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House of Commons Science and Technology Committee

The Medical Research Council's Review of the Future of the National Institute for Medical Research Fourth Report of Session 2004–05 Volume II Oral and written evidence Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 26 January 2005

HC 6-II Published on 8 February 2005 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £21.50

The Science and Technology Committee The Science and Technology Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration and policy of the Office of Science and Technology and its associated public bodies. Current membership Dr Ian Gibson MP (Labour, Norwich North) (Chairman) Paul Farrelly MP (Labour, Newcastle-under-Lyme) Dr Evan Harris MP (Liberal Democrat, Oxford West & Abingdon) Kate Hoey MP (Labour, Vauxhall) Dr Brian Iddon MP (Labour, Bolton South East) Mr Robert Key MP (Conservative, Salisbury) Mr Tony McWalter MP (Labour, Hemel Hempstead) Dr Andrew Murrison MP (Conservative, Westbury) Geraldine Smith MP (Labour, Morecambe and Lunesdale) Bob Spink MP (Conservative, Castle Point) Dr Desmond Turner MP (Labour, Brighton Kemptown) Powers The Committee is one of the departmental Select Committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No.152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk Publications The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at www.parliament.uk/s&tcom A list of Reports from the Committee in the present Parliament is included at the back of this volume. Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are: Chris Shaw (Clerk); Emily Commander (Second Clerk); Alun Roberts (Committee Specialist); Hayaatun Sillem (Committee Specialist); Ana Ferreira (Committee Assistant); Robert Long (Senior Office Clerk); and Christine McGrane (Committee Secretary). Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Science and Technology Committee, Committee Office, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general inquiries is: 020 7219 2793; the Committee’s email address is: [email protected]

Witnesses Wednesday 1 December 2004 Sir Anthony Cleaver, Chairman, Professor Colin Blakemore, Chief Executive, and Professor John Savill, Council Member, Medical Research Council Sir John Skehel, Director, Dr Robin Lovell-Badge, Head of Division, Developmental Genetics and Task Force member, and Dr Steve Gamblin, Task Force member, National Institute for Medical Research

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Monday 20 December 2004 Professor Richard A Flavell, Chairman, Section of Immunobiology, Yale University School of Medicine and Task Force member, and Sir Paul Nurse, President, Rockefeller University, New York and Task Force Member

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Monday 10 January 2005 Professor Alan North, Vice-President and Dean, Faculty of Life Sciences, and Professor Nancy Rothwell, MRC Research Professor, Vice-President for Research, Faculty of Life Sciences, University of Manchester

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Professor Stephen Tomlinson, Provost, Wales College of Medicine, Biology, Life and Health Sciences, Deputy Vice Chancellor, Cardiff University and Professor Kay Davies, Dr Lee’s Professor of Anatomy and Honorary Director, MRC Functional Genetics Unit, Department of Human Anatomy and Genetics, University of Oxford

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Written Memoranda 1

Medical Research Council

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John D Spencer

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Dr William James, Sir William Dunn School of Pathology, University of Oxford

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N Michael Green, Department of Mathematical Biology, National Institute for Medical Research Ev 56, 170

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Jacky Smith, Head Technician in Developmental Biology and Molecular Neurobiology, National Institute for Medical Research

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Dr J M Wilson and Dr D H Williamson, National Institute for Medical Research

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Dr Pushpa Bhargava, Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology, Hyderabad

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Dr Robb Krumlauf, Scientific Director, Stowers Institute for Medical Research

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Professor Dr Fritz Melchers, Max Planck Institute for Infection Biology, Berlin

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10 Dr Robert B Belshe, Saint Louis University

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11 Professor Stafford Lightman, University of Bristol

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12 Professor Stephen Challacombe, King’s College London

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13 Professor Sir David Weatherall, University of Oxford

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14 Professor Kay E Davies, former MRC Task Force member on the NIMR

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15 Professor A R Bellamy, University of Auckland

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16 Professor Andrew Read, University of Edinburgh

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17 Dr Michael Oldstone, Scripps Research Institute

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18 Dr Robert L Coffman, Dynavax

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19 Professor Brian D Sykes, University of Alberta

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20 Focus UK

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21 Anne McLaren, Gurdon Institute

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22 Janet Thornton, European Bioinformatics

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23 Dr Peter J M Openshaw, Imperial College London

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24 Dr Douglas Robinson, Imperial College London

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25 Professor Tony Magee, University of Manchester

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26 Professor Richard Flavell, former MRC Task Force member on the NIMR

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27 Dr Robin Holliday

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28 Professor Alan R North, former MRC Task Force member on the NIMR

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29 Professor Peter N Campbell, University College London

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30 Professor William Russell, University of Arkansas

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31 Professor Anne Cooke, Cambridge University

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32 Professor P M Biggs

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33 Professor Alan Gilbert, University of Manchester

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34 Dr Katie Petty-Saphon, Council of Heads of Medical Schools

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35 Professor Stephen Tomlinson, former MRC Task Force member on the NIMR

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36 Professor N J Rothwell, former MRC Task Force member on the NIMR

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37 Professor Simon Howell, King’s College London 38 Dr Jonathan Cooke

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39 Professor Thomas A Steitz, Yale University

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40 Jackie Wilbraham

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41 Public and Commercial Services Union

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42 Professor Trevor Jones, King’s College London

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43 Professor Adrian Newland, Royal College of Pathologists

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44 Dr E M Armstrong, Chief Medical Officer, Scotland

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45 Professor Olugbemiro, University College Hospital, Ibadan, Nigeria

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46 Dr R Henderson, MRC Laboratory of Molecular Biology

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47 Professor Neil Brockendorff, MRC Clinical Sciences Centre

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48 Professor Dario Alessi, University of Dundee

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49 Career Track Scientists at the National Institute for Medical Research

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50 International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology

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51 Dr Anthony Holder, Medical Research Council

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52 Professor John Walker, Medical Research Council

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53 Professor Peter Weissberg, Cambridge University

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54 Professor G Michael Blackburn, Krebs Institute, Sheffield University

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55 University of Edinburgh

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56 Dr Jamshed R Tata, National Institute for Medical Research

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57 Professor Dafydd Walters, St George’s Hospital Medical School

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58 Professor Elizabeth Simpson, MRC Clinical Sciences Centre

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59 Dr Kathleen Mathers, Medical Research Council

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60 Professor Donald Steiner, University of Chicago

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61 National Institute for Medical Research

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62 Brian Mahy, National Centre for Infectious Diseases

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63 Amicus

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64 Anna O’Garra, National Institute for Medical Research

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65 Robert Solari, Medical Research Council Technology

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66 Professor Hindmarsh and Dr Dattani, University College London

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67 Professor Jim Smith, Cambridge University

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68 Kenneth Fleming, University of Oxford

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69 Dr E F Gevers, National Institute for Medical Research

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70 Steven Ley, National Institute for Medical Research

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71 Gordon Reid, National Institute for Medical Research

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72 Professor B Askomas, Imperial College London

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73 Professor Sanjeev Khrishna, St George’s Hospital Medical School

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74 Association of University Teachers

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75 Professor Grant and Professor Trainer, University College London

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76 Professor Grahame Bullfield, University of Edinburgh

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77 Professor Andrew Michael, John Radcliffe Hospital, Oxford

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78 Professor Christopher Edwards, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne

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79 Professor Guy Dodson, University of York

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80 Professor Sir Paul Nurse, former MRC Task Force member on the NIMR

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81 Professor Wayne Hendrickson, Columbia University

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82 Royal Society of Edinburgh

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83 Professor Kathy Cheah, University of Hong Kong

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84 National Institute of Health

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85 Professor Moncada, Wolfson Institute

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86 Elizabeth Hirst

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87 Dr Steve Gamblin, former MRC Task Force member on the NIMR

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88 Heads of Division Committee, National Institute for Medical Research

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89 Professor Peter Rigby, Institute of Cancer Research

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90 Dr Ralph Schoepfer, University College London

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91 Professor Robert Liddington, Burnham Institute, La Jolla, California

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92 Langhorne Laboratory

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93 Dr Robin Lovell-Badge, former MRC Task Force member on the NIMR

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94 Dr Justin Molloy, National Institute for Medical Research

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95 Professor Amanda Fisher, Clinical Sciences Centre, Hammersmith Hospital

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96 Professor Dame Louise Johnson, University of Oxford

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97 Dr Hazel Dockrell, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine

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98 Professor Chris Higgins, MRC Clinical Sciences Centre

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99 Professor Sir Philip Cohen, University of Dundee

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100 Professor Iain Robinson, National Institute for Medical Research

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101 BioIndustry Association

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102 Professor Andrew Garner, University of Manchester

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103 Sir David Cooksey, Advent Venture Partners

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104 Department of Trade and Industry and Department of Health

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105 Professor David Trentham

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106 Academy of Medical Sciences

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107 Professor Critchley and Professor Calder, University of Edinburgh

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108 Professor John Bell, University of Oxford

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109 Professor James Fawcett, Cambridge University

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110 Professor Tony Minson, Department of Pathology, Cambridge University

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111 Professor Frank Grosveld, Erasmus Medical Center, Rotterdam

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112 Research Councils UK, Executive Group

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113 David Kerr, NTRAC

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114 Professor John Bell, University of Oxford

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115 Professor James Fawcett, University of Cambridge

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116 David Smith, former Secretary to the MRC Task Force on NIMR

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117 Professor Edwin Taylor,

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118 Alison Spaull, Director, Chief Scientist Office, Edinburgh

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119 Professor Richard R Denton, former MRC Task Force member on the NIMR

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123 Sir John Skehel, Director, National Institute for Medical Research

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126 Sir Anthony Cleaver, Chairman, Medical Research Council

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127 Professor Colin Blakemore, Chief Executive, Medical Research Council

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132 Fiona Fox Director, Science Media Centre

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133 Email correspondence, between Task Force members, not in the public domain but referred to in the Report

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List of unprinted written evidence Additional papers have been received from the following and have been reported to the House but to save printing costs they have not been printed, and copies have been placed in the House of Commons Library, where they may be inspected by Members. Other copies are in the Record Office, House of Lords and are available to the public for inspection. Requests for inspection should be addressed to the Record Office, House of Lords, London SW1. (Tel 020 7219 3074/2333/5316). Hours of inspection are from 9:30am to 5:00pm on Mondays to Fridays.

Email correspondence between MRC Task Force Members (November 2003-June 2004) Email correspondence between MRC Task Force Members with annotations by Professor Colin Blakemore, Chief Executive, Medical Research Council (June-October 2004) Professor Colin Blakemore’s response to Dr Lovell-Badge’s further submission (NIM 116K)

Science and Technology Committee: Evidence Ev 1

Oral evidence Taken before the Science and Technology Committee on Wednesday 1 December 2004 Members present: Dr Ian Gibson, in the Chair Dr Evan Harris Dr Brian Iddon Mr Robert Key

Mr Tony McWalter Dr Desmond Turner

Witnesses: Sir Anthony Cleaver, Chairman, Professor Colin Blakemore, Chief Executive, and Professor John Savill, Council Member, Medical Research Council, examined. Q1 Chairman: Sir Anthony, thank you very much for coming, and welcome to others in your team as well, Professor Savill and Professor Blakemore. Perhaps you will take just a minute to introduce your team and say what their roles are, and so on, in the organisation? Thank you very much. Sir Anthony Cleaver: I am Sir Anthony Cleaver, Chairman of the Medical Research Council for the past six years, previously Chairman of IBM and the Atomic Energy Authority, etc. Our Chief Executive is Professor Colin Blakemore, who is sitting on my left. I think Colin’s reputation is well known and I do not need to recite his medical pedigree. On my right is Professor John Savill, from Edinburgh, and again you have details of his career. John is on the Council and also has been part of the Forward Investment Strategy group and is here because of his involvement with these particular areas of science. Q2 Chairman: Thank you very much for that. You will have guessed that we have had loads and loads of evidence and surreptitious ‘phone calls from all over the world, and so on, about this issue, so it is attracting a lot of interest. We have, I think, 100 pieces of evidence, which will all be published, of course. You seem to have upset an awful lot of people. Do you think the process went wrong somewhere? Would you do the same all over again, the process? Sir Anthony Cleaver: I think the process we have followed is one we have had to follow in order to discharge our duty, which essentially is to ensure that the money we are given for the use of medical science in the UK is properly allocated. If I could rehearse the history, just quickly, that might be helpful. Q3 Chairman: Yes, tell us the original objective too, if you would, either to close Mill Hill, if that was your game, tell me the truth, please, or if it was to redirect research in some direction? Tell me, what was the priority of thinking? Sir Anthony Cleaver: Let me rehearse the history. Back in 2000 there was the normal quinquennial review. Each of our units and institutes is reviewed every five years, and at that time Mill Hill was reviewed and was given a very clean bill of health.

Arising from that were two issues which obviously needed to have some attention. The first was the fact that the Director would be retiring in 2006 and it is normal policy that whenever the director of an institute or unit retires one reviews the future plans for it. At the same time, there were concerns about the state of the building. Q4 Chairman: Why only five; why is that? Why do you wait until some poor devil leaves before you do it; you should be doing it all the time, should you not, every year? Sir Anthony Cleaver: Yes, of course. Each year the plans of the institutes and units are reviewed, but there is a five-year quinquennial review where there is special attention, outsiders are brought in specifically to review. At the same time, the whole idea of having a unit or an institute, as opposed to simply having a group of people working in a university research department, is that these are areas where we believe there is particular strategic focus and where the Council believes that a particular line of research needs to be covered. Obviously, that depends on the particular skills and attributes of the director, and therefore that is always a key point, and this is something that we do with every one of our units and institutes. That is a starting-point. I think probably we should take it on from there. The second issue that we were concerned about at that time was the question of the building and that became a major element in our thinking over the following two years. First of all, in 2001 there was a quinquennial review of all the Research Councils, and one of the recommendations from that was that there should be a particular look at institutes or units which the Research Councils own. Some of the Research Councils, as you will know, have a number, others do not use that form at all, and recommendations were to be made as to how they should be reviewed. Then in 2002 OST issued a requirement for a long-term plan which was to deal with any major capital investment. In our case, we were already concerned that we were facing a significant investment at the Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Cambridge, where we saw the need for a new building. Therefore, we decided that

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what we needed to do was look at all the major sites where conceivably there would be significant capital investment over the next 10 years, or so. Q5 Chairman: Remind me: how many sites do you have like that in the country? Sir Anthony Cleaver: There were four that we reviewed at that time. We have more than that, in that we have some 30-odd units and institutes spread around the country, but in many cases, in nearly every case, they are actually embedded within a university and therefore we do not have the same responsibility for real estate, etc. At that time, we set up a group to look at the Forward Investment Strategy, and that reviewed the situation at Cambridge, at Harwell, at Hammersmith and at NIMR. In the case of NIMR, the concern was that the building, according to the advice that we received, was not capable in the long term of meeting the needs of the Institute, and that led us to discussions as to the possible future. As you will know, the Forward Investment Strategy group, in fact, recommended the potential relocation to Cambridge. At that time we put out those recommendations for consultation and, based on the consultation that we received, there seemed to be general agreement with the recommendations for LMB, for Harwell and for Hammersmith, but in the case of NIMR the staV and a number of other people were very concerned about the recommendation. The Council therefore reviewed the position and decided that it should establish a Task Force specifically to look at these issues, and the Task Force was duly created. The then Chief Executive and the new Chief Executive, Colin Blakemore, were to lead it and its members were duly nominated. Q6 Chairman: Let me ask you if there was proper consultation at this point in the game, or was this all behind closed doors? Were you talking to the staV, were they aware that something was going on but did not know the details, were they involved in helping you in your decisions? Sir Anthony Cleaver: We had started the consultation even before the Forward Investment Strategy— Q7 Chairman: What form did that take? Sir Anthony Cleaver: We visited the Institute, but mainly we had meetings with Sir John Skehel, who expressed the views that he felt very strongly. At the time that we set up the Task Force, there was full consultation, in particular on the constitution of the Task Force, and I might ask Colin Blakemore, who was immediately involved in that process, to explain that. Q8 Chairman: Let me ask you, Colin, before you speak, when you consulted was it just on the issue of Addenbrooke’s, you did not give us all this guV about King’s and all that stuV then, that was not on the agenda, at that stage? Professor Blakemore: You will know, Chairman, of course, that I was not in post at the time that the Task Force was set up and the Forward Investment

Strategy Committee reported. I did sit in as an observer on the meeting of Council in July of 2003 when the Task Force was set up, and that was followed by a period of consultation, particularly with Sir John Skehel, about the remit of the Task Force, its terms of reference and its composition. Then he was asked specifically to nominate two representatives from the Institute and oVer further names, three of which were selected as members of the Task Force. Q9 Chairman: I am still asking the question about the kind of consultation that was going on. Did you stand up at a meeting and say, “Look, we’ve got Addenbrooke’s, we’ve got the possibility of going to London, we’ve got the possibility of rebuilding here, making it into a stem-cell centre,” whatever? Was that the issue at the time? Professor Blakemore: With respect, Chairman, I think you are conflating the reaction to the Forward Investment Strategy recommendation about Addenbrooke’s with the subsequent discussion of the Task Force. The Task Force, I think it would not be immodest to say, was a model of transparent decision-making, and certainly involved continuous consultation with and transparent disclosure to the staV of NIMR, and indeed the whole world. I have been eight times to Mill Hill. The Task Force had presentations from heads of divisions about their plans for the future. Sir John Skehel himself came to several meetings of the Task Force to contribute to the discussion, and of course we had present the two representatives of NIMR to present the views of Mill Hill staV. Dr Harris: Colin, for the record, we know each other, you are my constituent, I have discussed this with you. Chairman: He does not vote for you. Q10 Dr Harris: We have been through this, Ian. It is his business. Indeed, I went to NIMR, because I could not make the initial meeting, so I have had informal discussions with both. I want to ask you, if you would, to set out the issue about who should chair this Task Force, because issues have been raised about whether, as Chief Executive, you would find yourself in a diYcult position and liable to be criticised, and I know this may be something that you have thought about? Professor Blakemore: It is, indeed. Remember, I did not set up the Task Force. I sat in on the Council meeting at which its composition was discussed, and that Council meeting decided to invite me and my predecessor, Sir George Radda, to co-chair the Task Force. The first meeting of the Task Force occurred in fact after Sir George’s retirement, so it fell to me to be Chairman. I thought a lot before the first meeting about whether this was appropriate. I was absolutely sure that it was appropriate that the Chief Executive should be present during the discussions, since they were of such enormous strategic importance for MRC, but I asked the Task Force specifically at the first meeting whether we could engage external consultants to facilitate our meetings so as to liberate me from the Chairman role and allow me to

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1 December 2004 Sir Anthony Cleaver, Professor Colin Blakemore and Professor John Savill

participate fully in the discussions. That was accepted by the Task Force and we had consultants to help us all the way through. Most of the discussion of the Task Force was not chaired by me but was facilitated by the external consultants. Q11 Dr Harris: Do you have any memory of criticism of your chairmanship, of your role in the Task Force while the Task Force was ongoing? Professor Blakemore: The criticisms of me, as Chairman, and my personal role emerged towards the end of the process, particularly in the context of the discussions around which we failed to reach consensus. I should add that we managed to reach consensus, I think, on really most of the major points, but there was an area where we could not reach consensus and that is recorded. It was the question of the status of the Mill Hill site itself, whether it should be considered an active option, in the present options appraisal, whether it should be considered a fall-back position if the preferred options in central London failed, or whether we should concentrate on those preferred options, at least in the first instance. This did reveal deep-rooted diVerences of opinion. I have not seen all the evidence submitted from Mill Hill but you can see that this has crystallised into some focus of criticism on me. Q12 Dr Turner: From the evidence which has been submitted to us, I think you could crystallise a lot of the Mill Hill views as “If it ain’t broke, why fix it?” Can you explain to us, Colin, the factors which led to the exclusion of Mill Hill as an option? In other words, why is it that Mill Hill itself cannot be the subject of the investment which would be involved in this process in any event and which could deliver the objectives that the MRC wants? After all, it is supposed to be about translational research, and if the Institute is at Mill Hill it can collaborate with any partners it chooses rather than being stuck with the partners, right or wrong, at any other institution next to which they are located? Professor Blakemore: I think the important point here is that the discussion about location was driven by the clarity of the vision that the Task Force developed, and indeed the Forward Investment Strategy and previous discussions about the future of Mill Hill. Could I emphasise that the job of the Task Force was to look at the future of this Institute on a 20-, 30-, perhaps even 50-year timescale, when the needs of medical research and the opportunities for medical research will have changed radically, and that coloured enormously our view of the potential for the Mill Hill site. The clarity of the vision, and I must emphasise that there was absolute unanimity of opinion, was very clear. We felt that there was a place for a large, interdisciplinary institute with strength in basic biomedical research, that inevitably it would have to move more in a translational direction, given the opportunities in medical science and the demands of medical science and that the translational agenda could be better met by closer location with a hospital and clinical environment. Indeed, if the Institute was also set in

an active higher education institution it would give the Institute access to opportunities for collaboration with other scientists and other disciplines, extending even further the interdisciplinary range of the Institute. This was something the Task Force envisaged would be increasingly necessary in the future to maintain the cutting-edge in basic biomedical research as well as allowing the Institute to increase progressively its commitment to real clinical delivery. That vision drove the choice of location, because if, as the Task Force concluded unanimously, it would be better to work in close association in a hospital environment and with a university then it was very clear that being next to a hospital and university would help to deliver that vision. Q13 Dr Turner: The MRC has been down that route twice before, with the LMB and with Northwick Park, and the Institute at Northwick Park was closed because it did not work. It still seems to me that you have some way to go in making a case that Mill Hill cannot itself be an option? Professor Blakemore: Can I say, you are absolutely right, that this vision has been emerging for a long time. Can I quote just briefly from a report on this issue. “Because of the way medicine is developing, it is of crucial importance, if clinical research in the UK is to remain internationally competitive, to apply the new techniques of the biological sciences, for example, those of molecular and cellular biology, as an integral part of the study of an ever-increasing number of clinical research problems” . . .“This should be achieved by the move of the NIMR.” That was written in January 1986 as part of the Stoker Report on the future of the Clinical Research Centre, and at that time there seemed to be general acceptance of that possibility. Clearly, the attitude of NIMR was very diVerent. Here is another quote from the document. “In his discussions with us, the Director of the NIMR” that is Sir John’s predecessor “was clear about the undoubted benefits to clinical science of a merger.” That did not happen and I think actually that might have contributed to the failure of MRC to move them. Q14 Chairman: Why did it not happen? What dictated that failure? Professor Blakemore: It was financial considerations. The conclusion was, and I quote again, “The fabric of the building at NIMR could be expected to last without major repair for some 20 years,” so the scheme was abandoned. I think actually the failure to go through with that clear conviction was part of the reason for the failure of the Clinical Research Centre at Northwick Park and the necessity to move to the Hammersmith. Q15 Dr Turner: It has been put to us in much simpler and more pragmatic terms, as far as Northwick Park is concerned, that it was because the consultants at the Northwick Park Hospital were more interested in private medicine than in medical research. This is likely to happen wherever you put an institute next

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to a hospital, with consultants who are on diVerent contracts, non-MRC contracts, not necessarily being vitally interested in research? Professor Savill: I am a clinician scientist. I am a consultant physician and nephrologist. I am also a scientist and I think the primary reason that Northwick Park failed was that it was science grafted into an unreceptive environment at a district general hospital. That is completely diVerent from a culture in a tertiary referral centre, where many of the consultant-level staV are employed by a university, are clinician scientists, are engaged in science, hopefully of high quality. I am very interested by the way the discussion is focused on process. I am much more interested in outcome, and I think translational research is the key outcome here on which we should be focusing. Q16 Dr Iddon: Can I look at just the physical diYculties. We did visit the Mill Hill site a few weeks ago, as you know, and it is an enormous site with room for expansion and there is a considerable-sized animal house there, for example. We all know the two sites being considered, they are extremely overcrowded. We have looked at the evidence presented about those sites, but it is hard to accept, in my view, that you can move the whole of Mill Hill, without shrinking the size of it, especially the animal house, into central London, with all the problems that we know the extremists are giving people involved in animal research. Would you not have great diYculty physically moving into central London and really would you not attract the animal extremists to have a bigger go than they do every Wednesday night at the Mill Hill site? Professor Blakemore: I think it would be wrong to prejudge what the Council has to do over the coming weeks and months, which is to look at the quality, both the science case and the business case, of the bids from KCL and UCL. We have not done that yet. We have a Council meeting in a couple of weeks’ time, which will look at documents which have arrived only recently. The specification to the two Colleges was very clear. We wanted them to match, as far as it was conceivable, the space and the resources and the facilities of Mill Hill, although, of course, in gleaming new buildings that would provide state of the art laboratory space, something that Mill Hill certainly does not have at the moment. The requirement to be able to accommodate the animal needs, for instance, and the structural and biology needs of the Institute were specified very clearly. We will see how close KCL and UCL have come to the specification that we asked them to match, and of course that will be what the Council has to consider in its options appraisal. Q17 Dr Iddon: Why move into a highly concentrated environment, in terms of building and people and transport, and not out of the golden triangle? Manchester, for example, is building a £32 million interdisciplinary MIB building right now. Why London; why not the north?

Sir Anthony Cleaver: We stopped the discussion of the process at a particular point, the arrival of the Task Force. If I could give you just a little more background at that point. One of the major concerns which arose was a concern from NIMR, from the staV there, that the danger of moving, as originally proposed by the Forward Investment Strategy, to Cambridge was the destruction of that as an entity, that people would leave, that they were used to working together and that it should be preserved as an entity. It was partly in response to that that the Task Force, in looking at the various options, felt London was the one opportunity provided to meet all the requirements predicated by the vision. In other words, the ability to site it alongside a hospital with significant scientific capability, a higher education institute which could provide the other disciplines which you need, and, remember, nearly all the exciting developments come at the boundaries between disciplines nowadays, so it is very important to have other facilities, maths, physics, and so on, available close by. It was to meet the colocation, and again I can only stress that from my own experience over many years, 30 years in IBM, Atomic Energy Authority and everywhere else, increasingly the need to get the science, the basic research, as close as possible to the customer. Q18 Chairman: Have those at this end, in London, been consulted about this, because I imagine any move would input into their problems? Have you talked to King’s College and UCL? Sir Anthony Cleaver: King’s and UCL are both bidding because they believe there is significant advantage to them. Q19 Chairman: The workforce, have they been asked about it, do you know, or are they in the dark about it too; maybe they do not care, do you think? Professor Blakemore: Is that the workforce at NIMR, or King’s and UCL? Q20 Chairman: King’s and UCL? Professor Blakemore: I presume, in developing their bids, I would hope, that they have consulted widely, but of course that is their responsibility, not ours. Chairman: You are not sure. Q21 Dr Iddon: We have some concerns. For example, one of them would be that everybody knows that the UK has a considerable lead in stemcell research at the moment, they will also know the decision California has just taken, so there is an obvious tension there. What we are concerned about is disrupting that very important research, because you are going to disrupt it by a move. Has the disruption of state of the art, chalk-face research been considered vis-a`-vis the move into London? Professor Blakemore: Of course it has. Any major change is bound to produce disturbance, that is beyond question. I cannot believe that should be an overriding argument for simply maintaining the status quo. Can I point out that to move to a purpose-built, new set of laboratories, in a diVerent location, might actually be much less disruptive than

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1 December 2004 Sir Anthony Cleaver, Professor Colin Blakemore and Professor John Savill

having to renovate substantially and even rebuild on the existing site. The move would be planned presumably over the course of several years. NIMR staV would be involved in specifying the laboratory conditions and space for the facilities that they needed, and actually the transition could be minimally disruptive. I am very glad though you raised the question of stem-cell research. One possibility, but this will depend of course on the identity of the new Director and the evolution of science at NIMR, that the relocated Institute could become a really major, national centre for stem-cell research. There are possibilities for collaborations both at UC and at KC which would facilitate that. NIMR is just in the process of establishing a new division for stem-cell research and I think this will give a fantastic opportunity not only for further collaboration and strengthening of the basic aspect of that research but eventually for delivery into the clinical context, being close to a hospital. Q22 Chairman: For the record, can you tell me what is wrong with Lincoln’s Inn Fields as a centre for you to amalgamate with? Professor Blakemore: We have not discussed that with Cancer Research UK so I cannot give a simple, straightforward answer, but I would say there is not enough space at Lincoln’s Inn Fields for a building of 30,000 square metres. Also, I am not sure that the allegiances between the Cancer Research UK laboratories and NIMR as it is would make that particularly productive. Q23 Chairman: I am thinking about stem-cell, you see, and cancer treatment with stem-cells has great potential? Professor Blakemore: What I would say, Chairman, is that the distance from King’s College or University College to Lincoln’s Inn Fields is considerably less than the distance from Mill Hill. What we hope to see is that the Institute would be making a very strong contribution, in terms of collaborations, not only with whichever university or hospital it was co-located but with all the other, nearby, major medical schools and Institutes in central London. Q24 Dr Iddon: I am pleased to say that the vast majority of evidence we are receiving on this question suggests that Mill Hill is very highly rated internationally, but we have had some evidence to suggest that perhaps they have lost their way, in some respects, and that they have become isolated from the academic community. What is your view on that? Professor Blakemore: Could I emphasise that the remit of the Task Force had nothing to do with judging the quality of past or present science. We have the QQR process for doing that. It had to do with developing a strategic vision for the future of the Institute on a 20- to 30-, 50-year timescale. I would not want to express a view on whether NIMR has lost its way. It is going through a QQR at the moment and we will learn a great deal from that. My

personal view is that the quality of science at Mill Hill is extremely high and that there is world-class expertise there which must be preserved. Q25 Dr Iddon: It is not about refocusing the interests of Mill Hill, it is about improving the performance through the translational research into the clinic? Professor Blakemore: It is about oVering opportunity for the skills and strengths and facilities of NIMR to be directed more towards clinical delivery. Chairman: Let us talk about translational research. Q26 Mr Key: Sir Anthony, for over 21 years I have represented the scientists who work at two very important establishments at Porton Down, now Defence Science and Technology Laboratories and the Health Protection Agency. I find myself, therefore, really surprised that we are here discussing this at all. In both those establishments they have had at least three fundamental reforms of structure, and the science that they do has never been brought into question, but the legitimate ownership of those establishments has changed. Can you just confirm, therefore, that it is the Medical Research Council which is responsible for the overall ownership and vision and function of NIMR? Sir Anthony Cleaver: Absolutely. Q27 Mr Key: Therefore that it is up to the Medical Research Council to decide the future of NIMR? Sir Anthony Cleaver: It is our responsibility. Q28 Mr Key: Sir Anthony, can you also confirm what Professor Blakemore has just said, that at no stage has the quality of the science or the scientists at NIMR been in question, as part of this review of location? Sir Anthony Cleaver: Absolutely not. That is the function of the quinquennial reviews and, as Colin has just said, the latest one is currently taking place. Q29 Mr Key: I have been astonished at the vicious attacks on Professor Blakemore by some of the heads of division at NIMR. I wonder if I could ask Professor Blakemore therefore, in the light of a very important statement that the Chairman read to this Committee before the start of this meeting, and which I hope will become part of the evidence which is published, in which it appeared that the Task Force was united; Professor Blakemore, did anybody refuse to sign that statement which the Chairman read to us from members of the Task Force? Because six did: you did, Professor Davies did, Professor Denton, Professor Flavell, Sir Paul Nurse and Professor Tomlinson signed up to it. Who did not sign that statement of support, which said that the work of the Task Force was properly conducted and the views of staV at NIMR and the proposals for the Mill Hill site were fully considered? Professor Blakemore: Thank you, Mr Key, for raising that. This document was circulated only after I had seen Sir John Skehel’s submission to your

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1 December 2004 Sir Anthony Cleaver, Professor Colin Blakemore and Professor John Savill

Committee a few days ago. It was sent to the other two, the only other two members of the Task Force, Dr Robin Lovell-Badge and Dr Steve Gamblin. Q30 Dr Harris: What about Alan Bernstein? Professor Blakemore: I am very sorry, Alan Bernstein’s name should be on this; he has signed it. I am extremely sorry. Alan Bernstein has agreed to this. The only other two members are Robin LovellBadge and Steve Gamblin. It was sent to them but I have not heard from them. Q31 Mr Key: You do not know why they did not sign it? Professor Blakemore: I presume that it would be incompatible with the position that they are now taking in the statements, which I have only just seen, by the way. Q32 Chairman: We will ask them in the next session. Professor Blakemore: Can I come back, just to reinforce the point that we did have unanimity of view on the vision developed by the Task Force. The press release which all the members of the Task Force agreed to—all the members, including Robin Lovell-Badge and Steve Gamblin—says that “An international Task Force has recommended that if an appropriate partnership arrangement can be negotiated the Institute should move to a central London location, in association with a leading university and hospital, in order to carry out more patient-based research.” Dr Lovell-Badge very kindly contributed a quotation to that: “This has been a diYcult period for staV at the Institute and I am sure that they will appreciate these positive recommendations which would secure the Institute’s future.” Q33 Chairman: Can I ask you a question, is Mill Hill still an option at this moment? Professor Blakemore: What the Council has decided is that it is not an active option. Q34 Chairman: It is an inactive option. What is an inactive option? Professor Blakemore: It is the baseline case against which the two preferred options should be judged. With such very clear guidance from the Task Force, the Council decided that it should put all its eVorts into exploring the preferred possibilities. That is why it chose to concentrate on only the two options of King’s and UCL. Q35 Chairman: It is an option, even if it is not preferred? Professor Blakemore: It is providing the base case against which the options appraisal will be carried out. And not just the status quo, Mill Hill has developed an enhanced base case. Q36 Chairman: If the other two fell apart for some reason, would Mill Hill come back on the Task Force agenda?

Sir Anthony Cleaver: It would be the Council’s decision. The Council will review the recommendations of UCL and King’s College. We will examine whether we believe they meet all the requirements and are the best approach. In the event that one of them appears promising we will take that forward and ensure that we have both a satisfactory science case and a business case which meet as many of the objectives as we can possibly achieve. Q37 Chairman: Would you say that Mill Hill is not ruled in and it is not ruled out? Sir Anthony Cleaver: In the event that neither of those two, which are the only two which can, can meet the vision as defined and also meet the objective of trying to keep together the grouping at Mill Hill, who therefore could work in a London environment but who, we presume, based on their own concerns, would be vulnerable if we were to move further a field, if we cannot meet all those requirements we will have to look at all the other options. Q38 Chairman: What are they then? Sir Anthony Cleaver: There is no other option, other than these two which we are examining now, which meets all the requirements of the vision. Q39 Chairman: I understand that, but you said, Sir Anthony, that you would examine all the other options? Sir Anthony Cleaver: Exactly. Q40 Chairman: What are they? Sir Anthony Cleaver: They are the recommendation of Mill Hill, obviously, that they should stay where they are. Q41 Chairman: With developments, and so on? Sir Anthony Cleaver: Yes, but I will come back to that, if I may. There were two or three comments made that I have not had the chance to address, that I wish to. That is obviously a possibility. We will obviously have still to consider the original recommendation of the Forward Investment Strategy. There are a number of people, as you will be well aware from the people who have written in, who have said the best solution would be to take elements of Mill Hill and put them where the strongest science is in their particular area. There is a range of possibilities which could be considered. We have tried to respond to the concerns expressed and the only options which meet all those requirements are the ones which are now under consideration. In the event that Council cannot be satisfied by that, we will have to look at all the other options. Could I go back on one or two of the points of “If it ain’t broke, why fix it?” etc. First of all, just to remind the Committee, the pace of change in these areas is dramatic. It is very diYcult to see exactly what will be required in future years in a number of areas, but I think we could take it as axiomatic that we would need, for a world-class institute, world-class facilities. The physical facilities that are required really cannot be met by the buildings at Mill Hill. I state that with some confidence, in that we have a

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1 December 2004 Sir Anthony Cleaver, Professor Colin Blakemore and Professor John Savill

benchmark applied across science as a result of the Joint Infrastructure Funding which has been carried out over the last few years. The buildings at Mill Hill, even refurbished, will not meet the standards of JIF which have been set across the university and the research area. That being the case, it would be a concern, I think, if we were to say, “We wish to maintain our world standard, the eminence that NIMR has achieved, rightly, over many years, but we are going to be asking people, because there is a constant change of people, to come and work in facilities which are not world-class.” We believe that the other options ought to meet that as world-class. Chairman: I know that you have not finished, but other people would like to come in. Q42 Dr Turner: There is space on the Mill Hill site progressively to replace buildings if necessary, so that is not a reason for ruling it out? Sir Anthony Cleaver: Clearly, that would be an option. I made the point only in that the suggestion that there was a huge financial diVerence between the various options is flawed, I think. If one were talking of a new building at Mill Hill then the cost would be comparable to that of a new building in London. Q43 Dr Turner: Except that costs at Mill Hill would be less than in central London. Just addressing the translational point, is it not reasonable to say that what makes translational research work best is having the right partners, and Professor John Savill has made it clear that he would be an excellent member of one such partnership? In fact, Mill Hill might be able to succeed more at translational research by being able to choose the most appropriate partners, wherever they are, than by feeling the constraint of being involved in either King’s or UCL? Professor Savill: I think that is an important point. I think perhaps one misunderstanding in that statement is that no university I know of limits the ability of its staV to collaborate freely not only within the UK but across the world, so I would reassure those who feel that a partnership with a particular institution might limit collaboration to that institution. I am sure no-one on Council believes that is a serious likely outcome of this exercise. You will have gathered, I did want to hold forth for a minute or two on translational research, if that is alright, Chairman, because I think that much of the heat and light in this issue has been a lack of understanding about what translational research actually is and what it will require for the UK to be competitive in translational research. I have got one or two definitions here, if you will stick with me for a second. Q44 Chairman: Can you give us one definition? Professor Savill: I will give you one definition then. I think the best definition actually is in a letter written to you by the Director of the MRC Clinical Sciences Centre, Chris Higgins. He says: “It has been amply demonstrated that translation of biomedical research progresses most eVectively through

iterative interactions between clinical and basic scientists working closely together as a mix of equals, sharing laboratories, ideas and opportunities and understanding each other’s culture. This is the model being adopted in leading centres in the US. This model also enhances the quality of basic research which benefits substantially from ideas derived from patient-based research.” I am a very firm believer that much of the MRC’s mission should include very high quality, basic biomedical science. I have been involved in the previous QQR of NIMR and I have no doubt that it engages in very high quality, basic biomedical science, but, unfortunately, for reasons which I think I understand, it has missed an opportunity. Let me give you some data which emphasise the opportunity that this wonderful scientific environment has missed. During the recent consultation, Council were told that there were nine young, clinically-active scientists at NIMR, out of a cadre of well over 500 or 600, although that includes some support staV. Compare that, if you will, with the Clinical Sciences Centre which, at its last quinquennial review in 2003, reported recruitment of 54 clinical fellows. My own institution, the University of Edinburgh, I was formerly Director of part of it, about one-tenth of my College’s research activity, 200 colleagues in the Centre for Inflammation Research; in the last five years we have recruited 33 clinical training fellows and 13 at higher levels. One of the Colleges, in its submission, which I think you have had access to, refers to having 189 clinical training fellows and 22 clinical scientists. Why does not this wonderful Institute at Mill Hill attract more young clinical scientists? Q45 Chairman: I will tell you why, John, because some of the evidence we have had, from very eminent scientists who would be sitting in your place, would say quite the opposite, that co-location does not always lead to the best translational research. There is not a consensus, John? Professor Savill: I would disagree with that view and I think that our competitors in North America show us the way. They know that we need to shorten the translational pipeline. Q46 Chairman: We have got American evidence too, John? Professor Savill: They have undertaken exercises like bringing the Scripps Institute next to the hospital and forming the Scripps Hospital. There are many examples of this approach. If I can finish, I think my own city gives a beautiful example of the importance of co-location. The setting up of the new Royal Infirmary on a greenfield site stripped patient care away from the relevant research. We raised £90 million to co-locate 800 bench biomedical scientists with our hospital. Thank God we did that, because in the intervening two years, when we have been separate from the hospital environment, the clinical scientists, such as me, have found it very diYcult to function.

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1 December 2004 Sir Anthony Cleaver, Professor Colin Blakemore and Professor John Savill

Q47 Chairman: What would you say if I said to you—do not call me a liar but say “You’re wrong,” please, if you do not agree with me—that there was a requirement put on you to get clinical scientists at NIMR, it came from outside the structures that you have within the MRC, for example? You were here for the last questions we were having to the Minister, and so on. We are not naı¨ve. We know there are external influences in every organisation, not least from the master who pays you. What would you say about that, about clinical scientists, that you were told “You get clinical scientists in there”? I have not got minutes, I have not got evidence, but there may be some around, that that was put on you, that that did not come from the internal thinking that you were suggesting? Sir Anthony Cleaver: I think I should respond to that. There has been absolutely no pressure on us. It is our responsibility to decide how and where funds are spent in this context, and there has been no pressure on us. Q48 Chairman: Thanks for giving us that because it puts it on the record. Sir Anthony Cleaver: That is fine. Could I tell you now just one little story in this context, because I think it is relevant to this whole direction of research. In the course of the last two years we interviewed candidates for the job of Chief Executive of the MRC, and obviously Colin Blakemore was successful. One of the questions that we asked each of the candidates was how they saw things changing over the next few years in this whole context. What I found most interesting was that, while we got diVerent answers in all sorts of other areas, their answers were absolutely consistent that what has happened over the last 50 years, from the DNA discovery, etc., there has been an increasing focus at the molecular and cell level, but that the way things were developing now it was going to be possible to take this back to whole organisms and ultimately to the body and the patient. I think that whole trend is what is actually driving us in the direction that the Task Force and the Forward Investment Strategy saw as key to the vision. Q49 Dr Iddon: I have a quick, extremely mundane but important question, in my view. I am sure it is at the back of everybody’s mind. Obviously, the Mill Hill site, a large site, is potentially very valuable building land. Who would benefit from the sale of that site for building, where would the capital receipt go, and indeed have you had an estimate put on the value of the site? Sir Anthony Cleaver: I think, at the moment, we have only the book value, which I believe is some £30 million. In the event that there was a sale of the site then the decision would be for the Treasury, ultimately, as to whether or not the funds received were to be made available to us to plough back into future investment. Q50 Dr Iddon: That would not be automatic? Sir Anthony Cleaver: That would not be automatic, so we are certainly not relying on that.

Q51 Mr McWalter: Some of the questions I was going to ask have been half-asked by other people, but one of the issues which emerges clearly from the 115 items of evidence we have had is that the vision you have been talking about is not shared by very many people at all. You have got a nice little group that meets together and they have got their vision and they are very pleased about it, but the community, the world community, because we have got stuV from all over the world, actually does not share your view. We have heard a bit from Professor Savill that, actually, well, London should be more like Edinburgh. I would be a bit reluctant, to be honest, to find that there was instant translation of the hugely valuable research which Mill Hill is doing on mice and, say, on genetic codings for inadequate colonic development then instantly to find this guy going into a hospital. Of course, it is vital we have that understanding and equally it is vital, by the way, that the guy who is expert on mice be kept away from real patients for a significant period. There is a big programme there and at some stage, of course, that work needs to be translated, that is vital too. You seem to have a kind of Edinburgh view of what should happen and it is not shared by huge numbers of people. Would it not be sensible at least to try to ask yourselves about the vision that you have got of an Institute which has got 30 hospitals in relationship to it, not one, 30, we heard, which has got dozens of universities in academic collaboration with it and which has used those links with those hospitals and those universities to develop a worldclass facility? Why do you not actually stop messing around with it and allow them to continue to have their own programme for development on a huge site, very near London, okay in association with universities, if you like, but why have you not considered that as an option at all? That is largely what these 115 people want. Professor Blakemore: I hope that John will have something to say about the translational issue again. I have seen some of the correspondence that has been sent to you and I am absolutely sure that you will have passionate personal views from wellinformed, authoritative, senior figures which vary enormously, ranging probably from, “Well, close the place down and distribute the money as grants,” right through to “Leave it exactly as it is, it is pristine, it’s wonderful in Mill Hill.” Our task, in the Task Force, and actually, more importantly, the MRC with its national responsibility, is to ask how this huge investment of public money, more than £30 million a year, can best be spent to serve the needs of the whole biomedical community, not just, I have to say, to serve the interests of the staV of NIMR alone. It is very clear what they would prefer. It is a marvellous environment for them to work in. Q52 Mr McWalter: I am talking about people across the world. Professor Bellamy from Auckland, for instance, who puts forward very, very sensible ideas, clearly understands the nature of the problem, and so on. I am not talking about, as it were, the staV themselves and maybe what could be regarded as

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1 December 2004 Sir Anthony Cleaver, Professor Colin Blakemore and Professor John Savill

their own petty concerns, I am talking about the vast body of evidence we have had which relates to the whole of the world community in medical research? Professor Blakemore: I hope that you will look under the surface of the evidence that you have got and ask, in each case, what might have been the motive that led those people to write. Q53 Chairman: Tell us what it might be then? Professor Blakemore: I would say that, if you look at previous consultations, the community at NIMR and its contacts and collaborators and former workers and students around the world, it is very strong, very cohesive. It is a united body and they are able to mount very good propaganda campaigns. Q54 Mr McWalter: Another example of its eVectiveness? Professor Blakemore: Surely, but not necessarily the advice that the MRC should take primarily in determining what is the right thing to do. If I could emphasise again what the Chairman has said. This is our job. It is our responsibility and actually our duty as well, under the terms of the QQR of the Research Councils, to make the best decisions about how institutional investment benefits the university community and the whole of the rest of the biomedical research community. That is what we are trying to do against a background of very varied opinion, but we have a clear view, and let me remind you again that it was a view which was shared unanimously, not only by the FIS Committee before us, not only by the Stoker Committee before that, but by all the members of the Task Force, that it would be better not only to move in a translational direction but to achieve that by co-location; it would be better. Q55 Dr Harris: We have had evidence from Sir John Skehel which you might consider, I think you hinted at this, is troublesome to you in a personal capacity. You may have seen this. It states: “They” that is NIMR senior staV “were informed of attempts by the MRC CEO to influence and persuade Task Force members to agree with reports that were not consistent with the spirit of the actual meetings. This information has contributed considerably to a lack of staV confidence in the Task Force process.” We will publish this with our report, so you may wish to have the opportunity to respond to that statement? Professor Blakemore: Thank you, Dr Harris, and I value the opportunity to do so. Needless to say, it is disappointing to face that kind of accusation. I draw some solace from the fact that I am not the first person to suVer from those kinds of accusations. My predecessor similarly was subjected to accusations of hidden agendas and manipulation, and so on, and I think the Chairman has suVered too. I am very, very pleased to have received the support of the whole of the rest of the Task Force except Dr LovellBadge and Dr Gamblin in the form of this statement. If I can just extend the statement, so as to get it on the record, which all of the members of the Task Force signed up to, except Robin and Steve, so far, the work of the Task Force was properly conducted

and the views of staV at NIMR and the proposals for the Mill Hill site were fully considered. We were united in recommending a possible move into partnership with a leading hospital and university in central London. We were unable to reach consensus on whether the Mill Hill site itself should be considered as an active option but the range of opinions was fully presented to the Council of the MRC. I think that is very clear, and I do not think it is going to be productive to dissect the minutiae of the accusations against me and my behaviour. I did my best in diYcult circumstances, because opinions were divided on the Task Force. Q56 Mr Key: We are very grateful for all the evidence that has come from all around the world, of course we are, but I do recall that, as a former teacher of economics, George Bernard Shaw said you could lay all the economists end to end and they still would not reach a conclusion, and reaching a conclusion is what you have to do, in spite of all this. Can you confirm my understanding that Mill Hill simply cannot meet the strategic vision of the Medical Research Council in terms of translational research? Professor Savill: I think it is important to understand that Mill Hill does do translational research and, for example, the influenza programme is a very famous example of that. I think what Council needs to decide is where will the best possible chance of maximising translational research be delivered? I regard translational research not as a threat for basic science but as an opportunity, and I think it is a duty for the MRC, not a distraction. To answer your question, I think that the chances of achieving translational research would be much greater if the renewed Institute were co-located with a university and hospital. Q57 Mr Key: I think I understand the argument you have deployed, that the strengths of the NIMR, which are undeniable, are deployed best in a colocation with somebody else. If that happens, can you reassure the Committee that the basic research done by the NIMR either will be continued in the new location or is going to happen somewhere else within the strategic MRC remit? Professor Savill: Just to be absolutely clear, high quality, basic research is one of the lynch-pins of translational research. You cannot have translational research without high quality, basic research. The vision of the Task Force was an Institute concentrating on basic and translational research. We must maintain a very strong body of basic research in this renewed Institute. Professor Blakemore: The two major features of the vision developed by the Task Force, which raised some eyebrows amongst your advisers, were to keep it as a single multidisciplinary institution and to keep it in London. Both of those were in recognition of the strength of the basic science in the present Institute. They were eVorts to make sure that strength was retained.

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1 December 2004 Sir Anthony Cleaver, Professor Colin Blakemore and Professor John Savill

Q58 Dr Iddon: It seems to me that, possibly correctly, in the first place, you are trying to make a decision on the scientific basis, but surely the detailed business cases of the two preferred bidders must come close to that argument, and what we cannot understand is why the costs are very much down the agenda and the science is very much up the agenda. That leads me to ask you, if the two detailed business cases turn out to be so expensive, almost prohibitive, what will be your decision on 15 December? Sir Anthony Cleaver: We certainly will not take a final decision on 15 December in any case. It will be the first time that the Council will have reviewed the business case as well as the science case for both King’s and UCL. You are absolutely right though that all Council’s decisions have to be taken within the framework of limited finance. There has never been enough money for the good science that is brought forward to us, and your Committee, I know, in the past has commented on that. It remains the case that in this situation we are talking mainly on those business cases about the capital costs, and as far as the capital cost is concerned our responsibility is, first, to use our own funds, as far as they run. There is also a fund available for Large Facilities funding across the Research Councils and we would expect, for expenditure of this magnitude, to make a bid for some money from that fund and that would be perfectly normal. Also, we would look to the two institutions to see what they could bring to this exercise. At the moment, I simply do not know how those economic cases will stack up, and our ultimate decision will have to take that into account. That is what we are there for; we are set up to ensure that we use public funds eVectively. Q59 Dr Iddon: Are you able to tell us when a decision is likely to be made? Sir Anthony Cleaver: In the event that one or other, or both even, of the options seems likely to be successful in December then the Council will meet again in February and we would hope at that time to take a decision, at least in principle. That is the timeframe. Q60 Dr Turner: Sir Anthony, are you not worried by the implications of the much higher costs associated with central London? Given the fact that the money is never going to be ideally what you would like it to be, there is always going to be a fixed sum of money; you are going to get less building, fewer scientists and heavier running costs for your money in central London? Sir Anthony Cleaver: We simply do not know the answer to a number of those implied questions. They were statements but I presume that really they were questions. Q61 Chairman: It is not likely to be less, is it? Sir Anthony Cleaver: I think it is unlikely to be less, but whether it is likely to be significantly diVerent in the overall scheme is something we could question. One would expect, for example, to see some benefits, some synergies from shared infrastructure. There is

the university and a hospital there as well and there should be some shared infrastructure. There are a number of ways in which we will have to assess those costs, but remember that what we are really looking at, we reckon, over the next 20 years or so, is expenditure of some £800 million, that is if you assume a 2.5 per cent increase going forward on the capital and the running costs. We are looking at very major expenditure, and within that the diVerence in the running costs, I suggest, is not major. Professor Blakemore: Can I add to that, because it is very important. The Mill Hill proposal for the enhanced base case proposes a capital investment of £40 million over a 20-year or so timescale. The independent building consultants who have looked at the Mill Hill site suggest that even that level of investment would nowhere near bring the buildings up to even JIF standards, that is, the current accepted norms for the quality of laboratories in the universities. Q62 Chairman: What is their estimate? Professor Blakemore: Their estimate for a complete rebuild, which essentially is what they recommend, is £115 million on the Mill Hill site, which is very similar to the estimates that are coming from King’s and UC. If you have seen the proposals from Mill Hill, you will notice that they are suggesting that a complete rebuild should simply be delayed for another 20 years or so, just as Stoker did 20 years ago. The fact is that this 70-year-old building at some point must be replaced if it is going to be capable of attracting into the coming decades international, leading staV who will demand very high quality facilities. The point is that if a rebuild costs approximately the same on all three sites we have to look at the sources of funding. There are three possible sources of funding. From the partner university, and let us not forget that even Mill Hill has been asked to develop a proposal based on partnership from a partner university. We will be looking very closely at what UC and King’s have on oVer. From the Large Facilities Roadmap, which Sir Anthony has described, where we have to make a very strong and convincing case based on vision. Finally, in the case of a move from Mill Hill, the capital value of the site. I would point out that a build on the site, of course, would not involve releasing the capital value of that site, so, paradoxically, it might well turn out that to rebuild elsewhere would be very much less expensive than building on the Mill Hill site. Q63 Chairman: Would you accept the introduction of the private sector and charities as part of that? Professor Blakemore: It is conceivable. Those are the issues we have to look at into the future, Chairman. Q64 Mr McWalter: Chairman, in fact, this is a PFI really, actually, that you are after. If you flog the Mill Hill sites and then acquire a site in central London, which is 10 times as much probably per square metre, or whatever, the only way then you can go down that course is, in fact, with a private sector partner who owns the sites that you move into

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1 December 2004 Sir Anthony Cleaver, Professor Colin Blakemore and Professor John Savill

and who, 60 years down the track, or 30 years down the track, actually will acquire that site so you will dissipate the currently-held capital resources completely eventually. Is that the vision? Sir Anthony Cleaver: This is a very interesting construct, based on absolutely no facts whatsoever, and really I do not think it is worth answering.

Q65 Mr McWalter: It is based on the intelligence that you will flog oV the Mill Hill site, where you could develop, and move into central London, acquiring sites that are vastly more expensive, and the mechanisms for doing that we all know very well and many of us do not like them? Sir Anthony Cleaver: We are not talking about acquiring sites. We are talking about a partnership with a university that has a site. The idea of PFI is not something we have considered at all. Indeed it will be part of our responsibility as we go forward to see if there are any further ways in which we can get greater value for the public purse, and we will do that, but it does not result in the sort of outline that you have expressed. Dr Harris: What would you say to people who say that, given what is happening in Oxford with their animal research centre, it is simply not sensible to close a facility that is secure at the moment and build another one?

Q66 Chairman: Colin Blakemore, you are an expert in this area, I think?

Professor Blakemore: One has to point out, and I hesitate to do so really after what you have said, that there are major animal facilities in central London. Frankly, I feel that it would be an extraordinary admission if we had to say that our long-term vision of the future and the health of science in this country were going to be determined by the actions and the attitudes of a few extremists. We have to do what we think is right, and if that involves building new animal facilities in central London we will do it. Q67 Dr Harris: What about the new Category Four containment facility which exists currently at Mill Hill where there are issues around terrorism generally? Professor Blakemore: Of course, wherever NIMR was located it would be very valuable to the Strong Infections and Immunity Group to have occasional access, it is rarely required, to Category Four. As I understand it, there is no work at the moment in that facility, but of course it stands ready for nationally important circumstances where it would be needed. It might not be possible to duplicate those facilities in central London, but it was part of the specification we presented to UC and to KC. If not, we must explore alternative opportunities and we have oVers from elsewhere already to provide those facilities for NIMR scientists if and when they are needed. I am not absolutely convinced that they need to be on the spot. Chairman: I have got to bring this section of the inquiry to a halt. If there are things you want to say still, please write in and say, “I forgot to mention this,” and so on. We welcome every part of the evidence before we make a decision. Thank you very much for your time.

Witnesses: Sir John Skehel, Director, Dr Robin Lovell-Badge, Head of Division, Developmental Genetics, and Task Force member, and Dr Steve Gamblin, Task Force member, National Institute for Medical Research, examined. Q68 Chairman: John, Robin and Steve, you have been sitting through, animated, in the last section, so welcome, and thank you for coming along and presenting your point of view. You will have a chance here to get it on the record, it is being broadcast, and so on, so no swearing, please. Have you heard anything diVerent this morning you had not heard before? Sir John Skehel: No. Some of it is fairly recent. The thing that we might start oV with actually is fairly recent, that is the Task Force signed statement. Q69 Chairman: Yes, we will ask Robin about that. Sir John Skehel: If I may introduce my colleagues, this is Robin Lovell-Badge, who is a developmental geneticist at Mill Hill. This is Steve Gamblin, who is an X-ray crystallographer. Both of these people are representatives on the Task Force. I am the Director, John Skehel. Q70 Chairman: So you have not heard anything diVerent and certainly you have not changed your views at all?

Sir John Skehel: The diVerent thing that I heard, I must say, the major diVerent thing, was from Professor Savill, in terms of thinking that we had missed a chance, from the point of view of interacting with clinicians. I simply disagree with that. The fact of the matter is that the quinquennial review procedure disagrees with that. Most of the people who have replied to the consultation disagree with that, so I do not know where he gets that idea from. I disagree with it also. Perhaps I can start by addressing this piece of paper which came from the Council. Is that okay? Q71 Chairman: Yes. You were challenged on that, so please use it. Sir John Skehel: I was disappointed that the idea that I and others had attacked Colin Blakemore personally came out in the way that it did, because it simply is not the case. I have two things to say about that statement, before handing over to the people who are on the Task Force because they know more about it. The first one is that the word a “possible” move is completely uncontentious. If the

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recommendation from the Council was that there should be a possible move to a site in London, that is fine, but you would not exclude the Mill Hill site option on the basis of such a possibility. Q72 Chairman: Why do you feel that has been excluded? I thought they were kind of unbalanced but definitely you were still there. Sir John Skehel: “Kind of” is the problem. The truth is, it is not being considered as an option. You had it pretty plain from them, that there are two options, King’s and UC, and we are a baseline case. For whatever procedural reason that we are a baseline case, we are not an option. Q73 Chairman: They have a fall-back position if it falls through? Sir John Skehel: I do not think so; it is not. I think they made that pretty clear, that they would start looking at much wider possibilities if the King’s and UC were not acceptable. I would say our major request is that they look again and reinstate the Mill Hill proposals that we have made as an option and consider them fairly, side by side with the King’s and UC. The word “possible” that the Task Force members felt prepared to sign up to is absolutely uncontentious, but that is not the stance, as far as we understand, of the Council at the moment. It is not possible. You would not exclude the Mill Hill option on the basis of a possibility downtown. Q74 Chairman: Robin and Steve, why did you not sign it? Dr Gamblin: Mainly because we did not agree with it. Can I read you a short e-mail that came to the Task Force last night; it sets his letter in context. This is from Richard Flavell and Paul Nurse. “Dear Colin, Paul and I have had a chance to discuss the statement for the Task Force that you would like us to sign. We made a couple of modifications that we believe create a document that we could sign and we believe even more importantly Steve and Robin may be able to sign. First, we have taken out “without coercion”. The reason we have done this is that there was quite substantial lobbying at various stages and there is documentation of that (for example the Steve Tomlinson email). We’ve also removed the section about Mill Hill serving as a baseline, because that was done after the Task Force oYcial activities had been concluded.” The e-mail that he refers to I think you have got. Q75 Chairman: What point are you making about that? I want it on the record. I want you to tell me. Dr Gamblin: Paul and Richard say that there was coercion, that they would not sign anything unless that was taken out. I do not consider coercion is a part of proper conduct. Q76 Mr McWalter: Just to get it on the record, Chairman, you are saying that the words “without coercion” were in the document. They would not sign it until those words were removed because they believed there was coercion?

Dr Gamblin: Yes. Q77 Chairman: Who was this? Dr Gamblin: Richard Flavell and Paul Nurse. Q78 Dr Harris: They do not say because they think there was coercion, they say, what you have just read out, because there was extensive lobbying. You referred to an e-mail. I could not find that e-mail on the website so I presume that it was felt to be not websiteable, presumably because the people between whom it was to and from, even if it was copied out, in a flow or at the time, felt it was confidential. Can you clarify whether it is your understanding that the e-mail you were about to refer to was confidential, compared with all the other e-mails on this website? Dr Gamblin: On the Task Force website there are emails which are marked ‘confidential’ and e-mails which are not marked ‘confidential’ and the MRC secretariat decided which ones would go on the web. Q79 Dr Harris: Presumably, if I were the MRC secretariat, I cannot speak for them, I would ask people who were the authors or recipients, probably the authors, of e-mails marked ‘confidential’, or reply to ‘confidential’, which is somewhat diVerent, whether they were happy for it to go on the website. I am asking you, and clearly this is the House of Commons so privilege, and all that, but we have seen it and may or may not publish it, if you put it on the record it is awkward for us not to publish it, is it your view that there is permission from the senders of those e-mails for this to be put on the public record? Dr Gamblin: I have no awareness from the secretariat that there were any questions asked of people whether they wanted their e-mails put onto the public website. I have never received any. Q80 Dr Harris: This e-mail is not on the website, so presumably there may well have been a request to put them on the website and it may have been refused. I am asking you whether you have thought about this? Dr Gamblin: Yes, I have thought about it, but in keeping with the desire for transparency in the actions of the Task Force I think this sort of evidence is so important. Dr Lovell-Badge: Can I address that as well. There was a series of e-mails after the Task Force finished which I had marked ‘non-confidential’ which were not put on the website, despite requests both to the secretariat and Colin Blakemore himself. The whole saga finished with a letter from David Smith saying that he refuses to put them on the website. Q81 Chairman: You guys are saying there is more evidence that is not available to this Committee. Is that what you are saying? Dr Lovell-Badge: Yes. Q82 Chairman: Is that available to this Committee now? Dr Lovell-Badge: I have submitted some of it as back-up evidence.

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Q83 Chairman: What is missing that we should have, in your opinion? Sir John Skehel: On this particular point of coercion, the most convincing thing is this particular e-mail from Blakemore to Tomlinson. That has been submitted to you and left to your discretion, in terms of whether this Committee publishes it or not. We think it is actually pretty good evidence that there was extreme persuasion of some members of the Task Force to decide in a particular way. Q84 Mr Key: What form did that coercion take, please? I think it is very important. Sir John Skehel: Personally, I am not calling it ‘coercion’. I think obviously there was some feeling that to remove the word ‘coercion’ was a requirement before people signed. Q85 Mr Key: You are backtracking straightaway. You are saying there was not any coercion? Sir John Skehel: I am not backtracking. I am not a member of the Task Force, so I am not privy to these things. Q86 Mr Key: What was the coercion there? Sir John Skehel: I think maybe you should go back to the people who got the e-mail in the Task Force. Dr Lovell-Badge: I was in receipt of various forms of attempts at coercion, such as ‘phone calls late at night threatening me with my job. Q87 Mr Key: From whom? Dr Lovell-Badge: Colin Blakemore. Q88 Chairman: How many such ‘phone calls did you have? Dr Lovell-Badge: There were two occasions in particular, one in the spring and one after. Q89 Chairman: Would you care to quote what he said to you? Dr Lovell-Badge: He made statements such as “Robin, I don’t know how you can disagree with me. I am your employer.”1 Q90 Dr Harris: Clearly, this is a serious allegation, the general allegation, it is hard to comment on the context of that statement. Were you so concerned about this that you raised it at a Task Force meeting, because you say it occurred first in the spring, so it could go on the record? Alternatively, did you wait until the end of the Task Force to make this allegation, when it may or may not have disagreed with your view, because clearly a contemporaneous record or complaint of that sort, I think, would carry more weight? Dr Lovell-Badge: There was an exchange of e-mails after one such set of ‘phone calls, which was in the spring, which I did put on the Task Force website, but those have not been put on the public record, which was to do with several issues. In particular, we 1

Note by the witness: In the context in which this comment was made, which was inappropriate especially as I was acting as a member of the Task Force, I could only interpret it as a threat to my job.

had been arguing the wording over one of the reports from the Task Force about, for example, the word ‘focus’ where I did not think it was terribly sensible to use the word ‘focus’ to describe multidisciplinarity. It transpired, in one of these ‘phone calls, which was on a Sunday, that Colin Blakemore had then a vision for a future Institute which would have been considerably smaller than the current Institute, so in a sense we would have lost at least half the science going on there, including, for example, all the work that I do in stem-cells and genetics. Colin then asked me, I guess, not to talk about this, but in the way that the subsequent e-mail exchange was going about, it was clear that he had a hidden agenda and he had to declare it, so this was declared on that e-mail exchange. The next big occasion, there were several occasions and one was after the final Task Force meeting when the report of that meeting had been drafted. It had been drafted in the light of the spirit of the agreement that we had at that meeting, which was that the central London bids needed to be compared with the Mill Hill option. Really before the report was finalised Colin Blakemore contacted both King’s and UCL representatives and told them, essentially, that it was a straight fight between the two of them. It was at that point that I put a block on the report being published, because I felt this was certainly not in the spirit of the agreement that we had at the meeting, which was that any option to move the Institute had to be clearly better than what was at Mill Hill, which of course implicitly requires a comparison with Mill Hill. Q91 Chairman: Is this the first time you have raised this issue, with individuals, within your workplace? Obviously, you have prepared this, to come in front of us, but has it gone wider than this? Sir John Skehel: What happened after each of the Task Force meetings was that, Steve and Robin, it was their responsibility from the Task Force to inform the senior staV at Mill Hill, and so we have known about that, as heads of divisions, since those times. In fact, we have referred to this persuasion that had gone on, in letters, on the website and to Colin and to the Task Force members. Q92 Chairman: You understand the serious implications of you saying this. Not only does it get restricted to this Committee and so on and the people who are listening but the press are at this meeting too. Do you understand that? Dr Lovell-Badge: I understand it, absolutely. Q93 Dr Harris: Does Dr Tomlinson feel that he was coerced? He signed a letter, a statement, saying that he thought this was well conducted. He signed this letter saying the work of the Task Force was properly conducted, and I do not think any Vice Chancellor is likely to sign—this is just my view—a statement like that if he felt he had been coerced, or if there were unaddressed allegations of coercion which had not been dealt with?

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Dr Gamblin: The first sentence of this statement reads: “The work of the Task Force was properly conducted and the views of staV at NIMR and the proposals for the Mill Hill site were fully considered.” We are just looking at the proposals for the Mill Hill site being fully considered. In the e-mail sent to Steve Tomlinson, I quote: “We didn’t even consider the plans for a new building with a public lecture theatre, or the other plans for moves within the building that John proposed. How can we possibly say to Council that we are presenting the Mill Hill bid as an equal option alongside KCL and UCL, which we discussed in considerable detail?” To my mind, that statement directly contradicts. Q94 Dr Harris: I think my understanding of this exchange, and I have read this exchange, I spent hours going through these e-mails, is that the people at the Task Force, having heard the presentation, and you may not agree with this, but certainly it appears to me that the majority on the Task Force feel at least they agree with this, that it was so not an option to be put as an active option in comparison, that, given that time is limited, it was not gone into. It was for that reason, indeed the e-mail that you have read from precedes by saying: “As Robin agrees, we didn’t even discuss it. Do you remember: Paul” Paul is one of the NIMR nominees “just said that it was obvious that Mill Hill is not a long-term option within minutes of John Skehel leaving the room, and we moved on to draft the recommendations.” Then we go into the quote that you start with. I think it is important to see these things in context. I think that is ambiguous, the way you have put it, in that it must have been the view of members of the Task Force, because it is a key issue, so why would not Paul Nurse say “I insist”? Sir John Skehel: He denies that he said it, actually, but that is by the bye. Dr Gamblin: At that meeting a vote was taken to see where people’s opinions were. Five of the seven people there voted for keeping the Mill Hill option, so five of the seven voted for options one and two, which were develop it at Mill Hill, and the second one was look at relocation in central London. Q95 Dr Harris: And the date of this meeting, the fifth one? Dr Gamblin: June 21. Q96 Mr Key: Dr Gamblin, in what ways have you been coerced? Dr Gamblin: In the final meeting, a majority of those present and the majority of all the Task Force members, including those read in, voted to have the Mill Hill option on the table. The recommendation of the final meeting was conditional. That was what we all signed up to, a conditional recommendation that we look at central London options and if they provide a better scientific environment then we go forward with those. The conditionality was lost.

Q97 Mr Key: Dr Gamblin, Dr Lovell-Badge has said that he was telephoned late at night on a Sunday and that his job was threatened if he disagreed with the Medical Research Council. Did that happen to you? Dr Gamblin: No. Q98 Mr Key: Do we have any other example of coercion at all, from anywhere, in terms of Dr Lovell-Badge’s allegation? Sir John Skehel: The coercion that was referred to by the other Task Force members focused merely on this e-mail to Professor Tomlinson. I think that is probably it. Q99 Mr Key: So there was not any other, apart from that one e-mail? Sir John Skehel: I think that is the major case but I do not know. Q100 Mr Key: Sir John, so why are you building up this picture of coercion of members of staV of the NIMR by the Medical Research Council threatening you with your jobs? Why are you doing this? What is your motive? Sir John Skehel: I am not building up any picture at all. I am simply responding to questions about the word ‘coercion’ which clearly was removed from this statement that the Task Force members were prepared to sign. Q101 Mr Key: So the people who were not prepared to sign simply go back to the telephone calls received by Dr Lovell-Badge, is that right? Sir John Skehel: No. They simply said, in preparing this statement that they were prepared to sign, remove the words that there was no coercion. The logical interpretation of that is that there was coercion, but that is all. Q102 Mr Key: But only one example? Dr Lovell-Badge: No. There is more than one example. Steve, do you want to read more of the Tomlinson one? Dr Harris: We can make a judgment because we have got the e-mails which were sent, and we can ask Professor Tomlinson whether he feels there was coercion. Chairman: Can I say that we have some confidential e-mails too which we have kept confidential, I am not going to say the source, but now I will have to consider whether the Committee see them as well. I will have to confer with the staV. Dr Harris: What I do not understand, on this particular fifth meeting, which was why I asked the date, is that on the public website there is correspondence from 22 June for a number of days around discussion of the ‘Conclusions of the Fifth Task Force Meeting’, which I understand was drafted in the meeting, in the main, although then there is a discussion afterwards, and that it took some days, several days, following e-mails from, I think, both Robin and Steve, if I can use first names, which are quite friendly and constructive, and so forth, before, suddenly, there is a breakdown in agreement on the whole structure. That seems to me

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to be in the wrong order. Normally, if something comes out that fundamentally you disagree with, about whether there is an option on the table, you start “Er, er, er,” I will translate that for the transcriber, you make the big fuss and then you work constructively. It is a bit bizarre. Chairman: It might work in your Party that way. It works in quite the opposite way in our Party. It is when you have elicited out what happens that changes your mind. Q103 Dr Harris: Can you explain why there was a delayed reaction in this case and, I put it, in the case of the recommendations in July? Dr Lovell-Badge: Because at least four of the people who left the Task Force meeting were clearly under the belief that Mill Hill was on the table, it was an option. It was only subsequently that it became clear, from conversations with Colin Blakemore and others, that in his view it was not an option, and this was against the decision that we agreed on the day. Q104 Mr McWalter: Chairman, the question I want to ask is about the issue of the motive of the MRC. In his memorandum of evidence to us, Paul Nurse, who, as you know, is President of Rockefeller University, says: “The MRC has had financial problems in recent years.” He goes on to suggest that possibly the reason for all of this is that they have got a short-term financial problem. He says: “Government should be urged to address the MRC’s present financial problems so short-term thinking does not dominate future plans for NIMR.” Would you think that, in part, this recommendation is a response to MRC’s financial problems, such as they are, and would you agree that, potentially, at least, they are thinking short term rather than longer term? Sir John Skehel: I do not know that any of us think we understand what the motives of the MRC are, and we are not bothered about them actually. I suspect that it is not to do with any short-term financial problem. During the course of this consultation, letters have come through which indicate pretty strongly that these ideas were on the board even around the time of the last quinquennial review, although they were not discussed with me, so I am not sure that the short-term financial problems that they may have are a motive. We have never been presented with a reason for the re-review of NIMR after the last quinquennial review. Q105 Mr McWalter: The reason we have had is that the move might lead to more translational research. We have had a memorandum from Professor Anne Cooke of Cambridge, who says that, for instance, the TNF-(alpha) theory, which has revolutionised the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis, has taken more than 13 years to get from the fundamental science stage actually into the clinic. Indeed, she goes on to say as well, by the way, that although she works in Cambridge next to the hospital her clinical partners are Glasgow and in America because of the population that she needs to look at for doing

translational research. Do you think there is a lousy theory, or a lousy model of translational research which lies behind the MRC’s thinking in this matter? Sir John Skehel: I think it is true that translational research is multi-stage. Since we are basic scientists we have got more contact with the early stages than we have with the late stages which involve patients directly. I think that the concept of moving us into partnership with a university and hospital is flawed. I think our experience shows that to match the broad range of science that we do at the Institute we need a broad range of partners, and it is very unlikely that they will be found on any one particular site, and that point came up in the earlier discussions. I think the same thing goes for translational research. At the moment, it is perfectly true that we focus in our translation collaborations with the University of London, and about a third of those interactions occur with one hospital, in Great Ormond Street. That is going to change with time and, if the MRC is really taking a long-term look, we suspect that it will only grow easier to interact with people at a distance as communications improve, and we already do, very eVectively, even now. Q106 Mr Key: Sir John, one of the reasons we are here today is a compliment to the success of the NIMR campaign against the wishes of the MRC. Did you seek the advice of a media consultant to direct this campaign? Sir John Skehel: No. It is very kind of you to say so, but no, we did not. Q107 Mr Key: Dr Lovell-Badge, at some stage during last summer did you invite Fiona Fox, Director of the Science Media Centre, to visit NIMR? Dr Lovell-Badge: This was in response to the FIS proposals, the Forward Investment Strategy proposals. Q108 Mr Key: That is a yes? Dr Lovell-Badge: It has nothing to do with the Task Force. Sir John Skehel: They certainly did not meet me. I did not know what was going on. Dr Lovell-Badge: I know Fiona very well and we had a conversation, it was a very informal chat. Q109 Mr Key: Did you ask if she would recommend that you organise demonstrations outside the MRC Head OYce and other MRC events? Dr Lovell-Badge: No. Q110 Mr Key: Did she refuse to help you in that respect? Dr Lovell-Badge: We never asked her to help us. We were just having a discussion about the sorts of things one could do. People were very upset with the FIS proposals, if you remember, so we discussed several issues around that. Q111 Mr Key: Did she advise you that you might like to hire a consultant because it was not appropriate for her to do this?

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Dr Lovell-Badge: We certainly did not hire any consultant. Q112 Mr Key: Sir John, could I turn to this booklet that you published last summer, the National Institute for Medical Research ‘Publication Highlights’. Do you accept that the Task Force was not questioning the standard of science? Sir John Skehel: Yes. On paper at least, they are not questioning the standard of science. Currently, their objective is to look into the distant future. I think that is a diYcult objective. We have heard repeatedly, and again this is anecdotal, that there is a contrary campaign around to say that some parts of the science are not very good. We just put our confidence in the quinquennial review, not necessarily the Chief Executive’s statements in conversation around the place. Nevertheless, what are you asking about this booklet? Q113 Mr Key: What I am interested in is the final sentence of the Foreword by F. Norman. It says: “We hope you find the collection informative, particularly as the final stage of the consultation on the future of the Institute is due to begin.” Clearly, part of the purpose of publishing this was to influence the outcome? Sir John Skehel: It was a coincidence of time, there is no doubt, because it was prepared largely to contribute to the quinquennial review of the Institute, and we distribute those to all the reviewers that come. Q114 Chairman: How often do you publish this booklet? Sir John Skehel: This is the first one and this was the year of our quinquennial reviews and we distribute them to the external reviewers who come in to show the degree of interaction between the people that they are reviewing (since they review only a segment) and the other people who exist in the Institute. I have to say, before the formal consultation happened, there had been a number of selected interviews by the consultants of the Task Force with people around the place, nominated largely by the MRC but some also nominated by the Mill Hill representatives on the Task Force. It seemed to me that a number of the comments that came through, they came through printed confidential but they were told to me as Director, were ill-informed. In fact, in conversation with people outside who had been part of those interviews, they said to me, having received it, when I sent the thing out, how useful it would have been if they had had it before they were involved in the conversation with the consultant. I think there is a need to inform people on what they are writing about before they contribute to a consultation, and if that could be helpful in any way that was the reason for sending it out. Q115 Mr Key: I have absolutely no objection to NIMR battling to preserve what they believe is right for NIMR. What I am concerned about though is defying the authority of the MRC in the way that

appears to have been happening, through the publicity generated and by allegations that we have heard this morning? Sir John Skehel: We are not defying, we are simply saying that we disagree with the logic, any logic that we can see, behind this decision and we disagree particularly with any reason for excluding the Mill Hill site as an option. We go out of our way to choose people in these positions who have independence of thought and you cannot expect them not to function independently when their future is at stake. Dr Lovell-Badge: I just want to say, in terms of the media campaign, after the FIS process finished and the Task Force was set up, we were asked not to go to the media about anything and we have not. Sometimes the media have come to us, after a report has been published, and that is the only media involvement happening. Chairman: I do not think there is much chance they will not be coming towards you now, after what you said earlier. Q116 Dr Iddon: At the moment you have a degree of independence within the MRC structures. Do you think that is going to be compromised if you are going to move onto one of the two preferred sites in London? Sir John Skehel: I think it is the very strong recommendation of the Task Force that our independence is retained. My view is that if it were lost then the value of the Institute would be significantly decreased. Q117 Dr Iddon: Have you confidence that it will be maintained once you get on the University College site? Sir John Skehel: No, not particularly. I do not have much confidence in either of the options at the moment. Q118 Chairman: Is that partly because you think NIMR will become an adjunct to the University, a department? Sir John Skehel: It is a fear that it might, yes; no, not as a department. Q119 Chairman: You are not worried about that? Sir John Skehel: All I would say is that I hope very much that the MRC makes sure to retain the independence of the Institute. Q120 Dr Iddon: I am sure this Committee is going to look at the possible disruption of the research, and I have referred to that already in terms of the stem-cell research that your Institute does, and I am concerned about that personally. Professor Blakemore admitted that any move will cause huge disruption. However, I am also concerned that you may lose staV. Are there any indications that would be a possibility by moving into any location, never mind central London? Sir John Skehel: I think the staV is split into several sections, in consideration of this. I think the senior scientists have clearly chosen a place like Mill Hill as

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1 December 2004 Sir John Skehel, Dr Robin Lovell-Badge and Dr Steve Gamblin

optimum for progressing their own research, and if they think, in any way, that a consequence of the disruption or what is proposed elsewhere is going to be worse than that they may well move elsewhere. I think, in the junior levels of staV, there is such a turnover there anyway, in terms of post-doctoral training and graduate student training, that it may well not have an enormous impact on them. I think it will have an impact on recruiting them because the place will become known as being disturbed until it settles down again, but in terms of the individuals it is not as great an impact. In terms of the research support staV, who are invaluable, who are really something that make an Institute special, by comparison with other forms of research, I think there is a lot of unrest there and worry about their future. There is a lot of unrest when the MRC come out and speak to the staV and, instead of addressing the size of the future Institute, talk about the volume of the research in the future Institute. When volume was mentioned before, in the Forward Investment Strategy, it meant cutting the Institute by half, and so there is real concern among them and, frankly, I am very concerned that the Institute will finish up at anything like its size on another site. Q121 Dr Iddon: Can I tease a little more out of you about the impact that the move would have on the research. Do you think the research is going to be refocused, do you think you are going to lose areas of research possibly at risk now? Sir John Skehel: I think that is possible, with the talk about this translation. I would say that there is a willingness at Mill Hill to respond to the wishes of the community that there should be more early-stage translation linked with basic science. We are quite prepared to do that and we have made proposals to extend our eVorts in that regard in the documents that you have received. I think a bigger concern for me is the idea of preserving the Institute as a multidisciplinary, basic science centre, because all of the interactions that we have worldwide, including the translation interactions, are dependent upon us retaining that strong basic science base. Anything that disturbs that, for me, is detrimental. You talk in particular of disturbance during removal. There will not be anything like the disturbance that will happen in the Biological Services Department, because that will be an enormous task, to move the animals that we have to any new site, and it will be very costly also, I have to say, our estimates say. Q122 Dr Iddon: You have done a step-change modelling, of course, and given some costs to your best ability to that. Would you like to say something on that, relative to the costs of a potential move to either of the two preferred sites? Sir John Skehel: Yes. In absolute terms, it amounts to about 25 per cent of what would be required, in the estimates of what would be required in central London. The building, work we propose, focuses on a new outreach centre, which would be at the front of the building. We just want to take the opportunity to increase our interactions with the public and we would like to set ourselves up also as a national

conference centre. There has been a lot of demand for that in the past, we have considered it in the last couple of quinquennials, this might be an opportunity that we could get support for that. There is a lot of support locally for our interactions with the public and certainly that would help. We have a number of ways in which we want to develop the science, which involve extending the animal facilities and extending our imaging facilities, in particular, and that is something that is possible on the Mill Hill site because of its flexibility. We occupy about only 25 per cent of the area of the site, and really we think to give up that level of flexibility to expand science, to do diVerent sorts of science in the future, is a mistake on the part of the MRC. It is for that reason that we are not defying anybody, we are simply disagreeing. There is no point in us defying, we have no power in this, we simply disagree with the logic. Q123 Chairman: Suppose it happens that the view is a good one in London, financially and so on, what do you do then? Sir John Skehel: I think that is great. I think that it is the spirit of the Task Force to imagine that what would happen in central London is an all-singing, all-dancing, brand-new Institute, on a new site, with its independence, with the facilities that it requires, and really we have no objection to that, we are completely supportive of that. They, just as we are proposing this outreach centre in response to the possibility of getting support, they are looking to get support for a brand-new centre, to make a statement about medical research right now, and certainly we are not against that and never have been. Q124 Dr Iddon: I have one more question on costs. The Task Force have also looked at the costs of staying at Mill Hill and improving the buildings and work there, but you are disputing the consultants’ estimates. Could you give us just a brief reason why that dispute has occurred? Sir John Skehel: Not extensively, but we have a lot of experience of refurbishing and we refurbish to a very high standard, and as a consequence we recruit, and are still continuing to recruit, extremely good scientists. There was a mention made of the JIF standards. The JIF standards came out from the Joint Infrastructure Fund that gave out a lot of money for property to be developed in universities and they set certain standards, but the first thing in those standards was that the scientists’ wishes should be paramount. How our current laboratories, many of which have been refurbished recently, do not meet those standards is due largely to the fact that we do not want to use false ceilings, and false ceilings cover up all the pipes and stuV and have more attraction, but from the point of view of the work that we do, which requires fumigation of the laboratories, we do not want to do that, they would not fit the use of the laboratories. That is the only way that we know that our laboratories are not supposed to fit the JIF standards. We have had a discussion about that, it is still maintained as JIF standards because it is the standard recognised by

Ev 18 Science and Technology Committee: Evidence

1 December 2004 Sir John Skehel, Dr Robin Lovell-Badge and Dr Steve Gamblin

the industry, but the rest of the laboratories are completely as good, and certainly, as far as the scientists are concerned, completely appropriate for any research that they want to do. That was the major discussion. I should say that those particular consultants went through a range of options, from refurbishment all the way through to rebuilding. It was not clear to me that they were not potential contractors, but that is another matter. We have looked at those figures in detail and discussed with them, and we conclude that our refurbishment would be more cost-eVective, but it is only really because we have experience of doing it fairly frequently. Dr Gamblin: The base component of our stepchange option, which is to finish the refurbishment of the main building, 70 per cent of which is already complete, essentially is the same as the Ove Arup option for refurbishment. Sir John Skehel: I think a major point in this regard, which came up earlier in the day, is the idea that the building is going to need rebuilding at some stage. I imagine this place probably also needs rebuilding at some stage. Q125 Chairman: Never. It goes on for ever. Sir John Skehel: We get structural engineers to look at the Institute, and when they look at the actual quality of the building they are very enthusiastic, and when they look at the sort of refurbishment that

we do, recently, for example, an MRC group of consultants said that the refurbishment is adding value to the building all the time. It is not old, it does not require immediate building, it has a lifetime well beyond 30 years, so that sort of information is misinformation. Q126 Chairman: Can I say that the Committee has been very privileged by having two sets of very, very committed witnesses. As I said to the other group, you may have other things you would like to have said, and we have some questions and we will certainly write to you. This does not mean this is the end of the chance to say what you feel about the issue. I will finish with one, very simple question. From your point of view, what happens next? Sir John Skehel: We would like to think that the proposals we have put forward would be considered as a proper option, and we hope that the MRC reconsiders that. If that happens, all that we can ask then is that the comparison of the options, the Mill Hill option plus King’s and UC, is done fairly, and that is all we ask. Chairman: Can I say thank you very, very much for coming along, to both sets of witnesses, but thank you to you for coming, John. I have never ever sat through a meeting here, in my time as Chair, opening so dramatically, as it did. It almost threw me, but we managed to cover it because it is very important information. Thank you very much and thank you for the evidence you have given.

Science and Technology Committee: Evidence Ev 19

Monday 20 December 2004 Members present: Dr Ian Gibson, in the Chair Dr Evan Harris Dr Brian Iddon Mr Robert Key

Mr Tony McWalter Dr Desmond Turner

Witnesses: Professor Richard A Flavell, Chairman, Section of Immunobiology, Yale University School of Medicine (via telephone-link), Sir Paul Nurse, President, Rockefeller University, New York, (via videolink), examined. Q127 Chairman: Good afternoon. Thank you for joining us. The first question I want to ask you is about the words “without coercion” which were deleted from the statement that Professor Blakemore asked the Task Force to sign. Did you do that? Did you manipulate or seduce or whatever the words “without coercion” out of there? Why did you do that? Did you suggest anything else in that statement that might be changed, please? Paul? Sir Paul Nurse: This was a statement that was originally circulated a couple of months ago, I think around August, I cannot remember the dates. At the time I did not think it would be useful to sign such a statement. I suppose I felt that it was potentially provocative. Putting in words like “without coercion” seemed to me to be a statement that would be provocative, as if it was countering issues that were suggesting that there was coercion and I did not think that was very useful. That was what I thought in August. When it came back again a couple of weeks ago I read it very carefully because I think on the whole the Task Force operated reasonably well in extremely diYcult circumstances, but when it came to this question of coercion again it seemed to me too pointed and I really wanted to try and get the Mill Hill members of the Task Force on board so that we had a united front over the process. I felt that putting those words in might be diYcult for two reasons. One is that there was a lot of persuasion, there was lobbying maybe more than is usual for such meetings, certainly more than what I am used to. There is a fine line between strong persuasion and coercion. I felt it was more like strong persuasion. Others, particularly if you are an employee, might have thought otherwise. The second reason I had some concerns about it was that although I did not feel I had been subject to any coercion, I was aware of e-mails that were around that I think you have discussed already. I was not aware of the telephone conversation between Robin and Colin until I read about it. I was aware there were thoughts that some of the persuasion was very strong and so I felt unable to say with complete confidence what had happened elsewhere, where I had not been, although in the meetings and conversations I had I would put it as strong persuasion rather than coercion. I do not know if that deals with the question for you. Q128 Chairman: Was there anything else that was added with your recommendation or taken out by your recommendation, Paul, besides that?

Sir Paul Nurse: I talked about it with Dick Flavell who actually sent the e-mail back. He would probably be the better person to ask the question to. We removed “without coercion” and we took out another sentence a little further down which had been discussed more after the Task Force had been completed. I think it might be best to ask Dick about that because he was the one who removed the sentence. Q129 Chairman: Dick, what was it that you wanted to have removed besides the coercion phrase? Was there something else? Why do you think other people were not concerned about it, only you pair? Professor Flavell: I do not have the document in front of me now but I can certainly get that. There was a sentence which described a process. The process, as Paul just said, was something that happened afterwards and for that reason, because of the wording of the document, we both thought it was not appropriate for it to be in there. I would say there is nothing sinister behind that. It was just that we felt, independently and after we discussed it, that it was not a very good match for the document. Does that answer your question suYciently? I can try and find that e-mail. Q130 Chairman: We have the documentation that says it was about Mill Hill being a baseline. Was that the phraseology that you wanted to remove? Would you just confirm that for the record, please? Professor Flavell: That is correct. Thank you very much. The reason was that that was brought in later as part of the process and by the Council. Q131 Mr Key: Sir Paul, we were told in evidence from Dr Lovell-Badge that he received more than one phone call from Professor Blakemore late at night and at weekends and that he believed that other members of the Task Force had had this sort of pressure put on them. Did you receive any phone calls from Professor Blakemore exerting undue pressure? Sir Paul Nurse: I certainly received quite a few telephone calls from Colin. He certainly was trying to persuade me of certain opinions and situations. I would not say that I felt under enormous pressure, but then I am in a diVerent position from Robin Lovell-Badge as an outside person and not an employee. I certainly felt that there was a lot of persuasion going on, yes.

