбеком Бекназаровым в Бишкеке, Киргизия, ноябрь 2002 г. Sadji. An Early Defeat for President Akaev // Prism. — 2002. — Vol. 8. — № 4. — Pt. 4. — Apr. Американская компания «Access Industries» получила контроль над долей правительства Казахстана в 2001 г., отчасти из-за трудностей в управлении проектом, с которыми оно столкнулось при работе с китайцами. В 2003 г. эти доли были возвращены правительству республики. Central Asia and Caucasus Business Report / Interfax. — 2002. — Vol. 5. — № 16. — Apr. 15—21. Склады чрезвычайно важны, потому что страны Центральной Азии все еще используют рельсовую колею, отличающуюся от стандарта, принятого в большинстве стран Европы и Азии, так что требуется менять колесные пары или перегружать контейнеры. Отсутствие складов также затрудняет работу новой железнодорожной ветки между Тедженом (Туркмения) и Мешхедом (Иран) на туркменско-иранской границе. Этот путь включает в себя пограничный переход Серахс, который был открыт в мае 1996 г. В 1999 г. через сооружения в поселке Дружба прошло 3,5 млн т грузов, в 2000 г. — 5 млн т, а в 2001 г. — более 6 млн т. См. казахский железнодорожный сайт http://www.railways.kz/transit/eng.asp. Цель проекта «Traceca» состоит в ускорении товарообмена между Европой и Азией. Соответствующий договор был подписан восемью государствами в 1993 г., когда были открыты границы в Восточной Европе. Сейчас в программе «Traceca» принимают участие 13 государств: Армения, Азербайджан, Болгария, Грузия, Казахстан, Киргизия, Молдавия, Румыния, Таджикистан, Турция, Туркмения, Украина и Узбекистан.

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«Транзитный трафик» начинается в Алматы (Казахстан), идет через Бишкек (Киргизия) к Кашгару (Китай) и затем на перевал Хунджераб в Пакистане. Полная длина этой дорожной системы — около 3 тыс. км. Акт о защите свободы (FREEDOM — Свобода для России и формирующихся евразийских демократий и открытых рынков) вступил в силу 25 октября 1992 г., утвердив «комплекс программ поддержки свободного рынка и демократических реформ в России, на Украине, в Армении и других государствах бывшего Советского Союза». До сентября 2001 г. президент Назарбаев приезжал в США с официальными визитами в 1992, 1994 и дважды в 1999 гг. Президент Акаев в 1993 г. приезжал в США официально и еще несколько раз неофициально. Президент Рахмонов приезжал в США в 1999 г., а президент Ниязов — в 1993 г. (но до 1997 г. его не принимали в Белом доме). Президент Каримов дважды (в 1993 и 1995 гг.) приезжал в ООН, открыл посольство Узбекистана в Вашингтоне в ходе частного визита в 1996 г., а в Белом доме впервые побывал в апреле 1999 г. на торжествах по поводу пятидесятилетнего юбилея НАТО. Текст этой речи опубликован на сайте http://www.state.gov/www/ regions/nis/970721talbott.html. На церемонии подписания протокола о прокладке трубопровода Баку — Джейхан и Транскаспийского газопровода президент Билл Клинтон использовал важные в дипломатическом отношении выражения «несколько трубопроводов» (multiple pipelines) и «план действий» (action plan). Его замечания опубликованы на сайте http://www.useu.be/ISSUES/ casp1118.html. Хотя некоторое время казалось, что администрация Клинтона склоняется к тому, чтобы смягчить свое отношение к Тегерану, к 1997 г. стало ясно, что американское правительство не желает изменять закон о санкциях против Ирана и Ливии, принятый 23 июля 1996 г. и возобновленный в июле 2001 г. Эти санкции практически исключали участие американских фирм в транспортировке нефти и газа с месторождений Каспия через Иран. Относительно крупных проектов разработки природных ресурсов в Центральной Азии см. приложение 8. Встреча автора этой книги с Гиффеном произошла на закрытой пресс-конференции Элизабет Джонс, в тот момент недавно назначенного американского посла в Казахстане (1995—1998 гг.). Фактически связи между Гиффеном и членами правительства были настолько близкими, что он заявлял, что был ценным сотрудником ЦРУ и поэтому должен быть освобожден от судебного преследования, но суд отклонил этот аргумент.

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Александр М. Хейг-младший прибыл в Туркмению в 1992 г. Впоследствии он стал близким доверенным лицом президента Ниязова и в 1993 г. помог организовать его визит в Вашингтон, чтобы лоббировать увеличение американских инвестиций в Туркмении. Ottaway D. В., Morgan D. Gas Pipeline Bounces between Agendas // Washington Post. — 1998. — Oct. 5. Борис Шихмурадов занимал различные дипломатические посты в Советском Союзе, а позже в Туркмении. Он был заместителем министра иностранных дел (1992—1995 гг.), а затем министром иностранных дел Туркмении (1995—2000 гг.). В июле 2000 г. он был назначен специальным посланником Ниязова по проблемам Каспия и установления мира в Афганистане. В марте 2001 г. он стал послом Туркмении в Китае. В ноябре 2001 г. Шихмурадов вышел из правительства и присоединился к оппозиции. Соединенные Штаты использовали крылатые ракеты, чтобы уничтожить лагеря «аль-Каиды» около Хоста. См.: http://www.cnn.com/US/9808/20/ clinton.02/index.html. См. пресс-релиз «Unocal» на сайте http://www.unocal.com/uclnews/ 98news/082198.htm. В 2205 г. Азиатский банк развития удивил обозревателей, объявив, что по его мнению, что с коммерческой точки зрения прокладка трансафганского трубопровода выглядит обоснованной. Pannier B., Echanova Z. Uzbekistan: U.S. Signs Security Agreements in Tashkent // RFE/RL. — 1999. — May 26. Опубликовано также в: Asia Times Online. — 1999. — May 28 (http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/AE28Ag01.html). Так как Казахстан в 1993 г. отказался от ядерного оружия, Соединенные Штаты предоставили ему помощь в размере 188 млн долл. По данным Государственного департамента, в 1994 г. Казахстан передал США более 500 кг высокообогащенного урана. См.: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5487.htm. Эта программа была возобновлена в мае 2002 г., потому что в Казахстане еще остаются шесть пусковых шахт межконтинентальных баллистических ракет, расположенных на испытательном полигоне на юге страны в Ленинске (около Байконура). Kazakh Parliament Prolongs Agreement with U.S. on Destroying Missile Silos // RFE/RL NewsLine. — 2002. — May 17. Казахстан присоединился к программе «Партнерство во имя мира» в мае 1994 г., Киргизия — в июне 1994 г., Туркмения — в мае 1994 г., Узбекистан — в июле 1994 г., а Таджикистан — лишь в феврале 2002 г. Посол Стивен Сестанович, специальный посланник Государственного департамента США в СНГ, сделал это заявление по окончании заседания совместной американо-узбекской комиссии в мае 1999 г. См.: Pannier B., Echanova Z. Op. cit.

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По данным Теда Бридиса и Джона Соломона, всего в сентябре-октябре 2000 г. было послано одиннадцать беспилотных самолетов, но затем их использование было прекращено по указанию президента Джорджа Буша. См.: Associated Press, Washington Dateline. — 2003. — June 25. BBC Monitor. — 2001. — Aug. 19, Aug. 20. Тысячи жителей Центральной Азии получили стипендии для обучения в школах Движения Нурси, которые были открыты также в Узбекистане, Казахстане и Киргизии. Эти школы создаются на основе на модели, разработанной Фетуллой Гулленом, учеником Саида Нурси (1873—1960), который был приверженцем идеи исламизации духа и укрепления веры через образование с конечной целью исламизации государства. Подробнее см.: Balci B. Fethullah Gulen’s Missionary Schools in Central Asia and Their Role in the Spreading of Turkism and Islam // Religion, State and Society. — 2003. — Vol. 31. — № 2. — Р. 151—74. Имеются в виду изменения алфавита для национальных языков (по-русски по-прежнему пишут на кириллице). Киргизия, Казахстан, Узбекистан и Туркмения уже совершили такой переход. Таджикистан с помощью Ирана вновь перешел на персидский (арабский) алфавит. Верящие в двенадцать имамов полагают, что руководителями мусульманского сообщества по закону являются потомки Али, зятя Пророка, от его сына Али Хусейна. Существовало двенадцать таких законных правителей, называемых имамами, причем последний из них, как считают сторонники этого вероучения, не умер, но скрылся в IX столетии, чтобы вернуться в положенное время в качестве мессии (махди) и создать справедливое и совершенное мусульманское общество. Иранские учебники в Таджикистане гораздо легче адаптировать, чем турецкие, потому что на письме таджикский и персидский языки практически идентичны, в то время как туркменский язык относится к той же тюркской группе, что и стамбульский вариант турецкого языка. Olcott M. B. Turkmenistan: Challenges in the Transport of Turkmen Gas. — Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, May 2004. — Р. 13. Премьер-министр Индии Нарасимха Рао нанес официальный визит в Казахстан в мае 1993 г., министр иностранных дел Индии Залман Харшид посетил Казахстан в июне 1994 г., министр нефти и газа Индии В. Рамамурати приезжал в Казахстан 30 марта 1999 г., министр иностранных дел Индии Омар Абдулла посетил Узбекистан 17 сентября 2001 г.

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Организация экономического сотрудничества (первоначально она называлась Организацией по региональному сотрудничеству в целях развития), была создана в 1965 г. Ираном, Пакистаном и Турцией и позже, в 1985 г., была переименована в ОЭС. В 1992 г. в нее вошли Афганистан, Азербайджан и все государства Центральной Азии. Ее главная цель — интегрировать мусульманские государства этого региона в структуру, подобную ЕС. Подробнее см.: Getting It Wrong. — Р. 191—193. Киргизия, Таджикистан и Туркмения присоединились к Организация «Исламская конференция», насчитывавшей 56 стран-участниц, в 1992 г., Казахстан — в 1995 г., а Узбекистан — в 1996 г. См.: http://www. oic-oci.org. Президент Назарбаев посетил Саудовскую Аравию в сентябре 1994 г. В ходе этой поездки он встретился с королем Фахдом бен Абдель Азизом. Поездка Рахмонова в Саудовскую Аравию состоялась в июле 1997 г., и он также обсуждал вопросы саудовско-таджикского сотрудничества с королем Фахдом. Оба президента посетили Мекку, чтобы совершить умру, т. е. малый хадж. RFE/RL Newsline,. — 1997. — July 2. Президент Киргизии Акаев первым из лидеров стран Центральной Азии посетил Израиль в 1993 г. Президент Казахстана Назарбаев приезжал в Израиль в декабре 1995 г., а президент Узбекистана Каримов — в сентябре 1998 г. Israel Emerges as a Player in Central Asia // EurasiaNet.org. — 2001. — Aug. 15. Turkmenistan: President Signals New Gas Export Strategy // RFE/RL Magazine. — 1998. — Apr. 27. Некоторые лидеры Конгресса США, активно участвующие в работе американских еврейских организаций, лоббируют интересы Казахстана. См.: Wexler to Travel to Kazakhstan: Press release from the Office of Congressman Robert Wexler (D-FL), May 24, 2002. В дополнение к усилиям ЕБРР Европейский союз предоставляет странам Центральной Азии помощь через программу «Tacис»: в 1991—1999 гг. им было передано 4226 млн евро, а на 2000—2006 гг. предусмотрено еще 3138 млн евро. См.: http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca. Kyrgyzstan: Militants Test Regional Security // RFE/RL. — 1999. — Aug. 31. Согласно данным Всесоюзной переписи населения в 1989 г. в Казахстане проживало 946,9 тыс. этнических немцев, а в Киргизии — 101,2 тыс. Всего у АБР имеется 17 проектов улучшения систем транспорта и связи в странах Центральной Азии, предусматривающих как восстановление и

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модернизацию существующих маршрутов, так и создание новых. Более подробная информация относительно проектов АБР публикуется на сайте http://www.abd.org. Относительно крупных энергетических проектов в Центральной Азии см. приложение 9.. См.: Overview of Uzbekistan’s Mining Industry / U.S. Department of State. — Washington, DC, Dec. 16, 1998.

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См.: Lubin N. Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia. — New York: Century Foundation Press, 1999. См. также: International Crisis Group’s ICG Asia Reports № 7, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22 и 38, относящиеся к Центральной Азии, публикация на сайте http://www. crisisgroup.com. Относительно экономических реформ в Казахстане и Киргизии см. различные публикации МВФ, в частности «IMF Staff Country Reports» и «IMF Working Papers», на сайте http://www.imf.org. Разброс мнений американцев относительно возможностей реформ в Центральной Азии отразился в свидетельских показаниях в Конгрессе, звучавших в конце 1990-х годов и начале 2000 г. Представители Агентства международного развития в целом рассматривали перспективы реформ в Центральной Азии как довольно оптимистические, особенно с учетом продвижения собственных программ АМР, хотя говорилось и о неравномерности реформ, и о проблемах их осуществления. Между тем некоторые активисты правозащитного движения (например, Кассандра Кавано из «Human Rights Watch»), журналисты (Пол Гобл из RFE/RL) и ученые (включая автора этой книги и Нэнси Лабин из «JNA Associates») не были столь уверены в успехе реформ в Центральной Азии из-за авторитарного характера власти в этом регионе и из-за того, что Америка по-прежнему игнорировала тамошние проблемы. Подробнее см. показания этих и других лиц перед комиссиями Палаты представителей и Сената по иностранным делам в 1997—2000 гг. Gray Ch. W., Hellman J. S., Ryterman R. Anticorruption in Transition 2, Corruption in Enterprise-State Interactions in Europe and Central Asia 1999— 2002. — Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002. Относительно темпов экономического роста в Казахстане см. приложение 7. Данные о доходах на душу населения см.: World Development Report 2005:

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A Better Investment Climate for Everyone / World Bank. — Washington, DC, 2004. Местная валюта тенге была введена в ноябре 1993 г. Ее средневзвешенный обменный курс на Казахстанской фондовой бирже в 1998 г. составлял 78 тенге за доллар, в 1999 г. — 112 тенге, в 2000 г. — 142, в 2001 г. — 146, в 2002 г. — 153, а в ноябре 2004 г. — примерно 132 тенге за доллар. Republic of Kazakhstan: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix / Intern. Monetary Fund. — Washington, DC, July 2003. — (IMF Country Report; № 03/211); Interfax. — 2004. — March 16. Национальный банк Казахстана имеет рейтинг B (информации о рейтингах публикуется на сайте http://www.kase.kz/eng/kasemembers). С 2000 г. и до начала 2004 г. Национальный банк Казахстана возглавлял сильный реформатор Григорий Марченко, ранее руководивший фондовой биржей и отвечавший за первую пенсионную реформу в стране. Качество работы банковского сектора улучшалось с 1995 г., когда Марченко представил свою программу консолидации. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile. — 2003. Классификация «1000 лучших банков мира» (Top 1,000 World Banks) учитывает размеры капитала (по данным Банка международных расчетов в Базеле), а также обычные акции, объявленные резервы и нераспределенную прибыль. Публикация на сайте http://en.kkb.kz. Подробнее относительно частных и государственных банковских структур в Казахстане и Туркмении см.: Voronina S. How Do Companies in Eurasia Finance Their Trade/Investment Deals? // BISNIS Finance Survey, Kazakhstan, публикация на сайте http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/BISNIS/fq2004/ surveys/FinanceSurveyKazakhstan2004.htm. Republic of Kazakhstan: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix / Intern. Monetary Fund. — Washington, DC, July 6, 2004. — Р. 14. Казахстанская фондовая биржа — это прежде всего место организованной торговли ценными бумагами правительства (81,4% товарооборота в 2002 г.), иностранной валютой (12,1%) и ценными бумагами частных корпораций (3,1%). В 2002 г. общий товарооборот биржи составил 24,6 млрд долл. См.: Republic of Kazakhstan: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix / Intern. Monetary Fund. — Washington, DC, July 2003. — P. 61. — (IMF Country Report; № 03/211). Капитализация акций составила 3,7 млрд долл., капитализация облигаций — 4,3 млрд долл., и ежедневно продавалось в среднем 1,3 млн акций. Подробнее см.: http://www.kase.kz/eng/geninfo. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile. — 2004. — P. 30; Interfax. — 2003. — Sept. 16.

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13 июня 2003 г. Ташмагамбетова сменил Даниял Ахметов, который смог протолкнуть этот закон. Предельная налоговая ставка для частных лиц и корпораций — 30%. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile. — 2003. Казахстанские пенсионные планы разделены между частными пенсионными фондами и государственными пенсионными фондами, причем и те, и другие являются закрытыми акционерными обществами. См. также: Olcott M. B. Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise. — Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Intern. Peace, 2002. — Р. 141—142 (Олкотт М. Б. Казахстан: непройденный путь / Моск. Центр Карнеги. — Москва; Вашингтон, 2003. — С. 166—167). Цифры за 2003 г. взяты из публикации: Interfax. — 2003. — Febr. 2. В 2002 г. отмечен профицит государственного бюджета на уровне 0,02% ВВП, по сравнению с дефицитом 0,40% ВВП в 2001 г. См.: Annual Report 2002: East and Central Asia / Asian Development Bank. — Manila, 2002, публикация на сайте http://www.adb.org/documents/reports/annual_report/2002/kaz. asp. В 2003 г. дефицит национального бюджета составил 40,3 млрд тенге, т. е. 0,9% ВВП. Бюджет на 2004 г. был принят с профицитом в 92,7 млрд тенге, или 1,9% ВВП. Interfax Central Asia. — 2004. — Febr. 13, 17, March 12. Министерство финансов Казахстана подсчитало, что с 1995 по 2002 гг. ВВП Казахстана вырос на 140,1% (с учетом инфляции), а в абсолютных цифрах ВВП более чем утроился, увеличившись с 1 трлн тенге до 3,7 трлн тенге. В 2003 г. ВВП Казахстана вырос на 9,2% и достиг 4,4 трлн тенге. Interfax Central Asia. — 2004. — Febr. 13. Republic of Kazakhstan: 2004 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; and Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion / Intern. Monetary Fund. — Washington, DC, Oct. 28, 2004. — (IMF Country Report; № 04/339). По утверждению министра финансов Казахстана Зейнуллы Какимжанова, в 2002 г. доля обрабатывающей промышленности в государственном бюджете составляла 15%, торговли и различных услуг — 12,9%, транспорта и связи — 12,2%, горнодобывающей промышленности — 7,1%, прочих отраслей — 22,6%. Эти цифры прозвучали в речи на очередном ежегодном совещании ЕБРР, проходившем в Ташкенте в мае 2003 г. Общий рост промышленного производства в 2004 г. обеспечивался за счет увеличения производства в горнодобывающей промышленности (12,8%), обрабатывающей промышленности (7,8%), а также производства и распределения электричества, газа и воды (4,4%). См.: Republic of Kazakhstan: 2004 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report...; Interfax Central Asia. — 2004. — Sept. 6—12.

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Country Analysis Briefs: Kazakhstan / Energy Information Administration. — Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, Nov. 4, 2004, публикация на сайте http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/kazak.html. Central Asia and Caucasus Business Report / Interfax. — 2002. — Dec. 9. В 1993—2003 гг. общая сумма прямых иностранных инвестиций в казахстанскую экономику составила 25,8 млрд долл. Основными инвесторами в прошлом десятилетии были Соединенные Штаты, Великобритания, Италия, Южная Корея и Швейцария. Interfax Central Asia. — 2004. — Febr. 17, Sept. 13—19. Sarsenova D. Program to Develop Kazakh Sector of the Caspian Shelf Presented // Times of Central Asia. — 2003. — July 16. Focus on Kazakhstan’s New Hydrocarbon Behemoth / RFE/RL // Central Asia Report. — 2002. — Vol. 2. — № 8. — Febr. 28, публикация на сайте http://www.rferl.org/centralasia/2002/02/8-280202.asp. Newsline: Transcaucasia and Central Asia / RFE/RL. — 2003. — Vol. 7. — № 48. — March 13, публикация на сайте http://www.rferl.org/newsline/ 2003/03/2-TCA/tca-130303.asp. Общая длина трубопровода Баку — Тбилиси — Джейхан составит 1767 км, в том числе 443 км по Азербайджану, 248 км по Грузии и 1076 км по Турции. Стоимость проекта оценивается в 2,95 млрд долл. Interfax report. — 2003. — Sept. 23. В январе 2003 г. компании, входящие в консорциум, согласились в ближайшие три года выплатить Казахстану 810 млн долл. LeVine S. Oil Companies Settle Flap with Kazakhstan // Wall Street J. — 2003. — Jan. 29. 19 сентября 2003 г. акционеры «TengizChevroil» подписали формальное соглашение, определяющее работы на втором этапе проекта, затраты по которому оцениваются в 3 млрд долл. Kistauova Z. Kazakh Tengizchevroil Partners Sign Second Phase Development Deal // Dow Jones Newswires. — 2003. — Sept. 19. Kashagan Developer to Pay $150 mln to Kazakhstan Imminently // 525thenewspaper. — 2004. — № 58 (1664). — March 26, публикация на сайте http://www.525ci.com/2004/03/26/readen.php?m=9&id=13, а также Bukharabayeva B. Kazakh National Oil Company to Pursue More Aggressive Policy to Expand Market Presence // Associated Press. — 2004. — Febr. 23. По мере дальнейшего развития добыча должна возрасти до 1,2 млн баррелей в сутки. ExxonMobil Confirms Approval of Kashagan Development Plan // Scandinavian Oil and Gas Magazine. — 2004. — Febr. 26, публикация на сайте http://www.scandoil.com/moxie/news/world_news-/ exxonmobil-confirms-appro.shtml.

