Prague Papers on History of International Relations - Ústav

PRAG UE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL R E L AT I O N S

2008

Institute of World History

Institute of East European History

Faculty of Arts and Philosophy

Faculty of Historical and Cultural Sciences

Charles University Prague

University of Vienna

Prague Papers on the History of International Relations Institute of World History Faculty of Arts and Philosophy Charles University Prague nám. Jana Palacha 2 116 38 Praha 1 Czech Republic

Institute of East European History Faculty of Historical and Cultural Sciences University of Vienna Universitätscampus, Spitalgasse 2/Hof 3A A 1090 Wien Austria

Editors-in-chief: Aleš Skřivan Sr., Arnold Suppan Redaction: Václav Drška, Richard Lein, Lukáš Novotný

CONSULTING EXPERTS: Leopold Auer (Wien), Ivo Barteček (Olomouc), Winfried Becker (Passau), Marie Bláhová (Praha), Lenka Bobková (Praha), Franz Bosbach (Bayreuth), Egon Boshof (Passau), Ivo Budil (Plzeň),Václav Bůžek (České Budějovice), Jaroslav Čechura (Praha), John R. Davis (Kingston upon Thames), Reimer Hansen (Berlin), Arno Herzig (Hamburg), Hermann Joseph Hiery (Bayreuth), Wolfgang von Hippel (Mannheim), Milan Hlavačka (Praha), Rainer Hudeman (Saarbrücken), Ivan Jakubec (Praha), Drahomír Jančík (Praha), Zdeněk Jirásek (Opava), Thomas Kletečka (Wien), Dušan Kováč (Bratislava), Martin Kovář (Praha), Hans-Christof Kraus (Passau), Rudolf Kučera (Praha), Robert Kvaček (Praha), Igor Lukes (Boston), Jürgen Miethke (Heidelberg), Dagmar Moravcová (Praha), Vladimír Nálevka (Praha), Josef Opatrný (Praha), Alexander Patschovsky (Konstanz), Bianka Pietrow-Ennker (Konstanz), Volker Sellin (Heidelberg), Jiří Schwarz (Praha), Aleš Skřivan, Sr. (Praha), František Stellner (Praha), Holm Sundhaussen (Berlin), Arnold Suppan (Wien), František Šmahel (Praha), Jiří Štaif (Praha), Miroslav Tejchman (Praha), Marko Trogrlić (Split), Jan Wanner (Praha), Eike Wolgast (Heidelberg), Rudolf Žáček (Opava) Magazine’s title abbreviation: Prague PHIR ©Institute of World History Printed by Reprostředisko UK MF, Sokolovská 83, Praha 8 ISBN

CONTENTS/INHALT Václav Drška La Bourgogne entre la politique dynastique des Francs et Byzance. Quelques remarques à propos de l’influence du regnum Burgundiae sur la création de l’État mérovingien

9

Dana Picková Were the Varangians Really the Founders of the Rus’ian State?

17

Martin Nejedlý Le premier projet d’union des Etats européens, conçu en Bohême dans les années 1463–1464 à l’initiative de Georges de Poděbrady, le «roi hussite» et de son conseiller français Antonio Marini de Grenoble

29

Drahomír Suchánek The Emperor Maximilian I and the Possibility of Personal Connection of Empire and Papacy

57

Michal Wanner The Madagascar Pirates in the Strategic Plans of Swedish and Russian Diplomacy 1680–1730

73

Radek Fukala Silesia in the Power Plans of European States and Dynasties

95

František Stellner Die russisch-württembergischen Beziehungen unter Katharina der Großen

105

Miroslav Šedivý The Attitude of Chancellor Metternich towards the Treaty of Adrianople

115

Ivo Budil Arthur Gobineau and Greece. A View of a Man of Letters and Diplomat

131

Peter Skokan The Split of the Liberal Party Confirmed. The Round Table Conference of 1887

155

Aleš Skřivan, Sr. Die Mittelmächte und die zweite Haager Friedenskonferenz

169

Roman Kodet The Sanjak Railway Crisis

179

Aleš Skřivan, Jr. Austro–Hungarian Export to China

191

Filip Nerad The Gallant Allies? German-Irish Military Cooperation Before and During the World War I

209

Václav Horčička Soziale Zusammenhänge im Krieg zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika in den Jahren 1917–1918

239

Jan Županič Die Frage des Adelstandes und seiner Aufhebung in den Nachfolgestaaten von Österreich-Ungarn

255

Rupert Quaderer Liechtenstein und die Bodenreform in der Tschechoslowakei nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg

265

Lukáš Novotný Kameradschaftsbund. Contribution to the History of Czech-German Relationship (Part one)

291

Radek Soběhart Die Begriffe „Feind“ und „Freund“ im Werk von Carl Schmitt. Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte der Weimarer Republik

311

Igor Lukes The Schönborn Palace and its Prewar American Residents

321

Andrej Tóth Conclusion of the Czechoslovak-Romanian Little Entente Treaty of Alliance in Spring 1921

335

Jan Štemberk Czechoslovakia as the Tourist Destination between 1918 and 1938

355

Beata Katrebova-Blehova Die slowakisch-sowjetischen Beziehungen, 1939–1941: eine ungleiche Partnerschaft

375

Jakub Rákosník Czechoslovak Social Politics and Its Representatives in London Exile during Second World War

429

Martin Kovář The British Welfare State: First Attempts at Its Revision. Labours and Tories at the Time of the Birth of „One Nation“ and the Cold War (1949–1951)

445

Stanislav Tumis Marc Ellis’ Responses to Holocaust and Its Application to the Jewish-Palestinian Conflict

457

Marcin Kula – Leon Koźminski The Poles and the Hungarians in 1956

469

Jaroslav Fiala Was Kennedy a “Realist”? The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Decision Making in International Affairs

487

INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS / INTERNATIONALE AKTIONEN Kolloquium „Auf dem Weg zm Ersten Weltkrieg“ (Philosophische Fakultät der Karlsuniversität Prag, 16.Mai 2008) SEKTION DIPLOMATIE František Stellner Wilhelm II. und die Juli-Krise 1914

509

Aleš Skřivan, Sr. Angeblicher „Kriegsrat“ auf Konopischt, 12.–14. Juni 1914

517

Jan Županič Umwandlung der österreichisch-ungarischen Diplomatie vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg

521

Radek Soběhart „Primat der Innenpolitik“. Ursachen des Ersten Weltkrieges im Werk von Eckart Kehr

527

Roman Kodet Conrad von Hötzendorf and the Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary

537

SEKTION POLITIK Gabriele Clemens Der politische Katholizismus in Deutschland vor und nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg

545

Arno Herzig Die deutschen Juden vor und nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg

557

Peter Skokan The Split of the Liberal Party Confirmed. The Round Table Conference of 1887

567

SEKTION WIRTSCHAFT Aleš Skřivan, Jr The Role of Export in the Economy of the Habsburg Monarchy before the First World War

575

Lukáš Novotný Bismarcks Fehler oder ein unvermeidliches Ereignis? Beitrag zur Forschung nach der Entstehung der russisch-französischen Allianz

581

Stanislav Tumis The Economic Position of Women in Great Britain in the Beginning of the 20th Century

587

Jan Kočvar Japan’s Policy and Economic Interest during the Scramble for Concessions and the „Boxer Uprising“ in China

595

DISCUSSION/DISKUSSION Arnold Suppan Between Hitler, Beneš, and Tito. Occupation Policy, Resistance and Revenge in World War II.

605

BOOK REVIEWS / BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN ALEŠ SKŘIVAN, Jr., Hospodářské reformy v Čínské lidové republice v letech 1979–1989 (Wirtschaftsreformen in der Volksrepublik China von 1979 bis 1989), Karlova Univerzita Praha – Filosofická fakulta, Praha 2007 (Václav Horčička)

635

VÁCLAV HORČIČKA, Vztahy Rakousko-Uherska a Spojených států amerických v období první světové války (Die Beziehungen Österreich-Ungarns und der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika in der Zeit des Ersten Weltkrieges. Karolinum, Praha 2007 (Jan Županič)

637

Acta Oeconomica Pragensia 16, Německé hospodářské dějiny (Die deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte), hrsg. von František Stellner und Radek Soběhart, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, Praha 2008 (Pavel Szobi)

639

REPORTS/BERICHTE Die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Auswirkungen der Meilensteine 1848-1918-1938-1948-1968 (Petra Mikušová)

645

La Bourgogne entre la politique dynastique des Francs et Byzance. Quelques remarques à propos de l’influence du regnum Burgundiae sur la création de l’État mérovingien Václav Drška

Le royaume des Burgondes s’est intégré dans l’empire franc, à première vue, sans problème. Les historiens récents trouvent cependant de plus en plus d‘indices probants pour établir que ce processus fut, en fait, plus complexe. Ce fut en effet une tâche difficile pour les élites franques régnantes du Haut Moyen Âge de maîtriser un État prestigieux et stable, au sein duquel la formation non seulement de la représentation politique mais aussi des normes et traditions culturelles, juridiques et religieuses avaient atteint un certain niveau. Il est indéniable que ce pays, même après sa défaite, influença l’histoire de l’empire et qu’il existait, en effet, plus de variantes du règlement ultérieur des relations que l’on ne trouve dans les chroniques, souvent concises et formulées par le côté du vainqueur.1 Dans cette situation-là, il ne nous reste qu’à confronter leur témoignage aux renseignements d’un autre type: on peut compter parmi eux aussi bien les relations sur la stratégie familiale au sein de la dynastie des Mérovingiens que les conflits dans ce domaine. Ceux-ci étaient parfois utilisés par la diplomatie byzantine qui tentait par ce biais-là de ne pas perdre le reste de son autorité réelle dans la moitié latine de l’ancien Empire. Les chercheurs arrêtent leur attention notamment sur Gontran, fils de Clotaire Ier. Il est probable que son prénom fut intentionnellement composé du préfixe burgonde Gund- et du prénom franc Chramnus; Clotaire fit d’ailleurs baptiser de ce prénom un autre de ses fils cadets. Gontran est né autour de 532, c’est-à-dire à l’époque où le conflit avec le dernier roi burgonde Godomar II arrivait à son apogée. Naturellement cela pose la question de savoir si le père comptait déjà au temps de la naissance de son fils sur l’éventualité que ce dernier puisse entrer en possession du royaume burgonde.2 Il est vrai que Gontran imita pendant son règne jusqu’à un certain point ses prédécesseurs burgondes; il n’était pourtant pas le fils de la Voir Reinhold KAISER, Die Burgunder, Stuttgart 2004, pp. 72–74; Justin FAVROD, Histoire politique du royaume Burgonde (443–534), Lausanne 1997, pp. 472–474. 2 Cf. Eugen EWIG, Die Namengebung bei der ältesten Frankenkönigen und im merowingischen Könighaus, Francia 18/1 (1991), pp. 28–33. Or la première partie du prénom de Gontran pourrait tirer son origine de celui de sa mère Ingonde. 1

10 Václav Drška _______________________________________________________________________________

deuxième épouse de Clotaire, la princesse burgonde Guntheuc (bien que son prénom le supposât), ce qui contredirait cette éventualité. Or le frère de Gontran aurait été Gondovald, dit Ballomer („Trompeur“) qui dans la moitié des années 80 revint de son exil byzantin et déclencha un soulèvement contre celui qu’il considérait comme son frère. Il est intéressant de suivre ses intentions: gagner surtout l’égalité, bien sûr, quoi qu’il fût son frère présumé ou réel, mais de toute façon par la voie légale. „Reconnaissez donc maintenant que je suis roi tout comme mon frère Gontran“ ou, au moins … „que je sois conduit auprès de votre roi et, s’il me reconnaît pour son frère, qu’il fasse ce qu’il voudra. Si vous ne le voulez pas, que du moins il me soit permis de m’en retourner là d’où je suis d’abord venu“,3 aurait-il affirmé à ses partisans. Or ces paroles datent de l’époque où son étoile commençait nettement à décliner. Néanmoins il avait commencé à négocier encore plus tôt avec son frère par l’intermédiaire de ses propres ambassadeurs. Ceux-ci firent savoir à Gontran que leur seigneur demandait „la portion de son royaume qui lui est due“. Lui-même argumentait du soutien des hommes braves qui se trouvaient derrière la Dordogne et menaçait de guerre en tant que tribunal de Dieu si Gontran hésitait de l’exaucer.4 On peut en déduire que sa base principale se trouvait hors de l’ancien royaume burgonde mais il faut se rappeler que toute l’action a commencé à Marseille, donc à proximité. Même Frédégaire était plus tard persuadé que Gondovald tentait de gagner une partie du domaine de Gontran5 marqué dans le chapitre précédent comme regnum Burgundiae. Le prétendant venant de l’Orient, s’intéressait-il effectivement au moins à une partie de l’empire burgonde ? C’est un problème difficile à résoudre car la plupart de ses actions militaires et le sens de ses décisions politiques nous amènent à constater qu’il préférait le rétablissement du royaume avec son centre à Paris: „Je suis le fils du roi Clotaire et je m’emparerai immédiatement d’une partie du royaume, puis je me rendrai rapidement jusqu’à Paris où j’établirai le siège du royaume“, proclama-t-il à une autre

GREGORIUS TURONENSIS, Libri historiarum X, in: MGH SS rer. Mer. I.1, Gregorii Turonensis Opera, éd. Bruno KRUSCH et Wilhelm LEVISON, Hannover 1951, VII.36, p. 357 (GREGORIUS, Historia désormais). Traduction en français: GREGOIRE DE TOURS, Histoire des Francs (t. II), trad. de Robert Latouche, Paris 1995, p. 115. (GREGOIRE, Histoire désormais). 4 Ibid., VII.32, p. 352 („debitam portionem regni sui“) 5 Chronicarum quae dicuntur Fredegarii Scholastici libri IV cum Continuationibus, in: FREDEGARIUS SCHOLASTICUS, Chronicarum libri IV, IV.2. p. 124: „Gundoaldus cum solatio Mummulo et Desiderio ... partem regni Gunthramni praesumpsit invadere et civitates evertere.“ 3

La Bourgogne entre la politique dynastique des Francs et Byzance 11 ______________________________________________________________________________

occasion.6 Il est pourtant évident que Gondovald changea ses plans selon la situation du moment et que l’on ne connaît pas ses intentions réelles. Enfin il est frappant de constater que c’était justement le roi de Bourgogne qui s’inquiétait le plus de ses actions. Pour mieux s’orienter dans cette affaire il faut d’abord examiner si la revendication de Gondovald s’appuyait sur le droit légitime ou non. Les renseignements dont on dispose sur cet homme ne proviennent que de Grégoire de Tours, éventuellement des témoignages de Ballomer lui-même, rapportés par le chroniqueur. L’évêque lui-même admet qu’il était de naissance noble, en écrivant qu’il était né en Gaule, qu’il avait été élevé avec un soin diligent et qu’il portait de longs cheveux à l’instar des rois mérovingiens. Quand il fut grand, sa mère le présenta à Childebert, frère de Clotaire, en lui demandant de prendre son cousin sous sa protection parce que son père ne pouvait pas le supporter. Son oncle accepta parce que luimême n’avait pas d’enfant. Mais ensuite, il accéda aux désirs de son frère et donna le garçon à Clotaire. Ce dernier lui fit couper la chevelure et dénier sa paternité. A sa mort, Gondovald passa entre ses fils Charibert et Sigebert pour finir, de nouveau privé de ses longs cheveux, prisonnier à Cologne. Il réussit à s’échapper et, disposant de nouveau d’une chevelure, trouva un asile chez le commendant byzantin Narsès. Après son mariage et la naissance de plusieurs enfants, il rendit avec sa famille à la cour impériale de Constantinople. Ainsi fini la première, tout compte fait heureuse, partie de son destin.7 Ballomer n’a pas du tout la sympathie de Grégoire de Tours. Néanmoins la plupart de ses assertions parlent en faveur de l’origine légitime de Gondovald: son éducation, sa longue chevelure et surtout l’accueil par Narsès et plus tard par l’empereur d’Orient peuvent faire allusion aux contacts traditionnels de la dynastie burgonde à la cour du Bosphore. Ensuite, il est important de savoir qui était sa mère: comme on sait, Clotaire avait épousé Guntheuc, veuve de son frère Chlodomir, qui provenait probablement de la dynastie royale de Bourgogne. Surtout l’âge de Gondovald pourrait nous servir d’indice; il n’est pas possible de fixer exactement sa date de naissance – au moment où il est présenté à Childebert, Grégoire le désigne par des termes puer, iuvenis et admet qu’il était litteris eruditus. Il s’agissait alors d’un adolescent déjà formé. Childebert est mort en 558 et Gondovald est demeuré chez lui un certain temps – il a donc dû naître au début des années 40 au plus tard, mais il n’est 6 7

GREGORIUS, Historia, VII.27, pp. 345–346; GREGOIRE, Histoire, p. 101. Ibid., VI.24, p. 291.

12 Václav Drška _______________________________________________________________________________

pas exclu que ce fut encore plus tôt. Clotaire eut pour troisième femme Arnegond qui lui donna un fils, le futur Chilpéric Ier, en 537. La précédente fut peut-être Guntheuc que Clotaire épousa après la mort de Chlodomir, c’est-à-dire après 525. Si la rencontre entre Gondovald et Childebert a eu lieu entre 540 et 550, ce qui n’est pas à exclure, Guntheuc pourrait être en effet sa mère et encore en vie. Repoussée par son ancien mari et sa nouvelle femme, elle cherchait avec son fils asile auprès des autres cours mérovingiennes. Il s’agit, bien sûr, d’une hypothèse qu’on ne peut pas vérifier plus en détail. Or il existe d’autres indices qui vont dans le même sens. D’abord, pourquoi Clotaire Ier a-t-il aussi longtemps hésité à nier sa paternité? D’après les écrits de Grégoire on peut constater que le petit Gondovald jouit d’emblée de tous les privilèges dus aux princes mérovingiens. Deuxièmement, Childebert traitait la mère et l’enfant aimablement et il ne les repoussa que sur les insistances de son frère: ce garçon ne représentait-il pour lui, sans postérité, un bon argument dans un éventuel conflit avec son frère? De plus, d’autres aventures de Gondovald en Gaule nous prouvent que, d’un côté, on lui accordait certains privilèges (il était toujours privé de sa chevelure, mais jamais mis à mort; il trouva, bien que temporairement, un soutien même auprès des fils de Clotaire), d’un autre côté il suscitait des inquiétudes (internement à Cologne). Plus tard Gondovald assura lui-même avoir été accueilli à Constantinople par l’empereur et y avoir été traité de benignissime, donc pas du tout comme une personne sans aucune importance. Il fut exhorté à revenir en Gaule par le duc franc Gontran Boson qui lui assura un soutien général: „Viens parce que tu es invité par tous les grands du royaume du roi Childebert et personne n’a osé rien articuler contre toi. Car nous savons tous que tu es le fils de Clotaire et il n’est resté dans les Gaules personne qui puisse gouverner le royaume si tu n’arrives pas.“8 Certes Gondovald exagérait mais même Grégoire qui paraphrase ses mots ne nie pas que Ballomer eût beaucoup de partisans. Childebert II était le neveu de Gontran mais sa position fut longtemps compliquée par le fait qu’il devint roi enfant. Il est facile à imaginer qu’autour du nouveau souverain pouvaient se créer de nouvelles coteries dont le but était de compliquer la situation au roi des Burgondes. Il nous reste à supposer que le destin de cet homme, couronné par sa mort brutale, pouvait être en partie déterminé par les querelles sur l’avenir du royaume burgonde après la défaite de Godomar II. Gondovald,

8

Ibid., VII.36, p. 358. GREGOIRE, Histoire, p. 115.

La Bourgogne entre la politique dynastique des Francs et Byzance 13 ______________________________________________________________________________

en tant que fils de Guntheuc, ne devait-il pas être d’abord son héritier avant que Clotaire I ne changeât ses plans? L’enjeu de l’asile chez l’empereur de Constantinople était pour Gondovald la solution unique et logique dans cette situation. Les Burgondes n’étaient pas des inconnus dans le milieu impérial; Ammien Marcellin ainsi que Symmaque les considèrent comme les alliés des Romains et Agathias de Myrine, juriste et historien de la deuxième moitié du VIème siècle, les complimente en les traitant de peuple industrieux et courageux.9 Les Burgondes étaient en effet les alliés des empereurs d’Orient en Gaule depuis longtemps10 et ils se sont eux-mêmes présentés ainsi. Leur attitude était appréciée, du moins par les intellectuels gallo-romains de l’époque, tels que Sidoine Apollinaire ou Avit, évêque de Vienne. On ne peut donc pas douter que Byzance, même après la dislocation de leur royaume, ne cessa de s’intéresser au maintien des liens avec ce territoire. De plus, le développement déséquilibré des relations avec les rois francs la força à cette politique. Ces derniers s’immiscèrent dans la guerre de Justinien contre les Goths, ce qui conduisit non seulement à l’occupation de la Provence mais aussi aux tentatives de pénétrer en Italie du nord et de gagner l’alliance des Lombards. Malgré l’échec de ces plans et le début de la crise intérieure du royaume mérovingien au début des années 50 du VIe siècle, liée à la stratégie défensive, la cour de Constantinople ne cessa d’observer la situation en Gaule. Quand l’empereur Tibère II demanda son soutien contre les Lombards, c’était justement Gontran qui refusa de se joindre à la coalition, tandis que Chilpéric, son frère et roi d’Austrasie, prit une attitude favorable par son ambassadeur. On sait que Tibère soutint plus tard matériellement l’action de Gondovald et son héritier Maurice tenta de l’imiter lors des premières années de son règne.11 Si, au début, Gondovald ne réussit pas, à cause du changement de la stratégie dynastique, quand son père lui dénia sa légitimité, il était tout à fait naturel qu’il tentât alors d’acquérir ses droits avec le soutien byzantin.

AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS, Rerum gestarum libri, LLA 638, (d’après Bibliotheca Teubneriana Latina, Ver. 3.0.B, Saur Verlag München, Leipzig – Brepols Publishers, 2004) XXVIII, c. 11.5, p. 87; Q. AURELIUS SYMMACHUS, Laudatio in Valentinianum Seniorem Augustum altera. in: Orationes, MGH AA 6.1, éd. OTTO SEECK, Berlin 1883, p. 326; AGATHIAS MYRINAEUS SCHOLASTICUS, Historiarum libri V, in: J.-P., MIGNE PG 88, Paris 1864, I.3, col. 1284. 10 Une vue d’ensemble de cette problématique chez FAVROD, Histoire politique, pp. 141– 148. 11 Globalement chez Eugen EWIG, Die Merowinger und das Frankenreich, Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln 1997, pp. 37–41, p. 45–49 9

14 Václav Drška _______________________________________________________________________________

Il ne reste qu’à répondre à la dernière question: où faut-il chercher la cause du changement mentionné au-dessus ? La solution nous amène à l’histoire célèbre des fils de Chlodomir qui ont eu, sans aucun doute, Guntheuc pour mère. Ils portaient les noms de Théodovald, Gonthier et Cloud. Le nom du deuxième a son origine chez Gondicaire, le roi burgonde de la dynastie de Gibica. Les deux autres sont des mots composés dont les deuxièmes parties rappellent le style burgonde des prénoms et le nom du roi Gondovald qui était peut-être le grand-père des trois garçons. On ne peut pas, bien sûr, considérer cela comme un argument définitif mais il est frappant qu’aucun des princes mérovingiens ne soit plus nommé de cette manière par la suite. Le seul à être baptisé d’un prénom semblable à Théodovald était leur contemporain un peu plus jeune, le fils du souverain franc Théodebert Ier – roi qui fit pieusement déposer les reliques du roi burgonde saint Sigismond. Quant au destin tragique des fils de Chlodomir, c’est Grégoire de Tours qui nous informe en détail12 mais d’une façon qui suscite des soupçons. Après le décès de leur père, leur grand-mère Clotilde se chargea des enfants ce qui en soi ne représente rien d’extraordinaire. La veuve de Clovis était aussi la tante éloignée des princes, la cousine du roi assassiné Sigismond et on sait qu’elle s’est beaucoup engagée dans la politique burgonde. Ses demandes rencontraient surtout de l’écho chez Chlodomir, et notre choniqueur écrit qu’elle élevait les orphelins unico affectu, alors avec une „affection exclusive“. Si exclusive qu’elle éveilla les soupçons de leur oncle Childebert. Il s’adressa alors à son frère Clotaire en l’avertissant que leur mère voulait les priver du regnum. Mais duquel? En général on parle de celui de Chlodomir mais, à cette époque-là, le royaume des Burgondes était aussi en jeu. La grand-mère ne projetait-elle pas le partage entre ses petitsenfants non seulement de l’héritage du père mais aussi du royaume voisin? Childebert invitait son frère à délibérer s’il fallait couper la chevelure de ses neveux – et les priver ainsi d’un attribut visible de leur prétention – ou bien les tuer directement pour partager également „le royaume de notre frère“. Ensuite, tout se déroula conformément à une ruse: on avait fait courir dans la population le bruit que les enfants de Chlodomir seraient élevés sur le trône. C’est ainsi que l’on prévint aussi Clotilde. Sa joie, que le nom de Chlodomir ne serait pas oublié, prit fin quand un messager arriva chez elle avec une proposition simple et cruelle: soit elle permet que l’on coupe les cheveux des fils („et ils seront traités comme le reste du peuple“) soit on les tue. Il est remarquable que la décision sanglante ne concernât que deux des 12

GREGORIUS, Historia, III.18, pp. 117–119.

La Bourgogne entre la politique dynastique des Francs et Byzance 15 ______________________________________________________________________________

trois frères.13 En effet, le petit Cloud était épargné parce que défendu par les vires fortiores, comme l’écrit le chroniqueur tourangeau. Il y a trois circonstances qui attirent notre attention. D’abord on a visiblement modifié le plan initial en épargnant Cloud. Deuxièmement, Clotilde elle-même préférait l’élimination de ses petits-fils – après les avoir soigneusement gardés (!) – à la privation des droits provenant de leur père. Ce fait était incompréhensible même pour Grégoire de Tours („elle […] se laissa gagner par l’amertume et ne sachant plus dans sa douleur ce qu’elle disait répondit simplement: ‘Je préfère s’ils ne doivent pas monter sur le trône, les voir morts que tondus.’“) et suscite des questions même aujourd’hui.14 Troisièmement, le dernier descendant de Chlodomir n’était pas épargné sur ses instances mais par la résistance d’une partie de la noblesse ou par le changement des plans de ses fils. Partons du fait que les orphelins de Guntheuc auraient pu être, au début, garants communs pour la reine-veuve et ses deux fils contre les prétentions éventuelles de leur demi-frère Thierry Ier dans les affaires burgondes. Par conséquent, il devait exister un accord entre la mère et Chlodomir avec Childebert sur leur destin ultérieur. Certes il est possible de se figurer que Clotilde défendait les intérêts de ses petits-fils seulement parce qu’elle aurait eu, en tant que descendante de la royauté burgonde, des idées différentes sur la pratique de l’héritage. Néanmoins son engagement dans la lutte contre Sigismond nous force d’adopter comme exacte l’hypothèse qu’elle suivait son propre plan de l’avenir de la Bourgogne, peutêtre en tant que partie du regnum de Chlodomir. Mais quand la lutte contre le dernier roi burgonde Godomar se montra longue et ses résultats incertains, les frères décidèrent de partager au moins le royaume du frère défunt, ce qui surprit leur mère. Les neveux faisaient obstacle dans ce nouveau projet, c’est pourquoi on devait les éliminer. Il s’agit aussi d’une supposition qui est cependant fondée par le procédé choisi – le plan du meurtre était soigneusement caché au peuple et à la reine. Il est alors „...utrum incisis crinibus eos vivere iubeas, an utrumque iugulare“, Ibid., p. 118. Cf. Reinhard SCHNEIDER, Die Einheit des Frankenreiches und das Teilungsprinzip, in: Lotharingia – eine europäische Kernlandschaft um das Jahr 1000, Saarbrücken 1995 (= Veröffentlichungen der Kommission des saarlandischen Landesgeschichte 26), pp. 17– 18; IDEM, Königswahl und Königserhebung im Frühmittelalter. Untersuchungen zur Herrschaftsnachfolge bei der Langobarden und Merowinger (Monographien zur Geschichte des Mittelalters 3), Stuttgart 1972, p. 75 ou Waltraut BLEIBER, Das Frankenreich der Merowinger, Berlin 1988, p. 80 et suiv. On suppose globalement que Clotilde essayait sans succès faire reconnaître les droits d’héritage de ses fils en dépit du principe, traditionnel chez les Francs, de la réception de l’héritage du frère à l’instar du lot paternel. 13

14

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possible d’expliquer sa réaction non seulement comme une affection de grand-mère mais aussi comme une désillusion politique de la reine qui a compris que le destin de la Bourgogne lui glisse entre les doigts. Guntheuc devait être, en effet, l’épouse de Clotaire, le petit Gondovald (Ballomer) était déjà né et les frères étaient d’accord sur le partage égal; celui-ci pourrait consister dans la promesse d’aide pour Clotaire contre Godomar et la participation au butin, tandis que Childebert devait s’emparer de la plus grande part du royaume franc de Chlodomir. Il est pourtant remarquable que celui qui a ourdi le plan du meurtre fut devancé par „l’esprit de décision“ de Clotaire. Seulement le refus d’une partie des nobles (soutenus par Thierry Ier ou bien son fils?) et peut-être les protestations de Clotilde, ont abouti à épargner au moins la vie du dernier prince: cependant à la condition que ce dernier suivrait la carrière spirituelle et renoncerait à ses droits séculiers.15 On peut tirer l’essentiel de toute l’histoire en constatant que Guntheuc ainsi que son fils ne jouèrent qu’un rôle temporaire et tactique dans le projet dynastique de Clotaire. Son point de gravité consistait dans l’obtention de tous les arguments possibles pour gagner l’héritage de Chlodomir, éventuellement même le royaume burgonde. Il s’agissait d’une méthode utilisée mais critiquée par le clergé franc qui n’était pas, bien sûr, persuadé de sa validité. Clotaire était le plus jeune de tous ses frères. Il avait déjà trois fils de son premier mariage, tandis que son frère Childebert restait sans postérité et aussi la lignée de Thierry Ier qui passait par Theudebert Ier ne donnait pas non plus espoir de grande longévité. Clotaire avait donc une possibilité de gagner, tôt ou tard, l’ensemble de l’empire; c’est pourquoi Guntheuc et son fils perdaient de l’importance. Il s’efforça de se priver d’eux et de faire oublier ainsi la manière dont il s’était emparé de l’héritage de Chlodomir. La Damnatio memoriae ne réussit cependant qu’en partie: l’existence même des enfants de Guntheuc (et leurs prénoms) était un rappel du nomen Burgundiae et, au moment où la politique byzantine put en profiter, elle s’empressa d’utiliser ce fait pour contenir les projets expansifs des Francs.*

GREGORIUS, Historia, III.18, p. 119. This article has been published as a part of the research project MSM 0021620827 The Czech Lands in the Midst of Europe in the Past and Today at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Prague

15 *

Were the Varangians Really the Founders of the Rus’ian State?1 Dana Picková

In 793 Danish Vikings attacked the island of Lindisfarne off the Northeastern coast of England. Though probably not the first action of its kind, it was the first Viking raid, which entered history, and thus opened up the long Viking age in Europe. For more than two and half centuries the Norsemen ploughed the sea covering the entire European coast and threatening the continent from the British Islands down to Byzantium. Not only were they proficient invaders but also merchants and they colonised the invaded territories as well as deserted islands in the Atlantic. In addition, they are also said to have founded the old Rus’ian state – Kievan Rus’. The German historians, Gottlieb Siegfried Bayer and Gerhard Friedrich Müller, working in the newly founded St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences, first expressed this opinion in the first half of the 18th century. Their ideas were developed at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries by August Ludwig von Schlözer. On the basis of a thorough study of the oldest preserved work of the Rus’ian annals, Povest vremennych let (The Primary Chronicle), von Schlözer enunciated the so called Normanist Theory (the term is of a later provenance). Within the context of historical events, such as the Northern War with the Swedes or the harmful influence of the Germans on the reign of Russian tsarinas (e.g. Ernst Johann von Biron), the question of Norman influence on the creation of the original Rus’ian state was politicised from the very beginning because the Russians interpreted it as placing emphasis on Slavic insufficiency and backwardness. The Normanist question injured the Russian national pride, roused strong disagreement and heated exchanges and despite many new findings (e.g. results of intensive archaeological research in the Northern part of the East European Plain in

This article has been published as a part of the research project MSM 0021620827 The Czech Lands in the Midst of Europe in the Past and Today at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Prague 1

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the 1960s, the study of archival sources of foreign origin, etc.) it basically still persists even today.2 Contacts between the inhabitants of Northern and Eastern Europe were not new in the Viking age. They had existed long before that, perhaps since the Bronze Age, but they culminated in the Early Middle Ages. At that time, the Scandinavians were engaged in European-wide trade and had interconnected the system of their routes, which stabilized in the middle of the first millennium and connected Central Europe with the Baltic States and the North Sea region, first with Eastern Europe and then with the two richest states of the time as well, the Arab Caliphate and Byzantium. The first Vikings of Swedish origin, the Varangians3 as called in Rus’, had appeared in Eastern Europe as early as the 7th century. They landed on the coast of the Gulf of Finland and they started to penetrate inland. Their first route led along the Neva River, Lake Ladoga and upstream along the Volkhov River, into Lake Ilmen. In this area the Varangians built up their first fortified bases. One of the oldest and undoubtedly the most important ones was Aldeigjuborg (now Staraia Ladoga), situated near the mouth of the Volkhov River into Lake Ladoga. According to several permutations of Povest vremennych let, the „fortified town of Ladoga“, as it was called by the Slavs, was built by the Varangian chieftain Rurik and his brothers. It is possible that Rurik really settled here after his arrival to the North of Rus’ in 862. Nevertheless, he could not have founded Ladoga in any case, because dendrochronological research of the oldest remains of the local ramparts points to the 50s of the 8th century. This means that it is necessary to date the beginnings of Aldeigjuborg into the mid-8th century at the latest.4 The founding of this fort, which was at the same time a port, dock and stock, was an important step for widening the current trade connections. From Aldeigjuborg, the Varangians were setting out to explore new See f.e. Анmuнopмaнизм. Cбopник Pyccкoгo ucmopuчecкoгo oбщecmвa, т. 8/156, Mocквa 2003; Caxapoв, A.Н., Pюpuк, варяги u cyдьбы pyccкoй гocyдapcmвeннocmи, in: Mиp иcтopии 2002; Кyзмин, A.Г., Kmo в Пpuбaлmикe „кopeннoй“?, Mocквa 1993; Фoмин, B.B., Pyccкиe летописu u варяжcкaя лeгeндa, Липпeцк 1999; Нopмaнcкaя пpoблeмa в зaпaднoeвpoпeйcкoй ucmopuoгpaфuu XVIII вeкa, in: Cбopник Pyccкoгo ucтopичecкoгo Oбщecтвa, т. 4/152, Mocквa 2002; Варяги u варяжcкaя pycь: к umoгaм дucкyccuu пo варяжcкoмy вoпpocy, Mocквa 2005. 3 The Slavic term варяги–Varangians (in Byzantine sources ςαρανγοι) originates from the proper Scandinavian denomination Vaeringar or Vaeringjar, which marked a member of the retinue who was bound by a pledge (vár). See more: Мeльникoвa, E.A. – Пeтpyxин, B.Я, Cкaндuнaвы нa Pycu u в Buзaнmuu в X – XI вв.: к ucmopuu нaзвaнuя „вapяг“, in: Cлaвянoвeдeниe1994, вып. 2. 4 S. FRANKLIN, J. SHEPARD, The Emmergence of Rus 750–1200, London, New York 1996, pp.12– 13. 2

Were the Varangians Really the Founders of the Rus’ian State? 19 ______________________________________________________________________________

possibilities. Thanks to the local environmental conditions, it was not difficult for Swedish voyagers to travel huge distances across the continent. Not only the North of Rus’, but the whole terrain of the slightly undulating East European Plain is interwoven by a network of water sheets and navigable rivers, out of which the most important lead from North to South. Thus it was possible to sail from the Baltic Sea all the way to the Caspian Sea or the Black Sea. Only rarely did the Varangians have to pull their ships and goods with a tow5 on the land. During the 8th and 9th centuries, the Varangians came into contact with Volga Bulgaria, which lays from the middle reaches of the Volga, southwards from the confluence with Kama, with the Khazar empire, spreading across a vast territory from the lower Dnieper and Crimea all the way to the Caspian Sea and the foothills of the Northeastern Caucasus Mountains, and eventually with the Arab Caliphate itself. At the Arabic markets, the Scandinavian merchants were buying luxurious goods and silver, which was very cheap there. The archaeological finds are the proof – rich treasuries of Arabic silver coins have been found not only in Sweden but also spread along transit routes in Eastern Europe. Many trade transactions were made in khanates along the Volga River, where not only Varangians but also Arabic merchant caravans would come. In the middle of the 9th century the importance of the Varangian trade route towards the Arabs declined. It was clearly related to the weakening of the Caliphate, which occurred as a consequence of inner dissensions as well as subsequent foreign political failures. At that time a second and more well known route had formed, leading „from the Varangians to the Greeks”, this means from Sweden over the Baltic Sea towards the Dnieper and then to the Black Sea. It was the right time for the Varangians to arrive at the Byzantine trade centres as the expansion lead by the Arabs towards the West, and mainly their pirate actions, impaired the traditional trade route through the Mediterranean which up to then had been the domain of Byzantine merchants. Along lengthy routes, the Varangians were building other fortified trade bases. Some of them served only as hold during their long sails, others stayed there over the winter in case they did not make it on time to sail away for Scandinavia, and others settled here with their retinues and families forever. Many Scandinavian warriors, who were considered some of the best The ship with its load was put on a calash so that it was possible to drag it more easily from one river to the next.

5

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at that time in Europe, entered the services of Slavic aristocrats. Colonists settled places below the castle walls as well as big river basins, many of which were also of Scandinavian origin. They were engaged in various crafts, their production relied on distance trade, and in some case they traded amongst themselves on a small scale. As a consequence many fortified settlements came to have an urban character. Scandinavians themselves called Rus’ Garðar in their sagas, it means castles or more precisely castle towns (grad – gorod – gardar), or Garðaríki – land of castle towns. The Varangians were taking taxes from the local Slavic, Baltic and Finno-Ugrian inhabitants, mostly in kind, and sometimes also in money. The Arabic geographer Ibn Rusta narrates it in Povest vremennych let and and it is also proven by archaeological findings (in the North of Rus’ already from the first half of the 9th century).6 At that time, it was more of a tribute by which the local inhabitants were supposed to ward off attack by the tax collector than a public legal rent paid by the subjects. The Varangian chiefs maintained their retinues from these resources and mainly they made their businesses with them. Valuable furs, wax and honey, which this country provided sufficiently, were in great demand in both Arabic areas and in Byzantium. But the most profitable trade article were slaves. It is thus presumable that there was not always a peaceful coexistence between the Varangians and the local tribes and that the Norsemen were also going on predatory quests – which was, for that matter, characteristic of them – and they gained not only loot but also captives. It is mentioned as well in Povest vremennych let. The system of Varangian forts was first oriented from the West to the East. In the first decades they spread widely to the North around the Gulf of Riga, in the area of Lake Ladoga and the Volkhov River, eastwards from Smolensk, and between the upper Volga and Oka Rivers. Later the orientation turned more and more towards the South along the Dnieper. Other than that, the Varangians dominated some of the old Slavic centres, which eventually became Finno-Ugrian, such as Novgorod (in fact the nearby settlement of Gorodishche)7, Beloozero, Izborsk, Pskov, Rostov, B.Я Пeтpyxин, Д.C Paeвcкий, Д.C Oчepкu ucmopuu нapoдoв Poccuu в дpeвнocmu u paннeм cpeднeвekoвьe, (Studia historica), Mocквa 2004, p. 288. 7 Rurik could not have settled in Novgorod in 862 nor could have Oleg taxed the inhabitants twenty years later, because this town came into being in the first third of the 10th century at the earliest. Nestor’s Нoвeгopoд was in fact a settlement of urban character surrounding a fort called Городище (sometimes also Рюриково Городище), which stood not far from the present Novgorod. 6

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Gniezdovo at Smolensk and finally Kiev, and they conquered the outlying areas. The centre of the Varangian trade organisation moved from the North to the South, thus from Aldeigjuborg and Novgorod to Kiev. The gradual spread of the Varangian influence on the North of Rus’ and after Nestor recorded that from the North to the South, the author of Povest vremennych let, and he connected it with particular events. The beginnings of Rus’ian history, the formation of Rus’ian statehood and as an ethnic group, thus there came to be a so-called tale about inviting the princes: „Въ лето 6367. [859] Имаху дань варязи изъ заморья на чюди и на словeнех, на мерu и на всeхъ кривичeхъ. А козари имаху на полянех, и на сeверех, и на вятичeхъ, uмаху по бeлe и вeверицe от дыма. Въ лето 6370. [862] Изъгнаша варяги за море, и не даша имъ дани, и почаша сами в собе вoлoдети, и не бе въ нихъ правьды, и въста родъ на родъ, и быша у них усобице, и воевати почаша сами на ся. И реша сами в себе: «Поищемъ собе князя, иже бы вoлoделъ нами и cyдилъ по праву.» И идоша за море къ варягомъ, къ руси. Cице бо cя зваху тьи варязи русь, яко се друзии зъвyтся свuе, друзии же ypмane, анъгляне, друзии гъme, тако и си. Реша рус, чюдь, словенu и кривичи и всu: «Земля наша велика и обилна, а наряда в ней нетъ. Да поидете къняжитъ и вoлoдети нами.» И изъбрашася 3 братья с роды своими, пояша по собе вьсю русь, и придоша; старейший Pюрикъ, седе Нoвeгopoдe, а другый Cинеусъ на Белe-oзерe, а третий Избopьcтe, Тpyвopъ. И от техъ варягъ прозвася Руская земля….“8 According to Nestor, the arrival of the Varangians into Kiev was the work of Askold and Dir, men from Rurik’s retinue, who gained control of the local tribes of the Polans, whereas Rurik ruled in Novgorod.9 Before 879 the semi-legendary chief died, according to the chronicler „предасть княженье свое Олгови, от рода ему суща, въдавъ ему сынъ свой на руцe, Игоря, бе бо детескъ вельми.“ In 882 „поиде Олeгъ, поимъ воя многи, варяги, чюдь, словeни, мeрю, весь, кривичи, и придe къ Смоленьскy съ кривичи, и прия грaдъ и посади мужь своu, oттуда поиде внизъ, и взя Любець, и посади мужь своu. И придоста къ горамъ xъ киевьскымъ, и увeдa Олeгъ, яко Осколдъ и Диръ княжита.“ He brought them out of the town with a trick and when they came to him, he said: “«Вы нeста князя, ни родa княжя, но азъ есмь роду княжа», и вынесоша Игоря: «A ce есть Повест временных лет, издано под редакциею Д.С. Лихачева и B.П. AдpиaнoвoйПеpeтц, Санкт Петepбypг 1996, p.12–13. 9 According to Nestor, Askold and Dir, together with their men, made the first historically known raid of the Rus‘ against Constantinopole in 866 (according to Byzantine sources 860 - see e.g. Photii epistulae 1, Lipsiae 1983, No.2, pp.293–296). 8

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сынъ Рюриковъ».“10 Askold and Dir were killed and Oleg assumed the reigns of government in Kiev. He settled there, started to build fortified towns and required the Slovenes, the Krivichi and the Mer from Novgorod to pay taxes to the Varangians. This tax remained until the death of Yaroslav I the Wise (1054). Connecting Novgorod and Kiev under the single reign of the Varangian chief Oleg has been noted traditionally in historiography as the founding of the old Rus’ian state, Kievan Rus’. Nevertheless, it is only possible to confirm the information from Nestor on general terms. It is not possible to prove factually the existence of persons such as Rurik,11 Askold, Dir and Oleg in other historical sources, nor of a foreign provenance. Nevertheless, there exists a contemporaneous testimony according to which the Varangians might have ruled in southern Rus’ a quarter of century earlier than the 60s of the 9th century. We find it in Annales Bertiniani (The Annals of St-Bertin), in which Prudentius, the chancellor of the emperor Louis the Pious, recorded the following information: A delegation of the Byzantine emperor Theophilos arrived to the emperor’s court in Ingelheim in 839, among which were several men „qui se, id est gentem suam, Rhos uocari dicebant, quos rex illorum chaganus uocabulo ad se [Theophilum] amicitiae, sicut asserebant, causa direxerat, petens per memoratam epistolam, quatenus benignitate imperatoris redeunti facultatem atque auxilium per imperium suum tuto habere possent, quoniam itinera per quae ad illum Constantinopolim uenerant, inter barbaras et nimiae feritatis gentes inmanissima habuerant, quibus eos, ne forte periculum inciderent, redire noluit. Quorum aduentus causam imperator diligentius inuestigans, comperit gentis esse Sueonum.“12 The mentioned passage represents one of the main disputed subjects between supporters and opponents of the Normanist theory. The thing is that Prudentius does not state where the land of the khagan (chaganus) of the Rus’ was situated, he only indicates that the route of the delegates to Byzantium lead through the lands of wild peoples – most likely the steppes in the northern territory along the Black Sea under threat of raids by Повест временных лет, p.14. Regarding the historical authenticity of the figure of Rurik see: G. Schramm, Die erste Generation der altrusischen Fürstendynastie. Philologische Argumente für Historizität von Rjurik und seinen Brüder, in: Jahrbücher für Gechichte Osteuropas 28 (1980); newer Altrusslands Anfang. Historische Schlüsse aus Namen, Wörtern und Texten zum 9. und 10. Jahrhundert, Freiburg 2002. 12 Monumenta Germaniae historica, Annales et chronica aevi Carolini, ed. PERTZ, G.H., Hannover 1826, p. 434. It is the oldest known reference about the ethnicity called "Rhos" – the Rus‘. 10 11

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Hungarians and Pechenegs. To this day, historians try in vain to pinpoint the location of this khagan. Assuming „khagan“ to be the traditional Turkic term for a leader of a tribe, later a ruler, points to the influence of the Chazars and the southern areas of Eastern Europe, perhaps directly at Kiev. Nevertheless, there are no archaeological findings in this territory, which would prove the presence of Scandinavians there as early as the first half of the 9th century. On the contrary, one can find an abundance of such material in the North of Rus’ – but it is hard to provide a reason why the local ruler would be called khagan there. The Rus’ khaganate is also mentioned later, starting from the 10th century, in several Arabic and Persian sources. The first mention is by a geographer of Persian origin, Ibn Rusta, in the encyclopaedic work written in Arabic, Kitábu l-a’láqi n-nafísati (Book of Precious Jewels), written in 903 – 913. The Rus’ live on an island surrounded by a lake and have a ruler, “khaqan rus”, Ibn Rusta writes: "They harry the Slavs, using ships to reach them; they carry them off as slaves and … sell them. They have no fields but simply live on what they get from the Slav's lands."13 Also the Persian historian Gardízí wrote about the island of the Rus’ in the mid-11th century, though he probably cribbed the data from Ibn Rusta. But in his version the island is surrounded by the sea and is inhabited by a hundred thousand people. We find analogous narratives, although shortened, in other Arabic and Persian authors all the way to the 16th century. Just as the effort of researchers to define the territory of the Rus‘ khaganate more precisely failed, so too did the endeavour to identify the island of the Rus’ with a particular geographical location. None of the Oriental geographers as well as the annalist Prudentius indicated where the island or peninsula (the Arabic word jazira also supports this explanation), on which the Rus’ian khagan ruled was located. Was it in the north of Rus’, in the vicinity of Novgorod, the upper basin of the Volga, or even in Scandinavia, as the orientalists say, or, on the contrary, was it in the southern regions around Kiev, Tmutarakana, and the Crimea or in the Danubian delta? Neither of these speculative theories is possible to prove with conviction. The recently-deceased Russian archaeologist Valentin Vasiljevič Sedov pointed out the fact that the Khazars built up a belt of forts in the 30s and Bibliotheca geographorum arabicorum VII. ed. M.J. de Goeje, Lugduni Batavorum 1894, pp.145–146. 13

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40s of the 9th century with the help of Byzantine builders on their western frontier, which in his opinion was supposed to protect their realm from the Rus’ Khaganate, as mentioned in Annales Bertiniani. It is not known, however, if an outside party threatened the Khazarian realm at that time. Sedov assumes that this khaganate spread between the Dnieper and Don Rivers and he considers it not to have been Swedish but rather a Slavic state formation.14 Nevertheless, this is contradicted by the above-mentioned Arabic-Persian reports because the great majority of authors writing in Arabic assiduously distinguish between the Rus’ (ar-Rús) and Slavs. Also the Czech historian Dušan Třeštík points out the complete absence of written testimony about the Slavic character of this khaganate and adds that the archaeological sources cannot be decisive in judging the ethnicity, although it is right to suppose that the dominant majority of the inhabitants of this khaganate were not of Swedish origin.15 Regarding the story about the island of the Rus’, the most reasonable explanation seems to be the hypothesis of the Russian historian Je. A. Melnikova who supposes that it cannot be seen as a report about a particular island which belonged to the Rus’, but that it is necessary to see it as the result of a literary adaption of a compilation of miscellaneous information about the Rus’, gathered by Muslim authors from different sources during the 9th century,16 including biblical and ancient tradition. The Varangians, however, did not only write the history of Eastern Europe. There can be no doubt that most of the local inhabitants were not Northern in origin, but Slavic and also Baltic or Finno-Ugrian. The intensive archaeological research carried out in the 1960s brought to light major findings about the wider settlement of the Northern part of the East European Plain not only by Scandinavian, but also by Baltic and FinnoUgrian peoples. Up to then it was believed that the settlements of Slavs were the only ones in the area. In fact Slavs had not come there until the 11th century. Other findings have been brought to light through etymological analysis of the term Rus’. Nevertheless Soviet researchers and scientists from other countries of the Eastern block concentrated specifically, on the basis of richer and richer archaeological material, on the proof that the B. B. Ceдoв, Cлaвянe, ucmopuкo-apxeoлoгuчecкoe uccлeдoвaнue, (Studia historica), Mocквa 2002, pp.275–280. 15 D. TŘEŠTÍK, "Veliké město Slovanů jménem Praha". Státy a otroci ve střední Evropě v 10.století. In: Přemyslovský stát kolem roku 1000, Praha 2000, pp.66–67. 16 Дpeвняя Pycь в cвeme зapyбeжныx ucmoчнuкoв, издано под редакциею E.A. Мeльникoвoй, Mocквa 1999, p.123. 14

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socio-economic development of the Eastern Slavs proceeded more rapidly than supposed and that the actual roots of the statehood were built up before the arrival of the Varangians.17 According to the schema of the genesis of the Rus’ian state which dominated Soviet historiography up to the early 1990s, Slavs in the 6th and 8th century were in a phase of a military democracy with tribal features presented as the last stage of a primitive communal system or a transition stage from clans to early feudal society. They were organised into tribes, but mainly there were already larger tribal federations led by a prince who stood above the other minor rulers. The first state formations in the territory of the Eastern Slavs were believed to have been created in the 9th century; these were overlapping tribes, which provided the decisive condition for the later genesis of the Kievan Empire.18 These theories give the Varangians some credit in founding the Rus’ian state, but only in the idea that Oleg united two early state formations at the end of the 9th century. The noted Soviet historian Boris Alexandrovič Rybakov considers the Varangians to have only been mercenaries, and he does not credit them with any special role in the process of state formation of the Eastern Slavs – with the exception of the rather coincidental occupation of Kiev by Oleg. He considers their identification with the Rus’ in Povesti vremennych let to be a mistake.19 These seemingly credible schemata of the development of the Eastern Slavs’ political organisation contain several pitfalls. One of the basic weak points is the fact that they mostly do not rely on written sources, which are non-existent for the 7th – 8th centuries. Although we have sources for the 9th century, they are fragmentary and not completely clear, and the most important one, Povest vremennych let, is not even a contemporaneous writing. The results of Soviet historiography were therefore constructed on the basis of archaeological material and analogical reasoning. The conditions in Eastern Europe were applied based on the knowledge from the 17

See f. e. Łowmiański, H., Geneza państwa ruskiego jako wynik procesu wewnętrznego. In: Świantowit 24 (1962). 18 See f. e. A. H. Нacoнoв, „Pyccкaя зeмля“ u oбpaзoвaнue meppumopuu дpeвнepyccкoгo гocyдapcmвa, Mocквa 1951, pp. 28–46; Д. A Мaчинcкий,, A. Д. Мaчинcкaя,, Ceвepнaя Pycь, Pyccкuй ceвep u Cmapaя Лaдoгa в VIII-XI вв. In: Кyльтypa pyccкoгo Ceвepa, Лeнингpaд 1988. 19 Б.A., Pыбaкoв, , Киeвcкaя Pycь u pyccкue княжecтвa XII–XIII вв., Mocквa 1982, pp. 55–90. See also И.П. Шacкoльcкий, Hopмaнcкaя meopuя в coвpeмeннoй бypжyaзнoй нayкe, Mocквa, Лeнингpaд 1965, p.205; M.H.Тиxoмиpoв, Pyccкoe летописaниe, Mocквa 1979.

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environment of Western Slavs, where, due to more widely available written sources, it is possible to document the existence of tribal federations as well as the formation of monarchic government within a regional framework, or the development in this area is compared to individual stages of the formation of the Swedish state.20 As has been indicated, in searching for how the Varangians participated in the founding of the Rus’ian state, it is necessary to answer the question who the original Rus’ were. Were they arriving Norsemen, or Slavs already settled in Eastern Europe? Nestor knew the outright answer to this question: the Rus’ian country was named after the Varangian retainers ("vsja rus"), who came there in 862 together with Rurik. In 882 Oleg united Rurik’s holdings in the North with the territory of the Polans, who, up to then, had been ruled by Askold and Dir: “И седe Олегъ княжa в Киеве, и peчe Олегъ: «Ce будu матu грaдoмъ руськимъ». И бeшa у него варязи и слoвeнu u прочи, прозвашaся русью.“21 However, Povest vremennych let does not represent a trustworthy source for the 9th century and it is not possible to rely on the accuracy of its chronology. But on the basis of more accurate contemporaneous sources of foreign origin we can prove that the name Rus’ must have spread into the Middle Dnieper region earlier than in 882, as mentioned by Nestor. The ethnonym Rhos appeared for the first time in Annales Bertiniani in a previously mentioned record in 839. The form Rhos points to the influence of Greek. Somewhat later the concept appeared in Byzantine sources as well, together with the first historically documented attack of the Rus’ () on Constantinople in 860.22 From the second half of the 9th century we encounter this ethnonymum in German and Byzantine sources, and from the 10th century in Arabic sources as well (in the form ar-rus), where it occurs more often. The development of the concept Rus’ in various written traditions and its dissemination is an important record of the increasing ethnogenesis of the Eastern Slavs. The majority of contemporary researchers attribute a Scandinavian origin to the ethnonym Rus’.23 However, the form of the word itself indicates See more GOEHRKE, C., Frühzeit des Ostslaventums, (Erträge der Forschung 277), Darmstadt 1992, pp. 150–153. 21 Повест временных лет, p.14. 22 B. Г. Bacилeвcкий, Pycкo-вuзaнmuйcкue uccлeдoвaния. Жuтuя cв. Гeopгuя Aмacmpuдcкoгo u Cmeфaнa Cypoжcкoгo. In: B.Г. Bacилeвcкий, Тpyды, т. 3., Петepбypг 1915, pp.64–68. 23 Detailed analysis of the problem in: G. SCHRAMM, Altrusslands Anfang, pp. 75–112. 20

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that it could not have been primarily a Slavic expression.24 It is supposed that it was an Eastern Slavic form of a Finnish word Ruotsi, which even today indicates Sweden in the Finnish language. Finno-Ugrian tribes, settled in the North of Eastern Europe, most likely referred to Scandinavians who infiltrated into Eastern Europe with this name. However, they had met with them earlier than with the Slavs, already sometime in the 7th – 8th century. They could have been elite brigades of armed travelling merchants, Varangians, or, as the German historian Dittmar Schorkowitz has suggested, they could have been Northern inhabitants who had come to Eastern Europe with the intention to colonise the scarcely inhabited regions and settle southwards from the Finnish Gulf.25 Nevertheless, the Czech historian Jaroslav Bidlo pointed out the fact that Varangians and the Rus are not identical.26 As soon as the Slavs started to participate in Finno-Swedish contacts, they took up the local designation of the Norsemen into their own language, where it got the form Rus’. A century later the denomination Rus’ spread into the countries and tribes under the subjugation of the Rus’ian prince in Kiev and, finally, on both the developing state and its Eastern Slavic inhabitants.27 The fact that Eastern Europe had started to become a place of transit as well as the arrival of the Norsemen there brought new impulses into the processes taking place in the local society. The Varangians needed to safeguard the organisation and control of their trade, so they started building fortified economic trade centres along the trade routes and also collecting tribute from the local inhabitants. This pushed forward the socioSee more A. B. Haзapeнкo, Oб uмeнu pycь в нeмeцкux ucmoчнuкax IX– XI вв.. In: Вoпpocы языкoзнaнuя, 1980, вып. 5. 25 D. SCHORKOWITZ, Die Herkunft der Ostslaven und die Anfänge des Kiewer Reiches in der postsowjetischen Revision, in: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 48 (2000), No.1, p.581. 26 „Normans, who under the guidance of Askold and Dir and, later, under the chieftanship of Oleg, became the lords of Kiev, were called the Rhos or the Rus‘... The oldest Rus’ian chronicle calls them varjagi–Rus‘. The way these two terms are used in the chronicle corresponds with the existing results of the philological – historical research, that the so-called Varangians were fighters and soldiers, forming fixed military formations or retinues, and that the word Rus’ indicated their tribal membership. Therefore the state, which was created through the subjugation of the Eastern Slavs by Norman Varangians, was not call Varangia, but Rus’, the state of the Rus’, not the Varangians.“ J. Bidlo, Dějiny lidstva od pravěku k dnešku 3, Praha 1937, p. 678. 27 E. A. Мeльникoвa, B.Я Пeтpyxин, Нaзвaнue pycь в эmнoкyльmypнoй ucmopuu Дpeвнepyccкoгo гocyдapcmвa (IX-X вв.), in: Вoпpocы ucтopии 1989, вып. 8; see also A. DANYLENKO, The name "Rus". In search of a new dimension. In: Jahrbücher für Gechichte Osteuropas 52 (2004). 24

28 Dana Picková _______________________________________________________________________________

political development of the local Finnish and Slavic tribes and led to the formation of early state structures, with the Scandinavians in the forefront. Their primary goal was not to build up a state formation, but to secure successful trade operations and to gain tribute, which they could use for other trading. Through the interconnection of the two most important trade centres of Kiev and Novgorod (which without a doubt also represented a crystallisation of the core state formation) the foundation of the old Rus’ian state was laid down. Slavic tribes settled around the axis of Kiev – Novgorod were, through the following century, slowly bound to Kiev through tribute dependence28 and only later subdued. The integration of the vast Kievan realm was accomplished through Christianisation at the very end of the 10th century. There is no doubt about the influence of the Varangians on the development in Eastern Europe, or about the Varangian origin of the first rulers of the Kievan state. However the Norsemen were not the only group participating in the formation of the Eastern Slavic state as they themselves entered into a constructive process that was already under way. Thus a more developed form of state – a government of Scandinavian military aristocracy – replaced the local government of Slavic family aristocracy in the mid-9th century, which gradually integrated multiple centres of forming political organisation into one unit – the state of the Rus’ with its centre in Kiev.

In this context Richard Pipes actually denotes the first East Slav state as „a by-product of international trade between two alien peoples, Normans and Greeks.“ Russia under the old regime, London 1995, p. 49.

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Le premier projet d’union des Etats européens, conçu en Bohême dans les années 1463–1464 à l’initiative de Georges de Poděbrady, le „roi hussite“et de son conseiller français Antonio Marini de Grenoble Martin Nejedlý

Chaque historien doit se garder de relire le passé à la lumière des préoccupations actuelles. Dans les projets de Georges de Poděbrady de 1463–1464 on a voulu voir successivement le précurseur de la Société des Nations, puis de l’ONU et maintenant de la construction européenne. Certes, cela n’est pas tout à fait faux mais, à mon avis, l’on force un peu la note. Le contenu de ce document, le rôle central attribué à la France par Georges de Poděbrady et l’effort acharné pour imposer sa ratification par la voie diplomatique à la cour royale de France vont sans doute éveiller l’attention au moment où la République Tchèque prendra en charge la présidence tournante du Conseil de l’Union européenne.1 A mon avis, on peut se passer facilement de ces actualisations forcées. L’effort sincère qui vise à résoudre les conflits entre les États et les confessions par des moyens pacifiques est suffisamment lisible dans les documents authentiques du XVe siècle. Cette étude a pour but de présenter le contexte de la création du projet des années 1463–1464 et d’ en décrire le principe.

Elle succédera justement à la France à cette fonction à partir du 1er janvier 2009. Les relations franco-tchèques constituent un sujet de recherche que nous menons systématiquement, et ce depuis plusieurs années, avec une équipe de jeunes chercheurs et doctorants de l’Université Charles de Prague dans le cadre du Projet de recherche du ministère de l’éducation nationale tchèque MSM 00 216 208 27. Par son sujet particulièrement approprié, cet article s’inscrit dans ce programme; il représente par ailleurs une version élargie et complétée d’une conférence que j’ai prononcée au Centre Tchèque de Paris le 3 novembre 2007, à l’initiative de l’Association Masaryk, avec le concours de l’AFTS et le soutien du Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République Tchèque. Son texte a été publié sous le titre Un premier projet de constitution européenne né en Bohême au XVème siècle. L’initiative du roi Georges de Poděbrady et de son conseiller français Antonio Marini, AFTS, Bulletin de l’Amitié franco-tchécoslovaque, numéro spécial Georges de Poděbrady, décembre 2007, pp. 2–10. 1

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Le contexte du projet „Je congnois la faute des Boesmes, /Je congnois le pouvoir de Romme, /Je congnois tout, fors que moy mesmes,“2 écrivit François Villon dans une ballade pour parodier la tradition médiévale du monologue où l’auteur faisait étalage de ses connaissances. L’effet comique de ces vers réside dans la banalité des connaissances et l’antithèse du refrain avec le couplet. En effet, à l’époque de Villon, presque tout le monde parmi les gens instruits a plus ou moins entendu parler de cette fameuse „faute des Bohémiens“, c’est à dire de l’hérésie hussite.3 A partir de l’exécution du réformateur Jean Hus sur le bûcher en 1415 et de la mort du roi Wenceslas IV de la dynastie des Luxembourg en 1419, l’État tchèque a vécu une période de luttes dont le but était d’imposer un programme de réforme ecclésiastique et sociale.4 Ces efforts s’accompagnèrent de massacres et de souffrances dans les deux camps ennemis (catholique et réformé) et de raids étrangers extrêmement brutaux et sanguinaires sous la forme des croisades anti-hussites. Toutes ces invasions militaires furent défaites grâce à la détermination des partisans tchèques de Hus, combattant un envahisseur toujours mieux équipé et à chaque fois supérieur en nombre. Les étrangers évoquant les Hussites, tel un Gilles de Bouvier en France, mirent volontiers l’accent sur la qualité de leur armement et de leur tactique militaire. Il décrivirent les fameux chariots fortifiés (ou Wagenburgen) dont usaient les combattants tchèques pour arrêter les charges de la chevalerie ennemie, ainsi que leurs fléaux, un outil agricole qui se transforma dans les mains des soldats taborites (hussites radicaux) en une arme redoutable. Capable de tailler en pièces les armures les plus F. VILLON, Poésies complètes, présentation, édition et annotations de Claude THIRY, Le Livre de Poche, Paris 1991, p. 265, v. 22, Voir aussi F. VILLON, Poésies complètes, édition présentée, établie et annotée par Pierre MICHEL, préfaces de Clément MAROT et de Théophile GAUTIER, Paris 1972, p. 231. 3 Le topos du Bohémien hérétique revient avec insistance dans la poésie didactique en français des années 1430. Avant Villon, Jean Régnier et Alain Chartier brodèrent déjà sur ce thème, tandis que l’auteur anonyme de la Moralité du concile de Bâle (1434–1435) campa avec verve un personnage d’hérétique pragois. Voir la fine analyse d’Olivier MARIN, Histoires pragoises. Les chroniqueurs français devant la révolution hussite, Francia, 34, 1, 2007, pp. 39–63, plus précisément p. 61. 4 Sur la naissance du mouvement réformateur tchèque, cf. la monographie d’Olivier MARIN, L’archevêque, le maître et le dévot. Genèses du mouvement réformateur pragois. Années 1360–1419, Paris 2005. 2

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solides des croisés, cet outil devint dans l’iconographie hussite le symbole de la lutte nationale.5 Ces quinze années de guerres (entre 1419 et 1434 environ) n’ont pas seulement produit des effusions de sang, la disparition de villages entiers, l’expulsion d’habitants de leurs villes et la destruction de châteaux et d’églises; elles ont également profondément transformé le royaume de Bohême. La plus grande partie du peuple de langue tchèque s’est attachée au programme de réforme, ou programme hussite. Ils prirent pour symbole le calice, dans la mesure où les hussites communiaient sous les deux espèces (calixtins, utraquistes). C’est seulement en 1436 qu’un compromis fut solennellement proclamé à Jihlava6 entre la Bohême hussite et le Concile de Bâle. Ces accords, appelés compactats (compactata), autorisaient à communier au calice dans le royaume de Bohême et dans le margraviat de Moravie et, sous une forme affaiblie, donnaient suite aux autres articles du programme hussite. Il s’agissait d’une concession d’importance primordiale dans l’histoire de l’Église latine. Les Pays Tchèques devinrent par conséquent l’État d’un „peuple double“ dans lequel chaque individu pouvait choisir son appartenance soit à la confession hussite (utraquiste), soit à la confession catholique. Mais une circonstance a fatalement compliqué les choses : les compactats et l’autonomie des hussites (ou utraquistes) étaient approuvés par le concile mais pas par le pape,7 ce qui ne fut pas sans engendrer des attaques de la part des catholiques radicaux et surtout d’innombrables malentendus. Citons un exemple significatif. Un moine anonyme, auteur de la Chronique du Mont Saint-Michel, entendant parler de ces compactats (probablement de la bouche de l’un des nombreux pèlerins) a consigné par écrit et avec une jubilation manifeste pour l’année 1435 le retour des Tchèques dans le giron de l’Église: „L’ an dessus dit, les Boemez, qui avoient tenu de grans erreurs contre la foy, se révoquèrent au

Éd. de Joseph Kervyn de LETTENHOVE, t. 2, Bruxelles 1864, „Quand ils venoient en bataille contre les Alemans, ils s’enfremoient de leurs chariots a chesnes de fer“, éd. Kervyn de LETTENHOVE, p. 116: „ ...et avoient grans bastons fors, ou avoit au bout une chesne de fer, et au bout de la chesne une bolle de plonc, et a chascun qu’ilz frappoient ilz abbatoient ung homme, et par ce moyen demourerent toujours en leurs charios fortiffiez“. 6 Iglau en allemand, ville capitale de la région de Vysočina, au sud-ouest de Prague. 7 Voir Petr ČORNEJ, Milena BARTLOVÁ, Velké dějiny zemí koruny české, tome VI, 1437–1526, Praha, Litomyšl, 2007. Il s’agit de la monographie détaillée la plus récente sur cette période, elle renvoie de manière très utile aux sources et à la littérature de base sur ce sujet. 5

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concille de Balle qui lors tenoit et s’ en revindrent à nostre foy“.8 Mais la situation en Bohême était infiniment plus complexe. La coexistence des deux religions dans le pays était un fait avec lequel il fallait tout simplement compter. Celui qui voulait renverser cet équilibre risquait de se retrouver face à l’opposition farouche de l’autre partie; on ne pouvait plus envisager de revenir en arrière sans une guerre fratricide. En 1458, Georges de Poděbrady, un noble utraquiste surnommé par la suite le „roi hussite“, fut élu roi de Bohême.9 Il régna de 1458 à 1471. Le fondement de sa conception politique était la coexistence paisible des deux confessions dont la légalité et l’égalité en droit avaient été assises sur les compactats. Pour le roi Georges, ce document symbolisait la relation mutuelle de tolérance entre les deux confessions, les utraquistes majoritaires et les catholiques minoritaires. A ses yeux, il garantissait aussi la stabilité de la position des Pays Tchèques en Europe: les accords de Jihlava basés sur les compactats proclamaient clairement que les calixtins tchèques faisaient, malgré les différences théologiques, partie intégrante de l’Église romaine et ne devaient pas être insultés comme hérétiques à cause de leurs croyances. Georges de Poděbrady lui-même tentait de prêcher l’exemple. Il observait les compactats scrupuleusement et, à chaque occasion, se présentait comme un roi juste, impartial, un roi du „peuple double“ qui ne favorisait ni les catholiques, ni les calixtins. La double croyance devenait le fondement des rapports de force politiques intérieurs du royaume tchèque. Georges de Poděbrady comptait d’ailleurs parmi ces rares souverains de la fin du Moyen Age qui appliquaient une conception politique claire, fruit d’une démarche de longue haleine. Dans l’application de cette conception, il s’est montré très déterminé et créatif. Il a su faire la part des choses entre les idéaux et les nécessités stratégiques. Il savait manœuvrer, reculer, assouplir sa politique, sans jamais abandonner les principes de base et sacrifier les buts majeurs de sa conception. Il avait l’habitude d’ exprimer son credo politique par les mots suivants: „Le calice est le privilège de notre courage et de notre foi“.10 Par le mot „calice“, le roi comprenait l’ensemble des règles et des acquis de la réforme tchèque par rapport à l’universalisme du pape. Il faut relever un autre trait caractéristique de la politique de Georges de Poděbrady, qui s’est avéré indispensable eu égard à la situation dans Chronique du Mont Saint-Michel, éd. Simon LUCE, t. 1, Paris 1879, pp. 36–37. Cf. les pp. 152–172 sur le gouvernement de G. de Poděbrady. Nous ne renverrons qu’à ce texte dans le cadre de cette introduction, dans la mesure où la problématique y est traitée en profondeur et sous tous les angles possibles. 10 Josef MACEK, Jiří z Poděbrad, Praha 1967, p. 228. 8 9

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laquelle se trouvait son royaume: la volonté d’être toujours mis au courant des événements importants qui survenaient à la Curie romaine et dans les cours princières d’Europe. Pour ce faire, un dense réseau d’ambassadeurs et d’informateurs en tous genres avait été mis en place. Ces efforts royaux dépassaient la seule nécessité d’être informé des agissements des ennemis et des alliés politiques. Ouvrir son pays aux nouvelles idées, aux nouvelles inventions, aux nouveaux métiers, aux nouveaux courants de pensées, telle était l’ambition du roi Georges de Poděbrady. Rares sont pour l’époque les exemples de souverains s’évertuant avec autant de ténacité à combattre les tendances au repli et à l’isolationnisme avant la lettre de leurs propres pays, que ce soit dans les domaines diplomatique, commercial ou culturel. Cette politique du roi hussite avait pour corollaire logique la place très influente accordée aux conseillers étrangers et catholiques. Ces hommes de talent triés sur le volet avaient pour tâche d’aider le roi Georges à convaincre les souverains européens de l’importance de la question tchèque et de la légitimité des revendications de la cour de Prague vis à vis de Rome. Catholiques, ils ne pouvaient pas être soupçonnées d’hérésie. Étrangers, ils vidaient de leur sens les pamphlets accusant le roi Georges d’être aveuglé par le fanatisme ethnique et linguistique.11 C’est avec leur aide que Georges de Poděbrady tâcha, dès son élection, de se faire accepter comme souverain légitime sur le plan international. Nommons les plus importants d’entre eux. Le docteur Martin Mayr était un influent juriste allemand qui avait essayé de faire valoir le projet de candidature du souverain tchèque au trône de roi des Romains. Gregor von Heimburg était un autre juriste non conformiste qui avait rendu de bons services au roi hussite.12 Le troisième de ces conseillers étrangers, auquel le roi de Bohême prêtait une oreille attentive, concerne tout particulièrement notre propos. Il s’agissait d’un Français aux talents multiples: Antoine Marini.13 Certains historiens présentèrent ce globeRudolf URBÁNEK, Věk poděbradský IV. Čechy za kralování Jiříka z Poděbrad, léta 1460–1464, České dějiny, III/4, Věk poděbradský IV, Praha 1962, p. 26 12 Pour consulter une littérature linguistiquement abordable sur la politique étrangère de Georges de Poděbrady, voir Frederick G. HEYMANN, George of Bohemia. King of Heretics, Princeton 1965, notamment pp. 293–315 et Otakar ODLOŽILÍK, The Hussite King. Bohemia in European Affairs 1440–1471, New Brunswick 1965, notamment pp. 135–160. 13 Il est symptomatique que la première monographie sur ce Français au service du roi de Bohême provienne d’Ernest DENIS, De Antonio Marini et de Bohemiae ratione politica eo oratore, Paris 1878. Les faits généraux ont été de nouveau résumés et augmentés par Nicolas JORGA, Un auteur de projets de croisades Antoine Marini, in: Études d’histoire du Moyen Âge dédiées à Gabriel Monod, Paris 1896, p. 445. Plus récemment, la plus grande attention a été accordée au cas Marini dans l’œuvre monumentale de Rudolf URBÁNEK, Praha 1962. 11

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trotter comme un aventurier et un fantaisiste. A cause de cela, son projet d’union et de paix européenne, conçu pour le roi Georges et dont le lecteur trouvera le texte dans le présent volume, a été parfois considéré comme un plan utopique. Le conseiller français Antonio Marini de Grenoble Que savons-nous donc de cet homme de grand talent et quelque peu mystérieux? Il venait de Grenoble dans le Dauphiné.14 Il apparaît pour la première fois dans les sources sous la modeste mention de „maître Antoine de France, ingénieur“.15 Effectivement, cet homme était avant tout un inventeur, prédestiné à une vie errante. En 1444, sa présence est attestée à Venise, où il demande la permission de construire des moulins d’un type nouveau, à savoir des moulins sans eau. Un autre de ses projets permettait un dragage plus rapide et moins onéreux des canaux vénitiens. Il inventa également une méthode pour mettre à l’eau les grands navires de la République de Venise et un certain „engin de bois“ qui aurait permis aux bateaux de franchir des obstacles naturels sur le fleuve de la Brenta. Enfin, il inventa même une nouvelle forme de four dont il obtint le privilège en 1456. La même année, on le trouve à Graz en Autriche, où il réussit à obtenir, pour lui et ses compagnons, un privilège de vingt-cinq ans concernant „certains travaux de son invention pour calciner la chaux, cuire des briques, brasser la cervoise, bouillir du sel, construire des moulins, des aqueducs et fortifier les digues des rivières contre la crue des eaux“.16 C’est justement pour faire valoir ses inventions que Marini vint en Bohême, probablement en 1459. Bientôt, il devint conseiller et inspirateur de Georges de Poděbrady, au début dans les domaines économique et commercial. Il rédigea à son intention les „Livres sur le monneyage“, aujourd’hui perdus. Ensuite, il écrivit à la demande du roi un mémoire plus Anthonius Marini de Francia filius quondam domini Bartholomei Marini miles et doctor natus in ciuitate gracianopolitanensi in Delphinatu, in: Urkunden-Auszuge zur Geschichte Kaiser Friedrich des III. in den Jahren 1452–1467, éd. Ernst BIRK, Archiv für Kunde österreichischer Geschichtsquellen, 10, 1853, Notizenblatt, p. 292. 15 Archiv für Kunde österreichischer Geschichtsquellen, 13, 1854, Notizenblatt, p. 191. 16 La franchise fut délivrée au „Magister Anthonius Marini de Francia“, „Anthonius Marini de Francia filius quondam domini Bartholomei Marini miles et doctor natus in ciuitate gracianopolitanensi in Delphinatu“, „...pro executione certorum mei ingenij laborum hoc est pro coquendo calce et lateribus pro braxanda ceruisia Sale buliendo molendinis construendis aqueductibus formandis et firmandis aggeribus fluminum contra aquarum impetum etc“, in Urkunden-Auszuge zur Geschichte Kaiser Friedrich des III. in den Jahren 1452–1467, éd. Erns BIRK, Archiv für Kunde österreichischer Geschichtsquellen, 10, 1853, Notizenblatt, p. 289. 14

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large sur de possibles améliorations à faire dans le domaine du commerce du pays. Il recommanda par exemple aux bourgeois tchèques d’investir leurs capitaux personnels dans les mines et encouragea le roi Georges à prêter sans intérêt les sommes d’argent nécessaires à la réalisation de grands projets.17 Peu à peu, il était devenu conseiller universel et confidentiel du „roi hussite“. Ses compétences linguistiques et sa connaissance de la situation en Europe le prédestinaient à la carrière diplomatique. Il en saisit la première occasion à l’été 1461, quand Georges l’envoya auprès de la Curie romaine. En 1462, Marini eut l’idée de la manière dont on pourrait redorer le blason du „roi hussite“ en tant que bon roi chrétien. En même temps, il crut pouvoir empêcher le pape d’isoler la Bohême hussite du reste de l’Europe. Georges de Poděbrady devait prendre l’initiative d’organiser une croisade, à laquelle le pape Pie II tenait par ailleurs beaucoup.18 Marini a tout d’abord présenté au roi Georges son Mémorandum sur la nécessité d’une alliance anti-turque.19 Il s’agissait à ses yeux d’une arme de propagande, dont on pourrait exploiter les effets d’annonce dans les domaines politique et diplomatique. Ces projets de croisade échouèrent totalement après que le pape Pie II eut proclamé, le 31 mars 1462, la nullité des compactats de Bâle sur lesquels reposaient les accords entre la Bohême hussite et l’Église. Cette démarche eut de graves conséquences pour la cohésion interne et la position internationale de l’État tchèque. Le danger des guerres religieuses et des croisades dévastatrices recommençait à planer sur le royaume de Bohême à peine stabilisé.20

Ces données ont été retrouvées par URBÁNEK, p. 570, note 1. Marini est cité comme „Antonius carbonista, de Francia laicus“ parmi les membres de l’ambassade du roi à Rome en 1462 (voir František PALACKÝ, Urkundliche Beiträge, p. 268). 18 La lettre de Marini du 8 août 1461 a été éditée par František PALACKÝ, Psaní králi Jiřímu z města Viterbie léta 1461, Časopis Společnosti vlasteneckého Museum v Čechách, 2, 1828/III, pp. 21–24. Pour le contexte général de la négociation à la Curie voir URBÁNEK, pp. 506–510. 19 Voir František ŠMAHEL, Antoine Marini de Grenoble et son Mémorandum sur la nécessité d’une alliance anti-turque à paraître avec la première édition critique de ce document in: M. NEJEDLÝ, J. SVÁTEK, La noblesse et la croisade à la fin du Moyen Âge (France, Bourgogne et Bohême), Actes du colloque international tenu à Prague les 26 et 27 octobre 2007, Toulouse 2008. 20 Josef MACEK, Jiří z Poděbrad, Praha 1967, Frederick G. HEZMANN, George of Bohemia. King of Heretics, Princeton 1965; Josef MACEK, Král Jiří a Francie, v. l. 1466–1468, ČsČH, 15, 1967, pp. 497–534, ici p. 497; Otakar ODLOŽILÍK, The Hussite King. Bohemia in European Affairs 1440–1471, New Brunswick, 1965. 17

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Cultus pacis N’ayant jamais souhaité un schisme avec l’Eglise catholique, Georges de Poděbrady décida cependant de rester fidèle au calice et de faire face à la pression de la Curie romaine par des activités diplomatiques aussi intenses que variées. D’ailleurs, les hussites modérés dont il faisait partie se rendaient compte depuis longtemps, au moins depuis les années 1430, que le problème tchèque ne pouvait être résolu qu’à l’échelle européenne par le recours à une activité de propagande et à des conceptions diplomatiques hardies. C’est dans la continuation de cette tradition que la cour du roi Georges vit, entre 1462–1464, se cristalliser progressivement un nouveau projet de traité international et multilatéral. Cette fois-ci, il s’agissait d’un projet très large, jusqu’alors inimaginable. Antonio Marini en fut incontestablement l’auteur principal. Il se servit de certains éléments de son Mémorandum anti-turc, mais en l’élargissant substantiellement et en le remodelant complètement dans sa forme et dans son contenu.21 De même que le Mémorandum, le projet d’alors visait à empêcher l’isolement de l’État tchèque et à affaiblir l’influence internationale de la Curie romaine. Mais cette fois-ci, il avait un caractère révolutionnaire. L’organisation traditionnelle de la chrétienté médiévale, avec à sa tête l’empereur et le pape, y était abandonnée. Leur position devait être occupée par une union des États, indépendants et égaux entre eux.22 La participation principale du docteur Martin Mair est affirmée par F. M. BARTOŠ, Návrh krále Jiřího na utvoření svazu evropských států, Jihočeský sborník historický, 12, 1939, pp. 65–82. La coparticipation du roi était présumée déjà par URBÁNEK, p. 593; V. VANĚČEK, p. 37, parle de l’ensemble des auteurs et de la gestion personnelle du roi. 22 Voir Miloslav POLÍVKA, George of Poděbrady and his Idea of European Security, in: The Czech Contribution to Peace and War. From the Hussite Wars to NATO Memberhip, Praha 2002, pp. 80–91; Jaroslav BOUBÍN, Der Versuch einer Neuordnung Europas. Das Projekt König Georgs von Podiebrad und seines Rates Antonio Marini aus dem 15. Jahrhundert, in: Auf der Suche nach einem Phantom? Widerspiegelungen Europas in der Geschichtswissenschaft, Baden-Baden 2003, p. 93–106 ; Vilém HEROLD, Werner KORTHAASE, Der Friedensplan des böhmischen Königs Georg von Podiebrad und die Friedenspläne des Johann Amos Comenius, in: Comenius und der Weltfriede, ed. W. KORTHAASE, S. HAUFF, A. FRITSCH, Berlin 2005, p. 367–376; Gerhard MESSLER, Das Weltfriedensmanifest König Gergs von Podiebrad. Ein Beitrag zur Diplomatie des 15. Jahrhunderts, Kirnbach über Wolfach 1973; JORGA, pp. 445–457; H. MARKGRAF, Über Georg von Podebrads Projekt eines christlichen Fürstenbunden zur Vertreibung der Türken aus Europa und Hersstellung des allgemeinen Friedens innerhalb der Christenheit, Historische Zeitschrift, 21, 1869, pp. 257–304; Jaromír MIKULKA, Jiří z Poděbrad a plán mírového uspořádání Evropy, Slovanský přehled, 50, 2–3, 1964, pp. 75–80 et 154–159; Josef POLIŠENSKÝ, Bohemia, the Turk and the Christian Commonwalth (1462–1620), Byzantinoslavica, 14, 1953. 21

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Il est vrai que ce projet d’union et de paix servait à Georges d’instrument de défense de l’utraquisme tchèque et de son propre trône. L’alliance anti-turque en demeurait partie intégrante. Le succès des efforts communs contre les Turcs était en effet conditionné par une étroite collaboration pour le maintien de la paix entre les États chrétiens qui aurait trouvé son expression dans le conseil des représentants des souverains unis.23 Dans cette nouvelle organisation de l’Europe, le rôle prépondérant devait échoir à la France. On avait également adjugé une certaine importance à Venise, à la Hongrie et à la Pologne. La France bénéficiait d’un rôle extraordinaire d’abord à cause de son attitude vis-à-vis du Saint Siège et aussi grâce à Antonio Marini, qui n’oublia jamais ses racines françaises. De façon logique, Marini s’acquitta également d’une mission diplomatique préliminaire auprès de Louis XI en sa qualité d’auteur principal de ce projet pacifique de la ligue des princes chrétiens, projet auquel il avait consacré quatre ans de sa vie (1461–1464).24 Les premiers contacts avec le roi de France lui parurent – peut-être à tort – encourageants, si bien qu’il persuada Georges de Poděbrady de faire de ce projet le pivot de sa politique étrangère et de mettre tout en oeuvre pour qu’il soit réalisé dans les plus brefs délais. Essayons maintenant de relever les traits les plus importants de ce plan visionnaire. Les propositions du roi Georges et de son conseiller Antonio Marini étaient incorporées dans un document que l’on peut considérer comme une Charte d’organisation générale de la paix. Sur le plan formel, cet acte proposait un projet de traité international et multilatéral, ouvert à tous les États chrétiens. Le document était conçu en deux parties: la première était František KAVKA, La Bohême hussite et les projets de paix de Georges de Poděbrady. In: Cultus pacis. Études et documents du „symposium pragense cultus pacis 1464–1964“; Commemoration pacis generalis ante quingentos annos a Georgio Bohemiae rege propositae, publié par les soins de Václav VANĚČEK, Praha 1966, pp. 13–20; Remigiusz BIERZANEK, Les nouveaux éléments politiques et sociaux dans le projet du roi Georges Podiébrad. in: Cultus Pacis, pp. 57–74; František ŠMAHEL, Problèmes rattachés aux recherches sur le projet pacifique du roi Georges. In: Cultus Pacis, pp. 155–165; Josef MACEK, K zahraniční politice krále Jiřího, ČsČH, XIII, 1965, pp. 19–49, particulièrement p. 27. 24 C’est un autre conseiller de Georges de Poděbrady, Martin Mair, qui se voit adjuger la paternité du projet d’après BARTOŠ, pp. 65 et sqq. Cette opinion reste cependant isolée. Voir POLIŠENSKÝ, p. 86 qui penche pour la paternité de Marini, comme en particulier URBÁNEK, pp. 580–582; Marini est considéré comme l’auteur unique du projet par exemple par ODLOŽILÍK, p. 152. Il est incorrectement tenu pour Italien par MACEK, Jiří z Poděbrad, pp. 148 et sqq. L’origine de Marini est relatée avec la plus grande précision par URBÁNEK: „Marini était d’origine française de Grenoble dans le Dauphiné, descendant d’une famille italienne naturalisée“, p. 215. 23

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un préambule pour les propositions particulières, la deuxième présentait le canevas des statuts de l’organisation des États européens en projet.25 Dans l’introduction étaient d’abord expliquées les causes qui avaient amené à l’élaboration du projet. On y parlait, avec une grande franchise, du déclin de la chrétienté dont la cause principale aurait été le manque d’une unité véritable. C’était juste cette situation qui, d’après l’auteur, permettait à l’Islam de conquérir toujours plus de nouveaux territoires. C’était pourquoi le texte proclamait l’effort pour l’unité, la paix et la défense commune contre la pénétration de l’Islam en Europe, devoir principal de tous les souverains chrétiens. Il faut se rendre compte que ce texte a vu le jour une dizaine d’années après la chute de Constantinople et la destruction définitive de l’Empire byzantin.26 L’alliance anti-turque n’était cependant ni le seul ni le principal objectif du projet. D’ailleurs on ne parlait plus de la lutte contre les Turcs dans les parties décisives du document. En revanche, on y mettait en évidence la nécessité d’une organisation unitaire dont le but aurait été le maintien de la paix. Cet effort faisait l’objet de plusieurs articles de la deuxième partie du rapport représentant le coeur du projet. On y trouvait des propositions concrètes, élaborées parfois dans les moindres détails, parfois ne donnant que des principes fondamentaux. Ce fait témoignait plutôt de la prévoyance des auteurs du projet. On avait laissé en effet une série de questions à l’appréciation des instances de l’organisation envisagée.27 L’enjeu principal de la nouvelle organisation reposait, d’après les auteurs du projet, sur le maintien de la paix internationale ainsi que, comme ils le soulignaient, sur le droit et la justice.28 On peut même dire que la paix et la justice étaient les buts principaux du projet. C’est à ce point-là – garantir une paix durable – que plus d’un tiers des articles étaient consacrés. De plus, l’ensemble des articles le concernant se trouvait à la tête du projet (art. 1–8). Ils faisaient suite au préambule, dont la thèse était de créer une organisation unitaire pour délivrer le monde de la menace de la guerre et instaurer un gouvernement de paix, de fraternité et d’amour. Cette idée The Universal Peace Organization of King George of Bohemia a fifteenth century plan for world peace 1462/1464, Praha 1964, traduction en français Konstantin JELÍNEK, pp. 102–111. 26 Václav VANĚČEK, Historický význam projektu krále Jiřího a vědecké problémy kolem něho, in: Všeobecná mírová organizace podle návrhu českého krále Jiřího z let 1462/1464, Praha 1964, p. 14. 27 Ibid, p. 15. 28 Ibid, p. 24. 25

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principale était assez bien exprimée par l’expression „cultus pacis“ utilisée dans l’article 9: il s’agissait d’un véritable culte de la paix. „...le culte de la paix ne pouvant exister sans la justice, ni la justice sans la paix, puisque c’est de la justice que la paix prend naissance et garde en vie, que nous et nos sujets ne pourrions vivre en paix sans la justice, ainsi associons-nous la justice à la cause de la paix.“29 Cet effort avait pour but la fondation d’une communauté à jamais pacifique. Dans le préambule, les auteurs du projet s’adressaient à un public très large: omnes populi, omnes nationes, omnesque reges et principes („tous les peuples, toutes les nations, tous les rois et princes“)30 bien qu’ils y fissent d’abord appel, assez logiquement, aux nations chrétiennes. L’universalité proposée dans le projet était différente, par son caractère, de celle des époques médiévales précédentes. Son objectif consistait dans une communauté internationale des nations et des États égaux en droit qui deviendrait un ensemble organisé selon de nouveaux principes, sans pape ni empereur. Cette communauté aurait été responsable du maintien de la paix universelle, de la solution paisible des conflits entre les États et de la punition de ceux qui troubleraient la paix. C’est justement dans ce sens qu’il faut comprendre l’orientation anti-turque de certaines parties du projet car l’Empire Ottoman se montrait, dans la deuxième moitié du XVème siècle, l’agresseur le plus dangereux qui troublait la paix et menaçait les États voisins.31 Le statut propre de la ligue de paix contient 23 articles. Parmi eux, les dispositions à caractère politique, qui envisageaient des changements fondamentaux dans les relations entre les États, étaient mises au premier plan. Ce n’est que dans la suite que l’on trouvait des articles sur l’organisation et l’administration. Quelles seraient donc les relations entre les membres de l’organisation selon les propositions du roi Georges de Poděbrady? D’après l’énoncé de l’article 1, les représentants des États concernés devaient s’engager à la fraternité mutuelle („pure, véritable et sincère fraternité“).32 A un autre endroit (dans l’article 23) elle est désignée comme „verae et sincerae fraternitationis vinculum“ – d’où cet engagement: „Nous accomplirons tout ce qu’exige et requiert le lien de la véritable et sincère fraternité.“ L’objectif

The Universal Peace Organization of King George of Bohemia a fifteenth century plan for world peace 1462/1464, p. 106. 30 Ibid., Préambule, p. 103. 31 VANĚČEK, Historický význam projektu krále Jiřího, p. 26. 32 The Universal Peace Organization, p. 104. 29

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principal de l’organisation se définit simplement comme pax ou pax generalis, donc la paix générale (art. 6).33 C’est dans l’article 1 que l’on interdisait clairement l’usage de la force pour résoudre les conflits entre des États membres de l’organisation. Aucun d’eux ne devait recourir aux armes contre l’autre („nous faisons déclaration et promesse … de ne pas recourir aux armes l’un contre l’autre“ et ce „quelle que soit la nature de nos différends, discussions ou griefs“). Les querelles éventuelles devaient être réglées seulement par les institutions régulières de l’Union dont on parlait aussi dans d’autres clauses spéciales de l’article 11, où les compétences du tribunal de l’organisation sont énumérées. On disait clairement, dans l’article 3, que même les dommages causés par n’importe quelle action, même criminelle, d’un État membre sur le territoire d’un autre, ne devaient pas servir de prétexte à la violation de la paix générale. Ces torts ne devaient pas être redressés par les armes mais par la voie du droit, en d’autres termes, par une plainte auprès du tribunal concerné. „Nous garantissons, comme ci-dessus dit, que si l’un ou plusieurs des sujets de l’un d’entre nous commet ou commettent dévastations, pillages, rapines, incendies ou toute sorte de méfaits dans les royaumes, principautés ou terre de l’un d‘entre nous, la paix et l’union n’en seront ni troublées ni rompues, mais que les malfaiteurs seront amenés à réparer les dommages. S’il est impossible d’obtenir satisfaction à l’amiable, ils seront traduits en justice par celui dans la juridiction duquel les coupables ont leur résidence, ou sur le territoire duquel le crime a été constaté, de façon que le dommage commis soit réparé par ses auteurs à leurs dépens, ... sans que l’un s’en remette à l’autre, sera tenu et obligé de les poursuivre et mettre hors d’état de nuire en tant que malfaiteurs... La victime de l’injustice ou du dommage aura le droit de poursuivre et de citer en justice celui d’entre nous devant le Parlement ou Consistoire prévu plus loin.“34 En cas de conflit entre les États membres et les non-membres, il est prescrit que l’on devait obvier à la guerre à l’amiable, au moyen d’un accommodement aux frais de l’organisation et par l’office de ses institutions. Si cela échouait, l’organisation soutiendrait son membre. „...s’il arrivait que quelqu’un ou quelques-uns, ne faisant pas partie de notre convention, charité et fraternité, fît la guerre ou entreprît de la faire à l’un d’entre nous et cela sans molestations ou provocations de notre côté ce qui n’est absolument pas à craindre, aussi longtemps que durera cette amitié et 33 34

Ibid., p. 106. Ibid., p. 104.

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charité, notre Assemblée prévue plus loin, au nom de tous les signataires du pacte – même si l’allié attaqué ne nous a pas fait appel – enverra à frais communs et solennellement, en vue d’aplanir le différend et de ménager la paix, une délégation qui devra se transporter au plus vite en un endroit commode aux deux parties. Et là, en présence des parties en litige ou de leurs représentants munis des pleins pouvoirs, nos délégués feront tout effort et diligence pour ramener paix et concorde entre les adversaires, si possible par voie amicale...“ 35 Enfin, en ce qui concerne les guerres entre les États non-membres (art. 5) le projet ordonnait que l’organisation les empêche par son offre de médiation.36 Si, malgré tous ses efforts, la guerre éclatait, l’organisaion soutiendrait celui qui aurait voulu accepter la médiation de l’organisation et aurait donc eu la volonté de trouver une solution pacifique. Ces prescriptions se justifiaient explicitement par l’intérêt de la paix même entre des États qui seraient en dehors de l’organisation. Dans le cas des États membres, le recours aux armes dans des conflits internationaux serait conditionné par l’accord de l’organisation. Ceci était exprimé par les mots „sans édit légitime“ (absque legitimo edicto), employés dans l’article 1er, et qui concernaient la décision (edictum, édit) prise par l’organisation dans la question du recours aux armes contre un des États. La démarche guerrière de n’importe quel membre contre un autre, sans approbation explicite de l’organisation, serait considérée comme un acte illégitime.37 Sur ce point, on peut constater cette proposition remarquable qui subordonnait à des obligations juridiques l’une des fonctions régaliennes de l’État, son activité militaire. Cet engagement ainsi que d’autres dispositions du projet, surtout au sujet de la juridiction de l’union sur les États membres et sur l’admission des successeurs des souverains défunts, signifiaient sans aucun doute une atteinte à leur souveraineté. Ceux qui troublaient la paix devaient être traités comme de véritables criminels. Ce problème était réglé par l’article 6: „Aucun sauf-confuit ne pourra faire obstacle à l’arrestation, saisie et châtiment de ces personnes, comme profanateurs de la paix générale, selon la sanction encourue par la nature de leur crime ou délit.“38 Par conséquent, un État membre ne devait donner ni soutien ni aide à celui qui porterait atteinte aux prescriptions de Ibid., p. 105. Ibid. 37 VANĚČEK, Historický význam projektu krále Jiřího, p. 27. 38 The Universal Peace Organization, p. 105. 35

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solution paisible des querelles. Les sauf-conduits (salvus conductus) qui leur seraient délivrés n’auraient aucune validité selon l’article suivant, le n° 7.39 Dans l’article 8, il était affirmé d’une manière générale que celui qui donnerait n’importe quel soutien au violateur de la paix serait passible de la même punition que l’agresseur. Pour comprendre la portée des propositions du roi Georges concernant l’exclusion des guerres, il faut prendre en considération la réalité politique de la deuxième moitié du XVème siècle. Les guerres étaient à l’ordre du jour; en plus de celles entre des États sévissaient les guerres „privées“, typiques du Moyen Âge, entre les divers titulaires de pouvoirs soit à l’intérieur d’un pays, soit appartenant à différents États.40 Il est vrai que deux articles (13 et 14) concernaient une affaire d’importance primordiale pour l’Europe chrétienne de l’époque: la défense contre l’expansion de l’Islam représentée par les Turcs. Dans ce cas-là, la guerre n’est cependant pas considérée comme une nécessité inévitable. La possibilité de conclure la paix avec les Turcs y est prévue explicitement, par une résolution générale, à condition que la sécurité des chrétiens qui vivent à proximité de l’Empire Ottoman soit assurée. „Nous ne cesserons pas de poursuivre l’ennemi, si notre Assemblée le juge utile, tant qu’il n’aura pas été chassé du territoire chrétien, ou bien qu’en vertu d’une résolution prise en commun, nous ne nous serons pas convenus de faire la paix, laquelle ne devra être signée, à moins qu’on n’ait jugé qu’elle garantissait la sécurité des chrétiens avoisinants.“ 41 Ce qui importe le plus du point de vue de l’histoire sociale des organisations humaines, est le contenu des huit derniers articles du statut. L’ensemble politique né de la réalisation du projet de Georges de Poděbrady et d’Antonio Marini, n’aurait pas eu un caractère étatique, ni monarchique. Il était plutôt envisagé une organisation appelée „union“ dans les derniers mots du préambule.42 Le sens et la fonction de cette organisation étaient sous-entendus dans les mots „connexio, pax, fraternita et concordia“: „...nous avons décidé de sceller dans la forme qui suit un pacte établissant union, paix, fraternité et concorde inébranlable...“43

Ibid., p. 106. Ibid., p. 105. 40 VANĚČEK, Historický význam projektu krále Jiřího, p. 28. 41 The Universal Peace Organization, art. 13, p. 108. 42 Ibid., pp. 103–104. 43 Dans le texte latin „...consilio et assensu, ad huiusmodi connexionis, pacis, fraternitatis et concordie inconcusse...“, The Universal Peace Organisation, p. 72. 39

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Le terme d’ „union“ est le plus pertinent pour exprimer le principe de l’ensemble envisagé. D’ailleurs, son utilisation dans le projet même est attestée dans de nombreux passages importants. Il s’agit d’abord de l’article 3 (ici dans l’expression „la paix et l’union“)44, de l’article 8 („notre présente union“)45 ou de l’article 12 („notre présente paix, union, charité et fraternité“).46 On peut, bien sûr, se poser la question de savoir quel nom donnaient à ce projet de nouvelle union les représentants des États auxquels il était présenté dans les années 1460. Dans la réponse du roi de Hongrie aux propositions de Georges de Poděbrady, l’organisation envisagée était désignée par les termes liga generalis ou universalis concordia, ce qui est très significatif.47 Quand le texte du projet fut envoyé en 1463 de Prague au roi de Pologne, le copiste de la chancellerie royale polonaise lui donna pour titre „Tractatus pacis toti christianitati fiendae“.48 Ce qui en soi témoigne du fait que le projet était, en son temps, considéré plus comme un instrument de paix que de guerre contre les Turcs. Dans la pratique quotidienne de la politique internationale, l’institution principale de l’union était représentée, d’après les idées du roi Georges incorporées dans le projet, par un corps, un congrès ou simplement l’assemblée fixe des délégués des États membres. Dans le texte latin du document se trouve partout le mot congregatio, ce qu’on peut traduire en français par „congrégation“. Ibid., p. 104. Voici la teneur de ce passage en latin: „Tercio, spondemus modo supradicto, quod si aliquis vel aliqui ex subditis cuiuscunque nostrum aliquas vastaciones, predas, rapinas, incendia aut alia quecunque maleficiorum genera in regnis, principatibus seu terris alterius nostrum commiserit vel commiserint, volumus, quod per hos pax et unio premissa non sint vilate ne infringantur...“, ibid. p. 73. „Item volumus eciam, quod congregacio nostra debeat habere omnimodam et liberam facultatem quoscunque reges, principes et magnates cristianos, qui de presenti huic unioni incorporati non fuerint, ad presentem nostram pacem, unionem, caritatem et fraternitatem accipiendi et sesse nomine nostro...“, ibid., p. 76. 45 „Qui autem violatorem pacis presentis scienter sociaverit aut ei quovis quesito colore consilium, auxilium vel favorem prestiterit vel eum receptaverit aut ipsum defendere seu protegere vel ei salvum conductum contra presntem nostram unionem dare presumpserit, par pena ipsum et reum expectet“, ibid., p. 75. 46 Ibid., p. 107, en latin: „ad presentam nostram pacem, unionem, caritatem et fraternitatem...“, ibid., p. 77. 47 VANĚČEK, Historický význam projektu krále Jiřího, p. 45; voir Štěpán KATONA, Historia critica regum Hungariae stirpis mixtae, XIV, 1792, p. 704 et sqq. 48 VANĚČEK, Historický význam projektu krále Jiřího, p. 41. Comparer avec R. HECK, p. 176; M. TOEPPEN, Acten der Ständetage Preussens unter der Herrschaft des Deutschen Ordens, V, Leipzig 1886, n. 35, pp. 83–85. 44

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On ne compte pas, dans le projet, sur la présence des souverains euxmêmes lors des sessions de la congrégation. Selon l’énoncé de l’article 16, ce serait des délégués spéciaux (oratores, notabiles et magnae auctoritatis viri), munis des pleins pouvoirs, qui devraient y siéger. Ces délégués devaient être élus par les personnages les plus respectables de leur pays. Les résolutions de cette institution devaient cependant engager tous les États membres comme si leurs chefs y assistaient. La congrégation devait siéger en permanence tout en changeant le lieu de son siège tous les cinq ans. Ce changement devait suivre un itinéraire particulier. Pendant les cinq premières années, la congrégation devait se tenir à Bâle, les cinq années suivantes elle devait déménager dans une ville de France, les cinq années d’après en Italie, pour revenir enfin à Bâle. Les participants de l’union s’engageaient donc à „envoyer dans la ville de Bâle en Germanie ses représentants choisis parmi des hommes remarquables et de grande valeur, munis des pouvoirs les plus étendus ... Ils y siègeront en permanence les cinq années suivant immédiatement et formeront, constitueront et représenteront, en notre nom ainsi qu’au nom des autres membres et de ceux qui pourront le devenir, véritablement corps, communauté et corporation. Le quinquennat de cette Assemblée à Bâle une fois écoulé, la même Assemblée se tiendra pendant un deuxième quinquennat sans intervalle ni interruption dans la ville de X. en France, et pendant un troisième quinquennat dans la ville de X. en Italie; elle observera les mêmes règles et les clauses qui auront été retenues pour sages et appliquées précédemment à Bâle; de façon que de ville en ville et d’un quinquennat à l’autre, un circuit soit formé jusqu’au jour où soit l’Assemblée, soit sa majorité jugera qu’il convient de prendre d’autres règlements et dispositions. L’Assemblée, en tant que telle, aura un seul Conseil, en propre et spécial, un seul président, son père et son chef, tandis que nous autres, les rois et les princes de la Chrétienté, en serons les membres. Sur nous tous, sur nos sujets et sur ceux qui seraient admis par la suite, ladite corporation exercera aussi juridiction tant gracieuse que contentieuse et disposera du droit absolu et du droit mixte, selon les dispositions qu’aura décrétées et fixées la même Assemblée ou sa majorité.“49 Pour créer une volonté commune dans l’institution principale de l’union, le rassemblement des États dans des groupes régionaux nommés nationes était proposé. Dans l’article 19 figurait la natio (nation) française, mais aussi les germanique, italique et éventuellement espagnole, chacune 49

The Universal Peace Organization, art. 16, pp. 108–109.

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disposant d’une voix. „En outre, arrêtons et voulons que dans ladite Assemblée une voix soit attribuée au roi de France ensemble avec les autres rois et princes de la Gaule, la seconde voix aux rois et princes de la Germanie et la troisième au Doge de Venise ensemble avec les princes et Communes d’Italie. Si le roi de Castille et d’autres rois et princes de la nation hispanique adhéraient à notre alliance, amitié et fraternité, il leur sera semblablement accordé une voix dans notre Assemblée, corps et corporation.“50 Le projet de Georges de Poděbrady et d’Antonio Marini était probablement influencé par la pratique des conciles ecclésiastiques de la première moitié du XVe siècle. Au sein de ces groupes régionaux et linguistiques, chacun des souverains disposait d’une seule voix, quelle que soit la taille de sa délégation. On pourrait s’étonner de l’absence, dans l’article 19, de l’Angleterre, de la Pologne, de la Bohême ou de la Hongrie. Il est possible que l’Angleterre ait été comprise dans le bloc de la „Gallie“, la Bohême, la Pologne et la Hongrie dans celui de la „Germanie“. Georges de Poděbrady espérait probablement que le bloc de la „Germanie“ aurait son centre de gravité dans les Pays Tchèques, comme jadis au temps de l’empereur Charles IV de Luxembourg (1348–1378). D’ailleurs le mot „Germania“ n’avait pas ici la signification d’„Allemagne“. C’était un terme géographique, plus général, dont l’équivalent le plus pertinent, bien qu’anachronique peut-être, serait aujourd’hui le terme d’ „Europe Centrale“. Dans la procédure de vote c’était le principe majoritaire (maior pars) qui devait prévaloir. Ce n’était que dans le cas d’égalité des voix que s’appliquait aussi le principe de l’importance politique au sein des „nations“ (nationes). „...si des divergences d’opinions devaient se manifester sur une question entre les délégués des rois et des princes d’une seule et même nation, nous stipulons que le point de vue et le vote de la majorité seront acquis, comme s’ils avaient reçu l’approbation unanime de cette nation; au cas où il y aurait partage égal des suffrages, ce sont les voix des délégués représentant des seigneurs plus haut placés en titres et en mérite qui prévaudront.“51 Il est remarquable que les États membres soient, selon l’énoncé de l’article 16, „incorporés“ dans l’organisation. L’adhésion de nouveaux membres était d’ailleurs envisagée par l’article 12. Le congrès permanent des délégués (congregatio, en français: assemblée) déciderait de l’admission en obtenant du nouveau membre l’engagement de respecter les règles de 50 51

Ibid., p. 110. Ibid.

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l’organisation. La même institution était chargée d’annoncer l’adhésion du nouveau membre aux souverains ou aux gouvernements de tous les membres existants.52 La conclusion du traité de la nouvelle organisation ou l’adhésion ultérieure engageaient largement les États membres en faveur de la nouvelle formation politique, de ses fonctions et de ses pouvoirs. Ce sont surtout les questions de la déclaration de la guerre et de la conclusion de la paix qui sont les plus frappantes. Mais la transmission des compétences devait aussi avoir lieu dans le domaine des finances, des pouvoirs juridiques et de la jurisprudence en général. Car l’organisation bénéficiait du droit d’édicter des normes juridiques ayant force de loi générale.53 L’une des plus graves restrictions se trouve à l’article 22 (l’avantdernier). Les États membres devaient s’y engager à empêcher l’instauration d’un gouvernement qui ne respecterait pas les règles de la Charte constituante dans un des États membres. Le successeur d’un souverain défunt ne devait pas être admis à régner sans avoir confirmé par écrit les obligations de son État vis-à-vis de l’organisation. („...pour que la paix ainsi que les précédentes dispositions soient inviolablement observées, nous avons décidé et nous promettons, quand l’un de nous aura été appelé dans la patrie céleste, de ne pas laisser l’un de ses héritiers ou successeurs accéder au pouvoir et entrer en possession d’un royaume, d’une principauté ou d’un domaine aussi longtemps qu’il n’aura pas, avant toute chose, pris l’engagement de respecter avec une fidélité inébranlable l’ensemble des articles précédents ainsi que le suivant et chacun d’eux en particulier, par des lettres patentes avec sceau pendant, comme garantie en commun apportée à chacun de nous.“)54 Le fait que l’égalité devait régner parmi les États participants à l’organisation est d’une importance primordiale. Il faut souligner, dans ce contexte-là, que le projet ne comporte pas de statut particulier pour le roi de Rome ou bien l’Empereur. Le souverain portant ce titre est inclus dans l’ensemble des „princes de la Germanie“ („reges et principes Germanie“ en latin; „En outre, arrêtons et voulons que dans ladite Assemblée une voix soit attribuée au roi de France ensemble avec les autres rois et princes de la Gaule, la seconde voix aux rois et princes de la Germanie et la troisième au Doge de Venise ensemble avec les princes et communes d’Italie“).55 Ibid., p. 76. VANĚČEK, Historický význam projektu krále Jiřího, p. 19. 54 The Universal Peace Organization, p. 111, texte original latin p. 79. 55 Ibid., p. 110, texte original latin p. 78. 52 53

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Le projet ne respectait donc pas les théories qui prévalaient jusque là de la position et du pouvoir non seulement de l’empereur mais aussi du pape, ni pour les privilèges honorifiques (cf. la position prioritaire lors de l’énumration), ni pour les fonctions dans l’Union (cf. la présidence de l’organisation, les fonctions juridiques ou arbitraires). La noblesse ecclésiastique n’était probablement plus prise en compte du tout. Sur ce point, on peut constater l’influence du hussitisme tchèque (ou de la réforme, si l’on préfère) sur l’ensemble du projet. Certaines questions d’organisation n’étaient pas exposées en détail. Par exemple, les clauses concernant le président de l’organisation, le conseil des souverains (consilium) ou les structures administratives supérieures et inférieures étaient traitées de façon très laconique, donc obscures. Il faut toujours prendre en considération le fait qu’il s’agit d’un projet jamais réalisé, ni même discuté en un lieu adéquat, comme ses auteurs l’avaient envisagé. Cette assemblée présumée, c’est-à-dire la session des souverains européens, qui aurait dû être convoquée par le roi de France Louis XI, aurait pu encore améliorer et préciser le projet général. La fonction du Conseil (consilium congregationis), qui est mentionnée en deux endroits du projet, restait aussi sans aucune précision. Dans l’article 16, on parle de cette institution comme si ses membres (membra) étaient tous les souverains des États membres en personne („L’Assemblée, en tant que telle, aura un seul conseil, en propre et spécial, un seul président, N., son père et son chef, tandis que nous autres, les rois et les princes de la Chrétienté, en serons les membres“).56 On peut en conclure que le conseil n’aurait siégé que rarement et que sa fonction aurait été de pure cérémonie. Cela s’accorde avec le fait que l’on n’évoquait le chef de toute l’organisation que dans ce passage où il est désigné par les mots „président, père et chef ou tête“ (praesidens, pater et caput). Même si ce n’est pas explicitement dit dans le texte, les historiens sont d’avis que ce chef aurait dû être le roi de France. C’est indirectement indiqué par les négociations préalables d’Antonio Marini et les déclarations de protestation de l’ambassade tchèque en France en 1464 mais aussi par l’énoncé de l’article 19. Car „Gallia“ y était nommée en première place lors de l’énumération des participants et de la formation des ensembles régionaux. Le Conseil était encore une fois mentionné dans l’article 18 comme une institution à laquelle il fallait verser des contributions. „De plus, pour pouvoir faire face aux dépenses et aux frais indispensables et utiles pour le maintien de la paix, l’exercice du pouvoir judiciaire, la désignation et 56

Ibid., p. 109.

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l’envoi des représentants et des messagers et pour tous les autres besoins, chacun de nous fait promesse et prend engagement de percevoir, par ses propres agents ou en son nom, à l’époque qu’aura fixée l’Assemblée ou sa majorité, la dixième partie des dîmes ainsi que des gains et profits des trois journées, comme déjà dit; puis d’envoyer et faire transporter les fonds sans délai ni retard aux archives publiques, à la disposition du Conseil de l’Assemblée et de ses caissiers.“57 Cette formulation nous donne à penser que le conseil aurait dû avoir son secrétariat permanent à côté de la congrégation. On se trouve ici dans le domaine des spéculations, ce qui arrive fatalement aux historiens qui veulent réfléchir plus en détail sur la position et la fonction du président et du conseil ainsi que leur position par rapport à la congrégation. La congrégation, en tant qu’institution permanente, devait être composée des représentants des souverains, tandis que les souverains mêmes devaient s’occuper de leur gouvernement dans leurs propres pays; on peut supposer, par conséquent, que la congrégation aurait dû être présidée par le délégué du pays auquel appartenait le président du conseil. Une autre solution aurait été de faire présider la congrégation par le syndic, aussi mentionné par le projet. La seconde institution par son importance, prévue par la Charte, était le tribunal international, désigné par les termes parlamentum seu consistorium („le parlement ou le consistoire“, art. 3),58 parlamentum vel consistorium („le parlement ou le consistoire“, art. 4),59 generale consistorium („consistoire général“, art. 9)60 et parlamentum seu iudicium („Parlement ou cour“, art. 18).61 On pense en général que le mot parlamentum (parlement) renvoie à la tradition des parlements judiciaires français qui jouaient un rôle important dans les conflits entre le pouvoir central en France et les tendances centrifuges de certains féodaux. Cette institution a été probablement imposée dans le projet par Antonio Marini. Enfin, il est dit dans les articles 9 et 10 que le tribunal de l’organisation allait fonctionner au nom de toute la congrégation: omnium nostrorum et congregationis nostrae nomine („au nom de nous tous et de notre Assemblée“).62 Le „parlement ou consistoire“ déjà mentionné devait s’occuper des dossiers en instance juridique de la nouvelle organisation: Ibid. Ibid., p. 104. 59 Ibid., p. 105. 60 Ibid., p. 106. 61 Ibid., p. 109. 62 Ibid., p. 106. 57

58

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„Sur nous tous, sur nos sujets et sur ceux qui seraient admis par la suite, ladite corporation exercera aussi juridiction, tant gracieuse que contentieuse et disposera du droit absolu et du droit mixte, selon les dispositions qu’aura décrétées et fixées la même Assemblée ou sa majorité.“63 On a supposé que les membres du tribunal seraient iudex et assessores („juge et assesseurs“), nommés par la congrégation. Le tribunal devait s’occuper surtout du règlement pacifique des querelles soit entre les États membres eux-mêmes, soit entre les États membres et ceux qui restaient hors de l’organisation. Parallèlement (dans l’esprit de l’art. 16) le tribunal devait disposer d’un pouvoir, large mais indéfini, sur les États membres et leurs habitants en général pour le règlement de tous les litiges qui lui seraient adressés par les parties.64 La création d’un tribunal international fut comprise comme une première démarche vers l’instauration d’un nouveau droit universel (ce qui résulte de la comparaison des art. 9–10 et 16). L’article 11 confirme aussi cela; il prévoit pour le congrès des délégués (congrégation) la publication de normes juridiques de valeur générale (statuta, decreta et ordinationes, donc statuts, décrets et réglements). On y dit textuellement: „...au cas où de nouvelles querelles et divergences venaient à s’élever entre nous, rois et princes, et d’autres parties à notre pacte, que l’un et l’autre soient obligés et tenus de comparaître et plaider dans les formes devant notre dite Cour, en observant les statuts, décrets et règlements faits et établis par nos envoyés et représentants ou par la majorité de l’Assemblée“.65 La nouvelle organisation ou union devait disposer de solides structures administratives composées de charges supérieures et inférieures. Le fonctionnaire désigné comme „sindicus“ (donc le syndic) aurait dû être à la tête de cet appareil. En utilisant le vocabulaire d’aujourd’hui on peut dire qu’il s’agissait à peu près du secrétaire général de l’organisation. Si l’on veut recourir à une terminologie moins anachronique, on le nommera chancelier. A ses côtés devait aussi se trouver un dignitaire désigné par le projet comme le procurator fiscalis (donc procureur fiscal), qui devait occuper un poste important dans l’organisation.66 Ce fonctionnaire devait probablement jouer le rôle, plus ou moins, de gardien de la légalité dans le cadre de l’organisation. Selon l’article 18, il avait le devoir et le droit d’exiger (avec le Ibid., p. 109. VANĚČEK, Historický význam projektu krále Jiřího, p. 22. 65 The Universal Peace Organization, p. 29; VANĚČEK, Historický význam projektu krále Jiřího, p. 29. 66 Ibid., p. 109. 63

64

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syndic) les contributions des États membres à l’aide d’avertissements, ou de plainte au tribunal ou, enfin, par exécution grâce à une sentence prononcée au nom de l’organisation. „Pour pouvoir faire face aux dépenses et aux frais indispensables et utiles pour le maintien de la paix, l’exercice du pouvoir judiciaire, la désignation et l’envoi des représentants et des messagers et pour tous les autres besoins, chacun de nous fait promesse et prend engagement de percevoir, par ses propres agents ou en son nom, à l’époque qu’aura fixée l’Assemblée ou sa majorité, la dixième partie des dîmes ainsi que des gains et profits des trois journées, comme déjà dit; puis d’envoyer et faire transporter les fonds sans délai ni retard aux archives publiques, à la disposition du conseil de l’Assemblée et de ses caissiers. Faute de quoi, le syndic ou le procureur fiscal de l’Assemblée a le droit et est tenu d’assigner le débiteur devant le Parlement ou Cour pour recouvrer la créance par voie de justice, ainsi que des indemnités, avec intérêts; en outre, il devra prévenir les autres membres et nous inviter – conformément à la foi jurée – à exiger et faire rentrer par une exécution militaire la somme due par le débiteur et ses sujets, indemnités et intérêts compris; ces fonds seront affectés, comme prévu, aux besoins communs de l’Assemblée.“67 Les charges supérieures et inférieures devaient, en règle générale, soutenir l’action de l’organisation mondiale de la paix (union) et de ses institutions principales, c’est-à-dire l’assemblée des délégués (congrégation), le conseil des souverains (consilium) et le tribunal international. On prévoyait aussi des fonctionnaires spéciaux pour la gestion du trésor et des archives. En ce qui concerne l’administration, on trouve dans le projet un énoncé assez remarquable (art. 17) qui prescrivait que les charges supérieures (potiora officia) devaient toujours être occupées par les gens du pays (dans la nation même) dans lequel la congrégation siégeait temporairement. „Afin que les droits de chaque pays soient conservés intacts, nous stipulons qu’on désignera pour les charges supérieures de l’Assemblée, dans la nation même où l’Assemblée a son siège temporaire, des fonctionnaires qui soient originaires de ce même pays et en comprennent les moeurs et les usages.“68 On peut en conclure que l’appareil de l’organisation se renouvellerait entièrement tout les cinq ans. Bien entendu la nouvelle organisation aurait eu ses attributs, tels ses armoiries et son sceau: „Enfin, elle aura en propre ses armes, son sceau, son trésor commun, ses archives publiques, un syndic, un procureur fiscal, des

67 68

Ibid., pp. 109–110. Ibid., p. 109.

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fonctionnaires, ainsi que tous les autres droits concernant et intéressant en quelque manière une union conforme au droit et à la justice.“69 Pour financer les frais communs du fonctionnement de l’organisation, parmi lesquels on mentionnait en premier lieu „le maintien de la paix“, les États membres devaient, selon l’article 18, livrer au trésor de l’organisation des contributions régulières. Leur montant était fixé d’une manière assez étrange pour nous aujourd’hui. Tout en simplifiant, on peut dire que les États devaient livrer un dixième de leurs revenus nationaux annuels.70 Des charges financières spéciales sur les États membres de l’organisation étaient prévues dans l’art. 4 au profit d’un membre qui était forcé de se défendre par la guerre contre un quelconque ennemi. Dans ce cas, le projet proposait des mesures très concrètes bien que formulées de façon compliquée: „S’il arrivait que quelqu’un ou quelques-uns, ne faisant pas partie de notre convention, charité et fraternité, fît la guerre ou entreprît de la faire à l’un d’entre nous et cela sans molestations ou provocations de notre côté ce qui n’est absolument pas à craindre, aussi longtemps que durera cette amitié et charité, notre Assemblée prévue plus loin, au nom de tous les signataires du pacte – même si l’allié attaqué ne nous a pas fait appel – enverra à frais commun et solennellement, en vue d’aplanir le différend et de ménager la paix, une délégation qui devra se transporter au plus vite en un endroit commode aux deux parties. Et là, en présence des parties en litige ou de leurs représentants munis des pleins pouvoirs, nos délégués feront tout effort et diligence pour ramener paix et concorde entre les adversaires, si possible par voie amicale, sinon ils les engageront à choisir des arbitres ou à plaider devant la juridiction compétente ou devant le Parlement ou Consistoire prévu ci-dessous. Si l’assaillant faisant défaut en justice, paix et union ne peuvent pas être rétablies par l’un des moyens susdits....“71 Ce principe général était appliqué concrètement, dans l’article 13, à la situation de l’attaque des Turcs contre certains États chrétiens. Y était ajoutée la proposition de leur donner – outre les contributions prévues dans la situation normale – toutes les dîmes comme aide financière de la part de tous les États membres.72

Ibid., p. 109. Le texte original latin: „Habeat denique propria arma, sigillum et archam communem atque archivum publicum, sindicum, fiscalem, officiales et quecunque alia iura ad licitum et iustum collegium quomodolibet pertinencia et spectancia, ibid., p. 77. 70 Ibid., p. 109. 71 Ibid., p. 105. 72 Ibid., pp. 107–108. 69

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En plus du maintien de la paix, l’organisation se serait occupée d’autres affaires communes d’ordre plus pratique en général. Il était prévu la frappe et l’introduction d’une monnaie commune – communis moneta („nous décidons que sera fixé par une résolution commune de notre Assemblée unanime ou de sa majorité … comment introduire une monnaie unique pour l’armée afin que les soldats n’éprouvent pas de difficultés en marche, en garnison ou à leur retour“).73 Ensuite le document réclamait une régulation des prix alimentaires (victualia in competenti pretio) et la fondation d’un réseau d’hébergement approprié (hospitia in civitatibus, villis et aliis loci opportunis). Même si ces propositions ne concernent formellement que des objectifs militaires, il est évident que leur impact est plus général. Car si on réussissait à introduire une monnaie commune et des prix uniques pour les aliments, on ne pourrait pas les limiter exclusivement au but de la défense militaire. Les négociations sur le projet en France en 1464 et leur échec Le plan de Georges de Poděbrady différait des projets d’alliances pacifiques médiévales précédentes non seulement par son élaboration détaillée mais aussi par le fait qu’il était lié à une grande activité diplomatique et promotionnelle, dont le but était la mise en pratique des principes de la charte proposée. En mai 1464, une ambassade munie des pleins pouvoirs des trois souverains européens (le roi de Hongrie Matthias, le roi de Pologne Casimir et le roi de Bohême Georges de Poděbrady) quittait Prague. Elle avait pour but de demander au roi de France Louis XI de convoquer une assemblée générale des princes européens, qui aurait justement pour tâche de débattre du projet de paix du roi hussite.74 Heureusement pour les historiens et les lecteurs d’aujourd’hui, elle comportait aussi dans ses rangs l’écuyer Jaroslav. Il s’agissait d’un jeune homme curieux de tout, avide d’impressions nouvelles et les consignant volontiers par écrit. La mission diplomatique envoyée à la cour de Louis XI, et dont Jaroslav était membre, résultait des négociations infructueuses avec la Curie romaine et d’un effort de recherche de soutien international pour éloigner le danger d’une croisade contre le

Ibid., p. 108. Pour apprendre plus sur ces négociations voir URBÁNEK, pp. 600–608, 755–764 et VANĚČEK, Historical Significance, pp. 51–58. 73

74

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royaume „hérétique“.75 Georges de Poděbrady attendait beaucoup de Louis XI et de sa cour. Il prenait en considération aussi bien son gallicanisme politique envers la Curie que la place importante qu’occupait la France dans le projet de Marini. D’après les plans du roi hussite, l’assemblée des États présidée justement par le roi de France aurait joué le rôle d’arbitre entre les membres de la ligue nouvellement fondée. Ainsi, le sort de ce projet dépendait entièrement du résultat de cette mission. L’ambassade officielle tchèque quitta Prague le 16 mai 1464.76 A la tête de l’ambassade figuraient deux personnages qui participaient de manière cruciale à la diplomatie de Georges de Poděbrady. Le premier était Albert (Albrecht) Kostka de Postupice, membre d’une célèbre famille noble utraquiste qui s’était enrichie par la sécularisation des biens ecclésiastiques lors de la révolution hussite.77 À ses côtés se trouvait Antoine Marini de Grenoble.78 Le rôle d’ambassadeur officiel du roi tchèque ainsi que le titre de chef formel de la mission fut confié à Albrecht, Marini officiant comme ambassadeur du roi de Pologne et du roi de Hongrie.79 La politique d’entente et de bonne volonté de Georges de Poděbrady était justement illustrée par le fait qu’Albert, noble utraquiste tchèque et chef formel de l’ambassade, se vit accompagné par Antoine Marini de Grenoble,

Les résultats de mes recherches sur le récit de l’écuyer Jaroslav paraîtront très prochainement, cf. Promouvoir une alliance anti-turque, éviter une croisade antihussite: un noble tchèque en mission diplomatique. Le témoignage de l’écuyer Jaroslav sur l’ambassade à Louis XI en 1464, in: M. NEJEDLÝ, J. SVÁTEK, La noblesse et la croisade à la fin du Moyen Âge (France, Bourgogne et Bohême), Actes du colloque international tenu à Prague les 26 et 27 octobre 2007, Toulouse 2008, sous presse. Voir aussi Jak staří Čechové poznávali svět. Výbor ze starších českých cestopisů 14.-17. století, choix des textes et des illustrations, introduction et explications de Zdeňka TICHÁ, Praha 1984, p. 16; Josef MACEK, K zahraniční politice krále Jiřího, p. 27; URBÁNEK, pp. 593–594. 76 ČORNEJ, BARTLOVÁ, p. 213 et sqq; URBÁNEK, pp. 597–599, id., Rudolf URBÁNEK, České cesty na západ a nejstarší dva české cestopisy, in: Ve službách Jiříka krále. Deníky panoše Jaroslava a Václava Šaška z Bířkova, éd. Rudolf URBÁNEK, Praha 1940, pp. XVII–XVIII. 77 URBÁNEK, České cesty na západ, p. XVIV. 78 Outre la littérature déjà citée plus haut, voir, pour l’activité diplomatique de Marini à la cour du duc de Bourgogne Philippe le Bon, les pages de J. PAVIOT, Les ducs de Bourgogne, la croisade et l’Orient (fin XIVe siècle–XVe siècle), Paris 2003, pp. 161–162. 79 Pour les citations du Journal de l’écuyer Jaroslav, nous nous servirons de l’édition de URBÁNEK, České cesty na západ, pp. 3–30. 75

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catholique et français. Jaroslav, l’auteur du journal, était sans doute tchèque.80 Les notes de Jaroslav, qui sont notre source principale sur le déroulement des négociations de la mission tchèque auprès du roi de France, ne nous donnent pas de réponse à l’une des questions essentielles: l’ambassade a-t-elle soumis à Louis XI le projet officiel de l’organisation pacifique des États chrétiens? Nous ne pouvons qu’en formuler l’hypothèse.81 Jaroslav ne mentionne explicitement que la demande de convoquer l’assemblée des souverains européens qui fut présentée par les ambassadeurs du roi tchèque à Louis XI.82 En ce sens, l’ambassade du roi hussite était probablement vouée à l’échec dès le départ. Nous savons aujourd’hui que le 16 juin 1464, jour où l’ambassade entra dans la ville de Reims que l’ écuyer Jaroslav contempla avec admiration, le pape Pie II ordonna que le roi Georges, suspect d’hérésie, se présentât devant le tribunal du pape. La raison en était le discours du roi hussite d’août 1462 dans lequel il se déclarait en faveur des compactats et aurait prétendu que la communion sous les deux espèces était une condition du salut.83 Jaroslav sut décrire la phase décisive des délibérations avec un sens certain de la gradation dramatique. À Abbeville, le chancelier de France et l’évêque de Bayeux invitèrent les deux chefs de l’ambassade tchèque dans les appartements du chancelier pour une délibération secrète. „Ils ne laissèrent La monographie la plus récente sur l’écuyer Jaroslav accompagnée d‘une abondante bibliographie est celle rédigée en polonais par Bohdan MALYSZ, Najstarsza czeska relacja podréznicza. Poselstwo Jerzego z Podiebradów do Francji w roku 1464 w svietle dziennika Jaroslawa, Teschen 2004. Pour de plus amples informations sur la source, voir aussi la préface de Urbánek dans son édition České cesty na západ, pp. IX–XLVIII. Les aspects de politique extérieure sont envisagés par URBÁNEK, Věk poděbradský, spécialement pp. 555–765. Les notes de Jaroslav servent aussi de source dans la monographie sur Georges de Poděbrady par l’historien américain, HEYMANN, pp. 367– 372. Outre l’édition qui nous sert de base pour cette étude, il en existe aussi deux antérieures: l’édition originale de Palacký et la première édition intégrale de J. KAKOUSEK, Deník českého poselstva ku králi francouzskému v r. 1464, in: Archiv český, t. VII, Praha 1887, pp. 427–445. L’édition incomplète de Palacký servit de base pour la traduction en anglais Diary of an Embassy from King George of Bohemia to Louis XI of France in the Year of Grace 1464, éd. A. H. WRATISLAW, London 1871. 81 Déjà Victor Lucien Tapié s’étonnait qu’on ne puisse trouver dans les Archives Nationales que l’acte du roi Georges conférant les pleins pouvoirs à Albert (Albrecht) Kostka de Postupice pour sa mission auprès de Louis XI et le traité de renouvellement d’alliance signé le 18 juillet 1464 à Dieppe. Victor L. TAPIÉ, Le projet pacifique de Georges et la politique française, p. 112. 82 Le journal de Jaroslav ne fournit aucune mention sur les dessous éventuels des pourparlers avec l’ambassade tchèque qui auraient pu concerner une candidature de Louis XI au trône de l’Empire. 83 ČORNEJ, BARTLOVÁ, pp. 212–214. 80

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passer personne dans la chambre“ sauf Kostka et Marini.84 Or, Jaroslav avec deux amis se tapirent „près d’une fenêtre“ et s’efforcèrent de saisir des bribes de leur conversation bouillonnante et mouvementée. Leur entreprise fut largement facilitée par les éclats de voix considérables, voire les cris, des conseillers de Louis XI et des chefs de l’ambassade tchèque. Jaroslav comprit que c’était l’assemblée des princes européens qui était le brandon de la discorde. Les conseillers de Louis XI avancèrent que le roi tchèque n’était pas mandaté pour entreprendre une telle initiative sans l’autorisation particulière du Pape et de l’Empereur, étant donné que c’était de leur compétence que relevaient de pareilles questions. Il nota avec indignation que le chancelier, le patriarche de Jérusalem et un „certain maître“, par quoi il entendait probablement Jean Balue, prononcèrent encore beaucoup de „paroles narquoises et inutiles“.85 „Très fâché“, Marini n’hésita pas à insulter „d’une voix criante et ardente“ Pie II en personne: „Ce pape est possédé du diable, il n’y a pas au monde d’homme plus infâme et pire que lui, et vous voulez pourtant que rien de bon ne se fasse sans son assentiment.“86 Ces mots semblèrent si virulents au célèbre historien tchèque František Palacký, qu’il les supprima de la première édition critique du journal de Jaroslav en 1827 par crainte de la censure autrichienne. Son édition, qui servit de base à la traduction anglaise de 1871, remplaça cette exclamation d’Antoine Marini par quelques points de suspension.87 Ces quelques mots virulents illustrent très bien les difficultés des pourparlers, qui ont finalement abouti à un traité d’amitié entre les rois de France et de Bohême, mais qui sonnèrent le glas des plans d’une assemblée générale des souverains européens et de leur ligue pour la paix. Dans cette optique, la mission diplomatique dont Jaroslav nous transmit des notes précieuses échoua. Le traité d’alliance avec la France ne put nullement modifier la position intransigeante de la Curie romaine envers la Bohême hussite.88 Avec le retour de France de l’ambassade finirent de facto les tentatives de réalisation du projet d’union de paix conçu par Georges de Poděbrady et par Antonio Marini. Les négociations à la cour de Louis XI apportèrent du moins au roi hussite un traité d’amitié avec la France et la reconnaissance de l’orthodoxie de la Bohême, confirmée par un

Jaroslav, p. 15. Ibid., p. 16. Ce „maître“ est identifié à Balue par URBÁNEK, Věk poděbradský, p. 761, note 246. 86 Jaroslav, p. 16 (traduction de TAPIÉ, Le projet pacifique, op.cit.) 87 Voir MALYSZ, p. 14; TAPIÉ, p. 113. 88 MACEK, Jiří z Poděbrad, p. 164. 84 85

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acte spécial.89 L’ambassade tchèque revint à la fin du mois de juillet 1464, sans encombre, mais avec des résultats mitigés. Marini n’était plus du voyage. Ce globe-trotter et rêveur considérait les résultats des négociations comme une défaite personnelle eu égard à ses projets de ligue des princes chrétiens.90 Le plan de l’organisation générale de la paix et du parlement mondial échoua donc, mais il survécut dans la postérité comme un legs et un appel. Il n’est peut-être pas inutile de rappeler, dans ce contexte, un proverbe tchèque attesté en 1465 et qui est encore, à mon avis, d’actualité: „Mieux vaut négocier deux ans que de mener la guerre pendant deux semaines.“91 Le principe d’égalité entre les États dans le domaine du droit international, sans considération de leur structure interne et de leur forme de gouvernement, la procédure de règlement des conflits par la voie pacifique, le rejet explicite de la guerre, la mise hors la loi de l’agresseur et le principe de responsabilité collective – voilà les valeurs durables du projet. Le plan de Georges de Poděbrady et d’Antonio Marini était plein d’idées utopiques qui surpassaient de loin les basses querelles des féodaux de l’époque. Dans la réalité du XVème siècle, le projet du roi tchèque et du diplomate français était probablement irréalisable. N’est-il pas cependant un grand homme politique, celui dont le regard dépasse le seuil des portes encombrées de contingences, portes nécessairement étroites de son époque, pour s’élever vers des perspectives d’avenir?

Comparer avec MACEK, K zahraniční politice krále Jiřího, pp. 19–48. URBÁNEK, České cesty na západ, p. XVIII; JORGA, p. 457. 91 „Lépe jest dva roky jednati než 14 dní váleti“, voir aussi V. VANĚČEK, Le projet du roi Georges sous l’aspect de l’ histoire du droit, in: Cultus pacis, p. 56. 89

90

The Emperor Maximilian I and the Possibility of Personal Connection of Empire and Papacy1 Drahomír Suchánek

The end of 1511 could have brought a phenomenon very unique in the history. The Masters of papal liturgical ceremonies Paris de Grassi and Balthazar Nicolai came very close to solving the problem of how to hold a papal coronation conveniently and according to all necessary requisites. That is to say: the Catholic Church was a short remove from the moment when the still ruling Roman Emperor could have become the head of the Church, who was, moreover, still a layman without any degree of lower clerical ordination. The said event did not finally take place; however, the very possibility of such a project is a very interesting moment in the beginnings of modern history. For a short while, a unique interplay of various circumstances occurred, that more than ever strengthened the possibility of symbolically rounding off the centuries-long clash of the Church and secular powers by uniting both the highest posts of the Christian society in one person of the Emperor Maximilian I. This study wants to commemorate the hundred years that have passed since the publication of the essential monograph by Aloys Schulte2 and thus to resume reflections that thrilled the historical science above all in the 19th and in the beginning of the 20th century.3 Even though most historians agreed on the authenticity of well-preserved sources and on the necessity to interpret them in favor of the project of Maximilian’s papal candidacy, with the exception of rejected hypotheses by A. Jäger4 and H. Ulmann5 – motives of his actions were somewhat left out. That is why the Emperor’s papal ambitions still remain covered by a veil of an adventurous character of the “last knight“ and are to This article has been published as a part of the research project MSM 0021620827 The Czech Lands in the Midst of Europe in the Past and Today at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Prague. 2 A. SCHULTE, Kaiser Maximilian I. als Kandidat für den päpstlichen Stuhl 1511, Leipzig 1906. 3 For summary of literature compare A. NÄGLE, Hat Kaiser Maximilian I. im Jahre 1507 Papst werden wollen?. In: Historisches Jahrbuch 28 (1907), pp. 278–301. 4 A. JÄGER, Über Kaiser Maximilians I. Verhältnis zum Papsttum. (Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften – philosophisch-historische Klasse 12), Wien 1854. 5 H. ULMANN, Kaiser Maximilians I. Absichten auf das Papsttum in den Jahren 1507– 1511, Stuttgart 1888. 1

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document his affection for daring and almost fanciful plans. Nevertheless, there is the question whether it is possible to content oneself with this argumentation. Political Context The beginning of the second decade of the 16th century was under the sign of a contest of European great powers for the Italian territory. In 1508, the so-called League of Cambrai was established that united the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire Maximilian I, the French king Luis XII (as the Duke of Milano) and the Aragon king Ferdinand I (as the King of Naples) in a coalition with Pope Julius II.6 The joint target was the Republic of Venice and the territories in the northern Apennine Peninsula under its rule. According to agreements, the Emperor Maximilian laid claims to Padua, Vicenza and Verona, which were to be allotted back to the empire as fiefs, while Friaul and Treviso were to be connected to the Austrian hereditary lands. The French king laid claim to the territory that had earlier pertained to the Dukedom of Milano, and similarly, the king Ferdinand aspired to get hold of the cities that were occupied by Venice in the territory of Naples. Papal demands were directed towards the important cities in Romagna, namely and above all Ravenna, Rimini, Imola, Cesena, Faenza and Cervia.7 An enormous military power and a vision of quick territorial gains supplied the whole campaign with dynamics and the isolated Venice was not able to oppose attacks from more directions. On May 14, 1509 Venice was defeated by French army in the battle of Agnadello and the cooperating French and imperial forces occupied a significant part of the demanded territories, including the city of Padua, in three weeks.8 However, it was soon clear that the individual coalition partners had ambitions that made them potential H. WIESFLECKER, Kaiser Maximilian I. Das Reich, Österreich und Europa an der Wende zur Neuzeit. Bd. 4., München 1981, pp. 29–32; H. WIESFLECKER, Eine Denkschrift der Kaiserliche Kanzlei über die Politik und Kriegsführunder Heiligen Liga von Cambrai von 1508–1512. In: Siedlung, Wirtschaft und Kultur im Ostalpenraum. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Fritz Popelka, F. Posch/H. Wiessner (ed.) Graz 1960, pp. 23–27. 7 WIESFLECKER, Kaiser Maximilian, IV., pp. 30–31. 8 M. v. WOLFF, Untersuchungen zur Venezianer Politik Kaiser Maximilian I. während der Liga von Cambray mit besonderer Berücksichtigung Veronas, Innsbruck 1919, pp. 6–11; D. v. SCHÖNHERR, Der Krieg Kaiser Maximilian I. mit Venedig 1509. In: D. v. SCHÖNHERR, Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 2., Innsbruck 1902, pp. 30–31; N. BULST, Ludwig XII. (1498–1514). In: Französische Könige und Kaiser der Neuzeit. Von Ludwig XII. bis Napoleon III. (1498–1870), P. C. HARTMANN (ed.), München 1994, pp. 47 –49 etc. 6

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rivals. Above all on the part of Louis XII and Pope Julius II, it was possible to expect extensive plans for future formation of Italian territory and therefore also a real danger of a future conflict. The worsening situation of Venice opened new possibilities mainly to the ambitious and belligerent Pope Julius II.9 After a series of negotiations with emissaries of the naval republic he enforced a large part of the demands of the Holy See and he focused his attention on his existing partners from the League of Cambrai.10 He believed that the situation was suitable for the expulsion of all foreign powers from the Apennine Peninsula and for a marked consolidation of the territory of the Church state. In the center of his attention, there was mainly the French king, as the principal obstacle in the connection of other territories in the northern Italy, as he governed – apart from the Duchy of Milano – also a whole range of northern Italian cities with Genova and Florence in the lead. But the Pope’s fears concerning the French king were also of a different kind. The suspicious Julius II had a permanent fear of possible ambitions of the grey eminence of the French politics – Georges d’Amboise, the Archbishop and Cardinal of Rouen, whom he blamed for attempts to remove him from his post and to occupy a post in the Holy See.11 Even though the cardinal defended himself against these accusations and referred to paranoia of the ageing Pope, Julius saw a direct threat to himself in each new military campaign of the French king and he used to reproach Luis for trying to make him his chaplain. From the beginning of 1510, it was thus becoming more and more clear that the so-far cooperation of the Pope and the French was ruined and the time of military confrontation was drawing near.12 To achieve his Italian plans, the pope urgently needed to gain support of other powers involved in the Italian space, especially Ferdinand, the king As for the personality of the pope Julius II, see Ch. SHAW, Julius II., Praha 2001; C. FUSERO, Giulio II., Milano 1965; L. PASTOR, Geschichte der Päpste seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters. Bd. 3/2, Freiburg im Breisgau/Rom 1956, pp. 659–1142; F. X. SEPPELT, Geschichte der Päpste von der Anfängen bis zur Mitte des 20. Jahrhundert, 4. Bd., München 1957, pp. 395–408. 10 See WIESFLECKER, Kaiser Maximilian, IV., pp. 49–51; E. BREITNER, Maximilian I. Der Traum von der Weltmonarchie, Bremen 1939, p. 315; SHAW, pp. 236–244. 11 BULST, pp. 48–49. As for the character of the cardinal d’Amboise, see Dictionnaire d’histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique, 2. Bd., A. BAUDRILLART (ed.), Paris 1924, pp. 1060–1072. 12 Still in the half of 1509, the pope’s legate cardinal Francesco Alidosi negotiated an agreement about the mutual defence of the territory in Italy and settlement of disputes regarding ecclesiastical benefices. However, Julius’ sincerity can be successfully doubted, as he immediately began to attack the agreed conditions and began to harshly criticize the French politics. 9

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of Naples, and the Emperor Maximilian. In both cases, however, the result was somewhat uncertain. Although Ferdinand posed as a loyal son of the Catholic Church and outwardly he presented his devotion to the Holy See, he did not have any illusions about the Pope himself and he very carefully considered all negatives or positives that would follow from an anti-French coalition.13 When he firstly received the Pope's proposal in February 1510, he promptly pointed out at several essential conditions. First of all he appealed to caution when formulating anti-French orientation of a possible alliance and he rather preferred an agreement about protection of the Church that would not explicitly breach the principles of the League of Cambrai. He also conditioned his consent to such an alliance by further concessions, from which the most important one was surely the allotment of the Kingdom of Naples as a fief. The last significant condition concerned coalition partners. Although Ferdinand performed very independent politics, he still recognized the significance of deepening mutual contacts with the Emperor Maximilian in many respects. Besides political reasons, dynastic interconnection and their joint grandson Charles, on whom both rulers pinned their hopes, played the primary role.14 Ferdinand thus insisted that even the Emperor had to join the coalition.15 Julius II essentially welcomed such a request, as it was just the Emperor Maximilian I, who was the main obstacle in the effort to achieve isolation of France. The problem of the ambitious Emperor was a long-term imbalance between great plans and limited possibilities for their performance. He suffered by permanent lack of financial resources and inability to follow through already initiated military operations.16 Thus, Maximilian's participation in the League of Cambrai depended in many ways on the cooperation with the French king. That is why his abilities of maneuvering were very limited and the Emperor was naturally very careful

As for the politics of the king Ferdinand II, see R. KONETZKE, Die Außenpolitik König Ferdinands des Katholischen von Spanien. In: Historische Zeitschrift 175 (1953), pp. 463–482. As for the character of the king Ferdinand see J. PÉREZ, Ferdinand und Isabella. Spanien zur Zeit der katholischen Könige, München 1989. 14 As for this issues, see above all A. KOHLER, Die Doppelhochzeit von 1496/1497. In: Hispania–Austria. Die Katholische Könige, Maximilian I. und die Anfänge der casa de Austria in Spanien, A. KOHLER/F. EDELMAYER (ed.), Wien 1993, pp. 59–86; H. WIESFLECKER, H., Maximilian I. und die habsburgisch-spanische Heirats- und Bündnisverträge von 1495/96. In: Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung (further MIÖG) 67 (1959), pp. 1–52. 15 WIESFLECKER, Kaiser Maximilian, IV., p. 72. 16 WIESFLECKER, H., Kaiser Maximilian I. Das Reich, Österreich und Europa an der Wende zur Neuzeit. Bd. 5., München 1986, pp. 521–524, 565–568. 13

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with regard to cancelling the so-far working alliance with Luis XII.17 From his point of view, the Pope could not offer anything more important than the French king. On the contrary, the main problem now appeared to be the gradually increasing cooperation of the Pope and Venice, against which the Emperor directed the main part of his demands.18 That was the reason why Ferdinand urged the pope just in this respect, as he was aware that without termination of the rivalry between the empire and Venice, it would not be possible to achieve a strong anti-French coalition. Julius wanted to eliminate this problem and promised to take care of mediation between both sides, but he did not manage to dispel their mutual mistrust.19 The pope’s alliance with Venice and beginnings of instigation of antiFrench moods elicited a quick response. The French clergy at the synod in Tours under the leadership of the Cardinal d’Amboise proclaimed independency of the Gallican Church.20 Simultaneously, the Emperor Maximilian was solving complaints of the German church and did not hesitate to use them in the demands against the claims of the papal court.21 Pope Julius was trying to alleviate the Emperor’s anger and in April 1511 in the encampment in front of Bologna, he initiated a meeting with the principal Maximilian’s negotiator in the issues of church – the Bishop Matthäus Lang of Gurk.22 The Pope’s appeal to the Emperor to leave the alliance with the French, however, was refused by Lang.23 An absolute opposite occurred. Maximilian expressed his dissatisfaction with the Pope's politics and supported the idea of summoning a reform council, in front of BULST, pp. 47–49. M. HOLLEGGER, Maximilian I. (1459–1519). Herrscher und Mensch einer Zeitwende, Stuttgart 2005, pp. 197–198; WIESFLECKER, Kaiser Maximilian, IV., pp. 53–63. As for the issue of the conflict of the empire and Venice, the best is WOLFF, Untersuchungen. 19 HOLLEGGER, pp. 200–201. 20 As for the synod in Tours, see K. J. v. HEFELE/J. HERGENRÖTHER (ed.), Conciliengeschichte VIII., Freiburg im Breisgau 1870, pp. 432–439. 21 H. ULMANN, Studie über den Plan Maximilians I. einer deutschen Kirchenreform im Jahre 1510. In: Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 3 (1879), pp. 199–219. See also H. WIESFLECKER, Maximilian und die Päpste seiner Zeit. In: RöHM 22 (1980), pp. 147– 165; H. WIESFLECKER, Kaiser Maximilian I. und die Kirche. In: Kirche und Staat in Idee und Geschichte des Abendlandes. Festschrift Ferdinand Maas zum 70. Geburtstag, W. Baum (ed.), Wien/München 1973, pp. 143–165. 22 For more about the bishop Lang, see I. FRIEDHUBER, Kaiser Maximilian I. und Matthäus Lang. Ihr persönliches Verhältnis zueinander. In: Domus Austriae. Eine Festgabe Hermann Wiesflecker zum 70. Geburtstag, W. HÖFLECHNER, H. J. MEZLERANDELBERG, O. PICKL (ed.), Graz 1983, pp. 125– 136; P. LANGERS, Kardinal Matthäus Lang. Ein Staatsmann im Dienste Kaiser Maximilians I. In: MGSLK 46 (1906), pp. 437–517. 23 For negotiations between Julius II. and Lang, see WIESFLECKER, Kaiser Maximilian, IV., pp. 77, 82– 85; SHAW, pp. 272–275. 17

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which even Julius should have confessed from his wrongdoings. This way, he inclined towards the side of the group of rebellious cardinals, who planned this church meeting for the beginning of September in Florentine Pisa.24 Although it did not concern a majority part of the cardinal collegium, the protection provided to the whole enterprise by the French king, and now also by the Roman-German Emperor, did not portend anything good for the Pope. Nevertheless, Julius proved a significant amount of determination in this critical situation and he responded quickly and effectively. On June 28, 1511 he summoned his own council by the bull Sacrosanctae into the Lateran Basilica in Rome. Moreover, he threatened apostates by the harshest punishments.25 But first of all he expedited all previous negotiations that were to achieve creation of a really broad anti-French coalition. Urgency of solving the whole dispute was also caused by the pope's failures in the military field. In this area, the Pope had been active already since the beginning of 1510, when he carried out several military actions against French interests in Italy with the help of either Venice or Spain and this way, he initiated the war conflict, which many people were afraid of. Since June of that year he had made several unsuccessful attempts to expel the French from Genova 26 and soon he focused his attention against Alfons d’Este, the protégé of the French king, who ruled in Ferrara.27 On the Pope’s part, it was quite an uncertain action, in which he risked a significant loss in case of a defeat. Therefore his potential partners, above all Venice, had not believed until the last moment that Julius would be willing to resign himself to financial losses that would logically arise in case of a conflict from the losses of receipts from French church benefices.28 All the more, the Pope had to prove his determination and in spite of the dignity of his office and old For the Council of Pisa, see P. LEHMANN, Das Pisaner Konzil von 1511, Breslau 1874; J. M. DOUSSINAGUE, Fernando el Católico y el cisma de Pisa, Madrid 1946; W. ULLMANN, Julius II and the Schismatic Cardinals. In: Studies in Church History 9 (1972), pp. 177–193; N. H. MINNICH, The healing of the Pisan schism (1511–1513). In: AHC 16 (1984), pp. 59–192. 25 A. DENEFFE, Die Absicht des V. Laterankonzils. In: Schlolastik 8 (1933), pp. 359– 379; N. MINNICH, The Fifth Lateran Council (1512–1517). Studies on its Membership, Diplomacy and Proposals for Reform, Aldershot 1993; E. GUGLIA, Studien zur Geschichte des V. Lateranconcils. Sitzungsberichte der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse 10 und 3, Wien 1899 und 1906; J. GOÑI GAZTAMBIDE, España y el Concilo V de Letrán. In: AHC 6 (1974), pp. 154–222 etc. 26 SHAW, pp. 251–254. 27 Ibidem, pp. 256–261. 28 SHAW, p. 250. 24

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age, he had to be personally involved in the military operations. Especially his courage and resilience in front of the fortified city of Mirandola in the foul weather of January 1511 entered the history.29 But he could not prevent the increasing military pressure of French forces and he was gradually loosing positions. In May 1511, Bologna fell and the French occupied the whole surroundings.30 Julius tried to negotiate fervently and to accomplish the final subscription of alliance of all opponents of France in the so-called Saint League. In the half of August 1511, however, there was a turning point. On August 18, the Pope came down with fever and two days later, his condition was severely worsened. He was not able to receive food, he lost both sight and hearing and he repeatedly fell unconscious.31 In this critical state of health, he also suffered depressions and it seemed that Julius lost his will to live. The end appeared to be inevitable and almost none in his surroundings believed that the health of the sixty-seven years old pope would improve any more.32 Maximilian’s papal project On the background of the above-described events at the turn of August and September 1511, a plan began to be born, the background and real intentions of which have remained somewhat mysterious today. We learn about it more or less accidentally. Our information proceed from two Emperor's letters reflecting the attitude of the Emperor Maximilian himself, and further several pieces of dossiers and comments, that address the issue only indirectly and originate from a third, fourth hand. The first thing necessary to be mentioned is the two reminded letters. The addressee of the first paper was Paul von Liechtenstein who defended interests of the Emperor as an administrator of Innsbruck.33 It dates back to September 16, 1511 and is the only official source providing us with an insight into the PASTOR, p. 793. R. HONIG, Bologna e Giulio II, 1511–1513, Bologna 1904, pp. 40–45. 31 PASTOR, 3/2, pp. 822–829; SHAW, pp. 287–288. 32 What was characteristic for the mood in the papal court was the comment written down by the master of papal ceremonies Paris de Grassi into his diary on the 24th August, as he wanted to end the diary by the pope's death: „Credo finem posse imponi his diariis et annalibus D. Julii nostri pontificis, duem dicunt ad mortem velle preparace, cum saupte obstinatione nolit medicis obedire in aegritudine nec suae saluti consulere velle.“ See Das pontificat Julius’ II. Auszug aus dem Tagebuche des Grossceremoniars Paris de Grassis. In: Beiträge zur politischen, kirchlichen und Cultur-Geschichte der sechs letzten Jahrhunderte, 3. Bd., J. J. I. v. DÖLLINGER (ed.), Wien 1882, p. 411. 33 As for the personality of Liechtenstein, see WIESFLECKER, H., Kaiser Maximilian V., pp. 248–251. 29

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center of the very negotiations.34 The second one is the letter that the Emperor wrote two days later to his daughter Margaret, the Governor of the Netherlands.35 This one is not an official document, but a personal message, that theoretically allows for a more free interpretation and therefore its diction must be perceived with certain reservations.36 The letter to Liechtenstein includes Maximilian's instructions for this close confidant of the Emperor who had arranged various financial projects several times already. The marshal was charged with the task to negotiate with the Emperor's primary creditor and banker Jacob Fugger in Augsburg a provision of financial resources that would be subsequently used just for the achievement of the Papal Tiara by the Emperor.37 In an entirely unconcealed way, it follows from the instructions that this money was to be used to bribe the cardinals in case of a potential conclave. The Emperor estimated the needed amount was in the enormous height of 300 000 ducats. This amount was to be delivered by Fugger directly to Rome, where it was to be available for the Emperor's mediator Bishop Lang of Gurk. Maximilian offered four chests of jewels and valuables of Austrian origin as a forfeit (that is a part of the Habsburg and possibly not imperial property). Further a promise was heard that some Fugger’s person would become a pope's treasurer and after the successful takeover of the pope's office, a whole third of receipts of the pope’s treasury would be apportioned to the creditor. In the conclusion of the letter, Liechtenstein was asked to continue negotiating and inform the Emperor about the results. The overall tone of the instructions is very insistent at first sight and it really gives impression that Maximilian pinned his hopes into this matter.38 The second letter to his daughter Margaret gives a rather different view. Also here the Emperor counts on the forthcoming death of the ill pope and expresses aspiration for the Holy See, nevertheless he approaches certain corrections. Above all he abandons the thought of connecting the two offices - imperial and papal – in one unity and on the contrary he expresses For the text of the letter see SCHULTE, Kaiser Maximilian, pp. 15-19. For more about Margaret see U. TAMUSSINO, Margarete von Österreich, Diplomatin der Renaissance, Graz 1995; E. WINKER, Margarete von Österreich. Grande Dame der Renaissance, München 1966. 36 The text of the letter in A. J. G. LE GLAY (ed.), Corréspondence de l’empereur Maximilien Ier et de Marguerite d’Autriche, sa fille, gouvernaute des Pays-Bas, de 1507 à 1519, Bd. 2., Paris 1839, No. 411, pp. 37–39. 37 See the letter from Maximilian to Liechtenstein, pp. 16–17. 38 See H. WIESFLECKER, Neue Beiträge zur Frage des Kaiser-Papstplanes Maximilians I. im Jahre 1511. In: MIÖG 71 (1963), pp. 311-332. Here the authenticity of the letter is proved again. 34 35

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his readiness to resign the imperial title in favor of his, in that time elevenyear-old, grandson Charles. Ferdinand of Aragon forced this change. With respect to papacy the Pope's death would not be waited for anymore. The Bishop of Gurk was to negotiate that Maximilian became a kind of coadjutor of the papal throne instead of ill Julius with the right of succession.39 The whole letter is rather relaxed and in certain way the Emperor might consider it as a joke. Maximilian namely speaks about his gradually growing holiness and adoration.40 However the following survived letters of Margaret show the governor perceived her father's message seriously and looked upon the whole project with worries.41 Although we have only two imperial documents available and moreover only the letter to Margaret survived as original, there is a general opinion in historical circles that the project has a factual background and Maximilian was really determined to gain the Papal Tiara. Several others prove these fact, though not so significant, sources.42 Considering available information we have a picture of the Emperor who, under yet unclear circumstances, conceived a plan to join the imperial and papal crowns in his hands. He was ready to release significant financial resources, undergo complicated negotiations aiming to gain the cardinal collegium, ensure the minimum tolerance of decisive European powers and last but not least resign eventually his imperial dignity he had longed for so much for years. Thus we have to ask question what the reasons leading to such a radical step were. The first stage of our thoughts should be the thinking about the theoretical feasibility of the project in the situation of the last four months of 1511. Maximilian would hardly put his energy and financial resources into a business, which would be condemned beforehand. In his plans he had to ask three basic questions: Would he be able to get necessary number of votes within the cardinal collegium and overcome the legal problems of his accession? Would he be able to persuade other European sovereigns about his own candidacy? Would he be able to ensure sufficient finances to cover his plan? If Maximilian had overcome the problems following from these

„Et envoyons demain monsieur de Gurce, évesque, à Rom devers le pape pour trouver fachon que nous puyssons accorder avec ly de nous prenre pour ung coadjuteur...” See the letter from Maximilian to Margaret, p. 37. 40 „...vous serés contraint de me adorer dont je me trouveré bien gloryoes.” Ibidem. 41 See SCHULTE, Kaiser Maximilian, pp. 6–12. 42 The important notes see SCHULTE, Kaiser Maximilian; WIESFLECKER, Neue Beiträge etc. 39

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three obstacles, the project was really feasible. On the other hand only a single failure should negate everything and put it on a speculative level. The enforcement of Maximilian’s candidacy in the cardinal collegium was an immediate condition to gain the Papal Tiara. According to the rules of canon law the two-third majority of votes from cardinals present in the conclave was necessary for the election43, which was rather difficult in the time when this body of the highest church dignitaries consisted of rather antagonist groups. At the end of August 1511 39 cardinals formed the electoral assembly and Maximilian would have had to persuade at least 26 out of them. The Emperor could rightly rely on the support from cardinals who opposed the politics of Julius II and prepared their own council in Pisa. Their leader, cardinal Sanseverino, even negotiated with Maximilian several times and he was openly lobbying for him coming to Rome.44 Together with French and Spanish part of collegium they formed strong lobby in favor of the Emperor, counting at least nineteen votes.45 The rest of votes could have been brought to Maximilian either by bribes46 or by political compromises.47 Therefore there is no doubt the conclave itself would not be an invincible obstacle and with suitable approach the election could go through relatively quickly and with no complications. Even in the moment if Maximilian had succeeded to achieve the necessary majority, there would still be another legal obstacle left. The above mentioned election would be possible only when Julius II died. However See Licet de vitanda (Alexander III, 1179) 1th canon of third lateran council. In: Dekrete der ökumenischen Konzilien. Bd. 2, J. WOHLMUTH (ed.), Paderborn u. a. 2000, p. 211. See the commentary of W. M. PLÖCHL, Geschichte des Kirchenrechts. Bd. 3, Wien/München 1970, pp. 116–123. 44 PASTOR, 3/2, p. 828; SCHULTE, Kaiser Maximilian, pp. 60–61; WIESFLECKER, Kaiser Maximilian, IV., pp. 94–95. 45 The so-called „Pisa cardinals“ included Frenchmen Briçonnet and René de Prie, Spanishmen Carvajala and Francesco Borgia, and finally Sanseverino. Philipp von Luxemburg, d’Alambert, François de Clermont, Robert Challand and Génovian Niccolo Fieschi and Carlo del Carretto da Finale were under French influence. Lodovico Borja, Giacomo Serra, Francesco Remolino, Pietro Isvalies and Ximenez would probably vote within the intentions of the Aragon king Ferdinand. The Emperor himself could rely on votes of Matthäus Lang, in case he succeeded to confirm his appointment, and Adriano. The Englishmen Bainbridge would probably also join Maximilian, and the Hungarian Thomas Backóz may be also considered. 46 The curial cardinals Achille de Grassi, Antonio Ciocchi and Pietro Accolti could be taken into account, as well as Ippolito d’Este and Sigismondo Gonzaga who were following their own interests. The attitude of Florentine Giovanni de Medici and Francesco Soderini, as well as Allessandro Farnese and Luigi d’Aragon were unsure. 47 If the election prolonged the situation could be taken as advantage by Venice that could force Maximilian to peace negotiations. Only in this case he could count on votes by the cardinals Marco Cornaro and Domenico Grimani. 43

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from the Emperor’s letter to his daughter Margaret we learn that Maximilian did not give up his plans even in the moment when the Pope recovered a bit. He presumed it would not be possible to take the papal throne immediately but, expecting the forthcoming end of the ailing Pope, he could stay beside him as an administrator and coadjutor of the Roman Church. However there is a problem that ecclesiastical law did not count on any similar case and it was rather disputable if such an approach would have been legal. The particular legal regulation would have to be codified by the Pope himself, which seems to be rather questionable considering Julius's self-confidence and his resistance towards any infringements on papal rights. Another possibility would be the enforcement of the legal standard by cardinals; however the legal point of such a step would be easily impugn able. Of course, it is a question if Maximilian fully realized such problems and if he admitted it at all. He could be convinced these are minor details, which cannot touch the essence of the matter. In this point of view there seems to be no problem in the fact that the Emperor was a simple laic and as a socalled neophyte he would have to accept all necessary ordinations. 48 No matter how doubtful the legal part of the project seems to be, we cannot speak about any fundamental obstacle. The necessity to gain the approval or at least tolerance of other sovereigns is closely related to the above-mentioned thoughts. The problems first occurred in the negotiations with cardinals because their decisions were mostly reflecting the will of a place they came from and to which they were connected. Despite in this point of view we see Maximilian’s situation as highly favorable. In 1511 the Emperor found himself in the middle of political disputes without being explicitly identified with any party. He still acted as a French ally and he could expect the support of Louis XII.49 In case of Ferdinand, the king of Naples, we are directly informed about mutual

Maximilian’s second wife Bianca Sforza died in December 1510 and thus he was not tied with a marriage. Widowhood was theoreticaly no obstacle to accept the Papal dignity. 49 Many facts indicate that Louis XII was informed about Maximilian’s plan and supported him. The negotiations leads by Cardinal Sanseverino were most likely coordinated by French side. 48

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consultations.50 Thus Venice seems to be the only real problem as it might be afraid that Maximilian as the Pope would approach the change of the existing favourable papal policy. It is just a question if the Emperor chose a way of certain compensations and reconciliation, or he kept the existing style of confrontation. On the other hand his relationship with the Roman nobility could be denoted as friendly and correct. Maximilian in his two letters explicitly mentions the expected support from Romans.51 This started at the meeting of the representatives of Colonna, Orsini, Savelli, Conti, Anguillara and Cesarini families in Roman Aura Coeli where they promised to forget all past malice and disunity and declared peace (Pax Romana).52 From a certain point of view it seems that the enforcement of a papal candidate who would have legal relations to Rome was one of the goals of this reconciliation. The Emperor was a protector of Rome from the title of his function and could seem to be an acceptable candidate. This is what Maximilian’s notes might mention when he declared that the Roman nobility and people had united against French and Spanish and demanded a pope according to what the Emperor and Empire like. Even unverified information appeared that a Roman delegation was sent out to the Emperor with this message.53 Generally it can be said that political circumstances formed very good conditions for Maximilian’s papal candidacy. The third area concerns the feasibility of the financial provision of the project. The Emperor was not able to support all ongoing negotiations from his own sources and therefore he urgently needed the assistance from Jacob Fugger. Unfortunately we do not know how providently the banker approached the matter. The requested loan probably did not take place in R. KONETZKE, Die Außenpolitik König Ferdinands, pp. 472–475; P. KRENDL, Spanische Gesandte berichten über Maximilian I., den Hof und das Reich. In: MIÖG 87 (1979), pp. 101–102, 112. The Spanish side did not doubt about the Emperor’s decision and took it as a real fact. It is among others confirmed by the message of Spanish Embassador in the Habsburg court Pedro de Urrey who announced to Madrid Maximilian’s determination to gain the Papal Tiara even for the price of possible schizma („El emperador se resolvio que el no podia a ser papa sino noc cisma…“), see Fernando el Católico y el cisma de Pisa, J. M. DOUSSINAGUE (ed.), Madrid 1947, No. 23, pp. 485–488 51 „...à ma poste et du l’ empire d’Alemaigne...“ See the letter from Maximilian to Margaret, p. 39; “…die Ursiner, Colonenser und das populus Romanus gäntzlich beschlossen seyn, und fürgenommen haben, keinen Papst, der Frantzösisch oder Hispanisch sey oder durch diese gemacht werde, zu haben oder anzunehmen.“ See the letter from Maximilian to Liechtenstein, p. 19. 52 SHAW, pp. 289–290; SCHULTE, Kaiser Maximilian, pp. 33–34. 53 SCHULTE, Kaiser Maximilian, p. 35. 50

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the end, which however may reflect the final development of the whole situation. Fugger surely have his confidants directly in Rome and was very well informed about the changes in Julius’s health condition and moods related to the Emperor’s candidacy.54 Therefore he considered well his possible financial support and soon he put it aside as out-of-date. The question is how he perceived the project of Maximilian’s candidacy. In this regard we assume his skepticism would not have to be too large. The problems that Jacob Fugger encountered with imperial authorities always considered mainly Maximilian’s abilities to pay off his debts. If he was to release the large sum of 300 000 ducats, he must have been convinced about the economic return of his investments. The Emperor himself surely realized that and his orders, which are found in the instructions for Liechtenstein, confirm that. Fugger had the promise of the forfeit of jewels and particularly the vision of incomes from the papal treasury. In this respect there is no doubt the volume of income of the papal state were by its amount and regularity more secure than what the Emperor could have guaranteed so far. It is just enough to mention the regular prebends and many other fees. The size of the papal treasury in the moment of Julius II’s death in February 1513, which is said to include more than 800 000 gold ducats, may serve as an example. In the initial stage he therefore did not have to perceive the Emperor’s plan negatively. After this basic definition we can focus on the particular causes of Maximilian’s efforts to gain the papal crown. According to the main aim we can differentiate three main areas of interest, which he may be followed by his acts. The first one focuses on material goals. Governing the highest church post the Emperor would have the chance to influence widely the Roman Church including the extant areas of proprietary legacies, fees and taxes to the Roman Curia, granting privileges or appointments to ecclesiastical offices. In this way Maximilian would considerably recover the imperial supervision over imperial church prelates and institutions.55 At the same time he as the Pope could revive the mostly neglected old imperial rights in Italy. As the head of the universal Roman Church he could not only complete many ceasaropapist projects but also significantly enhance his

A. SCHULTE, Die Fugger in Rom, 1. Bd., Leipzig 1904. As for the personality of Jacob Fugger see M. JANSEN, Jakob Fugger der Reiche, München 1910; G. PÖLNITZ, Jakob Fugger. In: Jakob Fugger, Kaiser Maximilian und Augsburg 1459–1959, Augsburg 1959, pp. 5–40. 55 On legal conditions in the Roman Church see A. NIEDERSTÄTTER, Jahrhundert der Mitte, Wien 1996, pp. 306–309. 54

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financial situation and perform the so far unsuccessfully promoted plans.56 To certain extant this possibility is weakened by the agreement with Ferdinand of Aragon about Maximilian resigning the imperial dignity in favor of his grandson Charles. Because he was however under age and his election could hit the resistance of prince electors, Maximilian could justly presume he would keep both the offices in his hands for certain time period. Already H. Ulmann saw the Emperor’s initiative as the effort to gain the territory of the Ecclesiastical state.57 Although the hitherto research doubted the immediate effort to secularize papal territories we cannot fully suspend the idea that Maximilian could have aim to divide the spheres of interest in Italy together with French and Naples sovereigns.58 The abovementioned promise to resign the imperial title could have reflected the priority of family and dynasty interests. By this approach Maximilian would significantly strengthen the Habsburg policy and he could really be content only with his papal dignity in this stage. In this position as a head of the Church he would still significantly support his grandson, facilitate his imperial coronation, grant him many large privileges and finance the imperial politics. Naturally a certain resistance of the cardinal collegium should be taken into account. If this reason was really on the foreground of the Emperor’s interest in the Papal Tiara, the cardinals must have realized the danger. It would largely endanger the possibility of his election, or we could assume any form of pre-elect capitulation. As sources are silent, we move on a rather speculative level. The second group of reasons should observe rather ideological elements. It is necessary to mention the reform of the church in the first place. Though Maximilian could not be labeled as a prototype of a holy monarch perceiving primarily the reform of the church situation, he was sympathetic to its situation. The fact that despite of the offers made by Julius II he supported the Council of Pisa and that he made a stand for the demands and complaints of the imperial church and last but not least that he eventually listened to the first critiques of Martin Luther indicates his interest in the church matters. 59 But still this reason appears to be improbable. The connection of the papal candidacy with the project to The thoughts of the Spanish ambassador Pedro de Urrea aimed in this direction; however he saw the Bishop Lang and his effort to gain a cardinal hat and other benefits in the background of the project. See the report from Urrea (11th September 1511). In: Fernando el Católico, pp. 485–488. 57 ULMANN, H., Kaiser Maximilians I., pp. 47–50. 58 SCHULTE, A., Kaiser Maximilian, pp. 58–59. 59 See WIESFLECKER, Kaiser Maximilian, IV., pp. 417, 626. 56

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establish a large anti Turkish coalition seams to be more realistic. There was never a doubt about Maximilian's interest in this field. Even the French king Louis XII was prepared to join the actions against the Turkish danger in this stage.60 As for the king of Naples, we could also presume his understanding for this matter – for his Mediterranean interests alone. This platform could bring the ultimate compromise with Venice at the same time. The idea corresponds with Maximilian's nature in all possible ways. He would act as a chief and coordinator of all the actions and despite his presumed Emperorship resignation he would preserve the position of a leader of all the Christian forces.61 Underlying all those steps and in fact conditioning the alliance of all Christians we could recognize yet another possible reason for his papal candidacy. Maximilian could act as the one bringing peace to the quarreled Italian region. In the situation where the northern Italy stood on the doorstep of a definitive force measuring, the imperial Pope could be seen as a real reconciling authority. In this context we could see his dealings with the French and the Spanish king as well as the support he received from Romans, calling him to their city. The third plane of possible causes leads towards the reasons like prestige and legitimacy. Maximilian was a man particular in questions related to demonstrating his nobleness and dignity.62 He surely remembered the complicated and in fact unsuccessful effort to be crowned the Emperor in Rome in 1507–1508, when he finally had to settle only for the title of Roman Emperor without the Pope's participation.63 It is not probably by accident that we first encounter the idea of putting together the papal and imperial crowns in 1507.64 The possibility that Maximilian embraced his project for prestigious reasons could not be ruled out. According to the letter sent to Lichtenstein, Maximilian counts on organizing a ceremonial imperial coronation. Financial expenses of the whole project speak against it but it could not be ruled out as one of the supporting factors. Especially assuming that Maximilian’s effort had deeper ideological background. The beginning SHAW, p. 246. A. SCHULTE, Kaiser Maximilian, p. 52. See also E. GUGLIA, Die Türkenfrage auf dem V. Lateranconcil. In: MIÖG 21 (1900), pp. 679–691. 62 See G. BENECKE, Maximilian I. (1459–1519) an analytical biography, London 1982, pp. 94–111; WIESFLECKER, Kaiser Maximilian, V., pp. 380–409. 63 H. WIESFLECKER, Maximilians I. Kaiserproklamation zu Trient (4. Februar 1508). Das Ereignis und seine Bedeutung. In: Österreich und Europa. Festgabe für Hugo Hantsch zum 70. Geburtstag, Graz/Wien/Köln 1965, pp. 15–38; T. PERNTHALLER, Die Bestrebungen Maximilians I. um die Römische Kaiserkrone und die Kaiserproklamation zu Trient im Jahre 1508, Graz 1962. 64 See above all NÄGLE, Hat Kaiser Maximilan I., pp. 49–59, 288–305. 60 61

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of the 16th century did not fully show the decline of the formerly unimpugnable authority of the Pope and the imperial dignity. But there was no doubt that the possibility to influence the Christian society was decreasing. The Roman papacy faced growing critics and as a moral authority was diminishing. The Emperor was also not able to defend his priorities and he had to put up with frequent defeats at the imperial congresses. A question is whether we should not see Maximilian’s project of concentrating both positions to one man's hands as an attempt to preserve and uplift the legitimacy of the power of the Christian society head. This legitimacy element would have no chance in confrontation with ambitions and self-confidence of other sovereigns. But as a platform for other projects (such as the formerly mentioned anti Turkish quest, or the project of general peace), it could be seen as realistic. We can conclude that the idea of Maximilian's papal candidacy seen from many different angles appears to be realistic and substantiated. However it was difficult to achieve this goal for political of financial reasons, there were many reasons for Maximilian I to make it happen. The sources do not allow us to decide which one of the presented reasons is the main and definitive one. The thought impeaching a large number of consequent causes finally persuading the Emperor to take this unprecedented step is most likely the one closest to the truth. All the effort was destined to fail in the end because Pope Julius II once again showed his indomitability and strength of his organism.65 Still the events of 1511 make an example of the complexity of political affairs of the uprising modern age and are the grounds to comprehend the history of renaissance papacy.

65

See SHAW, pp. 290–292.

The Madagascar Pirates in the Strategic Plans of Swedish and Russian Diplomacy 1680–1730 Michal Wanner Pirate – celui, qui en temps de paix, attaque les navires pour les piller. Cardinal Giulio Mazarini (1602–1661) L’instruction pour les Gardes Riveraines

History tends to forget about unsuccessful projects and after an interval sets them down to a marginal importance. This approach is not justified every time. Many unsuccessful projects influenced people’s thoughts and behaviour in a particular period, they had their economic dimension, and last but not least, they left intellectual heritage behind that was often realized many years later. This study is dedicated to attempts of less developed countries in North and East Europe to use the Madagascar pirates for penetrating into trade between Europe and Asia, controlled by West European maritime powers until that time. The Madagascar and Caribbean Pirates The 1680s witnessed a great turning point of the pirate history. The pirates active in the Caribbean up to this time started to abandon their traditional territory. They looked for new territories offering richer loot. It was caused because sources in the centre of their activities were exhausted and they began losing support of local colonial officers and traders who regarded it as unprofitable. A part of pirates crossed the Isthmus of Panama and attacked the unprotected loins of the Spanish Empire in America. But even these opportunities were exhausted and pirates either returned back to the Caribbean or undertook long voyage across the Pacific to the Spice Islands. Their primary targets were galleons loaded with gold that headed from Mexican Acapulco towards Manila on the Spanish Philippines. The first recorded pirate ship, Nicholas, tried to catch up with a Manila galleon during its slow voyage from Acapulco in 1684. The ship Cygnet tried to do the same two years later. Both vessels did not succeed because crews were

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not ready for the long journey across the Pacific and suffered from scurvy. Sailors found a base on Guam where they refreshed themselves before a voyage to China and the Spice Islands. There the crews got separated and then they looked for their own way to a destination independently. A part of pirates found one of the routes to the Indian Ocean offering rich booty in the form of spices, fabrics, tea and other oriental products. Piracy had become global phenomenon for the first time.1 Cruising along the coast of West Africa, the second flood of buccaneers that had left the Caribbean reached the Indian Ocean from the West. It happened approximately at the same time. The first man who realized this action was John Avery also known as Henry Every or Long Ben. There is not too much we know about him before he appeared on the scene of history as a captain of a pirate ship. An Englishman, Sir James Houblon, hired him to attack Spanish colonies. But his crew revolted after long fruitless lurking at the English and Spanish shores. Under the leadership of Avery they set out for the coast of West Africa. The crew enlisted more men in Guinea and attacked two Danish vessels near Prince Island. Then the ship Fancy (formerly Charles) rounded the Cap of Good Hope, it replenished supplies on Madagascar and made for the Comoro Islands. There the crew prepared a large raid on vessels in the Red Sea. On 28th February 1695 Avery declared that he had 150 men and a ship with 46 guns, but that he would not attack ships under English flag. He supposed that the East India Company which dominated all trade between England and lands lying eastwards from the Cap of Good Hope would let him be, because he was going to assault only ships of “Moors” and “country-ships”, that is private ships of servants of the East India Companies trading in Asian ports. Avery’s ship was attacking vessels of the Mughal Empire with pilgrims to Mecca. Soon four other ships from the American colonies joined his squadron. The pirates visited Indian ports and than decided to finish this enterprise. They sailed to Providence Island, paid the Governor Nicholas Trott to protect them and for possibility to land. Later, a part of pirates left for Carolina, another part went back to England. Some of them were caught, but Avery became a legend.2 For the East India Companies that controlled Eurasian trade, as well as for Asian merchants, pirates presented a problem. Unlike the situation in both Americas, they were all interested in pirates eliminating, therefore it was difficult for buccaneers to find refuge in Asian harbours. Only few R. C. RITCHIE, Captain Kidd and the War against the Pirates, Cambridge (Mass.), London 1986, pp. 26, 83. 2 F. D. ARNOLD-FOSTER, The Madagascar Pirates, New York 1957, pp. 9–52. 1

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traders were interested in their spoils and even the Asian sovereigns took no interest in their military power. The East India Companies perceived pirates as enemies of the local trade and the King’s renegade subjects. In spite of that the Indian Ocean appeared not to be only large but also a long-term source of plunder. Pirates were looking for a stable base near the main routes from the East to Europe. They found it on Madagascar and near the Island of Saint Marie. There were neither merchants or servants of the trade companies who could have opposed the pirates on the island, which was undoubtedly a great advantage, nor a strong united state which might have taken action against them, but many ports and enough beef and rice, more over the local rulers appreciated their military power. During the mutual fights, tribal leaders employed the men who could handle guns and could train natives in this art. Therefore the buccaneers became involved in local wars and were remunerated for their services with slaves. Thanks to their knowledge of the local conditions they became intermediaries in slave trade.3 Some of the pirates who settled in Madagascar made noteworthy career. Among those well known was Abraham Samuel, who called himself “Tolinor Rex”. He created a sort of mini state around a former French fortress and had 300 armed men and a guard of buccaneers at his disposal. He addresses himself as “The King Fort Dauphine, Tollanare, Farrave, Fanquest and Fownzahira”. Buccaneers and merchants started to visit Fort Dauphin to trade with King Samuel, who accepted their presents and protected them during their stay in the port. Nevertheless Samuel preferred trade with his old fellows, sometimes he even seized ships of other pirates. We know that he ruled several years. The crew of a Dutch ship, who visited Fort Dauphin in 1706, found out that he was no longer the sovereign of the place. It is not clear if he was killed or whether he returned to sea.4 The ports of Madagascar concealed a lot of similar men, former slaves or local leaders, who had available pirate armies that numbered up to 500 men. Therefore the history of Madagascar is inseparably connected with the destiny of pirates such as David Williams, Thomas Tew, Misson and Caracciolli, William Kidd, Thomas White, John Halsey, Samuel Burgess, Nathaniel North, Robert England and other. These men created a unique chapter of the Madagascar history however from the history of piracy point

H. THOMAS, The Slave Trade: The Story of Atlantic Slave Trade: 1440–1870, New York 1997, p. 203. 4 RITCHIE, pp. 84–85. 3

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of view they represented only a smaller part of the pirates active in the Indian Ocean.5 Operations against Pirates The activities of pirates, especially those whose names were known and who had become legends made the English East India Company angry. That concerned especially William Kidd and John Avery. The Company informed the English government about the pirates in July 1696, outlined the steps against them, and required the proclamation aimed at Avery’s arrest. The proclamation was issued but the reward of 500 pounds had to be offered by the East India Company itself. Avery escaped thanks to his money, only six of his men were arrested, but the court acquitted them. The authority of the Company suffered serious damage.6 The East India Company needed an exemplarily punished one at least. Therefore it bombarded the Secret Council, the Lord of Trade and the Admiralty with items of information about necessity of the pirate “fortress”, Saint Marie, liquidation. Few shabby shacks were described as fortress with 50 cannons, protected by 1500 pirates and 17 ships. The second line of the Company’s attack was directed against the pirates support provided by the citizens of the American colonies. The company defended its own import interests there, because especially the Southern American colonies were an important outlet of calico, spice, and tea, coffee and Chinese porcelain.7 The Company tried to aroused an idea, that the main culprit of spreading piracy is precisely this support: “Pirates, sea rovers and blades of fortune were supplied with arms, liquor and other necessities by ships from the American colonies that also marketed their booty and arranged for their repatriation by contacting to carry them as passengers and put them ashore between the Capes of Virginia and the east end of Long Island for 100 pieces of eight each.”8 Despite the relatively large engagement of American colonists in the mentioned trade, the Company exaggerated the thing. But in the period of global lobbying, it had no other possibility how to make government to act H. DESCHAMPS, Les Pirates à Madagascar aux XVIIe et XVIIe siècles,2 Paris 1972, pp. 7–216. 6 ARNOLD-FOSTER, p. 52. 7 A. WILD, The East India Company: Trade and Conquest from 1600, New York 2000, p. 144. 8 Quoted by P. EARLE, Sailors: English Merchant Seamen 1650–1775, London 1998, pp. 118–119. 5

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against pirates, but to persuade it. But the government made almost no effort to annihilate piracy. The King sold a part of his fleet; another part was left in docks so that the Dutch had to safeguard their ships even in the English waters. Even municipalities got permission to pursue pirates, but they had only few tools to realise it. The municipal courts hardly ever dealt with causes beyond the borders of the country. In general, piracy was in jurisdiction of The High Court of Admiralty, but many members of the jury were tied to piracy, and The High Court of Admiralty litigated over the power with civil courts. Moreover two witnesses were necessary to find somebody guilty of piracy, and considering a number of deaths in the tropical waters, along with strong solidarity among sailors it seemed almost impossible. Thus as a real blow for piracy are considered changes in trade in the 18th century.9 There were still a lot of pirates in Americas, West Africa and the Indian Ocean. But these men began being more and more isolated from people who had supported them in the past. Royal officers were against them, local governments and merchant communities in colonies got into arguments with them. There were changes even in North America. Charleston and the ports in South Carolina were inclined towards them, because there was still a large demand for rice and a growing market, but most of other ports preferred secure legal trade. The more the colonial trade grew, the more the danger of damage increased, that could have been caused by pirates. Traders who purchased their goods, reoriented on local markets, and therefore a certain tension grew among them and pirates. This effect is well documented in New York. The loss of four East India Company’s ships that headed from New York to Madagascar in 1698 subdued arguments in a merchant community. It started to oppose pirates. The reaction of some pirates was aggressive. For example John James made campaign in 1699 during which he plundered the coast from North Carolina to New York.10 The other phenomenon influencing this event was a sharp fall in salaries of sailors at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. Wages of sailors were high during the war and the navy, private ship owners as well as fishermen fleet fought for them. This situation changed at the end of the war. Demand for sailors fell rapidly and about 40,000 men were unemployed. In economic depression ship owners reduced wages, and in case of revolts they often changed a complete crew. In this situation piracy was an RITCHIE, pp. 140–141. A. CALDER, Revolutionary Empire: The Rise of the English-speaking Empires from the Fifteenth Century to the 1780s, London 1998, p. 269.

9

10

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alternative to starvation, but the pirates could choose too. A pirate community also reacted to these trends. Many of the pirate crews started refusing married men. Hostility towards the captains and former mate sailors rose. Captains were executed not only when they refused to give information but also in case crewmen complained about their captain. Captive sailors, who refused to join pirates, were often tortured and even executed. Just at that time the bloody pirate flags were changed into symbols of death and time passing, thus a motive of scull and crossbones appeared.11 Great opposition against pirates was formed and war started. It was not in London. There was no great trial against pirates in The High Court of Admiralty from 1701 to 1715, and there were only few of them from 1719 to 1725. The jurisdiction of this court was handed over to 11 vice-admiralties in America, Africa and Asia. The navy and local communities launched a manhunt after the pirates. Royal ships used sometimes even foreign flags, for example French, to confuse enemies. Partial items of success were recorded during this campaign; among them was the Royal Fortune pirate ship capturing and destroying at the western shore of Africa, or liquidating two pirates, Sted Bonnet and Edward Tech at the shores of South Carolina. The governor Nicholson caught 100 pirates near the coast of Virginia. 26 of them were hanged. The action near the coast of New England led to several trials resulting in about 70 executed pirates. Britain emerged as the power, able to make order in its Empire. Growing economy of the Empire did not need the pirates and their booty.12 The Effort for European Protection These actions caused an unexpected response of the pirates. They decided to look for protection of European powers. They sent envoys to several courts and sought for protection. Long and complicated negotiations started. Pirates succeeded in pardon of Queen Ann, England, and the permission to settle in the country. In exchange they had to pay 10 million livres to the English Crown and to hand over an important part of their naval forces. A hopeful start of negotiations was thwarted by the tragic destiny of William Kidd. The story of this man, known also as Captain Kidd (1645–1701), belongs to the most typical in the history of the Madagascar pirates. This 11 12

W. MONDFELD, Das grosse Piratenbuch, München 1976, p. 244. RITCHIE, p. 235.

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man was a loyal subject of the English King for many years. In 1691 the Council of the province New York rewarded him 150 pounds for service he performed during disturbances that broke out in a colony after the Glorious Revolution in 1688, he also acquired high credit during operations against the French in the Caribbean. In 1695 he came to London. He wanted to trade with his sloop there. He was recommended to the Governor, Lord Bellomont, as an able man, suitable for leadership of a campaign against the pirates in eastern seas. Kidd equipped the ship Adventure at his own expense and acquired authorization from the King for arresting pirates and fighting against the French. He left for the sea from Plymouth in May 1696, sailed through New York and he reached the shore of Madagascar a year later. Instead of fighting against the pirates he went into partnership with them and attacked ships in the Indian Ocean. Complaints about his activities arrived at the English government in 1698–1699. Kidd abandoned board of the Adventure and got to the shore of New England on board of a small sloop. He wrote a letter to Lord Bellomont in which he tried to justify his acts and sent him even part of his loot. In spite of that he was arrested in July 1699, he was sent to England and put on trial because the widow of a gunner, Moore, sued him for the murder of her husband. Although it was in necessary defence against a mutineer, in fact he should have been acquitted according to the valid naval law; he was found guilty and was hanged on 23rd May 1701.13 Kidd’s trial had the fatal impact on discharging the negotiated treaty. Pirates took a dislike to England and suspended all negotiations with it. They approached other European powers. In 1712 they offered their service to Louis XIV through a Flemish merchant, Godefroi de la Merveille, who had “strong links with pirates”. Merveille argued for a quantity of pirate army and their willingness to subordinate to the royal authority. He calculated probably with continuing the French interest in their former colony in Madagascar. But direct contacts with the pirates were not made. The French government as well as the British one sought rather to reduce the pirate’s power than to stabilisation. Good knowledge of the local situation cast doubts on possibility of a real control of pirates.14 The interest of Madagascar RITCHIE, pp. 206–227. Ritchie’s interpretation is based on detailed analysis of Graham Brooks – G. BROOKS (ed.), Trial of Captain Kidd, Edinburgh, London 1930, pp. 43–48. 14 The mentioned plan was derived from the older one from 1701, core of which was an idea of eliminating the Dutch from Cape Town and Batavia by the united forces of France and Arabian pirates. The most Christian king rejected this plan because “Arabs are enemies of Christians”. DESCHAMPS, p. 187. 13

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pirates moved to North European powers – Denmark and especially Sweden. The engagement of both countries in the Indian Ocean was smaller.15 Other negotiations with the Madagascar pirates had taken place before those French ones and were initiated by two adventurers, whose real connection with pirates was not proved. The first one was Josef Joumard, who acted under the name Linange. He used unjustifiably the earldom and the land earldom and according to requirements he acted as the Prince of the Empire and Chabanais, the Duke of Angelpont, Madagascar, Ophir and other places. In many ways, he was a remarkable man. It was not common in France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes to convert to Protestant faith. Because of this, Joumard was arrested in Bastilla as a renegade. He was set free in 1714 and he set out on an adventure journey abroad. He learned about Madagascar in the Netherlands and it aroused his interest. Already during his stay in the Netherlands he persuaded the Dutch, that he had been elected as the King of Madagascar and that 100,000 pirates on this island were waiting for his order. He offered the pirate treasure to the Dutch in exchange for friendship and participation in a future trade company. But Dutch merchants knew the situation in the Indian Ocean quite well and therefore they recommended him to sell his tall stories somewhere else. It is not clear when and where Linange met Marquis de Langalerie. Langalerie was a real marquis, former brigadier, who had to depart France after quarrels with Chamillard. He served in Germany, but he was impeached and he was in danger of execution. At the same time he repudiated Catholicism and for unclear reasons he became very resentful to the Pope. Linange who boasted about dubious cousinage with Langalerie, persuaded him of grandiose projects and both men became allies. Langalerie The East India Company was in Denmark from 1616. It was not very successful and survived only thanks to the support of Christian IV. Denmark had one base in Asia Tranquebar on Coromandel Coast of India. Its successor was founded by King Frederick III in 1670. The company was successful in trade in the 1680s and the 1690s. But at the start of the Great North War it suffered financial forfeiture and had to leave its colonies in Bengal. It was liquidated after long crisis in 1729 (M. WANNER, Dánské východoindické společnosti1616–1808, in: Historický obzor 1–2, 1996, pp. 2–5). The Swedish General Trading Company made first contacts in the Orient in 1626. It was led by a Dutch merchant, Willem Usselinx. This company did not exist long, because King Gustav II Adolf sacrificed its capital and ships for war. It was closed down in 1633. Attempts of Hamburg merchants to establish the East India Companies in the 1660s were not also successful. (S. T. KJELLBERG, Svenska Ostindiska Compagniet, in: Svenska Kulturbilder, III/1930, p. 68; KRETSCHMAR, Schwedische Handelskompanien und Kolonisationsversuche im sechzehnten und siebzehnten Jahrhundert, in: Hansische Geschichtsblätter, XVII/1911, p. 238). 15

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took part in the enterprise under a condition it would be connected with a crusade against the Pope. He was an intellectual and needed an ideological charge for the action. The Ottoman Turks were better disposed for war against the Pope. Both companions offered them relinquishment of one of the islands around Madagascar with “20,000 brave men”. Langalerie assured the Ottoman ambassador, Osman-Aga, that he had “authorisation of these people to set out immediately after receiving passport of High Port with fleet of 60 armed ships to war and to use a greater part of their immense treasures”.16 Ottoman diplomats expressed vague approval, but the island as well as the amazing pirate army remained a mere illusion. Linange and Langalerie returned to Denmark in spring 1715. They requested territory near Altona, where they could have built their troops, but they did not receive any approval. Langalerie was arrested in Vienna in 1715 and died there. At the same time all records about Linage-Joumard disappeared.17 Negotiations in Sweden In the meantime the Madagascar pirates made contacts with the sovereign courts in North Europe. They were fascinated especially by Sweden and the military success of Charles XII. Sweden appeared like a mighty protector, in spite of fact, that the Swedish had been defeated at Poltava (1709), which was a start of descending from their great power position. Primary contacts were made in 1713 when Charles XII was in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore proposals were submitted to Count, Mauritz de Vellingk, a royal adviser and the Governor of Bremen and Verden.18 The pirates offered the Swedish 500,000 pounds and 25 ships for formal protection. It was in the situation, when the endless wars exhausted treasury and caused a lack of means for defending the country. In spite of that sufficient interest was not devoted to this offer, probably because the regent government in Stockholm had to solve more important issues than the East Indian Trade. The fact that the government in the Swedish absolute monarchy did not want to reach decision in such sensitive question during absence of the King in the country should be taken into account.19

Quoted by DESCHAMPS, p. 189. Ibidem, p. 190. 18 A. TOUISSANT, Histoire de l’Ile Maurice, Paris 1971, pp. 31–32. 19 Ch. KONNINCKX, The First and Second Charters of the Swedish East India Company 1731–1766, Kortrijk 1980, p. 34. 16 17

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During the next year it seemed that the cause had been forgotten. But a brigadier, Leutrum, initiated new interest in it, because he had discovered a memorandum meant for the Danish King in the Netherlands. Its author was a certain Huquetan, later promoted to the earldom as the Count de Gyldensten. The memorandum had to stimulate Danish interest in the protection of pirates. This document was probably created in cooperation with the Dutch who kept contacts with Madagascar. It contained a record about the situation of the pirates and exposé of the benefits for an European nation, which would result from alliance with them. Apart from wealth and naval power the record warned readers of the role of the pirates in the Indian trade and of the opportunity of establishing a colony on Madagascar. Huquetan offered to the Danish king half of a share of costs and using one fifth of profit. Apart from it he declared: “Your Majesty could profit from important sum, which I do not forget to submit to you.”20 Leutrum delivered the memorandum to the King at the beginning of 1718, in the time when the Swedish sovereign stayed in Lund in the province Skåne. Charles XII considered the question worthy of attention and entrusted the matter to Georges Henri Goertz, the Baron von Schlitz, who was charged with stabilisation of state budget. Goertz got enthusiastic about the chimerical plan and agents of the Madagascar pirates were invited to Sweden. Negotiations passed in town Strömstad in province Bohuslän in June 1718. Two envoys came there. The first one was Gaspar Guillame Morgane – his name in this form is mentioned in original documents written in French, but we know he was English. Originally he was a commander of an English man-of-war, but he was dismissed because of his sympathy to a pretender of the English and Scottish throne, James Stuart. Another man was a certain Jean Monery, who introduced himself as an ambassador of the pirates with mandate to empower Morgan to negotiate with the Swedish king. Both expressed their sincere wish that the pirates could finish their present style of life and settle in the territory under the protection of the Swedish sovereign. They knew very well, that they had never caused any detriment to Sweden and therefore they were not afraid of the King’s retaliation. The King accepted their proposal and emissaries promised that the pirate community would express its gratitude by transferring the sum, higher than

20

Quoted by DESCHAMPS, p. 188.