Ev 20 Science and Technology Committee: Evidence

20 December 2004

Professor Richard A Flavell and Sir Paul Nurse

Q132 Mr Key: Did that amount to coercion in your view? Sir Paul Nurse: Not coercion of me, no. Q133 Mr Key: Did you think this was regular lobbying that you might have expected if you were a member of the Task Force? Sir Paul Nurse: I would say it was just within limits but close to the limits in the sense that in my normal experience in such task forces I would not have so many one-to-one conversations outside such a Task Force. I think it was acceptable, but there was certainly a lot of it. Q134 Mr Key: Did you receive any similar sort of pressure or lobbying from the NIMR? Sir Paul Nurse: Not really, no. I was in conversation with the members of the Task Force. I had occasional conversations with John Skehel, who is the present Director, but they were more conversations in passing because I had lots to do with him wearing other hats as well. I would not say I was being persuaded of a particular position with my conversations with NIMR, no. Q135 Mr Key: Thank you, Sir Paul. Professor Flavell, did you feel any undue pressure or coercion from either the NIMR or from Colin Blakemore? Professor Flavell: I would say that I was lobbied in the same way that Paul mentioned by Colin on a couple of occasions. He sent me an e-mail once requesting my support for a particular position in July, I think, and we had certainly a phone call or two, one of which I remember was to ask me to sign that document that we have actually ultimately put together, the one that had the “without coercion” language in it. My perception of those contacts that Colin made is that they were not that of coercion, but obviously I am not an employee of the MRC and although I am not a peer of Colin (Colin is running a large organisation, I run a department of a university, etcetera), I felt that they were somewhat inappropriate, but I did not feel coerced. Q136 Mr Key: Were these concerns shared by members of the Task Force before the final meeting? Professor Flavell: Were what? Q137 Mr Key: The concerns about pressure, coercion and lobbying. Was there a general discussion by members of the Task Force before you came to your conclusions? Professor Flavell: No, there was not. These issues were not raised at any Task Force meeting. Mr Key: Thank you very much, gentlemen. Q138 Dr Turner: Paul, did you have the impression that anyone on the Task Force was running a hidden agenda or that there were conclusions to which the Committee was being surreptitiously steered? Sir Paul Nurse: I certainly did not at the beginning. I did begin to wonder a little bit when positions seemed to change somewhat between meetings. I remember one example where we discussed a split site alternative in central London. We had discussed

this in one of the earlier meetings and we completely rejected that as being a reasonable solution. At the next meeting it came back again on the agenda and I could not really understand it because in principle we had rejected it. It is clear that it had come up in discussions between the MRC and probably Imperial College that a split site should be reconsidered, but what I felt there was that the Task Force had considered it, we had rejected it really completely and yet it came back again. That made me feel that sometimes there was more going on outside the meeting than I would normally have expected. Once again, this is a complex issue and I could imagine people changing their minds and coming back again without necessarily that meaning there was a hidden agenda. I think towards the end and certainly after the Task Force had finished, when there was still some unfinished business unfortunately, I began to feel that there was a stronger agenda emerging that was more antagonistic to Mill Hill than I had noticed during the Task Force. At the very beginning, no, but one or two times during the meeting I thought there were lots of discussions going on about outside changing approaches. At the end I felt it became more antagonistic towards Mill Hill. Q139 Dr Turner: Professor Flavell, what was your view on it? Professor Flavell: I think that Paul summed it up very well there. It was the same perception. For example, the subject of the so-called “federated” option, which is the one to split up the Institute into a number of components, did appear in between two meetings and I did receive an e-mail soliciting my support for that, as I just mentioned. I would agree in general with Paul about this. However, I do not think I have any specific evidence of specific agendas. Q140 Dr Turner: Paul, how did you feel about the role of the Chairman of the Task Force? Was he a neutral, dispassionate Chairman acting as an equal member of the Task Force or did you feel that he was trying to guide the Task Force? Sir Paul Nurse: Colin came in to a very diYcult situation and certainly took it on freshly. I felt he had an open mind and was considering all the alternatives. I thought he chaired the meetings well and reasonably fairly. He did express his opinions but I felt that was okay. It was more these outside discussions which made me more concerned because I do not know what else was going on in the one-toone discussions. I always think in diYcult situations like this you are best having more group meetings because one-to-one conversations can be so easily misinterpreted. I thought he handled the meetings very well in quite diYcult circumstances. He did not interfere too much, he got the opinions that people had to say out there and I thought the actual meetings themselves were okay. What I cannot judge so much is what was going on outside those meetings. I knew things were going on because of all the e-mails and so on and that is diYcult for me to judge.

Science and Technology Committee: Evidence Ev 21

20 December 2004

Professor Richard A Flavell and Sir Paul Nurse

Q141 Dr Turner: Professor Flavell? We seem to have lost Professor Flavell. Paul, where did this notion of the federated or split site come back from? Who resurrected it? Sir Paul Nurse: Colin brought it back. Professor Flavell: I am sorry but I lost the connection there for about two or three minutes and so I did not hear approximately that much time. Perhaps somebody could repeat very briefly what was said. I apologise. Q142 Dr Turner: The question was how did you feel about the role of the Chairman of the Task Force? Was he neutral or was he trying to guide the committee in any given direction? Professor Flavell: Paul, would you mind summarising what you have said so far? Sir Paul Nurse: I said that I felt he chaired the meetings fairly. I felt that he expressed his opinions but that that was balanced. It was more diYcult for me to judge what was going on outside the meeting because I knew that there were lots of one-to-one meetings going on. I also said that I thought he had inherited a very diYcult situation and it needed a lot of managing. Can I also add in addition to what I have just said that I think it is very diYcult when one is a CEO of an organisation to chair a Task Force like this. It is easier if a Task Force reports to the CEO or the Chairman. In this particular instance obviously the Chairman had a double role and I think that is an extremely diYcult role to manage. Q143 Dr Turner: Could I come back to the question of where the federated site or the split site option got resurrected from. Who resurrected it? Paul? Sir Paul Nurse: It was Colin who brought that idea back to the Task Force. I think it had probably been resurrected from his discussions with Imperial College and the University College, that is my understanding. Q144 Dr Turner: Richard, would you agree with that? Professor Flavell: Yes. Colin sent me an e-mail. I have got it here. You probably have this because I think you were sent everything. It is a confidential email. It was sent on 28 March. I think Colin is saying in that e-mail his views on why he thinks that option really should be considered and what advantages it oVers. So from that point of view I suspect that Colin is at least one of the people that favoured that option at that time and therefore suggested that we discuss it again. Q145 Dr Turner: Thank you. Can I ask you both in turn whether you felt that all the Task Force members approached the issues with an open mind? Did you feel that the two NIMR members were there to represent the views of the staV and the Director? Sir Paul Nurse: Obviously you should ask that directly of them. Everybody on the Task Force comes with a diVerent position and with a diVerent background. I think the Mill Hill representatives found themselves in quite a diYcult position because I am sure they were seen by their colleagues at Mill

Hill as having a role there to support them. I thought that during the meetings they handled themselves very well. They provided lots of information and background. They did lots of work. They were partisan in the sense that they were very positive about Mill Hill, but other members on the Task Force were equally partisan about other positions, like the fact that the universities were suVering greatly and the institutes like Mill Hill were perhaps absorbing too much of the resources. People came with diVerent perspectives, but that is what you would expect. I thought the Task Force was put together in a way that would cover the range of views and opinions. Q146 Dr Turner: Richard Flavell? Professor Flavell: Both Robin and Steve Gamblin were very anxious, I think, and felt under a lot of pressure because of their two constituencies. They obviously had a strong advocacy position for their own institute which they, of course, were very fond of. That being said, however, they were very open to the various proposals that came forth. They supported the move to central London during discussions. They were open-minded about that. They raised what they thought were the pros and definitely the cons because they emphasised the fact that there was substantial translational research already ongoing and they felt that that functioned reasonably well and therefore that distance was not as big a problem as others thought. As I said, nonetheless, they went along with that and when it came around to voting for it at various times they were in favour of that. The workings of that, given the circumstance, were pretty good. It is not surprising that they would have certain positions given the fact that they have worked there for so long and they love the place, but they were pretty openminded for much of this discussion. Q147 Dr Harris: This is to Sir Paul and it is about the fifth meeting and the question of Mill Hill being either a full option or a fallback option. Do you recall saying after the presentation from Sir John Skehel at the final meeting words to the eVect, “It’s obvious that Mill Hill is not an option in the long run”, because more than one person has said that you said that? Sir Paul Nurse: I definitely said that and I am happy to say why. I think there were two factors. One is that I happen to think that a central London location would be best. I also think that if a proper central London location could not be found then Mill Hill has done very well in the past—and I think I have said this in the written evidence—and it should be seen as a fallback position, particularly because that would have stabilised the institute. I think it is really important to know that all of this has got a potential risk for destabilising that institute and I felt as the fallback position that was really very important. Why I felt that in the very long term Mill Hill would not be right was partly political. People have been taking pot-shots at isolated institutes for many years and I felt personally that for those political reasons it would be important to try and get

Ev 22 Science and Technology Committee: Evidence

20 December 2004

Professor Richard A Flavell and Sir Paul Nurse

the institute closer with a higher education institute so that the universities would not keep taking potshots at it. Q148 Dr Harris: Sir Paul, can I just interrupt you to say that it is not going to be my intention to ask you to justify your opinion as a distinguished scientist on the Task Force, and indeed it is arguable whether that is in the remit of our inquiry, so you do not need to go too far down that path. You having said that, as you agree you said, do you think that then was the basis for the exclusion of Mill Hill as an option, at least a full option, by the Task Force in the summary of the fifth meeting or by the Task Force by a majority by the end of the process? Sir Paul Nurse: I am not sure because I argued that it should be considered as a fallback position, and indeed with Dick we both argued that there should be an extra meeting to consider that because I felt we were getting dangerously close to destabilising the institute without having that as a fallback position. I also felt that Mill Hill could act in the way that it had done. I just did not think it was ideal and I felt politically, as I said, given the atmosphere and the culture, that it would be safer for the institute if it were more associated with an institute of higher education. Q149 Dr Harris: Did you make the argument for the fallback position at that fifth meeting? Sir Paul Nurse: This is where the Task Force went wrong and this is where we really required an extra meeting, and I think it was a big mistake for us not to have one. We never considered what would happen if London did not come up with adequate facilities and resources. We thought—and this was, I think, universal across the committee—that a central London site was best. What we did not consider was what would happen if we could only find half a site or the money was not available That was a big error. We should have considered that because if central London was not able to come up with a good site then Mill Hill should have been kept going for the medium term, 15, 20 years even, until a central London site was found. I strongly believed that, and wanted to argue it. We never had the opportunity to do it because we never had an extra meeting to consider it. In the meeting you are talking about we did not consider that option. Q150 Dr Harris: Professor Flavell? Professor Flavell: At that meeting there were a lot of issues raised, of course. One was the issue of Paul making that statement. I also remember him saying that. It is possible that it was influential. One of the things that is worth remembering is that during the course of the Task Force meeting there was a straw vote held halfway through it, as I said, and a majority of the people that were there really gave a pretty equivalent assessment of Mill Hill as an option compared with the two central London options. Paul said his position. My position was the same as Paul’s, that I favoured a central London option but we two, just as several others there, and I think it was five of the seven people there, said that

we felt that a Mill Hill option was certainly viable. Again, this was not an oYcial vote. This was a straw vote held as part of the process and it was stimulated by the consultants. The error that was made—and it was just a practical problem—was that we simply ran out of time to consider what to do following the discussion that really said the two central London options are the favoured positions, but then, as I said, we did not have that conversation about, “So then what are we going to do if it does not work out?”. This is the position that Paul and I both felt the same about, which is that that should be Mill Hill for the arguments he has raised to you already. That is the process end of it. Is that clear? Q151 Dr Harris: Yes. If I can ask a summary question on that issue, and it relates to the fifth meeting and Sir Paul has already answered this, was it your impression that there was a consensus or majority at the fifth meeting of the Task Force for Mill Hill to remain either as a fallback or an active third option and, if not, was that simply because it was not discussed rather than that it had been rejected? Professor Flavell: There was a majority position at this straw vote that I have just mentioned that said that that was the case, that it should be considered. Paul, you can correct me if I am wrong, but I do not think it was discussed in the sense of should it be a full option or should it be a fallback option at that moment. As I said, the way the meeting progressed, when we had come back and formulated this end conclusion that the two London options would be the favoured ones, we did not come back and revisit that issue. That was an error on all our parts, for which I am happy to accept responsibility like the rest of them. Q152 Dr Harris: What do you think were the reasons why the consensus apparently achieved at the final meeting, because there was an agreed form of words produced as I understand it before the meeting ended, broke down? Professor Flavell: My reading of that is because we had not considered that “what if?” scenario, and therefore what was left hanging was, “If this all does not work out for whatever reasons, be they cost, governance, etc, what do we do?” Because that had not been considered and many of us—and I would be one—felt that that should be in there, I think that is why the consensus suVered. Q153 Dr Harris: Sir Paul? Sir Paul Nurse: I agree with Dick there. I felt we were remiss, as I said, in that we did not consider what would happen if a central London site was not up to scratch. There were several reasons why that might not have been. The reason we did not go down that route, incidentally, was that we were positive about the central London site in a theoretical way, that is, if it all worked. The consensus broke down, I believe, because we did not revisit this position. When it became clear that if the central London site did not work this then put the whole institute at threat because then the Task Force had not come up with

Science and Technology Committee: Evidence Ev 23

20 December 2004

Professor Richard A Flavell and Sir Paul Nurse

that solution. I realised, and I think Dick (because we spoke about it) also thought strongly, that this was a dangerous situation and we needed to have an extra meeting to discuss that item, even if it was after the Task Force had finished, because what we saw was that the whole thing would unravel, the consensus would unravel, and what would also happen was that the people at Mill Hill would become extremely nervous and start looking for other jobs and so on, and I thought it was really important to try and avoid that. Unfortunately, that consensus has unravelled and we as a Task Force have to take responsibility, as Dick has quite rightly said, for not having dealt with it properly at that meeting in dealing with the fallback and then not having another meeting to pick up that lack. Q154 Dr Harris: Was that failure or omission at the fifth meeting to pin this down, this question of Mill Hill as either a fallback or a final option, a careless omission or do you think it was a deliberate omission with a purpose in order to that it could be then finessed in the final report to exclude it? Sir Paul Nurse: It was certainly careless on my part and I have really been kicking myself ever since then that I did not bring it up. I know I had to leave suddenly and so I was not concentrating too well. I can certainly say that for my part it was careless and I had no other ulterior motive. Q155 Dr Harris: Professor Flavell on that question? Professor Flavell: Yes, I can give you my own position there and then. I remember that going into this meeting we had felt that it was going to be very diYcult to get a consensus position, and I think people were so excited on the one hand that consensus had been reached and, secondly, we basically were out of time because Paul had to leave to catch a plane, I think. From my point of view it was really an omission which I regret and I accept responsibility for. I do not have any evidence that there was an agenda on anybody else’s part. It has never been declared to me but I do not have any evidence that there was not one, of course. I have no knowledge of it and so it would not be appropriate of me to suggest that. Q156 Dr Iddon: I want to address Sir Paul first with this question. It is really underscoring, Sir Paul, some of the answers you have already given. I want to ask were you satisfied that you fully considered all the options available for Mill Hill? My understanding is that the three options were either Mill Hill or the two London sites and that you favoured the two London sites. Is that correct? Sir Paul Nurse: It is correct. Q157 Dr Iddon: Is that also the opinion of Professor Flavell? Professor Flavell: Yes, that is absolutely correct. Q158 Dr Iddon: Did the Task Force, Sir Paul, consider the prospect of the redevelopment of Mill Hill in as much detail as it considered the other two

options? It sounds from your previous answers as if the answer to that is, “Possibly no”. Could I just underscore that? Sir Paul Nurse: I think, to be honest, we did consider it reasonably carefully. The focus did turn to central London for reasons to do with transport and contacts and semi-permeability with the higher education institutes, so we shifted from Mill Hill to central London fairly quickly, but I do think Mill Hill was considered as an option in a reasonable way. What we did not do, and I keep repeating that, of course, is consider it as a back-up option if central London did not work. I do think we considered it reasonably fairly. Q159 Dr Iddon: Professor Flavell, is that your opinion? Professor Flavell: I would put it slightly diVerently. I agree with Paul on most fronts. I think the one area in which we did not adequately consider the Mill Hill option was the area of cost. We did consider cost but the Mill Hill option provides a variety of cost scenarios and I do not think we really lined them up and said, “If, for example, the central London case falters on cost then we could go in this direction or that direction with the Mill Hill option”. I think that was a mistake. Q160 Dr Iddon: I have one final question to put to both of you. Do you think that the Task Force should have been able to consider the Mill Hill Step Change Option which has been produced now or is it the job of the MRC to consider it? Sir Paul Nurse: The Task Force was set up with a prescribed role. It was advising the MRC. It is the MRC whose job it is to sort all of this out, so it is up to the MRC what they do. You could say that it is such a politically complicated issue that it might be politically expedient to involve the Task Force more in the future. I think that should be given consideration because everything is turning into such a mess, but constitutionally, in how it was set up, the Task Force has essentially done its business and it is now up to the MRC. I think the MRC could reconvene the Task Force to try and see whether we could find a way through it but that would be more a political consideration than anything that it would absolutely have to do. Q161 Dr Iddon: Professor Flavell, on the Step Change Option please? Professor Flavell: Could you please define “the Step Change Option” so I make sure I am responding to the right question? Q162 Dr Iddon: My understanding is that Mill Hill have put a fairly substantial bid together, which they call the Step Change Option, which they would like to see considered with the two London options. Possibly you are not aware of it; I do not know. Professor Flavell: I do not know the particular term. There have been several options proposed for Mill Hill of various costs. Let us put that aside for the moment Give me your question again and I will answer it.

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Q163 Dr Iddon: Do you think that the Task Force should have been able to consider the Mill Hill Step Change Option now produced, or is that better left to the MRC Council? Professor Flavell: I think that it would benefit the Council greatly to utilise the Task Force. I think it would be in its interests to do that because it is a pretty unbiased group. I think the workings of the Task Force have shown it to be able to function, to develop consensus, starting with a group of people who had very diVerent positions. We had people in the beginning who wanted to close Mill Hill down, like Steve Tomlinson, who was a very flexible person. He developed diVerent views when he heard the evidence, so I think it would be of substantial benefit to the Council to do that, but, of course, that is their decision. I would completely stand by any decision they make on that point. Q164 Mr McWalter: Professor Flavell, you have just referred to some matters to do with costs. Steve Gamblin said that the likely financial implications of the two central London options that appeared in the final Task Force report were only available to the Task Force a matter of days before the completion deadline and were added to the report rather than being part of the decision-making process. Would you agree that the Task Force did not give full consideration to the financial implications of the two London bids before reaching a decision to exclude Mill Hill as an option? Professor Flavell: I think that is true for many reasons. I am sure we do not really know the cost now of the central London options because they are complex, and I do not think we had suYcient information and so therefore cost was not suYciently considered by us in our deliberations. That is at least my opinion. It was considered so it is not that there was no discussion about it, but I do not think we did an adequate job of doing that. Q165 Mr McWalter: Professor Nurse? Sir Paul Nurse: We did not do a proper job on costings, nor could we have done, to be quite honest. Both costings to my knowledge are not yet together. My view on the costing was that in the long run, over 50–70 years, the diVerences in costs between Mill Hill and central London were not going to be very diVerent, and so we should be driven more by the science and by where better things could be achieved. I also thought that if there was a strong vision, which I think there is, the money would be found because we had many years in which to find it, so for me the costs became somewhat less important. We did not discuss them in detail. It is very diYcult because there is a lot of chalk and cheese you have to compare here. Mill Hill is diVerent from central London in how it would be set up. It could even take many months from now before we are fully aware of the costs, but there can be too much focus on the building costs. When you spread it over 50 years it becomes much less important. I kept emphasising that during the Task Force, that this was a decision for 50 years and we should not be influenced too much by the short term costs of building.

Mr McWalter: Thank you, Chairman. Q166 Dr Harris: I want to go back to the question asked by Robert Key about the role of the Chairman because some comment was made about whether it was appropriate for the Chairman to be on the Task Force and I think that was a decision the Task Force was presented with by the Council and that he was involved in exerting some pressure, although neither of you described it as coercion. Looking at it as objectively as you can, do you consider in retrospect the actions he took to be unreasonable because too much emotion and time was invested or would you say that as a Chief Executive of a large organisation who was under pressure on a contentious issue it was appropriate to work behind the scenes to try and get consensus, even if that meant putting pressure on? Sir Paul Nurse: We put Colin in a very diYcult position as both CEO and Chairman of the Task Force. It was very diYcult for him to act in both roles. I did not realise this at the beginning but as it went forward I really felt sorry for the position he had. I have learnt something from this and that is that I think in the future where one has a major investigation of this sort probably the CEO should be kept separate and then the Task Force could report to the CEO, otherwise it is a bit of a mixture of roles. I think Colin was put in a very diYcult position and it probably was not ideal, but I do not think anybody really fully realised that when the whole thing was set up. Q167 Dr Harris: Professor Flavell, do you think anyone could have done a better or diVerent job in that position? Professor Flavell: I think in many ways Colin did a very good job. He started the process with an open mind. He had a skilful handling of the meetings with regard to the development of consensus. It was a terribly diYcult job. I told him after the event, which is not very useful, that I thought it would have been better had he not been Chairman, but he pointed out to me that that was in fact determined by the Council prior to all of these things, so that was really not a negotiable item. I think he should have realised— and this is easy to say at a distance perhaps and not so easy when you are in the midst of it—that when you are a Chief Executive of an organisation and you are talking to one of your staV scientists it is very much a non-equivalent position and that can be extremely intimidating. I do not think I ever felt intimidated by him but I would imagine that others may well have done because he is a strong advocate in certain cases. In many ways, as I said, I think he did a good job and, given the circumstances, for much of the process I felt quite satisfied with him. Q168 Dr Harris: You talked about sympathy. Do you have sympathy with Dr Lovell-Badge and Dr Gamblin because it is unusual for staV to be on a Task Force of this stature? Clearly it could be argued they are in a diYcult position because they had 12 other or so heads of divisions expecting them to deliver something that they could live with and a Director who is not backwards in coming forwards

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with views that are probably expressed quite clearly. Do you have sympathy with their position? Do you think that might explain—and it is up to you to agree this or not—the nature and timing of e-mail correspondence that kept re-opening something where there was a striving for consensus prior to those e-mails? Professor Flavell: Just as Colin was in a diYcult position, I think Steve Gamblin and Robin were in an impossible position. They were being squeezed from both directions. I am sure they had pressure from their colleagues in the sense that there was the expectation that they were to present their views and they were getting pressure from Colin in the other direction. I think they were incredibly courageous raising some of these issues about the process about which they were uncomfortable with their Chief Executive. I do not know if I would have had the courage to do it. I admire them very much for what they did. I think they did it with the best of intentions. I do not think there is anything malicious about what they have done. I am sure you will have seen the documentation. There was an issue about emails and how there was an attempt to modify the text of the document and there was a deadline and there were some e-mails that were received a minute or two after the deadline and so on. I think we would have been wise as a Task Force not to have worried so much about the deadline in order to have a fair process covered. That is a mistake again we all accept responsibility for. I could have said something and I did not. There were some mistakes on all sides. Q169 Dr Harris: Sir Paul? Sir Paul Nurse: I think that they did have a diYcult job. I know that they kept themselves away from all the discussions going on in Mill Hill, that is what they told me, so that they could keep some sort of level of independence, but they were under a lot of pressure. We did reach a consensus. The tragedy here is that I think we could have sorted all of this, I really believe it. They had signed up to the consensus and I think it has unravelled because we could not go one step further. I think they did a very good job in the circumstances. They have my sympathy just as Colin does as well. Q170 Dr Turner: I would like to ask both of you, starting with Paul, about the processes. You have both hinted that the processes of the Task Force were not perfect. I would like your view on that. No one has said anything yet about the role of the consultants serving the Task Force and the presentation to the Council. Can you comment on those? Sir Paul Nurse: I felt the consultants did a reasonable job. It is very consultants’ speak of course, but I thought they did a reasonable job and I have no criticism of them. As regards the Council, I have had nothing to do with that, Dick can comment on it as he presented to Council. Part of the discussions went on with Dick there and part of it without Dick being there, so we do not have a full view of what happened there. I have had very little

to do with the Council over this matter so I cannot comment on that. With respect to the process, we did follow the process in the sense of we had certain deadlines and we fitted it into those. I do think that had there been a bit more flexibility, as Dick has just hinted, particularly if we had had that extra meeting, we may have been able to sort this whole thing out before it unravelled and I think it was a mistake not to go down that line because we could have possibly generated another consensus over the fall-back position as well. Although oYcially the process was followed, I do think that with greater flexibility we could have come to a better solution. Q171 Dr Turner: Richard? Professor Flavell: I agree with Paul on what he said earlier about the tragic outcome given the fact that at the fifth meeting we were very close. I did say we should have a sixth meeting and we did not do it and I think that was a mistake. The role of the consultants was quite essential and I think it was Colin who proposed it. He was very democratic about asking were we all in agreement about that and everyone was happy with it. They did an outstanding job. There is no way that we would have finished that process in those five meetings without that assistance. It would have been impossible just because of the extraordinary deadline. Q172 Dr Turner: Do you think it was sensible to conduct the final discussions not in the whole Task Force but in a whole series of bilateral discussions on the telephone, via e-mail and so on without all the members of the Task Force being able to participate? Do you think this was satisfactory? How many bilateral phone calls were there? Professor Flavell: There were lots of these things and that is why I felt we should have a meeting, because it certainly was not time eYcient with all of this twoperson communication. In retrospect I feel even stronger that we should have had that meeting. Q173 Dr Turner: Paul? Sir Paul Nurse: I do too. We could have talked a bit more about the finances. We could have talked about the fall-back options. Having all these bilateral discussions, one-to-ones, is a real formula for confusion and for misunderstanding. I think in a complex issue like this we are best having mainly the business going on in the meeting itself. When you have to mop up with lots of one-to-one conversations there really is just too much confusion that can arise from that. I think an extra meeting could have sorted this all out. Professor Flavell: There was at least one conference call in which a large number of us were present, I think possibly one person was not there, in which the fall-back option was discussed extensively, but we could not reach a consensus at that meeting. That was pretty soon after the fifth meeting. I did not answer you about the issue of the presentation to Council and the reason is because I was not quite sure what you were asking. If you want me to say something perhaps you could clarify that. If not, that is absolutely fine.

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Q174 Dr Turner: It rather sounds as if you are both saying that the process started to break down after the fifth meeting. Would you agree with that? Professor Flavell: Yes. Sir Paul Nurse: Yes, it began to break down and that is why we needed another meeting, to rebuild consensus. Q175 Dr Turner: Did you think that the pressure to produce a final report to the MRC Council by 29 July was unhelpful? Did that bias the outcome? Sir Paul Nurse: It was unhelpful. We knew we had to be there. It was a very tough deadline. I think we should have put it oV and said that we could not deliver and we needed an extra meeting. I think that would have been a better outcome. Q176 Dr Turner: Do you think there were any unreasonable attempts by Task Force members to unstitch a consensus once you had got one? Sir Paul Nurse: I think we have seen, and you have seen in your earlier meeting, that there is obviously now a lot of bitterness and acrimony around. I think that is a tragedy because I think we were very close to a reasonable solution and we could have got there. I think it has been unstitched now and as a consequence it will be more diYcult to stitch it together, but because of the importance of the National Institute of Medical Research in the UK medical research portfolio it is absolutely essential that we do stitch it back together again. We have a responsibility for making this work. This is a tragedy and we seriously need to rebuild consensus and stitch things back together. I am afraid it will be more diYcult now than it would have been had we been able to do it in July. Q177 Dr Iddon: Sir Paul, have you any advice to give the Science and Technology Select Committee or the MRC Council on how best to stitch it back together now or do you think the Council will have to proceed on the evidence that you have already given them? Sir Paul Nurse: It is very diYcult for me to advise like this. I will state a couple of things, if I may. As I have just said, this is a very important issue. This Institute is a good Institute and it is very important for biomedical research in the UK, as you have seen from its international reputation. It has been a very diYcult issue to handle. I personally have always thought that if Mill Hill was the fall-back position then in fact these problems would go away because I think the central London site does have strong things going for it and the Task Force unanimously agreed it, including the two Mill Hill representatives. I think their concerns were at the time what happens if it goes wrong. If it goes wrong I think Mill Hill is a viable option. I personally would strongly advise that this Task Force be got together again, that we try and build a consensus, that we have some mediator to get these diVerent groups back together again because without it, as I said, we are walking into a tragedy here.

Q178 Dr Iddon: Professor Flavell? Professor Flavell: Could I add something there? Q179 Dr Iddon: I was going to ask you to do that. Professor Flavell: I completely agree with Paul. I was invited to present to Council and I really presented the arguments which I had solicited in part on Colin’s request from Steve Gamblin so I could adequately present the Mill Hill representatives’ views. I think that it is the absence of consideration of that which has caused all the trouble. The problem that needs fixing is to deal with that, to come up with a view on what should be done if these other options falter. I think explicit consideration of the Mill Hill option should be done and I think it would be best done by a more independent body than the Council because, of course, they are probably now under pressure and considered, at least in some quarters, to be biased. I am not referring to myself here. That is the most important issue and I think it would benefit Council enormously to deal with that issue, using an independent entity like the Task Force, for example. Q180 Dr Harris: There has been some conversation about the unravelling of the consensus that was reached at various meetings. What I could not understand at the beginning of this, if forms of words were agreed at the end of a meeting, like on 21 June, and then at the end of two conference calls on, I think, the 12 and the 19, that that was a sensible way forward, to get agreement there, how on each of those three occasions it appeared to have come apart. I see here an e-mail—and I have read through them and I do not know if you both have, but there are e-mails on 12 July, for example, from Colin Blakemore—saying, “Dear All, Attached is a short paragraph that we drafted and agreed during the conference call that has just ended. Steven Robbins said they would communicate this to the heads of divisions and ask them to remove the reference to me on the NIMR website, so I am grateful to them for that”. Do you think that e-mail is wrong in that there was not a consensus paragraph agreed at that conference call on 12 July, and indeed again on 19 July, or was it in due course unstitched by people who could not stick, for whatever reason, to what they had said at that meeting or conference call? Sir Paul Nurse: Evan, I cannot remember the precise details of the e-mail so I will answer in generalities if you do not mind. We did build consensus. What went wrong was that when it was realised that if central London could not deliver, because of the uncertainty around the Mill Hill site this would mean that Mill Hill might be closed with all the subsequent consequences. That led to a complete polarisation of the subsequent discussions and debate. That was utterly predictable given that we did not—and that was the problem with the Task Force—deal with the fallback position. I think the consensus unravelled because of the threat over the horizon. If we had dealt with that threat I do not think it would have happened.

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Professor Richard A Flavell and Sir Paul Nurse

Q181 Dr Harris: The point I am making is that the conference calls I am talking about deal with the setting out of the divergence, so it is the paragraph that says, “Some on the Task Force feel X and some on the Task Force feel Y”. I must correct myself: it was 15 July, the second conference call, when an even shorter e-mail says at 14.35, number 191, “Here is the new version of the little section on views”— that is the disparate views—“about the Mill Hill site just agreed during the conference call. Colin”, and then that blew apart later on in e-mails and I am just wondering whether either of you can work out why, with experienced people on this Task Force, three assumed agreed positions that were confirmed after the event and agreed at the meeting or the conference call fell apart within a few days. Sir Paul Nurse: I cannot. I think it fell apart for the reasons I just said, that the logic went through that if central London does not work then the National Institute for Medical Research may be closed. I think that is why it fell apart. Q182 Dr Harris: Professor Flavell? Professor Flavell: Paul is exactly right. What happened was that we had a consensus at the meeting followed by a discussion on the Mill Hill fallback issue. The fact that no position could be formulated on that made it, I am sure to the Mill Hill representatives, implicit that if the central London option were not successful the institute would be closed and, of course, that led to a substantial hardening of positions, for understandable reasons, because they felt that that would be a disastrous outcome. I cannot speak for Paul, of course, but I would have felt that that would have been the wrong outcome as well. Paul probably would feel the same way and he should comment himself. Q183 Dr Harris: I am looking at my colleagues and I have read through this e-mail and I do not see any discussion of Mill Hill closing. I see an e-mail from RAF, which I think is Professor Flavell, on 15 July at 18 minutes past 7.00 pm that says, “Looks okay to me re the revised paragraph”, and so it seemed that at that point you, as someone who is sensitive to this issue about the future of Mill Hill, were happy and it is followed by one from Professor Davies as well. I am looking for, if there is one, an alternative explanation as to why, despite you being happy and certainly no e-mail from Professor Nurse saying he was unhappy with any of those agreed paragraphs, it could not be made to stick. Professor Flavell: As you will appreciate, I do not have any of the e-mails in front of me. There are hundreds of them so I do not have any individual one. That date you were referring to—where does it sit with regard to the fifth meeting and these followup phone calls? Dr Harris: It is an e-mail sent after the second conference call after the fifth meeting where a paragraph was proposed coming out of the meeting that talks about “those who favour three site options recommend a straight comparison between proposals on a scientific value-for-money basis while the others suggest that if negotiations with UCL and

KCL fail to produce an acceptable solution the Council should consult the Task Force again”. I know it is hard for you to remember the detail. I feel I know it better having read this over the weekend. That is the paragraph we are talking about. Q184 Chairman: Can I interject? If you cannot remember this e-mail and we are just skating around it, would you say so? You have not got the details in front of you. Does that make a diVerence to your answers, because we can write to you about it? Professor Flavell: Yes. That may be better. This is an important issue we are trying to deal with and I do not want to make an oV-the-cuV answer. I appreciate your bringing it up; it is a good point, but I would rather try and do it better. Sir Paul Nurse: I actually think it is more straightforward. It is what I said before. This whole thing unravelled because it suddenly looked as if the whole Mill Hill institute, the National Institute of Medical Research, was under threat. Because it was not going to be considered as a fallback option it was thought that meant as an agenda that it was going to be closed. It is as simple as that. Q185 Mr McWalter: It looks from the e-mails as if Professor Blakemore really did not want to discuss the Mill Hill option because he thought that would lose momentum behind the drive towards central London. Is that not right? Sir Paul Nurse: I cannot speak for Colin. You should ask him that directly, of course. We all were enthusiastic about central London. He might have thought continuing the debate about Mill Hill was a distraction. My concerns were more tactical to keep everything together, to keep them secure, and also that if the central London site did not work we would have some way of keeping these 700 or 800 scientists together. Q186 Mr McWalter: Professor Flavell? Professor Flavell: While you were talking I was thinking about that meeting. I think what was going on in that one case was that there was enormous diYculty in getting a position that people could agree with and Paul came up with a good suggestion, which was a compromise suggestion, on consultation of the Task Force. I think that is actually what had happened. I am sorry: I missed the detail of your question. I was just trying to reconstruct what had just been asked. Q187 Mr McWalter: I said that Professor Blakemore really did not want Mill Hill discussed in any detail to retain the site because he thought that would lose momentum from the drive to relocate in central London. Professor Flavell: I do not think I can really answer that. That is a question that Colin has to answer himself. Q188 Chairman: Let me just finish this hearing oV, this stage of it, by asking you this. You have made some suggestions almost as if you would like to start all over again. I am not sure that is what you are

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saying but it sounded a bit like that. Do you feel that there are time constraints in making this decision? What is urgent about it? What diVerence would it make to science in Britain rather than making sure that the whole population who is interested in this seeing that there has been a fair and just process, looking at the whole thing? How would you feel about that? What would you do in this situation it the future and given the time constraints? Sir Paul Nurse: I think that we have to build up a working relationship between the staV at Mill Hill and the MRC administration. I think there is a breakdown of trust there, probably on both sides, and without a rebuilding of that trust we are not going to make much progress. Rebuilding of trust could be achieved if the issue of the fallback position for Mill Hill could be re-opened and re-discussed either by Council itself directly or by a new body or by the Task Force. I think that is the key issue that needs to be dealt with because if the central London sites do not deliver then if Mill Hill could be guaranteed as a site I think this problem would go away. First of all we need trust-building. Secondly, we need to have a process that will reconsider this fallback position and, thirdly, we have to get into discussions and try and deliver.

Q189 Chairman: Professor Flavell, are there any time constraints in your opinion? Is it worth taking a long time to recreate this process, as Professor Nurse has indicated? Professor Flavell: I think it would be worthwhile. I do not think the amount of time would be astronomical anyway to resolve the issue. I do not think there is anything which is so time sensitive, with the proviso that I do not know the details of cost, budgeting, etc, for capital expenditure, but it would seem to me that it would be feasible to do and I think the most time-eYcient way would be to use the Task Force. Let me emphasise I am not pushing for that. Of course, the decision needs to be made by, I guess, the MRC Council. I am totally happy with them deciding that. That is what I would do if I were in that position. Chairman: Thank you. That is fairly clear. Thank you very much, Paul. Thank you very much, Dick. We will see you again some time over this side of the big pond. Happy days over Christmas and New Year. Not too much eggnog, I fear. Professor Flavell: Same to you all. Sir Paul Nurse: Happy Christmas everybody. I will be back in Oxford in two days.

Science and Technology Committee: Evidence Ev 29

Monday 10 January 2005 Members present: Dr Ian Gibson, in the Chair Dr Evan Harris Mr Robert Key

Dr Desmond Turner

Witnesses: Professor Alan North, Vice-President and Dean, Faculty of Life Sciences, University of Manchester and Professor Nancy Rothwell, MRC Research Professor, Vice-President for Research, Faculty of Life Sciences, University of Manchester, examined. Q190 Chairman: Welcome to you all to your friendly Select Committee in this friendly subject! Alan North and Nancy Rothwell, thank you very much for taking the time to come out here today to help us with our inquiry into NIMR and the process that has been going on there. Can I wish you all the best in the New Year as well, and I am sure the one thing that unites us all is British science and technology—much to do, and I am sure that together we are going to do that. So in that spirit let me ask either Alan or Nancy to start oV by answering my first question: why all these diYculties and antagonisms, do you think? Why have they developed? What have been the key problems that have caused this to happen, in your opinion? Professor Rothwell: I was part of the Forward Investment Strategy Committee but have not been part of the Task Force, where I think you are referring to the diYculties? Q191 Chairman: Did the trouble start with FIS or did it start with the Task Force, or both? Professor Rothwell: Possibly both. It is diYcult for me to comment on anything relating to the Task Force. Q192 Chairman: You are here to answer for FIS. Professor Rothwell: I think it is fair to say that this is a diYcult and very sensitive issue. It was always going to be. I do not know how you can avoid considering the future of an Institute as anything less than very serious, very important and potentially very sensitive. I think that is unavoidable. Q193 Chairman: Do you think that there has been an impression all along that minds have been made up on this matter? That FIS was set up to establish what a lot of people thought had to happen anyway, in terms of your report and so on being approved before it went through consultation, et cetera? That is what is alleged; is that true, do you think? Professor Rothwell: It is absolutely not true. Q194 Chairman: Then tell us what has happened, please. Professor Rothwell: I have seen those allegations. I saw no evidence that any member of FIS had any preformed opinion at the outset. Secondly, you need to remember that this was a draft for

consultation and it was not a recommendation or a decision, and indeed any suggestion that I have heard that Council had made up its mind is clearly flawed given that Council then took on the Task Force. So if it had made up its mind then the outcome would now be that NIMR would be moving to Cambridge, so obviously that is not the case. I think Council had an open mind, I think FIS had an open mind. I cannot speak for Task Force but colleagues I know I think had an open mind. They tried to face a very diYcult and challenging issue to the best of their ability. Q195 Chairman: Did the NIMR staV engage with this FIS enterprise and examination, and if they did not, for example, would that have caused a lot of trouble, do you think? Would that set the hares running and so on? Or do you think that they were well consulted and knew exactly what was going on? Professor Rothwell: I think that they were consulted towards the end of the process. Again, a diYcult decision that we considered very carefully—would it be better to leak things out and ideas being formed before a draft consultation had been put out? I think it would not actually; I thought so at the time and I maintain that view. It is very diYcult to make that decision. To start to talk about say, “We wondered about this, we will know now for the next meeting; we wondered about that,” I think probably would have been even more damaging. Professor North: Can I just add that the Directors of the four Institutes that were being considered under the Forward Investment Strategy were consulted at the very beginning of the operation and they came and met with the Forward Investment Strategy group, I think at its third meeting, and argued their presentation. So the directors of the Institutes were certainly involved with what was going on. Q196 Chairman: But did the MRC Council not endorse your proposals for the consultation exercise? Professor North: The MRC Council endorsed the draft for consultation on 4 April and that went to a period of consultation for the next six or seven weeks. Then at the Council meeting subsequent to that we looked at the responses to the consultation and it was clear that there were a lot of people who were not content with the suggestion that had been

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made in that draft, and that is when Council then decided to look at the matter further and put in place the Task Force. Q197 Chairman: Were there accusations running around then that minds had been made up and suspicions were running free? Professor North: I was never accused by anyone of having my mind made up. I do not think there were those accusations. Q198 Chairman: Can you perceive that the workers at NIMR thought that? Professor North: I visited NIMR at about that time and certainly there did seem to be a perception around that minds had been made up, but, in fact, I had a full and forthright discussion with colleagues at NIMR at that time. In fact we were there together at that meeting. Professor Rothwell: I was there on that visit and I would endorse that, that there was some sense of feeling that minds had been made up and we did the best we could to assure them that our minds had not been made up at any stage and this was still a draft consultation, as it was said. Q199 Chairman: Tell me a little more, please, if you would, about the interaction with the Director of NIMR. Did he see the report before it was floated around? What discussion was there with him about Addenbrooke’s movements and so on? Or was it carte blanche as far as the FIS Committee was concerned—it did not really matter? Professor North: None of the Directors were members of the Forward Investment Strategy group and I think that is probably appropriate—it was a fairly small group to draw up suggestions. The draft for consultation was passed, I think, to the Directors at the time when it was released for consultation. Professor Rothwell: Just before it was released. Professor North: I think probably a day or two before. Q200 Chairman: What happened after that? What did the Directors say or do? Professor Rothwell: Nothing to us. Q201 Chairman: Nothing was said or done? Professor Rothwell: I had no direct interactions with the Director. Q202 Chairman: So do you think that there was then constructive engagement with the NIMR staV; is that your conclusion, looking back? Or would you do it diVerently if you had to do it again, without thinking about the animosities? Professor Rothwell: There is a tendency to think you would do it diVerently and I have thought this through quite a lot. I am not quite sure how you could do it diVerently because the alternative is then to engage throughout the process. I still think that might have been even more destabilising. It is possible that there might have been a better outcome with a slightly diVerent approach or an

earlier approach. That is very diYcult to say and it is very easy to be wise in hindsight. But I still come back to the point that I think that when a group is looking at a diYcult issue, trying to engage NIMR staV at all stages through it, I do not know if it would have been any better or not. I am not convinced it would. Professor North: It may be the diYculty would have been that we would have had to engage the Directors of all four Institutes because all four Institutes were being considered by the Forward Investment Strategy. Q203 Chairman: Was that discussed at any point in your deliberations on the Committee? Professor Rothwell: I think we did talk about involving them more. The other issue then is whether the engagement is just with the Director or with all of the 700 staV because the Director had been passing all the information on to the staV— that is his choice, of course, as Director, and he obviously thought that was his best course of action. But we would then be trying to engage with 700 staV at NIMR and the many hundreds at the other Institutes and, again, I am not at all convinced that that would have been the right way to do it. Q204 Dr Turner: Professor Rothwell, you said eVectively that you started out with an open mind and that the Committee did not have preconceptions, but that is a little diYcult given that the MRC had just published its 10 Year Vision for the Future. That surely must have had some influence on your thinking? Professor Rothwell: That shaped our general thinking about biology. We had the very strong preconceived idea that we had to look at what was best for the future for NIMR. We were not thinking of five or even 10 years, actually, we were looking ahead to 20, 25 and 30 years, and of course driving that was a lot of thinking about biology and how biology has changed and how it is likely to change in the next 10 years. What we did not have a preconceived idea about was whether NIMR should move, where it should move, what size it should be, how it should be shaped, and I think that the FIS, even at the end of its recommendations, made a suggestion and made some general suggestions but even then did not have detailed views. Q205 Dr Turner: Having said that, you evolved a template of what you thought the future pattern of research should look like, and you could almost say, looking at it, that it would be extremely diYcult for Mill Hill in its present form to fulfil the criteria if that template; would you not agree? Professor Rothwell: I would agree. Q206 Dr Turner: Do you think it could? Professor Rothwell: No, I think it would be diYcult in its current position and in its current shape to fulfil that.

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Q207 Chairman: Impossible, not just diYcult? Impossible? Professor Rothwell: Slightly splitting hairs. Very diYcult. Q208 Chairman: As an optimist you would say that nothing is impossible. Professor Rothwell: Of course! We were looking at what would be best for Mill Hill 30 years from now. Q209 Dr Turner: When you were looking at the shape of the MRC scientific future did you do any sort of cost benefit analysis—for want of a crude word—because clearly we are talking about investing large resources? Did you consider which kind of option would provide the best value for that investment in scientific terms for the future? Professor Rothwell: The primary driver was the scientific value. Any discussions about costs were very much secondary and not in any detail at all. It was what would deliver the best science, which was first and foremost in all of the discussions. Professor North: I think it is really diYcult to envisage a cost benefit analysis, which is projecting 15 or 20 years into the future. I think we can only be guided by what we felt would be the major drivers in terms of improving the scientific environment, which were largely interactions— interactions with clinical people, interactions with basic physicists, mathematicians and so on. Q210 Dr Turner: Clearly one of your first considerations is in fact clinical links and the facilitation of translational research. What evidence do you have to show that actual co-location produces the best results? Professor North: I think it would be quite diYcult to move forward on the basis of evidence because if all science progressed on the basis of published evidence then progress in fact would be rather slow. Q211 Dr Turner: It is. Professor Rothwell: It would be even slower! Professor North: It would be even slower, so obviously where evidence exists one has to take it into account. I think it is very diYcult to look for evidence of what will be more eVective in 15 or 20 years’ time. But I think there was a sense around on the Committee that the way that medical research is now being done and is likely to be done in the next 10 or 15 years is changing, and it is changing very quickly, and I think one of the reasons that it is changing quickly—one of the reasons—is because of things like genomics. Technology is changing extremely quickly. This means that it is much easier now to make links between human disease and fundamental mechanisms than it was 15, 20 years ago. I think it was the vision based on this that was in many ways directing our ideas rather than hard evidence that co-location of clinicians and basic scientists works. Professor Rothwell: Could I just add that I think a lot of the decisions were based on the collective experiences of the Committee, which, put together, were really quite extensive. I think most, if not of

all, of us have had experiences of working on single sites and on large sites. I worked in fact in a hospital and medical school but it was an isolated hospital and medical school and I would never want to go back to that situation. I did clinical research and what I did not have there was the link with the fundamental scientists. Co-location does not automatically mean collaboration but it makes it easier. I have just moved into a new building where I am co-located with a lot of colleagues and within weeks it has made a diVerence to me, just having the students able to bump into people. It will not automatically help but it certainly can help. Q212 Chairman: Are you saying that none of this went on at Mill Hill? Professor Rothwell: No, I am not saying that none of it went on, nor am I saying that isolated sites do not produce outstanding science; what I am saying is that the likelihood of it improving is significant with co-location. Q213 Dr Turner: Is there not a risk with co-location that it can also be, as it were, straightening because not all clinical institutions cover the entire spectrum of clinical science, they all have their specialities and their areas of excellence, whereas you are taking an Institute of basic research which covers a very wide range of disciplines? So although translational research and collaboration may be facilitated for a part of that Institute by putting it next to whichever hospital, is there not a danger that you may inhibit or change direction for the rest of the Institutes? Professor Rothwell: Quite the reverse actually. A major part of our rationale behind relocation was inter-disciplinary fundamental research. It is interesting that you called it an Institute of basic research; it is an Institute of Medical Research— that is its name. So it was not just the translational clinical, it was also the proximity to basic scientists, to physical scientists that was considered to be important. Professor North: I think it is an important point that you have made, that Mill Hill focuses on a few things, which it does spectacularly well; but it does not cover the whole breadth of basic medical research. Clearly for an investment of £27 million a year you do not get more than a few strengths in focused areas. Q214 Dr Turner: Did you actually as a Committee regard the future of the Mill Hill site as unsustainable? Professor Rothwell: I think it is summarised very well in our report that we did not find compelling evidence for it to stay there. It may be in the end that in any decision you identify your three best choices and none of them work out, for a variety of reasons; but I think the statement was a very true reflection of what that Committee felt, that there was not compelling evidence that this was the best place for NIMR to be, and I still think that is true.

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Professor North: In 15 or 20 years’ time. Q215 Dr Harris: The MRC Vision talks about this move towards more translational research and indeed even though the Vision was published around the some time you were doing your work you probably would have been aware of that shift. It could be said that you decided, or it was the view of both the FIS and to a certain extent the Task Force that that means co-location and that is the be all and end all in the move to translation, if you can show the OST and the DTI that you are doing that, and tick the boxes. I would like to ask how much consideration was given within the FIS and indeed generally to issues around how grants are awarded as a way of ensuring that there is a move to translational areas or individuals or the focus of other Institutes as well. Professor North: I do not remember any discussion of that kind in FIS. In fact I do not remember any discussion about OST. It was in the Vision and we certainly took the Vision seriously. Q216 Dr Harris: But the remit was just to look at it? Professor Rothwell: The remit was to look at the long-term future of these four research Institutes; that was the specific remit. The issues about grants are being dealt with under other Committees or by Council itself. Coming back to your point, I think the OST probably would not be happy with ticks in boxes, the OST looks for actual outcomes and looks for discoveries and translational discoveries and ability to treat disease. So I do not think colocation is the solution. Q217 Dr Harris: That comes a bit later. What I am saying is that if they see that the MRC are taking radical steps of considering big capital projects that might be seen to be in a way that is more discernible than other things which are much more fluid to be acting on this initiative. I am not saying it is a bad thing. Professor Rothwell: It was not part of our consideration. Q218 Chairman: But did your considerations change during the meetings with FIS? Did the remit change? You started looking at Mill Hill in the light of the Director’s retirement, and then it seems to me that you moved on to other research institutes as well—MRC Institutes. Professor Rothwell: No, the initial remit was the long-term future of the four research institutes; that is what we were set up to do. Q219 Dr Harris: Do you think that the MRC has put as much work into these other issues, like the focus of Institutes, whoever they are, and grant policy as it is put into issues around the long-term capital investment and co-location and issues like that in respect of the agreed need to move to translational research?

Professor Rothwell: Yes, I think it probably has in diVerent ways. I am no longer a member of Council, I am a member of the Training Board and that has paid a lot of attention to translational and clinical research. But it has been in other parts of its activities. There is no doubt that NIMR has taken a huge amount of time for staV serving on the sub-committees of Council and Council and perhaps more time might have been spent on the other issues if this had not taken up time. This has taken up more time than I think was predicted. Q220 Dr Harris: Was it a consideration that reducing spend on institutes in the FIS area, where there was a suggestion that you could reduce the size of NIMR in its move, might free up money to increase grants to more disparate groups, including outside the “golden triangle”? Professor Rothwell: No. Professor North: I do not think there was any discussion at that time. Professor Rothwell: I do not think there was. Q221 Dr Harris: You were members of the MRC Council, I think, that looked at the Task Force report in July, and that recommended co-location to the same size broadly, to a Central London location, which was a diVerent finding from that of the FIS, which was not that long ago—there have not been huge changes. Do you feel that you on the FIS missed, overlooked this possibility, because clearly you cannot both be right? This is a diVerent option, for the reasons given that it would keep people together. Professor Rothwell: I think we need to take a step back. I think that the details of the two reports are diVerent, inevitably. The FIS was a draft for consultation with ideas put down; the Task Force was a much more detailed in-depth analysis. I think the principles of the two reports are the same. Any potential relocation of NIMR has not yet been agreed and it may be that there is more work needed to be done. So we suggested Cambridge because it had so many of the potential benefits that we thought would bring success to NIMR. We also considered London as a possibility but thought it might be more expensive—but did not rule it out. Nor did the Task Force rule out Cambridge. In their initial discussions they came to a diVerent conclusion. I am not concerned that they came to a diVerent conclusion to FIS. Professor North: I think it is important to look at the chronology. The Forward Investment Strategy started with all four Institutes. It came out with a recommendation which dealt with one of them. The draft recommendation was modified by Council in the event of the feedback that it received. The Task Force then set up was a much more expert focus group dealing specifically with Mill Hill. Q222 Dr Harris: I want to ask a slightly diVerent question because, as I say, you were on the Council at the time it considered its report. One of the questions we are considering is whether adequate consideration was given by (a) the Task Force and

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(b) MRC to whether Mill Hill should have been an active third option, or a fallback option and not simply something to be compared with and then to reopen it all again if none of the London bids work. It has been argued to us that despite issues around not being able to agree in the Task Force a unanimous report that the MRC Council did hear the view of those who felt that the Mill Hill option should be either an active option or a fallback option because there is a report and I think Professor Flavell spoke to it specifically. Are you happy that therefore when reaching the conclusion that the Council did that the Council did consider arguments for the inclusion of Mill Hill as an active or fall back option within the Task Force report? Professor North: We heard those arguments and, as you have said, they were presented by Professor Flavell. I cannot speak for other members of the Council. I was satisfied that the main principles involved, which had actually been agreed unanimously by the Task Force, as I was led to understand, was that co-location of the renewed NIMR Central London site was favoured by the Task Force. Professor Rothwell: I finished on Council in July 2004 so I was not part of the later discussion, but, similarly, up to that point we had understood that at least at its meeting of the Task Force there had been agreement and it is just that there had not been discussion of a fallback if the London options turned out not to be viable. Q223 Dr Harris: Were you a member of the MRC Council that considered the report and decided to go with what I am calling, in inverted commas, the “majority” report? Professor Rothwell: Yes. Q224 Dr Harris: And in making that decision do you feel you were exposed to the argument that Mill Hill should be considered as an active or fallback option, as opposed to what was eventually decided, which was that if the London bids did not work then MRC would look at it again as a whole? Professor Rothwell: Yes. Q225 Dr Harris: Are you happy that you two personally received that information or do you think that ideally you could have seen more? Professor Rothwell: No, I think we received very, very extensive information, either directly through NIMR or through MRC. Q226 Dr Harris: Professor North? Professor North: Yes, I was happy with it. Q227 Chairman: Can I just come back, for the record, Nancy and Alan, about this issue about your remit? We have documents that are going to be publicly available—you may not have seen them so I will read it in some detail. It is from the current Director. This is an answer from Sir Anthony Cleaver at our last inquiry, so it is minuted, and the reply says: “This account fails to mention the initial proposal for a review presented to me” (that is the

current Director) “in August 2002 entitled, ‘Planning for the Future of the MRC National Institute for Medical Research’ that I discussed with Sir Anthony, Sir George Radda and Nick Winterton on 19 September. At this time they presented their views on the date of my retirement and the proposed date of the institute building as a reason for a review and here I indicated the inadequacy of these arguments. On 25 September the same year I wrote to Sir Anthony about his misgivings and in reply Sir Anthony said that MRC had decided on a diVerent approach—and I enclose a copy of the revised draft Council paper—entitled, ‘Planning a Forward Investment Strategy’ for MRC support and now addressed, as well the NIMR, the lab of molecular biology at Cambridge and Harwell Campus University of Oxford. Plans for major investments at Oxford and Cambridge I believe had already been made.” Is that a true account of what happened in your opinion? Were you aware of this during your deliberations? Professor Rothwell: I do not think that was an issue for Forward Investment Strategy because Forward Investment Strategy was set up to look at the four Institutes. Q228 Chairman: But I am saying it was not right from the beginning, Nancy, it was the NIMR from the beginning and that changed for some reason, and I am trying to find out why it changed. Professor Rothwell: In the Council papers of 2000 the issue of the long-term future of NIMR was raised and it was stated that that should be looked at. In other reports you will find for other institutes there are comments that we need to look at long-term future. So I think to suggest that there was something there and then it changed is not quite the right interpretation of that. I can see that you could put that interpretation on it, but I think you have to look at each Institute’s long-term future. The idea then was to bring it together into one group. The remit was to look at the long-term future of the four Institutes. So I do not think there was anything that FIS was set up to do this and we then changed our minds; I certainly have no sense of that whatsoever. Q229 Chairman: Alan, you confirm that, do you? Professor North: As far as I am concerned, when I agreed to work on the Forward Investment Strategy sub-committee then it was to look at the long-term future of four Institutes, and if there was anything before that I knew nothing about it. Q230 Chairman: You realise the relevance of that, of course? Professor Rothwell: Yes. Q231 Mr Key: So was the development of the Mill Hill site a serious option for your Committee? Professor Rothwell: It was considered seriously but it was not considered to be a compelling option.

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Q232 Mr Key: Were there any investment appraisals or formal financial evaluations taken in order to inform that final decision of yours? Are you aware of any formal financial evaluations? Professor Rothwell: Formal, no, because our remit was not about money, our remit was about what was best for science, for NIMR. We had some ballpark figures but they were not the purpose of our consideration. Q233 Mr Key: If it was not about money was it about value for money or delivering better value for money in terms of investment and research? Professor Rothwell: It was about getting the best research. I would not phrase it as value in terms of costs. Money was absolutely secondary; we discussed money very little. We discussed how we could ensure that NIMR will remain a world class Institute in 20 years’ time. Money was secondary. But obviously by inference— Q234 Chairman: I think the title gives the game away, does it not? Investment Strategy must involve money? Professor Rothwell: It was investment in science, but yes. We spent very little time discussing financial issues. Q235 Mr Key: I do find that rather extraordinary for a Forward Investment Strategy, that so little work was done on the financial side of this. If the science case for co-location is agreed by the MRC should they go ahead then regardless of the cost? Professor North: I think that is the next stage. The Forward Investment Strategy Group, as I recall, as Nancy has said, had only really limited consideration of the financial agenda; it was driven by what we believed would be the best environment in which to do science, internationally competitive science, in 15 or 20 years’ time. There was some discussion in the sense of added value and the size of Institutes and co-location with medical schools and other higher education institutes as being possible ways of saying money because you can share in some of the infrastructure costs, but there were no detailed financial considerations. Q236 Mr Key: That again I find interesting because your report concluded that, “A new smaller investment in a clinical multi-disciplinary environment would be likely to deliver a similar volume of science and greater value for money in the longer term,” which suggests that you have given very serious consideration to financial evaluations. Professor North: That is essentially what I said, that we thought that you could get the same science for slightly less money if you had it in an environment where certain infrastructure costs were covered and were shared by other operations. Q237 Mr Key: Do you feel that Mill Hill has had a fair crack of the whip?

Professor Rothwell: Yes. Q238 Chairman: Would you like to elaborate on that a little? Professor Rothwell: I think the fact that the Forward Investment Strategy put out a consultation. There was a large response almost exclusively from Mill Hill staV or former staV; Council listened to it and reconvened the Task Force at great cost and time. We do have to remember we are talking about MRC here and the people making these decisions are working scientists, many of whom have no personal interest or agenda, giving up their time freely to try to do the best thing. There was a Task Force with two eminent international members who I think did the best they could with two NIMR members on it and they made recommendations. Q239 Mr Key: Professor North, did Mill Hill have a fair crack of the whip? Professor North: I cannot speak for what went on in the Task Force but they were represented on the Task Force and I think that was entirely appropriate. Q240 Mr Key: And on the Forward Investment Strategy, they had fair consideration? Professor North: They had similar consideration to the Directors of the other Institutes. Q241 Dr Turner: How does the process that you have been involved in square with the Quinquennial Reviews of the Institutes because we have two quite diVerent processes going on here? Just how do they relate? Professor Rothwell: The Quinquennial Review is largely an assessment of the quality of the science and the future proposals and that had been undertaken, and we are currently in another cycle. Indeed the last Quinquennial Review commented on the excellence of the science at NIMR, which was never questioned by the Committee that I sat on. The Quinquennial Review does, however, often look at long-term infrastructure issues—not in detail— and the last Quinquennial Review did raise these and there were some very specific comments about concerns. In one of the sub-committee reviews the minutes state concerns raised about isolation and about clinical translational research. But the Quinquennial Review is a very diVerent and separate process undertaken by a group of scientists, often several from overseas, whose job it is to assess the quality of the science. That was not our job; it was very diVerent. Q242 Dr Turner: Was that diVerence clearly understood, do you think, by Mill Hill staV? Professor Rothwell: We repeated it time and time and time again, so I hope so. Q243 Dr Turner: So you can say with hand on heart that the quality of the scientific work carried out at Mill Hill was not a factor in your considerations?

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Professor Rothwell: It was a very strong factor in our considerations in that it was the excellence of that science that led us to spend so much time and eVort on trying to ensure its future. Q244 Dr Turner: How much did your view of the rationale for moving from Mill Hill change over time? Professor Rothwell: It became stronger in my case. Professor North: How much did the rationale change? Q245 Dr Turner: Yes. Professor North: I think the rationale was there from the very first discussions of the Forward Investment Strategy Group, so I do not think that changed very much. The desire to give it an exciting relocation alongside basic scientists of other disciplines and alongside clinical colleagues was pretty much formulated at early meetings of the FIS group. Q246 Dr Turner: So as far as you are concerned there is nothing which FIS did which should have given anyone involved with Mill Hill any reason to doubt that there was a long-term future? Professor Rothwell: No. I realise that there have been discussions about this—I have seen in the Press— closure of Institutes, but that was never ever part of our discussion, never part of the thinking of anybody that I spoke to on that Committee, and still is not. Professor North: I suppose it is fair to say that when the draft document for consultation came out one end of the spectrum could be to interpret that as a closure of Mill Hill. The other end of the spectrum is to interpret that as an exciting opportunity for relocation of an extremely strong and thriving Institute. Q247 Chairman: I want to ask you about the question of the new Director and the current Director retiring in 2006. Why does that have to be a major feature of the rationale for change, a new strategy of looking at it all and so on? Professor Rothwell: I do not think it was a major feature. Q248 Chairman: The literature that we have had, Nancy, it keeps coming up time and time again. Professor Rothwell: It is an issue. The Director of an Institute is a critical position. They need to lead what is a very large group of people and the Director of any unit or institute within MRC is extremely important; they are not a manager they are a leading scientist. So that position is extremely important and recruitment to those positions is treated very, very seriously. Q249 Chairman: I guess I know and you know of many situations where a Director does not have to be going before you put pressure on the change of scientific direction and I am just wondering why in this case that things that had to be done that should have happened 20 years ago, 10 years ago, 10 minutes ago, whatever, why did it not happen before? Why was this made to be the key feature?

Professor Rothwell: I think probably a combination of factors of which the change of Director was only one and not the most important one. I think the formulation of MRC’s Ten Year Vision, the fact that all of the Research Councils are now taking much longer-term views at their institutes—BBSRC is doing the same thing—I think a general coming to the point of “We must do it now”; it has been talked about quite a long time. So I suppose you could ask the question would we have done this had the Director not been retiring? It is impossible to answer but I suspect probably we would. Q250 Chairman: There is another argument too that in a unit like NIMR some of the units within that either he or she is not the actual Director of those units and the focus and the direction of the research, so you are taking them on as well in a sense if you are trying to modify the whole structure. Is that a fair assessment of what was going on, because that could aVect the way that people felt about it, that not only would the Director feel sensitive about what was happening but the individuals in their units might feel that they were under some kind of attack too? That is how I would feel if I were running a unit there on stem cells, for example, I might feel that—we all go down together. Professor Rothwell: I can understand the concerns; there are bound to be concerns. I just worry a little about the terminology, “taking on” and “under threat”. Certainly that was not the intention. Q251 Chairman: Not my words, I am quoting. There is massive literature I have here. Professor Rothwell: Inevitably this is a period of great sensitivity and concern for the staV and we recognise that fully. Q252 Chairman: Do you have a view about this, Alan? Professor North: I do not think that the retirement of the present Director in 2006 really played a terribly strong motivating role in the deliberations of the Forward Investment Strategy group, I think it was more the opportunity to look at an Institute that was physically becoming isolated and that in the next 10 or 15 years we thought that that isolation would probably make it less competitive in an international sense in science. Q253 Chairman: You are aware that there are diVerent views about that time and why it is that time and so on? Professor North: Yes, of course. Q254 Mr Key: What impact do you think the current dispute between the MRC and Mill Hill has had on relations between those two institutions? Has it been very damaging or is it all about personalities and not science? Professor Rothwell: It is quite diYcult for me to comment on because I am no longer a member of MRC Council. Do you want to comment?

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Professor North: I cannot say whether it is about personalities but I do not think it is about science. I think Mill Hill is full of excellent scientists who have enjoyed very good relationships with other scientists within the UK and I fully expect that that will continue. Professor Rothwell: I think it is unfortunate that we seem to be losing track of the most important thing, which is the best investment for science for NIMR. Q255 Chairman: Let us talk about that. If you and I were working in the NIMR together and all this was going on, we would say, “Sod it, let us get out of this,” would we not? If we lost all that teamwork and that force and that work it would put British science back quite a bit, would it not? Professor Rothwell: I do not know that we would do that because I am not aware of any staV who have left NIMR. Q256 Chairman: Because it is still up in the air at the minute with this whole thing. But that could happen, could it not? Professor Rothwell: But if I were at NIMR I might— and I do not know because I am not, and I think it is dangerous to speculate, look at massive investment on a new site with a new building with fantastic facilities as an opportunity. I could put it that way. Q257 Dr Harris: You both said in your written evidence—and I do not want to paraphrase it so feel free to restate it yourself—but you feel that this has now taken up too much time and money and really decisions have to be made and we need to press on and put it behind us. Is that an accurate summary of what you are saying? Or do you think if necessary to make sure as many people are kept on board as possible it could be looked at again in a diVerent way, for the sake of harmony? Professor Rothwell: I think the paraphrasing is a little extreme. I think we said it has taken up a great deal of time and there is now some urgency to move forward actually because of the new Director. But I think we have to get it right. Q258 Mr Key: Do you think that there is any case for actually revisiting this whole decision or recommendation—because of course a decision has not finally been made by the MRC yet? If NIMR has really made such a strong case that it has not had a fair crack of the whip should we as a Committee be recommending that it all be reopened and started again? Professor Rothwell: There will be a danger in doing that, I think, because it would mean that any decision taken by MRC would be questioned– and I come back to what MRC is, I presume you mean the Council, which are the working scientists? Q259 Mr Key: Yes. Professor Rothwell: Some of whom are funded by MRC, some are not. If the decisions of the Task Force are overturned, it would be diYcult for MRC to make decisions in the future. So I think we would

have to consider that before making that decision. I would have concerns about the way this has been done, about the Task Force representation and the independent members of that Task Force acting, from what I have, seen in good will to make a recommendation, to then overthrow that, I think, could have serious consequences. Q260 Mr Key: Professor North? Professor North: I think the Task Force and indeed Council have worked quite hard and with very good intent to solve the problem and the current process has some way to go. The bids from London have to be looked at and if they are not satisfactory then obviously one is left with the status quo and the Medical Research Council will then have to decide what to do next. Dr Harris: You both know the people involved here and this has all got quite unpleasant in terms of some of the allegations. I am asking you whether in your personal opinion there is a process out there that could exist or that could be devised and used that would bring everyone on board? Or, as it might also be considered, it is now really time to press on because, as you have just said, that you think the Task Force actually, the people on there, was not a bad process. Chairman: And if I could just add to that, what is the hurry? You indicated that you would like to get it over and done with in a way. So where is the hurry? Q261 Dr Harris: Two separate questions there. Professor Rothwell: The hurry is that MRC will not be resolved and will have extreme diYculty in recruiting a new Director and I think that will be extremely damaging, and there will be a continued period of uncertainty. It is very diYcult to imagine— I am sure there are other processes but it is speculation and I have not been involved for several months. I think it would be very diYcult to say that we could now go back. I think it would cause significant diYculties to say that we are going to ignore the Task Force. Professor North: I am not sure what process you would put in place that would give you any better— Q262 Chairman: It would give the Director an extra year of life, to get a result. Too radical? Professor North: When you say what is the hurry, I do not think there is a hurry in the context of a 15year plan, which is what is behind it. But in terms of the process that you would then use again in the future it is hard for me to see how you would improve on this process unless you got a diVerent Task Force with diVerent representation and diVerent people on it. Q263 Chairman: How did you interpret what Paul Nurse told us last time and Richard Flavell kind of agreed with him? I know that you are not the Task Force as such, but you are well known in the field and we respect your views, and I am just asking you the question. Did you read what Paul Nurse said?

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Professor Rothwell: Which bit? Q264 Chairman: The ideas for the future. Professor Rothwell: Having another meeting of the Task Force you mean? Q265 Chairman: Yes. Professor Rothwell: Yes, if it had happened some time ago. I have not been involved enough to know whether it would be viable now or whether

relationships have broken down too much to have a useful meeting of the Task Force. I just do not know; it is all second-hand. Professor North: I know not enough about what went on in the Task Force to comment sensibly. Chairman: That seems a good point to have some of the Task Force people in. Thank you very much. I know that you are not directly involved in the Task Force but thank you very, very much. I do appreciate you taking time oV from your real jobs to come and give us the evidence! It is very, very helpful to know what FIS is about.

Witnesses: Professor Stephen Tomlinson, Provost, Wales College of Medicine, Biology, Life and Health Sciences, Deputy Vice-Chancellor, CardiV University and Professor Kay Davies, Dr Lee’s Professor of Anatomy and Honorary Director, MRC Functional Genetics Unit, Department of Human Anatomy and Genetics, University of Oxford, examined. Q266 Chairman: Kay Davies, thank you very much for coming and I noticed that you and Stephen Tomlinson were there for the first session so you know some of the issues that we are interested in, but you as members of the Task Force have more to add to it and you can tell us how you feel about your responsibilities. Let me ask the first question. We heard from two non-NIMR members of the Task Force talking to us about “strong persuasion”, talking about “somewhat inappropriate” discussions with the Chairman and so on—short of coercion certainly. Did you feel that kind of pressure from the Task Force? Was the Chairman—I am not going to say bullying— squeezing just a little? Professor Tomlinson: Absolutely not. I think in the written evidence that I submitted I made it very clear that from the start I think Colin Blakemore behaved as I would expect a Chairman to behave, with integrity, and, as far as I am concerned personally, I certainly never felt coerced, with all the implications of that word. I think that there were very many robust discussions, both within the Task Force itself and there was robust correspondence in terms of the various emails; but speaking for myself I did not feel that Colin exerted undue pressure on me personally, no. Q267 Chairman: Kay? Professor Davies: I would endorse that view. There was a lot of lobbying outside the Committee, perhaps one could say more than one would normally see in the Committee itself, but we had a lot of business to get through and had a very tight timetable. Some of us obviously could not attend some meetings and therefore had to be filled in with the background of particular meetings. Q268 Chairman: Tell me about that lobbying outside the meeting room, what kind of form it took, short of coercion, again, but pretty tough stuV? Professor Tomlinson: Again, I think you have seen in the evidence that has been submitted previously to the Committee that in fact there was one email to me from Colin, which was said to be evidence

of undue pressure or even coercion, and I understand that some or even all of that email was read out at one of the meetings of this Committee. I think, possibly for privilege reasons I do not know, my reply was not read out. If you would like me to read it— Q269 Chairman: We will come to that question later on and you will have the chance, but I am asking in generality about the lobbying pressures. Professor Tomlinson: I think the lobbying pressures were very much around if you like, a dialogue that you would expect to have taken place. I must say that between each of the meetings of the Task Force it is inevitable, as Kay has said, being pretty busy people that everything that we might have wanted to consider in detail in the meetings of the Task Force was not considered in as much detail perhaps as some of us would have liked and as a consequence of that naturally we used email correspondence. I personally do not recall a specific time when Colin Blakemore, or anybody else for that matter, actually telephoned me to try to present arguments in favour of one position or another. Q270 Chairman: What about the other members of the Committee, they must have had views? Did their views change because of the lobbying, the discussions in the bars, the coVee bars, wherever? Professor Tomlinson: No, absolutely not. Q271 Chairman: So you felt really quite neutralised all the way through? Professor Tomlinson: I felt very comfortable with the way that the Task Force conducted its business, and indeed at the end of the fifth meeting I had thought that we had reached a consensus that what we had concluded was that the preferred view of the Task Force was that the National Institute for Medical Research should be relocated to Central London with a managed transition from Mill Hill. That was what I thought and that was an exciting vision, which has been alluded to by Alan North and Nancy Rothwell, and I thought that was what we were all signed up to. It was with a degree of

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disappointment and, I guess—if you are going to ask me about the emails—a degree of increasing irritation after the fifth meeting of the Task Force, that I observed this increasingly acrimonious correspondence, in which I was not personally involved; I was an observer of the correspondence which, as you know, was in the domain of the Task Force members. Q272 Chairman: Kay, you are an experienced person. How did you feel about the lobbying that went on here? Was it more intensive than you have ever had in your life before? Professor Davies: It really was intense but I am not sure that it was any more intense than occasions that I have had in my life before because of personal experience. I think the problem was that quite often we came out with a report that was agreed by the Task Force meeting and then 48 hours later we had a dialogue about various aspects of those reports and it is these which caused the extensive lobbying outside the meeting. So the lobbying was prompted by those email exchanges rather than the lobbying just being an extension of pressure, as you have called it, outside the meetings, which was not the situation. It was an evolution that came about. Chairman: We will come back to those emails. Robert is going to question them. Q273 Dr Harris: Professor Davies, you alluded to time constraints. Do you think that the work was done rather quicker than it need have been or perhaps a little more time, a little more consideration might have avoided many of the problems which have subsequently arisen because it was rushed? Professor Davies: No, I do not think at any stage it was rushed except the communication of what we concluded from the fifth meeting when we wanted to report to Council in July. I think we had a consensus at the end of that meeting where we had a favoured option of looking at the London locations. I was not at the meeting so I do not know, but the conclusion of that meeting from the report was that we would not consider Mill Hill at that stage and we would look very carefully because we all at that Task Force meeting felt that that, the central London, was a very exciting opportunity. In order to examine that in full and to give it our full attention the conclusion of that meeting was to concentrate on that option. Q274 Mr Key: Professor Tomlinson, did you regard the confidential email sent to you by Colin Blakemore on 28 June as evidence of coercion? Professor Tomlinson: This was the email about my proposing that we should now, if the Task Force agreed that Mill Hill was a fall back position, am I correct, then rather than go for a fall back position I suggested that we might go for Mill Hill being included in the competition? That is the email that you are referring to?

Q275 Mr Key: Yes. Professor Tomlinson: Chairman, may I read out my email response to that? Q276 Chairman: Yes. Professor Tomlinson: “Colin, thanks. What I was trying to do was to move us onward. I absolutely endorse the view that the future of NIMR is not Mill Hill. You know that my initial prejudice was to simply close it and redeploy the £27 million of annual funding across the UK. The strength of the arguments of relocation in Central London persuaded me otherwise and I stand by that view. What really irks me is the inference that Mill Hill is the fallback position and that is okay then. I simply do not understand why that should be. It implies that MRC will fail in its negotiations and we will have to accept second best. I am certain that is not acceptable to any of us, it places Mill Hill in a privileged position. My suggestion was intended to ensure a level playing field for those bidding. The playing field is level for KCL and UCL but Mill Hill simply waits to see if negotiations fail. That is just not good enough. I am more than happy to withdraw my suggestion but must repeat that I accept no fallback proposal that gives Mill Hill an unfair advantage. Again to repeat, I believe that the Task Force agreed on relocation of NIMR to either KCL or UCL with a managed transition from Mill Hill over an appropriate period of time. If both bids are rejected by MRC then the Council must reach its own conclusions but must not be able to use the recommendations of the current Task Force as the reason for NIMR remaining at Mill Hill. I hope that makes my position absolutely clear. I am sorry for creating further turbulence by my frustration-induced, perhaps ill-judged proposal. Steve.” Q277 Mr Key: Thank you, Professor, very much. So you did not feel coerced? Professor Tomlinson: Absolutely not. Q278 Mr Key: What other allegations of coercion were you aware of? Professor Tomlinson: I was aware that when I went to the meeting at Mill Hill in October— Q279 Mr Key: Was that meeting on the 8th of NIMR staV and Professor Blakemore? Professor Tomlinson: That is correct, yes. When I went there with Colin Blakemore and with Professor Andrew McMichael, who is a member of the Council of MRC, we had a meeting with the heads of divisions and I know from the evidence that has been submitted—and again may I read? This is fairly brief. From the evidence that I read in response to questions in this Committee there is one that begins, “In reply to a question Blakemore said that he had put no pressure on Task Force members to reach the conclusion that Mill Hill should not be an option for the renewed Institute. Robin Lovell Badge immediately challenged this assertion saying explicitly that Colin had made threatening telephone calls to him. Colin at first

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denied this but then admitted that he did recall a heated telephone call. The discussion was curtailed at this point by Steve Tomlinson saying he was becoming irritated.” That sounds a bit like Sir Lancelot Spratt—and I am a physician, not a surgeon! I do in fact at that meeting recall the dialogue becoming increasingly heated and I was aware that such accusations had been made in Robin’s e-mail of 26 July, in which he said: “I have had far too many unpleasant phone conversations with you (Colin Blakemore) where you have completely ignored what I said and in some cases even threatened me.” However, I do not recall at the Mill Hill meeting Robin accusing Colin Blakemore of threatening him. The question was whether undue pressure had been used. Robin Lovell-Badge said that it had; Colin Blakemore said that it had not, and it seemed to me that this was a dialogue of the deaf; it was getting us nowhere and certainly not moving us on. In terms of additional evidence of coercion or threats, as far as I am concerned that is all hearsay. I have no direct knowledge of that. Q280 Mr Key: There was no other evidence apart from that one person that you are aware of. Professor Tomlinson: That I am aware of. Q281 Mr Key: Professor Davies, at one point you took oVence at the suggestion from the chairman that you might succumb to pressure on the issue of Mill Hill as an option. What sort of pressure was exerted on you? Were you conscious of the pressure? Professor Davies: No. It was just lots of telephone calls and lobbying, which I have already referred to. Q282 Mr Key: Were you aware that other people might be under pressure or succumbing to pressure? Professor Davies: I was aware that Robin LovellBadge was under pressure or becoming under pressure. Q283 Mr Key: Anybody else? Can I ask both of you whether the chairman sought to persuade the task force to reconsider the federated option for Mill Hill split into several parts within London, after that had been rejected by the task force? Did he ask you to reconsider? Professor Tomlinson: After we had reached a conclusion? Q284 Mr Key: Yes. Professor Tomlinson: No. That option, as I understood it, was considered as one of the options at the first meeting. Professor Davies: And again at the second meeting probably. Q285 Dr Harris: You said you thought that Robin Lovell-Badge was under pressure. Who do you mean under pressure from?

Professor Davies: From the whole process, the Task Force and Colin Blakemore. Q286 Dr Harris: Not from NIMR? Professor Davies: Well . . . Q287 Dr Harris: I am going to let you answer that in the way you want. Professor Davies: Robin certainly indicated that he felt under pressure. He never indicated he felt under pressure from NIMR and generally both Steve Gamblin and Robin played a very professional part in this whole exercise, but it was very diYcult for them because they would have to go back with interim reports where there were vagaries. There was paranoia about whether the NIMR was going to be closed, and we never mentioned that NIMR could be closed at any stage. What we are looking at is a two-stage process: what NIMR can oVer now, which is excellence of science, and what it might do and contribute best to the MRC portfolio in the 20 to 30-year time frame; and that is going to be a phased transition, whatever the time-frame. MRC Council are very clear on this. Q288 Dr Harris: Some strong allegations have been made about the chairman of the task force, Colin Blakemore, putting undue pressure and indeed threats to Robin Lovell-Badge in particular; and the implication is—and I do not have the specifics in front of me—that this was on more than one occasion. Obviously, that has been rejected and that has been denied by Colin Blakemore—and indeed we have seen evidence to show a reasonably friendly exchange of e-mails even after some of these cases took place. Did you, at the meetings you attended, in retrospect I accept, and indeed at conference calls, detect that there was this problem underneath, that someone had been threatened allegedly? Professor Davies: No. There was disagreement when we had the final conference call, trying to put the final report together, when there was clearly no consensus on the wording, particularly of whether Mill Hill should be a fall-back option. Q289 Chairman: Did the task force discuss how to prevent all this lobbying and scurrying about and all this kind of stuV—how to ignore it or just to run with it? It seems to me somebody has to be tough and say, “cut it, stop it”. Was that discussed? Professor Davies: It was only after the fifth meeting that things started to go wrong. Before then, this was part of a constructive dialogue that went on between the meetings. Professor Tomlinson: I would endorse that. The exchange of e-mails between meetings was essential because, as we all recognise, the people involved with the task force were very busy people. We had five meetings, which were lengthy meetings, and conference calls in between. Just because there was a great deal of e-mail correspondence and even telephone calls does not mean that there is a conspiracy; it is a task force trying to inform itself.

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Q290 Chairman: It sounds as though it was a continual task force meeting. Professor Tomlinson: It was, you are quite right. Q291 Chairman: Day to day. Meetings are usually meetings, and then you get on with your work or whatever. Professor Tomlinson: I accept that. Q292 Chairman: You were carrying on all the time with the issues. Professor Tomlinson: One of the issues definitely, as Kay has already said—and certainly after the fifth meeting when we thought that we had reached a conclusion—was that clearly that conclusion was not acceptable to some members of the task force. That was extremely disappointing, particularly because of the nature of that fifth meeting and the excitement that people all felt about the consensus that had been achieved. Dr Turner: What is your impression of the role of the chairman in the operation of the task force? Did you feel he was an impartial arbiter and an equal member of the task force, or did you think he was leading the task force? Q293 Chairman: Or like me—completely neutral! Professor Tomlinson: I think that Colin was in a diYcult position, and this was discussed at the first meeting of the task force—what exactly his role would be, when there might be potential conflict of interests. Indeed, that was one of the reasons why we sought the support of the consultants, who I might say were extremely good. The company concerned had put in some very high-quality people who supported the task force, both in terms of gathering information and in terms of facilitating the meetings. If you are asking me whether Colin Blakemore started oV with a pre-conceived idea, he certainly did not betray that, as chairman of the task force. Indeed, when things got diYcult at the fifth meeting, you will see from the evidence that he oVered to step down as chairman, and the task force reaYrmed that he should remain as chairman. That would be rather strange if we had no confidence in his chairmanship, if the task force had agreed that he should remain. Professor Davies: As part of the process of the meeting you have to understand that the consultants did facilitate it greatly, not just during the meeting but they also made a summary towards the end. They would put the points up in a flip chart and we would go through the points and agree the consensus that we had reached. It was not Colin Blakemore who did that; it was done jointly, so in no way was it steered by Colin as chairman. Q294 Dr Turner: Various members of the task force have suggested that the chairman was in a diYcult position because obviously he was Chief Executive of the MRC at the same time as chairing the task force. Do you think that that might itself have been a complicating factor?

Professor Tomlinson: I think that if we were to start again, the question would have to be asked. The counter argument to that, in other words that Colin as chairman was inappropriately leading—and I do not believe he was, let me emphasise—is that having been a senior scientist involved with the MRC for many years and knowing biomedical research and health sciences research in the UK extremely well, and knowing the MRC, having been involved with it and knowing its vision for the future and its strategy, then there you have a chairman with the appropriate background. If you are suggesting that you could have somebody else, who did not happen to be the chief executive oYcer of the MRC, then maybe in the future one might, if it were to happen again—God forbid—have to address that question because he was in a diYcult position. Q295 Chairman: How was he appointed as chair? Was he elected at a meeting? How did it happen? Professor Davies: He was elected by MRC Council, Sir George Radda was CEO at that time Q296 Chairman: He did not volunteer! Professor Davies: No, he did not volunteer. Chairman: I bet he would not do it now! Q297 Dr Turner: I do not think he would! Equally, representatives from the NIMR were in a slightly sticky position, or could have felt that; so how do you think they performed? Do you think they were representing views of Mill Hill or were they being independent? Professor Davies: From a personal point of view, I thought that they would just present a narrow— which I knew they would not—let me rephrase that. There was always a possibility that they would take a very personal view from the NIMR point of view, but they did not; they acted in a very professional way and engaged in all of the discussions as scientific members of the community, and nothing to do with whether they were members of NIMR or not. Obviously towards the end, once the issue of the fall-back position was raised, that did change; but I think they did an excellent job. Their contributions were very much appreciated. Q298 Dr Turner: Do you think that there would have been any diVerence in the acrimony that has emerged if it had been a completely independent task force or completely independent chairman? Professor Davies: I think it is a question of balance. I think the Task Force was a model of transparency. What we have got here is that some of the snags have been completely opened in some ways. I think if we had excluded people from NIMR, we would not have been able to engage their views all the way through, which I believe we did. Q299 Chairman: Did their views change? Did their body language change at the meetings, during those meetings?

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Professor Davies: Their body language changed, but certainly their views evolved the same as ours did. Professor Tomlinson: I support that. I support the view that Steve Gamblin and Robin Lovell-Badge were also in an extremely diYcult position; but they certainly did engage in all five meetings of the task force. In addition, Steve was particularly exercised about the clinical links and he took the trouble to come to CardiV to see me, initially on his own, and subsequently with a number of colleagues, to talk around the issues, particularly of translational research, but especially of the training of clinician scientists. In terms of engagement, I do not think they could have been more engaged. Q300 Dr Turner: Given what you have said about the process, how do you account for the fact that it has been suggested to us that a lot of the staV at Mill Hill were feeling very uncertain about the future, i.e., uncertain about whether there was a future for the NIMR wherever? Can you account for that uncertainty having got about? Professor Davies: It is very easy to destabilise an institution, no matter what you say, because science is very competitive. Any suggestion that either the institution may change its shape because of a new director, or may get smaller because it has a new location destabilises people- we have at no stage ever given a message out that NIMR would be shut. We have always endorsed the excellence of its science. Any change causes some instability in institutions, and we were acutely aware of that, and that is what you have seen. Maybe we did not communicate well enough the process, but going back to what Nancy said, it is very important that you do not let this prolong because it will get worse. If you do want to take the opportunity of change, you have got to be able to carry the troops with you and you do not leave them in that unstable land for very long. Q301 Chairman: The question you were asked is, at what point has it got to an unstable condition? Is it there already? Is it unstable at the minute, in your opinion? Professor Davies: We need to do something to reassure NIMR staV that they are valuable, define their role in the portfolio of the NIMR, and the fact that here we have a phased position that we are here now, and this is where we might get to in thirty years’ time; and that we need to work together to get the best out of the science. Professor Tomlinson: Can I add to that that I suspect that people feel that there is some kind of long or even short-term plan to close NIMR, but certainly the task force has never said that. The expression “renewed institute in central London” was in some ways coined to try to provide that reassurance, that what we were about was relocating the whole of the excellent internationally distinguished science from NIMR to a central London location, as a renewed institute. I do not think that any signals have been sent that NIMR

as an institute is going to be closed. The recommendation of the task force is that it is relocated, that is not closed. Q302 Dr Turner: The terms of the bid invitations that you recommended included the accommodation of everybody currently working in Mill Hill. Professor Tomlinson: As far as I personally am concerned, that was the inference that I drew; that we were not talking about downsizing or splitting, we were talking about the Institute as it currently is, in terms of numbers. Q303 Chairman: Is the task force disbanded now? Professor Tomlinson: Yes. I believe that we have been—well, I do not believe—I know that we have been stood down, and if I was asked whether we would meet again, I would say, “please, no”. Q304 Chairman: Do you think that is the one unanimous thing we might get out of it? Professor Tomlinson: In terms of reconstituting the task force as it was, I think most people would say I think—although it is not unanimous obviously— that an additional meeting of the task force is not going to move us on. It might well be that individual members of the task force, some or all, may be consulted at some future point, but I do not think an additional meeting now—Nancy referred to—I think it has gone past that stage. If there was going to be a sixth meeting, it was August or maybe late July. Professor Davies: You have the forward investment strategy, which was UK-based. The task force was international, not just the UK. That is an important dimension to remember. MRC got two types of view on the future of NIMR. Q305 Chairman: You mean the flavour? Professor Davies: Flavour as far as the international side—what could happen elsewhere in the world. Q306 Chairman: They were not international in the sense that they were working over there but they are British boys? Professor Davies: No, no, but Dick Flavell has been there for many years. Paul has not, I agree. Q307 Chairman: I will tell him he is an American now! Professor Davies: Absolutely. Q308 Dr Harris: One of the things we are trying to establish is whether the task force could have been handled better to have reached a consensus, rather than eVectively a majority report. I want to ask you therefore about the last meeting. I know that you, Professor Davies, were not there—and then the conference call on 25 June. The things those had in common were that there was a form of words agreed by all present which then subsequently fell apart. I can talk you through the history because I have read it several times now from the e-mails

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we have been given, but there was a form of words agreed and then a few days later, though not immediately, those were challenged, usually from the Mill Hill side, although there were some other issues as well. Then the conference call was held, which was fully attended, I understand— Professor Davies: It was not fully attended throughout. Q309 Dr Harris: Following the message shortly after the telephone conference call on 25 June we see that that then later fell apart on the 28th. A memo came in from Robin Lovell-Badge saying that on reflection over the weekend it was not satisfactory, what was written there. Do you think, in the light of that, that it was not battened down tightly enough at the meetings, or that it was just not going to ever happen? Professor Tomlinson: I can speak for the last meeting which I was present at, but I do not think that I was present at the conference call. I can certainly speak for the fifth meeting. As I have said already, that meeting was a very productive, constructive meeting. People heard what was presented to them, and we came away—I certainly came away feeling that we had definitely reached a conclusion. There is the summary, the report of that meeting, which clearly outlines what the conclusion was. I think that probably what happened was that people went away from that— most of us—thinking we had cracked it, that it was now sorted; but then Robin and Steve particularly, on reflection, felt that the conclusion that had been drawn meant that Mill Hill was vulnerable to closure in the short to medium term. That is my personal interpretation. I do not know of any evidence that would support that. Q310 Dr Harris: Presumably then they were reassured at the conference call on the 25th because that heads out of the meeting saying, “at the last full meeting we want to thank you all for the amount of work you have done. We have just completed the conference call and all the participants agreed to the form of words in the attached version.” Presumably, following that period of reflection and worry, reassurance was given, and an amended form of words was agreed. Is that how you understood it? Why did that then fall apart? Professor Davies: I think the general uncertainty crept back in again. Q311 Dr Harris: Why? Professor Davies: Because they were not totally convinced in their own minds. We had failed to convince them, or they had to talk to other colleagues, which made them feel a little uneasy about the situation. Q312 Dr Harris: Do you think the task force could have done more to reassure them at the fifth meeting and in that conference call?

Professor Davies: I have thought a lot about that, and I am not 100% convinced we could have done that. Professor Tomlinson: I think it is natural that they would consult with their colleagues. They were there as nominees and representatives of the National Institute for Medical Research, and they would go back to their colleagues and report the results of the discussions. Naturally, if they had colleagues then saying “we do not like that very much and we think you ought to go back to the MRC and the task force and say that we do not like it very much”, that was their job, so it was bound to happen, I guess. Professor Davies: Maybe we could have been a bit more explicit in the sense that we could have said that our strongly-favoured option would be relocation, exploring relocation to KCL and UCL; but that in the end we would obviously return to a comparison with Mill Hill, which we did not state. That might have been more reassuring. Q313 Dr Harris: It happened again. I refer to what we have at 246 in our evidence. “We had held a final telephone conference call on Monday, 19 July, to check word by word through the task force report”—this is Professor Blakemore—“by most members of the task force including Steve Gamblin and Robin Lovell-Badge. By the end of that call we had, after some discussion, reached agreement on the wording of the entire executive summary and the rest of the text.” There are a few figures missing. For the third time agreement appeared to have been reached for a unanimous report, with presumably concessions and reassurances having been made; and again that fell apart because there was then a huge series of substantive amendments which appear to be after a deadline—whether that is relevant or not—it probably is not to this line of questioning. Why do you think that happened? Do you think it is inevitable that nothing could be done because this was the third attempt to make unanimity stick? Professor Tomlinson: I think we can only speculate. Your speculation might be right, that we were getting then to the point where it was really impossible to repair the rifts that had developed. Professor Davies: The only thing that might have changed that is if we had had a sixth meeting, because very often you can do things face-to-face in a way that you cannot by way of conference call. We did not have a sixth meeting. In retrospect—I am not saying it would have been, but it might have been helpful. Q314 Dr Harris: The comment was made that the wordings used in these reports were deliberately vague to achieve a consensus that was never there. Do you think that is a fair criticism? Professor Tomlinson: No. Certainly if I go back to the record of the fifth meeting of the task force, I think it was pretty clear. It was relocation to central London eVectively with a managed transition from Mill Hill.