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Интервью, данные автору в Алматы в июне 2004 г. См.: Kazakhstan’s Government to Buy out Part of BG’s Stake in Kashagan Project // RosBusinessConsulting. — 2005. — March 14, публикация на сайте http://www.rbcnews. com/free/2005314125341.shtml. Вторая стадия проекта стоимостью 3,5 млрд долл. была закончена в августе 2003 г. Это привело к увеличению годового объема добычи жидких углеводородов до 7 млн т и строительству Карачаганакского завода по переработке газа, которому предстоит перерабатывать это углеводородное сырье. Примерно в то же время вошел в строй 650-километровый трубопровод для транспортировки жидких углеводородов от Карачаганака до Атырау. См. сайт «ЛУКойла» http://www.lukoil.com/static.asp?id=76 и сайт «Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections» http://www.gasandoil.com/ goc/company/cnc24884.htm. Kazkommerts Securities. — Р. 22. Это газовое месторождение разрабатывает британско-итальянско-американско-росийский консорциум. См. также: Kazakhstan Daily Digest / EurasiaNet.org. — 2001. — Oct. 31. Republic of Kazakhstan: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix / Intern. Monetary Fund. — Washington, DC, Nov. 15, 2004. — (IMF Country Report; № 04/362). Казахстан продает газ примерно по 40 долл. за 1 тыс. куб. м, а цена, обеспечивающая возмещение издержек производства, составляет приблизительно 20 долл. См.: Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU ViewsWire. — 2004. — Sept. 7. The Innovative Industrial Development Strategy of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2003—2015 / Government of Kazakhstan. — Astana, 2003; Aggregate Net Resource Flows, Table 2, World Bank, Report on Global Development Finance 2002. — Washington, DC, 2002. Согласно первоначальным требованиям свои налоговые отчисления в этот фонд должны были направлять 12 фирм: корпорация «Актобемунайгаз», совместное предприятие «TengizChevroil», корпорация LLP, «Kaзцинк», эксплуатационное предприятие «Karachaganak Petroleum Operating», BV, корпорация «Казахмыс», корпорация «Hurricane Kumkol Munai», ООО «Turgai Petroleum», корпорация «Мангистаумунайгаз», корпорация «Узенмунайгаз» и ЗАО «Каражанбашмунай». По решению правительства список этих фирм может быть расширен или сокращен. Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who Will Benefit? / Open Society Inst. // Caspian Revenue Watch. — New York, 2003. — Р. 146. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile for Kazakhstan. — London, Aug. 12, 2003.

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Подробнее скандал, связанный с ролью Джеймса Гиффена в нефтедобывающей промышленности Казахстана, обсуждается в главе 2. Кое-кто утверждает, что Тасмагамбетов был назначен для того, чтобы ограничить ущерб от этого скандала. «Gazeta.kz» сообщила, что в обращении к парламенту 4 апреля 2002 г. он признал, что в 1996 г. действительно был открыт засекреченный счет в иностранном банке на сумму около 1 млрд долл., которые правительство получило от продажи 20%-ной доли в проекте разработки огромного месторождения нефти Тенгиз. Eurasia Policy Forum / EurasiaNet.org. — 2002. — May 5, публикация на сайте http://www. eurasianet.org/ policy_forum/crw_news_archiveapril.shtml. RFE/RL. — 2002. — Apr. 18. Программа правительства Казахстана «Стратегия индустриального развития на 2003—2015 гг.» построена в основном на положениях, содержавшихся в послании Назарбаева «О текущей ситуации в стране и об основных тенденциях внутренней и внешней политики в 2002 г.», и на материалах дискуссий на десятом Форуме предпринимателей Казахстана. Закон Республики Казахстан «Об инвестициях» от 8 января 2003 г. № 373-II был опубликован в газете «Казахстанская правда» 11 января 2003 г. и вступил в силу 22 января 2003 г. Он уравнивает права иностранных и местных инвесторов, заменяя собой закон 1994 г. «Об иностранных инвестициях» и закон 1997 г. «О государственной поддержке прямых инвестиций». Republic of Kazakhstan: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix / Intern. Monetary Fund. — Washington, DC, July 2003. — (IMF Country Report; № 03/211). — Р. 49—52. В октябре «Mittal» объявила, что намерена приобрести американскую компанию «LMN Steel» за 17,8 млрд долл. См.: http://msnbc.msn.com/id/ 6326993. В августе 1996 г. бельгийская энергетическая группа «Tractebel» получила концессию на 20 лет в «Almaty Energy», но в 2000 г. продала ее «Казтрансгазу» за небольшую долю ее первоначальной оценочной стоимости. Американская корпорация AES попыталась извлечь выгоду из проблем «Tractebel». AES, базирующаяся в Техасе, в 1996 г. также приобрела активы в энергетическом секторе Казахстана, и эти инвестиции принесли ей много проблем. Caspian World News. — 2003. — Aug. 27; Olcott M. B. Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise. — P. 164—165 (Олкотт М. Б. Казахстан: непройденный путь. — С. 192—193). В 2003 г. объем экспорта минеральных продуктов составил 8,4 млрд долл. Основной экспорт Казахстана — это нефть и нефтепродукты, металлы, пи-

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щевые и сельскохозяйственные товары и химикалии, в то время как в его импорте преобладают оборудование, химикалии и продовольствие. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2004. — Р. 50. Republic of Kazakhstan: 2004 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; and Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion / Intern. Monetary Fund. — Washington, DC, Oct. 28, 2004. — (IMF Country Report; № 04/ 339). — Р. 16—17. World Development Indicators 2004 / World Bank. — Washington, DC, 2004. Коэффициент Джини — это число в пределах между 0 и 1, где 0 соответствует полному равенству (все люди имеют одинаковый доход), а 1 — абсолютному неравенству (один человек получает весь доход, а остальные не имеют ничего). Индекс Джини выражается в процентах и равен коэффициенту Джини, умноженному на 100. FAST Update, Kazakhstan / Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation // Quart. Risk Assessment [Bern]. — 2003. — May to July. — Р. 5. Human Development Report—Kazakhstan: Rural Development in Kazakhstan: Challenges and Prospects / UN Development Program. — New York, 2002. С 1996 г. инвестиции «Petronas», «Maersk Oil», «Dragon Oil», «Burren Energy Ltd.» и «Maitro International Ltd.» составили более 800 млн долл. Daly J. C. K. UPI Energy Watch // United Press Intern. — 2004. — Aug. 12. Эта практика особенно активно используется в нефтяной и текстильной промышленности, но только на последнем этапе одобрения проекта. Кроме того, все иностранные инвестиции должны быть одобрены Государственным управлением по иностранным инвестициям. Эти займы предназначались для программ развития городского транспорта, развития систем водоснабжения и канализации, а также технической поддержки строительства учреждений и, как первоначально предполагалось, должны быть возвращены в течение 20 лет включая пятилетний льготный период с процентами согласно стандартной норме данного банка для единичных валютных займов на базе LIBOR (лондонского индекса межбанковских процентных ставок). Отказ указать размер внешнего долга является нарушением оговорки об отказе от залога активов, в связи с чем Туркмения перестала соответствовать минимальным требованиям банка в отношении управления общественными ресурсами. Strategy for Turkmenistan / European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. — London, June 23, 2004. — Р. 1. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2002. — London, 2002; Turkmenbashi Wields the Axe // Inst. for War and Peace Reporting. — 2005. —

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№ 356. — March 11, публикация на сайте http://www.iwpr.net/index. pl?archive/rca2/rca2_356_3_eng.txt. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2002; Strategy for Turkmenistan. RFE/RL: Report Says Turkmen President Orders Closure of Hospitals, Libraries, публикация на сайте http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/ turkmenistan/hypermail/200502/0008.shtml. Strategy for Turkmenistan. — Р. 23. Strategy for Turkmenistan. — Р. 17. Индекс переходных индикаторов учитывает показатели мелкомасштабной приватизации, либерализации цен, системы торгового и валютного обмена, крупномасштабной приватизации, управления, реструктуризации предприятий, политики в отношении конкуренции, банковской реформы и рынка ценных бумаг. Глава «Газпрома» Алексей Миллер сказал журналистам, что это соглашение о платежах будет действовать до 2006 г. С 2007 г. Россия и Туркмения должны перейти к оплате поставок газа по мировым ценам или к использованию формулы оплаты, привязанной к стандартному набору нефтепродуктов. По этому соглашению в течение 25 лет Туркмения должна поставить России 2 трлн куб. м газа. Interfax. — 2003. — Apr. 10. При поставке товаров по бартеру учитывается стоимость технической помощи, предоставляемой «Газпромом»; при этом торговлей и предоставлением технической помощи управляют дочерние компании «Газпрома». Согласно долгосрочному соглашению в 2005 г. Туркмения должна поставить России 6—7 млрд куб. м газа (сравнительно немного). Однако в 2006 г. поставки должны увеличиться до 10 млрд куб. м, а в 2007 г. должны резко возрасти до 60—70 млрд куб. м. При этом цена может пересматриваться только начиная с 2007 г. «Газпром» рассчитывает использовать дешевый туркменский газ для обеспечения дополнительных прибылей для России. Он подает дешевый туркменский газ в некоторые регионы России, продавая эквивалентные объемы российского газа по высоким ценам в Европе, а также перепродает в Европу все бóльшие объемы туркменского газа под маркой российского с высокой надбавкой. Подробнее см.: Socor V. Niyazov Unbending on Gas Prices to Russia and Ukraine // Eurasia Daily Monitor. — 2005. — March 24 (http://www.jamestown.org/edm/ article.php?article_id=2369474). Caspian Oil and Gas / Intern. Energy Agency. — Paris, 1998. — Р. 255—257. У автора имеются два документа, подтверждающие, что такой обмен «деньги за топливо» действительно имел место. Только за первые шесть месяцев 2004 г. президент Ниязов санкционировал вложение в строительные проекты 4,5 млрд долл. Repression and Regres-

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sion in Turkmenistan: A New International Strategy / Intern. Crisis Group // ICG Asia Report [Brussels]. — 2004. — № 85. — Nov. 4. Теперь Эсенов живет в Швеции, после того как в 1994 г. он был выслан из России якобы в связи с подготовкой свержения Ниязова. См.: Repression and Regression in Turkmenistan. — Р. 18. См.: Turkmenistan: Seidi Refinery Set for $1 Billion Facelift / Energy Intelligence Group // Nefte Compass. — 2004. — March 23 и Dun’s 100, Israel’s Largest Enterprises 2004, публикация на сайте http://duns100.dundb.co.il/ 600057061. См. также: Эсенов А. Турецкий бизнесмен Ахмед Калик — «серый кардинал» туркменской политики [29 сентября 2003 г.] // http://www. dogryyol.com/article/3729.html; Largest Textile Factory to Be Built in Ashgabat // ITAR-TASS News Agency. — 2003. — Oct. 21. Полная вместимость этого озера составит приблизительно 140 млрд куб. м, оно позволит увеличить площадь орошаемых земель с нынешних 1,8 млн га до 2,2 млн га. Ежегодно оно будет потреблять около 10 млрд куб. м воды, которые должны поступать из всех областей Туркмении. Его предполагается создать в ближайшие 20 лет, и, по имеющимся оценкам, это обойдется примерно в 4,5 млрд долл. Turkmenistan Daily Digest / EurasiaNet. org. — 2003. — May 8. См. сайт «Unocal» http://www.unocal.com/uclnews/97news/102797a.htm. В Туркмении два нефтеперерабатывающих завода: один в Туркменбаши производительностью 116 500 баррелей в сутки, другой в Сеиди производительностью 120 500 баррелей в сутки (в данном случае имеется в виду так называемый «синий», 42-галлонный баррель, ставший стандартной единицей объема в торговле нефтью). Завод в Туркменбаши был перестроен и обновлен за счет финансирования (в объеме 1,4 млрд долл.) из немецких и японских источников. Французская компания «Technip» получила контракт на строительство завода по выпуску смазочных материалов производительностью 36 150 баррелей в сутки, окончание строительства которого было запланировано на 2004 г. Report on Turkmenistan Energy Sector / Energy Information Administration. — Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, May 2002. Хороший пример — молодой экономист Тоили Курбанов, в течение короткого времени руководивший энергетическим сектором Туркмении, а теперь обучающийся в Соединенных Штатах (по программе повышения квалификации в середине карьеры). Использование русского языка в официальной жизни не было запрещено каким-либо конккретным актом; дальнейшие ограничения на использование русского языка в общественной жизни были введены в 2002 г. EIM

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Media Report from the CIS: Turkmenistan / European Inst. for the Media // Internews Russia. — 2002. — № 7 (28). — Aug., публикация на сайте http:// www.internews.ru/eim/august2002/tme.html. 71 Указ об отмене выездных виз был подписан президентом Ниязовым в декабре 2001 г., визы были отменены с 1 января 2002 г. Но 21 февраля 2003 г. Ниязов подписал указ о восстановлении выездных виз для туркменских граждан, выезжающих из страны. Начиная с 1 марта граждане Туркмении должны были оформлять выездные визы, но в 2004 г. эти требования были смягчены под сильным нажимом США. RFE/RL Turkmen Report. — 2001. — Dec. 24, 2003. — Febr. 2. 72 Указ президента Ниязова о восстановлении выездных виз резко ограничил возможности обучения за границей. Согласно этом указу большинство студентов не имеет возможности обменивать туркменские манаты на свободно конвертируемую валюту. Такая возможность предоставляется только учащимся, выбранным Министерством просвещения, причем обмен производится по искусственно заниженному официальному курсу. См.: Iankulova I. Presidential Decree Expected to Restrict Turkmen Study Abroad // EurasiaNet.org. — 2003. — March 11 (http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/ turkmenistan/hypermail/200303/0021.shtml). 73 В марте 2003 г. президент Ниязов подписал указ о снижении возраста, с которого молодые люди могут призываться на военную службу, с 18 до 17 лет. EurasiaNet.org. — 2003. — March 11. 74 Turkmenistan at a Glance / European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. — London, Aug. 22, 2003. 75 World Bank Development Indicators 2004 / World Bank. Точно выяснить, какая доля населения в данных странах Центральной Азии живет в бедности, очень трудно, поскольку каждое международное финансовое учреждение использует при таких подсчетах собственные критерии; так же поступают правительства разных стран и ООН, и все это приводит к широкому разбросу оценок. 76 Следует отметить, что при столь значительном субсидировании коммунальных услуг исчезают экономические стимулы для инвестиций в ухудшающуюся инфраструктуру этих секторов. 77 Linking IDA Support to Country Performance, Third Annual Report on IDA’s Country Assessment and Allocation Process / World Bank. — Washington, DC, Apr. 2002, публикация на сайте http://worldbank.org/ida. 78 На совещании Консультативной группы международных доноров в октябре 2002 г. Киргизии было обещано 700 млн долл. в 2003—2005 гг. См.: Kyr-

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gyzstan: Is Bishkek Ready to Spend Its Aid Money Wisely? // RFE/RL Magazine. — 2002. — Oct. 16. Комиссия ЕС решила увеличить помощь Киргизии почти вдвое; Программа развития ООН изменила подход к Киргизии, перейдя с проектов на программы; АРБ подписал новый трехлетний меморандум о взаимопонимании с киргизским правительством; Всемирный банк открыл свой новый региональный офис в Алматы, что позволит ему следить за ситуацией в Киргизии с более близкого расстояния; Исламский банк развития пообещал вскоре начать реализацию программы прямых инвестиций; ЕБРР пообещал финансировать крупные проекты в сельском хозяйстве, энергетике и сфере телекоммуникаций; Швейцария, Германия, Япония и скандинавские страны пообещали увеличить помощь Киргизии на двусторонней основе. В июне 2004 г. выплата третьего транша кредита Всемирного банка, предназначенного для реорганизации управленческой структуры, была задержана в связи с отказом Киргизии осуществить в намеченные сроки приватизацию компаний «Кыргызэнергия», «Кыргызгаз» и «Кыргызтелеком». Отчасти это было связано с активным сопротивлением законодателей приватизации этих компаний коммунального обслуживания. Interfax. — 2004. — Sept. 19; Kyrgyz Leader Says Debt Relief a Vote of Confidence // Kyrgyzstan Development Gateway. — 2005. — March 22, публикация на сайте http://eng.gateway.kg/cgibin/page.pl??id=1&story_name=doc7577. shtml. См. приложение 1. Kyrgyz National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003—2005: First Progress Report / World Bank. — Washington, DC, Apr. 2004. — Р. 13, публикация на сайте http://poverty.worldbank.org/files/cr04200.pdf. Small and Medium Business in the Year 2002 // Kyrgyzstan Development Gateway (http://eng.gateway.kg/business_small). См.: Comprehensive Development Framework of the Kyrgyz Republic to 2010, Expanding the Country’s Capacities, National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003—2005 / World Bank. — Washington, DC, Dec. 9, 2004, публикация на сайте http://poverty.worldbank.org/files/Kyrgyz_PRSP.pdf. CIA World Factbook: Kyrgyzstan / Central Intelligence Agency, публикация на сайте http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kg.html#Econ. Сообщается, что в самом Бишкеке и трех прилегающих областях доля бедных составляет всего 29,2%, в то время как в других частях страны процент бедняков значительно выше: 41% в Баткенской области, 55% в Джалал-Абадской, 56% в Ошской, 67% в Таласской, 55% в Иссык-Кульской и

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71% в Нарынской области. Эта информация основана на материалах разработанной правительством Киргизии Национальной стратегии сокращения бедности в 2003—2005 гг. См. также: Comprehensive Development Framework of the Kyrgyz Republic to 2010 / World Bank. — Chap. 4. На основе данных за 1996—1999 гг. из Программы развития ООН, Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World. — New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004. — Р. 151. Баткенская, Ошская, Джалал-Абадская, Таласская, Чуйская, Иссык-Кульская и Нарынская области отделены от столицы страны Бишкека горами. В 2001 г. число зарегистрированных безработных составляло около 60 тыс. человек, в том числе 15% — 21 года и моложе, 55% — 22—39 лет, 20% — 39—49 лет и 10% — 50 лет и старше. Узбекистан сообщает о немного большем (420 долл.) валовом национальном доходе на душу населения (330 долл. в год), чем в Киргизии, но наблюдения на местах заставляют предполагать обратное (см. приложение 5). Это подтверждается и собственными наблюдениями автора во время многочисленных путешествий по региону; в частности, имеются в виду сотни нелегальных узбекских торговцев и странствующих узбекских рабочих в Киргизии. Kyrgyz Republic: Joint Staff Assessment of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper / Intern. Monetary Fund and Intern. Development Association. — Washington, DC, Jan. 24, 2003. — Р. 27. На самом деле инвестиции в Киргизии в 2001 г. составили 2% ВВП. В 2003 г. Киргизия привлекла 146 млн долл. прямых иностранных инвестиций, что на 27% больше, чем в 2002 г., но все же меньше 10% ее ВВП. См.: Comprehensive Development Framework of the Kyrgyz Republic to 2010 / World Bank. — Р. 152. Многие из этих транспортных связей стали необходимы, потому что Узбекистан перекрыл пути к крупным городам в южной части Киргизии, и основные транспортные пути, связывающие север и юг страны, проходят через Казахстан и Узбекистан. Будучи членом ВТО, Киргизия является также членом Евразийского экономического сообщества, а также довольно рыхлого таможенного союза, в котором участвуют также Россия, Казахстан, Таджикистан и Белоруссия. При вступлении в ВТО ей было позволено сохранить членство в этих организациях. 14% — очень мало, если учесть, что между Россией и Таджикистаном согласовано 60% тарифов, между Россией и Казахстаном — 85%, а между

