Conditional Sentences in the New Testament - Gordon College

CONDITIONAL SENTENCES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

by William E. Elliott

Submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Theology in Grace Theological Seminary May 1981 Digitized by Ted Hildebrandt, Gordon College 2006

Title: CONDITIONAL SENTENCES IN THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT Author: William E. Elliott Degree: Doctor of Theology Date: May 1981 Committee: Dr. Charles R. Smith, Dr. John A. Sproule, Dr. Homer A. Kent, Jr. Increasing interest in the grammar of the Greek New Testament has focused attention upon aspects of the language that have, for the most part, been passed over by past grammarians. Among these topics is that of conditional sentences. A superficial survey of the literature indicates that most writers seem to have the data confidently in tow, but closer inspection shows that this is not the case. Modern grammarians are, for the most part, content to follow the lead of A.T. Robertson and classify these clauses in terms of First, Second, Third, and Fourth Class conditions. Others, dissatisfied with Robertson's system and the extension of it by his followers, have returned to the terminology, if not the principles of Classical Greek. The situation is uncoordinated at best, for even in Classical Greek studies there is significant disagreement upon the classification of these sentences. The historical background to the study of conditional sentences is presented from both the Classical and the Koine Greek standpoints. Suggested systems of classification include Time, Fulfillment, Form and Determination. The latter, championed by B.L. Gildersleeve, is the preferred system. Determination is indicated by the mood of the verbs employed in the protasis. Gildersleeve's system entered Koine studies primarily through the work of A.T. Robertson. He employes four classes into which he places these conditional sentences. The Simple Condition, using the indicative mood, states the condition as an assumed reality. There is no necessary connection between actuality and the statement. This condition merely presents the conclusion as a necessary corollary of the condition. The Contrary to Fact Condition also uses the indicative mood to present the condition as one that is assumed not true, i.e., contrary to fact. Again, there is no necessary connection between actuality and the conditional statement. The Probable Condition presents the condition as one assumed probable, i.e., one that could easily be fulfilled. The hypothetical nature of this condition requires the use of the subjunctive mood. The Possible condition states the condition as one that is assumed possible, i.e., little likelihood of fulfillment. This condition utilizes the optative mood, and there is no complete example of it in the New Testament. Two basic concepts underlie all conditional sentences. First, the determining factor is the mood of the verb, not the particle employed. Second, all conditional sentences state their case as an assumption, never as a direct statement of reality.

Accepted by the Faculty of Grace Theological Seminary in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree Doctor of Theology Examining Committee: Charles R. Smith Homer A. Kent Jr. John A. Sproule

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION

1

CHAPTER I. A HISTORICAL SURVEY Conditional Sentences in General Conditional Sentences in Classical Greek The Importance of Classical Greek Suggested Classification Systems Classification According to Time Classification According to Fulfillment Classification According to Form Classification According to Determination Conditional Sentences in Koine Greek Early Grammarians George Benedict Winer Alexander Buttmann Samuel G. Green Ernest DeWitt Burton James Hope Moulton Modern Grammarians Archibald Thomas Robertson William Douglas Chamberlain Charles Francis Digby Moule Friedrich Blass - Albert Debrunner Nigel Turner H. E. Dana and Julius R. Mantey Robert W. Funk William Sanford La Sor Summary of Koine Grammarians

4 4 8 10 10 11 18 20 23 33 34 34 37 40 42 46 49 49 55 57 60 62 65 67 65 71

II. THE SIMPLE CONDITION

73

Introduction The Conditional Particle ei The Significance of ei The Significance of ei with other Particles The Negative Particles in Simple Conditions Ean with the Indicative Mood Significance of Moods and Tenses i

73 75 75 77 81 84 88

ii Meaning of the Simple Condition Particular and General Conditions Degree of Reality Translation of the Simple Condition

95 95 98 105

III.

THE CONTRARY TO FACT CONDITION Introduction Significance of Tense Imperfect Tense Aorist Tense Pluperfect Tense The Use of An in Contrary to Fact Conditions The Meaning of the Contrary to Fact Condition The Translation of the Contrary to Fact Condition

106 106 110 110 113 115 116 121 123

IV.

THE PROBABLE CONDITION Introduction Analysis of the Probable Condition The Protasis The Apodosis Meaning of the Probable Condition Review of the Grammarians Evaluation of the Grammarians Relationship with the Simple Condition Summary Translation of the Probable Condition

129 129 131 131 141 148 148 151 156 163 165

V.

THE POSSIBLE CONDITION Introduction The Optative Mood in General The Optative Mood in Conditional Sentences The Construction The Significance The Grammarians The Specific Examples Those with the Protasis Implied Those with the Protasis Stated Translation of the Possible Condition

169 169 170 174 175 178 178 180 180 184 191

VI.