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Q315 Dr Harris: I know that Robert Key might want to come in on this issue, but in your view was Mill Hill given adequate consideration during the fifth meeting and in the process, in respect of whether it should be an active option or a fall-back option, or do you think the task force in the end was wanting some more data, information, and chances to discuss the status? Professor Davies: Can I make a comment on the meetings before the fifth meeting, and that is that it was incredibly useful to have Robin Lovell-Badge and Steve Gamblin there because they could always remind us what was going on in Mill Hill; so whenever we said that we should move to central London because we needed translational research, they could remind us of the significant amount of translational research that was going on at Mill Hill. It was not just translational research; it was also the ability to interact in a multi-disciplinary way with physics, chemistry, nanotechnology—all of the tools of medicine, which are diVerent from the clinical interface. There were two factors here. Again, Robin and Steve could remind us what was going on in NIMR, because not all of us had ever visited Mill Hill before. Therefore, up to the fifth meeting, we were very well informed about what Mill Hill was doing, and we always considered it— but I cannot comment on the fifth meeting. Q316 Mr Key: I will ask this of each of you in turn. Always and everywhere there is understandable institutional inertia when these sorts of decisions are made. In this very sad row, is it about institutional inertia or have fundamental errors been made by the MRC suYcient to invalidate any decision they might make about the future of NIMR? Professor Davies: I do not think it did. I think the MRC have done a very good job here. As we have said, the FIS came to its conclusion about NIMR not having a future in a 20 to 30-year time frame in Mill Hill. They then put that out to consultation and the thing that came back said, “you should pay more attention to Mill Hill”. They responded by setting up a task force. That was done in a very transparent, open way, which had international representation. It had representation from Mill Hill on it. I do not believe that the MRC could have done a better job than that. I think the fact that it is a diYcult situation in that it is a diYcult decision, and it is very important that we do not destroy an institute. It takes a long time to start a new institute, even if you gave me 100 million today— please, if you would like to do that— Q317 Chairman: No chance. Professor Davies: It would still take 10 years to do it because it takes that long to gel something like that. We have a fine Institute in NIMR, currently led by Sir John, and we do not want to destroy it. I think the MRC did all it could to ensure that that does not happen. Professor Tomlinson: I think we are forgetting what the consensus was at the end of the fifth meeting— and it is diYcult for me to convey the optimism and

the excitement that there was about a renewed institute, and our National Institute for Medical Research. In my evidence I said that originally, before I started on the task force, my prejudice, as a provincial lad, would have been to close it down and redeploy resources elsewhere. It was the strength of the arguments around this exciting new vision of relocation of a distinguished National Institute for Medical Research relocating into central London to produce the added value—it was the excitement of that vision that was driving us, and I really think that that is still there. It is not about closing the National Institute for Medical Research; it is about a renewed National Institute for Medical Research for the 21st century. Q318 Mr Key: Professor Davies, could I return to the meeting that you could not make, the fifth meeting of the task force. You told the consultants before that meeting that you had in mind a possible model for development of some form of transitional research on the Mill Hill site, if the task force favoured that option, but after that meeting your position was evidently not clear to everyone. You e-mailed the task force on 9 July and said: “Sorry not to make myself clear. As I said in one of my recent e-mails, we all agreed at an earlier task force meeting that the Institute should be in London; thus Mill Hill would be the fall-back position. However, as I understand, because of our clear preference for KCL or UCL, until we have explored those bids the task force has not examined the presentation by NIMR.” Are you happy that your consideration here was given proper time for consideration by the task force? Professor Davies: But I discussed that at length. The report of the task force was sent to me while I was in a conference on June the something— Monday the 21st probably. I was rather surprised by that report, and therefore I talked to other task force members and Colin Blakemore, and when I had finished discussing with people I was perfectly satisfied that I could endorse it. Q319 Mr Key: You had not changed your mind. Professor Davies: No. I was always very keen to explore translational research in a multidisciplinary way and explore what a UCL/KCL type option could oVer. Q320 Mr Key: Did any member of the task force call you in or telephone you, or put any pressure on you, between your two e-mails that day, 28 June? Professor Davies: Not that I can remember. They could not have done, actually, because I was at a conference so I was incommunicado. Q321 Mr Key: Can I ask both of you whether, if you feel that such a major issue as this one—this suggestion of yours, Professor Davies, should have been explicitly addressed by the task force? Do you feel that it was not addressed by the task force? Professor Davies: I think Professor Tomlinson can answer how my evidence was presented at that meeting.

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Q322 Mr Key: He was there. Professor Tomlinson: That particular issue of Professor Davies’s was—I absolutely agree with what she has just said. Dr Harris: There has been a bit of confusion over these e-mails. I cannot say whether it is important— Chairman: There are so many of them. Q323 Dr Harris: You gave an opinion to the consultants before the fifth meeting, that is before 21 June. Professor Davies: I met with the consultants. Q324 Dr Harris: You met with the consultants and you gave a view. According to Professor Blakemore, who was present at this interview, you put forward a possible model for development of some sort of translational research on the Mill Hill site, and the task force was to favour that option. Then it says that you pressed for clarity in the wording of the summary of the fifth task force meeting after you had received it at your conference. In one e-mail on 28 June you said: “I think we should at least clarify what the fall-back position is. If NIMR at Mill Hill is out of the question, it may be important to say that now.” The point being raised is that two hours later and without any further exchanges, you sent another email stating: “Since we are all enthusiastic about the central London possibilities, the summary can stay as it is without further discussion, as we clearly think that the new options are exciting and feasible. I favour no further change.” Was that your own hardening of opinion on that or had you been lobbied basically? Professor Davies: I am not sure I was lobbied, but somebody will have informed me about the options and the details of the discussion at the meeting—I was determined that we were not saying that NIMR was going to be closed. We were not saying it was a fall-back position either because we did not want to give Mill Hill equal status to KCL and UCL; and that is the key point, because we wanted active engagement in the new opportunity, as an inner stage process, so that we could then come back to those new opportunities as opposed to Mill Hill. I was assured by that. It was not lobbying. Somebody will have spoken to me but I can make up my own mind on that. It is very important that those became active options. Q325 Dr Turner: Why is it so important that your report should have gone to the MRC council meeting on 29 July? Why was that timing so important? Professor Davies: First of all, we wanted to move this forward. We would always inform council of where we were on this, and we thought it was very important to try and move to the next stage if we could; and in particular from the fifth meeting we could have gone for months and months and still not achieved consensus. We felt that if we moved forward, we might in the end get there, whilst minimising the destabilisation of the institution.

Q326 Dr Turner: You thought that by setting a deadline, it would concentrate the mind. Professor Davies: No, by informing council of what was going on so they could take part in the debate, we might be able to move things forward. Q327 Dr Turner: Did that necessarily have to be your full and final report? Might it have been useful to take a little more time to try and seek consensus? Professor Davies: We did say that the council could come back to the task force if it so desired. We did not completely draw a line in that sense. Q328 Dr Turner: Do you think that the issue, which seems to be the biggest bone of contention, which is the status of Mill Hill as a fall-back option, is an equal fall-back option or a fall-back, fall-back option? Do you think that that could have been resolved if you had had a sixth meeting of the task force? Professor Tomlinson: It might possibly have been resolved, but soon after the fifth meeting. Again, you heard what I said about the fall-back position: I would have opposed a fall-back position, and therefore I guess I would have caused trouble because the only alternative to that is an equal, level playing-field, with NIMR being at risk actually, just as KCL and UCL are at risk of losing in the competition. As far as I am concerned, what we were doing was correct, which was focusing upon the preferred option. NIMR is the baseline case, is it not, against which everything else will be compared? It is not about closing NIMR; it is about relocating the intact institution. Q329 Dr Turner: But do you not think it could have contributed towards stabilising the uncertainties if you had formalised the position of Mill Hill, so that whatever happened NIMR is still there, and no-one need to worry about the future? Professor Tomlinson: But everybody was aware that you cannot just close Mill Hill overnight. What we expected, and what we still expect, is that either KCL or UCL will come up with a deal which is good for British science and people at NIMR. That is what we expect, and that is what we focused upon—the new vision. Professor Davies: The counter argument to yours is that if you made it a level playing-field, would people at NIMR engage as actively in the process of thinking about the move, than if you just said, “let us just step back from NIMR at Mill Hill and look at these two options”? That is what we were trying to do. Q330 Dr Turner: That is not what I was trying to argue. I was trying to argue that if you accept the premise that either of the co-location options are the desired solution—and that is what you are working for—but Mill Hill still has surely a position in that if for some reason, whatever it may be—and there is a lot of complicated negotiation to be done—neither of these two options turns out to be viable, then in order to ensure the

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continuance of the work and building on work that has been done at Mill Hill, that Mill Hill then becomes the fall-back. Do you follow me? Professor Davies: Yes, I do. I think we were just afraid of making that because of the commitment issue. I do not think it is irrelevant, what you are saying. Professor Tomlinson: I must say that if neither KCL or UCL come up with a deal, then from my perspective I would be very reluctant—and I have made clear—I do not accept the fall-back position. Therefore, other options would have to be considered. Q331 Chairman: Kay Davies, in the e-mail traYc that has gone backwards and forwards prolifically, after that last meeting “careful examination of the Mill Hill option should be made but this is not the job of the current task force” (NIM116B e-mail 1248704). What was going on in your head at this time? Why did you have to say, “it is not our job”? Whose job was it—nobody’s? Professor Davies: We were looking at the future possibilities, the new opportunities for NIMR; and that was our responsibility at that stage. We wanted to explore those options. Q332 Chairman: Do you not think the smart thing would have been to keep the Mill Hill thing in? I know you are not smart politicians like we are, but at the same time do you not think you should have kept that in because it was quite clear that it was some kind of option anyway and should have been part of the task force remit? You could have opposed it, and others might have supported it, but that was really something the task force ought to have argued out. It seems to me that Paul Nurse was saying that too, in a way. Professor Tomlinson: We have both presented our views, and we do not know what the result of a sixth meeting of the task force— Q333 Chairman: I am just asking you whether you think it was smart not to do it. Professor Tomlinson: We had fulfilled the task that had been given to us, which was to make recommendations about the options for the size and location of NIMR. That is what the task force was asked to do. Q334 Chairman: You could have changed the remit at any point. After all, the chairman was the Medical Research Council Chief Executive. Professor Tomlinson: Maybe. Q335 Chairman: Easy meat. Professor Tomlinson: We are not smart politicians. Q336 Chairman: No, okay. What do you think of the step-change option that the NIMR produced? Professor Davies: That was discussed extensively. Professor Tomlinson: That was discussed in the fifth meeting, and was not considered to be in the same frame as—following the presentation.

Q337 Chairman: When you say “extensively”, was it one minute, 10 minutes, one hour? Professor Tomlinson: I cannot remember how long the task force meeting went on for, but it was discussed. That is all I can say. It certainly was not five minutes. Was it an hour? No, I do not think it was. Q338 Chairman: Was there much interest in it at the committee? Professor Tomlinson: No, and I think that again this is where—it is in the evidence and all the correspondence—Paul Nurse made an important contribution, saying that the future of NIMR is not at Mill Hill. That was an important intervention, I think. Q339 Chairman: Tell me what you think about the MRC council and its ability to carry out such decisions as this. Do you think, looking back, that it was the right place? I know how you were set up and so on, but could the task force not have made a point that perhaps some other organisation, neutral or whatever, might have looked at this— the Council for Science or something? Professor Tomlinson: No. What we are talking about here is the MRC, one of its most prestigious institutions. The people there at NIMR as I understand it are employees of the MRC. The MRC in that sense is like any other organisation— in my case a university, which I am sure you know a great deal about—and it is the responsibility of the institution to plan and implement its strategy. If, as the head of an institution, as I was at the College of Medicine in Wales, every time we wanted to make serious strategic decisions, we had to go outside our own governing body, then I think that would be dereliction of duty and would be entirely inappropriate. Q340 Chairman: If I can make the ironic point, Stephen, the fact that the Select Committee is looking at it was not in our remit either until a few months ago, and Parliament does look at many issues. I am not saying it should always come to Parliament—of course not—but some issues do have to like human embryology and laws and all that kind of stuV; and, after all, it is public money that you are looking at. We do look at the MRC. Professor Tomlinson: Indeed. Q341 Chairman: It was never really raised in our scrutiny of the MRC, which was some would say savage and others would say served the purpose. What do you think of that in terms of other bodies looking at the thing? Could you not have said that to the MRC council and made that recommendation? Professor Tomlinson: Could we have said it? Q342 Chairman: Yes, or recommended it to them. Professor Tomlinson: No, we were set up by the council of the MRC.

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Q343 Chairman: But you could make a recommendation to them for them as MRC council to take the report and think of that. Professor Tomlinson: The answer to your question has to be that, yes, we could have done that, but it was not something that was considered. Q344 Chairman: I know it was not, because it is not part of your remit as such and it is not part of your thinking in general—I understand that. Professor Davies: Nevertheless the MRC itself has enormous experience in this field. It set up the Clinical Sciences Centre; it moved the CSC from Northwick Park to the Hammersmith, where it is now a very successful institution; it has got the Weatherall Institute of Molecular Medicine; it has got the LNB which is less integrated with clinical science; it has seen, this particular problem, every which way. I would argue very strongly that the MRC council and staV had an enormous history in this particular problem, and therefore were well versed in the arguments and problems and therefore in a good position. Chairman: All I can say is that I understand that, but you should never count your chickens before they are hatched on any big political move; always assume the worst and move from there. I think we missed a trick in this case. Q345 Dr Turner: Going back to the question of money, were you satisfied when you made your recommendations to the MRC council that you had considered all of the relevant factors in particular the long-term costs? Professor Tomlinson: My own personal response to that is that until we know what the business cases are from UCL and KCL in the case of that recommendation to relocate to central London, then it is not possible to give full consideration to the financial cases because there are no full financial cases. Q346 Dr Turner: Fair enough, but do you think you should have considered the cost implications at least in outline? Was that part of the remit of the task force? Professor Tomlinson: Part of the remit of the task force was to frame the business case for future investment in NIMR, but in terms of identifying clearly the capital investment required and the revenue investment required for a renewed Institute of Medical Research, no, we did not consider that in detail. Professor Davies: Certainly at the first meeting the issue of how much more expensive it would be to run an institute in central London was raised, so we did not do it in the absence of any thinking at all. Q347 Dr Turner: Normally, a business case does have some price tags aYxed to it, even if they are approximate. They would have to be approximate in this circumstance. Did the consultants help with that in any way? Did they do any kind of thumbnail accounting of the likely cost implications?

Professor Davies: Again, in the earlier meetings we certainly went through those—so many hundreds of pounds per square metre for a new institute. You can do that sort of calculation on the back of an envelope. The real issue is how expensive it is to employ and recruit staV in central London. We measured that against the extra added value that being in central London would bring. That was something that was considered in detail. Paul Nurse certainly contributed to that because of his relevant experience. Q348 Dr Turner: You were satisfied that that balance came— Professor Davies: I was satisfied that there was suYcient information for us to move forward to consider those options. Before we come to a conclusion on those options, we need a detailed business case, which is a diVerent issue. Chairman: Let us go to where we move on to from here. We have been talking about past history, and I am sure you would be glad to say a few things. Q349 Dr Harris: How much damage do you think has been done to the NIMR and MRC as a result of this dispute? Professor Davies: How do you measure that? Some. The job now is to repair it and move forward. That is the only answer to that. Q350 Dr Harris: What do you think can be done to build trust up again? What consideration is the MRC council giving to that specific issue around relationships and confidence and trust? Professor Davies: A sub-committee has been set up by MRC council, chaired by Peter Fellner, to look at the NIMR business case as a baseline so that we can compare the other options, so we are moving forward in that sense. Q351 Dr Harris: Is that just looking at the move or is there a specific eVort being made by the council outside of the issues of the move, which is controversial, to try and bring people together, whatever that fluVy term might mean? Professor Davies: There is certainly awareness in council about the morale of staV, and the MRC are doing all they can to try and alleviate that—and we need to do more probably. I was not at the last council meeting before Christmas so I cannot make any further comment. Q352 Dr Harris: There is an issue of time because there is a perceived pressure to press on with this both for the sake of the timetable of any move, even though it is rather long term. Is time constraint now an issue, or is it more an issue of not wanting to drag out this process any longer? Is there an argument for having another process to go over some of the issues, not repeat the work of the task force, in order to seek to do the work for example that might have taken place or been achieved arguably in a sixth meeting; or is it your

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personal view that it is probably best to crack on now with the agreed timetable of agreeing a third option and a detailed business case and so forth? Professor Tomlinson: I think the latter. It is essential now that we crack on and accept the MRC’s decisions following the recommendations of the task force. It is particularly important to set the scene for beginning to recruit the successor to Sir John. It is essential that there is some certainty about what direction the National Institute for Medical Research is going in, because if there is continuing uncertainty, and certainly if there is turbulence, then what will happen is that I suspect it will be diYcult to recruit somebody of Sir John’s stature. Q353 Dr Harris: So no more turbulence is an argument for pressing on. Another argument might be that you are not going to get a better answer than that which at least the majority of the report of the task force provided—but is underlying it the idea that the credibility of the MRC is at stake if it does not go ahead with the timetable it has set out? Professor Davies: I think the credibility of the MRC council is not threatened—it has now arranged for site visits of KCL and UCL to move this forward, and that will happen in a very small time frame. That will only add to the process because that will be an informed decision at the next council meeting in February. That can only help the reputation of the MRC. We certainly need to maintain a dialogue with colleagues at NIMR as well. Q354 Dr Harris: Some people might argue that the MRC council in and of itself is no longer independent enough because it has so much in the dispute between itself and NIMR, if I can put it in those binary terms. That may apply by definition. Are you of the view that there is no case for trying to get an external view, or would you see this Select Committee report as an external view on process? Professor Davies: You are assuming that MRC council stayed with its membership the same this year as last, and it is not actually. As Nancy herself said, she has stepped down, and somebody else has come on who worked in NIMR, as it happens. Q355 Chairman: Are there dangers in that, do you think, with knowledge of history? Professor Davies: All I am arguing is that MRC council is not a static body and that new views will come in from diVerent positions. Q356 Chairman: It is quite a baptism, is it not, to come in at this stage? Professor Davies: If you are a bright scientist and you come on to the MRC council, you expect a baptism of fire whatever; there is always an issue— Q357 Chairman: Bright scientists are not always bright politically—we have heard that. Professor Davies: Some of them are. In any case, it is a new mind, a new contributor to the debate.

Q358 Chairman: What about the possibility of a phased move—unit by unit or whatever? Are there options like that still on the table, that it is not an all-in-one kind of move into the city, and the furore that stirs up? Do you think there is a case to be argued for bit by bit, a phased move? Professor Tomlinson: It is bound to have phases, the movement of people; not all 700 people will be able to move— Q359 Chairman: But there is such a diVerence in saying “phased”. It is like building a road; if you build it in phases it is much diVerent getting it through politically than saying “we want to build one big road” because you will not get the money for one big road, but you might get it in phases. Professor Tomlinson: This is a very careful balance, if you are talking about phasing the relocation of the scientists and what the impact will be on the science. I think that critical mass is important. You could not move, in my view, a small number of people one year and then wait another couple of years and move some more people. Q360 Chairman: Stephen, what we are doing is negotiating here about how the whole process would be carried out. It does not seem as if that was a consideration in the whole business; it was all or nothing. Professor Tomlinson: We were not given the job of implementing our recommendations. Surely, that is the job of the executive of the Medical Research Council? Q361 Chairman: I am saying that you were in a key position by being given that job to put real pressure on the MRC and determine how it moved, or they would not have appointed you in the first place. Professor Tomlinson: It might well be that that is a potential role for some or all of the members of the task force, but not as the same task force as has reached the conclusions about the recommendations. I believe that the council, the executive oYcers, are bound to ask for advice about the implementation of the relocation. Q362 Chairman: Looking back, do you think the remit was right or wrong? Professor Tomlinson: The remit of the task force. I think the remit for the task force was very clear, and it was correct. Professor Davies: I endorse that view. We are not saying there is any pre-set idea—if the conclusion that it is better and feasible financially for everything to move to central London, then that is the time to sit down with NIMR staV and say, “what is the best for the science to enable this to happen?” Q363 Chairman: In your heart of hearts, when do you think that will come about, given that you have been close to the parties concerned and their decisions? Will it be soon, late, 30 years, 100 years or never? What do you feel?

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Professor Davies: I would hope the commitment to the future would happen in a short time frame. The enactment of that vision may take a decade or more. Professor Tomlinson: I agree. Q364 Chairman: Do you think other task force members might feel the same?

Professor Tomlinson: I think so. Chairman: I know it has been painful and diYcult, going down history, but thank you very much for coming. You can see why we think it is a very important issue, and thank you very much for contributing and doing all the work on the task force and coming here today and giving us your views in a straightforward way. Thank you.

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Written evidence APPENDIX 1 Memorandum from the Medical Research Council MRC welcomes the opportunity to share with the Committee its vision for the future of NIMR and to address questions in the Clerk’s letter dated 27 October 2004. The vision and rationale is presented in detail in the Report of the MRC Task Force on NIMR published in July 2004. References to the Report are given below (TFR) particularly in section 4. 1. Introduction: MRC Governance, Scientific Strategy and Research Funding Policy Governance 1.1 MRC is a national organisation funded predominantly by the tax-payer and accountable to Parliament through DTI/OST as a Non-Departmental Public Body. Our primary mission is to encourage and support high-quality research and training with the aim of improving human health. 1.2 MRC is governed by a Council of non-executive members appointed by ministers following public advertisement. The Chief Executive is a member and deputy chair of the Council. Scientific vision and strategy 1.3 MRC develops its own scientific vision and strategy within the wider framework of government science policies. Our research strategy draws on inputs from all main stakeholders and partners in UK and abroad, including the research community. Relevant recent publications included the MRC Vision published in 2003 and the MRC Strategic Plan 2004–07. 1.4 The Vision, our new Strategic Plan and indeed MRC’s SR 2004 bid to Government for funding, all reflect MRC’s commitment, following broad stakeholder consultation, to giving greater priority to translational research in future: “We anticipate that the research MRC supports will have an increasing relevance to disease, with a greater priority given to translational approaches at the basic/clinical interface”. MRC A Vision for the future 2003 The Council will monitor and evaluate the impact of this approach to rebalancing across the MRC portfolio in future, not least in the context of the new Performance Framework for Research Councils. Other countries are seeing a similar push towards bridging the gulf between outstanding basic discoveries and their conversion into innovations that directly benefit patients or prevent disease. This requires a two-way transfer between laboratory work and patient care. MRC has embraced these new challenges: basic research will continue to be vital but we need to demonstrate that we can capitalise on the public’s investment in world class basic science with new translational approaches designed to turn research findings into healthcare. The types of research environment in which translational research will flourish were highlighted by MRC, again following broad stakeholder consultation, in the spring of 2003 (the “FIS principles” see appendix 1 and paragraph 3.2 below). A number of UK universities are now developing translational research environments for medical research, with funding from MRC and others. The Weatherall Institute of Molecular Medicine at Oxford and the Clinical Sciences Centre at Imperial College, Hammersmith are two such examples. Research funding policy 1.5 MRC has a long-standing policy of delivering its mission through research and training in its own units and institutes as well as in universities. The majority of units and institutes are hosted by or work closely with universities. Predominantly MRC funded and owned, their research programmes are rigorously peer reviewed in competition with research in universities. 1.6 The population of MRC units and institutes is highly dynamic to ensure that investment matches scientific strategy. For example of the 50 research units/institutes in existence in 1992, 27 have closed, 23 remain (two of these split into two) and seven new units have been opened. This rigorous and dynamic approach to management of the intra-mural programme is sometimes unpopular (not least with staV), however the Council believes it is an essential part of maintaining UK competitiveness in medical research in a fast-changing scientific world. Examples of this strategic dynamic approach in the past, and which is now paying oV in terms of calibre of research and researchers, would include the move of the MRC Toxicology Unit from a green-field site (Carshalton) to the University of Leicester, now under the leadership of Professor Pierluigi Nicotera, and the integration of the MRC Clinical Sciences Centre at Imperial College, Hammersmith Hospital now under the leadership of Professor Chris Higgins. A current example, to be

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announced shortly, is a major new strategic partnership between Cancer Research UK, MRC and Oxford University. This will take the form of a new translational centre in radiotherapy research, partly through a reconfiguration of the work of the MRC Radiobiology and Genome Stability Unit at Harwell.

2. The MRC’s NIMR 2.1 With a total expenditure of £32.8 million in 2003–04, NIMR is MRC’s single largest institute. 2.2 First occupied in the 1950s on a stand-alone site at Mill Hill in North London, NIMR houses approximately 730 people, including 520 MRC employees. The current Director, Sir John Skehel FRS, was appointed in 1987 until 2006. Although MRC has invested in appropriate refurbishment over the years, our long-term planning assumption is that substantial investment will be needed if these 70 year old buildings are to accommodate the needs of 21st century science. 2.3 NIMR research strategy is to focus on three areas of biology—development, neurosciences and infections and immunity—and to underpin this focus with genetics, biochemistry, cell biology, biophysics and structural biology.

3. Future of the MRC’s NIMR—the Scientific and Policy Context The ongoing review of the future of NIMR is part of the MRC’s normal approach to forward planning and strategic review of its intra-mural investment. The review also sits within a broader context of external and internal policy considerations—including the following: 3.1 The Quinquennial Review of Research Councils1 and the 10-year Framework for Science and Innovation2 confirm the Government’s policy that 3–5 year grants alone cannot deliver a world class science base and that special types of awards may be used by Councils, including intra-mural support in some. However these reports also emphasise the importance of clarity for stakeholders on the criteria for each institute/unit, on robust review and on co-location/partnerships with universities. 3.2 Prioritisation of major capital investments requiring extensive additional funds from Government is now managed on a cross-Council basis to draw up a strategy for calls on the Large Facilities Fund. As part of its own forward planning, MRC developed a Forward Investment Strategy (FIS) in 2002–03. The findings of the Council Subcommittee on FIS were published for consultation in 2003, articulating some key principles for future environments for medical research (“the FIS principles”—appendix 1). 3.3 The MRC’s focus on translational approaches has been echoed and developed in other in other fora during 2004.3 These have led to the setting up of the UK Clinical Research Collaboration (UKCRC) and the MRC/HDs Research Delivery Group. UKCRC is a partnership involving the Health Departments, the medical research charities, related industry sectors, the medical academies and NHS patients and carers and the MRC. UKCRC is taking a strategic overview of clinical research, gaps and opportunities and coordinating initiatives between funding bodies. The aim of the Delivery Group is to achieve greater strategic co-ordination of medical research between the main public sector funders in this partnership.

4. The Task Force Process 4.1 The Task Force was set up by the Council in the summer of 2003 following publication and consultation on the “FIS principles” (appendix 1) and on the recommendations for future investment strategy at four MRC-funded sites. The FIS report4 had highlighted the potential for enhancing translational research on all sites and proposed, for consultation, that NIMR be relocated to Cambridge to maximise interactions and synergy with other high quality science in the Cambridge Clinical School and Hospital and at the MRC’s Laboratory of Molecular Biology (LMB)) and other MRC Units in Cambridge. Council endorsed the FIS principles which continue to be used as a template for major new research investments including the new NIMR (see paragraphs 4.4, and 5, below). FIS conclusions in respect of three of the four sites were also endorsed. The consultation had demonstrated some concern regarding the initial proposals for the future of NIMR. Council accordingly saw the need to accelerate development of a vision for a strong scientific future for the NIMR and to consider and consult on a broader set of options for the size and location of the NIMR than those originally proposed by the FIS sub-committee. The Task Force was established for this purpose with members drawn from the Council, the NIMR, and national and 1 2 3

4

Quinquennial review of the Grant Awarding Research Councils—published by the OYce of Science and Technology in 2001. Science and Innovation Investment Framework 2004–14—Published by HM Treasury (July 2004). Bioscience 2015—Improving National Health, Increasing National Wealth—a report to Government by the Report by the Bioscience, Innovation and growth Team; Strengthening Clinical Science—a report from the Academy of Medical Sciences published in October 2003. MRC Forward Investment Strategy—published for consultation April 2003.

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international scientists. Membership was agreed by the (initially) joint chairs (the CEO and CEO-designate of MRC) in close consultation with the Director of NIMR. Membership and terms of reference of the Task Force are at appendix 2. 4.2 An overview of the Task Force process is set out in appendix 2 of its report (TFR appendix 2). Business was conducted primarily at five meetings, with video-conferencing for members who could not attend in person, and frequent telephone conferencing in the last months of its work. Conclusions of each meeting were published on the website together with all related email exchanges between members of the Task Force. Summaries of Council discussions were also published on the website in the normal way. 4.3 The Task Force consulted at three stages of its work (TFR appendices 2–9). An early consultation with funders nationally and internationally informed initial scoping of possible solutions by the Task Force. It then sought further views from a range of stakeholders who were interviewed by consultants and a written summary of their views passed confidentially to the Task Force. Finally, the formal consultation before the last meeting of the Task Force involved open and targeted invitations to comment on the emerging options and expressed the Task Force’s own preference for co-location. The consultation was not intended to be a “referendum”: the consultation document stated that the Task Force would take into account a number of separate considerations including: “the results of the consultation; the feasibility of diVerent options and the availability of specific sites suitable to each option and the assessment of diVerent options against the agreed criteria”. The Task Force received the quantitative results of the consultation in advance of its final meeting—the independent analyst for the exercise attended the meeting and confirmed that her qualitative analysis of the responses did not undermine the headline results from the quantitative analysis. The Task Force noted the striking diVerence of views between individuals and organisations on the issues of colocation and it is perhaps not surprising that in its final report the Task Force maintained its stated preference.

The vision for the future of the NIMR 4.4 The Task Force concluded that intramural research institutes, as exemplified by the best in the world, continue to play an important and distinctive role within the biomedical sciences. The Task Force also noted the increasing complexity of medical research—at a time when the global burden of disease is growing. Consultation and discussion in the Task Force demonstrated a hunger—from among research funders, scientists, physicians and patients around the world—to use the insights of biomedical science to change the practice of medicine for patient and societal benefit. The Task Force was well aware that this has proven diYcult to deliver. It took the view, as foreseen in the FIS principles (appendix 1), that future biomedical research environments will need to provide an environment which brings clinical and translational applications to the forefront. Accordingly, the Task Force vision is a multi-disciplinary biomedical research facility focused on basic and translational research. 4.5 The Task Force further noted that “there is already a significant ‘clinically-aware culture’ at NIMR and a real willingness of scientific staV to engage in the future vision, as evident from both their submissions to the Task Force and from the workshops held during the consultation process” (TFR appendices 5 and 6).

Location of the renewed institute 4.6 The Task Force gave due weight to the strong scientific track record of NIMR, derived in part from its interdisciplinary collaborations and overall cohesiveness. While the Task Force sought to build for the future, it proposed starting from the foundation of today’s scientific strengths at Mill Hill and the contributions these make to the MRC’s overall scientific portfolio. Accordingly, the Task Force expressed a strong desire to keep intact a critical mass of the existing excellent science and considered that a location which required a significant number of scientific and other staV to move would put this at risk. 4.7 However, the Task Force took the view, based on members’ knowledge and experience of the growing success of fully inter-disciplinary translational environments being developed in UK and overseas, that the culture shift required for the translational aspects of the mission of the new institute would best be achieved through physical proximity to a teaching hospital. The Task Force accepted that proximity of itself will not necessarily lead to strong clinical links—however they were firmly persuaded that if basic scientists and clinicians are in regular contact they are more likely to make connections between their respective research agendas. They also formed the view that the multi-disciplinarity and critical mass inherent in the vision for the renewed institute would best be achieved through co-location with a university that optimises access to the widest possible range of disciplines relevant to medical research—including for example physics, mathematics, chemistry, engineering and the social sciences. 4.8 The Task Force therefore concluded that moving NIMR to a central London site in partnership with a leading university/medical school would strengthen the institute’s ability to deliver its renewed mission.

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Financial issues 4.9 The Task Force took advice from professional buildings advisers on the costs of refurbishment likely to be needed at NIMR in the next 20 years. Proposed partner institutions also put forward estimates to the Task Force for the construction costs of new buildings (TFR section 6). Further work is now being done on estimated costs as part of further development of the business case. Further information will be available once more detailed submissions are received from proposed partners and from NIMR in late November. In the meantime MRC continue to assume that the capital expenditure required is almost certainly greater than we can fully finance from our own resources and that the final proposal will need to go forward to RCUK/ OST as an application to the Large Facilities Fund. 4.10 The MRC’s planning assumption for the renewed NIMR is to retain broadly the same volume of research activity. The co-location with a leading university and hospital should facilitate a number of opportunities for sharing of facilities.

5. Current Position and Next Steps 5.1 At its meeting in July 2004 the Council appointed Dr Peter Fellner as chair of a Steering Committee of Council members to oversee preparation of the science and business cases for the renewal of NIMR in accordance with the recommendations included in the report of the Task Force. The Steering Committee has met twice so far. Its membership and terms of reference are at (appendix 3). 5.2 The evaluation of the proposals for the renewed NIMR will be based on the FIS principles (appendix 1). Potential partners for delivering the vision for the new NIMR have been invited to focus on the areas set out in Appendix 4 which have been published on the website. 5.3 The Council’s formal conclusions on the science and business case for relocating NIMR await formal appraisal of the preferred options. These will weigh up the feasibility, costs and benefits of delivering the necessary facilities in central London in partnership with two alternative institutions—Kings College London and University College London. Financial considerations will be one element of the decisionmaking process. As with any Council decision, the final judgements will be based on getting the best science (with ultimate health output) for resource input. 5.4 The Council will consider more detailed proposals from the potential partner institutions at its next meeting on 15 December. Further decisions would be dependent on completion and approval of the business and science case early in the new year. In the event of relocation in Central London not being accomplished, the Council has reserved its position in order to be able to reconsider the longer-term future of NIMR and to look at all options afresh. 22 November 2004 Annex 1 MRC FORWARD INVESTMENT STRATEGY (FIS) PRINCIPLES 2003 The main principles are as follows: — Importance of appropriate two-way academic, clinical, and industrial linkages. — Ease of on-site interdisciplinary collaboration (adjacent buildings/facilities within walking distance; shared focal areas positively beneficial). — Issues of added value/opportunity cost (ongoing investment must be rigorously assessed against the possibility that it is a call on resources which could be deployed to greater eVect elsewhere). — Articulation of an optimal size for MRC institutes/centres. For example, in order to meet the requirements of the above template, those not embedded in university settings may have to be much larger to achieve critical mass. Those embedded in a multi-disciplinary campus should remain internally cohesive and well-focused, albeit heavily engaged on a wide range of on-site collaborations with shared infrastructure. — Financial flexibility—this will be a key factor for MRC in future in retaining competitive edge and ability to move quickly to capitalise on new scientific opportunities. — Focus on fewer locations with a view to providing first rate infrastructure and critical mass for training/career development. Not a major policy shift—almost 60% of MRC funding is already focused on only six sites across the UK. However, MRC would want to retain scope to support high quality research wherever it can best be done.

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Annex 2 MRC TASK FORCE ON NIMR Membership: — Professor Colin Blakemore—MRC Chief Executive (Chair); — Professor Alan Bernstein—President, Canadian Institutes of Health Research (nominated by the MRC); — Professor Kay Davies—University of Oxford—MRC Council member; — Professor Dick Denton—University of Bristol—MRC Council member; — Professor Richard Flavell—Chairman, Section of Immunobiology, School of Medicine, Yale University and Investigator, Howard Hughes Medical Institute (nominated by NIMR); — Dr Steve Gamblin—NIMR; — Professor Peter Gruss—President, Max Planck Society, Germany (nominated by NIMR); — Dr Robin Lovell-Badge—NIMR; — Sir Paul Nurse—President, the Rockefeller University, New York (nominated by NIMR); — Professor Steve Tomlinson—Vice Chancellor, University of Wales College of Medicine, CardiV (nominated by the MRC). The UK Health Departments have been invited to provide an observer, and a secretariat will be provided by Dr David Smith, MRC. Task Force Terms of Reference To make recommendations to the MRC’s Council on the future of the NIMR including: — The strategic positioning of the NIMR’s research within the MRC’s overall vision and policy framework for the future of medical research in the UK. — Consideration of and consultation on options for the size and location of the NIMR. — Framing of the business case for future investment in the NIMR. — Initial planning for the appointment of a new Director of the NIMR. The MRC’s Council set some ground-rules for the Task Force and also agreed on the importance of consultation in its work plan. The key points were: — The Task Force will start with a “clean sheet” regarding the future location and size of the NIMR. — The MRC’s Vision for Science and the policy drivers and principles for support of 21st century science articulated in the draft report from the FIS sub-committee will provide the primary MRC backdrop for the Task Force discussions. — A programme of staV consultation will be agreed. This will be shared with NIMR staV and their unions. NIMR staV and their unions will be consulted formally at key stages and a direct route will be available for them to provide comments to the Task Force. The Director of NIMR, Sir John Skehel, will attend meetings when appropriate. Annex 3 COUNCIL STEERING COMMITTEE—NIMR RENEWAL AND PARTNERSHIP At the meeting of Council held on 29 July 2004 Dr Peter Fellner was appointed to chair a Council Steering Committee to oversee the preparation of the Business and Science cases for the renewal of NIMR in accordance with the recommendations included in the report of the Task Force on NIMR. The Steering Committee membership is: — Dr Peter Fellner; — Mr Derek Flint; — Professor Alan North; — Professor John Savill; — Professor Herb Sewell. Terms of Reference The Steering Committee held its first meeting on 27 September and, subject to approval by Council on 13 October, adopted the following as its Terms of Reference: 1. To ensure that the necessary work is undertaken to prepare full science and business cases for the future of NIMR, as agreed by Council at its meeting on 29 July 2004.

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2. As a first stage to oversee the preparation of an options appraisal of the costs and benefits of the plans for a renewed Institute at (i) King’s College London and (ii) University College London, in comparison to Mill Hill as the base case. To ensure that this options appraisal provides the information necessary to enable Council to make an informed decision. 3. To ensure that the business case takes full account of the provision of key scientific infrastructure and facilities at the new location. 4. To ensure that action is taken to keep the staV of NIMR informed as appropriate about the preparation of the science and business cases. Annex 4 RENEWED NIMR—EVALUATION CRITERIA OCTOBER 2004 Dimension

Criteria

High quality research

— Significant opportunities for multi- and inter-disciplinary working — Potential for synergies with major initiatives — Significant opportunities to develop novel research at the international cutting edge in strategically important areas — Opportunities to develop and nurture research in special areas of national policy or interest — Strong academic links — Appropriate clinical links — Appropriate access to special research facilities (eg tissue banks, animal models, large equipment) — Possibilities of partnerships with other funders of research and inward investment — Appropriate contact with bioindustry — Appropriate links to complementary areas of science — An environment that enables recruitment, development and retention of outstanding researchers and support staV — A culture and infrastructure that will attract field leaders nationally and internationally — First rate training — Opportunities for translating research into the health service and into broader clinical development — Good value for the MRC — Scientific and financial flexibility for resource and capital budgets — An outstanding setting for research over a timeframe of 20 plus years

Partnerships

People—training, career development

Knowledge transfer Financial parameters

Annex 5 STATEMENT FROM MEMBERS OF THE TASK FORCE FOR THE MRC NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH The work of the Task Force was properly conducted and the views of staV at NIMR and the proposals for the Mill Hill site were fully considered. We were united in recommending a possible move into partnership with a leading university and hospital in central London. We were unable to reach consensus on whether the Mill Hill site should itself be considered as an active option, but the range of opinions was fully presented to the Council of the MRC. The Council has now decided to explore options at King’s College and University College London and we urge our colleagues at NIMR to engage positively in these discussions, to try to develop a n attractivepartnership agreement that will not compromise the institute’s integrity but will enhance its capacity to pursue its mission, to the benefit of medical research in the UK. Professor Alan Bernstein President, Canadian Institutes of Health Research Professor Colin Blakemore FRS Chief Executive, Medical Research Council Professor Kay E Davies CBE, FRS Dr Lee’s Professor of Anatomy and Honorary Director, MRC Functional Genetics Unit, University of Oxford

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Professor Richard M Denton FRS Department of Biochemistry, University of Bristol Professor Richard Flavell FRS Chairman, Section of Immunobiology, Howard Hughes Institute Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, CT, USA Dr Sir Paul Nurse FRS President, The Rockefeller University, New York, NY, USA Professor Stephen Tomlinson MD, FRCP, FMedSci Provost, Wales College of Medicine, Biology, Life and Health Sciences and Deputy Vice-Chancellor, CardiV University

APPENDIX 2

Memorandum from John D Spencer The Medical Research Council had a major research institute sited beside a hospital, indeed a purpose built hospital, Northwick Park. That hospital was built (in 1970) specifically to provide opportunities for translational research. The stated purpose at the time was that the basic research facilities would “solve” the problems thrown up by the “District General Hospital” dealing with real patients in the real world. Some wards were specifically designed to provide for dual access for the normal medical/nursing staV and for the researchers. You need to ask why the MRC withdrew from that concept. I went there in 1977 as a consultant and found that there was a fundamental conflict between the hospital medical establishment and the MRC appointed staV. The hospital consultants (eg Arnold Elton and Jonathan Levy) were traditional NHS type chaps whose main interest was private practice and who had no interest in research. As far as I know that is still the same today for the bulk of Consultants in Kings Hospital and University College Hospital. Research Institutes only work if everybody is pulling together with the same objectives. The senior staV at Northwick Park were on diVerent contracts—some NHS some MRC, some (very few) joint MRC/NHS. It didn’t work. The only way a new Institute set up with the same objective would work is if everybody in the Institute was on the same contract. See how enthusiastic the Kings consultant body is for the MRC if they cannot do private practice. See how enthusiastic the consultant body at University College is for the proposal if they cannot do private practice. In summary: The MRC had a purpose built translational research facility at Northwick Park. They need to explain why they closed it. How would setting up a new facility linked to a central London teaching hospital avoid the problems that ended the Northwick Park project? Does the MRC think that any new NIMR project should involve a Central London University where the main thrust of senior medical staV activity is directed towards private practice? If the NIMR moved to central London would either Kings or University College Universities provide a standard contract for all senior medical staV that excluded private practice and helped to ensure a common purpose? What precisely are the limitations on research at Mill Hill that preclude “leadership in research more directly related to the health and disease of human beings”. Is it really necessary to physically move a whole institution to remove those limitations? Most major advances in medical treatments are coming from basic cell research. The MRC doesn’t need to involve itself in clinical research. That can be done by existing medical institutions (with some support). What’s the evidence that involving the NIMR more directly with patients will produce better treatments and outcomes? If the NIMR really want to direct research aimed at solving the problems related to the health and disease of human beings then why don’t they just ring up a few NHS consultants and ask them what the problems are? You don’t need to move a whole institution to get a new direction for your research programme. 27 October 2004

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APPENDIX 3 Memorandum from Dr William James, Sir William Dunn School of Pathology, University of Oxford 1. I believe that proposals for reform of an institution of substance, like NIMR, need to start with an analysis of how it has been performing in relation to the function it is supposed to discharge. 2. It appears to me that the primary function is intended to remain the pursuit of medically-related research at the highest level. 3. Against this measure, the performance of NIMR is not evaluated in the document from the MRC entitled “NIMR: Consultation with Stakeholders, May 2004”, and so all the prescriptions and possibilities that follow cannot be evaluated as solutions to the “problem”. 4. I have briefly looked at the key outputs of NIMR over the last half decade in comparison with my own 5* institution, together with the financial inputs and believe the evidence indicates that the MRC is getting a good deal for its money. 5. If NIMR is not broken, why fix it, particularly if there is any serious danger that the operation has a risk of failure? 6. Briefly, NIMR has about twice the number of principal investigators than the Dunn School, costs approximately twice the amount to run and publishes approximately twice the number of papers. 7. The proportion of post-docs is lower and the proportion of support and admin staV higher at NIMR than here, but if the output is good, why should that be a concern? 8. Of the papers published in 1999 at both institutions, the top 10 cited papers from NIMR were cited an average of 186 times (!/"15) and the top five papers from the Dunn School in the same year were cited an average of 150 (!/"13) times. 9. This brief analysis suggests that NIMR is performing at the very top of the national scale in terms of quantity and quality of scientific output, at a cost per unit output that is comparable with another highly regarded, University-based institution. 10. The Task force needs to make a more persuasive case than it has that radical change is needed, in my view. 27 October 2004

APPENDIX 4 Memorandum from N Michael Green, Department of Mathematical Biology, National Institute for Medical Research The main avowed objective of the proposals by the MRC for the future of the NIMR is to promote clinical research and to provide clinicians with opportunities for an education in research methods. Given that this is a worthwhile objectives is it best achieved by revolution or evolution? So far the MRC has focused on the revolutionary solution. They propose to move the Institute to a new site in central London, emphasising the advantages of the new interactions which this would promote, with little apparent thought about the ensuing disruption of support facilities and of research teams. I would like to put forward briefly the advantages of an evolutionary approach, which could achieve the objective in a less destructive manner. There are at least two ways in which this might be done. 1. Clinical facilities could be created at Mill Hill, where there is plenty of space, but this would be expensive and diYcult to justify in terms of the need for a new hospital in the area. 2. A more practical alternative would be to build research facilities on one of the sites (UCL or KCL) already identified, to promote clinical research in collaboration with appropriate groups at NIMR. New appointments at NIMR could enhance the process, so that the new outstation of the Institute could grow and change according to demand. Such growth by evolution has proved successful at both LMB and NIMR and could be both less destructive and more economical than the current proposals for wholesale transfer. It is a fallacy to assume that proximity in itself promotes collaboration as can be seen from examples within the MRC. Very little of the first class research done at the Laboratory for Molecular Biology in Cambridge has involved clinical collaborators, in spite of the location next to a large hospital. Fruitful collaboration usually emerges from a common interest in specific problems, with benefit from complementary technical approaches. It often evolves slowly. The focus and the collaborators may change as the scientific understanding develops and new collaborators may well be distant, including international. Collaboration is driven by the science not by proximity. In a large Institute it can be fostered by new appointments. Examination of the publications from the NIMR shows how much this can change the focus of research in five or 10 years.

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I hope that that the proposals can be reconsidered in rational terms rather than burying them in the jargon of “management”—Blinded by the Vision! 27 October 2004

APPENDIX 5 Memorandum from Jacky Smith, Head Technician in Developmental Biology and Molecular Neurobiology, National Institute for Medical Research I first came to the National Institute for Medical Research in September 1967 as a very raw school leaver. Apart from a couple of sojourns to other MRC units, I have been here since. I was shocked and saddened to hear the plan to relocate NIMR to central London as I feel that the site here at Mill Hill is very well suited for our scientific needs and it would be hard to better the facilities elsewhere. I have seen many changes over the last 37 years, most of which have been for the better and I do feel that the building has evolved well to keep up with the necessary changes in science. Of course, we have a wonderful site here in Mill Hill and it would be not so pleasant to have to travel into London, but the major problem which I have is that it seems the new location would be change for change’s sake. Any new building (whether it was in London or Aberdeen) would take a long time to begin to work properly and a move would destroy the very cohesive community which we have here. My own experiences as a Head Technician here have shown that my work and the smooth running of our departments would not proceed so well without this “community spirit”. The other major worry is that, as yet, we have no real idea of the size of the new NIMR and so, Professor Blakemore’s “exciting vision of the future” is for me an unknown quantity. Our animal facility, here in Mill Hill, is superb and as this would be hard to construct elsewhere, work would be drastically slowed down until the new facility was “up and running”. In summary, I feel that an upgrading of our present site would be infinitely preferable to a new venue elsewhere. If, however, NIMR could be moved in its entirety to a new building, which would greatly improve the already excellent science which goes on here, then it would be hard to argue against such a move. Evidence, so far, does not, in my opinion, support this. 28 October 2004

APPENDIX 6 Memorandum from Dr R J M Wilson and Dr D H Williamson, National Institute for Medical Research 1. The executive of the MRC insist that basic, translational and clinical research must now cohabit. Here is an example of recent research at NIMR that has come to fruition without the need for such a juxtaposition. 2. Malaria is an international disease and a global problem. It touches on several continents, it is important in military interventions and it aVects many British people by their movements around the world. In these respects, malaria is an international problem just as much as cancer or heart disease. The solution requires international collaboration. 3. At Mill Hill we recently discovered, out of blue-sky research, that malaria parasites have a novel organelle of plant origin. Suddenly this explained why certain antibiotics are active against malaria in the clinic. More importantly it opened up insight into bacterial biochemistry inside the human parasite that was previously unsuspected. International trials of modified antibiotics in malarious patients now show promise for the advent of a new array of antimalarial drugs. This advance has come about because our lead was taken up by an interested and responsive international community of researchers. AYliation with a local hospital in London did not enter the picture. It was not necessary. 4. The MRC’s “vision” has a limited perspective compared to the reality of modern day science. 3 November 2004

APPENDIX 7 Memorandum from Dr Pushpa Bhargava, Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology, Hyderabad When I was recently in London to attend a meeting on “Ethics, Science and Moral Philosophy of Assisted Human Reproduction” organised by my old friend, Professor Robert G Edwards, FRS, at The Royal Society, I learnt that the Medical Research Council (MRC) is considering shifting the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR) to the campus of Kings College in Central London, and narrowing the Institute’s

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focus to infection and immunity alone. May I, as an admirer of British science and the MRC and of the many highly productive initiatives that the MRC has taken over the last 50 years or so, and as one who has gained immensely from the NIMR, take the liberty of listing below some of my concerns in regard to the above proposal. (i) I am unable to see any tenable reason for moving the Institute from its present campus which is beautiful, functional and provides scope for the Institute to expand or engage in new activities that may require additional construction. (ii) NIMR is now as autonomous as it should be. It is likely to lose a part of this autonomy if it is moved to the campus of a university college. There were very specific reasons why all over the world in the last century-and-a-half, research institutions and agencies were set up to function autonomously outside of the university system. I have listed these reasons in one of our books, “The Saga of Indian Science since Independence: In a Nutshell”, published by the Universities Press in 2003. (iii) I am told that the proposed shifting of the Institute may cost around a hundred million pounds—a sum which is not trivial for even an aZuent country like the UK. Will the expected benefit (if any) from the proposed move, be commensurate with this expense? (iv) One of the important strengths of NIMR in its present location is its excellent animal house. It is more likely to be “attacked” in Central London (and its activities made more restrictive) by animal-rights fundamentalists than in its present location. This would be an anachronism as the MRC’s stand in regard to the animal rights movement is widely known and appreciated. (v) On account of some of the factors mentioned above and the new mandate that would curtail the scope of the activities of the NIMR, we fear that some of the best-known members of the existing scientific staV in the Institute may leave, and its ability to attract people may diminish. (vi) The scientific record of the Institute since its inception more than five decades ago, has been outstanding both in basic and applied work. What has been impressive is the sustained excellence of the scientific work of the Institute over this long period. This is exemplified by Nobel Prizes to scientists who have worked there, its ability to attract and retain people of that calibre, and the number of NIMR scientists that have been elected to the Fellowship of The Royal Society. I recall the discovery of both paper and gas chromatography at the NIMR, as of interferon and cryo-preservation of spermatozoa, all of which have had enormous impact in diverse areas. Along with the LMB at Cambridge, NIMR has been the flag-ship of MRC. Therefore, the move to shift the Insitute may, in the eye of its scientific peers, tantamount to a policy of denigration of sustained excellence in the important field of bio-medical research. This would be a most saddening anachronism as Britain has been widely perceived as the Mecca of outstanding biomedical research, that has taken bold decisions and blazed new trails in the area. Indeed, if such were not the policy of MRC, the structure of DNA would not have been discovered—or the LMB set up—when it was! (vii) Few institutions of the size of NIMR have made the contribution it has—both in quality and in quantity—in initiating and supporting bio-medical research in other countries that have been not so well endowed as Britain has been. I have been one of the many beneficiaries of this generosity—and so have been many of my distinguished friends around the world. The integrity of such an Institute needs to be supported and not diminished. This does not mean that one may condone lapses in quality or quantity, or lack of focus or of commitment to society. Such institutes surely themselves like to be monitored continuously and stringently in regard to all these parameters, but any change required to maintain the high standards of such institutes in various respects, must come from within and not enforced from outside. (Such an imposition from outside, I recognise, is necessary in the case of institutes that have deteriorated beyond a point, which NIMR certainly has not.) In fact, I believe NIMR has been submitted to regular stringent peer reviews, and appropriate action taken following such reviews. I dare say that it is this stringent introspection and inspection that has allowed NIMR to keep its place of pride in the community of laboratories of the highest level of excellence in the field. (viii) As I have stated above, research institutes of a high level of excellence in the non-university sector have played an important role around the world in the progress of science and technology. Examples would be NIH, Institut Pasteur, several CNRS and INSERM labs in France, the laboratories of the Max-Planck Gesselschaft in Germany, of CSIRO in Australia, and of CSIR, ICMR and ICAR in India, and the institutes under the national scientific academies in countries such as Russia and China. I am sure you are just as well aware as I am that this has led to jealousies against such institutes on part of the university system in many countries, and thus generated an unreasonable (sometimes overt, sometimes covert) opposition to them. In the light of this ground reality, the proposed action in regard to NIMR is likely to send a wrong message around the world and could be used by unscrupulous elements in countries such as mine, to diminish nonuniversity research. It is, in fact, partly this concern that has prompted me to write this letter to you. Science is today the only truly international activity that cuts across all man-made barriers. 2 November 2004

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APPENDIX 8 Memorandum from Dr Robb Krumlauf, Scientific Director, Stowers Institute for Medical Research I am delighted to hear that the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee are conducting an inquiry into the future of the MRC National Institute for Medical research. I have been deeply concerned about the validity of both the decision and the process by which the MRC Forward Investment Strategy and the subsequent Special Task Force reached the conclusion that it would be in the best scientific interest of the MRC to close NIMR and merge it with University College London (UCL) or King’s College London (KCL). I should preface my specific comments by noting that I was a team leader and Head of Division at NIMR over a 15-year span from 1985–2000. I am a strong supporter of NIMR because it is a very special environment that combines scientific excellence in basic research with collegiality and shared resources. In my opinion NIMR was and is successful for four main reasons: 1. they attract top rank investigators at all levels; 2. they are focused on an area (basic biomedical research); 3. they employ shared core resources to maximize eYcient use of enabling technologies; and 4. minimal bureaucracy permits a greater eVort on generating research discoveries. This has lead to synergy and underpinned the outstanding scientific discoveries, which have emerged from this leading international institute. This kind of synergistic and interactive scientific culture is not easy to achieve and can’t simply be transplanted to a new location. The current view of the MRC is that basic research needs to be combined with translational and clinical research and that this could not happen if NIMR remained in its present location, as there are no universities or hospitals on the site. In this regard it is important to note that in university and clinical settings there may be additional opportunities for collaborations, but there are also greatly increased demands upon researchers time and resources associated with the goals of universities and hospitals in educating students and treating patients. This can seriously dilute the eVectiveness of an independent and synergistic institute focused on research outcomes. There is no doubt that it is of paramount import to exploit basic research discoveries though translational and clinical research directed towards improving health and well being. However, it is essential that we not to loose sight of the fact that generating basic research discoveries is the engine which drives this process. In the absence of basic or fundamental findings there is no raw material to develop and translate for the public good. Furthermore, successful translational and clinical research depends upon diVerent skills, goals, approaches and resources than basic research. These are very diVerent kinds of science. As a consequence immediate proximity in the same institution of those with expertise in basic, translational or clinical research does not always foster synergy and is often seen as a dilution of focused eVort. It would be foolish to attempt to take the relatively small-sized group of scientists at NIMR and divert the focus from basic research. There is little probability that they would have the critical mass to make an eVective eVort in more than one of these areas. Collaboration and interaction are the key to exploiting research discoveries not simply proximity. I read with utter disbelief that the subcommittee felt NIMR on its present site might be too isolated from clinical or academic expertise to remain attractive and competitive. NIMR is widely respect as a great place to train and routinely attracts some of the very best postdoctoral fellows and students worldwide. With respect to collaboration while at NIMR I had active and productive collaborations throughout the UK and around the world. Science in today’s world sees few boundaries and the immediate proximity to clinical or academic expertise does not in any way ensure close collaborations. The clinical expertise at UCL or KCL while good is still limited and scientists at NIMR already have productive links with clinicians in many locations. It was particularly confusing to me that the Special Task Force re-evaluating the future of NIMR reached a decision to move to KCL or UCL without considering the option of remaining in its present location. The Task Force confirmed that NIMR was an outstanding Institution and that any the option to move had to ensure the science and opportunities were equal to its present location. However, the cost eVectiveness of moving to central London and maintaining the critical mass of scientists and animal facilities required to support their research was not properly considered. To those of us outside the country it appeared there was a hidden agenda to close NIMR and move it at all costs. The scientific criteria and cost justification for such a decision were totally unclear. In the US and Europe NIMR is seen as a special place and is widely held to be one of the very best places in the world to train. Since the announcement by the MRC on its intensions for NIMR I have been besieged by colleagues from the US and Europe asking how it would be possible for the MRC to turn a blind eye to one of its jewels and asking if they can help to avert this illogical course of action. I must say that the standpoint taken by the MRC is frankly viewed by the international scientific community as foolish and ignores the process of scientific peer review, which has underscored the quality of science at NIMR. To my international colleagues and myself this comes across as blatant political maneuvering and is a sign that the MRC has lost its way in planning for the scientific needs of the country.

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In recent years, the ineVective way that the MRC has handled support for project grants and universities has lead to great hardships for academic researchers in universities. Naturally this has made them envious of the core support for institutions such as NIMR. To close NIMR and downsize it in a new location to save money that can be directed in other areas to meet needs is short-sighted. The move to central London may cost much more money with little promise of increased productivity. The MRC needs independent and focused research institutes as centers of excellent. Finally, if scientists at NIMR are unable to recruit good people because of this decision it will be extremely diYcult to maintain their research productivity. The uncertainty about whom and how many people would move to London and the time delay of the move will drive many of the best people at NIMR to seek other positions. Poaching by other institutions and universities will lead to a steady drain of top scientists and recruitment of new team leaders will be ineVective due to the uncertainty. The end result will be that a vibrant and strong NIMR will no longer exist to move. In summary for a variety of reasons it is imperative that the MRC reconsider its decision and initiate a fair and scientifically based evaluation of its strategy. The MRC can’t aVord to allow this decision to stand without a fair and credible debate, otherwise irreparable damage will be done to one of its major institutions. 3 November 2004

APPENDIX 9 Memorandum from Professor Dr Fritz Melchers, Max Planck Institute for Infection Biology, Berlin Let me state at the beginning that the NIMR at Mill Hill has an excellent world reputation as a multidiscipline, modern molecular-genetic, cell-biological institution, with important impact on the understanding and management of human diseases. This reputation has been gained in decades of highly exciting, groundbreaking research and has put Mill Hill “on the map”. I am sure that you have reached a similar conclusion and that your intention is to secure a prosperous future for this excellent institution under the most economic conditions. It is, therefore, troublesome for me to hear that you consider the possibility of either fragmenting the institution into separate sites of a “virtual” institute, or of moving the institution into central London into a place that has yet to be found, and maybe to be built. The first idea of a virtual institute is certain to destroy the essence of a physical unity of communication. Despite the great craze about modern media for communicating (like I do it with you here) there is nothing that equals personal contacts in the discussions on unforeseeable opportunities—and I wonder whether the British culture would ever be able to abandon the “afternoon tea culture”. Such worries would not exist if you found a place in central London for the NIMR—but you surely agree with me that it will be VERY costly, and almost impossible to realise. Furthermore it adds unnecessary burdens of justification towards the taxpayer in times when money for ALL projects of society are scarce. This option, therefore, appears unrealistic—leading into a situation in which you could be forced to conclude that the institute would have to be terminated since you could not find a place for it. In summary, it forces on me the conclusion that “DON’T FIX WHAT AIN’T BROKE”. Let me add that I know how diYcult it was—and remained—to keep the Basel Institute for Immunology (a companion and friend of the NIMR) in the forefront of internationally recognised, top research places, and what a tremendous loss for this research its sudden, badly contemplated closure has been. Once you have destroyed years of hard developments and constant renovations these achievements are lost—rapidly and apparently forever. 6 November 2004

APPENDIX 10 Memorandum from Dr Robert B Belshe, Saint Louis University I am Professor of Medicine and Molecular Microbiology at Saint Louis University School of Medicine. I have trained both at the US National Institutes of Health and for one year at the National Institute for Medical Research in Mill Hill. Therefore, I have had an opportunity to view both the US premiere medical research institution and the British institution. Regarding the proposal to relocate the National Institute for Medical Research into central London, I would comment that it is not a very practical idea. The conduct of medical research often requires use of animals and specialised bio-containment facilities. Both of these specialised facilities are available at Mill Hill, but the large space requirements and security requirements would seem to be diYcult to recreate in central London. Furthermore, the major costs in relocating these facilities into central London, in my opinion, would be better spent by upgrading the facility at Mill Hill. In my view, the important work that

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is ongoing at NIMR should be well-funded and supported and not be subject to threats of relocation in attempts to reduce costs, but rather reinvestment in an ongoing work at a very strong physical and academic facility is in order. 5 November 2004

APPENDIX 11 Memorandum from Professor StaVord Lightman, University of Bristol First I think I should like to point out the obvious—that NIMR is a unique British centre of research excellence with a fantastic international reputation. It would be unthinkable to risk losing this jewel in our crown unless we had hard, good quality evidence that an alternative was at least as good if not better. The current situation is simply undermining NIMR, causing a major distraction for the scientists involved and a threat to future recruitment. There are several questions for which I would like to seek answers. 1. What is the true reason for the MRC’s wish to move NIMR and the rationale behind the timing for this? 2. Why is it that the MRC has not listened to the views of the overwhelming majority of the scientific community? On both occasions that the community was consulted there was an overwhelming majority in favour of NIMR remaining at Mill Hill—but the MRC, rather than listening, seems to feel it knows better. There is a feeling of a small cabal wanting to impose their will on the scientific community. 3. Did we really need to pay for expensive consultants to canvass our views? I don’t feel that this canvassing was helpful in any way and I am amazed that the MRC couldn’t have done it themselves and saved the money and spent it on science! The key point appears to be the MRC’s apparent emphasis on clinical translation. This is a very laudable aim—but the MRC show a lamentable lack of insight into the translational research process. Good translational research comes from the intellectual links between the best basic and clinical research scientists—who may be at any institution in the UK. NIMR already has superb links with clinicians (of their choice) all over the country and have been working with many young clinical scientists who are grateful to be out of range of their hospital pagers! It could certainly be argued that we should increase the numbers of clinicians collaborating with NIMR—but this could be done in a totally diVerent way, for instance by creating a special fellowship programme to attract the very best clinical scientists to spend time at appropriate departments at Mill Hill. Moving NIMR to a London hospital site would be likely to reduce rather than increase the number of clinicians and clinical centres that would collaborate with NIMR and would thus decrease the potential for high quality collaborative translational research. I am amazed the MRC haven’t learnt from the disasters they have had at the Clinical Research Centre at Northwick Park and now the CSC as well. Simply moving Mill Hill into the campus of a University hospital is actually likely to lower the standards of research, cause a loss of some of the top scientists to other centres abroad and only help—to some extent—the particular institution which houses the new centre and will uniquely benefit from an infusion of MRC money at the cost to all the other good translational research centres in the UK. It is simply not true that independent institutes cannot collaborate eVectively unless they are physically rubbing shoulders with doctors. Most basic scientists are very keen to collaborate and to see their ideas put into a clinical setting. For them to have the widest choice of clinical collaborators is much more important than rubbing shoulders with people who might not be the most appropriate co-investigators. One of the great strengths of Mill Hill has been its critical mass in interdisciplinary interactions unlike the emphasis on intra-disciplinary critical mass forced on the Universities by the RAE process. It is the ability of structural biologists, bioinformaticists, neuroendocrinologists, parasitologists, physical biochemists and immunologists (for instance) to communicate together which really moves things forward. An example in my own sphere is that a neuroendocrinologist at Mill Hill noticed that the developmental biologists at the same institution had made a knock-out mouse which among other things had a neuroanatomical abnormality with similarities to the human condition of septo-optic dysplasia. This allowed this neuroendocrinologist to set up a collaboration with the developmental biologists and trained a clinician from Great Ormond Street to clone the human gene candidate, show it was responsible for the human disease, and worked out how this occurred. What we want to do is to make it easier to move the bright young doctors and scientists about and mix them up. This will allow us to spend our time fixing what is, in my opinion, the real problem—the careers of academic clinical scientists within the NHS environment. There are many other examples I could discuss which result in advances from fields as far apart as memory and malaria but the true point I want to make is that a move of NIMR to central London would be likely to reduce these collaborations and decrease our ability—as a country—to do good translational research. What we really need to do is to think positively about how to improve Mill Hill, make it more cost-eVective and think of novel schemes to increase interaction with universities throughout the British Isles. I should, therefore, like to make three further points:

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1. The cost of moving Mill Hill to a central London site would be enormous and I am not clear how the MRC will be able to create a large secure animal facility in a city centre site. Not only would the move cost a vast amount of money, but a lot of the scientists would not want to move into a very expensive part of central London and would be likely to leave—many of them abroad. I should therefore like to know what are the costs of the move into central London and how the MRC believes there are hypothetical benefits that can outweigh them. 2. I would like to suggest that the money could be far better spent in other ways. Not only could we increase the number of fellowships for clinicians to go to Mill Hill, but we could also make modest investments both at Mill Hill and building late translational facilities in several diVerent hospitals around the UK (MRC clinical investigation units would be very cost eVective), making the best of the science base at Mill Hill. We could, for instance, use their transgenic facilities to make animal models of disease. 3. Finally, I should like to share with you my great discomfort with the MRC’s current approach to serving the scientific and translational needs of the UK. I believe the MRC has been introspective, listening only to those it wants to hear and not responding to the vast majority of biomedical scientists in the UK for whom funding from the MRC has become an increasingly distant wish. If this country didn’t have the Wellcome Trust and the BBSRC also supporting our biomedical sciences, we would be a third world nation in terms of our science with all that would entail for our industrial base. 8 November 2004

APPENDIX 12 Memorandum from Professor Stephen Challacombe, King’s College London May I comment in general terms on the future of the NIMR, whilst declaring a potential interest since I am part of Kings College. I have four major points: (i) The process undertaken by the MRC (consideration of the various possibilities, widespread consultation) seems to me to have been exemplary. (ii) The recommendations of the Task Force (site in London with close links to a major research/ clinical base) seem extremely sensible. The reason is that such a linkage would maximise collaboration and enable and foster robust links with translational and clinical research. This surely is the real aim and purpose if the real strengths of NIMR are to have any impact on health and healthcare. (iii) Keeping the NIMR as a single and identifiable entity is important. It is an internationally competitive and splitting NIMR into smaller entities risks losing the leverage that a high quality research institute should have on training and on the public understanding of science. (iv) London with its large and diverse population is the correct location to realise the aims above. 9 November 2004

APPENDIX 13 Memorandum from Professor Sir David Weatherall, University of Oxford 1. Background I should preface these brief comments on the future of the NIMR by stating that I have had no input into any of the discussions that have been involved in this decision; rather, I write simply as a concerned member of the biomedical science community who is becoming increasingly worried about the deleterious eVect that this long drawn process is having on the morale of medical research workers in the UK. My only qualifications for presenting this evidence are that, for the last 25 years, I have been closely concerned with developing ways of facilitating the interaction of basic scientific research with its clinical application. This has entailed establishing what is now called the Weatherall Institute of Molecular Medicine in Oxford, together with several other similar developments, both in Oxford, other parts of the UK, and the USA. Since retirement I have been involved in two other activities with similar objectives, writing a major report for the World Health Organization, Genomics and World Health, and several sections of a major work that is being published under the auspice of the Disease Control Priorities in Developing Countries project which is being sponsored by the Fogarty International Center, National Institutes of Health (NIH), USA, and the World Bank. Based on experience gained in these various activities I thought that a few thoughts might be helpful to the committee.

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2. The Current State of Biomedical Research Over recent years there has been a major change in the range and scope of medical research. Instead of a series of watertight compartments it now stretches in a seamless fashion from basic molecular and cell biology, through research at the bedside, to epidemiology, health economics, and the social sciences. To realise the full potential of some of the remarkable developments in some of these fields, particularly the basic biological sciences, it will be essential to try to bring them together in an integrated fashion; while this was a problem for medical schools like Oxford in the 1970s, my recent experiences with the WHO and with the health economists at NIH and the World Bank have further highlighted the relative isolation of each of these branches of medical research, to their mutual detriment. Any planning for the future of biomedical research must take this isolation and need for integration into account.

3. Attempted Solutions As early as the 1980s it was clear that the rapid developments in the field of molecular and cell biology were going to have major implications for medical research. Yet how could this totally new technology be integrated into a medical school? As an experimental approach the Institute of Molecular Medicine was developed in Oxford on the John RadcliVe Hospital site. It was designed such that basic scientists who were interested in the clinical applications of molecular biology could work together with clinicians who would bring their own clinical research problems into this environment. There seems little doubt that integrating these disparate fields on the same site have helped to bring them together. Basic scientists and clinicians have developed a mutual respect, and, by insisting on communal social facilities, research workers from diVerent fields have developed valuable collaborations. The particular advantage of this close juxtaposition of basic science in a hospital setting encourages young doctors and scientists from the hospital to attend seminars and to be stimulated at an early stage in their development towards careers in medical research. And it provides an environment where basic scientists can interact more easily with clinicians and try to understand the complexities of human disease. More information is available about the work of the Institute on its website. Based on the success of this development a second basic science institute, The Wellcome Institute for Human Genetics, was established on the hospital site in Oxford and, most recently, the Sir Richard Doll building has been developed next door to it so as to bring epidemiology and molecular genetics into juxtaposition. Developments of this kind require a good understanding on the part of the clinical staV of the importance of the applications of basic science towards developments in patient care and hence it is vital that, if such integrated centres are being established, this is done in environments in which there are medical schools with very good track records in clinical research. The other critical issue which seems to have led to any success that the Oxford developments have had is that, in setting up the diVerent research groups in the basic research institutes, there was already strong evidence that there were related fields in research in a medical school which would be synergistic with those in the Institute. This requires very careful planning and the appointment of personnel who are able to work with one another. Each major research group in the Institute also has a “parent” department in the medical school so as to increase the synergy between the clinic and the research laboratory.

4. Experience in Other Centres The STC will no doubt be familiar with what has happened at the Addenbrooke Hospital site in Cambridge over recent years. Although the Laboratory of Molecular Biology (LMB) was next to the main teaching hospital, for many years there was very little interaction between the two. However, following some critical appointments in both institutions interactions gradually evolved and this led to the subsequent development of the Wellcome Trust Centre for Molecular Mechanisms in Disease which, in essence, links together the work of the two institutions. To an outsider, again this slow but excellent development relied on the coming together of key persons with compatible research interests. It is interesting to compare these developments with various institutions in the USA. At about the same time as the Institute of Molecular Medicine was established in Oxford a similar project was set up at Stamford University. Here, there was very little attempt to integrate the work with that of clinicians and it has remained rather an isolated basic biomedical science development. On the other hand, the more recently built Institute of Molecular Medicine at Houston has integrated much more closely with clinicians in the adjacent hospitals, and its early work reflects this synergy.

5. Does Close Proximity of Basic and Clinical Science Facilitate the Application of Scientific Discovery to Its Use in the Clinic? From the examples sited in the previous sections it does appear that the close approximation of basic and clinical scientists in an appropriate environment allows the clinical sciences to feed oV the basic sciences.

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Indeed, it is becoming apparent from experiences in Oxford that this kind of juxtaposition will, in the longer term, have the eVect of bringing together what, currently, are totally disparate branches of science, such as molecular genetics and clinical epidemiology and healthcare research. In short, this kind of close interaction may well be the ideal approach to developing research in medical schools of the future. 6. Implications for the Future of the NIMR To the outsider, it is not surprising that the diYculties between the MRC and the NIMR have arisen. On the one hand, the NIMR has a staV of, in many cases, internationally renowned scientists who do not want the upheaval of being moved and see no reason why they should be. This feeling may be re-enforced in part by the belief among basic scientists, not unique to this country, that clinicians are rather naı¨ve about matters scientific! The MRC, on the other hand, feel that medical science would be served better if the NIMR were moved into juxtaposition with one of the main London teaching hospitals. Presumably the reasons for this decision include better possibilities for evolving translational research for some of the reasons outlined in the previous sections, long-term financial considerations relating to the current building facilities for the NIMR, and other issues. Although it is inappropriate for an outsider to attempt to come down hard on either side of this complex argument, based on my experience of trying to organise interactions between the basic and clinical sciences it might be helpful if the STC inquiry considered the following key issues. (a) The NIMR has a very distinguished track record and high standing in the international biomedical research team; any move that is envisaged must ensure that it remains a centre of excellence. (b) Scientific interactions cannot be forced; any move would need to be preceded by extensive discussions between the clinical research workers of a potential parent institution and the diVerent scientific leaders at the NIMR. The potential benefits of an amalgamation of this type will certainly not be immediately obvious to either party, particularly the basic scientists. In particular, and as discussed in Section 3, it would be important to explore whether there were several research programmes in the potential parent institution which were genuinely related to those of the NIMR. (c) The scientists at the NIMR would have to be sure that the plant and facilities of any new building were adequate for their work. Given the increasing costs of the basic biomedical sciences because of the continuing changes in technology, there may be considerable advantages in being embedded within a university with respect to the availability of centralised equipment and plant. (d) To what extent are the diVerent groups at the NIMR already involved in translational research in collaboration with clinical research groups? Would a move of this kind have a deleterious eVect on these programmes? To what extent are the groups at NIMR carrying out work with a long term goal directed at clinical applications or are the bulk of their programmes still at the stage of basic biological mechanisms? In the latter case, would the groups feel the threat of being forced to dilute out their research programmes towards shorter-term goals? This is a key issue that requires very sensitive investigation. (e) For whoever is making the final decision on this question, the economic issues will be extremely diYcult to sort out. There is no good way of measuring diVerent organisational approaches to scientific productivity in economic terms. So the central issue is whether the MRC would be able to fund a new development for the NIMR which would provide genuinely adequate facilities for at least the bulk of their internationally competitive groups. 7. Summary Because of its mission, and given the importance of close interaction between the basic and clinical sciences in the future, the MRC has a good case for trying to integrate the work of the NIMR more closely with a university medical centre, as is now the case for its other major basic research institutions. However, achieving this in a way which will not destroy the traditions and international standing of the current NIMR will require extremely careful planning and skills in managing the human aspects of the development. From the public pronouncements, it is clear that the scientists at NIMR have not been convinced of the potential value of this development, even though it could be, in the long term, an extremely exciting addition to the biomedical scene. But it will only work if genuine synergies can be found between the work of these scientists and their potential hosts; scientific collaboration cannot be forced. Somehow these possibilities must be got over to the scientists involved, and plans must be developed such that by manoeuvres like a phased plan of transfer over several years, their current work is not disrupted. If a scheme along these lines can be developed, and if some of the key requirements outlined in the previous sections can be met, and if the financial implications are genuinely feasible, then it should be possible to achieve an integration along the lines suggested by the MRC. But it sounds as though the early stages of these discussions did not take a number of these issues into consideration and hence a large amount of groundwork will need to be repeated. 10 November 2004

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APPENDIX 14 Memorandum from Professor Kay E Davies, former member of the MRC Task Force on the NIMR As you may know, I am a member of MRC Council and was also a member of the Task Force looking at the future of NIMR. I am writing this in my capacity as a member of the Task Force and an Honorary Director of an MRC Unit. I have been associated with the MRC and working at the interface between basic science and clinical medicine for the last 20 years. I am currently Chairman of the Scientific Advisory Board of the Department Health funded clinical trial which you helped so much to set up. The MRC is required by OST to re-assess the strategic relevance of an institute whenever there is either a quinquennial review or whenever a Director retires. The MRC therefore needed to consider the future of NIMR in the context of its strategic priorities for the next 20–30 years. The genetic revolution and sequencing of the human genome has provided an unparalled opportunity to exploit basic science in the clinic. The MRC would naturally wish to facilitate this transition as much as possible to strengthen links with the NHS in the UK and also to ensure the exploitation of the fruits of the genome sequencing era via the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries. This step requires a shift from a purely biologically based research to a more multidisciplinary environment. The Task Force was set up in a spirit of openness and with no prior agenda. The first meeting endorsed the need for a National Institute but also recognised the need for the science to evolve towards more translational research. It was acknowledged that NIMR was already engaged in some translational research but the renewed institute would need to have more emphasis in this area. Some discussion was had about whether the remit of NIMR should cover clinical research as well as translational research. This was decided to be inappropriate as the former would need another type of infrastructure. Indeed, the report from the Academy of Medical Sciences has recommended a dispersed model for clinical research activity. The Task Force vision does not conflict with this recommendation. It can be debated whether translational research is done better adjacent to a medical school or not. However, there are additional considerations in locating a renewed institute. Translational research needs more interdisciplinary working in order to achieve its aims of delivery to the clinic and establishing links with industry to produce new drugs. In particular, there is a need for modern synthetic chemistry, physical chemistry, engineering and imaging. The Task Force therefore invited bids for other London institutions to accommodate NIMR. The membership of the Task Force was made up of leaders in the field many of whom have been involved in multidisciplinary institutes and translational research. The discussions were open and the proceedings published on the web. There was no bias at any stage. The Task Force recognised the high cost of re-location but also recognised the cost of keeping NIMR at Mill Hill. It was therefore decided to invite bids for a re-location. MRC Council could then make an informed decision about the future. 9 November 2004

APPENDIX 15 Memorandum from Professor A R Bellamy, University of Auckland Executive Summary The current NIMR Mill Hill site has many attributes that make it an ideal site for an expanded Medical Research Institute that is partnered with a major London University. The most important attribute of the site is space for the extensive ancillary facilities that are required for modern Medical Research, particularly animal facilities. Submission 1. My name is Alfred Richard Bellamy. I am a Professor of Cellular and Molecular Biology at The University of Auckland. I am a virologist with over 35 years experience in biomedical research. Currently I am Dean of Science at the University of Auckland, New Zealand where I direct 12 Departments comprising approximately 650 employees. Biomedical Research forms an important component of our Faculty. 2. I am very familiar with the NIMR, having spent a year working there in the 1970s and I have visited the Institute quite often, since that time. During the 1960s, 70s’ and early 80s’, the Institute was not in a strong position and in some areas was in something of an extended scientific decline. The appointment of John Skehel as Director reversed that trend and Sir John has now established a thriving biomedical culture. I am impressed with the ability of the Institute to attract leading highly qualified scientific staV over recent years. I believe the performance and publication output of staV has been outstanding.

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3. I understand that a case has been made to the MRC Council that retaining the NIMR on its present site and on its current scale is not compelling and that retention of the Mill Hill site does not fit with the strategic direction of the MRC. And further that the current NIMR location is too isolated from clinical and other academic units to compete and to remain attractive to scientists in the longer term—as it has been able to do in the past. I believe that these views overlook the important long-term desirability of achieving a balance between: — A continued strong MRC presence in the Greater London area. — Access to suYcient land for major animal facilities and other space-intensive infrastructure. — The desirability of having access to the very large student base provided by the University of London. — The attraction of London to international researchers and the access available to the many major clinical centres in London. — The presence in London of a very large patient base. 4. An initial proposal to relocate a reduced NIMR to Addenbrooke’s has now been discarded. From this distance that proposal did not appear to have been adequately investigated or thought through. Despite many years of eVort to build clinical linkages between LMB and Addenbrooke’s, these are widely known to be fragmentary at best. For whatever reason, topline medicine internationally continues to be located near major medical schools and hospitals located in major urban centres. I do not believe that shifting a reduced NIMR complement to Addenbrooke’s would ever have altered that fundamental equation. 5. The more recent proposal of 13 October reached by the Medical Council and published on their website is based on the “renewal of NIMR as a multi-disciplinary Research Institute in the London area focused on basic and translational research”. I believe that to be a much wiser decision. However I note that in deciding upon a suitable site, the Council Steering Committee will now need to consider what would be required at Mill Hill if that site is to meet the Task Force vision. 6. It is my submission that the Mill Hill site retains many attractive features as the site for a renewed and expanded Institute for Medical Research. For its advantages to be weighed against others, will require that the Mill Hill site be compared and carefully costed alongside the other options. 7. I believe that such an analysis is likely to reveal that a continued presence on the larger site at Mill Hill would provide a strong “driver”, particularly given the need for extensive animal facilities. Provided that the Local Planning Authority is supportive, the Mill Hill site is likely to provide a more cost eVective option than would a Central London site. 8. Formal identification of Mill Hill as a satellite campus of a major teaching institution such as University College London appears to be an obvious solution. Such an approach would address most of the requirements of the MRC vision, viz: “best science and value-for-money in the broader scientific and health context”. I believe that the arrangement I propose would provide many benefits to Medical Research in the United Kingdom while also building upon the wider international research eVort in the Medical Sciences generally. 10 November 2004

APPENDIX 16 Memorandum from Professor Andrew Read, University of Edinburgh I am commenting on this from my perspective as a malaria researcher. The Infection and Immunity group at NIMR is one of the best in the world, and in the case of my own speciality, is a jewel in the crown of UK— and indeed—world malaria research. I am unpersuaded that the costs of moving NIMR to the UC or Kings sites would be oVset by any benefits which might accrue from being nearer to a hospital. In the case of malaria research going on at Mill Hill, there is nothing to be gained. Meantime, the excellent malaria groups at NIMR are in planning blight, and will have trouble recruiting their current people and hanging on to the best. Nothing I can see in any of the MRC documents makes a strong economic or scientific case for the move, and indeed, under the current arrangements, MRC has refused to consider a future at Mill Hill, so that the case for a move per se is NOT being considered. It is easy to imagine that if the money spent on a move went into investment in Mill Hill, things could be even better there. I urge the ST committee to recommend that a Mill Hill option be considered against the UCL and Kings options.

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Nothing in the way the MRC has handled this makes sense to me, unless there are expected to be considerable cost savings by moving, and given the costs of moving, this would seem only likely if the resited NIMR was smaller. Is this really all about shrinking one of the world’s best medical research Institutes? 11 November 2004

APPENDIX 17 Memorandum from Dr Michael Oldstone, Scripps Research Institute Let me first introduce myself. I am a senior scientist who is head of the Division of Virology and the ViralImmunobiology Laboratory at The Scripps Research Institute. I know British science and scientists well. For example, your newly appointed Regis Professor of Medicine at Cambridge, Patrick Sissons, came to my laboratory over 20 years ago as a postdoctoral fellow to learn how to do biomedical research. Other distinguished senior biomedical academics from your country have passed through my laboratory including Sir Peter Lachmann, Anthony Nash, Peter Ghazal, and Sir Keith Peters. There are still others in the UK at the intermediate stage of their career who have great potential for future biomedical research achievements who also trained with me at Scripps. Further, I have been consulted by Sir Liam Donaldson about the measles virus vaccination controversy and have, in the past, reviewed grant applications for the MRC. Then, as a great supporter of the talent and science in your country, I write to you concerning the debate involving the future and the movement of NIMR, Mill Hill. In my judgment such a relocation will be a major mistake. Here is why. First, a candid assessment of the institution. NIMR, Mill Hill, although smaller is akin to our NIH, ie, is a research institute devoted to understanding and control of human diseases. It is this institute where influenza virus was first isolated and where interferon was discovered. In addition, workers in the NIMR uncovered many other medical firsts including the structure and folding of the influenza hemagglutinin. The NIMR currently serves as a WHO centre for surveillance and handling of evolving influenza viruses including the potential avian H5 flu that we are all concerned about causing a new pandemic in humans. Their current composition of balanced scientists in the NIMR, Mill Hill, is on the whole excellent and one to be proud of. I know that institute well having visited it on several occasions over the last 20 years, as I have also visited and lectured at Cambridge, Oxford, medical research clubs and hospitals in London. NIMR, Mill Hill, is one of the real jewels of your research establishment. The proposal to reorder and to move the NIMR near a university in central London is, in my opinion, poorly thought out. If NIMR, Mill Hill were to move to central London, they would likely lose their biosafety level (BSL)-4 unit and lose their advanced vivarium used to conduct important biomedical research in influenza, malaria, and tuberculosis. Is it feasible to move a high containment BSL-4 unit to centre city? I do not think so. With animal rights demonstrators can you build an equal vivarium in central London? I think not. Imagine the problems. Part of the past history in the selection of Mill Hill away from Hampstead was to overcome animal restrictions and diYculties. My strong opinion is that the error of relocating or dismantling NIMR, Mill Hill, will be shared by senior biomedical scientists outside of the UK, as well as most in the UK. I suggest you contact Rob Webster, the acknowledged expert in influenza in North America; Judy Gerhard, Nancy Cox or Walter Dowdle at CDC; experts in retroviral and lentiviral research Malcolm Martin at NIH or John CoYn at Tufts; senior American scientists Tom Steitz at Yale, Irvin Weissman at Stanford, Shirley Tilghman at Princeton; or Sir Gus Nossal at the University of Melbourne (former director of SAGE at WHO), I expect they would speak to the dominant position NIMR has, continues to have in biomedical research, and why it would be penny wise and pound foolish to move NIMR to central London. I cannot envision in my country a knowledgeable committee that would dismantle the intramural program of NIH and move it to a university. I am sure it would be possible to find those who would like to but I would like to probe into their reasons for doing so and the conflicts of interest involved. Yet, this is being planned for your country. Biomedical science is universal and the repercussions of a dismantled NIMR, Mill Hill, will aVect not only your future but ours as well. 10 November 2004

APPENDIX 18 Memorandum from Dr Robert L CoVman, Dynavax For the past 30 years, I have conducted research in the fields of Immunology and Infectious Diseases, two fields in which the NIMR is highly regarded throughout the world. I consider many on its staV as friends and colleagues and have followed the debate on the future of the NIMR with great interest and, more recently, considerable dismay.

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I will not attempt to restate or provide my opinions on all of the complex issues however, I would like to emphasise how critical the Mill Hill location is if the NIMR is to continue first-rate research in Immunology and Infectious Diseases. The arguments put forth concerning the need for significant expansion of facilities for infectious disease containment and animal research are quite compelling. It is inconceivable that significant facilities for these activities could, practically or politically, be constructed in central London. Having these specialised facilities at some distance from the main Institute laboratories is not a viable option either. Indeed, the Mill Hill campus has just the right balance of isolation, but proximity to other major research and clinical centres. In contrast, the need to have closer proximity to major hospitals to stimulate translational research is not a particularly compelling one. Clinical studies are done where there is appropriate medical talent and patient base and this diVers greatly for diVerent diseases. Mill Hill is, if fact, quite well located for clinical interactions, with an impressive array of hospitals within an hour’s travel. For research on even fresh clinical samples, this is quite suYcient. I feel qualified to comment on these particular matters as I run research programs in both Immunology and Infectious Diseases and do significant research on clinical samples from the US, Canada and the UK. At a time when infectious diseases, naturally acquired or deliberately spread, are a rapidly growing health concern and diseases of abnormal immunity, such as asthma and autoimmunity, remain major sources of unmet medical need, it would be irresponsible for the leading national biomedical research facility to be unable to perform necessary research in these areas. 10 November 2004

APPENDIX 19 Memorandum from Professor Brian D Sykes, University of Alberta It is clear to me that Mill Hill is an absolute first rate biomedical research institution with an excellent research program and an excellent scientific reputation world wide. I have collaborated with scientists in Mill Hill for more than two decades, and consider these collaborations amongst the highlights of my scientific career. Under these circumstances, I would be very, very cautious about the drastic changes that are proposed in size, location, and scope of the Institute unless the rationale is absolutely justified. It takes many years to build up excellence in scientific projects, people, infrastructure, and collaborations; but only moments and one bad decision to put it apart. Even the uncertainty surrounding the committee’s activities strongly perturb the activities of such an institution. There is a strong role for autonomous governmentsupported research institutes within the mix of international scientific endeavor. Personally I see no scientific reasons for moving the site to another hospital site in London—they already have extensive interactions and collaborations with the major London Hospitals. I’m not sure why administrators are so willing to make these kinds of decisions these days, as if one can mandate excellence and success. In my experience when people start to mingle at these levels in the aVairs of an institute of this size the result is always a loss. 11 November 2004

APPENDIX 20 Memorandum from Focus UK 1. I am writing on behalf of the UK branch of Focus Families, which is a support group for parents and carers of children with the developmental disorder, Septo Optic Dysplasia. As a group we are very concerned about the proposal from the Medical Research Council to close the National Institute for Medical Research on its Mill Hill site and move its scientists into Central London. As parents we understand more than most the value of basic research into the causes and impacts of the many debilitating and sometimes crippling developmental problems which our children suVer. It is crucial to support the best medical scientists who work with our doctors to improve the understanding of these disorders, and to develop better approaches to prevention, diagnosis, and treatment for our children. 2. The scientists and doctors at this prestigious Institute are conducting cutting-edge research on the understanding of the fundamental processes of life and the basis of diseases. They have long term links with the best medical specialists in many diVerent hospitals in London, throughout the UK, and abroad. They have made unique discoveries on the genetic basis of rare brain, eye and growth disorders, and their discoveries have a continuing and developing impact on the health of our children. The Institute also provides a wonderful training environment for the next generation of clinical scientists, where young doctors can learn the latest research techniques and apply them directly to medical problems such as those aVecting our children. We see the expansion of the medical knowledge base surrounding these disorders is vital to facilitate early diagnosis and treatment which can mitigate the long-term impacts of the condition.