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was offered to England, as well as an important number of ships, which would strengthen the Swedish fleet.21 These offers met with positive response and the King really issued a general pardon on 24 June 1718. He promised the pirates to determine a proper place of their stay with a clear reservation, that they would relinquish their pirate activities. He added that he did not want money, that he would be satisfied, if pirates would invest a part of their wealth in public funds in Sweden. They would use yields from these deposits as any other subjects of His Majesty.22 At the same time both ambassadors submitted a proposal of annexation of the Island of Saint Marie. This island was presented as a place very suitable for trade with East Indies. They proposed to leave a sufficient number of pirates there, “to erect the Swedish banner here” and to keep the island under the sovereignty of His Majesty. The King accepted this proposal. He appointed Morgane the Governor of Saint Marie and issued him a document on the base of which he took Saint Marie over to Swedish hands. Later, they should have established a colony on Madagascar.23 Both ambassadors provided costs for appointments and arming of ships earmarked for the enterprise, because the Swedish state had no money to realize it. They persuaded the King, that his demarche would be better accepted in Madagascar providing that any of his royal officers would be also members of the expedition. Therefore five Swedish emissaries became members of the voyage. The formal leader of the delegation was Othon Klinckowström, his assistant was Captain Mandel. Other members of delegation should have got information about Madagascar, and should have written record of possibilities of using it. Especially they had to research the opportunity to sell Swedish commodities in the country, as well as general conditions for trade and settlement. Swedish envoys should have acted very carefully, not to sow the seeds of doubts in the pirates, and if it had been possible, to get control of their wealth. Nevertheless the pirates should have been assured that their ownership would not be questioned, in the name of the King the pirates Compare Declaration of both envoys issued in Strömstad on 25th June 1718 Reconnaissance et engagement remis au roi de Suède par les députés des pirates. This document is quoted together with others in specialized edition of documents J. MACAU (ed.), La Suède et Madagascar au debut du XVIIIeme siècle, Aix-en-Provence 1973, pp. 32–33. 22 This document has not been preserved, but it is referred to in minutes written in the hall of the Chansellery from 11th March 1720, ibidem, pp. 43–44. 23 Declaration of 25th June 1718, ibidem, pp. 32–33. 21

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should have been promised the monopoly for Indian trade in Sweden, they should have been allowed to establish their trade company with own directors, which should have been independent of any court, ministry or government; it should have been subjected only to the King alone. On the contrary the King promised that he would nominate a special tribunal for civil and criminal causes, which should have consisted of members of the company and royal officers. This was the main contain of the instruction given to Klinckowström and his companions. Klinckowström and Mandel were the only ones who knew the real aim of the journey; they were not allowed to inform other delegates about it until the arrival to the Canaries. The secret character of instructions was not unusual in the period when every European state protected its own monopoly for trade with oriental products.24 As Morgane left Gothenburg on a French man-of-war, the negotiations with the Swedish emissaries continued in France in June 1718. They concerned issues connected with preparation of the expedition. Quarrels between France and Spain obstructed equipping the ship in France. That is why Morgane and his colleagues decided to go to Spain and to equip and to arm the ship there. Just before their departure they received a message about the death of Charles XII (30th November 1718). This information stopped the whole enterprise for a while. Morgane and Monery had no guarantee that a new government would fulfil promises of its predecessor. They sought for acknowledgement of the documents issued by Charles XII. Nevertheless Queen Ulrica-Eleonora was soon informed about the importance of the expedition.25 The matter was submitted to the Council of Kingdom (also Senate – Riksrâd) on 20th April 1719. Count Sparre backed the project, as he supposed, that the Kingdom could have a large profit from it. The Council of Kingdom took another view than advisers of Her Majesty, who wanted to keep promises of Charles XII. Count Nicolas de Bonde declared: “That does not credit us to protect the rabble of rogues and to affiliate with them.” Nonetheless he stated: “If we can seize their welfare and be on good terms with them, because these people are mostly rascals, it would be very nice affair.” Many members of Voltaire’s precondition, that the main initiator of the negotiations with the pirates was Goertz, whose aim was to acquire, by the means of this enterprise, money for expedition to England aiming at enthrone Stuart pretender, has no sufficient evidence – F. A. VOLTAIRE, Histoire de Charles XII. Roi de Suède, Divisée en huit livres, in: Oevres completes de Voltaire avec de notes et une notice sur la vie de Voltaire, tome 4, Paris 1862, pp. 529–530. 25 Wachtmeister’s work – MACAU, p. 14. 24

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the Council were afraid of reaction of other European states, above all England. Therefore they supported proposal, the Swedish minister of foreign affairs “chased up the most secret and as discrete as possible way point of view of the foreign courts to intended expedition and their view of the pirate community”.26 The Council decided to inform the Secret Committee on 21st April. The deputation of the Secret Committee announced that it did not see any obstacle, on the base of which the previous decision should be revised. On contrary they considered, that Her Majesty would make act advantageous for motherland as well as other countries if the pirates would peacefully subordinate. All doubts disappeared under the impact of this declaration. A new pardon as well as a new patent for Morgan was issued. All these documents were sent to France.27 But Morgane and Klinckowström had set out on a journey to Spain before these documents were delivered. Morgane’s partners, who stayed in Spain, sank into confusion because of the long delay. They were not sure of the intention of the Swedish government and therefore commenced negotiations with the Spanish Court. Morgane and Klinckowström then returned to Paris. Mandel informed them, that Queen Ulrica Eleonora acknowledged the pardon and gave Morgane the Governor’s patent.28 Morgane and his associates were satisfied with these documents; on the other hand they were worried about the turning point in relation between Sweden and England. They expressed their anxiety, whether a new agreement of these countries would not annul the result of the declaration of the protection of pirates. It was well known that a large part of the pirates were English Jacobites or criminals and the English king would not hesitate to ask for their extradition. Count Sparre, Swedish ambassador in Paris, was afraid of pirates if they really did not support a pretender, James Stuart. He warned the Queen that the project could be given to Jacobites and Baron Goertz and could cause quarrel with the English king, George I. He was

Minutes of the meeting of the Council of Kingdom from 20th April 1719, ibidem, pp. 33–37. 27 Minutes of the meeting of the Council of Kingdom from 21st, 25th, 29th April and 5th May 1719, ibidem. pp. 37–43. 28 Wachtmeister’s work, ibidem, p. 16. 26

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afraid of a revision of the English policy and the loss of English support of Sweden.29 He informed the Queen also about news that the French general controller of finances and director of the General Bank, John Law, intended to take all pirates to the Mississippi and found a colony for them there. Sparre stated that if these stories had any base, the mentioned banker could give more importance and better protection to the pirates.30 It is quite probable that Law had certain intents regarding Madagascar. The idea of settling the pirates in the river basin of the Mississippi corresponds well with other plans concerning this country, but Law’s negotiations with pirates are not documented. Gedda, the secretary of the Swedish embassy in Paris, wrote to the State Secretary Daniel Nicolas von Höpken on 25th January that he thought Law had made agreement with the pirates and had sent 18 ships. It is clear that Gedda could not have correct information about the affair. The Company of Indies (Compagnie des Indes) sent really 18 vessels to Pondichéry, Surat, China and Mocha in winter and 30 others to Louisiana, Guinea and Madagascar, but there was no reason to presume these ships had been sent because of transfer of the pirates.31 The reasons presented by Sparre did not have any impact, which Sparre had presumed. A common conference of the Council of Kingdom and the State Council decided that no modification would be taken as concerns Fear of the English reaction was indisputably justified. It sprang from the support, which Sweden provided to Jacobites. This subsidy was reaction to participation of George I as the kurfirst of Hannover in coalition against Sweden and above all Hanoverian occupation of Bremen and Verden (1712), two Swedish strategic territories important also from economic point of view territories in North. Importance of these territories even increased after the loss of Eastern possessions. George I indicated he wanted to retain mentioned territories or buy them for small sum. From 1715 he used British troops in fight against Sweden and it was in disagreement with conditions which he had accepted in his ascend to British throne. Therefore Swedish commenced negotiations with the leader of Jacobites in France and Britain Atterbury and Oxford (1716–1717). Jacobites demanded Sweden to raise army of 10 000 men for invasion to England at its own expense. George I reacted to this situation by arresting Gyllenborg, a Swedish ambassador in London. This breaking of diplomatic immunity gave British evidence of the negotiations. The ambassador was deported. But the incident did not end by open enmity. Swedish negotiations with Jacobites ended in 1717. After the death of Charles XII, the Queen Ulrica Eleonora concluded peace in 1719. According to this treaty Sweden surrendered territories of former bishoprics Bremen and Verden to Hannover in change of the British diplomatic support. Swedish relations with Jacobites remained cordial even in this period – D. SZECHI, The Jacobites, Britain and Europe 1688–1788, Manchester, New York 1994, pp.104–107. 30 Wachtmeister’s work, MACAU, p. 17. 31 C. MANNING, Fortunes and Faire: The French in Asian Trade, 1719–48, Aldershot 1996, p. 27. 29

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this operation and stated that it would be realized as soon as possible.32 This resolution was announced to Sparre, who immediately returned protective documents back to Morgane. These positive news were poisoned by the bankruptcy of the Law’s system. Morgan’s associates suffered considerable losses. They were not able to arm the ship. Therefore they sent a currier to the Swedish king, Friedrich with a letter describing their situation and asking for help. They requested two armed frigates and 15 000 rixdals for the expedition to Madagascar.33 A special commission for Madagascar was formed in Sweden. It was composed of royal officers, including the state secretary, D. N. von Höpken, and Admirals E. Taube and J. Ornfelt. Their duty was to find financial sources for equipping the expedition and to tell the government their view of the affair. The commission safeguarded two frigates in a port, Karlskrona, and started to equip them. There were the frigates Jarramas and Fortuna, later a third smaller ship was added. This fleet was subordinated to Captain Ulrich. The fleet had to sail for Madagascar together with a ship armed by Morgane and his companions. The equipment of the Swedish ship was late. The ships should have headed first to Gothenburg and later to Île de Baste near Morlaix, where they should have met Morgane’s vessels. In the meanwhile Morgan’s associates hired all their ships and gathered them under command of a Morgan’s nephew, Captain Galloway. But he was accused of hiring soldiers for money of James Stuart. He succeeded to defend himself in front of Lord Carteret. He was discharged and kept on his journey to Morlaix, where he met Morgane. Afterwards he continued alone to Cadiz whereas Morgane stayed in Morlaix waiting for news from Sweden and the Swedish frigates.34 Ulrich reached Île de Baste near Morlaix with the frigate Jarramas (other ships appeared later). He had two brave strong southeast wings and could not sail to roadstead. He decided for an unexplainable act. In spite of the instructions and without sending any message to Morgane he continued to Cadiz, which he reached in October. Immediately after his arrival he sent a message to Morgane. Delivering a letter from Cadiz to Morlaix took 25 days that time, so Ulrich could not have received the answer sooner than two

Minutes signed in the hall of the Chancellery on 11th March 1720, MACAU, pp. 43–45. Minutes of the meeting of the Council of Kingdom from 25th May 1721, ibidem, pp. 45–46. 34 Wachtmeister’s work, ibidem, pp. 19–20. 32 33

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months. Morgane wrote him that he had set sail immediately after receiving the letter, but his companions had not got any instruction until his arrival.35 In the meanwhile Ulrich sought to accelerate the departure to Madagascar. He proposed the expedition of two vessels only, without waiting for Morgane. Galloway and Colonel Seebach, who represented the pirates, accepted this proposal, but another partner, certain Wogan, opposed this decision. He reminded, that Morgane would not forget to inform the Swedish Court, and that he expected the ship to come in one or two days. Therefore the date of the departure was set on 11th February 1722. When both Swedish ship anchored in Cadiz at the end of January, it appeared that there was not enough of money for equipment. A Swedish consul in the city had not succeeded in gathering money for it. That is why Morgane decided to go to Madrid, where he had contacts in one merchant house. He presumed on return in 12 days. He really returned with 2,500 ecus and it seemed that the backward expedition would continue.36 But Ulrich changed his mind two days before Morgan’s arrival. Suddenly he was persuaded that the season suitable for rounding the Cap of Good Hope was over and under the new conditions he was not willing to risk the lives of the crew in the traps of sea. Therefore he decided to return to Sweden. The members of expedition were staggered. Morgane reproached him for saying nothing before his departure to Madrid despite the fact he had known the date of his arrival. Morgane wanted to take over the leadership of the expedition, but in vain. Ulrich ordered to return home.37 In the meanwhile the Swedish government planned the next steps in the penetration of Eurasian trade. Naturally the return of the fleet aroused surprise and indignation. The Council of Kingdom and the Commission for Madagascar recommended the expedition should continue. They insisted on immediate departure of the frigate, Jarramas, with a new captain. They judged the behaviour of captain Ulrich as unpardonable. In their view his acting had to be judged by the Military Council.38

Minutes of the meeting of the Council of the Kingdom from 20th June 1722, ibidem, pp. 46–50. 36 Wachtmeister’s work, ibidem, pp. 19–20. 37 Ibidem, pp. 21–22. 38 Minutes of the meeting of the Council of Kingdom, 20th June 1722, ibidem, pp. 46–50. This recommendation was acknowledged by the King, who ordered preparation of departure of the frigate Jaramass. Ulrich was arrested and judged by Military Council. 35

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Russian Interlude Stockholm’s negotiations with the pirates produced an unexpected reaction of the main Swedish enemy – Russia. Tsar Peter I might have learnt about it through secret ways of mentioned talks and understood the importance of a strategic base on Madagascar for further Russian naval trade with India. The establishment of a direct trade connection between Russia and India had been Peter’s dream from his childhood. Already during his stay in Amsterdam he had sent Prince Ivan Sachovsky and two other persons to India. Unfortunately it is not known, whether he received any record from these ambassadors. Nevertheless dispatching the expedition showed that Peter thought of trade with India at that time. Russian ships could have set sail from the White and the Azov Seas, because the Baltic Sea was still shut for them.39 Peter probably did not know that the Swedish had accepted the protection of the pirates after the death of Charles XII. He supposed that Russia could offer better protection than collapsing Sweden. Therefore he tried to snatch a potential booty away under the Swedish nose. It is also possible that he decided only to complicate or to foil the talks in progress. One way or another he decided to dispatch a small fleet of three frigates under the command of ice-admiral Whilster to Madagascar. There are only few records of this expedition. Diplomatic accreditation for Admiral Whilster to the King of Madagascar from 9th November 1723 has been preserved. It begins with formal words: “We, by the Grace of God Peter I, Emperor and autocrat of all Russia to high valued king of the famous island Madagascar.” The King of Madagascar was asked a friendly reception of Whilster and accompanying officers and to let them stay on the island. It was a necessary condition of mutual confidence and sending envoys back with satisfactory answer. The Tsar and his state councillor, Peter Tolstoy, signed this document.40 A question is who the King of Madagascar was. Peter knew geography quite well, he was well travelled and had also means by which he could quickly get information. There are no doubts about his good knowledge that Madagascar was not under the rule of any native sovereigns. Probably he Tsar’s interest in India and Far East was not caused by his curiosity. It was a part of his imperial plans. There is an evidence on Peter’s intention to possess Persia, India and China – M. ŠVANKMAJER, Petr I. Zrození impéria, Praha 1999, pp. 224–225. 40 K. E. BAER, von HELMERSEN, Beiträge zur Kenntniss des Russischen Reiches und der angrenzenden Länder Asiens, 1872, Reprint Osnabrück 1969, p. 219. 39

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knew they would deal with the English or other Europeans. Whilster was English and did not need an interpreter. Peter I could not address him in another way. It was not possible to set out the Tsar’s vice-admiral to a fear pirate. Whistler obtained also an authorisation for himself, Captain Mjasny, the first officer Koshelev and captains of the frigates issued on 3rd December 1723. This document states: “We, by the Grace of God etc. herewith state that we have received record that high valued the King of the famous island Madagascar had looked for protection of the died king of Sweden at once time, and it was promised to him, but because of the death of this king, all matter is adjourned, we have found good to send our vice admiral Whilster, captain Mjasny and the first officer Koshelev to the high valued king of Madagascar to advise him on our resolution if the mentioned king tend to it, that it would be necessary to look for protection of other European power, we would accept him to our protection with happy hart. He alone can consider where the best opportunity to find protection in present situation in Europe is. If this king decides for our protection, we enable him with pleasure to live in our possessions, everywhere he would like, and we do promise by our Tsar’s words, that we shall protect this king and his people when they would come to our Empire, irrespective of consequences, which would appear because of it.”41 This document shows that Peter did not know anything about dispatching Swedish ships to Madagascar, if he had known it and concealed his intention; he would not have written that Swedish postponed their proposition. He wanted to enable the “sovereign” of Madagascar to choose between Swedish and Russian protection. Two other instructions have been preserved in the Archives of Admiralty. Both were issued on 5th December 1723. The first one prescribes Whilster: “To sail from Sankt Petersburg to Roger Wiek (today’s Vihterpalu lath in Estonia) on frigate Krondeliwde, to meet frigates Amsterdam and Halley there and with help of God to enter upon elected journey.” A squadron should have sailed to the coast of Scotland and Ireland and avoided the English Channel. They should have behaved discreetly, used a foreign flag, and had not sailed in any harbour, only in necessary case, such as repair; in that event, they should have left it as soon as possible. Whilster should have struggled to convince the sovereign of Madagascar of his journey to Russia. In that case he should have planned the sail so that they could have returned to Archangelsk in summer, because the sea around the 41

Quoted ibidem, pp. 220–221.

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Kola peninsula is not frozen. If the king would not accept invitation and confine himself to sending envoy, Whistler should have returned through the Straits of Sund. The other instruction prescribed to sail to India, in concrete terms to Bengal, that a Russian ambassador should meet Great Mughal there, the sovereign of the largest Indian state. They should have also discovered trade opportunities and tried to establish trade with Russia. Apart from it the expedition should have imported Indian wood, which should have been used instead of ballast on frigates.42 Mutual relation between these two instructions is not known. The second one probably fulfilled only a cover function or was an alternative in case of failure of the Madagascar mission. Their mutual relation was probably described verbally to the leaders. Three frigates were secretly dispatched on the base of these instructions. Whilster really put to sea in December 1723, but immediately he suffered serious accident so that he had to enter port in Reval (Tallin). He sent a message to Sankt Petersburg and the Tsar blustered. General-admiral Apraxin conveyed his anger to a commander of Reval harbours, von Hofft, and made him obvious, that it was not possible to hesitate in dispatching these ships. If the expedition had been postponed, he would have been put on military trial. Von Hoff was charged with equipping the frigates without Whilster’s participation. Mentioned repairs were probably carried out. An indirect evidence of it is Tsar’s confirmation of Whilster as the commander of the expedition. Whilster was not enthusiastic about it. He emphasized conspicuously the uselessness of his ships. He proposed replacing the frigates by a common ship and one frigate, which he considered more durable. Immediately afterward he obtained the order to cover the ships with resin boards, to secure them better against storms. This order is from 1st February 1724, and it is the last one. There are no other records on expedition. It is clear that the expedition was not realized.43 It is known that Whilster took sail concentrated on training crews in summer 1724. This could be done only on the base of Tsar’s order. It is a question, why the Tsar cancelled expedition, in which he put his full hope. The reasons of withdrawing the fleet were probably pieces of news from Stockholm describing the steps of the Swedish government in the given thing. Really, an undated and unsigned record describing the Swedish 42 43

Ibidem, pp. 222–225. Ibidem, pp. 225–227.

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advancement has been preserved. This record had to correct Tsar’s views. It highlighted that there was no King of Madagascar, although there were rumours that this king was seeking protection in Europe. The record contained information that the Swedish king issued any pardon. It could be concluded from this that some lost Swedish had to be on Madagascar. There were rumours that people, who sent the deputation to Sweden, lived in republican regime and it would be necessary to prepare on it. These new circumstances led probably the Tsar to reappraise and withdraw the mentioned action.44 Madagascar and the Swedish East India Company Morgane and his companions did not have enough money after the return of Ulrich’s expedition and could not share the costs of the expedition. Therefore Klinckowström had to start negotiations with other entrepreneurs and remake all plan of the enterprise. He did it probably with approval of the State Secretary, Daniel Nicholas von Höpken. These potential shareholders proposed sending a frigate and hiring a crew. They accepted to secure a ship in London or Amsterdam and to give 60,000 ecus to the Swedish Crown for this purpose. They wanted the ship to be sent to India sooner than they fulfil these obligations. Although many details of the enterprise are not clear, the aim of the entrepreneurs was establishment of the East India Company, a monopoly trade company concentrated on trade with India and China. This item was emphasized as condition sine qua non. A contract concluded with the government did not include any reference to the way, how this document would be given in compliance with the promises regarding the monopoly trade with India given to the pirates. In spite of that the Madagascar commission and the Council of Kingdom recommended they should send out the frigate Jarramas. The ship under command of Captain Cronhjelm should have returned to France. It should have been subordinated to the command of a new captain nominated by the entrepreneurs there. But it was too late to equip the ship that year. Shipping season was over. Afterwards Klinckowström informed Morgane and his companions that they could join as shareholders the East India Company, which would be founded in Sweden in.45

44 45

Ibidem, pp. 228–229. KONINCKX, pp. 35, 38.

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This promising development was thwarted by news from Madagascar. The pirates allegedly dismissed their leaders and their community was splitting into smaller and smaller fractions. Other insecurity appeared concerning participation of the Crown in expenses of the new expedition to Madagascar. The Secret Committee indicated that it would not agree with any contract without detailed study and evidence that the pirates were still in control of the island. At the same time it made obvious that it would back the project only in case it would be financed from private sources. In the context it expressed its approval to the establishment of the East India Company. The Council of Kingdom also decided that the Crown would not spend any other money because it was an issue of shareholders if they would take the risk.46 The affair fell into oblivion next years. It was because of the change of position of the Madagascar pirates. They continued their robbing up to 1721, when the opposition of the trading companies achieved its zenith. Even the French Company of Indies appended to English severe measures. A part of the pirates met a great Portuguese ship and other Portuguese vessel armoured with 30 cannons the same year. They had to retreat after a great fight. They were pursued to Madagascar and compelled to burn up their vessels. It meant the end of large naval aggressions. After they did not dare to risk large attacks far from their base on Saint Marie. They were decimated by unfavourable climate there. Therefore the governor of the French base on Île de Bourbon (Reunion), Desforges-Boucher, relatively simply persuaded 23 pirates to settle peacefully on the island in November 1724. The last great campaign against pirates took place in the 1730s.47 The idea of the expedition to Madagascar was drawn up again in 1726. Even that time it remained in phase of concept. Godefroi de la Merveille participated again in the plan, core of which consisted in the establishment of the Swedish base on Madagascar. 60 000 florins and two armoured frigates were necessary for realisation an idea according to his view. In spite of the fact the Secret Council supported the plan, soon afterwards it identified with other project. A certain Captain Spaak introduced himself at the chairman of the Land Diet and declared his intention to realize an expedition to Madagascar. Reputedly he had spent long time on the island and knew it very well. He asked for one frigate with 40 cannons only, in exchange he promised to return with 40 ships and thousand “barrels with Minutes of the meeting of the Council of the Kingdom on 16th December 1723, MACAU, pp. 50–51. 47 DESCHAMPS, pp. 184–185. 46

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gold”. Spaak stated he had been a prisoner of the pirates, who controlled the coast of the whole island. They respected their King whose headquarters in the city had called also Madagascar. This city was well fortified. He had no detailed information about their fleet; he only knew that once they had been able to arm 40 vessels. But he exactly knew that they held the Swedish king in esteem and they had affection for the Swedish people.48 Despite the evident untrustworthy character of the project, the Secret Committee accepted it. The delegation of the Secret Council suggested establishment of the trade company that would take over costs of the expedition. This company would ask the Crown for protection, and the same document was given to Captain Ulrich in 1721. The Crown would obtain one quarter of the profit; the rest money would remain in hands of shareholders. The costs of the enterprise were estimated on 60 000 rixdals, so that the obligation of 150 shares on 400 rixdals was presupposed.49 At the end doubts appeared in the Secret Council. The Swedish ambassador in London, Nicholas Sparre, was asked for opinion. He stated that the pirates were generally despised in England because they had not earned their money in a correct way. He had doubts on information concerning the number of ships, as he had no records of robbed ships in India last time. Several members of the Secret Council insisted on deletion the enterprise from the list of projects on the base of this record. But Nicholas von Höpken pushed the plan vigorously. That was because several members of the Secret Council wanted to participate in the project. 20 joint stocks were subscribed in the Secret Council. Other investors were looked for, but only 141 joint stocks were sold. The realization of the project stretched and most of the shareholders lost their courage and withdrew their shares.50 All projects and speculations connected with the establishment of the colony in Madagascar and settling the local pirates in Sweden did not succeed. In spite of that they were not without impact on the future history of Sweden. After several years, the attention paid to these questions aroused again large appetite for oriental wealth, from which other countries profited. This interest enabled establishment of the Swedish East India Company in 1731, which existed up to 1813.51

Minutes of the Secret Committe of 16th November 1726, MACAU, pp. 54–56. Minutes of the Secret Committe of 30th November 1726, ibidem, pp. 56–57. 50 Minutes of the Secret Committe of 6th December 1726, ibidem, pp. 57–58. 51 KONINCKX, p. 65. 48 49

Silesia in the Power Plans of European States and Dynasties Radek Fukala

When the Prussian King Frederick II and his army crossed the Rubicon on 16 December 1740 and entered Silesian territory, no one imagined that vast section of the lands of the Bohemian Crown would become part of the Hohenzollern state for more than two centuries. Apart from Pomerania, it was the most significant acquired province in the framework of Brandenburg-Prussian expansive policy. The roots of the given interest in Silesia, however, reached as far back as to Middle Ages. They developed in an immensely promising and intensive way during the Reformation and began to culminate on the background of the diplomatic negotiations during the Thirty Year War. The Peace of Westphalia provided many variations of territorial compensations and claims to the Brandenburg electoral line of Hohenzollerns. At this occassion, Frederick William’s cabinet first attempted to revise the Silesian issue, but the point that was eventually given preference in the diplomatic game was Pomeranian aspirations. After prolonged negotiations, the envoys in Münster succeeded to annex part of Pomerania to the Brandenburg-Prussian state, and the lands of the Great Elector thus gained the desired seafaring connection between the Brandenburg base and the East-Prussian Duchy.1 Under these conditions, let us ask the following questions: “Which preconditions had the Prussian annexation in Silesia after the Thirty Year War? And, of what significance was the Oder region in the international politics during the period after the White Mountain battle?” The country of Silesia (Śląsk in Polish, Schlesien in German and Silesia in Latin) represents a significant historical unit in the framework of Central Europe. In our present times, its major part resides within the boundaries of Poland while its minor portions are in the Czech Republic. Until the end of the Second World War, Silesia mostly belonged to Germany. In history, Silesia – which represented a territory crucial to the reign and control over the trade on the river Oder – became a subject of interest to both Polish and Bohemian rulers as well as, later, of the Prussian Hohenzollern and Austrian Habsburg policies. The wealth of Silesia is undoubted. This country, as a Vgl. W. BEIN, Schlesien in der habsburgischen Politik. Ein Beitrag zur Entstehung des Dualismus im Alten Reich. Sigmaringen 1993. 1

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very interesting and strategically significant historical Central-European space, neighboured with Poland, Hungary, Brandenburg, Moravia, Bohemia and the two Lusatias – and these neighbours were the agents of the political, religious, cultural and economic relationships that determined the region’s development. Some Polish historians compared Silesia with Alsatia and Lotharingia and the geographic significance of the river Oder to the Rhine. German scholars ascribed Silesia the historical role of a bridge between the Carpathian region and the Roman territory.2 Let us only add that the regional variety of the individual Silesian duchies not only turned these territories into exposed centres of power policies but that it also made Silesia one connecting links of Europe, which – in the course of the historical development of the Bohemian lands as well as Prussia, Germany, the Habsburg monarchy and, especially, Poland – demonstrably supplement the mosaic of the European political, economic and cultural systems. The following brief overview will try to analyse the significance of Silesia in the strategic power policies of European states. The complex network of the particular Central-European problems gradually bore several separatist variants and political projects, aimed at incorporating Silesia either to Poland, Brandenburg, Saxony, Hungary or the Bohemian state. Most of the outlined solutions had dynastic subtexts in the Middle and early modern ages. From a long-term perspective, the location of Wroclaw and its economic, political, cultural and religious contacts, maintained with Bohemia and Moravia as well as with other neighbours, played an undisputed positive role. The business contacts of Wrocław helped draw the economy of the Bohemian lands closer to the economic systems of other Western- and Eastern-European states. Apart from the long-distant trade and economic potential, a crucial role in this respect was played by the above-mentioned ideological and religious trends.3

Vgl. K. BOBOWSKI, R. GŁADKIEWICZ, W. WRZESIŃSKI, Stan i potrzeby śląskoznawczych badań humanistycznych. Warszawa, Wrocław 1990; M. BORÁK (ed.): Slezsko v dějinách českého státu. Opava 1998; M. WEBER, C. RABE (edd.): Silesiographia. Stand und Perspektiven der historischen Schlesienforschung. Festschrift für Norbert Conrads zum 60. Geburtstag. Würzburg 1998. 3 In this aspect, the points of departure are the following syntheses and most substantial essays: K. MALECZYŃSKI (ed.), Historia Śłąska, I/2. Do roku 1763. Wrocław, Warszawa, Kraków 1961; H. AUBIN, Geschichte Schlesiens I (bis 1526). Breslau 1938, pp. 225–228; C. GRÜNHAGEN, Geschichte Schlesiens. Bd. 1: Bis zum Eintritt der habsburgischen Herrschaft 1527. Gotha 1884; M. CZAPLIŃSKI (ed.), Historia Śłąska. Wrocław 2002, pp. 77–117; W. KORTA, Historia Śłąska do 1763 roku. Warszawa 2003, pp. 179–195; R. FUKALA, Slezsko. Neznámá země Koruny české. Knížecí a stavovské Slezsko do roku 1740. České Budějovice 2007. . 2

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Next to Bohemia itself, the complex of the Silesian duchies and small territories seemed to be the most strategically significant support for the Bohemian ruler from amongst the countries of the Crown. In the period prior to the White Mountain, the duchies directly reignedby the Bohemian king were the following: those of Wroclaw, Jawór, Świdnica and Żagań, and later also Minsterberk (Ziębice), Opole and Racibórz. The Opava royal feoff represented a specific issue, for we do not perceive it to be a typically Silesian territory until the Thirty Years’ War. The feudal ties with the lands of the Bohemian Crown were formally maintained by the representatives of the ruling Silesian duchy families, with the Legnica-Brzeg Piast branch and their relatives in the Cieszyn region occupying the most significant position. Apart from the Upper and Lower Silesian Piasts, the descendants of King George of Poděbrady and the members of imperial families – the Hohenzollerns and Wettins, played an unmistakable religiously cultural and power-political role. These dukes were not just the feoffs of the Bohemian king; they, very often, followed their own lines of foreign policy, becoming especially inclined towards the Polish-Lithuanian state and the imperial countries for many of which, nevertheless, these emancipation dynastic strategies became fatal.4 The multifaceted mosaic of local power groups on the political and religious Silesian scene rather enhanced the sense of disintegration. An effective connecting link in this respect became the feudal ties to the Bohemian king and, also through him, ties to the Roman imperial environment. The Wroclaw bishop who began to be appointed to the post of supreme district administrator on a regular basis during the 16th century played an increasingly important role. After the certain decline of Episcopal power in the country, the prestige of the local Catholic clergy was uplifted by Sebastian of Rostock (1664–1671), who ranked amongst the main instigators of the extensive re-Catholization and who, after a long period of time, again held the office of district administrator. The pungent problems of the Wroclaw chapter in the period after the White Mountain were not only the interventions of the Habsburg reign, but also the power influences of the Polish clergy, and mainly of the Vasów royal court. The policy of the Cracow cabinet represented a significant factor in Central-European development, and its constant attempts at a restitution of Silesian territory shall not be overlooked. Many Piast dukes and aristocrats J. BAHLCKE, Regionalismus und Staatsintegration im Widerstreit: die Länder der böhmischen Krone im ersten Jahrhundert der Habsburgerherrschaft, 1526–1619. München 1994.

4

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in Silesia collaborated closely with the Polish court. The Habsburg reign in the northern part of the Bohemian state had to face several confrontations with Polish interests. During the estates’ upheaval, Polish Prince Charles Ferdinand Vasa was appointed the coadjuctor to the Wroclaw Bishop in 1619. The Polish royal court thus safeguarded its prospective positions aimed at territorial compensation in exchange for its support of the emperor against the Bohemian Protestant estates. It was quite apparent in this case that the covert dynastic Habsburg-Vasa treaty would eventually bring its fruit to the Cracow cabinet. The arrival of the Vasa family to the prosperous Opole and Racibórz regions turned into a political reality at the end of the Thirty Years’ War. The emperor, pressurized by the military defeats and political failures of the empire, forfeited this extensive Upper Silesian territory to the Polish King Vladislav IV in exchange for a financial loan on 30 May 1645. The Vasa court as the regent of the Opole and Racibórz forfeit took more than vehement steps. As is usual in such cases, this new strategy soon had a corresponding impact on Silesian-Polish relations. The especial furore arrived during the war between Sweden and Poland. The Polish royal family and its court found a long-term asylum in Glogów, i.e. a city owned by the Oppersdorf family. The local sojourn of Queen Ludowica Maria Gonzaga-Nevers and her consort, John Kazimierz Vasa, between 1655 and 1656, received great response in Silesia. Vienna was losing patience and was going to finish with the Polish administration in the Opole and Racibórz Duchy as soon as possible – and indeed, the Upper Silesian forfeit again fell into the hands of the Habsburg ruler in 1666.5 The Upper Silesian future was yet to see solely one Polish king who would establish close ties with Habsburg power interests. In the summer days of 1683, armies of John III Sobieski swept through the country on their way to a Vienna besieged by the Turks. This armed manifestation symbolically closed the period of existence of the Polish state as an international power and at the same time terminated Polish aspirations as to the Silesian issue.6 The webs of Hungarian relations towards Silesia are long-dated. During the Jagiellonian era and the early Habsburg reign, the Hungarian

R. FUKALA, Mocensko-politická krize polsko-litevské unie za vlády Jana Kazimíra Vasy v letech 1648 –1660. Otázky a problémy polské historiografie očima českého historika. In: Per Saecula ad Tempora Nostra. Sborník prací k šedesátým narozeninám prof. Jaroslava Pánka. Praha 2007, pp. 252–257. 6 J. LESZCYŃSKI, Władysław IV a Śląsk w latach 1644–1648. Wrocław 1969; Z. LIBISZOWSKA, Królowa Ludwika Maria na Śląsku 1655–1656. Katowice 1986. 5

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estates never ceased to claim Silesia and the Opava Duchy. But Hungary lost international prestige with the expansion of the Ottoman powers, while Transylvania patiently waited to see what the future had in store. In the preWhite Mountain period, Duchess Isabela, daughter of Sigismund I, received the Opole and Racibórz (1552–1556) as a territorial compensation for herself and her son, John of Zápole. She, however, soon had to surrender her rights. Passing the given duchies onto Sigismund Báthory, brother of the Polish king, in 1598 represented a very similar episode. The Silesian issue within the Transylvanian politics was revived under the reign of Duke Gabriel Bethlen. After the 1620 defeat of the Bohemian estates, the Viennese court offered him the Opole and Racibórz regions as one of the compensations for the Hungarian royal title. He also received the above-mentioned Upper Silesian duchies – along with seven east-Hungarian royal provinces, the restitution of rights and the amnesty. This strategic territory subsequently served the anti-Habsburg forces and the Bohemian-Moravian estates’ emigration as a point of departure for their military campaigns. After the collapse of the anti-Habsburg coalition and after the second Vienna peace treaty in 1624, the Opole and Racibórz regions returned under direct Habsburg administration. The Hungarian aristocracy and the Transylvanian dukes expressed their interests in the Upper Silesian territory several times more during the Thirty Years’ War, but the Habsburg cabinet strictly and especially strictly rejected the suggestions of Duke George I Rákoczy of 1645.7 It was no secret that the Scandinavian kingdoms were also interested in the economically strategic Silesian region. The two rivals, Denmark and Sweden, wanted to control the traditional copper way leading from the Upper-Hungarian mines to the mouth of the river Oder. This circumstance contributed to the fact that the Danish military contingent set off to the Silesian territory and, upon the initiative of Superintendent Joachim Mitzlaff and Bohemian-Moravian exiles, built an important base in the Opava region between 1626 and 1627. After the defeat of the DanishNorwegian King Christian IV, his decimated troops withdrew from the Silesian field. Another wave of awakened interest in Silesia very soon came J. POLIŠENSKÝ, Slezsko a válka třicetiletá. Česko-polský sborník vědeckých prací, I. Praha 1955, pp. 311–334; W. CZAPLIŃSKI, Polska wobec początków wojny trzydzestoletniej, Sobótka 15, 1960, pp. 449–477; W. CZAPLIŃSKI, Śląsk a Polska w pierwszych latach wojny trzydziestoletniej 1618–1620, Sobótka 2, 1947, s. 141–181; K. BARTKIEWICZ, Wojna trzydziestoletnia 1618–1648 na ziemiach nadodrzańskich. Zielona Góra 1993; J. MAROŃ, Śląsk jako teatr działań wojennych w czasie wojny trzydziestoletniej, Sobótka 47, 1992, pp. 313–321. 7

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from the side of Sweden, which opened another play on the battlefields of the Thirty Years’ War. Bohemian émigrés in the Swedish service warned the king and his chancellor of the preliminary capture of Silesia. Because Gustavus II Adolphus paid attention to the Saxony elector first, he delayed his own muster to Silesia and allowed his ally to develop actions against the lands of the Bohemian Crown. The Swedish diplomacy became so thoroughly orientated in the Central-European conditions in the course of the next months that it realized the transit significance of Silesia as a connecting link between the Swedish bases on the north of the continent and the rebel Protestant circles in the Bohemian lands, Hungary and Austria. The borderline with the traditional adversary – Polish-Lithuanian state – spoke for the tactical occupation of the Silesian territory.8 After the formation of the Heilbronn union, Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna invited Silesian Protestant politicians to enter the union of imperial Protestant estates in 1634. The Silesian dukes and estates were basically offered to leave the union of the lands of the Bohemian Crown and to join the lieges of the Swedish state. Sweden did not eliminate the Silesian regions, plundered and occupied by the units of the anti-Habsburg coalition, from its plans even in the last stage of the Thirty Years’ War. Before the peace talks began, Oxenstierna was asked to include the Silesian duchies among the suggested annexed regions in the instruction of 15 October 1641. Swedish diplomacy thus made Silesia a tool of pressure on Brandenburg and Poland. It was out of question for Vladislav IV Vasa to let the Swedish military garrisons in Silesia constantly threaten his country, as they did from Prussia and the Livon region. Also Berlin feared Swedish expansionism; Swedish bases on the Oder could have unforeseeable consequences from the point of the future development of the Brandenburg-Prussian state for the Hohenzollerns. During further negotiations, Swedish diplomacy yielded to French pressure and, in Osnabrück, it definitely resigned from occupying Silesia. Silesia’s experience with Saxony was different. The Wettins have been involved on the local political and religious stage since as early as the reign of George of Poděbrady. Silesian dukes, especially those of Minsterberk and Oleśnica, had family ties to the Dresden Lutheran court. An active role was W. DZIĘGIEL, Utrata księstw opolskiego i raciborskiego przez Ludwikę Marię w r. 1666. Kraków 1936; J. LESCZYŃSKI, Zabiegi i przetargi wokół Śląska w czasie wojny trzydziestoletniej, Sobótka 26, 1971, p. 523; H. PALM, J. KREBS (edd.), Acta Publica. Verhandlungen und Correspondenzen der schlesischen Fürsten und Stände, 1618–1629, I–VIII. Breslau 1865–1906; R. FUKALA, Dánský vpád do Slezska a rozklad opavské stavovské společnosti, Slezský sborník 99, 2001, pp. 81–94. 8

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played by John George after the defeat of the Protestant estates at the White Mountain, when his Dresden accord guaranteed the Silesians religious freedom and at the same time amnesty for Silesian dukes and estates, except the Krnów Hohenzollern. After forfeiting the two Lusatias, the electorate Saxony became Silesia’s direct neighbour. No wonder the Dresden cabinet resolutely protected its Silesian fellow-believers, since this was the only way to continue in the Saxon trade with the Eastern-European cities. In 1631, Silesia and Brandenburg integrated their Silesian Protestant allies into the camp of the anti-Habsburg alliance. Soon after this diplomatic intermezzo, Silesia again made a reversal in its policy and returned to the Viennese side. In the framework of the Prague peace treaty, the Saxony elector was validated to posses the Upper and Lower Lusatias; he, however, had to withdraw from his Silesian aspirations. Although Saxony did not act so vigorously in the Silesian issue at the end of the Thirty Years’ War, the gain of the Lusatian territory mainly shifted the policy of the Dresden court towards the east. This orientation successfully climaxed with the SaxonPolish personal union on the threshold of the 18th century. This period also witnessed the culminating efforts of August II aimed at gaining control over Silesia, which represented a wedge between his two countries. However, as soon as the Dresden elector became entangled in the northern war and was defeated, his prospects of gaining yet another prey quickly faded away. The process was accompanied by the decline of the Wettins’ prestige in Silesia. For the Hohenzollern dukes, Silesia has always embodied a tempting decoy. Although they were not especially welcomed there, they were certain warrants of the emancipative Silesian policy, and moreover a counterweight to the Habsburg power plans during the pre-White Mountain period. Since the arrival of the Luxemburg dynasty, the members of the Hohenzollern family undoubtedly acted in the region of Central-Europe as to provide the accelerating momentum in the gaining of vital economic and political contacts with Bohemian lands and German territorial states. Sigismund of Luxemburg provided Friedrich VI of Hohenzollern for his arrival at the Brandenburg Margraviate and gave him the Old and the New Marks as an electorate feoff at the Council of Constance. Since then, the electors had followed a permanent goal – to actively influence Central-European events. The ambitious Margrave Albrecht Achilles first supported the Curia in its fight against the Hussites, but later insensately joined the side of the Bohemian king. His unrestrained zeal to penetrate into the Silesian region of the lands of the Bohemian Crown made him accept the position of Silesian supreme district administrator in 1439. The vision of profit was confirmed

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by many matrimonial ties, the most significant among them being the marriage of Poděbrad’s son, Henry the Elder of Minsterberk, with Albrecht’s daughter, Ursula of Brandenburg, and of Vladislas of Jagiello with the twelve-year old elector’s daughter Barbara, Duches of Glogów.9 Other members of the Hohenzollern dynasty did not stay behind and followed the steps of Albrecht Achilles. In the early modern period, the Brandenburg margraves influenced the fragmented Silesia from two directions: the Brandenburg-electorate line planned to take control of the Lower Silesian territory from the Krosno region which they gained during the fights for the Glogów patrimony, while the Ansbach-Franconian branch tried to build their family enclave on the Upper Silesian territory; especially in the Opole, Racibórz, Bytom and Bohumín regions and, last but not least, in the Krnów region. The successful introductory move towards this game launched by the Ansbach Hohenzollern margraves was to purchase the Krnów Duchy with Głubczyce in 1524. The merit in this aspect belonged to the unquestionably competent politician, George of Brandenburg-Ansbach, called the Pious. This first Krnów Hohenzollern – grandson of Albrecht Achilles and nephew of the Bohemian King Vladislas of Jagiello – achieved considerable successes in supporting the Reformation during his reign between 1524 and 1543. It was especially his marriage policy that helped to establish close links among the Silesian Piasts, Poděbrads and Hohenzollerns. It was him who stood beyond the secularization of the Prussian monastery territory, and he hence justly deserves an honorary position side by side with his brother, Albrecht of Prussia, in the gallery of the Hohenzollern family.10 The other Krnów Hohenzollern, Duke George Friedrich of BrandenburgAnsbach (who became duke of Prussia during his career), also displayed an exceptional sense of boosting the economy in his Upper Silesian enclaves. His initiative resulted in the establishment of a high-quality administrative

R. FUKALA, Role Jana Jiřího Krnovského ve stavovských hnutích. Opava 1997; H. SCHULZ, Markgraf Johann Georg von Brandenburg-Jägerndorf. Generalfeldoberst. Halle 1899; G. JAECKEL, Johann Georg II. Markgraf von Brandenburg, Herzog von Jägerndorf 1577–1624, Jahrbuch für schlesische Kirchengeschichte 52, 1973, pp. 65–82; 53, 1974, pp. 57–95. 10 P. BAUMGART (ed.), Ständetum und Staatsbildung in Brandenburg-Preußen. Ergebnisse einer internationalen Fachtagung (Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin, Bd. 54.). Berlin, New York 1983; O. BÜSCH (ed.), Handbuch der preussischen Geschichte, Bd. 2: Das 19. Jahrhundert und Grosse Themen der Geschichte Preussens. Berlin 1992; R. FUKALA, Hohenzollernové v evropské politice 16. století. Mezi Ansbachem, Krnovem a Královcem 1523–1603. Praha 2005. 9

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system in the Krnów region and in stabilizing Protestantism in the country. He succeeded in implementing centralizing and absolutist aspects against not only the estates in the Prussian Duchy but also in Krnów. The childless duke subsequently passed his Prussian and Silesian properties onto the Hohenzollern electorate family, thus providing them a decent prerequisite for entering the international political arena through his legacy. In harmony with the particulars ensuing from the family contract, signed in Magdeburg in 1599, the Brandenburg Elector Joachim Friedrich rendered the Krnów Duchy with the Bytom and Bohumín forfeit domain to his younger son, John George. His elder brother John Sigismund consequently came to hold both the Brandenburg Margraviate and the Prussian Duchy, and the given properties became the basis of Hohenzollern power after the Thirty Years’ War. The policy of the younger elector’s son, John George of Krnów, as a Calvinist exponent in Silesia did not cease to support the anti-Habsburg resistance. John was the chief commander of the Silesian armed forces and, from the period after the Battle of White Mountain until his death in 1624, his armies consistently fought the Habsburg dynasty. This anti-Habsburg rebellious activity earned John George of Krnów the imperial anathema, pronounced against him in 1621, and his Silesian estates were confiscated. After the loss of the Opole and Racibórz regions in the mid-16th century, this was yet another territorial loss in Silesia for the Hohenzollern family from which its members could not reconcile.11 A similar stumbling block was the Hohenzollern-Piast compact about mutual inheritance, signed between the Legnica-Brzeg Piasts and the Brandenburg Hohenzollerns in Frankfurt am Oder in 1536. As early as in the eve of the Schmalkald war, Ferdinand I took the advantage to declare the given agreement invalid and illegitimate at the Wroclaw assembly, held on 18 May 1546. This step not only intensified the animosity between the Habsburg dynasty and Silesian duchy opposition but also launched the Habsburg-Hohenzollern power dualism in the Central-European political arena. The consequence was long-lasting Habsburg efforts to eliminate the Hohenzollern influence in the Oder region to the maximum extent and, on the other hand, Hohenzollern reminiscences and speculations in the Silesian issue. The first opportunity offered itself to the Hohenzollerns during the Wesphalian peace talks. The elector instructed his delegates to require the

R. FUKALA, Jan Jiří Krnovský. Stavovské povstání a zápas s Habsburky. České Budějovice 2005.

11

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restitution of the former Hohenzollern-controlled Silesian territories from the emperor. It was the nearby Lower Silesian duchies of Glogów, Żagań, Świdnica and Jawór that were especially at the centre of interest of Friedrich Willem’s Berlin cabinet. The secret backstage deliberations moreover also calculated with the Kłodzko, Krnów, Bohumín and Bytom regions. The Habsburg side labelled the Hohenzollern proposals as unreal and consistently refused them. The French side admitted this factual state of matters and diverted the Brandenburg standpoint to the Pomeranian issue. After the Thirty Years’ War, Vienna only recognized the Hohenzollern possession of the Krosen Duchy and surrendered the Świebodzin (Schwiebus) region in 1695 in order to oblige Berlin and soon win its favour. 12

The development of Silesian interior policy and economy after the dramatic events of the Thirty Years’ War gave new direction to the Hohenzollern ambitions. The wider comparative research of the power efforts of Poland, Hungary, Sweden, Saxony, the Bohemian lands (or, respectively, the Habsburg dynasty) and, especially, the Brandenburg-Prussian state revealed both the progressive and regressive factors of the influence of the given states in Silesia. It, at the same time underlined the fact that the reCatholization policy, the loss of the two Lusatias, the economic interests of Wroclaw and the decline of Habsburg prestige substantially undermined the integrative relations in the framework of the lands of the Bohemian Crown. The process of excluding Silesia from the Bohemian state was, naturally, long-termed, and the Prussian king in 1740 only took advantage of the situation at hand. Hungary was weakened by the wars against the Turks and the spasms of the estates’ uprisings. The aristocratic Rzeczpospolita, sideby-side with the Saxon dynasty of the Wettins, totally discredited themselves on the international scene of the 18th-century. The death of Charles VI eventually opened the Hohenzollerns way to aggression, and Prussia was to become a European power by its very attainment of Silesia.

To the Habsburg-Hohenzollern power interest in Silesia, cf. esp., BEIN, pp. 99–132; cf. also R. FUKALA, Die Rolle der Jägerndorfer Fürsten von Hohenzollern in der frühneuzeitlichen Geschichte Schlesiens. Prague Papers on History of International Relations, 2001, pp. 5–26. 12

Die russisch-württembergischen Beziehungen unter Katharina der Großen1 František Stellner

Katharina die Große hatte von allen russischen Herrschern des 18. Jahrhunderts die beste Ausgangsposition, die europäische Politik durch dynastische Bindungen zu beeinflussen und die Position ihrer Familie unter den wichtigsten europäischen Dynastien zu festigen. Sie ließ sich vor allem von den dynastischen Bindungen und Traditionen Holstein-Gottorps und Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttels inspirieren. Der führende Kenner E. Hübner schrieb dazu: „Augenfällig, aber gerade im 18. Jahrhundert keineswegs überraschend war die Aufmerksamkeit Katharinas für das dynastische Beziehungsgeflecht, in das die hineinwuchs und das sie als Zarin lenkend beeinflussen konnte. Dadurch, dass ihr diese Eingebundenheit bewusst war, konnte sie rational und abwägend handeln. Unterstützung für Angehörige der eigenen Dynastie gewährte sie, solange damit keine Nachteileverbunden waren und – weitaus wichtiger – solange die Interessen desjenigen Staates, über den sie regierte, gewahrt blieben. In aller Regel fielen die Entscheidungen Katharinas zudem dergestalt aus, dass sowohl Familienangehörige als auch das Russische Reich davon profitieren konnten. Mit dieser bewussten Instrumentalisierung der Dynastiepolitik hob sich die Zarin deutlich von ihren Vorgängern und Vorgängerinnen auf dem russischen Thron ab. Elisabeths Entschluss, den Eutiner Fürstbischof als Kronprinzen in Schweden wählen zu lassen, und der geplante Feldzug Peters III. gegen Dänemark waren Aktionen, die in den Augen Katharinas allzu dynastiebezogen waren und deshalb für sie kein Vorbild abgeben konnten.“2 Zarin Katharina II. konnte in den sechziger und siebziger Jahren keine vergleichbare dynastische Politik wie Maria Theresia betreiben, denn im Gegensatz zur Kaiserin hatte sie nur einen Sohn. Es gab auch keine Nichten und Neffen. Erst aus der zweiten Ehe ihres Sohns mit der Prinzessin von Württemberg gingen viele Kinder hervor, außerdem hatte ihre Schwiegertochter Dieser Text entstand an der Philosophischen Fakultät der Karlsuniversität in Prag im Rahmen des Forschungsvorhabens MSM 0021620827 Die Böhmischen Länder inmitten Europas in der Vergangenheit und heute. 2 Eckhard HÜBNER, Zwischen Stettin und Petersburg: Der Faktor Norddeutschland in Leben und Politik Katharinas II., in: Katharina II., Russland und Europa. Beiträge zur internationalen Forschung, hrsg. von Claus Scharf, Mainz 2001, S. 549–550. 1

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viele Verwandte, was eine Reihe politisch mehr oder weniger bedeutender dynastischer Bindungen ermöglichte. Auch dank dessen konnte Katharina II. auf ihre dynastische Politik mit Befriedigung zurückblicken. Sie wurde „Urmutter“ einer außerordentlich reichen und respektierten Herrscherfamilie. „Wenn ein Dichter sie im Kreise ihrer großartigen und zahlreichen Familie sehen würde, könnte er sie für Juno unter den Göttern halten,“ schrieb einer der Höflinge.3 Warum gelangten gerade deutsche Prinzessinnen und Prinzen auf den russischen Thron? Der deutsche Historiker G. Herm schrieb dazu treffend: „Halb Europa hielt es damals für angebracht, sich mit dem deutschen Adel per Ehekontrakt zu verbinden. Zum einen möglicherweise deshalb, weil die Mitglieder der Adelsrepublik ‘Heiliges Römisches Reich’ etwas Ähnliches wie eine noch vom Nachruhm Karls des Großen besonnte Ur-Aristokratie bildeten, zum anderen dürfte es damit zu tun gehabt haben, dass kein anderes Land des Kontinents viele blaublütige Eheaspirantinnen und Eheaspiranten hervorbrachte... weil man den deutschen Adelssprossen nachsagte, sie passten sich klaglos und diszipliniert jeglicher Forderung an, die ihre neue Heimat an sie stellte, würden fast über Nacht zu perfekten Briten, Franzosen, Dänen oder Schweden. Eigenes Nationalbewusstsein sei ihnen – von Ausnahmen abgesehen – völlig unbekannt.“4 Die Ebenbürtigkeit schrieb der Elite der europäischen Gesellschaften, den herrschenden Dynastien vor, sich eine Partnerin außerhalb des eigenen Landes zu suchen. Die deutschen Reichsfürsten herrschten zwar oft in kleinen und politisch unwichtigen Staaten, waren aber souveräne Herrscher.5 Die Studie beabsichtigt, die Gültigkeit der oben erwähnten Einschätzung der dynastischen Politik Katharinas II. am Beispiel eines der wichtigsten mittleren deutschen Staaten, am Herzogtum von Württemberg, zu überprüfen, deren Herrscherfamilien sich mit dem russischen Hof verbanden. Sie konzentriert sich auf die Verkopplung der dynastischen Politik mit der Festigung der Bündnisbeziehungen unter den Großmächten, auf den Verlauf der Verhandlungen über die Heirat des Zarewitschs Paul

Charles François Philibert MASSON, Sekretnyje zapiski v Rossii vremeni carstvovanija Jekateriny II i Pavla I. Nabljudenija francuza živšego pri dvore o pridvornych nravach, demonstrirujuščie nezaurjadnuju nabljudatelnost i osvedomlennost avtora, ed. Jekaterina E. Ljamina, Je. Je. Pasternak, Moskva 1996, S. 35. 4 Gerhard HERM, Deutschland-Russland. Tausend Jahre einer seltsamen Freundschaft, Hamburg 1990, S. 116. 5 Walter DEMEL, Europäische Geschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts. Ständische Gesellschaft und europäisches Mächtesystem im beschleunigten Wandel (1689/1700-1789/1800), Stuttgart 2000, S. 50-51. 3

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und darauf, in wie weit seine neuen Verwandten die Möglichkeit hatten, die russische Innen- sowie Außenpolitik zu beeinflussen.6 Der erste Angehörige der württembergischen Dynastie, der mit dem russischen Reich in Kontakt kam, war Prinz Maximilian Emanuel, Bruder des später herrschenden Herzogs. Er diente in der schwedischen Armee und fiel in russische Gefangenschaft, aus der er zwar bedingungslos entlassen wurde, er starb jedoch auf dem Heimweg an Fieber.7 Ein ähnliches Schicksal erwartete auch den preußischen General Prinz Friedrich Eugen im Siebenjährigen Krieg.8 Im Gegensatz zu seinem Verwandten kehrte er aber heil nach Hause zurück und ein paar Jahre später wurde er Schwiegervater des Zarewitschs und Großvater zweier Zaren. Das erste Angebot Katharinas II., seine älteste, dreizehnjährige Tochter Sophie Dorothea nach St. Petersburg zu schicken, wo sich der Zarewitsch eventuell für sie als Ehefrau entscheiden konnte, lehnte er jedoch ab.9 Man entschied sich dann für die Prinzessin von Hessen-Darmstadt, und das Leben im ruhigen Schloss nahm seine gewohnten Bahnen. Die Situation änderte sich jedoch rasch. 1776 schickte Friedrich II. sein Bruder Heinrich, um über die Bündnisverlängerung mit Russland zu verhandeln.10 Zufälligerweise starb die erste Ehefrau des Zarewitschs Paul während seines Besuchs und die Zarin führte sogleich mit dem Gast ein vertrauliches Gespräch über eine neue Heirat. Sie wünschte sich eine hübsche, gebildete, zurückhaltende, taktvolle und bescheidene Schwiegertochter, die sich nicht in die Staatsangelegenheiten einmischen sollte. Angesichts des bestehenden Bündnisses mit Preußen war es auch sehr wünschenswert, dass sie mit dem preußischen König verwandt war und zum Symbol der preußisch-russischen Freundschaft wurde.11 Die Zarin entschied Anknüpfend an meine Studie: František STELLNER, Die dynastische Politik russisches Imperium im 18. Jahrhundert, in: Prague Papers on History of International Relations 7, 2004, S. 33–55; František STELLNER, Die dynastische Politik in den russisch-deutschen Beziehungen im 18. Jahrhundert, in: „Deutsch-russische Beziehungen. Politische, wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Aspekte von der frühen Neuzeit bis zum 20. Jahrhundert“. Beiträge der internationalen Konferenz in Prag vom 24.– 25. November 2005, hrsg. von František Stellner unter Mitarbeit von František Bahenský und Radek Soběhart, Praha 2007, S. 31-51. 7 Robert K. MASSIE, Peter der Grosse. Sein Leben und seine Zeit, Frankfurt am Main 1997, S. 453. 8 Claus SCHARF, Katharina II., Deutschland und die Deutschen, Mainz 1996, S. 298– 299. 9 Hans-Martin MAURER, Das Haus Württemberg und Russland In: Zeitschrift für Württembergische Landesgeschichte 48, 1989, S. 202–203. 10 Chester V. EASUM, Prinz Heinrich von Preussen. Bruder Friedrichs des Groβen, Göttingen, Berlin, Frankfurt am Main 1958, S. 405. 11 MAURER, S. 203. 6

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sich deswegen, auf die ursprüngliche Wahl zurückzukommen und Sophie Dorothea zu berufen.12 Prinz Heinrich war begeistert und unterstützte sie mit allen Mitteln in ihrer Entscheidung, seine Großnichte einzuladen. Sophie Dorothea wurde 1759 in Stettin als Tochter eines nichtherrschenden Angehörigen der württembergischen Dynastie geboren, der als Regimentskommandant in preußischen Diensten war.13 Er heiratete eine Prinzessin von Brandenburg-Schwedt und führte einen bescheidenden, aber kultivierten Hof, an dem beispielsweise Goethes Schwager, Jurist und Schriftsteller, Johann Georg Schlosser als Erzieher tätig war. Nach dem Ausscheiden aus dem preußischen Dienst lebte die Familie in der burgundischen Grafschaft Mömpelgard im „Schnittpunkt“ der französischen, schweizerischen und deutschen Kultur.14 Während Prinz Heinrich die Prinzessin in St. Petersburg lobte und gleichzeitig den leicht reizbaren und hysterischen Großfürsten in seiner Trauer tröstete,15 ebnete sein Bruder Friedrich II. Wege im Reich. Dem Verlobten der Prinzessin, Nachfolger von Hessen-Darmstadt Ludwig, Bruder der eben verstorbenen Zarewitsch-Ehefrau, gab er sofort den Rat, auf die Braut zu verzichten. Ludwig verließ ruhmlos die russischen Dienste, weilte in Berlin und gab erst unter erheblichem Druck nach.16 Der dankbare Großfürst gewährte ihm dann eine Rente, die Ludwig jedoch enttäuschte.17 Der König begab sich auch zum württembergischen Hof. Er musste die Wolfgang STRIBRNY, Die Russlandpolitik Friedrichs des Grossen 1764–1786, Würzburg 1966, S. 93; Robert STUPPERICH, Die zweite Reise des Prinzen Heinrich von Preussen nach Petersburg, in: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 3, 1938, S. 589. 13 Katharina II. an Grimm, 29. 6. 1776. In: SBORNIK imperatorskago russkago istoričeskago obščestva (SIRIO), S. Peterburg 1878, XXIII., No. 33, S. 50–51; STUPPERICH, S. 580–600; EASUM, S. 403–417; STRIBRNY, S. 87-97. 14 SCHARF, S. 296-297. 15 Notiz Katharinas II., 15. 4. 1776, SIRIO, S. Peterburg 1880, XXVII., S. 78–79; Roderick E. McGREW, Paul I of Russia, 1754–1801, Clarendon 1992, S. 95; EASUM, S. 408–409. 16 Ludwig an Friedrich II., 9. 5. 1776, SIRIO, S. Peterburg 1872, IX., S. 9-10. Ludwig an die Herzogin von Württemberg, 11. 5. 1776, ebenda, S. 18-19. Friedrich II. an Heinrich von Preußen, 12. 5. 1776, Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des Grossen, bearb. von Gustav Berthold VOLTZ u. a., Berlin 1920, Bd. 38, Nr. 24 729, S. 89–90. 17 Friedrich II. an Friederike Sophie Dorothea, 7. 5. 1776, Politische Correspondenz, Nr. 24 715, S. 74; Friedrich II. an Friederike Sophie Dorothea, 9. 5. 1776, ebenda, Nr. 24 720, S. 79-80; Heinrich von Preuβen an Friedrich II., 27. 4. 1776, ebenda, Nr. 24 718, S. 76; Heinrich an Friedrich II., 30. 4. 1776, ebenda, Nr. 24 726, S. 84; Friedrich II. an Heinrich, 9. 5. 1776, ebenda, Nr. 24 718, 24 719, S. 77-79, Friedrich II. an Heinrich, 11. 5. 1776, ebenda, Nr. 24 726, 24 727, S. 84-86; EASUM, S. 409-410; STRIBRNY, S. 93–94; Hans SCHUMANN, Gelehrte, Bauern und eine Zarentochter aus Württemberg, in: Deutsch-russische Begegnungen im Zeitalter der Aufklärung (18. Jahrhundert). Wanderausstellung durch Deutschland und Russland. Dokumentation, hrsg. von Lew Kopelew, Karl-Heinz Korn, Rainer Sprung, Göttingen, Köln 1997, S. 234. 12

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Brauteltern überzeugen, denn sie bangten um ihre Tochter und bezweifelten, dass sie auf eine so anspruchsvolle Rolle vorbereitet war. Schließlich stimmten sie zu. Dann stand den zwei jungen Menschen, die sich nie zuvor gesehen hatten, nichts im Wege, sich zu treffen und zu versuchen Sympathien füreinander zu finden. Ihr Treffen fand im Juni 1776 in Berlin statt.18 N. Graf Panin machte den König rechtzeitig darauf aufmerksam, Zarewitsch sei ein begeisterter Bewunderer aller Militärparaden und Übungen, so dass der Gastgeber ihm ein solches Vergnügen mit vollen Händen gönnte.19 Auf die beiden Verlobten machten die Tage in der preußischen Hauptstadt einen unvergesslichen Eindruck. Sie erlebten sonnige Tage in lockerer „RokokoStimmung“ in Heinrichs Residenz im malerischen Rheinsberg und bewunderten den König im etwas düsteren Potsdam.20 Zarewitsch schrieb damals: „Ich fand meine Braut so, wie ich mir sie in meinen Gedanken erträumen konnte, hübsch, groß, schlank, freidenkerisch, klug und schlagfertig. Was ihr Herz angeht, hat sie ein sehr empfindliches und weiches, wie ich in verschieden Szenen mit ihren Verwandten merken konnte.“21 Über Zarewitsch führte ein Diplomat an: „Berlin gefiel ihm sehr, wo er mit seinem Geiz einen schlechten Eindruck hinterließ... Die Berliner Reise.. stärkte noch seine Eitelkeit... er machte den Eindruck eines ProvinzPflastertreters.“22 Im September 1776 traf die Prinzessin in der Hauptstadt ein, wo sie auf ihre zukünftige Schwiegermutter einen hervorragenden Eindruck machte. Die Zarin dachte ständig an den Widerwillen der russischen Elite gegenüber den deutschen Prinzen, deshalb erlaubte sie den Brauteltern nur, ihre Tochter bis nach Memel zu begleiten. Als Gegenleistung schickte sie dem zukünftigen Schwiegervater ihres Sohnes einen Gutschein über 40 000 Rubel und zeichnete ihn mit dem St. Andreas-Orden aus.23 Ein französischer Der König informierte die Herzogin über die Ankunft des Zarewitschs nach Berlin. Friedrich II. an die Herzogin, 8. 6. 1776, SIRIO, IX., S. 34. Über die Abfahrt nach Berlin: Katharina II. an Paul Petrowitsch, 14./25. 6. 1776, SIRIO, XXVII., S. 85. 19 McGREW, S. 60. 20 Martha LINDEMANN, Die Heiraten der Romanows und der deutschen Fürstenhäuser im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert und ihre Bedeutung in der Bündnispolitik der Ostmächte, Berlin, Bonn 1935, S. 46. 21 SCHUMANN, S. 234–235. vgl. Paul an Katharina II., 11./22. 7. 1776, SIRIO, XXVII., S. 98, Anm. 1. 22 Marie-Daniel Bourree de CORBERON, Iz zapisok In: Jekaterina. Put k vlasti, sost. M. LAVRINOVIČ, A. LIBERMAN, Moskva 2003, S. 146, 148. 23 SCHARF, S. 304; David Mark GRIFFITHS, Russian Court Politics and the Question of an Expansionist Foreign Policy under Catharine II, 1762-1783, PhD. dissertation, Cornell University 1967, S. 51. 18

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Beobachter schilderte die erste Audienz bei der Zarin folgendermaßen: „Gestern kam die Prinzessin von Württemberg. Sie kam auf die Zarin zu und warf sich ihr zu Füßen. Dank der geschlossenen Tür blieb diese Szene neugierigen Augen verborgen. Die Zarin war offensichtlich zufrieden... alle sagen, sie sei sehr nett, aufmerksam, zahm und freundlich.“24 Einen Monat später wurde sie unter dem Namen Marie Fjodorowna Ehefrau des Zarewitschs. Der britische Gesandter schrieb über sie: „Da der Charakter der gegenwärtigen Großfürstin dem der verstorbenen geradezu entgegengesetzt ist, so erscheint auch der Großfürst in einem ganz anderen Lichte. Sie ist mild, sanft und von dem strengsten ehelichen Pflichtgefühl durchdrungen. Er ist gesellig und heiter geworden und beginnt auch einen eigenen Willen zu haben. Sie versucht, durch alle mögliche Gefälligkeit und Aufmerksamkeit seine Zuneigung zu verdienen und er liebt sie sehr. Sie sind gegenwärtig in sich selbst vollkommen glücklich.“25 Marie Fjodorowna hatte ein langes und ruhiges Leben, hinterließ Pawlowsk als Andenken an ihren Geschmack – eine der zurzeit bestens erhaltenen Residenzen der Zarenfamilie. Sie brachte neun Kinder zur Welt, bereits 1777 den Nachfolger Alexander, ein Jahr später dann den zweiten Sohn Konstantin, danach fünf Töchter und schließlich noch zwei Söhne, Nikolaus und Michail. Sie sorgte für genug Erben in der Linie Katharinas, sodass seit Ende der 1780er Jahren nicht mehr zu befürchten war, dass im Todesfalle Pauls nach einer neuen Dynastie hätte gesucht werden müssen. Nun sollen die dynastischen Verbindungen des russischen Herrschergeschlechts mit den in Mitteleuropa herrschenden Familien erwähnt werden. Bis Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts traten vier Brüder und zwei Neffen Marie Fjodorownas in den russischen Dienst und wurden mit hohen und einflussreichen Posten betraut. Der älteste Bruder, Friedrich begleitete 1782 seine Schwester und ihren Ehemann während ihrer Italienreise, danach wurde er Generalgouverneur und als Generalleutnant nahm er am Feldzug gegen die Türken teil. Seinen Aufstieg beeinträchtigte eine Ehekrise, die in häuslicher Gewalt gipfelte. Die unglückliche Prinzessin Augusta, mit Spitznamen „Zelmire“, aus dem Haus Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel begab sich schließlich 1786 unter den Schutz der Zarin, die Friedrich aus dem CORBERON, S. 148. Depesche von Harris an Lord Suffolk, 3./14. 10. 1778, James HARRIS, Tagebücher und diplomatischer Briefwechsel seines Groβvaters James Harris, Earl von Malmesbury, während seiner Missionen bei den Höfen von Berlin, Petersburg, dem Haag, Madrid und Paris, hrsg. von Lord Malmesbury, I., Grimma und Leipzig 1852, S. 140. Vgl. Martin KOVÁŘ, Velká Británie v éře Roberta Walpola. K vývoji britského státu a britské společnosti v první polovině 18. století, Praha 2004. 24 25

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Dienst entließ. Von größerer Bedeutung als die Solidarität der Frauen war der Verdacht, der Prinz hätte geheime Gespräche mit den Schweden geführt. Friedrich verließ unfreiwillig den russischen Dienst, konnte nicht in den Preußischen eintreten und lebte dann zurückgezogen.26 Masson betonte, dass der Prinz im Gegensatz zum Nachfolgerpaar eine gewisse Hartnäckigkeit bewies und nicht zuließ, sich die eigenen Kinder von der Zarin „wegnehmen“ zu lassen. Seine Frau ließ er ruhig in Russland, die Kinder aber nahm er mit.27 Katharina kommentierte die Ehekrise in einem Privatbrief, man könne zugeben, dass die Braunschweiger Familie in Russland wirklich kein Glück hatte.28 Zwei Jahre später bestätigten sich ihre Worte endgültig, als Augusta untreu wurde und einen schrecklichen Tod infolge einer Fehlgeburt in ihrem „Asyl“ im Schloss Lohde (Koluvere) in Estland starb, denn sie musste die Schwangerschaft verheimlichen und weigerte sich, einen Arzt aufzusuchen. Nachdem Friedrich ein Jahr nach dem Tod Katharinas der Großen den Thron in Württemberg bestiegen hatte, nutzte er seine Beziehungen zum mächtigen Reich im Osten, erzwang sich von Napoleon Bonaparte Zugeständnisse und behielt für bestimmte Zeit eine gewisse Selbständigkeit. Er stieg zum König auf und erweiterte wesentlich sein Staatsterritorium.29 Der zweite Bruder Marie Fjodorownas, Ludwig, wurde General und Gouverneur St. Petersburgs. Seine Beziehung zur Zarin verschlechterte sich, nachdem er eine Fürstin Czartoryski ohne ihre Zustimmung und die Zustimmung seiner Eltern geheiratet und dadurch den Verdacht geweckt hatte, die polnische Krone anzustreben. Die Zarin hielt die Heirat für eine Intrige des preußischen Königs. Der Prinz verließ die preußische Armee, 1789 trat er in den polnischen Dienst ein, Ende Mai 1792 wehrte er sich als Generalleutnant der litauischen Armee nicht gegen den russischen Angriff, sondern lief sogar zum Feinde über. Er wurde als Verräter bezeichnet, der polnische König entzog ihm alle Titel und seine Frau ließ sich von ihm scheiden. Er kehrte nach Preußen zurück, wo er beschuldigt wurde, aus der Alexander Vasiljevič CHRAPOVICKIJ, Pamjatnyja zapiski A. V. Chrapovickago, statssekretarja Imperatricy Jekateriny vtoroj, Moskva 1990, S. 18, 110; Alexander G. BRÜCKNER, „Zelmira“. Epizod iz istorii carstvovanija imperatricy Jekateriny II (1782– 1788). In: Istoričeskij Vestnik 1890, 8, S. 277–303; 9, S. 551-572; Louis Philippe, comte de SÉGUR, Zapiski o prebyvanii v Rossii v carstvovanie Jekateriny II, in: ROSSIJA XVIII v. glazami inostrancev, podg. Ju. A. Limonov, Leningrad 1989, S. 400. 27 MASSON, S. 76, 183. 28 SCHARF, S. 335. 29 Sein Sohn Wilhelm I. heiratete die Großfürstin Katharina Pawlowna, der Enkelsohn Karl I. Olga Nikolajewna, Tochter des Zaren Nikolaus I., und die Enkeltochter Charlotta den Großfürst Michail Pawlowitsch. 26

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Kriegskasse gestohlen zu haben, um mindestens einige seiner zahlreichen Schulden zu bezahlen. Später kehrte er nach Russland zurück und stellte seine Position am dortigen Hof wieder her, nachdem seine zweite Frau Henrietta zu einer der engsten Freundinnen der Ehefrau des Zaren Alexanders I. geworden war. Der dritte Bruder Marie Fjodorownas, Karl, der mit neunzehn Jahren nach Russland kam, sammelte Kriegserfahrungen unter Fürst Potemkin im russisch-türkischen Krieg. Er starb mit einundzwanzig Jahren als Generaloberst und wurde in Cherson am Schwarzen Meer begraben. Der vierte Bruder, Alexander, blieb am längsten im russischen Dienst. Er wurde Gouverneur Weißrusslands, Generaldirektor von Straßen und Seewegen und Mitglied der Akademie der Wissenschaften.30 Er leitete beispielsweise den Bau der neuen Straße zwischen St. Petersburg und Moskau oder des Kanals zwischen der Wolga und Norddwina. 1798 verstärkte er seine Verwandtschaft mit dem Zarenhaus, indem er die Schwester der Ehefrau des Großfürsten Konstantin, Antonie von Sachsen-Coburg-Saalfeld, Tante der britischen Königin Viktoria und Schwester des belgischen Königs Leopold I. heiratete. Er wurde als größter Vielfrass seiner Zeit berühmt! Im Kampf gegen Napoleon diente er als Generaloberst, während sein Bruder Friedrich I. ein unfreiwilliger Verbündeter des französischen Kaisers war. Als Letzter kam Prinz Eugen von Württemberg, geboren 1788, Sohn des gleichnamigen Bruders der Großfürstin, unter Paul nach Russland.31 Es tauchten Gerüchte auf, denen zufolge Paul I. ihn mit seiner Tochter Katharina vermählen wollte und mit ihm „weitreichende Pläne“ hatte. Hatte der Zar vielleicht vor, die Primogenitur abzuschaffen, seinen eventuellen Schwiegersohn zu seinem Nachfolger zu bestimmen und seine Frau und Söhne in verschiedenen Festungen gefangen zu halten? Oder verbreiteten die Verschwörer nur solche Gerüchte, um die Gründe zu vermehren, sich gegen einen legitimen Herrscher zu stellen? Höchstwahrscheinlich handelte sich um ein Spiel der Verschwörer, um ein Mittel, den Großfürsten Alexander zu zwingen sich der Verschwörung anzuschließen.32

MAURER, S. 204; John P. LeDONNE, Frontier Governors General 1772–1825, I. The Western Frontier, in: Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 47, 1999, H. 1, S. 74; Alexej Vasiljevič ŠIŠOV, Znamenityje inostrancy na službe Rossii, Moskva 2001, S. 598–606. 31 Seine Nachkommen besuchten oft Náchod, denn sie verbanden sich mit dem Haus Schaumburg-Lippe. Eugens Enkelsohn heiratete die Großfürstin Vera Konstantinowna, was die fünfte und letzte Heirat zwischen der russischen und württembergischen Dynastie war. 32 Natan Jakovlevič EJDELMAN, Gran vekov. Političeskaja borba v Rossii. Konec XVIIInačalo XIX stoletija, Moskva 1988, S. 491–493. 30

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Mit der Schwiegermutter verband Marie Fjodorowna zwar ein gemeinsamer Geburtsort, sie gehörten jedoch unterschiedlichen Kulturen an. Während die französische Bildung und Kultur für Katharina II. von ausschlaggebender Bedeutung blieben, gehörte Marie Fjodorowna bereits dem „deutschen Jahrhundert“ an. Dies verband sie mit ihrem Mann, der fließend Deutsch sprach, und den sein Erzieher, der Dichter Ludwig Heinrich Nicolay mit der deutschen Kultur bekannt machte. Als Paul volljährig wurde, blieb Nicolay als sein persönlicher Sekretär und Bibliothekar seiner Ehefrauen. Seine Karriere beendete er 1798 mit der Ernennung zum Präsidenten der Akademie der Wissenschaften.33 Die russische Herrscherfamilie unterhielt intensive Beziehungen mit ihren württembergischen Verwandten. Bisher hatte keine der angeheirateten Prinzessinnen solche Erfolge erreicht wie Marie Fjodorowna. Sie machte sich auch die Tatsache zunutze, dass die württembergischen Prinzen politisch nicht gefährlich waren, die Regierung Katharinas stabilisiert genug war und sie es sich leisten konnte, viele deutsche Fürsten in ihre Dienste zu berufen. Dass Marie Fjodorowna ihre Verwandten vorzog, bezeugt die Tatsache, dass ihre Tochter Katharina, ihr Sohn Michail und ihre Enkeltochter Olga sich mit Württemberg durch Heirat verbanden.34 Die dynastische Verbindung der russischen Dynastie mit den Verwandten des preußischen Königs ergänzte die gegenseitig vorteilhafte gemeinsame Politik. Während sich Joseph II. 1774 ganz direkt, aber noch erfolglos um einen Freundschaftsvertrag zwischen Russland und dem Habsburgerreich bemühte, schien Friedrichs Strategie, seine Reichspolitik gegen Wien durch Familienbande zwischen kleineren deutschen Fürstenhäusern und dem Zarenhaus zu sichern, mehr Erfolg zu haben, denn das preußisch-russische Bündnis wurde 1777 um zehn Jahre verlängert. Die dynastische Beziehung zwischen Russland und Württemberg konnte jedoch später die Lockerung des preußisch-russischen Bündnisses und der russischen Orientierung an den Hof in Wien nicht verhindern.35 Auch die preußisch-württembergischen Beziehungen wurden lockerer, die jüngere Generation der württembergischen Dynastie orientierte sich nicht Erik AMBURGER, Deutsche in Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Rußlands. Die Familie Amburger in St. Petersburg 1770–1920, Wiesbaden 1986, S. 252; Edmund HEIER, Ludwig Heinrich von Nicolay (1737–1820) as an Exponent of Neoclassicism, in: German Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Oct., 1983), S. 595–596. 34 LINDEMANN, S. 56-96; František STELLNER, Ursachen der russischen Neutralität im preußisch-österreichischen Krieg 1866 In: Prague Papers on History of International Relations 10, 2007, S. 129; Jürgen WALTER, Carl Eugen von Württemberg. Ein Herzog und seine Untertanen. Biographie, Irdning 1987. 35 STRIBRNY, S. 94–95. 33

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mehr an den Hof in Berlin, sondern an den in St. Petersburg und Wien. Die Prinzen, die in der preußischen Armee dienten, schieden aus und traten in die russische Armee ein, wo sie keinen derart strengen Dienst ausüben mussten und auch eine viel großzügigere materielle Belohnung erwarten konnten. Die Zarin knüpfte in manchem an die dynastische Politik Friedrichs des Großen an, und in den achtziger Jahren konkurrierte sie insofern mit ihm, als ihr Hof einen mächtigeren und lukrativeren Ort für viele Reichfürsten darstellte. Katharina II. traf ihre Entscheidungen selbständig nach ihren eigenen, d.h. ausschließlich russischen Interessen und ließ in dieser Hinsicht keinen fremden Einfluss zu. Bei übereinstimmenden Vorstellungen begrüßte sie selbstverständlich die Mitwirkung anderer Höfe – insbesondere des in Berlin und Wien. Friedrich II. bemühte sich nach dem Siebenjährigen Krieg, das Bündnis mit Russland durch ein Verwandtschaftsgewebe zu festigen. Gleichzeitig suchten kleinere deutsche Staaten nach einem Gegenwert zum abnehmenden französischen Interesse an Reichsproblemen, anders gesagt, Frankreich hatte nicht mehr genug Kraft, sich gegen eventuelle Änderungen im Reich zu wehren. Aus diesem Grund stieg die Bedeutung der russischen Freundschaft. „Jedenfalls mehrten sich Stimmen, die am beruhigenden Einfluss Russlands auf die Politik Wiens oder auf den österreichisch-preußischen Dualismus interessiert waren, oder die sich von Russland eine Garantie der Reichsverfassung erhofften.“36 In dieser Hinsicht muss die Heiratspolitik als eine Bemühung, unmittelbaren Einfluss in Mitteleuropa zu gewinnen, verstanden werden.

36

SCHARF, S. 274.

The Attitude of Chancellor Metternich towards the Treaty of Adrianople1 Miroslav Šedivý

The Treaty of Adrianople of September 14, 1829, is doubtless one of the most important peace settlements in the history of the Eastern Question. It ended the eighteen month long Russian-Ottoman war and it also became an important turning point in the Greeks’ struggle for independence although absolute freedom was not granted the Greeks until February of the following year. The peace terms exposed the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and considerably strengthened the Russian position in the Near East. Perhaps no European diplomat was indifferent to the agreement, and its conditions were discussed in a considerable number of European capitals, in particular whether they were a coup de grace for Sultan Mahmud II’s declining Empire or, on the contrary, evidence of Russian Tsar Nicholas I’s moderation. This debate was naturally held also in Vienna, where Emperor Francis I and his loyal State Chancellor, Clemens Wenzel Lothar Nepomuk Prince von Metternich-Winneburg-Beilstein-Ochsenhausen, were probably the most involved observers of the conflict between Tsar Nicholas I and Sultan Mahmud II. Regarding the immediate vicinity of Austria and the Ottoman Empire, both men could not be indifferent to the fate of the latter. Some historians regard the Austrian chancellor’s view of the peace conditions as extremely negative.2 However, the reality is much more complicated and Metternich’s attitude towards this document has not been entirely clarified up to the present time. Therefore, this study has been written to shed light on the problem and contribute to the research of the diplomatic relations between the European Powers and the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the 19th century. For the correct analysis of Metternich’s attitude towards the RussianOttoman peace treaty, it is necessary to understand the circumstances under which it was concluded. The strategic and from Constantinople not too distant city of Adrianople was occupied by Russian forces on August 20, This study has been published as a part of the GAUK research project number 257604, Metternich and the Eastern Question 1829–1841, financed by Charles University, Prague. 2 Alexander BITIS, Russia and the Eastern Question. Army, Government, and Society 1815–1833, Oxford, New York 2006, p. 361. 1

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1829.3 Nothing could prevent Russian General Diebitsch’s army from marching against the capital. Nevertheless, the situation of the tsar’s troops was not as good as it appeared. Nobody in Vienna knew that they were seriously afflicted by diseases and in reality unable to attack the metropolis on the Bosporus. Moreover, the number of Russian soldiers was erroneously estimated by the Austrian internuncio in Constantinople, Baron Franz Ottenfels, at 60 0004 when in fact their number did not amount to half of that.5 The sultan’s empire seemed to be teetering on the bank of collapse, and only a promptly made peace settlement could save it. There was a widespread concern in Vienna about a possible refusal of the Porte to end the war and the consequent entry of the Russian army into Constantinople.6 Therefore, Metternich advised the sultan to make peace as quickly as possible.7 In the interest of the settlement of the crisis also threatening relations among the European countries, Metternich preferred considerably unfavorable peace conditions for the Porte to the continuation of “a situation that leaves Europe in a miserable uncertainty and that is too dangerous for the future”.8 In short, according to the chancellor, Mahmud II had no other option than to conclude peace.9 Owing to the sultan’s hopeless situation, none of his advisors dared to advise him to refuse Diebitsch’s peace terms and thereby “produce a catastrophe on the capital that could be pernicious for the existence of the Ottoman throne”.10 When the representatives of the Great Powers also urged Mahmud II to sign the peace treaty, the war was ended in Adrianople on September 14, 1829, despite the fact that the sultan found the conditions “exorbitant, onerous, humiliating and unacceptable”.11 The conditions Metternich to Trauttmannsdorff, Plas, September 2, 1829, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna (henceforth: HHStA), Staatskanzlei (henceforth: StK), Preussen 132. 4 Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, September 5, 1829, HHStA, Staatenabteilungen (henceforth: StA), Türkei VI, 38. 5 BITIS, p. 316. 6 Montmorency-Laval to Polignac, Vienna, September 16, 1829; Schwebel to Polignac, Vienna, September 24, 1829, both Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères Paris (henceforth: AEE), Correspondance Politique (henceforth: CP), Autriche 411. 7 Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, September 16, 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 39. 8 Maltzahn to Frederick William III, Vienna, September 8, 1829, Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz in Berlin (henceforth: GStA PK), HA III, Ministerium des Auswärtigen I (henceforth: MdA I), Nr. 6013. 9 Metternich to Ottenfels, Plas, August 30, 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 39. 10 Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, September 11, 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 38 11 Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, September 10, 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 38. 3

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included some Russian territorial gains in the Caucasus (Poti, Anapa, Akhaltsykh, Akhalkalaki and Atskhur) and the Danubian Delta: in other words the islands in the St. George mouth with an important trade center, Sulina; the restitution of six districts to Serbia according to the Bucharest Treaty and the Akerman Convention; the autonomy for Greece; the free pass for all Russian goods through the Straits; 1,5 million Dutch ducats as a trade indemnity for the financial damage the Ottoman Porte had caused to the Russian Empire from 1806 to 1828, and another 10 million Dutch ducats as a war indemnity for the damages inflicted during the period 1828–1829. The Principalities and Silistria were to be occupied until the indemnities were paid.12 The second problem concerning the correct analysis of Metternich’s reaction to the peace conditions is the way in which he was informed about the conclusion of the Treaty of Adrianople. His first reactions cannot really be considered as his definitive opinion because at first the Austrian chancellor only reacted to the proposal of the convention, the details of which he was informed about in Ottenfels’s despatch dated September 10, 1829. French historian Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny saw the reason for Metternich’s shift in opinions precisely in the delay between the receipt of the proposed peace settlement and its final form: in other words between September 25 and 26 and the beginning of October.13 The problem concerning Sauvigny’s opinion is that the plan and the definite peace terms differed de facto only in the length of the occupation of the Danubian Principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia: according to Ottenfels, Diebitsch demanded 20 years,14 whereas in the final peace settlement the period was reduced to 10 years. Initially, Metternich thought that the peace was made upon the conditions mentioned by the internuncio,15 but though he already

M. S. ANDERSON, The Great Powers and the Near East 1774–1923, London 1970, pp. 33–35; BITIS, pp. 353–356; N. CIACHIR, The Adrianople Treaty (1829) and its European Implications, in: Revue des études sud-est européennes 17, No. 4. (1979), pp. 706–707. 13 Guillaume de Bertier de SAUVIGNY, Metternich et la France après le congrès de Vienne, tome III: Au temps de Charles X – 1824/1830, Paris 1970, p. 1313. 14 Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, September 10, 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 38; See also the attached plan of the peace agreement conveyed by Reis Efendi to Ottenfels in an undated despatch. 15 Schwebel to Polignac, Vienna, September 25, 1829, AAE, CP, Autriche 411. 12

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knew about the shorter occupation of the Principalities on September 26,16 his considerably negative attitude tempered only several days later. This means that the receipt of the definite form of the peace treaty could not by itself have changed Metternich’s scepticism and defeatism although it probably contributed to it to a certain extent. The researched documents do not offer a clear explanation why Metternich’s attitude towards the peace settlement became significantly more conciliatory during the final days of September. The most probable reason was the influence of his close friend and collaborator, Friedrich von Gentz, who had viewed the conditions of the Treaty of Adrianople more positively from the very beginning.17 The fact that must be empasized is that it was in particular Metternich’s opinion of the existence of the treaty, in other words the signing of it, which changed, not his view on its conditions. Regarding these, his consternation undoubtedly lessened and some condemnations were soon forgotten, but in general the conditions were still considered burdensome. In any case, on September 25 and 26, 1829, Metternich was definitely shocked. He made no secret of his opinion that the peace conditions “seem to threaten strongly not only the integrity but also the very existence of the Ottoman Empire”.18 He wrote to the Austrian ambassador in London, Prince Paul Esterházy, about irreparable damage and the uncertain future of the sultan’s empire.19 He even declared in the presence of the French representative in Vienna: “The fall of the Ottoman Empire is inevitable and imminent, it will cause the birth of a new political system in Europe, [and] it will cause complications and incalculable consequences.”20 Even a decennary occupation of the Principalities was too long and was “in fact equivalent to the cession of those Provinces to Russia, and no one acquainted with her policy can alter himself to believe that after so long [an] occupation she will consent to evacuate them”.21 Their almost absolute independence and the emancipation from the sultan’s authority threatened to make from the Principalities a second Crimea, that, at the time of On Metternich’s knowledge of the decennary occupation on September 26 see Cowley to Aberdeen, Vienna, September 26, 1829, The National Archives: Public Record Office in London (henceforth: NA), Foreign Office (henceforth: FO) 120/105. However, it is possible to find Metternich’s reaction on twenty years lasting occupation from the same day. Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, September 26, 1829, HHStA, StA, England 188. 17 BITIS, p. 361. 18 Maltzahn to Frederick William III, Vienna, September 26, 1829, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, Nr. 6013. 19 Metternich to Esterházy, Linz, September 21, 1829, HHStA, StA, England 188. 20 Schwebel to Polignac, Vienna, September 25, 1829, AAE, CP, Autriche 411. 21 Cowley to Aberdeen, Vienna, September 26, 1829, NA, FO 120/105. 16

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Catherine II the Great’s reign, had obtained autonomy and was later annexed by Russia. Concerning other conditions of the peace treaty, according to the chancellor, the incorporation of six districts into autonomous Serbia and the entire fulfilment of the relevant articles of the Akerman Convention changed this province into a de facto “independent and powerful country because of the warlike spirit of its people”.22 The size of the indemnities was a serious blow to Ottoman finances, and the condition of the withdrawal of the Russian forces after the repayment of the indemnities was considered in Vienna as highly injurious to the sultan’s authority. Owing to the territorial gains in Asia, Russia became a factual master of Ottoman Armenia and a moderator of Asia Minor. The cession of the mouth of the Danube to Russia, as Metternich later added, was likewise detrimental to Austria as well as to the Ottoman Empire, and he described it as depriving the former of the navigation of the river.23 For the Danube Monarchy, the islands were in no case only a tiny, unimportant strip of land as some historians claim.24 The delineation of the frontiers of still autonomous Greece according to the protocol of March 22, 1829, created a new power in the Mediterranean allied with Russia. In short, on September 26, 1829, Metternich still considered the treaty as fatal to the independence of the Ottoman Empire and as placing that empire at the mercy of Russia. In his opinion, the sultan ceased to be the sovereign of an independent empire.25 Therefore, the chancellor did not share Ottenfels’s regret about the fact that Austria had been excluded from the peace talks and that the internuncio had not been invited to the negotiations by the representatives of Great Britain, France, Prussia or by the Ottoman dignitaries. On the contrary, Metternich thanked “the heavens for the escape from the necessity to cooperate in a work of destruction”.26 Nevertheless, he entirely agreed with Ottenfels’s extensive analysis of the peace conditions.27 The internuncio regarded the treaty as “the hardest, the most humiliating that had ever been

Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, September 26, 1829, HHStA, StA, England 188. Cowley to Aberdeen, Vienna, October 17, 1829, NA, FO 120/104. 24 Alan PALMER, Metternich. Councillor of Europe, London 1972, p. 242; Alan SKED, Metternich and Austria. An Evaluation, New York 2008, p. 84. Metternich’s negative attitude towards the Russian annexation of the Danubian Delta did not later change. 25 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, September 26, 1829, HHStA, StA, England 188. 26 Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, September 10, 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 38; Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, September 26, 1829, HHStA, StA, England 188. 27 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, October 17, 1829, HHStA, StA, England 188. 22 23

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dictated by a victor to a weak enemy”.28 Apart from the territorial losses in Asia and the enormous indemnities imposed on the Porte, he considered as rather problematic the clause obliging the Ottomans to ensure the free navigation of commercial vessels through the Straits. Russia reserved the right to consider every merest infraction of this obligation as an act of hostility and a justified reason for the declaration of war. Any incident, no important how insignificant, thus gave the tsar the authorization to open a new campaign against Constantinople.29 Ottenfels naturally came out in particular against two clauses of the agreement that directly touched the Austrian interests: the annexation of the Danubian Delta with Sulina and the military occupation of the Principalities until the repayment of the indemnities. The obligation to destroy several fortresses on the right bank of the Danube and the recognition of the autonomous status of both Principalities de facto deprived the Porte of these lands and put them into Russian hands. Austria would lose its influence in Moldavia and Wallachia. In short: The treaty ought to have serious consequences for the Ottoman Empire and, even though the Moslem inhabitants seemed to be peaceful, the Greeks, the Armenians or the numerous Slavs living within the empire obtained an incentive for an eventual battle for complete independence. However, this did not concern the Serbs, the Moldavians or the Wallachians, who, in Ottenfels’s opinion, had already in reality obtained it. There was nothing that Metternich could add to these views and he reacted only with these words: “The overview that you have pithily and in detail outlined of the peace and its influence on the future existence of the Porte and of its consequences is unfortunately only too accurate.”30 In the course of September, Metternich talked with some sarcasm about the moderation that the tsar had often proclaimed during the war and his promise that he would not seize any territory in Europe. The chancellor was sceptical at least about the first promise because the word “moderation” had too wide an interpretation.31 He wrote to the Austrian envoy in Berlin, Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, September 25, 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 38. 29 Though Metternich shared Ottenfels’s opinion of the article in a contract, he thought it ought to be understood more as a threat than strictly literally. De Bray to Ludwig I von Bayern, Vienna, October 22, 1829, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv in München (henceforth: BHStA), Ministerium des königlichen Hauses und des Äußern (henceforth: MA), Wien 2402. 30 Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, October 17, 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 39. 31 Metternich to Ficquelmont, Plas, September 1, 1829, HHStA, StA, Russland III, 88; Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, September 17, 1829, HHStA, StA, Frankreich 271. 28

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Count Joseph von Trauttmannsdorff-Weinsberg, on September 10, 1829: “Embarking on a large enterprise upon only a condition of confidence in the moderation of one of the contractual parties is not formulating a sensible policy, it is seeking an adventure. Moderation is always a relative quality; its application is a matter of many variables, as well as of the situations to which it can be applied. Founding a large and common political enterprise upon a mere guaranty of moderation is like blowing in the wind, it is gambling the future over a map, it is finally engaging in a round in which the players are exposed to the highest probability of losses.”32 Though Metternich expected that the peace conditions would be a lethal poison that would give more years of life to the empire of the crescent moon but that would finally deprive it of life and would lead to its downfall,33 he did not presume that Russia would aspire to territorial gains in the Continent.34 Considering the promises and the surprising seizure of the Danubian Delta, the chancellor regarded the peace conditions as harsh.35 They did not comply with the hopes that had been nurtured in Vienna as a consequence of the tsar’s moderate statements. Despite this fact, Metternich could not and did not blame Nicholas I for taking advantage of the situation for his own benefit.36 Metternich’s proclaimed antipathy towards the peace settlement abated at the turn of September and October 1829. Even though he still considered the situation within the Ottoman Empire to be serious, with regard to the events accompanying the signing of the treaty he saw in the Russian conditions a certain proof of moderation and he did not claim any more that the Treaty of Adrianople was a blow to the Ottoman dominion in Europe and that it would inevitably cause its fall.37 From Metternich’s correspondence and talks with foreign diplomats, it is obvious that relief that „a great disorder has been terminated“ replaced consternation.38 Now,

Metternich to Trauttmannsdorff, Plas, September 10, 1829, HHStA, StK, Preussen 132. Montmorency-Laval to Polignac, Vienna, September 11, 1829, AAE, CP, Autriche 411. 34 Cowley to Aberdeen, Vienna, September 8, 1829, NA, FO 120/105; Metternich to Trauttmannsdorff, Plas, August 25, 1829, HHStA, StK, Preussen 132. 35 Cowley to Aberdeen, Vienna, September 24 and 26, 1829, NA, FO 120/105. 36 Maltzahn to Frederick William III, Vienna, September 26, 1829, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, Nr. 6013. 37 However, it is true that some sigh can be found also in Metternich’s correspondence written during October 1829. For example, in his instructions for Ottenfels he talked about the peace as “an unfortunate result”. Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, October 17, 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 39. 38 Metternich to Trauttmannsdorff, Vienna, September 29, 1829, HHStA, StK, Preussen 132. 32 33

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he manifested his satisfaction39 and appreciated the restoration of peace that finished not only the war but also the unhappy Greek affair that had been its cause.40 The joy at the end of the conflict prevailed in Vienna, and, despite the unconcealed concerns about the consequences that the peace treaty could have for the Porte, the cabinet was well aware of the fact that the sultan had not been able to obtain better conditions owing to the Porte’s hopeless situation.41 The continuation of the war could be beneficial neither to the Porte nor to Austria, and it could cause only a general conflagration welcomed only by the enemies of the order. Therefore, Metternich did not speak about the peace in such dark tones any more and presented it as “an immense boon”.42 He did not think any more about “new political combinations or a new system of alliances”43 and even though he did not conceal that he wished that the Ottomans had not had to sign such a disadvantageous treaty,44 he did not agree with British Prime Minister Duke Wellington, who found its conditions as incompatible with the further existence of the sultan’s Empire.45 In the first half of October, Metternich solved an almost philosophical question as to whether the peace conditions should be generally considered moderate or immoderate. How difficult the answer was is evident from Metternich’s instructions to the Austrian ambassador in St. Petersburg, Count Ludwig Ficquelmont: “It is essential to distinguish between two questions: it is necessary to separate the question of the end of the RussianTurkish war and the question of influence that this [end] will have to have on Europe from that of the peace conditions and their effects, both on the respective positions of two reconciled Empires and on other European countries. The first of these two matters, the end of the war, must be included not only among the most fortunate events but also it must be welcomed as conditio sine qua non; I do not say the triumph of the system of conservation but rather a possibility that the system of political disorder will be forced to postpone the triumph to which its adherents looked

De Bray to Ludwig I von Bayern, Vienna, October 22, 1829, BHStA, MA, Wien 2402. Schwebel to Polignac, Vienna, October 1, 1829, AAE, CP, Autriche 411. 41 Schwebel to Polignac, Vienna, October 10, 1829, AAE, CP, Autriche 411. 42 Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, October 2, 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 39; Metternich to Ficquelmont, Vienna, October 5, 1839, HHStA, StA, Russland III, 88. 43 Schwebel to Polignac, Vienna, November 14, 1829, AAE, CP, Autriche 411. 44 Rayneval to Polignac, Vienna, January 25, 1830, AAE, CP, Autriche 412. 45 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, October 28, 1829, HHStA, StA, England 188; Maltzahn to Frederick William III, Vienna, October 27, 1829, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, Nr. 6013. 39

40

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forward.”46 In other words, for the situation in Europe the convention was beneficial and thus moderate, but for the Ottoman Empire it was not so moderate because “each of its stipulations ruins the rest of Ottoman independence”.47 However, it was not the whole conclusion. A week later, the chancellor declared in his instructions to Trauttmannsdorff: “The peace has terminated the Russian-Turkish war. Its conditions are moderate or ominous, depending on where the judge who must pronouce is located. It has saved the Ottoman Empire from its inevitable perdition only to place the existence of the empire in a precarious situation.”48 In short: The conditions were moderate regarding the situation of the Porte at the moment of concluding the peace, but immoderate regarding the consequences for its future.49 In the interest of the renewal of good relations with Russia that had considerably deteriorated during the war, Metternich did not show his disconcertion in the presence of the Russian ambassador in Vienna, D. P. Tatishchev. Although in talks with the British ambassador, Lord Cowley, the Austrian chancellor still talked about the peace as destructive for the Porte as a power, and about the occupation of the Principalities as a perpetual thorn in the side of Austria, he did not come out with any remonstrances upon any article of the treaty50 and the Austrian official statements relating to the peace were also rather reserved.51 With respect to the good relations between Berlin and St. Petersburg, Metternich did not hesitate to assure the Prussian envoy, Bogislaw Freiherr von Maltzahn, at the end of September 1829 that owing to the brilliant success of the tsar’s forces, the peace conditions had to be regarded as moderate.52 The chancellor informed him with the same caution of Ottenfels’s strong criticism of the peace conditions as being the opinions of one Austrian diplomat and not the entire Austrian cabinet.53 Emperor Francis I congratulated Nicholas I on the ending of the war, but he did not express his opinion of the treaty. Tatishchev, who read Francis I’s letter before its despatch, noticed that no remark about the tsar’s moderation towards the Porte had been made and expressed his concern Metternich to Ficquelmont, Vienna, October 5, 1839, HHStA, StA, Russland III, 88. Ibid. 48 Metternich to Trauttmannsdorff, Vienna, October 12, 1829, HHStA, StK, Preussen 132. 49 Metternich to Ficquelmont, Vienna, October 5, 1839, HHStA, StK, Russland III, 88. 50 Cowley to Aberdeen, Vienna, October 4, 1829, NA, FO 120/104. 51 De Bray to Ludwig I von Bayern, Vienna, October 22, 1829, BHStA, MA, Wien 2402. 52 Maltzahn to Frederick William III, Vienna, September 29, 1829, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, Nr. 6013. 53 Maltzahn to Frederick William III, Vienna, October 16, 1829, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, Nr. 6013. 46 47

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that this could be viewed with regret in St. Petersburg. Metternich replied: “It is not necessary in a letter of mere congratulation upon the termination of the war to comment on the conditions of the peace, and I think you may be satisfied with our silence upon that text.”54 As it happened, the letter came up to expectations and had favourable response in St. Petersburg.55 Metternich’s reaction to the Treaty of Adrianople was not only passive. Though he could do nothing with the Russian seizure of the Danubian Delta, at least he tried to hasten the Russian withdrawal from the Principalities. According to the chancellor, the “deplorable duration”56 of their withdrawal was the most dangerous result of the Russian-Ottoman war.57 Already in the course of the summer of 1829, he was disquieted by some Russian plans for the reform of the Principalities, for example by a planned election of a prince and the creation of a local army. Such a reform could provoke the local leaders’ struggle for independence and increase Russian influence.58 He was also disconcerted by Russian General P. F. Zheltukhin’s proclamation preceding the assembly of boyars. According to Metternich, the Russians tried to create a political constitution for both lands,59 which was an entirely justified concern.60 The only way to the earlier withdrawal of the Russian forces was a quick repayment of the Ottoman indemnities. The treaty enabled such a possibility, but the problem lay in the fact that the Porte was unable, after many years of battles with the Greeks and the exhausting war with its powerful northern neighbour, to obtain such an enormous amount.61 The advantage of a faster repayment was thus only illusionary. Any European power would have been able to solve such a complicated situation by a loan, but the sultan had no similar opportunities in his country.62 Therefore, Metternich started to deal with the possibility of acquiring for the Porte a loan of 300 million francs to be provided by European bankers. Even though Cowley to Aberdeen, Vienna, October 17, 1829, NA, FO 120/104. Ficquelmont to Metternich, St. Petersburg, October 28, 1829, HHStA, StA, Russland III, 86. 56 Metternich to Ficquelmont, Vienna, October 5, 1839, HHStA, StA, Russland III, 88. 57 Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, October 2, 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 39. 58 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, July 13, 1829, HHStA, StA, England 188; Brockhausen to Frederick William III, Vienna, July 19, 1829, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, Nr. 6013. 59 Metternich to Trauttmannsdorff, Vienna, August 4, 1829, HHStA, StK, Preussen 132, with attached General Zheltukhin’s note to the Walachian Divan, June 21, 1829. 60 See BITIS, p. 442. 61 Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, September 25, 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 38. 62 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, October 4, 1829, HHStA, StA, England 188. 54 55

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the chancellor was well aware of the difficulties accompanying such an arrangement, he and his associate Gentz considered its execution to be of considerable importance for Austrian interests.63 It is clearly evident not only from Metternich’s correspondence but also from foreign diplomats’ reports how much he cared about the evacuation of the European part of the Ottoman Empire.64 The first issue was to find financially strong enough bankers willing to offer the loan. A considerable number of prominent bankers and capitalists in Vienna expressed their willingness to consider the plan.65 The Parisian bankers approached by Austrian Ambassador Count Anton Apponyi were also prepared to offer the money, but they demanded an excessive rate of 20 percent interest as well as the guarantees of Great Britain, France and Austria.66 Metternich understood the justice of the claim on the guarantees and because, as he laconically declared, “the lenders are needed and they demand guarantees”,67 he turned in this matter to the governments in London and Paris.68 However, in London Duke Wellington as well as Foreign Secretary Lord Aberdeen were opposed to the underwriting of guarantees.69 Prince Esterházy met with the latter in the second half of November 1829 to discuss with him the loan for the Porte. Aberdeen pointed out the problems accompanying the execution of the plan and mentioned the fact that Nicholas I had promised the reduction of indemnities. Therefore, it would be premature to undertake anything until the tsar’s decision was known. Though he would welcome the success of the plan, the British cabinet could do nothing in the matter.70 French Premier Jules August Armand Marie Prince Polignac also raised similar objections at the end of October 1829. He found the whole scheme premature until the moment when the modifications of the peace treaty were known. He also demured that the Porte would refuse the loan because the payment of interests was incompatible with the religious canons

Maltzahn to Frederick William III, Vienna, October 9, 1829, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, Nr. 6013. 64 Maltzahn to Frederick William III, Vienna, November 14, 1829, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, Nr. 6013. 65 Bartillat to Apponyi, undated, attached to Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, December 23, 1829, HHStA, StA, Frankreich 270. 66 Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, October 22, 1829, HHStA, StA, Frankreich 270. 67 Metternich to Trauttmannsdorff, Vienna, October 12, 1829, HHStA, StK, Preussen 132. 68 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, October 4, 1829, HHStA, StA, England 188. 69 Esterházy to Metternich, London, October 12, 1829, HHStA, StA, England 186. 70 Esterházy to Metternich, London, November 27, 1829, HHStA, StA, England 186. 63

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of Islam.71 Apponyi’s prediction that France would refuse to participate in the plan proved to be true two days before Christmas Eve when Polignac informed the Austrian ambassador about the French government’s definite decision to abstain from any cooperation that could cause serious problems to France. Moreover, Paris had formerly declined to participate in a loan for Spanish King Ferdinand VII. The Spanish interests were naturally more important for the Parisian cabinet than those of the Porte. Consequently, Polignac saw no reason to grant Mahmud II something that had been refused to Ferdinand VII.72 Metternich had to proceed alone. Despite this fact he won over the members of the powerful Rothschilds family, in Vienna as well as in London, to the plan. They were prepared to open negotiations on the condition of the Russian consent.73 In this respect, Metternich obviously succeeded, probably owing to the Prussian support.74 Regarding the riskiness of the plan, the Rothschilds also found it necessary to obtain the guarantees of one or more of the Great Powers. They naturally also expected guarantees on the part of the Porte.75 However, even after the refusal of the Western powers, they were still prepared to negotiate, even if not with much enthusiasm,76 but they still insisted on the provision of the guarantees by the sultan. In Ottenfels’s opinion, the silver and copper mines in Asia Minor and construction timber could serve this purpose.77 According to Metternich, the tributes from the Danubian Principalities, Serbia and still autonomous Greece could be added. These revenues could be controlled by the powers.78 It was more difficult to persuade the Porte to accept the loan than to find the lender. At the beginning of October, the internuncio had already been charged with the investigation into the Ottoman financial state of affairs and the assessment as to whether Mahmud II could not hasten the repayment.79 In the second half of October, Ottenfels was instructed to advise the sultan Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, October 29, 1829, HHStA, StA, Frankreich 270. Apponyi to Metternich, Paris, December 23, 1829, HHStA, StA, Frankreich 270. 73 Cowley to Aberdeen, Vienna, November 8, 1829, NA, FO 120/104; Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, October 17, 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 39. 74 Metternich to Trauttmannsdorff, Vienna, October 12, 1829, HHStA, StK, Preussen 132. The degree of the Prussian involvement in the affair and the Russian attitude must be answered upon a thorough research of the archival correspondence housed in Berlin and Moscow. 75 Esterházy to Metternich, London, November 27, 1829, HHStA, StA, England 186. 76 De Bray to Ludwig I von Bayern, Vienna, May 18, 1830, BHStA, MA, Wien 2403. 77 Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, September 25, 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 38. 78 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, October 28, 1829, HHStA, StA, England 188. 79 Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, October 2, 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 39. 71

72

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to consider the acceptance of the loan if he did not find any other source of income.80 Ottenfels described the situation of the Ottoman treasury in rather dismal terms. In his opinion, the sultan would be unable to secure the money needed for faster repayment of the debt. Moreover, Ottoman Foreign Minister Pertev Efendi declared that the Porte was absolutely unable to repay the indemnities in full. Nevertheless, at first, the Porte refused to contemplate borrowing money and counted on the tsar’s generosity.81 This attitude was probably caused by Pertev Efendi’s dislike of the loan. The change did not occur until the accession of a new Foreign Minister, Mehmed Hamid Bey, in the second half of January 1830.82 The aversion of the Porte caused delay in the opening of direct negotiations with the Rothschilds, the negotiations preferred by Metternich to make sure that the sultan was in good hands and would not fall victim to speculators.83 Since Russia agreed to the offering of the loan, Metternich and the Rothschilds agreed upon the sending of an agent of the banking house to Constantinople who would learn the financial revenues of the Ottoman Empire and the sources utilizable for the guarantees.84 Finally, Mr Goldsmith was chosen.85 He arrived in the Ottoman capital on May 7, 1830, and opened talks with Ottenfels’s full support. The internuncio was instructed to persuade the Porte to conclude an agreement with the Rothschilds86 and to draw the sultan’s attention to the fact that an eventual contract would hasten the departure of the Russians from the occupied provinces, which would be considerably advantageous for the Porte: it would gain their tributes for its treasury.87 Goldsmith wanted to secure the loan by the production of the copper mines in Asia Minor and the monopolies on the trade with silk and opium. In this matter, Ottenfels was not very optimistic.88 This scepticism proved to be well founded in July 1830 when the Porte officially refused to take a loan Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, October 17, 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 39; Cowley to Aberdeen, Vienna, October 17, 1829, PRO, FO 120/104. 81 Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, October 26 and November 10, 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 38 82 Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, January 25 and March 10, 1830, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 50. 83 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, October 28, 1829, HHStA, StA, England 188. 84 Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, April 10, 1830, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 51. 85 De Bray to Ludwig I von Bayern, Vienna, May 18, 1830, BHStA, MA, Wien 2403. 86 Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, April 10, 1830, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 51. 87 Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, February 17, 1830, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 51. 88 Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, May 10 and June 11, 1830, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 50. 80

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from the Rothschilds. The official reason for the rejection was an alleged sufficient supply of money, which the sultan had at his disposal and planned to use to cover the financial obligations towards Russia. Ottenfels regarded this explanation as untrue because the sultan’s financial need was generally well known. The internuncio saw the real reason for the refusal in “the sense of impotence to offer a sufficient security or a guarantee to the House of Rothschilds for covering the loan”.89 There are questions whether the delayed sending of Mr Goldsmith in the spring of 1830 was caused only by Pertev Effendi’s attitude towards borrowing money and whether the refusal was caused only by the abovementioned reasons or whether there was some impact of the Russo-Ottoman negotiations in St. Petersburg about the moderation of some clauses of the Treaty of Adrianople on both issues. The Porte had strived to achieve the changes in the treaty since September 1829 when it decided to send its negotiator Halil Pasha to the Russian capital.90 Though it is impossible to offer a clear answer to these questions from the documents researched by this essay’s author, it is possible to explain Metternich’s opinion of the tsar’s moderate conduct towards the Ottoman Empire, in particular his promise to decrease the war indemnities and not to occupy the Principalities for the agreed period of 10 years.91 The first promise became reality on April 26, 1830, when Nicholas I reduced the war indemnities to 8 million ducats that could, under certain circumstances, be reduced by another million. The second promise of the earlier withdrawal was fulfilled in 1834 when the Russians recalled all their troops from the Ottoman dominion in Europe.92 The Austrian chancellor viewed these concessions with scepticism because according to him they did not result from the tsar’s generosity but rather from necessity. The military occupation of the Principalities was a burden for the local inhabitants and it was better for Russia not to burden them and thus risk losing their allegiance.93 Regarding the amount imposed on the Porte, it was considered to be unrealistic and unpayable. Consequently, Nicholas I did nothing other than demonstrate his recognition of

Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, July 26, 1830, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 50, with an attached Mustafa Bey’s letter to Mr. Rothschild (to Vienna), Constantinople, July 11, 1830. 90 Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, September 25 and October 26, 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 38. 91 Ficquelmont to Metternich, St. Petersburg, September 30 and October 28, 1829, HHStA, StA, Russland III, 86. 92 BITIS, pp. 376–377. 93 Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, November 15, 1829, HHStA, StA, England 188. 89

The Attitude of Chancellor Metternich... 129 ________________________________________________________

these facts by his would-be generous gesture.94 Despite the reduction of the indemnities, Metternich maintained a position that Mahmud II would still have to pay too much and even if he had the money at his disposal, which was precisely what the chancellor doubted, the repayment would still be a burden for the Ottoman Empire, and this led Metternich to continue supporting the idea of the loan until the sultan’s firm rejection of it in July 1830.95 In conclusion, the result of the Russian-Ottoman war strengthened the tsar’s influence within the sultan’s empire, particularly in the Caucasus and the Balkans. If the first territory had no importance for the Habsburg Empire, the fate of the latter was crucial for Austrian interests. The Russian annexation of Sulina and the several year long occupation of the Principalities allowing the Russian reformative activities in Moldavia and Wallachia were undoubtedly serious defeats for Metternich, who was well aware of this. However, he welcomed the ending of the conflict and the Greeks’ struggle for independence because he saw peace in the Levant as an important prerequisite for general stability in Europe. The fact that hopes for a stable future and the restoration of diplomatic ties between all European Powers were not satisfied in the following months and years was to be another painful blow to him.

94 95

Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, May 20, 1830, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 51. Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, April 10, 1830, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 51.

Arthur Gobineau and Greece: A view of a man of letters and diplomat Ivo Budil

Arthur Gobineau1 (1816–1882) entered the history of Western political thinking as one of the key founders of modern racial ideology. In addition to Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Georges Vacher de Lapouge Gobineau was often considered to be linked directly with the origin of Nazi racist totalitarianism. However, some authors argued that in the light of the character of Gobineau’s work such an evaluation was a considerable simplification. For instance, Pierre-André Taguieff labelled Gobineau a “pessimistic racist” in his book La Couleur et le sang, Doctrines racistes à la française (1998), for Gobineau’s fatalistic philosophy of history differed substantially from Gustav Le Bon’s activist ideology (an evolutionary and socially Darwinist racist) and Georges Vacher de Lapouge (an eugenic racist). Gobineau’s pessimistic fatalism reflects a belief in the unsustainability of civilised life as such as a consequence of racial interbreeding. This contradicts the spirit of Hitler’s racist revolution striving for a radical

Arthur Gobineau is in most studies referred to as Arthur de Gobineau or even Comte Arthur de Gobineau. In this way researchers are deceived by Gobineau’s own mystification because this writer came from a middle-class family, was not of aristocratic origin and was not entitled to use the title. The last will written by Gobineau’s grandgrand-father Pierre-Joseph, “conseiller du Roi honoraire en la cour des aides et finances de Guyenne, demeurant à Bordeaux, rue Porte-Dijeaux, paroisse Puipaulin”, on 3 March 1769 is signed merely “Gobineau” without any title. His two children, Jean Gobineau and Thibault-Joseph Gobineau, “conseiller du Roi au Parlament de Bordeaux”, did not have an aristocratic form of their names, either. The birth certificate of Joseph-Arthur Gobineau of Ville-d’Avray dated 20 October 1816 does not bear a title. Arthur Gobineau first used it when he was dealing with formalities connected to his wedding in 1846 (Jean BOISSEL, Gobineau, biographie, mythes et réalité, Paris 1993, p. 35). Arthur de Gobineau first passed himself off as a “Comte” in 1853, when he held the position of first secretary of the French embassy in Bern (BOISSEL, p. 36). Maxime du Camp wrote in Souvenirs littéraires published in 1881 and 1882 in La Revue des Deux Mondes that “Gobineau’s uncle was a grocer in Bordeaux. All Gobineau claims about his origin is a lie” (Tout ce qui touche à l’origine de Gobineaux est faux; cit. BOISSEL, p. 34). He suffered from “nobility obsession” (Il avait la folie de la noblesse; cit. BOISSEL, p. 34). 1

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reconstruction of society on the grounds of social Darwinism.2 Despite these objections academic circles still hold the opinion expressed by Stephen Jay Gould, who considers Arthur Gobineau “the father of modern scientific racism“3 and “the most influential academic racist of the 19th century”.4 Taguieff’s remark that after Arthur Gobineau too automatically identified 1945 rejecting Gobineau with anti-fascism and the work became “the shame of France” sparked off criticism.5 Fears of possible convergence between studying Arthur Gobineau and the ideology of the New Right mean that in the present socially and ethnically disturbed France interest in this author’s literary legacy is on the ebb again. Not even attempts by A. B. Duff, Jean Gaulmier and Jean Boissel,6 who intended to present Gobineau especially as a remarkable representative of French Late Romanticism, one whom Jean Mistler labelled “the greatest of the unknowns of the nineteenth century”, were successful.7 This study is not intended to interpret Gobineau's main “racist“ work Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines (1853–1855), the reception of which has so far been rather contradictory. I will try to show that the historical pessimism, fatalism and conservatism, which are the key features of the Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines as well as all of Gobineau’s later works is not an inherent feature underlying Gobineau’s entire legacy. The thinking of Gobineau, though perhaps always tending towards aristocratic and romantic exclusiveness, underwent a certain development and showed a certain degree of flexibility. This fact is best proved by Charles Maurras, the founder and leader of French rightist movement Action française, spoke about “incompetent Gobineau” (BOISSEL, p. 13), and, on the other hand, stressed the merits of Fustel de Coulanges (Charles MAURRAS, Réflexions sur la révolution de 1789, Paris 1948, p. IV). Houston Stewart Chamberlain, a true representative of pangermanism, considered Gobineau’s theories to be “disagreeable” and his philosophy to be “unbearable” (BOISSEL, p. 13). 3 Stephen Jay GOULD, Jak neměřit člověka, Pravda a předsudky v dějinách hodnocení lidské inteligence, Praha 1997, p. 368. 4 GOULD, p. 369. 5 http://www.geocities.com/demainlemonde/books/taguieff.htm, 16.1. 2008. 6 Etudes gobiniennes, a professional periodical published from 1966 to 1978 and founded by A. B. Duff from Hebrew University in Jerusalem and Jean Gaulmier, who worked at University in Strasbourg for twenty years and published two studies on Gobineau (Le Spectre de Gobineau, Paris 1965; Gobineau et sa fortune littéraire, Paris 1971). Jean Boissel was the author of Gobineau polémiste (1967), Gobineau, l’Orient et l’Iran (1973), Gobineau (1816–1882), Un Don Quichotte tragique (1981) and Gobineau, biographie, mythe et réalité (1993) and the editor of three-volume comprehensive edition of Gobineau’s works within Bibliothèque de la Pléiade (Gobineau, Oeuvres,1983, 1987, Scaramouche, Essais sur l’inégalité des races humaines, Mademoiselle Irnois a Nouvelles asiatiques). 7 “Plus grand méconnu du XIXe siècle” (BOISSEL, p. 18). 2

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pointing at Gobineau's interpretation of a phenomenon which he was interested in as a diplomat and man of letters: the struggle for Greek independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Arthur Gobineau was not an unbiased observer. He served in Athens from 1864 to 1868 as French ambassador representing the imperial regime of Napoleon III. In many respects, this was the climactic point of his diplomatic career. And Gobineau devoted two important studies to the Greek issue as well as the question of the East in the context of international relations. The first of these, entitled Capodistrias, was published in 1841, i.e. when he was twentyfive and had to make his way with difficulty as a poor Parisian publicist, while the other, Le Royaume des Hellènes, was published in 1878, after he had resigned from his position as ambassador in Sweden.8 Ironically enough, Arthur Gobineau, a conservative opponent of the French Revolution was born on the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille, 14 July 1816, in Ville-d’Avray on the outskirts of Paris.9 His father, Louis Gobineau moved from Bordeaux to Paris with his wife, Madeleine, in July 1812. As a convinced royalist Louis helped the Polignac brothers, supporters of the Bourbons, to escape. The role he played in the event was revealed and he was imprisoned in Sainte-Pélagie, where he stayed until he was freed by the allied forces, which arrived in Paris in March 1814.10 As soon as Napoleon had returned from Elba Louis followed Louis XVIII into his exile in Ghent. After the battle of Waterloo, Louis XVIII named him captain of the second regiment of the Royal Guard, on 23 October 1815.11 However, his family’s financial situation was still gloomy.12 Louis Gobineau was promoted to the position of commander of the 27th Infantry Regiment and was sent south to the Pyrenees on 4 December 1822 within preparations for the invasion of Spain.13 Meanwhile Madeleine Gobineau, who possessed an adventurous spirit, worked under a false name and would often break the law, took little Arthur and his sisters Caroline and Suzanne to eastern France. Then she hid in Baden and Switzerland with her lover. In Inzlingen, near the spa of Lörrach fourteen-year old Arthur Gobineau learnt to speak

Treatise Capodistrias was published on 15 April in La Revue des Deux Mondes; Le Royaume des Hellènes v Le Correspondant. Both studies included a foreword by Ludwig SCHEMAN under the title of Deux Études sur la Grèce Moderne in 1905 (Paris). 9 In July 1867 Gobineau wrote to his sister Caroline: „Je suis né le 14 juillet, et on a pris la Bastile en même temps. Ce qui prouve que les extrêmes se touchent“ (BOISSEL, p. 24). 10 BOISSEL, p. 43. 11 Ibidem, p. 44. 12 Ibidem. 13 Ibidem, p. 45. 8

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German well14 and in Biel, Switzerland, allegedly became engaged in the study of Oriental languages, especially Persian, at the local grammar school.15 Louis Gobineau was released from military service in June 1831 and settled in the Brittany harbour town of Lorient, where he took control over the upbringing of his children.16 The eighteenth century saw proud vessels belonging to the Francebased La Compagnie des Indes depart from the harbour of Lorient, as is indicated by its name, and thus make Colbert’s long-cherished vision of the global domination of Louis XIV’s France come true, fighting the British rivals for the legacy of the Indian realm of the Great Mughals. And it is Lorient where Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil Duperon, a legendary Orientalist, boarded the Duc d’Aquitaine on 7 February 1755 to search for relics of Zarathrustra’s teaching in Surat and involuntarily witnessed Robert Clive putting an end to Joseph François Dupleix’s dream of “la domination française dans l’Inde”.17 Arthur Gobineau, fascinated by the exotic East, had problems maintaining discipline at the Lyceum. The head teacher of the school wrote (falsely) about him that he must be “a son of one of the Chouans, the country’s most notorious”.18 In June 1835 Arthur failed - perhaps much to his own relief - the entrance exams at the military academy of Saint-Cyr.19 By the end of September 1835, at the age of nineteen, Arthur Gobineau took a step which, as Balzac noted was made by twelve hundred young men per year at that time: he left for Paris.20 His goal corresponded with the spirit of the time – he wanted to win fame in the field of literature.21 He had fifty francs in his pocket. 22 Ibidem, p. 48. „De cette manière, les premières bases de ce qui devait être l’attrait de toute sa vie étaient déjà posées et sa vocation d’orientaliste à peu près résolue“ (BOISSEL, p. 49). Arthur de Gobineau’s early intelectual development, see Janine BUENZOD, La Formation de la pensée de Gobineau, Paris 1967, and Jean BOISSEL, Gobineau, l’Orient et l’Iran, Paris 1973. 16 BOISSEL, p. 50. 17 Ivo BUDIL, Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil Duperron: Clash of Orientalists in the Eighteenth Century India. Prague Papers on the History of International Relations 2007, pp. 63–81. 18 BOISSEL, p. 51. 19 BOISSEL, p. 51. 20 Honoré de BALZAC, Ztracené iluse, Praha 1963, p. 176. 21 BOISSEL, p. 53. On 5 June 1836 Gobineau wrote to Caroline: „Je dois réussir ou mourir“ (BOISSEL, p. 21). 22 René GUISE, Le poète malchanceux ou les débuts littéraires d’Arthur de Gobineau, Études gobiniennes. 1966, 1, pp. 159–215, p. 164. 14 15

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At the end of the eighteen-thirties and beginning of the eighteenforties Romanticism, which had been prophesized by Chateaubriand, Goethe and Byron, was culminating. French literature dominated Victor Hugo, Alfred de Vigny, Lamartine, Alexandre Dumas, George Sand, Alfred de Musset, Honoré de Balzac and Théophile Gautier. This group was surrounded by hundreds of “minor poets” (poetae minores), who toiled to reach the peak of Mount Olympus.23 Gobineau worked in Compagnie française d’éclairage par le gaz,24 visited the Legitimist saloons (Madame de la Serre), wrote poetry, which he showed to his alleged real father Armand de Maistre,25 translated from German and Persian,26 compiled entries for the encyclopaedia,27 tried with occasional success to break through in various literary papers (La Mode, L’Echo de Jeune France, Le Populaire Royaliste) and together with Hercule de Serre, Paul de Molènes, Henri Rolland de Villarceaux, Edmond de Labrador and two other young writers established a group named Scelti or Cousins d’Isis around 1840. This introductory period of Gobineau’s development as a man of letters was symbolically crowned on 22 October 1841, when he sent a more extensive article about Capodistrias, a Greek politician, to the editors of the prestigious periodical La Revue des Deux Mondes. The article was accepted and published on 15 April 1841.28 This event was important for Gobineau. It was the first time his name had appeared in the company of authors such as Théophile Gautier, Philarète Charles, Sainte-Beuve, George Sand, Alphonse de Lamartine and Edgar Quinet. Gobineau also introduced himself as a surprisingly mature and educated political commentator. The study anticipated his later diplomatic career.29 While he was preparing the study dealing with Capodistrias, Gobineau was seriously considering the idea of establishing Revue de l’Orient with a clearly set ideological and political programme, with the aid of Greek ambassador John Colletis and the Cousins d’Isis. The programme was based on the idea of resurrecting the Greek, Wallachian and Slavonic national Maxime DU CAMP, Souvenirs littéraires III, La Revue des Deux Mondes. 1881, 46, pp. 481–515, p. 488. 24 GUISE, p. 165. 25 Ibidem, p. 168. 26 Ibidem, pp. 175–176. 27 L’Encyclopédie catholique or l’Encyclopédie du XIXe siècle (GUISE, p. 176). 28 The text on Capodistrias was together with Le Royaume des Hellènes, a more extensive treatise, published in a book entitled Deux Études sur la Grèce Moderne in 1905 in Librairie Plon, Paris. 29 Arthur de GOBINEAU, Deux Études sur la Grèce Moderne, Paris 1905. 23

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spirit, expelling the Turks, putting a stop to Russian expansionism and freeing Eastern Christians.30 The first issue was supposed to come out on 15 April 1841; Gobineau had already written the Introduction and an article titled Conspiration des Philorthodoxes en 1839.31 The founders of this journal were, however short of money and the project collided with Revue Oriental, a rival periodical, which Dr. Barrachin tried to publish in the first half of 1841, though unsuccessfully.32 Gobineau did not deny his diplomatic self and made sure beforehand that the Turkish ambassador would not raise any significant objections to this idea! The representative of the Sultan did not have to bother about the young writer's intentions, for the radical periodical never came into existence.33 Why did Arthur Gobineau choose Count John Capodistrias (1776– 1831), a Greek politician? One who spent many years in Russian service only to become the head of an independent Greece later on? Probably, becoming acquainted with John Colettis, a Greek ambassador in Paris, played the key role.34 This diplomat, who represented his country in France from 1835 to 1844 was former physician of the Ali Pasha of Yannina. He joined the liberation movement and, being an illustrious fighter and cunning politician, he was, like Sulla before, labelled “half lion and half fox”.35 In 1844, Otto I, King of Greece authorised him to preside over the government, in which position he remained until his death in 1847.36 Gobineau met Colletis in mid 1840 and the ambassador is likely to have been the key source of inspiration and information for Gobineau's work on Capodistrias.37 Capodistrias was not a forgotten figure in France in the early eighteen-forties. The topic was still controversial. Sainte-Beuve noted that Gobineau’s article in Revue des

„Reconstituer les nationalités grecque, valaque, slave (...). Jeter les Turcs à la porte (...). Paralyser les efforts de la Russie (...). Délivrer les chrétiens d’Orient“ (Jean-Hervé DONNARD, Pour le centenaire de l’insurrection crétoise: Arthur de Gobineau et Gustave Flourens, frères ennemis, Etudes gobiniennes, 1967, 2, pp. 185–220, p. 192). 31 GUISE, p. 190. 32 Arthur Gobineau wrote on 12 April 1841: „Notre revue de l’Orient va du reste fort mal, et je crains qu’elle n’échoue; mais comment se désoler d’une chose qui était à sa naissance et dont on ne pouvait prévoir si les résultats seraient bons ou mauvais. Si donc elle périt, j’en suis d’avance tout consolé“ (GUISE, p. 190). 33 DONNARD, p. 192. 34 Ibidem, pp. 191–192. 35 Ibidem, p. 191. 36 Pavel HRADEČNÝ et al., Dějiny Řecka, Praha 2007, pp. 309–310. 37 DONNARD, p. 191. Gobineau also drew on previously published Capodistrias’s correspondence and book Mémoires sur le comte J.-A. Capodistrias by André Papadopoulo-Vrétos. 30

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Deux Mondes aroused much “anger”.38 Capodistrias was highly esteemed by French liberals; his helpfulness towards France at the Congress of Vienna as well as his support for Louis XVIII’s liberal policy at the beginning of the Restoration had not been forgotten.39 Gobineau, who was influenced by Colletis, Capodistrias’s political rival, presented a controversial portrait of this first ruler of independent Greece. Count John Capodistrias was born in Corfu to an ancient aristocratic family. His ancestors had moved there from Istria in the fourteenth century and in 1471 they were entered in the “Golden book” of Ionian aristocracy.40 The Ionian isles had for centuries played the important role of a mediator between the Balkan and Greek populations under the rule of the Ottoman Empire and Italy. As they were under the control of Venice, they represented the only remnant of Orthodox Greek civilization that maintained a direct connection with the West. Therefore, it is not mere chance that a number of influential figures, who participated in the political and cultural revival of Greece came from the Ionian isles. Between 1794 and 1797 Capodistrias studied medicine in Padua and in 1799 he became the head physician of a Turkish military hospital in Corfu.41 In 1797 the French, who had just sealed the fate of the Republic of Venice, disembarked on the Ionian isles.42 They stayed for two years. Later Russians and Turks, who on the grounds of a treaty of 21 March 1800 established the United States of the Ionian Isles, substituted them.43 After concluding the Treaty of Tilsit in July 1807 the French returned to the isles, though this time they did not represent the Republic, but the Empire. Again, they were unable to hold the isles for a long time, for they were driven away the fleet of Great Britain, which safeguarded its control over the isles by a treaty dated 23 April 1814.44 A treaty dated 5 November 1815 signed by the four powers

In 1831 Revue Européenne published Sur la correspodance de M. Dutra, avec M. Capo d’Istrias pour éclairer la polémique élevée à l’occasion des derniers événements de Grèce; in 1837 André Papadopoulo Vretos published a paper on Capodistrias, which was answered by Édouard Grasset in Souvenirs de Grèce (GUISE, p. 188). 39 Patricia Kennedy GRIMSTED, Capodistrias and a “New Order” for Restoration Europe: The “Liberal Ideas” of a Russian Foreign Minister, 1814–1822, The Journal of Modern History, 1968, 40(2), pp. 166–182, pp. 186–187. 40 C.W. CRAWLEY, John Capodistrias and the Greeks before 1821, Cambridge Historical Journal, 1957, 8(2), pp. 162–182, pp. 165–166. 41 CRAWLEY, p. 166. 42 Ionian Islands were assigned to France under Article 5 of the Campo-Formio treaty. 43 CRAWLEY, p. 166; GOBINEAU, p. 8; HRADEČNÝ et al., p. 274. 44 CRAWLEY, p. 172; HRADEČNÝ et al., p. 275. 38

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in Paris then granted the United States of the Ionian Islands independence under Great Britain’s protection.45 Meanwhile, John Capodistrias gained favour with Count George Mocenigo, the Russian ambassador to Corfu,46 and became a member of the local aristocratic government at the age of twenty-five.47 He considered Russia or, to put it more precisely, the twelve thousand Russian soldiers deployed on the islands48 to be the most suitable guarantee of the independence of the Ionian isles, which had lost Venetian protection against the Ottoman and French threat. He boarded one of the last ships to depart from the islands and bound for St. Petersburg, where he entered the service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1809. Very likely, this is where Capodistrias metamorphosed from an Ionian aristocrat into a Greek patriot. As an expert on Balkan issues he was sent to Vienna, to Russian ambassador Count Stackelberg in September 1811.49 The following year he was appointed the director of the diplomatic Chancery at the headquarters of Prince Stourdza in the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia occupied by Russia.50 However, this service was interrupted by the Napoleonic Wars and Capodistrias was assigned to General Barclay de Tolly.51 Prior to the Battle of Leipzig, Tsar Alexander I, who entrusted him with a difficult mission in Switzerland, received Capodistrias. This was the beginning of Capodistrias’s nine-year career as a top European diplomat. Gobineau, who – as we will see – was far from idealising Capodistrias, was convinced that he could be compared only to Talleyrand.52 From 1813 to 1814 Capodistrias proved himself, first as an agent and later as an ambassador in Switzerland, which earned him the Order of St. Vladimir as well as participation in the Congress of Vienna amidst Alexander's closest advisors.53 Having returned to St. Petersburg in January 1816 Capodistrias acted as a joint foreign secretary (beside Karl Robert Nesselrode) and dealt with Balkan issues. In 1818 Alexander I and Capodistrias visited Odessa and Kishinev, where they met representatives from

CRAWLEY, p. 172. In 1863 Ionian Islands were associated to Greece. CRAWLEY, p. 167. 47 GOBINEAU, p. 9. 48 Ibidem. 49 CRAWLEY, p. 169. 50 CRAWLEY, p. 170; GRIMSTED, p. 173. 51 GOBINEAU, p. 17. 52 „C’est, à côté de M. Talleyrand, le nom le plus essentiellement diplomatique des temps modernes“ (GOBINEAU, p. 4). 53 GRIMSTED, pp. 173–174. 45

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Moldavia and Wallachia.54 Capodistrias, though holding a top diplomatic position, had never neglected Greek interests; he supported the “Company of the Friends of the Muses” (Philomuses), the mission of which was to boost the development of the Greek educational system and to enable gifted young Greeks to study in Western Europe.55 Capodistrias held the view that Tsar Alexander I was to become a “true protector of the Greek people”.56 Patricia Kennedy Grimsted highly esteemed Capodistrias’s attempt to make use of his political position for the sake of the Ionian Isles and Greece.57 The liaison between Capodistrias and secret circles preparing to overthrow the Ottoman rule has however never been proved. At any rate, in 1817 he was visited by Nicholas Gallatis of Ithaca in St. Petersburg and was offered leadership of the Philikè Hetaíria.58 In January 1820, on the eve of the Greek uprising, Capodistrias received the same offer from Emmanuel Xanthos, but he refused it again; in the end Alexander Ypsilantis became the leader of the Philikè Hetaíria in April 1820.59 The British government, which distrusted Capodistrias, disapproved of his visit to the Ionian Isles. This visit took place in 1819, allegedly under the pretence of poor health, shortly after High Commissioner Sir Thomas Maitland decided to cede a mainland area around the town of Plaga, which was under the administration of the isles, to the Ali Pasha of Yanina for payment.60 The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs may have been wrongly suspected of subversive intentions.61 Greek leaders are likely to have exaggerated Capodistrias's participation in the preparation of the rebellion in order to encourage a hesitating public. A member of Philikè Hetaíria claimed that he had met Capodistrias in Warsaw and that sixty thousand Russian troops were ready to march out and help Greek rebels.62 In fact Count John Capodistrias officially adopted a reserved attitude towards the Greek uprising and Ypsilantis’ activities, although he favoured Russia’s military intervention against Turkey.63 According to Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, Alexander I’s unwillingness to breach the treaty with CRAWLEY, p. 174. Ibidem. 56 GRIMSTED, p. 174. 57 Ibidem, pp. 175–176. 58 Nicholas Gallatis was, however, so indiscrete that he was arrested by tsarist officials and sent home. Eventually, members of Philikè Hetaíria themselves had him murdered on Peloponnesus in November 1819 (CRAWLEY, p. 173). 59 CRAWLEY, pp. 180–181; HRADEČNÝ et al., p. 277; GOBINEAU, p. 33. 60 CRAWLEY, p. 173; GRIMSTED, p. 176; HRADEČNÝ et al., p. 276. 61 The members of Philikè Hetaíria were probably Viaro and Agostino Capodistrias, John’s brothers living on Corfu; CRAWLEY, pp. 179–180; GOBINEAU, pp. 29–30. 62 CRAWLEY, p. 181. 63 GRIMSTED, p. 190. 54 55

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Turkey and support Greek rebellion was the main reason for Capodistrias's resignation and departure into Swiss exile in the summer of 1822.64 The evaluation of Capodistrias as a Russian diplomat has never been unequivocal. While he acted as a leading European diplomat, Metternich, allegedly the „key opponent“, of sympathy for liberal radicalism, suspected him.65 British diplomats regarded him as a ruthless campaigner of Russian interests and stirrer of Greek nationalism (agent provocateur).66 Patricia Kennedy Grimsted labelled Capodistrias a “progressive liberal”, whose conception of the arrangement of Europe after the Napoleonic Wars on the basis of national states and constitutional governance represented a liberalnational alternative to Metternich’s conservative international system of the equilibrium of power.67 Notwithstanding the aforesaid, future development verified Capodistrias’s thesis that national awareness aroused by the Napoleonic Wars would become the basis of the modern state.68

Ibidem, p. 176. In December 1819 Metternich wrote: “(Capodistrias) is not a bad man, but honestly speaking, he is a complete and thorough fool, a perfect miracle of wrong-headedness. … He lives in a world to which our minds are often transported by a bad nightmare” (GRIMSTED, p. 166). 66 CRAWLEY, p. 163; Frederick von Genz thought that Capodistrias had fallen prey to a dangerous illusion that might trigger off a revolution: “(Capodistrias) mistakenly believes that the maintenance of order is compatible with the ascendancy of liberal ideas” (GRIMSTED, p. 180). 67 GRIMSTED, pp. 176–178. Capodistrias defined the difference between his own and Austrian approach in the following way: “The Emperor of Austria has always professed the principles of absolute monarchy, Russia, on the other hand, has looked to the proper mixture of liberty and constitutional rights, that affords a more enlarged and better basis of government” (GRIMSTED, p. 183). Capodistrias at the same time condemned the excesses of the French Revolution and in 1820 wrote on the heirs of its liberal legacy: “These men, formed in the school of popular despotism during the French Revolution and perfected in the art of overthrowing governments by the despotism of Bonaparte, are working with fatal perseverance to regain the power which was taken from them by the reestablishment of order in Europe” (GRIMSTED, pp. 179–180). 68 GRIMSTED, p. 181. 64 65

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Gobineau’s study, which in many respects repeats Colletis’s views, was rather critical of Russian expansionism.69 On the other hand, Gobineau divided Capodistrias’s career into two stages. He felt clearly positive about the period when Capodistrias acted as the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is surprising to hear Gobineau, who is considered to embody conservatism and reactionary ideology, formulate views that criticise world powers for not understanding the strength of the ideas of freedom that emerged after the Napoleonic Wars.70 Their egoistic imperial ambitions were destroying the remnants of European order.71 The only exception was, as Gobineau held it, Russia, mainly thanks to Capodistrias’s statesmanlike wisdom.72 Gobineau nonetheless did not doubt that after the Napoleonic Wars the Greek uprising had been encouraged by Russia, which had intended to destroy the Ottoman Empire and gain control over the entire area.73 The first secret Greek associations preparing the uprising were inspired by the radical ideas of the French Revolution.74 Around 1806 a much more ambitious idea originated: the idea of the restoration of the “original” Great Greece (Megali idea) including virtually the entire Aegean Region as well as Epeiros, Thessalia, Macedonia, Thrace, Constantinople and the Anatolian coast.75 John Colletis, an ardent advocate of this idea, said, that “there were two great centres of Hellenism - Athens and Constantinople. Athens was „Les Russes se faisaient démagogues, croyant y trouver plus de profit. Tel a toujours été en Orient le système de cette dernière puissance: soutenir les mécontents, augmenter sa clientèle, jeter la perturbation au sein du pays qu’elle veut attirer dans ses filets“ (GOBINEAU, p. 8). On the other hand Gobineau, presumably under Colletis’s influence, stressed the unpopularity of Russia in Balkan: „La Russie, qui professe la même religion, n’a pu obtenir que la haine des populations grecques. ... Dans le royaume hellène, son parti, malgré tant d’intrigues et de violences récentes, est peu nombreux et isolé; dans les principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie, son nom est exécré. ... En Servie, chaque jour détruit le peu d’influence qui lui reste. ... Que devient donc la puissance prétendue de ce prestige religieux? Sous le point de vue ecclésiastique, les Russes devraient, sans aucun doute, relever de Constantinople; mais l’empereur a usurpé le pouvoir spirituel: les Grecs ont sur eux l’avantage de l’ancien fidèle sur le néophyte; les Russes ne sont que des convertis“ (GOBINEAU, pp. 15–16). 70 „Depuis la chute de Napoléon, les gouvernements n’avaient montré ni sagesse ni prévoyance; leur avidité aveugle pouvait les rejeter dans les désastres auxquels ils venaient d’échapper“ (GOBINEAU, p. 25). 71 „Ainsi se détruisait l’harmonie, dont le simulacre était important à conserver en face de gouvernés tous les jours plus menaçants et plus forts“ (GOBINEAU, p. 26). 72 „En vain la Russie s’efforçait-elle de calmer cette fièvre d’usurpation; elle ne parvient qu’à irriter la jalousie et la défiance du cabinet britannique“ (GOBINEAU, p. 26). 73 GOBINEAU, p. 28. 74 Ibidem, p. 11. 75 Ibidem. 69

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merely the capital of the kingdom; Constantinople was the great capital, the joy and the hope of all Hellenes”.76 Gobineau appreciated this idea and thought it “practical”.77 Given the fact that the Ottoman Empire was unhealthy and incapable of reform, Gobineau held the view that the Greek state was the only means of reining Russian expansion.78 Gobineau surmised that Capodistrias’s resignation from the position of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and departure to Geneva before the Conference of Verona were acts of preparation for his future role as the political leader of independent Greece.79 Then disillusionment came. The uprising broke out too early and remained isolated.80 Although Western Europe’s public opinion and Russian diplomacy forced powers to intervene and push forward the idea of an independent Greek state (Elliniki politia), they were unable to ensure its originally intended scope. The appointment of Capodistrias as the first and temporary governor (kyvernetis) in April 1827 was, as Gobineau puts it, no surprise no matter how hard Capodistrias tried to feign astonishment almost in the spirit of Richard III.81 Gobineau views Capodistrias’s subsequent steps as a deliberate effort to enforce autocratic power to the exclusion of other state administration bodies while not even

HRADEČNÝ, p. 309. „Répéter que, sur aucun point de territoire conquis, les Turcs ne tiennent solidement au sol ; que partout où ils se sont établis, principalement dans les pays chrétiens, ils n’ont fait que se superposer en dominateurs barbares aux races soumises, c’est reproduire un lieu commun cent fois répété, mais dont les conséquences immédiates, par rapport à la Grèce, n’ont pas toujours été examinées avec une réflexion sévère et mûrie. Les Hellènes n’avaient jamais pu voir dans les Ottomans que des étrangers oppresseurs, et le gouvernement, n’exigeant de ses raīas que de l’argent, et les laissant, du reste, administrer à peu près comme bon leur semblait le régime municipal qui s’était conservé parmi eux, irritait et vivifiait sans cesse le besoin de l’indépendance. Si l’on réfléchit, en outre, que toutes les lumières du pays se concentraient en eux; que l’industrie, la navigation, le commerce intérieur et surtout extérieur, se trouvaient dans leurs mains; que, sur les dix millions d’âmes qui peuplent la Turquie d’Europe, ils comptent pour sept millions; qu’enfin dans les îles, dans la Morée, dans les montagnes, certaines portions de la population gresque, telles que les Maīnotes, les Hydriotes, les Psariotes, les Souliotes, n’ont jamais perdu une indépendance, pénible à conserver sans doute et souvent attaquée, mais réelle, on cessera de répudier comme impraticable le plan des hétairistes; on nous permettra de le constater ici pour la première fois dans toute son étendue“ (GOBINEAU, pp. 11–12). 78 „Vieux et corrompu, l’Etat turc n’est plus assez vigoureux pour être sauvé par des réformes“ (GOBINEAU, p. 28). 79 GOBINEAU, pp. 39–40. 80 Ibidem, p. 40. 81 Ibidem, p. 42-43. 76 77

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concealing his orientation towards Russia.82 It is not very difficult to see that John Colletis, Capodistrias’s rival and a representative of the „French party“ in Greek political life influenced Gobineau’s interpretation. Colletis stood out in combat during the civil war in November and December 1824, when he contributed considerably to the defeat of the resistance movement in Peloponnesus. His influence was reduced considerably by Capodistrias’s arrival.83 Capodistrias cancelled the advisory assembly, panhellenium,84 and the commanders of the Greek armed forces, Sir Richard Church and Démétrius Ypsilantis, were made subordinate to his brother Count Augustin Capodistrias, who had no military experience.85 Then a senate (gerusia) was established consisting of twenty-seven members, none of whom was an important leader from the war of liberation.86 Gobineau compared John Capodistrias to Waldstein; he believed that the Count had been pursuing his own goals, which he had considered to be more important than loyalty to Russia and had attempted to gain absolute power.87 According to the London Protocol of 15 February, Prince Leopold, of the German Saxe-Coburg dynasty, should have ruled the Greek kingdom. Gobineau believed that the temporary ruler tried to prevent this.88 Capodistrias described the situation to the potential king in the gloomiest colours he could and exaggerated the importance of the debate of the terrestrial borders of the state. Leopold, who respected the opinion of a statesman whom he had admired in the past, decided not to ascend to the throne.89 „Il affirma que ce n’etait ni de la France, ni du cabinet britannique, qu’il fallait attendre des secours réels, mais seulement de la généreuse et puissante Russie“ (GOBINEAU, p. 47). 83 GOBINEAU, pp. 45–46. 84 By a decree of 22 July 1829 (according to the old calendar). 85 GOBINEAU, p. 57. 86 Ibidem, p. 59. 87 „Aucune pièce écrite et signée ne prouve matériellement que Wallenstein ait aspiré à la couronne de Bohême, et cependant personne ne doute de ce fait. Les démarches, les inconséquences même de l’ambitieux général de l’empire déchirent le voile mystérieux que des faits patents ne sont pas venus soulever. ... (Capodistrias) n’attire pas les Russes dans le pays; il se sert d’eux, mais uniquement pour se soutenir, lui et les siens; il confie les places à des étrangers, qui viennent de chez lui et qui sont à lui; élève ses deux frères aux plus importantes fonctions de l’Etat, l’un commandant l’armée, l’autre chargé de rendre la justice. Dès l’abord, il humilie et repousse loin du pouvoir les chefs dont il devine l’influence. Il cherche à les rejeter en dehors de tout rôle politique, en leur confiant des missions inférieures; il flatte les passions populaires, et, tout en concentrant dans ses mains un pouvoir usurpé, il cherche à garder les façons d’un père du peuple“ (GOBINEAU, p. 62). 88 GOBINEAU, pp. 63–64. 89 Ibidem, p. 64. 82

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However, opposition politicians defied Capodistrias’s intrigues and autocracy. These opponents included the leader of the “English party”, Alexander Mavrokortado, who joined the armed resistance, and John Colettic, who preferred political struggle.90 Capodistrias intervened in the epicentres of unrest and, inter alia, had Petrobey Mavromichalis, the leader of a powerful clan in Mani and Peloponnesus, arrested.91 The rebels managed to seize the government’s naval arsenal on the isle of Poros in July 1831.92 Captains Lyons and Lalande, commanders of the British and French fleets refused to intervene as they “had not come to serve the ambitions of a single man, but to protect the freedom of the entire nation”.93 However, Russian Admiral Petr Ivanovich Ricord supported Capodistrias and drove the rebels away. Constantine and George Mavromichalis, the brother and son of the imprisoned Petrobey Mavromichalis, decided to imitate Harmodius and Aristogeiton, the “tyrant slayers” who assassinated the tyrant Hipparchos in 514 BC.94 Both were outraged that Capodistrias had not kept his word and had not freed their clan leader.95 On 9 October 1831, they went to St. Spiridon's Church in Nauplius, where John Capodistrias would go to morning mass. A moment later Capodistrias appeared, accompanied by two bodyguards. When he saw Constantine and George, he hesitated, but kept walking. Constantine shot twice at close range and George leapt towards the president and thrust a dagger into his side. Capodistrias fell, fatally wounded. In the following panic Constantine was shot dead, but George fled and hid at the French Embassy. However, he surrendered and was executed the following day.96 Such is Gobineau’s conclusion of the life of a man who began as Talleyrand, proceeded as Waldstein and ended as Peisistratos. Gobineau believed that Count John Capodistrias failed, for he did not understand the importance of his mission. He should have rejected the antagonistic aspirations of the Western powers, which understood nothing, and as a leader of free citizens should have establish a revived Eastern empire in Constantinople, on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, a state strong enough to face the Russian threat. Had he succeeded, great minds like Titus Livius, Ibidem, p. 65. HRADEČNÝ, p. 297. 92 Ibidem. 93 GOBINEAU, p. 71. 94 Ibidem, pp. 75–76. 95 Ibidem, pp. 76–77. 96 GOBINEAU, pp. 77–81. 90 91

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Tacitus or Machiavelli would have been honoured to tell his story.97 Capodistrias, however, let the vision of provincial tyranny in Nauplius corrupt his ideal. France, the guardian of small nations, should have been interested in the Greek revolution, for it was a follow-up to France’s own ambitions.98 This dream never materialised. The result was an internally subverted and poor state with borders too difficult to protect. Russian dominance over the area was but a matter of time.99 Although the text on Capodistrias published in La Revue des Deux Mondes in April 1841 enjoyed a positive reception, Gobineau never published in this prestigious periodical again, in spite of the fact that he would write eight more articles dealing with “Eastern politics”.100 Maurice Lange assumes that this was due to a personal controversy with the powerful François Buloz, who established La Revue des Deux Mondes in 1829 and managed it for forty years.101 There may have been reasons other than ideology in the background of this quarrel. Gobineau at that time was taking to conservative legitimism with pronounced anti-democratic opinions, but this was not necessarily the reason, as Romanticists who published on the pages of La Revue des Deux Mondes frequently shared similar views. Gobineau was also ideologically flexible (as is manifested by his diplomatic career). In late 1841 he strove to publish in the newly established journal La Revue Indépendante, set up by left-wing writers such as the former SaintSimonist and socialist Pierre Leroux (who coined the term “socialism”), George Sand and Louis Viardot.102 However, La Revue Indépendante, which according to René Guise originated to a certain degree as a gesture of defiance of “Buloz’s dictatorship” did not publish any articles by Gobineau.103 After this failure Gobineau came together with the publishers of l’Union Catholique, journal religieux politique in late 1841 and cooperated with them until early 1843. Gobineau had by that time gained a reputation as an expert on the Orient, but this was insufficient for him to maintain

Ibidem, p. 84. Ibidem, p. 85. 99 Ibidem. 100 These were short studies on Afghanistan, Turkey, India, Wallachia and the law of Sir Robert Peel. In 1842 they were published in Greek journal Journal de Smyrne (GUISE, p. 191). 101 GUISE, p. 188. In addition François Buloz directed the Revue de Paris and in 1847 was 1848 was the administrator of Comédie-Française. 102 GUISE, p. 188. 103 Ibidem, p. 189. 97

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independent subsistence.104 His command of German enabled him to expand his professional interests to Germany. At that time the attention of the French was slowly turning to Germany as they anticipated that Germany would become the rival who would ultimately shatter the dominance of French civilization. The period between 1842 and 1844 saw Gobineau abandoning political journalism and taking to literary criticism.105 While he had perceived the Orient solely through political and historical reflection, he contemplated Germany through its literature. Gobineau was a merciless critic. However, his verdicts have stood the test of time remarkably. On the one hand he assailed authors such as Jules Janin and Gustave Planche with fierce words; on the other hand he managed to recognise true greatness. Commenting on Balzac in an era that failed to appreciate him duly he said that future generations would probably recognise him as the very prototype of a novelist.106 Gobineau wrote in La Revue Nouvelle that French had never been as rich, varied, cheerful and emphatic as from Victor Hugo’s pen, as clear and accurate as in works by Mérimé, as flaming and fair as in Lamennais’s books or as capable of enthralling the ear as in the verses of Lamartine. None of the previous epochs had born anything that could withstand comparison with the persuasiveness of description in books by George Sand.107 The above-mentioned authors favoured different political camps and Gobineau thus proved that his critical opinion was ideologically unbiased regardless of his own views. At the turn of 1843 and 1844 Gobineau met the then Member of Parliament and liberal political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville, who became interested in the young journalist and poet. Although Gobineau disappointed him at least twice in the years to come, first by his willingness to serve the regime of Louis Napoleon and then by publishing Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines, their correspondence showing mutual respect did not end until de Tocqueville’s premature death.108 The late eighteen-forties eventually brought literary success to Gobineau. His historical novels, published as newspaper serials enjoyed a

„Il n’y a d’ailleurs rien à dire sur l’Orient, en ce moment, tout cela fait que je n’y gagne pas de quoi vivre!“ (7 October 1842, GUISE, p. 191). 105 GUISE, p. 201. 106 Ibidem, p. 206. 107 GUISE, pp. 204–205. 108 GUISE, p. 197. 104

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positive reception from readers.109 He did not renounce public activity. Together with Louis de Kergolay he ran La Revue provinciale in 1848 and 1849 and advocated the policy of decentralisation.110 When de Tocqueville became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in June 1849, he chose Arthur Gobineau as director of his cabinet. After the fall of the government General De La Hitte appointed Gobineau the secretary of the French embassy in Berne, Switzerland, on 9 November 1849. A diplomatic career altered Gobineau’s lifestyle and brought him financial certainty. While staying in Switzerland, he began to work on his supreme work, Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines.111 Next he moved to Hanover, where he remained until 1851 as a temporary representative of the French ambassador, and then he was appointed secretary at the embassy in Frankfurt in 1854. He befriended Anton von Prokesch-Osten, an influential Austrian diplomat and the then chairman of the German federal senate. He also met Otto von Bismarck, a young representative from Prussia. In December 1854 Gobineau became the first secretary of the French Embassy in Persia; he remained in Teheran from June 1855 until January 1858. He returned to Persia three years later as ambassador and remained there until September 1863. In 1864 Napoleon III appointed Gobineau to the position of French ambassador in Greece, in court of the then nineteen-year-old King George I.112 This was a prestigious position as France was one of the world powers, together with Great Britain and Russia, which looked after Greek independence. Édouard Thouvenel, one of Gobineau’s predecessors became the Minister of Foreign Affairs later on.113 It was not the first time Gobineau had visited Greece. He stopped in Athens in 1858 on his way back from Persia. He visited for the second time three years later on his way to Teheran. He was fascinated by Greece.114 However, this positive impression was in steep contrast with his standpoint adopted in Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines. According to Gobineau, primitive “Aryan Helens” settled in Les aventures de Jean de la Tour Miracle surnommé le Prisonnier chanceux; Mademoiselle Irnois; Nicolas Belavoir; Ternove. 110 BOISSEL, p. 101. 111 Arthur GOBINEAU, Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines, Paris 1967. 112 BOISSEL, pp. 174–175. 113 DONNARD, p. 193. 114 On 8 November 1861 wrote his daughter Diana: „C’est un pays charmant et qui vous plairait beaucoup. Il n’y a pas l’ombre de fièvres ni d’aucune maladie. D’ailleurs rien n’est si gai que d’avoir toujours une belle mer ouverte devant soi; à tous moments, des bateuax à vapeur qui en deux jours vous portent à Trieste, en trois à Constantinople, en cinq à Marseille“ (DONNARD, p. 193). 109

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the Aegean Region around 1541 BC.115 Their original aristocratic feudalism faded as a result of their mingling with the Semite nations. Following a temporary aristocratic period between 753 and 508 the country fell into an epoch of “decadent patriotism and democracy”.116 Gobineau even regretted the Greek victory over “Aryan” Persians.117 The four years he spent in Athens represented the climactic point in Gobineau’s career and perhaps the happiest period of his life. He met Robert Lytton, the secretary of the British embassy and son of well-known writer Edward Bulwer-Lytton; however, relations with British ambassador Erskine himself were rather reserved.118 In addition to his official responsibilities Gobineau devoted much time to poetry and sculpture, accompanied Ernest Renan on his journeys119 and met the Dragoumis sisters, Zoé and Marika, who lived in the “oleander house” („la maison au laurier rose“) in Kladou street in Athens. Ironically enough, they were the daughters of Nicolas Dragoumis, a politician and former secretary of Capodistrias.120 Gobineau corresponded with Zoé and Marika until the end of his life. On 8 April 1866 his daughter Diana wedded Baron Ove de Guldencrone, a Danish naval officer and councillor of George I. The wedding took place on board La Renommée, a French frigate.121 As compared to the early eighteen-forties, Gobineau had sobered from his enthusiasm for Greek expansionism. Anton von Prokesch-Osten, a conservative Austrian diplomat, had taken the place of John Colletis, a romantic nationalist, in the role of Gobineau’s tutor. Gobineau no longer believed that a revived Greek empire could check Russian imperialism. This role had still to be played by Turkey.122

GOBINEAU, 1967, Livre 4, p. 476. GOBINEAU, 1967, Livre 4, p. 477. Gobineau wrote on Greek patriotism: „Le mot patrie couvrait en définitive une pure théorie. La patrie n’était pas de chair et d’os. Elle ne parlait pas, elle ne marchait pas, elle ne commandait pas de vive voix, et, quand elle rudoyait, on ne pouvait pas s’excuser parlant à sa personne. L’expérience de tous les siècles a démontré qu’il n’est pire tyrannie que celle qui s’exerce au profit des fictions, êtres de leur nature insensibles, impitoyables, et d’une impudence sans bornes dans leurs prétensions. Pourquoi? C’est que les fictions, incapables de veiller elles-mêmes à leurs intérêts, délèguent leurs pouvoirs à des mandataires. Ceux-ci, n’étant pas censés agir par égoïsme, acquièrent le droit de commetre les plus grandes énormités. Ils sont toujours innocents lorsqu’ils frappent au nom de l’idole dont ils se disent les prêtres“ (GOBINEAU, 1967, Livre 4, p. 462). 117 GOBINEAU, 1967, Livre 4, pp. 468–469. 118 BOISSEL, p. 179. 119 Ibidem, pp. 194–195. 120 Ibidem, pp. 185, 188–189. 121 Ibidem, p. 180. 122 Ibidem, p. 183. 115

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March 1866 saw the arrival in Athens of twenty-eight-year-old Gustave Flourens, son of the influential French physiologist Pierre-Jean-Marie Flourens, on whose works Gobineau drew in his Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines.123 Pierre Flourens was an ardent republican, idealist and champion of the “freedom of nations”. In the 1863–1864 academic years he substituted for his father at Collège de France, on which occasion he delivered fifteen lectures, the first of which was later published under the title of Histoire de l’Homme.124 This is a standard racial interpretation of the history of mankind strongly influenced by the works of Arthur Gobineau; Flourens was convinced of the superiority of the Aryan race and the harmfulness of miscegenation.125 The spring of 1866 saw the outbreak of an anti-Turkish revolt on Crete.126 The rebels believed that Napoleon III, who enjoyed the reputation of a protector of “nations’ rights”, would support their connection with Greece (Enosis) in much the same way as he had enabled Italy to become united.127 In February 1866 Gobineau received three Cretan emissaries; the French ambassador however adopted a reserved attitude.128 France was at that time in a difficult geopolitical situation. The adventurous expedition to Mexico was a total fiasco and the approaching conflict between Austria and Prussia was clearly an ill omen.129 Moreover, Great Britain openly advocated the idea of preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.130

DONNARD, p. 194. Gustave FLOURENS, Histoire de l’Homme, Cours d’histoire naturelle des corps organisés. Paris 1863. 125 „Ils s’appelaient eux-mêmes les Aryas, les hommes purs, et ils méritaient ce nom. C’est d’eux que nous viennent nos idées les plus élevées, nos sentiments les plus nobles, nos fidélités inébranlables, nos généreuses abnégations“ (FLOURENS, p. 7); „Or, de tous les hommes, ce sont les Aryas qui ont les plus beaux fronts, les plus vastes et les plus intelligents“ (FLOURENS, p. 10); „Les Aryas qui occupent l’Europe orientale s’appelent Slaves. Il est une nation parmi eux qui a conservé toute la noblesse et caractère, toute la beauté aryane. Ce sont les Polonais. Ils sont restés purs de tout mélange avec les jaunes, les Mongols, et ils en ont préservé l’Europe. Autant le mélange entre peuples de même race est bienfaisant, autant il est funeste entre peuples de races différentes“ (FLOURENS, p. 20). 126 HRADEČNÝ, pp. 320–321. 127 DONNARD, p. 198. 128 Ibidem, p. 198. 129 Ibidem, pp. 198–199. French minister of foreign affairs, who had held the position of ambassador in Istanbul, Marquis de Moustier said: „Si la Grèce continuait à encourager les insurgés directement ou indirectement, elle aurait à en supporter toutes les conséquences“ (DONNARD, p. 199). 130 HRADEČNÝ, p. 321. 123

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Gustave Flourens joined the Battle of Crete on the side of the rebels in November 1866.131 In July 1867 he returned to France because his father had fallen ill and publicized the idea of the “liberation of Crete”.132 In spring 1868 he reappeared in Athens and as a representative of Cretan resistance, called for a union with Greece.133 On 17 May 1868 Arthur Gobineau, who informed him that Great Britain, France and the Greek government did not intend to support the Cretan rebels, who should attempt to find a method of conciliation with the Ottoman Empire instead, received Flourens.134 Flourens published the French diplomat’s statement immediately afterwards. Greek leaders, who, observing the public opinion did not dissociate themselves from the uprising, found such openness embarrassing. In addition Flourens sought to be received by George I himself on 28 May 1868 but, by coincidence, was seized in the royal residence by Gobineau’s son-inlaw Ove de Guldencrone. Despite his protests he was taken on board ship and sent to Marseille at the French ambassador’s command.135 What followed was a press campaign condemning Gobineau’s behaviour. Flourens received support from Victor Hugo in the daily La Tribune on 19 July 1868.136 This affair blemished Gobineau’s career as he was blamed for not managing the situation. Although he kept his eye on diplomatic positions in Germany and Istanbul, he was appointed to the position of French ambassador to Brazil, which was considered tantamount to demotion.137 Gustave Flourens, as a consequence of his inability to restrain himself, soon came to odds with his Greek allies. In 1871 he joined the Commune of Paris and was appointed to the position of colonel of the revolutionary troops. On 3 April 1871 he took part in the unsuccessful battle for the hill at Meudon. After his men had deserted him, he was captured and a certain captain Desmaret cleaved his head with sabre.138 Gobineau mentioned Flourens’s death in his letter of 6 April 1871 to his daughter Diana.139

DONNARD, pp. 199–200. Ibidem, p. 204. 133 „Je suis citoyen Crétois de la province de Kissamos. Et la Crète entière a voté son annexion à la Grèce. J’ai donc le droit de parler en Grèce, avant d’aller mourir en Crète pour l’hellénisme. J’userai de ce droit à l’heure indiquée“ (DONNARD, pp. 204–205). 134 DONNARD, pp. 206–207. 135 DONNARD, p. 185. 136 Ibidem, p. 209. 137 Ibidem, pp. 209–210. 138 Ibidem, p. 210. 139 Marie-Louise CONCASTY, Gobineau et sa fille Christine, Etudes gobiniennes, 1966, 1, pp. 11–57, p. 21. 131

132

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Gobineau left Athens on 11 September 1868.140 He held the diplomatic position in Rio de Janeiro for two years, the only bright side of which was his friendship with Emperor Pedro II of Brazil.141 His request for another term in Athens was rejected and Augustin Thiers appointed him French ambassador to Sweden and Norway on 14 May 1872; he remained there until 1878. Although this was the period when Gobineau published his most credited works142 he lived the rest of his life in disillusionment and unrest. Disgusted by the republican regime he resigned,143 retired and settled in Rome, where he dealt with sculpture in particular. The rest of his life was influenced by his short, yet intense friendship with Richard Wagner. Cosima Wagner, in 1881, labelled this French man of letters a “hopeless castaway”, who “sought shelter in our harbour” in Bayreuth.144 On 12 October 1882, Arthur Gobineau felt suddenly ill at the station in Turin and was carried to the hotel, where he soon died. Gobineau last visited Athens in October 1876, when he accompanied Emperor Pedro II on his tour of Russia, Turkey and Greece.145 Deeply moved by his return to a city where he had felt “in heaven on earth”, he decided to write a new treatise on Greece.146 The result of this decision was Le Royaume des Hellènes, published in 1878.147 It is an analysis of a great illusion distorting the West’s view of Greece since the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Chateaubriand and Byron believed that the struggle for the liberation of Greece was to the benefit of the direct descendants of Miltiades and Aristides.148 But that was a myth. Gobineau fostered the view of Joseph de Maistre, Jakob-Philipp Fallmerayer149 and Anton von

BOISSEL, p. 199. Ibidem, pp. 211–212. 142 Les Pléiades (1874), Renaissance, scènes historiques (1877) and Nouvelles asiatiques (1876). 143 See Ce qui est arrivé à la France en 1870 and La Troisième République et ce qu’elle vaut. 144 BOISSEL, p. 23. 145 Ibidem, pp. 268–270. 146 DONNARD, p. 211. 147 Article Le Royaume des Hellènes was published as a serial (10 May, 10 July, 25 August and 10 November 1878) in Le Correspondant. 148 „Il fut convenu qu’il fallait trouver des Grecs, sauver des Grecs, parce que les Grecs étaient les gens les plus tendrement héroïques et les plus élégamment patriotiques que l’on pût rêver“ (GOBINEAU, 1905, p. 95). 149 BOISSEL, p. 193. 140 141

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Prokesch-Osten, who claimed that there was no racial continuity between Ancient Greece and the modern population of the Aegean area.150 The Western powers, which had become wedged between the Scylla of the Philhelen public opinion and the Charybdis of realistic efforts to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, adopted improvised and inconsistent solutions.151 The Modern Greek state was thus born from pure illusion, despite reality and common sense. Yet the state managed to survive.152 It appears that as soon as Gobineau saw the progress that the free Greek society had made during the period of his absence, he acknowledged the positive role of modernisation, which was in contradiction to his fatalism and historical pessimism. In this way he approached the standpoint embraced by Gustav Flourens, his late opponent.153 Like Flourens, Gobineau too was impressed by statistical data. After 1860 the number of people increased by 473 596, which means that the country population almost

„Il n’existe pas dans toute l’étendue de la Turquie d’Europe, pas plus que sur les côtes de l’Asie Mineure, un seul homme qui puisse légitimement se croire descendu des populations de la Grèce ancienne, et pour s’en étonner, il faut être de tempérament à admettre qu’on trouverait en France, si l’on cherchait bien, des familles issues des compagnons de Vercingétorix, et en Italie des neveux des Fabius, ce que personne n’a jamais imaginé sérieusement. Encore, à la grande rigueur, serait-il non pas assurément plus exact, mais plus plausible de prétendre qu’une population très ancienne a pu se maintenir dans les régions les plus pauvres et les plus sauvages de l’Auvergne, même depuis une antiquité, dans tous les cas, un peu plus courte. ... Il est bien connu que les habitants de l’Attique sont Albanais, ceux du Péloponèse viennent de partout; la Grèce est, à l’heure actuelle, peuplée d’une race mixte parlant le grec et l’albanaise, et dans le sang de laquelle il entre quelque chose de celui des bandes différentes qui, depuis six à sept cents ans, ont successivement et pour plus ou moins de temps gouverné le pays. Mais les libéraux d’Europe voulaient absolument parler à Miltiade, à Phocion et à Aristide. Ils ne s’adressaient qu’à eux dans leurs déclamations: ils ne consentaient à avoir affaire qu’à eux; bon gré mal gré, il fallut qu’on les leur présentât. On n’y manqua pas et la Révolution commença“ (GOBINEAU, 1905, pp. 110–111). 151 Ibidem, p. 191. 152 „Et, malgré tout, la Grèce vivait ! Elle vivait en manquant des éléments les plus indispensables à la vie d’un Etat, absolument comme les Grecs eux-mêmes vivaient sans pain, sans vêtements et sans abris!“ (GOBINEAU, 1905, p. 196). 153 Gustave Flourens said in 1868: „Et cependant, au milieu de cette situation impossible, de banqueroute et de ruine, les Hellènes vivent! Même ils prospèrent“; „Du désert que leur avaient laissé les hordes ennemis, désert de sable et de rochers, ils ont refait un pays habitable, ils ont ensemencé les terres, planté des oliviers. Ils ont plus relevé de villes anciennes, plus bâti de villes neuves, qu’aucun autre peuple d’Europe, sans excepter les plus florissants, n’en a bâti dans le même espace de temps. ... Race forte et féconde, ils ont rapidement augmenté de nombre. ... Née d’hier, leur marine marchande est déjà, proportionnellement au chiffre de la population, plus nombreuse que celle de la France. ... Sobres, intelligents, actifs, ils transportent à meilleur marché qu’aucun autre peuple“ (DONNARD, p. 215). 150

Arthur Gobineau and Greece 153 ________________________________________________________

doubled in the following half century.154 According to Gobineau this indicated that Greece belonged to the group of countries with dynamic population development, as well as Russia, Germany, the Scandinavian countries and England as opposed to countries with stagnating populations, including France, Italy, Spain and South American countries.155 Gobineau also noticed that while there were 225 716 houses in Greece in 1861, there were 312 519 houses in 1878. This meant that Greece was the only country in the world in which the number of houses grew faster than the number of people.156 Gobineau witnessed a similarly dynamic development in the areas of agriculture, Greece’s main economic industry,157 and education.158 Arthur Gobineau and Gustave Flourens jointly believed that due to the decadency of the Ottoman Empire the key threat to the autonomy of the nations of South-East Europe was represented by Russia.159 Flourens proposed the establishment of a confederation of emancipated Balkan nations following the Swiss or American example.160 Gobineau embraced the older idea of a Greek empire that would take over the role of the Ottoman Empire.161 There were very few countries as important to Arthur Gobineau, a cosmopolitan thinker who did not feel wholly French, as Greece. In his youth he fell under the influence of John Colettis and his idea of the restoration of the Greek empire. Fascinated by the Greek struggle for independence, Gobineau would often forget his conservative convictions and shared liberal and nationalist visions. As an elderly man, he was so impressed by the Greek economic and social development that he unwittingly acknowledged the benefits of the modern era. Gobineau’s departure from Athens anticipated his long decline, closed by an exile’s death in Turin. Gobineau’s relation to Greece was thus ambivalent.162 His own racial doctrine, fascination with feudalism and aristocracy as well as contempt for the “decadent” Athenian democracy, which was returned in the shape of the chaotic and despotic French revolutionary regime, clashed with his admiration for outstanding figures of Greek origin (John Colettis, John CaGOBINEAU, 1905, pp. 262–263. Ibidem, p. 264. 156 GOBINEAU, 1905, p. 273. 157 Ibidem, pp. 275–284. 158 Ibidem, pp. 289–297. 159 DONNARD, p. 217; GOBINEAU, 1905, pp. 317–318. 160 DONNARD, pp. 217–218. 161 GOBINEAU, 1905, pp. 309–323; DONNARD, p. 219. 162 In 1868 Gobineau wrote: „Sans la Grèce, je n’aurais pas fait beaucoup de choses que j’ai faites. La Grèce y est pour beaucoup“ (BOISSEL, p. 192). 154 155

154 Ivo Budil ______________________________________________________________

podistrias, sisters Zoé and Marika Dragoumis) and sympathy for the contemporary Greek society building a modern state. Gobineau’s experience of Greece involved permanent controversy between ideology and reality, while reality prevailed. In Greece Gobineau managed to come to terms with manifestations of modernity, nationalism and economic development. Eliza Marian Butler showed in her book The Tyranny of Greece over Germany how the specific reception of Hellenism fettered the German spirit in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.163 Arthur Gobineau, a French diplomat and writer, who is now known especially as a pioneer of Aryan ideology, was in a certain sense intellectually “liberated” by Greece and forced sometimes to abandon his racial schemes and stereotypes and accept the diversity and contradictions of real life.

163

Eliza Marian BUTLER, The tyranny of Greece over Germany, Cambridge 1935.

The Split of the Liberal Party Confirmed. The Round Table Conference of 1887 Peter Skokan

In the year 1886 the British Liberal Party split over the Home Rule question. The events of that year led to a crisis in the Liberal Party, which lasted almost twenty years. Though it could appear, that the secession of Liberal Unionists was definitive and irrevocable, it is necessary to say that it was not. A chance for reunion of the Liberal Party was still alive. Therefore, this article focuses on the most important attempt to reunify the Party, on The Round Table Conference of 1887 and on a way to it. Way to the Conference The Liberal Party on the eve of 1886 contended with internal divergences of opinion on a field of its future politics. On one side was Joseph Chamberlain, a Radical with democratic views, for whom “the recent Reform Act marked the start of new era”1 On the other side stood Lord Hartington, later eight Duke of Devonshire, a Whig with traditional attitudes. The controversy between these two men culminated at the end of the summer 1885, when Chamberlain published the brochure Radical Programme, which focused on social reforms, attempted to reform an old-style Gladstonianism and attacked aristocracy.2 The situation became calm, to certain extent, after an intervention of Gladstone himself. However, the next events, which indicated, that Liberal government would focus on the Home Rule question put a new strain into personal relations within the Party. Hartington, in January 1886, refused to join a new Liberal Cabinet and R. JAY, Joseph Chamberlain. A Political Study, Clarendon Press, London 1981, p. 96. More to the conflict between Whigs and Radicals and to the Radical Programme compare C. H. D. HOWARD, Joseph Chamberlain and „Unauthorised Programme“, English Historical Review, Vol. 65, No. 257 (Oct. 1950), pp. 477–491; JAY, pp. 106–116; G. R. SEARLE, The Liberal Party. Triumph and Disintegration, 1886–1929, London 1992, pp. 13–27; J. L. GARVIN, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, Vol. 2., London 1933, pp. 55–84; J. MORLEY, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, Vol. 3., 1880– 1898, London 1912, pp. 164–170; T. W. HEYCK, The Dimensions of British Radicalism. The Case of Ireland, 1874–1895, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago, London 1974, pp. 169–170; M. WINSTANLEY, Gladstone and the Liberal Party, London 1992, p. 60; To social background of the conflict compare S. WESTERMAN, Lloyd George und die Irische Frage, 1880–1922. Liberaler Politiker im Übergang vom 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert, Lit Verlag, Münster , Hamburg, London 2000, pp. 8– 25. 1

2

156 Peter Skokan ______________________________________________________________

Chamberlain, after several conflicts with Gladstone, became President of the Local Government Board. Nonetheless, different views on a solution of the Home Rule question between Gladstone, Chamberlain and Hartington led to a defeat of the Liberal Party and to secession of Whigs and even of some Radicals. The Liberal government fell and new general elections took place. In the summer 1886, after second general elections within seven months, a new Unionist government aroused. Despite it was compounded of Tories, Whigs supported it. On the other side, Chamberlainites were in a quite complicated position. “Radical Joe” tended towards the new government mainly because the Chancellor of the Exchequer was Randolph Churchill, one of few Radicals in Conservative lines. However, at the same time he “was not prepared to do anything what would alienate the rank and file of his Radical following”.3 His position was somewhere between a direct support of the new Cabinet and a reunion of the Liberal Party. Despite these facts, both former wings of the Liberal Party created, owing to previous conflicts between Hartington and Chamberlain, quite a strange alliance – Liberal Unionism. This expressed Arthur Hamilton Gordon when he warned Lord Selborne, that Liberal Unionists had “no real chemical union”.4 Nonetheless, Marques Salisbury was ready to accept a joint unionist Cabinet, composed of Conservatives and Liberal Unionists. Even he offered a premiership to Lord Hartington but the leader of the Whigs refused it. Hartington knew very well what difficulties could arise if Whig would lead Conservative majority in Parliament. Moreover, he was too experienced politician to throw away a position he had; a position of a leader of the Party, which was a decisive power in Westminster. Both sides, therefore, came to an agreement that Liberal Unionists would support the Conservative government without direct representation in it.5 The situation of Liberal Unionists was complicated. On one side, it could appear that Whigs would merge with the Conservatives. However, there was a considerable fear among them that they would lose identity. From this misgiving rose their distrust to Lord Salisbury.6 On the other side, a fusion of the Chamberlainites with the Conservatives was meanwhile R. FRASIER, The Liberal Unionist Alliance: Chamberlain, Hartington and the Conservatives, English Historical Review, Vol. 77, No 302. (Jan. 1962), p. 55. 4 G. D. PHILLIPS, The Whig Lords and Liberalism, 1886–1893, The Historical Journal, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1981), p. 167. 5 E. J. FEUCHTWANGER, Gladstone, Macmillan Press, London 1989, p. 247.; FRASIER, p. 58.; A. G. GARDINER, The Life of Sir William Harcourt, Vol. 2, London 1923, p. 4. 6 FRASIER, p. 58. 3

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unimaginable.7 Beyond this, two other facts averted the coalescence of Liberal Unionists and Conservatives. First was a continuing sympathy of the Whigs to the Liberal Party. Within the years 1886–1893 the Whig Lords voted nearly in 66 % cases in the same way as voted the Liberal Party in the House of Commons.8 However, their mutual relationship tainted a crucial controversy – the different attitudes to a solution of the Irish question. This lasted until 1891, when the Liberal Party adopted the Newcastle Programme, which meant a clear approximation to the radicalism and confirmed the Home Rule as a most important point of the Liberal Party agenda. This alienated Whig Lords too much and since this date any cooperation between them and the Liberal Party was impossible.9 Second was a fact that an existence of the two Unionist political parties, which were on opposite poles of the political though, gave certain electoral advantage to Unionism. Liberal Unionism thus obtained votes from people, who did not agree with Gladstone’s solution of the Irish question, but who would never vote for the Conservatives.10 These two points suggesting enough that the cooperation between Liberal Unionists and Conservatives was, at the turn of years 1886 and 1887, limited. The platform, on which it worked, was determined by their similar attitudes to the Home Rule question. In reality, it meant that any serious political turbulence could destroy this alliance. First and the most serious threat for the coalition appeared at the turn of years 1886 and 1887. Anyway, a new session of Parliament took place. Struggles over the Irish question continued when Charles Stewart Parnell proposed The Tenant Relief Bill. The scheme had a full support of the Liberal Party but it was defeated because of a resistance of the Unionists and because of liberal inability to face up the split of the summer.11 Whilst in September 1886 was the most important political theme a continuing struggle over the Irish question, the next month passed calmly. One of the reasons was that an annual meeting of The National Liberal Federation (NLF) in Leeds approached.12 Therefore, before such an important GARDINER, p. 2. PHILLIPS, pp. 167–173. 9 D. HAMMER, Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery. A Study in Leadership and Policy, Oxford, pp. 124–185. 10 FRASER, pp. 53–78; M. PARTRIDGE, Gladstone, London and New York 2003, p. 211. 11 F. S. L. LYONS, Charles Stewart Parnell, London 1977, p. 360. 12 M. HURST, Joseph Chamberlain and Liberal Reunion. The Round Table Conference of 1887, London, Toronto 1967, p. 62. 7

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intraparty event, the Party desired to avoid any political problems, which could shake her structures again. There was a considerable fear that a new misunderstanding could threaten attempts of the Party to cope with loses of the summer. John Morley, a prominent Gladstonian and a convinced Home Ruler, was to have been a chairman of the meeting. However, owing to Randolph Churchill attacks, he resigned from this position and relinquished it to Sir William Harcourt.13 The National Liberal Federation met on 3 November 1886. The most important topics were determined by the events of last few months. The conference confirmed the dominance of Gladstone’s solution of the Home Rule question in the Liberal Party agenda.14 Even it was heard an optimistic opinion that the Conservatives, in a relatively short time, would adopt it as well. Harcourt himself said: “When the Liberal Party proposes some great reform the Tories declared it is mischievous and dangerous, that its authors are wicked and profligate men and so they go on, it may for ten years, it may be for five years, or for six months, and then all of a sudden they turn round and find that this measure was an excellent measure”.15 In general, such a statement indeed contains a certain truth but the future ought to show that, in this concrete case, the Conservatives would not change their mind. Nonetheless the NLF and the rank and file of the Party demonstrated a desire for the reunion and a need for negotiations with the secessionists. Even, it appeared an attack on Gladstone because he denied some items of the Chamberlain’s Radical Programme.16 Thus, though Gladstone himself had an indifferent attitude to the reunion, the NLF in its final memorandum endorsed the principle. According to conviction of the NLF, the reunion became acute; particularly, because of Churchill’s attacks on the Party and because of his expression about “Tory democracy”, which caused that the NLF felt that “the position of the Gladstonians as the true guardians of the Liberal ideas” was threatened.17 This motion increased an appetite for a grand-scale reform of the Liberal Party, which was entirely connected with certain expectations of Gladstone’s retirement. In this situation, Chamberlain and his Radical Programme offered some kind of alternative

GARDINER,, p. 10. HEYCK, p. 182. 15 GARDINER, p. 11. 16 HURST, p. 71. 17 GARDINER, p. 11. 13

14

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and reform. Therefore, his comeback to the Party was, to certain extent, desired. Nonetheless, owing to previous conflicts with Liberal Unionists, it was clear enough that it was necessary to act carefully. First, who took the initiative was Chamberlain’s friend, Sir William Vernon Harcourt. He, in December 1886, invited Chamberlain and his right-hand man, Jesee Collings, to his house with a promise that the Irish question would not be mentioned. It was first contact between Chamberlain and the Liberal Party after the defeat of the Home Rule Bill and after the consequent split of the summer 1886. Though the meeting did not take place, closer communication endured. The reason why the session did not occur was an important and unexpected change in the Cabinet, which altered the position of Liberal Unionists in Parliament and even in government.18 Two days before Christmas the press announced a suppressive resignation of Randolph Churchill, a Conservative Radical, from the position of Chancellor of the Exchequer because of conflicts over next year’s budget. The Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, reorganized the Cabinet and appointed George Joachim Goschen in the front of the Exchequer. Moreover, Salisbury for a second time offered the premiership to Hartington, but he denied it wisely again.19 The important fact is that Goschen was a Liberal Unionist. The political structure of the government altered and Liberal Unionists became a direct part of the Cabinet. To some extent, it is possible to claim that this event confirmed the split of the Liberal Party. However, there was one big and important problem. When Salisbury appointed Goschen, he strengthened only the right wing of Liberal Unionists – the Whigs. He did not want to support the radical element among Unionists, because Radicals could alienate the old Tory aristocracy by their social reformism. He knew very well that such an event would be disastrous for the Conservative Party. In addition, an animosity between Radicals and aristocrats was already apparent enough from the conflict over budget, which led to the mentioned Churchill’s retirement. Thus, Chamberlain during a night lost both a position and a natural ally in the government. It seemed that from this moment it would be very difficult for him to carry any radical measure. Moreover, it appeared that Radicals were in this government definitely pushed to political periphery. This situation made a strong pressure on Chamberlain and it 18 19

Ibid., pp. 12–14. MORLEY, p. 275.