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Россией и Белоруссией — 95%. Michalopoulas C. The Integration of Low-Income CIS Members in the World Trading System: Report prepared for the Lucerne Conference of the CIS-7 Initiative, January 20-22, 2003. — Р. 28, ссылка с главной страницы: http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ECA/CIS7.nsf. Ibid. — Р. 44. 20 мая 1998 г. грузовик, перевозивший цианид натрия для этого рудника, перевернулся, что повлекло за собой отравление и даже смерть нескольких человек. Подробнее см.: Poisoned Gold, The Kumtor Goldmine in Kyrgyzstan, публикация на сайте http://www.zpok.hu/~jfeiler/kumtor. См. обзор золотодобывающей промышленности страны Эмиля Суеркулова на сайте http://eng.gateway.kg/gold. Согласно условиям нового соглашения доля «Cameco» в «Centerra» составляет 54%, доля «Kyrgyzaltyn JSC» — 16%, совместная доля Международной финансовой корпорации (International Finance Corporation) и ЕБРР — 4%. Подробнее см.: Gold Mine Reorganization in Kyrgyzstan Spurs Political Controversy // EurasiaNet.org. — 2004. — July 20; а также Ли Л. Жыпар Жекшеев: Золото пахнет криминалом // Моя столица — новости [Бишкек]. — 2004. — 13 июля (http://www. msn.kg). Несмотря на закон от 30 июня 2003 г., согласно которому на любые изменения соглашения об эксплуатации месторождения Кумтор от 1992 г. необходимо получить разрешение парламента, правительство во главе с премьер-министром Николаем Танаевым в декабре 2003 г. провело реорганизацию, создав с участием «Кыргызалтын» новое совместное предприятие «Centerra Gold Inc.» (филиал «Cameco»). Протесты оппозиции привели к рассмотрению этого вопроса в трех парламентских комиссиях, которые пришли к выводу, что распоряжение Танаева относительно Кумтора нарушает закон, принятый в июне 2003 г.; однако правительство объявило, что это распоряжение остается в силе, и соглашение будет соблюдаться. См.: Stern D. Kyrgyz President Admits Relative Sells to U.S. Base // Financial Times. — 2002. — July 22. Rakisheva Kh. Impact of the Internal Migration upon the Poverty Problem: Paper presented at the World Bank conference on poverty in Central Asia, Issyk-Kul, Kyrgyzstan, June 2003. По данным Всемирного банка, публикация на сайте http://www. worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/ tjk_aag.pdf. По имеющимся оценкам внешний долг Таджикистана в 2002 г. составлял 1,2 млрд долл. Примерно 75% этой суммы приходится на долю государ-

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ственного сектора (или гарантируется им). Самый крупный «двусторонний» кредитор Таджикистана — Россия, другие страны-кредиторы — это Казахстан, Белоруссия и Узбекистан. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile. — London, Sept. 1, 2003; World Development Indicators 2004 / World Bank. — Р. 244. Republic of Tajikistan: Joint Staff Assessment of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper / Intern. Development Association and Intern. Monetary Fund. — Washington, DC, Nov. 13, 2002. — Р. 4; Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper / Government of Tajikistan. — Dushanbe, June 2002. — Р. 12. По оценкам Международной организации по миграции, ежегодное число сезонных таджикских рабочих-мигрантов составляет около 620 тыс. человек; они едут главным образом в Россию, но также в соседние страны — Казахстан, Киргизию и Узбекистан. В 2002 г. общий объем их денежных переводов через таджикские коммерческие банки составил 80 млн долл., однако в целом денег и товаров в страну в том же году поступило на сумму от 200 до 230 млн долл. См.: Tajikistan: IOM Announces New Programme on Labor Migrant Remittances // IRINnews. org. — 2004. — Nov. 2. В административном отношении в состав Таджикистана сейчас входят Горно-Бадахшанская автономная область, Согдийская (ранее Ленинабадская) область, Хатлонская (ранее Курган-Тюбинская и Кулябская) область и город Душанбе. Economic Instruments, Environmental Expenditures and Privatization / United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. — Geneva, 2004 (http://www. unece.org/env/epr/studies/Tajikistan/chapter03.pdf). Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper / Government of Tajikistan. — Р. 27. См. приложение 1. Индекс производства продовольствия в конце 1990-х годов составлял 53,8% соответствующего значения в конце 1980-х годов.. См.: Foreign Direct Investment in Central Asian and Caucasian Economies: Policies and Issues / United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. — Bangkok, July 22, 2003 (http://www.unescap.org/ tid/publication/chap3e_2255.pdf). С 1996 г. Всемирный банк инвестировал в системы здравоохранения и социального обеспечения 36 млн долл. Программа реконструкции, восстановления и развития (RRDP) Программы развития ООН для Таджикистана включает 911 проектов (на 25 млн долл.), предусматривающих восстановление и реконструкцию базовой экономической и социальной инфраструктуры. В 2002 финансовом году общая сумма американской помощи социальному

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сектору составила 12,2 млн долл. Финансовая помощь АБР Таджикистану на конец 2003 г. составила 15 млн долл. См.: Tajikistan Country Brief / World Bank. — Washington, DC, Sept. 2002; Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Development Programme / United Nations Development Program in Tajikistan. — Dushanbe, July 2000, публикация на сайте http://www.undp.tj/ programmes/rrdp.html; U.S. Assistance to Tajikistan / U.S. State Department. — Washington, DC, Dec. 6, 2002, публикация на сайте http://www.state.gov/r/ pa/prs/ps/2002/15766.htm; Tajikistan and ADB / Asian Development Bank. — Manila, Dec. 31, 2003, публикация на сайте http://www.adb.org/Documents/ Fact_Sheets/TAJ.asp?p=ctrytaj#loans. Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper / Government of Tajikistan. — Р. 21—22. По состоянию на 1 июля 2003 г. Таджикистан был должен Узбекистану примерно 40 млн долл., из которых 33 млн — это долги квартиросъемщиков. См.: Asia-Plus News Agency [Dushanbe]; Transmitted at 900 GMT. — 2003. — July 16. Over 620 kg of Drugs Seized in Tajikistan for a Week — Government // Interfax. — 2004. — Nov. 25. Данные за 2003 г. см.: Tajikistan: Stemming the Heroin Tide / UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs // IRINnews.org, публикация на сайте http://www.plusnews.org/webspecials/opium/regTaj.asp. Подробнее см. приложение 2. Согласно гарантийному письму 30% урожая хлопка должно было быть закуплено у хозяйств по ценам государственных закупок, еще 20% — по договорным ценам, а оставшимися 50% они могли распоряжаться по собственному усмотрению. Для зерновых распределение было несколько иным: соответственно 25%, 25% и 50%. Всемирный банк и МВФ были готовы оказать поддержку экономическим реформам в Узбекистане. МВФ обязался предоставить Узбекистану в ближайшие три года до 350 млн долл., если реформы пойдут быстро, или около 150 млн, если они будут проводиться медленно. Они обещали упростить систему импортных тарифов в 2002 г., сократив число позиций, подпадающих под торговые ограничения, и отменить систему регистрации ожидаемых импортных контрактов к концу 2002 г. См. гарантийное письмо, подписанное заместителем премьер-министра и министром макроэкономики Рустамом Азимовым, министром финансов Мамаризо Нурмурадовым и председателем Центрального банка Узбекистана Файзуллой Мулладжановым, от 31 января 2001 г.; пу-

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бликация на сайте http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2002/uzb/01/ index.html. В октябре 2003 г. Узбекистан официально отменил все валютные ограничения, в том числе на покупку валюты фирмами и физическими лицами, и дифференциацию обменных курсов. Национальная валюта стала конвертируемой с 15 октября 2003 г. Все ограничения конвертируемости в отношении платежей и трансфертов по текущим международным трансакциям были отменены с 8 октября 2003 г. См.: RFE/RL Reports on Central Asia — 2003. Относительно дискуссии по поводу этого решения ЕБРР см.: Synovitz R. Uzbekistan: EBRD Freeze on Aid Praised by NGOs // RFE/RL. — 2004. — Apr. 19; Andersen M. Uzbekistan: EBRD Gets Tough with Tashkent: Credit That Karimov Didn’t Deserve // Index for Free Expression. — 2004. — Apr. 7, публикация на сайте http://www.indexonline.org/news/20040403_uzbekistan.shtml. Этот вопрос обсуждается также в главе 6 данной книги. Приведенные цифры определялись с учетом паритета покупательной способности. См.: Human Development Report 2004 / UN Development Program. — Р. 140—141. Strategy for Uzbekistan, approved by the Board of Directors on March 4, 2003 / European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. — Р. 16. Согласно последним данным Всемирного банка в 2000 г. 21,8% населения Узбекистана жило менее чем на 1 долл. в день и 77,5% — меньше чем на 2 долл. в день. World Development Indicators 2004 / World Bank. — Р. 56. См.: World Development Report 2005 / World Bank. — Р. 261; Country Profile: Uzbekistan / U.S. Department of State. — Washington, DC, Oct. 2004, публикация на сайте http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2924.htm. 1 ноября 2004 г. в Коканде около 10 тыс. узбеков собрались около мэрии, протестуя против новых законов, ограничивающих торговлю, в частности, запрещающих продажу импортных товаров через посредников, и требующих от продавцов получения специальных лицензий на импорт товаров из-за границы. По ходу демонстрации протестующие разграбили склад и подожгли несколько полицейских автомобилей. Подобные протесты имели место на рынках в южной части страны: в Карши, где перед городской администрацией собралось 500 рыночных торговцев, и в Фергане, где около 1000 торговцев перекрыли автомобильную дорогу. Wetherall B. U.S. Authorities Warn of Imminent Terror Attacks in Uzbekistan Following Mass Protests // World Markets Analysis. — 2004. — Nov. 5; Rotar I. Merchants Protest New Banking Laws in Uzbekistan // Eurasia Daily Monitor (Jamestown Foundation). — 2004. — Vol. 1. — № 123. — Nov. 9.

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Российская газета «Известия» приводит слова мирянина-узбека, который говорил так: «Сегодня в Ферганской долине, где живет много религиозных людей, можно снять проститутку за два доллара. Женщины соглашаются на этот позор, потому что иначе их дети останутся голодными. В такой ситуации я готов поддержать даже исламистов. По крайней мере, они не будут брать взятки и воровать!». См.: Ротарь И. Жители Ташкента удивляются, что теракты не случились раньше // Известия. — 2004. — 14 апр., публикация на сайте http://www.izvestia.ru/world/article61230. 129 Economist Intelligence Unit, Uzbekistan Country Profile 2004. — London, 2004. — Р. 21. 130 Strategy for Uzbekistan / European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. — Р. 17. 131 По индексу отношения к коррупции, определяемому организацией «Transparency International», все пять государств Центральной Азии в 2004 г. относились к странам с необузданной коррупцией и имели оценку ниже 3 баллов по 10-балльной шкале, где 10 баллов соответствуют нулевой коррупции. Узбекистан делил 114-е место (вместе со Сьерра-Леоне, Гондурасом и Молдавией), правда, опережая Казахстаном и Киргизию, которые (вместе Суданом) делят 122-е место. В Туркмении и Таджикистане ситуация еще хуже — они делят 133-е место. http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2004. 132 Strategy for Uzbekistan / European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. — Р. 17, 28. 133 В 1999 г. Россия импортировала из Узбекистана 143 тыс. т хлопка (62% объема российского импорта хлопка) на сумму в 188 тыс. долл.; в 2000 г. — 208 тыс. т (70%) на сумму в 263 тыс. долл. См.: External Trade of the CIS Countries, Statistical Abstract / Interstate Statistical Committee of the CIS. — Moscow, 2001. 134 Личные наблюдения автора. 135 Strategy for Uzbekistan/ European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. — Р. 26. 136 По классификации Европейской комиссии малые и средник предприятия имеют следующие характеристики. Средние предприятия имеют менее 250 сотрудников, их ежегодный товарооборот — не выше 40 млн долл., а суммарный годовой баланс не должен превышать 27 млн долл. Малые предприятия имеют 10—49 сотрудников, их ежегодный товарооборот не превышает 7 млн долл., а суммарный годовой баланс менее 5 млн долл. Микропредприятия имеют менее 10 сотрудников. См.: Activities of the European Union, Summaries of Legislation / European Commission, публикация на сайте http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/n26001.htm. 128

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Относительно цифр ВВП см.: Kudryashov A. Business: Private Sector in Uzbekistan Produces over 70% of GDP // Ferghana.ru Information Agency. — 2004. — Sept. 7. Относительно цифр занятости см.: Развитие малого и среднего предпринимательства в Узбекистане // Radio Tashkent Intern. — 2003. — June 23, публикация на сайте http://ino.uzpak.uz/rus/ econom_rus/econom_rus_2406.html. Strategy for Uzbekistan / European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. — Р. 27.

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Строуб Тэлботт подчеркнул, что американская помощь странам Центральной Азии должна определяться несколькими ключевыми параметрами, одним из которых является уважение к правам человека, которое пока «не очень глубоко укоренилось в этом регионе». См.: Talbott S. A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Address delivered at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC., July 1997. Показания посла Джона Теффта, заместителя помощника госсекретаря США по делам государств Европы и Евразии, в комитете Палаты представителей по международным отношениям «Выбор Украины: следующие шаги» от 7 декабря 2004 г. (http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/ 39542.htm). См. приложения 5 и 6. Общая запрошенная сумма американской помощи Центральной Азии на 2005 финансовый год составляла 178,61 млн долл., что меньше совокупных бюджетных фондов на 2003 финансовый год (306,77 млн долл.) и оценки на 2004 финансовый год (208,75 млн). Nichol J. Р. Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests: CRS Report for Congress. — Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Nov. 12, 2004 (http://www. fas.org/man/crs/IB93108.pdf). Относительно разбивки американской помощи по категориям и годам см. приложение 5. См. приложение 11. В 2002 г. финансовая помощь Казахстану, Киргизии и Узбекистану по сравнению с 2001 г. увеличилась ненамного. Максимальная помощь была оказана Узбекистану: по сравнению с 2001 г. (47,3 млн долл.) в 2002 г. она

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почти утроилась (130,4 млн долл.). Однако в 2003 г. финансовая помощь США всем центральноазиатским государствам, кроме Казахстана, резко сократилась. См.: FY2001, FY2002, FY2003 U.S. Assistance to Eurasia / U.S. State Department, ссылки со страницы http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/ rpt/c10250.htm. В то же время общая сумма иностранной помощи Египту в 2003 г. составила 2,2 млрд долл., а в 2004 г. — 1,9 млрд. Израиль, по имеющимся оценкам, получил в 2003 г. 3,8 млрд долл., а в 2004 г. — примерно 2,7 млрд. См.: Mark C. R. Egypt—United States Relations: CRS Issue Brief for Congress. — Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Oct. 10, 2003; Idem. Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance: CRS Issue Brief for Congress. — Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 14, 2003, July 12, 2004. Кое-что из этого автору удалось наблюдать непосредственно в бытность директором Американского фонда поддержки предпринимательства в Центральной Азии, финансируемого АМР США, в 1994—2000 гг. К таким неправительственным группам относятся, например, Национальный фонд развития демократии, Национальный демократический институт, Международный республиканский институт и Международный фонд избирательных систем; все они сотрудничают с законодательными органами, политическими партиями и движениями, центральными избирательными комиссиями, оппозиционными группами, журналистами и правозащитными группами в странах Центральной Азии. 2 октября 2001 г. американские наземные силы и ВВС получили разрешение при проведении операций использовать базу в Узбекистане, и ожидалось, что военное присутствие США в конечном счете возрастет до нескольких тысяч человек включая силы специального назначения. Публикация на сайте http://www.globalsecurity.org. National Poverty Reduction Strategy / Government of Kyzgyzstan, публикация на сайте «Kyrgyzstan Development Gateway» («Развитие Киргизии через Интернет») http://eng.gateway.kg/prsp. В процесс выборов в рамках Программы ООН по содействию проведению выборов были внесены некоторые технические изменения. В частности предусматривались установка прозрачных урн на избирательных участках, изменение конструкции кабин для голосования (с целью облегчения соблюдения тайны голосования, а также для того, чтобы наблюдатели могли убедиться, что внутри кабины не совершаются никакие противоправные действия) и поставка несмываемых чернил, чтобы делать отметки на руках проголосовавших избирателей для предотвращения неоднократного голосования одних и тех же лиц. Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems

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and Prospects / Intern. Crisis Group // ICG Asia Report [Osh; Brussels]. — 2004. — № 81. — Aug. 11. В рамках стратегии сокращения бедности доноры обещали Киргизии помощь в размере 700 млн долл., и значительная часть этих денег уже выплачена. В 2005—2010 гг. для этого потребуется около 1 млрд долл. Кроме всего прочего эта стратегия предусматривает некоторые политические реформы, в частности реформы системы государственного управления, судебной системы, местного самоуправления, а также усиление борьбы с коррупцией. См.: National Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2003—2005: First Progress Report / World Bank. — Washington, DC, Apr. 2004. — P. 16—42, публикация на сайте http://poverty.worldbank.org/files/cr04200.pdf. Правительство Киргизии закупило достаточное число урн лишь для северной части страны; урны были куплены в Китае. Interfax. — 2004. — Nov. 24. New Printing Press Opening in Kyrgyzstan: Press release / Freedom House // http://wwwfreedomhouse.org/media/pressrel/111403.htm. Александр Ким, главный редактор оппозиционной газеты «Моя столица — новости», начал распространять ее по всей стране в январе 2005 г. Перед парламентскими выборами кандидаты от оппозиции закупали номера этой газеты целыми грузовиками и распространяли их как свои агитационные материалы. Однако перед началом печати 200 тыс. экземпляров специального выпуска газеты в пресс-центре было отключено электричество. Радиостанция «Азаттык», вещающая на киргизском языке и финансируемая правительством США на основании специального соглашения с радио «Свободная Европа» и «Свобода», также была отстранена от эфира якобы из-за того, что правительство выставило ее частоту на аукцион. На следующий день после отключения электроэнергии посольство США послало «Freedom House» два генератора, что позволило напечатать почти все 200 тыс. экземпляров спецвыпуска газеты «Моя столица — новости». Подача электроэнергии была восстановлена 8 марта, после чего газета стала одним из главных источников информации для мобилизации оппозиции. См.: Smith C. S. U.S. Helped Prepare the Way for Kyrgyzstan’s Uprising // New York Times. — 2005. — March 30. Финансируемый США Центр поддержки независимых СМИ в Киргизии печатает также таджикскую газету «Руз-и Нав». Главный редактор газеты «Дело №» Виктор Запольский был обвинен в пристрастном отношении к газете «Моя столица — новости», конкретно — в искусственном занижении расценок на печать ее номеров, чтобы сохранить низкую цену для

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подписчиков и покупателей. См.: Namatbayeva T. U.S.-Funded Print Plant Gives Hope to Embattled Central Asian Media // Agence France-Presse. — 2003. — Nov. 14; Administrator, Kyrgyz Editor Disappointed with U.S.-Backed Printing House // Slovo Kyrgyzstana. — 2004. — Оct. 4. В сентябре 2003 г. корреспондент общенациональных газет «Кыргыз Руху» и «Кыргыз Ордо» Эрнис Назалов был найден мертвым в южном Казахстане. Было известно, что Назалов готовился опубликовать материал о коррупции в Киргизии на высоком уровне, но его записи, по-видимому, исчезли. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2003. — London, 2003. — Р. 22; RFE/RL Newsline. — 2003. — Vol. 7. — № 182. — Sept. 24. Утром 4 февраля 2004 г. в Ошский центр ресурсов СМИ пришли двое неизвестных в масках и вынули из всех компьютеров жесткие диски, процессоры, платы ОЗУ и дисководы для компакт-дисков, а также забрали ноутбук, цифровую камеру и мультимедийный проектор. Ошский центр финансируется региональным офисом ЮНЕСКО и Информационной службой США. См.: Criminal Attack Was Made on the OMRC Office // CASCFEN, fergana. org. — Febr. 4, 2004, публикация на сайте http://www.unesco.kz/ci/projects/omrc/omedia.htm. Президент Акаев и все члены его семьи активно участвовали в политике и в бизнесе или одновременно и в политике, и в бизнесе, и все их обвиняют в систематической коррупции, которая сильно затруднила преобразования в стране. Подробнее см.: Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects / Intern. Crisis Group // ICG Asia Report [Osh; Brussels]. — 2004. — № 81. — Aug. 11. — Р. 6—7. Правительство воспользовалось этими обвинениями, чтобы 25 августа 2003 г. сместить Дирилдаева с поста председателя комитета по правам человека Киргизии. В своем публичном заявлении он объяснил появление указанных обвинений стремлением киргизских властей дискредитировать его. RFE/RL Newsline. — 2003. — Aug. 28. Вскоре после заявления о намерении баллотироваться на президентских выборах 2000 г. Феликс Кулов был обвинен в злоупотреблении служебным положением на посту министра государственной безопасности в 1997— 1998 гг., но в августе 2000 г. был оправдан судом. Позже, в январе 2001 г., ему было предъявлено 15 новых обвинений включая растрату в бытность руководителем Чуйской области в 1993—1997 гг., а также мэром Бишкека в 1998—1999 гг. Его приговорили к семи годам лишения свободы. Он был освобожден своими сторонниками после изгнания Акаева. Подробнее см.: Jumataeva V. Kulov Muzzled. — London: Inst. for War and Peace Reporting,