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3. Having reviewed the publicly available information on this proposal, it is very disturbing to learn that all the scientists at Mill Hill and their clinical colleagues feel that the case for closing the Institute and rebuilding a new one in central London has not been properly established. It appears that an objective review of the background to and reasons for the proposal is vital, to ensure that the grounds for the proposal are based on achieving real scientific benefits rather than merely financial savings. The MRC have already spent a lot of money on the proposal which it could be argued would have been better spent on research. Although we are not experts, it is worrying that the MRC’s relocation proposal appears to ignore the opinions of the large majority of the UK biomedical community, who favour maintaining the Institute at Mill Hill. 4. We are also very concerned because this move could disrupt or even restrict the ongoing research on which our hopes for our childrens’ future health depend. In the case of Septo Optic Dysplasia, the hope is for this research to identify and prevent this disorder occurring in future generations. The NIMR has excellent facilities and expertise for creating and studying animal models of human diseases, which have proven critical for discovering and evaluating the developmental processes that sometimes go wrong, as in our children. These and other facilities attract top scientists and doctors from all over the world to work at the Institute. We support the view of these scientists that it is neither appropriate, nor value for money to destroy these facilities at Mill Hill, only to try to recreate them in central London. Many of these scientists are internationally renowned, and if the MRC tries to relocate them against their better judgement, many could be attracted to better facilities abroad, disrupting the close clinical links they have developed in the UK. As a result, our children will be the losers in the long run. 5. Given the costs to the public purse, and the long-term impact of a wrong decision on medical research in the UK, we think it vital that MRC listens to its staV who are actually doing this work and the patients who are directly benefiting and reconsiders the case for retaining and building on the investment in this successful Institute at Mill Hill. 12 November 2004

APPENDIX 21 Memorandum from Anne McLaren, Gurdon Institute The National Institute for Medical Research is known throughout the world for the high quality of its biomedical science. Most of the decisions have recently been rated Alpha or Alpha*. Part of its strength lies in the very close collaboration between definite groups within the building. If it were to be split up into many multiple sites, the critical mass of excellence and cohesive culture would be destroyed. As for moving the Institute into central London and attaching it to a hospital; at present it occupies a unique place in the UK as the top centre for high quality basic and strategic biomedical research. To introduce clinical research and clinical trials into the Institute would alter its character substantially, lowering the focus and distracting attention from the goal of scientific excellence. There are many collaborative links already with clinical research workers, and there are surely better ways to achieve eVective transition from lab to clinic. In addition, it would surely be hugely expensive to move the Institute into central London. I have never seen a good scientific justification as to why the MRC feels that something new has to be done with NIMR. 11 November 2004

APPENDIX 22 Memorandum from Janet Thornton, European Bioinformatics Institute I believe it is essential that the UK has a National Institute as a focal point for medical research. The NIMR has filled this role admirably since its inception and I feel strongly that maintaining the Institute at its current strength is important. As Director of the European Bioinformatics Institute (which is part of the European Molecular Biology Laboratory), I see the huge potential in post-genomic biology to change clinical practise radically, with a move towards molecular medicine, leading to personalised high-tech medicine in the not too distant future. In this new world, the UK has tremendous potential to contribute to these changes, through its basic research and the translation of discoveries into medicines and diagnostics. The National Institute should be the flagship, which promotes such work in the UK. The building and facilities at Mill Hill provide an excellent place for medical research, built up over many years. Clearly in an ideal world it would be preferable for the Institute to be attached to a clinical research hospital. However given the current location, the enormous cost of moving the Institute, especially to a site in central London and the disruption this would cause, it is extremely debatable whether a plan to re-locate is a good use of funds and will lead to the desired eVect. Strong interactions between basic and clinical research do not always follow as a result of co-location. There are many examples of research institutes on

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hospital sites, which have few interactions with their medical environment. Given current electronic communication and ease of travel, it is the science and the philosophy, which lead to good cooperative and translational work, rather than co-location. If the institute were to be re-located, my major concern is that insuYcient money would be provided for the move, with the result that it would be eVectively down-graded and less competitive. If the institute is not world class, it is not worth funding at all. It is therefore only possible to move the Institute if the government is willing to provide substantial capital to allow this to occur. Moving the Institute will be a huge disruption to all members of staV, including highly trained technical staV, who are unlikely to be willing to travel into the centre of London. Therefore to summarise: 1. The move should only be supported if the benefits for research and translational work are tangible, which is diYcult to quantify. 2. SuYcient funds must be provided by the government to do this properly or not at all. 3. The institute must remain first class, and receive the long term funding to ensure this. 12 November 2004

APPENDIX 23 Memorandum from Dr Peter J M Openshaw, Imperial College London 1. The present and future prosperity of the United Kingdom is based on its intellectual, technical and scientific strengths. This has given rise to many scientific achievements which have helped develop modern medical practice, a significant number of these have been contributed by NIMR, with five Nobel Prize winners. The closure of NIMR would basically be an opportunity for reducing funding of biomedical science at a time when there has never been a greater need for such an institution. 2. It is vital that London, the capital city, has a world-class institute devoted to medical research, acting as a focus for academic collaborations. 3. Fragmentation of the expertise at Mill Hill leaves the field of infectious diseases vulnerable to expected and unexpected events. With the emergence of pubic health threats such as HIV, SARS and bird influenza, it is essential that we have a world-class institute with excellent and comprehensive animal facilities and containment laboratories designed for category 3 and 4 pathogens. Recreation of these facilities in central London or elsewhere would be illogical, expensive and wasteful. I am not convinced that the option to keep Mill Hill open has been properly evaluated and its potential impact on UK biomedical research assessed. 12 November 2004

APPENDIX 24 Memorandum from Dr Douglas Robinson, Imperial College London I do not see a strong case for relocation, in fact rather the opposite. My reasons are as follows: 1. The existing team at NIMR have an excellent record in research across a broad range of biomedical science (as evidenced by their track record of publications). One only has to visit the building to sense the excellent atmosphere of teamwork and co-operation which is sadly lacking in many university campuses. The staV of NIMR are justly proud of their achievements and the existing enquiry process has already sapped morale. I believe a prolonged relocation process would risk destroying the loyalty and dedication which is the institute’s strength. 2. The existing institute has facilities second to none, particularly the animal facility, which represents an important national resource and would be very diYcult to recreate in a central London site. One only has to think of recent problems in Oxford to appreciate the practical diYculties and potential expense involved. 3. One reason for proposing a move is to foster links with clinical research and to build on “translational research”. It seems to me that physical relocation is not required for this process: indeed NIMR already has many collaborative links (for example I have applied for joint grants with Dr O’Garra at NIMR to link basic and clinical work in tuberculosis). To restrict these to any one site seems to represent a misunderstanding of the interactive nature of biomedical research. 4. The training of clinicians in scientific research should be an important priority for the country: the current clinical training programmes and structures actually militate against such interactions and the fact that there is integrated clinical/research training programme in the UK is a national disgrace which reflects

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badly on the MRC. It would seem to be much better to seize the opportunity to develop clinical science training programmes from the Mill Hill site rather than to use precious resources on unnecessary rebuilding (which seems unwanted by those conducting the research). In summary I think the review of NIMR represents a great opportunity for the MRC to re-establish its credentials as leading medical research thinking in the UK. As a co-holder of an MRC co-operative grant whose research is entirely supported from other sources, I have to say that for too long British Science has had to rely on other income streams (charities including the Wellcome Trust and industry). The MRC must prove that it can eVectively husband the resources it holds if it is make a cogent case for increased research funding in the UK. To propose disruption and relocation of its flagship research institute when this is not wanted by the research community seems to me an extraordinary diversion from this purpose. 12 November 2004

APPENDIX 25

Memorandum from Professor Tony Magee, University of Manchester I have read the MRC’s Forward Investment Strategy document and most if not all the documentation relating to the move of NIMR from Mill Hill to a central London site, as well as the responses of NIMR staV. I recognise that the MRC has to make sometimes diYcult decisions about long-term funding and that it has pressure on it from many stake-holders trying to influence the direction of MRC research and funding. Nevertheless, in this case I fully endorse and support the negative responses of the NIMR staV to the move. Having been both a staV member at NIMR and in the University sector since 2001 I am of the opinion that the arguments for closing NIMR at Mill Hill and moving it to are erroneous and poorly justified by the MRC Task Force. The manner in which the process has been carried out is also highly questionable. The “consultation” process that the MRC carried out, which was very substantially against the move, seems to have been completely ignored by the Task Force. These concerns are shared by many of my colleagues and by The Biosciences Federation, although I don’t speak for them. There are a number of issues. Firstly, NIMR is internationally acknowledged as a world class medical research institute. There is little if anything to gain from moving it to central London and a lot to lose. Having said that, there no doubt could be improvements to the way the Institute is run but these should be evolutionary and not involve the “nuclear option” proposed. The MRC already has two large institutes embedded in University/Medical School environments (the Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Cambridge and the Clinical Sciences Centre at Hammersmith Hospital/Imperial College London). Both of these are recognised as being very good basic science institutes but neither has a strong reputation for clinical research, despite their location (and the latter’s name!). Historically, the MRC also had its hands burned in an earlier attempt to set up a clinical research institute, the Clinical Research Centre at Northwick Hospital, which was a white elephant and closed in the 80s. It is essential that the MRC continues to fund basic research. MRC appears to be putting too much emphasis on clinical research at the expense of basic research. That’s not to say that clinical research shouldn’t be encouraged, but it should be driven by scientific and clinical need, bottom-up. In my view the major problem with stimulating clinical research in the UK is getting good young medics to consider getting involved in serious research—their present career structure does not encourage this and actually mediates against it, and this is only getting worse with changes to the NHS and medical school teaching. This issue needs to be addressed by Government and the NHS—the MRC cannot seriously make an impact in this area. Why are the MRC doing this—for ideological reasons or are they being driven by government? Or is the real rationale to close NIMR via the back door by a process of creeping emasculation. The proposed move of NIMR is likely to be poor value for money. The decision to exclude Mill Hill as the status quo option appears to have been made without comparing the relative costs and benefits of staying at Mill Hill with those of moving to central London. In the academic community there is a common misconception that moving NIMR will free up large amounts of money for response-mode funding but this is an illusion—it will actually cost money to move NIMR and put more pressure on MRC funding. The idea that the partner Colleges can make a large contribution to this seems unlikely. One of the major costs will be re-establishing an adequate animal facility at the new site and, given recent problems with animal rights activism in Cambridge and Oxford, this is likely to be a logistical nightmare also. If Government is going to provide extra money to the MRC (which would be needed to fund the proposed move of NIMR) it would be better used to improve the funding rate for MRC grants which has been very low for the last few years due to poor financial planning, as the Science and Technology Committee has previously investigated.

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The potential catastrophic loss of outstanding scientific staV at all levels (many leaving to take up appointments abroad) would be very damaging to UK biological science at a time when we are in a position to make a major international impact in a number of key areas. I strongly urge Council to reconsider these proposals in an open and rigorous manner. 12 November 2004

APPENDIX 26 Memorandum from Professor Richard Flavell, former member of the Task Force on the NIMR I was until recently a member of the task force charged with making recommendations to MRC council on the future of the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR) currently at Mill Hill. The conclusions of this task force have been made public and it’s not necessary for me to expand on those here. I would however, like to take the opportunity of providing you some feedback. The main issue that the Task Force did not address is what should be done in the absence of a successful viable outcome in the search for a central London site for the renewed NIMR. I, as with the majority of the Task Force Members, favoured at the time and continue to favour a central London location for NIMR providing that a number of diYculties including cost, governance, security both for animal research and researchers and placement of high level containment facilities for potentially dangerous microorganisms in the middle of a major city can be solved. A key feature of the recommendation made by the Task Force was that the central London options should oVer realisable advantages over the current site as modified and improved to bring the site up to modern standards. This is obviously sensible; there is little point to moving an institute to another location incurring great cost to end up with an inferior result. If however the proposed move were not to yield a superior result, then I and I believe several other colleagues on the Task Force (who should speak for themselves) favour maintenance of NIMR on its Mill Hill site. From my knowledge of translational research at Yale, and from what I know of the facilities and culture at NIMR, I am confident that NIMR can meet the task force’s and MRC’s vision for biomedical research on the Mill Hill site. I further recommend that this option be considered as part of due process in order to reach the most soundly reasoned decision on this topic which is most important for the future of British biomedical science. As a previous member of the Task Force I would be happy to assist in any reasonable way with your deliberations of this process as I’ve made clear to MRC Council. The Task Force worked long and hard to make the best recommendations it could to MRC council within the very taxing time constraints of the process. I am pleased that you have initiated this review process and I believe that this is the right thing to have done. I wish you all success with this and remain in the meantime, with best wishes. 12 November 2004

APPENDIX 27 Memorandum from Dr Robin Holliday NIMR has a very strong and successful tradition in research and such a tradition in itself provides very important impetus for future research. To put this in perspective one should consider the status of research institutes in the USA, such as the California Institute of Technology and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. It would be unthinkable to relocate such establishments because of their unique traditions of scientific excellence. The proposal that NIMR should be relocated is, in eVect, stating that it is less successful than it should be, or that it does not deserve to be supported by taxpayers money. I believe neither of these views stand up to scrutiny, for the following reasons: 1. Members of staV have been awarded Nobel Prizes. 2. Many have been elected Fellows of the Royal Society. 3. There have been innumerable publications in the scientific literature (about one per day when I was there). 4. Scientists from all over the world have been attracted to and worked at the NIMR. 5. StaV have been invited on numerous occasions to international conferences and congresses. 6. There are unique facilities at NIMR, including transgenic mice, molecular studies of all kinds, nuclear magnetic resonance, the library. 7. Large numbers of graduate students have obtained their PhDs there and have been launched on successful careers.

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8. Members of staV have edited many journals, and they continually review manuscripts submitted to other journals. 9. The location of NIMR allows easy access to central London, Cambridge and the Midlands. 10. There are excellent opportunities for collaborative research with the cancer laboratories at South Mimms, and also with the National Institute for Biological Standards and Control. 11. Last but not least, all Divisions and Laboratories are regularly assessed by reviewing committees, which are favourable in the great majority of cases. All these features of NIMR demonstrate that it is an research institute of the highest calibre with a very strong international reputation, and one that is worth every penny of taxpayers money. I am writing to you in the hope that the proposal to relocate the Institute will be abandoned. Such relocation would have very severe impact on existing staV, and it would greatly harm the tradition of excellence that has been built up over nearly 50 years. My only reservation is that there is no comprehensive archive which fully documents all the scientific initiatives and achievements during this period. 14 November 2004

APPENDIX 28 Memorandum from Professor Alan R North, University of Manchester I am writing to you with respect to the forthcoming inquiry of the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee. I write in a personal capacity. You will see from the attached biographical sketch that I trained in both medicine and science, I have held professorships in leading research universities and institutions in the United States, and I have also worked as a scientist for a leading pharmaceutical company. I am a Fellow of the Royal Society, the Academy of Medical Sciences, and the Royal College of Physicians. For more than three years I have served on the Medical Research Council, and I was a member of the group constituted by Professor George Radda to develop a Forward Investment Strategy for the MRC’s intramural research programme. The UK government spends very little on medical research. Taken in the context of the National Institutes of Health or even major pharmaceutical research companies the spend is derisory. The MRC Board that I currently chair is unable to fund many of the applications that it receives which are rated by peers as being of the highest international quality. We struggle to recruit and retain, and continue to haemorrhage leading brains to the US. Only last week I was dispiritedly writing a letter of recommendation for a quite outstanding young colleague, actually an MRC employee, who is seeking to relocate to the United States. I present this background context because I feel that it emphasises how critical is the obligation of the MRC to plan for the future so as to get the greatest possible value for its very limited monetary investment. I believe that this future must involve two key elements. The first is a very substantial input into biomedical research from the physical sciences. Most major advances in life sciences of the past 30 years have been led by technology developments lifted straight from the world of physics and/or chemistry. Usually, these have been made by those who are able comfortably to straddle the two worlds of physical science and life sciences. Furthermore, a new biology has emerged from the genomes in which the world of interacting molecules can be understood only by sophisticated mathematics. Leading institutions around the world are developing new institutes and centres to bring together their biologists with their mathematicians and physical scientists: Stanford, Harvard, University of Washington, Princeton all have them. Such institutes will power research and training in biomedicine over the next decades. The second element is the need for more translation of fundamental discoveries in medical research. I see two components, wealth and health. There are now many examples of the successful commercial exploitation of fundamental medical discoveries: indeed, some bring financial benefit back to the MRC itself. In their early stages, these transitions are much facilitated by physical proximity between scientist and entrepreneur; hence the success of “bioincubators”. However, it is the health component that has received much recent emphasis. This is because advances in genetics and genomics have strikingly narrowed the gap between disease and the molecular understanding of disease. Twenty-five years ago, we could do little more than simply describe most human diseases: molecular mechanisms were something to dream about. It is the narrowing of this gap between molecular mechanism and disease process which has so suddenly enabled socalled translational research—research in which the fundamental mechanistic questions are directly informed by a human disease. This will form an increasingly important ingredient of medical research in the next 25 years. Much of the discussion in the past couple of years, indeed much of the protest, has focussed on the quality of the science at Mill Hill and the disruption that might be caused by a move. This is a side-show. The quality of the science at Mill Hill has never been in question. The MRC has formal procedures for assessing that

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quality and I know nobody who disputes the process or its results. The disruption that would be caused by a move would be substantial, but forgotten in five to 10 years. The forward investment strategy must look considerably beyond that. I imagine a National Institute of Medical Research in which physics undergraduate student can be inspired by serendipitously attending a lecture by the professor of medicine, where a materials scientist meets weekly with his colleague studying plaque formation in coronary arteries, where computer scientist and neurologist collaborate intimately on human cognition and its decline in the elderly, and where fellows in an interdisciplinary postgraduate clinical training programme are excited about their future careers. I can not imagine this in a leafy London suburb. 15 November 2004

APPENDIX 29 Memorandum from Professor Peter N Campbell, University College London I propose that the NIMR in some form should remain at Mill Hill for the following reasons: 1. The facility for containment at category 4 is almost unique and would be of crucial importance should the UK be hit by a new disease. 2. The NIMR has very extensive animal breeding facilities which are well protected from invasion by anti-vivisectionist extremists. We surely have several examples to remind us as to the diYculty of creating such facilities. 3. While there should in future be an increased emphasis on clinical research it is not necessary for clinicians to work alongside those engaged in research. It is the personal links which are important. It is noteworthy that in the consultation exercise by Deborah Holman that in answer to question 4 the 975 respondents were of this opinion in contrast to the 36 respondents from unnamed organisations. 15 November 2004

APPENDIX 30 Memorandum from Professor William Russell, University of St Andrews 1. The proposals for the future of NIMR at Mill Hill have been under consideration since early in 2003 when a sub committee of the Medical Research Council (MRC) was given the task of examining the Council’s Forward Research Strategy and recommended that NIMR at Mill Hill should be closed and moved to Cambridge. The rationale for this recommendation was very poorly explained and since none of the over 700 scientists employed were consulted (including the Director) it was not surprising that the statement was met with incredulity and considerable anger. This very insensitive move by the Council has resulted in significant loss of morale amongst the staV at Mill Hill and has made it diYcult for all to move into a more co-operative mode. 2. Responding to a consultation, the Council (with a new Chief Executive) created a Task Force with national and international members (nominated both by the MRC and NIMR) and with two NIMR staV to re-examine this issue. The Task force reported in July this year and recommended that NIMR should be closed and moved to a site in London proximal either to University College or King’s College. However there has been a dispute between the MRC and NIMR about the reporting of the proceedings of the Task Force and this has not yet been fully resolved. Nevertheless, the MRC has appointed a steering group to prepare the business and scientific cases for removing NIMR to the central London sites. 3. Of particular concern to the Mill Hill scientists is that while they can understand the need to examine the financial and scientific implications of any move they do not understand why the Mill Hill site cannot be included in the comparisons. At the last MRC meeting on 13 October the Director noted that the NIMR senior staV has already had consultations with the scientists at both London sites and his conclusion was that it was unlikely that neither of them would be able to provide the facilities that were already present at Mill Hill (eg there are excellent facilities for dealing with transgenic animals and bio-containment). At this meeting the Director reiterated the case for including Mill Hill in the options appraisal and the Council thereafter accepted that for an appraisal to be valid “the base case should be enhanced to set out what would be required at Mill Hill in order that the renewed institute could meet as closely as possible the Task Force vision”. In many respects this moves the situation forward from that pertaining when the Science and Technology Committee called for a Review although the MRC are emphasising that the status quo is not an option. There are many questions still to be answered and there are a number of ambiguities in the current position of the MRC who evidently wish the London sites to be given prime consideration and are apparently wanting to come to a conclusion about a preferred site and partner by the December meeting of the Council (although this may now be deferred).

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4. It is perhaps surprising that the MRC did not at any stage advocate the move as part of a package to divert resources away from NIMR given that a significant component of the MRC budget (£25 million pr annum) is currently spent at Mill Hill and that there are great pressures on resources not least from those with unfunded alpha-rated project grants. Indeed looking superficially at the proposals by the Council it would seem extremely costly to move into the central London sites and it will be revealing to examine the detailed costings which may reveal if the new site envisaged by the Council is a much more limited operation compared to the current one. Thus, it may be that costs are one factor but this has apparently never been admitted. It is also clear that the Council have never disputed that NIMR is currently carrying out excellent research. 5. The main driver for the MRC’s policy with respect to NIMR appears to be their belief that, in the longer term, biomedical research will blossom in an environment in close proximity to clinicians and other disciplines. This attitude, in part, may have been influenced by their experience with clinical research when a Clinical Research Centre was created at Northwick Park Hospital in Harrow in 1972. However the Centre was moved in 1999 to central London at Hammersmith Hospital (Imperial College) presumably because the academic environment there was much more attractive to clinicians. To counter this argument the staV at Mill Hill can claim with justification that they already co-operate eVectively with clinicians and others at both the national and international level. Those of us who have worked in the biomedical research field in Scotland can testify to the fact that eVective co-operation is achieved not by proximity but by a sharing of complementary interests and there are now many examples of joint projects both in teaching and research across HE institutions and research institutes in Scotland. Thus I am not persuaded by this argument for proximity. 6. While I can appreciate that the MRC are concerned that biomedical research in the future may have to be more broadly based and that the case for a “stand-alone” institute in these circumstances may be suspect there is the counter argument that the Mill Hill site has plenty of room for redevelopment and moreover that there may be positive advantages in NOT being cited in central London eg NIMR has proposed through their quinquennial review to upgrade their activities in the field of emerging infections. This will be especially relevant to the concerns about climate change and the likelihood of new diseases appearing in Britain. An important corollary to this objective is the availability of high class containment facilities. The Mill Hill site already has these and it would seem unlikely that these facilities would be readily made available in central London. Another major concern is that the excellent animal facilities which are now well protected from the all too prevalent animal rights extremists (at great cost) would have to be duplicated on a crowded central site. Another facet to this question is that if the central London option is adopted this will lead to yet more pressure on housing and transport in Central London and the consolidation of the Golden Triangle of research funding. Perhaps we should seriously consider that more dispersion of physical resources to the regions would be advisable considering the availability of electronic communication (eg Scotland has excellent ongoing biomedical research and in the longer term oVers a greater quality of life for scientists). In conclusion, the impasse which has arisen must be resolved quickly and in such a way that the staV at NIMR as well as the Council can feel able to move forward in a co-operative mode. Biomedical research is at a critical stage and the prospects of real advances have never been better. The proposal to move to a site in central London seems ill advised given the constraints there for future development. 15 November 2004

APPENDIX 31 Memorandum from Professor Anne Cooke, Cambridge University As a member of the MRC organised team that site visited the Immunology Divisions at NIMR it should be stated that we found the science to be of the highest quality (top Alpha in all sections). It is my understanding that site visits to other Divisions in NIMR have found them to be equally impressive. We were extremely impressed by the ways in which the Immunology Divisions interacted together and with other divisions, utilising ideas and resources in ways that would not have been easily achievable if they were in University environments that I am familiar with such as Cambridge, Oxford, Imperial or UCL. The work in the NIMR divisions relies heavily on the use of animals (mice) and is greatly facilitated by the availability of state of the art animal house facilities on site. The scientists within these divisions are also interactive with groups outside NIMR. They are extremely helpful in providing the scientific community in the UK and abroad with novel mouse strains that kept to the highest standard of health (specific pathogen free). Such a facility is not easy to reproduce even de novo and its disappearance might lead to the scientists seeking positions elsewhere in the world and that would be a great loss to current and future members of the UK scientific community if these scientists were to leave the UK. The work in Infectious Diseases is carried out on a wide range of organisms including those that require Category 4 containment. The site at NIMR is secure both for this form of work and for animal experimentation. It has been suggested that NIMR might benefit form being moved to a central London site with closer proximity to a hospital. This presumably was suggested in the belief that it might lead to more translational research. It takes a very long time for a scientific advance to make its way from the bench to the bedside.

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TNF alpha therapy which has revolutionised the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis has taken more than 13 years to get to that stage. It was pioneered by researchers at the Kennedy Institute for Rheumatology and trials for this were carried out with clinicians around the world. Trials are normally carried out where the patient groups are available and they are not necessarily at the hospital next door. I work in the University of Cambridge with a hospital relatively close by but my clinical associates are in Glasgow and America. Scientists involved in biomedical research carry out their research because they want to understand how systems work, why they sometimes break down and how they can be repaired. When they translate their findings to the clinic this is done in collaboration with those clinical colleagues who have the relevant patient group, wherever these are available. There have been previous attempts by the MRC to bring science and medicine together. The Clinical Sciences Centre at Northwick Park was one such attempt. This was perceived not to be working and some of the scientists were then moved to The Hammersmith Hospital. A very good animal facility was left behind at Northwick Park and several scientists who had been moved struggled for many years to carry out comparable research at the Hammersmith site. It has never been stated how much these moves cost the MRC in the past and now another move appears to be planned. Such a move cannot save money if you have to rebuild the existing facilities that are available and function well at NIMR. As a committee member I perceive a lack of MRC funds available to fund young scientists at key stages in their careers. I am additionally dismayed by the news that in the last round of applications for programme and project grant funding only 50% of the top rated grants (alpha A) could be funded. That means good biomedical science is not being funded and our future research capacity in the form of young scientists are not being encouraged to see biomedical sciences as a career option worth pursuing. It is diYcult to understand the scientific rationale for tinkering with something that works well. I am sure that NIMR could be used more eVectively eg run specialist training courses, conferences, take in academics or clinicians for study leave etc where it currently situated. The case for moving it downtown with attendant security issues has not been fully explained to the community at large. The security issues are not trivial. In this age of concern about bioterrorism it seems strange to move Category 4 work to Central London. Additionally it costs a lot of money to secure a building in Central London against the Animal Liberation Front? In summary I am deeply concerned that moving NIMR to Central London will be costly and will further jeopardise the biomedical research base in the UK. The move has not been completely justified to the wider scientific community and the cost implications have not been made clear. The idea of breaking up something that works really well and is more than a sum of the parts seems strange when not fully justified and runs the risk of losing top class scientists from the UK. 15 November 2004

APPENDIX 32 Memorandum from Professor P M Biggs I find the proposal to move the Institute to a central London hospital site and reduction in size hard to understand. This view comes from collaborations over a number of years in the past and admiration for the achievements of the Institute and the major contributions the staV of the Institute have made and continue to make to medical science. I have known the Institute for over 40 years and over that period it has consistently been a major contributor to and icon for many areas of medical research. Firstly the translocation. There are several aspects to this recommendation. A major move of this magnitude will seriously disrupt research programmes and destroy teams. I have personal experience of the consequences of a move of this kind and its results. Over the period of several years required to rebuild at the new site and organise the move, morale will become aVected, some staV will look elsewhere for employment and recruitment will be diYcult. A proportion of senior staV and many support staV will choose not to move. What will the move achieve? Supposedly closer interaction with clinical services, but this already occurs with many hospitals in London. Most collaborations come from the will to do so and leadership, not the physical closeness of those concerned. Secondly, the reduction in size. I must confess that I do not understand this recommendation since the output and quality of the Institute cannot be criticised. I wonder whether those making the recommendation understand the eVectiveness of research institutes. They have the great asset over universities of being able to set up multidisciplinary teams, to take a long term view of research and more eVectively provide the support services and equipment required for the programmes. This reduction in size would in my view result in an overall reduction in the contribution the MRC makes to the advancement of medical science. 16 November 2004

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APPENDIX 33 Memorandum from Professor Alan Gilbert, University of Manchester I write to you on behalf of the University of Manchester, which has no direct interest in NIMR and has made no bid for relocation of the Institute or any of its staV to Manchester. We do however have an immense interest in the vital national role that the NIMR plays. As the largest University in the UK, by many measures, we have recognised the great importance of colocation of related research facilities, of establishing critical mass research capability, particularly in science, and of the need to couple biology with translational and clinical research in order to deliver medical benefit. There are certainly very strong scientific and clinical reasons to co-locate NIMR with a major University which includes a medical school and a teaching hospital. Indeed, we find it diYcult to envisage how an institute for medical research will be able to flourish in the 21st century without such co-location. But such considerations do not necessarily point to a location of the NIMR in the South East. The Medical Research Council has engaged leading national and international experts to review the future of NIMR and has consulted widely. Such reviews do, nevertheless, sometimes perpetuate status quo thinking on issues that might be better resolved through more imaginative solutions. So without questioning the bulk of the NIMR recommendations, I must report very widespread disappointment in Manchester that further investment in the South East has been preferred (once again) to the many excellent opportunities in other regions of the UK. 17 November 2004

APPENDIX 34 Memorandum from Dr Katie Petty-Saphon, Council of Heads of Medical Schools The Council of Heads of Medical Schools is the authoritative voice of the 31 Medical Schools in the United Kingdom. We asked the Deans of all the Schools the following three questions: 1. Do you support the Task Force’s vision for a renewed NIMR with a focus on translational research? 2. Do you agree that this vision would be best realised by co-location with a major academic and clinical centre? 3. Should this site be in central London—Kings and UCL have been suggested as possibilities? If not, where would you suggest? The answer to the first question was a resounding yes, as it was to the second—with the belief that it should be a large teaching hospital, with the widest possible range of sub-specialties and a large patient base. It was further suggested that to optimise the national nature of the NHS the NIMR does not in fact need to be co-located with one single centre—but a “virtual” NIMR might see existing productive groups relocate to join their London-hospital-based colleagues whilst other groups centred on regional centres of excellence say, for example linking existing Mill Hill work on infectious diseases with centres in Oxford and Edinburgh and centring translational research in clinical immunology in Birmingham and Cambridge. Whilst colleagues in London clearly support the idea of a central London location, it could not be said that such a move received support from outside the capital. 17 November 2004

APPENDIX 35 Memorandum from Professor Stephen Tomlinson, former member of the MRC Task Force on the NIMR I write to you as a member of the Task Force established in 2003, to review the future of the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR) at Mill Hill. The first and most important matter I would like to address is the Task Force’s vision and its recommendations to the MRC for the future of NIMR. The long-term future would be a renewed National Institute for Medical Research focussing on translational research from “bench to bedside” and indeed, into the community. As a clinician scientist, formerly with a strong laboratory based research interest, I am convinced that in the 21st century, prevention of disease and promotion of good health will have an increasingly high profile, compared with the causes and treatment of disease which have exercised us for the last century. This kind of vision can only be realised in an environment that facilitates multi-disciplinary research ranging from molecular genetics and cell biology through to the impact of the physical, social and cultural environment on susceptibility to disease. The ultimate objective must be to define appropriate and

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eVective interventions that will reduce the incidence and prevalence of ill health. This vision, which can be realised incrementally, is entirely consistent with MRC strategy and indeed government policy. As a specialist in diabetes I have a personal and professional commitment to this approach and I can therefore see how vitally important this will be if we are going to eVectively control the developing “epidemic” of diabetes in the future, not only in the UK but also internationally. Secondly I would like to address the process (which I understand has been challenged) by which the Task Force reached its recommendations. The business of the Task Force at each meeting was conducted in a spirit of openness, fairness and propriety. Colin Blakemore (Chief Executive of the MRC) in the Chair behaved with absolute integrity at each meeting and between meetings, in order to reach a consensus. My initial prejudice (as you might expect!), being in CardiV and formerly at Manchester University, was that NIMR should be closed and the substantial resources committed to it each year by the MRC, should be redeployed to Universities throughout the UK. However, I was persuaded by the debate and the strength of the arguments put forward within the Task Force to support the conclusion that NIMR should be relocated adjacent to a full range University associated with state-of-the-art clinical facilities and internationally distinguished clinician scientists in order to realise its agreed vision. Any suggestion that the Task Force, which included several Fellows of the Royal Society and a Nobel prize winner were, in some way inappropriately directed to this conclusion, is, frankly, not credible. Thirdly, on the options for the way forward. I had thought, as a member of the Task Force, following our final meeting last summer, that we had reached, not only consensus, but unanimous agreement. Sadly, that was not to be the case, with colleagues at Mill Hill discontent. Nevertheless, the choice based on a competition for the renewed Institute at either University College London (UCL) or King’s College London (KCL), in my view was (and is) the correct choice. I personally do not believe that there should be a “fall back” position, with NIMR at Mill Hill being given equal consideration to the two Universities in London because it is inconsistent with the vision agreed by the Task Force and endorsed by Council. If neither UCL nor KCL is able to present an attractive proposal to the MRC, then I believe we should start again with my original prejudice (redeployment of resources) included with any other options that might be considered. My conclusions are that we have a clear proposal in place and the Task Force’s recommendations were agreed through consensus within the group. Moreover, the recommendations of the Task Force were then scrutinised by the full Council of MRC with objections and counterproposals given a lengthy hearing and proper consideration. Despite these objections, the final conclusion of the Council (and indeed its preliminary conclusion) was to accept the Task Force’s recommendations. It is essential that we have a clear way forward in place in time for the appointment of Sir John Skehel’s successor as Director of NIMR. We must now move to implement the recommendations of the Task Force urgently and without further distraction. 16 November 2004

APPENDIX 36 Memorandum from Professor N J Rothwell, former member of the MRC Task Force on the NIMR As background, I served as a Council member of MRC from October 2000 until July 2004. During that time I chaired two of the boards (Physiological Medicine and Infections 2000–02, Neuroscience and Mental Health 2002–04), I served on many other boards including Strategy, Awards advisory, Training and careers development, Clinical trials and Animals in research. I chaired many reviews of MRC units and some institutes. I was a member of the Forward Investment Strategy (FIS) group which initially considered the future of MRC’s institutions (which included NIMR). I was not a member of the subsequent Task Force but discussed its progress and recommendations at council. I will comment on two aspects of the review—the process and the recommendations. Process This is one of the most extensive, rigorous and consultative reviews of science in the UK that I have observed. It involved many UK and international scientists, national consultations and direct and regular involvement of NIMR staV. The Chief Executives of MRC, and most probably Professor Blakemore, made numerous visits to NIMR, and many Council members including myself had extensive discussions with NIMR StaV collectively and individually (I visited NIMR twice). Leading international advisors were engaged, and I understand that the NIMR representatives initially agreed to accept the recommendations of the Task Force. Members of Council, FIS and (I understand) the Task Force entered discussions without preconceived ideas, and were all heard equally. There have been suggestions that there was a predefined “agenda” from within MRC head oYce—I had absolutely no experience of this at any time, and believe that such suggestions are completely unfounded.

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The Recommendations There is no easy solution to the future of NIMR—as the many hours, days and weeks of discussion have revealed. I fully understand the concerns of staV at NIMR—relocation will inevitably be disruptive, but is undertaken quite frequently in the commercial sector. I believe that the principle of the recommendations is well founded—for the future of NIMR, and most importantly for the future of biomedical research in the UK. Indeed it is critically important to consider NIMR in the national context. It is increasingly diYcult to maintain “stand alone”, major research facilities which require significant underpinning infrastructure. The very name National Institute for Medical Research indicates that the majority of the research should be medical or medically related. I recognise interactions with clinical colleagues particularly in London is arduous, but my own experience of clinical research is that it is very diYcult without a direct and geographically close relationship with a medical school and teaching hospital. I believe that the future success of NIMR depends on its close proximity to a major University, Medical School and hospital. I visited NIMR twice during my membership of FIS. It was then that I saw the distance they were from central London and the poor state of some of their laboratories and general infrastructure. The future costs of maintaining NIMR were very much secondary to discussions at MRC, but are not trivial. I cannot imagine how MRC can meet the real investment needed to maintain the position of NIMR as a leader in biomedical research. Finally, I would comment that NIMR is an extremely important and valuable part of MRC’s research portfolio, but the time and eVort expended on what I believe has been an essential, though diYcult review, is now starting to threaten MRC’s other work. The diYcult discussions and recommendations made recently may have been better undertaken 10 years ago. If they are not made now, they will need to be revisited regularly in the near future. 16 November 2004

APPENDIX 37 Memorandum from Professor Simon Howell, King’s College London I am submitting this document in my capacity as Project leader for King’s College London’s proposal that NIMR should be relocated to the Guy’s campus of King’s. It represents my own views; the College will be sending a separate memorandum. Background 1. Our interest in the relocation of NIMR to King’s was triggered in the summer of 2003 when MRC Council set aside the recommendation from the Forward Investment Strategy subcommittee that NIMR should move to Cambridge and set up the Task Force to consult and advise further on the future of NIMR. It seemed to us that the excellent science fit between the activities of NIMR and those at King’s, coupled with the fact that land is becoming available for redevelopment at our Guy’s campus created an excellent opportunity for both organisations. 2. Senior staV at King’s asked to discuss this idea with Professor Blakemore in July 2003 (after his appointment as CEO of the MRC but before he took up the post) and an (unsolicited) outline proposal was submitted to MRC by King’s on 6th October 2003. I understand that several other medical schools contacted the MRC to express interest in the possibility of hosting NIMR and all major medical schools were approached as part of the early consultative work of the Task Force. 3. The Task Force consisted of eminent scientists and science administrators from around the world. This group included the head of the Canadian National Institutes of Health Research (Dr Alan Bernstein), a Howard Hughes Institute Investigator at Yale, who formerly worked at NIMR (Professor Richard Flavell), the Honorary Director of an MRC Unit (Professor Kay Davies) and a Nobel laureate with close knowledge of UK science (Professor Paul Nurse). My understanding is that the Task Force had access to the preliminary bid from King’s, as well as to expressions of interest from other universities, during its discussions. 4. Following a series of interim reports which concluded that NIMR should move to a Central London campus in an academic/hospital environment, London Colleges and Universities were invited to submit formal proposal to the Task Force in June 2004, and if these were short-listed, to present their cases to the Task Force. 5. In its final report, the Task Force confirmed its recommendation that NIMR should move to an academic/hospital campus in Central London and recommended that discussions should continue with King’s College and University College. This was accepted by Council. 6. We are currently preparing a further set of proposals for a deadline of 22 November, and a presentation to Council on 15 December. We understand that Council intends to select a referred bidder at that time.

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Commentary 7. I believe that the decision to relocate NIMR to Central London is the correct one. All funders are turning their attention to research that will bring healthcare benefits to the population in the near term predominantly by the application of basic science research into clinical practice (translational research). This requires an integrated hospital/research environment in an area of large population—to provide a range of clinical material. In addition Central London is a magnet for researchers internationally in a way which other cities are not. It is not feasible to alter the focus of NIMR research in this way from a relatively isolated site at Mill Hill. 8. In addition true integration onto a hospital/academic campus will yield economies of infrastructure costs for instance library, IT provision, workshops, electron microscopes etc can be operated as a shared facilities yielding substantial recurrent cost savings. 9. It is important that MRC keeps to the currently proposed timetable for choice of preferred bidder. This is because there is a real risk of loss of key scientists if the future location is not identified in a timely manner after the decision to close Mill Hill, and locally because there are substantial opportunity costs for delaying planning for deployment of land in our partner’s control on the Guy’s campus. 10. I have been responsible for all the documents prepared by King’s and have been present at a number of meetings with MRC staV and consultants to discuss the project as well as presenting our case to the Task Force. To my mind the process has been conducted in an entirely fair, open and transparent way, within the context of what is essentially a competitive tender route for selection of preferred host for NIMR. This inevitably meant that the tender proposals (or aspects of them) are to a degree commercially sensitive, and are not available to public scrutiny. 17 November 2004

APPENDIX 38 Memorandum from Dr Jonathan Cooke Personal Background Recently retired long term Scientific StaV member at NIMR (1973–2001), having occupied roles from postdoctoral researcher to Head of Division (middle manager with continued scientific career). Diverse connections (possibly more so than typical for senior NIMR staV members) with biomedical researchers at various career levels in UK and abroad. While having enjoyed my career there, I have been out of the NIMR environment long enough to have shed certain irrational attachments to its site and character that I believe current senior staV may be displaying. I retain a concern for the future shape of biomedical research in UK and regard the overall decision-tree currently arrived at by MRC in relation to NIMR as a brave and forward-looking one. I do not see impropriety in the processes that have led to it, but understand some history that may shed light on why some are trying to claim this (see below). I feel that any process that forced MRC to retreat from what they currently refer to as their “compelling vision” in this matter (see their website under NIMR future), would cause a far-reaching opportunity to be lost without good grounds. The Background to Institution of a Parliamentary Inquiry Under its previous chief executive, Sir George Radda, two or three years back, MRC reached a decision radically to transform and to relocate to Cambridge the grouping of in-house scientists that is NIMR, currently located at MILL HILL. It turned out that crucial features of this plan, notably the proposed siting in the biomedical complex outside Cambridge, were logistically “not on”. But the arguments for major change including downsizing of this portion of MRC’s long term commitment, were as persuasive then as now (see elsewhere and below). Unfortunately, the secretive way in which MRC Head OYce handled the issue, then chose to announce their finished plan to senior NIMR staV (including its current scientific director who did not then, and still does not, himself have good relations with HO) was managerially inept and high-handed. The announcement provoked an understandably outraged reaction by the staV. The more recent course of events should all be seen in the light of this background. The current CEO Prof Colin Blakemore inherited the unenviable situation that the decision-making process on NIMR must be re-run, taking account of political correctness (ie, quite properly, openness of process), but also with an absurdly overbalanced degree of consultativeness, that had been extorted from MRC by the originally outraged staV. This was that NIMR staV members themselves should form a substantial portion of the “taskforce” or consulting and information-gathering body, that MRC now set up to re-appraise the long-term options for deployment of the NIMR part of MRC resource. Certainly we live in times when a spirit of participatory democracy is generally to be encouraged, but is there any precedent for employees who are doing the shop-floor work of a major government-funded organisation (viz MRC

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scientists) to expect to participate in, and almost exert a veto over, the highest level of strategic decisionmaking by that organisation’s managers? The decision does concern optimal deployment of national financial resources. Prof Blakemore and colleagues have had the diYcult task of trying to steer the strategic decision-taking within this ultra-participatory framework (I believe not of Blakemore’s choice but already promised before he took oYce), where the NIMR scientist input has quite clearly only ever had one objective (preservation of the Mill Hill Institute) in mind. Despite that input, and perhaps input from those NIMR has directly lobbied for its cause, MRC has again arrived at the overall conclusion that the character appropriate to a future version of NIMR in the 21st century, or at least to the future deployment of the public resources that currently go into it, would not be attained at the Mill Hill site. This seems a brave and a forward-looking decision to most observers in the wider scientific community (see Arguments, below), but the NIMR contingent will not accept it. They seem to be claiming that over-riding of their colleagues’ views on a task force may constitute impropriety. Major change always entails disruption for employees in the middle of their careers (schools, neighbourhood ties, spouse jobs etc), but MRC scientists’ contracts clearly state the in-principle liability to be re-deployed wherever else, within UK, MRC strategy may need to place them. To reach their goal, the scientists who have triggered the present review rely on MRC not being able to identify a site elsewhere in London that will take all major research groupings of the present institute. They would then claim that a retreat to the “Mill Hill option” was a promised alternative, and that any other proposal (involving separate new sites for groupings within the present NIMR) represents some sort of betrayal by MRC Head OYce. They may even claim that a relocation of a whole new institute in a more central London site, should this become a possibility, represents results of impropriety of some kind. They recognise the need to mount science-based arguments for their preference. But in all their submissions, it is easy to detect the irrational components of attachment that are felt by long-term occupants of any workplace where intense and exciting work has been done, and where certain “out-of-hours” facilities have been set up to compensate for its otherwise marginal (because outer suburban) location. Although it has elicited this sort of aVection in many of its longer-term inhabitants—I too have felt this and enjoyed my time there—the current NIMR site is NOT perceived as charming, in its favour, or advantageous by EITHER the majority of the scientific community OR, importantly, talented potential new recruits from within UK or from overseas. The eminent biomedical researchers that MRC recruited into their decision-taking process concurred that, while preservation of the great majority of research eVort from NIMR as one grouping or community was desirable if at all possible (ie an “NIMR” equivalent should still exist), this should not be at the present site. This is because the new character that the envisioned research institute must have could not plausibly be supported there (see Arguments, below). The belief professed by NIMR senior staV, that a majority of the biomedical research community supports their preference for retention of the current site, is an illusion caused by distorting social forces that operate within a small community such as the UK (and particularly the SE England “golden triangle”). It is important for parliamentary members, maybe not familiar with the workings of science research, to recognise these distorting forces, which operate as follows. Senior scientists at NIMR are, ipso facto, potential major shapers of the fortunes of peers elsewhere, as reviewers of their work and their submissions for funding of further work, editors of prestigious journals etc etc. They are currently in crusader, almost one might say gangster psychological mode on this issue, whereby anyone professing frankly not to share their position on what is best for the future, is seen as “against them” and their enemy in some broader sense. Thus unfortunately, Machiavellianism often prevails when other individuals are directly asked for their views, and NIMR staV walk through a world that concurs with their views. Though both MRC and, earlier, NIMR itself have sought unattributed views via websites and so forth, these are suYciently eVortful to lodge that few without strong personal stakes in outcomes get around to doing so. Because my chosen mode of retirement doesn’t give cause for guardedness in others, I am perhaps a better sampler of general opinion than a currently higher-profile scientist would be. In my experience most assume that the decision, that will in due course undo what they have always felt to be a geographically bad siting of a major resource package, has already been made and they welcome it. Nor is it true, as has been alleged, that there is general distaste in the university-based research community for an institute, because of the privileged status of staV members within it. It is recognised that with the current character of biomedical science, institutes have their place, but that this should be in close conjunction with major sites for the teaching and the translation into practice of biomedicine. Arguments Main arguments on both sides must have been laid out already, and available to select committee members; here I add in only remarks that come from a long-term familiarity with the present, Mill Hill site. Whatever is felt about this by some older scientists, we have entered an era where the total style package oVered by a potential environment is an important factor in job choices among the younger age-group who are in the course of doing their best scientific work. This is as true of clinician scientists as of “blue skies” ones. On these grounds, whatever its structural soundness, the Mill Hill site would need so total a transformation, in order to make it competitive with others that have been purpose-built for the biomedical science of more recent eras, as to approach the cost of a new building. Without this, MRC would be at a continual disadvantage in recruitment of the best younger laboratory leaders; the perpetual process of

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refurbishment for new workers at Mill Hill only ever produces a token gesture towards adequacy and is a continual drain on finances. The particular group of senior (near retirement) NIMR staV members who are most opposed to MRC’s plans, including its director, are quite impervious to this vital “style” factor in the pulling power of a modern environment after their long-term acculturation to the charms of their surroundings. Without some unimaginable change in the transportation system, the Mill Hill location really does disadvantage the current institute. This has always been perceived by collaborators from elsewhere and by visitors, but the degree of intercommunication that will be normal for the translational biomedical science of the future cannot but intensify the disadvantage. Indeed, if translational research and experimental medicine (see MRC’s own material for definitions of these terms) are to be a renewed institute’s remit, it is hard to see how continued Mill Hill siting could even be contemplated. A large hospital and presumably medical school would need to be set up/ translated there also. More rational surely to translate the research facility to the others. Certainly, current Mill Hill staV do have an extensive internal and external network of collaborations, but the latter could only be enhanced by re-siting. The institute’s geographically isolated position has led to a certain pattern whereby, if collaboration across expertises becomes indicated in a research project, the first impulse is to say “we’ve got it in-house” and look no further. The best researchers worldwide, try to forge collaborations on the basis of real commonality of interest and expertise level. Seen in this way, the advantages of having such a diverse collection of disciplines in one place, and an isolated place at that, begin to look less compelling. This issue points up the basic discrepancy, as I understand it, between the decision-tree that MRC has arrived at and the preference expressed by NIMR senior staV. This is between placing the highest priority on appropriateness of location, while giving only second importance to keeping all grouping of scientists in one place (desirable if possible), or alternatively preserving the institute as a single entity at all cost. My feeling based on my extensive time there, is that what would be lost by any separation of the major viable groupings within the present institute, does not match what would be gained by re-housing each grouping in scientifically and geographically appropriate surroundings. I have more than once heard the present director of NIMR express exasperation at what an uphill task it was to get appropriate “bigshots” finally to bite at oVers of positions at Mill Hill. Certainly, over the last 15–20 yrs, I have been aware that several such “bigshots”, who also happened to be personal acquaintances, chose other opportunities because of the siting and style factors outlined in the above paragraphs. With the altered remit for an institute of the future, those disadvantages can only become more acute, and could only be partially oVset by the most massive investment by government via MRC. A final factor, that may seem an irrelevant detail for purposes of a parliamentary review, concerns the important experimental animal housing facility currently at Mill Hill. This facility specialises successfully in maintaining animals with a stringently defined health status, necessary for certain categories of the work that is done there and elsewhere in UK, and is regarded a nationally significant by the community of people doing those kinds of work. For reasons that are not clear, but that can hardly have to do with Mill Hill as a geographical location, it has proved diYcult to attain these conditions reliably in many other UK animal facilities in recent years. The broad grouping of scientists known as the Infections & Immunity super-group at Mill Hill is currently that whose overall level of distinctiveness and contribution, in its fields, most conforms with the criteria that are supposed to justify research-dedicated institutes in general. It will thus be important, whether any relocation is of a whole (downsized?) institute, or of major groupings to separate sites, that this particular scientific grouping is given the opportunity of remaining together and with access to a specialist animal facility that can hope to match the current one. The present animal facility alone, however, cannot in my view possibly tip the balance against broader science-based arguments such as the above, in favour of the conservative option of a whole institute remaining at Mill Hill. 17 November 2004

APPENDIX 39 Memorandum from Professor Thomas A Steitz, Yale University I write to comment on the proposals to move the research labs of the NIMR at Mill Hill to another location, which, as viewed from a distance, appear to be unwise. 1. I am Sterling Professor of Molecular Biophysics and Biochemistry as well as a Howard Hughes Medical Institute Investigator at Yale University. I have served as chairman of my department and have served on the scientific advisory committees of the Skirball Institute at New York University and the EMBL. My field of research expertise is structural biology using X-ray crystallography and focused on the proteins and nucleic acids involved in gene expression. I have visited the NIMR at Mill Hill once a few years ago to present a seminar and talk to some of the investigators there. 2. It is not clear to me what the problem is that is being fixed. Certainly their facilities would benefit from an upgrade, but I would guess that everything necessary at Mill Hill could be done for far less than the 200 million cost of moving the labs. If the present members of the Mill Hill laboratory are opposed to the

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proposed moves, and some might choose to go elsewhere if it happens, there could be an additional cost to the move that is diYcult to estimate. Has anyone asked the research directors at Mill Hill to express their opinions? It would not be the less capable staV who might choose to find other opportunities. 3. While I can see some potential advantages of a close proximity to university labs and hospitals for making contact with potential collaborators, the reality is that large size often works against productive new interactions. The research investigators have to seek these interactions or have structured informal opportunities to meet the right people. How is that going to happen? I spent 2° years at the MRC LMB in Cambridge and witnessed very little, if any, interaction between the LMB and the hospital and little of important substance with the University (except for some great feasts). I am in a department that has ´ of its faculty in the medical school and have witnessed almost no productive research interactions with the clinical faculty, only the pre-clinical faculty of the departments of cell biology, genetics, microbiology, physiology and pharmacology; these are all areas already represented at Mill Hill, I believe. 4. It also seems to me that the space constraints for new construction in central London must be more severe than at Mill Hill. What are the visions for any future development of the NIMR and would it be possible to accommodate these at the sites near University College, London or King’s College? Would it be possible, cost competitive and eVective to bring clinical research to Mill Hill rather than Mill Hill to clinical research? I do not believe that top-down attempts to institute translational research directed towards clinical problems will be eVective, here or in the UK, since that is not the history of how biomedical research that transforms treatment possibilities has in general happened. Revolutions start at the bottom with outstanding people in the right environments. 5. I have a great respect for several lab directors at Mill Hill who have voiced disapproval of a proposed move. I strongly urge that you listen closely to them. 17 November 2004

APPENDIX 40 Memorandum from Jackie Wilbraham FUTURE OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH (NIMR)

Executive Summary 1. The UK has the opportunity to create a new world-class biomedical research institute based on an established internationally competitive research centre that will contribute greatly to the understanding of disease and through improvements in healthcare, bring benefit to patients. This in turn will result in improvement to the UK economy. The biomedical research base underpins future drug discovery and development and as such is of vital important to the continuing success of the highly productive UK pharmaceutical industry. Consequently, such an opportunity should be carefully thought through. 2. The MRC should consider thoroughly the strategic role of the NIMR and how it operates alongside the Clinical Sciences Centre (CSC) and the Laboratory for Molecular Biology (LMB). The challenge for the MRC is to describe a clear vision with a strategy that encompasses basic research into disease mechanisms, translational science, clinical research, training and patient benefit. The MRC should use this opportunity to re-align the work of the LMB, NIMR and CSC. 3. It is our view that the LMB should investigate fundamental aspects of molecular and cell biology and be the major centre for structural biology in the UK. The NIMR should focus on basic physiology and cell biology applied to understanding normal biological processes and disease mechanisms, particularly in priority areas such as diabetes and obesity, cancer and respiratory diseases. Responsibility for translational science should be part of the remit of the CSC, which should also conduct clinical research into major diseases including diagnosis, prognosis and disease progression. 4. The work of the NIMR should bring significant improvements in understanding of disease mechanisms and disease management. A multi-disciplinary NIMR with suYcient critical mass of biomedical science coupled with investment in infrastructure would be well positioned to tackle the biomedical challenges that we are faced with today.

Medical Research Council Task Force on NIMR—Consultation with Stakeholders Responses to consultation questions 5. The remit of the NIMR should be to conduct basic science into understanding fundamental biological processes and disease mechanisms.

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6. A single site that has strong links with universities would be optimal to perform this remit. We do not believe that such a site should necessarily be located in London. There appears to be a disproportionate emphasis on the “golden triangle” whilst other excellent sites are ignored. The location of a national site should take into account value for money and factors such as cost of living, transport links, price of housing, outlay for new building and refurbishment as well as the feasibility of recruitment of outstanding scientific staV. We know that the MRC has determined that the NIMR should remain in London but feel that is a serious and costly mistake based on false premises. The centre could be placed in Newcastle, Manchester or Birmingham at a much lower cost and this would prove more attractive to younger scientists. These areas boast excellent universities and strong scientific national and international links. Furthermore, these regional sites would derive benefit from regional development agency and European funding to create to jobs and enhance regional economies. It is recognised that such a new site would require relocation of staV but we reject the idea that a majority of current science leaders at NIMR would resign rather than move North. The same could also be true of a move to University College (UCL) or King’s College (KCL) in London. However, a relocation to a more Northerly regional site would be associated with a reduced cost of living for staV relocating from London, partly as a consequence of cheaper housing. The transfer of high calibre scientific staV would act as a magnet for new recruitment to the NIMR and associated activities in the particular region. There is much to commend serious consideration of such a move and a thorough costbenefit analysis. 7. If the NIMR remains in London then a move to KCL or UCL would incur significant cost whilst to remain at Mill Hill and carry out appropriate refurbishment would not be without expense. It is diYcult to put a precise figure on the cost of a move and associated activities. However, we question the costs of the proposed move and are concerned that not all of the key factors have been duly considered. The current costs seem to us to be a gross underestimate of what will be needed and we have concerns that the development of NIMR could then jeopardise the ability of MRC to provide adequate funding for response-mode grants. If the NIMR remains in London the Mill Hill site looks to us to be the most cost-eVective but loses the opportunity for close integration with a leading University. Of the two London sites identified, KCL is preferred, as it has oVered contributions of £30 million or more to the capital costs of the project. 8. The work of the NIMR should be aligned to a UK biomedical research strategy. There should be suYcient flexibility in the system to allow for change commensurate with scientific progress. The work should be complementary to that of the LMB and CSC and not duplicate eVort but work in partnership to create and deliver patient benefit. 9. In order to ensure that scientists are able to conduct multi-disciplinary research and optimally achieve the remit set out above, research on one site alongside a university is preferred. This will enable the UK to build on its existing strength in biomedical research and the NIMR continue to be a world-class organisation. This in turn will attract top-class scientists to the UK, a key component in creating a selfsustaining science base. Furthermore, partnerships and collaboration both with academia and Industry will be critical to the achievement of the MRC vision. 10. The NIMR should be seen as a centre of excellence in the UK providing both world-class biomedical research and training of future scientists and leaders. There should be suYcient critical mass and infrastructure to support a world-class facility. 11. The current size of the NIMR is probably about right to engage in productive multi-disciplinary research. A reduction in the current number of staV (730) would cause a decline in critical mass or result in too narrow a portfolio of research with major opportunities being missed. To deliver excellence in research we suggest an ambitious target of approximately 100 further scientific staV would be required. 12. The Director of the NIMR should possess strong leadership capabilities, have vision, international reputation, a track record of biomedical research excellence and be an influential communicator. The Director should receive the remit from the MRC and have clear accountabilities whilst retaining discretion in terms of scientific direction. The Director should be appointed by the MRC Council and be supported by a scientific advisory board to help to determine the priorities of the NIMR in the short, medium and long term, and to assist with scientific review of the scientific programmes. 13. We recognise the importance of publications in key scientific journals as a success measurement. However, to enhance the capabilities of the MRC and NIMR we strongly suggest that the critical success factors should be broadened to include metrics based on interaction with industry to develop and commercialise clinically successful treatments based on a fundamental understanding of disease process. Such key measurements would do much to promote eVective partnerships between industry and academia. 14. We hope that this brief response is helpful to you in determining the remit and the future of the NIMR. We would be pleased to discuss this important matter with you in greater detail than this consultation allows. 17 November 2004

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APPENDIX 41 Memorandum from the Public and Commercial Services Union PCS NIMR members have met as part of the NIMR action group with the MRC management over a number of months. We have had access to the Employee representations committee and engaged in discussion with Council members; our points were then reported to Council. Our main concerns remain the following: 1. Whilst we are committed to changing and innovative science and will support this, we strongly feel that NIMR at Mill Hill should be considered as a viable option as well as options to move to a university setting in central London. We are happy that an original proposed move to Cambridge has been totally rejected by Council following a lengthy campaign. 2. Our members are usually women, the lowest paid, in part time jobs, and with child care and elder care responsibilities: they have built up a network of support systems in the Mill Hill areas that enables them to attempt a reasonable work/life balance. We feel that they would be the most penalised staV , were they forced to travel much greater distances and pay more for commuting. 3. Clearly members are fully in support of a revitalised Institute and welcome the government’s commitment to science; they would wish to increase investment in NIMR. They are less impressed by the continuing attack by the government on public sector workers. 4. Our members in the support functions are a crucial part of a scientific team and are in the front line of science. PCS is committed to giving them our full support as part of a cadre of employees who carry out vital work and are motivated by the public sector ethos, belief in the importance of science for the UK, and a strong commitment to the MRC. 17 November 2004

APPENDIX 42 Memorandum from Professor Trevor Jones, King’s College London I am Professor Trevor M Jones CBE recently Director General of the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) and also Deputy Chair of Council of King’s College London. I would like the inquiry to be aware that in seeking a new location for the NIMR my contacts with the Medical Research Council have been frequent and I have found the Council and particularly Colin Blakemore to have given this matter significant priority and diligence. Obviously we would like King’s to be the preferred location for NIMR but I understand the necessity for MRC to carry out a very thorough examination of all the possibilities; which they have done. 17 November 2004

APPENDIX 43 Memorandum from Professor Adrian Newland, Royal College of Pathologists 1. The MRC’s remit of strengthening Clinical Research is an important one in the current climate. This is particularly crucial, at a time when Academic Medicine is under acute pressure, with the loss of over a third of the lecturer posts, and professorial vacancies approaching 80. It is increasingly apparent that research should not only be basic, but needs to link in with the clinical research undertaken in teaching hospitals, with a significant element of translational research, with more focused clinical goals. The stated aim of the proposals of the MRC for the National Institute of Medical Research, in increasing the number of Clinician Scientists with closer clinical links, will help achieve this. It is clear that a major lead in this area from the MRC will send an important message to the Government and to the academic community. 2. There are a number of potential options for the relocation of the site at Mill Hill. Of course, it should be considered as to whether Mill Hill should remain as the main academic site, but it is clear that, over the last few years, although producing some reasonable research, has rather lost its way, and has become isolated from the main academic community, and has provided less of an academic lead, as would have seemed appropriate for an institution of this size and importance. 3. The option of re-providing the development on a single site, in association with an academic clinical institution, is attractive. This would retain the intra-institutional interactions currently seen at Mill Hill, but would have the added value of clinical links. 4. The single site would be the preferable option; however, if this is not viable on cost grounds, then consideration could be given splitting the institution into smaller coherent elements, and placing these where they would get added value. It would, however, have to be considered whether the loss of interaction

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between the units is important, and this would, of course, have to be considered following an assessment of to what degree and with what success this currently occurs. It would have to be considered whether this loss would be oVset by the value of placing the units within institutions most likely to enhance their value, and would, of course, bring other additional links into play. 5. There needs to be considerable flexibility in considering the future of the NIMR and its research direction. Flexibility is the key, as in an envolving research environment, priorities change, and there needs to be an ability to adapt and exploit these. This however, would occur on the background of an established research direction, with appropriate technology that would not diVer much from the current areas of research. Although Cancer is widely supported in academic research, there could be value in adding the Cancer agenda into the research themes, but the actual direction should be left to a new Director, with his advisory team. 6. The importance of the proximity of a teaching hospital cannot be overestimated, as the development of strong clinical links in achieving the strategic remit of the MRC, is vital. In order to properly exploit translational research, close links with a hospital would be important in developing the contacts and having the discussions that make such a transition possible. In addition, in order to increase the number of Clinical Scientists, which is the stated aim of the project, to attract them and use them most eYciently, such close clinical links are crucial. This would be diYcult to achieve on a remote site. 7. An important role of the renewed institute, particularly with its potential increase in size, would be to be involved in the training of clinical academics, and could be the focus of the development of the National Training Numbers for Academics Scheme currently being considered by the Academy of the Royal Colleges. 8. A major role of the institution would be by acting as a focus for training clinical and non-clinical scientists. Co-ordinating key areas of biomedical research is also important, as by having appropriate areas of expertise, it would be possible to flexibly respond to any sudden new developments. This can be illustrated by our inability to react and exploit the few cases of SARS in the UK when they occured, which was unlike some of our European counterparts. 9. The development of the new institution should not be at the expense of basic scientists, but there should be an increase in Clinical Scientists, while maintaining those basic scientists with whom they would work and interact. The increase in numbers would take into account movement into newer areas such as Cancer. 10. The management of the new institution would be crucial and it will be key to attract a Director of international standing, with enough scope to direct the institute, but with an influential scientific advisory board, who can shape the elements of the institute over time. If the institute is to achieve excellence in a number of areas, then there needs to be a strong advisory board, although it is clear government by committee is rarely successful, and there needs to be a strong director to lead and shape the institution. It goes without saying that there needs to be a strong professional team to take the scientific aims forward. 11. The institute, as it currently stands, has become relatively insular, and isolated from clinical progress and translational research, and has not been the leader that would be anticipated for an institute of its size and reputation. A renewed institute with strong clinical links, is crucial for the development of academic research and in supporting academic medicine. In order to achieve, this co-location with a research active hospital is vital. This could be on one site, if such can be identified, or, as a secondary option, could be on more than one site, alongside one or more universities and their associated hospitals. However, this would not be the preferred option. 12. The MRC has made a bold attempt to reinvigorate the research output from the NIMR, which has understandably met opposition from internal vested interests. There is an element of complacency in the response to this, and the committee needs to make a bold attempt to support this development and allow this exciting endeavour to be taken forward. This can only be to the benefit of academic medical research in this country. 17 November 2004

APPENDIX 44 Memorandum from Dr E M Armstrong, Chief Medical OYcer, Scotland 1. Let me start by declaring and interest. I am a member of the Council of MRC appointed as a representative of the Scottish Executive Health Department. 2. I am a full time permanent civil servant. 3. I was a member of the Forward Investment Strategy (FIS) committee set up by MRC Council. 4. MRC is required to demonstrate accountability for the considerable investment of public funds which it controls. As a part of that accountability it is required to demonstrate that its forward investment strategy is focussed on delivering the strategic aims of the organisation as a whole, including delivering support for the part that MRC plays in the overall research eVort of the Research Councils accountable to OST.

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5. As a part of this process the FIS committee was asked to appraise the forward plans of all the major MRC units, in Cambridge, Harwell and London, benchmarking them against the strategic aims of MRC to 2010 and checking that there was maximum synergy and minimum duplication or overlap between the programmes and objectives of each unit, and that the units as a whole would be in a position to deliver the MRC strategic objectives. 6. Of particular interest to me from a Health Department perspective was the need to ensure that MRC was able to deliver patient benefit from its research, that there was a clear track from the bench to the bedside and that translational research capacity was included in the overall portfolio oVered by the MRC units. 7. As the work of FIS committee developed, my recollection is that a clear distinction emerged between the position of NIMR, Mill Hill and the other units at Imperial College, Cambridge and Harwell. The latter were all able to clearly articulate their strategic objectives in a way which was demonstrably in synergy with each other and with the aims and objectives of MRC as a whole. 8. In respect of NIMR the impression, as I recall it, was diVerent. We were not able to gain any sense that the work of NIMR itself was organised and co-ordinated with any strategic direction. There was, and is, world class work going on, but my impression was that there was little attempt being made to form it into a cohesive whole. While there was undoubtedly a sincere commitment to continue work to a world class standard, the principal objective was to continue with the historic direction of travel. There was no sense that this work had to play into the overall forward objectives of MRC. There was almost a feeling of resentment from NIMR that MRC should even be asking these questions, that it was really a question of MRC being there to support NIMR rather than NIMR playing a part in MRC. 9. The other key diVerence between NIMR and the other units was of course in respect of its patient focus. The MRC is in the business of medical research and there is a clear need as I have said to demonstrate the track from the bench to the bedside. We were not satisfied, despite the large number clinical collaborations involving NIMR staV, that there was any strategic intent to address this at Mill Hill nor was there any way in which FIS could see that it could easily be addressed. 10. The overall conclusion of the FIS committee was that while there was a clear need for much of the work of NIMR to continue, and that it should continue to do so to world class standards, there was a need to develop a forward direction for this work in synergy with MRC strategy, that some of it would benefit from being carried out in a context of greater critical scientific mass such as could be provided in one of the other units and that all of it needed to be carried out in a clinical environment rather than in an isolated setting. 11. It was clear to the FIS committee that achieving this would be diYcult on the current site at Mill Hill and thus the suggestion emerged that other locations for the work of NIMR should be considered and we so recommended to council. 12. Given the very tight deadline for the submission of evidence, this is an account based on my recollection of events rather than on a thorough trawl of my papers from the time. I hope nonetheless that it is of value to the Select Committee. 19 November 2004

APPENDIX 45 Memorandum from Professor Olugbemiro Sodeinde, University College Hospital, Ibadan, Nigeria THE FUTURE OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH—PLEASE SAFEGUARD IT I am Head of the Department of Paediatrics, College of Medicine, University of Ibadan and University College Hospital (UCH), Ibadan, Nigeria. UCH is the oldest established Teaching Hospital in West Africa. In addition to providing health care as the central regional hospital, our remit includes training a cadre of doctors with laboratory as well as clinical skills for high quality research. Our undergraduate students and postgraduate trainees come from other anglophone West African countries as well as Nigeria. Twice a year, we host the professional examinations of the West African College of Physicians. I am sure it would not surprise you that my interest in the matter of your inquiry stems from the excellent collaboration we have in malaria research with the Division of Parasitology at Mill Hill. This three-way collaboration between us, NIMR and the Department of Zoology, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, is supported by the WHO and the Wellcome Trust. This collaboration has primarily been focused on malaria vaccines. It led to the first demonstration in humans, that the vaccine candidate antigen, MSP 1, does induce the production of antibodies that are known to be protective. The integration of our studies in the field and in the laboratory has enabled us to make significant contributions to the development of a vaccine against malaria. As people who live and work at the coal face of malaria with responsibilities for clinical, laboratory, and other aspects of the disease, our work with the NIMR is of vital importance to us.

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Beyond the work on malaria vaccines our collaborations with Mill Hill are growing. For example, we have a joint application at the Gates Foundation “Grand Challenges in Global Health” entitled “Design and implementation of an automated malaria diagnosis toolkit”. If the proposed approach is successful it will have a profound impact in this important area, both in the clinic and for research in the field. Naturally, we are also interested in the research programmes at NJMR relating to Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS. Related to this, we are starting new postgraduate research degree programmes focusing on Aids, Tuberculosis & Malaria (ATM). As you are probably aware, these three diseases have been recognised globally as requiring special targeted attention. As to the importance of promoting cross-fertilisation of ideas between clinicians and basic scientists, I am sure the staV at Mill Hill have articulated very well how this is currently being ensured. However, kindly permit me to point out that the necessary integration of clinical, and laboratory approaches to a given problem depends more on the attitudes and habits of those concerned than their being on the same campus. Thus, Dr Tony Holder has already visited our hospital and laboratories in Nigeria twice as part of our collaboration which has taken a number of us, including myself, to work in the Mill Hill laboratories. In a few words, please do not allow disruption of the work at NIMR, Mill Hill. Its good works extend far beyond the shores of the UK. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 46 Memorandum from Dr R Henderson, MRC Laboratory of Molecular Biology I am writing to give you my views on strategic planning in MRC institutes in the context of your enquiry into NIMR. I write as Director of the MRC Laboratory of Molecular Biology, in Cambridge, one of three MRC institutes, which include the NIMR and the MRC Clinical Sciences Centre. I hope this will help to give the committee a wider perspective and be useful in their enquiry. MRC institutes provide an important component of the MRC’s intramural support for research, supporting as they do a multi-disciplinary portfolio of research in basic and more applicable biomedical and clinical science. Each institute has its own strategy and research programme, fully approved and funded by the MRC, but they share a number of key strategic features. Important among these is the long-term support for research into major scientific questions, which increasingly require interdisciplinary collaborative approaches. In the case of the LMB, such contributions include those such as its early successes in determining the structure of DNA, and in developing the techniques of X-ray crystallography (both of which involved researchers originally trained as physicists), through work on monoclonal antibodies and the sequencing of DNA, and more recently to work on embryonic development and the use of model organisms, as exemplified by the work on C elegans. All this work led to the award of Nobel Prizes which acknowledged revolutionary advances. I am pleased to say that work of comparable importance continues including that on the basis of immunological switching, which underlies the diversity of the immune response, and on the structure and function of the ribosome, which is the target of a number of novel antibiotics. I believe that all Institutes need to have a long-term research strategy, developed as part of the MRC’s overall vision and strategy. Such research strategies need to be forward looking, build on key strengths, identify new opportunities, and be responsive to the changing social and political environment in which research is conducted. They need to target opportunities presented by long term funding from the MRC (subject to regular, critical independent review), and the consequent obligation to tackle the most diYcult of research questions which do not lend themselves to short term funding objectives but at the same time often lead to the most revolutionary breakthroughs. Success of an institute is heavily dependent on the choice and subsequent nurturing of the individual scientists who lead their own research programmes within the overarching strategic framework and whose own interests are also in research of the highest quality. At the same time, the choice of the group leaders of the future is a key mechanism through which the Institute’s strategy is developed and realised. In the case of the LMB the early strategy was to support the development of new methods to analyse secondary and tertiary structures of proteins and nucleic acids and their inter-relationship through the genetic code. With time these key strengths were harnessed in the study of cellular mechanisms and development, not least through the choice of model organisms. In the 1960s the strategic decision was taken to work on C elegans, followed later by Drosophila and yeast, and more recently to extend our work on mammalian systems. In the 1990s the opportunity was taken to initiate work towards exploration of higher levels of organisation in the nervous system, but based very strongly on our strengths in structural and cell biology. Looking to the future the strategy involves a continued and expanding commitment to work on neurobiology, not least because of the burden of mental and neurological illness, and continued use of transgenic mice as model systems in which to study disease. It will also see closer interactions with groups involved in clinical research on the one hand, to better understand the nature of disease and to enable translation of research findings into application, and with physical scientists on the other, to expand the range of techniques which can be used to dissect molecular interactions and cellular processes.

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It is obviously not possible to predict with any certainty the direction in which particular research programmes will develop, or even which research programmes will be introduced. The first owes much to the unpredictability of research, which relies on trying out many approaches before finding the most fruitful avenue to follow; the second to the recruitment and retention of key research leaders. However, the institute as a whole will only be successful and strong if there is an overarching strategy, which frames the general nature of research which will be undertaken, and the general philosophy of the way it will be conducted. It also enables an Institute to look ahead to the challenges to come, and ensure that it is well placed to respond to such challenges. In the case of LMB, this strategy has focussed on understanding key cellular processes at the molecular level, bringing together exploration of structure and function to provide a complete understanding of cellular events. It has also included the concept of supporting relatively small groups, around internationally competitive scientists, and providing them with access to key techniques and resources, in an environment which encourages interactions and collective success, and avoids unproductive internal competition for resources or unnecessary staking out of territory. The strategies further seek to encourage the development of new techniques and methods; thereby ensuring by the very nature of its research programme that LMB is at the forefront of developments. Finally, the strategy also includes the commitment to assisting major programmes of work to become independent outside of the Institute when they individually out-grow what is possible within the institute itself. So, the LMB spawned the Sanger Institute, to take forward large scale sequencing, it launched a number of start-up companies to take forward breakthroughs in biotechnology, some of which have now been floated on the stock market, or acquired by other larger companies; and a number of senior group leaders left to start or lead their own institutes and Units, including the Wellcome/CRUK institute and the MRC Dunn Human Nutrition Unit in Cambridge, as well as a host of foreign institutes including the Howard Hughes Janelia Farm Research Campus which is both explicitly modelled on LMB and actually directed by an LMB research student alumnus. As part of this laboratory-wide strategy, the Divisions at LMB all have long term strategic plans which involve recruitment of young group leaders in key areas, succession plans for likely Division Heads and identification of infrastructure needs for the type of research envisioned. These then feed into the institute plan, which in turn forms part of the Addenbrooke’s 2020 Vision and the MRC’s own forward planning. It is also perhaps worth commenting on the advantages of location, in the case of LMB on the Addenbrooke’s Hospital site. When LMB first came to the site in the early 1960s, it was among the very first buildings here, on what was then the site for the fledgling new hospital. It had room to expand and grow, which it did very successfully, and the hospital grew around it, until today the LMB is enveloped and surrounded by the Clinical School and the Hospital. This led us, some years ago, to consider the possibility of moving out of Cambridge, to what was then a vacant site in Hinxton, before the Welcome Trust Sanger Centre was created. The older, established members of the Laboratory favoured such a green field site, with space, fine views and easy access. The younger postdoctoral scientists and students, those who are the future of the Laboratory, favoured a site closer to the centre of Cambridge, because of the links with the University and Colleges, as well as the social advantages. The MRC, then, as now, favoured co-location and juxta-position but not full integration with the hospital and university (the relationship desired was once described by Max Perutz as that of brother and sister rather than husband and wife), and so we remained on the Addenbrooke’s campus—half way between Hinxton and the centre of Cambridge. Clinical links have not been formal, but grass roots collaborations have been encouraged. These were of some significance in the development of the LMB’s research: Professor Herman Waldmann in the University of Cambridge, in collaboration with Dr Greg Winter in LMB and with clinicians within the Hospital, did some of the first clinical studies on the humanised monoclonal antibody Campath 1, which is now used for the treatment of certain leukaemias. This was the first clinical application of these novel compounds, which today are the basis of a multi-billion pound industry. MRC has a number of key patents in this field, on which royalties are received. On the Addenbrooke’s campus now, LMB is an integral part of the overall strategy for the development of the whole campus, and is a key player in the site wide developments planned for the next two decades and beyond. In closing, I hope the Committee will recognise the importance of institute research strategies, which can and should be planned over 10–20 years, if the institute is to take the long term perspective required to tackle major research questions in biomedical research. LMB has been fortunate in its interactions and opportunities, and has sought to maintain a consistent but developing strategy, to provide stability and allow exploitation of those opportunities. In the case of NIMR, the strategy will be diVerent but I hope it will help the Committee to know some of the issues that LMB considers important. 22 November 2004

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APPENDIX 47 Memorandum from Professor Neil BrockendorV, MRC Clinical Sciences Centre I am a research team leader at the MRC Clinical Sciences Centre based on the Hammersmith Hospital site. I am writing to you with my own personal views in relation to the handling of the review into the future of NIMR. I have expressed these views in response to the original call for comments following publication of the recommendations of the MRC forward planning committee in 2003 (attached). I have also expressed my views in a telephone interview carried out by consultants appointed by the MRC on behalf of the NIMR task force. I hope the committee will be able to access notes taken during this interview. To summarise, whilst I understand the need to periodically review and freshen up established research institutions, I feel that the MRC have seriously mishandled this situation. The initial announcement that NIMR would be downsized and moved to Cambridge was made without proper consultation with staV or the wider scientific community. At best this appears to represent a serious failure in communication between the MRC and the scientific community that it serves. At worst one might suspect this was a calculated and deliberate attempt to undermine and fragment NIMR. As a member of a much younger MRC institute I have looked to NIMR, along with LMB, the Cancer Research UK laboratories in London, and the Welcome-CRUK institute in Cambridge, as successes worthy of emulation. These institutions have over an extended period of time established an international reputation as centres of excellence. The name and reputation of an institute is an asset that is diYcult to price and my overall view in the case of NIMR is that the MRC have been careless in how they have handled this asset. 1. If the MRC had chosen to work closely with NIMR scientists at the outset, the polarisation that has occurred could have been avoided. Under those circumstances an argument to relocate NIMR to a London/ Cambridge University/Medical School may have been won. However it now seems that any decision to move the NIMR would be seen by the staV and the community at large as a battle lost. Given the spirit in which this process has progressed to date, one can’t help suspecting ulterior motives behind such plans. For example one might imagine that approval of a move to one of the London sites might be followed by progressive reductions in the ambitions for the relocated institute during the interregnum, or death by a thousand cuts. At this stage I would be very concerned that further destabilisation of NIMR will trigger an exodus. One could envisage a situation where only those who couldn’t readily find an alternative home, the less able, would be left in a new “slimmer” institute. I would suggest that no plan for NIMR should be approved without the clear approval of the majority of NIMR staV. Only that way can the morale and hence the identity of the institute be preserved. 2. It is often said that the UK has not done as well as we should in turning great science into health and wealth for the nation. This is a complex problem which needs to be tackled from many diVerent angles. Undermining innovative basic science however is killing the goose that lays the golden eggs! The notion that one can anticipate where the next important breakthrough may come from is in my view not supported by the facts. Most important scientific advances have involved some degree of serendipity. A simple formula, and the one that I think has served UK science best is to back excellent people and let them follow their instincts. In this regard I am concerned about the use of the terms “translational research” and “clinical research” in documents relating to plans for NIMR. These terms have not been foisted on the MRC-LMB, the most successful UK life sciences institution in terms of Nobel prizes. Here scientists have been free to pursue what they perceive as fundamentally important questions and trusted to get on with it. The benefit to the nation in terms of inventions, patents, wealth creation and employment creation has been enormous and represents extremely good value for the taxpayer. Translational research by definition is probably best carried out by companies. Clinical research also has its own special settings and environments. Both will be impoverished if innovative basic science in the UK is undermined. Although the MRCs questionnaire about NIMR did not include a research portfolio option of “only innovative basic science” this is what I would have chosen. 3. In my view the best solution to the current situation is to delay making a decision about relocating NIMR until a new Director has been identified. The MRC should find an individual with an exceptional track record in scientific research, and most importantly an individual who could gain the support and trust of NIMR staV. This I think could go a long way towards reversing the negative eVects of events to date, sending a clear signal of support for NIMR to the scientific community. This in turn should open the door for an inclusive appraisal of options, including possible relocation. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 48 Memorandum from Professor Dario Alessi, University of Dundee 1. I am a Principal Investigator working in the MRC Protein Phosphorylation Unit at the University of Dundee and I carried out much of my PhD research at NIMR (1989–91) under the supervision of Dr David Trentham, FRS, a renowned biophysicist, at this Institute. At the time, and I still feel the same is true at the present, it was really a unique place to work as it was a highly multi-disciplinary centre where scientists from

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diVerent disciplines got together to do highly original science in a manner that is diYcult in other institutions. In my case I was combining chemistry, biophysics and physiology working between 4–5 diVerent groups, each possessing distinct expertise. This type of research is diYcult to undertake in smaller MRC Units such as the one I am working in at Dundee in which all the groups work on a more related theme of work. The training I received at the NIMR played a significant role in enabling me to get to the senior MRC funded research position that I am fortunate to currently have. 2. I am not convinced of the argument that moving the NIMR into the centre of London to a new facility would greatly benefit UK science. A major concern is that this would be hugely expensive. Presumably, the large amount of money that would be required for this would need to come from the MRC budget. As the MRC only has a defined annual budget, the cost of re-locating NIMR to the centre of London will have to be borne by other MRC funded researchers working elsewhere in the UK. This will eVectively harm a considerable amount of other MRC funded projects. 3. One of the great benefits of NIMR is that they have very eVective animal research facilities on site. I understand that for the UCL bid for NIMR, the animal facility will be located one mile away. Anyone who has done animal-based research, such as myself, would recognise that this is highly impractical as experiments are much better performed if the animal facility is within the same building as the laboratories in which the researcher is working in. Moreover, with the increasing numbers of animal rights campaigners, having an animal research unit at a separate location will have serious security implications as the staV working in this Unit would be clearly identified by the campaigners as will the researchers entering and exiting the unit with research equipment as well as animal samples for analysis in their laboratory up the road. Animal samples will be transported in easily identifiable dry-ice boxes, liquid nitrogen containers or live animals in cages. Construction of these new animal facilities would also be highly expensive and cause a lot of unnecessary problems given that NIMR already possesses one of the best animal research facilities in the UK. 4. I understand that the King’s Building bid for NIMR proposes to divide it into two separate buildings. This would eVectively destroy the unique culture that has evolved in the NIMR that enables diverse research groups to work together in the same building. Splitting NIMR in half will harm collaborations and interactions between the researchers working in the diVerent buildings. 5. Taking the above points into consideration the most cost eVective and scientifically best option in my opinion would be to leave NIMR at its current site. 6. I understand that the MRC in a sensible drive to get best value for research are keen on the idea of MRC centres rather than specialised MRC Units such as the one that I work in. I think this is a potentially harmful policy as many of the top UK scientists work in MRC Units, as they are they are fabulous places to work in and make a major contribution to the highest quality UK research publications. If getting rid of MRC Units and converting them to Centres is the mechanism by which the MRC is going to come up with the additional funds to pay for the translocation of NIMR to the centre of London, this I do not feel will benefit at all UK science. Many scientists might consider going to work in the USA where they can receive better support for their research. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 49 Memorandum from the career track scientists at the NIMR As career track scientists (CT) at the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR) we wish to provide you with information regarding the discussions about the future of the NIMR. Career track scientist positions, which oVer six years of support at the same level as established tenured scientists, are designed to allow young scientists to make the transition to independent programme leaders. After six years a decision, based on scientific review, is taken regarding continued support. CT appointments are made on an open and competitive basis. At present there are 17 CT scientists working at the NIMR, of whom 10 are from abroad. We have chosen to undertake this crucial step of our scientific career at NIMR over other world-class institutions because we believe that the current organisation of NIMR fosters the careers of young scientists. The organisation of the Institute aids the rapid establishment of independent research programs: senior scientists are supportive, management ensures that science is the first priority and the highly experienced cadre of technicians provides essential support for each lab. Moreover, resources are available to everybody on an equal basis and the coherence and quality of the infrastructure is ideally suited to support successful interdisciplinary projects. Finally, the critical mass of CT scientists (® of all programme leaders at present) provides a system of peer support and allows us to participate and contribute actively in shaping the future direction of the institute. We believe that it is critical to consider the value of these attributes when assessing the future of the NIMR—it is of paramount importance that these strengths are maintained and developed at the renewed institute.

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We fully agree that it is useful to look at the long-term future of the NIMR, especially as we will be pursuing our careers beyond the 20–30 year time scale cited. We would like to stress that we are not against change or a move to a central London site per se and have written to the CEO in the past to express this view. However, we do not believe that “a multidisciplinary biomedical research facility focused on basic and translational research” can only be achieved through co-location with a hospital. Indeed, a Task Force member (S Tomlinson, who is strongly in favour of moving into central London) on a recent visit to the NIMR stated that high quality basic and translational research does not depend on co-location with a hospital or HEI. We believe that the Institute in its current location, with adequate investment, is more than able to fulfil the MRC’s vision for the future. It is our opinion that a decision over the future of NIMR should be based on evidence, however the MRC has yet to provide any evidence to support the need for relocation. We think that the practicalities of finding a suitable single site and the enormous expense of a move to a central London site have not been adequately addressed. It is unclear if a new location will provide the facilities required to support our research, for example, it is uncertain whether suYcient and secure space for laboratory animals and high level containment work will be available. It is also unclear whether large and vibration sensitive instruments including nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometers can be adequately sited close to central London train and tube lines. A significant risk of any move is that NIMR’s unique qualities and considerable strengths will be diminished. The independence of the institute could be lost, undermining its national role and discouraging collaboration with other organisations. This could seriously damage the important role the NIMR plays in the long-term training and career development of young scientists in the UK. Furthermore, we fear that, should these issues not be properly addressed, this might lead to a loss of senior scientists to institutions abroad, especially the US, reversing the success NIMR has had in recruiting internationally recognised scientists from overseas. It is widely acknowledged that establishing independent research programmes is the most diYcult step in a scientific career. The disruption caused by the present uncertainty over the future of NIMR only exacerbates these diYculties for us. For these reasons we are dismayed by the apparent lack of reason or evidence to justify a relocation. We believe therefore that the risks associated with a relocation should be carefully considered alongside any potential benefits. We fear that by failing to properly consider the potential for development on the current site, the MRC may destroy a valuable national asset, damage UK biomedical research and harm the career prospects of many young researchers—both those already at NIMR and those who would have benefited from the Institute in the future. James Briscoe Rita Cha Alex Gould Matthew Hannah Nobue Itasaki Malcom Logan Alexandre Potocnik Kenneth Raj Andres Ramos Katrin Rittinger Iris Salecker Benedict Seddon Ricardo Tascon Ian Taylor Paul Le Tissier Qiling Xu Lyle Zimmerman 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 50 Memorandum from the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology 1. It has come to my attention that the Science and Technology Committee are conducting an enquiry into the proposed move of the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR) to a location in central London. Whilst I am not aware of the rationale behind the MRC’s proposal, I nonetheless feel that there are several important scientific issues that should be taken into consideration.

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2. As it stands the NIMR is an outstanding research organisation. Its scientific output is at the forefront internationally and it is essential that this aspect is not compromised by the disruption that such a move would entail. Moving this kind of operation is likely to result in at least one year of “down-time”. In the current climate of highly competitive medical research this loss of competitiveness would probably be irrecoverable. 3. A major concern to an onlooker is also the sheer cost of such a move. The current facilities at Mill Hill are in place and are fully functional. The cost of a conversion/building programme within central London capable of encompassing an operation the size of that at the Mill Hill site would clearly run into many millions of pounds. Considering the tight constraints on research budgets this seems like a complete waste of taxpayers’ money in redirecting funds to a cause which will not actually result in improved scientific output. 4. Obviously, having a medical research Institute aYliated with a hospital has certain advantages when it comes to pursuing translational research. However it should also be recognized that in its current location it is ideally placed to collaborate with many diVerent hospitals around the UK. There is also a concern that it might become too closely linked with the hospital with which a site is shared, thus compromising its perceived independence and its collaborations with other hospitals. 5. Encouraging translational research and bringing laboratory discoveries to the clinic is what we should all ultimately aspire to. However, great care needs to be taken in not trying to make the research productdriven. Most of the outstanding discoveries within medical research were fortuitous, and would certainly not have occurred if research programmes had been too directed towards a given product. Research, by its very nature, needs to be free to address basic biological/medical problems from which unlooked-for, but without doubt vital, benefits will arise. 6. A final concern is one of security. The current site is self-enclosed and has high level containment facilities, as well as state of the art animal handling facilities. These aspects are intimately linked. The current problems encountered by medical research Institutions at the hands of animal activists should not be underestimated, and acquiring the level of security required at a central London site would be very diYcult indeed. Likewise, the containment facilities, as they stand, allow the NIMR to act as one of the major WHO reference laboratories for global Influenza outbreaks. Whether having such a laboratory in a highly populated area such as central London would meet with approval in the popular press is an issue which should also be considered. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 51 Memorandum from Dr Anthony Holder, Medical Research Council The proposed move makes neither scientific nor economic sense and may destroy the very areas that the MRC is wishing to promote. Translational research (both clinical and product-oriented) is underpinned by successful basic science—the evidence presented below is from malaria research at Mill Hill. 1. As Head of the Parasitology Division at NIMR I am responsible for the area of malaria research at the Institute. The environment at NIMR allows extremely productive interactions with colleagues in the Institute and the adjacent MRC Technology (MRCT). Our research spans basic and translational areas. 2. This strong environment has allowed us to collaborate with other scientific and clinical groups world wide, as well as with Pharma, small biotech and diagnostic companies. According to the MRC’s own definition we carry out clinical research. 3. In addition to funding from MRC, this base has allowed us to compete successfully for funding from The Wellcome Trust, European Union, WHO, US National Institutes of Health and USAID. We have currently submitted by invitation with colleagues, a $20 million proposal to develop new diagnostic methods for malaria funded by the Gates Foundation. 4. In the last five years we have: — filed eight patent applications; — identified several targets for antimalarial drug development, of which three will be examined in high-throughput screens for suitable leads (with MRCT); — developed what is one of the best candidate malaria vaccines; — developed a product with a diagnostics company that is used in the Blood Transfusion Service to screen donors for malarial antibody (saving thousands of donations per year); and — produced over 150 scientific publications in high quality journals.