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threatened that he would be isolated. Hence, he at Birmingham made an unexpected speech in which he suggested a need for the Liberal Party reunion. Now, a perfect opportunity appeared to fill up demands of the NLF Conference of November 1887. However, there was an important faction of MPs, who did not want to deal with secessionists. Though Gladstone was one of them, he did not obstruct efforts for the reunion. Nonetheless, he refused to participate at negotiations. His envoy there was to have been John Morley, who had similar attitudes to the question as the leader of the Liberal Party.20 Anyway, Harcourt was henceforth in a closest contact with Chamberlain. After a complicated exchange of letters between him and the leader of the Radical Unionists and between leaders of the Liberal Party itself as well, Chamberlain accepted proposed negotiations.21 Firstly, it was necessary to prepare for the conference. The radicals had only one demand. They wanted the Liberal Party to leave the Gladstonian Home Rule scheme. They were convinced that it would lead to a new Liberal unity and to cooperation based on one common platform. Nevertheless, this could be realized only if political and personal contradictions would be overcome. This principle expressed Chamberlain’s slogan: “nobody wearing a white shirt”. 22 Harcourt became a main mediator between Gladstone and Chamberlain. Therefore, on 31st December 1886, he showed Gladstone’s letter to Chamberlain, in which the leader of the Liberal Party proposed some points of the approaching conference: “(1) The Land question, (2) The Local Government question and (3) what form of legislature could be safely granted to Ireland.23 However, Chamberlain was not satisfied with these suggestions and he expressed it in his political memoir. Firstly, he wrote that he “had not proposed to discuss an Irish Legislature at all and secondly, he insisted: “that the words ‘what form of legislature could be granted’ must not be taken to imply that I thought any form of single legislature could safely be conceded. At present the largest concession I was able to contemplate was some form of Provincial Assemblies or Councils.24

GARDINER, p. 19. HURST, pp. 120–143. 22 Ibid, p. 21. 23 J. A. CHAMBERLAIN, A Political Memoir, 1880–1892, ed. by C. H. D. HOWARD, London 1953, p. 239. Chamberlain’s record from 31st December 1886. 24 Ibid., Chamberlain’s private objections to Gladstone’s letter. 20 21

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Chamberlain henceforth rejected the Gladstonian solution of the Irish question through The Home Rule Bill because he was convinced that such a measure would endanger the Union itself. He wrote in his diary: “I did not think that Ireland could be recognized as a Nation without conceding Separation. Ireland was a Province – as a Nova Scotia was a province of Canada and the cardinal difference between Mr. G. (Gladstone – P. S.) and myself was that he had treated the question from the point of view of the separate Nationality of Ireland, while I had regarded it from the point of view of a State or Province.”25 From the mentioned quotations, it is clear enough that Chamberlain returned to his Radical Programme, in which he had required a certain degree of devolution of power to newly established local authorities as well. According to the Programme, he, already in May 1885, tried to pass through the Local Government Bill, which had been his definitive answer to Irish demands for Home Rule and for self-government. It can be said, that it had not been pro-Irish because it had proposed to set up new local authorities – national councils - with broader competences not only for Ireland, but for England, Scotland and Wales as well.26 Thus, the bill had proposed to adopt certain Home Rule all-Round scheme based on some kind of limited federalism. However, there was one important conditio sine qua non. Above all, in any form it could not threaten the Union itself. Such a measure was in a full coherence with his conviction “to give the widest possible selfgovernment to Ireland, which is consistent with the maintenance of the integrity of the Empire”.27 The cardinal differences between Gladstone’s and Chamberlain conception of Irish question seemed firstly impassable. However, a certain shift in attitudes is considerable from Gladstone’s letters to Harcourt and from Chamberlain’s letter to Lord Hartington. Gladstone wrote on 1 January 1887: “By a ‘modus vivendi’ I understand a partial agreement without prejudice to what it beyond it supplying a plan for present action and prompted by a desire that a wider accommodation may in due season be found practicable“.28 One day later he wrote: “I should be very glad if any means could be found for bringing about a free discussion of the points of Ibid., p. 238; To Chamberlain’s interest in Canadian constitution compare R. QUINAULT, Joseph Chamberlain: A Reassessment. In: T. R. GOURVISH, A. O’DAY, A. (ed.), Later Vicorian Britain, 1867 –1900, London 1988, pp. 69–92, here 84–85. 26 GARVIN, pp. 3–30; JAY, pp. 103–106; PARTRIDGE, p. 196. 27 HOWARD, p. 480. Quoted from a preface of the brochure Radical Programme. 28 Gladstone to Harcourt on 1st January 1887. Chamberlain’s extract of the letter. CHAMBERLAIN, p. 241. 25

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difference, with a view to arriving to at some understanding for such common action as may be consistent with our respective principles; or at least of reducing to a minimum the divergences of opinion on the Irish question in its several parts and branches.”29 Chamberlain obtained extracts of these two letters. Then, in a reply to Harcourt, he expressed satisfaction over their content. Harcourt informed Gladstone about it. Moreover, “Radical Joe” in a letter to Lord Hartington repeated Gladstone’s words about “partial agreement without prejudice” and he added that his expectations from the conference were: “1st whether we can agree on other branches of the Irish question viz. the Land and Local Government: and whether there is any ‘tertium quid’- any alternative to an Irish Parliament on which we can also agree as good in itself without requiring from either side any formal repudiation of previously expressed opinions.”30 The Round Table Similar attitudes of Gladstone and Chamberlain to the conference declared certain will to reach an agreement with each other and to find a third, half-way, solution of the Irish question, which would be acceptable for both and which would reunite the Liberal Party. This fact allowed setting the beginning of The Round Table Conference on 13 January 1887. In addition, both sides agreed on participants of the conference. Joe Chamberlain and George Otto Trevelyan represented Liberal Unionists and Lord Herschell, John Morley and William Harcourt were delegates of the Liberal Party. 31 Gladstone himself did not attend the conference. His envoy at the Round Table was John Morley, who had similar attitudes to the question as the leader of The Party. Despite a fact that Gladstone declared certain will to reach an agreement with Chamberlain, his personal conviction to the possibility of the reunion of the Liberal Party remained indifferent. He even uttered his scepticism in a letter to Harcourt, in which he doubted about legitimacy of the approaching conference: “you three will represent in one sense 280, and in a fuller sense 195 votes. They two will represent six or eight? The 195 with firm ground under their feet; the six or eight (if they be so many) floating in the air”.32 Moreover, this statement confirms his diary Gladstone to Harcourt on 2nd January 1887. Chamberlain’s extract of the letter. CHAMBERLAIN, p. 241. 30 Chamberlain to Lord Hartington on 4th January 1887. CHAMBERLAIN, p. 243. 31 HEYCK, p. 186; HURST, p. 202. 32 Gladstone to Harcourt on 7th January 1887. GARDINER, p. 26. 29

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as well, where he even did not mention that the conference had begun at all.33 Considering this, a question arise, whether his compromise correspondence before the conference was expression of his personal approach and his real desire to reach the agreement and “modus vivendi” or whether he just yielded the pressure of the NLF and the pressure of the whole Liberal Party. His indifferent attitude to the reunion during the conference itself, his absence at the Round Table and his role after an inglorious end of the conference indicate that it was the later case. Anyway, The Round Table Conference met on 13 January 1887 at Harcourt’s house, Grafton Street 7. This first round of negotiations lasted three hours and occurred in a cordial atmosphere. It seemed that everything was on a good way. However, no concrete and serious agreement was reached and therefore later discussion was postponed to the next noon.34 Main topics were the Land question, the Local government question and, of course, the Home Rule question. Sir William Harcourt informed Gladstone about the last, but most important, discussion: “We started with the admitted basis that there (in Ireland – P. S.) should be a legislative body for Ireland with an executive department upon it for purely Irish affairs. Indeed the Leeds Resolution in principle was frankly adopted.”35 Moreover, in a question of relationship between the Imperial and the Irish Parliament Liberals yielded Chamberlain and agreed that a model for a new Irish constitution would be the Canadian one and that “the powers of the Provincial Legislatures” would serve “as an analogue for Irish Home Rule.”36 Chamberlain, after first day, was not fully satisfied because “not a word was said about a Parliament in Dublin and an Executive dependant upon it.” However, in general, in his private memorandum from 13th January, he appreciated an achieved progress. Moreover, he expressed an approval to take The Leeds Resolution and The Canada Act of 1867 as a basis for further discussion about the Irish problem.37 The next day filled up negotiations about a status and powers of the Irish Constabulary, about appointment of judges and about Irish representation in Westminster. In the last problem a majority agreed that their H. C.G. MATTHEW, (ed.), The Gladstone Diaries With Cabinet Minutes and Primeministerial Correspondence, Vol. 12, 1887–1891, Oxford 1994, p. 4. He mentions The Round Table Conference later, but his notes about it are too brief. 34 GARVIN, p. 286. 35 Harcourt to Gladstone on 13th January 1887. GARDINER, p. 27. 36 Harcourt to Gladstone on 14th January 1887. GARDINER, p. 27. 37 CHAMBERLAIN, p. 249. 33

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full representation in London would not be possible, but only John Morley “desired to exclude them altogether”.38 The most difficult point of the conference – a question of a separate legislative body for Ulster – was not set and was postponed for further discussion. Despite this fact, these two days were considerable success. It was reached an important consensus about the basis for the future Irish legislative and possible differences in attitudes existed just in postponed details. The majority of the Liberal Party and even Chamberlain himself were satisfied with results. Now, the conference was put off. During the recess, on 22nd January, Chamberlain’s address at Hawick attracted the public opinion and, of course, the Liberal Party as well. He did not show any desire to destroy auspicious negotiations. A reaction to the speech came quickly. William Harcourt gladly assured the Radical leader that Gladstone was disposed to the idea of the reunion of the Liberal Party.39 However, Chamberlain’s next speech, held on 29 January at Birmingham, did not have such an echo. The reason why was simple. The Radical leader criticized Gladstonians to such extent, that even Harcourt begun to doubt about further resumption of the conference.40 Finally, Gladstone himself, in an explosive situation, recommended continuing in negotiations. Therefore, the Liberal Party even did not comment this Chamberlain’s address. Only John Morley, during his speech at Newcastle, on 9 February, said some allusions on Radicals and their policy. Chamberlain felt hurt and wrote to Harcourt: “You will not be surprised to hear that the tone of the Morley’s speech at Newcastle is personally most offensive to me. However, I do not intend to allow private feeling to interfere with negotiations which have been dictated by consideration of public policy, I shall say more on the subject either to you or him, although I reserve my right to make a full public reply at the first convenient opportunity.”41 However, a desire to negotiate was meanwhile stronger than misunderstandings. Thus, George Otto Trevelyan, who acted from an initiative of Harcourt and Chamberlain as well, sent invitation letters for the second round of the conference. This met on 14 February 1887 at Trevelyan’s house, Grosvenor Crescent 8.42 Ibid, p. 250. Chamberlain’s private memorandum from 14th January 1887. HURST, pp. 238–240. 40 GARDINER, p. 30. 41 Chamberlain to Harcourt on 10th February 1887. GARDINER, p. 32; GARVIN, p. 291. 42 HURST, p. 270. 38 39

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At the beginning of this second round of the conference, Chamberlain and Morley quarrelled wildly over events of last days. Only an interference of Harcourt calmed down the situation. He said: “When the ambassadors of the contending powers meet it is the custom of the plenipotentiaries to wear the favour of the opposing sovereigns.” 43 Then, a following dinner took place in a quite good mood. Even, it seemed that in a short time it would be possible to renew negotiations in a full extent. However, for such optimism was to early. The first impulse to another and much more serious quarrel between the Liberal Party and Chamberlain gave Gladstone’s unfortunate open letter. He accused Liberal Unionism of postponing Liberal reforms. A reply was immediate. An editor of a nonconformist paper, The Baptist, F. H. Stockwell asked Chamberlain to respond to these accusations.44 His article about the Welsh Disestablishment, published on 25 February 1887 in The Baptist, blamed Liberals that their legislative, primarily focused on Ireland, neglected other parts of the United Kingdom. He wrote: “Thirty-two millions people must go without much-needed legislation because three million are disloyal, while nearly six-hundred members of the Imperial Parliament will be reduced to forced inactivity because some eighty delegates, representing the policy and receiving the pay of the Chicago Convention are determined to obstruct all business until their demands are conceded.”45 After these hard words even Harcourt himself lost his almost inexhaustible patience and expressed his disappointment: “I cannot say how much I regret all this. I feel that we are engaged in the work of Sisyphus. As soon as we have with great labour rolled the stone up the hill, you in an outburst of temper dash it down again to the bottom. You complain of the bitterness displayed against you, but I wish sometimes you would consider how much you do to provoke it, and I fear this last performance will greatly aggravate the feeling against you”.46 Chamberlain recognized that after this exchange of opinions it would be very hard to find mutual understanding. Therefore, he wrote to Harcourt as to the main mediator between him and the Liberal Party: “I agree with you that our task (to reunify the Party – P. S.) is almost impossible – there

GARDINER, p. 32. CHAMBERLAIN, p. 252; HURST, p. 277. 45 HURST, pp. 286–287. He quoted The Baptist from 25th February 1887. See also MORLEY, p. 278; GARVIN, p. 292. 46 Harcourt to Chamberlain on 25th February 1887. GARDINER, p. 34. 43

44

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is so much sensitiveness and feeling on both sides that the difficulties are nearly insurmountable”.47 Gladstone, in his diaries, summed up the situation in the best way. He indicated that the cup of patience overflowed and that a mutual disappointment and personal misunderstandings would not allow continuing in the conference. He wrote in his private memorandum from 26 February 1887: “I think that much has been done by the conversations, and I am not confident that a great deal more can be done now. At the same time if it is desired by Mr Chamberlain I am quite willing to call my late colleagues together, make know to them what has been reported to me, and learn their views upon the question whether and how far we can carry on any present communication with advantage beyond what has been already done. I think they would join me in thanking Mr Chamberlain for having promoted as well as shared in so much friendly intercourse”.48 This was very kind but very clear judgement over the fate of the conference. It was obvious that the negotiations collapsed and that nobody wanted to renew the discussion about reunion of the Party. The Round Table Conference never met again. In the following months, Gladstone and Chamberlain accused each other of failure of the conference. Both wanted to push their opponent to the position of a culprit; to the situation, in which one of them would lose the sympathies of public opinion. However, “Radical Joe” had a weaker position than his opponent because of George Otto Trevelyan. This man was insofar convinced that Chamberlain had destroyed the conference and that negotiations had lead to positive result that he, in April 1887, left his friend and colleague and rejoined the Liberal Party alone. Thus, already in byelections at Bridgeton in July 1887, he stood for a seat in Parliament as an official candidate of the Liberal Party.49 Chamberlain accused the Liberal Party that she used his article as pretence.50 In spite of it, he did not succeed in freeing himself from a suspicion that the collapse of the negotiations was his primary aim. The question was never solved, because new political topics appeared and there was not enough space and desire to revive the lost chance and to reunify the Liberal Party.

Chamberlain to Harcourt on 26th February 1887. GARDINER, p. 34. Private memorandum from 26th February 1887. MATTHEW, p. 14. Compare with Gladstone’s conversation with Harcourt, quoted in MORLEY, p. 278. 49 GARVIN, p. 294. 50 Ibid. pp. 37–38. 47

48

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Conclusion The Round Table Conference of 1887 was the most serious attempt to reunify the Liberal Party after the split over the Home Rule question in the summer 1886. In spite of the big expectations and optimism, its results were determined by previous political circumstances. On one side, Chamberlain’s acceptance of the conference came out from an uncertain position of the Radical Unionists in the new unionist coalition. Moreover, the resignation of Randolph Churchill worsened his uneasy position. Furthermore, the same event caused, that Whigs, partners of the Radicals in the Liberal Unionist Party, joined the Conservative cabinet directly and did not want to leave the new alliance, though it had some limits. In addition, they openly refused any negotiations about any form of Irish self-government. Ergo, a need for an immediate solution of a threat of possible political isolation of Radical Unionists and certain disunity in the Liberal Unionist Party itself were first obvious barriers for a successful end of the conference. On the other side, despite the fact that the common members of the Liberal Party and the NLF desired a reunion, Gladstone himself did not overcame his personal distaste to Chamberlain. Therefore, he just yielded the pressure of the Party and accepted the need for the conference. However, he had henceforth an indifferent attitude to the reunion what confirmed his absence at the Round Table. Moreover, although Harcourt’s endeavour, it became clear that personal misunderstandings and disappointments from the summer 1886 was still alive as it showed example of complicated relation between Morley and Chamberlain. The Round Table Conference of 1887 was thus condemned to failure. Although some important agreements over the Irish question were reached, it collapsed on personal relationships and on political circumstances. After the fail of the Round Table Conference, the idea to reunify the Liberal Party slowly sneaked away. In following period prevailed an opposite trend that led to a fusion of Liberal Unionists with the Conservatives.

Die Mittelmächte und die zweite Haager Friedenskonferenz1 Aleš Skřivan, Sr.

Russland entwickelte, wie bereits im Jahre 1899, auch im Zusammenhang mit der zweiten Haager Friedenskonferenz eine bedeutende Aktivität. Der Grund dafür war klar und einfach – die Lage in Russland nach dem verlorenen Krieg mit Japan und infolge der Revolution war höchst ungünstig. Russland war nicht in der Lage, das Tempo der Rüstung anderen Großmächte mitzuhalten. Fremde Beobachter hegten ernste Zweifel über die Zukunft des Zarenreiches. So schrieb der damalige österreichische Militärattaché in St. Petersburg Gottfried Prinz zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst: „Ich bin neugierig, wie sich die Duma entwickeln wird! Ich glaube nach wie vor, daß die ganz große Débacle im Innern dieses unglücklichen Reiches erst kommen wird und daß alles nur Vorspiel war. Von 1789–1793 waren auch nur 4 Jahre.“2 St. Petersburg legte den voraussichtlichen Teilnehmern an der Friedenskonferenz schon im April und Mai 1906 einen Programmentwurf vor.3 Mit der Absicht, Russland die günstigsten Ausgangsbedingungen zu verschaffen, schlug der russische Außenminister Izvol’skij während seines Besuchs in Berlin, Ende Oktober 1906, den Deutschen ein gemeinsames 1Diese

Studie ist ein Ergebnis von Forschungen im Rahmen des Forschungsprojekts MSM 0021620827 Die Tschechischen Länder inmitten Europas in der Vergangenheit und heute, dessen Träger die Philosophische Fakultät der Karlsuniversität in Prag ist. 2 Gottfried Prinz zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst an Aehrenthal, Hietzing 18. 5. 1906. Aehrenthalský rodinný archiv (weiter nur Familienarchiv Aehrenthal), Státní oblastní archiv Litoměřice, pobočka Žitenice, Kt. 126. 3 Vgl. die Note Nr. 704, die der russische Botschafter in Berlin dem Staatssekretär Tschirschky am 3. 4. 1906 vorlegte. Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871– 1914 (weiter nur GP), Bd. XXIII/1, Nr. 7802, hg. von Johannes LEPSIUS, Albrecht MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY und Friedrich THIMME, XXIII/1, Nr. 7828, S. 66–68., Quellenmaterial zur deutschen Beteiligung an der Konferenz vgl. GP, XXIII/1, 2. Zur österreichischen Beteiligung vgl. näher Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Wien (weiter nur HHStA), Archiv des österreichischen Außenministeriums, Administrative Registratur (weiter nur Ag. Reg.), Fach 60, Kt. 65, 66 (Vorbereitung zur zweiten Haager Friedenskonferenz 1907), Kt. 67–74 (Die Zweite Haager Friedenskonferenz 1907). Näher zur russischen Initiative und Vorbereitung der Konferenz vgl. The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and International Arbitration Reports and Documents. Compiled and edited by Rosenne SHABTAI, The Hague 2001, S. 141–155. Vgl. auch Jost DÜLFER, Regeln gegen den Krieg? Die Haagerfriedenskonferenzen von 1899 und 1907 in der internationalen Politik. Frankfurt/M. 1981, passim

170 Aleš Skřivan, Sr. ______________________________________________________________

Vorgehen bei der Konferenz vor. Diese reagierten auf den Vorschlag zwar positiv, behielten sich aber eine Erörterung einzelner Programmpunkte mit den Verbündeten vor. Mit dieser Aufgabe wurde der Geheime Legationsrat Dr. Johannes Kriege4 beauftragt. Noch kurz vor seiner Ernennung stimmte der ehemalige Botschafter in St. Petersburg und seit Oktober 1906 neue österreichisch-ungarische Außenminister Aehrenthal5 dem Gedanken, dass die Mittelmächte ihr Vorgehen auf der Konferenz mit Russland koordinieren sollten, zu. Er schrieb schon am 23. August 1906 an Außenminister Gołuchowski: „Gelingt es nicht, früher eine übereinstimmende Stellungnahme der Drei-KaiserMächte in der Abrüstungsfrage zu vereinbaren, kann die Haager Konferenz nur mit einem diplomatischen Erfolg Englands über Deutschland oder mit einer höchst gefährlichen Zuspitzung der internationalen Lage enden.“ Aehrenthals Brief endet mit den Worten: „Es scheint mir, daß der übereinstimmenden Stellungnahme in der Abrüstungsfrage der Abschluß eines förmlichen Bündnisvertrages der Drei-Kaiser-Mächte vorangehen müsste“.6 Dieser Vorschlag des neuen Kurses der Außenpolitik des Habsburgerreiches wurde in den politischen und diplomatischen Kreisen der Monarchie nicht günstig aufgenommen. Schon am 3. September 1906 schrieb der wichtige Beamte am Ballhausplatz, Kajetan von Mérey, an Aehrenthal, dass die Rückkehr zum Drei-Kaiser-Bündnis nicht der Realität entspreche, weil der Zar und seine Minister nicht bereit seien, den französischen Verbündenten zu verlassen.7 Die wesentlichen Erklärungen sind im Privatbrief, den sein Vorgänger im Amt, Graf Gołuchowski, Aehrenthal am 15. September 1906 schickte, zu finden. In diesem Brief konstatiert Gołuchowski: „Für uns würde die Wiederherstellung des DreiKaiser-Bündnisses das Ende des Dreibundes und eine wesentliche Änderung unseres Verhältnisses zu Italien bedeuten. Denn es unterliegt keinem Zweifel, dass es dann den Werbungen Englands und Frankreichs gelingen würde, Italien ganz auf ihre Seite zu bringen und zu bewegen, das

Dr. Kriege wirkte in der Rechtsabteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes. Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal diente als Botschafter in St. Petersburg (1899–1906) und am 24. Oktober 1906 wurde Außenminister. 6 Privatschreiben Aehrenthal an Gołuchowski, St. Petersburg 23./10. 8. 1906 HHStA, Politisches Archiv (weiter nur PA) I, Kt. 475. Geheimliasse XXXII. Vgl. auch Aus dem Nachlass Aehrenthal. Briefe und Dokumente zur österreichisch-ungarischen Aussenpolitik 1885–1906, Teil 1, hg. Solomon WANK unter Mitarbeit von Christine M. GRAFINGER und Franz ADLGASSER. Quellen zur Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, hg. von Fritz FELLNER, Bd. 6, Graz 1994, Nr. 303, S. 393–394; S 394. 7 Mérey an Aehrenthal, 3. 9. 1906. HHStA, Nachlass Aehrenthal, Karton 3. 4 5

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wenig populäre Bündnis mit uns zu kündigen“.8 Gołuchowski stellt die klare Frage: „Lassen es die gegenwärtigen Zustände in Rußland für geraten erscheinen, mit demselben in ein festeres Verhältnis zu treten?“9 Seine Antwort ist eindeutig: „Nach meiner Meinung ist die dortige Lage eine noch gefährlichere, die Zerrüttung eine noch größere, als man dies schon nach den äußeren Erscheinungen annehmen muß ... Die Fäulnis ist eine so tief gehende ... Die bloße, rücksichtlose Repression kann wohl einen momentanen Stillstand bewirken; wenn aber mit derselben nicht die einschneidendsten Reformen pari passu einhergehen, wird die revolutionäre Bewegung in einem gegebenen Momente mit umso größerer elementarer Gewalt zum Ausbruche kommen.“10 Am Schluss lehnt er die Vorschläge Aehrenthals zur Erneuerung des Drei-Kaiser-Bündnises ab: „Unter diesen Umständen erschiene es mir zum mindesten verfrüht, dem Gedanken eines Bündnisses mit einer Macht näher zu treten, die heute nach außen aktionsunfähig ist und deren Zukunft in so hohem Grade und auf lange hinaus unsicher und gefährdet erscheint.“11 Darüber hinaus wird deutlich die Befürchtung, welche Folgen ein solcher Schritt haben könnte: „Die Wiederherstellung des Drei-Kaiser-Bündnisses würde überall als ein reaktionärer Bund behufs Stärkung oder Wiederaufrichtung der zarischen Autokratie angesehen werden, und sowohl in Österreich-Ungarn als in Deutschland würde diese Politik einen wahren Sturm aller radikalen und revolutionären Elemente gegen sich entfesseln.“12 Unter diesen Umständen musste Aehrenthal vorsichtig sein. Er empfahl, wichtige Punkte mit Berlin vorher abzusprechen und „in Petersburg gar nicht wissen zu lassen, dass wir uns bereits verständigt hätten“.13 In diesem Licht betrachtet, wirkt seine gleichzeitige Anweisung an den Botschafter in St. Petersburg, Berchtold, Izvol’skij einen geheimen Austausch über die Programmpunkte anzubieten, zumindest eigenartig.14 Am 24. Januar begannen in Wien die Gespräche, an denen außer den offiziellen Bevollmächtigten Dr. Kriege und Baron Mérey auf deutscher Seite Botschafter Wedel, auf österreichischer Seite Hofrat Weil und der bekannte

Privatschreiben Gołuchowskis an Aehrenthal, Wien,15. 9. 1906. Familienarchiv Aehrenthal, K. 126. 9 Ebenda. 10 Ebenda. 11 Ebenda. 12 Ebenda. 13 Deutscher Botschafter Wedel an Auswärtiges Amt, Telegramm Nr. 6, 13. 1. 1907. GP, XXIII/1, Nr. 7830, S. 102. 14 Telegram Aehrenthals an Berchtold, 13. 1. 1907. HHStA, Ad. Reg., Fach 60, Kt. 65. 8

172 Aleš Skřivan, Sr. ______________________________________________________________

Politiker und Völkerrechtsexperte Prof. Heinrich Lammasch teilnahmen.15 Ein Schlüsselproblem während dieser vorbereitenden Gespräche bildete die Abrüstungsfrage, welche die Briten während der Konferenz aufs Tapet bringen wollten. „Aus dieser ganzen Haager Geschichte wird nie etwas vernünftiges herauskommen, sobald man über einen gewissen Rahmen hinausgeht, und Utopien wie die Abrüstungsfrage aufs Tapet bringt, die einfach nicht einmal besprechbar sind,“ kommentierte Prinz HohenloheSchillingsfürst diesen Anlass.16 Berlin lehnte offiziell diese Initiative entscheiden ab. Die deutschen Diplomaten nahmen deshalb mit Befriedigung zur Kenntnis, dass man in Wien „die Abrüstungsfrage als inakzeptabel [betrachte] sowohl als Programmpunkt wie als Thema einer offiziellen, im Protokoll zu vermerkenden außerprogrammatischen Diskussion“.17 Die Bedingungen zur Erreichung dieses Ziels waren günstig, denn nach den Informationen des deutschen Botschafters in St. Petersburg, Schoen, betrachtete es der Zar als „ganz ausgeschlossen, dem Gedanken der Abrüstung, der neuerdings von England so eifrig in die öffentliche Diskussion gebracht werde, näherzutreten“.18 Auch Aehrenthal versuchte in diesem Sinne zu wirken und betraute den Botschaftsrat in St. Petersburg, Prinz Fürstenberg, damit, Russlands Standpunkt zum britischen Abrüstungsvorschlag herausfinden.19 Der russische Außenminister erklärte seine Zustimmung zum Standpunkt Deutschlands und Österreich-Ungarns und ließ die Bereitschaft zu einem gemeinsamen Vorgehen in dieser Frage erkennen. Seiner Meinung nach musste nur noch entschieden werden, ob die Abrüstungsverhandlungen im Vorfeld abzulehnen seien oder ob ein „Begräbnis erster Klasse“ erst auf der Konferenz durchgeführt werden sollte. Die zweite Variante erschien ihm günstiger, den die erwähnten Großmächte könnten sich dem eventuellen

Zuz Lammaschs Rolle während der zweiten Haager Friedenskonferenz vgl. Heinrich Lammasch: Seine Aufzeichnungen, sein Wirken und seine Politik. Hg. von Marga LAMMASCH und Hans SPERL, Wien 1922; VEROSTA, Stephan, Theorie und Realität der Bündnissen. Heinrich Lammasch, Karl Renner und der Zweibund (1897–1914), Wien 1971, S. 1–28. 16 Hohenlohe an Aehrenthal, St. Petersburg 24. 3. 1907, Familienarchiv Aehrenthal, Kt. 126. 17 Telegramm Wedels ans Auswärtige Amt, Nr. 38, 11. 2. 1907. GP, XXIII/1, Nr. 7834, S. 108. 18 Schoen an Bülow, Nr. 31, 28. 1. 1907. GP, XXIII/1, Nr. 7835, S. 109. 19 Weisung Aehrenthals an Fürstenberg, Nr. 13, 13. 2. 1907. HHStA, Ad. Reg., Fach 60, Kt. 65. 15

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Vorwurf, sie würden eine edle Absicht durchkreuzen, entziehen.20 Die Österreicher präferierten dagegen die Möglichkeit, die Abrüstungsfrage schon im Vorfeld aus dem Programm der Konferenz zu streichen und waren entschlossen, auch den russischen Experten und bekannten Fachmann für Völkerrecht, Geheimrat Martens, der zu Gesprächen in Wien erwartet wurde, dafür zu gewinnen. Für den Fall, dass Russland sich doch noch der britischen Seite zuneigen sollte und die Abrüstungsfrage auf die Tagesordnung geriet, waren Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn entschlossen, während der Konferenz nicht an der Diskussion zu dieser Frage teilzunehmen. Am 2. März 1907 erörterte Martens dieses Problem mit Aehrenthal. Er ließ zwar gelten, dass eine eventuelle Diskussion über die Abrüstung keinen Sinn haben würde, war aber mit Rücksicht auf Großbritannien nicht geneigt, sie vorher von der Tagesordnung zu streichen. Ein ähnliches Ergebnis hatten auch seine Gespräche in Berlin. Auch Aehrenthals Vorschlag, die Abrüstungsfrage auf einer separaten Konferenz der Großmächte zu behandeln, bedeutete keinen entscheidenden Fortschritt. Die Haltung Italiens, wo Außenminister Tittoni aus Rücksicht auf das Parlament und die öffentliche Meinung sich nicht traute, den britischen Vorschlag bezüglich der Abrüstungsgespräche abzulehnen, bedeutete eine Verkomplizierung der Sache. Am Ende entschieden sich Berlin und Wien, fest auf der ursprünglichen ablehnenden Haltung zu verharren. Am 6. März wurde Berchtold instruiert, Izvol’skij klarzumachen, dass Österreich-Ungarn sich die Streichung der Abrüstungsfrage aus dem Konferenzprogramm wünscht.21 Ähnliche Schritte unternahm auch der deutsche Botschafter Schoen. Aber auch eine gemeinsame Audienz des österreichisch-ungarischen und deutschen Botschafters beim Zaren erbrachte keine eindeutige Ablehnung des britischen Vorschlags durch Rußland. Nikolaus II. „versicherte beiden, er stehe auf der Seite Deutschlands und ÖsterreichUngarns, aber wenn der englische Vorschlag nicht ins Programm aufgenommen werde, würde England wohl gar nicht an der Konferenz

Vgl. Telegramm Schoens an Auswärtiges Amt, Nr. 38, 11. 2. 1907. GP, XXIII/1, Nr. 7843, s. 118. Streng vertrauliches Telegramm Fürstenbergs an Aehrenthal 14. 2. 1907. HHStA, Ad. Reg., Fach 60, Kt. 65. 21 Aehrenthal an Berchtold, Nr. 17793/7, 6. 3. 1907. HHStA, Ad. Reg., Fach 60, Kt. 65. Zum Verhältnis Österreich-Ungarns zu Russland in dieser Zeit vgl. Instruktion Berchtolds vom 6. 3. 1907. HHStA, PA, Allgemeines rot, Geheime Akten XXXVII, Kt. 483, Verhandlungen mit Rußland 1906–1912,. 20

174 Aleš Skřivan, Sr. ______________________________________________________________

teilnehmen, und man würde Russland für ihr Scheitern verantwortlich machen“.22 Für Russlands schwankende Haltung gibt es eine Erklärung: Izvol’skij war entschlossen, die Außenpolitik des Zarenreichs auf eine Regelung der Beziehungen zu Großbritannien hin auszurichten. Deshalb war auch sein Bemühen verständlich, einer eindeutigen Ablehnung des britischen Vorschlags, besonders wenn dies in Zusammenarbeit mit Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn geschah, auszuweichen. Russland, dessen Marine größtenteils im Krieg mit Japan vernichtet worden war, konnte auf der anderen Seite kein Interesse an einer Rüstungsbegrenzung haben. Deshalb begrüßte der Zar auch begeistert Izvol’skijs Idee, die Abrüstungsfrage erst während der Konferenz „zu begraben“. Im Frühjahr 1907 wollte der österreichisch-ungarische Außenminister offensichtlich keine weitgehende Verschlechterung im Verhältnis zu Russland zulassen und war nicht bereit, das Vorgehen der Habsburgermonarchie einseitig den Interessen Berlins unterzuordnen. „Unsere & Russlands Politik muss auf die Erfüllung des Gleichgewichtes in Europa abzielen,“ schrieb er an Berchtold am 26. April nach St. Petersburg. „Dieses wird gegenwärtig nicht von Deutschland bedroht, zumal Wien, St. Petersburg und Paris es in der Hand haben, durch herzliche Beziehungen untereinander, ein etwaiges Ueberwiegen des Roi de Prusse in die entsprechenden Schranken zu weisen“. Im gleichen Brief konstatierte er: „Ich bin der Letzte, der pour le Roi de Prusse arbeitet“.23 Von den beiden Mittelmächten zeigte Deutschland stellenweise die verhältnismäßig nachgiebigere Haltung. Kaiser Wilhelm II. ließ die Möglichkeit einer „akademischen Diskussion“ über die Rüstung zu, während Aehrenthals Haltung unverändert ablehnend war. Was die Position der Verbündeten betraf, brachte die Denkschrift, welche der deutsche Chargé d’affaires in Wien, Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau, am 26. März 1907 Aehrenthal überreichte, die Klarheit.24 Die Deutschen schlugen vor, den ursprünglichen Entwurf Izvol’skijs, der keinerlei Programmpunkte zur Abrüstung umfasste, unter der Voraussetzung zu akzeptieren, dass die Repräsentanten Russlands, Österreich-Ungarns und Deutschlands Anweisung ihrer Regierungen Silke I. FISCHER, Die Beziehungen Österreich-Ungarns zu Deutschland in den ersten Jahren der Ministerschaft Aehrenthals (1906–1906), Diss., Wien 1959, S. 33. 23 Brief Aehrenthals an Berchtold, Moravský zemský archiv Brno (Mährisches Landesarchiv Brünn), Familienarchiv Berchtold, Fond G 138, Kt. 133, Inventareinheit 462/1. 24 Telegramm Brockdorff-Rantzaus an Auswärtiges Amt, Nr. 68, 26. 3. 1907. GP, XXIII/1, Nr. 7890, S. 176. Text der deutschen Denkschrift, GP, Bd. XXIII/1, Nr. 7887, S. 168–171. 22

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bekämen, sich nicht an den Abrüstungsgesprächen zu beteiligen. Für St. Petersburg bedeutete dies einen annehmbaren Ausgangspunkt und wurde deshalb ebenfalls akzeptiert.25 In Berlin und Wien hegte man Befürchtungen hinsichtlich eventueller Abrüstungsgespräche auf der Konferenz. Deshalb beschäftigte die österreichischen und deutschen Diplomaten lange die Frage, wie man gemeinsam mit Russland den Umstand, dass man sich das Recht vorbehalte, nicht an solchen „unpraktischen Gesprächen“ teilzunehmen, ausdrücken könnte.26 Ergebnis der konzentrierten Bemühungen der Mittelmächte war es schließlich, dass die Möglichkeit einer ernsthaften Behandlung der Abrüstungsfrage schon im Vorfeld der eigentlichen Konferenz verschwand. Am Samstag, dem 15. Juni 1907 eröffnete der niederländische Außenminister Tets van Goudrian, der ehemalige Gesandte in Berlin, die zweite Haager Friedenskonferenz, deren Verhandlungen bis zum 18. Oktober dauerten. Den Vorsitz übernahm der russische Bevollmächtigte und Botschafter in Paris, Aleksandr Ivanovič Nelidov.27 Während der Konferenzverhandlungen traten in den Beziehungen der beiden Verbündeten stellenweise Disharmonien auf. Betrachten wir den Verlauf der Konferenz unter dem Geschichtspunkt der Prioritäten und gegenseitigen Beziehungen der Mittelmächte, so lässt sich konstatieren, dass Österreich-Ungarn nur an einer wesentlich geringeren Zahl der erörterten Themen Interesse hatte und die österreichische Delegation nicht besonders gut auf die Verhandlungen vorbereitet war.28 Wenn sich die Österreicher und Deutschen auch in der negativen Haltung zur Abrüstungsfrage einig waren, so waren sie in der Frage der verbindlichen Unterordnung der Entscheidungen des internationalen Schiedsgerichts unterschiedlicher Auffassung. Mérey machte schon am Anfang der Konferenz den deutschen Ersten Delegaten Marschall29 und Dr. Kriege mit Österreich-Ungarns Telegramm Schoens an das Auswärtige Amt, Nr. 93, 27. 3. 1907. GP, XXIII/1, Nr. 7892, S. 178–179. Telegramm Berchtolds an Aehrenthal, Nr. 49, 27. 3. 1907. HHStA, Ad. Reg., Fach 60, Kt. 66,. 26 Silke I. FISCHER, S. 37–48. 27 Programm der Konferenz vgl. The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and International Arbitration Reports and Documents, S. 147–149. 28 Auf den Umstand, dass die österreichisch-ungarische Delegation schlechter als die Vertreter anderer Staaten zur Haager Konferenz gefahren war, hatte auch der erste Delegierte Mérey ex post am 6. 11. 1907 in einem Privatbrief an Außenminister Aehrenthal hingewiesen. HHStA, Ad. Reg., Fach 60, Kt. 72. 29 Adolf Hermann Marschall von Bieberstein war 1890–1897 Staatssekretär des deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes, 1897–1912 deutscher Botschafter in Konstantinopel und 1912 kurze Zeit Botschafter in London. Die Bezeichnung „Erster Delegierter“ war eine offizielle Bezeichnung für den Delegationsleiter. 25

176 Aleš Skřivan, Sr. ______________________________________________________________

Standpunkt zu dieser Frage bekannt. Er konstatierte, die österreichische Diplomatie sei nicht gewillt, einen eigenen Vorschlag vorzulegen und würde einen Vertrag über einen verbindlichen Schiedsspruch unterschreiben, wenn sichergestellt sei, dass die Signatarstaaten, falls der betreffende Streit ihre vitalen Interessen und ihre Ehre berührte, nicht an den Schiedsspruch gebunden seien. Die deutschen Vertreter schlossen die Möglichkeit einer Unterordnung unter einen Schiedsspruch hingegen aus. Der österreichische Standpunkt überraschte sie, denn er bedeutete die Abkehr Wiens von seiner vormaligen Position.30 Der enttäuschte Marschall schrieb diesen Wandel eindeutig dem österreichisch-ungarischen Außenminister Aehrenthal zu.31 Mérey empfahl Aehrenthal, dem deutschen Druck, trotz der entstandenen Spannungen, nicht nachzugeben.32 Der amerikanische Vorschlag vom Juli 1907 bot in gewisser Weise einen Ausweg an. Unter der Prämisse, die Angelegenheit berühre nicht ihre vitalen Interessen, die Unabhängigkeit, Ehre und gegebenenfalls die Interessen dritter Staaten, sollten jene Streitigkeiten, die nicht mit den geläufigen diplomatischen Mitteln gelöst werden könnten, dem ständigen Schiedsgerichtshof in Haag zur Entscheidung vorgelegt werden. An diesem Punkt kam es zu einer Art Rollenwechsel. Während Marschall andeutete, dass eine Einnahme in dieser Form für Deutschland annehmbar sein müsste, lehnte Mérey den amerikanischen Vorschlag ab. Die deutsche Delegation verspürte in Haag eine immer stärkere Isolation, weshalb Dr. Kriege zu Beratungen nach Berlin abreiste. Das Ergebnis war die erneute Ablehnung, sich dem Spruch eines Schiedsgerichts unterzuordnen und die Unterstützung des amerikanischen Vorschlags der Einrichtung eines Ständigen Schiedsgerichtshofs. Am 28. August trug Mérey im Probeausschuss einen österreichischen Resolutionsentwurf vor, der sich eindeutig für die verbindliche Unterordnung unter ein Schiedsgericht aussprach,33 aber weiterhin den Gedanken ablehnte, aus diesem eine feste Einrichtung zu machen. Bei den Abstimmungen im Probeausschuss erreichte weder der amerikanische noch der österreichische Vorschlag die notwendige Unterstützung. Auch das Quellenmaterial zur Behandlung der Schiedsgerichtsfrage auf der Konferenz vgl. GP, Bd. XXIII/2,S. 323–346. Der Umstand, dass Österreich-Ungarn in der Frage des Schiedsgerichts seine Meinung geändert hatte, kritisierte der deutsche Botschafter in Wien, Wedel, in seinem Bericht an Bülow, Nr. 233, 26. 6. 1907. GP, XXIII/2, Nr. 7989, S. 325–326. 31 Telegramm Marschalls an Auswärtiges Amt, Nr. 3, 18. 6. 1907. GP, XXIII/2, Nr. 7988, S. 324. 32 Bericht Méreys an Aehrenthal, Nr. 8 B, 9. 7. 1907, HHStA, Ad. Reg. Fach 60, Kt. 70. 33 Text der österreichisch-ungarischen Resolution vgl. Beilage zu Méreys Bericht an Aehrenthal, Nr. 29 B, 6. 9. 1907. HHStA, Ad. Reg., Fach 60, Kt. 72. 30

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britisch-amerikanische Kompromissvorhaben hinsichtlich der Ernennung der Richter hatte keinen Erfolg. Am 7. Oktober fand im Plenum die Abstimmung über den amerikanischen Vorschlag statt. Obwohl sich die österreichischen Delegierten erst unlängst für eine verbindliche Unterordnung unter ein Schiedsgericht ausgesprochen hatten, änderten sie nun ihre Meinung, stimmten gemeinsam mit Deutschland und einigen anderen Staaten dagegen, was angesichts des Einstimmigkeitsprinzips die Ablehnung bedeutete. Die Abstimmung im Plenum über Méreys Vorlage fand am 10. Oktober statt. Die britischen Vertreter wandten sich mit großer Schärfe dagegen, und so wurde die österreichische Resolution trotz der Unterstützung Deutschlands, Italiens und Russlands abgelehnt.34 In Anbetracht des französischen Drucks, überhaupt zu einem Abschluss in der Frage einer verbindlichen Unterordnung unter ein Schiedsgericht zu kommen, wurde am 11. Oktober ein vom Italiener Tornielli eingebrachter Resolutionsentwurf verabschiedet. In diesem äußerten sich die Konferenzstaaten in dieser Frage positiv, ohne sich formal jedoch auf irgendetwas festzulegen. Die Tatsache, dass letztendlich nur eine allgemeine unverbindliche Deklaration angenommen worden war, kam in der ersten Linie den Deutschen, die von Anfang an gegen die Pflicht zur Unterordnung unter ein Schiedsgericht gewesen waren, entgegen. In seinem Abschlußbericht über die Konferenz hob Marschall lobend hervor, dass „die Idee“ auf diese Weise durch die Delegierten der Dreibundstaaten „in Form einer nichtsagenden Resolution begraben wurde“.35 Letztlich waren auch die Österreicher zufrieden und Mérey äußerte die Ansicht, dass Österreich-Ungarn sich nichts Besseres hätte wünschen können.36 Was die im Vorfeld so viel diskutierte Abrüstungsfrage betraf, war sich Russland mit den Mittelmächten zwar darin einig, sie nicht auf die Tagesordnung gelangen zu lassen, wollte sich bei Beginn der Konferenz aus Rücksicht auf Frankreich und Großbritannien jedoch nicht grundsätzlich ablehnend äußern. Das größere Verständnis für die komplizierte russische Situation zeigte erstaunlicherweise der österreichisch-ungarische Außenminister Aehrenthal. Er bestand beispielweise nicht auf der Erwähnung der grundsätzlichen österreichischen und deutschen Vorbehalte gegen die Behandlung der Abrüstungsfrage im Rundschreiben, mit dem Russland zur Teilnahme an der Konferenz einlud. In der Frage einer eventuellen Behandlung Der österreichische Resolutionsentwurf wurde 23:14 Stimmen abgelehnt. Vgl. Telegramm Méreys an Aehrenthal, Nr. 28, 11. 10. 1907. HHStA, Ad. Reg., Fach 60, Kt. 74: 35 Marschall an Bülow, 10. 11. 1907. GP, XXIII/1, Nr. 7965, S. 290–291. 36 Silke I. FISCHER, S. 55. 34

178 Aleš Skřivan, Sr. ______________________________________________________________

dieser Frage auf der Konferenz blieben die Standpunkte Wiens und Berlins allerdings eindeutig ablehnend, wenn Aehrenthal es auch geschickter als die Deutschen verstanden hatte, Druck auszuüben und es den österreichischen Diplomaten manchmal gelang, den deutsche Standpunkt beeinflussen. Wenn wir die Haltung der Verbündeten zur Frage der verbindlichen Unterordnung unter einen Schiedsspruch betrachten, dann entsteht der Eindruck, Mérey habe seinen ursprünglichen Standpunkt bald aufgegeben und die österreichische Position der deutschen Meinung untergeordnet, was ihm zum Beispiel Lammasch vorwarf.37 Auf österreichischer Seite war aber auch eine gänzlich andere Einschätzung zu vernehmen. Der erfahrene Diplomat Konstantin Dumba, später Gesandter in Stockholm und Botschafter in Washington, schätzte Mérey als fähigen Diplomaten, der auf der Konferenz unzweifelhaft geschickt agiert habe.38 Im übrigen, behauptete auch Marschall, dass der österreichische Vertreter seinen Standpunkt auf der Grundlage eigener Bewertung geändert habe.39 Eine logische, wenn auch kritisch zu hinterfragende Erklärung lieferte Mérey selbst. Nach einer Erklärung wollte er Deutschland mit dieser Meinungsänderung eine Isolation auf der Konferenz ersparen. Der Kern des Problems lag, was Österreich betrifft, aber woanders. Dumba, in dessen III. Referat des Außenministeriums die Verantwortung für die Teilnahme and der Haager Konferenz fiel, gab zu, dass weder Aehrenthal noch jemand anderer der „Konferenz die nötige Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet hatten“. Österreich-Ungarn habe ein „mangelndes Interesse“ an der Konferenz gezeigt, und so ließen sich seine Vertreter, auch wenn die österreichische Diplomatie im Laufe der vorbereitenden Gespräche aktiver war, leicht von den Deutschen beeinflussen und in den Schatten stellen.40

LAMMASCH, S. 52. Konstantin DUMBA, Dreibund- und Ententepolitik in der Alten und Neuen Welt. Leipzig, Wien, Zürich 1931, S. 251. 39 Diese Meinung enthält der Abschlußbericht Marschalls über die Konferenz an Bülow, 10. 11. 1907. GP, XXIII/1, Nr. 7965, S. 289–295. 40 Silke I. FISCHER, S. 58. 37

38

The Sanjak Railway Crisis Roman Kodet

At the end of the year 1907 was focused the attention of European Great Powers on the problem of Macedonian reforms. On the base of this problem the two most interested Great Powers – Austria-Hungary and Russia – created common agreement known as the Austro-Russian entente and in the year 1903 signed Mürszteg Punctation. According to this treaty these two rivals in the sphere of Eastern Question decided to cooperate in preservation of the status quo on the Balkans. Their aim was to strengthen the control of the Macedonian reforms.1 The cooperation of these two states lasted with some problems for four years. But after the accession of new foreign ministers in Vienna and St. Petersburg, their mutual relations worsened. On the 12th May 1906 Alexander Petrovich Izvolsky became a foreign minister of tsarist Russia. He was convinced that his main task is to hinder German hegemony in Europe.2 He was therefore determined to cooperate closely with Western Powers, which corresponded with his liberal opinions. On the contrary the new foreign minister of Austria-Hungary Baron Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal, who had been in the years 1899–1906 an ambassador in St. Petersburg, was known as a russophile and “was highly estimated in high political circles in St. Petersburg and enjoyed favour and confidence of the Tsar.”3 His conservative conviction led him to a persuasion that the best way to secure the interests of Austria-Hungary is a close cooperation with Russia. Already as an ambassador in St. Petersburg he wrote several memorials to his superior Gołuchowski, whom he advocated the revival of the Three Emperors Alliance.4 However his plan couldn’t be executed because of Izvolsky’s unwillingness to closely cooperate with the Habsburg monarchy.

Francis Roy BRIDGE, From Sadowa to Sarajevo. The Foreign policy of AustriaHungary 186 –1914, London, Boston 1972, p. 265. 2 W. M. CARLGREN, Iswolsky und Aehrenthal vor der bosnischen Annexionskrise, Uppsala 1955, p. 73. 3 Berthold MOLDEN, Alois Graf Aehrenthal. Sechs Jahre äußere Politik ÖsterreichUngarns, Stuttgart, Berlin 1917, p. 17. 4 W. M. CARLGREN, Die Renaissance des Dreikaiserbundes. Ein Grosspolitischer Plan Aehrenthals im Jahre 1906, Stockholm 1954, p. 16–17. 1

180 Roman Kodet ______________________________________________________________

The opportunity to establish closer relations between both empires came in September 1907, when Izvolsky visited Vienna. Both ministers discussed mainly the situation in Macedonia. They agreed, that Vienna and St. Petersburg should press the Balkan states to stop their support of armed bands in this region, because otherwise the Great Powers wouldn’t be able to proceed with the reforms of administration in Macedonia based on the national identity. Nevertheless more important was Izvolsky’s probe with regard to discover Aehrental’s attitude to Izvolsky’s main goal, which was nothing lesser than the change of the status quo of the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. In exchange for the Austro-Hungarian support he was prepared to agree with Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and even the Sanjak of Novi Pazar.5 Aehrenthal answered quite evasively, because the Bosnian question wasn’t in that time actual. The meeting was successful, because Russian foreign minister promised cooperation on the problem of reforms in Macedonia.6 This completely suited Aehrenthal, who was notwithstanding worried, because Izvolsky’s comments about the Straits meant, that Russia once again activated its Balkan policy. From the messages from Constantinople it was simultaneously evident, that Izvolsky gives a free hand to ambassador Ivan Alexeevich Zinoviev, whose anti-Austrian attitude was well known and who ostentatiously cooperated with British envoy O’Connor.7 Therefore despite of assurances of Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Ottoman Empire Pallavicini, that “today Russia plays in Constantinople a lesser part than any other power,”8 Aehrenthal was suspicious of another Russian step. His apprehensions were boosted up by the fact, that in this time the question of the so-called Sanjak railway became acute. Austria-Hungary gained the right to build this key railway, which aim was to directly connect the Habsburg monarchy with Salonica, on the base of the 25th article of the Treaty of Berlin. According to Austrian plans this railway should connect the Bosnian city of Uvac with Turkish railway network in Mitrovica. The building of Austrian railway to Uvac protracted due to insufficient financial funds, but after activation of Serbian project of Adriatic railway in

CARLGREN, Iswolsky und Aehrenthal, p. 191. Francis Roy BRIDGE, The Habsburg Monarchy among the Great powers, 1815–1918, New York, Oxford, Munich 1990, p. 274.. 7 CARLGREN, Iswolsky und Aehrenthal, p. 192. 8 Ibid., p. 187. 5

6

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1890,9 the works were hurried and in the year 1905 this ambitious project was finished. “Only at this moment the connection of Bosnian with Turkish railways – the building of connection Uvac-Mitrovica – became key for Austro-Hungarian political and economic interests on the Balkans. The Habsburg monarchy would gain direct connection with Constantinople – so far part of the railway to Turkish capital led through Serbian territory. Austria-Hungary could also connect itself with Greek railway net and the building of this short highway would undoubtedly strengthened Austrian positions on the Balkans. The project had support of military leaders in Vienna, especially of the Chief of the General Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf.”10 The main problem of this plan lay in the response of the Great Powers. The Fundamental weak point of Aehrenthal’s meeting with Izvolsky lay in the fact, that the Sanjak railway project wasn’t mentioned. Vienna was therefore afraid that this whole problem could destroy the Austro-Russian entente.11 After relative successful discussion with Izvolsky Aehrenthal turned his attention towards Constantinople, where he designed to put through the Sanjak railway project. Simultaneously he knew, that the Mürzsteg program embodies serious weaknesses, which can lead to the collapse of the entente. Its main weak point was its clumsiness, which proved after the beginning of the conference of ambassadors in Constantinople. Here the weakness of the whole concert of the Great Powers showed itself. The ambassadors were only slowly informed about the intentions of their governments and their instructions were often outdated. Another important point was the fact, that the ambassadors of Great Powers in Constantinople were universally strong persons, who were convinced, that they are familiar with the present situation more than their chiefs and governments. This led to their ignorance of their directives and they played a lone hand.12 This fact gave rise to their mutual antipathies, which consequently complicated the conference. Its new meeting was on the request of the British ambassador Nicolas O’Connor postponed to the 26th of October. Until than O’Connor received instructions to cooperate with Russian envoy Zinoviev with the aim to enforce the most radical shape of the judicial reform in Macedonia. Against Arthur J. MAY, Trans-Balkan Railway Schemes. Journal of Modern History 24 (1952), p. 353. 10 Aleš SKŘIVAN, Císařská politika. Rakousko-Uhersko a Německo v evropské politice v letech 1906–1914, Praha 1996, p. 41. 11 CARLGREN, Iswolsky und Aehrenthal, p. 190. 12 BRIDGE, The Habsburg Monarchy, p. 275. 9

182 Roman Kodet ______________________________________________________________

his proposals stood up German representative Kiderlen-Wächter, who substituted absent German ambassador in Constantinople Marschall. At his side stood quite surprisingly French ambassador Constans. By this chain of events the conference lost its integrity and it can be claimed, that the representatives of Austria-Hungary and Russia lost control of the situation.13 Standstill of the conference led Aehrenthal to advice Pallavicini to support Zinoviev’s proposal, that the inspectors for Macedonia should be Christians chosen by the Sultan from a list created by the Great Powers. This invoked opposition from the side of Germans and British. At the meeting on the 4th of December the ambassadors achieved only the agreement that the still nonexistent project of the Great Powers will be presented to the Sultan as a collective note. However Pallavicini judged the possibility of an agreement quite pessimistic.14 He wrote his opinions to Aehrenthal on 11th December and complained on Zinoviev who cooperated with O’Connor. Pallavicini credited this Zinoviev’s activity to Izvolsky who along his opinion wasn't interested in the continuation of the entente. Aehrenthal estimated Pallavicini’s reports as exaggerated. In this opinion he was reassured by Austro-Hungarian ambassador in St. Petersburg Leopold Berchtold, whose messages revealed, that the RussoBritish rapprochement reached its climax and in the near future it would be disturbed by Russian ambitions in the question of the Straits.15 Aehrenthal was also cheered up by the concordant view with the Izvolsky on the question of Macedonian gendarmery which didn’t conform with the views of the British Foreign Secretary sir Edward Grey, who “faced with identical replies from Vienna and St. Petersburg could only abandon his proposal”.16 The fact that Russia still stands at the side of Vienna led Aehrenthal to a conviction, that he should exploit this support until Austria-Hungary can still count with it. In order to enforce the Austrian project Aehrenthal had to secure the support of Germany. He gained an opportunity to this move when the German ambassador Marschall went on the 14th of December from Berlin back to Constantinople. At the beginning of their conversations he tried to gain Germany for Austro-Hungarian policy in Macedonia. But Marschall was evasive and only confined himself to a statement, that Germany wouldn’t oppose the policy of entente powers. The second point of their CARLGREN, Iswolsky und Aehrenthal, p. 197. Ibid., p. 198. 15 Ibid., p. 200. 16 BRIDGE, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, p. 296. 13

14

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discussion was the question of the Straits. It became quite obvious, that the aim of Russian policy is to gain free passage through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. This would lead according to Vienna and Berlin to the Russian control of Constantinople. Despite of this fact the partners from the Dual alliance took an expectant stand. As the last point both statesmen discussed the question of the Sandjak railway. Though the Germans already promised their support when Aehrenthal visited Berlin in May 1907,17 Aehrenthal wanted to test the firmness of German attitude and gain another assurance of German support. He also hoped to gain Marschall personally, because German ambassador had a very firm position following the support of the Emperor Wilhelm II and during his long function in Constantinople he gained considerable influence on the Sultan Abdülhamid.18 Therefore Aehrenthal outlined the advantages of the project. The Austro-Hungarian minister claimed, that it wouldn’t only safeguard the status quo on the Balkans, but also oppose the Russo-Serbian project of the railway connection between the Danube and the Adriatic, which would evade the territory of Austria-Hungary.19 Aehrenthal appealed on Marschall to back up the Austro-Hungarian project, in order to stop this Serbian plan, which would seriously harm the interests of Vienna. Despite he didn’t gain direct assurance of German assistance, Aehrenthal hoped, that his arguments would eventually persuade Marschall. So on the turn of the years 1907 and 1908 the Austro-Hungarian policy focused its attention on the gain of the concession for the building of the Sanjak railway. However Aehrenthal was aware of two dangers, which loomed over the project. Firstly it was the mentioned Russo-Serbian plan of the so-called Transversal railway and secondly the menace that Izwolsky could get on with his designs in the question of the Straits. This would endanger the whole position of Austria-Hungary on the Balkans and would force Aehrenthal to the annexation of Bosnia a Herzegovina. Such step would undoubtedly lead to a serious conflict with the Turks and the project of the Sanjak railway would be ruined. Therefore Aehrenthal wanted to proceed as fast as possible and in this sense he sent instructions to Pallavicini. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Constantinople was also a supporter of the railway project, but he advised to be cautious and to wait till the Great Powers present their collective note concerning the Macedonian reforms to

SKŘIVAN, p. 41. CARLGREN, Iswolsky und Aehrenthal, p. 203. 19 MAY, pp. 353–357. 17

18

184 Roman Kodet ______________________________________________________________

the Sultan.20 But Aehrenthal intended not to wait especially when the collective note wasn’t prepared and the conduct of the Great Powers prolonged unbearably. Therefore he sent Pallavicini on the 23th of December instructions regarding the Austro-Hungarian project. Pallavicini had to arrange an audience by the sultan Abdülhamid, where he should refer to traditionally friendly relationship of the Habsburg Monarchy towards the Ottoman Empire and simultaneously emphasize the economical advantages of the Sanjak railway for both countries.21 Then Pallavicini had to meet the Grand Vizier Ferid Paşa whom he had to pledge, that if Vienna gains the concession for the Sanjak railway, Austria-Hungary would consult with the Ottoman government the shifts of its military garrisons in the area of the Sanjak Novi Pazar.22 Pallavicini should take these steps secretly, so the Russian ambassador Zinoviev, from whose side Aehrenthal suspected serious opposition, wouldn’t discover them. Still for the Austrian project the German support remained pivotal. This problem was solved by Pallavicini, who on the 30th of December informed Marschall about the presentation of Austro-Hungarian plans to the sultan. Afterwards Marschall asked the State Secretary Wilhelm von Schoen for instructions. Schoen answered immediately and wrote Marschall, that he is “consentient with cautious support of Austro-Hungarian proceeding in the railway question”. 23 Thereby the problem of German support was solved. Nevertheless there was a question of the reaction of the rest of the Great Powers. Aehrenthal thought that he should at least generally inform them. Berlin was informed about the démarche to the sultan by the AustroHungarian ambassador Szögyény. The task to acquire at least neutral standpoint got the ambassadors in St. Petersburg and Rome. Therefore, Berchtold and Lützow informed, on the 9th of January 1908, the governments of Russia and Italy. In conversations with Berchtold Izvolsky took a reserved standpoint, which was correctly interpreted as an unwillingness of

CARLGREN, Iswolsky und Aehrenthal, p. 207. Solomon WANK, Aus dem Nachlaß Aehrenthal. Briefe und Dokumente zur österreichisch-ungarischen Innen- und Außenpolitik 1885–1912, Graz 1994, p. 566–568. 22 CARLGREN, Iswolsky und Aehrenthal, p. 208. 23 Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871–1914. Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes (further quoted as GP), hg. von Johannes LEPSIUS, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy und Friedrich THIMME, vol. 25, Berlin 1926, p. 295. 20 21

The Sanjak Railway Crisis 185 ________________________________________________________

the Russian foreign minister to become involved in this question.24 But neither Izvolsky nor Italian foreign minister Tommaso Tittoni didn’t raise objections against the Sanjak railway project. The western powers were about the Sanjak railway informed only on 16th January 1908, which implies that Aehrenthal considered their support as inferior.25 Meanwhile Pallavicini tried to secure the agreement in Constantinople. He came near to this goal when he gained approval of the Grand Vizier. At this activity he availed the fact, that simultaneously the conference about the Macedonian reforms was in progress – the Turks anticipated helpful attitude from the part of Austria-Hungary. The questions of the Sanjak railway and the Macedonian reforms were therefore dangerously interconnected in the time when the situation became dramatically acute. The Ottoman government rejected a proposal of the Great Powers to prolong the mandate of the reform authorities. This decision led to a serious crisis of the conference in Constantinople. Pallavicini found himself in a painful situation – he had to join the pressure of the Great Powers, but he couldn’t took harder standpoint, otherwise he would endanger his main goal – the railway project. But Aehrenthal was afraid of withdrawal of the Great Powers, because it would only lead to a firmer resistance of Turkey to the reform proposals. This situation of uncertainty in Constantinople was superimposed by the antagonistic positions of the Great Powers. In this complicated situation the Austro-Hungarian delegations assembled. Here Aehrenthal made his memorable speech about the outlook of Austria-Hungary on the international scene. “Aehrenthal tried in this speech to rouse up the public opinion of Austria-Hungary from its out-andout pessimistic view of foreign policy and future of the Dual monarchy.”26 He started his speech by a survey of the political gains from the last year whereas he focused his attention on the situation in Macedonia. Than he passed over to the Sanjak railway. He claimed, that it “will be the shortest way from central Europe to Egypt and India” and thanks to this AustriaHungary will “participate on the huge exchange of goods between Occident and Orient via Constantinople and the Straits”.27 In order to calm down the public Aehrental declared, that the monarchy doesn’t long for territorial

CARLGREN, Iswolsky und Aehrenthal, p. 213. To the discussion about the Macedonian reforms between Berchtold and Izvolsky see WANK, Aus dem Nachlaß Aehrenthal, p. 569–570. 25 CARLGREN, Iswolsky und Aehrenthal, p. 214. 26 Ibid., p. 218. 27 SKŘIVAN, p. 42. 24

186 Roman Kodet ______________________________________________________________

gains on the Balkans28 and that the building of the Sanjak railway pursue only commercial aims and therefore does not oppose the entente with Russia, because its aim is to maintain status quo.29 Aehrenthals well balanced speech had a good impact on the public and the Sanjak railway project gained “great support of political and economical elites of both parts of the Dual monarchy”.30 However the international reception was quite different. Especially in Constantinople Aehrenthal’s exposé invoked inconsistent reactions. “That sensational Austrian coup caused violent repercussions in unfriendly foreign capitals and encouraged other countries to press their railway plans upon the Porte.”31 Especially the Russians were highly outraged whereas Russian press and the Duma reacted quite adversely. Izvolsky alone was took unaware and realized that the consent of the Turks with the Austrian project would minimalize the chances of the realization of the Russo-Serbian plan of the Transversal railway. This should connect Serbia with some of the Albanian or Montenegrin port by which this inland country would gain access to the sea avoiding the territory of Austria-Hungary. At current situation there was a menace, that the Turks will prefer the Austrian project, which took into account a branch of the Sanjak railway to Serbia via Bosnia. This would mean that the shortest way from Serbia to Western Europe would continually lead through the territory of the Habsburg monarchy, which would have a mean to control and restrict the expansive policy of Serbia. On the other hand Britain wasn’t anxious, because the Foreign Office hoped that the whole matter could be exploit in destroying the entente. The permanent undersecretary on the Foreign Office even claimed, that there starts a diplomatic struggle between Austria-Hungary and Russia so the Great Britain wouldn’t be bothered by Russia in Asia.32 Even, the British press kept reserved standpoint, which was accentuated by the fact that The Times didn’t mention, the Austrian project at all.33 In Constantinople there were mixed feelings. The expert on local problems Marschall wrote to Berlin, that “Aehrenthal’s speech made the most uncomfortable impression on the Porte and I don’’t doubt, that in the CARLGREN, Iswolsky und Aehrenthal vor der bosnischen Annexionskrise, p. 219. BRIDGE, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, p. 298. 30 Milan HLAVAČKA, Marek PEČENKA, Trojspolek. Praha 1999, s. 202. 31 MAY, p. 357. 32 BRIDGE, The Habsburg Monarchy among the Great powers, p. 277. 33 Francis Roy BRIDGE, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary 1906-1914. London 1972, p. 80. 28 29

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Palace it will receive the same reception”.34 Particularly Aehrenthal’s references about the necessity of Macedonian reforms made a flustering impression on the Turks. Despite of this the Ottoman government decided on the 29th of January to give the concession for the building of the Sanjak railway. Two days later the Sultan Abdülhamid himself gave his consent to the project. The building of the railway connecting Uvac with Mitrovica should be formally under Turkish control but in reality the specialists from the Company of Oriental Railways would be in charge of the project.35 This was a great success for Ballhauspatz and Pallavicini who secured the support of Marschall. Even other diplomats in Constantinople honoured this. The British ambassador O’Connor said: “It had never happened, that such an irradé was enforced in such a short time”.36 This success was augmented by the fact that it lasted Marschall alone to push ahead the project of the Baghdad railway. But the Austrian feeling of triumph shouldn’t last for a long time. The approval of the project meant a serious estrangement of Vienna and St. Petersburg. Particularly Russian nationalist circles were irritated and Russian press started hateful campaign against Austria-Hungary. The journal Novoe Vremya for example wrote, that the Austrian railway project would culminate in germanisation of the Near East and demanded compensations.37 Aehrenthal therefore sent instructions to Berchtold in order to improve mutual relations. The Austrian ambassador visited Izvolsky whom he told, that the Sanjak railway wouldn’t be pushed forward at the expanse of the reforms in Macedonia and that Austria-Hungary doesn’t plan an expansion in the direction on Thessaloniki. Despite some positive achievements Berchtold jugged the situation as dangerous38 and on the 5th of February he wrote Aehrenthal that “the entente can continue only if the judicial reform is successful”.39 The approval of the Austrian project was publicly announced, on 4th February, whereas on the next day another meeting of the ambassadors in Constantinople was scheduled. But the conference ended in utter fiasco. The ambassadors let themselves to persuade by the arguments of Marschall who insisted, that the current collective note of the Great Powers is not satisfactory and that the Porte is not prepared to accept such a document. GP, vol. 25, p. 297. CARLGREN, Iswolsky und Aehrenthal, p. 220. 36 Ibid., p. 220–221. 37 Ibid., p. 224. 38 WANK, Aus dem Nachlaß Aehrenthal, p. 576. 39 CARLGREN, Iswolsky und Aehrenthal, p. 233. 34 35

188 Roman Kodet ______________________________________________________________

This led to a rupture between the ambassadors and each of them estimated the chance for an agreement as negligible. Even the representatives of the entente powers weren’t able to take any effective steps. Therefore the ambassadors of the Great Powers rejected to hand over the collective note to the Porte. This diplomatic exposure caused mutual allegation between the ambassadors. Pallavicini charged especially O’Connor, who according to his opinion, hold an unflexible and too radical stand. This led Aehrenthal to an attempt to convince Izvolsky, that he should blame Great Britain not Austria-Hungary.40 But Izvolsky temporarily lost his confidence in Vienna, because Zinoviev wrote him, that Pallavicini sacrificed the conference in an effort to achieve the acceptance of the Austrian railway project. O’Connor supported Zinoviev’s point of view and Izvolsky assumed that he can not credit Vienna in the case of Macedonia and therefore he wanted to “rally himself ... to those powers who are sincerely desirous of reforms”.41 By this the Russian minister undoubtedly meant Great Britain, because Russian ally France observed to the whole thing quite reserved position. Though its true that Pallavicini didn’t want to escalate the pressure on the Turks and thus endanger the railway project, it is necessary to point out, that O’Connor’s and Zinoviev’s accusations “didn’t correspond the reality”.42 It’s also necessary to underline that both London and St. Petersburg saw German machination behind the whole crisis which lead them to harden their resistance. Here negatively acted the assessment of the correspondent of The Times in Vienna Henry Wickham Steed, who declared that behind the whole problem stood Germany.43 Though Germany played an important role, it must be said that the opinion that Austria-Hungary played in this matter a role of a German satellite is completely incorrect. Though St. Petersburg promised in April 1908 not to undermine the Austrian project44 the Sanjak railway crisis meant significant disturbance of Aehrenthal’s policy of cooperation with Russia. St. Petersburg started to team up with London on its support it became evidently dependent. The permanent undersecretary of Foreign Office sir Charles Hardinge was in this time satisfied with the collapse of the Mürszteg program.45 However despite of the failure of the common policy in Macedonia Aehrenthal still hoped to BRIDGE, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary 1906–1914, p. 81. BRIDGE, The Habsburg Monarchy, p. 277. 42 SKŘIVAN, p. 43. 43 BRIDGE, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary 1906-1914, p. 84. 44 SKŘIVAN, p. 44. 45 BRIDGE, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, p. 299. 40 41

The Sanjak Railway Crisis 189 ________________________________________________________

continue with the partnership between Austria-Hungary and Russia. His hopes rose after Izvolsky’s exposé in the Duma on the 17th of April 1908 where he defended the achievements of the cooperation with AustriaHungary.46 This gave Ahrenthal hope that despite of the estrangement during the Sanjak railway crisis the Austro-Russian cooperation can continue. As the months before the Bosnian crisis, which lead to the final rupture of Austria-Hungary and Russia, had shown the hopes of the AustroHungarian foreign minister weren’t without foundation.

46

SKŘIVAN, p. 45.

Austro–Hungarian Export to China1 Aleš Skřivan, Jr.

The position of China in Austro-Hungarian export Austro-Hungarian export (in fact, the aggregate of foreign trade) showed a long-term narrow territorial diversification with Germany clearly constituting a dominating part in the Austro-Hungarian foreign trade. Although in the long term perspective the share of Europe in AustroHungarian export declined, the significance of trade with non European regions2 grew; outside Europe it were, for example, Turkey and the USA which were among the few relatively important business partners of AustriaHungary. From the point of foreign trade, the Far East was a territory of lesser relevance with which, in the long term, the Habsburg Monarchy maintained only weak business links.3 From the basic statistics it is evident at first sight that in the long term the weak position of China in the AustroHungarian foreign trade did not essentially change, and business contacts between the Middle Kingdom and Austria-Hungary more or less stagnated (similar to the trade between Austria-Hungary and Japan). Chiefly because of its volume, the trade between Austria-Hungary and China could not yield any considerable influence on the economies of these countries. Only a small part of the total of Austro-Hungarian exporters engaged in trade with the Far East. China was not the type of target territory that would attract the attention of a particular industry, a particular production segment.4 For China, on the other hand, Austria-Hungary also meant a smalltime business partner. Compared to Austria-Hungary it was Great Britain, The paper has been prepared as an output of the research project entitled AustroHungarian Export to China and its Position Within the Total Export of the Habsburg Monarchy (the FIGA grant, Faculty of Economics and Public Administration, University of Economics, Prague). 2 More see Jindřich CHYLÍK, Přehled vývoje světového obchodu, Praha 1948, p. 69. 3 Besides Russia, the only region geographically close to China with which AustriaHungary conducted a relatively significant trade in the beginning of the 20 century was British India, and in the trade with British India Austria-Hungary regularly showed passive balance. Oesterreichisches statistisches Handbuch für die im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreiche und Länder, herausgeben von der K. K. Statistischen CentralCommision, Wien 1902–1913, passim. 4 Georg-Ludwig HEISE, Beiträge zu den Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen ÖsterreichUngarn und China (1860 –1914), Dissertation, Geisteswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Universität Wien, Wien 1999, p. 380 1

192 Aleš Skřivan, Jr. ______________________________________________________________

which, of all European countries, carried on the far largest trade with China, maintaining, in the long term, the strongest political and economic position in the Far East.5 In comparison with Austria-Hungary, the volumes of trade between Germany and China were also obviously larger. In contrast to Austria-Hungary, Germany ranked among the ten most significant business partners of China before the First World War.6 After the Anglo-Chinese War, called the Opium Wars, in connection with the gradual opening of China7 to foreign trade, China was perceived, at least by many European businessmen who were engaged in the Far East, as a highly prospective market, as a territory whose importance in the world trade would grow fast. As it turned out later, the real development differed from these rose-coloured visions considerably. In a certain respect, it was the year 1869 which represented a breakthrough for Austria-Hungary’s better chances to extend trade with China. On 17 November 1869 the Suez Canal was opened, making shorter the sea passages connecting Trieste, the most important port of the Habsburg Monarchy, with the Far East. Before the opening of the Suez Canal, on 2 September 1869, representatives of Austria-Hungary and China signed a treaty of friendship, trade and sailing in Peking. The main goal of the document was to stimulate trade between Austria-Hungary and China. Austria-Hungary also gradually extended the institutional background inevitable for finding a possible way to the Chinese market. Soon after the conclusion of the treaty, the Austro-Hungarian consulate was established in Shanghai; the monarchy had yet another in Hong Kong, and in 1896 the mission in Peking was turned into an embassy.8

For more details on trade between China and its most important business partners (including the trade with Great Britain) before the First World War, see International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia and Oceania 1750 –1993, p. 586. 6 China, A Commercial and Industrial Handbook, United States Department of Commerce, Washigton D.C. p. 52. For more detail on German-Chinese trade, see Uwe G. FABRITZEK, Gelber Drache, schwarzer Adler, chapter II: Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen Deutschland und China bis 1914, München und Wien 1973, and Udo RATENHOF, Die Chinapolitik des Deutschen Reiches 1871 bis 1945, Boppard am Rhein 1987, passim. 7 On the process of the opening of China, see Aleš SKŘIVAN, ml., První opiová válka a otevírání Číny, In: Historický obzor, 17, No. 11/12, 2006, pp. 242–251. On relations of China to other countries in the second half of the 19 century, see Hosea Ballou MORSE, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, Volume II, The period of submission 1861–93, London 1918. 8 For details on the consular activities, see Georg LEHNER: Beiträge zur Geschichte der k.(u.)k. Konsularververtungen in China, Dissertation, Geisteswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Universität Wien, Wien 1995. 5

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The Austro-Hungarian Concession in Tianjin was an interesting, though short-lived phenomenon.9 The given circumstances, however, did not help to sufficiently accelerate the long-term slow and unwieldy development of economic links between the Habsburg Monarchy and the Middle Kingdom. There were several reasons for the small volume, and, therefore, also a relatively limited significance of the Austro-Hungarian trade with China. Firstly, a considerable geographical distance between both countries stood in the way of a greater expansion of their mutual trade for a long time. Secondly, neither Austria-Hungary not China could offer the other party any really interesting and important commodity which could not be bought in another country without much difficulty. To the contrary, to each traded commodity there existed other, comparably beneficial alternative sources. When looking into the stagnating trade between Austria-Hungary and China, we also have to pay attention to the influence of the state on the development of mutual commercial relations. On the side of China the opportunities and willingness of the state to support and encourage mutual trade were very small. The reasons for this fact lay in regular economic problems of the Qing court, the image of Austria-Hungary as a remote country which did not rank among the strongest world powers, unequal agreements signed between China and other states, and controversial relations between the Chinese and foreigners related to it. In the case of Austria-Hungary the assessment of the state support of the trade with China seems to be more difficult. Individual producers in the monarchy, for example, had the opportunity to get information about the developments on the Chinese market from the consular news10 quite regularly through chambers of trade and commerce.11 There were, on the other hand, comparatively few entrepreneurs in the Habsburg Monarchy, which made real use of the information coming from the consular news, showed serious interest in trading with the Far East, and were ready to bear all the difficulties such business might often bring about. This lack of interest was the result of a number of reasons. Besides the above given factors Austro-Hungarian Concession was founded in 1902 after the locality in Tianjin was taken over. It was situated by the Hai He River, close to the Grand Canal, and it stretched on the territory of about one square kilometre. It was dissolved in 1917. On the Concession, see more Georg LEHNER Beiträge, p. 427–435 a Günter HÖRTLER, Die österreich-ungarische Konzession in Tianjin, Dissertation, Philosophishe Fakultät, Universität Wien, Wien 1984. 10 On consular news, see more in LEHNER, Beiträge, pp. 407–459. 11 HEISE, p. 382. 9

194 Aleš Skřivan, Jr. ______________________________________________________________

complicating the Austro-Hungarian trade with China, a mention should be made about the fact that a large part of Austro-Hungarian companies did not feel the urge to expand their business activities (in commerce and investment spheres) to faraway exotic regions, because, from the economic point of view, some regions much nearer at hand were considered highly attractive (e.g. the Balkans) and drew far more attention of the AustroHungarian businesses than China.12 The transport of goods to the Far East was a highly specific aspect of the Austro-Hungarian export to China. Trieste, the most important port of the monarchy, was the seat of the largest Austrian shipping company, the Österreichischer Lloyd.13 The shipment of goods via Trieste and the employment of the services of Österreichischer Lloyd was a very problematic matter in the long term. Trieste was facing the competition of important European ports, Hamburg in particular. Österreichischer Lloyd did not enjoy a good reputation because regularly it had considerable difficulties to compete with the prices of the German Norddeutscher Lloyd and HAPAG;14 in addition, the Austrian contractor was generally considered less reliable. Moreover, the transport of goods from Central Europe to the South, to Trieste, was also quite tricky and in a number of cases inefficient. The above problems, for example, contributed to the fact that a large part of the export from the Bohemian lands was realised via Hamburg.15 Also, in the sphere of the development of transport to the Far East it seemed that the Austrian Lloyd was almost always a step behind its main competitors. In 1869 The Suez Canal was opened and the above agreement between Austria-Hungary and China was signed in Peking.16 The Austrian Lloyd, however, did not respond to the favourable conditions by extending the transport to the Far East fast. It set up a regular connection for Hong Kong only as late as 1881, and for Shanghai as late as 1892. After the scheduled service to Shanghai was opened, its importance as a target In this context it is worth mentionning that a large part of the Austro-Hungarian firms was little interested in export and activities abroad in general. 13 Since 1872 Österreichisch-Ungarischer Lloyd, since 1891 Österreichischer Lloyd again. 14 In this connection it is of interest to compare the subsidies the companies received to operate individual lines. For more details, see HEISE, Appendix II. 15 For more details, see Ivan JAKUBEC, Zdeněk JINDRA, Dějiny hospodářství českých zemí, od počátku industrializace do konce habsburské monarchie, Praha 2006, pp. 299 a 312–313. 16 On sea transport and business contacts between Austria (Austria-Hungary) and the Far East before the agreement was signed and the Suez Canal opened, see more in Johann PFUNDER, Die Österreichische Handelsschiftfahrt im Ausland von 1850–1870, Dissertation, Philosophische Fakultät, Universität Wien, Wien 1953, pp. 98–112. 12

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destination increased at the expense of Hong Kong. In 1908 it was Shanghai where almost three fourths of the total volume of goods transported by the Austrian Lloyd to China was unloaded.17 The Austrian Lloyd was, among other things, criticised for insufficient speed of the transport of goods to the Far East because it took its ships six to seven weeks to reach China on the average. Therefore, the introduction of an express route between Trieste and Shanghai in 1912, which shortened the transport to approximately 30 days, was considered a success. Because of the outbreak of the First World War, however, the introduction of the express line came too late.18 Figure I: The proportion of China in Austro-Hungarian import and export (percent) 1,6 1,4 1,2 1

Austro-Hungarian import Austro-Hungarian export

0,8 0,6 0,4 0,2 0 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914

Source: Oesterreichisches statistisches Handbuch für die im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreiche und Länder, herausgeben von der K.K. statistichen Central-Commision, Wien, Einundzwanzigster Jahrgang 1902, Wien 1903, p. 243; Dreiundzwanzigster Jahrgang 1904, Wien 1905, p. 254; Sechsundzwanzigster Jahrgang 1907, Wien 1908, p. 298; Neunundzwanzigster Jahrgang 1910, Wien 1911, 272; Dreissigster Jahrgang 1911, Wien 1912, pp. 233 and 235; Einunddreissigster Jahrgang 1912, Wien 1913, p. 263; Zweiunddreissigster Jahrgang 1913, Wien 1914, p. 233; Fünfunddreissigster Jahrgang 1916-1917, Wien 1918, p. 195.

HEISE, pp. 200–201. The express line was operated by the ships Bohemia, Koeber, Afrika, and since 1914 also the Hungaria. See more in Chinyun LEE: Obchod mezi českými zeměmi a Čínou před první světovou válkou, Historický obzor No. 1/2, 17, 2006, pp. 21–24. For general information on Österreichischer Lloyd see Dieter WINKLER, Georg PAWLIK, Die Dampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft Österreichischer Lloyd, 1836–1918, Graz 1986. 17

18

196 Aleš Skřivan, Jr. ______________________________________________________________

The unfavourable development of the Austro-Hungarian export to China is documented in the basic statistics. In this spot, however, objective obstacles, which considerably complicate a more precise analysis of the Austro-Hungarian export to China, should be pointed out. Official AustroHungarian statistical surveys obviously do not include (and, understandably, even cannot include) all supplies, which in actually found their way to the Chinese market. They obviously do not include, for example information about some arms supplies. Monitoring supplies to the Chinese market is also greatly complicated by frequently non-transparent re-export, when it is impossible to determine precisely if it was the Chinese market where a particular shipment was delivered in the end. Greater difficulties appear when employing statistical surveys, which originated in China. For example, statistical surveys made by the customs offices19 in individual Chinese contracted ports took into consideration only the “nationality” of the ship bringing the goods to China, or the country from which the supply was transported disregarding the place where the goods was actually manufactured. A logical result of this approach was the fact that, in a number of cases, the goods produced in Austria-Hungary were recorded in customs statistics as German, British or, for instance, Russian.20 As a matter of fact, the above factors also make it difficult to specify the proportion of the Bohemian lands in Austro-Hungarian export. A more precise quantification of this share seems to be a very difficult, almost impossible task. The percentage of the Bohemian lands in the AustroHungarian export to China has, among other things, been dealt with by Chinyun Lee and Ivana Bakešová. Bakešová says that the manufacturers located in the Czech lands constituted about one quarter in the AustroHungarian export to China in 1913. Her conclusion is based on sources in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic.21 In these documents, however, it is not clear how the share has been arrived at,

The customs offices in treaty ports fell under the jurisdiction of the office of the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service (the Imperial Maritime Customs Service until 1912, The Chinese Maritime Customs Service since 1912) headed by Inspector General of Customs. 20 See more in, e.g. Returns of Trade (24th-61st issue), Trade Reports (18th-55th issue), Inspectorate general of customs, Shanghai 1882–1919, passim. 21 Ivana BAKEŠOVÁ, Československo-Čína 1918–1949, no place of publication, 1997, pp. 79 and 92. 19

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Table I: Trade of Austria-Hungary with China in 1899-1914 (value in thousands of crowns) year 1899 1900 1901 1902 Export to China 987 1652 2072 2231 Import from China 5476 6314 5869 6196 Balance of trade - 4489 - 4662 - 3797 - 3965 year 1903 1904 1905 1906 Export to China 4747 2399 6736 7808 Import from China 6563 7911 7622 10004 Balance of trade - 1816 - 5512 - 886 - 2196 year 1907 1908 1909 1910 Export to China 4091 2934 2893 4823 Import from China 11798 9835 12390 14907 Balance of trade - 7707 - 6901 - 9497 - 10084 year 1911 1912 1913 1914 Export to China 5192 6067 9425 31098 Import from China 18660 19108 13620 23343 Balance of trade - 13468 - 13041 - 4195 7755 Source: Oesterreichisches Statistisches Handbuch für die im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreiche und Länder, herausgeben von der K.K. statistichen Central-Commision, Wien, Einundzwanzigster Jahrgang 1902, Wien 1903 p. 241; Dreiundzwanzigster Jahrgang 1904, Wien 1905, p. 252; Sechsundzwanzigster Jahrgang 1907, Wien 1908, p. 296; Neunundzwanzigster Jahrgang 1910, Wien 1911, p. 270; Dreissigster Jahrgang 1911, Wien 1912, pp. 233 and 235; Einunddreissigster Jahrgang 1912, Wien 1913, p. 263; Zweiunddreissigster Jahrgang 1913, Wien 1914, p. 233; Fünfunddreissigster Jahrgang 1916–1917, Wien 1918, p. 195.

and it is likely to be just a rough estimate.22 Chinyun Lee, in the main, came to the conclusion that a precise quantification of the percentage of the Bohermian Lands is not practicable. In her analysis she, more or less, starts from the assumption that those industries (or particular companies) in the The Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic (further only AMFA), Praha, IVth section of national economy, boxes 846 and 844. The given case should definitely call forth no doubts whatsoever about the correct use of the sources in an otherwise very good work Československo-Čína 1918– 1949; it is mentioned here to show how difficult it is to quantify the percentage of the Czech lands. 22

198 Aleš Skřivan, Jr. ______________________________________________________________

Bohemian lands which had a high proportion in the total performance of the given industry in Austria-Hungary, or in the total export of the particular commodity from Austria-Hungary, also had an adequate part in the AustroHungarian export to China. Further on she tries to illustrate the justification of this assumption with particular examples of the export of individual companies from the Czech lands to China.23 In general, we may claim that the accessible sources yield a considerable share of the Czech lands in the Austro-Hungarian export to China, although its precise quantification will not be possible even in future. According to official Austro-Hungarian statistics, in the years 19001913 the proportion of China in Austro-Hungarian export ranged below 0.5 percent24 and its part in Austro-Hungarian import did not even reach 1 percent in the given period. Not before 1914 did the share of China in Austro-Hungarian export reach the “exceptional” 1.4 per cent (see Figure I). In the period under discussion the Austro-Hungarian trade with China regularly ended up in passive balance to the disadvantage of AustriaHungary. While the value of the Austro-Hungarian export to China slightly fluctuated but remained at an approximately constant level, the import from China to Austria-Hungary slightly grew, and so the trade deficit had gradually gone on increasing up to 1913 (see Table I). Only the year 1914 resulted in favourable balance to the advantage of Austria-Hungary.25 The structure of commodities of the Austro-Hungarian export to China was characterised by a narrow diversification typical, in the long term, especially of the import from China to Austria-Hungary clearly dominated by tea

Chinyun LEE, Obchod mezi českými zeměmi a Čínou před první světovou válkou, 2006, pp. 21–31. On business contacts between the Czech lands and China, see also Chinyun LEE, Obchod mezi českými zeměmi a Čínou na konci rakouského císařství. In: Studia Orientalia Slovaca 6, 2005, pp. 65–92. 24 Countries of origin were given in official statistics regularly since as late as 1891; until then only the transition port had been stated. 25Austro-Hungarian loans granted to the Chinese government in the last years before the First World War were largely responsible for the visible changes in the total volume and balance of trade with China 23

Austro–Hungarian Export to China 199 ________________________________________________________

Table II: Selected items of Austro-Hungarian trade with China in 1911-1913 (value in thousands of crowns, percentage share) 1911 Import from China to AustriaHungary tea share in the total import of AustriaHungary from China Export from Austria-Hungary to China enamel kitchenware, tinware share in the total export from China to Austria-Hungary Guns and part of guns share in the total export from China to Austria-Hungary

1912

1913

18660 7294

19109 7856

13620 4375

39,09

41,11

32,12

5192 863

6067 1539

9424 2491

16,62 546

25,37 99

26,43 1152

10,52

1,63

12,22

Source: Oesterreichisches statistisches Handbuch für die im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreiche und Länder, herausgeben von der K. K. statistichen Central-Commision, Dreiunddreissigster Jahrgang 1914, Wien 1916 pp. 252–253.

supplies. Besides tea, other agricultural commodities constituted the import from China, above all. In the long-term sum total, the commodity group of iron and products made of iron were the main part of the Austro-Hungarian export to China; from the varied range of items, mention should be made of especially enamel kitchenware, needles, guns and parts of guns. Furthermore, supplies to China regularly contained, for example, paper, glassware and textile.26 Matches and soap are examples of products a relatively great part of the overall export of which were bound for China for quite a long time. In the early 1890s supplies of matches to China still participated in the total Austro-Hungarian export of matches with about 15 percent. In the Oesterreichisches statistisches Handbuch für die im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreiche und Länder, herausgeben von der K.K. statistichen Central-Commision, Wien, passim. For selected items of the Austro-Hungarian trade with China in the last years before the First World War, see Table II. Data on trade between Austria-Hungary and China (e.g. commodity structure) can be found I the AMFA, Praha, IVth section of national economy, box 846. 26

200 Aleš Skřivan, Jr. ______________________________________________________________

years to follow, however, the demand for the Austro-Hungarian matches started to decrease rapidly, especially due to the growing Japanese competition on the Chinese market.27 As far as the supplies of soap to China are concerned, they participated in the total export of soap from AustriaHungary with roughly 14 per cent before the First World War.28 Here we should point out the fact that the given commodities (matches and soap) were not the cardinal items of the total Austro-Hungarian export. The comparison of the trade between Austria-Hungary and China, and between the Habsburg Monarchy and countries geographically close to China yields some similar features but also some obvious differences. As it has already been stated, besides Russia the only region geographically close to China with which Austria-Hungary carried out quite significant trade since the beginning of the 20th century was British India. Compared to China, it regularly took a clearly higher share in the Austro-Hungarian foreign trade until 1913. Among other things, British India was the second largest supplier of cotton to the Habsburg Monarchy after the United States of America. On the other hand, Austro-Hungarian supplies to British India consisted, first of all, of sugar, textile, paper and ironware – their composition being fundamentally very similar to the commodity structure of the AustroHungarian export to China and Japan. From the point of view of AustriaHungary a regularly passive balance was an obvious, long-term problem of the trade with British India.29 The volume of the Austro-Hungarian trade with Japan was not, in the long term, much different from the trade exchange realised by the Habsburg Monarchy with China. Similarly to China, Japan ranked, without doubt, among less important business partners of Austria-Hungary, and until 1913 its share in the Austro-Hungarian trade it hanged below one per cent limit. In contrast to Chinese supplies to Austria-Hungary, clearly dominated by tea, the Japanese export to the Habsburg monarchy was more diversified with copper, textile products and rice being the main items. In the comparison of the results of the balance of trade with China and British

HEISE, p. 155 and supplement I, p. ii. On export of matches, see more in Zdenko JANICZEK, Denkschrift über die Lage der einheimischen Industrie und ihr Verhältniss zum Export, Wien 1884, p. 2. 28 HEISE, p. 156 and supplement I, p. iv. 29 Magnus TESSNER, Der Außenhandel Österreich-Ungarns von 1867 bis 1913, Köln 1989, pp. 92 and 95. 27

Austro–Hungarian Export to China 201 ________________________________________________________

India, active balance in trade with Japan in some years between 1899 and 1913 was quite an achievement for Austria-Hungary.30 The Skoda Works and arms supply to China Arms supplies were a special, single chapter of the Austro-Hungarian economic activities in China. The character of arms trade naturally differed from the usual trade, and its monitoring is often very difficult, particularly because of the fact that frequently the business transactions do not appear in official statistics – whether the reason for their absence lied in the lack of interest in presenting these transactions publicly or, for example, in the fact that, from the point of view of foreign policy relations they were highly controversial and sometimes meant de facto a breach of international agreements. The Skoda Works in Pilsen, which were engaged in the Chinese market the most, compared to all the companies in the Czech lands before the First World War, played a decisive role in the Austro-Hungarian arms supplies to China. It follows from the available materials that Skoda Works began to deal with arms transactions to China in 1899, i.e. at about the time when the Boxer Rebellion was starting in Northern China, which, in the end, brought much trouble and humiliation to the imperial court in Peking in what was called the Boxer Protocol.31 In that year 1899 the Skoda Works succeeded in concluding the contract for the supply of 37 mm calibre mountain guns and 57 mm calibre quick-firing guns.32 Another “Chinese deal” the of Skoda Works occurred during the Russo-Japanese War, when in 1904 it delivered a supply of machine-gun cartridges to China. TESSNER, pp. 90–91 and 95. The comparison with Austro-Hungarian business contacts with other regions neighbouring with China (French Indochina, Siam and Korea) are not stetrd deliberately because of their small extent, which is also mostly the main reason for their omission from the basic statistical surveys. 31 The Boxer Rebellion was suppressed by a common intervention of the troops of eight countries in summer 1900. The Boxer Protocol was signed in September 1901, in which China undertook, among other things, to pay foreigners indemnities. For more on the Boxer Rebellion and the Austro-Hungarian participation in putting it down, see Georg LEHNER, Monika LEHNER, Österreich-Ungarn und der „Boxeraufstand“ in China, Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs, Sonderband 6, Wien 2002. 32 The available sources differ in how many pieces, and in what finish/version/make, were, in fact, shipped to China under this contract. Cf. Čína 1912–1916 ROS., collection of the Managing Director’s Office, section of trade, so far unprocessed, Archives of the Skoda Pilsen, (further only ASP); František JANÁČEK, Největší zbrojovka monarchie, 1859–1918, Praha 1990, p. 345; Chinyun LEE, Obchod mezi českými zeměmi a Čínou před první světovou válkou, pp. 28–29. 30

202 Aleš Skřivan, Jr. ______________________________________________________________

Reports of Austro-Hungarian diplomats from China mention the increased interest of the Skoda Works in the Chinese market and state also that, after the Russo-Japanese War, the Skoda Works ranked among the Austro-Hungarian firms most active in China. It was the firm Arnhold, Karberg & Co, which was charged with looking after the interests of Skoda Works in China. It also follows from these reports that the Skoda Works concentrated on the territory of northern China. The reports also refer to negotiations about new orders for Skoda, which were held in Manchuria in 1907, for instance, about supplies to Heilongjiang.33 In this connection we come across a description of a severe competition struggle over arms orders in China while German Krupp and French Schneider were considered the main Skoda Works competitors. Furthermore there are also rumours of suspicion regarding the possible corruption accompanying the arms deals.34 In 1906 the Skoda Works won an order to deliver 3 machine-guns (8 mm calibre) and two guns (47 mm and 37 calibres) including the ammunition in China. Afterwards, in September 1910 the representatives of the firm Arnhold, Karberg & Co and the governor of the Heilongjiang province signed a contract for the supply of arms from SkodaWorks 885,271 marks worth. The Skoda Works competed for this order with Krupp and is said to have got it thanks to the fact that its offer was found more attractively priced by the Chinese party than the offer of the German company.35 At that time a Chinese delegation visited Pilsen, they met with Karel Skoda and saw the Skoda’s firing range in Bolevec.36 In 1911 the Skoda Works supplied China with arms stated in the above contract of September 1910; these included, first of all, 18 field guns (L/29, 75 mm calibre)37 together with ammunition and ammunition carriages. The ceremony of handing the guns over was held

LEHNER, Beiträge, pp. 448–449. In greater detail, see LEHNER, Beiträge, pp. 447–450. 35 Further details on this deal, see Chinyun LEE, Obchod mezi českými zeměmi a Čínou před první světovou válkou, pp. 29–30. 36 Data on when the visit took place unfortunately differ. According to some available sources in took place in June 1910, according to others is was in 1911. Cf. e.g. documentation accompanying the mountain guns. 75mm L/15 Gebirggeschütz, 75mm gun for China, year 1913, collection of the Managing Director’s Office, section of trade, unprocessed so far, ASP; JANÁČEK, unmarked picture supplement placed after p. 310. 37 Detailed description of the guns with abundance of pictures is included in the publication 75mm L/29 Feldgeschütz 6/510, China 1911, Skodawerke Actiengesellschaft Pilsen, Pilsen 1914. 33

34

Austro–Hungarian Export to China 203 ________________________________________________________

in Peking in December 1911, and apart from other distinguished people Arthur von Rosthorn himself took part in it.38 At the turn of 1912, there was a revolution in China, which overthrew the imperial regime. Under dramatic and also quite chaotic circumstances a republic came into being. Due to the confused situation in China and obvious instability of the new regime, the prospects of further transactions with China immediately after the revolution were rather dim. Soon it turned out, however, that the situation was more likely to be favourable for Skoda Works. The Peking government showed an increased interest in arms from Austria-Hungary39 and did not hesitate to accept credits allocated got the realisation of arms purchases. Participating in these credits were, next to Skoda Works, also other private firms, e.g. Cantiere Navale Triestino,40 and Austrian banks, for example the Lower Austrian Discount Bank (Niederösterreichische Escompt-Gesellschaft).41 A large part of the money was meant for the purchase of the arms from the Skoda Works. The biggest loans were granted in 1913. In April 1913 the Chinese government received a loan of 1,200,000 pounds to buy three cruisers, each with a displacement of 1,800 tons. In April 1913 China was granted another loan of 2,000,000 pounds, out of which 1,500,000 were for the purchase of a cruiser with a displacement of 4,900 tons. The remaining 500,000 pounds were used to purchase field howitzers from the Skoda Works (18 pieces of 10.5 cm calibre and 12 pieces of 15 cm calibre).42 Both cruisers with a displacement of 1,800 tons and the bigger ones with a Photodokumentation on handing the guns over, see Přejímka polních děl typu L/29 v Pekinu (16. 12. 1911), collection of the Managing Director’s Office, section of trade, unprocessed so far, ASP. 39 A greater interest of the new Peking government in Austro-Hungarian arms and the subsequent supplies were repeatedly presented in consular news as, in the main, a great achievement in the struggle with German competition on the Chinese Market. See more in Georg LEHNER, Beiträge, passim. 40 In 1912, Skoda Works became the majority owner of the firm Cantiere Navale Triestino. Jiří NOVÁK, Válečné lodě pro Čínu, In: Historie a plastikové modelářství, No 5, volume 9, Praha 1999, p. 15. 41 For the list of the most important Austro-Hungarian loans granted to China, see Table III. On loans, see details e.g. in Vladimír KARLICKÝ, Svět okřídleného šípu, Koncern Škoda Plzeň 1918–1945, Plzeň 1999, pp. 77–79. On participation of other AustroHungarian subjects in trade with China, see also Heinrich BENEDIKT, Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in der Franz-Joseph-Zeit, Wiener historische Studien, Band IV, Wien 1958, pp. 170 –171. 42 A part of this supply was not eventually dispatched to China. Some howitzers from this supply ended in the arsenal of the Austro-Hungarian army after the outbreak of the First World War. Further see JANÁČEK, p. 346 and Vladimír KARLICKÝ, Československé dělostřelecké zbraně, Praha 1975, p. 32. 38

204 Aleš Skřivan, Jr. ______________________________________________________________

displacement of 4,900 tons were to be built by the firm Cantiere Navale Triestino, operating the new shipyards in Monfacone. The weaponry for the ships was to be supplied by the Skoda Works – for example, 47mm and 37 mm calibre quick-firing guns.43 Besides the above orders, Other orders were Table III: Austro-Hungarian loans granted to China in the 1912-1916 period

loan effected on 29 January 1912 29 January 1912 1 March 1913 10 April 1913 10 April 1913 27 April 1914 9 June 1916

total (British pounds) 300 000 450 000 300 000 1 200 000 2 000 000 500 000 1 233 000

Source: Čína 1912–1935 ROS, collection of the Managing Director’s Office, section of trade, unprocessed so far, ASP.

realised for China by the Skoda Works.44 In 1913 96 machine guns (7.9mm calibre) were delivered from theSkoda Works to China. In March of that year Skoda offered China 12 machine guns for riverboats at the total price of 87,354 marks;45 they were delivered to China in 1914. Negotiations about the purchase of 75mm calibre mountain guns were also conducted.46 Very interesting circumstances accompanied the arms supply, which was to be delivered to China, by the ship Bayern. The ship sailed from Hamburg in summer 1914 and its task was to deliver weapons and other war Detail on the weaponry of the ships, see Armierung eines Kreuzers von 1800 Tonnen Deplacement für China a 37mm Schnellfeurkanone L/50, collection of the Managing Director’s Office, section of trade, unprocessed so far, ASP. On war ships for China se more details in NOVÁK, pp. 15–16. 44 Steelworks Poldina huť was another firm which profited from Austro-Hungarian loans to China, though it was on a much smaller scale. See more in Čína 1913–1914 ROS., collection of the Managing Director’s Office, section of trade, unprocessed so far, ASP. 45 Čína 1913–1914 ROS., collection of the Managing Director’s Office, section of trade, unprocessed so far, ASP. 46 Documentation to the mountain guns, see 75mm L/15 Gebirgsgeschütz, 75mm dělo pro Čínu, rok 1913, collection of the Managing Director’s Office, section of trade, unprocessed so far, ASP. 43

Austro–Hungarian Export to China 205 ________________________________________________________

material made in the Skoda Works (field and mountain guns) and other arms manufacturers to China. At the moment the ship was passing the shores of Spain, the First World War broke out. Due to the new situation the captain decided to avoid any risk and berth in neutral Italy, namely at Naples. Under the given conditions it was quite a logical, but with regard to the further development a rather unfortunate move. The arms manufacturers tried to get their goods back, but in vain. In the end, Italy joined the Triple Entente in the First World War in May 1915 it was on war footing with Austria-Hungary and in August 1916 with Germany. Consequently the arms from the Bayern were confiscated and made part of the weaponry of the Italian Army. After the was had ended, a conflict arose over the possible replacement for the confiscated cargo between newly formed Czechoslovakia and Italy which definitely ended in complex compensations as late as in the 1950s.47 Intensifying business contacts between China and Austria-Hungary in the last years before the First World War, supported by newly effected loans, influenced, to some extent, the statistical image of the trade between the Habsburg Monarchy and China, which had, until then, been quite unfavourable According to the official Austro-Hungarian statistics the trade with China between 1912 and 1914 showed increases in percent (see Table I). Here we should, however, emphasize the fact that these statistics, though including some arms supplies, differ from the reality quite considerably. The First World War naturally hit the trade between China and the Habsburg Monarchy very much. Because of the war, the priorities of the Vienna government changed and so did those of many firms. Some arms originally intended for China ended up in the weaponry of the Austro-Hungarian Army, others – as has already been indicated – in the hands of the enemy. The situation in China was again very confused and for a long time it had not been clear whether China would join the First World War. On the other hand, economic links between the two countries had not been quite broken off. In China negotiations about new orders for Austro-Hungarian firms went on. In June 1916 the Chinese government managed to receive a fairly

On the whole case, see more details in JANÁČEK, pp. 347–348; Chinyun LEE, Obchod mezi českými zeměmi a Čínou před první světovou válkou, p. 30; Čína – půjčky, bony, výlohy, sig. 0055/0373, AŠP. The given list of Chinese deals of Skoda Works naturally does not record – and even cannot do so – all orders for China. Next to arms, Skoda Works tried to win recognition on the Chinese market also for non-military commodities (e.g. engines, cranes and hydraulic presses). Further see BAKEŠOVÁ, p. 80. 47

206 Aleš Skřivan, Jr. ______________________________________________________________

high Austro-Hungarian loan of 1,233,000 pounds even though it had obvious problems paying off the old loans at that time.48 After a long hesitation and dramatic events on the political scene in Peking, China declared war on Germany and Austria-Hungary on 14 August 1917. At the same time it denounced all agreements with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian Concession in Tianjin got under the Chinese administration, the ships of the Austrian Lloyd at anchor in Shanghai (Bohemia, Silesia and China) were confiscated, Austro-Hungarian citizens were dismissed from employment with the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, and the payments of indemnities to Austria-Hungary stated in the Boxer Protocol were halted.49 The Chinese government naturally did not continue to pay off the Austro-Hungarian loans, which considerably hit also the Skoda Works.50 How should we assess the development of the Austro-Hungarian export to China? To this question no unambiguous answer exists and whatever assessment will always be rather uneasy. It is worth to mention here the publication Die österreichische Industrie und der chinesische Markt, which contains a lecture by the legation councillor of the Embassy in Peking, Arthur von Rosthorn, delivered in March 1902. It is a brief, only about twenty pages long, but cogent analysis of the existing development and prospects of the Austro-Hungarian expansion to the Chinese market. In his essentially pessimistic report, Arthur von Rosthorn strove to draw attention to the obstacles that hindered the expansion of trade between Austria-Hungary and China, and to define difficulties that were behind the existing unfavourable outcomes of Austro-Hungarian trading activities in China. In a limited space he managed to analyse a number of factors affecting the penetration of Austro-Hungarian subjects on the Chinese market, including the customs problems, bank payments, transport problems and severe competition on the Chinese market. He also hints at the poor reputation of the Austrian Lloyd and rather unsuccessful efforts of this company to compete with Hamburg firms. Von Rosthorn also touches a On the circumstances of effecting the loan, Čína 1913–1935 ROS., collection of the Managing Director’s Office, section of trade, unprocessed so far, ASP. 49 HEISE, pp. 385–386. 50 After the First World War, Skoda Works had tried – not really successfully – to solve the problem of unsettled Chinese debts for many years. In the Archives of Skoda Works Pilsen an extensive material has been preserved dealing with the post-war talks about the unsettled debts, e.g. Čína 1913–1914 ROS., and Čína 1912–1935 ROS., collection of the Managing Director’s Office, section of trade, unprocessed so far, ASP. Further see SKŘIVAN ml., Aleš, K otázce vývozu Zbrojovky Brno a Škodových závodů do Číny v meziválečném období, Slovanský přehled 2/2006, pp. 194–195. 48

Austro–Hungarian Export to China 207 ________________________________________________________

controversial question of whether it is reasonable for Austro-Hungarian firms to penetrate to the remote Chinese market at all when territories nearer at hand offer, in a way, similar business and investment opportunities (the Balkans, for example). He also ponders over a rather ambiguous governmental support of the expansion to the Chinese market.51 Among other things he mentions commodities with which Austria-Hungary is believed to have had a chance to win recognition on the Chinese market in a greater extent (e.g. sugar, beer, enamel kitchenware, cheap leather products, paper).52 To find reasons as to why Austro-Hungarian trade with China did not visibly enlarge is not easy either. In some respect, there was, to some extent, a lack of a genius for business and willingness to risk in realising business activities in so remote a territory. Occasionally, people speak about a wasted opportunity to gain a firmer foothold on the Chinese market at the time when it started to open to foreign trade more. Some historians, however, dispute this theory53 and believe that the limited extent of the AustroHungarian trade with China was, in the main, determined by the above objective circumstances, obstacles and indeed by the fact that neither China nor Austria-Hungary were forced to develop a common trade. Other explanations also appear; for example, a low capacity of the Chinese market to absorb a greater number of industrial products in the long term, or the low purchasing power of an average Chinese.54 In this context it is also often pointed out that the supplies to China frequently contained goods not for the Chinese but “only” for foreigners living in China. One of the obvious, indisputable handicaps of the Austro-Hungarian export to China – e.g. in comparison with the British export – were the very limited links to Chins market, between particular Austro-Hungarian firms and customers in China, and linked to this an important role of the brokers, foreign representatives (e.g. British or German). It is, however, necessary to assess the long-term small volume of the trade between Austria-Hungary and China in a wider context; unsuccessful efforts to enlarge the trade with China were, in a way, “only” part of the general unsuccessful strategy to extend territorial diversification of the Rosthorn, Arthur von: Die österreichische Industrie und der chinesische Markt, Wien 1902, p. 12. 52 Ibidem, p. 7. 53 For example, HEISE, pp. 380–386. 54 For example, TESSNER, p. 90. But this argument, for instance, does not explain the differences between the Austro-Hungarian export and export of the more successful European countries to China (e.g. Germany). 51

208 Aleš Skřivan, Jr. ______________________________________________________________

foreign trade. Before the turn of the 20th century, Austria-Hungary managed to take several steps which were to lead to enlargement of the territorial diversification of export, and indeed, the whole of the foreign trade (for example, a greater expansion of the trade with the Balkans); these efforts, however, led only to limited, short-term changes. As it has already been indicated, the development of AustroHungarian export to China (in a wider conception of the whole trade with China) cannot be taken to be a straightforward failure, though. Among other things it cannot be determined whether the possible effort to penetrate the Chinese market decisively would be a step in the right direction – especially with regard to rather problematic reasons and also somewhat uncertain outcomes of such a strategy.55

Table IV: Important agreements of Austria-Hungary with China date treaty concluded 2 Sept. 1869

7 Sept. 1901

29 Aug. 1902 27 Sept. 1905; supplement 4 March 1912

Treaty

main purpose

Treaty of Friendship, Trade and Sailing

basic modification of mutual political and economic relations Boxer Protocol specifying compensations for (multilateral treaty) damages inflicted during the Boxer Rebellion Shanghai Treaty agreement about new Chinese (multilateral treaty) import tariff Whangpoo Conservancy modification of terms of Treaty sailing along the Whangpoo, (multilateral treaty) Huangpu River connecting Shanghai with the Yangtze delta.

Note: By signing the Saint-Germain Peace Treaty (10 September 1919) Austria surrendered all its rights ensuing from the above treaties.

On the development of relations between Austria-Hungary and China, see more in e.g. Georg LEHNER, Die Chinapolitik Österreich-Ungarns 1896–1917, Diplomarbeit, Geisteswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Universität Wien, Wien 1992. 55

The Gallant Allies? German-Irish Military Cooperation Before and During the World War I1 Filip Nerad

Due to its convenient geographic position and due to its specific relations to England (later Great Britain) Ireland has many times in history been a part of the military calculation of the adversaries of London, who saw it as a potential Achilles’ heel of the insular kingdom. The Irish card was a part of the Spanish invasion plans in the early 17th century, plans of the French king Louis XIV in 1689–1691 or the revolutionary France in the 1790s. So it was quite logical for the imperial Germany during the World War I to try it as well, especially as the friction on the island, caused by the growing call for Home Rule, almost spilled into an open conflict before the war. However an active cooperation between Germany and the Irish separatists in the years 1914–1918 was forming with difficulties and the results only highlighted the different interests of a superpower and a small nation. The beginnings of the cooperation were connected with another conflict on an opposite side of the world – the Boer War in the years 1899– 1902. The attempt of the London government to take control over two Boer republics in South Africa, so rich in raw materials, brought together the large Germany and Irish emigration in the USA; several hundreds of volunteers from Germany and Ireland even actively took part in the war on the side of the Boers against the British army.2 Although they failed to avert the defeat and conquest by the British Empire, the strong anti-British feelings of both emigrant ethnics in USA created a basis for the prospective cooperation, which in January 1907 lead to signing of an agreement between two emigrant organisations, the National German-American Alliance and the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH). Their main objective was to join

This study was written as a part of the project called ”Alliance or Opportunism? Analysis of the German-Irish military cooperation during the World War I and its perception in Great Britain“, financed by the Charles University in Prague, Philosophical Faculty, from the funds of specific research. 2 See more in Filip NERAD, Búrská válka, Praha 2004, pp. 107 ff. 1

210 Filip Nerad ______________________________________________________________

forces against the US and UK convergence.3 AOH also promised, that in any prospective conflict between Germany and Britain, the Irish will support the German side.4 In September of the next year, the first attempt of a direct military cooperation between the Irish nationalists and the German government began. An alleged member of AOH D. O’Connell wrote a letter to the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt) in Berlin and offered intelligence information about the situation in Ireland and Great Britain. The author claimed to have a network of agents all over England and Scotland. In exchange the author required help with realisation of “any project, which had been mutually agreed upon”. Until then he asked the German government to consider him a German agent on the isles and asked for an unspecified salary.5 The foreign office’s Secretary of State, Bernard von Bülow, passed the letter to the German Embassy in London with a note, that it is not to be answered. In 1911 O’Connell attempted another contact, but the German side did not react either.6 At the same time the journal Irish Freedom published the first of a series of articles describing the advantages of German-Irish cooperation. Until the start of the World War I these articles were published anonymously, only in 1914 they were published as a collection with the name of the author on it. It was Sir Roger Casement, a renowned former British diplomat, who later took active part in the nationalist organisations and finally came to advocate independent Ireland.7 In his first article called The Keeper of the Seas he claimed, that Ireland is the “keeper of the seas”, who played the key role in the British naval hegemony. He believed, that “the British Empire is founded not upon the British Bible or the British Dreadnought, but upon Ireland”, because it “stands between Britain and the greater seas of the west and blocks for her the highways of the ocean”.8 Ritschl to the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), 30 January 1907, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes Berlin (henceforth quoted as PA AA), Vereinigte Staaten von Nordamerika 10, Vol. 1, A 1657. 4 Alan J. WARD, Ireland and Anglo-American Relations 1899–1921, Toronto 1969, p. 28. 5 O’Connell to the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), 2 September 1908, PA AA, England 80, Vol., 10, A 14313. 6 Ibid., O’Connell to the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), 24 June 1911, Vol. 11, A 10058. 7 More about his persona and fate see in Filip NERAD, Sir Roger Casement – muž mnoha tváří, Historický obzor 18, 2007, issue 1–2, pp. 2–19. During Casement’s stay in the USA in 1914 these articles were published under the title The Crime against Europe. Two years later this collection was published in Germany too, under the name Das Verbrechen an Europa. 8 CASEMENT, Das Verbrechen, p. 23. 3

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Only thanks to Ireland the British can rule the world oceans. According to this, Germany, who was trying hard to match the British naval strength, should first of all help to liberate the “keeper of the seas” to ensure free cruise of the world oceans. Casement then used this theory of mutual benefit of the German-Irish cooperation during all of his attempts to make Germany to help the Irish. Casement’s views received publicity in Germany thanks to the Prussian retired general of the cavalry, Friedrich von Bernhardi. In September 1913 in the Berliner journal Die Post this military writer, author of the renowned book Deutschland und der nächste Krieg, encouraging war as a necessity for political and cultural development of the German nation,9 published Casement’s article Irland, England und Deutschland. The author, still anonymous at that time, promoted the perspectives of Ireland in case of German victory over Britain. Bernardi commented on the article, in view of potential military plans of Berlin, that for Germany “ist nicht ohne Interesse zu wissen, daß, wenn es über kurz oder lang zum Kriege mit England kommt, wir im feindlichen Lager selbst Verbündete haben, die unter Umständen zum Handeln entschlossen sind, und jedenfalls eine schwere Sorge für England bilden und vielleicht einen Teil der englischen Truppen fesseln werden”. 10 In spite of the already quite tense relationship to Great Britain, this article met a hostile reaction in the German press of that time, partially perhaps initiated by the official circles. The article was discussed even in the Imperial Diet and also the government circles could be heard to disagree with it. The Undersecretary of State of the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), Arthur Zimmermann, in his letter to the chief of the sovereign’s military cabinet General Lyncker, called the Bernhardi’s comments as ignorant and sheer speculations and expressed worries, that such statements could even Bernhardi also supported the idea to stir up a rising in India, Egypt and South Africa in case of war on Britain. He does not mention Ireland in this context. (Friedrich von BERNHARDI, Deutschland und der nächste Krieg, Berlin 1912, p. 165.) 10 Die Post, 18 September 1913, PA AA, Deutschland 121 Nr. 6, Vol. 2, A 19450. The original text called Ireland, Germany and the Next War was published in July of the same year in the Irish Review under the penname Shan van Vocht and it was a reaction to the article by sir Arthur Conan Doyle Great Britain and the Next War, in which the famous writer opposed the militant and nationalist opinions of the Bernhardi’s book. This was the reason, why in August Casement contacted the general, whom he had not known personally until then, and asked him to translate and publish his article in Germany. At least this is how Casement explained it later to his German friend, Professor Theodor Schiemann. Compare Casement to Schiemann, 14 November 1914, Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz Berlin, VI. HA, Nachlass Theodor Schiemann, Nr. 51. 9

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worsen the diplomatic relations with Great Britain.11 According to Lyncker the German Emperor Wilhelm II did not agree with these opinions either and said, that “der schriftstellerischen Tätigkeit des Generals von Bernhardi, die schädlich wirken könne, näher getreten werden sollte”.12 One fact is clear from these reactions: Germany did not calculate with military use of Ireland in case of a conflict with Britain at all. The operative plans of the Naval General Staff and the Great General Staff, created since the end of the 19th century, confirm it. They considered Ireland as strategically inconvenient for the purposes of a war on Britain.13 The first notion of a possible landing in Ireland appeared in a study of the German Naval Staff in 1898, which analysed the options of a GermanFrance-Russian alliance against Great Britain and which calculated with an invasion to South England and the Irish coast done by French troops.14 However, the officers of the generality refused the idea of an Irish landing due to the loyalty of most of the Irish to Britain and due to the failure of the previous invasions to Britain in the past.15 Until the start of World War I the German Navy was well aware of the strength of the British fleet. Admiral Tirpitz was against an invasion on the Isles before Germany would gain superiority over the North Sea, which did not happen till the outbreak of World War I.16 As far as they considered landing in Britain, it was only in the South-East England, which is the closest to the continent and at the same time on the shortest route to London.17 They even did not plan to initiate an uprising in Ireland, which would weaken the enemy and force him to withdraw a part of his forces off the war field. In February 1914 the German War Ministry received a forty-four-page study from the Legate Secretary of the Trade-and-Politics Department of the Zimmermann to Lyncker, 5–9 October 1913, PA AA, Deutschland 121 Nr. 6, Vol. 2, zu A 19450/19510, 12 Ibid., Lyncker to Bethmann Holweg, 27 September 1913, A 19450. 13 Compare ibid., Das englische Expeditionkorps, 30 May 1912, Deutschland 121 Nr. 31 secr., Vol. 1, AS 905. 14 The relations between Britain and France were strained at that time especially due to competition over the influence in Egypt due to the Fashoda incident. Also the open attempts of London to control the Boer republics in South Africa called out negative reactions of other powers. In this connection Berlin several times threatened London, that it would form a continental alliance, which would include Germany, France and Russia. 15 Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv Freiburg (henceforth quoted as BA-MA), RM 5/1610, Vol. 1. 16 Paul M. KENNEDY, The Development of German Naval Operation Plans against England 1896–1914, English Historical Review 89, 1974, pp. 48–76. 17 BA-MA, RM 5/1610, Vol. 1, pp. 184–185. 11

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Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), Christian Jordan, which recommended stirring an uprising in India, South Africa and especially in Ireland during the “inevitable conflict” between Britain and Germany, because it would be very damaging to Britain.18 The ministry thanked for the study at the end of the war and returned it back. However plans to stir up unrest in the enemy territory had had a long tradition in the German military. Already in the 1870s and 1880s there appeared ideas how to stir up a revolution in Poland, Finland or the people of Caucasus in case of a war on Russia. Similar plans were conceived at the turn of the century for Britain too – calculating with stirring up rebellions of the British subjects in the Middle and Far East (especially in India and in Egypt). While in case of Russia these plans were designed to destroy the whole Tsar’s empire, the plans against Britain were “only” to strip it of its colonies.19 However Ireland did not fit into this concept either. According to Baron von Strumm from the General Staff, Berlin believed, that Britain would remain neutral to the conflict on the Continent.20 Even the Secretary of State of the German Foreign Office Gottlieb von Jagow told Rear Admiral Behnke on 21 June 1914 that “falls es zum Kriege Dreibund gegen Zweibund komme, werde England nicht mitmachen”.21 The reason for these statements was high crisis in Britain and Ireland due to the Home Rule dispute that pushed Ireland on the brink of a civil war.22 In April 1912 the liberal Asquith’s government presented to the House

Giessler to Jordan, 13 April 1918, PA AA, England 78, Vol. 98, A 16014. Wolfgang HÜNSELER, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich und die irische Frage 1900–1914, Frankfurt am Main, Bern, Las Vegas 1978, p. 180; compare also Peter Graf KIELMANSEGG, Deutschland und der Erste Weltkrieg, Stuttgart 1980, pp. 214–219. 20 Thomas HENNESSEY, Dividing Ireland. World War I and Partition, London, New York 1998, p.134. 21 HÜNSELER, p. 255. 22 Some historians even believe that the Central Powers counted with the outbreak of a conflict in Ireland, which would not let Britain to intervene to the course of events on the Continent. And that is why they decided to unleash the war in the summer 1914. But it seems hardly likely that it was so. Compare Felician PRILL, Ireland, Britain and Germany 1871–1914. Problems of Nationalism and Religion in Nineteenth-Century Europe, Dublin, London, New York 1975, pp. 131–133; HÜNSELER, pp. 250–263. 18 19

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of Commons an Irish Home Rule Bill.23 This resulted in very loud protests from the Tories as well as from the representatives of the protestant Ulster lead by Sir Edward Carson. They demanded that the union had to be preserved, because they feared, that if the political powers were transferred to Dublin, all power would be taken over by the representatives of the Catholic majority represented by the Irish Parliamentary Party of John Redmond. In January 1913 they established a paramilitary organisation Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), which declared its readiness to prevent Irish autonomy even by force. In the north of the island demonstrations started against the Home Rule Bill and the armed Orangists even attacked the local Catholic population. The reaction of the nationalists to the formation and activities of the UVF was to establish the troops of Irish Volunteers on 25 November 1913 in Dublin. Their objective was to defend against the attempts of the unionists to disrupt the process of creation of the Irish Home Rule. Over six months they managed to enlist 130 000 men. Before the war the UVF had circa 85 000 armed men led by experienced officers of the British army.24 In 1914 the tensions in Ireland reached a peak. The Homer Rule Bill was discussed in the parliament for the third time and the House of Lords could no longer block it according to the 1911 Parliament Act. The unionists of Ulster started to prepare an armed uprising against the Home Rule. The Ulster Unionist Council, the highest organisation of the North-Ireland Protestants, was authorised to declare an interim government after the Home Rule is passed, and take control over the nine counties of the province. In April 1914 major Frederick Crawford purchased from a German arms dealer Bruno Spiro in Berlin 25 000 Mauser rifles and Mannlicher rifles for the UVF as well as three million pieces of ammunition and on the night of 24–25 April he brought it to the coast of Northern Ireland at the The content of this third version of the bill was based on the plan, which had been unsuccessfully proposed in 1893 by the liberal PM William Gladstone. The Irish government, appointed by Lord Lieutenant, a two-chamber parliament (elected House of Commons with 164 MPs and a Senate composed of 40 senators appointed by Lord Lieutenant) were to control the internal issues of Ireland, while the questions of the Crown, army, navy, declaration of war, conclusion of peace and international treaties and some taxes were to remain the competence of the parliament of London. Ireland would have 42 MPs in Westminster. The London parliament would also have the right to cancel any act passed by the Irish parliament. Apart from this safety mechanism the rights of the protestant minority were safeguarded also by the ban to pass any laws, which would disadvantage one of the religions or would impose discrimination due to faith. 24 The British Army was a traditional stronghold of the Unionists. A lot of the officers, including the highest commanders, sympathised with the Ulster resistance to the Home Rule and some of them were directly involved in the UVF activities. 23

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towns of Bangor, Donaghadee and Larne, near Belfast.25 The German authorities knew about the activities of Mr Crawford, who acted in Hamburg under the alias of John Washington Graham, an American, and tolerated them.26 The growing friction on the isles was good news for Berlin, because it meant that in case of a war on the Continent, London would remain neutral. British government feared most the possible cooperation between the Ulster Unionists and the Germans – in view of the statements of the Ulster leaders and the meeting of Carson with Wilhelm II in August 1913 in Bad Homburg.27 The enemies of the Irish Home Rule indeed used the “German scarecrow” as the means of pressure on the Asquith’s government to make it quit the idea of the autonomy. In November 1913 they issued a declaration, that they “have the offer of aid from a powerful continental monarch who, if Home Rule is forced on the Protestants of Ireland, is prepared to send an army sufficient to release England of any further trouble in Ireland by attacking it to his dominion”. They even threatened, that if the king signs the act, “the Protestants of Ireland will welcome this continental deliverer

More see Frederick Hugh CRAWFORD, Guns for Ulster, Belfast 1947. Already since 1911 news appeared in the German press about transports of weapons to Ireland for the Ulster Unionists, some of them allegedly from Germany. Compare Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Politische Polizei 331–3, Sk 158–19, Waffen- und Munizionsschmuggel nach Irland für die Ulsterfreiwilligen. The same information had the British police too. See National Archives London (henceforth quoted as NA), CO 904/28/2. By the way, Crawford himself wrote that he had started his activities already in 1906–1907, i.e. long before the Home Rule disputes. (CRAWFORD, p. 16.) 26 PA AA, Staats- und Völkerrecht, Vol. 10, A 6504, 30 March 1914. From 4 December 1913 it was forbidden to transport any military material to Ireland. The ban was the British government’s reaction to formation of the Irish Volunteers. 27 Carson was a member of the English-German committee, which was to improve the relations between the two countries, and he went to Germany regularly for holidays or to spa for recreation. In 1911 and 1912 he visited Baden-Baden, in 1912 and 1913 he was a guest at Bad Homburg. Little is known about the content of his meeting with the Emperor. According to the British historian Montgomery Hyde Wilhelm II repeatedly tried to change the topic and speak about the Northern Ireland issues, but Carson allegedly tried to avoid this theme. (H. Montgomery HYDE, Carson, London 1974, p. 337.) 25

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as their forefathers under similar circumstances did once before”.28 Plans with the same warning appeared in Belfast in the autumn 1912. In fact, no such offer ever came, and Berlin knew, that the high British army officials supporting the Ulster rebellion are in favour of cooperation with the French.29 The British government did not take these threats seriously either.30 Yet, Asquith’s cabinet was under a great pressure from the Unionists. It tried to scale it down through a concession in the bill, so the counties with the majority of protestant population would be excluded from its validity for six years. However Carson considered it only as a “sentence of death with a stay of execution for six years”.31 The only autonomy acceptable for the Unionists was no autonomy at all. But in the camp of the nationalists, the government concessions raised fears, how far Asquith would go to please the Unionists. Redmond’s Parliamentary Party – in exchange for a promise that no more changes would occur – supported the moderate course of the cabinet. However the Irish nationalists demanded Home Rule in the original form. Their uncertainty was increasing also because of the attitude of government to the import of weapons for the UVF or to the “Curragh mutiny”.32 The leaders of the Irish Volunteers were slowly losing hope in any help from London against the protestant minority and started preparations to enforce their legitimate demands by their own force. To be able to face the well-equipped and well-trained UVF troops,33 the Irish Volunteers needed to get real weapons, because so far they had Dorothy MACARDLE, The Irish Republic. A Documented Chronicle of the Anglo-Irish Conflict and the Partitioning of Ireland, with Detailed Account of the Period 1916–1923, New York, Toronto 1965, p. 90. The authors refer to the invasion of the General Stadtholder William III of Orange in 1688. The dethroned English king Jacob II landed in Ireland the next year and with the help of the local Catholics he tried to get his throne back. However the Wilhelm’s army supported by the Protestants defeated him in 1690. A number of manifests of the Ulster Unionists, in which they preferred the rule of the German over the Irish Protestants, alluded to the similarity of the William’s name and the name of the German Emperor. 29 PRILL, p. 134. 30 HÜNSELER, p. 204–205. 31 Robert KEE, The Green Flag. A History of Irish Nationalism, London 2000, p. 483. 32 In March 1914 sixty officers of the troop in Curragh refused to obey the order to reinforce the guarding of the barracks, because they understood it as the first step to using the army for an attack on Ulster. Under the pressure of the Conservatives, the government did not punish this breach of obedience (only the Secretary of State for War Seely and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff Lord French were forced to resign) and did nothing against the import of weapons for the UVF, though it was a violation of the ban of December 1913. 33 After the shipment of weapons from Germany the UVF had roughly 40 000 rifles and several machine guns. (HÜNSELER, p. 234.) 28

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been training with wooden rifle dummies only. Casement, who was the treasurer of the Irish Volunteers and was in charge of the recruiting campaign, took care of the weapon supply. In May 1914 he initiated establishment of a committee for acquisition of weapons for the Irish Volunteers and the members of the committee became a narrow group of people, who sympathised with the Home Rule.34 Mostly from their own sources they collected 1500 pounds for which Darrell Figgis and Erskine Childers tried to buy weapons in the Liege in Belgium in July. Due to their limited budget, they could not afford enough however, so they moved to Hamburg, where the Magnus brothers, the local arms dealers, sold them 1500 old Mauser rifles and 45 000 cartridges. On 26 July, two days before Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, the Erskin Childers’ private yacht Asgard transported one part of the shipment from Hamburg to the Howth harbour near Dublin.35 On the day when Germany declared war on Russia, on 1 August, another private boat, the Chotah, brought the rest of the cargo in the Kilcoole harbour in the Wicklow County, south of the Irish capital. Not only the highest circles of Germany did not plan to use Ireland in a prospective conflict with Britain, but the “Emerald Isle” also failed to figure among the military targets listed in the individual programmes, which were prepared in Germany once the conflict started.36 An exception was the wellknown project of so called Mitteleuropa, which proposed granting “freedom” to Scotland and Ireland once England is defeated. At the end of 1914 the army HQ received a study by the chairman of the Alldeutscher Verband Heinrich Claß. He recommended decreasing the area of Great Britain after its defeat to England and Scotland only, while Ireland should become an independent republic. His requirement of independence for the Irish was not motivated by any sympathy for the nationalist wishes of the Apart from Casement it included also his close friend Alice Stopford Green, widow after the deceased British historian J. R. Green, the couple Mary and Erskine Childer, the journalist Darrell Figgis, a cousin of the British ambassador in USA Mary Spring Rice or her cousins Connor and Hugh O’Brien. 35 See more in F. X. MARTIN (ed.), The Howth Gun-Running and the Kilcoole GunRunning 1914. Recollections and Documents, Dublin 1967. In the centre of Dublin – in the Bachelor’s Walk – part of the men importing the weapons from Howth met the King’s Own Scottish Borderers who wanted to confiscate their rifles. The result was three Irish dead on the spot and one wounded who died later in a hospital, another 38 members of the Irish Volunteers were wounded. The shooting at the Bachelor’s Walk confirmed the belief of the radical nationalists, that the British are using double standards to them and the Ulster Protestants, because a day before they let 5000 UVF members march through Belfast with rifles imported from Germany and did not react at all. 36 Compare Fritz FISCHER, Griff nach der Weltmacht. Die Kriegszielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18, Düsseldorf 2004, pp. 208 ff, 258 ff, 289 ff. 34

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people of the Island, but purely as a way to cripple the might of Britain.37 Paul Becker proposed even larger conquest in Great Britain. At the beginning of the war this war invalid designed two maps of Europe showing, what the continent should look like after the defeat of the Entente Powers and the victory of the Central Powers. In the second option Germany was supposed to conquer large territories from the enemy. England was to be limited to Cornwall and the Plymouth harbour only, whereas the rest of its land up to the Scotland border would become a German protectorate. Ireland and Scotland were to become independent kingdoms.38 In reality however the British navy blocked the German fleet from the very start of the war and avoided any decisive battle, in which the German Navy could try to break through the British superiority in the North Sea and possibly attack the British Isles. Ireland was excluded even from the plans of the German Admiralty concerning the naval blockade of Britain. According to the author of this plan, corvette captain Schlubach, the population of the “Green Isle” was too thin and there was not enough important trade centres. The only exceptions were Dublin and Belfast, which should be included in the blockade of the British harbours at the Irish Sea.39 In view of the strength of the British fleet this plan was hardly feasible. Germany even did not have enough submarines to realise it.40 In spite of all this, before the war the British representatives in Ireland were afraid of a German invasion in case of a Germany-Britain conflict. In the autumn 1914 the Undersecretary of State for Ireland Sir Matthew Nathan met the British Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener. The renowned general, famous thanks to his victory in Sudan and in the Boer War, counted with this option too and believed that if the German attempt

Hans-Dieter KLUGE, Irland in der deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft. Politik und Propaganda vor 1914 und im Ersten Weltkrieg, Frankfurt am Main 1985, p. 112. 38 Becker to the Foreign Office, 21 November 1914, PA AA, Weltkrieg 11k secr., Vol. 2, A 31825. 39 BA-MA, RM 3/27, Blockade der englischen Inseln, 25 October 1914. 40 At the beginning of the war Germany had 28 U-Boats; however four of them (U 1-U 4) were primitive technology and were used for training only. Part of the others (U 5-U 28) had not-quite-reliable oil engines, while the newer types had diesel engines already. At that time Britain had 78 submarines, France 55 and Russia 28. On 4 February, when Germany declared the submarine warfare, there were 21 submarines in the North Sea (FISCHER, p. 241; KIELMANSEGG, p. 134.). According to the unofficial pre-ware plans a complete blockade of the British Isles would require at least 222 U-boats. (V. E. TARRANT, Ponorky útočí. Ofenziva německých ponorek 1914–1945, Praha 1998, p. 16; KLUGE, p. 111.) 37

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the invasion; they will do so in the North-West coast of Ireland. In such case he believed, a division made of the Ulstermen would stop the invasion.41 Anyway, the Germans did not think about an invasion to Ireland at that time. The sea around Ireland witnessed only a commerce raiding of the German submarines, which tried to cripple the British sea routes, deprive Britain of food supplies and force it to capitulate. The U-boats operated especially south of the Irish coast, because there passed the routes to the western harbours and to the South England and Queenstown (now Cobh), the main base of the British fleet in Ireland. This area witnessed also sinking of the British trans-oceanic steamboats Lusitania (7 May 1915) and Arabic (19 August 1915), on which also many citizens of neutral countries drowned, especially Americans. These incidents lead to a significant worsening of the diplomatic relations between the German Empire and the United States and it was one of the reasons, why USA entered the World War I. The war changed the situation in Ireland too. Great Britain, its colonies and dominions, including Ireland, entered the war on 4 August. The call of the British army for volunteers was heard especially by the UVF members, who in September 1914 formed the 36th division (“Ulster Division”), which was joined by 27 412 men during the first year. On 18 September the British king George V signed the Home Rule Act, at the same time however another act postponed the validity of Home Rule by twelve months or until the end of war, whichever comes first.42 Redmond, who was looking forward to the title of an Irish Prime Minister, offered the London government his Irish Volunteers lead by his people, to defend the island and later also to serve in the British Army.43 He believed, that if he shows loyalty in the times, when Britain struggles for survival, it would break the resistance of the Unionists against the autonomy of the whole Ireland. Yet, Asquith as well as Lord Kitchener refused his offer. What is more, this Leon Ó BROIN, Dublin Castle and the 1916 Rising, New York 1971, pp. 26–27. In September 1915 the validity of the act was postponed for another six months. In late 1916 nobody believed, that the conflict could end soon, so the validity of the act was postponed “after the war”. 43 With more than 180 000 members this organisation represented an important element of the Irish political scene. However the Parliamentary Party had no control over it. This is why Redmond made effort to get his people into the Provisional Committee, a 25member governing body of the Irish Volunteers, to oversee its activities. The moderate members like the president Éoin MacNéill, Casement and most of the committee members gave in to the Redmond’s pressure, so as to prevent splitting of the organisation. On 16 June 1914 the committee co-opted 25 new members proposed by the leader of the Parliamentary Party. Nine radicals voted against, among others Thomas Clarke, Patrick Pearse, Sean MacDermott and others, mostly future leaders or participants of the Easter Rising in Dublin. 41

42

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gesture of the “Judas of Ireland” – as the leader of the Irish trade unions James Larkin labelled Redmond – divided the Irish public. Most of the Irish and the Irish Volunteers members backed Redmond. On the other hand the radicals refused taking part in a war on Germany, because Ireland had no quarrel with the German emperor and no reasons to fight against the Germans. This dispute caused that the organisation split into two parts. Redmond’s supporters called themselves the Irish National Volunteers (INV) and were ready to help Britain with the war on Germany. At the beginning of the conflict 175 000 former Irish Volunteers entered this organisation. Their number gradually lowered, as their members left for the British Army. By the autumn 1915 around 27 000 enrolled the army as volunteers.44 The remaining 13 500 members of the Irish Volunteers remained faithful to its president Éoin MacNéill and kept their original name. Some of the radicals did not only want to keep Ireland out of the war. Shortly after the beginning of the war the representative of the Irish Volunteers met with members of the secret separatist club Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB)45 and they agreed to use the conflict in the Continent to free from the British rule. Their credo was “England’s difficulty is Ireland’s opportunity”. Also the Clan na Gael organisation agreed with the plan. It was an association of the Irish emigrants to the USA and it promised financial support to the prepared uprising. Sir Roger Casement was to function as a liaison. Since 20 July he was in New York and did his best to persuade the leader of the Clan na Gael John Devoy to finance the purchase of weapons for the Irish Volunteer because with the 1500 old Mauser Rifles

At first Redmond hoped that the INV members, just like the Ulstermen, would form own troops within the British Army, with their own command. But Kitchener – although he came from the Catholic part of Ireland – did not trust the Irish, so the Irish Catholic soldiers were dispersed into many troops under British command. Many of them were in the 10th and 16th division, which is why they were called Irish Divisions. Until autumn 1915 more than 132 000 Irish - 79 511 Catholic and 52 943 Protestant - volunteers enlisted the British Army (KEE, p. 525.) 45 It was established in 1858 with the objective to achieve independence of Ireland, even with the use of force. It acted as a branch of the American Fenian Brotherhood and it closely cooperated also with its successor, Clan na Gael. At the beginning of the World War I the activities of the IRB were weakened due to the success and the overall national support to the Home Rule movement. The managing body of the IRB was a three-person Supreme Council. In 1913–1915 the leadership was taken over by a new generation of Irish nationalists. The president became Denis McCullough, the secretary was a young publisher of the journal Irish Freedom Sean MacDermott and the treasurer was Thomas Clarke, who was also the liaison between IRB and the Clan na Gael. 44

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imported from Germany they could not compete with the strength of the UVF. Casement was also in favour of the anti-British rising, but he was aware, that the success is impossible without sufficient weaponry and trained men. The limited financial sources of the American organisation and the neutral policy of USA made it impossible to get sufficient military equipment and instructors from beyond the ocean. However the war on the Continent opened the possibility to realise the plans about cooperation with Germany. This is why Casement decided to get military support from Berlin. We still do not know when it happened. In his memoirs Devoy says, that Casement informed him for the first time about this intention on 2 August, two days before Britain entered the war, but he believed, that the plan had been much older.46 The first contact between both sides took place on 9 August in New York, where Casement met the German military attaché Captain Franz von Papen. During this introductory meeting the Irishman explained to the future German Chancellor his plan to import military supplies and officers from Germany to train and prepare the Irish for an uprising, which would force the British army to withdraw a part of its troops from the Continent. According to Papen’s report to Berlin, they spoke about 50 000 rifles.47 In late August Casement also met the German ambassador Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff. According to Devoy’s memoirs, the ambassador “listened attentively and with evident sympathy, asked many questions, so as to be sure he fully understood our position, and he promised to send our application to Berlin”.48 Already three days earlier, on 25 August, Casement sent to the capital of Germany a declaration of the American Irishmen for the Emperor Wilhelm II. In the paper the Irish expressed their support to the fighting Germans and asked the German sovereign to make liberation of Ireland one of the objectives of the Central Powers. “Thousands of Irishmen are prepared to do their part to aid the German cause, for they recognize that it is their own … We beg Your Majesty to reflect that an Ireland freed by German victory over Britain becomes the sure gage of a free ocean for all who traverse the seas … We pray for that triumph for Germany; and we pray with it Your Majesty may have power, wisdom and strength of purpose to impose a lasting peace upon the seas by effecting the John DEVOY, Recollections of an Irish Rebel, Shannon 1969, pp. 417 ff. Papen to the Foreign Office, 9 August 1914, PA AA, Weltkrieg 11k secr., Vol. 1, A 18717. 48 DEVOY, p. 403. 46 47

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independence of Ireland and securing its recognition as a fixed condition of the terms of final settlement between the great maritime Powers.”49 Since early October Casement’s departure to Europe was being prepared in cooperation with the German embassy. On 13 October Bernstorff sent the promised recommendations to Berlin to Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, that the imperial government should help the Irishman.50 Two days later Casement embarked a trans-oceanic steamboat Oscar II under the alias James E. Landy, an American. Aboard this ship he travelled to Christiania (now Oslo), from where he took a train via Denmark to Germany. He reached Berlin on 31 October. Before the journey he set up several objectives to achieve in Germany. He wanted the German government and public to approve and support the Irish separatism. He hoped to persuade the German government to approve formation of a volunteer troop composed of British prisoners-of-war of Irish origin. This Irish Brigade,51 which he thought should have at least 200 men, would then be transported to Ireland along with a shipment of weaponry, ammunition and a group of German officers to support the planned antiBritish rising. Briefly after his arrival Casement (who acted under the name “Mr Hammond” at first52) addressed to the German Chancellor a memorandum, in which he urged Bethmann Hollweg to form a military unit composed of POWs of Irish nationality and Catholic faith.53 Five days later the Secretary of State Jagow informed his right hand Arthur Zimmermann, that the Chief of the German General Staff, general Erich von Falkenhayn approved the

Ibid., pp. 405–406. The German Emperor reacted to the letter in an instruction for the Foreign Office asking, “daß dafür auf diplomatischen Wege gedankt werde”. (Karin WOLF, Sir Roger Casement und die deutsch-irischen Beziehungen, Berlin 1972, p. 23.) 50 Bernstorff to Bethmann Hollweg, 13 October 1914, PA AA, Weltkrieg 11k secr., Vol. 1, AS 2452. 51 The name was probably inspired by the eponymous Irish volunteer unit, which fought on the side of the Boers in the British-Boer War in 1899–1902. 52 National Library of Ireland (henceforth quoted as NLI), Casement Papers, Ms 13,084/1. 53 Memorandum by Roger Casement German intentions toward Ireland and Irish Soldiers prisoners in Germany, 2 November 1914, PA AA, Weltkrieg 11k secr., Vol. 1, AS 2461. 49

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Irish Legion and ordered to start collecting the Irish POWs.54 They were to be collected in the prisoner camp at the town Limburg an der Lahn, near Frankfurt am Main. The troop was in the jurisdiction of three institutions. The political and propagandist exploitation was a job for the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), while the Prussian Ministry of War was supposed to organise it. The military issues were handled by the Department IIIb (intelligence) of the Reserve General Staff, which was headed by lieutenant in reserve Rudolf Nadolny. He also acted as a liaison officer for the Irish Brigade. Already before the Irish POWs were assembled in Limburg, the press published a declaration of the German government, according to which Berlin actually approved the Irish call for independence as legitimate. The document was signed by the Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, though written by Casement, and it declared, that “Deutschland nur Wünsche für die Wohlfahrt des irischen Volkes, seines Landes und seiner Einrichtungen hegt. Die Kaiserliche Regierung erklärt in aller Form, daß Deutschland niemals mir der Absicht einer Eroberung oder der Vernichtung irgendwelcher irischer Einrichtungen in Irland einfallen würde, … dem Deutschland nur nationale Wohlfahrt und nationale Freiheit wünscht”.55 Less than one month from the arrival to Germany, Casement achieved one of his main objectives, which however did not guarantee any long-term support to the Irish ambitions. The more important task was still ahead – to build a strong volunteer unit. According to Zimmermann they selected 2486 men of Irish nationality and Catholic faith from the British prisoners-of-war and these were to be moved to Limburg.56 When Casement got there on 4 December, there was still only a fragment of this number of men. First he informed a group of Irish non-commissioned officers about his plans. However, only two of them decided to join the Brigade.57

Ibid., Jagow to Zimmermann, 7 November 1914, AS 2536. The chief of the German diplomacy was sceptical to the Casement’s project from the very beginning. In a letter to Zimmermann he wrote: “Der militätische Nutzen [of the Irish Brigade – note by F. N.] würde gering, vielleicht sogar Negativer Natur sein,... Es würde aber genügen, dass die Bereitwilligkeit der irischen Gefangenen bekannt wird, an unserer Seite gegen England zu fechten.” The German government thus calculated to use the brigade not in a battle, but only for propaganda to make British recruitment in Ireland more difficult. 55 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 November 1914. 56 Zimmermann to Jagow, 17 December 1914, PA AA, Weltkrieg 11k secr., Vol. 3, AS 2957. 57 About the detailed reasons of the failure of Casement’s conscription campaign in Limburg see Filip NERAD, The Irish Brigade in Germany, 1914–1918, Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, 2006, pp. 188–189. 54

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After this failure Casement tried to put the Irish Brigade on a legal basis. On 18 December he had an audience with the Chancellor. He managed to persuade the sceptical Bethmann Hollweg, that this project could bring a success. Five days later Casement sent to Zimmermann a text of an IrishGerman Treaty, which he conceived. It was discussed in the government and on 28 December they signed it. The German party had only one condition – that it would be published only after this military troop had been successfully commissioned. In the ten points of the document the German government undertook to provide moral and material support to formation of the Irish Brigade, which would be intended “to fight solely in the cause of Ireland”, under an own flag, in own uniforms and under the leadership of its own officers. Until the officers are obtained (they counted with people from Ireland or USA) it was to be lead by the German officers, but during this time it could not be used in any military action. Its clothing, food and armament were to be donated by the German side, but no member of the Brigade was allowed to take money from the Germans. The German government undertook to transport the trained and fully equipped Brigade to Ireland with an “efficient military support and with an ample supply of arms and ammunition”. If it should prove impossible to transport the Brigade to Ireland, it was to be transported to the Middle East, where it would “assist the Egyptian People to recover their freedom by driving the British out of Egypt”. The last article of the treaty contained a German promise to acknowledge independent Ireland and to support its government internationally, if the British rule over the island is terminated.58 On 5 January 1915 Casement made his second attempt to acquire crew for the Brigade. But again, the Irish prisoners of war showed little interests and he had to face even hostile reactions. Some men asked him shouting, how much bribes does he get from the Germans for this dirty work. Although he finally managed to get fifty men for his brigade, it was far less than he had hoped. After his failure, Casement abandoned plans for any further recruitment. The project of the Irish Brigade was silently abandoned also by the German government, who regarded the Brigade composed of mere 55 Irishmen as quite useless from the propagandist point of view. Also the leaders of the land forces quite lost any interest in the Irish plans. Nadolny informed Casement quite frankly, that under these conditions the Brigade is useless for the German government. Original of the treaty see in PA AA, Weltkrieg 11k secr., Vol. 3, AS 3053; its copies are in NLI, Bulmer Hobson Papers, Ms 13,160/1; ibid., Casement Papers, Ms 13,085/vii.

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While in Berlin Casement made these vain efforts to ensure German support for the uprising, in Ireland the preparations were underway. It was organised by a small group of separatists from the Military Council of the Irish Republican Brotherhood. They were lead by Patrick Pearse, a writer and a headmaster of a bilingual Irish-English school in Dublin. Also other young poets were members – Joseph Plunkett and Éamonn Ceant along with two members of the Supreme Council of IRB Thomas Clark and Sean MacDermott. Later they co-opted also the poet and playwright Thomas MacDonagh and the leader of the Irish socialists and the leader of trade unions James Connolly. The seven men organised the preparations for the uprising alone. The only communication of the conspirators went on the line IRB Military Council – Revolutionary Directory of the Clan na Gael, which provide the finances. Nobody else knew anything. The organiser wanted to avoid the mistakes of the previous anti-British rebellions, which always failed, because someone leaked information. Each member of the council had also an important position in the structures of the IRB and the Irish Volunteers – and Connolly was in the militia of the trade unions, the Irish Citizen Army (ICA) –, so they could easily control and influence the activities in the military units of the nationalist groups. The only direct contact between the organisers and the Germans took place in late spring 1915. One of the members of the IRB Military Council, Joseph Plunkett,59 came to Berlin to negotiate with the representatives of the German army about supplies of weaponry for the rebels. It resulted in a promise of an undefined quantity of weapons and ammunition.60 However the Irish rebels hoped that German army would assault Ireland directly. It is clear from the thirty-two-page study written by Plunkett and Casement during their stay in Germany. The study analyses the distribution of forces in the island in March 1915. According to the authors (this part must have been written by Since childhood Plunkett suffered from breathing problems and already before the war he regularly travelled to convalescence stays abroad. This is why the British officials were not suspicious, when he left Ireland. He travelled to Germany via Spain, Italy and Switzerland where he acted under the alias “Mr. Malcolm”. He got to Berlin in late April and stayed there under the alias Johann Peter. (NLI, J. M. Plunkett Papers, Ms 10,999/i.) or Johann Peters. This name was e. g. written on his permit to Limburg camp (NLI, J. M. Plunkett Papers, Ms 10,999/xi.). 60 Plunkett was supposed to get it in a meeting with the German Chancellor. (Donagh MacDONAGH, Plunkett and MacDonagh, in: Leaders and Men of the Easter Rising: Dublin 1916, ed. F. X. MARTIN, London 1967, p. 170.) However there is no record of the Plunkett’s meeting with Bethmann Hollweg and the chancellor does not mention it in his memoirs either. Compare Theobald von BETHMANN HOLLWEG, Betrachtungen zum Weltkrieg, Hrsg. Jost DÜLFFER, 2 vol., Essen 1989. 59

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Plunkett, who knew details about the situation in Ireland, unlike Casement) there were 37 000 British soldiers and 12 000 members of RIC (Royal Irish Constabulary) in Ireland at that time. The core of the British army was in Dublin and its vicinity and also in the triangle in the south of the country among the towns of Cork, Mallow and Fermoy. In Ulster in the north, the concentration of the military was far thinner. Heavy artillery was only in Lough Swilly, Belfast Lough and “maybe” in Killiney in Dublin County. The authors pointed out that “British forces in Ireland are not an army nor even a garrison at present. They are a number of small-scattered garrisons and many large training camps. They are not equipped for the occupation of the country much less to resist invasion. Those units that are intended for immediate service receive their equipment, munitions and stores in England when they leave Ireland on their way to the front”. 61 Plunkett and Casement proposed an invasion of 12 000 German soldiers, who would enter the country on sea through the unfortified estuary of the Shannon River and land at Limerick in the west of the island, which they thought would be defended only by few Brits. The Germans should bring weapons for 40 000 Irish Volunteers. After the successful landing they would form a mixed German-Irish unit, which would be lead by experienced German officers, who would plan the military operations. To make the advance of this army easier, the Irish Volunteers were to severe the infrastructures of strategic importance for the British Army and to occupy Dublin due to “the arrest of British officials and military officers, the placing of a guard over the banks and British commercial interests and if possible the installation of a military Governor”.62 Limerick was chosen as the landing point, because it was relatively easily accessible, it had a railway connection to the east and south of the country and was surrounded with mountains from all sides, which would not allow the British to use cavalry – it is a landscape suitable for a partisan war. It is also only 100 km far from Athlone, a town in the very heart of the island, where there was the core of the British artillery in the island and the conquest of which could be a decisive strategic victory for the rebels. It was the attack to the Northeast towards Athone, where the mixed German-Irish army campaign was supposed to start. Because there were only few British forces (some 900 soldiers and three artillery batteries at the most), Plunkett calculated that the town and the nearby Shannon River Bridge could be Nadolny to the Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt), 8 June 1915, PA AA, Weltkrieg 11k secr., Vol. 9, A 18292; also NLI, Casement Papers, Ms 13,085/5. 62 Ibid. 61

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conquered fast. The rebels would thus cut off the west-Irish province Connacht and could advance to the north to Sligo and to the east to Dublin. Around the capital city they expected the meet main British resistance, as also the enemy troops from the South of the Island would gather there. The authors calculated also with the support of the local population. They wrote that especially the people of the West Irish counties Kerry, Galway and Mayo had a friendly attitude to Germany. However the authors admitted that the Irish support to Germany “springs not from knowledge of the Germans, but from knowledge of the English”.63 In spite of that they believed, that the Irish would come to like the Germans more, as soon as Berlin announces public support to the Irish national independence and once the German Army lands on the Irish coast. As soon as the West Ireland is occupied, the Germans could establish their Atlantic naval bases there in the deep Irish bays, “where the biggest battleships in the world can ride at anchor”.64 Also the strategic naval port Lough Swilly in the Northern Ireland could be conquered likely, because only weak land forces supposedly guarded it. Anyway, the German army maintained its sceptical attitude to these proposals, because its command – or at least part of it – regarded the cooperation with Irishmen after the failure of the Irish Brigade project as worthless. On 20 June when Plunkett was leaving Berlin, Casement sent him a copy of the German-Irish Treaty of 28 December 1914 and an order for the rebellion leaders not to launch the uprising without German help. The Irish asked for this aid in the autumn 1915. On 6 October Georg von Skal, who worked with the German propagandist bureau in New York, sent to Berlin Devoy’s plea for an urgent shipment of a small quantity of weapons, which the Clan na Gael leader proposed to transport by submarines to the Finet Bay (sic) near the town Tralee in the Kerry County in the South-West of Ireland.65 Nadolny, who was just appointed as a chief of the newly established political department of the General Staff, sent the application to the navy HQ for assessment.66 In late November the Chief of the High Seas Fleet Admiral Hugo von Pohl informed the Naval Staff, that the use of submarines for transport of weaponry to this area is inconvenient due to navigational reasons. Instead he suggested using a fishing steamboat Ibid. Ibid. 65 Skal to the Foreign Office, 6 October 1915, BA-MA, RM 5/4751. The application was related to the current discussion in Britain about the mandatory conscriptions to the British Army, which the Irish nationalists opposed heavily. 66 Nadolny to Heydel, 8 November 1915, BA-MA, RM 8/4751. 63

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of an English design.67 The acting Chief of the Naval Staff rejected even this option.68 Plans of the Irish uprising were finalised in January 1916. It was planned to start in Dublin on the Easter Sunday 23 April and then the Irish Volunteer organisations throughout the island were to join it. The Clan na Gael was informed about the final version on 5 February. Five days later Devoy asked Berlin again for a supply of ammunition, weapons and explosives, via the ambassador Bernstorff. The plea was then specified for “25 to 50 thousand rifles with a proportionate number of machine guns and field artillery and a few superior officers”.69 This all was to be transported to Ireland with submarines via the northern passage to Limerick in West Ireland between 20–23 April. According to the estimates of the rebels there were circa 30 000 soldiers of the British army in the island plus 10 000 policemen. There were roughly 40 000 Irish Volunteers70 who had approximately 10 000 various weapons, especially the Lee-Enfield rifles.71 They had circa 200 cartridges for each of them. The organisers of the rebellion counted, that also most of the cca 50 000 Redmond’s National Volunteers would join the rebellion. If Berlin sent 100 000 rifles, Devoy thought that Ireland would certainly find enough people to use them to bind up to half a million of British soldiers. Landing of the German troops, which Plunkett and Casement were talking about, was not mentioned any more. And yet the German side was still sceptical to providing military help to the Irish. Nadolny even asked the Naval Staff, whether they could not support the Irish rebellion “vielleicht durch irgend eine andere Maßnahme als die Zuführung von Waffen durch U-Boote”.72 The German Supreme Ibid., Pohl to Behnke, 27 November 1915. Admiral Pohl, who was one of the top advocates of the submarine warfare, was in years 1913–1915 the Chief of the German Naval Staff. In February 1915 he was appointed the Chief of the High Seas Fleet. 68 See note of captain Heydel - ibid. 69 Bernstorff to the Foreign Office, 16 February 1916, PA AA, Weltkrieg 11k secr., Vol. 11, AS 873. German excerpt in BA-MA, RM 5/4751, Vorschläge des irischen revolutionären Direktoriums in Amerika vom 16. 2. 1916. According to Devoy one of the pondered options was to import the military supplies by submarines directly to the Dublin harbour. But a transport of such quantity of material would require larger U-boats, which could take also enough fuel and food for the whole journey along the west coast of Norway and then along the north Scotland to the Irish Sea and back. But no such big submarine could get to the Dublin Bay underwater. (DEVOY, p. 460.) 70 This number was probably much lower in fact. The exact quantity is not known, but according to conservative estimates the Irish Volunteers had 11 000 to 13 000 men at that time. (HENNESSEY, p. 103.) 71 RIC estimated at the same time that the Irish Volunteers had only one third of the number. (NA, CO 904/99, Activity of Political and Secret Societies, 14 February 1916.) 72 Nadolny to Heydel, 22 February 1916, BA-MA, RM 5/4751. 67

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Army Command (Oberste Heeresleitung – OHL) and the War Ministry finally approved the supply of 20 000 rifles, ten machine guns and five million ammo,73 which – according to the Naval Staff – could be shipped to Ireland in two or three fishing steam-boats.74 A changed attitude to the Irish rebellion is evident also in the meeting of the General Staff on 17 March 1916. There were present also representatives of the Naval Staff, the Imperial Navy, the High Seas Fleet Command and others. The participants came to an agreement, that the uprising is feasible under the present conditions and has some chance to succeed. Even if the British army suppresses the rebellion, it would have a great moral influence on the Irish and it would keep the British troops off the Continent for some time.75 But Plunkett’s visit was useful, because it persuaded the top of the German military that even after the failure of the Irish Brigade project the cooperation with the Irish could still go on.76 On the recommendation of the leaders of the rebellion, the location for landing of the contraband was changed from Limerick to port Fenit (sic), which is a little more to the south in the Tralee Bay in the Kerry County. Nadolny informed the Foreign Office about the agreement between OHL and the Naval Staff and the Foreign Office sent it immediately to the ambassador Bernstorff in Washington, who was to inform Devoy.77 The leader of the Clan na Gael accepted the offer even without consulting Dublin. On 23 March Berlin sent to Washington a specification, that instead of three fishing boats the transport would be done on one merchant steamboat with carrying capacity of 1400 tons.78 At that time Casement was in a sanatorium near Munich, recovering from a nervous breakdown. When the good news about German help reached him via the Irish Brigade commander, Captain Robert Monteith, he resumed his activities again, in spite of persisting health problems. He still considered German aid as the key factor for the success of the rising, but the Ibid., Nadolny to Heydel, 6 March 1916. Ibid., Naval Staff to the General Staff, 28 February 1916. 75 BA-MA, RM 5/4751. 76 Andrea KRATZ, Die Mission Joseph Mary Plunketts im Deutschen Reich 1915 und ihre Bedeutung für den Osteraufstand 1916, Historische Mittelungen der Ranke-Gesellschaft, 8, 1995, p. 215. 77 Nadolny to the Foreign Office, 1 March 1916, BA-MA, RM 5/4751; also PA AA, Weltkrieg 11k secr., Vol. 11, AS 787. 78 The German command must have counted with this change at least since the sending of the first telegram in early March. The chief of the Irish Brigade, Captain Robert Monteith wrote in his memoirs, that he learned about the scope of the German aid on the meeting of the General Staff in Berlin on 1 March and already then it was spoken about one steam boat. (Robert MONTEITH, Casement’s Last Adventure, Chicago 1932, p. 134.) 73

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supply of mere 20 000 guns was, in his opinion, absolutely insufficient. It was also not accompanied with any officers, who could help with training and command of the rebel operations. He believed that starting a rebellion under such conditions would be a disaster and he decided to do his best to stop this half-baked rebellion at any cost. He used the need to make preparations for the landing as an excuse and asked the Navy Staff to transport him to Dublin in a submarine with two Irish Brigade members even before the military supplies are shipped.79 However the navy HQ as well as the General Staff refused.80 When Casement saw, that he would not get an own transport, he tried to send an emissary to stop the rebellion. He persuaded the Chief of the Department N of the Navy Staff, Captain Walther Isendahl81 – without informing the army leaders – to smuggle an Irish Brigade member John McGoey to Denmark, allegedly to prepare conditions for landing of the contraband in Fenit. In fact McGoey was ordered to go to Dublin and to give to the IRB leaders Casement’s warning that the German military aid is not big enough to ensure success of the revolt, so the rising needs to be called off. However McGoey never reached the Irish capital city and since 19 March, when he left German territory, there has been no trace of him.82 According to Casement this episode lead to a sharp exchange of views between himself and Nadolny, during which the German officer allegedly revealed the true attitude of Berlin towards the Irish aspirations. During the meeting of 30 March Nadolny criticised Casement for not informing him about the plan to send McGoey to Ireland. And the Irish envoy felt offended, that German army offered to the rebels only a fraction of what Devoy asked for. Especially he was worried, that Germany sends no officers to Ireland. The Chief of the Political Section of the General Staff allegedly said to Casement openly in the end, that the German side has no interest in the fate Casement to the Naval Staff, 7 March 1916, BA-MA, RM 5/4751. Ibid., 18 March 1916. The protocol about the yesterday’s discussion at the General Staff on the military aid to Ireland includes a note: “Sir Roger Casement würde am liebsten mit U-Boot vorher nach Irland fahren. Dies wird ihm ausgeredet.” Also Devoy was against his departure from Germany, because he wanted to keep the defeatist envoy out of Ireland as long as possible. He kept sending letters to Berlin, in which the insisted, that Casement has full support of the American Irish and that he should stay in Germany “until such time as the Provisional Government (set up during the rising by the members of the IRB Military Council – note by F.N.) may decide otherwise”. (Devoy’s Post Bag 1871–1928, eds. William O’BRIEN, Desmond RYAN, Vol. II, Dublin 1953, p. 487.) 81 This department was in charge of espionage, contra-espionage and agents abroad. 82 The historians suppose that he was probably captured by the British and then executed. Compare Reinhard R. DOERRIES, Die Mission Sir Roger Casements im Deutschen Reich 1914–1916, Historische Zeitschrift 222, 1976, p. 615. 79

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of Ireland and it sends the weapons only because it hopes to weaken the British army. And this is why it insists on realisation of the uprising. ”No revolution, no rifles,“ said Nadolny frankly according to Casement’s diary.83 Also the telegram of Plunkett’s father to Casement, sent from Bern on 5 April via the German envoy Romberg, shows, that the organisers of the rising were interested in German officers. Count George Plunkett – an influential persona of the Irish political scene, who was in the command of the Irish Volunteers – confirmed in it the date of the rebellion on the Easter Sunday 23 April and insisted, that the weapons must not come to Tralee later than on the Easter Monday evening. At the same time he urged the German envoy that German officers are “absolutely necessary for voluntary forces“ and that German submarine is “necessary for Dublin harbour“.84 But Nadolny said no.85 Yet before leaving for Vatican, where he was heading from Switzerland, Plunkett asked Casement to intervene at the German government in favour of this plea. “The effect of the presence of German officers, and of a German submarine (which otherwise might not seem so important) in Irish waters, assisting us, would be very great. I may add that the Supreme Council of the Irish Volunteers desire to associate Germany, in this marked way, with liberation of Ireland.”86 But the second letter missed the addressee. On 7 April, after repeated requests the German Naval Staff an approval to move to Ireland granted Casement. The German authorities changed their opinion after the intervention of Jakob Noeggerath. This American of German origin, who acted in USA as a German agent during the war and was in charge of contacts with the Irish emigrants, thought it necessary to prepare situation for landing of weapons in Ireland and he recommended sending there someone, who knows the situation there. In case of Casement he discouraged from transporting him in the same ship as the contraband, because, if the British caught the ship, the enemy would capture a very

Ibid, p. 616; Jeffrey DUDGEON, Roger Casement. The Black Diaries, with a Study of his Background, Sexuality, and Irish Political Life, Belfast 2002, p. 452. 84 Romberg to the Foreign Office, 5 April 1916, PA AA, Weltkrieg 11k secr., Vol. 11, AS 1253. 85 Ibid, Nadolny to the Foreign Office, 6 April 1916, AS 1261. 86 Ibid, Plunkett to Casement, 11 April 1914, AS 1311. Even on 17 April Devoy asked Berlin, whether the submarine gets to the Dublin harbour and if not, whether they intend to block the harbour or if possible the Limerick port too. “Landundg einer wenn auch noch so kleinen Truppenmacht dringend erwünscht ferner anregen gleichzeitige starke kriegerische Demonstration durch Luftschiffe und zur See.” (Ibid, German Legation Stockholm to the Foreign Office, 20 April 1916, AS 1399.) 83

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important person. So he suggested using a submarine for Casement’s transport to Ireland, just like Casement wanted.87 Meanwhile in Lübeck 20 000 rifles – confiscated from the Russian POWs – and ammunition were loaded on the steamboat Libau, which took off on 9 April to the shore of Ireland under the alias of a Norwegian trade ship Aud. The ship was originally called Castro and belonged to the British Wilson Co. from Hull. At the beginning of the war the Germans captured it and renamed to Libau. On 21 March its captain was appointed the naval lieutenant in reserve Karl Spindler and the crew was set at 22 men. The weapons and ammunition were masked under the cargo of pit props, metalsheet bathtubs, wooden doors, windowsills and other goods. If inspected by the British ships, the crew was supposed to present as Norwegian sailors taking the cargo to Cardiff and to Italy. From Lübeck the steamboat sailed through Kattegat and Skagerrak to the North Sea and then along the Norweigan coast to the Northern Polar Circle, where it turned and headed west of the Faer Islands and around the Rockall Island to the agreed place in the Tralee Bay. Meanwhile, Casement and two members of the Irish Brigade, Captain Monteith and Daniel Bailey (in Germany he acted under the alias Julian Beverley), set off from Berlin to Wilhelmshaven, where they embarked on the submarine U 20 on 12 April. This sub commanded by Captain Walter Schwieger, which a year earlier had sunk the Lusitania, was to transport the three Irishmen to the Tralee Bay and at the Inishtooskert island they were to move to the ship Libau/Aud.88 Casement intended to get to Dublin as fast as possible, contact MacNéill and persuade him to stop the uprising. He had no idea, that the president of the Irish Volunteers knew nothing of the plans of Pears and Co. and learned about the date of the rebellion only very shortly before its launch. But the events took a brand new heading. On the turn of March and April the Military Council of the IRB decided to reschedule the uprising to Monday 24 April. The Clan na Gael were informed about the change on 14 April with a note, that the weapons from Germany must not get to Fenit before Sunday 23 April. Berlin got the new instructions only on 18 April, when the steamboat with the military cargo had been on route for nine days already. Since the steam boat had no wireless telegraph and could not be informed about the changed plans, it reached the agreed location according to the original agreement on 20 April between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. Captain 87Ibid, 88

Noeggerath to Zimmermann, 30 March 1916, AS 1152. Order for U 20, 10 April 1916, BA-MA, RM 5/4751.

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Spindler was transmitting signals to the coast in vain. No reply. The sub, which was supposed to bring Casement, did not turn up either. After circa twelve hours of waiting, he turned the ship and set off for a return journey, with the weapons still on board. On 21 April the ship was caught by British cruisers, which ordered him to accompany them to Queenstown. In fear the weapons could get into the hands of the British, Captain Spindler sunk his own ship shortly before entering the harbour.89 U 20 had a malfunction on the second day of its journey.90 So Captain Schwieger headed to Helgoland, where the Irish passengers moved to a replacement submarine U 19. Its commander, Captain Raimund Weisbach, managed to reach the agreed location only several hours after Libau/Aud – according to the ship diary it was 10:30 p.m. –, but it was so dark, that they did not see the nearby Spindler’s steam-boat, which was only hundreds of meters away. On 21 April at 2:15 a.m. he put the three Irishmen in a boat and the ship returned back to the base.91 The Libau/Aud capture was not just a bad luck, because the British were informed about the planned transport of weapons from Germany to Ireland in advance.92 On 18 March 1916 the agents of the American intelligence service made a raid on the German office in New York. The bureau on Wall Street provided various propagandist and espionage activities for Germany. The office also served as a contact point for German agents and for representatives of the nationalist groups from Ireland and India, which were supported by Berlin. But it was not an official part of the German embassy, so it was not protected under the ex-territoriality principle and its staff did not have diplomatic immunity. The confiscated More about the journey of Aud see in Karl SPINDLER, The Mystery of the Casement Ship, Berlin 1931, pp. 10–155; John de Courcy IRELAND, The Sea and the Easter Rising, Dublin 1966, pp. 9–26. 90 A review at Helgoland revealed that the actuating lever of the rudder axle broke down. This is why the sub could not continue in this journey. (BA-MA, RM 97/579, Kriegstagebuch U 20, s. 60.) 91 Ibid, RM 97/555, Kriegstagebuch U 19, p. 6. For fear someone could hear the U-boat’s engine, captain Weisbach stopped three kilometres from the shore and the Irish had to cross the rest of the stormy sea in a boat. After two hours of exhausting rowing, in the early morning, they landed on the Banna Strand beach not far from Fenit. The exhausted Casement was unable to proceed in the journey. He sent his fellows to contact members of the Irish Volunteers nearby. At 1:30 p.m. he was discovered and arrested by a police patrol near the beach. More about the mission of U 19 see in Owen Dudley EDWARDS, Captain Raimund Weisbach’s Narrative of Casement’s Last Voyage to Ireland, in: 1916: The Easter Rising, eds. Owen Dudley EDWARDS, Fergus PYLE, London 1968, pp. 116– 118; IRELAND, pp. 27–35. 92 It is confirmed also by the memoirs of the former officers of the British Admiralty. Compare IRELAND, p. 18. 89

234 Filip Nerad ______________________________________________________________

documents included the correspondence between Berlin and Washington concerning the German aid to the uprising in Ireland. The American government sent this information to London.93 According to some historians the British had already known about the planned rebellion, even without the American info, because in early 1915 the British naval intelligence service cracked the code, which encoded the letters exchanged between Washington and Berlin.94 However in view of the later development, this American service was rather a disservice. When the British captured the shipment of arms for the rebels and apprehended Casement, whom they considered to be the key person of the rebellion in view of close contacts with the enemy, and when Éoin MacNéill publicly in press called off all actions of the Irish Volunteers during the Easter, the British started to believe, that the uprising will not take place during the holidays and that no special measures are needed any more. The Chief Commander of the British Army in Ireland, General Friend, quietly left for England, the policemen and soldiers of Dublin attended the annual horseracing and the clerks of the Dublin Castle (the HQ of the British administration in Ireland) enjoyed a day off with their families. Thus the outbreak of the rebellion on 24 April in Dublin found the British officials and army quite unprepared. On this day, around noon, a group of militants entered the General Post Office in Sackville Street (now O’Connell Street) and seized it. The leader of the group, Patrick Pearse, then read for the surprised passers-by a memorandum of the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic, signed by him, as the republic’s President and Chief Commander along with six colleagues from the IRB Military Council. The rebels explained the uprising by the oppression suffered under the British rule, they promised religious and civil liberties to the citizens of the new republic, as well as equal rights and opportunities, and they announced, they have the support of the Irish emigrants in the USA and ”the gallant allies in Europe“.95 They had the Germans in mind of course, thought they knew by the time already, that the

On 20 April the German navy sent a warning to all the submarines that the plan has been uncovered and that Libau must be told to turn back. But no ship received the message. (IRELAND, p. 43; SPINDLER, p. 106.) 94 KEE, p. 537; Angus MITCHELL, Casement, London 2003, p. 114. 95 Irish Historical Documents 1172–1922, eds. Edmund CURTIS, R. B. McDOWELL, London 1943, pp. 317–318. 93

The Gallant Allies? 235 ________________________________________________________

shipment of ammunition and weapons from Germany did not came.96 Yet they decided to start up the unrest, because they hoped to spark up rebellion in other parts of the country by their “bloody sacrifice”. At the same time when Pearse and Co. seized the GPO and established their headquarters there, another circa 1200 men and women from the Irish Volunteers and the ICA captured other strategic points in the centre of Dublin. Their objective was to paralyse the centre of Ireland and to occupy the British army of the island until the Irish Volunteers in other parts of Ireland start fighting too. However because of the constant changes of the starting day of the rebellion and due to contradicting orders sent from the leaders of the uprising on the eve of the events, the other regions did not joint the rebellion. Most of the Irish nation even did not approve of the rising at that time, because they believed, that after the war the British government would keep its word and grant autonomy to the whole island. The British Army lead by General Maxwell had an overwhelming superiority, so it encircled the rebels in the centre of Dublin and by 30 April it forced them to capitulate.97 Immediately after the suppression of the Dublin unrest, the Clan na Gael contacted Berlin with a new plea for help with preparation of another uprising in Ireland.98 Zimmermann forwarded the application to Nadolny, who consulted it with the German command and in early June he recommended continuing the cooperation. “Grundsätzlich [we are] zu weiterer Unterstützung der Iren durchaus bereit. Bitte um baldige Angabe über Art, Zeitpunkt und Umfang gewünschter Hülfe.”99 The German army was quite slow to answer, because it was uncertain about the fate of the shipment of weapons on Libau/Aud; some reports even claimed that the weapons finally got into the hands of the separatists.100 Only Captain However in the end Germany provided military support to the rebels after all. According to the previous agreement the German airships bombarded the east coast of England during the night from 24 to 25 April. Originally they intended to attack London, but due to bad weather they hit only Norwich and Cambridge. At the same time, in the morning of 25 April German cruisers bombarded the east England ports Lowestoft and Yarmouth. More see in Marine Archiv (Hrsg.), Der Krieg zur See 1914–1918. Der Krieg in der Nordsee, Vol. 5, Berlin 1925, pp. 140–148; IRELAND, pp. 36–37. 97 On 2 May special military tribunals were set up in Dublin, which sentenced 90 rebels to death. Fifteen of then were really executed, the rest were then reclassified to life sentence. The list of all the sentenced rebels and their punishment see in Breandán MAC GIOLLA CHOILLE (ed.), Intelligence Notes 1913–1916. Dublin 1966, pp. 258–267. 98 Bernstorff to the Foreign Office, 6 May 1916, PA AA, Weltkrieg 11k secr., Vol. 12. A 15049. 99 Nadolny to the Foreign Office, 11 June 1916, BA-MA, RM 5/4757. 100 Ibid., Chief of the Naval Staff, 26 May 1916, RM 5/4751. 96

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Spindler in a letter he wrote in early June to his father from the British prisoner camp confirmed the sinking of the steamboat with the cargo. Old Mr. Spindler forwarded his son’s letter to the Imperial Navy Office.101 The American Irish specified their requests three months later. They asked for “a sufficient military force to cover the landing… [and] as large a quantity of arms, munitions and equipment” as much the German government believes it can transport to Ireland.102 According to their – quite unrealistic – estimates the rebellion could be joined by up to 250 000 men. The Naval Staff considered landing of soldiers and weapons in Ireland as feasible under certain conditions and proposed two variants of how to do it. Both the variants counted with steamboats as means of transport. In the first option the cargo and the troops were to be transported in a single boat to one port; Galway in West Ireland was selected as the most convenient place. The benefit of this plan was, that it could be realised with a single steamboat. The second option counted with a transport in two steamboats to two different Irish ports – Galway and Tralee. The benefit of this plan was, according to the staff officers, that during the landing there would be less Irish in one place and the British security counter measures would be more difficult, because they could not know how much arms and soldiers to expect.103 However OHL, namely General Ludendorff, refused to provide soldiers for the expedition troops and offered “only” 60 000 rifles, 20 machine guns and 12 million ammunition. The staff preferred the variant with two steamboats, which were to transport the arms to Galway and Tralee between 21 and 26 February 1917 or a month later.104 The Naval Staff even provided four submarines, which were to accompany the shipment.105 But on 16 January Count Bernstorrf informed Berlin that the Irish ask to postpone the transport until it could be accompanied with a sufficient number of the German soldiers.106 The General Staff turned such request down, so Hauptmann Hünsel, who replaced Nadolny in July 1916 as the Chief of the Political Department of the Staff, informed the Admiralty that

Ibid., Hubert Spindler to the Imperial Naval Office, 4 June 1916. Ibid., Bernstorff to the Foreign Office, 8 September 1916, RM 5/4757. 103 Ibid., Naval Staff to the Political Department of the General Staff, 9 December 1916. 104 Ibid., Naval Staff to the Political Department of the General Staff, 23 December 1916. 105 Ibid., Naval Staff to the Naval Corps, 12 January 1917. 106 Bernstorff to the Foreign Office, 16 January 1917, PA AA, Weltkrieg 11k secr., Vol. 13. AS 304. 101

102

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the “Aufgabe P”, as the transport of weaponry to Ireland was called, is cancelled definitively.107 The “Aufgabe P” was the last specific attempt for a military cooperation between the Germans and the Irish during the World War I. In October of the same year alleged organisers of an Irish uprising planned for November contacted Berlin via the envoy Romberg with a plea for help.108 The Naval Staff discussed this request and asked Romberg to provide more information, but Berlin made nothing more to realise the help. In the spring of the next year the German Staff tried to use the growing tensions in Ireland due to the plans of the British government to increase the mandatory conscriptions, and tried to revive the contacts with the separatists, who formed the Sinn Féin party. In April the Germans transported to Ireland a member of the Irish Brigade Joseph Dowling, but the police apprehended him shortly after the landing. The British government used this episode as an excuse to imprison seventy Irish nationalists, who were accused of preparation of a “German plot”. After the failure of the Dowling’s mission, General Ludendorff himself ordered to stop sending any more agents to Ireland.109

Hülsen to the Naval Staff, 21 February 1917, BA-MA, RM 5/4757. Ibid., Romberg to the Foreign Office, 15 October 1917, RM 5/4751. 109 Berckheim to the Foreign Office, 9 June 1918, PA AA, Weltkrieg 11k secr., Vol. 13, AS 2620. 107

108

Soziale Zusammenhänge im Krieg zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika in den Jahren 1917–19181 Václav Horčička

Der Erste Weltkrieg veränderte nicht nur das Schicksal der Völker Europas, ja sogar der ganzen Welt, sondern stellte auch einen Einschnitt in das Leben Einzelner dar. Während das Ausmaß des Leidens, das dieser Krieg allen beteiligten Ländern und ihren Einwohnern brachte, alle bis dahin bekannten Grenzen überschritt, lebten die Vereinigten Staaten bis zum Frühjahr 1917 in relativer Ruhe und in Wohlstand. Erst im April 1917 griff dieses Land in entscheidender Weise in den Konflikt ein, der es bis dahin scheinbar nicht betroffen hatte. Als Hauptfeind betrachteten die Amerikaner das kaiserliche Deutschland, das von allen Staaten des Viererbundes über das größte Kriegs- und Wirtschaftspotential verfügte. Als weniger gefährlich wurde in Washington Österreich-Ungarn eingestuft. Der Präsident der USA, Woodrow Wilson, war lange nicht bereit, die Hoffnung auf einen separaten Frieden mit der Donaumonarchie aufzugeben, deshalb lehnte er es auch bis zum Herbst 1917 ab, dieser den Krieg zu erklären. Erst die dramatischen Ereignisse auf dem italienischen Schlachtfeld, wo die österreichisch-ungarischen Einheiten siegreich voranschritten und die Italiener vom Fluss Isonzo bis hinter den Piave trieben, bewegten die Vereinigten Staaten zu einer Änderung ihrer Meinung. Anfang Dezember 1917 verkündete Wilson beiden Kammern des Parlaments, der Krieg mit dem Habsburgerreich sei unvermeidbar. Der kriegerische Konflikt hatte natürlich auch jenseits der sogenannten großen Politik Auswirkungen. Obwohl beide Länder fern voneinander lagen und wirtschaftlich relativ wenig verbunden waren, betraf doch der Krieg eine nicht geringe Anzahl von Personen. Er betraf in erster Linie das Schicksal derjenigen Einwohner der Vereinigten Staaten und in geringerem Maße auch Österreich-Ungarns, die über die Staatsangehörigkeit des jeweils anderen Staates verfügten, beziehungsweise noch nicht die Bedingungen zur Einbürgerung erfüllten oder diese gar nicht beantragt hatten. Nach den Angaben, die das österreichisch-ungarische AußenministeDiese Studie ist ein Ergebnis von Forschungen im Rahmen des Forschungsprojekts MSM 0021620827 Die Tschechischen Länder inmitten Europas in der Vergangenheit und heute, dessen Träger die Philosophische Fakultät der Karlsuniversität ist.