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Aug. 10, 2001. См. также сайт партии «Ар-Намис» http://www.ar-namys. org/en/view_temp.php?i=140. Призывы к отставке Акаева раздавались еще весной 2001 г. Эти требования слабо освещались западными СМИ, но в беседе с автором, состоявшейся в Бишкеке в ноябре 2002 г., Бекназаров очень убедительно обосновал свою позицию. Он также утверждал, что эти 125 тыс. гектаров не были частью территорий, которые считались спорными в советскую эпоху, а были предложены Китаю киргизским президентом просто чтобы успокоить намного более сильного соседа. См.: Double Standard a Real Danger to Central Asia / State News Service. — Washington, DC, March 16, 2002. Принятое в 1916 г. решение правительства России заставить жителей Центральной Азии служить в трудовых батальонах российской армии привело к организованному и бесцельному насилию во многих районах, населенных киргизами. При подавлении бунтов погибли десятки тысяч людей, сотни тысяч бежали в Китай. См.: Бактыгулов Дж., Момбекова Дж. История кыргызов и Кыргызстана с древнейших времен до наших дней. — Бишкек: Мектеп, 1999. — С. 210—220. Бекназаров был признан виновным, приговорен к году лишения свободы условно и потерял свое место в парламенте. Он был освобожден 24 мая 2002 г. под письменное обязательство не покидать страну. В июне апелляционный суд подтвердил решение предыдущего суда, но аннулировал срок и восстановил его депутатский мандат. Human Rights Watch World Report 2003 on Kyrgyzstan. — New York, Jan. 2003, публикация на сайте http:// www.hrw.org/wr2k3/europe9.html. В голодовках участвовали более 700 человек. 7 февраля 2002 г. в ходе политической голодовки умер известный экономист и заместитель председателя Движения за права человека в Киргизии Шерали Назаркулов. Киргизские власти всегда утверждали, что большинство демонстрантов составляли представители рода Бекназарова, что вполне может соответствовать действительности. Но если это так, то его род очень велик, потому что на фотографиях, сделанных во время демонстрации, ясно видно, что манифестантов несколько сотен, а может быть, и больше тысячи. Razgulaev Yu. Aggravation of Political Crisis in Kirghizia // Pravda.ru. — 2002. — Febr. 12. В число специальных следователей входили генеральный прокурор Чубак Абишакаев, а позже руководитель отдела обороны и безопасности в президентской администрации Миктибек Абдилаев. См.: Khamidov A. Ak-Sui Trial in Kyrgyzstan Causes Rift between President and Law-Enforcement Officials // EurasiaNet.org. — 2002. — Oct. 18.

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Со своих постов были сняты начальники Осмонова — госсекретарь Осмонакун Ибраимов, бывший помощник президента Аманбек Карипкулов и министр внутренних дел Темирбек Акматалиев. Впоследствии Карипкулов бвл назначен послом Киргизии в Турции, а Акматалиев стал заместителем руководителя президентской администрации Khamidov A. Op. cit. Ibid. Интервью, проведенные в 2002 и 2003 гг. в Бишкеке, произвели на автора очень сильное впечатление. Некоторые видные члены оппозиции являются депутатами парламента Киргизии; это, в частности, Адахан Мадумаров (Узгень), Омарбек Текебаев (Базар-Коргон) и генерал-майор Исмаил Исаков (Ош). Обращение Акаева 26 августа 2002 г. Доклад Киргизского комитета по правам человека от 21 января 2003 г. В результате общенационального референдума 2 февраля 2003 г. были приняты поправки к Конституции, предусматривающие в частности расширение иммунитета первого президента страны от судебного преследования. Стало труднее возбудить импичмент — теперь для этого требуется поддержка уже не двух третей, а четырех пятых депутатов. Second Round of Kyrgyz Elections Demonstrates Need for Further Improvement // OSCE report. — 2005. — March 14 (http://www.osce.org/item/8980.html). Роза Отунбаева — крупнейший политический деятель среди женщин в Киргизии и лидер движения «Ата-журт» («Отечество»). Подобно Бакиеву Отунбаева была союзницей Акаева, но после того как он ее уволил, стала очень резко критиковать способ, с помощью которого он якобы захватил власть, разделив ее со своими родственниками. Ее основная база поддержки сосредоточена на севере. Курманбек Бакиев, ставший исполняющим обязанности президента после бегства Акаева, возглавляет Народное движение Киргизии. Будучи экономистом, он имеет опыт работы в правительстве. Его активно поддерживает население юга страны, где он родился. До мая 2002 г. он был премьерминистром. Он впал в немилость и был вынужден уйти в отставку после того, как при разгоне демонстрация оппозиции в южном районе Аксы полицейские застрелили пять человек. Заявление Акаева об отставке было записано на видеокассету в Москве, и его отставка была принята парламентом Киргизии 11 апреля 2005 г. Например, Институт управления, экономики и стратегических исследований Казахстана формально был образован 1 января 1992 г. по решению Назарбаева. Публикация на сайте http://www.kimep.kz.

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См.: Åslund A. Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc. — New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002. Рус. пер.: Ослунд А. Строительство капитализма: рыночная трансформация бывшего советского блока / Пер. с англ. Н. А. Ранневой, А. Ю. Молоканова; Под ред. И. М. Осадчей. — М.: Логос, 2003. Blua A. Kazakhstan: Movement Elects to Transform Itself into a True Opposition Party // RFE/RL. — 2003. — Dec. 5. Учредительный конгресс ДВК, на котором присутствовало 180 делегатов, состоялся в Алматы 21 февраля 2004 г. Он принял программу и устав партии, которые будут представлены на регистрацию в Министерство юстиции вместе с другими документами. RFE/RL. — 2004. — Febr. 23. См. также: Olcott M. B. Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise. — Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Intern. Peace, 2002. — Р. 228. Рус. пер.: Олкотт М. Б. Казахстан: непройденный путь / Моск. Центр Карнеги. — Москва; Вашингтон, 2003. — С. 260. В апреле 2002 г. уголовные обвинения были выдвинуты также против главного редактора «Каравана» Александра Шухова. EurasiaNet.org. — 2002. — Apr. 22. RFE/RL. — 2003. — Aug. 26. Жандосов был первым заместителем министра экономики, в 1996— 1998 гг. — председателем Казахского национального банка, а затем первым заместителем премьер-министра и председателем Госкомитета по инвестициям. RFE/RL. — 2003. — Jan. 30. Абилов вошел в политсовет «Демократического выбора Казахстана» в ноябре 2001 г. и стал сопредседателем партии «Ак жол». http://www.dpkakzhol.kz/eng/leaders_cv/abilov_ cv.htm. Платформа Демократической партии Казахстана, или «Ак жол», кратко формулируется так: «Наша цель — это суверенный, преуспевающий и демократический Казахстан, в котором каждому гражданину обеспечена достойная жизнь». Полный текст платформы «Ак жол» опубликован на сайте http://www.dpkakzhol.kz/eng. Согласно новому закону партия должна иметь не менее 700 членов в каждой области страны и собрать 50 тыс. подписей (вместо 3 тыс., которые требовались ранее). Проназарбаевским партиям, пользующимся поддержкой властей, легко выполнить эти требования, в то время как большинству оппозиционных партий такое не по силам или просто затрудняет регистрацию. Закон позволяет политическим организациям собирать деньги в виде вступительных и членских взносов, пожертвований

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от граждан Казахстана, неправительственных организаций Казахстана и местных предпринимателей. Он предусматривает обложение таких пожертвований налогом и требует их документального подтверждения. До принятия этого закона в Казахстане было зарегистрировано 19 партий, а теперь их только 7. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2003. — London, Aug. 12, 2003. См. также: Olcott M. B. Ceremony and Substance: The Illusion of Unity in Central Asia // Central Asia and the World / Ed. by M. Mandelbaum. — New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999. — P. 18—19. Wines M. Bruised, but Still Jabbing Kazakh Heavyweights // New York Times. — 2002. — July 13. См.: University of Southern California’s Annenberg School for Communication Online Journalism Review, публикация на сайте http://www.ojr.org/ ojr/world_reports/1031248269.php. Press release / Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe. — 2003. — May 2, публикация на сайте http://www.csce/gov/press_csce.cfm?press_ id=291. 6 мая 2002 г. Дуванов опубликовал «Молчание ягнят», после чего подвергся судебному преследованию за «оскорбление чести и достоинства» президента Назарбаева. Публикация на сайте http://www.ojr.org/ojr/ world_reports/1031248269. Сторонники Дуванова продолжают требовать его полного освобождения и реабилитации. RFE/RL. — 2004. — Jan. 30. Interfax-Kazakhstan. — 2003. — Sept. 23; BBC Monitoring. — 2003. — Sept. 23. Этого требует закон о местном и государственном управлении, принятый в апреле 2003 г. Выступая 15 ноября 2002 г. на девятой сессии Ассамблеи народов Казахстана, Назарбаев сказал, что этот консультативный орган, в который входят представители парламента, правительства, президентской администрации, политических партий и неправительственных организаций, должен подготовить предложения по дальнейшему развитию демократии в стране. EurasiaNet.org. — 2002. — Nov. 18. Новый избирательный закон был принят казахстанским парламентом в первом чтении 26 января 2004 г. 20 февраля 2004 г. парламент одобрил ряд поправок к закону о выборах. Теперь региональные маслихаты (местные ассамблеи) должны на основе предложений политических партий, участвующих в выборах, сформировать комиссии. Местные акимы должны

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представить списки избирателей в избирательные комиссии не позднее чем за 20 дней до голосования. Граждане, имеющие судимость, не могут баллотироваться в парламент. Третье чтение поправок состоялось 15 марта 2004 г., и обе палаты парламента проголосовали «за». Затем этот законопроект был передан на рассмотрение президенту. IRINnews Asia. — 2004. — Jan. 29; RFE/RL. — 2004. — Febr. 23. Текст нового закона о СМИ на русском языке можно найти на сайте http://www.government.kz. В докладах членов Европейского парламента этот закон оценивается как не соответствующий международным стандартам в отношении свободы выражения мнений средствами массовой информации. См.: CASCFEN.org. — 2004. — Febr. 4. Международный институт печати в июле 2003 г. также опубликовал сообщение с критикой проекта закона о СМИ, которое можно найти на сайте http://www. freemedia.at/Kazakhstanreport.htm. 17 марта 2004 г. нижняя палата парламента одобрила поправки к новому закону о СМИ (RFE/RL. — 2004. — March 18). 27 июля 2004 г. Абилов был признан виновным в клевете и приговорен к 18 месяцам лишения свободы условно. Pannier B. Kazakhstan: Opposition Party Sees Fortunes Rise and Fall // EurasiaNet.org. — 2004. — July 31 (http:// www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/pp073104.shtml). Официальные результаты выборов см.: Alibekov I. Kazakhstan: Election Results Harden Opposition // EurasiaNet.org. — 2004. — Sept. 29 (http:// www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/ articles/eav092704a.shtml). Данные опросов см.: Open Society Foundation Sums Up Results of Election in Almaty / Open Society Inst. — New York, Sept. 21, 2004 (http://www.cascfen. org/news.php?nid=408&cid=12). Kazakh Election Commission Nixes Opposition Referendum Proposal // EurasiaNet.org. — 2004. — Nov. 19. Kazak Heavyweight Takes on President / Intern. War Peace and Reporting. — London, Apr. 30, 2004. (http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca/ rca_200404_281_l_eng.txt). Кандидатуру Туякбая поддерживают в частности Галымжан Жакиянов и Акежан Кажегельдин. См.: Kazakhstan Daily Digest. — 2005. — March 21 (http://www.eurasianet.org/ resource/kazakhstan/hypermail/2005030024. shtml). Фотографии, сделанные 29 января 2005 г. на митинге в Алматы, см.: Kazak Opposition Protest // http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?centasia_photoessay_01.html.

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См. обращение Назарбаева от 18 февраля 2005 г. «Казахстан на пути к ускоренной экономической, социальной и политической модернизации» на его официальном сайте http://www.president.kz/main/mainframe.asp?lng=en. См. обращение Назарбаева к гражданам Казахстана, посвященное внутренней и внешней политике в 2003 г., опубликованное в апреле 2002 г., и его же обращение, посвященное внутренней и внешней политике в 2004 г., опубликованное в апреле 2003 г. Bukharabayeva B. Kazakstan Politics Could Turn Dynastic // Seattle PostIntelligence. — 2004. — Jan. 31. Цель партии «Асар» состоит в том, чтобы побудить молодое поколение (от 18 до 35 лет) более активно участвовать в политической жизни. Словом «асар» в казахском языке обозначается коллективная («всем миром») помощь общины одному из соседей, и задача местных организаций партии — обеспечить гражданам своего рода форумы для представления жалоб и обид на местные власти. Женщины, участвующие в демонстрациях, подвергаются аресту, если они протестуют против ареста родственников, но если они выступают против социальных условий, их чаще всего не задерживают. В ночь с 28 на 29 марта и 30 марта 2004 г. произошли нападения на полицию, в результате которых погибли трое полицейских; 29 марта два террориста-смертника подорвали себя на главном базаре Чорсу в Ташкенте, убив трех полицейских и ребенка; 28 марта в Бухаре в результате взрыва в доме, где проживал экстремист, погибло десять человек. Относительно реакции простых узбеков на эти события см.: Bukharbaeva B. Poor, Enraged, Fated to Die: Militant Islamists Find a Fertile Recruiting Ground in Bleak Uzbekistan // Associated Press-Times Union [Albany, NY]. — 2004. — Apr. 4. В начале ноября 2004 г. в Коканде несколько тысяч человек вышли на улицы, протестуя против принятых властями Узбекистана новых торговых законов, еще больше ограничивших импорт. Демонстранты бросали камни, жгли полицейские автомобили и били стекла в здании местной администрации. См.: Protests in Uzbekistan over Trade Law, публикация на сайте http://www.uzland.info/2004/november/04/02.htm. Государственный департамент США заявил, что авторитарный режим Каримова нисколько не приблизился к международным стандартам в области прав человека. Публикация на сайте Госдепартамента http://www. state.gov/p/eur/rls/prsrl/2003/27665.htm. См. также: Slevin P. U.S. Gives Uzbekistan Failing Grade on Rights // Washington Post. — 2004. — Jan. 11.

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Полный текст Декларации об основах стратегического сотрудничества и взаимодействия между Соединенными Штатами Америки и Республикой Узбекистан опубликован на сайте http://www.state/gov/r/pa/prs/ps/ 2002/8736pf.htm. См.: http://www.state/gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/8736pf.htm. По данным Национального информационного агентства Узбекистана, в референдуме, состоявшемся 27 января 2002 г. и одобрившем поправки к Конституции Узбекистана, приняли участие 13,26 млн человек, или 91,58% избирателей, однако «Human Rights Watch» назвала эти данные искаженными до полной неузнаваемости. Uzbekistan: President Rigs Extended Term of Office / Human Rights Watch. — New York, Jan. 25, 2002. Для участия в парламентских выборах 2004 г. зарегистрировались Либерально-демократическая партия, Народно-демократическая партия, Социал-демократическая партия справедливости, Демократическая партия национального возрождения и Национально-демократическая партия «Фидокорлар» («Самоотверженные»). Uzbekistan Starts Preparations for Parliamentary Elections // Interfax. — 2004. — July 14, публикация на сайте http://www.interfax.com/com?id=5740185&item=Uzb. Партиям «Эрк», «Бирлик», Аграрной партии и Партии фермеров и предпринимателей было отказано в регистрации. Подробнее см.: Kudryashov A. Opposition in Uzbekistan Misses Another Chance to Participate in the Parliamentary Election // Fergana.ru. — 2004. — June 28 (http://enews. ferghana.ru/detail.php?id=478&code_phrase=). Незарегистрированные партии могут поддерживать неприсоединившихся кандидатов в одномандатных округах. См.: Uzbekistan // Nations in Transit / Freedom House. — New York, 2003. — Р. 634. Опыт «Бирлика» показывает, что политические партии должны удовлетворять еще нескольким важным критериям, например, должны иметь свою организацию в северной Каракалпакской автономной республике, указывать даты рождения и места работы членов партии и подтверждать, что глава партии не возглавляет две организации одновременно. Несмотря на утверждения партии «Бирлик», что она выполнила все эти требования, Министерство юстиции отказало ей в регистрации. См.: Uzbek Opposition Party’s Registration Bid Rejected / British Broadcasting Corporation // BBC Monitoring Intern. Reports. — 2004. — Jan. 5. 6 декабря 2003 г. Аграрная партия провела в Ташкенте свой учредительный съезд, в котором участвовали 150 делегатов со всего Узбекистана; партия «Эрк» провела съезд 22 октября 2003 г., а заседание со-

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вета — 7 января 2004 г.; организация партии «Бирлик» в Шарихонском районе Андижанской области (восточный Узбекистан) 11 января 2004 г. провела учредительную конференцию, на которой присутствовали 22 делегата. Только в 2003 г. были избиты или арестованы многие журналисты. Например, 7 марта 2003 г. корреспондент RFE/RL Хусниддин Катбиддинов и корреспондент узбекского вещания «Голоса Америки» Юсуф Расулов были избиты в ходе репортажа с ташкентского рынка о протесте группы, состоявшей примерно из сорока женщин. Позже один из нападавших признался, что журналистов избили по указанию отдела борьбы с коррупцией Министерства внутренних дел Узбекистана (RFE/RL. — 2003. — March 10). 20 февраля 2003 г. узбекская полиция арестовала Тохтомурада Тошева, главного редактора газеты «Адолат», издаваемой Социал-демократической партией. 26 мая 2003 г. был арестован Руслан Шарипов, независимый журналист и правозащитник. Полиция арестовала также коллег Шарипова Олега Сарапулова и Азамата Маманкулова. 20 августа 2003 г. подверглась нападению корреспондент Би-би-си Матлюба Азаматова, присутствовавшая на митинге протеста против поведения сотрудников местных правоохранительных органов в Ферганской долине. И наконец, независимый журналист Шахназар Ёрматов был избит и арестован после того, как в его машину был (предположительно) подложен героин. EurasiaNet. org. — 2003. — Sept. 10, публикация на сайте http://usinfor.state.gov; а также Times of Central Asia. — 2003. — Febr. 22. 5 марта 2002 г. Министерство юстиции Узбекистана зарегистрировало Независимую организацию по правам человека Узбекистана, которая пыталась получить официальное признание в течение пяти лет. Она активно защищала узников совести в Узбекистане. В марте 2003 г. была зарегистрирована правозащитная группа «Езгулик». См. сайт «Human Rights Watch» http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/12/uzbek120603.htm. 20 августа 2003 г. подверглась нападению Мутабар Таджибаева, возглавляющая правозащитную группу «От Юраклар» и присутствовавшая на митинге протеста против поведения сотрудников местных правоохранительных органов в Ферганской долине (EurasiaNet.org. — 2003. — Sept. 20). В декабре 2003 г. местной общественной организации «Матери против смертной казни и пыток» не позволяли провести конференцию в Ташкенте, а ранее, в 2002 г., Министерство юстиции отказалось ее зарегистрировать. Публикация на сайте http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/12/ uzbek120603.htm.