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5. Without the basic science and the synergy with MRCT these successes would not have been possible. The quality of the current science at NIMR (as evidenced by the on-going five-year reviews) is unquestionable. What has been ignored by MRC is the current extensive translational research that will be jeopardised by their decision. This is the breadth of research that will be disrupted by the proposed move to central London, without obvious benefit. 6. If the MRC wishes to build a new institute for clinicians, why do that at the expense of a basic and translational science Institute that is constantly evolving to meet new challenges? Rather than putting money into buildings why not support the very processes that the MRC says it wants to promote? The scientific opportunities described above represent examples of where an organisation serious about translational research should provide the relatively small sums of money required to produce a malaria vaccine in a form suitable for clinical evaluation or support novel anti-malarial drug discovery. 7. A brand new independent national institute in central London of a similar size and with facilities better than those currently existing at Mill Hill is very attractive. However, the failure to consider the option to remain at Mill Hill must be seen at best to be irresponsible in view of the preliminary nature of the University bids, and at worst evidence of another agenda, given the fact that the money is not currently available and the huge cost of the move for an intangible gain. — It appears that the MRC has made no proper evaluation of the cost of developing the science at Mill Hill. — The move does not make economic sense, it would cost tens of millions of pounds. — The destablisation involved will undoubtedly result in the departure and loss to UK science of key staV, the money they attract and the training they provide, with the obvious consequences for science, UK plc and human health. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 52 Memorandum from Professor John Walker, Medical Research Council I am writing to you in relation to the forthcoming inquiry of the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee into the future of the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR). Over the past 30 years I have worked as a research scientist for the Medical Research Council (MRC), from 1974–98 in the MRC Laboratory of Molecular Biology (LMB) and from 1998 to the present in the MRC’s Dunn Human Nutrition Unit (DHNU). My research work and other professional activities have been scrutinised regularly at five-yearly intervals by visiting sub-committees of MRC Boards, as part of the MRC’s Quinquennial Review process. Most recently, in December 2003, the activities of the DHNU, of which I am the Director, were examined by such a sub-committee. I have also been a member of Quinquennial Review Committees visiting other Units, and I have taken part twice in reviews of the activities of Divisions at the NIMR. In addition, I have participated in similar reviews of research institutes overseas on behalf of their national bodies, notably in Sweden, Finland, Germany and Switzerland. From these experiences, I have no hesitation in saying that the MRC’s review processes are thorough, probing and rigorous. They also strive to be fair to those being reviewed by giving ample opportunity to scientists to present their work, both in the written submitted Report and in verbal presentations to the subcommittee, and for them to comment at each stage of the process. Sometimes, the scientific reviews are laudatory (happily my personal experiences are so characterised). However, sometimes they can be critical, but usually in a constructive way. Occasionally, as in the case of the Quinquennial Report of the Dunn immediately preceding my appointment as Director, the outcome of the review is suYciently critical that radical redirection of the research eVort is required, and wide ranging and strategic decisions have to be made about the future of the Unit. My experience was that the MRC acted decisively and fairly, and with clarity of purpose. I believe that the recent favourable outcome of the Quinquennial Review of the DHNU shows that that the restructuring and redirection that followed my appointment as Director have been beneficial and productive, opening up, as they have, new avenues of research that have been judged to be at the highest level. The review process itself is controlled by the Chair of the visiting sub-committee who is usually the Chair of the appropriate MRC Board. The Boards scrutinise and debate the recommendations of the review subcommittees and make their recommendations based on the sub-committee’s report about Institutes and Units to the MRC Council. The Chair has an important role to play in ensuring the objectivity and fairness of the review both with the visiting review sub-committee and at Board meetings. The Chairs are selected invariably (in my experience) from the “extramural” University sector, and the memberships of Boards are dominated by members from the same sector. Institutes and Units are represented on the Boards, and an independent Unit Director usually participates in the Board’s discussions about a sub-committee report. However, members of Boards from the so-called “intramural” sector are in a small minority.

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In the current prevailing climate of debate within the MRC where the roles of Institutes and Units and of the need for them to exist at all are being questioned by the Council, and where many medical scientists in the University sector appear to believe that they have been poorly supported by the MRC in recent years, whilst at the same believing that the MRC’s Institutes and Units have been favoured by receiving strong support, it is extremely important that the Chairs of Boards act with scrupulous impartiality both in reviews of Institutes and Units and in the decision making processes that may influence their futures. It is possible that since the Chairs of the MRC’s boards are drawn from the “extramural” sector, they too have a conflict of interest. The Board Chairs are also ex oYcio members of the MRC Council, whereas with the exception of honorary Directors of Institutes and Units, who are a small minority, Institute and Unit Directors are not allowed to be Council members, because they are perceived as having a conflict of interest. The Council makes the final decisions about Institutes and Units that are being reviewed. Thus, the views and interests of the intramural sector of MRC Institutes and Units are poorly represented at important levels of the decision making process. In contrast, the extramural sector, which has vested interests in the outcomes of reviews and Units because extramural scientists are competing for the MRC’s finances with Institutes and Units, is well represented and holds powerful and influential positions. Clearly, it is desirable to correct this imbalance by ensuring that both intramural and extramural interests are both properly represented, and that important decisions about Institutes and Units are arrived at impartially. Otherwise, the best decisions about the future of publicly funded Medical Research in the United Kingdom are unlikely to be made. In the current climate in the MRC, there is a real danger that unless appropriate decisions are made, this country could lose its position of pre-eminence in biomedical research surpassed only by the United States. The MRC Institutes and Units have played a conspicuous even dominant role in gaining and maintaining that position. Once this pre-eminence is lost, it will be extremely diYcult and probably impossible to regain. As I have no personal knowledge, I cannot comment on the recent controversies surrounding the future of the NIMR. However, I suspect that some of the points that I have made above about the MRC’s processes for review of its Institutes and Units may apply to that specific issue. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 53 Memorandum from Professor Peter Weissberg, Cambridge University I would like to oVer my opinion on the future of this Institution. It is my strong conviction that medical and medically related research is best undertaken on a biomedical campus where basic and clinical scientists, and indeed service-orientated clinicians, can interact. Whilst not wishing to denigrate the excellent work that has taken place in the past in the NIMR, or to deny that researchers in the NIMR have forged very successful clinical collaborations, it is my perception that clinical scientists working in NIMR become dissociated from the clinical context of their research. I know of at least one example of a very bright and promising young clinician who undertook a period of research training at the NIMR where his research subject was so far removed from clinical medicine that it oVered him little advantage in pursuing a career in academic clinical research. It is my personal conviction that translation of basic biological research into clinical advantage can best be achieved when all involved are on a single campus. For this reason it is my view that the long term interests of research at the NIMR would be best served by relocation to an alternative campus. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 54 Memorandum from Professor G Michael Blackburn, Krebs Institute, SheYeld University I have been engaged in research into biomolecular science for over 40 years. I have authored over 200 papers in refereed journals, a handful of patents, and two books. I have directed the work of over 100 colleagues (Post-doctoral, Pre-doctoral, Master’s students). I have been a founder member of the Krebs Institute for Biomolecular Science in SheYeld University since its foundation and latterly co-Director. Over the last three years I have enjoyed research collaborations with leading members of the Division of Protein Structure in NIMR. These have led to publications in Biomolecular Journals of the highest international calibre (Nature, Science, Cell). One of our collaborative activities featured as a “Highlight of 2003” in Chemical & Engineering News (US—December 2003).

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Through the last year, I have been aware of the huge eVort that Dr Steven Gamblin has invested into putting a case for the future development of NIMR. More recently, I have read some of the published work of the Task Force, of the contributions of SG, and of correspondence between the Director and Professor Colin Blakemore. It is sensible and realistic that the MRC should review the future of NIMR especially in the run up to appointment of a new Director (2006). It is critical for the proper development of MRC Science in the UK that the best plan is identified that achieves a proper balance between the scientific and business needs of the MRC. But it is extremely worrying that the process as described has been tainted with clear signs of haste, pre-judgement, and above all a lack of transparency that undermines confidence in the process. I am especially concerned at the decision to exclude Mill Hill from consideration alongside UCL and KCL as potential sites for the future development of NIMR. That decision seems ill-founded both because it appears unlikely that either of UCL or KCL could provide the wide range of high quality facilities available at Mill Hill (not least in animal housing!), and also because KCL closed its Chemistry Department (2003). The interface between chemistry and medical biology has never been stronger than at this time. To seek to develop a future for NIMR inside an establishment that has set itself against that future has to be a retrograde step. I urge the Select Committee to explore this position with its customary penetration. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 55 Memorandum from the University of Edinburgh The University of Edinburgh: 1. supports strongly an increased emphasis on translating NIMR science into improved prevention, diagnosis and treatment of ill health; 2. advises that the surest prospect for adding translational value to NIMR’s excellent basic research is to co-locate with a university/university hospital (we have recently raised over £90 million to colocate over 800 biomedical bench scientists with the new Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh); 3. believes that the status quo is not acceptable, since MRC is already foregoing added value from its very considerable annual investment in NIMR at the isolated Mill Hill site; 4. remains concerned that the case for productive synergy between some of the main groupings in NIMR (eg between Infection/Immunity and Neurosciences) has yet to be made, since this is the key argument against relocation to more than one site; 5. does not share the Task Force’s view that relocation to central London is less likely to risk loss of outstanding staV than relocation elsewhere; and 6. concludes that MRC should not limit relocation options to central London, seeking instead “added added value” from co-location with (a) university hospital site(s) where MRC already has major investment. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 56 Memorandum by Dr Jamshed R Tata, National Institute for Medical Research

Summary The central premise that embedding NIMR in a clinical centre in central London would somehow enhance its research capability and cost eVectiveness is flawed. This is borne out by examples of the impressive clinical applications, mentioned below, of the research carried out by this institute at its present Mill Hill location, and which is further supported by applications of similar research carried out at other biomedical research institutions not co-located with clinical centres. Good science, whether or not it is undertaken at clinical research centres, has always led to useful medical applications. Finally the financial, staYng and management consequences of moving a major institution to the centre of a large metropolis goes against much of the current thinking about moving to city centres.

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1. The central premise is flawed The central premise that co-locating the NIMR with a major clinical institution in the heart of London would enhance its research capability, and hence its clinical value, is unfounded. This is clearly borne out by the Institute’s contributions since it has been established at its Mill Hill site. I cite here just a few examples in support of this issue: (a) Sir Christopher Andrewes (himself a clinician and a past Deputy Director of NIMR) has said that, had he accepted the oVer of establishing a department at a central London clinical centre before deciding to join the NIMR, he might not have discovered the influenza virus at NIMR, work which later led to the development of flu vaccine and the discovery of interferon in his laboratory. (b) The isolation and determination of the structure of penicillin by Sir Ernest Chain at the NIMR during the Second World War, accompanied by collaboration with clinical colleagues. (c) The work of Sir Henry Dale (a past Director of NIMR) and Prof Willy Feldberg’s work on neurotransmitters has had a most profound impact on the discovery and use of drugs in psychiatric medicine. (d) Prof Rodney Porter’s elucidation of the structure of antibody at the NIMR, work for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize and before he moved to a clinical/academic centre, opened up a very fruitful branch of immunology. One can cite several examples of equally important contributions coming from independent biomedical research institutions, collaborating with, but not co-located with, hospital-medical school complexes: (a) Sir Peter Medawar’s work on tissue transplantation, first at Universities of Oxford and London and then continued at NIMR (as Director) was later taken up in many clinical centres throughout the world. (b) Robert Edwards’ (an ex-NIMR scientist) work on in vitro fertilisation, in partnership with Patrick Steptoe at a Manchester hospital, carried out at a university science department led to the birth of Louise Brown, the first “test-tube” baby. (c) The development of monoclonal antibodies by Cesar Milstein’s group at the MRC’s own Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Cambridge has had an immense impact on biotechnology and clinical practice. (d) DNA fingerprinting, invented by Sir Alec JeVreys in a science department at Leicester University is another example. (e) The technology of Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) imaging, which has revolutionised diagnostic medicine and surgery, was initiated in a non-clinical laboratory at the University of Nottingham and an industrial R&D centre in the USA. (f) The importance of Barbara McClintock’s studies on inheritance in maize at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory in the USA on human genetics. (g) Finally, one can cite the countless important clinical applications of research carried out at such institutions in the USA as Massachussetts and California Institutes of Technology (MIT and Caltech) and The Rockefeller University, which are not embedded in clinical centres. 2. Good basic science produces valuable applications The point in mentioning the above examples is simply that good fundamental science, wherever it is practised, always leads to important applications. This is not to say that clinical research at hospital/medical schools is unlikely to lead to useful applications. But an inescapable conclusion that can be drawn from biomedical research undertaken worldwide is that there is an inherent advantage in conserving and nurturing independent and detached research centres, encouraged to set up collaborations with clinical centres. Disruption, Staffing and Cost The disruption caused by the proposed move seems to have been deliberately minimised or ignored. It will be extensive and is bound to have serious consequences in breaking up ongoing collaborative projects within the NIMR and with external groups. It is not diYcult to predict that co-location to a central London site, with all its problems, inherent in any metropolitan centre, will cause the loss of staV (especially the promising, younger members) and create diYculties in attracting their replacements. Finally, there is no way to estimate the financial burden of undertaking this proposal. Past experience with all public financing schemes tells us that, whatever the reassurances to the contrary, the final cost will be far in excess of what is initially suggested. This can only lead to the abandonment of new ventures and seizing new opportunities, which far outweighs the benefits that have been suggested in the MRC’s proposals for the future of NIMR. 22 November 2004

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APPENDIX 57 Memorandum from Professor Dafydd Walters, St George’s Hospital Medical School 1. This letter is written to express a personal point of view in response to the call for evidence and comments on this issue. 2. The message I would very much like the Committee to take from my letter is that I and many of my colleagues have noted a growing divergence between the two most important groups for the advancement of medical science in the UK ie the scientists and the clinicians. I believe it is vitally important that these two groups are encouraged to interact at all levels and that this is best done by their co-localisation. The creation of a site where this can occur, just by its existence, would attract individuals who would want to work in such an atmosphere. 3. I have spent most of my career, of over 30 years, at the interface between basic scientific research and its application to the practice of medicine. I continue to perform basic physiological research in the laboratory, but I am also a practising clinician in Paediatrics and I have undertaken clinical research in my subject. In addition, I believe I have an overview of both clinical practice and research in the country through my positions in the past few years as Secretary of the Association of Clinical Professors of Paediatrics for (1998–2003) and as Deputy Chairman and then Chairman of the Executive of the Physiological Society (2001–04). 4. My colleagues and I have noted with regret over the past two decades a slow but steady separation between scientists and clinicians. This change is understandable given both the increasing emphasis in the scientific university community on short term productivity which has led to much more focus on immediate results and also the major changes in postgraduate medical education as a result of government directives which have shortened the post-graduate training program. The European Working Time directive has resulted in further pressures on junior clinicians which have inhibited exposure to research. In short, scientists have less reason to have interaction with clinicians and clinicians in training certainly have less opportunity and motivation to become involved in scientific research and this formative experience is diYcult to regain at a later date. This is sad, for Britain possess a strong reputation for clinical science. The crisis in the training of clinical scientists is well known and has been a major pre-occupation of all the Royal Colleges and of the Academy of Medical Sciences for most of the past decade. 5. I understand that the mission to be given to the National Institute of Medical Research for the next generation is to have an emphasis on translational research which in my understanding means the application of basic scientific discoveries to health care. Given that it is increasingly diYcult for the same person to be involved at the cutting edge of both sides of this endeavour, it strikes me that it is vital that individuals on each side of this divide should be encouraged to interact. Obviously this aim would be served best by co-localisation of scientists and clinicians. 6. Of course, co-localisation does not in itself guarantee success. However, I have been fortunate over the past decade to work at St George’s Hospital and its Medical School which on its new site in Tooting in the late 1970s was designed deliberately to intermix scientists and clinicians. My own department is firmly ensconced within the clinical area and carries out basic and clinical research work. I have seen at first hand the benefits of this geographical proximity. 7. I have no personal or vested interest in any of the three sites that are to be considered for the NIMR and having been at St George’s Hospital Medical School for over 10 years I feel I can give an unbiased view. (Perhaps for complete transparency I should state that I spent many years working at UCL and teach regularly at King’s College London.) 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 58 Memorandum from Professor Elizabeth Simpson, MRC Clinical Sciences Centre I am writing in a private capacity to inform the committee of my opinions, which are not necessarily the same as the three organisations with whom I have close links, the Medical Research Council, the cancer charity Cancer Research UK (CRUK) and Imperial College, London. However, my experience as a scientist working within each organisation informs my views. I have recently retired as deputy Director of the Clinical Sciences Centre, Imperial College, Hammersmith, where I was also the leader of a research group working in the field of transplantation biology,with strong links with academic and clinical colleagues in the adjacent University. I am now an Emeritus Professor of the University, Imperial College, in which the Clinical Sciences Centre is located, and thus aware of the similarities and diVerences between research environments within Institutes and Universities. I am also a member of the Scientific Executive Board of CRUK, and of their Programme

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committee, as well as chairing their Project Grants Committee. This gives me insight into both direct (ie institute) and indirect (ie university) funding of biological research related to cancer. This ranges from very basic science studies to clinical applications. My view of the current situation of the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR) is that neither due process or a properly considered rationale for the current proposals have been followed. The original review of the Institute was sprung on them with no prior indication, even to the Director, that a radically new and diVerent set of proposals were under consideration. This Institute review had followed a round of very successful quinquennial reviews of diVerent research groups within the Institute, from which it was not apparent that the quality of the work being undertaken, or its relevance to improving understanding of biological processes, was in question. However, following the strategic review of the Institute, by a panel which represented a broad span of scientists, including those with a clinical background, drawn from the UK and abroad, a highly controversial report, with which not all members of the review party agreed, proposed closing the Institute and moving the scientists to Cambridge, to take advantage of proximity to clinical medicine at Addenbrooks and to related University activities. This first proposal met with such an outcry from the NIMR scientists, few of whom could or wished to re-locate to another city, and almost all of whom immediately realised that Cambridge could not meet their requirements for experimental animals (mostly mice). This second objection was especially powerful in view of their heavy dependence on mouse models to explore basic physiological processes as well as generating relevant models for the study of human disease. There was a strong feeling amongst the NIMR scientists and their colleagues elsewhere that the drive to close the Institute came from another, unstated agenda, and was being driven by interests which would brook no interference. There has, of course, for many years, been a tension between the funding by the MRC and other bodies, of research within Institutes and to groups in Universities, the later sometimes showing jealousy of the research environments achieved in Institutes, and wanting a bigger slice of the cake. However, my experience as chairman and a member of various grant giving bodies over the last 20 years—the MRC, the BBSRC, the Wellcome Trust and CRUK, brings me to the view that a balance must be maintained between the two, and that failure to support the infrastructure for research in Universities (as happened in the 1980s and 1990s) should not be made an excuse for asset stripping Research Institutes. Indeed, the high value placed on Institutes for biomedical research is clear from the setting up or revitalising of several new ones, often jointly, eg the Wellcome/CRC Institute in Cambridge, the Beatson (CRUK) in Glasgow, and now the new CRUK Cancer Institute in Cambridge, currently under construction, the Director just appointed. Given the very real misgivings over the suggested move to Cambridge, a review committee of experts was then appointed to re-visit a new set of recommendations. These now emerged, driven apparently from MRC head oYce, as a choice between: (1) moving the whole Institute to a central London site adjacent to a hospital, (2) moving its component parts to be adjacent to diVerent London hospitals (the “virtual institute” option), or, (3) to leave it where it was. This third apparent option was possibly included to placate widely held opinion that the Institute should remain at Mill Hill, in buildings which could be refurbished in due course—they are not currently in a bad state of repair, and the animal house facilities are superb—probably the best in the country, after the spending of millions on them recently. These options were put on a website and a wide constituency of scientists were canvassed to complete a questionnaire that was by no means open-ended, and in fact, were based on a set of assumptions which many wished to challenge. Your committee will have been told how many questionnaires were completed. The majority were in favour of the third option. The committee convened to re-visit the recommendations needed to include the results of the questionnaire, but also other submissions, including those from the scientists at the Institute. At the conclusion of the committee’s work, option 1 was recommended, but again, there were dissenting voices on the expert committee. There is a strong feeling amongst scientists in the Institute as well as many of us outside, that the voices of those wishing to enter into a rational dialogue about the future of the Institute were not listened to. The subtext driving the recommendations was never made explicit, nor was the notion that research pertinent to advances in medicine can only be done adjacent to hospitals allowed to be questioned. I believe that the resource oVered by Institutes is a precious one—it can create an intellectually challenging, multidisciplinary environment and provide the tools to explore long-term questions of biological importance. Really novel discoveries are most often made serendipidously, and any research strategy needs to take account of that. There certainly needs to be connection between universities and research institutes, but such connections are evidently in place at NIMR, and could be expanded. It does no service to the Universities, or to the advance of medical research, to dismantle fully functional institutes. The rebuilding of NIMR in central London—UCL and Kings are currently bidding for this prize—will cost huge sums of money—matching the current NIMR mouse accommodation alone would cost between 20 and 30 million pounds. During the process some of the best scientists currently at Mill Hill may become disheartened and leave—the best are likely to be lured away elsewhere. Not only will the MRC thereby lose a whole generation of biomedical scientists, but also the careers of the young trainees —PhD students, post-docs, fellows, currently in their labs—will be adversely aVected.

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I recommend that your committee listen very hard to the voices of the scientists involved, and enter into a rational dialogue about how best to safeguard the long-term interests of biomedical research in this country. I doubt that this will be achieved by closing institutes. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 59 Memorandum from Dr Kathleen Mathers, Medical Research Council I am the Head of the Division of Biological Services at the MRC’s NIMR that provides and manages the laboratory animal resource to 17 of the Scientific Divisions at the NIMR. In particular regard to the relocation of animal facilities I have raised my own concerns, and those of my staV, throughout the last 20 months since the first FIS recommendations were published. I have felt that these concerns have not been considered or addressed by MRC council. I feel that it is my responsibility to ensure that careful and proper consideration is given to the issue of relocation of animal facilities because: — The current facilities are modern, eYcient, flexible and cost-eVective. — The current site will allow for future expansion of the facilities to meet changing legislation, and the changing needs of science including emerging infections. — The facilities are the largest academic animal facilities on a single site in the UK and based on Home OYce statistics represent 45% of the MRC animal use in direct support units (and˜ 5% of the national animal use). — Our operational procedures place great emphasis on animal care and welfare and maximising the principles of the 3R’s. — There will be a huge cost, both financially and in terms of animal welfare, in relocating these facilities. In addition I am worried about security issues of a move, the duplication of experiments that will be required during the early stages of a new build and the welfare implications and number of animals that will have to be used and killed to execute a move and test a theory which does not come backed with any evidence. I enclose a letter that the senior managers of Biological Services wrote to council in September, which seems to have been ignored. This letter further details the major disadvantages of moving the animal facilities away from Mill Hill. I request that the Committee will probe the real reasons for excluding Mill Hill as an option and will ensure that the MRC (with its commitment to the 3R’s) is aware of the implications to the Biological Services component alone. 22 November 2004 Annex Whilst the Division of Biological Services remains optimistic about the future of MRC’s NIMR in partnership with UCL or KCL we foresee a number of major disadvantages to moving away from the Mill Hill site. These are principally: — Loss of potential for expansion. The current Mill Hill site is located on a 47 acre site, only a fraction of which has been built upon. There is more than adequate space for expanding the animal facilities within the current buildings as well as constructing new units/buildings on the site within the secure perimeter fence. Future changes in legislation are likely to require larger rodent cages— therefore the space required to house our current numbers of animals is likely to increase, this can easily be accommodated at Mill Hill and must form part of the considerations of a site elsewhere. — Loss of flexibility. The animal facilities occupy six buildings on the current site, all within a short distance from the main building. This provides unequalled flexibility to house diVerent species, meet the needs of changing science and changes in legislation. The health status of the diVerent units can be managed individually within central control minimising any disruption to the science in the event of a microbiological breakdown and the flexibility to treat, contain or rederive stocks quickly and eYciently. — Reduced access to research models. All the current animal facilities are within easy reach of the main building and therefore scientists and support staV have access and a hands-on approach to the use of animals in their research. This is extremely important to ensure best use of animals and a responsible attitude to using animals in research with easy communication with animal care staV

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and experienced animal technicians. This ensures work is done promptly whilst ensuring the highest standards of care & welfare. We firmly believe that an animal unit remote from the science cannot encourage or meet best practice or ensure minimum numbers are used. — DiYculties in staV recruitment. Many of the animal facilities within central London are experiencing problems with recruitment and retention of animal technicians. This is not a problem at NIMR. Currently, 70 out of 71 posts within Biological Services are filled. Experience from the Mary Lyon Centre should demonstrate the importance of having enough trained and committed technicians to stock a new unit. Experience from many animal units across the UK demonstrates that diYculties arise when there is a mix of MRC & University employees in animal units. — Waste. Apart from a waste of money and resources (a new SPF facility was opened at NIMR less than two years ago) the likely increased waste of animals is of concern to many within the Division and Institute as a whole. Currently our operations can provide models to a number of diVerent research groups and sharing tissues and organs is commonplace. — Inability to recreate containment facilities. This poses a real problem. Our Containment II to IV facilities have been carefully designed and managed to be able to meet the needs of the current work carried out in them, but also with adaptability and flexibility to be used for new models or potentially emerging diseases. — Loss of training resources. Our facilities, especially those for Containment of pathogen infected animals, Aquatics and Transgenic species are of importance for training both scientific staV and animal technicians without impinging on the “day-to-day” work of the units. This would be hard to recreate elsewhere. — Potential loss of SPF facilities. Our SPF facilities are unique and keep cost of animal supply at a very low level. There is a long list of practical advantages for retaining an MRC SPF supply unit: refinement and reduction of numbers due to critical mass/scale of the operations is a good example. It would be very diYcult to recreate new SPF facilities and the time involved would impede progress of science. — Reduced cost-eVectiveness. Alongside our SPF facilities, the scale of the animal work at NIMR ensures a cost-eVective practice—commonly as units decrease in size they become more expensive to run and maintain. — Likely animal rights protests. Experience from Oxford and Cambridge indicates a likely problem from animal rights activists during the construction of new animal facilities. — Additional security problems. It is unlikely that the protests that are observed on a Wednesday at Mill Hill will go away. The experience in dealing with this, and the safety of the site should not be ignored. — Time involved in moving animal models. Duplication of models. Even if the SPF units could be moved as they stand, the remaining models at Mill Hill will need to be recreated elsewhere. This is a mammoth undertaking, as well as likely to increase the numbers of animals used (surgical rederivation of strains) and a huge and needless cull of animals at Mill Hill. There would be a significant time involved to recreate lines (see Mary Lyon centre) and therefore a delay in productive science. — Accessibility of site for deliveries etc. The Mill Hill site is easily accessible for the continual need for deliveries of animal food, bedding and other essential supplies. Central London will have reduced access and is therefore a huge disadvantage. — MRC-T’s reliance on animal units. MRC-T currently requires the facilities of NIMR for translational research requiring animal models—loss of the Mill Hill facilities would be a huge blow to their work. Kathleen Mathers Steve Clements Pete Dawson David Key RoseMary Murphy Paul Lynch Sarah Johnson Marie Caulfield Clare Brazill Alec Gallagher Alison Collyer Treena Carter

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APPENDIX 60 Memorandum from Professor Donald Steiner, University of Chicago I write as a concerned American scientist to express my strong support for continuity in preserving the national research treasure that currently is located at Mill Hill. This is one of the premier research institutions of the world and one that is very widely admired for the excellence of its many outstanding research contributions in major current areas of great scientific interest. These include neuroscience, genetics and development, infection and immunity, and structural biology—all representative of key areas for progress in understanding basic life processes. The Mill Hill site has proven to have been wisely chosen for it has provided the advantages of adequate space for maintaining critical mass, has facilitated local, national and international interactions through its proximity to Heathrow Airport and to a wide variety of centers in both London and the U.K., while providing a serene environment with near-ideal living conditions for staV and visiting scientists. In my view, attempting to condense and/or move this facility to a potential new site within Central London raises a great number of concerns that threaten the continued excellence of the programs that have been painstakingly developed through many years of eVort. Mill Hill is a first class institution; the jewel in the MRC crown—and as such is a symbol to the world of the value placed on basic biological research by the United Kingdom. Downsizing and relocation, in addition to being extremely costly financially, might well also send a confusing signal to scientists throughout the world in this regard. As to whether relocation to a more urban setting is more desirable from the point of view of “translational” issues, I would like to point out that translation is largely an intellectual process that transcends distances, ie, when breakthroughs of great clinical relevance occur, they are invariably rapidly taken up by alert physicians. As examples one can cite the development of protease inhibitory drugs for AIDS therapy. In the U.S. the Centers for Disease Control and the NIH are located near, but not closely-linked to hospitals or universities in major metropolitan areas. Indeed, there are many distinct disadvantages that argue against locating large national basic research resources in dense urban environments because of their dependence on the use of radioactive materials and often of mammalian animal models, not to mention the needs for reasonable and comfortable housing for the staV, freedom from threats of terrorism and other concerns. I am a Howard Hughes Medical Institute Investigator and can report that this premier research institution is currently planning a large centralized research facility for facilitating neuroscience and related endeavors, the so-called “Janelia Farm” Center, which will be located in a rural area of Northern Virginia near the Potomac river. It is being built quite near a major airport and about as close to Washington, DC and the NIH as Mill Hill is to London. Gerald Rubin, its recently appointed director, has strongly advocated such a rural location for many of the reasons cited above. I wish you well in your decision-making process, but would strongly advocate strengthening what you already have in Mill Hill and keeping it on its present exceptionally fine site. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 61 Memorandum from the National Institute for Medical Research

1. What factors persuaded the MRC that a stronger focus on translational research is required? What mechanisms were explored for achieving this end? There is publicity currently about a need to increase the transfer of the benefits of discoveries in basic science to patient care. Coupled with this is a realisation that the amount of clinical research, in particular experimental medicine, and the numbers of clinician scientists, including trainees, have declined. This information may have influenced awards for clinical research from Treasury that have been announced this year. Together, all these factors may have persuaded MRC to focus more on translational research. In relation to change in the balance of science and translation at NIMR, there has never been a discussion between MRC and NIMR on this point since the Institute Quinquennial Review of 2000. At that time the current strategy for the Institute was approved and complimented. The previous and current MRC CEOs, their administrative staV, and certainly the Council, appear to have been largely unaware of the extensive translation research done by NIMR, particularly with London medical schools. I suspect, therefore, that the suggestions for a stronger focus at NIMR were opportunistic. It was certainly not part of the rationale given to me for re-reviewing NIMR, which mainly involved erroneous views on the quality of the building and subsequently the date of my retirement. I do not know what extra mechanisms MRC recently explored to increase translation research in general. For NIMR the MRC objective appears to be to increase translation, in an unspecified way, at the expense of basic research. If realised this would damage the strength and the coherence of NIMR’s research programme, damage its already extensive clinical collaborations, and decrease its value as a site for training in biomedical science, not least for clinician-scientist trainees.

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2. What impact is a heavier focus on translational research expected to have on the balance of MRC funding for basic and applied research? Without extra funding a heavier focus on translation research for MRC overall or for NIMR specifically, would presumably decrease support for basic research. Such a consequence would not be in the best interest of UK science. This is certainly a good time for clinical science; it is also an exceptionally good time for basic science upon which future clinical science and training will depend. 3. What statistical and other evidence was found from UK and beyond to indicate that colocated medical research institutes realise more than a stand-alone institute in terms of cross-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary research collaborations, and partnerships with other research funders? Research collaborations flourish when the collaborators have common and often complementary research interests and are in general socially compatible. They do not depend on physical proximity. No evidence is presented by the Task Force for a contrary view other than selected quotations from a minority of opinions obtained from MRC selected interviewees. Within research Institutes of a suitable size, specific recruitments to match areas of expertise and interests can increase the likelihood of multi-disciplinary research collaborations. Free from the responsibilities for the propagation of individual disciplines which universities must carry, research institutes can be more flexible in this regard. As for forming partnerships with other research funders to which they are allowed to apply, eg EU Frameworks, research Institutes such as NIMR are very successful. And, in the process, of course, they are encouraged to form many research collaborations at a distance, throughout the EU. With UK charities partnerships through grant support are also readily formed. For research council funded institutes some charities, eg Wellcome Trust, do not usually fund research projects for which a research council employee is the principal investigator.

4. What evidence is there that the current location of NIMR inhibits the ability of scientists there to conduct translational research, and to collaborate with other research institutes and hospitals? I am unaware of any such evidence. On the contrary there is ample evidence, that was made available to the Task Force, to show that NIMR scientists have many fruitful and long-standing collaborations with both basic scientists and clinicians, within NIMR and in hospitals and universities throughout the UK and abroad. NIMR clinical interactions are concentrated in London because the range of clinical specialities that the range of NIMR basic science requires is best provided in the capital. This concentration does not extend to basic science collaborations which are widespread and chosen because the best expertise is widespread. There is every indication that these trends will continue in the future. It is therefore unlikely that co-location with a single college in central London will extend NIMR collaboration since the required range of expertise for collaboration is not found on a single site anywhere and is highly unlikely to be found on a single site in the future. In fact we have serious concerns that proposals for co-location and governance will inhibit the development of future collaborations with other universities and hospitals.

5. How was membership of the Task Force determined? What steps were taken to inform stakeholders of the progress of its work? MRC selected the two scientist members of Council who had not been members of the MRC Financial Investment Strategy Subcommittee, a clinician, who by his own admission to NIMR staV, was at the time in favour of disbanding NIMR and redistributing its funding, and a leader of a research council from abroad who in the event was unable to attend any Task Force meetings. NIMR nominated two members of NIMR staV, two British scientists currently in the US, and the president of a European research council. Due to other pressures the last person withdrew after the second Task Force meeting, having been unable to attend. NIMR senior staV were informed of Task Force business by the two nominated members following each Task Force meeting and subsequently they received the formal Task Force reports. As a result they repeatedly became aware of considerable disagreements between the formal reports and the views of Task Force members. They also were informed of attempts by the MRC CEO to influence and persuade Task Force members to agree with reports that were not consistent with the spirit of the actual meetings. This information has contributed considerably to a lack of staV confidence in the Task Force process.

6. What weight the Task Force ascribed to the consultation exercises which it used to formulate its conclusions? Reference to the Task Force consultation in the Task Force report is limited. Judging by the conclusions made by the Task Force, however, the weight that it placed on the results of the consultation was minimal.

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By its own admission it ignores the consultation on the crucially important point of the importance of physical proximity for collaborations when it states; “Notwithstanding only modest support (13%) among consultees (including among clinician scientists collaborating with Mill Hill), the Task Force is firmly persuaded that physical proximity can play a very important role in developing clinical links.” 7. What assessment was made of the impact on staV retention and recruitment of a move to (a) central London and (b) outside London? Some assessment appears to have been made in the Task Force report of the negative impact on established NIMR groups of a move outside London. It is less clear that the eVects of a move into central London were considered, even though evidence was submitted that central London establishments have great diYculty in recruiting in particular staV categories, relative to NIMR at Mill Hill. What is most incomprehensible to NIMR in relation to relocation, is the repeated unwillingness of MRC to take into account the unanimous views of NIMR staV and the overwhelming views of the consultees in relation to the outstanding qualities of the Mill Hill site now and for the future, the unwillingness of MRC to give any legitimate reason for contemplating relocation, and the adamant stance of the MRC CEO against the Mill Hill site as an option. 8. What assessment was made of the potential initial and recurrent costs of a move to (a) central London and (b) outside London? It appears from the financial analysis section of its report that the Task Force “has not been able to undertake detailed analysis.” (Section 6.1). Nevertheless MRC has decided to reject Mill Hill as an option for NIMR in the future. The information given in the Task Force report largely derives from the preliminary figures presented by King’s College and University College. We are convinced that the NIMR at Mill Hill option, the “Step Change Option” represents far better value for money and is clearly more aVordable in capital expenditure terms. Our projections show the capital cost of relocating NIMR to central London is likely to be over four times greater (£169 million) than the “Step Change Option” for NIMR at Mill Hill (£40.1 million). 9. To what extent will a final decision be based upon financial considerations? NIMR has had mixed messages with regard to the financial basis of any decision. We suspect that once a decision is taken, financial considerations will become paramount, at least for MRC financial input. A major concern is that a firm decision to relocate will be taken before proper comparisons of cost and overall aVordability are made. If, subsequently, suYcient financial support is not available for relocation, we fear that a Mill Hill option, with the current complement of excellent scientists, may have been irretrievably lost. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 62 Memorandum from Brian Mahy, National Centre for Infectious Diseases I wish to register my strong objection to the proposal to relocate the National Institute of Medical Research near a London Hospital. NIMR is a world-renowned institution which over the years has made enormous contributions to medical research in the UK. Moving such an Institute would result in the loss of key staV, poor morale, and considerable diYculty if work on dangerous pathogens is to be conducted elsewhere. The present site is ideal for the purpose. Particularly in the new age of information technology, collaborative work with hospitals or other institutions is much easier than in the past. The CDC in Atlanta is not aYliated with any hospital, but does world-renowned research on dangerous pathogens that is highly relevant to the needs of today. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 63 Memorandum from Amicus It is now well over a year since MRC set up a Task Force to review the options available to it for the continuation of the NIMR, following substantial criticism of its conduct of the Forward Investment Strategy Review.

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Throughout this period. Members have sought only that any review should be open and transparent and look objectively at all the options available from the following view points: — Scientific strategy. — Cost. — Feasibility. — Impact on employees and current/future communities. Although MRC has moved towards better communication with its employees at NIMR, there remains as issue of transparency around the ultimate objective concerning the future of the NIMR. At the most recent Employee Consultation Meeting of 20 September, MRC re-iterated its view that the current NIMR location would not be an option, although it would be the bench mark against which the other two options would be judged. In its exchanges with employees and their representatives, MRC has provided no evidence to support the view that a relocation to Central London would provide: — A better range or quality of academic and/or clinical science. — Significantly greater opportunities for academic and/or clinical collaborations. — Better and/or more cost eVective infrastructure to meet the research needs. Against this, our members believe the following must also be measured: — The cost of new build or refurbishment at a new location with the costs for the current site. — The possible loss of the extensive facilities at the current site and the eVect of this on future scientific opportunities, if these can not be reproduced at the new site(s). — The loss of the Institute as a national resource if it becomes embedded in one or more host institutions on one or more sites. This may raise issues about the governance of such a resource. — The eVect on morale and staYng levels over a prolonged period of uncertainty over the future of NIMR. The Amicus membership welcomes any review or inquiry that assists the open consideration of NIMR’s future. It readily accepts that progression in science frequently requires change, but it firmly believes that such change should be made on the basis of evidence, in a transparent way. Amicus would welcome the opportunity to discuss these issues fully. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 64 Memorandum from Anna O’Garra, National Institute for Medical Research

Brief Executive Summary I provide evidence in the document attached to the Science and Technology Committee, House of Commons, inquiry into the future of the Medical Research Council’s (MRC) National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR) and thank the Select Committee for the opportunity to do so. In brief, as head of Division of Immunoregulation, NIMR. To summarize, although I welcome changes that enhance the future development of the NIMR, a major concern is that a move to central London is unlikely to retain the key features of the Mill Hill site that have determined and will determine its success in multidisciplinary research and clinical translation in biomedical research. The major concerns are that: (a) Dismantling an Institute such as the NIMR by a move to Central London promises to stifle an important future need for UK. Biomedical Research by reducing and restricting the Animal Facilities and Expertise, as well as the Containment Facilities that currently exist on the Mill Hill site. (b) Movement of the NIMR is likely to result in the exodus of many of its scientists, many to locations abroad. (c) Restricting the interactions of the NIMR with one London Institution by placing this MRC Institute within the confines of one University/Hospital could greatly reduce its collaborations with clinical research laboratories. My own experience (please see below) and those of other NIMR researchers, is that it is very easy to set up productive collaborations with a vast number of London and other UK Institutes/Universities (ICH, UCL, GKT, Imperial College, London— to name but a few, and other countries including developing countries such as in Africa and Asia) from the Mill Hill site. This is completely in keeping with the MRC Vision.

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The reasons stated above and the overall cost of relocating the NIMR to a new building in central London, beg the question—are the MRC’s plans for the renewed NIMR justified by hard evidence and will they really benefit Biomedical research in the UK? I am greatly concerned that the Mill Hill site has been excluded as an option for future development, and by the procedure by which this and other key decisions have been made with respect to the future of the NIMR. 1. Background I worked at the DNAX Research Institute, California, USA, (owned by Schering Plough, NJ, USA) (from 1987–2001), studying cytokine gene regulation and its eVects on the immune response. In 2000, I decided to move from DNAX. Despite oVers from several other institutions in both the US and the UK, I accepted a position as Head of the new Division of Immunoregulation at NIMR. The major objective of this division is to interface basic immunology research with the study of infectious diseases. In particular, I am committed to researching the immune response to Mycobacterium tuberculosis (MTB) infection (identified as a critical disease area by the MRC), with the emphasis to further our knowledge on mechanisms of cure. A major reason for my choice of the NIMR was its extensive expertise and use of transgenic/knockout mouse technology, which is unsurpassed in any other institute in the UK, and amongst the top internationally. In addition, NIMR has excellent specific pathogen free and containment facilities (Category II, III and IV), which are essential for the study of infectious pathogens such as MTB both in vitro and in animal models. These superb Institute facilities will play a key role in the successful outcome of my research. Thus, the expertise at the NIMR and the excellent secure animal facilities (including available land space for future expansion) form a unique basis for research on the immune response to, and structure of dangerous infectious pathogens. 2. Concerns regarding a move of NIMR to Central London (a) The Future Needs for Animal Models and Containment Facilities in Biomedical Research. My major concern is that, by moving to central London the level of the excellent animal and containment facilities provided by the Mill Hill site will not be achievable. Full utilization of information from the human genome project will undoubtedly require the extensive use of mouse models to identify the functions of novel genes. Suggestions that there will be a reduction in the use of mouse models for biomedical research (for basic, translational and pre-clinical studies) are completely unfounded. It is clear that there is an ongoing commitment in the use of mouse models for academic, medical and industrial research, which will continue for at least the next 20 years. In immunology, for example, great advances have been made to create mice with many components of the human immune system to advance in vivo studies. Together with the high level containment facilities (Category II, III & IV) at the NIMR, the extensive experimental animal accommodation is essential for continued success of basic and translational research at NIMR. Any conceivable advantages of moving the Institute to central London will be hampered by the inevitable space constraints, which will prevent animal facilities from being expanded as the need requires it, in the future years of biomedical research. (b) Concerns for the security of animal facilities if NIMR moves to central London. It is of great concern that the building of new animal facilities in central London will generate unwarranted attention from the anti-vivisectionist movement which has recently disrupted developments at Cambridge University and more recently at Oxford University, as reported in the Economist, p29, 24–30 July 2004. Although I acknowledge that MRC strategies should not be driven by the activities of anti-vivisectionist groups, I am concerned that building new animal facilities in central London to cater for the NIMR renewed vision would exacerbate this issue creating unnecessary adverse publicity for animal research. This could be avoided by simply supporting NIMR on the Mill Hill site with its existing secure facilities, which could readily be expanded to serve its own needs and also those of other London institutions. 3. Enhancing translational and clinical research at NIMR does not require relocation to central London (a) Examples and Advantages of Collaborations from the NIMR I stress that enhanced interaction between basic and translational and clinical researchers is not necessarily achieved by placing them in close proximity to each other (the MRC’s own experience at Northwick Park being an example). The most eVective and eYcient way of achieving this is by funding appropriate shared research programmes aimed to improve and increase training of MD fellows, and crossdisciplinary translational studies. Since my move to the NIMR I have established multiple translational and clinical collaborations to study the use of immunomodulators in the treatment of TB and in intervention on allergy and asthma. I provide details of these as examples below:

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Use of Immunomodulators to cure TB: In collaboration with: A E Goldfeld, MD, CBR, Harvard Medical School, USA & Cambodia Health Committee (CHC), Cambodia. R CoVman, PhD, Dynavax, USA. J Banchereau, PhD, Baylor Insitute for Immunology Research, Dallas, USA. D Young, PhD, Imperial College, London. G Bancroft, PhD, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, London. D Robinson, MD, & O M Kon, MD, St. Mary’s Hospital, Imperial College, London. G. Trinchieri (Schering Plough, France—now NIAID, NIH, Bethesda, USA).

Use of Immunomodulators as therapy for glucocorticoid resistant asthma: In collaboration with: C Hawrylowicz, PhD, & Tak Lee, MD, GKT, King’s College. London. These collaborations were set up easily from the NIMR at Mill Hill, within the last three years since I returned to the UK. Importantly, I did not require my laboratory to be embedded in the institutions I am collaborating with. Thus, I suggest that you consider how the research funds of the UK and the MRC would be best used to achieve the MRC Vision, and maintain and increase the UK excellence in Biomedical Research by taking advantage of already existing successful operations such as NIMR and funding enhanced interactions between such research institutes with translational/clinical centres, whilst maintaining the current expertise and advantages of the Mill Hill Site.

4. Dangers of dismantling the NIMR by a move to Central London (a) Dismantling an Institute such as the NIMR by a move to Central London promises to stifle an important future need for UK. Biomedical Research by reducing and restricting the Animal Facilities and Expertise, as well as the Containment Facilities that currently exist on the Mill Hill site. (b) Movement of the NIMR is likely to result in the exodus of many of its scientists, many to locations abroad. (c) Restricting the interactions of the NIMR with one London Institution by placing this MRC Institute within the confines of one University/Hospital could greatly reduce its collaborations with clinical research laboratories. My own experience (please see above) and those of other NIMR researchers, is that it is very easy to set up productive collaborations with a vast number of London and other UK Institutes/Universities (ICH, UCL, GKT, Imperial College, London— to name but a few, and other countries including developing countries such as in Africa and Asia) from the Mill Hill site. This is completely in keeping with the MRC Vision. The reasons stated above and the overall cost of relocating the NIMR to a new building in central London, beg the question—are the MRC’s plans for the renewed NIMR justified by hard evidence and will they really benefit Biomedical research in the UK? These are important practical concerns regarding the MRC proposals for the future of the NIMR. It is somewhat surprising that the expertise of researchers at the NIMR was not regarded by the MRC throughout the whole process of evaluating the future of the NIMR. In particular this would seem important for example in areas regarding animal issues and practicalities for animal research and its future in the next 20 years of Biomedical Research, of which NIMR researchers have great expertise. On this note, I would like to comment finally on what appears to have been a failure throughout the whole process with respect to the MRC evaluation of the possible options for the future of the NIMR. First, conclusions were arrived at by the Task Force and the MRC which apparently had disregarded feedback from (1) the Medical Research Council Task Force on NIMR Consultation with stakeholders, May 2004; and (2) the opinion of the NIMR staV (from discussions of the MRC with NIMR). 22 November 2004

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APPENDIX 65 Memorandum from Robert Solari, Medical Research Council Technology

Executive Summary As CEO of MRCT, I have witnessed the process surrounding the proposed move of NIMR, although I have not been directly involved in the workings of the Task Force. I am well placed to judge the questions of “translational research” because of my current position and my past experiences. The MRC has a strategic goal in creating a new NIMR with a clearer commitment to integrating basic biological research with clinical and experimental medicine. The MRC believes that this is both necessary and consistent with its remit to deliver improved human health. The decision making process has been inclusive and transparent and has at all times focused on delivering an enhanced Institute in line with future strategic ambitions.

1. Translating basic science to the clinic The MRC is faced with the twin challenges of improving national health and creating increased national wealth. The recent reports from the Bioscience Innovation and Growth Team and the Academy of Medical Sciences both stressed the need to strengthen translational research at the interface between basic science and clinical practice. The MRC is publicly committed to giving this issue greater priority and has embraced the need to enhance its partnerships with the DH and the Bioscience Industry. The MRC is playing an integral part in the new UK Clinical Research Collaboration (UKCRC) and the new MRC/DH Joint Health Delivery Group. Two of the key recommendations from the BIGT report were to invest in the bridge between idea generation and commercial funding and to develop, attract and retain a high quality scientific and management base. The economic case was further strengthened by the DTI Innovation report and the Science and Innovation Investment Framework 2004–14, both of which highlight the need for the UK science base to increase the rate of knowledge transfer and to ensure that scientific knowledge is used by business to create wealth. The Bioscience Industry clearly values the high quality of MRC research for its contribution to the knowledge base from which innovation flows. However, the requirements of Industry have changed markedly in recent years and Technology Transfer practices in life sciences must evolve to meet the new challenges if we are to deliver on the “health and wealth” agenda.

2. Role of the MRCT The MRC manages the Intellectual Property generated in its Research Units and Institutes through its aYliated technology transfer company, Medical Research Council Technology (MRCT). The mission of MRCT is to disseminate knowledge and technology to improve the health and economic competitiveness of the UK. To achieve this mission MRCT identifies and protects inventions and seeks to bring such inventions to the market either by licensing to industrial partners or by the creation of new companies. These activities have seen seven new medicines launched that rely upon the invention of antibody engineering techniques by MRC scientists and have generated £60 million in income in the past four years. However, the antibody patent estate will not last indefinitely and the challenge for MRCT is to develop the next generation of MRC breakthroughs that will deliver healthcare improvements and generate economic returns. The current revenue stream is being re-invested in a number of programmes designed to enhance knowledge transfer and to respond to changes in the BioIndustry landscape. The first significant change was to expand the team of Technology Transfer managers so that they can actively engage with MRC scientists, to identify opportunities earlier and to create a more entrepreneurial culture. The second programme is the creation of a £4.5 million Development Gap Fund specifically designed to support proof of concept studies to bridge the gap between innovative research and a healthcare or industrial application. The third components are the applied research laboratories managed by MRCT in Mill Hill and Edinburgh. These laboratories and their dedicated staV try to develop applications for the basic scientific advances being made in the MRC. One area where significant eVort is currently being made is in the creation of a Drug Discovery Group (DDG). As a first step we have established an assay development and screening group. This group takes novel therapeutic targets from the MRC, configures them for chemical testing and attempts to find inhibitors that might be useful starting points for full scale drug discovery. The second step will be the creation of a chemistry team that can optimise these chemical starting points into more “drug like” molecules.

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To summarise, MRCT is making a significant contribution to these important translational issues as follows: The £4.5 million Development Gap Fund is already providing valuable proof of concept funding to bridge the gap between innovation and commercial potential. MRCT staV will actively search for innovative therapeutic targets from the MRC science base. This will help create a greater “therapeutic or translational” culture in MRC research establishments. The DDG will generate selective and potent drug-like molecules to help MRC scientists “validate” their therapeutic targets. A critical step in the path from bench to bedside. The DDG will generate drug-like molecules that will strengthen target patents so adding considerable economic value to MRC science. These drug-like molecules will hopefully be starting points for novel therapeutics for unmet medical needs and will provide enhanced partnering opportunities with the Bioscience Industry. The DDG will provide a centre of excellence in drug discovery and so help to train and retain in the UK a strong scientific and management base. 3. Relationship between MRCT and the MRC science base When compared to technology transfer oYces in Europe or the USA, there is no doubt that MRCT has enjoyed considerable success in recent years. Although MRCT can take some small credit for these achievements, there is no doubt that the main driver of this success has been the outstanding quality of basic research supported by the MRC. In addition to the quality, the intramural programmes have allowed the MRC to develop strong strategic themes and to build a critical mass of world class scientists in dedicated Units and Institutes. Moreover, the Intellectual Property produced in these Institutes and Units is unambiguously owned by the MRC so allowing eYcient exploitation. This integrated structure has helped to create a strong and successful technology transfer organisation. In recent years the Research Councils have come under increasing pressure to enhance the rate of knowledge transfer to industry and to make a greater contribution to economic growth of the UK. Inevitably this places the most fundamental, curiosity driven research under pressure to deliver industrial applications. However, we must be very cautious that whilst seeking more “translational” outcomes we do not lose the very core of what makes our science base world class. Some of the most significant breakthroughs in the MRC have come from the study of fundamental biological and biochemical processes. The MRC clearly understands the tensions between supporting fundamental research and delivering public value and is deeply committed to maintaining the quality and the breadth of its research base. In this context the MRC has clearly articulated its vision to strengthen the interface between clinical medicine and experimental biology, sometimes referred to as “translational research”. It is clear that the MRC’s ambition is for NIMR to become a centre of excellence for such translational research. 4. The relationship between NIMR and MRCT MRCT has two Applied Research laboratories, the largest of which is situated at 1-3 Burtonhole Lane, Mill Hill. This is adjacent to the NIMR site and has access to the Institute through a security gate. The MRCT laboratories can make use of the NIMR facilities and we enjoy a close relationship with the scientific staV at the Institute. The role of the MRCT is to identify novel inventions with practical applications and to help develop these towards the patient and the market. We have had many such interactions with scientists at NIMR thanks to the quality and quantity of research being conducted at the site. In addition, the proximity of our two laboratories makes interactions significantly easier. It is also fair to say that a great deal of the research being conducted at NIMR has a very clear and direct human health focus and there is consequently a straightforward dialogue between NIMR and MRCT. Nevertheless, despite all of these positive factors, NIMR has made less impact than certain other MRC Institutes in terms of raw technology transfer output measures such as the number of patents filed and spinout companies created. However, in terms of intangible or non-quantifiable contributions to MRCT’s activities at Mill Hill, the NIMR staV have made a huge contribution in terms of support and scientific interactions. Given the research focus and strengths of NIMR and the ambitions of MRCT in helping transform novel ideas into new medicines and diagnostics, we should be perfect partners. In discussions between Sir John Skehel and me, we have both expressed a strong desire to work more closely together to achieve these goals. 5. Translational Research What is translational research and what does this mean for NIMR? The term is used widely and loosely and appears to mean many diVerent things to diVerent people. At one end of the spectrum it can refer to the testing of therapeutic agents in man in clinical trials and at the other end of the spectrum it can relate to the discovery of those novel therapeutic agents. It can relate to the study of normal physiology, at both the tissue and cellular level, and how this changes during progression of a disease. It can relate to genetic and environmental factors that predispose or cause certain disease states. All of these approaches can and are called translational research. Some of these approaches can be addressed using model systems in vitro or in model organisms such as baker’s yeast, nematode worms, fruitflies and mice. However, many of these approaches require access to man in order to generate hypotheses or to test them. If we are to harness the

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great advances in basic science clinicians need to understand the power of modern biological technologies and basic experimental biologists need to have a better understanding of clinical practice. So without abandoning curiosity driven research we can perhaps get better at asking more relevant questions. It is with this aim that the MRC wishes to integrate NIMR into a hospital environment. In my opinion, such an integrated environment would be beneficial for delivery of the “translational” vision that MRC has articulated for NIMR. 6. Impact One of the great strengths of the MRC is the structure of their Intramural research and the ability this gives to make major strategic decisions. The proposed changes are intended to have an impact on the research in NIMR, hopefully this will be a positive impact and it will eVect the changes required to deliver on the renewed vision. The proposed changes will in the long run lead to an evolution in the composition of the research teams as diVerent skills and perspectives will be required. I believe this will ultimately benefit patients and hopefully deliver greater economic returns. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 66 Memorandum from Professor Hindmarsh and Dr Dattani, University College London We write to submit our views on the role and future for the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR), which is under consideration by the Medical Research Council (MRC). Both of us have been aYliated with the Institute over the last 20 years and have been more closely involved over the last six years as researchers on the Mill Hill site and more recently over the last two years as Visiting Workers. The involvement of Mill Hill over the last 20 years in the research that we have undertaken in clinical practice has been invaluable and has led to a massive expansion in our understanding of disease processes. This has placed our unit at the forefront of the evaluation and treatment of paediatric endocrine disorders and a similar beneficial relationship exists in other clinical areas such as cardiology, gastroenterology and immunology. We believe our experience as researchers and clinicians qualifies us to comment on the proposals made by the MRC regarding the direction for the NIMR. 1. The Case for Retention on the Mill Hill Site We believe that the National Institute for Medical Research as currently constituted at Mill Hill provides for the United Kingdom a unique constellation of scientists and supporting staV, which covers a breadth of scientific disciplines and specialities. This close proximity of working is to be commended and directly parallels models used by successful industries such as BMW’s Munich Engineering Centre and DaimlerChryslers Technology Centre in Michigan. Mill Hill exemplifies what organisational researchers have known for a long time, that the frequency of communication between co-workers decreases dramatically as the physical distance between them increases (1). This observation is true when considering basic science interactions but, paradoxically, a moderate separation works to a considerable advantage when we consider the interaction of clinical workers with the Mill Hill site. This stems from the fact that there is a tendency in many UK Academic settings for clinical researchers at all levels to become entangled with service delivery within the National Health Service (NHS). The distance between NHS site and Mill Hill is far enough to ensure that this potential conflict of interest does not take place so that the time that is dedicated for research is exclusively dedicated to that task, but close enough to allow easy and regular contact. This dissociation of immediate demands of clinical practice from a period of uninterrupted focus on basic science is advantageous to the clinician who then gains access to the extensive animal facilities and expertise on the Mill Hill site, the exposure to numerous and diVerent basic science concepts from the vast array of special interest groups on the site and the tremendous infrastructure at Mill Hill with respect to lab support and higher technologies. We believe that the separation of the clinical practice from the basic sciences is most beneficial in reality because it enforces the protection of clinicians’ time to spend on research. This insulation also engenders a spirit of independence of thought, which leads to the generation of intense, original and fruitful collaborations. This diVers from the current concepts often promulgated within universities where dependence within a smaller grouping is fostered because of the competitive nature for internal funding within an institution. This internal competition simply does not exist at NIMR and is a major reason for their collaborative culture. In addition, we do not view their current location as impeding the influence of basic science on clinical practice and vice versa as the attendance of ourselves and many others from the fields of cardiology, gastroenterology, virology and infectious diseases over the years have testified. Rather with this integrated approach and close liaison, both groupings have strengthened their standings within the basic science and clinical science communities.

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2. The Disadvantages Associated with Cessation of NIMR at Mill Hill One of the major arguments that has been put forward for the move of NIMR from the Mill Hill site is that it would allow them to integrate more with clinical practice. Several of the arguments against this have been rehearsed above, but less frequently mentioned are the many specific disadvantages to the current science of such a move. Any movement of NIMR to central London would lead inevitably to fragmentation of the resource as it now stands, because no single site in central London or within the University of London is capable of absorbing the number of scientists, support staV and facilities that go with NIMR, whilst protecting its freedom to interact with multiple clinical sites in the UK. We believe any such move would in practice lead to fragmentation of the existing groupings in attempts to embed them with the much less interdisciplinary culture in the Universities, and at considerably increased cost. Further, we believe that any movement into central London, leaving aside the property cost considerations and relocation expenses, is likely to be problematic in terms of ensuring staYng of the Institute in whatever form it would ultimately take. The evidence from the public service sector recruitment and in particular non consultant recruitment in the NHS points to London being seriously disadvantaged, because of the cost of living and travel associated with the area. Longer commuting times are hardly conducive to long out-of-hours working typical of NIMR staV, and it will be more diYcult to recruit and retain lower paid ancillary staV who also play a key role (eg trained animal staV). We question the wisdom of taking this risk. A question mark would also hang over the provision of the large animal facilities that are currently available on the NIMR site. Relocation of these facilities to central London would need careful consideration because the facilities would be far more expensive to rebuild in central London than to maintain at Mill Hill, would become very vulnerable to outside adverse interest cf the experience in Oxford, would require extensive expenditure on security and would probably not be cost eVective. Their existing location has not prevented them from providing much valued specialised animal support services for many central London Institutions including our own. The final point is that this large Institution if moved whole would then become part of already large and unwieldy organisations whose components are already distributed miles apart. Two situations could follow. In the best case scenario, NIMR might continue to operate as an independent Institute within another institution in which case nothing would have changed from the status quo other than a large waste of money. Alternatively, the pursuit of integration with clinical specialties would likely lead to fragmentation into science disciplines, and the unique culture of mutual interdependence across all scientific field would be lost. There are very few large scale functional entities within Universities that match the scale of integrated activities and collaborations across the Divisions at NIMR. 3. Current Arrangement Continuing with the Mill Hill option allows the Medical Research Council and NIMR to contemplate more practical ways in which they can improve and increase their contribution to clinical academic medicine in the United Kingdom, which is thought to be in crisis (2). In its present guise NIMR with its physical separation from the day to day demands of the NHS provides an ideal opportunity for several tiers of scientific clinician working. First, by creating junior research positions with focused time periods away from clinical commitments the organisation could help lay the foundations for the rediscovery of academic medicine by generating a cadre of highly trained scientific clinicians who would first be able to develop their own work programme and then maintain NIMR links through the next two stages. The second phase could be to build upon these participants in a highly structured and disciplined environment, by creating the equivalent of some tenured track posts linking NIMR with diVerent clinical Institutions. The final stage would be to develop a working bond with the scientific clinicians who are allied to NIMR with the creation of scientific clinician leaders who are based predominantly on the NIMR site but who can interact with the clinical fraternity. We know that NIMR leaders are keen to increase the number of clinically trained scientists running programs at Mill Hill. With proper and sustained funding, and appropriate agreements with the relevant NHS trusts, such opportunities would be highly prized within the academic clinical community. Finally, if the MRC wish to contribute to the revival of Academic Clinical Medicine in the UK they should consider the creation, in partnership with the NHS, of Clinical Research Centres to undertake the detailed patient evaluation and clinical studies that are the essence of translational research. 4. Conclusions We believe that the proposed move of NIMR from the Mill Hill site in pursuit of imagined improvements in clinical translation will do more harm than good, and risks damaging their unique scientific environment that is necessary to generate translatable discoveries in the first place. We believe that a more modest focussed investment on translational training and research at Mill Hill, together with separate investments in clinical units in several institutions, closely linked to the NIMR, would be much more likely to produce in practice the enhanced interactions between NIMR scientists and the clinical world that the Medical Research Council desires.

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References (1) Allen T J. Communication Networks in R&D Labs. R&D Mangement 1971; 1: 14-21. (2) Clark J, Tugwell P. Who cares about academic medicine? BMJ 2004; 329: 751-2. Dr Mehul Dattani Reader in Paediatric Endocrinology Professor Peter Hindmarsh Professor of Paediatric Endocrinology 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 67 Memorandum from Professor Jim Smith, Cambridge University 1. The success of the National Institute for Medical Research is due in large part to the interdisciplinary nature of the work being carried out. Few Universities or other Institutions within the UK can match the range of research being carried out at Mill Hill, and it is important that this interdisciplinary culture is maintained and encouraged. The financial and intellectual arguments for moving NIMR to central London are weak and unconvincing, and the option of remaining in Mill Hill should be included in further discussions. Finally, it is important that the future of NIMR is decided soon. I, and presumably others, became aware of the idea to move the Institute to Cambridge in 2000, and this long period of uncertainty must have been very damaging to Mill Hill. 2. I write as a former member of NIMR. I joined the Institute in 1984 as a tenure-track scientist, was awarded tenure in 1988, and became Head of the Laboratory of Developmental Biology in 1991. I then became Head of the Genes and Cellular Controls Group in 1996. I left in 2000 to become Chairman of the Wellcome/CRC Institute (now the Wellcome Trust/CR-UK Gurdon Institute) and the John Humphrey Plummer Professor of Developmental Biology at Cambridge University. 3. As a former member of the Institute I know that NIMR provides a superb environment to become a successful and productive scientist. When I told Martin RaV (University College, London), over 20 years ago, that I was going to NIMR, he said “if you can’t succeed there, you won’t succeed anywhere”. He was right. 4. The success of the Institute depends in part on the facts that the scientists have a superb research infrastructure, they have very little administrative work, they do not have to write grants, and they are not obliged to teach. More important, however, are: (i)

the depth and breadth of the research that is carried out at NIMR;

(ii) the fact that there are critical masses of scientists working on diVerent yet complementary problems; and (iii) the opportunities to collaborate. During my time at the Institute I collaborated and published with virtually all the developmental biology groups and had many productive interactions with members of the other “supergroups” (as they were called in my time). 5. Since my departure from the Institute, with more genomic sequences becoming available as well as the advent of “Systems Biology”, the importance of these interdisciplinary collaborations has increased enormously. In my subject of developmental biology, I need increasing access to expertise in imaging, cell biology, microarray technology, bioinformatics, proteomics, novel fluorescent molecules, physiology and mathematical biology, to name just a few areas. These techniques are all available at NIMR, but most University researchers, even those in the best Universities, do not have ready access to them, and certainly not on a daily basis, as is possible at Mill Hill. 6. Interdisciplinary interactions of this sort frequently lead to the establishment of new collaborative projects, and another strength of NIMR is that, with the Director’s support, such projects can be initiated immediately, rather then having to write a grant and wait for the outcome of the application. 7. I believe these arguments strongly favour keeping NIMR as a single multidisciplinary entity. To break it up, presumably into units whose remits would be those of the existing four research areas of Mill Hill, would be to take a huge retrograde step that runs counter to all the prevailing trends of biological research. These trends are illustrated by the establishment of systems biology institutes around the world, the expansion of the Sanger Institute, the founding of the Janelia Farm research community by the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, and the requirement of the HFSP that their research grants are multidisciplinary in nature. To deny NIMR scientists the opportunity to participate in this new and exciting style of biology would be very unfortunate indeed.

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8. I have heard, informally, some of the arguments against maintaining NIMR as it is. One is financial. I can’t speak to this because I don’t know what the numbers are, but I do know that it is diYcult to put a price on successful science, and that successful science can, sometimes, generate enormous income. A second reason (and I hear this argument more often now that I have left Mill Hill) is that some people are concerned that NIMR scientists have too good a deal and that they reduce funds available to universities through MRC project and programme grants. In response to this I would note that the Wellcome Trust, the BBSRC, CRUK, NIH, the Howard Hughes Medical Institute and many other agencies also have both Institutes and response mode funding. The important thing is to get the balance right and to make sure that the Institutes are rigorously reviewed. 9. Any discussion of the future of NIMR should indeed review the balance between direct support and response mode funding and consider the whole of the MRC’s portfolio, including other Institutes and Centres. 10. I can see no strong reason for moving the Institute to central London. First, the Institute has the necessary critical mass to function as an independent entity. Little would be gained on a day-to-day basis by moving to University College or King’s College London, and NIMR in its present position is close enough to collaborate eYciently with scientists in both these colleges. Second, the move itself would be very expensive, and one advantage of staying in NW7 is that it is much easier for people (especially non-academic staV) to live locally. I know how important this is from my experience in Cambridge, where very few of our animal technicians, for example, or secretaries, can aVord to live near the Institute. This makes recruitment and retention very diYcult. I believe it is very important to keep open the idea that NIMR stays in Mill Hill. 11. Finally, I believe it is very important to make a decision about NIMR as quickly as possible. I was made aware of the possibility that NIMR might move to Cambridge in 2000, shortly before I left the Institute. It took over two years for the proposal to appear in the draft MRC Forward Investment Strategy document of April 2003, and 18 months later all that has happened is that Cambridge has been ruled out and University College and King’s College have replaced it. NIMR has thus suVered a prolonged period of uncertainly, and this must have hindered recruitment and damaged morale enormously. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 68 Memorandum from Kenneth Fleming, University of Oxford In response to your request for submissions on the above, as head of the Medical Sciences Division at the University of Oxford, I have three comments. 1. With regard to the mission of the NIMR, I would agree that a move in the direction of translational and clinical research is correct. However, it is also important to ensure that this does not diminish the importance of the basic science, since ultimately clinical applications rely on discoveries in the basic science arena. Furthermore, given the lack of previous track record, developing a translational and clinical research activity is a major ambition. It will require very significant change of culture and leadership. Apart from outstanding leadership, to achieve this will certainly need physical co-location and close interaction and integration with an organisation with a strong tradition and record of achievement in this arena. 2. Following from the above, remaining on the Mill Hill site would severely compromise the integration required. Therefore, the option of moving all of the activity onto another and more appropriate single site is superficially attractive. My preferred solution to the issue of co-location would be a distributed model involving higher educational institutes with the relevant skills and commitment and track record of achievement, both within and without London, the best locations being delivered by a competitive bidding process. However, given the current plans for a central London site, the scientific case for UCL is generally accepted as being stronger than that of Kings across a broader range of activities which are likely to be complementary with the current NIMR activities. Measuring this is, of course, not straightforward, but surrogates such as RAE scores and external peer-reviewed grant income would appear to support this. However, I understand the Council of the MRC will be analysing exactly these sort of measures in addressing the relative merits of UCL and Kings. 3. The other vital consideration is the financial case, both for capital and revenue. I do not know what is being proposed by Kings and UCL, but given the financial situation of the MRC, the final solution must be as cheap and cost-eVective as possible. The MRC is currently unable to fund some of its most highest rated grant applications and, anything which makes this situation worse, is clearly against the best interests of the nation. 22 November 2004

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APPENDIX 69 Memorandum from Dr E F Gevers, National Institute for Medical Research We are clinicians in early stages of our careers and we currently work, or have worked in the recent past, as scientists at the NIMR, some of us combining our research with clinical sessions in teaching hospitals in London. The following represents the unanimous view of all the clinicians currently working at the NIMR We believe that moving the NIMR to a hospital/HEI site in central London would not be advantageous and we therefore would like to submit the following as evidence for the inquiry into the future of the National Institute for Medical Research.

1. Translational Research 1.1 The need to ensure translation of basic science into clinical research to benefit clinical practice and healthcare in the UK is widely recognised, but this is a multistage process. Early translational research bridges basic scientific findings to human physiology and pathophysiology (for example: eVects of gene mutations found in human diseases in mouse models) whereas late translational research involves the implementation and evaluation of promising diagnostic or therapeutic discoveries in clinical practice. The former requires the best environment for fundamental scientific discoveries with good links to the relevant academic clinical specialists. Late translation (experimental/physiological studies involving patients, clinical trials and epidemiological studies) primarily requires the best environment for patient centred research. The MRC’s proposal implies that these two activities would be best served by being combined on a single site in central London. We have seen no evidence presented for this. We have worked both medically and scientifically on sites where patient care and research were combined and have not experienced added value of the combination. We believe this is more likely to result in a compromised unfocussed solution for the NIMR that is sub-optimal for its science in the longer term. 1.2 The current NIMR already engages in early translation, with collaborations in 50 diVerent clinical centres, with suitable collaborators and appropriate well-described patient populations. In early translational research, little patient material is required, and the specialist knowledge and expertise of the clinical partner is far more important than its physical proximity. Key features are the exchange of ideas, a raised clinical awareness of scientists and the scientific training of clinicians. As clinician scientists in training at NIMR, we would welcome an expansion of capacity for early translational activities, done in a way that does not compromise the primary focus of the Institute in pursuing fundamental understanding in the biomedical sciences. It is the excellence and concentration of the multidisciplinary NIMR science environment, and the insulation from clinical demands that its location aVords, that attracts clinicians here, rather than to the many university science departments already embedded on a hospital campus. In our experience, the separation of the NIMR from our hospitals is a simple and practical solution that protects our precious research time and improves our productivity, whilst being close enough to move between clinical work and science work in a planned fashion. 1.3 The UK needs more individuals trained in both science and medicine for the improvement of translational research. Such clinician-scientists can ultimately work entirely as clinicians or as scientists, or both. Currently, training in both fields is given little oYcial recognition or encouragement, and is usually organised by a few highly motivated individual clinicians and scientists using ad hoc funding. We believe this discourages many medical students from taking this career path risk even though a clinician-scientist training is essential if we are to improve our translational research capacity. We believe research training in the NIMR could be integrated with advanced clinical training in the best teaching hospitals, but to capitalise on this investment in training, it is essential to follow through with a structured career development plan. This must include protected research time and specific funding opportunities, for the clinician-scientist to put his/her translational training into practice. This will require communication between the MRC, the clinical training authorities (Royal Colleges etc) and the NHS Trusts and is not something that moving NIMR will solve. 1.4 At a more senior level, most current consultant contracts have a set number of clinical sessions per week, which leaves little or no time for science. The next generation of clinician-scientists would possibly be better employed on joint appointments with research institutes like the NIMR, rather than solely by the NHS, whose main goal is to provide clinical services. There would be value in making more senior appointments at the NIMR to clinically practicing scientists, to strengthen research appropriate translational opportunities in specific areas. However, simply introducing more clinicians into NIMR will not automatically achieve increased translational results, any more than moving scientists en masse onto a single hospital campus.

2. Location of the Renewed Institute 2.1 All are agreed that the NIMR should remain as a national centre of excellence in biomedical science, building translational research capacity on top of its fundamental discovery science. Early translation requires partnership with clinical consultants keen to collaborate, and who are best placed to provide clinical

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knowledge, expertise, and appropriate patient material. In our view, this will rarely benefit from immediate physical proximity to a single clinical Institution, which will not be the best partner for all clinical disciplines. 2.2 Relocation of NIMR to a single hospital/HEI is bound to lead to the perception of the Institute as “belonging” to that partner, restricting in practice the range of contacts. NIMR scientists would not be encouraged to approach clinical specialists in “competing” Institutes who may in fact be better partners for their research than the particular local clinical specialists on site. In reality, both the Institutions invited to bid for the NIMR are in fact large conglomerates with clinical departments quite widely dispersed, so the physical proximity argument for clinical interactions does not stand much scrutiny in this case. In our experience, there is no guarantee that communication between clinicians and scientists is any greater when the hospital and research institute are in diVerent buildings on the same extended campus. A better way to improve this communication would be to organise meetings for scientists and clinicians which focus on specific organ systems and diseases, and NIMR could well develop this role. 2.3 The current location of the Institute has many advantages. It is in an area that is attractive and aVordable to live, so that a local community of scientists, clinician-scientists and support staV exists naturally. Social contacts and out of hours working in the laboratory are commonplace and the MRC can take advantage of significantly lower salary costs and better recruitment of support staV. Furthermore, the existing site presents many possibilities to expand and build new facilities. There are many ways in which investment at Mill Hill could improve on facilities currently lacking (conference facilities, visitor accommodation) and we believe this would be far more cost eVective than relocating the Institute to central London which would cause real disruption, loss of key support staV at huge financial cost, for imagined benefits.

3. Management of this Process We have made our views known, via interviews with the management consultants about our views on translational research in the renewed NIMR, and spoken and written representations to the Task Force and to Professor Blakemore in response to minutes of the Council Meeting and recommendations of the Task Force. These views arise from our direct experiences coming from university and hospital environments to work at the NIMR, but it is not clear whether they, or responses of most scientists and clinicians who responded to FIS and Task Force consultation exercises, have been taken into consideration. MRC should think again about the real opportunities for NIMR’s contribution to translational research and training on the Mill Hill site. Dr Laura Andreae, MA MBBS MRCP PhD National Institute for Medical Research, Division of Neurophysiology Dr Ross Breckenridge, MRCP PhD National Institute for Medical Research, Division of Developmental Biology/Specialist Registrar in Clinical Pharmacology University College Hospital, London Dr Evelien Gevers, MD PhD National Institute for Medical Research, Division of Molecular Neuroendocrinology/ Honorary Specialist Registrar in Paediatric Endocrinology Great Ormond Street Hospital/Middlesex Hospital, London Dr John Jacob, MRCP PhD National Institute for Medical Research, Division of Developmental Neurobiology/ MRC Clinician Scientist/ Specialist Registrar in Neurology National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery, London Dr Stephen Jolles, MBChB Hons, BSc Hons, MSc, MRCP, MRCPath, PhD Consultant Clinical Immunologist Royal Free Hospital Dr Nancy Long, MB MRCP National Institute for Medical Research, Division of Molecular Neuroendocrinology/Clinical Research Fellow in Endocrinology Christie Hospital, Manchester Dr Nikhil Thapar, BSc BM MRCPCH Lecturer in Paediatric Gastroenterology Institute of Child Health/Great Ormond Street Hospital

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Dr James Turner, MD PhD National Institute for Medical Research, Division of Developmental Genetics/Senior House OYcer in Oncology Mount Vernon Hospital, Rickmansworth 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 70 Memorandum from Steven Ley, National Institute for Medical Research 1. The Medical Research Council (MRC) decided at its meeting in October that the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR) should not remain at Mill Hill but rather be relocated to a central London site, adjacent to either UCL or KCL. As scientists, we are of course in favour of any changes that improve our scientific environment, including enhancing opportunities for translational research. However, we have concerns about the rationale behind this decision, its huge cost implications and about the way in which the decision was reached by the MRC. We are also unconvinced that the developments envisioned by the MRC will ever materialise.

The Decision 2. The Task Force stated that the proposed bid for a relocated NIMR would have to be more attractive than what could be achieved by NIMR at Mill Hill. However, from what we know about the bids from UCL (animal facilities one mile away from the Institute) and King’s (Institute split into two buildings), we think it is very unlikely that either option will come close to matching our current facilities. In view of this, we are astonished that the MRC has excluded the possibility of NIMR remaining at Mill Hill. Furthermore, while the MRC have recently requested that NIMR submit plans for an “enhanced” Institute at Mill Hill to act as a baseline comparison for the UCL and KCL bids, they have still refused to consider the Mill Hill site as a full option. This decision defies logic and common sense. 3. In our view the Mill Hill site oVers enormous advantages over the proposed central London sites. We have extensive research animal facilities (9,000 square metres; housing mice, rats, frogs and fish) which are unique in the UK in terms of their size and “state of the art” capabilities. These animal facilities form an essential part of our research infrastructure. Replicating this on a central London site would be very expensive and also diYcult to achieve in view of the likely response from animal rights groups. The Mill Hill Institute also houses the MRC Biomedical NMR facility and is immediately adjacent to MRC Technology (MRC-T), the technology transfer arm of the MRC. However, we understand that these facilities would not be co-located with the renewed NIMR on either of the central London sites. This would damage our science and capacity for translational research. 4. We are concerned that embedding NIMR within UCL or KCL will diminish the scientific and managerial independence of the Institute. We believe that independence is essential if NIMR is to carry out fully its national role, as recommended by the Task Force. In strong support of this view, the vast majority (83%) of independent scientists and clinicians who responded to the Task Force consultation exercise recommended that NIMR should stay at Mill Hill. 5. The Mill Hill site covers 47 acres, of which NIMR currently occupies about 25%. This provides the possibility of considerable expansion in the future, which could be funded by the MRC and also by inward investment from other stakeholders. This flexibility would be lost upon relocation, since the space available for the new NIMR would, for cost reasons, necessarily be limited to the current size of NIMR at Mill Hill at best. We believe this is a poor strategic decision, since over the proposed 20–30 year time frame for the renewed NIMR, we envisage a large increase in demand for biomedical research. In particular, it is inevitable that animal models will become increasingly important for both basic and translational research. It is crucial that NIMR does not lose the possibility of expanding its animal facilities beyond its current level in the future.

The Cost/Risk 6. The MRC’s decision to move NIMR to central London was made without a systematic analysis of the scientific advantages, risks and costs of the two central London locations compared with the Mill Hill site. Indeed, the detailed business cases from UCL and KCL were requested by the MRC only after it had already decided to exclude the Mill Hill site as an option. We have received no convincing justification from the MRC of why a proper comparative cost/risk analysis was not carried out before making any decisions about the future of NIMR. This has completely undermined our confidence in the abilities and motives of MRC management.

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7. The major rationale for relocation of NIMR to central London appears to be co-location with a research medical school in order to enhance clinical collaborations and translational research. However, the current NIMR already has extensive collaborations with clinical groups in London, in the rest of the UK and internationally, as demonstrated in submissions to the Task Force. Furthermore we believe that colocation of NIMR with a research hospital may reduce flexibility by restricting our ability to form collaborations outside of the host HEI. At present, we enjoy clinical collaborations with all of the major London research hospitals and their associated academic centres. It is important to note that a previous embedding of an MRC Institute with a hospital (the Clinical Research Centre at Northwick Park) was widely regarded as a failure and the MRC was eventually forced to close it. We therefore believe that the MRC proposal to relocate NIMR from Mill Hill is associated with considerable risk and uncertainty. Since a huge amount of money would be required to relocate NIMR from Mill Hill, we question whether this is prudent use of public funds. 8. The exclusion of Mill Hill as an option by the MRC has had a destabilising eVect on the Institute. Many of us have been approached with alternative job possibilities both in the UK and abroad. Clearly, if the current uncertainty regarding the future of the Institute continues or if the MRC approves a substandard bid for NIMR, many of us will seriously consider leaving. This will result in the loss of important research programmes from the MRC and probably the UK. This cannot be a good outcome for British science and would be the direct result of MRC mismanagement of its review of NIMR during both the FIS and Task Force phases. The Process 9. The decision to relocate NIMR to central London and to exclude the possibility of NIMR remaining at Mill Hill was taken by the MRC in light of recommendations from the Task Force. However it is clear from the reports of the Task Force and in subsequent emails (all released by the MRC) that the option of NIMR remaining at Mill Hill was not properly discussed at its fifth and final meeting. We consider this a clear failure of management of the Task Force by the MRC. The subsequent decision to exclude the Mill Hill option was reached by e-mail and telephone conversations and agreed by a 5–4 vote. The five member majority was achieved by the casting vote of the Chairman. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 71 Memorandum from Gordon Reid, National Institute for Medical Research I am employed as a Higher Scientific OYcer at the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR), where I have worked for 20 years. In this time I have contributed to many scientific papers in top class peer reviewed journals. I am opposed to the MRC plans as they do not present a convincing case that moving to a central London site will improve the work of the MRC either on scientific grounds or on a financial basis. In fact, it would be to the detriment of NIMR‘s science as the animal and NMR (nuclear magnetic resonance) facilities would be greatly aVected. Other work could be done in a central London location however no benefit arises through such a move and would be at great expense. The MRC would lose the benefit of a great site in Mill Hill. There is room to expand and we have an internationally renowned reputation. We are a scientific centre of excellence and this cannot be achieved overnight but can be easily destroyed. Salaries for scientific research are very poor compared to other fields of work especially when the academic requirements are so great. People work hard because we believe in the work. We are driven by an enquiring mind and not personal financial reasons. Many of us at NIMR will not still be working (ie retired) or will be on short-term contracts by the time these plans come into eVect. Others will not even be working in this country never mind the MRC. Despite this we are strongly opposed to these plans. There cannot be many employers who would have employees so upset over a situation whereby no personal financial or other gain exists. Surely, this verifies our sincerity. Millions of pounds spent on moving only 10 miles, without a convincing case for improvement, appear to be a waste of public money. The money would be much better spent expanding the present site. The following questions come to mind: 1. What will be the eVect of the proposed move on the MRC-T? 2. Is all this consultation bogus: are the MRC’s plans financially driven rather than the stated aims of translational research etc? 3. Consultation is a two way process, what evidence exists that the MRC have taken on board our concerns?

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4. 5. 6. 7.

8.

Is there a hidden agenda agreed with government that a sale of the Mill Hill site would provide a new housing development on a brown field site? What evidence exists that translational research can be done better in a University/Hospital campus? There are many instances whereby this is not the case. The MRC already has units/centres in university/hospital sites why do they also need NIMR on such a site? Animal rights protesters have a presence every Wednesday at the Mill Hill site. Would relocation to a central London site exacerbate this due to increased numbers of people and resulting higher profile protests? What plans do the MRC have for the Mill Hill site and is this a factor on the plans for the future of NIMR?

APPENDIX 72 Memorandum from Professor B Askonas, Imperial College London We greatly welcome the decision by the MRC to accept the majority votes following their consultations that NIMR should remain as a single multidisciplinary Institute rather than be split up. My brief comments relate only to the proposal to move NIMR to a central London University/Hospital site. I should like to point out that there are major advantages in leaving NIMR at its present site. The majority of about 1,000 individuals replying to the MRC email questionnaire voted that proximity to a Hospital was not important. The MRC only accepted votes of organisations where 56% of 36 respondents felt that Hospital proximity was very important. One complaint has been that there are so many NIMR alumni responding or writing in: however this in itself reflects one of the successes of NIMR that so many alumni are Professors and in high posts at many Universities and Medical Schools throughout the UK. In the original MRC Council Sub-committee report last year Infection/Immunity was to be a major focus in the future. Undoubtedly there are major advantages to NIMR at Mill Hill for all aspects of Infection research. I am an Immunologist who carried out research in immunology of virus and parasite infections at NIMR some while ago. There are important requirements when dealing with dangerous pathogens for special facilities—for example several separate containment facilities 2, 3 and 4 both for laboratory experimentation as well as for animal isolation set ups. To have such facilities at the same site requires a lot of space. Security is essential and undoubtedly everyone is aware of present day problems created by animal activists preventing the building of new animal facilities. Additional spare space for emergency problems such as SARS (that fortunately did not reach the UK) is a bonus. All these facilities are available at the present NIMR site at Mill Hill. In recent years more than 50 new viruses that can infect humans have emerged across the world. At present we have the threat of bird influenza hanging over us. With new regulations rebuilding of all these facilities next to a Hospital would be enormously expensive—it does not seem a great idea to have to move infected animals over some miles in the centre of London if it is not possible to have everything at the same site; Moving infected animals requires special permission from the Home OYce on each occasion. The science at NIMR is excellent according to recent quinquennial site visits. NIMR already does translational research and has many outside collaborations within the UK and other countries. This could be further encouraged at the Mill Hill site. In any case, e-mail seems to be a preferred method of communication these days. Provision of more clinical Fellowships to be held at NIMR would strengthen closer links with clinical research and clinical scientists. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 73 Memorandum from Professor Sanjeev Khrishna, St George’s Hospital Medical School 1. I write to the Select Committee from the perspective of a Clinician-Scientist who is actively collaborating with groups at NIMR. My comments are therefore limited to this viewpoint, rather than addressing the wider and deeper implications of siting research carried out in NIMR. The goal of stimulating research that can provide clinically relevant benefits is a very important one that deserves to be pursued aggressively. Now that large-scale genome, gene expression and proteome databases are available, they are proving to be an invaluable resource for the study of the diagnosis and mechanisms of disease. For example, I work with Dr D Fernandez-Reyes (Division of Parasitology, NIMR) on the analysis of complex datasets from proteomic fingerprinting of serum samples to identify biomarkers of infection with tuberculosis. We will extend the work to patients with malaria. In this way, we are addressing a key challenge in the biomedical sciences to design mathematically robust methods of discovering relationships among complex sets of data derived from patients. The benefits for future diagnosis and treatment strategies are immediately

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obvious to those concerned with these important diseases. Our multidisciplinary approach relies on computational biologists, molecular biologists and clinicians being members of an interdependent research team. How do these observations relate to the proposed move for NIMR? 2. A National Institute for Medical Research that is an internationally recognised flagship of scientific excellence already provides a flexible scientific resource that is itself multidisciplinary and responsive to new collaborations. If NIMR were moved to an alternative site in proximity to a teaching hospital, it is diYcult to see how busy clinicians concerned with the priorities of the NHS could find additional time to focus on cementing strong links with a new infusion of basic scientists. There is also a potential danger that a site considered “excellent” from the clinical perspective today, may lose that cachet when competing NHS priorities commit expertise away from research. 3. I suggest an alternative approach. A rapid way in which science may be interfaced with clinical problems is to promote Clinician-Scientist positions in two ways. First, to increase their overall numbers, and secondly to stimulate support for work to be based in NIMR in collaboration with groups who would be keen to develop such links. In this way, an outstanding sheltered training environment becomes available for Clinician-Scientists. This will allow new relationships to form between clinicians and the basic scientists at Mill Hill, led by the importance of scientific questions rather than any lesser priority. If this view finds resonance, then there may be no clear national benefit from having NIMR in central London, either in terms of scientific productivity or value for money. Disruption of the current scientific programmes that would result from this move can be avoided. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 74 Memorandum from the Association of University Teachers

Introduction 1. The Association of University Teachers is the recognised trade union which represents the non-clinical scientific staV of the Medical Research Council. 2. The union and its members are committed to delivering top quality research at the MRC and in universities and colleges across the country. 3. We welcome the decision of the Science and Technology Select Committee to launch an inquiry into the MRC proposals to move the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR) to one of two central London sites. 4. We do not believe that these proposals have merit. We believe they will have a detrimental impact on the ability of NIMR to deliver the high quality research it is rightly famed for. We believe the decision has been taken in a way that has not taken full account of all the available options. We further believe that the decision to move the Institute into central London may be unwise in the current international political climate. 5. We are relieved that the MRC has, at least, accepted the need for the NIMR to remain on a single site as a single entity. It is vitally important, due to the collaborative nature of the work carried out by the Institute, that physical cohesion is central to any discussion about the future of the Institute. 6. We also welcome the recognition of the Chief Executive OYcer of the MRC, Professor Colin Blakemore, that the NIMR can play a more central and important role in aiding the development of research into clinical practice. This has been a strategy of the scientists who work at the NIMR for many years. 7. We also believe that Professor Blakemore shares our commitment to maintaining NIMR’s basic medical research to underpin the desire to play a greater role in developing clinical practice. 8. However, it is at this point where the view of the staV at NIMR diverges from Professor Blakemore and his management team.

The Case for Mill Hill 9. We have failed to receive an adequate explanation from anyone involved in framing the proposals of why staying at the Mill Hill site and developing it further is not included in the options. 10. It seems to the AUT that the Mill Hill site is the ideal location for the NIMR. It is secure. It is a single site. It does not have the same monetary land value a London city centre site would surely have. Most importantly, there is more than adequate space and infrastructure for future development, allowing Professor Blakemore to deliver his vision of a more central role for the NIMR.