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rium zur Verfügung hatte, lebten zu Beginn 1918 in Cisleithanien und in Bosnien-Herzegowina etwa 1350, in Ungarn ungefähr 650 amerikanische Staatsbürger.2 Die Zahl der nicht eingebürgerten Einwohner der USA österreichisch-ungarischer Herkunft schätzten österreichisch-ungarische Quellen im Jahre 1917 auf eine Million.3 Diese Zahl kam der tatsächlichen wohl recht nahe. Allein im Jahre 1913 übersiedelten etwa 300 000 Auswanderer aus dem Gebiet der Monarchie in die USA.4 Da das Einbürgerungsgesetz aus dem Jahre 1906 einen mindestens fünfjährigen ununterbrochenen Aufenthalt im Lande zur Bedingung für die Erteilung der Staatsbürgerschaft hatte, haben Personen, die in den Jahren 1912 bis 1914 in die USA auswanderten, im vorletzten Kriegsjahr die amerikanische Staatsbürgerschaft noch gar nicht erlangen können. Es ist von nicht geringem Interesse, dass Wien noch Mitte 1917 mit einer massiven Rückkehr dieser Menschen in die Heimat nach dem Krieg gerechnet hat. Auf einer Besprechung mit den ehemaligen Konsuln in den USA, die kurz zuvor nach Hause zurückgekehrt waren, wurde in Anwesenheit der Vertreter des Kriegsministers, beider Ministerpräsidenten und beider Innen-, Finanz-, Handels- und Justizminister konstatiert, dass in allen Zentren österreichisch-ungarischer Auswanderer ohne Ausnahme „eine deutliche und weit verbreitete Tendenz zur Rückkehr“ festzustellen sei. Die einzige Ausnahme bildeten anscheinend die Tschechen, die vor dem Krieg dazu neigten, „mit dem Betreten des amerikanischen Bodens ein für allemal die Brücke zur alten Heimat hinter sich abzubrechen“. Jetzt jedoch traten einige von ihnen aktiv gegen die Monarchie auf. Interesse an einer Rückkehr wurde unter den einzelnen Nationalitäten in folgender Reihenfolge angegeben: Magyaren, katholische Südslawen, Polen, Ruthenen, Slowaken, Deutsche, Rumänen aus dem Banat, und am Ende Italiener. Es handelte sich hierbei nicht nur um leere Worte. Den Konsuln zufolge löste eine Reihe von Personen bereits ihre Konten auf, verkaufte ihre Häuser und anderes. Allein im Falle der Magyaren rechnete man mit einer Rückkehr von 300 000 Auswanderern. Es war klar, dass die Rückwanderung einer solch großen Personenzahl sehr sorgfältig vorbereitet sein wollte. Man zog Anonym, 26. 1. 1918, No. fehlt, Haus,- Hof,- und Staatsarchiv (weiter HHStA), Politisches Archiv (weiter PA), Administrative Registratur (weiter AR), Fach 36, Kt. 608 Dep. 11 47 (weiter F 36/608) und Ungarisches Innenminist., Außenmin., 8. 6. 1918, No. 7017/Eln I/ szám, HHStA, PA, AR, Fach 36, Kt. 607 Dep. 11 47 (weiter F 36/607). 3 Telegraphen-Korrespondenzbureau Außenminist.., 7. 12. 1917, No. fehlt, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F36/607. 4 Josef POLIŠENSKÝ, Češi a Amerika. Úvod do studia dějin vystěhovalectví do Ameriky, díl II., Praha 1996, s. 82. 2

Soziale Zusammenhänge im Krieg zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und USA... 241 ________________________________________________________

beispielsweise eine Amnestie für Kriegsverbrechen (Desertion) oder für die unberechtigte Annahme einer fremden Staatsbürgerschaft usw. in Erwägung.5 Aus den genannten Zahlen ist auf den ersten Blick ersichtlich, dass es hauptsächlich die Vereinigten Staaten waren, die ihre Beziehung zu den „feindlichen Ausländern“ regeln mussten. Das Problem hatte eine formale und eine praktische Seite. Im ersten Falle wurden alle Verhandlungen mit aus dem Feindesland kommenden Personen hauptsächlich durch das Gesetz über den Handel mit dem Feind (engl. Trading with the Enemy Act) vom 6. Oktober 1917 geregelt, das feindliche Ausländer kategorisierte und ihnen bestimmte Beschränkungen auferlegte. Es ging hierbei nicht nur um den Handel mit dem Feind, sondern auch um die Ausübung von Rechten im Zusammenhang mit Eigentum, der Möglichkeit zu unternehmerischer Tätigkeit auf dem Gebiet der USA usw. Der Präsident hatte zwar das Recht, jeder Person eine Ausnahme zuzugestehen, theoretisch jedoch galt, dass das Eigentum des Feindes in die Verwaltung durch einen gesonderten Beamten zu überführen war (der sogenannte alien property custodian – Verwalter fremden Eigentums). Dieses Gesetz bezog sich auch auf die österreichischungarischen Untertanen, da deren Heimatland Verbündeter von Deutschland war. Der österreichisch-ungarische Außenminister, Graf Ottokar Czernin, protestierte zwar seit November 1917 gegen dieses Gesetz, die USA jedoch erklärten kurz danach Österreich-Ungarn den Krieg, sodass über die Gültigkeit dieses Gesetzes kein Zweifel mehr aufkommen konnte.6 Gewisse Probleme betreffs der Stellung der österreichisch-ungarischen Bewohner der USA gab es jedoch bereits vor der Annahme des Gesetzes. Czernin war sich des Risikos ihres Aufenthaltes in Übersee wohl bewusst, daher versuchte er kurz vor dem Abbruch der diplomatischen Beziehungen den amerikanischen chargé d’affaires in Wien, Joseph Grew, zur Unterzeichnung eines Vertrags zu bewegen, der den Amerikanern eine sichere Ausreise aus dem Land garantieren (im Falle seiner Landsleute war das wegen der britischen Blockade technisch nicht möglich) und den Bürgern beider Länder dann auch weiterhin die Ausübung ihrer ursprünglichen Arbeit ermöglichen sollte.7 Grew jedoch lehnte die Unterzeichnung eines solchen Vertrages ohne Autorisierung aus Washington ab und Czernin versuchte, sie im letzten Moment durch Vermittlung des designierten österreichisch-

Aufzeichnung, 15. 6. 1917, No. fehlt, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F 36/607. Czernin an Hadik, 3. 11. 1917, No. fehlt, HHStA, PA, Kt. 898 P. A. I. 7 Penfield an Lansing, 7. 4. 1917, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (weiter FRUS) 1918, Supplement 2 (weiter Suppl.), Washington D. C. 1969, S. 244–245 5

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ungarischen Botschafters in den USA, Graf Adam Tarnowski, direkt in der amerikanischen Hauptstadt auszuhandeln.8 Das amerikanische Außenministerium ließ Czernin Mitte April über die Schweiz ausrichten, dass es die Vereinbarung annehme, ersuchte jedoch um eine Verlängerung der Frist für die freie Abreise der amerikanischen Bürger.9 Wien nahm diese Änderung an.10 Die österreichisch-ungarischen Behörden nahmen gegenüber den Amerikanern, die auf dem Gebiet der Monarchie geblieben waren, eine großzügige Haltung ein. Grew versicherte im Juni 1917 aus seiner neuen Wirkungsstätte, dem Außenministerium, einem beunruhigtem Fragesteller, dass „die Bewegung der Amerikaner auf österreichischem Staatsgebiet in keiner Weise beschränkt wurde und dass ihnen in diesem Land keinerlei Gefahr seitens der österreichischen Regierung droht“ (“no restrictions have been placed upon the movements of Americans in Austria, and no danger threatens them in that country by reason of any action of the Austrian Government”)11 Etwas anders sah die Situation in den Vereinigten Staaten aus. Die österreichisch-ungarischen Behörden zeigten hauptsächlich Interesse hinsichtlich eines eventuellen Eintritts ihrer Landsleute in die amerikanische Armee. Im Oktober 1917 hatten sie sogar die Besorgnis, die USA könnten fremde Staatsangehörige zur Einrückung zwingen oder eventuell Verweigerer aus dem Land ausweisen.12 Aber die Realität war nicht so dramatisch. Die amerikanischen Behörden wurden zwar mit Anträgen auf Erlaubnis zum Eintritt in die Armee überhäuft, nahmen dazu jedoch einen ablehnenden Standpunkt ein. In der Antwort auf ein offizielles Ersuchen des rumänischen Außenministers teilte das amerikanische Kriegsministerium mit, dass dies in Friedenszeiten nicht möglich sei. Die Vereinigten Staaten befanden sich zu diesem Zeitpunkt nämlich noch nicht im Krieg mit Österreich-Ungarn. Kriegsminister Nelson S. Baker räumte ein, dass man dies nur im Falle des Ausbruchs einer Feindschaft zwischen beiden Ländern in Erwägung ziehen könne. Gleichwohl wäre es auch so „nicht konsistent mit dem Geist unserer Gesetze und im Widerspruch zu unserer nationalen Sicherheit“ (“it would be highly inconsistent with the spirit of our laws and Grew, letters, Eintrag zum Datum 26. 2. 1917, Harvard University Library (weiter HUL), Joseph Clark Grew Papers, Vol. I; Czernin an Hadik (Tarnowski), 15. 4. 1917, No. 139, HHStA, PA, Kt. 898 P. A. I. 9 Lansing an Stovall, 16. 4. 1917, FRUS 1918, Suppl. 2, s. 245. 10 Stovall an Lansing, 15. 5. 1917, FRUS 1918, Suppl. 2, s. 249. 11 Grew an A. Bragg, 7. 6. 1917, No. fehlt, HUL, Joseph Clark Grew Papers, Vol. I. 12 AOK Nachrichtenabteilung, Auszug aus den vertraulichen Nachrichten bis 10. Oktober 1917, No. Evb. Nr. 20/84 res., HHStA, PA, Kt. 898 P. A. I. 8

Soziale Zusammenhänge im Krieg zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und USA... 243 ________________________________________________________

in disregard of our national safety“)13 Diese ablehnende Haltung hielt er jedoch administrativ nicht lange aufrecht. Bereits im Oktober 1917 erlaubten die Vereinigten Staaten auf ihrem Staatsgebiet die Rekrutierung von polnischen Freiwilligen für die Nationalarmee in Frankreich. Im Lichte der abgelehnten Anträge österreichisch-ungarischer Untertanen verschiedener Nationalitäten auf Eintritt in die amerikanische Armee ist es paradox, dass es die Entente kurz nach Kriegseintritt der USA ablehnte, im Rahmen der Mission des Amerikanischen Roten Kreuzes in Europa bereits eingebürgerte Freiwillige deutscher, österreichischungarischer und türkischer Abstammung anzunehmen. Die Vereinigten Staaten nahmen dies zur Kenntnis und der amerikanische Außenminister Robert Lansing gab am 28. Juni 1917 eine Erklärung heraus, in der er diese Freiwilligen beruhigte, ihre Loyalität gegenüber dem neuen Vaterland werde keinesfalls bezweifelt14. Auf anderen Gebieten betraf der amerikanischdeutsche Krieg die nicht eingebürgerten Landsleute jedoch im Prinzip nicht. Es wurde ihnen sogar erlaubt, auf amerikanischen Handelsschiffen, die ins Ausland fuhren, zu dienen. Lansing informierte die amerikanische Vertretung in Buenos Aires, mit diesen Personen sei zu verfahren „wie mit dem Seemann eines Staates, der nicht mit unserem Land im Krieg ist“ (“as are the seamen of any other nation with which this country is not at war”).15 Die Situation änderte sich erst durch die Kriegserklärung an Österreich-Ungarn. In der offiziellen Kriegserklärung, die der Präsident am 11. Dezember 1917 unterzeichnete, kam der Stellung der österreichischungarischen Untertanen auf amerikanischem Boden große Aufmerksamkeit zu. Sie wurden aufgefordert, sich jeglicher feindlicher Aktivitäten zu enthalten. Außerdem wurde ihnen versprochen, dass sie bei Einhaltung der Gesetze in ihrer bisherigen Lebensführung fortfahren und ihrer derzeitigen Arbeit weiter nachgehen können. Allerdings durften sie nicht ohne Genehmigung ausreisen oder umgekehrt auch ins Land einreisen. Personen, denen gegenüber ein begründeter Verdacht der Unterstützung des Feindes oder der Absicht, dies zu tun bzw. des Verstoßes gegen Gesetze bestand, sowie diejenigen, die „eine große Gefahr für den öffentlichen Frieden und die Sicherheit sein könnten“ (“who may be at large to the danger of the public peace or safety”) durften festgehalten und inhaftiert werden, und zwar im Baker an Lansing, 26. 5. 1917, No. A. G. 2598637, National Archives, College Park, Maryland (weiter NA), Record Group 59 (weiter RG 59), Microcopy 367, Reel 41. 14 For the Press, 28. 6. 1918, Library of Congress (weiter LC), The Papers of Robert Lansing, Vol. 28. 15 Lansing an den Gesandten in Buenos Aires, 1. 9. 1917, No. fehlt, NA, RG 59, Microcopy 367, Reel 49. 13

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Gefängnis, Militärlager u.ä.16 Die Beschäftigungsgarantie bestand natürlich nicht unbeschränkt. „Eine Reihe von Personen mit Verbindung zu Österreich-Ungarn“ musste verschiedene Positionen im Staatsdienst verlassen. Darunter befand sich beispielsweise der hochgestellte Beamte des Amtes für Kriegshandel (engl. War Trade Board) Charles Short. An seiner Loyalität gab es zwar keinen Zweifel, aber er hatte Gräfin Camilla Hoyos17 zur Frau. Die Entscheidung des Präsidenten ermöglichte es, „mit gewissem Wohlwollen mit denjenigen österreichisch-ungarischen Untertanen zu verfahren, die in Wirklichkeit nicht mit den Mittelmächten sympathisieren“ (“to treat with a degree of leniency those subjects of Austria-Hungary who are not in fact sympathetic with the Central Powers”).18 Der Verwalter des Eigentums von Ausländern versicherte, „die Kriegserklärung ändert nichts am Status der sich in diesem Land (den USA – Anmerkung V.H.) aufhaltenden österreichisch-ungarischen Einwohner“ (“Declaration of war with Austria-Hungary will not change the status of citizens or subjects of Austria-Hungary resident in this country”). Sie wurden weder als „Feinde“ betrachtet noch drohte ihnen Schaden an ihrem Eigentum (z.B. Beschlagnahmung ihrer Ersparnisse) oder Ähnliches. Restriktionen sollten sich nur auf Personen beziehen, die sich auf feindlichem Territorium befanden.19 Hunderttausenden antiösterreichisch denkenden Auswanderern wurde jedoch entgegengekommen, gleichzeitig bestätigte damit Wilson seine Bereitschaft, mit Österreich-Ungarn besser zu verfahren als mit Deutschland. Diese Tatsache zeigte sich alsbald in der Praxis. Nicht eingebürgerte Landsleute mussten sich im Unterschied zu Deutschen nicht polizeilich melden und wurden auch nicht aus so genannten Kriegszonen ausgewiesen.20 Das Finanzministerium empfahl in Übereinstimmung mit dieser Politik, loyalen österreichisch-ungarischen Seeleuten, die sonst nach einer Kriegserklärung aufgrund einiger Bestimmungen des Spionagegesetzes (engl. Espionage Act) vom 15. Juni 1917 nicht auf amerikanischen Fischfangschiffen arbeiten dürften, eine Sondergenehmigung zu erteilen.21 Im Repräsentantenhaus wurde am 23. Januar 1918 ein Gesetzesentwurf vorgelegt, auf dessen Grundlage einige österreichisch-ungarische und A Proclamation. By the President of the United States of America. Existence of War– Austro-Hungarian Empire, 11. 12. 1918, No. 1417, Anhang zur Depesche Ekengrens an Czernin, 20. 12. 1917, No. 2742, HHStA, PA, Kt. 898 P. A. I. 17 Phillips, Eintrag im Tagebuch, 3. 1. 1918, HUL, William Phillips Papers, Box 1. 18 Phillips, Eintrag im Tagebuch, 12. 12. 1917, HUL, William Phillips Papers, Box 1. 19 Erklärung des Verwalters fremden Eigentums, 10. 12. 1917, FRUS 1918, Suppl. 2, s. 271. 20 Ekengren an k. und k. Außenminist., 6. 3. 1918, No. 1169, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F 36/607. 21 Rowe an Lansing, 26. 1. 1918, No. fehlt, NA, RG 59, Microcopy 367, Reel 352. 16

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deutsche (hier nur Einwanderer aus Elsass-Lothringen) Untergebene vom Status feindlicher Ausländer befreit werden konnten. Außerdem sollte der Präsident das Recht bekommen, Angehörige der bewaffneten Kräfte einzubürgern. Kriegsminister Baker änderte zwar seine frühere Haltung und nahm eine positive Haltung zu diesem Entwurf ein, dagegen sprachen sich jedoch das Justizministerium und das Außenministerium aus. Justizminister Thomas W. Gregory erhob den Einwand, die österreichischungarischen Untertanen seien aufgrund der Entscheidung des Präsidenten keinerlei Beschränkungen unterworfen, mit Ausnahme von Reisen ins Ausland. Er warnte auch davor, dass die Einbürgerung von Soldaten ein echtes Sicherheitsrisiko darstellen und die Arbeit der Geheimdienste komplizierter machen könnte.22 Lansing schloss sich dieser Kritik an. Er betonte, der Feind, und besonders Österreich-Ungarn, verfolge solcherlei Bemühungen mit Beunruhigung, was sich „wahrscheinlich in bestimmtem Maße in den gegenwärtigen Ausreisebeschränkungen aus diesem Kaiserreich, die Amerikanern auferlegt werden, zum Ausdruck kommen kann“23 In Wirklichkeit handelte es sich seitens Österreich-Ungarns um eine vorbeugende Maßnahme, die solange gelten sollte, bis der Status der eigenen Untertanen in den USA geregelt ist. Dem Grenzübergang in die Schweiz, Feldkirch, war am 11. Dezember 1917 der Befehl erteilt worden, amerikanischen Staatsbürgern keine Ausreiseerlaubnis zu erteilen.24 Die Unsicherheit war jedoch nicht von langer Dauer. Schnell zeigte es sich, dass die USA gegenüber den österreichisch-ungarischen Landsleuten Nachsicht walten ließen. Die Schweden informierten Wien über die Aufenthaltsbedingungen der Landsleute schon am 7. Januar 1918.25 Der Ballhausplatz (das Außenministerium) fragte über Stockholm sofort zurück, ob sich das Gesetz über den Handel mit dem Feind auch auf österreichischungarische Untergebene beziehe.26 Theoretisch galt das wohl, die Praxis sah aber anders aus. Man muss in Betrachtung ziehen, dass der Präsident oder ein von ihm bevollmächtigter Beamter für einen jeden eine Ausnahme machen konnten. Es tat nichts zur Sache, dass das oben genannte, von Gregory und Lansing kritisierte Gesetz über die Befreiung vom Status eines feindlichen Ausländers nicht angenommen wurde. Lansings Stellvertreter, J. L. O’Brian, Memorandum to the Attorney General, 24. 1. 1918, No. fehlt, LC, The Papers of Robert Lansing, Vol. 33. 23 Lansing an Gregory, 30. 1. 1918, No. fehlt, LC, Papers of Robert Lansing, Vol. 34. 24 Czernin an das ungarische Innenminist., 11. 12. 1917, No. Z. 117251/11, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F 36/607. 25 Hadik an Czernin, 7. 1. 1918, No. 1/P. E., HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F 36/607. 26 Czernin an Hadik, 9. 1. 1918, No. Z. 121241/7, HHStA, PA, Kt. F 36/607 22

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Alvey A. Adee, gab Anfang April 1918 an, mit Ausnahme einer geringen Zahl Internierter seien die österreichisch-ungarischen Untertanen nicht in die Kategorie „feindliche Ausländer“ eingeordnet worden.27 Am 9. Mai 1918 wurde jedoch das Gesetz angenommen, das dem Präsidenten die Einbürgerung von Soldaten ermöglichte. Deshalb ergriff Österreich-Ungarn nur sehr milde Vergeltungsmaßnahmen: Bürger der USA mussten sich nun polizeilich registrieren lassen, konnten bei Notwendigkeit interniert werden und ihre Ausreise aus dem Land unterlag einer Genehmigung.28 Es gab aber nicht viele solcher Fälle. Im Internierungslager befanden sich Ende Mai 1918 im gesamten Cisleithanien lediglich 6 Amerikaner. Dabei handelte es sich um kürzlich eingebürgerte Polen.29 Amerikanischen Staatsbürgern wurde die Ausreise in die neutrale Schweiz in der Regel ohne Verzögerungen erlaubt. Im Zeitraum von Januar bis April 1918 ersuchten in Ungarn nur 6 Personen um eine solche Genehmigung, die allen von den Behörden erteilt wurde.30 Zufriedenstellend war auch die Situation in den USA. Mit den österreichischen und ungarischen Staatsangehörigen wurde im Prinzip nachsichtig verfahren, in Anbetracht ihrer Anzahl waren Internierungen nur ein nebensächliches Problem. Am Ende des ersten Halbjahres 1918 befanden sich in vier der Armee der Vereinigten Staaten unterstehenden Internierungslagern insgesamt 185 Personen. Das größte Lager war Fort Oglethorpe in Georgia, in dem sich 121 Internierte befanden, gefolgt von Fort Douglas in Utah mit 60 Landsleuten.31 Der Ballhausplatz respektierte diese Tatsache und lehnte deshalb im Sommer 1918 auch einen Vorschlag auf pauschale Internierung amerikanischer Staatsbürger ab. Es sollte in der bisherigen Praxis fortgefahren werden, d.h. es wurden nur Einzelpersonen interniert und auch dies nur in ernsthaften Fällen. Die Position des Außenministeriums wurde auch durch

Adee I. Rocicovi (Chicago), No. fehlt, 10. 4. 1918, NA, RG 59, Microcopy 367, Reel 353. Vgl. auch Wilson, Erklärung, 5. 2. 1918, FRUS 1918, Suppl. 2, s. 284–285. Das Gesetz über Handel mit dem Feind wurde im Fall der österreichisch-ungarischen Untertanen nur auf diejenigen angewendet, die in der „Pflege“ des Kriegsministeriums waren, d.h. auch auf die Internierten. 28 K und k. Außenminst. an die spanische Botschaft, 22. 2. 1918, No. Z. 14660/11, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F 36/607. 29 K. und k. Außenminist., Amtserinnerung, 29. 5. 1918, No. fehlt, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F36 /607 30 Ungarisches Innenminist. An österreichisch-ungarisches Außenminist.. (k. u. k. Min. des Aeussern), 6. 5. 1918, No. 5277/Eln. I., HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F 36/607. 31 Ekengren an Außenminist. , 25. 6. 1918, No. fehlt, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F 36/607. 27

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die offizielle Zustimmung der Amerikaner zu diesem Prinzip gestärkt.32 Dennoch geriet die amerikanische Praxis ins Kreuzfeuer der Kritik. Es beschwerten sich hauptsächlich die Internierten selbst. Entweder sie attackierten die Tatsache, dass sie ihrer persönlichen Freiheit beraubt wurden, als solche oder sie kritisierten die Bedingungen in den Internierungslagern. Drei österreichisch-ungarische Untertanen schickten Anfang Februar 1918 dem Außenminister persönlich eine Beschwerde. Sie waren verhaftet und auf Ellis Island gebracht worden, in Sichtweite der Freiheitsstatue, wo sich vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg das Eingangstor in die USA für arme Einwanderer befand. Über ihre Internierung war bis dahin noch nicht entschieden worden. Trotzdem beschlossen sie, nicht länger zu warten. Zwischen der Verhaftung und der Entscheidung über eine Internierung konnten nämlich Monate liegen. Sie behaupteten, der Präsident habe ihnen als Staatsangehörigen der Habsburgermonarchie das Recht auf freie Bewegung auf dem gesamten Staatsgebiet der USA garantiert einschließlich der für andere feindliche Ausländer gesperrten Gebiete. Es ist bemerkenswert, dass sich das Außenministerium mit ihrer Beschwerde tatsächlich ernsthaft befasste. Der Generalkommissar für Immigration beim Arbeitsministerium antwortete jedoch, dass die betroffenen Personen in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Justizministerium festgehalten worden seien.33 Eine Reihe Beschwerden von angeblich und tatsächlich zu Unrecht Internierten erhielt auch die schwedische Gesandtschaft in Washington. Der Chef der Mission, W. A. F. Ekengren führte als Beispiel die Verhaftung des Dirigenten des Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra, Dr. Ernst Kunwald, an, der außer anderen Unannehmlichkeiten um die damals bedeutende Summe von 20 000 Dollar Jahresgage gebracht wurde. Das Hauptproblem jedoch sahen die Schweden in den Bedingungen, die in den Internierungslagern herrschten. Die Internierten wurden zu manueller Arbeit beim Bau von Häusern, der Kanalisation und Ähnlichem herangezogen. Die festgehaltenen Personen kritisierten auch die Verpflegung und die Lebensbedingungen in den Lagern überhaupt.34

K und k. Außenminist. an (gemeinsames) Finanz- und Kriegsminist. , AOK und beide(dem österreichischen und ungarischen) Innenminist., 7. 7. 1918, No. Z. 60693/11, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F 36/607. 33 Commissioner General of Immigration (Dept. of Labor) Woolseymu, 11. 2. 1918, NA, RG 59, Microcopy 367, Reel 353. 34 Ekengren an k. und k. Außenminist., 6. 3. 1918, No. 1169, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F 36/607. 32

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Zur Arbeit der Internierten äußerte sich auf Ersuchen des Außenministeriums der Stabschef der amerikanischen Armee, General Peyton C. March. Er teilte mit, dass die Internierten im Prinzip zu keiner Arbeit gezwungen werden können. Die einzige Ausnahme bildete die Instandhaltung des Lagers, z.B. das Reinigen der Baracken. Mit ihrem schriftlichen Einverständnis können sie auch zu anderen Arbeiten eingesetzt werden. General March räumte ein, dass diese im Grunde sehr großzügige Regelung aus Besorgnis über Vergeltungsmaßnahmen des Gegners getroffen wurde.35 Die Wirklichkeit sah jedoch anders aus als der Stabschef behauptete. Sehr viel hing auch von den Leitern der einzelnen Lager ab. Aus diesem Grunde führte die schwedische Gesandtschaft im Juni 1918 in Fort Oglethorpe eine Inspektion durch. Attaché Göran Rosen bemühte sich um eine ausgewogene Sichtweise auf die dortigen Verhältnisse. Nach Gesprächen mit 70 Internierten gelangte er zu der Einsicht, unter technischem Aspekt sei im Lager alles in Ordnung. Der Leiter der Einrichtung habe allerdings nicht verstanden, dass „das Internierungslager nicht mit einer Straf- und Korrektionsanstalt zu verwechseln ist“. Die Internierten wurden zur Arbeit gezwungen. Der Konsul betrachtete auch die Vermischung von Angehörigen verschiedener Gesellschaftsschichten, zu der es in den Unterbringungs- und Verpflegungseinrichtungen kam, für ungünstig.36 Probleme gab es auch in anderen Lagern. In Fort Douglas bezeichnete die Lagerverwaltung die Vertretung der Internierten als inkompetent und lehnte die Erledigung der von ihr überbrachten Beschwerden von Personen ab. Die Schweden intervenierten daraufhin im Außenministerium, der stellvertretende Verteidigungsminister William Phillips erklärte innerhalb kurzer Zeit, die Entscheidung der Lagerverwaltung würde außer Kraft gesetzt. 37 Die österreichisch-ungarischen Behörden waren im Sommer 1918 mit der amerikanischen Vorgehensweise immer weniger zufrieden. Die Internierungen gingen weiter, immer mehr österreichisch-ungarische Untergebene fanden sich in Lagern wieder. Mitte Juli beispielsweise ersuchte der P. C. March, Regulations governing the employment of prisoners of war, and interned enemy aliens, 28. 3. 1918, LC, The Papers of Lester H. Woolsey, Vol. 70. Bis zum Jahre 1949 gab es keine internationale Konvention, die internierte Zivilisten in Kriegszeiten geschützt hat. 36 Rosen an den schwedischen Gesandten in Washington, 30. 6. 1918, No. fehlt, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F 36/607. 37 Der schwed. Gesandte in Washington an das k. und k. Außenminist.., 5. 9. 1918, No. 4405/21, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F 36/607 35

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schwedische Vizekonsul in Philadelphia das Arbeitsministerium, ein Namensverzeichnis zu schicken und ihm das Recht zuzusprechen, die Internierten in Gloucester City, N. J., besuchen zu dürfen. Es kam auch zur Internierung der Frauen und Kinder der bis dahin gefangen gehaltenen Männer. Im April 1918 beschwerte sich Ekengren über die für sie unzumutbaren Bedingungen in den Lagern sowie die Trennung der Familien. Lansing versicherte, dazu sei es nur in den Fällen gekommen, in denen Frauen sich schuldig gemacht hatten bzw. ein Sicherheitsrisiko darstellten.38 Das österreichisch-ungarische Außenministerium warnte deshalb mittels der Schwedischen Gesandtschaft in Washington das amerikanische Außenministerium vor weiteren Internierungen. „Sollte die amerikanische Regierung“, so hieß es in dem Dokument, „weiterhin ohne gewichtigen Grund österreichische und ungarische Untertanen internieren, so wie es im Falle Kunwalds und Pohls (nicht näher spezifiziert – V. H.) geschehen ist, so bleibt eine solche Handlungsweise nicht ohne entsprechende Folgen für amerikanische Staatsbürger in Österreich-Ungarn“. (“That if American Government should without valid cause continue to intern Austrian and Hungarian subjects – as seems to have been the case with Kunwald and Pohl– such a proceeding could not but have a corresponding effect on the treatment of American citizens in Austria-Hungary”).39 Das Justizministerium äußerte sich zu den Fällen Kunwald und Pohl Anfang September 1918. Pohl konnte nicht identifiziert werden, Internierte mit diesem Familiennamen gab es viele. Die Internierung von Kunwald jedoch bezeichnete es als „voll gerechtfertigt“. Außerdem waren alle österreichisch-ungarischen Bürger angeblich aus gewichtigen Gründen in den Internierungslagern. Sollte also Wien Vergeltungsmaßnahmen ergreifen, wäre dies „ungerecht und unklug“. 40 Ein ähnlicher Fall wie Kunwald und Pohl war auch die Verhaftung des Präsidenten der Transatlantic Trust Company in New York, Julius Pirnitzers, zu der es Mitte Juli 1918 kam. Diese Bank war kurz zuvor von den Amerikanern enteignet worden, ähnlich wie andere österreichischungarische Besitztümer in den USA, mit Ausnahme der angesiedelten nicht eingebürgerten und nicht internierten Landsleute.41 Ende 1918 gab der Ekengren an das k. und k. Außenminist., 3. 6. 1918, No. 2906, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F36/607. 39 Ekengren an Lansing, 3. 7. 1918, No. 3446/21, NA, RG 59, Microcopy 367, Reel 353. 40 Justizminist. an Lansing, 5. 9. 1918, No. 9–16-12–70-23, NA, RG 59, Microcopy 367, Reel 353. 41 K. und k. Außenminist. an den Vorsitz der österr. Regierung., 11. 6. 1918, No. 48848/16, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F 36/607. 38

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Präsident eine Verordnung heraus, die die Definition „feindliche Ausländer“ auf weitere Personengruppen ausdehnte. Betroffen waren vor allem die Ehefrauen der Offiziere, die von der Entente inhaftierten Gefangenen und auf Feindgebiet lebende Männer.42 Der Verwalter des Eigentums von Ausländern versuchte bereits im September 1917, unter diplomatischer Immunität stehendes österreichischungarisches Eigentum zu beschlagnahmen. Dagegen wendete sich das Außenministerium jedoch in entschiedener Weise.43 Einen weiteren Schritt wagte der Verwalter im Sommer 1918. Im August wies er eine Bank zur Herausgabe von Fonds an, die vor der Ausreise der österreichischungarischen Diplomaten der schwedischen Gesandtschaft zur Verfügung gestellt worden waren. Erst nach dem Eingreifen Phillips wurde diese Anweisung annulliert.44 Im Oktober 1918 zog der Verwalter des Eigentums von Ausländern in Erwägung, das Eigentum der Ehefrauen ehemaliger österreichisch-ungarischer Konsuln, das auf dem Staatsgebiet der USA verblieben war, zu beschlagnahmen. Dieses wurde in vier Kategorien unterteilt: Möbel im Haushalt, die persönliche Residenz außerhalb der Konsulate, übriges mobiles Eigentum wie Investitionen und zum Schluss Wertpapiere. Der Rechtsberater des amerikanischen Außenministeriums schloss die erste und zweite Kategorie aus und warnte davor, sollte dieses Eigentum beschlagnahmt werden, drohten Vergeltungsmaßnahmen seitens des Feindes.45 An Pirnitzers Schicksal zeigten der neue österreichisch-ungarische Außenminister, Graf István Burián, sowie der ungarische Premierminister Sándor Wekerle, Interesse.46 Die Schweden intervenierten jedoch vergeblich zu seinen Gunsten. Phillips teilte lediglich mit, er habe in großem Umfang Tätigkeiten ausgeübt, „die mit der Sicherheit und den Interessen der Vereinigten Staaten unvereinbar waren“ (“an alien enemy whose presence at large is inconsistent with the safety and the best interests of the Government of the United States”). Im September 1918 wurde über seine Internierung entschieden. Die Zeitungen, die über seine Internierung berichteten, erwähnten dann, er habe in reger Korrespondenz mit dem To Alexander Mitchell Palmer, 3. 6. 1918, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 48, ed. Arthur S. Link, Princeton, N. J. 1985, s. 228–229. Nützlich ist besonders Anmerk. Nr.1. 43 Phillips an Palmer und Lansing an Palmer, 24. 12. 1917 a 19. 1. 1918, FRUS 1918, Suppl. 2, s. 334–335. 44 Phillips, Eintrag im Tagebuch, 13. 8. 1918, HUL, William Phillips Papers, Box 1. 45 State Department an A. M. Palmer (Alien Property Custodian), 7. 10. 1918, LC, The Papers of Lester H. Woolsey, Box 32. 46 Wekerle an Burián, 14. 8. 1918, No. Z 64688/11, HHStA, PA, Kt. F 36/607. Pirnitzer war ungarischer Untertan. 42

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ehemaligen österreichisch-ungarischen Botschafter in den USA, Constantin Dumba, und mit dem Generalkonsul in New York, Alexander von Nuber gestanden, und zwar auch noch nach deren Ausreise aus den USA.47 Es stimmt, dass die Transatlantic Trust Company enge Beziehungen zu den österreichisch-ungarischen Diplomaten in den USA pflegte. Gerade mit Hilfe dieser Firma waren im April 1917 die mit der Auflösung der Botschaft und der Konsulate verbundenen finanziellen Angelegenheiten geregelt worden.48 In Anbetracht der Krise und des Zerfalls der Monarchie machte der Ballhausplatz seine Drohung jedoch nicht wahr, und Österreich-Ungarn verschärfte auch nicht die Aufenthaltsbedingungen für amerikanische Bürger auf seinem Staatsgebiet. Dies galt, obwohl das Außenministerium auch mit der amerikanischen Vorgehensweise hinsichtlich der österreichisch-ungarischen Untertanen im wehrpflichtigen Alter nicht zufrieden war. Theoretisch hätten diese nicht einberufen werden dürfen, und die Monarchie selbst hielt sich auch bei den Amerikanern auf ihrem Territorium daran. Im Hinblick auf ihre geringe Anzahl stellten diese jedoch kein bedeutendes Rekrutenpotential dar. Völlig anders war die Lage 1918 in den Vereinigten Staaten. Eine Reihe dieser Personen wurde nicht nur gegen ihren Willen einberufen, sondern auch in den Dienst eingegliedert. Wenn sie dagegen protestierten, waren sie unvorstellbarem Druck ausgesetzt. Ekengren berichtete Anfang Juli 1918 über den Fall einiger Soldaten österreichisch-ungarischer Herkunft, die dem 36. Infanterieregiment in Fort Snelling, Minnesota, zugeteilt worden waren. Sie wurden zur Annahme der amerikanischen Staatsbürgerschaft gezwungen, bei Ablehnung folgten Schläge und Psychoterror.49 Im September 1918 befasste sich mit dieser Situation von Nuber, der zu dieser Zeit am Ballhausplatz wirkte. Er wies darauf hin, dass in den USA die Rekrutierung von Freiwilligen für die polnische Armee stattfinde, wobei einige auch österreichisch-ungarische Staatsbürger seien. Die in die amerikanische Armee einberufenen Personen wurden zwar in einigen Fällen entlassen, wenn sie Protest einlegten, dann aber sofort interniert. Ein abschreckendes Beispiel war der Fall des ungarischen Untertanen Emil Sekulic, der den Befehl missachtete und den Militärdienst nicht antrat. Er wurde der Desertion beschuldigt und zu zehn Jahren Zwangsarbeit Der schwedische Gesandte in Washington an das k. und k. Außenminist., 10. 10. 1918, No. 4634, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F 36/607. 48 Hadik (Tarnowski) an Czernin, 21. (18.) 4. 1917, No. 155 (T bis), HHStA, PA, Kt. 1048 P. A. I. 49 Ekengren an das k. und k. Außenminist., 1. 7. 1918, No. 3365/22, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F 36/607. 47

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verurteilt. Von Nuber empfahl deshalb, Vergeltungsmaßnahmen zu ergreifen und einige Amerikaner zum Dienst in der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee zu zwingen. Aber auch dazu kam es nicht. Die mit der Internierung verbundenen Probleme sollten auf einer Konferenz über Kriegsgefangene in der Schweiz gelöst werden. Die Amerikaner verhandelten hier bereits unter der Leitung des Gesandten in den Niederlanden, John W. Garret, mit den Deutschen.50 Washington hatte auch an Verhandlungen mit Österreich-Ungarn Interesse, und Mitte August 1918 fand die erste Sondierung durch seinen Botschafter in Madrid statt.51 Anfang 1918 gab die Monarchie ihre Zustimmung.52 Zu einem weiteren Kontakt kam es über das schweizerische Außenministerium (das sog. Politische Departement – V. H.)53 Der Ballhausplatz wandte sich umgehend an beide Ministerpräsidenten und entwarf einen Komplex von Fragen, über die verhandelt werden sollte. Es handelte sich hauptsächlich um die Problematik der Spionage, bei der die Amerikaner auf die Tatsache Rücksicht nehmen sollten, dass der Krieg fast zu Ende sei, und deshalb großzügig vorgehen sollten. Außerdem sollten die Internierungsbedingungen präzisiert werden. Österreich-Ungarn wollte erreichen, dass die Amerikaner den Internierten Kontakt mit ihrer Familie erlaubten und eine freiwillige Internierung der Ehefrauen ermöglichten. Nach ihrer Freilassung sollten diese Personen das Recht erhalten, sich an einem beliebigen Ort der USA niederzulassen, ihr Eigentum sollte ihnen zurückgegeben werden, bei Interesse sollte ihnen auch die Rückkehr nach Österreich-Ungarn oder die Ausreise in ein neutrales Land ermöglicht werden. 54 Es ist offensichtlich, dass die Wiener Bürokratie sozusagen bis zum letzten Moment funktionierte. Verhandlungen über die Kriegsgefangenen wurden jedoch aus verständlichen Gründen – Österreich-Ungarn hörte auf zu existieren – nicht mehr aufgenommen. Die Amerikaner verschoben dies auf unbestimmte Zeit.55 Interessante Folgen für einige österreichisch-ungarische Untertanen in den USA hatte die Entscheidung der Wilson-Regierung, die „Tschechoslowaken“ als Kriegsvolk und den Tschechoslowakische Nationalrat in Paris Grew an Frau Herter, 9. 10. 1918, HUL, Joseph Clark Grew Papers, Vol. 12. Lansing an Willard, 16. 8. 1918, FRUS 1918, Suppl. 2, s. 157. 52 Willard an Lansing, 1. 10. 1918, FRUS 1918, Suppl. 2, s. 158. 53 Weinzetl (Bern) an das Außenminist. , 17. 10. 1918, No. 713, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F 36/607. 54 Burián an beide Ministerpräsidenten, 20. 10. 1918, No. Z 97218/11, HHStA, PA, AR, Kt. F 36/607. 55 Lansing an Stovall, 15. 11. 1918, FRUS 1918, Suppl. 2, s. 159. 50 51

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de facto als Regierung anzuerkennen (3. September 1918). Es entstand eine kuriose Situation. Alle nichteingebürgerten Landsleute waren nämlich unter rechtlichem Aspekt „feindliche Ausländer“. Gleichzeitig war es aber nicht gut möglich, diesen Status weiterhin auf Tschechoslowaken anzuwenden. Das Außenministerium in Wien fragte deshalb beim amerikanischen Außenministerium an, ob „Ihre gegenwärtige Proklamation einen Teil des österreichisch-ungarischen Reichs aus dem Kriegszustand herausnimmt. Und wenn ja, dann welchen Teil?“ (“your recent proclamation takes any portion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire out of the status of being at war with this county? If so, what portion?”)56 Der Chef der westeuropäischen Abteilung des Außenministeriums, Joseph C. Grew, war sich dessen wohl bewusst, dass „die Antwort gewisse Schwierigkeiten bereiten würde“ (“some difficulty in answering”) Er meinte, Lansings Erklärung nähme unter rechtlichem Aspekt keinen Teil des österreichisch-ungarischen Territorium aus dem Kriegszustand heraus. Dennoch empfahl er festzustellen, welche Haltung zur Grenze des „tschecho-slowakischen Volkes“ die Briten einnehmen würden.57 William Phillips machte Lansing, der am 27. September 1918 die Botschafter in London und Paris beauftragte, die Haltung der dortigen Regierungen zur tschechoslowakischen Grenze58 herauszufinden, mit diesem Problem bekannt. Dies war jedoch eine Angelegenheit, die sich eher für eine Friedenskonferenz eignete, und deswegen verwundert es nicht, dass sie bis Kriegsende noch nicht gelöst war.

Justizminist. an Lansing, 5. 9. 1918, No. fehlt, NA, RG 59, Microcopy 367, Reel 353. Grew an Phillips, 5. 9. 1918, No. fehlt, NA, RG 59, Microcopy 367, Reel 353. 58 Lansing an die Botschafter in London und Paris, 27. 9. 1918, No. 663 a 744, NA, RG 59, Microcopy 367, Reel 353. 56 57

Die Frage des Adelsstandes und seiner Aufhebung in den Nachfolgestaaten von Österreich-Ungarn1 Jan Županič

In der Österreich-ungarischen Monarchie konnte man den Adelstitel auf mehrere Arten verlieren,2 aber das definitive Ende des Adels als gesellschaftliche Gruppe konnte nur in Form eines Beschlusses der gesetzgebenden Körperschaft gesetzlich festgelegt werden, die den Adelsstand und die mit ihm verbundenen Privilegien aufhob. Der Ausgangspunkt für diesen Schritt, den die meisten Staaten (einschl. Monarchien) im neuzeitlichen Europa nach und nach vollzogen haben, war der Beschluss der französischen Nationalversammlung vom Jahr 1790, mit dem der Adelsstand und alle damit verbundenen Privilegien aufgehoben wurden. Es ist dabei interessant, dass eben dieses Gesetz nicht von allen Abgeordneten mit besonderer Begeisterung begrüßt wurde. Der berühmte französische Historiker Jules Michelet beschrieb dieses Ereignis mit folgenden Worten: „Selbst die Nationalversammlung schien durch die allgemeine Begeisterung [von der Föderalisierung des Landes] gewonnen. An einem heißen Juniabend fand sie für eine flüchtige Stunde ihre Hingerissenheit von 1789 wieder und ihre junge Schwungkraft vom 4. August. Ein Abgeordneter aus der Franche-Comté sagte, man solle den auswärtigen Bundesbrüdern die Demütigung ersparen, die Provinzen in Ketten zu Ludwig XIV. Füßen zu sehen, man müsse die Statuen auf der Place des Victoires fortschaffen. Ein Abgeordneter aus dem Süden benutzte die edle Bewegung, die der Vorschlag in der Versammlung hervorrief, und forderte die Abschaffung aller jener prunkenden Titel, welche die Gleichheit verletzten, der Bezeichnung „Graf“ und „Marquis“, der Wappen und Livreen. Der Vorschlag wurde von Montmorency und Lafayette unterstützt und nur von Maury (bekanntlich der Sohn eines Schusters) bekämpft. Noch in derselben Sitzung schaffte die Versammlung den erblichen Adel ab (19. Juni 1790). Die meisten, die dafür gestimmt hatten, bedauerten es am folgenden Tage. Diese Studie entstand dank der Unterstützung der Studienbeihilfebehörde der Tschechischen Republik Nr. 404/08/0259. 2 Reinhard BINDER-KRIEGLSTEIN, Österreichisches Adelsrecht. Von der Ausgestaltung des Adelsrechts der cisleithanischen Reichshälfte bis zum Adelsaufhebungsgesetz der Republik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des adeligen Namensrechts, Frankfurt am Main 2000, S. 65–76; Jan ŽUPANIČ, Nová šlechta Rakouského císařství (Der neue Adel des Kaisertums Österreich), Praha 2006, S. 367–378. 1

256 Jan Županič ______________________________________________________________

Die Ablegung der Namen, die am Grundbesitz hafteten, und die Rückkehr zu den fast vergessenen Familiennamen verwirrte alle Welt; Lafayette wurde nur ungern ein „Herr Motier“, Mirabeau war wütend, nur noch „Riquetti“ zu heißen. Diese Änderung war indessen kein Zufall und keine Laune, sondern die natürliche und notwendige Anwendung des Prinzips der Revolution selbst. (…) Was die Vorfahren getan haben, kommt auf die Rechnung der Vorfahren, nicht auf die der Lebenden. An den Lebenden ist es, das Ihrige zu tun! Bei diesem System pflanzte sich früherer Verdienst nicht fort, der Adel hörte auf.“3 Die Gleichheitsidee verbreitete sich in Europa zusammen mit den revolutionären Truppen. In den besetzten Territorien führte die neue Regierung die Konstitution nach dem französischen Muster ein und damit hob sie auch die Adelstitel auf. Dieser Prozess wurde mit der Erklärung des Kaisertums und mit der Gründung des sog. Napoleonischen Adels4 gestoppt, und der Sturz Napoleons I. stellte den vorrevolutionären Zustand in vielen Hinsichten wieder her. Die Gesellschaft nach 1815 unterschied sich jedoch von der Gesellschaft vor 1789 grundsätzlich. Die mit den antiaristokratischen Stimmungen eng verbundenen liberalen und demokratischen Tendenzen trafen zunächst das Gebiet, wo der Geburtsadel fast nicht existierte – Norwegen. Im Jahr 1821 verabschiedete das Storting das Gesetz, mit dem der Adelsstand aufgehoben wurde, und dies obwohl König Karl XIV. Johann (der ehemalige französische Marschall Jean Baptiste Bernadotte) entschieden dagegen war.5 Mitteleuropa und die Donaumonarchie blieben lange Zeit von diesen Änderungen fast unberührt. Die Debatte über die Aufhebung des Adels gelangte zwar einige Mal bis ins Parlament, aber wegen Widerwillens des

Zit. nach: Jules MICHELET, Geschichte der französischen Revolution, bearbeitet und herausgegeben von Friedrich M. KIRCHEISEN nach der Übersetzung von Richard KÜHN, Band 1–2, Gutenberg-Verlag Christensen Co. Wien-Hamburg-Zürich, Bd 2. „Das Zweite Jahr der Revolution 1790“. Erste Auflage, 1929, S. 370–371. 4 Vgl. z.B. Brigitte MAZOHL-WALLNIG, Die inneren Verhältnisse im lombardovenezianischen Königreich. In: Das Zeitalter Kaiser Franz Josephs. 1. Teil: Von der Revolution zur Gründerzeit (1848–1880). Beiträge, Niederösterreichische Landesausstellung. Schloss Grafenegg 19. Mai–28. Oktober 1984, Wien 1984, S. 286–289; ŽUPANIČ, S. 69–79. 5 Das Gesetz wurde bereits im Jahr 1815 verabschiedet, aber der König lehnte ab, es zu genehmigen. Dieselbe Situation trat auch im Jahr 1818 ein. Da jedoch der König in Norwegen nur das Recht des suspendierenden Vetos hatte, trat das Gesetz in Kraft, nachdem es im Jahr 1821 fast einstimmig angenommen wurde. Miroslav HROCH, Helena KADEČKOVÁ, Elisabeth BAKKE, Dějiny Norska (Geschichte Norwegens), Praha 2005, S. 136. 3

Die Frage des Adelsstandes... 257 ________________________________________________________

Kaisers wurde ein diesbezügliches Gesetz nie verabschiedet6. Die wesentliche Änderung trat erst im Herbst 1918 mit dem Zerfall von ÖsterreichUngarn ein, als auf dem Boden der untergegangenen Monarchie drei Republiken entstanden sind – die Tschechoslowakei, Deutsch-Österreich und Ungarn – und der Rest des Staates unter der Polnischen Republik, dem Königreich Italien, dem Königreich Rumänien und dem neu entstandene Königreich der Serben, Kroaten und Slowenen aufgeteilt wurde. Mit der Ausnahme von Italien, in dem die Nobilität eine durch das Gesetz garantierte Position hatte, war der Adel in den übrigen zwei Monarchien entweder überhaupt nicht vorhanden (Serbien) oder seine Form basierte auf völlig anderen Traditionen (Rumänien). Das Herantreten der neu gegründeten Republiken an den Adel und an die Titel als solche schwankte zwischen einer gewissen Toleranz und einer strengen Verweigerungshaltung. Lassen wir Ungarn, das bereits 1919/1920 der Wende der 10er und 20er Jahre des 20. Jahrhunderts eine stürmische, mit der Gründung eines Königreichs ohne König kulminierende Entwicklung durchlief, und Polen, das aus drei annektieren Territorien mit ihren eigenen Besonderheiten wiederhergestellt wurde, außer Acht, wird unser Augenmerk auf die Tschechoslowakei und Österreich, zwei Staaten, die den Kern des untergegangenen Cisleithaniens bildeten, gerichtet. Wenn auch ihre gegenseitigen Beziehungen in der Zwischenkriegszeit nicht immer glänzend waren, verstanden sie sich eindeutig in Fragen des Adels. Als erste rechnete die Tschechoslowakei mit dem Adel ab. Der Verabschiedung des diesbezüglichen Gesetzes gingen allerdings stürmische Ereignisse voran. Am 28. Oktober 1918 wurde vom Nationalausschuss in Prag der selbständige tschechoslowakische Staat erklärt und kurz danach wurde nach Gesprächen mit Vertretern der Emigration für eine republikanische Form entschieden. Durch die Erweiterung des Nationalausschusses entstand am 14. November 1918 die Nationalversammlung. An ihrer ersten Sitzung wurde die Tschechoslowakei als Republik proklamiert, zu ihrem Präsidenten der abwesende Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk und zum erste Vorsitzenden der Nationalversammlung František Tomášek gewählt. Danach wurde die Regierung konstituiert, an deren Spitze Karel Kramář trat. Nach der Besprechung der organisatorischen Fragen bat der Vorsitzende der Nationalversammlung am Ende der Sitzung, die eingereichten Gesetzesvorlagen vorzulesen. In einem der ersten Gesetze ging es um die Aufhebung des Adels.

6

ŽUPANIČ, S. 227 ff., 320 ff.

258 Jan Županič ______________________________________________________________

Die Vorlage des Gesetzes über die Aufhebung des Adels, der Titel und Orden stand auf der siebten Sitzung der Nationalversammlung am 3. Dezember 1918 als erste auf der Tagesordnung. Vor dem Plenum wurde sie von Dr. František Weyr begründet, dessen ausführliche Rede eine wortwörtlich beispielhafte Zusammenfassung der gegen das Bestehen der privilegierten Schichten orientierten Argumente war: „…Dem Staat soll die Möglichkeit entzogen werden, Nobilitierungen zu erteilen, Orden und bestimmte Titelsorten zu verleihen. Ich bin der Meinung, dass diese Auffassung völlig richtig ist, weil, meine hoch geachteten Herren, die wahre Garantie dafür, dass dieses Gesetz wirksam ist, meines Erachtens nicht auf der Strafsanktion oder auf der Festlegung von Geld- oder Haftstrafen usw. beruhen soll, sondern auf der echten demokratischen Gesinnung der Bevölkerung unserer Republik. Soweit dieser Bevölkerung ein gewisser Adelsstand, die Graf- oder Fürstentitel usw. mehr imponieren werden als der gewöhnliche Bürger, so, meine Herren, wird uns nicht einmal die Strafsanktion helfen. Sobald wir jedoch so demokratisch sind, dass uns ein solches Privilegium nicht mehr imponiert, dann denke ich, dass es an dieser Strafsanktion in dem Gesetz auch nicht mangeln wird…“7 In der Frage der Zulässigkeit dieses Gesetzes herrschte allgemeines Einverständnis, weshalb es praktisch sofort verabschiedet wurde. Eine Woche später, am 10. Dezember 1918, trat es als Gesetz Nr. 61 der Gesetzesund Verordnungssammlung in Kraft. Den Adeligen wurde danach verboten, „ihren Familiennamen mit dem den Adelsstand bezeichnenden Prädikat oder Zusatz zu benutzen“. Der Adelsstand als solcher, die Orden, „sowie alle diesbezüglichen Rechte (…), genauso wie die Titel, soweit sie als reine Auszeichnungen erteilt wurden“, wurden aufgehoben worden. In Kraft blieben sind jedoch „solche Titel, auf die man durch die Erfüllung der vorgeschriebenen Bedingung den Rechtsanspruch erwerben kann (Doktor-, Ingenieurtitel usw.), und die Titel, die eine tatsächlich bekleidete Amtswürde zum Ausdruck bringen, sowie die von den Hochschulen erteilten Auszeichnungen (Ehrendoktorwürden u. ä.)“.8 Das Gesetz musste während des Bestehens der sog. Ersten Republik (Tschechoslowakei zwischen 1918 und 1938) mehrmals novelliert werden. Zitiert nach: Abschrift des stenografischen Berichts aus der 7. Sitzung der Tschechoslowakischen Nationalversammlung in Prag am Dienstag, den 3. 12. 1918). In: Jan DROCÁR, Jak jsme si zrušili šlechtu (Wie wir den Adel aufgehoben haben), [online]. c 2006, letzte Revision 4. 4. 2006 [Zit. 14. 8. 2006]. Zugänglich unter: . 8 Gesetz Nr. 61/1918 Sb. vom 10. 12. 1918, mit dem der Adelsstand, die Orden und Titel aufgehoben werden. 7

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Der Hauptgrund lag darin, dass die Abgeordneten im Revolutionseifer auf die Legionäre sowie die Soldaten in der Slowakei und in den Grenzgebieten vergessen hatten, die das Recht verloren, die Orden und die Auszeichnungen zu tragen, die sie für ihre Verdienste um die Tschechoslowakei erworben hatten. Im Jahr 1920 wurde deswegen der entsprechende Paragraph geändert, und außerdem wurde genehmigt, neue Ehrenzeichen „für Soldaten, die ihre Tapferkeit vor dem Feind bezeugten, oder für ausländische Staatsbürger für ihre Verdienste um den tschechoslowakischen Staat“ zu gründen.9 Die Tschechoslowakei verlieh jedoch ihren eigenen Bürgern vorerst keine Orden, und erst im Jahr 1936 wurde genehmigt, „Auszeichnungen auf die Art von Orden und Ehrenzeichen für die Verdienste um den tschechoslowakischen Staat“ einzuführen.10 Bis zum Ausbruch des Zweiten Weltkriegs wurde ein solcher Schritt von der Regierung nicht gesetzt. Gleichzeitig mit den Nachtragsgesetzen verschärften sich auch die Sanktionen wegen Verletzung dieser Verbote. Obwohl das erste Gesetz von 1918 noch keine Strafen vorsah, konnte seit 1920 mit einer Gefängnisstrafe von 24 Stunden bis 14 Tagen oder mit einer Geldstrafe von 50 bis 1500 Kč derjenige bestraft werden, der: „1) vorsätzlich und öffentlich die Adelstitel, Wappen, Orden, Auszeichnungen nutzt, die durch Gesetz aufgehoben wurden, oder auf eine solche Weise versucht, seinen ehemaligen Adelsstand anzudeuten, 2) sich ein Ehrenzeichen oder Auszeichnung aneignet, auch wenn er dazu nicht berechtigt ist, 3) jemandem den durch Gesetz aufgehobenen Adelstitel in Druckform gibt.“11 Die Strafen wurden im Jahr 1936 wesentlich verschärft. Der Delinquent konnte von dieser Zeit an mit einer Gefängnisstrafe bis zu 2 Monaten oder mit einer Geldstrafe von bis zu 20 000 Kč bestraft werden. Darüber hinaus wurde betont, dass „die Ordnungswidrigkeiten auch in demjenigen Fall strafbar sind, wenn sie im Ausland begangen wurden“.12 Zur grundsätzlichen Änderung kam es erst nach dem Entstehen des Protektorats Böhmen und Mähren, als die damalige Regierung mit ihrer Verordnung Nr. 220 vom Jahr 1939 die Gültigkeit der Adelstitel wiederbelebte und Gesetz Nr. 243 vom 10. 4. 1920, mit dem das Gesetz über die Aufhebung des Adelsstandes, der Orden und Titel, geändert wird. 10 Gesetz Nr. 268 vom 21. 10. 1936 über die Orden und Titel. Deswegen wurde der im Jahr 1922 gegründete Orden des Weißen Löwen nur für ausländische Staatsbürger vorgesehen. 11 § 6 des Gesetzes Nr. 243 vom 10. 4. 1920. 12 § 7 des Gesetzes Nr. 268 vom 21. 10. 1936. 9

260 Jan Županič ______________________________________________________________

anerkannte.13 Unmittelbar nach dem Krieg wurden die Gesetze und Verordnungen aus der Zeit der deutschen Okkupation jedoch annulliert und mit der Wiederaufnahme der ursprünglichen Vorkriegsgesetze wurden die Adelstitel wieder aufgehoben. In dem neu gebildeten Österreich war die Situation wesentlich komplizierter. Bereits am 21. Oktober 1918 entstand die Provisorische Nationalversammlung für Deutsch-Österreich, in dem auch die deutschen Abgeordneten aus den Ländern der böhmischen Krone saßen, und die aufgrund des Manifests Kaiser Karls über die föderative Umgestaltung Cisleithaniens mit der Forderung auftrat, einen deutsch-österreichischen Bundesstaat zu bilden, in dem auch die deutschen Gebiete der böhmischen Länder eingeschlossen werden sollten. Die folgenden Tage brachten jedoch einen vollkommenen Zerfall der Monarchie. Am 30. Oktober bildete die deutsch-österreichische Nationalversammlung einen Staatsrat und setzte die neue Regierung Karl Renners ein. Am 11. November resignierte die letzte „k. k. Regierung“ von Heinrich Lammasch und am 11. November legte Kaiser Karl I. seine Herrscherbefugnisse nieder.14 Am 12. November 1918 wurde dann die Republik Deutschösterreich als Teil der Deutschen Republik ausgerufen, die anstatt des ehemaligen Kaisertums entstand. Das Vorhaben einer Vereinigung beider Länder wurde jedoch wegen des Verbots seitens der Entente-Länder nicht realisiert, und genauso wurden auch die deutschösterreichischen Territorialforderungen nicht verwirklicht. Wien musste nicht nur auf Südtirol, das an Italien ging, sondern auch auf die Sudetengebiete und einen Teil von Niederösterreich (Feldsberg mit Umgebung und einen Teil des Gebietes bei Gmünd) verzichten, die an die Tschechoslowakei gingen. Offiziell verzichtete Deutsch-Österreich auf diese Territorien erst am 21. Oktober 1919 aufgrund des Friedensvertrags von St. Germain, mit dem es sich gleichzeitig von Deutschland trennte und den Namen Republik Österreich annahm. Jan DROCÁR, Jak jsme si zrušili šlechtu. Im Vergleich mit der antiaristokratischen Hysterie, von der einige Politiker der sog. Ersten Republik befallen wurden, handelte es sich um eine höchst interessante Änderung. Vgl. z.B. den Artikel Znaky českých spisovatelů. Sedm šlechticů na českém literárním nebi (Wappen der tschechischen Schriftsteller. Sieben Adelige am tschechischen Literaturhimmel), der am 29. 10. 1939 in Lidové Noviny veröffentlicht wurde. (Ich danke Michaela Kořistová für die Unterstützung und Bereitstellung von Informationen.) 14 Karl dankte jedoch nicht ab, sondern er unterzeichnete lediglich eine Erklärung, in der er nur auf seine Herrscherpflichten verzichtete, die Regierung abberief und die Volksvertreter beauftragte, eine neue Regierung zu bilden. Siehe Jan GALANDAUER, Karel I. Poslední český král (Der letzte böhmische König), Praha, Litomyšl 1998, S. 280– 285; Jan ŽUPANIČ, Habsburkové ve 20. století (Die Habsburger im 20. Jahrhundert), Historický obzor 1–2, 2006, S. 5. 13

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Man könnte glauben, dass in dieser unruhigen Periode keine Zeit gewesen wäre, eine dermaßen marginale Angelegenheit wie die Frage des Adelsstands zu behandeln. Das Gegenteil war wahr. Am 30. Oktober 1918 wurde festgelegt, „dass die Gesetze und Verordnungen, die (…) nicht aufgehoben oder geändert werden“,15 weiterhin gültig sind, und das betraf auch das Bestehen des Adels und der Nobilitierungen. Auch nach dem Antritt der Regierung Renner erhob also Kaiser Karl verdienstvolle Einzelpersonen in den Adelsstand und die Ritter des Maria-TheresienOrdens hatten auch fernerhin das Recht, den Freiherrenstand zu beantragen.16 Gleichzeitig wurden jedoch die letzten wichtigen Privilegien des Adels aufgehoben: die Erbmitgliedschaft im Herrenhaus und die Kurie der adeligen Großgrundbesitzer im Tiroler Landtag. Eine außergewöhnlich interessante Situation trat nach der Verabschiedung der republikanischen Staatsform und der Erklärung von Deutsch-Österreich als Teil Deutschlands ein, weil die Nobilitierungen – oder besser gesagt die Anfertigung von Adelsbriefen – auch weiter fortgesetzt wurden. Die finanzielle Lage des Landes war nicht besonders gut, und deswegen versuchten einige Politiker, die Idee durchzusetzen, dass man in der Herausgabe der Nobilitierungsurkunden und etwa auch in der Erteilung von Titeln weiter fortfahren sollte, wobei die dadurch erworbenen Einnahmen in den Staatshaushalt fließen würden.17 Die Meinung der Mehrheit der Abgeordneten war jedoch grundsätzlich eine andere. Bereits am 5. Dezember 1918 hörte die Herausgabe der Nobilitierungsurkunden auf18 und eine Woche später, am 12. Dezember, präsentierte der sozialdemokratische Abgeordnete Albert Sever auf der Sitzung der Provisorischen Nationalversammlung seinen Vorschlag betreffend die Aufhebung des Adels, der Ehrentitel sowie anderer Privilegien, einschließlich der Wappen. Gleichzeitig sollten das Vermögen der ehemaligen kaiserlichen Orden nationalisiert und die Fideikomisse aufgehoben werden. In diesem Augenblick begann auch die Staatskanzlei, sich mit dieser Frage zu befassen, und am 16. Januar 1919 legte sie ihre eigene Gesetzesvorlage vor, deren Hauptautor der Sektionsrat Fröhlich war. Danach sollten BINDER-KRIEGLSTEIN, S. 141. ŽUPANIČ, Nová šlechta, S. 126, 135–136 und 144–145. 17 BINDER-KRIEGLSTEIN, S. 142–143. 18 Den Antragstellern wurde deswegen das Geld zurückerstattet, das sie für die Ausfertigung von Urkunden bezahlten. Siehe die Fälle von Friedrich Edler von Schwaller (nobilitiert am 25. 6. 1918) und Ritter des Maria-Theresien-Ordens (184. Promotion vom 17. 8. 1918) Franz Schöbl. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Wien, Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv, Adelsarchiv, Friedrich Schwaller, Adelstand (Edler von) 1918; ebenda, Franz Schöbl, Adelsakt 1918. 15

16

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der Adel, die Adelstitel und Adelswappen aufgehoben und ihre Nutzung im alltäglichen Leben verboten werden. Strafsanktionen wurden darin jedoch einstweilig nicht vorgesehen.19 Im Laufe der Behandlung dieser Gesetzesvorlage radikalisierte sich die Haltung der österreichischen Politiker jedoch fortlaufend. Am 16. Februar 1919 wurde die neue Nationalversammlung gewählt, in der 72 Sozialdemokraten, 69 Christlichsoziale, 29 deutsche Nationalisten und 3 Vertreter der kleineren Parteien saßen. Knapp einen Monat später, am 15. März 1919, wurde die neue Koalitionsregierung der Sozialdemokratischen und der Christlichsozialen Parteie konstituiert. Die Tolerierung des Adels war nicht mehr auf der Tagesordnung, das Hauptthema dieser Gespräche waren der genaue Inhalt des Gesetzes und die Abgrenzung von Sanktionen. Das Adelsaufhebungsgesetz kam auf das Programm der achten Sitzung der österreichischen Nationalversammlung am 3. April 1919, und es wurde in einer stürmischen Atmosphäre nach der Verabschiedung des sog. Habsburgergesetzes20 und des Gesetzes über die Aufhebung der Exterritorialität21 behandelt, die nicht auf dem internationalen Recht basierte. Es wurde noch an demselben Tag wie das Gesetz Nr. 211 verabschiedet. In seinen sieben Paragraphen wurde die Aufhebung des Adels, der weltlichen Ritter- und Damenorden und einiger Titel und Würden festgelegt. Sein Inhalt war dem tschechoslowakischen Gesetz ähnlich, das ein wenig früher verabschiedet wurde. Zum Unterschied davon beinhaltete es einen wichtigen Abschnitt über die Sanktionen. Diese waren ausdrücklich strenger als die später in der Tschechoslowakei bemessenen Strafen: für die Verletzung des Gesetzes drohte eine Geldstrafe bis zu 20 000 Kronen oder eine Gefängnisstrafe in

Berthold WALDSTEIN-WARTENBERG, Das Adelsaufhebungsgesetz von 1919, Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs, 25. Bd., 1972, S. 307. 20 Es handelte sich um das Gesetz, mit dem die Herrscherrechte und weitere Privilegien der Familie Habsburg-Lothringen aufgehoben und ihren Mitgliedern die Nutzung aller damit zusammenhängenden Titel, einschl. des Prädikats „von Österreich“ verboten wurden. Diejenigen Familienmitglieder, die in Österreich bleiben wollten, mussten offiziell auf die Nachfolgerechte verzichten und den Namen Habsburg oder HabsburgLothringen annehmen. Das Gesetz betraf insbesondere die (kaiserlichen) Hauptzweige sowie die toskanische Linie, die über umfangreiches Vermögen in der Republik Österreich (bzw. derzeit in Deutschösterreich) verfügten. ŽUPANIČ, Habsburkové, S. 5. 21 Damit wurde das den Mitgliedern des Hauses Habsburg-Lothringen zustehende Sonderprivileg sowie das Sonderrecht verstanden, das den in der Monarchie ansässigen und früher herrschenden Familienhäuptern (Liechtenstein, Bourbon, Braganza, Cumberland und Sachsen-Weimar) erteilt wurde. Diese Personen unterlagen bis damals keinen ordentlichen Gerichten, sondern dem Amt des Oberhofmarschalls. BINDERKRIEGLSTEIN, S. 156. 19

Die Frage des Adelsstandes... 263 ________________________________________________________

der Dauer von bis zu sechs Monaten.22 In der Praxis wurde also verboten, nicht nur die Adelstitel und Prädikate von zu benutzen, sondern auch „die Würde des geheimen Rates, der Titel und Vorrechte einer Geheimen Ratsfrau, die Würde eines Kämmerers und eines Truchsessen, die Würde einer Palastdame, die Anredeform „Exzellenz“, der Titel eines kaiserlichen Rates, ferner alle mit nicht mehr bestehenden Hof-, Lehens- und landesständischen Einrichtungen verbunden gewesene Titel, insbesondere die Titel der Landeserbämter und Landeserzämter, die sonstigen Würdenlehenstitel und die aus der Verbindung mit den vorangesetzten Worten „Hof“, „Kammer“ oder „Hof- und Kammer“ gebildeten, nicht mit einer amtlichen Stellung im Zusammenhange stehenden Titel“.23 Kurz danach wurde die österreichische Währung jedoch durch die Hyperinflation abgewertet und die vorgeschriebene Geldstrafe von 20 000 Kronen war plötzlich lächerlich niedrig. Deswegen wurden die Geldstrafen von der Regierung fortlaufend erhöht: allein bis Ende des Jahres 1920 tausendmal. Nach der Vollführung der Geldreform wurde zum 1. Januar 1925 auch die neue Währungseinheit eingeführt – der Schilling. Die Geldstrafe in Kronen verlor dadurch ihre Gültigkeit, aber es dauerte neun Jahre, bis das jeweilige Gesetz verändert wurde. Erst am 24. April 1934 wurde eine Verordnung erlassen, mit dem die Höhe der festgesetzten Geldstrafe auf maximal 2000 Schilling beschränkt wurde. Die Entwicklung nach dem Anschluss, also zwischen dem 12. März 1938 und dem 27. April 1945, war höchst interessant, als Österreich (vorübergehend als „Ostmark“ bezeichnet) mit dem Deutschen Reich verbunden war. Hitler, dessen negative Stellung zum österreichischen Adel und zur Donaumonarchie als solche allgemein bekannt war, ließ das Adelsaufhebungsgesetz in Kraft und nur die Geldstrafen auf die Reichsmark umrechnen. Dies hatte interessante Folgen. Da der Adelstitel in Deutschland zum Bestandteil des Namens gehörte, konnte passieren, dass zwei Mitglieder derselben Familie in einem Staat zwei unterschiedliche Namen trugen.24 Nach der Niederlage des nationalsozialistischen Dritten Reiches wurde in Österreich der größere Teil Gesetz vom 3. 4 1919 über die Aufhebung des Adels, der weltlichen Ritter- und Damenorden und gewisser Titel und Würden, Staatsgesetzblatt 1919/211, umgedruckt in: BINDER-KRIEGLSTEIN, S. 267. 23 Durchführungsvorschrift des deutschösterreichischen Innen- und Bildungsamts und des Justizstaatsamtes zum Gesetz über Aufhebung des Adels und gewisser Titel und Würden (hier § 3). Ebenda, S. 268. 24 Indem ein (aus Österreich stammendes) Familienmitglied z.B. den Namen Georg Stürgkh nutzte, konnte sein deutscher Verwandter seinen Namen als Friedrich Graf Stürgkh schreiben. Adam WANDRUSZKA, Die „Zweite Gesellschaft der Donaumonarchie“. In: Heinz SIEGER (Hrsg.), Adel in Österreich, Wien 1971, S. 66. 22

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der Vorkriegsgesetze, einschl. des Adelsaufhebungsgesetzes von 1919 wieder in Kraft gesetzt. Es ist interessant, dass dies einschließlich der Geldstrafe bis von zu 20 000 Kronen war, so dass es praktisch nicht anwendbar wurde. Es war nämlich schwer, jemanden zur alternativen Gefängnisstrafe zu verurteilen, die denjenigen Personen drohte, die nicht bezahlen konnten, da der Staat über lange Jahre hinweg eine völlig andere Währung benutzte.25 Als der Adelsstand als Rechtsinstitution aufhörte, auf dem Territorium des ehemaligen Österreichs zu bestehen, waren die Reaktionen der Betroffenen unterschiedlich. Einige nahmen das Gesetz stoisch an, andere lehnten es ab, sich damit abzufinden, und wurden verbohrte Gegner des neuen Regierungssystems, weitere nahmen die ganze Sache mit Humor. Allgemein bekannt ist die ironische Haltung von Adalbert Graf Sternberg, der auf seine Visitenkarten folgenden Text drucken ließ: „Adalbert Sternberg. Geadelt von Karl dem Großen, entadelt von Karl Renner.“26 Aber die neue Staatsmacht von 1919 war kompromisslos. Der Adelsstand wurde aufgehoben und für die Verletzung des Gesetzes drohten Strafen, die mit denen vergleichbar waren, welche einst von den k. k. Gerichten für die unberechtigte Nutzung des Adelsstands zuerkannt wurden. Die uralte und alterüberlieferte Hierarchie, die über mehrere Jahrhunderte hinweg in der Donaumonarchie bestanden hatte, stürzte wie ein Kartenhaus ein. Der Adel, der noch im Herbst 1918 eine wichtige Rolle im Schicksal der mitteleuropäischen Großmacht gespielt hatte, verlor innerhalb von einigen Monaten seinen meisten Einfluss und alle Privilegien. Durch die Ironie des Schicksals wurde von den Gesetzen der Jahre 1918–1919 am wesentlichsten der neue Adel getroffen, die „arbeitenden“ Freiherren, Ritter und Adeligen, die üblicherweise über kein größeres Vermögen verfügten und deren prunkvolle Zierde eben ausschließlich der Titel war. Die Aristokratie, wenn auch in einigen Nachfolgestaaten ernsthaft von der Bodenreform betroffen, behielt auch weiterhin einen bestimmten Einfluss, der sich aus ihren wirtschaftlichen Positionen ergab. Dieser wurde jedoch, wenigstens auf dem Territorium der Staaten des ehemaligen Sowjetblocks, durch die politischen Änderungen nach 1945 gebrochen, von denen der überwiegende Teil des untergegangenen Österreich-Ungarns zwischen 1945 und 1948 betroffen wurde.

BINDER-KRIEGLSTEIN, S. 225–226. Zitiert nach: Ernst STREERUWITZ, Springflut über Österreich. Erinnerungen und Erlebnisse eines alten Österreichers, Wien 1934, S. 188. 25

26

Das Haus Liechtenstein und die Bodenreform in der Tschechoslowakei nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg Rupert Quaderer

Der Großgrundbesitz des Hauses Liechtenstein war von der Bodenreform in der Tschechoslowakei nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg gravierend betroffen.1 Die Enteignungsproblematik war bald nach Kriegsende ein zentrales Thema für die liechtensteinische Güterverwaltung geworden. Vor allem wurde der Zusammenhang zwischen der drohenden Enteignung und der Anerkennung der Souveränität Liechtensteins deutlich. So machte der liechtensteinische Gesandte in Wien, Prinz Eduard von Liechtenstein,2im März 1919 den liechtensteinischen Gesandten in Bern, Emil Beck,3 darauf aufmerksam, dass der tschechoslowakische Aussenminister Eduard Beneš bei der Friedenskonferenz in Paris eventuell auf die Enteignung des landwirtschaftlichen Besitzes zu sprechen kommen könnte. In diesem Fall sollte Beck den Standpunkt vertreten, „dass derartige Schritte gegen einen Souverän nicht usuell [seien] und der internationalen Höflichkeit zuwiderlaufen“ würden.4 Prinz Eduard hielt auch fest, dass Präsident Thomas G. Masaryk gegenüber Prinz Alois von Liechtenstein5 „ausdrücklich und spontan“ bemerkt habe, „dass das Enteignungsgesetz den regierenden Fürsten als Souverän nicht berühre“. Prinz Eduard warnte aber gleichzeitig Siehe dazu grundsätzlich Lucia DALLABONA, Die Bodenreform in der Tschechoslowakei nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des FürstlichLiechteinischen Besitzes, Wien 1978. Siehe auch Veronika MITTERMAIR, Die Neutralität Liechtensteins zwischen öffentlichem und fürstlichem Interesse. In: Arthur BRUNHART (Hrsg.), Bausteine zur liechtensteinischen Geschichte. Studien und studentische Forschungsbeiträge, Bd. 3, 19. Jahrhundert: Modellfall Liechtenstein, Zürich 1999, S. 43–97 und RUBERT QUADERER, Neutralitäts- und Souveränitätsprobleme Liechtensteins im Umfeld des Ersten Weltkrieges. In: Kleinstaat und Menschenrechte. Festgabe für Gerard Batliner zum 65. Geburtstag. Hrsg. Alois RIKLIN, Lucius WILDHABER und Herbert WILLE, Basel, Frankfurt/M 1993, S. 43–61. 2 Prinz Eduard von Liechtenstein (1872–1951), 1919–1921 liechtensteinischer Gesandter in Wien. 3 Emil Beck (1888–1973), 1919–1933 Geschäftsträger der liechtensteinischen Gesandtschaft in Bern. Siehe dazu: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, Band 3, Basel, 2002, S. 137. 4 Liechtensteinisches Landesarchiv (weiter nur LLA) Vaduz, Gesandtschaftsakten Bern, V2/170/5, 6. März 1919; Prinz Eduard an Emil Beck. 5 Es dürfte sich um Alois von Liechtenstein (1869–1955), den Vater von Fürst Franz Joseph II. handeln. Siehe Gustav WILHELM, Stammtafel des fürstlichen Hauses von und zu Liechtenstein, Vaduz o. J., Tafel 9. 1

266 Rupert Quaderer ______________________________________________________________

davor, diese Äusserung Masaryks gegenüber Beneš zu verwenden, da „in einzelnen Ämtern und Regierungsstellen Prags“ diese Meinung „nicht gebilligt und geteilt“ werde. In seinen weiteren Ausführungen ging Prinz Eduard auf die Argumente ein, die er von tschechoslowakischer Seite erwartete. Gegen den „in Böhmen gerne erhobenen“ Einwand, der Fürst von Liechtenstein sei ein Reichsdeutscher und damit ein „tschechischfeindlicher Souverän“ führte Prinz Eduard an, dass Liechtenstein seit 1806 nicht mehr zu Deutschland gehört habe. Zudem habe der Fürst „niemals auf seinen Gütern gegen tschechische nationale Interessen zu verstossen gesucht“, sondern wiederholt tschechische Interessen gefördert, wie zum Beispiel durch Überlassung eines Baugrundes für eine tschechische Bürgerschule. Abschliessend meinte Prinz Eduard, dass bei Verhandlungen „sowohl mit der Prager wie mit der Wiener Regierung“ versucht werden sollte, „ein direktes gütliches Einvernehmen zu erzielen“ und Proteste erst dann eingebracht werden sollten, „wenn die Verhandlungen mit den Regierungen keinen guten Verlauf nehmen“ würden. Prinz Eduard versuchte auch den schweizerischen ausserordentlichen Gesandten in Wien, Charles Bourcart,6 für die liechtensteinische Sache zu gewinnen. Prinz Eduard hatte diesem das „Fürstentum seines Onkels“ wärmstens empfohlen. Er stellte gegenüber Bourcart das Weiterbestehen Liechtensteins und die Rettung der grossen Besitzungen des Fürsten in Österreich, Ungarn und vor allem in der Tschechoslowakei als eine Garantie gegen den Bolschewismus dar.7 Bourcart nahm diesen Gedanken auf und meinte, dass das immense Vermögen Fürst Johannes II. wirklich eine seriöse Hilfe für die gute Sache sein könne.8 Auch in weiteren vertraulichen Stellungnahmen an das Eidgenössische Politische Departement setzte sich Bourcart für die Anliegen Liechtensteins ein. Er bezeichnete Prinz Eduard als „mehr oder weniger Minister des Aeussern seines Onkels“9 und betonte Bourcart, Charles-Daniel (1860–1940); 1896–1902 Schweizer Botschafter in London; 1912–1915 Leiter der Abteilung für Auswärtiges sowie 1915–1925 Botschafter in Wien. 7 LLA, Mikrofilm Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv Bern (weiter nur BA Bern) 2001(B) 2, Schachtel 1, 23. Mai 1919, Bourcart an Charles Lardy, Minister in der Abteilung für Auswärtiges, Bern: „Prince Edouard ... m’a chaudement recommandé la principauté de son oncle. Il considère son maintien – et le sauvetage des grandes propriétés du prince en Autriche en Hongrie et notamment en Tcheco-Slovaquie – comme une garantie contre le bolchévisme.“ 8 „La fortune immense de S.A.S. Jean II peut, en effet, être un sérieux soutien pour la bonne cause.“ 9 LLA, Mikrofilm BA Bern, 2001(B)/2, Schachtel 11, 4. November 1919; Bourcart an Eidgenössisches Politisches Departement. 6

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in zwei weiteren Berichten an den Bundesrat, dass „dem Fürsten und seiner Familie“ viel an der Souveränität gelegen sei, „weil die grossen Güter, die der Fürst namentlich in Böhmen“ besitze, ihm eher belassen würden, „wenn er ein fremder Monarch“ sei.10 Wenn der Fürst hingegen als ein „aristokratischer und zudem als ein österreichischer Grossgrundbesitzer wie ein anderer“ angesehen würde, bestehe die Gefahr, dass sein Besitz enteignet und verteilt würde. Bourcart machte den Bundesrat auch darauf aufmerksam, dass der fürstlichen Regierung sehr daran gelegen sei, dass die diplomatische Vertretung Liechtensteins in London durch die Schweiz „sehr bald“ zustande komme, „weil der Fürst (dies vertraulich) auf die englische Unterstützung zum Schutze seiner Güter in Böhmen“ hoffe.11 Wie der Zentraldirektor der fürstlich-liechtensteinischen Hofkanzlei im Juni 1919 der Regierung in Vaduz mitteilte, ersuchte das tschechoslowakische Ackerbauministerium darum, eine Zusammenstellung über die Art der Erwerbung des fürstlichen Besitzes in der Tschechoslowakei vorzulegen.12 Die Hofkanzlei vermutete, dass eine solche Aufstellung dem tschechoslowakischen Ackerbauministerium als Entscheidungshilfe dienen sollte, für welche Güter die Tschechoslowakei bei einer allfälligen Enteignung eine Entschädigung zu bezahlen hätte und welche Güter entschädigungslos konfisziert würden. Der Archivar des Liechtensteinischen Hausarchivs, Franz Wilhelm, erstellte im Juni 1919 eine „Erwerbungsgeschichte der fürstlich Liechtenstein’schen Herrschaften und Güter im Gebiete des tschechoslovakischen Staates“.13 Gemäss dieser Aufstellung bestand der Güterbesitz des Hauses Liechtenstein in der Tschechoslowakei im Jahr 1919 aus 24 Herrschaften. Die Gesamtfläche dieser Besitzungen machte insgesamt 160 000 ha aus, davon waren 124 000 ha Forstwirtschaft und 36 000 ha Landwirtschaft.14 Die Stimmung gegen die ausländischen Grundeigentümer zeigte sich auch in der tschechischen Presse. So kritisierte ein Beitrag vom September 1919 im Blatt Večerní České slovo die „Aufsehen erregenden Zustände auf LLA, Mikrofilm BA Bern, 2001(B)/2, Schachtel 11, 10. Dezember 1919; Bourcart an Eidgenössisches Politisches Departement. 11 LLA Mikrofilm BA Bern, 2001(B)/2, Schachtel 11, 4. November 1919; Bourcart an Eidgenössisches Politisches Departement 12 Hausarchiv der Regierenden Fürsten von Liechtenstein/Wien (weiter nur HALW), Karton 1616H, 21. Juni 1919; fürstlich-liechtenteinische Hofkanzlei an Regierung in Vaduz. 13 HALW, Karton 1616H, Nr. 7113, 25. Juni 1919. 14 Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59; Memorandum betreffend Enteignung, von Emil Beck am 12. November 1924 dem schweizerischen Bundesrat überreicht. 10

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der Herrschaft Neuschloss“.15 Dieser Artikel kritisierte die „nationalen Verhältnisse“ auf dieser liechtensteinischen Herrschaft, deren Beamtenschaft „ganz deutsch“ sei. Der Nachlässigkeit des Ackerbauministeriums sei es zu verdanken, dass „das Germanisationssystem auf der Herrschaft“ weiterdauere und dass manche Leute gezwungen seien, ihre tschechischen Kinder in deutsche Schulen zu schicken, „damit ihnen die Grundstücke nicht genommen“ würden. Im Bestreben, die sich anbahnende Entwicklung in der Enteignungsfrage zu beeinflussen, entfalteten sowohl die Regierung in Vaduz als auch die Verwaltung des Hauses Liechtenstein in Wien eine schriftliche Offensivaktion. So griff Prinz Eduard bereits im Memorandum vom September 1919 an die Pariser Friedenskonferenz diese Thematik auf und führte umfangreiche Argumente gegen die entschädigungslose Konfiskation des fürstlichen Besitzes in der Tschechoslowakei an. Im gleichen Monat nahm Fürst Johann II.16 durch einen Rechtsvertreter mit dem Ministerrat der Tschechoslowakei wegen der „Beurteilung der öffentlichrechtlichen Vermögensverpflichtungen des Fürsten von Liechtenstein“ Kontakt auf.17 Das Schreiben berief sich auf „jene Rechtstatsachen, welche aus der Stellung [des] regierenden Fürsten“ von Liechtenstein folgerten und die „für die Beurteilung der öffentlichrechtlichen Vermögensverpflichtungen des Fürsten von wesentlicher Bedeutung“ erschienen. Diese staats- und völkerrechtlichen Momente bestanden gemäss diesem Schreiben aus der Souveränität des Fürsten, aus der Neutralität des Fürstentums Liechtenstein während des Krieges und der Eigenschaft eines Teils des fürstlichen Besitzes in der Tschechoslowakei als Krongut. Das Schreiben begründete den Anspruch auf einen Teil der Besitzungen als Krongut historisch. Der Verfasser ging davon aus, dass der Primogeniturbesitz bei der Erhebung Liechtensteins zum unmittelbaren Reichsfürstentum im Jahre 1719 nicht als blosser Familienbesitz angesehen werden konnte, weil dieser Besitz Gewähr dafür bot, dass aus ihm die Bedürfnisse des Reichsfürstentums gedeckt werden konnten. Durch diesen Akt „der untrennbaren Vereinigung mit dem Reichsfürstentum“ habe der Primogeniturbesitz „den Charakter von Krongütern erhalten“. Die ZweckbeHALW, Karton 1616H; zeitgenössische Übersetzung des Beitrages in Večerní České slovo vom 12. September 1919, Nr. 205. 16 Johann II. von Liechtenstein (1840–1929); 1858–1929 regierender Fürst von Liechtenstein. 17 Hausarchiv der Regierenden Fürsten von Liechtenstein/Wien, Karton 1616H, 26. September 1919; Fürst Johann II. an den Ministerrat der Tschechoslowakischen Republik (zeitgenössische Abschrift). 15

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stimmung dieses Besitzes liege somit „in der Deckung der mit der Ausübung der Regierungsgewalt verbundenen Lasten“. Der Rechtsvertreter des Fürsten folgerte aus seiner Argumentation, dass der Fürst von Liechtenstein als Souverän eines im Weltkrieg neutralen Staates nicht enteignet werden könne. Keinesfalls könne von den Krongütern eine Vermögensabgabe gefordert werden, da „hiedurch die Interessen der Staatsbürger des Fürstentums Liechtenstein direkt geschädigt würden“. Dieses Faktum erachtete der Verfasser zum gegebenen Zeitpunkt als besonders bedeutsam, da für die „Herstellung einer Liechtenstein’schen Währung und die Lösung sonstiger durch den Krieg entstandener Finanzfragen“ grosse Opfer zu leisten seien, weshalb „die Pertinenzeigenschaft der Krongüter für die Interessen der Staatsbürger Liechtensteins von vitaler Bedeutung“ sei. Abschliessend hielt das Schreiben fest, dass es Fürst Johann II. „sehr am Herzen“ liege, zu der Tschechoslowakei in freundschaftliche Beziehungen zu treten und auch für die Bedürfnisse des tschechoslowakischen Staates eine „besondere Anteilnahme“ bekunde und bereit sei, „die für die finanzielle Erstarkung der Republik zu leistende Arbeit seinerseits werktätig zu unterstützen“. Fürst Johann II. erklärte sich auch bereit, mit der tschechoslowakischen Regierung in direkte mündliche Verhandlungen zu treten. Mit dem Hinweis, dass er „die Inanspruchnahme jeder diplomatischen Intervention zu vermeiden“ versuche, wollte Fürst Johann II. wohl die Überlegungen des weiteren Vorgehens andeuten. Das Schreiben gab am Schluss der Hoffnung Ausdruck, dass bald eine Regelung gefunden werden könne, „welche den Bedürfnissen der Čechoslovakischen Republik Rechnung [trage], ohne den Fortbestand des Fürstentums Liechtenstein zu erschweren“. Liechtenstein bemühte sich weiterhin, auf verschiedenen Wegen seine Interessen durchzusetzen. Neben Vorstößen bei den Grossmächten und direkten Verhandlungen mit der Tschechoslowakei setzte man auch auf die besonderen Dienste der Schweiz und hoffte aufgrund von deren hohem internationalem Ansehen Erfolge erzielen zu können. In diesem Sinne erstellte Emil Beck im Februar 1920 zu Handen des schweizerischen Bundesrates einen ausführlichen Kommentar zur Entwicklung der Bodenreform in der Tschechoslowakei. Die Absicht dieses Schreibens war es, den Bundesrat um „eventuelle Vorbringung einschlägiger Wünsche bei den Ententemächten zu ersuchen.“18 Diese präventive Maßnahme war für den Fall gedacht, dass es „wider Erwarten nicht immer möglich sein sollte, die 18

LLA Gesandtschaftsakten Bern, o. Nr., 15. Februar 1920.

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dem Fürsten und seinem Vermögen auf Grund seiner völkerrechtlich anerkannten Souveränität zukommende Behandlung zu sichern“. Dieser vorbereitende Schritt weist darauf hin, dass man in Liechtenstein die Frage der Bodenreform in der Tschechoslowakei mit einer gewissen Besorgnis verfolgte. Beck erwähnte zur Verdeutlichung dieser Bedenken die Gesetze, welche in der Tschechoslowakei zur Durchführung der Konfiskation des Grossgrundbesitzes erlassen worden waren. Er brachte auch die Bedenken der liechtensteinischen Regierung zur Sprache, dass in der Tschechoslowakei „in einzelnen Köpfen“ die Vorstellung vorhanden gewesen sei, „in einem eigenen Gesetzesparagraphen die Konfiskation des unbeweglichen Vermögens der fürstlich liechtensteinischen Familie in Böhmen auszusprechen“. Diese Idee sei zwar fallen gelassen worden, es gebe aber immer noch Anzeichen dafür, dass eine generelle Bestimmung aufgenommen werden solle, „welche in der Praxis gegen den fürstlichen Besitz verwendbar sein“ werde. In seinem Bericht nahm Emil Beck auch Stellung zu verschiedenen Gutachten, die in der Tschechoslowakei zu der Frage der Enteignung ausgearbeitet worden waren. Der Historiker Josef Pekař19 bezeichnete in seinem Gutachten vom 23. November 1919 jenen Grundbesitz als widerrechtlich erworben, welcher nach der Schlacht am Weissen Berg durch Konfiszierung aus dem Besitz des böhmischen Adels in den Besitz der neuen Eigentümer gelangt war. Nach Pekař war die entschädigungslose Enteignung aus juristischer Sicht wegen Verjährung nicht mehr zu rechtfertigen; die Enteignung im 17. Jahrhundert habe auch dem Gesetz von 1608 widersprochen, nach welchem Hochverrat nicht mit Vermögenskonfiskation zu bestrafen gewesen wäre. Zudem seien nur jene Güter damals unrechtmässig erworben worden, welche „gewissen Getreuen der Habsburger schenkungsweise“ übergeben worden seien. Pekař kam daher zu dem – nach Emil Beck „lediglich national-chauvinistischen Masseninstinkten gefälligen“ – Schlusse, „man solle eine gewissermassen manifestationelle Strafe“ verhängen. Diese bestünde in der Bestrafung des Hauptrepräsentanten der damaligen absolutistischen Regierungswillkür, besonders des „Ausführers der Korruptionsclique“, welche das meiste Unheil gestiftet habe. Damit war Fürst Karl von Liechtenstein gemeint, welcher „als Bevollmächtigter Vertreter des Königs mit der Bestrafung des böhmischen Adels betraut gewesen sei“. Fürst Karl von Liechtenstein könne – so argumentierte Pekař Josef Pekař (1870–1937), tschechischer Historiker, Professor an der Karls-Universität in Prag, Mitglied der Tschechischen Akademie der Wissenschaft und der Kunst. (Siehe Milan CHURAŇ, Kdo byl kdo, II. N–Ž, Praha 1998.) 19

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weiter – allerdings „nicht anders als in seinen Nachkommen bestraft werden“, und zwar durch entschädigungslose Konfiskation jener Güter, „welche seine Vorfahren, wenn es auch nicht Vorfahren direkter Linie waren..., aus der Beute nach der Schlacht am Weissen Berg für ihr Geschlecht erworben“ hätten. Der Jurist Karl Kadlec20 erachtete es in seinem Gutachten vom 27. November 1919 als „unbillig“, solche Güter ohne Entschädigung wegzunehmen, „deren Eigentum ... in die Zeit des Umsturzes nach der Schlacht am Weissen Berg“ zurückreiche. Was das fürstlich liechtensteinische Eigentum betraf, so empfahl Kadlec dennoch, „der fürstlichen Familie ohne jede Entschädigung den gesamten aus den Konfiskationen nach 1620 herrührenden Besitz wegzunehmen...“ Kadlec argumentierte, dies sei eine „gerechte Strafe“ für die „grundlose, zum Nachteil des böhmischen Adels sowie des böhmischen Staates erfolgte Bereicherung“. Diese Strafe sei zudem als „minimal“ zu bezeichnen, „da der Familie noch die Nutzungen für 3 Jahrhunderte verbleiben“ würden. Der Jurist Anton Hobza21 argumentierte hinsichtlich des unbeweglichen Vermögens des Hauses Liechtenstein vom Standpunkt des Völkerrechts aus. Nach ihm hatte der Fürst von Liechtenstein in Österreich eine doppelte rechtliche Stellung: Er war sowohl einheimischer Adeliger und Mitglied des Herrenhauses als auch Souverän eines Staates. Da der Fürst von Liechtenstein „unstreitig im Subjektionsverhältnis zu Österreich [gestanden habe, komme] ihm der Anspruch auf Exterritorialität nicht zu“. Nach Hobza war die Tschechoslowakei auch nicht völkerrechtlich verpflichtet, dem Fürsten die Stellung einer exterritorialen Persönlichkeit zuzugestehen, „und zwar auch dann nicht, wenn ihm andere Staaten eine solche Stellung zuerkennen würden,“ weil der Fürst nicht völlig souverän sei, was sich vor allem in den Bereichen Justiz, Zollgebiet und Diplomatie zeige. Nach Hobza bildete das Fürstentum „nur ein blosses Annex oder eine Pertinenz Österreichs“. Daraus leitete Hobza ab, dass sich Liechtenstein mit der Tschechoslowakei im Kriegszustand befinde, beziehungsweise könne die Tschechoslowakei „darüber nach freiem Ermessen entscheiden“.

Karel Kadlec (1865–1928), tschechischer Jurist, Professor an der Karls-Universität in Prag; Mitglied der Tschechischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften und der Tschechischen Akademie der Wissenschaft und der Kunst. (Siehe Československý biografický slovník, Praha 1992, S. 294) 21 Anton Hobza (1876–1954), tschechischer Jurist, Professor an der Karls-Universität in Prag, Jurist im Aussenministerium, Mitglied des Ständigen Internationalen Gerichtshofes in Den Haag. (Siehe Československý biografický slovník, Praha 1992, S. 215f.) 20

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Bei Anerkennung der Neutralität Liechtensteins, so folgerte Hobza weiter, wäre eine Konfiskation des Vermögens „insoweit sich dieselbe auf eine spezielle, direkt gegen den Fürsten gerichtete gesetzliche Vorschrift gründen würde, mit Rücksicht auf das Völkerrecht prinzipiell ausgeschlossen“. Eine Verstaatlichung des Eigentums ohne Entschädigung wäre nach Hobza auf Grund eines Gesetzes nur dann möglich gewesen, wenn dieses „in abstracto für alle Fälle“ erlassen worden wäre, „ohne zwischen In- und Ausländern zu unterscheiden“. Als letzte Schlussfolgerung hielt Hobza fest, dass der Staat „jedenfalls ... gegen Entschädigung den gesamten liechtensteinischen Besitz im Gebiete der Republik konfiszieren“ könne. Nach Emil Becks Einschätzung schien in der Tschechoslowakei „nun tatsächlich die Absicht zu bestehen“, eine solche allgemeine Formulierung des Gesetzes in Antrag zu bringen, „welche dann das Einschreiten gegen die fürstliche Familie ermöglichen würde“. Beck erinnerte auch daran, dass alle Grossmächte der Entente die Vertretung Liechtensteins durch die Schweiz anerkannt hätten, womit auch die Neutralität Liechtensteins anerkannt worden sei. Als Argumentationshilfe übergab Beck dem Bundesrat jene Note, welche Liechtenstein an die Friedenskonferenz über die Frage der Neutralität Liechtensteins gerichtet hatte. Die Bedeutung der Haltung der Grossmächte gegenüber Liechtenstein zeigte sich in der Bemerkung Becks, Außenminister Beneš habe zwar „in liebenswürdigster Weise“ zu erkennen gegeben, dass er nicht die Absicht habe, bei den „auf die Enteignung des fürstlichen Besitzes abzielenden Bestrebungen mitzuwirken“. Beneš habe aber die Souveränität und Neutralität Liechtensteins bezweifelt und erklärt, sich in dieser Hinsicht „den Entschlüssen der Grossmächte der Entente“ anzuschliessen. Aufgrund der angeführten Argumente ersuchte die liechtensteinische Regierung den schweizerischen Bundesrat, die Regierungen in Paris, London und Rom darüber zu informieren, „in welcher Lage der fürstliche Besitz in der Tschechoslowakei sich derzeit“ befinde. Zudem sollten diese Regierungen veranlasst werden, „mit grösster Beschleunigung“ dem tschechoslowakischen Außenministerium zu vermitteln, dass für sie die Souveränität Liechtensteins ausser Zweifel stehe und sie auch dessen Neutralität während des Krieges anerkannt hätten. Das Eidgenössische Politische Departement reagierte entgegenkommend und wies die schweizerischen Gesandtschaften in London, Rom und Paris an, „in vertraulicher Weise“ die jeweiligen Regierungen zu bitten, dem tschechoslowakischen Ministerium des Äußern erkennen zu geben, dass sie

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die Souveränität des Fürstentums „als außer Zweifel“ betrachteten.22 Das Eidgenössische Politische Departement wollte jedoch vermeiden, gegenüber der Tschechoslowakei allzu sehr als Fürsprecher der fürstlichen Besitzungen in Erscheinung zu treten. Es beauftragte deshalb die Gesandtschaften, ihre Anliegen den jeweiligen Regierungen vorzulegen, ohne sich auf das diesbezügliche Ansuchen der fürstlichen Regierung zu berufen und ohne besondere Hinweise „der gegen den fürstlichen Besitz gerichteten Bestrebungen erkennen zu geben“. Der Generalsekretär des französischen Außenministeriums, Maurice Paléologue,23 erklärte gegenüber dem schweizerischen Botschafter, dass die Frage der Souveränität Liechtensteins ausser Zweifel stehe und dass er davon der tschechoslowakischen Regierung Mitteilung machen werde.24 Nur gut eine Woche später brachte jedoch Paris eine relativierende Haltung zum Ausdruck. Das französische Außenministerium teilte dem schweizerischen Botschafter mit, es sehe sich nicht in der Lage, der Regierung in Prag zu signalisieren, dass Frankreich die Souveränität Liechtensteins anerkenne. Frankreich komme es nicht zu, in dieser Angelegenheit die Initiative zu ergreifen. Der beste Beweis für die Anerkennung der Souveränität Liechtensteins ergebe sich aus der Tatsache, dass Frankreich den schweizerischen Botschafter als diplomatischen Vertreter Liechtensteins anerkannt habe.25 Der schweizerische Botschafter hatte zudem den Eindruck, dass man in Paris der Frage, ob es sich um eine Zwangsenteignung handle, misstrauisch gegenüberstehe. Deshalb vertrat der schweizerische Botschafter den Standpunkt, dass es unklug wäre, in dieser Frage weiter zu insistieren. Das Foreign Office in London verständigte den schweizerischen Botschafter darüber, dass ihm das Gesuch bereits auf anderem Weg zugekommen sei

BA Bern 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 43, 26. Februar 1920; Eidgenössisches Politisches Departement an schweizerische Gesandtschaften in London, Rom und Paris. 23 Maurice Paléologue (1859–1944); Generalsekretär im Außenministerium des Kabinetts Alexandre Millerand. 24 BA Bern 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 43, 2. März 1920; Schweizerische Botschaft in Paris an Eidgenössisches Politisches Departement. 25 BA Bern 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 43, 12. März 1920; Telegramm der Schweizerischen Botschaft in Paris an das Eidgenössische Politische Departement: „Aux Affaires étrangères on me déclare qu’auprès réflexion on n’a pas cru pouvoir signaler au cabinet de Prague qu’on reconnait souveraineté Liechtenstein car il n’appartient pas à la France de prendre initiative de semblable démarche. Mon interlocuteure ajoute que la meilleure preuve de la reconnaissance souveraineté principauté réside dans le fait que France m’a admis comme représentant diplomatique du Liechtenstein. J’ai le sentiment qu’on se méfie ici qu’il s’agit d’une question de séquestre et qu’insister serait peu prudent.“ 22

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und dass der englische Vertreter in Prag die gewünschte Mitteilung machen werde.26 Bemerkenswert ist der Bericht des schweizerischen Botschafters aus Rom nach Bern. Dort heisst es, der Generalsekretär des Außenministeriums habe versichert, dass er nicht zweifle, dass das italienische Ministerium keine Einwände dagegen habe, bei der tschechoslowakischen Regierung diplomatische Schritte zugunsten der Unabhängigkeit und der Neutralität Liechtensteins zu unternehmen.27 Die italienische Regierung wollte allerdings erst nach Klärung der Haltung Liechtensteins in der Neutralitätsfrage während des Ersten Weltkrieges Stellung beziehen. Sie zeigte auch ein gewisses Verständnis für den Standpunkt der tschechoslowakischen Regierung in der Enteignungsfrage. Am 20. August 1920 berichtete der italienische Gesandte aus Prag nach Rom, dass die tschechoslowakische Regierung sich nicht weigere, die Souveränität Liechtensteins und seine Neutralität während des Krieges anzuerkennen. Sie weigere sich aber, Folgerungen zu akzeptieren, welche das Fürstentum aus einer solchen Anerkennung ziehen wolle.28 Die tschechoslowakische Regierung wolle nicht zugestehen, dass diese Besitzungen Objekt einer Spezialbehandlung sein sollten. Die Regierung in Prag halte zudem fest, dass die Souveränität und Neutralität des Fürstentums den Fürsten nicht daran gehindert habe, auch während des Krieges Mitglied des Herrenhauses in Wien gewesen zu sein. Auch andere Mitglieder des Hauses Liechtenstein hätten in der Armee und der Verwaltung des österreichischen Reiches gedient.29 Die zurückhaltende bis kritische Einstellung der italienischen Regierung gegenüber Liechtenstein dürfte wesentlich davon beeinflusst gewesen sein, dass dieses während des Krieges eng mit Österreich-Ungarn, dem Kriegsgegner Italiens, liiert gewesen war. Die Hoffnung, in der Frage der Enteignung des GroßgrundBA Bern 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 43, 9. März 1920; Telegramm der schweizerischen Botschaft in London an das Eidgenössische Politische Departement. 27 BA Bern 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 43, 9. März 1920; Telegramm der schweizerischen Botschaft in Rom an das Eidgenössische Politische Departement. 28 Archiv des italienischen Außenministeriums Nr. 398/5020, 3. August 1920; Telegramm der italienischen Gesandtschaft in Prag an das Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten in Rom. Fotokopie, freundlicherweise zur Verfügung gestellt von Frau Veronika Mittermair. 29 „Il Principe di Lichtenstein [sic] possiede vaste proprietà in Boemia e questo governo non vuole ammettere che esse siano oggetto di un trattamento speciale e diverso da quello che verrà fatto alle proprietà dei czecoslovacchi come degli stranieri. Ed osserva che la sovranità e la neutralità del Principato non ha impedito al Principe di Lichtenstein di essere membro della Camere di Signori di Vienna anche durante la guerra, ed agli altri membri della famiglia di servire nell’esercito e nella burocrazia dell’Impero d’Austria.“ 26

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besitzes die Unterstützung der alliierten Grossmächte zu erhalten, erfüllte sich jedenfalls nicht. Wie weitere Angriffe in einem Teil der tschechischen Presse zeigten, war der Besitz des Hauses Liechtenstein ein in der Tschechoslowakei auch öffentlich diskutiertes Thema. In der Abendausgabe des Právo lidů vom 15. Juni 1920 hielt ein Artikel unter dem Thema „Die Kolodejer Frage“ fest: „Wir kennen keine Souveränität Liechtensteins. Die Liechtensteinischen Güter gehören der Republik.“30 Der Artikel nahm Bezug auf die aus seiner Sicht unrechtmässige Erwerbung von Gütern durch Karl von Liechtenstein nach der Schlacht am Weissen Berg und folgerte daraus, dass dieser dadurch Lehensmann der böhmischen Krone geworden sei. Dieses Verhältnis dauere auch in der Gegenwart noch an, lediglich mit dem Unterschied, dass die Hoheitsrechte der Böhmischen Krone auf die Tschechisch-slowakische Republik übergegangen seien. Weil Liechtenstein erst 1719 entstanden sei, habe dieses neue Fürstentum „absolut gar keine Beziehung zur Böhmischen Krone“. Daraus ergebe sich, dass der „Fürst Liechtenstein souverän [sei] in seinem Fürstentum Liechtenstein, aber nicht im Bereiche der tschechoslowakischen Republik“. Der Artikel schloss mit der resoluten Forderung: „Die Wegnahme ihrer ungerechtfertigt erworbenen Güter ist die allerheiligste Pflicht unserer Republik“. Diesem Presseartikel war bereits am 3. Mai 1920 eine Protestversammlung der Einwohner von Kolodej vorausgegangen.31 Der Protest richtete sich gegen die Absicht der liechtensteinischen Verwaltung, im Kolodejer Schloss die Zentraldirektion der liechtensteinischen Herrschaft in der Tschechoslowakei unterzubringen.32 Während der Jahre 1919/1920 schuf die Tschechoslowakei die gesetzlichen Grundlagen für die Durchführung der Bodenreform. Die Zentraldirektion der liechtensteinischen Güterverwaltung musste sich wohl oder übel mit dieser Entwicklung befassen und versuchen, daraus das Bestmögliche zu machen. Im Februar 1921 stellte sich die Zentraldirektion auf den Standpunkt, dass die ausländischen Grossgrundbesitzer zwar den Bodenreformgesetzen unterstünden und die Enteignung durch das Beschlagnahmungsgesetz zur Anwendung gelangen dürfte.33 Das Entschädigungsgesetz hingegen laufe den anerkannten LLA, Akten Gesandtschaft Wien V3/108/1920, übersetzter Text aus dem Právo lidu, Nr. 133, 15. Juni 1920. 31 Hausarchiv der Regierenden Fürsten von Liechtenstein/Vaduz (weriter nur HALV), Karton 221–500/1920, Nr. 428, 5. Juni 1920; Bericht an den Fürsten. 32 Gemäss diesem Bericht war die Zentraldirektion ein Beamten- und Dienerapparat, der beinahe 1000 Personen zählte und Forst- und Landwirtschaftsboden von über 100 000 Hektar umfasste. 33 LLA SF 1.10/1921/26, 19. Februar 1921; Zentraldirektion an ausländische Bodenbesitzer in der Tschechoslowakei. 30

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Grundsätzen des Völkerrechts zuwider, da durch dieses Gesetz keine „gerechte und angemessene Entschädigung“ gewährleistet werde. Wenn die aktuell gültigen Preise bezahlt werden müssten, so folgerte die Zentraldirektion, dann hätte das Bodenamt „weniger Interesse an Entschädigungen von Ausländern“. Die Zentraldirektion wandte sich an diejenigen Ausländer, welche als Angehörige der alliierten und neutralen Staaten Bodenbesitz in der Tschechoslowakei hatten. Durch ein gemeinsames Auftreten der betroffenen Ausländer hoffte die Zentraldirektion eine Anwendung des Entschädigungsgesetzes abwenden zu können. Zu diesem Zwecke verfasste die Zentraldirektion ein Memorandum, das sie den Gesandten derjenigen Staaten zukommen liess, welchen die ausländischen Bodenbesitzer angehörten.34 Das Memorandum nahm Stellung zu den verschiedenen im Zusammenhang mit der Bodenreform erlassenen Gesetzen. Vor allem kritisierte das Memorandum das Schadenersatzgesetz vom 8. April 1920. Die Entschädigung für die bisherigen Bodenbesitzer sei so tief angesetzt, dass dies einer Konfiskation gleichkomme. Die Zentraldirektion kritisierte den § 41 dieses Gesetzes, das den Ablösungspreis auf den Durchschnittspreis der Jahre von 1913 bis 1915 festsetzte. Eine österreichische Krone hatte damals einem Schweizerfranken entsprochen. 1921 entsprach ein Schweizerfranken 13 tschechoslowakischen Kronen. Dies bedeutete für die Großgrundbesitzer einen Verlust von 12/13 ihres Vermögens. Dazu kam noch, dass die Konfiskationssumme bis zu 40 % gekürzt werden konnte. Die Großgrundbesitzer kamen so noch auf 1/26 des Friedenswertes ihres Eigentums. Außerdem bekamen die Besitzer diese Entschädigung nicht in bar ausbezahlt, sondern als Gutschrift. Die Entschädigung verstiess nach Auffassung der Zentraldirektion gegen die Grundsätze des Völkerrechts, vor allem gegen den Art. XVII der Deklaration der Menschenrechte über die Unverletzlichkeit des Eigentums.35 Die Zentraldirektion forderte, die Entschädigung für Enteignungen müsse ausreichend sein, andernfalls müssten die Regierungen zum Schutz ihrer Untertanen eintreten. Dies erfordere direkte diplomatische Verhandlungen,

LLA SF 1.10/1921/26, 21. Februar 1921; Entwurf des Memorandums. Es ist unklar, welche Deklaration der Menschenrechte gemeint ist. Art. 17 der französischen Verfassung von 1791 lautet: „Da das Eigentum ein unverletzliches und heiliges Recht ist, kann es niemand genommen werden ...“

34 35

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wie sie Art. 17 und 13 des Völkerbundsabkommens vorsehen würden.36 Die betroffenen Bodenbesitzer stammten aus Belgien, England, Frankreich, Italien, der Schweiz und Liechtenstein. Die Zentraldirektion war am 19. Oktober 1919 in Prag auf Wunsch des tschechoslowakischen Bodenamtes errichtet worden. Grund dieses Schrittes war, die Verwaltung der liechtensteinischen Güter in der Tschechoslowakei von der fürstlich-liechtensteinischen Hofkanzlei in Wien zu „emanzipieren“.37 Sämtliche in der Tschechoslowakei liegenden liechtensteinischen Güter sollten auf Wunsch des Bodenamtes ausschliesslich von einer Zentraldirektion verwaltet werden, die „ihren Sitz in der tschechoslowakischen Republik hat und haben muss“.38 Im November 1919 stattete Fürst Johann II. seine Finanzkonsulenten mit einer Spezialvollmacht „zur ausschliesslichen und alleinigen Führung der gegenwärtig schwebenden Unterhandlungen mit der tschechoslowakischen Regierung zwecks Schaffung eines Ausgleichs in den Fragen der Vermögensabgabe und des Bodenreformgesetzes“ aus.39 Die fürstlich-liechtensteinische Verwaltung verfügte in ihrem Vorgehen jedoch nicht über ein klares Konzept. Zuerst erhielt die Zentraldirektion eine Vollmacht, die dieser aber wieder entzogen und auf die Generaldirektion übertragen wurde. Die Zentraldirektion ihrerseits beklagte sich darüber, dass ihr die Schritte des Generaldirektors nicht bekannt seien. Über Bitten der Zentraldirektion wurde Prinz Alois mit der Behandlung der „inzwischen brennend gewordenen Bodenreformangelegenheiten“ betraut. Einen Ausweg aus der „gegenwärtigen äusserst gefährlichen Situation“ sah die Zentraldirektion nur in einer gemeinsamen diplomatischen Aktion. Da die Beratungen des Bodenamtes auch zu „tiefeinschneidenden Beschlüssen“ führten, war keine weitere Aufschiebemöglichkeit mehr gegeben. Nach Auffassung der Zentraldirektion verfügte Art. 13 Völkerbundssatzung: „Die Bundesmitglieder kommen überein, dass, wenn zwischen ihnen eine Streitfrage entsteht, die nach ihrer Ansicht einer schiedsrichterlichen Lösung zugänglich ist und die auf diplomatischem Wege nicht zufriedenstellend geregelt werden kann, die Frage in ihrer Gesamtheit der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit unterbreitet werden soll.“ Art. 17 Völkerbundssatzung: „Bei Streitfragen zwischen einem Bundesmitglied und einem Nichtmitglied oder zwischen Staaten, die Nichtmitglieder sind, werden der Staat oder die Staaten, die Nichtmitglieder sind, aufgefordert, sich für die Beilegung der Streitfragen den Bundesmitgliedern obliegenden Verpflichtungen zu unterwerfen, und zwar unter den vom Rate für gerecht erachteten Bedingungen....“Zitiert nach Staatsgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich Nr. 303, ausgegeben am 21. Juli 1920. 37 LLA SF 1.10/1921/26, 25. Februar 1921; Denkschrift der Zentraldirektion für Fürst Johann II. 38 Ebenda. 39 Ebenda. 36

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das Bodenamt die Enteignung des landwirtschaftlichen Bodens zu „schandbaren Preisen“. Zudem erwartete die Zentraldirektion, dass „demnächst“ auch über den forstwirtschaftlichen Besitz beschlossen werde. Dabei werde „in erster Reihe an die in den Grenzgebieten gelegenen Waldungen“ gedacht. Am 26. Februar 1921 informierte die Zentraldirektion Prinz Alois über Beschlüsse des Bodenamtes vom 23. Februar 1921.40 Gemäss dieser Meldung wurden folgende Güter enteignet: Herrschaft Radim oder Kaunitz, Uhříněves und Netluky, 500 ha des Gutes Eisgrub, das Gut Hluk, der Komplex der Meierhöfe Trnávka, Dürrhof, Umiraska, ferner Rovenz, Aussee, der Meierhof Schönwald und Krenzendorf. Die Zentraldirektion bedauerte, dass die Vollmachten „ununterbrochen“ wechselten, da dadurch das Ansehen der Zentraldirektion untergraben werde. Die Zentraldirektion beklagte sich auch über den Zeitverlust, da es „leider lange Zeit“ dauere, bevor der Fürst seine „Einwilligung zu erteilen geruht“ habe. Die Zentraldirektion warnte schliesslich „vor vollständiger Desorganisation durch Dezentralisierung, an der in Wien gearbeitet“ werde, ja sie äusserte sogar „Angst vor Anarchie“. Die Zentraldirektion wandte sich nun auch an Landesverweser Josef 41 Peer in Vaduz.42 Sie war der Auffassung, dass neben Prinz Alois auch die liechtensteinische Regierung die Interessen des Fürsten vertreten solle. Diese könne durch ihre diplomatischen Kanäle zugunsten der fürstlichen Besitzungen wirken. Die Zentraldirektion zog auch in Betracht, eventuell die schweizerische Regierung um Vertretung der liechtensteinischen Interessen anzugehen. Sie wies nochmals auf die drängende Zeit hin und vermerkte, dass sie deshalb ihr Schreiben ohne Vorwissen der Kabinettskanzlei direkt an Peer gerichtet habe. Sie begründete dieses Vorgehen mit der Langsamkeit der fürstlich-liechtensteinischen Verwaltung in Wien. Peer teilte zwar die Auffassung der Zentraldirektion, „dass etwas in die Wege geleitet werden“ müsse.43 Er wollte jedoch keine konkreten Maßnahmen vorschlagen, da die liechtensteinische Regierung keine Weisungen erhalten habe und zudem die „alten Domänenangelegenheiten aus ihrem Wirkungskreise gelöst“ worden seien. Die liechtensteinische Regierung könne deshalb nicht viel bewirken. Für Peer stellte sich die Frage, ob die Sonderstellung des Fürsten von Liechtenstein aus dem Rechtstitel der LLA SF 1.10/1921/26, 26. Februar 1921, Zentraldirektion an Prinz Alois. Josef Peer (1864–1925); Österreicher; Landesverweser 15. 9. 1920–23. 3. 1921. 42 LLA SF 1.10/1921/26, 26. Februar 1921. 43 LLA SF 1.10/1921/26, 2. März 1921; Peer an fürstlich-liechtensteinische ZentralGüterdirektion für die Tschechoslowakei in Prag. 40 41

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Souveränität oder aus der Ausländerqualität abzuleiten sei. Er schloss aus dem Schreiben der Zentraldirektion, dass man sich auf die Ausländerqualität stützen wolle. Daraus folgerte Peer, dass es vorteilhafter wäre, wenn die Aktion von jener diplomatischen Stelle in Prag vertreten werde, welcher insgesamt die Vertretung der liechtensteinischen Staatsangehörigen in der Tschechoslowakei übertragen sei. Peer fragte sich, ob diese Verantwortung noch bei Prinz Eduard liege. Er selbst war darüber im Unklaren, da dieser – wie Peer mit einem Seitenhieb auf Prinz Eduard festhielt – sich „in einem etwas fliessenden Stadium“ befinde. Nach Peers Auffassung war entscheidend, von welcher Rechtsbasis aus Liechtenstein auf die Bodenreform in der Tschechoslowakei reagieren wollte. Wenn vom Standpunkt der Souveränität aus argumentiert werden sollte, so wäre nach Peer ein liechtensteinischer Sondergesandter ad hoc zu ernennen gewesen. Als die dafür geeignete Person nannte er Prinz Alois. Wenn die Argumentation sich hingegen auf die Ausländerqualität konzentrieren würde, so müsste Liechtenstein seine Interessen eher durch den in Prag akkreditierten schweizerischen Diplomaten vertreten lassen. Wenige Tage später meinte Peer gegenüber der fürstlich-liechtensteinischen Kabinettskanzlei, dass das tschechoslowakische Außenministerium „noch immer die Souveränität Seiner Durchlaucht anzweifle“.44 Deshalb hielt er es für richtiger „die geplante Aktion auf die Ausländerqualität Seiner Durchlaucht ... aufzubauen“. Den Anteil der liechtensteinischen Regierung sah Peer darin, dass Emil Beck in Bern angewiesen werde, sich bei der schweizerischen Regierung dafür einzusetzen, dass diese ihren diplomatischen Vertreter in Prag beauftrage, die Interessen des Fürsten und des Prinzen Alois „im Sinne der Intention der fürstl. Zentraldirektion zu wahren.“ Peer riet auch dazu, dass Fürst Johann II. persönlich ein Schreiben in dieser Angelegenheit an den schweizerischen Bundespräsidenten richten solle. Peer schlug vor, die zu Bundesrat Giuseppe Motta,45 dem Chef des Politischen Departementes, aufgebauten Beziehungen zu nutzen. Er anerbot auch, sich bei diesem durch ein Schreiben „für die nachdrückliche Verwendung des Schweizer Vertreters in Prag gütigst“ einzusetzen. In einem weiteren Schreiben an Kabinettsdirektor Martin signalisierte Peer, dass er sich mit der Sache nicht persönlich befassen wollte, da er LLA SF 1.10/1921/33, 7. März 1921; Peer an fürstlich-liechtensteinische Kabinettskanzlei. 45 Giuseppe Motta (1871–1940); 1899–1911 schweizerischer Nationalrat und 1911–1940 schweizerischer Bundesrat; er stand 1912–1919 dem Finanz- und Zolldepartement und 1920–1940 dem für die Aussenpolitik zuständigen Politischen Departement vor; er war 1915, 1920, 1927, 1932 und 1937 Bundespräsident. 44

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zuwenig Detailwissen habe.46 Zudem sah er sich durch die liechtensteinischen Regierungsangelegenheiten zu stark in Anspruch genommen, als dass er noch Kapazität für die Bodenreform frei gehabt hätte. Die Kabinettskanzlei nahm die Anregung Peers insofern auf, als sie Emil Beck in Bern anwies, den schweizerischen Bundesrat zu ersuchen, die Interessen des Landesfürsten und des Prinzen Alois „konform mit der Vertretung der schweizerischen Grossgrundbesitzer“ zu vertreten.47 Die von Peer vorgeschlagene Strategie, sich der Dienste der Schweiz zu versichern, verfolgte Liechtenstein in der weiteren Auseinandersetzung um die strittigen Fragen in der Bodenreform. Dabei kam immer wieder die Frage der Souveränität des Fürsten von Liechtenstein zur Sprache. Als das Journal de Genève am 28. Januar 1922 im Rahmen der Zollvertragsverhandlungen Liechtensteins mit der Schweiz von einer „Einschränkung der Souveränitätsrechte des Fürsten“ sprach, zeigte sich Alfred von Baldass48 gegenüber dem schweizerischen Botschafter in Wien etwas pikiert darüber.49 Der schweizerische Botschafter interpretierte die liechtensteinischen Empfindlichkeiten mit dem früheren Abhängigkeitsverhältnis Liechtensteins gegenüber Österreich. Auf Grund dieses Abhängigkeitsverhältnisses hätten nämlich verschiedene Sukzessionsstaaten Österreichs die Souveränität Liechtensteins in Zweifel gezogen. Der Fürst von Liechtenstein habe jedoch wegen seines Besitzes in der Tschechoslowakei ein bedeutendes Interesse an der Aufrechterhaltung der „Tatsache – mag man es auch eine Fiktion nennen – dass er ein absolut souveräner ausländischer Fürst“ sei. Für die Schweiz, so hielt der Botschafter in seinem vertraulichen Bericht an den schweizerischen Bundesrat fest, sei die Erhaltung der Privatgüter des Fürsten „gleichgültig“, nicht aber für Liechtenstein. Bei einem Verlust der Güter in der Tschechoslowakei sei Fürst Johann II. nicht mehr im Stande, „seinen Untertanen mit Geldzuschüssen unter die Arme zu greifen“. Wie angespannt das Verhältnis Liechtensteins zur Tschechoslowakei sich entwickelte, zeigte eine Episode im Frühjahr 1922: Regierungschef Josef Ospelt50 berichtete im Februar 1922 „streng vertraulich“ an die 46 LLA

SF 1.10/1921/212, 13. März 1921. SF 1.10/1921/213, 14. März 1921. 48 Alfred von Baldass, fürstlicher Legationssekretär in Wien; 1921/1922 Geschäftsträger ad interim der liechtensteinischen Gesandtschaft in Wien. 49 LLA, Kopien Bundesarchiv Bern C.6.22.51, 3. Februar 1922; Schweizerische Botschaft an Bundesrat. Baldass hatte bereits Ende Januar 1922 seine Demission als Geschäftsträger der liechtensteinischen Gesandtschaft eingereicht. 50 Josef Ospelt (1881–1962); Regierungschef 23. 3. 1921–27. 4. 1922. 47 LLA

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Kabinettskanzlei in Wien, dass er Hinweise erhalten habe, dass von der Tschechoslowakei aus wieder versucht werde, „gegen das hochfürstliche Haus Stimmung zu machen, um dessen Souveränität zu beseitigen“.51 Hintergrund für diese etwas nervös wirkende Verhaltensweise Ospelts waren Gerüchte, welche schon seit dem Sommer 1920 im Umlauf gewesen waren. Damals hatte Josef Hoop,52 der damalige Attaché bei der liechtensteinischen Gesandtschaft in Wien, an Landesverweser Prinz Karl53 berichtet, er habe Gerüchte gehört, „die von 3 Millionen c. sl. Kronen sprachen, die hier als Bestechungsgelder verwendet werden sollen.“54 Prinz Eduard meinte, dass dieser Bericht Hoops von Feldkirch her kommende Gerüchte „bezüglich des Rollens čechischer Kronen“ bekräftige, „die der Wahrscheinlichkeit nicht entbehren“ würden.55 Nach Prinz Eduard hatte die Tschechoslowakei „das entschiedenste Interesse, die Souveränität des Fürstentumes zu untergraben“. Er schloss dabei auch nicht aus, dass die Tschechoslowakei zu diesem Zwecke „die Opposition im Lande finanziell“ unterstütze. Die Annahme, dass „tschechische Gelder“ eingesetzt worden wären, um die liechtensteinische Politik zu beeinflussen, konnte in keiner Art und Weise belegt werden. Die ganze Angelegenheit muss wohl in den Bereich der Gerüchte verwiesen werden. Es ist aber doch bemerkenswert, dass solches Gerede Nahrung fand, vor allem wohl in politisch interessierten Kreisen. Wie stark dahinter parteitaktische Überlegungen standen, kann nur vermutet werden. Die liechtensteinische Verwaltung in Wien und die Regierung in Vaduz mussten im weiteren Verlauf der Bodenreform einsehen, dass ihre Bemühungen um ein Verzögern oder gar Verhindern dieser Entwicklung in der Tschechoslowakei wenig Wirkung zeigte. Ein Weg, von dem sich Liechtenstein noch Erfolg erhoffte, war, die Schweiz um ihre Unterstützung anzugehen. Am 29. September 1924 ersuchte Emil Beck Bundesrat Giuseppe Privatarchiv Kaiser, Nachlass Josef Ospelt, 7. Februar 1922; Josef Ospelt „streng vertraulich“ an Kabinettsdirektor Martin. 52 Josef Hoop (1895–1959); 1920–1923 Attaché und Geschäftsträger Liechtensteins in Wien, 1928–1945 Regierungschef des Fürstentums Liechtenstein. 53 Prinz Karl von Liechtenstein (1878–1955); Landesverweser (Regierungschef) vom 13. Dezember 1918–15. September 1920. 54 LLA, Gesandtschaftsakten Wien, V3/1194, 1. Juni 1920, Josef Hoop an Landesverweser Prinz Karl. Zeitgenössische Abschrift im Hausarchiv der Regierenden Fürsten von Liechtenstein/Vaduz, „Kabinettskanzlei 1920“. 55 LLA, Gesandtschaftsakten Wien, V3/1194, 2. Juni 1920, Prinz Eduard an Kabinettskanzlei. Zeitgenössische Abschrift im Hausarchiv der Regierenden Fürsten von Liechtenstein/Vaduz, „Kabinettskanzlei 1920“. 51

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Motta, sich „für das Fürstenanliegen“ zu verwenden und dieses Anliegen eventuell mit Außenminister Beneš zu besprechen.56 Laut den Angaben Becks waren bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt 11000 Hektar landwirtschaftlicher Boden und 9500 Hektar Waldboden enteignet worden. Dazu waren 6500 Hektar Boden „in Übernahme befindlich“. Eine amtsinterne Aktennotiz des Eidgenössischen Politischen Departementes hält dazu fest, dass diese Angelegenheit nicht mit Beneš besprochen werden konnte, da sie zu spät eingereicht worden sei.57 Am 12. November 1924 überreichte Emil Beck dem Eidgenössischen Politischen Departement ein Memorandum. Darin wurde der Verlust an fürstlichem Grundbesitz durch Enteignungen auf 17 Prozent des Gesamtbesitzes beziffert. Ein grosser Nachteil zeigte sich jedoch dadurch, dass für eine damalige Goldkrone nur eine tschechoslowakische Krone bezahlt wurde. Diese galt lediglich noch 1/6 der Goldkrone. Der Verlust in Schweizerfranken belief sich nach den Angaben Becks zu diesem Zeitpunkt auf 15 Millionen Schweizerfranken. Im Januar 1925 richtete Beck ein weiteres Gesuch an Bundesrat Motta.58 Beck hielt in diesem Schreiben fest, dass in der Enteignungsfrage die „Grenze des Zumutbaren“ erreicht sei. Er ersuchte im Namen des Fürsten Johannes II. Bundesrat Motta, in Vertretung Liechtensteins bei der tschechoslowakischen Regierung wegen der Besitzungen des Fürsten vorzusprechen. Nach den Vorstellungen Johannes II. hätte Motta auf die Auszahlung des Gegenwertes für die enteigneten Besitzungen dringen sollen. Für weitere künftige Enteignungen wäre der volle Marktwert zu bezahlen. Grundsätzlich jedoch stellte sich Fürst Johann II. auf den Standpunkt, dass keine weiteren Enteignungsmaßnahmen mehr durchgeführt werden sollten. Wenn dies dennoch der Fall sein sollte, so erwog Fürst Johann II., ein internationales Schiedsgericht, etwa den Internationalen Gerichtshof in Den Haag, anzurufen. Fürst Johann II. ließ durch Emil Beck an Bundesrat Motta die Bitte herantragen, Motta möge die Angelegenheit persönlich in die Hand nehmen. Zusammen mit dem Ersuchen um Unterstützung reichte Emil Beck ein weiteres Memorandum an das Eidgenössische Politische Departement ein.59 Die Argumente dieses Textes konzentrierten sich vor allem auf die Tatsache, dass Ausländer nur gegen 56 BA

Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59. BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59, „Notiz“ auf dem Schreiben Emil Becks an Bundesrat Motta vom 29. September 1924. 58 BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59, 9. Januar 1925; Gesandtschaft Bern an Eidgenössisches Politisches Departement. 59 BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59, 9. Januar 1925. 57

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volle Entschädigung enteignet werden dürften. Dies treffe um so mehr auf den Fürsten von Liechtenstein, einen ausländischen Souverän, zu. Emil Beck ersuchte das Eidgenössische Politische Departement, das Memorandum zur Bodenreform auch der tschechoslowakischen Gesandtschaft zuzustellen.60 Beck erhoffte sich davon die Möglichkeit, „die Frage in freundschaftlichem Geiste“ diskutieren zu können. Mit Hilfe der Schweiz meinte Beck von der tschechoslowakischen Regierung auch erfahren zu können, „welche Fragen sie vor der Aufnahme der ordentlichen diplomatischen Beziehungen zum Fürstentum geregelt wissen möchte“. Beck vermutete wohl richtig, dass die Durchführung der Bodenreform dabei eine zentrale Rolle spielen werde. Gleichsam als Bestätigung dieser Annahme notierte Motta am 9. Januar 1925: „Gerade heute haben wir von der tschechischen Gesandtschaft vernommen, dass deren Regierung das Fürstentum Liechtenstein noch nicht anerkannt habe.“61 Die weiteren Kontakte der liechtensteinischen Gesandtschaft in Bern mit dem Eidgenössischen Politischen Departement zeigen, dass Liechtenstein sehr grossen Wert auf die Unterstützung durch die Schweiz legte. Dies war auch dadurch bedingt, dass die direkten Vorstöße von Wien und Vaduz aus in Prag wenig Zuversicht auf Erfolg aufkommen liessen. Am 14. April 1925 informierte Emil Beck das Eidgenössische Politische Departement darüber, dass die Enteignungen in der Tschechoslowakei weiter gingen, obwohl im oben erwähnten Memorandum darum gebeten worden sei, dass dies „bis zur Abklärung der grundsätzlichen Fragen unterbleiben“ solle.62 Beck richtete deshalb ein „dringliches Ersuchen“ an die Schweiz, die Tschechoslowakei zu ersuchen, ihren Standpunkt zu den grundsätzlichen Fragen zu erörtern. Das Eidgenössische Politische Departement wies Beck umgehend darauf hin, dass eine Intervention in Prag durch die Schweiz nicht in Betracht kommen könne, da die Tschechoslowakei ausdrücklich abgelehnt habe, vom schweizerischen Generalkonsulat Gesuche in Vertretung liechtensteinischer Interessen entgegenzunehmen.63 Dennoch versuchte Motta bei Beneš für Liechtensteins Anliegen Verständnis zu wecken. Er übergab diesem in Genf eine Kopie des von Liechtenstein ausgearbeiteten BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 43, 16. Februar 1925; Gesandtschaft Bern an Eidgenössisches Politisches Departement. 61 BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59, 9. Januar 1925, Randnotiz. 62 BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59, 14. April 1925; Gesandtschaft Bern an Eidgenössisches Politisches Departement. 63 BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59, 15. April 1925; Eidgenössisches Politisches Departement an Schweizer Generalkonsulat in Prag. 60

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Memorandums und empfahl „ihm den Fall mündlich“.64 Auf die Empfehlung Mottas hin empfing Beneš zwar in Genf den liechtensteinischen Gesandten Beck, machte diesem jedoch keinerlei positive Zusage in der Frage der Anerkennung Liechtensteins, beziehungsweise der Enteignungen des Besitzes des Hauses Liechtenstein. Beneš versprach Beck lediglich, er werde die Angelegenheit prüfen. Emil Beck blieb, wohl auch auf Drängen von Wien und Vaduz aus, beharrlich und wandte sich Ende Mai 1925 nochmals an Motta und bat ihn, „Fürsprache für eine gerechte und billige Lösung“ bei Beneš einzulegen.65 Beck beurteilte eine persönliche Intervention Mottas als „besonders wertvoll“, da die tschechoslowakische Regierung eine offizielle Vertretung Liechtensteins durch die Schweiz ablehne. Beck erwartete von Mottas Fürsprache eine „ausgezeichnete Wirkung“. Motta wandte sich denn auch an Beneš, da mehrere Vorstöße von Seiten des Eidgenössischen Politischen Departementes bei der tschechoslowakischen Gesandtschaft in Bern ohne Erfolg geblieben waren.66 Motta übermittelte Beneš den Wunsch Liechtensteins, dass das Gesetz über die Bodenreform, soweit es den Besitz des Fürsten von Liechtenstein betreffe, in einer moderaten Art besprochen werde. Motta übernahm die liechtensteinische Argumentation, dass die von den tschechoslowakischen Behörden getroffenen Maßnahmen schwerwiegende Auswirkungen auf die finanzielle Situation eines kleinen Staates haben könnten, den zahlreiche Bande der Freundschaft und Nachbarschaft mit der Schweiz verbänden. Motta bat Beneš, die Vorschläge der liechtensteinischen Regierung mit seinem bekannten Geist der Versöhnung zu prüfen, um möglichst bald zu einer angemessenen Regelung zu kommen. Beneš reagierte rasch und hielt gegenüber Motta fest, dass er nicht verkenne, dass die angesprochene Frage infolge der Nichtanerkennung Liechtensteins durch die Tschechoslowakei sehr kompliziert sei und unter streng interner Sicht einige Schwierigkeiten biete.67 Beneš versprach, die Angelegenheit mit Interesse zu verfolgen und er werde gemäss weiteren Auskünften, die er noch in Prag einholen werde, detaillierte Erklärungen und seine definitive Ansicht dazu äussern. Eine interne Randnotiz des BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59, 5. Mai 1925; Randnotiz Mottas in Französisch auf dem in französischer Sprache abgefassten Memorandum Liechtensteins. 65 BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59, 25. Mai 1925; Gesandtschaft Bern ab Eidgenössisches Politisches Departement. 66 BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59, 3. Juni 1925; Motta an Beneš, „Président de la Conférence internationale du Travail Genève. Original in französischer Sprache. 67 BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59, 11. Juni 1925; Beneš an Bundesrat Motta. Originaltext in französischer Sprache. 64

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Eidgenössischen Politischen Departementes hielt dazu fest, dass „vorderhand keine weitere Mitteilung“ gemacht werden solle. Die Bemühungen Liechtensteins um eine schweizerische Unterstützung dauerten jedoch an. Ende August 1925 übergab Liechtenstein dem Eidgenössischen Politischen Departement ein weiteres Memorandum betreffend die Enteignungen in der Tschechoslowakei.68 In diesem Memorandum wurden die Ergebnisse der bisherigen Verhandlungen und der Umfang der Enteignungen dargestellt. Der Text hält fest, dass die Bemühungen, eine offizielle Vertretung Liechtensteins in Prag durch die Schweiz zu erreichen, ohne Erfolg geblieben waren. Der Umfang der Enteignungen belief sich nach dieser Darstellung auf 31'342 Hektar Landwirtschaftsboden und auf 41 065 Hektar Waldbesitz. Zudem hatte das Haus Liechtenstein an den tschechoslowakischen Staat eine Vermögensabgabe von 71 Millionen tschechoslowakischen Kronen zu leisten. Das Haus Liechtenstein seinerseits erhob gegenüber der Tschechoslowakei eine Forderung von 45,144.099 tschechoslowakischen Kronen. Diesen Anspruch begründete das Haus Liechtenstein damit, dass der wirkliche Wert des Bodens sich zwischen 7000 und 10.000 Kronen bewege. Die Tschechoslowakei hingegen bezahlte durchschnittlich lediglich 2000 Kronen Entschädigung pro Hektar. Das Memorandum wiederholte bei dieser Gelegenheit den Hinweis, dass der liechtensteinische Staat an der Enteignungsfrage auch deswegen interessiert sei, weil der Fürst keine Zivilliste besitze und vom Staat keinerlei Abgaben beziehe, sondern „im Gegenteil dem Staat jährlich bedeutende Geldopfer“ leiste. Nach Durchführung der Bodenreform im bisherigen Ausmass wäre das Fürstenhaus nicht mehr in der Lage, diese ausserordentlichen Leistungen zu vollbringen. Am 29. September 1925 richtete Fürst Johann II. persönlich ein Schreiben an Bundesrat Motta.69 Fürst Johann II. legte ebenfalls die Situation der Enteignungen dar und folgerte daraus, dass ein Ausgleich mit entsprechender Entschädigung anzustreben sei. Nach Fürst Johann II. war dies vor allem wichtig wegen der „Vermögensgebahrung“, und zwar sowohl im Hinblick auf das Haus als auch auf das Land Liechtenstein. Fürst Johann II. gab abschliessend der Hoffnung Ausdruck, dass Bundesrat Motta bei seinem „Gerechtigkeitssinn“ und seiner „überragenden Stellung“ die

BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59, 28. August 1925. BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59, 29. September 1925; Johann II. aus Feldsberg an Bundesrat Motta, 68 69

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Bestrebungen zur Ordnung der Besitzverhältnisse des Fürsten von Liechtenstein auch weiterhin „gütigst unterstützen wolle“. Am 8. Oktober 1925 sprach Kabinettsdirektor Josef Martin70 beim schweizerischen Generalkonsulat in Prag vor. Martin wollte in Prag eine gemeinsame Konferenz zwischen Emil Beck, einem Vertreter des Hauses Liechtenstein und Josef Martin mit dem schweizerischen Generalkonsulat durchführen. Dabei sollte das weitere Vorgehen bei der Regierung in Prag gegen die Konfiskation des fürstlichen Grundbesitzes besprochen werden. Gleichzeitig versuchte Emil Beck, der in Genf eine Unterredung mit Beneš gehabt hatte, eine Besprechung der Enteignungsangelegenheit mit Beteiligung von tschechoslowakischen und liechtensteinischen Vertretern zu erreichen. Er ersuchte das Eidgenössische Politische Departement, zu dieser Besprechung ebenfalls einen Vertreter abzuordnen.71 Das Eidgenössische Politische Departement unterrichtete das schweizerische Generalkonsulat in Prag darüber, dass Beneš erklärt habe, keine Möglichkeit zu sehen, die strikte Anwendung des Bodenreformgesetzes von den fürstlich-liechtensteinischen Gütern abzuwenden.72 Ein letzter Versuch, der von der fürstlichen Güterverwaltung unternommen werde, sei eine Konferenz von liechtensteinischen und tschechoslowakischen Vertretern mit Beteiligung eines Schweizer Delegierten. Das schweizerische Generalkonsulat in Prag berichtete gegenüber dem Eidgenössischen Politischen Departement, dass der Jurist Victor Kaplan, der Direktor der Güterdirektion in Kolodej, die Interessen Liechtensteins nicht mit dem nötigen Nachdruck vertreten habe. Das Generalkonsulat vermutete, dass Kaplan diese Haltung eingenommen habe, um bei der Interessenwahrung für andere Großgrundbesitzer „gewisse Vorteile“ zu erreichen.73 Das Generalkonsulat wies auch darauf hin, dass die Tschechoslowakei gegenüber einem englischen Staatsangehörigen Entgegenkommen gezeigt habe, da sie die Absicht habe, in Grossbritannien ein Darlehen aufzunehmen. Trotz der inständigen Bitte von Fürst Johann II. sah Bundesrat Motta keine Möglichkeit, weitere Schritte zu Gunsten Liechtensteins zu unterJosef Martin (1874–1955); 1921–1945 Direktor der Kabinettskanzlei des regierenden Fürsten von Liechtenstein. 71 BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59, 8. Oktober 1925; Gesandtschaft Bern an Eidgenössisches Politisches Departement. 72 BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59; 15. Oktober 1925; Eidgenössisches Politisches Departement an schweizerisches Generalkonsulat in Prag. 73 BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59, 29. Oktober 1925; schweizerisches Generalkonsulat in Prag an Eidgenössisches Politisches Departement. 70

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nehmen, da die Tschechoslowakei alle bisherigen Vermittlungsvorschläge abgelehnt hatte. Die Prager Regierung sprach sich auch gegen eine schweizerische Beteiligung bei einer vorgesehenen Besprechung zwischen Vertretern der liechtensteinischen Zentraldirektion und den tschechoslowakischen Behörden aus. Prag bedauerte, aus prinzipiellen Gründen keinen Schweizer Vertreter zu einer solchen Besprechung einladen zu können.74 Bundesrat Motta verständigte Fürst Johann II. darüber, dass der schweizerische Bundesrat die Gesetzgebung der Tschechoslowakei in der Enteignungsangelegenheit zwar fraglich finde und er deshalb die Bestrebungen des Eidgenössischen Politischen Departementes auf Milderung der tschechoslowakischen Maßnahmen gebilligt habe.75 Den Bestrebungen des Eidgenössischen Politischen Departementes sei jedoch leider kein Erfolg beschieden gewesen. Da die Tschechoslowakei aus innenpolitischen Gründen auf die schweizerischen Vermittlungsvorschläge nicht eintrete, würden weitere Schritte des Eidgenössischen Politischen Departementes „wohl nicht in Betracht kommen.“ Motta stellte aber in Aussicht, die Schweiz werde ihre Dienste neuerdings zur Verfügung stellen, wenn eine nochmalige Intervention möglich und angebracht erscheinen sollte. Als weitere flankierende Maßnahme versuchte Prinz Franz von Liechtenstein76 in Paris seine Verbindungen einzusetzen. Er beabsichtigte, mit Außenminister Aristide Briand77 eine Aussprache wegen der Enteignungen in der Tschechoslowakei zu führen.78 Prinz Franz wollte Briand veranlassen, Beneš im Sinne eines Entgegenkommens auf die Wünsche des Fürsten von Liechtenstein zu beeinflussen. Prinz Franz scheiterte jedoch mit seinem Vorhaben. Er wurde lediglich von Generalsekretär Philippe Berthelot79 empfangen. Prinz Franz machte gegenüber dem schweizerischen Botschafter in Paris seiner tiefen Verärgerung Luft. Er bezeichnete die Mitglieder der Prager Regierung, jede diplomatische Höflichkeit ausser Acht lassend, als „Banditen von Prag“. BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59, 4. November 1925; tschechoslowakische Gesandtschaft in Bern an Eidgenössisches Politisches Departement. 75 BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59, 13. November 1925; Bundesrat Motta an Fürst Johann II. 76 Franz von Liechtenstein (1853–1938); 1894–1899 österr.-ungar. Botschafter in St. Petersburg; 1929– 1938 regierender Fürst von Liechtenstein. Bruder des Fürsten Johann II. 77 Aristide Briand (1862–1932); 1921–1922 französischer Ministerpräsident. 78 BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59, 26. November 1925; Eidgenössisches Politisches Departement an schweizerische Gesandtschaft in Paris. 79 Philippe Berthelot (1866–1934); französischer Diplomat; 1920–1922 Generalsekretär des Aussenministeriums. 74

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Der Enteignungsvorgang liess sich trotz aller Anstrengungen von Seiten des Hauses Liechtenstein, seiner Verwaltung und der Regierung und ihrer diplomatischen Dienste nicht mehr aufhalten. In verschiedenen Enteignungs- und Veräußerungsaktionen verlor das Haus Liechtenstein in den Jahren 1921–1938 von rund 160 000 Hektar Grundbesitz 91 500 Hektar. Dies entsprach einem Verlust von 57,18 Prozent des Gesamtbesitzes in der Tschechoslowakei.80 Dabei gilt es zu beachten, dass die Entschädigungspreise nach den Durchschnittspreisen der Jahre 1913– 1915 berechnet wurden, „so dass der Entschädigungspreis nur einen Bruchteil des tatsächlichen Wertes des Grundbesitzes ausmachte.“81 Die Durchführung der Bodenreform in der Tschechoslowakei hatte für das Haus Liechtenstein zweifelsohne schwerwiegende Auswirkungen. Wenn dadurch auch nicht die materielle Existenz insgesamt gefährdet wurde, so waren die Verluste an Grundbesitz doch erheblich und der Ausfall an Einkommen empfindlich spürbar. Durch das sowohl von Seiten des Fürstenhauses als auch vom Land Liechtenstein wiederholt vorgebrachte Argument, dass der Vermögensverlust sich auch für das Land nachteilig auswirken würde, sollte auf die Durchführung der Bodenreform eingewirkt werden. Es zeigte sich jedoch auch in diesem Fall, dass der Kleinstaat Liechtenstein ohne Unterstützung von aussen gegen die Interessen anderer Staaten nicht aufkommen konnte. Auch die Schweiz, welche Liechtenstein großes Verständnis entgegenbrachte, konnte in der Frage der Bodenreform keine Veränderung der Haltung der tschechoslowakischen Regierung bewirken. Es war für die Schweiz letztendlich ein rationales Abwägen, wieviel Einsatz sie für den Kleinstaat Liechtenstein bringen wollte, ohne das Verhältnis zu anderen betroffenen Staaten zu belasten. Diese Haltung kommt in einer Stellungnahme des Eidgenössischen Politischen Departementes zum Ausdruck, welche bereits 1921 festhielt, dass die Schweiz zwar Liechtenstein als souveränen Staat anerkenne.82 Eine andere Frage aber sei, „ob und inwieweit“ die Tschechoslowakei verpflichtet sei, „den Fürsten Liechtenstein einzig als fremden Souverän zu behandeln,“ gegebenenfalls seinen Besitzungen eine Vorzugsbehandlung angedeihen zu lassen. In der internen „Notiz“ des Eidgenössischen Politischen Departementes heisst es weiter: „Vom tschechoslowakischen Standpunkt aus kann es, nicht BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 59; Memorandum vom 29. Mai 1945. Siehe dazu auch DALLABONA, S. 46–52. 81 DALLABONA, S. 32 und S. 52–53. 82 BA Bern, 2001(E)/1969/262, Schachtel 43, „Notiz“ ohne Datum auf dem Schreiben des schweizerischen Konsulats in Prag an das Eidgenössische Politische Departement vom 12. Mai 1921. 80

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unbegreiflicherweise, als ein abusus juris betrachtet werden, wenn der Souverän Grundbesitz für die Exterritorialität beansprucht, zumal wenn dieser Privatbesitz ein Mehrfaches des souveränen Territoriums bildet. Est modus in rebus.“ Die Bodenreform in der Tschechoslowakei war nicht nur, wie es auf den ersten Blick erscheinen mag, eine Angelegenheit, die das Vermögen des Hauses Liechtenstein betraf. Es war ein Vorgang, der für Liechtenstein auch staatspolitisch bedeutsam war. Da die tschechoslowakische Regierung bei der Durchführung der Enteignungsmassnahmen ausländischen Grundbesitzes auf Schwierigkeiten stiess, suchte sie für die Durchsetzung ihrer Ziele die richtige strategische Verhaltensweise. Diese Taktik ging darauf aus, Liechtenstein als einen Staat zu interpretieren, der nicht als souverän sondern als ein Annex Österreichs zu gelten habe. Daraus leitete die tschechoslowakische Regierung ab, dass Liechtenstein im Ersten Weltkrieg nicht neutral gewesen sei, sondern an der Seite Österreichs aktiv Krieg führend mitgewirkt habe. Daraus folgerte sie, dass der regierende Fürst von Liechtenstein als österreichischer und somit für die Tschechoslowakei als feindlicher Staatsbürger zu gelten habe. Infolge seines „Subjektionsverhältnisses“ zu Österreich kam ihm nach Interpretation der tschechoslowakischen Regierung kein Anspruch auf Exterritorialität zu, wie dies bei einem Oberhaupt eines souveränen Staates nach Völkerrecht der Fall gewesen wäre. Die Republik der Tschechoslowakei versuchte deshalb von Beginn ihrer Existenz an, Einfluss darauf auszuüben, dass Liechtensteins Souveränität und Neutralität international nicht anerkannt wurde. Dies wirkte sich für Liechtenstein aussenpolitisch nachteilig aus. Sowohl an der Pariser Friedenskonferenz als auch beim Antrag auf Aufnahme in den Völkerbund stand Liechtenstein in bezug auf seine staatliche Unabhängigkeit und Neutralität unter einer drückenden Beweislast. Auch die Beziehungen Schweiz – Liechtenstein waren von der tschechoslowakischen Bodenreform betroffen. Die Schweiz geriet infolge der Übernahme der auswärtigen diplomatischen Vertretung Liechtensteins seit Oktober 1919 in das tschechoslowakisch-liechtensteinische Spannungsfeld. Dabei zeigte sich allerdings, dass die Staatsraison den Entscheidungsspielraum der schweizerischen Bundesbehörden stark einengte und ihr Verhalten im Konfliktfall dirigierte. Liechtenstein bemühte sich auf diversen Wegen um Durchsetzung seiner Interessen. Einerseits versuchte es, bei den Großmächten für sein Anliegen Gehör zu finden, andererseits hoffte man durch direkten Kontakt mit der Tschechoslowakei zu einem Erfolg zu kommen und als dritten Weg

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versprach man sich vieles von den „besonderen Diensten“ der Schweiz. Als weitere Möglichkeiten setzten die Hofkanzlei, die liechtensteinischen Gesandtschaften in Wien und Bern, Prinz Franz und selbst Johann II. persönlich einige Hoffnung auf direkte Kontakte zu einflussreichen Persönlichkeiten. Vor diesem Hintergrund sind die eifrigen politischen und diplomatischen Tätigkeiten zu sehen, die in Wien, Vaduz, Bern, Prag, Genf und Paris auf verschiedenen Ebenen entfaltet wurden. Jede Seite versuchte, ihre Auffassung durch Argumente von Gutachtern zu untermauern. Letztlich machte aber auch hier wieder der Kleinstaat Liechtenstein die ernüchternde Erfahrung, dass er auf das Wohlwollen und den Großmut der Stärkeren angewiesen war – den es nicht gab.

Kameradschaftsbund. Contribution to the history of Czech-German relationship1 (Part one) Lukáš Novotný

Othmar Spann and his ideological influence Othmar Spann (1878–1950), an Austrian philosopher, economist and sociologist, studied in Vienna, Zurich, Bern and Tübingen. In 1903 he finished a doctorate in political economy and eight years later he started to teach at the Brno Technical University.2 During the war he worked at the statistic department of the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of War. In 1919 he was appointed professor of political economy and sociology at the University in Vienna. His philosophy expressed one of the Austrian anti-democratic concepts of the 1920’s. Spann’s lectures given at the University of Vienna and the work of his students and friends who joined the so-called Spann’s Circle, created ideological assumptions for the later Austrian chancellors and leaders of the “Estates’ State” – Engelbert Dollfuss3 and Kurt Schuschnigg. Othmar Spann expressed his ideas about a “real state” in his work Der wahre Staat.4 The work was based on “the analysis of metaphysical terms – idealism and universalism opposed against positivist materialism and historism with spiritual values”.5 The critique of liberalism and democracy was one of the elements of Spann’s philosophy. His concept of “real state” also rejected the parliamentary

This article has been published as a part of the research project MSM 0021620827 The Czech Lands in the Midst of Europe in the Past and Today at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University, Prague. 2 There he also encountered national disputes between Czechs and Germans, later leading him to write up several papers on national consciousness and nationality. There was a rumor that his political ideas were determined by the “anti Czech mentality of Czech Germans and Lower Austrians who felt economically threatened”. K. BALLESTREM, H. OTTMAN, Politická filozofie 20. století, Praha 1993, p. 92. 3 Othmar Spann, who made “den größten und nachhaltigsten Eindruck auf den Studenten Engelbert Dollfuß”. G. WALTERSKIRCHEN, Engelbert Dollfuss. Arbeitermörder oder Heldenkanzler, Wien 2004, p. 66. 4 O. SPANN, Der wahre Staat, Leipzig 1921. 5 M. JEŘÁBEK, Konec demokracie v Rakousku, 1932–1938. Politické, hospodářské a ideologické příčiny pádu demokracie, Praha 2004, p. 37. 1

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form of government or the sovereignty of people defined within natural law.6 According to Spann a crisis of individualism had begun. He perceived it in two levels – 1) political one, when democracy was opposed by ideas aiming towards dictatorship or, at least, towards the creation of “special rights” and 2) economic one, when socialism and communism started to endanger capitalism seriously. Spann criticized liberalism and democracy as ideologies7 expressing, in political level, individualism of natural law but at the same time differing from each other. He perceived liberalism as a moderate representation of the ideas of natural law which can develop into a constitutional form of a state; according to him democracy on the other hand expresses the government of people in the least mediated form, most it represents the ideas of a state treaty and popular sovereignty.8 The theory of state from the viewpoint of enlighted individualism prefers individuals to a whole. Accordingly, a state is then based on a treaty of autonomous individuals about the social contract and the government.9 Spann saw the basic mistake of individualism in the fact that an individual is considered as something primary and original.10 Othmar Spann came to the conclusion that democracy is the only logically correct political form of natural law individualism that is even most elaborated in theory. As he mistakenly perceived it only within this perspective (the decision of majority instead of pragmatic decision, buying votes, demagogy etc.), he refused it.11 According to Spann, democracy is based on several elementary theses – equal members concluded a contract (Staatsbürger) and have an equal right to vote; the government execution is

H. WOHNOUT, Regierungsdiktatur oder Ständeparlament? Gesetzgebung im autoritären Österreich, Wien, Köln, Graz 1993, p. 22. 7 A. DIAMANT, Austrian Catholics and the First Republic, 1918–1934: A Study in AntiDemocratic Thought. The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 10, 1957, No. 3, p. 623. 8 SPANN, p. 104. Compare DIAMANT, p. 625. 9 Compare O. FRAUSCHER, Othmar Spanns universalistische Gesellschafts- und Staatslehre und der Einfluss der Romantik, Salzburg 2001, p. 66; O. HAUSMANN, Othmar Spann und seine Schule, Wien 1962, pp. 243–244. 10 Compare B. LANDHEER, Othmar Spann’s Social Theories. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 39, 1931, No. 2, p. 240; FRAUSCHER, p. 67. 11 W. BECHER, Der Blick aufs Ganze. Das Weltbild Othmar Spanns, München 1988, p. 134. For Spann “bleibt Demokratie jene unheilvolle Kraft der gesellschaftlichen Nivellierung und Gleichmacherei, die jeden organischen, ständichen Aufbau des Staates verhindere”. K. SONTHEIMER, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik, München 1962, p. 169. 6

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carried out collegiately. The constitutional liberalism eventually the enlightenment absolutism violated the mentioned theses in Spann’s eyes.12 However Spann did not consider the democratic system as suitable. He concluded that such a form of a state had the character of a non-viable utopia.13 He criticized the fact that the form of government, which enabled all to take part in the execution, would end up as a mechanical rule of the decision of majority.14 Another point of his criticism was the situation when every vote has the same weight and importance, which means that the majority governs.15 Spann as even more ruthless expression of equality regarded the rule of eligibility proved already by antic democracies. Thus masses become unstable (party and government changes). If all votes have the same importance, none can have a greater inner value. It means that in democracy it is not a value but a mechanical majority that governs. Similarly to Plato, Spann rejected democracy as ochlocracy and was afraid of the beginning of the “mass era” which could suppress everything noble and spectacular.16 From the viewpoint of universalism the substance of a society is not an individual but the supra-individual spirituality (überindividuelles Geistige). The organization – “state” expresses the spiritual unity and not the random will derived from the majority opinion. Spann thus rejected the principle of voting. According to him individual votes should not be counted but weighed. It should not be the majority taking decisions through voting that governs but the best (from the society; “das Beste”).17 According to Spann the important principles should not be changed according to the opinion of the randomly chosen majority; they should be applied because of one simple reason – i.e. because “the best” want them to be applied. On the contrary, democracy wants to vote on the truth. One of the main points of Spann’s criticism of democracy obviously aimed to the SPANN, p. 108. Compare J. H. PICHLER, Othmar Spann oder Die Welt als Ganzes, Wien, Köln, Gratz 1988, pp. 75–76. 13 Compare P. KAMPITS, Malé dějiny rakouské filozofie. Mezi zdáním a skutečností, Praha 1995, p. 152. 14 It does not have to be truth either. Democratic leaders are said to vote themselves. Parties‘ voting lists are compiled by narrow groups of people who control the others. The result is “eine Herrschaft der Minderheit”. BECHER, p. 133. 15 “Majority rule, the method for deciding issues in a democracy, robbed the individual of his intrinsic value by equating the value of his vote mechanically with that of every other individual.” DIAMANT, p. 625. 16 SPANN, p. 109. “Demokratie bedeutet auf die Dauer Kulturtod.” M. SCHNELLER, Zwischen Romantik und Faschismus. Der Beitrag Othmar Spanns zum Konservativismus in der Weimarer Republik, Stuttgart, 1970, p. 42. 17 Nevertheless, Spann did not say who the best are, how to define or select them. 12

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fact that it refuses to acknowledge the spiritual values as given and votes on the truth.18 Spann considered the voting principle itself as infeasible. The truth cannot be voted on, “it has to establish itself by its own weight”.19 According to him the democratic system is: “A mechanisation of a state organization and at the same time a liquidation of a value base by voting, by the government of majority.”20 Othmar Spann concluded, that the political organization of a democratic system consisted of leaders and the led people and that the political will of the organized people (masses) is formed by the leaders themselves. This fact results in the definite conclusion – a mass is predestined to the political unimportance. This thesis confirms it is necessary to prefer the universalistic form of state. Obviously, it is not feasible to form the will mechanically through the majority. On the contrary, a spiritual power, the leader’s will, gains ground and takes the position of the passive mass lacking any will. If democracy itself says it had enabled the execution of political power to the mass, it is a basic mistake because even in democracy the mass has no power. According to Spann this applies even more than in an absolutist state.21 As another great deficiency Spann denoted the choice of leaders. His vision of the best choice of candidates was represented by the hierarchical system, which can ensure the performance of power from the highest leaders to the lowest ones.22 “The ideas of estates were as a whole subordinated to an elitist vision which used the category of leadership principle.”23 The most competent should become the leader. In compliance with Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Spann denoted as the outstanding characters those who made history (Geschäftsführer des Weltgeistes); who looked into the world of ideas and realized them in the history. In Spann’s concept the leaders had independent positions in the sphere of state, religion and

JEŘÁBEK, p. 38. Compare J., HAAG Knights of the Spirit: The Kameradschaftsbund. The Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 8, 1973, No. 3, p. 135. 20 SPANN, p. 110. 21 Ibidem, p. 113. 22 Spann suggested the society should have been controlled by a system of leaders, where the lower was responsible to the higher. He also spoke about so called educated leadership and warned “against uneducated parties’ leaders which are not ranked”. BALLESTREM, OTTMAN, p. 90. 23 SONTHEIMER, pp. 200–201. 18 19

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culture. They draw their power and wisdom from the objective spirituality and therefore they should be released from any criticism and supervision.24 Othmar Spann based his criticism of liberalism and democracy on the theoretical scope of his universalistic studies of society. He perceived these studies as a higher spiritual reality, which should face the endangerment of the society’s civil system, which he saw in the rise of working-class movement. Spann also justified the subordination of an individual to the community25 and therefore he put the term “individualism”, which absolutized an individual and rejected the existence of community, as the antithesis to “universalism”. Spann’s criticism of democracy consists mainly in perceiving the democratic system as the performance of individualist principles as he understood them. He considered the primary position of an individual against the whole and the equality of people as a dangerous potential symbol of destroying the existing social system.26 In Spann’s universalism, as well as in other anti-democratic concepts of interwar period, there are conformities with National Socialism. They include the refusal of liberalism and individualism, the fight against Marxism, and mainly the emphasis of anti-democratic attitude, which is one of the pillars of these ideologies. Universalism, alike National Socialism, refuses the right for individual freedom, it demands the subordination of an individual to the society which it perceives as an objective fact and which is built hierarchically on the leadership principle and provides the state with a right to intervene with almost all spheres of human life. “Both ideologies are based on the principle of inequality of people which however Spann did not stress as racial and biological one, but spiritual.”27 On the other hand one should admit that Spann’s ideas differed from National Socialism in some fundamental issues. Universalism is a close, logically structured and obligatory system in which religion has an important position as the highest principle, in contrast to National Socialism which consists of different world-view elements, does not incline to theory, lacks definite outlines and the main issue of its doctrine is to conform to the Führer’s will. Spann’s concept of decentralized state was a direct SCHNELLER, p. 49. According to Schneller the thinking and acts of leaders take on “a unearthly consecration” (überweltliche Weihe). 25 For him an individual has “no other meaning than to serve as an accidental carrier of the national spirit”. E. RÁDL, O německé revoluci. K politické ideologii sudetských Němců, Praha 2003, p. 106. 26 Spann regarded individualism as a big mistake. HAUSMANN, p. 260. 27 J. K. HOENSCH, Othmar Spann, Kameradschaftsbund a Sudetoněmecká vlastenecká fronta. Dějiny a současnost, 1999, No. 5, p. 32. 24

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contradiction to the idea of a centralist totalitarian state in the conception of National Socialism.28 Spann presumed some autonomy of estates in the matters, which would concern them. He attributed the role of arbiter in case of disputes among particular estates to the Party, which was in his opinion also one of the “estates”. Nevertheless, National Socialism considered the politics as the most important sphere and therefore in this conception the Party had the role of the creator of the worldview “deren Anforderungen sich die einzelnen Lebensgebiete zu “unterwerfen” hatten”.29 Spann’s universalistic doctrine was publicized by his public activities in the 1920’s. Spann was able to influence the political situation in Austria by his opinions; his lectures were directed against the parliamentary state. Spann’s ideas “reverberated in different groups of Austrian society as well as in nationalist Germans”,30 which was not a good sign for the Austrian Republic, or for the whole Europe. The Situation after First World War The Year 1918 had brought the end of World War One and the socalled “long 19th century” was buried in its fires. Europe needed to have recovered from the bloodiest conflict in its history. Ten millions men had died in trenches and on battlefields. The old European order had collapsed; the results of the fights meant the beginning of a new epoch. With the exceptions of large battlefields the old continent looked almost the same. The big cities were standing, railroads were existing. However, the four years of war shattered “the haughty self-confidence which had led Europe to the world’s supremacy ... The war threw down governments, lowered the powerful and turned upside down whole societies”.31 As a result of the war Before Adolf Hitler seized power, Spann’s ideas were not in conflict with the National Socialism of the German Reich; but everything changed after the January 1933. Compare J. KUČERA, Mezi Wilhelmstraßse a Thunovskou. Finanční podpora Německé říše Sudetoněmecké straně v letech 1935–1938, Český časopis historický 95, 1997, No. 2, p. 391. Protagonists of the thesis about ideological rivalry between Kameradschaftsbund and National Socialism were for example Friedrich Prinz or Ronald M. Smelser. Compare F., PRINZ., Geschichte Böhmens 1848–1948, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin 1991; R. M. SMELSER, Das Sudetenproblem und das Dritte Reich. Von der Volkstumspolitik zur nationalsozialistischen Aussenpolitik, München 1980. 29 Ch. BOYER, J. KUČERA, Alte Argumente im neuen Licht. Bohemia. Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur der böhmischen Länder, hrsg. im Auftrag des Collegium Carolinum von F. SEIBT, und H. LEMBERG, Band 38, 1997, p. 363. 30 JEŘÁBEK, p. 43. 31 M. MACMILLANOVÁ, Mírotvorci. Pařížská mírová konference 1919, Praha 2004, p. 14. 28

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conflict the map of Europe was thoroughly changed - the old “established” monarchies ceased to exist and new, so called “succession states” were established.32 The young Sudeten Germans returning from the front or imprisonment found themselves in a rather difficult situation. Before the war these young people had been trained in the Union of German scouts (Deutscher Wandervogelbund) aiming to cultivate the national awareness in the young generation and “strenghten the feeling of fellowship of all Germans”.33 These people perceived the war conflict not only as a solution of generation conflicts but also saw the possibility to realize the union of all supporters of the Great Germany. After they returned home, however, they met a new political and social situation. The disappointment and frustration from defeat and the dissatisfaction with difficult material life conditions combined with another unfortunate fact they had to cope with – as the members of national minority in a new nation state – they felt dispossessed of their rights and saw no chance of any social progression or possibility to participate in the new political arrangement.34 Their only life certainty based on the priority of being German inhabitants was shaken. No wonder some of them expressed their strong hatred and negated the new state and was willing to listen to suggestions calling for extreme, idealist solutions.35 One may therefore agree with an opinion that “the political feeling of young generation was dominated by dissatisfaction and despair”.36 Not a small part of young generation therefore did not identify themselves with the democratic system of the Czechoslovak Republic, refused political membership and saw the chance for better future after World War I in the inclination towards romantic and mythic ideals of the nationalistic Václav Kural writes about the particularization of Central European region to number of “small, so called succession states. In size they were unequal, quite equipotent but not very powerful, formally national but determined by their structure as in fact racial”. V. KURAL, Konflikt místo společenství? Češi a Němci v československém státě (1918– 1938), Praha 1993, p. 7. 33 V. OLIVOVÁ, Kameradschaftsbund. Z českých dějin. Sborník prací in memoriam prof. Dr. Václava Husy, Praha 1966, p. 238. The young Germans from the Bohemian lands expected the war to fulfil their goal – to unite all the Germans. 34 Compare M. ALEXANDER, Phasen der Identitätsfindung der Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei, 1918–1945. Nation – Nationalismus – Postnation. Beiträge zur Identitätsfindung der Deutschen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, hrsg. von H. KLUETING, Köln, Weimar, Wien 1992, pp. 125, 127. 35 Compare K. G. ROBBINS, Konrad Henlein, the Sudeten Question and British Foreign Policy. The Historical Journal 12, 1969, Vol. 4, p. 677. 36 HOENSCH, p. 31. Compare J. HARNA, Krize evropské demokracie a Československo 30. let 20. století (Srovnávací sonda), Praha 2006, pp. 62–63; M. VYMAZALOVÁ, Sudetoněmecká strana 1935–1936 (unpublished thesis), Praha 1999, pp. 9–11. 32

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movement of the Sudeten Germans; after some time they started to seek more effective forms for the youth movement. This new trend in organization was characterized by elitism; strict organizational structure built on a military model and based on discipline and leadership principle. The common objective of these unions was to “form national community of the Sudeten Germans which would be led by personalities and not parties and which would be the result of wide spiritual recovery of the state and society”.37 The not exactly clear ideals of “national fellowship” (Volksgemeinschaft) had the main role in these organizations from the very beginning. Thus various clubs and associations started to appear, being nearer to everyday life than political parties. Their members paid regular fees, presented gifts, took care of fellow members who were in need. They had a chance, which corresponded to their ideas of national objectives.38 To a certain extent the associations substituted for the weakened party system. To be a member of an association was considered a greater honor than a political mandate.39 In August 1918 the representatives of the Wandervogelbund met in Krumlov to discuss further steps. At the beginning of 1919 a program (so called Schreckensteiner Leitsätze) was established aiming to cope with the new political situation and at the same time restricted to “raise and strengthen the awareness of unity of German youth inside Czechoslovakia and nourish the feeling of national fellowship within the young people in Germany and Austria”.40 In January 1919 a gathering of the German nationalist youth took place in the Knights’ Hall of the Střekov Castle to discuss the possibilities of the restoration of pre-war youth movement.41 Heinz Rutha was one of the gatherers. The result of the discussions was a commitment to endeavour the recovery of “Germanship”. According to the

HOESNCH, p. 31. Compare E. WOLFGRAMM, O počátcích henleinovského hnutí. Československý časopis historický 12, 1964, No. 1, p. 30. 39 Compare R. JAWORSKI, Na stráži němectví nebo v postavení menšiny? Sudetoněmecký národnostní boj ve vztazích výmarské republiky a ČSR, Praha 2004, p. 66. 40 OLIVOVÁ, p. 239. The national movement spread also to universities. For example the Bund der böhmerländischer Freischarre was founded in Prague. The goals were similar to strengthen the nationalist attitudes of university students. 41 There were talks about the tendency to “revive Germanship”. J. CESAR, B. ČERNÝ, Politika německých buržoazních stran v Československu v letech 1918-1938. Díl II. (1930–1938), Praha 1962, p. 202. 37

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organizers of the meeting this objective was to be achieved by devoted cooperation of young people in the recovery of public life.42 The German youth was not only influenced by the thoughts of national fellowship of all Germans based on the old roots of German nationalism and Pangermanism. New ideological streams appeared. Young people looked for answers related to the problems of the society and its new organizations. The philosophy of history by the German thinker Oswald Spengler and the ideas of Othmar Spann, the professor at the University in Vienna, appeared as the most influential. “Spann’s ideas gave the most significant features to the German intelligence in the Czech lands and influenced it from the point of ideas as well as politics.”43 The Viennese philosopher and sociologist offered an alternative to ideologies, which destroyed the idea of Germanship, as his listeners perceived it. His “universal realm” overcame social antagonisms; it was a return to the idea of recovery of the Holy Roman Empire, which was to be organized on the basis of the estate-related thinking.44 The society would be divided into estates and on the top of an imaginary pyramid there would be the so-called highest estate (staatsführende Schicht). Spann’s “universal realm” would govern over Central Europe and touch the Balkans as well.45 This idea reverberated in the great part of young generation. Spann defined the Germanship in the sense of a spiritual community. In his conception the Germanship was defined by “thinking of individuals, by their feelings and actions rather than by blood or race”.46 Spann conducted a private seminar in his apartment and used to invite his best students. There were several Sudeten Germans among them. The S. BIMAN, J. MALÍŘ, Kariéra učitele tělocviku, Ústí nad Labem 1983, p. 27. OLIVOVÁ, p. 240. More on Spann’s ideology compare above. His ideology “bildet nämlich nichts anderes als eine idealistische Variante des Führerstaats…” F., SEIBT, Unterwegs nach München. Zur Formierung nationalsozialistischer Perspektiven unter den Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei 1930–1938. Der Nationalsozialismus. Studien zur Ideologie und Herrschaft, hrsg. von W. BENZ, H. BUCHHEIM, H. MOMMSEN, Frankfurt am Main 1993, p. 140. 44 S. DOLEZEL, Základy říšskoněmecké politiky vůči Československu v letech 1933–1938 se zvláštním zřetelem k sudetským Němcům. J. K. HOENSCH, D. KOVÁČ, (eds.), Ztroskotání spolužití. Češi, Němci a Slováci v první republice 1918–1939, Prague 1993, p. 107; J. PETZOLD, Wegbereiter des deutschen Faschismus. Die Jungkonservativen in der Weimarer Republik, Köln 1978, pp. 255, 257. The idea of the Holy German Roman Empire was to wake up the spirit of faded German glory. Germans were supposed to become the ruling class in Central Europe; this Spann’s conception of integrating this region was unacceptable for all the German nations. Compare KURAL, pp. 119–120. 45 Compare O. NOVÁK, Henleinovci proti Československu. Z historie sudetoněmeckého fašismu v letech 1933–1938, Praha 1987, pp. 19–20. 46 HAAG, p. 135. 42 43

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participants were rather enthusiastic about their teacher’s opinion on the definition of nationality. Spann understood it as a spiritual community, which the young Sudeten Germans liked more than the not very theoretically elaborated racial theories. “Young intellectuals who used to meet in Spann’s apartment arrived to an idea that his ideology could again enhance the Germanship, particularly in the Czech Republic [understood Czechoslovakia – L. N.]”.47 Walter Heinrich was the brightest of Spann’s students. He read Plato, mediaeval German mystics and German romantics and searched for the essence of the Germanship. The experience from the Wandervogel movement and the influence of Spann’s lectures persuaded him that only an elite consisting of spiritually connected men could save the Germanship.48 The enthusiasm over Othmar Spann drew Heinrich to the cooperation with Heinz Rutha. Although Rutha did not reach Heinrich’s intellectual level,49 he shared the opinion that it was necessary to free the Sudetenland from Western materialism and Slavonic supremacy.50 Both the men were not satisfied with the unclear romanticism and political naivety of youth movements and therefore in 1923 they established a small study group for political education aiming to educate young males in fellowship and thus forming an elite circle of friends, which would be able to unite the Sudeten Germans.51 Members of the group spent time discussing Othmar Spann’s work and at the same time studying elitist organizations, knight orders or even the Jesuits.52 Kameradschaftsbund In 1926 Spann’s students and supporters founded an organization called Arbeitskreis für Gesellschaftswissenschaften (Working Circle for

Ibidem, pp. 135–136. Ernst von Salomon wrote that Heinrich was “the Peter among Spann’s apostles, his closest colleague, friend, and confident, a pale, thin, fanatical man, incredibly learned, a wild and deadly intellectual.” E. SALOMON, Fragebogen. The Questionnaire, Garden City, New York 1955, p. 95. 49 He was an architect. 50 Compare R. GOLDMANN, Von der Böhmerlandbewegung zur Sudetendeutschen Jungenschaft. P. NASARSKI, (hrsg.), Deutsche Jugendwebegung in Europa. Versuch einer Bilanz, Köln 1967, pp. 136–137. 51 Compare WOLFGRAMM, pp. 35–36. 52 HAAG, p. 136. 47

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Social Sciences).53 Spann’s close colleague and senior lecturer at the University of Vienna, Walter Heinrich, took an important part in its establishment; other important members were Walter Brand, Heinz Rutha, Wilhelm Sebekowsky etc.54 The prime task of the circle was to elaborate and spread Spann’s ideas. It was a closed movement of German national intelligence formed by 200 to 300 members. Most of them were the Sudeten Germans but the Kameradschafsbund had its “subsidiaries” also in Austria, Germany and Transylvania. The structure of the organization was a strict hierarchy;55 the power was executed by a leading group (an executive committee of 15 members).56 ”The exclusivity and supremacy of people aware of their own price and the seriousness of their future objective” flourished among the members.57 In compliance with Spann’s philosophy, these people considered themselves as the supreme estate,58 which in future should take over the control over the politics in the Sudetenland and stand in the head of the fight against the old rule represented by political parties. Their objective was “jene Menschen zu suchen und zu sammeln, die als Erzieher und künftige Politiker geeignet sind, in strenger Formung einen staatstragenden Stand zu entwickeln”.59 This was later the basis for “the formation of a unified “Sudeten German” tribe and the transformation of Czechoslovakia into a federalist multinational state”.60 The Kameradschaftsbund perceived the existence of the Czechoslovak state as a given fact which, despite all reservations, must be coped with. The members of the association privately addressed themselves as Kameradschaft. According to the federal jurisdiction the organization was legally transformed and renamed to Kameradschaftsbund, Bund für volks- und sozialpolitische Bildung in 1930. Věra Olivová writes about Kameradschaftsbund für gesellschaftswissenschaftliche Bildung. OLIVOVÁ, p. 241. 54 For details about members see NOVÁK, p. 20; CESAR, ČERNÝ, p. 203. 55 On the top there were the “informed” surrounded by the “uninformed“ crowd 56 Mr. Hadow (Prague) to Mr. O’ Malley, 9th June, 1936, The National Archives, London, Kew, FO 371/20374, R 3417/32/12. It is a detailed report from the British embassy in Prague concerning the Sudeten German party and Kameradschaftsbund. The author of this paper describes in detail the evolution of both subjects in question and their current situation. 57 OLIVOVÁ, p. 241. Ronald M. Smelser writes about “Netz persönlicher Kontakte.” Compare W. JILGE, Zwischen Autoritarismus und Totalitarismus. Anmerkungen zu einer Kontroverse. Bohemia. Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur der böhmischen Länder, hrsg. im Auftrag des Collegium Carolinum von F. SEIBT, und H. LEMBERG, Band 39, 1998, p. 103. 58 They presented themselves as “the most mature core”. 59 GOLDMANN, p. 139. 60 HOENSCH, p. 33. 53

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Even in the future they counted that Czechoslovakia should form a state frame within which the Sudeten Germans should try to achieve their national and political goals. The members of the Kameradschaftsbund (KB) started to infiltrate in political parties and tried to achieve important positions in German national organizations (e.g. scientific and geographical associations or sports clubs). Some of them joined the German Agrarian Party,61 some joined other German political parties (National Socialist or Christian-Social parties).62 The economical sphere was not left out either; the members of the KB took positions of consultants and secretaries.63 Despite the success of the KB in the sphere of organization, Walter Heinrich was not entirely satisfied. In his opinion the KB successfully bore all the signs of the governing estate but it was not enough. Should not it all ended with academic discussions of intellectuals, those people had to join the political fight actively to influence the course of social events and thus build a “real state” in Central Europe.64 It was necessary to end the period of “theoretical” preparations and initiate the move towards the performance of practical tasks and political objectives. The representatives of the KB gained the decisive position in the German Sports Union65 (Deutscher Turnverband, DTV), an important Sudeten German youth organization. Although the representatives of the DTV publicly proclaimed they wanted to be above parties, in fact the DTV was a pan-German and anti-democratic institution. Rutha, Brand and Sebekowsky concentrated there. The organizational chief of the union was Konrad Henlein, a supporter of the KB.66 They aimed to change the Union The Party was officially called Bund der Landwirte. Deutsche nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei; Deutsche christlich-soziale Volkspartei. 63 There was a theory of so called “second man”. The KB members did not have to take the most important post, it was sufficient for them to be “only” advisors, secretaries, etc. Compare E. FRANZEL, Sudetendeutsche Geschichte: eine volkstümliche Darstellung, Mannheim, Würzburg 1990, p. 362. CESAR, ČERNÝ, pp. 208–209. 64 To the public these people were meant to be ordinary members of organizations they joined, but secretly they were supposed to act as a group designated to change the political life of the German minority in Czechoslovakia. W. JESSER, “Bereitschaft”, “Kameradschaft” und “Aufbruch” in den Sudetenländern. P. NASARSKI, (hrsg.), Deutsche Jugendwebegung in Europa. Versuch einer Bilanz, Köln 1967, pp. 367–368. 65 You can even see a translation “Svaz německých turnerů”. Compare M. BURIAN, Deutscher Turnverband a československý stát v letech 1918–1933. M., WAIC, (hg.), Češi a Němci ve světě tělovýchovy a sportu, Praha 2004, p. 53. 66 The former bank clerk had been active in the turner movement since 1925, when he became the gym teacher in Aš. He was reelected to the union counsel three years later, this time as the leader of the whole union. Compare BIMAN, MALÍŘ, pp. 35–44; BURIAN, pp. 62–63. 61

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into a half-military organization based on the leadership principle. The German Sports Union “became a natural centre of the whole Kameradschaftsbund group”.67 Its members understood that the DTV is a rather important organization and decided to strengthen their influence there. Walter Brand, the treasurer of the KB, was given the task to assist Henlein.68 His “abilities of an organizer were supported by Henlein’s administration skills and those two men created a close work relationship”.69 The German Sports Union maintained contacts not only with the group of Othmar Spann in Austria but its members intensively met the representatives of German minorities in all states of Central Europe, particularly in the areas of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. There, too, was a generation which had to cope with the new situation after 1918; its representatives studied at the University of Vienna and often knew the members of the KB. They annually visited German minorities in surrounding states and maintained friendly relations with them.70 Since summer 1930 KB had been publishing its own magazine called Die junge Front.71 It mediated “the elitist thoughts to the young Sudeten German intellectuals and served as an ideological forum for the KB members”. Die junge Front offered its readers sophisticated conservative revolutionary ideas. The KB hoped this educational activity would help to recruit new members and bring a financial support from political and economical leaders.72 The KB leaders set a strategy, which they wanted to use to enforce their political and national interests. It consists in the gradual enhancement of the influence in that organization into which the KB members infiltrated OLIVOVÁ, p. 241. DTV became “fast völlig unter den Einfluß des engeren KB-Kreises und wurde zum Essen eigentlicher Machtbasis und zum Ausgangspunkt der Realisierung der vom KB bestimmten politischen Konzeption”. JILGE, p. 103. 68 Walter Brand (1907–1980) was a typical person of his generation. During his high school studies he was devoted to the national youth movements – the complex “turnership” or the “Wandervögel” movement with its walking trips, camping and singing strongly encouraged ties to nature and accented the friendship, solidarity to the group and team. He started to study social sciences in Vienna in 1927, soon he became the member of professor Spann’s circle and he got his philosophy doctorate in 1931. He became the DTV ideological leader in 1932. 69 HAAG, p. 140. 70 Compare OLIVOVÁ, p. 242. Rudolf Jaworski pointed out the significance of the panGerman aspect contained within the Sudeten German politics. Compare JAWORSKI, p. 41. 71 The journal was published between 1930 and 1938, thus in years “in denen sich die deutsch-tschechische Katastrophe anbahnte”. SEIBT, p. 138. 72 HAAG, p. 138. 67

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and in waiting for “the” right day when everything should be successfully completed. On the turn of the 1920’s and 1930’s an economical crisis hit Europe. The Czechoslovak industry, which was concentrated mainly on export suffered seriously; the unemployment had grown extremely in the Sudetenland.73 The attitudes of local people started to be more radical. ”The conciliating mood of the 1920’s was replaced by an aggressive, radical attitude which was even more apparent after Hitler seized the power in 1933.”74 Also the KB had to cope with the new political situation. Its leaders, influenced by Othmar Spann’s ideas, were faced with an elementary task – to find a modus vivendi with the Nazi ideology. Spann movement was based on the condition of the weak Austrian Republic and to reach its objective it would use rather long-term political and educational work based on a scientifically approved program then strength. Its leaders were educated people; they looked upon socialism with disdain and perceived it as something with no scientific roots.75 The Nazis, on the other hand, considered the representatives of Spann movement as “university politicians and intellectuals” which are not able to act.76 When Hitler seized the power many states neighbouring with Germany prohibited National Socialist parties. In the connection to this development a question arose about what subject should protect and enforce the objectives of the Sudeten Germans. Both so called negativist parties (DNSAP and DNP – Deutsche Nationalpartei) found them endangered by an

Václav Kural sees the structure of the Sudeten German industry as unfortunate. The structure “which grew obsolete even in the end of the Austro-Hungarian era, which was not rebuilt during the 10 year period of ČSR, and which in fact as a result of its nature was able to survive during crisis much worse than the Czech industry structure”. KURAL, p. 104. 74 HAAG, p. 140. Till 1933 there was a majority of activist orientation in the Sudeten German politics, “then the new type of negativism spread”. KURAL, p. 116. 75 In fall 1933 Henlein talked to the Spann's student Ernst von Salomon in Vienna saying that “the Sudeten Germans should form an organization which … would be sufficiently solid and representative to withstand the pressure from the Czech majority within the country and to force the state to grant at least a considerably greater degree of autonomy than at present. In case of future incorporation into Germany … this organisation should be strong and well-established to be able to resist the political tendencies of National Socialism”. ROBBINS, p. 678. 76 Compare OLIVOVÁ, p. 243. 73

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official prohibition.77 The representatives of endangered parties saw the only way out in “the formation of a uniform national front merging DNSAP and DNP with other German bourgeois parties targeted against Marxism. The only thing left was to find a saver not too politically skillful but influential enough”.78 More and more, Konrad Henlein seemed to be the person. The KB also tried to unite the Sudeten Germans. It tried to form the Sudeten German National Council (Volksrat), which would govern, and control the activities of all non-Marxist parties and prepared their unification. The issue came out as an initiative of the German political work office (Deutsch-politisches Arbeitsamt) where it was in the care of the office secretary and the KB member Ernst Kundt. In March 1933 an annual meeting of the German Political Work Office was held in Liberec (Reichenberg); the main speaker was Walter Brand. Many promises, wishes and preliminary approvals of the idea of the Sudeten German National Council were proclaimed in the discussion. However the factual results were none; a uniform Sudeten German organization was not established. Brand and his Spann-based conception of society controlled by estates did not succeed.79 During the first half of 1933 it was more and more obvious that the negativist parties would not be successful with their attempt to form a uniform national front. After the failure from March 1933 when Brand did not succeed to enforce his suggestion in Liberec the group of German intelligence gathered around the KB again got in the foreground of all efforts. In July 1933 a meeting of the German Sports Union was held in Žatec (Saaz) and for the first time Konrad Henlein was introduced to the public as That finally happened in October 1933. But before that the Czechoslovak authorities were forced to step in against the DNSAP politics. Compare Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte aus Prag. Innenpolitik und Minderheitenprobleme in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik (further Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte), Teil IV. Vom Vorabend der Machtergreifung in Deutschland bis zum Rücktritt von President Masaryk 1933–1935. Berichte des Gesandten Koch, der Konsuln von Bethusy-Huc, von Druffel, von Pfeil und des Gesandtschaftsrates von Stein. Ausgewählt, eingeleitet und kommentiert von Heidrun und Stephan Dolezel, Veröffentlichungen des Collegium Karolinum, Band 49/IV, München 1991. Die tschechischen Maßnahmen gegen die DNSAP, deutsche Gesandtschaft an das Auswärtige Amt, den 16. April 1933, Nr. 13, pp. 38–39. To the dissolution of the party compare ibidem, Selbstauflösung der D.N.S.A.P., den 5. Oktober 1933, Nr. 31, pp. 73–74. 78 VYMAZALOVÁ, p. 19. The task to create a new, unified political organization of the Sudeten Germans “was imposed upon a new man, not a politician, but gym teacher Henlein” KURAL, p. 117. 79 BIMAN, MALÍŘ, pp. 52–53. 77

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the leader of the Union.80 In his speech addressed to young people he expressed the idea of “national fellowship” (Volksgemeinschaft) based on “German principles”, namely on leadership and discipline. He proclaimed that the DTV would be able to serve as a model for a “new spirit of national unity”. Great applause and a euphoric proclamation of Henlein as the leader of young generation was the answer.81 The demonstration of unity and the determination of these people were important political moments in the instable environment of the Sudetenland. Until the meeting in Žatec nobody had expressed similar ideas. Now the DTV through the person of Konrad Henlein declared itself as a main representative of the united Sudeten German nation.82 The proposal of Hans Krebs presented to Henlein in Žatec provoked a stormy reaction inside the KB. Its members claimed independent control over the Sudeten Germans and were not willing to share the position, moreover with national socialists whom they looked upon with disdain from the very beginning. However, the position of the KB was not strong enough to afford a refusal of such an offer. The basic question for the nearest future was - if any form of unification occurs, is the small core of the KB representatives able to maintain primacy over much more numerous groups of the nationalistic Sudeten Germans? And who would be the leader of the new organization?83 Although the KB refused Krebs’s proposals the whole discussion did not end. Konrad Henlein understood the offered position of a leader of all the Sudeten Germans as a chance for a long jump ahead in his political career. He negotiated not only with Krebs and Kallina,84 who insisted he became the leader of the new party, but also with Brand and Rutha who probably discouraged him.85 When Henlein told them he had decided to undertake the new task they decided to follow him into the new political subject.86 Brand and Rutha both realized that if they did not support CESAR, ČERNÝ, p. 197. He oficially quit the Kameradschaftsbund in May 1933. HAAG, p. 141. Also one of the DNSAP leaders Hans Krebs came to Žatec trying to persuade Henlein to lead and organize the German national front, which would have the support of nationally sentimental Germans. Compare FRANZEL, p. 365. 82 HAAG, p. 141. 83 Konrad Henlein became the designated leader. He was a good spokesman and organizer, which allowed him to get to the DTV leadership, but the KB leadership considered him “unable of independent thinking and decision-making” OLIVOVÁ, p. 247. 84 Othmar Kallina, a member of parliament for DNP. 85 Henlein met with them in Aš upon his invitation. They agreed, that it is a tempting offer, but in their opinion coming too early. Compare VYMAZALOVÁ, pp. 20–21. 86 FRANZEL, p. 366. 80 81

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Henlein in his activities, another chance to strengthen the role and importance of the Sudeten Germans would not come again soon. The position that the KB had established was endangered and therefore they decided to support Henlein fully.87 On September 23, 1933 an important meeting of Henlein, Brand, Krebs and Rudolf Kasper took place in Ústí nad Labem. The participants agreed the DNSAP would be disbanded in the nearest days and they would prepare the move of the members over a new subject only after Henlein would present the declaration of the new organization. Henlein also refused to guarantee Krebs he would appoint some of his colleagues (Ing. Haider or Ing. Fischer) into the future leadership.88 At the end of September and beginning of October 1933 a situation arose in the Sudeten German political environment that the negativist parties were isolated not only towards the Czechoslovak Republic but also towards the German activist parties. Two results were obvious from previous discussions – Konrad Henlein would be the leader of the new organization; DNSAP would be disbanded and the members would be moved over the new political subject.89 On October 1, 193390 Henlein published a proclamation whose author was Walter Brand and which has obvious traces of the KB’s influence: “I call hereof all parties and estates to unite all the Sudeten German force and I shall be in the lead.”91 Thus the Sudeten German Patriotic Front (Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront – SHF) was formed. The new subject did not have any strict political program and its only goal was to unite all the Sudeten Germans.92 The SHF structure and articles corresponded to the contemporary political situation – the leading positions were occupied by the members of KB who had the main say in the political, ideological and personal areas; the former national socialists had not seized the power so far. HAAG, p. 142. According to Henlein, the individuals were too famous and unsuitable. Compare BIMAN, MALÍŘ, p. 59; CESAR, ČERNÝ, p. 198. 89 DNP was not disbanded and after its prohibition in fact dissolved. 90 Jörg Hoensch writes down, that the proclamation was on the September 30, 1933. Compare HOENSCH, p. 34. 91 OLIVOVÁ, p. 248. 92 But SHF wanted to choose another path than that of National Socialism. It was prepared to acknowledge the Czechoslovak Republic and it clearly formulated its goals spiritual development of the Sudeten Germans, the accent of the idea of estates. To the negotiations on the establishment of SHF see BURIAN, pp. 65–66; CESAR, ČERNÝ, pp. 196–202. 87

88

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As Walter Koch, the German Envoy in Prague, reported, the situation in the Sudeten movement developed in following way in the first October decade of 1933 – the movement de facto split into three streams: the first one was formed by the activist parties (Social Democrats and Agrarians), the second was represented mainly by Christian Social and the third was composed of “unorganized masses of former members of just disbanded parties”. Koch did not believe in Henlein very much and regarded his movement just as an attempt to unite the Sudeten Germans and not as a political factor, which should be considered.93 Conclusion Disbanding the Sudeten national socialist parties and establishing the SHF meant the end of the first period of development of the movement of German national intelligentsia formed in an association called since 1930 Kameradschaftsbund. From the beginning its first members proposed the unification of “the Sudeten German tribe” and the reformation of Czeechoslovakia into a federalist multinational state. The leaders of the KB chose the policy of co-operation with official representatives of the Czechoslovak Republic and hoped they would manage to enforce its intention on the basis of a positive approach to the state elites. The course of event dramatically changed after Adolf Hitler seized the power in January 1933. Also the leaders of the KB had to cope with the new political situation. When Walter Brand had not succeed with his conception of the unification of the Sudeten Germans based on the theory of the Austrian philosopher and sociologist Othmar Spann, the leaders of the KB had no other possibility but to find a man under whose leadership the Sudeten movement would get united. They found such a man in Konrad Henlein. He saw the offered position of the new party leader as an opportunity, which would not have to repeat, and therefore he decided to accept the position of the leader of a new organization covering the Sudeten Germans. The most important positions in the new subject (SHF) were occupied by the members of Kameradschaftsbund who had the main say in the political and ideological areas. The membership consisted of the members of prohibited political parties; their leaders (so far) did not seize the power. The SHF structure with the leadership and membership based on different Deutsche Gesandtschaftsberichte, Situation des Sudetendeutschtums, Deutsche Gesandtschaft an das Auswärtige Amt, den 10. Oktober 1933, Nr. 33, pp. 75–77.

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ideological roots on one hand enabled Henlein to perform flexible politics but on the other hand did not foreshadow anything good for the future development of the SHF, nor for the Kameradschaftsbund.

Die Begriffe „Feind“ und „Freund“ im Werk von Carl Schmitt. Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte der Weimarer Republik1 Radek Soběhart

Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) gehört zu den bedeutendsten, aber auch kontroversesten Intellektuellen des 20. Jahrhunderts. Die Bewertungen seiner Person durch seine Zeitgenossen und Erklärer bewegen sich zwischen zwei Extremen. Die einen hielten ihn für „den Totengräber der Weimarer Republik“, für den „Kronjuristen des Dritten Reiches“ oder sogar für „den Zuhälter der Macht“.2 Die anderen stellten ihn Thomas Hobbes oder Niccolò Machiavelli gleich und nannten ihn den „jüngsten Klassiker des politischen Denkens“.3 Das Interesse am Werk Schmitts besteht bis heute.4 Er gilt immerhin als einer der bedeutendsten Intellektuellen der Weimarer Republik. Die Forscher beschäftigen sich primär mit dem Thema des Untergangs der Weimarer Demokratie und dem Anteil Schmitts an der Konstituierung des nationalsozialistischen Regimes. Geforscht wird auch Der Beitrag entstand im Rahmen des Projekts „Analýza východní politiky Willy Brandta vůči Východnímu bloku v letech 1966–1974. Proměna německé zahraniční politiky v období détente“, GAUK 7/2006/R (Analyse der Ostpolitik Willy Brandts gegenüber dem Ostblock 1966–1974. Die Veränderung der deutschen Außenpolitik in der Zeit der Détente). 2 Henning OTTMANN, Carl Schmitt. In: Politická filosofie 20. století, hrsg. von Karl Ballestrem und Hennig Ottmann, Praha 1993, S. 59. 3 Diese Bezeichnung, die eine sehr negative Reaktion hervorrief, kommt von Bernard Willms, vgl. Bernard WILLMS, Carl Schmitt – jüngster Klassiker des politischen Denkens, in: Comlexio Oppositorium. Über Carl Schmitt, hrsg. von Helmut Quaritsch, Berlin 1988, S. 595; Bernard WILLMS, Politics as Politics. Carl Schmitts 'Concept of the Political' and the Tradition of European Political Thought, in: History of European ideas 13, 1991, No 4, S. 371. Bernard Willms stützte seine Ansicht jedoch nicht auf eine Bewertung, sondern er bemühte sich auf die Tatsache aufmerksam zu machen, dass viele Bücher und einige Sammelbände über Schmitt, eine lange Reihe von Fachstudien in den wichtigsten Weltsprachen und seine Werke herausgegeben, in weitere Sprachen übersetzt werden und einige Fachzeitschriften und Fachleute sich auf sein Werk spezialisieren. In dieser Hinsicht kann also dem zugestimmt werden, dass Schmitt zum Klassiker der politischen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts geworden war, was wiederum nicht bedeutet, dass sein Erbe positiv und immer lohnenswert ist, vgl. Hans-Christof KRAUS, Carl Schmitt (1888–1985). In: Die Weimarer Republik. Portrait einer Epoche in Biographien, hrsg. von Michael FRÖHLICH, Darmstadt 2002, S. 326. 4 Günter MASCHKE, Carl Schmitt in den Händen der Nicht-Juristen. Zur neueren Literatur, in: Der Staat 34, 1995, S. 104–129; Reinhard MEHRING, Rekonstruktion und Historisierung. Zur neueren Carl Schmitt-Forschung, in: Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 49, 2001, H. 11, S. 1000–1011. 1

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über seine Stellung in der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, seine Ansichten zur Theorie und Praxis der internationalen Beziehungen sowie seine Arbeiten zur politischen Philosophie, insbesondere seine Definition des Staates und seine Kritik an Liberalismus und Demokratie. In meinem Beitrag möchte ich mich mit einem seines essentiellen Begriffspaars – den Begriffen „Feind“ und „Freund“ auseinandersetzen. Diese Begriffe scheinen zwar klar zu sein, Schmitt versuchte jedoch ihren „wahren Inhalt“ zu finden, der sich oft davon unterschied, wie er in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts benutzt wurde.5 Ich möchte vor allem folgende Fragen beantworten: Welche Bedeutung hatte diese Wortdichotomie in der politischen Philosophie Schmitts? Wer war dieser Feind? Und wer der Freund? Ist es Schmitt gelungen, den „wahren Inhalt“ dieser Begriffe zu finden? Schmitt erwähnt die Begriffe „Freund“ und „Feind“ im Zusammenhang mit der Krise des Politischen, als es dem Liberalismus gelang, das Politische vom Staat zu trennen. In diesem Zusammenhang war es wiederum notwendig, wie Schmitt behauptete, Kriterien des Politischen festzustellen, denn „das Politische hat nämlich seine eigenen Kriterien, die gegenüber den verschiedenen, relativ selbständigen Sachgebieten menschlichen Denkens und Handelns, insbesondere dem Moralischen, Ästhetischen, Ökonomischen auf eigenartiger Weise wirksam werden“.6 Und das Hauptkriterium, von dem aus sich die ganze Verhandlung im Rahmen des Politischen abwickelte, „ist die Unterscheidung von Freund und Feind. Sie gibt eine Begriffsbestimmung im Sinne eines Kriteriums, nicht als erschöpfende Definition oder Inhaltsangabe. Insofern sie nicht aus anderen Kriterien ableitbar ist, entspricht sie für das Politische den relativ selbständigen Kriterien anderer Gegensätze: Gut und Böse im Moralischen; Schön und Häßlich im Ästhetischen usw.“7 Und gerade die Fähigkeit des Staats, den Feind zu definieren, bewahrt seine Fähigkeit, eine selbstständige Wolfgang MANTL, Carl Schmitt und die liberal-rechtsstaatliche Demokratie. In: Geschichte und Recht. Festschrift für Gerald Stourzh zum 70. Geburtstag, hrsg. von Thomas Angerer, Wien, Köln, Weimar 1999, S. 120; Martin GRALHER, Antinomisches Denken und dilemmatische Kontrastdialektik. Warum Carl Schmitt kein Liberaler sein konnte. In: Carl Schmitt und die Liberalismuskritik, hrsg. von Klaus Hansen, Hans Lietzmann, Opladen 1988, S. 88; Raphael GROSS, Carl Schmitt und die Juden. Eine deutsche Rechtslehre, Frankfurt am Main 2000, S. 7. 6 Carl SCHMITT, Der Begriff des Politischen. Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien, Berlin 1994, S. 26. 7 SCHMITT, (wie Anm. 6), S. 26–27; Wolfram PYTA, Schmitts Begriffsbestimmung im politischen Kontext, in: Carl Schmitt. Der Begriff des Politischen. Ein kooperativer Kommentar, hrsg. von Reinhard Mehring, Berlin 2003, S. 222; Julien FREUND, Schmitt’s Political Thought, in: Telos 102, 1995, S. 15. 5

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und souveräne Entscheidung zu treffen.8 Schmitt warf dem Liberalismus vor, für universelle moralische Werte zu schwärmen, womit er den Staat oder die Gesellschaft daran hinderte, einen eigenen Feind zu definieren, denn er hob die Grenzen zwischen Staaten, Kulturen, Nationen oder Gemeinschaften auf.9 Gerade die Möglichkeit, einen Feind zu definieren, stellte einen der wichtigsten Werte des Staates dar, für die er von der politischen Einheit, d.h. dem Volk beauftragt wurde. Schmitt zufolge wird das Leben erst dann sinnvoll, wenn wir unseren Lebensfeind erkennen. Nur die Unterscheidung zwischen „wir“ und „sie“, in der es um unser physisches Überleben geht, gibt dem Politischen seinen Glanz, formt richtige Männer und ermöglicht politisch engagierten Menschen, sich von der Oberflächlichkeit ihres Alltags zu erheben.10 Wer ist also dieses Feind? „Der politische Feind braucht nicht moralisch böse, er braucht nicht ästhetisch häßlich zu sein; er muß nicht als wirtschaftlicher Konkurrent auftreten, und es kann vielleicht sogar vorteilhaft scheinen, mit ihm Geschäfte zu machen. Er ist eben der andere, der Fremde, und es genügt zu seinem Wesen, daß er in einem besonders intensiven Sinne existenziell etwas anderes und Fremdes ist, so daß im extremen Fall Konflikte mit ihm möglich sind, die weder durch eine im voraus getroffene generelle Normierung, noch durch den Spruch eines 'unbeteiligten' und daher 'unparteiischen' Dritten entschieden werden können“.11 Aus Schmitts Worten ist zu folgern, dass der Feind weder von der Moral, Ästhetik noch von der Ökonomie bestimmt oder definiert sein muss. Es genügt, dass er fremd ist. Schmitt fährt jedoch fort: „Feind ist also nicht der Konkurrent oder der Gegner im allgemeinen. Feind ist auch nicht der private Gegner, den man unter Antipathiegefühlen haßt. Feind ist nur eine wenigstens eventuell, d. h. der realen Möglichkeit nach kämpfender Gesamtheit von Menschen, die einer ebensolchen Gesamtheit gegenübersteht. Joseph W. BENDERSKY, Carl Schmitt. Theorist for the Reich, Princeton 1983, S. 90; Andreas HERBERT-ROTHE, Hannah Arendt und Carl Schmitt – „Vermittlung“ von Freund und Feind, in: Der Staat 43, 2004, H. 1, S. 42. 9 Es ist auch zu erwähnen, dass dieses Freund-Feind-Verhältnis eine rein irrationelle Überlegung ist, die durch eine Diskussion, Moral oder ein Gesetz nicht zu rechtfertigen ist. Felix GROSSHEUTSCHI, Carl Schmitt und die Lehre vom Katechon, Berlin 1996, S. 110; SCHMITT, (wie Anm. 6), S. 56; Andrew NORRIS, Carl Schmitt on Friends, Enemies and the Political, in: Telos 112, 1998, S. 68. 10 Stephen HOLMES, Die Anatomie des Antiliberalismus, Hamburg 1995, S. 81; Bernd LADWIG, Die Unterscheidung von Freund und Feind als Kriterium des Politischen (26– 28). In: Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen. Ein kooperativer Kommentar, hrsg. von Reinhard Mehring, Berlin 2003, S. 50. 11 SCHMITT, (wie Anm. 6), S. 27. 8

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Feind ist nur der öffentliche Feind, weil alles, was auf eine solche Gesamtheit von Menschen, insbesondere auf ein ganzes Volk Bezug hat, dadurch öffentlich wird… Den Feind im politischen Sinne braucht man nicht persönlich zu hassen, und erst in der Sphäre des Privaten hat es einen Sinn, seinen 'Feind', d. h. seinen Gegner, zu lieben“.12 Schmitt schränkte seine Definition ein, indem es sich jedenfalls um einen öffentlichen Feind handeln muss, es sollte also nicht ein Einzelner sein, immer nur eine Gruppe. Deshalb kann man seinen persönlichen Rivalen nicht als politischen Feind bezeichnen. Der politische Feind ist ebenfalls kein Krimineller, dieser verletzte zwar ein Gesetz, gefährde jedoch keinesfalls den Staat oder das Volk.13 Auch später kam er auf seine Definition des Feindes zurück, ohne sie irgendwie zu spezifizieren. Er sprach von einer „totalen Feindschaft“, von einem „konventionellen“ und „absoluten“ Feind, und in seinem Werk „Theorie des Partisanen“ steht: „Erst die Ableugnung der wirklichen Feindschaft macht die Bahn frei für das Vernichtungswerk einer absoluten Feindschaft“14 Meiner Meinung nach ist eine solche Herangehensweise Schmitts, in der er einen Begriff nicht klar definiert, recht bezeichnend. Gleichzeitig bin ich der Meinung, dass versucht werden sollte, nach einer Antwort auf die oben gestellte Frage zu suchen, wer für Schmitt den existentiellen Feind darstellte, denn sollte er einen solchen gehabt haben, wäre es seine Aufgabe, den Gegner um jeden Preis zu vernichten.15 Die Forscher, die sich mit dem Werk Schmitts beschäftigen, sehen meistens zwei Möglichkeiten. Die jüng-

SCHMITT, (wie Anm. 6), S. 29. GROSSHEUTSCHI, (wie Anm. 9), S. 111; Stephan LAHREM, Olaf WEIßBACH, Grenzen des Politischen. Philosophische Grundlagen für ein neues politisches Denken, Darmstadt 2000, S. 69; Norbert CAMPAGNA, Carl Schmitt. Eine Einführung, Berlin 2004, S. 90. 14 Carl SCHMITT, Theorie der Partisanen. Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen, Berlin 1975, S. 96. Nicht einmal hier stellte er klar fest, wer der eigentliche oder sogar absolute Feind ist, vgl. Hasso HOFMANN, Feindschaft – Grundbegriff des Politischen?, In: ders., Recht-Politik-Verfassung. Studien zur Geschichte der politischen Philosophie, Frankfurt am Main 1986, S. 220-221. 15 Kurt LENK, Günter MEUTER, Henrique Ricardo OTTEN, Intensität des Politischen: Carl Schmitt. In: dieselb., Vordenker der Neuen Rechten, Frankfurt am Main 1997, S. 84. 12 13

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ste Forschung sieht seinen existentiellen Feind in den Juden.16 Schmitt gehörte zu Vertretern des sog. Kulturantisemitismus,17 in dem die Juden als Kultur, die Deutschland angeblich schädigte und für dessen Niederlage im Ersten Weltkrieg verantwortlich war, gelten. Schmitt bemühte sich nach 1933, die deutsche juristische Schule nicht nur von jüdischen Juristen, sondern auch von ihren Büchern, die aus den Bibliotheken verschwinden sollten, zu „reinigen“.18 Als zweite Möglichkeit wird der Liberalismus erwähnt. Also eine Ideologie, die den Staat und das Politische trennte, womit sie die Ära eines starken souveränen Staates beendete.19 Zudem hatten die Staaten mit liberal-demokratischer Ordnung das Deutsche Kaiserreich im Ersten Weltkrieg besiegt, womit der Traum vieler Deutscher von einem eigenen Imperium geplatzt war. Außerdem wurde die Liberaldemokratie zum politischen System, das nach 1918 den „schmachvollen“ Vertrag von Versailles unterzeichnete und eine Spaltung der deutschen Gesellschaft nicht verhindern konnte. Es ist jedoch auch notwendig, sich dem zweiten Begriff des FreundFeind-Antagonismus zu widmen. Wer war der Freund? Wie ist er zu definieren? Im Unterschied zum Begriff Feind, den Schmitt umfangreich definierte, gibt es keine Definition des Begriffs. In seiner Theorie gab es keinen Platz für den Begriff „Freund“. Er versuchte zwar ein paar Jahre später, sich zu diesem Problem zu äußern, das Ergebnis waren jedoch nur schwammige Worte davon, dass ein Freund „blutsverwandt“, d.h. ein Schmitt hatte zu Juden ein ambivalentes Verhältnis, er selbst hielt sich nicht für einen Antisemiten. Er will Juden gegenüber immer nur „…kritisch gewesen sein“. Einerseits hatte er viele Freunde unter den Juden, und einigen war er nach 1933 bei der Emigration behilflich, andererseits begrüßte er die Maßnahmen gegen die jüdische Bevölkerung in Hitler-Deutschland, vgl. Raphael GROSS, Carl Schmitt und die Juden. Eine deutsche Rechtslehre, Frankfurt am Main 2000, S. 10; Lutz NIETHAMMER, Die polemische Anstrengung des Begriffs. Über die exemplarische Faszination Carl Schmitts, in: Nationalsozialismus in den Kulturwissenschaften. Bd. 2. Leitbegriffe – Deutungsmuster – Paradigmenkämpfe. Erfahrungen und Transformationen im Exil. Hrsg. von Helmut LEHMANN, Otto Gerhard OEXLE, Göttingen 2004, S. 65. 17 HOLMES, (wie Anm. 10), S. 97. 18 Dirk van LAAK, Carl Schmitt, ein Widergänger Weimars?, in: Intellektuelle im Nationalsozialismus. Hrsg. von Wolfgang BIALAS und Manfred GANGL, Frankfurt am Main, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Wien, Oxford 2000, S. 72; GROOS, (wie Anm. 16), S. 32; Stephan LOOS, Carl Schmitt. Ein deutsches Trauerspiel. Dezision und politische Souveränität in der Politischen Theologie, in: Leben, Tod und Entscheidung. Studien zur Geistesgeschichte der Weimarer Republik, hrsg. von Stephan Loos, Holger Zaborowski, Berlin 2003, S. 182. 19 Kurt SONTHEIMER, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik. Die politischen Ideen des deutschen Nationalismus zwischen 1918 und 1933, München 1994, S. 146; CAMPAGNA, (wie Anm. 13), S. 90; Alexander DEMANDT, Staatsform und Feindbild bei Carl Schmitt In: Der Staat 27, 1988, H. 1, S. 27. 16

316 Radek Soběhart ________________________________________________________

Familienmitglied sein muss.20 Ich bin der Meinung, dass das Weglassen des Begriffs „Freund“ einen der wichtigsten Vorwürfe gegenüber der Konzeption Schmitts darstellt. Schmitt zeigte in diesem Fall eher eine Unkonzeptionalität und Unkonsequenz als eine durchdachte politische Theorie.21 Als hätte er sich hinter der Behauptung versteckt, die Definition des Begriffs „Freund“ habe keine lange Tradition, womit er gleichwohl Platon und Aristoteles ignorierte, die die Grundlagen der Philosophie der Freundschaft schufen.22 In diesem Zusammenhang ist die Frage, ob die Definition des Begriffs „Freund“ nicht vorrangig und wichtiger sei als die Suche nach einem Feind, sicher berechtigt. Schmitt begnügte sich jedoch nicht nur mit der Teilung der Gesellschaft in Feinde und Freunde, er spitzte die Situation noch zu, indem er die Beziehung als die äußerste Grenze der menschlichen Existenz klassifizierte. Mit seiner Freund-Feind-Auffassung stellte er den Menschen bewusst in eine extreme Lebenssituation. Zwischen den zwei Polen gibt es keine dritte Möglichkeit,23 der Mensch müsse sich Schmitt zufolge entscheiden, auf welcher Seite er stehen werde. Und diesen „…extremen Konfliktsfall können nur die Beteiligten selbst unter sich ausmachen; namentlich kann jeder von ihnen nur selbst entscheiden, ob das Anderssein des Fremden im konkret vorliegenden Konfliktfalle die Negation der eigenen Art Existenz bedeutet und deshalb abgewehrt oder bekämpft wird, um die eigene, seinsmäßige Art von Leben zu bewahren.“24 Ich möchte in diesem Zusammenhang das Verb „kämpft“ betonen. Das Wort Kampf „… bedeutet nicht Konkurrenz, nicht den 'rein geistigen' Kampf der Diskussion, nicht das symbolische 'Ringen', das schließlich jeder Mensch Carl SCHMITT, Corollarien 2: Über das Verhältnis der Begriffe Krieg und Feind (1938), in: Schmitt, (wie Anm. 6), S. 104; Eric HOERL, Die Privatisierung des Politischen bei Carl Schmitt, in: Gegen den Ausnahmezustand. Zur Kritik an Carl Schmitt. Politische Philosophie und Ökonomie, hrsg. von Wolfgang Pircher, Wien 1999, S. 102. 21 Einige Interpreten erklären dies mit seinen Misserfolgen im Privatleben, wo er weder eine feste Beziehung noch eine dauerhafte Freundschaft geknüpft hatte, vgl. NIETHAMMER, (wie Anm. 16), S. 79–81. 22 Jacques DERRIDA, Die Politik der Freundschaft, in: Philosophie der Freundschaft, hrsg. von Klaus-Dieter Eichler, Leipzig 1999, S. 195; Jörg PANNIER, Das Vexierbild des Politischen. Dolf Sternberger als politischer Aristoteliker, Berlin 1996, S. 81. 23 SCHMITT, (wie Anm. 6), S. 27; Friedrich BALKE, Zur politischen Anthropologie Carl Schmitts, in: Die Autonomie des Politischen. Carl Schmitts Kampf um einen beschädigten Begriff, hrsg. von Hans-Georg Flickinger, Weinheim 1990, S. 40; Ulrich K. PREUß, Carl Schmitt. Die Bändigung oder die Entfesselung des Politischen?, in: Mythus Staat. Carl Schmitts Staatverständnis, Hrsg. von Rüdiger VOIGT, Baden-Baden 2001, S. 145. 24 SCHMITT, (wie Anm. 6), S. 27; CAMPAGNA, (wie Anm. 13), S. 81–82. 20

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irgendwie immer vollführt, weil nun einmal das ganze menschliche Leben ein 'Kampf' und jeder Mensch ein 'Kämpfer' ist. Die Begriffe Freund, Feind und Kampf erhalten ihren realen Sinn dadurch, dass sie insbesondere auf die reale Möglichkeit der physischen Tötung Bezug haben und behalten. Der Krieg folgt aus der Feindschaft, denn diese ist seinsmäßige Negierung eines anderen Seins. Krieg ist nur die äußerste Realisierung der Feindschaft. Er braucht nichts Alltägliches, nichts Normales zu sein, auch nicht als etwas Ideales oder Wünschenswertes empfunden zu werden, wohl aber muß er als reale Möglichkeit vorhanden bleiben, solange der Begriff des Feindes seinen Sinn hat…“25 Schmitt spricht hier vom Krieg ganz klar als von einer möglichen politischen Methode, nicht von einer „Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln“, sondern als von einer der vielen Möglichkeiten, den politischen Kampf zu führen.26 Dem Staat kam in der Entscheidung über den Krieg und Frieden eine wichtige Bedeutung zu, denn er war das einzige Subjekt, das von seinen Bürgern verlangen konnte, für ihn zu töten oder zu sterben.27 Die Loyalität sowie die Einigkeit des Volks und die Tatsache, dass der Staat und das Politische identisch sind, spiegelten sich in der Möglichkeit, einen Krieg zu

SCHMITT, (wie Anm. 6), S. 33; GROSSHEUTSCHI, (wie Anm. 9), S. 111; Wilfried NIPPEL, Krieg als Erscheinungsform der Feindschaft (28-37), in: Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen. Ein kooperativer Kommentar, hrsg. von Reinhard Mehring, Berlin 2003, S. 61. 26 Er selbst versuchte dem Krieg einen bestimmten Schein von Existenzialismus zu geben: „Denn erst im wirklichen Kampf zeigt sich die äußerste Konsequenz der politischen Gruppierung von Freund und Feind. Von dieser extremsten Möglichkeit her gewinnt das Leben der Menschen seine spezifisch politische Spannung.“ SCHMITT, (wie Anm. 6), S. 35. 27 SCHMITT, (wie Anm. 6), S. 46, 70; Günter MEUTER, Günter; Henrique Ricardo OTTEN, Das Recht der Neuzeit. Carl Schmitts Geschichtsbild als Instrumentarium der Krisenanalyse, in: Alteuropa oder Frühe Moderne. Deutungsmuster für das 16. bis 18. Jahrhundert aus dem Krisenbewußtsein der Weimarer Republik in Theologie-, Rechtsund Geschichtswissenschaft, hrsg. von Luise Schorn-Schütte, Berlin, 1999, S. 161. 25

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führen, wider.28 Und wenn er sich entscheiden sollte, einen Krieg zwischen zwei Staaten oder einen Krieg innerhalb des Staats zu führen, galt für ihn der Krieg in der Gesellschaft als die äußerste Alternative, denn ein „Bürgerkrieg“ bedeutete eine grundsätzliche Gefährdung der Souveränität und Staatseinheit, deswegen war seine Priorität, jedwede Situation zu verhindern, die in einen Bürgerkrieg ausufern konnte. 29 Warum legte Schmitt so viel Wert auf die Begriffe „Feind“ und „Krieg“? Einige Erklärer erläutern dies mit seiner anthropologischen Einstellung zum Menschen. Er ging von der These aus, dass „… alle echten politischen Theorien den Menschen als ‘böse’ voraussetzen, d. h. als keineswegs unproblematisches, sondern als ‘gefährliches’ und dynamisches Wesen betrachten“.30 Nicht einmal hier entwickelte Schmitt diesen Gedanken weiter und blieb nur bei einer allgemeinen Feststellung, was seine Erklärung problematischer macht.31 Meiner Meinung nach sind jene Autoren einer richtigen Erklärung näher, die Schmitts Thesen als eine Wiederbelebung des Kriegserlebnisses aus dem Ersten Weltkrieg betrachten. Gerade in den 1920er Jahren setzte sich in der deutschen Gesellschaft eine heldenhafte Darstellung des „Großen Kriegs“ durch, die eine militärische Lebensführung, Soldatensprache und -denken, „echte“ Kameradschaft und Schmitt ging es nicht um die Anzahl der Kriegssituationen, sondern um die alltägliche Möglichkeit einen Krieg zu führen. Der Staat konnte sich dieses Arguments zur permanenten Mobilisierung und Aktivierung der Bevölkerung bedienen. Falls die Bevölkerung in Angst oder mit der Möglichkeit eines Kriegsausbruchs lebt, wird sie keine Zeit haben, über das Wesen oder sogar die Legitimität des Staats nachzudenken, der von ihr verlangt, ihr Leben zu opfern. Dies beeinflusste auch Schmitts Einstellung zur Frage, was der Krieg eigentlich sei. Er antwortete: alles, was kein Frieden ist. Vgl. Carl SCHMITT, Corollarien 2: Über das Verhältnis der Begriffe Krieg und Feind (1938), in: Schmitt, (wie Anm. 6), S. 104. Im Grunde genommen rechnete er gar nicht mit dem Frieden, denn Frieden stellte für ihn keine Lösung dar. Außerdem ließ er die Alternativen zwischen Krieg und Frieden, wie Waffenstillstand, Interim, Übereinkommen usw. absichtlich weg. Volker GERHARD, Politik als Ausnahme. Der Begriff des Politischen als dekontextualisierte Antitheorie, in: Carl Schmitt. Der Begriff des Politischen. Ein kooperativer Kommentar, hrsg. von Reinhard Mehring, Berlin 2003, S. 215; Henrique Ricardo OTTEN, Wie Realpolitik in den Mythos umschlägt. Die „Sachlichkeit“ des Politischen bei Carl Schmitt, in: Mythus Staat. Carl Schmitts Staatsverständnis. Hrsg. von Rüdiger VOIGT, Baden-Baden 2001, S. 182. 29 Schmitts Betonung der Gefahr eines Bürgerkriegs und der Pflicht des Staats, gegen den internen Feind hart vorzugehen, zeigte sich vielen seiner Kritiker zufolge nach 1933 klar, indem er die Maßnahmen des Nazi-Deutschlands gegen die Juden aktiv unterstützte. GROSSHEUTSCHI, (wie Anm. 9), S. 114. 30 SCHMITT, (wie Anm. 6), S. 61. 31 BALKE, (wie Anm. 23), S. 37-38; Ernst-Wolfgang BÖCKENFÖRDE, Was kennzeichnet das Politische und was ist sein Grund? Bemerkung zu einer Kommentierung von Carl Schmitts „Begriff des Politischen“. In: Der Staat 44, 2005, H. 4, S. 604. 28

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ein intensives Militärerlebnis hervorhob. Ich stimme der Meinung zu, dass Schmitt dem Kriegsmythos unterlag und den Kampf als die einzige Möglichkeit sah, um die Verhältnisse in der Weimarer Republik zu verändern.32 Meines Erachtens blieb Schmitt ideologisch vor dem Jahr 1918 stehen und sein Ideal war immer noch der militärische, nationale und hierarchische deutsche Staat von vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg.33 Damit möchte ich zwar seine Bedeutung als einen der wichtigsten Kritiker der Weimarer Republik nicht abwerten, aus seinen Worten kann man jedoch Angst, Furcht und Panik vor der neuen Ordnung nach 1918 spüren. Und die Begriffe „Feind“ und „Freund“ sind nur klare Beweise seiner „Begriffsmagie“, der er keinen klaren Inhalt zu geben vermochte.