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30 января 2002 г. суд в Ташкенте признал четырех узбекских полицейских виновными в том, что они замучили арестованного до смерти. Все четверо были приговорены к двадцатилетнему заключению. Погибший, 32-летний Равшан Хаитов, умер от пыток 17 октября 2001 г. всего через несколько часов после того, как был арестован якобы за принадлежность к «Хизб атТахрир». Его изуродованное тело со следами жестоких побоев было выдано родственникам на следующий день. Согласно официальному заключению причиной смерти стал сердечный приступ. Uzbek Court Convicts Police for Beating Death / Human Rights Watch. — New York, Jan. 25, 2002. В декабре 2003 г. Бовен посетил Узбекистан с двухнедельным визитом и затем представил доклад в Комитет ООН по правам человека. Он встречался с министрами юстиции и внутренних дел, генеральным прокурором, председателем Верховного суда и представителями неправительственных организаций. Он выразил озабоченность в связи с тем, арестованные часто признают свою вину под пытками. Interfax Central Asia. — 2003. — Dec. 6. Эти расследования были организованы в рамках программы контроля за соблюдением правовых норм, реализуемой «Freedom House» в Ташкенте. Финансируемый государством Национальный правозащитный центр Узбекистана, возглавляемый Акмалом Саидовым, закупает телевизоры, постельные принадлежности и даже новое нижнее белье для некоторых учреждений, в которых содержатся узники, осужденные за политическую или религиозную деятельность. Ramazanov E. Fresh Allegations Continue Pattern of Repression in Uzbekistan // EurasiaNet.org. — 2002. — May 1. В настоящее время в стране насчитывается около 30 тыс. заключенных, и примерно 3400 из них — политзаключенные и осужденные по религиозным мотивам. В Узбекистане 47 тюрем, в том числе 11 предварительного заключения. Interfax Central Asia. — 2002. — Dec. 6. Подробнее о систематическом жестоком обращении с религиозными активистами см.: Creating Enemies of the State: Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan / Human Rights Watch // http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/ uzbekistan0304/index.htm. 30 июля 2003 г. практически одновременно прогремели взрывы, устроенные террористами-смертниками, перед посольством США, посольством Израиля и зданием Генеральной прокуратуры Узбекистана. 22 ноября 2004 г. суд признал виновными тринадцать человек, обвиненных в причастности к терактам, имевшим место в марте-апреле; восемь из них по-

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лучили по пять с половиной лет, двое — по шесть лет, один — десять лет. Еще двое были осуждены условно. Правозащитные группы сомневаются в том, что при этом были соблюдены все процессуальные нормы, и утверждают, что причиной мартовских событий стали гонения на мусульман, молившихся вне мечетей, контролируемых государством. Terror Trial Jails 13 in Uzbek Capital // BBC Monitoring. — 2004. — Nov. 23; Uzbek Court Convicts Five Alleged Terrorists amid Torture Allegations // Associated Press. — 2004. — Nov. 11. Всего в 1997—2004 гг. в результате разных амнистий было освобождено примерно 199 тыс. заключенных, в том числе много религиозных активистов. EurasiaNet.org. — 2004. — Febr. 2. В этих соседних странах арестам подвергаются люди, которых подозревают в принадлежности к «Хизб ат-Тахрир», а также те, у кого обнаруживают запрещенную религиозную литературу, и те, кто посягает на конституционный порядок. EurasiaNet.org. — 2004. — Febr. 17. На местах «Хизб ат-Тахрир» получает деньги от торговой деятельности своих членов, а также в виде благотворительных пожертвований. Подробнее см.: Olcott M. B. Financing Islamic Groups in Uzbekistan. — Unpublished manuscript. Возвращены, в частности, комплекс Шах-и-Зинда в Самарканде и храм в Термезе, имеющие большое историческое значение. Шах-и-Зинда — это большой средневековый погребальный комплекс, сформировавшийся примерно в XIV столетии при Тамерлане. Это был не абстрактный вопрос, потому что в советском паспорте была обязательная для заполнения графа «Национальность». Согласно официальной статистике таджики составляют менее 5% населения Узбекистана, но многие полагают, что на самом деле их намного больше. Значительную долю населения Узбекистана (уже независимого) составляли русские, но сейчас по имеющимся оценкам их доля составляет всего 5,5% (по сравнению с 8,3% в 1989 г.). Число казахов также уменьшается, так как очень многие из них, имеющие такую возможность, перебираются в Казахстан, где экономические возможности намного шире. После того как силы безопасности Узбекистана, как сообщалось, тем же летом вытеснили боевиков ИДУ из этого района, местные власти разместили на линии границы минные поля. Таджикские эксперты также говорят, что узбекские силы безопасности насильственно выселили примерно 5 тыс. жителей из приграничных деревень. Это были в основном таджики, и переселили их на расстояние около 160 км в Шерабад. EurasiaNet.org. — 2003. — Febr. 14.

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Поправка Джексона-Веника к разделу IV Закона о торговле 1974 г. была принята после того, как Советский Союз в 1972 г. серьезно ограничил эмиграцию. Ее основная цель состояла в том, чтобы наказать советское правительство за то, что оно препятствовало массовому выезду евреев из СССР, но позже эта поправка стала применяться в отношении всех стран с «нерыночной экономикой». Foreign Assistance: U.S. Economic and Democratic Assistance to the Central Asian Republic / U.S. General Accounting Office. — [S. l.], Aug. 1999, публикация на сайте http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99200.pdf. На основании Закона о защите свободы в Туркмении финансируются проекты, поддерживаемые разными организациями, предоставляющими гранты, в частности, Фондом «Евразия», который выделяет средства для развития частных предприятий, гражданского общества и государственной администрации, Программой инвестирования в деятельность сообществ, которая стимулирует гражданский диалог и участие в деятельности по развитию сообществ, и целевыми программами технической помощи АМР США, которые должны способствовать скорейшему развитию демократии и свободной рыночной экономики. См.: USAID Program Data Sheet on Turkmenistan, публикация на сайте http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2003/ ee/tm/120-0420.html. Программа Института «Открытое общество» в Туркмении имеет целью развитие гражданского общества, а также поддержку искусства, культуры, здравоохранения и обеспечение доступа к информации. Кроме того, оппозиционные группы активно действуют в Швеции, и некоторые из них в частном порядке финансируются коммерческими структурами; это, в частности, Сапармурат Иклимов и Мурад Эсенов из «Центральноазиатского журнала» и сын Шихмурадова в Соединенных Штатах (и Объединенных Арабских Эмиратах), поддерживающий сайт «Гундогар» (Gundogar). См.: OSI Launches Turkmenistan Project / Open Society Inst. — [S. l.], Dec. 16, 2002, публикация на сайте http://www.soros.org/initiatives/cep/ news/turkmenistan_20021216. В июне 2004 г. президент Ниязов намекнул, что «мог бы обнародовать планы выборов нового президента Туркмении на следующей сессии Халк Маслахаты осенью 2004 г.», заявив, что один и тот же человек не может оставаться у власти вечно. Когда в ноябре 2004 г. он представил эти планы Народному совету (самому мощному властному органу в Туркмении), аудитория отклонила его предложение и убедила и дальше оставаться у власти. Niyazov May Announce Presidential Election Plans in Autumn // News

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Central Asia. — 2004. — June 22, публикация на сайте http://www.newscentralasia.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=675; Turkmen Leader Bows to Calls not to Hold Elections // BBC Monitoring Central Asia. — 2004. — Oct. 26. Blua A. Turkmenistan: Observers Denounce Sentencings as Pretext for Crackdown // EurasiaNet.org. — 2003. — Jan. 4 (http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/rights/articles/eav010403_pr.shtml). До принятия американского гражданства Леонид Комаровский был российским тележурналистом. Его арестовали, когда он был в Туркмении в качестве гостя своего старого друга местного бизнесмена Джуванча Джумаева. В интервью он подтвердил, что была предпринята попытка переворота, в которой участвовал и Джумаев, и переворот должен был происходить без использования огнестрельного оружия. Turkmenistan—One Year after the Botched Coup // News Central Asia, публикация на сайте http://www. newscentralasia.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=365. Те, кто считает, что Шихмурадов был обвинен ложно, подозревают, что все это могло быть организовано сторонниками бывшего руководителя службы безопасности Мухаммада Назарова или даже самим Ниязовым. Некоторые люди, близкие к Шихмурадову, даже утверждают, что никакой стрельбы вообще не было, но американские дипломаты в неофициальных беседах подтвердили, что выстрелы были, и, как следует из официальных сообщений, несколько участников нападения были ранены, а один убит. Turkmen President Niyazov Survives Assassination Attempts // EurasiaNet.org. — 2002. — Nov. 25, публикация на сайте http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav112502.shtml. Это резко контрастирует с поведением Феликса Кулова, который и в Киргизии, и за ее пределами выступал за то, чтобы Акаев оставался на своем посту вплоть до окончания предусмотренного законом срока. 29 апреля 2002 г. Шихмурадов провел презентацию в Фонде Карнеги в Вашингтоне. Его выступление было озаглавлено «Политический кризис в Туркмении: что происходит внутри режима Ниязова». Расшифровка стенограммы опубликована на сайте http://www.ceip.org/files/events/ sheikmuradov042902transcript.asp. Например, согласно президентскому указу январь переименован в «туркменбаши» (второе имя президента Ниязова), февраль — в «байдаг», что означает «месяц знамени», март стал «новрузом» (по названию весеннего мусульманского праздника), апрель в честь матери президента теперь называется «Гурбансолтан Эдже» и т. д. См.: Pravda.ru. — 2002. — Aug. 12.

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Находясь в изгнании, Борис Шихмурадов четыре раза встречался с автором этой книги. Pannier B. Turkmenistan: Former Minister Wanted on Criminal Charges // RFE/RL. — 2001. — Nov. 2. См. также Cohen A. Defection Shakes Tyrant // Johnson’s Russia List. — 2001. — Nov. 8. — Р. 5531—5532. См. сайт Шихмурадова http://www.gundogar.org. Для этого существует еще одна веская причина: дело в том, что отец Шихмурадова (туркмен по национальности) занимал в Туркмении видный пост в последнем Министерстве государственной безопасности сталинской эпохи и несет ответственность за аресты многих видных людей, родственники которых, как говорят, до сих пор считают запятнанным и самого Шихмурадова. Interfax. — 2002. — May 7. Ibid. RFE/RL. — 2002. — May 16. Concerns in Europe and Central Asia, July-December 2002 / Amnesty Intern. // http://www.erkin.net/chronicle2/news207.html. Именно такое впечатление сложилось у автора этой книги, когда она его услышала, а затем его содержание было воспроизведено в декабре 2003 г. в документе, приписываемом Шихмурадову, который представил пространное описание заговора с целью убийства президента Ниязова в книге «Я и мои партнеры-террористы». Подробнее см.: Turkmenistan Publishes ‘Confession’ in Presidential Assassination Plot // Agence France-Presse. — 2004. — Febr. 26. Этот редко используемый договор, подписанный в Москве в 1991 г., предусматривает возможность развертывания экспертных миссий для проверки ситуации в области прав человека в странах ОБСЕ. К нему пришлось обратиться в декабре 2002 г. (при мощной американской поддержке). См.: http://www.osce.org. U.S. at OSCE: Human Rights Violations Unabated in Turkmenistan: Press release / Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, публикация на сайте http://www.usinfo.pl/releases/docs/text_212.htm. Хотя министр иностранных дел Узбекистана не подтвердил это, как-то в публичном выступлении он отметил, что у Шихмурадова, в течение долгого времени занимавшего пост министра иностранных дел Туркмении, было много друзей в правительстве Узбекистана. Косвенным признанием вины может служить также то, что Узбекистан не объявил туркменского министра персоной нон грата после того, как посол этой страны в Ашхабаде был вынужден покинуть Туркмению. RFE/RL. — 2002. — Dec. 23.

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Также в июне 2003 г. Министерство просвещения приняло общее постановление, согласно которому никакие дипломы, полученные служащими туркменских государственных организаций в учебных заведениях за пределами Туркмении после 1993 г., признаваться не будут. Central Asia Report / RFE/RL. — 2004. — Vol. 4. — № 19. — May 11. Turkmenistan: Religious Leader Arrested and Imprisoned / UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. — [S. l.], March 18, 2004, публикация на сайте http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=40133. Григорьева Е. 25 лет счастья // Независимая газ. — 2003. — № 64. 27 июня российские СМИ сообщили, что представители Министерства государственной безопасности Туркмении конфисковали квартиры у лиц, имевших двойное гражданство. Российские граждане, лишившиеся своих квартир, организовали массовые акции протеста. Pravda.ru. — 2003. — June 30. На переговорах в Москве в апреле 2005 г. президент Ниязов и председатель правления «Газпрома» Алексей Миллер договорились, что «Газпром» больше не будет расплачиваться за туркменский газ товарами, т. е. техническим оборудованием, а перейдет исключительно на оплату деньгами. RIA Novosti. — 2005. — Apr. 15. Ниязов разделил человеческую жизнь на девять частей, примерно по 12 лет в каждой. Таким образом, потенциальная продолжительность жизни растянулась примерно до 109 лет, причем в 49 лет начинается «возраст пророка», продолжающийся до 62 лет, а затем, в 63 года, начинается «возраст вдохновения», продолжающийся до 73 лет. Затем наступает «возраст белобородого старца», который еще оставляет Ниязову в его достаточно преклонных летах некоторые возможности. Graves G. The Age of Reason: A Liberal Interpretation // CBC News Online. — 2003. — Sept. 23. Конституция гласит, что «...если президент не способен исполнять свои обязанности, то до избрания нового президента обязанности президента исполняет председатель парламента. В такой ситуации выборы президента должны состояться не позже чем через два месяца со дня передачи обязанностей президента председателю парламента. Лицо, исполняющее обязанности президента, не может участвовать в выборах президента в качестве кандидата». Авторы доклада, представленного Международной антикризисной группой в ноябре 2004 г., предполагают, что Ниязов мог бы передать президентский пост слабому кандидату и продолжать управлять страной в качестве

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главы Халк Маслахаты. Возможно также (после ожесточенной схватки) появление нового диктатора, подобного Ниязову. Кроме того, с учетом той огромной роли, которую играет в туркменском обществе принадлежность к определенному клану, и отношения Ниязова к крупнейшим национальным меньшинствам страны, не исключена возможность столкновения между лидерами кланов после ухода Ниязова. См.: Repression and Regression in Turkmenistan: A New International Strategy / Intern. Crisis Group // ICG Report [Brussels]. — 2004. — Nov. 4. — P. 21. Более подробную информацию об этом можно найти в докладах Международной антикризисной группы по Таджикистану: Tajikistan: A Roadmap for Development / Intern. Crisis Group // ICG Asia Report [Osh; Brussels]. — 2003. — № 51. — Apr. 24, а также Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace / Intern. Crisis Group // ICG Asia Report [Osh; Brussels]. — 2001. — № 30. — Dec. 24, публикация на сайте http://www.crisisweb.org. Худжандcкая (в советское время Ленинабадская) область теперь переименована в Согдийскую, а Куляб стал частью переименованной Хатлонской области. 30% постов на всех административных уровнях резервировалось для членов бывшей ОТО. Tajikistan: A Roadmap for Development / Intern. Crisis Group // ICG Asia Report [Osh; Brussels]. — 2003. — № 51. — Apr. 24, а также http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/ unmot/prst9757.htm. Подробнее см. публикацию на сайте http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmot/UnmotB.htm#general. Американский посол в Таджикистане в 1998—2003 гг. формально не находился в этой стране, вместо этого он еженедельно приезжал туда из своего «опорного пункта» в Алматы в Казахстане. Но в течение недели после 11 сентября он непрерывно находился в Душанбе. Публикация на сайте http://usembassy.state.gov/dushanbe/wwwhcons.html. Программа технической помощи Европейского союза Содружеству Независимых Государств (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States — TACIS) после гибели жены одного из экспертов TACIS в декабре 1997 г. полностью прервала работу и не возобновляла ее до 2003 г. Публикация на сайте http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/tajikistan/intro. McDermott R. Border Security in Tajikistan: Countering the Narcotics Trade? — Camberley UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Aug. 11, 2003. См. сайт НАТО http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/03-march/ e0325a.htm.

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См. сайт Государственного департамента США http://www.state.gov/p/ eur/ci/ti/c7013.htm. По данным ООН, в 2003 г. производство опиума увеличилось на 6% и достигло 3600 метрических тонн (по оценкам США — 2865 метрических тонн). U.S.: Afghan Poppy Production Doubles // Reuters. — 2003. — Nov. 28. Abdullaev Z., Nazarova S. Tajikistan: Referendum Result Controversy. — London: Inst. for War and Peace Reporting, June 28, 2003. Interfax Central Asia. — 2003. — June 23. Interfax. — 2003. — June 23. Из-за низкого уровня прямых иностранных инвестиций и недостаточно активной приватизации основными источниками покрытия налогового дефицита и дефицитов текущих статей бюджета в Таджикистане были внешние займы и гранты, так что в 2003 г. внешний долг страны составлял примерно 1 млрд долл. В 1998 г. Таджикистан заключил двусторонние соглашения о списании долгов с Казахстаном, Киргизией, Турцией, Узбекистаном и Россией, в 2002 г. аналогичные соглашения были подписаны с Казахстаном, Узбекистаном и Белоруссией. В середине 2003 г. таджикский парламент ратифицировал межправительственное соглашение с Россией (самым крупным кредитором в рамках двусторонних связей) о реструктуризации долга, составляющего 300 млн долл. Country Reports on Investment Climate: Tajikistan / United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific // Foreign Direct Investment in Central Asian and Caucasian Economies: Policies and Issues. — Bangkok, 2003, публикация на сайте http://www.unescap.org/tid/publication/chap3e_2255.pdf. В 2004 г. две независимых газеты были вынуждены приостановить свою работу, но закрытие газеты «Руз-и Нав» за неуплату налогов затруднило иностранным обозревателям интерпретацию этих случаев, потому что издатели «Руз-и Нав» признали, что действительно не все налоги платили должным образом. Они жаловались, что из-за высоких налогов большинству газет приходится занижать тиражи, но что наказаны они были не за это, а за редакционную политику. RFE/RL. — 2004. — Jan. 11. Позже «Руз-и Нав» начала печататься в Центре поддержки независимых СМИ в Киргизии, но периодически стакивалась с проблемами доставки тиража в свою страну. Например, в ноябре 2004 г. Министерство государственных доходов и сбора налогов Таджикистана конфисковало 15 тыс. экземпляров этой газеты, заявив, что ее материалы нарушают таджикский закон, который эта газета обязана соблюдать, будучи еженедельным изданием, зарегистрированным в Министерстве юстиции Таджикистана. См.: Tajik

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Opposition Weekly Seized for Being Printed in Kyrgyzstan // BBC Monitoring Intern. Reports. — 2004. — Nov. 9. Например, член ПИВТ Мирзо Зиоев занимает в правительстве Рахмонова пост министра по чрезвычайным ситуациям. См.: http://www.cia.gov/ cia/publications/chiefs/chiefs174.html. Видный член ПИВТ Давлат Усмон занимал пост министра экономики, но был уволен в 2000 г. Tajikistan: An Uncertain Peace / Intern. Crisis Group // ICG Asia Report [Osh; Brussels]. — 2001. — № 30. — Dec. 24. Представителем этого лагеря является, например, Мухиддин Кабури, заместитель председателя ПИВТ. Два члена ПИВТ обвиняются в уголовных преступлениях, и осенью 2003 г. очень серьезные обвинения были выдвинуты против лидера этой партии Саида Абдулло Нури. Давний член ПИВТ Касым Рахимов в июле 2003 г. был арестован в связи с обвинениями в изнасиловании. В октябре 2003 г. были выдвинуты обвинения против заместителя председателя ПИВТ Шамсуддина Шамсуддинова: он обвинялся в государственной измене, создании нелегальной вооруженной группы, незаконном пересечении границы и двубрачии. Публикация на сайте http://www.muslimuzbekistan.com/eng/ennews/2003/10/ennews25102003.html. В июле 2003 г. официальные представители правительства провели инструктаж для всех имамов (религиозных лидеров общин) региона. Два имама были смещены, а две мечети были закрыты из-за неправильной регистрации. Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Tajikistan, 2003 / U.S. State Department. — Washington, DC, 2003. Более подробную информацию об Ага Хане и его семье можно найти на сайте http://www.amaana.org/agakhan/profile.htm. Peuch J.-Ch. Central Asia: Charges Link Russian Military to Drug Trade // RFE/RL. — 2001. — June 8 (http://www.rferl.org/features/2001/06/ 08062001111711.asp). Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict / Intern. Crisis Group // ICG Asia Report [Osh; Brussels]. — 2001. — № 25. — Nov. 26. См. также: Reuter P., Pain E., Greenfield V. The Effects of Drug Trafficking on Central Asia. — Unpublished manuscript. Tajikstan: Fall of Praetorian Guardsman / Inst. for War and Peace Reporting // RCA № 306. — 2004. — Aug. 10, публикация на сайте http://www. iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca2/ rca2_306_1_eng.txt.