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11. We also understand that it is unlikely that the full range of research facilities available to NIMR in Mill Hill will be located at a single central site. The space available and the cost would both appear prohibitive. 12. This possibility has already been considered in the MRC Task Force, but appears to have been relegated to a position where it has no bearing on the decision. We see no feasible way for the necessary animal accommodation and nuclear magnetic resonance facilities to be provided on a single site in central London. 13. With the lack of explanation from the management of the MRC, we are left with the conclusion that the decision not to include staying at Mill Hill amongst the options is based on the value of the site on the open market. This is not the basis for making far reaching decisions about the future of medical research in the UK. The Scientific Case 14. We also believe that the scientific case for the move has not been made. We believe that many of the current cadre of scientific staV at Mill Hill would not seek to move with the Institute into central London. They have chosen to work outside central London for a reason and this will inevitably lead to the break up of many high-quality and well-respected teams. This seems a strange way to ensure the future and development of the NIMR. 15. There has not been a level playing field in making the proposals between the Mill Hill site and the two other sites in central London. A direct comparison of the benefits of the three options is the least that the staV and the public purse can expect. 16. We also believe that one of the main attractions of the NIMR in working with other seats of scientific research (most notably the university sector) is its independence. Delivering the name, resources, background and some of the staV to a single university could well lead to a reduction in the amount of collaborative work the NIMR will be involved with. One university’s immense gain will be a loss to UK medical scientific research. Safety and Security 17. The NIMR has Category 4 containment facilities for dangerous and potentially lethal pathogens. We are frankly astonished that with the ever present dangers of terrorist activity in the current political climate that the MRC could even propose to move such facilities into central London. 18. The NIMR has extensive and secure animal facilities, essential to many areas of research. Given the current level of protest by animal activists at Oxford, Cambridge and outside NIMR, it is very doubtful if new animal facilities could be built in central London without much disruption. 19. If a decision is made that these specialist facilities should not be in central London or Mill Hill, a matter on which we are sure that the Government, emergency services and security services would have strong views, then this could potentially lead to the break up of the NIMR. 20. We do not believe that this possibly lethal material would be as safe in central London as it currently is in the very secure Mill Hill site. The Need for Further Information 21. We believe that the MRC should explain why the current Mill Hill site is not included in the options. 22. We believe that the MRC should explain how they expect to replicate the current facilities at Mill Hill at a single site in central London. 23. We believe that the MRC should provide full details of the risk analysis of the proposed move to central London. 24. We believe that the MRC should seek the advice of the emergency and security services about the relative safety of the potentially lethal material currently stored at Mill Hill if this work is moved to central London. 25. We believe that the MRC should seek the views of current and prospective scientific partners about the possible impact on future working relationships if the NIMR is placed within a single university. 26. We believe the MRC should be asked to provide a full financial breakdown of the costs required to move all the facilities, staV and material at Mill Hill to an adequate and safe central London location. These figures should be made available to the Committee and the trades unions at NIMR before any decision is made. 27. We believe that the MRC should ensure that staying at Mill Hill should be one of the options considered and an analysis of the benefits and problems of Mill Hill and the two proposed London sites should be published prior to any decision being made.

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28. The AUT is also concerned about the move away from support of full-time Research Institutes. This has great importance to the staV at NIMR and AUT members in general. 29. Considering our objections to the proposals made by the MRC working group on financial, scientific and security grounds we would welcome the opportunity to give oral evidence to the Select Committee if you feel that would be appropriate. 30. We thank the Committee for the opportunity to produce this evidence and we look forward to your deliberations. 22 November 2004

APPENDIX 75 Memorandum from Professor Grant and Professor Trainor, University College, London At its meeting on 29 July 2004, the Council of the MRC agreed in principle to relocate the National Institute for Medical Research at an academic/hospital campus in Central London. It asked our two institutions to submit bids to host the Institute. This decision followed the recommendations of a Task Force which had been set up to consider the future of the NIMR, and was confirmed at its meeting on 13 October. The bids will be considered at the Council’s meeting on 15 December, when it is expected that a preferred bidder will be chosen. The issue will return to the Council in February when the detailed business case to be taken forward to the OYce of Science and Technology will be considered. The future of NIMR is a matter of great importance to the development of biomedical science in the UK scientific community. We both share the MRC Council’s view that to the greatest extent possible their decision-making should be through a transparent process. We wish to express our support for the principle behind the Task Force’s recommendation and the Council’s decisions to date. We also wish to express our confidence in the decision-making process established by the Council. The Committee can be assured that the MRC staV and its advisors have worked carefully to ensure that both institutions are able to present their best cases in such a way as to allow the Council to make a fair comparison between the two. The case for relocation was made clearly in the Task Force’s report. Few would question the need to ensure that the full benefits of advances in medical science are reflected in advances in public health. The translation of basic scientific research into clinical practice must therefore be a high priority. This requires bringing the scientific and clinical endeavours into close proximity. For this reason NIMR’s move from Mill Hill to an established and integrated hospital/research environment in Central London will result in a step change in the Institute’s capacity to engage in translational research. Either site will enable NIMR scientists to participate actively in London’s extensive networks of high-quality research as well as maintain national and international collaborations. We would regret any delay to the process established by the MRC Council. This would add to the current uncertainty and complicate the forward planning of our own institutions as well as NIMR. The proposed move will ensure that the public will get even greater value out of the considerable resources expended on scientific research and lead to important breakthroughs in clinical practice earlier and more eYciently than might otherwise be achieved. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 76 Memorandum from Professor Grahame Bulfield, University of Edinburgh I would like to make a few additional comments to those of our Principal, Professor Timothy O’Shea, on the future of the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR). I consider it essential for the longer term future of NIMR that its important research work becomes embedded in universities with strong biological and medical research capabilities and track records. It is essential for biomedical research, especially in the post-genomic era, not to become isolated and to be able to interact across a broad spectrum of scientific disciplines. In addition, biomedical scientists need to be in close proximity to their clinical colleagues for an understanding to develop, which will lead to eYcient translation of research into clinical practice. I say this from the experience of 15 years as Director of Roslin Institute, which was removed from a University Campus in the 1980s to a green field site, much to its detriment. One caution . . . the Medical Research Council (MRC) must ensure that a translocated NIMR does not become seen as a creature of one University and continues to operate as a national resource. The MRC has, however, successfully achieved this in other cases over many years with, for example, the Laboratory of Molecular Biology on the University of Cambridge’s Hill Road site.

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If the issue of location of NIMR is not dealt with now, it will reoccur at frequent intervals over subsequent years. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 77 Memorandum from Professor Andrew Michael, Weatherall Institute of Molecular Medicine, John RadcliVe Hospital, Oxford 1. I am the Director of the Weatherall Institute of Molecular Medicine (WIMM) in Oxford, Honorary Director of the MRC Human Immunology Unit, Chairman of the MRC Infections and Immunity Board and a member of MRC Council (since August 2004). I qualified in Medicine in 1968 and spent three years at NIMR between 1971 and 1974 working for my PhD. I have visited NIMR frequently since then and have collaborated with NIMR scientists. I was a member of the MRC site visit that reviewed Immunology in July 2004 and chaired the site visit that reviewed the Infections divisions in September 2004. 2. I have only been part of the review process for the future of NIMR since joining MRC Council three months ago. However I have followed events, have read the Task Force report and all associated papers, and have formed an opinion as to the process and the future of NIMR. This submission is made in my personal capacity. 3. The science in NIMR is of the highest calibre and the scientific leadership has been outstanding. It was the opinion of both recent review committees, that I was on, who examined each scientific programme and the opinions of more than fifty external referees, that the science in the Infections and Immunity Groups are both of the highest international class. Both groups were rated alpha-A, the highest category. These assessments recognise the very high quality of research carried out at NIMR, sustained over several decades. The MRC is rightly proud of the achievements of NIMR. 4. It is worth pointing out where research sits at NIMR vis-a`-vis the overall research portfolio of the MRC. The MRC quite rightly funds a spectrum of research from basic molecular and cell biology to phase III and IV clinical trials. In between is translational research is the process that leads from basic research to experimental medicine and then full scale clinical trials. The Cambridge Laboratory of Molecular Biology, focuses on basic biomedical research and is the world leader with a clutch of Nobel prizes. NIMR has a broader remit, from basic molecular and cell biology to model systems and translational research. Examples of NIMR translational work are; the classification and molecular epidemiology of the influenza, malaria vaccine and drug discovery and TB model systems. I am personally indebted to their Immunology programme, which has underpinned much of the clinically orientated work in my own group. 5. I support Council’s decision to review the two options of moving NIMR to either University College London or Kings College London. The Task Force has made a cogent scientific case for this after months of deliberation with a very large number of consultations and submissions, I see the clear advantages in such a move, if an equivalent facility can be set up in a University site and attached to a Medical School. The University site will open up possibilities for innovative and exciting collaborations in the basic sciences, particularly the physical sciences. The integrated Medical School connection will oVer new opportunities to expand their translational research and develop programmes in experimental medicine. The move would make NIMR more accessible to clinical scientists who could develop full careers within its structure. The move to more clinical research has been highlighted as a direction in which the MRC must travel over the next 10–20 years. This must be true, although it cannot happen in a vacuum and will always be dependent on excellent basic research, which the MRC must continue to support. 6. I am fully signed up to MRC Council’s decision, but I do have a concern that the cost of moving their outstanding biomedical research unit and NMR facility, as well as providing equivalent space in a new central London institute may prove too costly. Obviously every eVort will be made to find the funding and to ensure the full transfer of facilities, the option of seriously cutting down the scale of the National Institute is not acceptable. We need a National Institute; the US National Institutes of Health campus has several Institutes of NIMR size, we are seeking to support only one. 7. The business plans for the UCL and KCL bids will soon be compared, by MRC Council, with the costs of keeping NIMR at Mill Hill. If the UCL and KCL bids fall below the standard required, then the Mill Hill option will be revisited. My personal view is that it might be possible for the Mill Hill option to deliver a substantial part of the new vision, if the full scale move to UCL or KCL proves impossible. There are other famous Institutes of medical research that are similarly distant from a medical school, for instance the Naval Yard Facility at Harvard, which is 20 minutes from the Massachusetts General Hospital, carries out outstanding translational research. The Infections Group at NIMR exemplifies that certain types of translational research can be carried out at Mill Hill. However, for the Mill Hill option to move forward, I would urge much closer interactions with one of the London Medical Schools, including space sharing on both sites and more external grant funding for research at NIMR.

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8. The option, sometimes floated, of closing the Institute or splitting it up and relocating groups would be extremely damaging. The NIMR carries out biomedical research at the highest level and has an outstanding international reputation. NIMR, together with the Cambridge Laboratory of Molecular Biology, flies the flag for UK medical science. Closure, which would certainly precipitate a US-led recruitment drive for the brightest talents, would send out a disastrous message with far reaching negative implications. MRC Council has already correctly rejected this option. 9. Whatever the outcome of Council’s assessment of the bids from UCL and KCL and the comparison with the “enhanced Mill Hill” option, crucial factors will be the retention of the core scientific structure, including several key groups, in NIMR and the appointment of the new Director to succeed Sir John Skehel in 2006. His/her vision and ambition will be the most critical element in the future plan. There needs to be an end to the uncertainty so that a vigorous recruitment exercise can get under way in the very near future. 10. Finally, I believe that the MRC has acted correctly and fairly in setting up the Task Force and acting on its recommendations. The next phase will to look at the facilities that the two bids oVer and the costs involved, comparing these with the costs of an enhanced Mill Hill option. MRC Council, since before I was a member, has continuously engaged with staV at Mill Hill and this continues. I have accompanied Professor Blakemore on a recent visit to meet staV. Their views have been considered carefully and Council will certainly continue this dialogue. Summary I am a recent member of MRC Council, though this submission is in a personal capacity. I have considerable experience of NIMR and of biomedical research including translational research and experimental medicine. The proposal to move NIMR into a clinical setting in UCL or KCL potentially oVers considerable advantages for the progress of clinical research in the next 20 years. However, should the bids not measure up to the vision the Mill Hill option must be revisited; I think there are ways this could deliver much of the vision of the Task Force. I believe that MRC Council and the Task Force have acted correctly and fairly in preparing, delivering and assessing their report. The process continues and the quality of the bids and budgetary implications are now high on the agenda. The MRC needs the time and space to continue to assess all the options so that a final decision can be made in the near future. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 78 Memorandum from Professor Christopher Edwards, University of Newcastle upon Tyne I am writing in connection with the recent Press Release inviting written evidence in connection with the future of NIMR. My reason for writing is that I have extensive experience of this area, stemming from my appointment as the first Principal of the Imperial College School of Medicine in 1995. I was asked to implement the vision outlined in Sir Bernard Tomlinson’s report on London Medicine. In the following five years we were able to eVect a transformation of academic medicine in West London with the mergers of St Mary’s Hospital Medical School, the Royal Postgraduate Medical School at the Hammersmith Hospital, the National Heart and Lung Institute at the Brompton Hospital and the Charing Cross and Westminster Medical School with Imperial College. The results have been dramatic with markedly enhanced research activity and income, the largest group of 5* research workers in any UK university, major benefits to the NHS with improvement/reorganisation of services to say nothing of the financial benefits to the UK from increased spin-out activity. One of the key driving forces for this was the recognition that modern biomedical research requires the juxtaposition of first-class basic science with clinical medicine. This has to be the most important consideration when determining the future of the NIMR. In this context I would make the following points. 1. The UK has a remarkable record of achievement in basic science but a very poor one of translating that research into health or economic benefit. One of the aims of any new vision for the NIMR would be to put it in an environment where its excellence in research is more likely to be translated into benefit. 2. One of the major advantages of the mergers in West London was that, after three years, there was no basic science or engineering department in Imperial College which did not have research grants with the School of Medicine. If the NIMR was co-located with a university/hospital I would expect a major increase in the number of collaborative research projects. Currently the 200 scientists and 100 post-docs appear to have about 67 collaborations in London. A close analysis of this would be helpful. 3. I am surprised at the small number of postgraduate students (100) at NIMR. Given the size of the scientific staV this is a matter of concern. The staV have no undergraduate teaching and an excellent research environment. Given a new university based environment I would expect the number of postgraduate students to increase significantly. People trained in this environment must be a critical resource for the future of UK biomedical science and commercialisation. In addition, if NIMR was moved then it is much more likely that they could recruit more clinically qualified students to do postgraduate degrees. These students

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could well be leaders of UK clinical medicine in the future. One of the aims of a new NIMR must be to produce an environment in which young clinicians can be exposed to high quality scientific research and in which senior scientists can interact with clinical medicine. All too often one hears the expression of taking research from “the bench to the bedside”. Major pharmaceutical companies are now understanding that many of their very expensive mistakes could have been obviated if there had been more input from the bedside ( ie the patient) to the laboratory bench. This interactive feedback is greatly facilitated by co-location of the basic research and the patients. 4. The key question that the Select Committee should be asking is whether the status quo is tenable? If it is not (and I have seen considerable evidence to indicate that this is the case) then all concerned should be prepared to have an open mind in considering future options. The NIMR is too important to the future of the UK biomedical research to allow its future to be determined entirely by its past. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 79 Memorandum from Professor Guy Dodson, University of York My name is Guy Dodson, I am a retired professor of chemistry at the University of York who for 11 years held a joint appointment at the NIMR as Head of the Division of Protein Structure. My research career has been devoted entirely to the x-ray analysis of proteins, now a key discipline in biology. I have watched the field grow explosively to take a central role in the medically related sciences. I recognize that the MRC has a very diYcult job meeting the always increasing pressures from the research community. In these circumstances transparency and informed consultation are crucial. It is with these perspectives in mind that I write to the committee about the future of the NIMR. The NIMR is a unique centre of biomedical research poised to play a major role in shaping the future of the biological and medical sciences. Its size, 750 staV all under one roof, gives it a broad combination of molecular, biological and biomedical science and a superbly maintained and resourced infrastructure. The key to the NIMR’s success is its coherent combination of disciplines that brings the molecular sciences together in a coherent context and gives biomedical relevance to structure and mechanism. The biomedical sciences equally benefit from the fundamental insights into function that come from knowledge of structure and mechanism. Finally as an indicator of the NIMR’s quality I draw attention to the NIMR’s consistent recruitment and retention of outstanding scientists. You will know that there has been a most robust response by the NIMR staV to some aspects of the MRC’s proposals about its future. The institute as you can imagine has been galvanized by the experiences of the last two years. Indeed the review processes have served to strengthen further the staV’s already strong appreciation of the exceptional nature of the research environment here, of which the MRC can be proud. The NIMR staV, and I expect the MRC, are all pleased that the Task Force has confirmed the NIMR’s scientific standing and its important present contributions to the MRC, and its future potential. The NIMR therefore matters and its future is an important issue. There are six major issues need considering and that I should like to highlight these for the committee’s attention. 1. Should the Mill Hill site be retained as an option for the future of NIMR? 2. The basis for the review of the NIMR. 3. The mechanism of comparison of the two London sites and Mill Hill. 4. The case for translational research (at NIMR). 5. The practicalities of moving the NIMR. 6. Why has this happened? These are followed by some background and specific issues that are relevant to the NIMR’s present situation and its future.

The Major Issues 1. Should the Mill Hill site be retained as an option for the future of NIMR? I give this issue specific attention because it is impossible to understand its basis, it has raised serious anxieties in the staV and it illustrates some of the problems with the management of the Task Force process. In saying this I do not include the Task Force itself in any critical comment, their job has just been made very much more diYcult by mismanagement in the processes.

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The way the decision emerged has caused dismay at the NIMR. The Task Force announced its preliminary conclusions in June, recommending NIMR be relocated to one of two central London sites. That this meant the Mill Hill site was excluded from consideration emerged only after later statements from the CEO. The circumstances around this decision to exclude Mill Hill are confused. The decision did not reflect the views or understanding of the majority present and was certainly contrary to the impressions of the NIMR Task Force representatives of the fifth meeting itself. Most remarkable and most damaging of all, in a communication to us prior to issuing their final report, the Task Force acknowledged that the issue of Mill Hill as an alternative site was not discussed at the meeting. Nonetheless the decision to exclude the Mill Hill site from consideration was subsequently endorsed by Council in July. I can see no logic in ruling out the Mill Hill option at this stage. As I understand it the OGC Gateway process will require extensive comparisons of options. Do the MRC imagine they can avoid this rigorous exercise? 2. The basis for the review of the NIMR The puzzle about this review of the NIMR is simply there is no convincing evidence that a move to central London is justified in terms of inadequacies in the NIMR at Mill Hill, or in terms of benefit from co-location with a hospital. A further puzzle is the evident determination to remove the NIMR from Mill Hill in the face of its many strategic and practical advantages. It has always seemed likely to me that the decision to review NIMR’s future was driven by financial and organisational considerations. These have not been used as primary reasons by the MRC in its statements or discussions with the NIMR, but increased financial flexibility was used as a driver in the FIS. In the FIS proposal the financial pressure was satisfied by halving the size of the NIMR—at the expense of the NIMR’s multidisciplinary science. However the Task Force is explicit about retaining an NIMR of approximately the same size. Thus the present plan to move NIMR to central London presents an enormous financial problem that simply has not been addressed with any useful clarity. 3. The mechanism for comparing the two London sites and Mill Hill Two central London bids and the Mill Hill enhanced baseline case have to be assembled and brought together for an appropriate comparison, and then a most consequential decision on the preference has to be made. On the present MRC timescale this has to be done in a matter of weeks The bids are complex and one presumes detailed, their analysis and comparison will be a diYcult exercise. Research in a multidisciplinary institute, with its interdisciplinary tradition, is a complex exercise and easily damaged. It will be essential to have insight into the research and staYng practicalities and these are likely to be decisive—the devil after all is in the detail. After the diYculties with the arbitrary approach Council took in the FIS review, I am anxious that the Council is briefed suYciently to be informed of the NIMR research needs. This is essential for a proper comparison. As far as we are aware the NIMR is not to be involved in tendering advice and that there is to be no independent input into the decision about the NIMR’s location from other scientists expert in institutes and biomedical research, especially in London. Haste has been a characteristic of the reviews since they began. The evident haste at this juncture to reach a decision is not in the best interests of an unusually complex decision with a 50 year future; this rush is certainly not helping the institute’s uncertainties. 4. The case for translational research at NIMR The Task Force recommended an expansion of translational research at NIMR as part of its “new vision”. There were two reasons for this. First there is a perceived need for more translational research. It was considered desirable that the £2730 million pa committed to the NIMR needed to include translational programmes to fit the demands and potential of modern medicine. However the report fails to recognise the extent and nature of research that is translational and clinical at the NIMR, even though this information was presented to the Task Force. Secondly the proposal to expand translational research was seen as a powerful reason to co-locate the NIMR with a hospital. It is ironic that there is no evidence on basic and clinically related research collaborations in other London biomedical research institutions, on or oV hospital sites, equivalent to that provided for the NIMR. This is the kind of evidence the Task Force needs before it can even begin to make decisions on translational policies in central London, and it should be got. 5. The practicalities in moving the NIMR A successful research organization is valuable property and it should be cared for. Relocation on the scale required for the NIMR is an enormous undertaking. The expense of moving is one matter, but the

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dislocation associated with any move of this complexity is a major factor that needs realistic assessment. The particular practicalities of animal housing, high containment facilities and advanced research equipment like NMR, are fearsome. Obviously moves have to happen, and have happened, and the dislocation in itself is not a reason not to move. But in this case there really are major considerations, they seem not to have been considered in detail at all. 6. Why has this happened? The debate over the NIMR’s future comes at a time when the exciting potential for translation of biomedical science is starting to be realized and involves an institution that is equipped to play a critical role in this future. The matter has involved the NIMR, and no doubt the MRC Head OYce staV, in two years of distraction, uncertainty and cost. It indicates to me there really is something wrong with the system. The Central Issues — The origins of the decision to review the NIMR need to be identified, together with the extent and nature of the advice the MRC sought and was given. Perhaps this will explain why review of the NIMR is being pursued with such relentless determination. — To what extent did the MRC and Council consult its own expert committees for advice on strategy. — The Council contains no representation from Institutes, only from Universities and from the commercial and administrative fields. This has created an imbalance of experience that prevents Council getting the full range of knowledge and perspective that it needs to serve the whole MRC community properly. In particular the matter of the NIMR’s future presented the Council with obvious problems. These include the issues of direct and indirect funding (in which Universities have an interest), the role of institutes generally in biology and biomedicine and the pattern of diVerent research traditions/practices/mechanisms needed in the current rapidly changing fields of biological and medical sciences. — The corporatisation of the Medical Research Council has created a proactive culture in which the CEO has a double responsibility—for scientific and medically related research, and for management. Possibly as a result of this culture an important element of disinterested input from the Chair has been lost. The reduced dialogue that I have noticed over the last years between the Head OYce and its community is also a serious loss. It has been made worse by the pressures on MRC Head OYce staV who are seriously overstretched. Another consequence of these changes has been a very considerable increase in the work load and responsibilities of Council members. I suspect that these factors are making it more and more diYcult for the MRC and Council always to work eVectively. — The MRC is embarking on a review of its policy of unit assessment. It seems likely to me that this development is driven by a fundamental rethink on direct and indirect funding, an issue that needs clarification and that I consider is possibly connected to the basis for the NIMR reviews. — Finally perhaps the most important lesson for the MRC must have informed, open and genuine contacts with its community through which it can gain confidence in its decisions. It needs to have a culture in which consultation about scientific, organisational and investment strategy with its experienced scientists occurs naturally, reasonably often and at an early stage. On a more formal level there are existing mechanisms such as the quinquennial visits that provide a platform for longer term thinking without destabilizing the communities involved. In my view it is imperative that future approaches to strategic reviews avoid destabilization, are transparent, and have both the advice and the confidence of the community. Background to the MRC’s Review of NIMR To begin I should say that I consider it is essential that the MRC is informed on the progress and potentials in its research portfolio and I understand and support the principle of the MRC reviewing its policies and research commitments when appropriate. The present process began, at least for the NIMR, in September 2002 when the MRC’s Chairman and CEO George Radda informed the Director that there was need for a review of the Institute on the grounds that the building needed to be replaced and that this required the preparation of a scientific case based on a review. This approach departed from the traditional MRC quinquennial institute review strategy that has been the foundation for managing future research and funding in institutes and units in the MRC. However this first initiative collapsed immediately when it was demonstrated that the building was completely sound and had 20–30 more years of working life. The Forward Investment Strategy (FIS) followed within a few weeks. In this review the future scientific and financial strategies were to be considered initially for three MRC institutes and then the four institutes. The haste with which this review was put in place and the fact it was a reconstruction of that planned for

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the NIMR alone, considerably undermined the credibility of the exercise. The serious inadequacies of the FIS review that followed are well documented. Its proposal to move the NIMR to Cambridge and to reduce it in size by half was overwhelmingly rejected by the community. After the collapse of the FIS a Task Force was quickly set up to review the NIMR and to make recommendations on its future. The Task force had both representation from the NIMR and from the MRC Council and members nominated by the NIMR and MRC. Management consultants were appointed to provide the paper work, organization of meetings and the consultation exercise, seen as an important component, with the community/stakeholders. There were five meetings of the Task Force whose conclusions have been published. The Task Force identified the central role that institutes play in biomedical research. Its recommendations include: i. the NIMR should stay in London, and be of “approximately the current size”; the sites selected were either to be at University College or Kings College and an enhanced Mill Hill site was to be used as a bench mark; ii. the NIMR should be relocated to a single site adjacent to a hospital/university, provided that “suitable arrangements for governance, funding and accommodation of the institutes activities can be arranged.”; iii. the NIMR should establish and expand in translational research. The procedure for the preparation of the submission by NIMR on the Mill Hill site and its comparison with the central London sites. It is extraordinary to me that the MRC has been completely uninvolved in advising or consulting the NIMR about how we should shape our future in relation to the MRC’s needs from the FIS exercise on. Even at this late but critical stage there has been no real consultation and certainly no dialogue between the Institute in relation to the central London sites or how we might best think out our plans for enhancement at Mill Hill. Since the enhanced Mill Hill site is the base line its quality and of character must be of direct interest to the MRC who I imagine would be wanting to oVer help and advice. Nothing of this has happened. And one wonders why. Issues to Do with Procedure The MRC has been addressing the future of the NIMR since at least mid-2002. No-one denies the MRC’s responsibility to manage its research. To do this eVectively however the MRC needs to have the confidence of its community and in its community. These relations are only achieved by a combination of consistency, consultation and competence. I consider that in approaching the NIMR’s future, the MRC has too often failed to achieve good management practice. This is demonstrated by the procedures followed in the FIS exercise and the management of the Task Force —especially since its final meeting. Two specific issues arise in relation to the Task Force 1. Consultants One aspect of the Task Force’s management by the MRC that has given me much concern is the use of the consultants. It seems to me to be an alarming development that the MRC does not feel it can rely on its own competence to carry out such reviews. The very limited knowledge that consultants have about MRC culture, the practice of science and its clinical ramifications does not serve MRC’s need to guide development of its research and organizational policies. Moreover I am afraid that the use of consultants as ‘summarisers and interpreters’ contributed to the lack of direct productive contact between the MRC and NIMR. In this context also I note that consultants have also been employed to help with current MRC review on unit assessment. 2. Minutes of Task Force meetings On the matter of professional practice I consider that it was a disaster for NIMR:MRC relations that no minutes of the Task Force meetings were taken and agreed. This must have contributed to the disputes over what the meetings were thought to have agreed and the subsequent reports produced by the consultants. I also understand that the consultant’s preparation of background material was on occasion inadequate or inaccurate, for example on such matters as bibliometric analysis. The consequences of this failure to minute the Task Force discussions properly was particularly serious after the fifth and final meeting. 23 November 2004

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APPENDIX 80 Memorandum from Professor Sir Paul Nurse, former MRC Task Force member on the NIMR 1. The National Institute for Medical Research is an excellent biomedical research institute with a strong international reputation. It has prospered well under its current leadership and I would rank it amongst the top five or so such institutes in Europe at the present time. The UK and the MRC should be proud to have NIMR as part of its scientific research portfolio. 2. Although NIMR is prospering, its present site is not completely ideal, being located in outer London which is less than perfect for travel, and not being located near other biomedical research activities. Given it is the National Institute for Medical Research a central London location would be better, where connections to the rest of the UK and the world would be better. There would also be advantages if NIMR were closer to other major biomedical research facilities and research hospitals (eg Imperial, Kings, UCL). It is important that NIMR should collaborate throughout the UK and the rest of the world. However, research contacts can be easier to set up when activities are more closely located, and there are cultural diVerences in the way patient based and basic research are carried out, and greater exposure of NIMR scientists to clinical scientists working in research hospitals would be an advantage. A central London site near one of the bigger research universities would provide an ideal location for NIMR in the 21st century. 3. A move to central London should be combined with an increased focus of the institute providing national leadership and driving up standards of basic and clinical research throughout the country. This is an exciting vision for biomedical research in the UK. However, there are potential obstacles in realizing this vision briefly summarized in the next three paragraphs which are also important for understanding the present unease about the future of NIMR. 4. A suitable site in central London large enough to accommodate NIMR at its present size needs to be found, and the resources to purchase the site and build a new institute need to be made available, if necessary by additional support to the MRC. Given that this is an investment for the next 50–70 years, the capital costs will in reality be amortized over an extended period of time. Viewed this way the annual costs are more acceptable and should not distract from the future vision for NIMR. 5. Although located closely to other biomedical research facilities, the governance of NIMR should remain independent of any adjacent university. Interactions need to be close and whenever possible research costs shared, but the institute is a national facility and must maintain its independence if it is to fulfill this role eVectively. 6. The size of NIMR in central London should be similar to the present institute at Mill Hill. It will be diYcult for it to carry out its new national mission unless its present size is maintained, and so moves to reduce its size should be resisted. 7. The MRC has had financial problems in recent years which have led to extramural response mode research funding being reduced. In turn this has led to some, particularly in the university sector, arguing that MRC institute funding should be reduced to fund the short fall, and they may like to see MRC council reduce NIMR support to fund this deficit. This is quite wrong. Extramural response mode funding and the universities indeed need support, but this should not be at the expense of MRC institutes such as NIMR which play a special role in the UKs research portfolio. Institutes are important for highly innovative research (for example calculate the numbers of Nobel prizes awarded from work in institutes and compare this with the total funding given intramurally to institutes compared with extramural response mode mechanisms), they can be more strategic, and they are also more eVective for inward international recruiting. Government should be urged to address the MRCs present financial problems so short term thinking does not dominate future plans for NIMR. 8. The discussions concerning NIMRs future in recent years have put it in a potentially fragile condition. High quality research takes years to build up and can be very quickly destroyed. Stabilizing the present research scientists at NIMR must be a priority for UK science, and the easiest way to achieve this is to guarantee the long term future for NIMR. The best solution would be re-location to a central London site of the right size with appropriate resources and governance arrangements to maintain the present NIMR research activities. Should this not be possible in the short to medium time frame, the present Mill Hill site should be maintained keeping NIMR at its present size. NIMR has been a success and its new national and clinical focus could continue to be eVectively supported at the Mill Hill site. If MRC could give such a clear guarantee then I believe the present unrest would subside allowing the negotiations concerning relocation to central London to proceed more smoothly. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 81 Memorandum from Professor Wayne Hendrickson, Columbia University I write with regard to your inquiry into the future of the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR)

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in relation to a move to central London that is being contemplated by the Medical Research Council (MRC). I suggest that the proposed move would likely break up the NIMR and that a protraction of the decisionmaking process would be a grave mistake. I am broadly familiar with the situation at NIMR, and I have the immediate perspective from having served in October on a Molecular & Cellular Medicine Board Review of four NIMR divisions of structural biology and the Biomedical NMR Centre. I was most impressed by the overall excellence of this group of NIMR divisions and by their integration with other NIMR units. John Skehel and Guy Dodson have provided superb leadership for these activities. They have built up one of the finest of structural biology groups in the world to complement the world-class excellence of NIMR in general. The prospect of a move to central London, presumably to facilitate the translation of basic science into medical application, is an unsettling one. Excellent institutions are built slowly and carefully, but they can be brought down quickly if not constantly nourished. Should the prospect of this move continue to be held open, I would expect an adverse impact on retention and recruitment of talent. In such an unsettled state of aVairs one can expect some of the best to leave first. In the eventuality of an actual decision to move to central London, one can expect that many will not follow for personal reasons. The rebuilding process will necessarily slow scientific progress and may cripple the institution. In summary, it does not seem to me that the case for a move from the Mill Hill site has been a persuasive one and I urge a swift and clean conclusion to maintain a vigorous NIMR at its current site. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 82 Memorandum from The Royal Society of Edinburgh 1. The Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE) is pleased to respond to the House of Commons Science and Technology Inquiry into the future of the National Institute for Medical Research. This response has been compiled by the General Secretary, Professor Andrew Miller and the Research OYcer, Dr Marc Rands, with the assistance of a number of Fellows with considerable experience of the MRC. 2. The current impasse regarding the location of the Institute must be resolved quickly and in such a way that the staV at NIMR as well as the Medical Research Council (MRC) can move forward in a co-operative mode. Biomedical research is at a critical stage and the prospects of real advances in areas, such as malaria, within the NIMR’s Infection and Immunity group have never been better. The Rationale Behind the Move of the NIMR 3. There is no doubt that work of the highest quality is being done at the NIMR at Mill Hill and has been throughout its existence. The level of performance, however, has been patchy and the spread of expertise, facilities and world class research does not map onto current MRC priorities or its vision for the future. A key criticism is that the structure and management at the NIMR lacks the necessary flexibility and dynamism to respond to rapidly changing perspectives and capabilities in modern biological and medical research. A move was therefore proposed in order to put into place appropriate structures and staYng mechanisms and re-align the emerging institute with the developing strategy of MRC. This would introduce a flexibility to respond to future changing capabilities and priorities in biomedical science. 4. In early 2003, a sub committee of the MRC was given the task of examining the MRC’s Forward Research Strategy and recommended that NIMR at Mill Hill should be closed and moved to Cambridge. However, the rationale for this recommendation was poorly explained and none of the NIMR scientists were consulted. This resulted in significant loss of morale amongst the staV at the NIMR and has made it diYcult for all to move into a more co-operative mode. The MRC Council subsequently created a Task Force with both national and international members (nominated both by the MRC and NIMR) and with two NIMR staV to re-examine this issue. The Task Force reported in July this year and recommended that NIMR should be closed and moved to a site in London, proximal either to University College or King’s College, identifying a clinically-aware culture and translational research as being important for the NIMR. However, the NIMR staV have disputed the Task Force conclusions. 5. The MRC has now appointed a steering group to prepare the business and scientific cases for removing NIMR to the central London sites, as well as a base case to set out what would be required at Mill Hill in order to meet as closely as possible the Task Force vision. The Impact of the Proposed Move on the Work of the NIMR 6. The impact of the proposed move on the work and, equally importantly, the international reputation of the NIMR should be enhanced greatly, as a result of its sharper focus and increased flexibility. Locating the NIMR within a hospital site should also further focus on clinical research and/or the translation of basic to clinical research. However, whilst these are laudable goals there are a number of concerns. While the

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ultimate location of NIMR is undoubtedly important, the geography of the site is not the only major factor; the status of research as viewed by clinicians as much as it does the geography of the collaborators. In the UK, there are no career paths that enable clinicians to devote themselves to scientific studies in the long term, and most clinician-scientist collaborations have a considerable ad hoc element. There needs to be more clinicians trained in research and the creation of eVective multidisciplinary teams where the roles of clinical and basic research staV are better understood by all. These teams would have shared objectives, and commitments and leadership would not necessarily come from one side or the other. 7. These underlying, cultural aspects will not themselves be changed by relocating NIMR and remoulding its brief. Overall, collaborations work best when the investigators choose whom they want to work with and where the most appropriate patient cohort is based. Forced collaborations tend not be successful and an early attempt to artificially bring MRC scientists and clinicians together at the Northwick Park Hospital was unsuccessful and was abandoned. 8. In addition, the NIMR at Mill Hill has a 47 acre site with consequent flexibility for redevelopment that would not be the case in central London. It has high class containment facilities to study emerging infections (which will be important in light of climate change and the likelihood of new diseases appearing in Britain) and there are excellent animal facilities which are unlikely to be readily available in central London, or would have to be duplicated on a crowded site. Given the magnitude of future threats of infection cannot be foreseen in these uncertain times, limitations on NIMR’s potential for expansion should be avoided at all costs.

The Financial Implications for the MRC 9. Through enhanced focus and the opportunity to close down ineVective research programmes, this initiative has the potential to deliver more world class science. It may be tempting to believe it will also save money but this is unlikely. However it should not undermine the key priority to further develop the science and its exploitation in the development of new treatments for major diseases. Overall, the rationale for moving to a central London location is unclear, and will not prove to be in any way cost-eVective or provide a location capable of attracting and retaining the best scientists. It will lead to yet more pressure on housing and transport in Central London and the further consolidation of the Golden Triangle of research funding. Relocation to a major centre out with London would be preferable and consideration should be given to other possible locations. Alternatively, consideration should be given to addressing the situation at Mill Hill to meet the Task Force vision without relocation.

The Balance of the MRC’s Strategic Priorities 10. We welcome the MRC’s interest in pursuing translational research, but there appears to be a narrow view of what this is and how best to approach it within the UK. There are various ways to pursue translational research which this initiative may ignore such as working successfully with pharmaceutical, biotech and diagnostic companies. These are, at least, equally important interfaces that in many areas of highly competitive basic research can provide more eVective ways to develop new medicines and treatments for disease. And there are cultural issues that aVect our ability nationally to develop an eVective clinicalbasic research interface which moving NIMR will not solve. 11. It is perhaps surprising that the MRC did not consider diverting resources away from NIMR, given that a significant component of the MRC budget is currently spent there and that there are great pressures on resources, not least from those with unfunded alpha plus-rated research grants. Other expensive projects, like the Biobank, are straining its resources and, in the absence of substantial new funding, it appears there is a need to redeploy resources in a more cost-eVective way. This would be achieved for example, by only funding the most excellent basic science at the NIMR, perhaps without the very costly move, and reinvesting the savings in several successful centres around the UK where the best translational research would be easier to achieve. 12. The role of MRC institutes should be recognised in providing the environment for tackling long term research questions that cannot be addressed easily through five-year research grants to universities.

Additional Information 13. In responding to this inquiry the Society would like to draw attention to the following Royal Society of Edinburgh responses which are of relevance to this subject: Healthcare in 2020 (September 2000), Fighting Infection (October 2002); A Vision for the Future (December 2002); Health Protection in Scotland (January 2003). Copies of this response and the above publications are also available from the Policy OYcer, Dr Marc Rands (email: evidenceadvicewroyalsoced.org.uk). 23 November 2004

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APPENDIX 83 Memorandum from Professor Kathy Cheah, University of Hong Kong 1. I write to express my views on the recommendations for the future NIMR. My comments stem from: (a) the perspective of a senior University academic with experience of working in diVerent research environments; (b) over 20 years personal experience of the research environment and culture at the NIMR (1980–present) through association as a visiting scientist at various stages of my scientific career. I am currently Chair of Biochemistry, Head of the Department of Biochemistry and the Interim Director of the University of Hong Kong Faculty of Medicine Research Centre for Reproduction, Development and Growth. I have worked previously in the then Imperial Cancer Research Fund Laboratory at Lincoln’s Inn Fields, London. My research is mainly in basic science research but I have also had extensive experience of collaborative research and interactions with clinicians over many years. For example I hosted and mentored an orthopaedic surgeon in basic research during his 12 months research training fellowhip where he was relieved of clinical duties. I am currently leading a large multidisciplinary “Area of Excellence” five-year research programme involving basic scientists and clinicians. My experience of the research environment and interaction/collaboration with the many outstanding scientists, junior and senior, in the NIMR has profoundly influenced my own strategic planning as an academic leader in the University of Hong Kong. 2. The NIMR has a long established international reputation for excellent scientific research in multidisciplinary areas of importance to both human health and fundamental biology. The Institute attracts many of the best young researchers in the UK and internationally as a highly desirable place for career development, an incubator for fundamental discoveries and is a magnet for many foreign scientists across the world. Having had the privilege of observing the development of research at the NIMR for nearly 20 years both from without and within, I am able to oVer an external international perspective on the importance and role of the Institute and comment on the proposed changes. I have contributed in the previous consultation on the future of NIMR as articulated in the MRC Forward Investment Strategy and have been following the subsequent developments and recommendations with interest. I note that the major outcome of the review is that The MRC Task Force have recommended: “that the NIMR should be renewed as a multidisciplinary research institute, based in the London area, focused on basic and translational research, and that the plan is to co-locate the NIMR with a major academic and clinical partner: King’s College London and University College London as possible options.” I also note that the current call for views by the select committee arises because “ The NIMR’s Director, staV and trade union representatives argued strongly that Mill Hill should be considered as a third and equal option for the renewed institute, including for reasons of economy. The Council carefully considered their view that the vision for the NIMR could be realised by investment at Mill Hill, but concluded that the case for co-location with a university and hospital, as set out in the Task Force report, remains persuasive. It could not reconcile the NIMR in its present form with the strategy for achieving the vision proposed by the Task Force”. 3. In order to assess whether the proposed changes to the NIMR would be the best way forward, one should ask the following questions: (a) Is the NIMR an internationally competitive excellent institution? Has there been translational value for their work? The MRC in its Forward Investment Strategy paper clearly acknowledges the excellence of the NIMR. Professor Raisman’s ground breaking work on spinal cord repair leading to future clinical trials is a prime example of the clinical relevance and translational potential of the basic research at the NIMR. (b) The second question to ask is what are the critical factors behind the current high standing of the NIMR and how the proposed changes would impact on this. I believe that the success of the NIMR stems from several critical factors. The well established infrastructure and number of sizeable research Divisions with complementary and multidisciplinary teams with expertise in key areas of biomedical and biological research provide the necessary breadth and supportive environment which has enabled the NIMR to attract, train and nurture exceptionally high quality scientists. The strategy of targeted recruitment of excellent scientists at both junior and senior levels and provision of opportunities for creative research through a stimulating and highly interactive research environment. NIMR’s independent status as a separate premier research institute enables it to interact with a wide range of basic science and clinical researchers from diVerent academic centres in London and elsewhere. It interacts with some of the best medical schools and life science departments in the UK, such as University College London, the other London University Colleges and medical schools, the Cancer Research UK laboratories in Lincoln’s Inn Fields and Clare Hall and others. These advantages considerably enhance the attraction of the NIMR to many excellent scientists from all over the world, as a place for sabbaticals, training and collaborative research. As a result

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the NIMR has a strong international profile as the flagship national biomedical research institute for the UK. It is internationally respected as one of the premier research centres in the UK for developmental biology, neuroscience and infectious diseases. These are the features of the NIMR which have been appreciated tremendously by many scientists and have made the NIMR such a unique Institute over the years. (c) The third question is should there be a significant shift away from basic to translational research or should equal emphasis be made on both? I believe that both should be emphasized and that there are ample examples where major clinical applications and translations of basic research have been made, not simply by setting out at the first instance to find an application, but rather the importance lies in recognizing the potential application value of discoveries arising from basic research. Therefore emphasis should be on both. (d) The fourth question is how best to achieve the realization of clinical potential of basic discoveries. It is true that interactions between scientists and clinicians are very important and that both should understand the perspective of each other. While it is cited that embedding labs in a clinical setting will facilitate such interactions, I am not aware of solid data showing that that is the only or preferred option. There are many examples of successful partnerships between basic science institutes and industry/clinical medicine such as for the Salk Institute, EMBL, ICRF etc. One also asks if co-location has resulted in increased translational research—perhaps examination of the experience of the MRC Laboratory of Molecular Biology located very close to a hospital setting may be informative. From personal experience it is not the proximity of the lab to the clinic that facilitates interactions, rather it is the resources available to clinicians for laboratory research and the amount of dedicated research time that the clinician can spend interacting with the basic scientist that is important. Indeed the temptation to run to the ward or being on constant call back to the wards disrupts both experiments and interactions. Rather providing time and opportunity for clinicians to really spend time in the lab is the most eVective. (e) For the NIMR, considering the major impact changes will have on its future as the flagship British Institute for medical research it seems imperative that all possible scenarios be examined and carefully weighed before making decisions. (i) So one asks: have all possibilities been thoroughly explored in regard to their feasibility and their value in ensuring research excellence will be maintained? (ii) What is the rationale for excluding consideration of redeveloping NIMR on its present site as an option? The current site has the advantage of ample space for expansion. From the outside, it seems that it would be very expensive to relocate and rebuild the NIMR in central London where space is in short supply, so the cost and benefits should be closely examined and the final decisions should be based on solid evidence. 5. Finally I believe that the decision on the future of NIMR is so important to biomedicine in the UK that the decisions should be taken only after thorough, transparent and evidence-based considerations. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 84 Memorandum from the National Institute of Health Last July, the Medical Research Council asked my agency to comment on the future scientific program of the National Institute of Medical Research (NIMR) and its optimal location and organizational structure. I attach our response in hopes that it may assist your enquiry. In sum, we concur with the central recommendation of the NIMR Task Force: that the preferred organizational model for NIMR is a single site in partnership with a university and aYliated hospital. We base our concurrence on criteria that MRC established to guide strategic decisions on institutional priorities. These include: — capacity to conduct transnational and clinical research; — expanded contacts with industry; — linkages to complementary areas of science and other disciplines; — an environmental culture that enables the recruitment and retention of highly talented researchers; — capacity to translate research into the health services sector and broader clinical development; and — strong academic links. November 2004

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Annex A July 2, 2004 Professor Colin Blakemore, FRS Chief Executive Medical Research Council 20 Park Crescent London W1B 1AL UNITED KINGDOM Dear Professor Blakemore: Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments in support of the strategic review of the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR). As you know, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has engaged in numerous collaborative projects with this historic institution of the Medical Research Council (MRC) and has valued highly these interactions. I circulated the consultation documents you provided among my NIH colleagues, and there is broad concurrence with the recommendations of the Task Force-especially with the conclusion that continuation of the NIMR is in the best interest of the MRC as well as the international community. We wholly support recommendations that the mission of the renewed Institute incorporate basic science and translational research, as well as clinical research, and that it be envisioned as the premier central UK resource for future training in the biological and medical sciences, biotechnology, and bioinformatics. We defer to the UK medical and scientific communities regarding the most appropriate location for this renewed NIMR. Certainly, as the Task Force proposed, we appreciate that a location in central London, close to academic and clinical centers of excellence, would oVer distinct logistic advantages for the future development of integrated business and strategic plans for the reconfigured NIMR; but we recognise the cost implications of relocation. With regard to the three alternative organizational models being considered by the Task Force, we too prefer Model 2-a single site in partnership with a research university and associated hospital. If the NIMR does expand to incorporate areas of clinical investigation, we believe that this enterprise should build on areas of current scientific strength in the basic sciences among NIMR research groups. Attached are additional comments that provide texture to these general comments that I hope are useful. Thank you again for soliciting our views as you move forward. With best personal regards, Sincerely, /s/ Elias A Zerhouni, MD Director Enclosure (follows) Similar to the MRC, the NIH possesses the dual mandate of supporting an extramural research enterprise—consisting of support to academic and not-for-profit research centers—and an intramural program housed largely on its central campus. The NIH periodically has reviewed the mission and focus of its intramural research program and has addressed questions similar to those faced in reviewing the prospective directions for the MRC Mill Hill site. In its planning eVorts, the agency has tried to take full advantage of those attributes within the intramural program which set it apart from the extramural program and believe these considerations may be germane to your discussion. First, the NIH intramural program includes relatively long-term and stable funding. Among other advantages, this provides potentials to pursue highly exploratory or high-risk studies often undervalued in the extramural peer review process. Second, the availability of on-site patient investigational facilities promotes cooperation among laboratory-based and physician scientists; their co-location both has accelerated the movement of scientific discoveries from bench to bedside and engaged biotechnology firms in multiple research protocols. Third, the intramural program has provided an environment where scientists can be mobilized at short notice to respond to urgent scientific challenges, such as an eVective vaccine against HIV or investigations of drug resistant pathogens. This has enabled NIH to adapt rapidly to emerging needs. These attributes are key considerations in identifying research priorities, which are shaped both by the knowledge and skills of the intramural scientific community and its unique capacity to aggregate multidisciplinary research resources. Moreover, and most importantly, the intramural program has provided a central national locus where scientists from various academic centers work in concert, reaping the benefits of cross-fertilization. One of the most productive aspects of the program has been to attract clinically trained scientists to work with resident scientists expert in a variety of both basic and translational

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biomedical disciplines. These programs not only have recruited many young physicians into a research career, but often have redirected and reinvigorated the work of physician scientists from academic research centers. The NIH recognizes that the review of the NIMR is taking place in the broader context of MRC’s Forward Investment Strategy, which examines strategic directions in biomedical science in the context of future capital investment. Over the past two years, the NIH and its community of stakeholders have been engaged in a consultative process, commonly known as the Roadmap for Biomedical Research, to define a select set of scientific and infrastructual priorities essential to accelerate progress in biomedicine. The core premise of the initiative is that the biomedical sciences are converging on a set of unifying principles that link disparate diseases through common biological pathways and therapeutic approaches. The NIH’s challenge is to promote an enabling environment to support the pace and direction of discovery and application. Given the NIMR’s four current areas of research emphases, your discussions regarding the potential of incorporating clinically-oriented programs, and the NIMR’s role as an enabling complement to the MRC research supported within British universities, several of the Roadmap priorities may be relevant to the MRC’s discussions on the future directions of the NIMR. Detailed information on this initiative is available at http://nihroadmap.nih.gov. The NIH is happy to discuss any of the major areas and provide you with information on the status of the initiatives. The NIH hopes this information is useful in considering the role of the NIMR within the MRC’s broad scope of investment. NIH/FIC 6 June 2004

APPENDIX 85 Memorandum from Professor Moncada, Wolfson Institute 1. The idea to move the NIMR to a central London university hospital location and emphasise its activities towards translational research is excellent if, we define translational activities as those that take the results of research from the bench into clinical practice. 2. A great deal of research activity in the post-genomic era is related to the identification of biologically significant proteins, their interactions in the generation of biological activities (ie molecular physiology) and their malfunction (molecular pathophysiology). The direct corollary of these activities is the investigation of ways in which those interactions can be modified to develop new therapeutic tools. In this sense it is almost impossible to separate what is fundamental from what is applied research, a separation of activities which has been fashionable until recently. In this context it is not self-evident, and has never been true in practice, that the thinking about practical endpoints decreases the quality of scientific research. 3. An example of this is our own Wolfson Institute for Biomedical Research at University College London in which basic and applied aspects coexist in a synergistic environment in which medicinal chemistry complements biological research. Chemicals made to probe molecular mechanisms are likely to be candidates for future drug prototypes. All this could be carried out very close to, or within, a hospital environment to increase the eYciency of the movement from the generation of knowledge to its application.

APPENDIX 86 Memorandum from Elizabeth Hirst Summary Concerns over MRC proposals to move NIMR into the centre of London in association with a single hospital in order to apply the progress made in basic science to the prevention and treatment of human diseases 1. Mill Hill has enormous potential for greatly increased clinical collaborations with the very best, most appropriate speciality hospitals and academic centres wherever they may be in London or worldwide. It is highly unlikely that any one general hospital would provide the very best in so many clinical specialisations. MRC have identified areas of human health requiring future attention (respiratory, cardiac and infectious diseases, cancer, aging, obesity, mental health and health inequalities). Clinical priorities will change rapidly and the renewed Institute will need to respond swiftly to form necessary collaborations There will be constraints to this if associated with a single hospital site. As an independent Institute Mill Hill is also more recognisable as a “National” asset

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2. Clinical scientists already working at Mill Hill expressed the collective opinion to the CEO that on there are too many clinical distractions on a hospital site and it was preferable to concentrate on research away from patients. 3. Mill Hill as it is at present has been compared to theoretical future visions at KCL and UCL. MRC has expressed an unexplained resistance to considering the future theoretical potential of the Mill Hill site to achieve the Task Force’s vision for the renewed Institute. This resistance was reflected in the electronic Consultation exercise which forced the person answering to order options which were unacceptable to them otherwise it would not “send” and the very short times given for NIMR to respond to critical decisions regarding it’s future (eg six weeks for the original FIS document). StaV at Mill Hill were also informed by the CEO that the Mill Hill “option” was not being put forward to the relevant Council meeting because they were “so excited” about the KCL and UCL options. 4. It is also of great concern that previous attempts to move functional groups or to create a National centre of clinical excellence in association with a hospital (eg CRC at Northwick Park hospital) met with failure for a variety of extremely complex reasons most of which were not anticipated. The proposed move assumes that the reasons (eg why medical and scientific staV remained as “two separate communities” and why an “appropriate form of governance was lacking” etc) are fully understood and will not be repeated. The proposed move runs a serious risk of losing the excellence in basic research that NIMR currently enjoys and losing essential research support staV. 5. It is also by no means guaranteed that the additional funding and facilities necessary for any move will be available, nor is it possible to know what the cost of any move will finally turn out to be. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 87 Memorandum from Dr Steve Gamblin, former member of the MRC Task Force on the NIMR In the following sections I address some of the questions posed by the Select Committee to the MRC from the viewpoint of one of NIMR’s Task Force representatives. The MRC selected some of the Task Force correspondence for publication on its website, some of which is marked confidential and some of which is not. I have illustrated some of my points with Task Force emails that were not selected by the MRC to appear on its website. I would ask that the Select Committee gives due consideration to the appropriateness of this material being made publicly available. Overall, I am disappointed with the process and eVectiveness of the Task Force. This is unfortunate given the time and expense that went into it. The main problems I perceive were the lack of hard evidence to support the conclusions reached and the failure to keep the process focused on the key objectives. The latter was largely a result of handing over responsibility for the process to consultants, and the fact that the Task Force chairman clearly had an agenda that was not revealed to the Task Force at the outset. Our international Task Force colleagues are probably too discrete to say it, but our eVorts to base the Task Force’s work on data and evidence were largely a waste of time. Ultimately, however, the real problem is that the decision being taken forward is bad for science, bad for translation of our science and poor value for money. Q3.1 The Task Force concluded that it wanted the renewed NIMR to pursue an interdisciplinary approach to biomedical science. Data were presented to the Task Force by the NIMR representatives which showed the very extensive cross-disciplinary interactions already in place within the Institute (Attachment 1). This analysis is consistent with the conclusions reached by the MRC’s strategic review of NIMR in 2000 (Attachment 2) that noted “The “added-value” of the Institute environment was clearly reflected in the number of highquality integrated programmes involving interactions between diVerent divisions and the sharing of expertise and technologies.” The Task Force was also presented with data describing NIMR’s very extensive external academic collaborations (Attachment 3). 3.2 I am not aware that any such analysis was carried out to compare the eVectiveness of NIMR’s interdisciplinary collaborations (internal or external) with co-located medical research institutes. Q4.1 The Task Force was initially presented with evidence of the extent and range of NIMR’s clinical collaborations. Schematic diagrams outlined the number and distribution of the extensive network of clinical collaborations (Attachment 4) with NIMR. In response to this one member of the Task Force, Professor Steve Tomlinson, asked the NIMR representatives to provide further information about the clinical contacts because of his expertise in this area. Consequently, two members of NIMR staV and two collaborating consultants from The Institute of Child Health/Great Ormond Street presented a detailed analysis of NIMR’s clinical collaborations to Professor Tomlinson. A synopsis of these discussions was distributed to the Task Force (Attachment 5).

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Professor Tomlinson was entirely satisfied by the extent, depth and relevance of NIMR’s clinical collaborations and agreed that for the purposes of training and research there were distinct advantages to clinician scientists having time in a research environment that was physically removed from the pressures of clinics and patients. He was particularly keen on the role NIMR did and could play in clinician scientist training. I am unaware of any comparable data provided to the Task Force regarding the ability or output of medical research institutes co-located with a HEI/Hospital to transfer their science into clinical research. NIMR staV undertook a series of discussions with collaborating clinician scientists to get their input into how the renewed NIMR could eVectively increase its clinical collaborations and training. Consequently, Professor Tomlinson assisted in the development of six specific proposals that were sent to the Task Force and later posted on the MRC’s Task Force website (Attachment 6) (not printed). These proposals were never discussed by the Task Force. 4.2 At the fifth TF meeting a majority (four [PN, RAF, SJG and RLB], out of the seven, TF members present) thought that the Mill Hill site was a potential long-term option. Subsequently, a “majority” of the TF came to the conclusion that it was not. The email that the Task Force Chairman sent to Steve Tomlinson asking him to withdraw his suggestion that Mill Hill be taken forward as an equal 3rd option (Attachment 7) (not printed) makes it clear that the pressure for excluding Mill Hill as an option came from the MRC CEO and not from the work of the Task Force or its consultations. 4.3 After the final Task Force meeting the MRC CEO decided to circulate the draft conclusions of the meeting to the Chairman of the MRC and the Director General of the Research Councils, Sir Keith O’Nions, before the Task Force had agreed to the final version. This meant that what these individuals, and presumably other parts of Whitehall, first saw was the draft statement that lacked the essential clause of conditionality about the Task Force’s preference for a central London location. This statement, proposed by Richard Flavell and supported by the Task Force, reads “. . . However, it will be essential to develop a partnership for this move, more attractive than possible with NIMR at Mill Hill.” This statement reflects the spirit and intentions of the final meeting; a move to central London was preferred if it provided better facilities and environment for NIMR’s science than could be developed at Mill Hill. The circulation of the draft version without this crucial conditionality seriously misrepresented a key recommendation of the Task Force. 4.4 Towards the end of preparing the final Task Force report it became apparent that the MRC secretariat would not correct the text to reflect the views of all the Task Force members. The MRC CEO took the decision to send to Council, as the final agreed version of the report, a document that he knew the NIMR representatives did not agree with. We had suggested various compromises that would enable our views to be incorporated but he decided arbitrarily to omit our views. Subsequently, the two NIMR representatives wrote directly to MRC Council members to point out the problems with the final version of the report. This act of omitting our well-known views from the TF final report completely marginalized us from the process. 4.5 Before the July meeting of Council the MRC showed the Council briefing paper to NIMR and other Union representatives (Attachment 8). This briefing paper makes no mention at all of the possibility of NIMR being developed at Mill Hill or of the conditionality in the Task Force’s recommendations. The primary information given to the MRC Council was then also seriously flawed and misleading. Q6. The Task Force had three main streams of input from consultation exercises. 6.1 A formal consultation exercise was carried out for the Task Force using a questionnaire designed by McKinseys. This questionnaire was web-based (although other types of submission were accepted) and there were over 1,000 respondents. The numeric analysis of this consultation was carried out by McKinseys and is provided here in graphical form (Attachment 9). A qualitative analysis of free-format comments written by some of the correspondents was undertaken by an independent analyst, Deborah Holman, but was not available to the Task Force until after its final meeting. These comments were essentially similar in nature to the results of the quantitative analysis. The overwhelming majority of respondents (85%) chose a single independent site as their preferred organisational model with 83% preferring Option 1—enhancing NIMR at Mill Hill with a focus on basic and translational research. In the Independent Report on the consultation exercise it says, in the executive summary, “1,058 consultees responded to the questionnaire, the vast majority individuals. The organisational response was poor.” The views of Mill Hill staV and the vast majority (83% of 1,036) of respondents to the formal Task Force consultation were given no weight at all in the recommendations of the Task Force or the conclusions of the MRC Council. More than this, the preferred option of these stakeholders was explicitly excluded as a possible option for further consideration. 6.2 The views of NIMR staV, relating to the various options under consideration for the final meeting of the Task Force, were sought in a series of group interview sessions conducted by McKinseys at Mill Hill. Reports on these interview sessions were presented to the Task Force prior to its final meeting. NIMR staV unanimously preferred the development of the renewed NIMR at Mill Hill.

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6.3 The views of various individuals were gathered by the McKinsey consultants to represent the views of certain organisations and presented to the Task Force as interview notes. The individuals concerned were largely selected by the MRC secretariat. The NIMR Task Force members provided a long list of clinicians and academics for interview but only two interviews were presented to the Task Force although we have subsequently discovered that at least two other nominees were interviewed but their views were not presented to the Task Force. Q7. Early on in the Task Force process Paul Nurse made the argument that moving the Institute outside of the London area would constitute de facto closure of the Institute because most of the staV would not relocate. Overall the Task Force seemed to be of the opinion that retaining current staV was important because of their high quality and relevance to the future of biomedical research. Evidence was also presented to the Task Force by the NIMR members showing that a high proportion of the NIMR’s clinical collaborations were with clinical specialities in London. It would therefore be nonsense, from a clinical translation viewpoint, to move the institute out of London. It seems the Task Force took relatively little account of the importance for NIMR of the wealth of collaborating clinical specialities in London since, when the final Task Force report was being prepared, the MRC secretariat refused to include a statement to this eVect in the executive summary. There were two main sources of data available to the Task Force concerning a move to central London on staV retention and recruitment. Firstly, data were presented to the Task Force showing the very high rates of application for animal technician posts at Mill Hill. These figures are important because of the diYculties in recruiting to these posts in central London. Secondly, in the interviews conducted with NIMR staV by McKinseys and the subsequent reports presented to the Task Force, it is clear that most of the scientific staV have severe misgivings about moving to central London. In some sense that is predictable in that the scientific staV at NIMR have all chosen to come to NIMR at Mill Hill as opposed to taking up positions elsewhere. For these staV the scientific advantages of working at NIMR in Mill Hill are decisive and if the Institute is going to be reconstructed in central London they would probably consider all employment options available. Q8. Although the initial brief said that the Task Force should start with a clean sheet and that the process was not driven by financial considerations it soon became apparent that the Task Force chairman believed that only a certain sort of recommendation would be acceptable on financial grounds (Attachment 10). It is then all the more surprising that the options available to the final Task Force meeting had no robust estimates of the likely costs. In fact, the Task Force undertook no cost analysis of its own at all regarding relocation options. Such “estimates” of capital and recurrent costs that were presented to the Task Force were provided by the bidders. Only in the case of Mill Hill was an independent analysis of potential capital costs provided by external consultants appointed for the Task Force. The likely financial implications of the two central London options that appeared in the final Task Force report were only available to the Task Force a matter of days before the completion deadline and were added to the report rather than being a part of the decision making process. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 88 Memorandum from the Heads of Division Committee, National Institute for Medical Research Summary The Heads of Divisions of NIMR welcome changes that enhance the future development of the National Institute for Medical Research. However, a move to central London will lead to the inevitable loss of features of the Mill Hill site that are important determinants of NIMR’s success in multidisciplinary research and clinical translation. We are greatly concerned that the Mill Hill site has been excluded as an option for future development, and by the procedures which have resulted in this decision. Council’s Decision to Exclude a Formal Bid From NIMR at Mill Hill 1. We welcome the MRC Council’s endorsement of the future NIMR as a multidisciplinary institute, building upon its basic science core with an increased emphasis on clinical translation, on a single site in London. However, the Council proposes only to consider two central London bids and to exclude the option for development of the renewed NIMR at Mill Hill. As we have always stated, and reiterate here, we are not opposed to any change that oVers real improvements. We believe that investment in a renewed NIMR on the Mill Hill site would serve the MRC’s vision best and would be by far the most cost-eVective option. We fear that, in pursuit of its vision of an institute embedded in a hospital and HEI setting, the MRC will end up spending large sums of public money on building an Institute with facilities, resources and a culture that are inferior to those that already exist at Mill Hill. In excluding Mill Hill as a formal option, MRC is putting vision before common sense.

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2. The recommendation of the Task Force that NIMR moves to central London is based on a view that the potential advantages outweigh the disadvantages. It is therefore essential that any decision is based upon a proper evidence-based analysis of the key factors. The NIMR culture of interactiveness and crossdisciplinarity, excellent basic research and clinical translation are the result of the co-location of disciplines within a single building at a convenient location, extensive on-site animal facilities, and independence from a specific HEI/hospital. Future scientific developments, increased interactions with MRC Technology, inward investment from industrial and/or academic partners, an increase in our national role in the provision of large-scale facilities and in training of clinician scientists, will all require space. There are obvious and considerable diYculties in recreating these essential features of the Mill Hill site in central London. The Task Force report presented no data or informed discussion relevant to the central issue of whether basic/ translational research is more eVectively conducted by a multidisciplinary institute on an HEI-embedded site rather than an independent site. 3. A cost/benefit analysis can only realistically be carried out by direct comparison between Mill Hill and the central London options once the full costs for each are properly assessed. Following Council’s meeting on 13 October, we were asked to prepare a last-minute “enhanced” Mill Hill proposal. It was emphasised that this would not be considered as a formal option, but rather an enhanced “baseline” against which the two central London options would be assessed. In the not unlikely event that neither UCL nor KCL meets the criteria for Council’s vision, the MRC has stated that the entire issue would be reconsidered. The Select Committee can imagine how we feel about that prospect. It is foreseeable that a third protracted enquiry run by the MRC will lead to a mass exodus of senior scientific and support staV and a break-up of the structure and culture of the existing Institute. 4. The comparison of the three sites involves scientific, organisational and financial issues. Analysis of the advantages and disadvantages will be a complex exercise. We would like to know if independent scientific opinion will be sought by the steering committee set up by Council to assess the bids. For example, proximity to expertise in disciplines such as chemistry, physics, nanoengineering and mathematics was a major motivation of the Task Force in recommending relocation, yet these disciplines are dispersed across the multi-site campuses of KCL and UCL. Who will advise the MRC steering committee on whether this is as serious a problem as it appears to be? Finally, what opportunity will NIMR representatives be given to comment on the bids—for example, on whether the proposed animal facilities are adequate. We have raised the key question of NIMR input several times with the MRC, but have yet to receive a response. The Task Force Process 5. It is clear that some Task Force members felt that an enhanced Mill Hill option should be considered on an equal basis with the central London options. This was in fact the majority view expressed by those present at the last Task Force meeting. It was highly inappropriate that no formal minutes were kept at this or any other Task Force meeting. As a result, there were protracted disagreements between Task Force members about what was or was not discussed and agreed. This is evident from the selection of email exchanges between Task Force members that has been published (especially those from the period leading up to publication of the final Task Force report). However, only a selection of the email correspondence has been published by MRC. We urge the Committee to ask that all of these communications be made available as we believe they will provide a unique indication of the direction of the Task Force discussions and the unsatisfactory manner in which the Task Force was conducted. 6. We are astonished that the MRC managed a year-long, time-consuming and expensive review process without properly discussing the future proposals from NIMR for an enhanced NIMR at its current site, and whether this could serve the strategic vision of MRC. This is of especial concern given that two of the Task Force members (whose votes contributed to the final 5:4 majority to exclude the Mill Hill option) never visited the Institute, and one of these did not attend a single meeting in person.5 (A request by our Task Force representatives for attendance of Task Force members at these meetings and conferences calls to be put on public record was denied by the Task Force secretariat). In his most recent discussions with us, the MRC CEO oVered two reasons for excluding Mill Hill as an option: (i) his prejudice (sic) that NIMR staV would not engage in discussions of the other options if the Mill Hill option were considered; and (ii) its inclusion might preclude later bids from other HEIs (eg Imperial College) being considered. These are not reasoned scientific arguments for excluding the Mill Hill option, a point forcefully made by our Director, John Skehel, in his presentation to Council at their last meeting (see Statement from NIMR Director 13 October at http://www.nimr.mrc.ac.uk/future/). The CEO’s failure to provide staV with a credible reason for excluding Mill Hill as an option exemplifies a managerial approach that has repeatedly undermined productive engagement with NIMR staV. 5

The Task Force originally consisted of 10 members, five nominated by the MRC and five by NIMR. An NIMR nominee, Professor Peter Gruss, resigned because he could not devote the necessary time to Task Force business. Professor Gruss is head of the Max Planck Society, a major funder of research institutes in Germany. The member of the Task Force who did not attend any meetings in person was Professor Alan Bernstein, head of CIHR, the main biomedical funding agency in Canada, which supports only extramural university research. We do not know if Professor Bernstein similarly oVered to resign.

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7. The management consultants hired to facilitate the business of the Task Force carried out an extensive public consultation on a range of options for NIMR, including the key issue of NIMR’s location. Individual responders voted overwhelmingly (85%) for a model in which a renewed NIMR conducts basic and translational research at a single site, and remains independent of any HEI/hospital. This conclusion holds up even after discarding all responders with any past or present connections with NIMR (of which, not surprisingly, there were a significant number). It appears that the Task Force placed much greater weight on the small number of organisational responses than the opinions of the vast majority of individual responders.

Conclusions 8. NIMR at Mill Hill is a major national asset of proven excellence. We are unanimous in our belief that the exclusion of Mill Hill as an option is a mistake, arising from another flawed review process by the MRC (the first being the widely discredited recommendations from the FIS process in 2003). The MRC is proposing to move NIMR to central London without adequate cost/benefit evaluation. Such a move is certain to be both costly and disruptive, and carries with it a real risk of destroying world-class research teams and clinical links that have taken many years to establish. The vision that is driving the MRC to this decision shows little understanding of the essential components that maintain the current highly collaborative interdisciplinary culture at Mill Hill. The exclusion of Mill Hill as an option is based on a narrow majority of a split Task Force and a poorly run review process. The MRC is damaging its reputation in the eyes of the scientific community both within the UK and abroad. We hope that the Committee will probe the reasons for this state of aVairs, establish the real reasons behind the MRC’s determination to close NIMR at Mill Hill, and make recommendations about how the MRC should act to restore the confidence of the scientific community in its management of strategic reviews. NIMR Heads of Division Committee: Tim Bliss Tony Holder Dimitris Kioussis Lee Johnston Kathleen Mathers Tim Mohun Justin Molloy Anne O’Garra Vassilis Pachnis Iain Robinson Jonathan Stoye Willie Taylor Victor Tybulewicz David Wilkinson

Division of Neurophysiology Division of Parasitology Division of Molecular Immunology Division of Yeast Genetics Biological Services Division of Developmental Biology Division of Physical Biochemistry Division of Immunoregulation Division of Molecular Neurobiology Division of Molecular Neuroendocrinology Division of Virology Division of Mathematical Biology Division of Immune Cell Biology Division of Developmental Neurobiology

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APPENDIX 89 Memorandum from Professor Peter Rigby, Institute of Cancer Research I am currently the Chief Executive of The Institute of Cancer Research in London, although I write in a personal capacity. I therefore have considerable knowledge of what it takes to run a research institute that is heavily focussed on translational research. From 1986 to 2000 I was a senior member of the scientific staV of the National Institute for Medical Research, serving as Head of the Genes and Cellular Controls (now Genetics and Development) Group from 1986 to 1996, and as Head of the Division of Eukaryotic Molecular Genetics for the whole of my time there. I am therefore thoroughly familiar with all aspects of the Institute’s operation. In considering the possibility that the Institute might be relocated to a site in central London, the following points should be taken into consideration. 1. So far as I am aware, there has not been any challenge to the quality of the Institute’s research. Indeed, its activities have, over the past 20 years, been accorded the highest accolades by the peer review committees of the Medical Research Council. Why then, is it necessary to consider radical reorganisation, let alone relocation?

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2. Since the publication of the Council’s unfortunate Forward Investment Strategy, there has been a blurring of the arguments. It is now held that the Institute must focus on a translational agenda. Why is this? My current Institute is intensely translational and I am totally supportive of such work. But it seems to have been decided that all medical research institutes have to be translational. There is absolutely no justification for this. Institutes that do excellent basic research will remain highly valuable, and the simplest survey of the rest of the world will indicate how they are valued. The Council must state clearly why they are of the view that this institute needs to adopt a translational agenda. Many would say that this is the business of its Clinical Sciences Centre (CSC). By embedding the CSC in an academic clinical setting (as opposed to the now defunct Clinical Research Centre next to a district general hospital at Northwick Park) it was hoped this would be the MRC’s Institute for carrying out clinical/translational work. The Council should wait to see whether it is achieving these aims, before carrying out experiments on another Institute. 3. If translation is to be the name of the game, then the financial consequences must be addressed. It is widely held within the scientific community that the original motivation for the Council’s proposals regarding the Institute was the saving of money. Be that as it may, the reincarnation of NIMR as a translational institute will cost a great deal of money. I am struck by the following facts. NIMR has some 800 staV and an annual budget of £28 million. My institute has just over 1,000 staV, it is a little bigger, but its annual budget is £55 million. Why is this? The answer is translational research. To do this eVectively requires specialised facilities and the salaries of large numbers of clinicians. So the transformation of NIMR into a translational institute will cost a great deal of money, and it is not at all clear that the Council has the requisite funds. The costs of rebuilding the institute in central London will be very large. I have been responsible for rebuilding most of my current institute and can thus be expected to have a reasonably authoritative view of the costs, which will clearly be in excess of £100 million. There is also the unquantifiable cost, both financially and politically, of seeking to recreate the NIMR’s animal facilities in central London. The Select Committee should be under no misapprehension, without these facilities NIMR will cease to exist. If the funds for such a relocation were to be available, then it is essential that the value for money of such an investment is rigorously contrasted with what could be achieved by investing at the present site at Mill Hill. The Council has thus far been totally silent on the relative cost eVectiveness of the various schemes under consideration. The costs and benefits of the relocation should be evaluated against what could be achieved by investment on the Mill Hill site. It would be surprising if the relocation option were to survive such an analysis. In summary: There is no objective case for a radical reorganisation of NIMR. There is no case whatsoever for it becoming a translational institute. Relocating it to central London would cost a very great deal of money that could be better spent elsewhere. It is essential that the benefits of investing on the Mill Hill site are fully explored. I would be happy to expand on any of these points should the Select Committee find that to be of value. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 90 Memorandum from Dr Ralf Schoepfer, University College London I am writing to comment on the future location of the “new NIMR” and would like to add one aspect, which apparently has not been received suYcient consideration. The current NIMR site presents a unique opportunity to relocate some biomedical research, perhaps including specialised medical care units, out of central London, in particular if one takes a long-term view. The costs of doing research in central London will always be higher than at the NIMR site, because of limited space and restriction imposed by historic developments in central London. On the other hand, a “reorganised NIMR” at its current location could become a nucleus for a much larger biomedical community there, with the benefit of reduced costs and new facilities. Obviously I am not suggesting an enlarged NIMR, but a gradual relocation of outstanding existing biomedical to Mill Hill. Similar out-of-town relocations have recently been successfully by other world-class institution, such as “The University of California at San Francisco (UCSF)”. To my knowledge the current NIMR site is the only site in the Greater London area, which has already

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an internationally highly recognised institute on site and where there is suYcient open land available for future developments. To relinquish this site would present an irrevocable loss for science in the capital and will entail substantial long-term negative consequences, by undermining future developments. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 91 Memorandum from Professor Robert Liddington, Burnham Institute, La Jolla, California Executive Summary I wish to make two arguments for not moving the NIMR to a central London site. First, the NIMR is scientifically outstanding, and the science within the institute is very well integrated, but it is a precious commodity that may not survive a move to the center of London, owing to the way in which science is actually done at a research institute. Second, the rationale for siting the NIMR next to a hospital is poor. There is no weakness in the selection of research priorities by the basic scientists at the NIMR that would benefit from interactions with physicians. The government should instead be focusing its eVorts on encouraging the early-to-mid stages of drug design—medicinal chemistry and animal trials—especially for the treatment of infectious diseases, because this is where a gap exists in the drug design pipeline that makes the creation of new drugs economically unattractive to drug companies. A move to central London would only hinder such eVorts. My Credentials Professor Liddington trained in the UK at Oxford (BA) and York (DPhil) universities, and in the US at Harvard University. He held a Faculty position at Harvard Medical School (1990–95) before returning to the UK as Chair of Macromolecular Crystallography at the University of Leicester (1995–99). He returned to the US in 1999 to become Professor at the Burnham Institute in La Jolla, California, and is now Director of the Program on Infectious Diseases. He directs a group of 10 faculty, and also runs a research laboratory of 25 persons funded exclusively via peer-reviewed grants from the National Institutes of Health and the Department of Defense. POINT 1: The NIMR is a precious commodity that cannot readily be transported to another site I was recently asked to act as an external reviewer of the Structural Biology program at NIMR. I found the quality of the science to be outstanding—comparable or better than any major department in a US university or research institute. The choice of research topics was absolutely at the cutting edge of modern molecular biology, and highly synergistic with the other research programs within the institute. The level of achievement, as judged by the publication of a large number of papers in the top scientific journals—Nature, Science and Cell—was truly extraordinary. The creation of such an intellectual resource requires strong leadership and the recruitment of key individuals—lieutenants—who provide the day-to-day drive and enthusiasm for this scientific work. Although their academic standing is comparable to a University Professor, they continue to do experiments themselves at the same times as directing and training junior colleagues. Because of this they work long and irregular hours (with modest pay). They are typically in their thirties and forties with young families to support. I doubt that the prospect of a long commute to the centre of London will appeal to these individuals, and therefore they will either find jobs elsewhere or productivity will suVer. Please note that such highly skilled and dedicated scientists may be impossible to replace. Of the four lieutenants in the structural biology division at NIMR I cannot think of more than a dozen other scientists with comparable credentials within the UK. POINT 2: The critical step in bridging the drug design gap is the provision of funding for drug lead optimization and animal trials New treatments for infectious diseases—whether caused by antibiotic-resistant bacteria, emerging viruses such as SARS and West Nile, or the work of bioterrorists, are likely to be of critical importance over the next decades. Drug companies have classically focussed their eVorts on the treatment of chronic diseases rather than acute ones owing to economic imperatives. Therefore, university researchers and government must change this situation by making the design and testing of treatments for acute diseases economically attractive to industry. Historically, basic scientists have not had the resources to take drug discovery beyond inhibitor design in the test tube. One way to bridge the gap to industrial drug design is for the government to fund the intermediate steps in drug discovery—lead optimisation through medicinal chemistry and animal trials—which can lead to compounds with proven eYcacy in animals that are patentable and that can then

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be developed further by biotech or drug companies. This is a key area for development. Moving the NIMR to the center of London will not further this objective, and will actually impede research by making animal trials harder to perform. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 92 Memorandum from Langhorne Laboratory Executive Summary: The Laboratory of Jean Langhorne studies malaria, a disease which kills millions of children every year. We study the disease in humans, via a collaboration with the Wellcome and KEMRI-sponsored institute in Kilifi, Kenya. We also study the immune system in malaria infection in mice. Mice provide a model for many aspects of the disease which are not easily investigated in humans. Basic biology is vital to the fight against disease. Mill Hill, as an international centre of excellence for basic biology, is as important as clinic-based science, and Academia-based science. We hope that the government’s emphasis on clinical science will not detract from study of the basic sciences which make that possible. Our work on the immunology of malaria occurs at the intersection of two huge and complex fields of science. The help and input of knowledge and equipment that we derive from collaborations within the institute, both within the Infection and Immunology Research Area and with other divisions, is indispensible for our work. We do not believe that a move into London can possibly improve our facilities, the collaborations available to us, or our science. In contrast, it would cost millions and interrupt our work setting us back in the fight against malaria; which means that millions more would die while we struggle to get back on our feet. We have outlined below what we consider to be the irreplaceable facilities and the critical mass of disciplines and internationally renowned scientists at Mill Hill required for our work on malaria to succeed against this wily internal predator.

The geography of a malaria experiment: Why the animal facility must be nearby Planning: in our lab and on the third floor consulting with our Immunology associates Experimental Day:

Langhorne Malaria Laboratory 10:00-14:00 Purify Parasites 17:00-19:00 Mix

17:00 14:00

9:00

15:00

Magnetic and High Speed Purification Machines (in Immunology): Purify Cells

Special Malaria Animal Facility: Collect samples

Dear Sirs, We are writing in support of keeping the NIMR in Mill Hill. We have confined our comments to three critical areas. Firstly, the positive aspects of the present site for our work, including the animal facility, the finest in the UK. Secondly, the perfect constellation of disciplines assembled here, including the best immunology faculty and the highest concentration of malaria research as well as truly world-class faculty experts in recombinant protein structure and production. The third area we would like to highlight is our very successful clinical collaboration in Africa, which would not benefit by co-location with any UK clinical centre/hospital. (i) Internal Collaboration: The first two areas are best summarized by the work of the dendritic cell group within our laboratory. We are studying the cells which initiate the protective immune response to malaria, Dendritic Cells. If we want to develop an eYcient malaria vaccine, it is critical to understand how these cells are triggered. We are fortunate to have the support of scientists in the other divisions of the Infection and Immunity group who have tremendous experience in other

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infectious diseases like tuberculosis and influenza to help me plan and execute my experiments. Researchers in the division of Immune Regulation have been critical in developing the techniques we are using in malaria, and are always available just upstairs to help and discuss. (ii) Biological Services: The study of malaria requires veterinary technicians trained to follow special requirements in mouse care. We are very well supported by the experienced staV in Biological Services who run a unique unit specialized in malaria for our work. Moving mice is a process which takes years and is incredibly disruptive to a lab. Our lab moved here from Germany several years ago, and we have just gotten all of our strains back into use this year. We would like to point out that we would not be able to do our experiments unless the mouse facility is very close to the lab (see Figure 1), we would not be able to move to a new site without this amenity. We want to know how the malaria parasite stimulates Dendritic Cells so I mix the two together. First, we have to catch the parasite at the right time of day, sometimes this means multiple trips to the mouse facility to check if it is ready. Then, I have to purify the parasite and the dendritic cells. The dendritic cells are very fragile and also quite rare, so time is of the essence. Several of us work together to rush back and forth from the mouse house checking the parasites to the purification equipment in the Parasitology and Immunology divisions. Having all of the right ingredients here at Mill Hill has made this work possible. (iii) Clinical Collaboration Though we have several productive collaborations with immunologists and parasite biologists in the UK, our primary external collaboration is with clinicians and scientists in Kilifi, on the coast of Kenya. Over the years we have hosted scientists and been hosted by Wellcome Trust/KEMRI Research Laboratories. By commuting back and forth, Kenyan scientists investigating basic biology of malaria vaccine candidates have been able to utilize the facilities at the to do cutting edge work on human malaria. British students have also been able to utilize the well-developed cohorts at the malaria clinic there for samples to investigate here in the UK. Scientists, ideas and equipment move between Oxford, Kilifi and Mill Hill in a very productive set of collaborations in pursuit of a malaria vaccine testing options in Kenya in humans and here in mice. This type of collaboration could not be improved by a move into London, in fact a move would disrupt the laboratory financially and physically, only possibly delaying the timeline of any advances toward a vaccine trial. We hope that this description of our laboratory’s work can provide some insight into why we believe that our best interests as scientists, and as people living in Britain, are best served by the multi-disciplinary basic research institute we currently have at Mill Hill with its divisions geographically linked and its excellent facilities close to hand. We do not believe that combining this institute with any other institution in the UK would lead to an improved output of clinically relevant science. Alternate proposals should be considered for enhancing this type of collaboration and providing training opportunities for clinicians and researchers wishing to translate basic science to the bedside. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 93 Memorandum from Dr Robin Lovell-Badge, former member of the MRC Task Force on the NIMR 1. As one of the NIMR representatives on the Task Force, I would first like to give some of my overall impressions of the process before specifically addressing, from my own perspective, some of the questions supplied to the MRC by the Select Committee. (N.B. my colleague Steve Gamblin has largely focussed on a separate set of questions, so I have avoided answering these so as not to duplicate our responses, but I should state that we are entirely in agreement.) Many of my views have been expressed previously in e-mail correspondence with the Task Force Chairman, Colin Blakemore (CB), in particular in two messages I sent on 22 and 26 July 2004, after the TF had essentially concluded its business and before the MRC Council Meeting that was to look at its final report. These e-mails were circulated to the Task Force, and, according to CB’s wish for openness and transparency, were marked non-confidential. However, despite two requests, they have not been made public and, in a recent letter (11 November 2004), David Smith, the TF Secretariat, has written to me to say that he will not do so. I attach these messages and others as supporting evidence for my position. I would ask that the Select Committee gives due consideration to the appropriateness of this material being made publicly available, although I still have no reservations. I particularly encourage you to read my message of 26 July, which is the last I include in the accompanying attachment. 2. I have worked at the NIMR since 1988, and have been Head of the Division of Developmental Genetics since 1993. I am therefore very familiar with the Institute, its advantages and disadvantages. I have always felt privileged to work there and it has enabled me to make significant progress in my science. For this reason I was enthusiastic to be part of the Task Force, which had the specific remit of exploring ways of securing the future success of the Institute. It was my wish that we would be able to put forward sound ideas to enhance its ability to nurture good science and scientists and to play an even greater National role in the future. To make something the UK could really be proud of. I believe this was also the goal of at least some of our international colleagues on the TF, but perhaps we were all naive.

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3. I have ended up being extremely disappointed both with the process and with the outcome. Important issues were frequently glossed over or not discussed at all and, in too many instances, prejudice and hidden agendas have taken precedence over evidence as means to reach conclusions. Despite public statements to the contrary, there was in the end little unanimity on critical issues. Moreover, the final TF report was submitted to Council without several members of the TF having even seen information that was only forthcoming in the last few days before its completion. As the report did not adequately reflect my views, the appearance of unanimity being more important to the Chairman than reality, it was also submitted without my approval. Council have then based their decisions on a document and a process that falls well below my ideals and those I believe they should demand. There is no logic in having the Mill Hill site as a comparator, without it being a formal option for the future location of the Institute. There is now a real danger that Council will pursue a decision that will have a long-lasting deleterious eVect on UK biomedical research.

Response to Select Committee Questions Please refer to Appendix 61 for Questions. 4. Question 1. There have been similar, at least spoken, trends in other countries, to push towards more translational research. In the USA, this has coincided with a change in Director of the NIH from Varmus, a basic scientist, to Zerhouni, a clinician. Of course the former managed to double the baseline NIH budget, perhaps leaving the latter with little room for manoeuvre. (In fact Zerhouni has only allocated a very small percentage of the NIH budget to clinical/translational initiatives.) It is often stated that it is a good time to start translating all the basic knowledge we have uncovered over the past decades into real clinical benefit. However, this ignores the fact that we are still so ignorant, and that it is an even better time to do basic research, a time when we can build on the really important breakthroughs made in recent years and gain real understanding. The cynical view is that many feel it is easier to persuade politicians to give money for “curing diseases” than it is to merely provide knowledge. Of course we should also pursue translational research, but not at the expense of the foundations on which its future, and ours, will depend. This view was in fact supported by most of the Task Force. It was felt that the Institute should take on a greater role in facilitating translational research, for example through training clinician scientists in research methods, and by having more clinician scientists on staV, but that it would be counterproductive to lose the excellent basic science as this provides the necessary foundation to do the former. However, this view has become distorted by statements issued subsequently—perhaps as a justification for wanting to relocate the Institute to a clinical setting. 5. The various consultations conducted on behalf of the TF asked the question about the balance of basic versus translational research. However, the views of many were ignored, including clinician scientists working at NIMR, those elsewhere with whom we collaborate, and basic scientists working in more clinical settings. 6. Question 2. A greater emphasis on translational research at NIMR would perhaps have only a modest aVect relative to the way the overall MRC budget is allocated. However, it could mean the loss of a very critical driver of high quality basic biomedical research in the UK. It may tip the balance too far in a direction from which it would be hard to recover in the future. And why choose the NIMR as the target for this change, rather than other components of its portfolio, notably those already co-located in clinical settings, especially if the latter is felt to be such a persuasive argument ? Or why not plan a new, additional venture rather than put at risk an internationally competitive and highly renowned institute ? 7. Question 3. There was no evidence to suggest that co-location would be of benefit to the work of the Institute. (Indeed, some have tried to justify co-location on the grounds that it may be the other way round— the Institute might help the host institution—even at the risk of damaging its own research.) Many of the best multi-disciplinary research institutes around the world are not co-located, as is also the case for almost all institutes with a national role (NIH in Bethesda, for example). Indeed, the explicit reason the European Molecular Biology Laboratories are not co-located with a university, is to allow them to fulfil their international role. 8. Question 5. NIMR was asked to nominate two internal representatives and three external members to the Task Force. Unfortunately, one of the latter, Peter Gruss, became unable in his view to devote suYcient time to TF business and stepped down, but was not replaced. Both Richard Flavell and Paul Nurse devoted considerable time and eVort to the TF, despite their very busy schedules. The MRC nominated two Council members, Kay Davies and Dick Denton, the only two scientists on Council that had not been part of the FIS subcommittee, although all had signed up to its recommendations. They also nominated Steve Tomlinson to represent both a clinical and an additional provincial viewpoint, and Alan Bernstein as another international member. George Radda was to begin as Chairman, but a considerable delay in organising the first meeting meant that Colin Blakemore had already taken over as CEO. Despite the obvious conflict, the latter was willing, albeit with stated reluctance, to take on the role of Chairman. John Skehel was meant to attend the meetings, except for occasions when the question of his replacement as NIMR director was to be addressed. He did attend parts of some meetings, although in the end there was very little discussion that

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would have required his exclusion. Alison Spaull attended as an observer, also nominated by the MRC, and the others present were David Smith from MRC Head OYce as the Secretariat, and representatives from McKinsey’s, who were employed by the MRC to assist the Task Force. 9. There was clearly a wide range of views held by the TF members. Steve Tomlinson admitted to the NIMR staV during his only visit to the Institute in October that his view, when appointed to the TF, was that NIMR should be closed and the funds released should be redistributed around the country. Alan Bernstein, who did not attend in person any meetings of the TF and who by his own admission had not followed all the correspondence or read critical documents, has well known opinions that there is no need for bricks-and-mortar institutes. I do not know if Colin Blakemore had fixed views at the beginning, but he seemed to have started making up his mind already by the third meeting, before we had gathered any real evidence, such as results from consultations, the ARUP report on the Mill Hill site, details of potential sites in central London and their costs, etc. His ideas for a much smaller institute focussed on only a part of the current range of science carried out at NIMR (which appear to go against our final conclusions) were put to me in a ‘phone conversation and then to the rest of the TF (but only in a confidential e-mail) after I had challenged the ambiguity of the use of the word “focus” in the draft report of the third meeting. These views, and others based on a disregard for facts, have encouraged the view that there were hidden agendas. 10. Several methods were used to communicate TF progress to stakeholders. However, not all have been either timely or appropriate. I give just a few examples: (i) The reports from each of the TF meetings were always delayed, as there would be disagreement over the wording, which either failed to reflect decisions reached during the meetings or where it had meanings that were too ambiguous. There were no formal minutes taken. (ii) There have been long delays and only selective publication of e-mail correspondence between TF members, even where messages have been marked non-confidential. Reading the collection on the MRC website gives a very distorted view. (iii) Inappropriate conversations or correspondence by the Chairman with stakeholders, which have given strength to the view that a hidden agenda was being followed. Examples, being: (a) a conversation with two young NIMR postdoctoral researchers after the third TF meeting where he told them that he had cancelled a proposed visit to the Institute—before others had been informed—and that he was considering abandoning the TF. (This followed a heated exchange during a TF conference call earlier that day.) (b) Sending out letters on behalf of the TF, or draft reports of the TF meetings without agreement from all members. (c) After the last TF meeting, again prior to the report being finalised, and against the spirit of our agreement at the meeting, informing KCL and UCL that it would be a straight fight between the two of them rather than saying that their bids would be compared with Mill Hill. The report of the Fifth meeting was only released for publication after acceptance of the conditionality of any central London bid and after KCL and UCL were properly informed. However, the Chairman selectively uses phrases from this report, taken out of context and conveniently omitting the conditionality, to pretend that there was unanimity for co-location amongst TF members, when there was not. 11. Question 7. Apart from proposals to move the Institute, the Task Force also considered options to break it up into two or more separate locations. Splitting the Institute would have inevitably destroyed its productive culture and multidisciplinary interactions. It was clear from the outset that this would not be attractive to NIMR staV. Consequently, these options received no support from the majority of the Task Force and they were rejected during our Third meeting. The only one present at this meeting who tried to reinstate it was David Smith. However, the split option was subsequently put back on the table by the Chairman. It was argued that this was in response to London HEI’s who considered that such an option would be best (from their point of view). In my opinion, it was ridiculous to have the work of the TF sidetracked by external influences. Putting this option back on the table also had consequences for the subsequent work and progress of the TF. It wasted time and eVort from the HEI’s involved, who could perhaps have better concentrated their eVorts on single-site bids. It was clearly never an option that would receive suYcient support from TF members, yet we had to devote a lot of valuable time to discuss it. This includes the final meeting—where we had insuYcient time to, for example, debate the proposals from Mill Hill or even whether Mill Hill should be an option. It also served to distort the balance of options under consideration, with too much time devoted to the need to exclude the split site, rather than focusing on the values of an independent versus co-located site. 12. There was a suggestion, from Richard Flavell, to hold a sixth TF meeting in an attempt to resolve some of the unfinished business, after Council had made their preliminary decisions. But this did not take place as it was decided that the TF no longer existed.