Richard BESSEL, Germany after the First World War, Oxford 1993, S. 265; Stefan BREUER, Anatomie der Konservativen Revolution, Darmstadt 1993, S. 38; HOLMES, (wie Anm. 10), S. 84. 33 BREUER, (wie Anm. 32), S. 41. 32

The Schönborn Palace and its Prewar American Residents Igor Lukes

The United States Embassy in the Schönborn Palace in Prague stands on Tržiště, a street that meanders from the Malá Strana quarter up toward the Petřín Hill. Despite its picturesque setting, it has witnessed a number of dramatic events. This paper focuses on the period from the end of World War One to the temporary departure of American diplomats in the fall of 1940. The history of the Schönborn Palace was reviewed by Friedrich Count Schönborn, President of the Higher Administrative Court of the Habsburg Empire, in a 1905 public lecture he gave in Vienna.1 The sixty-six year old jurist, once the empire’s minister of justice, noted that the palace one of his ancestors had acquired in the late 18th century was a post from which one could have observed some of the central events in European history. From the top floor, he recalled, one could see Hradčany, the castle, which dominates the city’s panorama, home to kings and emperors. Upon closer examination, noted Count Schönborn, one could identify the very window from which, in May 1618, representatives of the Czech estates had cast the envoys of the Habsburg emperor, unleashing the forces that plunged Europe into three decades of conflict. One of the post-White Mountain arrivals was Charles Prince of Liechtenstein who purchased the site of the future Schönborn Palace, tore down all the existing buildings in the area, and ordered the construction of an entirely new palace and gardens. The new property was purchased by the powerful Franz Cardinal Dietrichstein whose family sold it to the Princes of Colloredo. It was Rudolf Count Colloredo (1585–1657), owner of the palace, who repulsed and turned back the Swedish offensive in 1648. The Colloredos kept the property for over a century. Carl Friedrich Count von Hatzfeld, Grand Chancellor of Bohemia and a Knight of the Golden Fleece of the Habsburg Empire purchased the palace in 1771. Some The following review is based on Brigitte HAUGER, The Schönborn Palace: A History of the American Chancery Building in Prague, unpublished manuscript, no date. I am grateful to the staff of the U. S. Embassy in Prague for giving me a copy of this perceptive paper. See also Archives of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMFA), “History of the Site and Building of the American Embassy, Prague III, Tržiště 15,” 1945– 54, 6th Section, USA, box 16. 1

322 Igor Lukes ________________________________________________________

forty years later it passed to Damian Hugo Ervin Count von Schönborn, Imperial Chamberlain and Privy Counselor. It stayed in the hands of the Schönborns, a significant family originally from the Rhineland that gave Europe a long line of bishops, archbishops, cardinals, administrators, and lawyers, until 1919. The American Tenants The palace took a decidedly democratic turn, when it was acquired by the first American minister accredited to the new state of Czechoslovakia. Richard T. Crane (1882–1938), the American envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, graduated from Harvard in 1904 and devoted some ten years to working for the Crane Company that was established by his grandfather. He became an assistant to the Secretary of State Robert Lansing in 1915 and four years later, in April 1919, he was appointed by President Woodrow Wilson as the first American minister to Prague, the secretary of state having established his salary at $12,000 per annum.2 The appointment was hardly surprising. First, the Crane family were among the greatest financial contributors to the Democratic Party’s coffers. For instance, in the frugal year 1920, the Cranes contributed $10,000 and were planning to give more.3 There was another reason for Richard Crane’s appointment: his father, Charles R. Crane, had visited Prague in 1902, befriended Thomas G. Masaryk, invited him to the University of Chicago where he had endowed a chair in Slavic studies, and introduced him to influential personalities in the United States, including President Woodrow

The Richard T. Crane Papers, Georgetown University, henceforth RCP, box 6, folder 14. RCP, box 6, folder 17. Roger H. Williams wrote to Minister Crane on 5 October 1920: “This is campaign time, and funds are being not only asked for but strongly urged, and I have just made a contribution of $10,000 to the Democratic Fund. In order not to have the amount seem too large, I have put it in two checks, one ostensibly from you for $2,500, and one for $7,500 from your father. I am expecting later to give further amounts on behalf of your father.” 2 3

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Wilson.4 This proved quite helpful for America’s relations with Czechoslovakia since Masaryk was now the new country’s first president. Minister Crane sailed from the United States on 6 May 1919, landed in Brest, took a train to Paris and arrived in Prague a mere twenty-three days later, on 29 May 1919. As the express from Paris came to a full stop in Prague at 13:30, the nervous band had already started playing the Star Spangled Banner. To make it worse, the new American minister was unable to locate his silk hat in his luggage. Since he was unwilling to alight and face the official party without proper headgear, a scene worthy of Charlie Chaplin unfolded. The band kept playing the tune over and over again while the American minister, frantically searching for his hat, was conspicuously absent. It was after quite a few repetitions that Minister Crane finally appeared – properly attired. There was an honor guard, dignitaries, and a crowd of well wishers, and also Jan Masaryk, the president’s son and Crane’s friend, who escorted the American minister to the presidential castle, Hradčany. After a lunch with President Masaryk and his daughter Olga, Jan took Crane to his temporary quarters in the splendid residence of the Archbishop of Prague, Cardinal Schwarzenberg. Crane’s rooms were on the second floor west. “My suite quite magnificent,” he noted in his diary.5 Minister Crane formally presented his credentials and good wishes from the United States to President Masaryk on 11 June 1919. Two days later, he enjoyed an opera performance in his honor. Although he was a novice in diplomacy, he became Dean of the Diplomatic Corps. The relationship between the new Republic of Czechoslovakia and America could not have been any better. But there was a problem: the United States did not own any property that would be suitable for its diplomatic mission in RCP, Part II, box 1, folder 14. Richard Crane, Department of State, to President Woodrow Wilson, 7 May 1918. “My dear Mr. President, at the request of my father I am sending you the enclosed memorandum on Russia prepared by professor Masaryk of Prague, who has just arrived in this country after spending a year in Russia. You doubtless know that prof. M is the recognized leader of the Bohemians all over the world, and father considers him the greatest living authority on Central Europe.” (By hand.) Richard Crane, Department of State, to President Woodrow Wilson, 11 May 1918, “My dear Mr. President: Father would like to see you some time Monday afternoon, if possible, to tell you why he is most anxious to have you see Professor Masaryk . . . . Professor Masaryk’s position as the leader of the Bohemian race, as well as a recognized authority on racial and political conditions in Austria-Hungary, makes it especially desirable, in view of recent developments in regard to these questions, that he be given an opportunity to see you.” See also John O. CRANE and Sylvia CRANE, Czechoslovakia: Anvil of the Cold War, New York 1991, pp. 16–17, 51–53, 321–323. Because of various factual errors this source has to be used with caution, but it provides inside information on the link between the Masaryks and the Cranes. 5 RCP, box 5, folder 25. 4

324 Igor Lukes ________________________________________________________

Prague. It helped that Minister Crane was a man of considerable means and he did not search long for an appropriate building that could serve as the U. S. legation. When he saw the Schönborn Palace on Tržiště on 26 July 1919 he was greatly impressed. He recorded the day in his diary: “Went out to look at Schönborn Palace, which has beautiful gardens, and may be useful for Legation purposes.”6 The palace had a grand gate in the center with a large balcony above it. The property consisted of four wings and three courtyards and had one hundred rooms; those on the first floor had ceilings that were more than thirty feet high. From the central yard rose a double flight of steps that took one to a large garden. Each step was designed to be extra wide, possibly because Count Colloredo had suffered a serious injury at the battle of Lützen in 1632 and preferred to go up and down the staircase on his horse.7 The gardens that rose above the palace were divided into two lower terraces, which were formal, and a large strip of land with fruit trees and greenhouses. Together they represented seven acres of the most fabulous piece of land in the city. At the top stood the Glorietta, an ornamental gazebo, from which visitors were treated to a breath-taking view of the city below and the Royal Castle above. Before the Schönborn Palace became a United States legation in 1919, painters used to come to its gardens because of the perspective they offered of the city.8 We have no difficulty imagining how the Schönborn Palace looked inside when Minister Crane came to inspect it. In early 1917, the then unknown Franz Kafka was looking for a new apartment and he described the process to his friend Felice Bauer in considerable detail. As millions suffered on the battlefields of the Great War, Kafka was driven to despair by his housing situation and the need to find a new apartment: “It scares me; I won’t be able to cope with it. Too much for me. I can’t describe more than a thousandth part of it in writing.”9 He lived in an apartment of the building “At the Golden Pike” at Malostranské Square, in the heart of Malá Strana. It was comfortable and pleasant, even the neighbors were tolerable, primarily because the sensitive man hardly ever saw them. But the structure carried sound so efficiently that any movement within, for instance, when a housemaid went to hang up the washing, caused Kafka to feel as if she “literally, RCP, box 5, folder 25. This is mentioned in various sources, e.g., Lewis EINSTEIN, A Diplomat Looks Back, New Haven 1968, p. 174. 8 HAUGER, The Schönborn Palace, 37. 9 Erich HELLER and Jürgen BORN (eds.), Franz Kafka, Letters to Felice, New York 1973, pp. 540–543. 6 7

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quite innocently, put the heel of her boot through my skull”. Hence the need to find another residence. Kafka hired a real estate agent who promptly showed him an apartment in the Schönborn Palace. He loved it: “The rooms are high and beautiful, red and gold, rather like Versailles. Four windows overlooking a quiet, dreamy courtyard, one window into the garden. The garden! On entering the gateway to the palace, one can hardly believe one’s eyes. Through the tall arch of the second gate, flanked by caryatids, one catches sight of a beautifully spaced double flight of stone steps leading to the large garden which rises gradually in a wide sweep up to a belvedere.” After much reflection, Kafka found this accommodation too expensive (650 crowns) and settled on a smaller apartment in the palace on the second floor with lower ceilings, but with a direct view of Hradčany. It cost less – 600 crowns – and was not as ostentatious. Kafka moved in and it was here that he wrote the short story Beim Bau der chinesischen Mauer. Like many properties of this kind, the Schönborn Palace was dilapidated and in need of modernization when Minister Crane saw it. The war had impoverished the once wealthy European aristocrats, including the Schönborns, who had postponed for too long necessary maintenance and various much-needed improvements. The last private owner, Carl Johann Count Schönborn, a Habsburg bureaucrat and a very pious man, had neither the means nor the practical skill to renovate the palace. He was resigned to selling the property to the highest bidder. In August 1919, Minister Crane received a note from Masaryk’s chancellor: “The President desires me to inform you that Count Schönborn’s palace in Prague III is not yet definitely sold and that the price of same is about 2 ½ and 3 million crowns.” The note informed Crane that there were two other potential buyers and that he had to decide promptly.10 The American minister took the warning seriously. On 23 October 1919 he went to see Jaroslav Preiss, one of the most prominent bankers in Prague, and took out a mortgage for financing the purchase of Schönborn Palace at five and a half percent interest with the provision that the amount could be repaid “as desired”.11 This did not happen too soon because the minister’s wife, Ellen, arrived in early November, found the conditions at the Archbishop’s palace substandard and left for Marienbad to recover from the disappointment. Energized, Crane noted in his diary that he was busy

10 11

RCP, box 6, folder 27. RCP, box 5, folder 25.

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looking for a new and comfortable legation and residence.12 He purchased the Schönborn Palace for $117,000. There was a catch: Mr. Crane was able to use only about twenty percent of the total space. The rest of the palace had tenants who, under existing laws, could not be forcibly evicted. Quite a few were poor and paid trivial or no rent at all.13 The Schönborn clan occupied a third of the one hundred rooms.14 It was easier for the Americans to co-exist with the Schönborns, of course, than with the needy lodgers. But the aristocrats kept their horses in stables directly under Minister Crane’s window, and the stench emanating from that source often combined with the smell of cooking from the other quarters in the palace; the result was most undesirable. And there was another serious obstacle – the City of Prague was uneasy about allowing the sale of the large and beautiful gardens to a private owner. It demanded, and obtained, Minister Crane’s commitment that he would allow some public access and that, should he decide to sell the property in the future, the city would have the right to make the first offer.15 Despite letters to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, and even a personal intervention, Minister Crane had never been able to make full use of his own property when he left Prague at the end of 1921.16 At the end of President Wilson’s term in the White House, following tradition, Minister Crane offered to resign his post to give the new president the freedom to choose his own envoys. He informed the secretary of state in February 1921 that his letter of resignation was effective at President Warren G. Harding’s pleasure. Amazed, he read the following note that arrived within just one month: “I am directed by the President to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of Feb 14th, and to inform you that your resignation as American Minister . . . is accepted.”17 Lewis David Einstein, the second American minister in Czechoslovakia, arrived by train in December 1921. He was a veteran Foreign Service officer, having joined the Department of State almost twenty years before. This exquisitely educated professional diplomat was also an art historian specializing in the Italian renaissance, an accomplished historian, and a close friend of the jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes. He enjoyed his new post in RCP, box 5, folder 1. EINSTEIN, p. 189. 14 HAUGER, The Schönborn Palace, p. 42. 15 RCP, box 5, folder 26. 16 RCP, box 5, folder 26. Crane noted in his dairy on 25 Feb 1920 that Ellen was so angry “at the delay in getting rooms at the Schönborn palace that she went to see Dr. Benes”. 17 RCP, box 6, folder 14. 12 13

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Prague immensely. The city fascinated him, he reported, because “from its ancient towers one saw the roads which lead south to the Danube, north to the Reich, and easterly across Poland to the Russian steppes”. It was, Einstein observed, a “meeting ground of East and West”, setting the tone for much of the geopolitical thinking that would gain currency some twenty-five years later.18 He found the Malá Strana neighborhood quite agreeable, noting approvingly that “modernity had not been permitted to intrude in its deserted streets nor deface the ancient palaces with their hidden gardens behind”. And he adored the Schönborn Palace: “In no other capital were diplomats lodged with greater architectural splendor”. Minister Einstein was delighted that the United States “owned the most ancient of its diplomatic residences in the youngest capital of the world”. 19 However, the palace urgently needed to be modernized and cleaned up, and it was impossible to start the complex operation as long as there were tenants. There did not seem to be a way of solving this dilemma while it belonged to a private individual. The United States Government therefore purchased the Schönborn Palace from Richard Crane in 1924 for a reasonable $125,000.20 This was, Minister Einstein noted, a generous arrangement for the American taxpayer. Mr. Crane could have asked for a larger sum.21 Once the palace ceased to be private property and became a diplomatic mission, different laws applied. Nevertheless, it still took several – possibly three – years, before the tenants were gone. Einstein wrote to the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs that he had had ample opportunity to determine that the tenants’ choice of “gramophone selections” differed from his own, and that the smell of their cooking made his quarters occasionally uninhabitable.22 Einstein’s situation was not made any easier by the daily habits of the last Schönborn owner who lived above the American minister’s salon. Count Schönborn liked to pray his rosary while walking around his apartment. He stomped his feet with such fervor that the chandeliers in Minister Einstein’s quarters would swing wildly whenever the Count was praying, which was often.23

EINSTEIN, p. 192. Ibidem, pp. 173–174. 20 HAUGER, The Schönborn Palace, s. 42. 21 EINSTEIN, pp. 191–192. 22 HAUGER, p. 44. 23 HAUGER, p. 41. 18 19

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It is a tribute to Minister Einstein’s patience that he endured such hardship and various other setbacks on the road to success.24 In the end, the American minister’s organizational skills enabled the great restoration project whereby the Schönborn residence was rebuilt and equipped with modern amenities. The State Department clearly appreciated the minister’s competence because he stayed in the post for eight years and four months, an unusually long tenure. Upon leaving in February 1930, he was proud to note that the property’s market value was now seven or eight times higher than the sum for which the United States Government acquired it six years before.25 Of course, not all of the American diplomats posted in Prague were as intimately connected to the new republic as Mr. Crane or left such a mark on the Schönborn Palace as Minister Einstein.26 Lewis Einstein’s successor, Abraham C. Ratshesky, stayed in the restored American Legation from May 1930 to May 1932. He was a Boston-born Republican and a supporter of President Herbert Hoover, who had appointed him. A man of enterprise and courage, Ratshesky was in charge of the 1917 expedition that brought supplies to Halifax, Nova Scotia, after the explosion of an ammunition ship wreaked unprecedented havoc.27 He gave an excellent speech when presenting his credentials to President Masaryk at the Prague Castle.28 But, judging by the scant volume of reports to Washington, it is not clear that he was interested in Czechoslovak politics. Early in 1933, just before his four-year term in the White House expired, President Hoover named Henry Frank Holthusen to be his next minister in Prague. Columbia graduate, World War I officer, and corporation lawyer, Holthusen also had extensive experience in government “Prague Courts Balk American Legation: Decline to Oust Tenant of Palace,” The New York Times, 20 December 1925. The article reports that the United States Legation in Prague appealed a recent court decision to the effect that a foreign diplomatic mission was not exempt from the existing housing laws. 25 EINSTEIN, pp. 191–192. 26 At least one appeared to be insane. Charles E. Bohlen, who served as a U. S. consul in Prague for two “pleasant” years from 1929 to 1931, recorded the mental breakdown of a consul general. The gentleman had become progressively more paranoid until he completely isolated himself in his apartment, subsisting only on beer and raw beef. When he found out that his colleagues were about to seize him, he dashed out of his rooms, hailed a cab and took it all the way to Carlsbad – a good eighty miles west of Prague – “scattering hunks of beef on the way, presumably to divert his pursuers”. Charles E. BOHLEN, Witness to History, 1929–1969, New York 1973), pp. 7–9. 27 “Abraham Ratshesky, Banker, Diplomat, 78,” The New York Times, 17 March 1943. 28 “Prague Greets Our Envoy: Rathesky Carries Hoover’s Felicitations to President Masaryk,” The New York Times, 3 May 1930. 24

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service. But his appointment was made so close to the end of President Hoover’s term that he was not confirmed by the senate.29 When Adolf Hitler became Chancellor and Führer, it was President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s turn to nominate the United States minister who would preside over the Schönborn Palace. He picked Francis White, a Republican and the current Assistant Secretary of State. This proved to be an unlucky choice. The new minister departed for Europe in August 1933 on USS Washington.30 He presented his credentials to President Masaryk in September, but then left abruptly in November. He told the press that he had found the post too expensive to maintain and he did not like the living quarters, i.e., the newly restored Schönborn Palace. He packed up his belongings and departed. The legation remained in the hands of J. Webb Benton, chargé d’affaires, pending the next appointment.31 FDR now chose J. Butler Wright to be his minister in Prague. This well-rounded man had graduated from Princeton and had worked as a financier and rancher, before becoming a career Foreign Service officer. He had served in Russia, Hungary, and Uruguay.32 He presented his credentials to Masaryk in October 1934 and stayed until June 1937. In contrast to his unhappy predecessor, he thought the Schönborn Palace lovely and was pleased to find that the office could be maintained inexpensively. He told his successor that he should be able to live as America’s minister in Prague on his salary, which was $1,000 per annum.33 Some Americans at the Schönborn Palace had no reason to be concerned with expenses. Consul General Orme Wilson, Jr. served in Prague from November 1934 to 1936.34 On arrival, he and his wife, Alice Borland Wilson, rented an ostentatious palace for their residence. When another Foreign Service officer saw it, he blurted out: “What do you have to pay for this?” The answer was a calm: “Not very much”. It took some time for the staffer to learn that Mr. Wilson’s mother was from the Astor family and that his wife descended from the Vanderbilts.35 “Henry Holthusen, Lawyer, Dies; Foreign Service Inspector, 77,” The New York Times, 20 September 1971. 30 “Ocean Travelers,” The New York Times, 2 August 1933. 31 “Only 4 Vacancies in Foreign Service,” The New York Times, 26 December 1933. 32 William T. ALLISON (ed.), J. Butler Wright, Witness to Revolution: The Russian Revolution Diary and Letters, Westport 2002. 33 Peter BRIDGES, “Mr. Carr Goes to Prague,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 8, vol. 3 (November 1997). Much of the information on Carr is drawn from this excellent source. 34 Register of the Department of State (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1940), 208. 35 Dorothy BRUINS, “Unpublished manuscript,” p. 95. 29

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The last prewar American minister in Prague was Wilbur J. Carr, a legend in American diplomatic circles. He joined the Department of State as a clerk in 1892 and served until his retirement in 1939. Over the decades he was one of the few civil servants who provided stability and continuity in the Department at a time when secretaries of state came and went rapidly. It was Carr who designed in 1924 a system for a merit-based promotion in the Foreign Service.36 Some consider him its father.37 He worked on behalf of the Department’s interests with an “imperturbable patience, a studied softness of speech, and a transparent integrity.” His name, writes George Kennan, was “in the consciousness of every member of the American Foreign Service”.38 In June 1937, Carr was already sixty-seven, two years past the mandatory retirement age. Therefore, when he was summoned by Secretary of State Cordell Hull he had reason to assume he might be invited to submit his resignation. He was surprised to learn that President Roosevelt wanted him to take over the Legation in Prague. Secretary Hull told Carr that Prague was now, in the president’s opinion, “one of the most important posts in Europe”. Carr accepted the charge and, as Kennan put it, became a “firstrate chief of mission”. He arrived in Prague in September 1937 and went to work immediately, on the 10th. On Tuesday, 14 September 1937, the former President Thomas G. Masaryk died and the whole country – before Minister Carr’s eyes – was plunged into sorrow. The first official duty of the new minister was to represent the United States at the state funeral for the deceased founder of Czechoslovakia.39 Minister Carr was well aware of the need to create a sense of camaraderie at the legation. A wife of a foreign service officer later recalled that Minister Carr helped the staff celebrate Christmas 1937 by assuming the role of Father Christmas, complete with the staff, beard, fur hat and gifts for all the children who solemnly declared that they had been good. At the end of the evening, Mrs. Carr played carols at the piano while her husband picked up his violin.40 The American Legation in Prague received a powerful boost at the end of September 1938 when George F. Kennan, a rising star of the Foreign Service, flew to Prague. He arrived just as the outcome of the Four Power Act signed at Munich became known. The city was still under a complete George F. KENNAN, Memoirs, 1925–1950, Boston 1967, p. 89. Dorothy BRUINS, Unpublished manuscript, 94 and KENNAN, p. 89. 38 KENNAN, p. 89. 39 BRIDGES “Mr. Carr Goes to Prague”. 40 BRUINS, “Unpublished manuscript,” p. 115. 36 37

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blackout and a concrete air shelter was under construction in the garden of the U.S. Legation. But the streets were filled with weeping crowds and it soon became clear to Kennan that the Government of President Benes was going to accept the terms dictated from Munich. Kennan saw the Czechoslovak-German crisis reach a point of feverish intensity, followed by the breakdown and surrender. There was little the small American Legation could do, other than observe and report on the crisis to Washington. Unlike the French, British, German, Soviet, and Italian diplomats in Prague, the Americans were only marginally involved in the dispute regarding Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland. The Schönborn Palace was one of the few remaining islands of peace, as the city around it suffered a nervous breakdown. Kennan recorded an episode that illustrates the contrast between the gathering fury outside and the solidity and slowness within the walls of the Legation. He had been invited by Minister Carr to join him for dinner. He got dressed and waited for the butler’s call. None came. After some time he ventured out of his apartment. Eventually, in one of the great salons, he found the American minister “peacefully sleeping in an armchair. The servants stood respectfully behind the curtains of the dining room, not daring to wake him. The sight of the old gentleman, thus peacefully at rest in the solitary splendor of his heavily curtained salons while outside in the growing darkness a Europe seething with fear and hatred and excitement danced its death dance all around us, struck me as a symbolic enactment of the helplessness of all forces of order and decency, at the moment, in the face of the demonic powers that history had now unleashed.”41 After its capitulation to the Diktat from Munich, Czechoslovakia attempted to continue without the borderland territories, but no state thus truncated could have maintained a sovereign existence without allies and without any credible means of defending itself. On 15 March 1939 Hitler militarily occupied the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, creating a German protectorate that was to exist next to a quasi-autonomous Slovakia.42 Some three weeks later, on 6 April 1939, Minister Carr departed

KENNAN, p. 90. “Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles,” 17 March 1939. This regarded the visit by the German chargé d’ affaires, Dr. Thompsen, who formally announced the “proclamation by Germany of a protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia”. Mr. Welles accepted the note “but made no comment with regard thereto”. FRUS, 1939, vol. II, 567–568. 41

42

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from the city that now lived in terror under the heel of the Nazis. He resigned from the Foreign Service in July 1939.43 With the disappearance of Czechoslovakia and the American minister’s departure, the Schönborn Palace was downgraded from a legation to a consulate general.44 The State Department had chosen Irving Nelson Linnell to be the American consul general in Prague even prior to the German occupation – he sailed to Europe on 10 March 1939.45 Linnell was a Harvard-trained lawyer with extensive Foreign Service experience. Before coming to Prague, he had served in Canada, Great Britain, South Africa, and China.46 Although his signature is on many documents available in the National Archives, some of which are important, Kennan indicates that he was the actual author of much that went from the American Consulate General in German-occupied Prague to Washington.47 The United States accepted the “de facto situation prevailing in Bohemia and Moravia”, but it refused to grant legal recognition to the consequences of the occupation of 15 March 1939.48 In addition to issuing an explicit statement to this effect, the written request for Consul General Linnell’s exequatur was accompanied by an oral statement by chargé d’affaires Alexander Kirk in Berlin that the “submission of the formal application for an exequatur for the Consul General in Prague does not indicate a change in the position of the American Government with regard to Czechoslovakia”.49 The German Foreign Office took some time to study the request and then pointed out that the position of the United States was illogical. Washington was asking Berlin to allow an American consul general to function in Prague, thus accepting that the Third Reich exercised jurisdiction over that territory. At the same time, the Americans stated that they did not Register of the Department of State, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1940, p. 214. 44 The Acting Secretary of State, Washington, to Minister Carr, Prague, 17 March 1939. Mr. Welles asked Minister Carr to prepare to “close the Legation and turn over the files and archives to the Consulate General, and to return to Washington at your convenience”. FRUS, 1939, vol. 1, 47. 45 “Ocean Travelers,” The New York Times, 10 March 1939. 46 Register of the Department of State, Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1940, p. 140. 47 KENNAN, Memoirs, p. 100. 48 Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Washington, to chargé d’affaires, Alexander Kirk, U. S. Embassy, Berlin, 8 July 1939, FRUS, 1939, vol. II, 458–459. See also Department of State, Press Releases, 18 March 1939, 199. 49 The Secretary of State, Washington, to the chargé d’affaires Alexander Kirk, U.S. Embassy, Berlin, 25 May 1939, FRUS, 1939, vol. II, 458. 43

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recognize that Germany now ruled over the lands of the former Czechoslovakia. “Since the request of the American Government for the granting of the exequatur involves this contradiction, the Foreign Office regrets that it cannot comply with it”.50 The Germans hinted that the exequatur would be granted if the written request were submitted without the accompanying oral restatement of the U.S. position.51 But time was running out and ultimately both sides lost patience with such diplomatic games. Secretary Hull wrote to Berlin on 22 July 1939 that he had “nothing to add” to what had been said already. The German position remained the same: the foreign affairs of the former Czechoslovakia were now conducted by the Third Reich. “The result is that the government of the protectorate does not receive foreign missions and that foreign missions accredited to the former Czechoslovak Government are no longer legally permitted to continue in the exercise of their official duties”.52 Nevertheless, Linnell kept the American flag above the entrance to the Schönborn Palace well into 1940. He was recalled to the State Department in August 1940, and after some delay, in September 1940, the German Foreign Office requested that all American diplomats leave Prague promptly. They did so on 15 October 1940.53 Consul General Linnell had to leave behind his eight-cylinder Buick, a marvel of a car at the time. More than one hundred American citizens had remained in the German-occupied Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. After Pearl Harbor five of them were seized by the Nazis and placed in confinement at the Hotel Koruna at the center of Prague. 54 Just before they left, the Americans handed the keys to the Schönborn Palace to the Swiss Consul General Albert Huber and negotiated a deal whereby Switzerland would protect American interests in Prague and care for its legation. As was to be expected the Swiss consul executed his

Chargé d’affaires Alexander Kirk, U. S. Embassy, Berlin, to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Washington, 3 July 1939, FRUS, 1939, vol. II, 458–459. 51 Chargé d’affaires Alexander Kirk, U. S. Embassy, Berlin, to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Washington, FRUS, 1939, vol. II, 461–462. 52 Chargé d’affaires Alexander Kirk, U. S. Embassy, Berlin, to the Secretary of State, Washington, 12 May 1939, FRUS, 1939, vol. II, 53 Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Washington, to chargé d’affaires Alexander Kirk, U. S. Embassy, Berlin, 22 July 1939, FRUS, 1939, vol. II, 467. 54 Swiss Federal Archives, E 2200.56 -/3, 59, 1.106.53, Aktenzeichen: USA 201 Prag. Schweizerische Gesandschaft in Deutschland, Abteilung: Schutzmachtangelegenheiten, Berlin, Frank Novotny, Custodian of the U. S. Government-owned property in Prague. 50

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obligations to the letter.55 At regular intervals, the Swiss Consulate General in Prague assured the United States that all was well with the Schönborn Palace and the personal articles left behind by the last departing State Department employees. Custodians of U. S. property in Prague, Frank Novotny and, later, Frank Beranek, produced detailed and rather elegant reports on the status of the building and the small staff that took care of its one hundred rooms and the large gardens. There is a surreal quality to these reports, focused on stains caused by dampness, broken window-panes, and other trivial items while the horror of the war was taking place outside the small American island in the heart of the city. The Nazi rulers of Prague made no effort to cause trouble. Although the departing Americans had left behind the complete archive of the United States Legation, it was never disturbed by the German authorities.56 Despite the state of war between the two countries, they fully respected the extraterritoriality of the Schönborn Palace and never entered it. Even the great Kennan, for all his dark fears and premonitions about the future in the late thirties, did not foresee its hideousness. The world of Czechoslovak democracy and of men like Count Schönborn and Ministers Crane, Einstein, and Carr was seriously damaged between 1939 and 1945. When the next team of American diplomats arrived in May 1945 to reopen the embassy in Prague, the city was full of Red Army troops and it was clear that more than dusting would be needed for the embassy to succeed.

Consul General Huber served in Prague from June 1939 to September 1945. During the war Switzerland also protected several other allied interests, including the British Legation in Prague. References to this period can be found in Daniel C. SCHMID, Dreieckskgeschichten. Die Schweitzer Diplomatie, das ‘Dritte Reich’ und die bömischen Länder, 1938–1945, Zürich 2004. 56 Swiss Federal Archives, Bundesarchiv Bern, E 2001-02-/11, Bd. 55 and 1000/113 Bd 3, DO 13, 5 July 1945, Der Generalkonsul Huber, Prague, to Abteilung für Fremde Interessen des Eidgenössischen Politischen Departements, Bern. 55

Conclusion of the Czechoslovak-Romanian Little Entente Treaty of Alliance in Spring 1921 Andrej Tóth

This paper documents the procedural background of the process of persuading Romania to sign a treaty of alliance with Czechoslovakia managed by Edvard Beneš, the head of Czechoslovak diplomacy, immediately after the Easter restoration attempt by the former Emperor Charles I. Habsburg in Hungary; specifically it covers a period from 6 to 23 April 1921, till the day when the Czechoslovak-Romanian alliance convention was signed.1

The issue of the military and political association of the Little Entente was dealt with in a number of studies and monographs dealing with various aspects of this alliance. Actually, even the literature from the inter-war period is very rich on this topic. With regard to the scope of literature on the issue of Little Entente, I would only like to point out some Czech and foreign works, specifically those created after 1945. As regards Czech literature, we owe to mention the so most comprehensive monograph so far about the Little Entente in the Czech Republic by Zdeněk SLÁDEK, Malá dohoda 1919–1938, Praha, 2000. In connection with Czechoslovak-Romanian relations we need to mention a study by Miroslav TEJCHMAN, Počátky diplomatických vztahů československorumunských, Slovanský přehled, 57, 1971, No. 4, pp. 273–280. The establishment of the Little Entente was dealt with by Koloman GAJAN, Polsko-ruská válka a vznik Malé dohody ve světle diplomatických dokumentů. In: České země a Československo v Evropě IX. a XX. století – sborník prací k 65. narozeninám prof. dr. Roberta Kvačka, organized by Jindřich DEJMEK and Josef HANZAL, Praha, 1997, pp. 191–206. As regards foreign monographs, I would like to point out especially monographs by Hungarian historian Magda ÁDÁM, The Little entente and Europe 1920–1929, Budapest 1993, Richtung Selbstvernichtung. Die Kleine Entente 1920–1938, Budapest 1989 and Magyarország és a kisantant a harmincas években, Budapest 1968; and as far as international works on this topic are concerned, worth mentioning are – Milan VANKU, Mala antanta 1920– 1938, Titovo Užice 1969; Nicolae IORDACHE, La Petite Entente et l’ Europe Centrale, Genève 1977; Andrzej ESSEN, Polska a Mala Ententa 1920–1934, Warszawa, Kraków 1992. As regards a broader international political aspect of the beginning of Little Entente, or more precisely the policy of countries aligned in the Little Entente with dominant interests in Central Europe, we owe to mention a work called Alliance de Revers Stabilisation of France’s Alliance Policies in East Central Europe 1919–1921, Turku 1984, written by Kalervo HOVI. As regards sources for this study we need to mention that since it is a study whose target is to document namely the chronology of the procedural background of the effort of Czechoslovak diplomacy led by Edvard Beneš (whose intent was to make Romania conclude a treaty of alliance with Czechoslovakia and later on also with the SHS Kingdom), they comprise archive materials in the Archives of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter AMZV), specifically sent and received telegrams. 1

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The paper supplements the author’s study about the first restoration attempt by Charles in Hungary in spring 1921.2 The main objective of the Czechoslovak foreign policy during the first restoration attempt by Charles in Hungary in spring 1921 was to promptly eliminate the former Austro-Hungarian emperor-king from the Hungarian territory and to communicate a common protest to the Hungarian government along with the Yugoslav and Romanian governments by means of a common ultimative note. The basic target of this effort made by Prague diplomacy was to clearly and stringently demonstrate the integrity of the allied policy of the Little Entente, or the unity of Czechoslovakia and its allies, Yugoslavia and Romania, in their policy towards Hungary. The joint protest of the aforementioned Central-European allies was supposed to declare their readiness to intervene in Hungary against any development endangering the new setting of Central Europe, i.e., to declare their determination to protect the achieved status quo in Central Europe by any means necessary, including the use of either diplomatic or military forces. Nevertheless, the objective of this effort conducted by the Czechoslovak diplomacy led by Edvard Beneš was not only to demonstrate the integrated policy of the aforementioned Central-European allies. The intent of imperative Czechoslovak diplomacy during Charles’ Easter trip to Hungary was also an attempt to increase the isolation of their southern neighbor with the aim to create a more favourable position for bilateral negotiations between Prague and Budapest3 which started in March of the same year. It is beyond doubt that Beneš intended to use Charles’ arrival in Hungary to create the best achievable initial conditions to See Andrej TÓTH, Czechoslovak Policy and the First Restoration Attempt of Charles Habsburg in Hungary in the Spring of 1921, In: The Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, Prague, Vienna 2007, pp. 241–279. 3 Regarding the issue of the first bilateral negotiations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, see more detail in: Andrej TÓTH, První bilaterální jednání mezi Československem a Maďarskem – Bruck an der Leitha (1921). Moderní dějiny 9, pp. 97– 159; Andrej TÓTH, První bilaterální jednání mezi Československem a Maďarskem – Mariánské Lázně (1921) II. Moderní dějiny 10, pp. 29–76. Between 14–15 March the very first Czechoslovak-Hungarian bilateral negotiations took place in Lower Austrian town Bruck an der Leitha under the leadership of the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Edvard Beneš, his Hungarian resort colleague Gusztáv Gratz and Hungarian Prime Minister Earl Pál Teleki. Both parties clearly intended to continue the bilateral negotiations in the future, even though their opinions about the contents of the discussion differed significantly. While the Czechoslovak party considered it a priority to discuss questions mostly of economic type, Hungarians also wanted to discuss political issues and specific agreements. The meeting of government representatives of both the parties was repeated in June (23rd–24th) of that year, and was even held on Czechoslovak territory, in Mariánské Lázně. 2

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negotiate an economic agreement with Hungary without the need to deal with political issues much during the bilateral negotiations, which the Hungarian party obviously eagerly strove for. The attitude of the Hungarian government towards this issue justified the consolidation government concept introduced and maintained in the country with great difficulties from the international and political point of view; however, it did not subdue the Central European political isolation of the country, in fact it deepened it. Even though the scandal initiated by the arrival and short stay of the former emperor in Hungary was calmed down quickly and nearly automatically from the very beginning thanks to the active and sober attitude of the Hungarian government in re, without any significant diplomatic pressure from the outside, and even though the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs did not succeed in forcing his foreign allies to jointly submit an ultimative note to the Hungarian government during Charles’ visit, the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs did not come out of the “battle” as a loser, in fact it was vice versa. This was not even changed by the fact that the Czechoslovak diplomacy failed to take advantage of the scandal related to Charles’ return because the diplomacy did not succeed in pushing through the final solution of the royal issue, which is to be understood as giving clear guarantees that the Habsburgs would not return to the Hungarian throne, i.e., their dethroning in Hungary, and that the diplomacy did not succeed in taking advantage of the favourable situation with regard to the fast solution to the issue of West Hungary, which was expected to result in Austria being more obliged to Czechoslovakia. Even though Prague, in spite of all its diplomatic effort, failed to organize its allies into an integral diplomatic front against Hungary declaring its unshakeable unity, they succeeded in taking advantage of the unexpected situation from the point of view of foreign policy and in confirming the image of Hungary as a dangerous and inscrutable neighbour which has the potential to endanger the post-war setting of Central Europe, or specifically the independence and integrity of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania. Beneš was most interested in Romania, whom he hoped to see in the integrated alliance block with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (which Czechoslovakia was bound with by means of a protective alliance contract guaranteeing safety of both the countries against the potentially active Hungarian anti-Trianon policy). And therefore, after Charles was removed from the Hungarian territory, the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs successfully focused his attention on the full utilisation of the accrued unexpected internal situation in Hungary to complete the geo-political character of the Little Entente union showing

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some features of a military and political block based not only on mutual defense treaties of alliance, but also on bilateral military conventions. The main addressee of the immediate “post-Easter” foreign political initiative of the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs was obviously Romania for the above reasons; this country belonged to the political line of the Little Entente due to its attitude based on previous joint policy with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; however, it was not officially bound by a treaty of alliance if we ignore the Czechoslovak-Romanian alliance protocol of August 1920. Romanian foreign policy did not fully agree with the effort made by Prague to establish the Little Entente in the form promoted by Beneš, since the Czechoslovak version favoured Czechoslovak interests in the very heart of Europe and did not guarantee safety to the whole of Romania – it only protected its western border. This way the Czechoslovak concept offered Romania a shield against only one of its most dangerous neighbours and did not provide an alliance guarantee for its complex territorial integrity, which Czechoslovakia refused to bear responsibility for purely due to the political tendencies of the Czechoslovak diplomacy – a rather different, rather neutral relationship towards Soviet Russia, a frigid attitude to Poland and also a significant effort to individualize the Central European foreign policy without direct participation of big powers. From the geopolitical point of view Bucharest intended to incorporate Poland into the planned block since Romania and Poland shared the most dangerous enemy on the eastern border, and this enemy was, in fact, more dangerous than Hungary at that time; Bucharest shared this opinion regarding Poland with France too, and Romania had always carefully monitored French foreign and political orientation and adjusted its activities according to it. Beside Poland, Romania strove to include Greece also in the intended alliance with the clear target to create an integral cordon against the Bolshevik Russia supported by France. For this reason Beneš did not succeed in Bucharest, where he arrived at the time of surprising political rapprochement of Paris and Budapest, directly after signing the first bilateral treaty of alignment within the Little Entente with Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs Momčilo Ninčic in Belgrade, in the summer of 1920. The journey of the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs to Bucharest resulted only in a joint agreement, which took the form of a protocol representing a bilateral undertaking that Romania would help the attacked party in case of a Hungarian attack. At the head of this protocol the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs promised to Romania that in case of a Polish-

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Soviet conflict, Czechoslovakia along with Yugoslavia would prevent a Hungarian or Bulgarian attack against Romania, should there be one. A rather more favourable situation for Beneš’ plans did not come until the next year in spring. The reason for a change of circumstances in favour of Beneš’ ideas was not only Charles’ first restoration attempt in Hungary (though this event played an important role in this matter), but also especially the anti-Soviet Polish-Romanian contract about mutual military assistance, concluded on 3 March 1921. This significantly reduced the chance of another failure of the Czechoslovak diplomacy because of the Romanian effort to incorporate Poland into the Little Entente, or, if you like, the risk that Czechoslovakia would be involved in a potential eastern conflict. The conclusion of the Polish-Romanian treaty of alignment provided a much more favourable negotiation basis for the completion or creation of the Little Entente based on bilateral conventions between its members, which would maximally protect the territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak state at a minimal risk that Czechoslovakia would have to take over warranties of a more global responsibility exceeding its Central European interests. However, even after the conclusion of the Polish-Romanian treaty about mutual military assistance, Romanian political representation was not unified as regards concluding the treaty of alignment with Czechoslovakia, or, if you like, as regards joining the Little Entente, and therefore, they were absolutely inactive in this respect. Romania monitored the Central European question from a greater distance and unlike its Central European partners, it continued responding to Entente’s policy namely with regard to French policy. This is fully documented by an event related to the former King Charles’ arrival in Hungary, when Romania waited for the opinion from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and especially from the Entente, and acted only afterwards.4 The only loyal follower of the Czechoslovak foreign policy, not only as regards Charles’ adventurous venture5, but also as regards the Little Entente, was Yugoslavia – though “prima vista” only, since they also

See for example a telegram by Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest, who besides others announces on 2nd April 1921 in relation to the intervention into Prague planned by Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia: “However, I think that he (Take Ionescu) needs an initiative on our or Serbian part that would make him follow it.” (AMZV, Received telegrams 1921, No. 3801–4000; No. 31118). 5 See ibidem, where the following is said: “... his opinion is to intervene, however he indicated that this is not shared by others.” 4

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factored in Entente’s opinion more than Prague wished in the context of Central-European cooperation.6 Even though Hungarian events contributed to the creation of favourable conditions for Czechoslovak agitation concerning persuading Romania to join the treaty of alignment, which was pointed out to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest, who sent a telegram on 4 April where he also said: “I think that this is a good time to make the alliance issue public without regard to whether Charles leaves or stays”7; Romanian policy remained rather distant and did not prioritize the need for the Little Entente in their foreign policy. On the other hand, Czechoslovakia significantly underestimated the campaign in the local press aimed at winning the Romanian public opinion and Romanian political scene for the common treaty of alliance, which was documented by some statements of the Czechoslovak government’s envoy in Romania. He complained about the lack of funds available to the press section of the Czechoslovak foreign office in Bucharest and required them to be increased for the purpose of promoting the treaty of alliance.8 As far as top Romanian representatives are concerned the only supporter of the CzechoslovakYugoslav and Romanian cooperation was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Take Ionescu, who had suggested a meeting for diplomatic leaders of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania in Beograd during Easter events in Hungary; however, he also pointed out that Prime Minister Alexander Avaresco, a member of the People’s Party, might not agree with such a meeting, and therefore, Ionescu required a proactive attitude on the part of Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia and assured everyone that he would fully support the conclusion of the Little Entente treaty in the Romanian political scene.9 What is interesting is the fact that Beneš responded to the pledges of the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest regarding a prompt response to the Hungarian situation only after two days, on 6 April, i.e., only after he learned that the Romanian party did not see any reason to organize a meeting for the three ministers of foreign affairs in Belgrade any more after Charles See for example withdrawal of Yugoslavia from the draft of a joint ultimative note at the end of Charles’ Easter stay in Hungary in consequence of a differing opinion and absence of support provided by Italy as a member of the Triple Entente. 7 A telegram from the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest on 4th April 1921. AMZV, Received telegrams 1921, No. 3801–4000; No. 3838. 8 Ibidem. 9 A telegram from the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest on 2nd April 1921, AMZV, Received telegrams 1921, No. 3801–4000, No. 3820. 6

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had left the country.10 Only then did Beneš start focusing on the idea of the finite form of the Little Entente, or the intent to persuade Romania to sign the defense treaty of alliance. During the few days when the former ruler stayed on Hungarian territory, Beneš focused purely on Charles’ restoration attempt, clearly with the intent to create the most advantageous position for negotiating the Czechoslovak-Romanian treaty of alliance. Only after he realized that Romania was satisfied that Charles’ venture was terminated by his departure from Hungary and that Bucharest did not consider any further duress aimed against its western neighbour useful, the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs started negotiating with his Romanian partner about a meeting where a bilateral treaty of alliance might be signed. The Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs first presented this on 6 April when he suggested a meeting to the Romanian party through the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest, and where he intended to discuss the treaty of alliance; however, he “sub linea” pointed out – no doubt he did so for practical reasons – that he did not push this initiative and that “it depends on whether Romania is ready or not”.11 The following day he informed Bucharest again that he was willing to negotiate about a treaty similar to the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav one, i.e., a treaty which referred to Hungary and the Habsburgs only, not the eastern border” (to be understood as the eastern border of Romania).12 The Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs also refused the trilateral meeting in Belgrade13 suggested by Ionesco, since he doubted that two bilateral treaties could be signed at a time and was afraid that the meeting suggested by his Romanian resort colleague would fail to exceed the scope of an informative meeting or a discussion. He called this “a political mistake with regards to the current international situation,”14 which would only result in “diminishing the importance of our last action against Charles if we held a meeting with no positive outcome”.15 Beneš was ready to accept a A telegram from the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest on 6th April 1921, AMZV, Received telegrams 1921, No. 3801–4000, No. 3853. 11 Beneš’ telegram on 6th April 1921, AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5001–5200; No. 5165. 12 Beneš’ telegram to Czechoslovak envoy on 7th April 1921, AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5001–5200, No. 5167. 13 Ionescu suggested a meeting in Beograd at the initiative by Yugoslavian Prime Minister Nicola Pašić, and he planned to hold it during his trip to Paris and expected that “both the conventions would be completed” there. 14 Beneš’ telegram to the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest on 9th April 1921, a free quote from AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5001–5200, No. 5179. 15 Ibidem. 10

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meeting in Beograd only if it were clear that the meeting would result in the creation of the Little Entente (i.e., signing of two bilateral treaties of alliance, conclusion of a treaty of alliance between Czechoslovakia and Romania on one part and between Romania and Yugoslavia on the other), which he himself considered highly unlikely under the given circumstances. For this reason, the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs preferred a more conservative option, i.e., the attempt to persuade Romania to sign a bilateral alliance convention only with Czechoslovakia for the time being.16 Beneš’ diplomatic activity after Charles’ departure from the Hungarian territory fully focused on compensation of the failure of the Czechoslovak diplomacy concerning integral diplomatic policy against Hungary at the time of Charles’ Easter restoration attempt. Beneš wanted to demonstrate this failure by quickly signing a treaty of alliance with Romania which he considered necessary “to increase the reputation of both, Romania and us” 17 and “to respond to the recent events by performing a significant act;” but he especially envisioned it as the impetus for a speedy completion of the Little Entente’s final form with three bilateral treaties of alliance.18 For this reason, the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs suggested only a bilateral Czechoslovak-Romanian meeting to his Romanian resort colleague Ionesco in order to sign a mutual treaty of alliance, which could be followed with preparations “for execution of a convention common for the three of them.”19 But Beneš preferred not to inform20 the allied Beograd government about his intent to leave himself a door open to Ionesco’s option as well (i.e., immediate negotiation about a Czechoslovak-Romanian and CzechoslovakRomanian alliance), and he asked the Czechoslovak envoy in Yugoslavia to find out the “mood in Beograd”. 21 But he pointed out that he would agree

Ibidem, Beneš says the following in the telegram: “Nevertheless I suppose that longer negotiations between Romania and Yugoslavia will be necessary. It would be a mistake to wait for it. It would be an even greater mistake to meet and fail to agree.” And ibidem, No. 5167, Beneš’ telegram to the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest where the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs says and instructs: “I suppose that we could make an agreement between us and Romanians in the meantime. We can keep quiet about the Little Entente, do nothing against it”. 17 Beneš’ telegram to the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest on 9th April 1921, AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5001–5200, No. 5179. 18 Ibidem. 19 Beneš’ telegram to the Czechoslovak envoy in Beograd on 11th April 1921, AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5001–5200, No. 5193. 20 See ibidem, Beneš points out to the Czechoslovak envoy in Beograd in his telegram: “Do not mention the matter to anyone and find out what the mood in Beograd is.” 21 Ibidem. 16

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with the journey to the capital city of the Kingdom of SHS only in a situation “when everything would seem to be really mature”.22 The significance which Beneš attached to the royal issue in Hungary and to the objective to utilize Charles’ Easter arrival in Hungary with the aim to take over the power is also documented by his double, or, if you like, another concurrent diplomatic activity. The Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs acted in compliance with his telegraphic note to Ionesco on 4 April intended to force Romania to conclude a treaty of alliance with Czechoslovakia23 and also fully in agreement with the original effort to file a joint urgent note intended to be understood as a transparent demonstration of common policy towards Budapest at the end of Charles’ stay in Hungary. This concurrent alternative diplomatic effort demonstrating the integrity of Czechoslovakia and its political allies was supposed to insure the joint policy towards Hungary if Czechoslovakia failed to conclude a treaty of alliance with Romania without Yugoslavia, and thus adequately and fiercely respond to the events in Hungary. The Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs turned his post-Charles diplomatic activity towards Yugoslavia as well, beside his effort to negotiate a joint Czechoslovak-Romanian treaty of alliance, since Yugoslavia was more stringent than Romania in spite of its fully loyal attitude towards the opinion of the Entente powers; but Beneš did not aim to force the Belgrade government to conclude a bilateral treaty of alliance with Romania. Beneš suggested to Yugoslavia that a treaty about joint foreign policy towards Hungary, based on the steps summarized in the six items below, be concluded: a) to file “a joint note that the Habsburg issue is not and shall not be an internal issue for us – Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of SHS – and a protest against Gratz’s speech,24

Ibidem. Even though Beneš did not trust the suitable situation for finalisation of the Little Entente within the potential Beograd meeting, he did not refuse it even later (see Beneš’ telegram to the Czechoslovak envoy in Beograd on 13th April 1921, AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5201–5400; No. 5204, whom he did not let leave the office as per his request, “in case there were a meeting in Beograd”. Nevertheless, Beneš repeated his skeptical point of view with regard to the likeliness that this meeting would take place.) 23 Beneš’ telegram to the Czechoslovakian envoy in Bucharest on 4th April 1921, AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5201–5400, No. 5151, where Beneš gives instructions to the Czechoslovakian envoy: “Tell Ionescu that we are determined to take advantage of the whole event to the greatest extent...” 24 This was Gratz’s speech at the 173rd meeting of the Hungarian national assembly. Viz Az 1920. Évi február hó 16–ára hirdetett Nemzetgyűlés naplója, IX, Budapest 1921, A Nemzetgyűlés 173. ülése, pp. 161–165 or Budapesti Hírlap 41, No. 73 on 7th April 1921, p. 2 (“Külügyminiszter beszéde.”). 22

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b) a joint request in Paris and in London to have the Trianon Treaty ratified, and, at the same time, a request to hand over Western Hungary and to disarm the army immediately after the ratification, c) each of us should clearly and closely communicate to Hungarians that if the parliament declares the Habsburgs finally removed, mutual relationships will improve, d) we should agree that if Habsburg coup d’état were to be repeated, we will submit an ultimatum that, within 48 hours, the issue needs to be eliminated, and we will prepare some military forces along with the ultimatum; and after the 48 hours, we will occupy the territory which will be defined by the general staff of both our armies, e) we would inform Hungarians and Allies and possibly also the public about this agreement, however, we would not specify which territories we intend to occupy, f) shall the SHS government agree, I would have the plan concerning us - which is drafted in item d) – prepared by the general staff and inform the SHS government as soon as possible”.25 The Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs did not want to give up his plan to take advantage of the unpleasant foreign political situation in Hungary, which the country “nolens volens” ended up in as a result of Charles’ arrival during Easter, and Beneš did not want to let the unexpected development in Hungary go without appropriate demonstration of political integrity of his closest Central European partners; and he did not desire to demonstrate any trace of division and dispute regarding the policy towards Hungary. The Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs informed Bucharest about the aforementioned plan, even though he was well aware of the fact that such an attitude towards Hungary was very sensitively perceived among politicians there. Therefore, Beneš pointed out to the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest to communicate these suggestions to Ionesco very carefully,26 and he also referred to the possibility to discuss this issue during the Czechoslovak-Romanian meeting. This next attempt of the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs to give an imperative answer to the first restoration attempt of Charles did not initiate the desired response, due to a Beneš’ telegram to the Czechoslovak envoy in Beograd on 11th April 1921, AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5201–5400, No. 5194. Beneš informed the Czechoslovak representative in Budapest on 18th April (see AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5201– 5400; No. 5271 on 18th April 1921 or AMZV, Political news Budapest, 1921, No. 126, the same telegraphic message). 26 Beneš’ telegram to the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest on 12th April 1921, AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5201–5400, No. 5200. 25

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rather sober attitude at the time of Charles’ action. Even though the Romanian party, represented by its Minister of Foreign Affairs, indicated their readiness to edit a joint note for the Hungarian government, the Czechoslovak proposal was not clearly supported in Bucharest, similarly to the situation at the very end of Charles’ spring restoration attempt when Prague made an effort to submit a joint ultimative note to the Hungarian government. The Romanian party “via facti” indicated their willingness to participate in a joint activity with regard to the second item in Beneš’ proposal (i.e., the joint intervention aimed at speeding up the process of ratification of the Trianon Peace Treaty by the French and British parliaments); however, Bucharest disagreed with the second part of the item regarding the issue of Western Hungary where they did not consider it suitable to proceed without Hungarian consent, or without Austrian request for help in this respect. Ionescu also agreed with the third item, i.e., to influence Hungary separately and try to persuade them to dethrone the Habsburgs for the sake of good relationships with neighbours. The proposals contained in other items were diplomatically designated as subject to further negotiations by Romania.27 Generally, Beneš’ plan failed in Yugoslavia as well, because their response on 13 April was, at least to our knowledge, rather controversial.28 Even though the Yugoslav party’s answer was traditionally more favourable for Beneš (since the Yugoslav Prime Minister was willing to act in accordance with the fourth item, i.e., to agree - in the case of a repeated restoration attempt – to a specific deadline after which all the three countries would organize military interventions against Hungary), Pašić’s attitude still sounded rather neutral. The Yugoslav Prime Minister said that he “fully agreed”, but, at the same time, he added that he needed to “think about it”.29 The fact that this topic was not reflected in the telegraphic correspondence between the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its foreign offices in Beograd and Bucharest documents that this concept suggested by Beneš (as regards the Hungarian issue) was overshadowed by the approaching date of signing the Czechoslovak-Romanian and subsequently also the Romanian-Yugoslav treaties of alliance. The only result of this parallel initiative of the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs was the agreement about a joint intervention in Paris and London as regards A telegram from the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest on 15th April 1921, AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5201–5400, Received telegrams 1921, No. 3801–4000; No. 3939. 28 A telegram from the Czechoslovak envoy in Beograd on 13th April 1921, AMZV, Received telegrams 1921, No. 3801–4000; No. 3918. 29 Ibidem. 27

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speeding up the ratification process of the Trianon Peace Treaty by their parliaments; however, this was eventually not performed, since envoys pointed out the running procedural process of ratification of this peace treaty in both the French and the British parliament.30 During Beneš’ parallel effort to make a coordinated political step towards Hungary within the frame of the Little Entente, which was intended to prevent undesirable development in this country from the perspective of countries neighbouring Hungary, further specific steps were becoming apparent regarding gradual persuasion of Romania to officially join the Little Entente. In mid-April, when the Yugoslav Prime Minister Pašić “rejected an immediate meeting”31 and indicated that it could only be organized sometime in the second half of May, the history of the Belgrade meeting of ministers of foreign affairs reached its end.32 However, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of SHS, Pašić, also approved Beneš’ plan, or, if you like, the intent of Prague – to first conclude a bilateral treaty of alliance with Romania before the Little Entente takes its final form on the Yugoslav part. At the same time, he indicated the readiness of Belgrade to sign the Little Entente alliance convention together also with Bucharest, which raised some optimism as regards approaching full implementation of Beneš’ idea of an anti-Hungarian coalition incorporating Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania. On 15 April, with regard to the given circumstances, the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs required a meeting with the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs for the purpose of executing the treaty of alliance, which he suggested to take place on 21 or 24 April; and the venue for the meeting was suggested to be the town of Siget33 situated on the Czechoslovak-Romanian border. Beside the execution of the treaty of alliance and A telegram from the Czechoslovak envoy in London on 21st April, see AMZV, Received telegrams 1921, No. 3801–4000, No. 3969. But even this time Beneš, like in the case of the ultimative note draft at the end of the scandal regarding the former King’s arrival in Hungary, he supported demonstrative intervention in spite of the fact that the procedural process regarding ratification had started in the French and English parliaments. (See Beneš’ telegram to the Czechoslovak envoy in London on 16th April 1921, AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5201–5400; No. 5241, where he says: “If the South-Slavic and Romanian representative is instructed to intervene in favour of speeding up ratification of Trianon peace, proceed together with them, in spite of the fact that, to my knowledge, instructions for speedy ratification have been given in Paris and London.”) 31 A telegram for the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest on 15th April 1921, AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5201–5400; No. 5226. 32 A telegram from the Czechoslovak envoy in Beograd on 13th April 1921, AMZV. Regarding this issue also Received telegrams 1921, No. 3801–4000; No. 3919. 33 Today’s Sighetul Marmaţiei (former Máramarossziget) on the Romanian-Ukrainian border. 30

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negotiation about bilateral issues regarding delimitation and conclusion of a commercial contract, Beneš suggested another item for the agenda – the issue of the common attitude towards Hungary; he suggested a one day meeting “to agree quickly, to sign quickly and return immediately”.34 Even though Beneš could be sure about his success, and though the act of signing the treaty of alliance between Czechoslovakia and Romania was approaching quickly, the few days before the act of signing did not pass without unexpected problems. The Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs played an important role in the implementation of Beneš’ alliance plan at this stage, and he deserved the greatest credit for actual execution of the Czechoslovak-Romanian bilateral treaty of alliance at the end of the whole process between the two parties. Most Romanian political representatives remained in opposition to Beneš’ narrow concept and were still interested in a broader alliance coalition. As far as Ionescu’s approval of Beneš’ concept of the block is concerned, there were several circumstances which might have influenced him: first, the impression from a fairly coordinated presentation of partners allied by means of a treaty of alliance, i.e., Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, towards Hungary during Charles’ stay on Hungarian territory35, even though it eventually failed to achieve the required status envisioned by Prague; and second, the pure fact that there was the above mentioned treaty of alliance between Romania and Poland which guaranteed broader cooperation and safety, albeit relative, concerning the Eastern border of Romania. It is very clear that without the existence of the Romanian-Polish treaty of alliance the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ionescu, would have failed to persuade the local political scene to approve of the treaty of alliance with Czechoslovakia, especially if we consider the problems which emerged before the execution of the treaty; and not to mention the fact that even Ionescu’s positive attitude towards the Little Entente would have been very debatable. The head of Romanian diplomacy made a creditable effort in relation to the Czechoslovak-Romanian treaty of alliance; at the time when there were doubts regarding the Belgrade meeting of three ministers of foreign affairs, he suggested to Beneš that just the two of them meet if the Belgrade meeting were not to take place, even though he emphasized that he Beneš’ telegram on 15th April 1921, AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5201–5400; No. 5226. 35 A telegram from the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest on 2nd April 1921, AMZV, Received telegrams 1921, No. 3801–4000; No. 3871, where he, beside others, refers: “The notion from our performance with South Slavs, even though mostly judged as too abrupt, inspires.” 34

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preferred the first option, i.e., a broader meeting.36 This means that Ionescu was willing to immediately accept alliance not only with Czechoslovakia but also Yugoslavia. Both the parties, or, if you like, both the ministries of foreign affairs, were now “eager” to sign the treaty of alliance. Under such circumstances, the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs was willing to make a great effort to have the treaty signed as soon as possible since he wanted the issue to be resolved before Ionescu’s approaching departure abroad. Beneš eventually even waived his personal participation in the act of signing the convention, even though he first suggested that Ionescu travel to the West via Slovakia for which purpose Beneš was even willing to send a special train – where he would accompany him all the way to Bratislava, and where the convention would be signed; eventually, he authorised the Czechoslovak diplomatic envoy in Romania to sign the treaty.37 For the sake of a quick solution to this issue, Beneš assured the Romanian party that the emerged delimitation issue on the shared border would be resolved to the full satisfaction of Romania.38 Equally amicable was also the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs who, even though he wanted to have the treaty signed in Romania, which he considered “simpler and better for internal reasons” 39 also from the point of view of an initiator“40 of the matter, was willing, like his Czechoslovak colleague, to authorise the Romanian envoy in Prague to sign the treaty. 41 However, while the venue for signing the treaty was being discussed, there was unexpected development on the Romanian part. Several days after the Czechoslovak party had sent out a circular letter to inform its foreign offices about the conclusion of “the Czechoslovak-Romanian treaty, a similar one to the treaty concluded with Yugoslavians”,42 and after a final

A telegram from the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest on 8th April 1921, AMZV, Received telegrams 1921, No. 3801–4000, No. 3875. 37 Beneš’ telegram for the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest on 15th April 1921, AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5201–5400; No. 5231. 38 Beneš’ telegram to the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest on 16th April 1921, AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5201–5400, No. 5239, where he says: “Inform Ionescu..., that I assure him that the issue of borders will certainly be resolved to his satisfaction.” 39 A telegram from the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest on 14th April 1921, AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5201–5400, No. 3932. 40 Ibidem. 41 Ibidem. Regarding this issue see also telegram No. 3953 on 18th April 1921. 42 Beneš’ circular telegram to Czechoslovak foreign authorities on 16th April 1921, AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5261–5268. 36

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decision about Bucharest43 as the venue for signing the treaty of alliance had been made, and after the Yugoslav government had been informed44 based on the third article of the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav treaty, the Romanian board of ministers came up with a requirement to attach a supplement to the treaty saying that “in case of a Russian attack,”45 Czechoslovakia will not impose a “restriction”46 (i.e., Czechoslovakia will not prevent the “possibility to supply weapons and ammunition”47 to Romania via Czechoslovak territory in case of a Romanian-Russian armed conflict). The requirement of the Romanian board of ministers unpleasantly surprised not only Prague, but even Ionescu himself whose mood is illustrated by a report from the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest, who said, in relation to this information, that Ionescu had visited him “and had been upset because of the board of ministers”;48 and the Czechoslovak envoy also regretted that he had not received the power of attorney earlier since this unexpected problem could have been prevented.49 The issue eventually proved to not be serious enough to prevent the act of signing the convention. It was Beneš who deserved the greatest credit for smooth settlement of the issue, since he was aware of the fact that he had to do his best for the sake of prompt execution of the contract, and since postponement would have harmed the policy credibility of the Little Entente; he responded to the current situation by suggesting that the convention be signed in its original wording, i.e., without the postulated protocol, whereas the “eastern“ issue could be negotiated subsequently, or the validity of the executed convention could be conditioned by subsequent negotiations Ibidem, see Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5272 on 18th April 1921 and 5275 on 19th April 1921. As regards the venue for signing the joined convention and subsequent signing of the mutual commercial contract, Prague was first discussed, or actually agreed, as the venue for the treaty of alliance, and Bucharest as the venue for the commercial contract (see Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5201–5400; No. 5239 on 16th April 1921, where Beneš informs that: “...Ionescu has just approved that the convention would be signed in Prague...” for more information on this, see the circular telegram No. 5261–5268 on 16th April 1921 or telegram No. 5272 on 18th April 1921). Later – 19 April, three days later Prague informed Bucharest about granting the power of attorney to the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest to sign the convention (see Beneš’ telegram on 19th April 1921, ibidem, No. 5275). 44 Beneš’ telegram for the Czechoslovak envoy in Beograd on 19th April 1921, AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5201–5400; No. 5274. 45 A telegram from the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest on 21st April 1921, AMZV, Received telegrams 1921, No. 3801–4000; No. 3974. 46 Ibidem. 47 Ibidem. 48 Ibidem. 49 Ibidem. 43

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regarding this issue.50 If Beneš wanted the cooperation between both the countries to be topped with or ensured by a treaty of alliance, there was no time for political maneuvers due to Ionescu’s approaching departure from the country. Though Beneš emphasized (in his telegraph) to the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest that he had no intent to “force Romanians to do anything they did not want to”, 51 nor did he want to show them “how very much”52 he was interested in the treaty; he also complained that: “We keep stepping back, which might seem like we are weak or worried.”53 Nevertheless, the Romanian party also showed some amicability, since they modified or generalized the protocol they had suggested; and after the modification it did not expressly mention Russia – it just contained a neutral statement: “Shall Romania find itself in a war with a neighbouring country, Czechoslovakia shall not prevent ammunition and weapon traffic.” Having seen the unfavourable situation related to the CzechoslovakRomanian treaty of alliance, which the Romanian Prime Minister and the King did not feel like signing yet, Ionescu reacted by threatening to file a demission (which, if accepted, would have seriously endangered the conclusion of the second bilateral treaty within the Little Entente), the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest took over the initiative and on 23 April signed the treaty of alliance with a new supplement, cum clausula, or, if you like, with an annexed final protocol according to which the validity of the treaty of alliance was conditioned by subsequent approval of the attached supplement – which the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest declared to be “a paraphrase of neutrality according to the international law”54 which is “easily revocable”.55 Under the given circumstances, when the treaty of alliance did not hold Czechoslovakia responsible for the eastern border of Romania to a greater extent, and when the negotiations about the military issue or mutual military cooperation or assistance were supposed to be

Beneš’ telegram for the Czechoslovakian envoy in Bucharest on 22 April 1921, AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5201–5400; No. 5299. 51 Ibidem. 52 Ibidem. 53 Ibidem. 54 A telegram from the Czechoslovak envoy in Bucharest on 24th April 1921, AMZV, Received telegrams 1921, No. 3801–4000; No. 3992. 55 Ibidem. 50

Conclusion of the Czechoslovak-Romanian Little Entente Treaty... 351 ________________________________________________________

subject to a secret military convention,56 Beneš agreed that the treaty be signed.57 Even though Beneš failed to submit the joined ultimative note to the Hungarian government during Charles’ restoration attempt; or, in other words, though he failed to take advantage of the situation in Hungary to demonstrate the unity of Czechoslovakia and its political partners, Yugoslavia and Romania, during the former emperor’s stay in Hungary, he, being greatly assisted by his Romanian colleague, without whom he would have had difficulties making the Romanian government adopt the treaty of alliance with Czechoslovakia, succeeded in adequately responding to the situation in Hungary by signing another defense treaty of alliance within the frame of the Little Entente. Beneš’ effort was crowned by prompt execution of the treaty of alliance between Romania and Yugoslavia,58 which finalized the process of establishment of the Little Entente – an alliance based on three bilateral treaties of alliance which were not only defensive, i.e., promising mutual military assistance if one of the parties is attacked by Hungary, but also aggressive, subsequently incorporated into secret military conventions concluded in July and January. 59 While the official portion of the Little Entente convention stipulated that “if Hungary attacks one of the high contracting parties without having been provoked to do so, the other party undertakes to help the afflicted party by means of the measure defined in article 2 hereof”,60 i.e., that “the respective authorities of Czechoslovakia and the Romanian Kingdom would determine measures necessary for performance of the current convention”,61 and such measures will be mutually agreed on in a subsequently concluded military convention, the secret military convention See ibidem. The Czechoslovakian envoy in Bucharest points out the fact that questions of military cooperation – in the telegram he expressly mentions armament – shall be incorporated in “military convention of the general staff specialists, which shall naturally remain secret, and at the moment when this contract between staffs is executed, it shall cease to exist as an annex to a contract and cannot be subject to any attack”. 57 AMZV, Sent telegrams 1921, No. 5201–5400, No. 5340 on 29th April 1921. 58 7 June 1921. 59 The Czechoslovakian-Romanian military convention was the first to be concluded, specifically on 2nd July. Military convention between Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of SHS was concluded on 31 July and half a year later, on 22 January 1922 the same was executed by Romania and the Kingdom of SHS. 60 Quoted from the text of the Treaty of Alliance published in: Sborník zahraniční politiky, 11/1921, p. 246 (Dokumenty, Nová střední Evropa – Obranný spolek Československa a Rumunska proti Maďarsku), in AMZV see Little Entente, K 1; Fasc. IV. (Czechoslovakian-Yugoslavian Treaty) and Fasc. VII. (Czechoslovakian-Romanian Contract). 61 Ibidem. 56

352 Andrej Tóth ________________________________________________________

determined that “if one of the high contracting parties attacks Hungary without having previously discussed such a step, the other high contracting parties are forced to remain neutral and dislocate at least two mobilized divisions by their border with Hungary”.62 Another very significant factor was the portion of the Little Entente treaty of alliance, which bound the contracting parties to execute integral and coordinated foreign policy towards Hungary.63 So, if Beneš and his political partners failed to put Hungary into an unfavourable foreign-political situation, or, if you like, to push it as Beneš envisioned in mediis rebus, during Charles’ first restoration attempt, the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs succeeded in demonstrating the integrity of the political line of the Little Entente ex post. By mid–1921 the geopolitical pliers completely closed up around Hungary, which Czechoslovak diplomacy significantly contributed to. Hungary found itself in complete isolation within the region in mid–1920. Signatories of the Little Entente on three sides, who were ready not only to defend themselves, but also to initiate an attack, surrounded it. And if we add Austria, which was defeated but hostile towards Hungary not only because of disputes regarding western Hungary, and which was a country economically dependent on Czechoslovakia to a great extent, and a country which Prague had had successful bilateral negotiations with, and further on Poland, not directly neighbouring Hungary, whose bilateral communication with Czechoslovakia was showing some traces of friendship, Hungary ended up in a complete economic and political isolation. Beside the Rapallo – Italian-Yugoslav treaty, which comprised an anti-Habsburg convention, there was another treaty aimed against Hungary – even though it was not expressly declared as an anti-Habsburg pact. Nevertheless, its signatories clearly communicated their opposition to any potential restoration of the house of Habsburg in Hungary and clearly identified the result which could be expected, or, if you want, the likely response to such an internal development in the Hungarian Kingdom – an integral military intervention. The foreign political isolation of Hungary was significantly contributed to by a broader political situation in Europe, which was completely different from the time when the Czechoslovak-Yugoslavian treaty of alliance was signed in summer 1920. At that time, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia Magda ÁDÁM, A Kisantant (1920–1938). Budapest 1981, pp. 54–55. See article 4 of the Treaty of Alliance. Sborník zahraniční politiky, II/1921, p. 246 (Dokumenty. Nová střední Evropa. – Obranný spolek Československa a Rumunska proti Maďarsku). 62 63

Conclusion of the Czechoslovak-Romanian Little Entente Treaty... 353 ________________________________________________________

decided to make this step in spite of strong resentment from their greatest Entente partner and a sponsor of Central Europe, France – which vigorously resented Beneš’ Central European alliance policy. In 1921, the completion of the Little Entente was fully supported by French diplomacy without which Romania would have hardly decided to join the international alliance. The Little Entente became a “full-blown” international alliance after an Organisational Pact was concluded, i.e., after a permanent council acting as a managing body was established in 1933 at a joint meeting of Ministers in Genève. However, the Romanian diplomacy remained very careful, even in the future, which was reflected in the Romanian-French treaty of friendship concluded in 1926 by means of which Romania clearly emphasized undisputable links between the Little Entente, or specifically, Romania and France.

Czechoslovakia as the Tourist Destination between 1918 and 19381 Jan Štemberk

Introduction Tourism is one of the neglected chapters of the economic and social history in Czechoslovakia between 1918 and 1938. The first half of the 20th century is related to three types of tourism development, active (incoming), domestic and passive (outgoing). The main attention was certainly paid to the incoming tourism and the assets were showed in several levels. First it was the economic level associated with an inflow of valuable foreign currency, second was the political propaganda level which tried to present Czechoslovakia as the consolidated, developed and democratic country. The tourism plays the important role of relationships between countries and nations. Until the beginning of the 1930s, the domestic tourism was understood as „money flowing from one part of the country to the second one or from a pocket of one citizen to the second one“.2 This study will be focused on Czechoslovakia as the destination of incoming tourism. It is necessary to analyse conditions marginally related to the tourism development besides own analysis of attendance structure. A care of the tourism did not have any priority in the Czechoslovak economic policy and it was supported on the basis of own activity from a big part, the state or individual regions were contributed only partly. Projects connecting with a systematic support of the tourism development stayed only in a stage of designs. The traffic infrastructure was not without problem as well as an offer and a quality of accommodation services. The tourism policy The tourism policy of the new state came out from a model, which existed before 1918. There were a special department of ministry or organized region and national associations providing the tourism mainly. This article has been published as a part of postdoctoral grant project of Grant Agency of Czech Republic No. 409/07/P463 - Tourism posibilities and limits in inter-war Czechoslovakia. 2 J. GUTH-JARKOVSKÝ, Turistika, Praha 2003, p. 97. 1

356 Jan Štemberk ________________________________________________________

This system even expanded to Slovakia and later to the Carpathian Ruthenia. All this period was trying to find an optimal model how to ensure the successful tourism development. The Foreign Commission (Cizinecká komise) was founded in November 1918 and the Czechoslovak Foreign Authority (Československý cizinecký úřad) was established on the basis of a resolution from the 2nd December. The new Authority had to care of arriving foreigners. In this period they were mainly official state guests. Authority’s agenda under the chairman Karel Domin leadership was constantly increasing and at the beginning of 1919 was focused on the new state propagation in abroad. The Foreign Authority with its activity was directly subordinated to the presidium of the council of ministers. In July 1919 the Authority crossed to a competence of the Ministry of Industry and Trade (hereinafter reffered to as the Trade Ministry).3 The Trade Ministry took care of the tourism and supported it between 1918 and 1938. In spite of chaotic conditions the Authority gave information about travelling possibilities. The next year subsidiaries were established in Bratislava and Užhorod. After the country stabilization due to the end of the First World War, the Foreign Authority was cancelled in 1921 and the department for foreigners, tourism and health resorts within the Trade Ministry started to look after its agenda.4 In its competence belonged: to form conditions to stimulate foreigners attendance and it mainly on the basis of organization and legislative level; to take care of accommodation; to propagate Czechoslovakia visiting in abroad; to support organizations serving for the foreigners attendance support; to support tourism and winter sports as a factor stimulating the tourism; in a cooperation with relevant ministries to promote passport and administrative reliefs and to improve transport, mainly the public one.5 The Trade Ministry subsidized from its financial resources the tourism too. The amount of these subsidies did not cover tourism requirements and fell behind the neighbouring states very much. The Trade Ministry concentrated its propagation activities on Germany and Austria due to a high number of arriving tourists. In 1919 it was established the information and travel agency in Vienna and Berlin. In our country the Trade Ministry tried to continue in a development of organiThe National Archives in Prague [Národní archiv v Praze] (hereafter just NA), the archival fund of the Presidium of Cabinet Council [Předsednictvo ministerské rady] (hereafter just PMR), box 1613, sign. 207/1. 4 Deset let Československé republiky, díl II [Ten Years of the Czechoslovak Republic, Vol. II]. Praha 1928, p. 233. 5 Ibidem, p. 232. 3

Czechoslovakia as the Tourist Destination between 1918 and 1938 357 ________________________________________________________

zations dealing with a foreign tourism stimulation that was stopped by war and changes related to constitutional law. In July 1920 there was established the new Headquarters of Provincional Foreign Associations (Ústředí zemských cizineckých svazů) in Prague that renamed on the Czechoslovak Headquarters of the Foreign Tourism (Československé ústředí cizineckého ruchu) since January 1929. Members of this Headquarters became the individual foreign associations and other associations working in the tourism. In 1921 the newly established foreign association in Bratislava (Zväz pre povznesenie návštevy cudzincov na Slovensku v Bratislave) joined to the foreign associations in Prague (Český cizinecký svaz, established in 1886), Brno (Zemský svaz pro povznesení návštěvy cizinců na Moravě a ve Slezsku, established in 1908), Karlovy Vary/Karlsbad (Deutscher Landesverband für Fremdenverkehr in Böhmen, established in 1905) and Frývaldov/Freaiwaldau (Jeseníky) (Deutscher Landesverband für Fremdenverkehr in Mähren und Schlesien). At the same time, when the name of Headquarters was changed, a number of membership corporations also increased.6 The Headquarters was established as provisional organization providing a voluntary cooperation of officials interested in the tourism and worked as a consultative body of the Trade Ministry. The final statute of the central organization looking after the tourism development had to be solved in a preparing law about the tourism. Several proposals of law were ready between 1928 and 1938. Most of them came out from necessity to create an independent organization where all enterprises and organizations working in the tourism could be members. They had to contribute to the tourism development, as well. Competence disputes with the Trade Ministry or too centralistic conception led to a fall of these plans. The interesting proposal was connected with an establishment of individual ministry for the tourism. Finding of solution on the national level caused regional activities. In February 1937 the Slovak Council for the Tourism (Slovenská rada pre cestovný ruch) was established from an activity of regional authority. The Council had to support the tourism development in Slovakia and coordinate a cooperation of interested persons.7 An insufficient legislative amendment of the tourism and unspecific definition of competences caused a lot of confusions and unclearnesses. A propagation department of the Ministry of Railways existed besides the NA, the archival fund of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Business [Ministerstvo průmyslu, obchodu a živností] (hereafter just MPOŽ), box 281, sign. P 5602. 7 NA, the archival fund of the MPOŽ, box 2737, doc No 36564/1938/IV/F. 6

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Trade Ministry. The Ministry of Public Health included health resorts comitted also in the tourism. In 1934 the Action Committee for the Tourism was established from an initiative of the ministry. Karel Baxa, the mayor of Prague, became chairman of this Committee. The Action Committee’s activity was insignificant and did not contribute to the tourism development.8 The incoming tourism development was closely connected with a propagation of Czechoslovakia in abroad. The propagation tried to concentrate on an objective indication of interesting attractions. The reliable information and propagation service was taken from the principle of success in the tourism. Well-arranged maps and posters had to inspirate visitors. The permanent interest in propagation in abroad increased in this period. Czechoslovakia tried to present itself as a peaceful country with many natural and cultural seightseeings. Unfortunately, the propagation possibilities grappled with a chronic lack of money. The foreign associations had limited budgets and the state support was totally insufficient. The propagation of Czechoslovakia as a target destination had several forms. The most frequent and easiest alternative was printing of propagation leaflets and brochures, which were offered to foreign tourists in their country or during their visit. They had to persuade them into visiting of a concrete place. In abroad the leaflets and brochures were offered to potential visitors in various Czechoslovak representations. In some foreign metropolises were even established information offices. At the beginning of the 1930s Czechoslovakia had eight official information offices in abroad. Activity results of these offices were different and depended on an amount of the financial support limiting the propagation reach. An activity of the offices was focused on the Central European states predominantly. Czechoslovakia neglected the propagation in Anglo-Saxon and oversea countries very much. A huge potential, which the United States concealed, was appeared at the end of the 1930s. Advertisings in foreign newspapers and magazines created one part of the propagation activity that was supported by the Trade Ministry and its financial resources. The propagation materials were almost printed in different languages and they were imported to abroad. The foreign information offices were usually private companies, which were deputed by the Trade Ministry to propagate Czechoslovakia in their country. Thus they were not the official state offices. Their owners only

Co je s Akčním výborem pro cizinecký ruch? [What is with the Action Committee for the Foreign Tourism?]. In: Hotelier [Hotelier], Vol. 13/1934, Issue 5, p. 4. 8

Czechoslovakia as the Tourist Destination between 1918 and 1938 359 ________________________________________________________

got the propagation materials and a commission for their activity. They had to inform about it regularly.9 The next propagation possibilities were offered within organized exhibitions and fairs. The exhibitions were usually a part of economic and cultural transactions, which were abundantly visited like the exhibitions in Vienna, where came people from Southeast Europe, or the propagation tourism fair in Cologne visited by people from west and north Europe. A lack of money contributed to an insufficient representation again. The exhibitions in oversea were taken part only in exceptional cases. Actions increasing an attraction of Czechoslovakia between the foreign visitors were already ready in the second half of the 1920s. The action Three days in Prague took place on the basis of similar successful projects in Vienna and Budapest. It initiated the Czech foreign association and the Prague sample fair. The action, which was prepared as an accompanying program to the running Prague sample fair, brought to the visitors a lot of discounts. A flat price of 275 crowns included the entry to the fair, three days with full board in a hotel, Prague round-seightseeings with a guide, a ticket to a theatre and museum, a tram ticket, an accident insurance and a title to 33% railway rabate. This project was effective and was repeated several times.10 Anniversaries of different historical events were exploited to the tourism support. In 1929 the Millenium of St. Wenceslaus was exploited to the propagation in Czechoslovakia. German action connecting with 300 anniversary of the battle of Lützen was followed with a big interest. The important event of Thirty Years’ War had to be exploited to attract guests from nothern countries to Czechoslovakia. The famous person, Albrecht of Waldstein, was also used for propagation. In 1936 the anniversary of 70 years of Austrian-Prussian War was exploited. Folk festivals belonged to the next tourism attraction (e.g. Passion plays in Hořice in Šumava). In connection with the propagation it is necessary to mention two other spheres. One of them was sport, where Sokol Rallys represented the first place, and then there were inland exhibitions, fairs and congresses as the second one. Excursions for participants and their suite were prepared in connection with their realization. They visited the closed attractive places. These excursions had to be a motivation for next visits of Czechoslovakia. NA, the archival fund of the MPOŽ, box 2740, doc No 78048/1939. Wochenbericht über den Fremdenverkehr in Österreich und in der Tschechoslovakei für Presse und Interessenten [Week reports about foreign transport in Austria and Czechoslovakia for the press and interested persons]. Vol. 2/1928, Issue 31, p. 6. 9

10

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Technical newcomers like radio and film were exploited for propagation, as well. The film, which enabled visual perception, became more attractive for the propagation. The films about interesting places were made with the state support (e.g. Vysoké Tatry, Český ráj). Sometimes subtitles were added to the film for the purpose of presentation in foreign cinemas or in oversea. In 1930s colour film was already exploited. A document about folk costumes celebrations, which took place in Prague in May 1937, was made on the basis of the Trade Ministry’s order. The propagation was not set up on uniform principles and idea about unification of Czechoslovak propagation in the tourism appeared only in 1932. It was paid not only from public money but also from businessmen contributions.11 The outgoing tourism After the First World War period there were not good conditions for the tourism. A lot of administrative and economic limitations appeared. The First World War led to a stricter passport duty in Europe. From the beginning of the War all visitors needed not only passport but also visa of foreign country, as they wanted to travel there. These duties stayed in validity constantly in the next years. The establishment of Czechoslovakia did not bring any liberalization on the contrary it made travelling to the countries of former monarchy more difficult. The passport duty stayed in its principle during all period. Visa duty was cancelled gradually during second half of the 1920s. Due to a high purchase of Czechoslovak currency a few tourists travelled to our country, because a staying was too expesive for them. Economic complications were the worst in west Bohemian spas. Seasons in 1922 and 1923 came off badly because only a half of guests visited the spas. However, the attendance increased the second half of the 1920s. The spas achieved the highest attendance in 1927 and a number was increasing permanently since this time. At the end of the 1920s were even exceeded the most successful seasons, which were monitored before the First World War. From a geographical view the Czechoslovak spas, mainly in western Bohemia, and Prague belonged to the most frequented places between 1918 and 1938. In the first place were generally German visitors, but after the war a lot of Austrian tourists arrived, as well. In the second half of the 1920s this NA, the archival fund of the MPOŽ, box 2659, doc. No 69311/33, Minutes of a meeting from 21. 6. 1933. 11

Czechoslovakia as the Tourist Destination between 1918 and 1938 361 ________________________________________________________

rate levelled off: 40 % guests came from Germany, 20 % from Austria, 10 % from Poland, 8 % from Hungary and finally 7 % from the United States. Other countries comprised the rest.12 It is evident, that the Czechoslovak tourism depended fully on the neighbouring countries, especially on Germany. This had several reasons. First was geographical location. Germany was on a higher economic level than Czechoslovakia, therefore more tourists could come and their staying wasn’t too expensive for them. German minority and a travel tradition belonged to the next significant factors. An interest of German visitors mainly concentrated on the west Bohemian spas and Prague. The part of German guests in the spas was approximately 50 %. Most of them were localized in Mariánské Lázně and Karlovy Vary. In addition, a lot of German visitors went to the Czech mountains in border regions. Weekend trips also played very important role. Unfortunately, in the east of our republic we could find German tourists rarely. Many visitors from Austria were in Moravia. Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia were attractive for Hungarian guests. On the other hand official statistics did not demonstrate visitors according to the nationality. A number of visitors increased in 1928. The most of them arrived from Germany, Austria, Romania, Yugoslavia and the United States. However, a number of visitors from west Europe, especially from France, decreased.13 A look at some European nations and their potentional role in the outgoing tourism is also very interesting. The Czechoslovak tourism was sceptical in relation to the Western European tourists. French, Italian as well as Swiss people were considered to be “home-birds” spending their holidays rather in own country. In relation to Great Britain scepticism predominated over traditional conservatism. The systematic propagation for few years could only attract more Britain. The other Western and Northern European inhabitants were treated as diversification of tourism. It was evident, that they could not form a heart of visitors due to geographical location and a number of populations. In spite of that, Dutch people started arriving a lot. The United States with its high potential was interesting, but the tourism had its disadvantages. A big distance and a journey’s lenght to the Europe were the first. On the other hand it was unfamiliarity of Czechoslovakia. The financial resources were lacking for the propagation campaign. The exact statistics of tourism is very difficult in the first years of Czechoslovakia existence. Data appears sporadically and brings incorrectnesses. 12 13

Wochenbericht… [Week reports...], Vol. 2/1928, Issue 27, p. 4. Ibidem, Issue 35, p. 1.

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The situation starts to be better in the half of the 1920s when the increasing tourism importance started an interest in statistics as well. The following tables bring statistic data about the outgoing tourism in Czechoslovakia between 1925 and 1938. The first table brings the interesting data about expenses and the second one about a number of nights. The staying length shows an important factor how the tourism was successful in the market. In the second table these data are from 1932 to 1938. We can determine from the statistic data that German tourist spent on average 5 nights in Czechoslovakia as well as tourists from Great Britain. In particular, visitors from oversea stayed longer time here – the United States guests stayed on average 7 nights.14

Statistics of the outgoing tourism between 1925 and 1933 Year

1925 1926 1927 300 300 350

1928 1929 1930 1931 400 440 460 350

1932 1933 270 200

Number of persons (thousand) Total expenses 570 560 710 770 810 795 580 420 288 (million crowns) Average 1 900 1 866 2 028 1 925 1 841 1 728 1 657 1 555 1 440 expenses per person in crowns Source: NA, the archival fund of the PMR, box 3580, sig. 841/16.

J. KOSE, Hospodářský význam cestovního ruchu [Economic significance of the tourism]. In: Sbírka přednášek České národohospodářské společnosti [Collection of lectures of the Czech Economic Association], No 9 (1940-1941), Prague 1940, p. 22.

14

Czechoslovakia as the Tourist Destination between 1918 and 1938 363 ________________________________________________________

The outgoing tourism in Czechoslovakia between 1925 and 1938 Year 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938

Visitors 384 530 411 792 508 314 655 413 726 621 787 290 646 146 564 175 414 294 447 498 462 564 489 331 549 773 237 177

Number of nights

Unidentified

3 331 523 2 914 402 3 267 196 3 377 731 3 547 406 4 410 417 1 500 531

Source: B. V ČERNÝ, Základy poznání cestovního ruchu [Principles of the tourism knowledge]. Prague 1945, p. 101.

Deep course of economic depression caused the lower attendance of Czechoslovakia in neighbouring countries. The economic depression impact on health resorts we can document with the following numbers: in 1930 travelled to the Czechoslovak spas 311,861 guests and 157,291 from them were foreigners; three years later it was only 209,297 guests and foreigners arrived only 61,641. The number of foreign visitors fell by nearly 60 %. This fall was balanced by permanent increase of domestic tourism.15 The first half of the 1930s the foreign exchange measures brought a decrease of foreign visitors in Czechoslovakia. The lack of valutas forced the other states to limit their quotas and therefore the outgoing tourism was limited. The number of visitors decreased in the neighbouring states as well. All neighbouring states of Czechoslovakia, which comprised together with Yugoslavia nearly 90 % of foreign visitors decided for deviza limitations. The tourism crisis occured late, the year 1931 displayed stagnation in comparison 15

Ibidem, p. 20.

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to the previous period, but the clear fall was connected with 1932. The deviza measures were accepted as late as the second half of 1931 and thus the season was not influenced very much. The clearing became a particular solution for the tourism. There was also calculated with the tourism in the agreements setting up the clearing clearance of mutual business transactions. The expenses associated with the tourism were usually written down in the special bills, which were also subsidized from claims of the common business transactions. In this way, the tourism helped with the settlement of frozen outstanding debts in unsolvent states. Bohemia showed the biggest attendance of foreigners (1934 – 281,117 foreigners) in statistics according to the individual countries. The health resorts in the western Bohemia belonged to the main tourism attraction. In the second place was Slovakia (1934 – 81,535 foreigners). The third position belonged to Moravia and Silesia (1934 – 77,282 foreigners). Prague as the capital city took the fourth place. The last place belonged to the Carpathian Ruthenia (1934 – 7,564 foreigners).16 Due to a worse political situation in Europe in the second half of the 1930s, the tourism became the political dimension, as well. The individual Central European states tried to attract more visitors from the West Europe (mainly from Great Britain and France) and gained their sympathy. The main political rivals of Czechoslovakia in this tendency were Hungary, Germany and Austria. Czechoslovakia was observing these actions, but it did not make any radical changes to present itself more in the West Europe. The tourism was influenced by domestic politics. At the end of the 1930s everybody was afraid of political stabilization and therefore the attendance from the Western European countries fell down. German people did not want to travel to Czechoslovakia and this situation was even supported by their government. The problems also made domestic opposition activities, authoritative tendency in Slovakia and others. The transport conditions If the foreigners wanted to travel to Czechoslovakia, they could use both public and individual transport. The Czechoslovak State Railways (Československé státní dráhy, hereafter just ČSD) cared of public transportation in this period. The First World War brought limitation of train offer and a quality of travelling became worse. After Czechoslovakia NA, the archival fund of the MPOŽ, box 2697, Reports of State Statistical Office, line 9, No 9, Cizinecký ruch v ČSR v roce 1934 [The foreign tourism in Czechoslovakia in 1934]. 16

Czechoslovakia as the Tourist Destination between 1918 and 1938 365 ________________________________________________________

establishing a number of trains increased slowly. Fast trains started to go among health resorts. In summer 1919 they connected Vienna with health resorts in the western Bohemia three times a week. In February 1919 the Travel and Information Agency of the ČSD was established and supported by the new Czechoslovak Ministry of Railways. This agency had the headquarters at the corner of Dlážděná and Hybernská Street in Prague. This institution sold tickets of the ČSD in advance sale; the information office propagated the tourism and distributed brochures issued by the ČSD.17 A year later an activity of the agency was assigned to the new Czechoslovak Travel and Transport Agency (Čedok). The possibilities of the international tourism were given by a transportation offer of trains among the European centers. The ČSD offered a lot of international lines. Travellers, practically from all Europe, could arrive to Prague. They could use the fast trains or through carriages. For example in summer 1930 more than 40 direct carriages and 10 couchette cars went daily. Fifteen direct international carriages passed through Czechoslovakia. The direct carriages arrived from Istanbul (2048 km), Roma (1505 km) or Calais (1258 km). In 1931 Prague was connected with Vienna with six fast trains. A journey lasted from 6.5 to 8 hours in dependence on the train line. The timetable from 1932 to 1933 offered 54 direct carriages, which led to the south, southeast and north Europe. The international lines led to the Czechoslovak spas, as well. In summer went the direct fast trains Paris – Karlovy Vary, Ostende – Karlovy Vary, Vlissingen – Karlovy Vary, Vienna – Františkovy Lázně and Vienna – Mariánské Lázně – Karlovy Vary.18 In this period an air services started to develop. The airplane was not common transport means and a journey by plane was often understood as a special experience or as a necessary tax for speed. Nevertheless, air sevices was increasing between 1918 and 1938. In summer 1930 Prague was connected (except Sunday) with 13 regular lines daily with abroad. In summer the airplanes flew between Mariánské Lázně and Leipzig one a day. Three regular lines flew to Vienna and Katowice from Brno and one line to Zagreb from Bratislava. The longest direct line had Prague with Istanbul, Paris and Bukarest.19

NA, the archival fund of the Ministry of Railways [Ministerstvo železnic] (hereafter just MŽ), box 157, No 39621/1919. 18 Mezinárodní spoje ČSR [International communications of Czechoslovakia], 22. 5. 1932–14. 5. 1933, Prague 1932, pp. 55–56. 19 Ibidem. 17

366 Jan Štemberk ________________________________________________________

In the half of the 1930s an offer of both domestic and international air services multiplied. Besides domestic airplanes, international airlines like Air France on the line Prague – Paris, Prague – Vienna – Budapest – Belgrade – Bukarest and Prague – Warsaw; Deutsche Lufthansa AG on lines Munich – Prague – Wroclaw, Prague – Saská Kamenice – Leipzig – Hannover – Bremen, Mariánské Lázně and Karlovy Vary with Saská Kamenice and Leipzig also flew to Czechoslovakia. However, other European airlines (e.g. from the Netherlands, Great Britain, Poland and Austria) flew to Czechoslovakia as well.20 Individual car transportation was limited by road conditions and administrative limitations. The road infrastructure began to improve at the end of the 1920s. The administrative limitations lasted much longer. A motorist had to show international documents about driver and vehicle capability. In addition, the tax from the vehicles was setted up. Till the half of the 1930s the coming foreigners paid it as well. Transportation tax belonged to other taxes and was paid by foreign bus excursions. If you wanted to travel abroad, you needed a triptyque or a carnet. The individual national car clubs were authorized to issue these documents. In this way these organizations guaranteed payment of the entrance duty and other duties on imports. The most foreign vehicles arrived from Germany (60 %), then from Austria (20 %) and Hungary (10 %). Two percent vehicles came from Poland and France, 1 % from Switzerland, Italy, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The rest fell on the other states.21 In the first half of the 1930s Czechoslovakia represented exception from validation of the strict tax liability in connection with foreign car drivers in the Central Europe. In 1933 were following rates: personal cars 40 crowns for less than 2-day staying, 80 crowns for less than 5-day staying, 160 crowns for less than 15-day staying, 240 crowns less than 30-day staying and 480 crowns for less than 60-day staying. Buses paid between 20 and 400 crowns according to the total weight and staying period. The rate for buses was lower, but it was necessary to include a transport tax in amount of 10 hellers per person and kilometer. Next curiosity of tax rates was paying a tax for 15-day staying instead of tax for 6-day staying.22

Ivan JAKUBEC, Dějiny českého a československého cestovního (turistického) ruchu [History of the Czech and Czechoslovak tourism], rukopis, archiv autora [manuscript, author’s archive]. 21 NA, the archival fund of the MPOŽ, box 2581, doc No 41073/34 from 27. 4. 1934. 22 Poplatky vybírané v jednotlivých státech od zahraničních automobilistů [Duties collected from foreign car drivers in individual states]. In: Auto [Car], 15/1933, p. 216. 20

Czechoslovakia as the Tourist Destination between 1918 and 1938 367 ________________________________________________________

More exact statistics about transport means using for travel to Czechoslovakia are available from the half of the 1930s. In 1935 most foreigners used the railway (992 765) and cars (668 935). Much less people came by boat (32 099) and by plane (4 230). Until 1938 the primary position kept railway according to the arrival of foreigners to Czechoslovakia. The tourists could travel individually or use some travel agency services. A visitor could use services of some foreign travel agency providing excursions into Czechoslovakia, or refer to subsidiary or trade agency of some Czechoslovak travel agency. The specific status gained abovementioned Czechoslovak Travel and Transport Agency Ltd. (Čedok). The Agency was established on 21st July 1920. Establishing partners were the Headquarters of Provincial Foreign Associations and Bohemia the Czechoslovak Foreign Bank in Prague. Čedok had exlusive right to railway ticket sale, which sold out of the station cash desks. The contract obtained permanent incomes to the Agency.23 Čedok setted up its business in the following domains: exercise of the travel and transport agency; sale of tickets; suitable insurance delivery; foreign tourism and touring propagation; advertisement; carrying on trades and business – exchange offices, payment of cheques; transport of goods and passengers baggages; sale of souvenirs and also emigration. Čedok became the semiofficial enterprise immediately after its establishment. It represented the state within the incoming tourism supporting and it gained a lot of benefits due to the realization. In the foreign propagation activity it focused on Austria, Germany and Hungary. It opened its subsidiaries in their capital cities. South-East Europe (Romania and Yugoslavia) as well as West Europe stayed out of its interest, but Čedok tried to propagate Czechoslovakia there. Čedok had a very difficult position. In accordance with the law, Čedok was a business company concentrating on a profit. The direct state contribution did not exist nevertheless, the company worked as a semistate subject, which had an obligation to propagate the state in abroad. Čedok tried to realize these tasks, but it was unrealizable without state subsidy. The main problem appeared during the economic depression when closing of the foreign subsidiaries was planned. Čedok tried to cover its losses from the state money for the purpose of Czechoslovakia propagation. It also required subsidy for a subsidiary in Vienna, which was only replacing of already existing Czechoslovak information agency. In the first years of its existence the office management took the bull by the horns and showed rather deficit. A change came with a capital entry 23

NA, the archival fund of the MŽ, box 183, doc. No 55123/21.

368 Jan Štemberk ________________________________________________________

of the Czechoslovak Legion Bank. The Ministry of Railways did not take opportunity to capital entry into Čedok. The positive impacts of these changes had an influence on the Čedok economic development in the second half of the 1920s. Čedok created a distribution chain not only in the republic, but also in abroad during the course of its activity. It had 17 own subsidiaries located in the big and spa towns in Czechoslovakia. In the 1930s Čedok had four subsidiaries in abroad. The oldest one was Reise und Verkehrsbüro, A. G. in Berlin, established in 1920. The second enterprise was ČEDOK, Bureau des Voyages in Paris. It was established in July 1927 with the basic capital of 50 000 francs. The French subsidiary showed the positive economic results as only one. In May 1927 the subsidiary in London Czechoslovak Travel Bureau Ltd. was established. The next subsidiary was established in Vienna in 1935. Čedok had next agreements with 27 great foreign travel agencies in all Europe. These contractual travel agencies had in total 662 points of sale.24 In addition, Čedok published propagation materials and distributed them. Unfortunately, the company focused more on the outgoing than the incoming tourism. It was reproched for it. The official Čedok position was strenghthened in the second half of the 1930s. However, the Ministry of Railways did not believe that the presentday form of the Čedok could not take over a function of the national travel agency and therefore it prepared a project for an establishment of a new joint-stock company. This company had to continue in the previous Čedok’s work. The first Čedok reaction was negative, but soon after that it was replaced by opportunistic standpoint. The Ministry of Railways was satisfied and agreed with the same name in certain cooperation during the new national travel agency establisment.25 In September 1936 the establishment was permitted and ratified articles of new corporation Čedok. The Czechoslovak State Railways owned 57.5 % of shares. The rest of shares were offered to persons interested in tourism.26 Čedok became the official state travel and information agency, which took over all propagation of Czechoslovakia in abroad. Čedok mainly transported foreigners into the republic in spite of that the outgoing tourism (e.g. into Yugoslavia) had a significant part in the company activity. Čedok became the most successful company in 1937. The offer of foreign and domestic excursions evened out gradually (153 domestic and 173 Ibidem. NA, the archival fund of the PMR, box 3578, sig. 841/5-1. 26 NA, the archival fund of the PMR, box 3900, sig. 270. 24 25

Czechoslovakia as the Tourist Destination between 1918 and 1938 369 ________________________________________________________

foreign) and therefore, it could be stopped reproching for Czechoslovak outgoing to abroad.27 Accomodation and boarding A lot of accommodation (hotels, inns and guesthouses) with suitable fittings was precondition for a successful tourism development. The main importance lay in a local and financial accessibility. These factors were appeared during all period between the world wars. After the First World War Czechoslovak hotels were in crisis. The war influenced an offer and a quality of accommodation very much. At the beginning of our period a lack of hotels, especially in Prague, and the low quality of services were one of the biggest problem for the tourism development.28 Only about 2000 beds were available for the visitors in Prague. In peak season it was a totally insufficient number. An accommodation price was moving between 30 and 240 crowns. For the purpose of hotel quality increase The office for enterprises to foreigners possession (also called Institution for Hotel Instructions) was established in accordance with Act No. 649/1919 Coll. and D. from the date 4th December, which was responsible to the Trade Ministry. This office cared of fault removal in the accommodation, supported modernization of older enterprises, helped building and fittings of new hotels, gave a testimonial concerning accommodation prices and controlled them, represented interests of the hotel industry during negotiation with the state bodies.29 Prague as the new state metropolis brought the higher requirements for a capacity and quality of the hotel services. The new hotels had to be built and stand on the top.30 Between 1918 and 1926 there were built 8 new hotels in Prague. The modern hotel construction required the expense of approximately 12 million crowns. The hotel comfort increased. It can be supported with a statistics of baths. In 1923 Prague hotels disposed of 98 private baths and five years later it was already 546 baths. Besides comfort, the capacity rised, as well. There were accorded 76 new hotel licences only in 1927. Approximately 80 hotels with 3300 rooms and 4000 beds were NA, the archival fund of the MPOŽ, box 2733, doc. No 36299/1937. Deset let Československé republiky [Ten years of the Czechoslovak Republic], p. 232. 29 Sbírka zákonů a nařízení ČSR 1919 [Collection of Laws and Ordinances of the Czechoslovak Republic]. Prague 1919, Law No 649. 30 See Ivan JAKUBEC, Ing. Alois Krofta, zapomenutý podnikatel v cestovním ruchu [Eng. Alois Krofta, forgotten entrepreneur in tourism], In: Cestování včera a dnes [Tourism yesterday and today], vol. 3, 2006, No 1, pp. 50-55. 27

28

370 Jan Štemberk ________________________________________________________

available for visitors in 1928. This capacity was sufficient most of the year. It enabled to accommodate 100 000 guests per month. Average month attendance was moving about 52 000 guests. The hotel statistic shows that approximately 5 months per year it was only used 1/3 of beds, the next 5 months it was occupied around 90% of beds and only two months per year (June and August) the demand exceeded the supply.31 A bad influence on the foreigners had a levy of various surcharges to the prices. Until 1927 the luxurious tax was paid from the “luxurious” accommodation. The luxurious tax was paid on condition that the price of one-bed room exceeded 20 crowns for a night (two-bed room 35 crowns), or in the health resorts 35 crowns for one-bed rooms and 50 crowns in two-bed rooms.32 Municipal charges were also usually included in these surcharges. A guest paid extra for music what was understant entertainment tax in restaurants. There was tax from expenses in luxury rooms like at the Šramota, Mánes and Kočí restaurants in Prague. In Brno the municipality collected the allowance for unemployed people, which was paid by restaurant and cafe visitors. In bigger cities was collected the allowance for temporary accommodation (the highest around 20 % was in Brno in the half of the 1920s). The association of hoteliers and restaurateurs33 protested against these allowances. The association pointed out the negative influence, mainly on the incoming tourism.34 The Trade Ministry maintained the same position. The surcharges also concerned a “tip”. It was added to the accommodation or board price by a percentage rate. The tip was intended for service staffs that were not paid from employers’ resources. Until 1923 the tip was collected in amount of 10 % in Prague. However, it was annuled by the Trade Ministry and became a free allowance. A pressure on annulment of the obligatory tip was pressure on tip cancellation was obvious in the whole republic. The tip existed in the northern and western Bohemia for the longest time in amount about 20 %. In these cases it was striven to reduce fewer than 10 %. A guest had to be warned of the tip payment in the menu or by notice in a restaurant.35 The association of hoteliers and restaurateurs did not protest against the tip because an enterpriser could save on salaries.

NA, the archival fund of the MPOŽ, doc No 17762/1928, O pražských hotelích, Národní osvobození 12.2.1928 [Paper about Prague hotels, National liberation 12. 2. 1928]. 32 NA, the archival fund of the MPOŽ, box 2632, sig. 5606/24, doc. No 71806/26. 33 Profesní spolek [The Professional Association]. 34 NA, the archival fund of the MPOŽ, box 2653, sign. 78616. 35 NA, the archival fund of the MPOŽ, box 2632, sign. 5606/24, doc No 53910/26. 31

Czechoslovakia as the Tourist Destination between 1918 and 1938 371 ________________________________________________________

In the half of the 1920s approximately 6500 hotel trades were conducted in Czechoslovakia. 72 118 persons (in Bohemia 44 708 persons) worked in this resort according to census from 1921. The highest number had small enterprises with 10 rooms. Big hotels were mostly situated in the spa towns.36 Overview of the hotel trades according to room number in 1925 Bohemia Moravia Silesia

More than 100 29 rooms 51 to 100 rooms 62 21 to 50 rooms 238 11 to 20 rooms 349 5 to 10 rooms 969 4 rooms and less 2563

5

4

8 43 98 235 748

7 16 25 91 236

Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia 19 25 69 98 178 356

Source: R. ČUMPELÍK, Přehled našeho hotelnictví [Review of our hotel business]. In: Hoteliér [Hotelier], Vol. 4 (1925–1926), Issue 1, pp. 8–9.

Only a small part of the Czechoslovak hotels, situated just in the main tourism places, was convenient for increasing international standards. Villages and smaller towns fell behind. A quality and restaurant services became a big problem in the small towns. A price of provided services was often debatable, although the prices should be visible on notice board; only a small part of entrepreneurs respected this obligation. Similar obligation had also restaurants, which had to have the menu with meals prices. The accommodation quality became worse toward to the east of the republic. In the big cities and health resorts the situation was substantially better. The offer of accommodation services was differentiated and concentrated more on customer wishes. A locality, where a hotel was situated, influenced the accommodation prices together with hotel and room fittings. The accommodation costed about 5 crowns per night in a room without sanitary facilities. More usual price was moving about 10 crowns. In the health resorts the lowest prices R. ČUMPELÍK, Přehled našeho hotelnictví [Review of our hotel business]. In: Hotelier [Hotelier], Vol. 4 (1925–1926), Issue 1, pp. 8-9.

36

372 Jan Štemberk ________________________________________________________

were moving between 20 and 25 crowns. The price of more luxurious rooms was much higher. The rent of an apartment costed about hundreds crowns per night. The price increased minimally about 10–30 crowns in case of a board order. It was expected that a guest would eat at least one meal a day in the restaurant during staying in the hotel. On the other hand the price for accommodation usually increased. The highest average prices for accommodation and board were in the health resorts in the western Bohemia (in 1927 the accommodation costed between 25 and 70 crowns per person in Karlovy Vary and the board between 30 and 60 crowns per person). The guests complained of the high prices very often. The staying in the Slovak spas was cheaper (accommodation in Piešťany costed between 10 and 60 crowns).37 Other surcharges were added to price in smaller and medium hotels, for example 2–6 crowns for a heating. The guests gained various discounts like a cheaper board during a longer staying (usually more than three days). The Great Depression influenced also hotel business. During the course of the first half of the 1930s the prices decreased on average about 1/3, nevertheless, the number of guests went down. The hotels as well as boarding were too expensive for the Czechoslovak people. In the first half of the 1930s the tourism crisis affected the hotel and restaurant bussines, mostly in the health resorts in the northern and western Bohemia. It was in the poor time, because in the second half of the 1920s a lot of investments were realized, which increased the capacity and quality of accommodation. A lack of free financial resources and unstable time stopped most of the reconstructions and discouraged from the big investments. The prices of services were falling down slowly. The hotel room prices fell about 30 % in 1933 in comparison with 1928. The guests were arriving less and less. The hotels were occupied about 60 % even in peak season. Only devaluation of the Czechoslovak crown in 1934 influenced the tourism development propitiously. The Czechoslovak accommodation and tha health resorts were becoming more competitive. The quality of services was increasing. The staying including board in Karlovy Vary costed about 25 % less than in 1932. The prices of more luxurious accommodation fell down slowlier. The propitious trend of tha hotel prices was succeeded by lower prices in the restaurants. Lunch cost in a good restaurant about 12 crowns on average.38

37 38

NA, the archival fund of the MPOŽ, box 2632, sign. 5606/24, doc No 34946/27. NA, the archival fund of the MPOŽ, box 2664, doc No 29688/34.

Czechoslovakia as the Tourist Destination between 1918 and 1938 373 ________________________________________________________

In 1938 there were registered 62 000 restaurant trades in Czechoslovakia, but only 14 000 could accommodate the foreigners (hotels). The following table shows the situation at the end of interwar period. Hotels occupied the first place among all business firms with trade licence for foreigner accommodation. In comparison with the middle of the 1920s a number of enterprises and beds increased. The second table shows accommodation in the health resorts. It is evident, that hotels in these places had higher sleeping capacity than other places, probably except cities. Only big cities had the similar position. A lot of beds were also offered in private houses because many persons were interested in summer flats. Tables do not include data for the Carpathian Ruthenia. Accommodation in 1937

Num ber 5480

Guest-houses, Hostels sanatoria Num Num Beds Beds Beds ber ber 74870 610 24027 512 11507

1569

22131

188

966 8015

19018 116019

252 1 050

Hotels Country Bohemia Moravia Silesia Slovakia Altogether

10321

Beds in privacy

Altoget her beds

85586

195990

221

8649

35132

76233

10591 229 44939 962

5811 25967

22176 142894

57596 329 819

Accommodation in the health resorts and climatic zones in 1937 Hotels Country Bohemia Moravia Silesia Slovakia Altogether

Guest-houses, Sanatoria Num Beds ber 281 11294

Num ber 548

21585

143

4880

85

282 973

10807 228 37272 594

Beds

Hostels

Beds in privacy

Altoget her beds

Num ber 52

1 299 29944

64122

5206

13

440

8903

19429

9767 26267

79 144

1 643 3382

5465 44312

27682 111 233

Beds

Source: Dvouletý plán cestovního ruchu [Two-year plan of tourism], Studijní ústav cestovního ruchu [Research board of tourism], Prague 1946.

374 Jan Štemberk ________________________________________________________

In the second half of the 1930s hoteliers warned of two basic problems, which impeded the successful hotel development. First, it was a requirement of a hotel credit, which could grant a state support for reconstructions. The expenses were estimated at ten million crowns. Second, it was nonclassification of accommodation, which did not exist in the whole interwar period and no conditions for hotels were determined either. Summary Between 1918 and 1938 the Czechoslovak tourism development was determined by geographical, political and economic-social factors. The Czechoslovak health resorts mainly the west Bohemian spa triangle were the most attractive for foreigner visitors. The Czechoslovak tourism depended fully on guests from the neighbourhood, mainly from Germany. The economic and political situation of these states influenced an amount of arriving visitors. If Czechoslovakia wanted to be known in Western Europe as well as in overseas, it needed big investments for the propagation, but the financial resources were not enough. Czechoslovakia did not show any willingness to eliminate the administrative and economic barriers. It had a cautious approach to providing advantages for foreigner guests; therefore it lost suitable conditions for a better exercise on the European tourism market. In addition, the West European public did not have enough information about the political situation in Czechoslovakia.

Die slowakisch-sowjetischen Beziehungen, 1939–1941: eine ungleiche Partnerschaft Beata Katrebova-Blehova

Die de facto und de jure Anerkennung der Slowakischen Republik durch die Union der sowjetischen sozialistischen Republiken, die am 16. September 1939 erfolgte, eröffnete eine einundzwanzig Monate dauernde Periode der regulären slowakisch-sowjetischen diplomatischen Beziehungen. Die Tatsache, dass der kleine mitteleuropäische Staat durch eine Großmacht im Osten anerkannt wurde, wirkte sich stabilisierend auf seine Existenz aus. Die Hoffnungen eines Teiles der slowakischen politischen Elite nach mehr Unabhängigkeit von der deutschen Suprematie, die mit diesem Status quo verknüpft wurden, konnten jedoch nicht erfüllt werden, da es seitens Berlin keine Aufweichungen ihrer im deutsch-sowjetischen Nichtangriffspakt mit Moskau ausgehandelten Einflusssphären geduldet wurden. Das bis dato wenig beachtete Kapitel der slowakisch-sowjetischen Beziehungen trägt somit zum besseren Verständnis nicht nur des komplizierten Verhältnisses der Slowakei zum ungleichen Partner im Osten bei, sondern beleuchtet auch die Peripetien der Koexistenz zweier antagonistischer Großmächte in der Zeit ihres kurzfristigen Bündnisses. Der deutsch-sowjetische Nichtangriffspakt und die slowakische Außenpolitik Der Ribbentrop-Molotov-Pakt zeichnete einen neuen Kurs der Sowjetunion in der slowakischen und insofern auch in der tschechoslowakischen Frage. Die bis dahin vertretene Haltung, die Liquidierung der Tschecho-Slowakei nicht anzuerkennen, kam in der Note des Volkskommissars für Äußeres, Maxim Litvinov, an den deutschen Botschafter in der UdSSR, Friedrich Werner Graf von der Schulenburg, vom 18. März 1939 zum Ausdruck. Die Okkupation Böhmens und Mährens wurde darin als ein Akt der Willkür, der Gewalt und der Aggression genannt; der geänderte Status der Slowakei, der „durch keinen Willensakt der Slowaken gerechtfertigt werden könne“, wurde ebenfalls nicht anerkannt. „Aufgrund der genannten Tatsachen kann die sowjetische Regierung die Einbeziehung Tschechiens wie auch in der einen oder anderen Gestalt auch der Slowakei in das Deutsche Imperium nicht als rechtmäßig und den Prinzipien des

376 Beata Katrebova-Blehova ________________________________________________________

Völkerrechts und der Selbstbestimmung der Völker entsprechend anerkennen.“1 Zdeněk Fierlinger, der letzte tschecho-slowakische Gesandte in Moskau, konnte seine Tätigkeit in der diplomatischen Mission weiterhin fortsetzen, denn er wurde als „Vertreter eines symbolischen Staates und seiner Regierung“ anerkannt2. Über diese wohlwollende Haltung hinaus durfte er mit Beneš, der in London weilte, chiffrierte Telegramme austauschen. In den Berichten des Stellvertreters Litvinovs, Potemkin, mit dem sich Fierlinger mehrmals traf, um die Unterstützung der sowjetischen Regierung für den tschechoslowakischen Widerstand zu erbeten, figurierte er nach wie vor als der Gesandte.3 Die in den Sommermonaten fortgesetzte, abwartende Haltung der Sowjetunion in der tschechoslowakischen Frage, die sich aus der Ungewissheit über den Ausgang der Verhandlungen mit den Briten und Franzosen einerseits und den Deutschen andererseits ergab, änderte sich Ende August 1939 rasant. Beneš fragte Fierlinger, ob – wie es laut Gerüchten zu vernehmen sei –, die Sowjetunion tatsächlich die Einflusssphären mit Deutschland geteilt habe und ob die Tschechoslowakei in den deutschen Einflussbereich gekommen sei. Weiterhin wollte er wissen, was daran wahr sei, dass Moskau den Slowakischen Staat anerkennen und einen slowakischen Gesandten akkreditieren wolle mit all den negativen Folgen, die sich somit für den diplomatischen Status Fierlingers wie auch die tschechische Emigration ergäben.4 Fierlinger war zwar in seiner Antwort sehr zurückhaltend – zurückhaltend war letztendlich auch die Haltung Beneš’ zum neuen Kurs Kremls, der weiterhin auf einen Krieg der Westmächte gegen Deutschland hoffte –, konnte aber daran nichts mehr ändern. Seit Mitte September wurde Fierlinger im sowjetischen Außenministerium (NKID) nicht mehr empfangen, galt laut Molotovs Anweisung nicht mehr als Gesandter, und am 14. Dezember wurde ihm mitgeteilt, dass die Gesandtschaft

Dokumenti i materiali kanuna vtoroj mirovoj vojny, 1937–1939, Bd. 2: Janvar–avgust 1939 g., Moskva 1981, S. 46f. 2 So die Note Litvinovs an den sowjetischen Konsuln in Prag Jakovlev vom 28. März 1939. Siehe, Valentina MARJINA, Slovakija v politike SSSR i Germanii. In: V. K. VOLKOV (Hg.), Vostočnaja Jevropa meždu Gitlerom i Stalinym, 1939–1941gg., Moskva 1999, S. 208. 3 Fierlinger gab am 25. Juni 1939 Potemkin zur Kenntnis, dass unter den Regierungen, auf die die tschechoslowakische Regierung am meisten hofft, die UdSSR den ersten Platz einnimmt. Er hoffte daher, dass Moskau die tschechoslowakische Mission weiterhin erhalten wird. AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 1, Schachtel 20, Dokument 217. Prijom čechoslovackogo poslannika Fierlingera 25 ijunja 1939 goda. 4 Toman BROD, Osudný omyl Edvarda Beneše 1939–1948. Československá cesta do sovětského područí, Praha 2002, S. 36. 1

Die slowakisch-sowjetischen Beziehungen, 1939–1941... 377 ________________________________________________________

ab 1. Jänner geräumt werden müsse und er nur mehr als Privatperson sich aufzuhalten habe.5 In London nahm man an, dass die radikale Wende der sowjetischen Haltung auf deutschen Druck erfolgt sei und die restlose Anerkennung der ehemaligen Tschecho-Slowakei als Einflussbereich des Dritten Reiches sich als Konsequenz dieses neuen Kurses erwiesen habe.6 Die einschlägigen Archivdokumente über die Beziehungen zweier kontinentaleuropäischer Großmächte können – wie die russische Historikerin Valentina Marjina feststellt –, für die Behauptung einer direkten Pression seitens Berlin jedoch keinen Beweis liefern.7 Trotzdem wäre die Normalisierung der sowjetischslowakischen Relationen oder vielmehr die Demonstration einer Art Desinteresse an der tschechoslowakischen Frage seitens Moskau nach der Unterzeichnung des Nichtangriffspaktes das Gebot der konkreten Umstände des Septembers 1939 gewesen.8 Nichtsdestoweniger waren es die eifrigen Bemühungen der slowakischen Diplomatie, durch die de jure-Anerkennung seitens der Sowjetunion ein Pendant zur deutschen Hegemonie zu erreichen, die für die Aufnahme der Beziehungen wahrscheinlich am meisten wogen. Der 23. August 1939, der als ein „großartiger Umsturz der Geschichte,“9 oder eine „kolossale Wende in der Kontinentalpolitik Europas“10 in der slowakischen Presse der damaligen Zeit gedeutet wurde, sowie seine Auswirkung auf die außenpolitische Linie der Slowakischen Republik, werden von der slowakischen Geschichtsschreibung nach wie vor kaum berücksichtigt. Die ideologisch gegebene Tabuisierung der Existenz der sowjetischen Beziehungen zu dem „klerofaschistischen“ Staat, für die sich die marxistischen Historiker sprichwörtlich schämten11 und diesbezüglich in der Fachliteratur kaum erwähnt werden durften, sorgten dafür, dass die grundlegende Wende in der europäischen Politik im Spätsommer 1939 mit all ihren Konsequenzen an den Rand des Interesses verdrängt werden MARJINA, Slovakija v politike, S. 214. Dies ergibt sich aus einem an das Foreign Office verfassten Memorandums Bruce Lockharts, der mit der tschechischen Agenda betraut war und sich gerne als Intimus Jan Masaryks ausgab. P.R.O., FO 371/22900. Memorandum by Mr. Bruce Lockhart on the Status of the Czechoslovak Minister in Moscow, 19. 12. 1939. 7 MARJINA, Slovakija v politike, S. 210. 8 Vgl. dazu die Erinnerungen Zdeněk FIERLINGERs, Ve službách ČSR, I. Teil, Praha 1947, S. 300. 9 Slovensko v novom zvrate dejín. In: Slovenská politika, 24.8.1939, S. 1. 10 Národnie noviny 26.8.1939. Hier zitiert nach Dagmar ČIERNA-LANTAYOVÁ, Politické úvahy pri nadviazaní diplomatických stykov medzi Slovenskom a Sovietskym Zväzom roku 1939. In: Historické štúdie Jg. 37, Bratislava 1996, S. 74f. 11 MARJINA, Slovakija v politike, S. 198. 5

6

378 Beata Katrebova-Blehova ________________________________________________________

musste. Neulich erschienene Arbeiten slowakischer Historiker, die sich zu sehr auf die Quellen slowakischer Provenienz beziehen, sind diesbezüglich zwar zu begrüßen; sie betonen aber zu sehr die positiven Effekte der sowjetisch-deutschen Annäherung auf die Stabilität des kleinen mitteleuropäischen Staates, die es zweifellos gab.12 Der Aspekt des immanenten Antikommunismus und Antibolschewismus, der der slowakischen politischen Garnitur anhaftete, wie auch die nicht zu unterschätzenden Befürchtungen vor einem für möglich gehaltenen baltischen Szenario, werden dabei ausgeblendet. Auf der anderen Seite wird die übertriebene Betonung des Angstfaktors Sowjetrusslands in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa, wie sie in der umfassenden Arbeit Jan Lipinskis dargestellt wird, auch nicht die einzige Erklärung für das ungleichmäßige sowjetisch-slowakische Verhältnis sein. Wie war nun tatsächlich die Reaktion auf die neue politische Konstellation Europas in Bratislava? Wie änderte sich etwa die Haltung des Außenministeriums, bzw. der mit der Außenpolitik betrauten Politiker? Was erwartete man sich von den slowakisch-sowjetischen Beziehungen und wie war die Reaktion Berlins? Der Nichtangriffspakt wurde in der slowakischen Presse unisono als eine historische Wende ohnegleichen bezeichnet, wobei auf die Berichterstattung der renommierten westlichen Tageszeitungen wie auch auf die Aussagen des deutschen Reichsaußenministers Ribbentrop selbst, der vor seinem Abflug aus Moskau am 24. August den Pakt als „einen der bedeutendsten Wendepunkte in der Geschichte der beiden Völker“13 – des deutschen und des russischen – nannte, Bezug genommen wurde. Die Politik Frankreichs und Großbritanniens, die auf die Unmöglichkeit einer Zusammenarbeit zweier ideologisch unversöhnlicher Mächte hofften und aufgrund dessen die von ihrer Seite geführten Verhandlungen in die Länge zogen, sei gescheitert – wie ein Kommentator in der dem Außenminister Ďurčanský nahe stehenden Zeitung Nástup ausführte. Ebenfalls habe sich die Politik der Einkreisung der Sowjetunion, die im Süden an die britischen Kolonien grenzte, als irregeleitet gezeigt. Deutschland, das durch die Verzögerungstaktik an Zeit gewonnen habe, habe nun mal diese Karte den Westmächten aus der Hand geschlagen und habe erreicht, dass Moskau ihm Dagmar ČIERNA-LANTAYOVÁ, Pohľady na východ. Postoje k Rusku k slovenskej politike 1934-1944, Bratislava 2002. Bohuslav HLAVA, Recipročné návštevy S. V. Kaftanova a J. Siváka v kontexte slovensko-sovietskych vzťahov v rokoch 1939–1940. In: Historický časopis 50/4, Bratislava 2002, S. 607–618. 13 o.V., Významné vyhlásenie Ribbentropovo pred odletom: Hitler a Stalin sa rozhodli pre priateľstvo – Najvýznamnejší obrat v dejinách oboch národov. In: Slovenská politika, Jg. 20, Nr. 193, Žilina 25. August 1939, S. 1. 12

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gegenüber neutral bleibe.14 Der Pakt, der „eine grundsätzliche Wende in der Aufteilung des wirtschaftlichen, politischen und militärischen Potentials der Demokratien auf der einen und der Achsenmächte auf der anderen Seite“ bedeute, gäbe den Achsenmächten, die nach Revisionismus rufen, eine neue, ungeahnte Kraft. Die Stellung Englands und Frankreichs würde sich so sehr verschlechtern, dass an eine Intervention in Ostmitteleuropa ihrerseits nicht zu denken sei. Die Slowakei zöge aus dieser neuen Konstellation der politischen Kräfte – des Endes der Gleichgewichtspolitik – eindeutige Vorteile, denn in der Aussöhnung zweier europäischer Kontinentalmächte erblicke sie neue Garantien für die internationale Verankerung ihrer Eigenstaatlichkeit.15 In der Presse trat besonders das Argument in den Vordergrund, wonach diejenigen Politiker, die auf die deutsche Karte setzten, in ihrem Handeln eine Rechtfertigung erführen, da durch das deutsch-sowjetische Bündnis alle anderen Varianten nunmehr als Fehlschlag gedeutet wurden. Man argumentierte sogar damit, dass sich trotz der Besetzung und Auflösung Polens die außenpolitische Lage der Slowakei verbessert habe, da zur deutschen Schutzmacht auch ein gutes Verhältnis zu Sowjetrussland dazu trete und der deutsch-sowjetische Pakt konsolidierend wirke.16 Man erhoffte sich sogar – und das nicht ganz unbegründet – die Rückgabe der nach dem Wiener Schiedsspruch abgetretenen Territorien.17 Dabei wurde an die mögliche Wiedervereinigung der Karpato-Ukraine mit der Sowjetunion gedacht, die sich als die Folge der Besetzung der Westukraine ergab: „Und wenn das ruthenische Unrecht wieder gutgemacht ist, warum sollte nicht auch das slowakische Unrecht beseitigt werden […],“18 fragte der Autor des Kommentars. Tatsächlich bemühte sich Außenminister Ďurčanský seinem neuen sowjetischen Partner gegenüber, die Frage der Angliederung der Karpato-Ukraine an die UdSSR aufzuwerfen. In Bratislava erhoffte man sich – wie aus den Berichten des sowjetischen Gesandten Puškins hervorgeht –, als Gegenleistung die Fürsprache Moskaus für die im Süden an das Königreich Ungarn verlorenen Gebiete, wovon noch die Rede sein wird. Der antibolschewistische Ton der von der regierenden Hlinkas Volkspartei (HSĽS) dominierten Presse wurde wesentlich gemildert. Im Presseorgan der HSĽS Slovák wurde im Leitartikel auf der ersten Seite der Štefan ŇUKOVIČ, Pakt o neútočení. In: Nástup, Jg. 7, Nr. 17, 1. 9. 1939, S. 204. Ebenda. 16 o.V., Ako bomba. In: Slovenská politika, Jg. 20, Nr. 214, Žilina 19. September 1939, S. 1. 17 o.V., Slovensko v novom zvrate dejín. In: Slovenská politika, Jg. 20, Nr. 192, Žilina 24. August 1939, S. 1. 18 Ako bomba, a.a.O. 14 15

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Zusammenhang zwischen der von Stalin durchgeführten Entjudaisierung und dem Nichtangriffspakt konstruiert. So hieß es darin, dass gerade die antijüdischen Maßnahmen in der Sowjetunion wie auch die Opferung des jüdischen Außenministers Litvinov die beiden großen Reiche näher zueinander gebracht hätten. Russland unter Stalin habe eine große Rückkehr zurück zu den eigenen nationalen Traditionen angetreten: Kutuzov und der Sieg über Napoleon von 1812, Peter der Große und der Sieg bei Poltava 1709 ja sogar Ivan der Schreckliche und der Heilige Vladimir wurden in Erinnerung gerufen und seien Garanten für das nationale Erwachen: „Stalins Russland ehrt alles, was russisch ist und das Wort russisch müssen wir im Sinne des Reichs verstehen.“19 Die Entjudaisierung und die Nationalisierung Russlands durften somit die Grundlage für das neue Verhältnis zu Moskau werden. Begriffe wie „das Slawentum“ und „der Panslawismus“ wurden wieder rehabilitiert. Gewiss könnte man in dieser neuen Entwicklung einen gewissen Widerspruch erblicken, wenn man an die in der Zwischenkriegszeit vertretene antikommunistische Linie der konservativen Volkspartei Hlinkas denkt, proklamiert im Manifest von Piešťany vom 19. September 1936, in dem die „Zusammenarbeit mit den internationalen Vertretern der materialistischen Ideologie und der jüdisch-bolschewistischen Anarchie“ strikt abgelehnt und eine Eingliederung in die gemeinsame antikommunistische Front auf der Seite der von christlichen Prinzipien geleiteten Völker gefordert wurde.20 Die Eindrücke der im März 1939 organisierten, großen antibolschewistischen Ausstellung in Bratislava waren noch nicht ganz verblasst. Tatsächlich mussten die konkreten Auswirkungen des Hitler-Stalin-Paktes und die daraus folgende de jure und de facto Anerkennung der Slowakei seitens der Sowjetunion in Bratislava freudig begrüßt werden. Die somit angeknüpften diplomatischen Beziehungen zur Großmacht im Osten standen aber keineswegs im Widerspruch zur außenpolitischen Linie, die insbesondere auf die Freundschaft mit allen Völkern hinarbeitete und einen pragmatischen Realismus verfolgte. Im ersten Exposé des Außenministers vor dem außenpolitischen Ausschuss des Landtages der Slowakischen Republik am 15. Juni 1939 wurde dieser Grundsatz besonders betont.21 Die außenpolitische Leitidee der Freundschaft zu allen Völkern war immer wieder Bestandteil der politischen Reden einiger Clement HARAOUI, Odžidovštenie Ruska a moskovský pakt. In: Slovák, Jg. 21, Nr. 234, Bratislava 11.10.1939, S. 1. 20 Róbert LETZ, Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana. In: Róbert LETZ, Peter MULÍK, Alena BARTLOVÁ, Slovenská ľudová strana v dejinách 1905–1945, Martin 2006, S. 58. 21 Prvé expozé nášho ministra zahraničia. In: Slovák, Jg. 21, Nr. 137, Bratislava 16. Juni 1939, S. 1. 19

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Abgeordneten des Slowakischen Landtags. Der Abgeordnete Tido Gašpar sprach auf der Sitzung des Landtags am 29. November 1939 von der kompromisslosen Schlussfolgerung, wonach es für ein jedes kleine Volk am besten sei, möglichst viele Freunde zu haben.22 Trotzdem machte er sich über die Idee des Slawentums keine Illusionen: „Wir haben unsere Zugehörigkeit zum Slawentum nie verheimlicht, auch künftighin wollen wir sie nicht verheimlichen, aber wir werden nicht zulassen, dass uns jemand im Namen des Slawentums aufopfern will. Wir sehen unsere slawische Idee nicht darin, dass ein slawisches Volk das andere auffrisst, aber wir sehen es auch nicht in der Feindschaft zu anderen Nationen.“23 Der politischen Annäherung an Moskau durften die eigenen nationalen Interessen und die christliche Weltanschauung nicht geopfert werden, denn durch die Auflösung Polens und das Heranrücken des Sowjetstaates sah sich die Slowakei in einer als unangenehm empfundenen exponierten Lage an der „Kreuzung der unterschiedlichsten antagonistischen ideologischen und großmachtpolitischen Interessen und Plänen“.24 Um diesen Ideologien nicht anheim zu fallen, sei das Gebot der „Neutralität des Geistes im Sinne unserer Traditionen“ gewahrt.25 Die Slowakei sollte sich nicht als ein Staat in der Pufferzone an der Kreuzung der europäischen Interessen verstehen, vielmehr sich als „der Vermittler und der Ausgleich zwischen Ost und West, zwischen der slawischen und der germanischen Welt“.26 Jahre später erklärte Tiso vor dem Volksgericht, er habe das deutsch-sowjetische Abkommen herzlich begrüßt und dachte, dass es eine Garantie für eine ruhige Entwicklung sein werde.27 Der Abgeordnete Tido Gašpar meinte ebenfalls als Angeklagter, dass er das gute Verhältnis Deutschlands zur Sowjetunion als eine dauerhafte Erscheinung betrachtet habe.28

http://www.nrsr.sk/dk/Documents.aspx?MasterID=135165.TesnInventarverzeichnisecká zpráva o 17. zasadnutí snemu Slovenskej republiky v Bratislave v stredu 29. novembra 1939. Digitale Bibliothek des Nationalrates der Slowakischen Republik. 23 Ebenda. 24 So der Landtagsabgeordnete und Mitglied des Außenpolitischen Ausschusses, Ferdinand Mondok, in seiner Rede vor dem Landtag am 28. November 1939. http://www.nrsr.sk/dk/Documents.aspx?MasterID=135164. Zpráva o 16. zasadnutí snemu Slovenskej republiky v Bratislave v utorok 28. novembra 1939. Digitale Bibliothek des Nationalrates der Slowakischen Republik. 25 Ebenda. 26 So Präsident Tiso vor dem Landtag am 31. Oktober 1939. TesnInventarverzeichnisecká správa o 13. zasadnutí snemu Slovenskej republiky v Ružomberku v utorok 31. októbra 1939. http://www.nrsr.sk/dk/Documents.aspx? MasterID=135161. 27 Pred súdom národa, Bratislava 1946, Bd. 1, S. 127. 28 Siehe HLAVA, Recipročné návštevy, S. 608f. 22

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Zu den durchaus positiven Reaktionen auf den Abschluss des deutschsowjetischen Bündnispaktes29 gesellten sich aber durchaus auch gewisse Befürchtungen vor möglichen künftigen Szenarien eines expandierenden Sowjetrusslands. Die „Politik der absichtlichen Verunsicherung“ Hitlers, der Informationen über die weitgehende territoriale Geheimvereinbarung mit Stalin seinen osteuropäischen Verbündeten vorenthielt, um sie gezielt als Droh- und Druckmittel anzuwenden30, schürte diese Ängste. Der slowakische Gesandte in Berlin, Matúš Černák, erkundigte sich am 10. Oktober beim Staatssekretär Weizsäcker, „ob Russland gegenüber den südosteuropäischen Staaten etwa ähnliche Pläne haben könnte wie gegenüber dem Baltikum“.31 Er sagte weiterhin, dass Russland nunmehr auf etwa 20 km an die Slowakei herangerückt sei, und dass sich auch Ungarn und Rumänien auch Gedanken wegen ihrer gemeinsamen Grenze mit der UdSSR machen müssten.32 Der Staatssekretär wich zwar mit einer ungenauen Antwort aus, der Eindruck einer gewissen Verunsicherung des slowakischen Gesandten, die aus seinem Bericht hervorgeht, blieb trotzdem. Der slowakische Chargé d’affaires in Belgrad, Jozef Cieker, fragte den ungarischen Gesandten Baron Bakách-Besseney, ob das Heranrücken der Sowjetunion an die ungarische Grenze in Budapest nicht als Gefahr gesehen werde. Besseney meinte, dass eine akute Gefahr – das Wort akute wurde im Bericht zweimal unterstrichen nicht bestünde; im Gegenteil, die ungarische Regierung würde daran arbeiten, die regulären diplomatischen Beziehungen zur UdSSR erneuern.33 Der deutsche Gesandte in Belgrad, Viktor von Heeren, der mit Cieker freundschaftlich verkehrte, machte diesem gegenüber keinen Hehl aus der erstarkten Rolle der aufkommenden Großmacht im Osten. So sehe sich Deutschland nach wie vor in seiner Rolle als Bollwerk gegenüber dem Bolschewismus bestätigt.34 Eine ganze Reihe von Missverständnissen zwischen Russland und dem übrigen Europa würde sich daraus ergeben – so von Heeren gegenüber dem slowakischen Gesandten in Belgrad Milecz – Es sei noch anzumerken, dass am 22. August 1939 die Nachricht über die Annäherung zwischen Moskau und Berlin eine spontane Manifestation in Bratislava auslöste. 30 Vgl. Jan LIPINSKY, Das geheime Zusatzprotokoll zum deutsch-sowjetischen Nichtangriffsvertrag vom 23. August 1939 und seine Entstehungs- und Rezeptionsgeschichte von 1939 bis 1999, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern e.a. 2004, S. 254f. 31 PA AA Berlin, Büro des Staatssekretär, R 29737, Bl. 248303. Vgl. auch LIPINSKY, Das Geheime Zusatzprotokoll, S. 254f. 32 Ebenda. 33 SNA Bratislava, F. MZV, Schachtel 265, Politischer Bericht Nr. 130/39 Chargé d’affaires Cieker, Belgrad 13. 10. 1939. 34 SNA Bratislava, F. MZV, Schachtel 265, Politischer Bericht Nr. 127/39 Chargé d’affaires Cieker, Belgrad 12. 10. 1939. 29

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dass die kleinen Länder an der Grenze zu Russland dieses zu wenig als entscheidende Großmacht begriffen. Der deutsche Diplomat gab deutlich zu verstehen, dass Berlin die russischen Forderungen nach freiem Zugang zum Meer völlig anerkenne und sich – da es im Westen gebunden sei – gegen die Ansprüche der Sowjets in Ostmitteleuropa nicht stellen werde.35 Befürchtungen hinsichtlich einer bolschewistischen Gefahr in Mitteleuropa wurden in einem Gespräch mit Cieker auch seitens des Apostolischen Nuntius in Jugoslawien, Ettore Felici, geäußert. Durch den Vorstoß Russlands nach Mitteleuropa sei die christliche Zivilisation gefährdet und die kommunistische Gefahr näher gerückt. Die Bündnispartner Deutschland und Russland hätten gemeinsam eine riesige Kraft und würden Europa unter ein Diktat stellen.36 Hilter persönlich schürte die Ängste der kleinen ostmitteleuropäischen Verbündeten. Bei einem Treffen mit Černák am 21. Oktober 1939 sagte er, dass er sich mit Stalin über die beiderseitigen Interessensphären geeinigt habe, um „dummen Kriegen“ vorzubeugen.37 Die genauen Grenzvereinbarungen wurden aber nicht weiter erwähnt, er meinte nur, seine Ausführungen im Reichstag zur Umsiedlung hätten sich zunächst auf das Baltikum bezogen, da er das Verlangen und den Drang der Sowjetunion nach eisfreien Häfen verstehe. Somit gestand er die Preisgabe der baltischen Staaten ein und deutete die Gefahr für diejenigen Völker an, die sich nicht in der deutschen Interessensphäre befunden.38 Dürften sich die Befürchtungen vor der sowjetischen Expansion noch im Herbst 1939 als begründet erweisen haben, so war es im Frühjahr 1940, nach dem verlustreichen Winterkrieg der Sowjetunion gegen Finnland offenbar nicht mehr der Fall. Diesbezüglich liefert das Gespräch, das zwischen Černák und dem sowjetischen Botschafter in Berlin, Škvarcev, am 23. April 1940 stattfand, interessante Einblicke über das instabile slowakisch-russische Verhältnis. Der sowjetische Botschafter, den Černák als seinen Freund bezeichnete, dürfte sich in einer äußerst pesimistischen Stimmung befunden haben, die er auch auf die Lage in der Slowakei ausdehnte. Der sich ausweitende Krieg, der nicht mehr zu stoppen sei, würde auch die Slowakei treffen, wobei dem Lande die größte Gefahr seitens Deutschlands drohe. Dabei habe Škvarcev während seiner pessimistischen SNA Bratislava, F. MZV, Schachtel 180, Politischer Bericht Nr. 445/39 des Gesandten Milecz, Belgrad 30. 11. 1939. 36 SNA Bratislava, F. MZV, Schachtel 265, Politischer Bericht Nr. 123/39 Chargé d’affaires’ Cieker, Belgrad 10. 10. 1039. 37 ADAP, Serie D, Bd. VIII, 1961, Nr. 286, S. 258. 38 LIPINSKY, Das Geheime Zusatzprotokoll, S. 255. 35

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Ausführungen hinsichtlich der schlechten Verteidigungsfähigkeit der slowakischen Armee, die angeblich jederzeit von einem unerwarteten Angriff überrascht werden könne, offen auf die guten freundschaftlichen Neigungen Russlands zu der Slowakei hingewiesen und meinte zum Schluss, er würde den Gesandten im Falle einer akuten Gefahr sofort unterrichten.39 Die Erklärung für diese merkwürdige Besorgnis des russischen Botschafters fand Černák jedoch weniger in der angeblichen Schwäche der Slowakei, sondern vielmehr in dem allgemein herrschenden Pessimismus nach dem sowjetisch-finnischen Krieg. Im Winterkrieg habe die Sowjetunion ihre militärischen und inneren Schwächen entdeckt, was sich auf die Stellung in Europa negativ ausgewirkt habe. So sei die skandinavische Halbinsel, die zum sowjetischen Einflussgebiet gehöre, verloren gegangen; Moskau könne außerdem in dem mit dem Deutschen Reich verbündeten Rumänien seine Pläne hinsichtlich der „Integrität“ Rumäniens nicht verwirklichen und fühle sich durch die Ausbreitung der deutschen Einflusssphären an der eigenen Grenze bedroht. Hier sollte man – so Černák – die Quelle des sowjetischen Pessimismus sehen und nicht in der angeblichen Bedrohung der Slowakei.40 Das Schattendasein der slowakischen diplomatischen Mission in Moskau Am 16. September 1939 teilte Botschafter Škvarcev Černák mit, dass die UdSSR die Slowakische Republik de jure und de facto anerkannt habe und mit ihr diplomatischen Beziehungen anknüpfen wolle. Damit begann eine einundzwanzig Monate dauernde Periode offizieller diplomatischer Beziehungen zwischen Bratislava und Moskau. Obwohl seitens der sowjetischen Regierung kein offizielles Kommuniqué erfolgte, wurde dieser feierliche Akt in der slowakischen regierungsnahen Presse begrüßt. Man erwartete sich, dass die umstrittenen Fragen und Probleme der beiden Staaten untereinander überwunden und eine bedeutende wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit entwickelt werde, die das Ausbleiben der wirtschaftlichen Hilfe aus dem Westen ersetzen würde.41 Trotz dieser raschen Anerkennung dauerte es noch ganze drei Monate, bis der vom slowakischen Staatspräsidenten und der Regierung mit der Funktion des Gesandten betraute

SNA Bratislava, F. MZV, Schachtel 180, Politischer Bericht des Gesandten Černák, Berlin 23. 4. 1940. 40 Ebenda. 41 o.V. Rusko nás uznalo. In: Slovenská politika, Jg. 20, Nr. 213, Žilina 17. 9. 1939. 39

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Fraňo Tiso42 die Leitung der diplomatischen Mission in Moskau übernahm. Die Verzögerung der Abreise Tisos ist der sowjetischen Seite zuzuschreiben. So meldete am 15. Dezember Černák aus Berlin, dass nicht nur Tiso, sondern auch deutsche Journalisten Schwierigkeiten mit Einreisevisa hätten, obwohl sie über größere Machtmittel verfügten.43 Die offensichtliche Schwerfälligkeit der sowjetischen Behörden ging soweit, dass Černák am 27. November vom slowakischen Außenminister angewiesen werden musste, bei Škvarcev zugunsten Fraňo Tiso zu intervenieren, um seine Abreise zu beschleunigen.44 Zwei Wochen später, am 11. Dezember kam Tiso in Begleitung vom Legationsrat Dr. Jozef Bellai tatsächlich in Moskau an und nahm im Hotel National auf der Mochovaja Straße – einem der luxuriösesten und elegantesten Hotels Moskaus – vorläufig Quartier.45 Fraňo Tiso, geboren 1891 in Bytča, war Cousin des Präsidenten Jozef Tiso und Bruder des späteren Premierministers Štefan Tiso. Er studierte Theologie und Rechtswissenschaften, wirkte in Trenčín (Trentschin) und Brno (Brünn) als Gymnasialprofessor, war Mitglied von Hlinkas Volkspartei und war zuletzt Generaldirektor der Bauernbank (Sedliacka banka) in Bratislava. Tiso war in Wirklichkeit kein politischer Mensch, war aber aufgrund seiner Verwandtschaft zum Präsidenten kein unbedeutender Mann, was gewissermaßen für die Wertschätzung der slowakischen Mission in Moskau innerhalb der Außenpolitik der Slowakei spricht. Über seine politische Einstellung kursierten in Berlin verschiedene Gerüchte. In einem Bericht des Reichssicherheitsdienstes in Wien vom 2. Oktober 1939 an den Chef des Sicherheitshauptamtes in Berlin wurde mitgeteilt, dass der Fabrikant Tiso aus Trenčín, der in seinem Heimatort Gauführer der Hlinkajugend gewesen sei, antideutsch eingestellt sei.46 Es mag sein, dass die deutschen Agenten in Wien Tiso aus verschiedenen Gründen als einen „aufrichtigen Filosemiten, Slawenfreund und aus politischem Standpunkt einen Feind der Deutschen“ einstuften, wie es der Historiker Ďurica in seinem Überblickswerk darstellt.47 Trotzdem können wir aufgrund der ausführlichen Charakteristik des Grafen Schulenburg, die der deutsche SNA Bratislava, F. MZV, Schachtel. 198, Betrifft: Fraňo Tiso – die Betrauung für Moskau (13. 11. 1939). 43 SNA Bratislava, F. MZV, Schachtel 180, Černák an MZV, 15. 12. 1939. 44 SNA Bratislava, f. MZV, Schachtel 180, Betreff: Gesandter Tiso – urgente Intervention, 27. 11. 1939. 45 Daniel ŠMIHULA, Vnútorný život na vyslanectve Slovenskej republliky v Moskve v rokoch 1939–1941. In: Historický časopis, 46/3, Bratislava 1998, S. 479. 46 SNA Bratislava, Alexandrijský archív, C 969, Bericht an den Chef des Sicherheitshauptamtes P., 2.10.1939. 47 Milan S. ĎURICA, Dejiny Slovenska a Slovákov, Bratislava 2003, S. 410f., 3. Aufl. 42

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Botschafter am Ende der diplomatischen Mission Tisos anfertigte, annehmen, dass er in Berlin Vertrauen genoss. So schreibt Schulenburg wörtlich: „Gesandter Tiso ist während seiner etwa eineinhalbjährigen Tätigkeit in Moskau politisch wenig hervorgetreten. Sein Interesse an der Außenpolitik dürfte nur gering sein. Die wenigen ihm gestellten nichtpolitischen Aufgaben – Abschluss eines Handelsvertrages, Umsiedlung einer kleinen Zahl Slowaken aus Wolhynien usw. –, scheint er nicht ohne Geschick gelöst zu haben.“48 Zu Tisos Verhältnis zum Deutschen Reich meinte Schulenburg im Unterschied zur Meinung des Sicherheitsdienstes folgendes: „Seine politische Einstellung ist ausgesprochen deutschfreundlich. Er benutzt jede Gelegenheit, diese Einstellung auch in der Öffentlichkeit zu zeigen, ebenso wie er sich stets der deutschen Sprache bedient, die er, wie die ungarische, fließend beherrscht.“49 Auch Tisos Einstellung zu den Ideen des Panslawismus, die ihm unterstellt wurde, wurden von Schulenburg revidiert: „Irgendwelche Neigungen zum Panslawismus, die ihm seinerzeit nachgesagt wurden, konnten hier nicht festgestellt werden. Er hielt sich im Gegenteil von seinen slawischen Kollegen eher fern und dürfte sich in seiner Berichterstattung in erster Linie auf die Informationen der deutschen Botschaft gestützt haben.“ Zu den inneren Eigenschaften meinte der deutsche Botschafter: „Er ist von bemerkenswerter Sparsamkeit und hat keinerlei Geselligkeit unterhalten, nahm aber persönlich gern Einladungen an; er scheint eine gewisse Neigung zu haben, neben seinen Dienstgeschäften auch seine Privatgeschäfte weiterzuführen. Tiso ist besonders angenehm liebenswürdig, ruhig und zurückhaltend.“50 Aus der Darstellung des deutschen Botschafters, der mit Tiso oft verkehrte und in einem guten Verhältnis zu ihm stand, bekommen wir nicht nur Einblick in die politischen Dispositionen und persönlichen Charakterzüge des slowakischen Diplomaten, sondern erfahren auch, dass seine Tätigkeit in der Sowjetunion in der relativ kurzen Zeitspanne von eineinhalb Jahren in der Wilhelmstraße wohlwollend betrachtet wurde. Der sowjetische Gesandte Puškin brachte mit seiner Beurteilung Tiso wiederum in ein anderes Licht. Er zählte ihn zu den Anhängern der gemäßigten und um einen neutralen Status der Slowakei bemühten außenpolitischen Linie des Außenministers Ďurčanský und des Präsidenten Jozef Tiso, obwohl er gleichzeitig zugeben musste, dass Fraňo PA AA Berlin, Büro des Staatssekretärs, Schulenburg aus Moskau, 3.5.1941, Bl. 248610f. 49 Ebenda. 50 Ebenda. 48

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Tiso nicht als politische Figur erschien. Infolge des Salzburger Diktates vom 27.–28. Juli 1940, als Außenminister Ďurčanský seines Postens enthoben wurde, äußerte er Befürchtungen, dass der in Bratislava weilende Gesandte Tiso nicht mehr nach Moskau zurückkehren würde.51 Nach seiner Ankunft in Moskau kontaktierte Tiso die BJUROBINBehörde, die Gebäude an die diplomatischen Missionen vermietete. Am 20. Dezember konnte er nach Bratislava berichten, dass er für die Erfordernisse der Vertretung die ehemalige spanische Gesandtschaft gemietet habe, die sich in einem relativ guten Zustand befinde. Die Bemühungen, die Räumlichkeiten der vormaligen tschecho-slowakischen Gesandtschaft zu bekommen, seien an der Weigerung der Sowjets gescheitert. Der deutsche Botschafter von Schulenburg zeigte sich zwar bereit, dem slowakischen Kollegen Hilfe zu leisten, zum Problem der ehemaligen tschecho-slowakischen Gesandtschaft meinte er aber, man könne den früheren Gesandten Fierlinger nicht so einfach hinauswerfen.52 Das Gebäude auf der Malaja Nikitskaja, Nummer 18, wurde nach einigen Renovierungsarbeiten Mitte Jänner 1940 bezogen. Das diplomatische Personal vergrößerte sich im Februar 1940 um den Wirtschaftsfachmann Gejza (Ladislav) Krno, der als ehemaliger Mitarbeiter des Prager Außenministeriums über professionelle Fachkenntnisse in der Diplomatie verfügte und mit der handelspolitischen Agenda gut betraut war. Die Entsendung des fachkundigen Krno als Geschäftsträger nach Moskau war ein Zeichen dafür, dass eine gute wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit in der Donaumetropole Priorität besaß. Seine Ernennung entging jedoch der Abteilung des Sicherheitsdienstes in Bratislava nicht, und in einer Meldung des SD-Agenten Goldbachs vom 17. Februar wurde er als ein bekannter „Panslawist, Tschechen- und Polenfreund“ bezeichnet. Laut einer von Krno selbst gemachten Aussage würde er lieber einen Monat unter den Russen verbringen, als einen Tag unter den Deutschen, denn die Russen seien doch Slawen.53 Krno dürfte im Mai 1941 Kontakte mit der Exilgruppe um den Obersten Heliodor Píka geknüpft haben, der nach dem deutschen Überfall auf die UdSSR die Tschechoslowakische Militärmission in Moskau leitete und Beneš unterstellt war.54 Zum Presse- und Kulturattaché der Gesandtschaft wurde der antikommunistisch eingestellte Schriftsteller und Journalist Mikuláš Gacek Archiv vnešnej politiki Russkoj federacii (AVP RF), F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 2, Schachtel 23, Akte 288, Informationsbericht, Nr. 216, 16. 8. 1940. 52 ČIERNA-LANTAYOVÁ, Politické úvahy, S. 80. 53 SNA Bratislava, Alexandrijský archív C 969, Bericht Goldbachs, 17.2.1940. 54 Bohuslav HLAVA, Ťažký údel diplomata. In: Historická revue, 8/5, Bratislava 1997, S. 5 51

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ernannt, der vorher in der Kulturabteilung des Verteidigungsministeriums tätig gewesen war.55 Im slowakischen Außenministerium kalkulierte man ursprünglich, um die Bedeutung der Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion um die militärpolitische Agenda zu ergänzen, mit der Entsendung eines Militärattachés. Der Stabschef des Kommandos in Banská Bystrica, Štefan Tatarko, der vom Verteidigungsministerium für diesen Posten noch im Dezember 1939 vorgesehen worden war, trat diesen Posten jedoch nie an. Der Nichtbesetzung des Postens des Militärattachés legt die Vermutung nahe, dass seitens Berlin keinerlei militärische Kontakte gewünscht waren – direkte Beweise dafür fehlen jedoch. Die meisten Kontakte pflegte Tiso zum deutschen Botschafter, die wegen ihres Patronatscharakters weit über den formal-offiziellen Rahmen hinausgingen. In seiner Berichterstattung stützte er sich oft auf diese Quelle und ließ darin unverhohlen die deutsche Optik widerspiegeln. Die Berichte sind in einem dermaßen unpolitischen und distanzierten Ton verfasst, dass von dem in Sachen Weltpolitik wenig erfahrenen Diplomaten der Eindruck entsteht, als verstünde er nicht einmal, was er schreibe. So gesehen, kann seiner Korrespondenz kein hoher Wert zugemessen werden, und es sind nur Splitter an Informationen darin enthalten, über die man sich jedoch nur schwer ein allgemeines Bild verschaffen kann. Vor allem glaubte Tiso an die Dauerhaftigkeit des deutsch-sowjetischen Bündnisses. Im Zusammenhang mit den Truppenverschiebungen der Wehrmacht nach Ostpreußen im Juli 1940 wurde ihm seitens Schulenburg mitgeteilt, dass dies mit der Demobilisierung zusammenhänge und keineswegs einen Konflikt heraufbeschwören solle. Seinem Bericht fügte Tiso lakonisch hinzu: „Auch meiner Meinung nach kommt es zu keinem Konflikt.“56 Von den Sowjets meinte er im Zusammenhang mit den Verhandlungen des britischen Botschafters Stafford Cripps im Mai 1940, dass sie außerordentliche Angst vor den Deutschen hätten, was sie zu besonderer Vorsicht mahnen würde. Diese Vorsicht brachte er auf den bekannten Spruch Stalins zurück, dass sich die Russen zu nichts hinreißen lassen würden, was bedeutet hätte, die Kastanien für die Engländer aus dem Feuer zu holen.57 Fraňo Tiso war kein politischer Mensch. Aufgrund seines römischkatholischen Bekenntnisses misstraute er dem atheistischen Kommunismus. Staatspräsident Tiso sagte einmal lachend zum sowjetischen ŠMIHULA, Vnútorný život, S. 484. SNA Bratislava, F. MZV, Schachtel 198, Die Gesandtschaft in Moskau – pol. Bericht, Moskau 20. 7. 1940. 57 SNA Bratislava, F. MZV, Schachtel 113, Bericht Tisos, Betrifft: Die Entsendung Creeps nach Moskau, Moskau 29. 5. 1940. 55

56

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Gesandten Puškin bei einer Audienz, dass sein Cousin deshalb auf die Stelle des Gesandten verzichten wollte, weil er aus religiösen Gründen seine Kinder nicht in die sowjetische Grundschule schicken wollte.58 Tisos Antikommunismus spiegelt sich in seinem Bericht über die aktuelle Lage in den baltischen Staaten nach der Besetzung durch die Rote Armee wider. Diesbezüglich sprach er vom außerordentlichen kommunistischen Terror, der dort überall herrschen würde.59 Wegen seiner Kritik an den innersowjetischen Verhältnissen, die an die slowakische Öffentlichkeit durchdrang, wurde Tiso in einem kommunistischen Flugblatt scharf angegriffen. Die an die Arbeiter adressierten Flugblätter wurden in der Nacht vom 1. auf den 3. März 1940 in Trenčín verteilt und sollten die „Lügen“ des Gesandten über die schlechte Ernährung, Bekleidung und das schwierige Leben des sowjetischen Menschen „bloßstellen“. Tiso, der der Klasse der reichen Bourgeoisie angehöre, sehe die sozialen Unterschiede der armen slowakischen Arbeiterschaft gegenüber den reichen ľudáci, Neureichen und hohen Beamten nicht.60 Seine politische Einstellung mag auch eines der Gründe dafür gewesen sein, dass sich zwischen ihm und einem hochrangigen sowjetischen Repräsentanten während seiner Missionstätigkeit kein vertrautes Gespräch ergeben konnte. Der andere wesentliche Grund bestand wohl darin, dass die sowjetische Regierung auch unter dem Einfluss der politischen Berichte des Gesandten Puškin keine hohe Meinung über die slowakische Eigenstaatlichkeit hatte, sie als ein ausschließlich deutsches Einflussgebiet betrachtete und zu ihrem politischen Repräsentanten aus diesen Gründen kein Vertrauen genoss. Der Mangel an Vertrauen, die sich daraus ergebende gesellschaftlich-politische Isoliertheit der slowakischen diplomatischen Vertretung und die Befürchtungen vor Spionage sprechen für den besonderen Charakter der slowakisch-sowjetischen diplomatischen Beziehungen. Davon wurde auch die Arbeitsweise der Gesandtschaft betroffen. Die meisten politischen Berichte wurden als chiffrierte Telegramme in die Zentrale des Außenministeriums nach Bratislava telegraphiert, wobei für Moskau ein anderer Code verwendet wurde als für die anderen Gesandtschaften, der schwieriger zu entschlüsseln war.61 Die Telegramme wurden nach deren Dechiffrierung verbrannt, was in der Diplomatie der Vorgangsweise mit einem verfeindeten Staat entspricht. AVP RF, F. 0138, Inventarverzeichnis 2, Schachtel 1, Akte 1, Bericht Puškins vom 20. 5. 1941. 59 SNA Bratislava, F. MZV, Schachtel 198, Tisos Bericht, Moskau 13. 7. 1940. 60 SNA Bratislava, F. MZV, Schachtel 113, Die kommunistische Tätigkeit in Trenčín, Bratislava 7. 3. 1940. 61 ŠMIHULA, Vnútorný život, S. 484. 58

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Neben seiner Zusammenarbeit mit Schulenburg verkehrte Tiso meist mit den Diplomaten der Achsenmächte; mit dem bulgarischen Gesandten Christov bis zu seinem plötzlichen Ableben und dem ungarischen Gesandten Kristóffy. Von den offiziellen sowjetischen Vertretern traf Tiso den ersten Stellvertreter des Volkskommissars für Äußeres, Vladimir P. Potemkin. Die Position Potemkins übernahm am 10. September 1940 der Stellvertreter des Rates der Volkskommissare, Andrej J. Vyšinskij, der – laut Tisos Bericht – ein neues Gesicht im sowjetischen Außenministerium darstellte.62 Für die Weltöffentlichkeit war der mächtige Prokurator im berüchtigten politischen Prozess gegen die so genannten Troztkisten keine unbekannte Größe; in den letzten Monaten vor der Annektierung Estlands am 6. August 1940 organisierte der Intimus Stalins – ähnlich wie Vladimir G. Dekanozov in Lettland – die Aufnahme des Landes in die UdSSR.63 Die eigentlich für die Slowakei zuständige Kontaktperson im NKID war jedoch Alexander M. Alexandrov, der Leiter der Abteilung für Mitteleuropa. Der junge Alexandrov wurde in das Amt von Molotov gehievt und repräsentierte die neue politische Garnitur, die nach der Entfernung Litvinovs in die Amtsgeschäfte eingeführt worden war.64 Im Februar 1941 wurde die Slowakei aus unbekannten Gründen von der Abteilung des NKIDs für Mitteleuropa in die Abteilung für den Nahe Osten verlegt, die Nikolaj V. Novikov leitete.65 Dieser Abteilung gehörte die Slowakei jedoch nur für kurze Zeit an; im Mai 1941 wurde sie letztendlich der Abteilung für Balkanländer zugeteilt. Aus der Korrespondenz der slowakischen diplomatischen Vertretung in Moskau, von der im Nationalarchiv in Bratislava lediglich ein Teil erhalten ist, geht hervor, dass das Ziel der mit der Ďurčanský-Linie betrauten Diplomaten, durch reguläre diplomatische Beziehungen mit der UdSSR einen Ausgleich zur deutschen Vormachtstellung zu erreichen und der Slowakei somit eine gewisse Neutralität zu verschaffen, weit über die eigenen Möglichkeiten hinaus ging. Die Tätigkeit bestand hauptsächlich in der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit, teilweise in kultureller Agenda und ansonsten in regulären Konsularangelegenheiten. Der Inhalt der politischen Berichte ist aufgrund der starren sowjetischen Zensur, sowie der Angst, der Spionage angeklagt zu werden und der außerordentlichen Isoliertheit der SNA Bratislava, f. MZV, Schachtel 113, Betrifft: der neue erste Stellvertreter des Volkskommissars für Äußeres, Moskau 12. 9. 1940. 63 Ebenda. 64 SNA Bratislava, F. MZV, Schachtel 198, Betrifft: Besuch Alexandrovs in Bratislava, Moskau 7. 7. 1940. 65 SNA Bratislava, F. MZV, Schachtel 198, Betrifft: die Verlegung der Slowakischen Republik im NKID, Moskau 26. 2. 1941. 62

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slowakischen Gesandtschaft, in der sie sich während der gesamten Periode ihrer Existenz nicht nur gegenüber den sowjetischen Behörden, sondern auch gegenüber der einfachen Bevölkerung befand, eher dürftig und es wurde oft nur das wiederholt, was in der sowjetischen Presse ohnedies bereits publiziert war. Tiso beklagte zum Beispiel, dass bis Juni 1940 kein einziger sowjetischer Bürger die Gesandtschaft aufgesucht hätte, außer offizielle Personen und Diplomaten.66 „Die Informationsarbeit ist hier, im Vergleich mit anderen Staaten, unverhältnismäßig schwieriger… Die Beamten der Gesandtschaft dürfen mit den sowjetischen Bürgern nicht verkehren, kein sowjetischer Bürger darf hierher kommen und wenn sie uns mal besuchen, so antworten sie auch auf die unschuldigsten Fragen, dass sie nichts davon wüssten.“67 Um der Isolation zu entkommen, schlug Tiso dem slowakischen Außenministerium nach Verhandlungen mit der Allunionsgesellschaft für kulturelle Beziehungen mit dem Ausland (Vsesojuznoje obščestvo kuľturnoj svjazi s zagranicej) vor, eine Ausstellung der slowakischen Bücherproduktion in Moskau zu organisieren. Eine solche Initiative betrachtete er als eine der wenigen Möglichkeiten, mit den sowjetischen Kulturträgern und somit auch mit dem russischen Volk unmittelbaren Kontakt zu knüpfen.68 Das Außenministerium bewertete jedoch die Angelegenheit offenbar bezüglich der Krise in den deutsch-slowakischen Beziehungen in diesem Moment als sehr ungünstig und riet, sie zu verschieben.69 Puškins Mission in Bratislava Der bevollmächtigte Vertreter der UdSSR in der Slowakei, Georgij Maximovič Puškin, kam am 2. Februar 1940 gemeinsam mit dem Legationsrat N. M. Kovalev am Hauptbahnhof in Bratislava an. Er wurde vom stellvertretenden Direktor der politischen Abteilung des slowakischen Außenministeriums, Gejza Krno, begrüßt. Die slowakische Tagespresse widmete der Anreise des sowjetischen Diplomaten kein besonderes Interesse, sie „beschränkte sich lediglich auf kurze Meldungen.“70 Drei Tage später ŠMIHULA, Vnútorný život, S. 483. SNA Bratislava, F. MZV, Schachtel 189, Betrifft: Unwirtschaftlichkeit bei der Berichtsendung, 25.5.1940. 68 SNA Bratislava, F. MZV, Schachtel 198, Betrifft: Die Ausstellung des slowakischen Buches in Moskau, 29.5.1940. 69 Ebenda. Eine handschriftliche Bemerkung an der Rückseite des Berichtes. 70 AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 2, Schachtel 23, Akte 289, Das Tagebuch des bevollmächtigten Vertreters der UdSSR in der Slowakei, 2. 2. 1940. 66 67

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wurde er, begleitet vom Attaché der Gesandtschaft A. A. Smirnov, vom Chef der Protokollabteilung Radúz Radlinský und Außenminister Ďurčanský selbst empfangen, dem er sein Beglaubigungsschreiben überbrachte. In sein Tagebuch notierte der etwa dreißigjährige Diplomat, dass die beiden – der Protokollchef sowie der Minister – junge Leute seien, nicht älter als 33 Jahre. Nach einer nicht besonders aufregenden Debatte äußerte sich Ďurčanský, für den sowjetischen Diplomaten etwa unerwartet, zum Problem der an Ungarn abgetretenen Südslowakei. Seine Ausführungen schienen Puškin interessant, als er sich die Aussage des Ministers wortgenau notierte: „Die Ungarn haben einen Teil unseres Gebietes besetzt, aber wir [die Slowaken] verlieren die Hoffnung nicht, ihm zurück zu bekommen.“71 Die Reihe der üblichen Vorstellungsbesuche wurde schließlich am 6. Februar beim Protokollchef Radlinský beendet, den Puškin als einen klugen, eher germanophil eingestellten, ausgebildeten Juristen charakterisierte. Radlinský beklagte ebenfalls das Schicksal der Südslowakei, bezeichnete Ungarn als einen Staat, der sich völlig unter dem italienischen Einfluss befinde, wo Deutschland kaum mehr etwas zu sagen habe.72 Die Eröffnung der sowjetischen Gesandtschaft in Bratislava ermöglichte dem Kreml nach der erzwungenen Aufgabe der Missionen in Wien, Prag und Warschau eine aktivere Politik in Ostmitteleuropa und auf dem Balkan.73 Als „das Tor zum Balkan“ – wie die geopolitische Stellung der Slowakei sowohl in Berlin als auch in Moskau interpretiert wurde – fassten die Sowjets ihre Anwesenheit in der slowakischen Hauptstadt als eine einmalige Chance auf, die Entwicklungen westlich des Karpatenbogens unmittelbar zu beobachten. Ihre wesentliche Aufgabe konzentrierte sich daher auf die Gewinnung von Informationen über die Situation in diesem Teil Europas und nicht zuletzt auf die direkten Kontakte mit dem kommunistischen Untergrund. Der personell starke Mitarbeiterstab, den die deutschen Stellen der Spionagetätikeit verdächtigten, weckte bei ihnen ein ziemliches Misstrauen. Die Deutschen nutzten jede Gelegenheit, ihnen deutlich zu machen, dass die Slowakei sich im ausschließlichen „Lebensraum“ des Deutschen Reiches befinde und keine Konkurrenz aus dem Osten in ihrer dominanten Position dulden werde.74 Ebenda, 5.2.1940. Ebenda, 6.2.1940. 73 Valentina V. MARJINA, „Brána na Balkán“. Slovensko v geopolitických plánech SSSR a Německa v letech 1939–41. In: Soudobé dějiny, Jg.1,H.6, Praha 1994, S. 830 74 Die sowjetische diplomatische Vertretung wurde insbesondere als das „Zentrum der bolschewistischen Propaganda“ bezichtigt. PA AA Berlin, Handakten Luther, R 27659, Bericht über die politische Lage in der Slowakei, 19. 8. 1940. 71

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Die offiziellen Beziehungen der Slowakei zur Großmacht im Osten spielten in der außenpolitischen Linie des jungen, pragmatischen Außenministers Ferdinand Ďurčanský eine wichtige Rolle. Der gleichzeitig das Innen- wie Außenressort leitende, einflussreiche Minister, der die eigenen Möglichkeiten auf dem Gebiet der Außenpolitik überschätzte und in trügerischer Erwartung einer schnellen Niederlage Deutschlands sich letztendlich verrechnete, suchte sich vorsichtig aus der Umklammerung des Reiches zu lösen.75 Die Sowjetunion war Anfang des Jahres 1940 die einzige von Deutschland unabhängige und am Status der Neutralität beruhende Kontinentalmacht in Europa, die der deutschen Expansion ein gewisses Paroli aufbieten konnte und die für manche Vorhaben der slowakischen Diplomatie, die sich im Schatten Berlins befand, Hoffnungen weckte. Diese Linie wurde von dem begabten Beobachter Puškin erkannt und richtig eingeschätzt. In seinem Lagebericht über die „Slowakei im Jahre 1940“ wurde das erste halbe Jahr als das von der Dominanz des Ďurčanský-Kreises geprägt bezeichnet, der in der Außenpolitik zwischen Deutschland, Italien, Ungarn und anderen Ländern zu lavieren versuche. Die slowakische Außenpolitik habe sich auch nicht gescheut, „mit uns zu kokettieren, weil sie fürchtet, in die völlige Abhängigkeit zu Deutschland zu geraten“.76 Ďurčanský – so Puškin in seinem Lagebericht weiter –, ginge in der Politik sehr vorsichtig vor und würde alles vermeiden, was die Deutschen gegen sie aufbringen könnte; gleichzeitig erlaube er ihnen nicht, sich allzu sehr auszubreiten. Als Anfang März 1940 Ďurčanský einen Empfang im Außenministerium gab, auf dem das gesamte diplomatische Corps Deutschlands und der Sowjetunion anwesend war, kommentierte dies der sowjetische Gesandte, dass die Slowaken den Deutschen vermitteln wollten, sie seien nicht nur mit den Deutschen, sondern auch mit Moskau liiert und meinte dazu in seinem Tagebuch lakonisch: „Die Slowaken erwarten von uns mehr, als wir ihnen geben können. In diesem Sinne ist unsere Position hier delikat.“77 Als das vorrangige außenpolitische Ziel der Slowakei galt es, die an Ungarn verlorene Südslowakei zurückzugewinnen, deren Abtretung infolge des Ersten Wiener Schiedsspruchs vom 2. November 1938 und des Kleinen Krieges vom 23. März 1939 in Bratislava als völlig ungerecht empfunden und deren Wiedereingliederung während der gesamten Existenz der Slowakischen Republik nie aufgegeben wurde. Ďurčanský kalkulierte mit dem eventuellen Interesse der Sowjetunion an der Karpato-Ukraine und zog Jürg HOENSCH, Die Slowakische Republik 1939–1945. In: Studia Slovaca, S. 231. MARJINA, „Brána na Balkán“, S. 834. 77 MARJINA, Slovakija v politike, S. 219. 75

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daraus eine etwas verkürzte Konsequenz, dass die auf diese Weise gewonnene gemeinsame Grenze mit der Großmacht im Osten, sie veranlassen würde, der Slowakei zu helfen, die südlichen Gebiete zurückzubekommen. Am 5. Mai 1940 versuchte er in einem Gespräch, den sowjetischen Gesandten zu überzeugen, dass die Sowjetunion die Karpato-Ukraine und Bessarabien besetzen sollten, falls Deutschland gegen Rumänien antrete.78 Wenn man die konkreten politischen Umstände des Herbstes 1939 in Betracht zieht, so erscheint die von Ďurčanský verfolgte Linie nicht mehr unrealistisch. Das Näherrücken der Sowjetunion an den Karpatenkamm, das sich durch die Inkorporation der Westukraine und des westlichen Weißrusslands in die Sowjetunion im November 1939 ergeben hatte, schaffte gewiss eine Grundlage dafür. Auch das später von Moskau scheinheilig bekundete désinteressement an der Karpato-Ukraine wirkte angesichts der zwischen dem sowjetischen Botschafter in London, Ivan Majskij, und dem in Londoner Exil weilenden Beneš geführten Gespräche um das künftige Schicksal derselben nicht völlig überzeugend.79 Es ist durchaus anzunehmen, dass man über die Konversationen zwischen Beneš und Majskij in Bratislava wusste und dass man die „ruthenische Karte“ für die eigenen außenpolitischen Interessen auszunützen gedachte. Nach der Kapitulation Frankreichs im Juni 1940 standen die Zeichen für die endgültige Befriedung sowjetischer Territorialansprüche in Osteuropa, die im Artikel III des Geheimen Zusatzprotokolls zum Nichtangriffspakt festgehalten wurden, tatsächlich sehr günstig. Die Okkupation und die anschließende Annexion Bessarabiens und der nördlichen Bukowina stießen jedoch in Berlin auf Unverständnis; Hitler bezeichnete den überraschenden Aggressionsakt der Sowjetunion als ein Zeichen des russischen „Dranges nach Westen“.80 Die mit einem ziemlichen Risiko durchgeführte Besetzung und Eingliederung der beiden rumänischen Gebiete machte es Moskau völlig unmöglich, an zusätzliche Gebietserwerbungen auch nur zu denken, wollte man das deutsch-sowjetische Bündnis nicht völlig aufs Spiel setzen. MARJINA, „Brána na Balkán“, S. 835. Majskij traf sich im Herbst 1939 zweimal mit dem ehemaligen tschechoslowakischen Präsidenten; das eine Mal am 22. September und das zweite Mal am 21. November. Bei beiden Treffen wurde von Beneš die Notwendigkeit der künftigen Eingliederung der Karpato-Ukraine in die UdSSR als sine qua non für die gemeinsame sowjetischtschechoslowakische Grenze der künftig erneuerten Tschechoslowakei aufgeworfen. Siehe Dokumenty vnešnej politiki, Moskva 1992, Bd. 22, Teil 2, 122, S. 327. 80 Siehe V. VERATIK, Sovetsko-germanskije otnošenija i vopros o territoriaľnoj celostnosti Rumynii v 1939-1940 gg. In: ČUBARJAN, Meždunarodnij krizis, S. 540. Vgl. auch Manfred HILDERMEIER, Geschichte der Sowjetunion 1917–1991. Entstehung und Niedergang des ersten sozialistischen Staates, München 1998, S. 596. 78 79

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In diesem Sinne beteuerte Außenkommissar Molotov dem deutschen Botschafter Schulenburg bei einem Gespräch am 25. Juni 1940, dass mit der Angliederung der mehrheitlich von Ukrainern bewohnten nördlichen Bukowina die Ukraine zwar mit einigen Ausnahmen vereinigt sei; so wolle die Sowjetunion Ungarn mit der Frage der Karpato-Ukraine nicht konfrontieren, da sie sie nicht für aktuell halte.81 Die Linie des NKID befolgend erwiderte der sowjetische Missionschef in der Slowakei am 16. Juli 1940 Außenminister Ďurčanský auf dessen konkrete Frage, wann die Sowjetunion die Karpato-Ukraine einnehmen würde, dass dieses Gebiet sowohl von der Bevölkerung als auch von der Lage her dermaßen unbedeutend sei, dass es wenig Sinn mache, so viel darüber zu reden, wie es in der Slowakei derzeit üblich sei.82 Nach dieser Unterredung wurde die Frage der Karpato-Ukraine nicht mehr aufgeworfen; bekanntlich wurde Ďurčanský auf Druck Berlins während der Salzburger Verhandlungen vom 27.-28. Juli 1940 seines Außenministerpostens enthoben. Die Haltung Tisos zur Sowjetunion Die Salzburger Verhandlungen am 27. und 28. Juli 1940 zwischen Tuka, Tiso und Mach einerseits, Hitler und Ribbentrop andererseits, stellen in der Geschichte des slowakischen Staates eine tiefe Zäsur dar.83 Ziel der deutschen Intervention war es, die nationalslowakischen Kräfte um Ďurčanský auszuschalten, die klerikal-konservative Gruppe um Tiso zurückzudrängen und den germanophilen, in der Bevölkerung jedoch unbeliebten Kräften um Tuka und Mach zum Durchbruch zu verhelfen.84 Die „Korrektur des Schutzverhältnisses“, d.h. eine noch stärkere Anbindung der Slowakei an das Deutsche Reich, sollte in den folgenden fünf Monaten erst allmählich zum Vorschein kommen. Der österreichische Karrierediplomat Hans Bernhard, der sich bis zuletzt sehr darum bemühte, doch noch nach Bratislava zurückkehren zu dürfen, wurde vom SA-Obergruppenführer, Manfred Freiherrn von Killinger ersetzt. Im Unterschied zu seinem Vorgänger verkörperte der diplomatisch kaum ausgebildete ehemalige Marineoffizier Dokumenty vnešnej politiki, Moskva 1995, Bd. 23, Teil 1, 374f. Valentina V. MARJINA, Zakarpatskaja Ukrajina (Podkarpatskaja Rus) v politike Beneša i Stalina, Moskva 2003, S. 16. 83 Ľubomír LIPTÁK, Príprava a priebeh salzburských rokovaní roku 1940 medzi predstaviteľmi Nemecka a Slovenského štátu. In: Historický časopis XIII/3, Bratislava 1965. 84 Jörg HOENSCH, Grundzüge und Phasen der deutschen Slowakei-Politik im Zweiten Weltkrieg. In: Hans LEMBERG e.a. (Hg.), Studia Slovaca. Studien zur Geschichte der Slowaken und der Slowakei, München 2000, S. 260. 81