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См. приложение 5. Кроме министра обороны США Дональда Рамсфельда, посетившего Узбекистан в феврале 2004 г., сюда приезжали и другие представители США, в частности конгрессмены, дипломаты и военные. В августе 2004 г. в Узбекистане с двухдневным визитом побывал генерал Ричард Майерс, после чего Соединенные Штаты увеличили финансирование совместных проектов на 21 млн долл., чтобы помочь Узбекистану исключить возможность распространения биологического оружия, еще остающегося в этом регионе. См.: http://www.usembassy.uz/home/index.aspx?&=&mid=327; Hendren J. Head of Joint Chiefs Reassures Uzbekistan amid Aid Cutoff; Gen. Richard Myers Says the Central Asian Nation Is a Key Ally in the Fight against Terrorism // Los Angeles Times. — 2004. — Aug. 13, а также US Helps Uzbekistan Fight Spread of Bio Weapons // Agence France Presse. — 2004. — Aug. 12. Существует также резолюция Конгресса с выражением озабоченности в связи с нарушениями прав человека в Центральной Азии («Expressing the Sense of Congress with Respect to Human Rights in Central Asia»), представленная в комитет Палаты представителей по международным отношениям 11 февраля 2003 г. Публикация на сайте http://www.hrw.org/reports/ 2002/usmil/USass0202-01.htm. Президент Буш распорядился снять ограничения на помощь Узбекистану в соответствии с программой «Совместное сокращение угрозы» 1993 г. и разделом V Закона о защите свободы (20 декабря 2003 г.). Публикация на сайте http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/prsrl/2003/27665.htm. Его решение было озвучено официальным представителем Госдепартамента США Ричардом Баучером 13 июля 2004 г. См. замечания с пресс-конференции Рамсфельда в Ташкенте 24 февраля 2004 г., публикация на сайте http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/23724. pf.htm. Davis J., Sweeney M. Central Asia in U. S. Strategy and Operational Planning. — Cambridge, MA: Inst. for Foreign Policy Analysis, Febr. 2004. — P. 51. В октябре 2001 г. Рамсфельд приезжал в Узбекистан для обсуждения с президентом Каримовым прав базирования. См.: http://www. defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t10082001_t1005uz.html. Несмотря на явно выраженное стремление сотрудничать с Соединенными Штатами, узбекские власти, как полагают, заняли жесткую позицию на перегово-

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рах относительно точных условий многостороннего соглашения «О статусе вооруженных сил». См. приложение 5. Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2003: Uzbekistan / U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. — Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, February 25, 2004 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 2003/27873.htm), а также Creating Enemies of the State: Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan / Human Rights Watch // http://www.hrw.org/reports/ 2004/uzbekistan0304/index.htm. Judicial Reform Index for Kyrgyzstan, June 2003 / Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative. — [S. l.], 2003. Предполагают, что лидер ИДУ Тахир Юлдаш все еще скрывается в Афганистане или Пакистане. См.: Central Asia Report / RFE/RL. — 2004. — Vol. 4. — № 14. — Apr. 7, а также Mydans S. Uzbeks’ Anger at Rulers Boils Over // New York Times. — 2004. — Apr. 8. В результате взрыва бомбы у ворот посольства США погиб сотрудник местной службы безопасности. Обзор, проведенный центром по изучению общественного мнения «Ижтимоий фикр» в Узбекистане в октябре 2001 г., показал, что примерно 90% населения одобряют кампанию борьбы с террором и тесное сотрудничество Узбекистана с Соединенными Штатами. Однако обзор, проведенный в июле 2002 г., показал, что в то время поддержку Узбекистаном антитеррористических операций одобряли лишь около 60% граждан. В 2003 г. в своих показаниях в комитете по иностранным делам Сената США Эндрю Коут из «Pew Research Center» заявил, что проводимые в Узбекистане опросы свидетельствуют о том, что уровень поддержки возглавляемой США войны с террором составляет в Узбекистане 85%. Eshanova Z. Uzbekistan: Survey Shows Waning Support for War on Terrorism // RFE/RL. — 2002. — July 26. Что касается поездок Каримова за рубеж, то в 2003 г. он побывал в Испании, Болгарии и Польше. Подробнее относительно поездок западных лидеров в Узбекистан см.: http://www.press-service.uz/eng/pressa_eng/ pressa_eng.htm.. The Failure of Reform in Uzbekistan: Ways Forward for the International Community / Intern. Crisis Group // ICG Asia Report [Osh; Brussels]. — 2004. — № 76. — March 11. Такие критические замечания содержатся в неопубликованных рукописях погибших членов ИДУ, собираемых автором с середины 1990-х годов.

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Подробнее см. публикации Международной антикризисной группы: The Failure of Reform in Uzbekistan...; Uzbekistan’s Reform Program: Illusion or Reality? / Intern. Crisis Group // ICG Asia Report [Osh; Brussels]. — 2003. — № 46. — Febr. 18; Central Asia: Uzbekistan at Ten—Repression and Instability // Asia Report. — 2001. — № 21. — Aug. 21. См.: Pentagon Studies Central Asia Forces // Associated Press. — 2002. — Apr. 30. Первоначально на базе размещалось 1800 человек (половина из США), а также истребители FA-18 и французские реактивные «Миражи», которые использовались в Афганистане. В отличие от авиабазы в Ханабаде (Узбекистан), с которой осуществлялись только полеты с целью поиска и уничтожения, авиабаза в Киргизии может использоваться для налетов с возможностью боевых столкновений. Однако после открытия американской базы Байрам в Албании потребность в боевых налетах из Киргизии исчезла. Численность персонала на этой базе — примерно 1100 человек; там базируются самолеты-заправщики KC-135 и транспортные самолеты C130. К августу 2004 г. оттуда было совершено около 18 тыс. вылетов. См.: Tyson A. S. New U.S. Strategy: ‘Lily Pad’ Bases // Christian Science Monitor. — 2004. — Aug. 10, публикация на сайте http://www.csmonitor.com/ 2004/0810/PO6s02-wosc.html. Это высокогорная страна граничит с Китаем, но не граничит с Афганистаном, и дорога в Афганистан пролегает через Таджикистан по высокогорной границе. Поэтому гуманитарную помощь для Афганистана, идущую через Киргизию, приходится везти на грузовиках по шоссе через шесть перевалов высотой более 2 тыс. м. Через киргизско-таджикскую границу идет «утечка» в Киргизию; в частности, через нее осуществляется торговля наркотиками, и именно по этому маршруту боевики ИДУ проходили в Баткенскую область Киргизии в 1999 и 2000 гг. См. приложение 5. Эта база названа в честь начальника службы пожарной охраны Нью-Йорка, погибшего при нападении на Всемирный торговый центр. Сообщалось, что правительство Киргизии получало за каждый взлет по 7 тыс. долл. См.: Andrews E. L. Bustling U.S. Air Base Materializes in the Mud // New York Times. — 2002. — Apr. 27. По утверждению Александра Кима, бывшего корреспондента газеты «Вечерний Бишкек», которому пришлось покинуть страну, Тойгонбаев и его партнеры контролируют множество предприятий, в том числе конгломерат СМИ (телевидение и печатные издания), водочный бизнес, самый большой в Киргизии сахарорафинадный завод, цементный бизнес и крупный бизнес по обеспечению поставок ре-

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активного топлива, позволяющий зарабатывать миллионы на продаже топлива союзным ВВС, использующим авиабазу «Манас». Kaiser R. Difficult Times for a Key Ally in Terror War, Kyrgyzstan’s Politics, Economy in Turmoil // Washington Post. — 2002. — Aug. 5. Interfax Central Asia. — 2003. — March 4, 20. «Оппозиции теперь придется взять на себя всю ответственность, особенно в отношении поддержания законности и порядка», — заявил представитель ОБСЕ в Бишкеке Алоиз Петерле 24 марта 2005 г. Он выразил сожаление в связи с сообщениями о грабежах в некоторых частях страны и призвал все стороны вести себя мирно и ответственно. См. официальное сообщение для печати на сайте http://www.osce.org/item/9014.html. В мае 2003 г. парламент Казахстана санкционировал отправку казахстанских военнослужащих в Ирак в мае 2003 г. сроком на один год. Казахстанские военные прибыли в Ирак в августе 2003 г. и сменились в феврале 2004 г. В апреле 2004 г. министры иностранных дел и обороны Казахстана заявили, что после мая 2004 г. страна больше не будет посылать своих военных в Ирак. MacAskill E. A Coalition Showing Signs of Fracture // Guardian. — 2004. — Apr. 9. Президент Назарбаев вел переговоры с президентом Бушем в ходе рабочего визита в США 20—21 декабря 2001 г. По имеющимся оценкам подтвержденные запасы углеводородного сырья в Казахстане в целом составляют от 9 до 17,6 млрд баррелей. В 2003 г. правительство объявило о планах добыть в 2010 г. Казахстан будет добывать 2,4 млн баррелей в сутки, а в 2015 г. — 3,6 млн баррелей. Kazakhstan Country Analysis Brief / Energy Information Administration. — Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, July 2003. Как заявил в апреле исполнительный директор государственной нефтегазовой компании «Казмунайгаз» Каиргельды Кабылдин, соглашение, позволяющее Казахстану экспортировать нефть с месторождения Кашаган по трубопроводу Баку — Тбилиси — Джейхан, должно быть подписано в сентябре 2005 г. Президент азербайджанской государственной нефтяной компании «Сокар» Натик Алиев сказал, что новая инфраструктура, необходимая для подключения Казахстана к трубопроводу Баку — Тбилиси — Джейхан, будет включать в себя 700-километровый трубопровод. Marketwatch.com. — 2005. — Apr. 18. См.: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/t04282002_t0428kzk.html. Kazakhstan News Bull. / Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. — 2002. — Vol. 2. — № 16. — May 8, а также Interfax Central Asia. — 2002. — Sept. 27.

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См.: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040225-secdef0494. html, а также Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan // Kazakhstan News Bull. — 2003. — Vol.1. — № 14. — March 18. 33 Central Asia Report / RFE/RL. — 2002. — Vol. 2. — № 30. — Aug. 8, а также Interfax Central Asia. — 2002. — Aug. 5. 34 Blua A. Central Asia: Rumsfeld Wraps up Visit to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan // RFE/RL. — 2004. — Febr. 26. 35 Список проектов по Программе совместного сокращения угроз в Казахстане приведен в приложении 5. См. также: http://www.fas.org/nuke/ control/ctr/provisions.htm. 36 Например, в ноябре 2002 г. правительство Туркмении подписало контракт на сумму в 8,3 млн долл. с американской корпорацией «Case» на поставку 70 тракторов с плугами. См.: Central Asia and Caucasus Business Report / Interfax. — 2002. — Nov. 18—24. 37 Крас. звезда. — 2002. — 25 янв. 38 Туркмения подписала документ о партнерстве 10 мая 1994 г. в Брюсселе. См.: http://www.newscentralasia.com/modules.php?name=News&file= article&sid=555. 39 См. приложение 5. 40 9—20 февраля 2004 г. Управление США по борьбе с наркотиками провело в Ашхабаде расширенный курс обучения. В декабре 2002 г. Туркмения единственная из стран Центральной Азии не послала своих представителей на третий региональный семинар по борьбе с наркотиками для сотрудников полиции и таможни, проводившийся в Тегеране Управлением ООН по борьбе с наркотиками и преступностью. 41 Interfax Central Asia. — 2003. — March 3, а также Панфилова В. Двойная игра Туркменбаши // Независимая газ. — 2003. — 12 марта. 42 В июне 2003 г. Управление ООН по борьбе с наркотиками и преступностью пообещало выделить на эту многолетнюю программу 17 млн долл. Weihman T. U.S. Focus on Interdiction in Central Asia is Inadequate to Meet Drug Trafficking Challenge // EurasiaNet.org. — 2003. — Sept. 23. 43 По сообщениям Государственного департамента, в 2002 г. Соединенные Штаты выделили на программы борьбы с наркотрафиком в Центральной Азии 22 млн долл. См.: Weihman T. Op. cit, а также Lubin N., Klaits A., Barsegian I. Narcotics Interdiction in Afghanistan and Central Asia. — New York: Open Society Inst., 2002. 44 В 2003 и 2004 гг. Москва предлагала Киргизии кое-какое оборудование бесплатно или по очень низкой цене, и иногда закупка российского оборудо32

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вания производилась на деньги, предоставленные США. В 2003 Россия передала Киргизии военное оборудование стоимостью 3 млн долл., и в 2004 г. российско-киргизское военно-техническое сотрудничество продолжалось. Улучшение отношений между Россией и Узбекистаном в июне 2004 г. привело к созданию совместного оборонного предприятия; кроме того, был отремонтирован авиационный завод им. Чкалова в Ташкенте, началось обучение узбекских военнослужащих и передача Узбекистану российского военного оборудования. См. различные сообщения «BBC Monitoring International Reports». См. также: Tashkent Will Settle Accounts with Russian Weapon by Shares of Its Enterprises // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. — 2004. — June 18, и Мухин В. Ташкент против «бесплатной приватизации» // Независимая газ. — 2004. — 13 мая. Socor V. Kyrgyzstan’s Hosting of U.S. Forces Irritates Moscow // Monitor 26. — 2002. — Vol. 8. — № 82. — Apr. Shanker T. Russian Official Cautions U.S. on Use of Central Asian Bases // New York Times. — 2003. — Oct. 10. Заседания высших органов СНГ // Дипломат. вестн. — 2000. — № 7. — Июль. — C. 47—48. Это соединение было создано весной 2002 г. на основе 201-й российской мотострелковой дивизии, базирующейся в Таджикистане. Jonson L. Russia and Tajikistan in a New Regional Context: Post September 11, 2001. — Stockholm: Swedish Inst. for Intern. Affairs, Oct. 2002. — P. 7. Во время визита в Узбекистан в мае 2004 г. министр обороны России Сергей Иванов сказал, что Организация договора о коллективной безопасности проведет в Казахстане и Киргизии крупномасштабные антитеррористические учения, на которых должны присутствовать наблюдатели из Китая и Узбекистана. Interfax Central Asia. — 2004. — May 12. Здесь базируется 10 боевых самолетов (реактивные истребители Су-27 и бомбардировщики Су-24), 2 военно-транспортных самолета и 13 учебных самолетов и вертолетов. Russia Opens Airbase in Kyrgyzstan // Russia J. — 2003. — Oct. 23. Более подробный список см.: EurasiaNet.org. — 2003. — Febr. 13, а также Interfax Central Asia. — 2004. — Febr. 24. Arman K. Russia and Tajikistan: Friends Again // EurasiaNet.org. — 2004. — Oct. 28 (http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eavl02804. shtml). Таджики должны русским около 300 млн долл. и получили кредит еще на 50 млн долл. на основании соглашения между РАО ЕЭС и правительством Таджикистана о расширении Сангтудинской гидроэлектростанции.

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В ходе своего визита в Узбекистан в мае 2004 г. министр обороны России Сергей Иванов сказал, что Узбекистан и Россия проведут совместные военные учения в 2005 г. Central Asia Report / RFE/RL. — 2004. — Vol. 4. — № 16. — Apr. 19, May 3, а также Interfax Central Asia. — 2004. — May 12. Central Asia Report / RFE/RL. — 2004. — Vol. 4. — № 18. — May 3. В ходе визита министра обороны России Сергея Иванова в Узбекистан 12 мая 2004 г. было заключено двустороннее соглашение, которое позволяет России продолжать обучать узбекских специалистов по ПВО и готовить пилотов, а также помогать Узбекистану модернизировать свои военные самолеты. Мухин В. Указ. соч. Публикация на сайте http://www.muslimuzbekistan.com/eng/ennews/ 2003/09/ennews17092003.html. Гюльнара живет там с двумя детьми, нарушая решение суда Нью-Джерси, который предоставил право опеки ее мужу. Jones R. L. Immigrant Wins Custody of Children, Who Are with Mother in Uzbekistan // New York Times. — 2003. — Febr. 11, а также Maqsudi v. Karimova-Maqsudi // New Jersey Law J. — New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, August 11, 2003. Подробнее о ее роли во взаимоотношениях Узбекистана и России см.: Dejevsky M. Interviews with Gulnara Karimova // Independent. — 2004. — Jan. 7. В этих учениях участвовало более 10 тыс. человек, 60 военных кораблей и 30 разведывательных самолетов и реактивных истребителей. В ходе первого международного «Каспийского форума» в столице Казахстана Астане в апреле 2004 г. заместитель министра иностранных дел России Виктор Калюжный, говоря о проблемах обеспечения безопасности Каспийского моря, заявил, что «внешний фактор [Соединенные Штаты] только создаст проблемы». Он также сказал, что прикаспийским государствам необходимо согласиться, что в Каспийском регионе не должно быть войск никаких других стран и что Россия видит себя в качестве основного гаранта безопасности в этом регионе. См.: Russia against Demilitarized Caspian Region // Russia J. — 2004. — Apr. 28. В 2002 г. Казахстан покупал оружие и военное снаряжение у предприятий российской оборонной промышленности. Interfax Central Asia. — 2004. — Apr. 22. См.: Military Forces and Military and Political Direction of the Republic of Uzbekistan // Uzbekistan Information Directory. — 2003. — Jan. 31, публикация на сайте http://www.uzland.uz. Central Asia Report / RFE/RL. — 2004. — March 23.

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Например, узбекские офицеры проходят подготовку на объектах НАТО в Испании и Германии. См.: Military Forces... Blagov S. Kazakhstan Looks to Russia amid Hail of Western Criticism // EurasiaNet.org. — 2003. — Febr. 19. Putin, Nazarbayev Set to Bring Two Countries Closer Together // ITARTASS News Agency. — 2003. — Febr. 18, а также President Putin Pleased with Russian-Kazakh Relations // RIA Novosti. — 2003. — Febr. 18. В 2002 г. доля России в экспорте Казахстана составляла 15,5%, а в импорте 39%. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2003 / Intern. Monetary Fund. — Washington, DC, 2003. — Р. 290—291. Относительно крупнейших торговых партнеров стран Центральной Азии см. также приложение 1. Например, депутат Государственной думы Дмитрий Рогозин, политик националистического толка, предложил, чтобы права этнических русских защищала международная организация. Однако наиболее неудовлетворенные русские уже уехали из Казахстана. В 1989 г. здесь проживало 6062 тыс. этнических русских, а спустя десять лет — только 4479,6 тыс. См. также: http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org. Первоначально Казахстан согласился на непрерывное использование Россией космодрома Байконур, но позже, в конце 1990-х годов, поставил вопрос об ограничении запусков российских космических аппаратов, надеясь добиться изменения условий арендного договора с Россией, а также возражая против загрязнения окружающей среды, которое иногда происходит при таких запусках. Действующее ныне соглашение позволяет Казахстану закупать российские товары на сумму, эквивалентную долгу России за аренду космодрома. Россия арендует Байконур с 1994 г. на основании соглашения, заключенного на 25 лет. В 2002 г. Путин и Назарбаев договорились о продлении аренды, а в январе 2004 г. подписали новый арендный договор, который предусматривает продление соглашения до 2050 г. Interfax Central Asia. — 2003. — July 30; Russia Extends Space Site Lease // BBC Reporting. — 2004. — Jan. 9. Относительно торговых партнеров Центральной Азии см. приложение 1. В феврале 1999 г. Россия, Белоруссия, Казахстан, Киргизия и Таджикистан подписала соглашение о создании таможенного союза и единого экономического пространства, имея в виду три основных цели: сотрудничество с целью вступления в ВТО, согласование таможенных тарифов и разработку общих принципов охраны границ. См.: Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections. — 2003. — Oct. 17, а также Eurasian Economic Community Chronology, публикация на сайте http://www.photius.com/eaec.