CONCLUSION Simple Conditions Unreal Conditions Probable Conditions Possible Conditions Summary

193 194 195 195 196 196

iii APPENDICES Appendix I: Occurrences of the Simple Condition Appendix II: Occurrences of the Unreal Condition Appendix III: Occurrences of the Probable Condition

198 198 211 215

BIBLIOGRAPHY

226

INTRODUCTION God created man with the potential for abstract reasoning, and his many languages reflect this through their use of the subjunctive mood: the mood of contingency or possibility. Posing questions, exploring possibilities and analyzing logical connections are part of man's reasoning capabilities, and his languages reflect these skills. Among the syntactical tools which accomplish these are conditional sentences. These sentences, usually consisting of two clauses, state a hypothesis and give a conclusion. In English this corresponds to the "If . . . then" formula. This type of sentence, while prevalent in English, is usually listed as one of several subordinate clause relationships.1 By contrast, the Greek language presents a more fully developed system of conditional sentences by means of which a remarkable degree of precision may be obtained in expressing conditional thought. The Greek conditional sentence presents both the condition and certain specific implications about it in one sentence whereas English needs both the conditional statement and qualifying sentences to communicate the same concept. This compactness lends itself to greater precision 1

Porter Perrin and George H. Smith, Handbook of Current English, third edition, edited by Jim W. Corder (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1968), 48-56, 120-121.

2 in the statement of conditional concepts. Since conditional sentences are basic to the material of the Greek New Testament, a detailed understanding of conditional sentences is vital for an accurate interpretation of its contents. This, then, is the goal of this study: to explore conditional sentences so that the message of the New Testament may be better understood. Though all students of Greek, both Classical and Koine, agree on the importance of conditional sentences, few agree on the analysis of them. A. T. Robertson aptly describes the situation in Koine studies when he writes, "In truth the doctors have disagreed themselves and the rest have not known how to go."1 The Classical scene is likewise muddled, as Blass-Debrunner notes, "The classical grammars are also hopelessly at variance."2 Some of this confusion is due to the absence of a standard by which to classify conditional sentences. Time, degree of reality and construction have all been suggested by various grammarians as possible classification systems. Further, each grammarian seems to have developed his own terminology in discussing the subject, and each argues that his is best. Indeed, it is possible to trace the influence of major grammarians through succeeding generations by noting who adopts their terminology in dealing with conditional sentences. 1

A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research (Nashville, Tennessee: Broadman Press, 1934), p. 1004. 2 Friedrich Blass and Alvert Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, translated and revised by Robert W. Funk (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 189.

3 Another reason for the lack of standardization may be the inherent flexibility of the language itself. Though Classical and Koine Greek may be considered fossilized ancestors of Modern Greek, they were living, functioning languages, complete with the internal syntactical elasticity found in living languages today. Greek, like English, developed through usage, and patterns so developed may refuse to be forced into a logically consistent mold. So, whether through lack of a standard, or lack of accepted terminology, or through syntactical flexibility, conditional sentences have provided grammarians with a fruitful area of contemplation, and students with a frustrating area of concentration. This study seeks to offer help to those involved in the analysis of conditional sentences by summarizing the work of previous grammarians and giving a detailed analysis of each type of conditional sentence in the New Testament. The work of past and contemporary scholars will be surveyed to give an overview of their studies, agreements, and disagreements. Then the conditional sentences in the Greek New Testament will be identified and analyzed with the help of principles obtained from the grammatical survey. Finally, observations will be offered on the important matters of translation and interpretation. The result should be a small but positive step in gaining further insight into the meaning of conditional sentences in the Greek New Testament.

CHAPTER I A HISTORICAL SURVEY Since any study necessarily builds upon the work of others, a survey of previous studies of conditional sentences is basic to a thorough understanding of the topic. This study will include the work of both Classical and Koine scholars. Conditional Sentences in General A brief survey of the technical details of conditional sentences will set the scene for the succeeding discussion and evaluation. The Definition of Conditional Sentences A conditional sentence is a two-clause sentence in which the first clause states a supposition or hypothesis and the second clause states the results if that condition is met. The hypothetical clause which states the condition ("If this . . .") is termed the protasis and the conclusion clause is called the apodosis (". . . then this."). Herbert Weir Smyth explains it this way: A condition is a supposition on which a statement is based. A conditional sentence commonly consists of two clauses: The protasis: the conditional, or subordinate, clause, expressing a supposed or assumed case (if). The apodosis: the conclusion, or principal, clause, expressing what follows if the condition is realized. The truth or fulfillment of the conclusion depends on the truth or fulfillment of the conditional clause.1 1

Herbert Weir Smyth, Greek Grammar for Colleges (New York: American Book Company, 1920), p. 512.

5 The Construction of Conditional Sentences The Protasis As Smyth stated, the protasis stands as the subordinate or dependent clause, setting forth the condition. The term protasis comes from prosta