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und später als Fememörder verurteilte von Killinger den Typus des in den Nachkriegswirren aus der Bahn geworfenen Angehörigen der Frontgeneration, ein „echter Landsknecht“ – wie ihn Goebbels in seinem Tagebuch nannte.85 Vielmehr als von diplomatischen und politischen Feingefühl verstand er sich eher auf SA-Kameraderie und passte mit seinem radikalen Gedankengut in das Konzept einer seit langem wohl zun Missfallen der hohen Beamtenschaft im Außenamt angestrebten „revolutionären“ Außenpolitik von Ribbentrop, der von Killinger als Gesandten selbst vorschlug.86 Die von Berlin erzwungenen Maßnahmen – so Gesandter Puškin in einem politischen Bericht an das NKID –, haben in der slowakischen Gesellschaft eine prosowjetische Sympathiewelle hervorgerufen.87 Der Missionschef führte weiters aus, dass die Gruppe um den abberufenen Außenminister die Stimmungslage für sich auszunützen vorhabe und sich dabei einigen Erfolges sicher sein könne. Er behauptete, dass gerade die intensiven Kontakte zur sowjetischen Gesandtschaft den jungen Außenminister in Berlin zur persona non grata haben werden lassen.88 Der sowjetische Gesandte betrachtete jedoch im Handeln Ďurčanskýs mehr Kalkül und Pragmatismus als ehrliche Sympathien für den sowjetischen Staat, obwohl sein Kurs sicherlich demokratischer und dem Volke näher gewesen sei als die reaktionäre Politik Tukas, die sich nur auf die nationalsozialistische Herrschaft seiner Gönner stütze. Puškin gab eine wenig schmeichelhafte Charakterdarstellung des ehemaligen Außenministers, in dem er rekapitulierte: „Aber letztendlich heißt es nicht, dass die Gruppe um Ďurčanský mit der Sowjetunion sympathisiert. Vielmehr spekuliert sie mit dem Namen der Sowjetunion und ist bestrebt, die eigene Lage zu verbessern. Ďurčanský würde sich leicht mit Berlin aussöhnen, hätten ihn [die Deutschen] nicht dermaßen entschlossen aus dem Amt entfernt und ihm zur Kenntnis gebracht, dass er nicht mehr brauchbar sei.“89 So Goebbels in seinem Tagebuch 14. 12. 1928. Ernst KLEE, Das Personenlexikon zum Dritten Reich. Wer war was vor und nach 1945, Frankfurt am Main 2005, S. 308f. 86 Johann KAISER, Die Politik des Dritten Reiches gegenüber der Slowakei 1939-1945. Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der nationalsozialistischen Satellitenpolitik in Südosteuropa, Univ.Diss., Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 1969, S. 356. 87 AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 2, Schachtel 23, Akte 288, Nr. 202. Bericht von Puškin vom 4. August 1940. 88 In einem für den Unterstaatssekretär Martin Luther verfassten Lagebericht zur Slowakei wurde Ďurčanský samt seiner Anhänger der Russophilie sowie der Zusammenarbeit mit den Westmächten bezichtigt. PA AA Berlin, Handakten Luther, R 27659, Die politische Situation in der Slowakei. 89 Ebenda. 85

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Im Gegensatz zu Ďurčanský unterstützte Premierminister Tuka – die Intentionen der ukrainischen Politik des Deutschen Reiches befolgend – die ukrainische Nationalbewegung, welche die Konstituierung eines eigenständigen Staates zum Ziel hatte. In Bratislava wurde im Hause des ukrainischen Emigranten Kamarinski in der Spitalgasse 31 unter dessen Leitung ein Zentrum eingerichtet, das sich als Filiale ähnlicher Organisationen in Prag und Wien verstand.90 Gemeinsam mit Innenminister Mach pflegte er enge Kontakte zum ehemaligen Minister für die Karpato-Ukraine, Revay, den die slowakische Presse als künftiges Oberhaupt der autonomen „Republik Karpato-Ukraine“ innerhalb des Slowakischen Staates, betitelte.91 Eine solcherart konstituierte autonome Karpato-Ukraine – so Puškin in einem Bericht – wäre zwar mit eigener Exekutive und einem Präsidenten an der Spitze ausgestattet, aber die wirklichen Macht- und Entscheidungsbefugnisse in der Politik, der Administrative und dem Militär hätten die Reichsministerien in Berlin ausgeübt. Die Ukrainer hätten von hier aus ihre eigene Armee aufgebaut und sie mit den in Wien und im Generalgouvernement ausgebildeten Offizieren rekrutiert. Sollte dieser Plan aufgehen, so wären die Ukrainer für die deutschen Ambitionen einer selbständigen Ukraine nützlich gewesen.92 Freilich wurden solche Zukunftspläne, ob nun ernsthaft überlegte oder nur bloße Gerüchte, seitens des sowjetischen Gesandten als schier antisowjetische Maßnahmen gebrandmarkt, die verständlicherweise zur Vorsicht mahnten. Da die sowjetische Führung – ein Zerwürfnis mit dem Dritten Reich und dessen Verbündeten Ungarn fürchtend – die ruthenische Frage nach wie vor auch im September 1940 für nicht aktuell betrachtete, gab Molotov Puškin herablassend zur Kenntnis, dass er im „Schwanz der antigermanischen Elemente“ herumspiele und den Sinn einiger wichtiger Tatsachen nicht verstünde.93 Deutschland, das sich stärker auf die Südosteuropapolitik konzentriere, befasse sich mit der Frage des künftigen Status der Karpato-Ukraine wenn überhaupt, dann nur am Rande. In den deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen, die über die slowakische Problematik freilich weit hinausgingen, mit ihr aber in bestimmten Punkten doch zusammenhingen, zeichneten sich bereits seit Sommer 1940 die ersten AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 2, Akte 288, Schachtel 23. Puškin an Molotov, 4. 8. 1940. 91 AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 2, Akte 288, Schachtel 23. Puškin an Molotov, 8. 9. 1940. 92 AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 2, Akte 288, Schachtel 23. Prisojedinenie Podkarpatskoj Rusi k Slovakii. 93 MARJINA, Zakarpatskaja Ukraina, S. 17. 90

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Risse ab. Die nach der Kapitulation Frankreichs vollzogene Interessenverschiebung Deutschlands nach Südosteuropa, verbunden mit weit reichenden Neuordnungsplänen unter dem ausschließlichen deutsch-italienischen Duumvirat, brachte in die Reihen der sowjetischen Diplomatie eine nicht unbegründete Unruhe.94 Der sowjetische Gesandte Škvarcev schrieb aus Berlin am 8. Juli 1940, dass sich die Deutschen in der letzten Zeit ausschließlich Südosteuropa widmeten, wobei die Probleme dieser Region im Zusammenhang mit der Abtretung Bessarabiens und der Bukowina, der stärker nach Deutschland ausgerichteten rumänischen Außenpolitik, so wie der revisionistischen Forderungen Ungarns und Bulgariens diskutiert würden.95 Die Salzburger Verhandlungen mit den drei Ländern Rumänien, Bulgarien und der Slowakei im Juli 1940, die ganz im Geiste der nationalsozialistischen Hegemoniesicherung auf dem Balkan geführt wurden, riefen in Moskau große Beunruhigung hervor. Sie wurden zu einem brennenden politischen Thema, weil sie der Sowjetunion besonders nahe Problembereiche berührten. Die Behandlung dieser Fragen ohne Teilnahme der sowjetischen Diplomatie, die sich ein Engagement ihrerseits erwartete, warf ein schiefes Licht auf das deutsch-sowjetische Bündnis.96 Molotov, der vom Reichsaußenministerium nicht einmal unterrichtet wurde, musste in einem Gespräch mit dem Botschafter Schulenburg am 29. Juli Informationen über den Verlauf der Salzburger Verhandlungen verlangen.97 Als sie ihm zwei Tage später vom deutschen Botschafter ausgehändigt wurden, enthielten sie keine Ausführungen über die Gespräche mit der slowakischen Delegation, was von Molotov allerdings nicht beanstandet wurde.98 Molotovs Beurteilung der wichtigsten Schlussfolgerungen machen unvermittelt den Eindruck, dass die sowjetische Seite zu diesem Zeitpunkt ihre Hoffnungen auf die gemeinsame Bewältigung der südosteuropäischen Fragen nicht aufgegeben Vladimir VOLKOV, Balkanskije problemy v otnošeniach Sovetskogo Sojuza i Germaniji v 1940g. In: VOLKOV, Vostočnaja Evropa meždu Gitlerom i Stalinym, S. 253. 95 Dokumenty vnešnej politiki, Moskva 1995, Bd. 23, Teil 1, S. 421f. 96 VOLKOV, Balkanskije problemy, S. 259. 97 Dokumenty vnešnej politiki, Moskva 1995, Bd. 23, Teil 1, S. 461. 98 Anhand des deutschen Berichtes machte Molotov folgende Zusammenfassung: 1. Deutschland wolle sich bei den geplanten Verhandlungen zwischen Ungarn, Rumänien und Bulgarien nicht als Schiedsrichter beteiligen; 2. in Bezug auf die Gebietsforderungen Ungarns gegenüber Rumänien empfahl Deutschland Budapest, einen Katalog mit Forderungen zusammenzustellen; 3. Deutschland gab Rumänien den Rat, sich sowohl mit Ungarn, als auch mit Bulgarien über ihre Territorialansprüche zu einigen; 4. Rumänien wurde empfohlen, die Süddobrudscha an Bulgarien abzutreten. Siehe Dokumenty vnešnej politiki, Moskva 1995, Bd. 23, Teil 1, S. 467. 94

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hatte.99 Hier zeigt sich auch die allmähliche Diskrepanz zwischen dem sowjetischen Standpunkt, der sich nach wie vor auf die Allianz mit dem Dritten Reich berief, und den im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht seit Anfang Juli 1940 im geheimen laufenden Vorbereitungen für einen „Lebensraum“-Krieg gegen Russland ab. Der zugunsten Deutschlands veränderte Machtstatus musste sich nachhaltig auf das sowjetisch-slowakische Verhältnis auswirken. Bei der Unterredung zwischen Reichskanzler Hitler und dem slowakischen Staatspräsidenten Tiso auf dem Berghof am 28. Juli betonte der Diktator, dass sich die Slowakei innenpolitisch loyal und eindeutig zur deutschen Sache bekennen müsse. Zweideutige Haltungen, wie sie etwa Rumänien vorgehalten wurden, wurden nicht geduldet.100 Tiso verstand sehr wohl, worauf Hitler hinauswollte, als er ein kurzes Plädoyer über die „angebliche Hinneigung der Slowakei zu Russland im Rahmen einer panslawistischen Politik“ hielt. Er brachte seine reservierte Haltung zum sowjetischen Reich unmissverständlich zu Wort und machte dafür sowohl seine politischen Erfahrungen, als auch die religiösen und kulturellen Bedenken verantwortlich: „Was die panslawistische Politik bedeute, habe er in den letzten 20 Jahren mit der Tschechoslowakei und Polen erlebt. Er habe nach diesen Erfahrungen nicht Lust, sich ein drittes Mal mit Russland zusammen auf ein solches Gebiet zu begehen. Außerdem gäbe es auch für ihn noch stärkste kulturelle und religiöse Hindernisse in dieser Hinsicht.“101 Tisos echter Antibolschewismus, der einen tiefen religiösen und weltanschaulichen Hintergrund eines katholischen Priesters hatte, durfte trotz seiner bis zu einem gewissen Grad vorgetäuschten Loyalität zum Deutschen Reich, das er wegen dessen tragenden nationalsozialistischen Ideologie eben aus gleichen Gründen notgedrungen verachten musste, gewiss einer der Gründe gewesen sein, warum er mit einer wohlwollenden Haltung des Reichskanzlers rechnen konnte. In zahlreichen Zeitungsartikeln, Reden vor der tschechoslowakischen Nationalversammlung, als deren Abgeordneter er 1935 gewählt worden war, gab er seiner antikommunistischen Gesinnung einen vielfach überzeugenden Ausdruck. Als im April 1935 Außenminister Beneš das tschechoslowakisch-sowjetische Bündnisabkommen der Nationalversammlung vorlegte, warnte Abgeordneter Tiso eindringlich vor einem solchen Bündnispartner im Osten, der den Plan der Weltrevolution nicht

VOLKOV, Balkanskije problemy, S. 260. ADAP 1918–1945, Baden-Baden 1956, Serie D, Bd. VII., S. 284. 101 Ebenda, S. 285. 99

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aufgegeben hätte.102 In der Parlamentsdebatte über das Staatsbudget für das Jahr 1937 ermahnte er zum Widerstand gegen den Kommunismus: „Wir haben auch vom nationalen Standpunkt her die Pflicht, uns gegen den Kommunismus zu stellen […] das slowakische Volk wird es nie zulassen, dass sein Land zur Brücke der asiatischen Barbarei gegen das Christentum und die westliche Zivilisation sein wird, und wird alles dafür unternehmen, um mit moralisch-religiösen und sozial-politischen Mitteln den Geist des slowakischen Volkes gegen die Infektion des internationalen Satanismus immun zu machen.“103 In einem aufgebrachten Ton berichtete Gesandter Puškin nach Moskau über eine Rede Tisos anlässlich eines Erntedankfestes am 1. September 1940 in Bratislava, in der er offene antisowjetische Angriffe beklagte. Neben weit schweifenden Ausführungen über die Bedeutung des slowakischen Bauern für die gesamte Gesellschaft, paraphrasierte Präsident Tiso Hitler, der vor dem Ausbruch des Krieges folgendes gesagt hatte: „Dieser Krieg ist ein sozialer Krieg, kein imperialistischer. Es ist ein Kampf gegen Plutokratien und Marxismus. Ein aus sozialen Gründen geführter Krieg ist eine Katastrophe für Kapitalismus und Bolschewismus.“104 Die eben zitierte Passage aus Tisos Rede wiederholte Puškin in seinem Bericht wörtlich und kam zum Schluss, dass Tisos Auftritt von den Deutschen angeordnet worden sei. Er meinte gleichzeitig, dass in diesem Zusammenhang auch das Benehmen der slowakischen staatlichen Behörden zur sowjetischen Mission erklärbar sei.105 Trotz seines religiös fundierten Antibolschewismus war Präsident Tiso einer slowakisch-sowjetischen Zusammenarbeit nicht abgeneigt. Obwohl er hinsichtlich des gesteigerten deutschen Druckes nach Salzburg eine den sowjetischen diplomatischen Vertretern distanzierte Haltung einnehmen musste, so ist dies weniger einem offenen Antisowjetismus zuzuschreiben, sondern vielmehr der Überlegung, unnötige Provokationen zu vermeiden. Der vom Präsidenten Tiso favorisierte slowakische Gesandte in der UdSSR, Fraňo Tiso, wurde in Moskau dem gemäßigten Tiso-Ďurčanský-Flügel zugerechnet, und es wurde befürchtet, dass er aus diesem Grunde infolge

Siehe Milan S. ĎURICA, Postoj Jozefa Tisu voči nekresťnaským ideológiám. In: Duchovný pastier, 88/4, Trnava 2007, S. 310. 103 ĎURICA, Postoj Jozefa Tisu, S. 310. 104 Tisos Rede wurde in mehreren Tageszeitungen abgedruckt. Hier zitiert nach: Miroslav FABRICIUS – Katarína HRADSKÁ (Hgg.), Jozef Tiso. Prejavy a články (1938–1944), Bd. II, Bratislava 2007, S. 267. 105 AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 2, Akte 288, Schachtel 23. Informationsbericht, Nr. 228, 7. 9. 1940. 102

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des Salzburger Diktates abberufen werden könnte.106 In einem breiteren Zusammenhang wies die Vorsicht der slowakischen Politiker im persönlichen Umgang mit den sowjetischen Diplomaten, die von derselben immer wieder beklagt wurde, auf das deutlich abgekühlte deutsch-sowjetische Verhältnis hin. Nach einem am 2. Januar 1941 abgehaltenen Empfang beim deutschen Gesandten von Killinger beklagte sich Puškin über das merkwürdige Benehmen Tisos. Seine Bemühungen, mit dem Präsidenten ein diskretes Gespräch über allgemeine politische Themen zu führen, schlug wegen der Anwesenheit der Deutschen einfach fehl, da Tiso auf die Fragen des sowjetischen Diplomaten dermaßen laut antwortete, dass es bis zu den deutschen Ohren vordrang und für Puškin als sehr unangenehm empfunden wurde. Der aufgebrachte Missionschef schrieb in sein Tagebuch: „Das Benehmen Tisos gefällt mir überhaupt nicht. Es ist von ihm wenig taktvoll gewesen. Ähnliches habe ich in der Vergangenheit von ihm noch nie erlebt.“ Er fügte auch eine Erklärung hinzu: „Ich bezweifle nicht, dass Tiso sich mit allen Kräften um die Erhaltung seines Postens bemüht. Er scheut keine Mittel, sich vor den Deutschen hervorzutun, insbesondere, wenn sie gegen uns eingestellt sind. Ich habe daraus für mich notwendige Konsequenzen gezogen, und künftighin werde ich mehr Vorsicht walten lassen.“107 Die deutliche Zunahme der im antisowjetischen Geiste verfassten Presseartikel in einigen slowakischen Tageszeitungen, die gegen die Ideen des Panslawismus gerichteten öffentlichen Auftritte Tukas, Machs und Tisos, so wie die von den höchsten Regierungsstellen angeordnete Überwachung der sowjetischen Gesandtschaft verschlechterten die slowakischsowjetischen Beziehungen in den ersten Monaten nach Salzburg wesentlich. Die seit längerer Zeit angekündigten Handelsvertragsverhandlungen, die insbesondere von den Slowaken erwünscht wurden und unmittelbar bevorstanden, drohten völlig zum Abbruch zu kommen. Gesandter Puškin sah in den antisowjetischen Tendenzen die verlängerte Hand Berlins und urteilte, die Deutschen würden diese massive Propaganda gegen die Sowjetunion in ihrem Satellitenland forcieren, weil sie sie auf Grund der gegebenen internationalen Lage bei sich nicht leisten könnten.108 Die seit dem 2. September 1940 von einem starken polizeilichen Einsatz ganztäglich betriebene Überwachung der sowjetischen Gesandtschaft, das Aufhalten AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 2, Schachtel 23, Akte 288, Informationsbericht, Nr. 216, 16. 8. 1940. 107 AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 3, Schachtel 20, Akte 271, Das Tagebuch des Gesandten der UdSSR in der Slowakei, Puškin, 16. 1. 1941. 108 AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 2, Schachtel 23, Akte 288, Informationsbericht Nr. 228, 7. 9. 1940. 106

402 Beata Katrebova-Blehova ________________________________________________________

und Verhören aller die Konsularabteilung aufgesuchender Personen und die Bespitzelung des sowjetischen Missionschefs riefen in Moskau einen scharfen Protest hervor, der von Dekanozov im Namen der sowjetischen Regierung dem slowakischen Chargé d’Affaires, Krno, mündlich mitgeteilt wurde.109 Erst auf Anraten des Botschafters Schulenburg, der sich über die polizeilichen Überwachungsmaßnahmen überrascht zeigte, wurde zwar die Beobachtung der sowjetischen Mission nicht völlig abgebrochen, aber sie erfolgte im weiteren verdeckt.110 Das Volkskommissariat für Auswärtiges befasste sich eingehend mit der scheinbar steigenden antisowjetischen Stimmung in der Slowakei nach Salzburg. Die vom Leiter der zentral-europäischen Abteilung im NKID, Aleksandrov, angefertigte Aktennotiz, die die antisowjetischen Tendenzen analysierte und für den Stellvertreter Molotovs, Vyšinskij, bestimmt war, liefert uns Beweise über das Engagement der sowjetischen Seite, die ungünstige Entwicklung nicht mit Schweigen hinzunehmen. Im Dokument wurde die Überzeugung geäußert, dass die zentralen Ereignisse der letzten zwei Monate August-September 1940 vom Wunsch Berlins geleitet würden, die antideutschen und prosowjetischen Tendenzen eines Teiles der politischen Elite des Landes zu entfernen und sich eine günstige Basis für die Verwirklichung eigener Neuordnungspläne auf dem Balkan zu verschaffen. Diese Politik hätte ihren Ausdruck in der Reorganisation der slowakischen Regierung und der breiten antisowjetischen Propaganda in der Presse und den öffentlichen Auftritten des Ministerpräsidenten Tuka und des Präsidenten Tiso gefunden.111 Im folgenden bezog sich der Inhalt der Aktennotiz auf „provokante“ Zeitungsartikel, welche die Angriffsbereitschaft der Sowjetunion gegen das Deutsche Reich beweisen sollten, die provokanten Auftritte der slowakischen Polizei gegen die sowjetische Mission, sowie die Schwierigkeiten mit dem Weiterführen der Konsularagenda. Zusätzlich sei das Personal der Gesandtschaft in einem internen Dokument des slowakischen Außenministeriums der kommunistischen Propaganda beschuldigt worden.112 An die Analyse knüpft sich die Schlussfolgerung, die etwa in zwei Linien verläuft: erstens übersteigt die Summe der antisowjetischen Taten den Rahmen der sowjetisch-slowakischen Beziehungen und berührt unmittelbar die Relation der UdSSR zum Dritten Reich. Zweitens die innenpolitische Sicherung der deutschen Interessen sollte nebenbei die SNA, F. MZV ZÚ Moskva, Schachtel 198, Telegramm Krnos v. 5. 9. 1940. SNA, F. MZV ZÚ Moskva, Schachtel 198, Telegramm Krnos v. 6. 9. 1940. 111 AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 2, Schachtel 23, Akte 288, Aktennotiz v. 28. 9. 1940. 112 Ebenda. 109 110

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Sowjetregierung zu solchen diplomatischen Schritten herausfordern, die in der Folge gegen sie hätten gerichtet werden können.113 Um die provozierenden Versuche von sich zu weisen und die geänderte Lage für sich auszunützen, soll der slowakischen Regierung eine offizielle Stellungnahme vorgetragen werden: „Den Slowaken soll anhand der zusammengefassten Fakten über das antisowjetische Benehmen klargemacht werden, dass diese Haltung die freundschaftlichen Beziehungen der UdSSR mit Deutschland, das laut dem Schutzvertrag vom 23. März 1939 die Außenpolitik der Slowakei koordiniert, verschlechtert.“ Ein solches Verhalten der Slowaken angesichts der herannahenden Verhandlungen über den Abschluss eines Handelsvertrages fand die sowjetische Regierung unbegreiflich. Der Verfasser der Aktennotiz schlug daher vor, die offizielle Reaktion seiner Regierung für die eigenen propagandistischen Zwecke auszunützen und die Regierung Tuka mit einer Erklärung zurechtzuweisen, damit sie vor dem eigenen, die sowjetische Freundschaft bejahenden Volke, bloßgestellt werde.114 Ein entsprechender Auftritt, welcher der slowakischen Regierung die Empörung der sowjetischen Seite nahe gelegt hätte, blieb jedoch aus. Das NKID zog es vor, diese bittere Pille angesichts der angewachsenen Verstrickungen auf dem Balkan, die eine viel größere Bedeutung besaßen, herunterzuschlucken und die angespannten Beziehungen nicht zusätzlich zu belasten. Der Schwerpunkt wurde auf die Handelsverhandlungen verlegt, von denen man sich die Lösung der Krise erwartete.115 Der Beitritt der Slowakei zum Dreimächtepakt und die sowjetische Reaktion Der Beitritt der Slowakei zum Dreimächtepakt am 24. November 1940 war eine logische Konsequenz der nach Salzburg eingetretenen Linie einer engen Anlehnung an die Achsenmächte und vollzog sich ohne jede Spektakularität. Ministerpräsident und Außenminister Tuka, der im Namen der slowakischen Regierung den Pakt in Berlin unterschrieb, unterhielt sich mit Reichsaußenminister Ribbentrop am gleichen Tage der Unterzeichnung über Fragen von lediglich innenpolitischer Bedeutung, als er etwa nachfragte, wie mit der ruthenischen Minderheit in der Ostslowakei, die prorussische

Ebenda, S. 3. Ebenda, S. 4. 115 Vgl. MARJINA, Slovakija v politike, S. 231. 113

114

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Haltungen einnahm, umzugehen sei.116 Voll bewusst über die Brisanz der slowakisch-sowjetischen Beziehungen für die Deutschen, schnitt er auch das Problem der kommunistischen Propaganda an, die angeblich von den Angestellten der sowjetischen Botschaft auf eine raffinierte Art verbreitet werde. Er fragte diesbezüglich, wie man mit den „kommunistischen Umtrieb“ umzugehen habe, wonach ihm der Reichsaußenminister kurz zu Verstehen gab, man solle solche Aktivitäten radikal abstoppen und mit dem Kommunismus insgesamt umbarmherzig verfahren.117 Anders als im Falle Bulgariens, das seine neutrale Schaukelpolitik und die vorsichtigen Annäherungsversuche an die Sowjetunion nicht aufgeben wollte, musste auf die Slowakei keinerlei Druck ausgeübt werden, um mit dem Beitritt zum Dreimächtepakt die Farben zu bekennen. Hitler lag zwar an der unmissverständlichen Bezeugung der Zugehörigkeit der ostmittelund südosteuropäischen Länder zum Bündnis der Achsenmächte; damit sollte aber nicht nur die Variante eines möglichen Übertritts auf die Seite Großbritanniens, bzw. der Vereinigten Staaten verhindert werden, sondern vielmehr die Distanz zur Sowjetunion so wie die Eliminierung jeglichen prorussischen Einflusses erreicht werden. So ließ sich der Führer während der Salzburger Verhandlungen mit den slowakischen, rumänischen und bulgarischen Staatsvertretern vernehmen, dass er keine zweideutigen Haltungen dulden könne und eine eindeutige Loyalität zur deutschen Sache verlangen müsse.118 Die Frage des sowohl außen- als auch innenpolitischen Bekenntnisses zur Politik des Deutschen Reiches wurde im slowakischen Falle definitiv in Salzburg geklärt. Ein einflussreicher NSDAP-Vertreter meinte zum Legationsrat der bulgarischen Gesandtschaft Konstantin Šišmanov, dass der sowjetische Einfluss in der Slowakei in der Vergangenheit stark gewesen sei, aber „wir haben einen der Hauptanführer dieser Bewegung, das Schwein (sic!) Ďurčanský, rechtzeitig eliminiert und seit dem, nach Salzburg, hat sich die Situation verbessert“. Nach den weiteren Erläuterungen dieses nicht sonderlich taktvollen, namentlich nicht genannten Nationalsozialisten, sei das Ziel Russlands nicht klar gewesen. Die Einteilung der deutschrussischen Interessengebiete habe demnach keine langfristige Bedeutung, da sie je nach den Bedingungen geändert werden müsse. Man müsse insbesondere in Betracht ziehen, dass Russland nicht allein handeln könne, sondern im Rahmen einer gemeinsamen Front mit Großbritannien und den ADAP 1918-1945, Baden-Baden 1964, Serie D, Bd. XI., S. 580. Ebenda, S. 581. 118 ADAP 1918–1945, Baden-Baden 1956, Serie D, Bd. VII., S. 284. 116 117

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USA.119 Durfte es also vor Salzburg unter Ďurčanskýs Wirken ein Lavieren zwischen den Großmächten und eine Bekundung der prorussischen Sympathien gegeben haben, so wurden diese im Spätsommer 1940 definitiv abgewürgt. Der Gesandte Puškin bezeichnete in seinem Bericht vom 21. Dezember 1940 den Beitritt der Slowakei zum Dreimächtepakt als einen bloß formellen Akt, der den Status des Landes in keiner Weise veränderte. Die Slowakei, die für das Dritte Reich bei weitem nicht uninteressant sei, ziehe die Aufmerksamkeit der Deutschen in zweierlei Hinsicht an. Erstens diene dieses kleine mitteleuropäische Land – schwer erreichbar von den Gegnern Deutschlands – als ein strategisch wichtiges Hinterland. Aus diesem Grunde würde Berlin die formellen Attribute der Staatlichkeit auch weiterhin gewähren. Zum Zweiten sei die Slowakei wegen ihrer Nähe zur Sowjetunion interessant. Demnach urteilte Puškin, dass Berlin die Slowakei so lange wie möglich an einem Krieg unbeteiligt lasse, unter anderem auch deshalb, da die Slowakische Armee militärisch kaum einen bedeutenden Beitrag leisten könne. Zum Schluss erwähnte er einen kleinen Witz, der in Bratislava verbreitet worden sei, wonach man über den Beitritt der drei Länder, der Slowakei, Ungarn und Rumänien zum Dreimächtepakt als über eine „Winterhilfe“ für Deutschland witzele.120 Insgesamt wertete Puškin die innen- und außenpolitische Entwicklung in der Slowakei im Herbst 1940 als eine weitere Vertiefung der Satellitenstellung des Landes gegenüber dem Dritten Reich. In dieser Hinsicht urteilte er auch über die von politischen Attributen völlig freien, bereits dritten Reorganisation der Slowakischen Armee, die am 1. Oktober 1940 wirksam wurde. Er ging sogar so weit, dass er die damit zusammenhängenden Maßnahmen als den Inhalt eines angeblich geheimen Abkommens zwischen der Slowakei und Deutschland, das den Schutzvertrag ergänzen sollte, bezeichnete.121 Obgleich der nach den Anweisungen der Deutschen Heeresmission unter der Leitung von General Paul Otto durchgeführte Umbau der Slowakischen Armee tatsächlich mit dem Vorbild der Wehrmacht übereinstimmen sollte, wofür sich die slowakische Regierung laut Legationsrat Konstantin Šišmanov an Minister Dimitar Šišmanov, Sekretär im bulgarischen Außenministerium, Bratislava 21.9.1940. Jan RYCHLÍK, Politický vývoj na Slovensku v rokoch 1940– 1941 v správach bulharského diplomata Konstantina Šišmanova. In: Historický časopis, 43/3, Bratislava 1995, S. 548. 120 AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 3, Schachtel 20, Akte 269, Bericht Puškins Nr. 262, 21. 12. 1940. 121 AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 2, Schachtel 23, Akte 288, Bericht Puškins Nr. 256, 19. 11. 1940. 119

406 Beata Katrebova-Blehova ________________________________________________________

Art. 3 des Schutzvertrages ohnedies verpflichtete, so war die Reorganisation der Armee eher die Folge von rein pragmatischen Überlegungen nach deren Effektivitätssteigerung. Die Zusammenfügung der drei Infanteriedivisionen in lediglich zwei und ihre Unterstellung unter das Gebietskommando in Trenčín und Prešov (das Gebietskommando in Banská Bystrica wurde demnach aufgelöst), sowie eine neue Oberkommandostruktur122, richteten sich in erster Linie nach dem Gebot einer Modernisierung und Anpassung an reale Bedingungen der slowakischen Militäreinheiten und waren politisch kaum zu begründen. Vom Abschluss des Handelsvertrages bis zum Abbruch der diplomatischen Beziehungen Die Intensivierung der slowakisch-sowjetischen Handelsbeziehungen wurde von Anfang der offiziellen Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion an vom Wunsch der slowakischen Regierung geleitet, die einseitigen wirtschaftlichen Bindungen an das Deutsche Reich zu lockern und aus der isolierten Stellung im Welthandel auszubrechen. Bereits am 14. Februar 1940, einige Tage nach der Ankunft des Gesandten Puškin in Bratislava, wandte sich während eines feierlichen Empfangs der Stellvertreter des slowakischen Außenministers, Štefan Polyak, an den sowjetischen Missionschef mit dem Wunsch, bald ein slowakisch-sowjetisches Handelsabkommen abzuschließen.123 Als entsprechende Rechtfertigung der seitens der slowakischen Regierung rasch unternommenen Schritte diente der am 11. Februar 1940 unterzeichnete deutsch-sowjetische Wirtschaftsvertrag, das zum ersten Mal seit 1936 die Verkäufe der deutschen Rüstungsgüter in die UdSSR ermöglichte, wofür die deutsche Industrie massive sowjetische Rohstofflieferungen erhielt.124 Trotz dieses offenkundigen Engagements der slowakischen Seite, die Handelsbeziehungen auf eine vertragliche Basis zu stellen, wurde der Beginn der offiziellen Verhandlungen immer wieder hinausgeschoben. Betrachtet man das vorsichtige sowjetische Vorgehen, so vermutet man weniger, dahinter könnte sich das große Unverhältnis der wirtschaftlichen Strukturen sowie der Größe der Volkswirtschaften verbergen. Die sowjetische Regierung war trotz der wirtschaftlichen Vorteile, die ein Handelsaustausch Siehe Charles K. KLIMENT, Břetislav NAKLÁDAL, Slovenská Armáda 1939–1945, Praha 2006, S. 27 –31. 123 Siehe ČIERNA-LANTAYOVÁ, Pohľady na východ, S. 142f. 124 Siehe etwa Valentin FALIN, Zweite Front. Die Interessenkonflikte in der Anti-HitlerKoalition, Berlin 1997, S. 184–185. 122

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mit der Slowakei versprach, offensichtlich nicht bereit, im Bereich der Handelsbeziehungen mögliche negative Folgen für das deutsch-sowjetische Bündnis zu riskieren, die sich aus einem eigenmächtigen slowakischen Vorgehen hätten ergeben können. Es scheint, dass sie sich erst dann zum Handeln bereit sah, als die Frage der deutschen Reaktion geklärt wurde. Trotzdem konnten bis zum Sommer 1940 weder die Aktivitäten des Pressburger Zentrums, noch die konzentrierten Bemühungen der slowakischen Mission in Moskau nennenswerten Ergebnisse in der Frage des wirtschaftlichen Durchdringens der Slowakei auf den sowjetischen Markt bringen. Die Linie der intensiven wirtschaftlichen Kontakte änderte sich auch nach den Gesprächen auf dem Obersalzberg vom 28. Juli 1940 nicht wesentlich, als das Amt des Außenministers der germanophile Tuka übernahm. Puškin bekam gleich am 1. August die Gelegenheit, mit dem neuen Außenminister ins Gespräch zu kommen. Er bezeichnete ihn als einen der reaktionärsten Politikern in der Slowakei, die sich definitiv an die Deutschen verkauft hätten. Während des kurzen Gesprächs mit dem russischen Diplomaten vermied Tuka, wie es für ihn bezeichnend war, jegliche politische Fragen, zeigte sich aber sehr zufrieden, als Puškin den anstehenden Abschluss eines Wirtschaftsvertrages in Aussicht stellte.125 Nach der vereitelten offiziellen Einladung des Volkskomissars für Außenhandel, Anastas I. Mikojan, die für den 20. September vorgesehen worden war, wofür die unangenehme Affäre mit der Bewachung der sowjetischen Gesandtschaft im September 1940, sowie die Hinhaltetaktik der Deutschen verantwortlich waren, kam die erneuerte Einladung aus Moskau erst Anfang November.126 Am 17. November reiste eine elfköpfige Handelsdelegation mit dem Abendschnellzug nach Berlin ab127 und wurde vier Tage später von Mikojan in Moskau empfangen. Nach zwei Wochen intensiver Verhandlungen wurde am 6. Dezember das Handels- und Schifffahrtsabkommen zwischen der Slowakischen Republik und der Union der Sowjetischen Sozialistischen Republiken mit der Beilage über die Rechtliche Stellung der Handelsvertretung der UdSSR in der Slowakei, ČIERNA-LANTAYOVÁ, Pohľady na východ, S. 152. SNA, F. MZV, Schachtel 198, Telegramm Tisos vom 6.11.1940. 127 Sie bestand aus Ing. Július Pazmán, dem Direktor der Devisenabteilung der Slowakischen Nationalbank, der den Leiter der Delegation Ing. Ján Ország – den Sektionschef der volkswirtschaftlichen Abteilung im Außenministerium, vertrat; im weiteren waren die Vertreter des Verkehrsministeriums (Dr. Dohnal), des Finanzministeriums, des Wirtschaftsministeriums (Ing. Ján Peterka), des Industrieverbandes (Dr. Stanek), des Landwirtschaftlichen Rates (Dr. Šimunič), der Kabelfabrik – Káblovka, der Baťa-Betriebe (Ondruššek) und des Mautner-Betriebes (Pavlíček) anwesend. SNA, F. MZV, Schachtel 198, Notiz auf dem Telegramm von Tiso vom 8.11.1940. 125

126

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sowie das Abkommen über den Warenaustausch und den Zahlungsverkehr mit den entsprechenden Kontingentlisten unterschrieben.128 Von allen paraphierten Dokumenten durfte im Slowakischen Gesetzesblatt lediglich der Handelsvertrag abgedruckt werden. Sowohl das Abkommen über den Warenaustausch und Zahlungsverkehr samt den Kontingentlisten, als auch die Regelungen über den rechtlichen Status der sowjetischen Handelsvertretung in Bratislava durften aufgrund ihres vertraulichen Charakters nicht an die Öffentlichkeit gelangen und wurden somit dem Landtag nicht zur Ratifizierung vorgelegt.129 Am 16. Jänner 1941 wurde auf der Sitzung des slowakischen Ministerrates der Text des Vertrages einstimmig angenommen und an den Außenpolitischen Ausschuss des Slowakischen Landtages zur weiteren Abstimmung weitergeleitet;130 am 28. Jänner wurde der Handelsvertrag letztendlich ratifiziert. Der Austausch der Ratifikationsurkunden fand am 4. Februar zwischen dem Gesandten Puškin und dem Ministerpräsidenten Tuka statt.131 Der glatte Verlauf des Ratifikationsprozesses mutet an, dass auf der slowakischen Seite das Interesse am Vorankommen der wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen vorhanden war. Es waren hauptsächlich wirtschaftliche Kreise, die sich mit dem Abschluss des Vertrages durchaus zufrieden gaben, zumal Das Handelsabkommen war ein klassischer Vertrag auf der Grundlage der Meistbegünstigungsklausel mit Ausnahme des kleinen Grenzverkehrs, der Begünstigungen im Handel der UdSSR mit Finnland und den angrenzenden Staaten Mittelasiens, sowie der Rechte, die sich aus der Zollunion ergaben (Art. XI.). Die Regeln der Meistbegünstigung bezogen sich ebenfalls auf die Donauschifffahrt, und auf die Benützung der Häfen (Art. VI.). Im Artikel VIII. wurde die Errichtung der sowjetischen Handelsvertretung in Bratislava geregelt; im Artikel X. wurde festgelegt, dass der Post-, Telegraphen- und Telefonverkehr mit den gültigen Abkommen der Weltpostunion und der Internationalen Telekommunikationsunion abgestimmt wird. Das Abkommen über den Warenaustausch und Zahlungsverkehr bestimmte, dass die Warenlieferungen nach den jährlich ausgehandelten Kontingentlisten in USD, bzw. einer anderen Devise gemäß Absprache zwischen der Slowakischen Nationalbank und der Staatsbank der UdSSR, zu erfolgen waren. (Der Zahlungsverkehr wurde letztendlich in slowakischen Kronen über ein eigens zu diesem Zweck eingerichtetes Konto der Slowakischen Nationalbank abgewickelt.) Die slowakische Seite verpflichtete sich, folgende Waren im Gesamtwert von 1,8 Mio. USD in die UdSSR zu liefern: Kabeln und wasserleitende Elektrodrähte, Elektromotoren und Transformatoren, Stahlrohre, Blech und Stahlseile, Kalziumkarbid, Garn aus künstlicher Wolle, Textilmaschinen. Aus der Sowjetunion sollten dagegen meist Rohwaren eingeführt werden: Baumwolle, Asbest, Phosphate, Glyzerin, Borsten, Getreide, aber auch Kinofilme, Bücher etc… im Gesamtwert von 2,4 Mio. USD. Siehe die Texte der beiden Abkommen, SNA, F. MH (Ministerstvo hospodárstva), Schachtel 19. 129 SNA, F. MH, Schachtel 19, Brief Ján Országhs an den Regierungsvorsitz vom 10. 1. 1941. 130 SNA, F. Snem Slovenskej republiky, Schachtel 62, Die 5. Sitzung des Außenpolitischen Ausschusses am 27. 1. 1941. 131 Vgl. ČIERNA-LANTAYOVÁ, Pohľady na východ, S. 157f. 128

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sie sich eine Erweiterung des gegenseitigen Handels erhofften. Auf der anderen Seite hatte Ministerpräsident Tuka keine besondere Eile, das Werk durch die Ratifikation möglichst ohne unnötigen Aufschub zu Ende zu bringen. Nach der Rückkehr der Delegation aus Moskau fand er es nicht für notwendig, mit dem Leiter der Delegation, Ján Orságh, ein Gespräch über den Verlauf der erfolgreichen Verhandlungen zu führen.132 Trotzdem wurde die Sitzung des Ministerrates, auf der die Vertragstexte angenommen wurden, ziemlich rasch einberufen, und zwar lediglich sechs Tage nach dem vom Außenministerium an alle Ministerien, an das Amt des Staatspräsidenten und die Slowakische Nationalbank ein Brief samt der in Moskau unterschriebenen Urkunden mit der dringlichen Bitte versandt wurde, die Angelegenheit möglichst schnell zu erledigen.133 Die diplomatische Initiative der slowakischen Regierungskreise, die im Februar 1940 gestartet wurde und die sich zum Ziel setzte, durch die Erweiterung der wirtschaftlichen Kontakte mit der Großmacht im Osten sich aus dem Würgegriff der nationalsozialistischen Kriegswirtschaft zu lösen, kam ein Jahr später zu einem erfolgreichen Abschluss. Es zeigte sich jedoch, dass die damit verbundenen Hoffnungen auf mehr wirtschaftliche Freiheit durch den Konflikt, der sich zwischen der Sowjetunion und dem Dritten Reich bald abzuzeichnen begann und an dem die Slowakei auf der Seite Deutschlands aktiv mitmachte, begraben werden mussten. Viele Vorhaben blieben daher bloß auf dem Papier, da nicht genug Zeit blieb, sie in die Tat umzusetzen. Im Jänner 1941 erreichte der seit Herbst 1940 anschwelende innenpolitische Machtkampf zwischen dem konservativ-klerikalen Lager Tisos und dem um die Einführung des nationalsozialistischen Modells bemühten Tuka seinen Höhepunkt. Tiso, der in Bereichen Außen- und Wirtschaftspolitik durchaus gewillt war, sich den deutschen Weisungen zu fügen, stellte sich mit aller Kraft seiner Autorität gegen die Versuche einer ideologischen Überfremdung seines Landes, vereitelte den von Tuka mit Hilfe einiger deutscher Berater geplanten Staatsstreich durch die revolutionisierte Hlinka-Garde und schaffte sich rechtzeitig die Loyalität der slowakischen

AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 3, Schachtel 20, Akte 271, Aus dem Tagebuch Puškins, Eintrag vom 25. 12. 1940. 133 SNA, F. MH, Schachtel 19, Brief Ján Országhs an den Regierungsvorsitz vom 10. 1. 1941. 132

410 Beata Katrebova-Blehova ________________________________________________________

Armee mit Verteidigungsminister Čatloš.134 Der Kurswechsel der deutschen Slowakei-Politik, der mit der Amtsübernahme des neuen Gesandten Hans Ellard Ludin am 13. Jänner eingeleitet wurde, wirkte sich letztendlich zugunsten des Staatspräsidenten aus. Reichskanzler Hitler und Reichsaußenminister Ribbentrop konnten aufgrund der angespannten Lage auf dem Balkan keinen offenen Machtkonflikt im „Schutzstaat“ riskieren und waren bereit, Zugeständnisse zu machen. In diesem Sinne erhielt Ludin vor seiner Abreise von Hitler und Ribbentrop klar umrissene Aufträge, die in vier Punkten zusammengefasst wurden: 1. „Das Reich will die volle staatliche Souveränität der Slowakei aufrechterhalten […] Es sei demnach abwegig, auch nur mit dem Gedanken einer grundsätzlichen Änderung zu spielen“; 2. „Ein offener Ausbruch der teilweise noch latenten Machtkämpfe der Gruppe Tuka einerseits, der Gruppe Tiso andererseits ist unerwünscht.“ Ludin wurde demnach verpflichtet zwischen beiden Parteien zu vermitteln, einen Ausgleich zu suchen und sie zur unbedingten Loyalität zu bewegen. 3. „Die Sympathien des Reiches liegen auf Seiten der nationalsozialistischen Kreise der Slowakei.“ Damit war das Lager Tuka, Mach, Murgaš gemeint. Der vierte Punkt enthielt eine Zusammenfassung, wonach der zu erstrebende Ausgleich, die Konzentration auf „positive Arbeit“ und eine anzustrebende Wohlstandssteigerung im vorbildlichen „Schutzstaat“ zum größeren Ansehen des Deutschen Reiches beitragen würden.135 Im Bewusstsein, das Vertrauen der Führung des Reiches zu genießen, ging Tiso, die Gunst der Stunde nützend, zu einem offenen Angriff gegen die Siehe dazu Jörg K. HOENSCH, Die Slowakische Republik 1939–1945. In: Studia Slovaca, S. 236–238; ders. Grundzüge und Phasen der deutschen Slowakei-Politik. In: Studia Slovaca, S. 267f. Ausführlich zu dem für den 21. 1. 1941 geplanten Staatsstreich siehe Milan S. ĎURICA, Jozef Tiso, 1887–1947. Životopisný profil, Bratislava 2006, S. 286–289. Bei der Schilderung der bisher weniger bekannten Einzelheiten über den vereitelten Putschversuch Tukas stützt sich der Historiker auf die Memoiren des Wirtschaftsministers Gejza Medrický und des Staatsratsmitglieds Ján Balko. Siehe auch die Meldung des Militärattachés Becker vom 16.1.1941 über die Hintergründe der von Čatloš eingereichten Demission, die dann jedoch am 14. 1. 1941 nach der Rücksprache mit Tiso wieder zurückgenommen wurde: PA AA, R 27659, Handakten Luther, 338194338196. Zur Demission Čatlošs siehe auch das Telegramm von Ringelmann an RAM vom 10. 1. 1941. PA AA, R 29737, St.S., 248514. 135 PA AA, R 27659, Handakten Luther, 338189-338193, Bericht Ludins vom 17. 1. 1941. Siehe auch den ausführlichen, 24 Seiten umfassenden Bericht Ludins vom 29.1.1941, in dem er auf die Einzelheiten seiner Besprechungen mit Tiso und Tuka eingeht, denen der neue deutsche Kurs nahe gelegt wurde. PA AA, R 27659, Handakten Luther, 338163338185. Dieser revidierte deutsche Kurs gegenüber der Slowakei, der auf das Duumvirat Tiso-Tuka setzte und auf die rigorose Anpassung der innenpolitischen Verhältnisse an das nationalsozialistische Modell verzichtete, sorgte einigermaßen für innenpolitische Stabilität, die sich bis zum Ausbruch des Aufstands im Sommer 1944 halten konnte. 134

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Radikalen über und erklärte auf der Sitzung des Präsidiums der HSĽS am 15. Jänner das neue Parteiprogramm. In seiner strategisch gut durchdachten Rede verkündigte er den legitimen, alle Bereiche des öffentlichen Lebens umfassenden Machtanspruch der Partei, die sich bei der Rettung der slowakischen Nation und den Aufbau des Slowakischen Staates auszeichnete. Beim Bemühen um die nationale Einheit, die kein Politikum sondern das Prinzip für das Überleben an sich sei, wandte sich Tiso gegen alle „Verräter der Nation“, die diese Einheit bewusst untergraben wollten.136 Damit war freilich er radikale Flügel um Tuka gemeint, dem mit dieser Erklärung des eigenen „nationalsozialistischen“ Programms, freilich gestützt auf die päpstlichen Sozialenzykliken und die nationalemanzipatorische Philosophie, der Wind aus den Segeln genommen werden sollte. Zusätzlich betonte er, der „Nationalsozialismus ist kein Exportartikel, den die Völker ohne weiteres kopieren sollten“, im Gegenteil der Nationalsozialismus sei an der Hebung der sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Standards interessiert und wünsche keinen Kultur- und religiösen Kampf der Völker untereinander.137 Tiso wurde aufgrund des stärker gewordenen Druckes seitens der radikalen Tuka-Anhänger mit deren Initiativen, die totale Machtkontrolle zu übernehmen, dazu gezwungen, eine eigene Alternative des nationalsozialistischen Gedankengutes auszuarbeiten. Insbesondere die Ablehnung des Individualismus und die Hervorhebung des „völkischen“ Prinzips – wie Tiso als Angeklagter vor dem Volksgericht nach dem Krieg zugab –, waren die zwei Elemente der nationalsozialistischen Ideologie, die er bereit war, ohne die christlichen Grundlagen seiner Politik zu verlassen, in das Programm der HSĽS aufzunehmen.138 Die letzte entscheidende Phase im Kampf um die Führerschaft wurde am 20. und 21. Jänner 1941 ausgetragen. Zunächst ließ Tiso auf der Beratung der HSĽS-Parteifunktionäre das Programm des ľudové Slovensko, also der Volksslowakei, vor dem begeisterten Publikum nochmals bestätigen, holte sich die Zustimmung für seinen Anspruch des unangefochtenen Führers und sagte: „Die politische Truppe hat sich mit uns geeint und die Generale ohne Truppen haben wir nicht zu fürchten.“139 Es lag kein Zweifel daran, wenn er unter dieser Bezeichnung meinte. Das 14-PunkteProgramm Tukas, dessen Positionen in den letzten Tagen wesentlich Jozef TISO. Prejavy a články, S. 317. Ebenda, S. 318. 138 Siehe Róbert LETZ, Hlinkova slovenská ľudová strana (Pokus o syntetický pohľad). In: Róbert LETZ, Peter MULÍK, Anna BARTLOVÁ (Hgg.), Slovenská ľudová strana v dejinách 1905–1945, Martin 2006, S. 86. 139 PA AA, R 29737, St.S., Telegramm Mühlbergers vom 20. 1. 1941. 136 137

412 Beata Katrebova-Blehova ________________________________________________________

geschwächt wurden und der sich einen Rückhalt aus Berlin nicht mehr sicher sein konnte, das er vor den Kommandeuren der Hlinka-Garde in Trenčianske Teplice am 21. Jänner vortrug, wirkte nur mehr wie ein Schwanengesang über den slowakischen Nationalsozialismus.140 Trotz des erschwerten Zugangs der sowjetischen Gesandtschaft zu Informationsquellen liefern die Berichte Puškins eine interessante Sicht der innenpolitischen Verhältnisse in den ersten Monaten des Jahres 1941. Insgesamt beurteilte der sowjetische Diplomat den noch ungewissen Ausgang der Krise viel pessimistischer als er letztendlich ausfiel. Die scharfen innenpolitischen Auseinandersetzungen verglich er mit der Entwicklung unmittelbar nach Salzburg, als Ďurčanský gezwungen worden war, zurückzutreten. Ähnliche Schlussfolgerung vermutete er auch für Tiso, der den Kampf mit Tuka verlieren sollte. In seinem Lagebericht vom 17. Jänner hieß es daher folgendermaßen: Tuka würde die Rolle des Marschalls Antonescu übernehmen, in dem er den Posten des Staatspräsidenten für sich beanspruche. Aus Deutschland zurückgekehrt habe er begonnen, Tiso zu ignorieren und sei dabei von Mach unterstützt worden. Der Konflikt, der sich mit der Ernennung des Wirtschaftsministers Medrický zum Generalsekretär der HSĽS verschärft habe, habe Tiso genützt, um die Sitzung des Parteipräsidiums einzuberufen, auf der er Tuka offen beschuldigte, jener sei ein Karrierist, wolle in der Slowakei eine prodeutschere Politik betreiben, als die Deutschen selbst. Tiso habe sich dabei auf seine Absprache mit Hitler berufen, dass der Reichskanzler sich nicht in die inneren Angelegenheiten einmischen werde, falls die Slowakei auf der Seite Deutschland marschiere. Die Deutschen wollten den Slowaken den Nationalsozialismus nicht aufzwingen; es sei vielmehr der Premierminister, der aus rein karrieristischen Gründen sich für seine Indoktrination einsetze. Nach der Sitzung habe sich Mach zum Lager Tisos bekannt, was die Position des Präsidenten bei der Hlinka-Garde deutlich aufwertete.141 Hinsichtlich des Lagerwechsels des Innenministers zeigte Puškin jedoch eine gewisse Nüchternheit, wenn er meinte, die wirkliche Haltung Machs würde sich erst in der Zukunft zeigen. Im Zusammenhang mit diesen Ereignissen würde der Slowakei eine Regierungsumbildung bevorstehen, wobei diesmal Gerüchte vom Rücktritt Tukas und des Propagandachefs Murgaš im Umlauf seien. Den Posten des

Vgl. Anton HRNKO, Politický vývoj na Slovensku na prelome rokov 1940–1941. In: Štefan PAŽÚR, Dezider TÓTH (Hgg.), Zborník múzea Slovenského národného povstania, Martin 1988, Bd. 13, S. 22f. 141 AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 3, Schachtel 20, Akte 269, Bericht Puškins Nr. 12/c vom 17. 1. 1941. 140

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Regierungsvorsitzenden würde demnach Martin Sokol, der Vorsitzender des Slowakischen Landtags, einnehmen, der als gemäßigter Politiker galt.142 Aus dem oben Geschilderten zog der Gesandte folgende Schlussfolgerung: „Gegenwärtig fällt es schwierig, den tatsächlichen Ausgang des Kampfes vorauszusagen. Es spricht mehr dafür, dass die Gruppe um Tiso gezwungen sein wird, zurückzutreten, aber es ist auch durchaus möglich, dass die Deutschen der Scherereien überdrüssig werden und die einen wie die anderen fortjagen. Eben das letzte ist nicht ausgeschlossen, wenn man die schnelle Aufwertung des slowakischen Territoriums für die deutsche Kriegsmaschine in Betracht zieht. Momentan ist die Haltung der Deutschen in dieser Frage nicht klar. Die Anhänger Tisos bekräftigen, dass der Präsident einen geeigneten Zeitpunkt für den Angriff gewählt hat, weil die Deutschen zur Zeit nicht an einer Verschlechterung der Lage interessiert seien, daher würden sie auch Tuka und ihm nahe stehenden Personen aufopfern. So denkt Tiso? Mir scheint, er dachte das Gegenteil. Tiso ist offensichtlich von seiner Niederlage überzeugt. Weil er darüber weiß, setzte er alles darauf, seine Autorität aufrechtzuerhalten […]. Ähnlich erschien die Situation mit Ďurčanský. Insgesamt entsteht in der Slowakei eine Situation, die an die Entwicklungen im Lande kurz vor dem Rücktritt Ďurčanskýs erinnert.“143 In einer knappen Darstellung ging Puškin ebenfalls auf die Rolle des neuen deutschen Gesandten ein, den er einen aktiven Offizier der Wehrmacht144 mit guten Russisch-Kenntnissen nannte. Seine Ernennung, die er keineswegs als einen Zufall betrachtete, hing seiner Meinung nach mit dem neuen Kurs des Reiches der Slowakei gegenüber zusammen, wonach die letztere als ein Transitland für die deutschen Truppen Richtung Balkan an Bedeutung zulegte.145 Bekanntlich entwickelten sich die Dinge keineswegs nach diesem, einigermaßen pessimistischen Szenario. Tiso wurde seitens Ludin beim Treffen am 15. Jänner das volle Vertrauen der deutschen Führung ausgesprochen,146 wovon Puškin allem Anschein nach keine Notiz erhielt. So mußte er seine Lagebeurteilung korrigieren. In seinem etwa zwei Wochen darauf verfassten Lagebericht schrieb er von einem Kompromiss der sich bekämpfenden Gruppierungen, der unter Druck Berlins zustanden gekommen Ebenda. Ebenda. 144 Hans Ellard Ludin war SA-Obergruppenführer, ab 1933 Führer der SA-Gruppe West. 145 AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 3, Schachtel 20, Akte 269, Bericht Puškins Nr. 12/c vom 17. 1. 1941. 146 PA AA, R 27659, Handakten Luther, 338163-338178, Bericht Ludins vom 29.1.1941. 142 143

414 Beata Katrebova-Blehova ________________________________________________________

sei. Da er seine Informationen überwiegend aus der in der Slowakei erscheinenden Presse bezog, wies er auf die neue Linie in der Berichterstattung des Organs der Karpatendeutschen Der Grenzbote und des dem Innenminister Mach nahestehenden Organs der Hlinka-Garde Gardista hin. Beide Tageszeitungen hätten in ihren Angriffen nachgelassen und würden Tiso den „Führer des slowakischen Volkes“ betiteln. Hinter diesem maßgebenden Umschwung vermutete Puškin die Nebenwirkung des am 24. Jänner blutig niedergeschlagenen Putschversuches der Eisernen Garde in Rumänien, eines Ereignisses, dass die Radikalen zum Umdenken zwang. Obwohl es keine direkten Parallelen zwischen dem Aufstand der Eisernen Garde und der innenpolitischen Krise im Jänner 1941 gab, war für die radikalen Gardisten allein die Tatsache, dass Hitler sich hinter Antonescu stellte und eben nicht auf die Seite der Putschisten, schwerwiegend genug, um rasch zu kapitulieren.147 Wie erklärte nun Puškin den zwischen beiden Lagern erzielten Kompromiss, der für die nicht Eingeweihten ziemlich überraschend ausfallen musste? An dieser Stelle ist es angebracht, direkt aus seinem Bericht zu zitieren: „Der Kompromiss, der zwischen den Gruppen Tiso und Tuka erreicht wurde, soll unter zwei Gesichtspunkten bewertet werden: Tiso lehnt sich an die katholischen Kreise in der Slowakei und im Vatikan an. Die Widersprüche zwischen der katholischen Kirche und dem Nationalsozialismus in Deutschland konnten werden in der Slowakei nicht unbemerkt bleiben. Die slowakische katholische Kirche, die sich als eine ausgeprägt einflussreiche politische Organisation erwies, wollte ihre Positionen im Lande keineswegs der prodeutschen Gruppierung überlassen. Mit Anweisungen aus Vatikan ausgestattet, wo die Slowakei der antideutsch eingestellte Sidor vertritt, trat die katholische Geistlichkeit mit Tiso an der Spitze in einen offenen Kampf gegen die Anhänger des TukaMach-Lagers an. […] Tiso unter Anwendung der Gewalt zu entfernen, würde bedeuten, dass Deutschland einen offenen Konflikt mit dem Vatikan eingeht, was Hitler angesichts der gegenwärtigen Kriegsverwicklung schwerlich nützlich sein könnte.“148 Den zweiten Grund für die Mäßigung des deutschen Gleichschaltungsdrucks sah Puškin, wie schon erwähnt, in der Eskalation der Lage in Südosteuropa, die ein sofortiges militärisches Eingreifen nach sich zog und keinerlei unerwünschte Verwicklungen im

Vgl. auch HRNKO, Politický vývoj, S. 23. AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 3, Schachtel 20, Akte 269, Bericht Puškins Nr. 21 vom 3. 2. 1941. 147

148

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wichtigen Hinterland, zu dem die Slowakei nunmehr militärstrategisch aufgewertet wurde, duldete.149 Puškins ungewöhnlich scharfe Darstellung trifft sicherlich in vielen Punkten zu. Die Rolle des Vatikans und dessen Verhältnis zur slowakischen politischen Elite werden jedoch stark übertrieben. Es muss in Zweifel gezogen werden, ob es die Linie der strengen Unparteilichkeit150 dem Heiligen Stuhl erlauben würde, in die innenpolitischen Kämpfe soweit einzugreifen, um die Position des katholischen Priesters Tiso zu stützten. Wir können im Gegenteil eher davon ausgehen, dass sich der Hl. Stuhl zur Besetzung einer hohen staatlichen Stelle durch einen katholischen Priester besorgt zeigte. Bischof Michal Buzalka, dem am 8. September 1939 eine Privataudienz beim Papst Pius XII. in Castel Gandolfo gewährt wurde, zeugt in einem schriftlichen Bericht von der Besorgnis des Pontifex. Papst Pius XII fragte, ob es für die katholische Kirche angesichts der gegebenen Umstände vorteilhaft erscheinte, auf eine so verantwortungsvolle Staatsposten den Priester Jozef Tiso zu befürworten.151 Über die Vermittlerrolle des Gesandten Karol Sidor, der die Agenda der slowakisch-vatikanischen Beziehungen mit großem Geschick leitete, trifft eher die Meinung zu, dass er aufgrund seines aufgezwungenen Rückzugs aus der Innenpolitik im Frühjahr 1939 eher ein Einzelgänger geworden war, der weder dem einen noch dem anderen Lager seine Person zur Verfügung zu stellen bereit war, obwohl er innerlich mehr mit dem konservativ-klerikalen Kreisen sympathisierte. Obendrein galt er für das Auswärtige Amt als persona non grata, dessen Abberufung vom Gesandtenposten beim Hl. Stuhl als Folge des Salzburger Diktats von

Ebenda. Zu den Grundzügen der päpstlichen Politik unter Pius XII. siehe etwa Pierre BLET, SJ, Pius XII. a druhá svetová vojna podľa vatikánskych archívov, Bratislava 2002, S. 92–111; Michael F. FELDKAMP, Pius XII. und Deutschland, Göttingen 2000, S. 124–142. 151 Laut Buzalkas Bericht durfte Pius XII. zum Staatsposten Tisos folgendes gesagt haben: „Es gibt eines, was uns mit Befürchtungen erfüllt, ob es unter solchen Umständen in Anbetracht der möglichen künftigen Entwicklungen vorteilhaft erscheint, dass auf einem so verantwortungsvollen Staatsposten heute unser Priester Dr. Tiso steht. Dass Priester [Andrej] Hlinka an der Spitze einer gewissen Partei [HSĽS] stand, das erscheint plausibel; bei einer missglückten oder weniger vorteilhaften künftigen staatlichen Entwicklung könnte sich der Zorn des Volkes gegen die Priester oder überhaupt die Kirche in einer irrtümlichen Annahme wenden, dies hätten die Priester und die Kirche verursacht.“ Siehe Róbert LETZ, V hodine veľkej skúšky. Listy biskupa Michala Buzalku, Trnava 2007, S. 297. 149

150

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Reichsaußenminister persönlich überlegt und auch eingeleitet, später dann aber wieder zurückgenommen wurde.152 Am 12. Februar erfolgte ein dritter Bericht an Molotov, in dem Puškin – gestützt auf eine vertrauliche Informationsquelle – einige inhaltliche Thesen seiner letzten zwei Schreiben unterstrich. Es handelte sich um eine bemerkenswerte Analyse der aktuellen internationalen Entwicklung vom ehemaligen Außenminister Ďurčanský. Die zentrale Botschaft der Ausführungen Ďurčanskýs lag in der Behauptung, Deutschland habe bereits im September 1940 den Krieg verloren. Der Sinn des Beschlusses des Nichtangriffspaktes mit der Sowjetunion bestünde darin, Polen und Frankreich niederzuschlagen und Großbritannien zur Kapitulation zu zwingen. Danach hätte mit Hilfe Italiens und Englands der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion, und zwar noch im August 1940 begonnen werden sollen. Da aber London nicht kapitulierte, seien die deutschen Kriegspläne durchquert worden.153 Ďurčanský sei – so Puškin weiter – aus dem oben Geschilderten zu der Schlussfolgerung gelangt, dass Deutschland ein Zusammenbruch bevorstünde. Diese Meinung würden viele hochrangige Persönlichkeiten im Reich teilen; ebenfalls seien davon einige ungarische Politiker überzeugt, die Ďurčanský gerne seine Zustimmung zu einer künftigen Eingliederung der Slowakei in das Ungarische Königreich entlocken würden. Im weiteren behauptete der slowakische Exaußenminister, dass der Vatikan in den letzten zwei Monaten Anweisungen an die Oberhäupter der katholischen Kirche in Deutschland, Österreich, Tschechien und der Slowakei durchgegeben habe, sie mögen in keinem Falle für die Unterstützung der Politik der Achsenmächte auftreten, da das Dritte Reich vor dem Zusammenbruch stünde. Eben aus diesen Gründen habe Ďurčanský die prodeutsche Politik Tukas und Machs kritisiert, da diese zur Verschärfung der sozialen Gegensätze führen könnte und somit den Sieg der Kommunisten erleichtere.154 Es ist schwer zu beurteilen, wieviel Glauben Puškin dem als exzentrisch bekannten und zu voreiligen Folgerungen neigenden Exaußenministers schenkte. Zu jener Zeit waren freilich viele angedeuteten Entwicklungsszenarien, welche späterhin eintrafen, nicht abzuschätzen. Tatsache ist jedoch, dass der sowjetische Diplomat sie nicht in Frage stellte; im Mehr dazu siehe Beata KATREBOVA-BLEHOVA, Pokusy ríšskeho ministerstva zahraničných vecí o odvolanie Karola Sidora v dôsledku salzburských rokovaní. In: Martin PEKÁR, Richard PAVLOVIČ (Hgg.), Slovensko medzi 14. marcom 1939 a salzburskými rokovaniami, Prešov 2007, S. 434–444. 153 AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 3, Schachtel 20, Akte 269, Bericht Puškins vom 12. 2. 1940. 154 Ebenda. 152

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Gegenteil, er berichtete über die Ausführungen Ďurčanskýs so, als hielte er sie für bare Münze. In diesem Sinne zog er den Schluss, der sein Urteil über die politische Linie Tisos bekräftigte: „Das politische Leben in der Slowakei in der letzten Zeit beobachtend, bin ich zum Schluss gekommen, dass Präsident Tiso gerade nach solchen Instruktionen Vatikans handelt, über die Ďurčanský sprach.“155 Am 9. April 1941 brach die Slowakei die diplomatischen Beziehungen zu Jugoslawien ab. Zu diesem Schritt wurde sie, obgleich sie zu diesem Balkanstaat in keinem kriegerischen Konflikt stand, auf direkte Weisung Ribbentrops veranlasst, der einen Tag zuvor per Diplogerma die deutsche Gesandtschaft aufgefordert hatte, seine Verfügung der slowakischen Regierung nahe zu legen.156 Der Leiter der politischen Abteilung im slowakischen Außenministerium Mračna überreichte in der Folge dem jugoslawischen diplomatischen Vertreter eine Verbalnote, in der die slowakische Regierung ihrer Verpflichtung Ausdruck verlieh, die Beziehungen mit Jugoslawien abzubrechen, da dieses, „obwohl es Mitglied des Dreimächtepaktes ist, im Wege eines Staatsstreiches eine feindliche Haltung gegen Deutschland eingenommen hat“. Die Verbalnote war in der gleichen Diktion wie die Anweisung Ribbentrops verfasst; hinzufügen bleibt noch, dass der slowakische Geschäftsträger in Madrid, Jozef Mikuš, beauftragt wurde, die spanische Regierung um Wahrung slowakischer Interessen in Jugoslawien zu ersuchen.157 Der Geschäftsträger in Belgrad, Jozef Cieker, der die Pressburger Zentrale bis zuletzt mit informativen Lageberichten versorgte, kam am 7. April in Bratislava an und reiste erst als neuer Gesandter nach Zagreb wieder ab. Am 16. April sandte Präsident Tiso an den kroatischen Staatschef Ante Pavelić ein Telegramm, in welchem der Freude über „den Endsieg des kroatischen Befreiungskampfes“, die derjenigen Freude gleichen würde, welche die Slowakei vor zwei Jahren selbst empfunden hätte, Ausdruck verliehen wurde.158 Puškin kritisierte die rasche Anerkennung Kroatiens seitens Bratislava. Er wies zunächst auf das lebhafte Echo in der slowakischen Gesellschaft hin, das der Staatsstreich in Jugoslawien am 27. März hervorgerufen hatte. Die jugoslawische Gesandtschaft habe folglich mehrere Ebenda. PA AA, R 29737, St., 248587. Telegramm Ribbentrops vom 8. 4. 1941. Ähnliche Weisung erging auch an die Regierungen in Budapest und Sofia; die Slowakei handelte demnach nicht allein, sondern im Gleichschritt mit den sonstigen Signataren des Dreimächtepaktes. 157 PA AA, R 29737, St., 248589, Telegramm Endrös’ vom 9. 4. 1941. 158 PA AA, R 29737, St., 248593f., Fernschreiben Woermanns an RAM vom 16. 4. 1941. 155

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Begrüßungsbriefe erhalten, die in einem antideutschen Ton verfasst wurden; den jugoslawischen diplomatischen Vertreter seien offen Sympathien entgegengebracht worden. Eine andere Haltung nahm jedoch die slowakische Regierung ein, welche die mutige Handlung Jugoslawiens geängstigt habe. Da sie alle Gelegenheiten nutzte, um sich den Deutschen einzuschmeicheln und ihren Verdacht zu zerstreuen, sei es verständlich, warum die Slowakei unter den ersten Ländern gewesen sei, die diplomatischen Beziehungen gebrochen habe.159 Puškin erwähnte im Weiteren die engen Beziehungen einiger slowakischer Politiker zu den kroatischen Nationalisten, die oft in der Slowakei weilten und sich einer besonderen Aufmerksamkeit vor allem seitens Innenminister Mach erfreuten. Daher sei es verständlich, wenn es den deutschen Interessen voll Rechnung trage, dass die Slowaken unter den ersten gewesen seien, die die von den Deutschen initiierte Unabhängigkeit Kroatiens anerkannten.160 Die Einbeziehung der Slowakei in das Unternehmen „Barbarossa“ in den Berichten des sowjetischen Gesandten Obwohl Hitler zunächst nicht geneigt war, die Slowakische Armee in den direkten Kampfhandlungen des Unternehmens „Barbarossa“ mitwirken zu lassen, besaß die Slowakei aufgrund ihrer von West nach Ost gezogenen geographischen Gestalt als Durch- und Aufmarschgebiet eine erhebliche Bedeutung.161 Diesem militärstrategischen Kalkül wurden alle entsprechenden Kriegsvorbereitungen, die sich seit Frühjahr 1941 abzeichneten, untergeordnet. Dies stimmt nicht ganz, da die Slowakei gemeinsam mit Bulgarien und Ungarn handelte. Siehe Telegramm Ribbentrops vom 8. 4. 1941. 160 AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 3, Schachtel 20, Akte 269, Bericht Puškins Nr, 42 vom 23. 4. 1941. Die guten Beziehungen Innenministers Mach zu einigen kroatischen Politikern trugen sicherlich zur raschen Anerkennung bei. Machs Kontakte reichten jedoch bereits in die dreißiger Jahre zurück; er ließ in der slowakischen Presse mehrere Artikel veröffentlichen, in denen er auf die Ähnlichkeit der nationalen Aspirationen der Kroaten mit denen der slowakischen autonomen Bewegung hinwies. Aus dieser Zeit stammte auch seine Freundschaft zu Vladko Maček, dem Vorsitzenden der Kroatischen Bauernpartei und einen bekannten Gegner der Diktatur Alexander I.’, den er mehrmals traf und interviewte. Siehe Alexander MACH, Rozhovor s dr. Mačkom o veciach chorvátskych. In: Slovák, 13. 10. 1935. Siehe auch die Biographie Machs von František VNUK, Mať svoj štát znamená život. Politická biografia Alexandra Macha, Bratislava 1991, S. 257f. 161 Vgl. Klaus SCHÖNHERR, Die Slowakei im militärischen Kalkül des Deutschen Reiches, 1939–1945. In: František CSÉFALVAY, Miloslav PÚČIK (Hgg.), Slovensko a druhá svetová vojna, Bratislava 2000, S. 163. 159

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In der militärischen Expertise, die im Jahre 1946 für das Volksgericht angefertigt wurde, wurde die strategische Bedeutung des slowakischen Territoriums genau umschrieben. Demnach stellte das Gebiet eine natürliche Verbindung zwischen den Rüstungsbetrieben des Protektorats sowie des Deutschen Reiches mit den später okkupierten westlichen Gebieten der UdSSR dar. Ähnliche Relevanz besaß die nord-südliche Achse, die vor dem Angriff die Truppenverschiebungen der Wehrmacht aus dem Kampffeld in Südosteuropa in den Norden in das Generalgouvernement an die Grenze zur Sowjetunion gewährleistete. Um einen möglicht raschen und ungehinderten Aufmarsch der deutschen Truppeneinheiten durch das slowakische Gebiet zu sichern, wurden sämtliche Bauvorhaben an den Kommunikationsnetzwerken meist unter der deutschen Aufsicht durchgeführt: Umbau, Erneuerung und Aufbau neuer Straßen, Eisenbahnstrecken und Telekommunikationsverbindungen. Die militärischen Maßnahmen und Vorbereitungen wurden bereits beim Durchmarsch der Wehrmacht durch die Slowakei nach Ungarn vor dem Balkan-Feldzug durchgeführt. Im Zeitabschnitt Mai-Juni 1941 wurden auf dem slowakischen Gebiet mindestens fünf deutsche Divisionen und weitere Korps- und Luftwaffe-Einheiten untergebracht, die später in das Generalgouvernement verschoben wurden. Seit Ende April kamen auch die Maßnahmen im Rahmen der Luft- und Fallschirmjägerverteidigung zum Einsatz; Pläne zum Einsatz der Luftstreitkräfte und der festen Maschinengewehrkompanien gegen die Flugzeuge wurden erstellt, Übungen des staatlichen Meldedienstes durchgeführt.162 Es steht daher außer Zweifel, dass der mit Wissen der Regierung realisierte intensive Aufbau der Kommunikationen sowie der Flugplätze, die Transporte des Kriegsmaterials und der Wehrmachtseinheiten, die erheblichen Einschränkungen im persönlichen Eisenbahnverkehr, die vor allem einfache Reisende betraf, etc…, auf die Nähe eines kriegerischen Konfliktes hindeuteten und von einem schärferen Beobachter wohl bemerkt werden mussten. Wir wollen nun der Frage nachgehen, inwieweit sich der bevorstehende Konflikt auf die slowakisch-sowjetischen Beziehungen auswirkte und wie er in der Berichterstattung Puškins reflektiert wurde. Es zeigte sich, dass die Frühjahrsmonate keine bedeutsameren Ereignisse, sei es im gegenseitigen kulturellen und wissenschaftlichen Austausch oder auf der höchsten staatspolitischen Ebene, brachten. Im Gegenteil, es zeichneten sich Siehe dazu die ausführliche Studie von Zoltán KATREBA, Vojenské a politické kroky predchádzajúce vstupu Slovenskej republiky do vojny proti Sovietskemu zväzu v roku 1941. In: Vojenská história, Jg. 4/Heft 2, Bratislava 2000, S. 40–49. 162

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eine allmähliche Abkühlung und eine steigende Isolation der sowjetischen Gesandtschaft ab, die Ende April in einer offenen polizeilichen Überwachung resultierte und die notwendigen Fühlungnahmen zu den slowakischen Politikern aber auch den Vertretern des diplomatischen Korps unmöglich machte.163 Auch die Bemühungen des neuen Rektors der Höheren Schule für Technik (der künftigen Technischen Universität), Anton Bugan, eine sowjetische Delegation der Technischen Hochschule in Moskau zur feierlichen Installation des Rektors nach Bratislava einzuladen, schlugen fehl.164 Die Initiative der sowjetischen Gesandtschaft, ein breites slowakisches Publikum mit sowjetischen Filmen bekannt zu machen, womit der deutschen Propaganda entgegengesteuert werden sollte, war von Schwierigkeiten und Obstruktionen seitens der slowakischen Behörden begleitet. Obwohl der Einkauf sowjetischer Filme laut dem Handelsabkommen von slowakischen Distributionsfirmen vorgesehen war, weigerten sie sich, die Filme zu erwerben, da sie mögliche Sanktionen seitens Ministerpräsidenten Tuka fürchteten und dies trotz der Tatsache, dass die Filme nur mit knapper Not von der slowakischen Zensur bewilligt wurden. Als am 8. Mai die Premiere von „Vojevaja molodosť“ (Die kämpfende Jugend) und „Muzykaľnaja istorija“ (Die musikalische Geschichte) in dem größten slowakischen Kinosaal Reduta stattfand, nahmen immerhin einige hochrangige Politiker und Diplomaten teil: Finanzminister Pružinský, Wirtschaftsminister Medrický, der Stellvertreter der Außenministers Polyák, der neue slowakische Gesandte in Moskau Šimko; der ungarische Gesandte samt seinem Mitarbeiterstab und der Sekretär der italienischen Gesandtschaft. Beide Filme wurden laut Puškins Bericht mit großem Interesse angesehen.165 Dies konnte aber nichts an der Tatsache ändern, dass kein einziger deutscher Vertreter anwesend war; diese demonstrative Abwesenheit führte Puškin zur Schlussfolgerung, dass die Deutschen von den Slowaken das Verbot der sowjetischen Filmschau verlangten: „In Anbetracht der gegebenen Puškin beklagte im Bericht vom 19.5., dass er die Frage der Zentrale in Moskau nur mehr schwer im Detail beantworten könne, da sich die Bedingungen, in denen die Gesandtschaft arbeiten müsse, wesentlich verschlechtert haben. Die Schuld an diesen Umständen gab er den Deutschen, die „ununterbrochen hinter uns her sind und alles tun, um uns der Möglichkeit der Kontakte mit den Slowaken und dem diplomatischen Korps zu berauben.“ AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 3, Schachtel 20, Akte 269, Bericht Puškins vom 19. 5. 1941. Zu der Überwachung siehe AVP RF, F. 0138, Inventarverzeichnis 2, Schachtel 1, Akte 1, Bericht Puškins vom 20. 5. 1941. 164 AVP RF, F. 0138, Inventarverzeichnis 2, Schachtel 1, Akte 2, Die Noten der slowakischen Mission an das NKID, 11. 2. 1941 und AVP RF, F. 0138, Inventarverzeichnis 2, Schachtel 1, Akte 1, (Die Antwort des NKID vom) 7. 3. 1941. 165 AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 3, Schachtel 20, Akte 271, Aus dem Tagebuch Puškins, der Eintrag vom 8. 5. 1941. 163

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Umstände und des deutschen Misstrauens über unsere Aktivitäten, bin ich der Meinung, dass wir von künftigen Filmvorführungen, so wie den Versuchen, unsere Filme zu verkaufen, künftighin Abstand nehmen sollten.“166 Die Möglichkeit eines Krieges zwischen der UdSSR und dem Deutschen Reich wurde das erste Mal vom Verteidigungsminister General Čatloš während des feierlichen Empfanges beim Staatspräsidenten anlässlich der Staatsgründungsfeier am 14. März 1941 seinem sowjetischen Gesprächspartner Puškin gegenüber aufgeworfen. Laut dessen Eintragungen im Tagebuch meinte Čatloš im Zusammenhang mit der sowjetischen Note an Bulgarien, in der gegen den Durchmarsch der deutschen Wehrmacht protestiert wurde, die Dauer des Krieges würde einzig von der Haltung Moskaus abhängen. Solange die Sowjetunion wirtschaftliche Hilfe an Deutschland gewähre, verlängere sich der Krieg; falls aber die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit abgebrochen werde, würde dies einen Krieg gegen die UdSSR bedeuten. Er sagte gleichzeitig, dass die Sowjetunion bis dahin kein Napoleon besiegt hätte. Puškin kommentierte die Ausführungen des slowakischen Generals nicht; er beschränkte sich lediglich auf die knappe Antwort, dass die Sowjetunion gegenwärtig die Position der Neutralität einnähme.167 Etwa zwei Wochen später, am 2. April, beim Abendessen mit dem stellvertretenden Außenminister Polyák und dem Geschäftsträger Krno, wurde von den Slowaken die Eventualität eines deutschen Angriffskrieges gegen die Sowjetunion erneut zur Sprache gebracht. Vor allem Krno, der sich laut Puškin über die slowakische Selbständigkeit lustig machte,168 sagte einen baldigen Krieg voraus. Als interessierte Puškin nachfragte, worauf er seine voreiligen Schlüsse stützte, deutete Krno auf den ungewöhnlich regen Bau der Straßen und Flughäfen in der Slowakei und im Generalgouvernement hin. Hitler könne sein „neues Europa“ nicht ohne ein dermaßen wichtiges Land wie die Ukraine aufbauen; die Deutschen würde das ukrainische Getreide benötigen und würden in Sache der Lieferungen keine Abhängigkeit von Moskau auf die Dauer dulden. Im Tagebuch des sowjetischen Missionschefs ist kein Kommentar zu diesem Gespräch zu Ebenda. AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 3, Schachtel 20, Akte 271, Aus dem Tagebuch Puškins, der Eintrag vom 14. 3. 1941. 168 Gejza Krno unterstützte bekanntlich während seines Aufenthaltes in Moskau und später im slowakischen Außenministerium die tschechoslowakische Widerstandsbewegung und beteiligte sich aktiv am Slowakischen Nationalaufstand. Siehe Jozef JABLONICKÝ, Samizdat o odboji. Štúdie a články, Bratislava 2006, Bd. II, S. 279. 166 167

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finden; trotzdem kommt einem beim Lesen seiner Eintragungen der Eindruck, dass er den Argumenten seines Gesprächspartners nicht vollen Ernst geschenkt hatte.169 Dabei kann nicht angenommen werden, dass ihm die breit angelegten bautechnischen Vorhaben und insbesondere der Durchmarsch der deutschen Truppen durch die Slowakei, der nach der Okkupation Jugoslawiens mit gleicher Intensität fortgeführt würde, entgangen wären. Puškin wies auf den Zusammenhang der Truppenverlegung mit einem „angeblich bevorstehenden kriegerischen Zusammenstoß zwischen der UdSSR und Deutschlands“ hin, der als Gerücht in den wirtschaftlichen und journalistischen Kreisen aber auch unter der einfachen Bevölkerung verbreitet sei. Diesem und ähnlichen „Gerüchten“ und Lagebeurteilungen schenkte er eine ziemliche Aufmerksamkeit, als er sie in seinem Bericht vom 23. April ausführlich beschrieb. Demnach könne Hitler auch nach der Einnahme Südosteuropas den Krieg gegen England nicht erfolgreich fortsetzen, da ihm nach wie vor nicht genügend Ressourcen zur Verfügung stünden. So würden sie ein anderes Angriffsobjekt, etwa im Nahen Osten wählen, um ihr Kriegsziel, die Niederlage Großbritanniens, zu erreichen, was aber zu einer direkten Kollision mit den sowjetischen Interessen in dieser Region führen würde. Ein deutscher Angriff auf die Türkei, Syrien und die englischen Kolonien im Nahen Osten und Afrika würde die Sowjetunion mit in den Krieg hinein ziehen; die Konsequenz, die sich daraus ergäbe, wäre jedoch ein in Berlin befürchteter Zwei-Frontenkrieg, den die Deutschen zu vermeiden suchen werden. Es wäre daher kriegsstrategisch viel einfacher, zunächst die Sowjetunion niederzuringen und die Ukraine einzunehmen – so der Sinn der verbreiteten Gerüchte in der Slowakei.170 Auf der Ebene der rein diplomatischen Beziehungen hatte der Gesandte jedoch keinen Grund zur Annahme eines in der nahen Zukunft bevorstehenden Konfliktes: „Das Verhalten der hiesigen Slowaken und Deutschen unserer Gesandtschaft gegenüber liefert keine Grundlage zur Befürchtung, dass hinfort grundlegende Veränderungen in den deutschsowjetischen Beziehungen drohen würden. […] Das Verhalten uns gegenüber lässt sich als korrekt bezeichnen.“ Puškin sah auch die polizeiliche Überwachung der Gesandtschaft mitnichten als einen besorgniserregenden Zustand, zumal sie in einer viel diskreteren Form geschah, als es im AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 3, Schachtel 20, Akte 271, Aus dem Tagebuch Puškins, der Eintrag vom 2. 4. 1941. 170 AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 3, Schachtel 20, Akte 269, Bericht Puškins vom 23. 4. 1941. 169

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September 1940 der Fall gewesen war. Aus diesem Grunde betrachtete er sie nicht als eine Diskriminierung.171 Einen Monat später berichtete Puškin an die Moskauer Zentrale, dass die slowakische Hauptstadt sich im Laufe des vergangenen Monats mit Gerüchten über den Krieg zwischen Deutschland und der Sowjetunion füllte, der angeblich bereits vor der Tür stehe. „Ein jeder Besucher der Handelsvertretung oder der Konsularabteilung sieht es als seine Verpflichtung, uns auf die drohende Gefahr aufmerksam zu machen.“172 Puškin sah hinter der Verbreitung der Flüsterpropaganda auch in diesem Falle das Treiben der unter dem Einfluss der NSDAP stehenden Slowakei-Deutschen; er fand dafür allerdings keine plausible Erklärung. Er meinte, die Deutschen könnten eine Verschärfung der Lage beabsichtigen, um härter gegen die „antideutschen Elemente“, womit an erster Stelle die Kommunisten betroffen sein würden, vorzugehen. Möglich war aber in den Augen des Diplomaten auch die Variante, dass die Deutschen mit Hilfe solcher Gerüchte die geplante militärische Auseinandersetzung mit Großbritannien vertuschen wollten. Im weiteren Verlauf seines Berichtes wurde er jedoch realistischer, als er auf die ungebrochenen Truppenverschiebungen durch die Ostslowakei nach Polen hinwies. So seien im Laufe von 24 Stunden an die 30 Züge zu diesem Zweck befördert worden. Trotzdem vermutete er auch in diesem Falle, keine direkt gegen die Sowjetunion gerichteten Maßnahmen; der Transport der deutschen Wehrmachtseinheiten geschehe zu dem Zweck, die Divisionen nach deren Reduktion zu ergänzen.173 Die Frage eines möglichen Kriegsszenarios wurde auch vom neuen slowakischen Gesandten in Moskau Šimko angesprochen, der einen Tag vor seiner Abreise dem sowjetischen Missionschef einen Besuch abgestattet hatte. Šimko merkte an, dass in der letzten Zeit durch die Slowakei ohne Unterlass deutsche Divisionen an die sowjetische Grenze befördert werden und dass in diesem Zusammenhang die Gerüchte über einen bevorstehenden Krieg mit der UdSSR in der Slowakei weit verbreitet seien. Puškin fragte seinen Gesprächspartner, ob auch er diese Meinung teile, woraufhin Šimko erwiderte, dass alles davon abhänge, ob die Sowjets den Deutschen das nötige Getreide umsonst lieferten, da sich das Reich in einer ernsthaften Versorgungskrise befinde. Aus den Aufzeichnungen Puškins geht hervor, dass er diese Argumentationsweise nicht ernst nahm; er notierte lakonisch, Ebenda. AVP RF, F. 0138, Inventarverzeichnis 2, Schachtel 1, Akte 1, Bericht Puškins vom 20. 5. 1941. 173 Ebenda. 171

172

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dass er sich nicht sicher sei, ob dieses Gespräch von den Deutschen oder von Šimko selbst initiiert worden sei.174 Puškins Weigerung, all die Maßnahmen, die er in seinen Berichten ausführlich beschreibt, als die tatsächlichen Kriegsvorbereitungen des Deutschen Reiches gegen seine Heimat auch nur im Anschein zu interpretieren, erscheint nicht nur aus dem Blickfeld der später eingetroffenen Entwicklung, die allen diesen „Gerüchten“ Recht gab, merkwürdig. Wurde den sowjetischen Diplomaten, über den drohenden Krieg offen zu berichten, oder die Darstellungen zumindest in diese Richtung auszuführen, vom NKID verboten? Oder wollte man den zumindest bis zum Balkan-Feldzug durchaus erfolgreichen Neutralitätskurs unter keinen Umständen in Frage stellen? War der junge Diplomat von der Unmöglichkeit eines deutschsowjetischen Krieges so fest überzeugt, dass er den deutschen Hauptfeind in Großbritannien behauptete? Selbst Stalin, der in den Berichten seiner Geheimdienste von den kriegerischen Absichten Hitlers beinahe überschüttet wurde,175 wollte an diese Option nicht glauben und das auch dann nicht, als sie bereits am 22. Juni Realität wurden.176 Auch wenn man diese Fragen nicht zur Gänze beantworten kann, entspricht die in den Berichten Puškins eingehaltene Linie der in der neuesten Historiographie verbreiteten Meinung, wonach die völlige Verkennung der deutschen Absichten bis in die ersten Stunden des begonnenen Krieges der sowjetischen Führung allein und insbesondere Stalin selbst zum Vorwurf gemacht werden kann.177 Die slowakische Regierung erfuhr vom deutschen Angriffsplan zu einem sehr späten Zeitpunkt. Der aus Bukarest und Budapest zurückkehrende Generalstabschef, Generaloberst Franz Halder, traf inkognito am 19. Juni 1941 in Bratislava den Chef der Deutschen Heeresmission, General Paul Otto, und den deutschen Militärattaché Becker und teilte ihnen mit, dass Hitler an einer Mitwirkung der Slowakei am Feldzug gegen die Sowjetunion interessiert sei, und dass der Wunsch des Führers der slowakischen Führung zu vermitteln sei. Am 21. Juni traf Gesandter Ludin Tuka und Tiso, um sie noch in völlig unverbindlicher Form zu fragen, ob sie AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 3, Schachtel 20, Akte 271, Aus dem Tagebuch Puškins, der Eintrag vom 29. 6. 1941. 175 Der russische Historiker Valentin Falin schreibt in seinem Buch, dass von Juli 1940 bis Juni 1941 allein die politische Aufklärung mehr als 120 Berichte über Hitlers Absicht übermittelte, gegen die Sowjetunion zu ziehen. Siehe FALIN, Die zweite Front, S. 192. 176 Über den psychologischen Zustands Stalins unmittelbar nach dem deutschen Überfall schreibt ausführlich Dmitrij VOLKOGONOV, Triumpf i tragedija. Političeskij portet I.V.Stalina. In: Okťabr, Nr. 7/1989, S. 10–27. 177 Vgl. Manfred HILDERMEIER, Geschichte der Sowjetunion 1917-1991. Entstehung und Niedergang des ersten sozialistischen Staates, München 1998, S. 603. 174

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„mit einer Teilnahme der slowakischen Wehrmacht bei eventuellen Aktionen grundsätzlich einverstanden sind“, woraufhin die beiden Politiker ihre Zustimmung gaben.178 Tags darauf folgte auf Initiative Tukas eine Demarche Černáks in Berlin, in der, ganz im Sinne der gleichzeitig nach Bratislava übermittelten Anfrage Ribbentrops, eine Beteiligung der Slowakei am Kriege angeboten wurde.179 Am 22. Juni gab der Oberbefehlshaber der Slowakischen Armee, General Čatloš, den Sonderbefehl Nr. 1 aus, in dem die Bereitschaft der Schnellen Division auf die 24. Stunde des Tages angeordnet wurde. Tags darauf wurde die Schnelle Division dem Kommando der 16. Armee unterstellt; am 24. Juni überschritten die slowakischen Einheiten unter Oberst Rudolf Pilfousek gemeinsam mit deutschen Truppen die sowjetische Grenze.180 Am 23. Juni wurde Gesandter Šimko beim Außenkomissar Molotov vorstellig. Er teilte ihm mit, dass entsprechend der Information, die er über den Rundfunk erhalten habe (sic!), die slowakische Regierung die diplomatischen Beziehungen mit der UdSSR abgebrochen habe. Diesen Schritt erklärte er durch die aus dem Schutzvertrag hervorgehende Verpflichtung für die slowakische Regierung, die eigene Außenpolitik mit derjenigen des Deutschen Reiches zu koordinieren. Molotov wollte wissen, ob die Slowaken einen Grund zur Unzufriedenheit in den Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion hätten. Šimko, dem solche Gründe unbekannt waren, wies nochmals auf die Verpflichtungen hin, die sich für die slowakische Führung aus dem Schutzvertrag ergäben. Molotov fragte daraufhin, ob die sowjetische Seite die Erklärung des Gesandten so verstehen könne, dass die Slowaken zu diesem Schritt gezwungen worden seien, obwohl es seitens der Sowjetunion keinerlei Anlässe gegeben hätte. Er meinte weiterhin, er würde es so verstehen, dass die UdSSR sowohl vor als auch nach dem deutschen Überfall keinen Anlass zur Unzufriedenheit geboten hätte. Šimko antwortete, dass ihm über solche Informationen nichts bekannt sei; alles, worüber er zu berichten habe, sei der Abbruch der diplomatischen Beziehungen und die Bereitschaft der schwedischen Botschaft, die slowakischen Interessen in der Sowjetunion künftighin zu vertreten, wofür er um die freundliche Erlaubnis Molotovs bat.181

PA AA, Büro des Staatssekretärs, R 29737, 248625, Telegramm Ludins vom 21. 6. 1941. 179 KAISER, Die Politik des Dritten Reiches, S. 536. 180 Siehe ĎURICA, Dejiny Slovenska a Slovákov, S. 426. 181 AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 3, Schachtel 21, Akte 275, Aus dem Tagebuch Molotovs. Empfang des slowakischen Gesandten Šimko am 23. Juni 1941. 178

426 Beata Katrebova-Blehova ________________________________________________________

Während des Besuches übergab Šimko Molotov eine offizielle Note. In dieser wurde festgestellt, dass die slowakische Regierung bereits am 22. Juni die diplomatischen Beziehungen zur UdSSR abgebrochen hatte, und nicht erst einen Tag später, wie in der slowakischen Historiographie bis jetzt angenommen wurde.182 Im Folgenden wurde auf die mit der Auflösung der Mission verbundenen üblichen Formalitäten eingegangen. Es wurde um die Erlaubnis für die Abreise des diplomatischen Personals, die Übernahme der Vertretung der slowakischen Interessen durch die schwedische Botschaft, sowie den Ausgleich der Finanzkosten für die Vermietung der Gesandtschaftsräumlichkeiten gebeten.183 Interessant im Zusammenhang mit dem geschilderten Empfang erscheint die Tatsache, dass der Abbruch der diplomatischen Beziehungen der slowakischen Regierung zwei Tage, vor der ungarischen Regierung dazu trat, erfolgt war. Diese gewisse Eile, die hauptsächlich Premierminister Tuka an den Tag legte, lässt sich mit dessen Absicht erklären, Ungarn zu überholen, um somit eine günstigere Position für die künftige Forderung nach der Revision der südslowakischen Grenze zu erlangen. Tuka, der den Gedanken an die Rückgabe der an Ungarn abgetretenen Südslowakei nie aufgab, handelte in diesem Falle eigenmächtig, als er ohne die Kenntnis der Regierung und des Staatspräsidenten den Befehl zum Angriff der Slowakischen Armee gab. De jure erfolgte seitens der Slowakei also keine Kriegserklärung; dazu war laut der Verfassung nur der Staatspräsident mit Zustimmung des Landtages ermächtigt. Auch die Proklamation des Staatspräsidenten erfolgte erst nach der Regierungssitzung am 24. Juni, auf der Tuka vorgeworfen wurde, eigenmächtig und ohne Absprache mit der Regierung gehandelt zu haben.184 Die Proklamation wurde daher als die Reaktion auf die vollzogenen Tatsachen dargestellt, wonach die Slowakische Armee mit zwei Divisionen an der Seite der deutschen Wehrmacht bereits die ukrainische Grenze überschritten hatte. Am Tage des deutschen Überfalls auf die Sowjetunion befand sich der Gesandte Puškin bereits in Moskau, wohin er am 15. Juni zu Konsultationen mit der Zentrale abgereist war. Während seiner Abwesenheit leitete die Mission der Chargé d’affaires Afanasjev, der nach dem Abbruch der Beziehungen ihre Liquidation überwachte. Am 22. Juni wurde das Gebäude der Gesandtschaft von vandalierenden Pressburger Deutschen überfallen; Siehe z.B. ĎURICA, Dejiny Slovenska a Slovákov, S. 426. AVP RF, F. 06, Inventarverzeichnis 3, Schachtel 21, Akte 275, Aus dem Tagebuch Molotovs, 23. 6. 1941. 184 ĎURICA, Jozef Tiso, S. 292. 182 183

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sie zerschlugen die Fensterscheiben und drangen in das Innere des Gebäudes ein. Afanasjev übergab sofort einen Protestschreiben an das Außenministerium; es wurden von diesem zwar Sicherheitsmaßnahmen versprochen, trotzdem wiederholten sich die Ausschreitungen am 23. Juni nochmals. Nach erneutem Protest bei der slowakischen Regierung, wurde dem verbliebenen diplomatischen Personal die Verbindung zu Budapest und Berlin ermöglicht und ihre Abreise organisiert.185 Schlussbemerkungen Die offiziellen Beziehungen der Slowakei zur Großmacht im Osten, die von der de jure und de facto Anerkennung durch die Sowjetunion am 16. September 1939 bis zum deutschen Überfall am 22. Juni 1941 andauerten, spielten in der außenpolitischen Linie des jungen, pragmatischen Außenministers Ferdinand Ďurčanský eine wichtige Rolle. Der gleichzeitig das Innen- wie das Außenressort leitende, einflussreiche Minister suchte sich vorsichtig aus der Umklammerung des Reiches zu lösen. Die Sowjetunion war Anfang des Jahres 1940 die einzige von Deutschland unabhängige und am Status der Neutralität festhaltende Kontinentalmacht in Europa, die der deutschen Expansion ein gewisses Paroli bieten konnte und die für manche Vorhaben der slowakischen Diplomatie Hoffnungen weckte. Als das vorrangige außenpolitische Ziel der Slowakei galt es, die an Ungarn verlorene Südslowakei zurückzugewinnen, deren Abtretung infolge des Ersten Wiener Schiedsspruchs vom 2. November 1938 als völlig ungerecht empfunden und deren Wiedereingliederung während der gesamten Existenz der Slowakischen Republik nie aufgegeben wurde. Ďurčanský kalkulierte mit dem eventuellen Interesse der Sowjetunion an der Karpato-Ukraine und dachte, dass die auf diese Weise gewonnene gemeinsame Grenze mit der Großmacht im Osten sie veranlassen würde, der Slowakei zu helfen, die südlichen Gebiete zurückzubekommen. Seine Bemühungen scheiterten letztendlich; jedoch nicht nur wegen dem angeblichen Desinteresse des Sowjetstaates an dieser Region, sondern wegen seinem Festhalten an der im Nichtangriffspakt abgesteckten Einteilung der Einflussgebiete, die einen gewissen Status quo in Ostmitteleuropa garantierte. So gesehen war der Ribbentrop-Molotov-Pakt und das darauf beruhende deutsch-sowjetische Bündnis, so unberechenbar es auch war, auf der einen Seite ein Garant für die Stabilität des jungen Staates; auf der anderen Seite aber wurde damit die für die Slowakei ungünstige Grenzziehung im Süden zusätzlich gefestigt. 185

SNA, F. MZV, Schachtel 198, 5012/41.

428 Beata Katrebova-Blehova ________________________________________________________

Nichtsdestotrotz waren die Kalkulationen Ďurčanskýs mit dem sowjetischen Faktor einer der Gründe für seine Abberufung infolge des Salzburger Diktats im Juli 1941, das eine Zäsur in der slowakischen Außen- und Innenpolitik darstellte. Die eng an das Deutsche Reich angelehnte Linie des Ministerpräsidenten und zugleich neuen Außenministers Tuka unterschied sich daher von der bisherigen Außenpolitik in einem wesentlichen Punkt, als er für alle seine Schritte in Bezug auf die slowakisch-sowjetischen Beziehungen zunächst die Zustimmung Berlins abwartete. Auch die Intensivierung der slowakisch-sowjetischen Handelsbeziehungen wurde von Anfang der offiziellen Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion an vom Wunsch der slowakischen Regierung geleitet, die einseitigen wirtschaftlichen Bindungen an das Deutsche Reich zu lockern und aus der isolierten Stellung im Welthandel auszubrechen. Die diplomatische Initiative der slowakischen Regierungskreise, die im Februar 1940 gestartet wurde und die sich zum Ziel setzte, durch die Erweiterung der wirtschaftlichen Kontakte mit der Großmacht im Osten sich aus dem Würgegriff der nationalsozialistischen Kriegswirtschaft zu lösen, kam zwar zu einem erfolgreichen Abschluss, als das Handelsabkommen im Dezember 1940 unterschrieben wurde. Es zeigte sich jedoch, dass die damit verbundenen Hoffnungen auf mehr wirtschaftliche Freiheit durch den Konflikt, der sich zwischen der Sowjetunion und dem Dritten Reich bald abzuzeichnen begann und an dem die Slowakei auf der Seite Deutschlands aktiv mitmachte, begraben werden mussten. Viele Vorhaben blieben daher bloß auf dem Papier, da nicht genug Zeit blieb, sie in die Tat umzusetzen. Trotzdem sind die Ambitionen eines Teiles der slowakischen politischen Führung, die ungleiche Partnerschaft im Osten, die sich auch im kulturellen Bereich ergab, ein Beweis dafür, dass der junge Staat trotz der ungünstigen Kräftekonstellation, die es Ende der dreißiger und Anfang der vierziger Jahre in Europa gegeben hatte, nicht als bloß passiver Bestandteil dieser hervortreten, sondern auch aktiv mitwirken wollte.

Czechoslovak Social Politics and Its Representatives in London Exile during Second World War Jakub Rákosník

The purpose of this article1 is to outline a general overview of the activities of the Czechoslovak Exile Ministry of Social Care in London (further on MSC) within the period of the Second World War. Because this topic has not been dealt with in the literature more thoroughly yet, the following text is based almost primarily upon archive and much less also upon already published sources (apart from editions these are mainly magazines of that period). The article is structured into following sections. The first section Activities and Structure of the MSC is focused on general interpretation of competences and personal staffing of the office. The second section Social benefits of the exiles deals with social reliefs of the ministry. It is being focused mainly upon the care of the civilians since the specific provisions of the soldiers exceed a common framework of the social politics. Periodical reports of the ministers about activities of the MSC2 are perfect as for analyses of these activities. The third section Plan of Social Security is dedicated to monitoring of activities and preparatory work for necessary precautions in the liberated territory. Mainly it concerns preparatory works as for preservation of the due to war disrupted systems of social welfare that finally lead into adoption of the decree of President of the Republic from the 29 September 1945 on the interim remedy in the field of the statutory social insurance. Activities and Structure of the MSC The activities of the Exile Ministry of Social Care can be roughly divided into two groups. The first concerns social security of Czechoslovak citizens in abroad. However, the MSC was not the only competent body in This article is a part of an output of the research MSM 0021620827 „Czech Countries in Central Europe in Past and Now“ that is being carried out by Charles University in Prague. 2 These reports we can find scattered in various resources of exile institutions in Prague National Archive (further on N.A.) and mainly in resources „State Council – London“ (further on SC-L.) and „The Ministry of Social Care – London“ (MSC-L.). One of these reports has been recently published in edition Jana ČECHUROVÁ (ed.), Antologie studijních textů k novověkým sociálním dějinám, part V, section II, Praha 2003, pp. 157–168. 1

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this issue. On the other hand; it was more of a subsidiary role, i.e. it could be counted with as the last institution in case of need if there was no other, particularly orientated institution or office available. As for government institutions it was primarily the Ministry of National Defense that was responsible for part of the subsidiary agenda of the army people. The MSC attended in most cases to a care of the civilians. The issues of social care fell to their cognizance, too.3 Many non-governmental organizations of various kinds were also engaged in the support. In case of Czechoslovak citizens it was foremost the Czechoslovak Red Cross (CRC) that was very closely intertwined as for their activities with the MSC. Further on, we can state Czech Refugee Trust Fund (CRTF), a British Organization specialized in refugees from Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless several problems arose with this organization at the beginning of the functioning of the Czechoslovak State establishment in emigration, thus mutual relationship was of a reserved character.4 Other non-governmental organizations of smaller importance as for the studied topic were the Jewish Refugee Committee or German Emergency Committee the names of which are expressive enough in relevance to their alignment. The second activity of the MSC was a project of after-war reconstruction of the social security in Czechoslovakia. It concerned mainly monitoring of the situation in the former Czechoslovak countries. Further on it took on systematical works on first after-war proceedings in social Contrary to a social care the issues of health care have been at least generally elaborated. See Petr SVOBODNÝ, Petr: Aktivity československého exilu v oblasti zdravotnictví. In: D. HEŘMANOVÁ, 6. mezinárodné sympózium k dejinám medicíny, farmácie a veterinánej medicíny (CD version), Bratislava 2003. Petr SVOBODNÝ, Ludmila HLAVÁČKOVÁ, Dějiny lékařství v českých zemích, Praha 2004. 4 Objection of Minister Němec that he declared in February in the State Council gives under no condition an evidence on good terms: “Practice of this fund is for the Czechoslovaks much more disadvantageous than for the Austrians and Germans who are being provided with by means of this fund. Czechoslovak institutions have no impact upon the administration which contrasts the fact that the Law on the Trust Fund was passed at the time when there was no free government in the so-called Protectorate. Such a situation arose then that the Czech fund for refugees acknowledges indisputable legitimacy of the Austrians and Germans who sought a temporary asylum in Czechoslovakia and denies any claims of the Czechoslovak citizen. The ministry strove to change or moderate the situation. Apart from fundamental objections we find a fault with the today’s administration of the Trust Fund that its operation is disproportionately expensive in a view of results achieved and that internal situation of the fund is so influenced by the politics that it is of no benefit to the fund and it can do a lot of harm to a Czechoslovak reputation.“ Quot. from Československá sociální péče. In: Čechoslovák 3, iss. 7, 14th of February 1941. 3

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security. Study and popularization work was of no smaller significance. Czechoslovak immigrants in England could make use of the latest intellectual achievements in the field of social politics. They could study new works of William Beveridge whose theoretical works participated fundamentally on a form of an after-war British welfare state since a great deal of his project had been already adopted by a great war coalition and later on the after-war British Labor government of Clement Attlee. Other names are usually overshadowed by a genius of Beveridge, however the Czechoslovak magistrates reflected also others, today often forgotten alternatives of this project.5 Nevertheless it was primarily Beveridge and also the Soviet model of social security that regardless of an extensive study of other materials were of greatest influence. American and New Zealand experience were reflected, too, however much less. The last mentioned might be surprising, but only at first sight. This distant country in southern hemisphere was in 1930s the first country in the world that implemented "social security" in a way of complex provision of the citizens by means of which it had anticipated Beveridge who was and is still being related to a concept of "social security" by many years.6 The MSC was one of departments of the Czechoslovak exile government. In the first government that was appointed on the 21st of July 1940 a social-democratic politician and experienced trade union leader František Němec was chosen as its chief representative. What is surprising is the fact that for the “boss” of the MSC was not appointed Jaromír Nečas, ex-minister of social care from period between 1935-1938 (in the last government of Malypetr and both governments of Hodža) and at the time the most qualified present politician as for the issues of social politics. Nečas was first appointed the minister without portfolio and from the 27th of October 1941 minister for economical restoration. However his illness prevented him from further activities, thus he went to retirement. As is turned out at the end, once forever (he died in UK in 1945). In the second London government that was again presided by Jan Šrámek and that was appointed on the 12th of November 1942, František Němec moved to hitherto Nečas’ ministry and

J. Rhys WILLIAMS, Rhys: Something to Look Forward to. London 1943. As for monitoring of discussions see also N. A., MPOŽ-L., board no. 42, sign. Z331. 6 See Margaret S. GORDON, Social security policies in industrial countries. Cambridge 1989, p. 2. The notion „social security“ was already used by administration of F. D. Roosevelt in the second half of 1930s. However American reforms did not get on such a level of complexity and universal range in a question of personal force as New Zealand reform, respectively British post-war reforms inspired by Beveridge. 5

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Ján Bečko, a Slovak social democrat and skilled union worker, was appointed minister of social care. Philosophy of the interim state establishment was a continuity of Czechoslovakia, that is why president Beneš already during an opening meeting conference of the State Council on the 11th of December 1940 declared that “all our resistance movement exists as a continuation of the First Republic, as the Czechoslovak State, and in accordance with that it carries on: it is subject to its constitutional and other laws, the army and its offices function in that respect and within a legal and political tradition of the First Republic”.7 This was also the most general instruction for the functioning of the MSC. Nevertheless, its everyday operation had to be set upon a totally different basis. As for issues of subsidiary care the MSC was before the war a central administrative body, i.e. the highest administrative and supervisory authority regarding autonomous subjects (being it insurance companies in a social, sickness or accident insurance or union institutions and unemployment insurance). There were no such institutions in exile and the MSC found itself as the only one regarding payments of social benefits. In consonance with these changes the whole organizational structure and competences had to be altered. The minister was the head of the MSC. In relevance to other government departments it was concerning the staff one of smaller general administrative bodies. On the other hand as for the budget, it was one of the biggest. Only the ministry of defense and ministry of foreign affairs had bigger budgets.8 On the other hand operational possibilities of the exile MSC were of a limited sort that is why we could not expect any revolutionary proceedings in the field of care of the Czechoslovak refugees. Two departments that were further divided were carrying out the particular agenda of the ministry. Such a structure was not perceived as ideal even in its time; there were certain tensions9 felt in an atmosphere of the office. The first problem was the glaring discrepancy between the I. and II. Department when the second mentioned was significantly smaller than the other. As for budget, its share was four times smaller. Further divisions of an already rampant I. department into sections IA, IB, IC, solved this problem. I. Department was responsible for issues concerning evacuation and compatriotic and it dealt with the Czechoslovak Red Cross. The section IA was legislative and it was without further specification responsible for the Edvard BENEŠ, Šest let exilu a druhé světové války. Praha 1947, p. 264. Několik poznámek k organizačnímu plánu. N. A., MSP-L., board no. 46, sign. 11-17/1. 9 N. A., MSP-L., board no. 46, sign. 11-17/1. 7

8

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general matters. The section IB was in charge of the suspended soldiers, families of the army members, retraining courses; simply said it looked after military persons and their families. The section IC on the contrary took care of civilian refugees. It also dealt with agenda of cooperation with CRTF. II. The Department was then in charge of all issues concerning medical care since this ministry was not established independently in the exile. Social benefits of the exiles Being the operation of the MSC in 1940 of a very improvised kind, during 1941 all the work got systematized and in 1942 we can finally talk of stabilization of the care of the refugees. People who were being cared of during the Second World War can be divided into three groups: unable to work refugees, suspended soldiers and family members of military people.10 The development of subsidiary activity of the MSC was up to 1942 of a rising kind that was afterwards succeeded be decreasing number of people cared of. When a compulsory registration of Czechoslovak state citizens was ordered in the half of 1941, the figure reached was of 100 000 people. It was a period when most of the refugees had already left their homeland. The MSC distinguished four kinds of refugees in agreement with the time of their arrival and the place of origin. The First group were so called “denizens”, who came to England in the inter-war era or even sooner. During the Second World War the MSC recorded about 300 of them still as refugees. The second group was represented by the “Second Republic” emigration that was coming mainly via Western Europe (Netherlands, Belgium, France). The Third wave came right after establishment of the Protectorate. These people arrived via Central and Southern European countries (primarily Poland, but also via Yugoslavia, Romania, Hungary and Italy). The last group represents war emigration the journeys of which were of a most interesting kind, including Asia Minor and Africa.11 Such fact however played no role as for the amount of benefits from the MSC. In 1941 the number of supported persons was still low (on average 797 people),12 nevertheless there was a rising tendency. In 1942 the MSC Zpráva o činnosti exilového MSP pro Státní radu. In: Jana ČECHUROVÁ, (ed.): Antologie studijních textů k novověkým sociálním dějinám, Praha 2003, p. 158 11 N. A., MSP-L., board no. 46, sign. 17/1. 12 See Zpráva o činnosti exilového MSP, quot. p. 158. In this report of the MSC there is also an interesting professional structure of a Czechoslovak emigration published (p. 161). 10

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supported every month on average 1000 people. According to the statistics in the first month of 1943 there was a drop in figures. On average there were 703 people being supported by MSC, 53.5% being sick people. This statistics distinguished four groups of supported people: suspended soldiers, their family members, widows and surviving relatives and other civilians (including denizens). For example in January 1943 there were percentages of these people as follows: 247 suspended soldiers, 115 relatives, 12 surviving relatives, 228 civilians.13 Figures concerning other months are of similar kind. As the need of manpower for the war industry was rising, the total number of the supported was diminishing since they were being employed in the industry. There was permanent rise in the category of suspended soldiers because these regardless the level of their disability was not able to get employed for financial benefit or they were working in a limited way. Similarly to other war economies Great Britain started an extensive statutory interference into situation on labor market. Already in 1940 the act of admission into positions was being regulated – the result being then that in some branches there was employment possible only by means of labor exchange. As late as in 1941 an improvisation was being replaced by conceptual politics the part of which being “the freedom of the employer and employee to terminate an employment was nearly abolished in most important companies”.14 In connection with this (under existing terms logically) also strict sanctions were implemented as for unpardoned absences from work (of course with a possibility of proper appeal of procedure with the help of trade union organizations). Implementation of working duty for men in between 14 and 64 years of age, respectively for women between 14 and 59 is in relevance to this. What is being commonly handed down is the fact that both world wars contributed greatly to emancipation and equalization of women on labor market. The figures are indeed expressive: out of 16 million British women in a productive age in June 1944 there were employed 7 million, being it a rise of 2.2 million as against the beginning of war, i.e. a rise of the 50 % in comparison with the period before the war.15 That means that nearly about 44 % percent of British women were employed. Within Czechoslovak women the figures were similar. Out of 4259 registered women 47 % were in household, 0.6 % were unable to work, 4.3 % were students, 2.3 % without occupation that means that 46 % present N. A., MSP-L., board no. 47, sign. II-17-8/2. Jiří FISCHER, Zkušenosti z Velké Britannie – 1. Pracovní mobilisace, Sociální revue 20, 1945, p. 1–2, p. 21–22. 15 ibid, p. 20. 13

14

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women were gainfully employed. In conditions of inter-war market economics such figures were truly extreme. No need to state further on those British rules as for employment and working duties applied to Czechoslovak citizens, too. The level of benefits paid is much more important issue than the particular clientele. Minister Němec was boasting in September 1941 in the press that: “There is not a single refugee who would be starving”.16 However what was it like in reality? Viktor Haas with reference to Beveridge’s calculations stated that in England a living wage was 40 shillings17 a week for a married couple without children, respectively 26 shillings for the family with four members.18 As for a single person the sum was 25 shillings a week.19 It is necessary to mention that these calculations were set really low since the rise of prices of basic needs was growing faster during the war.20 The basic monthly benefit paid to single civilians was set to 120 shillings (the living wage being by 20 shillings lower). People with low wages were other supported group. Such a type of benefit was a novelty in a Czechoslovak social law. According to the ordinance of the MSC from the 29th of December 1942 the person who earned less than 9.14 pounds (i.e. 182 shillings) was entitled to be paid a difference from the funds of the MSC. When we use the above stated key also for the wages we will obtain following figures: before the war the lowest wages of laborers was around 135 shillings a month in agriculture and 192 in industry.21 Taking into account the stated mark-up, the amount would be 168, respectively 240 shillings. With reference to the above mentioned data on living wage such a criterion of low wage can be rated as decent. To compare these wages it would be good to mention that employees of Čechoslovák, 5th of September 1941. N. A., MSC-L, board no. 47, sign. II/17-8-2. In this article we work rather with the then common currency „shilling“ for its being more illustrative. Pound was too big unit and it would be necessary to work with decimal places. One shilling used to be 1/20 of a pound, i.e. it matched 5 pennies. It was abolished in 1971. Quot. from Lumír KLIMEŠ, Slovník cizích slov, Praha 1981, p. 704. 18 N. A., MSC-L, board no. 47, sign. II/17/29. For calculations the data from 1938 were being used then that were being topped by one fourth. 19 These numbers were being calculated in accordance with the situation in 1938 and were being topped with regards to price increase during the war by 25%. This figure is missing in Haas’s paper. K. de Schweinitz states a living wage for a single person in 1938 76 shillings a month. Compare Karl SCHWEINITZ, England’s Road to Social Security, New York 1961, pp. 232–233. 20 See also Working Class Income and Expenditure, Institute of Statistics Bulletin 6, 5th of February 1944, s. 4ff. 21 SCHWEINITZ, pp.. 232–233. 16 17

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Czechoslovak exile offices, i.e. the lowest office and non-manual positions had the basic wage of 20 pounds (400 shillings) which was from September 1943 even raised to 22 pounds.22 Salary grades were in general according to rules implemented in autumn 1940 between 22 in the sixth grade and 45 in the first grade (the attendants represented then the non-mentioned seventh grade). In this case the salaries were basic ones that got higher than by means of family bonuses and other amounts, such as for diplomats and clerks with a great range of agenda.23 We have not found explicit complaints of insufficiency of social benefits in the sources and the theme was not discussed on the pages of the Čechoslovák either. On the other hand it does not mean that there were no problems in the system of benefits. They concerned predominantly discrepancies between social benefits designated for different categories of people. Both the MSC was not, as stated above, the only institution where the exCzechoslovak citizens could seek help, and the system of benefits was not fully coordinated within the ministry. The discrepancy in both levels of benefits has originated in two directions. Apart from the MSC exCzechoslovak citizens were supported also by other institutions whereas the harmonization of their care was not perfect at all which is relevant especially for the relations between the MSC and CRTF. As late as within 1942 the problems had not been smoothed away (the MSC used to pay higher benefit). Harmonization was in progress with other subsidiary organizations, too. Second source of discrepancies embodied in distinction Czechoslovak citizens into military persons and non-military ones. That did not have to be any problem the soldiers being granted various social benefits even in peace times. The problem however was that not every military person was acknowledged as such by the ministry. That has occurred in the case of exmembers of the British paramilitaries, so-called Pioneer Corps, respectively other units of the British army. They were in the system of the social benefits equal to civilians which meant they were not entitled to get any alimentary benefits that the soldiers released from the Czechoslovak army made use of. Their benefits were also much lower than the ones of the suspended soldiers. These were according to the dates from March 1942 entitled to get 8–12 pounds (160–240 shillings) in accordance with lengths of their service. In agreement with the level of their disability they were granted other bonuses whereas the members of Pioneers Corps mere 6 pounds (120 shillings) as common “civilians.” Though their status was changed already from March 22 23

N. A., MSP-L., board no. 47, sign. II/17-8-2. Jan KUKLÍK, Mýty a realita takzvaných Benešových dekretů, Praha 2002, p. 88.

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1942, as late as in 1943 there were still 60 persons left in the care of the MSC. Probably it was this fact that contributed to a quite “wild” atmosphere on the premises of the MSC as it is recorded in a report on the work of the MSC from years 1942–1943: “Recently, supposedly under influence of various campaigns, quite a number of individuals have made a stand against norm adjustments and refused to apply for any employment without further promise of being further paid a full amount of their benefit regardless height of their salary... They declared that they had been in service in France in the Czechoslovak army, thus as persons duly released they refused to take into account consequences related to a government resolution of the 6th and 7th of June 1941.24 In some cases the misunderstandings were of such an extent that it was necessary to call English police since the clerks responsible could not under the threats work at all.”25 The MSC took in a way care of the Czechoslovak refugees in other countries, too, sometimes by a single application during exceptional events, sometimes permanently. This was being done by means of the Czechoslovak diplomatic institutions. One of the permanent forms was the benefits sent to the USSR. This was started at the beginning of 1941. First the amount of money was insignificant. That year it made up 50 pounds a month. However, the sums started to grow within the following year. During 1942 there were thus sent 24000 pounds for a total of 210 supported persons, which represents 1/5 of the total number of refugees supported in Great Britain.26 The Plan of a Social Security The program objectives of the Czechoslovak resistance in the field of the economic and social politics are in the Czech historiography one of the well-treated issues. Being it so it will be discusses further on only in a

It was a resolution of the minister’s council that equaled these people with Czechoslovak citizens. 25 N. A., MSP-L., board no. 46 sign. 17/1. 26 Ibid. 24

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limited way.27 The fact that post-war Czechoslovakia will be as for social security totally different than before the war was absolutely certain, both in London and in Moscow and protectorate resistance. Regarding the conceptions of socially political arrangements the London centre disposed of the best starting conditions. The MSC cooperated with the International Labor Organization; it could make use of the latest special literature and from the professional point of view a great number of experts worked there, too. On the other hand Moscow communists were not interested much in social politics apart from the most common declarations. It is necessary to note that the London representatives of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia such as Václav Nosek (a member and later deputy chairman of the State Council) or Anežka Hodinová-Spurná (member of the State Council) though not being the most important authors of the socially political arrangements influenced significantly the form of the program documents due to their active participation in the State Council and other advisory panels of the legislative work. Both of them were members of an advisory board for the social insurance that was formed in autumn 1944 and Hodinová-Spurná was also one of the most active members of the economic and social committee of the State council that she presided. The Home resistance created in its beginnings a very important document Za svobodu, do nového Československa28 (For Freedom, up to New Czechoslovakia). Nevertheless it had neither conditions nor reasons for making a specific outline of particular steps. This document might have been known in London during the war, however the sources do not prove its being perceived seriously enough. In that aspect London started its help to the homeland as late as at the end of the war when articulated ideas on future social politics started to appear mainly coming from the trade unions. Notwithstanding the ideas of the home, foreign, communist and non-

See Karel KAPLAN, Znárodnění a socialismus, Praha 1968; Lenka KALINOVÁ, Změny sociálního systému v Československu po druhé světové válce v kontextu vývoje ve vyspělých zemích. In: Zdeněk, KÁRNÍK, Michal KOPEČEK, Bolševismus, komunismus a radikální socialismus v Československu, folio. I, Praha 2003, pp. 119–155. Jiří KOCIAN, Sociální zákonodárství „košické“ vlády Národní fronty Čechů a Slováků (1945–1946). In: Zdeněk KÁRNÍK, Jan MĚCHÝŘ, K novověkým sociálním dějinám českých zemí IV, Praha 2001, pp. 57–69. 28 Za svobodu do nové Československé republiky – Ideový program domácího odbojového hnutí vypracovaný v letech 1939–41, Praha 1946. 27

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communist resistance at least on the level of general principles was consistent.29 It is usually thought that the post-war social consensus originates in disposal of the right wing parties. Nevertheless it is only one part of the truth. Its structural causes dwell far deep in the pre-war years when the Great Depression shattered the faith in the market economy and free competition. That is why all the political manifestations of all political movements are so similar and why agreement on the need of a complex and universal national insurance that would involve all classes of population was not violated by any disagreements during the Moscow negotiation in March 1945 where the future Košice governmental program was being prepared. As having been mentioned in the first part of this article the British and Soviet experience was the most popular among the specialists in the MSC. Such a statement is of value regardless their personal sympathy or antipathy towards the Communist Party.30 Even Beveridge himself was joking in the newspapers that his plan will lead England half way to Moscow.31 Activities as for the socially political reconstruction started to rise from 1943. Whilst any activity had been till that time limited to monitoring of the development in occupied countries and the MSC had to pay heed to current destabilized problems in the social care of the refugees, from that year the number of documents on social reform started to increase nearly geometrically. London awareness of a present state of social security in occupied countries was pretty good even though not 100%, however it was getting better by and by. At the beginning there was not enough information from Slovakia and countries occupied by the Hungarians. One of advantages was the fact that the Nazis used social reforms as a means of propaganda thus it was possible to make use of official materials. To be honest that as for The contents of this social reform consensus was concisely described by F. Němec: „Social politics as we had taken it in the old economic system used to treat consequences of an individualistic economic system: it took care of the unemployed and improved health of those who had lost it due to their overstrain at work. Its goal must be to take care of the individuals on principles of collective insurance of all. Also it must make an effort to remove causes instead of treating consequences.“ In: Sociální péče v zahraničí, Čechoslovák 4, iss. 31–32, 31 July 1942. 30 It is funny that as it is in present discussions a continuous financing criticized for its being a Soviet model (thus undesirable), a German model was perceived at that time similarly. Even though a social legislative of Cisleithania and to certain range even a later Czechoslovakia had been significantly influenced by western neighbor from 1880s, after the Second World War can find apart from pragmatic statements about shortages of the pre-war system also such comments, and not sporadically, that the worst shortage is its being of German origin (thus unfavorable). 31 Nicholas TIMMINS, The Five Giants – A Biography of the Welfare State, London 1995, p. 41. 29

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payees of the benefits, respectively of other social “diets” there are many improvements evident under Nazi administration. It concerned primarily ordinance no. 420/1941 Col. that enabled payees of the disability and old age securities to work further on in their professions without being deprived of their benefits. This ordinance was motivated by an urgent need of labor power. The ordinance no. 292/1944 Col. was other case that set a rule that all insured individuals will have the years 1943-45 included regardless their not having been insured for some part of this period. On the other hand these proceedings were only a of a very basic form regardless financial backing which significantly burdened funds of the Central Social Insurance Company. Viktor Haas, one of the best experts on systems of social insurance who the exile had, exactly defined a dual form of this care during his lecture on the 5th of June 1944: “The Nazis and fascists apparently improved the social security. In fact all these improvements are the best example that all the Nazi and fascistic social politics is based on exchanging the freedom of laborers for some financial benefits and then when such a bribery does not work it punishes the disobedient ones by financial handicaps.”32 One of few changes accomplished in the Protectorate and in Slovakia that was perceived positively in London was implementation of Employment Bureaus. With regards to their significance during the war they were both personally and materially very well established.33 In comparison to an unsatisfactory situation of the inter-war labor exchanges these institutions represented an obvious achievement. It was counted with their maintenance after the war. What was however the problem, it was their unpopularity among the people.34 They were thus after the war succeeded by Bureaus of the Labor Protection.35 Emil Schoenbaum who came in spring 1944 from his exile refuge in South America where he emigrated in 1940 became a significant support of the London expert group. During years to come he helped to governments of N. A., MSP-L, board no. 49, sign. 11-17/25/2. Overview of reforms of social insurance in the Protectorate. See Dvacet let Ústřední sociální pojišťovny, Praha 1946, pp. 13–19. 33 N. A., MSP-L., board no. 47, sign. 11-17/11/2. 34 In his expose from 1944 the minister Bečko stated: „They are on the other hand one of the most loathed instruments of the politics serving to the Germans. At this point it will be our first objective to relieve our authorities of the pro-nazi elements, to fill them with a new democratic spirit serving to the needs of the nation and engage them in the apparatus representing the people and workers.“ N. A., MSP-L, board no. 46, sign. 1117/1. 35 Compare with the government ordinance no. 13/1945 on temporary creation of the labor protection bureaus. 32

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many countries of the territory to create their own systems of social security. In Čechoslovák, in the article celebrating his arrival to London, there are these countries enumerated and their number is respectable. They were Ecuador, Mexico, Chile, Paraguay and Costa Rica. Their neighbors36 got inspired with them. Schoenbaum prepared a whole range of analytical documents for the government that have been still the most valuable sources for study of then plans.37 Even though the MSC did not idle in the preparatory works, its activity embodies on the other side a certain restraint. Responsible employees knew very well it was not possible to prepare in a detailed way all socially political proceedings. Bečko announced that the MSC “did not go in the opinion it was possible to prepare all plans of welfare schemes from England”. He pointed out the French experience when allegedly “some of the detailed letters prepared in Algeria had not been carried out and the life required them to be either cancelled or changed.”38 A communist Karl Kreibich shared similar opinion when he warned in 1944 against “an immoderate dependence on a possibility of preparation of temporary proceedings by means of a conception of norms and articles.”39 Nonetheless a synopsis of a decree on social security in liberated countries was prepared at the end of the year 1944, even in a paragraph form. It contained basic rules for providing benefits and organization of insurance companies. It was not an unimportant task. Because of disintegration of a territory there were after the war in a way 5 insurance systems. The countries annexed after Munich Treaty to the German Empire were being gradually conformed to a German regime, in southern parts to insurance system of ex Austria and parts of southern Slovakia were influenced by the Hungarian system. The provision systems of Protectorate and Slovakia, even though having similar initial conditions, had undergone such changes till 1945, that they were totally dissimilar systems of social insurance in 1945. After the liberation it was urgent to ensure a continuity of payments of benefits, which was among others one of the tasks of his decree. The minister of social care was in paragraph 2 entitled to carry out in a cooperation with trade unions a “purgation” of all bodies. The only way how not to endanger the payments of the benefits was a temporary adoption of existing rules (paragraph 3). The rest of the law included basic rules of a 36Quot.

from Čechoslovák 6, 28th of April 1944. documents are on deposit in N.A., SC-L., board no. 118, folio no. 30. 38 N. A., MSC-L, board no. 46, sign. 11-17/1. 39 Karl KREIBICH, Obnova československého právního řádu, Nové Československo, 22 July 1944. 37These

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state social security system that came into effect in a moment when the person concerned was not eligible to any benefits of the social insurance. It was a great surprise for the MSC that its draft of the decree was criticized heavily. Let us deal with some criticism more in a detail. The Ministry of Business, Industry and Trades objected that it was more a program document than a mandatory norm. Further on it replied that many of provisions had been sufficiently treated in other decrees and some of the provisions are not of a temporary kind which contradicts an exile norm making. Ministry of finances argued that altered issues are of course in competences of governmental delegate, thus the whole decree fails to have any significance. All departments minded its name. Some took a notion “social security” as too vague and non-defined, others perceived it as too distant ideal of a complex social security system. We may find the most concise criticisms in a commentary of the Ministry of Justice from the 31st of January 1945: “The title… is too pretentious and does not correspond in any way to a humble content of the particular decree… These are merely temporary provisions in a field of a social insurance and a non-elaborated general regulation of certain subsidiary state old-age or social benefits… The title makes an impression of the decree being some long-term legislative product, which it is not at all.”40 It is necessary to mention that the synopsis truly made an impression of a compilation of some rules. Even though that the MSC fought for it and its employees argued with other departments, the criticism was such that the draft of a decree had never been signed by the president. It also had not been replaced by any other edict. As late as after the liberation in 1945 a decree on temporary provisions in a field of statutory social insurance was issued (no. 93/1945 Col.). However its content was limited to a mere general legislative “purgation” of insurance institutions. Conclusion As it was shown above even within rather humble exile conditions there were quite successfully solved various impacts of social events upon the Czechoslovak refugees. Even though the MSC tried to formalize a straightforward rule of payments of benefits, always there was a “loop-hole” for a discretionary authority of the administration to help in the event of need to critical cases that for any reason did not live up to criteria. However, the sources of the MSC are important for us from any reason, too. The mate40

N. A., MSC-L., board no. 83, sign. 11-168.

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rials prepared by exile MSC have been still the best non-published information sources that weigh critically and prove by evidence a development of the Czechoslovak social insurance before the war and in its course. Despite a new complex law on social insurance was passed as late as in April 1948, i.e. after February putsch, there is no doubt that residence of some Czechoslovak experts in London exile had predetermined its form that still did not correspond much to a Soviet model of a state social insurance. The title proves that expressively. The law no. 99/1948 Col. was on ”national insurance” which corresponds indeed to an English tradition where the “national insurance” was for the first time enacted in 1911. Nevertheless everything started to change after 1950.

The British Welfare State: First Attempts at Its Revision. Labours and Tories at the Time of the Birth of “One Nation” and the Cold War (1949–1951) Martin Kovář

When analysing the formation, promotion and functioning the of British Welfare State in the years 1945–1949, which my study in Prague Papers on the History of International Relations (2007) dealt with,1 it is naturally very important to know not only the attitude of the government Labours but also their opponents, both on the left and right wings of the political spectrum, especially in the connection with the gradual weakening of the position of the Cabinet and with the attempts at a certain modification of the Welfare State.2 Thus, this study will firstly focus on the analysis of the relations between the Labour in power and radical Left (mainly the Communists), or between the Government and the Opposition, i.e. Tories, secondly on the analysis of the causes accounting for the fall of Attlee’s Cabinet in 1951 and its consequences, all this being at the time of the culminating phase of the first period of the Cold War.3

M. KOVÁŘ, M., The Origins of the British Welfare State and Its Functions in 1945– 1951. Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, Prague 2007, pp. 343– 352. Compare M. KOVÁŘ, J. SOUKUP, Vznik a fungování britského sociálního státu v letech 1939–1951. Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, Vědecký časopis Vysoké školy ekonomické v Praze, 2007, No. 7, pp. 257 –271; S. TUMIS, S., Britský sociální stát za vlády konzervativců v letech 1951–1964, Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, Vědecký časopis Vysoké školy ekonomické v Praze, 2007, No. 7, pp. 460 –471. 2 To the problems of the origins of modern Welfare State in Europe compare F. STELLNER, R. SOBĚHART, R., Vybrané problémy hospodářské politiky vlády H. Müllera do října 1929. Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, Vědecký časopis Vysoké školy ekonomické v Praze, 2008, No. 1, pp. 99– 107; F. STELLNER, R. SOBĚHART, K ekonomickému vývoji výmarské republiky za Brüningovy éry. Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, Vědecký časopis Vysoké školy ekonomické v Praze, 2007, No. 7, pp. 395–404. 3 This study is based on a detailed analysis of programme declarations, press, laws and other sources of that period, as well as a big amount of specialized literature – monographs, articles and studies. 1

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The Opposition towards the Welfare State in Great Britain As far as the Left is concerned, very symptomatic was the attitude of the British Communists, the members of the Independent Labour Party, and radical Labours towards Attlee’s cabinet as well as towards the views of its members on how the Welfare State should look like.4 Whereas in summer 1945 the great majority of members of the Communist Party of Great Britain and other radicals generally welcomed the formation of the socialist government,5 gradually their obliging attitude was changing and with the start of the severe winter at the turn of 1946–1947 and especially with the rise of the Cold War it changed completely. As another example we may also put forward the ambivalent attitude of some government Labours towards Attlee’s model of the Welfare State or towards the pamphlet Keep Left, the publication of which was made possible by three young Labour MPs – Richard Crossman, Michael Foot and Ian Mikardo shortly after declaring Truman Doctrine at the turn of winter and spring 1947.6 The Communists and their followers were in their opposition to the government relatively successful when directing their attention to practical The more it was known about the Soviet system of forced labour, bloody terror practised in the years of 1948–1953, the easier it was to believe Churchill’s propaganda of 1945 that all socialist measures must lead to „a form of Gestapo rule“. The influence of more prominent Marxist intellectuals such as Alan Bush, Ivor Montague or the “read dean” of Canterbury – Dr Hewlett Johnson, was decreased by the fact that they accepted many absurd statements of Moscow. The same is valid for the Communist leader Harry Pollitt who managed to get the audience by his attacks on universal conscription, fees to write out doctor’s prescriptions and „imperialism“; however, he was extremely unconvincing at the same time when defending political “monster trials” in Central and Eastern European countries, denouncing Labour leaders and demonizing the Tito’s Yugoslavia. His speech after the February coup d’état in Czechoslovakia, when he was talking about the “triumph of democracy” in this country (D. KYNASTON, D., Austerity Britain, 1945–51, London 2007, p. 223), made extremely dubious impact. On the state BBC, which had a monopoly on radio broadcasting, and especially in the predominantly right-wing press, socialism was mostly presented a “romantic nonsense” at best, or as “sheer evil” at worst. 5 To cover the topic of pro-soviet sentiment in Great Britain after the World War II see e.g. KYNASTON, p. 131ff. See also an article by William GALLACHER in Labour Monthly of August 1946. 6 In this case it was a criticism of Bevin’s „dangerous dependence on the USA“ which requested that British and French socialists establish a firm link to maintain the balance of powers in the world. Shortly after publishing the pamphlet Keep Left appeared a reaction to it entitled Cards on the Table, the author of which, Denis Healey, was in Bevin’s service. See K. O. MORGAN, Labour in Power, 1945–1951, Oxford 1984, p. 253 ff.; G. RADICE, Friends and Rivals, London 2002, p. 64 ff.; E. PEARCE, E., Denis Healey, London 2002, p. 76 ff. 4

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“bread-and-butter issues”. One of their achievements was the so-called White Paper on Wages and Personal Incomes of February 1948. As another example may serve the attempts to use of the government problems with preserving the quota system (in this context we must point out that even in 1949, i.e. four years after the end of the Second World War, the average consumption of many staples in Britain was lower than in 1939). They were also successful in some unions (e.g. in Electrical Trades Union; ETU).7 Thus, this fact manifested itself in the decision of Government to purge the state administration and also trade unions from Communists,8 especially the most important Trade Union Congress (TUC).9 On the other hand, the reputation of the Communists at that time was undermined by brutal crimes of Stalinism; the real face of the Soviet totalitarian regime was so obvious then that in Britain it led to very serious doubts on the idea of socialism as itself.10 A far more important than the attitude of the Communists and their camp followers was naturally the way of how the opposition Conservatives viewed the building-up of the Welfare State in Great Britain and the changes relating to it. According to David Childs, the Tory party, who suffered the

To cover the topic of the position of trade unions in British economy after the Second World War see D. H. ALDCROFT, M. J. OLIVER, Trade Unions and the Economy, Aldershot 2000, p. 46, 90 ff.; R. HYMAN, R., Praetorians and Proletarians, in: Fyrth, J. (ed.), Labour’s High Noon, London 1993, p. 166 ff.; N. WHITESIDE, Industrial Relations and Social Welfare, 1945–79. In: Ch. WRIGLEY (ed.), A History of British Industrial Relations, 1939–1979, Cheltenham 1996, p. 111ff. Compare Conservative Research Department, All the Answers, 1949, p. 39 ff.; The Economist, 23 September 1950; Hansard, Vol. 448, Col. 1703. 8 In May 1947 Prime Minister Attlee himself started to run the Special Cabinet Committee on Subversive Activities (SCCSA); in early 1948 the government set up the Information and Research Department (IRD) the aim of which being anti-Communist propaganda. To cover the topic of harsh ideological clashes, especially on the left see S. PARSONS, British “McCarthyism” and the Intellectuals. In: J. FYRTH (ed.), Labour’s Promised Land?, London 1995, p. 227 ff.; P. DEERY, The Secret Batallion, in: Contemporary British History, Winter 1999, p. 20 ff. 9 Department of Employment and Productivity, British Labour Statistic: Historical Abstract 1886-1968, HMSO, London 1971, p. 396, chart no. 197. The fact that the influence of the Communists on the life in Britain was insignificant on the whole and that the social sphere was generally quiet in the years of 1945-1951 can be also proved – maybe with the exception of the year 1948 – by a relatively low number of workers striking in all the industrial branches and services. 10 To cover this topic generally, see R. SAMUEL, The Lost World of British Communism, London 2006. In more detail see W. GALLACHER, The Case for Communism, London 1947, p. 134 ff.; W. THOMPSON, British Communists in the Cold War, 1947–52. In: Contemporary British History, Autumn 2001, p. 121 ff. 7

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last really sweeping election defeat forty years ago, in 1906,11 reacted to surprising results of the election of 1945 with a special “mixture of arrogance and courage”.12 Whereas the idea of changing the traditional name of the party (as we know from my last year study the word “conservative” had a very bad reputation in the first post-war years) and forming an alliance with other non-socialists in the country did not win recognition, the Conservatives did succeed as far as their efforts at attracting popular personalities who had not been more closely related to them so far, to their ranks. We may mention e.g. so called „Radio Doctor“ Charles Hill who became famous during the wartime broadcasting on the BBC, and mainly Lord Woolton who showed his capability as a Minister of Food in Churchill’s Coalition Cabinet and who was now entrusted with modernizing the Tory party.13 Lord Woolton’s activities contributed, among others, to the fact that the Tories, however unwillingly, gradually reconciled themselves with the “concept of Mixed Economy and Welfare State”. A key expression of this new policy became the Industrial Charter,14 published in May 1947 by R. A. Butler. Then followed Agricultural Charter as well as political documents relating to a “new approach” of the Conservatives towards Wales, Scotland, imperial policy and, last but not least, towards the “women’s liberation movement”. Butler, who was charged with putting the change of the party policy into effect by Churchill, later wrote down that he had been ordered to give the Tories “a new face, painlessly but permanently if possible”.15 In reality the documents mentioned above were rather monotonous and dull as

In 1906 the Conservatives only got 157 seats in parliamentary elections, while the opposition Liberals exactly 400 seats. The Labour got 30 seats in the Lower House and the Irish nationalists 73 seats. The Conservatives were voted for by 2,45 million people, the Liberals by 2,76 million people. J. RAMSDEN (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Twentieth-Century British Politics, Oxford 2002, p. 713. 12 The conviction that after the next elections they return to power required after the year 1945, when “the left were sweeping across nearly all Europe victoriously”, really a high level of self-confidence from British Tories. D. CHILDS, Britain since 1945, p. 23. ff. In this connection a note that many a Tory perceived the crushing defeat of 1945 as “a long night walk, which must end at dawn anyway” seems quite apt. See H. JONES, New Conservatism?. In: CONEKIN, B. et al (eds.), Moments of Modernity, London 1999, pp. 171–188. 13 See H. MACMILLAN, Tides of Fortune, 1945–1955, London 1969, pp. 292, 294, 296. 14 Conservative Party, The Industrial Charter, Popular Edition, 1947; see also B. DE JOUVENEL, Problems of Socialist England, London 1949, p. 23; Howard, A., RAB, London 1987, p. 156 ff. 15 BUTLER, Lord, The Art of Possible: The Memoirs of Lord Butler, London 1971, pp. 145– 146. 11

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far as their language was concerned and “bland as to their tone”;16 consequently, the majority of experts regards their contribution to the future electoral victory of the Conservatives in the 1950s as rather dubious. Parliamentary Elections of 1950–1951: the End of the British Welfare State or its Transformation? Many historians agree that the key factors, which decided about the election results of parliamentary election of 1950 and 1951, had eventually nothing to do with the efforts of the leaders of the Conservative Party to present themselves as a more effective alternative to the Labours.17 In the elections of February 1950 the Labour Party obtained more than 13,2 million votes, whereas the Conservatives gained 12,5 million votes and the Liberals 2,6 million votes. This means 315 seats for the Labours, 298 for the Tories, 9 for the Liberals (2 seats were taken over by the candidates off the mentioned political parties).18 In October 1951, when the elections repeated, the opposition Tories gained 321 seats while the Labours only got 295 seats and the Liberals 6 seats.19 As a decisive moment proved to be both a most dramatic international context, i.e. the break-out of Korean War and its impact on Western Europe, and intra-party feuding in Labour Party which had on top of that – to the detriment of the Labours – much in common. Apart from general hardships which were dealt with my “last year study”, a big problem of Britain was especially the fact that the costs to cover the functioning of the National Health Service (NHS) rose higher than

Ibidem. There has been fear among a goodly part of voters that a possible victory of the Conservatives in the elections will bring high unemployment, strengthen private enterprise, and abolish or at least weaken the Welfare State. See also M. ABRAMS, Social Trends and Electoral Behaviour. British Journal of Sociology, September 1962, pp. 240–241. The Labour pre-election manifest had a rather unoriginal title Let Us Win Through Together, while the Tory Programme published in early 1950 was entitled This Is the Road. See also Conservative party, This is The Road, London 1950, pp. 1–4.; M. FRANCIS, Not Reformed Capitalism, But... Democratic Socialism. In: H. JONES, M. KANDIAH (eds.), The Myth of Consensus, Basingtoke 1996, p. 43ff. 18 Historians think that the Labours won a narrow victory because – among others – they managed to keep the so-called “the 1930s myth” which presented the Conservatives as antisocial politicians bearing only in mind the good of higher social classes alive. By the way, Labour Party tried to keep it in the following years. S. LAING, Representation of Working-Class Life, 1957–1964, Basingtoke 1986, p. 7 ff. On the topic of the 1950 election generally see Nicholas, H. G., The British General Election of 1950, London 1951. 19 H. G. NICHOLAS., The British General Election of 1950, London 1951, p. 4, 9 ff.; R. BLAKE, The Conservatives from Peel to Churchill, London 1970, pp. 263-264. 16 17

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members of Attlee’s Cabinet had expected.20 In the incomplete financial year from its introduction, i.e. from July 1948 till March 1949, the real costs amounted to £251.2 million in comparison with the expected £241.4 million (in the case of a complete financial year the real costs would – according to experts from the Treasury – amount to £339.6 million in comparison with the estimated £ 326.3 million). In the following year (1949–1950), the expenses were estimated at £387.6 million and this sum was not exceeded, but in the year 1950-1951 were estimated expenses amounting to £398.3 million while in reality they were £ 405.8 million.21 Cabinet tried to react to the first estimates of the differences between planned and real expenses on NHS. At the beginning of October 1949 the Chancellor of the Exchequer Stafford Cripps tried to win over Aneurin Bevan for the idea of introducing fees for prescriptions but he did not succeed. Thus, in spring 1950 he tried it again, this time proposing that patients should pay at least for their dentures, spectacles and various health aids.22 Bevan stood up again and insisted that health care be completely free of charge; he only agreed that it would be necessary to “keep an eye” on the expenses in the health service more closely than before.23 In October 1950 joined in the conflict the Prime Minister himself replacing the seriously ill Cripps by “the rising star of the party”, Hugh Gaitskell. Several months later, in January 1951, he “removed” Bevan to the Ministry of Labour. Thus arouse a huge potential for both political and personal clash of these men24 and, at the same time, for the split up of the already polarized Labour Party into two irreconcilable camps. And it was at that time, the least suitable for the Labours, when the Korean War broke out. For the United States of America, frustrated by the loss of China, where in autumn 1949 a great communist state came into existence, by a successful “crowning” of the Soviet nuclear energy programme and by the omnipresent “spy mania” on the home political scene, this Compare British Medical Journal, 19 Februrary 1949; Tomlinson, J., Welfare and the Economy, in: Twentieth Century British History, 6/2, 1995, p. 210 ff. 21 The main problem was that when planning the government did not take into account approximately 3% inflation, and also naively expecting that the better the health service the lower the demand for the service because illnesses will be treated more effectively and the population will be more healthy. Compare Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Cost of the National Health Service, Cmd. 9663, (so called Cuillebaud Report, HMSO, London 1956, p. 7. 22 C. WEBSTER, The Health Services since the War, Vol.1, London 1999, chapter 1. 23 Compare B. BRIVATI, Hugh Gaitskell, London 1996, p. 116 ff.; P. M. WILLIAMS, Hugh Gaitskell, London 1979, p. 214 ff.; K. O. MORGAN, Labour in Power 1945–51, Oxford 1984, pp. 412–413. 24 K. O. MORGAN, Harold Wilson, London 1992, p. 163. 20

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war had by then been the most serious test in the bipolar world. That’s why the U.S.A. required from their closest ally not only diplomatic support but also substantial rise in the defence expenses as well as extending military service from one and a half years up to two years.25 From the view of the British (and other Western European) politicians there was “hovering” a fear that unless they did not at least partially comply with the Americans‘ insistence, there could be considerably reduced their military presence on the Continent, which would substantially increase a threat from the side of the Soviet Union at the head of which still stood the ageing, paranoid dictator Stalin.26 In view of the above given explanation, it is no surprise that in January 1951 Attlee’s Cabinet decided on a gradual increase in military expenses from £750 million (in 1950) up to £4.700 million (in 1954).27 To be able to realistically consider such a growth, the Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Gaitskell proposed a lot of severe cuts including some expenses in the health service – among the others that the British will pay fees for dentures, spectacles and prescriptions. The Cabinet finally after heated discussions only passed the first two items of his proposal (they rejected the prescriptions again, as in the previous year), however, Aneurin Bevan, Harold Wilson (another Cabinet minister) and John Freeman resigned from government in protest. Their arguments mostly related to the fact that it was a “matter of principle” and that “we cannot budge from free health care in any case”; they also attacked the amount of defence expenses (“armament expenses” as they kept calling them).28 Thus, it was these fundamental facts and not a slow “convalescence of the Tories” after the “disaster of summer 1945” which were the main cause of both actual (1950) and real (1951) defeat of Labour Party in parliamentary elections and retreat of the Labours into opposition.

C. BARNETT, The Verdict of Peace, London 2001, pp. 16–26; S. GREENWOOD, A War We Don’t Want Contemporary British History, Winter 2003, pp. 1–24. 26 An important role was also played by negotiations on involving Britain in the European Community of Coal and Steel. See A. BULLOCK, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945– 1951, Oxford 1983, p. 782 ff. To the situation on the international scene see K. DURMAN, Popely ještě žhavé. Velká politika 1938–1991, Vol. 1: Válka a nukleární mír, 1938–1964, Praha 2004, mainly chapter 3, pp. 147–224; P. HENNESSY, P., Never Again: Great Britain 1945–1951, London 1992, p. 410. 27 In reality they never reached that height, being also kept on a tight rein by the successive conservative cabinet. M. HILL, The Welfare State in Britain. A Political History since 1945, London 1993, p. 42 ff. 28 K. HARRIS, Attlee, London 1982, pp. 477–480; B. PIMLOT, Harold Wilson, London 1992, p. 162 ff. 25

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When in February 1950 the Labours, as we already know, gained the majority in the Commons by 6 votes and a vote of confidence after dramatic voting,29 the “Cabinet of Tired Men” – as it was called by the press – set about its daily routine office work. Despite general expectations they remained in power longer than they were supposed to, from March 6, 1950 till 5 October 1951. In view of a close majority it was only a “maintenance Cabinet”, any fundamental steps in accordance with the party programme were out of question. With the benefit of hindsight it is only worth mentioning the organization of so-called Festival of Britain, which took place in London and in a few places in the country from May till September 1951. Prime Minister Attlee tried to give his fellow citizens by means of this event “in hard times” not only a chance to show their joy that “Great Britain is still vital and indefatigable”, and it has its place in the world certain, as he would say, but also to point out “how well it recovered from the war aftermath,”30 which was in fact true although this “recovery” was going in a much more complicated way than it seemed to at the beginning. The election of 1951 passed without any relevant incidents. The Labours had their “big topics”, even though these were – mainly in comparison with the year 1945 – rather “worn”, especially another development of the Welfare State.31 Moreover, they made use of a nervous atmosphere of “double-sided fear” in abundance, and warned about the unleashing of the Third World War, going too far when indicating that the head of the Opposition, “the Cold Warrior Churchill”, cannot be trusted in the questions of war and peace. According to some historians “a slightly hysterical tone” of the Labour campaign suggested that the party was more afraid of the defeat than a year before if they were not reconciled with it. The Tories in their election campaign counted on the votes of those who were not satisfied with insufficiently speed of the post-war reconstruction, on the opponents of Welfare State and on a sheer desire of the inhabitants of the Isles for a MPs were brought to Westminster from hospitals only to take part in voting. George Witt in this connection wrote that it was a totally “gruelling and demeaning procedure”. 30 The festival was more about Great Britain than about the British Empire, and included samples fromt he sphere of art, science, technology, industry and agriculture. The main part was concentrated in London South Bank and Southwark; many events related to the festival took place all over the country. As a symbol of hopes from that time remained The Royal Festival Hall to the British. Compare F. M. LEYENTHAL, Festival of Britain (1951), pp. 286–287; R. HEWISON, Culture and Consensus: England, Art and politics since 1940, London 1995, p. 58 ff. 31 One of the main “triumphs” of the Labours in the elections was that they could present themselves as a “full-bodied alternative” to the Tories connected to the Establishment in all respects. 29

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change. When wording the programme points they had to be very careful: The Labour Welfare State had numerous and rather noisy critics, however, its straight rejecting could result in a disaster similar to that of 1945. For that reason, Churchill’s followers stressed the fact that they would make the Welfare State as well as the whole Cabinet more rational and effective, naturally while preserving “everything good” the Labours had come with in the past years. When the results were known the Conservatives – very self-confident as always – found out that they came off worse that they had expected. The majority of 26 votes over the Labour and 17 altogether was anything but convincing; the Labours gained even more votes than the winners the triumph of them being only ensured by the special characteristics of the British electoral system.32 At the same time, the narrow victory ensured that the Tories really could not afford to set about implementing more fundamental changes with which some voters, despite careful pre-election rhetoric, would link their getting into power.33 In the following years the Welfare State struck root so deep in Britain that its radical revision had until Margaret Thatcher’s moving in 10, Downing Street in 1979 become impossible. Conclusion When in autumn 1951 the seventy-seven-year old Winston Churchill formed his last Cabinet (until 1955) it seemed that once again there returned “good old times” – from the Tories’ point of view. The Prime Minister, fundamentally convinced that the Conservatives had won the elections mainly thanks to his charisma, formed with the approval of the King the Government of political veterans, mostly members of his War Cabinet, made complete by a few new faces that should have added to it “a semblance of Part of the Conservatives‘ gains obviously resulted from the fact that the Liberals in comparison with the year 1945 shifted “to the right”, consequently putting up only 100 candidates for the Commons in the whole country. The Conservatives were better organized making use of so-called “postal votes” with more effect. Even the weather played a role of itself as less disciplined Labour voters stayed at home. Nevertheless, the Labours could pose as “moral winners” because they not only got more votes than the Conservatives but the most votes any political party in Britain had ever obtained. D. BUTLER, British General Elections since 1945, Oxford 1995, pp. 63–64. 33 The 1950s was – in many respects – from its beginning the years of “social conciliation”. Compare J. GARDINER, From the Bomb to the Beatles: The Changing Face of Post-War Britain, London 1999, p. 83 ff.; J. WESTERGAARD, H. RESLER., Class in a Capitalist Society, Harmondsworth 1977, p. 34 ff.; P. ADDISON., Now the War is Over: A Social History of Britain, London 1985, p. 176; M. AKHTAR, S. HUMPHRIES, The Fifties and Sixties: A Lifestyle Revolution, London 2001, p. 81 ff. 32

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modernity”.34 Let us mention, of its prominent members, at least R. A. Butler who became Chancellor of the Exchequer, or the Anthony Eden, who returned to “his” post in Foreign Office; the prestigious post of Lord President was occupied by Lord Woolton who had in the previous years been “instrumental in a kind of modernization of the party” and was a favourite of the middle class; the extremely “sensitive” Ministry of Housing and Local Government being taken over by Harold Macmillan and the Ministry of Labour by Walter Monckton. The main problem of the Cabinet, which set their priorities especially in the sphere of economy, consisted in the fact that the Prime Minister was not able to – especially with respect to his advanced age – run effectively their work35 and the finance minister did not have sufficient experience of running such a department, so that it was in fact run by permanent secretary of the Exchequer sir Edward Bridges, by sir Edwin Plowden and William Armstrong.36 In the ranks of the Labour Opposition broke out, for a change, an open “civil war”. The aspirants to the leadership after major Attlee, who even after the defeat in election in his 68 years of age surprisingly remained the head of the party – Bevan, Gaitskell and Morrison – kept fighting battles not only purely political but also passionately ideological clashes for a future resemblance of the Labour Party.37 How devastating the intra-party fight was can be proved, among others, by the fact that the Tories remained in power until 1964, i.e. long thirteen years, although they did not manage to offer the public anything else than the administration of public affairs as fair as possible, and “keeping the state going”, let alone the far-reaching disasters such as the Suez Crisis.38 As far as the development of the British economy and the British Welfare State after 1951 is concerned, the historians – as we already mentioned – mostly agree that fundamentally it was a “period of continuity (not only) with the previous era of the Labours”, but – in many respects –

R. A. BUTLER, The Conservatives: A History from their Origins to 1965, London 1977, p. 427 ff. 35 C. PONTING, Churchill, London 1995, pp. 756–757. 36 A. HOWARD, RAB: The Life of R. A. Butler, London 1987, p. 182 ff. 37 H. PELLING, A Short History of the Labour Party, London 1961, p. 111 ff; J. CAMPBELL, Nye Bevan and the Mirage of British Socialism, London 1978, p. 488 ff; D. HEALEY, D., The Time of My Life, London 1990, p. 152 ff; P. M. WILLIAMS, Hugh Gaitskell: A Political Biography, London 1979, p. 301 ff. 38 D. SANDBROOK, D., Never Had It So Good. A History of Britain from Suez to the Beatles, London 2005 pp. 1–30. 34

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the period of continuity with the “gloomy interwar era”.39 Kenneth O. Morgan wrote about the years of “conservative compromise”,40 whereas Michael Fraser compared the common basis of the Tory and Labour policies, following different goals, to two trains departing from opposite platforms of a busy London station and running for a long time one next to the other on wide rails, always destined for distant stations though.41 The AngloAmerican monthly Encounter for a change celebrated “the triumph of Keynesianism” declaring “the end of ideology”;42 many politicians of that time even spoke of a “One Nation”.43 Thus, it seemed for a certain time that the period of fatal feuds between the followers of the Right and the Left concerning the future semblance of (not only) the Welfare State was coming to an end gradually. The reality was, however, different, as we know. Especially in the 1970s the British political scene dramatically polarized again, this time in the way almost inconceivable at the beginning of the 1950s.

“At the beginning of the fifties ... Britain was still a country in which millions of people shared the toilet with their neighbours, in which many young married couples were forced to live with their parents, and in which few people have ever laid eyes on a television set. It was a country of conservative habits poised on the brink of exuberant affluence and irrevocable change.” SANDBROOK p. 105. Compare HENNESSY, p. 112 ff.; J. HOPKINS, The New Look: A Social History of the Forties and Fifties in Britain, London 1964, p. 309 ff.; J. STEVENSON, C. COOK, Britain in the Depression: Society and Politics 1929–1939, London 1994, pp. 15–39; J. BENSON, The Rise of Consumer Society in Britain 1880-1980, London 1994, passim. 40 K. O. MORGAN, K. O., The People’s Peace. British History 1945–1989, Oxford 1990, p. 112. 41 M. FRASER, British Politics 1945–1987: Four Perspectives. In: P. HENNESSY, A. SELDON (eds.), Ruling Performance: British Governments from Attlee to Thatcher, Oxford 1989, p. 310. 42 Encounter, April 1955. 43 The term „One Nation“ originated from a book of the same title published in October 1950 by a group of nine young Conservative MPs, among others prominent politicians Edward Heath, Iain Macleod, Robert Carr or Enoch Powell. The work reflected the Conservatives‘ rhetoric of the 1950s and 1960s referring to the former Tory reformers (Benjamin Disraeli, Stanley Baldwin and others). The authors of the book committed themselves that they would continue the Labour policy of supporting the Welfare State, which meant supporting full employment, building new flats, social services, reforms in the sphere of health care and education. After publishing the book politicians kept meeting professionally on a regular basis, and soon they labelled themselves as „One Nation Group“. See Sandbrook, D., Never Had It So Good..., p. 51; Conservative Political Centre, One Nation: A Tory Approach to Social Problems, London 1950; Campbell, J., Edward Heath: A Biography, London 1993, pp. 76–79; Shepherd, R., Iain Macleod: A Biography, London 1994, pp. 61–70. 39

Marc Ellis’ Responses to Holocaust and Its Applicationto the Jewish-Palestinian Conflict Stanislav Tumis

Introduction We can summarize Ellis’ responses to the Holocaust in his three dialectical realities – suffering and empowerment, innocence and redemption, uniqueness and normalization. His approach to the Holocaust is, however, different in comparison with the previous Holocaust theologians, both Jewish and Christian. Most other Holocaust theologians concentrate on the suffering of Jews during Holocaust and perceive the result of the Holocaust in terms of vulnerability and innocence of Jewish victims. To Ellis, Auschwitz and its interpretation after the war, particularly against the Palestinians, suggests that the Jews have lost their innocence and their former status of suffering victims was replaced by the status of perpetrators of violence. While Holocaust theologians tend to look for the response to the Holocaust – the redemption of Jews – in empowerment of the Israeli state and its affirmation, Ellis is one of the major critics of the state policy of empowerment.1 His theology is aimed at contemporary Jewish but also Christian and Palestinian world, looking for identity and their place in the current world, whether particularly in context of the legacy of the Holocaust or Jewish-Christian inheritance. His critical and controversial approach has caused that “Ellis became a ‘heretic’ not only in the established Jewish world […] but also to ‘liberal’ Christians”.2 Another critics reproach many aspects of his theology as lacking balance and one-sided.3 How can we characterize Ellis’ approach to For example M. H. ELLIS, Israel and Palestine Out of the Ashes. The Search for Jewish Identity in the Twenty-first Century, London 2002, pp. 54–57. 2 R. R. RUETHER, “Preface”. In: M. H. ELLIS, Revolutionary Forgiveness. Essays on Judaism, Christianity, and the Future of Religious Life, Waco, Texas 2000, p. XIII. Ellis himself realizes that he is regarded by a number of Jews as a traitor. See M. H. ELLIS, Ending Auschwitz: The Future of Jewish and Christian Life. Louisville, Kentucky 1994, p. 64. 3 On this, for example, R. RUBENSTEIN, After Auschwitz: History, Theology, and Contemporary Judaism. Baltimore & London 1992, pp. 266–280. On the other hand Countess suggests that Ellis would be more critical to ideology of Zionism. See R. COUNTESS, Jewish Writer Grapples with Ethical Dilemma of the Holocaust and Zionism, [Online], Available on: http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v12/v12p.215_Countess.html [2003, May 18] 1

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the Holocaust and what attitude assume about it? What are the strong and weak sides of his theology? Are his responses to the Holocaust, Jews, Christians, and Jewish-Christian dialogue useful or irrelevant? We will explore his approaches in three sections. First paragraph concentrates the attention to his understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, second deals with how the reality of the Holocaust influences his conclusions towards Jews and Christians and third regards the role of tradition for contemporary identity both of them. Suffering and Empowerment Ellis’ theology concentrates on suffering of people and justice for victims of oppressive regimes, which is an integral part of the Liberation theology4. His attention is on the situation in Israel and its policy towards the Palestinians. His sympathies lie with the Palestinians who are to him victims of the Israeli Jews supported both financially and morally5 by the Diaspora, particularly America, but also by mainstream Christianity.6 But he is not interested in the suffering of the Palestinians only. As a Jew, he looks at the current situation in Jewish identity and its future, which is depicted according to his conviction that speaking of truth is loyalty, very pessimistic.7 Ellis strongly criticizes the empowered policy of the State of Israel towards the Palestinians, which is reflected in their underprivileged position within the state and in violence, injustice and suffering, including death.8 The relations between Jews and Palestinians are interpreted in the scheme perpetrators (Jews) and victims (Palestinians). While Ellis argues that Jews See his books: M. H. ELLIS, Towards a Jewish Theology of Liberation. London 1988; M. H. ELLIS, Revolutionary Forgiveness. Essays on Judaism, Christianity, and the Future of Religious Life. Waco, Texas 2000 5 Ellis looks for the reason in an essay of Israeli commentator Boas Evron, according to whom the support of American Jews is driven by their guilt, because they did not do enough to prevent the Holocaust. See M. H., ELLIS, Beyond Innocence and Redemption: Confronting the Holocaust and Israeli Power: Creating a Moral Future for the Jewish People. San Francisco 1990, p. 36–37. There may be some point in this explanation, but I am convinced that there are number of another reasons, such as pragmatic policy, logic support to their kin and so on. To explain and derive everything through the Holocaust, which is frequent among Holocaust theologians is not always fully appropriate. 6 For example ELLIS, Ending Auschwitz., pp. 94–95. The detailed comments to it later in this study. 7 ELLIS, Beyond Innocence and Redemption., p. 145. 8 See his latest book where we can find a number of concrete examples of injustice and violence toward Palestinians witnessed by many Jews living in Israel; ELLIS, Israel and Palestine Out of the Ashes..., passim. 4

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have lost their innocence after Auschwitz, it seems that the intention of his books creates new innocent victims – the Palestinians. I believe that a number of his suggestions for a solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and some of his criticism of the policy of the State of Israel are true. I agree for example that the solution of the problem lies in the model of binationalism,9 and I reject the violence and underprivileged position of the Palestinians within the state and so on. Nevertheless I cannot agree with Ellis’ black-and-white scheme that the guilt for the civil war is only with Jews. The problem is more complex and the Palestinians are not innocent victims, as Jews were in Auschwitz. The Arabs have their significant share of guilt in the conflict not only in the past (and not only in 1948) but also today, such as their terrorism.10 The conflict is mutual and both sides carry a great deal of guilt. Although Ellis’ approach to Jewish-Palestinian problem has a number of serious problems and imbalanced positions, there is one important point. In Holocaust theology there is at least one important theologian, moreover of Jewish origin, who does not support uncritically the policy of the State of Israel towards Palestinians. Such criticism of the oppressive policy of the State of Israel is quite appropriate. While we have to strongly object Ellis’ lack of balance, it is important to point out his imbalance provides a counterweight to the imbalance of the other representatives of Holocaust theology to this question. It is a pity that Ellis’ inability to be objective excludes him from the current critical debate. On the other hand, I think that such exclusion witnesses the weakness of the mainstream. I believe that Ellis’ one-sided approach to the conflict may be deriving from three sources. Two of them have theological roots. The first reason is the influence of Liberation theology, which shaped his view on suffering of people and his judgement of events. His empathy for people who suffers and his humanism are the values, which are worth and their support is important particularly in the places of wars and violence. On the other hand, the situation in Israel is very complex and although Israeli people have more advantageous position in comparison with Palestinians because of their military power, suffering is a part of their experience from many reasons too. In this sense Ellis’ naïve view drawing the strict black-and-white line Ibid., p. 139. For example, criticism of Ellis in RUBENSTEIN, After Auschwitz, pp. 266–280. Rubenstein objects to Ellis’ unbalanced view and advocates Israeli interests. While the advocacy of national interests is a normal policy of the states and Rubenstein is right in criticism of naïve theology of Ellis, Rubenstein’s approach to conflict is unbalanced in the accusation on Palestinians as preventing Israel from acting differently.

9

10

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between perpetrators and victims can be extremely dangerous, as it helps to escalate mutual antipathies. Equally, the danger is the mainstream Holocaust theology, which supports the black-and-white division conversely. The conflict is mutual and as long as both sides do not realize it, the mutual accusations will keep on escalating the conflict. Second, Ellis is influenced by Holocaust theology. While he rejects the basis of the mainstream of the Holocaust theologians, as we will see in the next paragraph, he is unable to avoid their schemes and terminology although he uses them in an opposite sense. Ellis criticised the dialectics between suffering and empowerment, victims and perpetrators, innocence and redemption used by Holocaust theologians for the situation of Jews after the Holocaust, as description of reality of the Jews after foundation of the State of Israel. He is, however, even less persuasive when applying the scheme and terminology to the Palestinians. It seems that the third reason is in the fact that he assumes a role of prophets.11 Here we can look for the basis for his implacability, exaggerative and one-sided statements, and provocative criticism. It should not be, however, an excuse for his imbalanced statements. What are the implications of Ellis’ attitudes to Jewish-Palestinian conflict for Christians who are part of it and for the Jewish-Christian dialogue? Ellis’ point, despite his problematic rhetoric, is, that he makes the current Christian and Jewish communities realize that in current encounters on national and religious basis in Israel and elsewhere, it is impossible to limit the dialog to Jews and Christians. It is important to support friendly relations not only between Jews and Christians but also with Palestinians or Muslims. But again he reduces the importance of such dialogue trough the exaggerative statements and suggestions: The inclusion of Palestinian voices in contemporary Jewish life as a critical challenge to Jewish power is impossible without the prodding of Western and, most specifically, American Christians. In fact, the neglect of Palestinian voices in Jewish life is intimately tied to the refusal of American Christians to hear those voices and, if heard, to speak the truth to their Jewish ecumenical partners. […] Yet at this point in Jewish history, the ability of Christians to speak honestly to Jews is a key to the future renewal of the Jewish people.12 Ellis seems to overvalue the influence of religious communities on the solution of the Jewish-Palestinian conflict. This is even clearer when he 11 12

For example ELLIS, Israel and Palestine Out of the Ashes, pp. 112–123. ELLIS, Beyond Innocence and Redemption., p. 134.

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identifies West Europe and the USA with Christianity and Israel with Judaism. He does not distinguish that while the Western world is in many aspects the result of Christian tradition and a number of Christian features are present in Western countries, he underestimates other important trends forming Western world, such as secularism and pragmatism. It enables him to forge the image about mutually advantageous ‘deal’ between Jews and Christians, as he argues: Since 1967 it also lends itself to the creation of a united front on the question of Israel. At the same time, the pairing of Judaism and Christianity after the Holocaust attempts to forge an establishment that once and for all banishes the question that Christians ask of Jews and Jews of Christians. In the moral warfare against secular paganism, it is good Jew and Christian battling the bad pagans. […] The bargain is sealed […]13 Sometimes it is difficult to know what Ellis exactly means when he uses the words Christianity and Judaism, because he tends to freely pass towards the solution of one problem from a definition of another. The readers can be confused because they do not know whether Ellis means Jewish or Christian culture or tradition, religious communities, or Western countries and the State of Israel. I suppose that he tends to use all meanings without realizing the complexity, which particular categories contain. His notion about the united front of Christianity and Judaism and his premise about the crucial role of theology and the theologians for the solution of problems of the present world, clear in his considerations,14 are largely naïve. Despite the fact that theological and religious reasons represented by both religious communities can partly influence the attitudes between states, pragmatic interests of particular countries play the decisive role in policy. It is naïve to imagine a united front of Western (Christian) countries towards Palestinian-Jewish problem, when some European countries strongly criticize Israel’s policy. On the other hand, the notion that Western countries will unite on moral grounds to force Israel to change the status quo, seems unlikely. We can hardly expect that the conflict will be solved by external intervention.

13 14

ELLIS, Ending Auschwitz, p. 95. See for example in detail his argumentation in ibid., pp. 94–95.

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The Holocaust The terms such as Holocaust or Auschwitz play in an important role in Ellis’ theology. According to him, Holocaust which was tied closely with the birth of the State of Israel,15 has had the crucial importance in Jewish world after war and has influenced and shaped the Jewish identity in Israel and Diaspora. The role of Auschwitz for today’s Israel is regarded from many reasons in negative terms. Ellis emphasizes that Jews use the Holocaust as an ideological weapon of the State of Israel against the Palestinians and in his criticism of its policy.16 He suggests that the Jews after the Holocaust have monopolized the Nazi experience17 and have identified themselves as innocent victims threatened by another Holocaust.18 The Palestinians were turned, according to this logic, with Nazis.19 Ellis believes that the experience of the Holocaust as it is ahistorically misused by the state,20 or interpreted in conclusions of Holocaust theologians who support the restrictive policy of the State of Israel towards Palestinians. The reason, why he argues that Christian communities have supported Jewish empowerment, while neglecting Palestinian suffering, lies in the fact that Christianity felt the guilt for Holocaust.21 On the other hand he appreciates that the experience of Holocaust helped the normalization of relations between Jews and Christians.22 The solution of the Jewish-Palestinian conflict is drawn as a parallel with Christian-Jewish hostility. He argues that “just as Christians cannot go back behind the Holocaust, but can’t go forward except in solidarity with their victims […] so Jews today cannot go back behind Auschwitz and Israeli (and American Jewish) power […] cannot go forward except in solidarity with their victims, the Palestinian people.23 Ellis suggests “ending of Auschwitz”,24 regarding

ELLIS, Beyond Innocence and Redemption, p. 32. Ellis quotes a number of Jews and their ideas about Holocaust as a burden, a bully, a means of manipulation, Yad Vashem as kitsch and Elie Wiesel as kitsch-maker etc. See ibid., pp. 32-35. 17 Ibid., p. 36. 18 ELLIS, Ending Auschwitz, p. 28. 19 ELLIS, Beyond Innocence and Redemption, p. 37. 20 Ibid., p. 37. 21 Ibid., p. 134. 22 Ibid., p. 138; ELLIS, Ending Auschwitz, p. 125. 23 Quoted in RUETHER, “Preface”, p. XII. 24 Ibid., p. 40. 15

16

Marc Ellis’ Responses to Holocaust... 463 ________________________________________________________

Holocaust as historical event, or normalization of Jewish deeds which will not be justified by the Holocaust.25 The essential question to his arguments is whether the Jewish experience of the Holocaust plays so important role in the current world as he suggests. It seems that while the reality of the Holocaust has partly influenced the internal policy of the State of Israel and the feelings of Jewish society particularly towards the Palestinians, we can find more credible reasons for oppressive policy of the state towards the Palestinians. The question is: Would the Israeli politicians take up different or alternative attitude towards Palestinians without the reality of Holocaust? Is it really the Holocaust or rather the logic of behaviour of the major national groups towards significant national minorities, in this case supported by religious differences similar to other countries in the past,26 which shape the policy of the State of Israel towards its most important minority? Have not the Arab countries and the Palestinians been helping in the past and present the fact that Jews in Israel can have reasons to worry? I do not want to argue that the reality of the Holocaust had no influence on shaping the Jewish policy towards Palestinians particularly in ideological sense, but I believe this less boldly than Ellis suggests. If he argues that Jews approach the normalization in light of the Holocaust, I believe that reality is different. Despite the “Holocaust” rhetoric, which does occasionally appear, the actual motivation of Jewish policy towards Palestinians is not the Holocaust, but pragmatic considerations. Another question is whether such reasons and policy are wise.27 It seems that Ellis unduly relies on the basis of his Holocaust theology and over-estimates the impact of Holocaust theologians on JewishPalestinian conflict.28 On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the conclusions of the Holocaust theologians had no impact on Jews. When Ellis criticizes the impact of the Holocaust for current Jewish society he objects rather to logic consequences of Holocaust theology than the real consequences caused by the reality of Holocaust or Holocaust theologians. Therefore I believe that ELLIS, Israel and Palestine Out of the Ashes, pp. 56-57. Good example can be Yugoslavia in times before division. 27 A number of objections to Ellis on the oppressive policy of the State are quite significant. 28 It seems that Ellis realizes this; he seems to contradict his conclusions when he suggests that Holocaust theology reached its peak in 1967–1982. See COUNTESS, Jewish Writer.Such contradictions and confusions arise from the fact that Ellis examines both the conclusions of theology, but also politics, sociology, psychology, philosophy, and he tends to fail to reconcile their results with his theology. The reality is often more complex than the resources of his theology. 25

26

464 Stanislav Tumis ________________________________________________________

his biggest acquisition is not in the fact that he truly describes the reality of the contemporary Jewish life, which is really more complex than Ellis’ notion to explain everything almost in categories of the Holocaust, but in his criticism of ideas of Holocaust theology linking innocent victims suffered in Auschwitz with protective, redemptive, mystical or transcendental function of the empowered state. I think Ellis is right when he criticizes inviolability and adoration of the Holocaust and the state having almost character of idolatry, mythologizing of the reality and different categories such as innocence of Jews, state, Holocaust and so on. Equally he is right when he criticizes the image, influenced again by the myth of Palestinians as Nazi perpetrators, which is the consequence of teaching of Holocaust theologians. Then he claims de-mythologizing and normalization of the facts, which do not reflect reality.29 Ellis’ criticism of the mythologizing view of the Holocaust and the State of Israel with impact on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Jewish identity helps to discover that the application such theological concepts for understanding society, political realities and identity formation of a nation are misleading. Unfortunately, Ellis makes similar mistakes and as suggested earlier. He is unable to avoid the premises and terminology of the Holocaust theology, even though he does not use them in transcendental sense. His theology, while discovering the misguiding role of the mainstream of Holocaust theology, does not describe the reality too and is misleading in another sense. What are the implications to Jewish-Christian dialog? As suggested earlier, Ellis affirms that uncritical support of Christians towards Jews and the neglect of Palestinians are caused by the fact that Christians feel guilt about the Holocaust and historical anti-Semitism. Despite the improvement in relations between Judaism and Christianity after WWII is largely a consequence of the Holocaust, to which both religious communities have respect, it is problematic to speak about uncritical support of Christians and about Jewish-Christian conspiracy.30 Ellis overlooks that Christians are a part of the conflict – a number of Palestinians are Christians – and for example an important Christian theologian Hans Küng is very critical to Jewish policy towards Palestinians.31 Ellis also underestimates a fact that Christian churches have no political power – churches are separated from In this sense he uses expressions as “beyond innocence and redemption” or “after Auschwitz”. See also ELLIS, Beyond Innocence and Redemption, pp. 149–155. 30 ELLIS, Ending Auschwitz, p. 95. 31 H. KÜNG, Judaism, London 1992, pp. 519–580. 29

Marc Ellis’ Responses to Holocaust... 465 ________________________________________________________

the state – and their direct influence on political decisions is less significant that suggested. Ellis again judges the Christian attitude trough premises of Holocaust and particularly Liberation theology, which is very critical to Christian mainstream.32 Tradition Ellis’ considerations about Auschwitz and its influence on contemporary Jews and Christians, their identity and relations lead him to examine the tradition and its impact on the image of the Holocaust and current repressive attitude of Jews towards Palestinians. The question is whether tradition contains a connection or continuity with violence and brutality of Auschwitz. Ellis asks even further: Does not Auschwitz result from the inner essence of Christianity and Judaism? And finally he poses question of viability of Christianity and Judaism. Although he develops the idea of betrayal of Jewish tradition of weak position of Jews in exile in contrast with contemporary empowerment,33 his attention is on Christianity where he finds a number of examples of empowerment. The symbol of the violent nature of Christianity is year 1492 and the Roman Emperor Constantine, who is important for him because he represents the break in move of innocent Christianity to Christianity of Auschwitz,34 characteristic also for the transformation of the innocent Jews of Auschwitz to empowered perpetrators. Ellis is attracted by the question how do those who suffered become oppressors.35 Unfortunately his answer is rather descriptive than explanatory. He details the differences between historical Christianity of Jesus, canonical Christianity and violent Christianity of Constantine, 1492, or Auschwitz.36 When he found what he needed, i.e. empowered and oppressive Christianity, he drew a simple notion of history. He believes in continuity of distorted Christianity with Auschwitz: […] I.G. Farben can be seen as completely secular and in its actions anti- Christian. Unfortunately, this is too easy. Modernity itself is to a large extent an extension of Christianity, and the secularization of Western culture over the last centuries is both in conflict with and a fulfilment of the ELLIS, Ending Auschwitz, p. 95. Cohn-Sherbok shows that the Jewish tradition contains periods of empowerment. See D. COHN-SHERBOK, Holocaust Theology, London 1989, pp. 105–107 34 ELLIS, Ending Auschwitz., p. 103. 35 Ibid., p. 103. 36 See also his idea of distorting Jesus in ibid., pp. 73–102. 32 33

466 Stanislav Tumis ________________________________________________________

Christian West. The link between Christianity and empire, forged in the gospels of Constantine, Columbus, and Luther, gave birth to a Nazi empire with an internal dynamic that it is difficult to disassociate from Christian inspiration. […] Auschwitz was total empire, an extension of the empires built in 1492.37 Ellis examines the roots of tradition of violent, imperial or triumphant Christianity leading to Auschwitz. He offers a few answers, which are for the most part related to Jesus. First, there is a motive of retreat of Christianity from historical, ideal Jesus.38 Second, Ellis speaks about connection of violent character of Christianity with redemptive Jesus and suggests demythologizing of Christian tradition.39 In this sense, his concept of God is interesting: “whom man makes exist”.40 And finally the main reason is the connection of Christianity with political power of state, the mentality of empire.41 According to Ellis, contemporary Jews have joined Christian mentality of empire, which is deeply anchored in Christian tradition.42 He further argues that after Holocaust united Jewish and Christian tradition supported by leaders, scholars and intellectuals, it was stripped of meaning43 and the real reason of Jewish-Christian connection and dialogue is that nonviable traditions “need to continue these events of Auschwitz and 1492 to survive”.44 As he believes that Judaism and Christianity closely linked to state represented by institutions, have failed, he seeks authentic covenantal community that resists the tradition of empire, oppression and injustice, a community opposed to institutions of both religions and therefore community of exile.45 Ellis’ constructions are largely controversial. He is right in repeating the known truth that Christianity particularly in the Middle Ages was Ibid., p. 76. He agrees with Ruether about the link between Christianity with imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. Ibid., pp. 85, 129. 38 Ibid., p. 87. 39 Ibid., p. 87. Ellis assumes that the redemptive Jesus is a similar burden to Christianity as the Sinai Covenant for Jews. See ibid., p. 127. The idea that the Christian teaching of redemptive Jesus is responsible for violent Christian evangelization seems acceptable in some aspects, but rather accidentally. I believe that the real reasons should be sought in concrete historical context rather than in all-embracing theological explanation. 40 See M. H. ELLIS, Unholy Alliance. Religion and Atrocity in Our Times, London 1997, p. 149. Steiner criticizes correctly that such concept is ontologically and ethically naïve. See Jewish Quarterly Review of Israel and Palestine: Out of the Ashes, [Online], Available: http://www3.baylor.edu/Church_State/ellis.html, [2003, May 18]. 41 For example ELLIS, Ending Auschwitz..., p. 125. 42 Ibid., p. 95. 43 Ibid., pp. 124–128. 44 Ibid., p. 89. 45 RUETHER, “Preface”, pp. XIV–XV. 37

Marc Ellis’ Responses to Holocaust... 467 ________________________________________________________

connected with political power, used oppressive methods and served as ideology of the state. His uncritical condemnation of Christianity as tradition of empire, violence, oppression, triumphalism leading to total empire of Auschwitz, and his notion that Christian tradition is almost responsible for all evil in history are, nevertheless, largely simplistic. His premise that he can explain the oppressive history of the 20th century, both Christian and Jewish, from the fact that in the Middle Ages Christians used oppressive and violent methods is naïve. Why does he not accuse for example the GreekRoman civilization or ancient Israel, which used the political power too? Did not states of ancient world, such as Babylonia, Egypt, Assyria, Persia, attempt to build an empire too? Can we simply link the use of power to Christian tradition? And, are the Western states just influenced only by Christianity? Is there not influence of the Graeco-Roman tradition and also of barbarian paganism? Ellis is not a historian and his interpretation of history shows this. Historical exploration follows clear rules, which Ellis does not respect. He fails to understand the complexity of such periods as Constantine or Columbus epoch, which simply criticizes because they represent violent and empire Christianity. Detailed analysis of these periods would prevent him from their simplistic connections with Auschwitz. It is correct to discuss the continuity in history and seek what contributed to Holocaust, but it is inadmissible to make such bold and simple connections without proper contextualisation. Ellis underestimates that the contemporary world is entirely different in comparison with the world of 4th or 15th century and Christianity is in competition with a number of different philosophical concepts and traditions, which depolarised its privileged position. The grounds of the Holocaust or contemporary situation in Israel should be sought in modern period and their specific context rather than in distant history. It seems that Ellis, in his prejudice against establishments, which have caused suffering, is unable to appreciate the extent of Christian culture. His image of Christianity and Judaism is largely pessimistic. While I appreciate Ellis’ sensibility about victims, he could do more, if he realises that complexity of the world prevents from creating of the world without victims.

468 Stanislav Tumis ________________________________________________________

Conclusion Although Ellis’ theology is controversial and has a number of serious deficiencies and imbalances, the significance of his thought is high, particularly because of his criticism of Holocaust theology and his contribution to understanding that mythologizing of the State of Israel, Holocaust and Jews is misleading. Similarly, although his understanding of JewishPalestinian conflict lacks objectivity and concentrates on criticism of Jews as perpetrators and Palestinians as victims, he counterbalances the black-andwhite image of mainstream Holocaust theologians and pushes Jews and Christians to support the dialogue and positive attitudes to Palestinians. Moreover, his engaged and critical views of the Israeli oppressive policy towards Palestinians bear certain value. On the other hand, his ideas and images about Jews, Christians, their past, present, future, tradition, identity, and Jewish-Christian relations contain a number of inadequacies and lack balance. While the significance of his message lies in his criticism of mythologizing views of Holocaust theologians, he is unable to avoid the assumptions in his thinking influenced by Holocaust and Liberation theology. It seems that Holocaust theologians narrow their focus on Holocaust and Liberation theologians on injustice and suffering, and thus interpret everything through their key topic underestimating the complexity of the world. I think that this is why Ellis fails to explain fully the past and current encounters, and identities of Jews, Christians and Palestinians (Muslims). This failure poses a doubt about the value of his visions about future.

The Poles and the Hungarians in 1956 Marcin Kula – Leon Koźminski

Although on the one hand the countries of the socialist bloc were closely interconnected, on the other, their people lived in mutual isolation. The official “friendship” between the communist nations was widely publicised but the word, used so often in official discourse, frequently brought to mind the saying, “With friends like these, who needs enemies?” Spontaneous contacts were supposed to be replaced by stuffily formal delegations, usually consisting of supremely uninteresting people. Even in the later years of the communist period, when many Poles could travel to countries like Hungary, they were more interested in getting to know Lake Balaton than the local people. We didn’t know much about each other and the consultations between national leaders on which so much depended, always remained a black box. After the fall of communism, each of the former bloc’s countries had a lot to make up for in the area of studying its national history. This public interest also encouraged historians to concentrate on past events in their own countries, while the rejection of Marxist dogma led to a strengthening of traditional historiography. However, one of the most important research challenges today is to taker a comparative look at the routes taken by our societies – even if in each case, the general direction of those routes was mandated from above. We should look at the contacts between our people – especially the spontaneous ones, which did, in after all, exist.1 We should examine the influence of the situation in each country on the other countries of the bloc. Our objective should be to develop not just factographic, but also comparative, topical and generalising analyses.2 In this article, I would like to present a comparison of two events whose 50th anniversary was recently observed in Hungary and Poland – the Hungarian revolution and the Polish October of 1956. I am pleased to note research on unofficial contacts between the "people’s democracies ", initiated by my colleagues from Warsaw University, Prof. Włodzimierz Borodziej and Prof. Jerzy Kochanowski. 2 I would like to mention two recently published comparative works: Małgorzata MAZUREK, Socjalistyczny zakład pracy. Porównanie fabrycznej codzienności w PRL i NRD u progu lat sześćdziesiątych, Warszawa 2005; Socjalizm w życiu powszednim. Dyktatura a społeczeństwo w NRD i PRL, ed. by Sandrine KOTT, Marcin KULA, Thomas LINDENBERGER, Warszawa 2006. 1

470 Marcin Kula – Leon Koźminski ________________________________________________________

It is obvious that both these events were interconnected. The revolution in Hungary began on 23 October 1956, with a demonstration of support for the political changes that were taking place in Poland. In Poland, the Hungarian uprising and the outrage at its crushing by the Soviet Army caused a wave of sympathy and the rise of a broad-based movement of support for the Hungarians. János Tischler gave the fullest accounting of those events; today they are generally well-known.3 What we are less aware of, on the other hand, is the direct and long-lasting impact of the Hungarian revolution on Poland. In the fall of 1956 Poland was undergoing the process of de-Stalinization. Władysław Gomułka came (back) to power on a wave of intra-party intrigue and with the approval of Moscow. This communist who had been a political prisoner, a man at one time removed from power for his “nationalist deviation”, proved to be the salvation of those in power. At the same time, Gomułka took the top leadership with massive popular support. The agreement to his candidacy had to be wrested from Moscow. Later on, Khrushchev could only congratulate himself on giving his assent. In internal policy, Gomułka never deviated from communist principles (with the exception of the position the Catholic Church and the organisation of agriculture). Even if his time in power is still – and should be much more intensively – discussed by Polish historians as a step away from hard-line communism, during his years in power he did not on the whole give the Soviet Union any cause for concern. He also remained loyal to the USSR in foreign policy and finally, as we remember, steadfastly supported the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In October 1956, however, the situation was far from clear. The Soviet Army units stationed in Poland left their bases, and the inhabitants of Warsaw and certain Polish military units began preparing for the defence of the city. The events of those days will continue to be the subject of much research.4 After Khrushchev’s dramatic 19 October visit to Warsaw, which fortunately ended well – the Soviet troops returned to their bases – Gomułka would always remain mindful of the danger of intervention. Such an intervention would not even have to take the form of an armed invasion. János TISCHLER, I do szabli... Polska i Węgry. Punkty zwrotne w dziejach obu narodów w latach 1956 oraz 1980–1981, Warszawa 2001. 4 I am happy to refer to the fullest history of the Polish events of 1956 to date, written by my student: Paweł MACHCEWICZ, Polski rok 1956, Warszawa 1993 (an updated version of the book is currently being prepared for publication in the United States). 3

The Poles and the Hungarians in 1956 471 ________________________________________________________

After all, the USSR had many means of influencing Poland’s political situation; there were also enough people faithful to it inside the country, only waiting for the signal. Gomułka’s other fear was more multidimensional. Paradoxical though it may sound, he was afraid of the very masses, which cheered for him. It seems he never really liked the popular acclaim. It looked like a positive thing, but it was difficult to accept for a traditional communist. Any true communist greeted by spontaneous cheers had to ask himself whether he wasn’t slipping onto the path of opportunism; whether he wasn’t relinquishing his role of the leader of the people who should, after all, applaud only when the leader deemed it appropriate. More importantly, Gomułka realised that the people were cheering him because they took him for something different than what he really was. He knew that people wanted more democratic reform and greater national independence, which he was neither – considering the Soviet domination – able, nor – as a true communist – willing to provide. Thus, Gomułka was afraid of the people supporting him or, more broadly speaking, supporting the changes he symbolised; this was because of the possibility that this movement could then slip out of his control, as well as the possibility that the masses could gravitate toward demands which were both unrealistic and, in his view, undesirable. No less important, he also feared that an uncontrolled movement that made unacceptable demands would surely provoke a Soviet invasion. And finally, he also probably suspected that a popular movement may be incited by his opponents the Stalinists, precisely in order to provide justification for a Soviet invasion. The Soviet intervention in Hungary could only sharpen his awareness of the dangers facing Poland. At the same time, however, the sad truth is that it was also extremely helpful for him. It is difficult to say what exactly Gomułka’s personal opinion on the Soviet intervention in Hungary was, because he was a complex personality. As many Polish communist leaders, Edward Gierek and general Jaruzelski included, he feared the Soviets. On the other hand – again, like the two leaders mentioned above – he was a committed ally of Poland’s giant neighbour; he also believed that Poland simply didn’t have any other choice. His mentality combined the experience of a political prisoner under Stalinism with the ardent communist’s belief that the cause must come before all else. What is no less important, in many areas Gomułka was more inclined to follow Realpolitik than it is usually believed today. For all these reasons, his attitude toward the Hungarian crisis was probably ambivalent. On 12

472 Marcin Kula – Leon Koźminski ________________________________________________________

November Eric Berthoud, the British ambassador in Warsaw, transmitted information he had heard to the effect that the Polish government deeply regretted the need to follow the Soviet line on Hungary in the United Nations – but decided that loyalty to the bloc was the price that had to be paid for greater freedom in internal matters. They were anxious about the Hungarian intervention leading to a renewal of the cold war, since that would mean the end of any hopes they had for improved relations with the West made possible by the greater autonomy that Poland had gained. At the same time, according to the ambassador, Polish leaders were already convinced that the intervention in Hungary – although certainly regrettable – was also unavoidable in view of the fact that Imre Nagy had lost control over the situation5. There may have been another additional reason why Gomułka had a negative attitude toward the Hungarian insurgents. Their possible victory would have put him in an uncomfortable position, since it would stimulate Polish pro-democracy and pro-independence sentiments – both dangerous from the communist government’s point of view. Certainly, Gomułka did not want Imre Nagy to be executed. It is said that the killing surprised him. After hearing the news, he reportedly became furious, used some very vulgar expressions and smashed a chair (which was actually nothing unusual for him). Coincidentally, this took place on the eve of the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Polish-Hungarian treaty; neither Gomułka nor Cyrankiewicz went to the official reception held at the Hungarian embassy. However, Gomułka’s opinion on the execution of Nagy was probably clearer than on the Hungarian issue as a whole. His point of view on the murder was probably strongly influenced by his own memories of Stalinism and his suspicion that if things took a turn for the worse, he could be next. Regardless of Gomułka’s attitude toward the events in Hungary, the situation there did put him in the comfortable position of being able to tell the Poles to better shut up. He didn’t even have to say it, it was simply obvious. It was becoming apparent that any attempt to follow in Hungary’s footsteps would end in disaster. It was thus easy for Gomułka to quash the hopes that had arisen. Calm had to be maintained at any price in order not to give any cause for intervention and the Soviet troops had to remain in Berthoud, Warsaw 12.11.1956, Public Record Office, London, FO 371/122600. In the following pages, I make several references to diplomatic opinions, both due to their synthetic character and external point of view, as well as for the simple reason that I worked on them (Marcin KULA, Paryż, Londyn i Waszyngton patrzą na Październik 1956 r. w Polsce, Warszawa 1992). 5

The Poles and the Hungarians in 1956 473 ________________________________________________________

Poland – something which Gomułka was in favour of, also as a form of protecting the territories awarded Poland after World War Two against any territorial claims by West Germany. And even though the reflex of solidarity with the Hungarians and the movement to collect humanitarian aid were very widespread, everybody realised that behaviour, actions and demands that crossed a certain line would come at a terrible price. It should be pointed out that in Poland the memory of the bloody repression of Poles by tsarist Russia and the USSR, and of the destruction of the country’s capital during the Warsaw Uprising – if not with the Soviets’ help, then through their inaction – was still very much alive, and still continues today. All these experiences laid the historic substrate that reinforced an already natural attitude. The fears that Poland would also suffer Hungary’s fate were very real. Warsaw and Gdynia experienced runs on food stores, although these were short-lived. It was probably to calm the people's emotions that the Polish government chose November 4 to announce that the United States had provided aid to Poland. On November 10 the French ambassador, M. de Carbonnel, reported that the Polish public was deeply concerned about the fighting in Hungary. He also remarked on Poland’s feeling of alienation from the other countries of the bloc and on rumours of Soviet troops massing on Polish borders.6 In Cracow, as the French consul posted there reported, in the second week of November life revolved around the Hungarian crisis. The consul remarked that the chancellors of Cracow’s universities and the “Students’ Revolutionary Committee” feared the possibility of provocation, called on university students to remain calm and warned against jeopardising the achievements that had been made in democratising Poland. The consul quoted a translation of a proclamation issued on the night of 4–5 November by the Students’ Revolutionary Committee – an organisation formed outside the official and government-approved student movement – to the young people of Cracow. The proclamation stated that Poland did not want to share the fate of Hungary, that there were forces operating both within and outside Poland which were ready to destroy all that had been won in October, that foreign troops were massing along the borders, and that common sense dictated refraining from providing those forces with even the smallest excuse for action. The authors noted that two previous uprisings – in 1831 and 1863 – had brought disastrous consequences. This time, they said, emotions could not be allowed to outweigh political considerations and the 6

De Carbonnel, Warsaw 10 November 1956, Archives Diplomatiques, Paris, EU 27/3/1.