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Президент Казахстана Назарбаев предложил ввести в этом едином экономическом пространстве общую валюту «алтын» (что означает «золото»). Назарбаев хочет, чтобы были созданы зоны свободной торговли и чтобы эти государства ввели единые тарифы на перевозку грузов. Interfax Central Asia. — 2003. — Apr. 1. Казахстан подал официальную заявку на вступление в ВТО в 1996 г. и собирается стать членом ВТО сразу после России. В марте 2004 г. премьер-министр Казахстана Даниял Ахметов заявил, что Казахстан планирует присоединиться к ВТО в конце 2005 г. или в начале 2006 г. Interfax, Central Asia and Caucasus Business Report. — 2004. — March 22—28. Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan Still Negotiating Caspian // BBC Monitoring. — 2004. — Apr. 14; Legal Status of the Caspian Sea to Be Discussed in Baku // Gazeta.kg. — 2004. — March 15, а также Five Countries to Discuss Legal Status of Caspian Sea in Tehran // Pravdaonline. — 2003. — Dec. 4. Последние переговоры относительно юридического статуса Каспийского моря состоялись в апреле 2004 г. в Казахстане. Следующая встреча, которая должна была состояться в Тегеране в январе 2005 г., была отложена без объяснения причин. В настоящее время «ЛУКойл» участвует в трех нефтяных и газовых проектах в Казахстане. «ЛУКойл» имеет 15%-ную долю в консорциуме «Karachaganak Integrated Organization», разрабатывающем месторождение Карачаганак, 50% в совместном предприятии «Turgai Petroleum», разрабатывающим месторождение Кумкол в Кзыл-Ординской области (Центральный Казахстан), а также долю в совместном российско-американском предприятии «LUKArco», которому принадлежит 5% месторождения Тенгиз. Кроме того, «ЛУКойл» владеет 12,5% в Каспийском трубопроводном консорциуме, который экспортирует нефть Тенгиза в Новороссийск. Interfax Central Asia. — 2003. — Febr. 10. В мае 2002 г. Казахстан и Россия подписали протокол, согласно которому нефтяное месторождение Курмангазы относится к юрисдикции Казахстана, а месторождения Центральное и Хвалынское — к юрисдикции России; все три расположены в северной части Каспийского моря. См.: Interfax Central Asia. — 2002. — Oct. 2, а также Kazakhs Turn Up Heat on Rosneft // Reuters. — 2004. — Apr. 14. Central Asia and Caucasus Business Report / Interfax. — 2004. — March 22—28.

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Договориться по этому вопросу, конечно, очень сложно, потому что в переговорах участвуют партнеры по совместному предприятию, разрабатывающему месторождение Карачаганак, правительство Казахстана, представители российской газовой промышленности, а также стоящее за ней правительство России. В 2003 г. «LUKoil Overseas» начала переговоры с «Газпромом» об увеличении цены на газ, добываемый на месторождении Карачаганак; сейчас «Газпром» платит всего 14,5 долл. за тысячу кубометров — примерно треть того, что он платит за туркменский и узбекский газ. Interfax Central Asia. — 2003. — Aug. 28. По сообщениям западных компаний, работающих в Центральной Азии, «Газпром» платит за казахский газ меньше 40 долл. за тысячу кубометров. См.: http://www.capitallinkrussia.com/ press/companies/50010088/6619. html. После создания предприятия «Казросгаз» было решено, что около 3 млрд куб. м казахского газа будет ежегодно продаваться в европейских странах. Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections. — 2002. — July 12. В апреле 2004 г. «Газпром» и министр энергетики и природных ресурсов Казахстана договорились относительно транзита дополнительных объемов казахстанского газа на европейские рынки. Взамен правительство республики предложило финансировать программу увеличения пропускной способности системы казахстанских газопроводов (стоимостью в 2 млрд долл.), чтобы «Газпром» мог транспортировать из Туркмении необходимые ему объемы газа. См.: Коммерсантъ. — 2004. — 6 апр. К 2015 г. Казахстан планирует увеличивать добычу природного газа до 70 млрд куб. м, из которых 40—45 млрд планируется экспортировать. В 2002 г. объем добычи газа в Казахстане составил 14 млрд куб. м. Kazakhstan Country Analysis Brief / Energy Information Administration. — Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, July 2003. Соглашение об импорте газа и стратегическом сотрудничестве на 2003— 2012 гг. между «Газпромом» и «Узбекнефтегазом» было подписано 17 декабря 2002 г. Публикация на сайте http://www.uzland.uz. 15 мая 2003 г. Киргизия и «Газпром» подписали соглашение о сотрудничестве в разведке и разработке нефтяных и газовых месторождений с целью транспортировки газа в Киргизию, а также о реконструкции имеющихся и прокладке новых газопроводов. Это соглашение предусматривает, что «Газпром» будет покупать газ в Туркмении и Узбекистане и затем продавать его Киргизии, которая будет платить за него не узбекскому правительству, а «Газпрому». Interfax Central Asia. — 2003. — May 16.

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Nobatova M. Gazprom Lays Down the Rules for Gas Business in Central Asia // Russian Petroleum Investor. — 2003. — March. — Р. 76. Ibid. — P. 78. В апреле 2004 г. «Зарубежнефтегаз» и «Узбекнефтегаз» подписали соглашение о разделе продукции в соотношении 50 : 50 сроком на 15 лет, касающееся разработки газового месторождения Шахпахты в Узбекистане. «Газпром» обязался вложить в обновление инфраструктуры этого месторождения 15 млн долл., чтобы довести объем ежегодной добычи до 500 млн куб. м. Позже, в июне 2004 г., была достигнута договоренность о разработке Россией газового месторождения Кандым, запасы которого составляют 150 млрд куб. м, в рамках соглашения о консорциуме; России будет принадлежать 90% из 9 млрд куб. м газа, которые там планируется добывать ежегодно. Lukoil to Launch Uzbekistan Gas Project This Week // Interfax. — 2004. — Nov. 24. Кроме изоляции Туркмении в рамках системы газопроводов Центральной Азии «Газпром» также стремился не допустить, чтобы Туркмения экспортировала свой газ непосредственно на Украину с помощью компании «Итера», которая занималась транспортировкой туркменского газа с 1999 до 2003 гг.. В декабре 2002 г. «Газпром» подписал контракт с «Eural Transgas», обязывающий ее ежегодно транспортировать на Украину 36 млрд куб. м газа, так что возникли подозрения, что «Eural Transgas» — это частная дочерняя компания «Газпрома». Belton C. Gazprom Gives Away Turkmenistan-Ukraine Gas Sales // The Moscow Times. — 2003. — Febr. 28. Строительство газопровода «Центральная Азия — Центр» (ранее «Средняя Азия — Центр») началось после открытия месторождения Джаркак, и его первая очередь была закончена в 1960 г. Второй участок в 1968 г. достиг Ташкента, в 1970 г. был продлен до Бишкека, а в 1971 г. — до Алматы. К середине 1970-х годов строительство этой системы длиной 13 750 км была закончено включая четыре параллельных нитки от точки разветвления Бейнеу в Северо-Западном Казахстане, две нитки, идущие на северозапад к Москве, и еще две нитки, идущие на запад через Волгу к системе «Северный Кавказ — Москва». Dienes L. The Soviet Energy System: Resource Use and Policies. — Washington, DC: Wiley and Sons, 1979. — Р. 79— 80. 2300-километровый трубопровод Бухара — Урал также берет начало в Центральной Азии и тянется из северной части Туркмении до Урала. Он был проложен в 1963—1965 гг., после открытия крупнейшего месторождения газа в Газли (Узбекистан). По этому трубопроводу газ подается также в Башкирию и Татарстан, к западу от Оренбурга. Country Analy-

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sis Brief on Turkmenistan Energy Sector / Energy Information Administration. — Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, May 2002. См. также: http://www.gazprom.com. В июне 1999 г. РАО ЕЭС совместно с Казахстаном создали новую транснациональную энергетическую компанию «Уралтек», в которой Казахстану принадлежит 25%, филиалам РАО ЕЭС — 45% и «Access Industries» — 30%. RIA Oreanda Economic News. — 1999. — June 11, а также Финансовые известия. — 1999. —10 июня. См.: http://www.cawater-info.net/news/11-2004/04_e.htm. В советское время центральные планирующие органы старались, чтобы вода Киргизии использовалась для орошения хлопковых полей Узбекистана и Казахстана, а эти две республики зимой делились своими нефтяными и газовыми ресурсами с Киргизией. «Русал», одна из трех крупнейших в мире алюминиевых компаний, собирается потратить 560 млн долл., чтобы сдвинуть с мертвой точки этот проект, застопорившийся еще в 1980-х годах. В дополнение к своим инвестициям в Рогун «Русал» в ближайшие пять лет намерен вложить 600 млн долл. в строительство предприятия по выплавке алюминия в Южном Таджикистане. В целом эта компания планирует в ближайшие десять лет вложить в экономику Таджикистана более 10 млрд долл. См.: Arman K. Russia and Tajikistan: Friends Again // EurasiaNet.org. — 2004. — Oct. 28. Energy and Environmental Security in Central Asia: The Syr Darya / United States Department of Energy. — [S. l.], Febr. 20, 2001. — (CSIS briefing by Keely Lange) http://www.csis.org/ruseura/cs010220lange.htm. Наиболее известное соглашение, регулирующее использование водных и энергетических ресурсов, было подписано в марте 1998 г. Казахстаном, Киргизией и Узбекистаном. Узбекистан использует 51% воды из Сырдарьи, а Казахстан — 37%, в то время как бóльшую часть вод Амударьи используют Узбекистан и Туркмения. Квоты для Таджикистана и Киргизии составляют по 15%. Asia Report / Intern. Crisis Group. — 2002. — № 34. — May 30. — Р. 9, 12, а также Tajikistan Calls for More Cooperation in Water Management // Transitions Online. — 2003. — Sept. 9. В 2000 г. Туркмения приступила к созданию в пустыне Каракумы гигантского водоема под названием «Озеро Золотого века» стоимостью в 4,5 млрд долл. Согласно существующим планам создание этого озера займет двадцать лет. Ожидается, что его поверхность составит 3,5—4,0 тыс. кв. км, глубина — от 70 до 100 м, а вмещать оно будет от 132 до 150 куб. км воды. Дренажные воды из пяти областей Туркмении, а также из Хорезмской обла-

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сти Узбекистана будут поступать в это озеро по двум главным каналамколлекторам. Некоторые эксперты утверждают, что это озеро не сможет существовать только за счет дренажных вод и в конечном счете оно или исчезнет, или соединится с Амударьей. Linette D. Water Resources Management in Central Asia: Addressing New Challenges and Risks // Central Asia and Caucasus Analysis. — 2001. — Aug. 15.; ICG Asia Report / Intern. Crisis Group. — 2002. — № 34. — May 30. — Р. 25—26, а также EurasiaNet. org. — 2003. — May 12. Разработка системы водопользования в Центральной Азии была любимым проектом министра иностранных дел Великобритании Робина Кука. С небольшими водными проектами работали разные международные организации, в частности, Глобальная программа обеспечения энергоснабжения (в рамках Программы развития ООН) с финансированием Всемирного банка, Специальная программа для экономики стран Центральной Азии в сотрудничестве с Европейской экономической комиссией ООН, Экономическая и социальная комиссия ООН для стран Азии и Тихого океана и АМР США. Уйгурская сепаратистская группа — Исламское движение «Восточный Туркестан» — наиболее воинственная из всех мусульманских групп, действующих на западе Китая в Синьцзян-Уйгурском автономном районе. Его члены требуют отделения от Китая и создания независимого государства Восточный Туркестан. In the Spotlight: East Turkestan Islamic Movement / Center for Defense Information. — [S. l.], Dec. 9, 2002, публикация на сайте http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/etim.cfm. В 2002 г. Соединенные Штаты внесли «Восточный Туркестан» в список террористических организаций. Eshanova Z. China: Uighur Group Added to U.S. List of Terrorist Organizations // Eurasianet.org. — 2002. — Sept. 1. В 2003 г. Верховный суд Киргизии запретил четыре группы, которые были признаны террористическими и экстремистскими организациями, причем три из них были организациями уйгуров из Китая: Организация освобождения Туркестана, Исламская партия Туркестана и Исламское движение «Восточный Туркестан». В том же 2003 г. китайское правительство выпустило официальный документ, который объявлял «Всемирный конгресс уйгурской молодежи» и «Информационный центр Восточного Туркестана» террористическими организациями. Blua A. Kyrgyz Rights Activists Call for End to Deportation of Uighurs to China // EurasiaNet.org. — 2004. — Jan. 25. Turaev F. Prickly Uzbekistan Comes Closer to Russia // Transitions Online. — 2003. — Aug. 19.

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Премьер-министры государств — членов ШОС согласились переместить этот центр в столицу Узбекистана Ташкент 24 сентября 2003 г. См.: Ferghana.ru. — 2003. — Sept. 24. Осенью 2002 г. Киргизия и Китай провели совместные военные учения. Следует заметить, что китайские военные впервые участвовали в маневрах за границей. В 2003 г. Казахстан и Китай также планировали провести совместные антитеррористические учения вдоль общей границы. Они решили также провести совместные тренировки летом 2003 г. в рамках первых антитеррористических учений, проводимых ШОС. Сообщают, что в 2002 г. Китай предоставил Центральной Азии военную помощь на 4,2 млн долл. Bailes A. J. K. et al. Armament and Disarmament in the Caucasus and Central Asia. — Stockholm: Stockholm Intern. Peace Research Inst., July 2003. — Р. 20. Индия, Пакистан, Монголия и Иран, возможно, тоже станут членами ШОС. См.: WPS: Defense and Security. — 2004. — Apr. 26, публикация на сайте http://www.wps.ru. Первая встреча глав правительств шести государств — членов ШОС состоялась 14 сентября 2001 г. в Алматы. На ней обсуждались проблемы регионального экономического сотрудничества. Относительно крупнейших торговых партнеров стран Центральной Азии см. приложение 1. В первые годы независимости стран Центральной Азии Китай был источником товаров для множества «челноков» из Казахстана, Киргизии и в меньшей степени Таджикистана и Узбекистана. Такая торговля давала местным жителям возможность накопить капитал, и во всех странах в рамках общего процесса установления контроля правительства над финансовыми процессами она подвергалась жестким ограничениям. Interfax Central Asia. — 2003. — Sept. 26. Американская компания «Access Industries» взяла на себя управление акциями правительства Казахстана в марте 2001 г., отчасти из-за трудностей в управлении этим проектом, которые возникли у казахстанского правительства с китайцами. «Access Industries» получила права на управление государственными акциями сроком на пять лет. Interfax Central Asia. — 2003. — March 31. Central Asia and Caucasus Business Report / Interfax. — 2002. — Vol. 5. — № 16. — Apr. 15—21, а также Central Asia Report / RFE/RL. — 2004. — Vol. 4. — № 12. — March 23.

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China Inks Historic Kazakh Oil Pact // The Moscow Times. — 2004. — May 19. «CNOOC North Caspian Sea Ltd.» и «Sinopec» не удалось купить права «British Gas» в западных компаниях, таких как ENI и «Royal Dutch/Shell», которые в мае 2003 г. осуществили свои приоритетные права блокирования сделок этих двух китайских нефтяных компаний. См.: Kashagan Project Participants Exercise Preemption Rights // Alexander’s Oil and Gas Connections. — 2003. — Vol. 8. — № 11. — June 3. Казахстан и в меньшей степени Киргизия озабочены защитой своего водоснабжения. Две крупных реки Или и Иртыш, которые Китай предлагает отклонить, текут в Казахстан и в Россию. Они питают важные сельскохозяйственные и индустриальные зоны в Центральном и Восточном Казахстане. Подробнее см.: Hagt E. China’s Water Policies: Implications for Xinjiang and Kazakhstan // The Central Asia—Caucasus Analyst / Center for Strategic and Intern. Studies. — 2003. — July 30. В турецко-казахстанском Международном университете Хока Ахмета Есеви, основанном в Казахстане в 1992 г., обучаются более 7 тыс. студентов. В турецко-киргизском университете «Манас» обучаются около 1700 студентов. Примерно 10 тыс. студентов из Центральной Азии учатся в Турции. Объем торговли со странами Центральной Азии с 1992 г. составляет примерно 7 млрд долл. Турция — основной экспортный партнер Туркмении и главный поставщик импорта для Таджикистана. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profiles 2003. — London, 2003. Относительно торговли см. также приложение 1. Например, в октябре 2003 г. турецкий премьер-министр Реджеп Таип Эрдаган совершил четырехдневную поездку по Киргизии и Таджикистану. Во встречах тюркоязычных государств как многосторонних форумах сотрудничества участвуют Азербайджан, Казахстан, Киргизия, Турция, Туркмения и Узбекистан. Седьмая такая встреча состоялась в апреле 2001 г. Starobin P. The Next Oil Frontier // Business Week. — 2002. — May 27. ОИК — межправительственная организация, насчитывающая в настоящее время 57 членов, была создана в 1969 г. в Марокко. Киргизия, Таджикистан и Туркмения вступили в нее в 1992 г., а Казахстан и Узбекистан — в 1995 г. См. сайт Исламского банка развития http://www.isdb.org. Относительно биографии Машкевича см.: http://eajc.org/pers_bio_e. php?idpers=1.

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Политические заявления Векслера опубликованы на сайте http://www. wexler.house.gov. См. также: Kazakhstan Daily Digest // EurasiaNet.org. — 2002. — May 29; Reaction of Some Kazakh Intellectuals to Robert Wexler’s Statement on Democratic Achievement in Kazakhstan // RFE/RL. — 2002. — May 30. Подробнее об этой встрече см.: http://www.kazakhstanembassy.org.uk/ cgi-bin/index/87?id=76. Папа Иоанн Павел II хотел побывать в Астане, потому что после того как в 1941 г. СССР захватил Западную Украину, многие поляки были насильственно переселены в Казахстан и/или отбывали здесь заключение. Киргизия стремится укрепить свою репутацию как азиатского государства, хотя и без особого успеха — с учетом ее трудного экономического положения. Из недавних азиатских поездок Акаева можно отметить посещения Японии в апреле 2004 г., Ирана в декабре 2003 г. и Индии в ноябре 2003 г. Киргизия имеет посольства в Индии, Малайзии, Китае, Турции и Объединенных Арабских Эмиратах. Совещание по взаимодействию и мерам доверия в Азии объединяет шестнадцать государств. Его участниками являются Афганистан, Азербайджан, Китай, Египет, Индия, Иран, Израиль, Казахстан, Монголия, Россия, Киргизия, Пакистан, Палестина, Таджикистан, Турция и Узбекистан (FBIS. — 2002. — June 4). 12 февраля 2002 г. Назарбаев и премьер-министр Индии Ваджпаи подписали совместное заявление. Полный текст документа опубликован на сайте http://www.meadev.nic.in/foreign/jt-declindo-kazakh.htm. Ramachandran S. India, Iran, Russia Map Out Trade Route // Asia Times. — 2002. — June 29., публикация на сайте http://www.atimes.com/ind-pad/ DF29Df02.html, а также Bedi R. India and Central Asia // Frontline. — 2002. — Vol. 19. — № 19. — Sept. 14—27 (http://www.frontlineonnet.com/ fll919/19190600.htm). Appelbaum A. EBRD Annual Meeting in Tashkent: No Showcase for the Uzbek Government // EurasiaNet.org. — 2003. — May 2. В 2003 г. ЕБРР выделил 2,3 млн долл. на реконструкцию аэропорта в Ташкенте. В том же году он открыл источники кредитования на сумму 2 млн долл. для обеспечения аренды оборудования и транспорта предприятиям малого бизнеса в Узбекистане. В апреле 2004 г. ЕБРР объявил о сокращении финансовой помощи Узбекистану в связи с нарушениями прав человека в этой стране. На весну 2005 г. планируется новая стратегия ЕБРР для Узбекистана. Interfax Central Asia. — 2003. — Apr. 7; Uzbekistan Infor-

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mation Directory—Uzland (http://www.uzland.uz); FBIS. — 2003. — May 5, 2004. — Apr. 7, 8. На конференции стран-доноров в Берлине, проходившей 31 марта — 1 апреля 2004 г., Афганистану было обещано выделение в течение трех лет 8,2 млрд долл. Афганистан, Китай, Иран, Пакистан, Таджикистан, Туркмения и Узбекистан подписали региональное соглашение о сотрудничестве с целью усиления борьбы с торговлей наркотиками в этом регионе. Esfandiari G. Afghanistan: Donors Conference Focuses on Security // RFE/ RL. — 2004. — Apr. 1. Относительно европейских обязательств см.: http:// europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/afghanistan/intro/memo_04_ 33.htm.

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За Центральную Азию, Кавказ и Юго-Восточную Европу в Госдепартаменте США отвечает заместитель помощника госсекретаря Линн Паско, назначенный на эту должность в 2001 г. Подробнее об обязанностях низовых филиалов АМР США см.: http://www. usaid.gov/policy/ads/100/103.pdf. В феврале 2002 г. Центральноазиатское экономическое сообщество было преобразовано в Организацию центральноазиатского сотрудничества. В интерпретации Ниязова позитивный нейтралитет означает, что Туркмения не может быть членом ОЦАС и ШОС, но может быть членом Организации экономического сотрудничества (со штаб-квартирой в Иране) и Организации «Исламская конференция». По поводу попыток трансформации наркогосударств существует много литературы, посвященной прежде всего производителям кокаина в Латинской Америке. Подробнее см.: Bagley B. M., Walker W. O. Drug Trafficking in the Americas. — Miami: Univ. of Miami, North/South Center Press, Dec. 1, 1994; Vellinga M. The Political Economy of the Drug Industry: Latin America and the International System. — Gainesville: Univ. Press of Florida, 2004; Cristy J. Colombia: A Risk-Prone Democracy. — Monterey, CA: Naval Post-Graduate School, 1998. Относительно производства опиума см. документы Управления ООН по борьбе с наркотиками и преступностью, публикация на сайте http://www. unodc.org/unodc/en/world_drug_report.html.

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См. также: The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem, 2nd ed. / UN Office on Drugs and Crime. — Vienna, 2003; Afghanistan Opium Survey 2002 / United Nations Drug Control Program. — Vienna, 2003; Islamic State of Afghanistan: Rebuilding a Macro-economic Framework for Reconstruction and Growth / Intern. Monetary Fund. — Washington, DC, Sept. 2003. — (IMF Country Report; № 03/299). Двумя самыми активными сторонниками этого были американский посол в Афганистане Залмай Халилзад и министр финансов Афганистана Ашраф Гани (бывший экономист Всемирного банка). Подробнее см.: Lancaster J. Karzai Urges War on Opium Trade; Leader Says Cultivation Imperils Attempt to Rebuild Afghanistan // Washington Post. — 2004. — Dec. 10; Graham S. Karzai Urges Afghans to Give Up Lucrative Opium Trade, Says Taliban Profiting // Associated Press. — 2004. — Dec. 9; Ghani A. Where Democracy’s Greatest Enemy Is a Flower // New York Times. — 2004. — Dec. 11. Полный текст Берлинской декларации о борьбе с наркотиками опубликован на сайте http://bglatzer.de/aga/berlinantidrugs.htm. Opium Cultivation Continues to Rise in Afghanistan / Drug Policy Alliance. — Washington, DC: Febr. 13, 2004. В течение долгого времени Вашингтон считал, что наркотики из Афганистана — это прежде всего европейская проблема, потому что более 90% героина и опиума, потребляемых в Европе, поступает из Афганистана. В итоге партнером по коалиции, взявшим на себя основную ответственность за программы борьбы с транспортировкой наркотиков и уничтожения наркотиков стала Великобритания. Но это не удовлетворило Соединенные Штаты, потому что они предпочитали налеты на пункты хранения мака в военном стиле, учитывая неподходящее время для кампании по его уничтожению. Franco C. Afghanistan’s Anti-Poppy Drive Off to Shaky Start // EurasiaNet.org. — 2004. — June 3. Esfandiari G. Afghanistan: Donors Conference Focuses on Security // RFE/ RL. — 2004. — Apr. 1. Относительно программ Управления национальной политики контроля за наркотиками США, связанных с Центральной Азией, см. приложение 11. См. также документ о национальной стратегии контроля за наркотиками, выпущенный Белым домом в феврале 2002 г., публикация на сайте http:// www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/policy/index.html. Такое впечатление сложилось у автора на основании интервью с представителями местных органов безопасности и с некоторыми западными спе-

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циалистами, принимавшими участие в обучении и переподготовке местных коллег. Central Asia Report / RFE/RL. — 2004. — Vol. 4. — № 19. — May 11. Помощник госсекретаря Роберт Чарлз, возглавляющий Бюро государственного департамента США по борьбе с наркотиками и обеспечению правопорядка, сообщил Конгрессу, что по данным ЦРУ в 2004 г. площади, на которых выращивался опиумный мак, составили в Афганистане примерно 250 тыс. акров, что более чем на 60% превышает уровень 2003 г. Miller T. Ch. Post-Invasion Chaos Blamed for Drug Surge // Los Angeles Times. — 2004. — Oct. 4. Подробнее относительно конфискации наркотиков в 2004 г., а также обзор опубликованных в местной прессе статей о наркотиках см.: Afghan Heroin Engulfs Central Asia / RFE/RL // Central Asia Report. — 2004. — Vol. 4. — № 45. — Dec. 17. Tohid O. Bumper Year for Afghan Poppies // Christian Science Monitor. — 2003. — July 24. Подробнее см.: Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict / Intern. Crisis Group // ICG Asia Report [Osh; Brussels]. — 2001. — № 25. — Nov. 26; Makarenko T. Crime, Terror, and the Central Asian Drug Trade. — Bromma, Sweden: Cornell Caspian Consulting, July 2002. — (Caspian Brief; № 25); McDermott R. Border Security in Tajikistan: Countering the Narcotics Trade? — Surrey, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Oct. 2002. Представительство центров контроля и профилактики заболеваний США в Центральной Азии работает с 1995 г. Относительно его работы по ВИЧ/ СПИДу см.: http://www.cdc.gov/epo/dih/centralasia.html. См. также: HIV/AIDs: Reversing the Epidemic / UN Development Program. — New York, 2004. — Р. 21—23, публикация на сайте http://rbec.undp.org/hiv/ ?english. Казахстан, по-видимому, располагающий наиболее точными данными, сообщает о самой высокой заболеваемости ВИЧ/СПИДом в размере 0,3% по сравнению с менее чем 0,1% в других частях региона. См. запись разговора, предоставленную бывшим послом Крейгом Мэрреем Королевскому институту международных отношений 4 ноября 2004 г., публикация на сайте http://www.riia.org. Если технические, командные и управленческие стандарты программы НАТО «Партнерство во имя мира», организации коллективной безопасности СНГ и ШОС не удастся сделать совместимыми, то страны Центральной Азии могут отказаться от участия в программе НАТО, поскольку структуры СНГ и ШОС почти наверняка совместимы.

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В частных беседах такое мнение выражали представители всех трех стран. В действительности многие высокопоставленные должностные лица в Узбекистане весьма критически относятся к политике правительства Каримова в отношении исламских экстремистов и еще более критически — к его экономической политике. К «традиционным» христианам, живущим в этом регионе с давних времен, таким как православные и католики, в Казахстане относятся хорошо, но группам протестантских меньшинств во всем регионе часто отказывают в регистрации, а в Туркмении их открыто преследуют. Подробнее см.: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices / Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. — Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, публикация на сайте http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt. Хуже всего к евангелистам относятся в Туркмении, где не ограничиваются отказами в регистрации: в 2001 г. было совершено нападение на церковь, а несколько членов этого протестантского сообщества были оштрафованы и задержаны. См.: Corely F. Tortured Baptist Prisoner Near Death in Turkmenistan // ChristianityToday.com (http://www.christianitytod.aycom/ct/2001/106/35.0.html) Руководитель противоминного центра Таджикистана заявил, что с 2000 г. на узбекских минах подорвались более 120 таджиков, причем 62 из них погибли. EurasiaNet.org. — 2004. — Febr. 25. Узбекские планы разминирования были оглашены министром обороны на совещании 13 августа 2004 г. До этого, 18 июня 2004 г., соответствующее заявление было представлено в ОБСЕ. Interfax. — 2004. — Aug. 13. Соглашение по демаркации 690-километровой границы между Киргизией и Узбекистаном было подписано в 2001 г. См.: http://www.uzland.uz. Узбекистан резко критиковал Киргизию за предположительную оттяжку выполнения этого соглашения. Киргизские должностные лица хотят делимитировать отдельный 256-километровый участок границы, прежде чем решение о новой границе вступит в силу. EurasiaNet.org. — 2004. — Febr. 25. Узбекистан имеет два анклава — Сох и Шахимардан, Иордан — в южной Киргизии. Таджикистан также имеет два анклава — Ворух в Киргизии и еще один в зоне Алтынкен около перевала на шоссе, ведущем в Ферганскую долину в Узбекистане. В июле 2002 г. таджикско-узбекская граница была определена на 70%. Ее общая длина — 1300 км. Interfax Central Asia. — 2002. — July 30. См. также: Многомерные границы Центральной Азии / Под ред. М. Б. Олкотт и А. Малашенко; Моск. Центр Карнеги. — М.: Гендальф, 2000. — (Аналит. серия / Моск. Центр Карнеги; Вып. 2).

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В сентябре 2002 г. Назарбаев и Каримов подписали двустороннее соглашение, окончательно определяющее линию границы между этими странами. В ноябре 2001 г. был подписан документ, определявший 96% линии их общей границы протяженностью 2440 км. Последние 4% линии границы были определены соглашением, заключенным в сентябре 2001 г. RFE/ RL Newsline. — 2002. — Sept. 10; Central Asia Report / RFE/RL. — 2002. — Vol. 2. — № 35. — Sept. 13; EurasiaNet.org. — 2002. — Jan. 5. Одна из бомб весной 2004 г. взорвалась в деревне в Ферганской долине рядом с киргизской границей. Предполагается также, что узбекские террористы имели секретную базу подготовки на казахской территории. 11 ноября 2004 г. казахские силы безопасности ликвидировали террористическую ячейку под названием «Джамаат уль-Муджахеддин», связанную с «аль-Каидой», и арестовали 17 членов этой группы включая граждан Казахстана и Узбекистана, в том числе четырех женщин. Согласно официальным заявлениям эта группа была сформирована в Казахстане. Подробнее см.: Al-Qa’idah-Linked Group Detained in Kazakhstan // BBC News. — 2004. — Nov. 11. Подробнее см.: Niyazov-Karimov Press Conference—Transcript of Tape. — [S. l.], Nov. 21, 2004, имеется в архиве Туркменского агентства новостей по адресу: http://NewsCentralAsia.com. См.: Tapping the Potential: Improving Water Management in Tajikistan // National Human Development Report 2003 / UN Development Program. — New York, 2003; Water as a Key Human Development Factor Kazakhstan // Ibid. Автор может доказать справедливость некоторых из этих слухов относительно Киргизии. Автор пять лет была директором Американского фонда поддержки предпринимательства в Центральной Азии, что дало ей возможность наблюдать реализацию многих проектов помощи со стороны США и Европейского банка реконструкции и развития. Это также обеспечило ей широкие возможности наблюдать некоторые виды мелкой коррупции, в частности, во многих проектах малого кредитования. См.: Khan M. S., Sharma S. IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs. — Washington, DC, Sept. 2001. — (IMF Working Paper; № WP/ 01/142). В то время, когда писалась данная книга, Мохсин Хан возглавлял научно-исследовательский институт МВФ; теперь он возглавляет отдел МВФ по Ближнему Востоку и Центральной Азии. Акционерный (выпущенный по подписке) капитал ЕБРР составляет 20 млрд евро, из которых 2 млрд обеспечивается Соединенными Штата-

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ми. Для сравнения: администрация Рейгана собиралась выделить на Стратегическую оборонную инициативу, которая должна была обеспечить защиту США от угрозы со стороны коммунистов, от 32 до 70 млрд долл. То, что страны Центральной Азии не соответствуют требованиям «Millennium Challenge Accounts», объясняется главным образом плохими показателями эффективности работы правительства и неудовлетворительностью процедур голосования. Казахстан не имеет права на помощь по этой программе, поскольку это достаточно богатая страна. Данные о корпорации «Millennium Challenge» опубликованы на сайте http://www.mcc.gov. Van de Walle N., Johnston T. Improving Aid to Africa, Policy Essay no. 21. — Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1996. — P. 3—4 Интервью, взятые в регионе в 1998—2004 гг. Van de Walle N., Johnston T. Op. cit. — P. 5. Michalopoulas C. The Integration of Low-Income CIS Members in the World Trading System: Paper prepared for the CIS-7 Conference in January 2003, Lucerne Switzerland. — P. 13 (на основании данных о торговле за 2000 г.), публикация на сайте Всемирного банка. См.: Olcott M. B. Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise. — Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Intern. Peace, 2002. — Р. 81. (Олкотт М. Б. Казахстан: непройденный путь / Моск. Центр Карнеги. — Москва; Вашингтон, 2003. — С. 102). Например, в апреле 2003 г. у посольства России собралось много русских, чтобы выразить протест против нового закона о гражданстве (RFE/RL. — 2003. — June 11). Российские граждане, проживающие в Туркмении, которые по истечении установленного крайнего срока (22 июня) лишились своих квартир, тоже протестовали около российского посольства, бросая свои туркменские паспорта через ограду посольства (Pravda.ru. — 2003. — June 27). Одна из акций протеста в Узбекистане продолжалась бóльшую часть дня 20 августа 2002 г.: борцы за права человека пикетировали Министерство юстиции, протестуя против условий жизни в Узбекистане. 27 августа 2002 г. узбекские неправительственные правозащитные организации провели еще одну акцию протеста — против коррупции государственных чиновников и полицейского насилия. Central Asia Report / RFE/ RL. — 2002. — Vol. 2. — № 33. — Aug. 29. По данным «Human Rights Watch», чтобы остановить акции протеста, узбекские власти обычно арестовывают несколько десятков женщин с детьми и содержат их под стражей до пятнадцати суток по незначительным обвинениям. См.: Human Rights

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Watch World Report 2003 on Uzbekistan / Human Rights Watch. — New York, 2003. В Туркмении 11, 15, 16 и 18 апреля прошли акции протеста, в ходе которых несколько сотен простых граждан и членов Национального демократического движения Туркмении протестовали против режима Ниязова, а также против злоупотребления сотрудников служб государственной безопасности своими полномочиями. См.: Turkmenistan Daily Digest / EurasiaNet.org. — 2002. — Apr. 18; Central Asia Report / RFE/RL. — 2002. — Aug. 16. См. также: Olcott M. B. Ceremony and Substance: The Illusion of Unity in Central Asia // Central Asia and the World / Ed. by M. Mandelbaum. — New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999. — P. 18—19. Информацию по истории киргизской государственности см. на сайте http://www.eurasianet.org/ resource/kyrgyzstan/hypermail/200212/0034.shtml. Например, Леонида Брежнева, который многие годы был генеральным секретарем КПСС, во многих сельских районах Центральной Азии называли «белым падишахом», и нынешних президентов этих стран тоже часто называют падишахами. 44% казахстанцев считают, что их страна — пока далеко не демократия. Как правило, демократию определяют как общество, в котором соблюдаются права человека и существуют личные свободы и свобода выбора. 41% считают, что законы о выборах в стране нуждаются в изменениях, но не высказывают конкретных предпочтений и пожеланий в отношении избирательной реформы. 41% опрошенных в Киргизии предпочитают демократию, а всего 23% считают, что Киргизия — полностью демократическая страна. 50% считают свою страну частично демократической, 17% вообще не считают ее демократической, 9% не смогли ответить на этот вопрос. 58% определяют демократию как наличие прав и свободы. 41% выразили неудовлетворенность уровнем практической демократии в стране. Основные причины неудовлетворенности — политические и экономические: отсутствие демократии (11%), низкий уровень жизни (6%), безработица (3%), недостаточная социальная защита (3%), экономический спад (3%) и инфляция (2%). Pilototskii V., Sahrmi R. IFES Surveys in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. — Washington, DC: Intern. Foundation of Electoral Studies, May 2002. В опросе, проведенном Международным фондом избирательных систем, респонденты дают низкую оценку работе правительства по созданию рабочих мест, замедлению темпов инфляции, сокращению разрыва в доходах, борьбе с преступностью и коррупцией. Выше оцениваются успехи правительства в борьбе с терроризмом (47% удовлетворены, 43% не удовлетво-

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рены) и в решении проблем, существующих между северными и южными частями страны (29% удовлетворены, 39% не удовлетворены). По имеющимся оценкам, гражданская война 1992—1997 гг. в Таджикистане унесла от 50 до 100 тыс. жизней, и около миллиона человек вынуждены были покинуть свои дома. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2003. — London, Sept. 1, 2003. Первые парламентские выборы в Казахстане были проведены в 1999 г. Последние выборы в местные органы власти — областные, районные и городские советы — состоялись 20 сентября 2003 г. В Киргизии президент Акаев подписал специальный декрет, определивший дату выборов в местные органы власти в стране. RFE/RL, Reports 2001—2003. Среди этих лидеров — поэты Мухаммад Салих из Узбекистана, Олжас Сулейменов из Казахстана и Бозор Собир из Таджикистана. Бозор Собир в 1992—1993 гг. отбывал срок в тюрьме в связи с обвинениями в подстрекательстве к межэтнической ненависти и призывам к задержанию членов парламента в апреле 1992 г. В декабре 1993 г. он был осужден снова и получил четыре года условно. Теперь он живет в добровольном изгнании в Соединенных Штатах. См.: Tajikistan Human Rights Practices, 1992 / U.S. Department of State. — Washington, DC, Jan. 31, 1994. Среди групп, созданных этими лидерами, партии «Эрк» и «Бирлик», международное антиядерное движение «Невада — Семипалатинск» и Демократическая партия Таджикистана. Например, Демократическая партия Таджикистана была основана философом академиком Шадманом Юсуфом в августе 1990 г., в начале 1993 г. она была запрещена, в 1995 г. ее штаб переместился из Тегерана в Москву, и в 1997 г. она была одной из сторон, подписавших соглашение о национальном примирении. Country Studies on Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan / Federal Research Division. — Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, 1997. — Р. 275; Hunter Sh. Central Asia since Independence. — Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Intern. Studies, 1996. — Р. 53. Относительно политических партий в Центральной Азии см. приложение 12. Carothers Th. Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve. — Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Intern. Peace, 1999. — Р. 88. Критический анализ деятельности неправительственных организаций в Центральной Азии см.: Weinthal E., Luong P. J. Environmental NGOs in Kazakhstan: Democratic Goals and Non-democratic Outcomes // The Power and Limits of NGOs / Ed. by S. E. Mendelson and J. K. Glenn. — New York:

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Columbia Univ. Press, 2002. — Р. 152—176, а также Adamson F. B. International Democracy Assistance in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan: Building Democracy Assistance from the Outside? // The Power and Limits of NGOs / Ed. by S. E. Mendelson and J. K. Glenn. — New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2002. — Р. 177—206. См., например, такие документы, как Хартия ОБСЕ по предотвращению и борьбе с терроризмом, Парижская хартия для Новой Европы и Хартия европейской безопасности, публикация на сайте: http://www.osce.org.

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О Фонде Карнеги

Фонд Карнеги за Международный Мир является неправительственной, внепартийной, некоммерческой организацией со штабквартирой в Вашингтоне (США). Фонд был основан в 1910 г. известным предпринимателем и общественным деятелем Эндрю Карнеги для проведения независимых исследований в области международных отношений. Фонд не занимается предоставлением грантов (стипендий) или иных видов финансирования. Деятельность Фонда Карнеги заключается в выполнении намеченных его специалистами программ исследований, организации дискуссий, подготовке и выпуске тематических изданий, информировании широкой общественности по различным вопросам внешней политики и международных отношений. Сотрудниками Фонда Карнеги за Международный Мир являются эксперты мирового уровня, которые используют свой богатый опыт в различных областях, накопленный ими за годы работы в государственных учреждениях, средствах массовой информации, университетах и научно-исследовательских институтах, международных организациях. Фонд не представляет точку зрения какого-либо правительства, не стоит на какой-либо идеологической или политической платформе, и его сотрудники имеют самые различные позиции и взгляды. Решение создать Московский Центр Карнеги было принято весной 1992 г. с целью реализации широких перспектив сотрудничества, которые открылись перед научными и общественными кругами США, России и новых независимых государств после окончания периода «холодной войны». С 1994 г. в рамках программы по России и Евразии, реализуемой одновременно в Вашингтоне и 486

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О Фонде Карнеги

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Москве, Центр Карнеги осуществляет широкий спектр общественно-политических и социально-экономических исследований, организует открытые дискуссии, ведет издательскую деятельность. Основу деятельности Московского Центра Карнеги составляют публикации и циклы семинаров по внутренней и внешней политике России, по проблемам нераспространения ядерных и обычных вооружений, российско-американских отношений, безопасности, гражданского общества, а также политических и экономических преобразований на постсоветском пространстве.

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036, USA Tel.: +1 (202) 483-76-00 Fax: +1 (202) 483-18-40 E-mail: [email protected] http://www.CarnegieEndowment.org МОСКОВСКИЙ ЦЕНТР КАРНЕГИ Россия, 125009, Москва, Тверская ул., 16/2 Тел.: +7 (095) 935-89-04 Факс: +7 (095) 935-89-06 E-mail: [email protected] http://www.carnegie.ru

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Марта Брилл Олкотт Второй шанс Центральной Азии

Редактор А. И. ИОФФЕ Верстка Д. А. БАСИСТЫЙ Подписано к печати 22.10.2005. Формат 60х901/16. Бумага офсетная. Гарнитура Журнальная. Печать офсетная. Усл. п. л. 31,5. Тираж 1000 экз. Издательство Р. Элинина ([email protected]). 127562, Москва, проспект Мира, д. 36, стр. 1. Отпечатано в типографии «Гриф и К», г. Тула. Заказ №

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