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13. Questions 8–10. There was considerable ambiguity throughout the whole TF process as to the nature of any financial constraints. We were at times told that we should not think about them—a good argument can always persuade Government or others to provide the money. At other times it was made very apparent that there could be no increase in recurrent expenditure from the MRC. The latter became of particular concern to me when the details of the costs of running an Institute in central London began to emerge. It would simply not be possible to carry out the same volume of research on the same core funding from the MRC. The co-location options had to be far less cost-eVective, especially if there was to be a change in emphasis, with a greater proportion of clinician scientists on the payroll. 14. Having looked at all the evidence over the course of the Task Force and subsequently, and being aware of what is possible on the Mill Hill site, I am convinced that remaining there is the best and most exciting option for the future of NIMR. It should certainly not be excluded without a full and proper, unbiased comparison with the central London bids. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 94 Memorandum from Dr Justin Molloy, National Institute for Medical Reseach

Interdisciplinary Research at Mill Hill I am writing to you on behalf of scientists at NIMR who trained in the physical sciences (including chemistry, physics, mathematics and engineering) and who work at the interface between classical scientific disciplines. We all believe that interdisciplinary research is of critical importance in the post genomic era of biomedical research. We also believe that interdisciplinary research can continue to be conducted, eVectively and in a world-leading manner, at the National Institute for Medical Research based on its current site at Mill Hill.

Our Main Areas of Research are: Mathematical Biology: De novo structure prediction, bioinformatics, modelling of mesoscopic and complex systems. Physical Biochemistry: Synthetic organic chemistry, enzyme kinetics and mechanism, single molecule research, AFM, CryoEM, optical tweezers, single molecule fluorescence imaging in cells, mechanistic studies of motor proteins, DNA processing enzymes, signalling molecules and membrane receptors, medical nanotechnology. Protein Structure: X-ray crystallography structure determination, enzyme mechanism, protein complex assembly Molecular structure: NMR structure determination and molecular dynamics, biomolecular interactions and the MRC Biomedical NMR centre.

Background (1) We have an excellent track record of interdisciplinary research: work from the Divisions of Physical Biochemistry, Mathematical Biology, Protein Structure, Molecular Structure and the MRC Biomedical NMR centre is world-leading and the scientific excellence of our work has never been in question. We believe that the breadth and quality of the interdisciplinary work we do, reflects the fact that the research programmes have evolved organically over the past 20 years. Mill Hill is unique in the UK in that there are genuinely no scientific barriers here and this is what draws the best young people to work here. (2) We can still recruit the best scientists doing interdisciplinary science to NIMR. Over the past two years we have recruited Molloy & Veigel (single molecule research), Goldstein (mathematical and systems biology), Rosenthal (cryo-electron microscopy), Ramos and Driscoll (molecular structure and NMR). We must be doing something right in order to out-compete Cambridge, Oxford, Imperial and several other leading UK Universities to recruit such people to work here. (3) Significantly, we have also retained all senior staV that work in this area in spite of tempting oVers being made to induce them to move elsewhere. StaV morale remains high: we are passionate about the NIMR, loyal to MRC but still convinced that Mill Hill remains the best future site for the renewed National Institute for Medical Research. We want our opinions to be heard and do not wish to align ourselves with any dictum that we think is flawed.

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The Future of Interdisciplinary Science at NIMR We first want to dispel the misconception that interdisciplinary work at Mill Hill cannot continue to thrive here in the future. Our vision for interdisciplinary research at Mill Hill is forward-looking and is based on a “tried-and-tested” plan. The future of interdisciplinary science maintained on the current site at the Mill Hill site would involve no compromises. This is in sharp contrast to the proposed moves to central London that involve fragmenting the science because of conflicting demands of our work in terms of space, vibration and magnetic fields. It would be unacceptable to break up the interdisciplinary community that has been created in Mill Hill and madness to hive it oV from the rest of the Institute. Furthermore, Mill Hill is on a secure site where our highly quantitative work can be translated readily into animal models and used to study live cells and genetically manipulated organisms. Mill Hill has massive scope for expansion and since funding for biomedical research will increase over the next 20 years (as part of our new knowledge-based economy), the MRC will need to expand both its extramural and its intramural research capacity. Mill Hill oVers a single contiguous site, with ample space for expansion, and this will enable us to compete with the best in the USA, Japan, Germany, France and Scandinavia. Interdisciplinary work often has special infrastructure needs and Mill Hill provides the necessary flexibility in this respect. We are sympathetic with our University colleagues who face significant barriers and problems in embracing interdisciplinary research. These include, geographically separated departments, intellectual isolation between communities, problems in juggling teaching commitments and research, poor uptake of physical science undergraduate courses, diYculties in organising interdisciplinary graduate and undergraduate taught courses and poor “matchmaking” between the best biologists and the best physical scientists. Moving NIMR to UCL or King’s is unlikely to help or alleviate any of these problems. The shortterm political and financial impact might be significant (eg RAE 2007). However, the long-term scientific benefit to the “host” University in terms of boosting interdisciplinary research might only be marginal at best. We fear plans to move NIMR to King’s or UCL might damage our research capacity: Both of the proposed new sites will be spatially constrained and future expansion will be limited. The Institute may need to be geographically fragmented in order to facilitate the conflicting needs of physical science work (involving high-field NMR, low vibration requirements for cryo-EM and single molecule research). This factor alone will destroy our vision for interdisciplinary research remaining a completely integrated component of the Institute. StaV recruitment to a central London location will also be diYcult or prohibitively expensive. We know that over the next 10–20 years, interdisciplinary research will permeate all aspects of biomedical research from molecules to cells and from cells to organisms. On this point, we believe that the contentious issue of where to place the animal house is being unrealistically “glossed-over”. We know that there will be huge knock-on problems in terms of security and ease of access across the institute if the animal facility were to be located within central London. We have a clear view of how our science will develop in the future and we have prepared a case for how this can be achieved at Mill Hill. However, we wonder why the MRC Council fear our bid so much that they refuse to consider it alongside the King’s and UCL bids as an equal “Option”. We simply do not understand the political complexity and wonder why our views and our vision are being compromised and marginalized. We actually wonder whether we are the people whom MRC intend to recruit to staV the renewed NIMR. We would welcome the opportunity to engage fully with MRC Council to help develop interdisciplinary research at NIMR. For a secure and successful future, we would like there to be a continuing dialogue between our Director and staV at NIMR with MRC Council and Head OYce. Name

1)/2) Degree

Research Area

Speciality

Justin Molloy

Molecular Biophysics

Martin Webb John Eccleston John Corrie Edward Hulme Nigel Birdsall Peter Rosenthal

Physiology/ Biophysics Medicine Biochemistry MD/PhD Chemistry Chemistry Chemistry Biochemistry Chemistry Physics

Biochemistry Biochemistry Organic Synthesis Membrane Proteins Pharmacology Electron microscopy

Lesley Calder

Biology

Electron Microscopy

Peter Bayley

Physics

Molecular Biophysics

Single Molecules, nanotechnology Single Molecules, nanotechnology Molecular Mechanism Molecular Mechanism Molecular Probes Structure of GPCRs GPCR pharmacology Single particle cryo-EM, molecular structure determination, cell tomography High Resolution, negative stain EM Biomolecular interactions

Claudia Veigel

Molecular Biophysics

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Name

1)/2) Degree

Research Area

Speciality

Mark Wallace

Chemical Physics

Stephan Schmitz Gregory Mashanov

Biotechnology Physiology Biophysics

Biological Fluorescence Molecular biophysics Cell Biophysics

Gordon Reid Peter Fletcher Steve Martin

Chemistry Chemistry Chemistry

Organic Synthesis Peptide synthesis Molecular Biophysics

Mike Anson

Physics

Molecular Biophysics

Single Molecules, nanotechnology Optical tweezers, motor proteins Cell biology, single molecules, computer programming, nanotechnology labelled nucleotides Peptide synthesis Optically based biophysics, biomolecular interactions Optically based studies of single motor proteins Molecular probes/caged compounds Molecular probes/caged compounds Structure-function determination of DNA helicases Cell-based assays of inorganic phosphate Bioinformatics, systems biology Structures-function, bioinformatics, complexity mesoscopic systems. Bioinformatics, systems biology Bioinformatics, systems biology Bioinformatics, systems biology Bioinformatics, systems biology Bioinformatics, systems biology Bioinformatics, systems biology Molecular modelling, MD simulations Molecular modelling, MD simulations Protein structure determination

George Papageorgio Chemistry

Organic Synthesis

Ranjit Munasinge

Chemistry

Organic Synthesis

Mark Dillingham

Biochemistry

Michael Okoh

Biochemistry

Protein-DNA interactions Small molecule probes

Richard Goldstein Willie Taylor

Mathematics Mathematics

Mathematical Biology Mathematical Biology

Fernandez Reyes Douglas Saldanha Blackburne Sheth Chernova Michael Green

Details to follow Details to follow Details to follow Details to follow Details to follow Details to follow Details to follow

Mathematical Biology Mathematical Biology Mathematical Biology Mathematical Biology Mathematical Biology Mathematical Biology Mathematical Biology

Franca Fraternali

Details to follow

Mathematical Biology

Guy Dodson

X-ray Crystallography

Steve Gamblin

Chemistry Physics Genetics Chemistry Biochemistry

Katrin Rittinger

Chemistry

X-ray crystallography

Ian Taylor

Biochemistry Biophysics Biochemistry

X-ray crystallography

Biology Biochemistry biophysics Biology Biochemistry biophysics Biology Biochemistry biophysics Biology Biochemistry biophysics Biology Biochemistry biophysics Biochemistry Mass Spec.

X-ray crystallography

Protein structure-function determination Protein structure-function determination Protein structure-function determination Protein structure-function determination Protein crystallography, computing Protein crystallography

X-ray crystallography

Protein crystallography

X-ray crystallography

Protein crystallography

X-ray crystallography

Protein crystallography

X-ray crystallography

Protein crystallography

Mass Spectrometry

Protein-ligand Mass Spec. MALDI TOF

Steve Smerdon

Phil Walker Ennis-Adeniran

Lloyd

Xiao

Smith

Dutta

Steven Howell

X-ray crystallography X-ray crystallography

X-ray crystallography

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Name

1)/2) Degree

Research Area

Speciality

Dan Zhu

Computer Science

Stamatis Pagakis

Electrical Engineering Biomedical Engineering

Bioimaging/optical techniques. Computation Bioimaging/optical techniques

Annalisa Pastore

Biochemistry

Tom Frenkiel GeoV Kelly Andres Ramos

Physics NMR NMR Biology Biophysics

Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy NMR NMR NMR

Adolfini

Biology

NMR

Jake Grimmett

Biology Biology-computing

NMR

McCorrmick

Biology

NMR

Birdsall Laura Masino

Biology Biochemistry Biophysics Biochemistry Physics & Physiology Physiology Biology Electrophysiology

NMR NMR

Computer programming, algorithm development image analysis Imaging methods, including method develoment, image analysis. Cellular and molecular imaging Molecular structure determination, protein-ligand, protein-protein interactions MRC Biomedical NMR facility MRC Biomedical NMR facility Molecular Structure determination, protein-ligand, protein-protein interactions. Molecular Structure determination Computing/computer programming/ Algorithm development Molecular Structure determination Molecular interactions Protein structure-function relationships

Hollingworth Bliss Ogden

NMR Long-term potentiation and memory Electrophysiology of Two-photon photolysis of caged sensory cells and compounds in synaptic clefts. hippocampal slices

23 November 2004

APPENDIX 95 Memorandum from Professor Amanda Fisher, Clinical Sciences Centre, Hammersmith Hospital My name is Amanda Fisher and I am an MRC employee (of ( 10 years) and leader of a research team based at the Clinical Sciences Centre at the Hammersmith Hospital site in London. I am writing to express my concerns about the decision-making process behind proposals to relocate the NIMR. First I would like to say that over the last 15 years the NIMR has made truly outstanding contributions within the area of Life Sciences that underpin human health. It certainly rates among the top three institutes in the UK. This contribution is also evidenced by the fact that many former NIMR staV now head leading initiatives throughout the world. Example include Professors Rob Krumlauf (head of the Stowers Institute, USA), Jim Smith (head of the Gurdon Institute, Cambridge) and Frank Grosveld (Erasmus University, Rotterdam). Furthermore, successive peer reviews have consistently commended the NIMR for the exceptional quality and innovation of its multi-disciplinary research program. Despite this, NIMR has come under increasing pressure to relocate. I have seen very little rational evidence to justify the move—on either financial or strategic grounds. On the contrary, there are a number of reasons why it might be more prudent for NIMR to be restructured on its present site. One of these is the flexibility the Mill Hill site oVers—particularly the option to expand (or contract) animal-based or nuclear magnetic resonance-based work, according to need. The present NIMR site is close to central London but unconstrained in terms of space. This oVers an ideal opportunity for expansion over the next 20–30 years. I am dismayed that this option has not been fully explored by the task force. Personally I am still waiting to hear a coherent or persuasive argument for the relocation of NIMR. I hope that these comments are useful. 23 November 2004

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APPENDIX 96 Memorandum from Professor Dame Louise Johnson, University of Oxford 1. I should like to submit some views in connection with the proposal to move the National Institute for Medical Research from its present site at Mill Hill to a site closer to one of the London Hospitals. 2. While I can see the advantage in promoting translational research by placing research laboratories close to clnical sites, the proposed move appears not to take into account the success of the current research on its present site and is likely to be a costly disruption. 3. My field of expertise is structural biology and I can only speak with authority on this area. The laboratories at NIMR, Mill Hill are doing excellent research in this area with a special emphasis on signal transduction mechanisms that are important for understanding cell growth and diVerentiation with implications for cancer research. The structural biology programme also has special relevance to the programmes at Mill Hill on malaria, tuberculosis, influenza and HIV. There has been splendid interactions between structural biology and the other Departments and it is hard to see how these can be sustained if the research laboratories are to be fragmented. 4. In recent years the NIMR has been rated first class in the five yearly reviews. Its publication record (according to an independent survey) placed it among the highest record in the UK. I hope the results of this survey are available to the Committee . I should be pleased to forward if needed. 5. In discusions with staV at NIMR I have been impressed with their unanimous view that their best research can be done in the present environment at the NIMR Mill Hill site. This is a view that has my warm support. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 97 Memorandum from Dr Hazel Dockrell, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine I write to express my concern about the decision process and reasons for the proposed move to NIMR from Mill Hill to a central London site, as part of King’s College or University College London. NIMR is a special and unique institution. In my former work on malaria and my current research on tuberculosis and leprosy, I have collaborated with scientists at NIMR, as have many members of my Department. In September this year, I had the opportunity to review the work of the Virology, Parasitology and Mycobacteriology Divisions at NIMR during a site visit/review as a member of the Medical Research Council’s new Infection and Immunity Board. This review confirmed my view that the research performed at NIMR is world class, that this research exploits and requires the breadth of disciplines within the institute, and that the animal facilities are a unique resource for UK scientists. I have followed the progress of the discussion about NIMR’s future with great interest, but am still unclear as to the main motive for the proposed move. NIMR is only about 40 minutes away from, say UCL at present, and I do not consider its location a problem or a limitation to interactions with NIMR. Should NIMR relocate to King’s or UCL, I doubt that our interactions with its scientists will increase much. I have not sent the plans for a move to King’s, but relocation to the National Temperance Hospital site at UCL would put the new NIMR about as far from UCL as we are currently from UCL. That is close enough to attend a special seminar, but not a routine one, and definitely not close enough for NIMR scientists to benefit from a clinical environment. If the aim is to integrate NIMR scientists more closely with those scientists and clinicians working in the university sector in London, this could be achieved through the funding of joint PhD studentships, joint grants etc. NIMR is in essence a research institute that specialises in fundamental research on medically important topics. Some of the research is clinically related and some is designed to lead to new drug design, or new vaccines. The UK needs excellence in both fundamental research and in clinical research; discoveries in one can lead to breakthroughs in the other. I myself doubt that relocating NIMR in a building with some other research groups will lead to more translational research or more patentable discoveries. There may well be a case for a greater focus on translational and clinical research in the UK, but this could be achieved by strategic funding initiatives, rather than by changing the focus and shape of NIMR. In particular, as a nonclinician with an academic career in medical research, I find the suggestion that the proportion of clinicians doing research at NIMR should be greatly increased curious; it is certainly a good idea for researchers to understand the disease they work on, but why not oVer a smaller number of clinical scientist fellowships at NIMR? A great strength of NIMR has been its extensive and excellent animal facilities. Many UK scientists envy the access NIMR scientists have to this unique resource. I have heard many concerns expressed that to relocate such a large facility into central London would be diYcult if not impossible. I consider that for

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eYcient working, such facilities need to be on-site and for work with infectious agents this becomes even more critical; for example, tissues or samples contaminated with a Category 3 pathogen such as Mycobacterium tuberculosis cannot be easily transported from one site to another. The original suggestion that NIMR should be relocated to Cambridge was not supported by the scientific community in London, or by most of those at NIMR. A move to central London would benefit the institution that would house NIMR, and should not adversely aVect the NIMR scientists, especially if spectacular new facilities and space to house all the existing groups and perhaps new groups too, were to be provided. NIMR’s special atmosphere would be altered but its scientists’ ability to carry out world-class research without the need to spend a significant proportion of their time raising grants, or teaching should not be aVected. But a NIMR move to central London would be very expensive, and I would not want to see this expenditure remove money from the funding of research grants—as it is, too many excellent and highly scored medical research applications cannot be funded by the MRC. These discussions on NIMR’s future are meanwhile having a very adverse eVect on morale at NIMR and there is a real danger the UK may lose many outstanding scientists as a result. And why has no one explained why it does not seem to be an option to retain NIMR at Mill Hill? 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 98 Memorandum from Professor Chris Higgins, MRC Clinical Sciences Centre 1. As Director of the MRC Clinical Sciences Centre (CSC), one of the three MRC Research Institutes alongside NIMR and The Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Cambridge, my personal perspective may be useful in your deliberations. Process 2. As MRC employees, all Unit/Institute Directors expect the MRC to review their establishments regularly, both for research quality and for strategic priority. A particularly thorough strategic review of any major Institute would be expected immediately preceding the retirement of its Director or when substantial capital expenditure is likely to be required. 3. The current strategic review of NIMR is appropriately separate from the quinquennial reviews of research quality, and has used diVerent review bodies. Thus, although some might take issue with details of the process, the ongoing strategic review of NIMR by the MRC is entirely appropriate and is to be welcomed. Location of NIMR Research 4. Independent scientific reviews have concluded that many of the NIMR research teams are at the international forefront. It is therefore important for the UK that this expertise is retained. I know from personal discussions that many NIMR scientists will move overseas (many are receiving generous oVers) if relocated outside London or if NIMR is disbanded. 5. London oVers the only location in the UK where there is suYcient critical mass of clinical research excellence across the board, and a suYciently large patient base, for all the scientific Divisions of NIMR to enhance critical mass and clinical links. 6. I therefore concur with the MRC conclusion that NIMR science should be renewed in some form in London. Strategic Mission 7. Achievements in basic research over the past 50 years (many of which have been MRC-supported) now provide a significant knowledge base. The MRC has both the opportunity and obligation to exploit this knowledge base to enhance clinical research and deliver healthcare benefit. I therefore strongly endorse the proposed change in the strategic mission of NIMR, which calls for enhanced clinical and translation research alongside the existing strengths in basic research. 8. Based on my experience as an MRC Director implementing a similar mission, I have no doubt that the renewed mission for NIMR cannot be eVectively delivered by status quo, or by “appending” a few clinicians to the existing Institute. It has been amply demonstrated that translation of biomedical research progresses most eVectively through iterative interactions between clinical and basic scientists working closely together as a mix of equals, sharing laboratories, ideas and opportunities, and understanding each others “culture”. This is the model being adopted in leading Centres in the US. This model also enhances the quality of basic research which benefits substantially from ideas derived from patient-based research.

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As clinical research cannot be pursued eVectively away from a strong patient base, and there is no prospect of a patient base at Mill Hill, if the proposed mission for a renewed NIMR is adopted there is no option but that NIMR basic research should be relocated. 9. In the above context it is important to recognise that the renewed mission for NIMR will not be delivered simply by relocating MRC scientists to a new building close to an academic hospital unless: (i) the research strengths and patient base at that hospital/institution complement the research strengths of the basic science, and the Institution also brings additional and essential strengths in increasingly critical areas such as chemistry, physics bioengineering and computing; and (ii) the Institute is fully embedded in the host Institution with appropriate joint governance enabling joint research strategy and appointments, shared facilities and coVee rooms, co-investment and integrated laboratories. A free-standing, self-governing building, even on a hospital campus, will not realise the proposed new mission—a few metres can be as isolating as a many miles. The Role of a Renewed NIMR in UK Biomedical Research 10. If the UK is to continue to compete at the international forefront of biomedical research, NIMR science should not be considered in isolation. Despite its influential past and the international standing of many NIMR scientists, the interdisciplinary nature of modern biomedical research, the need to eVectively link to clinical practice, and the increasing role of “big” science and expensive facilities, require that a “National Institute for Medical Research” is more than a relatively small and isolated Institute with limited clinical or medical infrastructure. NIMR is, after all, only around 5% of MRC activity and very small compared with the NIH campus in the USA. 11. In my view it would be a missed opportunity if, in renewing NIMR, the UK did not “think big” and take the opportunity to establish a true “National Institute” which can compete internationally in the modern world. 12. No single Institution in London (or elsewhere in the UK) oVers the range of scientific expertise (including physical sciences and engineering), clinical research excellence, and patient base to fully complement and strengthen all the Divisions of NIMR. Thus, in my opinion, scientific advantage would best be achieved by embedding individual Divisions of NIMR at the three or four distinct locations in London which best complement the Divisional research strengths. This would provide new opportunities for both NIMR scientists and cognate University researchers. A robust, overarching Governance and Management could ensure eVective co-ordination of the research of these Divisions of the Institute. 13. Additionally, it is sometimes forgotten that there are other MRC activities in London whose research also complements a renewed NIMR and, in sum, are more-or-less equivalent in size and activity to NIMR. These include my Institute (the CSC at Imperial) and the MRC Clinical Trials Unit and the MRC Laboratory of Molecular Cell Biology at UCL. The renewal and relocation of NIMR oVers a unique opportunity to co-ordinate all of these MRC activities with those of NIMR under an overarching governance “umbrella”, for example as Divisions of a new and much stronger Research Institute. 14. Co-ordination of the MRC intramural programmes across London would also serve to strengthen eVective links between the MRC the developing NHS Clinical Research Collaboration. In conclusion, I personally believe that the proposed renewal of NIMR, if distributed across three or four sites in London, provides a unique opportunity to develop a research Institute for the 20th century. Co-ordination of all relevant MRC activities, the NHS CRC, and the consequent co-operation and collaboration between more than one leading academic Institution, could put in place a research base which can truly compete on the world stage—a true National Institute. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 99 Memorandum from Professor Sir Philip Cohen, University of Dundee As the Director of a Medical Research Council Unit, I would like to add a few thoughts about the current debate as to whether NIMR should stay where it is or whether it should relocate to a Central London site. I apologise for being slightly past the deadline, but I understand that your committee will accept late submissions. Firstly, I would sincerely hope that the MRC will not be criticised for considering this possibility, which I believe to be timely for the following reasons. NIMR is not in a great location. I think that most people would agree that it would be much better if it were embedded in a Higher Education Institute and/or a Research-active hospital. Proximity to an HEI would greatly extend the range of its scientific interactions and create critical mass in particular areas that can be so crucial to setting up collaborations with the Pharmaceutical and Biotech industry.

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Proximity to a research-active hospital would expose it to the clinical culture that it lacks at present and encourage more doctors to undertake research training, the lack of which has been a major weakness in the UK medical system for many years Although everyone would agree that NIMR has a number of excellent scientists, it is not nearly the force it once was and its value for money can be questioned. For example, I recently commissioned ISI to compare the MRC Unit that I direct with the MRC Laboratory for Molecular Biology (LMB) and NIMR in terms of the number of times scientific papers published over the past 10 years are quoted by other scientists in their own publications. I then divided the number of citations by the annual cost to the MRC of funding each centre. NIMR came far below LMB (and even further behind my own Unit!). NIMR needs an increased commitment to translational research, and hence wealth creation, in which its track record is relatively weak. My own Unit is involved in one of the largest collaborations ever undertaken between the Pharmaceutical Industry and a UK research institution. The collaboration not only involves the eight diVerent research teams in my Unit but five other research teams working in complementary areas, who work in close proximity to the Unit in the School of Life Sciences at the University of Dundee. The critical mass created by these 13 research groups has been critical to the success of this venture. My personal view is that the LMB is really Britain’s NIMR, and I am also concerned that two of the three MRC Institutes in the UK (at NIMR and Hammersmith) are both located in London. I can see significant advantages for UK Biomedical Science as a whole if only part of NIMR moved to Central London (for example virology and immunology where obvious synergisms with clinical research are possible) while other research teams working in areas that lack critical mass at NIMR would be best relocated in MRC Units or University Departments elsewhere in the UK to create critical mass and so stimulate early-phase translational research. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 100 Professor Iain Robinson, National Institute for Medical Research I write to submit my views on the future of the NIMR. I have worked at NIMR for more than 25 years and have seen how the MRC and this Institute perform under diVerent CEOs and Directors in response to changing scientific and funding climates. As a current Head of Division (HoD), I have helped to construct, and strongly endorse, the views of the letters and statements from the HoD committee which you will have received, and I will not rehearse those arguments in detail here. Instead I would like to bring to your attention some broader concerns.

NIMR and Clinical Translation 1. There is justifiable interest in evolving structures that will result in an increased pace and eVectiveness of translating scientific discoveries into clinical practice. The question is how best to do this, and how NIMR could increase its eVectiveness in this regard. I comment on this as a scientist long engaged in exploiting two way translation and training across the science/clinical translation interface, running a Division containing both scientifically and clinically qualified staV, and benefiting from many discussions with hospital-based clinical colleagues in the UK and overseas, engaged in this activity. The NIMR’s written proposals to the Task Force for improving clinical translation were adopted in large part verbatim in the Task Force’s final recommendations for this major driver for change. I contributed heavily to these proposals, which are based on the premise that changes to NIMR to bring about long-term increments in translational capacity must be achieved without damaging the environment that fosters the scientific discovery process, and involves moving bodies, not brickwork. Most of the investment in the London university biomedical sciences is already channeled to Institutions already embedded on campuses with Hospitals. If despite this physical proximity, we have not avoided a deficit in UK translational capacity, why would relocating NIMR to a hospital site (to produce more of the same) improve this? What evidence did the Task Force obtain that physical relocation of a multidisciplinary independent science Institution, already interacting with many hospitals, would improve its clinical interactions by being adjacent to one hospital as part of a single HEI? 2. The primary problem for clinician scientists is their training and career development within the clinical academic environment, and protection of their time both whilst they are performing science, and also once they return to an environment with heavy NHS demands. Without this, the next generation of clinical scientists will not be able to capitalise in practice on their training. This is not something that relocating NIMR to a hospital will address, and requires serious discussions between MRC and the relevant clinical training authorities and the NHS. Indeed, and as I can testify in practice, the eVective insulation from NHS demands that the location of NIMR at Mill Hill currently aVords its young clinical visitors in training, is highly prized: close enough for regular contact—not too close for conflicting distractions. It is essential that the MRC take a long hard look at what already works well in practice at NIMR and why.

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3. MRC already has a major investment in its Clinical Sciences Centre (CSC) on a University/Hospital campus, whose focus is clearly towards clinical translation. It is not clear how the Task Force recommendations distinguish its vision of NIMR from that of the CSC, and how their location enhances their clinical translation activities, compared with those at NIMR. Does the MRC want to turn the NIMR into another CSC? If so, what would it lose and at what cost? If it is important to build more capacity in latestage patient-based research (which can only be done on a hospital site) why no mention of the possibility of investing new funds on several embedded small clinical research facilities, at clinical centres of excellence in diVerent specialties, rather than on a single hospital site, and making a separate smaller investment in developing the capacious Mill Hill site. Several senior clinicians, including those in Institutions bidding for NIMR have said to me that this would be a good way forward, not requiring the massive investment that moving NIMR would entail without any obvious increment in clinical research facilities.

Scientific Culture 4. A diVerence in approach that has emerged in discussions with potential partners is worthy of discussion. NIMR addresses very many areas of science, with relatively small groups representing diVerent areas of expertise. Experience has shown that this size allows ready interactions between all the Divisions on a daily basis—indeed it is diYcult to avoid! The NIMR concentrates on forming critical mass in interdiscisplinary interactions, through its lack of internal funding barriers or competition. In discussions with several HEI colleagues, it appears they have placed more emphasis on intradisciplinary focus, for example wishing to house all the developmental biologists together in one place, the structural biologists in another, immunologists in a third etc. This is the antithesis of what we experience at NIMR, and in my view less likely to facilitate truly cross-disciplinary interactions. As most of the work in Universities is externally funded there is a level of competition amongst similar groups which can impede free exchange of unpublished data. The alternative collaborative culture at NIMR takes a long time to establish, and MRC risks losing this by embedding NIMR in a much larger HEI culture. This may be fine in principle, but in practice it will eventually lose its independence, not least in the minds of potential collaborators from competing HEIs.

Broader Management Issues 5. I believe that the disaVection with the current MRC management approach extends beyond NIMR, and has lost the unquestioned confidence of the medical and scientific communities that once used to admire and respect this organisation. As an MRC PhD student 30 years ago I joined an organisation intent on encouraging high quality scientific and clinical research arising from the community to whom it listened. In my view the current MRC style sets too much store in an amateurish corporate ethos, where mission statements, vision statements, scoping exercises and target setting distract the organisation from concentrating all its eVorts in finding and supporting the best science. Rather than listening to its communities before formulating policy, the MRC has drifted towards more directed research initiatives and strategies formulated by internal committees, communicating these in a top-down inappropriate fashion, both with its own staV and with the wider biomedical community. 6. As evidence, I cite the FIS review of NIMR. There was no consultation with the scientists at NIMR as to what their vision was, recommendations were made to move NIMR at half the size to Cambridge to “improve” clinical translation. This was decided without the FIS committee (who were Council members) informing themselves of any of the extensive existing clinical interactions that already existed at NIMR. Following a hasty public consultation exercise which condemned the decision and the process, this was abandoned. When I questioned senior MRC administrative staV about this, I was told it was better to announce a strategy without consultation and wait for potential criticism, rather than consult first. Why do I bring this up now? When the Task Force was set up, the FIS recommendations in respect of NIMR were to be set aside. I now understand that the evaluations of the relative merits of the bids specifically for the renewed NIMR will be guided by the principles of FIS, a steering committee of Council members aided by a consultant, and decided by Council without external advice on the real merits of the bids. There will be no further reference to the Task Force whose recommendations for a move were conditional on improvements over what could be achieved at Mill Hill. They presumably have some criteria in mind. What are they? This continued lack of clarity does not inspire confidence that MRC has learnt from its mistakes. 7. Whatever the rights and wrongs, the public record shows a clear breakdown of trust and respect between the MRC CEO and his staV at NIMR. I believe one underlying contributory problem is that the scientific/clinical members of MRC Council are drawn exclusively from the university-based part of the MRC funded community, so that the many intramural staV at MRC Institutes have no direct representation on Council. This has been justified as avoiding conflict of interest, but this is entirely specious, since the University-based members are often actual or potential recipients of MRC funding. They are not disinterested parties when considering intramural v extramural spend, or independent Institutes v embedded university groups. I do not for one moment suggest that Council members have behaved in anything other than exemplary fashion—they are eminent people working hard for MRC and have a diYcult job to do. My

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point is that Council composition lacks balance. By having some input from its major intramural Institutes, some misunderstandings and lack of communication that now characterises the relationship between the MRC CEO and NIMR might have been avoided. 8. I hope that as a result of this enquiry, it will not be too late for the Council to think again about a straightforward open and transparent comparison of the costs and benefits of the Mill Hill option (not “an enhanced base case” ) with the other two bids from KCL and UCL, and to take some external independent experienced advice on the merits of the cases. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 101 Memorandum from the BioIndustry Association

Executive Summary 1. The BioIndustry Association (the “BIA”) is the trade association for innovative, emerging small to medium sized enterprises in the UK’s bioscience sector. Established in 1989, the BIA’s mission is to encourage and promote a thriving, financially sound sector of the UK economy, built upon developments across the biosciences, to create economic growth, employment and an expanding skills base. There are over 550 bioscience companies operating in the UK employing over 40,000 people. 2. The BIA has over 350 members6, the majority of whom are involved in realising the human health benefits that biotechnology promises. The BIA seeks to represent the interests of these innovative companies to the Government and regulatory authorities and to present positive evidence based suggestions for policy change that assist a healthy UK bioscience sector and benefit the UK as whole. 3. The UK is already a global leader in biosciences, second only to the US, with 18 profitable bioscience companies and over 40 marketed products. The industry employs more than 25,000 people and generates revenues of over £3 billion a year. British biotechnology companies account for 43% of all biotechnology drugs in advanced clinical trials in Europe. 4. The BIA welcomes this opportunity to contribute to the Science and Technology Committee’s consultation on The Future of the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR). The NIMR performs a vital function currently, but this role could be enhanced to add further value to the research industry in the UK. Moreover, the siting of the NIMR in Mill Hill has always been somewhat quixotic, and we welcome a thorough review of its location. 5. This submission addresses three issues which the BIA feel are crucial considerations in assessing the future viability and function of the NIMR: (a) The role of translational research. (b) The future location of the NIMR. (c) The question of co-locating an industrial park with the NIMR at Mill Hill.

The Future of the National Institute for Medical Research 6. I would like to comment on three specific aspects of the NIMR and its future that I believe the Medical Research Council (MRC) addressed in their review.

The role of translational research 7. There is a big gap, in the UK and globally, between what is known in the lab and what happens in the clinic. In part, this is a natural consequence of the inherent diVerence in the pace of advances in each area, but there are also structural aspects. We are experiencing major changes in our basic understanding of biology and the causes of disease driven by a scientific focus to understand basic biological mechanisms. And yet medicine seems still to have almost an 18th century structure with its practitioners divided into organ-focused specialists so that, for example, inflammation in the brain is treated by a neurologist and inflammation in a joint is treated by a Rheumatologist. There is a fundamental challenge to bring the benefits of research into the practice of medicine (and to have the real day to day challenges of clinicians inform research) and a real role for an institute that would focus on leading that change. With the possible exception of Cancer Research UK, this is not being addressed in the U.K. The US National Institutes of Health are planning to play a big role in this area and the UK also needs to address it. 6

A full list of BIA members is available on the BIA website at www.bioindustry.org

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Location 8. The NIMR’s location “out at Mill Hill” has always given it a sense of physical isolation. Oddly, it almost seems closer and easier to go from Central London to Cambridge or Oxford than it does to go to Mill Hill. Whatever role the institute has in the future, a Mill Hill location will not encourage collaboration. This would be particularly important for a translational research institute since close collaboration with clinicians and other health/research professionals would be vital. It seems unanswerable that it should be co-located on a site with world-class research and hospital facilities. Building an industrial park co-located with the NIMR at Mill Hill 9. The idea of intentionally planning a significant industrial campus around a research institute to encourage industrial collaboration is not viable. Geography is a less important factor than scientists’ personal networks when it comes to establishing new companies or commercialising science generally. The most important thing a research institute can do to attract industry is to be great at what it does. It should also be open to scientists being networked with relevant companies, and more importantly their staV, and themselves being open to the possibility of commercialising their work. If those things are in place, established industry will collaborate with the institute and new companies will form. Some of these may initially want to co-locate with the institute but not enough to justify investment in a site in an expensive area. 10. Whilst high tech companies may locate near to where their founding scientists are or want to be, more often they form in areas where they can quickly recruit the right management and staV as they grow, and access networks of colleagues and advisers etc which is why clusters form. Clusters have grown organically and it has proven diYcult to intentionally plan them. 11. The relative isolation of Mill Hill would be a drawback to the ultimate success of such a research park. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 102 Memorandum from Professor Andrew Garner, University of Manchester Comments on the Proposed Relocation of NIMR The high-level strategic mission—including the areas of biomedical research that the institute will focus on: — All research environments, including universities, must sharpen their focus. It is no longer possible to attain critical mass in all areas of biomedical research. — Any national institute for medical research must integrate fundamental and clinical research. The emphasis should be on translational research, including prevention of disease. — A flagship MRC institution such as NIMR should be forcing the pace in key areas of greatest clinical need and working with the academic, health and biopharmaceutical sectors. An understanding of the institute’s national role, eg, in training and providing centralised facilities: — World leading expertise in a few, clinically relevant research fields will naturally lead to a recognisable role as a national training facility; pre-eminent institutions are characterised by a sustainable “youth team” and an ability to attract “trainees” on an international scale. — NIMR can only be expected to provide a UK-wide service, whether in training or technology, in one or two distinct areas. There are a number emergent fields in which the barriers to entry such that the national can only aVord one. A description of how clinical links might be strengthened: — Physical co-location of basic and clinical research centres is a major driver of translational research, for example in facilitating patient access and joint appointments/projects. — It is vital that basic and clinical scholars interact on a daily basis and that eVort is expended in fostering an interactive environment; physical co-location alone is not suYcient to build strong clinical links. An outline of other potential partnership arrangements, eg, with academic research organisations, industry, other funders of biomedical research: — The re-engineered NIMR should work hard to build a range of partnerships in order to increase awareness of clinical and commercial pressures that impact on translation of basic biomedical science into improved clinical outcomes. — Given that Pharma is seeking to work in partnership with the NHS and looks increasingly to academia to outsource basic research, then co-location at a site combining academic, healthcare and industrial sectors could potentially have the greatest impact.

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A specific location and an indication of overall size, structure and major on-site facilities: — Change can be disruptive as evidenced by mergers in the higher educational and pharmaceutical sectors. Whilst the character of NIMR will change, a reinvigorated and more relevant institute is likely to emerge. MRC will need to minimise the impact of change on current high-performing research groups. — Size, structure and ethos will depend on location. It strikes me that three possibilities exist. Remaining in London has some obvious advantages and a move to either Cambridge or Oxford would give immediate credibility. — A more radical solution would be to move from the overheated South-east to the North-west where a comparable environment exists combining the UK’s largest university, NHS trust and concentration of pharmaceutical R&D with lower costs, better communications and higher disease burdens. Some ideas on leadership and internal governance: — Strong, clinically-minded leadership will be crucial. A charismatic, team-builder who is able devote his or her full time attention to the new institute will be needed. — Performance-based governance that combines a culture of accountability with a tight touch style of management should characterise the institute. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 103 Memorandum from Sir David Cooksey, Advent Venture Partners My principal activity is as Chairman of Advent Venture Partners, a substantial venture capital firm investing in innovative early stage companies in the fields of life sciences, information technology and communications. I have also been involved in public policy issues having been Chairman of the Audit Commission and the Small Business Investment Taskforce. I am currently Chairman of the Committee of the Non-Executive Directors of the Bank of England and of Diamond Light Source Ltd (DLS), the joint venture between the OYce of Science and Technology and the Wellcome Trust. DLS is constructing the new synchrotron light source at Rutherford Appleton Laboratory. I was formerly a Governor of the Wellcome Trust. Most recently I have been invited to chair the MRC/DH Health Research Delivery Group to oversee joint working between these bodies to improve the eVectiveness of clinical research in the UK. The Chancellor announced extra resources for clinical research building over four years to £100 million per annum for the MRC in his 2004 Spending Review and a similar figure was allocated to the NHS R&D budget in his 2004 Budget. The Delivery Group is responsible for ensuring that these extra resources significantly improve medical translational research in the UK. This concentration of resources for translational research followed two reports that were issued in November 2003. The first was from a group headed by Professor John Bell at the Academy of Medical Sciences which pointed to the current shortcomings of clinical research in the UK and the second was from a joint DH/DTI/BioIndustry Association study group, the Biosciences Innovation and Growth Team (BIGT), chaired by me. It demonstrated the opportunity to build a substantial Biosciences sector in the UK by 2015 but showed that this could only be achieved by co-ordinated eVorts between the DH, NHS, MRC and the biosciences industry. Government’s immediate response was to set up the UK Clinical Research Collaboration under the leadership of Sir John Pattison (and since his retirement by Professor Sally Davies). This has been complemented by the MRC/DH Health Research Delivery Group. Much needs to be done but a good start has been made with a real commitment from the NHS, academia and the pharmaceutical/ biosciences industries. The prize for success is very large in terms of better health for patients and more successful pharmaceutical/bioscience industries located in the UK. In the case of NIMR, I must emphasise that I have no direct involvement in it myself, and I would not wish to comment on the decision to move it to central London or on the specific choice of a partner organisation. On the other hand, I am well aware of the scientific reputation of NIMR and of the very significant contribution it has made to the field of medical research in this country. Its international reputation for scientific excellence is without question. It is very important that we preserve this continuing contribution in whatever form it may emerge. In the broader context, it has been very pleasing to see the way that the MRC is responding to the new translational research agenda. It has embraced the requirements of the BIGT report and is redirecting its eVorts alongside the revised approach by the NHS R&D function to implement the BIGT recommendations.

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In this regard it is important that NIMR can play its full part in the evolving translational research agenda. I am persuaded that more progress will be made if the NIMP is located in a medical school environment with good access to clinical medicine where the broadest range of supporting disciplines relevant to its fields of research are available. This should include access to secure animal facilities, which inevitably will reduce the choice of partner organisations. I commend the Committee to address the issues identified above in their overall consideration of the future of NIMR. 17 November 2004

APPENDIX 104 Memorandum from the Departments of Trade and Industry and Health

Introduction 1. The Departments of Trade and Industry and Health welcome this inquiry. This paper sets out the involvement of OST and DH in the MRC’s review of the future of NIMR. 2. It is the responsibility of the MRC, guided by its Boards and other structures, to decide what medical science it should fund to deliver its Charter objectives and its mission. OST’s input focuses on monitoring MRC’s performance in relation to agreed objectives, ensuring its activities are consistent with government policies and aims as set out for example in: — “The Quinquennial review of the Grant Awarding Research Councils” published in November 2001 (weblink: http://www.ost.gov.uk/research/councils/quinquennial/index.htm; — “The Science Budget 2003–04 to 2005–06” published in November 2002 (weblink; http:// www.ost.gov.uk/research/funding/budget03-06/; and — the “Science and innovation investment framework 2004–2014” published in July this year. (See http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/spending–review/spend–sr04/associated–documents/ spending–sr04–science.cfm). 3. In relation to MRC’s review of NIMR particular attention has been given to ensuring that the process MRC follows is clear, transparent and has involved staV and other stakeholders in appropriate ways. OST believes that MRC’s review of NIMR is consistent with its remit and with these requirements. 4. The science at NIMR has consistently been highly rated. It makes an important contribution to the excellence of the UK biomedical base. OST is therefore pleased that MRC is looking for the best way to sustain and build on this as it considers the future of NIMR in the academic and health care environments of the future. 5. In that context, OST welcomes the MRC’s intentions to strengthen translational research in the UK to improve still further the benefits of our excellence basic research for the benefits of patients and the economy. How best to achieve this goal is a matter for MRC to decide in light of all the options and competing priorities.

Government Representation on MRC Council 6. A senior OST oYcial sits as observer on the Governing Council of each of the Research Councils to ensure its activities are consistent with government policies as described in paragraph 2 above. 7. Senior Health Department oYcials (including the Director of Research and Development at the Department of Health) also sit on MRC’s Council to ensure that their views and priorities are considered by the Council during its deliberations.

2001 Quinquennial Review of the Research Councils 8. The first Quinquennial Review of the Research Councils took place in 2001. This concluded that the Research Council system was working well and made a number of recommendations on how to optimise this. 9. This Quinquennial Review considered the role of institutes and the Councils review of these. It indicated that Councils should, as part of their review, consider strategic options for the future of institutes and encouraged collocation of institutes with universities. It suggested that reviews should question the need for Institutes, and consider alternative ways of meeting these needs, including changes of ownership or management.

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Review of MRC Units/Institutes 10. The MRC has a responsibility to keep under review all the scientific work it funds within its establishments and directly-supported units. It undertakes to do this in a fair and open manner and to ensure that the same standards of objectivity are applied to all scientific reviews. 11. In line with the Quinquennial Review, MRC routinely reviews its institutes and units on a five yearly cycle. The review includes an evaluation of the remit and value-four-money of scientific work undertaken by the institute/unit and the use of resources in its research establishments. MRC Council is advised on whether direct support remains appropriate, on the remit of proposals for future work, and whether the allocation of resources is cost-eVective and consistent with its overall research priorities and portfolio. 12. The current review of NIMR is appropriate in that it is normal practice to consider ongoing need and overall investment in a unit/Institute at a strategic points such as when the tenure of the director is due to expire. In the case of NIMR, the need for substantial forthcoming capital investment to underpin the longterm future of the Institute also made a strategic review timely.

Large Facilities Roadmap and Funding Issues 13. In many areas of science, UK researchers need access to large scale facilities of increasing cost and complexity. This is essential for them to stay internationally competitive. The Government and the Research Councils produced the UK’s first Large Scale Facilities Strategic Road Map in 2001, and revised it in 2003. This Road Map sets out a 15-year forward look at the most important large facilities which UK scientists wish to see completed. These facilities are both national and international, across the whole range of scientific disciplines. The Road Map has enabled significant discussions with international partners and within RCUK on the prioritisation of major facilities. 14. The Government has set aside a Large Facilities Capital Fund, to help Research Councils meet the irregular capital demands associated with construction of major facilities such as the redevelopment of the Institute of Animal Health at Pirbright, the Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Cambridge and a replacement marine research vessel. 15. Demand always exceeds available funds and priorities need to be agreed across all areas of the science base. It will be for the MRC to make the case for inclusion of NIMR in the Road Map, and for any funding from the Large Facilities Capital Fund. Funding from the Large Facilities Capital Fund is generally conditional upon a council itself contributing a significant proportions of the overall capital funds required (from their own budget and/or through agreement with a third party). When the MRC has decided its preferred way forward for NIMR, MRC and OST will need to discuss how any major capital funding from the science budget should be addressed within the Roadmap process.

The Lyon’s Review 16. As an NDBP, the location of MRC’s Head OYce was considered as part of the Lyons review. In addition to its Head OYce MRC, seven of its 32 research institutes and units are located in London. The review concluded that the siting of these was a matter for the Council to consider in the light of its scientific remit and following the process set out in the Quinquennial Review and that they should not therefore be included in the Lyons Review of MRC.

Department of Health 17. The UK Health Departments and the MRC have a common interest in promoting research into all areas of medical and related science with the aims of improving the health and quality of life of the UK public and contributing to the wealth of the nation. 18. Since 1981, formal agreements have provided the basis for a partnership between these organisations. The current Partnership Agreement states that MRC will take into account, before reaching any funding decision, the needs, priorities and realities of the NHS when it is considering funding R&D which will have immediate or future cost implications for the NHS and that it will balance these against all other relevant criteria. It also states that the Health Departments will seek to ensure that the NHS meets legitimate service support and treatment costs associated with MRC-funded research. 20. The UK Clinical Research Collaboration was established in April 2004 and brings together the major stakeholders in clinical research in the UK including the MRC and the UK Health Departments. It aims to harness the UK’s strengths in biomedical research to improve the nation’s health and increase the nation’s wealth. The UKCRC is considering the areas necessary to deliver this aim, including translational research. MRC’s consideration of the future of NIMR was already well advanced when UKCRC held its first meeting, but all UKCRC partners will clearly need to take account of UKCRC’s emerging views and plans as they consider their future support for clinical and translational research across the country.

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21. Most recently, the MRC and the UK Health Departments have formed a Joint MRC/DH Health Research Delivery Group to co-ordinate their work in areas of common interest including developing agreed positions on research issues to be discussed and developed into proposals at UKCRC. This group will play an important part in discussing and agreeing a common way forward on MRC and DH support for translational and clinical research. 23 November 2004

APPENDIX 105 Memorandum from Professor David Trentham 1. I endorse fully and without reservation the several responses of the Heads of Divisions’ Committee, NIMR, to the Task Force and to the MRC Council’s preliminary conclusions on the future of NIMR. 2. It would appear to be without international precedent for a major and highly successful National Medical Research Institute to have its autonomy reduced as would occur if it were to be relocated within the confines of a University that is itself being required to commit major resources. It is likely that such a move will also be detrimental to the autonomy of the MRC. It is unfortunate that the Council of the MRC is unbalanced with respect to representation from its Research Institutes. 3. MRC policy and management of Clinical Research is a major issue. It should be dealt with separately from considerations of the future of NIMR. This does justice neither to Clinical Research nor to NIMR. An MRC Task Force on Clinical Research could well recommend greater participation by its Institutes and Units in clinical research and training but that is a complementary issue to the future of NIMR. 4. One of the real privileges of my time at NIMR was to carry out my research in an Institute that has made and is making such a profound contribution to major infectious diseases and particularly those of the developing world. It was especially important to me to see my colleagues in the biophysical sciences have such positive and productive interactions with their more biologically and medically trained colleagues on a day to day basis. Any diminution of this very special character of NIMR, of which the United Kingdom has every reason to be proud, must not be allowed to happen both for humanitarian and political reasons. 5. I am aware that the MRC when considering the future of NIMR is proposing to act within a formula that may in a legalistic sense be compatible with the guidelines of the Treasury “Green Book” (http:// greenbook.treasury.gov.uk/). However the spirit of those guidelines, which seek to ensure prudent fiscal management, has not been followed. This Green Book expects several procedures to be adopted amongst which is (Paragraph 2.8); “The “do minimum” option should always be carried forward in the shortlist, to act as a check against more interventionist action.” In this context I find quite inexplicable a quotation from the MRC CEO in 17 November 2004 Daily News of The Scientist. One paragraph reads: On the question of the current Mill Hill site being considered as an option, Blakemore said it would “complicate” the process of moving forward. “It was not logical. If Mill Hill was the default choice, then the implication is that nothing else could be considered at any stage in the future.” I and I hope the Science and Technology Committee will disagree with this logic—the implication that “nothing else could be considered” does not follow. Furthermore avoiding consideration of the Mill Hill site for NIMR on an equal basis with other options directly contradicts the recommended procedure of the Green Book. 6. The MRC is to be condemned for the extremely serious damage to NIMR StaV morale. Amongst several issues are the mixed messages from the MRC that have emanated from the outset of this saga concerning timing of a possible move. To give an example, at his most recent meeting with NIMR StaV the CEO listened to and discussed with them their diYculties in pursuing animal based experiments on the King’s College London site, and yet he is quoted in the same November 17 issue of the Scientist Daily News as follows “ . . . I would ask them (ie NIMR StaV) to remember two things. One is that the review is about the NIMR in 20 or 30 years’ time. Some of them are thinking it’s an immediate crisis for them and their work . . . ”. It is demoralising and worse to have the CEO give one picture to MRC StaV and quite a diVerent one to the public at large. 7. No appreciation so far as I am aware has been made of the continuing major changes that will occur in audiovisual communication and in data and other information exchange. These will surely enhance communication and collaboration of an already interactive Institute from its present site at minimal cost. 8. The losses on moving from the NIMR site from both personnel and facilities viewpoints are incalculable. It is incredibly diYcult to create excellence but easy to be destructive. The idea that an Institute and its environment such as exist at NIMR can be recreated is possible but I rate the odds at less than one in 100. That a successor to Sir John Skehel will lead NIMR to even greater scientific achievements should certainly be the goal and one that has a reasonable chance of success on the present site but a much lower probability elsewhere. David Trentham’s background: I have 43 years broad experience in basic medical research and 26 years senior administrative responsibility. I have conducted my research and teaching in many organisations as follows with time in years listed in brackets: Cambridge University (3), Salk Institute (1), MIT (1), Bristol

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University (11), University of Pennsylvania (7), NIMR (19), King’s College London (1). I was elected FRS in 1982, was Chair of the Department of Biochemistry and Biophysics in the Medical School at the University of Pennsylvania and Chair of a Cardiovascular Graduate student PhD programme (incorporating MD/PhD students) across the University of Pennsylvania, and have received more than 25 years continuous NIH grant support that together give me significant experience of basic medical research in the USA as well as the UK. 24 November 2004

APPENDIX 106 Memorandum from the Academy of Medical Sciences The Academy welcomes the opportunity to provide evidence for the Science and Technology Committee’s deliberations on the future of the National Institute for Medical Research. In preparing this paper, the Academy took the view that, given the considerable strategic investment associated with the review of the NIMR, it was important to focus the Academy response around basic principles. 1. The Academy is convinced that the future health of biomedical science in the UK requires investment in an appropriately renewed national institute. Such an institute should oVer outstanding scientists the opportunity to pursue long-term goals with secure long-term funding, and without the distraction of shortterm grant applications and major teaching and managerial duties. The Academy recognises the past success of the MRC strategy in support of medical research in this way. 2. The Academy believes that a national institute for medical research should concentrate on basic biomedical science. Such an institute should be complementary to the existing investments by the MRC, such as the Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Cambridge, the Clinical Sciences Centre at Imperial and institutes funded by the major research charities, such as the Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute and the Cancer Research UK institutes. 3. Increasingly, basic biomedical science is highly dependent on productive interactions with chemists, physicists, mathematicians, computer scientists and engineers. These relationships are diYcult to achieve without active measures to promote interaction or close geographical proximity. A renewed national institute must not be isolated from such resources and steps should be taken to ensure wide connectivity. 4. As well as pursuing long-term major research programmes, such an institute should be able to draw upon a supply of outstanding young people in a wide range of relevant disciplines. 5. The Academy has been a strong proponent for the MRC and other research funding agencies to place more emphasis on the translation of basic medical science into the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of disease. See the Academy’s report Strengthening Clinical Research, published in October 2003. [The opportunity to utilise basic research technologies and skills to solve problems associated with well-defined clinical problems has been identified by funding agencies worldwide as being a major strategic target.] However, the Academy is unconvinced that such translational research should be a core activity of a national institute. A culture should be fostered that will allow the institute to relate to clinical research centres where research is translated into practice. 6. While the institute should have a ready means of translating its basic biomedical research into clinical practice, that process ultimately depends on the major medical centres and is essentially a distributed function. There are many centres of medical excellence in the UK and it would be in the best interests of a national institute to collaborate where there are the best facilities and with those best able to conduct translational research. 7. The Academy further recommends that consideration be given to establishing connectivity between the national institute and the networks being established for clinical research through the UK Clinical Research Collaboration. The UKCRC is committed to the development and training of a new generation of clinical scientists.

Conclusion The Academy hopes that the Science and Technology Committee will consider the opportunities now presented for MRC strategic investment in both basic and translational research—an investment that looks well into the future. 25 November 2004

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APPENDIX 107 Memorandum from Professor Critchley and Professor Calder, University of Edinburgh We understand that the Science and Technology Select Committee has been considering the future location of the MRC funded National Institute for Medical Research at Millhill and has been consulting on this issue. We write to contribute to the debate by expressing our unambiguous view concerning the best location for such a Medical Research Institute. We are in no doubt about the added value of location adjacent to a busy (preferably teaching) hospital which is dealing with the clinical problems which are ultimately the target of the research agenda of the scientists. Such a location benefits greatly from the opportunity for exchange of ideas between basic scientists, clinical academics and medical specialists. Those who work “at the bedside” are then in the position to interact with colleagues working “at the bench” in active regular interchange of ideas in relation to the important questions that need to be addressed. Translatable studies are more easily executed from the laboratory when the patients are in close proximity. Geographical isolation inevitably makes collaborations more diYcult. Joint meetings between hospital and laboratory staV become a reality thereby providing opportunities for each to recognise the others’ needs where there is a common goal namely optimisation of patient care. In Edinburgh, we have been privileged to have enjoyed several such arrangements for several decades. Our own participation lies within the Centre for Reproductive Biology which is a tripartite collaboration consisting of the Medical Research Council Unit of Human Reproductive Sciences together with the University Division of Reproductive and Developmental Sciences and the National Health Service Centre for Reproductive Health located in the Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh. When the hospital faced relocation two years ago to a greenfield site, the strategic decision was taken that the three components of the Centre for Reproductive Biology would remain in close association; indeed with the opportunity for new building currently under construction as the Research Institute for Medical Cell Biology, this integration has been enhanced. The consequence of this is that clinicians and basic scientists identify as being part of one organisation with common goals. Joint seminars take place and all of the professionals contribute to both undergraduate and postgraduate training. Clinical research is a central part of the culture of the hospital as a whole and there is a wholly positive attitude about the benefits of a research agenda which is held by all staV (clinical and non-clinical) as well as the many patients who themselves feel part of that culture of common pursuit of the highest quality of clinical care and who willingly participate in the relevant research endeavors. We believe that the conduct of basic research in a clinical vacuum detracts from its impact on the eVective development of enhanced treatment opportunities and consequently runs the risk of failing to achieve the full potential of this vital investment. November 2004

APPENDIX 108 Memorandum from Professor John Bell, University of Oxford The Medical Research Council has an important challenge in determining the future of NIMR as it represents the single largest recurrent expenditure for the MRC and, with the change in Director and the possibility of undertaking significant capital structure investment to bring it up to date, it is an appropriate time to consider the strategic issues associated with MRC investment now and in the future. In considering the likely demands on MRC strategic investment over the next 10 to 20 years, it is important to recognise that the wealth of information emerging from basic science over the last 20 years has yet to be applied successfully for the benefit of human disease. There appears now an opportunity to use the technologies developed in basic science to address some of these issues and, internationally, the focus is increasingly on the relevance of basic research rather than basic research for its own sake. It is unlikely that the MRC will move in any other direction over the next 20 years. This should not, however, polarise a view about diVerent types of biomedical science. There are no clearly defined borders between basic, translational and clinical research. They all relate importantly to each other and it is this connectivity which will be important in any model for the future of NIMR. The central question that the Science and Technology Committee are considering relates to the size, shape and location of this national institute. The NIMR in its current location has several considerable strengths. It has substantial space in which to develop and grow and has perhaps the best animal facility in the UK. It is clearly limited, however, by the lack of access to the major physical sciences (physics, chemistry and engineering) and the lack of a major teaching hospital with clinical and translational research associated with it. Despite these substantial barriers, NIMR has succeeded in undertaking some important translational research. For example, the Director’s programme on influenza is in every sense translational and of major relevance to human health. The issue is not, therefore, whether NIMR has succeeded in achieving some of the goals necessary for a National Institute for Medical Research, but whether it is optimally positioned or whether it could be considerably more successful if it was relocated.

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My judgement is that the likelihood of improving the relevance of research activities at Mill Hill and using their basic science strengths to drive excellent translational work would be greatly improved by proximity to a major university teaching hospital. The Institute, for example, has had a very poor record in training clinician scientists which must be a major goal for all MRC functions in the future. There is little doubt that the distance for NIMR from academic teaching hospitals has made this job much more diYcult. It is formally possible that this National Institute could achieve this goal if it remained in its current location. I agree, however, with the conclusions of the MRC Taskforce that, if one is looking strategically over the next 20 to 30 years, the current geographical location is by no means ideal and co-location with other sciences would greatly enhance the performance of the Institution. One could tolerate a wide range of options here and much will depend on what resource the MRC is able to spend both on relocation and recurrent running expenses. I hope these comments are helpful. 25 November 2004

APPENDIX 109 Memorandum from Professor James Fawcett, Cambridge University I write as an active scientist with some knowledge of NIMR from the inside and a view from the outside. My current position is Chairman of the Cambridge University Centre for Brain Repair, which is partially funded by an MRC cooperative group grant. I was a PhD student at NIMR some years ago, and have visited the Institute and collaborated with one of the scientific divisions over many years. 1. NIMR is the largest item of MRC expenditure, and it is clearly correct that its eVectiveness and value for money relative to other calls on the MRC, and relative to its title and intended role should be examined. At a time when a substantial proportion of Alpha A- rated programme project and centre applications, of a similar standard to work in NIMR, are turned down, NIMR needs to demonstrate an exceptional level of performance. 2. Scientific achievement at NIMR. The level of scientific achievement at NIMR is generally of a high order, as confirmed by the recent review process. The best known groups work in developmental biology and in immunology. There is a good level of collaborative working between most of the groups. The research is almost all at the cellular/molecular level with little interaction with clinical medicine. 3. Advantages of keeping NIMR at Mill Hill. The Mill Hill site provides ample space and good facilities. The new animal facilities are large and excellent. Because of the isolated nature of the site, it is possible to maintain tight security. The current faculty mostly works well together, and clearly does not wish the disruption that a move would bring. 4. Advantages of closing NIMR. The directly funded budget of NIMR from the MRC is £31 million a year. The total cost is considerably greater. This would fund an extra 100 programme grants in Universities, or 500 project grants. The site has considerable value, and the money released could relocate groups from NIMR and fund new initiatives. The relocation of groups to universities would benefit higher education and university research.

5. Advantages of relocating NIMR to a central site. 5.1 Training. The current NIMR is not a good site for training PhD students, and has no contact with undergraduates. Students are isolated from the type of training courses that are run in universities, and from the large student bodies that provide a good learning, training and social environment. Relocation to a site near a major university would improve the training experience of young scientists. 5.2 Education. At a time when UK universities are struggling to maintain their research base and to maintain educational standards, it is not sensible to remove some of the best scientists from the educational environment and sequestrate them in large isolated institutes. If NIMR were moved to a major university, it would greatly benefit both university education and research. 5.3 Clincal and translational research. NIMR at present is distant from a major hospital, and therefore has few links to clinicians and clinical research. Central London provides these links in profusion, with several of main specialist clinical research centres nearby. 5.4 NIMR scientific careers. NIMR is large, but does not always provide the stimulation needed for scientists to maintain their productivity until retirement. Links to a university would provide more varied and long term intellectual stimulus to the scientific staV, and also provide alternative career paths to those whose work has gone oV the boil. 5.5 Public engagement in Science. A National Institute for Medical Research should be open and available to the public, and play a part in fostering public understanding of and sympathy with science. The current site of NIMR, and its fortress-like stance, prevent this.

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6. Conclusion. NIMR has an enviable reputation in basic biological research. Moving it to a central site associated with a university would greatly increase its potential and influence. In central London it could fulfill the role suggested by its title. I would have thought that the staV of the Institute, when presented with the opportunity to set up a new and enhanced institute, would have jumped at the chance, and I slightly at a loss to understand why they view a move to central London so negatively. 25 November 2004

APPENDIX 110 Memorandum from Professor Tony Minson, Department of Pathology, Cambridge University The UK needs a National Institute of Medical Research and it needs to be located on a single site. In my view any attempt to locate the Institute on more than one site will create a “virtual institute” that will quickly loose its identity. Defining the remit of the Institute is more diYcult. As the MRC task force noted, investment in a new Institute will take at least a decade and priorities in the future are uncertain. The remit of the Institute should therefore be basic and translational medical research and should remain suYciently broad to respond to changing priorities. It is crucial that the Institute has eVective clinical links but I question whether this can be achieved by association or co-location with a single hospital, because it is unlikely that any one hospital will provide the necessary range of specialities. I note, for example, the current focus of NTMR on infectious disease, neuroscience and development. While there are hospitals in London with excellent clinical expertise in each of these areas, no single hospital could provide the patients or provide high level clinical expertise to cover them all. Doubtless the emphasis at NTMR will change, but the point is made. It would be unfortunate if the priorities of a national centre were driven by the clinical remit of a single hospital. The challenge, then, is to achieve eVective links with multiple clinical centres while locating the NIMR on a single site. It does not seem to me that current proposals meet this challenge. Finally, we cannot ignore the problem of research with experimental animals. In its current location NIMIR has excellent accommodation for experimental animals and has the necessary security arrangements in place. The use of experimental animals will remain essential to the success of NIMR for the foreseeable future. Any proposal to re-locate NIMR, regardless of the site, must face up to the realities and costs of planning, building and running a large new animal facility. Recent experience in Cambridge and Oxford suggests that this is a key issue. 16 November 2004

APPENDIX 111 Memorandum from Professor Frank Grosveld, Erasmus Medical Center, Rotterdam I would like to comment on one of the major arguments, being used to justify the relocation of the MRC NIMR, namely the fact that the basic research should be placed close to a clinical setting to ensure its translation to the clinical practice. It is simply false. I am doing basic research in related fields. I started my research group at NIMR in Mill Hill, stayed there for more than 10 years and then moved to the Netherlands to the Erasmus Medical Center (Rotterdam). This center is a fusion between the biggest Academic Hospital in the country and the medical faculty of the Erasmus University. My department is working with several clinical departments. However our research is slowed down rather than the opposite by being close to a clinical setting, even though some of these collaborations work well. Perhaps most telling is that my best research projects and groups are not associated with clinical departments (the exception is the genomic analysis of cancers, but that can hardly be classified as basic research as it is in fact of a diagnostic nature). Many institutions will often claim that they have an excellent basic research programme, when in fact this is not the case. Perhaps the best example is the MRC’s own Clinical Research Center on the Hammersmith site. It was set up to have basic research close to the clinic with clinicians participating in or running the research. However the example they present as their best case is one of a very good research programme run by a clinician, but the work is unrelated to the clinic and his clinical work is not even done at the same site. Over the years I have become convinced that the argument to close basic research institutes like the one in Mill Hill and place it much closer to a clinical setting to be able to eYciently do medical research, is in fact only part of a struggle about power, control and funds by a community that is increasingly overrun by the incredible speed of modern basic science. The pressure on basic research is also increasingly accompanied (at least in my country) by political pressure from central Government and parliament that all research has to be “useful” or “applicable”. Most progress is not made that way as it is often unpredictable and depending to a large extent on serendipity.

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This does not mean that I think that science should not be brought closer to medicine, but instead of the “collaboration model” we have tried for 10 years (and are continuing where it is fruitful), we have changed tactics to close the gap with the medical community by bringing much more science education to the medical students. The idea is of course that in future they will automatically be much more sensitive to integrating basic research in their clinical departments. We therefore started a MSc Molecular Medicine programme for the best and most motivated medical students. It includes a year of basic research and is a great success. When they complete the MSc and their medical degree, we make it easy for them to come back for a PhD doing basic research as part of their medical specialization. For example I presently have a PhD student working on the mechanism of X chromosome inactivation, while his further medical training will be to become a surgeon. 16 November 2004 APPENDIX 112 Memorandum from Professor Ian Diamond, Research Councils UK I am writing on behalf of the Research Councils UK Executive Group in response to your call for evidence in relation to the future of the MRC NJMR. The proposals for the NIMR were brought by MRC to the RCUK Strategy Group where they were discussed fully in conjunction with other requests for strategic funds. It is one of the advantages of the RCUK governance arrangements that we now have an open and transparent system for discussing major new strategic initiatives within Councils and for formulating advice to the Director General for Research Councils on the relative priorities for funding. A fundamental element of this system is that Chief Executives are able to debate the opportunities, strengths and any weaknesses in each case, without second guessing the detailed scientific and financial planning that has been carried out in individual Councils. In other words we each rely on the integrity and thoroughness of the strategic planning in individual Councils. MRC would have been rightly criticised by other Councils if proposals for the future of NIMR had come forward for possible additional funding without a clear vision for the future and that this vision was based on the necessary scientific and strategic planning. We hope the Committee will recognise the importance of Councils continuing to plan strategically for major future investments for the longer term. Ideally such planning and the ultimate vision should command the support of all key stakeholder groups. However in reality, in research as in other endeavours, the Committee may need to recognise that this is not always achievable. 16 November 2004 APPENDIX 113 Memorandum from David Kerr, NTRAC I would like to focus this brief submission on the translational research potential of NIMR and why I believe that this would be significantly enhanced by its proposed relocation in partnership with one of London’s major colleges. The science based in NIMR is widely acknowledged to be strong and internationally competitive in infection and immunity, developmental biology, neurosciences, genetics and structural biology. However, as has been previously noted, the existing Unit is somewhat isolated from the clinical mainstream and has not harnessed as fully as it might, its potential for joint training of clinical fellows or translation of its science for human health benefits. A reasonable operating definition of translational research would be the application of basic scientific research for patient benefit, through the creation of novel diagnostic predictive or prognostic assays and development of new treatments. This is a noble aim and one would imagine would be core business for the Medical Research Council’s largest Unit. This mission should not and will not detract from the quality of the underpinning science, but rather has the potential to enhance it. It is unlikely that these values could be fully adopted in NIMR’s current environment and location and I agree with the Task Force’s recommendations that translational research could only be properly pursued from the sort of multidisciplinary environment oVered by a major University which has a Medical School and associated teaching hospitals. Any notion that the quality of science would be diluted down by such a move in is fallacious. Clearly, the business case for relocation of NIMR has not yet been constructed, but if we are to have a National Institute for Medical Research, representative of its name, then we should support application for the funds necessary to achieve its integration, as outlined in the Task Force’s report. Clinical research sits high on the Government’s agenda for health and wealth creation, and I have no doubt that the reconfigured NIMR will have a key role to play in the seamless transition of high quality basic research into the clinical realm. 24 November 2004

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APPENDIX 114 Memorandum from Professor John Bell, University of Oxford The Future of the National Institute for Medical Research The Medical Research Council has an important challenge in determining the future of NIMR as it represents the single largest recurrent expenditure for the MRC and, with the change in Director and the possibility of undertaking significant capital structure investment to bring it up to date, it is an appropriate time to consider the strategic issues associated with MRC investment now and in the future. In considering the likely demands on MRC strategic investment over the next 10 to 20 years, it is important to recognise that the wealth of information emerging from basic science over the last 20 years has yet to be applied successfully for the benefit of human disease. There appears now an opportunity to use the technologies developed in basic science to address some of these issues and, internationally, the focus is increasingly on the relevance of basic research rather than basic research for its own sake. It is unlikely that the MRC will move in any other direction over the next 20 years. This should not, however, polarise a view about diVerent types of biomedical science. There are no clearly defined borders between basic, translational and clinical research. They all relate importantly to each other and it is this connectivity which will be important in any model for the future of NIMR. The central question that the Science and Technology Committee are considering relates to the size, shape and location of this national institute. The NIMR in its current location has several considerable strengths. It has substantial space in which to develop and grow and has perhaps the best animal facility in the UK. It is clearly limited, however, by the lack of access to the major physical sciences (physics, chemistry and engineering) and the lack of a major teaching hospital with clinical and translational research associated with it. Despite these substantial barriers, NIMR has succeeded in undertaking some important translational research. For example, the Director’s programme on influenza is in every sense translational and of major relevance to human health. The issue is not, therefore, whether NIMR has succeeded in achieving some of the goals necessary for a National Institute for Medical Research, but whether it is optimally positioned or whether it could be considerably more successful if it was relocated. My judgement is that the likelihood of improving the relevance of research activities at Mill Hill and using their basic science strengths to drive excellent translational work would be greatly improved by proximity to a major university teaching hospital. The Institute, for example, has had a very poor record in training clinician scientists which must be a major goal for all MRC functions in the future. There is little doubt that the distance for NIMR from academic teaching hospitals has made this job much more diYcult. It is formally possible that this National Institute could achieve this goal if it remained in its current location. I agree, however, with the conclusions of the MRC Taskforce that, if one is looking strategically over the next 20 to 30 years, the current geographical location is by no means ideal and co-location with other sciences would greatly enhance the performance of the Institution. One could tolerate a wide range of options here and much will depend on what resource the MRC is able to spend both on relocation and recurrent running expenses. I hope these comments are helpful. November 2004

APPENDIX 115 Memorandum from Professor James Fawcett, University of Cambridge The Future of the National Institute for Medical Research I write as an active scientist with some knowledge of NIMR from the inside and a view from the outside. My current position is Chairman of the Cambridge University Centre for Brain Repair, which is partially funded by an MRC cooperative group grant. I was a PhD student at NIMR some years ago, and have visited the Institute and collaborated with one of the scientific divisions over many years. 1. NIMR is the largest item of MRC expenditure, and it is clearly correct that its eVectiveness and value for money relative to other calls on the MRC, and relative to its title and intended role should be examined. At a time when a substantial proportion of Alpha A-rated programme project and centre applications, of a similar standard to work in NIMR, are turned down, NIMR needs to demonstrate an exceptional level of performance. 2. Scientific achievement at NIMR. The level of scientific achievement at NIMR is generally of a high order, as confirmed by the recent review process. The best known groups work in developmental biology and in immunology. There is a good level of collaborative working between most of the groups. The research is almost all at the cellular/molecular level with little interaction with clinical medicine.

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3. Advantages of keeping NIMR at Mill Hill. The Mill Hill site provides ample space and good facilities. The new animal facilities are large and excellent. Because of the isolated nature of the site, it is possible to maintain tight security. The current faculty mostly works well together, and clearly does not wish the disruption that a move would bring.

4. Advantages of closing NIMR. The directly funded budget of NIMR from the MRC is £31 million a year. The total cost is considerably greater. This would fund an extra 100 programme grants in Universities, or 500 project grants. The site has considerable value, and the money released could relocate groups from NIMR and fund new initiatives. The relocation of groups to universities would benefit higher education and university research.

5. Advantages of relocating NIMR to a central site 5.1 Training. The current NIMR is not a good site for training PhD students, and has no contact with undergraduates. Students are isolated from the type of training courses that are run in universities, and from the large student bodies that provide a good learning, training and social environment. Relocation to a site near a major university would improve the training experience of young scientists.

5.2 Education. At a time when UK universities are struggling to maintain their research base and to maintain educational standards, it is not sensible to remove some of the best scientists from the educational environment and sequestrate them in large isolated institutes. If NIMR were moved to a major university, it would greatly benefit both university education and research.

5.3 Clincal and translational research. NIMR at present is distant from a major hospital, and therefore has few links to clinicians and clinical research. Central London provides these links in profusion, with several of main specialist clinical research centres nearby.

5.4 NIMR scientific careers. NIMR is large, but does not always provide the stimulation needed for scientists to maintain their productivity until retirement. Links to a university would provide more varied and long term intellectual stimulus to the scientific staV, and also provide alternative career paths to those whose work has gone oV the boil.

5.5 Public engagement in Science. A National Institute for Medical Research should be open and available to the public, and play a part in fostering public understanding of and sympathy with science. The current site of NIMR, and its fortresslike stance, prevent this.

6. Conclusion NIMR has an enviable reputation in basic biological research. Moving it to a central site associated with a university would greatly increase its potential and influence. In central London it could fulfill the role suggested by its title. I would have thought that the staV of the Institute, when presented with the opportunity to set up a new and enhanced institute, would have jumped at the chance, and I am slightly at a loss to understand why they view a move to central London so negatively. November 2004

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APPENDIX 116 Memorandum from David Smith, former Secretary to the MRC Task Force on NIMR I worked for the MRC until my retirement on 30 November, and my last role was as Secretary to the MRC Task Force on NIMR. I attended your Committee’s session on 1 December as a member of the public, and I would now like to submit my own evidence. I address three specific issues and then add some general comments. (i)

the NIMR Heads of Divisions, in their evidence to the Committee, express concern that no minutes of the Task Force meetings were kept. I agreed with Professor Blakemore after the first Task Force meeting that we should concentrate our eVorts on issuing very quickly after each meeting an agreed summary of the meeting and its conclusions. This was intended to serve as a record of the meeting and a means for disseminating an agreed statement of conclusions to stakeholders and the public. No doubt a verbatim record would have been helpful in resolving current diVerences of recollection about Task Force meetings. But anything short of a verbatim record (for example, traditional minutes) would have taken considerable time and eVort to agree and publish, and would have been unlikely to add value to the process.

(ii) Dr Lovell-Badge reported to you that I had refused to put a non-confidential e-mail of his on the MRC website. No doubt the MRC could let you have, in confidence, a copy of the letter I wrote to Dr Lovell-Badge and Professor Blakemore about this. But, in brief, my concern was that the email from Dr Lovell-Badge in question, and a previous one from him to Professor Blakemore, were potentially actionable. It seemed to me that, as an MRC oYcial, it would have been irresponsible of me to publish such documents on the MRC’s behalf in case publication led to legal action (whatever the views of the author). I also declined to publish a reply from Professor Blakemore to the first of these and an acknowledgement of the second, since these could not be readily understood without reference to Dr Lovell-Badge’s e-mails. In all this, I took advice from the MRC’s Human Resources Director and from the MRC’s legal adviser on personnel matters. (iii) I would like also to respond to Dr Gamblin’s statement to you that “On the Task Force website there are e-mails which are marked ‘confidential’ and e-mails which are not marked ‘confidential’ and the MRC secretariat decided which ones would go on the web.” The only editorial action taken by the Task Force secretariat, except as described above, was as follows: — to exclude from publication ephemeral messages (eg about travel arrangements), and throughout to edit out references to the names of the consultants since otherwise we would have infringed our confidentiality agreement with them; — to hold back genuinely confidential e-mails, including some responses to confidential e-mails that were not marked confidential but which could be only understood in the context of the confidential messages. I say “genuinely confidential” because you will see that a number of published e-mails do bear a “confidential” header. This was because they were replies to earlier genuinely confidential messages, but did not themselves need to be kept confidential. I sought to include all of these on the MRC website, consulting the author if I was in doubt. To the best of my recollection, the MRC website contains an otherwise complete set of e-mail exchanges between the Task Force members. Please note that Professor Blakemore had no involvement in the publication of the e-mails. Finally, I would like to add my impression of the conduct of the whole Task Force process by Professor Blakemore, with particular reference to the allegations of coercion. I am not in a position to comment specifically on Dr Lovell-Badge’s dramatic allegation against Professor Blakemore, and I am sure you will be seeking Professor Tomlinson’s input on the allegation that he was “coerced”. I can confirm, however, that throughout the Task Force process there was frequent robust debate among the members, in meetings, during telephone conference calls and through e-mails. All this was to be expected given the diYcult and controversial nature of the subject matter. What surprised me was that the group achieved consensus (this is not in doubt) on almost all aspects of its output, notwithstanding the novel (perhaps unique?) presence of two members of staV on such a strategic review. For me, this is a tribute to Professor Blakemore’s leadership of the exercise, and the disagreements that emerged in the last few weeks of the group’s work should be not be allowed to over-shadow the achievements. December 2004

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APPENDIX 117 Memorandum from Professor Edwin Taylor The problems of the treatment of NIMR have now reached the pages of Nature (December 9). This is the second time in the past few years that there has been a move to emasculate one of England’s finest research institutions. Among scientists who are familiar with the work that has been done by the researchers at NIMR,the policies adopted by MRC are diYcult to understand and one can only conclude that the motives are political rather than scientific. A move to Guys Hospital, where there is little space, would essentially be the first step in destroying this laboratory. Recently, first rate appointments of younger scientists, like Malloy and Weigle, did much to insure the future of a leading laboratory in the field of motility and compensate for the retirement of distinguished older scientists. Disruption of the laboratory and the clear indication that there is no future for NIMR will lead to the loss of these people, who would have been the new leaders of this field in England. As a former member of the MRC lab at Kings College and a contributor to the field of motility I wish to express my disappointment with the policy of the MRC and the way in which it is being carried out. Prof Edwin W Taylor(FRS) December 2004

APPENDIX 118 Memorandum from Alison Spaull, Director Chief Scientist OYce, Edinburgh 1. I should start by declaring an interest. I am a member of the MRC Health Services and Public Health Research Board appointed as a representative of the Scottish Executive Health Department. 2. I am employed by NHS National Services Scotland but have been seconded since appointment in January 1996 to a Civil Service role within the Chief Scientist OYce of the Scottish Executive Health Department. 3. I was an Observer on the NIMR Task Force, acting on behalf of all four UK Health Departments. 4. I attended the meetings held on 8 February 2004, 19 April 2004 (when I left before the end) and the last meeting 21 June 2004. A series of conference calls were also arranged but my recollection is that I joined only one. As an Observer I did not participate in general discussion either at or between meetings. I recall asking a question on two occasions only. 5. The only apparent departure from this Observer role resulted from receiving a lengthy e-mail from Professor Colin Blakemore on 28 March, described as “a private note” and marked Confidential. The e-mail although initially (and surprisingly) appearing to be to me alone, on reading in full, it was clear that its content had already been raised with many of the members as well as myself. It seemed necessary to respond but without over-reaching my Observer status. 6. I was on sick leave following surgery from 5 May and returned to work, part time on 21 June (the last Task Force meeting). I did not participate in the interval. I withdrew from that meeting in the afternoon for over an hour, thus missing some of the later presentations and discussion. I set this out in some detail since it should be clear that I have observed a minority of the process. 7. My impression was of the MRC still smarting from earlier criticism and taking considerable pains that the work of the Task Force be above reproach. I do not subscribe to the view that the Chairman had a “hidden agenda”. At the last meeting high importance was generally attached to reaching some consensus since anything less might appear inconclusive and be impossible to action. This was achieved and a statement issued. It was only subsequently that divergent opinion emerged in relation to Mill Hill itself. 8. Given the tight deadline for submission of evidence, this is an account based primarily on memory of events rather than on a thorough trawl of OYce records. I hope it remains of value to the Select Committee. December 2004

APPENDIX 119 Memorandum from Professor Richard M Denton, former Member of the MRC Task Force on the NIMR INQUIRY INTO THE FUTURE OF NIMR BY THE S&T SELECT COMMITTEE At the end of July, I retired from my full-time post as Dean of Medical and Veterinary Sciences and this coincided with the end of my term on the Council of the MRC as well as the end of the work of the Taskforce set up to look at the long-term future of NIMR. I took this opportunity to have an extended holiday with

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my wife mainly in some isolated parts of New Zealand. We returned just before Christmas. I now have a part-time appointment at the University of Bristol and have had an opportunity to catch up with some of the developments around NIMR. Following reading some of the papers that have been submitted to the Inquiry as well as the uncorrected transcript of oral evidence given on 1 December 2004 and 20 December 2004, I would like to make the following specific personal comments: 1. It is the responsibility of the MRC to review the long-term future of the NIMR and its other Research Institutes. The five year reviews are an excellent way of judging the output of the previous five years and the plans of specific groups for the next five years but they are not the perfect vehicle for tackling strategic longer-term considerations. Thus every 20 years or so it is vital that the mission, site and size of institutes such as NIMR are carefully scrutinised. In my view, it was entirely appropriate that Council set up the Taskforce to advise Council on these issues. 2. The work of the Taskforce was diYcult and complex but in my view it was carried out very properly. In particular, I would emphasise that I never experienced any hint of coercion by Colin Blakemore in his roles as either CEO of the MRC or Chairman of the Taskforce. The examples of possible coercion cited by members of NIMR at 1 December hearing are frankly not credible. Although I was initially sceptical about the inclusion of consultants, it is diYcult to see how the work of the Taskforce could have been carried out in the time without their assistance. There were some communication diYculties especially between meetings of the Taskforce but this was largely because the members of the Taskforce had other responsibilities and very full diaries! The position of being Chairman of the Taskforce was an extremely challenging one and in my view Colin Blakemore carried it out rather well. At no time did I sense any serious conflict between this role and his responsibilities as CEO of the MRC. On the other hand, I did feel that the two NIMR representatives (Stephen Gamblin and Robin Lovell-Badge) where in an increasingly diYcult position and probably came under great pressure from their colleagues and Director to defend NIMR as it is currently set up. 3. Although I am concerned about the proportion of MRC funds that are spent in the golden-triangle, I became convinced from the discussions within the Taskforce that a central London location for NIMR was the best option. For me the strongest argument in favour was that this would allow the co-location of NIMR with a wide range of clinicians and other scientists while ensuring that the key staV of NIMR were kept together. Like all the other members of the Taskforce I was clearly in favour of the MRC exploring the possible location of NIMR at either University College or Kings College (using the status quo of NIMR remaining at Mill Hill as a baseline). Both options appear to have strong positive features but many elements of the bids from the two London colleges will require very careful scrutiny by Council with the aid of the Steering Committee set up for this purpose. These include the proposed site, facilities, scientific and clinical support and interactions, national role, recruitment of staV and, of course, the cost. 4. In my view, if the eVorts to relocate NIMR to central London were to fail, then Council will have to re-evaluate the position. As far as I am concerned it certainly would not mean that either a “renewed” NIMR should continue to be sited at Mill Hill or that NIMR should be closed! In any case, the very process of negotiating with University College and Kings College will further clarify what a “renewed” NIMR would look like and sharpen up the issues that were raised by the Taskforce about mission, governance, relationship to other institutions and national role. Importantly, it will also but the costs (capital and running) on a better footing. I would emphasise that all members of the Taskforce coming from very diVerent backgrounds agreed that the Central London options should be explored. 5. I sincerely hope that the apparently extremely negative attitude of many senior staV within NIMR will abate and that they will engage constructively with discussions about the University College and Kings College options. Otherwise, I fear that the exciting future for NIMR set out in the Taskforce report will not be realised. I have kept this submission brief. If the Committee wishes any further clarification I would be happy to supply it to the best of my ability. January 2005

APPENDIX 120 Supplementary memorandum from N Michael Green, Department of Mathematical Biology, National Institute for Medical Research The Future of NIMR Further comment following previous submission, (Appendix 4), and the evidence session of the committee 10 January 2005. The confusion following the fifth and final meeting of the task force concerning the status of the Mill Hill option, stems directly from the lack of consultation at an earlier stage. This deficiency was also the source of the lack of trust, which has led to the present impasse. It was only after the task force had completed its

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work that the MRC asked NIMR to put forward proposals for its future, so that the task force were influenced by the unsubstantiated opinion of the MRC that long term development at the Mill Hill site was not an option. The Step Change Option proposed by NIMR shows how the requirements of the MRC vision for the future of the NIMR could be met, based mainly on the present site coupled to parallel clinical developments elsewhere. These proposals were not available until late November. It is clear from the answers of Professors Flavell and Tomlinson to questions from your committee that they knew nothing about them. The MRC thus becomes the sole arbiter. It is to be hoped that they will give proper consideration to the Step Change Option. Unfortunately one is left with the feeling that it may end like the Caucus race in Alice in Wonderland, followed by the Mouse’s tale—“I’ll be judge, I’ll be jury said cunning old Fury—I’ll try the whole cause and condemn you to death”. January 2005

APPENDIX 121 Supplementary memorandum from Dr Jonathan Cooke Having attended the evidence session at Westminster yesterday, I should like to place on record some short remarks about instances, during the hearing, where I felt that a distorted impression might have been conveyed given the enormous amount of material that committee members have had to absorb on this issue. 1. During questioning of MRC oYcials (part 1 of hearing), it was stated at one point that “many prominent scientists from around the world” have been upset by MRC’s plans with regard to Mill Hill. While this is not literally untrue, as witness the letters that are doubtless in hand, the enormous distorting eVects in a case like this must be borne in mind. That is, most research scientists, even good ones, just resent disruption of the flow of their ongoing work for any reason, and empathise with those they feel are their personal friends in a worldwide community. Most do not think, or feel, strategically in terms of the longterm optimal use of resources that are put into science (though many are trained to mouth the right catch phrases). It is these “friends”, whether spontaneously writing or (in more cases) lobbied to write by their Mill Hill associates, who express outrage or negative concern. The greater number are silent, even though aware of the MRC plans, because they recognise their appropriateness, even long-term inevitability. 2. Professor Blakemore indeed seems to have pushed at the limits of permissible managerial tactics. But as emerged in his first submissions, he came into post inheriting an almost impossible decision-taking procedure, in the form of a task-force including members (NIMR staV) whose mind set was going to render them irreversibly partisan in relation to certain of the options, together with some requirement that each step of the decision-tree was to be sanctioned unanimously by the members! In his defence, this is a recipe for the sort of extreme managerial exasperation that leads to tactical unwisdom. 3. The ultimate diVerences between MRC’s hierarchy of preferences for the future and current NIMR sentiments seemed insuYciently explored at the hearing. That is, MRC believes that while preservation of an entire broadly inter-disciplinary institute would be “nice”, appropriate future location for each major grouping of scientists must take precedence over that if it cannot be achieved. Although the overall peerreview standing of NIMR scientists has been high within recent years, this has not been universal across the board or over time. Despite Sir Skehel’s remarks, few are convinced by the arguments that the whole has been scientifically (as opposed to sentimentally or socially) greater than the sum-of-parts as across the major groupings (known technically as supergroups) within NIMR. The case for preservation of most of the groupings as more focussed “institutes” is much stronger. 4. Sir Skehel’s representation of (a) the physical appropriateness and (b) his experiences of recruitment across the years at Mill Hill, were biased to his cause to say the least. I understand the viewpoint, that the current building is irremediably out of style for the future, to have been represented in the session immediately prior to the public one. On recruitment, I respectfully suggest that selective memory is in operation. NIMR’s current reputation, at least in basic cell and developmental biology, rests largely on a generation of scientists who were recruited there in the late 1980s, did the work and have recently left for “peak of career” posts elsewhere. That was in an era largely before such environments as those oVered by eg the Wellcome specialist institutes for recruits of elite standard, were in existence. Without wishing to disparage in any way the very good younger scientists and others currently remaining at NIMR, one has to point out that it has not been possible to secure the equivalent of the workforce of that time, in these areas; the “style-conscious” generation now on the scene (see my earlier submission) does not choose positions there so readily. 5. On outreach programmes; if educational community outreach is to be a major facet of any renewed institute, as would indeed make great sense, this also weighs in against continuing on the Mill Hill site despite the current director’s plans. Educational “days out” tend to involve combined visits to one or more other, metropolitan attractions. The location is a quiet, outer suburban one whose transport infrastructure counts

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greatly against it for this sort of role, as indeed it does in general. That could not be altered without a degree of government intervention going altogether beyond what I imagine possible, and this would still leave the eccentric location itself. December 2004

APPENDIX 122 Supplementary evidence from the Medical Research Council MRC Response to S&T Committee Questions 9 December 2004 1. When did discussions begin with the Minister for Science and Innovation about the process by which decisions are to be taken and with what result? It is for MRC to determine how to progress aspects of its corporate strategic planning. The likely need for future capital investment for NIMR has been on MRC’s forward planning agenda since 1999. OST has been party to the various deliberations through their attendance at Council meetings at senior level since that time. There has also been discussion of our plans at RCUK, again involving senior OST oYcials, in the context of the large facilities fund. We have provided briefing for Ministers but we have not sought Ministerial views either during the work of the Task Force or prior to the Council decision in October. 2. What precisely were the agreed respective roles in chairing meetings and producing draft reports of the Chairman of the Task Force and of the consultants employed by the MRC to facilitate its work (Q10)? The Task Force agreed at its first meeting that consultants should facilitate their discussions and progress some of the consultation with stakeholders and the research on other national and international funding models in medical research. In practice the work was shared between the chair, the secretariat and the consultants who worked interchangeably on occasions—this was essential in progressing the volume of business and in making optimal use of members’ time. 3. If the Council decides that neither of the two proposed options meets the necessary requirements, will the enhanced base case prepared by Mill Hill be considered as one of “all the other options” (Qq37–41)? All options would be reconsidered if neither of the two current proposed options can be fully developed to meet the Council’s overall vision. 4. What consideration was given to the option of redevelopment of the Mill Hill site prior to or during the Task Force’s work (Qq 41–2; Q62)? A strategic approach to possible future development needs at Mill Hill has been part of our forward planning since before the last quinquennial review (see question 6). 5. What other means of increasing the priority given by MRC to translational research were considered before the move of the NIMR was proposed by the FIS? The increasing emphasis on translational approaches, in MRC as in most medical research funding agencies in the UK and around the world, gathered momentum in 2002–03 and was articulated in the MRC 10-year Vision published in 2003 following stakeholder consultation. The strategy has had and will continue to have implications across the MRC portfolio, not just at NIMR. 6. What consideration was given during the 2000 Quinquennial Review of the NIMR to strategic questions about the strategic direction of the institute and the need for it to remain at its present site (Q104)? For what reasons were these questions addressed by the FIS in advance of the 2005 Quinquennial Review of the NIMR? The need to distinguish the normal QQR of scientific achievement and future plans from a strategic review of the future of NIMR after his retirement was discussed with Sir John Skehel in 1999. This strategic review needed to be conducted well in advance of his retirement in 2006. The 2000 Quinquennial Review of NIMR focused mainly on overall research strategy and quality and on resource needs for the coming five years. The Review made some observations on future direction and the need for forward planning to identify Sir John Skehel’s successor by 2006. The need for a strategic review of future capital investment at NIMR has already been explained in our previous submission.