474 Marcin Kula – Leon Koźminski ________________________________________________________

heart could not hold sway over reason. The authors stressed that their motives were not cowardly or base, but due to a conviction that the Poles had gained too much to be allowed to risk it7. It was significant that the proclamation made no mention of the Warsaw Uprising, a point on which the Soviets – and communists in general – were particularly sensitive. All in all, the Hungarian tragedy gave Gomułka what he wanted: the calm he desired and the curtailing of popular demands; and all of us, along with him, avoided a Soviet intervention and retained much of what we had won in 1956. This was certainly cause for joy. True, we could have wanted much more. Gomułka himself quickly disappointed our hopes – unfounded as they most likely were – but everything seems to indicate no broader changes to the system could have been achieved. In that way the Hungarians, through their struggle, by helping Gomułka also helped the Polish people tout court. On the whole, everybody in Poland had an understanding of the situation. We should remember that in January 1957 the Roman Catholic Church, an institution that could hardly be suspected of harbouring any sympathies for the Communist regime, called on the faithful to vote in the general elections – although by then, it was no longer threatened by terror and repression. Naturally, this election wasn’t worth much more than other elections under communism. Nevertheless, the church hierarchy understood that Gomułka should be allowed to succeed. A boycott of the elections, or their relatively poor result, would weaken his position in the eyes of the Soviet Union, and any alternative to what he stood for was seen as decidedly worse. By the way, Cardinal Wyszyński was later criticised by the Vatican for his support for Gomułka. It is interesting that even on the eve of Gomułka’s trip to Moscow in November 1956, a visit, which ended in his success, the British ambassador in Moscow thought that a Soviet intervention in Poland was not impossible. He wrote that the Soviet Union’s position was particularly unpredictable at the time. He speculated that this might have been due to disagreements within the Soviet leadership. "But I should say it was fairly certain that if the Gomułka Government goes one inch beyond its present position, Soviet reaction will be immediate and violent. The army is certainly ready and willing to act,” he wrote 8. Poland’s leadership also saw the execution of Imre Nagy on June 16, 1958, as a warning. However, it also harmonised with Gomułka’s desire, 7 8

Van Ghele, Krakow 14 November 1956, AD, EU27/3/4. Hayter, Moscow 12 November 1956, PRO, London, FO 371/122600.

The Poles and the Hungarians in 1956 475 ________________________________________________________

natural for him or dictated by the internal situation, to limit the political freedom, which appeared in Poland after 1956. Not only the power elite, but all of us once again clearly understood that there were certain boundaries which could not be crossed. There has always been a tradition of friendliness between the Poles and Hungarians, although its origins are uncertain. There is even a Polish proverb about Poles and Hungarians being “cousins”. (It probably originated in the 18th century9, although it is unclear in what circumstances.) Regardless of what those circumstances were, however, today’s historians can see certain reason in this saying, due to the structural similarities in both countries’ development paths. Of course, both countries lie in East Central Europe, and this has had an impact on numerous facets of their history – the significance of large landholdings, the importance of the nobility, the position of the peasants, and the military. Both had been part of larger empires. Both countries’ original capitalist transformation was flawed. Both experienced strong authoritarian tendencies between the two World Wars. Both had real socialism imposed on them by outside forces and both rose up against it. Mindful of these similarities, we should nevertheless explore the differences. Let us move to the 1956 Hungarian revolution and attempt to ask the question about both its similarities to and differences as compared to opposition movements in the Polish People’s Republic. Methodologically such a comparison is not an easy one. Certain differences between people and societies are natural and neither requires explanation nor can be explained. The Polish revolts (1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980) differed due to the progress of time and the experiences that had accumulated. Their participants often had Hungary’s experience of 1956 firmly in mind. The times changed, as did civilisation phenomena and the international situation. Events were frequently random, the people varied, and the reason for certain differences was pure chance. Some historic events cannot be explained otherwise than by simply stating the existence of a coincidental similarity. This does not diminish the importance of any differences or the advisability of studying them, but it alters the character of the research challenge. If we for instance conclude that the Third Reich was defeated because Hitler was not woken in time to give orders that could have stopped the Allies’ Normandy landings, while the USSR almost lost because in 1941 Stalin did not believe the intelligence reports he received, then it would be difficult to expand the analysis of the events of the time beyond a mere 9

Władysław KOPALIŃSKI, Słownik mitów i tradycji kultury, Warszawa 1991, p. 900.

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listing of the facts, but it would, on the other hand, be possible to draw farreaching conclusions on the nature of dictatorial systems. In spite of the already mentioned difficulties with historical comparative and sociological research studies, several issues in the area merit investigation. The following reflection is only an initial collection of thoughts, which are not necessarily supported by a deeper analysis of the source materials.10 I can only hope that it will inspire my colleagues to undertake such studies. The first question that comes to mind when making that comparison concerns the nature of Stalinism in Hungary and Poland. Even though the system was harsh and cruel everywhere, starting with the Soviet Union itself, it seems that in Hungary it was worse than in Poland. If this was in fact true, what was the reason? Was it the result of somewhat accidental differences between the people who implemented Stalinist policies in each country? Or was it because of the country’s past under Horthy, and its alliance with Nazi Germany during World War II, that Stalin and Hungarian communists treated the Hungarian people as contaminated by fascism and in need of a thorough cleansing? It is sometimes said that Stalin viewed Poland with some apprehension because of the history of Russian-Polish relations, especially the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, when the Poles did not hesitate to go into battle against all odds, even at the price of having their capital destroyed. But this is only an unproven theory. Moreover, this could be a double-edged argument. After all, it is also said that Stalin had the flower of the Polish intelligentsia killed off in Katyń precisely because of his resentment toward Poland dating most probably from 1920, when the Soviets lost the decisive battle of Warsaw. It is another matter that this hypothesis is also unproven. It is entirely possible that in the case of Katyń we were witnessing merely yet another example of the typical infernal mechanism of Stalin’s thinking, which turned against any nations – not to mention individual people – in the same way. The following was largely inspired by a text that it as well known as it was important for improving knowledge of the Hungarian revolution in Poland: Wiktor WOROSZYLSKI, Dziennik węgierski 1956, Warszawa 1990 (and previous underground publications). The book was written under special circumstances. In spite of the political thaw that occurred in Poland in 1956, the author was careful about what he wrote, not only to protect his informants in Hungary, but also due to the conditions in Poland. He once alludes to the Warsaw Uprising, but in a veiled way. He writes about the workers’ quarter of Budapest: "Everywhere houses are burnt out or reduced to rubble, roads upturned, the smell of burning, dust, narrow footpaths through the ruins... We know this sight. It’s Warsaw 1944. A city conquered." (p. 44). 10

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The second question is why the Soviets decided to proceed for military intervention in Hungary, and not in Poland. The argument that the Hungarians went further in their rejection of the system seems a weak one. Although this is not my area of expertise, I suspect that Soviet leadership had decided their course of action even before Imre Nagy announced his country’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Of course, we could try to credit the difference in the Soviet Union’s attitude towards Poland and Hungary to the skilful political manoeuvring by Edward Ochab, the First Secretary of the Polish United Worker’s Party (PZZPR) who stepped down in 1956, and by Władysław Gomułka, the party’s new leader. By the way, both worked together then, and were to do so later. Especially the fact that Ochab had supported Gomułka and the transformation process could, in Khrushchev's view guarantee that Poland would keep the faith. Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński of Poland also proved himself more adroit than Hungary’s Cardinal József Mindszenty. The broadcasts of the Polish service of Radio Free Europe at the time were politically wiser than those of the Hungarian Service. The difference in Soviet attitudes towards Hungary and Poland could also have been due to Poland’s geographical location – surrounded by other “people’s democracies”, and not on the outside border of the bloc. Another factor working against the Hungarians may have been the establishment of other, non-communist political parties, and perhaps also the Soviets’ belief that “fascists” were really coming back to power. It is sometimes said that the Soviets were supposedly afraid of how the Poles would react if an intervention took place. Such fears were supposedly bolstered by the memory of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising – suggesting that the Poles would take up arms, and that the subsequent struggle would be a long one. Personally, I would not give much weight to this argument. After all, the Soviet did decide to invade Afghanistan, although the fierceness and tenacity of the local highlanders was legendary – which in combination with the extremely difficult terrain indicated that the invading army would face problems much larger than, say, teenage boys throwing Molotov cocktails at Soviet tanks. Naturally, not all elements of the issue can be answered logically, especially if we are dealing with actions within a political system that was ruled arbitrarily by one or several people, and particularly if the ruler is at one point a drunkard with his finger on the nuclear button and at another, a very sick man probably being kept alive by medical machinery.

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The factor that I personally believe was decisive in determining whether or not the Soviet Union decided to invade was the stability or fragility of the communist party’s grip on power. Contrary to Marxist theory, the main issue, which the Soviet rulers cared about most, was not the ownership of the means of production, but power. In order to avoid an intervention, the power had to be of the communist type and held by communists or at least people believed to be communists (thanks to their loyalty towards the USSR). Cuba was termed a communist country as soon as its system of government came to resemble the Soviet one. Romania, regardless of all its heresies, was never threatened by a Soviet intervention. In spite of everything, in 1956 the Polish communists retained their grip on power, while in Hungary the party apparatus disintegrated. Of course, this general rule could be modified by various strategic or international considerations. Perhaps it was these that determined that the Yugoslav heresy was treated with relative mildness. It should nevertheless by recalled that in Yugoslavia – as in Romania – the communists actually remained in power until the final demise of the “global communist system”. My next question in comparing the two countries concerns the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution and successive waves of protest in Poland and the behaviour of the people at those moments. The Poles have a reputation of being eternal rebels. The analysed events show that this label is as true to life as most national stereotypes. The deviation of our actual behaviour from the stereotype was remarked on already in 1956. According to a saying that became popular in Warsaw directly after the events, “The Hungarians had behaved like Poles, the Poles like Czechs and the Czechs like swine”. I would like to apologise to our Czech neighbours for bringing up this saying, which I of course don’t subscribe to. However, if we are to search for the factors that shape collective behaviour, we should give serious consideration to the templates which are encoded in us by upbringing, tradition and knowledge, and which operate in addition to the factors that are the direct stimuli for action. I am convinced that the reason that underground opposition activity developed so quickly in Poland both during the Nazi occupation and after the imposition of martial law in 1981 was our tradition of clandestine resistance. After the introduction of martial law, socalled “patriotic jewellery” appeared in Poland, and the combination of religious and patriotic symbols became popular. The idea for both referred directly to similar undertakings during the uprising of 1863 and the Nazi occupation. The memory of past struggles could stimulate the outbreak and progress of new ones. On the other hand, the historical tradition

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(knowledge) of both domestic and foreign (including Hungarian) experiences probably induced the Poles to avoid certain behaviours burdened with excessive risk. Such a comparative reflection requires asking whether, to what extent and in what areas memory of the national history also influenced the Hungarians – starting with the outbreak of the 1956 revolution, through numerous actions of individual people, to a general reference to the past.11 Did anybody in 1956 Budapest think about 1848? Did the Polish general Józef Bem, under whose monument the Budapest revolt began, plays a posthumous role of a symbolic connection to the already rebelling Poland, or did his figure also represent the national movement of 19th century? An important question in making the comparison is that of the progress of revolutionary movements. A basic element of their mechanics has been the frequent combination of social and nationalist motives. This combination has determined all such movements’ basic structural similarity. The system was seen to be bad in and of itself (and in particular as representing social injustice), and at the same time it was an expression and an instrument of foreign domination. Both these factors not only coexisted but reinforced each other. This structural similarity has been often been observed in anti-colonial and independence movements in subjugated countries. Another question worthy of a comparative look was the increasing degree of the revolts’ self-organisation. This is a difficult issue, since the passage of time and the accumulation of experiences had a fundamental effect on it – which means that the comparison cannot by its very nature be completely convincing. In 1956, in both countries there were still people who remembered the political life before the war, many participants of pre-war strikes and demonstrations were still active. Later on, people also considered the experiences gained after the war. In 1980, the Polish strike leaders’ organising committees, demands for free trade unions, as well as their decision to remain within their workplaces or self-limitation drew upon the new post-war experiences – 1956 Budapest, 1968 Prague, December 1970 on the Polish coast, the long observations pointing to the impossibility of reforming the communist system and possibly other factors. Nevertheless, a comparison of the short-lived episode of the Hungarian conflict of 1956 with both the short-term outbreaks and the long-range changes that occurred in Poland would be interesting for analysing the

See an interesting Polish reflection on Hungarian historical memory: Magdalena LECHOWSKA, Węgrzy patrzą na swoją historię (1945–2003), Warszawa 2004.

11

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development of self-organisation and demands for freedom of association in our countries.12 The Hungarian uprising dealt much more harshly with its opponents than did the Polish protests. I believe that there was only one instance of a UB officer being lynched in Poland (in Poznań in 1956). Was this because the Poles hatred toward the UB secret police was smaller than the Hungarians’ toward its counterpart, the ÁVH? Or because during the events of 1956 and in later years, the UB, and later SB gave the Poles less reasons to hate it than the ÁVH did in Hungary? Both in Poland and Hungary, the protesters often attacked communist party offices – which was not surprising. Both in Poland and in Hungary there was an “internal democracy of revolutionary movements” – but this is probably typical for all revolutions. We can also remark on the efforts to ensure a high morale (including the banning of alcohol!). The development of the two countries’ revolutionary programs also had a similar dynamic. Initially (in Poland in October 1956) it included strong demands for the repair of socialism, whereas later (in Poland in the 1980s) few oppositionists even mentioned the word ”socialism”. This change was probably typical of revolutionary movements in general, in Poland it was advanced by the communist establishment’s repeatedly reneging on promises to improve the system, made during successive protests. Both in Poland and in Hungary, the resistance movements frequently took on as their symbols the colours of the countries’ national flags. This was nothing extraordinary, since they were both movements of national emancipation. Several comments are however in order. The perception of the local communist parties as anti-national forces, and therefore using the national flag and nationalist slogans in the revolts against them, merits deeper analysis. The fact that the “people’s democracies” and their communist parties were subordinate to Moscow is obvious. It is however interesting to note that, as was said above, a large portion of Poland’s party establishment was deeply afraid of Moscow, and General Jaruzelski was probably sure that he was saving Poland from "fraternal assistance" (and perhaps he did, who knows?). It would also be good to recall that in 1956 the people cheered for the communist Gomułka; that until they proved to be totally unrealistic, Not a comparison, but an interesting step towards a reflection on the motives of selforganisation in one particular historical episode: Dionizy SMOLEŃ, Tłum czy społeczność zorganizowana? Strajkujący w Stoczni Gdańskiej w sierpniu 1980. In: Solidarność w ruchu. 1980–1981. Studia pod redakcją Marcina Kuli, Stowarzyszenie "Archiwum Solidarności", Instytut Historyczny Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2000, pp. 151–217. 12

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Gierek’s economic plans were received with much interest; and that during his time the Polish United Worker’s Party had over 3 million members. One last thing that should be borne in mind is the fact that a large portion of those who protested in 1956 came from the ranks of the PZPR, while in 1980 many party members joined Solidarity (and not just in the course of fulfilling their party duties). This gives rise to the question of whether the situation was the same in Hungary. An issue that would be interesting to tackle in a comparative study would be the role of religion and religious symbols – which was probably different in Poland and in Hungary. It would also be interesting to look at the role of other symbolic actions, such as the changing of street names or the destruction of monuments. It seems that fewer monuments were destroyed in Poland than in Hungary. Why was that? And why wasn’t there ever a monument of Stalin built in Warsaw? Was it only because of the more-or-less known coincidence13 or was there some deeper reason? The lack of such a monument meant that Warsaw would not have an iconoclastic image to rival those in Hungary. The destruction of the Felix Dzerzhinsky monument after the fall of communism was a poor substitute. Anyhow, Dzerzhinsky disintegrated too easily – both literally and metaphorically. It was ironic that the arm of the crane that took the Cheka founder off his plinth bore the name “Waryński” (the crane having been manufactured by the Waryński machinery plant).14 Some Varsovians joked somewhat bitterly that this was one monument that should remain standing in the Polish capital– after all, there were few people who had killed as many Russians as Dzerzhinsky. Another issue important in making a comparative analysis is the representation of various social groups in the opposition movements. In both countries the participation of workers proved to be of fundamental importance, which is especially interesting when we consider the ideology of the system they rebelled against. It would be only partly ironic to say that Marx’s dream of a proletarian revolution was finally coming true. An noteworthy element in both countries was the participation of the intelligentsia. It can even be said that intellectuals – and even philosophers – played a significant role in the events (the French Revolution comes to mind!). I might also mention the Warsaw’ University's Philosophy Department’s The government did not like the design submitted by Xawery Dunikowski, and the cult of Stalin ended shortly afterwards. 14 Ludwik Waryński (1856–1889), Polish socialist, founder of the first Polish worker's party, called the Proletariat. He died in prison in the fortress of Shlisselburg (Petersburg). Under communism, he was venerated as a hero. 13

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little-known initiative to help György Lukács by hiring him after the defeat of the Hungarian revolution in 1956. I do not know how this idea was pursued, but at any rate it did not end in success. The large role played by the intelligentsia may have been due to the specific characteristics of Eastern Europe and the overrepresentation of this social class in our region. The role may have also been due to an inherent trait of despotic systems. In such systems it is often the intelligentsia, and specifically the intelligentsia close to the political establishment that is the source of social ferment – because it is the only group capable of initiating reflection, and perhaps even action. Despotic systems also give the intelligentsia a greater opportunity than other classes to achieve leadership of the movement during the further course of events. This is especially true in the initial phase of the revolt – because later on, as a result of the changes that the movement brings, it is the intelligentsia, which is most at risk of being swamped by other groups with their own distinct goals and motives. An important issue for consideration in any comparisons would be the participation of particular age groups in opposition movements. Both in Hungary in 1956 and in successive revolts in Poland, young people played a major role. Was this due to the simple reason that, as the Polish proverb says, “when you’re young you start fires, when you get older you put them out”? Or were there also other reasons, more characteristic of the countries and/or political system in question? It is sometimes said that in 1980 the young generation of Poles rebelled because they had never experienced Stalinism themselves, and thanks to that, they were less intimidated (or perhaps they simply did not realise how they could be punished for their actions?). This explanation is probably true – but it doesn’t account for the enormous role played by young people in either Poland or Hungary in 1956. Moreover, it overlooks another significant factor. In Poland young people matured to an attitude of opposition more easily due to their constant contacts with the older generation – those who had their own experiences of fighting or resisting communism. The multigenerational composition of the Workers’ Defence Committee (KOR), the opposition organisation established in 1976 following a wave of workers’ demonstrations, was a typical example of this phenomenon. What happened in Poland and in Hungary in 1956 marked history for a long time to come. However, it marked it quite differently in each country. In Hungary, the drowning of the popular movement in blood and the horrific repressions, which followed, meant that János Kádár had to do something to gain the people’s support. He felt that it was necessary to

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improve living standards, introduce reforms and gradual (although relative and selective) liberalisation. The blow he had dealt to the Hungarians was so strong that even a slight easing of repressions was already seen as a step in the right direction. By the way, in Poland after 1981 General Jaruzelski modelled his actions on Kádár’s policies – he wanted to first strike a blow, and then introduce controlled reforms and liberalisation. There was talk in Poland then of the perspective of “kadarization”. The fact that General Jaruzelski was unable to carry out these plans is a different matter. In 1956 Władysław Gomułka’s situation was opposite of Kádár’s. He came (returned) to power on a wave of a great movement of popular support and liberalisation. On the one hand he had to, on the other hand he probably wanted to, and finally, he felt he could (thanks to his popularity among the people) restrict those freedoms. He wanted to and was able to slow the rise in incomes and to concentrate more and more power in his own hands. Both of these desires were rooted in his personality, which combined the traits of an ascetic and an authoritarian. He couldn’t understand why the people were displeased, since, whatever else could be said, they were better off and freer than before 1956. Overall, the situation in both countries differed diametrically not only at outset (1956), but also in the way it subsequently evolved. It’s true that in Poland the situation never reverted to the Stalinist model, but it was also true that we were often jealous of Hungary’s well-stocked stores, its economic reforms, and sometimes even certain Hungarian liberties. This divergence of evolutionary paths had further consequences. In Stalin’s time all socialist states ran largely according to one clock - set in Moscow. The fact that over time their individual clocks started running at different speeds had a fundamental influence on the fall of communism. The annual attempts to synchronise them, made at each year’s meeting of the communist nations’ leaders at Crimea, proved insufficient The Soviet invasion of Hungary – and in addition, of course, the subsequent intervention of Warsaw Pact states in Czechoslovakia – were a true watershed for our countries and were to have an impact upon our thinking in the future. In 1980–1981 the Communist power elite in Poland was certainly afraid of a Soviet intervention. The threat of such an invasion was one of the reasons General Jaruzelski gave for his introduction of martial law in December 1981. Initially, he did so indirectly, although in a way that was quite clear to everybody. After the fall of communism, when he defended himself (as he continues to do) against numerous accusations, he has articulated this argument more clearly.

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In Poland there have been and continue to be discussions on whether there was real reason to fear an invasion in 1981. Today, the prevailing opinion seems to be that the USSR would not have been ready for such a move. It does not, however, seem possible to find convincing arguments, either at the time or in the sight that would definitely exclude the possibility of a “fraternal intervention” in Poland. Not only the communist elite, but also the average citizen not only knew that Poland’s “Big Brother” was the ultimate guarantor of the system’s existence, but also that if the need arose, he would not hesitate to use military force to defend it. That explained the self-limitation of the Solidarity movement. The labour union was careful to avoid irritating or provoking the Soviet Union. The belief that an invasion was unavoidable also probably partly explained our surprise at the imposition of martial law by General Jaruzelski himself. Before that, we had been more afraid of the formation in Poland of a “workers’ and peasants’ government” and the subsequent provision of “assistance” by the Soviet Army in response to this government’s appeal for help. There had been plenty of internal and external signs that made such a course of events seem likely. In view of this, the fact that the whole issue was resolved with the use of domestic forces (which proved quite surprisingly efficient taking into account what a sorry state the country was in) came as much more of a surprise. Looking over the more significant moments in Solidarity’s history, we find only one when the union consciously irritated the USSR. During its first congress (1981), Solidarity issued an appeal to the nations of Eastern Europe, more or less openly calling on them to follow the same path as Poland. Regardless of how this move looks from the point of view of political expediency, it does merit deeper reflection. In spite of all the above-mentioned mutual isolation of the countries of the communist bloc, the delegates to the Solidarity convention who, after all, were mostly so-called average people, did remember the other countries of the communist bloc. In a sense, they began – independently, and in opposition to a Marxist system – to implement the Marxist slogan "Proletarians of all countries unite!" There were various reasons for this – starting with a desire characteristic of most revolutionary movements to spread their revolution as far and wide as possible. I believe, however, that another reason was the memory of the Hungarian revolution quashed by the Soviet intervention in 1956 and this, in turn, served to moderate the workers’ behaviour.

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In Poland, where historical memory was, in spite of everything, suppressed to a lesser extent than in many other communist countries, quite a few people remembered the Hungarian tragedy; many probably learned of it from underground publications and materials published abroad, or even in Poland, after communism began to loosen its grip. That memory never really died. Neither did the memory of events in Poland in 1956, even though the crushed Poznań revolt in June was recalled more clearly than the transformations that took place that year. It is interesting how well the Hungarians themselves remembered the revolution of 1956. What were the events to which the Hungarians harked back during the final downfall of communism and were there any similarities to Poland in this area? There are various indications that the communists in Hungary had effectively obliterated the memory of 1956. The Hungarians – especially the younger ones – only discovered the history of those events as the ancien régime disintegrated, to finally uncover it fully after its collapse. When we speak of historical references and inspiration with the past, we should not of course confine ourselves to the most recent history. Unlike in Hungary, in Poland the events of 1848 are practically forgotten, and the role of the Szczerbiec sword15 is nowhere near as important as that of the Crown of St. Stephen in Hungary. Another interesting aspect are the differences in the memory of the empires that had dominated both countries and the symbols they left behind – a memory which it seems to me is much different in Poland than it is in Hungary, but which in both cases played an important role in the in the system transformation.

15

The coronation sword of the kings of Poland.

Was Kennedy a “Realist”? Cuban Missile Crisis and the Decision Making in International Affairs Jaroslav Fiala

The Cuban missile crisis is considered to be one of the pivotal moments in the history of the Cold War. As the American Historian Jack M. Schick pointed out, the United States and the Soviet Union were protecting their interests by nuclear force.1 Their destructive potential was a source of the crisis. In contrast, French political-scientist and philosopher Raymond Aron noticed that the bipolar order was as dangerous as any other international order. The probability of a nuclear war was low because of mutually assured destruction. This also means that representatives of superpowers were rational individuals who could make decisions in accordance with the national interest. But were they so “realistic indeed”? Did they sufficiently calculate the costs and benefits of their actions?2 According to Aron they did, except for the Caribbean crisis.3 Thus, if we ponder causes of the crisis we would find several contradictions. The Soviet ballistic missiles were installed at a time of mutual negotiations, the premature development of installation was very hazardous, and so, the world was suddenly on the brink of nuclear holocaust without corresponding causation. The American analyst Graham T. Allison highlighted these differences in his work Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. From this point of view it cannot be clearly known what J. M. SCHICK, American Diplomacy and the Berlin Negotiations, in: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 18, 1965, No. 4, pp. 809–810. 2 In this context “realism” is considered as an effort to achieve balance of power in the international system. For realists the main actors on the world stage are states, which are legally sovereign actors. World politics (or more accurately for Realists international politics) represents a struggle for power between states each trying to maximize the national interest. Such order as exists in world politics is the result of the workings of a balance of power. The potential of conflict is, therefore omnipresent and world politics depends on diplomacy as a key mechanism for balancing various national interests. The role of a state is then based on the rational choice and on the balance between costs and benefits of its behavior. Actors of this analysis are, nonetheless statesmen, but they are still representatives of states. See S. SMITH, J. BAYLIS, Introduction, in: S. SMITH, J. BAYLIS, (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford 2005, pp. 4–5. 3 For more details, see R. ARON, The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World 1945–1973, Cambridge 1974. 1

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Khrushchev really intended – therefore, we can reconsider the rationality of Soviet action. Nonetheless, what if we rethink the American reaction as well? Was the naval quarantine of Cuba an outcome of rational decision making, involving only strategic factors? Why could the U.S. not have ignored Soviet installations? In short, this paper would attempt to summarize reasons for operation Anadyr, and then to analyze motives for the Kennedy administration’s performance during October 1962. The aim is to highlight the linkage between internal politics and decision making in the international relations. Soviet decision about the installation In the years 1961–1962 John F. Kennedy was confronted with Soviet demands for a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic and for modification of West Berlin into a “Free City”. On the other hand, the US government increased the defense spending and provided backing for Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs. These events had significant consequences for the following diplomatic confrontation. Khrushchev was aware of Soviet conventional arms superiority in Europe and regarded Kennedy as an inexperienced politician with intellectual ambitions. Therefore, the Soviet Chairman escalated his German ultimatums and declared support for “Wars of National Liberation”.4 However, Khrushchev was confronted with internal as well as with foreign opposition. Chinese politicians especially criticized the Soviet Union for incomplete claims in case of Germany. Simultaneously, the question of the Cuban-American neighborhood became influential for American foreign policy: the island was taken as a disturbing element in the U.S. geopolitical sphere of influence and the debacle at the Bay of Pigs caused closer SovietCuban co-operation. In December 1961 Fidel Castro declared that he would be a MarxistLeninist until the end of his days5 and on January 1962 Cuba was excluded from the Organization of American States.6 The Soviet government started to cooperate with Havana more intensively and began to rethink the issue of Cuban security. On February 18, 1962 the Kremlin proclaimed publicly that the Soviets would support the Cuban regime despite economic embargos N. KOCHAVI, Limited Accommodation, Perpetuated Conflict: Kennedy, China and the Laos Crisis, 1961–1963, in: Diplomatic History 26/2002, Oxford 2002, p. 104. 5 L. A. PÉREZ, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution, Oxford 1995, p. 331. 6 The Times, February 1, 1962, p. 8. 4

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and U.S. hostility.7 Moscow also promised a delivery of Soviet anti-aircraft system with surface-to-air missiles. However, when the American government announced activation of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey, the delivery was postponed.8 According to William Taubman and Herbert S. Dienerstein, the decision to strengthen Cuban defense was made at the beginning of 1962. In fact, the Soviet Chairman was considering this issue immediately after the Bay of Pigs,9 but in February 1962 he discussed it in the context of a nuclear disequilibrium between superpowers at his dacha. The U.S. had approximately fifteen times more nuclear capability than the Soviets and knew this due to the satellite exploration of the U.S.S.R.10 On the other hand, Moscow owned many medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) and these could have partly balanced the American strategic supremacy. In April 1962 Khrushchev was debating this question in Bulgaria with his minister of defense, Rodion J. Malinovsky. In accordance with his memoirs, Khrushchev allegedly was shown the far bank of the Black Sea and saw that Western missiles in Turkey could destroy the Southern Ukraine. Therefore, why should the Soviet Union not have the same opportunity? The Soviet Chairman was thinking about Soviet missiles in Cuba – according to him, they would create a situation which the Western politicians were calling a “balance of power”.11 Although some of his advisers like Anastas Mikoyan and Andrei Gromyko disagreed, Khrushchev persuaded the unconvinced Politburo members and gained support from the military leadership. In May, the Soviet Council of Defense authorized plans for military protection of Cuba and the Chairman nominated a secret commission whose members had to hand over the Soviet proposals to Fidel Castro personally.12 On May 30th the Soviet delegation arrived in Havana and on July 2nd the Cuban representatives signed a secret agreement about economic and military cooperation. The main part of the treaty consisted of a layout of Soviet missile sites and troops on the island. There should be deployed three regiments of medium-range ballistic missiles R-12 (SS-4) and two regiments H. S. DIENERSTEIN, The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962, London 1976, pp. 167–168. 8 W. TAUBMAN, Khrushchev. The Man and his Era, London 2004, p. 534. 9 N. S. KHRUSHCHEV, Remembers, New York 1971, pp. 545–546. 10 M. FRANKEL, Learning from the Cuban Missile Crisis, in: I. L., HOROWITZ, J., SUCHLICKI, (eds.), Cuban Communism 1959–2003, London 2003, p. 60. 11 KHRUSHCHEV, p. 494. 12 TAUBMAN, pp. 542–544. 7

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of intermediate-range ballistic missiles R-14 (SS-5). Both types could carry one megaton nuclear warhead. Another dangerous type of weapon was the short-range missile Luna (known in the West as FROG) with a two-kiloton warhead. Khrushchev decided to add six Luna rocket launchers, which could be used without direct consultation with Moscow. Apart from that, the following weapons and troops were to be carried to Cuba: heavy bombers Il28, rocket launchers with surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), antiaircraft batteries, tanks, helicopters, nuclear submarines and military equipment. The number of Soviet troops was reduced to 45,000 men under the command of General Issa Pliev.13 According to John Lewis Gaddis, the most decisive motivation for installation of Soviet missiles was centered on the fear of U.S. invasion.14 For that matter, Khrushchev confirmed this claim in his book Remembers: “The main thing was that the installation of our missiles in Cuba would restrain the United States from precipitous military action against Castro’s government.”15 However, this reason does not explain the imminent danger of Soviet nuclear weapons and their offensive character. The cost of the Soviet Union’s effort did not correspond with its profit. To deploy the missiles was hazardous not only because of American reaction, but due to the Cuban leadership and their insufficient control of the precarious situation as well. The exhilaration of Cubans came from the full scale mobilization announced by Castro. It seemed inevitable that the United States would launch a major invasion of the island and the official government newspaper Revolución was emblazoned with the headline on October 23: “The Nation on a War footing”. Even today it is not certain if Cuban leaders were “ready to die in a nuclear holocaust”. Nevertheless, as Norberto Fuentes wrote, the atmosphere in Cuba was full of combativeness. After the mobilization, the sentiments were towards “homeland and mass of combatants motivated not to capitulate” – and not even due to the peril of total anihilation.16 As Philip Brenner pointed out, the ferocity of Cubans was shown by Castro’s order on October 27th to fire on any hostile aircraft in the Cuban airspace. That morning, a Soviet officer, who seemed to prefer Castro’s order rather than the instructions from Moscow, fired a SAM rocket that downed Anderson’s U-2. On the same day a Cuban antiaircraft battery hit the Ibid., pp. 547–548. J. L. GADDIS, We know now, Oxford 1998, p. 265. 15 KHRUSHCHEV, p. 547. 16 N. FUENTES, La autobiografía de Fidel Castro. II. El poder absoluto e insuficiente, Madrid 2007, pp. 895–907. 13

14

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reconnaissance F8U-1P plane. With a second machine down there was a real chance that the United States would invade Cuba. In 1964 Robert F. Kennedy admitted that he had warned Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin: “If one more plane were destroyed, we would hit all the SAMs immediately and probably the missiles as well and we would probably follow that with an invasion.”17 John F. Kennedy was also under pressure from military officials and the invasion was being prepared for October 29th or 30th.18 The deployment of nuclear missiles was never fully completed.19 However, the uncertainty was omnipresent and nobody knew whether the Americans, the Soviets and the Cubans would lose control over their communication. That is why the main probable motive – an effort to achieve the balance of power by the Soviet Union – was too risky. As Graham T. Allison wrote, this motive could be deconstructed also with regard to badly organized installation. According to Allison, the irrationality of Soviet action should be summarized into three basic questions. Firstly, why did the Soviets carry out the plan in spite of American warnings and presumptive reaction? Secondly, why did they not make their SAM rocket launchers operative before assembling of “offensive weapons”? And thirdly, why did they not sufficiently camouflage their facilities?20 Allison offered an explanation based on three theoretical models: 1) “model of a rational actor” 2) “model of an organizational process” 3) “model of governmental politics”. In reference to these “schemes” we cannot for certain know what Khrushchev intended. On the other hand, the abnormalities of Soviet action could be understood as personal failures together with organizational procedures of Soviet political and military institutions. That is, the installation of Soviet weapons was based on standard army instructions. In the case of Cuba there were no special military propositions and, therefore, Soviet heavy bombers were put on uncovered areas – exactly like in the U.S.S.R.21 The answer to why the Soviets did not consider the consequences of their action with respect to the anti-Castro persuasion of the American government and public is more evident if we mention the internal problems P. BRENNER, Cuba and the Missile Crisis; in: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. XXII, No. I, 1990, p. 16. See also D. ELLSBERG, ’The Day Castro almost started World War III‘, The New York Times, 30 October 1987, p. 27. 18 E. ABEL, The Missile Crisis, Philadelphia 1966, pp. 194–195. 19 V. NÁLEVKA, Světová politika ve 20. století II, Praha 2000, p. 107. 20 G. T. ALLISON, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Boston 1971, pp. 40–56. 21 Ibid., pp. 110–111. 17

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in the Soviet Union. First, the Kremlin had been delivering weapons to Cuba from 1960 without American resistance. Second, Khrushchev was under pressure from the militant wing of the Politburo, the army and by Chinese politicians; therefore, he decided to demonstrate his political “forcefulness”. And third, the debacle of the Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs could have persuaded him that the U.S. officials took the island as strategically not so important.22 Owing to this interactivity, we cannot ignore the internal motives of Soviet foreign policy. In reference to Stefano Guzzini, we can comprehend these models as complementary23 and on that account summarize four main motives for the layout of the missiles: 1) The Soviet government’s fear of losing the leading role in the socialist camp 2) fear about the “client-state” in the Caribbean 3) effort to balance the nuclear disequilibrium 4) effort to affect the German issue. These reasons correspond with American analysts such as H. S. Dienerstein or M. J. White.24 Internal motives of Soviet decision making were emphasized by Czech historian Vladimír Nálevka as well.25 Similarly, Russian historians Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov claimed that the Soviet politicians had internal and external motives on their mind. Khrushchev’s motivations “should not be attributed to any single policy aim; more likely he intended the move as a bold stroke that would alleviate pressures from several directions”.26 However, the shadow of irrationality still remains, even if it seems that the Soviets simply underestimated the course of their action. Reaction of the Kennedy administration Concurrent with the rising number of Soviet ships in Cuba, the American government was receiving alarming messages.27 On August 10th the Chief of Intelligence John McCone sent a report in which he warned that his men had evidence of a Soviet military presence on the island.28 Several days earlier, Khrushchev had asked Kennedy to stop the control and Ibid., pp. 231–232. S. GUZZINI, Realismus v mezinárodních vztazích a mezinárodní politické ekonomii, Praha 2005, pp. 94–97. 24 M. J. WHITE, The Cuban Missile Crisis, London 1996, pp. 72–88. 25 V. NÁLEVKA, Karibská krize, Praha 2002, p. 60. 26 V. ZUBOK, C. PLESHAKOV, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, Harvard University, 1996, p. 259. 27 R. S. THOMPSON, The Missiles of October: The Declassified Story of John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, New York 1992, pp. 161–162. 28 Ibid., p. 163. 22 23

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espionage of Soviet ships. The President agreed, but required the withdrawal of Soviet demands on Berlin. But the Soviet Chairman did not promise anything clear-cut and, therefore, the Americans expected more pressure in Germany.29 As Kennedy said to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 19th, “Our problem is not merely Cuba, but it is also Berlin. And when we recognize the importance of Berlin to Europe, and recognize the importance of our allies to us, that is what has made this thing be a dilemma.”30 When it became more obvious that the Kremlin was providing important military cover to the Cuban government, Kennedy issued several public statements. On September 4, 1962 he declared that the American reaction would be dependent on the character of Soviet weapons. If the Americans found them “offensive”, they would start with “necessary counter-measures”.31 Nevertheless, the evidence of “offensive” weapons was still missing. The most decisive proof could have been taken by U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, but the exploratory flights in September were cancelled – first, because of bad weather and second, owing to internal discussions in the administration. The decision came from the possibility that a spy plane could be shot down and this would be the source of a tighter diplomatic confrontation. Whereas Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy supported the exploration, Dean Rusk was afraid of disproportionate risk. Anyway, the worrying messages about Soviet installations were crucial and in the early morning hours of October 14th Rudolf Anderson photographed missile sites near San Cristóbal.32 During October 15th, experts at the CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) revealed Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) of the SS-4 family. One day later McGeorge Bundy brought this news to the private quarters of the White House. Several hours later President Kennedy met his advisers. This group (later known as the “Executive Committee of the National Security Council” – ExComm) immediately agreed that the presence of “offensive weapons” in Cuba was “unacceptable”.33 However, the question remained why this was perceived as a justification for acts of war. A. FURSENKO, T. NAFTALI, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis 1958–1964, New York 1997, pp. 194–202. 30 E. MAY, P. D. ZELIKOW, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Cambridge 1997, p. 176. 31 The Times, September 5, 1962, p. 8. 32 L. FREEDMAN, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam, Oxford 2001, p. 168. 33 MAY, ZELIKOW, p. 54. 29

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As early as October 16th two possible solutions were proposed: either a military strike or strong diplomatic pressure. General Maxwell Taylor also suggested a naval blockade, but only after “we have destroyed as many of these offensive weapons as possible”. According to American officials, the peril was evident. But what if we try to reconsider this accepted logic? Why were Soviet missiles on Cuba so dangerous? Why were they the source of a potential conflict? Western ballistic missiles were situated in Turkey and Italy and this did not start a comparable crisis in consequence. In short, why was the situation in the Western hemisphere different? The usual interpretation is that the Soviet missiles were supposed to divert strategic disequilibrium.34 John F. Kennedy advocated this reason as well. As he declared in his speech on October 22th, “the Soviet action was a deliberately provocative and unjustified change of status quo”.35 On the other hand, several members of Ex Comm did not support this claim – above all, Minister of Defense Robert McNamara. He actually recognized the situation in the international system as a “nuclear stalemate” – neither one of both superpowers had the potential to completely avert a nuclear counterstrike. And even Soviet missiles in Cuba were not able to change this state of affairs.36 That may have signified that the American attack on Cuba would be relatively unproblematic. However, the American President supposed that a military strike could not be accomplished without a significant response. The Soviets may have intervened in Europe where they possessed superiority in conventional forces. Even if the Soviets had not used nuclear weapons, there would have been a possible attack on the Western Allies with armored divisions.37 The naval blockade was immediately assessed as an extreme solution as well – it could have been recognized as a declaration of war.38 Members of the Kennedy’s administration were analyzing five reasons for Soviet missiles in Cuba: 1) Improvement of Soviet strategic position; 2) replacement of Jupiters in Turkey; 3) defense of Cuba; 4) split among Western Allies; 5) improvement of Soviet bargaining position. ALLISON, pp. 40–56; R. GARTHOFF, U. S. Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis, in: J. BLIGHT, D. A. WELCH, (eds.), Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis, London 1998, p. 25. 35 D. DETZER, On the Brink. Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, London 1980, p. 186. 36 McNamara declared this statement on October 18: „Secretary Rusk asked me, and I evaded it because I wanted this information. This stuff first. The question he asked me was: How does, in effect, the introduction of these weapons to Cuba change the military equation, the position of the U.S. versus the U.S.S.R.? And, speaking strictly in military terms, it doesn’t change it at all, in my personal opinion.” MAY, ZELIKOW, p. 133. 37 R. F. KENNEDY, Thirteen days: a memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, New York 1969, pp. 40–45. 38 FURSENKO, NAFTALI, p. 233. 34

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Therefore, members of the Ex Comm gradually agreed with McNamara’s proposal of quarantine – the naval blockade including only “offensive weapons.”39 Those who assumed that Khrushchev’s effort did lie in the change of a strategic imbalance presumed that he was preparing the ground for a new political offensive over Berlin. According to Kennedy, the Soviets would have probably taken lower risk in pressing the U.S. hard in other confrontations. “Berlin preyed on Kennedy’s mind throughout the crisis, acting as a significant constraint.”40 From this point of view the quarantine was a rational solution. A military strike could not guarantee that it would put out of operation all Soviet missiles. Moreover, if the Soviets retaliated, they could have attacked Western Europe as well. The quarantine was a logical way out, because it could provide enough time for a diplomatic initiative. However, this does not explain the different situation in Turkey and the “evidence of the missile’s unacceptability” in Cuba. At first, we could aim at the issue of strategic balance. Above all, presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba had its “psychological implication”. Soviet missiles ninety miles from the U.S. could have started a new era of equilibrium – the United States would have been under pressure from imminent proximity. The potential number of megatons would have been higher, the area of U.S. more endangered and the time for American counterstrike logically shorter. The Americans were not sure if Soviet nuclear warheads had been ready for assembly, but they simply supposed that presence of ballistic missiles would include warheads as well. We can admit that the difference between Cuba and Turkey lay in a disparity of strategic significance. Thus, American officials analyzed whether the situation in Cuba was similar to Turkey. With reference to Philip Nash, the Americans used “ethical argumentation”: according to them, missiles in Cuba were installed secretly, while the others in Turkey and Italy publicly and legitimately.41 However, this explanation does not have a strategic relevance. The more probable reason is that the number of Jupiters in Turkey (15) was different from number of missiles in Cuba (42).42 Minutes of the 506th Meeting of the National Security Council, October 21, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Washington 1997, pp. 141–149. 40 FREEDMAN, p. 173. 41 P. NASH, The Other Missiles of October. Eisenhower, Kennedy and the Jupiters 1957– 1963, North Carolina 1997, p. 122. 42 ALLISON, p. 44. 39

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Nevertheless, even after the deployment of missiles in Cuba, the United States was keeping superiority in nuclear weapons. This state of affairs was definitely confirmed in the autumn of 1961 when pictures from satellite Corona revealed strategic imbalance at the expense of the U.S.S.R. According to the Strategic Air Command, the U.S. had 1530 missiles and heavy bombers available for the first strike. This massive force was arrayed against the Soviet Union and could destroy 82 % of its military capacities. As Dean Rusk said, “well, I think when we use the word equal, what is meant there is that in this confrontation of two great power blocks each side has a capacity to inflict very great damage upon the other. But that does not necessarily mean that, in the total situation, the two situations are equal”. And McNamara added: “I believe we have several times more nuclear power that of the Soviet Union.” In short, the United States did not have to “trade places with anyone in the world”.43 As Noam Chomsky pointed out, bipolar order was on the beginning of the “decade of disillusionment” asymmetric. The decisive world power has been under control of the United States and therefore, whilst the Soviets were obliged to hide their intentions and courses of actions, the Americans were not. The Cuban missile crisis confirmed this paradox in praxis: while the U.S. could install ballistic missiles in Turkey, the U.S.S.R. was not allowed to disturb the Western sphere of influence. If the Soviets acted similarly, they would risk nuclear war.44 As a result, the effort to defend the national interest of the U.S. was backed by the consciousness of enormous strategic dominance. Secondly, as in case of the Soviet decision, we cannot underestimate the context of internal politics. The existence of a socialist regime in Cuba was a challenge for any U.S. government and public retreat was very difficult. If the representatives in Washington had tolerated ballistic missiles in Cuba, they would have risked their own political defeat at home. After the Bay of Pigs debacle Kennedy could not afford a similar failure. As Dean Acheson said on October 19th, “we were involved in a test of wills, and the sooner we got to a showdown the better”.45 Soon after Fidel Castro’s triumph in January 1959, Cuba became a big political issue in the United States. At the end of the Eisenhower Presidency, M. BESCHLOSS, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1961–1963, New York 1991, p. 331. 44 N. CHOMSKY, Hegemony or Survival. America’s Quest for Global Dominance, New York 2003, pp. 100–103. 45 Record of the Meeting, 19. 10. 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961– 1963, Vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Washington 1997, pp. 116–118. 43

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the Democrats were criticizing the Republicans for permitting the increasingly radical Cuban Revolution to rise and flourish. Kennedy repeatedly charged that the Republicans had allowed Cuba to become a Communist satellite. After the Bay of Pigs the new Administration ordered Operation Mongoose, engaged in sabotage, paramilitary raids and other so-called “dirty tricks” (the CIA plotted to assassinate Castro as well). However, the growing Soviet military presence held significance in itself as a challenge of the United States in Latin America.46 When the Soviet military presence in Cuba was publicly known, Kennedy decided to make several public declarations. As we have seen at the beginning of this paper, the U.S. leaders warned Moscow not to deploy “offensive weapons”. However, the Republicans were criticizing Kennedy anyway – they were, above all, collecting support for the November congressional elections. Therefore, the question of a Soviet arms build-up in Cuba took its serious political dimension when Republican leaders began to mount an unrelenting attack against Democrats. They strove to make Cuba, not Medicare, the leading topic of the Congressional campaign. Whereas Kennedy had insisted that the Soviet missiles in Cuba were “defensive” (short-range surface-to-air), Republicans labeled them as “offensive” (surface-to-air and surface-to-surface).47 Decrying a Soviet disruption of the Monroe Doctrine, Republicans demanded immediate action. On September 4th Kennedy tried to quiet the clamor by meeting with congressional leaders of both parties and by stating that neither Soviet combat troops nor ground-to-ground missiles existed in Cuba. The next day, the Republican senator Kenneth B. Keating dismissed the President’s explanation: “Who is to say, whether a weapon is offensive or defensive? It depends on the direction in which it is aimed.” Kennedy took the initiative in consequence. On September 7th he asked the Congress for standby authority to call up 150,000 military reservists to “meet challenges in any part of the free world”.48 Therefore, with reference to internal politics, it seems that American response on Soviet missiles had to For the issue of Cuba-United States relations, see T. G. PATERSON, Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution, New York 1994; J. D. MARTZ, (eds.), United States Policy in Latin America: A Quarter Century of Crisis and Challenge 1961–1986, University of Nebraska 1989; M. PÉREZ-STABLE, The Cuban Revolution. Origins, Course and Legacy, Oxford 1999; L. A. PÉREZ, Cuba and the United States: Ties of singular intimacy, London 1990. 47 T. G. PATERSON, W. J., BROPHY, October Missiles and November Elections: The Cuban Missile Crisis and American Politics 1962, in: The Journal of American History, LXXIII/I, 1986, p. 95. 48 Ibid., pp. 96–97. 46

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be uncompromising, because the threat of political fiasco at home was enormous. “But did those consequences counsel an American choice of a course of action involving a higher probability of nuclear war?”49 Decision making and the context of a particular identity As we have seen, the character of a danger often results from the calculation of a threat. Therefore, the different attitudes in the cases of Cuba and Turkey could be reconsidered in accordance with the interpretation of danger. With reference to the French philosopher Michele Foucault we can point out that danger is not a strictly objective condition. It is not a thing that exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. Anything can be a risk. It all depends on how one analyzes the danger and considers the event. Therefore, danger bears no essential, necessary or unproblematic relation to the action. It includes reflections of the people said to be at risk. It is also a result of power relations among people – an expression of a political discourse.50 To suggest as much, nonetheless, is not to argue that “everything is language” or “there is no reality”; rather to reconsider the “self-evident” knowledge of facts. In Foucault’s terms: “We must not resolve discourse into a play of pre-existing significations; we must not imagine that the world turns toward us a legible face which we would only have to decipher; the world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our favour.”51 However, if we acknowledge that danger is not primary or stable, but performatively constituted, how can we speak about other concepts such as “security”, “war” or “sovereignty”? Anyway, how can we speak about “danger” if we consider it as a temporarily constituted entity? Isn’t security, after all, determined by the requirements of objective conditions? The answer could be “yes”, but with the objection that the extent of any danger still depends on its interpretation. In short, these terms and explanations should be understood with respect to the context of a political community. And so, political scientists like Richard Ashley, James Der Derian or Alexander Wendt (to mention them among the others) have reconsidered the cognition of reality in the international relations. Their common attitude is that ALLISON, p. 201. M. FOUCAULT, Society Must Be Defended. Lectures at the College de France 1975– 1976, London 2003, pp. 11–35. 51 M. SHAPIRO (ed.), Michele Foucault: Language and Politics, Oxford 1984, pp. 126– 127. 49

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international relations are not independent on human consciousness and that is why “naturally” concepts are linked with different images of reality.52 This understanding of the interpretative basis of risk has important implications. If we are considering American reaction during the missile crisis, it seems that we should analyze it with reference to the linkage between foreign policy and internal affairs. One possible way is to highlight the connectedness between external threat and boundaries of American identity. In other words, to analyze whether the interpretation of a danger was linked with the state’s identity and secured by a political representation. The political analyst David Campbell discussed this linkage in his book Writing Security. According to him, the American identity was traditionally constituted in the light of the dichotomy between “civilization” and “barbarism”. This course was maintained in the Cold War as well. What this argument does suggest is that it is erroneous to relieve the practitioners of American statecraft from all responsibility for making the world in which they worked. Campbell pointed out that in the American documents on foreign policy the boundary between internal and external security was blurred. A Soviet threat was assessed not only in geopolitical terms, but it was often understood as a political rather than a primarily military danger. “While one might have expected few if any references to national values or purposes in confidential documents, the texts of foreign policy were replete with statements about the fulfillment of the republic, the fundamental purposes of the nation, God-given rights, moral codes, principals of European civilization and the responsibilities and duties thrust upon the gleaming example of America.”53 Campbell argued that most of the texts and speeches on foreign policy are more than strategic analyses of the “reality” they confronted: they actively concerned themselves with the scripting of a particular American identity. These foreign policy texts of the postwar period recalled the seventeenth-century literary genre of the “jeremiad”, or a “political sermon”, in which Puritan preachers combined searing critiques with appeal for spiritual renewal. The refrains of political sermons have occupied a prominent place in the postwar political discourse. “The cold war, then, was both: a struggle that exceeded the military threat of the Soviet Union, and

For more details, see I. B. NEUMANN, O. WAEVER (eds.), The Future of International Relations, London 1997. 53 D. CAMPBELL, Writing Security, Minnesota 1998, p. 31. 52

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a struggle into which any number of potential candidates, regardless of their strategic capacity, were slotted as a threat.”54 And so, the source of a danger has not been ultimately fixed. We can consider it in case of John F. Kennedy and his attitude to Cuba. During the presidential campaign in 1960 Kennedy said in a speech: “The enemy is the Communist system itself – implacable, unceasing in its drive for world domination. For this is not a struggle for the supremacy of arms alone – it is also a struggle for supremacy between two conflicting ideologies: Freedom under God versus ruthless, godless tyranny.”55 However, in case of Castro’s revolution Kennedy was changing his opinions noticeably. Two years before his election, on December 15, 1958, in Puerto Rico, Kennedy said: “I realize that it always will be a cardinal tenet of American foreign policy not to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations – and this is particularly true in Latin America.” But than he corrected his statement: “For there is little question that should any Latin American country be driven by repression into the arms of the communists, our attitude would change overnight.”56 In his book Strategy of Peace in January 1960 Kennedy wrote: “Whether Castro would have taken a more rational course after his victory had the United States Government not backed the dictator Batista so long and so uncritically and had it given the fiery young rebel a warmer welcome in his hour of triumph, especially on his trip to this country, we cannot be sure.”57 On the other hand, when Castro became closer to the influence of the Soviet Union, Kennedy interpreted his significance differently. On September 2, 1960 he declared: “I think he [Castro] should be condemned. I think he is a source of maximum danger. I think the big task of the next administration is going to be to contain this revolution in Cuba, itself, and not have it spread through Latin America.”58 And on October 6 at Cincinnati, Ohio: “But Castro is not just another Latin American dictator – a petty tyrant bent merely on personal power and gain. His ambitions extended far beyond his own shores. He has transformed the island of Cuba into a hostile and militant communist satellite – a base from which to carry communist infiltration and subversion throughout the America. With guidance, support and arms from Moscow Ibid., p. 33. BESCHLOSS, p. 25. 56 R. J. WALTON, Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy, Baltimore 1972, p. 35. 57 J. F. KENNEDY, The Strategy of Peace, New York 1961, pp. 172–173. 58 WALTON, p. 36. 54 55

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and Peking he has made anti-Americanism as a sign of loyalty and antiCommunism a punishable crime (…) threatened the existence of our naval base at Guantanamo and rattled red rockets at the United States, which can hardly close its eyes to a potential enemy missile or submarine base only ninety miles from our shores.”59 But in fact, already in 1959 Castro and his Barbudos were killing their opponents, collaborating with Cuban Communists and nationalizing American property.60 It seems Kennedy’s change of mind was particularly caused by the criticism of Republicans in the Presidential elections. And thus, after Cuban cooperation with the Soviet Union became closer and more explicit Kennedy could declare his open hostility. In the light of Campbell’s arguments – when Cuba emerged as a part of the “communist empire”, Castro has been taken as a member of the “barbarous world”. In this sense, we can understand international politics as a practice of the inscription of the dangerous, the externalization and totalization of dangers and the mobilization of population to control these dangers. In Campbell’s words, “foreign policy is one part of a multifaceted process of inscription that disciplines by framing man in the spatial and temporal organization of the inside and outside, self and other: i.e., in the state”. Therefore, “foreign policy” could be divorced from the state as a particular resolution of the categories of identity and difference and applies to confrontations that appear to take place between “self” and “the other”. In short, “foreign policy” provides a “conventional matrix” of interpretations in which politicians operate.61 Thus, the American reaction during the Cuban crisis seems more complicated. At the outset of the crisis there were several counter-arguments to resolve it only by a diplomatic route. But by the afternoon of the second day, serious discussions in the ExComm focused on the military alternatives: the air strike and the blockade. Especially Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze did not accept McNamara’s assertion that Soviet missiles in Cuba constituted no change in the strategic balance. According to “hawks”, the U.S. warning of an attack would be cut from fifteen to three minutes and Soviet first-strike capability would be doubled. However, in reference to G. T. Allison, the question of whether a resolute action was necessary depended on one’s interpretation of the meaning of “superiority”, “inferiority” and Ibid., p. 36. C. FRANQUI, Cuba, la revolución: ¿mito o realidad? Memorias de un fantasma socialista, Barcelona 2006, pp. 229–261. See also H. THOMAS, Cuba: la lucha por la libertad, Madrid 2004, pp. 1531–1627. 61 CAMPBELL, pp. 66–69. 59

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“equality” in a nuclear age. The common opinion was, nonetheless (and even McNamara agreed with it), that Soviet missiles did have some effect on political balance.62 Therefore, in accordance with Campbell’s statement, missiles were assessed primarily as a political threat. Just before the disclosure of ballistic missiles on September 19th the Office of National Estimates published its findings on the Soviet buildup in Cuba: “We believe that the U.S.S.R. values its position in Cuba primarily for political advantages to be derived from it.”63 The National Estimates, then, on October 19th and 20th issued a statement in which neither the effort to defend Cuba, nor narrowing the missile gap were estimated as a motive. Primary emphasis was placed on demonstrating a shift in the balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union.64 By October 16th, when the first meeting of the President and his advisers took place, there were no doubts that Soviet missiles would need to be eliminated. As Lawrence Freedman pointed out, “turning Cuba into an offensive military base for a non-American power was against spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, which for over a hundred years has been used (mostly ineffectually) to insist that European great powers should not meddle in the Americas.”65 This was exacerbated by the consciousness that the power interfering in the Western hemisphere was associated with the MarxistLeninist ideology. Thus, it was the real representative of “otherness” in Campbell’s sense. Scholars cannot be definitive about the relationship between politics and the Cuban missile crisis. Members of the ExComm made decisions that derived from a complex mix of private thoughts and public pressures that historian cannot easily disentangle. On the other hand, authors such as Thomas G. Patterson suggested that Kennedy boldly confronted the Soviets and initially eschewed quiet diplomacy to resolve the conflict because a forthright, public display of toughness would disarm Republicans who had been criticizing the administration for failing to deal with the Cuban issue. But according to William J. Brophy, Kennedy’s choice of the quarantine “was not dictated by internal politics, although public addresses may have

ALLISON, pp. 200–201. Special National Intelligence Estimate 85–3–62, September 19, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Vol. X, Cuba (January 1961– September 1962), Washington 1997, p. 1072. 64 FREEDMAN, p. 172. 65 Ibid., p. 173. 62 63

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been”. According to political preferences, neither party profited from the missile crisis on election day.66 Nonetheless, as we have seen, Kennedy and his advisers unanimously agreed with the expulsion of Soviet “offensive weapons”; the only question was if it should be done by military force. When a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down, the Americans warned that they would invade Cuba. Anyway, the possibility of American invasion was “still in the air.” Moreover, if we accept the context of the November elections and criticism by the Republicans, we cannot avoid one fact. The opposition was criticizing Kennedy for allowing disruption of the Monroe doctrine by the spread of Soviet communism – this was their crucial political advantage and Kennedy had to react to that. Therefore, when we are considering the causes of the American government’s decision making during October 1962, we should not marginalize ideological aspects. For that matter, political scientist Michael Cox characterized the Cold War not only as a strategic confrontation between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, but as an ideological stand-off between Soviet communism and Western liberal-capitalism, “a wider opposition between two material civilizations both of which insisted that they, and they alone, represented the wave of the future”.67 The Kennedy government had to react to the internal state of affairs as well. The decision about quarantine was made as a political compromise between “doves” and “hawks” in the ExComm, but also as a reaction to the political situation in the U.S. McNamara’s argument was unusual, because he stepped aside from this logic and saw the situation strictly in the light of strategic terms. American politicians had the advantage of nuclear superiority and they could have presumed that Soviet representatives would decide to retreat. To do nothing was “unthinkable” not only because of a potential shift in the balance of power. It seems it was also due to the fear of disrupting the “Cold War consensus” in the American society. For that matter, Republicans were emphasizing the threat of Soviet “defensive” weapons even before disclosure of ballistic missiles. After the quarantine was implemented, the Soviet leaders considered their options and decided to withdraw. The crisis was fortunately overcome.

PATERSON, BROPHY, pp. 118–119. M. COX, From the Cold War to War on Terror, in: S. SMITH, J. BAYLIS, (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford 2005, p. 133.

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Conclusion We could say that Kennedy was a “realist” if realism includes waging the most of all available possibilities. However, this issue also touches where the boundaries of political realism are and which we should accept. Nearly 40 years ago the analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis made by G. T. Allison questioned the realist presumption that politicians were considering courses of their actions only according to the strategic calculation of costs and benefits. The aim of this paper was to point out the influence of internal politics on foreign affairs. In accordance with previous analyses, we should conclude that the decision making of the American administrative involved not only the strategic issues like balance of power or connections between Cuba and Soviet pressure in Europe, but the context of the November congressional elections as well, even if we accept that the crisis did not affect political preferences significantly. If we try to analyze the most important aspects during the decision making process, we can deduce that Soviet missiles were assessed primarily as a political, not military threat. Nevertheless, ExComm was considering military reaction and the idea of an invasion was not abandoned. Kennedy decided to demonstrate his political decisiveness and, therefore, the extent of a risk was still imminent. It seems that behind the American performance during the crisis was an effort to preserve the Americas from Soviet-Cuban ideological influence. This endeavor recalls Campbell’s dichotomy between American “civilization” and “barbarism” secured by the boundaries of American identity. However, the more concrete picture of this relationship would require another analysis and still remains an issue for further research.

Kolloquium „Auf dem Weg zm Ersten Weltkrieg“ Philosophische Fakultät der Karlsuniversität Prag, 16.Mai 2008

SEKTION DIPLOMATIE

Wilhelm II. und die Juli-Krise 19141 František Stellner

Ich habe mich für eine Frage entschieden, mit der sich jeder Wissenschaftler bei der Erforschung der wilhelminischen Ära im Zeitraum 1914– 1918 befassen muss, und zwar in wie weit der letzte deutsche Kaiser Wilhelm II. für die Kriegsentfesselung verantwortlich war, oder besser gesagt, ob er rechtens für den Hauptakteur gehalten wurde. Es muss sicher nicht betont werden, dass die gegenwärtige Historiographie die These über die ausschließliche Schuld Deutschlands als zeitgenössisch tendenziös ablehnt. Die Nachricht über das Attentat auf den österreichisch-ungarischen Thronfolger erreichte Wilhelm II. auf See, und er befahl, sofort nach Kiel zurückzukehren, eilte nach Potsdam, um sich mit Diplomaten und Militärs zu beraten. Er war über die Ermordung des Thronfolgers „von Gottes Gnaden“ sehr entrüstet. Er zweifelte nicht daran, dass die serbische Regierung hinter der Aktion in Sarajevo stand. Er wollte mit seiner Gemahlin an der Beerdigung teilnehmen, aber aus Wien wurde ihm angedeutet, die Teilnahme von fremden Monarchen wäre angesichts des Alters und der Erschütterung Franz Josephs I. nicht wünschenswert. Der Wiener Hof vermied somit eine pompöse Beerdigung des Erzherzogs und seiner morganatischen Ehefrau, und die österreichischen Politiker mussten sich nicht über ihre Pläne mit den Bündnispartnern auf höchster Ebene beraten. Gemäß der Reichsverfassung erklärte der Deutsche Kaiser den Krieg mit Zustimmung des Bundesrats. Eine entscheidende Rolle spielten der Reichskanzler und der Staatssekretär des Auswärtigen Amts, die konkrete Verhandlungen führten, obwohl der Kaiser das letzte Wort hatte. Die Verfassung garantierte Wilhelm II. einen beträchtlichen Anteil an der Entscheidung über Krieg und Frieden. Es stellt sich die Frage, in wie weit er davon im Juli Gebrauch machte. Blieb er wie die anderen Monarchen im Schlepptau der militanten Umgebung oder entfesselte er durch sein persönliches Handeln wirklich den Ersten Weltkrieg? Der deutsche Reichskanzler Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg versicherte Wien bereits am 2. Juli, „Deutschland habe während der Krise Der Aufsatz ist einer der Ergebnisse des Forschungsvorhabens „Efektivnost volby teorií a tvorby hospodářské politiky v dynamickém modelu podnikatelských rozhraní“, das bei der Förderagentur Grantová agentura České republiky unter der Registriernummer 402/07/0137 registriert ist.

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mehrmals erklärt, in der Balkan-Politik Österreich-Ungarn beiseite zu stehen“.2 Damit bestimmte er die Einstellung Berlins klar voraus. In diesem Sinne antwortete Wilhelm II. auf den Brief des österreichischen Kaisers vom 2. Juli,3 wenn man Serbien hart bestrafen möchte, kann mit der unbedingten Unterstützung Deutschlands gerechnet werden.4 Der deutsche Kanzler war Anfang Juli der Meinung, es würde sich um ein diplomatisches Spiel oder einen begrenzten Krieg handeln; einer anderen Interpretation nach soll er gewusst haben, dass der an Wien ausgestellte „Blankoscheck“ auch die Möglichkeit eines Weltkriegs in sich trug. Wilhelm II. schätzte die Situation falsch ein, da er glaubte, den Konflikt auf den Balkan „lokalisieren“ zu können. Der ehemalige Reichskanzler Bernhard Fürst von Bülow kam in seinen Erinnerungen zum Schluss, Bethmann Hollweg und seine Berater hätten sich keinen großen Krieg gewünscht, aber ihn mit ihrer Leichtsinnigkeit und Dummheit verursacht.5 Dem würde entsprechen, dass das Auswärtige Amt in der ersten Juliwoche die Botschaft in London instruierte, unter allen Umständen eine Konfliktbeschränkung anzustreben.6 Dennoch informierten die Vertreter der Generalität und Admiralität den Kaiser, dass die Armee und die Marine auf eine Situation vorbereitet seien, in der Russland und Frankreich einen Kontinentalkrieg riskieren könnten. Alfred von Tirpitz erklärte, die Marine sei vorbereitet, wenn Großbritannien neutral bliebe.7 Der Kaiser verbrachte den Rest des Monats ab dem 6. Juli wieder auf See. Einigen Historikern nach sollte seine Abfahrt die Großmächte beruhigen, Ruhe vortäuschen, während sich Wien und Berlin auf den Krieg vorbereiteten. Dieser These zufolge überzeugte der Kanzler den Monarchen, seine Anwesenheit in der Hauptstadt wäre nicht mehr notwendig, und gleichzeitig schickte er Vertreter der Armee und Verwaltung auf Urlaub. Der Staatssekretär des Auswärtigen Amts Gottlieb von Jagow setzte seine HochBercholds Aufzeichnung des Gesprächs mit dem deutschen Botschafter, 3. Juli 1914, Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitk von der Bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914 (weiter nur ÖUA), bearb. von Ludwig BITTNER, Hans UEBERSBERGER, VIII., Wien, Leipzig 1930, Nr. 10006, S. 277. 3 Franz Josef I. an Wilhelm II., 2. Juli 1914, Die deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch 1914, hrsg. von Karl KAUTSKY, Graf Max MONTGELAS, Walter SCHÜCKING, Berlin 1922, I., Nr. 13, S. 21. 4 Szögyényi an Berchtold, 5. Juli 1914, ÖUA, VIII., Nr. 10058, S. 306-307. 5 Bernhard Fürst von BÜLOW, Denkwürdigkeiten, hrsg. von Franz von STOCKHAMMERN, III., Berlin 1931, S. 160. 6 Jagow an Lichnowsky, 7. (12.) Juli 1914, zit. nach: Alan PALMER, The Kaiser, Warlord of the Second Reich, London 1978, S. 167. 7 Alfred von TIRPITZ, Erinnerungen, Leipzig 1919, S. 209. 2

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zeitsreise fort, Chef des Generalstabs Helmuth von Moltke weilte mit seiner Familie in Karlsbad. Der Kanzler schaltete den Kaiser als einen unsicheren Faktor aus.8 Trotz dieser Vorgänge ist es unwahrscheinlich, dass der Kanzler und der Generalstab sich bereits Anfang Juli für einen „großen“ Krieg entschieden hätten. Nach der vorherrschenden Auffassung wollten sie Wien unterstützen, sie waren sich auch des Risikos bewusst, allerdings nicht in seinem vollen Ausmaß. In diesem Zusammenhang erscheint die Abwesenheit der Spitzen des Reiches und Preußens eher als Unterschätzung der Ernsthaftigkeit der neuen Krise auf dem Balkan. Der deutsche Botschafter in London besuchte am 6. Juli den britischen Auβenminister Sir Edward Grey mit der Bitte, er solle sich für eine friedliche Beilegung der Krise einsetzen. Das britische Kabinett befasste sich eben mit einer schweren Krise in Nordirland und begann sich erst am 21. Juli ernsthafter für die Entwicklung auf dem Balkan zu interessieren. In den Tagen vom 20. bis zum 23. Juli stattete der französische Präsident Poincaré einen Staatsbesuch in St. Petersburg ab und versicherte die russische Regierung, Frankreich käme im Falle eines Kriegs mit Deutschland seinen Bündnisverpflichtungen nach. In Wien begann man inzwischen mit den militärischen Vorbereitungen und formulierte ultimative Forderungen, die der serbischen Regierung am 23. Juli vom österreichisch-ungarischen Botschafter überreicht wurden. Die deutsche Note vom 24. Juli bekundete die Unterstützung der österreichischen Forderung.9 Serbien nahm die österreichischen Forderungen mit einer einzigen Ausnahme an. Die Antwort befriedigte Wien allerdings nicht. Wilhelm II. war zwar nur zur Hälfte über die Vorgänge informiert, aber er wusste genug, um zu erkennen, dass Österreich sich durch seine Zurückweisung der großzügigen serbischen Antwortnote die Sympathie der Großmächte verscherzt hatte und dass damit keine Möglichkeit mehr bestand, den Konflikt zu lokalisieren. Grey forderte am 26. Juli Deutschland, Italien und Frankreich auf, ihre Delegierten zu einer Konferenz nach London zu schicken, um mit der Vorbereitung von Vermittlungsvorschlägen und Prozeduren anfangen zu

Fritz FISCHER, Krieg der Illusionen. Die deutsche Politik von 1911 bis 1914, Düsseldorf 1969, S. 692. 9 František STELLNER, Poslední německý císař. Z německých dějin v epoše Viléma II., Praha 1995, S. 326. 8

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können.10 Berlin lehnte die Vermittlungsvorschläge Greys stolz mit der Begründung ab, Österreich könne nicht mehr nachgeben.11 Mittlerweise intensivierten sich die deutschen Vorbereitungen „auf alle Eventualitäten“. Am 26. Juli kehrten Tirpitz und Moltke in die Hauptstadt zurück, am folgenden Tag auch der Kaiser. Über die vorzeitige Rückkehr Wilhelms II. freuten sich weder der Generalstab noch die Kanzlerschaft. Sie hatten Angst, dass er ihre bisherige Taktik mit seinen eigenen Ideen verderben könnte. Ihre Befürchtungen wurden wahr. Die ursprüngliche Entschlossenheit des Kaisers und seine starken Worte wurden durch eine entgegensetzte Einstellung konterkariert, so dass er nach der serbischen Antwort auf das Ultimatum keinen Grund zum Krieg mehr sah. Im Memorandum an Jagow vom 28. Juli schrieb er: „Sie sollen sich Belgrad als Geisel nehmen und verhandeln! Jedweder Grund zum Krieg ist entfallen.“12 Er befahl, der deutsche Botschafter in Wien solle beim Auβenminister Leopold Graf Berchtold auf versöhnliches Tun appellieren. In diesem Moment hatten aber die damaligen diplomatischen Schutzmechanismen bereits ausgesetzt. Am Nachmittag des 28. Juli war es zu spät, Berchtold setzte die Kriegerklärung an Serbien sowie die Mobilmachung durch. Wilhelms Instruktionen an Jagow lagen noch im Auswärtigen Amt. Nachdem Russland von der Bombardierung Belgrads erfahren hatte, gab es in der Nacht vom 29. auf den 30. Juli den Befehl zur Teilmobilmachung. Wie Taylor Whittle geschrieben hat: „In dieser Nacht des 30. Juli 1914 stand Wilhelm ganz im Bann der unausweichlichen Gewissheit des Krieges. Seine ganze Bitterkeit und sein ganzes Elend ergossen sich in ein langes, leidenschaftliches Memorandum. Seine Überzeugung, dass Deutschland einer Intrige zum Opfer gefallen war, und sei Enttäuschung, dass die Tripelallianz seine Bemühungen fortwährend missachtet hatte, brach aus ihm hervor, und er schwor, dem Schurken, der hinter all dem stand, Rache. Dieser Schurke war für ihn nicht etwa Serbien oder Russland, sondern England und das britische Empire. Es wurde ein erschreckendes und erschütterndes Dokument, was dieser Mann da in seiner Erregung und seinem Entsetzen und am Ende seiner Kräfte hinkritzelte. Es konnte unmöglich von jenem

Grey an F. Bertie, 26. Juli 1914, Korrespondenz der königlich großbritannischen Regierung betreffs der europäischen Krise. Im Auftrag Seiner Majestät den beiden Kammern des Parlaments im August 1914 vorgelegt, Bern 1914, Nr. 36, S. 32. 11 Lichnowsky an Bethmann Hollweg, 24. Juli 1914, Dokumente zur deutschen Geschichte 1914–1917, hrsg. von Dieter FRICKE, Berlin 1976, S. 24–25. 12 Wilhelm II. an Jagow, 28. Juli 1914, Die deutschen Dokumente, II., Nr. 293, S. 18. 10

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Klischee-Kaiser stammen, der in den Augen der gegnerischen Propaganda Europa in einen Krieg gehetzt hatte und stolz darauf war.“13 Am 31. Juli erklärte Russland die totale Mobilmachung, der eine Welle von Mobilmachungen und Kriegserklärungen folgte. Der Reichskanzler schloss seinen Situationsbericht vor dem Bundesrat mit den Worten: „Wenn nun die eisernen Würfel rollen, wolle Gott uns helfen.“14 Zu seiner Rolle äußerte sich J. Herbert: „Wenn man sich auch darüber streiten kann, ob Bethmann Hollweg im Juli 1914 kriegsbereit oder kriegswillig war, so geht doch aus den Quellen hervor, dass er seine Politik auch nicht änderte, nachdem die Prämissen vom 5./6. Juli offensichtlich nicht mehr gegeben waren. Er nutzte nicht einmal die Chancen, die es ihm ohne Prestigeverlust erlaubt hätten, vom harten Kurs abzuweichen, so etwa nach dem Bekanntwerden der serbischen Antwortnote, da er sich in diesem Fall innenpolitisch durch den Kaiser hätte decken könne. Der Fatalismus seiner politischen Auffassung und sein Image als Schwächling können sein Verhalten vielleicht erklären.“15 Die deutsche Diplomatie trat nicht energisch genug zugunsten einer Krisenbeilegung ein, Wien ließ die Krise in einen europäischen Krieg auswachsen. Die Soldaten auf allen Seiten begannen die sorgfältig vorbereiteten Kriegspläne unaufhaltsam umzusetzen, und Kaiser Wilhelm II. war sehr verwundert, dass sich die Situation von Manövern und Übungen völlig unterschied, denen er als oberster Befehlshaber jahrelang zugesehen hatte. Michael Balfour schrieb über den Kanzler: „Er und der Kaiser hätten besser getan, wenn sie in den vorhergehenden Jahren mehr Zeit darauf verwandt hätten, sich die politischen Konsequenzen der deutschen strategischen Pläne zu überlegen.“16 Wilhelm II. trug mit seiner Einstellung vom 5. Juli zur Entfesselung des Ersten Weltkriegs bei. In den Augen der gegnerischen Propaganda zog er Europa in einen Krieg hinein und soll sich damit noch gebrüstet haben. Aber viele seiner Zeitgenossen und gegenwärtige Historiker sind der Auffassung, dass er sich den Krieg nicht wünschte. Eine Verwandte des Kaisers behauptete, er wäre 1914 von der Kriegspartei missbraucht worden. Tyler WHITTLE, Kaiser Wilhelm II. Biographie, München 1979, S. 310. Vgl. Rudolf von VALENTINI, Kaiser und Kabinettschef. Nach eigenem Aufzeichnungen und dem Briefwechsel des Wirklichen Geheimen Rats Rudolf von Valentini dargestellt von Bernhard SCHWERTFEGER, Oldenburg 1931, S. 127. 14 WHITTLE, S. 311. 15 Jürgen HERBERT, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg in der europäischen Krise im Juli 1914–im Spiegel der Historiographie. Ein kritischer Beitrag zur Geschichtswissenschaft, Frankfurt am Main 1989, S. 108. 16 Michael BALFOUR, Der Kaiser Wilhelm II. und seine Zeit, Berlin 1996, S. 432. 13

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„Wilhelm war der Letzte, der sich den Krieg wünschte.“17 Ende Juli teilte der französische Botschafter seinem britischen Kollegen mit: „Heute Abend blieben in Berlin drei Leute, die es bereuen, dass ein Krieg ausgebrochen war: Sie, ich und Kaiser Wilhelm.“18 Er hatte Recht. Später im Exil kam der letzte Adjutant des Kaisers zum Schluss, Wilhelm „habe den Krieg nicht gewollt, sein Ideal wären eher weitere Kaisermanöver gewesen, wo er sich als siegreicher Feldherr präsentieren konnte,... aber er habe einen wirklichen Krieg nicht gewollt“.19 Man kann Wilhelm nicht für den „blutgierigen Etzel“ halten.20 Im Juli 1914 handelte er strikt nach den Verfassungsbefugnissen, es kann keinesfalls von einem Ausdruck seines „persönlichen Regiments“ die Rede sein.21 Nach der Rückkehr von seiner Nordlandreise bemühte er sich, einen europäischen Konflikt zu verhindern, aber ohne Erfolg. Er ließ die Ereignisse viel zu lange in den Händen der Politiker und des Militärs. Ein Historiker darf sich eine solche Frage, wie: Was wäre passiert, wenn er Berlin nicht verlassen hätte, nicht stellen. Wilhelm II., der bis Juli 1914 „Friedenskaiser“ genannt wurde, trat letztendlich in die Weltgeschichte als Militarist und „Kriegsanstifter“.22 Wer war demnach für die Kriegsentfesselung verantwortlich? Mit dieser komplizierten Frage haben sich selbstverständlich viele Autoren beschäftigt und einige Grundthesen vorgelegt. Unmittelbar nach dem Krieg wurden die Deutschen für die Hauptverantwortlichen gehalten. In den 60er Jahren kam man zum Schluss, dass niemand den Krieg wollte. Gleichzeitig erschien eine These, dass Deutschland einen präventiven Krieg gegen Russland und Frankreich führte. Die militärischen und politischen Kreise fürchteten die russische Aufrüstung. Manchmal wird auch mit einer gewissen „Unausweichlichkeit“ des Kriegs argumentiert. Die Schuld daran teilen sich jedenfalls alle Mächte, von Österreich bis Russland, von Deutschland bis Frankreich. Wilhelm II. hat später geschrieben: „Die ganze Zit. nach: Alan PALMER, Glanz und Niedergang der Diplomatie. Die Geheimpolitik der europäischen Kanzleien vom Wiener Kongress bis zum Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs, Düsseldorf 1986, S. 391. 18 Zit. nach: WHITTLE, S. 314. 19 Sigurd von ILSEMANN, Der Kaiser in Holland. Aufzeichnungen des letzten Flügeladjutanten Kaiser Wilhelms II., hrsg. von Harald von Koenigswald, II.: Monarchie und Nationalsozialismus 1924-1941, München 1967, S. 268. 20 Alexander Fürst von HOHENLOHE-SCHILLINGSFÜRST, Aus meinem Leben, hrsg. von Gottlob ANHÄUSER, Frankfurt am Main 1925, S. 339. 21 STELLNER, S. 373-386. 22 Vgl. Aleš SKŘIVAN, Schwierige Partner. Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn in der europäischen Politik der Jahre 1906–1914, Hamburg 1999, S. 380–390; Catrine CLAY, König. Kaiser. Zar. Drei königliche Cousins, die die Welt in den Krieg trieben, München 2008, s. 385–400. 17

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diplomatische Maschine bei uns hat versagt.“23 Es ist grundlegend, dass sich Wilhelm II. primär keinen europäischen Krieg wünschte und versuchte, ihn zu verhindern.

WILHELM II., Ereignisse und Gestalten aus den Jahren 1878–1918, Berlin, Leipzig 1922, S. 212.

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Der angebliche „Kriegsrat“ auf Konopischt, 12.–14. Juni 19141 Aleš Skřivan, Sr.

Am 12. Juni 1914 begrüßte der Thronfolger Franz Ferdinand am Bahnhof in Beneschau seinen Gast – den Deutschen Kaiser Wilhelm II., der u.a. vom Oberhofmarschall Freiherr von Reischach und Großadmiral von Tirpitz begleitet wurde. Das Datum dieses Zusammentreffens wurde schon während der vorherigen Verhandlungen des Kaisers und des Thronfolgers in Miramare am 27. März 1914 vereinbart. Der so oft erwähnte und von zahlreichen Legenden umsponnene Besuch Kaiser Wilhelms II. vom 12.–14. Juni bei Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand auf Schloss Konopischt, trug offensichtlich nicht besonderes zum deutschen Verständnis und zur Harmonisierung der gegenseitigen Beziehungen beider Verbündeten bei. Nach Ansicht der österreichischen Presse handelte sich um einen vollkommen privaten Besuch, in dessen Verlauf der Thronfolger vorhatte, dem deutschen Monarchen seinen berühmten Rosengarten zu zeigen, der in voller Blüte des späteren Frühjahrs stand. Die Tatsache, dass Großadmiral Tirpitz, der Vater des deutschen Flottenprogramms, den Kaiser begleitete und einen Tag nach der Abreise Wilhelms II. der österreichischungarische Außenminister Berchtold auf Schloss Konopischt eintraf, wurde seinerzeit und auch später zum Gegenstand verschiedenster, zuweilen bizarr anmutender Spekulationen. Die erwähnten Gespräche wurden oft mit dem Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges in Zusammenhang gebracht, dessen Ausbruch manche Autoren als Folge des „Paktes von Konopischt“ darstellten, den Wilhelm II. und Franz Ferdinand angeblich geschlossen hatten. Schon während des Ersten Weltkrieges entstand in den Entente Staaten, wahrscheinlich auf Initiative Serbiens bzw. Russlands, eine Legende über den „Konopischter Kriegsrat“, auf dem der Angriff auf Serbien behandelt worden wäre. Den Höhepunkt phantasmagorische Gespinste präsentierte der ehemalige Korrespondent der Times, Henry Wickham Steed, den britischen Lesern im Februar 1916 angeblich auf

Dieser Beitrag ist ein Ergebnis der Forschung im Rahmen des Forschungsprojekts MSM 021620827 Die Tschechischen Länder inmitten Europas in der Vergangenheit und heute, dessen Träger die Philosophische Fakultät der Karlsuniversität in Prag ist.

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Grundlage des Berichtes eines anonymen Informanten.2 Nach Steeds Version hatte Wilhelm II. dem Thronfolger den grandiosen Plan einer Veränderung der Landkarte und der Machtverhältnisse des europäischen Kontinents vorgelegt. Angeblich wollte er diesen vor allem gewinnen, dass seinen Söhnen Maximilian und Ernest zwei neu geschaffene mitteleuropäische Reiche zufallen sollten. Nach einem siegreichen Krieg sollten das alte Polen, Litauen und die Ukraine zu einem Staat vereinigt werden, dessen Thron Franz Ferdinand besteigen und dessen Nachfolger sein ältester Sohn werden sein sollte. Der jüngere Sohn sollte die Herrschaft eines aus den böhmischen Ländern, Ungarn und den Balkangebieten bis nach Saloniki gebildeten Reiches übernehmen. Die österreichischen Lande mit Triest sollte der gesetzmäßige Erbe (und spätere Thronfolger und Kaiser) Erzherzog Karl unter der Voraussetzung erhalten, dass sie als Bundesland Teil des Deutschen Reiches würden. Die genannten beiden Staatsgebilde sollten dann eine Militärallianz und ein dauerhaftes Wirtschaftsbündnis mit Deutschland abschließen und dieser Bund würde dann zum Schiedsrichter in Europa. Da diese Pläne aber den übrigen Angehörigen des Hauses Habsburg nicht verborgen geblieben wären, entschied man sich für die gewaltsame Beseitigung des „Verräters“ Franz Ferdinand, das Ergebnis sei das Attentat von Sarajewo gewesen. Es ist überraschend, dass diese praktisch durch nichts untermauerte Fiktion nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg in der einen oder anderen Abwandlung von einer Reihe von Autoren, insbesondere französischen3 übernommen wurde, während die angelsächsische Historiographie sich von derartigen Konstruktionen relativ früh distanzierte.4 In der heutigen Zeit misst kein seriöser Wissenschaftler Steeds unbelegten und halsbrecherischen Kombinationen irgendeine Bedeutung bei, zumal glaubwürdige Zeugnisse von Teilnehmern des Treffens von Konopischt über den Ablauf der Gespräche vorliegen. Ein der zuverlässigsten Zeugen ist Andreas von Morsey, der im Januar 1914 dem Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand zugeteilt wurde und bis zur Reise nach Sarajewo sich in der Nähe des

Henry Wickham STEED, The Pact of Konopischt. Nineteenth Century and After. Bd. 79/February 1916, S. 253–273. Steed wiederholt seine Version vom Pakt von Konopischt auch in der Arbeit Through Thirty Years, 1892–1922. Bd. I, London 1924, S. 396–403. 3 Antoine DEBIDOUR, Histoire diplomatique de l’Europe. Bd. II, Paris 1918, S. 229; Alfred DUMAINE, La dernière ambassade de France en Autriche. Paris 1921, S. 126ff; Jules CHOPIN, La prémédiation austro-hongroise. Mercure de France. Bd. 115, S. 577– 599; Jean POZZI, Les Roses de Konopischt. In: Le Correspondant, 10. 6.1921. 4 Sidney B. FAY, The Origins of the World War II. Bd. II, New York 1928, S. 32–43. 2

Der angebliche „Kriegsrat“ auf Konopischt, 12.–14. Juni 1914 519 ________________________________________________________

Thronfolgers befand.5 Letztendlich spricht auch eine Reihe allgemein bekannter Tatsachen gegen oben erwähnte Konstruktion. Mit Ausnahme von Großadmiral Tirpitz war auf Konopischt kein anderer maßgeblicher hoher Offizier anwesend. Der ranghöchste Offizier auf österreichischer Seite war Oberst Bardolff, der Chef der Militärkanzlei des Thronfolgers, was zum Abschluss irgendwelcher Militärbündnisse in der Tat zu wenig war. Am angeblichen „Kriegsrat“ auf Schloss Konopischt nahmen an die dreißig Personen teil, zu einem beträchtlichen Teil Frauen. Nach verschiedenen Zeugnissen waren der Kaiser und der Thronfolger nur sehr kurze Zeit allein. Nur am zweiten Tage des Zusammentreffens vor und nach dem Abendessen gab es ein etwas längeres Gespräch beider Männer, aber es handelte sich nicht um ein Gespräch unter vier Augen, weil nämlich immer jemand ein Dritte anwesend war (Oberst Bardolff, Andreas von Morsey). Über diese Besprechungen existiert ein ausführlicher Bericht im Privatbrief des kaiserlichen Gefolgschaftsrates, des Gesandten von Treutler. Zudem „ist es schwerlich vorstellbar, dass Franz Ferdinand einen Krieg plante, der mit seiner Ermordung beginnen sollte.“6 Eine gewisse Rolle hat hierbei auch der Irrtum einiger europäischen Blätter gespielt, die auf dem gemeinsamen Bild der Teilnehmer in Hans Graf Wilczek den deutschen Kanzler Bethmann Hollweg und in Adolf Graf Waldstein den österreichisch-ungarischen Außenminister Graf Berchtold zu erkennen glaubten. Einfach gesagt, es genügte ein wenig der Retusche und aus Waldstein wurde Berchtold...7 Hauptthema der Gespräche von Konopischt waren abermals die inneren Probleme der Habsburgermonarchie.8 Der Kaiser war darum bemüht, den ungünstigen Eindruck zu zerstreuen, den seine Begeisterung für den ungarischen Ministerpräsidenten Tisza im März beim Thronfolger hinterlassen hatte. Dieser warf Tisza nämlich vor, „das benachbarte Rumänien Russland in die Arme zu treiben und den Wert der Monarchie als Großmacht durch sein eigensinniges Streben nach einer nationalen ungarischen Armee zu gefährden“.9 Andreas von MORSEY, Konopischt und Sarajewo. Berliner Monatshefte/Die Kriegsschuldfrage, Jg. XII/Juni 1934, S. 486–499; Privatbrief und Anlage zu diesem Brief des kaiserlichen Gefolgschaftsrates, des Gesandten von Treutler, an Unterstaatsekretär Zimmermann, 15. 6. 1914. Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871–1914. Hg. von Johannes LEPSSIUS, Albrecht MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY und Friedrich THIMME, Bd. XXXIX, Berlin 1930, Nr. 15736, S. 356–369. 6 Alan John Percivale TAYLOR, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918. Oxford 1954, s. 516. 7 MORSEY, S. 488. 8 Vgl. Notiz vom 13. 6. 1914. Schicksalsjahre Österreichs, 1908–1919. Das politische Tagebuch Josef Redlichs. Hg,. von Fritz FELNER, Bd. I (1908–1914). Graz, Köln 1953, S. 232–233. 9 Josef ŠUSTA, Světová politika. Bd. VI, Praha 1931, S. 346. 5

520 Aleš Skřivan, Sr. ________________________________________________________

Die beiden Männer besprachen ferner kleinere Probleme der Balkanpolitik und das Verhältnis zu Italien. Ihre Diskussion berührte die Serbienfrage nur am Rande und auf die Frage des Thronfolgers, ob Österreich-Ungarn im Falle eines Krieges gegen Serbien mit der vollen Unterstützung Deutschlands rechnen könne, antwortete Kaiser Wilhelm II. ausweichend. Eine Kuriosität zum Schluss. Nach dem Kriegsende, im Dezember 1918, entsandte die neue Regierung in Prag zwei Bausachverständigen nach Konopischt, wo sie die Baupläne des Schlosses untersuchen und ein „schallsicherer Raum“, wo der Thronfolger und der Deutsche Kaiser die Kriegspläne vorbereiteten, finden sollten. Es handelte sich um eine sehr absurde Sache, weil „wer das Schloss kennt, wird sich des Lachelns nicht erwehren können, in Erinnerung an den Raum, in welchem der Erzherzog und der Kaiser eine kurze Unterredung gehabt haben.“10 Das Gespräch des Thronfolgers und des Kaisers verlief nämlich in einem kleinen Pavillon, wo „am 13. Juni 1914 in Anwesenheit sämtlicher Gäste, darunter mehrerer Damen, ein kleiner Tee, völlig harmloser Natur, stattfand. Hier war erst recht nichts von Schallsicherheit zu entdecken, denn das Schlößchen ist ein Holzbau, dessen Wände wie die einer Jagdhütte jedes, auch nur leise geführte Gespräch der Außenwelt weitergeben.“11 Es gibt jedoch keinen glaubwürdigen Beweis dafür, dass die Gespräche von Konopischt das erwähnte Komplott oder die unmittelbare Vorbereitung eines Krieges zum Gegenstand hatten. Aus dem Zusammentreffen in Konopischt blieb nur die oben erwähnte Fotografie und die Gäste des Thronfolgers erfuhren, „daß sie angeblich in Konopischt Zeugen einer so welthistorischen Begebenheit gewesen sein sollten.“12

MORSEY, S. 490. Ebenda, S. 12 Ebenda, S. 10 11

Der gesellschaftliche Wandel in der österreichisch-ungarischen Diplomatie vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg1 Jan Županič

Im Allgemeinen überwiegt die Meinung, dass das Jahr 1848 für Österreich eine ähnlich wesentliche Änderung bedeutete wie für die anderen Staaten – zumindest was die Positionsschwächung des Herrschers und die Machteinbuße der Aristokratie betrifft. Das kann zwar für andere europäische Länder gelten, aber der Revolutionsprozess hatte in der Donaumonarchie zunächst völlig entgegengesetzte Folgen. Als am 2. Dezember 1848 der damals erst achtzehnjährige Franz Joseph I. den Thron bestieg, wurde diese Änderung nicht „von unten“ durchgesetzt, sondern im Gegenteil – es handelte sich um die Folgen von Intrigen der konservativen Kreise am Habsburger Hof sowie der Kulissengespräche der Erzherzogin Sophie, der ambitiösen und energischen Mutter des jungen Kaisers. Mit der Abdankung von Ferdinand I. verlor Österreich einen Herrscher, der sich mit der Beschränkung seiner eigenen Rechte abgefunden und versprochen hatte, die Verfassung einzuhalten. An seine Stelle trat ein Herrscher, dessen Hauptziel die Stärkung seiner eigenen Position und die Liquidierung des Parlamentarismus waren. Tatsächlich löste Franz Joseph unter dem Einfluss seiner aristokratischen Ratgeber bei der ersten sich bietenden Gelegenheit den Reichtag auf, der aus dem exponierten Wien in die Provinzstadt Kroměříž verlagert worden war, er widerrief die meisten Zugeständnisse, zu sein Onkel durch die Revolution gezwungen worden war, und errichtete ein neues Regierungssystem, das als Neuabsolutismus bezeichnet wird. Das kaiserliche Regierungssystem kehrte nach einer kurzen Periode der Liberalisierung und Verfassungsmäßigkeit der Jahre 1848 und 1849 wieder zur souveränen Regierung des Herrschers zurück, der aber nach einer Serie von Niederlagen in den 50er und 60er Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts schließlich trotzdem gezwungen wurde, seine Macht mit parlamentarischen Vertretungskörpern zu teilen. Obgleich die Niederlage der Revolution für einige Zeit auch das Ende der Verfassungsmäßigkeit bedeutete, war das Jahr 1848 für die Entwicklung der Diese Studie entstand im Rahmen der Grantagentur der Karlsuniversität Prag Nr. 324/2006 A HN „České měšťanské a novošlechtické elity v rakousko-uherské diplomatické službě v letech 1914-1918“ (Die böhmische Bürger- und Neuadel-Elite im österreichisch-ungarischen diplomatischen Dienst zwischen 1914-1918).

1

522 Jan Županič ________________________________________________________

österreichischen Gesellschaft in manchem von wesentlicher Bedeutung. Die Standesstruktur der Gesellschaft wurde nun schrittweise durch die bürgerliche Gesellschaft ersetzt. Der Adel, jahrhundertelang der Hauptrückhalt der Macht des Herrschers, verwandelte sich im Laufe der Jahre 1848–1849 von der Grundobrigkeit zu gewöhnlichen Großgrundbesitzern und verlor seine meisten Rechte im Bereich des grundherrlichen Gerichtswesens und der Verwaltung. Die Bauern, die bis dahin seine Untertanen waren, wurden zu vollberechtigten Staatsangehörigen, und die Rechtsgleichheit war nun für sie ebenso gültig, wie für alle anderen. Der Adel verlor dadurch seine entscheidenden Funktionen, die er über ganze Jahrhunderte im Land bekleidet hatte, und die für ihn prinzipielle Bedeutung hatten.2 Für viele Aristokraten waren diese Änderungen so außerordentlich wichtig, dass sie dadurch veranlasst wurden, sich aus dem öffentlichen Leben zurückzuziehen.3 Durch die Änderungen nach 1849 wurde einerseits die Position des Hofs und der elitären ersten Gesellschaft gestärkt, andererseits trugen sie zum schnelleren Aufstieg des Bürgertums bei, welches das Rückgrat der neuabsolutistischen Bürokratie darstellte. Nach den Änderungen, die nach Metternichs Sturz realisiert wurden, verlor der Adel seine wichtigsten Vorrechte und klammerte sich umso enger an den Kaiser, den er für den Haupt- (und im Grunde genommen auch den einzigen) Verteidiger seiner Privilegien hielt. Je mehr sich Europa liberalisierte, je mehr Herrscher gezwungen wurden, die Rolle konstitutioneller Regenten zu spielen, umso geschlossener wurde diese Gruppe um den konservativen Herrscher herum. Die Aristokratie bildete während der ganzen Regierungszeit von Franz Joseph I. den Grundstock des Habsburger Hofes, und obwohl sich ihr Anteil fast in allen gesellschaftlichen Gruppen verminderte, blieb ihr Einfluss auf den Herrscher erhalten.4 Da die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten auch nach der Einführung der Verfassungsmäßigkeit das alleinige Fähigkeitsfeld des Kaisers blieben, ist es Helmuth FEIGL, Die Stellung des Adels nach 1848 im Spiegel der Gesetzgebung. In: Helmuth FEIGL und Willibald ROSNER (Hrsg.), Adel im Wandel. Vorträge und Diskussionen des elften Symposiums des Niederösterreichischen Instituts für Landeskunde Horn, 2.–5. Juli 1990, Wien 1991, S. 117–135; Dominic LIEVEN, Abschied von Macht und Würden. Der europäische Adel 1815–1914, Frankfurt am Main 1995; Walter DEMEL, Der europäische Adel. Vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart, München 2005. 3 Ralph MELVILLE, Adel und Revolution in Böhmen. Strukturwandel von Herrschaft und Gesellschaft in Österreich um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, Mainz 1998, S. 255 ff. 4 Brigitte HAMANN, Der Wiener Hof und die Hofgesellschaft in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts. In: MÖCKL, Karl, Hof und Hofgesellschaft in den deutschen Staaten im 19. und beginnenden 20. Jahrhundert, Büdinger Forschungen zur Sozialgeschichte 1985 und 1986, Boppard am Rhein 1990, S. 62. 2

Der gesellschaftliche Wandel ... 523 ________________________________________________________

kein Wunder, dass der Anteil der Aristokratie auf diesem Gebiet auch nach der Einführung der Verfassungsmäßigkeit im Jahr 1861 hoch blieb; sogar so hoch, dass das Außenministerium als „Aristokratische Festung“ bezeichnet wurde.5 Ist diese Behauptung jedoch wirklich wahr oder sank der Anteil der Aristokratie im Laufe der Zeit auch in diesem Teil der Staatsverwaltung (genauso wie in allen anderen Teilen)? Wollen wir diese Frage beantworten, müssen wir wissen, aus welchen gesellschaftlichen Gruppen sich die Staatsbeamten in der Diplomatie rekrutierten, und ob es aus dieser Sicht zu einigen grundsätzlichen Änderungen in der Zeit vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg kam. Es muss vor allem betont werden, dass im Außenministerium der Anteil von Personen anstieg, die zwar Adelstitel innehatten, aber aus bürgerlichen Familien stammten. Diese Personen werden meistens als Beamtenadel bezeichnet, wenn mit Rücksicht auf ihre unterschiedliche Abstammung diese Bezeichnung auch nicht immer genau ist. Sie können jedoch auf keinen Fall für Aristokraten gehalten werden, obwohl mehrere von ihnen über große Besitzstände verfügten und mit den alten Familien der Monarchie verwandt waren. An dieser Stelle muss betont werden, dass nicht alle österreichisch-ungarischen Außenminister aus den aristokratischen Kreisen stammten. Die erste Ausnahme stellte Heinrich Karl Freiherr von Haymerle (1828–1881) dar, dessen Familie im Jahr 1737 nobilitiert wurde6; die zweite Ausnahme war Alois Freiherr Lexa von Aehrenthal (1854–1912), der zu den aktivsten und meist anerkannten Politikern der Monarchie zählte.7 Baron Lexa, öfter jedoch nach seinem Adelsprädikat Aehrenthal genannt, stammte aus einer reichen Familie, aber der Adelstitel wurde seinem Urgroßvater Johann Anton (1733–1824) erst im Jahr 1790 erteilt. Dieser heiratete zwar noch eine Unadelige, aber sein großes Vermögen, das er ansammelte, öffnete seinen Erbfolgern die Tür in die Adelssalons und zu den lukrativen „Partien“. Minister Aehrenthal war (nach der männlichen Geschlechtsfolge) das Enkelkind der Gräfin Wilczek, der Sohn der Gräfin ThunWilliam D. GODSEY, Jr., Aristocratic Redoubt. The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office on the Eve of the First World War, West Lafayette 1999. 6 Die Familie Haymerle erhielt den Adelstitel in den Erbländern am 12. 9. 1737, den Rittertitel und das böhmische Inkolat am 6. 3. 1748. In den Freiherrnstand wurde Heinrich Karl Haymerle am 4. 4. (14. 6.) 1876 erhoben. Rudolf Johann Graf von MERAVIGLIA-CRIVELLI, J. Siebmachers großes und allgemeines Wappenbuch in einer neuen, vollständig geordneten und reich vermehrten Auflage mit heraldischen und historisch-genealogischen Erläuterungen, Bd. IV, 9. Abth.: Der böhmische Adel, Nürnberg 1886, S. 62. 7 SKŘIVAN, Aleš, Císařská politika. Rakousko-Uhersko v evropské politice v letech 1906–1914 (Die kaiserliche Politik. Österreich-Ungarn in der europäischen Politik zwischen 1906 und 1914), Praha 1996, S. 14–23, 51 ff. 5

524 Jan Županič ________________________________________________________

Hohenstein und der Ehemann der Gräfin Széchenyi. Dank dieses Umstands war er bereits lange vor der Verleihung des Grafentitels im Jahr 1909, den er für die bei der Annexion von Bosnien und der Herzegowina erwiesenen Verdienste erhielt, Mitglied der ersten Gesellschaft der Monarchie.8 Die dritte Ausnahme war der ungarische Adelige István Graf Burián de Rájecz (1851 – 1922), der erst im Jahr 1900 Baron und im Jahr 1918 Graf wurde.9 Das Amt des Außenministers bekleidete er zwischen 1915 und 1916 und im Jahr 1918. Er bewährte sich zwar in dieser schwierigen Zeit, aber die Achtung seiner aristokratischen Kollegen, die ihm die Niedrigkeit nicht verzeihen konnten, hatte er nie gewonnen.10 Es ist jedoch zweifellos interessant, dass der Anteil der Aristokratie und des Bürgerstands im diplomatischen Dienst und im Außenministerium während des ganzen 19. Jahrhunderts verhältnismäßig konstant blieb. Seit Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts war ein hoher Anteil der Bürger (egal ob mit oder ohne Adelstitel) unter den hohen Ministerialbeamten für die Monarchie sehr typisch und erreichte etwa 50 Prozent. Seit Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts wuchs ihre Vertretung noch weiter, und vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg bildeten die Vertreter des Bürgerstands mehr als 62 Prozent der Ministerialbeamten.11 Die Diplomatie war immerhin noch jahrzehntelang eine echte Domäne des alten Adels und der Anteil des Bürgerstands unter den k. k. Diplomaten stieg seit Mitte bis Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts nur minimal von 28 auf 32 Prozent. Eine Wende stellt der Zeitabschnitt des Ministers Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal dar, unter dem der Anteil der Nichtaristokraten in der Diplomatie auf 42 Prozent

Der Adelstitel der Erbländer mit dem Prädikat „von Aehrenthal” wurde der Familie am 9. 6. 1790 erteilt, den Reichsritterstand erhielt sie am 4. 7. 1792 vom pfälzisch-bayrischen Kurfürst Karl Theodor in Befugnis des Reichsvikars, den österreichischen Freiherrnstand erhielt die Familie Lexa am 10. 3. 1828. Der Grafentitel wurde dem Außenminister am 17. 8. 1909 verliehen. R. J. Gf. v. MERAVIGLIA-CRIVELLI, Der böhmische Adel, S. 51; Almanach českých šlechtických rodů (Almanach der böhmischen Adelsfamilien), Hrsg. Vladimír POUZAR, Petr MAŠEK, Hugo MENSDORFF-POUILLY, Pavel R. POKORNÝ, Praha 1999, S. 234–237. 9 Am 5. 3. 1900 wurde ihm der ungarische Freiherrentitel und am 9. 5. 1918 der ungarische Grafentitel verliehen. János József GUDENUS, A magyarországy főnemesség XX. századi genealógiája, I. kötet, Budapest 1990, S. 230–231. 10 Václav HORČIČKA, Rakousko-uherská politika vůči sovětskému Rusku v letech 1917– 1918 (Österreichisch-ungarische Politik gegenüber dem sowjetischen Russland in den Jahren 1917-1918), Praha 2005. 11 Zum k . u. k. Außenministerium vgl. z.B. W. D. GODSEY, Jr., Aristocratic Redoubt; Václav HORČIČKA, Vztahy Rakousko-Uherska a Spojených států amerických v období první světové války (Beziehungen zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika zur Zeit des Ersten Weltkriegs), Praha 2007, S. 16f. 8

Der gesellschaftliche Wandel ... 525 ________________________________________________________

und in der Leitung des Ministeriums auf 62 Prozent stieg.12 Der Konsulardienst war in dieser Zeit bereits die Domäne des Bürgerstands und des neuen Adels. Während der hohe Anteil des Bürgerstands im Außenministerium verhältnismäßig logisch ist (der trockene Beamtendienst war für die Aristokratie weniger attraktiv), genauso wie seine hohe Vertretung im Konsulardienst verständlich ist (an diese Personen wurden nicht so hohe Finanzansprüche gestellt wie an die Diplomaten, aber die Konsularstellen brachten auch nicht so große Würdigkeit), ist die allmähliche Stärkung des Bürger- und Neuadelselements auch im letzten aristokratischen Bollwerk der Monarchie – in der Diplomatie – interessant. Es ist naheliegend, dass sich die Nichtaristokraten zuerst in den weniger wichtigen Staaten und Republiken durchsetzten, aber mit der Zeit wurden sie auch auf die Gesandtenposten ernannt.13 Eine ganze Reihe von ihnen erreichte ausgezeichnete Ergebnisse in der Diplomatie, und ihre Erfolge wurden selbst vom Kaiser anerkannt. Einigen von ihnen (Anton Prokesch von Osten14, Alexander von Hübner15) wurden sogar die Grafentitel verliehen, also die Würdigung, die üblicherweise nur für den alten Adel vorbehalten war.

Nikolaus von PRERADOVICH, Die Führungsschichten in Österreich und Preußen (1804–1918) mit einem Ausblick bis zum Jahre 1945, Wiesbaden 1955, S. 8–25. 13 Z.B. Alexander Hübner in Paris und Rom, August Freiherr Koller in Preußen, Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal in Russland oder Constantin Dumba in der USA. Zur Dumba-Karriere vgl. V. HORČIČKA, Vztahy Rakousko-Uherska a Spojených států amerických, S. 14 f. 14 Anton Prokesch (1795–1876) begann seine Karriere als österreichischer Offizier im Jahr 1813. In den 20er Jahren wurde er zum Generalstab einberufen und mehrmals zum Mitglied der in die Türkei entsandten Missionen ernannt. Am 24. 5. 1830 wurde er als Ritter des Leopoldordens mit dem Prädikat von Osten in den Ritterstand erhoben. Im Jahr 1833 half er, den Frieden zwischen dem Sultan Mahmud II. und seinem ägyptischen Vasallen Muhammad Ali Pascha zu vermitteln, seit Mitte der 30er Jahre war er als Diplomat in Griechenland tätig. Am 1. 2. 1845 wurde er aufgrund des Kommandeurkreuzes des Leopoldordens in den Freiherrnstand erhoben. Seit 1849 Gesandter in Berlin, seit 1853 Bundespräsidialgesandter in Frankfurt am Main, seit 1855 in der Türkei, wo er bis zu seiner Pensionierung im Jahr 1871 blieb. Am 3. 11. 1871 (6. 2. 1872) wurde er in den Grafenstand erhoben. Jan ŽUPANIČ, Nová šlechta Rakouského císařství (Der neue Adel des Kaisertums Österreich), Praha 2006, S. 98–99. 15 Alexander von Hübner (1811–1892), eigentlich Hafenbredl. Seit 1833 im diplomatischen Dienst, 1844 Generalkonsul in Leipzig. In den Jahren 1849-59 Botschafter in Paris, 1859 Polizeiminister, 1866-68 Botschafter in Rom, seit 1869 a. D., seit 1879 Mitglied des Herrenhauses. Am 6. 5. 1854 wurde er als Ritter der Eisernen Krone I. Klasse in den Freiherrnstand erhoben, mit dem Allerhöchsten Handschreiben vom 3. 10. und Diplom vom 28. 10. 1888 erhielt er den Grafentitel. Vgl. Peter FRANK-DÖFERING, Adelslexikon des Österreichischen Kaisertums 1804–1918, Wien, Freiburg, Basel 1989. S. 346; Ottův slovník naučný (Ottos Konversationslexikon), Band XI., S. 825. 12

526 Jan Županič ________________________________________________________

Es steht außer Frage, dass der Einfluss des hohen Adels (wenn auch mit dem Einfluss des Kaisers eng verbunden) nach 1848 und insbesondere nach der Verkündigung der Verfassung von 1861 (des sog. Februarpatents) allmählich niederging.16 Die reale politische Macht ging in die Hände der zweiten Gesellschaft über, die sich in absoluter Mehrheit aus den bürgerlichen Kreisen rekrutierte. Nach den im Jahr 1859 und 1866 verlorenen Kriegen blieb auch die Armee von Erschütterungen nicht verschont, und am Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts ist der Rückgang der Aristokratie auch in der Diplomatie markant zu spüren. Die Angehörigen der bürgerlichen Schichten wurden immer häufiger auf die bedeutenden diplomatischen Positionen ernannt, und ihre Laufbahnentwicklung stützt sich nicht nur auf ihr Adelsgeblüt, sondern auch auf ihre Ausbildung und Wirtschaftsgrundlage. Es ist sehr schwer abzuschätzen, in welcher Richtung die Entwicklung im Falle des Weiterbestehens der Monarchie gegangen wäre. Es ist jedoch höchst wahrscheinlich, dass die Aristokratie innerhalb einer relativ kurzen Zeit auch ihr letztes Bollwerk – den diplomatischen Dienst – verloren hätte.

Radmila SLABÁKOVÁ-ŠVAŘÍČKOVÁ, Rodinné strategie šlechty. Mensdorffové-Pouilly v 19. století (Familienstrategie des Adels. Familie Mensdorff-Pouilly im 19. Jahrhundert), Praha 2007, S. 159 –160.

16

„Primat der Innenpolitik“. Ursachen des Ersten Weltkrieges im Werk von Eckart Kehr1 Radek Soběhart

In meinem Beitrag möchte ich mich nicht vorrangig auf die einzelnen Ursachen des Ersten Weltkriegs konzentrieren, sondern eher auf den Interpretationsrahmen der Diskussion, die über die Ursachen geführt wurde und bisher geführt wird.2 Ich möchte mich insbesondere auf die Thesen des deutschen Historikers Eckart Kehr konzentrieren, denn ich bin der Meinung, dass er zu den wichtigsten „vergessenen“ Persönlichkeiten der Interpretationsrichtung „intepretative turn“ gehörte. Ich halte seine Ansichten bis heute für lohneswert, und zwar nicht nur angesichts dessen, dass der „Primat der Außenpolitik“ in der tschechischen Historiographie dominiert,3 sondern dass er auch in der westdeutschen Historiographie zur Entwicklung der sogenannten historischen Sozialwissenschaft an der Wende der 60er und 70er Jahre beitrug. Aus diesem Grund wird mein Referat eher ein Diskussionsbeitrag sein, in dem ich mich vorrangig auf folgende Fragen konzentriere: Welche waren die Hauptthesen Eckart Kehrs über die Tirpitz-Flotte? Wie war ihre theoretische Verankerung? Warum wurden Kehrs Thesen in der zweiten Hälfte der 1960er Jahre wieder entwickelt? Worin besteht die Bedeutung seines Werks? Kehr widmete sich der Geschichte des Deutschen Kaiserreichs vor allem in seiner Dissertationsarbeit, die 1930 unter dem Titel: Schlachtenflottenbau und Parteipolitik 1894-1901: Versuch eines Querschnitts durch die innenpolitischen, sozialen und ideologischen Voraussetzungen des deutschen Imperialismus, erschien.4 Kehr ging in dieser Arbeit von der Grundprämisse aus, dass die Außenpolitik nicht nur in diplomatischen Akten und Handlungen der Staatsmänner und Diplomaten besteht, sondern dass auch innenpolitische Diese Studie ist ein Ergebnis von Forschungen im Rahmen des Forschungsprojekts MSM 0021620827 Die Tschechischen Länder inmitten Europas in der Vergangenheit und heute, dessen Träger die Philosophische Fakultät der Karlsuniversität in Prag ist. 2 Vgl. Wolfgang JÄGER, Historische Forschung und politische Kultur in Deutschland. Die Debatte 1914– 1980 über den Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkrieges, Göttingen 1984. 3 Vgl. František STELLNER, Poslední německý císař. Z německých dějin v epoše Viléma II., Praha 1995; Aleš SKŘIVAN, Císařská politika. Rakousko-Uhersko a Německo v evropské politice v letech 1906– 1914, Praha 1996. 4 Eckart KEHR, Schlachtflottenbau und Parteipolitik 1894-1901. Versuch eines Querschnitts durch die innenpolitischen, sozialen und ideologischen Voraussetzungen des deutschen Imperialismus, Berlin 1930. 1

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Aspekte – wie zum Beispiel die wirtschaftliche und soziale Situation des Landes, einzelne Interessen der politischen Parteien usw. zu berücksichtigen sind.5 Kehr konzentrierte sich vor allem auf die Analyse des Baus der deutschen Kriegsflotte, die eine der Hauptsäulen der wilhelminischen Weltpolitik bilden sollte.6 Im Unterschied zu den meisten Historikern7 lenkte er seine Aufmerksamkeit auf das Erkennen innenpolitischer, wirtschaftlicher und sozialer Auswirkungen des Flottenbaus. Aufgrund einer großen Menge von Quellenmaterialien bin ich zum Schluss gekommen, dass die Entscheidung des Kaisers, der Regierung und der Armeeführung, eine starke Flotte zu bauen, nicht primär durch die Staatsicherheit, sondern durch die innenpolitischen und gesellschaftlichen Interessen der Industrie- und Agrareliten motiviert war, die auf diese Weise bestrebt waren, ihre privilegierte Position im Staat zuungunsten der Demokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft zu erhalten. Kehr drückte das Ziel beim Flottenbau so aus: „…die Flotte nicht so sehr als Eckart KEHR, Deutsch-englisches Bündnisproblem der Jahrhundertwende. In: ders., Der Primat der Innenpolitik. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur preußisch-deutschen Sozialgeschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, hrsg. und eingel. von Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Berlin 1970, S. 180; Kehr selbst drückte dies mit folgenden Worten aus: „Eine Außenpolitik hat – es klingt trivial, aber es wird gern übersehen – nicht nur einen Gegner vor sich, sonder auch eine Heimat hinter sich. Außenpolitik kämpft nicht nur gegen den Gegner, sondern auch für die Heimat, sie wird nicht nur nach den Schachzügen des Gegners orientiert, sondern auch – und oft mehr – nach dem Willen und Bedürfnis der primär nicht außenpolitisch empfindenden Heimat.“ Eckart KEHR, Englandhaß und Weltpolitik, in: ders, Der Primat der Innenpolitik. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur preußisch-deutschen Sozialgeschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, hrsg. und eingeleitet von HansUlrich Wehler, Berlin 1970, S. 150. 6 Kehr kommentierte seine Herangehensweise später folgendermaßen: „Mein Studium begann unter dem Vorzeichen der politischen Geschichte und der Philosophie. In seinem Verlauf drängte sich aber, besonders intensiv bei den Vorausarbeiten für das Flottenbuch, immer stärker das Problem der Beeinflussung der reinen Politik durch die Wirtschaft und die soziale Gliederung in den Vordergrund, und die Untersuchung der Beziehungen zwischen beiden wurde zum Mittelpunkt meiner wissenschaftlichen Interessen.“ Zit. Hans-Ulrich WEHLER, Radikaldemokratische Geschichtswissenschaft: Eckart Kehr, in: ders., Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs 1871–1918. Studien zur deutschen Sozialund Verfassungsgeschichte, Göttingen 1970, S. 261. 7 Kehr kritisierte mit Recht den deutschen historischen „Mainstream“, der sich andauernd an Rankes Thesen über die Einzigartigkeit der Außenpolitik und der Auffassung des „Staates“ als einer eigenen und unabhängigen Entität stützte. Seinen Kollegen warf er vor, immer noch im Bann des „Primats der Außenpolitik“ und stereotyper Ideengeschichte zu bleiben und sich nicht zu bemühen, auf neue Erkenntnisse und Herangehensweisen nordamerikanischer Historiker und Soziologen zu reagieren, die immer stärker die Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte präferierten, vgl. Eckart KEHR, Neuere deutsche Geschichtsschreibung, in: ders., Der Primat der Innenpolitik. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur preußisch-deutschen Sozialgeschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, hrsg. und eingel. von Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Berlin 1970, S. 254-268; vgl. Hans-Ulrich WEHLER, Eckart Kehr. In: Deutsche Historiker, Bd. 1, hrsg. von Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Göttingen 1971, s. 108. 5

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Instrument zur Bewahrung der nationalen Autonomie im ideologischen Sinne oder staatlichen Interesse forderte, vielmehr unter dem außenpolitischen Aspekt als Instrument der wirtschaftlichen Autonomie und Erkämpfung der wirtschaftlichen Expansion, unter dem innenpolitischen und sozialen Gesichtspunkt als Mittel, um durch sie und ihre Erfolge immer brüchiger werdende Herrschaft der in der Sammlungspolitik alliierten Industrie und Landwirtschaft gegen die proletarische Gefahr erneut zu stabilisieren.“8 Gerade der Bau einer starken Flotte sollte der deutschen Industrie große Gewinne sichern, den „nationalen“ Geist der deutschen Öffentlichkeit beruhigen sowie die Großmachtstellung des Deutschen Kaiserreichs festigen. Kehr zitiert eine Äußerung Tirpitz’, die die Funktion der Flotte genau traf: „Ein Staat, der See-, oder was hierfür gleichbedeutend ist, Weltinteressen hat, muss sie vertreten und seine Macht über seine Territorialgewässer hinaus fühlbar machen können. Nationaler Welthandel, Weltindustrie, bis zu gewissem Grade auch Hochseefischerei, Weltverkehr und Kolonien sind unmöglich ohne eine der Offensive fähige Flotte. Die Interessenkonflikte der Nationen und das alsdann mangelnde Zutrauen des Kapitals und der Geschäftswelt würden diese Lebensäußerungen eines Staates im Laufe der Zeit ersterben oder überhaupt nicht aufkommen lassen, wenn nicht nationale Macht auf den Meeren, also jenseits unserer Gewässer, ihnen das Rückgrat gibt. Hierin liegt der vornehmlichste Zweck der Flotte überhaupt.“9 Die Flotte sollte zwar nach innen den wichtigsten „Triumph“ in der „Weltpolitik“ Wilhelms darstellen und Beschützerin der deutschen Wirtschaftsinteressen in der Welt, gleichzeitig aber auch stark genug sein, um die Pläne der britischen

KEHR, (wie Anm. 4), S. 7; vgl. Friedrich FORSTMEIER, Der Tirpizsche Flottenbau im Urteil der Historiker. In: Marine und Marinepolitik im kaiserlichen Deutschland 1871– 1914. Hrsg. von Militärgeschichtlichen Forschunsgsamt durch Herbert SCHOTTELIUS und Wilhelm DEIST, Düsseldorf 1972, S. 47. 9 Eckart KEHR, Die deutsche Flotte in den neunziger Jahren und der politisch-militärische Dualismus des Kaiserreichs. In: ders., Der Primat der Innenpolitik. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur preußisch-deutschen Sozialgeschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, hrsg. und eingeleitet von Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Berlin 1970, S. 119; vgl. auch: Eckart KEHR, Soziale und finanzielle Grundlagen der Tirpitzschen Flottenpropaganda, in: ders., Der Primat der Innenpolitik. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur preußisch-deutschen Sozialgeschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Hrsg. und eingel. von Hans-Ulrich WEHLER, Berlin 1970, S. 135. 8

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Admiralität für eine eventuelle Blockade der deutschen Küste zu verhindern.10 Kehr sah jedoch ihre Bedeutung eindeutig auf der innenpolitischen Ebene.11 Kehr wies auch auf die wirtschaftlichen Zusammenhänge des Flottenbaus hin, denn die Gesetze über die Etaterhöhung für die Marine wurde oft von Vorschlägen auf die Erhöhung und Erweiterung von Schutzzöllen für preußische Junker begleitet, um ihre Stimmen im Reichstag zu gewinnen, wie zum Beispiel der so genannte Bülow-Tarif von 1902.12 Dem Bürgertum und der Schwerindustrie wurden die Artikel über die Erweiterung der Kriegsflotte bestimmt, den Großbesitzern gehörte wiederum der Teil über die Verschärfung der Schutzzölle. Kehr kommentierte diese Dualität mit folgenden Worten: „Marine war ein Teil der auf kapitalistischen Motiven beruhenden Weltpolitik, die Armee ein Teil der der agrarischen Verfassung parallelen Kontinentalpolitik.“13 Der Flottenbau war also in seinen Augen keine aggressive Taktik der deutschen Weltpolitik, sondern ein defensives Mittel, um die Aufmerksamkeit von den innenpolitischen Problemen zu lenken und um eine tiefere Demokratisierung des deutschen politischen Systems und einer umfangreichen EinfühHans-Ulrich WEHLER, Der Aufbruch in die Moderne 1860 bis 1890. Armee, Marine und Politik in Europa, den USA und Japan. In: Das Militär und der Aufbruch in die Moderne 1860 bis 1890. Armeen, Marinen und der Wandel von Politik, Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft in Europa, den USA sowie Japan, hrsg. von Michael EPKENHANS und Gerhard P. GROSS, München 2003, S. XXVII. 11 Dieser Schluss kann auch aus den Worten des Admirals Tirpitz gezogen werden: „Meiner Ansicht nach sinkt Deutschland im kommenden Jahrhundert schnell von seiner Großmachstellung, wenn jetzt nicht energisch, ohne Zeitverlust und systematisch diese allgemeinen Seeinteressen vorwärtsgetrieben werden, nicht zu einem geringen Grade auch deshalb, weil in der grossen nationalen Aufgabe und dem damit verbundenen Wirtschaftsgewinn ein starkes Palliativ gegen gebildete und ungebildete Sozialdemokraten liegt.“ Zit. Volker R. BERGHAHN, Der Tirpitz-Plan und die Krisis des preußisch-deutschen Herrschaftssystems. In: Marine und Marinepolitik im kaiserlichen Deutschland 1871–1914, hrsg. von Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt durch Herbert SCHTTELIUS und Wilhelm DEIST, Düsseldorf 1972, S. 97. 12 Gerade in der Verabschiedung dieses Tarifs von 1902 sah Kehr den Höhepunkt der sog. Sammlungspolitik, d.h. die Verbindung des Bürgertums mit dem agrarischen Adel. Seiner Ansicht nach „Die Sammlungspolitik bedeutet das Ende der Diplomatie alten Stils, welche die wirtschaftliche und politische Außenpolitik der Staaten isolieren zu können geglaubt hatte und die Beugung der Diplomatie unter das Gebot der kombinierten agrarischen und industriellen Partikularinteressen… Die Sammlungspolitik wollte mit den Schutzzöllen die soziale Herrschaft einer wirtschaftlich nicht mehr lebensfähigen Herrenschicht konservieren.“ KEHR, (wie Anm. 4), S. 265; vgl. HansUlrich WEHLER, Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918, Göttingen 1973, S. 169. Kritisch wird dieser Begriff betrachtet z.B. in Geoff H. ELEY, Sammlungspolitik, Social Imperialism and the Navy Law of 1898. In: Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 15, 1974, S. 29–64. 13 KEHR, (wie Anm. 8), S. 117. 10

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rung von politischen und sozialen Reformen zu verhindern.14 Seiner Ansicht nach konnte gerade der Gedanke einer starken Marine Unterstützung breiter Bevölkerungsschichten sowie der Führungsschichten gewinnen und somit zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung des Staates beitragen. Kehr schrieb: „Gerade die Marine verkörperte am meisten die moderne, demokratisch-nationale und kapitalistisch-imperialistische Machtidee, in der das 20. Jahrhundert die außenpolitischen Konsequenzen aus den Menschenrechten der französischen Revolution zog, während die politische Führung des Reiches vor dem Kriege nur zu sehr der matten und hilflosen konservativen Außenpolitik vor 1848 ähnelte.“15 Wie war der theoretische Hintergrund der Ansichten Kehrs? Kehr ging von der These aus, dass das politische, gesellschaftliche sowie wirtschaftliche Leben in Deutschland im Übergang des 19. zum 20. Jahrhundert von der Industrialisierung beeinflusst war, die die Dualität der Staatsmacht mit sich trug, indem konservative „zurückgebliebene“ Führungsschichten einerseits und progressive Bürger- und Arbeitergruppen andererseits standen. Das Hauptproblem bestand darin, dass die regierenden Gruppen mit der Industrialisierung nicht fertig wurden, die tiefgreifenden wirtschaftlichen sowie sozialen Änderungen nicht verstanden und die Erfüllung von Wünschen der „alten“ und „neuen“ Mitgliedern der deutschen Gesellschaft nicht in Einklang bringen konnten. Aus diesem Grund mussten der Kaiser und die Regierung nach „defensiven“ Lösungen suchen, wie z. B. Flottenbau, um eine radikale Wende zu verhindern. Kehr bevorzugte die Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte des wilhelminischen Deutschlands, die seiner Ansicht nach neuen Möglichkeiten zur Interpretation der Außen- und Innenpolitik im Übergang des 19. zum 20. Jahrhunderts eröffnete. In seinen frühen Arbeiten knüpfte er an die Theorien von Karl Marx und Max Weber an; Weber stand er jedoch näher, denn er lehnte einerseits die eindeutige Marxsche Betonung der Wirtschaft ab, andererseits knüpfte er an Max Weber an, indem er eine direkte Verbindung

Denn Kehr zufolge musste sich das deutsche Kaisertum bereits Anfang der 1890er Jahre mit schwerwiegenden innenpolitischen Problemen beschäftigen: „Die Innenpolitik des deutschen Reiches in den neunziger Jahren ist durch zwei Faktoren bestimmt: den Kampf der Industrie und der Landwirtschaft um die Hegemonie im Staate, um durch die Ausnützung der Staatsmaschine ihre soziale Lage zu verbessern und den Kampf, den das revolutionäre Proletariat gegen den Staat und seine Gesellschaftsordnung führte.“ KEHR, (wie Anm. 4), S. 172. Und der Flottenbau war ein willkommenes Mittel, um diese Problem zu lösen. 15 KEHR, (wie Anm. 8), S. 119. 14

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zwischen der Wirtschaft und der Politik als einer sich gegenseitig beeinflussenden Dimension der Staatspolitik betrachtete.16 Warum wurden Kehrs Thesen in der zweiten Hälfte der 1960er Jahre wieder entwickelt? Obwohl seine wichtigsten Werke bereits in der Zeit der Weimarer Republik erschienen waren und auch andere Historiker ähnliche Thesen vertraten, wie z.B. Arthur Rosenberg und George W. F. Hallgarten, gab es in der Geschichtsforschung der Weimarer Republik drei wichtigste Themen, und zwar den Primat der Außenpolitik, den Revisionswunsch des Vertrags von Versailles, der als ungerecht galt, und das Rühmen der konservativen Vorkriegswerte.17 Kehrs Ansichten gerieten erst im Rahmen der sogenannten Fischer-Kontroverse Anfang der 1960er Jahre erneut in den Fokus der historischen Diskussion. Fischer befasste sich zwar vor allem mit der Frage der deutschen Schuld an der Entfesselung des Ersten Weltkriegs und bemühte sich, in seinen Arbeiten zu zeigen, dass Deutschland bereits vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg aggressive Ziele hatte. Aber in seinem Buch „Krieg der Illusionen“ aus dem Jahr 1969 konzentrierte er sich auf den innenpolitischen Hintergrund der deutschen expansiven Politik und versuchte, anhand Kehrs Arbeiten, die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Prozesse der aggressiven Politik des Deutschen Kaiserreichs zu analysieren.18 Von noch größerer Bedeutung waren die Thesen Kehrs für die Entwicklung der sogenannten historischen Sozialwissenschaft Ende der 1960er und Anfang der 1970er Jahre. Zu den wichtigsten Vertretern dieser Richtung in der westdeutschen Historiographie gehörten z.B. Jürgen Kocka, Jörn Rüsen, Wolfgang J. Mommsen und Winfried Schulze. Besonders hervorzuheben ist jedoch ein Name: Hans-Ulrich Wehler, der 1970 die Neuausgabe von Kehrs

Rolf HOBSON, Die Besonderheiten der wilhelminischen Navalismus, in: Deutsche Marine im Wandel. Vom Symbol nationaler Einheit zum Instrument internationaler Sicherheit, hrsg. von Werner Rahn, München 2005, S. 185; JÄGER, (wie Anm. 2), S. 243. 17 Ein größeres Feedback hatten Kehrs Arbeiten in der Zwischenkriegszeit in den USA. Wirklich begeistert von seiner Doktorarbeit war der damalige bedeutendste amerikanische Historiker Charles Austin Beard, der schrieb: „Seitdem Eva Adam den Apfel überreichte hat, wer die Wahrheit vom Trug unterscheiden will, selten eine bessere Gelegenheit besessen, die Frucht vom Baume der Erkenntnis zu essen.“ Zit. WEHLER, (wie Anm. 6), S. 266. Vgl. Arthur Lloyd SKOP, The Primacy of Domestic Politics: Eckart Kehr and the Intellectual Development of Charles A. Beard. In: History and Theory 13, 1974, No. 2, S. 119–131. 18 Fritz FISCHER, Krieg der Illusionen, Berlin 1969; JÄGER, (wie Anm. 2), S. 136. 16

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Studien und seiner Dissertationsarbeit vorbereitete.19 Wehlers Interpretation des deutschen Kaisertums als eines Systems, das politischer und gesellschaftlicher Änderungen unfähig gewesen sei und sich hinter der aggressiven Außenpolitik versteckt hatte, basierte auf Kehrs Thesen. Wehler entwickelte auch und das theoretisch verankerte Bemühen Kehrs, die Wirtschafts-, Sozial-, politische und Kulturgeschichte zu verbinden, die ihren Ausdruck in Wehlers Definition der sogenannten Gesellschaftsgeschichte fanden.20 Worin besteht die Bedeutung von Kehrs Werke? Kehr wurde Bahnbrecher der Verbindung zwischen der Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Mit seiner breiten Auffassung von Industrialisierung zeichnete er die Diskussion über die Modernisierung und die Modernisierungsauswirkungen auf die gegenwärtige Gesellschaft vor. Er überwand die rigide Verschlossenheit der Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte und versuchte, seine Schlussfolgerungen in eine Analyse der Politik im deutschen Kaisertum einzugliedern. Mit seiner Betonung des „Primats der Innenpolitik“ machte er in den 1980er Jahren den Weg für ganz neue Forschungsmöglichkeiten der „Weltpolitik“ frei,21 wozu beispielsweise auch die Propagandageschichte, Verfassungsgeschichte, Parteiengeschichte usw. gehören. Kehr widerlegte auch überzeugend die bisherige Auffassung der Geschichte durch das „Primat der Außenpolitik“22, die sich rigide auf diplomatische Akten und offizielle Berichte stützte, was so eine entsprechende Analyse des Entscheidungsprozesses im wilhelminischen In diesem Zusammenhang halte ich das Vorwort Wehlers zur Sammlung von Kehrs Studien für wichtig, die er in einen methodologischen, theoretischen und historischen Zusammenhang zu bringen versucht, vgl. Hans-Ulrich WEHLER, Primat der Innenpolitik, in: Kehr, Das Primat der Innenpolitik. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur preußischdeutschen Sozialgeschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, hrsg. und eingeleitet von HansUlrich Wehler, Berlin 1970, S. 1–29. Ich habe seine Veröffentlichung im Sammelband von Wehlers Texten „Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs 1871–1918. Studien zur deutschen Sozial- und Verfassungsgeschichte“ benutzt. 20 Hans-Ulrich WEHLER, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte. Dritter Band: Von der „Deutschen Doppelrevolution“ bis zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges 1849–1914, München 1995, S. 965; Gilbert ZIEBURA, Die Rolle der Sozialwissenschaften in der westdeutschen Historiographie der internationalen Beziehungen, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 16, 1990, S. 89. 21 Eckart KEHR, Englandhaß und Weltpolitik, in: ders., Der Primat der Innenpolitik. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur preußisch-deutschen Sozialgeschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, hrsg. und eingeleitet von Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Berlin 1970, S. 149; WEHLER, (wie Anm. 12), S. 184. 22 „Der Primat der Außenpolitik ist ein ehernes Gesetz, an dem zu rütteln ein Verbrechen derselben Schwere ist, wie im 16. Jahrhundert die Behauptung, daß die Erde sich um die Sonne drehe.“ Eckart KEHR, Klassenkämpfe und Rüstungspolitik im kaiserlichen Deutschland, in: ders., Der Primat der Innenpolitik. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur preußischdeutschen Sozialgeschichte im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, hrsg. und eingeleitet von HansUlrich Wehler, Berlin 1970, S. 87. 19

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Deutschland nicht ermöglichte. Kehr stellte die Gesamtkonzeption der deutschen Außenpolitik im Grunde genommen in Zweifel, die auf der britischen und russischen Feindschaft basierte: „Die deutsche Außenpolitik der Vorkriegszeit hatte keine Wahl zwischen englischer und russischer Orientierung. Solange Deutschland den politischen Einfluß hatte und solange die ganze Wirtschaftspolitik primär auf die staatliche Subventionierung der agrarkapitalistischen Getreideproduktion durch Zölle eingestellt war, hätte eine außenpolitischen Entscheidung für England oder für Rußland sozial in der Luft geschwebt. Mit dem sozialen Aufbau des Bismarckschen Reiches harmonisierte, seitdem es in Deutschland eine Krisis des politisch mächtigen verschuldeten Grundbesitzes östlich der Elbe gab, nur die Entscheidung der Außenpolitik gegen England und gegen Rußland.“23 Kehr konzentrierte seine Aufmerksamkeit auf die Innenpolitik, womit er ein neues Feld für die Interpretation der Ursachen des Ersten Weltkriegs offen legte. Damit war auch sein persönlicher Widerspruch zur dominierenden Einstellung der Weimarer Gesellschaft zum kaiserlichen Deutschland gegeben. Während er die neue Republik offen unterstützte und das Kaiserreich für ein abgeschlossenes Kapitel hielt, gedachten die meisten seiner Mitbürger nostalgisch und unkritisch der Zeit vor 1914.24 Dank seiner Dissertationsarbeit setzte sich die These über die Tirpitz’s Flotte als ein defensives Mittel herrschender Schichten zur Erhaltung des damaligen Herrschaftssystems auch in der neuesten Historiographie durch.25 Kehrs Thesen wurden auch zum Ausgangspunkt für die Erforschung der deutschen Geschichte vor 1914, der sog. „Gesellschaftsgeschichte“ Ende der 1960er und Anfang der 1970er Jahre, trotzdem entstand keine „Kehrsche Schule“. In diesem Zusammenhang stimme ich der Aussage des deutschen KEHR, (wie Anm. 5), S. 156. In diesem Zusammenhang kritisierte er auch das Buch seines Doktorvaters Friedrich Meinecke, das 1927 unter dem Titel Geschichte des deutsch-englischen Bündnisproblems erschien. Kehr warf ihm eben vor, dass es nur auf offiziellen diplomatischen Quellen basiere, vgl. SKOP, (wie. Anm. 17), S. 122. 24 WEHLER, (wie Anm. 6), S. 259; Helmut BÖHME, „Primat“ und „Paradigmata“. Zur Entwicklung einer bundesdeutschen Zeitgeschichtsschreibung am Beispiel des Ersten Weltkrieges, in: Historikerkontroversen, hrsg. von Hartmut Lehmann, Göttingen 2000, S. 108; JÄGER, (wie Anm. 2), S. 89. 25 Vgl. HOBSON, (wie Anm. 16), S. 177; Stig FÖRSTER, Im Reich des Absurden: Die Ursachen des Ersten Weltkrieges. In: Wie Kriege entstehen. Zum historischen Hintergrund von Staatenkonflikten, hrsg. von Bernd Wegner, Paderborn, München, Wien, Zürich 2000, S. 225; Michael EPKENHANS, Die wilhelminische Flottenrüstung 1908– 1914. Weltmachtstreben, industrieller Fortschritt, soziale Integration, München 1991, S. 2. Es ist jedoch zu ergänzen, dass die neueste Forschung die strenge Polarisierung zwischen „Primat der Außenpolitik“ oder „Primat der Innenpolitik“ nicht mehr anerkennt und versucht, die beiden Auffassungen zu verbinden; vgl. ZIEBURA, (wie Anm. 20), S. 91. 23

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Historikers Hans-Jürgen Puhle völlig zu, dass „… es gibt heute [in den 70er Jahren] weder gläubige noch orthodoxe „Kehrites“; die kritische KehrRezeption ist vielfach sektoralisiert und – je nach dem behandelten Gegenstand – von unterschiedlicher Intensität und Ausrichtung. Die „Kehrsche Schule“ im Sinne einer einheitlichen Orthodoxie ist ein Phantom.“26

Hans-Jürgen PUHLE, Zur Legende von der „Kehrschen Schule“, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 4, 1978, H. 1, S. 112. Aus diesem Grund können sich die Autoren, die diesen Begriff benutzen, auch nicht einigen, wer dazu gehören sollte und wer nicht. Sie weisen immer darauf hin, dass solche Autoren den Begriff Sammlungspolitik benutzen, den sie für ungenau halten. Vgl. Geoff ELEY, Die „Kehrites“ und das Kaiserreich: Bemerkungen zu einer aktuellen Kontroverse. In: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 4, 1978, H. 1, S. 93. 26

Conrad von Hötzendorf and the Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary Roman Kodet

In the year 1906 the Austro-Hungarian monarchy tried to „master the domestic situation by men of imagination“.1 In February Max Vladmir von Beck was appointed as a new prime minister. After Gołuchowski’s resignation on 22nd October 1906, Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal became the new foreign minister. This change of the leading men in Vienna culminated in November, when Conrad von Hötzendorf was appointed to the post of the Chief of the general staff. Conrad was, in fact, a nominee of the Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand, who for a long time opted for a strong personality in this position, who could help to reform and modernize the army of the dual monarchy. The crown prince already met Conrad several times at the manoeuvres of the AustroHungarian army and gained sympathy for this firm and strict commander. Although, Conrad was not a staff officer, he was appointed as a chief of general staff of the armed forces of the Habsburg monarchy on 10th November. As he later wrote, it was for him „like a lightning from a clear sky“.2 For the army „there was no other choice but Conrad“.3 His straightforward character showed itself at the first audience by the Emperor Franz Joseph, when Conrad asked to be allowed to express his opinion without restriction. The Emperor granted it, but he regretted his permission soon,4 because Conrad’s standpoint to foreign policy differed from the Emperor’s and the foreign minister’s Aehrenthal as well. As a man responsible for military preparation, Conrad believed, that he should be able to influence the foreign policy. In his opinion, the task of the diplomacy and the army was to secure the safety of the state and therefore the politicians should closely cooperate with the army.5 This view collided with Aehrenthal’s foreign policy. The imperial minister „did not allow his

Francis Roy BRIDGE, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, London, Boston 1972, p. 288. Franz CONRAD VON HÖTZENDORF, Aus Meiner Dienstzeit 1906–1918, vol. I., Wien 1922, p. 33. 3 Eugenie Maria MÜLLER, Der Konflikt Conrad-Ährenthal, Vienna 1977, p. 17. 4 CONRAD, vol. I., p. 35. 5 MÜLLER, p. 45. 1

2

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subordinates to express their viewpoints on the policy“.6 The opinions of these two men on solutions of the international problems of Austria-Hungary were different. This led to their serious conflict. Conrad saw, that countries, which were hostile to it, surrounded AustriaHungary. The only exceptions and allies were Germany and Rumania. Conrad reckoned, quite paradoxically, Italy as the most dangerous enemy of the monarchy. Relations between Vienna and Rome were complicated during the whole existence of the Triple alliance. Centuries old hostility between the Habsburgs and Italian states and Italian irredentism on the Austro-Hungarian soil made their mutual relations difficult. Conrad familiarized himself with the Italian problem while he was commander of 55th brigade in Trieste.7 For him Italy was an unreliable ally, whose propaganda inside the Austro-Hungarian territory could be hardly stopped by diplomatic agreement.8 As a military officer he could not overlook, that the war preparations of Italy were directed against Austria-Hungary (for example building of Italian forts along the shared border, while the Italian frontier with France was undefended). Because of these facts he tried to alert the emperor, whom he sent plenty memoranda. On 6th April 1907 he called for preparation for a preventive war with Italy, whose military forces were, in his opinion, still weaker than the AustroHungarian.9 Franz Joseph refused his proposal, because after military defeats in the first half of his rule, he maintained a strict peace policy. Therefore, he shared Aehrenthal’s opinion and thus wanted to keep good relations with Italy. The foreign minister established a background of such a policy during his meeting with the Italian foreign minister, Tommaso Tittoni, in Desio in the middle of July 1907. It secured for some time good relations between both countries.10 Conrad came into a serious conflict with Aehrenthal over this, but was calmed by the emperor, who did not share Conrad’s and Franz Ferdinand’s negative affinity to Italy. In Conrad’s view it was not only Italy, which represented a serious danger for Austria-Hungary. In a short time after his appointment he turned his attention to the south Slavic problem. He saw a solution in economic attachment of both, Serbia and Montenegro, to the Habsburg monarchy.11 In Aleš SKŘIVAN, Císařská politika. Rakousko-Uhersko a Německo v evropské politice let 1906–1914, Praha 1996, p. 15. 7 P. FIALA, Conrad von Hötzendorf, Wien 1972, p. 13. 8 Hans Jürgen PANTENIUS, Der Angriffsgedanke gegen Italien bei Conrad von Hötzendorf, Köln, Wien 1984, p. 290. 9 Alfred von WITTICH, Feldmarschall Conrad und die Aussenpolitik ÖsterreichUngarns, In: Berliner Monatshefte, XI/1932, p. 117. 10 SKŘIVAN, p. 25. 11 WITTICH, p. 118. 6

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case of their permanent enmity to Vienna, he advised to destroy them by preventive war. He saw their irredentism as dangerous as Italian policy and maybe even more serious, mainly in the case, when Russia would support these two states. Ideal opportunity for Conrad to request preventive war against Serbia was the Bosnian crisis. The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary from the time of the Berlin congress in 1878. In summer 1908 the Young Turk revolution triggered a diplomatic process, which led to the annexation of these provinces by Austria-Hungary. In spite of preliminary agreement with Russian foreign minister Alexander Izvolski, the annexation caused a serious international crisis. Especially the Serbs, encouraged by nationalist propaganda of Nikola Pašić and his party demanded compensations. Moreover, in such a motion they were supported by Russia and Great Britain. Conrad advised to lead a resolute politics against Serbia and prepared Austro-Hungarian army for war. From the accessible documents we can learn, that his preliminary steps contained not only partial mobilization against Serbia, but also against Italy.12 But Aehrenthal chose a diplomatic solution and secured German support. Owing to this Vienna achieved the isolation of Serbia, which was abandoned by its main supporters – Russia and Great Britain. In this situation Aehrenthal could request Serbian acceptance of the annexation. Conrad urged for war. He claimed that Serbia was abandoned and the war would be restricted only to the Balkans and therefore he added that the right time to loose the Serbian problem came now. But Aehrenthal again rejected these suggestions and contended himself with Serbian acceptance of the annexation and their assurance to maintain friendly relations with Austria Hungary. Conrad was bitterly disappointed by the peaceful solution of the Bosnian crisis. Later, in his memories called Aus meiner Dienstzeit, he wrote: „In the years 1908–1909 Serbia and Russia were not prepared for the war, AustriaHungary was. But not determined to seize the opportunity, the old monarchy compelled the disaster on itself.“13 Here Conrad’s concept of a preventive war should be explained. Conrad was persuaded, that war would come, sooner or later. And because, as it was mentioned above, the monarchy was surrounded by enemy states, it should destroy some of them earlier, than it would lose military superiority above them. Even the international situation during Bosnian crisis was favourable. The main foe of the dual monarchy, Russia, was seriously weakened by the 12 13

CONRAD, vol. I., p. 118. Ibidem, p. 174

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disaster of a war with Japan and a subsequent revolution. Therefore, his concept of preventive war contained just short limited war (Conrad did not wish a war among Great Powers), which would defeat the enemies of the monarchy, destroy the irredentism and strengthen Austria-Hungary internally and externally as well. But this scheme should never be realized. And later historians identified him as a man, who was most eagerly working to drag the whole world to the Great War.14 Conrad’s endless memoranda urging for war annoyed the emperor and also led to a serious conflict with the foreign minister Aehrenthal, who complained, that Conrad interfered into his competencies. Conrad tried to defend himself with statement, that when „Count Aehrenthal influences the emperor against me, I must react“,15 but, in fact, his reactions brought their dispute to a climax. In the quarrel the emperor sided to his foreign minister, who was working according his determination to lead a politics of peace. Therefore, Conrad was on 30th November 1911 disengaged from his function and consequently appointed as an army inspector. Aehrenthal died only a few months later because of leukaemia. He was by some of his contemporaries celebrated as Austro-Hungarian Bismarck,16 what can be a little bit exaggerated, but in any case, he was the ablest foreign minister of Austria-Hungary since the time of Andrássy. A year later Conrad was appointed again the Chief of the General Staff. In the autumn 1912 the coalition of Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria started a war against Ottoman Empire and the European diplomacy was in turmoil. During the following two years, to the outbreak of the First World War, we can observe some changes in Conrad’s views. The Balkan wars demonstrated a power and ability of Serbia; moreover during these years Russia had strengthened its position. Conrad expressed his opinion on relations with Russia in his memorandum from 24th January 1913, which he called „War with Russia“. Conrad believed, that in a hypothetical world war, Russia would be defeated and it would be followed by a fall of tsarist régime and by a creation of liberal and revolutionary Russia, which would have a great attraction for the Slavs within Austria-Hungary. According to his words Russian regime was „orthodox autocracy and a foreign product of Byzantine, Tatar and Prussian

Lawrence SONDHAUS, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf. Architekt der Apokalypse, Wien, Graz 2003, s. 9. 15 CONRAD, vol. II., Wien 1922, p. 36. 16 Francis Roy BRIDGE, The Habsurg Monarchy among Great Powers, New York, Oxford, Munich 1990, p. 311. 14

Conrad von Hötzendorf and the Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary 541 ________________________________________________________

elements“, the fall of this empire could destroy Austria-Hungary. Because of this, fore Vienna should protect the old regime.17 But this was only a theory. The fact was, that from the end of Balkan wars, which ended in a serious diplomatic defeat of the Habsburg monarchy, the mutual relations with Russia worsened. Conrad intensified his correspondence with the Prussian Chief of Staff Helmut von Moltke, with whom he consulted the war plans of both countries.18 This exchange of letters between Conrad and Moltke lasted until the July crisis. After the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo Conrad called for war. He was supported not only by the army, but also by some of the AustroHungarian diplomats. Even the foreign minister count Leopold Berchtold was persuaded, that the collision with Serbia was inevitable. But both, Berchtold and Conrad, hoped, that the war with Russia could be avoided. But they were disappointed. When Serbia rejected Austro-Hungarian ultimatum and war between these two countries begun, Russia mobilized. This step triggered an unstoppable chain of events, which resulted in an outbreak of a world war. Conrad’s partial responsibility for this development cannot be denied. He was a leader of the war party in Vienna and his permanent call for preventive war disrupted the Austro-Hungarian policy. On the other hand, his criticism of an Austro-Hungarian policy during the Bosnian crisis, which, according to his view, was the same „as the politic, which led from Magenta over Solferino to Königgrätz,“19 was in some points correct. If the emperor had followed his advice, Serbia could have been destroyed in the time, in which it was isolated and in which Russia was relatively weak. In summer 1914 the international situation was completely different and the following war led to the destruction of Austria-Hungary. In some cases we can claim, that „there remains an open question, what would be the fate of Austria-Hungary if the sovereign and foreign minister listened to the warning voice of Conrad von Hötzendorf”.20

CONRAD, vol. III., Vienna 1922, p. 115–117. Norman STONE, Moltke and Conrad, In: The war plans of Great Powers 1880–1914, London, Boston, Sydney 1979, p. 226. 19 MÜLLER, p. 315. 20 August URBAŃSKI von Ostrymiecz, Conrad von Hötzendorf und der Präventiv-Krieg gegen Italien, In: Berliner Monatshefte/Kriegschuldfrage, VIII/1930, p. 248. 17

18

SEKTION POLITIK

Der politische Katholizismus in Deutschland vor und nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg Gabriele Clemens

Einleitung Der Begriff „Politischer Katholizismus“ hat in der Forschung verschiedene Deutungen erfahren. Setzen einige, wie beispielsweise Rudolf Morsey,1 ihn mit der 1870 gegründeten Deutschen Zentrumspartei gleich, verstehen andere, wie zum Beispiel Karl Buchheim und Hans Mayer, ihn als die Durchsetzung klerikaler Sonderinteressen bzw. als Freiheitsbewegung der Kirche gegenüber den Machtansprüchen des Staates und konstruieren somit einen Gegensatz zwischen Staat und politischem Katholizismus.2 Der Begriff politischer Katholizismus wird auf diese Weise untrennbar mit einer staatsfeindlichen Haltung verbunden. Diese Gleichsetzung des politischen Katholizismus mit der Abwehr staatlicher Machtansprüche aber entspringt einer zeitbedingten Sicht der Lage des deutschen Katholizismus zu Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts und ist daher für eine allgemeine Definition des politischen Katholizismus unzureichend. Die Auflösung des Heiligen Römischen Reiches Deutscher Nation 1806, die Säkularisation und Entstehung neuer, konfessionell gemischter Staaten hatten die katholische Kirche aus ihrer bisher dominierenden Stellung im Reich verdrängt und sie vor eine völlig veränderte, unsichere Lage gestellt, aus der heraus es zur Entstehung des politischen Katholizismus kam. Während in der ersten Phase des politischen Katholizismus daher der defensive Charakter gegenüber einer positiven staatlichen Einstellung noch überwog, verlor er sich zunehmend mit dem Hineinwachsen der Katholiken in den Staat am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts und wich einem katholischen politischen Engagement, das schließlich zur Übernahme von Regierungsverantwortung durch das Zentrum Rudolf MORSEY, Die Deutsche Zentrumspartei, In: Erich MATTHIAS, Rudolf MORSEY (Hg.): Das Ende der Parteien 1933, Düsseldorf 1960, S. 281–453, S. 283. 2 Karl BUCHHEIM, Grundlagen und Anfänge des politischen Katholizismus, in: Frankfurter Hefte 2 (1947), S. 1224–1236, S. 1225; Hans MAIER, Revolution und Kirche. Zur Frühgeschichte der christlichen Demokratie, München 1975, S. 21 ff. Maier unterscheidet zwischen politischem Katholizismus, der seiner Auffassung nach vornehmlich defensiver Natur ist, und katholischer Politik, die die Neugestaltung des gesamten öffentlichen Lebens im katholischen Geist zum Ziel hat. 1

546 Gabriele Clemens ________________________________________________________

in der Weimarer Republik führte. Ebenso wenig kann der politische Katholizismus im Sinne Morseys einfach mit der Zentrumspartei gleichgesetzt werden, da sich vor allem nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg ein Teil der Katholiken links und rechts von der Zentrumspartei ansiedelte und dort politisch tätig wurde. Um sowohl der breiten Skala katholisch-politischer Tätigkeit als auch der historischen Entwicklung des politischen Katholizismus gerecht zu werden, sind weiter gefasste Definitionen des Begriffs zu verwenden, wie sie u.a. Michael Klöcker und Martin Conway formuliert haben: Klöcker fasst den politischen Katholizismus als „das Auftreten der Katholiken als politische Kraft in Staat und Gesellschaft,“3 Conway als politische Bewegungen, worunter er sowohl politische Parteien als auch eine breite Skala sozioökonomischer Organisationen, Gruppen von Intellektuellen usw. versteht, „which claimed a significant, though not necessarily exclusively, Catholic inspiration for their actions.“4 Der politische Katholizismus im Kaiserreich war keineswegs die Ideologie einer homogenen Gruppe, sondern umfasste vielmehr sozial heterogene Elemente und verkörperte politisch unterschiedliche Vorstellungen und Interessen. Aristokratische Großgrundbesitzer, Industrielle und bürgerliche Honoratioren gehörten ihm ebenso an wie Kleinbauern, kleinbürgerliche Unterschichten und Arbeiter. Wie Bismarck in Bezug auf die Zentrumspartei, die parlamentarische Vertretung des politischen Katholizismus, äußerte, gab es in ihr „nicht zwei Seelen, sondern sieben Geistesrichtungen, die in allen Farben des politischen Regenbogens schillern: von der äußersten Rechten bis zur radikalen Linken“.5 Damit hatte Bismarck treffend die politisch unterschiedlichen Vorstellungen und Interessen des deutschen Katholizismus im ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert skizziert. Was diese sozial und politisch heterogenen Elemente einte, war „ein spezifisches katholisches Selbstbewußtsein, wie es sich insbesondere in der Romantik in der AuseinanderMichael KLÖCKER, Der politische Katholizismus. Versuch einer Neudefinierung, in: Zeitschrift für Politik 18 (1971), S. 124–130, S. 130. 4 Martin CONWAY, Introduction, in: Tom BUCHANAN, Martin CONWAY (Hg.): Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–1965, Oxford 1996, S. 1–33, S. 2. Wilfried Loths Definition des politischen Katholizismus als “eine Koalition von im Wandel befindlichen Sozialmilieus, die sich aufgrund gemeinsamer Werte und/oder Interessen gegen den auf den staatlichen Bereich übergreifenden Säkularisationsprozeß mobilisieren ließ” nimmt eine vermittelnde Position ein, die zwar den Abwehrkampf des Katholizismus thematisiert, aber den politischen Katholizismus nicht auf diesen reduziert. Die Zentrumspartei bezeichnet Loth als die politische Organisationsform dieser katholischen Bewegung; siehe Wilfried LOTH, Katholiken im Kaiserreich. Der politische Katholizismus in der Krise des wilhelminischen Deutschlands, Düsseldorf 1984, S. 35 f. 5 Fürst Bismarck und die Parlamentarier, hg. von Heinrich von POSCHINGER, Bd. 3, Breslau 1896, hier zitiert nach LOTH, S. 17. 3

Der politische Katholizismus in Deutschland... 547 ________________________________________________________

setzung mit dem Erbe von Aufklärung und Säkularisierung herausgebildet hatte“6 und welches noch gefestigt wurde durch den „Doppelangriff aufklärerischer und obrigkeitsstaatlicher Kräfte auf traditionale Freiheiten und Machtpositionen der katholischen Kirche“7 sowie die verschiedenen Vorbehalte gegenüber dem kleindeutsch-preußischen, protestantisch geprägten Reich. Die gemeinsam erlebten Repressionen, insbesondere durch den von Bismarck zusammen mit den liberalen Kräften geführten Kulturkampf, bildeten die „Integrationsklammer“ für den politischen Katholizismus, die positive Zielsetzung hingegen blieb recht vage. Nach Wegfall dieser Integrationsklammer, d.h. nach dem Ende des Kulturkampfes, traten die Divergenzen innerhalb des politischen Katholizismus deutlicher hervor, bröckelte die „Einheit“ des politischen Katholizismus zusehends. Ausgangslage: Katholiken im Kaiserreich Die Gründung des kleindeutsch-preußischen Reiches im Jahre 1871 brachte die Katholiken in eine Minderheitenposition. Sie stellten nicht nur rein zahlenmäßig eine Minderheit im Deutschen Reich dar (ca. 63% Protestanten, ca. 35% Katholiken8), auch in Bezug auf ihre wirtschaftlich-soziale und gesellschaftliche Position, ihre Ausbildung, ihre Teilhabe an Staatsämtern verkörperten sie eine „strukturelle Minorität“.9 Katholiken waren vor allem im Mittel- und Kleinbauerntum und in der Mittelschicht zu finden, eine katholische Unternehmerschicht fehlte – von einigen Ausnahmen abgesehen – weitgehend. Auch in den Bereichen Handel, Verkehr-, Bankgewerbe und in der öffentlichen Verwaltung blieben sie unterrepräsentiert. Katholiken siedeltenn überwiegend in ländlichen Gebieten; in größeren Gemeinden von über 10.000 Einwohnern, und das heißt insbesondere in Städten, waren sie deutlich unterrepräsentiert. Sie hatten gegenüber anderen Konfessionen im Kaiserreich einen deutlichen Ausbildungsrückstand; nicht nur an den Hochschulen waren sie unterrepräsentiert, auch im Bereich der Sekundärschulen und der Berufsund Fachschulen. Ihre geringe Repräsentanz in wichtigen Ämtern und Positionen löste um die Jahrhundertwende die sogenannte „Inferioritätsdebatte“ aus. Diese ging von einer Rede Hertlings im Jahre 1896 aus, in der

LOTH, S. 17. Ebenda. 8 Siehe Hans MAIER, Zum Standort des deutschen Katholizismus in Gesellschaft, Staat und Kultur. In: Anton RAUSCHER (Hg.): Entwicklungslinien des deutschen Katholizismus, München 1973, S. 40–49, S. 41. 9 Ebenda. 6 7

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Hertling die zu geringe Vertretung der Katholiken in wissenschaftlichen und politischen Führungspositionen beklagte.10 Der von Bismarck gemeinsam mit den Liberalen geführte Kulturkampf erschwerte die Integration der Katholiken ins Kaiserreich, die gerade – trotz ihrer ursprünglichen Option für ein großdeutsches Reich unter Einschluss Österreichs – begonnen hatte. Die Katholiken wurden als national unzuverlässig, als „Reichsfeinde“ deklariert. Ihre Minderheitenposition bzw. ihre deutliche Benachteiligung im Kaiserreich führte aber nicht dazu, dass sie in ihrer überwiegenden Mehrheit dem Reich ablehnend gegenüberstanden; vielmehr waren sie darum bemüht, sich in das Reich zu integrieren, ihre Loyalität gegenüber dem Reich zu zeigen. Insbesondere jene Generation von Katholiken, die den Kulturkampf nicht mehr bewusst erlebte, bemühte sich, ihre nationale Gesinnung unter Beweis zu stellen. Ein Vertreter dieser Generation war der Zentrumsabgeordnete und Historiker Martin Spahn, der 1909 schrieb: „Erst das Jahr 1870 machte uns endlich nach der staatlichen Seite hin Luft; durch die Reichsgründung wurden wir auf einen breiten, freien, uns mit der ganzen Nation gemeinsamen Boden gestellt, auf dem wir uns recken und entfalten können“.11 Seine historischen Arbeiten sind mit den Werken kleindeutsch-preußischer Historiker vergleichbar, die in der Reichseinigung den Höhepunkt der geschichtlichen Entwicklung der vergangenen Jahrhunderte sahen. Spahn und andere – hier wären insbesondere Karl Muth und Franz Xaver Kraus zu nennen – bemühten sich um die Integration der Katholiken ins Reich, um die Aufhebung der trennenden Grenzen zu den Protestanten. Sie suchten die Überwindung des Konfessionalismus im Nationalismus, setzen sich ein für interkonfessionelle Kooperation.12 Ihre Bestrebungen wurden nicht überall im katholischen Lager geteilt; diese sogenannten „Reformkatholiken“ waren heftigen Angriffen seitens der sogenannten „Integralisten“, die die Besonderheit und Geschlossenheit der katholischen Kultur nicht auf dem Altar der nationalen Einigung opfern wollten, ausgesetzt. Der Österreicher Richard Kralik beispielsweise hielt die Zum Inferioritätsproblem vgl. Martin BAUMEISTER, Parität und katholische Inferiorität. Untersuchung zur Stellung des Katholizismus im Deutschen Kaiserreich, Paderborn 1987; Michael KLÖCKER, Das katholische Bildungsdefizit in Deutschland, in: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 32 (1981), S. 79–98; Werner RÖSENER, Das katholische Bildungsdefizit im Deutschen Kaiserreich. Ein Erbe der Säkularisation von 1903?, in: Historisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft 112 (1992), S. 104–127. 11 Martin SPAHN, Glossen zur katholischen Literaturbewegung, in: Hochland 6/11 (1909), S. 600–605, S. 602. 12 Zu Spahn als einem exponierten Vertreter des sog. Reformkatholizismus und des „Rechtskatholizismus“ siehe Gabriele CLEMENS, Martin Spahn und der Rechtskatholizismus in der Weimarer Republik, Mainz 1983. 10

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Bestrebungen Karl Muths und anderer für Verrat an der Sache des Katholizismus.13 Der sogenannte „Integralismusstreit“ zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts, der sich auf mehreren Ebenen (Partei, Gewerkschaften, Literatur) abspielte, war Ausdruck dieser Differenzen; dieser innerkatholische Streit um die Geschlossenheit der katholischen Kultur bzw. um das Verhältnis zwischen Katholizismus und Nation schwächte den politischen Katholizismus erheblich. Den Rückgang der Stimmen für die Zentrumspartei im Jahre 1912 führt Hürten vor allem auf diesen Streit zurück.14 Die Bemühungen der deutschen Katholiken, sich in das Reich zu integrieren, waren auch in anderen Bereichen festzustellen, wie beispielsweise in den katholischen Arbeiter- und Gesellenvereinen. Dort wurden, ähnlich wie in den bürgerlichen Vereinen des Kaiserreichs, Feiern zu nationalen Gedenktagen veranstaltet, wurden Lobeshymnen auf Kaiser und Reich verfasst. In den zahlreichen Theaterveranstaltungen dieser Vereine wurden unter anderem Stücke aufgeführt, die die Reichstreue der Katholiken unter Beweis stellten, ihre patriotische Gesinnung demonstrieren sollten. Diese Vereine leisteten einen wesentlichen Beitrag zur Integration der katholischen Arbeiter und Gesellen in das Kaiserreich nach Beendigung des Kulturkampfes.15 Dennoch waren bei Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkrieges die Katholiken noch nicht als gleichberechtigte Staatsbürger akzeptiert; ihre Imparität in verschiedenen Bereichen des staatlichen und gesellschaftlichen Lebens bedingte dies ebenso wie das Weiterbestehen von Resten der Kulturkampfgesetzgebung und die liberal-protestantische Voreingenommenheit gegenüber den Katholiken. Parteipolitisch war die Mehrheit der Katholiken der Zentrumspartei zugewandt, wenngleich diese Partei sich seit ihrer Gründung nicht als katholische, sondern als überkonfessionelle, politische Partei verstanden hat. Im Jahre 1881 wählten ca. 86 % der Katholiken – genauer der katholischen Männer – die Zentrumspartei. In den 1870er Jahren wuchs das Zentrum auf Kosten der nationalliberalen Partei zur mitgliederstärksten Fraktion im Reichstag heran und nahm damit eine Schlüsselstellung ein. Wenngleich auch der Anteil an (katholischen) Wählerstimmen von 86,3 % im Jahre 1881 auf 54,6 % im Jahre 1912 zurückging, so blieb der Zentrumspartei, u.a. dank einer die ländlichen Kreise begünstigenden Wahlkreiseinteilung und geschickter Stichwahltaktik, ein Block von 100 und mehr Reichstagssitzen (von 397) Siehe dazu ausführlich die Einleitung in Gabriele CLEMENS, „Erziehung zu anständiger Unterhaltung“. Das Theaterspiel in den katholischen Gesellen- und Arbeitervereinen im deutschen Kaiserreich. Eine Dokumentation, Paderborn 2000, S. 11–19. 14 Heinz HÜRTEN, Kurze Geschichte des Deutschen Katholizismus 1800–1960, Mainz 1986, S. 179 f. 15 Siehe dazu CLEMENS, Erziehung zu anständiger Unterhaltung. 13

550 Gabriele Clemens ________________________________________________________

erhalten. Das Zentrum war nicht nur die stärkste Fraktion im Reichstag geworden, sondern auch die unbestrittene Vertretung der Katholiken im Kaiserreich.16 Aufgrund seiner Spezifik, d.h. der Mischung aus traditionalen und modernen Elementen und der Komplexität der sozialen Basis, war der politische Katholizismus in mehrere Richtungen hin bündnisfähig und stellte, wie Friedrich Naumann 1905 in etwas überspitzer Form herausstellte, die entscheidende politische Kraft des Kaiserreichs dar.17 Das Zentrum trug einen erheblichen Teil der innenpolitischen Gesetzgebung der Bismarckzeit, wie Schutzzollpolitik und Sozialpolitik, mit, lehnte aber jegliche Repressionsmaßnahmen ab. Auch die Bismarcksche Außenpolitik, insbesondere der Zweibund mit Österreich und dessen Ausweitung zum Dreibund, fand die Zustimmung des politischen Katholizismus, sie beschleunigte die Aussöhnung der Katholiken mit dem Kaiserreich. Seit 1897/98 wurde das Zentrum auch, in Abkehr seines bisherigen Kurses, zum entscheidenden parlamentarischen Mitträger der Militärvorlagen, in erster Linie des Schlachtflottenbaus der Tirpitz-Ära. Insbesondere die Zustimmung zur Weltmacht- und Kolonialpolitik des Kaiserreichs verschaffte den Katholiken die lang ersehnte „nationale“ Rehabilitierung, sie wurde aber zugleich mit tiefgreifenden inneren Spannungen innerhalb der Zentrumspartei erkauft.18 Die nach außen hin aufscheinende „Geschlossenheit“ des politischen Katholizismus innerhalb des Zentrums war keineswegs spannungs- oder konfliktfrei. Konflikte waren in der heterogenen sozialen Zusammensetzung der Partei und den unterschiedlichen Antriebskräften für das politische Engagement angelegt. Wilfried Loth hat diese verschiedenen in der Partei sich artikulierenden Interessen folgendermaßen charakterisiert: „Im Widerstand gegen die aufklärerisch-repressive Kirchenpolitik artikulierten sich zugleich die Vorbehalte traditioneller Eliten gegen den modernen Nationalstaat, der Protest katholischer Bürger gegen den autoritären Zuschnitt des neuen Reiches, die latente Opposition katholischer ländlicher Unterschichten gegen die Ansprüche liberaler und meist protestantischer städtischer Führungsschichten sowie die Erbitterung katholischer Arbeiter über protestantische HÜRTEN, S. 144 ff; siehe auch Johannes SCHAUFF, Das Wahlverhalten der deutschen Katholiken im Kaiserreich und in der Weimarer Republik. Untersuchungen aus dem Jahre 1928, hg. und eingeleitet von Rudolf MORSEY, Mainz 1975. 17 LOTH, S. 24 f.; zur Zentrumspartei siehe auch Jürgen ELVERT, A Microcosmos of Society or the Key to a Majority in the Reichstag? The Centre Party in Germany, in: Wolfram KAISER / Helmut WOHNOUT (Hg.): Political Catholicism in Europe 1918–45, Vol. 1, London 2004, S. 46–64. 18 Rudolf MORSEY, Der politische Katholizismus 1890–1933, in: Anton RAUSCHER (Hg.): Der soziale und politische Katholizismus. Entwicklungslinien in Deutschland 1803– 1963, München 1981, S. 110–164. 16

Der politische Katholizismus in Deutschland... 551 ________________________________________________________

Eliten in Wirtschaft und Bürokratie; und mit diesem vielfältig motivierten Widerstand verbanden sich dann auch noch die Abneigung süddeutscher und welfischer Kräfte gegen die preußische Hegemonie und die Opposition von Elsässern, Lothringern und Polen gegen den deutschen Nationalstaat überhaupt – all dies vereint in der Gegnerschaft gegen den von Bismarck im Verein mit den Nationalliberalen verfolgten Kurs, aber notwendigerweise höchst vage und voller ungeklärter Widersprüche in seiner positiven Zielsetzung.“19 Die Frage war, ob die Klammer der religiösen Überzeugung noch halten würde, wenn die kirchenpolitischen Auseinandersetzungen in den Hintergrund traten. Und tatsächlich hat die Partei, wie oben bereits angedeutet wurde, einen kontinuierlichen Rückgang an Wählerstimmen verzeichnen müssen; von 1874 bis 1912 gab es einen Rückgang von 27,8 % aller Stimmen auf 16,3 %. Zu Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges wählte nur noch etwa die Hälfte der katholischen Männer die Zentrumspartei.20 Und dieser Prozess setzte sich fort. Am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges strebte die dominierende Parteimehrheit ein Regime an, das Loth als „bürgerlich dominierten Klassenstaat“21 bezeichnet, d.h. ein die monarchische Form bewahrendes Regime, in dem die Macht- und Verfassungsverhältnisse zugunsten der bürgerlichen Führungsschichten umgebogen wurden und zugleich der Arbeiterbewegung die Gleichberechtigung verwehrt blieb. Gegen Ende des Krieges aber verschoben sich aufgrund des Anspruches der Arbeiterschaft nach Gleichberechtigung die Gewichte innerhalb des Zentrums und führten 1918 zu einer Reformpolitik des Zentrums, das jetzt für eine weitgehende Parlamentarisierung eintrat. Politischer Katholizismus im Ersten Weltkrieg Zunächst aber überdeckten der Ausbruch des Krieges und die Welle nationaler Begeisterung die latent vorhandenen Spannungen im Zentrum. In allen Fraktionen der Partei setzte sich die Auffassung durch, dass die Partikularinteressen angesichts der Lage der Nation zurücktreten müssten. Der Krieg schien zudem die Gelegenheit zu bieten, die nationale Zuverlässigkeit der Katholiken, die ihnen im Kaiserreich abgesprochen worden war, unter Beweis zu stellen und ihre lang ersehnte Gleichberechtigung herbeizuführen. In ihrer LOTH, S. 17 f.; siehe auch HÜRTEN, S. 145. HÜRTEN, S. 160. 21 Wilfried LOTH, Zwischen autoritärer und demokratischer Ordnung. Das Zentrum in der Krise des Wilhelminischen Reiches, in: Winfried BECKER (Hg.): Die Minderheit als Mitte. Die deutsche Zentrumspartei in der Innenpolitik des Reiches 1871–1933, S. 47–69, S. 62. 19

20

552 Gabriele Clemens ________________________________________________________

Kriegsbegeisterung standen die Katholiken nicht hinter der übrigen Bevölkerung des Kaiserreiches zurück. Von einer die Grenzen überwindenden Solidarität der katholischen Kirche blieb angesichts der nationalen Begeisterung nichts mehr übrig.22 Im Hochgefühl des nationalen Aufbruchs identifizierte sich das Zentrum nahezu geschlossen mit dem Ziel einer Hegemonie des Deutschen Reiches auf dem Kontinent, die Annexionsforderungen wurden mitgetragen. Vor allem jene Kreise innerhalb des politischen Katholizismus, die sich im Kaiserreich sehr für die nationale Integration der Katholiken engagiert hatten, sahen in dem Krieg die Chance, gemeinsam für den Aufstieg des Deutschen Reiches zur dominierenden Macht zu kämpfen. Spahn schrieb 1914: „Bescheiden und sicher wird die deutsche Nation auch, wenn Gott ihr den Sieg verleiht, nach schweren Tagen an Englands Stelle die Führung Europas in der Weltpolitik übernehmen.“23 Vor allem betonte er die Einigkeit im deutschen Volk, die keine Minderheiten mehr kenne: „Hinter Wilhelm II. steht“, so konstatierte er, „ein gesundes, kraftstrotzendes, begeistertes Volk.“24 Zugleich aber wurde im Verlauf des Krieges die Polarisierung innerhalb der Zentrumspartei weiter vorangetrieben, nahmen die Spannungen zwischen dem Arbeiterflügel der Partei, welcher mehr Partizipationsrechte einforderte, und der dominierenden Parteimehrheit weiter zu. Die Polarisierung zwischen der dominierenden bürgerlichen Mehrheit und der Arbeiterbewegung wurde durch die unterschiedlichen Kriegserfahrungen wesentlich verschärft; die Arbeiter waren von der generellen Verarmung, die der Krieg mit sich brachte, weit stärker betroffen als die wohlhabenderen Schichten. Zudem pochten sie auf die Einlösung von Gleichberechtigungsversprechen. Die Einigkeit des Zentrums wurde zunehmend brüchig, und am Ende des Krieges stand das Zentrum am Rande der Auflösung. „Die traditionellen Formeln genügten nicht mehr, die tiefen Gegensätze zu überbrücken, die, seit langem latent vorhanden, durch die Kriegserfahrungen noch verschärft und vermehrt worden waren“.25

Siehe dazu Günter BAADTE, Katholischer Universalismus und nationale Katholizismen im Ertsen Weltkrieg. In: Albrecht LANGNER (Hg.): Katholizismus, nationaler Gedanke und Europa seit 1800, Paderborn 1985, S. 89–109; siehe auch HÜRTEN, S. 183 f. 23 Martin SPAHN, An den Pforten des Weltkriegs. In: Hochland 12/1 (1914), S. 14–29, S. 29. 24 Ebenda. 25 LOTH, Katholiken im Kaiserreich, S. 381. 22

Der politische Katholizismus in Deutschland... 553 ________________________________________________________

Nach dem Krieg/Weimarer Republik Der Anfang zur Auflösung der im Zentrum sich manifestierenden politischen Einheit des Katholizismus wurde in Bayern gemacht. 1918 spaltete sich – in Protest gegen den auf Demokratisierung setzenden Erzberger-Kurs in der Partei – die bayerische Zentrumspartei ab und formierte sich zur „Bayerischen Volkspartei“. Bereits mit der innenpolitischen Wende des Jahres 1917 (Koalition von SPD, Zentrum/Fortschrittliche Volkspartei) hatte sich ein Teil der als konservativ-national zu bezeichnenden Katholiken heftig gegen die Erzberger-Richtung im Zentrum gewandt und vor dem „verhängnisvolle[n] Übergang zur Parlamentsherrschaft“26 gewarnt. Die Zustimmung des Zentrums zur Weimarer Reichsverfassung, welche an sich den Katholiken die volle Religionsfreiheit und Gleichstellung sicherte, rief in diesen Kreisen einen Sturm der Entrüstung hervor, welcher in dem Vorwurf gipfelte, dass das Zentrum mit diesem Schritt nicht nur die eigene Tradition verleugne, sondern zugleich die Prinzipien der katholischen Kirche und der katholischen Weltanschauung verletze. So nannte Spahn die Weimarer Verfassung einen „glatte[n] Versager“ und führte weiter aus: „Ihr Urheber, der Berliner Jude Preuß, lebt und webt ausschließlich in den Gedankengängen des westlerischen Konstitutionalismus, und dieser hat von je, wo er Fuß faßte, den Staat zur sozialorganisatorischen Leitung unfähig gemacht.“27 Die Angriffe dieser sogenannten „Rechtskatholiken“ auf den republikanischen Kurs der Zentrumspartei konzentrierten sich fast ausschließlich auf die Person Erzbergers, der „planmäßig zur negativen Symbolfigur der neuen Republik gestempelt und als die Personifikation von Waffenstillstand und Niederlage, von Revolution und Volkssouveränität angeprangert“28 wurde. 1921 verließ eine kleine Gruppe überwiegend katholischer Akademiker und Adeliger unter Führung Martin Spahns die Zentrumspartei und schloss sich der Deutschnationalen Volkspartei an, wo sie einen eigenen Katholikenausschuss

Denkschrift betr. Vorarbeiten und Gründung der Vereinigung für ständischen Aufbau vom 23.6.1923, NL Heinz Brauweiler, Stadtarchiv Mönchengladbach; siehe auch CLEMENS, Martin Spahn und der Rechtskatholizismus in der Weimarer Republik, S. 90. 27 Martin SPAHN, Das deutsche Zentrum und die Wahlen, in: Das Neue Reich 2/32 (1920), S. 511–513, S. 512. 28 Rudolf MORSEY, Die deutsche Zentrumspartei 1917–1923, Düsseldorf 1966, S. 274. 26

554 Gabriele Clemens ________________________________________________________

gründete.29 Damit war die ohnehin schon brüchig gewordene politisch-parlamentarische Einheitsfront der deutschen Katholiken weiter aufgebrochen. Die Rechtskatholiken arbeiteten in den Folgejahren eng mit den Vertretern der sogenannten „Konservativen Revolution“ oder des „Neuen Nationalismus“, vor allem mit den Jungkonservativen um Arthur Moeller van den Bruck zusammen; ihr Ziel war die Abschaffung der parlamentarischen Demokratie und die Errichtung eines machtvollen, die Tradition des Heiligen Römischen Reiches und des Bismarckreiches fortsetzenden „Dritten Reiches“, das sie als ein großdeutsch-mitteleuropäisches Reich unter deutscher Führung verstanden. Im „Neuen Nationalismus“ mit seiner „Vision des Reiches“, seinen Vorstellungen eines deutschen Sozialismus, seinem Antiliberalismus und der Ablehnung alles „Westlichen“ erblickten die Rechtskatholiken den natürlichen Verbündeten des Katholizismus; sie vermengten jungkonservatives und katholisch-romantischen Gedankengut, etablierten einen Jungkonservatismus katholischer Prägung, von dem aus sie die Weimarer Republik und die Zentrumspartei als eine ihrer Vertreterinnen heftig bekämpften. Die Zentrumspartei selber stellte sich auf den Boden der Weimarer Republik und wurde zu eine der tragenden Stützen Weimars. Das Zentrum gehörte allen Kabinetten zwischen 1919 und 1932 an, vier der insgesamt zehn Reichskanzler dieser Jahre waren Zentrumspolitiker (Fehrenbach, Wirth, Marx und Brüning); sie standen in diesen 13 Jahren zusammen acht Jahre an der Spitze der Regierungen; dadurch wuchs dem Zentrum ein großer politischer Einfluss zu. Den Anspruch, die Partei des politischen Katholizismus in Deutschland zu sein bzw. mehr oder weniger alle katholischen Staatsbürger zu vertreten, konnte die Zentrumspartei allerdings nicht mehr aufrecht erhalten. Immer weniger Katholiken entschieden sich bei den Wahlen für diese Partei bzw. gingen gar nicht zur Wahl. Die für die Zentrumspartei im Reich abgegebenen Stimmen gingen zwischen 1919 und 1933 von 16,2 % auf 11,2 % zurück. Dabei blieb der Anteil der Frauenstimmen mit ca. 60–65 % konstant hoch. Zuletzt, d.h. gegen Ende der Weimarer Republik, votierte nur noch ein gutes Drittel aller wahlberechtigter Katholiken für das Zentrum (aber immer noch zwei Drittel der bekenntnistreuen katholischen Wähler). Die dem Zentrum abgehenden Stimmen fielen vor allem den Linksparteien, zu einem kleinen Teil ab 1930 auch der NSDAP zu.30 Zu den Rechtskatholiken siehe Gabriele CLEMENS, Rechtskatholizismus zwischen den Weltkriegen, in: Albrecht LANGNER (Hg.): Katholizismus, nationaler Gedanke und Europa seit 1800, Paderborn 1985, S. 111–130. 30 MORSEY, Der politische Katholizismus 1890–1933, S. 146 ff. 29

Der politische Katholizismus in Deutschland... 555 ________________________________________________________

Zusammenfassend bleibt als wichtigstes Ergebnis festzuhalten, dass der Erste Weltkrieg die bereits nach der Reichsgründung begonnene, durch den Kulturkampf dann verzögerte Integration der Katholiken in das deutsche Kaiserreich beschleunigt oder weitgehend vollendet hatte. Andererseits führte er zu einer weiteren Desintegration der parlamentarischen Vertretung des politischen Katholizismus in Deutschland. Die ohnehin schon brüchige Einheit der von verschiedenen sozialen Gruppen und unterschiedlichen politischen Zielvorstellungen geprägten Zentrumspartei bröckelte weiter, Teile der Partei spalteten sich ab, einige Zentrumspolitiker verließen die Partei und Teile der ehemaligen Zentrumswähler wandten sich anderen Parteien zu. Weniger denn je konnte die Zentrumspartei nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg für sich in Anspruch nehmen, den politischen Katholizismus zu verkörpern. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenfördes Aussage, dass der deutsche Katholizismus am Vorabend des Krisenjahres 1933 „eine auf religiös-weltanschaulicher Grundlage fest geeinte, in zahlreichen Berufs- und Standesorganisationen erfaßte, zu einheitlichem politischem Wollen verbundene soziale Gruppe“31 darstellte, ist von der Forschung inzwischen überholt worden und muss als nicht zutreffend zurückgewiesen werden.

Ernst-Wolfgang BÖCKENFÖRDE, Der deutsche Katholizismus im Jahre 1933. Eine kritische Betrachtung, in: Hochland 53 (1961), S. 215–239, S. 216; siehe ebenso Ernst DEUERLEIN, Der Deutsche Katholizismus 1933, Osnabrück 1963.

31

Die deutschen Juden vor und nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg Arno Herzig

Im Rückblick mag das Wilhelminische Zeitalter, die zwei Jahrzehnte vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg, als das goldene Zeitalter des deutschen Judentums erscheinen. Seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts war der jüdischen Minderheit der Aufstieg aus einer weitgehenden Randposition in das Bürgertum, ja Großbürgertum, gelungen. Dem kulturellen Konstituierungsvorgang des Bürgertums kam in Deutschland eine weitaus größere Bedeutung zu als der Herausbildung des Wirtschaftsbürgertums. So wichtig der wirtschaftliche Aufstieg für die Integration der jüdischen Minderheit in die deutsche Gesellschaft war, um so gravierender war jedoch die Aneignung von Bildung und das damit verbundene Sozialverhalten mit seinen moralischen Normen und Werten sowie seinen ästhetischen Idealen.1 Die von C. W. Dohm 1781 propagierte Erziehungsemanzipation war von den jüdischen Aufklärern, den Maskilim begeistert aufgenommen und in Erziehungs- bzw. Bildungskonzepte umgesetzt worden. Das traditionelle Judentum und seine Bildungskonzepte wurden dabei einem grundlegenden Paradigmenwechsel unterworfen. Nicht mehr die Angleichung und Integration an ein starres Gesellschaftskonzept wurde von den jüdischen Aufklärern gefordert, sondern die Individualisierung in einem pluralistischen gesellschaftlichen Diskurs.2 Dem Anpassungsdruck an die bürgerliche Gesellschaft musste sich nicht nur die jüdische Pädagogik, sondern v.a. die jüdische Religion stellen. Mit dem in Deutschland seit 1810 entwickelten Konzept des Reformjudentums hatte das Judentum den Durchbruch zur Moderne geschafft, und das nicht nur in Deutschland, sondern von Deutschland ausgehend auch in Europa und v.a. in den USA.3 Das Judentum war zu einer Konfession geworden, indem es auf seine nationale Identität verzichtete. Der Vorkämpfer dieser Idee, Gabriel Riesser, hatte als Abgeordneter der Paulskirche 1848 diese Idee vehement verteidigt, und die meisten Juden in Simone LÄSSIG, Bildung als kulturelles Kapital? Jüdische Schulprojekte in der Frühphase der Emanzipation. In: Andreas GOTZMANN, Rainer LIEDTKE und Till van RAHDEN (Hg.): Juden, Bürger, Deutsche. (Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts 63), Tübingen 2001, S. 263–298, S. 264. 2 Andreas GOTZMANN, Zwischen Nation und Religion: Die deutschen Juden auf der Suche nach einer bürgerlichen Konfessionalität. In: A. GOTZMANN, R. LIEDTKE, T. van RAHDEN (Hg): Juden (wie Anm. 1), S. 241–261, S. 242. 3 Ebd., S. 246; Michael A. MEYER, Antwort auf die Moderne. Geschichte der Reformbewegung im Judentum, Wien, Köln, Weimar 2000, S. 263ff. 1

558 Arno Herzig ________________________________________________________

Deutschland standen hinter ihm.4 Freilich stieß bei allen Integrationsforderungen der Allgemeingesellschaft diese Integrationsleistung auf Widerspruch, so wenn der Philosoph Arthur Schopenhauer 1851 schreibt: „Demnach ist es eine höchst oberflächliche und falsche Ansicht, wenn man die Juden bloß als Religionssekte betrachtet: wenn aber gar, um diesen Irrtum zu begünstigen, das Judentum mit einem der Christlichen Kirche entlehnten Ausdruck bezeichnet wird, als ‘Jüdische Konfession’, so ist dies ein grundfalscher, auf das Irreleiten absichtlich bezeichneter Ausdruck, der gar nicht gestattet sein sollte. Vielmehr ist „Jüdische Nation“ das Richtige…“.5 Doch hier irrte eher Schopenhauer als Riesser. Der göttliche Auftrag des Judentums wurde gewissermaßen säkularisiert. Es wurde nun zum Auftrag des Judentums, an einer gleichberechtigten bürgerlichen Gesellschaft mitzuwirken.6 Der Erfolg schien dieser Interpretation recht zu geben. Die Einigung Deutschlands brachte die Gleichberechtigung der Juden. Sie gehörten nun zu den Schrittmachern des Verbürgerlichungsprozesses in Deutschland. So wiesen sie den höchsten Verstädterungsgrad auf. Am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkriegs lebte mehr als die Hälfte der Juden in Großstädten, während der Verstädterungsgrad der übrigen Gesellschaft bei 20 % lag. Doch wurden auch die demographischen Folgen dieses Prozesses deutlich. Der bürgerliche Aufstiegswille, den die jüdische Minderheit bewies, führte früh zu einer „Konzentration der familiären Ressourcen“. Man beschränkte sich weitgehend auf die Zwei-Kinder-Ehe. Der demographische Aufschwung, den die Juden in Deutschland bis in die 1880er-Jahre genommen hatten, stagnierte, wenn er auch nicht rückläufig war. Von 1871 bis 1910 stieg die Zahl der jüdischen Einwohner von 512 000 auf nur 615 000, während die übrige Bevölkerung erheblich zulegte. Mit der niedrigen Geburtenrate korrespondierte allerdings eine geringere Kindersterblichkeit. Auch war die Lebenserwartung in jüdischen Familien höher als sonst, was freilich schon relativ früh den Prozess der Überalterung einleitete. Den wirtschaftlichen Erfolg beweist die Statistik. Die Steuerleistung jüdischer Bürger war vor dem 1. Weltkrieg dreimal so hoch wie bei den protestantischen und gar sieben Mal so hoch wie bei den katholischen Einwohnern Deutschlands. Durch das preußische Wahlrecht bedingt, war damit auch politischer Einfluss gegeben. Die Priorisierung der Bildung dokumenArno HERZIG, Gabriel Riesser, Hamburg 2008, S. 49ff. Aus: Zur Rechtslehre und Politik, § 132. Zitiert nach: Robert WELTSCH, Die schleichende Krise der jüdischen Identität. In: Werner E. MOSSE und Arnold PAUKER (Hg.), Juden im Wilhelminischen Deutschland 1890–1914. Schriftenreihe wissenschaftlicher Abhandlungen des Leo Baeck Instituts, Tübingen 1976, S. 689–702. Zitat S. 690f. 6 GOTZMANN (wie Anm. 2), S. 252. 4 5

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tieren die jüdischen Gymnasialbesucher. Auf den preußischen Gymnasien waren jüdische Schüler 1906 im Vergleich zur Bevölkerungszahl um das 6fache überrepräsentiert. In Frankfurt am Main besuchten zu diesem Zeitpunkt 86 %, in Hamburg sogar 96 % der jüdischen Kinder eine weiterführende Schule. In Preußen waren unter den 100 reichsten Männern 29 Juden. Es war für diese jüdische Oberschicht eine Selbstverständlichkeit, dass man ein umfangreiches Stiftungswesen betrieb. Dabei waren es primär soziale und erst sekundär kulturelle Stiftungen, die man errichtete oder unterstützte.7 Kein Wunder, dass man von einem goldenen Zeitalter sprechen konnte. Doch war dieses Glück trügerisch. Die bürgerliche Gleichstellung hatte nicht alle Zurücksetzungen beseitigt. Diese gab es für Juden v.a. im Militär, in der Beamtenschaft und an den Universitäten. Da im Wilhelminischen Deutschland mit dem Militärrang das Sozialprestige verbunden war, empfand man ersteres als besonders schmerzlich. Wenn auch der Antisemitismus mit der überwundenen Wirtschaftskrise Ende der 1880er-Jahre an politischer Bedeutung verloren hatte, so war er doch in den einzelnen Milieus stark verankert. Wohnte man nicht gerade in Bayern, so mochten Juden den katholischen Antisemitismus nicht als so gravierend empfinden. Dieser war v.a. seit dem Kulturkampf gegeben, als die katholische Presse Liberalismus und Judentum gleichsetzte und diesem die Schuld an den Antikirchengesetzen gab. Verbunden war damit der soziale Neid der wirtschaftlich nicht so erfolgreichen Katholiken.8 Gravierender war es für die jüdische Minderheit, dass seit den 1880er Jahren im protestantischen Bildungsbürgertum der Antisemitismus zu einem „kulturellen Code“ wurde.9 Gerade das protestantische Bildungsbürgertum war das Ideal, mit dem sich viele Juden indentifizierten. Der „Staatshistoriker“ Treitschke und der Hofprediger Stöcker hatten mit ihren Tiraden im Bürgertum den Antisemitismus hoffähig gemacht. Treitschkes Parole im Berliner Antisemitismusstreit von 1879 die „Juden sind unser Unglück!“ war zu einer allgemein akzeptierten Formel geworden. Wie er verbanden viele mit dem „Semitentum“ das Unbehagen am „schnöden Materialismus unserer Tage“, der die Kultur bedrohte. Auch bei Treitschke war der Antisemitismus nicht frei von Sozialneid, wenn er paradoxerweise vor den armen Ostjuden warnte , da die „Schaar strebsamer hosenverkaufender Jünglinge“ mit ihrer Nachkommenschaft „dereinst Deutschlands Börsen und Zeitungen beherrschen“ würde. Ulrich SIEG,Das Judentum im Kaiserreich (1871–1918). In: Arno HERZIG und Cay RADEMACHER (Hg.): Die Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland, Hamburg 2007, S. 122–137, S. 122f. 8 Arno HERZIG, Judentum und Emanzipation in Westfalen, Münster 1973, S. 89ff. 9 Shulamit VOLKOV, Das jüdische Projekt der Moderne, München 2001, S. 68. 7

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Proteste, wie sie der Althistoriker und Nobelpreisträger Theodor Mommsen dagegen erhoben, verstummten jedoch bald.10 Eine Erscheinung wie der sog. Bäder-Antisemitismus mit seinem Klischee vom „jüdische Parvenü“ dokumentiert die Verinnerlichung dieses „kulturellen Codes“, wenn man bei Autoren, so bei Theodor Fontane, der sonst kaum des Antisemitismus verdächtig war, 1882 in einem Brief von Norderney an seine Frau Sätze wie diese liest: „Fatal waren die Juden; ihre frechen, unschönen Gaunergesichter (den in Gaunerei liegt ihre ganze Größe) drängen sich einem überall auf. Wer in Rawicz oder Meseritz ein Jahr lang Menschen betrogen, oder wenn nicht betrogen, eklige Geschäfte besorgt hat, hat keinen Grund darauf, sich in Norderney unter Prinzessinnen und Comtessen mit herumzuzieren.“ Fontane, der wohl wie kaum ein anderer die heimlichen Sehnsüchte des deutschen Bürgertums kannte, offenbart dessen geheime Wünsche, nämlich vom Adel anerkannt zu werden.11 Die Anerkennung, die Juden sogar am Kaiserhof genossen, wie die sog. Kaiserjuden, was deren wirtschaftlichem Erfolg geschuldet war, erregte aber den Neid der Bürger, die nicht an Grafentischen sitzen durften, wie eben Fontane. Gegen diesen bürgerlichen Antisemitismus reagierte das jüdische Bürgertum mit unterschiedlichen Strategien. Einmal mit totaler Anpassung, d.h. man konvertierte, um alle Schranken zu beseitigen. Seit 1875 gab es in Deutschland die Zivilehe. Damit entfiel der Zwang für sog. Mischehen, nur christlich heiraten zu müssen. Da bei diesen Ehen weitgehend die Frauen den jüdischen Part stellten, zählten die Kinder nicht mehr zum Judentum. V.a. aber die Konversionen nahmen zu, um sich damit das gesellschaftliche Fortkommen zu sichern. Interessanterweise entstand hier so etwas wie eine Doppelidentität, wie sie der Historiker Fritz Stern in seinen Erinnerungen am Beispiel seines Patenonkels, des bekannten Chemikers und Nobelpreisträgers Fritz Haber dokumentiert: „Haber, der zum Christentum übergetreten war, erinnerte sich stets seiner jüdischen Wurzeln, und irgendwie hatte er es fertiggebracht, ein nominelles Christentum mit einer Arte Zivilreligion, dem „Deutschtum“ und einer privaten jüdischen Identität zu verschmelzen.“12 Diejenigen, die dem Judentum treu blieben, suchten andere Wege, um gegen den Antisemitismus anzugehen, sei es durch Vereine wie den sog. Abwehrverein, der mit wirksamen Gerichts-Prozessen gegen antisemitische Heinrich von TREITSCHKE, Unsere Ansichten. In: Der Berliner Antisemitismusstreit, hg. von Walter BOEHLICH, Frankfurt /M. 1965, S. 5–12. 11 Frank BAJOHR, Bäder-Antisemitismus in Deutschland. In: A. HERZIG, C. RADEMACHER (Hg.): Die Geschichte der Juden (wie Anm. 7), S. 180–187 (hier auch das Zitat). 12 Fritz STERN, Fünf Deutschland und ein Leben. Erinnerungen, München 2007, S. 127. 10

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Erscheinungen ankämpfte. Oder aber durch die bewusste Betonung seiner Einstellung als Deutscher und Jude, wie es der 1893 gegründete Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens (CV) tat. Er wurde zu einer „Massenbewegung“, soweit dieser Begriff für eine Minderheit angewendet werden kann. 1914 hatte er 40 000 Mitglieder und galt weitgehend als die politisch repräsentative Vertretung des deutschen Judentums. Die Betonung des Nationalen konotierte bei ihnen mit dem Bekenntnis zur deutschen Kulturnation.13 Eine Alternative zur problematischen Doppelidentität als Deutscher und Jude bot der Zionismus. Theodor Herzls säkulare Vorstellungen von einem fortschrittlichen Judenstaat waren durchaus von einem bürgerlichen Bewusstsein getragen. Doch eine radikale Trennung von der deutschen Kultur und eine Existenzgründung in einem völlig unbürgerlichen Land wie Palästina besaß allenfalls für Jugendbewegungen, die wie andere Jugendbewegungen im Protest zur bürgerlichen Gesellschaft standen, etwas Anziehendes. Doch faszinierte in bürgerlichen Kreisen durchaus die „kulturzionistische Lesart“ des Zionismus.14 Hatte zu Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts der Berliner jüdische Kulturverein die jüdische Kultur und Wissenschaft entdeckt und damit erheblich zu einem jüdischen Selbstbewusstsein beigetragen, so entdeckten nun jüdische Intellektuelle wie Martin Buber im ausgehenden 19. und beginnenden 20. Jahrhundert die Mythenwelt des Judentums mit ihren Heldengestalten aber auch die chassidische Philosophie. Renommierte Verlage wie der Jenaer Verlag Eugen Diederichs boten in ästhetisch ansprechender Form ein Forum (Medium) für diese „jüdische Renaissance“. Doch auch privat gab es Auswege, um dem antisemitischen Druck aus dem Weg zu gehen. Jüdische Akademiker wählten Berufe, die sie später unabhängig agieren ließen, so als Rechtsanwälte, Ärzte oder Journalisten. Im Wissenschaftsbereich boten Positionen in den Laboren der Industrie aber auch in den Kaiser-Wilhelm-Instituten einen Ersatz für die noch immer mit Hindernissen versehene Universitätskarriere. Brachte der Erste Weltkrieg nun das Bewusstsein, ganz dazu zu gehören? Viele glaubten es. „Man war froh, dabei zu sein,“ schreibt der Breslauer Studienrat Dr. Willy Cohn in seinen Lebenserinnerungen, die er kurz vor der Deportation nach Kowno/Kaunas, wo er 1941 mit seiner Familie ermordet wurde, abschloss und die gerettet wurden. In seiner Einschätzung des Kriegsbeginns 1914 heißt es bei ihm: „Viele von uns Juden beherrschte die Vorstellung, dass nun mit einem Schlage und zwar für ewige Zeiten alle Judennot ihr Ende haben würde, zumal nach dem der Kaiser gesagt hatte: 13 14

SIEG (wie Anm. 7), S. 128. Ebenda, S. 129.

562 Arno Herzig ________________________________________________________

‘Ich kenne keine Parteien mehr, ich kenne nur noch Deutsche’ [...]. es war wirklich ein ganz großer Rausch, der uns alle gepackt hatte [...]“ Immerhin bewahrte ihn seine Devise „Man soll das Schicksal nicht herausfordern, aber man muss überall da, wo man hingestellt ist, unter bedingungslosem Einsatz seiner Person seine Pflicht tun“ vor einer sinnlosen Langemark-Begeisterung. Bald aber konstatierte er: „Der Rausch war bald verflogen.“15 Die angebliche „Augustbegeisterung“ war – so die wohl heute übereinstimmende Meinung der Historiker – wohl eher ein staatlicher Propagandamythos. Wenn es denn einen Rausch gegeben haben sollte, so war es unter den Juden eher die Ansicht, in der „Stunde der Not“ die bedrängte Nation nicht im Stich zu lassen. Dies ist zumindest der Tenor in den zahlreichen gedruckten Predigten deutscher Rabbiner zu Kriegsbeginn 1914. Der „Hassgesang gegen England“ von dem jüdischen Dichter Ernst Lissauer, der dem Kaiser so gut gefiel, wurde von 60 angesehenen Persönlichkeiten des deutschen Judentums als „unjüdisch“ gebrandmarkt. Auch wenn jüdische Publikationen darauf hinwiesen, dass von 100 000 jüdischen Kriegsteilnehmern 2000 das Offizierspatent erwarben und die Juden damit gleichgestellt schienen, zeigen die zahlreichen überlieferten Tagebucheintragungen, dass – wie Willy Cohn schreibt – „uns das alte Judenschicksal wieder packte, dass letzten Endes alle Opfer, die unsere Gemeinschaft brachte, umsonst sein sollten.“ Für ihn persönlich führte das zu folgender Konsequenz: „Ich war in den Krieg gezogen, zwar gewiss schon als bewusster Jude, aber doch als Vertreter der Assimilation, nämlich als deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens. Unter dem Eindruck dessen, was man draußen erfuhr, wurde ich im Laufe der Kriegsjahre, nicht von heute auf morgen, nach sehr langem und ernstem inneren Kampfe Zionist.“ Mit ausschlaggebend war für ihn jene – wie er schreibt – „demütigende Zählung der jüdischen Frontkämpfer, die das [preußische] Kriegsministerium angeordnet hatte“.16 Der Burgfrieden, der durch seine Zensur judenfeindliche Schriften unterdrückt hatte, war bald vorüber, und die Juden wurden wiederum zum Sündenbock der sich bald nach den ausbleibenden Erfolgen einstellenden Misere gemacht. Das immer stärker werdende antisemitische Meinungsklima der Öffentlichkeit veranlasste im Oktober 1916 eine Erhebung über die Kriegsbeteiligung der Juden. Leider sind die Akten zu diesem Vorgang verbrannt, sodass sich „dieses fatale Ereignis, wie es der Historiker Ulrich Sieg Willy COHN, Verwehte Spuren. Erinnerungen an das Breslauer Judentum vor seinem Untergang, hg. von Norbert CONRADS, Köln, Weimar, Wien 1995, S. 210ff. (hier auch das Zitat). 16 Ebenda, S. 225 (hier die Zitate). 15

Die deutschen Juden vor und nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg 563 _______________________________________________________

bezeichnet, kaum noch vollständig aufklären lässt. Nachweisen lässt sich jedoch, dass jüdische Frontkämpfer vor dieser Zählung bewusst in die Etappe versetzt wurden, um ihre Zahl möglichst gering zu halten. Im Reichstag attackierten die SPD und die Linksliberalen diesen Vorgang, sodass das Kriegsministerium von einer Publikation des Ergebnisses absah. Dies geschah wohl auch aus der Einsicht – so stellte sich nach dem Krieg heraus –, dass das Ergebnis für antisemitische Kampagnen kaum geeignet war, da trotz der Manipulation der Anteil der jüdischen Frontkämpfer durchaus dem Anteil der Juden in Deutschland entsprach. Unter den meisten jüdischen Frontkämpfern führte die Zählung – wie bei Willy Cohn – zu einer großen Enttäuschung.17 Die Enttäuschung über den Kriegsausgang führte zu starken antisemitischen Reaktionen. Nach deren – der Antisemiten – Logik zählten die Juden zu denen, die den Frontkämpfern den Dolchstoß versetzt hatten. Zu den Opfern der Freikorpsmorde gehörten primär Juden wie Rosa Luxemburg, Kurt Eisner, Gustav Landauer oder Bernhard Schottländer. Immerhin waren 12.000 jüdische Soldaten an der Front ums Leben gekommen. Berücksichtigt man die Überalterung der jüdischen Minderheit, so entsprach der Prozentsatz jüdischer Kriegsopfer mit 12,5 % in etwa dem allgemeinen mit 13.4 %.18 Die Geschichte der Juden in der Weimarer Republik ist ambivalent. Die Beschränkungen, die im Kaiserreich noch herrschten, wurden nun beseitigt. Die Weimarer Verfassung bestimmte ausdrücklich, dass die bürgerlichen und staatsbürgerlichen Rechte vom religiösen Bekenntnis unabhängig seien (Art. 136, Abs. 2). Weder Armee noch Verwaltung konnten ihre Vorbehalte gegenüber Juden aufrechterhalten, was nicht bedeutete, dass nicht auch jetzt noch Karrieren an antisemitischen Vorbehalten scheiterten. Die jüdische Religionsgemeinschaft wurde der christlichen gleichgestellt. Die einzelnen Synagogengemeinden waren nun Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts. Auch die einzelnen jüdischen Landesverbände wurden von der Reichs- und den Länderregierungen als solche angesehen. Damit hatte nicht nur der einzelne Jude, sondern die Judenheit als Gesamtheit ihre Anerkennung im Staat erhalten. Die antisemitische Propaganda dieser Phase hatte äußerst geschickt das Erscheinungsbild der jüdischen Minderheit auf einige Stereotypen reduziert, die in sich widersprüchlich sein mochten, aber vielleicht gerade deshalb als ‘Erklärung’ für alles herangezogen werden konnten. Es war das Stereotyp vom Drückeberger, vom Kriegsgewinnler und dazu widersprüchlich das Stereotyp SIEG (wie Anm. 7), S. 136. Arno HERZIG, Jüdische Geschichte in Deutschland. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, München 22002, S. 211. 17

18

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vom armen Ostjuden. Mit der tatsächlichen sozialen Situation der Juden in Deutschland während der Weimarer Zeit hatte dies alles wenig zu tun. Entgegen der antisemitischen Propaganda war der „jüdische Reichtum“ von den Wirtschaftskrisen der Weimarer Republik nicht unbeeinflusst geblieben. Viele Juden hatten ihr Vermögen durch Kriegsanleihen und Inflation eingebüßt. Nach 1929 stieg vor allem die Arbeitslosigkeit unter den jüdischen Angestellten. In Berlin waren es 1931 allein 14.560 Arbeitssuchende, von denen durch die jüdische Arbeitsvermittlung nur ein Drittel vermittelt werden konnte. Dieser sogenannte jüdische Arbeitsnachweis wie auch die Einrichtung von Darlehensbanken und Suppenküchen sind ein Zeugnis jüdischer Selbsthilfe, die der steigenden Armut unter den jüdischen Bürgern noch vor 1933 entgegenwirken sollte.19 Wie die antisemitische Propaganda vom „jüdischen Reichtum“ so entsprach auch die von der „Verjudung“ der Weimarer Kultur nicht der Wahrheit, wenn auch die deutschen Juden selbst stolz auf ihre Erfolge verwiesen. Trotz der großen Namen waren 1930 im Bereich des Theaters und der Musik nur 2,4 % der dort Beschäftigten jüdisch. Über den bedeutendsten Filmkonzern, die UFA, herrschte der Rechtskonservative Alfred Hugenberg, der 1933 dem Kabinett Hitler angehörte. Selbst im Pressewesen entstammten trotz Mosse und Ullstein die meisten Presseerzeugnisse eher dem rechten Spektrum. Der übrige Bereich war weitgehend konfessionell oder parteimäßig gebunden und bot, von der SPD abgesehen, jüdischen Redakteuren kaum eine Chance. Von den Redakteuren und Schriftstellern waren 1933 deshalb nur 5 % jüdisch. Auch unter den meistgelesenen Autoren besetzten nicht Juden die Spitzenstellungen. Dennoch wäre es verkehrt, die Bedeutung jüdischer Künstler und Schriftsteller in der Weimarer Epoche zu bagatellisieren. Ihr qualitativer Anteil ist bedeutend. Die Öde, die nach 1933 vor allem im literarischen und wissenschaftlichen Bereich um sich griff, demonstriert dies recht überzeugend. Heute wird zudem deutlich, dass der Verlust im intellektuellen Bereich viel gravierender war als der im künstlerischen. Deutschland verlor nach 1933 seine führende Stellung im wissenschaftlichen Bereich, während die USA hier stark aufholten.20 Es dauerte noch sehr lange, bis in die 1970er-Jahre, dass man in Deutschland einsah, dass das jüdische Bürgertum in Deutschland vor, während Monika RICHARZ, Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland. Selbstzeugnisse zur Sozialgeschichte 1918–1945, Stuttgart 1982, S. 25. 20 Hermann JOST, Juden in der Weimarer Republik. In: Walter GRAB und Julius H. SCHOEPS (Hg.), Juden in der Weimarer Republik, Stuttgart-Bonn 1986, S. 9–38. 19

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und nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg nicht die angeblichen „Schmarotzer“ der deutschen Wirtschaft, Kultur und Wissenschaft waren, sondern dass sie entscheidend zu deren Erfolgen beigetragen hatten.

Navy Estimates and Gladstone’s Resignation Peter Skokan

The British Liberal Party was at the end of the 19th century in a complicated position. Unsuccessful effort to pass The Home Rule Bill of 1886 disintegrated the Party and created a difficult situation in Parliament. Therefore, last Liberal Cabinet between years 1892 and 1895 had to work under knotty circumstances, when House of Lords was controlled by Unionists and House of Commons by a small Liberal majority. Moreover, the Liberal government was shaken by another unsuccessful effort to pass The Home Rule Bill in 1893 and by internal grievances regarding situation in Uganda and Egypt. In this uneasy state came out another crucial question, which lead to Gladstone’s definitive retirement. It was a question of Navy Estimates. It aroused at the end of 1892 and was intensified in summer 1893. Since the end of the 1892 the press was convinced, that it is necessary to strengthen the Two Power Standard established in 1889 by The Naval Defence Act, which had set down a number of ships as large as had any two navies combined. In June 1893, an accident of the ship Victoria, which was rammed by the Royal Sovereign,1 focused an attention of politicians and of public opinion on the state of the navy. Moreover, successful and friendly visits of the French fleet in Kronstadt and the Russian fleet in Toulon created an immediate feeling of danger. Above all, there was a fear, that the joint Franco-Russian fleet in the Mediterranean threatened route to India, and thus, that it endangered a basic condition of British welfare and safety. In addition, here, it is necessary to remark that navy was considered as the most important segment of defence of the empire and Britain itself. Therefore, Lord Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty pushed the Cabinet to focus on this question. His department worked out two plans: a wanted one and a minimum one. Spencer adopted the later. It proposed to increase a naval expending by four millions pounds over last year navy expenses, which had been nearly 14 and half million pounds. This sum consisted of normal navy estimates established in 1889 by The Naval Defence Act and of some additional gains. Proposed figures were unacceptable for Harcourt, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and for Gladstone himself as well.

1

A. G. GARDINER, Life of sir William Vernon Harcourt, London 1923, p. 245.

568 Peter Skokan ________________________________________________________

Harcourt held a strong position against the estimates firstly and he argued that a new navy scare is based on ill-founded feelings and on a press agitation because, as he wrote to Spencer: “If the French and the Russians send every first-class battleship they had into Mediterranean we could match them there ship for ship and still have ten first-class battleship equal to the whole of the French force available for any purposes in the Channel.”2 In another letter to Spencer, which he sent him one month later, he added: “the public should be informed of the true facts as we know them and not to be scared by the lying statements of the Times. At this moment the world at large are fully convinced that our fleet instead of being vastly superior to the French and Russians combined is ‘miserably inferior’ to the French alone.”3 The case culminated in December 1893, when sir George Hamilton, First Lord of the Admiralty in previous Cabinet, said in House of Commons: “That in the opinion of this House it is necessary for the maintenance of the security of the country and the continued protection of British interests and commerce that a considerable addition should at once be made to the navy.”4 The effect of these words was immediate. Gladstone was forced to arrange a Cabinet meeting focused on the question of naval expenditure. The Cabinet met on 14 December 1893 and there crystallized two basic statements. One side represented Spencer, whom supported Lord Rosebery, Foreign Secretary. On the other side was Harcourt, who had Gladstone behind his back. The situation became serious, when Spencer with the whole Sea Board threatened that they would resign, if demands of the Admiralty would not be fulfilled.5 In this important moment Spencer obtained support from others Cabinet members. Mainly from Lord Rosebery, who defended additional navy and army expenditures as a basic condition for maintaining of the balance of Powers and consequently for maintaining of peace itself.6 Harcourt realized that he had to withdraw from his position. Therefore, he, at next Cabinet meeting, held on 26th December, declared that navy estimates proposed by the Admiralty would not threaten a national budget.7 In this moment Gladstone entered the dispute fully. He had taken the part with Harcourt, but after his withdrawal he criticized him that he did not GARDINER, Quoted from the letter from 28th September 1893, p. 246. Ibid, p. 247. Letter from 1st November 1893. 4 Speech from 12th December 1893. Quoted in STANSKY, P., Ambitions and Strategies. The Struggle for the Leadership of the Liberal Party in the 1890, Oxford 1964, p. 20. 5 J. L. GARVIN, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, 1885–1895, Vol. II., London 1933, p. 590. 6 STANSKY, pp. 20–21. 7 E. J. FEUCHTWANGER, Gladstone, London 1989, p. 269. 2 3

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face his colleagues strongly enough. Moreover, he refused Rosebery’s argument of preserving peace by power and consequently came into conflict with a major part of the Cabinet. Gladstone was an heir of radical and liberal principles of non-intervention, non-aggression and balanced national budget, which were in a sharp conflict with a groundless strengthening of military forces. In such a complicated and tight situation John Morley, Irish Secretary and Gladstone’s right-hand man, tried to reach a compromise among his colleagues. His effort wrecked because the Admiralty refused to accept Gladstone’s halfway proposal to increase naval expenditures by two and a half million pounds over the sum established by The Naval Defence Act.8 Reason for this rejection is obvious, when we realize, that such a solution would mean increase only by one million pounds over last year naval expenses. What scheme was Gladstone ready to accept? In his private memorandum, he worked out on 1 January, he had summed up that the normal expenditure established by The Naval Defence Act of 1889 was 13 millions pound per year. Further, he drew up, that last year expenses on the navy were 14 and half million pounds and that average expenses within the last five years had been 16,2 million pounds. The discrepancies in mentioned sums were caused by several additions to The Naval Defence Act of 1889. Considering this, the demand of the Admiralty to increase naval expenditure by 4 millions pounds over last year expenses would create a sum 18 and half million pounds. This was higher by 5,5 million pounds, ergo 42 percents, than expenses established in 1889. For Gladstone were such a figures unacceptable and he reassured himself that maximal possible increase could be the sum two and half million pounds over The Naval Defence Act of 1889.9 However, on the other side, this solution was undesirable for the Admiralty, as was mentioned above. Gladstone presented his scheme at a next Cabinet meeting, held on 9 January 1894. He attacked militarism firstly and then he refused to accept additions to naval expenditures proposed by the Admiralty with an argument, that such a plan had not ever had a precedent. He reminded the navy scares in 1859, 1870 and 1884 and added that in those situations he had supported an increase in naval expenditure. He denied the Two Power Standard and in his notes for the Cabinet meeting he called it a “short of absurd” principle. Then he threatened, that he would resign, if the proposal of the Admiralty passed STANSKY, p. 26. H. C. G., MATTHEW (ed.), The Gladstone Diaries with Cabinet Minutes and Primeministerial Correspondence, Vol. XIII, 1891–1895, Oxford 1994, p. 350.

8 9

570 Peter Skokan ________________________________________________________

through and he underlined that this would mean very hard times for the Liberal Party. At least he said that he doubted, that Sea Lords would resign, if the Two Power Standard did not pass through.10 Notwithstanding, the Cabinet did not reach any concrete conclusion and it became more and more clear that Gladstone’s resignation would be unavoidable. But the whole affair was now postponed for a time, because Gladstone left Britain to have a three-week holiday in Biarritz, a town in South Western France. Nevertheless, in London grew up a complicated situation. Gladstone’s supporters feared that his resignation would lead to two terrible results; to “the difficulty, and almost impossibility, of reconstruction of the government” and to disaster in the liberal Irish policy.11 Therefore, Lord Acton came to Biarritz to persuade Gladstone to avoid resignation and to accept figures of the Admiralty. He refused his effort because he thought that part of his colleagues would support him at least. However, he did not realize that it was very uncertain. Harcourt, meanwhile, changed his mind and stayed behind Spencer. Even John Morley doubted about usefulness of Gladstone’s statement. He knew very well that the prime minister would be defeated in such a situation; that his resignation would be inevitable and that the only victim of such an event would be liberal Irish policy. Though Gladstone was in profound situation, he did not think on a resignation seriously yet. He tried to pass the crisis by focusing on another important problem and to unify Cabinet on a common ground. The House of Lords offered him a perfect chance. The Upper House radically amended The Employers Liability Bill and The Parish Council Bill. Moreover, its refusal of the Home Rule Bill of 1893 and its permanent conflicts with House of Commons created tight relation between the two Houses. Therefore, Gladstone tried to focus his attention and the attention of the whole Cabinet on a struggle with House of Lords. In a letter from Biarritz to Sir Edward Marjoribanks, Chief Whip, he proposed to dissolve parliament and to face the Lords in a general elections. This change of politics was to substitute internal problems of the Cabinet and to strengthen a position of the Liberal Party against House of Lords. Gladstone, also, wrote a letter to John Morley, in which he made clear his position. He wrote: “The proceedings in the Lords appear to be raising a question altogether new and one perhaps capable of Ibidem, p. 354–355. A Letter from John Morley to Gladstone, 2nd February 1894. Quoted in STANSKY, p. 34. 10 11

Navy Estimates and Gladstone’s Resignation 571 _______________________________________________________

changing situation. It would seem now that the whole year’s work of the Commons is to be destroyed, and the question seems to arrive whether the Ministry and House of Commons are to acquiesce to this destruction.”12 Gladstone’s colleagues refused to accept his plan to dissolve parliament. Therefore, Lord Kimberley, Secretary of State for India, could on 7 February send a telegram to Biarritz, which contained these words: “Colleagues in town, namely all the Peers, Asquith, Fowler and Arnold Morley strongly and unanimously against proposal to dissolve.”13 In addition to these, for Gladstone, bad information, Sir Marjoribanks sent a letter to Algernon West, who was Gladstone’s private secretary and who was to inform prime minister about its content. The letter in four points summed up and explained why was Gladstone’s effort ill founded and unreal: firstly, because the Liberal Party was not prepared for such a motion; then, because the Lords had “not yet filled up their cup of wrath.” Thirdly, because it was necessary to solve the navy question; and lastly, because Cabinet would have to introduce Registration Bill, which would establish the one man one vote principle.14 The third paragraph was essential for Gladstone. He realized that he could not avoid the confrontation with the Cabinet, unless he, in the question of naval expenditures, withdrew from his position. The only alternative to this was his resignation. Moreover, the Cabinet as a whole did not regard the struggle with the Lords as a good idea. It was clear, that in future it would be necessary to settle this problem as well, but for now it was obvious enough that the idea came in a wrong time. A situation in the Party was uncertain and explosive, which was caused by permanent conflicts between Harcourt and Rosebery and by expectations of a retirement of 84 years old prime minister. In addition, structures of the Party were still marked by factionalism, disintegration and disappointment of the second half of the 1880s. In such a situation it would be suicidal to proclaim a crusade against the House of Lords. Furthermore, we have to realize that preceding crusade, for the Home Rule, was not at the end and Liberal Party was not yet strong enough to fight on both battlefields. Gladstone returned to London on 10 February 1894. The Cabinet met two days later. Despite expectations of all its members, nothing happened.15 Gladstone ignored the question of navy estimates, what really surprised his STANSKY, p. 39. Ibidem. 14 Ibidem, p. 41. 15 J. MORLEY, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, Vol. III, 1880–1898, London 1912, p. 383. 12 13

572 Peter Skokan ________________________________________________________

colleagues. He wanted to make the last effort to turn their attention to the struggle with the Lords. On 13 and 14 February 1894 took place a conference of The National Liberal Federation in Portsmouth. Here the Liberal Party accepted the attack on House of Lords firstly, but consequently William Harcourt persuaded his partisans that for such a motion had not come the right time. So, even Gladstone’s last attempt to avoid the naval question wrecked and in this situation it was clear enough that his resignation would be inevitable.16 Therefore, on 27 February he wrote to Queen Victoria that he would resign for health difficulties at the end of the current parliamentary session. He tried to mask a real motive of his demission but it was obvious that the real one was the naval question. Another reason was that he did not want a fall of the whole government and the only way to prevent it was to resign because of personal problems. On 1 March 1894 Gladstone held his last Cabinet. For several moving scenes, during which Lord Kimberley and even William Harcourt broke down to cry it, became known as “blubbering Cabinet.” Prime minister himself commented the scene in his diaries: “Final Cabinet 12 – 1 3/4. Really moving scene”. 17 Nevertheless, this event definitely closed his active political career. His fundamentally different opinions on the question of naval armament and his unwillingness to make a compromise acceptable for the Admiralty forced him to resign. Although he tried to focus an attention of his colleagues on the struggle with the Lords, but it became obvious that he could not avoid the naval question. The only alternative was his demission. After it the government survived and Lord Rosebery became prime minister. Naval estimates proposed by the Admiralty passed through but caused another quarrel between Rosebery and Harcourt over the national budget. Then the question of navy took away for a time and came out once more at the beginning of the 20th century with the German naval programme and with a new type of battleships – dreadnoughts.

16 17

H. C. G. MATTHEW, Gladstone, 1875–1898, Oxford 1995, p. 353. MATTHEW, The Gladstone Diaries, p. 386.

SEKTION WIRTSCHAFT

The Role of Export in the Economy of the Habsburg Monarchy before the First World War1 Aleš Skřivan, Jr.

Before the First World War the Bohemian lands did not represent an independent entity in economic terms, but were an inseparable part of a larger unit, i.e. Cisleithania. Single aspects of the economic development of the Bohemian lands should therefore be analysed within the wider context of Cisleithanian economy. In similar terms, the economic analysis of the position of Slovakia, must be understood principally as within one of the regions of Transleithania.2 It is natural that these fundamental facts also influence the analysis of export from the Bohemian lands (and/or Slovakia) to outside the border of the Monarchy; its character and significance rather differed from the role of export in the new Czechoslovak state. According to the data provided by the primary statistics the Habsburg Monarchy was a European country of average growth in 1910, and the GNP per capita of Austria-Hungary differed only slightly from the average of whole Europe.3 In 1910 Austria-Hungary constituted roughly 12 % of Europe’s population, about 10 % of the gross national product of whole Europe, but obviously had a lower proportion of the all-European export (about 6 %). The share of Austria-Hungary of the export of all Europe had not changed in the long-term perspective and ranged between 6 and 7 %. In 1910 the Austro-Hungarian export was about half of that of France, about five times smaller than that of Britain and reached only about three quarters

The paper is part of the research project Bohemian Lands in the Middle of Europe in the Past and Present (Výzkumný záměr MSM 0021620827 České země uprostřed Evropy v minulosti a dnes), carried out by the Faculty of Arts and Philosophy of Charles University in Prague. 2 On the economic position of Slovakia within Austria-Hungary, see more details in, e.g. Vlastislav LACINA, Formování československé ekonomiky 1918–1923, Praha 1990, pp. 42–50. 3 For more details on the economy of Austria-Hungary, see e.g. Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918, Bd. I., Die wirtschafltliche Entwicklung, hg. von Alois BRUSATTI, Wien 1973 and David F. GOOD, The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750–1914. Berkeley 1984. 1

576 Aleš Skřivan, Jr. ________________________________________________________

of the export of Belgium.4 In Austria-Hungary export took only a low share in the GNP (it is estimated that it was only about 7 % while the all-European average was about 12 %, with Germany even exceeding 14 %).5 When assessing the above numbers, we should take into consideration some specific circumstances, which, to some extent, change the informative values of these data. In economic terms, Austria-Hungary was a highly heterogeneous formation with considerable regional differences. First of all, there was the obvious difference in economic development of the western and the eastern parts of the Monarchy. In the final years before the First World War, 56 % of inhabitants of the Monarchy lived in Cisleithania that created over 80 % of the export of the Monarchy. The export capacity of Cisleithania per capita was noticeably higher than within the whole of Austria-Hungary. On the other hand, however, it should be admitted that the export per capita in Cisleithania obviously lagged behind the most advanced west European countries (e.g. Great Britain, France, Netherlands, and Belgium).6 It was a complex of several factors, which apparently contributed to the low proportion of Austria-Hungary in the all-European export and the low share of Austro-Hungarian export in the Austro-Hungarian GNP. Although the impact of individual factors on Austro-Hungarian export can hardly be defined with any precision, growing competition on foreign markets (especially that of Germany) and a relatively inconvenient location of Austria-Hungary (e.g. with regard to greater participation in the overseas trade) were probably among the more important ones. A large domestic market, which did not push the Austro-Hungarian producers to export played an indispensable role. Generally weaker direct ties between AustroHungarian factories and the target markets (especially the more remote ones), or rather common employment of the broker services of Vienna firms Paul BAIROCH, European trade policy 1815–1914, In: The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Volume VIII (The Industrial Economies: The Development of Economic and Social Policies). Cambridge 1989, pp.. 3 and 37; Scott M. EDDIE, Economic policy and economic development in Austria-Hungary 1867–1913, In: The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Volume VIII (The Industrial Economies: The Development of Economic and Social Policies), Cambridge 1989, pp. 828–829. 5 EDDIE, Scott M., Economic policy, pp. 828–829. For the comparison of the economic position of Austria-Hungary with other European countries, see Petr PROKŠ, Pozice českého kapitálu v Rakousko-Uhersku v letech 1890–1914, In: Studie k moderním dějinám, Sborník prací k 70. narozeninám Vlastislava Laciny, edited by Josef HARNA a Petr PROKŠ, Praha 2001, pp. 53–56. 6 B. R. MITCHELL, European Historical Statistics 1750–1975, London 1981, pp. 29 and 31; Ivan JAKUBEC, K problematice zahraničního obchodu rakousko-uherské monarchie v letech 1850–1914, In: Studie k moderním dějinám, Sborník prací k 70. narozeninám Vlastislava Laciny, edited by Josef HARNA and Petr PROKŠ, Praha 2001, pp. 38–39. 4

The Role of Export in the Economy of the Habsburg Monarchy... 577 ________________________________________________________

or firms from abroad proved a disadvantage. In Austro-Hungarian export there were practically no commodities which would be highly attractive for customers from abroad, and which, at the same time, could fundamentally change the overall picture of the Austro-Hungarian export.7 Moreover, the Austro-Hungarian customs policy was quite a controversial phenomenon, which in its ultimate implications yielded negative impact in the poor performance of the export. In about the mid 1870s Austria-Hungary reverted to the protectionist policy whose logical goal was, primarily, the reduction of imports and the protection of domestic producers connected with this. This strategy, together with other, for example, political reasons, led, necessarily, to retaliatory measures on foreign markets, and had, therefore, a negative impact on the Austro-Hungarian export. In some cases trade conflicts spilled over into customs wars (e.g. with Rumania and Serbia). Protectionist policy increased the isolation of the Austro-Hungarian market and enhanced the concentration of domestic producers on the domestic market. It is also worth mentioning that after the intensifications of the protectionist policy of Austria-Hungary in years 1903 and 1906, the results of the balance of trade visibly worsened.8 Since 1907 the balance of trade had regularly ended unfavourably.9 The above factors as well as some other circumstances considerably influenced the business strategy of most Austro-Hungarian companies, for which the domestic market was of much greater importance than were the foreign markets. Protectionist policy and an ensuing economic isolation of Austria-Hungary also de facto contributed to strengthening the economic ties between Cisleithania and Transleithania. In the long-term perspective a large part of the export of Cisleithania headed to Transleithania and vice versa. Both units were much dependent on this business cooperation.10 Other controversial aspects of the Austro-Hungarian export come to light when we examine its territorial orientation. For a long time the AustroHungarian export had shown a narrow territorial diversification. Germany had clearly the largest share in the Austro-Hungarian export (and import). Further see Ivan JAKUBEC, K problematice zahraničního obchodu, pp. 33–50. For more detail on Austria-Hungary customs policy, see Ivan JAKUBEC, Zdeněk JINDRA, Dějiny hospodářství českých zemí, od počátku industrializace do konce habsburské monarchie. Praha 2006, pp. 295–307. 9 MITCHELL, p. 513. 10 From Cisleithania especially textile, machines, machinery and iron were imported to Transleithania. In reverse direction it was mainly agrarian production. More on mutual Austro-Hungarian trade, see JAKUBEC, JINDRA, Dějiny hospodářství českých zemí, pp. 290–294 and John KOMLOS, The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union, Princeton 1983. 7

8

578 Aleš Skřivan, Jr. ________________________________________________________

In 1913 Germany participated in the Austro-Hungarian export with about 40 %, followed by Great Britain (less than 10 %) and Italy (less than 8 %).11 High proportion of Germany in the Austro-Hungarian export pointed, among other things, to a high interconnection of the economies of both countries and to the dependence of Austro-Hungarian export on the German market, which, logically, bore certain risks. The fact that Germany was the most important customer of Austro-Hungarian goods and, at the same time one of the most dangerous competitors of Austro-Hungarian exporters on European markets was quite contradictory as well. The development of trade between the two countries was also influenced, to a considerable extent, by mutual political ties. Although Austria-Hungary had made some steps towards enlarging the territorial diversification of export and in fact the whole of the foreign trade (e.g. towards a greater expansion of trade with the Balkans) before the beginning of the 20th century, these efforts led only to limited and short-term changes.12 The commodity structure of the Austro-Hungarian export was not clearly favourable either, and was not evidence of Austria-Hungary being a country with highly developed industry the vital part of whose export was formed by the sale of sophisticated products, e.g. machines or means of transport to other countries. In the last years before the outbreak of the First World War, wood, sugar, coal, textile products, iron and iron products, glass and glass products, machinery and devices were among the main items of the Austro-Hungarian export.13 On the other hand, some changes in the commodity structure yielded rather a positive impression and pointed to the advancing industrialization of the Monarchy – for example the increasing proportion of machines and devices in both export and import.14 In economic terms, the Bohemian lands in the Habsburg Monarchy had a very specific and sui generis exclusive position. They claimed about one third of the inhabitants of Cisleithania but produced almost one half of the gross national income. The comparison of the individual regions of Cisleithania shows that the Bohemian lands had the greatest share in the On export to individual countries, see more details in MITCHELL, p. 523. Vlastislav LACINA, Jan HÁJEK, Kdy nám bylo nejlépe? Od hospodářské dezintegrace k integraci střední Evropy, Praha 2002, pp. 16 a 17. 13 It must be admitted that the high proportion of the production of the primary sector of the total export was not a clear evidence of the underdevelopment of the given country. As an example the United States of the same period (i.e. at the turn of the 20 century) can be quoted. 14 For more details on the commodity structure, see Richard L. RUDOLPH, Quantitative Aspekte der Industrialisierung in Cisleithanien, In: Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848– 1918, Bd. I. Die wirtschafltliche Entwicklung, Wien 1973, p. 246. 11

12

The Role of Export in the Economy of the Habsburg Monarchy... 579 ________________________________________________________

national income of Cisleithania. In the national income per capita Bohemia came second after Lower Austria.15 Although the Bohemian lands were among the industrially most developed regions of the Monarchy, there were still obvious differences between the industrial production in the Bohemian lands and the advanced west European countries. In comparison with the greater opportunities to invest, an obvious technological head start, and the costs connected with expansion to foreign markets were a smaller burden for them. The exact definition of the participation of the Bohemian lands in the export of Austria-Hungary is a very difficult task unlikely to fulfil because there are several factors which complicate the matter: among other things, missing statistical data or frequent employment of the broker services when, in some cases, it was not quite clear whether the goods ended on the AustroHungarian market or on the foreign market. Most historians agree that the Bohemian lands had a great share in the export of Cisleithania (and hence of the whole monarchy) and supplies from the Bohemian lands to foreign markets were of the higher order than export from Slovakia.16 Among the main export items from the Bohemian lands sugar, malt, beer, textile and Jablonec goods (artificial jewellery) are ranked. Simultaneously, however, the majority of producers in the Bohemian lands oriented themselves on the domestic Austro-Hungarian market in particular, and the export outside the Habsburg Monarchy was of limited importance to them. Most of the goods leaving the Bohemian lands ended at a customer in the Habsburg Monarchy. There were several reasons for the relatively small supplies to the foreign markets. The factors mentioned earlier inevitably influenced also the export from the Bohemian lands: somewhat unfavourable inland location making more considerable participation in overseas trade difficult, quite a large domestic market of the Monarchy, weaker direct business ties with target markets and the ensuing employment of the broker services especially of Vienna and Hamburg firms, and others. Sometimes little initiative of individual producers and willingness to handle difficulties connected with For more information on the position of Bohemian lands within the economy of Austria-Hungary, see Zdeněk JINDRA, Výchozí ekonomické pozice Československa. Odhady národního jmění, důchodu a hrubého národního produktu Rakousko-Uherska a českých zemí před 1. světovou válkou, In: Střední a východní Evropa v krizi XX. století, K 70. narozeninám Zdeňka Sládka, pp. 183–202. Cf. Vlastislav LACINA, , Hospodářství českých zemí 1880 –1914, Praha 1990. 16 Jindřich CHYLÍK, Přehled vývoje světového obchodu, Praha 1948, p. 69. On the proportion of the Bohemian lands in the total export of Austria (Austria-Hungary) see Jindřich CHYLÍK, Vývoj zahraničního obchodu v našich zemích, Praha 1947, pp. 36–38 and JAKUBEC, K problematice zahraničního obchodu, p. 34. 15

580 Aleš Skřivan, Jr. ________________________________________________________

export are given. With some exaggeration we may undoubtedly claim that for the firms from the Bohemian lands it was usually easier to place their goods on the domestic Austro-Hungarian market than to try and win recognition on foreign markets.17

On export from the Bohemian lands, see JAKUBEC, JINDRA, Dějiny hospodářství, pp. 311–315. 17

Bismarcks Fehler oder ein unvermeidliches Ereignis? Beitrag zur Entstehung der russisch-französischen Allianz Lukáš Novotný

Die Allianz zwischen Russland und Frankreich, die an der Wende der Jahren 1893–1894 geschlossen wurde, bedeutete einen Schlüsselfaktor in der Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Bei der Entstehung dieser Allianz spielten nicht nur eine wichige Rolle die russischen und französischen Politiker und die Militärspitze, sondern auch, obwohl nur indirekt, der deutsche Reichskanzler Otto von Bismarck. Im November 1887 hatte er der Reichsbank angeordnet, die russischen Wertpapiere nicht als Reserveanleihen anzunehmen. Diese Weisung war von großer Bedeutung. Russland konnte sich in Zukunft nicht auf deutsches Geld verlassen, ohne Geld aber konnte St. Petersburg keine Eisenbahnen bauen, keine alte Schulden zurückzahlen usw. Die russische Regierung mußte deshalb einen anderen Verbündeten suchen – als der einzige erschien in dieser Situation Frankreich. Der Entstehungsprozess der russisch-französischen Allianz kann man in zwei Perioden teilen. In der ersten spielten die französische Anleihen eine entscheidende Rolle, die Russland in der schwierigen wirtschaftlichen Situation halfen. Am Anfang der zweiten Periode stand Bismarcks Entlassung im Frühling 1890. Von diesem Moment an traten die politischen und militärischen Verhandlungen in den Vordergrund, die mit der Ratifizierung der Militärkonvention an der Wende der Jahre 1893–1894 beendet wurden. Die erste große französische Anleihe an Russland Nachdem die Reichsregierung im November 1887 das sogenannte Lombardverbot angenommen hatte, befand sich Russland in einer schwierigen wirtschaftlichen Situation. Der Rubelkurs sank ständig, an der Börse von St. Petersburg erschienen die ersten Zeichen einer Krise. Ein Beispiel

582 Lukáš Novotný ________________________________________________________

dieser Krise war der Zusammenbruch der Privatbank Fehleisen Anfang des Jahres 1888.1 Die internationale Position Russlands verschlechterte sich fortwährend. Im Dezember 1887 schrieb der deutsche Geschäftsträger in St. Petersburg, Bernhard von Bülow, an Kanzler Bismarck, dass sich die russische Gesellschaft immer mehr von Deutschland abwende. Bülow informierte weiter, dass man öfter von der Anknüpfung bestimmter Kontakte zu Frankreich spreche.2 Der deutsche Botschafter in Paris, Graf Georg Münster, äußerte sich Anfang Januar 1888 zur Möglichkeit der Entstehung einer russisch-französischen Allianz. Seiner Ansicht nach war es in diesem Moment nicht möglich, von einer solchen Form der Zusammenarbeit zwischen den beiden Staaten zu sprechen. Er hatte dafür drei Gründe: 1) die instabile innenpolitische Situation in Frankreich; 2) die Furcht der Franzosen vor einem Kriege mit Deutschland und die Unsicherheit hinsichtlich der russischen Hilfe im Falle dieses Krieges; 3) die unterschiedlichen Interessen des Zarenreiches im Vergleich zu den französischen.3 Am 17. Januar 1888 trafen sich der deutsche Botschafter in Russland, Lothar von Schweinitz, und der russische Finanzminister Ivan Alexejevič Vyšnegradskij zusammen. Sie diskutierten unter anderem die harten, gegen Russland gerichteten Maßnahmen Deutschlands. Der russische Minister teilte dem Botschafter mit: „Ich bin im Princip gegen alle Represalien, und im vorliegenden Falle ganz besonders, und zwar aus dem Grunde, dass ich keine Represalien zu ergreifen imstande bin.“4 Schweinitz konnte nicht bestreiten, dass sich die russich-deutschen Beziehungen verschlechtert hatten. Ein paar Tage später äußerte er sich in ähnlichem Sinne bei der Audienz bei Alexander III.

Der Bankbesitzer war Baron Fehleisen. Seine riskanten Operationen führten zum Krach. Vgl. R. GIRAULT, Les rélations économiques et financières entre la France et la Russie de 1887–1914, Paris 1972, S. 241; G. F. KENNAN, The Decline of Bismarck’s European Order. Franco-Russian Relations 1875–1890, Princeton, New Jersey 1980, S. 381. 2 Der Geschäftsträger in Petersburg Bernhard von Bülow an den Reichskanzler Fürsten von Bismarck, den 15. Dezember 1887. Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871–1914 (weiter nur GP), hg. J. LEPSIUS, A. MENDELSSOHN BARTHOLDY, F. THIMME, Bd. VI, Berlin 1926, Nr. 1219, S. 118–120. 3 Botschafter in Paris Graf Münster an Reichskanzler Fürsten von Bismarck, den 13. Januar 1888, GP, VI, Nr. 1220, S. 120–122. 4 L. SCHWEINITZ, Denkwürdigkeiten des Botschafters General von Schweinitz, II. Band, Berlin 1927, S. 358. 1

Bismarcks Fehler oder ein unvermeidliches Ereignis? 583 ________________________________________________________

Am 3. Februar 1888 wurde der Zweibundvertrag aus dem Jahre 1879 veröffentlicht.5 Bismarck verfolgte damit ein doppeltes Ziel. Erstens, wollte der Kanzler Österreich-Ungarn zeugen, dass der Zweibund eine defensive Allianz sei. Zweitens, sollte Russland begreifen, dass Deutschland auf keinen Fall die Vernichtung seines Verbündeten erlauben würde. Nun war St. Petersburg vom Zweibundvertrag informiert. “The Treaty was a great blow to the Russian nationalists and increased their dislike of Germany,” schrieb William Leonard Langer.6 Die oben erwähnten Ereignisse deuteten an, dass St. Petersburg keine finanzielle Hilfe aus Berlin erwarten konnte. Russland war also gezwungen, sich mit den Ersuchen um Geld an einen anderen Partner zu wenden, d. h. es musste mit Frankreich ernste Verhandlungen eröffnen. Am 29. Februar 1888 kamen in Paris der russische Botschafter Arthur Mohrenheim und der Direktor des Comptoir d’Escompte Isaac DenfertRochereau zusammen. Mohrenheim zeigte dem Direktor einen Brief von Nikolaj Karlovič Giers, in dem der russische Außenminister fragte, ob Denfert-Rochereau nach St. Petersburg kommen könnte. Der Botschafter hatte noch einen Brief bei sich, in dem über eine Sitzung beim Zaren berichtet wurde. An dieser Beratung hatten neben dem Zaren die ehemaligen Finanzminister Reutern, Abaza und Bunge teilgenommen. Der damalige Finanzminister Vyšnegradskij sprach von einem Projekt eines Bankenkonsortiums, an dessen Spitze die Comptoir d’Escompte stehen sollte.7 Anfang April 1888 kam tatsächlich der französische Bankier DenfertRochereau nach St. Petersburg. Er verhandelte mit Giers, Vyšnegradskij und mit dem Kriegsminister Vannovskij. Denfert-Rochereau war am meisten vom Gespräch mit dem Finanzminister enttäuscht, denn Vyšnegradskij beabsichtigte eine große Finanzoperation, während auf der französischen Seite die Vorstellung von einer kleineren Anleihe herrschte.8 Der Finanzminister hatte auch Angst vor innenpolitischen Schwierigkeiten in Frankreich, die eine Panik auf der französischen Börse verursachen könnten. Vyšnegradskij wollte nicht nur auf französische Bankhäuser angewiesen sein. Es war nämlich offensichtlich, dass ein Teil des Geldes für die Der Vertrag wurde z. B. im Rechts- und Staatsanzeiger in Berlin und in der Abendpost in Wien veröffentlicht. 6 W. L. LANGER, European Alliances and Alignments 1871–1890, New York 1931, S. 450. 7 KENNAN, S. 380–381. 8 Laboulaye an Außenministr René Goblet, 10. April 1888. Documents diplomatiques français 1871–1914 (weiter nur DDF), ed. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, I Série: 1871–1900, VII (1. Januar 1888 bis 19. März 1890), Paris 1937, No. 96, S. 105–106. 5

584 Lukáš Novotný ________________________________________________________

Ausrüstung der russischen Armee und für den Ausbau der russischen Eisenbahnen bestimmt sein sollte. Damit konnte die Anleihe einen starken politischen Charakter erhalten.9 Der Finanzminister wollte anderseits zur Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen mit Deutschland beitragen und dafür wäre eine ausschließlich durch französischen Banken durchgeführte Operation abtraglich gewesen. Seiner Ansicht nach wäre es am besten, die deutschen und die französischen Interessen in einer großen Anleihe zu verbinden.10 Im Sommer 1888 gab es in Russland eine reiche Getreideernte, während im übrigen Europa Mißernten verzeichend wurden. Da auch Frankreich Getreide importieren musste, verbesserte sich die russische Verhandlungsposition. Minister Vyšnegradskij sah darin einen geeigneten Augenblick für die Realisierung einer Konversionsanleihe. Paris ließ nun seine Bereitschaft zu Verhandlungen erkennen. Auf der französischen Seite änderten sich aber die Hauptunterhändler. Die Stelle der Comptoir d’Escompte besetzte nun die Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas (Paribas) und ihr Direktor Charles Sautter. Eine wichtigere Rolle spielte aber auch der Privatbankier Émile Hoskier. René Girault bemerkte dazu: „L’ heure d’ Hoskier était arrivée.“11 Im Oktober 1888 kamen Hoskier und Sautter nach St. Petersburg. Hoskier wollte im Namen aller französischen Banken mit Ausnahme Rothschilds verhandeln. Weil die russische Regierung ein wenig reserviert war, mussten beide Männer noch einmal im November 1888 St. Petersburg reisen. Hoskier schlug der russischen Regierung eine Konversion der Obligationen der russischen Anleihe vom Jahre 1877 vor. Vyšnegradskij war damit einverstanden, wollte aber zu dieser Operation auch die Bankhäuser aus Berlin, London und Amsterdam hinzuziehen. Am 16. November 1888 sprach der russische Finanzminister von Hoskiers Angebot im Finanzausschuss (Komitet finansov). Vyšnegradskij nannte vier französische Banken, die an dieser Konversion teilnehmen sollten. Es ging um Comptoir d’Escompte, Paribas, Crédit Lyonnais und Société Générale. Die Höhe der Summe war 500 Millionen Franken (125 Millionen Goldrubel). Die Finanzmittel waren für die Zurückzahlung der Anleihe vom Jahre 1877 bestimmt. Vyšnegradskij sagte zu Ende seiner Darlegung, dass der Moment für die vorgelegte Kreditoperation geeignet sei, denn seiner Meinung nach beständen eine günstige wirtschaftliche Situation И. С. РЫБАЧЕНОК, Образование русско-французского союза, Moskau 1997, S. 276. РЫБАЧЕНОК, S. 277; vgl. auch KUMPF-KORFES, S., Bismarcks „Draht nach Russland“. Zum Problem der sozialökonomischen Hintegründe der russisch-deutschen Entfremdung im Zeitraum von 1878–1891, Berlin 1968, S. 160. 11 GIRAULT, S. 258. 9

10

Bismarcks Fehler oder ein unvermeidliches Ereignis? 585 ________________________________________________________

und gute politische Bedingungen.12 Er nannte auch alle Bankhäuser, die an der Konversion teilnehmen sollten. In Frankreich gehe es um Paribas, Banque d’Escompte de Paris, Crédit Industriel et Commercial, Crédit Lyonnais, Comptoir d’Escompte, Société Générale, Hoskier & Co; in Großbritanien und in den Niederlanden gehe es um die Firmen Baring, Hambro & Co, Hope & Co; aus Deutschland sollten sich an der Operation Mendelsohn & Co, Robert Warschauer & Co und die Berliner Handelsgesellschaft beteiligen. Aus Russland nahmen die Bankiers Sack und Laski teil. Die Höhe der Anleihe betrug 500 Millionen Franken. 417,5 Millionen sollte Russland bekommen, den Rest bildete den Gewinn der Banken.13 Antoine Laboulaye, französischer Botschafter in Russland, gab schon vier Tage vorher den Abschluß des Abkommens bekannt. Hoskier teilte ihm angeblich mit, dass die Angelegenheit, die ihn zwang, nach St. Petersburg zu kommen, erfolgreich erledigt werde. Alexander III. zögerte kurze Zeit, ratifizierte aber das Abkommen am 17. November 1888.14 Der größte Teil der Anleihe wurde in Frankreich plaziert. Es ging um 275 Millionen Franken; die Anteile der anderen Subjekte waren wesentlich niedriger. Die deutschen Banken hatten einen Anteil von 75 Millionen, die britisch-niederländischen von 50 Millionen und die russischen von 100 Millionen Franken.15 Das, was bis dahin undenkbar war, geschah nun wirklich. Die Zeit des Monopols Berlins am russischen Kapitalmarkt war beendet. Die deutschen Banken nahmen zwar an der Realisation der neuen Anleihe teil, aber ihr Einfluss sank. Mehr als 50 % aus der Summe der neuen Anleihe war in Frankreich plaziert. Diese Operation konnte selbverständlich die russische auswärtige Schulden nicht dramatisch herabsetzen, ihre Bedeutung ist anderswo zu suchen: der erste entscheidende Schritt zur Ersetzung Berlins durch Paris war damit getan. Der Grundstein der russisch-französischen finanziellen Beziehungen war erfolgreich gelegt. In Paris herrschte die Ansicht, dass diese Anleihe sehr erfolgreich gewesen sei. „La France s’ ouvrirait à la Russie, la Russie s’ ouvrirait à la France,” schrieb René Girault.16 Russische Politiker sahen die Anleihe nur als eine wirtschaftliche Operation an; dieser Schritt war aber von großer Конверсии внешних займов России в 1888–1890 гг., ед. А. Л. СИДОРОВ, Moskau 1959, No. 3, S. 103. 13 Ebenda, S. 110. 14 Laboulaye an Außenministr René Goblet, den 18.November 1888, DDF, VII, No. 275, S. 285. 15 Vgl. GIRAULT, S. 268–270. 16 Ebenda, S. 276. 12

586 Lukáš Novotný ________________________________________________________

politischer Bedeutung. Der französische Botschafter in St. Petersburg, Laboulaye, sprach von einem brillanten Erfolg dieser Anleihe. Seiner Ansicht nach zeigte diese Operation weitere Zusammenarbeitsmöglichkeiten zwischen Russland und Frankreich.17 Vom Erfolg berichteten auch die russischen Zeitungen. Das Blatt Novoje Vremja schrieb, dass sich Russland vom Joch befreit habe, unter dem es zwanzig Jahre standen.18 Alexander III. wusste bestimmt von allen Folgen der Annäherung mit Frankreich. Die finanzielle Situation Russlands sah aber so schlecht aus, dass es nötig war, das russische Misstrauen in das politische System der Französischen Republik zu überwinden. Die französischen Zeitungen widmeten dieser Angelegenheit eine große Aufmerksamkeit. Die Artikeln berichteten von einer engeren Zusammenarbeit zwischen Russland und Frankreich. Giers und Vyšnegradskij mussten sich deshalb an die französische Regierung mit einer Bitte wenden, auf die Presse einzuwirken. Die Zeitungen sollten die Anleihe nicht als rein politischen Schritt interpretieren. Bismarck half also dem größten Feind Deutschlands, Frankreich, zum Hauptfinanzpartner Russlands zu werden. In letzter Konsequenz untergrub er sein bisheriges politisches System, denn er ermöglichte Frankreich, die Isolationsbarriere, wenn auch vorläufig nur im Bereich der Wirtschaft, zu durchbrechen. „Nicht Russland, sondern Deutschland hat verloren,“ schrieb Sigrid Kumpf-Korfes.19 Man kann nicht genau sagen, ob diese Niederlage tatsächlich zur Folge hatte, dass Bismarck im Frühling 1890 aus seinem Amt abberufen wurde. Dieser Mißerfolg half ihm aber sicher nicht im folgenden Konflikt mit dem Kaiser.

РЫБАЧЕНОК, S. 277. Vgl. Laboulaye an Aussenminister René Goblet, den 18. Dezember 1888, DDF, VII, No. 289, S. 296–297. 19 KUMPF-KORFES, S. 171. 17

18

The Economic Position of Women in Great Britain in the Beginning of the 20th Century Stanislav Tumis

My contribution about the economic position of women in the late Victorian and Edwardian era will be focussed primarily on the working class women. The economic subordination of women in these times was strengthened by the legal doctrine of couveture resulting from the principle that “husband and wife were as one and that one was the husband”.1 This theory legitimized for example the fact that women did not dispose of suffrage because they should have same political interest as their husbands. Thus the married women became de facto men’s property. The men’s responsibility lied in providing women protection and material support. Women were expected to retaliate husband with household and sexual services (these obligations were legally designated the husband’s right to his wife’s consortium). A husband could sue anyone who deprived him of his wife’s consortium. Even in 1861 was decided that it was possible to estimate the monetary value of a wife’s services and thus to decide the amount of damages due to husband.2 His right to forcibly confine his wife in order to perform her duties was impugned by the Jackson case of 1891. The court ruled that none husband has right to keep his wife in detention in order to enforce the restitution of his conjugal rights.3 The doctrine of couveture gave reasons for the fact that after marriage women lost control of entire property. According to the Common Law a wife gave over her personal property to husband and without his agreement she could not dispose of estate or copyhold being in her possession. The campaigns of women reformers for enforcement of the Married Women’s Property Act brought small improvements in 1870 and 1882.4 The Act of 1870 gave women the right to dispose of their earnings and particularly the J. LEWIS, Women in England 1870–1950: Sexual Division and Social Change, Brighton 1984, p. 119; to the legal doctrine couveture compare: J. LEWIS (ed.), Before the Vote Was Wone: Arguments For and Against Women‘s Suffrage 1864–1896, London 2001, p. 3. 2 LEWIS, Women in England, p. 120. 3 Ibidem, p. 120; compare. R. H. GRAVESON & F. R. CRANE, (eds.), Century of Family Law 1857–1957, London 1957, p. 116. 4 www.legislation.gov.uk/RevisedStatutes/Acts/ukpga/1882/cukpga_18820075_en_1, 31.1.2008. 1

588 Stanislav Tumis ________________________________________________________

working class women benefited from it. On the other hand the Act of 1882 had a positive impact for middle and upper class women because it gave them the right to control any property obtaining for example by means of heritage or disposition. Though some historians considered particularly the Act of 1882 to be a real turning point it meant rather just the removal of some contradictions concerning the provision of middle and upper class daughters than the imposition of the principle of separated property enabling them to achieve the equal property rights.5 The Victorian model of men as a breadwinner and women and children as dependant on his work should be applied according to then theoreticians to the whole society, i.e. also to the working class. The idealist social workers notions of unselfish father and husband care of family contrasted often with reality. As a result a great number of women had to work. This fact is confirmed for example by the enquiry among working class women in Birmingham in 1906 concluding that “women workers were compelled to work because their husbands were unsteady, drunken or idle”.6 The inability of working class men to care sufficiently of family had also its consequences in legislation. Already mentioned Married Women’s Property Act of 1870 gave working class women protection enabling them to dispose of their earnings. A number of the factory acts restricted the women and children work – for example they could not work weekly more than Compare LEWIS, Women in England, p. 120–123; C. DYHOUSE, Feminism and the Family in England 1880–1939, Oxford 1989, p. 56–57; M. VICINIUS, A Widening Sphere: Changing Roles o Victorian Women, Bloomington 1977, p. 4; A. L. ERICKSON, Women and Property in Early Modern England, London 1993; T. MAY, An Economic and Social History of Britain: 1760–1970, New York 1987; M. L. SHANLEY, Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian England, 1850–1895, Princeton 1989; D. STETSON, A Woman’s Issue: The Politics of Family Law Reform in England, London 1982; M. B. COMBS, Cui Bono? The 1870 British Married Women‘s Property Act, Bargaining Power, and the Distribution of Resources Within Marriage, in: Feminist Economics, Vol. 12, No. 1–2, January-April 2006, p. 51–83; M. B. COMBS, A Measure of Legal Independence: The 1870 British Married Women‘s Property Act and the Portfolio Allocations of British Wives, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 65, November 2005, p. 1028–1057; M. B. COMBS, Wives and Households Wealth: the Impact of the 1870 British Married Women‘s Property Act on Wealth-Holding and Share of Household Resources, in: Continuity and Change, Vol. 19, May 2004, p. 141–163; L. HOLCOMBE, Wives and Property: Reform of the Married Women‘s PropertyLaw in Nineteenth Centrury England, Toronto 1983; S. STAVES, Married Women‘s Separate Property in England, 1660–1883, Cambridge (MA) 1990. 6 E. CADBURY, C. M. MATHESON & G. SHANN, Women‘s Work and Wages, London 1906, p. 216. Compare also G. M. TUCKWELL, Woman in industry from seven points of view, London 1908. 5

The Economic Position of Women in Great Britain ... 589 ________________________________________________________

provided by law.7 The position of working class women in families where they often faced whipping and cruelty of husbands was improved also by passing of laws enabling them to sue for divorce. Above all the measure from 1886 giving them the right to sue for divorce on the basis of husband’s reluctance or inability to support family meant the real breakthrough; despite of the fact that they could not rely on too rich material support of the state.8 The biggest problem in relations between married couple of working class was caused by the inability of men to earn enough money enabling

Compare V. JEANS, Factory Act legislation: its industrial and commercial effects, actual and prospective being the Cobden prize essay for 1891, London 1892; N. VYNNE & H. BLACKBURN, Women under the factory act: Part I – Position of the employer. Part. II – Position of the employed, London 1903; T. M. WALTON, The early factory legislation; a study in legislative and administrative evolution, Leigh-on-Sea 1948; A., REDGRAVE, The factory & workshop act, 1878: with introduction, copious notes, and an elaborate index, London 1885; A. REDGRAVE, The factory & workshop acts, 1878 to 1891: with introduction, copious notes, and an elaborate index, London 1891; E. L. HUTCHINS & A. SPENCER, A history of factory legislation, London 1911; J. B. MATTHEWS, The law relating to children and young persons, London 1895; M. E. TENNANT, The law relating to factories and workshops, London 1908; W. BOWSTEAD, The law relating to factories and workshops: as amended and consolidated by the Factory and Workshop Act, 1901. With all orders, special rules, and requirements now in force; and the provisions of the truck acts, elementary education acts, and other statutes and regulations so far as they affect factories and workshops, London 1901; A. H. EVANS, The law relating to factories and workshops: including laundries, docks & c., bakehouses etc., being the factory and workshop acts 1878-1895 together with the shop hours acts 1892-1896, the truck acts 1831 & 1887. Orders of the Secretary of state made under the factory acts with explanatory notes and a copious index, London 1895; R. W. COOKE-TAYLOR, The modern factory system, London 1891; B. P. WEBB, Women and the Factory Acts, London 1896. 8 Compare G. L. SAVAGE,, The Operation of the 1857 Divorce Act, 1860–1910 a Research Note, in: Journal of Social History, Vol. 16, No. 4, Summer 1983, p. 103–110; I. MINOR, Working Class Women and Matrimonial Law Reform, 1890–1914. In: D. E. MARTIN & D. RUBINSTEIN, Ideology and the Labour Movement, London 1979, p. 103–124; Women‘s Cooperative Guild, Working Women and Divorce, London 1911. 7

590 Stanislav Tumis ________________________________________________________

them to care of family. Charles Booth 1889 survey of London9 showed that 30 per cent of the population was unable to rely of a man’s wage alone. Ten years later Joseph Rowntree calculated the subsistence wage for a male breadwinner with a wife and three children to be 21/8d per week; in 1908 the subsistence wage increased according to Edward Cadbury to 25/-.10 The 1906 Wages Census showed that in the cotton industry 27.2 percent of male workers earned below 22/- per week and 41.6 percent of less than 25/-. In the metal engineering and shipbuilding trades encompassing 12 per cent of the male workforce, 20 per cent of all men over the age of twenty earned less than 22/- per week and 30.6 percent less than 25/-. The poorly paid agricultural workers earned an average of 18/4 per week.11 In this era the married working class women could not rely too much on the state welfare provision because the state supported the model of the so called family wage trying to keep women in household. In 1911 the British members of parliament passed the National Insurance Act12 which became the base of the modern British social system. The health insurance, however, From the most important then surveys dealing with the position of working class women compare: C. BOOTH, Life and Labour of the People in London, London 1891; C. BOOTH, The Aged Poor, London 1894; E. CADBURY (ed.), Women’s Work and Wages, London 1906; J. ROWNTREE & A. J. SHERWELL, The Temperance Problem and Social Reform, London 1900; W. BESANT, East London, London 1901; W. H. BEVERIDGE, Unemployment: A Problem of Industry, London 1909; C. BLACK (ed.), Married Women’s Work, London 1915; E. BOWMAKER, The Housing of the Working Classes, London 1895; C. COLLET, Women in Industry, London 1911; E. COLLET & M. ROBERTSON, Family Budgets, London 1896; M. L. DAVIES, Cooperation in Poor Neighbourhoods, publishing place not specified, 1899; B. DRAKE, Women in the Engineering Trades, London 1917; B. L. HUTCHINS, Women in Modern Industry, London 1915; M. KAUFMAN, The Housing of the Working Classes and of the Poor, London and Edinburgh 1907; L. LEVI, Wages and Earnings of the Working Classes, London 1885; J. R. MACDONNALD (ed.), Women in the Printing Trades, London 1904; A. MARTIN, The Married Working Women, London 1911; R. B. SEEBOHM, Poverty. A Study of Town Life, London 1901; R. B. SEEBOHM & M. KENDALL, How the Labourer Lives, London 1913; R. B. SEEBOHM & B. LASHER, Unemployment: A Social Study, London 1911; G. TUCKWELL (ed.), Women in Industry, London 1908; M. WILSON & E. G. HOWARTH, East Ham, London 1907. 10 To the transfer of then currency I recommend the following web sites: http://www.woodlands-junior.kent.sch.uk/customs/questions/money.html, 15.2.2008. To the detailed budget of the working class families and to then prices compare: S. MEACHAM, A Life Apart, the English Working Class 1890–1914, London 1977, p. 70– 86. 11 LEWIS, Women in England, p. 48. 12 Compare B. B. GILBERT, The Origins of National Insurance in Great Britain, London 1966; O. B. CLARKE, The National insurance act 1911: being a treatise on the scheme of national health insurance and insurance against unemployment created by that act, with the incorporated enactments, full explanatory notes, tables, and examples, London 1912; compare also MEACHAM, A Life Apart, p. 60–94. 9

The Economic Position of Women in Great Britain ... 591 ________________________________________________________

did not cover dependants and married women could only join the scheme if they were insured workers in their own right. Women workers comprehended in the national insurance found them to be submitted to strict control because of the unexpectedly large number of sickness claims.13 In case of man inability to care of family the wives looked for another source of income. The first possibility was to borrow on credit – thus women became the haul of tallymen, scotch hawkers or owners of pawnshops. The loans on credit and help of neighbours could generally solve the sudden lack of material sources caused by irregular income, sickness or necessity to pay unpredictable expenses.14 The lack of financial sources often compelled women whether to the casual work or full-time jobs. In 1901 England and Wales had over 4 million women full-time job and the bulk of them was (except approximately 300 000) workers.15 In late Victorian and Edwardian Britain the women’s work was characterized by two complementary concepts: first, the idea of the so called “women work” presupposing the existence of purely men professions; secondly, the idea of the so called “women wage” – in comparison with men considerably lower.16 There is no surprise that position of women on employment market was inferior. Catherine Hakim defined on the basis of her research of censuses which she explored from 1901 onwards two types of their segregation: 1) horizontal segregation – the share of all employments where women had together with men approximately equal representation remained permanently about 25 per cent of total number; jobs with majority of men reached permanently around 75 per cent, while purely women employments appeared rarely; 2) vertical segregation – women performed on employment market in comparison with men lower position; for example in non-manual sector they worked often as clerks or shop assistances while their share in managerial professions remained largely low.17 The examples of undervaluation of women work in comparison with men can be found almost in all industrial sectors. Sidney Webb was for LEWIS, Women in England, p. 48–49; compare with J. LEWIS (ed.), Women’s Welfare/Women’s Rights, London 1983, pp. 17–37. 14 LEWIS, Women in England, p. 53. 15 D. C. MARSH, The Changing Social Structure of England and Wales, London 1958, p. 126. 16 J. LOWN, Not So Much a Factory, More a Form of Patriarchy: Gender and Class during Industrialisation, In: E. GMARNIKOV (ed.), Gender, Class and Work, London 1983, pp. 28–45; compare also K. COWMAN & L. A. JACKSON (eds.), Women and work culture: Britain c. 1850– 1950, Aldershot 2005. 17 C. HAKIM, Occupational Segregation, in: Research Paper, No. 9, London: Department of Employment 1979, p. 22–34. 13

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example wondered that women compositors received 5½d setting “1000 ens”, while the men received 8½d.18 In 1909 the Trade Board for the tailoring industry set an hourly rate of 3¼d for women and 6d for men. 19 In factories women could earn about half of men weekly wage.20 Moreover the employers introduced new strategies of wages with the aim to yet more reduce women payment. The majority of women remained considerably below the limit of living wage, i.e. below 14–16s per week considered in 1906 by Cadbury and Shan as ultimate for provision of spinsters;21 in 1914 the sum increased according to Rowntree to 1 pound a week.22 In 1906 the average wages of adult

S. WEBB, The Alleged Differences in the Wages Paid to Men and to Women for Similar Work. Economic Journal 1, December 1891, p. 635–662. 19 LEWIS, Women in England, p. 163. 20 Compare table from A. L. BOWLEY, Wages and Income in the U.K. since 1860, Cambridge 1937. Percentage share of women wage from 100 % Sector male (in 1906) Textile industry 58,5 Clothing industry 46,3 Food industry 41,5 Paper and printing industry 36,4 Metal industry 38,1 Total (all sectors) 43,7 18

21 22

E. CADBURY, C. M. MATHESON & G. SHANN, Women‘s Work and Wages, p. 14–15. B. S. ROWNTREE, The Human Needs of Labour, London 1918, p. 117.

The Economic Position of Women in Great Britain ... 593 ________________________________________________________

workwomen in textile factories reached 15/5d, in clothing industry 13/6d, in metalworking industry 12/8d, in printing-works 12/2d and in food industry 11/3d.23 The inferior position of women on employment market in late Victorian and Edwardian England was explained in different ways. Sidney Webb for example believed that subordinated position of women resulted from natural state of things: their productive force is usually lower, as regards both quantity and quality.24 According to modern neo-classicist economists their lower wages and their inferior position on employment market result from their prime commitment to maternal duties and care of family – as a consequence they do not so much invest in comparison with man in education and professional working training, they prefer jobs close to their B. DRAKE, Women in Trade Unions, London 1920, p. 44; compare also MEACHAM, A Life Apart., p. 100–101; HUTCHINS, Women in Modern Industry, p. 216, 218, 225–226; C. BLACK., Sweated Industry and the Minimum Wage, London 1907, p. 27–28. However some women received wage deeply below the average salary in the trade. As example I chose financial conditions of women working in 1906 in London laundry where average wages was 10/2d: Weekly wage in shillings 1906 – percentage number of women below 8 shillings 6% 8–9 12 % 9–10 17 % 10–11 25 % 11–12 13 % 12–13 14 % 13–14 6% 14–15 3% 15 and more 4% 23

Source: The National Archives, London – Kew, LAB 2/17/TBM176/1922. To the working and wage situation of women in different sectors compare: L. H. C. TIPPETT, A Portrait of the Lancashire Textile Industry, Oxford 1969; J. R. MACDONALD, Women in the Printing Trades, London 1904; F. HUNT, The London Trade in the Printing and Binding of Books: An Experience in Exclusion, Dilution and De-skilling for Women Workers, in: Women’s Studies International Forum 6, 1983, p. 517-524; DRAKE, Women in the Engineering Trades ...; J. W. F. ROWE, Wages in Practice and Theory, London 1928; A. V. JOHN, By the sweat of their brow : women workers at Victorian coal mines, London 1984; D. VALENZE, The First Industrial Women, Oxford 1995; G. HOLLOWAY, Women and work in Britain since 1840, London 2005; E. JORDAN, The Women’s Movement and women’s employment in nineteenth century Britain, London 1999; W. BOTTERO, Women’s occupations, mobility and the social order, Cambridge 1999; G. BRAYBON, Women workers in the First World War, London 1989; J. HALSWORTH & R. J. DAVIES, The Working Life of Shop Assistants, Manchester 1910; Board of Trade, Report on Changes in the Rates of Wages and Hours of Work, 1912, xcii, Cd. 6471. 24 WEBB, The Alleged Differences in the Wages, p. 649.

594 Stanislav Tumis ________________________________________________________

home and they are willing to interrupt their carrier and predisposed to absenteeism. According to them such an order-attaching women to the domestic duties and care of children reflects the natural state of gender settlement.25 According to Mary MacArthur the reason of their failure lied in insufficient women organization,26 particularly in their weak representation in trade unions. 27 Men stood strongly out against participation of women in trade unions because they were afraid of their bad influence on reducing wages. Moreover the concept of the so called women work was shared almost by entire society – by workers, employers, trade unionists, government and even by workwomen alone. The division of work into men and women was perceived as something “natural”.28 The majority of working class women supported the claim of the higher man status on employment market because it had a positive impact on family budget and prosperity.

LEWIS, Women in England, p. 170. DRAKE, Women in Trade Unions, p. 45. 27 Comparison of membership and density in trade union between men and women in Great Britain: Year Male Density Women Density Percentage membership in % membership in % share of women in 1000 in 1000 rom total umber 1896 1356 14.0 116 2.7 7.9 1901 1781 17.2 124 2.9 6.5 1911 2799 24.5 331 6.6 10.6 1921 5526 46.3 986 18.8 15.1 25

26

Source: G. S. BAIN & R. PRICE, Profiles of Union Growth, Oxford 1980. 28 LEWIS, Women in England, p. 173.

Japan’s Policy and Economic Interest during the Scramble for Concessions and the „Boxer Uprising“ in China Jan Kočvar

At the end of the 19th century, China became one of the main sources of international tension. Emerging Japanese power was dependent on growth of economy and its expansion on Chinese markets. Encroachment of the Great powers in China brought reaction in form of so-called „Boxer Uprising“ in 1900. At this time, Japan was not a priori enemy of China and after 1895 did not humiliate China very much. The Sino-Japanese war of 1894–1895 settled all matters of discord in favour of Japan. Since then, Japan had not to fear Chinese might, but weakness, which prepared way to aggressive powers endangering Japanese interests. Decline of China might have brought her dismemberment, which Japan did not wish, because she was too weak to exact significant gains. Numbers of Japanese instructors in China, as well as of Chinese students in Japan, increased substantially. Japan intended to maintain friendly relations with China and trade with her. After the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese acquired opening of new treaty ports and gained right to sail the Yangtze and build factories in China. They have deprived Korea of Chinese influence, acquired Taiwan and the Pescadores and intended to seize also the Liaotung Peninsula with ports Dalny and Port Arthur. The last mentioned gain has been hindered by the so-called Triple Intervention of Germany, France, and Russia, allegedly in interest of integrity of China. Real motives of these powers for the first time demasked France, which in 1895 annexed large territory at border between China and Laos. Better known is German the occupation of Kiaochow two years later and the almost contemporaneous Russian seizure of the Liaotung Peninsula. France acquired naval base Kuangchowwan. Provinces bordering with French Indochina and the island of Hainan became French sphere of influence, Shantung sphere of Germany. Manchuria fell under Russian influence, only Italy did not gain something. The British were unable to prevent these actions. They intended to counterweight Russian hold over Port Arthur by seizure of Weihaiwei in Shantung. This port had been held by Japanese troops until China pays entire war indemnity. The last instalment had been paid on May 9, 1898,

596 Jan Kočvar ________________________________________________________

and on May 24, British troops replaced the Japanese in Weihaiwei. The United Kingdom also enlarged its territory in Hongkong and forced upon China guarantees, that no province adjoining to the Yangtze River, or its part, shall be alienated to any foreign country. Foreign powers contested for concessions for construction of railways. The Russians were finishing the Transsiberian Railway to Vladivostok across Manchuria, the British were building railways in the province of Chihli and on Lower Yangtse, the French in Southeastern China and the Germans in Shantung. Franco-Belgian consortium acquired concession for railway construction from Peking to the Yangtse. Japan, lessoned by the Triple Intervention, stood aloof and on April 26, 1898, she only exacted from China the guarantee of non-alienation even a part of the province of Fukien to a foreign power. The United States had not taken part in the scramble for concessions and spheres of influence. They were confident of strength of her economy, so she tried to maintain equal treatment and trade conditions for citizens of all countries in all parts of China. The United Kingdom has been motivated by the same desire.1 In September 1899, American Secretary of State John Hay sent to foreign Governments a note, in which he demanded equal treatment and trade opportunities in spheres of influence and treaty ports in China. Japan needed goodwill of both main supporters of the „Open Doors Policy“, so she without hesitation agreed. At the end of the nineties, as a consequence of foreign encroachment were rising activities of anti-foreign societies, which were endangering foreigners in Chinese interior. The most important of these secret societies was the I-ho-tuan society or the „Boxers“. Since the beginning of 1900, antiforeign riots in Northern China became so powerful, that the reactionary clique at the Court and in northern provinces began to consider them to be a useful ally against foreigners. In Peking, assassinations of Japanese and German diplomat and assaults on foreign legations took place. The foreign settlement in Tientsin had been also besieged. Troops of foreign powers attacked forts in Taku in order to open way to Peking and Tientsin, subsequently the Empress Dowager declared war on the Great Powers. Northern China and Manchuria became centres of bloodshed; bud viceroys in Central and Southern China maintained neutrality and in their best interest suppressed anti-foreign movement in their provinces. In August, the armies of the Great Powers conquered Peking and the Court fled to Tientsin. William L. LANGER, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890–1902, Vol. II. New York, London 1935, p. 686. 1

Japan’s Policy and Economic Interest ... 597 ________________________________________________________

The first wave of riots at the country had been directed against Christian missionaries and their Chinese converts. It did not directly affect Japanese subjects. On the other hand, in Chinese treaty ports existed large Japanese communities. In 1899, there were 933 foreign companies operating in China, and 195 of them were Japanese. 2,440 from 17,193 foreign residents were Japanese subjects; in both cases only the British outnumbered the Japanese.2 Growth of xenophobe movement endangered both merchants and diplomats. Foreign legations in Peking (with exception of the Belgian one) were located in an area in the Tartar City. Growing disorder meant danger for foreign diplomats and at the break of May and June 451 foreign troops arrived to Peking. It was clear, that this number was not sufficient. On June 10, large force under command of Admiral Seymour departed from Tientsin, but he has been attacked by “Boxers” and governmental troops and forced to retreat to Tientsin. On June 11, 1900, the secretary of Japanese legation in Tentsin, Akira Sugiyama, had been assassinated by Chinese governmental troops. The Chinese Emperor Kuang-hsü was a mere puppet of the Empress Dowager. However, he sent to the Japanese Emperor a telegram, in which he assured, that the assassins had been punished, and offered an alliance between China and Japan on basis of common interest. The first statement was very doubtful, because the murderer of German Minister had been several days later rewarded. No one in Tokyo had even for a while in mind an alliance with China against the Western powers.3 On June 13, numerous bands of “Boxers” entered Peking. Opponents of xenophobe clique have been killed, looting took place, and it was clear, that the clash was inevitable. Because the movement remained limited on Northern China, it was entirely within Japan’s might to suppress it on his own. Although it did not happen, Japanese merit on its suppression was greater than merit of any other country except Russia. When Taku fell, Japanese forces in China totalled 3,000 men. On June 15, Field Marshall Yamagata’s Government took into consideration sending two divisions under command of Field Marshall Fukushima. On June 22, the British Government offered £ 1,000,000 to finance this expedition; at that time was generally believed, that expeditionary force should count at least 50–60,000 Hosea Ballow MORSE, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, Vol. III., The Period of Subjection, 1894–1911. London, Bombay, Calcutta 1918, p. 326. 3 The d’Anethan Dispatches From Japan, 1894–1910. The Observations of Baron Albert d’Anethan, Belgian Minister Plenipotentiary and Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Ed. by George Alexander LENSEN. Tokyo. Tallahassee 1967, p. 133. 2

598 Jan Kočvar ________________________________________________________

men. But then, the Japanese Government changed its stance, cancelled the expedition and refused the British offer, although it on June 26, mobilized one division. The Japanese Foreign Minister Aoki Shuzo explained to Belgian Minister and dean of the diplomatic corps, Baron d’Anethan, that Japan could immediately send one or two another divisions, but restrains from it in order not to arouse suspicion of the powers.4 On July 3, the Russian Government informed, that it would welcome 20–30,000 troops of relief forces, even from Japan. Then to the Tientsin area arrived the Fifth Division of Lieutenant General Yamaguchi. Japan was interested in the person of the Supreme Commander of the allied forces. Both Field Marshall Fukushima and Lieutenant General Yamaguchi had the highest rank among foreign commanders. However, they were of yellow race. The Meiji Emperor consented to the appointment of the German Field Marshall Alfred von Waldersee,5 who, nevertheless, arrived to China only in late September. Yamaguchi commanded approximately 8,000 soldiers, who represented important part of joint relief forces. On July 19, Tientsin fell, and on August 4, 1900, relief forces counting together 19,000 men started to advance on Peking. Japanese troops had given evidence of pure professionalism. They had great merit on the fall of Peking and the liberation of the foreign legations, which took place on August 14, 1900. The conquered city had been divided into sectors of occupation, and Japanese troops were behaving quite well.6 In Siamen (Amoy), one of the most important ports in Fukien, lived many Japanese subjects and there was built a Japanese Buddhist temple, which had been burned by the Chinese. On August 24, in Siamen landed 250 Japanese troops from large Japanese garrison of not entirely subdued Taiwan, but shortly thereafter, these forces have been withdrawn from fear from international reaction. In contrary, in Shanghai, which had been in summer 1900 occupied by international forces, remained the Japanese troops for several years. In late summer, Russia recalled its troops and its Minister from Peking. Originally Russian Government intended to halt her soldiers before entering Chinese capital, but the Russian commander Linevich did not Ibidem, p. 127. Ian Hill NISH, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1868–1942, London, Henley, Boston 1977, p. 53. 6 Nevertheless, Japanese army confiscated in the Board of Revenue silver ingots worth of 2–3 millions silver taels (and in Tientsin had stolen 1,4 millions, but the „boxers“ and Chinese troops had only in Tientsin stolen several tens million taels.) See MORSE, pp. 245, 285 and 367. 4 5

Japan’s Policy and Economic Interest ... 599 ________________________________________________________

receive this order at time.7 Russia intended to improve his image in Chinese eyes, thus to persuade the Chinese to fulfil Russian requests relating to Manchuria and Northern China. Japan also withdrew larger part of his troops, but left in Chinese metropolitan province Chihli sufficient forces. Aim of this move was to influence another Great Powers. The cooperation between Germany and the United Kingdom took shape. Both countries were in no way “natural enemies”. The BritishGerman “Yangtse Agreement” from October 16, 1900, stipulated, that both countries shall restrain from territorial aggrandizement in China and shall prevent such actions of another countries. On October 29, Japan acceded to the treaty.8 The Russians had ambitions even to the south of the Great Wall. During suppression of the “Boxer Uprising”, Russian troops conquered British-run railway from Taku to Manchurian border, and in October 1900 seized railway station in Tientsin, but they had been forced to withdraw. However, focus of greatest Russian interest was Manchuria, which had been in summer and autumn, 1900, conquered by General Kuropatkin. The treaty port Newchuang on Manchurian coast became the first theatre of Russian ambitions. Russian gunboats, followed by British and Japanese ships, anchored there, and the Russians begun administer the city.9 In November 1900, the Russians concluded with Tseng Ch’i, Governor of Mukden, treaty, which gave to Russia right to deploy in Manchuria her troops.10 Germany did not want to estrange himself from Russia completely, but Japan intended to show himself as an ally of the United Kingdom. As a consequence of British-Japanese pressure, Russia ceased demanding of ratification of that treaty. American policy in China was hostile towards any territorial gains of foreign countries. Nevertheless, on December 6, 1900, John Hay asked for Japanese consent with establishing an American coaling station on the Samsah Islet at the coast of Fukien as a part of indemnity for the “Boxer Uprising”. Although Fukien was the Japanese sphere of influence, the Japanese Minister to Washington, Takahira, was sympathetic towards this idea. The new government of Prince Ito disagreed. It feared, that Japanese

LANGER, op. cit., p. 696. Morinosuke KAJIMA, The Emergence of Japan as a World Power, 1895–1922, Rutland, Tokyo 1969, p. 92. 9 Ian Hill NISH, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War. London, New York 1985, pp. 65–66 and 86–87. 10 Text of the Tseng-Alekseiev Treaty see LANGER, op.cit., pp. 714–716. 7

8

600 Jan Kočvar ________________________________________________________

consent could be considered a nullification of non-alienation guarantees relating to Fukien, and that it could start dismemberment of China.11 The whole matter had to be settled by a diplomatic agreement. Talks began in December 1900 and continued for a long time. The so-called “Boxer Protocol” had been signed on September 7, 1901. It greatly diminished Chinese sovereignty, including right of foreign powers to station their troops in Chihli. In Peking, Japan alone could maintain 400 soldiers (Russia 350, USA 100). A representative of the Chinese Emperor had been sent to Japan in order to transmit an apologize for the murder of Sugiyama. Only the apologizes did not suffice, it was also necessary to punish all culprits. Of course no one waited until the Protocol had been signed. Since the fall of Peking punitive expeditions to areas, where “Boxer” atrocities took place, had been organized. The Japanese took part only in several these expeditions and they were handling the Chinese less brutal than another foreigners or troops of friendly Chinese commanders. No one had much interest on fate of these small fish. Punishment of major criminals became a matter of controversy. The most unforgiving of all Great Powers was Germany, which not only requested the execution of all supporters of the “Boxers”, but was also ready to execute them on his own.12 In contrary, Russia, Japan, and the United States were ready to let most of prominent culprits live except the most savage of them. Finally, this attitude prevailed. Another important question related to a war indemnity. The powers, primarily for German opposition, refused the Japanese offer, not to claim money spent on military actions. Japan also agreed with an unsuccessful American initiative, under which entire indemnity should not overreach Chinese capabilities (the Americans estimated this sum at $ 150,000,000, then increased it at $ 200,000,000).13 Foreign countries requested altogether 462,500,000 taels (or $ 333,000,000), the Japanese demanded 33,770,000 taels for their war expenses and 1,770,000 for private losses. The final versioyn of the Boxer Protocol set entire indemnity at 450,000,000 taels, Japan got altogether 35,800,000, or 7,7 %.14 The Japanese economic interests in China were not yet fully developed. In 1902 Japanese investments in China totalled only $1,000,000,

Hikomatsu KAMIKAWA (ed.), Japan-American Diplomatic Relations in the MeijiTaisho Era, Tokyo 1958, pp. 190–194. 12 Tyler DENNETT, Americans in Eastern Asia. A Critical Study of United States’ Policy in the Far East in the Nineteenth Century, New York 1963, p. 658. 13 Ibidem pp. 658–659. 14 For demands and final division of indemnity see MORSE, s. 353. 11

Japan’s Policy and Economic Interest ... 601 ________________________________________________________

whereas all foreign investments totaled $ 788,000,000.15 Until 1914 they increased to $ 220,000,000, mostly in Souhern Manchuria, where only Southern Manchuria Railway was worth of $ 100,000.000.16 Japanese export to China increased: between 1895 and 1899 it totalled 14,1 % of total Japanese export, between 1900 and 1904 18,8 %. Imports from China to Japan were stagnating around 12,5 %, but imports of raw materials for Japanese industry were invaluable.17 To sum up, Japanese policy in China at the time of “scramble for concessions” and the “Boxer Uprising” was relatively moderate. Direct gains from the “Boxer Uprising” were insignificant and were not in accordance with Japanese merits. Nevertheless, the turmoil in China between 1900 and 1901 had significant effect. It showed, that Japan was a regional power, which had to be taken into account. The Japanese firm attitude towards Russian ambitions led to a rapprochement with the United Kingdom. Without these assets, the Japanese emergence would have been much more difficult.

W. G. BEASLEY, Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945, Oxford 1991, p. 133. Ibidem, pp. 135–136. 17 Ibidem, p. 127. 15

16

DISCUSSION/DISKUSSION

Between Hitler, Beneš, and Tito. Occupation Policy, Resistance, and Revenge in World War II Arnold Suppan

It is the essential aim of this paper to present the historical, political, economic, social and internationally recognized legal premises, contexts, background, and consequences of the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia between 1939 and 1945, and of Yugoslavia between 1941 and 1945, as well as to highlight the direct and indirect consequences for the German minorities after the end of the war. These include the Sudeten and Carpathian Germans, the “Danube Swabians” in the Vojvodina and East Slavonia, as well as the German Lower Styrians, together with the Gottscheer. Even if the Czech, Slovak, Serb, Slovene, and Croat campaigns of retaliation and expulsion were only partially due to the German occupation and annexation, these would point to essential political and moral motivations for the AVNOJ Resolutions in 1944/45 and the Beneš Decrees in 1945. Therefore, both a comparison of occupation, annexation, resistance, collaboration, revenge and displacement, as well as a comparison of the direct and indirect consequences of the war and post war years, together with the long period of repressed memories are important for an overall assessment.1 The following facts furnish comparative background: 1. The cohabitation and coexistence of the Czech and German people in the Bohemian Lands (present-day Czech Republic), of the Slovak and German people in historical Upper Hungary (present-day Slovakia), of the Slovene and German people in Lower Styria and in Carniola (present-day Slovenia), in Croatia-Slavonia (present-day Croatia), and historical Southern Hungary (the present-day Serb Vojvodina, including Syrmia) were relatively free of insolvable conflict in daily life until 1914. Many German-Bohemians, German-Moravians, German-Silesians, Germans of the Zips (Spiš), Danube Swabians in Banat, Bačka, Syrmia, Baranya, and East-Slavonia, as well as the Lower Styrians and Gottscheer, lived in their small towns and villages without any real contact with their Slavic neighbors, and therefore spoke Apart from the international historiography, which is concentrated on different matters of my subject, I used archival materials of archives in Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Prague, Bratislava, Vienna, Freiburg im Breisgau, as well as of the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford. 1

606 Arnold Suppan ________________________________________________________

only their own German dialect and understood their Slavic neighbors little or not at all; if anything, they understood Hungarian or Italian. On the other hand, this did not hold true for the (Sudeten) Germans in Prague, Plzeň, České Budějovice, Brno, Jihlava, Olomouc, Ostrava, Český Těšín/Cieszyn, and Bielsko, the (Carpathian) Germans in Bratislava, Trnava, Nitra, Kremnica, Prešov, and Košice, the Danube Swabians in Vršac, Bela Crkva, Veliki Bečkerek, Velika Kikinda, Pančevo, Zemun, Novi Sad, Sombor, and Osijek, as well as the Germans in Zagreb, Ljubljana, Gorizia/Nova Gorica, Trieste, and Pula. These town-dwelling Germans lived in relatively close contact with their Czech, Slovak, or South Slavic neighbors – as well as with Jews, Magyars, and Italians – and had diverse economic, social, and cultural contacts with them. Naturally, this was not possible without a certain command of the other language, for which the children were useful. There existed child-exchanges during the summer months, or even for an entire year. In addition, there was an increasing number of ethnic, and to a lesser degree, denominational, intermarriages.2 On the level of political and intellectual rivalry, an increase in “Communities of Conflict”3 and national rivalries began to develop beginning in the 1880s, which included the competition between nationalist societies, reciprocal economic boycott provisions and occasionally degenerated into open ethnic fighting about the use of language in school and administration – as was the case in the Badeni-riots of 1897. While the Czech parties in Bohemia and Moravia pushed for the accordance of equal Oscar JÁSZI, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, Chicago 1929, ²1961; Adam WANDRUSZKA and Peter URBANITSCH (eds.), Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, vol. III: Die Völker des Reiches, Wien 1980; Gerald STOURZH, Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in der Verfassung und Verwaltung Österreichs 1848–1918, Wien 1985; Helmut RUMPLER, Eine Chance für Mitteleuropa. Bürgerliche Emanzipation und Staatsverfall in der Habsburgermonarchie, Österreichische Geschichte 1804–1914, Wien 1997; Péter HANÁK, Ungarn in der Donaumonarchie. Probleme der bürgerlichen Umgestaltung eines Vielvölkerstaates, Wien, München, Budapest 1984; Robert A. KANN and Zdeněk V. DAVID, The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands, 1526–1918, Seattle 1984; Mikluáš TEICH (ed.), Bohemia in History, Cambridge 1998; Elena MANNOVA (ed.), A Concise History of Slovakia, Bratislava 2000; László KONTLER, A History of Hungary: Millenium in Central Europe, Houndmills and New York 2002; Arnold SUPPAN, „’Germans’ in the Habsburg Empire. Language, Imperial Ideology, National Identity, and Assimilation“. In: Charles W. Ingrao and Franz A. J. Szabo (eds.), The Germans and the East, West Lafayette, Indiana, 2008, pp.147–190. 3 Jan KŘEN, Die Konfliktgemeinschaft. Tschechen und Deutsche 1780–1918, München, ²2000; Gary COHEN, The Politics of Ethnic Survival: Germans in Prague, 1861–1914, Princeton 1981; Jiří KOŘALKA, Tschechen im Habsburgerreich und in Europa 1815–1914, Wien–München 1991; Otto URBAN, Die tschechische Gesellschaft 1848–1918, 2 vols., Wien, Köln, Weimar 1994; L. FASORA, J. HANUŠ, J. MALÍŘ (eds.), Človek na Moravě 19. století. Der Mensch in Mähren des 19. Jahrhunderts, Brno 2004. 2

Between Hitler, Beneš, and Tito. 607 ________________________________________________________

status for the Czech language and for the linguistic division of state institutions and schools – especially that of the Charles University in Prague, in 1882, the German parties – especially those in Bohemia – began to advocate the administrative division of the country along ethnic lines. The result was that prior to 1914, the formation of two, often splintered, national societies occurred. In the 1880s, this process had begun in the Slovene-inhabited crown lands (Kronländer) too; however, it had decelerated due to the Germans’ strong social position in the cities – including Ljubljana. Similar tendencies for separation between the Danube Swabians and the Croats or Serbs did not exist in Croatia-Slavonia or in Southern Hungary, as the political and administrative stratification emanated from the Hungarian government, its officials and its educators; it affected both Germans and Southern Slavs alike. The organization of political life also lagged behind developments in Cisleithania. Therefore, the German-Czech conflict conditions in České Budějovice or the German-Slovene conflict in Celje was somewhat tenser than perhaps the Magyar-Serb-German coexistence in Novi Sad.4 2. The First World War, with its heavy mobilization of people and ideology increased ethnic tensions to a level beyond anything that had occurred prior to that point.5 This was directly associated with the AustroHungarian campaigns against Serbia and Russia. However, the main problem did not lie in consistent German and Magyar doubts as to the “reliability” of the Slavic regiments, which suffered demonstrably heavy casualties on both the Balkan and Galician fronts—and later on the Italian front. Recent research on the subject shows that, in fact, there were individual deserters – for instance a Slovene First Lieutenant stationed on the Italian Front – but that the defection of entire regiments, or of regimental companies, simply did not occur. At the same time, the claims made by the German national propaganda were just as false, and in there

Vasilij MELIK, Wahlen im alten Österreich. Am Beispiel der Kronländer mit slowenischsprachiger Bevölkerung, Wien, Köln, Weimar 1997; Peter M. JUDSON, Guardians of the Nation. Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria, Cambridge, Mass., London 2006; Scott SPECTOR, Prague Territories: National Conflict and Cultural Innovation in Kafka’s Fin de Siècle, Berkeley 2000; Jeremy KING, Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848– 1918, Princeton 2002; László KATUS, „Multinational Hungary in the Lights of Statistics“. In: Ferenc Glatz (ed.), Ethnicity and Society in Hungary, Budapest 1990. 5 Hew STRACHAN, Der Erste Weltkrieg. Eine neue illustrierte Geschichte, München 2006; James J. SHEEHAN, Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe, Boston– New York 2008, pp. 69–91. 4

608 Arnold Suppan ________________________________________________________

way were identical to those made by the Czech national side, which wanted, above all, to emphasize its military contributions on the side of the Entente.6 Even more problematic in the escalating ethnic fighting were the increasing reproaches of support for Pan-Slavism, Pan-Serbianism, and Pan-Russianism made by the German-Austrian and Magyar middle-classes. By the second half of 1914, this gave rise to mass persecutions of Serb, Croat, Slovene, and Czech politicians, lawyers, journalists, professors, teachers, priests, and others who were nationally and politically active leading up to 1914. The thousands of summons to court resulted in hundreds of convictions and many long-term prison sentences, as well as death sentences and executions. The cruelty of the military conflict against Serbia and Montenegro in 1914, and partly the Austrian-Hungarian occupying regime in Serbia and Montenegro from the winter 1915/16 until October 1918, poisoned the relationship between the Serbs on one side, and the GermanAustrians and Magyars on the other. However, in November 1918, this did not result in a large-scale campaign of revenge in the Vojvodina by the Serbian divisions of the Salonika army – such happened more often against Albanians in Kosovo and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina.7 3. The relationships of the new nation-states of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia with their German minorities and with Germany and Austria suffered repeated setbacks after 1918 due to a variety of factors. These included conflicts over border-demarcations (Northern Bohemia, Southern Bohemia, Northern Moravia, Southern Moravia, Southern Carinthia, Lower Styria); the tendency towards “de-Germanization” and “de-Austrianization” (nostrification of foreign companies; land reform to confiscate estates); questions regarding the interpretation of new minority rights (in regards to the school system and the official language); the lack of political participation by minorities until 1923/25; and discriminatory trade restrictions between the “winning” and “losing” countries. Here, above all, the psycholoIstván DEÁK, Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848-1918, New York 1990; Manfried RAUCHENSTEINER, Der Tod des Doppeladlers. Österreich-Ungarn und der Erste Weltkrieg, Graz, Wien, Köln 1993; Ivan ŠEDIVÝ, Češi, české země a velká válka 1914–1918, Praha 2001. The statement of Hugh AGNEW, The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, Stanford, 2004, p. 164, that „the 28th Prague Infantery Regiment surrendered almost to man in the Carpathians on April 3, 1915,“ does not correspond with the reports in the Vienna Kriegsarchiv. See also Richard LEIN, „The battle of Zborów and ist reflection in history. An example of the Czech-German national conflict,“ in: Arnold SUPPAN and Richard LEIN (eds.), From the Habsburgs to Central Europe (Wien, Berlin 2008) pp. 179–197. 7 Milada PAULOVÁ, Tajný výbor Maffie a spolupráce s Jihoslovany v letech 1916–1918, Praha 1968; Andrej MITROVIĆ, Serbia’s Great War 1914-1918, London 2007. 6

Between Hitler, Beneš, and Tito. 609 ________________________________________________________

gical factor of humiliation must not be underestimated. It is for this reason that the large majority of Sudeten and Carpathian Germans did not regard Czechoslovakia as their country – by definition, the nation state of the “Czechoslovak nation,” with “Czechoslovak” as the official state language. The same was true of the scattered minorities of the Danube Swabians or Lower Styrians and Gottscheer, who did not allow them to develop an allegiance to the nation state of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, with “SerbCroat” as the official state language. Incidentally, neither of the two German minority groups was allowed to play a role in the shaping of the new constitutions and administrations.8 Because the German Reich became not only a member of the League of Nations, but also the League Council following the Locarno Pact in October 1925, its importance to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia was reinforced, as it now had a voice in the evaluation of minority treaties. On the other hand, the global economic crisis divided the Sudeten and Carpathian Germans, regardless of their political “activism” after 1926, even more strongly from Czechoslovakia. The drop in exports in Sudeten German light industry and the decrease in spa tourism resulted in tremendous large-scale unemployment. In their view, these developments were not opposed strongly enough by the Prague government. When Milan Hodža’s government accepted demands of the younger generation of German “activists” in February and March 1938 (public works contracts for local contractors and labor in the border regions, proportional minority representation in the civil service), it was too late. Many Sudeten Germans had begun to look to Nazi Germany and Hitler in the fight against the mass unemployment. Unfortunately, they could not see the problematic budget manoeuvres of the Reichsbank president Hjalmar Schacht. The severe agricultural crisis in Yugoslavia beginning in the late 1920s forced King Alexander I of Yugoslavia to look for new export markets and led to a rapprochement with NS-Germany. Consequently, easements in business and the school system for the Danube Swabians (less so for the Lower Styrians and Gottscheer) followed. Another

Zara STEINER, The Lights That Failed. European International History 1919–1933, Oxford History of Modern Europe, Oxford 2005; Ivo BANAC, The National Question in Yugoslavia, Ithaca and London 1984; Arnold SUPPAN, Jugoslawien und Österreich 1918– 1938. Bilaterale Außenpolitik im europäischen Umfeld, Wien, München 1996; Zdeněk KARNÍK, České země v éře První republiky, I: Vznik, budování a zlatá léta republiky, 1918–1929, Praha 2000; Peter VODOPIVEC, „Slovenes and Yugoslavia, 1918–1991.“ In: The Demise of Yugoslavia, East European Politics and Societies 6/3, 1992, pp. 220–241. 8

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explanation of the Yugoslav approach to Germany was the Balkan policy of Benito Mussolini.9 Meanwhile, the active and passive cooperation of the German minorities in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia resulted in somewhat varied outcomes. The National Socialist wing of the Sudeten German Party established itself through its victory in the May 1935 parliamentary elections. By November 1937, its Führer, Konrad Henlein, had secretly written to Adolf Hitler offering up his party as an instrument for the dismantling of Czechoslovakia and for the annexation not only of the Sudeten region, but also of the “entire Bohemian-Moravian-Silesian region”. Following the Anschluss of Austria in March 1938, the Sudeten German Party began to support publicly the German Weltanschauung – or National Socialism – and called for the recognition of the Sudeten German ethnic group as a legal entity and for compensation “for the injustices inflicted upon the Sudeten Germandom since the year 1918”. After the party had won 90 percent of the German vote in the local elections held in May and June 1938, Henlein systematically refused the Prague government’s (and President Edvard Beneš’) proposals for autonomy, even the offer of a singular, summary Gau, or district, consisting of the most densely German-populated area. Henlein had long promised Hitler to demand far more than the Czechoslovak government could give. On September 12, 1938, at the Nuremberg Party Congress, Hitler threatened that he would no longer tolerate “the further oppression and persecution of those 3.5 million Germans”. With the beginning of unrest in the Sudeten region, the imposition of martial law, and the formation of the “Sudeten German Volunteer Militia” in Germany, France and Great Britain agreed to Hitler’s ultimate demands for annexation, and referred them to the Prague government with the request for acceptance. Despite the mobilization of the powerful Czechoslovak army Elisabeth WISKEMANN, Czechs and Germans. A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, London, New York, Toronto 1938; F. Gregory CAMPBELL, Confrontation in Central Europe: Weimar Germany and Czechoslovakia, Chicago 1975; Rudolf JAWORSKI, Vorposten oder Minderheit? Der sudetendeutsche Volkstumskampf in den Beziehungen zwischen Weimarer Republik und der ČSR, Stuttgart 1977; Piotr S. WANDYCZ, The Twilight of French Eastern Alliances, 1926-1936: French-Czechoslovak-Polish Relations from Locarno to the Remilitarization of the Rhineland, Princeton 1988; Jiří KOVTUN, Republika v nebezpečném světě. Éra prezidenta Masaryka 1918-1935, Praha 2005; AGNEW, The Czechs, 195; Arnold SUPPAN, Zwischen Adria und Karawanken, Deutsche Geschichte im Osten Europas 7, Berlin ²2002, 375-380. In late July 1934, after the Nazi July Putsch in Austria, Yugoslavia even absorbed over 2,000 emigrant Austrian National Socialists into Slovenia and Croatia, before sending them to Germany by ship, in November 1934. – Dušan NEĆAK, Avstrijska legija II, Ljubljana 1995. 9

Between Hitler, Beneš, and Tito. 611 ________________________________________________________

(which included also the majority of the called-up Sudeten Germans), President Beneš and the Prague government ultimately capitulated and agreed to abide by the resolutions of the Munich Agreement, which had established the surrender of all Czechoslovak borderlands with majority German populations. Indeed, more than 300,000 Czechs, Jews, German Social Democrats and Communists fled into the remaining portion of Czechoslovakia, which had diminished in size by nearly one-third. Nevertheless, the Sudeten German Party played only a peripheral role in the dissolution of the Federal State of Czecho-Slovakia, which had been in existence since October 1938. The new Prime Minister Rudolf Beran merged the Czech right-wing parties and began to appease Nazi Germany. But on March 14, 1939 Hitler forced the new Czecho-Slovak President Emil Hácha to capitulate. On March 15, German troops invaded Prague and Brno, and the day after Hitler proclaimed at the Prague castle the creation of the “Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia”. Just prior to the German ultimatum to Hácha, Hitler also issued an ultimatum to the Slovak Prime Minister Jozef Tiso, whom the government in Prague had tried to depose, and on March 14 the Slovak Parliament concluded a Declaration of Independence.10 Likewise, in Yugoslavia, after the Austrian Anschluss, National Socialist functionaries began to replace the hitherto authoritative, predominately Catholic Kulturbund higher-ups, a process which lasted until May 1939. Just how much significance Hitler attributed to the German minority did not become clear until his October 6, 1939 address at the Reichstag, in which he announced the repatriation of people from ethnically German communities in East Central and South East Europe. In the year and a half that followed, thanks to treaties and agreements with the Soviet Union, the Baltic States, and Romania, hundreds of thousands of people of German decent were called upon to return Heim ins Reich. But Hitler did not call the Transylvanian Saxons, the Carpathian Germans or the Danube Swabians in Romania, Hungary or Yugoslavia. Up until March 25, 1941, Hitler pursued Ferdinand SEIBT, Deutschland und die Tschechen. Geschichte einer Nachbarschaft in der Mitte Europas, München, Zürich 1993; Ronald SMELSER, The Sudeten Problem, 1933–1938: Volkstumspolitik and the Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy, Folkestone 1975; Peter GLOTZ, Karl-Heinz POLLOK, Karl von SCHWARZENBERG and John van NES ZIEGLER (eds.), München 1938. Das Ende des alten Europa, Essen 1990; Igor LUKES, Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of Edvard Beneš in the 1930s, New York 1996; Igor LUKES and Erik GOLDSTEIN (eds.), The Munich Crisis 1938. Prelude to World War II, Portland 1999; Richard J. EVANS, The Third Reich in Power, London 2005, 665-683; Václav HAVEL, „Beneš und das ‚tschechische Dilemma’. Das Drama eines tschechischen Politikers,“ in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nr. 90, 19 April 2002, 6. 10

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no grievances against Yugoslavia relating to its German minorities; rather, he first trumpeted them in the war propaganda immediately following the government’s collapse in Belgrade on March 27, 1941. Contrary to what the German and Yugoslav propaganda led people to believe, the Danube Swabians and Lower Styrians played only a minor role in the swift occupation of Yugoslavia, even if they did happily greet the German Wehrmacht troops in Banat and Lower Styria.11 4. The Nazi annexation policies vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia did not originate from consistent strategic planning on the part of the NS leadership, but developed gradually as part of Hitler’s political and military objectives. If he had already formulated a policy of conquest by November 5, 1937 before the Reich’s Foreign Secretary, the Reichs’s War Minister, and the commanders-in-chief of army, navy and air force for dismembering Czechoslovakia and dominating of the Bohemian-Moravian region–not the “freeing” of the Sudeten Germans–as an essential goal of future war, then Hitler believed, up until March 27, 1941, that Yugoslavia, with its metal and agricultural products and a valuable source of raw materials would be able to keep out of the warlike conflict. While the targeted and aggressive annexation of Czechoslovakia, under the threat of military assault, required half-a-year, the conquest of Yugoslavia came after an eleven-day-long Blitzkrieg. To facilitate the German Reich’s policy against Czechoslovakia, a renewal of the important political alliances between Poland and Hungary was carried out. In the conquest of Yugoslavia, Italy, Bulgaria, and Hungary played direct roles. After the division of Czechoslovakia, the Third Reich annexed almost the entire BohemianMoravian-Silesian region, Poland keeping only a small area around Cieszyn and small areas within the Carpathian Mountains. But the Reich established, for the first time, an independent Slovakia as a “buffer-state”, which had to abandon two German populated suburbs of Bratislava to the Reichsgau Niederdonau. In addition, the southernmost border regions of Slovakia with a Magyar majority were given to Hungary, which also annexed the Carpathian Rus’.12 Yugoslavia was divided into approximately equal pieces between the Germans and Italians, with smaller ones going to Bulgaria and Hungary. At Dušan BIBER, Nacizem in Nemci v Jugoslaviji 1933–1941, V Ljubljani 1966; HansUlrich WEHLER, Nationalitätenpolitik in Jugoslawien. Die deutsche Minderheit 1918– 1978, Göttingen 1980; SUPPAN, Zwischen Adria und Karawanken, pp. 380–422. 12 George F. KENNAN, From Prague After Munich: Diplomatic Papers, 1938–1940, Princeton 1971; EVANS, The Third Reich, 683-688; Ljubo BOBAN, Hrvatske granice od 1918. do 1992. godine, Zagreb 1992. 11

Between Hitler, Beneš, and Tito. 613 ________________________________________________________

the same time, the new so-called Independent State of Croatia, led by the Ustasha, became a satellite state of Germany and Italy until the middle of 1943. Afterwards, it became one of Hitler’s last surviving allies. The divisions of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia resulted in the great majority of Czechs, Slovaks, and Croats being lumped by Berlin together in a more or less dependant state-entity, while the Serbs and Slovenes were divided into occupation zones; however, a puppet government under General Nedić was installed in Belgrade, but not in Ljubljana, where General Rupnik got only the command of the domobranci.13 The NS command structure in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia acted under differing titles and had both direct and indirect control: German civil administrations in Sudetenland, Southern Moravia, and Southern Bohemia, as well as in Lower Styria, and Upper Carniola; a Czech government in Prague headed by General Alois Eliáš under German protectorate (Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath) and a Serb government in Belgrade (General Milan Nedić) with German military administration; a Slovak government in Bratislava (President Jozef Tiso; Prime minister Vojtech Tuka) along with a Croat government in Zagreb (Poglavnik Ante Pavelić) that were under German control. This illustrates the different levels of the Slovaks and Croats on the one side and of the Czechs, Slovenes, and Serbs on the other side in the hierarchy of the new National Socialist Europe, as well as the cooperation of different governments with NS policy. This was true of both foreign policy (especially in regards to the question of participation in the war against the Allied forces) and domestic affairs, especially in regards to the question of Jewish persecution and extermination.14 A Jewish lady who fled from Prague to London on March 24, 1939 reported: “We understand that hundreds of people who have been in refugee camps have run away into the woods. We know that there are between 600 and one thousand people moving about Prague, who are starving and cannot sleep in the same place twice […]. Those [Jews] who can get enough money together are trying to emigrate to England, but when they reach the border at Bendheim the Dutch authorities hold them Jozo TOMASEVICH, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945. The Chetniks, Stanford 1975; Tone FERENC (ed.), Quellen zur nationalsozialistischen Entnationalisierungspolitik in Slowenien 1941–1945. Viri o nacistični raznarodovalni politiki v Sloveniji 1941–1945, Maribor 1980; Dušan NEĆAK (ed.), ‚Nemci’ na Slovenskem 1941– 1955, Ljubljana 1998. 14 Zdeněk BENEŠ and Václav KURAL (eds.), Facing History. The evolution of CzechGerman relations in the Czech provinces, 1848–1948, Prague 2002; Livia ROTHKIRCHEN, The Jews of Bohemia & Moravia. Facing the Holocaust, Lincoln, Jerusalem 2005. 13

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unless they have British visas, which have not been required on Czech passports up to now. I met 18 such refugees, including little children. They had not had food for two days, although they have wealthy relatives and guarantees in London. They were not permitted to take more than 100 crowns out of the country, and the Germans were refusing to cash crowns for marks even to permit to buy food.”15 5. With regard to NS-occupation policy, a long list of political, military, and law enforcement orders were issued. These orders came in part directly from Hitler, Himmler, and Heydrich, and in part from the acting military command, high-ranking SS officers, and the police leadership, as well as the Gauleiter (Nazi district leaders). These orders clearly went against the international rules of war, which also applied to the German Reich during World War II. Especially for the Unternehmen Barbarossa or the war against the Soviet Union, a whole list of violations against the regulations of international rules of war occurred. The violations eventually also took place in the occupation zones of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, especially in Serbia where a ratio (Sühnequote) of 1:100 existed in regard to the shooting of Serb and Jewish hostages. The extermination of the Jews of Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia, Vojvodina, and Serbia loomed especially large because of the number of victims concerned. In the Protectorate and in Slovakia, the prominent members of the SS were responsible for the deportations to Theresienstadt, Auschwitz and other death camps, but the Wehrmacht was responsible for the thoroughness of the exterminations in Serbia in 1941. The responsibility for the extermination of a large part of the Croat and Bosnian Jews lies with the Ustasha regime. The responsibility for the shootings of Serbs and Jews in Novi Sad and the surrounding areas in January 1942 belongs to the Hungarian regime.16 The perfidious occupation policy of the SS, and eventually the Gestapo and the security forces in the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia, held the Czech people captive – pushing on the workers with carrot and stick policy and punishing the intellectuals. Many isolated acts and waves of terror followed. Demonstrations on October 28, 1939 accompanied the closing of Excerpts from letters by one who left Prague [on] March 24 [1939]. Archiv ústavu T. G. Masaryka (Prague), Fond Edvard Beneš II, V 51/3b. 16 Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung (ed.), Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Dimensionen des Vernichtungskrieges 1941–1944. Ausstellungskatalog, Hamburg 2002; Jozo TOMASEVICH, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945. Occupation and Collaboration, Stanford 2001, pp. 580–608; Norman M. NAIMARK, Fires ot Hatred. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe, Cambridge, Mass. 2001, pp. 77–106; Ivo GOLDSTEIN, Croatia. A History, London, 1999. 15

Between Hitler, Beneš, and Tito. 615 ________________________________________________________

all Czech universities and technical colleges and the deportation of 1,200 students to concentration camps. Mass-shootings and mass-arrests at the end of September 1941 took place following SS General Reinhard Heydrich’s ascension to power as Deputy Reichsprotektor. The assassination of Heydrich on May 27, 1942, which was ordered by Beneš and his intelligence service chief Moravec, was followed by mass-executions and the total destruction of the small villages Lidice and Ležáky, as well as the execution of all men and a part of women living within the villages, and the deliberate execution of Czech intellectuals between June and September 1942. Nevertheless, the occupying policy of the SS and police commander, the Sudeten German Karl Hermann Frank, was from his view “successful”. This can be measured by the achievement of the immediate goal of the National Socialists in making the greatest possible demands on Bohemia and Moravia for the German wartime economy. This certainly exacerbated the shortcomings of the Czech resistance and the longtime blockage of any possible insurgence. Last but not least, this was a result of Frank’s concept of a gradually increasing threat of terror. Although Frank’s policy could without a doubt be categorized as inhumane and, was considered a war crime, it was more lenient in light of the situation than the more brutal occupation policies of other NS functionaries in Slovenia and Serbia. But Heydrich himself outlined in terrible words the fate of the Czech people in a private speech from the beginning of October 1941 in the event of a German ultimate victory: the Germanization of the “gutrassigen and gutgesinnten”, the deportation and extermination of the “schlechtrassigen and schlechtgesinnten”, the sterilization of the “schlechtrassig gutgesinnten”, and the extermination of the “gutrassig schlechtgesinnten” Czechs if they were not willing to be Germanized.17 The most egregious offences against the laws of war as carried out by the NS in Yugoslavia, were chronologically as follows: the bombing of entire cities, such as Belgrade in April 1941; the deportation of over 60,000 Slovenes from Lower Styria and Upper Carniola between June 1941 and July 1942 to Croatia, Serbia, and Germany; the disproportional mass shootings of Vojtěch MASTNÝ, The Czechs under Nazi Rule: The Failure of National Resistance, 1939–1942, New York 1971; Detlev BRANDES, Die Tschechen unter deutschem Protektorat, 2 vols. München, Wien 1969/1975; Miroslav KÁRNÝ, Jaroslava MILOTOVÁ and Margita KÁRNÁ (eds.), Deutsche Politik im „Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren“ unter Reinhard Heydrich 1941–42. Eine Dokumentation, Berlin 1997; Bernhard R. KROENER, Rolf-Dieter MÜLLER, Hans UMBREIT, Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs, 2. Halbbd. Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und personelle Ressourcen, Stuttgart 1999; AGNEW, The Czechs, pp. 208–214. 17

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prisoners of war and civil hostages in Serbia in the fall of 1941 (over 15,000 Serbs and Jews), and in Slovenia from the winter of 1941/1942 onwards; the mass recruiting of male and female workers in Slovenia and Serbia; and the mass recruiting of Slovene soldiers. However, war reprisals and the massshootings of prisoners of war were not expressly forbidden in any laws of war as long as a recognizable proportionality was not surpassed. The use of excessively violent measures created and determined the playing fields between the Germans, on one hand, and the Czechs, Serbs, Slovenes, and Slovaks on the other – the worst being in Kraljevo and Kragujevac in Serbia in 1941, in a series of Slovene villages between 1942 and 1944, in Lidice and Ležáky in 1942, as well as in a series of Slovak villages in the fall of 1944. By the end of the war, there was little differentiation between the Germans from the Altreich, from Austria, or from other ethnically German areas; perhaps more importantly, there was little differentiation between German war criminals and totally innocent German civilians. The Austrian poet Franz Grillparzer seemed to be correct when he wrote an epigram in 1849 after witnessing the battles in Upper Italy and Vojvodina: “The path of modern education runs from humanity through nationality, to bestiality.”18 A lieutenant from the Office of Strategic Services – presumably Wayne Vucinich – who visited around the New Year 1945 the southern part of the Yugoslav Banat, reported on the rule of the German Volksgruppe, which exercised thorough control and organized efficient exploitation of this agriculturally fertile region: “The Serbs in this area, thoroughly suppressed, confused and frightened, worked hard for the enemy. The Volksgruppe, which was far more brutal than forces from Germany, controlled their lives to the last detail. Every untoward act was ruthlessly punished. Restrictions on the movements of the individuals were so thorough that a peasant could not even visit a village three miles away without special permission. Within the villages all movements were forbidden from eight in the evening until eight in the morning. This latter rule was strictly enforced in 1944, however.”19

Klaus SCHMIDER, Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944, Hamburg 2002; Franz GRILLPAZER. Sämtliche Werke. Ausgewählte Briefe, Gespräche, Berichte, hg. von Peter Frank und Karl Pörnbacher, vol. 1, Stuttgart, Zürich 1960, 500; Holm SUNDHAUSSEN, „Der Ustascha-Staat: Anatomie eines Herrschaftssystems“. In: Kroatien. Landeskunde – Geschichte – Kultur – Politik – Wirtschaft – Recht, Österreichische Osthefte, Sonderband, Wien, Köln, Weimar 1995, pp. 251–287. 19 OSS, Research and Analysis Branch, Field Memorandum 145 (FR-254), 2 February 1945, Report on the Situation in the Banat, Belgrade, 14 January 1945, in Hoover Institution Archives, Wayne S. Vucinich papers, box 1. 18

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6. President Beneš ordered from his exile in London that vengeance and retribution be visited upon all Germans. This was also how the Czech and Slovak resistance saw the situation in their respective countries. Similar orders were issued by Marshall Tito in October 1944, as well as by Communist Party head Boris Kidrič from Slovenia in the main square of Maribor in June 1945. Not only were revenge and restitution called for, but at the same time, the creation of a “revolutionary climate” that would rid the countries of Germans, preferably in the framework of military operations. This was possible in Slovakia as the Red Army pushed towards Bratislava; and in Vojvodina towards Hungary. This only met with marginal success by the Partisans in Croatia and Slovenia, and almost not at all in Bohemia and Moravia. According to German and Soviet reports in Upper Silesia, Moravia, and the Vojvodina even hardened Soviet tank commanders were shocked by the persecution of German civilians, persecuted by Czech and Serbian “partisans” and “revolutionaries” and therefore intervened on occasion. Beneš and other exiled politicians wanted de facto to camouflage the driving-out of Germans civilians as “national revolutions connected to a social revolution”, using the pent-up rage from the NS occupation as fuel. In the middle of April 1945, the Czechoslovak Košice government called on the Czech and the Slovak people not to have any mercy on the German enemy and to avenge German atrocities. The Czech people, during the Prague insurrection between May 5 and 8, experienced German fire-bombings of the city center and the use by SS units of women and children as hostages for protection against insurgents’ barricades. After Soviet tank commanders had already reached the city, the National Assembly on May 9 demanded of the people: “Capture the German murderers, and if they offer any resistance, kill them.” And President Beneš stated in Brno on May 12, 1945 that: “The German people […] appear to be, for us, the single largest human threat.”20 The Deutschenhass (hatred for the Germans) of the exiled Czech politicians and resistance activists, as well as of large segments of the population grew on one hand out of the role of the Sudeten German Party in the carving-up of Czechoslovakia and out of the terror regime of Heydrich and Frank. On the other hand, it was a product of their anger at their own passiveness during “Munich”, specifically at the military’s impotence, and the more active resistance in Poland, Slovakia, and Yugoslavia. The Edvard BENEŠ, Odsun Němců z Československa, Praha 1996, p. 137 f.; Samuel W. MITCHAM, Jr., The German Defeat in the East, 1944–45, Stackpole Military History Series, Mechanicsburg, PA 2001. 20

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deliberate instigation of reckless action on the part of Czech people by their main representatives – President Beneš, Prime Minister Zdeněk Fierlinger, Defense Minister Ludvík Svoboda, Minister of Interior, Václav Nosek, and Communist Party head Klement Gottwald – should not be underestimated.21 The first great acts of revenge against the Germans in Yugoslavia followed directly after the capture of Vojvodina by the Red Army, which advanced from Romania and Bulgaria into Serbia and Southern Hungary in October 1944. In the wake of the Russian soldiers, who raped countless numbers of women, Yugoslav partisans killed over 7,000 German civilians in the Banat, the Bačka, and Syrmia. These civilians neither could be evacuated in time, nor did they have the chance to flee. By order of two members of the Polit office of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Moše Pijade and Aleksandar Ranković, Commissions for the Freedom of the People and the OZNA (Department for Protection of the People), which was formed by Tito’s order on May 13, 1944 as the Communist Secret Police, organized the Peoples’ Court of Justice and the shooting-commandos. The OZNA executed especially industrialists, affluent businessmen, rich farmers, professionals, teachers, and clergymen. Rich Magyars and Serbs were not spared from the killings. On August 15, 1944 was established the KNOJ (Corps of the National Defense of Yugoslavia). Its main task was to keep order on liberated territory and to enforce “the liquidation of Chetnik, Ustasha, White Guard and other anti-people gangs”. The new regime in Yugoslavia was trying to collect data for all real and potential “people’s enemies” and “war criminals”. Also political opponents, real or supposed, were killed, imprisoned or sentenced.22 The number of Germans killed in Croatia and Slovenia, which were first seized by the partisan armies in April and May 1945, was not as high as in Vojvodina. This had less to do with a reduction in the feeling of hatred for the Germans, and more with the fact that the majority of Germans from Croatia and Slovenia had been already evacuated as the fleeing German armies pulled out of those regions. Nevertheless, among the tens-of-thousands of German prisoners of war, countless died. Following the end of the war, partisan fighters executed whole lists of Croat, Slovene, and Serb Emilia HRABOVEC, Vertreibung und Abschub. Deutsche in Mähren 1945–1947, Frankfurt am Main etc. 1995; Tomáš STANĚK, Adrian von ARBURG, „Organizové divoké odsuny? Úloha ústředních orgánů při provádění „evakuace“ německého obyvatelstva (květen až září 1945)“. In Soudobé dějiny XII/3-4 (Praha 2004), pp. 465–533. 22 Tamara GRIESSER-PEČAR, Das zerrissene Volk. Slowenien 1941–1946. Okkupation, Kollaboration, Bürgerkrieg, Revolution, Wien–Köln–Graz 2003; Michael PORTMANN, Die kommunistische Revolution in der Vojvodina, PhD dissertation Wien 2005. 21

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“collaborators” (Ustaše, Domobrani, Domobranci, and Četnici), those massgraves in Slovenia only began being discovered in the 1990s. But Aleksandar Ranković, the chief of the OZNA, was unsatisfied with the work of his men: “During 10 days in liberated Zagreb only 200 bandits was shot. […] You work contrary to our orders since we have told you to work quickly and efficiently and to finish all in the first days.”23 7. Directly following the end of the war was the “lawless displacement” of Germans and Magyars from Czechoslovakia. Germans and Magyars were declared as “enemies of the state” and whole segments of the population were arrested, interned, and chased from their land, while their property was confiscated without compensation. German civilians were singled-out by having Swastikas drawn on their backs, or, following the example for the Jews, were forced to wear an “N” for “German” (Němec) sewn onto their clothes. Part of the German population was placed in concentration camps, while others were used as forced labor, while still others were transported in freight cars over the border. Czech officials initially allowed Germans to take with them thirty to fifty kilograms of belongings, necessities for three to seven days, as well as fifty to 300 Reich marks in cash. However, few Germans were able to escape the Czech militias, revolutionary soldiers, or security forces still in possession of their belongings. In this manner, from the beginning of May to the beginning of August 1945, 450,000 Sudeten Germans were expelled to the Soviet-controlled German sector, 200,000 to the American-controlled German sector, and 150,000 to Austria. Members of the Czechoslovak army, armed revolutionaries, freed prisoners, and Soviet soldiers handed out justice, either alone or in lynch mobs, to known or suspected National Socialists and collaborators. With the close of the Moravian Central National Commission, German able-bodied men were brought to a work camp in Brno. On the morning of May 31, 1945, 26,000 German women, children, and elderly were put on the road out of Brno and force-marched towards the Austrian border. Of these, almost 1,000 people did not survive the sadistic displacement. At the end of May 1945, soldiers of the 1st Czechoslovak division executed almost 800 Germans at Postoloprty. A mass murder of Germans also happened at Ústí nad Labem, on July 31, 1945, after an explosion in an ammunition depot. This Prague-instigated shooting supposedly influenced the negotiations in PotsHrvatski institut za povijest (ed.), Partizanska i komunistička represija i zločini u Hrvatskoj 1944–1946. Dokumenti, Slavonski Brod 2005, doc. 28; Vladimir GEIGER, Ivan JURKOVIĆ, Što se dogodilo s Folksdojčerima? Sudbina Nijemaca u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, Zagreb 1993. 23

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dam to favor a faster expulsion of Germans. In Western and Southern Bohemia, the Third US Army hindered larger excesses against displaced persons. Criticisms voiced came from the House of Commons after a British newspaper covered a Reuter’s report about Czech displacement practices. Meanwhile, thousands of Germans were placed in barracks, movie-theater auditoriums, and guesthouses as the prisons, penitentiaries and camps filled up. Forced-labor, violence, rape, starvation, and disease caused mass-deaths and often led to suicides. After a year-long detailed study, Tomáš Staněk estimated the number of deaths in the camps at between 4,000 and 5,000 people. During the period from the end of October to the beginning of November 1945, there were an estimated 300 internment camps and prisons with a total of 150,000 prisoners documented in Bohemia, Moravia, and Czech-Silesia.24 By October of 1944, Germans and Magyars were arrested and imprisoned in Vojvodina as “persons of suspicion to the state.” However, the Communist military administration began to differentiate between the two ethnic groups after December 1, 1944. Beginning at Christmas 1944, 8,000 women and 4,000 men were taken from the Danube Swabian camps and villages and deported to the Soviet Union for purposes of forced labor. After January 1945, the mass-confinement of around 170,000 Danube Swabian men, women, and children in work and starvation camps occurred in Bačka and Banat. Over 50,000 of these people didn’t survive this internment.25 8. Resettlement plans had already been developed during the interwar period. Not only Hitler and Stalin, but also Churchill, considered ethnic cleansing to be a tolerable political instrument in order to align future political and national borders. The example of the 1922/23 “population exchange” between Turkey and Greece was widely known and carried no negative stigma. Beneš was also an advocate of ethnic engineering. In the course of 1938, he had already developed five plans for the division of Czechs and Germans, whereby the fifth plan endeavored to combine a partial resettlement of the Sudeten Germans with the surrender of the Sudeten German borderlands. If from his exile, Beneš could still envisage in Kulturstiftung der deutschen Vertriebenen (ed.), Vertreibung und Vertreibungsverbrechen 1945–1948. Bericht des Bundesarchivs vom 28. Mai 1974. Archivalien und ausgewählte Erlebnisberichte, Bonn 1989; Tomáš STANĚK, Verfolgung 1945. Die Stellung der Deutschen in Böhmen, Mähren und Schlesien (außerhalb der Lager und Gefängnisse), Wien, Köln, Weimar 2002; Giles MACDONOUGH, After the Reich. The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation, New York 2007, pp. 125–159. 25 Donauschwäbische Kulturstiftung (ed.), Leidensweg der Deutschen im kommunistischen Jugoslawien, 4 vols., München, Sindelfingen, 1993–1997. 24

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1939 another compromise between the cession of territories to Germany and the resettlement of a portion of the Sudeten Germans, then by the fall 1940, he had already determined on a resettlement of all Sudeten Germans from post-war Czechoslovakia. Under the impact of the German repression, first under Heydrich, and then after his murder–particularly evident in the liquidation of the village of Lidice – Beneš attained on July 6, 1942, the public rescission of the Munich Agreement by the British government, as well as the secret approval for the general principle of the transfer of German minorities from Central and Southeastern Europe after the war. In the spring of 1943, U.S. President Roosevelt agreed, followed in December 1943 by Generalissimus Stalin and Foreign Minister Molotov – together with the exiled leadership of the Czechoslovak Communists. All the same, uncertainty as to whether the Allies would keep their word concerned the Czechs in exile, the opposition on the home-front, and ultimately, by the end of the war, the Košice government. After all, neither the Red Army in Moravia, Eastern and Central Bohemia, nor the U.S. Army in Western and Southern Bohemia were interested in any more chaos. Nevertheless, in May, June, and July 1945, both the Russians and the Americans allowed the “lawless displacement” of hundreds-of-thousands of Sudeten Germans in the German and Austrian occupation zones. It was not until the Potsdam Conference on August 2, 1945 that they put an end to these illegal displacement campaigns and arranged for the “orderly and humane transfer” of German people out of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. With that, the Allies met the basic demands of the Czech, Slovak, and Southern Slav nationalists who wanted the land – but without its German population, regardless of whether it had constituted a majority or a minority.26 On August 2, 1945, the Beneš Decree was issued which denied Germans and Magyar, with the exception of the “antifascists”, the citizenship and was the legal basis for coerced resettlement. The Prague government explained to the Allied Control Council for Germany that there were still 2.5 million Germans left to evacuate – a number which was surely exaggerated. On November 20, 1945, the Allied Control Council agreed to the dispersion of displaced persons to occupied zones in Germany: 1.75 million Germans from Czechoslovakia would be deported to the U.S. zone, and 750,000 to the Soviet zone. The Prague Department of the Interior was meant to administer the Abschub (odsun), or evacuation through its Detlev BRANDES, Der Weg zur Vertreibung 1938–1945. Pläne und Entscheidungen zum ‚Transfer’ der Deutschen aus der Tschechoslowakei und aus Polen, München 2001. 26

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“regional settlement agencies” in cooperation with its “national committees”, which were organized by the police force and the army. After finalizing the date, the Germans were brought to a holding camp, where they waited for up to three weeks for evacuation transport. U.S. authorities persuaded the Prague government to allow the Germans to bring with them fifty kilograms of luggage, along with three days worth of necessities, as well as 1,000 Reich marks per person. The bringing of any objects of value, apart from wedding rings, was still forbidden. However, the Americans insisted that only whole families be deported and that there be a doctor’s examination before compulsory eviction. Each transport was to consist of forty freight cars, with nearly 1,200 people who would be accompanied by German doctors and nurses. In March 1946, the Czechoslovak government learned that Stalin had coerced the reluctant Marshall Georgij K. Žukov into accepting even more Sudeten Germans into the Soviet-occupied zone. From the middle of June until the end of October 1946, an additional 630,000 Germans were thereupon deported into the Soviet-occupied zone, whereby they were allowed to bring fifty kilograms of luggage and 500 Reich marks.27 “Antifascists” and certain groups of skilled tradesmen, whom Czechoslovakia needed, were exempted from the displacement and remained. An “antifascist” was considered to be any person “who had remained true to the Czechoslovak Republic, had never gone against the Czech and Slovak people, and had either taken an active part in the fight for his freedom, or had suffered under the NS-Terror.” In the face of the hate-filled, antiGerman sentiment, however, nearly 53,000 German Social Democrats emigrated to the American-occupied zone, by July 1947, and almost 43,000 Communists to the Soviet-occupied zone. Even still, in 1947 roughly 240,000 Germans remained behind, often involuntarily. These were mostly skilled craftsmen and their families who, among others, were employed at the Jáchymov uranium mine.28 Clearly, there was no comparable master plan for the displacement and resettlement of the Yugoslav ethnic Germans in either the AVNOJ leadership or in Marshall Tito’s closest staff (in any case, none has been made known to date). However, plans among Serb intellectuals existed for achieving a Serb majority in the Vojvodina through the resettlement of the Danube Swabians and Magyars. The most famous of these plans came from Alfred M. de ZAYAS, Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans – Background, Execution, Consequences, London 1979. 28 Adrian von ARBURG, Zwischen Vertreibung und Integration. Tschechische Deutschenpolitik 1947–1953, PhD dissertation Prague 2004. 27

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one of the seven assassins responsible for the death of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, Vaso Čubrilović, who became the Yugoslav Minister for Agriculture and Land Reform in March 1945. In Yugoslavia, mass expulsion and imprisonment in camps of certain ethnic groups – especially Germans –was less a revenge for their real or presumed support for the Nazi ideology and the Nazi occupation policy and more a way to change the national structure of population on specific territories (mainly in the Vojvodina, in Slavonia, and in Slovenia) and to attempt to solve social problems. The new government was aware of the fact that confiscation of property of real and supposed enemies opened the possibility for realisation of land reform and colonisation. Confiscation of “public enemies” property was anticipated by the decision of the Presidium of the “Anti-Fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia” (AVNOJ) on November 21, 1944 to transfer the “enemy property” and the property of absent persons under state administration. As a result of an amendment to the proceedings and interpretation of the AVNOJ Resolutions of November 21, 1944, the international historiography is even today in agreement that, on this day, there was not only a resolution on expropriation, but also a resolution on disenfranchisement, which is not actually true. The Yugoslav Germans lost their earlier citizenship not due to an AVNOJ Resolution, but rather, in the summer of 1945, through their loss of voting rights. On June 9, 1945 the Law on confiscation on property and implementation of confiscation was enacted. These measures disqualified all potential enemies and at the same time meant the possibility for higher communist officials to acquire material benefits. The intention of the new communist authorities was obviously to economically destroy all social classes, which were considered the enemies of the new social order.29 Independent from the Serb demographic ambitions, the “Slovene National Liberation Council” (OF) developed as early as February 1944 strategies to deport the Lower Styrians from the Slovene region due to their role in NS occupation policies. Above all, members of the Kulturbund (cultural association) or other NS organizations, along with their families, were to be expelled from the country. Indeed, even today, it remains unclear why the Yugoslav government did not ask the Potsdam Conference for the mandatory resettlement of the mostly interned Germans who remained in Yugoslavia in July 1945. When the Tito government submitted this request to the Allied forces in January 1946, the U.S.A. and Great Britain declined,

29

Partizanska i komunistička represija, 28.

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as the mass transports had just begun from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. 9. The AVNOJ Resolutions and Beneš Decrees and the fate of the Danube Swabians, the German Lower Styrians, Gottscheer, and Laibacher, as well as the Sudeten and Carpathian Germans are for the most part – though not completely – to be understood as political and legal reactions to the German occupation forces in Serbia (including Vojvodina) and Slovenia and in the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia (and, as of August 1944, also in Slovakia) on the other hand. The idea of “revenge against Munich” played an especially important role in the Czechoslovak exile in London around President Beneš. Neither in Yugoslavia nor in Czechoslovakia were any laws, decrees, or other legal actions adopted which would have expressly authorized German displacement and mandatory resettlement. Thus, still today in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Serbia there are politicians, lawyers, and historians who contend that the displacement and mandatory resettlement were direct consequences of the war – in the case of those who fled from the Red Army or from the Yugoslav partisans – or who attempt to make excuses on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement or the Allied Control Council for Germany. Some even cite both chains of events as determining factors. To that end, it must be noted that the flight and evacuation before the Red Army affected essentially only in parts of the Vojvodina (specifically in Syrmia) and Slovakia, while the flight from partisans only occurred in Vojvodina and Slovenia. What should particularly not be overlooked is that both the Belgrade and Prague governments deprived the Germans of any available possibility for livelihood through their resolutions of expropriation. Furthermore, the Czechoslovak government had prepared a “forced eviction decree”. The only reason this was not enforced was the Potsdam Agreement. A retribution decree signed by President Beneš on June 19, 1945, “for the punishment of Nazi criminals, traitors, and accessories”, aimed at punishing crimes against humanity and freedom, or war crimes, but also “attacks against the Republic”. In the case of temporarily enacted “extraordinary People’s Courts”, drumhead court-martials were used in which trials had to be concluded within three days. In these proceedings, appeals were barred and sentences were executed within two hours of the rulings. The Czech People’s Court handed down 475 death sentences against Germans, and 234 against Czechs; 443 life sentences to Germans, and 293 to Czechs; 19,888 people were given up to ten years in prison; 9,132 were freed of any charges; and 5,129 people fled or died during the process. Provided that the goal had been “to contribute to the fight for the recovery

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of freedom for Czechs and Slovaks, or fight for the deserved retaliation against acts committed by the occupiers and their helpers”, a May 8, 1946 law declared that all misfeasance committed between the time of the Munich Agreement and October 28, 1945, would go unpunished. An amnesty was not, however, issued! This judicially problematic policy of forgiving punishments, for which there were comparable rules in France, Italy, Belgium, and Austria, is unfortunately still in place in the Czech Republic.30 The communist leadership of the Yugoslav partisan movement publicly preached the creation of a new state on democratic principles, with respect to human, civil, national and ethnic rights and international civil and military laws with the establishment of a legal framework for punishment of war criminals and “people’s enemies”. But the real actions of the political and military leaders, as well as of the policemen completely disregarded the official principles. The paragraphs of criminal law were misinterpreted during trials and in numerous cases elimination of real and possible enemies and robbery of their property took place without any form of legal proceedings. Following countless drumhead court-martials during the war and thousands of death sentences, mass-sentencing ceased in Communist Yugoslavia. The new style of justice concentrated on show-trials against German generals, SS leaders, NS functionaries, previous advocates of that ethnic group, and leading “collaborators”. In this way, the Austrian-born Colonel General Alexander Löhr and the Chetnik-leader Draža Mihailović were executed in Belgrade, the Lutheran Regional Bishop Philipp Popp was executed in Zagreb, and General Rupnik, SS-General Rösener as well as the Carinthian District Leader for the Reich Friedrich Rainer were executed in Ljubljana. Rainer had been responsible for the entire occupation district between the Karawanken Mountains and the Adriatic after September 1943.31 The AVNOJ Resolutions and Beneš Decrees had numerous consequences. The worst of these naturally involved the complete expropriation and loss of rights of most of the Sudeten and Carpathian Germans, most of the Danube Swabians, and most of the Slovene Germans. Using the Beneš Decrees Nr. 12 and 108, the Sudeten and Carpathian Germans (and Benjamin FROMMER, National Cleansing. Retribution against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia, Cambridge 2005. 31 The Trial of Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović. Stenographic records and documents, published by the Union of Journalists’ Associations (Belgrade, 1946); [People’s Republic of Slovenia] (ed.), Proces proti vojni zločincem in izdajalcem Rupniku, Rösenerju, Rožmanu, Kreku, Vizjaku, in Hacinu, Ljubljana 1946; Maurice WILLIAMS, Gau, Volk und Reich. Friedrich Rainer und der österreichische Nationalsozialismus, Klagenfurt 2005. 30

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Magyars) were stripped, without compensation, of a total of 1.62 million hectares of arable land and 1.3 million hectares of forest, or more than 29,000 km² (a total land area larger than Moravia!), in addition to nearly 3,900 industrial concerns, 34,000 handicraft enterprises, hundreds-ofthousands of commercial operations, homes, and apartments, as well as banks, insurance policies, hotels, treatment facilities, medical practices, attorney’s offices, libraries, theaters, museums, and 120,000 motor vehicles. The Sudeten Germans estimated the total loss to 33,516 billion Reich marks. Due to the AVNOJ Resolution of November 21, 1944, the Danube Swabians and Slovene Germans lost all of their real estate, and the larger part of their moveable property: a total of individual 96,874 possessions with 636,847 hectares of agriculture and forestry land, all industrial concerns, 8,268 handicraft enterprises, commercial operations, houses, apartments, banks, insurance policies, hotels, treatment facilities, medical practices, attorney’s offices, libraries, theaters, museums, etc. The total loss of assets in the accepted currency and 1945 price ratio amounted to 84,266,690,000 Dinar, which, when converted to Reich marks, and then to the ratio of the 1982 German mark, is equivalent to a loss of 15,589 billion German marks.32 Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia certainly submitted data to the reparation conference in Paris in 1946 regarding personal and material losses which amounted to markedly higher totals than those calculated by the German displaced persons. The Federal Republic of Germany began to pay reparations to Yugoslavia under different legal titles beginning in the 1950s. In addition, according to its 1955 state treaty, Austria also had to renounce all claims to Austrian assets in Yugoslavia held prior to 1938 (24,000 hectares of agricultural and forestry land, industrial concerns and handicraft enterprises, houses, apartments, bank balances, insurance policies, hotels, treatment facilities, medical practices, attorney’s offices, patents, means of transportation, etc.). In 1954 and 1955, however, both Bonn and Vienna were forced to renounce claims against allied and associated countries, a point, which has been forgotten in some political and international law discussions that have taken place after 1990. 10. A summary also requires a description of the death toll of war. According to the 1930 population census, the population of Czechoslovakia before the Munich Agreements equaled at least 15 million, of which 7.5 Karel JECH, Jan KUKLÍK, and Vladimír MIKULE (eds.), Němci a Maďaři v dekretech prezidenta republiky. Studie a dokumenty 1940–1945. Die Deutschen und Magyaren in den Dekreten des Präsidenten der Republik. Studien und Dokumente 1940–1945, Brno 2003. 32

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million were Czechs, 3.3 million Germans, 2.4 million Slovaks, 730,000 Magyars, 580,000 Ukrainians (Rusini), 350,000 Jews, 90,000 Poles, and 50,000 Roma. Between October 1938 and December 1946, nearly 600,000 of these people violently lost their lives: in NS death and concentration camps, as soldiers on the frontlines, in guerilla warfare, by military and police executions, as victims of bombings, by forced labor, and by expulsion. The greatest number of victims was Jews, of which all told 270,000 were murdered, predominately in Auschwitz: 80,000 from the Bohemian lands, 70,000 from Slovakia, 80,000 from the Carpathian Rus’, and 40,000 from the area of Southern Slovakia which was ceded to Hungary.33 6,000 Roma also fell prey to racist persecution. The Sudeten and Carpathian Germans counted roughly 180,000 soldiers killed in action, and 30,000 victims of displacement. The Czechs suffered a death toll of 40,000-45,000 (including victims of concentration camps and imprisonment, the executed, guerilla fighters and allied soldiers killed in action, forced laborers, and victims of bombings); the Slovaks counted approximately 40,000 victims (insurrectionists, partisans, soldiers, the executed, forced laborers, and victims of bombings). The number of Czechoslovak Magyars, Rusini, and Poles who violently lost their lives has never been statistically recorded. The number lost on account of the war might include close to 20,000 Rusini, 10,000 Magyars, and 5,000 Poles.34 In March 1941, the population of Yugoslavia, which continued to increase into the 1930s, consisted of almost 15.9 million, of which – based on projections from the 1931 population census – nearly 6.3 million were Serbs, 3.7 million Croats, 1.3 million Slovenes, 1.1 million Bosnian Muslims, 700,000 Macedonians, 600,000 Albanians, 550,000 Germans, 500,000 Magyars, 250,000 Montenegrins, 150,000 each of Romanians and Turks, 130,000 Bulgarians, 82,000 Jews, 80,000 Roma, 80,000 Slovaks, 55,000 Czechs, 40,000 Russians, 30,000 Ukrainians and Rusini, as well as 10,000 Italians. Between April 1941 and March 1948, over 1.1 million of these people violently lost their lives: in mass persecutions by the Ustasha against Serbs, Jews, and Roma; in partisan and Chetnik wars against the occupying forces, as well as against the Ustasha, Muslims, and each other; in German, Saul FRIEDLÄNDER, Die Jahre der Vernichtung. Das Dritte Reich und die Juden, 2. Bd.: 1939–1945, München 2006. 34 Miroslav KÁRNÝ, „Die tschechoslowakischen Opfer der deutschen Okkupation“. In Jörg K. HOENSCH and Hans LEMBERG (eds.), Begegnung und Konflikt, Essen 2001, 143; Jaroslav KUČERA, „Statistik auf dem Holzweg“. In: Richard G. PLASCHKA, Horst HASELSTEINER, Arnold SUPPAN, and Anna M. DRABEK (eds.), Nationale Frage und Vertreibung in der Tschechoslowakei und Ungarn 1938–1948, Wien 1997. 33

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Italian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian hostage shootings and executions; in Croat and German death and concentration camps during the war; in Yugoslav concentration camps after January 1945; as soldiers on the frontlines, from forced labor, and by expulsion. The Serbs had the largest number of victims, of which a total of 530,000 lost their lives (330,000 of which in NDH); the Croats suffered 210,000 deaths, the Bosnian Muslims around 90,000, the Slovenes more than 50,000, and the Montenegrins nearly 30,000. Among the minorities, the Jews had relatively the highest number of victims with 67,000. The Yugoslav Germans lost nearly 60,000 civilians and more than 25,000 soldiers killed in action. The Yugoslav Magyars claimed around 20,000 soldiers and civilians killed, and the Yugoslav Bulgarians roughly 10,000 soldiers and civilians. The number of victims among the Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Romanians, Slovaks, Czechs, Russians, and Ukrainians was relatively minor. Finally, of the Yugoslav Roma, 20,000 suffered violent deaths.35 Until the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991/92 it remained largely unclear whether the total death tolls among the South Slavic people were due more to the occupying powers or the different fratricidal wars. Generally, it is believed that the fratricidal wars – initiated, naturally, by the occupation – caused considerably more deaths than the occupying powers. In this manner the Slovene fratricidal war between the Communist-led “Liberation Front” and the Domobranci cost 14,000–18,000 Slovene victims at the nonCommunist side, particularly in the days of May and June 1945. In the “Independent State of Croatia”, fratricidal wars between the Ustaše, Domobrani, partisans, Četnici, and Muslims claimed the majority of the victims. Even in Serbia, the mutual campaigns of revenge by the Četnici and partisan fighters exceeded the brutal persecution measures of the NS occupation in terms of mass executions of hostages. Finally, it is important to remember that at least 50,000 Croat victims – captured in part by Yugoslav Army troops, in part by the British Army – were liquidated after the war by the partisans in Northern Slovenia.36 11. The question as to whether what happened in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia during and after the Second World War was “genocide” or “ethnocide” has brought varied answers in the historiography. Many Czech, Vladimir ŽERJAVIĆ, Yugoslavia. Manipulations with the Number of Second World War Victims, Zagreb 1993; Leidensweg der Deutschen im kommunistischen Jugoslawien, vol. IV: Menschenverluste – Namen und Zahlen, München 1994; TOMASEVICH, Occupation and Collaboration,, pp. 608–610, 718–750. 36 Drago JANČAR (ed.), Temna stran meseca. Kratka zgodovina totalitarizma v Sloveniji 1945–1990, Ljubljana 1998; TOMASEVICH, Occupation and Collaboration,, pp. 751–778. 35

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Slovene, and Serbian historians describe the NS occupation tactics in Bohemia, Moravia, Slovenia, and Serbia as “ethnocide.” Many German experts on international law describe the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia as “genocide.” One thing is certain: the predominant, manipulative execution of the majority of Jews living in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia by SS and NS groups must be called genocide. Also certain is that the purpose of the SS Volkstumpolitik (racist policy) was to dissolve the Czechs, Slovenes, and Serbs as political nations, perhaps not as ethnic groups. After the war, Czech, Slovene, and Serb politics focused on getting “the Germans” completely out of their countries, or at any rate, to “liquidate” the Germans as an “ethnic group”. If “ethnocide” can be understood as the liquidation of a people as a political nation, then the German acts of violence against the Czechs, Slovenes, and Serbs can be described as “ethnocide”, just as the Czech, Slovene, and Serb acts of violence against the Germans were. German violence against Serbs from 1941–1944 and the Serb partisan violence against Germans in the Vojvodina from 1944–1948 are even harder to characterize. The German hostage shootings in the fall of 1941, in which thousands Serbian children and their teachers were shot too, and Communist Serb actions against Danube Swabians from 1944 to 1946, in which over 100,000 children, women and elderly people were held in death camps, fulfill, without a doubt, the definition of a “genocide”, the intentional killing off a part or all of an ethnic, religious, or national group.37 Hannah Arendt’s lecture, Some Questions of Moral Philosophy, which was presented at the New School of Social Research in New York three years after the execution of Adolf Eichmann, raises questions as to the origins of “evil”, including fundamental aspects of German-Czech and GermanYugoslav disputes. If one reads the diary entries of the learned historian Josef Pfitzer during his time as the Deputy Mayor of Prague and the American interrogation protocol records of NS State Minister Karl Hermann Frank, one learns about the day-to-day workings of the NS Regime in the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia. On the one hand, one gets to know prototypical agents who thoughtlessly and bureaucratically fulfill their duties. On the other, one gains insight into a Weltanschauung incited by racism, which, in its tyrannical, politically-amoral delusions defied every form of the rule of law (Rechtsstaat). Neither of these reflects upon what is “good” and what “bad” and they also repress the ability to remember. This nihilism, to the point of death and suicide, removes all restraints and allows 37

NAIMARK, Fires of Hatred, p. 3.

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the culprits to take the law into their own hands. Both Frank and Pfitzner were sentenced to death and executed in Prague. 12. Part of the former German settlement area suffers to this day from the expulsion of Germans sixty years ago. As a result of the expulsion in Northern Bohemia and Northern Moravia, as well as in former Austrian Silesia, there are still deserted villages, dilapidated houses, an antiquated infrastructure, and very little modern industry. The Germans were replaced by Czechs, Slovaks, Roma, Greeks, and Vietnamese. The once overwhelmingly Sudeten German district Freudenthal (Bruntal) is today the poorest region in the Czech Republic. Even the entry into the EU has brought, to date, only meager investment into these crisis-region. Despite this, there are already trendsetting industrial business projects in the former Sudeten German region: Karlsbader Oblaten, Gablonzer Bijouterie, Bohemian glass, Mattoni Mineral Water, Pilsner Urquell, Budweiser Beer, and Karlsbader Becherovka. For the socio-economic history of the latter half of the 20th century, one can say that, on the one hand, the loss of over three million well-educated, skilled, and entrepreneurial fellow citizens was a blow from which the Czech Republic has yet to recover. On the other hand, the expelled Sudeten Germans and Danube Swabians have contributed to decisive “economic miracles” in Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, and Austria. Even so, the former breadbasket of the Habsburg Monarchy, the Vojvodina, was hard hit, even with Germans making up “only” twenty percent of the population. Also here, along with the Germans and a part of the Magyars, many gifted people were expelled who could not be “replaced” with “colonists” from Yugoslavia’s southern regions. This is still the case in many ways, especially concerning the people who have fled Serbia since 1991. Today, the Serbs have established the long aspired absolute majority, but the economic handicap, when compared to Southern Hungary, is increasing. In the same way, the Eastern Slavonian region of Croatia was hard hit by the evacuation, flight and expulsion of the Germans in 1944/45. Only in Slovenia can the wounds of the Second World War be considered healed, at least economically, though not psychologically. An examination of the German/Austrian-Czechoslovak and German/Austrian-Yugoslav history of conflict in the 20th century reveals – in addition to a wealth of positive economic, social, technical, cultural, academic, and scientific connections – a long list of discrimination, injury, degradation, oppression, warlike actions, destruction, persecution, and eviction, which could ultimately be compared to ethnic genocide. Therefore, it is understandable that different, at times very contradictory, historical

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understandings still exist at the beginning of the 21st century – both between the relevant nations, as well as within ethnic groups. In order to overcome the divide that exists in East Central European comparative history, it is absolutely necessary for each side to incorporate a deeper understanding not only of the pain and injustices they suffered, but also of those crimes they perpetrated. “Remembrance, therefore, is so important in the posttraumatic period following excessive criminal violence, because the determination of whether the former states of violence will be implicitly accepted and protracted, or effectively disowned, allowing for the ushering in of a new era, is dependent on this one thing alone. The remembrance of a perpetrated injustice, and the public acknowledgement of the victim, is the litmus test for the internal transformation of a country [and its society, note: Suppan]; it is the necessary symbol of its denunciation of terrible, historical consistencies.”38 “The desire to free oneself from the burden of knowledge of an event, the burden of accountability for an event, the burden of memory of an event”, is understandable, but futile. We confront the past as an individual and collective memory: “People in their relative present want to know what actually happened in the past, why it happened, and how it could happen.” Since 1989, a new generation, less familiar with the people and countries east of the “Iron Curtain”, wants to discover and explore Eastern Europe, with its many different languages, religions, and cultures – without the ballast of the National Socialist and Soviet Communist past. Naturally, with that also come the German, Austrian, and Jewish histories of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, including the violent chapters. In the course of two totalitarian dictatorships, and of National Socialist, imperialist, racist, nationalist, and Communist motivated wars and acts of repression, over forty million people violently lost their lives in Eastern and Southeastern Europe in the decade between 1938 and 1948. Amplified knowledge of the complicated history of this region, the exploration and interpretation of this past as “learned history”, and the “historicization of events” could perhaps help to make comprehensible the old and new prejudices and fears, the inherited images of “the enemy”, and national sensitivities, or at least to make known the difficulties in creating a politically, economically, socially, and emotionally united Europe. In any case, any sort of moral arrogance in the unilateral assignment of blame is therefore wholly misplaced. Only with a shared reconsideration of the past, borne from a European spirit of Aleida ASSMANN, „Morgen kommt Moskau“. Die Presse, 1 July 2006, „Peace vermutet: Europa in 50 Jahren“, p. 44f. 38

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reconciliation, can the history of Europe’s ethnic groups during that dark decade interlink; and with that, contribute to the development of a shared European culture of remembrance.39

Rudolf VIERHAUS, „’Historisierung’ als Gegenwartsbewältigung. Das deutschtschechische Verhältnis 1918-1989“. In, Jörg K. HOENSCH and Hans LEMBERG (eds.), Begegnung und Konflikt, Essen 2001, pp. 13–21. 39

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Aleš SKŘIVAN, Jr., Hospodářské reformy v Čínské lidové republice v letech 1979–1989 (Wirtschaftsreformen in der Volksrepublik China von 1979 bis 1989), Karlova Univerzita Praha – Filosofická fakulta, Praha 2007. Der tschechische Historiker und Ökonom Aleš Skřivan, Jr. bringt nach der Biografie von Teng Siao-ping eine weitere umfangreiche, der neuesten Geschichte Chinas gewidmete Studie auf den Buchmarkt. Skřivan befasst sich bereits mehrere Jahre speziell mit der Wirtschaftsgeschichte, seine neueste Arbeit ist also logisches Ergebnis seiner langfristigen fachlichen Ausrichtung. China stellt gegenwärtig einen solch bedeutenden politischen und wirtschaftlichen Faktor dar, dass es selbstverständlich die Aufmerksamkeit westlicher Fachleute verschiedenster Wissenschaftsbereiche auf sich zieht. In diesem Zusammenhang könnte man im Westen sogar von einer gewissen Faszination vom Reich der Mitte sprechen. Skřivan spiegelt dieses Interesse in seinem Buch zwar auch wider, analysiert jedoch den Anfangszeitraum der chinesischen Wirtschaftsreformen, ohne einseitige Schlüsse zu ziehen. Die Wirtschaftsgeschichte Chinas wird vom Autor in einer breiteren Perspektive dargestellt, als es der Titel des Buches vermuten lässt. Zunächst analysiert er die politische und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung ab der Machtübernahme durch die Kommunisten im Jahre 1949. Interessant ist die Schlussfolgerung, die erste Dekade der Regierung unter Mao sei sowohl in der Landwirtschaft als auch in der Industrie grundsätzlich erfolgreich gewesen. Skřivan zufolge tat dem Agrarsektor die von den Kommunisten durchgeführte Bodenreform sogar gut, und auch im Laufe der Kollektivierung in der zweiten Hälfte der 50er Jahre stiegen die Erträge im Durchschnitt um 4 % jährlich (S. 22). Die chinesische Kollektivierung brachte so größere Erfolge als die sowjetische. Die Gründe dafür sieht der Autor hauptsächlich im größeren Einfluss der chinesischen Kommunisten auf das Land. In der Industrie hingegen hatte die sowjetische Wirtschaftshilfe entscheidende Bedeutung. In einem weiteren Teil seiner Arbeit belegt Skřivan anhand von statistischen Daten den grundsätzlichen Misserfolg Maos Politik des sogenannten Großen Sprunges, der Millionen Menschenleben forderte. Die ideologischen Faktoren hatten dann bis ans Ende der Regierungszeit Maos 1976 Auswirkungen, die China in seiner Entwicklung zurückwarfen. Trotz der Meinungsverschiedenheiten mit der Sowjetunion in den 60er und 70er Jahren hatte China im Prinzip eine stalinistische Konzeption der Entwicklung der Volkswirtschaft und legte besonderen Wert auf die Entwicklung der Schwerindustrie. Unbefriedigend entwickelte sich auch die Landwirtschaft, die der „problematischste Bereich der chinesischen Wirtschaft“ (S. 42) blieb. Bis zu Maos Tod verfolgte das Land eine Politik der wirtschaftlichen Autarkie. Den Kernteil des Werkes bildet die Analyse der in den achtziger Jahren des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts durchgeführten Wirtschaftsreformen. Mit dem Sieg Tengs im Machtkampf, der nach Maos Rücktritt von der Szene ausgebrochen war, gelangte eine Gruppe von reformerisch eingestellten Parteifunktionären an die Macht. Vorherrschend war die Überzeugung, dass das Land schnellstmöglich zu reformieren und an die Weltwirtschaft anzuschließen ist. Reformen in der Landwirtschaft und im Außenhandel waren schon am Ende der 70er Jahre eingeleitet worden, in der Industrie jedoch erst seit 1984 in bedeutenderem Maße. Skřivan belegt, dass trotz eines langsameren Wachstums der landwirtschaftlichen als der

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Industrieproduktion in den 80er Jahren die Reformen auch in diesem Sektor zur Gesundung beitrugen. Der Produktionsanstieg führte unter anderem zur Entwicklung des tertiären Sektors in den ländlichen Gebieten und brachte eine Erhöhung des Lebensniveaus der Bauern mit sich. Noch positivere Ergebnisse brachten die Reformen im Bereich der Industrie. Skřivan nennt drei Schlüsselbereiche. Im Jahre 1984 erhielt ein Teil der staatlichen Industriebetriebe größere Freiheiten hinsichtlich der Produktions- und Geschäftsstrategie. Zu einer allmählichen Entstehung eines Konkurrenzumfeldes trug zu dieser Zeit auch eine Liberalisierung der Preise bei. Ein sehr wichtiger Beitrag war die Revitalisierung des privaten Produktionssektors, der bereits am Ende der 80er Jahre eine bedeutend höhere Wachstumsdynamik als die staatlichen Betriebe auswies. Der Privatsektor war auch in den sogenannten Sonderwirtschaftszonen, in die in der zweiten Hälfte der 80er Jahre zunehmend mehr ausländisches Kapital floss, außerordentlich erfolgreich. In den 80er Jahren erlangte China Zugang zu modernen Technologien, so dass eine Expansion des Exports begonnen werden konnte. Der Exportumfang wuchs durchschnittlich um 13 % jährlich und China überholte hinsichtlich der Wachstumsdynamik andere bedeutende, sich schnell entwickelnde Länder wie Indien und Brasilien. Die Warenstruktur veränderte sich weg von den Rohstoffen und hin zu Fertigprodukten. Vom Wachstum des Außenhandels Chinas profitierten alsbald die Länder des Ostblocks, besonders die Tschechoslowakei. Diese Entwicklung konnte jedoch, ungeachtet gegenteiliger Ansichten, nicht von Dauer sein. Der Autor belegt, dass das Interesse Chinas an tschechoslowakischen Produkten hauptsächlich durch einen vorübergehenden Mangel an Devisen motiviert war. China wandte sich also an die „weichen Märkte“. Sobald sich jedoch die Situation Ende der 80er Jahre gebessert hatte, orientierte sich Peking wieder auf die höher entwickelten westlichen Partner um (S. 140). Gleichzeitig betont Skřivan, dass die 80er Jahre trotz der insgesamt positiven Ergebnisse auch eine Reihe von Problemen mit sich brachten. Diese bestanden hauptsächlich in der fortdauernden Existenz uneffektiver Staatsbetriebe sowie einer insgesamt extensiven Entwicklung der Industrie bei geringem Interesse an einer Erhöhung der Produktivität. Negativ wirkte sich auch der unflexible Arbeitsmarkt aus. Die industrielle Entwicklung brachte grundlegende demografische Veränderungen hervor, es kam zu einer massiven Migration der Bevölkerung in die Städte an der Küste, die zur vollständigen Aufnahme dieser großen Zahl nicht in der Lage waren. Zudem vertieften sich die Unterschiede zwischen den entwickelten Küstengebieten und den demgegenüber unterentwickelten Regionen im Landesinneren. Aleš Skřivan bietet mit seiner Arbeit einen ausgewogenen Blick auf die chinesische Realität der 80er Jahre. Seine Hinweise auf die mit Investitionen in China verbundenen Risiken (Korruption, das Bemühen um die Erhaltung einer chinesischen Mehrheit in joint ventures usw.) sollten bei potentiellen Investoren auf diesem riesigen Markt auf Interesse stoßen. Skřivans Buch bringt eine Reihe neuer Sichtweisen auf die chinesische Realität der 80er Jahre und sollte deshalb sowohl in der Fachwelt als auch in der Öffentlichkeit Beachtung finden. Václav H o r č i č k a

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Václav Horčička, Vztahy Rakousko-Uherska a Spojených států amerických v období první světové války (Die Beziehungen Österreich-Ungarns und der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika in der Zeit des Ersten Weltkrieges). Karolinum, Praha 2007, 365 Seiten. Die vorliegende Arbeit ist eine Analyse der Beziehungen zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und der USA in der Zeit des Ersten Weltkrieges. Dieser Problematik ist bis heute nicht genügend Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt worden. Es gibt zwar eine Reihe von Arbeiten zu den Umständen, die zur Entstehung der Nationalstaaten in Mitteleuropa führten, zur Rolle der USA in diesem Prozess, sowie auch Teilstudien zu einigen Ereignissen in den Beziehungen zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und den USA, aber eine Monografie, die sich auf komplexe Weise mit der offiziellen Ebene der Beziehungen zwischen der Habsburgermonarchie und der bedeutendsten Großmacht in der Neuen Welt befasst, ist bis jetzt noch nicht vorhanden. Der Autor verfolgt in seiner Arbeit die Entwicklung der gegenseitigen Beziehungen nicht nur auf politischem, sondern auch auf wirtschaftlichem, sozialem und humanitärem Gebiet. Es wäre falsch, die Beziehungen der beiden Großmächte nur unter dem Aspekt des Zerfalls des mitteleuropäischen Reiches am Ende des Krieges zu betrachten. Dessen Liquidierung war nämlich keine Selbstverständlichkeit. Lange wurde sie von den wichtigsten US-Akteuren abgelehnt, einschließlich des Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staaten Woodrow Wilson, und zwar ungeachtet der allgemein, wenn auch nicht ganz berechtigt angenommenen These von der vollständigen Abhängigkeit Wiens von Deutschland. Bis zum Frühjahr 1918 rechnete man nämlich in Washington mit dem Fortbestehen ÖsterreichUngarns. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird auf die Ursachen und Zusammenhänge der Wende in der amerikanischen Politik gegenüber Mitteleuropa tiefgründig eingegangen. Horčička hat in diesem Zusammenhang auch die Rolle der Repräsentanten im Exil, besonders der tschechischen, slowakischen und polnischen, nicht vernachlässigt. Der Autor belegt überzeugend, dass zum Beispiel die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Kontakte der beobachteten Länder bis zum letzten Augenblick des Krieges intensiver waren, als man es in Kenntnis der Tatsache, dass die britische Marine zu dieser Zeit den Nordatlantik beherrschte, hätte erwarten können. Österreich-Ungarn hatte Interesse an der weiteren Lieferung einiger wichtiger Rohstoffe (z.B. Baumwolle), die bis Mitte des Jahres 1915 noch zu erhalten waren. Das Interesse der USA an Gewinn von Schiffsraum führte dann in den Jahren 1917–1918 wiederum zu Verhandlungen über den Verkauf österreichisch-ungarischer Schiffe in amerikanischen und neutralen Häfen, was nicht einmal von der formalen Kriegserklärung der USA im Dezember 1917 unterbrochen wurde. Die gegenseitigen Beziehungen wurden nicht von den Konflikten des Jahres 1915 (z.B. die Dumba-Affäre, die Versenkung der Ancona) beschädigt, entscheidend war auch nicht die bereits erwähnte Kriegserklärung im Dezember 1917. Als tatsächliches Schlüsselereignis, das die Zukunft der Monarchie entscheidend beeinflusste, betrachtet der Autor nicht allein die traditionell angeführte Rede ihres Außenministers Czernin vom April 1918, sondern hauptsächlich die gleichzeitige Unterstützung der deutschen Offensive an der Westfront durch Österreich-

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Ungarn sowie die Entwicklung der Situation in Russland einschließlich des Auftretens der tschechoslowakischen Legionen. Es waren unter anderem diese Ereignisse, die die USA und die Entente im Frühjahr 1918 dazu bewegten, sich definitiv für die Zerschlagung der Monarchie auszusprechen. Das Buch ist in sechs Kapiteln unterteilt, um die komplizierte Entwicklung der gegenseitigen Beziehungen so genau wie möglich aufzuzeigen. Die Einleitung mit dem Titel „Am Kreuzweg. Österreich-Ungarn und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika im Jahre 1914“ ist nicht nur den Veränderungen gewidmet, die der ausbrechende Erste Weltkrieg für beide Partner mit sich brachte, sondern sie beinhaltet auch Schlüsselfragen der gegenseitigen Beziehungen der Vorkriegszeit. Im zweiten Kapitel, „Streit um die Auslegung der amerikanischen Neutralität. Österreich-Ungarn und die USA im Jahre 1915“ beschäftigt sich Horčička mit den Krisen in den gegenseitigen Beziehungen, die das zweite Kriegsjahr brachte, sowie mit der Entwicklung des Handels in den Jahren 1914–1915. Im dritten Kapitel, „Das Jahr 1916 – die Ruhe vor dem Sturm“ widmet er sich neben den wichtigsten politischen Themen der gegenseitigen Beziehungen (U-Boot-Krieg) der innenpolitischen Entwicklung beider Länder und ihrer Reflexion durch die jeweils andere Seite (Präsidentswahlen in den USA usw.). Hinzugefügt sind auch Abschnitte, die sich mit der Hilfe durch das amerikanische Rote Kreuz für die leidenden Völker der Monarchie sowie für die in den USA befindlichen Landsleute, worum sich wiederum die Botschaftsorgane Österreich-Ungarns in den USA kümmerten, befassen. Im vierten Kapitel, „Endlich Krieg (1917)“ analysiert er unter anderem die Gründe für das Abbrechen der diplomatischen Beziehungen (im April) und für Wilsons Kriegserklärung an Österreich-Ungarn (im Dezember). Große Aufmerksamkeit schenkt er den verschiedenen Interpretationen der Gründe für den Kriegseintritt der USA gegen die Mittelmächte (Österreich-Ungarn und Deutschland), und zwar so, wie sie von der österreichisch-ungarischen Diplomatie gesehen wurden. Das fünfte Kapitel, „Das letzte Kriegsjahr und die amerikanische Rolle beim Zerfall Österreich-Ungarns“ beleuchtet die Gründe für die negative Wende der amerikanischen Politik gegenüber Wien. Abseits blieben auch nicht die Friedenssondierungen, die im Winter 1917/1918 verliefen, sowie die innen- und außenpolitischen Zusammenhänge des Meinungswechsels der Wilson-Regierung. Das sechste Kapitel, „Soziale und wirtschaftliche Zusammenhänge des Krieges zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika in den Jahren 1917–1918“ deckt weniger bekannte, aber trotzdem bedeutende Bestandteile der gegenseitigen Beziehungen auf. Horčička beschäftigt sich hier mit der Stellung der Bürger beider Länder nach der Kriegserklärung sowie dem Verkauf österreichisch-ungarischer Schiffe an amerikanische Käufer. Die Arbeit besticht durch einen einzigartigen Fundus an Quellen, an die sie sich konsequent anlehnt. Die umfangreiche Nutzung amerikanischer und österreichisch-ungarischer Archivfonds (z. B. National Archives in College Park, Maryland, Congress Library in Washington sowie das Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Wien), besonders der diplomatischen Korrespondenz, ermöglichte dem Autor, in nie da gewesener Breite und in vielen Details die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Donaumonarchie und den USA während der vier Kriegsjahre zu dokumentieren. Horčička schildert das Handeln hinter den diplomatischen Kulissen auf spannende und informative Weise, beschreibt verschiedenste dramatische Episoden und Peripetien in den offiziellen Beziehungen beider Großmächte

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auch in halbprivaten Initiativen, die hauptsächlich seitens Österreich-Ungarns ab 1917 entwickelt wurden. Eine solche Form der Präsentation dieser Fakten ist in der historischen Literatur einzigartig, denn die genannten Archive wurden bisher noch nie auf solch konsequente und detaillierte Weise durchforscht. Die Publikation stellt eine grundlegende, sich mit der Problematik der Beziehungen zwischen Österreich-Ungarn und den USA in der Zeit des Ersten Weltkrieges befassende Studie dar. Auch unter internationalem Aspekt handelt es sich überhaupt um die erste Arbeit, die sich mit der genannten Thematik so vollständig beschäftigt. Es handelt sich um eine Studie, die aufgrund ihrer Komplexität, Ausführlichkeit und Systematik für die Erkennung der Ursachen und Zusammenhänge des Zerfalls der Habsburgermonarchie im Jahre 1918 unverzichtbar ist. Jan Ž u p a n i č

Acta Oeconomica Pragensia 16, Německé hospodářské dějiny (Die deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte), hrsg. von František Stellner und Radek Soběhart, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, Praha 2008, 149 Seiten. Die erste diesjährige Ausgabe von Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, der wissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift der Wirtschaftsuniversität in Prag, wurde von dem Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsgeschichte an der Fakultät für Volkswirtschaft und Öffentliche Verwaltung der Wirtschaftsuniversität in Prag erarbeitet. Eine Gruppe von Historikern, geführt vom Lehrstuhlleiter František Stellner und seinem Stellvertreter Radek Soběhart, hat zwölf Studien zum Thema „Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte“ vorgestellt. Die Einleitung zum Band fasst bisherige Tätigkeiten des Lehrstuhls im Zusammenhang mit der Zeitschrift Acta Oeconomica Pragensia zusammen, wobei die Herausgeber akzentuieren, an die Bände von 1996, 1998 und 2005, die sich mit der Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte der Tschechoslowakei und der Wirtschaftsentwicklung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert befassten, anknüpfen zu wollen. Der Ansatz des neuesten Sammelwerkes ist viel breiter als „nur“ eine Analyse der deutschen Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Es widmet sich verschiedenen Fragen der Zusammenhänge zwischen der deutschen und britischen Wirtschaft, des Einflusses Deutschlands auf die Wirtschaft und Politik Böhmens (bzw. der Tschechoslowakei), Polens und gemeinsamer Beziehungen. In chronologischer Hinsicht wird hier vor allem die Entwicklung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert behandelt. Der erschienene Sammelband beinhaltet Texte tschechischer, deutscher und britischer Kollegen. In diesem Zusammenhang sind zwei sehr anregende Artikel von John R. Davis zu nennen. In beiden Beiträgen setzt sich der Autor mit der Persönlichkeit des Unternehmers, Politikers und Vertreters des Manchesterliberalismus, Richard Cobden, auseinander. Im ersten Artikel bearbeitet Davis Cobdens Betrachtungen der deutschen Länder und deren Wirtschaftsentwicklung; der zweite Beitrag stellt eine Zusammenfassung der Aufzeichnungen dar, die Cobden während eines kurzen Aufenthaltes in Böhmen in sein Tagebuch eintrug.

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Die authentische Beschreibung wirft einen einmaligen Blick auf die Perzeption des alltäglichen Lebens der tschechischen Bevölkerung aus der Sicht eines Ausländers. Der einzige Beitrag, der sich mit der Wirtschaftgeschichte des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts auseinandersetzt, ist der Text Toni Pierenkempers, der die deutsche Merkantilpolitik, den sog. Kameralismus am Beispiel Preußens analysiert, wobei er zur Überzeugung gelangt, dass die Wirtschaftspolitik Friedrichs II. wegen seiner Neigung, sich an Frankreich als Vorbild zu orientieren, erfolglos blieb. Ein neues Licht auf die Aktivitäten von Prinz Albert, des Gemahls der britischen Königin Viktoria, wirft Oliver Walton. Dank intensiver Recherchen in den Royal Archives und im Staatsarchiv in Coburg gelang es dem Autor zu beweisen, dass sich Prinz Albert nie völlig vom Land Coburg-Gotha löste, was viele bisherige Studien übersehen haben. Der Autor konstatiert, dass Albert mit dem Fürstentum in Verbindung blieb und seine Vertreter an wichtigen Entscheidungsstellen des Landes hatte. Er habe Coburg-Gotha finanziell unterstützt und sich für neue Technologien und Innovation in der Wirtschaft stark eingesetzt. Der gelungene Beitrag Martin Kovářs zu britisch-deutschen Beziehungen behandelt die Ausgangslage der Londoner Außenpolitik am Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts, wobei er sich auf die Rolle der sog. Haldane-Mission in Berlin konzentriert. Der Autor versucht die Frage des britischen Interessenwandels angesichts der sog. Balance-of-Power-Policy am europäischen Kontinent zu beantworten und gelangt zu einer interessanten Schlussfolgerung, indem er Beweise für Annährungsversuche zwischen London und Berlin in jenen politischen Kreise in Großbritannien nennt, die Frankreich als einen traditionellen Feind verstanden. Diese Versuche seien jedoch nicht stark genug gewesen, um der „Entente“ mit Frankreich zu schaden und die Rivalitätstendenzen zwischen Großbritannien und dem Reich zu mildern. Der komplizierten wirtschaftpolitischen Entwicklung am Ende der Weimarer Ära widmen sich František Stellner und Radek Soběhart in ihrer wertvollen, auf bekannten Editionen und unveröffentlichten Quellen basierenden, Studie. Die Autoren entschieden sich zur Analyse jener Aspekte, die von der Regierung Müller für die Kernprobleme der Wirtschaftskrise in Deutschland gehalten wurden. So wird die Aufmerksamkeit in erster Linie dem Young-Plan und der Sozialreform, verbunden mit Schwierigkeiten des Weimarer Parlamentarismus, gewidmet. Unterstrichen werden die Unfähigkeit der Koalitionsparteien, einen Kompromiss in Fragen des Haushaltsdefizits und der Sozialausgaben zu schließen, und er allmähliche Vertrauensverlust der Bevölkerung in die Regierung. Aus Sicht der ökonomischen Theorie verarbeiteten David Lipka und Dan Šťastný die Wirtschaftspolitik des Dritten Reiches. Im Text spielt die Persönlichkeit von John Maynard Keynes die zentrale Rolle, dessen Werke mit Deutschlands sozialistischer Wirtschaftspolitik konfrontiert werden. Nach der Meinung der Autoren war Keynes’ Fassung des neuen Liberalismus eher naiv und die Behauptung, dass seine Konzeption der nationalsozialistischen und bolschewistischen Vorstellung der Optimalsozialisierung der Wirtschaft sehr ähnlich sei, bleibe lediglich eine Spekulation. Zur Problematik der Germanisierung in den Kriegsjahren 1939–1945 äußern sich zwei gleich Beiträge. Es handelt sich um den Text Drahomír Jančíks, der die Germanisierung des tschechischen Wirtschaftsraums am Beispiel der Montangesellschaft Prag analysiert, und den Artikel von Jiří Novotný und Jiří

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Šouša, in dem die Frage der Prager Börse, deren interne Entwicklung und der sinkende Aktienmarkt in der Protektoratszeit behandelt werden. In einem aufschlussreichen Beitrag widmet sich Ivan Jakubec der, bisher wenig verarbeiteten, Problematik der tschechoslowakisch-deutschen Verkehrsbeziehungen. Er analysiert die Entwicklung zwischen den Jahren 1968 und 1989, womit er auf seine früheren Studien, in denen er die Situation in der Nachkriegszeit bis zum Ende der sechziger Jahre bearbeitete, anknüpft. Der Autor stellt fest, dass die Erstellung besserer Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik und Tschechoslowakei durch machtpolitische und ideologische Verschiedenheiten bestimmt wurden. Die praktische Notwendigkeit eines engeren diplomatischen und Wirtschaftskontakts war jedoch der Ansatz für Kompromissversuche und führte zu Vereinbarungen, die das gemeinsame Geschäft unterstützten und erleichterten. Bis ins 21. Jahrhundert führen Eva Cihelková und Jakub Krč das Thema der deutschen Wirtschaftsinteressen im Rahmen des EU-Erweiterungsprozesses, wobei Nachdruck auf den Beitritt Polens und der Tschechischen Republik zur Europäischen Union gelegt wird. Damit wird chronologisch das Thema der deutschen Wirtschaftsgeschichte vollendet, gefolgt von drei Kapiteln über die akademische und wissenschaftliche Aktivität an der Wirtschaftsuniversität in Prag. Bei den ausgewählten Texten handelt es sich um hochwertige Studien renommierter Historiker und Ökonomen sowohl aus tschechischen, als auch ausländischen Forschungsinstitutionen. Zum Bedauerlich ist jedoch der neue Umfang der Zeitschrift, die nun im Gegensatz zu vorigen Ausgaben um zwei Drittel kürzer ist. Trotzdem kann die inhaltliche Qualität der Zeitschrift Acta Oeconomica Pragensia in ihrem neuen Format nicht angezweifelt werden. Pavel S z o b i

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Die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Auswirkungen der Meilensteine 1848-1918-1938-1948-1968 Am 20. und 21. November 2008 wurde im Kongresszentrum der Tschechischen Nationalbank eine internationale Konferenz mit dem Thema Die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Auswirkungen der Meilensteine 1848–1918– 1938–1948–1968 veranstaltet. Die Konferenz, von der Fakultät für Volkswirtschaft und Öffentliche Verwaltung der Wirtschaftsuniversität in Prag organisierte, sah vor, verschiedene politische und ökonomische Aspekte jener Jahre des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, die mit der Nummer acht enden und in der Gesellschaft für Meilensteine oder Schicksalsjahre gehalten werden, zu erforschen. Die Veranstaltung wurde von dem Leiter des Lehrstuhls für Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Fakultät für Volkswirtschaft und Öffentliche Verwaltung der WU František Stellner eröffnet, wobei die Grundthesen und Ziele angedeutet wurden. Danach begrüßte der Vizegouverneur der Tschechischen Nationalbank Mojmír Hampl die Versammlung. Er wies auf die Tatsache hin, dass die meisten angesehenen Ökonomen in Folge der andauernden Finanzkrise auf der Suche nach Belehrung aus den vergangenen Wirtschaftsdepressionen viel Wert auf die Forschungsergebnisse der Historiker legen. Die Konferenz teilte man in fünf thematische Blöcke. Der erste von ihnen widmete sich dem Revolutionsjahre 1848 und wurde von Georg Christoph Berger Waldenegg geleitet (Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg). Den ersten Beitrag, der das Jahr 1848 aus der wirtschaftlichen Sicht betrachtete, trug John R. Davis (Kingston University) vor. Er verband die ökonomischen und Staatsinteressen mit dem steigenden Einfluss von Geschäftsmännern auf die Regierungshandlungen. Das Revolutionsjahr wurde weiter aus der Sicht Alberts von Sachsen-CoburgGotha im Beitrag von Oliver Watson (Navy Records Society, London) beschrieben, und zwar erstens als Meilensteine im Privat- und Familienleben des Prinzen und zweitens als Reaktionen Alberts auf die europäische Revolutionswelle. Der Autor deutete auf die Tatsache hin, dass der Prinz die Ereignisse des Jahres 1848 nicht als Katastrophe, sondern als Hoffnung auf positive Änderungen verstanden hatte. Albert hoffte auf die Verbreitung konstitutioneller Monarchien am Kontinent, vor allem in Deutschland und Italien. Das Beitragsthema František Stellners waren Russland und Mitteleuropa im Jahre 1848. Der Referent analysierte die Ursachen für den negativen Ruf Russlands im Jahre 1848 und die wichtigsten Grundsätze der russischen Außenpolitik in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Er brachte außerdem das Charakterprofil des Zaren Nikolaus I. näher und anschließend beschrieb er die Beziehungen der tschechischen politischen Elite und der Öffentlichkeit zu Russland. Den zweiten Block, der die Bezeichnung Österreich und die Tschechoslowakei trug, moderierte John R. Davis. Georg Christoph Berger Waldenegg leitete den Block mit einem Referat über verschiedene Interpretierungspositionen zur Frage der Auflösung der Donaumonarchie im 1918 ein. Er nannte dabei eine Reihe von relevanten und zugleich diametral unterschiedlichen Einstellungen. Andrea Komlosy (Universität Wien), eine prominente österreichische Expertin am Felde der Geschichte der Habsburger Monarchie und deren Nachfolgestaaten versuchte in ihrem Beitrag, die Identifizierung der Meilensteine im Kontext der wirtschaftlichen und internationalpolitischen Ereignissen zu erläutern. Den

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letzten Blockbeitrag hatte Thomas Wünsch (Universität Passau), der sich mit dem Vergleich von den Werken, der Hussitenbetrachtung und der Philosophie der Geschichte zwischen František Palacký, Tomáš G. Masaryk a Josef Pekař befasste. Der zweite Tag der Konferenz wurde völlig dem zwanzigsten Jahrhundert gewidmet. Den ersten Block mit dem Namen Tschechoslowakei und Slowakei leitete Thomas Wünsch. Der Fortgang der Transformation der tschechoslowakischen Infrastruktur in den Jahren 1918 und 1938 war das Beitragsthema von Ivan Jakubec (Karlsuniversität Prag / Wirtschaftsuniversität Prag). Der Referent deutete auf ihre wirtschafspolitischen und verkehrstechnischen Aspekte hin, wobei er von seinem langjährlichen Studium unveröffentlichter Quellen der vornehmlich tschechoslowakischen und deutschen Provenienz ausging. Er hob den Fakt hervor, dass die Verkehrsproblematik und eine funktionierende Infrastruktur zu den wichtigsten, vielleicht sogar Existenzfragen der tschechoslowakischen Entwicklung zwischen 1918 und 1938 gehörten. Der Versuch, eine neue Interpretierung der britischen Einstellung zur Septemberkrise im Jahre 1938 präsentierten in einem gemeinsamen Vortrag Martin Kovář und Jaromír Soukup (Karlsuniversität Prag / Wirtschaftsuniversität Prag). In der Einleitung würdigten sie den großen Beitrag der Studien zum Thema Münchner Abkommen eines der größten tschechischen Historiker der letzten Jahrzehnten, Robert Kvaček. Dann analysierten sie die Politik Großbritanniens im Herbst 1938 und gelangten zur Schlussfolgerung, dass es beim besten Willen nicht mehr möglich gewesen wäre, im Jahre 1938 das totalitäre Deutschland beim Vormarsch in den mitteleuropäischen Raum aufzuhalten. Der vierte Teil der Konferenz behandelte die Tschechoslowakei in den Jahren 1938–1968 und wurde von Andrea Komlosy geleitet. Der Beitrag von Jan Oliva (Université Michel de Montaigne Bordeaux) widmete sich der Frage des Projekts für die erste tschechoslowakische Autobahn vom Jahre 1938. Das Projekt sollte zu einer besseren Verteidigungsfähigkeit dienen und die wirtschaftlich schwachen Regionen mit den Industrie- und Geschäftszentren zu verbinden. Außerdem sollte sie zugleich die gemeinsame Nationalkraft des tschechischen und slowakischen Volkes präsentieren. Aleš Skřivan jr. (Wirtschaftsuniversität Prag) verarbeitete die Entwicklung der tschechoslowakischen Wirtschaft und des Marktes nach dem Jahre 1948. Er stellte die wichtigsten Aus- und Einfuhrpartners vor und machte auf die Folgen der Änderungen in der Industriestruktur aufmerksam. Er wies sowohl auf die Konkurrenzunfähigkeit und verfehlte Wirtschaftpolitik des RGWs, als auch auf die schlechte Lage der Tschechoslowakei im Rahmen der Geschäftsbeziehungen zwischen den Ostblockstaaten. Radek Soběhart (Wirtschaftsuniversität Prag) widmete sich dem Prager Besuch des westdeutschen Studentenführer Rudy Dutschke im April 1968. Er identifizierte die Unterschiede und Ähnlichkeiten in der Sprache, in den Gedankenquellen und Zielen der westdeutschen und tschechoslowakischen Studentenbewegung. Dabei versuchte er, die Frage, ob es trotz des Daseins einer bipolaren Welt im Jahre 1968 eine Studentenbewegung mit einem Übernationaleinfluss gegeben hatte, zu beantworten. Der letzte Block über die sechziger Jahre, von Georg Christoph Berger Waldenegg moderiert, wurde mit einem Referat von Hannes Lachmann (Universität Passau) eingeleitet. Er machte einen hervorragenden Vergleich der tschechoslowakischen und ungarischen Wirtschaftsreformen im Verlauf der sechziger Jahre. Er deutete darauf hin, dass die

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Reformen eine feste Position der regierenden Elite gewährleisten sollten und die volle Auflösung der Zentralplanung nicht ihr Ziel war. Man konzentrierte sich darauf, die Wirtschaft mit Hilfe von Dezentralisierung zu unterstützen. Obgleich die Reformen nach 1968 fast völlig aufgehalten worden waren, blieben einige von deren Aspekten in einer Form eines sog. Gesellschaftsvertrag zwischen der Kommunistischen Partei und der Bürger enthalten. Pavel Szobi (Wirtschaftsuniversität Prag) analysierte in seinem Beitrag die strukturellen Mängel der ostdeutschen Wirtschaft und den erfolglosen Versuch, das Tempo des Wirtschaftswachstums zu beschleunigen. Den Hauptfehler des sog. Neuen Ökonomischen Systems sah er in der falschen Vermutung ostdeutscher Wirtschaftsplaner, konkurrenzfähige Produkte mit Hilfe sowjetischer Rohstoffe dem Weltmarkt bieten zu können. Der Autor bezeichnete das Jahr 1968 als einen ideologischen Meilenstein für die DDR-Staatlichkeit; in jenem Jahr wurde eine neue sozialistische Verfassung mit der Bestätigung der Orientierung auf den Ostblock gültig. Nach dem letzen Beitrag von Petr Chalupecký, Klára Fabianková und Zdenka Jeřábková (Wirtschaftsuniversität Prag) folgte die Abschlussdiskussion. Die Konferenzreferate weckten ein großes Interesse unter dem Publikum, was mit einer fruchtbaren Diskussionen am Ende aller Blöcke bestätigt wurde. Deswegen war die Bekanntgabe der Veranstalter, dass eine Publikation der Referate in einem Sammelband vorbereitet und im nächsten Jahr herausgegeben wird, sehr erfreulich. Während des Symposiums erklang eine Reihe inspirativer Thesen zu den wichtigsten Problemen der Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts. Der Hauptbeitrag des Treffens lag in der Zusammenarbeit und dem Meinungsaustausch tschechischer Historiker mit den Kollegen aus verschiedenen europäischen Forschungsinstituten. Die Organisation der Konferenz war auf einem beachtlichen Niveau und die Räumlichkeiten der Tschechischen Nationalbank unterstrichen die eindeutig positive Bewertung. Petra M i k u š o v á

Authors/Autoren Ivo Budil (The University of West Bohemia, Pilsen) Gabriele Clemens (University Hamburg) Václav Drška (Charles University, Prague) Jaroslav Fiala (Charles University, Prague) Radek Fukala (University Hradec Kálové) Arno Herzig (University Hamburg) Václav Horčička (Charles University, Prague) Beata Katrebova-Blehova (University of Vienna) Jan Kočvar (Charles University, Prague) Roman Kodet (Charles University, Prague) Martin Kovář (Charles University, Prague) Leon Koźminski (Academy of Management, Warsaw) Marcin Kula (Warsaw University) Igor Lukes (Boston University) Martin Nejedlý (Charles University, Prague) Filip Nerad (Charles University, Prague) Lukáš Novotný (Charles University, Prague) Dana Picková (Charles University, Prague) Rupert Quaderer (Liechtenstein-Institut, Bendern) Jakub Rákosník (Charles University, Prague) Peter Skokan (Charles University, Prague) Aleš Skřivan, Jr. (University of Economics, Prague) Aleš Skřivan, Sr. (Charles University, Prague) Radek Soběhart (Charles University, Prague/University of Economics, Prague) František Stellner, (Charles University, Prague/University of Economics, Prague) Drahomír Suchánek (Charles University, Prague) Arnold Suppan (University of Vienna) Miroslav Šedivý (Charles University, Prague) Jan Štemberk (Foreign Trade High School, Prague) Andrej Tóth (Masaryk University, Brno) Stanislav Tumis (Charles University, Prague) Michal Wanner (National Archives, Prague) Jan Županič (Charles University, Prague)