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7. What discussions were held by the Chief Executive with OST/Treasury about the potential availability of funding for the NIMR with a new focus, including the proceeds of any sale of the Mill Hill site; and what account of such discussions was taken by the Task Force in its work? As indicated in reply to question 1, there is regular discussion with OST at senior levels, in a variety of fora, in respect of all major capital plans in MRC as in other councils. There has been no formal discussion with OST or Treasury regarding handling of possible proceeds from any sale of the site. The Task Force simply noted that “disposal of the Mill Hill site could significantly reduce the costs to MRC” of co-locating the renewed NIMR. 8. To what extent was the need to attract serious interest from potential hosts a factor in the decision not to keep Mill Hill as an active third option? The decision was based on the assessment of the majority of the Task Force, and shared by the Council, that the cultural shift required for the translational aspects of the mission of the new institute would best be achieved through physical proximity to a teaching hospital. 9. Did the Task Force give full consideration to the financial implications of the two central London bids before reaching its conclusions? Was the Task Force fully aware during its discussions of any financial constraints surrounding the relocation of the NIMR? Like most research funders, MRC cannot fund all the high quality research proposals we receive. That applies equally to extra-mural and to intra-mural research. The Task Force—like all MRC advisory groups —would have been well aware of the need for rigorous strategic direction and prioritisation across the MRC portfolio, not just at NIMR. The Task Force report makes clear that at the time of their report it was not feasible to give a definitive view of the cost to MRC of proposals for renewal of NIMR. Their initial financial analysis is published in their report (section 6). 10. How did the FIS seek to engage with the NIMR on the development of its proposal to relocate it at Addenbrooke’s? FIS developed their draft principles for future funding of medical research (“the FIS principles”—see previous submission) at their first meeting in November 2002. Each of the Directors of the four FIS sites was invited to comment on these and to discuss with the FIS committee the implications for future research strategies and positioning in their units/institutes. In the case of NIMR, the FIS committee had a meeting with the local staV side as well as with the director before developing the detailed propositions which were published for consultation in April 2003. Each of the four directors was sent an advance copy of the FIS report just prior to publication. The report included a set of propositions for each of the four sites. These were to be the subject of broad consultation including with staV. In the case of NIMR, it was agreed with the director that the Council Chair, the previous CEO and other senior MRC oYcials would visit NIMR on the following day to explain the overall vision, to set out the specific FIS propositions and to elicit the initial views of senior scientific staV. In the event, the director chose to circulate the report to all staV at NIMR in advance of the meeting. Heads of Divisions walked out of this meeting without any engagement. Subsequent engagement with staV, including some meetings between NIMR scientists and FIS members, demonstrated that resistance to the FIS propositions was implacable and led to the decision to take a diVerent approach to engaging NIMR staV in discussions in the Task Force. 11. What consideration was given by the Task Force to the ability of the proposed sites to facilitate all the existing activities of the NIMR and to allow scope for future expansion? The Task Force discussions and the current more detailed options appraisal are based on no reduction in the volume of science currently supported at NIMR. December 2004

APPENDIX 123 Memorandum from Sir John Skehel, Director, National Institute for Medical Research I’d like to comment on three issues raised by the MRC presentations at the Inquiry on 1 December. 1. On several occasions Professor Blakemore mentioned the Clinical Research Centre at Northwick Park and the Stoker Report on it in January 1986. He quoted from the report (Q13) in responding to Dr Turner: “Because of the way medicine is developing . . . etc. This should be achieved by the move of the NIMR”. Perhaps there has been a drafting problem but this quotation is exact in detail until the last sentence “This

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should be achieved by the move of the NIMR” which is not present in the copy of the Stoker report that I have available. The section of the Stoker report at issue is Section 2 which had 17 subsections; NIMR is not mentioned in one of them. I have it on good authority that no serious suggestion of a move of NIMR to Northwick Park was made to my predecessor and certainly neither on my appointment in 1987 nor in the 17 years since then has the Stoker report or any suggestion of transfer of NIMR from Mill Hill been mentioned to me by MRC, until I was given the FIS subcommittee report on 31 March 2003. I suspect that Professor Blakemore is wrong in all his conclusions on the Stoker report and that as a new CEO he may be fighting yesterday’s battles for yesterday’s men. 2. Professor Savill in answer to Q15 from Dr Turner referred to the numbers of clinical fellows at the Clinical Sciences Centre (54), at his own institution in the last five years (33 clinical training fellows and 13 higher levels), and at one of the Colleges that submitted, 189 clinical training fellows and 22 clinical scientists. He and subsequently Professor Blakemore consider that the number of nine clinicians scientists in training at Mill Hill is disappointingly small. There are two points in relation to NIMR performance in this area: (a) There may well be diVerences in nomenclature for clinicians in training and diVerent counting procedures. As far as I can gather from the following communications from a senior colleague at the Clinical Sciences Centre this may have led to an inappropriate comparison. “I suspect the number quoted is so high because many Hammersmith clinicians are aYliated with the CSC and their fellows are being counted in this exercise. In terms of marrying basic and clinical science however the fellows that count are those that cross the boundary, ie those that go to work in basic science labs. As I say this number is probably on a par with NIMR and certainly not dramatically higher.” (b) In the NIMR quinquennial review in which MRC endorsed NIMR strategy for the period 2001–06, MRC complimented the Institutes performance and increased its capital equipment and recurrent expenses budgets. No major changes in direction were recommended. To some extent Professor Savill and the CEO are importing an issue, which will of course be addressed by NIMR in the appropriate future reviews. This is also the case for Professor Blakemore’s additional comment on the proportion of NIMR budget that derives from sources other than MRC. Our performance and strategy in this regard were also endorsed by MRC for the 2001–06 period. 3. The MRC Chairman Sir Anthony Cleaver and the CEO Professor Blakemore both raised the issue of the state of the NIMR building at Mill Hill and, the committee were given similar information in the session before the inquiry by Lord Sainsbury. All three indicated that there was concern that the building, according to the advice that they received, was not capable in the long term of meeting the needs of the Institute. In fact during the last 12 months the site has been surveyed for MRC by Powis Hughes, Ove Arup and NIFES. There were no adverse comments from the consultants regarding the Institute building structure but there were comments on its increasing life expectancy through investment, huge potential for development and recommendations for routine budgets to maintain decoration, plant and fixtures/fittings. The building construction is of 600 mm thick solid brick wall elevations with an internal steel column and beam support frame structure suspending the steel reinforced concrete floors. There are no notable defects in this structure or history of any necessary structural repairs since its building in the 1930s. There is no reason to suspect that this structure will fail or require anything more than routine repairs for the long term future. On the issue of refurbishment standards, MRC investment during the last 10 years has allowed a refurbishment programme for all the laboratories that is more than 70% complete, and that has led to the increased life expectancy referred to above. December 2004

APPENDIX 124 Supplementary evidence from the National Institute for Medical Research NIMR Answers to the Committee’s follow-up Questions 1. The Committee would like to see copies of the e-mail from Richard Flavell and Paul Nurse referred to in the evidence session (Q74) and any evidence of alleged coercion that was referred to in the session (Qs90, 98) We enclose a copy of the Flavell-Nurse e-mail of 30 November (Annex A) that was referred to in the evidence session (Q74). This e-mail was in response to an MRC draft statement for Task Force members to sign that presumably contained the words “no coercion”. The Mill Hill Task Force members were not contacted at the draft statement stage. However, the statement seems remarkably similar to one circulated to all the Task Force in August (e-mail) that also requested their signatures but was not pursued.

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There are four main pieces of evidence of the alleged coercion of Robin Lovell-Badge referred to in the session (Qs 90, 98). 1. Robin’s evidence in the session and extended in writing here (see attachment) (Annex B) indicates the background to the threat. 2. John Skehel’s recollections of Robin reporting this and previous threats to him as Director and Robin’s line-manager. 3. A Task Force e-mail of 26 July 2004 (e-mail) from Robin to Colin Blakemore in which he states “ . . . I have experienced far too many unpleasant ’phone conversations with you, where you have generally ignored what I have said, and in some cases even threatened me.” 4. On 8 October 2004 at Mill Hill, Blakemore, Andrew McMichael and Steve Tomlinson met with Heads of Divisions, without either John Skehel, the Director or the assistant Director John Wills being present, to discuss MRC conclusions regarding NIMR. The Heads of Divisions recall that: “In reply to a question, Blakemore said he had put no pressure on Task Force members to reach the conclusion that Mill Hill should not be an option for the renewed Institute. Robin LovellBadge immediately challenged this assertion, saying explicitly that Colin had made threatening telephone calls to him. Colin at first denied this but then admitted that he did recall a heated telephone call. The discussion was curtailed at this point by Steve Tomlinson saying that he was becoming irritated.” Midway through the final Task Force meeting, the seven members present declared their preferences for the options for the future location of NIMR. Five out of seven preferred single sites either at Mill Hill or in central London (Nurse, Flavell, LovellBadge, Gamblin and Tomlinson). One out of seven preferred a single or multiple distributed sites in central London (Blakemore) and One out of seven had no preference (Denton). In an opinion collected before the meeting an absentee stated to Colin Blakemore and the consultants who were recording the statement, a preference for NIMR at Mill Hill (Davies). Nevertheless, following subsequent persuasion five out of nine Task Force members excluded the Mill Hill site as an option (Blakemore, Bernstein, Denton, Tomlinson and Davies). 2. How did the NIMR engage with the FIS on the development of its proposal for relocation at Addenbrooke’s NIMR was given the FIS consultation document with its proposal for relocation to Addenbrooke’s, on 31 March 2003. Until that date we were unaware of any proposal to relocate NIMR and, therefore, had not engaged in the development of this proposal. On 2 April 2003, the MRC Chairman, Sir Anthony Cleaver, CEO Sir George Radda, Executive Director Nick Winterton, Head of Corporate AVairs Jane Lee and Head of Human Resources Elizabeth Sideris came to Mill Hill to present the FIS consultation document to the staV. A preliminary meeting was arranged with the Heads of Divisions to clarify the MRC intention to downsize the Institute described in the document. A letter was subsequently sent to MRC explaining our concerns. After this exchange the Director, John Skehel, having informed the MRC representatives and the HoD’s previously that he had to attend a funeral left the meeting. A discussion continued with Sir Anthony Cleaver on the possible outcome of the consultation process and when he failed to reassure the Heads of Division of the possibility of reversing the FIS recommendations by consultation, the Heads of Divisions left the room. Subsequently the Heads of Divisions prepared “A response to the Medical Research Council (MRC) from the Heads of Division’s Committee of the MRC National Institute for Medical Research, Mill Hill (NIMR) in relation to the recommendations of the MRC Subcommittee on Forward Investment Strategy, May 2003” detailing their objections to the recommendations and their reasons for them. We then participated fully in the consultation process. 3. What was the role of two NIMR staV on the Task Force: ie to represent the views of NIMR management to the Task Force or to report back to the NIMR on the work of the Task Force, or both? The role of the two NIMR staV on the Task Force (TF) was just as for all TF members, principally to bring their independent experience and viewpoint to looking at the future of the National Institute. It was not the intention of MRC that NIMR management views should be represented since the Director was excluded from membership. From the outset however the TF made it clear that an additional role to be played by these two members was to keep NIMR staV informed about the workings and conclusions of the TF. This obligation was fulfilled by the two NIMR members meeting and discussing TF progress with the NIMR Heads of Division (HoD) committee at regular intervals. During these meetings a wide range of opinions and views were usually raised which contributed to the backdrop of thinking of the two NIMR members. The HoD committee did not instruct the NIMR members nor did it criticise stances or opinions adopted by the two NIMR members.

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At various stages, the NIMR TF members sought factual information from the HoD Committee and its individual members concerning TF work. For example, the NIMR TF members worked with another TF member, Professor Steve Tomlinson, on a series of proposals for how NIMR might, in the future, expand its impact in clinical training and translation. These ideas originated mainly from the HoDs in discussion with their clinical colleagues and collaborators. In this way the proposals came from the Institute as a whole and were supported with enthusiasm by the HoD Committee. The role of the TF members in this case was one of facilitation and presentation. A second example of how the two NIMR staV members were supported with factual data from the HoD Committee concerns the draft of the final Task Force report. When the worked-up UCL and KCL bids were seen by the NIMR TF members it was apparent that these two institutions had been asked to provide something like 4,000 square metres of space for animal accommodation. This seemed too small for current scientific activities and the NIMR TF members asked for data and clarification from members of the HoD committee, which did reveal a serious error had been made in this specification by the MRC. On the occasions that specific presentations and proposals from NIMR were made to the TF, they were made by the NIMR Director and relevant HoDs and not by the NIMR TF members. 4. What role did NIMR management play in the exchange of e-mail correspondence that followed the fifth meeting of the Task Force The NIMR TF members discussed the fifth TF meeting (and all the others) extensively with the HoD committee and subsequently they discussed with them the polarisation of the TF. Much of the discussion centred on why the initial report of the fifth meeting given by the NIMR TF members to the HoD committee was substantially diVerent from the eventual TF report. Throughout the course of these discussions the NIMR TF members were told that they had confidence and support of the HoD committee in following what they believed to be the proper course of action. At no point was any pressure put on the NIMR TF members by the NIMR management to alter the views they held or expressed to other TF members. As the preparation of the final TF report proceeded the NIMR TF members came under sustained pressure from the TF secretariat and CEO to acquiesce to the views and statements endorsed by the MRC. The NIMR TF members made extensive eVorts to find wordings that enabled the views of the whole TF to be reflected in the final report. Many of these suggestions were rejected by the MRC secretariat or CEO and eventually the MRC CEO took the arbitrary decision to omit the views of the NIMR TF members from the final report and in so doing marginalised them from the TF process. 5. Does the NIMR support, in principle, a shift in its focus towards translational research and how was this view relayed to the Task Force? Yes. One of our commitments in the last Institute quinquennial review in 2000 was to recruit clinical candidates to PhD training posts. As noted in (3) above NIMR Heads of Divisions together with their clinical colleagues and collaborators prepared proposals for the expansion of clinical scientist training and early stage translation research. These proposals were presented to the Task Force by the NIMR Task Force members. At the same time it was made clear that this expansion could only be achieved to the same high standard with continued support for the Institute’s multidisciplinary basic research. In addition NIMR submitted proposals to the Task Force that contained plans for clinical collaborations, that were presented to the Task Force by the Director, John Skehel, at its fifth meeting. December 2004 Annex A Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2004 13:22:58 -0500 From: Richard Flavell Reply-to: MRC Task force To: MRC Task force Subject: [Fwd: Statement for the Task Force] Dear Colleagues I must truly apologize but in error yesterday I neglected to send this email to you all as I had agreed to do with Paul Nurse. I hope this does not arrive too late for you to peruse it. Richard """""Original Message""""" Subject: Statement for the Task Force Date: Mon, 29 Nov 2004 15:52:39 -0500 From: Richard Flavell To: Blakemore Colin

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Dear Colin, Paul and I have had a chance to discuss the statement for the Task Force that you would like us to sign. We made a couple of modifications that we believe create a document that we could sign and we believe even more importantly Steve and Robin may be able to sign. First, we have taken out “without coercion”. The reason we have done this is that there was quite substantial lobbying at various stages and there is documentation of that (for example the Steve Tomlinson email) We’ve also removed the section about Mill Hill serving as a baseline, because that was done after the Task Force oYcial activities had been concluded. We would suggest that you contact Steve and Robin as soon as possible and see if this statement could be signed by the entire Task Force which we think would be the best solution. We wish you good luck. Paul Nurse, M.D.

Richard Flavell, Ph.D.

Statement from members of the Task Force for the MRC National Institute for Medical Research The work of the Task Force was properly conducted and the views of staV at NIMR and the proposals for the Mill Hill site were fully considered. We were united in recommending a possible move into partnership with a leading university and hospital in central London. We were unable to reach consensus on whether the Mill Hill site should itself be considered as an active option, but the rage of opinions was fully presented to the Council of the MRC. The Council has now decided to explore options at King’s College and university College London and we urge our colleagues at NIMR to engage positively in these discussions, to try to develop a partnership agreement that will not compromise the institute’s integrity but will enhance its capacity to pursue its mission, to the benefit of medical research in the UK. 27 November 2004 Professor Colin Blakemore FRS Chief Executive, Medical Research Council Professor Kay E Davies CBE FRS Dr Lee’s Professor of Anatomy and Honorary Director, MRC Functional Genetics Unit, University of Oxford Professor Richard M Denton FRS Department of Biochemistry, University of Bristol Professor Stephen Tomlinson MD FRCP FMedSci Provost, Wales College of Medicine, Biology, Life & Health Sciences and Deputy Vice-Chancellor, CardiV University ????Paul ????Richard Annex B From Robin Lovell-Badge I put a temporary block on the publication of the report from our 5th and last meeting, because I had heard directly from people involved with the bids from both UCL and Kings that Colin had told them it was a straight fight between the two of them. He had not mentioned any comparison with Mill Hill. The following is the e-mail that I sent to the Task Force, which explains why I felt this was wrong. 28 June 2004 Dear All It was my clear impression at the meeting, that we would only ensure the best bids from Kings and UCL for a move into central London if the option of staying at Mill Hill was still on the table. Colin has seemingly lost all bargaining power by telling both UCL and Kings that the Institute will definitely move to one or other of them. By ruling out the possibility of the Institute staying at Mill Hill, which he also stated in his conversation with John Skehel on Friday and very clearly on my answering machine today, neither UCL nor Kings will feel the need to match what the MRC already has, let alone what is possible to do here. This is a big mistake and I feel that the only way it can now be rectified is by spelling out in the report that the Mill Hill option is still a possibility. I would have gone along with the report as it was if I felt confident that the spirit of our agreement would hold, but Colin appears to be following a diVerent agenda. This is why I am now being diYcult over it. Robin

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Colin was very aggressive late that night over the telephone. He did not attempt to understand what I was saying. Towards the end of the call he practically shouted something along the lines of “Robin, I don’t know how you dare to challenge me, you work for the MRC and are therefore my employee”. Because he had already said something similar to me at the end of February, I was a less shocked than I had been at that time, so I asked him if this was a threat? He did not deny this, but continued: “If you don’t sign the report then MRC Council will just close down the Institute”. I responded by saying that this sounded like another threat, at which point Colin hung up the telephone. Needless to say, I thought both his comments to be very inappropriate, and to be threatening, especially as I was acting as a member of the Task Force. The fact that I was an MRC employee should have been irrelevant. With respect to Colin’ s response to my statements at the Select Committee hearing on 1 December, it is true that I had called Colin at about 11.30 pm that night from my home telephone, but this just after he had tried to call me on my mobile and I had failed to answer it in time. (It does not work well at home, which is why I used by home telephone.) This was after many previous attempts from him to call me at work or on my mobile (I had been very busy that day and had missed all of these calls.) I decided to return the last call partly out of desperation as a way to stop any further call, but also because I wished for the situation to be resolved. I believe some pressure was brought to bear on Colin from other TF members and the next afternoon I had a telephone call from Colin to apologise for losing his temper on the phone (he obviously remembered ending the conversation by hanging up on me) and saying that he had spoken again with UCL and Kings to make sure they realised their bids had to be in comparison with Mill Hill. I had confirmation of this (including an email from Simon Howell at Kings: “the script has changed”), so with the understanding that Mill Hill was at least an unstated option, I agreed to sign the report. I now regret not sticking out for a clear statement in this report that Mill Hill was a formal option. I did not do so at the time, believing that it would have to be by the time we had gathered more evidence and produced our final report to Council. I have had many telephone calls from Colin over the period the Task Force was active, and while this was one of the worst, it was by no means the only one where he was trying to put undue pressure on me. I do not know how he treated the other TF members, but I understand that such telephone calls, often late at night and at weekends, were not uncommon. I reported what I considered to be threats to my line manager, the Director, on the following day, as I had done on the previous occasion after the Third Task Force meeting. On the first occasion (which was linked to the revelation that Colin Blakemore’ s vision was for a smaller Institute focused on infections and immunity) I considered resigning from the Task Force, but this would have been very bad for morale at NIMR and not very constructive. I have already submitted as supporting evidence the e-mail exchanges between Colin and myself that occurred around this time to the Select Committee. These make it clear that there had been an unpleasant telephone conversation. I had also specifically mentioned that I had received threats from Colin in my e-mail that was marked non-confidential that was distributed to the Task Force after the final report had been submitted to Council. (This e-mail had also been submitted to the Select Committee.) So all the Task Force was aware of this including Colin, so it is not correct of him to say that I had kept the threats secret until now. The threats were also referred to in a verbal exchange between Colin and myself in front of the Heads of Divisions committee, Steve Tomlinson and Andrew McMichael at NIMR in October. On this occasion, as before, Colin did not deny them, but merely said that he had lost his temper.

APPENDIX 125 Supplementary memorandum from the National Institute for Medical Research NIMR Response to Further Questions Put to MRC by the Science and Technology Select Committee (Appendix 122) Q6. What consideration was given during the 2000 Quinquennial Review of the NIMR to strategic questions about the strategic direction of the Institute and the need for it to remain at its present site (Q104)? For what reasons were these questions addressed by the FIS in advance of the 2005 Quinquennial Review of NIMR? The 2000 Quinquennial Review of NIMR followed scientific reviews of each of the 18 research Divisions. It considered proposals for the future strategy of the Institute based on the results of these Divisional reviews. It was informed by a review of Institute management and resources, a review of Technology Transfer through commercial interactions, a review of the Institute’s postgraduate and postdoctoral training programmes and of its communication of science to the public. As a result, one new Group Head and four new Heads of Divisions were appointed and plans accepted for recruitment of leaders in Physical Biochemistry and Protein and Molecular Structure; increases of £400,000 in annual recurrent expenses and £660,000 in the annual capital equipment allowance were awarded, and a laboratory refurbishment programme for the new Heads of Divisions and a major refurbishment of the animal facilities were initiated at a total cost of £3.9 million.

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These strong indications of long-term support were the result of the strategic considerations described above. There was no discussion of alternative sites with me or other Institute staV and since none was recorded in the Council minute sent to me I assume there was none at that time. MRC states that the need for an additional strategic review was discussed with me in 1999. To my knowledge the only discussions I had on the 2000 Quinquennial Review were witnessed by the NIMR Assistant Director. Neither he nor I can recollect a discussion on the need for an additional strategic review and we are both unaware of any MRC documentation to this eVect from that time. MRC may have had “the likely need for future capital investment for NIMR (on its) forward planning agenda since 1999” but they never mentioned it to me. MRC also states that “The need for a strategic review of future capital investment at NIMR has already been explained in our previous submission.” In his reply to Question 3, Sir Anthony Cleaver gave the reason that “the Director would be retiring in 2006 and it is normal policy that whenever the Director of an Institute or Unit retires, one reviews the future plans for it.” He chooses to use the words “Unit Director” and “Institute Director” interchangeably. In practice they are not. In Units, MRC most frequently supports Directors in the single disciplines of their expertise. When a Unit Director retires or resigns the Units are often closed. NIMR by comparison is multidisciplinary with 18 Divisions each with a leader equivalent to a Unit Director. So, although NIMR has a single Director, in my case a virologist, it is quite inappropriate to reconsider on my retirement the futures of these senior scientists who have committed their careers to MRC, as if their scientific leader was retiring. If this was “normal practice” MRC would have diYculty recruiting to its institutes any senior scientist younger than the Institute Director. In his reply to Question 5, Sir Anthony says, “In the case of NIMR, the concern was that the building, according to the advice that we received, was not capable in the long-term of meeting the needs of the Institute.” I addressed this issue in point 3 of my letter to you of 15 December 2004. To summarize “during the last 12 months (2003–04) the NIMR site has been surveyed for MRC by Powis Hughes, Ove Arup and NIFES. There were no adverse comments from the consultants regarding the Institute building structure but there were comments on its increasing life expectancy through investment . . . “It is not clear on whose advice Sir Anthony formed his concerns for the long-term capability of our current building to meet the needs of the Institute. The opposite conclusion was reached by independent structural engineers commissioned by NIMR, whose report I submitted to him in October 2002. In his reply to Question 4, Sir Anthony states “Then in 2002 OST issued a requirement for a long-term plan which was to deal with any major capital investment. Therefore we decided that what we needed to do was look at all the major sites where conceivably there would be significant capital investment over the next ten years, or so.” This account fails to mention the initial proposal for a review presented to me in August 2002 (Attachment 1), (not printed) entitled Planning for the Future of the MRC National Institute for Medical Research that I discussed with Sir Anthony, Sir George Radda and Nick Winterton on 19 September 2002. At this time also they presented their views on the date of my retirement and the poor state of the Institute building as the reasons for a review and as here, I indicated the inadequacy of these arguments. Subsequently, on 25 September 2002 I wrote to Sir Anthony (Attachment 2), (not printed) about my misgivings. In reply (Attachment 3a), (not printed), Sir Anthony indicated that MRC “had decided on a diVerent approach, I enclose a copy of the revised draft Council paper.” This paper was entitled Planning a Forward Investment Strategy for MRC Support and now addressed as well as NIMR the Laboratory of Molecular Biology, Cambridge and the Harwell Campus/University of Oxford (Attachment 3b), (not printed). Plans for major investments at both Oxford and Cambridge sites had already been made The reason for detailing these events is that the shifting rationale for carrying out another review of the Institute so soon after its 2000 quinquennial review certainly influenced how the Institute received the FIS proposals. I attach here the summary of the Heads of Divisions’ Committee response to the FIS proposals (Attachment 4), (not printed). To complement the responses of MRC and NIMR to NIM 46B (Q10) I also attach the executive summary of an independent analysis, commissioned by MRC, of the community’s response to the FIS consultation exercise (Attachment 5), (not printed). This analysis demonstrated the breadth of evidence that the FIS process was improperly conducted, a view also expressed to NIMR by Lord Sainsbury. It also made it clear that the recommendations of the FIS subcommittee for NIMR were not supported by NIMR staV or the wider community. December 2004

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APPENDIX 126 Memorandum from Sir Anthony Cleaver, Chairman, Medical Research Council The MRC’s NIMR I understand that at your Committee’s final evidence session yesterday, Council members were asked about the scope for reconvening the MRC Task Force and/or deploying some diVerent process (or body) to progress the future of NIMR. I thought you might find it helpful if I were to clarify some of the fundamental governance issues from my perspective as Council Chair. Governance of the MRC mirrors that for all Non-Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs), ensuring a level of independence from the executive. Council members are drawn from the academic community and from our other key stakeholder groups (NHS, industry, lay). They are appointed by the Minister for Science following public advertisement. The chair and members are all non-executive appointments, with the CEO serving as a full member. The Council and the executive takes seriously its custodianship of and accountability for public funds. In MRC the Council aims to manage an unusually broad mix of stakeholder inputs to our business. All decision-making is informed by advice from a range of stakeholders—whether through advisory committees, consultation, or other networks and fora. The Council strives to balance and to weight advice from diVerent sources, to draw on Council members’ own high-level experience and judgement, and to be open about the process by which decisions are reached. I have every confidence that the Council will continue to apply these principles in determining how best to take forward plans for the renewed NIMR. As with all other major corporate investments this will be done in conjunction with the executive, selected partners, NIMR staV and OST/RCUK. The Council recognises the importance, not least for staV, of maintaining momentum while preserving the quality and robustness of its corporate decision-making. In all complex projects there are lessons to be learned and I have no doubt your report will be helpful in drawing attention to these. We welcome the opportunity provided by your inquiry to clarify even more publicly the MRC’s overall vision for the renewed institute and the strategy for implementing it. January 2005

APPENDIX 127 Supplementary evidence from Professor Colin Blakemore, Chief Executive, Medical Research Council Inquiry into the Future of NIMR Not least because of the serious allegations against me made by Sir John Skehel, Dr Robin Lovell-Badge and Dr Steven Gamblin, in both their written and their oral evidence to the Committee, I wish to submit further evidence that I hope the Committee will consider as it forms its judgement. I appreciate that the staV of NIMR, led by their Director, continue to oppose the Council of the MRC, as it works to try to implement the vision developed by the Task Force, which was unanimously endorsed by the Council. Although their tactics have been vigorous, I am appalled that they have chosen to make damaging accusations against me, presumably in the hope of influencing the S&T Committee’s views about the validity of the Task Force recommendations. I had seen Sir John’s evidence to the Committee a few days before the hearing, but he refused to send to the MRC copies of Robin Lovell-Badge’s and Steve Gamblin’s submissions. I therefore had no warning of their content and I saw them only after the hearing. I have replied to Sir John’s submission in Annex 1, attached, and I am working on responses to the submissions from Drs Lovell-Badge and Gamblin, (Annexes 2 and 3). Two very serious allegations have been made: (1) I am accused of “coercing” members of the Task Force to sign up to statements that did not represent their opinions or the spirit of discussion at the meetings of the Task Force. The particular example that was cited is a confidential email that I sent to Professor Steve Tomlinson, ViceChancellor of the University of Wales College of Medicine, on 10 July 2004. I understand that Dr Lovell-Badge and/or Dr Gamblin have supplied to the Committee a copy of that email. However, when it is viewed in the context of the preceding message from Professor Tomlinson and his replies, and all his previous and following contributions to the discussion, it is clear that my message was not coercive. I merely encouraged him to stick to his firmly-stated position on the question of whether the Mill Hill site should be considered as a “fall-back” or “equal” option in the appraisal

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of possible sites for the future of the institute. I understand that Professor Tomlinson (and other Task Force members) submitted evidence to the Committee before the hearings. I hope that the Committee will examine those statements for any indication of coercion. (You will recall that Dr Gamblin said that he had not been coerced when asked during the hearings). I have arranged for the entire exchange of email between members of the Task Force, including all those marked “Confidential” to be forwarded to the Committee (on the understanding that confidential messages will not be put in the public domain without the permission of their authors). It will take a little time to collate the hundreds of messages, but, in the meantime, I have appended a full and annotated set of exchanges during the period when the incidents that form the basis of allegations against me are supposed to have occurred. The correspondence starts immediately after the important 5th meeting of the Task Force, where the bids from London Colleges and from Mill Hill were considered and the Task Force came to its conclusions, and includes the final, beyond-last-minute attempt by Dr Gamblin and Dr LovellBadge to introduce substantive changes into the full Report of the Task Force, against the resistance of all other Task Force members who were in contact. I use this opportunity to tell the Committee that I did, at several times during the work of the Task Force, feel excessively pressurised by Sir John Skehel. I had a number of conversations with him during the period of work of the Task Force and was shouted at, laughed at and derided by Sir John on almost every occasion. I had the distinct impression that Sir John felt no sense of duty towards the MRC, and he told me and others explicitly that he would fight to oppose any decision of Council with which he disagreed. (2) Dr Lovell-Badge alleged during the oral presentation that I had telephoned him on a number of occasions late at night and on a Sunday afternoon, and had specifically threatened him with dismissal. I deny this categorically. The events in question were supposed to have taken place 5 months ago, yet, to my knowledge, this is the first time that Dr Lovell-Badge has made this accusation, at least publicly. You will notice that, surprisingly, the allegation was not mentioned by Dr Lovell-Badge in his written evidence. I am, of course, well aware of employment law, and of the strict formal procedures that have to be gone through before any employee can be dismissed. I would expect any MRC employee who is faced with a threat of constructive or vindictive dismissal immediately to lodge a grievance, and to complain to his or her union, to the MRC Director of Human Resources or to the Chairman of Council. As far as I am aware, Dr Lovell-Badge did none of these things. The conversation in question, which took place on 28 June, concerned the draft “Conclusions of the 5th meeting of the Task Force”, which, after extensive circulation and discussion, had been agreed by the other members of the Task Force, but which Dr Lovell-Badge had recently refused to accept without the addition of a commitment to include the Mill Hill site as an active option in the options appraisal for the site of the renewed NIMR. Dr Lovell-Badge asserts that I telephoned him late at night, with the implication that I was harassing him. In reality, Dr Lovell-Badge telephoned me, at 23:30 on 28 June, rather than my phoning him (this is recorded in my email to the Task Force on p 80 of the attached correspondence)! He criticised me aggressively. I appealed to the fact he had already agreed to the Conclusions of the 5th meeting, both in the original meeting and during a subsequent telephone conference call, and that the other members of the Task Force had agreed to it. When asked by the S&T Committee to describe the threat of dismissal, Dr Lovell-Badge alleged that I said: “Robin, I don’t know how you can disagree with me. I am your employer”. This is not a threat of dismissal, but, in any case, I did not say it. As far as I can recall, the closest that I came to such a statement was to express my surprise that there should be such hostility at NIMR towards me and the MRC when the MRC owns the institute and employs most of the staV. December 2004 Annex 1 RESPONSE TO THE EVIDENCE OF SIR JOHN SKEHEL (PUBLISHED AS APPENDIX 61) Science and Technology Committee Questions Comments are in italics. 1. What factors persuaded the MRC that a stronger focus on translational research is required? What mechanisms were explored for achieving this end? Sir John suggests that the vision of an increased emphasis on translational research at NIMR was simply “opportunistic”, and that it was developed by MRC CEOs, the administrative staV and the Council. It was, in fact, developed by the Task Force, which included two NIMR scientists, and which consulted NIMR

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extensively, had presentations from NIMR scientists and conducted workshops and discussions at NIMR. We have been led to believe that NIMR accepts and even welcomes the increased emphasis on translation, and it is disappointing to see Sir John’s negative reaction to it. He questions what “extra mechanisms” MRC is using to advance translational research. They are several, and they underpin our Delivery Plan proposals to OST. They have evolved in consultation with our committee on Strategy, Corporate Policy and Evaluation, which includes all chairs of research boards and with our Clinical Research Advisory Group. An essay on our strategic views in the area of clinical research in general, and translation in particular, are the front page feature on the MRC web Portal, which is directly available to all units and institutes. I am disappointed that Sir John appears not to have read this article, particularly since it refers to the role that we hope NIMR might play. Sir John suggests that the MRC will reduce its commitment to basic research in its eVorts to strengthen translational research, but the best early-phase translational research is simply high-quality basic research orientated towards clinical problems. Some of the most outstanding such research is done at LMB and the Cancer Cell Biology Unit in Cambridge, the Protein Phosphorylation Unit in Dundee, and the Human Immunology Unit in Oxford. Sir John on the one hand extols the translational work already being done at NIMR but, on the other, sets it up as the enemy of basic research. Finally, he suggests that an increased commitment to translation would decrease NIMR’s “value as a site for training in biomedical science, not least for clinician-scientist trainees”. As Professor Savill pointed out in the ST hearing, the record of NIMR in training young clinical scientists is disappointing, with only 9?? young clinicians out of the roughly 750 people on site. 2. What impact is a heavier focus on translational research expected to have on the balance of MRC funding for basic and applied research? Sir John is right in saying that future clinical science will depend on the maintenance of support for basic research, and MRC has no intention of robbing the latter to pay for the former. We hope and expect additional funding from SR2004 (and SR2006) for the increased commitment to clinical research. In the meantime, we hope to encourage basic biomedical researchers to direct their fundamental skills more towards problems that have clinical significance, not to switch from being basic to being clinical researchers. 3. What statistical and other evidence was found from UK and beyond to indicate that colocated medical research institutes realise more than a stand-alone institute in terms of cross-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary research collaborations, and partnerships with other research funders? Sir John’s view that the Task Force’s view was based on “selected quotations from a minority of opinions obtained from MRC selected interviewees” is an insult to the Task Force. Those interviewed for the extensive institutional consultation were selected, to a large extent, by the Task Force, feeding suggestions to the consultants. The message from these consultations was clear ı and logical: if you put people with complementary interests close together, exchange of views and collaboration are more likely. It seems to me perverse to suggest that collaboration in less likely if potential collaborators are close. Sir John says that partnerships with other funders “are very successful at NIMR”. In fact, only about 9% of the total cost of NIMR is derived from other other funders. The MRC pays a higher fraction of the total cost of NIMR than of most other institutes and units. In some, as much as 30% of the cost comes from other sources. 4. What evidence is there that the current location of NIMR inhibits the ability of scientists there to conduct translational research, and to collaborate with other research institutes and hospitals? Once again, I appeal to the argument that it cannot possibly be true that proximity to a hospital and medical school will stimulate less collaboration that geographical isolation. It is important to point out that MRC has insisted to KCL and UCL that whatever governance structures they propose for the renewed institute must not interfere with existing or future collaborations with other institutions. 5. How was membership of the Task Force determined? What steps were taken to inform stakeholders of the progress of its work? You will note that Sir John criticises one member of the Task Force, who, as well as being “a clinician” was “by his own admission in favour of disbanding NIMR and redistributing its funding”. He does not mention that the two members of NIMR staV were (understandably) in favour of retaining NIMR on the Mill Hill site! Sir John appears to be saying that anyone who has views other than his own is fundamentally flawed in his or her judgement. I object to the suggestion that there were “disagreements between the formal reports and the views of Task Force members”. The record of email exchanges demonstrates that the pressure to modify reports of meetings after they had been approved by everyone else came largely, sometimes exclusively, from the NIMR representatives on the Task Force. I also deny that I (MRC CEO) attempted “to influence and persuade Task

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Force members to agree with reports that were not consistent with the spirit of the actual meetings.” The Task Force were a group of senior and powerful individuals. The suggestion that they could be manipulated in this way is an insult to them as well as to me. Again, the record of email correspondence demonstrates that this allegation is entirely unfounded.

6. What weight the Task Force ascribed to the consultation exercises which it used to formulate its conclusions? Sir John’s quotation from the Task Force Report is accurate. The Task Force did not attach as much weight to the public (web-based) consultation as it did to the longer and more intensive institutional consultations. I remind the S&T Committee that two members of the Task Force were members of staV at NIMR and they did not dissent from this view. We were told that about 2/3rds of those responding to the public consultation were either members of NIMR staV or had some personal connection with NIMR. We did not know what fraction, if any, of the remainder had been encouraged by colleagues at NIMR to respond to the questionnaire. In addition, at least some members of the Task Force were concerned that the glassy booklet describing NIMR’s “Research Achievements 2000–04”, which was distributed to more than 1500 researchers in Britain with a Foreword relating it to the consultation, might have biased the result of that consultation, by convincing respondents that what was at issue was the quality of past and present science.

7. What assessment was made of the impact on staV retention and recruitment of a move to (a) central London and (b) outside London? The main reason for the Task Force limiting its consideration of sites for the renewed institute to the London area was its recognition of the hostile reaction of NIMR staV to the recommendation of the Forward Investment Strategy committee that the institute should move to Cambridge. NIMR had argued that any move away from London would break up research groups. However, we now seem to be faced with the argument that NIMR can never be moved from Mill Hill (even some other part of London) because it would be impossible for staV to work elsewhere. If we were to accept this argument, no MRC establishment could ever move from its present location. The Task Force was made fully aware of the views of NIMR staV and many of them were surprised by an unwillingness even to consider any future other than to stay where they are, working as they do. Many of them came to the conclusion that, despite their concern not to add to the anxiety of NIMR staV, this could not be the only factor determining their recommendation to the MRC. The goal of the Task Force was not simply to recommend a future for NIMR that optimally satisfied the existing staV. It was to propose a vision for the future that balance the concerns of present staV against the needs of the MRC and the wider biomedical community.

8. What assessment was made of the potential initial and recurrent costs of a move to (a) central London and (b) outside London? MRC has not rejected “Mill Hill as an option for NIMR in the future”. It has accepted the unanimous view of the Task Force that the vision for the renewed instituted would be better realised by co-location with an HEI and research-active hospital, and will explore that preferred option. The business cases for KCL and UCL were not fully developed for the Task Force but will be considered by the MRC Council. Sir John suggests that the capital cost of keeping NIMR at Mill Hill will be considerably less expensive than relocation. The independent analysis of the building consultants engaged by MRC does not support this view. The present Mill Hill building is far from JIF standards for laboratories, and minimal renovation cannot create laboratories to meet the needs and expectations of the 21st century. In the long run (the timescale of the Task Force review), a total renovation or rebuild would be needed on the Mill Hill site, and this would not be significantly less expensive than a new building on a central London site. Given the possible contributions from the host university and from the value of the Mill Hill site, it seems likely that Mill Hill would be the most expensive option, in the long run.

10. To what extent will a final decision be based upon financial considerations? It is ridiculous to suggest that financial considerations will emerge only after a decision on location has been taken. The Council will consider both the science cases and the business cases from KCL and UCL. The business cases will include financial contributions from the Colleges and it is likely that the capital value of the Mill Hill site could also be deployed. The MRC expects to have to contribute from its own capital funds. We are well aware that, if additional capital funds are needed for the relocation, it will be necessary to present a very convincing case for funding from the OST Large Facilities Roadmap. Major renovation or rebuilding on the Mill Hill site would also be very expensive and, since there appears to be no oVer of funding from a university and the value of the site would obviously not be available, the shortfall in funding could well be substantially higher than for a new building in central London.

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Annex 2 COMMENTS ON THE SUBMISSION OF DR LOVELL-BADGE, (PUBLISHED AS APPENDIX 93) Comments are in italics. 1. Dr Lovell-Badge’s emails of 22 and 26 July are included in the complete sequence of messages that I have supplied to the Committee. They include various criticisms and accusations, each of which I should be more than willing to respond to individually. These messages arrived shortly after the attempt by Drs Gamblin and LovellBadge to introduce a large number of changes, some of them substantive, into the final Report of the Task Force, after the deadline for the communication of minor corrections, and just two days after a telephone conference call, attended by most members of the Task Force, including Robin and Steve, which had approved the precise wording of the Executive Summary and the entire text of the Report. Please note that the only two other members of the Task Force who were in email contact when Steve and Robin’s changes were received (Kay Davies and Dick Denton) both wrote immediately to object to these changes. How could we possibly incorporate these changes with no approval from any other member of the Task Force? What I did was to ask David Smith to make all the changes that he could, without changing the thrust of the document and then to ask Steve and Robin to write a letter to the Council, describing their position. This letter was presented to the Council, alongside the Report, and Professor Flavell was invited to attend the Council meeting specifically to represent the views of Steve and Robin. What more could I have done without disenfranchising all the other members of the Task Force? The decision to exclude Robin’s two messages from the correspondence on the MRC website was not mine but that of David Smith, secretary to the Task Force. He wrote to me, as well as to Robin to explain his decision. I presume that he took legal advice before making this decision. In any case, all the messages have now been submitted to the S&T Committee. 2. Dr Lovell-Badge writes as if he and the “international colleagues” had no influence on the work of the Task Force. They were, of course, equals in the process to all other members of the Task Force. Robin writes as if he were excluded from the work of the Task Force by the fact is that he was not only a member of the Task Force but he was also a member (with Paul Nurse, Dick Denton and myself) of the sub-committee that drafted the final report. The record of communication between members of the Task Force shows that he contributed more to the discussion that most of the other members of the Task Force. 3. Despite what Dr Lovell-Badge now writes, consensus was reached on the important issue of the preference for the institute to move into co-location with a London HEI and hospital. This is most clearly expressed in the press release following the crucial fifth meeting of the Task Force: “An international Task Force, set up to advise on options for the future of the MRC National Institute of Medical Research (NIMR), has recommended that, if an appropriate partnership arrangement can be negotiated, the institute should move to a central London location in association with a leading university and hospital, in order to carry out more patient-based research.” Robin not only individually approved this press release, but contributed the following quote for it: “This has been a diYcult period for staV at the institute and I am sure that they will appreciate these positive recommendations, which would secure the institute’s future.” The only reason why “the final TF report was submitted to Council without several members of the TF having even seen information that was only forthcoming in the last few days before its completion” is that this information was submitted after the deadline for minor changes. The only other members of the Task Force in contact at the time refused to accept the substantive changes. Response to Select Committee Questions 4. Question 1. Robin implicitly criticises Dr Elias Zerhouni, Director of NIH, for being a clinician, but he fails to mention that the doubling of the NIH budget was gained on the basis of promises of health delivery not on promises of more basic research. Of course basic research is still important, and MRC has no intention of reducing its investment in it. But if MRC gains substantial new funds in this and forthcoming Spending Reviews, that new money will also have been gained on the back of promises of delivery, and at least part of it will be used to push forward translational and clinical research. I am confused by Robin’s response, given the fact that he, like everyone on the Task Force, embraced the proposal that mission of the renewed NIMR should be more translational. And Robin also supported the proposal that co-location with clinicians would help to implement this mission. The statement is the first indication that Robin has given that he is opposed to the vision of increased emphasis on translation and to the preference for a move into co-location with a hospital and HEI. 5. No-one’s input to the consultation was “ignored”. The transcriptions of interviews, letters and the results of the web-based consultations were all discussed by the Task Force.

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6. Question 2. I simply don’t understand why Robin is raising these arguments now. At the meetings of the Task Force he oVered no objection whatever to the view, accepted by all, that the future mission of NIMR should be more translational. These are entirely new arguments, presented four months after the Task Force completed its report. 7. Question 3. Again, it is hard to believe that Robin is raising such arguments at this stage. The advantages of co-location are central to the recommendations of the Task Force, and no objection was ever raised to this argument, even in the last-minute changes proposed by Steve and Robin. Again, I draw your attention to the press release after the fifth meeting: “An international Task Force, set up to advise on options for the future of the MRC National Institute of Medical Research (NIMR), has recommended that, if an appropriate partnership arrangement can be negotiated, the institute should move to a central London location in association with a leading university and hospital, in order to carry out more patient-based research.” 8. Question 5. Robin states that for me to chair the Task Force was an “obvious conflict” but doesn’t mention that his own and Steve Gamblin’s membership was at least equally conflicted, given the diYcult if not impossible dual role of participating as individuals in the Task Force’s discussions and yet being compelled to represent the opinions of Sir John Skehel and all the staV of NIMR.

9. It is interesting that Robin criticises the fact that Steve Tomlinson and Alan Bernstein (who attended and contributed to several meetings by video and telephone input) expressed their initial views in advance. Robin and Steve Gamblin also made their opinion—that the institute should be kept at Mill Hill—patently clear from the start. But unlike Steve Tomlinson and Alan Bernstein, who were willing to shift from their stated positions in the interest of compromise, Steve and Robin now reveal their unwillingness to give an inch.

10. It is outrageous that Robin should now complain about “delays” in the release of summaries of meetings. Inspection of the record of emails reveals that these delays were invariably produced by objections from him and Steve Gamblin to wording that had been agreed by all the other members of the Task Force. As far as I know, the only email message marked Non-Confidential that was not displayed “on the MRC website has been described above, with the reasons for its exclusion by David Smith. The conversation with the” two young NIMR postdoctoral researchers”, to which Robin refers, followed a telephone conference call in which I was called “facile” by Steve Gamblin. I did indeed cancel a proposed visit to NIMR because of this because I was unwilling to expose myself to further humiliation. I was well aware of the way in which heads of division at NIMR had walked out of a meeting with Sir Anthony Cleaver and George Radda. The only letter that I sent “on behalf of the Task Force” was that of 19 July to Guy Dodson of NIMR (see the attached sequence of correspondence). Robin knows that I was compelled to reply to that letter under instruction from the OST, because Lord Sainsbury wanted to see my reply for a meeting with Sir John Skehel and Andrew Dismore the next day. In that letter I wrote: “Thanks for your letter of 16 July to which I’m sure you and your colleagues would like a rapid reply. I haven’t been able to consult all the other members of the Task Force but I’ll try to represent their collective views. I’ve already forwarded your letter to them; I’ll send them copies of this reply and I’ll let you know if there are objections to what I’ve written.” I copied the letter immediately to the entire Task Force and there were no objections at the time. It is disingenuous of Robin to say that I informed “KCL and UCL that it would be a straight fight between the two of them against the spirit of our agreement at the meeting”. The Conclusions of the fifth meeting were unanimously agreed at that meeting and I was specifically instructed by the Task Force to communicate the document to KCL and UCL. I simply read out the appropriate sections of the Conclusions over the telephone. Robin was present at that meeting and he agreed that I should telephone KCL and UCL! Moreover I made it absolutely clear to KCL and UCL that any oVer would have to be better than could be achieved at Mill Hill for it to be acceptable. 11. Question 7. At the request of the Task Force, at its third meeting, all the London Colleges were invited to present proposals for a single-site institute. The proposal for a “federated”, split-site institute came from Imperial College and UCL, in response to that request. Robin and Steve Gamblin tried very hard to have it ruled out before the Task Force could even consider it, but I thought that it would have been insulting to IC and UC for the Task Force not even to have considered it. They did so, at their fourth meeting, and rejected it. This seems to me to have been an entirely fair and democratic process.

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12. The Task Force had indeed been stood down. 13. Questions 8-10. For its first two meetings, the Task Force conducted a broad discussion about principles, dependent only on scientific arguments rather than financial constraints. This led to the unanimous conclusion (now apparently abandoned by Robin) that the institute should be renewed with its future mission orientated more towards translation, with a greater proportion of clinician scientists on the staV. Subsequent discussion was coloured by financial considerations. There is confusion between capital costs (for which an approach to government is indeed possible) and recurrent costs in Robin’s statement. There was general agreement that the funding envelope for recurrent costs could not increase, given the fact that only 60% of alpha-A grant applications were, and still are, being funded. But there was also the hope that the fraction of income from other sources could be raised from its present level of 9% (low compared with most MRC units and institutes). Also, co-location would provide additional support for the institute from members of the host university. 14. The Task Force concluded unanimously at its fifth meeting, with Robin present, that “moving NIMR to central London in partnership with a leading university and hospital—on a suitable site, with appropriate governance and financial arrangements—would strengthen the NIMR’s ability to deliver this renewed vision” (ie a multidisciplinary institute with a stronger focus on translational research). This is incompatible with Robin’s statement above, yet he signed up to the Conclusions of the fifth meeting and provided a quotation for the related media release.

APPENDIX 128 Supplementary evidence from Professor Colin Blakemore, National Institute for Medical Research Comments on Sir John Skehel’s Letter of 15 December (Appendix 125) Comments are in italics. 1. I’m puzzled. Sir John’s copy of the Stoker Report appears to have been specially edited to remove all references to Stoker’s strong support for a move of NIMR into association with the CRC or its proposed successor—a new clinical research centre with the Royal Postgraduate Medical School at the Hammersmith Hospital. I have attached a pdf copy of the Stoker Report, so that the S&T Committee can judge the accuracy of Sir John’s statement. The sentence that I quoted (“This should be achieved by the move of the NIMR”), which Sir John seems to imply is an invention, appears in Para 3.4: “As we have already pointed out, the Council’s original intention in establishing the CRC was that there should be strong basic research on site and that this should be achieved by the move of the NIMR to Northwick Park.” This clearly refers back to Para 2.14, from which the other sentences that I quoted were drawn: “We next examined whether, as the Council had originally intended, it had indeed proved possible to bring together at the CRC an ‘adequate and appropriately comprehensive concentration of clinical and pre-clinical subjects’ and were agreed that in formulating this concept of linking clinical with basic research it had shown remarkable prescience. Because of the way medicine is developing it is of crucial importance, if clinical research in the UK is to remain internationally competitive, to apply the new techniques of the biological sciences—for example those of molecular and cellular biology—as an integral part of the study of an ever increasing number of clinical research problems.” The S&T Committee will see from the unedited Stoker Report that, contrary to Sir John’s assertion, there are many references to the suggested move of NIMR, throughout the document. For example: Paras 1.2-1.3: “We therefore turned to the Council’s memorandum, submitted to Ministers in September 1959, which sets out the arguments which led to the proposal to create a new clinical research centre. At that time the Council put forward as its ultimate aim the “bringing together in one place of an adequate and appropriately comprehensive concentration of relevant clinical and preclinical subjects . . . At that time the Council examined the possibility of building a hospital at Mill

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Hill in proximity to the existing National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR), but did not pursue this as it was clear that the surrounding area would not provide enough patients. However, it was clear that the chosen site should have suYcient space eventually to accommodate the transfer of the NIMR” Para 4.1: “The new national centre should be formed by merging the best of the CRC, the RPMS and the NIMR on one site. This would provide a centre of excellence where clinical research and postgraduate training can be pursued to internationally competitive standards. The NIMR component would provide not only a yardstick of excellence but also the skills and techniques necessary to exploit to the full the unparalleled scientific opportunities for advances in clinical science.” Para 4.3: “While there are in our view exceptional attractions in suggesting that the essential basic science component of the new centre be provided by the NIMR from the outset, we have already established that its move is only likely to be acceptable if the inevitable physical disruption were reduced to a minimum. We urge however that the integration of the NIMR into the new centre should remain a long-term objective” Conclusions 6.1 vi: “There are great attractions in providing the basic scientific component of the new centre by moving some or all of the NIMR to form part of the new institution. If this does not prove possible it should remain a long-term objective.” I trust that the members of the S&T Committee will ask why Sir John has misrepresented the facts in such a way as to try to convince the Committee that I was lying and that the Stoker Report did not recommend moving NIMR into association with a research-active hospital. I have it on good authority that no serious suggestion of a move of NIMR to Northwick Park was made to my predecessor and certainly neither on my appointment in 1987 nor in the 17 years since then has the Stoker report or any suggestion of transfer of NIMR from Mill Hill been mentioned to me by MRC, until I was given the FIS subcommittee report on 31 March 2003. I suspect that Professor Blakemore is wrong in all his conclusions on the Stoker report and that as a new CEO he may be fighting yesterday’s battles for yesterday’s men. Again, this comment from Sir John is a curious version of reality. Para 3.7 of the Stoker Report states: “In his discussions with us, the Director of the NIMR [ie Sir John’s predecessor] was clear about the undoubted benefits to clinical science of a merger with the CRC.” The Stoker report, as the S&T Committee will see, makes it clear that the MRC had planned since 1959 to move NIMR into association with a research-active hospital, and the Stoker Committee strongly recommended that such a move should eventually take place: Para 4.3: “We urge however that the integration of the NIMR into the new centre should remain a long-term objective” Stocker’s recommendations included: “There are great attractions in providing the basic scientific component of the new centre by moving some or all of the NIMR to form part of the new institution. If this does not prove possible it should remain a long-term objective.” It was the cost of a move a the time that led the Stoker Committee to conclude that it should be delayed, and they pointed out that the fabric of the building at NIMR “can be expected to last without major repair for some twenty years.” That was written nearly 20 years ago. Again, I ask the S&T Committee to consider why Sir John misrepresents the facts in this way. 2. John Savill gave simple factual evidence to the Committee. He pointed out that there are only nine clinically active scientists out of a total of about 750 staV at NIMR, while the Clinical Sciences Centre had recruited 54 clinical fellows (out of a much smaller total staV) at its quinquennial review this year, Professor Savill’s own Centre for Inflammation Research in Edinburgh, with only 200 staV, had recruited 33 clinical training fellows and 13 more senior clinicians in the past five years, and UCL has 189 clinical training fellows and 22 clinical scientists. Sir John quotes an anonymous source at the CRC as saying that “many Hammersmith clinicians are aYliated with the CSC”. This does not, however, explain away the surprisingly poor record of NIMR in attracting bright young clinicians for research training. Why are so few clinicians aYliated to NIMR? (b) I was not at the MRC at the time of the last QQR of NIMR, but what I can say is that it was concerned with scientific achievement from 1996–2001 and with specific proposals for research from 2001–06. What Sir John and the senior staV at NIMR still seem unwilling to recognise is that the strategic review conducted by the MRC, through the work of the Forward Investment Strategy committee and the Task Force, is concerned the coming 20-50 years. When Drs Lovell-Badge and Gamblin were asked at the first meeting of the Task Force to describe the mission of NIMR they said that NIMR had no explicit mission. It just did “good science”. The OST requires that Research Councils conduct strategic reviews of their institutes, specifically examining their scientific missions and asking, in each case, whether and why an institute is needed to fulfil the mission. In the case of NIMR, both the FIS committee and the Task Force recommended that the long-term vision for NIMR lies in

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more translational research, in close partnership with a university and medical school. This vision has been unanimously endorsed by the Council. I do not understand why Sir John is appealing to funding decisions that were made nearly five years ago. To some extent Professor Savill and the CEO are importing an issue, which will of course be addressed by NIMR in the appropriate future reviews. This is also the case for Professor Blakemore’s additional comment on the proportion of NIMR budget that derives from sources other than MRC. Our performance and strategy in this regard were also endorsed by MRC for the 2001–06 period. Again, I cannot comment on endorsement on performance nearly five years ago. I simply pointed out a fact— that the fraction of NIMR’s income that derives from other sources (about 9%) is low compared with most MRC units/institutes. The hope of the Task Force was that this could be improved by a move into close association with an HEI/hospital and by appropriate governance arrangements. 3. I draw the attention of the S&T Committee to the conclusion of the Stoker report in 1986, namely that the fabric of the building at NIMR “can be expected to last without major repair for some twenty years.” The Ove Arup survey, to which Sir John refers (described in an appendix to the Task Force report), concluded that, over a 20-year period, “Strategic refurbishment (to ‘well-found’ standards) and limited new construction” on the Mill Hill site would cost £159.9 million, including maintenance and utilities, while “phased replacement of existing buildings by new construction” would cost £172.8 million. It would be very unfortunate, in my opinion, if the MRC were to make such an important decision about the future of its largest single recurrent investment simply on the basis of the capital cost. Over a 20-50 year period, the recurrent costs (currently £33 million per annum) will enormously exceed the capital cost of refurbishment or a new building. If a new building in central London significantly enhances the future potential of the institute, as concluded unanimously by the Task Force, it must surely be the right thing to do. And in any case, with the possibility of a significant contribution to building costs from the host HEI and with a probable contribution from the capital value of the Mill Hill site, it seems certain that a new building in central London would be less costly to the public purse that the major refurbishment or rebuild that will be needed at Mill Hill in the 20-50year time-frame. December 2004

APPENDIX 129 Supplementary memorandum from Professor Colin Blakemore, Chief Executive, Medical Research Council RESPONSES TO “NIMR ANSWER” (APPENDIX 124) In the interests of fair play, in what is looking increasingly like a judicial process, I hope that the Committee will note my responses (below) to NIMR’s answers to follow-up questions. NIMR Answers to the Committee’s Follow-up Questions 1. The statement from all members of the Task Force except Robin Lovell-Badge and Steve Gamblin, which I sent to the S&T Committee on 30 November, was a shortened version of a statement (Annex 2 below) (not printed) that was circulated between all Task Force members in August. Robin Lovell-Badge and Steve Gamblin never responded to it. (The relevant email correspondence is included in the full file of all Task Force emails, already submitted to the Committee). The original statement was composed in response to a document from Heads of Division at NIMR that had been displayed on the NIMR website following the decision of Council at its July meeting (see Annex 1 below) (not printed). That document essentially rejected the KCL and UCL options in advance, accused me of mismanagement and said that I “persuaded the Task Force to arrive at an interpretation, by a majority of just one, in which the Mill Hill site is not an option for the long-term future”. I and several other members of the Task Force were concerned about inaccuracies in this document, and about the potential damage that it might do to the negotiations with KCL and UCL. I drafted a statement and Richard Flavell circulated it to Task Force members and invited comments and editing. We arrived at the attached statement (Annex 2), containing the words “without coercion”, which was explicitly agreed by five members of the Task Force (CB, KD, ST, AB and DD). The email record shows that Richard Flavell and Paul Nurse were hesitant to sign up, on the grounds that it might deepen the division between Steve Gamblin and Robin Lovell-Badge and the rest of the Task Force. Richard also argued that, since the Council had oYcially disbanded the Task Force, it no longer had any formal standing. No-one raised any objection to the phrase “without coercion” at that stage. When I saw the allegation of coercion in Sir John Skehel’s initial written evidence to the S&T Committee, just a few days before the 1 December hearing, I thought that it would be valuable to obtain a statement on this issue from the other members of the Task Force. I remembered the statement that we had prepared in

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August, and the fact that it had already been agreed by five members. I therefore recirculated that old statement (minus the introductory sentence, which referred to the Heads of Divisions’ document) to all members of the Task Force (except, initially, to Steve and Robin, on the grounds that, since they were giving evidence “against” the MRC, it was extremely unlikely that they would sign any such statement). I asked permission from those members of the Task Force to send the statement to the S&T Committee. Richard and Paul communicated with each other about this and provided the further shortened version, which I submitted to the S&T Committee on 30 November (Annex 3). You will know from Richard Flavell’s email of 30 November that he and Paul wanted to remove the words “without coercion” on the grounds that this might make the statement less divisive and to make it possible for Robin and Steve Gamblin to sign it. At the evidence session on 20 December, Paul Nurse said: “when it came to this question of coercion again it seemed to me too pointed and I really wanted to try and get the Mill Hill members of the Task Force on board so that we had a united front over the process”. I did send the revised statement to Steve and Robin as soon as I received it, but had no reply. Robin Lovell-Badge’s outburst during the evidence session on 1 December came as a complete surprise to me. I had no warning whatever that he would make this accusation, I hope that the S&T Committee will note that he made no reference to ’phone calls, coercion or threats in his written evidence to the Committee. He never initiated a formal complaint, nor did he make any mention of this in any email to the Task Force at the time (even though he was not reticent in making other accusations, about my having a “hidden agenda”, etc). Neither Robin nor any other member of the Task Force mentioned or complained about coercion, persuasion or lobbying at any meeting of the Task Force. (In his response to Q137 in the 20 December evidence session, Richard Flavell said: “These issues were not raised at any Task Force meeting.”) I apologise for labouring the following discussion, but I hope that the Committee will understand that my career might be under threat as a result of this allegation from Robin. I need to describe the circumstances surrounding what I take to be the two telephone conversations that Robin refers to. (I must emphasise that, at the time of writing this I have not seen Robin’s further evidence “extended in writing”, which is referred to in the NIMR answers to follow-up questions. When I do see that, there might be additional points to which I ought to reply.) Let me respond to each of the “four main pieces of evidence of the alleged coercion of Robin LovellBadge” Point 1. (Robin’s evidence in the session and extended in writing here (see attachment) indicates the background to the threat.) Robin said the following during the 1 December hearings: Q86 Mr Key: What was the coercion there? Dr Lovell-Badge: I was in receipt of various forms of attempts at coercion, such as ’phone calls late at night threatening me with my job. Q87 Mr Key: From whom? Dr Lovell-Badge: Colin Blakemore. Q88 Chairman: How many such ’phone calls did you have? Dr Lovell-Badge: There were two occasions in particular, one in the spring and one after. Q89 Chairman: Would you care to quote what he said to you? Dr Lovell-Badge: He made statements such as “Robin, I don’t know how you can disagree with me. I am your employer.” I hope that the S&T Committee will note that the entire allegation of threats of dismissal rests on this one suggested quotation. These words could hardly be taken as a threat of dismissal, but, in any case, I deny unequivocally having said them, or anything that could have been construed as a threat to Robin’s employment. Robin refers to “two occasions” and identifies the first of these in his answer to Q89: First occasion Dr Lovell-Badge: It transpired, in one of these ’phone calls, which was on a Sunday, that Colin Blakemore had then a vision for a future Institute which would have been considerably smaller than the current Institute, so in a sense we would have lost at least half the science going on there, including, for example, all the work that I do in stem-cells and genetics. Colin then asked me, I

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guess, not to talk about this, but in the way that the subsequent e-mail exchange was going about it was clear that he had a hidden agenda and he had to declare it, so this was declared on that e-mail exchange. The Committee will notice that there is no reference here to coercion or a threat to Robin’s job—only to an idea that he disliked (and which he exaggerates in what he says here). Inspection of the email exchanges (which I have supplied to the Committee) shows that this refers to a conversation on the afternoon of Sunday 15 February. It is important to set the background to this call. The third full meeting of the Task Force had been held on the preceding Sunday 8 February. The agenda had included: Discussion of future options for NIMR: — Relocate within London. — Reconstitute outside London. — Re-allocate funds. — Distributed model. — Optimise NIMR in Mill Hill. David Smith, Secretary to the Task Force, circulated a draft summary on Wednesday 11 February, which included the following wording: 3. The Task Force recognises the importance of a clear scientific focus for a new institute. It is particularly interested in exploring the possibility, among others, of adding to existing basic science strengths from NIMR those research disciplines in clinical and health services research that will facilitate the translation of findings into clinical practice for the benefit of patients. A suitable name might be National Institute for Human Health. This could entail significant partnership working with other institutions under an appropriate governance structure. 4. At the start of its work, the Task Force recognised the diYculty of moving to a location away from London those parts of the work of NIMR that it would want to keep intact. Robin Lovell-Badge immediately replied, with, amongst other points, the following: Point 3: I was not under the impression that it was going to be a new Institute, but one that will continue its evolution, although perhaps in an accelerated fashion with additions that will capitalise on the current strengths. To use “new” at this stage will be an exaggeration and it will unsettle the present staV. The idea of a new name for the Institute was only brought up at the end of the meeting and with no time for reflection and little opportunity for comment. Point 4: As we did not at any time discuss which parts of the Institute should be kept intact and which should not, or even if this was something we should discuss given that there is no criticism of current research at NIMR, it would be very misleading to say that: “the Task Force recognised the diYculty of moving to a location away from London those parts of the work of NIMR that it would want to keep intact.” Indeed this is likely to provoke a riot. It was simply concluded that the Institute should not be broken up. There was also email input from Steve Gamblin, Richard Flavell, Steve Tomlinson and Alison Spaull. David and I spoke to Robin on the ’phone. I spoke to Paul Nurse, who agreed to new wording for the summary. So did Kay Davies and Dick Denton, whom David and I spoke to that day. The revised version, circulated on Thursday 12 February, contained the following: 2. The Task Force argues that there is a good case for a national institute, building on a core of present NIMR science, with a newly-focused mission that explicitly addresses: — training and professional development in life sciences and health research; and — helping translate basic research findings into clinical practice and/or into industrial application; and that shares its facilities and training environment with the UK life sciences and health research communities, and forms close partnerships with other institutions throughout the UK. 3. The Task Force recognises the importance of a clear and definitive scientific focus for the new institute. It is particularly interested in exploring the possibility, among others, of adding to existing basic science strengths from NIMR those disciplines in clinical and health sciences research that will facilitate the translation of findings into clinical practice for the benefit of patients. In these circumstances, a new name might be appropriate, such as National Institute for Human Health. This could entail significant partnership working with other institutions under an appropriate governance structure.

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The next day, Robin wrote again with the following objection: “There may be some confusion matching ‘options that build on a multi-disciplinary research institute model’ in paragraph 1 with ‘The Task Force recognises the importance of a clear and definitive scientific focus for the institute’ in paragraph 3, the latter implying a move away from multidisciplinarity.” David responded: “I am now a bit worried that we are moving away from the original point. While the word ‘focus’ perhaps doesn’t have a very precise meaning in this context, I had understood that we had agreed that in addition to the training and translation missions in para 2, we need to be clear what the scientific mission is going to be—and that this was what was meant by the phrase ‘scientific focus’. I can see the clarity in the word ‘portfolio’, but Robin’s suggested wording could imply that once agreed neither MRC nor Director could change the areas of research being pursued in the institute.” This was followed by further objections from Steve Gamblin but support from Steve Tomlinson. At 18:13 on Friday 13/10/2004, I wrote to Steve Tomlinson: Dear Steve, I agree completely with these thoughts. It is such a disappointment to see what seems to be suspicion and doubt about opportunity and challenge. The correspondence following our last meeting seems so diVerent in tone from the discussion at the meeting itself—and so much more divided. I begin to wonder whether we, the Task force, can complete our job. Have a good weekend. Yours despondently, Colin Steve Tomlinson replied at 20:02 on Friday 13 February: Dear Colin, Thanks. Having been through our merger discussions with CardiV University over the last two years and experienced cycles of despondency and (relative!) euphoria, I know that suspicion and distrust are almost always a result of poor communication, misunderstanding or a mixture of both(for example the College of Medicines insistence on using and protecting the name “College of Medicine” post merger was interpreted as us wanting to “take over” Bioscience, Vision Science, Psychology and Pharmacy in CardiV University and call the whole thing “the Wales College of Medicine”; this was failure of communication and misunderstanding of something that was precious to the College—just the name! Subsequently, we found that the way forward is absolute openness, frankness and robust dialogue. I do think it essential the key players open up, cards on table now. Maybe email is not good enough for this kind of dialogue. If there’s anything I can do to help us move on let me know, Yours optimistically! Steve PS All non-confidential

I wrote again to Steve Tomlinson at 16:23 on Sunday 15 February: Dear Steve, Thank you for your characteristically straightforward and constructive response. I had hoped that nine months of attempts to reassure the staV of NIMR would have built their confidence in me and in the process that we have in place to look openly, honestly, compassionately but rigorously at the future of the institute. I say nine months, because I first visited Mill Hill last spring, within days of the announcement of my appointment at the MRC, and I have been going there, as well as having meetings with individuals and groups from Mill Hill in other locations, at regular intervals ever since. I think that I have visited NIMR six times, to discuss with staV and to look around labs and facilities. Yet, when I spoke at a meeting of the MRC AUT the other day, one of the six members of NIMR staV present asked why I was going on roadshows to universities

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in the UK but never visited NIMR! Indeed, the level of hostility that I am encountering from some staV at NIMR is a real shock. What have I done, or not done, that justifies the continuing suspicion? I had really thought that we achieved a breakthrough in the Task Force’s meeting last Sunday. So it was doubly disappointing to see the retreat from any mention of change in some of the responses to the draft report. I fear that the TF is not fully aware of the reality of the financial constraints on the final decision that others will ultimately have to make, after we make our recommendations—constraints that I myself have only come to understand fully during the past couple of months. I am planning to write a note to the TF later today to try to make the position clear. The work of the TF has already consumed a huge amount of the time of busy people, as well as quite a lot of public money. Before we spend more time and money, I think that we should ask ourselves, seriously, whether we have any chance of being able to achieve a consensus. If not, perhaps we should plan to have just one more meeting, and then present two brief reports—from the majority and the minority, and let the Council, RCUK and the OST decide what has to be done. You are so right about openness and the need for “cards on the table”. If the only outcome of our deliberations that is acceptable to some members of the TF is that NIMR must remain exactly as it is, except for significant extra investment, I think that we should all know that now. It could save us a lot of time. I’ll write again soon. Best wishes, Colin At 17:02 that Sunday, I sent the following confidential message to Robin and the entire Task Force: Dear All, I am replying to Robin’s latest comments on the draft statement, but I also want to convey some thoughts to the Task Force as a whole. First, for Robin: I don’t see a contradiction between “multi-disciplinary” and “focus”. For instance, the work involved in the development of MRI was certainly “focused”, but it required expertise in physics, engineering, computing, physiology, clinical medicine, etc, etc. Let me put it another way. Would you be happy with a recommendation that the new institute should be “unfocused”? Now, I want to make a point to the whole Task Force, about why it so important that we should record the need for “focus”. The Task Force is, of course, empowered to come to its own conclusions and make its own preferred recommendation to MRC Council. But we must remember that the final decision will be made by the Council, which will make a proposal to the OYce of Science and Technology (OST) and Research Councils UK (RCUK), in the context of the whole MRC portfolio, indeed the whole of UK science, and in the cold light of funding implications. I strongly recommend that we all take a reality check at this point. I meant to convey this to you when I told you all, at the start of last Sunday’s meeting, that the MRC will not be able, given all the demands on its resources, to increase its financial commitment to NIMR (already more than £27 million per annum) significantly in the future. We haven’t received information about the cost implications of maintaining and improving the present building at Mill Hill, but it would surely involve a good deal of money within the 10-year timeframe. On the 20-year scale, even if the institute were to stay at Mill Hill, substantial building work would probably be needed. In my opinion, and with knowledge of the huge demands on the “Large Facilities Roadmap” of RCUK, I just can’t imagine that a proposal to spend lots of capital money on the institute would be successful without very strong arguments about how its work is going to be focused so as to strengthen the MRC portfolio, to complement the rest of the MRC’s work and, preferably, to enable the MRC to do new things that it presently cannot do. I’m sorry to put these constraining thoughts in the minds of the Task Force, but if we want our recommendations to be taken seriously, we have to be realistic. You have seen from the tone of the QQR of the Research Councils that, for the OST, institutes are not the immediately preferred form of research funding. That is why research councils have to ask, whenever an institute is strategically reviewed, whether its mission could be achieved in some other way. I was, then, delighted by the direction and spirit of our discussion last Sunday. We were all able to agree unanimously that institutes can still be valuable, because of the special opportunities for building capacity and the strong environment for research that they can provide, and we were

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therefore about to reject the dissolution option. For the first time, I sensed that we were all willing to support a plan for something innovative and exciting—a plan that might be persuasive to the Council, RCUK and the OST. And that is why I am so disappointed to see some members of the TF denying that words like “new” and “focus” were even used last Sunday, and denying that we discussed and did not reject a possible change of name. Let me be blunt. I do not think that a proposal to maintain ALL the existing work of NIMR intact and to add new research to it, with a need for considerable capital investment, will be acceptable to those who will, in the end, make the decision. And I don’t think that it will be possible (even if desirable) to keep an unchanged Mill Hill going, within the existing budget, on the 10 to 20-year time-scale. We have constantly acknowledged and sympathised with the anxieties of the staV at NIMR. But that concern can not be the only factor determining our recommendation. If it were, we need not have spent so much time and public money. We could simply have recommended immediately that nothing can possibly be changed for fear of upsetting someone. But there is no chance that such a recommendation would be accepted. In the long run, it would be more damaging to NIMR and its staV to make an unacceptable recommendation than to make a well-argued, focused proposal that preserves intact the most relevant work of NIMR and which has a chance of being implemented. Best wishes, Colin Kay Davies immediately replied: Dear Colin, I agree with what you say. I think everyone in the TF at last Sunday’s meeting thought we had made real progress including Robin and Steve. The problem came afterwards because of the sensitivities of the NIMR staV. I discussed this with Robin yesterday. In order to move forward and be open, we are bound to upset various interested parties and these may not always be only at NIMR. I am very much in favour of openness. Whatever the final conclusion, the way in which we arrive at it must be seen to be fair and rigorous. NIMR staV are already thinking about a future with change. I am sure we can carry them with us without worrying about every word after every meeting. There has to be an element of trust and as you say, we need to recommend a realistic option if we are not to have wasted our time. The TF is fortunate in having so many international players on it with so many diVerent experiences of running the best science and individuals who are working at the clinical interace. Best wishes, Kay Closely followed by Steve Tomlinson: Dear Colin, Thanks. I agree. Three comments: (1) We do need a reality check on what’s possible. For a whole range of reasons—financial, political etc, status quo is a non-starter. (2) We all need to reflect on both the spirit and content of last Sunday’s meeting, which seems to have been forgotten in subsequent correspondence. (3) As I mentioned last Sunday, but perhaps with insuYcient emphasis, perhaps all of us should revisit the MRC’s “Vision for the Future” 2003 (on the web-site) to see what the MRC Council will ˆ £25 million/annum plus substantial be looking for, from any continuing investment of more than A additional capital. If what is to be proposed doesn’t map explicitly to that vision, the Council and other key players, Treasury included will simply say “think again”; the TF will have no credibility and our work and public money will have been wasted. (4) Finally, I personally have reflected on the position that Dick Denton and I share as “provincial lads” and non-golden triangle participants in all of this. I have to say that we’ve recognised the importance of the National Institute to the future of UK Biomedical and Health Sciences research (as have our overseas colleagues),and we have spoken up for it. After last Sunday’s meeting, I was convinced we were on the way. I expected that Current NIMR folk would be relieved and delighted at this wonderful new opportunity. Naturally, I’m bemused and disappointed. So naturally, it wouldn’t be surprising to hear that I’m now having second thoughts! If we don’t see a much more positive and visionary future for OUR National Institute emerging from the TF, why shouldn’t we act from enlightened self-interest too? Steve(T)

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Strengthened by these expressions of support, I did indeed call Robin on his mobile phone that Sunday afternoon, 15 February. (PLEASE NOTE that Robin had given me his mobile number so that I could contact him outside oYce hours). I asked if he was free to talk and he readily agreed. The conversation was not at all acrimonious, and there was no hint of a threat in anything that I said. Robin was, however, clearly resistant to any discussion about “focus” for the renewed institute. I explained to him my concerns about the financial constraints on any recommendations the Task Force might make. I reminded him that the Terms of Reference of the Task Force included consideration of the size of the future institute and that we could not simply assume that it must be at least as large as it currently is. I reminded him that we had explicitly discussed how large an institute would have to be in order to maintain interdisciplinarity and had agreed that 500 or more staV would be appropriate (NIMR currently has about 750). I pointed out that I thought it was very unlikely that the Council would be willing to increase the recurrent funding envelope of NIMR and that, if we were to recommend a greater capacity to support short-term visiting scientists using the facilities of NIMR (a “research hotel” function) it might not be possible to sustain a core staV as large as at present. I asked Robin for his views about whether there is an irreducible core of research in the current NIMR and I said that it seemed to me that the work on infection and immunity, supported by structural biology, is the central core. Robin did express great concern at any suggestion that the institute might be reduced in size, especially if it involved a reduction in genetics and developmental biology—his own areas of work. Robin, in his evidence to the S&T committee, said: “Colin then asked me, I guess, not to talk about this”. This is absolutely untrue. Indeed, Robin did wrote about our conversation in the following message, copied to the entire Task Force, sent at 20:32, that same evening. PLEASE NOTE that there is no hint in this message of threats or coercion. Indeed, it is entirely concerned with Robin’s attempts to persuade me of his position (“I am wasting too much of my time on this if you are not going to listen. I have just spent an hour on the ’phone with you telling you . . .”). Dear Colin I really think I am wasting too much of my time on this if you are not going to listen. I have just spent an hour on the ’phone with you telling you, in what I thought was a very clear and straightforward way, that I and Steve and the vast majority of the Institute will not be worried about the prospect of change and that indeed they would welcome it. This is especially true if they are brought into the discussions and asked for their ideas and to help plan the future of the Institute. Indeed, I think they would be very keen to do this. The staV at the Institute is always looking for ways to improve things, we are certainly not retreating from the idea of change or any any mention of change. I have not done a survey of staV to ask how many would be willing to move to a central London location if it became clear that this would be the best option, but I bet it would be a significant majority. They would certainly enjoy planning for this. Do you really think that scientists of the quality of Justin Molloy and Anne O’Garra, or our excellent tenure track people such as James Briscoe, chose to move to NIMR because they thought it was stuck-in-the mud? It is a progressive place full of scientists wishing to do cutting edge research. What leads you to think otherwise? So I find this message to Steve T, which I note you have made non-confidential to be a travesty. It does not represent my views and it is extremely unhelpful. You risk destroying the process if you will not listen. It is perhaps bizarre, but I have no problem whatsoever with your subsequent confidential message and the reply from Kay. I totally agree. As I have said on the phone to you twice now and to David once, I was worried about the original draft report for four reasons. First, I did not think it adequately represented the positive and unanimous conclusions we had reached. By deciding to carry forward options 1 and 2a, I felt, as I think everyone else did, that we would be able to positively engage everyone at the Institute. Secondly, the draft was a little misleading in that the choice of some words and phrases suggested that we had reached additional conclusions that we had not (more on this below). I do not think that changing the name of the Institute would compromise my ability to do good research, I really do not care about this. But others might, and I do not mean those at NIMR. It is essentially a trademark name that has been used for many years, so there needs to be some thought given to any change, which it definitely was not at the meeting. But, in any case there is no point in you ranting on about this as I am entirely happy with the way this is now worded in the report. Thirdly, I questioned the use of some words like “new” and “focus” because I felt I could not justify or explain these in the context they were being used, to either the staV at NIMR or to members of the public (or media) if I was asked. I made a few simple suggestions which I felt were more neutral, such as “Institute with a new look” or “portfolio” simply to make it easier to explain to others the conclusions of last Sunday’s meeting. I suppose we can have a focus on multidisciplinarity, but I thought this was simply a peculiar use of English, when focus usually implies narrowing down on something. My suggestions were in no way intended to send you oV the deep-end and threaten to change the agreed process of the Task Force. Lastly, I was indeed worried about the sensitivity of the staV at NIMR to the original sentence in the draft report: “At the start of its work, the Task Force recognised the diYculty of moving to a location away from London those parts of the work of NIMR that it would want to keep intact.”

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Perhaps I was being over-sensitive, thinking that this might be interpreted to mean that we had already discussed the idea of losing parts of the current Institute and what these might be. Steve and I are expected as part of our Task Force duties to present to the Institute the outcome of our deliberations. We have not had a discussion on the Task Force about losing parts of the Institute or restricting it to a core of current activity. I therefore can not present this part of the report to my colleagues. If it is simply to say that perhaps not everyone can stay at the newly constituted Institute, and who does will be based on a scientific and strategic case that they themselves will actively participate in drawing up, then this will not be a problem. But if you, Colin, have not adequately explained the background in which you are operating, or if you have another hidden agenda as to which parts of the Institute should stay or go, then this is unacceptable. It this that will compromise our ability to reach a consensus. As for me, I have no doubt that we can reach a consensus if we are all open and playing with the same set of cards. Robin At 21:39, Kay Davies responded: Dear Robin, I think your response makes moving forward diYcult. At this stage we merely have an overview, we are a long way from details. We cannot remain at this level of analysis as this will seriously inhibit progress. Trying to move forward with a vision (or several scenarios) and then working out the detailed feasability of any option will at least guarantee that every option (including ones we have not even suggested yet) will be considered. I am certain in my own mind that there is no “hidden agenda”. This is based on several conversations with Colin, particularly one in the car on the way back to Oxford last week. Best wishes, Kay And at 22:44, only a couple of hours after the phone conversation, Robin replied to Kay (NOTE—not a mention of threats or coercion): Dear Kay Please do not misinterpret me. I agree that we are a long way from details and that this is what we need to make a start on, indeed I had hoped we would have been given the go-ahead by now to let the Institute know what was concluded at the last meeting. I am keen to get everyone on board as soon as possible, but we still do not have approval to tell anyone. Moreover, I am not being intractable on the wording of the report—in my last message I was just spelling out why I expressed concern over the choice of some phrases when David had specifically asked for comments. I am not the one who has been going overboard with this. I am just saying that I might not be able to explain everything that is in the report to members of the Institute or to others. And with respect to hidden agendas, I will leave it to Colin to tell everyone what his vision of the future Institute is, as expressed to me over the ‘phone today, and which parts of the Institute he believes are important to keep. Robin At 00:51 on Monday 16 February, I wrote to the whole Task Force: Dear All, I am responding immediately to Robin’s suggestion that I should tell everyone my “vision of the future Institute”. I spoke at length today to Robin, following up briefer conversations during the week. I tried to explain the constraints that there are on our recommendations, as spelled out in my longer email of today. I don’t have a firm “vision of the future Institute”, but I did outline a POSSIBLE scenario that I have been thinking about, and which I believe might have a chance of arousing enthusiasm (from those currently at NIMR, as well as the rest of the biomedical community, and even the OST and the Treasury). I have said many times until now that there has been absolutely no hidden agenda on my part, and that I have had a completely open mind. That is completely true. I have been happy to listen to all the arguments and to weigh up the evidence. However, as a result of our conversations (particularly those last Sunday) and the many other discussions in which I am involved (especially

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the Pattison working party on clinical research and the negotiations about the spending review proposals) I am beginning to form a preliminary view—though by no means fixed. I hope that it won’t be seen as Machiavellian to be forming an opinion as a result of hearing evidence! I should be amazed if others around the table aren’t starting to get a feel for what the new (if I dare use that word) institute might look like. In fact, I suspect that most people have much clearer views than mine. Just to avoid the accusation that my “agenda” is hidden, let me spell out my present thoughts. 1. As I said in my earlier message, I have been convinced by all the evidence that a vibrant institute, with highly motivated staV, excellent facilities, and good space and support for training, meetings and research experience for people from around the country (not to mention from abroad) could benefit the MRC and the biomedical community as a whole. 2. Expenditure on renovation at Mill Hill over the past couple of decades has been modest, and I suspect that we shall discover that, in the 20 year timeframe that we are considering, considerable capital investment would be needed to keep it going. Frankly, I think that the buiding feels tired and even a bit forbidding. If we were to recommend that the institute should stay at Mill Hill, I think that we would have to recommend a new building or very major renovation within a decade or so. Maybe the reports from the surveyors will prove me wrong. 3. If we were starting from scratch today, I don’t think that we would be proposing that a new institute should be put on the Mill Hill site. Proximity to the fantastic university and hospital resources of central London looks very attractive. But I still have an open mind on that, and it obviously depends on the availability of a site, etc. 4. It will be impossible to go to RCUK and the government and ask for a large amount of extra capital investment without a scientific programme for the institute (wherever it is) that is focused, fits the MRC Vision, complements the rest of the activity in other MRC establishments, oVers benefit to the whole community—and couldn’t be achieved in any other way. 5. I think that the best route to new funding is to capitalise on the current enthusiasm for clinical research/translation, and to make that a major part of the new institute. The proposal to add such work seems to have been unanimously welcomed by the TF. For that to succeed, close proximity to hospitals and/or industrial facilities would be an advantage. A new name, such as Institute for Human Health, would symbolise a focus on translation and would certainly make it easier to persuade others that the institute is genuinely refocusing its work in a way that will resonate with the emphasis on clinical science. But that was really only a suggestion. 6. If we are to set up a strong training/research hotel environment (with substantial throughput of shorter-term visitors/students) we shall have to look carefully at staYng levels. (Don’t forget that our terms of reference require us to look at “size” as well as location). That means considering which parts of the present NIMR would most clearly belong in the new institute. What I said to Robin was that I feel that the work that would most obviously complement and link with the proposed clinical element is that on infection and immunity. An emphasis on vaccine development might help to pull in Gates money. I then said that, if the general scenario does prove attractive to the TF, we should have to think and listen to arguments about which of the other areas of work would fit into the vision. I hope and presume that, whatever way our deliberations move, we shall, at some stage have to get down to deciding on that “size” question, which will involve choosing what we think should be in the institute (in 10–20 years time). Think evolution—but slightly more punctuated than in the past. 7. I also told Robin that, if, as I think likely, we are not going to be able to recommend that absolutely everything in the present NIMR will be preserved in the new institute, we can still try to provide the best possible future for the rest of the work elsewhere. Let’s not forget that there are going to be several retirements in the coming years. That alone gives us some space for planning. There you are: that’s the way my own thoughts have moved in the past few days. But my mind is by no means made up, and anyway I’m only one member of the TF. I am honestly not trying to force my opinions on you. But I think that it is right to reveal my present thoughts now in the interests of openness, and to make sure that I can’t be accused of having hidden plans. We’ve spent a lot of time talking together, and we’ve considered a lot of evidence. I’m presuming that you all have views, or at least, like me, are beginning to form them. I hope that other members of the TF will feel ready to open up a bit, in the interests of frank, honest exchange of views. I suppose that this has to be confidential, but I wish that it wasn’t so. If only we had the kind of buy-in from NIMR staV that I had hoped we would achieve by now, we could be more open, and involve them in frank but positive discussion about how the institute should evolve. Best wishes, Colin

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At 08:00, Steve Tomlinson wrote: Colin, Thanks.Steve At 08:01, Kay Davies: Dear Colin, This is helpful. Thanks Best wishes, Kay And, to my surprise, at 11:02, Robin wrote: Dear Steve T and Kay I agree with both of you. Many thanks Robin At 14:18 on Tuesday 17 February, David Smith circulated a further revised version of the summary: Dear Colleagues I am writing in the hope that we might now achieve consensus for the final text of the conclusions of the last Task Force meeting. I have been catching up on the weekend exchanges but more importantly I have had a long discussion with Colin this morning. As a result, I attach version 1.2 which incorporates Colin’s latest suggestions. I have also taken the liberty of proposing some more changes in the light of Colin’s views and picking up helpful comments from others. The main points to draw to your attention are as follows: